The Rise of Indonesian Communism

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

RUTH

T.

MCVEY .

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

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1he Rise of Indonesian Communism by Ruth T. McVey

First Equinox Editio n 2006

Copyright © 1965 by Cornell University; renewed 1993 lhis is a reprint editio n authorized by the originaJ publisher, Cornell U niversity Press.

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McVey, Ruth Thomas. The rise: ofIndonesian communism I Ruth T. McVey. 1st Equinox cd. Jakana : Equinox Pub., 2006. xviii, 510 p. j 23 em. ISBN : 9793780363 Includes bibliographical references (p. 359-491) and index. i . Panai Komunis Indonesia--History. 2. Communism- indonesia.

2007306456

All righTS reserved. No part of this p'ublication may be repnxluced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmiued in my form or by my mearu, deamnic, mechanical , photocopying, recording or otherwise: withom the prior permission of Equinox Publishing.

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Contents P<elace Introduction

I Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies II Birth of the Revolutionary Movement III Becoming a Communist Party IV V

vii xi

1 7 34

joining the Comintem

48

The Bloc Within

76

VI Elective AfHnities

105

VII Semaun's Program

125

VIII

The Bloc Above

IX International Relations

X Deviation XI Making a Revolution XII The Rebellions XIII Turning Points

155 198 'lSI

290 323

347

Notes

359

Index

493

Preface THE formative years of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) are of interest both for scholars concerned with modem Indonesia and for students of international Communism. One of the first political groupings in Indonesia, the PKl reflected in its early period many characteristics of a movement bridging the gap from traditional to

modem concepts of political organization and goals. As such, it exhibited openly many traits that today aTC muted but nonetheless strong in Indonesian politics, and a study of the nature of its early appeal contributes greatly to our ability to appreciate its position as the most popular Indonesian political party today. At the same time, the early PKl contributed by both its actions and its ideas to the evolving Indonesian independence movement, and neither the growth of that movement nor the colonial government's response to it can be fully comprehended without an understanding of the Communists' role. The importance of the PKI in the international Communist movement stems chiefly from the fact that it was one of the very ,few Asian Communist parties to develop something of a mass following in the early years of the Comintern. It therefore proVides a point of comparison for the evolution of Comintem policy in China, the chief arena of the Third International's activity in underdeveloped Asia. This is particularly relevant in that the bloc-within strategy, the culmination of the Comintem's China policy in the period 1920-1927, was first evolved in Indonesia, and this prior Indonesian experience was then consciously applied in China; in Indonesia, however, as the author of the present book demonstrates, application of this strategy had a very different outcome. Most studies of Communist parties tend to concentrate either on their role on the indigenous stage or on their participation in international Communist affairs. However, to prOvide a balanced view of the Piers development, Miss McVey has given her attention vii

Pre/ace to both aspects of its early existence, and in doing so she has demonstrated the interplay of domestic and international factors in detennining the party's growth. She is unusually well equipped to consider Indonesian Communism in both lights, having received her academic training first in Harvard University's Soviet Area Program, where her work was primarily concerned with the development of Comintern colonial policy. and then in the. Deparbnent of Government and the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University, where her doctoral work centered on Indonesian government and politics. Miss McVey has been studying Indonesian Communism since 1953. and in her present pos.ition as Research Associate in the Cornell Modem Indonesia Project is carrying this research forward. The present volume, conceived as the 6rst part of a general history of the PKI. is the product of research in 6ve countries and as many languages. It draws not only upon extensive interviews but also upon a mass of material hitherto largely unexplored. On the basis of these data, Miss McVey provides a solid documentation of events and presents an account and analysis of the party's internal workings that goes beyond, I believe, any other study of Communism in Asia. GEORGE

Ithaca July 9, 1965

viii

MeT.

KAlUN

Introduction THE Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has attracted considerable attention in recent years because it is the largest such organization outside the Sino-Soviet bloc and the most powerful poUtical party in its country. This notoriety is of recent vintage, but the PICI itself is not: it can claim to be the oldest major Indonesian party and the first Communist movement to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the fanner Russian Empire. It began as a Marxist socialist organization, founded in the Netherlands Indies a few months before the outbreak of World War I. By the time of the Soviet seizure of power in Russia it had been divested of its non-Bolshevik elements, and early in 1920 it officially took the title Communist. This volumethe first in what is planned as a general history of the Indonesian Communist movement-concems the PKI's development from its birth in 1914 to its temporary eclipse in 1927 after a disastrous revolutionary attempt. This period has not preViously been investigated by historians of international Communism. The double language barrier of Indonesian and Dutch has combined with the PKl's peripheral position as an object of Comintem interest to preserve its obscurity. The principal studies dealing with the development of Indonesian Communism during the colonial period were sponsored directly or indirectly by the Netherlands Indies government in the wake of the 1926-1927 rebellion and are limited in both their objectives and their point of view. Indeed, Indonesian political development in the colonial part of the twentieth century is, as a whole. still relatively unexplored territory; in the past decade several important scholarly investigations have appeared that add conSiderably to our understanding of the period. but much more needs to be done before our grasp of it can be considered in any way satisfactory. As an active participant both in the Comintem's Asian activities xi

1I1troducti0l1

and in the evolving Indonesian independence movement, the early PKl contributed to two historical streams. Its major importance as part of the world Communist movement is that it was the only Communist party other than the Chinese · in the "colonial and semi· colonial" Far East that both possessed legality and played a Significant role in the political life of its country; and it was the only one to do so in a European-governed possession. The PKI's relations with the Communist International were therefore rather different from those of its illegal or politically impotent counterparts elsewhere in the colonial world. They were more intimate, in that the PKI was able to maintain active and meaningful relations with the Comintern, and also more stramed, in that, as a movement that had achieved political significance by its own efforts, the Indonesian party had its own vested interests and its own concepts of the proper path to power. Physical distance added to the complexity of the relationship, for, having no direct access to the Indies and no means of imposing its opinion on the party, the Comintem was forced to deal with the PKI through the Dutch Communists and the highly opinionated Indonesian party representatives abroad. Under these circumstances the lines of communication knotted into a political entanglement, the snarled skeins of which were spun of national, factional, and personal differences within the Communist Jeaderships concerned . The most extreme development of the program of alliance with revolutionary nationalism, which the Comintern followed from 1920 to 1927, was the so-called bloc within, whereby a Communist party's members entered a nationalist mass movement and worked to caphrre it from inside. The strategy was followed in two countries, Indonesia and China. The result in China has been widely discussed by both Communist and non·Communist historians, for this was the program that culminated disastrously in the defeat of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. The Indonesian bloc within has never really been considered as an aspect of international Communist policy, but it was in Indonesia that the strategy first developed and it was 6tted to political conditions there and not in China. The course of the Indonesian bloc within-unfolding in this case without effective interference by the Comintem-offers parallels and contrasts to the Chinese experience that may be useful in evaluating that still wannly debated episode in the history of Communist strategy. Though the PKI was never a large party in the colonial period. its xii

Introdu ct ion place in the Indonesian politics of its day was out of aU proportion to its numerical size. In 1924 the party itself had barely one thousand members, but at the same time it had by common concession the greatest popular following of all the Indonesian political groupings. Its relations with the other elements in the Indonesian opposition were of long-standing if scarcely harmonious intimacy; the nature of these connections and the attitudes of the non-Communist leaders toward the PKI as an ally, rival, and source of ideas are of interest because they reflected the organizational and ideological leanings of the Indonesian political elite-leanings which, in several important respects, are similar to those of the country's leadership in the period since independence. The PKI's relations were not con6ned to the elite, however; much the same as the party today, it had no special appeal for the well-educated but drew its cadres from the ranks of those who found themselves SOCially, economically, and psychologically on the border between Indonesia's traditional and modern worlds. Though its core was urban, lower-class, and ethnically. Javanese, it extended its appeal to Outer Islanders, merchants, thc religiously orthodox, members of the lesser aristocracy, and wealthier peasants, in addition to and in some places even in exclusion of the morc familiar sources of Communist support. Frankly playing upon popular messianic traditions, it thus gathered a heterogeneous follOwing whose only common characteristic was bitter discontent at the colonial status quo. In accomplishing this, the party sowed the seeds of its own destruction, demonstrating the danger of relying too much on the anarchist element which is a part of Communism's appeal: the price of the PKI's popularity was the promise of revolution, and in the end it found itself leading a rebellion its leaders knew could not succeed. The PKI's early career spanned a fateful period in the development of Dutch colonial policy, for the outcome of which the party itself was in good measure responsible. At the beginning of the century the Ethical Policy, which stressed the promotion of Indonesian social, economic, and political progress, became the guiding philosophy of Indies government. The last aim was always the policy's weakest, and with the rise of an Indonesian political opposition it was increasingly questioned by Ethicism's numerous foes. The bistory of the era in which Indonesian Communism 6rst developed is one of bittet conflict between those who were convinced that only a xiii

Introduction sympathetic approach to Indonesian political movements would eusure the healthy development of the colony and those who feared political freedom was a Pandora's box, the opening of which would result in revolution. It was a lOSing battle for the Ethici; scholars disagree on just when the tide turned against them. but the final blow their cause received is clear: it was the Communist rebelUon of 1926-1927, which ended DutCh eHorts to compromise with the Indonesian opposition and so left the Indonesian parties no real middle road between revolution and disengagement from the problem of achieving independence. There is reason enough, then, to undertake a study of the early PICl The problem, however, is how to go about it. Anyone attempting to deal with the history of a Communist movement outside the USSR must decide whether to consider the party primarily as a component of a world movement or to view it as a part of the domestic political scene. In some cases the nature of the available materials or the course of the party's history makes the choice a fairly simple one; in the case of the early PICI, however, the problem is vexing. Both its international and its domestic connections were important to the party's development; at the same time, the history of the PKl prOvides useful material for understanding both the Indonesian independence movement and the colonial policy of the Comintem. My initial intention, having come to the PKI by way of an interest in the history of Communism, was to focus chiefly on the party's character as a component of the Comintern and to deal with the domestic scene only as a background for its relations with the Third International. I found, however, that the closeness of the party's ties to its local environment, when combined with the fact that these surroundin.gs have not yet been adequately studied, forced me either to gloss over problems that were of cardinal importance for the party's attitude toward the world movement aT to devote as much attention to its domestic as to its international setting. The result is a work that views the party in both environments and is directed at students of Indonesian as well as Communist history. This has meant that I have included some information which, though doubtless familiar to one group of readers, is needed by the other and that I have discussed some problems that are germane to one set of interests but not to both. I have tried to weave my account closely enough so that this does not irritate the reader; so far as I have not succeMed in xi"

Introduction this, I hope the advantage of having both sides of the Communist coin presented in one work will outweigh the stylistic drawbacks. The paucity of studies concerning the period in which the PKI arose made limitation of the subject difficult, but it provided a clear choice in another matter. Although treabnents based on conceptual frameworks are often more stimulating than chronological accounts, it seemed to me that at this stage the latter approach would he more useful, as it would provide an easily accessible record of events, The fact that the work is devoted to analysis and suggestion as much as to annals Jed me to the same conclusion. Communism, nationalism, and colonialism are subjects on which few people agree, and I felt the reader would accordingly be best served by an account that provided enough detail , arranged in a chronological-and thus un· directed-framework, to enable him to interp~et the events for him· self. Sinee I am dealing with the PKI on several levels, I have not always been able to adhere to a presentation through time-I have deviated from it most notably in describing the party's communica· tions with the Comintern and in discussing its organization and social sources of support-but this has remained the basic structure of the study. Similar reasons prompted me to document my account closely. There are a number of points at which my version of events differs from that given in other histories, and heavy documentation is necessary if this is not to become just one more divergent source from which the bewildered reader must choose, Furthermore, although a comparatively rich amount of primary sources and contemporary accounts of the early PKI exist, not all the story could be pieced together from these, and it seemed to me important that the reader be able to check how close a source was to the event it described. Finally, the fact that an account is 6rsthand by no means guarantees its accuracy. A high degree of personal and partisan feeling colored the writings and statements of participants in the events described here; even government intelligence reports classified for internal use and dealing with matters observed firsthand were often heavily slanted by their compiler's prejudice against or in favor of Indonesian political activity. Neither the Indies Dutch nor the IndoneSian-language press was noted for checking stories before p'rinting them; the major Indonesian papers, for that matter, functioned more as journals of debate than of record and were not overly concerned with recounting xo

Introduction events. In consequence. widely differing presentations of facts-let alone motives-appear in contemporary sources on the events in which the PKI was involved. Doe way to judge wbether an event did or did not take place as described in a firsthand account is to trace the survival of the account in subsequent writings-particularly those of the side injured by that version. 1 have supplied later references in addition to contemporary ones wherever it was possible to do so, in the many cases where the 6rsthand sources might be considered skewed by bias. In an important sense, the sbarp disagreement of contemporary sources on the early PKI is all to the good. It has not been necessary for me to rely to any great extent on the analytical techniques of what .has become popularly known as Kremlinology: no lacquer of monolithic unity hid the splinters of debate in the early phase of the Indonesian party. Not only was intraparty disagreement on major issues aired publicly, but the Indies Communist press was decentralized, with regional journals reflecting the thinking and the popular approach of the provincial party leaders . who ran them. Moreover, until about 1924 the PKI was closely tied to the other components of the Indonesian national movement; it was not a closed group, and its various non-Communist observers were relatively well aware of what was going on within it. They themselves might be highly prejudiced in their views, but there was no finn division into pro- and anti-Communist in Indonesian politics of the period; consequently, we find contemporary outside accounts of the party's activities re8ecting a wide range of approaches to the subject and a correspondingly rich store of analysis. Differences in attitude toward the emergence of Indonesian nationalism Similarly lent variety to the interpretations appearing in government reports. Moreover, certain Dutch officials and scholars associated with the Indies government added to their private libraries the classified documents, intelligence and police reports, and accounts by local administrators to which they were given access. Thus materials dealing with a broad spcctrum of the party's activities, which might otherwise have been lost or hidden away in archives, were available to me; and I am grateful to the Indonesian government for granting me permission to use them. The existence of such materials, along with those of government-sponsored SOCiolOgical investigations into the two major areas of· rebellion, a few important bits of party =i

Introdu ction correspondence, advice and criticisms-some very outspoken-by the PKI's advisers abroad, and the oral accounts of surviving party leaders of the period made it possible to consider the PKl on many levels and from many angles. The result is that, in spite of the span of years that separates the early PKI from a present-day observer, the nature of the party in its first stage of development is in some ways more visible than its present personality. I hope that this volume contributes to revealing that character and, in consequence, aids in our understanding a formative period in the development both of Indonesian politics and of Asian Communism. Since the research for this study took place over a number ot years, a great many individuals and institutions contributed to its realization. I am particularly indebted to George MeT. Karun, of Cornell University, without whose encouragement and painstaking guidance the work would never have reached completion. I should further like to express my thanks to Mario Einaudi and Knight Biggerstaff, also of Cornell, who advised my study of Marxist ideology and Asian revolutionary history, and to Merle Fainsod, of Harvard, who guidcd mc to the study of Comintern colonial strategy. In the Netherlands, Professors W. F. Wertheim and G. F. Pijper were generous with their time and advice; B. Costcr made available to mc the sUlviving set of Het Vriie Woora, which he once edited, and A. van Marie and James S Holmes made the vital contribution of first suggesting that I study the Indonesian Communist movement. In Indonesia I should particularly like to thank Semaun, Darsono, thc latc Alimin, and Djamaluddin Tamin-all of whom were extremely patient and frank in answering my endless questions about the movement they once ledas well as Mansur Bogok, who was most helpful in introducing me to these and later leaders of Indonesia's revolutionary left. Finally, I wish to express my very great gratitude to those who were with me as graduate students in the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University; their companionship. made study a pleasure, and their ideas and criticisms did much to diScipline my work and broaden its approach. The major part of my research was done in the follOWing libraries, the staffs of which were most helpful to me: in the United States, the university libraries at Cornell and Harvard, New York Public Library, and Hoover Memorial Library at Stanford; in the Netherlands, the libraries of the Royal Tropical Institute, the International xvii

Introduction Institute for Social History, the Royal Library, the Documentation Bureau for Overseas Law, the Ministry for Overseas Territories, and the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography, and Ethnography; in England, the British Library for Political and Social Sciences and the library of the Royal Institute for International Affairs; in the USSR, the Lenin Library in Moscow and the libraries of the Institute of Asian Peoples in Moscow and Leningrad; and in Indonesia, the library of the Museum at Djakarta. My study in them was made possible by Cornell University, its Southeast Asia Program, and tbe Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, which supported various phases of my research at Cornell and in the Netherlands as well as my visits to England and the USSR; by the Ford Foundation, which granted me fellowships for work in the Netherlands, Indonesia, and the United States; by the Russian Research Center, a fel10wship from which supported my work at Harvard; and by the Fels Foundation, which made possible the writing of the study. Needless to say, none of them is in any way responsihle for the views presented in the book. Most introductions end in a fiuny of technicalities, and this one is no exception: I shall close with a note on spelling. Both the Indonesian and the Dutch orthographies were revised after the period dealt with in this volume. The names of people and organizations existing both then and now are thus spelled differently at different times. Recent works in Indonesian and Dutch referring to the earlier period generally use the new rather than the original spelling of names. Because the present spelling is more akin to actual pronunciation, I have chosen to use it except in the titles of publications. The only Significant change in Indonesian spelling is the substitution of u for the Dutch· derived oe. In Dutch, the major changes have been the dropping of doubled vowels and the ch in sch wherever their presence did not affect pronunciation.

Rum T. McVEY Ithaca

June, 1965

xviii

I

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies ONE of the major tasks assigned the Comintem by its founders was to create a role for Communism in that act of the Asian revolutionary drama which was played out between the two world wars. In part, this concern for revolution in the East was a product of Russian proximity to the major Asian countries and the Soviet Union's consequent desire to influence events in those lands. The International's interest did not stop with Russia's neighbors, however, for its efforts in Asia were only one part of an attempt to make a place for Communism in underdeveloped areas all over the world: The East-this is not only the oppressed Asian world. The East is the whole colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples not only of Asia, but also of Africa and South America: in a word, all that world on whose exploitation rests the might of capitaJ.ist society in Europe and the United States. l

This belief that the colonies played a vital role in shoring up the capitalist system was not part of the original Marxian system: the tradition in which the European revolutionary socialists were raised not only tended to ignore the colonial problem in general but also went so far as to deny that the Communists had a part to play in the backward areas of the world. The destruction of capitalism through socialist revolution absorbed the attention of the movement's founders; and this. they held. could only take place in highly indusbialized Western Europe, where a massive proletarian class groaned under the rule of the bourgeoisie. 2 Other societies would be consumed in the spreading holocaust, but their populations would provide neither the spark nor the fuel for it. The colonial question was thus peripheral in Marxian thought, and it was not until some years after his death that Marx's followers began to

1

Rise of Indonesinn Communism reinterpret his · system to allot the East a more important role. The cause of this reappraisal was the unprecedented prosperity the capitalist nations enjoyed at the turn of the century. Marx had pictured Europe's future as one of deepening economic crises and mounting proletarian misery. The capitalist states. however. became ~ore prosperous than ever, and-even more surprising to the revolutionaries.the economic and social position of the working class distinctly improved. Marx was thus apparently wrong, and his system had to be either abandoned or l'einterpreted to explain the new development. In response to this ideological crisis, the main body of continental socialists abandoned the belief that socialism could be gained only through revolution. The progress made thus far by organized labor showed. they held, that the proletariat could gain sufficient strength by parliamentary means to force the capitalists to accede to its demands and, eventually. to take over the government itself. This revision of Marx's theory had tremendous implications for the socialists' attitude on international questions: for if the proletariat did have a chance to participate in and eventually control the affairs of its country, it then followed that the working class had a stake in the nation's welfare and that Marx's dictum that the proletariat had no fatherland was no longer valid. The consequences of this position were vividly illustrated in 1914, when the socialist parties of the great powers decided to back their governments in war; but the implications had also been evident some years before in the debate on the colonial question at a congress of the Second (Socialist) International held in Stuttgart in 1901. At that meeting, the majority of the delegates from the major powers supported a proposal to abandon the International's previous policy of condemning colonialism outright. They reasoned that possession of colonies was not an evil in itself, for the exploitation of underdeveloped areas brought prosperity to European workers and economic and political development to the colonies.s What should therefore be cOmbated, the reformists he1d, was the misuse of colonial power and not the possession of colonies per se. 4 This left the colonial question, so far as the Revisionists were concerned, where it had been for Marx---on the periphery of socialist interest. They tended to sec the problem as one on which their stand had to be dctennined on general humanitarian grounds rather than by the 2

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies immediate interests and desires of the European working class, Indeed, to support colonial independence frequently meant to oppose those interests and desires, for such a stance offended nationalist feelings and alarmed those who thought that the loss of the colonies would bring poverty and unemployment to the metropolitan workers, When we consider that the Revisionist leaders staked their hopes on parliamentary success-and thus' on securing widespread popular support-we can readily understand why they generally allowed the colonial question to rest as a side issue in their party platforms and why they placed far more emphaSiS on reform in the colonial governments than on speedy independence for the colonies, The Revisionist proposal was defeated at the 1907 congress by a combination of socialist delegates from the lesser noncolonial powers and representatives of the second major stream of Marxist thought, the Left or Orthodox: socialists. This was the ideological faction to which Lenin belonged and which, after much splitting, was to fonn the core of the Third (Communist) International. The radical group generally held that the reason why Marx's prophecy of capitalist crisis had not been fulfilled was that the capitalist system in the industrially developed Western countries had renewed its lease on life by expanding into less developed parts of the world: in other words, by imperialism. A number of theories on the imperialist phenomenon were developed by the radical Marxists, but the most important for our purposes is that set forth by Lenin. The Russian revolutionary asserted that capitalism, because of its anarchic, competitive nature, necessarily results in overproduction of goods and capital. The capitalist nations are forced to take up an imperialist policy in an effort to find new areas for capital inveshnent; and to ensure that a sufficient area will be available to them, the capitalist powers reserve underdeveloped areas by placing them under colonial rule. The state is thus used by capitalist interests to further their expansionist policies, and in this process nationalism, hitherto a progressive force, is twisted into an imperialist weapon. During the imperialist period, the upper levels of the working class in the metropoles may enjoy some small share of the colonial proSts; in return for this, they tend to identify with their "national interests" rather than with the interests of the proletariat as a whole. When, however, the division of the world among the great imperial powers has been completed, there will be increasingly savage wars among the

3

Rise of Indonesian Communism master nations for control of .subject areas; these conllicts will force such great sacri6ces upon the workers that they will eventually revolt and bring down the capitalist system. As I have stated, this theory was developed in response to the situation in Western Europe rather than in Asia. In explaining capitalist prosperity, however, it succeeded in bringing the colonia~ question from the outskirts of Marxist thought to its very center: for if in its imperialist stage capitalism depends for its existence on dominating underdeveloped regions, it follows that removing those areas from metropolitan control would mortally injure the capitalist system. During the existence of the Comintem, the Communists never came to the extreme conclusion that could be drawn from Lenin's theory-that is, that the colonial areas, as the "soft underbelly of capitalism," were . actually a more important arena of revolution than was industrial Europe. The docbine did, however, keep the Comintem from viewing the colonial issue simply as a side line to the revolutionary campaign in Europe. Although the requirements of Russian foreign policy would, of themselves, have forced a considerable Communist interest in the awakening of Asia. we may doubt whether this concern would have expressed itself as consistently and uncompromisingly as it did in ~e Srst two decades after the October Revolution, had it not been for thiS ideolOgical incentive. Lenin did not publish his full theoretical analysis of imperialism until 1917, but the divergence between the right and left socialist views on the subject had been clearly apparent since the tum of the century and, as we have seen, led to a major dispute at the 1907 Stuttgart congress. G The debate in that assembly was dominated by Karl Kautsky, advocating retention of socialist anticolonial views on behalf of the Orthodox left, and the Dutch representative, H . van Kol, who urged adoption of a resolution which had been proposed by the Revisionistdominated colonial commission of the congress and which prOvided as follows: The congress affirms that the usefulness of colonial policy in general, and especially for the working class, is strongly exaggerated. However, it does not reject every colonial policy on principle and for all time, since under a

socialist regime it could have a civilizing effect.' Van Kol was the principal colonial expert of the Netherlands Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP ); he prided himself on the practi-

4

Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies cal view of affairs that ten years' experience in the Dutch parliament had given him, and he let Kautsky know plainly that his advocacy of economic and technical assistance instead of socialist colonialism was sheer folly: Today we have heard once again the old wives' tale of colonial oppression, which has become boring enough for a congress of socialists. , ' . We in Holland have the right and the duty to impart our experiences to the comrades of the other countries, We Dutch socialists have won for ourselves the confidence of mi1lions of Javanese.• • . If we Europeans go [to underdeveloped areas} armed only with tools and machinery, we would be the helpless victims of the natives. Therefore we must come with weapons in our hands, even if Kautsky calls this imperialism.'

"'We have achieved signi6cant advantages for our Dutch colonies through our socialist action in Parliament," Van Kol declared, and he assured the other socialists that they would not be thanked for a persistently negative attitude toward colonialism: "If you wish to achieve for yourselves the confidence of the natives, you too must take an active part in colonial affairs," As for Kautsky's proposals of disinterested economic assistance-"Bookleamingt And he wants to civilize a country that wayl"-the portly Hollander conjectured that "the natives might destroy our machines: they might kill or even eat us, in which case (stroking his stomach) I fear I would be given preference over Kautsky," 8 When the congress finally formulated a resolution that satisfied both Orthodox and Revisionist views, the Dutch delegation was the only one to object, abstaining from the 6nal vote on the grounds that the compromise did not sufficiently acknowledge the positive aspects of colonialism.8 Van KoI's attitude reRected the main stream of thought in the Dutch socialist party. which was one of the most conservative members of the Second International. To the SDAP leaders, civilization was equivalent to Westernization, and socialism could be accomplished only by fully developed capitalist societies: 'lhe leap from barbarism to socialism is impossible." l() The advanced countries must therefore visit civilization on the less fortunate areas. whether they liked it or not; and they must encourage indigenous private enterprise in the colOnies, for only with the development of nativeowned heavy industry could the civilizing process be considered accomplished and the transfer to independence and socialism be contemplated,ll

5

Rise of Indonesian Communism In later years, the SDAP gradually modified its views on the benefits of colonialism and the economic prerequisites for independence. but nonetheless it maintained a very moderate attitude. within the main stream of liberal nonsocialist Dutch thought on colonial affairs. The party's interest in the whole subject was peripheral. for as a primarily Revisionist group, basing its hopes on labor union organization and electoral success, it concentrated its efforts and interests almost completely on the immediate concerns of the Dutch working clasS. 12 This was above all hue before World War I. when Van Kol was virtually the only socialist leader to take a real interest in the colonial question. Yet it was in this period, and from this conservative movement, that the seeds of revolutionary Leninist Marxism were planted in Indonesia.

6

II

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement IN 1913 a Dutch-owncd sugar company in Java was moved by the untoward course of recent events in that island to publish the following notice in several Indies newspapers under the candid title of "'rer. riSed"; Required, with an eye to the rising unrest among the native populace in Java. a capable NetherLmds-Indies military officer, willing to advise the management of several large enterprises concerning the preparation of their installations against attack 1

The advertisement reSected all too well the state of nerves then prevailing among. many Indies Netherlanders, who were convinced that the specter of revolution was stalking Java. Echoes of their alarm spread to Europe, where the exiled Lenin was cheered by this new threat to imperialist rule: It is being carried forward, first. by the popular masses of Java, among whom there bas risen an Islamic nationalist movement. Second. by an intelligentsia brought into being by the development of capitalism. It consists of Europeans acclimatized in the colony who demand independence for the Dutch Indies. Thlrd, by the fairly large Chinese population in Java and the other islands, which brought over the revolutionary movement in China• • ••

The amazing speed with which the parties and unions are being founded is one of the typical developments of the prerevolutionary period . . . . The workers of the advanced counbies follow with interest and inspiration this powerful growth of the liberation movement, in all its various forms, in every part of the world. 2

The cause of this disturbance was the emergence of the first mass political movement in Indonesia, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union ). 7

Rise of Indonesian Communism The SI had been founded at the end of 1911 as the Islamic Commercial Union-Sarckat Dagang Islam-in Surakarta (Solo), capital of one of the two remaining princely territories of Java. Its original purpose was to protect the interests of Javanese batik merchants from increasing competition by Indies Chinese traders; 'however, it swiftly caught the popular imagination and emerged as something far broader than a merchants' protective group. In 1912 the association was reorganized under the leadership of Umat Said Tjokroaminoto and, dropping the conunercial portion of its name, set itself up to promote the social and economic progress of the Indonesian common man. Banished from Solo, it moved its headquarters to Surabaja, the capital of East Java; very rapidly it gained adherents throughout the island, and by 1913, though nebulous in discipline and purpose, it was dearly a force to be seriously reckoned with. S The Sarekat Islam arose at a time of considerable' ferment in Javanese social, economic, and religious life. The island was already begin- . ning to feel the burden of overpopulation: in many areas there was very little unus~ arable land, and peasant holdings were being divided into smaller and smaller portions in order to take care of the growing number of cultivators. Villagers became increasingly dependent on work provided by plantations, on sharecropping arrangements, or on finding work in the towns. This process was accompanied by a gradual impoverishment, which had become sufficiently marked by the turn of the century to bring about a major revision in the Dutch colonial program. The Ethical Policy adopted at this time aimed both at improving the social and economic lot of the Indonesians and at preparing them to associate with Europeans in governing the colony. Its immediate result was a considerable increase in the visible participation of the colonial government in Indonesian affairs. Hitherto the Dutch had relied heavily on indirect rule via the traditional Indonesian social structure; under the Ethical Policy, however, the European administration was greatly expanded, technical services were added. and Western authorities began to playa direct role even at the local level. This development inevitably produced in the population a heightened awareness of the European presence: moreover, it furthered the decline of traditional authority, both indirectly and as the deliberate product of the government's efforts at social administrative modernization. In the same period the European economic role in the Indies was

8

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement expanding rapidly, creating a marked dichotomy between modern and traditional sectors of the economy. This contrast was most evident in East and Central Java, which was both the heartland of Javanese high culture and the area where Western enterprise and government were penetrating most deeply. Plantation agriculture was well established there; it was devoted primarily to the production of sugar. which expanded rapidly after the turn of the century and was Indonesia's principal export crop prior to the Creat Depression. The sugar plantations shared the irrigated lowlands with the rice-cultivating peasantry. The estates owned no land themselves but leased it from the villages surrounding the sugar mills. rotating their portion with every canegrowing season. The traditional and modern economic sectors were thus closely interlocked; the sugar-growing areas. already centers of dense rural population. became increasingly crowded as people from neighboring areas moved. in to seek work on the plantations. while the local peasantry, in chronic need of cash to pay taxes and debts; was inclined to lease out more land than it could part with and still remain selfsufficient.4 • The great burden of population on the land and the dependence of the peasantry on its powerful plantation partner provided ample opportunity for friction and abuse. and the Ethical colonial government introduced a host of new regulations and services aimed at controlling peasant-planter relations and developing the economy of the area. The benefits of its policy were not always apparent to the people, but the burdens were. Improvements in roads and irrigation works meant more taxation in labor for their maintenance, and the general increase in government activity meant greater taxation in perennially scarce cash. The traditional sources of rural leadership seemed incapable of mediating between the villagers and the impinging outside world: they appeared helpless in the face of superior European power, too closely identilled with the colonial government and/or plantations, or simply unable to master the proliferating regulations and requirements imposed on the villagers. As a result, people began to look beyond the traditional authorities for representation and .leadership, and the Sarekat Islam seemed to them a promising alternative. Having begun among the urban commercial class, it spread rapidly to the poorer population of the towns and then began to acquire a consider~ able rural follOWing. The swiftly multiplying outposts of the SI took on the aspect of complaint bureaus, to which a vast and varied number 9

Rise of Indonesian Communism of grievances were presented in the hope of redress; and Tjokroaminoto was acelaimed by many as the Ratu Adil, the Prince of Righteousness promised by tradition to lead the people in their hour of need. . The speed of the 5arekat Islam's expansion and its attraction for the uneducated peasantry in itself caused considerable European concern. It was feared that, by assuming the function of popular spokesman, the 51 would cut through the established channels of authority and drive a dangerous wedge between the administration and the people. The adulation of Tjokroaminoto and the disorganized and sometimes disorerly character of the association seemed potentially explosive factors, and even those who sympathized with the Indonesian popular awakening felt that it would be necessary to check the movement's growth. A less imme.diate but ultimately more alarming prospect was the religiOUS identification of the 51. The Dutch had built their system of indirect rule on the pre-Islamic customary (adat) structure, supporting it where necessary against the claims of Islamic rivals for popular leadership, and in general tended to discount the strength of the MusUrn religion in the archipelago. However, the recently ended A.~eh War had illustrated the folly of neglecting Islam as a foca1 point of leadership, and the emergence of Pan-Islamism as a dynamiC force in Asia, combined with the recent revival of religious energy in Java under the impact of modernist Islamic teachings, made the creation of a religiously based resistance movement seem all too possible. In the absence of the concept of an Indonesian nation-and this idea was generally lacking among the peoples of the archipelago at the time-Islam appeared to be the most likely source of unity against foreign rule; and in their early dealings with the 51 the Dutch showed themselves to be painfully aware of this fact. The 5arekat Islam's followers were united "by their profesSion of faith, but they were not agreed on their interpretation of religion or on the role it should play in the 51's activities. The movement attracted many santri, strict Muslims who wished to see it promote either the modernist religiOUS interpretations that were becoming popular among the urban commercial groups or the older fonns considered orthodox in the countryside; it also included abangan Javanese, whose MusUrn faith was mixed with a considerab1e portion of pre-Islamic beliefs and who opposed the religiOUS purism of the santrJ. It drew some of ~ts backing from lesser pri;aji (gentry) who objected to the rigid conservatism of the Indonesian regents or the princely regime in Surakarta; at

10

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement the same time it acquired support hom traditionalists who opposed the program of Westernization put forth by Budi Utomo, a cautiously progressive movement that had been founded by younger Javanese prifaii in 1908. In short, the SI was extremely heterogeneous in compo~ sition ; it expressed the malaise felt by a society undergoing profound change, and .the very vagueness of its organization and aims allowed it to include those whose dissat~faction took contradictory forms. This varied following made it most difficult for the Sarekat Islam's leaders to channel the movement and for the authorities to evolve a coherent policy toward it. Moreover, it posed the danger that such generalized restlessness, once collected in a single organization, might be turned against foreign rule-the one obvious element that could appear to both modernizers and traditionalists, santri and abangan, Javanese and non-Javanese as the cause of their frustrations.~ To the great majority of Europeans resident in the Indies, the Sarekat Islam presented a disruptive force that the government could not afford to tolerate. The number of Dutch inhabitants of the colony had been increasing rapidly since the end of the nineteenth century; most of the newcomers viewed the archipelago as a temporary abode and had littJe interest in Ethical experiments with native progress, particularly when this seemed to threaten their own security. The officials of the Binnenlands Bestuur, the European civil administration that paralleled and dominated the prifaii-run Indonesian bureaucracy, were overwhelmingly against tolerating the 51. They pointed out that the Ethical Policy was predicated on the assumption that the loosening of traditional ties, the spread of education, and the encouragement of an Indonesian awakening would result in a gradual evolution in' friendly apprenticeship to the Dutch. This, they asserted, was dangerously un~ realistic; instead, the Indonesian people would pass from domination by custom to domination by demagogues. They must therefore be kept as long as possible in the bottle of traditionalism, for once they es~ caped, they would ineVitably do so as a revolutionary force. It was Governor General Idenburg's duty, the conservatives held, to ban the Sarekat Islam as he had the Indische Partij (Indies Party), which had vainly sought recognition from him in 1912. Idenburg, however, saw the SI as something very different from the Indische Partij. That organization had had franldy revolutionary inclinations, whereas the SI showed no disloyalty; moreover, it had been clearly oriented toward the Eurasip,n poputation and thus could not be

11

Rise of Indonesian COmmunism considered to represent Indonesian opinion. The 5arekat Islam, however, appeared to represent a step toward the popular awakening that was a goal of the Ethical Policy: "We must therefore rejoice over it, even if we find this somewhat difficult. We wanted this-at least we said we did-and have encouraged it through our education.'" The movement, he considered, could serve the Useful purpose of opposing arhitrary action by employers, plantations, and government officials; its "complaint bureau" function might prove useful as an escape valve for popular frustrations and as an indicator of local grievances. If the 51 weakened traditional authOrity by bypassing it, this, he held, was because that authority was no longer able to represent and guide the people; such popular movements as the 5arekat Islam might help to replace it.' The Governor General therefore took a sympathetic attitude toward the new movement, but although his stand was supported by the Minister of Colonies and the Dutch parliament it aroused great alarm among most of the Indies Dutch. who felt the government was opening the door to chaos. To them, SI stood for Salah Idenburg-Idenburg's mistake.' Wild rumors of native conspiracy were circulated: a revolt was being organized by the 'SI; 5urakarta royalty was secretly behind the rebellion; the native police were putting pr~sure on plantation workers to join the movement; the Indonesian railway workers were org~ed to cut off conununications when the time came to revolt. For some months a mood close to panic prevailed among the Indies Dutch; nearly all sugar estates took precautionary measures against attack, and some established arsenals.' Idenburg was by no means insensitive to the fears of the Indies Europeans; moreover, he was himself seriously disturbed by the 51's rapid and undisciplined growth. Consequently, when the sugar estate operators sent a deputation to express their concern about the 5arekat Islam, the Governor General was able to assure them that be did not intend to anow the movement to expand unchecked. On June 30, 1913, he informed the SI leaders that he could not recognize the association on a centralized basis, since it had yet to demonstrate organizational and financial responsibility. However, its loca1 groups might continue to exist autonomously, and the central leadership could act as a contact body until such time as it proved itself ready to assume the responnDllities of controJ.IO In the midst of the alarms and eJcursions surrounding the rise of

12

Birth of the Reoolutionary Movement the Sarekat Islam. a young Dutch labor leader, Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, arrived in the Indies. He was a gifted and ardent propagandist, a mystic whose search for salvation had begun with Catholicism and ended with "the Richness, the Beauty, the Luster of the Social Democratic Religion. For social democracy is, rightly understood, more than a political teaching. It brings with it the heavy burden of bearing witness, of sowing the seed of propaganda at all times and in all places." 11 Sneevliet had come to the Indies simply to seek employment, but his sense of a revolutionary vocation made it inevitable that his major activity 'would be the preaching of his politi. cal beliefs. Sneevliet's zeal made him demanding of his colleagues and chronically incapable of compromise, but at the same time he was never so sure of his own interpretation of the sociaUst faith as to be immune from changes of denomination. In this, he followed his own crises of conscience rather than the exigencies of political seU-interest. He replained in the Revisionist SOAP when most of his fellow radical Marxists left it to form the SOP, precursor of the Communist Party of Holland. In 1912, however, he switched to the radical group when the reformists refused to back a dockworkers' strike in Amsterdam. This break with the m'!derates cost him his job, for up to that point Sneevliet had been chairman of the SDAP-controlled railway workers' union (NVSTP). No other employment as a unionist was available, and since private industry showed little inclination to hire such a well-known firebrand, he decided to seek his fortune in the Indies. Before he left Holland, however, Sneevliet experienced another change of heart: disturbed at the SDP's decision to run in the Dutch elections against the Revisionist party-and thus, in his estimation, to split the socialist vote -he left it and rejOined the older group. During most of his stay in Indonesia Sneevliet was thus, in spite of his revolutionary activities, a member of the moderate SDAP and not of the proto-Communist movement. 12 Fortunately for Sneevliet, educated Europeans were in considerable demand at that time in the Indies, and his political background was therefore no bar to employment. He first joined the editorial staff of the Soeraba;lUl$ch Handelsblad, the principal newspaper of East Java and the voice of the powerful Sugar Syndicate. Shortly thereafter a fellow socialist, D. M. G. Koch, left his job as secretary of the Serna· rang Handelsvereniging (Commercial Association) and got Sneevliet 13

Rise of Indonesian Communism appointed his successor. The move to the Central Javanese capital was politically propitious, for Semarang, a rapidly expanding urban center, was the seat of such radical activity as the Indies then possessed. The atmosphere of the town was considerably more liberal than that of the other major Javanese cities, in part because it was a center for European commercial interests that hoped to develop an internal market in Java and thus looked favorably on the Ethical Policy'S goal of raising the Indonesian standard of living. IS It was these interests-import houses, banks, and manufacturing ~stablishments-that were Snee-vliet's employers, and initially their relations with their new secretary were extremely cordial. Sneevliet did an excellent job of promoting capitalism during his working hours, and the Ha..ndelsvereniging made no objection to his extracurricuIar efforts on behalf of socialism. It only asked that be not set about actually organizing a revolution; but this is what Sneevliet proceeded to do. If Semarang was the headquarters of the Indonesian railroad workers' union (VSTP), an organization in which Sneevliet took a natural · interest because of his former association with its Dutch equivalent. The VSTP was one of the oldest Indonesian labor unions, founded some five years previously; it was also progressive for its time, welCOming both sldl.led Dutch and Indonesian members into its ranks.l~ Within a year of his amval in Semarang. Sneevliet had succeeded in moving the union along more radical lines, shifting its concern toward improving the lot of the unskilled and impoverished Indonesian workers.18 Early in 1914 Sneevliet added to his full-time job in the capitalist world the task of editing the VSTP's newspaper, De Volhardmg (Persistence); at the same time he busied himself learning Indonesian and Javanese in order to communicate his beliefs to the local population,u This was not enough, however, to satisfy his desire to spread the socialist faith: real work, he felt, couJd only be accomplished through the organized eHorts of all the socialists already in the Indies. Accordingly. on his initiative a group of sixty social democrats met in Surabaja on May 9, 1914, to found the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal~Democratische Vereniging; ISDV).lI The ISDV was one day to become the Indonesian Communist Party, but its first meeting gave doubtful evidence that it was either Indonesian or Communist. Nearly all those present were Dutch., and the few Eurasians and Indonesians who attended remained in the background.

14

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement Most of the charter members belonged to the SDAP and not to its more radical rival. a Nearly all bad become socialists while in the Netherlands and bad come to Indonesia as fairly recent immigrants. Their reactions to the totally unfamiliar social conditions in the colony diJl'ered sharply: some abandoned Marxism so far as Indonesia was concerned, advocating Ethical gradualism as the only practical approach to so backward a society; others, stung by the grave injustices of the colonial system, insisted on the applicability of revolutionary principles regardless of the country's stage of development. 2o This latter group was the more powerful one, and so, in spite of the adherence of its members to the moderate group in Europe, the main impetus of the ISDV was toward the extreme left This was of considerable importance at its first meeting, for the moderates and radicals split at the very start over the question of the organization's function. The rightists wished to see the association become a center for exchanging ideas among the European socialists in the Indies and a fact-Goding bureau for the socialists in the Dutch parliament. They did not think it would be appropriate for the ISDV to participate in Indonesian political life itself, in the first place because the association members had neither a sufficient Imowledge of Indonesian society nor the necessary command of the local languages to have an influence on native politics. Moreover, they held the evolutionary theory that socialism was meaningful only in countries with a well-developed industrial proletariat; in precapitalist Indonesia, they considered, socialist agitation would be at best useless and would at worst lend support to irresponsible revolutionary elements in the Indonesian political world. 21 Those socialists who shared Sneevliet's viewpoint saw the ISDV's main task as propagating socialist principles in the Indies; they thought socialism could playa direct role in colonial areas, particularly by encouraging revolutionary anti-imperialism. After a heated debate the radical majority had its way, and it was declared that the party's function was to unite the Indies SOCialists, to inform the social democratic faction in the Dutch parliament of conditions in the Indies, and to spread socialist propaganda throughout the land. Now it was all very wen to elect for participation in Indonesian politics; it was another thing to Snd a means of doing so effectively. The ISDV, though it included nearly aU the socialists then in the Indies, was hardly an imposing organization: in 1915 it had only &5 members and a year later 134. 22 It had neither funds, nor in8uence, 15

Rise of Indonesian Communism nor a program comprehensible to the mass of the Indonesian population; and the moderate socialists bad been perfectly right in pointing out the drawbacks inherent in an organization composed almost entirely of Netherlanders. If the party was to be effective at alL therefore, it seemed imperative that it seek an alliance with a larger movement that would act as a bridge to the Indonesian masses. For a time the ISDV made no move in this direction, -partiy because the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent collapse of the Second International brought the Indies socialists into a temporary state of ideological sbock.23 For the first year or so of its existence, the ISDV restricted itself to theoretical discussions of the colonial problem and to collecting money for the socialist election effort in the Netherlands. 2 • Indeed, at its 1915 congress there was a strong move to allot the bulk of the party's income to the movement in Holland, and only after the congress were Sneevliet and his associates able to defeat iL

The party did attempt to increase its influence by establishing a newspaper, Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word), the first issue of which appeared in October 1915.2~ The paper was published in .Dutch, which severely limited its circulation among Indonesians-it was nearly two years before the party established an Indonesian journal-but Het Vri;e Woord did provide a public platform from which the ISDV could express its view. This proved to the party's great advantage in 1916, when it secured the admiration of radically inclined Indonesians by its stand on two issues which were then creating a considerable stir among the politically conscious public. One was the arrest of a leading Indonesian journalist, Mas Marco Kartodikromo. who had published an article critical of the government attitude toward the Sarekat Islam; 28 Het Vri;e Wooui, like most of the Indonesian-language press, took a strong stand on Marco's side. The second issue was the lndie Weerbar (Ann the Indies) campaign to establish an Indonesian militia under Dutch command. Originally the project of Netherlanders who feared a Japanese or Australian (English) move on the archipelago during World War I, it achieved surprising popularity among the politically conscious Indonesians. a number of whom saw it as a means of per· suading the Dutch to broaden their political rights. Het Vri;e WOOTd campaigned against the scheme on the grounds that it would serve militarist and imperialist ends, and its objections were shared by those

16

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement Indonesians who were s).;eptical of the government's willingness to reward cooperation with political concessions. The Indonesians who approved of the newspaper's position should have directed their admiration to the left wing of the ISDV, for in spite of its claims to represent the party as a whole Het Vri;e Woord was virtually the organ of its revolutionary faction. Westerveld, a plodding centrist, found himself no match for the two agitators with whom he shared the editorial board, Sneevliet and Adolf Baars. Tbe latter, a protege of Sneevliet, was the second most important of the Dutch founders of Indonesian Communism, A recent graduate of the ,engineering school at Delft-then considered a hotbed of Dutch student radicalism-he was employed as a teacher in the government-run technical school in Surabaja. Like Sneevliet, he was an enthusiastic revolutionary; but although he had a considerable knowledge of Marxist theory, his desire for revolution sprang more from a romantic and unstable nature than from lifelong dedication to the socialist cause. The result, as we shall see, was that in times of emotional crisis his enthusiasm was likely to give way to blackest despair. 21 Baars was extremely active as an editor of Het Vri;e Woord. Complctely innocent of tact, he expressed himself continuously and vitriolicaUy on its pages. His importance did not, however, lie in his accomplishments as a journalist or in his ability to alienate the moderates, but rather in his war).; of establishing contact with the Indonesian movements. Like Sneevliet, he was convinced of the need to agitate ' among the Indonesians; and he was able to accomplish more in this direction, for of all the Europeans in the ISDV he had acquired the most fluent knowledge of the Javanese and Indonesian languages. It was Baars who in 1917 established the first Indonesian-language socialist journal.28 The paper, Soeara Merdika (The Free Voice), ceased publication after little more than a year; but Baars, undiscouraged by its failure, came forth in March 1918 with a new Indonesian-language organ, Soeara Ro';ot (The People's Voice ),29 which was one day to become the , theoretical journal of the Indonesian Communist Party. Baars was also responsible for the establishment of the first Indonesian socialist group, a Surabaja-based organization that called itseU Sarna Rata Hindia Bergerak (The Indies on the March toward Equality ). The association was not a large one-in 1917, when it was founded, it had 120 members 3O-but even so it was nearly the size of

17

Rise 0/ Indonesian Communism the ISDV, and it placed before the older organization a question of considerable potential importance: Would it be better to merge the Sarna Rata movement with the main body of the ISDV on the principle that the socialist movement should not split on national or ethnic lines, or should the new organization be used to contain the socialists' Indonesian mass following? This question was pondered for some time by the ]SDV; II no clear decision was made, but after about a year Sarna Rata was quietly allowed to expire. One of the reasons no further action was taken on the Sarna Rata movement was that the ISDV leaders had in the meantime estabUshed contacts with already existing Indonesian organizations that foreshadowed a completely different relationship between the socialist party and the mass movement. In their search for a bridge to the Indonesian population, they arrived first at an alliance with Insulin de, which was then the most radical and politicaUy well developed of the nonEuropean organizations. The movement, which had been founded in 1907 as a nonpolitical, Eurasian-oriented association, inherited much of the membership and character of the Indiscbe Pamj after that ilI·fated party's dissolution in 1913. Its radicalism derived largely from the secial rejection felt by the Eurasian group from the increasingly exclusive European community and the economic threat of the gr~wing number of educated Indonesians, who were paid a lower wage scale and thus were cheaper to hire than Eurasians. Insulinde's leaders sought to overcome this disadvantage by forming an alliance between Eurasians and educated Indonesians to secure rights equal to those of the Euro. pean population. To this end they promoted an "Indies nationalism" aimed at creating a sense of common identity based on residence in the Indies rather than ethnic origin. The leaders of this movement had sought the support of the SDAP in their campaign to gain legal recognition .for the Indische Partij; the socialists had listened sympathetically, but this did not prevent the banning of the party or the banishment of its principal beads-E. F. E. Douwes Dekker (Setiabuddhi), Tjipto Mangunkusumo, and Suwardi Surjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro )-for engaging in rebellious ac· tivity. The exiled leaders went to Holland, where they were taken up by members of the SDAP who objected to the government's abrogation of their civil rights. At the outset, therefore. there was a basis for cooperation between Insulinde and the socialists in the Indies. Moreover, although the organization was largely Eurasian, it did include

18

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement some prominent Javanese in its leadership, and in Semarang, which became its headquarters, it had a following among the urban Indonesian population. It was much larger than the ISDV, comprising some 6,000 members in 1917, and was extremely active; in addition, its Eurasian clement made it more akin culturally and linguistically to the socialist group than were the purely Indonesian movements.3Z In spite of these advantages, the alliance with Insulinde proved a mistake almost immediately. For one thing, the Eurasian-oriented movement was hardly a gateway to the Indonesian masses. Moreover, its socialist sympathy was admittedly opportunistic, for its leaders were openly interested in replacing the European ruling elite with one of Eurasians and educated Javanese; they therefore had little use for the radical socialists' emphasis on the class struggle and the plight of the Indonesian workers and peasants. 5neevliet, who at first had been greatly impressed by Insulinde leader Tjipto Mangunkusumo,33 was soon attacking him for insufficient dedication to the proletarian cause, and Tjipto himself came to resent Sneevliet's efforts to turn his party in a more radical direction. 8~ Within a year the alliance was out. At its June 1916 congress the 15DV decided to break off general political cooperation and requested that party members who also belonged to lnsulinde cease participating in it. 35 Even before the entente with Insulinde collapsed, the ISDV revolutionaries began to look for more verdant political pastures. TIlls time their attention was drawn to the Sarekat Islam, which by 1916 had hundreds of thousands of members and was far and away the giant among the Indonesian movements. Some Indonesian members of the ISDV had already become prominent in the Sarekat Islam, and both Sneevliet and Baars had addressed 51 gatherings and stood well with the movement's leaders.ao Nonetheless, the revolutionary ~ocialists hesitated to usc this opportunity: the Islamic character of the 51 and its very hazy political orientation made even the most enthusiastic proponents of mass action wonder what the ISDV could hope to accomplish with it. The increasing popularity of the Sarekat Islam persuaded them, however, that it could perhaps be seen as an Indonesian version of the Chartist movement and therefore as a fit object for socialist attention.31 Consequently, Baars cautiously introduced the subject of a new partnership for the socialists: We arc quite well aware ~hat this group, in spite of the fact that its world view is completely inimical to the socialist one and is much more receptive

19

Rise of Indonesian Communism ('0 bourgeois ideals, means great progress in the native world, if only insofar as it brings people to self-awareness and independent thought. Howev~r, the experiences we have had with lnsulinde will prevent us from attempting to

do missionary work in those circles which are necessarily closed to our propaganda.!S Baars' comment had its immediate inspiration in the Srs first national congress, which was held in Surabaja in JWle 1916. The meeting did not show an overwhelming desire for alliance with the ISDV, since its chairman cut off the speech of the socialist spokesman Semaun after only Dve minutes; 3iI but it did show a growing antigovernment feeling. At its founding convention three years before, the Sarekat Islam had unconditionally proclaimed its loyalty to the Dutch regime; now it cautiously began to raise the question of self.government. The congress criticized the administration's agrarian policY' and considered promot· ing a labor movement. Morcover, it brought up the subject of amal· gamating Islamic and socialist pr:inciples, an idea that was backed not only by the young radicals already attracted to the ISOV but also among leading representatives of the urban santri merchant class. "Socialism" was already becoming a word that meant, very roughly, opposition to foreign domination and support of a modem, prosperous, and independent Indonesia. 40 At the 1916 congress the revolutionary cloud on the SI horizon was still exceedingly small; but within a year it threatened the original leadership's control of the movement. This sharp upsurge in the radical spirit of the Sarekat Islam re8ected in good part the hardships and uncertainties that World War 1 was imposing on the Indies. As the war progressed, isolating the colony and restricting shipping. prices rose steeply, accentuating the decline in Indonesian real income, a decline that began in 1914 and continued until 1924,41 The unfortunate effects of the war added greatly to the doubts of the Indonesian intelligentsia about the bleSSings of a foreign-controlled capitalist economy. It aJso made the general populace increaSingly conscious of its disadvantaged position. This was particularly the case in the sugar-growing areas of Java, where the peasantry showed considerable dissatisfaction with the rents they received for land leased by the plantations. Rice harvests had been bad, and with importation hindered by the wartime shipping shortage, the price of that staple began to soar. Pinched by the general inflation and well aware of the high price they could obtain for rice, the peasants ·felt increasingly the in· 20

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement adequacy of the amounts the plantations paid to lease irrigated land. 42 The prospects for ISDV influence over the Sarekat Islam, enhanced by this general discontent, were further aided by a structural peculiarity of the mass organization. The Sarekat Islam, it happened, was a body whose head was attached by the most insubstantial of necks. We will remember that in 1913 the Governor General had refused to charter the organization on a national basis. Each branch of the Sarekat Islam therefore enjoyed independent status, and the central leadership was forced to carry on in the form of a coordinating board called the Central Sarekat Islam (CSI ). Idenburg recognized the movement nationaJly in 1916, in one of his last acts of office; but by that time its charter was already set, and CSI authority over the branches remained extremely weak. As a result of this loose organization, a forceful local leadership found little to prevent it from propagating its ideas within the rest of the movement. Even this might have done the ISDV very little good if it had had to seek an ordinary political alliance with the Sarekat Islam, for the socialist organization was still small, weak, largely European, and so divided on the question of its task in the Indies that it was unable to publish a political program. However, another structural condition-shared by most political movements in the Indies-made it possible for the revolutionaries to function not only alongside the Sarekat Islam as representatives of their own party but also within it as members of the SI itself. This was the practice of holding membership in two or more parties at once, a custom which seems to have arisen because most Indonesian movements had not begun as political parties per se. The right of political association and assembly in the Indies was denied by Article III of the Regeringsreglement (Government Regulation), which had functioned as the colony'S constitution since 1854. Article 68c of the Decentralization Law of 1903 removeo the prohibition for organizations and meetings exclUSively intended for recommending members for the local and regional councils established by this act. It was not until 1915 that the general right to political association and assembly was recognized, however, and not until three years later that its limits were defined by law.43 Although the local councils established by the Decentralization Law contained elected members after 1908, suffrage was at first limited exclusively to those of European status; it was later extended to Indonesians, but only to a severely restricted group. There was thns little reason for the Indone-

21

Rise of Indonesian Communism sians to organize for electoral purposes before 1918: even the Indies Europeans seem to have seen little need to do so, for they showed no notable interest in political party fonnation at this time. This meant that the early Indonesian organizations were founded not as parties but as organizations to promote various social, cultural, and economic interests; inevitably they were politically oriented, since their concerns involved government policy and reOected attitudes toward the colonial relationship, but they did not possess the exclusive character of political parties. Membership in one group did not preclude membership in another; particularly among the educated elite, it was common for individuals to join as many group~ as promoted projects of interest to them, It was thus possible for members of the ISDV to belong to Budi Utomo, Insulinde, or the Sarekat Islam-and 0ccaSionally to all four, As we shan see, this peculiarity of early Indonesian political structure was to inspire the Comintern's "bloc within" strategy, whereby Communist party members entered a mass movement and worked to seize control of it from within. In its initial Indonesian phase, however, dual membership was less useful in bringing ISDV members into the Sarekat Islam-the European revolutionaries did not become members of the Muslim organization H-than in bringing gifted young 51 radicals into the ISDV and guiding them in a revolutionary socialist direction. Sneevliet and Baars were very successful in this, and they soon gathered a coterie of young idealists who were troubled by opportunism and dishonesty in the CSI leadership and who found an inspiring alternative in the uncompromising "scientific" idealism preached by their revolutionary mentors. The most prominent figure in this early group of Indonesian Marxists was Semaun, who was the ISDV's spokesman at the 1916 SI congress. Born near Surabaja, the son of a minor railroad official and himself a railroad employee, he was an early member of the Sarekat Islam, joining its Surabaja branch in 1914 and short1y thereafter becoming that chapter's secretary, He soon became involved in union work in the railroads, which brought him notoriety as one of Indonesia's first labor agitators; it also brought him in contact with Sneevliet, who was then beginning his work with the VSTP. Semaun admired the efforts of the European revolutionary on behalf of the Indonesian workers, and in 1915 he joined the ISDV; a year later be was vice~chainnan of its Surabaja branch. Semaun was very young when he rose to prominence

22

Birth of the Revolutionary "Ai ovement in the revolutionary movement; in 1916, when he first enters our story, he was seventeen years old.~~ Shortly after the Sarekat Islam congress of 1916 Semaun was trans~ ferred by his employen from Surabaja, the headquarters of the CSI, to Semarang, the stamping ground of Sneevliet and the VSTP. The Cen~ tral Javanese capital already possessed a well-organized SI branch. which was much under radical in8uence. Semaun gave the group a talented and fiery spokesman; at the same time the young revolutionary's position in the SI was considerably enhanced by his association with this dynamic political machine. The Semarang SI expanded rapidly, claiming 1,700 members in 1916 and 20,000 a year later.~" Almost immediately it developed into a rival of the Surabaja organization: its appeals, expressed in the newspaper Sinor Djawa (later Sinor lJindia). were directed primarily at the urban SI branches and stressed more radical demands for social and economic justice than were expressed by TjokroanUnoto's Oetoeson flindia, the unofficial organ of the CSl. The Semarang SI leadership devoted nearly as much energy to criticizing the CSI leadership as it did to condemning the government and foreign capital. Semaun attaCked the CSl's planned participation in the Volksraad, a consultative assembly being set up by the government as a first step toward political representation, and he also led a campaign against the I"die Weerbar action, which bad support from important leaders of the Surabaja organization. The struggle over Indie Weerbar greatly agitated Sarekat Islam circles, particularly when the CSI elected to send one of its members, Abdul Muis, to the Netherlands as part of a delegation to plead for an Indonesian militia. The Semarang SI 'led the protest against the CSI action, and shortly before the Sarekat Islam congress of 1917 it announced that it would offer a resolution against the lndie Weerbar effort. Incensed, the CSI infonned the Se· marang branch that unless the resolution was withdrawn, it would break off connections with that local. Semarang replied that if the cen~ tral leadership did not behave, Semarang might very well start its own SI ccnter.·1 This crisis coincided with a threatened break between the Sarekat Islam and the ISDV. The CSI had become increaSingly upset at the dog-in-the-manger attitude taken by the ISDV, which in one breath professed a burning desire to cooperate and in the next unmercifully criticized the CSlIeaders. The Muslims finally bad enough when Baars 23

Rise of IndonesWn Commlmism violently attacked the SI leaders in a public debate on the tender subject of Int!ie Weerbar.4I The CSI decided to demand at the 5arent Islam congress of October 1917 that all relations with the 15DV be cut Off.48 The prospect of lOSing their ~ with the Indonesian movement threw the radica.1 leaders of the 15DV into something of a panic. 5neevliet, calling on the 51 heads to reconsider, assured them of the socialists' upright intentions: "Persona1Iy oppose you? Dispute your leadership over your organization?-What nonsense." But, chronically incapable of compromise, he ended his appeal with an attack on the 51 leadership as violent as any before,GO As it turned out, the socialists need not have worried. At the congress it was apparent that 5emarang had strong backing among the other 51 branches, and Tjokroammoto, whose instinct was to preserve unity at aU costs, backed down. The proposals to dea1 with the I5DV and the 5emarang 51 were quietly buried, and although the congress did not adopt the radicals' view on Indie Weerbar and the Volksraad, CSI spokesman Abdul Muis did take a long step in their direction by announcing that if parliamentary action should prove unfruitful, the 5arekat Islam would not hesitate to revolt. Moreover, the congress condemned "sinful"-that is, foreign-capitalism and demanded freedom of political organization, radically improved labor and agrarian legislation, and free public education. Gl The revolutionaries thus won their first round with the SI leadership in a game of bluff that was the pattern for relations between the two groups for the next few years. The upsurge of radical power continued, owing partly to good organization and propaganda work by 5emarang and partly to the increasing importance the CSI itself attached to its big-city branches. The major reason for this tuming toward the urbkn centers was the realization of the 51 leaders that their rural base was at best undependable. Although the movement's claimed membership continued to rise steeply-reaching a peak of two and one-half milUon in 1919-this increase was largely illusory. Membership was acquired with a low initiation fee; after that, contributions were appreciated but not required. As a result the rolls recorded those who joined and not those who lost interest. In cons~uence, many branches that flourished on paper had Simply faded out of existence in reaUty. This problem was most .acute in the countryside, where, we will remember, the peasants looked to the movement to secure the redress of their grievances. They joined the 51 in droves and overwhelmed its 24

Birth of the RevolutionanJ Movement

very

units with their demands. However, it soon became apparent to them that the local 51 leaders-who possessed little education or organizational knowledge and who were usually regarded unfavorably by both European and native officials-were no more able to secure satisfaction than were the traditional village leaders. Disappointed, the rural 51 adherents lost interest almost as rapidly as they jOined. The ephemeral nature of the movement's peasant membership was already becoming apparent during 1916, and this led the 51 leaders to attach increasing importance to the urban branches, which were usually better organized, more active, and further to the left. 52 5emarang's threat to start a rival 51 center was thus doubly alarming, and CSI concessions to the left in 1917 and after were aimed not only at placating Semaun and his follOWing but also at drawing to itself as much urban loyalty as it could. The 150V radicals were jubilant at the results of the 1917 51 congress: We merely wish to point out that it has become clear, particularly in the last tv.·o days of the congress, that if the 51 leadership wishes to preserve its mass following it will have to devote its greatest attention to the deeply felt economic needs of its exploited masses and to the radical economic and social refonns which alone can alleviate their suffering. It has also been proved that our outspoken campaign against the political puttering of the central leadership gave it a powerful push in the direction of this insight; had we not brought forth this criticism, had we, in order to preserve our "influence," tagged aJong uncomplainingly behind that leadership and only agitated in a "diplomatic" manner, the C5 I would never havc learned this obvious lesson. ~11

The I5DV bad every reason to rejoice in this upswing in its fortunes, for it had recently undergone a crisis that bad weakened it considerably but left it revolutionarily more pure. Only a few weeks before the party had been sundered by a final split between the moderate and revolutionary socialists. A breach between the two groups had long been pending, and since March of that year relations between them had been extremely bitter. The occasion of the March disagreement had been the overthrow of the Russian Ts.ar, news of which reached Indonesia on the evening of March 18, 1917. 5neevliet immediately sat down to write an impassioned article, OOZegepraal" (Triumph ), which appeared the following day in the Insulinde paper De Indiiir. In it, he strongly hinted that

25

Rise of Indonesian Communism Dutch rule in the Indies wou1d go the way of the Tsar if only the Indonesians set their minds to it. The article horrified the socialist moderates and. more important for its general impact. it alarmed the colonial authorities. The government promptly took measures to prosecute Sneevliet and to suppress discussion of the uprising, its ellorts serving to make th~ Russian revolution a cause celebre in Indonesia. Shortly after the first news of the revolt, the Semarang executives of the ISDV and lnsulinde asked official permission to hold an open meeting at wbich the revolution would be discussed; the request was refused on the ground that not enough was yet 1Cn0wn about the event to form the basis for objective discussion; a later petition by the Sernarang ISDV was denied without explanation. When Insulinde asked government permission to fonn a new branch in Bandung, this was granted only on condition that it not discuss the Russian revolution or invite Sneevliet to address it. In Surabaja an ISDV request to discuss the Tsar's overthrow publicly was refused because such a mccting wou1d constitute"a gathering of political nature which wou1d, in addition, form a threat to the public peace and order in this colony." ~ Sneevliet's trial lent additional publicity to the March Revolution. The public prosecutor's attempt to bring the socialist leader to trial was denied by the Semarang courts; only when the case reached the Indies Supreme Court was it decided the grounds were sufficient for prosecu: tion. The trial took place in November; Sneevliet conducted his own defense, which consisted mainly of an impassioned anticolonial speech lasting nine hours. ~II It won him both considerable publicity and an acquittal; the state was unable to reopen the case, though it appealed . the decision up to the Supreme Court." Sneevliet, of course, enjoyed privileged civil status as a European; nonetheless, it was general1y characteristic of the colonial authorities to exercise Widely varying control over politica1 expression. Authoritarian colonial attitudes were mingled with the precepts of Dutch parliamentary democracy; the 'result was not so much a compromise between, the two as the inconsistent application of the one philosophy or the other, depending largely on which in~ividual or branch of government decided the case. As a result, people were jailed for the mildest criticisms, while at the same time outspoken revolutionaries urged the overthrow of the government with impunity. Since the reaction of the authorities to criticism depended largely on their philosophy of colonial government, the leeway for political expression was far greater in the major 26

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement cities-especially in Ethically inclined Semarang, which acquired a moderate socialist mayor, D. de Jongh, in 1916-and this gave the urban radicals an edge in efforts at winning popularity through boldness. Though Sneevliet won the government trial handily, be had more difficulty in gaining acquittal from the ISDV moderates. The Batavia branch, which beaded the gradualist wing of the party. published a declaration denouncing the revolutionary activity of the radicals: It was Marx who, in dealing with revolutionary romanticists and half·bour-

geois anarchists, proclaimed that only at a certain economic phase and through organization and politica1 education is a fruitful action possibIe-an action which docs not work with revolutionary phrases, but is directed at formulating demands which proceed directly and logically from the social needs of the community . . . . It is the task of the Indies social democrats to teach this naive and easily aroused population to control itself though organization and discipline in the struggle for its goals. We social democrats ought not only to take the firmest possible stand against the rulers whenever they misuse their economic and political power, but also against those Europeans who. driven exclusively by political passion, hold the people back from their historical course of development. We shouJd also oppose those who. ignoring the unity of the native population groups necessary for the achievement of national independence and freedom, drive a wedge into it through their so-called socialist internationalism. ~7 At the party congress in May. the Batavia leader Scbotman repeated the Revisionist objections to promoting revolution and urged the ISDV to consider seriously the realities of its situation. As an organization, he pointed out, the party was small, isolated. and ineffective, lacking even a program to call its own; its only hope for a meaningful existence lay in affiliating with the SDAP as its Indies branch. The ccntrists under Westerveld agreed with Schotman's criticism. but they feared to force a crisis with the left by supporting his motion to join the Dutch p arty. The revolutionaries made their standpoint quite clear: Semaun declared that if Schotman's plans were accepted, he, among others, would 'resign; and Sneevliet bore his usual witness for the class struggle. for cooperation with the SI, and for mass revolutionary agitation. ~a Those hopelessly diverging viewpoints were reconciled by a compromise, the only visible purpose of which was to postpone the schism as long as poSSible. The congress determined tha t "premature resistancc" .should not be encouraged, and at the same time it pronounced tha~

ZT

Rise of Indonesian Communism . Sneevliet was innocent of engaging in such activity. In return for SneevUet's acquittal. the left approved ISnV participation in the forthcoming Volksraad election. This agreement did not prevent the radicals -and particularly Semaun--from going right ahead with their campaign against thc Volksraad. Moreover, the continuing efforts of the revolutionaries to push the Indonesian movements in a radical direction were seriously aUenating the leaders of those groups, and the ISnV moderates, although they were not interested in agitation among the Indonesian masses, did desire constructive cooperation with the heads of the Indonesian organizations. We have seen that relations between the ISDV and CSI were nearly terminated in 1917. Those with Insulinde were actually severed: the parties had cooperated against lndiii Weerbar and in some local election campaigns after the breakdown of their formal alliance the year before, but Sneevliet's criticisms proved too much for the Insulinde leadership. which announced on August 30, 1917, that all relations with the socialists were at an end.5~ For the ISDV moderates, this was the last straw. On September 8 they resigned en masse and established the Indies SDAP. Westerveld and some other centrists hung on to the older organization. but their inHuence on it was minimal and at the end of the year they went over to the moderate groUp.60 By the time of the November Revolution, then, the ISDV was reduced. to a group esscntinlly Communist in attitude. We might therefore expect the party to have greeted the Bolshevik seizure of power with clamorous approval, especially after the great publicity accorded the overthrow of the Tsar. However, the ISnV responded to the news of the second revolution almost hesitantly. Reports of the Russian uprising trickled slowly through to the Indies; it was not until late in November that the 6rst news of it was published in Het Vriie Woord.'· The early accounts left the ISDV in the dark as to the outcome of the revolt, and this was undoubtedly a major reason for its cautious handling of the news. Succeeding communiques brought increased hope, however, and soon Baars was able to write: The hope that we almost dared not cherish, the expectation that we almost dared not express-so impossible did it seem to us here in this land. where capitalism still reigns supreme and where our small group is just beginning to form the organization that will do battle with it-all this has become deep, joyful certainty. The proletariat now rules in RUSSia, at least for the time being. And every day of rest, of proletarian order, makes its mastery more secure. 82 28

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement For the Europ~an revolutionaries in the Indies, the November Revolution meant the justification of their stubborn refusal to be dissuaded by arguments of Indonesia's backwardness, its lack of a proletariat, and the absence of nearly all the factors assumed necessary for a socialist revolution. Elsewhere in Europe there were signs of coming revolt, and the ISOV cou1d hope that the wave of the revolution would ~weep over Holland and perhaps even wash the shores of the Indies. The mercurial Baars, who was finding the frustration of colonial life increasingly difficult to bear, seized upon the Communist victory in Russia with desperate enthusiasm. On Chrisbnas Day, 1917, he exhorted a rally in Batavia: The lower classes must be organized' You must organize now, the Russian example must be followed now . . . . Do as in Russia and the victory is yours! U

As party chainnan, he announced the ISOV's commibnent to the Bolshevik pattern at its May 1918 congress: The Russian Revolution naturally dominates our thoughts at present. I do not believe-to judge from reports in the European socialist papers-that there is any grDllp of socialists which is more strongly under the influence of the Russian movement than we ourselves . . . . We, too, must take the path which the Bolsheviki have chosen, even though the situation here is different. Where capitalism exists, socialism is also possible.6 ( In the same speech Baars mourned that in the light of events in Europe, "'it is bitter to be doomed to helplessness. here." M The ISDV, however, had been far from inactive in response to the Bolshevik Revolution. At the end of 1917, it began organizing soldiers' and sailors' soviets on the Russian example; and within three months it had gathered over 3,000 members into this movement. 86 The Red Guardist action began among the sailors and was centered at Surabaja, the major naval base of the Indies. It soon spread to the soldiery, however, and although its existence was evidenced more by alarming rumors than visible activity, it caused the government considerable concern. At that time the Indies army consisted of some 9,000 Europeans, 10,000 Ambonese, 18,000 Javanese, and 3,000 other Indonesians-a force the modest size of which had for some time worried Dutch residents of the Indies. The European officers were felt to be reliable, but the Ambonese were .restless; the Javanese were not notably enthusiastic soldiers and might well prove less than loyal if it came to putting down a revolt on their island. The Dutch common soldiers had little love for the

29

Rise of Indonesian Communism Indonesian population, but they also had little reason to identify with the European clviUans, who treated them as outcasts not much better th~ the natives. The government realized that their enthusiasm for the Red Cuardist action stemmed in good part from deep resenbnent of their position, and it instituted measures to improve their social and economic status. Such reforms took time to achieve, however, and with the growing momentum of the socialist revolutionary movement in Europe, it became problematical whether they might not come too late to prevent military apathy or alignment with the socialists in a bid for power. At the May 1918 ISDV congress, the party discussed how best to encourage "revolutionary defeatism" as Lenin had done, arguing that if the colonial troops could generally be persuaded not to fight, the Red Cuardists could seize power handi1y.'T At the same meeting the party, finally possessing a consensus in the absence of the socialist moderates, drew up its first program of demands 88 and attempted to formulate a policy of work among the Indonesian mas~es. The debate engendered on the latter subject gives us a glimpse into the party's eaIly struggles with a question that was to perplex many a Communist leader-how to deal with nationalism. 11te ISDV executive proposed that the party's statement of purpose declare: The Indies Social Democratic Association aims at the organization of the Indies population, especially the proletariat and the peasantry and without regard to race or religion, into an independent poli,tical party which will lead the class struggle in its native land against a ruling capitalist class of foreign race, thereby carrying on the only possible struggle for national liberation. It gives all possible support to every economic and political movement of the subject population insofar as those movements strengthen the position of that population against the ruling class."

The Semarang group moved that the world-wide character of the movement should be emphasized by cutting out the reference to oppressors of "'foreign race" and by adding that the party's sbuggle against the ruling class in the Indies would "'strengthen the international class struggle and at the same time lead the only possible struggle for national liberation." Surabaja, however, felt that even this did not go far enough, and wished to cross out the entire reference to national liberation. It was only after a heated debate that the Surabaja 30

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement branch was satisfied that the ISDV would continue to value economic revolution above national liberation and the declaration, as amended by Semarang, was adopted. 7o Not surprisingly, the chief opposition to the Surabaja position came from the ISDV central executive, dominated by Sneevliet and Baars, and from the party's Indonesian members, who wished to maintain the statement in its original fonn. 111at they were not able to prevail was in . good part because the European members or the ISOV-with the notable exceptions of Sneevliet, Baars, and the VSTP leader Bergsmawere ilI-equipped by language or interests to work among the Indonesian population. For the most part they occupied themselves with discussions of Marxist theory, observation of events in Europe, and agitation among fellow Indies Europeans. Typically, the work that most engaged their energies, the Red Guardist action, revolved around a Dutch-speaking part of the population; Similarly, the party's 6rst May Day celebration, held in Surabaja in 1918, was considered of interest only to Europeans, and no Indonesians attended. The Bolshevik victory and the increasing hopes for revolution in Europe brought new energy and influence to this Europocenbic faction, and at the 1918 congress they succeeded in moving party headquarters from Semarang, center of activity among the Indonesians, to Surabaja, its largest European branch and the most radically internationalist of its mvisions. T1 Economic conditions in the Indies worsened during 1918, as rice harvests remained poor and the shipping shortage reached an acute stage. The Indonesian parties were more critical of the government and produced a disturbing flood of criticism in the 6rst Volksraad debates. In Holland the SOAP, hitherto a small minority, emerged as the second largest party in elections to the lower bouse of parliament; the new cabinet was right of ccnter, and the socialist opposition to it assumed an increasingly rebellious aspect. In November, inspired by the German revolution, the SOAP leader Troelsua preached revolt from his post in parliament. The 6rst reports of the Troelsua Revolution threw the Indies government into something of a panic, for their incompleteness lent considerable scope to the imagination. Rumors circulated that the SDAP was organizing a seizure of power in the Indies, and a police watch was set on the house of Cramer, head of the Volksraad socialists, for it was thought that he would lead the march on the Governor General's palace to demand power in the name of the SDAP,72

31

Rise of Indonesian Communism The Indies SOAP had no thought of seizing control unless a Dutch socialist government authoriz~ it to do so, but it responded to the news of events in the Netherlands by calling a meeting of 51. Budi Utomo, and Insulinde representatives to formulate a plan of action. The conference, which met on November 16, agreed that the movements would urge their followers to maintain peace but at the same time would press the government to tum the Volksraad into a popularly elected parliament within the next three years. 73• Not all groups were so inclined to the parliamentary path. Demonstrations were organized by the ~ed Guardists among the European soldiers and sailors, and there were scumes with the police.14 On the pages of the ISDV Soeara Rd;at, Darsono urged his fellow Indonesians to follow ' the Russian example: "It is not the ruler who has the power, but the people. Let the RED FLAC fly everywhere, the sign of HUMANITY, EQUALITY, and FRATERNITY. What can stop the common man if once he begins to rebel? Let the red flag wavel" 7G The CSI Odoe-. san Hind/o. published his writings approvingly. noting that if the government did not concede extensive refonns immediately, revolution might well be the result.;e Even the Indonesian revolutionaries placed their hopes in events in Europe rather than the Indies, however. As Semaun indicated in the left 51 Sinor Hindia, the chances for violence lay in colonial resistance to a Dutch socialist regime rather than in Indonesian rebellion itself: There will undoubtedly be an attempt Ito set up a separate Indies capitalist regimeJ. but there are also socialists such as 5ncevliet and Baars in the Indies. These comrades. who have many followers among the sailors from the warships and among a great part of the European soldiers, have fellow party members in the 51 and thereby can reckon on the support of thousands of natives, among them many policemen in the cities and native soldiers, many of whom are now members of the SI. Undoubtedly the Sneevliet party will gather all its forces to carry out the mandate which the socialists in the Netherlands will send. AND WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN so IT WILL CO).(E TO A PARTICULARLY snARP STRUCCLE (IERE IN TIlE INDlES. 71

5emaun did not envision a complete divorce from the Dutch as the outcome of a socialist victory. The native socialist movement was still too weak, he pointed out, and it was likely that the leadership of the country would fall into the hands of those who would tum it over to capitalism : 1'herefore we must ask the help of socialists such as Snecvliet, Baars, and Brandstedcr, and of the [EuropeanJ sailors and sol32

Birth of the Revolutionary Movement diers, so that capitalists from coWltries like Japan and England will not invade Our newly liberated COWltry."18 The November crisis passed as quickly as it had come. The Indies opposition was restless but not ready for revolt; in Holland the Troelstra Revolution fizzled out in a shower of rhetorical sparks. As SOOD as he received word that the Dutch government would not fall, Governor General van Limbug Stirum paciGed local tempers with broad but vague promises of reform, r9 Soon thereafter a reaction set in among the governments of the Netherlands ~nd the Indies; detennined that such challenges to their authority should not rise again, they took steps to consolidate their position which were to lead to the abandonment of almost all the envisioned refonns and to the adoption of a far less tolerant attitude toward extremist agitation. The government revival of confidence was matched by deepening despair in the ISDV. Its hopes had been based so completely on a DutCh revolution that the European leadership of the movement sank into a depression that bordered on paralysis. As Sneevliet later remarked, the end of 1918 closed the ISDV's first period of growth. After that the pirty was forced to face the unpleasant facts that the German revolution would not spread to the Netherlands, that the Indonesian leaders were at least temporarily taken with Van Limburg Stirum's November promises, and that the government was now moving seriously against the revolutionaries. s!>

33

III

Becoming a Communist Party ONCE the general situation was in hand, the govenunent turned its attention to the Rcd Guardist action as the most intolerable challenge to its authority. Stiff sentences were imposed on members of the armed forces who refused duty or were suspected of fomenting trouble, and civilian leaders who were in government service were transferred to out-of-the-way places or expelled from the Indies. By the end of 1919. the movement was virtually dead, I At the same time, the authorities took steps to rid themselves of their most outspoken political opponents, expelling the Dutch ISDV leaders one by one from the country.!! The 6rst to go was Sncevliet. for whom ~xpulsion proceedings were initiated as soon as it seemed certain the Dutch government would survive. That revolutionary had long irritated Indonesian as well as government leaders,s but in the heated abnosphere of November 1918 the Indonesian opposition promptly adopted him as its martyr.4 The government added to the drama of Sneevliet's departure by taking elaborate security measures to prevent possible riots,lI and it strengthened the Indonesians' feeling of solidarity with him by following up his banishment with the arrest of Darsono. Abdul Muis, and a succession of lesser Indonesian figures , Semaun used the burst of sympathy for his departed mentor to extract promises of financial support not only from the ISDV and VSTP but also from the CSI. The purpose of his move was to provide Sneevliet with aid until he found employment and also to solidify the connections between the Indonesian mass movement and ~e European socialist revolutionaries; but since the quid pro quo was that Sneevliet would represent his supporters in the Netherlands it also gave the departed leader a basis for speaking int~­ nationally in their name.' Shortly after. Sneevliet's departure, Baars abandoned the Indies of

34

Becoming a Communis.t Party his own free will. He had lost his teaching job in October 1911, when the government decided that his political utterances had exceeded the permissible limits for those in its employ. After that he devoted full time to running the ISDV and Het Vrife Woord. but this revolutionary activity was not enough to satisfy him. Unlike Sneevliet, who alter. nated between enthusiasm and distress but never abandoned faith in his work in Indonesia, Baars .finally lost both his temper and his interest. Convinced that his calling lay with the revolution in Europe. he set forth to tilt at the Dutch bourgeoisie: Oh, there is so much that is depressing. Naturally. that is no reason in itself to leave. However, if you do not possess at the same time the firm conviction that you cannot do better work elsewhere, if, on the contrary, you are continually overcome by the passionate desire to join in the struggle abroad, where you could 6ght in another and better fashion and with greater understanding from others-then your strength is consumed by doubts. strength that is not renewed by the wann sympathy of those you are struggling to help . . . . I often said to Sneevliet that a European can't hold out in the tropics in this manner. And really, if I had had to stay in that deadly hot Scmarang another few years, with after my day's work the directing, conferring, meeting, speaking, etc., etc.-all this with the same result we have achieved up to now, namely that the masses applaud but are not ready to do anythingno, I think that I would have broken down completely in mind and body. If it had been necessary I would have perhaps made even this sacriflcc; but as , it is-if I must sacrifice myself, then I'll do it in the heat of battle.1 The rest of 1919 was a series of disasters for the European. members of the ISDV, for dwing the course of the year the government imprisoned, banished, or instituted proceedings against most of them. Loss of their best leaders, arrest and fear of arrest, and discouragement at the failure of the revolutionary movements in Europe and Indonesia all diminished the Dutch role in the ISDV, which many of its European members regarded as a dying movement,' By early 1920 the number of active Dutch members of the organization was reduced to a fraction of what it had been. Had the fate of the ISDV depended on its Dutch leadership, the party would now have faced dissolution. What took place, however, was not the degeneration of a vital center but the atrophy of a now unnecessary limb. 11te reason for this was a change in the substance of the party that had been taking place since 1917. In that year, we will

35

Rise of Indonesian Communism remember, the ISDV lost a good part of its membership as a result of the splitting off of its less radical elements. Those who left were mostly Dutch; those who entered thereafter were Indonesian. Beginning in late 1911, ISDV membership began to increase as' a result of Semarang's victory at the Sarekat Islam congress, the party's first major effort to gain converts throughout Java,' and the discontent created by the increasingly bad economic situation. In addition, the decision of the May 1918 congress to establish the ISDV as an Indonesian movement in its own right caused the party to make a special effort to attract Indonesian adherents without too much regard for whether they understood or even approved · of the movement's Communist goals. The result was an extremely rapid expansion of membership,tO which gave the ISDV some of the character-and some of the problems-of a mass movement. It also complicated relations between the central executive and the party branches, since the Europeans kept finn control of the center, whi1e the branches gave more prominence to their Indonesian adherents.t1 Whether the European leaders would in the normal course of things have yielded gracefully their control of the ISDV is an open question. This was certainly their ultimate intention, but whether their ideas about the proper thning and extent of the transfer of power agreed with those of their Indonesian coUeagues is quite another matter. This particu1ar problem was avoided. however, by the gradual expulsion of the European leaders from the colony. Fortunately for the ISOY, its Indonesian adherents possessed the talent, if not the experience, to enable them to replace the absent Europeans. In addition to Semaun, the party had acquired a first-class leader in Darsono, a young Javanese aristocrat who had dropped in on SneevJiet's mal in 1917 and been converted on the spot to revolutionary socialism. He was one of SneevJiet's closest co-workers during that leader's last year in the Indies, and he was also closely associated with Baars and the Jabor organizer Bergsma. Darsono was one of the few Indonesian Communist leaders to make a serious srudy of Marxism; indeed, he frequently had trouble adjusting his W~stem Communist ideas to Eastern conditions. He was a great admirer of the BolshevIK Revolution, which he enthusiasticaUy urged his feUow Indonesians to emulate; this led, in December 1918, to his arrest and a year's imprisonment. 1S • The Indonesian leaders of the ISDV devoted particular attention to 36

Becoming a Communist Porty developing relations with the Sarckat Islam, to which they also be· longed. They were aided by deteriorating economic conditions and general restlessness in 1918, which had a considerable effect on the spirit of the SI. The extent to which ISDV slogans found response in the popular movement was indicated by the temper of the 1918 Sate· kat Islam congress, which was distinctly revolutionary: not onlY 'did the meeting protest sharply against' the authorities, but it based its attack on the charge that the government was the protector of "sinful~ capitalism.IS The ISDV also improved its positipn within the Sarekat Islam at this meeting, as at the SI congress the previous year, by means of a threat from Semarang to split the movement. Shortly before the 1918 SI meeting, Darsono had written a series of articles attacking the promi· nent anti..semarang CSI leader Abdul Mois, and Semaun issued a pamphlet accusing Muis of baving feathered his' financial nest by sup· porting bulie Weerbar.14 Muis' position at that time was rather delicate, since he had become the editor of Neratja, a newspaper that was known to rely GnanciaDy on the govemment. 1D In it he published a series of articles arguing that a restriction of sugar plantation acreage in the interests of increased rice production-then urged by the 51 and other Indonesian parties in the face of a growing food shortage-would not advance the public welfare. This was a highly unpopular stand to take, and the Javanese Slleaders questioned whether Muis' Sumatran heart was reaDy with their people. For a while it seemed possible that Muis would be dropped from the CSI at its 1918 congress, and the radicals' concerted attack on him aimed at encouraging such a rejection. However, Muis toured Sumatra just before the meeting and was greeted there with great enthusiasm; he thus appeared at the SI congress as the head of a powerful Outer Island faction. The CSI was now faced with a very nasty problem: if it met Muis' demands, Semarang might secede; if it yielded to the leftists, the increasingly important Outer Island branches might well form their own movement. The Muis-Semarang .fight erupted as soon as the congress opened, and Tjokroaminoto quickly called a closed session of the CSI to settle it before the breach became ineparable. As a result, Darsono and Semann promised to cease their personal attacks on Muis, who, in tum, promised to follow the SI and not the government line in running Nerati~. Muis was kept on as vice-president of the CSl, and the Semarang branch was satisfied by the appointment of Darsono as official CSI

:r;

Rise of Indonesian Communism propagandist and of Semaun as CSI commissioner in charge of Central Java.II This last nomination represented a significant advance for the ISDV, for it meant that the most popular and able of the Indonesian leftist leaders now held a powerful position in the directorate of the Sarekat IslamP During 1919 the Indonesian ISDV leaders increased their efforts to inRuence the Sarekat Islam in a radical direction, and the economic situation continued to aid their project By this time inflation and poor barvests were bringing conditions of ncar famine to some areas. The rice shortage was so severe that the government instituted compulsory grain collection, which caused considerable resentment among peasants who did not want to part with their crop at the government price. ]n 1918, the Sarekat Islam bad begun a campaign to transfer a part of the land under contract to sugar plantations to the peasants for growing rice; this was supported by Governor General van Limburg Stinun, who considered such a measure necessary until rice shipments were received from abroad. The sugar interests were by no means amenable, however, since they were counting on the very high prices their product would bring on the postwar market, and to the Indonesians' distress the Governor General did not feel he could impose more thun moral suasion on the industry. The 51, Buw Utomo, Insulinde, and Indies SDAP sponsored a Volksraad motion to petition the Dutch parliament to restrict the sugar acreage, but the conservative Indonesian regents and nonsocialist Europeans in the assembly combined to defeat the proposal. The SOAP in Holland thereupon introduced it into parliament itself, but only the Ethically inclined Vrijzinnige Democratische Partij supported it. The sale result was that the Governor General appointed a commission of inquiry into conditions in the sugar areas, on which Tjokroaminoto was invited to sit; its report was not ready until 1921, by which time the crisis was long past. I S Whether or not restriction of sugar acreage would have ameliorated the immediate food problem, the lndonesian parties attached a great deal of importance to it, and their failure to achieve any satisfaction on the subject caused them to view the Indies government more than ever as the servant of Dutch capital. Even cautious, upper-class Budi Utomo took on a radical tint and at its 1919 congress expressed a desire for closer contact with the masses. Rallies held in Batavia to protest the refusal to limit sugar acreage and the use of force in government rice collections were supported not only by Insulinde. the 51. ISDP, and 38

Becoming a Communist Party Budi Utomo but also by the conservative regional associations Sarckat Sumatra (Sumatranenbond) and Pasundan.la In the rural areas there were increasing signs of dissatisfaction. Peasants in the sugar districts set fire to cane fields, in the famine-struck region of Kediri troops had to be called in to combat disorder, and in West Java the forced rice collections produced a series of incidents. More alarming to the government than these sporadic and unplanned disturbances, however, was the apparent involvement of Indonesian political groups in resistance movements. The first to be accused was Insulinde, which associated itself in early 1919 with agrarian unrest in the Surakarta region of Central Java. In recent years the government had been endeavoring to put through agrarian refonns in this princely territory so as to bring conditions in )joe with those in the directly administered regions. The refonns proceeded very slowly, and many peasants were disturbed at their delay, particularly in the matter of substituting a direct tax for the burdensome corvee duties. Others objected to their taking place at all, for they substituted incomprehensible requirements for the personal and familiar relationships of that highly traditional area. The result was general discontent, in the form of refusal to render corvee duties : the reformists claimed that their preservation was unjustified, and the traditionalists argued that they had not been sanctioned as before by customary decrees (peranata n). The movement, which lasted some six months, was headed by Hadji Misbach, who was the de facto leader of Insu}jnde in the Surakarta region as well as an active SI member and vicepresident of the ISDV-sponsored PKBT, a union of peasants and agricultural workers. The national leadership of Insulinde took considerable interest in his efforts; Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker both made propaganda tours of the area. The government decided that Insulinde was responsible for the change of peasant dissatisfaction into concrete protest; Hadji Misbach and Douwes Dekker were arrested, and Tjipto Mangunkusumo was banished from the Javanese-speaking areas of the island.20 A conflict over corvee also broke out in Celebes at this time, and although it was less widespread than the Surakarta passive-resistance movement, it was viewed more seriously by the authorities because it resulted in the murder of a European official. This time the Sarekat Islam was held responsible. That organization had appeared in the Outer Islands as a reform movement demanding greater legal rights for

39

Rise of Indonesian Communism the population and a decrease in the power of the petty autonomous rulers; one of its principal projects was the substitution of taxation for corvee, which the government ,had already undertaken in the directly administered areas of Java. The Sarekat Islam made considerable headway on Celebes in the face of opposition from the association of adat rulers (Pcrkumpulan Radja), which was backed, as usual, by the local European advisers on the grounds that reforms, even when contemplated by the government, should not challenge the structure of customary authority. In May 1919 Abdul Muis toured the island on behalf of the CSI; his visit sparked new enthusiasm for the movement, and in some areas pcople began to refuse to render corvee. A month after Muis' trip, the Dutch contr6leur De Kat Angelino was killed in Toli·toli when he visited that center of unrest to enforce the corvee obligations. The Sarekat Islam as a whole was considered at fawt, and proceedings were instituted against Muis for having instigated the assassination by his visit,21 The Toli.toli incident was particularly distressing to the Ethici, for the murdered official had been considered a progressive man who had tried to improve local conditions as well as shore up traditional rule. Moreover. Muis-a member of the Volksraad. opponent of Semarang. and fonner editor of Neratja-had been thought one of ~e more rea· sonable of the Sarekat Islam leaders. If even he were to contn'bute to so serious a breach of the peace. was it not likely that the conservatives had been right in warning that the Ethical program was dangerously utopian in tolerating an Indonesian oppoSition? These suspicions seemed to be con6nned the very next month. for in July the government, investigating the shooting of a Garut peasant family that had resisted the forced rice collections. discovered the existence of a secret SI organization that appeared to aim at the over~ throw of the government. This group-known in Indonesian as the S.I. ke·Dua (Second SI) and in Dutch as Afdeling B (Section B)-was concentrated in the Priangan region of West Java. It had been started in 1911 by a Hadji Ismael, who had encouraged resistance by selling chanos (d;imat ) guaranteed to make the wearer invulnerabJe. Ismael's secret association had gained momentum with peasant objections to the forced rice collections; it seems to have acted outside the authOrity of the CSI but not in opposition to it, That the SI leadership was direct1y involved was not at all clear. but Sosrokardono, the party 40

Becoming a Communist Party secretary, was immediately arrested and later Tjokroaminoto was also put on trial. Although some Indonesian ISDV members-notably Alimin and Musso-were ultimately implicated in the affair, the party itself disapproved of the conspiracy. Much as it approved of revolution, it could hardly support a movement that appealed to the wealthier rural santri and was said to have in mind the murder of all non-Muslims on Java: We are of the opinion that we must keep both feet on the ground and not idealize obscure groups without sufficient evidence. For the time being we wish to make no further judgment of Hadji Ismael's association and continue to place more faith in the work of such people as Semaun and Darsono. 22

The Carut affair horrified the Ethica1Iy inclined Europeans, and their conservative opponents pounced upon it as proof of the correctness of their predictions. The incident created a stir not only in the Volksraad but also in the Dutch parliament. The Adviser for Native Affairs. Hazeu. who was noted for his sympathy with the Indonesian movements, was forced to resign, and the embattled Ethical Governor General van Limburg Stirum faced even more heated opposition than before. The Europeans who remained optimistic about a peaceful Indonesian transition to the modem world became much more cautious in their opinion of the ability of politically oriented popular movements to aid in this process. Those officials who considered that the Sarekat Islam {.'Ould still perfonn a useful function thought that it must be gUided into less dangerous channels; and the SI leaders, alarmed by both the sharp government reaction and their inability to curb their rural follOWing, were only too ready to agree. For both the government and the SI, the answer seemed to lie in the organization of labor unions. The conditions of the Indonesian wage earners at that time can only by described as deplorable; a government investigation concluded that the income of unskilled workers was too low to provide a "hygienically sufficient means of existence" and had .Jed to the serious undernourishment of a large portion of the population.23 Private enterprise--and particularly the plantation industry, which was by far the largest employer-turned a deaf ear to the gov. emment's moral arguments, and so the authorities enCOUraged the Jabor unions as a means of forCing the desired improvements without overt government action. Moreover, they hoped that economic activity 41

Rise of Indonesian Communism would divert the energies of the popular movement into channels less dangerous to the state than the political lines along which it had thus far moved.·· The ISDV was at least as interested as the government in turning the SI to labor organization, although for very different reasons. A tum to the proletariat would probably increase the inOuence of Semanmg. the SI branch most closely identified with labor. It might also make the CSI leaders more receptive to the ideological views of the radical socialists and less inclined to stress religion. Moreover, the ISDV was sadly aware that its own ability to organize Indonesian labor was restricted. Although the party had considerable influence among the developing organizations of skilled and semiskilled urban workersnotably the VSTP, the most powerful union of this sort-it had virtually no foUowing among the plantation workers, coolies, and landless farm laborers who formed the vast bulk of the Indonesian proletariat. Nor did it influence the various associations of Indonesian petty officials and lower white-collar employees that were emerging at the time. The ISDV leaders, conscious of their limited urban appeal, had made an effort to organize rural labor in the sugar areas, which seemed an obvious point of potential unrest. In 191.7 Porojitno, an association of peasants and unskilled laborers, was founded on the party's initiative, and in January 1918 it was reorganized into the Workers' and Peasants' Association (Perhimpunan Kaum Buruh dan Tani, or PKBT). The movement was headed by Suharijo, an SI-ISDV leader from Demak, but its guiding spirit was Baars, who at the time was an enthusiastic proponent of agrarian action. 2~ The purpose of the organization was to unite the peasantry of the sugar districts, who wanted higher rents paid for their land and higher wages for work at harvest time, with the landless laborers employed in the cane Gelds and mills. It also was supposed to function as a cooperative, which would bypass the middlemen in marketing rice. The association led a precarious existence throughout 1918, changing its leadership and headquarters with disorganized rapidity; the combination of peasant and plantation labor proved unsuccessful, and it was split into two divisions, the Peasants' Association (PKT ) and the .Estate Workers' Association (PK:BO ). At the beginning of 1919 it moved to Surakarta and came under the hegemony of Hadji Misbach; after his arrest it found a new chief in the CS[ leader Surjopranoto.28 The PBKT was far overshadowed in importance by Surjopranoto's

42

Becoming a CommuTlist Party own PFB, which he began in Jogjakarta in April 1911 as Adidarmo, the Anny of Labor, an association of vast and hazy purposes, In 1918 Adidarmo developed a special division to support Iaid-off sugar factory workers and the families of deceased laborers; this branch became known as the Union of Factory Personnel (Personeel Fabrieksbond, or PFB ) and began to organize the sugar workers for improved wages. In December 1918 it had only about 700 adherents, but at its first congress a year later it claimed 6,000 full members and 2,000 candidates.2T The PFB's rapid rise was due not only to Surjopranoto's abilities as a popular leader and to the rural restlessness of 1919 but also to the status of its chief, who as a member of the Jogjakarta royal house of Paku Alam appeared to the inhabitants of that princely state both as a modem labor organizer and as a traditional defender of his people. The other branch of labor that resisted ISDV penetration, the Indonesian petty officials, was dominated by the pawnshop employees' union (PPPB). which had been founded in 1916 and was led by the CSI secretary Sosrokardono. vice-president was Alimin, a member of the ISDV executive, Alimin, however, divided his loyalties equally between the ISDV, Insulinde, and the Sareht Islam: in union matters he was very conscious that Indonesian government employees could not afford to be too radical, so the socialist revolutionaries could not hope for too much from this toehold in the pawnshop workers' organization. With little apparent prospect of being able itself to establish successful unions outside the urban proletariat, the ISDV saw that its best chance was to influence the labor organizations led by the SI, a strategy that looked the more promising because both Surjopranoto and Sosrokardono entertained radical notions and depended on Bamboyant personal leadership rather than a diSciplined organization to control their associations, A program of penetration could best be carried out via a trade union federation, something the socialist group had been trying to establish since 1915.28 Economic hardship and increased unrest caused the ISDV to step up its efforts during 1918, but it was not until the foll OWing year that its campaign was successful. In May 1919, at a congress of the pawnshop workers' union in Bandung. labor leaders from the ISDV and SI-Sosrokardono, Alimin, ScmauD, and Bergsma-outlincd a plan to unite the unions of the two parties in a common front. They envisioned a Revolutionary Socialist Federation of Labor Unions, which would become the upper house of a "true Volksraad," the lower chamber of which would be composed of

Its

43

Rise of Indonesian Communism delegates from the Indonesian political organizations. If the plan could be put into effect, Sosrokardono asserted, "we will be able to achieve by ourselves a government for the people of Indonesia, and will be able to change the capitalist society into a socialist one." 2V It was unanimously decided to establish a committee of union representatives headed by Surjopranoto to prepare the federation, and Semaun was assigned to draft its declaration of purpose and its constitution. As this action indicated, the Sarekat Islam leaders were most sanguine about their prospects in the labor field. A strike wave that broke out in 1918 reached major proportions the follOwing year, and because of government encouragement of the unions and the sharp upswing in business during 1919 it was by Indies standards extremely successful.30 The workers, seeing in the unions the same quick remedy for their iUs that had caused the peasantry to Bock to the rural SI, joined the new organizations in rapidly increasing numbers. During 1919 the number of labor unions grew swiftly, and the majority of organized workers came under SI leadership. At the October 1919 congress of the Sarekat Islam, the ISDV distributed a pamphlet urging the delegates to "join in the class struggle" and declaring that "the task of the SI is to create the organization through which the proletariat of the Indies will liberate itself. The SI should become the organization of the worker and small peasant class." at The response to this call was more than encouraging, for the meeting ex_ hibited an almost hysterical verbal radicalism that seemed to derive in good part from a desire to cut a deBant figure before the Dutch in the face of the reaction engendered by the Carot and the Tali-tali affairs. Both Tjokroaminoto and Surjopranoto argued in favor of the program evolved at the pawnshop workers' congress, asserting that the government would be unable to ignore the demands of the people united by the "'true Volksraad." The normally conservative Hadji Agus Salim urged endorsement of the revolutionary socialist title for the labor federation in the face of Alimin's objections that this would frighten off the workers in public employ; In their arguments, the CSI leaders identificd the government more closely with the capitalist system than ever before, declaring that the Indonesian proletariat must force the capitalists to grant them needed refonns, if necessary by means of a general strike.12 The ISDV was greatly pleased by this demonstration of radical intcnt, the more so since it had taken place without much goading from

44

Becoming a Communist Party Semarang. With cause to hope that the less radical SI leaders could be either won over or worked out, its view of that movement brightened considerably. The 1919 congress, Het V1'iie Woord declared. had shown that the Sarekat Islam was exchanging its religiOUS character for a secular socialist one, for at that meeting "the struggle was directed squarely against capitalism and was not, as in previous times, an attack by a few on 'sinful capitalism,' a combination of concepts that rests on a misunderstanding of socialism." 33 All that was needed was to get rid of the "weak spots in the sturdy body of the SI" 34 for it to become a true workers' and peasants' movement. The 51 leaders proved that they were serious in their congress state· ments by moving immediately to establish Indonesia's first labor fed· eration, which came into being on December 25, 1919, at a convention of SI and ISDV unions in Jogjakarta. It consisted of 22 unions with a total of 72,000 workers; the majority of the unions were under the control of Semarang, but the greater number of workers belonged to CSI·in.8uenced unions.S~ It had been generally assumed that Surjopra. noto, head of the largest member union, would lead the federation. However, Semaun outmaneuvered him at the convention and was ap· pointed bead of the interim executive of the federation, which cstablished its first headquarters in Semarang. 86 In the beginning, the convention decided that the new federation would bear the title proviSionally approved by the recent 51 congress. However, Semaun alarmed many delegates by identifying revolution" ary socialism with Bolshevism in a speech on the significance of the Russian November Revolution for the Indonesian struggle. The union representatives did not feel they wished to go so far as to tie the fed· eration publicly to Bolshevism, and to avoid giving any impression that they were doing so they asked that the revolutionary socialist label be dropped. Much to the disgust of his fellow ISDV members, Alimin played a major part in this retreat, declaring that, although he personally favored the Bolshevik standpoint, so radical a title would merely frighten off the white"collar unions. Seeing himself outvoted on the issue, Semaun acceded to a change of name, and the association emerged as the Concentration of Labor Movements (Persatuan Per· gerakan Kaum Buruh, or PPKB).117 If the ISDV failed to obtain a Bolshevik title for the labor federation, it did manage to secure one for itself. With the establishment of the Comintem in 1919, the social·democratic label had become increas· 45

Rise of Indonesian Communism ingly identified with the_gradualist adherents of the Serond International and unacceptable for those of a revolutionary viewpoint. The Dutch SDP had acknowledged this promptly by becoming the Communist Party of Holland (CPH), and some of the European members of the ISDV thought that their party should also assert its Comintern sympathies in this fashion. By no means all of them felt the need, however, and the question might have remained open had the party not been presented by its moderate rivals with a linguistic dilemma. At its congress of June 1919, the Indies SDAP decided that it had been a mistake to establish itseU as a branch of the Dutch socialist movement; casting about for a name of its own, it ended by becoming the Indies Social Democratic Party (ISDP).S8 Not only was this title very similar to that of the revolutionary socialist organization, but it was almost impossible to differentiate in Indonesian: that language, possessing no "v" sound, substitutes a "p" instead, with the result that the ISDV members were discomfited by being referred to by the moderate title.1i Since the ISDP showed no incUnation to change its new name, the older organization decided to do so. According to Alimin;tO plans to assume a new title were made during 1919, but no action was taken that year. The party did not even hold its annual congress, principally, it seems; because the European leadership was decimated and the ' two principal Indonesians, Semaun and Darsono. spent much of their time in jail.u It was not until January 1920 that the party was able to gather, but this sixth congress was a· hurried affair that only marked time until the seventh convention, scheduled for the ISDV's usual meeting month of May. At the seventh congress, the principal topiC of discussion was the proposal to change the name of the ISDV to Perseruatan Kommunist di India (Communist Party in the Indies ).42 Among its principal sponsors was Baars, who had returned from Holland in March, having found neither revolution nor employment there. He had been rescued from political and economic idleness by the Semarang municipality, which appointed him an engineer in its department of public works; the nomination understandably raised a furor, but the government blocked neither his retum nor his reinstatement in public employ. At the congress Baars spoke for those ISDV members who wished the organization to distinguish itself from Revisionist socialism and declare its kinship with the parties then aligning about the Comintem. He was backed by the powerful Indonesian-led Semarang faction, 46

Becoming a Communist Party which had adopted a resolution advocating the proposed change of title a few weeks before. For the Indonesian majority, a principal ground for backing the change appears to have been the desire for a name in their own language, one that avoided the problem of the letter "v," n It was a humble reason for deciding to become a Communist party, but a sufficient one: the motion passed by a good majority, and on May 23, 1920, the ISDV became the Indonesian Communist Party-the first such organization to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the former Russian Empire.

47

IV

Joining the Comintern WRITING from Europe when the Comintem was formed in 1919, Baars assured his Indies comrades that "the ISDV can state with pride that it has always worked in the spirit which is now recognized by the Third International as the spirit of Communism," 1 At the time, however, any congruence between the policies advocated by the- Comintern and the practices of the Indonesian party was largely coincidental, for the ISDV had very little. information concerning Soviet Russia or the Communist International. About the only reports on events in Soviet Russia that appeared in Het Vri;e WOO1d during 1919 were the regular wire-service accounts of the civil war. 2 It did print the manifesto issued by the 6rst Comintem congress, but it made no comment on it, either then or later.3 The ISDV journal also serialized Karl Kautsky's Soziaiismu8 und Kolonialpolitik-a study which, though it presented an Orthodo)l; interpretation of imperialism, was written by a Marxist who had been anathema to the Leninists ever since he supported the German war effort in 1914. The ISDV leaders were not, in fact, completely sure that they wished to impose on their own party the strict ideological confonnity that the Bolsheviks were impressing on the emergent Third International. They were not even certain about the Soviet revolution itself: as party cilRinnan Hartogh remarked at the January 1920 ISDV congress, they did not have the "objective materials" to fonn a clear opinion about the Bolsheviks. However, he added that "Russia still stands in the center of our interest" and that from available indications the Soviet regime seemed to be traveling in the right dircction. 4 Concern for international ideology was limited almost solely to European ISDV leaders, who were deeply divided as to the party's course. 'We will remember that at the ISDV congress of 1918 the party had resolved to transfonn itself into a political organization of some mass substance instead of remaining an e1ite group dependent for its 48

Joining the Comintem popular following on the Sarekat Islam. This endeavor was soon brought to a virtual halt, and Hartogh noted at the following congress that: "not much has come of the reorganization decided upon at the Semarang congress, because of the expulsion of Sneevliet, who was charged with canying it out. For the time being we have not been able to do more than keep ourselves functioning, in which we have been relatively successfu1."II On December 12, 1918, the ISDV executive held a, conference in response to its leaders' realization that the Troelstra Revolution had been defeated in Holland and that the Indies government was not going to concede anything more than its November Promises. The meeting determined that the party should emphasize organization and ideological training rather than mass revolutionary agitation: Should capitalism maintain itself for some time to come, we must, far more than has been the case until now, consider it our first duty to cultivate at least a thorough socialist knowledge and sympathy among a proletarian elite here, in order to equip it to appear as the leader of a future, inevitable clash. In this manner we will fulfill the prerequisites for a true mass action. e Although this resolution was framed in response to the immediate situation, it also represented the general concept of mass action held by Hartogh, the Surapaja leader who succeeded Baars as party chairman. In his view, the purpose of the party was, first, "to supply socialist information and to cultivate a core of SOCialistically, thinking and feeling people," and, second, to influence in a socialist direction such proletarian elements as were to be found in the other Indonesian movements. 1 To this end he refused to charter any new party branch unless he knew it would contain at least one or two members "with thorough socialist training-no small requirement for Indonesia in those or later days. First, Hartogh submitted. must come the organization and the knowledge; only then could there be mass action. S The perennial argument over party membership standards was thus reopened; as before, the whole question of the purpose of the ISDV was debated. The developments of 191~the increased government restrictions. the growing popular unrest, the discovery of Section B, and the ambivalence of the Sarekat IsIam---only aggravated ~e dispute; they convinced the Semarang group of the need to spread the revolutionary word while popular feelings still ran high, but they proved just as clearly to the Surabaja leaders the need to preserve the 49

Rise of Indonesian Communism party as a small, tightly disciplined organization that could ride out the gathering reactionary storm. Hartogh was plainly aIanned by the possibility of some party members developing a Section B of their own-not unreasonably, since the Surabaja leadership bad little control over the activities of Indonesian ISDV members, some of whom, we will remember, were implicated in the SI plot.' This was one reason for his refusal to charter branch organizations unless be was sure they would contain a trained core of socialists who could control them: as Hartogh put it, unless the party maintained tight discipline, it might find itself in a compromising situation that would allow the government to wreck it. By and large, the ISDV chairman added in defense of his policies at the January 1920 congress, the Indonesian workers jOined the ·party too carelessly, were indifferent to discipline, and did not pay their dues. The sixth party congress was held to confirm the Surabaja policy, which it did by re-electing Hartogh as chairman. I G The meeting lasted only one day-January 3, 1920-and no vote was taken on the policy itself. Semarang maintained that the congress was steamrollered and subsequently refused to accept its decisions as legitimate. ll Bergsma voiced the Semarang objections in an editorial note appended to the account of the congress in Het Vriie Woord. The opposition, he stated, believed that the party should not allow fear of being compromised to interfere with the establishment of new branches where there was a demand for them. Only with a large number of branches could the socialist message really be spread, since propagandizing could only be effective with direct missionary effort.12 The debate continued on the pages of Het Vrije Woord,u and inevitably it became a major topic at the May 1920 congress. By the time of the May meeting, Surabaja was apparently ready to yield control of the party. for it approved a shift of ISDV headquarters-and thus party leadership-back to Semarang "for practical reasons." Nonetheless, Hartogh made a strong plea for his program, arguing as before that the ISDV should be an elite organization devoted to spreading "socialist infonnation" and to strengthening the proletariat against "capitalist oppressors of all nationalities.'" If Hartogh asserted that the Comintem represented the only true s0cialists and that the world revolution was at hand, but he and the outgoing Surabaja executive rejected the Semarang proposal that the party assume the Communist label. The Indonesian masses did not 51)

Joining the Comintem Wlderstand the ABCs of socialism, he pointed out; bow then could they be committed to one of socialism's many "European nuances'?

U the !SDV wishes to agree to the change in name, then it will also have to accede to tho criticism expressed about the "'false socialists" in this and other

countries. Are tbere-and I measure it very generously-ten members of our nssoc:IatJon ca.pa blc of th e independent criti cism necessary for this? I think

not. Party formation in the Indies is still in an embryOniC stage; differentia. tion is only beginning to take place. At the moment a member of the executive o f Budi Utomo is at the sa.me time a member of the executive of

one of our branches. 1 could name more such cases. Moreover, the proposal for the change of name bas not come from a majority of our members. but from a few leaders. In itself there should be no reason to object to this, provided a majority is found which. after hearing the argwnents pro and con, will come independently to a decision. In view of the nature of the majority of our members-I mean this not as a slur; I am merely stating a fact-there can be no doubt that this will not be the case.15 Bergsma. Baars, and Semaun argued against Hartogh that only a change in name was involved in order to distinguish the ISDV from the "false socialists" and identify it with the Comintern .. It ~ould not, they assured, imply a shift in policy, for the ISDV had always been sympathetic to Bolshevik socialism: "We have been Communists for a long time now," Bergsma asserted. Hartogh pointed. out, however, that the ISDV members, even if they all sympathized with the Russian Revolution. did not unanimously endorse for Indonesia such institutions as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soviet system, which Baars himself had just mentioned as essentials of the Communist program. The ISDV was too small to indulge in sectarianism, he held; and there were too many useful things it could do without committing itself to one corner of the revolutionary arena. Finally, he announced that if the party approved the proposal, he would have to refuse any leading function in it. 18 The motion was put to a vote; only the Dutch-dominated branches of Surabaja and Bandung and a member-at-Iarge from Temate opposed the transformation of the ISDV into the PKI.17 A new executive was accordingly elected, consisting of the Semarang-based core group of Semaun (chairman ), Darsooo ( vice-chainnan ), Bergsma (secretary), Dekker (treasurer), and Baars (commissioner); members outside Semarang were Starn ( Tuban ), Dengah and Kraan (Surabaja ).

51

Rise of Indonesian Communism and Sugono (Bandung).18 For the flrst time Indonesians were given the top posts in the party. Moreover. the Netherlanders in the new executive core were noted proponents of agitation among the Indonesian masses. The new party leadership was committed to greater activity among the local population, but it still faced the problem of deBning the tenus on which this work would take place. Should the Communists aim first of all at preserving their influence in the Sarekat Islam. or should they . sacrifice this if necessary by competing with the SI leaders for popular favor? How much of Communist doctrine could be insisted on in preindustrial Indonesia. where even the party's leadership was often ignorant of-or willing to ignore-the Marxist tenets? Similar questions were being asked at this time in Soviet Russia. where the Comintem was preparing to convene a congress that would devote considerable attention to Communism in the East. The task of the Third International was not an easy one. for although Lenin's doctrine on imperialism had given an ideological basis for Communist interest in the colonial question. it provided only the haziest indication of what Asian Communist parties should do. Moreover, the problem of balancing circumstances in the precapitalist East against the need to preserve overall unity in Communist policy was an exceedingly difficult one, for which in fact the International never achieved a satisfactory solution. Behind all Comintem decisions stood the red eminence of Soviet Russia, and it was Russia's experience and interests which. beyond the requirements of ideology itself. played the greatest role in determining the first Asian program of the International. The Soviet victory was, in the first place. proof that the Communists could assume power in a country generally regarded as backward. Of equal signficance so far us the colonial question w~ concerned was the fuct that this victory was achieved largely without the active participation of the peasantry. Peasant acquiescence and approval were obtained by the promise of bread, land, and peace. but the seizure of power itself took place in the cities, and its active elements were the proletariat and the common soldiery. It is li1cely that much of the Comintem attitude toward the peasantry in the Asian revolution derived from this experience, which tended to reinforce the ideologically based disregard of the Communists for the political potential of the peasantry. Neither Marx nor Engels had had much regard for the peasants; they were considered too unorganized, too b~ck\vard , and too possessed of a "petty-bourgeois" desire 52

Joining the Comintem to own land to be an effective revolutionary force. At some points Marx and Engels had maintained that the landless peasants might adhere to the proletarian cause, but this affiliation they considered to be of a wholly subordinate nature and of little consequence for the revolution. The peasantry did not constitute a distinct class, they claimed, and therefore it could not be an independent force in the class struggle. As we shaH see the International considered that peasant demands should be a principal part of the Asian Communist program-just as the Bolsheviks had used peasant demands to gain popular support for their cause-but at the same time it was assumed that the peasantry would be a docile follower of the proletariat and that the urban workers would thus be the dynamic force of the revolution. This resulted in a curious ambivalence in the Comintern program, whereby the International insisted that the Asian revolution would be agrarian in nature and that the support of the peasantry was vital for its success, ·at the same time cautioning that the peasants could not playa truly active revolutionary role and that the Communists should refrain from relying on them too greatly. The Cominfem never abandoned this dual attitude, and it was not until the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China that Soviet policy makers came to realize that the peasantry might be a driving force and not just a vehicle in the Asian revolution. The Soviet experience in the period just after the revolution was also important in the development of the Comintem colonial program. This influence was partly negative, since Russia's greatest hopes and fears lay in the West-hope for a revolution in Europe. fear of Allied intervention in the civil war-and this, added to the then prevalent belief that Communist rule in agrarian Russia could be ensured only by proletarian victory in a highly industrialized land, led the Bolshevik leaders to neglect the Asian question. In another sense, however, the civil war period did force the Soviets to consider the East: Russia desired to maintain the loyalty of the Tsarist Central Asian territories and to maintain Russian influence vis-a-vis that of the British in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Soviets were in no position to use force in these areas, and so it was necessary to rely on persuasion. The semifeudal rulers of Central Asia could hardly be appealed to with Marxist slogans, and so the two themes given the greatest emphasis in Russian propaganda in the East were Islam and independence. Incongruous though it was for atheist Communism to base its plea upon religion, the Bolsheviks were well aware that Islam struck the 53

Rise of Indonesian Communism deepest emotional chord in the areas where they were anxious to gain allegiance. Consequently, the period between 1917 and 1920 saw a steady stream of proclamations, congresses, and propaganda ~mpha­ sizing Russian friendship with the Muslim peoples. The first Soviet declaration on the colonial question was an Islamic appeal-the proo. lamation "To AIl Muslim ToUers of Russia and the East," issued a few weeks after the Bolshevik seizure of power. In addition to promising religious freedom to the Islamic peoples of the fonner Russian Empire, it called on the Muslims of Turkey, Persia, and India to take up arms against imperialism. In February 1918 a "Mohammedan Central Commissariat" was fonned to further revolution in the Muslim areas of the East, and in November of that year and the next the Soviet government sponsored the first and second All-Russian Congress of Communist Muslim Organizations. I ' These activities were spurred mainly by the need for Central Asian support, but the Soviets were also intrigued by the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic movement, which seemed then to be growing into a powerful force in the Muslim world. Seeing in it the same antiWestern potentialities that the Indies authorities had feared earlier in the century. they called for a "revolutionary tie with the Muslims of the English, Italian, French, German, Dutch and other colonies, who find themselves under the oppression of the European imperialists." 20 The League for the Liberation of the East, formed in November 1918, took up the question of Pan-Islamism and concluded: This movement is, to be sure, still basically national and religiOUS. But Islam has always been an active, political religion ; the Mohammedans are not exclusively or even predominantly a theological people, but a political one; their religiOUS life is filled with a political, militant spirit. Pan-Islamism can thus also be used for political purposes--especially for furthering the movement for national independence.~l

In December 1918 the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party announced that it would establish a Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples. This office was to carry the revolutionary message beyond the Soviet borders, principally via Islamic ties, for "'We, the Muslim Communists, who know better the language and the way of life of the peoples of the East, who are Muslim in our great majority, are duty-bound to take the most active part in this saered work." n These sweeping gestures were inspired by emergency conditions; 54

Joining the Comintern they were thus concerned with slogans and tactics rather than analysis and grand strategy, and they contributed little to a program for Asian Communism. The single exception was the League for the Liberation of the East (Soiuz osvobozhdeniia Vostoka ), which was established as a pilot organization from which it was hoped to develop a "special International of the East, in accordance with the peculiar circumstances under which the various nations of the East exist, have developed, and will necessarily continue to develop."!!3 . At its fO\lllding convention-the first occasion on which the Bolsheviks discussed the unification of the East against imperialism 2f_the League set forth a program that analyzed the nature of the Asian revolution and outlined the Communist role in it. It rejected the Asian bourgeoisie, declaring that only the working class-peasants, laborers, and artisans--could carry on the revolution against imperialism. The aim of the anti-imperialist movements should be to create governments based on "healthy nationalism": these were to be "workers' republics," which would embody the principles of both national and class self. detennination. In spite of Asia's backwardness, the League held, it would not be necessary for the workers' republics to pass through the capitalist stage: for with the world socialist revolution already begun the masses could seize power themselves from the feudal classes and thus avoid the period of bourgeois rule. The program envisioned the unification of these republics into a giant federation, which would be "unselfishly" exploited by Soviet Russia.2~ In addition, the League outlined an action program for the Asian revolutionaries that was adapted directly from the experiences of the Bolshevik Revolution. 28 This attempt at establishing an Asian Commupist program proved completely abortive; nothing further seems to have been done with the League, and at the Second All. Russian Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, held a year later, the League's ideas were almost com· pletely contradicted. The congress passed resolutions calling for the formation of Asian Communist parties that would become sections of the Comintern and for support of the Asian national liberation movements as a means of overthrowing Western capitalism. Lenin, addressing the meeting on the immediate duties of the Asian Communist movements, declared : The task is to arouse the toiling masses to revolutionary activity, to translate the true Communist doctrine, which was intended for the CommlDlists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out 55

Rise of Indonesian Communism those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to merge with the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle. . . . You will have to base yourselves on that bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and cannot but awaken, among those peoples, and ~hicb has its historical justification. At the same time, you must find the way to the toiling and exploited masses of every country and tell them in the language they understand that their only reliable hope of emancipation lies in the victory of the international revolution, and that the international proletariat is the only a11y of all the hundreds of millions of toiling and exploited peoples of the East. 21 This view was typical for Lenin, who had been a consistent proponent of cooperation with Asian "'bourgeois nationalism" on the grounds that in precapitalist areas the bourgeoisie and nationalism were progressive forces,28 Bolshevik opinion was not united on this interpretation, however, and not only the League for the Liberation of the East but the 1919 congress of the Russian Communist Party held for a struggle against the Asian bourgeoisie. 2' At the same party congress Bu1charin advocated a policy that went much further than Lenin's toward collaboration with nonproletarian forces, The Bolsheviks, he declared, should exercise extreme opportunism in supporting movements in Asia, since anything that would hurt the imperialists would help the world revolution: If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots, the Negroes, the Indians, etc., we lose nothing by it. On the contrary. we gain; for the national gain as a whole will damage foreign imperialism . . . . The most outright nationalist movement, for example, that of the Hindus, is only water for our mill. since it contributes to the destruction of English imperialism.&!)

pn the face of it, the question of the Asian bourgeoisie was a minor one, since that class represented a small and feeble segment of Asian society; but the matter had implications that went beyond the bourgeois class itself. First of all, the Asian nationalists might be won by a program that attacked foreign capitalism, but they would dislike a frontal assault on their own struggling middle class, especially if this diverted energies from the effort against colonial rule. Moreover, mOst of the Asian nationalist leaders were members of the intelligentsia; they were thus by Marxist de6nition bourgeoiS, and the Communists referred to the movements they led as "bourgeois nationalist." The identification of nationalism with the bourgeoisie made the Commu56

Joining the Comintern nists' attitude toward cooperation with Asian nationalism dependent on their view of the Asian bourgeoisie; and this lent great importance to the question of the Comintem's attitude toward that class. By the time the Comintem was founded, in 1919. there had thus been a good deal of agitation about Asia but very little progress toward a Communist policy in the East. There existed only Lenin's fragmentary contributions on the relations between Communism and Asian nationalism, and these had been contradicted in other Bolshevik statements. There had been virtually no discussion of Communist policy toward the Asian peasantry,81 and the statements on Islam had been largely opportunistic, based on the needs of the Russian emergency. The only attempt to create an organization and policy for Asian Communism bad failed completely, which, considering that program's provisions, was just as well. The first Comintem congress added nothing to this meager progress toward a Communist colonial policy, mentioning the Asian question only in passing as a minor aspect of the world revolution. In July 1920, however, the second Comintem congress set itself to amend the Internationa1's previous neglect. Zinoviev, reporting for the Comintern's executive committe (ECCI), apologized to the congress for the committee's failure to pay adequate heed to the Asian situation.82 A Commission on National ,and Colonial Questions was appointed to outline a Communist program in the East; reflecting the importance the congress accorded the problem, Lenin himself assumed its chairman-

ship. The secretary of the commission was Sneevliet, who appeared under his Comintem name, Maring. 33 He attended the congress as the representative of Indonesia, extrapolating for the purpose on the authorizations given him by Indies organizations at the time of his expulSion from the colony. Although he clearly spoke in his capacity as a Communist rather than as an advocate of the CSI, much of his considerable activity at the congress was directed toward securing Comintern approval of cooperation with the Sarekat Islam. His reservations regarding the ISDV's close relations with the Muslim movement seem to have vanished when he left the Indies. Arriving in Holland to Gnd the radical socialists despondent over the failure of the Troelstra Revolution-which doubtless made the Indies situation seem relatively bright -he had assured a welCOming rally that the Sarekat Islam was a "proletarian movement" and that "the Mohammedan religious tend57

Rise of Indonesian Communism ency of this movement was only a side issue." 34 At the August 1919 congress of the SOP. now the Communist Party of Holland (CPH). he had spoken in the name of both the ISOV and "our comrade-in-arms, the left wing of the Sarekat Islam" and assured the meeting that:

The Sarekat Islam continues to hope for revolution, and it is justi6ed in doing so---after all, the Third International has committed itself to the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the areas exploited by European capitalism."

The news Sneevliet subsequently received from the Indies seems only to have strengthened this conviction,u and at the second Comintern congress he made a strong ,plea for international support for the Indonesian Communists' strategy :

This organization, although its name-Sarekat Islam-is a religious one, bas achieved a class character. When we realize that the struggle against sinful capitalism stands in the program of this movement, that the struggle is not omy directed against the government but also against the Javanese nobility, we can appreciate that it is the duty of the socialist revolutionary movement to establish firm bonds with this mass organization, with the Sareht Islam. I am of the opinion that only through mass action can a truly socialist movement or revolutionary resistance be organized, that orily in this way can capitalism be opposed by genuine power. 51

Sneevliet's view fortunately coincided with Lcnin's-indeed, this may well have been why he was named the commission's secretary. The Russian leader presented to the commission a set of theses on the colonial question which emphasized the necessity of cooperation with bourgeois-democratic nationalism: Tl),ere is no doubt that every nationalist movement can on1y be of a hourgeois-democratic character, because the great mass of the population of the underdeveloped countries consists of the peasantry, which is the representative of bourgeois-capitalist relationships, It would be utopian to think that proletarian parties, insofar as it is possible for them to exist in the place in these countries, would be capable of carrying out the Communist policy in the underdeveloped countries without having a de£.nite relationship with the peasant movement, without in fact supporting it. B8

am

In Lenin's view. the Communists should pursue the follOwing line in underdeveloped regions: Support of the peasant movement in the backward lands against the landowners and all fonns and remnants of feudalism. We must above all strive to

58

Joining the Comintem give the peasant movement as revolutionary a character as possible. to organize the peasants and all the exploited people into soviets wherever possible, and thus to create a close connection between the west European proletariat and the revolutionary movement of the peasants in the East, in the colonies and the underdeveloped areas. The Communist International is to create a temporary cooperation, even an alliance, with the revolutionary movement of the colonies and the backward countries; it must not, however, amalgamate with it but must maintain absolutely the independent character of the proletarian movement-albeit only in embryo forrn. 3D

It was lucky for Sneevliet that he had such a distinguished ally in his opinions, for other members of the committee on the colonial question disagreed sharply with this view. In the end, even Lenin's great prestige could not bring unity, and the committee reported two separate sets of theses to the congress. 111e alternate theses, which were proposed by the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, called for Communist opposition to bourgeois nationalism as a force basically opposed to social revolution. Roy considered the landless peasantry to be the natural ally of the proletariat and counted on increasing landlessness to bring about Communist domination of the political movement in Asia. The bourgeois nationalists, he accused, would try to take contrO'l of the less sophisticated peasant movement and usc it for their own, nonsocial~st ends; and thus the Communists must do their best to prevent the spread of bourgeois nationalism. 40 Lenin, on the other hand, argued that by nature the peasantry was bourgeois-democratic, and he did not see the landless peasants as a considerable force distinct from the rest of the peasantry. Both Roy and Lenin thought that the colonial revolution would be essentially agrarian; but their diHering analyses of the class role of the peasantry led the one to argue for cooperation with the nationalist movement and the other to reject it. 41 So powerful were the objections to Lenin"s theses that he was forced to make some amendments to his original proposal in order to make it palatable to the more radical members of the committee. These changes consisted chiefly in the substitution of the word "revolutionary" for the tenn "bourgeois-democratic" when referring to nationalist movements, an increased emphasis on the need to {onn peasant soviets, a denunciation of religion and religiOUS movements, and a demand that Communists expose those privileged classes in the colonies which benefited from and supported the rule of the imperialists.~ 2 59

Rise of Indonesian Communism In view of the difficulties Lenin's program experienced in committee, further debate seemed likely when the two proposa1s reached the floor of the congress. The Comintem, however, was saved from argument by Sneevliet, who as commission secretary effectively sabotaged Roy's

prop"'al,

.

I see no difference between the theses of Comrade Lenin and Comrade Roy. They are basically in agreement. 'The difficulty consists merely in Gnding the proper attitude toward relations between the revolutionary nationalist and socialist movements in the underdeveloped lands and colonies. In practice this difIlculty does not exist. It is necessary in practice to work together with the revolutionary nationalist elements. and we will accomplish only half our task if we deny this movement and put ourselves forth as doctrinaire Marx· ists. 43

This move presented a diplomatic way out of the situation, and both theses were adopted by the Comintem. Actually. however, only Lenin's analysis was used during the period with which we are dealing.u The Asian revolution, the Comintem thus decided, would be bour· geois-democratic in fonn , and the Communists must call first for land reform on the basis of small peasant ownership. On the other hand, the capitalist stage could be skipped a nd a peaceful transition to socialism would be possible: "If the revolutionary. victorious proletariat organizes a systematic propaganda and the Soviet govenunents come to its aid with all possible means, it is correct to assume tha t the capitalist stage of development will not be necessary for these peoples." n If Sneevliet saw the Comintern adopt a favorable view on the vital issue of alliance with bourgeois nationalism, he found it opposed in another matter of importance to the Indonesian Communists. This was the question of Pan-Islamism, which, we will remember, the Bolshevilcs had previously encouraged primarily because of their weakness in Central Asia. By the time of the second congress the Soviet position in that area of the world had improved to the point where the stick as well as the carrot could be employed to maintain Russian influence; conse· quently, it was no longer so necessary to play upon their Islamic and regional sentiments. On the contrary, these feelings were now felt to be centrifugal forces, which interfered with the establishment of Soviet authority. Thus, in spite of the manifest interest of SneevUet and others that the Comintcrn utilize Islamic solidarity. or at least be neutral on the subject, the second congress declared: 60

Joining the Comintern It is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and the Pan-Asian movement and similar currents of opinion which attempt to combine the struggle for liberation from European and American imperialism with a strengthening of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landowners, the clergy, etc.·' The Comintem position on this point was to create a serious problem for the Indonesian Communists in their relations with the Sareket Islam, for not only was Pan-Islamism then gaining powerful adherents within the Indonesian movement, but the thesis was an open invitation for the PKI's opponents to declare the Communists hostile to Islam. The party's immediate objections to the Comintem program were not based on the religious issue. however. but on the decision to support bourgeois nationalism. One might have expected the PKI to approve the Comintem endorsement of cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists in view of its implications for the alliance with the Sarekat Islam, but in fact the Indies Communists viewed any open concession to nationalism as anathema: We have fought against nationalism. We, too, desire an independent Indies, but are of the opinion that this can only be achieved lastingly and in the quickest manner through the struggle against imperialism as a whot~thus througb struggling against imperialism together with the other workers out· side the Indies, and thus by being international. 41 One reason for the vehemence of Indies Communist opposition to nationalism was the presence of Netherlanders in the party leadership. The Dutch members tended to view nationalism in its European context, ·seeing in it the reactionary force that had undone the socialist movement at the outbreak of World War I. Acutely aware of their precarious position as an alien minority in the indigenous movement, they tended to identify nationaJism with xenophobia; moreover. although they desired the overthrow of colonial rule, they viewed a revolution that barred foreigners from the archipelago as a disastrous prospect: Suppose that all [non-Muslims] were to leave the country at once: then thousands of your own countrymen would starve to death, since the Indies social organism functions in such a way that the leadership of a large number of trained technical personnel is indispensable. The persons who are

61

Rise of Indonesian· Communism capable of giving that leadership are rull chiefly non-Islamic. Throw them out of the country and in the large cities you will have famine and plague. 48 The Europocentric Surabaja group was particularly disinclined to make any concessions to Indonesian nationalist sentiment. We will remember that in the discussion of the party program at the 1918 congress Surahaja had opposed even mentioning national liberation as a feature of the Indonesian revolution. The Semarang Dutch leaders were more willing to accede to Indonesian feelings on the importance of national independence as a revolutionary goal; however, partly because they were strongly inclined toward syndicalism, they also refused to separate national from class revolution. Thus, although Bergsma argued the importance of the Asian anticolonial struggle for the proletarian revolution in Europe, he concluded that "only the Communists" method of struggle" (by which he meant class warfare) could bring national liberation; and he regretted the fact that few Asians really seemed to appreciate this.4~ A striking example of this tendency to eschew ·activity that could be construed as nationalist rather than socialist was seen at the founding of the Concentration of Labor Movements in December 1919. We will remember that the PPKB was envisioned by the SI leaders as the upper house of a "true Volksraad," the lower chamber of which would consist of political party representatives. This body was formed at the same time and place as the PPKB and was called the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements (Persatuan Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Rakjat; (PPKR). The program it adopted was close to the Communists' own, and, speaking for the ISDV, Bergsma declared that the only thing wrong with it was the assumption that it could he carried out under a nonsocialist regime. 60 Tjokroarrunoto had stated at the Concentration's founding convention that socialism was admirable but would have to wait until after the liberation of Java; this separation of the two elements of revolution was totally unacceptable to the ISDV. Accordingly, the party refused to join the · Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Hindia (formerly Insulinde), and ISDP in the Concentration, and Bergsma wished the new grouping a speedy demise. It was one thing to cooperate with non-Communists in a labor federation, for unions had an implicit class character; it was another thing to cooperate with the same people in a political alliance oriented toward independence. Acknowledging that itS refusal to join political alliances on a national, nonclass basis might well lead to the 62

Joining the Comintem party's isolation, ISDV chairman Hartogh declared that this was a risk it would have to take: "Even if this viewpoint temporarily destroys our organization every one of us, man for man, will continue to defend it and propagate it indiVidually." Ol The antinationalism of the ISDV jPKI was not simply a product of its Dutch element, however; to discover the sense in which this senti· ment was shared by the party's non.European membership we must first understand the position of nationalism in the Indonesian independence movement at the time. It is important to realize that there was then a very real distinction in the Netherlands Indies between the "national" and "nationalist" movements. Most of the Indonesian parties compromising the independence movement at this stage, although they were "national" in the sense of being Indonesian, were either founded on a regional-cultural basis-as were Budi Utomo, Pasundan, and the Sarekat Sumatra~r were international in their ideological back· ground. The PKI belonged to the latter group, and so did the Sarekat Islam. which in the words of one of its leaders. "cherishes the idea of brotherhood; it is national, but at the same time through religion inter· national." 52 Although these groups became increasingly conscious of a national identity, they did not take an Indonesian national state to be their supreme goal; this was left to a new generation of parties that arose only at the end of the period discussed in this volume. There was, however, one Indies party of this era that was vociferously nationalist; this was Insulinde, which maintained that religiOUS, ethnic. and economic differences must be subordinated to the achievement of an independent national state. But Insulinde was nationalist without being national-for it was primarily Eurasian in origin, and one of its chief reasons for promoting an Indies nation·state was to overcome the ethnic and religious barriers between that group and the main body of the Indonesian population. Insulinde's principal leader and ideologue was E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, whose political ideas mingled radicalism of both left and right. A believer in the naturally superior man-he was an admirer of the racist theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain-Douwcs Dekker argued that the Indies suffered from being explOited by a foreign elite rather than by its own. The nationalist regime that should replace colonial rule would be based on social justice but would not be socialist; the class struggle must be subordinated to the national struggle, and it was the duty of the work· ers to support the Indies bourgeoisie in its bid for power. Outside aid 63

Rise of Indonesian Communism would probably be necessary to seize power; this might be had from America or from Japan in .return for the promise that their capital would be allowed to enter the country, or perhaps from Soviet Russia. which seemed interested in promoting anticolonial revolution. This last suggestion was greeted .by the Indies Communists as rank opportunism: "'Bolshevism may be viewed by some nationalists as a welcome guest, but time will teach them that Bolshevism will also cause many of these nationalists' ideals to go up in smoke, since in a Commtmist society there is no place for the national capitalism of which so many nationalists dream." 113 Since nationalism in the Indies was embodied in Insulinde, it did not appear to be a viewpoint that sprang naturally from the indigenous anticolonial movement but was rather,like Marxism, an ideology that a certain faction wanted an essentially uncommitted national movement to adopt. The nationalist-Communist competition in this sense was very real, for Douwes Dekker's movement and the ISDV jPKI were struggling at the time for control of the Sarekat Islam. Insulinde was at the height of its activity in 1919, for all three of its major leaders had returned from exile and were making vigorous efforts to increase their political influence. In June, Douwes Dekker took his followers out of Insulinde ·and formed the Sarekat Hindia (Union of the Indies) in order to break the identification of the movement with the increasingly conservative Eurasian community and to strengthen it among radically inclined Indonesians. The Sarekat Hindia then made a major bid for in8uence in the 51, urging the mass movement at its 1919 congress to abandon its religious orientation on the grounds that it provided no sound basis for political action, change its name to Sarekat India. and adopt a program of national liberation and social iusticc.6~ Much as the Communists desired the SI to reject its religiOUS label, they refused to support the Sarekat Hindia's urgings, arguing instead that if the SI were to change its name, it would do best to call itself the Sarekat Internasiona1. They were unwilling to give their rivals any advantage, for the Sarekat Hindia's revolutionary nationalism attracted not only various members of the 51 but also a number of Indonesian Communists; it was in fact the ISDV member Alimin who made the Sarekat Hindia's principal plea for alignment with nationalism. Dogmatic inclinations were thus reinforced by practical motives in opposing nationalism: to prevent the 51 from getting its political inspiration from the Sarekat Hindia rather than from the Communists, and to 64

Joining the Comintern keep the primary loyalty of its . own members who also belonged to the SH, the ISDVjPKl stressed the hollowness of Sarekat Hindia Claims to seek social justice, its opportunistic search for foreign imperialist support, and its desire to replace colonial with Indies capitalist oppression. The Eurasiim origin and the political theorizings of Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia lent credence to the Communist arguments that nationalism was an instrument used by an aspiring bourgeoisie to secure its own hegemony; it thus did not appear to many Indonesians to be mere Marxist casuistry when the Communists argued that '1nsulinde is dangerous for the Indonesians because it seeks independence for the Indies but not for the native population .... The freedom of the country alone will be useless, at least for its natives." G~ Moreover, the energy the nationaJists displayed during 1919 proved their undOing, for Insulinde participation in the Surakarta anticorvee action resulted in the arrest of several of its major leaders and the disruption of an important part of its organization. The establishment of the Sarekat Hindia proved a mistake, for it did not acquire the image of a purely Indonesian movement, and the govenunent withheld the charter necessary for its existence as a legal party. By 1920 it was already evident that the movement was in serious trouble, and the Communists began to lose their fear of it as an alternative focus of revolutionary discontent. The failure of the Sarekat Hindia did not lessen Indies Communist opposition to nationalism. Rather, it seemed to them to prove the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of nationalism: it was an expression of bourgeois ambitions, and since in the Indies the middle class was composed overwhelmingly of non-Indonesians, its lack of appeal to the indigenous population was only natural. To the Communists this feebleness meant that the Indonesian revolution would combine the national liberation and proletarian stages of struggle and thus aim directly at establishing a socialist state. For that reason, they considered, the Indonesian revolutionary effort was on a higher plane than that of other Asian countries, where a rising native bourgeois class existed and where the independence movement was in nationalist hands. G6 This interpretation was eXpressed by the major Dutch mentors of the Indies Communist movement 57 and by all the Indonesian Communists who achieved international importance during this period; it was, in fact, one of the very few points on which they agreed. This analysis was not accepted by the Comintern, and it was even65

Rise of Indonesian Communism tuully to become an important point of conflict between the ECCI and the PKI. The Indonesian party was later charged with left deviation. an accusation that was true so far as the PKI rejected support of nationalism as such and continued to aim for a socialist and not a national-democratic revolution. On the other hand. PKI opposition to nationalism by no means meant that it refused to cooperate with the "national" movement The Indonesian Communist leaders therefore were not in the same category as India's M. N. Roy, who consistently opposed cooperation with non-Communist mass movements; they supported Indonesian participation in the SI but argued that that movement was in essence neither bourgeois nor nationalist. Since the antinationalist view was held by the Semarang as well as the Surabaja faction and by the Indonesians as well as the Dutch, the transfer of power that took place at the May 1920 party congress did not mean a change in policy. Indeed, Baars stressed that the change of name to PKI would not entail this: "we have always made it a point of honor and a point of our practical policy to direct our glance first of all to the events taking place in the world at large; we have been strong and principled internafiolUllists, combating nationalism here as a thing fatal to the proletarian and peasant population." 68 After the May meeting, a referendum was held among the party branches to confirm the decision to change the organization's name. The party locals showed themselves overwhelmingly in favor of the Communist title, and when the results of the poll were received, the executive called a special congress for December 24, 1920, to consider affiliation with the Comintern. 511 The party leadership stated plainly that it expected the congress to rubber stamp the proposal: In point of fact the executive views this congress as a fonnality. In deciding to name ourselves a "Communist party" we made it self-evident that we would abo affiliate ourselves to the international Communist organization.to

The reason for the meeting, it was explained, was to head off any pos~ sible objections from Indies ~mmunists or the Comintern as to the procedure by which affiliation was decided. It was not expected that there would be any objections to the proposal itself; after all, the executive pointed out, there had been no protests about Sneevliet representing the PKI at the recent Comintem congress. The party had learned of this only after the mccting was over, and the Semarang branch of the PKI and SI had immediately acted to remove any doubts as to his quaJ~ 66

Joining the Comintern ifications by authorizing him to represent the two parties "wherever this is necessary in his opinion." 61 Affiliation with the Comintem was not so simple a matter as the executive indicated, however; the party still had to adjust its views to the Asian policy outlined by the International. On November 20, two weeks after the PKI executive announced its intention to link the party to the Comintem, Het Vrije Woord published the 6rst detailed reports of the International's decisions on the national and colonial question.s2 Baars, speaking for the editors of Het Vrije Woord, chose first to em· phasize the similarity between the Comintern theses and the PKI view: The international congress in Moscow has thus accepted our tactic as a Communist one in the sense that the delegates there have, on theoretical and practical grounds, detennined a standpoint and prescribed a line of action which for us no longer needs to be determined and prescribed because it has already long been our own.1l3 As he proceeded, however, he let his reservations be known: In point of fact, nothing was detennined for us [by the theses on the national and colonial questions}. for on reading the theses it will be clear to everyone that they were drawn up with a special view to India and Egypt. Conditions there are different: among the nationalists in those countries can be found real revolutionaries who are driven wholly by idealism and who do not shrink before difficulties; and the attitude of the Communists there can thus be a different one from that taken here. . . . Even so. the theses concede. in our opinion, too much to nationalism. It is true that the Communist International has gone beyond the slogan that "national freedom" must come before the class struggle; but it still expects too much from nationalism and therefore spares it too greatly.

'1t is understandable and forgivable," Baars explained, .. that it is the Russians most of all who do this, since for them the nationalism of the oppressed middle classes in India, Egypt, and elsewhere really is an enonnous help in the struggle against England, the leader of the Entente." His estimation of the importance of Russia's national interest in shaping the colonial theses was very much to the point, and Russophile that be was, Baars allowed that if Indonesia had been a British dependency "if would have been very possible that-in order to help our Russian comrades and thus to deat the ruling power's imperialism a very serious blow-we would seek closer relations with nationalism." We can ahnost hear Baars' sigh of relief, however, as he found

67

Rise of Indonesian Communism himself able to draw the conclusion that, inasmuch as Indonesia was a colony and Holland was too busy making money to take part in European politics, this gesture of solidarity need not be made. Anyhow, he concluded, Indies nationalism was not reany against Dutch rule: Here, however, nationa~ is not revolutionary. and the ruling power does not fear it, but on the contrary flirts with it. We can thus pl'OCe!!d in precisely the same line which we have followed without hesitation until now, thereby acting completely in the spirit of the Communist International. U Baars's views were opposed as unorthodox by any of his comrades, there is no record of it. There was one point on which Comintern decisions did change PKI policy, however, and that was the matter of Volksraad participation. At its 1920 congress, the International determined that Communist move- . ments were to conclude alliances with parties of the non-Communist left where possible, to participate in eJections, and to use their parliamentary position to strengthen the leftist alliance. This strategy, known as the "united front from above," was advocated by the Comintem from 1920 to 1927; its opposite number, the "united front from below," was followed from 1928 to 1934 and called for the Communists to attack rather than to ally with the leadership of the non-Communist left in an effort to win over its supporters to their own party. The ISDV jPKI strategy on parliamentary participation had been curiously schizophrenic up to this point. The party had always taken part in town council ( gemeenteraad ) elections in the major Javanese cities, had formed alliances with other parties for electoral purposes, and had taken committee work in the councils seriously.54 1ts position on the Volksraad was extremely ambiguous. however. At first the party had planned to participate in the elections to the 1918 VolkSTaad, and it joined with the S1, Budi Utomo, and InsuUnde to support the centrist ISDV leader Westcrveld as a common candidate. The radicals were never more than lukewarm to the idea, however, and Semaun was violently opposed (we will remember that his attacks on Volksraad participation were an immediate cause of the Revisionist departure from the party). When the ISDVs partners in the electoral alliance wished to water down the campaign platform that the ISDV executive presented them, the party was only too willing to withdraw from the coalition and campaign against those who did participate.1I5

68

Joining the Comintem The ISDV boycott of the Volksraad was motivated principally by the thought that the assembly was do:omed to political failure. Such a body had been debated in the Dutch parliament for twenty-Bve years, and by the time it was finally established no one, Indonesian or Dutch, expected much to come of it. Its functions were purely advisory, and its method of selection made it seem highly unlikely that the left opposition would receive any representation at all. G6 With so little prospect of achieving anything by participation, it is not surprising that the ISDV decided to boycott the Volksraad in the hope of being able to say "I told you so" to the opposition groups that tried their luck. This tactic proved to be a mistake, for although Abdul Muis was the only member of the Indonesian opposition to be elected, Governor Ceneral van LimbW'g Stirum appointed to the council some of the more outspokenly anticolonial political leaders in an effort to draw the Indonesian opposition into cooperation with the government. Among them were Tjipto Mangunkusumo of Insuunde and Tjokroaminoto of the Sarekat Islam; the latter barely managed to gain party pennission to assume the post, for there was a strong noncooperation element in the 51, which seriously doubted that the appointment should be accepted.61 If the general composition of the Volksraad had been as conservative as had been widely prophesied, the ISDV could have hoped that the participating members of the Indonesian opposition would have been frustrated and angered by their experience. However, it happened that the conservative Europeans, uninterested in what they considered an unnecessary appendage to Indies goverrunent, did not bother to form parties, and those who did take an interest were largely from the Ethically inclined minority. Consequently, the elections resulted in a victory for the NIVB, a party that stood solid1y behind Van Limburg Stirum's program of Indonesian-Dutch association in colonial government.°s Together with the representatives from the "radicar partiesBudi Utomo, Insulinde, Sarekat Islam, and SDAP (ISDP)-this group fanned a majority of the council. With the Volksraad so constituted, there seemed a chance that the participating Indonesians, instead of being antagonized by their European colleagues, would find common ground with them and would thus be influenced away from the revolutionary left. An even greater danger to the ISDV was posed by the creation of the Radical Concentration in response to the events of November 1918. 69

Rise of Indonesian Communism TIle parly was not excluded from this alliance, for it was invited to take part with the proviso that it cease opposing participation in the assembly. Although some Semarang adherents were beginning to have second thoughts on the uselessness of VolkSTaad participation," the ISDV refused to change its stand. In part this was due to the same dislike of multiparty alliance that was to prompt the ISDV to reject the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements. It did not wish a nonclass alliance, and certainly not one that included the conservative Budi Utomo. Moreover, it wished to isolate the Sarekat Islam leaders as much as possible from the ISDP and Insulinde, both to preserve its own influence on them and to prevent their seeking to redress the advance of Semarang within their organization by gaining outside support. Consequently, the ISDV refusal to participate in the Radical Concentration was coupled with frantic eHorts to keep the SI out also." The attempt to prevent Sarekat Islam participation failed, and although the Radical Concentration never became an effective bloc, it did provide a basis for day-to-day contact beh,\,een key leaders of the SI,ISDP, and InsulindefSarekat Hindia. In the Volksraad context, the moderate socialist ISDP presented the chief danger to the Communists, for its representatives, familiar with parliamentary procedure and eager to influence the Indonesian delegates, gave them considerable advice and support. The ISDP was able at this time to exert a rather considerable influence on the CSI,1' with the result that the ISDV leaders saw their position as principal European advisers to the mass movement seriously reduced. Moreover, the Volksraad participants were able to use the assembly as a podium from which to make parliamentariIy immune attacks on government policy, and this became increasingly important with the steady restriction of free expression that took place after 1918. The ISDV accordingly began to question the wisdom of its Volksraad boycott, for the party could have used delegates there both to make propaganda and to pry the SI from jts parliamentary allies. At the same time, however, powerful voices within the Semarang party faction opposed participation in any representative assembly. At the beginning of 1920 Semaun refused to take part in the conunittee work of the Semarang town counciL of which he was a member, on the grounds that parliaments were useful to the revolutionaries only as a means of publiCizing their views; serious participation, he declared, merely took up time that could be devoted to extraparliamentary activ70

Joining the Comintem ity. He was backed by the syndicalist-inclined Bergsma, who argued that constructive participation in the councils was self-defeating, since it could result in refonns that would only weaken the class struggIe.12 Semaun's principal opponent in this argument was the Surabaja leader Hartogh, and the transfer of the party chairmanship from him to Semaun in May 1920 accordingly lessened the likelihood of PKI parliamentary activity. New elections to the Volksraad were scheduled for early 1921, but the party continued its boycott and refused to put up any candidates. Then came the news that the second Comintern congress had decided in favor of the united front from above; this tipped the balance in favor of pro-Volksraad opinion. On December 21, three days before the special congress to discuss PKI affiliation with the Comintern, Het Vriie Waard announced that the meeting would have a second item on its agenda: participation in the Volksraad.13 In the same issue of the party journal, Baars argued for reversal of PKI parliamentary policy. In doing so, he warned that although the opinion of the Comintem should be weighed in reaching a decision, it should not be the sole reason for changing course: We could content ourselves with calling on the decision taken in Moscow, which leaves no doubt that the Communists must take part in parliamentary elections and must assume seats in parliament if elected. , .. There is a tendency among the European parties, ns has appeared from the events follow:ing the Moscow congress, which attempts to treat the theses of that congress the way a Christian does his Bible, and which wishes to suffice with saying "it must be done," thus cutting off further discussion. However much we must applaud true internationalism as a mighty step forward, . . . we feel it necessary to guard most strongly against a spirit which demands blind subjection to Moscow's commands. 74 Baars went on to remark that Comintem decisions had been generally made with an eye to marc developed countries than Indonesia, lands where the revolution was closer at hand and Commuf.list parties could think of organizing workers' and peasants' soviets to seize power: Here in the Indies. however, there is no question of soviets or their beginnings: here our abstention (from the first Volksraad elections] was connected with the fact that in our opinion no real parliament existed. Now we must detennine our position anew on the occasion of the second elections for the Volksraad-keeping in mind, naturally, the spirit of the decisions taken in Moscow, but also knowing that conditions like those in the Indies were not taken into consideration there.'I~ 71

•

Rise of Indonesian Communism As if to emphasize that the International's attitude would not be the

sole reason for a policy change, the party executive placed the question first on the agenda. before the matter of Comintem affiliation, and discussed it almost solely in terms of the situation in Indonesia. The chief debate was between Baars. the proponent of participation,7' and Bergsma. who pointed out that the PKI could never hope to win an elected seat-it was too late to enter a candidate for the 1921 elections anyway-and that it would therefore have to rely on appointment by the Governor General. This, in Bergsma's view, was entirely too humil· iating a method. Moreover, he maintained, Moscow's ideas ·about having Communist spokesmen in parliament were fine in principle, but in practice the PKI needed all its capable people for work among the masses.H

Semaun, previously the most vehement spokesman against participation, was ready to reverse himself on the grounds that there were too few other opportunities for publicly criticizing the goVernment. He pointed out that the candidate would have to be a Dutchman, since all the competent Indonesian party leaders were disqualified because they had served prison terms. This fitted his idea of the Dutch role in the party; he maintained that the European members were little qualified by language and customs to deal with the Indonesian masses and could therefore well be spared for the peripheral function of parliamentary . represcntation. 18 After a lengthy debate a vote was taken, and Vol1csraad participation was overwhelmingly approved.7 ' The congress named J. C. Starn, an executive member from Strrabaja, as its candidate. Not long afterward, however, the PKI discovered that its candidate was due to go to the Netherlands on leave, a fact he had somehow neglected to mention at the congress.so The party therefore appointed Baars in his stead. He hardly was in th~ category of useless European; however, he was well aware that his return to the Indies had been something of a fluke; anxious to avoid expulsion, he had avoided public activities that might give cause for banishment 81 Under these circumstances, being able to air his opinions with parliamentary immunity undoubtedly seemed attractive, for Baars was not a man who bore silence easily. The party debate on VoIksraad participation was curiously unrealistic, for it rested on the assumption that the Governor General would appoint a representative of the PKl. Van Limburg Stirum had assigned seats in the first Volksraad to prominent Indonesian opponents of the 72

jOirdng the Comintem

regime with the idea of persuading them to be more cooperative; he was hardly likely to appoint a European representative who guaranteed to sabotage any tendencies toward moderation among the Indonesians. Moreover, the Governor General had grown increasingly dubious of his original decision, for he had been greatly disturbed by the sharp criti· cisms the Indonesians leveled at the government in the opening Volksraad debates. The opposition parties were less cooperative than ever, and all three major Indonesian leaders in ~e Volksraad-Tjokroami. nota, Abdul Muis, and Tjipto Mangunkusurpo--had been implicated in the violent resistance of 1919. The PKI seemed to realize the futility of its plan during the Volks· raad campaign, for as soon as the election results were announced, it declared that it had been a mistake to offer a delegate for government appointment, although it apparently did not withdraw Baars' candidacy.&2 The party campaigned against participation in the Volksraad, reminding the other Indonesian parties that the Indian National Congress refused such collaboration with the British authorities. a3 The Governor General made his stand clear by ignoring the Communist candidate, declaring that as a matter of principle he was opposed to seating Communists in the Volksraad; shortly afterward the government added insult to injury by expelling Baars from the colony.s4 Het Vrije Woord, commenting on the Volksraad nominations, consoled the party with the remark that at least "we've done our duty." III> The December 1920 PKI convention was held in the Sarekat Islam headquarters at Semarang. The walls were decorated with red and green (it was, after all, Christmas Eve) , and one of the party members had made a hammer-and-sickle design in batik, "so that the always channing color combination of the Javanese could prove that it, too, was suitable for the emblems of the revolution." 86 Few executive members attended the meeting: Darsono and Dengah were in jail, Sugondo had moved to Borneo, and only Starn was present of the executive members from outside Semarang. Indeed, there was only one other delegate from beyond that city, a representative from Bandung. A great many people were present from Semarang itseH; the congress report described them as "thousands," most of whom must have been spectators. We can only speculate about the poor partiCipation from beyond Semarang; perhaps sending delegates to three congresses in a year was more than most locals felt they could afford, particularly since

73

Rise of lndonesinn Communism the outcome of the issue to be discussed (the Volksraad question was not brought up until a few days before the meeting) was considered certain. Once the Volksraad issue had been settled, Semaun announced that the rest of the meeting would be held in closed session, since not everything that would be said on the matter of Comintern affiliation would be legally permissible to publish, especially if there were opponents who had to be convinced.87 Het Vrije Woord described the ensuing scene: Slowly, with dragging·feet. the masses leave the scene; and Snally. after half an hour, the police have also left it, having convinced themselves that those remaining are all really party members. The shrunken group collects in the middle of the hall, as far as poSSible from all the walls with· ears; and in a hushed tone further explanations arc given.88

We do not know just what went on in this conspiratorial huddle; it seems, however, that there were indeed objections. The major problem appears to have been the Comintem denunciation of Pan-Islamism. That had been a sore subject ever since publication of the Lenin theses in Het Vrije Woord, for the anti-Communist faction in the SI bad immediately and successfully claimed it meant opposition to Islam in general. It was Bnally decided that the party would do its best to explain just what was meant by Pan Islamism in the Comintern decree: ''however,'' it was added, "we cannot do anything else to prevent the demagogic use of those theses." 119 There appear to have been further protests about the applicability of Comintern strategy to the Indies. A major point of the International's colonial program called for the Asian Communists to advocate land redistribution and the abolition of large landholdings in order to attract peasant support. It was noted in the PKI discussion that this had little application in Indonesia : "the clause on land distribution is not correct here in the Indies, where large landownership is virtually nonexistent and village ownership is the norm." "If necessery," the gathering concluded, "'this will be pointed out at a fuhrre international congress." 00 Finally, the party detemtined that the Comintern program gave no cause to consider a shift in basic policy. As had been evident from their earlier discussion of nationalism and the Volksraad question, the PKI leaders considered that they and not Moscow knew the Indies and that

74

Joining the Comintern they had been in the business of colonial revolution long enough to detennine party policy for themselves. With sublime assurance in the rightness of its previously chosen course, the PKI executive therefore pronounced that: As has previously been explained, we have followed the CommWlist tactic here before there existed "orders from Moscow" concerning it. We therefore need change nothing following our affiliation as far as our tactics or method of struggle are concerned. . .. Long live the Indies Communist party. Netherlands Indies branch of the Communist International! III

75

v

The Bloc Within ALTHOUGH the second Comintern congress adopted a general policy for the East, it did not indicate just how Communist-nationalist cooperation was to be achieved. The Lenin theses had emphasized the need for alliance but had conceded very little to the Communists' prospective partners: '1'he idea is this. that we as Communists wiJI only support the independence movements in the colonial lands if these movements arc truly revolutionary, if their representatives do not oppose our training and organizing the peasantry and the great masses of the exploited in a revolutionary maqner." I Such conditions would he hard to obtain under any circumstances, and the feebleness of Asian Communism made it most unlikely that the nationalists would make an ordinary alliance on these terms. If the Comintcrn really wished to

establish Communist-nationalist cooperation,' it would have to mooify its demands radically or pennit a relationship other than the equal partnership for Communists and their allies ,envisioned in the European united front from above. The International eventually chose the latter course, and Sneevliet played an important role in the choosing. "I might also suggest," Sneevliet remarked to the second Comintem congress, ..that a propaganda offiCe of the Communist International be organized in the Far East and also in the Middle East; since the [Asian revolutionary 1 movement is of such great Significance at the present time it would be very useful to unite under one office the work that is taking place in that region and to carry on a concentrated propaganda cHort, which could not be directed satisfactorily from Moscow." 2 There seems to have been some initial hesitation regarding his proposal, but the Comintem concluded that the idea was a good one and decided to establish a Far Eastern bureau in China.' Sneevliet was chosen as its first director, reportedly on Lenin's recommendation.· His appoinbnent in preference to a Russian or an Asian would seem to indicate general Comintem approval of the ideas he had expressed at the 76

The Bloc Within second congress. if not Lenin's personal endorsement. We will remember that at the meeting Sneevliet had not on1y advocated cooperation with non-Communist Asian revolutionaries but had also sought approval of the relationship the Indonesian party had achieved with the Sarekat Islam. SneevIiet left Russia in the early fall of 1920 and returned to Holland for a few months before going to the East. His contact with Lenin at the congress had sold him completely on the Soviet experiment; he now thoroughly endorsed Russian domination of the International and maintained more confidently than ever that "the Communists must everywhere work among the masses and penetrate into [other] organizations." ~ Leaving Holland at the end of 1920, he reached Singapore in May 1921, where he was joined by Baars, on his way to Russia after being expelled from the Indies. and by Darsono, who was making a pilgrimage to Moscow for the third Comintem congrcss.6 The three revolutionaries landed in Shanghai in early June; i Baars and Darsono continued on their journey while Sneevliet settled down to Comintem business. The office Sncevliet established was to prove of some comfort to the Indonesian Communists, but during its first year it was not overly active in establishing links with Asian Communist movements outside China.' This was not Sneevliet's major purpose, however; he was in China principally to observe the situation there and to suggest a future course of Comintern action in that country. In July 1921 he attended the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai but apparently only as an observer; he played no really active role at the meeting.1I He met Sun Yat-sen in Kweilin during August or September and reportedly lectured him on the need to establish the Kuomintang as a strong. multiclass party that would unite the Chinese people--and particularly the workers and peasants-to support the national revolution, Sun is said to have agreed with Sneevliet's comments, but no fonnal commitment was made by either side. 1u It seems unlikely tllat Sneevliet had hoped for a commitment by either the Chinese Communists or the Kuomintang at this stage. Accounts differ as to whether he was instructed to deal primarily with the Kuomintang or to negotiate with any likely revolutionary force,ll but his own comments on the Chinese situation at the time do not betray marked enthusiasm for any group. The Kuomintang. he indicated, was interested in the working class solely for its own purposes. 12 As to the

77

Rise of indonesian Communism socialistically inclined groups, there existed only Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Canton coterie, which had elected to fonn a Communist Partyi a Marxist study circle in Pekingi and a heterogeneous collection of students and teachers in Shanghai. The Chinese proletariat was, in his view, much less SOCially conscious than were the workers of Java. "In view of thCie facts," he concluded, "the immediate prospects for the development of either the labor movement or revolutionary socialist propaganda are very slim. Much weaker than in Japan, much worse than in the Netherlands Indies. 13 Sneevliet is said to have found his first meeting with Sun Vat-sen a disappointment; U in any event, Sun did not then appear a successful revolutionary, for h~ was on one of his periodiC flights from Canton. In December 1921. however, Sneevliet left Shanghai for a tour of Hunan. Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces. 15 Much of his three-month trip was spent in Canton, where he was delayed by the South China seamen's strike. HI During his visit, Sneevliet was able to take another look at the Kuomintang, which now appeared an increasingly attractive revolutionary poSSibility. For one thing, Sun's military position had improved considerably, and the Kuomintang was now a force to be seriously' reckoned with; for another, Sneevliet's opinion of Sun's socialism was much higher, in large part because .of the progress of the seamen's strike. 1T Finally, the Comintem envoy noted that of all the districts he had visited in China, the only one in which it was poSSible to organize the masses was the region in which Canton was locatedKwangtung province--since its warlord, General Chen Chun-ming, had fuzzy socialist views that put him more or less on the side of the workers.18 Sneevliet left China shortly after this journey, firmly convinced of the revolutionary value of the Kuomintang. Stopping in the Netherlands on his way to Moscow, he declared: "There can be no doubt that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement possesses socialist leanings. even though its leader also bases his principles on traditional Chinese philosophy." 111 On July 17, Sneevliet reported on the Chinese situation to the Comintern executive. He declared that the International's best chances lay with the Kuomintang, and he sharply criticized the Chinese Communists for their secretarian refusal to take part in the practical politics of South China.20 His opinion was later published in the Comintern journal: 78 to

The Bloc Within If we Communists wish to work successfully. we must see to it that friendly relations are maintained between the South China nationalist movement and ourselves. The theses of the second congress are to be implemented in China. where the proletariat has as yet developed only to a very small degree, by giving active support to the revolutionary nationalist elements of the South. It is our task to attempt to hold these revolutionary nationalist elements together and to drive the whole movement to the left. 21

Sneevliet's view that the Communists must link themselves to the revolutionary movement in the South was supported by Markhlevsky, who had been working for the Comintern in the north of China. It also appears to have found the ready approval of the ECC!, for immediately after the July meeting 22 Sneevliet returned to China, this time as "Philips," Far Eastern correspondent of lnprecorr aod the Communist Intemotional. 23 He brought with him a letter signed by Voitiruky for the Far Eastern Section of the Com intern, ordering the Central Committee of the Chinese Corrununist Party to move immediately to Canton, the center of Sun Yat-sen's movement, and to "do all its work in close contact with Corr. [Correspondent] PlULIPp," in accord with an ECC! decision of July 18, 1922.24 Sneevliet proceeded to Shanghai and there got Sun Yat-sen to agt.:ee that the Communists could enter the Kuomintang individually; that is, they would belong to both the KMT and the CCP. which would continue to exist as separate organizations. This done, he summoned the Chinese Communist leaders to meet with him; they did so in August 1922, at a special conference of the CCP central committee: Shortly after Sneevliet arrived in China, there took place on the Western Lake at Hangchow a meeting of the Central Comnrittee of the Chinese Communist Party, at which Maring (pseudonym of Sneevlict) urged in the name of the Comintem that [the Chinese Communists) enter the KMT. He was personally a proponent at that time of a closer cooperation between the Communist Party and the bourgeois-democratic movement, though naturally only if political independence and conscious inHuencing of the movement were allowed; and this was chieHy on the basis of his experiences in Indonesia. The executive of the Chinese party. however, unanimously rejected this policy. which in its opinion would be a hindrance to the carrying out of an independent policy. Only on the grounds of international discipline was it prepared to execute the decisions of the Comintem.2 5

79

Rise of Indonesian Communism Other accounts of this meeting (the one quoted here is by former associates of Sneevliet who had access to his papers) leave some question whether the Chinese Communists were so opposed to the strategy that it was necessary to impose Comintcm discipline. 21 However, it had undoubtedly not been their idea of the proper relationship between the two movements, for only a month before they had decided at their second party congress to pursue an alliance with the Kuomintang on the basis of equal partnership. Since Sun Yat-sen indicated about the time of the CCP conference that he was not interested in an alliance except through individual Communists joining the Koumintang, it has sometimes been suggested that the strategy originated with him. 21 What appears most likely, however, is that Sneevliet described to Sun the relationship between the Indonesian Communists and the Sarekat Islam; he may have done so as early as their first meeting, where, we will remember, he reportedly lectured the Kuornintang on the proper composition and function of a revolutionary mass movement. To Sun, this form of cooperation had distinct advantages : it helped secure Soviet support, it did not force the KMT into equal partnership with a numerically insignificant ally, and it provided a means of controlling the Communists through the organizational discipline of the Kuomintang. Knowing that this kind of arrangement existed elsewhere and that it was advocated by the Comintern representative in China, he was hardly likely to have agreed to an alliance that conceded anything more to the CCP. For Sneevliet, this method of partnership was not simply the best . that the Communists could reasonably hope for in their weak position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang. He was, as we have seen, a staunch advocate of Communist participation in larger mass movements, which they could influence to the left through their superior organization and their energy in propaganda. If they were fortunate, they could win the non-Communist leadership to their side or drive it out, capturing the whole movement for themselves; if they were less successful, they could at least hope to emerge from the broken alliance with a good part of the mass movement's supporters. This had been his experience in working within the Sarekat Islam, and he is said to have pointed out the Indonesian example to the Chinese Communists,28 The Chinese Communist leaders objected to Sneevliet's project on the grounds that it ignored the class interests represented by the various parties. Doctrinally. this was a very reasonable protest, for Sneev-

80

The Bloc Within lict's concept contradicted the orthodox Marxist belief that political parties represent the interests of a single class. Sneevliet, however, argued that the Kuomintang was actually a multiclass party, containing both proletarian and bourgeois elements, and could therefore contain Communists as well as nationalists .~' The Chinese classes, he claimed, were "not differentiated"; the Kuomintang was led by revolutionary bourgeoiS intellectuals, followed by the urban proletariat of the South, and supported by the Chinese great bourgeoisie living abroad.Do Similarly, the ISDV leaders of Sneevliet's day had viewed the Sarekat Islam as a movement of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie led by the bourgeOiS intelligentsia. The class character of the leader~ ship was less important than the character of its following, for by working within the movement they could develop the class consciousness of the masses to the point where they realized that their interests lay with the Communist faction and not with their formal bourgeois leaders. Thus Baars could comment on the 1918 51 congress that, al~ though the mass movement, was still dominated by religious and nationalist elements, it would be brought to socialism by class agitation among its following: 11lat will not be easy to accomplish; it will inevitably produce clashes among the heterogeneous elements which are now still collected in the SI. On this matter our young, enthusiastic organizers await many-and sometimes bitter--experiences. For this reason it is still absolutely necessary that a separate organization eJlist, where they and the others who come to us can be fully socialist, where they can gamer socialist knowledge and find renewed strength after the defeats that ineVitably await them. But at the moment that this development of the 51 reaches its end, that it loses its religiOUS and nationalist character and assumes exclusively a class character; at that moment the imported ISDV need only abandon its distinction from the (purged ) SI in the higher unity of socialist mass action. U It is not certain whether the ECCl meeting of July 1922 went so far in its recommendation to cooperate with the Kuomintang as specifically to endorse the bloc Within-although it seems unlikely that Sneevliet would have refrained from arguing for his pet theory there, or that if it had been rejected he would have urged it on the Chinese Communists immediately afterward. The ECCI's first public endorse~ ment of the Chinese line came in a resolution of January 12, 1923, which might indicate that 5neevliet had acted on his own initiative or

81

Rise of Indonesian Communism that the Comintern was too uncertain of the feasibility of the project to endorse it openly before he had succeeded in arranging it.u However, the ECCI pronouncement coincided with Sneevliet's transfer from China: two days earlier the Comintern executive had detennined to move its ag~nt to its Far Eastern office in Vladivostok.33 Since the ECCI resolution called on the Chinese Communists to "remain within" the Kuomintang rather than to start joining it,84 it is possible that the resolution was intended not to announce a new policy but to confinn Sneevliet's tactic, despite his withdrawal. Although individual Communists had been entering the Kuomintang ever since the August 1922 conference, the bloc within was not formally adopted by the CCP until the summer of 1923, at its third congress,u and only in January 1924 did party. members join the Kuomintang en massc_ Increasingly, however, thc stratcgy became ~ dominant factor in the Comintem's view of Asia, in large Part because it became involved in thc Stalin-Trotsky feud. The ideological basis for this quarrel was Stalin's support of alliance with the refonnist socialists in Europe and the bourgeois nationalists in Asia. Trotsky fiercely opposed this, attacking the idea of a multiclass party as particularly reprehensible: In China, India. and Japan this idea is mortally hostile not only 10 the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution but alSo to the most elementary independence of the proletarian vanguard. The workers' and peasants' party

can only serve as a base, a screen, and a springboard for the bourgeoisie. at China, which experienced the extreme development of this cooperation and was at the same time a major objective of Soviet foreign policy, became the chicf issue in their argument. The passions of the China fcud inevitably affected Comintern policy·elsewhere in the Far East, especially since the International's decisions characteristically generalized practical considerations into universal theory. The result was an ever-increasing emphaSiS in Comintern Asian policy on the need to cooperate with bourgeois nationalism and a steadily growing pressure on Asian Communists to pattern their action on the Chinese example. Both in Indonesia and in China the bloc within proved an effective strategy for the rapid expansion of Communist inBuence within the national revolutionary movement. The nationalist-CommWlist alliance was, however, assumed by the Communists to be impennanent. The

82

The Bloc Within nationalist leadership might try to consolidate its position by refusing to allow the Communists sufficient leeway to develop their own strength; or the Communists might build their popular support to the point where a subordinate position was no longer necessary or profitable. As Stalin said, the bourgeois nationalist movement was to be squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away. The problem for the Communists was to determine when the lemon was ready to be discarded. In China, the course of the bloc-within strategy was affected considerably by Soviet interests. which required the alliance with the Kuomintang to be maintained to the bitter end. Moreover, the strategy was not well suited to a situation of armed revolution, for the Kuomintang as senior partner controlled a military force that gave it the power to tum the tables and throw the Communists away. The bloc within was better Stted to the Netherland Indies, where there was no question of control over armed strength or a state apparatus and where competition was solely between the partners for the favor of the masses and the loyalty of local and regional political leaders. Nonetheless, the Indonesian bloc within had its limitations; even before Sneevliet introduced it in China the strategy had broken down in the Indies. By 1920 the Indies Communists were asking themselves whether the Sarekat Islam had not been squeezed dry. Indeed, the aftermath of the Section B affair seemed to have drained the movement of its vital juices. Several hundred SI members had been arrested, and the major branches in the Priangan were so unnerved that only extensive missionary cHorts by Alimin and Tjokroaminoto prevented them from voting their own dissolution. SI membership rapidly dwindled as a mass exodus occurred of those who disapproved of Section B or feared that Sarekat Islam membership would be held against them. Many of these, of course, were only token members, but their desertion did not help the movement's shaken prestige. Some of those who left were better-situated moderates who did not approve of the movement's radicalism and its involvement in Section B; they tended to join more conservative political movements or purely religiOUS groups. By far the largest number, however, were peasants, most of whom had been inactive for years, and they jOined no new movements. 31 The result was to increase the influence of Scmarang over the SI rank and fil e, for those who left the movement were mostly adherents of the moderate wing, and those who remained were sympathetic to the Communists' radical 83

Rise of Indonesian Communism urban appeal and to charges that the CSI was weak in its opposition to the government,as At the same time that the Semarang-oriented membership of the Sareht Islam increased its relative strength, the central SI leadership became more impervious to in8uence by the Communist left. Semarang was now too obvious a challenge not to be viewed. with alann; moreover, the CSl leaders, badly shaken by the government reaction to Section B and anxious to keep out of trouble, found their Communist component an embarrassment. As a result, they began to look for a field of activity that would avoid challenging the government and also circumscribe the activity of the Communist element. The need to consolidate the mass movement arolln~ a coherent program had long been apparent to its leaders; as had been widely remarked at the time of the SI 1918 congress, the Sarekat Islam had passed the poiqt at which popular expectations and Tjokroaminoto's personality could provide it with momentum and cohesion,lIt That congress had represented the high point in the movement's revolutionary inclination and in 15DV inSuencc over it; although there was considerable rivalry on the leadership level, a general polariza~ion into right and left wings had not yet taken place. The outlines of such a diHerentiation were already evident, however, and CSI secretary 50srokardono swnmarized them as follows ! 1. The right wing looks first to lslam and seeks to propagate that religion; the pwty of the left is content us long as its faith is not made subject to other religions in Indonesia. 2. The right wing desires a struggle against domination by another race, whi1e the left sees racial domination us a result of sinful capitalism and therefore wishes to struggle primarily against sinful capitalism on the side of the workers and peasants, an effort directed against foreign rather than native capital. 3. Both parties encourage native capital fonnation: the right wing approves of the development of large Indonesian landowning and private enterprise, while the left wants nationalization of the land and cooperative enterprises. Both wish state exploitation of major industries and monopolies. 4. The right wing is anxious for [colonial} government aid and is concerned for the welfare of the country us a while, while the left urges selfreliance and places the interests of the common people first. The ·left wing takes part in the international proletarian struggle against big capital and against imperialism.40

84

The Bloc Within In 1919-1920 these divergent tendencies sharpened into a serious cleavage, as the increase in leftist influence over the rank and SIe, a1ann at government reaction to the events of 1919, and growing personal bitterness among the faction leaders divided the movement. The left wing within the Sarekat Islam looked, of course, to Semarang, where the SI executive was identical with the local PKI leadership. The right wing came increasingly to turn to Jogjakarta and to center about the CSI members Surjopranoto, Abdul Muis, and Hadji Agus Salim. Muis had an abiding dislike of the Semarang group since the time of the IneUe Weerbar action, and Surjopranoto was Semaun's chief rival for leadership of the labor federation. Salim was a moderate socialist, with close connections in the ISOP, and was also a proponent of the modernist movement in Indonesian Islam. Neither Muis nor Surjopranoto was particularly concerned for religious action; but Jogjak~ was the center of Islamic reformism in Java, Salim was becoming increasingly powerful in the SI, and religion was a cause that was popular, nonrevo!utionary, and not exploitable by the left. The weight of Jogjakarta influence in the SI thus favored a religious orientation. Between these two groups stood Tjokroaminoto. Far more than any other l~der he symbolized the Sarekat Islam, and the mass following the SI had acquired was in great part loyal to him rather than to the movement itself. He was a strongly charismatic leader; his political style was similar to that of his .sometime protege, Sukarno, and his influence lay in his acknowledged primacy as a popular leader and in his ability to balance rival factions against each other. He was an orator and not an organizer; unlike the faction leaders, he represented no special interest within the movement but attempted to represent a synthesis of its various interests. His principal concern was to preserve the unity of the Sarekat Islam; his position depended on this, and he realized also that once the SI appeared to represent particular interests it would lose its remaining prestige as the representative of all Indonesians. By 1920, Tjokroaminoto's primacy was in serious question. The Section B affair had shaken his position severely; not only did the government blame him for it, but those who earlier had questioned his policies were given added reason to think he had outlived his usefulness. It was not a time for oratory and emotion, but for consolidation and discipline, they argued. Tjokroaminoto himself agreed on the need for retrenchment, for government investigations of the Section B were 85

Rise of Indonesian Communism placing him in an increasingly awkward position, and it seemed that he might end in prison. Consequently, his defiant expressions of the 1919 SI congress were soon replaced by words of caution; in June 1920 he appealed to all SI members to avoid. controversy and not irritate the authorities.u Tjokroaminoto's caution annoyed those SI members-by no means all from the Semarang faction-who thought that the proper stance for a popular leader was one of heroic defiance and that he was abandoning his accused colleagues in their hour of need. Moreover, Tjokroaminoto seemed no longer able to take the political initiative. He had supported 51 involvement in the labor movement as a means of taking the 51 out of political controversy; but he had thus played into the hands of his two major rivals, Semaun and Surjopranoto, for the strength of the labor-oriented left was increasing alanningly within the movement. Tjokroaminoto was not overly concemed with ideology, but he was not willing to concede the leadership of his organization. He could not forgive the stinging personal criticisms the ISDV fPKI leaders had frequently addressed to him, attacks to which he grew all the more sensitive as his position weakened. Neither was he blind to Surjopranoto's hope to succeed to the SI chairmanship via his role as Indonesia's "strike king." (2 To offset the advance of his labor-oriented rivals, Tjokroaminoto began increasingly ' to support a religious focus for the 51, a course he had toyed with on previous occasions. This brought him closer to Hadji Agus Salim and his, e.lly Hadji Fachrudin, the vice-chainnan of the Muslim educational and social welfare association, Muhammadijah. Both these Jogjakarta leaders were modemists, who advocated the purification of Indonesian Islam from local traditions and its adjustment to the requirements of the times. They were also Pan-Islamists, and in June 1920 Tjokroaminoto joined them in setting up a committee for the defense of the Turkish Chalifate. He hoped thereby to generate a religious momentum for the 51, but his effort was immediately opposed by Semarang on the grounds that politics and religion did not mix. All this meant that the SI chairman became increasingly dependent on the Jogjakarta wing of his movement, and the effective headquarters of the CSI accordingly began to shift from Surabaja. Tjokroaminoto's home, to Jogjakarta. 43 Under these circumstances, the Communists began to ask themselves whether it was useful for them to continue to endorse Tjokroaminoto's 86

The Bloc Within leadership of the mass movement by professing loyalty to him as head of the SI. Their attitude toward the movement had always been a patchwork of contradictions, the inconsistency of which could be ignored only as long as the SI appeared to be moving in a revolutionary direction. Thus far the party's tacit assumption had been that Semarang's rising strength in the national movement would lead to a seizure of power from within; this would presumably take place before independence, since the PKI viewed the Indonesian revolution as aiming directly at socialism and thus not requiring bourgeois democratic leadership. By 1920, however, it was apparent that the Communists had reached the limits of the pressure they could put on the SI leaders. If the party wished to remain effective within the SI, it would have to be far more considerate of non-Communist sensitivities, temper its bid for popular support, and try to win Tjokroaminoto back to a more neutral position. Alternatively, the PKI could press a radical antigovernment program and destroy Tjokroaminoto's personal prestige in an attempt to loot the mass movement of the membership that remained to it. This action, outwardly more radical, would in fact re8ect a more conservative view of the political situation; for it would mean that the Communists had given up hope of claiming revolutionary authority over the broader mass movement in order to build an organization that would stand through a long season of reaction and retreat. The Dutch party members were particularly strong advocates of the second line. As we have seen, they were greatly disturbed by the Section B affair; no less than the CSI leaders, they felt that the incident and the government's response necessitated consolidating and diSciplining the mass movement. At first, encouraged by SI interest in labor organization, they sought to achieve this goal within the Sarckat Islam framework. 44 However, when it became apparent that the SI leaders were interested in unions as an escape from revolutionary politics rather than as an avenue to it, their reservations about subordination to non-Communist leadership were strengthened. In August 1920 Baars and Bergsma published on behalf of the PKI a detailed set of theses to guide the party's more distant branches in formulating their relationships to non-Communist groups. The theses fonned a striking contrast to those Sneevliet was then supporting at the second Comintern congress, for they resembled Roy's view and not Lenin's. In summary, they were as follows:

nise of Indonesian Communism 1. "Every popular movement must be carried on by the action of the most completely oppressed [part of the1 masses." Any popular movement. therefore, that is led by classes or groups occupying a more or less preferred position-and this includes skilled labor-is doom~ to compromise and will desert to the enemy camp as soon as the true members of proletariat have developed a class consciousness of their own. 2. The above statement is true of Indonesian popular movements, as shown by the fact that they have inevitably ended by compromising and betraying the workers. 3. The action of the privileged group in Indonesia is also characterized by an anarchic and aimless nature; its leaders do not strive to make the masses SOCially conscious. Instead, "the present-day movement very consciously puts a new spiritual slavery (the power of the leaders ) in the place of the old ( respect for authority) ." 4. "An Indies socialist movement will have to derive its support solely from the proletarianized agricultural workers and the industrial proletariat." There is no use for the Communists to work with other groups, not even with sueh organizations of skilled workers as the chauffeurs' and truck drivers' union, since «all these organizations are in any case doomed to bourgeoisification." 5. The Indies Communists must consider it their first duty to bring the proletarian masses to self-consciousness and a spirit of resistance. Until this is achieved, aU actions will be ineffective. !be present native movement is absolutely powerless precisely because it is a bourgeois movement and does not desire the consciousness of the masses." 6. The 6rst object is therefore to organize the industrial proletariat and to teach it socialism, at the same time carrying on propaganda among the proletariat organized in the Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Hindia, and Budi Utomo. The bourgeois nationalist leaders must be exposed, not collaborated with: "Agitation together with bourgeois leaders for bourgeois purposes has no use." 7. As long as the workers' movement remains as weak as it is, its activities must be carried out cautiously in order that the few existing leaders may not be lost through arrest. The theses concluded with the follOWing advice to the new branches being established outside Java: We have had enough sad experience in Java with regard to cooperation with bourgeois tmd semibourgeois elements, and we cannot advise our comrades

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The Bloc Within in the Outer Islands too strongly to follow our policy and avoid all actions of that sort. It is better to remain small for the time being and to lay a soWld basis rather than to expand rapidly and eventually have to break off that which was begun with such

enthusiasm.4~

The PKI theses reRected a retreat into radical dogma by profoundly disenchanted Europeans, but at the same time they were not unrelated to the general Indonesian political mood. The SI, Sarekat Hindia, and even uncompromised Budi Utomo were also concluding that what was now needed was not broad popular inRuence and alliances but organizational discipline and insistence that members adhere to the principles of their own group. Inevitably, this led them to reconsider the longestablished custom of multiparty membership. In June 1920 Budi Utomo adopted the principle of party discipline, which forbade members of the association to belong to other movements. Although disapproval of the Sarekat Islam's role in the Section B affair w~ a major reason for this decision, an exception was made for ~embership in the SI in order to placate the younger and less conservative Budi Utomo adherents.~B Sarekat Hindia and the PKI responded with party discipline requirements of their own, again excepting the all-important Sarekat Islam. For the time being, the CSI took no action itself. Party discipline, destroying the last hope of a unified Indonesian movement, was a course Tjokroaminoto would accept only if all other alternatives failed. Moreover, such an action would reduce the Sl's stature from one of implied primacy to that of equality with the other parties. Within the Jogjakarta faction, however, voices began to be heard in favor of expelling those who would not be loyal solely to the Sarekat Islam. Like Baars and Bergsma, the Jogjakarta leaders thought the time had come to abandon the idea of leading an amorphous mass movement and that ideological and organizational discipline must be the order of the day. In the first half of 1920 polarization developed principally within the framework of the PPKB, the latest and last cooperative eHort of the PKI-SI alliance. Relations within the federation were exceedingly complex, since the executive had practically no control over its component unions, which were loyal to the heterogeneous political viewpoints of their individual leaders. 47 Moreover, the rivalry between Semarang and Jogjakarta within the PPKB was heightened because its two principal leaders-Surjopranoto and Semaun-both wanted Tjokroaminoto's position as chief of the SI. The competition between Semarang 89

Rise of Indonesian Communism and Jogjakarta within the federation was thus particularly intense, with the result that the PPKB more often resembled a political battlefield than a functioning labor organization. ' Surjopranoto was, we will remember, the head of the sugar workers' PFB. During 1919 and early 1920 acute unrest in the sugar areas enabled the PFB to organize the plantation workers rapidly; and in March 1920 the union sent a memorandum to the Sugar Syndicate containing various wage .demands and the request that the PFB be recognized as the sugar workers' bargaining agent. 'I1ie employers replied that they wauld fire all members of the PFB if any action were taken, At this point the government took a hand; it assured the industry that it would not tolerate political strikes, but it sharply criticized the planters for refusing to negotiate or to improve wages. '!1le Governor General ordered the Residents in the sugar areas to investigate working conditions on the plantations, taking evidence not only from estate administTators but also from workers and their chosen spokesmen (that is, PFB representatives). It began to seem that the estates might be forced to recognize the PFB as a bargaining agent; they therefore decided to back down on their employees' economic demands, and they doubled wages and improved benefits considerably.48 For the PFB this victory was a hollow one, It had gained what the workers wanted but not what the union needed-its recognition as a bargaining agent. Such acceptance was doubly necessary because Indonesian workers of that day were inclined to view unions solely as associations fanned to lead strikes; they joined them in times of hardship, but once their basic economic demands were satis6ed-or the strike failed-they lost all interest in the organization. nus was a pbe· nomenon that plagued the Indonesian labor movement as a whole, and it was particularly marked among the less skilled wage earners in private enterprises, who were least inclined to organize, least able to pay dues, and most vulnerable to employer retaliation,ti RealiZing the precarious position in which nonrecognition placed both his union and his political ambitions, Surjopranoto determined to take advantage of the momentum the PFB had built up to force a strike for the acknowledgment of his union as the sugar workers' bargaining agent. In June, shortly before the beginning of the harvest season ( the only time when the plantations were in need of a full labor force and hence vulnerable ) Surjopranoto declared to a wildly cheering rally that a general sugar strike would take place unless the employers agreed 90

The Bloc Within immediately to recognize the PFB . The estates had not yet felt the power the union, he declared; of the thirty-six sugar strikes thus far, only three had actually been sponsored by the PFB. This was no com· pliment to union organization, but to Surjopranoto spirit, not discipline, was the essence. He asserted that the union's lack of a war chest and its inadequate preparation need not discourage the strikers; the workers were used to poverty and hardship, and temporary loss of income would therefore not make much difference to them.~ Tjokroaminoto backed Surjopranoto's demand, although his enthusiasm was understandably limited. Hadji Agus Salim strongly supported Surjopranoto, in good part from a desire to embarrass Semarang and to take control of the labor federation away from it. The leftist leaders themselves were in a very unpleasant predicament. They had no desire to bolster the Jogjakarta-based labor movement or to enhance Surjapranoto's position; moreover, it seemed obvious the strike would be a disaster since it was unlikely to be strongly supported by either the workers or the government. At the same time, they could not sit back and wait to say "I told you so" to a defeated PFB. The Semarang leaders had won much of their support in the mass movement by arguing that the CSI was a donothing leadership, and it would ill serve them to allow the accusation to be reversed. Caution was too easily equated in the popular mind with cowardice in politics or labor; a leader was supposed to be a hero, willing to face overwhelming odds without fear of the consequences. Moreover, if the Communists refused to participate actively in the strike, their opponents would probably blame them for its failure, and a good deal of this blame might stick. Already it had been publicly suggested in Jogjakarta that the Communists be expelled from the PPKB; the PKI could ill afford to refuse to endorse the strike at the federation's forthcoming congress, for this would almost surely mean a split on unfavorable terms for Semarang. 51 The labor federation's meeting was held in Scmarang on August I. The fires of disagreement burned briskly at the meeting, and they were industriously stoked by European advisers on both sides (Communists for Semarang, ISDP socialists for Jogjakarta) who did not share the common Indonesian preference for unity above ideology. Semaun debated hotly with Surjopranoto over the strike plans and his refusal to cooperate with the PPKB, and for a while a break seemed unavoidable. As usual, · it was Tjokroaminoto who compromised the erisis, this time

of

91

Rise of Indonesian Communism by a truly heroic eHort in which he declared, on the one hand, that he was in principle a Communist and, on the other-in order to avert demands that the PPKB take decisions on discipline qnd union organization that would favor Semarang-that the congress was not the place to discuss federation policies. The meeting ended by confirming Semaun as chairman of the federation; but its headquarters were moved to Jogjakarta, with Tjokroaminoto's backing, th~ hopelessly tangling ' its lines of control.52 Immediately after the congress proper a meeting of PPKB leaders was held to complete the plans for a sugar strike. Surjopranoto had already indicated what he wanted from S~marang-help with agitation and a VSTP strike against railroad lines serving the sugar mills. The Communists agreed, but they must have done so with heavy heartsthe sugar harvest was ending, and Semaun and Bergsma were engaged in VSTP wage negotiations that would have been ruined by a pro-PFB railway strike. A!l ultimatum was accordingly issued to the Sugar Syndicate by the PFB, accompanied by a general strike warning from the labor federation. ~'Icanwhil e, the various sponsors of the sugar strike scattered to whip up enthusiasm among the potential strikers. As Semaun traveled about the district assigned to him and acquainted himself with grassroots disinterest, he became convinced that the strike would be a disaster of much greater magnitude than he and Bergsma had imagined. Desperately he wired his findings to PFB headquarters in Jogjakarta and asked for another meeting to reconsider the strike plan. His messages were promptly intercepted and published by an enterprising Dutch reporter.~~ At this painful moment, the Sugar Syndicate rejected negotiation with the PFB on any basis, and the Resident of Jogjakarta warned that the government would take firm measures against strike leaders and agitators if the union proceeded any further with its plans. The SI leaders breathed a sigh of relief, for it enabled them to retire gracefully from what had promised to be a catastrophe. The affair by no means improved their feelings toward Semarang, however; nor did it further unity in the PKI itself, for Baars, long a proponent of agrarian action centered in the sugar areas, denounced Semaun's reversal as "undisciplined and un-Communist." ~t . Shortly after this the PFB declined into obscurity, the victim of discouragement and employer retaliation.5~ No further eHorts to organize the sugar workers (or any other plantation laborers) succeeded

92

The Bloc Within during the colonial period. Moreover, the failure of the PFB concluded effective political activity among the rural masses of the sugar areas, which had so long seemed the obvious center of revolutionary activity on Java. The PFB disaster also ended Jogjakarta's tolerance of the Communists. Salim and Surjopranoto moved to dislodge Semarang from the Sarekat Islam by announcing a conference of the CSI to be held in Jogjakarta at the end of September, to set a date for the next SI congress. The idea was to declare that, contrary ·to all expectations, there would be a convention in October. A <;ongress meeting in that month would have to do without a number of the principal SI chiefs, among them Tjokroaminoto, who were either in jail or appearing at the Section B trials. That, however, was just what was wanted by the Jogjakarta group, for the missing leaders were mostly from the center and left and therefore might be reluctant to break with the Communists. Consequently, Salim and Surjopranoto ignored Tjokroaminoto's telegraphic appeal to delay the convention and set the date for October 16--0nly two weeks away.~6 Semaun was unable to attend the CSI meeting that called the congress, and he sent Darsono as ~is emissary. Darsono was denied admission on the grounds that he was not a full CSI member, but as soon as the meeting adjourned he made his presence felt in a disastrously effective manner. On October 6 he began to publish a series of articles implicating Tjokroaminoto in the gross misuse of SI funds and asking for a full investigation of the association's 6nanccs.1I7 There was good reason to think that Darsono's allegations were true, for the CSI treasury was notoriously empty. Financial responsibility was not one of the characteristic virhles of the SI leadership, and the Communists themselves do not seem to have been completely free of wcalcness in pecuniary matters. IIB Understandably, however, Tjokroaminoto viewed Darsono's move as a stab in the back.li~ His public image was struck a blow it could ill endure, for the popular ideal was that of a "-pure" leader, the image of the Ratu Adil. Much could be forgiven a public hero as long as he maintained an aura of nobility and authority, but once the idol had become tarnished it quiclc1y lost its worshipers; and Tjokrmlminoto's appeal had already been seriously compromised by Section B and its aftennath. The Jogjakarta SI leaders were not included in Darsono's attack; so 93

Rise oj Indonesian Communism nonetheless, his accusations damaged their position considerably, for they needed Tjokroaminoto's prestige as a non-Communist 51 leader to obtain the support necessary to jettison the left. When the accusations brought no ready reply from Tjokroammoto, they concluded that it would be unwise to face up to 5emarang; and so, suddenly discovering that few 51 leaders could attend, they postponed the congress. 61 The attack was by no means a complete disaster for them, however, for it threw Tjokroaminoto into their hands. The 51 chainnan could not even rely on his own Oetoesan flindia for support, and the Surabaja SI organization was almost totally demoralized.82 Directly after the congress postponement the Jogjakarta leaders announced the removal of CSI headquarters from Surabaja to their own city. A few days later Salim and 5urjopranoto met with Tjokroaminoto in Batavia and secured his acquiescence in this transfer and in a reorganization of the CSI that took all real control of the movement away from him.S3 Tjokroaminoto and the Jogjakarta leaders now exchanged polemics. with Semarang over Darsono's criticisms. The tirades were instructive both for their attacks (which showed what they felt the public would believe and disappr:ove of about their opponents) and for the points on which they protested their own ~nOCfDce. Both sides announced Stst of all that they did not want to split the Sarekat Islam: unity of the national movement must be the first consideration. Both insisted they only wished to purify the association of undesirable elements that were harming it. Semarang declared it wished to do this by ridding the 51 of corrupt and vacillating leaders; Jogja1carta sougbt to accomplish it by expelling the disruptive Communist component. Both sides agreed that the principal struggle must he against capitalism, and the Jogjakarta leaders generally stated the opinion that Communism must be Indonesia's economic goal. Semarang claimed that its opponents were insincere in their anticapitalist protestations; Jogjakarta approved of the Communists' principles but not of their divisive methods. S4 While the Jogjakarta leaders concentrated on painting the Communists as disrupters of Indonesian unity and slanderers of self-sacrificing leaders, they also developed two other lines of argument that were deeply embarrassing to the PK1. The Stst was that the Communists, for all their revolutionary talk, were in fact cowards when it came to opposing the government. Surjopranoto hrought up Semaun's telegrams at the time of the threatened PFB strike and charged that these had defeated the effort. This attack was the more damaging because

94

The Bloc Within Semarang had not been involved in the major antigovernment incidents of 1919, and it was not Communist leaders who were currently on trial. Moreover, 1920 had been a year of great labor activity, with workers in all fields demanding higher wages to meet the increased cost of living; frequently they struck and, facing defeat, appealed · to the Semarang-Ied PPKB for aid. The federation had managed, principaUy because of government support, to achieve some success in a printing strike in Semarang earlier in the year. However, it was in no position to rescue most of the labor groups that asked for help," and Semaun found himself repeatedly admonishing labor organiZers that wann hearts must be accompanied by cool heads. Moreover, he and Bergsma were engaged in VSTP negotiations to acquire wages and bargaining rights for private railroad workers equivalent to those employees on the state-owned line. Since their best hope lay in securing a government ruling on · the matter, they cooperated with the authorities and opposed wildcat strike efforts, a strategy that caused some of the more militant private-line employees to charge that the VSTP represented the privileged group of state workers. All this gave Jogjakarta a chance to 6t the shoe of weak leadership to Semarang's foot, and the anti-Communists made the most of it.&6 A second line of attack against the PKI was prOVided by the Comintern. We will remember that Lenin's theses were published by the PKI in November and furnished grounds for the charge that Communists were against Islam. The attack was led by Pan-Islamists Salim and Fachrudin; they declared that the thesis opposed "the unity of Islam," and not, as Semarang tried to claim, "the evil use of Islam," that is, the utilization of religion to justify greed and oppression. The Communists hotly denied any incompatibility between their prinCiples and Islam, and replied to charges that included (since the antithesis to Islam was popularly seen not as atheism but foreign-imposed Christianity) that of being a tool of Dutch imperialism and Christian missionaries.Gl The PKI admitted at its December 1920 congress, however, that it had no effective way to repulse these blows. A third salient was opened on the labor front when the PFB and the pawnshop workers' PPPB announced that they refused to cooperate with the Communists in the labor federation. Each side blamed the other for having paralyzed the PPKB with factional fighting, and a split in the organization seemed imminent.G8 Nonetheless, a break did not take place; although the PPKB was anything but a functioning

95

Rise of Indonesian Communism organization, it was still a symbol of Indonesian unity and neither side wished to be blamed for destroying it. Each faction therefore maneuvered to achieve a situation in which its opponent would be forced to make the break. At this point, however, it was not to anyone's advantage to bring matters to a head. The Jogjakarta faction, its position shaken along with Tjokroaminoto's, did not feel ready to push the issue; Semarang had no practical interest in a split, for in spite of Jogjakarta's counterattacks it had the initiative in the Sarekat Islam, where its inOuence among the rank and file continued to grow." Moreover, SI morale was visibly deteriorating under the impact of the dispute; branch activity seemed at a standstill, and its unions were split by dissent. The Dutch-language press had capitalized on the revelations of corruption and factional self-seeking, and the arrest of various Indonesian opposition leaders in November added to the protests that Semarang and Jogjakarta were only serving the Dutch by feuding. If the SI centers were to coexist, however, it was apparent that they would have to Snd some basis for re1ations other than the hotly traded insult. The first moves were made by the CoJ!lmunists; Semaun, in particular, seems to have had serious reservatioll.'l about Darsono's attack and about the desire of his more sectarian colleagues to break with the Sarekat Islam.'o Darsono was one of the Indonesian politicians jailed in November, and immediately afterward the Communist journals, under Semaun's direction, began to publish articles deploring the disruptive eHccts of the dispute and assuming a more or less ncu- . tral stand on Darsono's action.71 At the end of December the CSI announced that, in view of the PKl's positive attitude at its recent congress, it was willing to end the dispute. This was followed by a PFB decision not to abandon the trade union federation,12 and the Jogjakarta SI declared that it would be content if Darsono were expelled at the next SI congress. Just before the SI convention, which was held on March 2 to 6, 1921, Semaun and Hadji Agus Salim deew up a program founded on Islamic and Communist principles, which they presented to the meeting as a basis of agreement: In all [ib} policies and aspirations the Sarekat Islam is inspired by the principles and precepts of Islam: a) Regarding state power, there must be a people's government, with the right to appoint and discharge officials in the common interest. b) Regarding management of the various types of labor, councils must

96

The Bloc Within be fonned composed of the leaders of these groups of workers who will direct them at their tasks. c) Regarding production and the seeking of a living. every person must work v.ith all his strength and heart, but in no wise may he appropriate for himself the fruits of another's labor; which requirement can be met at present by returning the wealth and property used for production to the common ownership of the people. d ) Regarding the division of the fruits of toil, Islam forbids anyone from hoarding these for himself, requiring instead that the common interest be served by using the results of all labor to further the goal of human equality. It is felt this can be achieved only if the distribution of products and pro6ts is in the hands of a popular representative assembly.13

The March 51 congress continued this theme of disengagement. The major issues were disposed of fairly quickly and amiably; Darsono, having been disavowed by his pmty and attacked by 51 delegates loyal to Tjokroaminoto, apologized for the manner though not the substance of his accusations.'4 He was appointed member of a committee to investigate Tjokroaminoto's use of CSI funds, thus effectively burying that issue (for it was tacitly assumed that nothing would come of the investigation), and motions of confidence in both Tjokroaminoto and Semaun were then passed. The PKI chairman forestalled religious criticism by declaring his admiration for the Islamic faith and stating that he saw no reason for the Communists to become rivals of the Sarekat Islam. Reportedly, he commented at several points that the Communists should function as intellectual leaders who would in8uence the mass movement from within and that as long as the Sarekat Islam followed the new unity program it would not be necessary for the PKI to establish itself as an independent party.r:i Semaun was clearly inclined to go far to preserve participation in the Sarekat Islam. For one thing, he generally favored unity above purity, and for another his position as Tjokroaminoto's rival in the movement was now very strong. for Surjopranoto, the only other serious contender, had faded completely as a popular figure. The Salim-Semaun unity program was, after some confusion, adopted by the congress. Its statement of principles was far enough to the left to border on the Communists' own position, for it unreservedly condemned capitalism: "It is the conviction of the Sarekat Islam that the evil of national and economic oppression must be considered exclusively a product of capitalism, so that the people of this colony, if they

97

Rise of Indonesian Communism wish to be freed from that evil, must necessarily struggle against capitalism to the best of their strength and ability, above all through labor and peasant unions." 1$ At the same time, however. Tjokroaminoto and Salim announced reassuringly that the declaration was based solely on the Koran and could be accepted by any Muslim. More important than this as a practical gesture toward compromise was the withdrawal of a jogjakarta motion forbidding 51 members to join other political organizations. In accord with Tjolcroaminoto's advice, the question was put off until a special congress, tentatively scheduled for the end of August 1921. Meanwhile, the SI locals were to discuss the question among themselves and to infonn the CSI of their views; if a branch wished to introduce party discipline itself, it could do so without the consent of the CSl Although the PKI was among the potentially prohibited organizations, Semarang voted for the motion, which was passed unanimously by the congress. 71 In spite of these public demonstrations of good will, the veneer of agreement was very thin. Before the March congress, the 51's right and left wings had filled their journals with mutual denunciations,78 and powerful voices in both camps had argued that cooperation was useless. Baars, while he maintained that the 51 could provide an important peasant-based complement to the workers' movement, declared that under its current leadership nothing could be expected of that organi~ zation: The 51 has degenerated and decayed, principally by reason of the irreparable mistakes of its leadership, through its absolute lack of any sense of responsibility, and through the boundless ambition of various prominent members, who have found fatal imitation in nearly all the branches. Continued in this manner, it can end in nothing but a stinking morass full of poisonous gases.111 At the congress, the jogjakarta fa ction distributed a Pan-Islamic brochure by Hadji Fachrudin, which denied that Communism and Islam were at all compatible. "The jogjakarta SI leader Abdul Muis and the Dutch PKI member Van Burink engaged in a verbal duel that brought the meeting into an uproar. Van Burink also quarreled with Semaun: he wished the 5arekat Islam to join the PKI in boycotting the Volksraad, but Semaun, anxious to repair his relations with jogjakarta, urged that Hadji Agus Salim be given leave from the CSI to accept a Vollcsraad appoinbnent from the Governor General. Discussion of the new SI program led to further conSiet and confusion, and 98

The Bloc Within Tjokroaminoto and Semaun managed to keep the congress centered on the theme of unity only with the greatest effort. 80 Reportedly, a number of Europeans in the PKI demanded at the time of the lo.·farch congress that the Communists break with the CSI on principle.1t Certainly, Het Vrite Waard gave every sign that it considered a breach inevitable and would not regret one : "We do not wish to 'p romote the schism; the interests of the workers demand the contrary. However, jf it is pushed through by the other side, we will accept it. ]t will be seen afterward which party has chosen the side of the workers and peasants." 82 Nonetheless, events at the congress seemed to revive their hopes that something could still be gained from the bloc within. Baars was not entirely pleased with the Salim-Semaun compromise ("We cannot be completely content with this program") but he considered the congress a victory for the left and promised to be more polite to the non-Communists in the future: To swnmarize our impression, we may state that iron necessity has driven the SI leaders to pursue the path pointed out by th~ Communists, even though they were extremely upset by the manner-indeed, not gentle-in which they were urged in that direction. It has appeared, however, that we must revise that method of pressure, since otherwise personaJ sensitivities can do too much damage to the affair. We shall indeed keep this feeling in mind in the future, though of course we cannot weaken the pressure itself." In general, the PKI leaders seem to have thought that the congress had represented a showdown and that they had ·won; they exhibited considerable optimism just after the meeting and opined that future diHerences would be even more easily resolved. at In their pleasure over the immediate achievements of the congress, the Communists seem to have forgotten that the meeting also gave the Jogjakarta leaders something they wanted: time. Tjokroaminoto's position was very weak at the March congress-even Oetoesan 11 india had suggested that "younger forces" assume the party chairmanship-and had a 6ght over party leadership occurred, the results would have been difficult to predict.85 The opponents of Semarang appreciated this danger and sought to avoid an immediate contest; as soon as the congress adjourned, they set about strengthening their position. To do so, they had to revive the non-Communist energies of the movement, which were by now seriously weakened. Of the 200-0dd registered Sarckat Islam branches, only 57 had sent delegates to the congress and none came from outside Java. Contact between the CSI and its locals 99

Rise of Indonesian Communism had largely broken down, and listlessness and discouragement seemed to characterize Indonesian politics as a whole. The cruef figures rallying the anti-Semarang SI were Tjokroam,inoto and Hadji Agus Salim. The latter had been charged with preparing for the proposed reorganization of the Sarekat Islam, much to the Communists' displeasure, for they correctly viewed him as their most dangerous opponent. The hvo leaders tOured the various non-Communist branches of the movement, reviving their interest and priming them to expel Semarang. Their arguments made three points: First, the SI could not hope to survive, mueh less regain its lost influence, unless it united behind a single leadership and became a real party ·instead of a collection of warring factions. The PKI, Sarekat Hindia , and Budi Utomo had instituted party diScipline for their own movements, making an exception for membership in the Sarekat Islam because it was the key to the masses. Why should the SI suffer these parasites, who drained its strength and preserved it in confusion? Secondly, religion should be the keystone of SI action, for Islam was the factor that united the Indonesian people and contained, in addition . to spiritual values, all the major economic and social principles embraced by Marxism. Thirdly, the- PK] was openly connected with the European Communist movement, particularly the Dutch; hence, the PKI was a tool of European colonialism. Europeans, no matter what they professed, could have no real interest in a socialist Asia. Had not the Comintern theses opposed Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism, and thus the unity of Islam and Asia? In the last analysis, they argu"ed, the PKI was an instrument whereby the Dutch policy of divide and rule was extended to the Indonesian independence movement. On the other hand, the SI was genuinely Indonesian, genuinely Islamic, andwitness its recently adopted program-genuinely Communist. Why, therefore, adopt a foreign product when you could have a native one that possessed additional virh.ICS? u The fragility of the congress agreement was revealed in June 1921, when the neutral Union of Native Public Works Employees (VIP· BOW ) called its fellow PPKB members together to discuss the possibil. ity of restoring the shattered unity of the federation. The labor . organization had greatly declined in membership from the peak of a claimed 150,000 in mid·1920; 81 this loss had occurred principally within Surjopranoto's PFB and other non-Communist unions. Scmarang, on the other hand, was riding out the slump rather well; in fact , its major

100

The Bloc Within union, the VSTP, had more than doubled its membership and was now by far the largest unit in the federation. Of the unions represented at the conference, only two-the sugar and pawnshop workers' unionswere partisans of Jogjakarta; three were neutral but opposed to schism. and ten supported Semarang.ss Understandably. Semaun thought himself in a strong position at the meeting, for it seemed that his opponents could not poSSibly control the conference; hence. the onus of any schism would fall on them. He therefore began by pointing out the all too obvious fact that the PPKB was effectively inoperative, for half its executive refused to cooperate with the other half. The only solution was to elect a new executive. and the conference. he asserted, provided the opportunity. The two Jogjakarta unions naturally opposed this suggestion. and it was eventually acknowledged that the meeting did not constitute a PPKB congress and thus could not elect officials. Not satisfied with this, however. the Jogjakarta unions. led by Muis and Salim, outlined their reasons for refusing to cooperate with Semarang. The Communists. they charged, made slanderous attacks on their colleagues. were tools of the Dutch, and were cowards when it came to really putting on a strike. Semarang's supporters replied in kind, and the session ended in a shambles. This quarrel apparently convinced the Semarang unions that their initial willingness to compromise had been foolish, for they reintroduced the matter of electing a new leadership on the second day and the whole debate began again. At this point. Semaun and Bergsma made a fatal slip: the Jogjakarta unions had argued that a new executive could be elected only if al1 members of the old one resigned. and so they declared the current leadership to be dissolved. Immediately the Jogjakarta representatives declared that if the Semarang members wished to resign. they themselves no longer need do so, for their sale objection to the PPKB had been the presence of Communists in it; the federation executive would therefore continue without Semarang members. With that they broke up the meeting.S. This political sleight of hand was performed in an atmosphere of near chaos, with both sides making wild personal attacks on their opponents. The leftist leaders attempted to recoup some of their losses by holding a rump conference at which they announced the creation of a Revolutionary Federation of Labor Unions (Revolutionnaire VakcentraIe. RVC) . to be centered in Semarang. A portion of the title originally urged by the ISDV for the labor federation was thus resurrected.

101

Rise of Indonesian Communism Times had changed, however, and the Communists could better appreciate the public servants' fears of being compromised; there was no mention of Bolshevism at the founding of the new federation, and it was stressed that the term. "revolutionary" had been chosen to distinguish the new federation from the old and not to iJ:Idicate any desire to overthrow the government. The Rve's first move was to issue a manifesto, in the classical fashion of the united front from below, to bid for the allegiance of its opponents' membership. The PPKB replied in kind, and the next few months were taken up with the battle. The RVe controlled fourteen unions, all loyal to Semarang and composed mostly of blue-collar workers; of these, the VSTP was by far the largest and best organized. The PPKB controlled three unions whose directorates interlocked with the eSI : the PPKB, PFB, and Sarekat Postel (post, telephone, and telegraph workers) . Of the neutral unions, VIPBOW was initially inclined toward the Rve but soon turned to the CSI-Ied federation, along with the teachers' associations. These unions remained on the periphery of the PPKB, however. Less politically oriented than the core group of Jogjakarta unions, they desired a single labor association that would balance olI factional tendencies; thus they mediated between the two federations, although they were basically more conservative than either of them.1IO The collapse of the Sl-PKI labor alliance presaged events in the political movement. The initial optimism of the Communists vanished soon after the March congress; for a time they continued to rail against party discipline; but their arguments lacked energy. Indeed, they seemed undecided what stand to take: some Semarang voices urged that there be no party disCipline in Indonesian politics before independence, others that party discipline be imposed but not for the PKI; occasionally it was stated that the bloc within the SI seemed doomed and that the Communists should therefore seek alliance on another basis. ~ I After the split in the lahor movement, the Communists no longer gave special emphasis to the party discipline measure; apparently persuaded that the eSI leaders could not again be won to a compromise, they devoted themselves to attacking their opponents. The special congress that was to discuss the party discipline issue was set by the CSI for October.~2 Late in August, Tjokroaminoto was arrested and charged with perjury in the Section B investigations, and he was imprisoned to await trial. This ended any chance of a camprn102

The Bloc Within mise, since it meant Jogjakarta would control the m~eting and would

probably prevent any last-minute attempts by Tjokroaminoto to preserve the movement's unity. The SI chainnan's absence by no means strengthened Semarang, for his imprisonment made him a martyr and

therefore politically unassailable. Just as Sneevliet's Indonesian opponents had rallied to praise him in his hour of exile, so the Communists ceased to

plight.

a~tack

Tjokronminoto and instcad cxpressed sympathy for his

93

The SI congress was held in Surabaja from October 6 to 10; the eff~t of Salim's spadework was immediately evident, for the meeting

was entirely under his controP· The Semarang faction seems to have been unsure whether to attend, and Semaun did not at first take his place on the podium with the other members of the CSI executive. On the third day, the major agenda items were put before the delegates: the program adopted by the March meeting, and the proposal for party discip~e. Salim interpreted the program and explained that the 51 was revolutionary in the sense that it strove for the principles of liberty. equality, and fraternity and th~t it acknowledged the possibility of violence in achieving those aims. However, he continued, the movement did not seek these goals for one class but for all classes; therefore it did not base itself on the class struggle. It was national in character, but it was also international because it was based on religion; so far as nationalism represented the interests of a single class (a probable reference to the Sarekat Hindia's "national capitalist" inclinations), the SI would oppose it. 9 5 Semarang did not object to this exegesis, but reserved 'its arguments until Salim and Muis moved to tie acceptance of the program to party discipline. At that point Tan Malaka, a rising young Communist leader, urged that an exception be made for the PKI, since Communism was the natural ally of Islam in the struggle against imperialism. Were not the Bolsheviks allies of the Muslims in the Caucasus, Persia, Afghani. stan, and Bukhara; were not the British imperialists so afraid of this union that they demanded the Soviet government abstain from propaganda in those countries? If the SI was religiously international, then it should take a lesson from the ]slamic community abroad and preserve its alliance with Communism. Semaun, taking another tack, argued that if the SI abandoned its left wing, it would lose the masses and return to what it had been in the beginning-a minor union of Muslim merchants. Religion alone was

103

Rise of Indonesian Communism not a sufficient basis for the Indonesian popular movement. for it could serve a capitalist ideology as well as a socialist one. Moreover. not all Indonesians were Mus1im; what of the Christian minority, whose support was so important in winning the native soldiery over to independence? The struggle must be for all oppressed Indonesian classes; to restrict it to one religion was to follow the government policy of divide and rule. Salim replied to these arguments that everything stated by Marx was. already contained in the Koran, even the principle of dialectical materialism. It was true that the Muslims of the Middle East accepted aid . from the Bolsheviks, but they were independent of tl;lem and did not allow tbem in their midst. The 51 could not go on being a battlefield for other parties, unable to determine its own course; if it lost members by imposing party discipline, it would do so in order to build a wellknit. purposeful cadre that in the end would be far more effective than nebulous mass support. A vote was taken. party discipline was approved by a great majority, and so far as the CSI was concerned the bloc within was ended. . The collapse of the alliance represented more than the end of a period for the Indonesian Communist party. It marked a great and fatal schism in the Indonesian independence movement, which resulted in the retirement of the general populace from the political scene for the rest of the colonial period. Of the 196 branches claimed by the Sarekat Islam at the time of the October congress. only 36 sent delegates to the meeting and only one came from outside Java. Clearly, the mass movement had fallen on evil times; but those on both sides who believed that discipline would give it momentum and direction were never more wrong.

104

VI

Electi ve Affinities TIiE acceptance of party discipline by the October 1921 congress ended the bloc within the Central 5arekat Islam but Dot in the 51 as a whole. This apparent contradiction arose because the association, which had originally been forbidden to organize on a centralized basis, had allowed only a coordinating function to the CSI. The central board could expel only its own associates; the right to determine who should or should not belong to the 51 branches lay with the locals themselves.

A proposal to transfonn the Sarekat Islam into a centrally controlled party was on the agenda of the October congress, but no action was taken on it at the time; as a result, the party discipline decision applied only to members of the CSI and to those who represented locals before the central body. When the measure was passed, Semaun and the representatives of the five branches that opposed it at the congress-Semarang, Salatiga, Sukabumi, Kaliwungu, and Surakarta-severed their connections with the CSI and left the meeting. I Their disaffiliation was only personal: it was agreed that they would present the question of party discipline to their respective locals for a vote, and if the branches disagreed with them, other leaders would be elected to represent their locals before the CSI. This meant that the same battle would now be fought out in the Sarekat lslam branches, and only when it was completed wou1d the symbiotic Communist-51 relationship be entirely end!XI. The separation of the two elements promised to be no easy task. In spite of the longstanding feud between 5cmarang and the CSl, factional divisions within the movement were not clearent. By no means all Semarang adherents were PKl members; the Communist party had counted 269 members in 1920 and, in spite of the resCinding of Hartogh's restrictive policy, it contained fewer a year later.2 Ultimate loyalties were not certain even among this core group: Alimin, for example, was generally considered a CSI supporter in spite of his long membership in the 105

Rise of Indonesian Communism PKI/ ISDV. Personal rivalries and ambitions detennined factional Jeanings to at least as great a degree as did ideology, and in spite of elements in both Jogjakarta and Semarang factions that urged reliance on a small, ideologicany pure group, neither side was willing to impose undue pressure for commitment. Leadership was both too personal and too scarce; alienation of a local politica16gure might lose the support of an entire branch, and loss of a leader of national rank would be a serious blow to a faction's general prestige. Many lesser politicians, concerned either for the unity of the Indonesian movement or for their own position as SI officials, were not inclined to cooperate with the CSI demand for a decision. Moreover, many branches did not wish to weaken themselves and dishub personal friendships by ousting their pro-Semarang members. Consequently, a large number of SI units refused to declare themselves either for Semarang or for Jogjakarta: a Hageant case was that of the radical Bandung SI, which, to the helpless indignation of the Jogjakarta leadership, took part in a CSI-sponsored regional conference that followed the break by sending as its representative the only member of its executive who did not belong to the Communist party.a In short, separation of Semarang's following from ~e Sarekat Islam by no means fonowed automatically from the October congress decision, The process would, it was clear, involve intensive and delicate efforts on the part of both factional centers to commit their following. In this effort the activity of each side's most popular leader was indispensable, As it happened, neither was available, for Tjokroaminoto was in jail and Scmaun left the country shortly after the congress, Furthermore, neither side was sure at this point how far it wished to can:y the split. In arguing for party discipline at the October meeting, the Jogjakarta leaders had stressed that the end of the bloc within did not preclude cooperation with the Communists on other bases. Within the PKI itself the. inBuence of the radical purists had declined; the Indonesians were becoming 'increasingly independent of their remaining European advisers, and two major opponents of compromise-Baars and Darsono--were no longer in the colony, There was some feeling in the party that the CSI desire for comprehenSive party discipline was justified and that cooperation on the basis of a simple alliance would be more profitable to both sides,4 Semaun did not share this view, but neither did he contest the congress decision, Instead, .,"vith a final plea to his erstwhile colleagues not to tread the path of

106

Elective Affinities Islamic capitalism, he urged cooperation on specific projects via COOlmon membership in a "National Committee." According to Tan Malaka. he and Semaun pressed the CSI leaders at the meeting for a commitment to join in such a committee and managed to secure their "semiagreement." ~ Both the Semarang leaders and their rivals were acutely aware of the demoralizing effect all-out hostilities would have on the popular following of both factions. The CSI treasury was empty. its adherents apathetic; Semarang's base of support was more active, but it also was greatly discouraged. Malaka, who succeeded Semaun as PKI chairman, considered the split a disaster and did not hesitate to blame his party for helping to bring it about: As a newcomer to the movement, I tried to see a just cause for the break. I was, however, unable to find such a reason. I only saw that the polemics in Oetoesan Htrniia and SinQr Hindia had no connection with principles but were instead concerned almost solely with personal matters. and were accompanied by slanderous remarks. Polemics which were based on insults and which did not provide accurate accounts were causing the common people to lose a good deal of their fruth in the leaders of both the CSI and the PKI. I feared that this split would not be limited to the CSI and the (executive . of the) PPKB but would continue to spread throughout the locals, those led both by the CSI and by the PKI. A schism of this sort, taking place in a period of reaction, would be exceedingly dangerous for the people and would make much easier the work of the reactionaries. a Malaka's feeling that unity was required was generally shared throughout the Indonesian political world. Budi Utomo had been urging coordination of effort through a national committee .since late 1920; the CSI leaders had devoted considerable effort in 1921 to breathing life into the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements. and the Sarekat Hindia pressed proposals that the opposition parties fuse into one mass organization. None of these efforts was successful, for personal and political differences prevented any lasting alliance, but cooperation on specific projects did increase during 1921. In August. a Committee for Strengthening the Spirit of the Movement (Comite Mencguhkan Keberanian Pergerakan) was fonned by Budi Utomo, the CSI, and a number of labor unions in Jogjakarta to coordinate their efforts and support those in difficulty with the authorities. In November, the Communists surrendered their objections to multiparty cooperation and sponsored a meeting against government interference

1UT

Rise of Indonesian Communism with SI-sponsored schools and against the continued existence of seignoriallands. The demonstration, in which Budi Utomo, the Sarekat Islam, and Sarekat Hindia participated and which was attended by an estimated 5,000 pcr.sons, was viewed by the authorities as the year's high point in antigovernment cooperation. 1 This desire for unity was in part a defensive reaction to the changing policies of the colonial government. We; have noted the mutual disillusionment between the government and Indonesian political movements during the latter part of the 1910s; both sides had expected too much of each other, and disappointment led to distrust. In addition, Dutch colonial policy was undergoing a reaction from the Ethical assumptions of the early years of the decade. The war and its accompanying fears for Dutch power in the Indies contributed to this; even more important were the great expansion of the Indies export economy and the increasingly conservative character of the postwar Netherlands governments. Ethical arguments for the social and economic development of the Indonesian population gave way to the rationalization that the highest good for both motherland and colony was served by promoting and protecting European enterprise. It was a concept that appealed vastly to the Indies Dutch, who had long heen impatient of "sickly Ethicism," but it was not one that attracted the Indonesians, who saw it as proof of the radicals' argument that colonial rule could benefit only the Europeans. By 1920, Ethical proposals found support in the Netherlands parliament only from the Nonconfessional Democrats, Socialists, and Communists, an ineffective and incompatible minority. A stubborn battle for Ethical principles was led by the Leiden professors Van Vollenhoven, Snouck Hurgronje, and Carpentier Alting; but although these scholars enjoyed wide respect, the~ arguments were totally unacceptable to postwar Dutch opinion. Increasingly, "Leiden" came to mean not the scholarly conscience of colonial policy but wooly-minded interference in the hardheaded politics of imperial rule.8 With the change in policy came a change in rulers. When Idenburg resigned as Minister of Colonies in November 1919, he was replaced by the archconservative Simon de Graaff. 'When Governor General van Limburg Stirum finished his tour of duty, he was replaced, in April 1921, by one of his most vociferous critics, Dirk Fock. The new Governor General was a laissez-faire Liberal. and one of the chief points on which he had attacked his predecessor was the rapid increase in gov108

Elective Affinities ernment expenditures for Van. Limburg Stirum's program of welfare, education, and goverrunent services, He saw his principal task as Governor General as balancing the Indies budget; this was no mean undertaking, for the previous government had gone heavily into debtpartIy because many of the new taxes it had imposed had not yet been sanctioned by the home government-and Fode had assumed office at the onset of an international recession, which severely hurt the colony's export economy. Fock was not a man to boggle at drastic remedies, however; he promptly introduced a series of draconian financial measures, cutting public expenditures to the bone and increasing taxes conSiderably. In addition, the taxes proposed by his predecessor began to be implemented, so that in spite of the declining economy government receipts rose sharply. The great weight of this increase fell on the already overtaxed Indonesian population, for Fock proceeded on the conservative premise that to get an economy going again, the burden on industry shou1d be eased. 9 Moreover, when he did attempt to raise money by an excess profits tax on the petroleum industry, he was turned down by the Minister of Colonies, to whom the oil interests made it clear that, although they could afford to pay, they did not choose to do SO.10 The Indonesians naturally looked on this with extreme misgivings, the more so since the governmenfs arguments of dire necessity in cutting welfare items in its budget were vitiated by a simultaneous campaign to increase conSiderably the Indies military forces and Beet. Both within and without the Volksraad, Indonesian spokesmen protested the government's tax policy, but the result of their efforts was very close to zero.ll Their failure impressed upon them the political helplessness of the Indonesians in the face of detennined government opposition, and it contributed to the growing feeling that there could be no community of interests between themselves and the Dutch. The trend toward extreme economic and social conservatism was accompanied by decreased government tolerance for Indonesian political opposition. In part, this continued the process of disillusionment that had begun before Fock; however, in spite of the mutual suspicion that marked the last years of Van Limburg Stirum's rule, the Indonesians looked on that governor as an enlightened and sympathetic ruler. Not so Fock, however; his tenure has gone down in Indonesian nationalist histories as It time of black reaction, and it was seen thus by Indonesians of that day. The characterization is somewhat unfair, for,

109

Rise of Indonesian Communism especially when compared to the Indies regimes of the 19305. Fock's rule was not completely intolerant. Like a number of other Duteh Liberals, he had once supported the Ethical program: although he now gave priority to Netherlands economic interests, he continued to think that he was folloWing a basically Ethical course. As a lawyer and a Lib· eral, he was concerned for due process of law and for the rights of political expression; before he assumed office, he had indicated that he in· tended to expand the freedom of the Indies press. He was, however, a rigid and stubborn man-<:lne who said what he meant, had no patience with vagueness or haggling, and· equated compromise with weakness. Although he had lived in the Indies earlier and Van Limburg Stirum had not, he was far less understanding of the Indonesians than his predecessor, who was by nature, philosophy, and diplomatic training able to see and respond to other points of view. Though Fock upheld libertarian political principles, his concern for their application in the Indies was severely limited by his belief that unrest in the colony was produced by troublemakers rather than by genu· ine popular grievances. In his view, unwise toleration of such elements had resulted in the disturbances of 1918-1919; now that the Indies was in a period of radical economic retrenchment, it was more necessary than ever that the government take a finn stand against any attempts to undermine its authority. It was a very short step. given the gap that sepa. rated the Indonesian movements from the colonial regime, to equate all criticism with subversive opposition, and Indonesian political groups accordingly found themselves subjected to much greater resbictions. At the same time, Fock did not wish to abandon his principles or to deny the right to criticize; he was therefore reluctant to reduce existing civil rights. This ambivalence accentuated the contradictory aspect of colo· nial political liberty that we noted earUer: in one case the mUdest criticism might result in severe reprisal; and in another, overt declarations of revolutionary intent might be tolerated. TIlls meant that the Indonesians were less certain of the pennissibJe limits of opposition, and the possibility of an Indonesian orientation that was neither one of revOlution nor one of noncooperative quietism accordingly decreased. The fate of the autonomy movement of 1921-1922 reflected this loss of a middle ground. Autonomy for the Indies was originally a goal of the Ethici, who saw it as part of the process whereby Indies inhabitants of all races would govern the archipelago as partners. Proposals drawn up by the Revision Commission, established to redesign the 110

Elective Affinities

Indies constitution in accord with the concessions of November 1918, provided for a considerable increase in autonomy; but it was very soon apparent that these suggestions were opposed by the domi· nant conservatives, and especially by Colonial Minister de Graaff. In an effort to rescue something of the conunission's program, a Committee for Indies Autonomy was established in December 1921. It consisted· of prominent Indies Dutch Ethici and Indonesian regents and Volksraad members. The committee aroused considerable interest among the Indonesian elite and attracted not only the main parties but also professional groups, regional associations, and the leagues of regents and princes. Such were the conservative European objections to associationist reform, however, that in spite of the committee's politically respectable leadership, the limitation of its goals to those set by the Revision Commission, and the fact that it neither sought nor received the backing of the PKI, it was widely accused in the Indies Dutch press of desiring Communist support and of being at least indi· rectly revolutionary. Shortly after its establishment, the movement was dealt a severe blow by the Governor General, who objected to the presence of three regents on a delegation the conunittee proposed to send to Holland. ]n March 1922 it received the coup de grdce when Colonial Minister de Graaff alUlounced that he considered revision of the Regeringsreglement unnecessary. The Leiden Ethici attempted to revive the campaign in the Netherlands by organizing an autonomy committee to in8uence the parliamentary elections that year. None of the candidates they recommended was elected, the new government was more conservative than the last, and De Graaff, the prime target of their attaclc, was kept on as Minister of Colonies. 12 This effectively ended the political in8uence of Leiden; it also marked the failure of moderate European-Indonesian association as a political instrument or goal. The autonomy movement continued, but under the less moderate aegis of the National Committtee, which bad been founded about the same time as the autonomy committee by Douwes Dekker and the radical Ethici Fournier and Van Hinloopen Labberton. This committee, which was supported chiefly by the ISDP, Sarekat Hindia. and Sarekat Islam, drew up a national unity program that aimed at a federation composed of the East Indies, the West Indies, and the Netherlands on the basis of equality and broad auton· omy. The group was inclined towaxd noncooperation, a leaning that was strongly expressed at the AlI·lndies Congress it organized in June

111

Rise of

Indon~sian

Communism

1922. Moreover, although it was associationist in composition, the com· mittee's members were coming to doubt the benefits of EW'OpeanIndonesian partnership. As one of its leaders remarked, it was no longer realistic to seek self-rule together with the Europeans; that goal would have to be achieved by Indonesians and for their own people. 11 To the Indonesians' sense of identity against the Europeans was added at this time a growing awareness of an Indonesian national self. In 1921 the w'ord "Indonesia" began to replace the colonial "Indies" in political discussions; in intellectual circles people began to talk seriously about an Indonesian state, and Indies Malay-the future Bahasa Indonesia-began to be spoken instead of Dutch by Indo: nesian delegates to the Volksraad. u The existing parties did not lose their essentially regional or international orientation, but they were deeply affected by this sense of an Indonesian identity, which was to result a few years later in the first true nationalist groups. The impulse for a unmed na~onalist political effort was greatly strengthened by the noncooperation campaign then being carried on by the Indian National Congress under Gandhi's leadership. The relative effectiveness of the Congress and its ability to overcome regional and religiOUS diHerences made a deep impression on the Indonesian political elite, whose own organizations lay scattered and stagnant. In all the major parties emulation of the Congress was urged, but the Indian example was particularly useful to the left wing. Semarang could point out that the Indians were united and strong while the Indonesians quarreled and were weak, and could charge that Gandhi braved imprisonment while Tjokroaminoto visibly cowered at the thought. The example of the Congress served both to belabor PKI opponents and to urge them to radical unity; understandably, then, Indonesian Communists did not see Gandhi's nationalism in the same light as the hybrid patriotism of the Sarelcat Hindia. Instead, they held it to be the sort of truly revolutionary leadership the Comintem had in mind in advocating nationalist-Communist cooperation. The International itself was not so sure; its own organs were at first ambivalent and then sour in their view of the Indian leader, but the PKI continued for some time to praise Gandhi as an inspiring example for the Indonesian national movement. 11I The moral imperative of Indonesian unity was visible in the willing~ ness of the October 1921 SI congress to consider forms of alliance other than. the bloc within; it was even more apparent at a conference of the 112

Elective Affinities PPKB that took place in the 6nal days of the congress. Although the meeting was composed of non-Communist unions, it was not united on the question of party discipline and responded favorably to Semaun's plea to resume cooperation between the sundered branches of the labor movement. Salim, who led the conference, did not favor restoration of relations with Communist unions, but in the end he agreed to reunification, the details of which were left to a later date. liS He may well have felt, principles aside, that he could ill afford to do otherwise. The VIPBOW was leading the non-CSI unions in urging either unification or establishment of a third labor center tied neither to Sernarang nor to Jogjakarta. Pro-Semarang leaders in the PFB had recently ousted Surjopranoto, and the union was now moribund and hopelessly split. The PPPB was anticipating a strike and needed all the help it could get; moreover, its Bandung branch, which headed all the Priangan divisions, had elected Communist leaders, who were actively opposing the union's CSI central command,l7 The ideal of unity thus combined with the exigencies of politics to prevent a real severing of relations between Jogjakarta and Semarang. In effect, the October congress decision left the PKI half in and half out of the Sarekat Islam, and in this awkward position it remained another year and a half. The ambiguity of its condition was illustrated at the Communists' eighth congress, convened in Semarang at the end of the year. The theme of the meetings was unity; in calling the convention, the PKI executive declared that it hoped to discuss methods by which Indonesian movements could coordinate their efforts against government restrictions on their activities. To this end, it invited the participation of representatives from the CS[ and Sarekat Hindia as well as from the PKI and the SI units loyal to Semarang. Two notable concessions to the non-Communists were made in the announcement: it stated that the party hoped for cooperation through a national committee or federation, thus abstaining from a campaign to revive the bloc within, and it specified that the Indonesian struggle should be aimed against "modem organized capital," a secular phrase for the "sinful" foreign capital the SI opposed. IS The meeting, which opened on December 25, was attended by some 1,500 persons, among them representatives of ten PKl branches, fourteen SI locals, and a delegation from the CSI.18 Portraits of Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Lenin, and Trotsky covered the walls of the meeting room, reminding the delegates of the party's 113

Rise of Indonesian Communism international orientation; but hanging with them were not the pictures of Dutch leaders from the CPH and PKI that generally looked down on Indies Communist gatherings but likenesses of Sentot, Diponegoro, and Kijai Modjo, heroes of earlier Indonesian struggles against Dutch ruJe,20 1he keynote address was given by Tan Malaka, who for six hours argued for unification of the Indonesian mass ·movement. His discussion compared the achievements of the united ' Indian National Congress and the failures of the divided Indonesian parties. The Congress, he pointed out, was able t~ organize a noncooperation movement that the British could not suppress, but the Indonesian opposition, which took no such radical action, was paralyzed by the far weaker Dutch. Solidarity made the diHerence; the English did not dare arrest Gandhi because they knew the Indian people were united behind him. If the Indonesians would only close ranks in similar fashion, the Dutch would be unable to defeat them an.d they would reverse the diminution of their political liberties/u By either its persuasiveness or its length Tan Malaka's speech wore down the opposition, and he noted with satisfaction that both Communist and Islamic response was much more favorable than even he had expected.22 The conciliatory moves were interrupted., however, when Abdul Muis, who arrived at the meeting after Malaka had spoken, reopened old wounds by denounCing the past behavior of the PKI within the Sarekat Islam. 23 His charges were immediately taken up by the more irascible Communists, and MaJaka's effort seemed doomed. when aid came from an unexpected source. The PKI spokesman was rescued by a Widely respected religiOUS teacher and CSI leader, Kjai Hadji Tubagus Hadikusumo, who was attending the congress as the representative of the Muhammadijah. He spoke to the quarreling factionalists in favor of cooperation, using instead of the example of the Indian National Congress the still more powerful argument of the interests of Islam. The Indonesian people, he declared, were in the great majority members of the Community of Islam; this was true of Semarang's adherents as well as those of Jogjakarta. The chief goal of the Indonesian movement was to struggle against the oppression of unbelieving foreign rulers; this struggle could be carried on effectively only by a united people, and those who worked against unity were serving the enemy and acting against Islam. The proper attitude between Indonesian Communists and non-Communists, the Muhammadijah leader concluded, should be one of muJ14

Elective AOinities tual respect and tolerance in the interests of the greater struggle against the Dutch.:u This intercession, reflecting doubts felt even in deeply religious cir· cles about the CSI's wisdom in choosing purity of principle over mass unity, had a tremendous impact on the congress. As the grateful Tan Malaka described it, Hadji Hadilrusumo's message was like that of a healer [dukun] bringing succor to a person on the brink of death. Insults and disputes were buried completely. From the side of the CSI and PPKB as well as from the PKI, Semarang-oriented SI. and RVC the voices that sought to slander and de-stroy their own friends were stilled. This was a great victory for both parties and for the entire people. Zri

Muis and the anti·Communists suddenly saw their position reversed; they had previously based their arguments against Sernarang principally on the incompatibility of Conununism and Islam, but they now found the anti-Islamic label threatening to attach itself to them. They accordingly abandoned their opposition, and the meeting' decided that both groups would cooperate closely on specific projects and would develop some sort of central organ through which their eHorts could be coordinated. 26 In addition, a conference between the CSI, the Semarang-oriented 51, the PKI, and the two labor federations was to be held in April 1922 to agree on cooperation in labor and political aHa irs. On this cautiously optimistic note, the Communist meeting closed-but not before sending a telegram of greetings to the distant author of much of its success, the Indian National Congress.:n As it made progress toward an alliance, the congress also moved to end the bloc within by approving a Sarekat Islam Association (Persatuan Sarekat Islam, PSI ) to unite the SI units that had left the main body when the Communists were expelled. On October 25, a meeting had been held at PKI headquarters in Semarang to consider a response to the SI congress decision for schism; it was suggested that an effective way to organize the pro-Communist 51 members and Win away SI members would be to create URed" SI units to compete under PKI direction with the regular Sarekat Islam branches. The decision to organize the PSI was made in early November, after lengthy debate. At the time, the Bandung leader GunawaI?- suggested that the proCommunist locals drop the confessional title and call themselves Sare·

115

Rise of Indonesian Communism leat Rakjat (People's Union), but this was apparently felt too radical a step." In declaring its intention to form the PSI, Semarang emphasized that it hoped the new center would join the PKl, CSI, Sarekat Hindia, and other Indonesian organizations in a National Committee, which, though undefined, was clearly envisioned as an Indonesian counterpart to the Indian National Congress. Such emphasis on unity and cooperation did not hide the fact that the center was part of the competition with Jogjakarta for the allegiance of the 51 rank and file; reflecting this aspect, the PKI invited all SI locals and not just the Communist ones to participate in the fonnatioD of the new league. The actual membership of the PSI was limited, however; it consisted of ten locals," a~1 from the genera1 Semarang area. In fact, it formalized the hegemony the Communist-led Semarang regional SI organization had long exerted over locals in northern Central Java. 30 The PSI did. not represent the total number of 51 units of leftist sympathies, let alone all the individual Sarekat Islam members who looked to Semarang rather than Jogjakarta; that phase of the split was yet to come. Three more features of the PKI congress deserve attention. The meeting decided to press the Comintern to abandon its stand against Pan-Islamism, for the religiOUS issue was a powerful weapon for Jogjakarta and had been used repeatedly to urge party disCipline. The Communists, while maintaining that politics should be secularly based, had attempted to counter these arguments by supporting religion themselves. They referred, for example, to Koranic passages expressing sympathy for the poor and condemning oppression and greed; they argued that communism was taught by the Prophet and was therefore the basis of Islam, whereas capitalism was the system of the unbelieving West. 31 Efforts to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and Communism were particularly marked in the last months of 1921, perhaps because Tan Ma1aka, who came from a strongly Muslim area, wanted particularly to avoid a religiOUS quarrel and was sanguine about the revolutionary potential of Islam. Shortly after the October SI congress, 5emarang organized a Hadj Committee to modify government regulations concerning the Mecca pilgrimage that were burdensome or conflicted with Islamic law. The committee secured an audience with the Governor Ceneral, and as a result some of the more troublesome had; rulings were changed. The Communists could thus claim that they were doing as much for Islam as Jogjakarta was. Malaka, as we know, did his best 116

Elective AtJinities to point out Soviet support of Islam; but the Lenin theses lay solidly in the way of his argument, and they were brought up again by CSI adherents at the PKI congress. Nothing would suffice, it seemed, but their withdrawal, and the party chairman's personal feelings on this score were only strengthened when the Muhammadijah invited him after the meeting to address its leaders on the subject of Communism.82 The PKI congress also discussed VoIksraad participation, somewhat surprisingly in view of the party's previous experience and the reiteration by the government that under no circumstances would Communists be appointed to the assembly. Apparently some delegates drew hope from the fact that the PKl had recently elected four members to the Sernarang town council with Sarekat Hindia support, and they speculated that if the government introduced some electoral reforms as a sop to those who urged constitutional revision, the Communists might be able to take advantage of the urban-skewed voting qualifications, alliance with other radical groups, and their strength in the Semarang district to gain an elective seat.u ln the end, however, the congress endorsed Bergsma's argument that the PKI should lead the other Indonesian groups in noncooperation, and the subject was permanently buried. After its public sessions, the PKI congress elected Tan Malaka party chainnan.J4 One of Indonesia's major revolutionary figures , he was born Sutan Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka in Suliki, a small town in the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, during the last decade of the nineteenth century.35 He was not born into the downtrodden masses; he came of gentry stock, his father was head of his village, and he enjoyed European-style basic schooling. Malaka attended the teacher training school in Bulcit Tinggi (then Fort de Kock ); according to his account, the Dutch assistant director of that institute persuaded the leading families of Suliki to establish a fund to send him to Holland to continue his studies,38 and he thus joined the then very small elite of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. He began work at the Haarlem teachers college in 1913 and later studied for a principal's diploma at the school of education in Bussum. He was far from a dull student, but his academic experience in the Netherlands was no unqualified success; moreover, the climate and careless living encouraged tuberculosis, which was several times to endanger his life. While he was in the Netherlands, World War I and the presence of a socialist in his boardinghouse caused Tan Malaka to be swayed by the

117

Rise of Indonesian Communism ideological winds that were then roaring over Europe. He read Nietzsche and developed an enthusiasm for Gennany that inspired him to volunteer for the Kaiser's army, only to be informed that it did not possess a foreign legion. He read Carlyle and became a passionate admirer of the French Revolution-not so much, however, as to take advantage of that nation's facilities for foreign enthusiasts. When the Russian revolutions came, Tan Malaka began to take socialist propaganda more seriously, reading Marx, Kautsky; and the outpourings of the early Dutch Marxists. He became more and more attracted to a revolutionary viewpoint hut was not sure that it was appropriate to Indonesia. In 1916 he had joined the Indische Vereniging, the association of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. 37 However, when he was asked by Suwardi Surjaningrat to talk about the Indonesian national movement at a congress of Dutch Indologists in 1918, he first declined on the grounds that he knew little about the movement and was not sure he wished to support it publicly.38 The turning point came, as it did for many Indonesians who studied in Holland, when he returned at the end of 1919 to second-class citizenship in the Indies. For a little over a year, Malaka taught contract coolies on a Sumatran rubber plantation-a disheartening experience, which, he related, 611ed him with hatred for the colonial Dutch and a burning desire to better the lot of the downtrodden Indonesians. In early 1921 he moved to Java, ready to devote himself to political action. Shortly after he arrived on the central island, Tan Malaka journeyed to Jogjakarta to visit Sutopo, a friend who was one of the leaders of Budi Utomo's progressive younger generation. His trip coincided with the March 1921 SI congress, and his host took him to the meeting to acquaint him with thc Indonesian leaders gathered there. ~'falaka made an immediate impression on Semaun, who was delighted to come upon an educated and enthusiastic admirer of Marx. The PKI chairman suggested that the young revolutionary join him in Semarang and there help establish a school that the Semarang SI was to sponsor. Malaka accepted, and the Indonesian Communist movement gained one of its greatest revolutionary talents.SQ 'I1Ie new recruit came to Semarang in July and took up residence in Semaun's house, which was then a gathering place for Semarang's young revolutionary set. 40 As Malaka later recalled, the radical spirit in the city was then at an ebb, since the c:tciting days of the soldiers' 118

Elective Affinities and sailors' soviets had become only memories and increasingly strict police supervision was depressing both the membership and the spirits of the Indonesian organizations.t1 His own project, however, did not partake of the general malaise: the Semarang 51 school was an immediate success, and soon branches were established in other Javanese cities"~ The Dutch authorities were not pl~ased at this accomplish. ment, for they disliked the mushrooming Indonesian-sponsored "wild schools," especially those which purveyed the ideas of Semarang. Ma· laka soon became a well-known political figure, launching himself on a long career as ideologue of the Indonesian revolution with a work on parliamentary and soviet government, in which he concluded that the principles of the latter more closely fitted Indonesian traditions. 43 Semaun gave him a role in labor organization through bequeathing him the chairmanship of the newly organized miners' and oil workers' union, Serikat Buruh Pelikan Indonesia,H and soon thereafter Malaka inherited the entire party. Tan Malaka agreed thoroughly with Semaun on the need for. a uni· 6ed revolutionary movement; he did not, however, approve of his predecessor's emphasis on caution and consolidation, and accordingly he ignored Semaun's admonition to continue in that vein.u As he saw it, a major cause for schism and apathy was PKI concentration in the past year on party organization and Marxist indoctrfuation instead of a broad campaign of protest against the government. What was needed, he thought, was not a detailed and specifically Communist program but a wholehearted effort to force the government to relinquish the "extraordinary rights" and other restrictions on civil liberties; such a campaign could unite all Indonesian movements, for none of them could flourish while. the government held these powers, Above all, the PKI must do and not talk: Certainly we need to have a program in the Indies, but that program must be very brief. The program must not have chapters or paragraphs: it must

contain only one word, and that is action. Action by the Indies proletariat for a clear and consistent goal, the withdrawal of the powers which so greatly impede and injure the popular movement,tG Malaka's idea to base PKI action on the extraordinary rights issue may well have been inspired by the fact that the Dutch Communists had raised a parliamentary stonn on this subject during his last year in the Netherlands and had been supported by SDAP and other members 119

Rise of Indonesian Communism of the legislature who were particularly concerned about civil rigbtsY The Indonesian opposition was certainly agreed on the issue, for all parties except Bum Utomo had bad leaders banished. Moreover, since 1919 the right of political association had been restricted,48 officials bad been reminded sharply that political opposition was not compatible with government employ,48 and the number of arrests under the press and speech laws increased considerably.oo To attempt to reverse such a trend would doubtless have been popular witb other parties in principle; whether in practice unity would have resulted is another matter. Although all opposition groups protested the limitation of their freedom, none had made civil rights a central issue. One reason may have been that the mass-oriented parties thought the subject had litt1e interest for the general populace; another may have been that a campaign of direct protest against government policy involved risks the parties were only sporadically willing to undertake. How Tan Malaka wou.ld have gone about organizing the eHort remains a mystery, however, for events immediately follOWing the PKI convention led him in an entirely different direction. The cause of this diversion was a pawnshop workers' strike in January 1922. Members of the PPPB, as low-ranking state employees, were among the Srst to feel the gathering depression in the fonn of layoHs and wage cuts under Fock's economy drive. By mid-1921 they nervously began to threaten a strike if any of their number should be dismissed, and they showed considerable impatience with their leaders' failure to obtain assurance of their security. Since the PPPB was the principal Jogjakarta union and was headed by Tjokroaminoto. Moo, and Salim, it made an excellent target for Semarang. The RVC made concerted and rather effective efforts to take advantage of the pawn- . shop workers' unrest, and the CSt leaders fought back with the argument that the Communists talked much but could not be counted on to back a strike.51 Government assurances of job security allayed tensions temporarily; but the momentum of unrest was too strong. and by the end of the year the workers had found a new issue on which to walk ou1.° 3 The immediate cause of the pawnshop strike was a quarrel over requirements that employees carry articles from the pawnshop to the place of auction. For some years this had been a burning issue in the pawnshop service, a govemment·run institution that played an important role in providing scarce cash for paying taxes and debts. The

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Elective Affinities pawnshop officials. whose status was in a limbo between white and blue collar. aspired to be recognized as prijaji, members of the gentry class from which the bureaucracy was traditionally drawn and for whom manual labor was out of the question. The government, on the other hand, took the position that the "continued existence of medieval Javanese attitudes and sentiments regarding the inferiority of manual labor" was to be discouraged 63 and issued a series of directives to the effcct that a pawnshop employee's refusal to carry objects would result in instant dismissal. Until 1921 most pawnshops had a man of all work; but this deus ex mochino vanished with the economy drive. and the pawnshop officials turned to their union for help. The PPPB leaders were not eager to act, for the issue was not negotiable and a strike was likely to bring disaster. However, they could not afford to lose the allegiance of this last major CSI union, whose members were beginning to question whether they should continue to support leaders who did not defend what they regarded as a vital interest. In the end. the union heads gave in. Once the pawnshop workers' union was committed, the PPKB was also involved, for that union was the federation's principal component and the directorates of the two groups interlocked. Nor could the Communist federation refrain : to do so would have been contrary to the direct action policy endorsed by Tan Malaka and Bergsma, would probably have ended the chances of reuniting the labor movement, and would have shown that their earlier wooing of the pawnshop workers had been insincere. As Malaka put it, "The time had come for the Communists to show that at their congress they had not been talking with their mouths alone, but also with their hearts." ~4 The pawnshop strike was Indonesia's first really large-scale unionsponsored work stoppage. It was not actually started by the union; what the PPPB decided, in effect, was that if the workers struck, it would support them. Consequently, the con8ict began locally-with the walkout of one employee in a small Central Javanese town-and spread in rapid but ragged fashion throughout the island.lI~ Within two weeks it affected 79 of 360 pawnshops, and in late January, at its height, it extended through the districts of Jogjakarta, Tjirebon, Pekalongan, Kedu, Semarang. Rembang, Kediri, Surabaja, and Pasuruanall areas in which the CSI and PKI were most active.GtI The immediate government response was to dismiss all who refused to return promptly to work, and the main activity of the labor federations in the strike was 121

Rise of Indonesia" Communism to organize enough support to persuade the authorities to soften this stand. On January 18, the RVe issued a manifesto, signed by Malaka and Bergsma, in which it called on the Indonesian proletariat to support the pawnshop workers' effort for reinstate~ent and hinted at a general strike if the government stood by the dismissals. ~T On January 25, the PPPB held a mass meeting in Jogjakarta, where leaders from aU the major Indonesian parties and labor unions spoke in support of the strike. Tan Malaka, who represented the RVe, presented a message of encouragement from the revolutionary federation; this was to be the immediate cause of his expulsion from the Indies. At the same time, unrest among the oil workers, the VSTP, and the dockworkers added emphasis to the Rve threat of a general strike.58 In these actions the Communists won considerable public attention, but they did not allay the suspicions of the eSI labor leaders. The extent of Jogjakarta's doubts about the PKI was illustrated toward the end of the strike, when the government forbade meetings in the Jogjakarta area: in spite of Communist urgings, Hadji Agus Salim, who then led the union, refused to transfer the center of the strike organization to Semarang, because he feared the Communists would take over the movement once it was on their home grounds.u Had the other Indonesian organizations seen the immediate cause of the pawnshop workers' walkout as the only reason behind the strike, the PPPB might have found it difficult to secure allies, for most Indonesian associations disapproved of the action itself. They viewed it, however, as a product of the general DClVousness and insecurity of the time and related it to ·their own feeling of deep frustration and helplessness in political affairs. The government's unbending attitude seemed symptomatic of the rigid conservatism of the new regime, which fired one out of five pawnshop employees in Java eo and complimented itself on haVing thus contributed to the economy drive.'1 Consequently, the strikers got widespread support, even from moderate Budi Utomo. The government also saw the strike as representing more than its immediate cause. In spite of the strikers' insistence that their support was related to the dismissals, the authorities viewed it as a revolutionary demonstration against foreign ntle.'2 Even the leaders of Budi Utomo, which not l.ong before had been declared the "association which most closely approaches the most desirable form of political action for real progress of this country,....' were informed that ..the

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Elective Affinities action of their support for the strikers can be described as nothing less than revolutionary." U As a "revolutionary" organization, Buw Utomo was infonned that until further notice it could hold meetings only with government pennission; apparently the government feared criticism for this punishment of a widely respected party, however, for the Budi Utomo executive was initially instructed to keep secret the restrictions placed uPO!l it. Of the political organizations involved in the strike, the C5I suffered the heaviest damage. The pawnshop workers' union collapsed after the strike, putting Jogjakarta permanently out of the race for control of the Indonesian labor movement. 6~ Abdul Muis was arrested midway through the strike and subsequently sent out of Java, thus dep'riving the non-Communist 51 of one of its top leaders. The PKI won considerable popular sympathy through its strong support of the strike and effectively rebuffed the argument that it was inactive; moreover, the government's sharp retaliation convinced more people than ever that revolution was the only answer. Nonetheless, the Communists also suffered. Malaka and Bergsma were arrested in mid-February and shortly thereafter deported. 68 Their cHorts had not increased the desire of the Jogjakarta to cooperate with 5emarang, for the C5I chiefs were now more than ever convinced that the wisest course was to avoid trouble in general and the Communists in particular. With Bergsma's departure, Dutch participation in the PKI came to an effective end; Het Vrije Woord, long kept alive almost solely by his efforts, ceased publication in May 1922. For the labor organizations the defeat was a bitter one, as the strike effort had been their rust attempt at a large-scale work stoppage; it bad been backed by most of the Indonesian organizations and had been undertaken against the government, hitherto a much more pliable opponent than private enterprise-and it had failed completely. Moreover, the authorities had treated the action as revolutionary in spite of the union's disclaimer of political motives, thus raising grave doubts about the fea~ibility of strike efforts in the future_ The immediate result of the defeat was paralysis. All branches of the Indonesian opposition were stilled, exhausted not only by their physical losses but also by the psycholOgical shock of the experience. The gulf that separated them from the government had been harshly illuminated; it was now so great that no real communication across it was possible. Both sides had retreated from the early days of hopeful con-

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Rise o/Indonesiall Communism frontation, and they now withdrew still further-the government into reliance on force and the Indonesian groups into sullen noncoopera~ tion. For the PKI, the hazards of a policy of direct challenge were all too clear: the arrest of Malaka and Bergsma, the only two first-rank party lead~ in the colony, virtually beheaded the Communist movement. Clearly, Tan Malaka's action program could not be continued if it br~ught such results. It was in this period of general discouragement and indecision that the two major 6gures in the mass movement, Tjo-kroaminoto and Semaun, resumed the leadership of their battered organizations.

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VII

Semaun's Program AT the end of October 1921, the VSTP executive announced in the union's journal that its chainnan had temporarily departed: On Leave. Beginning this month Comrade Semaun is going on leave for some time; the reason is that he must compose his mind, since he has been under a considerable strain from the work he has carried on in behalf of the people in general and the workers in particular. We cannot say where he will stay, since he is naturally not planning to let his place of retreat be known, lest his just-described purpose be frustrated by letters and such. We are bringing this to the attention of the VSTP members so that they will not be confused by reports in the white press and thus entertain suspicions that do not rest on the truth.1

Semauo's secluded spot was Soviet Russia. from which he returned late in May, 1922. The rumors to which the announcement probably referred were the widely circulated stories that the PKI chairman had in fact

gone to Russia and that he had done so because members of his partyparticularly the European ones-were concerned that he was straying from the orthodox internationalist path. 2 Semaun did not deny that ·he had doubts before his journey; indeed, he stressed this point at the meeting that welcomed him home. One stated ·cause of his disquiet was the famine in Russia, which had been much emphasized in the anti-Communist Indies press during 1921 and which the PKI had ceased to deny: "Reports of the confused condition of the administration under the leadership of the Bolsheviks in Russia caused me to go there in order to see for myself just what the situation was." S Furthermore, he maintained that he had been uncertain whether Communism was merely a servant of Russian interests, as its opponents claimed: \\'e can give assurance that the reactionaries' accusation that we Indies Communists are only a tool of the Russians is simply a slander and untrue.

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Rise of Indonesian Communism We thought this from the beginning, but the many reactionary reports inspired me to pass on the truth or falsity of these reports from within Russia itself. For if a person's convictions are attacked on many points, he may end by losing faith himself if he cannot come forth with strong proof that the truth is on his side.4 In judging these statements, we should bear in mind that, while they may reBect an actual crisis of conscience for Semaun, they also confonn to an Indonesian political gambit. Going on retreat, usually to a holy and rather inaccessible spot, is in the Javanese mystical tradition; one returns from the journey, having received spiritual guidance thr!,ugh meditation, with strength renewed and doubts resolved. In politics, a leader might undertake such a withdrawal before announcing a momentous decision, or he might use the custom to explain an absence necessitated by other reasons. Semaun was no stranger to this technique: returning from prison in 1919, he compared his experience to that of a hennit who, having separated himself from worldly affairs, partook of the grace of God .and thereby gained new strength and conviction.' Thus his expressions of doubt may have been rhetorical, for the purpose of emphasizing ~stored faith on his return; in this case they would have significance not for Semaun's own state of mind but as questions he thought his Indonesian audience might have about the PKI and Soviet Russia. Quite aside from this possible personal crisis, a conDict over Semaun's policy within the PKI itself provides a likely basis for the reports that that leader was sent to Soviet Russia to improve his orthodoxy. Semaun, as we have noted, guided the party along cautious lines, emphasizing the need to consolidate its position within the Indonesian movement and to avoid a direct chaUenge to the government. This brought criticism within the party from those who felt that the proper strategy for a Communist movement was Bolshevik-style revolutionrebeUion aimed directly at establishing a .dictatorship of the proletariat through the creation of soviets, with its chief weapon the general strike. These advocates of a "Russian" policy, who seem to have been for the most part Europeans, were joined in increasing numbers by party followers who, like Tan MaJaka, thought that the prevailing Indonesian sense of frustration and insecurity should be explOited in a massive protest action that would revive the momentum and cohesiveness of the popular movement. This pressure for a forward policy came to a peak over a railroad

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Sel1uwn's Program

strike, which many VSTP members had been urging since 1920. Semaun had been the principal spokesman against such a move, but at the VSTP congress of December 1920 the pressure for a stronger stand was such that the union declared it would consider a strike against those private companies that did not accept the government pay scale and hours by October 1, 1921. In mid-1921 there was a renewed tendency toward wildcat striking by private-line employees; as a result, the VSTP expelIed an important branch that had promoted such an eHort, thus giving the PPKB excellent ammunition in its postschism combat with the Communist labor leaders. By late September the strike deadline was drawing 'near, and most companies had not met the demands. Semaun began to hedge, however, arguing that the depression had altered the situation considerably since the ultimatum had been set; the balance of power was now in the hands of the capitalists and not the workers, and even on the state line the wage scale, part of which consisted of a cost-of-Iiving bonus, was endangered. Largely because of his urging the union again postponed action, on the grounds that a recession was not the proper time for wage demands. The VSTP chairman was right enough, but the decision aroused considerable unrest among the railroad workers, who tended to react to the depreSSion in the same way as the members of the pawnshop union: that is, the increasing economic uncertainty made them restless and doubly resentful, and they wished to lash out at their foreign masters without considering practical consequences.~ With the "Russian pattern" identified with a policy of direct challenge, Serna un's refusal to act must have appeared to the more radical members of the PKI as an unfortunate diversion from Communist orthodoxy,1 and they may well have thought that a journey to the heartland of the revolution would bring him back in line. In any event, there is considerable reason to believe that Semaun's journey was for another purpose than the official one of representing Indonesia at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. In the tirst place, that meeting, held in Irkutsk in Novcmbcr 1921 and in Moscow in January aod February 1922, was organized for the countries of the northern Far East; 8 Semaun, the only delegate from Southeast Asia, was clearly an afterthought. 8 True, Sneevliet was then urging from Shanghai that the Indonesian party should establish as many contacts as possible with other Asian revolutionary movements; according to Sernaun, Sneevliet secured the inclusion of Indonesia in the congress by arguing that the

JZl

Rise

0/

Indonesian Communism

Indies would occupy a strategic position in a future Pacific war and that the Netherlands was a participant in the Washington Conference, which the congress was called to protest. to But why send Semaun, who knew none of the languages spoken at the congress,l1 and leave the PKI in the hands of Bergsma-whose role was limited by the fact that he was Dutch---and Tan Malaka-who had belonged to the party only a few months? Darsono would have been a far more lOgical choice: he was already in Europe working for the Comintem; he ,had represented Indonesia at the International's third congress in mid-1921, and he spoke German. It therefore seems likely that Semaun's pilgrimage was arranged, perhaps by the European members of the PKI in collaboration with Sneevliet, to convince him by a stay in Russia of the need to travel the Bolshevik path. Unfortunately, such expectations were disappointed, for Semaun's Soviet experience had precisely the opposite eHect. Very little Comintern activity since the International's second congress related to the East; what activity there was chiefly represented vain eHorts by the advocates of radical proletarianism to incorporate their views into Comintem policy. The sole meeting devoted to Asia before 1922 was the First Congress of the Peoples of the East,12 which opened on Baku 00 September I, 1920. Soeevliet represented the Dutch and Indonesian Communist movements there: he addressed the delegates in the name of the CPH, PKI, and Sarekat Istam.a Apparently, he did not expect much of the meeting, however, for he had already assured the second Comintem congress that "we shall next attend the congress in Baku. However, we are oot under the illusion that this congress will have great Significance for the Far East. This is impossible." 14 The meeting drew up resolutions calling for agrarian revolution, opposition to both foreign and native capitalism, and establishment of workers' and peasants' soviets that would unite against foreign and native oppression. Although Comintem representatives Zinoviev and Bela Kun acknowledged that Asian Communism could succeed only with the help of revolutionary democratic nationalism, the general tenor of the congress reflected an extreme antibourgeois spirit, which many Soviet and Asian Communists held in spite of the decisions of the second Comiotern congress. U 1he Baku gathering was not a policymaking assembly, however, and its chief characteristic was confusion. It did establish a Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East, which was apparently designed as a Comintem junior exccu-

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Semaun's Program tive in charge of Asia. Its Far Eastern division, in Irkutsk, was given charge of China, Korea, Mongolia, Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan. Indonesia was thus very far from its center of attention, and the only apparent advantage that the Indies Communists gained from the Baku meeting was that they were able to use one of its several :Ilorid demonstrations (the proclamation of a djihad [Muslim holy war} against imperialism) as an argument against those who accused the Bolsheviks of hostility to Islamic unity,17 After the Baku meeting, overt Russian interest in the Eastern revolution seemed to decline. The Soviet govenunent was bending all its efforts toward restoring relations with the European powers, and this both drew its attention away from Asia and made it generally less wi1ling to support actions that would alienate West European governments. A general retreat in revolutionary agitation was declared, and emphasis was placed on improving organization and discipline instead. This was demonstrated very clearly at the third Comintern congress, which met in June and July 1921. At the meeting Darsono represented the Netherlands Indies. 1II He had, we will remember, jOined Baars and Snecvliet in Singapore in May 1921 and sailed from there to Shanghai; then he and Baars continued by rail to Moscow. a The congress devoted itself to the problems raised by Russia's withdrawal from a program of inunediate world revolution, by its desire for normal relations with Western Europe, and by Lenin's New Economic Policy, which was bringing about a compromise with capitalism in thc Sovi.c t economy. So far was the subject of Asian revolution from thc attention of the Comintem that the congress was not originally scheduled to discuss it seriously. The Asian delegates were unhappy at this ncglect and finally managed, with Lenin's backing, to get the Eastern question on the agenda.~o The colonial commission thus created uncovered considerable disagreement with the Comintem line on the East. The dissidents were by no means united, however: .their criticisms re8ected two diametrically opposed points of view. Onc group, chiefly delegates from the Near East, wantcd a policy that favored Pan-Islamism and ~ multiclass alliance similar to the bloc of four classes that was later to be employed in China. 21 This was sharply opposed by India's M. N. Roy, who repeated his argument against bourgeois nationalism from the second Comintern congress and emphaSized particularly the need to oppose the Pan-Islamic movement. 22 Chang Tai-Iei, of China, produced a set HI

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Rise of Indonesitm Communism of theses which argued that it was impossible for the Asian workers to fight on two fronts at the same time; therefore, Communists should cooperate with the national bourgeoisie until imperialism had been defeated: 23 The task of the communists of the colonial and semi-cokmial countries of the East is as follows : without surrendering their independent program and organization, the communists must gain predominance in the national revolutionary movements; they must draw the participating masses away from the domination of the national bourgeoisie, and they must force the bourgeoisie to follow the movement for the time being under the slogans "away with the imperialists" and "long live !Iational independence." However, when the moment arrives, this bourgeoisie must be cut off from the movement. 2t Chang's interpretation was favored by the Comintem at this time, but Zinoviev's explanation of Soviet support for Kemalist Turkey also made it apparent that the Comintem might be willing to go qU"ite a bit further in practice than in theory, especially where Soviet policy was concerned. A prefercnce for the nationalist bird in the hand over the Communist birds in the bush was implicit in his declaration: We know quite well that in Kemalist Turkey, for example, the Communists are murdered in just as foul a manner as in social-democratic bourgeois Gennany" Of course tJle Communist International will fight most sharply against such methods of struggle and against the persecution of Communists in general. However, where a really revolutionary movement-perhaps semi· nationalist, but really revolutionary-is in progress, the Communist International will support this movement insofar as it is directed against all imperio alism, and the world proletariat will march on in the vanguard. 211 In spite of their disagreement, the Comintem leaders gave no additional attention to the program for the East. The colonial commission appears to have been only a sop to the dissatisfied delegates; Roy vigorously protested that "the commission, which was not fonnally installed, thanks to the disorder prevailing at the congress, decided not to draw up a theoretical resolution on the Asian question." 211 The discussion of Asia on the floor of the congress was limited to one session ( the twenty-third), in which the speeches of the Eastern delegates were held to five minutes each. 2T Replying to Roy's objections, the Com intern heads made clear how little importance they attached to Asian revolution at this time; We regret that the congress has no time to treat the Asian question with the necessary thoroughness; but this is not a great misforttme, since this ques130

Semaun's Program tion has already been dealt with exhaustively at the second congress of the Conununist International, from which the theses on the colonial question have been adopted. This question was likewise discussed at the Congress of the Peoples of the East, which took place in August of last year; and I am convinced that it will be thoroughly considered. at other congresses and 9ther meetings. For us, the most important thing on this occasion was to achieve a demonstration of the international solidarity of the Western proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the colonies. The demonstration has taken place; that is the main thing.28 In tbe end, the Asian Communists had to content themselves with Zinoviev's brief declaration on the colonial question, which reiterated in strong terms the theme that Communist cooperation with revolutionary nationalism would benefit both the Asian masses and the European proletariat: The Communist International has decided to advance the principles of the labor movement, the principles of a Communist movement, in all oppressed nations, in all colonial lands: this is the nrst task of tile Communist International. The Communist International, however, has decided at the same time to support every really revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples of the colonial countries against imperialism, since the Communist international is convinced that only the victory of the proletarian revolution can really liberate the oppressed peoples. Our slogan is : Proletarians of aU cOt/fI,trie, ami opprellcd nationalities of all countrics, you must unite for a common struggle against imperialism , for Col'nmunism. 2V Thus cooperation with nationalism rather than imitation of the Bol.shcvik proletarian revolution was confinned as the Comintem colonial strategy. Moreover, the general discussions of the congress, asserting the "temporary stabilization" of world capitalism, endorsed the Soviet retreat from revolutionary confrontation internationally and in economic poliCies at home. In short, neither Comintem theory nor Soviet practice was likely to convince Semaun that his party should rely on doctrinaire proletarian ism or adopt a forward stance in opposing the government. The PKI chairman had traveled to Russia via China, probably stopping on the way to see Sneevliet. BO He then went to Irkutsk for the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which opened on November 11, 1921. Although the meet~g was intended primarily as a demonstration against the Washington Conference,'l it was clear even before it convened that it would review the Comintem Asian strat131

Rise of Indonesian Communism egy; 32 this was probably one reason why after its first session the convention moved to Moscow, where it reconvened oD'January 21. 1922.31 The argument resembled the dispute within the PKI in that it involved a protest against, current policy by a radical group that wanted a more "'BolsheVik" strategy in the East. This time the objeOo tions came not from discontented Asian radicals but from the Russian left. including the Comintem chainnan himself,s, The published congress records present a confused picture, in which the major Russian speakers expressed varying reluctance to cooperate with the bourgeois nationalist movements; according to an account written by the congress secretary, Shumiatskii, it took the personal intervention of Lenin and Stalin to impose the more tolerant orthodox view. 35 Scmaun, whose linguistic difficulties probably made him as innocent as any participant of the nuances of the arguments, declared his complctc agreement with the radical keynote address delivered by Zinoviev and presented a message of greeting that placed such exclusive emphasis on the proletarian nature of the Indonesian movement that one who did not know his policies in Indonesia would have considered him an adherent of the left." Whether because of this apparent agreement with the radical views of the congress leaders or b~use they were impressed to discovcr that the distant Indies had a wcll-established revolutionary labor movement, the directors of the meeting decided to ignore Semaun's linguistic handicap and make him a member both of the congress presidium and of a special commission to discuss ·thc trade union movement in the East.37 Finally, as if the presence of the Indonesian representative had opened new horizons in Southeast Asia, the assembly addressed its concluding manifesto not only to the countries of the northern Far East but also to Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies,' aod the islands of the Pacific,ss If the Southeast Asian delegate impressed the leaders of the congress, Semaun does not . appear to have been overwhelmed by the meeting. Aside from the linguistic barrier, it is possible that he felt the polemiCS of the congress leaders did not apply to Indoncsia. The arguments of Zinoviev and his allies were directed largely against the "nationalist bourgeoisie," and as we have seen, the Indonesian Communists not only accepted a limited de6nition of nationalism, which excluded the Sarekat Islam, but held that their country's position was unique in that it lacked a native bourgeois class strong enough to play , a real political role. In any event, when Semaun returned to the Indies, 132

Semaim's Program

he did not mention the congress at all. Instead, he referred to advice given him by various "leaders of the CommWlist party in Russia itself," foremost among them Lenin, to the effect that he should not mimic too closely the Russian pattern of revolution but should make adjustments to the situation in his country.a, Semaun has since stated 40 that the major basis for this claim was a conference with Lenin in connection with the congress; this may have represented the "personal intervention" that Shumiatskii declares Lenin undertook to correct the left deviation of the meeting. Lenin did not take an official part in the congress; he was still ill and, accor.ding to Serna un, limited himself to receiving the heads of the Asian delegations, seven or eight persons in all. Sernaun, who in spite of his activity possessed to a considerable degree the Javanese tendency to be shy, took a back seat at the meeting. However, when Lenin was infonned that Utis was the representative from Java, he made quite a fuss over the delegate from farthest away. When Semaun offered polite apologies for the smallness of the Indonesian 'party and its ignorance of Marxist principles, Lenin replied that the important thing was to unify the .people for the anti-imperialist struggle. The Bolshevik leader, according to Semaun, then discussed the revolutionary movement in Asia, pointing out that the tactics of the Russian Communists could not be duplicated by Asian parties faCing quite different conditions; in addition, he noted that the revolution must adjust to world economic conditions and that at present even Russia was having to retreat via the New Economic Policy.H This view, which, we shall see, was expressed at the Comintem congress later in 1922, was just what Semaun had hoped to hear, and perhaps enthusiasm caused him to embroider it. At any rate, he maintains that when he returned to the Indies he presented his analysis not with the idea that it deviated in any way from the Comintem program but in the belief that this was the essence of what the Soviet leader had stated. On June 4. 1922, some ten days after his return to Indonesia, Semaun addressed a homecoming rally in Semarang. To the 3.000 persons assembled there. he explained what his Soviet experience had taught him about the Bolshevik pattern: At present, we in the Indies are faced with the problem whether the tactics employed by the Russians in their country must also be followed by us in

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Rise of Indonesian Communism our land, in view of the differing strengths of the parties and the different situations prevailing in Russia and in the Indies. In my opinion, there are many differences in the aspirations of the Russian people and of the people here; moreover, in Russia a greater number of industries provide the necessities of life than here. In view of these factors, I bel;eve that we in the Indies must shape our political tactics in a difFerent manner than has been done in Russia, a mannner that corresponds to the situation in OUT own country. ·We are not contradicting the Communist Parly in Russia, for all its actions and decisions are COrTect and in agreement with the situation there; but we are not so foolish as merely to imitate the Communists there, since the different situation in our country, the relative youth of the movement in the Indies, as well as the differing desires of the people in Russia and the Indies make it impossible for us to follow exactly the example of our comrades in Russia. Moreover, many Communist Party leaders in Russia have themselves reminded foreign visitors that the movement in each country must be carried on in agreement with the situation in that particular country.42 The activity of the Communist parties would follow the same general lines, Semaun continued, but this was because all countries were affected by world economic conditions rather than because of Comintern discipline: The type of action in each country should accord with the times. international activity wi1l take place at approximately the same time, since eco. nomic conditions in the various counbies are so closely connected that economic action is the same everywhere. If the price of necessities in America and elsewhere rises, the cost of living in the Indies also increases, since many of our essentials come from abroad; in thIs manner action will develop in the Indies along the same lines as in other countries, without a command from Moscow.U The speech caused an immediate furor. To the non-Communist press Semaun seemed to be rejecting Comintem authOrity; reports reaching the exiled Tan Malaka in the Netherlands caused him to declare that he hoped his colleague had not said what the papers were claiming he had.·· The newspapers could hardly be blamed for drawing this conclusion, for the speech produced a hot debate within the PKI itself. Semaun was accused of faintheartedness and of rightist inclinations, and it was doubted that he had accurately reported the Comintern advice. The argument had begun even before the June 4 meeting; only a few days after he arrived, the PKI journal had found it necessary to deny

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Semaun's Program that there was a split in the party, although it admitted that Semaun clearly stood to the nght and others to the left in its ranks. u There was certainly reason to believe that Semaun could hold unorthodox views. He maintained that the overproduction crisis could be solved by increasing the purchasing power of the world's population through a moratorium on international debts and diversion of armament funds to an international scheme for planned economic development. 4 6 He declared that wage protests were justified during the current Indies depression because penny-pinching government policies reduced public purchasing power and so made the situation worse; on the other hand, he asserted, resistance should not be carried to the point where both parties to the dispute were so injured by the con8ict that ~e standard of living would be reduced even more. This limit could be ascertained only through organized, disciplined pressure asserted by Indonesian Jabor and political organizations.H Such an analysis sounded more like Revisionist than Orthodox Marxism, for it did not appear to point ineVitably to revolution. Indeed, Semaun declared in his June 4 speech that "'we do not know whether we will achieve the Indies' independence through the wiII of the Dutch or through our own strength," f8 a quite extraordinary comment in view of Indonesian opposition feelings at the time. This point was not the real cause of the quarrel over Semaun's orthodoxy, however. He clearly did not think his philosophy incompatible with Communism; neither did he criticize Soviet Russia in any way or maintain that the PKI should claim marc independence from Moscow than the International wished to give. He may well have interpreted Soviet opinion on Comintern-PKI relations very broadly, though Tan Malaka, visiting Russia later that year, also received the impression of great Bexibility in the Soviet attitude: A truly professional revolutionary from any country must, like an expert in any scicnce, maintain nn open mind regarding the problem of revolution in other counbics. In general, the view of the most prominent leaders in Russia while I was there (1922 ) was of this nature. They did not dictate their own views regarding the content of the revolutionary movement (Indonesia, India, or' China). and they left ideas on the action to be undertaken in foreign countries up to the Asian leaders. They also understood that there is an "X," an intangible factor, in each individual area. . . . In connection with this, the discussions and debates in the congress and in the Comintern

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Rise of Indonesian Communism executive were of the broadest possible character. We did not have to fear th~t any or the "top brass" would be "insulted" if he received any crlticism.n Furthennore, unquestioning obedience to orders from Moscow was hardly a basic tenet of the PKI leadership of the time. We will remember that it had been specifically rejected by the principal European party members (who could be expected to be the most Oriented toward orthodoxy and international disCipline) , and the PKI Indonesian leadership in general was neither well versed in Marxist-Leninist doctrine nor inclined to accept outside opinion as law.1IO The reason Semaun was criticized for deviation was rather that those who advocated an actionist policy based on the proletariat refused to believe that the Russians would not have urged the PKI to imitate the Bolshevik experience. As we have seen, however, they, and not Semaun, were wrong on this point. The returning chairman was orthodox in saying that revolutionary action centered about a general strike was impractical under the prevailing economic and political conditions, The revolutionary tide was at a temporary ebb, he explained, and the party should therefore concentrate on organization and propaganda and should not attempt a major strike or other action aimed at matching forces with the ruling powers, When economic conditions had improved and the workers' organizations were in better shape, more aggressive activities might be considered; but until then the advocates of a "'Russian" revolutionary policy were unrealistic. In conclusion, he called on the party to adopt a new and more cautious program and thus to abandon the direct action concept that had prevailed in his absence,51 Reportedly, some of the more radical members of his June 4 audience left the meeting in protest at these remarks,62 and Scmaun was forced to defend himself: As has been declared by Comrade Sukendar, we may under no circum· stances weaken the action: I have only said that if our activity does diminish it will be in connection with economic and other conditions in the Indies, Our action cannot 'be made more or less intense by anyone person, but depends on the conditions in which the people exist, , , • Whether I have been a great troublemaker, as I w"as called two years ago during the printers' sbike in Semarang, or whether I have been a coward. as I was considered. 1.15t year during the PFB strike, or whether I am a person of weak character, 8$ I am now held to be, I leave to those who hold such opinions. However, before still others adopt these attitudes, let me state that I have been consistent in my views, but that activity must be adjusted to the circum-

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Semaun's Program stances. . . . 1 only hope now that we will not be rendered panic-stricken by the reactionaries, for if we wish to proceed according to plan we must not be so foolish as to engage in desperate adventures. liS Semaun did not hesitate to point out that his analysis of the situation was essentially the same one he had urged before his Russian visit; nothing he had heard in the Soviet Union had altered that analysis, and certainly nothing he found on his return to the Indies indicated that he had been wrong in urging caution. As he later described it, he came back to a scene of desolation: In 1921 I was delegated to go to Moscow, spoke with our great leader Lenin, was shown all about our first workers' republic, returned-to find new destruction wreaked by the reactionaries. Comrades Malaka and Bergsma expelled, many comrades in prison, the workers' 6ghting spirit slackened by the hard-won improvement in conditions, the labor organization in a decline, our positions in the national movement and especially in the SI as good as lost because of the abandoning of that organization by the masses11 result in part of the sabotage committed by national-capitalist leaderswhile at the moment the PKI.was too shattered to offer those masses a place for their aspirations. 64

Though personal interest may well have lent color to Semaun's brush, it could not be denied that the Indonesian revolutionary movement had fallen on dark says since the pawnshop workers' strike.55 This was particularly .true of its labor organizations! VSTP membership had declined from a peak of 16,975 members in October 1921, when Semaun departed the Indies, to 7,731 at the time of his retum. ~8 Consequently-, his opponents were in a poor position to revolt when Semaun announced the Communist program was consolidation and retrenchment and that the railroad workers should not consider a strike even if their wages were reduced. Cries of rage soon gave way to Sighs of resignation,QT and the PKI returned from a crusading policy to the improvement of its position within the general Indonesian movement. Semauo's first concern was to restore the Communists' labor strength, and in particular that of the VSTP. What with policy disagreements, the arrest or absence of its top leaders, and the general decline in spirit, in 1921 the railroad union had not even been able to hold its annual congress; M it was therefore no small task to revive the organization and persuade its members to accept an unpalatable program of caution. However, Semaun and other top VSTP leaders

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Rise of Indonesian Communism toured Java, addressing locals and urging unity, discipline, and caution, and within a few months the VSTP was well in hand.o9 The recovery of the VSTP was matched by a general rise in union activity and an increase in Communist influence throughout the labor movement. This success stemmed partly from the PKl's energetic propaganda efforts and partly from the disintegration of Sareht Islam influence in the labor field following . the pawnshop workers' strike. Abdul Muis, who had led the PPPB into· that conHict, was arrested midway through the strike; he was later sent to his native West Sumatra and retired temporarily from Indonesia-wide politics and pennanentIy from the labor movement. Hadji Agus Salim also abandoned union activity; the Sarekat Postel, which he had headed, soon fell into Communist hands. GO Tjo1croaminoto took over the pawnshop workers' union when he left prison, but his leadership was constantly chal. lenged, and after ·a turbulent year pro-Semarang elements gained control. The sugar workers' union also fell into Communist hands,61 and with this the organizations that had formed the basis of the CSI labor eHort came under PKI direction. In addition, the ' Communists moved to expand their new-found influence among public servants by establishing an Indonesian policemen's union, and they attempted to revive tIle flagging interest of the privately employed urban proletariat by establishing a new union for automobile mechanics, metal workers, and drivers. G2 It was generally conceded, however, that the major reason for the marked PKI success in reviving trade union activity was the onset of the depression. I have already remarked that Indonesian workers of that day tended to be interested in unions only dwing a crisis. Before 1921 workers in private enterprises had felt the pinch most sharply and had been the most active source of unrest; now it was the state employees, who had enjoyed a cost-oF-living bonus during the earlier inflation, who were first and hardest hit. e3 In consequence, Indonesian labor militancy shifted from the privately to the publicly employed workers; and though the PPPB strike disaster Jed to temporary paralysis of their unions, most recovered rapidly in the second half of 199...2. Moreover, the anticapitalist and antigovernment feelings engendered by the depression, by budget-cutting, and by the treatment of the PPPB strikers made the civil employees more radical, and they lost many of their reservations about cooperating with the Communists. We will remember that the PKI and CSI had agreed in prinCiple in

138

S~maun's Program

October 1921 to establish a single labor federation. The first moves toward realizing this goal were not made by either party, however, but by the neutral public works employees' union, VIPBOW, which sponsored the founding of a Persatuan Vakbond Hindia (PVH, Indies Labor Federation) in Madiun on December 3, 1921. The new association was to provide a middle way between the warring political factions of the existing federations, and speciflcally to oppose the government's planned removal of the cost-oC-living bonus granted to state employees. 84 The PVH was not supported by the politically oriented unions, and it seems to have vanished with the pawnshop strike. However, Semaun allied with its sponsors on his return from Russia, and in June 1922 the VIPBOW called a meeting of public employees' unions to discuss the reunification of the labor movement. 5:> The PPKB opposed the conference, for it had little desire to associate with the now far more powerful Communist-led unions; but the conference decided that if the CSI federation would not modify its stand, the VIPBOW would seek to establish an independent league of government employees' unions.6tI Since the new center would have absorbed nearly all the effective non-Communist unions and would in all likelihood have allied with Semarang, Tjokroaminoto conceded the issue and bestowed on the effort his not unqualified blessings.57 The united labor federation was established at a convention of unions called by the VIPBOW on September 3, 1922. Named the Persatuan Vakbond Hindia, it was, like its shortlived predecessor, assigned to organize opposition to wage and employment cuts.58 It was by no means as large as the PPKB had been in its heyday, and it was composed almost entirely of government workers.59 Suroso of the VIPBOW became its chainnan, and the executive was dominated by nonCommunists.70 The founders stipulated that the PVH would avoid political questions,11 but the Indonesian unions were no more able to untangle politics from economics in labor activity than was the government; one of the first decisions of the PVH was to appoint a committee of representatives "in the Netherlands to further its anti-budget-cutting efforts. These spokesmen were to be Tan Malaka, Bergsma, and either Sutomo or Gunawan, both nationalist students then in Holland.72 At its first congress, in December 1922, the new federation drew up a program of what were, in the Indonesian context, unrevolutionary but also unrealizable aims. The program betrayed a strong desire for state participation in the economic process, a feature that probably indi-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism cated less the Communist leanings among its members than the overwhelming proportion of Javanese government employees; for .them, private enterprise was neither well understood, highly valued, nor better paid. As if to forestall criticism, however, the PVH stipulated that it was not against capitalism but only against its abuses, which it hoped to in8uence the government to correct.13 In spite of the modest overt role of the Communists in the PVH, they exercised considerable power because Semarang controlled the federation's largest and most active union (the VSTP) and was far better provided with leadership and money than its partners. This preponderance of resources was evident at the first PVH congress, which was moved at the last minute because the federation could not finance the gathering at its Madiun headquarters and had to accept Semarang's invitation to pay all expenses if the meeting were held there,14 Semaun and his allies do not seem to have pressed their views on the other members of the federation, however; apparently they preferred the PVH as a symbol of the cooperation possible between Communists and non-Communists if only the non-Communist leaders were willing. The non-Communist politicians were not willing, however. Small wonder, for even with the PKI partly dismissed from their ranks Semarang's influence grew among the Sarekat Islam branches, making it clear to the SI leaders that if they wished to control their organization at all, they must not embrace the PKI again. Moreover, in spite of their best intentions the Communists could not refrain from occasional stabs at the CSI members, particularly on the sensitive subject of the movement's finances; this did little to improve the temper of the SI chiefs, whose personal dislike of their Semarang rivals had reached a point at which any real cooperation would have been unlikely even if both sides had greatly desired it,T~ The increased strength of the left after the SI congress was most notable in the regions of Semarang, West and Central Priangan, and North KedirU' In the larger centers, the PKI was often able to spread its influence through the SI schools, which, as one of. the few concrete activities of the Sarekat Islam, played an important role in the movement and in the towns where they were established. The schools, which were largely though not entirely influenced by Semarang, expanded rapidly, for the officially approved educational system was sadly inadequate to popular demand for schooling, and Indonesian-run 14()

Semaun's Program

"wild schools" were springing up to fill the gap.H The effect of such schools on the battle for hegemony in the Sarekat Islam was graphically illustrated in Madiun, where the establishment of an SI school in the latter half of 1922 soon led to predominance of pro-Semarang views in that branch of the SI.18 This increase in Communist strength made the extension of party discipline both more necessary and more difficult for the SI leadership. As one C5I member later recounted, the movement spent the period follOWing the October 1921 decision in a state of severe crisis, for thousands of lesser 51 activists looked to Semaun as their principal chief; the result was a running debate in the branches on the wisdom of the party discipline decision.?& In the end two of the most badly divided locals, Madiun and Sukabumi, proposed that at the next SI congress the party discipline resolution be rescinded. so This was what Semarang wanted, for when Semaun returned hom Soviet Russia he ended the fonnation of the PSI, declaring that the task of the Communists was to ally with the national revolutionary movement and not compete with it. 8l His Soviet experience and the situation he found on his return had apparently convinced him that the proper course was to renew the PKI eHort to gain hegemony within the Sarekat Islam; and so, after Semaun resumed command of the party, the Communists engaged in a vigorous campaign to restore the bloc within. They pointed out that the party discipline measure had only resulted in greater disunity and confusion in the SI, that most major SI locals had not canied it out, and that more mudslinging between the rival leaders would seriously diminish the movement's popular support-all of which was painfully true.B2 In Semaun's effort much depended on the attitude of Tjokroaminoto, who, we will remember, had been in preventive detention when the party discipline decision was taken. He had been released in May 1922, but because he had been convicted of perjury and was free pending appeal to the Indies supreme court, he did not immediately resume public life. In August he was acqUitted, but he still remained carefully ~on­ committal on the subject of party discipline, giving Semarang cause to hope he might support a reconciliation. as Gradually, however, it seemed that Tjokroaminoto was repeating the perfonnance he gave after the March 1921 SI congress: having disanned the opposition by raising .hopes of a rapprochment, he was working to strengthen his influence among the Sllocals and tum them against his rivals. 84 He began publi-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism cation of Islam dan Socialisme ( Islam and Socialism). a work on an Islamic socialist phiJosophy intended as an ideological substitute for Communism in his movement. u In November 1922 he chaired, and Hadji Agus Salim oommandcd, the first AI-Islam oongress; inspired by India's All-Muslim League. it was intended to promote the interests of Indonesian Islam and also to further political orientation in a religiOUS direction. The PKI oould hardly have been enthused about the gather~ ing, since it was strongly Pan· Islamic and implicitly anti-Communist; however, the party was anxious not to open itself to attack on religious grounds. and not only refrained from criticizing the oongress but sent a representative to it. SS In the last months of 1922, Tjokroaminoto began an intensive campaign to centralize the SI by calling for the creation of cadres (warga TUmeksa ) within every SI local to guard the, unity of the branch; these cadres would also be members of a Partai Sarekat Islam (Sarekat Islam Party ). into which it was hoped the CSI and its branches would eventually be totally absorbed. The aim of the new party. Tjokroaminoto declared, would be to support the people of the Indies in a struggle for independence based on Koranic principles,81 This he proposed to submit to the next 51 congress as his solution to the party discipline question; and the CSI announced that since it seemed certain Tjokroaminato's proposal would be accepted, an official organ for the party was being established under his editorship.ss A few days later the first issue appeared; in it Tjokroaminoto declared that if his ooncept were not accepted, he would resign as chairman of the SJ.8' The Communists oontinued to urge the bloc within, but Tjokroaminoto's activities naturally gave them pause.to Accordingly, they cast about for an alternate fonn of alliance in order, as Semaun put it, "to avoid breaking connections with the national movement through a possible expulsion from the S1." 8 1 This was not difficult, for the events of 1922 had created an abnosphere favorable to ooalition efforts. The Indian National Congress had provided the example and the autonomy movement an issue for attempts at unmcation, the most notable of which. in June 1922, was the All-Indies congress.82 It was not until November, however, that more than ephemeral coordination was achieved, via the establishment of the Radical Concentration, which was intended as a grand alliance of all the major Indonesian movements.'3 As its name suggests, the Radical Concentration was a descendant of the Radical Concentration of 1918 and the Political Concentration 142

Semaun's Program (League of People's Liberation Movements) of 1920. There were two Significant diHerences, however: assessing the increased disillusionment with the government and the example set by the Indian National Congress, the new alliance decided its chief Seld of action was not in the Volksraad but in mass extraparliamentary pressure on the authorities; and it extended farther to both the right and the left of the Indonesian political spectrum than had its forerunners. On the right, it had the active participation of Budi Utomo 9i and the regional movements Pasundan, Sarekat Ambon, and Sarekat Minahassa; on the left it included for the 6rst time the PKI.1I5 The Communists attended the ISDP-Ied meeting that founded it, and Semaun stressed to his followers that "the PKI is very, VERY much in agreement with tile Concentration, for the PKl desires with all its heart to further the weUare and progress of the people of the Indies .... Unity of action toward a common goal: this must now be emblazoned on the banner we all hold high, the banner of the common needs of the people of the Indies." 96 At the PVH congress in December, Semaun urged the federation similarly to commit itseU to the new political alliance.lli The new united front was imposing in its outward dimensions, and so general was the sentiment against the Indies government's recent policies that its members were able to agree on a broad program of demands. U Had it achieved real cohesion, the Radical Concentration might have inaugurated a new period for the Indonesian national movement; but solidarity was unfortunately not the coalition's most notable quality. It is significant that the alliance was inspired by the Dutch-led ISDP; the Indonesian leaders themselves, no matter how clearly they saw the need for a common front in principle, continued to be more conscious in practice of their diHerences. Nor was the Radical Concentration given time to establish a tradition of cooperation, for very soon after its founding a clash between two of its adherents shook the entire Indonesian movement and created enmities that would have disrupted the sturdiest alliance. This conBict was, not surprisingly, a quarrel between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. The congress at which the CSI was to reopen the party discipline issue had finally been set for February 1923, and both sides qUietly prepared their forces for a battle royal. In public, if we can judge from the arguments presented in the Communist and CSI press at this time, the two opponents restricted themselves to fairly oblique sparring. This mildness was perhaps due on the Communist

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Rise of Indonesian Communism side to vestigial hopes for reconciliation," and on the SI side to Tjokroaminoto's disinclination to give his opponents cause to attack him directly; in addition, neither side wished to be accused of taking an unconstructive, disunifying position. There was no direct struggle over the issues, but instead the two rivals used disagreement on the site of the cOngress (each naturally wanted to hold it in its own strong· hold ) in order to bring each other's good faith into doubt. loo By the time the congress met, from February 17 to 20 in Madiun, it was clear that Tjokroaminoto was not to be persuaded from his course. According to the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo, Tjokroaminoto told him shortly before the meeting that he had concluded Islam was the only element that could unite the Indonesian people and that he intended to make this the basis of the Sarekat Islam's activities, As for the Com· munists in the SI, they had done their best to spread dis.trust of the CSI leadership, and the movement was better rid of them. Their fate, he said, wou1d be sealed at the congress. I OI The meeting itself was heavily attended, and 1,200 to 1,500 onlook· ers filled the schoolhouse where it was held and overflowed into an adjoining thatched shed. There were 117 delegates representing about forty branches-more divisions than had been represented at the October 1921 congress, but no improvement considering the spadework that had preceded it and the fact that, unli,ke its predecessor, it was not the movement's second convention in less than a year. Those who did attend were solidly on Tjokroaminoto's side, however. Semarang's viewpoint was supported by only three pro-Red branches (Madiun, Tjepu, and Ngandjuk ), all of them from East Java and all with divided loyaltics; Semaun himself did not attend. lOll Indeed. the PKl had announced several days before the gathering that it would hold a special congress immediately thereafter, including an agenda that clearly re8ccted expectation of a complete break. 11a At the S[ convention. Salim and Tjokroaminoto acted as a team, making sure that the initiative remained constant1y in their hands. Opening the meeting. Tjokroaminoto announced that it had been decided to discuss establishment of the PSI openly rather than in closed session, as had been scheduled. Salim then spoke, stressing the Islamic nature of S[ socialism. After this Tjokroaminoto announced that he had visited fifty-two SI locals before the congress and that forty-five of them had declared themselves in favor of the PSI; he asked the delegates therefore to affirm the branches' appr.oval. At this point the Corn-

144

Semalln'S Program

munists tried to argue that a decision on the PSI should properly follow a discussion of party discipline. Tjokroaminoto instead declared the proposal for establishing the PSI accepted, and only then opened the meeting to discussion of party discipline, instructing the Communists to state the principles of their organization and its attitude toward religion. Sukendar, the chief PKI representative, responded with a statement that was well argued but highly theoretical, concerned with labor relations in industrialized societies, and partly in Dutch, and hence beyond the reach of most of the audience. The Red delegates stressed that there was no essential difference between their principles and those espoused by the C5I; although they asserted that Communists need not be unbelievers, they had to admit that on the subject of religion their movement was "neutral" (that is, secular). This was bad enough from the religious representatives' point of view, but Sukimo, an undiplomatic Red delegate from Madiun, made it worse by criticizing the money-grubbing and hypocrisy of the pious. This threw the meeting into an uproar, and the unfortunate speaker was forced to flee the podium in order to escape a beating. The party discipline measure was passed by an overwhelming majority; the delegates reportedly maintained the same position in voting that they had held on arriving at the congress. 11K All this took place on the first day; by the end of it the Communists were permanently out of the SI, which went on to work out a formula for a Partai 5arekat Islam in accordance with Tjokroaminoto's concept. It was decided that the executive of the new party would be the same as the C5I; gradually the older mass movement would be transformed into a cadre-composed PSI commanding a substructure of occupationally based "unions," which would contain the rank and Sle. IOG Like the 1921 party disCipline decision, this program was more drastic in appearance than in fact: 51 leaders apparently feared to alienate local politicos, for the proposed PSI units maintained the right to decide their own membership, and the mechanism for securing adherence to party disCipline was the same one that proved so inadequate after the previous congress.toe It was immediately evident, however, that this time neither side was reluctant to force its adherents to choose. Tjokroaminoto announced that he would visit places where S[ locals were under Communist control and set up rival pro-PSI units, and be did so promptly thereafter. 101 The PKI held its own congress and drew up a plan of battle, and the two groups exchanged recrimina-

145

Rise of Indonesian Communism tions so violent as to jeopardize the entire Indonesian opposition. lOS The battle naturally wreaked havoc on the Radical Concentration and PVH; even more serious was its impact on the mass membership of the Sarekat Islam, which was deeply disillusioned by fighting within the local SI executives and by the accusations the national leaders flung at each other. Almost universally, Indonesian opinion expressed distress at the dispute and urged that the opponents forget their quarrel in favor of the common struggle against the Dutch. IOII However, the rancor stored up during a long and unhappy partnership could no longer be dammed; it 800ded the entire movement and ended hopes for unity at this stage of Indonesia's national development. The first of Semaun's objectives after he returned to the Indies-the unification of Indonesian political forces-was thus destroyed; shortly thereafter his second project, the establishment of a powerful and disciplined labor movement, died. a stiU more violent death. The precipitating event was a strike by the VSTP, the result of the long-suppressed effort of the railroad workers to achieve their demands of 1920 and to ward off the consequences of the depression. The railway union had increased steadily in membership and income from dues during the latter half of 1922, the direct result, as the VSTP pointed out, of the rail and tram workers' fear of the depression. IlO Pressure increased within thc union for action to prevent the crisis from affecting. the workers; at the same time the government and private companies began to layoff employees and raise job requirements, and moved toward redUcing wages and the cost-of-Iiving bonus. It seemed increasingly likely that the VSTP leadcrs would be forced either into an aggressive action, which they realized would be unsuccessful, or into a surrender of much of their prestige among the workers. Gradually, as a government report described, Semaun began to lean toward the first alternative: In the course of the year 1922 the preachings of the reformer were mixed with a new tone, which found greater response among the mass of the PKI following-that of a strike forced on the workers through hung~ as a result of the rationalization measures or through the government's actions against their leaders. Now here and now there, sometimes weakly and sometimes strongly, his urging to direct action made itself beard, an appeal better suited to that group of the urban proletariat upon whlch the misfortune of the times pressed than were admonitions to calculated preparation and undiminished exertion for a goal which lay in the indefinite future. When the partial withdrawal of the cost-of-living bonus was eventually announced,

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Semaun's Program a spirit of resistance arose among Ule workers, and especially, among the members of the most powerful and best-led organization, that of the rail and tramway personnel (VSTP):11I

The government had announced the first cost-of-Iiving bonus reduction, to take effect on January 1, 1923, and the private rail lines had stated they would also announce major wage and personnel cuts on that day. The VSTP therefore decided to hold its twelfth congress soon after that date. The central issue of the meeting would be a proposal by the Tjirebon VSTP branch to consider whether the rationalization measures, if put through as planned, should be protested by an industrywide strike or by strikes against individual firms, or whether a slowdown, mass resignation, or some other form of protest should be made. Announcing this, the VSTP executive declared that it did not intend to suPPort actions for wage raises during the depression, but it would insist that the pay scale not drop below that of the state-line level of 1921. If the companies wished to rationalize, the executive asserted, they could best do so by lowering their highest salaries and holding their lowest ones at a reasonable level. lI2 Until the congress met, both the VSTP and the PVH tried other methods of putting pressure on the government and alleviating discontent among workers already affected. Depression Committees were formed, anti-budget-cutting demonstrations were held~ cooperative enterprises for the unemployed were discussed, and appeals and protests were addressed to the Volksraad, the Governor General, and the government in Holland.1I3 The other Indonesian parties joined in protesting the government refusal to compromise on the drastic rationalization plans; and even the collaborationist PEB (Political-Economic Union), which had been founded to encourage Indonesian political activity outside the opposition, protested the government's handling of the issue.l14 Their efforts were of no avail, for the beginning of 1923 brought the promised acrossthe-board reduction in the cost-of-living bonus, and its complete elimination was set for six months later. When the VSTP convened its congress in February 1923. it inevitably centered its discussion on a strike.l1~

At the meeting the railroad union leaders empqasized that the strike, if it came, would not be the result of unreasonable demands by the workers but of the government's stubborn refusal to yield at all in its plans to cut wages of its lowest-paid employees. Semaun polled the

147

Rise of Indonesian Communism representatives of the locals, almost aU of whom reported that their members wanted an industrywide strike held as soon as possible. 1lI The VSTP leader agreed to this demand but asked that the action be postponed to allow for a last round of negotiations with the authorities and the private companies concerned. The strike, he emphasized, must be well disciplined and properly timed, and must not consist of local ventures at wildcat walkouts and sabotage. 1I1 The congress yielded to his arguments, and the final decision to strike was thus postponed once again . Even before the VSTP congress, the government had announced that any state railway workers who struck would be instantly dismissed. 1 ill Semaun, who gave every indication of realizing the consequences of a strike, was thus in the unhappy position of the leaders of the pawnshop workers' union a year before. Nor did the government offer any crumbs of concession on which a face-saving retreat could be based. On the contrary. it went out of its way to indicate that it had no intention of dealing with Sernaun at all. The PVH had proposed him as its representative to the Salary Commission. whieh the government had formed to determine a general wage policy for state employees; the nomination was promptly and rather acidly rejected on the grounds that it was "political." The refusal upset the Indonesians considerably. for the PVH had made its nomination in good faith. Sernaun was not only the head of what was currently Indonesia's major union, but the government had in previous years indicated that in spite of his political views it considered him to be one of Indonesia's more responsible labor leaders and had consulted him regarding government labor policy during 1920-1921. 1111 At its December 1922 congress, the PVH proposed to seek an audience with the Governor General to· reverse this decision; Semaun himself opposed the idea, however, arguing that there was little reason to put faith in the commission. and after some debate a motion of no confidence in the Salary Commission was passed. 1w The Salary Commission's prospects could certainly be doubted, for it was 'already apparent that the government had in mind a wage system highly unpalatable to the Indonesians. In 1913 the goveniment had established a single salary scale, with an extra allowance only for .offi· cials brought hom the Netherlands. It now thought that this was un· necessarily expensive. High salaries were d~med essential to attract Europeans to In~es government service, and the Eurasians, who filled

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Semaun's Program most of the middle-level functions, were thought to need a higher standard of living than Indonesians in public employ. As a result, a three-step salary scale was proposed, one that was to all intents and purposes racially based. Not only did it place the Indonesians at the low end of a wide wage range, but it seemed to conSrm that the classification of the population into European, Native, and Foreign Asiatic legal categories (a measure introduced in 1919 ) was to be used to institutionalize the subordinate status of the ethnic Indonesians. This in fact was what eventually happened; the new salary scale contributed to the process by removing any remaining community of interest between the various racial groups in public employ. llll The Salary Commission contained only one Indonesian representative, but it consulted with leaders of the major Indonesian public employees' unions. The first meeting took place in Batavia on February 19, 1923, with representatives of the teachers' union (PGHB ) and Semaun and Najoan of the VSTP. Both unions asserted that the planned pay raises, intended to restore partially the cost-of-living bonus, were so set up that they would ben eSt only the higher-paid (that is, non-Indonesian ) employees. Half of the salary-increase budget was for higher-paid officials; this meant, Semaun pointed out, that the bulk of the Indonesian public servants could expect a raise of 5 to 8 per cent in place of a 25 per cent cost-of-living bonus. Similar objections were voiced in Jogjakarta at the commission's next discussions, where the spokesman for the union of teachers training sch?Ol employees ( Kweekschoolbond ) denounced the intended wage scale. At the final session, held in Surabaja on F ebruary 24, the VIPBOW attacked the commission even more sharply, demanding the government res!rict salary differentiation and establish a two-step wage scale, based on whether the employee was an Indies resident or an imported specialist. These complaints were received unsympathetically, and the debate became so heated that the Indonesians walked out before the conference ended.1 2~ These developments did much to alienate thc politically conscious Indonesians, the great body of whom worked for the government. They accordingly sympathized with the railroad workers, who grew increasingly impatient for a strike after further discussions with government and private employers failed. On March 8 and 9, 1923, a closed meeting of VSTP leaders was held in Bandung; they decided, reportedly without Semaun's approval,1 ~3 to go ahead with plans for 149

Rise of Indonesian Communism an industrywide strike. One last round of negotiations took place on April 9 and 12; the government and private spokesmen refused to concede on any of the points offered by the unions, and thereafter Scmaun and his fellow VSTP leaders accepted a strike as inevitable. 124 Having made this decision, the VSTP cruefs began an intensive campaign to gain sympathy and support for the coming confiict, pressing the argument that a strike was being forced upon them. The government, which had been observing this progress with disfavor, now stepped in; on April 18 Semaun and the recently returned Darsono were informed that if they did not moderate their actions they would be in immediate danger of intemment.I !!~ The effect of this warning was unhappy, for Semaun lost his temper and said that if any VSTP leaders were arrested, the union would immediately strike. illS His challenge was a political error, for it aroused the criticism of otherwise sympathetic Indonesian moderates. As the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo remarked, Semaun possessed the admirable qualities of honesty and sincerity; but he had evidently fallen prey to the "sins of the West"pride and stubbornness. l27 His declaration was also a major strategical blunder, for it gave the government an opportunity to force the strike before the union was prepared and before the sugar harvest, when the railroads of Central and East Java fun ctioned at peak capacity. On May 8, two days after his challenge to the government, Semaun. was carted off to jail, charged with having breached the speech laws a month before. The Semarang tramway personnel struck as soon as they heard of his arrest, and they were joined by demonstrative walkouts o( sellers in the public markets, machine shop employees, and automobile and truck drivers from that city. Wit1.'lin a few days the strike had spread to Pekalongan, Tegal, Madiun, Surabaja, and Tjirebon, and it then advanced rather raggedly to the other railroad centers of Java.us In a short time most VSTP adherents (though, as in the pawnshop strike, only the Javanese ones 1211) were out on strike. D. M. G. Koch, who was then editor of the East Jav3 edition of the Indische Courant, visited strike rallies in Surabaja and nearby Wonokromo on the evening before the VSTP stopped work: That night joumey is clearly etched in my memory. We visited several working class houses, where fifteen to thirty railroad workers received their instructions from locnlleaders. It was impressed on them that they were to handle their equipment properly and, before leaving the railway installations . and workshops, to replace tool5, drive the locomotives into the sheds after

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Semaun's Program putting out the fires, and in general to commit absolutely no sabotage. The mood was embittered and detennined. They were reminded of the seriousness of th~ strike plan, and the duty of solidarity was stressed. taO

The result of the strike was predictably disastrous in spite of such efforts to avoid wmecessary hostility. The government dismissed all striking employees, established strict military control over the rail lines, prohibited the right of assembly for the VSTP, and drastically re· stricted it for all organizations in the residencies of Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Pekalongan. Priangan, and Surabaja. It also took stem measures against the strikers. Koch recalled: There was in Surabaja a neighborhood of about three hundred company houses for lower personnel of the state rail line. On the morning the strike began the people received orders to move out of those houses; police and soldiers dragged furniture and household goods from them. It was a miserable sight. Weeping women sat with their few possessions on the roadside, in a drizzling rain. My wife went over and met a couple of women with babies several weeks old. whom she took along in the car and installed in a few rooms in the outbuildings of our house. Their husbands naturally also came to us for shelter. A police commissioner warned that we were making ourselves liable to prosecution: it was "support for the strike." and the government had let it be Imown that any fonn of support for the strike would be punished. Shocked, I wrote a sharply worded article over the affair; but the official antistrike action did not go so far that I was prosecuted for this. although according to the law it was a criminal offense. 1Sl The law which made,punishable the sheltering of strikers' families was Article 161 bis, which was added to the Indies criminal code two days after the strike had broken out: He who. with the intent of disturbing the public peace or disrupting the economic life of the community. or knowing or being in a position to Imow that such disturbance of the public peace or disruption of the economic life of the community would be the result, causes or abets that several persons abandon or in spite of lawfully given order refuse to, carry out work for which they have contracted or to which they are bound by virtue of their employment. will be punished with imprisonment of up to nve years or a fine of not more than ten thousand guilders. The Dutch socialists attacked the law as a juridical monstrosity, drawn up to enable the government to prevent any act it might choose to interpret as connected with what it defined as a strike, It showed, too. the SDAP accused, that Fock's government was bent on destroying all

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Rise of Indonesian Communism Indonesian opposition; in protest, the socialists took the unusual step of joining with the CPH to oHer parliament a motion criticizing the Indies government, urging,Fock's removal, and asking an end to the extraordinary rights and the measures imposed in connection with the strike.lS~ In the Volksraad, Indonesian, ISDP, and some NIVB delegates protested the government handling of the strike, but without eHect. The great weight of European opinion approved the firm measures and applauded Article 161 bis precisely because it did constitute a political weapon : The magistrate no longer has to salt away WI1lTllllU against notorious leaders order to employ them at a moment when they have committed a deed which the Jaw does not forbid (as happened with Semaun, and again with Sudibio [another VSTP leader]); instead, he can haul the mischief-maker straight from the podium at the very moment he oversteps this Jaw. This can only serve to improve respect for laW.ta3 in

Under the new law many VSTP and other radical leaders were arrested, seriously impairing the leadership of both the union and the PKI.'U Partly as a result of the government measures, which included restriction of the union"s use of the mails and telegraph service, and partly as a result of its own poor organization, the VSTP central executive was virtually cut oH from its branches outside Semarang. so that it could not give leadership to the strike. Sugono had been named "strike dictator" and temporary chairman of the unUm follOWing Semauo's arrest, and a "Central Leadership of the Rail and Tram Strike in the: Netherlands Indies" was formed as soon as the strike broke out. It appears, however; to have been unable to communicate in any way with the VSTP branches, and it had little idea of the general progress of the strike. Moreover, because of the restricted freedom of assembly, it could not meet with more than two strikers at a time.135 Within a few weeks the VSTP finances, substantial though they were for an Indonesian union of that day, had been exhausted,lM and the workers, who soon saw the hopelessness of their cause, began to ask for their jobs back again. l3T The union accepted the inevitable and tried to negotiate the reacceptance of the strikers. A "council of mediation" was set up, and Sugono and Kadarisman held discussions on behaU of the VSTP; but since they refused to negotiate without a guarantee that all strikers would be taken back, they very qUickly reached an impasse. tlS The government was adamant, and the private companies were both disinclined to deal with the union and eager to take advan-

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Semaun's Program tage of the strike to make drastic wage and personnel cuts. Its back broken, the strike lingered on until July, when the government announced its intention to banish Semaun; then it quietly succumbed. The government justified its severity by arguing that the strike was inspired by political and not economic motives. It pointed out that Semaun's arrest had been the immediate cause of the walkout, and that the VSTP leaders and their allies tried to tum it into a general strike.J3tI On the other hand, the state railroad authorities had said even before the VSTP congress was held that a strike would be considered illegal, and the government had Similarly called "political" the PPPB strike of the year before. It thus seems quite likely that the authorities would have taken the same attitude regardless of Semaun's action or the calls for a general strike. The government interpretation of the nature of the conflict was protested not only by the Communists, who ' insisted that it was purely economic, HO but also by the less radical Indonesian groupings. It could hardly be claimed that the strike was pushed upon the workers by their leaders, since, as the government's own reports pointed out, the reverse was patently the case. Union demands had been nonpolitical and were in most instances justified: the railroad workers were among the most underpaid in the state employ, and elimination of the cost-of-living bonus would reduce their wages by one-fourth. As for the striking employees of the private lines, most of them had not benefited from the wage raises granted in many other industries; their demands were essentially the same as those presented in 1920, at which time the authorities had thought them reasonable. In spite of the abject .failure of the strike itself, the VSTP action gained some advantages for the left ; Indonesian opinion nearly unanimously d enounced the harsh measures taken to suppress the strike, thus increasing sympathy for the radicals and disillusionment with the government. HI The Communists had gained their martyr: Semaun, Sinor Hindia proudly announced, had become the Gandhi of Indonesia. HZ The martyr gained was not worth the leader lost, however; and the increased general sympathy with the revolutionary standpoint did not make up for the discouragement and disorganization inflicted on the Semarang-oriented labor movement. Like the pawnshop workers' union before it, the VSTP went into a state of shock from which its recovery seemed for a long time dubious. tn The rest of the leftist unions sank into profound apathy, and the PKl executive frankly admitted that it was having trouble maintaining contact with its

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Rise of Indonesian Communism branches, collecting dues, and publishing the party paper. 1U The restrictions on the right of assembly prevented the Communists from convening in their major centers: no PKl meeting was held in Semarang, for example, from early May until October 1923, after the ban was lifted.us The middle of 1923 thus saw both major branches of the Indonesian opposition in a state of distress. The Communists had been crippled by the VSTP defeat, and the SI was feeling deeply the effects of the split with Semarang. The attempts to unite the Indonesian movement through the Radical Concentration and the PVH diSintegrated amid these turbulent events: both of these organizations expired in June, almost unnoticed in the wake of the railroad strike. 1te Indonesian political opposition was not again united in a single coalition until 1939; the non-Communist labor organizations retired from politics and thenceforth functioned more as white-collar professional associations than as unions. Serna un, who had ended by doing what he had warned his followers against, departed for the Netherlands in August. Sinar Hindfa hopefully predicted his return :

The

We cherish, however, the hope that you will some day be allowed to tread the Indies soil once more. The portents of this can already be seen in the people's struggle in Europe (which has now begun in Cennany) to destroy the capitalist system, root and branch. It is, in short. the world-wide people's movement which will make it possible to bring you and other comrades bac1c from exile. l41 He was not to return, however, for more than thirty years. The events surrounding the VSTP strike strengthened the trend among the Indonesian political elite to bifurcate along revolutionary and quietist lines. This same separation appeared in the mass membership of political movements, with the result that popular support for the less radical leaders melted into indifference, leaving the politically active remnant committed to the revolutionary left. It thus came about that, in the period we are about to d iscuss, the energy and popularity of Tjokroaminoto's Sarekat Islam faded very rapidly, and by the end of 1923 the PKI was viSibly the only major representative of the Indonesian popular movement. The bloc within had ended, but in this case quite differently from that in China of the 19205. Of the two competing wings, the Communists emerged the victors; but they had gained command of a dying movement.

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VIII

The Bloc Above ON MARCH 4, 1923, the Communists convened a special "Congress of the PKI and Rcd sr to decide what steps to take after their expulsion from the Sarekat Islam. The meeting was held in Bandung, with a session two days later in Sukabumij 2,000 to 3,000 persons attended, including delegates from fifteen PKI branches, thirteen Red 51 locals,

and thirteen labor unions.' The PKI executive was not so well represented: only Semaun, Subakat, and Sukarsono appeared. for the other members of the party's current governing board-Tan Malaka, Bergsma, Harry Dekker, Gondojuwono, and Dengah-were either in prison or exile. 2 They were present in spirit, however, for portraits of Malaka and Bergsma, Sneevliet and Baars lined the red-festooned walls of the

congress han, together with pi'ctures of the newly returned Darsono and the PKI's international heroes, Marx, Lenin, and Gandhi. 3 The atmosphere was charged with stored-up resentment of the "White" Sarekat Islam, and Semaun and other Communist leaders bitterly denounced Tjokroaminoto and the CSI. Some of their audience thought they went too far, in fact, and various complaints were addressed from the floor. The only objector to receive satisfaction, however, was a Bandung student, the future Indonesian president Sukarno, who censured Hadji Misbach for the personal nature of his attack on Tjokroammoto and won both considerable applause and an apology from the Muslim Communist leader.4 The Sarekat Islam, Semaun and Sukendar charged, no longer represented the people's interests; only the PKI could do this, for it alone was the defender of the poor and the leader of the' fight for independence from foreign capitalist rule. Marxist and Koranic teachings were similar, Misbach and Sugono stressed; the PKI strove for freedom of religion and defended the right of Indonesia's Muslim population to the unfettered exercise of its religion. It sought to recapture Indonesia's idyllic past, Darsono declared; before the advent of foreign capital, the 155

Rise of Indonesian Communism people had enjoyed prosperity and social justice, and it was to this

state that the party wished to return.1i Laying the foundations for a popularity contest with the Sar~kat Islam, the party took up the major issues on which the recent SI congress had hoped to gain mass support and fonnulated even stronger positions: It adopted resolutions denouncing the government's latest tax measures and the contract coolie system and declared its intention to further the interests of the peasantry and to cooperate with other Indonesian political groupings. S On the last point the party declared that, although it hoped eventually to see the country adopt a sovietbased socialist system. it realized that in a colonial land like Indonesia this goal ·could be attained only g;.adually and through parliamentary action. The PKl therefore would concentrate its political agitation in a campaign for a real parliament and would cooperate with all parties that shared a sincere interest in this refonn. The Sarekat Islam, it emphasized. was not sincere. Since the CSI was basing its argument against the Communists largely on religion, a major object of the PKI meeting was to proclaim its support of Islam without abandoning the stand that religion and politics did not mix. It could do so because of the colonial govcrnment's promotion of Christianity and its attempts to regulate Muslim religious affairs: Muslims! Community of Islam. W ill lhe PKI be able to represent the OF COURSE! Here is til e (WOOf:

j'lteresis of til e Islamic faith?

READ!

The standpoint of the PKI regarding the defeme ckcided in the follOWing motion:

of the ISUJmic faith

is

Resolution VI The congress of the PKI and Sukabumi 51, gathered on Tuesday morning, March 6 at Sukabumi, etc., recognizing that in the Indies religious instruction in Islam is restricted through government regulations, to wit, that religiOUS teachers are obliged to secure permission for the giving of instruction from the head of the regency, declaring that the PKI does not agree to governmental intervention ill religious affairs, resolves: to call on the executive of the PKI to take the necessary steps toward the rescinding of this regulation {and] toward the liberation of religion from the state.;

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The Bloc Above The most important resolutions taken by the congress were, however, on the organization of the movement's mass following. The PKI declared it intended to win the members of the non-Communist Sarekat Islam in the same manner the SI had indicated at its preceding congress it would use against its opponents: everywhere a White SI branch existed, the Communists would found a competing unit. To distinguish them from their local rivals, they would take the name Sarekat Rakjat ( People's Union), a name that the PKI hoped (overoptimistically, as we shall see) would soon be assumed by all the Red SI branches. At the same time, the party made clear that it did not intend to create a rival to the CSI, as it had decided after the October 1921 schism, but would subordinate the mass units openly and directly to the PK1 itself: 1. In all places where Red Sis exist, a branch of the PKI will be established. 2. The Red SI and PKI branches will work together. 3. This cooperation will center about the struggle against capitalism. 4. All major matters will be referred by the PKI and Red SI branches to the executive of the PKI in Semarang, attention of Chainnan Semaun. 5. At least once a year the PKI will hold a congress, at which the delegates of the Red SIs and the PKI will determine policy in defense of the interests of the people of the Indies. 6. The Red 51 units need pay no dues to the PKI ; they have only !o pay the costs of sending delegates to the annual congress. 7, PKI funds will be obtained from PKI branches (80 per cent of the funds received by PKI units must be deposited with the central executive), 8. The Red SIs will thus be in a financial position to defend the interests of their members. for they need not contribute to the PKI executive nor need they pay the expenses of such PKI and Red 51 propagandists as Hadji Misbach, Darsono, Abulrachman, etc.: their travel costs will be paid by the executive of the PKI. 9, Wherever a capitalist SI d 10 Tjokroaminoto exists. the PKI will establish a party branch and an SR, which will work together in the same way the PKI and the Red Sis do. 10, Further information on this matter can be obtained from the PKI executive.'

it is now clear," the party proclaimed, "that the Red SI and the PKI and the future Sarekat Rak;at .....RE UNITI:!) into one fortress, one army, one front for the defense of the interests of the people of the Indies." 9 In effect. this dccision reversed the position of the PKI on the mass

1.57

Rise of Indonesian Communism movement; for whereas the Communist party had previously acted as a bloc within the mass organization, it now set itself openly at the head. The system it proposed was similar 10 that envisioned by Tjokroaminoto for the relationship between the PSI and the mass following of the Sarekat Islam, and, as we shall see, it arose from the same concern -the desire to create an organization in which mass participation was subject to the strict control of a disciplined and ideologically cohesive elite. It was, however, far from clear that the PKI strategy corresponded with Comintem ideas on Asian Communist relations with the mass movement. The International's support of a close relationship with Asian nationalists had been expressed pointedly at its fourth congress, which convened in Moscow in November 1922. At this meeting the Comintem formally announced the end of the revolutionary period that had fonowed World War I. The capitalist system, it stated, had now temPorarily stabilized; therefore, the European Communists must pursue a defensive tactic, consolidating their forces and working for refonns in alliance with socialist parties. Interpreting this program for Asia, Karl Radek warned that the Eastern Communists must be cautious and remember that soviets could not be formed overnight in the Orient. The Asian Communist parties, he said, were all too often ineffective groups of intellechlals who lacked any contact with the masses. To remedy this. the Communists must increase their activity in the labor movement and among the peasantry; they must associate with the revolutionary bourgeoisie and, if necessary, even with feudal elements. tO Unless the Asian Communists showed. some practical achievement along these lines. Radek warned, they could not expect the International to give great attention to the Eastern question or to place its confidence in the Asian parties. The Comintern, it was obvious. was increasingly impressed by the prospects of association with Asian nationalism; for although the colonial Communist movements had not progressed much beyond embryo stage, nationalism was a visible revolutionary force. The masses, it seemed, were with the nationalists; and 10 the Massesl" was the slogan proclaimed by the fourth congress as world Communism's immediate task. In acknowledgment of this, the Asian parties were called on to participate in any movement that would give them access to the people.l l The bloc within, newly adopted in China, was suggested as a method for this approach, and Chinese Communist representative Liu

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The Bloc Above Jen-ch'ing explained how his party hoped thereby to gain control of the Chinese revolutionary movement. 12 Comintern support of the bloc within for aU Asia was, however, by no means unambiguous: the same congress warned the Asian Communists at various points that in forming their partnership with nationalism, they should not forget to retain their proletarian purity, to criticize the local bourgeoisie, to adopt a program of agrarian revolution, and to struggle against reformism within the labor movement.IS It was apparent that the International was still undecided as to how far Asian Communists should go in distinguishing themselves from their nationalist partners. On the one hand, concessions to nationalism seemed imperative; on the other, powerful voices still opposed sacrificing the purity of the Asian proletariat. The tenns of the European united front from above couId not be ignored, lest the unity of the intemationalline be broken; nor couId the Comintern overlook the problems created by Soviet diplomatic interests, which in the Middle East were served by militant anti-imperialism and in Western Europe were opposed to an outspoken stand. These conflicting considerations, when combined with a general ignorance of the situation in the countries concerned (and a not innequent indifference to the whole subject ), led the congress to adopt a program that advised the Asian Communists to have their cake and eat it too. The Asian Communists, however, wanted to be supplied with the recipe for the cake, an understandable desire in view of Communist claims to scientific understanding of political events. To make the situation more complicated, Asian delegates usually had very definite ideas on certain ingredients of the recipe, depending on their interpretation of the situation in their individual countries, and they were accordingly upset when the International seemed to exclude them from its analysis. The result was considerable unhappiness on the part of the Asian delegates at the way in which the Eastern question was handled, and they ended by formally protesting to the meeting. a The objection, when read out on the floor of the congress, received a hearty round of applause, l~ an unusual demonstration of rebellion even in the fairly liberal first years of the <;omintern. Nonetheless, the move was quite unsuccessful. The central dissenting figures among the colonial delegates were India's M. N. Roy, who, although he was willing to soften somewhat his views about alliance with the nationalists, still wanted a more inde-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism pendent proletarian policy,18 and Indoncsia's Tan Malaka, who thought, on the contrary, that not enough concessions had been made to nationalist feelings. ?\.'falaka had arrived in the Nethcrlands to begin his exilc on May 1, 1922; he had spent July and August in Berlin, visiting Darsono at the Comintcrn's West European headquarters 17 and then, after a brief return to Holland, had proceeded to Soviet Russia. At the beginning of November he attended an ECCI sessioli devoted to preparing for the forthcoming Comintern congress; as the representative of "Java," he was given an advisory (nonvoting) place at the meeting. 13 At the congress itself, he served on the committee that discussed the Eastern question, which by his account was a scene of hopeless confusion: The Comintem (its Oriental Section) put forth a "thesis," which asserted that the Communist Parties in the colonial countries must aid and work together with the nationalist parties against imperialism. This thesis was introduced and defended by the Russian and Indian Communists. Surely everyone is agreed on the need to give help to the nationalists and for cooperating with them as a matter of abstract principle, as theory. But how to bring this into practice, how to realize concretely this cooperation and aid-this [the Comintem ] had uot been able to dtlcide up to the time 1 lert for Indonesia. At the time I left Moscow, the Comintem leaders were simply leaving the matter up to one's own judgment and the local situation. It is true that I became involved in a heated debate that had been going on for some time between the defenders of the thesis and its opponents. One evening, rather late, just after I had returned from a visit to a factory near Moscow, a Japanese Communist, the bte Sen Katayama, who had been attacking a point in the thesis, asked me to continne the argument against the provision in question. . . . The difference in view, which seemed small enongh at Ilrst, became dearly great when we descended from the airy, abstract heights or theory to the concrete world of fact. When my argument touched on actualities, such as boycotts or noncooperation or Pan [s[amism, the gap between the abstract and the concrete, between theory and practice became visible. For example, the English Communists declared their objection to a boycott of Engllsh goods by the Indian people, inasmuch as this would increase unemploymen~ in England. Therefore, how could one ask the English workers to cooperate with the boycotters in India and elsewhere? . . . The debate, which at first went smoothly, gradually became heated, Jast~ ing, if I remember rightly, for three days. At last the representative of the Comintem , assuming charge of the the.~is, forbl1dp me to speak. I replied to

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The Bloc Above this with a strong protest against the manner of handling the Asian question, which was so complex and foreign to the Communists of the West. 19

Tan Malaka's particular concern was to repeal the denunciation of Pan-Islamism by the second Comintcm congress. We wiJI remember that the 1921 PKI congress had decided to take this matter up before the ' Comintem, and that, in addition, Malaka was a personal proponent of alliance between Communism a nd revolutionary Islam. He had continued to assert his views in the Netherlands, arguing in the Dutch Communist newspaper that support for Pan-Islamism would serve the revolution and not, as the Comintern had argued, the interests of imperialism: Among the European Mu~lims in the Balkans, among the Arab Muslims, the African, Hindustani. and, yes, even the Indonesian Muslims there is but one hope: LiberaliOtl from tlw Western imperialist powers . . . . The attempt at reuniflcation of the Muslim countries coincides with [the stroggle forJlibcration from the yoke of foreign rule. The victory of Kemru is reawakening the old self-confidence. . . . Our Indies will not remain behind. It is especially the revolutionary Muslims of Silmatra, the lJeople of Djambi and At jell, wlw still look up with Jwpe to Istanbul .. Alongside the crescent, the star of the soviets will be the great battle

emblem of approximately 250 million Muslims of the Sahara, Arabia, Hindustan, and our Indies. May our comrades in Indonesia understand this. May they keep in mind the significance of the thousands of ~·Iuslims in the Sarckat Islam. Lastly. let us realize that the millions of proletarian Muslims are as little attracted to an imperialist Pan-Islamism as to \ Vestem imperinlism. 20 Not one to be stopped by indifference to his pleas in committee, he put the matter before the entire congress, explaining the hannful effect the Comintern stand had had in Indonesia: A split [between the SI and PKIj occurred in 1921. owing to tactless criticism of the leaders of the Sarekat Islam. The government, through its agents. made use of this split, and also of the decision of the second Congress of the Communist International to fight against Pan-Islamism. . .. The Sarekat Islamists believe in our propaganda. They are with us "with their stom:lC'hs," but with their hearts they remain with the Sarekat Islamwith their heaven, which we cannot give them. Therefore, they boycotted our meetings and we could not carryon propaganda any longer. . . . If we have another split, we may he sllTe that the government agents will be there

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Rise of Indonesian Communism again w:ith their Pan·lslamism. Therefore. the question of Pan-lslamism is very important. ... At present Pan-Islamism is a national-liberation struggle. because Islam for the Moslems is everything: not only religion. but also the state. the economic system, the food, in fact everything. Thus Pan-1s1amism now means the fraternity of aU Mohammedan peoples and the liberation not only of the AIabian, but also of the Indian, Javanese, and all other oppressed Mohammedan peoples. This fraternity is called the liberation struggle against the British, French, and Italian capitalists, consequent1y against world capitalism. Such is the meaning of Pan·Islamism in India among. the oppressed colonial peoples for which secret propaganda is being carried on. This is our new task, and just as we are willing to support the national war, we shall also support the liberation struggle of the very active and energetic 250 million Mohammedans who are subject to the imperialist Powers. There· fore, I ask once more if we should support Pan-Islamism in this sense, and how far we are to support it. 21 Tan Malaka was supported by a representative from Tunisia and by the Dutch delegate Van Ravesteyn, who made the congress keynote speech on the colonial question and asked that Pan-Islamism be supported as an anti-British weapon in India and in the Middle East.2"J The Russians, as we have noted, had not been blind to the uses of Panlslamic sentiment in the past, and they continued to employ it on occasion.23 Pan·lslamism was a two-edged sword, however; it was one thing to make use of it in ad hoc fashion outside the Soviet Union and another to give it a public imprimatur. At the congress, Tan Malaka recounted, '1 did not receive any answer at an, although my speech had received considerable applause from the entire congress." 2 4 The International again condemned Pan-Islamism; 25 the only beneSt of Malaka's efforts was that Indies Communists could quote his remarks to prove that their party defended Islam,26 Comintern obection to Pan-Islamism did not mean that the Intema~ tional disapproved of the PKI . alliance with the Sarekat Islam. Quite the contrary, the Indonesian bloc within was pointed out at the congress as an example of the strategy that should be employed through~ out the East. Replying to a delegate who feared that alliance with bourgeoiS nationalism would prevent the d evelopment of a solid Communist labor movement, Safarov pointed out that, "as we bave already remarked, the Communist Party of the Dutch East Indies, which is small but active and rich in ideas, has been able on the one hand' to develop its work among the proletarian masses and on the other to

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The Bloc Above exercise a significant inHucnce on the left .wing of the nationalrevolutionary movement." 21 It is questionable whether the Comintcrn was completely aware of the unhappy state of the PKI-SI alliance by that time; beside the slow arrival of news from such a distance, most of the Indies emissaries to Moscow had been passionate proponents of the bloc within and had tended to portray it very favorably. The articles published by PKI and CPH leaders in the international Communist press between 1921 and early 1923 stressed the importance of the.relationship with the Sarekat Islam, and those written in the latter part of this period gave the general impression that with the reunification of the labor movement in 1922 the breach in the alUance had been healed.28 At the sCC9nd Profintern congress (held at the same time as the November 1922 Comintern convention ) Tan Malaka attacked the Profintem spokesman on the colonial question, who had innocently referred to the Sarekat Islam as a "radical nationalist" movement. This characterization was not accurate, Malaka insisted: 90 per cent of SI members were workers and poor peasants, and what bourgeois elements it had CODtained were fast leaving thc movement; moreover, in 1921 it had adopted the PKl program almost in toto .~ The Comintern's Indies informants were no more accurate in portraying the situation even after the nnal break with the SI. Tan Malaka attended a June 1923 ECC] meeting as rapporteur for Indonesia and submitted a report that noted comfortably that the PKI "enjoys a considerable influence within the 'Sarekat-Islam:":SO Comintem accounts from later in that year occasionally remarked a split between the right and left wings of the SI, but they do not indicatc that the International realized that PKI inBuence on the radical branch of the mass movement was now exercised not within but over it or that the party was disinterested in alliance with non-Communist groups. The Comintem yearbook for 1923 followed Malaka's report in announcing the PKTs :considerable influence" within the Sarekat Islam.; U the Pronntern executive reported to its July 1924 congress that the Indoncsian Communists were carrying on their efforts within the framework of a united front fonned by the Radical Concentrationwhich had then been dead for over a year.n Such assertions seem to have been hased on misleading accounts like that of Bergsma and Tan MaIaka, who c1aimed that ..the last (PICI} congress, held in March [1923} , brought not only almost all the trade unions and the Rcd SI

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Rise of Indonesian Communism under Communist in8uence, but also the . nationalist Indian party [Sarekat Hindia] and the Budi-Utomo." as The Comintem's informants may not have been consciously trying to mislead it; they themselves were forced to base their analyses on infrequent and not always accurate information from the Indies. Moreover, their own notions about PKI policy colored their view of what news they did receive, Thus Bergsma, a passionate supporter of alliance with . the Sarekat Islam, wrote in 1925 that "the quarrel that lasted for a long time between the Communists and the 'Sarekat Rajat' on the one side and the 'Sarekat Islam' on the other has come to an end, which provides the possibility of forming an anti-imperialist bloc" 3~_a statement about as f~r from actual fact as anything that could be said at that time. Nor can we discount the human tendency to portray one's activities to others in a fonn calculated to . please and impress-the party in Java to its correspondents abroad, and they in tum to Comintern headquarters. Finally, the Indies Communists continued to think, as we noted in their affiliation to the International, that the Comintern had no particular expertise on Indonesian affairs. "The methods or work adopted by our comrades in the Indies are not always understood in Europe," Malaka and Bergsman explained. "But to be understood is not the main thing. We must look to the results. And those are supremely favourable to us in Java." 3' \Vith such an attitude, it was very tempting to gloss over differences in policy that might create unpleasantness between the party and its international center. The peculiarities of the PKl's international communications are detailed in Chapter 9; it is enough now to note that the Comintern, what with distance, misinformation, and a relative lack of concern, did not criticize the new PKI strategy until 1925. When it did so, it found that the decisions of the 1923 congress had been left deviationist ones, which had ignored the importance of the nonproletarian masscs; and it urged the PKI to return to a system whereby it would work from within and not from above the mass movement. Tan Malaka hoped eventually to return to Indonesia, but since the Indies government was unlikely to allow him t9 do so legally in the near future and since the Comintem felt that the Indies movement was vulnerably dependent on one trained leader, it was decided that Darsono should join Semaun. Darsono, we will remember, had represented Indonesia at ,the International's 1921 convention; after a few months in Moscow he' had been sent to work at the Comintem 'Vest European

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The Bloc Above secretariat in Berlin. Tan ~·jalaka described him as having a wonderful time in that city, immersed in Marxist theory and the Gennan Communist movement.86 Reluctantly, he heeded the International's call and, after stopping for about two months in Holland, sailed for home. He arrived in Batavia in February 1923; there, to his great distress, the customs officials confiscated his extensive library of Marxist literature. 3i Darsono's arrival, coinciding with the complete breakdown of the Indonesian bloc within, generated new speculation about Semaun's orthodoxy. It was rumored that Moscow had threatened to cut off aid to the party unless Semaun's un-Bolshevik policies were reversed; U less spectacularly, it was thought that Darsono was responsible for the aggressively anti-51 line taken by the PKI congress.3~ This seems unlikely, since the March decisions moved away from and not toward the Comintem stand; both Scmaun and Darsono have denied that the latter effected a policy change, and other commentators on PKI history of this period have pointed out that there was no visible alteration of course. 40 T1lC agenda for the March PKI congress, published before Darsono arrived, made it evident that the party was determined to break with the 51 and reorganize its forces. 41 It thus does not appear that Darsono was responSible for a change in PKI strategy; on the other hand, it is likely that he helped influence party policy along lines that were doctrinaire, internationalist, and isolated from the other Indonesian political groups. In general, hc had never been very diplomatic toward non-Communist politicians, and his opinion of the SI leadership was outspokenly low. Moreover, he .was by nature inclined to be absorbed by theoretical questions, and his German experience had strengthened this tendency, Like most European Communists of the time, he was convinced that the proletarian revolution would imminently take place in Cermany, and he believed that it would then spread, if not over the whole world, at least to the Netherlands. A Communist Holland would automatically mean an independent Indonesia, he thought; thus the future of the Indies would be decided in Europe. The PKI's duty was therefore not primarily to prepare a revolution against the Dutch but to strcngthen itself and its following in order to assume control when the capitalists were defeated in Holland.~2 Darsono was the tacitly acknowledged leader of the PKI after Semaun left, although, taking a lesson from his predecessors' unhappy

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Indonesian Communism

experiences, he assumed no official executive funtion in order to avoid occasion for banishment." His views were therefore of great importance for the party. although since he kept in the background it is hard to assign any particular decisions to his inOuence. His thinking was plainly evident. however. when in 1923 the International Red Aid (a Comintern-sponsored association for channeling funds to parties in distress) called on the world's Communists to contribute to the Gennan workers. Darsono took a publicly active role in organizing mass meetings to set off a money-raising campaign. However, at the opening rallies in Semarang and Surabaja, the campaign was so strongly attacked by tllose who felt that PKI charity could best begin at home that the party leaders were forced to agree that a token contribution would suffice as a sign of PKI international solidarity.H In spite of this evident Jack of the proper spirit on the part of less cosmopolitan PKI members, the party laid great stress after Darsono assumed command on internationalism and the need to remember that world capitalism and not the Netherlands was Indonesia's enemy.u Darsono's view of the function of the Indonesian party. coupled with his ideological development in the anti-Revisionist; antinatiollalist atmosphere of Gennan Communism, may also help explain why, in spite of its statement at the March 1923 congress, the PKI made no effort to revive a common front with the non-Communist parties after the Radical Concentration collapsed and devoted itself instead to strengthening its own forces at their expense. This policy did not reduce the party to a proletarian splinter group, however; instead, the PKl could state truthfully in less than a year after the 1923 congress that it was the only significant popular movement in the country.'" This triumph partly reRected the failings of the other parties, for none of the existing Indonesian movements could give the PKI a run for the money. Budi Utomo had never had a general appeal, and now its energies were absorbed by a running battle between its right and left wmgs. 41 The Sarekat Hindia was so unsuccessful that in 1923 it died out entirely. Nowhere, however, was the decay of the non-Communist movement more evident than in the Sarekat Islam, for very soon after its break with the Communists. it was clear that the purge would bring not renewed vigor but a mortal decline.~8 Tjokroaminoto's overwhelming victory at the Madiun congress proved to be no real indicat.o r of the actual situation within the movement. Objections to his program arose almost immediately after the SI meeting. not only

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The Bloc Above from the left but also from those who opposed the attempt to turn the Sarekat Islam into a religiously oriented movement and from rival SI leaders who felt threatened by the decision to create a disciplined PSl." As a result, the Sarekat Islam branches were riven by quarrels, and even the SI stronghold in Jogjakarta broke in half under the strain.MI None of the major plans of the congress were carried out, the PSI mummified in embryo, and the financial situation of the movement went from desperate to catastrophic. In March 1923 Oetoesan Hindia ceased publication for lack of funds; Tjokroaminoto's new journal, Parti; S.l., went the same way soon after. At the end of 1923; financial exhaustion was such that the SI executive hardly functioned, and its branches had lost almost all contact with the center.61 Among the local non-Communist leaders, resistance to Red 51 competition was abnost lethargic, and Tjokroaminoto's attempt to create counterorganizations had no visible result. Not even Semaun's arrest cOl,lld revive the fortunes of the movement; Tjokroaminoto had already lost too much influence to take advantage of the absence of his most serious competitor. More and more, the SI came under the control of Salim and moved in a religiOUS, Pan-Islamic sphere. It had, as one observer remarked, "worked itself into a political impasse. With the carrying on of propaganda for Islam and against Communism the CSI's activity was ex"hausted. The popular movement continued on , leaVing it behind."L2 When the Sarekat Hindia came to an end in mid-1923. the Communists sympathetically offered a political home to its adherents. A number of them did go to the PKI. and when an attempt was made later in 1923 to resurrect the nationalist organization, the Communists understandably if llnfratemally denounced the project. ~3 The dissension and discouragement that followed the 1923 SI congress provided a similar opportunity to solicit adherents at all levels, and as a result a number of the more prominent SI figures began to appear in and around the Communirt camp. One was Surjopranoto, who broke with the CSI after its February 1923 congress; the PKI congratulated him,M and, according to Surjopranoto, Semaun invited him to act as "adviser" to the Red 51. M Another was the former CSI secretary Sosrokardono, who on his release from Section B imprisonment in 1923 was solicited eagerly by both the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. For a year he remained loyal to the SI; then, protesting its excessive stress on religion, he jOined the Communist party.oa These and similar defections from the CSI were useful to the Com-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism munists only for prestigej Surjopranoto merely flirted with the PKI, and Sosrokardono soon associated himself with a deviant Communist group, Sudiro's New SR. However, two other leaders, Alimin and Musso, were to play more substantial roles. They I)ad been members of both the CSI and PKI before their imprisonment for the Section B affairj however, they had been noted for their 10ya1ty to Tjokroaminato, in whose defense they had perjured themselves, and had been criticized in Darsono's 1920 attack for unquestioningly supporting the 51 chairman. Both camps seemed to consider it a matter of prestige to secure the loyalty of the two men when they left prison in September 1923. Hints of high position were given: Sinar Hindia hopefully proclaimed that the PKJ now had two leaders capable of replacing the exiled Semaunj within the Sarekat Islam they were suggested as sue.cessors to Tjokroaminoto.01 Since they did choose the PKl and were to rank among the major leaders of Indonesian Communism, a sketch of their backgrounds is relevant. Mas Alimin Prawirodirdjo was born in Surakarta in 1889; his family was poor, but at the age of nine he became the foster son of G. A. J. Hazeu (later Adviser for Native Affairs) and so was able to obtain a' good education. He attended European schools in Batavia and became fluent in French, English, and Dutch; he also added Sundanese to his native Javanese, which later helped him to be effective politically in West as well as his native Central Java. Hazeu had hoped he would enter government service, but Alimin was drawn to Indonesian politics and journalismj he began a newspaper, Djawa Maeda (Young Java ) and entered the Budi Utomo. Soon after the Sarekat Islam was founded, he joined and became an early member of the CSI; for a time he stayed in Surabaja at Tjokroaminoto's boardinghouse, a center for politically minded young Indonesians. Alimin was also associated with Tjipto Mangunkusumoj he joined Insulinde and was coeditor of its Batavia journal, MOll;opallit. He became interested in labor affairs and was active in organizing printers and the seamen and dockworkers of Batavia; he was a founder of Baars's rural union, the PKBT, and was vice-chairman of the pawnshop workers' union. For a while he was employed in the Batavia offices of the Japanese firm Mitsui, but he soon felt the penalty for political activity in colonial Indonesia : he was fired at the request of the Indies authorities. M Alimin rounded out his place in the Indonesian opposition by joining the ISDV j in 1918 he became chairman of its Batavia branch and a

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The Bloc Above member of the central party executive.~~ The Communists were not too happy with him, however, for he took a syncretic attitude toward politics and refused to commit himself wholly to anyone of the groups he had jOined; until 1920 they thought him too close to lnsulinde/Sarekat Hindia, and in the Jogjakarta-Semarang conflict he sided with the CSI. When he left prison, he was for a time politically unclassi6able, although he successfully revived the pawnshop workers' union '0 and joined Musso and Sosrokardono in a shortIived attempt to revive the CSI organ Oetoesan llifldia. G1 Gradually, however, Alimin's activities became one-sided: he appeared as a major speaker at a Red Sl/SR convention in April 1924, and thereafter he starred at nwnerous Communist meetings, giving the 51 increasing cause to question his loyalty.6:! Finally, he made his position completely clear by appearing in China as the PKI delegate to a Comintem-sponsored conference. Musso was born in 1897 in Pegu, a village in the residency of Kediri. He attended high school and teacher training school in Batavia; there he was a friend of Alimin and a protege first of Hazeu and then of the educator, theosophist, and Ethical refonner D. van Hinloopen Labberton. Like Alimin, he lived for a time at the Tjokroaminoto boardinghouse in Surabaja, where he met Sukarno, with whom he was one day to compete for control of Indonesia's revolutionary Republic. Like Alimin, too, he divided his loyalties between several political organizations-in his case, lnsulinde, Sarekat Islam, and the ISDV-and was considered in the Jogjakarta-Semarang competition as an ally of Tjokroaminoto. He was described as very bright and a good organizer and political \vriter; he was an imposing figure on the speaker's platform but not a particularly brilliant orator, and he affected a rough-andready style in his public appearance. At the Section B trials, Aliroin confessed when confronted with evidence that he had lied to save Tjokroaminoto; but Musso defiantly refused to do so, exhibiting a damn-the-consequences attitude that was to serve the PKI fatefully more than once in its later history.'3 He was treated rather badly in prison (Salim protested this to the Vol1csraad), and the experience embittered him deeply against the Dutch. However. he did not exhibit revolutionary inclinations immediately when he was released, perhaps because Van Hinloopen Labberton planned to take him as his assistant on a teaching assignment to Japan. The Japanese government eventually decided, however, that Musso was not eligible for appoinbnent. He was to teach Indonesian languages, in English, and although he

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Rise of Indonesian Communism commanded the requisite tongues, the Japanese decided he lacked a sufficiently high academic degree (although we might suspect that his radical politics and prison record also entered into their consideration). Immediately after his rejection, Musso announced that the Batavia PKI branch had been revived under his leadersbip.Sf An Indies government report, considering the decline of the 5arckat Islam during 1923, attributed it largely to a retreat into abstraction: The misfortunes of the SI during the past ye~ seem to conflrm anew the proposition that neither a Pan-Islamic nor·a socialist ideal, neither a striving for all-Indies unity, nor governmental-economic questions such as tax policies or noncooperation, move the great majority; but locaJ grievances, the concerns of daily life. do accomplish this. Whoever makes use of this fact finds response from the crowd; whoever denies it can only attract intellectuals. If a popular leader mixes the one [aspect] with the other he can sometimes awaken a degree of interest in broader and higher concern."

The Red 51, on the other hand, did attract the people, "because in it expression is given. openly and in no uncertain terms, to the bitterness. distrust, and disappointment in the government. the authorities, the plantation owners-all Westerners. in short, insofar as they do not stand on their side as Communists-for in this manner the leaders arouse the expectation that they will act more strongly [than their rivalsJ in the interests of those who feel themselves disadvantaged. Moreover, this association has more funds R:nd makes better use of them than the Sarekat Islam locals did previously." t8 Certainly Communist militancy was the prinCipal reason for PKl success in capturing the mass movement. since people tended to be interested in politics only as an active protest against the status quo. At the same time, the 5arekat Islam's ideological stand contributed to its decline, for although its leaders appealed to the religion of the great mass of the Indonesian people, whereas the PKI professed an alien, proletarian doctrine, the SI had actually chosen the narrower base. To begin with, the schism in the Sarekat Islam reSected in some ways a separation between secular and religious orientation that was to become a perennial division in Indonesian politics; the wide popular use of the labels "Red" and "White'" to identify the warring 51 factions probably arose as much from their traditional identification with the two major Javanese religiOUS communities as it did from European revolutionary usage. In Javanese, aban (g) (the equivalent of the Indonesian merah ) means red or brown; the kaum abangan were thus 170

The Bloc Above the Reds; putih means white, and the kaum putiJUln (a popular term for the santN) were accordingly the Whites. Because the abangan felt their world view threatened by the stricter imposition of Islam and by the relatively individualistic and competitive values of the santTi, they have tended to prefer political movements that were "neutral" about religion. Thus Bud! Utomo (an organization of the pri;a;i, who share the general abaflgun ethos) declared that if it had to choose between the religious attitudes of the PKI and those the CSI advanced, it would prefer the Communists.67 Nor did the Sarekat Islam's religious standpoint appeal universally to the santTi. The CSI had become closely identified with the modernist viewpoint of the Muhammadijah, which in 1924 declared that Islam and Communism were incompatible and hence that no real Muslim could adhere to the PKI.68 The Muhammadijah was at the time the only articulate spokesman for Javanese Islam, but its religious interpretations were not uncontested. Its views may be seen as at the extreme White end of the abangan-santri scale in the sense that it wished to purify Indonesian Islam of local tradition. The Muhammadijah was chiefly influential among the more sophisticated, entrepreneurially oriented santr; of the towns; its greatest strength was in Jogjakarta, and this was the only place where the 5arekat Islam offered the PKI any serious popular resistance after 1923. Many sontri who did not share the Muhammadijah religious viewpoint seem to have found the position of the White 51 more inimical to their values than the secularism of the Red. This, coupled with the position of the PKI as a radical protest movement, may explain why a number of those santri who sought political expression aligned themselves with the party and professed a religious variant of Communism. In Java, Islamic Communism was particularly strong in the 5urakarta area; the following is an example of its argument, in which elements of indigenous tradition, Islam, and Marxism are visible: In bygone centuries, justice was considered by the people to be their greatest and universally acknowledged need; its execution rested with the king, who in his capacity [as judge] was raised above all other mortals and honored, and the masses subjected themselves completely to him. When, however, many persons began to compete with each other in the pursuit of riches, justice could no longer be meted out as it should; for the rich people who had committed a crime could bribe witnesses and thus buy their way out of the charges against them. From this time on the king was seldom able 171

Rise of Indonesian Communism to judge correctly. The human mind, once upright, became dishonest and led along crooked paths, so that man's sins became greater and the world was fuIl of cruelty. The rich could profit by the means which Cod gave, through the person of His Prophet and in the fonn of a religious teaching. for the benefit of the world and of mankind; for they had the opportunity [to study the teachings], while the proletariat, on the other hand, had to spend the whole day working to earn its food . When the rich people began to asswne an interest in religiow affairs they also intnxluced politics into religiow instruction; and after the passing of the Prophet they were able to use their influence [on religion] to make their riches secure. Religious leaders, pri~sts, and teachers were paid by the capitalists, and in this manner the capitalists were able to achieve their goal of seeing the interests of wealth placed above the interests of the people. The duties of giving zokat and fitrah [tithes and alms], prescribed by Islam, prove that the welfare of man should be placed above the welfare of goods. But as soon as the leadership of Islam no longer rested with the disciples of the Prophet, these duties were no longer obeyed. Many of the rich no longer thought of Zllkat: and many prohibited goods were dealt with in trade with other parts of the world, until hom the standpoint of Islam aU the goods in the world became impure. It is therefore no wonder that sinful capitalism has arisen. There are stiJ! no laws against capitalism, save in Russia; it is high time that the workers and peasants began to realize how evil capitalism is, and that they unite ill agitation against it, for their rights and for a decent existence. U The chief teacher of this creed was the son of a, 5W1lkarta batik dealer, Hadji Misbach. The 6rst act that brought him in contact with the law was his refusal in 1915 to repair his house. He undertook this peculiar form of political resistance because the government was then attempting to impose various requirements in house construction and maintenance; its object (the improvement of public health ) was praiseworthy, but to many Indonesians it was an uncomprehended and unwarranted interference in their private affairs. Misbach, who was at heart both a radical and a traditionalist, felt this most strongly; in spite . of a heavy 6ne he refused to make the necessary changes and, when all else faiJed, simply abandoned the dwelling. He joined the 51 in its early years, edited religiOUS journals in the 5urakarta area, and helped found the Bala Tentara Nabi Muhammad (Anny of the Prophet Muhammad ), a project of Tjokroaminoto's to combat insulting references to Islam. Concerned for the lot of the poor as well as for religion, he

172

The Bloc Above became involved with Insulinde when it replaced the SI as the chief vehicle of social protest in the Surakarta area during the mid-1910s. Misbach was, we will remember, a leader of the SUlakarta anticorvee effort during 1919. Placed under preventive detention, he was released in October of that year, only to be rcimprisoned for violating the speech Jaws in May 1920. When he left prison in August 1922, Misbach resumed the leadership of Medan Moeslimin (Muslim Arena) and Islam Bergerak (Islam on the March ), which were already expressing Muslim Communist views. He disapproved of the CSI's party discipline decision and chose for the · PKI at the Sarekat Islam's 1923 congress. Misbach was, according to Dutch nccounts, motivated by idealism rather than ambition in his career, an accolade the Europeans accorded few Indonesian radicals of that day. He was extremely popular in the Surakarta region, and his teachings had such appeal that he was soon a figure of major importance. This greatly a1armed the authorities, who thought his indigenously oriented arguments were particularly dangerous ; after a bomb-throwing incident in Sura1carta later that year, they seized the opportunity to accuse him of haVing organized a terrorist group called "Sabotage" to do the job. The case was so obviously weighted with perjured testimony as to arouse general complaint; the state was unable to prove its charge and had to resort to the extraordinary rights to banish him to New Guinea. This action was protested in both the Volksraad and the Dutch parliament, the more so since his place of exile was considered unhealthy.70 The Dutch Communists, seeing an opportunity to make a grand gesture toward Indonesia and Islam, named Misbach a candidate for the 1925 parliamentary elections, the second Indonesian to be nominated to that body, although he was quite ineligible.lI Islamic Communism in Java by no means expired with Hadji Mis· bach's banishment. In Surakarla Meda,1 Moeslimin increased publication from twice to thrice monthly, and religiOUS Communism in that area was virtually identical with the Mu'alimin movement. This was sponsored by an Islamic Communist association, Mardi Busono, which reportedly had several thousand members in the Princely Territories by early 1926; the Mu'alimin courses, held in prayer houses, explained the Koran along Islamic Communist lines, opposed the modernist interpretations of Muhammadijah, and protested government interference in religiOUS affairs. The movement became 'suffiCiently popular to slann the government, which began to break up Mu'alimin meetings; it im173

Rise of Indonesian Communism prisoned some half-dozen leaders in February 1926, causing a riot of Mu'a1imin followers before the great mosque in Surakarta. Other Islamic Communist groups were reported to exist in Tegal, under the leadership of Hadji Adnan, and in the pesantren (religious school) center of Ponorogo. Whether they had any connection with the PKI is unclear; their chief common characteristic seems to have been opposition to the Muhammadijah: The Communist party drew on such antimodcrnist sentiments in its appea4 for reUgious support, declaring, even as the modernist association had banned the party to all good Muslims, that no true believer could belong to the Muhammadijah.72 Although Javanese Islamic Communism was antimodernist, this was not so in Sumatra, where religious reform movements had an independent history and were not amenable to Muhammadijah attempts to penetrate the area. When Communism spread to the island, it centered in the strongly Muslim Minangkabau area o~ the West Coast and assumed a religious form. Its chief proponent was Achmad Chatib gelar Hadji Datuk Batuah, who had been one of the first pupils of Hadji Rasul, a prominent teacher of Islamic modernism. He came from Kota Lawas in the Padang highlands and was a teacher and executive officer in the Sumatra Tawalib, which sponsored schools providing modernistoriented instruction in Padang Pandjang, Fort van der Capellan (Batu Sangkar ), and Fort de Kock (Bulcit Tinggi ). In early 1923 he resigf;led these positions and, together with a pupil, set out on a trip through northern Sumatra. In Atjeh he is said to have come in contact with Natar Zainuddin, a tramway conductor and sometime journa1ist, who had recently returned from Java and who was a zealous propagandist for the VSTP. It is not certain whether Batuah was converted to Communism by Zainuddin, or whether he had already come to a Communist viewpoint before he undertook his journey. Zainuddin himself had been born on the West·Coast, and he returned to it in May 1923, when in response to the VSTP strike the Resident of Atjeh expelled him from there. Soon thereafter Batuah also returned, resuming both his associa~ tion with Zainuddin and his role in the Sumatra Tawalib school in Padang Pandjang. He now preached a clearly Communist-oriented Islam, and he soon gathered. a considerable follOwing both among the people of his home district of Kota Lawas and among the Sumatra Tawalib pupils. In the Tawalib system the' teachers taught only the highest classes; their pupils, in tum, instructed the lower ones. A teacher with a strong 174

The Bloc AboDe personality was able to exert great influence, and Batuah soon had gathered a wide circle of student propagandists. He cooperated with Zainuddin in setting up two journals, the popular Djago! Diago! (Up and At 'Em!), which was edited by Zainuddin, and the more theoreti· cal Pemandangan Islam ( Islamic Outlook) , which was run by Batuah and Djamaluddin Tamin, a Tawalib teacher who was the son of a Minangkabau ki;ai (religious teacher ) and who had followed Batuah into Communism. They also founded the International Debating Club, a Marxist social study group, and made plans to establish a school that would teach religion and politics as well as the three Rs. Hadji Batuah's emergence as a proponent of Communism created something of an uproar among the notables of the West Coast. A secular PKI branch had been established in Padang in March 1923 by a handful of young people under the leadership of Magas, a local boy who had joined the party during a sojourn in Java; but they were viewed Simply as wayward youth. Zainudrun's activities had also not aroused comment: half Indian and married to an Indian woman, he had no place in matrilineal and clannish Minangkabau and could only hope to inBuence fellow outsiders. But Batuah, a man of rank by both religious and customary reckoning, a hadji, a penghulu adat-the world seemed to have turned upside down. In the consternation accompanying the rapid spread of his religious Communist ideas, the wildest rumors were spread: the village heads of Kota Lawas were going to revolt, there would be a massacre of Europeans, the Assistant Resident of Padang Pandjang would he the 6rst victim, and so on. Hadji Rasul and other modernist leaders tried to bring Bamah to his senses, but to no avail. They then tried to inBuence the alim «lama (religious scholars ) against him, and Budi Tjaniaga, an association of notables by pre--Islamic customary law, tried to keep the adat leaders from his in8uence. These effort s proved insufficient, and so various hitherto opposing groups united into the K·arapatan Minangkabau, which sponsored a major gathering in Padang Pandjang on November 4, 1923, and decided on a political program that opposed the noncooperation urged by the Communists. The Dutch authorities were no less concerned by the rapid spread of Communist influence in the area; some days later Hadji Batuah and Natar Zainuddin were arrested, and later they were banished under the extraordinary rights. 13 After Batuah's arrest the PKI continued in Sumatra's West Coast region under secular direction, but it retained a strong religiOUS cast. 175

Rise of Indonesian Communism The Muslim Communists were largely from the modernist younger generation; a good part of the movement's propagandists were Swnatra Tawalib graduates who had been unable to lind fitting employment in the depression. However, the movement also included figures prominent in various other Islamic groupings; its denunciation of Dutch colonialism as the embodiment of rule by unbelievers had no sectarian limits: The communists really do desire what is right, namely, that religion, adat , and prosperity should all be improved. 1 Has not Allah said, " Do not obey the commands of the kafirr' And what do we do? 2 Our adot, which used to govern us, yea and what not, have been ruined by ilie government and the capitalists. 3 Now we work only for the benent of the capitalists, not for the benefit of ourselves and our families. In all these matters .the communists seek to bring improvement. The hour has almost shuckl Whoever joins those who do right, does right himself. Whoever joins the ranks of those who do wrong or give it their approval, does wrong himselfJ The communists wish to do right but are prevented from doing so by the capitalists. Whoever does not join the communists and whoever speaks ill of them are themselves capitalists. \"hoover, when the time shall have come for the fight against the Dutch, is not a communist, has ranged himself on the side of the Iwfir•. Otherwise he would have become a communist. Think it over.14 Another variant of religious Communism, this time a heretical, abangan-oriented group, developed in northern Central Java. In the Jate nineteenth cenrury Kijai Samin, a religiOUS leader from Blora, began to preach what he called the Agama Adam (the Religion of Adam), which called for a return to the simple life. In the early twentieth century the movement became one of passive resistance, apparently as a protest t9 the increasing disruption of rraditional village life. Santin preached that the people should regard themselves as free (merckka), which, in Javanese tradition, connoted freedom from tax and labor obligatiOns to the ruler. The Saminists, arguing that they were free of the Indies government, were reluctant to render taxes and rejected the Ethical rural improvement projects, which they regarded as interfering with their way of life. Samin and his chief followers were banished in 1907, but their atti176

The Bloc Abooe tudes lived on and eventually found a political outlet in Communism. The PKI, well aware that attitudes epitomized by the Saminists were prevalent in a much larger part of the population, laid particular stress on its opposition to the taxes imposed by the government and its desire to set free the people as well as the state. In the rural areas of the Semarang and Rcmbang residencies, where Saminism had its most enduring influence, it combined with Communism to produce a highly mystical version of the political movement. In 1924 this variant found a leader in Sudiro, chainnan of the Wirosari SR, who organized the New Sarekat Rakjat (S.R.·Baru) about it. Sudiro's movement spread to the surrounding districts, as far as Surakarta; and since, unlike the other groups mentioned, it was headed by a leader who had broken with the regular Communist organization, it was a source of schism in a key area of PIQ activity.7G Communist secularism thus did not hinder PKI popularity as it might have and as the SI leaders had hoped it would. Religion, however, was not the only argument that could have been used against the Communists, and we might wonder why some other issues, such as the PKI's foreign connections and the alien nature of Marxism, were not employed more effectively by its opponents in the struggle for popular support. As we have seen, such points of attack were not ignored by the CSI; on the other hand, the White SI leaders were strongly inclined to the internationalism of Pan·Islamism, and Salim, the chief author of their anti-Communist arguments, was closely identified with the Dutchled, moderate Marxist ISDP. This made it awkward for Jogjakarta to argue that the PKI was not sufficiently indigenous in its orientation. for the accusation could cut two ways. Probably another reason for the failure to stress nationalist argu· ments was that nationalism was not then a distinct and vital ideolOgical orientation. Tjokroaminoto did attempt to form an Indies National Congress in 1923-1924, patterned after the Indian movement and aimed at obtaining sworal. It did not generate much enthusiasm, at· though the PIa executive was horrified to discover a prominent Makas. sar Communist had joined its Celebes committee; and it ran into the determined resistance of the colonial authorities. In January 1924 the PKI participated in a conference with representatives frOm a wide range of Indonesian organizations (including the SI and Muhamma· dijah ) on the Congress question. apparently in deference to Indonesian and Comintem feelings that the national movement should be united

177

Rise

0/

Indonesian Communism

in a common front. The participating groups could come to no teal

agreement, and shortly thereafter the Congress effort collapsed. This, coupled with the demise of the Sarekat Hindia, gave the Communists no reason to abandon their argument that nationalism was a European phenomenon of the nineteenth century and not a real issue in the Indonesia of their day.7I This estimate of nationalism did not mean that the PKI played down liberation from Dutch rule as its goal or that it consistently insisted on framing its arguments in doctrinaire Marxist terms. On the contrary, considerable effort was made to interpret the ideology into local terms and emphasize its concurrence with popular values. To overcome the alien identification of Communism, the PKI had the advantage that Marxist concepts acquired general usage at an early stage of Indonesian political development. We will remember that capitalism, imperialism, internationalism, and the class struggle were heatedly debated issues at early ~l congresses, and they were also Widely found in the Indonesian-language press, appearing even in moderate Outer Island journals by 1918-1919. As the PKI expanded into the focal point of popular unrest, the number of newspapers adhering to its viewpoint increased. Except for the two main party journals (Socora &'jat and SinDr Hindia, which in August 1924 changed its name to Api [Fire] ) these were generally the organs of local leaders, who tended to be political chiefs, journalists. and organizers of one or more labor unions all at once. Chronic financial anemia and government persecution plagued these papers; moreover, they could reach at best only a very small portion of the popu1ation, since lndonesia was more than nine-tenths illiterate. The people they did reach. however, were the elements from which the rank and Gle of the party and the cadres of the mass movement were drawn : those with enough education to realize that things could be different, enough ambition to feel burning social discontent. and enough alienation from village life to seek a cosmopolitan philosophy. In spreading the rudiments of ideology in local tenns, the journals of the left per· formed an important function for the PKI, making Communist ideas popular to a degree that later surprised the Dutch: Various reports that have been received concerning the recent resistanoe movement indicate very clearly that the extremist propaganda, especially on the islands or Java and Sumatra. had assumed much greater dimensions in

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The Bloc Above both size and depth than had been suspected. In general. not only the top leaders but also those of lower rank appeared to be very knowledgeable of the principles of Communist doctrine and of revolutionary organization and were at the same time flrmIy convinced that the revolution would succeed in its time. It further appeared that the propagandists had succeeded-in pene-

trating deep into the countryside, winning a broad segment of the population for the SR through a system of propaganda which they Stted in a strikingly effective manner to the particular social environment of the groups involved and even to the ability of the individuals to comprehend. 77

In the popular presentation of Communism, capitalism was associated with greedy exploitation, in particular that of the Indonesians by

the Dutch, and the class sbuggle was that of the Indonesian common man, equated with the proletariat, against the ruling Westerners. lDe revolution was often compared to the coming of the Ratu Adil, the Righteous King, which would mark a new era, that of Communism, which was pictured as freedom in its broadest sense. The revolution was seen as a sudden and total change but not necessarily a major anned struggle. Undoubtedly, denials of violent intent were largely aimed at the government; but there also appears to have been, on the one hand, a belief that Communism would sweep triumphantly and without eHective opposition to the Indies from abroad and, on the other, a feeling that the end of the Dutch era was at hand and that when it came the people need only rise up for the oolonial apparatus to collapse.78 In any event there was, as we shall see, real confusion even among the major party leaders about what they were undertaking when they decided to make a revolution. The concept of a revolution aimed not just at national independence but also at drastic social change was thus not limited to doctrin~ire leftists in the central party leadership; it was an integral part of the PKl's popular appeal. This revolution was not to require a dictatorship of the proletariat or any other intermediary stage; it was to aim directly at the classless society in which the state was replaced by voluntary mutual aid. If the PKI leaders gave thought to organizing the state after liberation from the Dutch, they did not express it; they oHered utopia, the nuances of which their fol1owers could define as they liked. The power of this appeal is shown by the fact that opponents preferred to attack the PKI on almost any issue except Communism itself. We have seen how Tjokroaminoto and Salim emphasized in the Jogjakarta~ Semarang struggle that they supported Communism hut opposed the 179

Rise of Indonesian Communism tactics of the PKJ; they continued to do so even after the final expulsion of the Communists in 1923.18 In seeking popular support, the PIG had the great adv~ntage that Communism could appear as both past and future. On the one haod, it could claim to represent the newest aod most radical European concepts; on the other, it could refer to the traditional view of'the imperfect present as a corruption of an idyllic past. Communism, in this sense, represented a return to the pristine values of Indonesian society as it was ideally pictured before the coming of the Dutch. For example, one argument was that in bygone days the Indonesian people had planted their rice without interference from outside, had prospered, and had thus given employment to craftsmen and tradesmen. The prijaii were close to the people, for the villagers gave them part of their harvest and this strengthened the bond of mutual interest between them. But then came the Europeans, who brought foreign capital and plantations; the people became poor, lost control of their land, and were forced to seek work in the factories and on the estates. The government forbade the prijaji to receive gifts from the people. saying it did so to protect the villagers. but actually doing so in order to make the priiaji its servants and the people's enemies. The villagers w~e driven to the cities. where they were forced to compete with each other and with machines; they endured ever-deepening misery, and all this was the result of capitalism-the system of the foreigner. of greed, of competition, of the exploitation of man by man, Under Communism, however, there would no longer be economic or political competition: all would be based on cooperation. There would be no poverty. People would work because they wanted to and at the tasks they preferred; there would be no masters, no servants, and no seeking of profit. The problems of government would be easily solved, for there need be no army or navy, no legal rights of ownership, no laws other than those of custom, no prisons, orphanages, or any of the other apparatus of the cxploitive state. 80 The international character of Communism was an asset to the PKJ's messianic popular appeal in that it strengthened the party's image as the wave of the future and supported the claim that its feebleness before the colonial regime would soon be overcome by aid from outside. Here the party could play upon popular legends such as one predicting that the coming of the Ratu Adil would be prepared by the legions of Prince Djojobojo. After the Russo-Japanese War, Djojobojo

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The Bloc Above had been widely identi.6ed with the Japanese; among the Communist following of the 19205 he was identified with Soviet Russia (and sometimes with Kemalist Turkey, which was seen as the Muslim ally of Russia and identified with the Chalifate).81 For the politically more sophisticated, the idea of receiving revolutionary aid from abroad was not at all unusua1. The Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia leaders had speculated in their day on the possibility of Japanese or American help. The CSI, in 1919, had evolved a project to send Hadji Agus Salim to Europe, where one of his tasks would be to present the SI side of the Section B affair to the Dutch and another would be to see what he could obtain in the way of foreign aid, preferably from Germany's revolutionary socialists.82 A year later there were rumors that the Comintern was sending agents and gold to the Indies; Oetoesan Hindia expressed great enthusiasm, particularly for the financial side of this prospective sUpport.S3 . As we have seen in the case of Darsono's German aid project, enthusiasm for international help tended to be a one-way aHair even among the Communists. Moreover, news reaching the Indies about postrevolutionary events in Russia caused that country to lose some of its utopian luster, and people began to ask questions that the P~ was hard put to answer. 84 On the whole, however, the image of Russia as the source of world revolution, and of the Comintem as a potential backer of efforts to overthrow colonial rule, seems to have prevailcd; the increasing tendency of the government and the Dutch-language press to attribute all outspoken opposition to Bolshevik inspiration probably had a good deal to do with this. The principal PKI strength lay in the large cities of Java, by reason both of the party's proletarian origin and of the difficulty in organizing the countryside and outlying regions. Its influence radiated from Semarang to the surrounding countryside and to the smaller cities along the railway lines organized by the VSTP. Like the o~her Indonesian opposition parties, it was largely composed of ethnic Javanese; but after the Section B affair it acquired strength in Sundanese West Java, for political activity revived there under the Red 51. The PKI expanded rapidly in t,he last months of 1923, and a government report observed that by the end of that year it could no longer be considered Simply a party of the urban proletariat. To the surprise of many officials, it showed itseU capable of acting as spokesman for local discontent in various rural areas, where it led protests against a food shortage on the Bandung 181

Rise of Indonesian Communism plateau, against higher school fees, and against increased taxes on land. It had become active along Java's north coast (Pasisir) districts, especially in Pekalongan. Brehes, and Tjirebon. Bandung became a center of influence second only to Semarang. with PKI strength extending to Sukabumi and the general plateau area. In eastern Java, the party's major centers were M.adiun and Ngandjuk, and it also had influence in Kediri In short, the PKI had more than recovered from the paralysis that followed the VSTP strike, although it did not achieve even a minor part of the following that the Sarekat Islam had once been able to claim. 8S

PKI strength also began to move outside Java in the early 1920$; it did so in a patchy manner, for Communist teachings were usually brought by persons who had been to Java or to Outer Island areas where the movement already had adherents. The bearer of the doctrine might be a native of the area, or he might come from a diHerent region but succeed in interesting localleaders or groups in his message; reportedly, Menadonese soldiers who had been attracted to the Communists via the Red Guardist action played this role in various ouUying districts. In some areas identification of the Communists with one ethnolinguistic group seems to have precluded securing adherents in another: in East Java. for instance, the party made no headway among the resident Madurese, and in Atjch it attracted local Malays but not the Atjehnese. In general, the movement gained adherents in urban centers and sometimes market towns; if its leader was locally prominent or a gifted political agitator, and if there was an issue to exploit. it might spread ,vith grassfire swiftness, Inasmuch as the Outer Islands were considerably less poIiticalized than Java, and their admiriistrations were less tolerant of opposition, such leaders usually had very brief careers, at the close of which the local movement often collapsed. The PKI achieved its greatest Outer Island strength in Sumatra, which was undergoing rapid economic and administrative deve10pment and where the disorienting effects of change were thus more strongly felt than in the other outer provinces. [n the West Coast (Minangkabau) residency, tpe movement was able to take advantage of Muslim sentiments, friction between the populace and the local administration, resentment of taxation and depresSion hardships. and a relatively high level of education and contact with the outside Indonesian political world. The arrest of Zainuddin and Batuah and, in March 199-4, of the secular PKI leadership, put a temporary stop to Communist activity; within a few months, however. it revived under Said gelar 182

The Bloc Above Sutan Said Ali, a Minangkabau aristocrat and one-time follower of Abdul Muis. A fanner government teacher, he resigned a post as secretary of a local merchants' association, the Saudagar Vereniging Sumatra, to organize the PKI. Attempts by the West Sumatra PKI to keep publications going were generally unsuccessful, for the government systematically arrested editors on charges of breaking the press laws; but the party activists were more than able to make up for this by energetic personal propaganda tours. They had very little opposition, for the Karapatan Minangkabau fell apart as soon as Batuah and his associates had been gotten out of the way. By the end of 1924 the Communists had gained adherents in many portions of the Padang, Padang Pandjang, Bukit Tinggi, Pajakumbuh, Solok, and Sawahlunto districts. There were Sarekat Rakjat branches in nine towns in the area, and the government estimated that they had about 1,000 members." In the Moluccas ·a lively Communist movement developed. In 1919 some Javanese residents in Temate organized Buw Mulia, an association initially thought by the authorities to be, if anything, pro-SI. It was not very successful, and in order to rescue it from an early demise its leaders sought outside support. One of them was an old friend of Semaun, who had just become chairman of the PKI; he paid him a visit and requested aid for the Ternate organization, and thus the Communists' first Outer Island base was established. J. C. Dengah, a Menadonese ex-soldier who had been a member of the ISDV/PKI executive, was sent by the party to help organize Ternate. However, the real expansion of Communist influence began in 1921, when the movement came under the leadership of Raden Mas Gondojuwono, a descendant of the nineteenth-century Javanese rebel prince Diponegoro. With the aid of Dengah and Said Hamid Assor, a local man and former chatib (mosque official), he made the Temate PKI into a vigorous movement of popular protest. Acting as a complaint bureau and promising freedom from taxes and service to the authorities, it extended itself by means of utusan, political circuit riders who brought the message as far as the Sula Islands. The Temate PKI published a weekly newspaper, organized local seamen, sponsored a dockworkers' strike, and held lecture courses, which, according to government reports, were Widely attended. The movement subsided in 1922 with the arrest of its leaders and the restriction of political freedom in the area, but when Gondojuwono returned, in 1924, it again spread rapidly and another clampdown was necessary. Elsewhere in the Outer Islands, Communist strength was more

183

Rise of Indonesian Communism ephemeral. There was some PKI activity in Langsa (Atjeh, northern Sumatra) and Palembang (southern Sumatra), and in 1923 the government thought it detected rising sympathy for Communism in the Indonesian-language press of Sumatra's East Coast. In 1920 the party sent Sukendar. an ISDV jPKI propagandist, to organize Makassar (Celebes), but the movement did not really get under way there until 1923, in which year the Communists gained control of the .hitherto nonpartisan newspaper Pemberita MakMsar. In Pontianak (Borneo ) PKI supporters began publication of Halilintar, whidl did battle with the SI-controlled Suara Borneo. During 1924 government reports also noted that propaganda for the Communists was being made in Timor, Bali, and Lombok.1I1 In the PKI expansion, much depended on commanding the loyalty of inBuential leaders, and with literacy and organizational experience very scarce, this was a chronic party problem. In the urban centers, leadership was usually associated with the labor unions (especially the VSTP) and consisted at the lowest level of clerks, literate foremen and skilled workers and the semieducated unemployed. In the smaller towns and rural areas it came principally from those who, as a result of superior education, ambition, or contact with urban life, felt deep frustration with the status quo. Such persons might be traders and cashcrop farmers distressed by the depression, better-situated villagersoften had;is-angcred over burdensome and complicated taxes, religious teachers opposed to kapr rule and regulation of religious activity, or local notables and officials alienated by injustices they felt had been done them by higher authorities. The process of dissemination described in the Bantam (Banten ) region of West Java seems to have been fairly typical: The number of members was increased by persons with a certain influence going over to the movement and bringing with them virtually all those who came under their influence. Nevertheless a group of this sort did not join all lit once. The most prominent went over first, often members of one family which little by little joined in its entirety; only after this had happened did the hangers-on follow suit quickly or gradually. Soon after some inHuential person had been won a large increase in membership would become apparent.1I8

This was typical enough of a society in which the process of politicalization was only beginning, and it was also the pattern the Sarekat Islam followed during its rise. However, it created obvious problems 184

The Bloc Above for the Communists because of the clash bctwe(:n the egalitarian, proletarian, secular orientation of the central party leadership and the frequently individualistic, "pctty-bourgeois," and religious values of locallcaders outside the cities. The requirements of education and the ability to command rose, of course, with the rank of the leader, and in the highest echelons of regional and central party leadership a number of important figures came, as in the other Indonesian movements, from the gentry. However, they were individual mavericks and represented no trend among the prifaii, which as a social elite and the Indonesian arm of the colonial bureaucracy had no reason to find the PKI attractive. As we have seen, the party did appeal to traditionalism, and in some outlying areas disaffected elite groups aligned themselves with it; but this was not the case in the upper levels, where the party's class position was better defined and where members of the gentry were more directly bound to the Dutch:8l1 The party did not think it necessary to define its role as antifeudal as well as anticolonial: the pri;a;i was a bureaucratic rather than a landed elite, and insofar as members of the gentry were willing · to tum against the Dutch it was only too happy to make use of their talents and inHuence. Most of the principal PKI leaders, like those of the other radical opposition parties, became involved in politics at an early age-from idealism, ambition, or lack of challenging or appropriate employment. They often found that what started as a youthful fling ended as a permanent commitment, for once a radical reputation was established it was hard to get back into the good graces of the authorities, and private employment was all too often unacceptable or unavailable. Such political leaders tended willy-nilly to become professionals, relying on their movements for financial support. Much the same was true of union leadership, which was composed for a good part of politicians or of politically affiliated profeSSional labor organizers; (10 the VSTP was the exception among Indonesian unions of this period, in that its leaders had all been employed by the industry they had organized. Because of the great importance of personal leadership in securing a popular foUowing, the critical shortage of organizational talent, and the constant disruption of leadership by arrests, the Communists put a premium on securing individual leaders and were inclined to forgive grave deviations by inHucntial ones." 1 The PKI attitude toward the teachers of religious Communism is an outstanding example. The party

185

Rise of Indonesian Communism was, after all, avowedly secular; on the other hand, to separate itself from its Islamic following would have removed an important source of popular support and furthered the accusation that the PKI was against Islam, The PKI executive was too well aware of the popular appeal of Islamic Communism to denounce it, but at the same time it could not wholeheartedly endorse so unorthodox a source of support. As a result, the Muslim Communist groups were semiautonomous, in but not quite of the party.'~ On a lesser scale, much the same was true of other elements in the party. Communist mass support. though better articulated than the Sarekat Islam had ever been, still resembled a movement of leaders and their followings rather than an organization of branches with welldefined memberships. Local leaders, d epending for their position on their own supporters rather than on the central party leadership, were inclined to reBect local views; and since these were drawn from a wide range of discontent, Communism appeared locaUy in incarnations that ohen had littJe to do with the doctTinal aims or organizational discipline of its central command. To the colonial authorities this catchall character seemed particularly dangerous; it was not the party ideology or international connections that distmbed them, but the PKl's potential as a de facto nationalist movement: Theory is kept in the background here, and attention is devoted to the

matters that concern the masses, their daily difBcu1ties and grievances. These, naturally. do not spring from a Communist world view; rather the concepts of the common people are expressed. And when the Communists make themselves the people's advocate they automatically sail in a nationalist current. If the authorities wish to measure the unrest in native society, the popular assemblies of the 5arekat Rakjat or Red 51 are of much more significance than the quasi-academic pronouncements of the superstructure." It also disturbed the PKI leadership, however, for the proletarian core of the party was so small and its cadres so ill disciplined ideologically that the movement was in danger of drowning in its own deviations. Moreover, its membership, consisting of the deeply disaffected elements that were all that remained of the politically active masses, adhered. to the party because they expected. it to produce radical action; particularly outside the urban centers, the Communist appeal aroused messianic expectations that were not amenable to urgings of patience and

188

The Bloc Above discipline. Local leaders, sharing their followers' emotions or fearing that inaction would lose them support. also pressed for action instead of ·organization. Even high in the party voices urged a program of "revolutionary political violence" in which the proletariat. descending on the enemy "like a whirlwind" would crush it and thus achieve Communism.o4 Concern for the consequences of undisciplined mass support had been expressed earlier by the European leaders of the party, hut the Indonesians had been absorbed in the struggle for the loyalty of the Sarekat Islam following. Attention had been paid to popularity. not to discipline; some "Communist courses" had been held in Semarang in 1920-1921 in order to improve theoretical and organizational knowledge, but this was the only obscrvable effort in this direction before 1923.o~ As long as the PKI was under the umbrella of the Sarekat Islam, it was not likely to be held responsible by the authorities for adventures unless the party itself was dirC
Rise

~f

Indonesian Communism

must not indulge in nationalist race hatred but seek representation in government bodies and spread the idea of the abolition of private property and the establishment of soviets, for if capitalism collapsed quickly in Europe, they might assume power directly and without violence. Above all. he concluded, the party must concentrate on the politica1 education of the Indonesian workers, for they were the inhcri· tors of the Indies future.81 Darsono's analysis reRected in part the sectarian view common, as the Comintem noted, to Asian Communists of that day: Our comrades in the colonies often err along the paths of left communism. Themselves educated by a literature which proclaims the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is only with the utmost difficulty that they can adapt themselves to combining the work of gathering together the young proletariat and the craftsmen of China, Corea, India and Egypt, against the foreign and native bourgeoisie, with the attempt to support the national emancipation movement of the young native bourgeoisie agaiJ?-st the capitalist center by which it is being suppressed: Decades will again have to pass before actual practice will be successful in combining the struggle for national emancipation among the colonial peoples with the proletarian revo-lution in Europe and America.1l8 This tendency to think in the tenns of European Marxism was evident in the new party constitution, which the March 1923 congress had ordered drawn Up.8' A revision of the PKI "action program, statement of purpose, and statutes was published in draft fonn in November 1923, and with minor alterations it was adopted by the June 1924 PKI congress. 10ll By all rights the Communist action program of 1924 should have diHered great1y from the one proclaimed in 1918 by European revolutionaries who expected the inuninent world overthrow of capitalism. In fact, however, the new program was almost startlingly the same. 10l It is Significant that the reason the party gave for having issued it was not that the old program had been too European but instead that it had been social..democratic rather than Communist; and indeed, the changes made were largely in the direction of the left.1M The new declaration of principles cried to explain the PKl standpoint in popu1ar tenns,toa but it did not water down those principles from the proletarian internationalism of the 1918 version. On the contrary, the PKI took pains to point out that it was interested in a class struggle and not a national one :

188

The Bloc Above The fact that there is a foreign regime in Indonesia-a diHerencc of nationality and religion-hides the economic conflict, which is a struggle between workers and capitalists. The oppression under which the native population groans makes it difficult or impossible for the native workers to see the cia$! struggle, which is the conffict between the working class and the capitalist class. The indignities to which the native population is subjected give the workers of this nationality the feeling that it is not economic op~essioll but natiollal oPIJfessioli which causes these wretched conditions. [Explanation of the proposition that the struggle is really economic and that only economic revolution will bring welfare to the people.] If this is the case, then it is not merely its own interests which force the Indonesian proletariat to awakCll to the struggle against capitalism, but it is also its desirc to achieve the independencc of Indonesia aud the welfare of the people which leads the Indonesian proletariat to oppose capitalism, even in its own country. In this struggle against capitalism the Indonesian proletariat will join hands with other groups of workers, without regard to nationality or religion. Therefore the effort of the proletariat here must be an international one, for this means the summoning of all the forces of the proletariat, of every religion and nationality.HH Neither in the new action program nor in the statutes and statement of purpose was the Sarekat Rakjat mentioned. Instead, a provision for "extraordinary membership" in the party was adapted from the statutes of 1918: Local associations may become extraordinary members of the Party while

continuing to maintain their own name; but to this name must be added the words Hwbstructure of the PKI" if this association is a political one and "PKI Cel" if it is of another naturc. Regional associations may also cnter the Party as extra<Jrdinary members if the Executive of the Party so allows. Such a request to become a member of the Party will be viewed as a collective request by all the members of the associations in question. H.owever, the entrance of the associations as members of the Party does not mean that their members become members of the Party. Associations which have become members of the Party are bound by the decisions of the Party, no matter what the nature of these decisions. These associations will still maintain fully the right to govern the internaJ arrangements of their groups themselves, as long as their decisions and activities are not in conOict with the principles of the Party, its action program, or the decisions which have been taken by the Party. If the Executive refuses to admit an association to extraordinary membership, that association may appeal to the Party's annual congress. This congress will then decide on the request.105

189

Rise of Indonesian Communism Into this framework the Sarekat Rakjat was fitted. Not only was it placed directly under the PKI, in the spirit of the March 1923 congress, but it joined the party; each SR branch was declared to be a PKI "member" and subject to party discipline. To ensure Communist control, the PKI also decided that the SR units, although each had only one vote, could never have more than one-third the total votes at a congress and that no SR could be established unless six PKI members (a party cell) resided in that locality.lDlI This last provision, had it been followed literally, would have practically eliminated the movement in the rural areas; in practice, a compromise was reached whereby the SR branches in the towns developed "subsections" in the surrounding villages, which worked under their guidance and thus under the indirect control of the nearest PKI unit. The reason for placing the SR in a close and subordinate relation to the party. Semaun later stated. was to ensure PKI domination of the mass organization and to prevent it from diluting the party's proletarian charactcr. 101 Doctrinaire leftism doubtless contributed to this insistence on overt and stringent control of the mass movement, but the policy was at the same time conservative, reflecting much the same sort of agonizing reappraisal that the Sarekat Islam leaders had undertaken after the Section B affair. Like the CSI, the Communist executive was feeling the unreliability of its mass support and pondering whether it would not be in the long run better to exist as a disCiplined and ideologically trained urban core rather than as a foCal point for general unrest. The mixed feelings the PKI central leadership had about its mass following resulted in great ambiguity in its popular approach during 1923--1924. Although the Red SI/SR membership was overwhelmingly nonproletarian, the PKI leadership centered its program myopically on the urban working class; although its mass following was strongly antiDutch. the Communist executive strenuously insisted that the party was intcmationalist and did not oppose the Netherlanders as such; although its adherents were at least nominally Muslim, the PKlleadership emphasized that it wl.ls nonreligiOUS. As a result, party pronouncements were very confused; what was said by the PKI executive and what was preached by the leaders in the hinterlands was often completely opposed. How much this acted as a brake on the expansion of PKI popular support is difficult to say, but it seems likely that its effect was consid-

190

The Bloc Above crable. The March 1923 decision to transform the Red SIs into the Sarckat Rakjat and place them directly under the party was received reluctantly. When the Semarang SI members were confronted with the proposal, they responded with dead silence, and their leaders decided it would be better not to put the matter to a vote ·right then.I08 It is reasonable to assume that if the SI branch traditionally identified intimately with the party was so hesitant, less closely associated units must have been even more so. Although the PKI congress had expressed the hope that the Red Sis would change their title, with its nationalist and religiOUS flavor, to Sarekat Rakjat, this did not generally happen in 1923, even in Semarang.l ~ Not until April 1924 was it announced that all Red SIs would adopt the new name, A statement of leaders from sixteen West Java Red SI and SR units declared that the leftist units would thereby distinguish themselves from the SI and proclaim their belief that religion was too noble to be involved in politics. The meeting gave little evidence of the ideological orthodoxy and self-control desired by the party. "Every state is a deception." Alimin reportedly declared. "'in every state there is oppression"; 110 and other speakers expressed equally bitter grievances against authority. Apparently, the question of adopting the Sarekat Rakjat title was still something of a hot issue, for it was discussed in closed session; the decision does not seem to have been generally carried out by the units of the mass organization until after it had been reiterated by the June 1924 party congress. In its efforts to give the movement a sense of proletarian discipline, the party leadership campaigned energetically during 1923-1924 to improve the ideological and organizational level of both PKI and SR branches. Courses in Marxist theory were given; indoctrination and propaganda were carried on by the Red SI schools, which had changed their name to Sekolah Rakjat (People's Schools) in April 1924,111 and by adult literacy courses. Tracts on the Communist program and principles were published, including the first Indonesian translation of the Communist Manifesto, and a campaign was begun to increase circulation of PKI-sponsored periodicals. 1I2 A Center for Revolutionary Propaganda (CORP) was established in Semarang under the chairmanship of Subakat, one of the party's chief theoreticians; it was to provide funds and direction for Communist propaganda and indoctrination, and it reportedly also established several schools.1I3 In addition, the party attempted to consolidate its publications, resolving to 191

Rise of Indonesian Communism concentrate on a few strong daily papers rather than on the plethora of financially (and ideologically) unstable provincial journals it then pos~ .sessed.1U Here, however, there seems to have been resistance from local Communist leaders, who wanted the prestige and propaganda opportunities of their own papers; despite reiteration of this decision by the June 1924 PKI congress, there was no visible reduction in the number of minor journals or increase in the central party organs. Sarekat Rakjat members were encouraged to improve their knowl~ edge to the point where they were able to join the party. The system for absorption into the PKI seems to have differed from place to place, but in the Semarang area it was reported that an SR member received a green card on first admission; this entitled him ·to participate in general activities but not to attend closed meetings. If investigations showed that he was not a spy or a troublemaker, be received a white card, which indicated that he was a fun member but not ideologicaUy trained. ]f he followed several indoctrination courses successfully, he was given a red card, which entitled him to be a leader or a propagandist.tu. An SR member could (at least in theory) join the PKI if (1) he was literate, (2) he had a sufficient knowledge of Communist doctrine, (3 ) he was sufficiently familiar with the organization, (4) he was completely trustworthy, (5 ) he would subject himself to party discipline without reservation, and (6) he was willing to carry on Communist propaganda workY' The necessity for discipline and indoctrination was also the theme of the PKI convention of June 7-10, 1924. 'This congress will not, like the previous ones, be concerned only with arousing the masses and winning their hearts, but must be one which will gather the revolutionary forces into an organization ruled by strict discipline," the party journal explained. -rhe time of agitation ruone, the time of making one's voice heard only through meetings and in newspapers, is now past, and the moment has come to form an organization." 1I1 The meeting was held in Batavia, at the Arab athletic club AI-Hambra at Pasar Senen; the actual number of delegates was quite small (seventy-six, from thirty~ two party branches), but its open sessions were heavi1y attended by the public and many stood outside to listen. It took the important steps of ratifying the new PKI program and statutes and electing a new executive; Winanta, a former mbtor official of the state railway line and a leader of the Communist movement in Bandung, became the party chainnan. 118 192

The Bloc Above This ninth congress voted to change the organization's name to its present one, Partai Komunis Indonesia, for with the party ~ipline debates "partai" had become the term for a tightly organized, independent political movement, and "Indonesia" was by then widely used as an anticolonial name for the Indies. In addition, the meeting decided to transfer party headquarters from its home in Semarang to the capital city of Batavia. The move, it was stated, would enable the party to taunt the colonial regime and the ISDP socialists in their stronghold. It probably also reflected the growing importance of the PKl strength in West Java and its difficulties in Central Java, where anests and rcstrictions of political activity in the wake of the VSTP strike and the bombings had had a severe impact on party activities. Since proximity to party headquarters aHected local activity and the inHuence of regional leaders on the central command, the move shifted further PKI sources of strcngth and weakened the Semarang-based leaders,H'i We might note in this connection that the PKI did not use the Soviet party system of Central Committee, Politburo, Secretariat, and so on, but maintained the Duteh fonns! the party was headed by a hoofdbestuur, or main executive, consisting of chainnan, vice-chainnan, secretary, treasurer, and commissioners (members) located in the headquarters city, together with members representing major units outside that city. Policy decisions were taken in the name of the Hoofdbestuur, which was the equivalent of a Central Committee and was sometimes referred to as such (for example, in correspondence with the Conlintern ). Day-to-day affairs were offiCially handled by a dageli;ks bcstllur (executive in charge of routine administration), which consisted of the main executive members in the headquarters city. Actually, however, ultimate control lay with the party branch of the center city, which was empowered to place candidates for office before the congresses and to lead the party in "extraordinary circumstances." Members of the DageIijks bestuur were almost invariably also· officers of this branch executive. Because of its leading role, and because it was easier for leaders in or near the headquarters city to attend party conclaves, the central branch effectively dominated the PKI machine. The machine itself was a very imperfect one, however: because the party organization was more dependent on leaders than the leaders were on it, the central branch could not generally impose its will over strong objections from powerful outlying units. As PKI activities outside Semarang became

]93

Rise of Indonesian Communism more important, the relative power of the leading branch declined. The move ,to Batavia facilitated this process because, although party activity in West Java was of growing importance, the recently revived Batavia branch was not yet a significant organization nor was Batavia the site of major PKI unions. Conversely, the Semarang branch, though greatly weakened by reverses, remained an important center of PKI activity, particularly in the Jabor field; it continued to put out the principal PKI publications and remained the headquarters of a number of the most powerful party leaders. ExpanSion of the PKI thus implicitly threatened central control of the party. At the June 1924 congress, the keynote speech was made by Darsana. "Lengthy and vigorous applause resounds as he enters," the government rapporteur recounted; "his appearance is modest and polite; he has the pleasant manner of the cultured Javanese. His large glasses give him the appearance of a scholar, and indeed mucb of what he says smacks of the study lamp." 120 His main themes were discipline, internationalism, and proletarianism. A party without discipline, he declared. is a wall without cement, a machine without screws; but with discipline even a small party can, like the Bolsheviks in Russia, achieve great victories. The PKI must be intcrnational and must not forget that the Dutch workers arc its great allies. The party must not forget that the trade unions arc its basis, but at the same time it must also increase its work among the youth. the women, the peasants. the intellectuals, the Chinese minority, and the Indonesian members of the armed forces and police. It must especially endeavor to increase the social consciousness of the peasantry. The vi1lagers only know that they must pay more taxes and that taxes go to the Dutch; therefore, they view the Dutch as their enemy. They must be taught through the Sarekat Rakjat that it is international capitalism and not just the Dutch that is at fault. The party must concentrate on organization and not on agitation; its leaders must avoid giving provocation for arrest, and cadres must be trained to make up for losses through imprisonment. Terrorism must be rejected, for the revolution will come when the time is ripe; premature action wi1l not serve the cause. "Our party desires to make easy the birth of the Communist era," Darsono concluded. "He who wishes peace must prepare himself for war, so that his opponent gives in from fear." I!!l Other speakers emphasized the same themes. Aliarcham discussed the failure of the nationalist movement and predicted that Tjokroa-

194

The Bloc Above minoto's national-religious effort would also fail, for it served the Indonesian petty capitalists, who could not possibly survive the competition 'o f foreign big capital. Only the PKI would endure, for it alone was organized about the economic struggle. Soviet Russia and Turkey must be Indonesia's examples, he declared, and the congress cheered, Subakat urged the party to become strong enough to demand a parliament elected by universal suffrage. Unlike the March 1923 meeting, the congress did not view this issue as a basis for cooperation with other parties: the speakers had only harsh words for the Sarekat Islam, the ISDP, and Burn Utomo. Instead, it was argued, the plank was a useful first step toward the establishment of soviets, which, in the spirit of the new action program, were envisioned at village, factory, district, prOVincial, and island levels, under the command of a central soviet. At the June congress, outgoing party secretary Sukendar presented an important set of theses (drawn up, it has been claimed, by Tan Malaka) I Z!! analyzing the nature of the Indonesian revolution and outlining the tasks of the party. In Indonesia, he declared, the revolution would be proletarian, for "the absence of a real national bourgeoisie precludes any successful effort by nationalist parties." 128 The PKl must rely on the urban working class, the only objectively revolutionary group. The petty and part of the great bourgeoisie were subjectively revolutionary in the colonial situation, but they were not reliable and should not he taken into the party: A Communist party like that in Indonesia must bear in mind that not all revolutionaries be<.-ome Communists. The millions of Indonesian semiproletarians (on the sugar plantations) , poor peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, craftsmen, and merchants arc all economically oppressed: a great part of them are revolutionary, but only subjectively so--only in their minds. Their ambition is that their small fortune may become a large one, or that from being a small capitalist they may become a big capitalist. 121 The PKI must therefore kecp itself purcly proletarian; it did not matter if the party were small as lQ,ng as it had the masses behind it. The subjectively revolutionary groups should be in an organization subordinate to the party, like the SR. The PKI should instruct and organize them, not in order to make them party members but to secure their sympathy for the revolutionary cause. In doing so, the party should bear in mind that after the imperialists were defeated, the petty bourgeois elements would cease to be revolutionary and that the Communists must then be in a position to neutralize them. 195

Rise of Indonesian Communism The PKI, Sukendar continued, must also improve its connections with other Communist parties, and especially with the Comintern. Perhaps, too, the party could form a union with other colonial revolutionary movements, for if the peoples of the subject areas differed in many respects, they were alll!Jlti-imperialist: It must aim at establishing cormections with the revolutionary nationalists and workers of the East (with nationalists from Africa, India. the Philippines, and China, and with a1l the workers of Asia and Africa ). The best single orientation for such cooperation is an '"anti-Imperialist union," a revolutionary front of the peoples of the East against the imperialists of other continents_I :~

At the same time, the PKI should not forget that it must struggle against the Asian bourgcoisie as soon as the imperialists were .defeated. In conclusion Sukendar said that "the duty of the PKI at present is not just to make propaganda but, especially by its organization and tactics. to arouse and assemble the revolutionary forces of Indonesia, to instruct them, and to lead them by its tactics and strategy to victory. If it can become strongly united, then it will make itself a valued section of the International" 1%& In the months after the Batavia congress, the PKI worked energetically to develop the Sarekat Rakjat. Increased vigor was shown, especially among the SRs of West Java and the Outer Islands. Efforts were made to increase the number of women participants in the movement; the congress devoted a special session to this project, and a Youth Front (Barisan Muda) was established to recruit ,and indoctrinate younger members of the movement. The People's School system continued to expand in the face of interference by the authorities.l21 Yet in spite of the party's successes, a number of PKI leaders had growing doubts. Was it wise to have tied their still small and poorly disciplined party-less than 1,000 members, ~ot aU of whom paid their dues 1~8_ so closely to the non-Communist masses? Was it -wise to devote so much energy to the nonproletarian elements, which in spite of the best party eHorts gave litt1e hope of becoming disciplined, faithful, or patient? Was it wise to have committed the PKI to a project which was necessarily public and which necessarily drew government attention to the Communist threat? Did not the sharp increase in government interference in 1924 and the subsequent decline in popular participation in SR activities lZ9 suggest that the effort with the mass organization

196

TIle Bloc Abolle

might be like that of a squirrel on a tread wheel 1 One who thought these fears justified was Aliarcham, the PKl executive member for Semarang; and in mid-1924, with the imprisonment of Winanta, he

became the party chairman.

197

IX

International Relations THUS far we have discussed the ties that bound the PKl to th~ international Communist movement only as they affected general policy, and not in regard to day-to-day communications, However, we "have now reached the point at which the PKI became involved in a serious conflict with the Comintcm, and in order to understand the course of that conBict, it is necessary to consider in greater detail the paths by which the International and the PKI were. infonned of cach other's dOings. The description here, because of the secret nature of most of these communication routes, can be no more than a bare sketch, but it may provide an impression of the major chan~els used and the problems involved. In the period with which we are dealing, China was the major focus of the Comintern in Asia; India was given consideration as a potential source of revolution on the Soviet periphery and as a traditional object of Russian diplomacy, but the Southeast Asian lands were too much on the perimeter of Soviet interest and knowledge to be important in the International's calculations. Nonetheless, the USSR and the Comintern made what were under the circumstances rather extensive cHorts to improve their knowledge of and contact with the distant Indonesian movement. Indonesia's colonial status and Soviet Russia's political isolation made direct contact between the two countries imposSible. The only effort that appears to have been made in this direction was an attempt in 1924 by an official of Centrosoiuz, the Soviet trading agency, to visit Java in order to make arrangements for the purchase of tea, sugar, and other products. The British authorities seem to have thought that he was interested in trade and not inbigue, for he was granted visas for the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, and India; tlle Dutch consulate~generaI in Shanghai, after conferring with Netherlands representatives in Peking, similarly approved his projected visit to the Indies. The visa was

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lntemational Relations withdrawn on the order of Governor General Fode, however, who argued that it would set a precedent leading to the establishment of a Centrosoiuz office in the colony; this he feared for political reasons.l In spite of various rumors of Bolshevik infiltration, circulated chiefly by the Dutch-language press, there is no indication that any clandestine foreign emissaries actually arrived in the Indies.!! In the absence of any direct link with the Indies, Moscow ,depended for knowledge of the movement there on inionnation supplied it by its Indonesian and Dutch associates. These were neither unbiased nor in agreement, and the Comintern possessed no knowledgeable and reliable Indies specialists who could sift through the partisan claims. The Bolshevik leaders were themselves conscious of the disadvantages of relying on foreign Communists for infonnation on contemporary nonSoviet Asian affairs; in December 1920 the Russian government established a Marxist center for research on Asia, the All-Russian (later AllUnion) Scientific Association for Oriental Studies. This project had been pressed by the Academy of the General Staff and Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities; the association's work was supervised by the Commissariat, and its first head was Mikhail Pavlovich (S. Vel'tman ), who also directed the Council for Action and Propaganda for the Peoples of the East, set up by the Baku congress. However, such were the demands of the Russian domestic situation and the difficulties of mobiliZing a politically acceptable body of Asia experts that it was January 1922 before the organization actually came into being.3 The tasks confronting the association were immense, and the products of the Brst generation of Communist Asia specialists wcre admittedly often of slight use.4 Southeast Asia presented a particu1arly knotty problem because of its colonial inaccessibility and because Tsarist Russia had had no real interest in it. Consequently, Soviet expertise on the area built up very slowly and was probably of no particular aid to Soviet or Comintem policymakers in the period we are dealing with. Other institutes were established to provide the Russians with a knowledge of the contemporary East; they included the School of Asian Studies of the Red Army Workers' and Peasants' Military Academy in Moscow, the Military College for Asian Studies in Tashkent, the Institute of Living Asian Languages in Petrograd, and a number of other specialized organizations.1S These, however, were primarily concerned with Soviet Asia or the countries on Soviet Russia's borders and

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Rise of Indonesian Communism not with Southeast Asia. Of greater importance for the distant colonies were the "universities" established during the 19205 to train Asians for work in the Communist movements in their own countries, for they provided both a point of contact with colonial revolutionaries and an opportunity to train a politically reliable corps of Communist leaders. The establishment of these schools was first publicly suggested by Sneevliet, who put the ma.tter before the second Comintem congress in

1920, I propose that the Communist International give to the leaders from the Far East the opportunity of living here for half a year and attending several Communist courses in order that they will be able to understand correctly what is taking place here and will be able to carry out the principles of the theses [the second congress passed on the colonial question], so that they will be able to create a Soviet organization and to carry on Communist work in the colonies. B

The most prominent of these institutions was the Communist University of the Toilers of the Far East (KUTV), established by a Soviet government decree of April 1921 and at first attached to the Commissariat of Nationalities. The university was set up in Moscow, with branch faculties in Irkutsk, Baku, and Tashkent; in July 1922 it counted 700 students of fifty-seven nationalities. The elaborate course of lectures and fleld work in Soviet Asia was scheduled to consume four or five years of the students' timo-no small period for Asian Communist movements short on leadership of any caliber.1 A few years after the founding of the KUTV, two otber major centers for training Asian party members were established: one was Sun Yat-sen University (later called the Communist University of the Toilers of China), which was set up in Moscow in September 1925 and began courses two months later; 8 the other was the International Lenin University, which was ordered by the March 1925' ECCI plenum and began sessions during 1928 in Moscow.' From the ECCI report on its efforts to establish the last-named school we can see some of the difficulties that surrounded the setting up of such institutions. In the first place, there was the question of housing for the school and its students, a critical problem in Russia at that time. Another major difficulty was an adequate teaching force, which, after half a year the ECCI still had not found. This was quite understandable: the ledurers had to be politically reliable, know their ·200

Inter1Wiional Relations Marx and Lenin well, and give classes in three languages (French, English, and Cerman).l0 In Soviet Russia of the 1920s these quali6cations were rare enough to assure their owner generally of higher status than teacher in a school for propagandists. A third task was to find qualified students, and so far as Indonesia was concerned this was a practically insoluble problem. Both the International Lenin School and Sun Yat-sen University requested, through ~he ECCI. that Communist parties abroad do what they could to provide students. I I On August 25, 1925, the Comintern executive wrote the PKI requesting that it dispatch students for Sun Yat-sen University; it was most important, the letter pointed out, that Asian Communists be trained at that institution, and six or seven more candidates could be placerl. 12 The response was hardly enthusiastic, however; the party replied that it cost too much money for the PKI to send students there and it was unaware of any private individual who could afford it. 13 Financial difficulties did not keep aU Indonesians from attending the Soviet training schools, for Semaun, who was then PKI representative in Holland, sent about half a dozen students. They were. however. mostly seamen from the ships that plied between the Netherlands and the Indies; their revolutionary spirits were high but their educational level was not, and they had almost no knowledge of the languages in which the sehools were run. The result was something less than success; one student left after only SL,,{ months, a few returned to Indonesia only to be arrested, and the rest never got in touch with the Comintern or the PKI after their return to the Indies. 14 The names of some of these early trainees-Kamu, Johannes Wawornntu, and Clemens \Ventuk-are known to us because they were arrested. after they returned to the Indies.u They were all from northern Celebes. Only Waworuntu, who had been a figure of some standing in the movement since its ISDV days/6 was prominent in Indonesian Communist circles before his Moscow experience. In announcing the internment of Wawornntu and Wentuk, the government claimed that the two seamen had left their ship in Rotterdam in 1924 and. through the mediation of Semaun, were sent to the KUTV in Moscow, where they remained for two and one-half years. When in 1927 they were considered sufficiently trained (and when the Camintern was beginning efforts to revive the Indonesian Communist movement) they were sent, with advice and money from Semaun, to Vladivostok and thence to Indonesia, where they arrived in early 1928. The 2IJ1

Rise of Indonesian Communism government claimed to have been aware of their activities after their arrival and to have intercepted some of their reports on .the Indies situation to Semaun in the USSR; they were alleged to have communicated through messages given to Indonesian seamen and via addresses in Shanghai and Berlin.l1 Another of Semaun's students achieved notoriety in 1928 at the sixth Comintem congress; much to the emharrassment of the other Indonesian representatives, he attacked Bukharin's presentation of the colonial theses and defended the left-wing position on cooperation with Asian bourgeois nationalists.18 Alimin and Musso attended the Lenin school for several years after their return to Russia in 1927; 18 and the PKI leader Mohammed Ali, who escaped the mass arrests that followed the 1926-1927 revolutionary attempt hy Seeing to Singapore, was reportedly sent to Moscow by Suba1cat and other Indonesian Communists then stationed across the Straits. After training in Soviet Russia, it was claimed, he returned to Singapore, where he was arrested in 1930 together with Djamaluddin Tamin and other members of the Indonesian Communist group in that city.20 As we have seen, none of these students of revolution finished his training in the period with which we are concerned, and their training thus belongs to our story only peripherally.21 None of the major early leaders with international experience-Tan Malaka, Darsono, and Semaun-attended such fonnal training courses, though they all spent some time in Moscow.2:! Distance and the mutual isolation of Indonesia and the Comintem center lent particular importance to the international contact points established outside Moscow. The 6rst attempt we know of to establish such a headquarters for Asia was the founding of the Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East by the Baku Congress of 1920. We have already described this organization and noted that it was generally ineffective: moreover, its areas of concern in the Far East were the regions on Russia's borders--China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan-and not the distant countries to the south. Similarly, offices set up about this time in Irkutsk and V1amvostok to deal with the Soviet and non-Soviet Far East 23 directed their attention chieSy to the easily available north. It was not until Soviet interest in Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement brought Comintern agents to southern China that the International established an office within practical communicating distance of Indonesia. The Comintern's South China office was set up in Canton

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Intemational Relations and later, when the Kuomintang forc es captured the city~ in Shanghai; since Sneevliet was its 6rst director, it was assured that that bureau would do its best to contact the Indies. There seems to have been fairly steady contact between Shanghai and Indonesia during Sneevliet's administration (steady, that is, in comparison with PKI contact with the international Communist world at other times). Copies of the major Indonesian Communist newspapers were apparently sent to him by the Indonesian Communists, and articles by the former ISDV leader occaSionally appeared in Het Vriie Woord or Soeara Ra';at. According to the Netherlands Indies government, the Shanghai office regularly sent letters and Communist reading material to the PKI and its affiliates. Bergsma, Dekker, Mohammad Kasan, Darsono, Najoan, Semaun, and Tan Malaka were said to have corresponded with Sneevliet; and Subakat, Najoan, Darsono, and Semaun reportedly met with him in Shanghai. 24 Sneevliet, however, was transferred to the Comintern Vladivostok office in January 1923, perhaps because his views on the Chinese policy of the Comintern were beginning to deviate from those of the InternationaJ.2~ From then on, he seems to have been out of touch with the movement in Indonesia, Toward the end of the year he resigned his Comintem position 26 and returned to Moscow, We have only a few scraps of information on his activities in the Soviet capital; they indicate he was busy renewing his position as an authority on Indonesia and establishing new means to contact the PKI. On F ebruary 23, 1924, he addressed the Scientific Association for Oriental Studies on "The Economic and Political Significance of Indonesia"; 27 and he suggested to the Eastern Section of the Comintem that an office for Indonesian affairs be set up in the Netherlands under the direction of CommuniSts there who were acquainted with the Indies situation. This proposal was: accepted; when Sneevliet returned to Holland a few months later, he resumed his work with the Indonesian Communist movement, though now in a new and less felicitous capacity, Meanwhile, the Netherlands Indies govenment had been tightening its restrictions on correspondence and published materials from Communists abroad, Before May 30, 1922, the exchange of correspondence and publications seems to have met no major restrictions, although there were complaints that letters had been opened and delayed. Sinor Hindia, Soeara Ra'iat, and Het Vri;e Woord received exchange numbers of International Press Correspondence, but on May 30, 1922, 20J

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Indonesian- Communism copies of the Comintem newspaper belonging to Sinar Hindia were confiscated by the customs authorities. At the same time restrictions on correspondence were sharply inreaseil,l!8 After this it became more and more difficult for the PKI to communicate legally with the outside world, although contact with the party in Holland was not so severely limited as communication with the Comintem or other contact points outside the Dutch sphere. The government also took steps to remove the last Dutch Communists from the Indies. Harry Dekker, a railway employee who had taken over the VSTP during Semaun's Russian sojourn, was sent back to Holland by his finn, on the government's urging, in 1922. In June 1923 Sneevliet's wife, who had been teaching in the Semarang SI school and whose correspondence with her husband in Shanghai was viewed by the authorities as a probable source of international contact, was ordered to leave the Indies. Shortly thereafter VSTP member and fonner party treasurer Van Koordenoordt was transferred home, and in this fashion the last active Dutch Communists were removed from the Indies by the "end of 1923.2' The government, Soearo Ro';at charged, was trying to divorce the Indonesian Communists from their European brothers by this action. Whether the party actually thought their departure an entirely· bad thing is questionable, however; as Darsono later remarked to the Comintern, the departure of the Netherlanders had its advantages: "The very fact that the leadership of the Party was in the hands of native comrades still further raised the prestige of the Party in the eyes of the masses, for we must not forget that in a colonial country like Indonesia, the masses are somewhat prejudiced against the Dutch comrades." 110 In spite of the narrowing opportunity for legal communications and for contact via Holland and the Dutch PKl members, the ECCI reported to the 1924 Comintem congress that the link between the PKI and the International's Eastern Section had been greatly strengthened during the preceding year.S! It is possible that this improvement was due to efforts by Voitinslcy, Sneevliet's successor as director of the Shanghai office, but his energies seem to have been almost wholly absorbed by the events in China and there is no indication that he devoted any particular attention to Southeast Asia. It seems more likely that the progress was due to the opening up of other channels of oommunication, one of which ran via the exiled PKI leader Tan Malaka .

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International Relations Banished from thc Indies. in March 1922, Tan ~·..Ialaka had gone to ·HoUand. He promptly became involved in Dutch politics, for the CPH named him one of its parliamentary candidates in the 1922 general elections. He also made his first contact with the International, for in June 1922 the ECCI organized a meeting of prominent European Communists in Amsterdam to protest the socialist-sponsored Hague Peace Conference. A good many of the expected participants could not come; Malaka was the only Asian present, although India's M. N. Roy sent greetings. The Indonesian delegate made a speech stressing the importance of the revolutionary East, but the gathering does not seem to have had further importance for Asia. 32 From Holland Tan Malaka went to Berlin, where he joined Darsono for a few months at the Comintern's West European secretariat, and then to Moscow to represent Indonesia at the fourth Comintern congress. Although Malaka's role at the Comintern meeting hardly showed him as an unquestioning servant of the party line, the International leaders resolved to make further use of him. Malaka remained in Moscow for approximately a year. He recounted later that he was given a large room in a fonner hotel and told to sit down and write a book that would give the Comintern a picture of the Indonesian situation; that is, he was to provide the facts and the Russians would fill in the analySis.u The January 1923 issue of the ProSntern journal listed Tan Malaka and Semaun as the pennanent Indonesian correspondents of the RlLU, and in June Malaka took an active part in the ECCI plenary session as Indonesia's representative, It would thus appear that at or shortly after the fourth Comintern congress he was given a position of some responSibility regarding Indonesia for the International. This, in any event, would explain an otherwise puzzling passage in a letter 'written by Bergsma to Semaun in February 1923: I know that they recently elected Jep; I was strongly against this and even had a Bght with the others, but you know how it goes: if someone at such a congress fills the whole congress with speeches. the delegates are so gratcful that they reward the speaker with a position in the executive. I hope you haven't let this bother you. On the contrary, as a good Communist you will do what the interest of the working class demands. and that is naturally to see that the PKI does not die out.3 ' From another letter it appears that Bergsma was in Moscow about the time of the Comintcrn congress and that "Jep" was Tan Malaka. M 205

Rise 0/ Indonesian Communism Bergsma's remarks indicate that he and Semaun were less than enchanted with their erstwhile protege; perhaps they thought that Malaka, haVing risen far and fast in the movement, had gotten somewhat too big for his boots. In mid-1923 (thus about the time of the ECCI session he attended), Tan Malaka later claimed, the Comintem named him its supervisor for Indonesia, Bunna, Thailand, Malaya. Vietnam, and the Philippines, with charge over such Communist movements as existed or could be founded in those countries.31 This assertion has been a subject of considerable argument, not only because Malaka himself later became a controversial figure in the Indonesian Communist world, but also because his status in relation to the Comintern was an important factor in the PKI deviation of 1924-1926. The substance of this quarrel is not so much his claim of baving held a post for the International in Southeast Asia-it seems fairly clear that he did act as Comintem representative in that area 31-as his description of the extent of his authority. Malaka claimed that he had the right to veto policies of the Communist movements under his charge when necessary.38 The possession of this power by a Comintem representative was by no means unique. The Dutch Communist leader Van Ravesteyn held it with regard to at least some of the Indonesian party's activities; he exercised this right through the Netherlands bureau of the PKI, which seems to have had roughly the same relationship to the Indonesian party as did Tan Malaka's office in Canton. On the other hand, the PKl leader Alimin asserted that MaIaka had received no such mandate from the ECCI and that, if he had been granted any such power. it had been given without central authorization by the International's representatives to the PaciSc Transport Workers Conference of June 1924: Tan Malaka ... feels insulted because we ~Musso and Alimin-went to the Far Country [the Soviet Union] without his knowledge. In the Far Country we were able to learn just what his rank and authority meant. People who know the policies of that country will be "surprised" to hear such effusive self-praise and advertisement. Perhaps the writer of the "Thesis" [the pamphlet in which Tan Malaka announced his Comintem role] is still thinking of comrades like O. Hell . . . [Leo Heller, the chief rrofintern worker in the Far East] and M. Voit •.. [C. VoitinskyJ. who worked for some time as regular officials in the Paciflc. These two people did not work in the Main Office [the ECCI?], but only helped with work within the labor movement. They were people of the Prof ... [Prolintem?J . Per-

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Intenwtional Relations haps it was these two arrogant officials, who did not have the right to decide anything, who gave the "mandate," who gave the "authority," who gave the "great power" to Tan Malaka. Those two propagandists afterward were PWlished because of their defense of the anti-Soviet movement of the Trotskyists. People who are honest and Wlderstand the work of a propagandist are not people who claim "importance" and "authority"; they would never advertise themselves or publicly claim connection with the Main Office. Ordinarily, a person who really works for the good of the working class, not looking for notoriety and admiration or seeking to be "in the limelight," would never disclose secrets regarding the method of underground work. We know what the Main Office means in the eyes of the imperialists.SII Alimin had very good reason to deny Malaka's authority over the PKI, and he is patently unfair in his description of the roles of HeUer and Voitinsky in this period; and so we should look on his denunciation with considerable reserve. However, Semaun bas also claimed that Malaka's pOsition for the Comintem in Southeast Asia involved propagandizing, organizing, and advising but did not include a veto right; to Semaun was in a position to know through his membership in the ECCI and when he prOVided this information was generally sympathetic to the Murba Party group, which consists of Tan Malaka's spiritual heirs. According to Semaun, Malaka was not authorized to use Comintem discipline to bring a party into line except with specific orders from Moscow. However, because of the increasing difficulty of communications between his office, the Southeast Asian movements, and the Comintem headquarters, he began to exercise this power without first obtaining directives from Moscow, a process that eventually ended in his establishing a heretical Southeast Asian Commullist organization. Veto right or no veto right, Malaka set off for China and arrived in Canton, aecording to his recollection, in December 1923. He claimed that shortly after his arrival he was introduced to Sun Yat-sen by Tan Ping-shan, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, in a m~eting held in Sun's house on the Pearl River; others present were Sun Fa, Liao Chung-kai, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei. In their conversation, Sun suggested that Tan Malaka might find the Japhnese useful allies in his work. Malaka claims to have found this unthinkable, since as a Communist he was as much opposed to Japanese imperialism as to that of the West (a scruple, I might add, that Malaka's critics have said he did not always entertain).4l Canton remained Tan Malaka's base of 2fJ1

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operations for over a year, and from it he made occasional expeditions to Southeast Asia on International business. In June 1924 he attended the Pacific Transport Workers Conference, which the Comintem and Profintern had organized in Canton to improve connections with the Far Eastern labor movements. The international organizations were represented there by Voitinsky and Heller; Malaka identifies them in his autobiography as a Comintem representative with whom he was connected at that time and a Pro6ntern agent whom he had known well in Moscow and with whom he was to be associated in the future. 42 According to Tan Malab. they approached him as soon as he arrived and informed him that the International had decided to establish· a Red Eastern Labor Bureau in Canton to maintain contact with the workers' movements in the Far East and to be connected directly with them and with Moscow; Tan Malaka was to he its head. n The work of the bureau, as Heller later described it, was to be carried out with the aid of a secretariat of representatives from Indochina, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Japan; it was to publish a bulletin in English and Chinese to guide the transport workers of these countries and keep them in touch with the revolutionary movement in the West. The secretaries were to translate these bulletins into the languages of their countries and arrange for printing and distribution at home. In addition, "seamen's clubs" were to be organized under the sponsorship of the Canton office in the major port cities of the Pacific, beginning with Hong Kong, Manila, and Batavia. These clubs, Heller noted, were to improve contact between the Pr06ntem and the Asian Communist movements. They would playa vital role in the International's activities, since improved communications were necessary if the Comintern program for the East was to be carried out. "It must be confessed on this occasion," HeUer added, "that the revolutionary trade union movement has not had a satisfactory. practical effect among the workers in the colonies; and the majority of the decisions taken at our congresses have remained on paper." 44 This may have been the International's blueprint for the bureau, but according to Tan }..{alaka the Canton office did not work this way in practice. Although he later became auent in Cantonese and lived for years in China, Malaka was a 6sh miserably out of water during his Grst sojourn in that country. He found the climate wretched and the food worse (his ignorance of the language restricted him to taking his

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International Relations meals at a Chinese-American restaurant, which provided a legible menu, if not an edible dinner ). Malaka's main function as the labor office head and only member resident in Canton was to publish an organ of advice and encouragement to Far Eastern labor movements, The DoW1l. This journal was supposed to appear in English, and Malaka was handicapped in his function as editor, publisher, and sale correspondent because he knew only the barest rudiments of that language. However, he reasoned that he had picked up enough German in two or three months in Berlin to enable him to communicate at Comintern meetings, and he ought to be able to do the same with English. He sat down with a grammar, only to discover that learning German in Germany with a Huent knowledge of Dutch was most different from learning English from a book in China. He tried to get a coworker to help with the Chinese and English aspects of the job; but when he finally found an assistant, he vanished within two days, snatched up by a better-paying revolutionary organization. Malaka finally settled unhappily for the fruits of his own study of Basic English; hut when he produced a few articles in that version of the language he was faced with the problem of getting it printed. With the help of the Canton CCP he eventually located the only printery in the city willing to handle the job. The first issue came out but was unreadable. The words, in Tan Malaka's description, swayed across the page like the tracks of a broken-down cart; the printer, not having enough type, had substituted capitals and then signs for missing letters, and finally, be· fore half the issue was set, he had given up entirely. Malaka was in despair; months had gone by, and the journal had not yet appeared. What would the International say? 4~ On top of his journalistic tribulations, Malaka became seriously ill and began to thipk of returning home. By his account, sickness was not his only reason: he also wished to renew his work with the PKI, and Canton was too distant a base from which to maintain contact with the Southeast Asian countries. He wrote the PKl for its opinion on an attempt to return, and the party replied that there was no harm in ,trying.41 On August 29, 1924, he accordingly sent the Governor General a request to be allowed a return to Indonesia for reasons of health. He asked permission to settle in Java; he was willing if necessary to promise not to engage in political activity. but he assured Fock that he was as fervent a Communist as before and a!ked the government to send its reply via PKI headquarters,47 Both the Dutch and Indonesian 209

Rise of Indonesian Communism Communists agitated for Malaka's retwn, the CPH sponsoring a mass meeting on his behalf at which the main speakers were Semaun and Harry Dekker,is but the Govemor General refused. to allow him to come back except under conditions that amounted to banishment.". On April 16, 1925, Tan Malaka gave up the effort and wrote the Governor General an indignant letter withdraWing his request. lIO Shortly after, Malaka relates, he determined to re-enter the Indies iUegally. He jowneyed south as a stowaway, but soon after he had reached a place in Southeast Asia from which he intended to embark for Indonesia, he received word from Canton to return immediately to consult with a Profintern representative ncwly arrived from Moscow. Two weeks later Malaka was back in Canton, only to find that the man he was supposed to sec had been called back to Moscow himself. Exhausted, ill, and undoubtedly enormously irritated, Malaka abandoned the Canton office in June 1925 and went to the Philippines to recuperate. u While in the Philippines, Tan Malaka seems to have had considerable contact with nationalist leaders. It has been said that he was instrumental in setting up the Communist Party of the Philippines, though this is questionable. 62 As for his contact with the PKI, it seems to have been quite regular while he was in Canton and Manila. According to Malah, Aliarcham wrote him a report oncc a week until his arrest in early 1925; ~3 he also received visits from PKI members, among them Mohammad Sanusi and A1imin.t t Since shipping connections between Java, Canton, and Manila were good and there were always Indonesian sailors who were willing to help smuggle messages, the problem of communications was not too great. On the other hand, distance meant delay and also inability to influence people directly, a drawback of major proportions when dealing with a party whose. decisions were arrived at emotionally at least as much as through calculation. As we shall see, Tan Malaka, though he exercised a very considerable influence on the PKI, could not detennine party policy in a contest of wills with the PKI leaders on Java. Tan Malaka's Far Eastern activities were not carried out under the aegis of the Comintem alone; he was equally responsible in his work to the Profintern, or Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). This federation of Communist-oriented trade unions was officially founded in 1921, but plans for establishing it had been announced the year before; M thus it happened that the matter of joining the organization 210

Ihterrnltiornll Relations was Srst brought up in the Indonesian labor movement at the VSTP congress of December 1920. What was decided at that meeting is something of a puzzle. Semaun reported that the VSTP decided to affiliate to the "Third International" thus presumably to the nascent ProSntern. Other accounts, however, maintained that the congress del. egates balked in spite of pleas by Semaun and Bergsma ~at the rail· way union to declare itself in favor of joining the labor international; after a stalemate that was said to have lasted two days, the meeting was still so divided that the whole matter was dropped. ~6 Inasmuch as the VSTP did not join the Pro6ntern during 1921 and did so eventually under rather unclear circumstances, it seems likely that the congress showed no great enthusiasm for affiliating. Since the VSTP fonned the most solidly Communist section of the Indonesian labor movement and its meeting was held immediately after the PKl congress that decided to affiliate with the Comintem, such hesitation is of considerable interest. We will recaU that there appear to have been objections made at the party congress to joining the International; the VSTP reaction, if it was as negative as described, might indicate that the PKI leaders pushed through their project only by a relatively narrow margin. Indonesian contact with the Profintern, once it had been officially founded. started off in an equally left·footed manner: a representative from Java to the founding congress of July 1921 seems never to have shown up.6i Shortly thereafter. however. Indonesian relations with the Pro6ntem assumed a more solid character. In mid-I921, we will reo member. the PPKB broke up. and Semarang adherents formed their own revolutionary labor federation. In October the executive of the RVC announced to the Pronntern its decision to afii.liate with the RILU (although the declaration rather elaborately remarked that it had been considered better not to hold a congress to confirm this move ). To the Executive Bureau of the Pronntem Semarang, Octpber 3, 1921 At the session of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Labor Federation we have decided to affiliate ourselves with the Pronntem. We remark here that in connection with the reaction which at present holds sway in the Dutch East Indies it is out of the question to place this question on the agenda of a congress, since we would run the danger that the courts would dissolve our Revolutionary Labor Federation or take even stronger measures of reprisal. 211

Rise of Indonesian Communism In connection with the above·mentioned circumstances we hope that the declaration of our affiliation will be regarded as completely suillcient and that we will receive a favorable reply from the Executive bureau regarding our affiliation. We likewise hope to be able to take further part in the leadership of the Profintem in the future . . With comradely greetings The Executive Committ~ of the Revolutionary Labor Federation G8

The Profintem reported in April 1922 that it was successfully main· taining contact with the Indonesian labor movement. and it also noted that a representative of the Rve (probably Semaun. who had just attended the FirSt Congress of the Toilers of the Far East) had taken part in the February 1922 plenary session of the Pro6ntem executive. GII The RVC. however, was dissolved in September 1922. when the Communist and non·Communist unions allied in the PVH. In its stead. the VSTP entered the Pr06ntem as Indonesia's representative. There is some question as to when it did so. however. Some sources (including the Netherlands Indies government and the present chairman of the PKI) state that it joined in March 1923.00 but the labor international itself declared that in 1922 the VSTP announced its afEliation and its intention to participate in a11 future Pro6ntcm congresscs,81 Indonesia was. in fact, represented at the second (November 1922 ) Pro6ntern conven· tion by Tan Malaka, who attended the concurrent fourth Comintem congress, It is unclear. however. whether he acted as a delegate of the VSTP, the PVH (which did not belong to the Profintem but whose mandate he had to represent it "in Europe"), or the Indonesian work· ers in general. H the VSTP executive did affiliate in 1922. it must have done so without polling its membership, for no congress had been held by the union since its eleventh convention of December 1920. The report of that meeting was distributed to the VSTP branches in November 1921 for discussion and for consideration at the twelfth congress.G2 which would normally have been held in December together with the PKI convention, The congress did not take place, however, until February 1923. Dissension over domestic issues and the decline in morale during Semaun's absence may have determined this departure from the VSTP tradition of yearly meetings. It is poSSible, however, that continuing disagreement over the Profintern issue, still hanging fire from the 1920 meeting, influenced the decision to postpone the twelfth congress, If 212

IntenUltional Relations this were still a delicate issue within the union, it would explain the discrepancy in dates of VSTP affiliation to the labor international: namely, that the union executive declared its affiliation to Moscow in 1922 but did not make it public in Indonesia until after it had secured the official acquiescence of the union membership at its February 1923 congress. At its 6rst congress the Profintcrn indicated its interest in the colonial problem with a resolution on the Eastern question,03 and in early 1922 the Profintem participated in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. Semaun reported on the Indonesian labor movement to that meeting. A Profintern delegate later recounted that his information came as a revelation: If we had received at least ~asional reports on the revolutionary struggle in Japan, China, and Korea, inddlnite as they may have been, we knew abso-

lutely nothing about the Dutch East Indies .. .. The sole representative of the Dutch East Indies at the Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East. Comrade Sernaun, who reached Moscow only after overcoming great difficulties. gives in his comprehensive article extremely valuable and interesting material on the life of the toilers in the Dutch East Indies and on their struggle for liberation from the yoke of capitalism and imperialism.of That the ProBntem was delighted to learn more of its distant affiliate is understandable enough. for the PKI was one of the few Asian Communist movements in this period to boast a functioning labor organization. Its Executive Bureau report to the third (July 1924 ) congress emphasized this point : When we consider the geographic position of the Nelherlands Indies between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the exceptiona1ly high revolutionary spirit of the Indonesian proletariat compared with the backward countries in the Near and Middle East, it is impossible not to conclude that from the viewpoint of the struggle of the working class the Dutch East Indies represents an extremely strategic point. This was the estimate of Indonesia made by the Executive Bureau of the Profintem, which throughout the entire period [since the November 1922 congress} devoted particular attention to its connections with Java and the Communist and revolutionary labor organizations there." At its plenary session of July 2:7, 1922, the Executive Bureau had heard a report from Sneevliet (Maring) on the expulsion of Bergsma and Tan MaJaka from the Indies for their part in the pawnshop workers' strike earlier that year; the Pronntem executive thereupon resolved 213

Rise of Indonesian Communism to collect information on governmental abuse of the labor movement in Dutch colonies, which it hoped to have published in the French and Italian press G$-presumably in order to arouse international disapproval of the Dutch. This active interest continued; by its own count, the ProSntern executive discussed the Indonesian situation on ten different occasions between 1924 and 1928.67 I shan not discuss here the various resolutions passed by ProSntem congresses about colonial labor movement policy; suffice it to say that they were noticeably more radically proletarian than those propounded by the Comintern, particularly on the subject of cooperation with bourgoois nationalist movements. &8 This conflict between the various international Communist bodies over Asian revolutionary policy was most clearly expressed in China, where the Comintem, Pr06ntern, and Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) were directly rcpresented. GQ It is probably safe to assert that it was of much less importance for policy in Indonesia, where communications with the Comintem and Profintern were generally filtered through Semaun in Europe and Tan Malaka in Asia, both of whom gave more evidence of trying to persuade the international organizations toward their own views than of reflecting the Sner differences in the international line. Nonetheless, disagreement among the various offices and individuals in the International affected the Indonesian movement because Moscow served as the link between Semaun's European PKI office and Tan Malaka's Asian base, which had virtually no direct contact. Moscow should have kept the two informed of each other's activities and opinions, but in fact it did not; according to Semaun, this was largely because the International was split by factional and departmental rivalries.?!) As a result, the PKl's European hand did not know what its Asian hand was doing. and this caused considerable frustration and confusion. The importance of the ProSntern for Indonesia lay chie8y in its efforts to establish contact points between the Asian parties and the Communist organizations in the West. Its first move in this direction was to found in February 1922 an office equivalent to the Comintern's Eastern Section, headed by Pr06ntem staff workers Reinstein, Andreychin, and Eiduss. H At the ProSntern's second congress, in November 1922, the labor international resolved to strengthen its ties with the Asian unions in four ways: by urging metropolitan labor organizations to establish special sections to maintain contact with the coloniarIabor

214

1ntel'f1ational Relations movements; by creating offices in the major seaports, which would agitate among colonial maritime workers; by calling a conference of revolutionary labor organizations from the Eastern countries, which would meet simultaneously with the next Profintern congress and which would work out concrete programs for the labor movement in each of the lands represented; and by holding a meeting of the transport workers in the countries bordering on the Paci.6.c.72 Although the Profintem called for immediate action on these resolutions, response to its first demand was initially disappointing. In its executive session of June 25 to July 2. 1923. the RILU complained that its directive for the metropolitan parties to establish colonial contact bureaus had nowhere been carried out. This neglect must be rectified within three months, the executive warned; and it noted particularly that "our Dutch partisans are charged with maintaining a close and effective connection with the labor movement in Indonesia and especially with the revolutionary labor unions on Java." 73 These urgings were to little avail; the Western labor organizations refused to become colony-conscious, and the Profintern's subsequent references to this as· pect of its program carried a distinctly fretful air.14 Greater progress was made in realizing the second demand., and on January 5, 1923, the ProSntem executive announced. its decision to establish harbor offices in Rotterdam and Vlaruvostok.7G Contact through the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam was naturally of considerable Significance for Indonesia, not only because Indonesian seamen proved ready recruits to the radical cause but also because the converts provided a much-needed courier service between the Inwes and the Communist workers abroad. Semaun, who was named a member of the Profintem Executive Bureau as well as the ECCI in 1924,7$ established the Indonesian Seamen's Union (Sareht Pegawei Lant Indonesia; SPLI) in Amsterdam early in that year. This organization functioned not only as a union of seamen on the European nul but also, according to Semann, as the effective headquarters of the PKI abroad. As a labor organization it was the western partner of the Semarang.based Union of Seamen and Dockers (Serikat Laut dan Gudang; Serilagu ), which became quite active in 1924. The Serilagu/ SPLI attempted to attract both Indonesian and Chinese seamen. They organized a "group" on each large steamship and harbor installation in which they were active, with a ·"consul" in charge of each group. On the Holland-Indonesia run, these consuls served as couriers for the 215

Rise of Indonesian Communism PKl. iT Serilagu shifted its headquarters officially to Holland in 1924 in order to avoid the Netherlands Indies authorities. This, a Profintem account noted, was the first instance of a labor union establishing its headquarters ahroad for strategical reasons since Russian unions had done so to avoid the Tsarist police. 78 The maneuver was conceived as a temporary measure, however, and in early 1925 the official headquarters of Communist maritime activities were transferred back to Indonesia. · The SPU continued, but as an aBiliate of a new Indies-based union that combined all the PKl-run sailors' and dockworkers' groups. The last of the Pro6ntem projects produced the Pacific Transport Workers Conference, held in Canton in June 1924. The inspiration for this meeting had originally come from the Australian spokesman at the fourth Comintern and second Profintern congresses in November 1922; he had proposed that those international bodies sponsor a gathering of workers from countries bordering on the Pacific. The idea was favorably received, since at that time Russian fears of a Far Eastern war and of being barred from the Pacific made the Soviet government eager to assert itself in the area. Soon afterward the war scare receded, however, and the plan for a general Pacific conference was shelved; in its place, the ProSntem executive brought forth an idea for a meeting of transport workers from the countries of the Far East. This would serve to catalyze the development of the movement among a group of workers most susceptible to radical organization and would also improve international connections in that area.1g Semaun had been Originally scheduled to go to Canton as the main Indies representative, but this plan was shelved. Instead he attended the fifth Comintem and third ProSntern congresses, held in Moscow in June and July 1924, and then journeyed to Hamburg for a transport workers' conference, which discussed, among other things, collaboration with the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF ) led by the radical socialist Edo Fimmen. We shall hear more of this later. As his Canton replacement Semaun sent a trusted comrade from the seamen's union, who was Brst to go to the Indies, bringing /2,(J(XJ to the PKI from the Comintern, and there pick up other representatives of the Indonesian movement for the journey to China. 80 Unfortunately. Semaun's trust was misplaced, for the comrade in question handed the party very little of the International's money, and he never went to Canton. In his stead, the PKI appointed AIim"in and Budisutjitro to represent it at the conference. They joined Tan Malaka, who 216

International Relations was then in Southeast Asia (apparently Singapore) on International business, and the three of them proceeded to Canton together. According to Malab, they experienced considerable delay on their journey and arrived in Canton after the conference opened on June 17.8 1 The Canton conference got off to a poor start. The Indian and Japanese representatives were prevented by their governments from attending, and thus it was limited to delegates from Indonesia, China, and the Philippines; moreover, the most prominent labor organization in attendance, the Chinese railway workers' union, had just suffered crushing defeat in a strike.82 And there was the eternal language problem: of the twenty-five delegates, those from North and South China could not underestand each other; one of the Filipinos spoke only a Philippine language, two others knew Spanish, and one English: and one of the Indonesians could not be understood. 83 The Canton Bureau, which Tan Malaka claims -he was appointed to head, has already been described. Other port offices were soon established in Shanghai, Manila, and the Indies. Undoubtedly, the Canton office and its affiliates improved revolutionary communications to some extent, but we do not know enough about their activities to form any real judgment of their usefulness. The Canton center was abandoned by Tan Mala1ca in mid-I925; he reported that he turned it over to another worker,84 but it seems to have existed only a brief time after that. At the fourth plenary session of the Profintem executive ( 1926 ), Heller reported that the international revolutionary link in the East was still extremely weak: the Canton conference had not been a real succe.ss since the revolutionary base in the individual countries concerned was too weak to respond to it adequately.8.'i This, the Pronntem decided, would not do at a time when the revolutionary movement in the East was becoming increasingly important; it therefore resolved to have a new conference of Pacific labor organizations and to establish a special Profintern office in the East that would act as a contact center and publish a journal. se AU this indicates that the Canton office and The Dawn no longer existed. The new contact center, which was not established until after the period in which we are interested, was envisioned in the Pronntem resolution as the joint project of the RILU and the International Red Aid. The latter organizatipn (also called by its Russian initials, MOPR) was established in 1922 to lend moral and material support to revolutionary movements around the world. It paid very little attention to the 217

Rise of Indonesian Communism colonial movements before 1927,81 but the ECCI reported that during 1923 it provided financial aid to some 2,000 Javanese workers impover. ished by the ill-fated railway strike.8S In his report .on the 1924 Comintern congress, Semaun mentioned that the International was considering an additional grant to the Indonesian revolutionaries,8' and later he noted that the ECC[ session of March-April 1925 had discussed 6nancial help to the Indies movement." Just how much the Comintern decided to grant and whether it actually reached the Indies party is not known, but it is ·certainly true that the Indonesian Communists received funds from abroad, either through the IRA or other organizations. Communications do not a~ pear to have been a great problem, for money was easier to smuggle than revolutionary reading material. and articles in pKJ-oriented news· papers indicate that the movement was kept fairly wen supplied with international Communist literature. Apparent1y small sums were frequent1y transferred from Holland by money order, for the police claimed to ~ve uncovered correspondence between the PKI and sym. pathizers in Holland in 1925 in which the Indonesian party requested its Dutch correspondents to stop sending contributions directly to Java, since party mail was frequently opened and confiscated; instead, the party suggested. donations should be sent via trusted addresses in Sin· gapore.'l Larger amounts were brought by sympathizers returning from abroad. although as we have seen in the case of the "trusted comrade" who was to attend the Canton conference, this method was not without risk. Most of the funds seemed to have traveled to the Indies via Holland, since that presented the easiest line of communica· tions. Acrording to Semaun. the Dutch Communist Party was not an important primary source of help; it was willing to assist its Indonesian colleagues. but its own 6nancw situation was too precarious to allow much in the way of foreign aid. 82 Relations between the PKJ and the Dutch party on financial matters were by no means entirely smooth. for Brandstcdcr, who acted as business manager for PKI funds in Holland, was on exceedingly bad tenos with Semaun, the party representative in that country. The a.mount of money received by the PIC] from abroad seems to have been modest, since Indies Communist newspapers succumbed more frequently to poverty than to government measures. and concern about failing party 6nances was expressed by the PKI conclaves of 218

International Relations December 1924 and December 1925.g3 On the other hand, Sarekat Islam leaders accused the PKl executive in 1924 of having received 112,000 from Moscow, for only a small part of which it had accounted. This was part of the mutual smear campaign in which PKl and CSI leaders had engaged since 1923; it Bared to new heights in mid·1924, and Darsono's old accusations of Tjokroaminoto's financial unreliability were renewed. The SI chairman was charged specifically with being responsible for the disappearance of the funds collected by the Sarekat Islam in 1919 for Hadji Agus Salim's projected trip to Europe, where, we will remember, one of his tasks was to seck foreign aid for the movement. Since the CSI charges fit the current accusations so well, we might suspect that they were simply payment in kind for Comunists' allegations, and therefore deserving of little credence. Api, however, denied only that the PKI leaders had embezzled .the money; it neither confirmed nor denied that the party had received it but left the distinct impression that it had. After all, the party newspaper remarked, 112,000 was really just a drop in the revolutionary bucket; something in the nature of hundreds of thousands was necessary to really get the movement going in the Indies.9i Twelve thousand guilders· was no small windfall for an Indonesian political party, no mattcr how deprecatingly Api referred to it, although the paper's remark may indicate the scale of aid the PKI hoped to acquire from the Comintem for its revolutionary eHort. It is conceivable, however, that in spite of the newspaper's implication the gift never actually existed or was much smaller than the stated amountperhaps the f2,fXX) that Semaun had tried to send the party and which was indeed embarrassingly unaccounted for. In later and more emphatically nationalist days, the Communists did their best to deny rumors of Russian gold; but, as I have remarked earlier, that was not the PKI's attitude at this time. Thc Indonesian party instead placed great emphaSiS on being part of a world movement of irresistible strength and great resources. The PKI may therefore have felt it could tum the accusation of embezzlement to its own advantage by implying it had reeeived a good deal of aid and was expecting more. It would not have been the first time such tactics had been used: only a short time before Alimin had revealed that a similar maneuver accounted for the "disappearance" of the funds for Salim's 1919 trip.\l5 There is no proof that the PKI hint of funds from Moscow was fictitious, but none of the

219

Rise of Indonesian Communism government reports on the party's activities in Hr24 or on its connee· tions with the Comintern took the implication seriously enough to mention it. International aid was by no means a one·way affair. When Dutch members of the ISDV / PKI were expelled from the Indies, it the party's charitable custom to allot them a stipend to help them along until they were able to support themselves in Holland, and this was a relatively large expense. When Danono returned from Europe in 1923, he did his unsuccessful best to interest the Indonesian proletariat in supporting their German brethren; in this conneetion he had estab· lished a Committee for Red Aid in Semarang, to pave the way for an IRA branch in Indonesia.tIl Reporting on the 1924 Comintern con· gress, Semaun also urged the establishment of an IRA branch in the Indies, arguing that if one helped brother parties, one could expect help in return in times of crisis.91 In early 1925, the PKI set up a Workers' Aid fund,98 which was intended to become the Indonesian branch of the IRA. Given PKI poverty and its members' lack of interest in supporting foreign movements, it is probably safe to assume that the party did not contribute much to world Communist welfare, although the police claimed to have found in 1926 a list of donors to the revolutionary effort in China." This probably represented funds col· lected in connection with the PKI China action, to be discussed presently. AnotllCT international Communist organization with which the PKI was associated '.Vas the Peasant International (the Krestintern ), estab· lished with much fanfare in the Kremlin in the fall of 1923. We might suppose that an organization oriented toward the peasantry would have a particularly close association with colonial Communism, since it was recognized that the Asian revolution would ~e agrarian in nature. This was not the case, however. Although its opening meeting did issue an appeal to the peasants of the colonies, the Krestintem paid very little attention to Asia. 1be only representative of the colonial and scmicolonial East on its eleven-man presidium was Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh),HKI It devoted itself instead to promoting peasant unrest in eastern Europe and to increasing rural sympathy for the proletariat's cause. Its efforts were therefore of less interest to the Asian Communists than to the European parties; at that, it accomplished little enough. At the ECCI plenary session of February-March 1926, . the best Zinoviev could say was that "the Krcstintcrn, still a young

was

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International Relations organization which up to now has shown not a few failings, has managed in the course of the last year to achieve its first-although still, it is true, inconsiderable-successes," and Trotsky later remarked that the organization had so little impact that no one bothered to announce its end. IOt In spite of its general impotence and lack of concern with the East, the Krestintern did have some relations with Indonesia. Iwa Kusumasumantri, an Indonesia n student who visited Moscow in 1925-1926 after graduating from the University of Leiden, was later charged by the Netherlands Indies government with having earned part of his keep there by working as a correspondent for the Krestintern. I02 Under the pseudonym of S. Dingley, it was asserted, he had written pamphlets on the situation in the Indies; one of these, The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia, is a major source for international Communist criticism ofPKI deviations in the 1924-1926 period. los There were also attempts to establish a Krestintern affiliate in Indonesia. Semaun, adVising the PKl on the decisions of the 1924 Comintern congress, urged the establishment of a separate Indonesian peasant organization that could join the international grouping. Heretofore, he noted, such affiliation had been impossible because the Indonesian Communists had possessed no exclUSively peasant association. Outlining the procedure for establishing such an C?rganization, he continued: In order that peasant affairs may be handled effectively, peasant committees must be fonned in every Sarekat Rakjat local, where they will represent the interests of the peasants. The various local committees should be organized for coordinated work into a Central Peasant Committee, which will be controlled by the Executive of the PKI. The Central Peasant Committee should affiliate itself as soon as possible w:ith the Peasant International, which is located in Moscow. It will he the duty of the Indonesian Central Peasant Committee to write the Peasant International every month, reporting on its program, on any movements that may arise among the Indonesian peasantry, on weaknesses wherever they occur, and on how others can help the peasant movement in our country.11l4

This idea was elaborated in an IndoneSian-language pamphlet which was published in Amsterdam in the spring of 1925 and which contained an account of the 6rst congress of the Krestintern. IOIi In a lengthy introduction, its author set forth a program of Indonesian peasant demands. This is something of a landmark in Indonesian Com-

221

Rise of

Indon e~n

Communism

monist history, for it was the movement's first detailed agrarian program and was drawn not from European Communist slogans for rural action hut from demands peculiar to the Indonesian peasantry.loe The publication of the program was a lonely event, however, for it was not until the mid-l950s that the party seriously undertook to ascertain peasant demands and rally rural support. The pamphlet acknowledged that neither the Sarekat Rakjat nor the PKI could adequately represent peasant interests, the fonner because it included workers and shopkeepers as well as peasants, and the latter because it spoke first of all for the proletariat: "so the movement to carry out this peasant program of ours will surely get mixed in with other demands. This can make matters 'unclear' for our movement, because of this 'unclearness' we peasants might lose interest in working through the Sarekat Rakjat and the Communist Parly." 107 As in Semaun's recommendations, the solution was seen as peasant committees within the SR rather than an entirely separate organization. These committees would exist on central, regional, and district as well as village levels. Local units would elect delegates to an Indonesian Peasant Congress, meetings of which would be held just after SR congresses, which in tum met after PKl conventions. The peasant congress representatives could thus be chosen from among those who were attending the PKI and. SR conventions, whether or not they were peasants, "In this fashion," the pamphlet somewhat disingenuously observed, ..the expenses of the mov~ent can be kept down and agreement will be easy to reach." 108 The peasant congress would elect a Central Committee of Indonesian Peasants, which in twn would send representatives to congresses of the lCrestintem in Moscow, "so that our Indonesian peasant movement may be connected with the movement of peasants and workers of the whole world. . .. And in this fashion we Indonesian peasants will soon gain· freedom and a decent living, as well as the general good or all mankind." l OW In 1925 the PKI created an agrarian organization, the Sarekat Tam (Peasant Union ). Its decision to do so may have been spurred by such ca1ls, though the concept appears to have been somewhat different; the ST units existed in addition to or as substitutes ror Sarekat Rakjat locals rather than as groups within them. A similar organization, bearing the same name, had been proposed earlier by the 51, which decided at its 1923 congress· to establish a Sarekat Tani system to revive 51 rural strength through class-oriented agrarian action. no lbe 222

International Relations PKI Sarekat Tani probably did not have much international contact. By the time it was fonned the PKI and its affiliates were well on their way to illegal status; the peasant organization enjoyed only a 6tful existence, and in early 1926 its leaders were jailed. Perhaps the most striking thing about the various attempts in this period to organize and link with Moscow the Communist movements in the East was the absence of any real effort to create an Asian antiimperialist forum. Such an organization would have served as a means of contact between Soviet Russia and the Asian Communist movements and as a valuable propaganda device. The idea was not lacking (we will remember the attempt to create a League for the Liberation of the East), and it was never entirely abandoned, for in 1922 the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East called for an "Alliance of the Toilers of the Far East" under Comintem sponsorship.1I1 The ProSntern, at its 1922 congress and at several points thereafter, had called for regular conferences of the Eastern labor movements, but for "organizational and technical" reasons not even the first of these was convened during the period under discussion here; the Canton transport workers' meeting had been a separate undertaking. n: Interest in a link between the Asian revolutionary movements was by no means absent on the Asian Communist side. Sukendar's theses urged such a union, we will remember, and the Indonesian delegation reportedly pressed establishment of an association of Asian revolutionary movements at the Paci6c Transport Workers' Conference in 1924.1IlI While in Canton, Ho Chi Minh established an International Union of Oppressed Peoples of the East, which held its 6rst conference in the summer of 1925. 114 Indonesia was not represented, for Tan MaJaka had left Canton for the Philippines; he, however, enthusiastically advocated a Pan-Asian revolutionary link and called in particular for greater unity between the peoples of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya.JIII The Comintern seems to have been at best unimpressed hy such projects. Its indiH'erence may have Originated in the USSR's desire to prevent Pan-Asian tendencies, which might have damaged Russia's position in Soviet Central Asia and might, in the Far East, serve the interests of Japan. Moreover, an organization in which non-Communist groups were included might be more than the Comintem could handle: for example, any real attempt to clarify the ambivalent relati.onships between Asian Communists and non-Communist revolu-

223

Rise of Indonesian Communism tionaries might destroy nationalist sympathy rather than increase it. Even a forum where only Communist groups were represented might not be completely controllable, for Asian Communists had shown a discouraging amount of independence: if they combined outside the central sphere of the Comintem, an unpleasant conflict might develop. Moreover, while the Stalin-Trotsky feud raged. the Comintern was not eager to establish centers that might be attracted to the left opposition; this. according to Semaun, was a major reason for Moscow's disinterest in any real center for Asian work outside MOSCOW.116 In any event the International, although concerned to improve contact with Asian Communists U7 and to publicize its anticolonial efforts, did not really back an anti-imperialist union until the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression in 1927. The Comintem's reluctance to sponsor an Asian revolutionary center did not imply that it disapproved of Asian Communist movements taking an interest in the activities of thcir brother parties. Qu"ite the contrary: as the Chinese Communists proceeded under Comintern tutelage to establish a bloc within the Kuomintang, the Chinese example was increasingly held up by the International as a model for other Asian Communist groups to fonow. Writing in 199.,4 on the union of the KMT and CCP, VOitinsky declared : The news of the reorganization of the Kuomintang has penetrated into the French colony oC Indochina, the American colony of the Philippines, the Dutch colony of the Ma1ay archipelago, reached Singapore, Malaya, and India. At the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference in Canton in June of this year delegations from almost all these areas saluted the Kuomintang, although to some extent they tended to idealize its program and activities. There can be no doubt that even the partial victory of Sun Yat-sen over the attempted counterrevolutions in Canton and over their instigators-the Anglo-American-French imperialists-will raise the authority of this party in the eyes of the colonial peoples of the PaciJlc Ocean to a new height and will serve as a stimulant to the liberation movement of these peoples. 1l8

The presence of a large and rapidly expanding Chinese minority in Indonesia naturally had considcrable bearing on the usefulness of the Chipesc example to the PKI. It meant, on the one hand, that developments in China had repercussions in the Indies, where the local Chinese community had supported the Kuomintang from its beginnings and followed the revolution with great interest. On thc other hand, the Indies Chinese had a different legal status from the ethnic 224

International Relations Indonesians and, as the great part of the independent middle class, enjoyed a generally superior economic position. Particularly on Java they were popularly stereotyped as moneylenders and merchants and hence were considerably distrusted. Too close association with the Indies Chinese would thus endanger the party's mass support, particularly in the rural areas, which the Chinese penetrated rapidly during the 19205 and where, since they could not own land, they almost invariably assumed the moneylender-merchant role. At the same time, the Indies Chinese were not notably interested in participating in Indonesian political movements. Beyond promoting their local concerns as a minority, they were mainly attracted to movements in China. This was particularly true of recent immigrants, who were also the most attracted to the left Kuomintang by reason of their acquaintance with that movement at home and by the radicalism resulting from their poverty and uncertain position. In attempting to engage Chinese sympathies the PKI thus faced the highest cultural and linguistic barrier to cooperation precisely at the point where its ideological attraction might have been the greatest. In view of these factors militating against cooperation with the Chinese minority, it might have seemed practical for the party to point to the revolutionary example of China but to make no eHort to recruit the local Chinese. This, however. would have run counter to the party's ideolOgical rejection of ethnic boundaries; throughout its history, the PKI stressed its refusal to oppose the Indies Chinese as a minority. though this stand has sometimes cost it dearly. It was probably this consideration, combined with the presence of large Chinese populations in the Communists' early bases of Semarang and Surabaja, that prompted the party to secure local Chinese support even before Communism emerged as a political element in China. In 1918 Sneevliet and Baars attended the May Day celebration of a Chinese union in Surabaja, where they proffered ISDV sympathy and aid; 1111 and at the time of the October 1918 Sarekat Islam congress Semaun reportedly proposed to the CSI that the movement adopt a cooperative attitude toward the Indies Chinese, prOVided they supported its political eHarts and did not hinder its struggle against capitalism. 12ll In 1920 the party journal declared optimistically that the Indies Chinese proletariat would soon join its Indonesian counterpart, for it too was subject to increasing capitalist oppression,121 and in 1922 the PKI urged sup~ port for a China relief drive sponsored by the local minority, arguing

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Rise of Indonesian Communism that if the Indonesians helped the Chinese now, they could expect them to reciprocate in the future. lZ2 Such efforts. sporadic and ineffective, had the character of reminders of proletarian internationalism rather than real campaigns. They were oriented toward the Indies Chinese and not toward China: that country was not seen as a revolutionary example, for it was Gandhi and the Indian National Congress rather than Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang which the party saw during the early 1920s as the most significant expression of the Asian national liberation movement. After Semaun's departure in mid-1923, however, Gandhi ceased to be held up as a hero. We might suspect that Darsono played a considerable part in his rejection, for he was better acquainted with the Comintern's unfavorable view of Gandhi and may have been affected by the even stronger opinions of M. N. Roy, who operated from Berlin at the time Darsono was at Comintern headquarters there; 123 Tjokroaminoto's attempts to promote an Indies National Congress and the PKI loss of interest in multiparty alliance also helped jettison the Indian example. At the same time, the rising strength of the Kuomintang and the Comintem's manifest support of it made Sun Yat-sen's movement the natural choice for a new model of national revolution. At the principal PKI celebrations in 1924, Sun Yat-sen's portrait replaced that of Gandhi in the party gallery of heroes.' ~~ Efforts to attract the Indies Chinese were renewed and this time reached the proportions of a major campaign. The attendance of Chinese at PKI and SR meetings was carefully noted in Communist newspaper accounts, and considerable publicity was given to the progress of the revolution in China. A Committee for the Respect of Nationalities (Comite Kehonnatan Bangsa) was set up to press for granting full legal rights to both Indonesians and Indies Chinese, and a fund was established to aid flood victims in China.12~ At the June 1924 PKI congress. Darsono stressed the party's need to attract Chinese; it should denote most of its attention to those locally born, he said. for the immigrants already felt themselves intemation~ alists thanks to the influence of Sun Yat~sen.126 Apparent1y to further this project. the PKI appointed its first Chinese executive member, Kho Tjun Wan, who represented the Semarang division of the party.127 At a mass rally at Semarang in August 1924, PKI leaders stressed the need for closer cooperation with the Indies Chinese and for aid to the Chinese revolution. The fact that the local Chinese were largely en~ 226

International Relations gaged in commerce need not deter such cooperation. it was asserted. Darsono and other speakers discoursed on the difficulties the small traders and market sellers were having. and a motion was passed against government interference with peddling and selling and for the support of the Indonesian and Chinese petty merchants. 1t was also emphasized that China's ,liberation from imperialism would mean a good deal to Indonesia's struggle; if the Indonesians supported the Chinese now, their aid would be reciprocated. Sugono warned that if the Chinese people became too poor to buy imported goods. Indonesia would suffer an even worse depression than it was then enduring; Sumantri offered the more idealistic argument that support should be given because national boundaries did not count for the proletariat, and Darsono described the piteous conditions he had observed in China during his stay there in 1921 on the way to Soviet Russia,128 All these pleas brought forth scanty fruit; when the hat was passed for the China aid fund, only f31.03 was collected. The relief committee efforts seem to have elicited much the same objections as Darsono's project to aid the Gennan proletariat, and nothing much was heard of it after the initial burst of activity.l29 The death of Sun Yat-sen in March 1925 provided a major occasion for the PKI to stress its sympathy for the Indies Chinese and the Kuomintang; it held rallies to mourn the departed leader, and its adherents attended local Chinese demonstrations in Sun's honor. Condolences were cabled to the Kuomintang in China, and the West Java PKI leader Gunawan produced a highly flattering biography of Sun. ISO The Shanghai incident of May 1925 gave new fuel to PKl arguments for an anti-imperialist alliance with the Chinese. The affair aroused the Indies Chinese, who began collecting money for the support of the Shanghai workers, to which project the PKI lent its enthusiastic assistance. 1!11 There was some sharp criticism outside the party of PKI relief to foreigners rather than to Indonesians in need,lH but the campaign does not seem to have met the same degree of resistance within the movement as the earlier party campaigns for Gennan and Chinese aid. The sums collected seem to have been small, but numerous rallies on China's behalf were reported in various major and secondary cities in Java. Ideological principles alone do not adequately explain this display of energy, since they had not sufficed in earlier times; it sccms likely that

2Z7

Rise of Indonesian Communism the less internationalist PKI leaders expected material advantages to comc of their campaign. For one thing, the Indies Chinese were far morc able and willing to donate to causes in China tha!l the Indonesians were to contribute to activities at home, a characteristic the Indonesians viewed with both admiration and jcalousy.'3S If the Indies Chinese population could be persuaded to divert some of this money to the local Communist cause, the party's financial agonies would have been greatly eased. Moreover. the Indies Kuomintang was highly disciplined and accustomed to underground activity. whereas the PKI was inept at conspiracy.lU By 1925 the party had great trouble maintaining communications with both its units at home and the movement abroad; local C"inese associations, had they had a mind to cooperate, might have helped preserve these contacts. Finally, by 1925 the PKI was seriously considering il;lsurrection and was inclined to encourage all possible sources of revolutionary aid. By demonstrating friendship for both the Indies Chinese and the Kuomintang, the PKI might hope both to attract local Chinese support and to acquire help from abroad, for it was constantly stressed that China was relatively near and that aid for China now would mean Chinese aid in the future. The appeal to the Indies Chinese and the contributions to China .in 1925 probably did l!ttle to enhance PKl popularity among ethnic Indonesians, but emphasis on the revolution in China was not without effect. The Kuomintang's advance showed, as not only the Communists pointed out, what the Indonesians might achieve by national solidarity and detennination. Moreover, the PKI argued that Kuomintang alliance with Soviet Russia and promotion of the interests of the Chinese working c1ass showed that national liberation and socialist revolution went hand in hand. This argument made no point of Chinese Com· mwUst strategy. or indeed of the existence of the CCP. For one thing, the PKI had abandoned the bloc within; to stress its use in China might merely serve the critics of its own policy. Moreover, the party may well have thought that the support of the Indies Chinese would be better secured by concentrating exclusively on the symbol of the Kuomintang. The PKI also used the Chinese revolution as evidence that Soviet help was disinterested. In an effort to secure the support of the young Indonesian intellectuals, who were then fonning the first of the "study clubs" that began the true nationalist movement, it declared: 228

International Relations In China the intellectuals proclaim their sympathy for the Russians, and Russia will value that sympathy highly. Jus~ as Russia gives aid for the liberation of colonial countries, so it will surely take into consideration the request of the Chinese nationalists now; what sort of government will later emerge in China is left to the Chinese people to determine themselves. Russia will only help in getting rid of foreign imperialism. In .

Above all, the PKI used the events in China to .demonstrate that revolution was no longer a distant European affair, that it was spreading toward the Indies, and that Soviet aid was a reality. It implied that if the anti-imperialist cffort could succeed in China, where the interests of so many capitalist nations were involved, then surely it could triumph in the Indies, where only the relatively weak Dutch need be faced. The argwncnt, as we shall see, was perhaps too persuasive. "Beside the demonstrations in support of China our party proclaimed the struggle for unification with the awakening Chinese working class," Semaun proudly declared at the end of 1925. ''This development is a constant topic of discussion in the Indonesian press, and makes the capitalists wild with anger." 1311 If not as distraught as Semaun described, the colonial authorities were certainly sCriously concerned at the prospect of PKI-KMT cooperation and the danger of radical Kuomintang ideas inHuencing the Indonesian population. The Advisor for Chinese AHairs was a prominent participant in a major government conference in July 1925 at which the Communist threat was discuss~; after the meeting the authorities undertook to remove Chinese revolutionary inHuence from the colony by restricting immigration and deporting a number of radically inclined Chinese residents.1ST Government fears · were largely unfounded, however. Although during 1925 a greater number of Indies Chinese attended China-oriented PKI gatherings in Java (the only island where such meetings were held) and although pro-Soviet sympathies were sometimes expressed in the Indies Chinese press, las the PKI attempt to secure Chinese participation was generally unsuccessful. A few did enter the movement,139 but the vast majority preferred to stay out of Indonesian politics, and especially out of a movement that offered many prospects for trouble and almost none for success. Those few Chinese the PKI did attract seem to have been born in and oriented toward Indonesia, and there is no indication that the party had connections with China-oriented organizations or "relied to any extent on the 229

Rise of Indonesian Communism Chinese minority financially or .for communications within the archipelago and abroad. By 1925 the problem of maintaining foreign communications became acute for the PKI, both because it was engaged in a controversy with the Comintem and because most of its top leaders had by then either Oed abroad or been exiled. From the party's point of view Singapore was a natural contact center, since it was easy to reach both legally and illegally ( thanks to the smuggling trade) and an Indonesian visitor could easily melt into the Malay crowd. It was, however, very far from the areas of Comintern power and interest, and this was probably the major reason why it was not important as a communication center. However, some Indies government accounts reported that during 1925 a center for propaganda in French Indochina and the Netherlands .Indies was opened in Singapore under ~e supervision of ECCI and Profintem representatives; it was said to be composed of representatives from the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Indonesian Communist movements, with a total staff of thirty persons, divided into a section for propaganda and a section for direct action. 140 The origin of this claim seems to have been a statement reportedly made at a PKI conference in December 1924 about plans for such an office, but it seeIn'l unlikely that one actually existed outside the minds of enthusiastic Indonesian Communists and worried government officials. From the"description of the center, the reports seem to have sprung from rumors in connection with the Comintem-Profintem bureau established in Canton in 1924 or the Shanghai-based PanPacific Trade Union Secretariat, which was not set up until 1927 but had been talked about for some time before. Another possible source is the Nan Yang [South Seas} Communist Party, which emerged among the Singapore Chinese from the Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. was reportedly authorized "by the Intemational to deal with movements in the English, British, Dutch, and French colonies of Southeast Asia, and was responsible to the CCP in China. H.I However, it is most unlikely that this organization, which was both insignificant and illegal, received such authorization before the collapse of the PKI made" it the only functioning Communist organization in Southeast Asia. Chinese Communist activity had reportedly begun in Singapore in 1925, and although it is claimed that Indonesian Communists were instrumental in starting it, the reports of Indonesian 230

Intemational Relations Communist' exploits in Singapore during the mid-1920s are more notable for their failure to reflect contact with the Malayan Chinese radicals than for any evidence of it. U2 Darsono has said that if the PKI had contact with the International through Singapore, he was not aware of it. IU If a Comintem office or agent was in Singapore in the 1925-1926 period, it is most remarkable that neither the International, the party on Java, or the quarreling PKI factions then exiled in that city appealed to it or brought it in any way into their negotiations; b~t this the reader can observe for himself in the following chapters. The idea of linking Indonesia to the outside Conununist world was not unthought of, however. Semaun has recounted that he broached to the Dutch Communists and the Comintern a proposal to move PKI foreign headquarters from the distant center of Amsterdam to a spot in the Far East, preferably Singapore. He pushed. this particularly during 1925, when the increasing isolation of the Indies Communists, Aliarcham's leftist policies, and Semaun's own quarrels with the CPH made him feel strongly that it would be better to have the party's major link with the International so situated that he could confer directly with PKI leaders. (According to Semaun, he had almost no idea at this time what Tan Malaka was doing about the Indonesian party.) Semaun said that he discussed his plan with Sen Katayama and M. N. Roy, who were themselves interested in establishing a base for Asian revolutionary work outside Moscow. The final reaction of the Comintern was negative, however. Then in the midst of its conservative stabilization-of-capitalism phase, with the Soviet Union trying to nonnalize its relations with the Western powers, the International was not eager to send new agitators to colonial areas of the East, and particularly not to a British possession. Moreover, with the StalinTrotsky feud nt;aring its climax, the Comintem did not want to send out of its inunediate control those whose ultimate loyalties it could not guarantee; and it could not guarantee Semaun"s.lH A PKI office was in fact established in Singapore in 1925, though apparently not on the initiative of the Comintern. Subakat, editor of the party newspaper Api and one of the older and more responSible PKI members, fled the Indies to escape internment for his revolutionary writingS.14~ In Singapore, he set himself up as liaison man for the PKI, having contact with Semaun in the Netherlands and later with Tan Malaka (but none, so far as we can see, directly with Moscow or with the International's representatives in China). The Singapore ·231

Rise of Indonesian Communism center became an increasingly. important contact and conference point as government measures cut down on PKI activities within Indonesia; in 1926 it became a major headquarters for the party leadership, In spite of all its agencies and offices for contact with the East, the major link between the Comintern and the PKI was not one of the International's own organizations but the Communist Party of Holland, It was a general Comintem policy to hold the West European parties responsible in some degree for the training and guidance of the colonial movements (a logical practice, since the metropolitan Communists had greater access to and knowledge of their countries' dependencies than did the Moscow organization itself). The extent to which the Comintem linked the metropolitan and colonial parties together was re8ected in the International's organization: the Administrative Secretariat, which was composed of sections in charge of Communist activity in individual countries or geographic areas, placed colonies in the same slot as the countries that ruled them. Thus Indonesia belonged to the fourth section, which had jurisdiction over the Netherlands and England and their possessions,14. This use of metropolitan Communist movements as a main source of contact with the colonies had definite advantages, but it was not a completely felicitous system. For one thing, the problems of the Commumst movement in the metropoles differed from those in the colonies. and the difference resulted at times in a conOict of interest. We will remember Tan Malaka's deSCription of the argument betwcen the metropolitan and Asian Communists within the colonial commission of the 1922 Comintern congress. Moreover, few metropolitan Communists had any great interest in the colonies, and they thus gave the colonial question less attention than it deserved and certainly much less than the Asian Conununists thought it merited, In spite of the Comintern's repeated admonitions to the metropolitan parties to increase their activities on behalf of the colonies. ln the European parties could not satisfy their colonial comrades' expectations of assistance, a fact of which the Asian Communists made the Comintem well aware. Dutch Communist interest in the Indies can be traced from the 1914 congress of the party's revolutionary socialist forcrunner. the SOP, Stirred by contact with the Dutch Marxists in the Indies, who had recently fonned the ISDV, and by agitation in' the SDP organ De Tribune about a plague threat on Java, the meeting devoted ·considerable attention to the Indies, Its most important act was to adopt the 232

International Relations slogan "Indie los van Holland" (the Indies free from Holland) as part of its action program. 148 This was not in itself a demand for Indonesian sovereignty, since ios van Holland" was at the time also an extreme statement of the demand for autonomy, However, since the SOP called for political and economic changes that would have rp.suited in Indonesian control of the country, it constituted in effect a demand for independence and was recognized as such. No other Dutch party adopted a similar slogan in the period with which we are concerned; the ISDP specifically rejected ios van HoI· . land" at its 1919 founding congress, and the SDAP denounced it as irresponsible in the Indies budget debate the same year. H9 Both the Indies and Dutch socialists stressed that they did not oppose eventual Indonesian independence; nonetheless. it gave the Communists an excellent point on which to argue that the socialists were insincere in supporting the Indonesian cause. At its 1929· congress the SDAP adopted the "los van Holland" slogan but stressed that it was not an immediate goal; by this time, however, the socialist action appeared to the Indonesian radical nationalists as both too little and too late, particularly since the CPH had meanwhile altered its own version to read "free from Holland now," Similarly, when the subject of changing the Netherlands Indies' name arose during the 1921 parliamentary debate on revising the colony's constitution, the CPH urged the newly current "Indon~ia" ' wheroas the SDAP thought Indie or Oost lodic (East Indies) was going far enough. 1M In general, the CPH remained a ' step ahead of its socialist rival in appealing to radical nationalist sympathies in the 19205. It d«;lmonstrated more often and with less restraint on the colony's behaU than did the SOAP, which was reluctant to devote much energy to a cause at best tangential to its campaign for domestic popular support. The SDAP was basically more friendly to nationalism as such (the CPR took a stand on that issue to the left of the Comintern's), but by its moderation it failed to appeal to the emotional ingredients of radical nationalism; the CPH did this with flamboyant support of the anticolonial struggle. Accordingly, the radical nationalists of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the association of Indonesian students in Holland, developed closer ties with the CPH than who the SDAP; and since the Perbimpunan Indonesia played a key role in the development of the nationalist revolutionary movement, this was a Significant factor. In addition tq adopting the "free from Holland" slogan, the 1914 233

Rise of Indonesian Communism SDP congress called for abolition of all regulations restricting Indonesian political freedom, and it named a commission to draw up a colonial program based on these demands. World War I and the ensuing European revolutions drew the party's attention away from the colonies, however, and it was not until 1919 that the SDP again devoted its attention to the East. Sneevliet returned to the Netherlands early in 1919, and from the time of his arrival dates to the party's real interest in Indonesia. at In the spring of that year the SDP took part for the first time in the Dutch parliamentary debate on the Indies budget, entering resolutions to abolish the extraordinary rights, to withdraw the han on Sneevliet's presence in the Indies, and to grant amnesty to those punished as a result of the November 1918 disturbances. Van Ravesteyn acted as the SDP spokesman, and Sneevliet helped him prepare a speech stressing that the question of Indonesia's freedom was "necessary and urgent." 152 .In August of that year the SDP, now renamed the Communist Party of Holland, held its tenth congress, at which the most important event was Sneevliet's speech on behalf of the ISDV and the left Sarekat Islam.U3 The congress named the former ISDV leader to the CPH secretariat and provided him with a job as party propagandist. He was by no means happy with this role, particularly since it left him too poor to bring his wife and children to Holland, and he therefore appealed to the government to allow his return to Indonesia, even if it were to an outlying island where political activity would be impossible. I ~ I The CPH supported his efforts, but the government did not grant Sneevliet's request; shortly thereafter the Dutch party lost ~is services when he departed for the second Comintem congress and a subsequent career with the International. Sneevlict's place as Indies adviser to the Dutch Communist movemcnt was soon more than filled by other expellees, and within a few years there were enough of them to form a powerful pressure group within the Dutch party. In 1920 the CPH established. an Indies Revolutionary Information Service to sift through material on Indonesia for party use, and the PKI was requested to send information on to this office.' ~~ Indonesian Communists were also asked, even before they joined the International, to furnish information and copies of their publications to the Amsterdam and Berlin offices of the Comintem. 158 The Amsterdam bureau had been established by a conference organized in February 1920 by the CPH, on the mandate of the ECCI, to

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International Relations discuss Comintem communications with America and West Europe. A "representative of the revolutionary movement in the Netherlands Indies" (probably Sneevliet) was present, as well as a "Chinese comrade" who represented no particular organization. It was perhaps because of their presence that the meeting, which decided to establish an o~ce in Mexico to act as a contact point for the Communist movement in the Americas, declared that the base would also serve as a link with the movements in the Far East. Had the Amsterdam bureau been a success, it might have given the Dutch Communists a more inBuential position in the Comintem-CPH-PKI triangle; but the Mexican venture proved a Basco, and the Amsterdam bureau was soon denounced as ultraleftist by the ECCI, with the result that the rival international office in Berlin won out as the center for the Comintern's West European activities. U1 At the CPH congress of 1920 Indonesia appeared only as a side issue, but this was not the case at the party convention of November 1921, which was attended by the first of the Indonesian Communist visitors to Europe. Darsono, fresh from Moscow and the third Comintern congress, greeted the assembly in the name of the PKI and described his party's struggle against the colonial regime. CPH chairman Wijnkoop invited him to join the party leaders on the podium, and much was made over the Indonesian Communist movement, which, as Wijnkoop acknowledged, seemed more promising than the movement in the Netherlands. Even greater publicity for the colonial effort was given by the Dutch police, who arrested Darsono in the midst of the proceedings, throwing the congress into an uproar and eliciting a Burry of motions promising protest and support. Darsono was released in a few hours' time, and the delegates, complimenting themselves that their qUick action had saved their colleague from durance vile, returned to their deliberations.l~8 Darsono soon left for the ECCI West EuroRean headquarters in Berlin, but before he departed he made several suggestions to the Dutch Communists regarding their effort for the Indies. He urged the CPH congress to strengthen the bonds between the Indonesian and Dutch proletariat by issuing a message of sympathy to the people of the Indies, which it did on November 17: On the occasion of its twelfth anniversary, the Dutch Communist Party sends

greetings to its sister pnrty of the East Indies, which constitutes so small yet

235

Rise of Indonesian Communism so brave a vanguard of a different race, and which has taken up the struggle against the colonial exploitation of the East Indies peoples by Dutch and international capitalism, as well as the light for the final overthrow of race as well as class rule. The Dutch Communist Party will do everything in its power to inspire and reinforce this fighting vanguard, inasmuch as it particularly seeks to stir the Dutch proletariat wherever possible against the Dutch regime in these distant countries. The Dutch Communist Party expresses its sincere sympathy not only with the suffering of the oppressed, but also with the beginning of a reawakening and a revolt against capitalist rule, no matter in what form it may manifest itself among the masses of the East Indian peoples, in Java as well as in the rest of the East Indies, among the peasantry as well as among the proletariat. The Dutch Commmlist Party is conscious of an inner bond with the hopes and ideak of these masses which constitute a part of the whole

International, embracing miUions of workers and exploited. And we promise to use all means at our disposal to aid and reinforce these masses in their struggle and aims. One great aim in particular must be achieved-the solidarity of the Dutch proletariat and the millions of workers and peasants of the East Indies. Long live the East Indian Communist Partyl Long live the Communist International! Long live the World Revolutionl 1Gll

Darsono's second suggestion concerned the long-neglected matter of drawing up a colonial program. The Netherlands Indies authorities charged that such a program was produced about this time with the help of Darsono and the ECCI. Tan MaIaka, however, wrote that when he arrived in the Netherlands in 1922 and inquired about the Dutch Communist program for the Indies, he was infonned that the party intended to draw one up' but had not yet .6nished the taskindeed, it had not even started it. At any rate, the CPH went into the general election campaign of 1922 with the liberation of Indonesia as point 10 of its ten-point program. 1M These elections were the subject of Darsono's third suggestion: he urged that the CPH name an Indonesian as one of its candidates.lel Since the CPH would be the first Dutch party to do so, it would gain the Communists considerable Indonesian sympathy. Happily for this project, the Indies government exiled Tan Malaka, thus providing the CPH with an Indonesian Communist who was well known, spoke Ouent Dutch, and had no prison record to make him ineligible-in short, a

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International Relations ready-made candidate. Malaka conveniently arrived in Holland on May Day; his Dutch colleagues whisked him off to the party celebration at the Diamond Exchange in Amsterdam, which was turned into a pro-Indonesian demonstration. Although he had not been listed as a speaker before the meeting, Malaka addressed the audience on the events that led to his banishment. Wijnkoop then spoke solely abOut Indonesia; urging greater cooperation between the Dutch and Indonesian proletariat, the CPH chairman said he was beginning to believe the Indonesian people would throw off the yoke of European capitalism before the Europeans themselves did. The rally ended with Tan Malaka being carried about the hall on the shoulders of the Dutch Communists; after it was over CPH leaders approached him to join their list of candidates for the lower house of parliament. He accepted and thus became the 6rst Indonesian to run in a Dutch election. 1a2 The CPH nomination was aimed in the first place at demonstrating to the Indonesians that the Netherlands Conununists stood on their side. According to Tan Malah, the Indonesian students in the Netherlands were quite taken with the Dutch party's gesture in naming him a candidate. Although only a few of the 6fty..ood members of the Indische Vereniging (the future Perhimpunan Indonesia) were at aU attracted to the Communist movement at that time, those sympathizers persuaded the association to endorse Malaka's candidacy as a protest against the extraordinary rights and the Indies government persecution of the 51 schools. las The candidacy of Tan Malah also helped publicize party endeavors to abolish the extraordinary rights, in particular the right of the Governor General to banish and expel political wtdesirables. The CPH well realized that this power formed a major obstacle to the development of the Indonesian movement and to the Dutch Communists' ability to playa role in it; in addition, the extraordinary rights were one of the few subjects on which the CPH could get non-Communist parliamentary support. On May 12, the day after Malaka's candidacy was announced. the CPH introduced a new motion into parliament to remove the extraordinary rights; the socialists felt obliged to support it, although, anxious to establish themselves as a politically respectable group. they expressly declared their disapproval of the Indonesian Communist movement. 1M In the election campaign. the CPH called on its members to emphasize the Indonesian question, announcing: 237

Rise of Indonesian Communism In the meantime the Party Executive. together with comrades Bergsma and MaIaka. will decide on further measures so that in the next tWo months [before the elections1 they can make the necessary propaganda in this country for the struggle of the Indonesians against exploitive Dutch imperialism. For the time being, you are requested not to tum to Bergsma and Malaka personally concerning this propaganda but, if you find it necessary. consult with the Party Secretariat. IG6 For a few months Malaka campaigned . Vigorously; he also helped Wijnkoop prepare parliamentary speeches against Dutch policies in the Indies. As third man on a slate that would be hard put to place two candidates. he had little hope of actually winning a seat, and even before the results were announced he left to visit Darsono in Berlin. As it happened, however, the election tally showed Malaka's extraordinary ability to gain followers on short notice: he came in considerably ahead of the second man, Van Ravesteyn, thus placing the CPH in the awkward position of having to choose between him and its principal theoretician and ,parliamentary speaker. Malaka. however, turned out to be too young for a member of parliament. a fact that he and/or the . CPH had apparently neglected to make known to the electoral authorities, a nd it was not for another decade that an Indonesian entered the Dutch parliament. 10$ In early September 1922, Bergsma announced that he had received a cable from the founders of the newly created PVH informing him of the reunification of the Indonesian labor movement: To P. Bergsma At the meeting of both trade union federations day before yesterday (i.e., on September 3) it was decided to combine bOth labor groups into one federation. Bergsma, T. Malak-a, and Sutomo or Gunawan (the last two medical students) are named as representatives of the Indonesian Labor Federation in Europe. The Second Chamber has been cabled that we protest most strongly against the withdrawal of the cost-oE-living bonus from the lowest-paid personnel. Call on the representatives to proVide infonnation to the members of Parliament. SUROSO lU SEMAUN

238

11ltemational Relations The career of the PVH European representation is obscurej doubtless Tan Malaka's departure took most of the substance from it. Bergsma's report is Jess interesting for its announcement of the committee's creation than for his editorial comments on it. The message proved, he declared, that Semaun was not the deviationist he had been called when he returned to Indonesia several months before and that the PKI had not split over his policies, Moreover, it showed th.at the breach in the bloc within had been sealed : 'The 'miracle' has occulTed, It seems no miracle to us, however, for it was not a diHerence of principle that led to disagreement, but chiefly a misunderstanding, a failure to comprehend each other." 108 . Bergsma, therefore, had still been worrying over Semaun's program and the condition of the PKl j moreover, he was convinced that the schism in the mass movement was not fundamental and could beindeed, had been-healed. Bergsma was a fervent proponent of the alliance with the Sarekat Islam; as we have seen, he stressed this in his writings for the Comintem and in the process demonstrated that he saw agreement where not even the possibility existed. He shared this tendency with Sneevliet. who returned to Holland in mid-1924 and who argued even in 1926 that restoration of the bloc within was essential and that only ill-advised PKI criticism of Sarekat Islam leaders had caused the split. TI1is stubborn insistence on a bygone polley showed that the Dutch mentors of the PKI still judged the Indonesian situation by the conditions that had existed during their stay in that country. No doubt, too, the popularity of the united front from above and the Chinese bloc within in the international Communist world, the impotence and isolation of the unallied Dutch Communist movement, and the visible decline in Indonesian mass interest in politics helped convince these leaders that the Indonesian Communists must act in concert with other components of the national movement. Since, however, the PKl proceeded in exactly the opposite direction, there was bound to be conflict with the heads of the Indonesian party. Lack of infonnation was a major reason for the diverging CPH-PKl viewpoint, and this was not only because of measures taken by the Netherlands Indies government but also because the Indonesian Communists could not be bothered to write. In early 1923 Bergsma was to write Semaun as follows : 239

Rise of Indonesian Communism You have, I hope, received my previous letters. I am very pleased that you fellows have brought things as far as you have and that the situation has been improved. However, I wou1d also have wished that we beard more from the PKI. Ho~ are things really going there, comrade? You don't write a word about it; and as a Communist that's after all the first thing. You understand that in order to create a good Impression outside [on the Camintern?] it is absolutely necessary that we maintain a good core of conscious fighters in the PKI. Who is now in the Executive? Who is cbainnan? •.. To be sure, I don't doubt your good will; it's because you are busy and your attention is d istracted too much by your work. in the PKI. What I would like is that you would sometime tell me how things are going at present in the PKI.1GI

This missive re8ects a considerable lack of contact: the man who was then the Dutch Communists' principal authority on Indonesia did not know that Semaun, to whom he was writing. was then the PKI chairman. Presumably he thought the party had held its annual congress in December 1922, and he had no way of knowing that the meeting had not talcen place. Although of all the returned Dutchmen Bergsma was the best able to get along with Semaun, 110 we can well imagine that frustration taxed his diplomatic quaUties to the utmost. The Indonesians, for their part. seemed to regard CPH ignorance of Indonesian affairs as the Dutch Communists' own fault; when later that year Semaun departed to Holland and exile, Sinor Hindia expressed the pious hope that with Semaun's aid the CPH would improve its knowledge of the Indonesian situation.l1I Semaun arrived in the Netherlands on September 20, ' 1923, and was greeted by a large delegation of Dutch Communists. Thee days later be was presented to the public at a mass demonstration held in the Amsterdam Concertgebouw, and he then settled down in Bergsma's home in that city to begin his work as PKI European representative. 112 With Semaun's arrival, the Netherlands became a major base for PKI activity. His efforts extended in several directions: one was agitation among the Indonesian seamen, whom, we will remember, he organized into the SPLI, a union that acted as a major communication line between the PKl and Europe. Secondly, Semaun did his best to attract the Indonesian students in the Netherlands a task facilitated because the Perhimpunan Indonesia bad been moving toward a radical nationalist position and in 1923 declared itscU for noncooperation. Acc<.miing to Semaun, these students. as members of the Indonesian elite,

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International Relations had very little interest in the proletarian struggles of the CPH, but they were attracted by the Comintem's proclamations on the colonial question and by the Leninist explanation of imperialism. 118 Their sympathy was reflected in the memorial volume that the association published in 1923 to commemorate its Gfteen years of existence. There it was noted that the PKl was the only party that seemed able to attract the enthusiasm of the Indonesian people and that, should Communism prove the victor in the Indies, this might not be so bad: After all, the SIllvation of human freedom does not lie exclusively in the so highly praised political systems of the Western lands. Other institutioru are also imaginable, which may perhaps possess a greater effectiveness and a more appropriate character for the development of an Eastern society.174 In 1923, Iwa Kusumasumantri, a law student in Leiden University, became chairman of the Pcrhimpunan Indonesia. He was a close associate of Semaun, with whom he roomed for a time; in addition to moving the student group leftward, he became secretary and then aeting chairman of the SPLI. 116 After finishing his studies in 1925 he went on Semaun's urging to Russia, where he studied and later taught at one of the schools for Asian revolutionaries established in Mascow. m In addition, the Indies government charged, he worked for the Krestintern. The Perhimpunan Indonesia did not frown on its ex-chairman's Soviet sojourn. On the contrary, its executive wrote the ECCI on November 8, 1925, expressing its appreciation of the Comintem position on the national revolutionary movement and declaring: The Board of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Indonesian Union) a national-

revolutionary Union of students coming from Indonesia (Java. Sumatra. Celebes, Borneo etc.) authori7..e r-.h. Semaoen and Mr. K. Soemantri to represent and to promote the interests of our lillion with regard to the fight against the world-imperialism . The Board of Perltimpoenan Indonesia Boediarto, 'president Sartono secretary M. Hatta treasury 111 The student group thus saw both Semaun and Iwa Kusumasumantri as able to represent its interests. Clearly, the organization had moved rapidly and far toward the left; however, it was not Communist-control1ed at this point. Its members were strongly inc1ined toward

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Rise of Indonesian Communism Marxism, partly because of the intrinsic appeal of the Leninist explana· tion of imperialism to revolutionary colonial intellectuals and partly be· cause the only Dutch groups with which they had meaningful political contact werc Marxist. Moreover, the Comintem's relatively pronation· alist stand (which Semaun carried. a good deal further in his dealings with the student group) made the line bctwcen revolutionary nation· alism and Communism so blurred as to be almost i1Icgible, In addi· tion, only thc Comintem seemed a likely source of intemationai support for an indcpendence struggle, support that seemed all the more impor· tant to young people who saw revolution as their country's only salva· tion but had little idea of how to go about it. Soon after Sernaun arrived in Europe, the CPH executive announced it was fonning a committee to improve cooperation between the Indonesian and Dutch proletariat. It was to Ionnulate measurcs to cxchangc infonnation, improve analysis of materials coming from Indo· nesia, and carry out activities in the Netherlands to support the Indonesian struggle, ns This was probably inspired by Semaun. who wished to improve CPH appreciation of and activity for the Indonesian movement and who saw himself as head of an Indonesian Communist Representation (Perwakilan Kommunis Indoncsia; Perkommind) in Europe. Meanwhile, however. Sneevliet was suggesting establishment of an Indies Bureau to the Comintem in Moscow; it was to be situated in Holland and to consist of Communists there who knew the colony, and its principle purpose would be to advise the party in Indonesia. The two concepts emerged as one office, but they obviously arose from very different ideas and their conflict of purposc soon became all too apparent. The major product of the Indies BureaujPcrkommind was a peri. odical, Pandoe MUM (The Red Guide) , which was to act as an organ of advice and support for the Communist movement in Indonesia, The journal, first issued in Amsterdam in May 1924, was edited by Semaun, Sneevliet, and Bergsma (the members of the bureau ) and declared its purpose as follows: When we begin the publication of this little monthly organ, we set ourselves a dual task. In the llrst place, we wish to direct ourselves to the Indonesians in Holland and those who are interested in the awakening of Indonesia. iri order to inform them in another manner [than that provided hy regular SOUl'CeS of information} about the important events which mark the awakening of the brown masses. We therefore appear as the defenders of the

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International Relations revolutionary popular movement and desire to give just dues both to the radical nationalist and to the Communist element in this movement. It is a matter of com:re that in a land where. in spite of rapid modernization, no national bourgeoisie of significance has been able to form, extreme nationalism goes together with Communism in the liberation movement. On the other hand, we wish through the publication of this organ to bring help to our brothers in the Indonesian movement, which we have followed with undimmed interest since our expulsion and which we have continued to serve to the best of our abilities, in the hard struggle which they have continued in spite of all persecution and through which they have so clearly shown that our movement in that country is not the creation of a few persons but has developed out of economic relations there. We are aware that this aid can be of only very limited use, but if we succeed in the first place in improving the contact of the Indonesian movement with the international movement, and in the second place in contributing to the strengthening of the cadres in that movement, we feel that we will have accomplished the aim of this journaI. l19

Pandoe Merah's history, in spite of its hopeful beginning, was brief and quarrel-ridden. As one Indies newspaper noted, the publication devoted itself more to denounCing European social democrats and the Netherlands Indies goverrunent than to discussing anything of practical use for the Indonesian Communists. 180 In September 1924 the government, apparently as a result of decisions for sharper anti-Communist action taken at a conference earlier that month, banned the jmport of the journal through the mails. It also took to arresting seamen found smuggling the organ into the Indies, and the mortality rate of couriers was so high that after a few months the editors of Pandoe Meralt decided to give up.t8l The arguments that surrounded the journal reflected the serious disagreement between its Indonesian and Dutch managers concerning the Indonesian party's strategy and their function in guiding it. We have seen that the Pandoe Merah statement of purpose strongly supported radical nationalism. To Sneevliet and Bergsma, however, this meant the Sarekat Islam, which they still regarded as the organization that could best appeal to the Indonesian masses. To Sernaun, who had lost all desire to cooperate with the SI leaders and who had seen the rapid disintegration that followed the SI congress of 1923, such association was unthinkable. Their quarrel was carried over into the Comintern, where, at the ECCI plenum of February/March 1926, Semaun bluntly declared: ''To the comrades in Holland I would like to say: 'do not try

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Rise of Indonesian Communism to interfere in our tactics of leading the national movements as the Sarekat Islam etc., onto our line, as very great changes have taken place in the last few years in Sarekat Islam of which our Dutch com· rades know nothing:" 1&2 For his own part, Semaun thought the future lay with radical secular nationalism, represented by the Perhimpunan Indonesia; as it happened, he was quite right. To the minds of his Dutch colleagues, Semaun was overly attracted to the student group's point of view; they had not forgotten the rwoors of heresy that had surrounded his return to the Indies in 1922, and they accused him of nationalist inclinations. l83 The other aspect of the quarrel concerned the role the PKl advisers in the Netherlands were to play regarding the Indies party. Should they be directors, advisors. or just a link with the Comintem? Should the expellees in the Netherlands form a branch of the Indonesian party there, or should they only work from within the CPH? How great was the Dutch party's respOnsibility for work within the Indonesian move· ment; should it only provide support. or should it also advise and censure when it felt the PKI had fall en into error? On these questions the disagreement was deep and exceedingly bitter. This quarrel took place against the background of a Dutch Communist movement both weakened in nwohers and riven by conHict.1S4 From behind theoretical barricades syndicalist. Trotskyite, and Centrist groups blazed away at each other, and it was not beforc 1930 that the party was reduced to peaceful if dreary Stalinist solidarity. Until 1925 the CPH was under the leadership of Wijnkoop and Van Ravesteyn, with Sneevliet and most of the other Indies expellees in the left opposition. A conllict with the Comintern, which emerged during 1924-1925, led to the downfall of this leadership, and Wijnkoop form ed a CPH of his own in 192B. 18~ Sneevliet, Schilp. and the revolutionary poetess Henriette Roland Holst now came to power, only to be sacrificed in 1927 to the Stalin-Trotsky feud; thereupon Sneevliet set up his own Revolutionary Socialist Party, which eventually allied with the Trotskyite Fourth International. With so much of its energy absorbed in internecine warfare the CPH could not devote much attention to Indonesia. Tbe situation had its advantages, however, as Semaun was quick to observe, for his position against Sneevlict and the expellees could be strengthened by currying favor with the Wijnkoop group. Accordingly. Semaun secured for Wijnkoop a post in the PKl Dutch office, and he in turn was prOVided 244

International Relations with a place in the CPH Central Committee.us This was strictly a marriage of convenience, for the Dutch party chairman and his associates, although they were considered to be otherwise on the right wing, took a position on nationalism considerably to the left of that advocated by the Comintern. Their analysis of the national question was more akin to that of Rosa Luxemburg than to that of Lenin: holding to the orthodox Marxist view that the proletariat had no fatherland, they did not wish to see the Communist struggle sidetracked by support of bourgeois nationalism. 181 Needless to say, the CPH leaders soon came into conHict on this subject with Semaun, who feared that Wijnkoop was trying to reduce the PKI to a component of the Dutch proletarian movement. ISS Their quarrel was aired publicly at the Comintem congress of 1924, a meeting that also saw Ho Chi Minh attack the French and Roy the British Communists for paying insufficient heed to the colonial movements. The Indonesian section of the ECCI report on its activities since the 1922 meeting remarked that the CPH "does very little for the support of the Communist Party of Java." 189 No doubt Semaun, who was elected to the ECCI at the 1924 congress, had something to do with this unkind cut; Wijnkoop certainly did not, for he hastened to set the record straight: We think that the most important point is our attitude toward the Indian [Indies] Party. We have already achieved something in connection with this question. Already some years ago, we drafted the following program: complete emancipation of the Dutch East Indies from Dutch capitalism. And we have to record considerable achievements in the practical carrying out of this program. 1W Nonsense, Semaun replied, the CPH had been no help at all: Comrade Zinoviev was right when he said that the European Communist Parties must work in close cooperation with the Colonia] Communist Parties. Comrade Wijnkoop asserted that the Dutch CommWlist Party had been very active in the colonies, but this is not really so. If the movement in the Dutch colonies is strong, this is not due so much to the influence of the Dutch Party, as to the influence of the Russian revolution. In fact, the work within the Dutch Communist Party was greatly impeded by the dissensions within the Dutch Communist Party. When the railwaymen's strike broke out in Java last year, the party was occupied in settling its dispute with the National Trade-Union Federation (N.A.S.). The strike ended in failure and S<.'Ores of our comrades were imprisoned. Therefore, our advice to the Dutch

Rise of Indonesian Communism Communist Party is that they work more energetically in the future, and to the Executive that they pay more attention to the colonies. I i I De Visser of the Dutch delegation replied with some heat to these accusations: "In connection with comrade Semaun's statement that Wijnkoop e.'(aggerated the influence of the Dutch party on the Indian movement and that it was in reality the Russian revolution which had inRuenced the movement, I will merely remark that already in 19111912 [sic] a number of Dutch comrades were very active in the Indian movement. Semaun himself acknowledged at various meetings that the Dutch Party had carried on a thorough and energetic agitation,'" 1112 Since both Setriaun and Wijnkoop were members of the ECCI, we can well imagine that the Comintem was not allowed to forget the quarrel. Nor did it end with Wijnkoop's ouster: at the ECCI plenary session of March 1926 Semaun again attacked the CPH for claiming much whiJe doing nothing. The Dutch party spokesman indignantly replied that while the recently purged CPH had had its faults in handling the colonial question, its new leadership had an entirely constructive attitud~which , if his Indonesian colleague would bring his head down out of the clouds long enough to look, he should easiJy be able to see,liS Semaun's attitude was by no means entirely justifled. Considering its small size, its poverty, and the fact that its energies were sapped by bitter internal w,arfare, the CPH paid rather considerable attention to the Indies, particularly compared with other European parties' activities on behalf of their colonial comrades. This was partly because Indonesia occupied a much larger place in the Dutch cosmos than did anyone colony of the other imp~ powers; moreover, as Wijnkoop had acknowledged, the PKl was a more Significant 'movement than the CPH at the time, and ex-members of the Indonesian party formed an influential bloc in the Dutch movement. 'Ille real nub of the dispute was not the quantity of CPH activity but its type, 'Ille Dutch Communist leaders viewed their task as prOViding advice and guidance to their younger and more inexperienced colonial comrades, whereas the Indonesians, and particularly Semaun, wanted material and agitational support but in no case the supervision reminiscent of colonial paternalism. 'Ille group most concerned with advising the PKI was the expellees, who found that the CPH did not offer them sufficient scope. A few months after Semaun's arrival in Holland, they accordingly broached

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International Relations the subject of establishing a PKl branch in the Netherlands. This, they argued, would furnish a spiritual home for the Indies Communists r.esident in the Netherlands, represent PKI interests in Europe, and provide guidance, which the ill-trained Indonesian leadership sorely needed and which the CPH was not equipped to give. The last thing Semaun wanted was to give the expellees a chance to meddle in PKI affairs; he stalled on the issue, but they got in touch with the Indonesian party themselves. We may suspect that SemauD suggested the PKI reply, although no doubt the Indonesian party leaders shared his general feelings about the role of the Dutch: About the proposal of our comrades in Holland to recognize your [Semaun's] group as a section of our party, having a mandate from us as our representative body. We have discussed this carefully and often. Organizationally it is impossible to have a section of our party in Holland, because we already have II brother pllrty there. Our decision is thus not in favor of these comrades' (the Dutch comrlldcs') proposal. However, since we know the Dutch party is weak and we cannot expect anything from it, we are of the opinion that it is necessary to have a station of our party in HoUand; this will depend on your remaining in Holland. U there arc comrades who wish to become members of our party, please . tell them to enter the Dutch one. It is not necessarily in our interest to give a mandate as our representative body to a section of our party in Holland; it is enough to give a mandate to one comrade. However, in case you are of the opinion that it is necessary for your work in supplying information to the [CPHJ parliamentary fraction and 50 on, you may create a body composed of old comrlldes; we give you our full mandate in this question. It is up to you, and we give you our full power of attorney .I~ As a result, no PKI branch was established in the Netherlands. Note that in keeping the Dutch out without declaring expressly and uninternationally that it did so because they were Dutch, the PKI also ex-

cluded all Indonesians resident in Holland who wished to join the party and instructed them to join the CPH instead. This was not of great significance during the period with which we are concerned, but it was an important factor in the development of the Indonesian Communist movement after the destruction of the legal PKl.l&5 The maneuverings between the CPH leadership, Sneevliet, the Comintern, Semaun, and the PKl would probably take chapters to describe if we knew them all. The few bits of correspondence available do, however, give some glimpses into the course of the battle. On Novem-

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Rise of Indonesian Communism her 15, 1924, Semaun wrote a report to the Eastern Section of thc Interna.tional in reply to a report sent that body by SneevJiet (Maring) on October 29. We do not have Sneevliet's account, but from Semaun's retort it is evident that he had taken his Indonesian colleague severely to task. He had also apparently objected to the existence of both Tan Ma!aka's Canton office and the PK.I office in Holland as advisers to the Indonesian movement and suggest~ that only one be maintained, preferably the Dutch one. Secondly, he seems to have claimed that Semaun had opposed the association of the Amsterdam office with the Colonial Bureau in Paris, which had been established as a center for metropolitan work among the colonies in response to a demand by the fifth (1924) Comintem congress that the European parties make a greater contribution to the colonial Communist cHart. In addition, he had objected to the Semaun.Wijnkoop deal and the banishment of Brandsteder from the Dutch office of the PKI. Finally, Sneevliet ap. parently opposed participation of the VSTP in the Intemational Trans· port Workers' Federation (ITF), in which the Comintem, doggedly pursuing- the united front from above, hoped to ally the Communist transport unions and those led by the radical socialist Edo Fimmen. Sernaun began his rebuttal by declaring that both the Canton and Dutch connections were necessary, the ~hinese ODe particularly be.. cause of the large number of Chinese proletarians in Indonesia, which the PKI was trying to bring under its influence. Sneevliet, he noted. had once been all for the China link. and now he wished to destroy it; how consistent of comrade Sneevlietl As for the Dutch connection, that was a150 necessary . . . because of the postal connection, the connection with our Javanese . sailors, the political link, and other factors of considerable importance for the revolutionary movement in Indonesia. on the condition that the sectarianism and left sickness of the Dutch so-called "revolutionary" movement is not exported to Indonesia. Our PKI knows this very well. fortun ately. Comrade Maring, in WllDting to destroy these two stntions or one of them, is working against the interests of our PKI, and we take notice of this. About comrade Maring's assertion that. contrary to the advice of comrade Roy. our bureau in Holland is not working in cooperation with the colonial bureau in Paris. I know nothing. I spoke with comrade Roy. during the last congress in Moscow. He told me nothing about this; and later, when comrade Roy came to Holland illegally (llDd when. even more often, his wife came [Evelyn ,Roy, also prominent in the colonial Communist movement]) , comrade Mar·

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International Relations ing did not tcll me that Roy was there, so that I could not speak with him. Comrade Maring talks about the Paris-Amsterdam connection, and yet hc did not want to connect me with comrade Roy. --Of course, I am eager to have such a connection, not only with Paris but with every section of our International. Warming to his subject, Semaun took up the matter of Wijnkoop's veto right over the work of the PKl office: Our bureau in Holland is a communications burcau, and the most important questions handled by it are thus technical and financial ones. In this impor. tant work the rcpresentative of the Dutch party has no veto right. The veto right can only be used in questions of: a. the work (political) of the PKI in Holland, h. the work of the Dutch Party in Java. However, even on these questions the Dutch party can impose a vcto only until the Ea$tern Section [of the Comintem] decides the question . .. . [Maring's] argument that the national movement will use the veto right question against us is nonsense. Our bureau is a secret one and no national· ist or member of the 51 or Budi Utomo will know anything about this; besides, there is the fact that in practice this so-called veto right is not at all important for the work of our bureau, so that even a nationalist will not be able to use this question against us if he finds out about it. This question is not at all 5econd-Intemationalistic or against the spirit of the theses of our second congress. In any case, our PKI win rcmain independent from the CPH, even our PKI bureau in Holland; they will only be disciplined by the Comintem. and are not willing to be dictated to by the CPH or by the Dutch comrade Maring. Turning to the matter of the CPH's work on the Indonesian question, Sernaun continued: Until now the practice has been that comrade Wijnkoop received from me the written speeches about the colonial question which he presented in parliament, and last October be made an interpeJlation in parliament on the reaction in Indonesia on my request. Until now there have been no objections from the opposition in the Dutch party to the colonial policy of com. rade Wijnkoop, ·who was worlting together with me. But comrade Van .Ravesteyn, this Ph.D. who knows every line of the books written by Karl Marx, etc., lives in Rotterdam and has had no connection with me; his mistakes were not the mistakes of our bureau. In the future there will be no such mistakes, because now our connections [with the CPH] via our bureau and via the Central Committee of the Dutch Party will prevent it, cannee-tions which we did not previously have. Then we must consider the contents 249

Rise of Indonesian Communism of OUT orgau Pandoe Merah. It was decided by our last meeting that this organ should contain articles in the Indonesian language, so that the poUtical line presented there in connection with the world movement is controlled by me; Wijnkoop and the others, not understanding the language, can thus not use the veto right here. It is true that leftist deviation is a danger to our movement when [Maring) as the editor infonns our Javanese comrades about a Right Comintem and ProJintem who wish to make a united front with Amsterdam [the IntemationaJ Federation of Trade Unions] and so on, without explaining clearly our general tactic on this question. And what comrade Maring has written is law. For example: in the nrst number of our Pandoe Merah he wrote: "In Indonesia there does not exist a national capitaJism, in spite of the fact that foreign capitalism has penetrated extremely ra pidly." I opposed this conclusion, being of the opinion-having analyzed the history of capitalism in Indonesia-that [nationaJ] capitalism does not exist there precisely because of the fact that foreign capitalism has penetrated so rapidly, which fact made impossible the nonnm growth of nationaJ capitalism. But comrade Maring did not want to change his mistaken point of view without argument, perhaps because I am "politicany not sufficiently educated." -My experiment with comrade Maring in the editorship of the Pandoe Merah was a dangerous one, and it is good that he has resigned from it. . . . Now about comrade Brandsteder, the Dutch knight who sallies forth against the united front. I have had quite some experience with this comrade. A year long he kept our brochures in Holland and did not send them to Java. Four months long he sent no money for Java, because he did not know how to send it-perhaps because he has had practical experience in organizational questions. It was only when I was deported to Holland that I could take over this work, using my own methods of creating a connection between Indonesia and Holland. In this work I had asked many times for comrade Brandsteder's support, but I received very little and often had to wait a long time for it. OUf great comrade had so much to do, and the brown Javanese could come back again at Brandsteder's convenience. Such is the custom of the Dutch ruler in Java. -What support did comrade Brandsteder give? Nothing more than to keep our own money safely and to put it in the Bank. My work among the seamen, building up an organization there, composing statutes [for the SPLI], etc., I bad to do by myself. Our Brandsteder was supposed to arrange for the printing of our materials• . and-he brought them to a private printing nrm and not to the Dutch party one, so that we got into trouble with the brother-party. We wanted our own money? Good, boy, come back again tomorrow. I have YOU f money now, but I don't want to hand it over, and tomorrow I mall decide. Understand Semaun? This sort of thing has taken place many times in Holland, and I

25Q

I ntcmational Relations have had to use all sorts of diplomatic manoeuvres to get anything from this comrade. Oh, if it wasn't so necessary for O\lr movement in Indonesia, I would have liked to end my connection with him long ago. (Comrade Sumantri, my assistant, has also been in conflict with Brandsteder.) This Dutch comrade. who is so full of ruling-race-superior-fancy. worked only among the Dutch navy men and soldiers in Indonesia. does not speak MaJay. and looked with disdain upon the brown masses. the very stupi4 coolie class. Yes. he was deported for his revolutionary activities, but his activity was on a Dutch basis. In place of the Dutch capitalistic governor general you have the Dutch dictator Brandstedcr, and the Indonesi:ms must recognize the superiority of Dutch leadership! Does comrade Maring think that I am so ingenuous as not to understand this and to devote myself like a slave to the Dutch? I thank him for it, but I am of the opinion that it is a very good thing that comrade Brandsteder is now discharged from our bureau. U he should come back there, our bureau would become a battlefield, with a very small capacity for work. Let him go and dictate to the syndicalist members of his own transport workers' union, which has a very small number of Dutch seamen as members. -This will be better for our work on behalf of the movement in Java, though perhaps not so good for comrade Maring's efforts in his own behalf. . . . Now about our railway trade union and Fimmen's ITF. What is Maring ta1lcing about? Until now we have not yet joined the ITF, because we are waiting for instruction about this from the Pro6ntem. I just want to give my opinion about the so-called "experiment" here. Comrade Maring, the Dutch General against the United Front Movement. is of the opinion that it is dangerous to let the young Javanese trade union into the ITF because its youthfulness will allow it to be inHuenced along reformistic lines. Opposing this, I am of the opinion that the facts show (1) the trade unions in Indonesia have been created by our political party, and so there is a historical reason why our trade unionism is revolutionary; (2) the working class in our country is doubly oppressed by the political and economic policies of imperialism, so that there is an objective basis for the revolutionary character of our trade unions; (3) the trade unions are led by members of our PKI. It is therefore dear that our trade unions are by nah.!re revolutionary; this being the case, no reformist will be able to influence our trade unions along reformist lines. On the contrary. our young movement will be able to work inside the Amsterdam {lntemationalJ for our purposes. The experience of our trade unionism has shown clearly that our party alone controls 75 per cent of the labor movement, and the social democrats not one per cent. Why then does comrade Maring fear this danger? Well, he fears it because he is against the united front, and nothing more. It is very wrong of him to talk nonsense about Javanese trade unionism for his own ends whUe

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Rise of Indonesian Communism declaring that he wunts to prC?tect our movement from the Amsterdam danger. Let him guard himself from the sickness of leftism; it would be healthier for him! He would then be balanced in mind and would no longer try to destroy II decision of our third RILU congress, namely. to make me a member of the Executive Bureau of the Profintem. His trade unions are not members of our Profintem, and-he wants to dictate to our Profintem what it should do.

Semaun continued in this vein for some length; he was sorry to have to fight with Sncevliet, he declared, but the Dutch leader bad unfortunately fallen into error., Apparently, too, Sneevliet persisted in believing the '1ies about my speeches" on his return to Indonesia and was convinced that Semaun was immature. However, both he and the PKI were well able to take care of themselves: "Yes, our movement is still young, but it is no longer a litt1e child. It is a strong young adult with an independent character, which does not want to be a child of the Dutch but only a child of Leninism." Sneevliet, SemaWl asserted, had written to the PKl denoWlcing him; fortunately. he too had written the . party, inForming it of Sneevliet's plottings, and so the PKI was not taken in. "In conclusion," Semaun stated, ., propose you reject comrade Maring's protest and not follow the proposals at the end of his letter. Please help us to keep every sectarian Dutch comrade away from the ranks of the Indonesian revolutionaries," It1 A month later, on December 25, 1924, SemaWl wrote the PKI that Moscow had decided in his favor in the quarrel with the CPH.1i8 Whether it actually had is a question. since both Semaun and his Dutch opponents seem to have embroidered the truth when that served their side of the struggle. Meanwhile. the PKI had written to the Comintem on December 17 (presumably in connection with its just-concluded Jogjakarta conference). expressing its views on the work in Holland. Apparently the message was not plain, for the Comintern, in a letter of May 5, 1925, requested c1ari6cation. On May 30. Semaun wrote to the Indonesian party denouncing what he claimed were Bergsma's intrigues against him, saying that it was a great pity that he did not have a clear authorization to handle the party's European affairs, and asking the PKI to write the ECCI as follows in response to its letter of May 5:

I"

The meaning of our letter, dated 17 December 1924, was only: 1. To demonstrate that comrades Semaoen, Ma1aka and eventually other new comrades, which we send probably From Java, are our real representa-

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International Relations tives, which we believe to work in the interest of the Comintern and Pro6ntern, thus also in the interest of the revolutionary movement in Indonesia in general (PKI, Red Trade Unions, etc.); 2_ That consequently other representatives in Holland and somewhere can be only those comrades who are elected by comrades Semaoen (in Holland can be elected; Bergsma, van Munster. Dekker. van Burink, etc_). Malaka and other real representatives; 3. That Holland is too far from Indonesia and that the revolutionary movement there is very complicated, so that we cannot be responsible for the detai1ed work of the Perkommind in the Dutch movement and others, but in this matter we believe in comrade Semaoen as our real representative, -so that he is responsible also for election of our second representative in the Perkommind bureau Holland (comrade Bergsma was not elected by us as second member of that bureau. but elected by comrade Semaoen and we could agree with it). Consequently we have not any objection against comrade Bergsma as long as he will work hannoniously with comrade Semaoen, who is responsible for . everything in Holland before our party.19lI

If Semaun felt himself harassed by Dutch intrigues. the expellees seem to have consideted themselves victims of his empire-building eHorts_ In June 1925 Sneevliet and the fonner VSTP leader Harry Dekker addressed themselves in desperation to Tan Malaka in Canton and Sugono at PKI headquarters in Java: Dear friends, We tum to you ronceming the cause which is of such great importance for all of us, to which we have given years of our lives, and which. although far from the scene of batt1e, we view with undiminished concern: the movement in Indonesia. 1. Our i$olatlon. We begin directly with a bitter complaint about the fact that. we, through various circumstances. are completely isolated from the movement. For some time no news has reached us other than reports from the bourgeois papers and-irregularly-from the Sinar Hindia, later the Api.

In spite of the fact that here in Holland there exists a so-called Indies Bureau, in which Semaun, Bergsma and Wijnkoop (as representative of the CPH) are currently seated, Semaun in particular manages to keep us and to a certain degree the bureau member Bergsma out of things. Why he does so is unknown to us. If it is due to the consideration that only Indonesians must handle these affairs, that absolutely un-Communist and In our special case is anything but romradely. It cannot be completely unknown to Semaun what we once were and still can be for the Indies movement. His attitude

is

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Rise of Indonesian Communism leaves the impression that the Indonesians (that is to say, the Indonesians who think the way he does) are grateFul to the Indies Government For the expulsions and forced resignations which have been employed against prominent Europeans in our movement. Dear friends, the attitude of Semaun in this matter is absolutely wicked.

2. The Indies Bureau. When Sneevliet was· still in Moscow in 1923 and 1924, he suggested to the Eastern Section [of the ComintemJ that for the handling of Indies aHairs a bureau be foimed in Holland from those comrades acquainted with the Indies, who were living in Holland. This was agreed to. The bureau was fonned of Semaun-Brandsteder-Bergsmaj it took up the organization of the seamen in HolJ.and, in which at the beginning Brandsteder rendered good services as a union man, and published the Pandoe Merah, originally under the editorship of Bergsma. Semaun. and Sneevliet. ·The leadership of the CPH was not taken with this and wished to have a saYi and during the fifth world congress, which Dekker and Semaun attended for Java (on this occasion, too, Semaun kept comrade Dekker out of all discussions over the bureau ), the Wijnkoop-Semaun combination managed to get comrade Brandsteder removed without redress from the bureau (Brandstcder, who had been expelled from the Indies and who had done his work without recompense of any sort), and in place'Of him named Wijnkoop as third member with extraordinary privileges, even the right of veto in political questions concerning the Indies. To the great amazement of the British Indian Roy, Semaun lent his cooperation in this. Semaun's aim was clear: he calculated that Wijnkoop would not bother with the affairs of the bureau, and he intended to worle for the fOrming of a one-man bureau, a Semaun-bureau. So far "this has not yet been achieved, though Semaun's attitude toward Bergsma proves that nothing is coming of the collective leadership. It occurs to us that this effort does not have the support of responsible Indonesian comrades. On the contrary. we are certain that they prefer collective [action] and thus mutual consultation. Even though it is Wlderstandable that Indonesian comrades act with reserve toward Westerners they do not know, and are not happy with their interference, we do "not believe that they approve such an attitude toward those who stood with them at the head of the work in the Indies and who clearly had the con6dence of the comrades while there. We do not know in what manner Semllun informs comrades who ask about us and about our place in the work. What is written above is, however, an e'[act representation of the facts : Semaun has systematically broken every connection between us and the Indonesian workj and when he praises us for our "former" services in newspaper articles and the like, he makes himself guilty of one of his many dishonesties.

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Intemational Relations What is true for our contact with the PKI and Sarekat Rakjat is just as true for the labor movement, the railway workers' union, in whose develo~ ment we took a considerable part. Repeatedly we ask Semaun for addresses, so that we could write ourselves. He always claimed not to possess such addresses, and with such an attitude on his part it made us doubly sorry that we never receive letters directly from your side. It occurs to' us that the Indies Bureau would be abJe to do good work if, in the first place, it would be formed of persons nominated by the leading organs in Indonesia and the Eastern Section [of the Comintem], and further, that the comrades in Holland who are acquainted with the Indies be drawn into the work and that consultation with these comrades be provided for.. We Icnow very well that the usefulness of such a bureau is always limited at such a great distance; but it could be much greater than it now is. In how far the Bureau has succeeded in really building up a union of Indonesian seamen is naturally unknown to us. We notice nothing here of the activities of this organization. 3. Semaun's policy. The presentation which Semaun gave on various occa~;ons was, in brief, this: When he returned to Indonesia in May 1922, everything was, according to him, in a mess . Dut four months later everything was in order. In those four months there came, so far as we know, that remarkable public appearance of Semaun which he now labels a tactical manoeuvre and which at the time made a number of comrades wonder whether Semaun had suddenly changed his allegiance. As soon as he returned, everything was naturally fine. He uses unbelievable statistics for membership, particularly of the Sarebt Rakjat, and in general seems to us to give a completely false picture of the real situation. A short while ago Moscow rejected his political policies, that nonsense with the substructure and the superstructure and the alienation from the nationalist movement. \Ve do not Imow in how far direct reports from the Indies and from Canton were inOuential in this. At the moment a series of articles from his pen are appearing in the Tribune, inaccurate by their incompleteness, and apparently aimed at praising his own part in the work as highly as poSSible. Since MoSCt)w disapproved his political line there is a double reason why Indonesia should work to put a speedy end to the personal leadership of the Indies Bureau and thus to the one-sided infonnation provided by this Bureau. 4. The Colonial Bureau, which concerns itself with the movements in English and French colonies, should extend its efforts to include the Dutch colonies, in which way a better control over policy regardillg Indonesia could also be achieved. 5. Canton and lndmwsia. It is not clear to tiS in what manner comrade Malaka can help to influence the work in Indonesia and at the same time

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Rise of Indonesian Communism avoid that his advice does not at times differ completely from that which goes to Indonesia via Holland (a possibility which is not unimaginable). There should be a connection [between Holland and CantonJ. The tie with Canton. seems to w of great importance for variow reasons, but we wouJd like to know something more about these matters. At the same time Malaka would do us a great pleasure if he would now and then inform us about conditions in South China. These change so rapidly that one can't keep track of them without infonnation from other than newspaper sources. 6. Information about Indonesia. First of all, we appeal to comrades Sugono, Kadarisman, SubaJcat, Gondojuwono, and others to provide a system by which we will periodically receive information about the situation in the movement. [There then follows a closely typed page of questions regarding the Indonesian situation which reveals that Sneevliet and Dekker were quite truthfu1 in claiming that they knew nothing about what had been going on there.J 200 'Ibis p1aint seems to have gone unheeded, for on August 25, 1925, the PKI executive answered the Comintem with the reply that Semaun had dictated,201 and his domination of the Amsterdam office was assured. Undoubted1y, the whole affair was an enormous headache for the Comintern, since it reduced the value of its most important connection with the PKI very considerably. Its contacts with the Indies thus tenuous and dependent on information supplied by the PKl's strongly opinionated friends and relatives abroad, the International was unable to intervene effectively in Indonesian affairs. Little wonder, too, that the Comintern took no great interest in the Indonesian question. 202 The PKI was not the only party to badger the International with its feuds and deviations; because it was one of the most distant and little known, it doubtless also seemed one of the least important of Comintern adherents. As for its representatives' claims that the party dominated the Indonesian mass movement, who could be sure they were right? Sneevliet for one seemed convinced that they were a gross exaggeration. The Intemational therefore had neither a pressing reason nor a reliable basis for intervention. Thus lightly held, the Comintem rein was not sufficient to check the PKI. During 1924 the party took the bit between its teeth; two years later, it bolted.

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Deviation ALL in all, 1924 had been a good year for the PKI. It had clearly bested the Sarekat Islam in the competition for popular support, had expanded its mass organization considerably in West and Central Java, and had made marked progress in establishing footholds on the Outcr Islands. Nonetheless, at the end of the year storm clouds gathered on the PKI horizon, and a special conference convened by the party in December took place in an atmosphere of impending crisis. Among the signs of coming trouble were the development of Indo. nesian anti·Communist organizations in certain areas, the appearance of competing radical groups here and there in the countryside, and a minor but rising inclination for SR units to undertake individual terrorist actions. 1 The less intransigent Communist following was being eatcn away by discouragement. while the morc irascible PKl adherents were becoming impatien't of the party's failure to attack the existing order by stronger means than words. Moreover, there was the very shaky state of party finances to consider. Although the PKI had abandoned its original promise to supply frcc propagandists to the Sarekat Rakjat and was now requesting both SR and party branches to send money to cover all travel expenses with their request for an agitator,2 the central executive was beginning to nm seriously into debt. PKI aHairs"were in this parlous state partly because the rapid expansion of the Sarekat Ral..iat, to a considerable extent, did not add to PKI work among the urban proletariat but replaced it. The activists who had gone to work in the SR were in good part labor leaders whose unions had been hit by the VSTP strike and its aftennath, the virtual collapse of the PKI Semarang-based network of labor organizations.! Communist labor activity was dormant during 1923 and most of 1924, and the movement expanded outside the urban proletariat. This threatened the PKI's proletarian character,and it created a serious financial problem for the party executive, since the unions were more

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Rise of Indonesian Commlmism reliable sources of fWlds than either the SR or the party branches themselves. Because labor organizations were morc successful in collecting dues and contributions from their members, both SI and PKI leaders of the early I920s had drawn income from the unions rather than from the politic~l groups they led.4 The loss of much of this monetary support, combined with the added costs of far-Rung actiyities, made the central executive's position increasingly precarious. In addition, the party leadership was becoming increasingly concerned by the attitude of the authorities. For some time Governor General Fock had been Wlder pressure from conservative opinion, re8ected in the majorities in the Volksraad and Netherlands parliament and by the Minister of Colonies, to take additional measures against the Communists. Fock was, we will remember, a libertarian by inclination, and he had been reluctant .to increase the number of sanctions at his disposaL though he applied -the available ones much 'more strongly than his predecessors.6 These weapons were, as we have seen, considerable. The government was empowered to restrict drastically the right of assembly when it felt the public order thrcatened, and in Jogjakarta, Surakarta, and Semarang this became almost a permanent state of affairs. Articles 155 and 156 of the Criminal Code gave it great leeway to restrict the freedom of speech and press.! In addition, the lack of habeas corpus in Indies law (which. like that of the Netherlands. was based on the Napoleonic Code) made it possible for the government to hold prisoners inde6nitely on suspicion; this was increasingly used as a political weapon, so that major PKl leaders could usually count on spending several months of each year in jaiU This greatly hindered PKI organizational development; moreover, when it :was massively ap· plied, as with the arrests of party executive members in October 1923. it could virtually paralyze the party central command. 8 Impressive as it was, this arsenal soon appeared insufficient to check the revolutionary movement, and after the VSTP strike of 1923 the Governor General was less reluctant to increase the punitive measures at his command. The antistrike law was the first and most notable move in the new direction; in the ensuing year the government also tightened its supervision and restriction of "wild school" instruction, refused various political leaders pennission to reside in areas of their principal inBuence, introduced a passport system to curb the movement of political undesirables in the Outer Island areas. strengthened immigration and residence rules, narrowed its conditions for recog258

Deviation nizing Indonesian organizations, stiffened its requirements for poUtical orthodoxy in publie and private utterances by government officials and teachers, increased the authorization necessary for the holding of public meetings. encouraged the indirectly administered Outer Is~nd regions and Princely Territories to restrict political activity. and openly contemplated drastic measures to control the Indonesian press. 8 Although these measures were aimed in the first place at the Communists, they were also employed against other Indonesian political movements. Thus the non-Communist wild schools suffered as well as the SR system from restrictions on private education; Abdul Muis was refused pennission to continue residence in his native West Sumatra (leaving the field free to the PKI, which he had bee~ opposing there ) ; the Sarekat Ambon and Sarekat Hindia were denied official recognition as political organizations; and the position of public servants with any but the most conservative political inclinations was made extremely uncomfortable. Although the proponents of stem repressive action stressed the foreign connections of the PKl they did so not to distinguish the party from the rest of the Indonesian opposition but rather to equate all outspoken dissent with revolution, hence with Communism, and, thus with alien, "unnatural" ideas used to arouse a basically contented but unfortunately naive populace. The government's concept of what was potentially subversive was extremely broad, for in the Netherlands a rising spirit of nationalist possessiveness had by now effectively overwhelmed arguments for gradual emancipation: "We must hold the Indiesl Because we feel the ties of historyl Because our welfare is so greatly dependent on the Indies . . . . We must hold the Indies!" 10 Opposition to colonialism was from this point of view inherently revolutionary. and non-Communist as well as PKI critics of the government were thus affected by the growing official conviction that "every propagandistic action which is directed toward or capable of leading to an undermining of authority or a disturbance of the public peace and order must be opposed by all legal means at the disposal of the authorities." 11 This attitude served to drive the Indonesian parties further toward noncooperation, and in 1924 and 1925 both the Sarekat Islam and Budi Utomo were shaken by debates on the wisdom of continuing Volksraad participation. The SI decided in 1925 to withdraw from the assembly and be noncooperative. Budi Utoma came to the same conclusion a year later; it soon reversed this policy but thus alienated its younger 259

Rise of Indonesian Communism generation. TIle PKI, as the chief object of the government attack, became for many non-Communists a martyr in the popular cause; mOJ:C{)Ver, the great aJann the authorities showed concerning the party made it appear that the Dutch were mortally afraid of it and that therefore its strength must be far greater than appeared on the surface. TIlls was a principal cause of the steep rise in the Sarekat Rakjat's following during 1924, Budi Utomo warned; 12 and the Communists, well aware of its usefulness in creating a bandwagon effect, emphasized the governmental dismay in their agitation among the common people. This was a principal theme of a series of mass meetings sponsored by the PKI at the end of August 1924 to protest recent police measures and to call on the Comintern and the Dutch and Chinese Communist parties for support. 11 The August demonstrations were prompted by fear of new restrictions as well as objections to current ones. By mid-l924 it was apparent to the government that ad hoc application of its legal weapons might maim but not destroy the Communist movement. Coordinated measures were needed, and the Governor General accordingly called high officials to his palace in September to confer on a campaign against the Communist movement. The meeting, which was secret, produced a series of directives calling on officials to take a sharper stand against public expres.sion of unrest and particularly against organizations associated with the PKI. The Governor General's conference caused the Communists' hearts to skip a beat, for they feared a gener'a) ban on party activities-a move that was in fact under consideration. 14 The PKI was by no means in a position to go underground. It did not have the organizational cohesion necessary for effective illegal existence, and it would become immeasurably more difficult to attract and hold a lJN!.ss foUow~ iog. Because of the extremely high ill.iteracy rate, the printed word was almost worthless as a means of communication with the SR rank and 61e; 15 the PKI therefore relied on its cadres and traveling propagandists to bring the word to the villages. TIle meetings they held could contiriue illegally only if they were much smaller (which meant an increase in their number, and thus in the number of trained propagan~ dists) and if those attending them kept silence (which meant greatly improved diScipline). Money, cadres, and discipline the PKI possessed in greater measure than had the Sarekat Islam. but even so th~ Communists were scarcely rich in these resources. As the party itselF re26IJ

Deviation marked, the June congress directives, urging that work in the mass movement proceed in a manner that was both more disciplined and less likely to attract the unfavorable attention ,Of the authorities, had by September nowhere been carried OUt. 16 The first PKI response to the Governor General's conference was sharply to reduce the number of public SR rallies, conccntrating instead on informal gatherings either open to members only or involving a few persons at a time. To allow for public attendance at closed meetings. it was arranged that SR "membership" could be acquired Simply by paying a small admission fee. This maneuver bore the danger that the Sarekat Rakjat, hardly tight-knit to begin with, would become an audience rather than an organization. This tendency was somewhat offset, however, because SR members were often treated unfavorably by the local authorities, particularly in the rural areas, where village heads had considerable personal contact with and control over the people under their jurisdiction. Since the police checked membership cards at meetings and wrote down names, this probably reduced substantially the number who took out membership cards without intending to participate seriously in the movement. On the whole, a government report noted, the result of the new tactic was that Communist propagandiSts reached fewer people but worked more intensively than before among the audience they did obtain. l1 The new tactics on SR membership and meetings constituted a stopgap measure, for there was every reason to believe that the government's next step would be to act against the closed meetings as wen. 'I1le Communists, although they asserted that the Governor General's conference merely showed how afraid the authorities were, admitted in the same breath that the future of the party was in grave peril. The PKI press continued to declare its opposition to terrorist actions and to underground work, which it prophesied would lead to a breakdown in the central executive's control, particularly in the crucial area of 6nance. At the same time, however, it warned that government policy was forcing the PKI toward illegality and revolution. using arguments reminiscent of those employed by the VSTP leadership as it shifted its stand from opposition to support of the ill-fated railway strike. 11 The PKI executive met on September 27 to 28 to discuss the situation. After this conference, the party announced that, as a result of government restrictions, it would no Jonger work to expand the mass movement but would instead intensify its work among the proletariat, 261

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particularly in plantation, rail, I..'Ommunications, harbor, mining, and oil enterprises. A few days later; the party leadership wrote to its branches urging them to develop their labor union work and to consider the possibility of replacing the eristing 5R sections with PKI branches. 19 nus decision, involving a drastic change in the movement's structure and activity, reflected a shift in power within the PKI executive to a group led by Aliarcham, which wished to see a purely proletarian action aimed at preparing a revolution. Just where Darsono stood on the matter is not clear, although since he spoke out against it at a party congress three months later, it is prohably safe to asswne that he did not sponsor the move. Darsollo had, however, become notably less active in PKI affairs; he did not move to Batavia when party headquar. tees were transferred there, and during the latter part of the year he was not often in 5emarang. The authorities speculated that he was withdrawing from the public view to avoid internment; 2D it is also possible that his position in the PKI leadership was on the wane, for in the ensuing year it is increasingly difficult to observe his in8uence on PKI policies. The executive's recommendations were not without their opponents in the party. 50 strong were the objections, in fact, that they were withdrawn on October 12, and it was announced that the issue would be discussed at a special conference to be held in December,21 This meeting convened from December 11 to 15 in Kutagede, a suburb of the city of Jogjakarta; it was attended by 96 delegates from 38 PKI sections, representing 1,140 members, and from 46 5R branches, representing 31,000 members,22 The party executive presented a plan to jettison the 5arekat Rakjat in favor of purely proletarian activity. The proposal was defended by Aliarcham, who was a graduate of teachers training school and an ardent theoretician. It was this interest in doctrine, Alimin later charged, that led him astray: "Because at that time Aliarcham did not have a sufficiently deep understancling of Marxist concepts and the ways of putting them into practice, he clung stub-bornly to the basic principles of Marxism.. , . Aliarcham was unable to utilize Marxism according to the conditions prevailing in Indonesia at that time," 23 The PKI chairman was also an extremely prinCipled and courageous man, who, as he was later to demonstrate in exile, was willing to maintain a position literally to the bitter end. Aliarcham's character and interests made him an unbending opponent of those elements in the party he considered inclined to compro. 262

Del)iation mise in the anti-imperialist struggle; moreover, his opl.D1on was bolstered by the now very real prospect of the mass movement's collapse under increasing government pressure. If the Communists were to live up to their principles and choose revolution instead of political silence, Aliarcham declared, they would have to change their policies radically, especially as far as the Sarekat Rakjat was concerned. That organization possessed imposing proportions but little revolutionary value, for its peasant members held the petty bourgeois vaJues of their class: they only considered their immediate economic interests, had no concept of the Communist purpose, endangered the party's proletarian character, and were all too inclined to give up in despair ,or go over into terrorism. The SR was too bulky and too undependable to organize illegally; at the same time its public existence meant open gatherings and hence an opportunity for the authorities to arrest Communist leaders for their antigovernment statements. In addition to these strategical considerations, Aliarcham continued, the party must realize that its attempt to organize the masses had been doctrinally incorrect, for the Communist party was after all supposed to concern itself with the proletariat and not with the peasantry. The party should instead work on the organizations it had neglected so shamefully since 1923-the revolutionary labor unions. Here the Communists would be in their own element; they could organize without such a great risk of government reprisal, and they could form a disciplined machine with a secret, insurrectionary character, Henceforth the party's work in the labor movement should concentrate not on strikes for economic ends but on preparation for revolution, for insurrection must be led by the proletariat. The peasant masses were not in themselves a revolutionary force and would be roused to rebellion only when the uprising was clearly under way; hence, the object of the PKI must be to create a proletarian revolt, the momentum of which would be so powerful that it would sweep the peasantry along with it.~' It has been claimed that a major consideration behind the PKI executive recommendation was the program laid out by the fourth Camintern congress and the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference, which in June of the same year had urged on the Communists greater proletarian pruity and increased emphaSis on revolutionary trade unions.2~ According to Darsono and Alimin,28 intemation'al opinion played very little part in the debate on the Sarekat Rakjat; however, the PKI congress did consider the decisions or those meetings, and since the ques263

Rise of Indonesian Communism tion is an important one for understanding the subsequent relationship of the PKI with the Comintem, we shall here review the advice they expressed in order to see what further light it sheds on the subject. The PaciSc Transport Workers' Conference undeniably emphasized the organization of the proletariat-understandably so, for it was originally a Pro6ntem project and was intended to deal specifically with labor unions. At the meeting. the representatives of the Chinese railway workers' union were hostile to the alliance with the Kuomintang. and were supported by the Indonesian delegates, Alimin and Budisutjitro. The Pr06ntern representative, Leo Heller, expressed the radical inclinations of his organization by holding up the Indonesian and Chinese railway union delegates as the really revolutionary element at the conference. but Comintem spokesman VOitinsky charged them unfavorably with"forming the "'left wing'" of the meeting. The Indonesian delegates, he noted, "'gave a cold and dubious reception to the declaration of the responsible representative of the Kuomintang Party, who called upon the workers to form a united front with the peasantry and intellectuals, but not under the hegemony of the proletariat." Eventually, they were persuaded to join in the conference appeal for a united front, but they insisted that such an alliance must be "under the leadership of the real revolutionary organizations in which there is sufficient Communist influence.":1 Comintem opinion at the Canton conference was thus to the right, not the left, of the PKI delegates' stand. It should be noted, however, that the Indonesians objected not to the type of relationship the party enjoyed with the Sarekat Rakjat but to the one it had had with the Sarekat Islam-in other words, to the bloc within. They did not protest cooperation with organizations the Communists controlled, and the (.'Onference itself made it clear that work with the non proletarian masses was essential: Such organized struggles of the coloniaJ peoples against imperialism in this historical period when the proletariat, organized in revolutionary parties and led by a revolutionary center against the strongholds of Capitalism. necessitates the formation of militant peoples' parties in the colonies. consist· ing of workers, peasants, intellectuaJs and nonpropertied classes in the cities. Such parties will not only unite the struggling forces for independence inside the colonies, but will a1so bring the "national revolutionary movements of the East in contact with the world revolutionary labour movement. Toiling masses of the East! We call upon you to assist in the organization of peoples' parties for the struggle "against imperialism.28

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Deviation The equivocal wording of this declaration, which did not make clear whether the popular parties ~ere to be under Communist control, may have been a concession to leftist opinion at the conference. or it may have originated in the demand for Comintem-sponsored "people's parties" which currently fanned a minor theme in the Comintem's Asia program. The International seems to have adopted this line on the urging of those revolutionaries who feared putting all their eggs in the bourgeois basket; it did not become a major point in the program for the East, very likely because the top Comintem leaders were not at heart convinced the Communists could themselves organize mass movements that 'extended beyond the proletarian cIass; therefore, they preferred to rely on alliance with non-Communist mass groupings. In any event, it is clear that the Canton conference did not want to abandon work among the nonprolctanan masses; on the contrary. its manifesto clearly approved SR-type organizations. There is no evidence that the Indonesian delegates, returning home afterward, represented the Transport Workers' meeting as opposed to the Sarekat Rakjat. Alimin objected to Aliarcham's proposal at the De.. cember meeting, and the existing account indicates that he and Budisutjitro faithfully repeated the Canton recommendations of support for nonproletarian movements, together with its call for increased labor union work. Alimin was reported to have described the conference's principle topics as follows: (a) The unity of the transport workers in the whole of Asia, the strength of which could be employed as a weapon when the time for radical action had come; (b) cooperation with all political movements of a revolutionary nature in the whole of Asia, in order to rebel against Western and Eastern imperialism by force, in which connection-according to the speaker, the Red Eastern Labor [Secretariat] of which Ibrahim Datulc Tan Malaka was also a member, had been established in Canton. This body was designed to maintain the link between the transport workers' associations, in particular those of the dockworkers and seamen in Asia, viz., China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, India, Singapore, Siam, etc. The communists should not, however, con6ne themselves to working among the dockworkers and seamen (though these should be canvassed 6rst and foremost), but should also try to obtain influence (lnd leading positions among transport workers, industrial workers, and miners, in order to be prepared at the outbreak of war in the near future in Asia and the Pacific, when America and Japan would be the first belligerents.28

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Budisutjitro discussed the conference rapommendations concerning c0operation with non-Communist movements and reportedly said that, although the Kuomintang and the Philippines independence movement were largely bourgeois nationalist in character, the Communists s~ould support them inasmuch as Communism championed the struggle against imperialism as well as capitalism. For this reason, he declared, the Javanese delegation to the Canton conference had stated its willingness to cooperate with all Asian revolutionary movements, regardless of whether they had a Communist character. 8o It thus seems most unlikely that the Paci6c Transport Workers' Conference, concerned as it was for proletarian action, inspired the abandoning of the Sarekat Rakjat. Much the same may be said of the fifth Comintern congress, which opened in June 1924. At the time the apparent success of Communist policy in China and the stirrings of revolt elsewhere in the East contrasted sharply with the stagnant condition of the revolution in Europe; as a result, the International's in~er­ est in Asia was rekindled, and it attempted to make up for previous neglect of the East by elaborating its colonial program. The theme of the International's recommendations was stated by the Comintern chairman before the meeting began: The task of the Fifth Congress will consist in worlcing out more concretely the application of the national policy of the Comintern in various COWltries, and especially in the countries of the East and the ColoniC.f where the struggle for national independence is deve10ping more and more into a revolutionary movement directed against the domination of international capitalism. The proper solution of the nationaJ question will help aU parties to win over the masses to our side. It is the national and agrarian questions that most of all distinguish the Comintem from its predecessors, the Second International and even the First Intemational, which, owing to historical conditions, raised these questions only in an abstract manner. Without solving the national and agrarian questions in the spirit of Leninism, the Comintern cannot win over the majority or the toilers and without doing the latter, we cannot enter the decisive bartJe.81

As usual, M. N. Roy opposed close relations with non-Communist movements. "It is true that we must always have a connection with these national movements, but it seems to have been overlooked that these connections have not always been successful," he pointed out. "What pra ct~cal results has our connection with the national liberation movement had hitherto? Nonc. except in the onc or two cases where a 266

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nationalist State Government has bad friendly relations with the Soviet State." U Not surprisingly in view of the current success of the Chinese bloc within, the International did not share his views but proclaimed itself heartily in favor of cooperation with nationalist revolutionary movements. The Asian discussion therefore gave little grounds for a turn to the left. However, in its general policy recommendations, which were keyed to the situation in Europe, the congress took a much Jess sanguine attitude toward alliance: In view of the danger of the "right" aberrations, which were revealed in the application of the tactics of the united front to a far larger extent tban could be anticipated, the Executive rejected as an opportunistic interpretation any attempt to construct the tactics of the united front into anything more than a revolutionary method of agitation and mobilization of the masses, as well as any attempt to make use of the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government'" not for agitation in favour of the proletarian dictatorship, but for a coalition of bomgeois democracy." Both the fifth Comintcrn and concurrent third Profintem congresses emphasized the need to increase labor union work and to "bolsheVize" the Communist parties by strengthening their proletarian orthodoxy. This lent an air of radicalism to the meetings, though the International's motives for urging this action were based on a conservative assumption, namely, that an uprising in Europe was no longer likely and that the Communists' best hope for success lay in long-term infiltration of the non-Communist labor movement, a process that demanded both increased concentration on the proletariat and the guarantee of orthodoxy in the parties themselves. We could reasonably suspect that this stress on proletarianism might have influenced the PKI's decision to reject its nonproletarian base, had not the congress specifically endorsed the SR. The Indonesian case was brought up by ManuiIsky in the keynote address; he noted with approval Communist participation in the "workers' and peasants' party in the Dutch East Indies" (which he appeared to consider an out~ wardly independent unit with which the PKI was cooperating as a bloc within ).u The objection that the SR might infect the party with a petty bourgeois spirit was not without foundation , he acknow1edged; it was a problem that generally confronted Asian Communists: Thus the sections [of the Comintem in Asia) are faced with a two-fold danger: the danger of ignoring the phenomena which are revolutionizing the 2Rl

Rise of Indonesinn Communism East, and the danger of losing their character by collaboration ,vith the petty bourgeoisie; we are faced with the question not only of revolutionary collaboration in existing parties of this kind, but of the advisability of Communists taking the initiative in organising such parties in counbies with a low standard of economic development. 311

In attacking questions of this type, Manuilsky charged, the Asian Communists had generally erred on the side of caution. They had approached collaboration with other classes "with great timidity," with the result that in many cases "we lose control over the national liberation movement which passes into the hands of the native nationalist elements." As for the danger of falling into petty bourgeois error, Manuilsky stated optimistically that the International hoped to counter this tendency by supervising more closely the day-ta-day activities of its Asian adherents, principally by improving contact between the colonial and metropolitan parties. There is therefore little reason to suppose that the Comintem inspired the abandoning of the Sarekat Rakjat-unless, of course, the IndoI?esian delegation reported Comintem opinion back to the PKI in such a way as to imply its disapproval of the SR. Semaun, however, was Indonesia's principal representative to the third Profintem and fifth Comintem conventions.!' He was hardly one to talce a narrowly proletarian line or to reject the Sarekat Rakjat, which he had sponsored; and this attitude was apparent in the report he wrote to the PKI about the Comintem meetings. Sernaun outlined both the ECCI attitude on cooperation with nationalism and Roy's ohjections to it; he then described the congress decision in Favor of increased collaboration with non-Communist groups and the intention to avert the danger of deviation by advising more closely the activities of the Asian parties. The International approved the Sarekat Rakjat, he reported; in fact, it had decided to set up similar mass organizations in other colonial countries, including India.31 The ECCI, to which Semaun had just ~cn elected, held a plenary session following the fifth congress; there, he reported, the colonial question was further discussed and a resolution on the Far East was drawn up. The declaration reaffirmed the need for the Communists of that area to fonn and participate in mass anticolonial movements. "In order to meet this need," he asserted, "the Communist. parties in the colonial countries must bring about a campaign for unity which will gather together the workers, peasants, petty merchants, intellectuals

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Deviation and women in common opposition to the foreign capitalists (in the manner of the Radical Concentration in Indonesia in 1923)." lIlI The ECCI resolution, Semaun reported, contained a section on Indonesia, which read in part as follows : The Indonesian Communist Party is already following a correct policy, which is producing good results, in that it has attempted to gain control of the working class movement and to secure its influence and control over the mass peoples' movement, the Sarekat Ral..i at. While accomplishing this purpose and achieving its leadership of the mass movement for national independence, the Indonesian party must continue its efforts to organize and lead workers' and peasants' groups in such a way as to orient them toward a class struggle. 30 •

While thus noting the correctness of. the general line followed by the PlCI, SemaUD suggested far-reaching changes in the party structure that he held were in line with the Comintern congress decisions.~ o The International, Scmaun reminded, had decided that Communist parties aU over the world should be organized on a place-of-work basis rather than on the territorial bases that had been frequently employed and which the PKI had heretofore used. This would greatly alter the nature of the party's local units; since the place-of-work principle could operate only in industrial areas, the Communist movement would have to be organized in two different ways, maintaining both territorially based party units in the vi1lages and factory-based PKI cells in the cities. The Communist Parties must therefore drastically reshape themselves so as to have their groups in the factories and no longer on a village or city level. Our party in Indonesia must also reorganize itself in this manner. We bear in mind. however. that the majority of the Indonesian people are still peasants, and for them there can be no group other tMn a village-based party. The groups of peasants who have become members of the Sarelwt Rakjat must therefore continue to be located in the villages. However, it must be otherwise with our workers' groups in the cities. In the cities the kompung [neighborhood] committees of our party should organize their working cla&s members into party or Sarekat Raklat groups in their factories or other places of work. H

Contact between the factory-based workers' groups and the territorially based units of peasantry and petty bourgeoisie would not occur below party officia1s of the intermediate leve~ Semaun explained, and 269

Rise of Indonesian Communism this would prevent the proletarian core of the PKI from being diluted by elements from other classes that had attached themselves to the party. Having thus dealt with the problem of preserving party ortho.doxy, he turned to the Sarekat Rakjat, which he asserted should remain the mass base of the Communist movement. Greater attention should be paid to agrarian policy, and a ccntral peasant organization should be created with committees in every SR unit to ensure that peasant interests were apprehended and treated with sympathy by the party.42 Clearly, then, Semaun did not contemplate abandoning the nonproletatian masses. The PKI executive thus seems to have adopted its stand on the SR independently; it did so, moreover, knowing that the Comintern approved the Sarekat Rakjat. The PKI leaders had had plenty of time to absorb the content of the Communist conferences, for Alimin and Budisutjitro returned to the Indies not long after the Canton meeting (on July 20 the fonner spoke to the pawnshop workers' union on the conference decisions }.43 Semaun's report on the fifth Comintem congress was published in the journal of the PKI office in Holland, Pandoc AI eroh, in September 1924.H Signillcantly enough. it was not printed in the party newspaper Ap i until February 1925.4 5 It had certainly been available to the PKI before that, for it had been printed earlier in a West Sumatra Communist journal,46 and its suggested reorganization of the party on a place-of-work basis had been discussed before the Kutagede conference and was offiCially inaugurated by tllat meeting. Moreover, the opponents of Aliarcham's proposal brought up Semaun's report at the conference: had not the International's ruth convention decided that the Communists must cooperate with nonproletarian elements, and had it not approved the PKI relationship with the Sarekat Rakjat? 41 This was the amy reference the party newspaper account of the Kutagede gathering made to Comintern opinion being used in debate; and we will note that it was introduced by the opposition. Although the party executive certainly did not state it as such. its program in effect rejected the Comintern line. and it was accordingly a step of the gravest importance. The executive proposal was not unopposed; indeed. the majority of the delegates objected to it.48 Interestingly enough. the center of opposition was not the more rural segments of the party but Europeanminded Oarsono and the proleterian Semarang branch of the PKI." However, the opponents of the executive proposal did not disagree

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with the claim that the SR was an unreliable, petty bourgeois element and that it would eventuaUy have to go; what they objected to was the timing. If the party cut itself off so quickly from the Sarekat Rakjat, they argued, it could lose its connection with the masses, who might revert to the Sarekat Islam. This would be an unnecessary and unfortunate loss, for not only had the Comintern declared for cooperation with the petty bourgeoisie, but in IndonC5ia conditions were particularly favorable to such cooperation: the Indonesian petty bourgeois had no opportunity to enter the great bourgeoisie, which was composed of foreign minorities, and hence he was a candidate proletarian a!1d not a candidate capitalist. The executive argument that activity in the Sare· kat Rakjat drained the party's strength was, the opposition thought, exaggerated: the activists who had gone to work in the SR were fanner labor leaders and not organizers from the party itself; now that the unions were recovering, these people wou1d drift back into their nonnal field of activity. To hasten this process by suddenly abolishing the SR would, they argued, result in a number of unemployed agitators for whom the party would have to Snd work or funds for support.~o In the end, the two viewpoints compromised on a more gradual realization of the party executive's wishes: the Sarekat Rakjat was not to be abandoned immediately but was to be maintained, without add. ing new members, until its adherents had been Winnowed out. Those current SR members who took a special course on Communist theory and otherwise proved themselves worthy would be taken into the PKI itself. and the rest would either drop out of themselves or join a Com· munist-led agrarian cooperative movement, which was thought more suitable to their unrevolutionary spirit.51 In this way the Sarekat Rak· jat would die a slow but natural death, while the PKI doubled its size (to some 3,000 members ), with which army it would attack the gov· ernmental Goliath. ~2 "The conference's decision was certainly a wrong one," the PKl's foreign advisers later charged, "since it did not furnish a proper line of policy for the development of the national-revolutionary movement, in order to mobilize the oppressed native middle class for a struggle against imperialism; nor did it indicate a way of effecting good relations between the proletarian movement and the peasan· try. "~3

. This decision was by far the most controversial one taken by the Jogjakarta conference, but it was not the only important one. A new elCecutive was elected. and Aliarcham was replaced by the West Java

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Rise of Indonesian Communism PKI leader Sardjono. According to Darsono, Aliarcham's removal was connected with his extreme stand on the Sarekat Ra1cjat. However, the official reason was that Aliarcham was expecting to be imprisoned; he had been convicted of overst'e pping the press laws and was currently free pending appeal. This , may well have been the motive (Aliarcham went to jail in January 1925 for six months ), although the prospect did not prevent the party from naming him head of its central labor organization just after the 'conference. By the same token, however, disapproval of Aliarcham's stand could not have been very great, as the uQ.ions were seen as forming the center of future party activity. He was replaced by vice-chainnan Sardjono, who had been a teacher in the SI school system and the leader of the 5ukabumi Red 51. Sardjono had played a prominent p art in making the Priangan area of West Java a center of Conununist activity. and a government oberver at the March 1923 PKl/ Red SI congress commented on his outstanding oratory a nd remarked that some saiq his ability to sway a meeting approached Tjokroaminoto's.u He did -not give much evidence of such. talent as party chairman, however, poSSibly to avoid incarceration. The PKl also took note of its financial condition, which, considering the heavy burdens of its envisioned program. was clearly a Sickly one. Therefore, in spite of the conference's emphasis on the need for ideological training, it decided to abandon Soeara Ra';at, the party theoretical jownal, and to dissolve CORP, the central organization for revolutionary propaganda.~~ Party and SR dues were raised, and a new budget for the central executive was drawn up. Its projected income was a minimum of 11,000 a month, of which 1400 was to go for administrative expenscs, 1400 for the payment of propagandists, and f200 for a strike fund . Members of the executive were to receive f30 to f35 a month and propagandists flO; ~G since this was an inadequate income for people on their economic level, it was presumably to be supplemented by earnings as union heads, journalists, and so on. The Kutagede conference also adopted a resolution on the revolutionary intelligentsia, a necessary move since the first nationalist "study clubs" were then being formed in the Indies: 1. Foreign imperialism can rule over a colonial possession as long as it can draw to itseU a part of one of the classes from the population of that colonized land: that part must have or be capable of having political and economic influence over the class which supports the society; that is, over the exploited group.

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Deviation In the beginning the class which was used in Indonesia as the intermediary between the exploited people and the exploiting foreign imperialism was the class of the ningrats [nobility1. With the disappearance of the influence of this class, the group of the intellectuals was drawn to and used by imperialism as a means for the exercise of its suzerainty here. Through the weakness of the class of the native bourgeoisie, as well as through the heavy pressure of foreign imperialism and capitalism it was difficult for the intelligentsia here to take a uniRed stand and to carry out their program as intelligentsia-namely, to open the way for 11 native capitalism (national bourgeoisie ) . 2. The revolutionary character of the intelligentsia as a class is necessarily based on anti-imperialist nationalism, which in these [colonies1 must naturally combat Western imperialism. 3. In the late capitalist period the capitalist economic circumstances have everywhere driven the intellcctuals into economic difficulties, which has resulted in the intellectuals becoming revolutionary, even though their revolutionary character has no definite direction. 4. As a rcsult of the economic pressure which has been laid on the intellectuals and which placed them in the same social position as the proletariat, many of them developed a proletarian attitude. Under these circumstances it is the duty of the Communists to attract these elements to their movcment. S. At meetings, in propaganda, newspapers, pamphlets, etc., the Communists must draw the intellectuals to them through coiwincing them that freedom (independence) and the new society, which will be capable of giving the intellectuals the place they deserve, can omy be achieved through the class struggle, which is being fought by the proletarians against the capitalists.u The most important conference decision, however, was to prepare for rebellion: "Concentrate and shape the passions of the revolutionaryminded people that they become a single, passionate desire for powerl" the party workers were urge(I. ~8 The last issue of Soeara Ra'jat, which was devoted 'to the meeting, declared that since nothing further was to be gained by legal revolutionary action, the party must attempt revolt. The urge to power, it asserted, must be felt by the population as strongly as the urge to eat; it must become a fire that would consume capitalist oppression in its revolutionary blaze.~' In his address to the congress, Aliarcham had placed great emphasis on the need to reorganize the PKI for this role, arguing that it should develop an illegal organization but at the same time oppose individual terrorist actions,

Z73

Rise of Indonesian Communism which would only compromise the major revolutionary eHort. Accordingly, the meeting decided to form groups of ten men, gathered under an experienced party member. These cells would exist sub TOSd and would be connected with each other only on the leadership level When sufficiently trained, each member would gather ten men under him, and in this manner party organization and in8uence could spread without public notice. eo At the same time that it took up the ten-man system, the party abandoned the principle of democratic centralism. Previously all important questions confronting a PKl or SR section had to be referred to the central party executive for decision. Now, however, it was determined that a local unit could act independently, without Wonning party headquarters, so long as its decisions were in line with the PKI constitution and by-laws.'1 The new system, "federative centralism," was a sharp departure from normal.communist practice, and the party eventually regretted it bitterly. It is not entirely clear just why the PKI undertook this step; we have noted, however, that the power of the leading branch of the party, and with it the authority of the central command, had been eroded, and it may have been that such a grant of autonomy was necessary to put over the executive's controversial program. Moreover, it may well have been thought-Qr argued, by those branches desiring greater freedom of action-that a system of close supervision was too unWieldy, what with poor communications and growing government interference. The VSTP was similarly reorganized in 1926, and the reason was given that its executive was so restricted by the authorities that the organization might collapse if it were too dependent on its cc.ntr,al command.'!! This combination of illegality and decreased supervision did not encourage the disciplined preparation for revolution that the party leaders desired, which became all too evident during the next two years. '"'Devote yourselves with all your strength to the labor movement!" was the slogan on which the Kutagede meeting had concluded/ 13 and immediately after the conference the PKI set out to put it into practice. No labor activity of note had occurred during the first half of 1924, but after the PKI executive's September announcement of its proposed concentration on the proletariat there were increasing reports in the Communist press of the revival of dormant union locals and the planned establislunent of new organizations. This revival doubtless owed its organizational impulse to Communist emphaSiS on proletarian ZT4

Deviation activity, but it also rested on economic developments that increased the restlessness of the workers. The dying depression, by now largely overcome in the public services, still affected private industrial and clerical employees severely. Wages in Surabaja, the chief industrial city, had generally risen untill92J but suffered sharp setbacks in 1924 and 1925; in Semarang, Indonesian skilled workers and white-collar employees were hard hit by wage reductions and unemployment, which increased markedly during 1925.&4 Labor unrest, and with it Communist union activity, thus returned to its pre-1921 concern, the workers in private employ. The PKJ's proletarian action was officially inaugurated at a mooting of top party and union leaders in Surabaja on December 20 and ·21, 1924.65 As the party newspaper explained: It has been brought home to us with increasing clarity that we must no longer seek our strength so much in our previous areas of activity but should transfer part of our work to another 6eld, that of the proletariat. We must build up a strong orgwtization for the workers in the sugar factories as quickly as possible. In the machine shops and other factories, and more especially among the transport workers, such as drivers and so on, we must also establish workers' organiz.'ltions. When this has been achieved, the time will have arrived when we are able successfully to ward off the attacks of the reaction.GG

The conference resolved to join the PKJ-minded unions in a Secretariat of Red Indonesian Labor Unions. There had been no central labor grouping since the collapse of the PVH in the wake of the railroad sbike, although Darsono had urged a Red Labor Federation at the June 1924 party congress. No action seems to have been taken at that time, but renewed emphasis on the unions gave the question new importance. Moreover, the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference had urged establishment of proletarian contact bodies and had set up the Red Eastern Labor Secretariat (Tan Malaka's office) in Canton; the Indonesian organization, as the Surabaja conference declared, would be tied to the Canton body and to the ProBntem. 67 The Red Labor secretariat was envisioned as existing alongSide the PVH, which the Communists were attempting to revive under their own aegis,G8 apparently in an effort to do whatever they could to in8uence the nonCommunist unions. 11lis endeavor was quite unsuccessful, for by now the political breach between Communists and non-Communists was

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too wide for any real cooperation, and the non-PKI labor organizations, composed overwhelmingly of civil servants, were neither under pressure to strike nor anxious to engage in controversial activity. The headquarters of the secretariat were established in Surabaja, which as Indonesia's major industrial center became the chief area of the party's proletarian campaign. Aliarcham was appointed its chairman, and among its executive members were Sugono, Sukendar, Kadarisman, Surat Hardjomartojo, and Musso. 8~ It is not clear how well the secretariat succeeded in organizing the unions outside Surabaja itself (where contact was easy, since the secretariat and the major PKI unions were all housed in the same building), for very little mention of its activities was made either in government reports or in the Communist press of the time. It might be noted, however, that several important unions retained de facto headquarters in Semarang, although they were officially centered in Surabaja; presumably this occurred because the clientele of their leaders was in Semarang and they therefore did not wish to move. It was not until mid-l925 that the PKI executive sent the draft statutes of the secretariat to its member unions; 10 not long after that a disastrous series of strikes brought an effective end to Communist union activity. In addition to farming the labor secretariat, the Communists unified the existing Indonesian seamen's and dockers' unions into one organization, the Sarekat Pegawei Pelabuhan dan Lautan (SPPL). It was to affiliate with the Amsterdam-based SPLI, which Semaun had established earlier that year. l l The unification of the harbor unions bad interested the Communists for some time, not only in connection with the benefits to be gained by coordinated action but also because of the Canton conference decisions for more work among the seamen and dockers and Semaun's establishment of the SPLI. That unification was not achieved earlier we may possibly ascribe to a leadership conHict, for in urging a single union both the Batavian PKBP, led by Marsum and Alimin, and the Semarang Scrilagu, led by Sumantri and Surat Hardjomartojo, made it clear they wanted to control it. 12 The SPPL was set up in February 1925, announcing it would publish a monthly newspaper, Dfankor (Anchor). ]n March of the same year the headquarters of the SPLI were moved offiCially from Amsterdam to the SPPL office in Indonesia. The SPPL elected to join both the PVH and the Red. Labor Secretariat and announced that it would seek international coo-

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Deviation tact via Canton, Manila, and other ports where offices were being set up under Pro6ntem auspices." The Communists further decided to intensify their efforts with the VSTP and the Sarekat Postel and to revive union activity among the sugar workers,74 and to combine the various machine-shop and metal factory workers'locals into the Sarckat Buruh Bengkel (Union of Machine-Shop Employees). This union, which later absorbed the electrical workers' organization and became the Sarekat Buruh Bengkel dan Elektris (SBBE). was headed by Prawirosardjono. a Surabaja machinist and member of the PKI executive for that city. Together with Musso, who had established himself in the East Java capital as head of the Sarekat Postel and editor of the local Communist newspaper, Proletar (The Proletarian ), he was the major leader of the PKI Surabaja-based labor campaign, Finally, in June 1925, the PKI called for establishment of a Transport Workers' Federation (Federasi Kaum Buruh Transport ); it was to unite aU unions connected with that branch of the economy and to affiliate with the radical socialist International Transport Workers' Federation,7o which. we will remember, had been one of the issues in the Semaun-Sneevliet quarrel. All these decisions were accompanied by feverish activity within the PIasponsored labor movement. and this, coupled with the precarious ec0nomic position of the urban workers. made possible a rapid increase in the in8uence and revolutionary temper of the PKI unions. While this reorganization was taking place. news of the party decision to abandon its mass base reached the PKI's international advisers. Semaun had heard of the proposed abolition of the Sarekat Rakjat even before the Jogjakarta meeting but apparently too late to intervene: it was not until December 25, 1924, that he wrote the PKI executive pleading for the retention of the mass organization. If there existed no revolutionary organization for the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. he warned. these elements might very well go over to the Sarekat Islam. As the fifth Comintem congress had pointed out. such groups would be converted to fascism if the Communists offered no place for them. The PKI must not retreat into proletarian extremism but must continue to place the national revolution first. he declared. and he assured the party that -the leftist course which is proposed by the comrades. if they really intend to abandon the peasants. will not be approved by the Comintem." if! 9:17

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When Semaun heard of the compromise plan arrived at by the Jogjakarta conference, he was greatly relieved. Perhaps he had not expected that the SR would be allowed a stay of execution, or perhaps he was not fully informed of the decision to let the organization die gradually. At any rate, he wrote the PKI on February 16, 1925, to express his gratification that the Sarekat Rakjat was retained and to remind the Indonesians of his earlier instructions to establish peasant committees in the SR units and affiliate them with the Krestintcrn.l1 Meanwhile, the PKI itself grudgingly modified its stand to reduce the contl"ast between its decisions and Semaun's report on the Bfth Comintem congress. Immediately after his report was published in February 1925, the party newspaper printed i'he Communist Guide," a series of articles devoted to the history and principles of the movement, in which it declared that there was a time for open and a time for secret activity and that the party must base its strategy on international factors as well as on the situation in Indonesia. It also acknowledged that the party must avoid a putsch and must not rely on the proletariat alone; "The revolution will not succeed with the help and leadership of the party alone; the party must always bend its efforts not only to achieving the support of the greater part of the organized working class but also to making certam that the revolution is agreed to by the peasantry."1S ·It implied strongly, however, that it considered the time for moderation past, and its references both to the peasantry and to cooperation with non-Communist groups were distinctly perhmctory. 1be concessions were not enough to bring the PKI in line with the views of the Comintem; only complete reversal of its decisions couJd have accomplis,hed this. PKI policy, as embodied in its Jogjakarta decisions, was taken up by the International at a plenary session of the ECCI during March and April 1925. The Comintem's entire colonial program was discussed at length in that meeting, and it was apparent from the theses presented on that subject that the PKI program stood little chance of approval. "The national question iri the colonial and semicolonial countries-and not only in those countries-is in large part a peasant question, for the peasants constitute the majority of the population in thO.!ie lands," Zinoviev asserted. 'The experience of the last years has shown that in various countries and various situations the Communists have committed the same error of underestimating the national question, an error which had made it impoSSible for the Communists to achieve an Zl8

Deviation important, not to mention decisive, place among the population." 79 The colonial Communists, he declared, should adopt the following strategy in regard to the peasantry: Wherever peasants are organized into political parties of heterogeneous social constitution, the Communist party must court the left wing, which is formed of small peasants, in order to separate them out at an opportune moment and form an independent organization. The Communist parties should form a bloc with the small peasant parties, subjecting them to all their ideological influence and propagating the idea of the necessity of an alliance between the workers and peasants for a successful struggle of the toilers against the exploiters . ... Wherever the peasant question is connected with a national question, the Communist parties must pay particular attention to the latter. To ignore the national factor in such cases would not only be an error but a political crime. 80

The ECCI did not stop with condemning the PKI current strategy; instead, it reviewed the whole question of SR-PKI relations and called for a drastic reorganization of the Indonesian movement. The executive charged that PKI handling of the Sarekat Rakjat had been wrong from the beginning, and Semaun, who attended the meeting for the PKI, duly apologized for his part in it. 81 The ties between the two organizations had been too close and too public, and because of this the fear that the Sarekat Rakjat endangered the party's proletarian character had been justified. The Sarekat Rakjat should not have been an open subordinate of the PKI, nor should its leadership and its program have been publicly those of the Communist party; this limited both the appeal and the maneuverability of the SR and tempted the Communists to dilute their own program in order to make it more . compatible with the needs of the nonproletarian organization. The Sarekat Rakjat should have been created instead as an entirely separate organization, "a genuine national revolutionary organization working in conjunction with and under the intellectual leadership of the Communists." 82 In effect, what the ECCI wished the PKl to do was establish the Sarekat Rakjat as a mass organization through which the Communists would operate as a bloc within. The new relationship would be vitally different from the Chinese and previous Indonesian blocs within, for real control over the mass movement would lie from the start with the PKI leaders; this, however, would hardly be a disadvantage, since it 279

Rise of Indonesian Communism

would eliminate the cardinal weakness of that strategy. Thus sheltered within the larger movef!lent, the PKI could both perfect the organization of the proletariat and take advantage of the SR's official1y independent character to appeal hroadJy to the peasant masses. Semaun, elaborating on the Comintem decisions in 'an open letter to the PKI. said that the Indonesian party was not only to revive the SR but also to make further concessions to non-Communist Indonesians by renewing its ties with the Sarekat Islam and uniting all Indonesian organizations into one anti-imperialist front. This was not only possible but should actually prove relatively easy, he argued, since Indonesia's lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie meant that the native antirevolution- _ ary forces were weaker than in other colonies. No matter how important the Sarekat Rakjat might become as the representative of the Indonesian people, some portion of the pot~ntiany revolutionary masses would remain by the SI 'a nd other nationalist or seminationaUst organizations. If the Communists attacked the leadership of those bodies, it would only alienate their supporters and weaken the revolutionary movement as a whole. "'1berefore," he concluded, "it is necessary for us to infiltrate into the organization of the Sarelcat Islam, to carry on the revolutionary policy there, in order to draw the revolutionary masses to the side of our party." Not only the 51, but also the Muhammadijah, the Budi Utomo, and other intellectual and regional groups should be penetrated: Patiently, carefully, and with the utmost tact we must work in and with these organizations, avoiding every cause for unnecessary annoyance at w. And we can best carT}' out those tactics toward the national parties under the slogan of one flag for Indonesia, the flag of a Radical National Front movement. (Call it whatever the majority of those affiliated with it desire: the name is not important) . . . . Our party mwt, as the Comintem resolution says, create a united party movement such as an anti-imperialist hont, or, if this already exists in embryo form, cause it to be developed further, That our labor movement will take part in it is a matter of course. We had made this tactic a reality in the beginning of 1923 with the Radical Concentration, and we' must now repeat it again and again, even though the complex situation should repeatedly prevent the establishment of a stable united front, until a Soviet Indonesia makes its existence no longer necessary.83

Deviation Outlining the program the Communists should put forth in their campaign for a united anti-imperialist front, Semaun proposed slogans far more moderate than anything the PKI had previously advocated. The first demand should be "independence for Indonesia." The Communists showd ask for universal suffrage for all residents of the Indies above eighteen · years of age, regardless of race or nationality. They should not demand a parliamentary democracy, for parliamentary government depended on a well-developed bourgeOisie, good communications, and an effective press. Since Indonesia lacked these, and because it was ethnically, culturally, and linguistically so diverse, there was a danger that a parliamentary system would break down under communal conflicts. Therefore, the PKl should abandon its demand that the Volksraad be turned into a regular parliament. Instead, the Communists should advocate division of the country into ethnically based autonomous regions; the lower councils of this federation would be directly elected and the higher ones indirectly. Semaun added that the party should drop its demand for a soviet state, since such a radical slogan had little meaning under the current circumstances: Now that a temporary depression in our active mass movement toward a Soviet system can be seen in the ruling West, we must revise our propaganda in this matter. . . . The resolution of the Comintem says this clearly. We must agitate within the national revolutionary movement for a form of state which will not alienate the revolutionary bourgeois forces from us but which, on the contrary, will bring them to realize that we are their friends in the struggle against imperialism. Therefore [we must urge] universal suffrage, not for a parliament, but also not proletarian suffrage for a Soviet state. 84 The Comintem opinion was conveyed to the Indonesian party not only by Semaun but also by the ECCI itself, which wrote the PKI Central Committee on May 4, 1925.85 It called on the party to "draw up a platform for the general national struggle, which must give first consideration to the interests of the peasantry and must also contain a minimum program for the workers." The SR was to be separated from the PKI and made "'a genuine national revolutionary organization working in conjunction with and under the intellectual leadership of the Communists." Mobilization of the peasantry was, the ECCI declared, inextricably bound up with the participation of nonCommunist parties in the revolutionary struggle; the PKI must immediately campaign for an anti-imperialist bloc consisting of all national

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revolutionary parties. The following stereotyped program of demands would, the ECCI thought, he attractive to the nationalists: (1) independence for Indonesia; (2) withdrawal of foreign troops and establishment of a national militia; (3) an Indonesian Popular Assembly to establish an Indonesian People's Government; (4) universal suffrage, independent of sex, national origin, or place of residencc; (5) recognition of the native languages as the official · languages of the state; (6) agrarian reforms (confiscation of great landholdings and redistribution among the peasantry, abolition of oppressive taxes and of tax farming, an end to the system of leasing peasant lands to sugar estates); (7) eight-hour working day, minimum wage, abolition of child labor, and protective measures for female labor; (8) advanced public education and establishment of an extension education system.8C1 Instead of complying with these instructions, the PKI protested to the International. 57 Not only did this constitute a breach of international party discipline, but it touched a very sensitive sore on the Conununist body politic-the Stalin-Trotsky feud. The struggle between those two giants, which was at this time entering its critical phase, was expressed in the international Communist movement by a debate over the effectiveness of the united front from above. Stalin, who had championed that policy. advocated a broad united front from above in Europe and the further development of the Chinese bloc within; Trotsky, on the other hand, thought such a strategy played into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and he urged the Communists to rely on a revolutionary effort based on the proletariat's strength in the cities. Though the PKI leaders did not choose their program in conscious alliance with Trotsky's side of the struggle (nor were they ever accused of tbis by tbe Comintern). it is understandable that the party position was opposed by the Stalinist forces. Stalin himself. lecturing on the nature of left deviation in colonial CommWlism, noted that this consisted of . . . overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and underrating the importance of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. The Communists in Java, who ~ecently erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet government for their country, suffer, it seems, from this deviation. It is a deviation

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Deviation to the Left, which threatens to alienate the Communist Part}' from the masses and to transform it into a sect.58 In the year that followed these warnings the PKI continued along its deviant path, and the modifications that it did make in the Jogjakarta line were, it appears, decided by Indonesian circumstances rather than by Comintern admonitions. The most notable concessions were those made in early 1925 to restore cooperation with non-Communist groups. Indonesian opposition opinion outside the 5arekat Islam and the PKI had persistently deplored the continuing feud between the two bodies; and by late 1924 bitterness toward the government, fear for the fate of t,he entire opposition, and a rising sense of Indonesian nationalism caused some leaders to propose a truce. Abdul Muis, once a principal enemy of the PKI, called on the Sarekat Islam to cease disrupting S8 meetings (as it had been doing in the Jogjakarta area) in the interest of restoring the unity of Indonesian political forces. Muis argued that the government was concentrating its fire on the Communists because they were currently the strongest group; in their day the Sarekat Islam and 5arekat Hindia had borne the brunt of the government attacks, which were ultimately aimed at crushing the whole Indonesian political movement. What was needed, he concluded, was to unify the QPposition forces in a nationalist front.89 A meeting of the Indies National Congress committee in January 1925 provided another occasion to urge a united front. Hopes for such a body were centered on the recently organized Indonesian Study Club, a Surabaja-ccntered association of young nationalist intellectuals. As a new and neutral body, the Study Club seemed the likeliest mediator between the established groups; its leaders were acceptable to the SI heads, and the PKI had seemed to approve it in its Jogjakarta conference resolution on the nationalist intellectuals. In February 1925 Musso attended the Club's first convention, where he expressed his sympathy and the wish that the group would develop close ties with the common people,oo In March, the neutral opposition newspaper Kemadjoean Hindia (then managed by 5inggih, a leader of the Study Club) urged the 51 and PKI to set aside their quanel in the interest of national unity and suggested a conference of Indonesian groupings to fonn n commission of neutral persons for the purpose of purging Indonesian movements of

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Rise of Indonesian Communism insincere leaders and forming a supraparty executive to settle disputes and develop a corrunon line of action. The CSI agreed in principle but wanted the initiative for ~e congress to come from the uncommitted Study Club leaders. The PKI, commenting favorably on the Surabaja Study Club, declared: . It does not matter in this country whether a person is Communist, national-

ist, or whatever; as long as he is really sincere in his intention to see the people freed as quickly as possible from oppression he will be forced to follow a single political road, the road of reoolution . ..• We are therefore only too glad to form a united front with any popular party, provided this union is of a revolutionary nature.'t

As was to be expected in view of the bitterness between the Sarekat Islam and PKI leaders, the efforts at reconciliation soon fell victim to name calling. The Communists announced that their executive had contacted other groups "to form a united front against war and militarist politics" and that Salim and Tjokroaminoto had promptly bitten the hand of friendship n ( understandably enough, since the PKI had given no sign that it .had changed its opinion of them). This effectively ended attempts at a united front, for the other parties, .aII of which were more conservative than the SI in their attitudes toward the government, would cooperate with the Corrununists only for the sake of unifying the entire Indonesian opposition. The Comintern recommendations did not soften the PKI attitude toward the Sarekat Islam; instead, the party's view of non-Communist groups, including the nationalist intellectuals in the Study Club and the younger generation of Budi Utomo, grew progressively cooler. It was not the issue of nationalism per se 'that held down the party's enthusiasm. Although the PKI continued to maintain that Indonesia's road to revolution was internationalist and aimed directly at establishing Communism, it was, as it had declared in its comments on the Study Club, willing to overlook this in the interests of securing revolutionary support. That support, however, had to be revolutionary-for, determined on revolt, the PKI saw no use in establishing what would of necessity have been a moderate alliance. Consequently, in supporting a united front, it had sped.6cally rejected an _alliance of the sort represented by the Radical Concentration (which, we will remember, Semaun recommended ) on the grounds that it was insufficiently revolutionary.S3 With a formal partnership thus excluded, PKI hopes for non284

Deviation Communist support lay in arousing the sympathies of individual opposition members and if possible winning them over to the cause of rebellion. 'It Wooing away members of other organizations-most notably the 51-still continued at the local level in some areas, but in the higher echelons of the political movements partisan Jines were by now too deeply drawn. By mid-19M the differentiation of the Indonesian opposition was essentially completed; relations with other parties and leaders, once intimate and a matter of cardinal concern to the Communists, thereafter became tangential and guarded. The Commu~ists enjoyed the respect of a number of non-51 opposition leaders because they were persecuted by the Dutch, but this sympathy was far too qualified to help the PKI gain inHuence among them. The nationalism of the Study Club intellectuals at this time was (in contrast to that of the Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland) gradualist rather than revolutionary; furthennore, the PKI was obViously heading for disaster, and political leaders outside the party did not want to share the destruction. The PKI became increasingly impatient with this aloofness and ascribed it to the fact that the nationalists came from a privileged elite: "In these tense times the intellectuals may take thought! Perhaps they do not feel that their schooling and the things they enjoy are gotten from the proletariat and the common people; if so, is it not clear that their feelings are dead? Let them continue to disport themselves. Should the people wait for them? No, it's too latel" 115 PKI failure to confonn to the Comintern strategy brought continuing criticism from party advisers abroad. At no time, however, did Moscow's disfavor extend to outright denunciation of the PKI leadership, and party efforts against the colonial regime continued to be noted with appreciation. The PKI leaders were probably saved from international disgrace in good part because of poor communications between the Comintcrn and the Indies. The information passed on by PKI representatives abroad seems to have been contradictory and misleading. Thus Semaun and Bergsma, influenced by wishful thinking or by misleading reports from Indonesia, described fictional PKI attempts to confonn with Comintern advice: In accordance with the latest resolution of the Enlarged Executive, the Communist Party has altered its tactics and adapted the propaganda more to the requirements of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.. .. As a matter of fact, success has not yet been reached in welding the national and

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Rise of IndonesifJn Communism revolutionary movement into a united anti-imperialist Bloc, 1be existing conditions however go to prove that a comprehensive organization of all revolutionary groups is indeed possible. to Inadequate contact also kept the 1ntemational from playing off one group within the Indonesian party against another, and it prevented the exchange of opinions between the ECCI and the PKI executive from assuming the character of a debate. The Comintem, at odds with both the party in Indonesia and the quarreling PKI advisers abroad, had no one whose opinion it could trust; hence, as we shall see, it did not know to whom it could tum for a solution. At the end of 1925 the fourteenth Soviet party congress celebrated Stalin's victory in the question of cooperation with the peasantry and other nonproletarian elements. His triumph was re8ected in the ECCI plenary session of February and March 1926, when the Comintem executive favored more strongly than ever increased concentration on the peasants and reliance on the bloc within. The success of the KuOmintang was proving the correctness of the Comintem course, the ECCI proclaimed; and it charged the Indonesian Communists to look to the Chinese example for a model on which to pattern their political strategy.li At this meeting. Semaun cast himself as an honest broker between the Comintem and the PKI. His attitude toward the Indonesian situation sccms to have been somewhere between that of the PKI in Indonesia and that of the ECCI; his report to the Comintem executive's 1925 plenum had allegedly been criticized for its negative attitude toward cooperation with non-Communist Indonesian movements.'8 This attitude was not evident in his letters relaying the plenum's advice to the PKI, but it does appear in an article he wrote for the Comintem journal later in 1925, where he denied the importance of bourgeois nationalism for lndonesian revolutionary politics: If we consider that the working class is on a higher level than the peasantry, we will realize that the movement of the Indonesian people against oppression is directly and indirectly a proletarian class struggle against capitalism and impeiialism. This is witnessed by the successes of the Indonesian Communist Party and by the fact that every national movement with a nonproletarian progrnm and tactics is doomed to defeat (e.g., the Sarekat Islam) . . . . The ardent desire of the best elements of the Indonesian working class is a Soviet Indonesia, which might become part of the world federation of free Soviet republics." 286

Del)iation At the 1926 ECCI session, Semaun attempted to forestall any possible eHort to brand the Indonesian party as Trotskyist by explaining that the deviant PKI strategy was not willful defiance of international advice but a tragic necessity forced upon it by circumstances beyond its control. ''In our party," he declared, "we have neither right nor left deviation, but other difficulties exist." Chief among these, he asserted, were government persecution, interference in PKI affairs by the Dutch Communists, and the danger of losing contact with the outside revolutionary world. "By now," he noted, "the government has succeeded in isolating our movement from all other revolutionary movements in the world, and recently even from Moscow." The party's ability to control the mass will to rebeJUon was being sorely tested, and' further government persecutions would only strain it more by inRaming popular opinion. Such action would "promote the propaganda of the Indonesian anarchists, who advocate incendiarism against the sugar industry, the oil wells and tobacco works. For the illiterate masses plunged into misery such propaganda is attractive and it will be difficult for the Party, driven into illegality, to oppose it with our own methods of fighting." 100 It seems evident that Semaun, like the PKI leaders in the Indies, was deeply worried about the consequences of the party's inability to offer its follOwing definite prospeCts for revolution. The Indonesian people, or at least that part which had aligned themselves behind the Communists, supported the PKI because they felt it promised release from the Dutch. TItis had been the key to the Sarekat Islam's popularity in the days of its success, and the Sl's retreat from a revolutionary position was a cardinal cause of its death as a mass movement. The PKI was now faced with the same question the SI leaders had confronted, and it could ignore the popular mood only at the risk of suffering the same fate as the Sarekat Islam. Semaun attempted to explain this to the fowth session of the Profintern Central Council, which met just after the ECCI session. Citing the case of the Sarekat Islam, he declared that the PKl must confonn to what the people expected of it: "Every movement whose program corresponds to the people's interest will be well received; every other program will be rejected. But even when an organization has already succeeded in drawing the masses to it, it cannot rest content with this but must bend every eHort to carrying out a correct tactic, lest the masses tum from it and the whole process begin anew." 11H

Rise of Indonesian Communism The ECCI did not accept Semaun's analysis of the PKI's troubles, although he was made a member of the ECCI presidiwn at this ses· sion. 102 The Comintem executive quite realistically pointed out that however desirable revolution might be in the long run, the Indonesian Communists simply were not in a position to carry it out in the m~ar future. It was true that the PKl was in difficulty because it could not offer the Indonesian people the immediate hope of rebellion, but this was because it did not have anything to offer them beside rebellion. The party could retain its popular support and gain the necessary additional backing it needed for a successful revolt only if it made a major effort to attract the people to it with a program designed to appeal to interests broader than those of th~ proletariat alone. In other. words, the PKI must carry out the previous ECCI resolution. The party had, the executive noted, already made some motions in that direction and had received a favorable response from the national groupings, which (especially Bum Utomo and the 51) were turning more and more to the left; but these gestures were not enough: It must, however. be said that our Indonesian comrades have not shown satisfactory activity reglU"ding this process [of attracting the nationalists into a united anti·imperialist bloc]. The Communist press pays much too little attention to the question of the united front and the creation of a platfonn which could bring together all national revolutionary elements. The party has not yet discovered appropriate methods of approach to those masses which are under the influence of the refonnist leaders. The Communist Party has not been able to hold those revolutionary elements who despair of the reformist tactics of their leaders. with the result that they tum to terror· ism. . . . Individual facts show .. .. that the Indonesian Communist Party, in spite of its activity. has not been able to develop a satisfactory action among the peasantry and to win it for the general national movement. The resolution of the last ECCI plenum regarding the gradual separation of the "Sarekat Rakiat" from the party and its transfonnation into an independent national revolutionary organization with close ties to the broad mllSSes has not been carried out. On the other hand, the political activity of the peasants, that most oppressed part of the Indonesian population, is steadily rising as a result of increasingly heavy tax pressures and the continuing dispossession of the peasants by foreign capital. If the party does not take a correct line regarding the peasantry in time, the political movement of the peasants will pass over the party, as has already been the case to some extent with the radical nationalist elements. Only the complete and unconditional execution

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Deviation of the resolution of the last ECC! plenum can bring the party out of its isolated position and unite it with all the active anti-imperialist forces of the Indonesian people. l OS

The PKl did not follow this advice. Indeed, it may not even have received it, for in the time since the previous ECCI conference things had gone badly for the Indonesian party. By 1925, the Dutch authorities had become sufficiently alarmed at the Communist success to conclude that the PKI and its sympathizers must be rendered inactive at all costs. Government determination, plus a disastrous strike campaign led by the PKI during 1925, had by the end of that year reduced the Communists' legal role to the vanishing point. Hence, the Comintem's repeated emphasis on long-term public activity had less and less meaning for the Indonesian Communists. If there was one thing in the PKI that grew stronger during this period, it was the will to revolt; and not unnaturaUy, the more impatient party leaders resented the Comintern's caution. At a meeting of PKI leaders in Singapore in early 1926, Alimin reportedly vented his dissatisfaction with the accusation that "A spirit of slackening, retrogression and dissension is prevailing in Moscow"; he declared that it was the task of the "millions of Eastern peoples, the last reserves of mankind," to save the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia. lOt In this spirit, the Indonesian Communists set about to make their revolution.

XI

Making a Revolution ON FEBRUARY 12, 1925. Api v.oiced distress that most of the deci· sions of the December 1924 PKI conference had remained on paper. and it called for the immediate implementation of those decisions affecting the reorganization of the party. These plans incorporated the suggestions contained in SemaWl's report on the 1924 Comintern congress, which fitted well with the PKl's own desire to proletarianize the party and to avoid the public eye. As Api outlined it. the new program called for the creation of cells (benjh) as the chief means of spreading Communist influence; these should be organized primari1y on a placeof-work basis: "Wherever there is a group of workers we must have a party member whose duty it is to spread Communism among his fellowlaborers. We must now begin to train people from various areas of work to become Communists. so that they may take up the duty of carrying on our propaganda." The cell leaders should be known only to the executive of the party section concerned, the newspaper continued, for if the employers found out what was going on they would surely fire those responsible. As their task was to teach Communism to the workers, the cell organizers were to be given special instruction in Marxist theory by the executive of their party section. When several cells had been fonned in an enterprise, they would be gathered into a group (grup), and these groups were to be the basic units of ·the party. The function of the cells was both to gain recruits and to collect money; as Api noted, the cell organizer, who saw his comrades at work every day, was a more reliable collector of funds than the previous system of passing the hat at general propaganda meetings. Moreover, the new organization would take some of the responsibility from the shoulders of the party section heads, who had hitherto borne the entire weight of organizing local activities. lb.e new pattern, Api hoped, would improve party work and discipline and would pave the way for a soviet system. 290

Making a Revolution The program for a (.'ell network was directed by a committee headed by the VSTP leader Mohammad Ali, who was a member of the Semarang town council and who assumed the ehainnanship of the PVH when it was revived by the Communists. In addition to its work in factories and offices, the committee also attempted to establish cells in the armed forces, but without notable success. Cells were also to be organized on a territorial (neighborhood) basis, although this was conceived as a secondary aspect of party activity. Propaganda was spread through infonnal meetings at private homes, and various local groups, such as burial associations, were used as a cover for PKl meetings and propaganda work. In Bandung and other cities, a snowball system was reportedly used, whereby a propagandist and up to seven interested persons met in someone's home for instruction in Conununist teachings; when sufHciently indoctrinated, each student would seek seven additional people to teach, and so on.l In such ways, by substituting small, closed meetings for open affairs, the party sought to build a reliable organization and avoid the attention of the authorities. 2 At a meeting in Jogjakarta on June 19, 1925, the PKI leadership called for a "strong and lasting proletarian discipline" based on groups of five rather than the ten envisioned by the December 1924 conference. The party would, it was declared, be divided into major territorial units responSible directly to Batavia headquarters; the fonner party branches would become subsections of these new units, and it was planned to expand the number of such subsections to seventy-five. Their administration was placed in the hands of five commissioners, who were also to cooperate with the executive of the local SR. Each commission was to be aided by nve directors (pengurus) of its choosing. and each director selected five aides (pembantu). Each aide was to have under him five cadres (kepala warga), party members who were each given charge of a number of SR members who lived in their neighborhood.a At the June conference Alimin is reported to have discussed the tactics for unleashing the rebellion, calling for a strike wave centered on railways and harbors and culminating in a general strike. Such action would weaken the imperialists economically, he asserted, and would also help isolate the Dutch forces in the Indies. 4 This strategy would concentrate PKI effort in the neld where its labor strength was greatest, namely, the communications and transportation sector. Moreover, international authority could be cited for such a method, since,

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Rise of Indonesian Communism we will remember. the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference had stressed the revolutionary importance of the communications and transportation unions. More recently. Tan Malaka had written a tract giving his views on the tactics to be used in an Indonesian revolution. and there he had also stressed the importance of the transportation unions and a general strike. The West Java PKI leader Mohanunad Sanusi visited Tan Malaka in Canton in March 1925, and Alimin reportedly also saw him early in that year and was informed of his views on PKl strategy.~ All this would indicate that the PKI was shaping itself into a tightly knit. well-disciplined revolutionary force; but between party plans and practice there was a very considerable gap. This was frankly conceded by the .PKI leaders, who were concerned by the declining payment of dues, the decreasing contact between the central executive and the provincial units, and the failure to implement the decisions of the December 1924 congress. Lack of income, the party complained, was preventing it from publishing the materials necessary to indoctrinate its follOwing, and it was forcing the PKI to pay its propagandists too low a wage to ·ensure their diJigence in the party's cause.' In part, this disorganization resulted from heavy opposition by the authorities. It was almost impoSSible for the PK.I to hold publie meetings now wilhout being dispersed by the police. In the Semarang district court aJone. thirty trials for political crimes were held during 1925, and in the same year the directors of Api were put on trial twenty four times.' Communist activity by no means ceased with the arrest of these leaders, but organizational continuity was damaged. One of the restrictive measures taken was to tighten regulations forbidding attendance at political meetings by persons under eighteen years of age. One result of this was that the PKI Youth Front was replaced by the Organization of Indonesian Youth (OP!' Organisasi Pemuda Indonesia), ostensibly a nonpolitical scout group.s More serious consequences arose from the new provision that if minors--or persons who could not prove they were not minors-were found at a meeting, the leader of the gathering or the executive members of the sponsoring organization wou1d be liable to arrest. Since it was rarely possible to control attendance in this fashion, particularly in villages, where closed meeting-halls were not generally available and where few people could prove their age, the measure posed a considerable threat to PKI and SR organizers and was the basis for numerous arrests. 292

Making a Revolution The reader might well ask why the govcrnmen't tolerated the PKI at all by this time, for the party had made no secret of its December 1924 decision to attempt to seize power, A strong current of opinion urged this-and had done so for some time, However, the very vehemence of this attitude, which saw aU outspoken criticism as "extremist" and therefore impennissible. made it impossible for the government to separate its treatment of the PKI from that of the rest of its opponents. To ban the party. or to undertake mass arrests, would have meant admitting that even the "consen'ative Ethk-al" approach had failed and that Western democratic concepts must be abandoned as far as the colony was concerned. At the same time, the opponents of such a revision could point to the fact that the PKI and its allied organizations were visibly suHering from a growing sense of "being threatened ' and trapped." 9 They no longer showed their former energy in areas where they had been prominent; their most important leaders hesitated to make public appearances; and the projects on which they publicly embarked soon failed. There was an obvious Similarity between the December 1924 PKI conference and the Sarekat Islam congress of 1919. which had masked in revolutionary phrases a decision to avoid genuine confrontation. The PKI, too, was rejecting its unruly rural following in favor of diSciplined organization in the cities, and the strike law and the improving economic situation should keep it from b ecoming much of a nuisance there. Why. then. ban the party and drive it completely underground. where it could not be watched and where it would have no choice but to prepare for violence? It should be possible to reduce the Communist movement piecemeal, by gradually removing its leaders and discouraging malcontents from joining; it might be necessary to continue restricting political liberties in this process, but not to throw overboard libertarian principles. As we have noted previously, parliamentary democracy at home and authoritarian rule in the Indies resulted in curiously mixed responses to challenge on the part of the colonial regime. Thus, although the PKI announced with impunity its intention to overthrow the government. an ordinary woman declaring in public that "if my life depended on it. I would not want a government official for my son-in-law" could be and was sentenced to a year in prison for expressing contempt for authority.tO In 1925 this contrast was sharpened when the government urged Indonesian administrators to take sterner steps against the development of Communism in their areas. As a result, extreme pressure 293

Rise of Indonesian Communism was exerted on party and SR members and those suspected of adhering to the movement, with the chance of rehabilitation offered if ' they recanted and asked absolution from the appropriate official. In some areas this was reportedly quite effective. However, it was easily open to abuse, for-outside the contradiction it entailed in keeping Communism within the law but placing the Communists outside it-.:.the highly conservative aristocrats who staKed the Indonesian administration tended to consider any objection to traditional rule as revolutionary. In areas whC1"e their authority was not completely accepted, as on the West Coast of Sumatra, this aided the rebels in the end : Persons who dared to speak their minds frankly, to criticize situations and conditions, who lodged complaints, who were, in short, a nuisance, risked being charged with being communists, which charge was sufficient to set the whole administrative machine in motion against them. Such individuals were checked by perpetual orders to appear at "the office," they were "wanted," and this helped to prepare the soil for the favourable reception of the seed of commtmism. If they were punished by the magistrate, as sometimes happened at Fort De Kock {Bukit Tinggi], Padang, and Solak, the discipUn~ treabnent often consisted of degrading them in a most childish way-making them carry stones uphill at a run and the like• . .. In other places the taxes of those c1assec;l as "commtmists" were raised. The only result of all this, however, was to increase the agitation. l l In several parts of Java, most notably the Priangan, this pressure took the fonn of cncouraging or condoning anti·Communist strong-ann groups among the populace. The government cherished the hope that "in the society itself countermovements will develop and organize to suppress the alien, artificial, anarchist spirit of resistance, which is in disharmony with the Native folk conscioumess," 12 and there were in fact signs of increased resistance in 1924. These were part of the continuing SI~PKl feud and centered in Jogjakarta, At the end of August Darsono, Gondojuwono, and Subakat found themselves shouted down by SI and Muhammadijah supporters at a rally in Jogjalcarta, and when in December the party tried to hold its conference in Jogjakarta proper, it could not find a meeting place and was forced to move to outlying Kutagede.1lI Such opposition may have inspired the official promotion of anti-Communist movements, but it was soon clear that the two countermovements had quite different sources. . During the second half of 1924, the authorities, concerned by the vigorous development of Communism in the Sumedang area of the

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Making a Revolution Priallgan, encouraged the formation of anti·Communist mutual aid associations. Each village had its own, and there was no central body or executive, but everyone knew the groups were backed by the Regent of Sumedang and the Indonesian officials under him. By early 1925 such associations had spread through the Priangan and were making their appearance in Bogor, Tijirebon. Kediri, Ngawi, Madiun, and Djcpara. Though they had no fonnal connection and bore various names-PerkwnpuIan Tolong-Menolong (Mutual Aid Association ) and Kaum Pamitran (Friendship Group) in the Priangan, Sarekat Hitam (Black Union) and Sarekat Kemantren Tjerebon in Tjirebon, and Anti·Communisme. in Bogor-they became generally known by the name of the Sumedang grouping, Sarekat Hidjau (Green Union).u They broke up party and SR meetings, disrupted SR schools, beat up Communist followers, destroyed Communist property, and where possible drove PKI adherents from their villages. Their size is something of. a mystery and probably varied greatly, but at least in the Priangan they seem to have had a considerable follOWing, for newspaper reports spoke of incidents involving bands of several hundred. The PKI found it necessary to establish a guard system in neighborhoods in which party leaders lived, not only in the affected areas but also in Batavia and Semarang, where threats were made on the lives of top party chiefs. Appeals to the European administration for police protection or for judicial .redress did very little good, particularly in the Priangan. where the police were then clamping down on Communist activities, with anti-PKI groups acting as their informal auxiliaries. At the same time a campaign was launched by the administration in the Priangan to get people to tum their party or SR cards in to the local officials as a sign that they had broken with Communism; many did so, some voluntarily and others because force was applied by their village chief. u The anti-Communist groups sometimes made use of the Red-White antithesis, but their action was not related to the conHict between the Sarekat Islam and the Communists.le: All the Indonesian opposition parties condemned the groups, which they commonly labeled fascist. They saw in them evidence of a government decision to turn. back the clock and substitute repression for reform in dealing with opponents. The most vocal critic of government encouragement of strong-ann groups was the PKI's archenemy, Hadji Agus Salim. The government, he warned, was playing with fire in encouraging violence and placing

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Rise of Indonesian Communism its opponents beyond the protection of law; in the end, such a course could only sabotage aU respect for authority. Indeed. this was already becoming evident to the government: at the February 1925 Palace Conference several Residents doubted whether they would be able to keep the Sarekat Hidjau groups in hand. n Salim's arguments were inspired by more than a concern for the rule of law, for the 5arekat Hidjau groups soon extended their attacks to the 5arekat Islam. As a proponent of religious rciorm, the 51 was currently campaigning against the dedication of Friday mosque services to the regent; this brought down upon it the WTath of those officials and the inclusion of 51 adherents in 5arekat Hidjau and Pamitran raids. The situation was suffipiently alarming for Tjokroaminoto and Sjahbudin Latief to journey to the Priangan and there confer with local 51 leaders, on whom they urged passive resistance to the attacks. ls The PKI leaders, although they fulminated against the 5arekat Hidjau and kindre:d groups, also adopted what was essentiaUy passive resistance. In Bandung an Anti-Ruffian League ( Anti-Ribut Bond) was established by those who felt threatened by the 5arekat Hidjau; its purpose was to repay strong-arm actions in kind. The initiative does not seem to have come from central PKI headquarters, however. The party newspaper at first cautioned against the League as containing dubious elements, although later it seems to have acquired more positive support and was established in other areas where anti-Communist fighting groups existed. l ' The Communists acknowledged that the roots of the reaction went deeper than mere hooliganism and that many Sarekat Hidjau adherents had formerly been in the sa They had not been attracted to the Sarekat Rakjat solely by gentle persuasion (the Communists had used social pressure, boycotts, an4 threats of future reprisal in place where they were strong), and this had naturally brought repercussions. Moreover, the PKI had been active in the Priangan for several years, and its utopian promises had not yet been ful6lled ; people who had' given the party their support and their money began to feel they had been gulled. The 5arekat Islam, which had used simUar tactics to gain adherents, had run into the same problem in West Java in its heyday.flo The reaction was all the more dangerous because it was now pushed by traditional leaders, in an attempt to make people shift their grievances from the established authorities to the opposition. It .might not be feasible ·to reverse the course of popular discontent permanently, but it might well be possible seriously

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Making a Revolution to weaken and discredit the party by a popular revulsion against it. In an effort to repair the situation, the PKI issued an appeal 1'0 the Members of the Sarckat Hidjau, Kawn Pamitran, and People of the Priangan," calling them to forget their quarrel with the Communists and unite with them against the Dutch.21 The trouble was, as Api declared, that the people were ready to revolt but not to be indoctrinated: As long as the People only believe that Communism is good but do not sufficiently understand the theory of Communism, our party will be in danger. Because of their difficult lot the People are unhappy. And because we make propaganda everyWhere and promise to improve conditions, the people are drawn to us. These insufficiently trained people understand only their own immediate interests, and nothing more. And they think that these interests can easily be achieved, if only they follow the Communists. What is the 6nal result of such a situation? If the campaigns led by the Communists fail, and if suffering results, the people become afraid and abandon our ranks; in the end they may tum against us. Half our comrades, the party paper continued, think theory unnecessary; the essential thing for them is that the party possess daring leaders. This, however, leads to fascism and not to Communism-we have seen it happen in Italy. The party must emphasize an understanding of Communist principles, for only if the people understand what the PKI is aiming at and what the risks are will they remain faithful to us in adversity. Indeed, the Comintem itself stressed this point, for had not its fifth congress emphasized that Communist parties must improve their understanding of bolshevik theory? 22 Now there were two poSSible roads for the PKI to take in this crisis. One was that outlined by the December 1924 conference: concentrate on disciplining the party and its proletarian adherents and let agitation in the unruly agrarian sector go, on the assumption that when the cities moved, the countryside would follow. But could the party in fact abandon its nonproletarian support? CouId it be sure that leaders in the hinterlands, already poorly controlled by the center, would not act in the " parly's name and bring disaster to the whole organization? Would not abandOning the countrySide also increase the likelihood tnat Communist rural adherents, disillusioned by the party's loss of interest, would turn against the PKI in a wave of reaction that would demoralize the entire movement? Moreover, could the party be sure that action by the proletariat would in fact create a rev.olutionary situation without

2M

Rise of Indonesian Communism the help of agitation outside the cities? If the party really intended to carry out a rebellion and not simply to retreat into its proletarian shell, was it not better to draw the support of restive elements by whatever means possible, in order to secure a wide base of support for the revolt? In ·the end, both courses were pursued-that is to say, no visible choice between them was made. Both proletarian organization and rural agitation were carried on, but because of it the December program was effectively gutted, for its purpose was to establish an organization the party could be sure of controlling, which would not plunge it head.1ong and unprepared into rebellion. Some persons were alarmed at the direction in which the PKI was heading, but they presented a grim alternative: only wait and see what will happen. Although we hoPe to continue to act and speak freely, if the government really prohibits and penalizes our freedom of action we shall not be able to nullify the government's decision. It is the government, after all, that possesses the power. The only thing now is for the Communists everywhere to be on their guard and to worle harder and in a more disciplined manner than at present." We Communists can

Most party leaders preferred not to consider so gloomy a prospect. Many who favored an all-out effort for rebellion doubtless believed that with popular backing and outside assistance they would overthrow the Dutch. As for the rest, some may have reasoned that a revolt, even if it failed, would increase the restlessness of the population and thus contribute to later, successful rebellion. 2t Still others were probably motivated Simply by the reason Darsono later gave the Comintem: "We believed that it would be better to die fighting than to die without .fighting." U The paversion of the course decided on at Jogjalcarta was already apparent at a conference of PKI leaders he1d in Batavia on March 22, 1925. The meeting discussed the impJementation of the December decisions on organization and issued directives to the party branches to fono ten-man groups (later replaced, we will remember, by the 6ve-man system) and to reorganize party activities on a cell basis. The cells, it was declared, would serve to subvert non-Communist groups: ""The planting of ~Jls is of especially great importance among those workers who are still under the leadership of other parties. By means

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AI aking a Revolution of these cells we will be able to eliminate the other parties who up to now have been their leaders, and we will be able to replace thm by assuming that leadership ourselves." Ultimately, however, they were intended as an instrument for overthrowing the regime and as the basis for postrevolutionary power: "the main aim is to use these cells for the great struggle, namely th~ conquest of political power in the country; once this struggle has succeeded we will make use of these cells for the realization of Communism, in other words, for the organization of the state on a proletarian basis, which will be preceded by the establishment of proletarian dictatorship." 2 8 So far in the Jogjakarta tradition. The same meeting, however, took up the problem of the Sarekat Hidjau. The instructions issued to the .party branches on this subject denied that such groups could be considered fascist (as Api had hitherto labeled them) because they did not represent a distinct political movement but only criminal hirelings of the authorities. Nonetheless, PKI organizers were not to oppose the elements from which these groups were drawn: they could be used to serve the party as well as to fight against it, and it would be more advantageous for the PKI to have them on its side.2J The party was clearly not referring here sirilply to recovering disaffected SR members; it had in mind securing the adventurers, who would be attracted to the party by its defiance of authority and not by class interests or by doctrine. Reportedly, it was Alimin who brought the matter up at the March conference.28 We might note that as a CSI leader in 1919 he had urged the Sarekat Islam heads to define their stand on such illegal movements as the Section B. Such groups might be useful at a future point, he declared; he did not feel the CSI should endorse them at that time, since it was not ready to assume power, but it must give the matter serious consideration. Z9 The suggestion that the PKI recruit elements that were essentially outside the law for the purpose of rebellion was not without precedent or practical value. Various areas in Java (to mention only that island) had long harbored outlaw groups, which were commonly enlisted by those who sought to overthrow established rule. The phenomenon was not eradicated .by Dutch control, and areas where such groups operated continued to form centers of social dislocation and rebelliousness.30 Although they were essentially predatory, such clements were viewed by the populace with awe as well as fear: thus d;uara (one of 299

Rise of 1ndoneruln Communism the words for this sort of person) "denotes someone who has the courage to defy the laws of the land and who is prepared and able to force others to do his will by threat of injury. deprivation or death." 81 Those who set themselves up as leaders did not operate simply as heads of criminal gangs but sought to create an aura of extrapersonal power to gain foH owers, impress the population, and make their exactions more palatable. They might thus claim to possess mystical powers, particularly the secret of invulnerability, the benefits of which they could confer on their fonowers. Moreover. since they were outside the law but not necessarily outside the society of the area (somewhat like Robin Hood ), in times of unrest they' might lead messianic protest movements. Where they were active; such groups both reSected and intensified social disorientation and alienation from authority; hence, protest movements were rather more likely to erupt into violence there than elsewhere.32 The rise of mass political movements in Indonesia permitted such elements to attach themselves to · or act in the name of the larger organization; this seems to have been the case with Section B. which was not the only such group to arise about the Sarekat Islam.33 Communism, a movement that portrayed itself popularly as world-wide, irresistible, and achieving paradise through violence. undeniably attracted such adventurers, which compounded the disciplinary problem Darsono later described to the Comintern: '''here was a time when the propaganda of our theories was mocked at. We were told it is not theories but deeds that change the world. On the basis of these ideas, bomb-throWing and acts of individual terror were engaged in. as was the case in Russia at the end of the last century." 1 4 The March 1925 decision to encourage adventurers consciOusly did little to overcome this failing. Api's articles on strategy in this period Similarly alternated between the December line of tight, proletarian organization and the alternative of widespread, rebellious agitation. On March 21, for example, it declared that events in the Priangan showed the party had devoted too little attention to educating its followers in Marxist theory, although this had been its official line since the June 1924 congress. It must therefore concentrate on the proletariat and on strengthening discipline; a certain amount of work must be done in the villages. but the uneducated peasantry wou1d be less accessible to an effort of this sort. On- March 23 and 24, however, the paper published leading articles 300

Making a Revolution arguing that propaganda must be carried out among both workers and peasants in tenns they understood, avoiding complicated or unattractive ideas and stressing the utopian aspects of 1ife under Communism. Such ambiguity combined with the weakening hold of the party central command to give increasing autonomy to the movement in the provinces. Gathering momentum toward rebellion, Communist leaders in the outlying districts freely used appeals alien to or in con8ict with Communist doctrine. Thus, in Bantam: The Communists showed great skill and keen insight in the way in which they spread expectation of the success of the rebellion and promises of a "Utopia. For every group they had ready a separate ideal suited to the group's conditions. This ideal was always called kemerdekoon [freedom], but each group had its own ideas of wJ:tat that meant. The more well-to-do were promised a Utopia where they could keep everything they possessed, would not have to pay any taxes. and would even get positions with the new government_ The descendants of the sultan and the other title-hearers were promised the establishment of a new sultanate and "their own sultan"; this state was represented as an Islamic state to the religious orthodox. The followers of the religious leaders who were preparing for the rebellion were enticed with the prospects of the glOries of paradise. the reward which would await them as warriors victorious in Allah's name, or ItS martyrs who have died for his cause. Where it was of service the common man was given visions of sarna rata sarna rasa [equality for alil. but this did not often occur, as it proved sufficient to win the support of eminent citizens. However, everyone was led to expect the blessings of cheap rice or free rice and free transport in cars and trains, etc. But nothing much was said about distribution of property belonging to the wealthy because an attempt was made to get the wealthy to join also. Side by side with the illusions of fortune for those who would rebel were of course the threats for those who would not. They would not partake in the advantages of Utopia; on the contrary they would be oppressed: their property would be confiscated for the founders of the new community.3G The freewheeling use of such appeals by local leaders, tied to the expectation of imminent rebellion, led to a general increase in Communist activity outside the urban centers during 1925-1926 in spite of the party decision to concentrate on . the cities. The extension of the movement was ITUllked in the Outcr Islands; it proceeded by fits and starts, being thwarted in one arca only to arise in another. On the West Coast of Sumatra, the Communist movement was aided by a new government regulation that forced the return of political undesirables

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R4e 0/ Indonesian Commun4m to their home areas; this brought back a number of Minangkabau Communist leaders who had been active elsewh~re and thus helped overcome a decline in adivity brought about by other repressive measures. Both secular and religiOUS Communist propaganda increased. and new branches of Communist unions were formed. Labor unions were also founded in East Sumatra, and Communist in8uence became marked among Javanese contract coolies on the district's numerous plantations. This challenge caused estates and other major private firms to pool their intelligence services with the government's, and unrest was checked by jailing or firing suspected leaders. The movement in Atjeh. which developed rapidly during early 1925, was curbed by similar measures and by the dram imposed by the forced return of a number of its leaders to their native Minangkabau. In Palembang the Communists gamed considerable popularity by preaching self-government under a Muslim ruler. with no corvee and few taxes; this even attracted some odat heads, who were accordingly cashiered. In the Lampung district Communists were particularly active during 1925. and in the Batak areas (including Mandailing, where they called for an Islamic state) the movement gained rapidly in early 1926. A PKI section was established on Nias Island in January 1926 and was sufficiently disruptive that troops were sent there to restore authority. In Celebes, the movement showed considerable vigor in the Makassar area, and a number of unions and peasant organizations were formed. The Moluccan organization did not recover substantially from the repressive measures taken in 1924, most of which were still in effect. although union activity revived. In Timor an anticorvee movement expanded rapidly during 1925 and then decayed with equaJ alacrity when its leaders were imprisoned; in Bali and the Riouw archipelago some peripheral activity was noted. 3G In Java, the most notable PK[ activity was penetration into Bantam, the northwestern part of the island. Communism had been known to that area in earlier years. for Hasan Ojajadiningrat, younger brother of the Regent of Serang, had been not only head of the SI in Bantam but also a member of the ISOV. Although his personal views were very moderate (his political career resulted from a family decision to have one of its members participate in movements that were attracting the masses). he was appointed to the party's central executive in 1918 and remained a respected ISOVjPKI member until his death in late 1920. Probably as a result of his dual membership, the 5erang 51 (the chief 302

Making a Revolution Bantam unit) took a neutral stand in the Jogjakarta-Semarang quarrel and after the 1923 split was one of the SI units that urged Tjokroaminoto's replacement by Musso and Alimin.ST It was not the Serang SI. however, but the VSTP unit of that city . that brought Communism to Bantam, by sponsoring a rally early in 1925 at which Musso and Alimin spoke. After a false start in which the Communists professed a neutral attitude toward Islam, they assumed a hyperreligious stand-to the extent that when the local party chairman was found drinking a cup of coffee before sundown during the fasting month. he was immediately r~moved from office. Thereafter the movemcnt caught on rapidly, attracting peasants of all economic levels, including village heads. Bantam was a bastion of conservative Islam (hence opposed to the modernist Muhammadijah) , and the Communist movement there aimed at a holy war to overthrow kafir rule. Some religious teachers opposed it, but many supported the party and others, by their neutrality, did nothing to make people feel it was in conHict with Islam, Bantam was also an area with a tradition of outlawry, and a relatively large proportion of the movement's adherents were drawn from this d;uara element.3s As violence seemed more inuninent, the preachings of the Communist propagandists in the outlying areas took on an apocalyptic urgency, which in various areas communicated itself to the general population and formed an important source of support. Here is an example of this sort of argument, used in West Sumatra, in which Lenin appears as the traditional hero overthrowing the rule of the wicked, a holy war is urged, the benefits of acceptance arc contrasted with the penalties of refusal, and, above all, the impression is created that time is running out: Brothers, the birthplace of the Communist Party is Russia. The Communists have seized freedom in Russia. The leader of the Communists was named Lenin. He had an older brother, who was sentenced to the following punishment by the Emperor (Radja) of Russia: one leg was bound to a horse and the other to a second horse; the horses were then made to gallop, the one to the Jeft and the other to the right, so that his body was tom in two and he died. When the time of revenge came, Lenin seized power with the Communists, arrested the Emperor and burned his body. The ashes of the body have been preserved. When the time has come here we may see the ashes of that body with our own eyes, that we may be convinced.

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Rise of Indonesian Communism Now Russia is free. Everyone is equal there, is already free from all mistreatment and oppression from ·the government. Communism spread over the whole world, even here, to the Indies. Lenin was not content with the liberation of his countl)' alone. . . . Now we need only await the time; we, the people of this place, are the only group that has not yet joined the Communist Party. But when the time has come we may no longer join. Therefore we must enter now, so that we shall be able to help drive away the Dutch . . . . The faithful may take no kafir for their mler; he may only be a believer; the Dutch are kafir, and must be driven away at all costs . . . . It is better that we become Communists, for Communists will come here from Russia to drive out the present Dutch government. Whoever is no Communist will be killed immediately by the Russians. To become a member of the Communist Party you need only to pay fO.83 . What would you rather do, brothers, pay fO.83 or be killed by the leaders of the Communists? If you join the Communist Party you will live free and pleasantly, and ,viII be safe; you will need pay no more taxes to the government and viUage. 8~

In areas where Communists were strong, heavy social pressure was exerted to secure adherents: in Silungkang, West Sumatra, one cou1d not purchase rice at the market without a red carel. for the rice merchants belonged to the party; in Solak nonmembers were boycotted on social occasions and in trade. In South Tapanuli the owners of small· holder coffee plantations were forced to join to avoid being boycotted by their workers, and in other areas shopkeepers would not sell to persons without a red card. All this was done in the expectation of imminent Armageddon : in West Sumatra it was said the Russillns and Chinese would come with battleships and airplanes. to establish a gQvemmen! like that of Kcmalist Turkey; in Bantam it was told that the soldiers and religiOUS teachers had gone over to the Communists and that outside aid would come from airplanes sent hy Kemal Ataturk. In the Moluccas it was declared that two Communist ships would come, the first with a white Bag, the second with a red; those who had not joined by the time the second ship arrived would be thrown into the sea. The first ship bad already come; there was not much time. t O How rapidly the PKI following increased under these conditions is hard to say. However, a 1926 campaign in the Batavia area to iriduce people to turn in their red cards and ask forgiveness of the authorities yielded 10,000 cards in a few weeks, and it was estimatf;!d, that almost the entire Indonesian population of the area· had bought them.·· In Bantam, the police estimated after the revolt that there were about 3Q4

Making a Revolution 4,000 party members, but the government investigation into the causes of the rebellion suggested that the actual number of those who had taken out membership cards in that district was probably very much higber. 4Z Such support was, of course, of a crisis character, wholly dependent on the atmosphere of impending rebellion. The chief practical signifi. cance of the red cards was to create a sense of commitment and to provide money for the party. The cards cost (depending on the area or the time of purchase ) anywhere from 10.25 to /3.; in addition, contri· butions (uang derma ) were given by or pressed from more amuent followers. Some of the money went to the central executive, but the great part of it seems to have been collected and used locally for the activities of the movement, the support of its leaders, and the purchase of arms. The central leadership itself took to selling "shares" in the PKI, an idea inherited from the early Sarekat Islam, in order to im· prove its still-floundering financial position. 43 Membership in the PKI as well as in the SR was sold, blurring the division between members and fellow travelers of the party. In West Sumatra it was decided to dissolve the existing SR units after the December party conference and take its members into the PKI as candidates, a course which the conference itself had rejected. In Bantam the SR neVer existed; all followers of the movement were considered members of the party. In various aeas, Sarekat Tani groups were fonned during 1925; sometimes they replaced the SR and sometimes they were simply the name given to SR-type units founded after the Jogjakarta conference.H There was no noticeable organizational difference between these groups and the Sarekat Rakjat: indeed, there was little evidence anywhere outside the cities of regular organizational structure or cohesion other than that proVided by personal leadership. Investigations of the two areas where rebellion took place disclosed that there was no sign that the five-man and ten-man systems had ever existed, except in rudimentary fonn in the towns housing the section headquarters. f 5 From all outward appearances the same was true in other outlying regions. While this inchoate expansion was taking place in the provinces, the central party leadership devoted itself, in line with the December 1924 policy decisions, to consolidating and extending its strength among the proletariat. Its hope that the workers would provide a more diSciplined and obedient source of strength was disappointed, however. The PKJ's

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Rise of Indonesian Communism proletarian followers, like their country cousins, were more interested in action than in organization; and the increased revolutionary agitation, added to the already present feeling of economic and social injustice, caused them to press the Communist-led unions to strike back at the Dutch. The party could not resist this pressure, and the manner in which it gave way showed how deeply divided its leadership was and how little authority the center possessed over even its established proletarian units. Originally, it is reported, the PKI had considered a demonstrative general strike for May 8, 1925, to commemorate Semaun's arrest on that date two years before. This idea was quashed by the VSTP, which had learned a painful lesson on the timing of strikes and refused to cooperate without an adequate basis for a really serious effort. The plan was therefore discarded, only to be reconsidered after a few weeks in the form of a proposed strike to protest the govenun~nt refusal to let Tan Malaka return to Java; but again the VSTP refused. While the major union hesitated, however, the smaller and less cautious labor organizations chafed at the bit; and between May and July 1925 a number of wildcat strikes broke out, all of them on a small scale and most of them unsuccessful. In Semarang the mood of the unions was particularly tense, and in Jate July major strikes began to break out in that city, facing the Communist leaders with the problem whether to turn their backs on the unplanned action or to seize the opportunity and transform it into a general strike.48 On Augu'st 5, the PKI executive issued a directive to its branches declaring that the world revolution had been delayed by the stabilization of the capitalist forces and consequently the party should adopt tactics that recognized the absence of a revolutionary situation.H It seems likely that this was a belated response to the earlier criticisms of the ECCI and Semaun; and a victory in principle for the advocates of caution. In practice, howevcr, thc PKI did nothing to alter its revolutionary coursc. The provincial party leaders showed no modcration in their agitation, and those at the PKI's proletarian center made their attitude clear in their reaction to the developing Semarang strike. On August 5, the same day the cautioning directive was issued, twenty representatives of thc Communist unions held a secret meeting at Semacang to discuss )Vhcther to tum the local effort into a general strike. Thcir decision was favorable, and Mardjohan was named strike director over stubborn VSTP objections that the time was not yet

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M. aking a Revolution 48 ripe. Typically, the Communists did not then set down a unified plan of campaign but decided to allow each union to determine individually its role in the general strike, deciding the matter at meetings of their members.4' Even before the Semarang strikes began, the authorities had been preparing new measures to check the PKI: in a conference held at the Governor General's palace on July 22, a program for combating the Communists was discussed and the drastic restriction of civil liberties and labor union activity was proposed.~ Once the strikes had begun, the government moved quickly to implement the measures decided at this meeting. as well as its powers under the strike law of 1923. On August 6 the right of assembly was prohibited in Scmarang, which prevented the unions there from meeting to fonnulate plans for a general sbike; this ended the effort to universalize the Semarang action. The backbone of the walkout was broken, although the strike lingered on in some concerns for nearly a month in spite of the largescale importation of strikebreakers by the affected employers. As in previous major labor conBicts, a large number of those who walked out were not allowed to return to their jobs, and this, plus disillusionment and discouragement, extinguished the unions that had sponsored the strike.51 Those labor leaders who had not made the move to Surabaja now did so: what remained of the Semarang leadership of the SPPL; Ngadino, chainnan of the sugar .workers' SBG and printers' SBT; and Sukendar, leader of the machinists' SBBE.n Of the Communist labor organizations, only the powerful and as yet uncompromised VSTP remained centered in Semarang. In addition to arresting a number of union organizers under the strike law, the governmcnt moved to rid itself of various PKl leaders. Darsono and other Semarang lcaders were arrested, and in early Septembt;r the Attorney General proposed that Alimin, AIiarcham, Darsono, and Mardjohan be banished. Alimin was no longer available, however. He had eluded police surveillance in July and managed after various nalTOw escapes to make his way to Singapore." From there he traveled to Canton and then to Manila, where he joined Tan Malaka. Measures to prevent undesirable political activity increased significantly, so that almost all meetings of Communist groups had to be held in secret. Restrictions on SR schools were tightened, and special classes in Dutch were established to draw away children who had been attending them in order to learn the language that was the key to ad3ffT

Rise of Indonesian Communism vancement in the Indies. Press supervision was increased, especially over the party daily Api. Official appro.val had to be secured for each issue before it was distributed, and during 1925 the police began to confiscate as evidence not only the copies of the disapproved issues but also the type from which they were printed, thus preventing Api from publishing until the type was given back. The most severe blow dealt the paper, however, occurred after the government looked at the Api subscription list: somewhat to their embarrassment, the authorities discovered that the journal's financial mainstay consisted oJ Indonesian civil service officials, most of whom subscribed in connection with their duties; a ban was therefore placed on the purchase of CommWlist journals by state employees, which reduced Api to near-bankruptcy by the end of the year. G4 Increasingly, there seemed to the Communists no alternative between surrender and rebenion; at the same time, removal of top PKI leaders placed the party in the hands of men whose desire to create a revolution was by no means matched by their ability to plan one. Even in the more rebellious provinces, however, some leaders became concerned about the rapid and disorganized pace at which the party was proceeding toward violence. In West Sumatra, the party held a conference on October 3, where it decided to transfonn the local Sarekat Rakjat and Sarekat Tani branches into subdivisions of the PKI in order to prevent their leaders from interfering with the implementation of instructions from party headquarters. 'Ibis was done in the face of objections by the local PKI chainnan, MangkudWl Sati, who charged that it was not the officials of the SR and ST but rather certain subordinate leaders of the party itself who, though they were well aware of central headquarters desires, were too hotheaded to refrain from inBammatory and irresponsible agitation. GG The rebellious elements were not to be contained, however, and even in the relatively cautious VSTP an actio.nist movement developed that wished to unseat tbe union's moderate chairman, Sugono.GtI In the urban areas, continuing political and economic unrest was expressed in strikes, which broke out in Batavia. Medan. and Surabaja during the later part of 1925.G1 Of these, the Surabaja disputes were the most Significant; beginning in September, they reached their climax at the end of the ·year, when they approached the proportions of a general strike. 'Ihe role of the PKI in the Surabaja action was much the same as it had been in Semarang: having aroused the enthusiasm or 30Ii

Making a Revolution the workers for a walkout, the party leadership was unable to hold them in check. so that the strike broke out in a ragged and disorderly fashion. with disastrous results. The Surabaja action began with a strike at a printing plant on September 1, 1925, and was extended to a machinists' strike on October 5. During October there were rumors of an impending harbor walkout, and the employers announced to members of the seamens' and dockers' union that they wou1d be fired if they engaged in any agitation. The machinists' strike began with the firing of a labor organizer; to the distress of the other employers, the management of the factory involved acceded readily to a compromise favorable to the workers. Encouraged by this, the union of machine-shop and electrical workers (SBBE) presented a list of demands to the seven major machine factories of Surabaja, the chief points of which were a 6ve-and-a-half-day ~eek, an eight-and-a-half-hour day, a wage increase, and recognition of the SBBE as a bargaining agent. The Surabaja factory heads determined to present a united front and reject all demands. On December 14, the workers at the four largest factories laid down their tools; in two other concerns there was a high rate of absenteeism. On December 21. the employees of the drydock company also walked out. Reportedly, the Communists hoped to extend the strike to the harbor workers, gas and electric workers, and some government services, but they were prevented from doing so by police measures.liS One reason the Surabaja strike wave lasted as long as it did was that the Resident of Surabaja, Joordan, tended to view the union demands on their own merits and accordingly recommended a much-needed improvement of working conditions and pay instead of taking immediate repressive action. The Governor General took a quite different view, however, and sent his own men to Surabaja to suppress the strike. ~9 The police ordered the strikers to return to work and arrested not only the leaders of the striking unions but 'also those of the Surabaja SPPL and PKI. This destroyed whatever organization the strikers had had and disrupted the Surabaja party organization; the PKI asked union locals outside that city not to correspond with headquarters there because of the prevalent disorganization and the possibility that the police would intercept the mail.60 By the end of the year the strike eHort ground to a halt, and as a 6nal disaster Sutigno, the Surabaja representative to the PKI central executive, made off with the strike funds collected by the unions of that city.61 309

Rise o/ ' Indonesian Communism Displaying the ambivalence that still characterized its response to challenge. the government released after a few weeks all but about a dozen of the ISO persons arrested in connection with the Surabaja walkouts, and those who remained in prison were acquitted ten months later of breaking the strike law./I~ The employers took a less lenient attitude; they blacklisted workers suspected of Communism and instituted a fingerprinting system to prevent employees from shifting jobs at will and to keep black1isted workers from finding employment Wlder an assumed name. They tended, as a government report noted, to blacklist all workers who could read and write, on the groWlds that intellectuals were easy prey to Communist ideas; this made the position of literate skilled workers in the Surabaja area an Wlcnviable one, although the rate of illiteracy in the Indies was such that excluding workers who were familiar with the alphabet did not seriously reduce the labor supply.as The Surabaja defeat was an even more serious hlow for the party than the Scmarang failure hed been, for ever since its December 1924 conference the PK] had placed its hopes on the revolutionary future of Surabaja, the industrial center of Java.&4 As we have seen, it bad concentrated its unions in that city. uniting them Wlder the same roof with its Red Labor Secretariat Even so, it bad not been able to control them. According to Musso, the machinists' strike was to have begun a general insurrection, but it broke out prematurely.1I6 The authorities. too. had the impression that the strikes took place too soon: May I, 1926, had been increasingly rumored as the date for a revolutionary outbreak, and a strike in that month would have been a serious matter, for it would have affected the heavy orders for machinery that the sugar industry had placed for the 1926 harvest season.M The events in Surabaja thus not only destroyed the second major center of PKI urban support but took the proletarian teeth out of the revolution before it began. The Surabaja strike wave was followed by a new series of general government measures against the Communists. These included universal prohibition of free assembly in Surabaja and Surakarta (the latter to suppress the burgeoning Islamic Communist Mu'alimin movement) . Moreover, the right of assembly was denied to the PKI, the SR, and their allied unions in all areas where there organizations existed.1I1 These measures forced the cancellation (at least as public gatherings) of a series of congresses the party. the VSTP, and the youth organv.a-

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Making a Revolution tion OPI had scheduled for Surakarta during December. On December 22, a conclave of PKI leaders at the Semarang VSTP headquarters made the first move to adjust to an illegal position by outlining plans for an underground organization. G8 However, the main decisions were taken at secret gatherings held in or near Surakarta, where various high party leaders had already gathered for the canceled congresses. eo The most important of these meetings was held in the town of ~~ banan, which is located on the border between the princely states of Surakarta and Jogjakarta and is the site of one of the great monuments of Java's Hindu civilization. The conference convened on December 25 70 and seems to have consisted of about eleven of the top party leaders.l l According to a 'present-day PKI account, it was opened by Sardjono as chainnan of the central executive. He and other speakers explained that matters had reached a point where it was necessary to make concrete plans for insurrection. Sardjono, according to this ac~ count, suggested that the action begin with strikes and culminate in anned violence, with attempts being made to draw both the peasants and soldiers into the revolt on the Communist side. 12 Accounts of the Prambanan conference generally report that it de~ cided the revolt should begin apprOximately half a year hence, but they disagree widely whether the date was May,?' June,14 or July U 1926. It seems quite possible that the meeting did not actually settle on a specific date for the outbreak of the revolution but set a deadlirie by which participants should be ready. The rest would depend on when preparations had been completed and outside support had arrived, and it was apparently considered that this could be expected sometime around Mayor June. 1926. This interpretation seems in line witll the party leaders' later actions and also with the minutes of a PKI conference held in January 1926. This record noted that the question of preparations for revolt had been settled in December. Preparedness for revolution would be determined in two ways: first, by conferring with the executives of unions involved in order to determine the date of a twenty-four-hour general strike; second, by observing the support that such a strike received. Commu~ nist responsibility for the strike would be kept secret, and the action would ostensibly be to demand a general wage increase and to express popular grievances against the government. The strike would doubtless be called for sometime in 1926 (no further indication of a date was given in the report); if it received considerable response, the party 311

Rise of Indonesian Communism would go over into revolution. If not, further preparations would be made and the test repeated until the worlcing class was ready for a Bolshevik.style revolution. When the final decision had been reached, the party executive would send coded telegrams to each section, infOrming them of the date; these branches would wire their subsections, which would spread the word among the rank and file. 7& These provisions indicate that the date for rebellion had not been firmly fixed by the December 1925 meetings, and this helps explain the widely conflicting rumors that circulated among party branches during the first part of 1926 regarding the date for the revolutionary outbreak. The VSTP congress that accompanied the Prambranan meeting had originally been planned for Semarang in the latter half of 1925, but as a result of the prohibition of assembly in that city, union leaders decided to hold the meeting in Surakarta on December 25 and 26. Its main business was to discuss a major railroad shike, proposed for May 1926.77 At the last moment the congress was canceled when the ban on public activity was extended to Surakarta; it emerged instead as a "social gathering." The' participants in the outing gathered at the Hotel Pasar Pon, on December 25; there were eighty-two union dele-gates in attendance, all PK.I members. The day was passed in walks through the park and a visit to the movies, with the police in close attendance to see that no matters of business were discussed. Late that night, however, the merrymakers gathered in a hotel bedroom, having set lookouts to warn them in time to pretend slumber whenever the authorities checked.18 Sugondo, PK.I vice-chairman, opened the conclave by declaring that the recent police measures against Communist leaders should be pro· tested by a day-long general work stoppage. Winanta, likewise a member of the PKI executive, attempted to whip up enthusiasm for a revolt: It was the VSTP's duty to participate in a rebellion, he said, since it was the oldest and largest Indonesian labor organization and had corunitted itself to Communism; moreover, restrictions on its activities were such that there no longer remained an alternative to revolution. Both Sugono, the union chainnan. and Samsu, PKl executive member for Tjepu, discussed the consequences of prohibited assembly for the movement. Since it was no longer possible to ~eet legally, Samsu argued, it was essential that the members penetrate other organizations, wooing their leaders with sweet words and converting their followers to the Communist way of thinking. Sugono 312

Making a Revolution went a step further, arguing that the PKI should dissolve itself as a legal entity: it was not the party and its allied organizations that were important but the viewpoint they taught; therefore, it would be better if the Communist leaders jOined other groups and spread their views through them. The sense of the meeting favored preparation for a strike leading to revolution, and it was decided, in line with a decision of the Semarang meeting of December 22, to conduct a referendum on the matter among the VSTP locaIs.18 At the Prambanan conference it had been decided that the first anned outbreak would take place in Padang, headquarters of the powerful West Sumatran Communist group, after which violence would be extended to Java. so The pwpose of this was to draw the Dutch forces away &om Java and thus give the main push on that island a better chance of success; as we shall see, it was in line with a strategy that Tan Malaka had been urging and may well have originated with his ideas. The December meetings also called for the creation of a secret party structure, the Double or Dictatorial Organization (DO). This, as its name implied, was to be the real party leadership, and the official structure would serve as a &ont to distract the authorities and absorb their blows; it was to be highly disciplined (hence "Dictatorial") and responsible for concrete preparations for rebellion.8 1 In addition to such domestic arrangements, the conferences took up the matter of help from abroad. There was reason for the Communists to cherish hopes on this point: they had, after all, received funds from the Intemational Red Aid after the VSTP strike of 1923, and in his report on the 1924 Comintern congress Semaun had held out the promise not only of more IRA help but also of support from the West European Communist parties: . The parties in England, France and other counbies would also have to help us in Indonesia with demonstrations and so on when the time comes for our enemies to gather their forces. This fact is very important for the people's movement in Indonesja, since the assistance given by general strikes abroad will be of great value in the critical time when reaction has mobilized [against us]. 82 The Indonesian rebel leaders, who had little idea of the Comintern's limitations, seem to have taken this statement for a good deal more than it was worth, and they later complained. bitterly to the Comintern about its poor support. Semaun had also reported that at its plenary session 313

Rise of Indonesian Communism of March-April 1925 the ECC1 had discussed financial .support to the PKI to enable it to withstand government pressures. However. he had continued, along with this international aid we in Indonesia must revise our organization and tactics in order to make more effective our resistance to the reactionaries. We shall make no Bulgaria out of Indonesia. We shall not accept our enemies' provocations . . . but shall now reorganize ourselves as the Comintern resolution advises.!S Semaun's warning against a putsch and his demand for adherence to ECCI instructions went unheeded by the PKI, and the Comintem for its part seems to have supplied only vocal support in the ensuing period. The International. however, was obviously shOWing much more interest in the Indonesian movement than before. The Profintem issued a special resolution protesting the police measures taken against the Semarang and Surabaja strikes and calling on tbe Dutch proletariat to demonstrate against their government's policies. It cabled this resolution to the movement in Indonesia, which published it as proof that the Profintem was deeply concerned with the fate of the Indonesian proletariat.-- The Dutch Communists had earlier done their part to assure the party of international support by wiring it in connection with the Sarckat Hidjau re.action: The NAS (Netherlands Labor Socretariat), CPH (Communist Party of Holland), and the BKST (?) are fonning a branch of the International Red Aid; their effort is meeting with success. Semaun represents the PKI in the Central Committee; he vigorously defends the freedom of political action in Indonesia, in connection with aid for the Priangan and Ngawi; the Comintem (the Communist International, centered in Moscow) is to spread a proclamation of support all over the world. Agreed? 8$ Api, publishing the message, joyfully appended ..Agreedl" and declared that it was now awaiting the results of Moscow's proclamation (although apparently the expected resolution was lost in the ECCI criticism of the Indonesian party line ). Whatever weight the PKI asSigned such gestures, it had China before it as an example of successful revolution carried out with Soviet support. As we have noted, Indonesian Communist utterances during 1925-1926 increasingly emphaSized the Chinese revolution; this development earned the PKI the compliments of the Comintern, which was 314

Making a Revolution interested, if not for precisely the same reasons, in having the Chinese situation studied by the colonial parties.SG As for the PKl interpretation, Darsono was probably expressing the view of the prorebellion party leaders more accurately than he knew when he wrote: Without doubt the victory of the Cantonese National Anny was a great influence in the revival of the national-revolutionary movement in China. The more the influence of the imperialist powers in China is diminished as a result of the stand taken by the National Anny, the more eager for combat the toiling masses of Indonesia become. If the masses of China can be mobilized against the Creat Powers, why should not the Indonesian masses be capable of being led against the relatively weak Dutch imperialists? 87 That this argwnent was used to whip up enthusiasm for rebellion and shame those who urged a more cautious approach is evident hom the record of the Pasar Pon meeting: Winanta, introducing the subject of revolt, stressed the examples of the nationalist revolution in China and Abdulkarim's rebellion in Morocco. Was it not Simply a matter of daring to act, he asked, and were the PKI. the VSTP, and the people of Indonesia less courageous than those of China and Morocco? 88 The very improbability of independent success fed hopes for intervention from abroad. Ever since the December 1924 congress had decided for revolt, tales had been rife within the Communist movement of military support from the USSR-or from Turkey, Arabia, China, or Japan.I" Presumably the wilder rumors were believed only by the rank and file, although there is some reason to believe that the leaders of the Prambanan group thought the Comintem would be willing to run in guns with the aid of Soviet warships,OO It was, in any event, decided at the December meetings to appeal to Moscow, and Alimin was to make this contact.'l The primary purpose was to secure authorization for the rebellion, but it was quite clear that the party expected that approval would bring material as well as moral support. u While these meetings were taking place, the government acted against the party leaders. On December 17, it announced that it would banish Darsono, Mardjohan, and Aliarcham. Mardjohan, who had led the Surabaja dockers' and printers' unions during the strikes in that city, had been arrested on November 24; Aliarcham had been jailed on December 5. They were sent to New Guinea, where they later died. Darsono, however, was allowed to go into exile, the last time the 315

Rise of Indonesian Communism colonial government granted this alternative to a political opponent. Unlike his predecessors, he did not go to the Netherlands but was allowed to travel directly to the Soviet Union.1Il In January the police searched for Musso, Budisutjitro, and Sugono, but they were not to be found.'f Several other members of the PKl high command were also missing. Like the three wanted men, they had quietly slipped out of the country and gone to Singapore. There they met with Subakat, the party agent in Singapore, and with Alimin, who had been staying with Tan Malaka in the philippines. Malaka himself remained in Manila, fighting a new round in his battle with tuberculosis. According to Alimin, the conferees (himself, Musso, Sardjono, Sugono, Subakat, Mohammad Sanusi, Winanta, and Budisutjitro) held a three.day meeting and confirmed the decision to revolt. It was decided to send Alimin to Manila to secure Tan Malaka's cooperation in an appeal to Comintern headquarters .ll~ Accordingly, Mimin addressed himself to the exiled leader, but he found Malaka's attitude distinct1y cool." Ian Malaka feels himself bypassed" Alimin later replied to MaIaka's criticism of the Prambanan decision.'1 And indeed, there was good reason for Tan Malab-to feel left out of things. For the past year, ever since the December 1924 conference, he had observed the development of party policies with increasing misgivings." In response to the 1924 meeting he had written a tract, Naar de "Republiek-lndonesia" (Toward the Indonesian Republic ),1l5I in which he criticized the PKI plan to abandon the Sarekat Rakjat and gave his own views on a party program. The Sarekat Rakjat, Malaka maintained, should be transfonned into a national party nominally separate from the PKI. The PKl itself should adopt a program that would appeal to all the noncapitalist Indonesian classes. for, as he reminded the party, the mass of the Indonesian people were "national-socialist" rather than proletariansocialist in their orientation. 'OO Malaka suggested a sample program; it is too 1engthy to be described here, but it may be roughly characterized as a revolutionary program that did not call for nationalization of all land, socialization of small businesses, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or government by SOviets. '01 Communist leadership and the lack of an Indonesian bourgeoisie would, Malaka thought, assure proletarian hegemony in the revolution,'02 but that revolution cou1d only succeed if the Indonesian people were solidly behind it. This unity

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Making a Revolution could only be achieved if the Communists emphasized the goals they held in common with the rest of the population instead of insisting on a purely proletarian program. Therefore, he declared, "the SR must become more and more the organization of all the enemies of imperialism." 1(13 The result of the revolution would be, in its first stage, a government with a mixed economy, in which nonproletarian elements had a voice; In order to assure [the continuation of] economic life in Indonesia an opportunity must be given after national freedom is achieved for the nooproletarians to exercise (on a limited scale) private ownership and capitalist enterprise. More than that. the state must give them material and moral support in order to increase production ... , Especially if the nonproletarians have played a role as great or greater [than the proletariat] in the struggle we 'will not be able to consider the immediate establishment of a soviet system in Indonesia. tOt

If Naar de "Republiek-Indonesia." was moderate about the goals of the revolution, it was militant concerning its execution. Malaka de-' e1ared that he expected a Pacific war between America and Japan; this conflict would ,probably present the best opportunity for Indonesia to move. However, such a war was not likely in the immediate future, nor was it so inevitable that Indonesia could rely completely on it as the occasion for its revolution. Therefore, "the question as to when would be the best time to act for absolute and complete political freedom must, we feel, be answered with 'Now and not later: Otherwise there may come a time when we will be forced to admit, We let the opportunity slip through our fingers then:" 10~ So saying, he outlined a revolutionary strategy centered on an attack on the Solo Valley area of Java-Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Madiun, Kediri, and Surabaja. In a subsequent tract, written in 1925 (Semangat AI oeda-The Young Spirit), Tan Malaka was more cautious, either because of Commtem views or his own sober second thought; he emphasized that although the party should prepare for revolution, it could not consider ~ginning one until it was sure the entire population was behind it: "Any Indonesian revolt will be in vain unless the people are ripe for revolution. We must distrust and oppose . . . all forms of 'putsch:" loe When the people were ready, however. the revolutionary action should begin. Commencing with strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, it should proceed through terrorist actions to an all-out revolt. The first 317

Rise of Indonesian Communism thrust should be made: on the Outer Islands, he now thought; only after the Dutch had been wealc:ened and distracted there should terrorism begin in Java, So far as strategy was concerned, the Prambanan decision was akin to, if not derived from, Malaka's analysis; the question was whether or not the sihJ.ation was ripe for revolt, and here Tan Malaka and the party were, by early 1926, in utter disagreement, Malaka appears to have learned of the Prambanan resolution just after the meeting via a letter from the PKl; according to him, A1imin was at that time still staying with him in Manila and had agreed with Ma1aka's opinion that it was foolhardy,lor He had corresponded with the party in Singapore about it, and when A1imin returned and added his voice to the arguments for revolt, he became highly indignant :

I was asked to come to Singapore, but not in order to discuss WHETHER OR NOT THE PKI WAS READY to lead a revolution against the Dutch and HOW to carry out such a revolution, I was asked to come to Singapore in order to proceed from there to Moscow with Musso, There we were to ask for approval and moral support, since the decision taken at Prambanan went against Comintem rules,los . In reply, he prepared a set of theses in which he warned that the party was heading for a putsch and not a rebellion; it must check its course before it was too late, iCHI Elaborating on the theses shortly afterward in a third pamphlet, Massa Actie (Mass Action ), he declared : To bring about a putsch in a country like Indonesia (especially on Java), in a place where capital is concentrated, well organized, and protected by soldiers and spies in the modem Western fashi on, and where on the other hand the people are still completely superstitious means to play with fire-it is one's own fin gers that will get burnt, These anarchists who are accus· tomed to saying that the well·knit forces of the West can be crushed by a few "exploding cggs ~ are being no more intelligent than a man who tries to beat in a stone wall with his head.110 Only an organized mass action, Malaka declared, would overthrow the Dutch : to achieve this, he urged the party to take advantage of all the legal opportunities that still remained to it. Such efforts should include strikes, boycotts of Dutch goods, campaigns for the extension of political rights, and, if the opportunity presented itself, participation in the Volksraad-all of which must have struck the Singapore refugees as akin to and no more appropriate than the advice they had

318

Making a Revolution received earlier from the Comintern and Scmallll. It was necessary, Malaka stated, to transfonn the PKl's heterogeneous character into that of a truly disciplined, proletarian elite; "until now Indonesia has not had a revolutionary party," he asserted; "it has only had associa· tions of people of 'assorted' views and political activities." At the same time, however, the party rank and file should participate more in mak· iog decisions, which should be reached by musjawarah (consultation). Bureaucracy and autocracy in the party apparatus should be strongly opposed. The PKI must secure the baclqng of the masses, through either a national front or the development of the Sarekat Rakjat, which the party should influence as a bloc within: "If a 'single party' system is to be used, the proletarians and nonproletarians will be gathered in one revolutionary organization, within which party the more conscious and educated workers will fonn a 1eft wing: This left wing will be· come the driving force of the Indonesian movement." 111 The PKl, Malaka continued, should pay special attention to building up its labor union strength and establishing an underground organiza· tion. It must, however, be sure of controlling its forces; terrorism, he argued (in contrast to his position in Semangat Moeda), was danger. ous because it led to uncontrollable, anarchist adventures. In any event, the party must not now proceed to violence. for if the movement had waxed in rebelliousness, it had waned in strength: In several local actions for limited objectives the PKI and SR have already shown their strength and capacities. However, they are "really and truly" not strong enough to carry out a general national action (let alone an international one). In the name of freedom and humanity, this fact must not be hush~ up. If [the party] acts in the way [it intends tal thjs will clearly mean its plunge into an error as deep as that made by the bourgeois parties (especially the party of Tjokroaminoto and Company). When the prohibition of assembly was ordered at the end of last year, we did not give voice to our objections. Eight months have passed since then, and still nothing has happened. Where are the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in Java, Sumatra, the Celebes, who directly stand under our leadership or who are influenced by us? Where have the faithful revolutionaries gone, in those eight months, who were gathered in the VSTP, SPPL, SBG, SBBE, etc., and those who are not organized but who sympathize with us? It was our task speedily to mobilize and attract the people [in a campaignJ against the issuing of the assembly prohibition, against the imprisonment, banishment, and death of comrades Sugano, Misbach, etc., with a mass action which was appropriate and enthusiastic.

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Rise of Indonesitm Communism We should not have remained silent in the face of the enemy's attacks, 10 the point where a disagreement has arisen within the revolutionary ranks which cannot be bridged, and where anarchistically inclined members have taken matters in their own hands, persuading their comrades to join ' them. lta . Indeed, Malaka concluded, even if the govenunent's current course of action should destroy the legal party organization, Indonesian Communism would lose less than if it extinguished itself in an abortive revolt. Tan MaJaka gave his theses to Alimin, declariilg that he himself had no ii1tention of sponsoring the proposals of the Pramban~ group before the Comintem and that the International, which viewed the current period as one in which the capitalist forces had stabilized themselves, was not at all likely to support an ill-conceived and foredoomed rebellion. He proposed that the expedition to Moscow be scrapped and that instead a conference to develop a more realistic plan be held in Singapore between himself and representatives from the Indonesian party. Party headquarters, he declared, should be temporarily transferred to Singapore to avoid police interference and to facilitate international contacts, and the PKI should reorganize itself and the SR in accordance with his suggestions and the ECCI resolution of Aprii 1925. 111 Malaka later claimed that he could have vetoed the project outright, although his power to do so is, as we have seen, a matter of some dispute: Now I regarded it as beyond my authority to decide to call for a revolution six months hence, a revolution which had been agreed upon by a few leaders of a Communist party which was held to be a section of the Comintern in one of the most vital areas of the world. Such a decision would have to be made in Moscow in consultation with other Communist parties; in Moscow an investigation would have to be made as to whether [the party] had sufficiently considered the nature of Indonesian society, the class struggle (within that society), the Communist consciousness of the members of the PD, and the readiness of other Communist parties to lend support to an Indonesian revolution led by the PKI. Although I had the veto right, I did not want to make use of this power. Before [the party] asked for support from Moscow, I wanted to hold a conference in Singapore which would be attended by representatives of all its major branches. My action in 1926 was thus not to forbid the rebellion hut to state my opinions and criticisms of the decision taken at Prambanan. u4

Making a Revolution Alimin reportedly agreed with Malaka's proposals, although he could hardly have been happy with them, since he was one of the more enthusiastic proponents of revolt. He then departed for Singapore, where he was to present the theses to the PKI leaders and request them to wait until Malaka was well enough to join them in discussion. Accounts of the ensuing events agree that Alimin met with the emigre leaders immediately on his return to Singapore, They differ, however, as to whether he presented Malaka's theses or indicated his disapproval of their project. The most likely version is that he declared Tan Malaka had been too ill really to discuss the matter, that he had refused to back their project, and tbat they would have to make their appeal to Moscow alone.!l~ This they decided to do, with Musso and Sardjono reportedly taking the lead in insisting that the revolt be carried out at any hazard. tiS Apparently Alimin did report Malaka's warning that the Comintern would not back the project (we will remember his bitter remark that in Moscow "a spirit of slackening, retrogression and dissension is prevail. ing"), for although the conference decided to send Alimin and Musso to Russ~ to present the party's appeal, it also discussed what to do if their request were denied. According to Semaun, the decision was this: if the International supported the endeavor, the two emissaries would send a message to delay action until material support had arrived and then set off a full-scale revolt. If the Comintern reaction was negative, the PKI would engage in guerrilla and terrorist actions on its own. In other words, the Communist leaders were intent on violence; the Comintern's decision would aHect the manner but not the occurrence of the combat. Hi Just how quickly these decisions were reached is a matter of some mystery, given the conflicting dates at which the various meetings are said to have taken place. ll8 However, Malaka, waiting impatiently in Manila, finally received a letter from Alimin asserting that it had been impoSSible to arrange the requested conference with the party leadership and that he and a companion were planning to depart for Moscow. m As soon as he was able, Malaka left for Singapore, where his worst suspicions were conSnned. He arrived at the place where the PKI leaders had been staying (the lodging house of Ki Masduki, in Kebun Pisang GeyIang Serai, a Malay neighborhood in Singapore), but he found no one there. Alimin and Musso had set off for Canton and Russia; the other party leaders had returned to Indonesia 321

Rise of Indonesian Communism to prepare for the revolt, and only Subakat, the .permanent PKI agent in Singapore, remained there when Malaka anive4.120 Tan Malan qUickly discovered that the theses had not been handed over by Alimin and that he had been badly outplayed by the Prambanan faction; but he was not one to concede defeat so easily. Fortunately Subakat was a ready sympathizer for his viewpoint ( reportedly he had never favored the Prambanan proposals ) and the two of them sat down to write the PKI executive on Java about Malaka's views and the trick that had been played him.l21 MaIaka demanded consultation with representatives of the party leadership; the prorebe1lion heads were hardly pleased by thls, but they could not reject the request completely, for by now opinion in the central executive was bacUy divided. Accordingly, they sent the current vice-chairman, Suprodjo, to talk with Malaka. After conferring for a few days with the Singapore leaders he became convinced of the correctness of Tan Malaka's view. The three major leaders (Malaka, Subakat, and Suprodjo) then composed and signed a new set of theses, to which was added the original Manila statement, which, according to one source, had been found secreted inside the rattan suitcase Alimin had carried with him from Manila.122 This done. Suprodjo returned to the Indies and called a party conference to discuss the rejection of the entire Prambanan line. It was now June 1926, but instead of being ready for revolution the PKI was being split wide open.

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XII

The Rebellions WHILE the party leadership outside the Indies was negotiating the expedition to Russia, the PKl at home was preparing for revolt. On January 13, 1926, representatives of the party central command and leaders of its units from outside Batavia met at PKI headquarters, l The conference, apparently held to acquaint the provincial leaders further with the revolutionary plans and to secure their agreement, affinned that legal political activity was no longer possible and that revolution was the only hope: Propaganda work alone is not enough for the party to seize power in the

COWltry. Simply because there are many workers who ask to join us because they are attracted by our propaganda does not mean that they can be trusted by us to take part when the time for fighting has come. Because of

this we must begin taking extraordinary measures to consolidate and strengthen ourselves. In connection with the abolition of the right of assembly we must exercise caution and must work secretly, but at the same time more energetically than before. Our stress must not lie in propaganda alone, but must be directed most of all toward working 011 people who have already been attracted' by our propaganda in order to train them to prepare and to carry out resistance. Members of the revolutionary party who are to participate in the fighting may be referred to as the soldiers of the party; for we must teach them from now on to aet in fact as soldiers, no matter how much we are hindered in this by the prohibition of our right to hold meetings. ll

Trusted party members must be divided into three groups, it was declared : soldiers, who would prepare [or the coming campaign; spies, who would check on what the enemy was planning; and propagandists, who would infiltrate other organizations and encourage a revolutionary attitude. 1b.is, as was candidly admitted, would not only prepare for the eventual revolt but give PKI adherents a renewed sense of participation, for with the closing down of the party's public activities their only function had been to pay duesJi 323

Rise of Indonesian Communism The January L'Onlerence furLher stated the party {:ollviction that the PKI revolutionary task was different from that of other Communist parties: whereas in Europe the Communists aimed at class warfare and the overthrow of capitalism and in democratic countries ' could use parliamentary activity, the Indonesian path lay outside the law and was directed against foreign imperialism. The party must therefore overcome regional and ethnic differences, which the imperialists exploited to divide and rule the people, and must unite the population in a nationa~ anti-Dutch struggle:' 10 the outside world we maintain that our movement is based on internationalism and is directed against capitalism and imperialism, but internally we also bear the aim of freeing the Indonesian people from the oppression and slavery of Dutch imperialism." t The decisions of the December 1925 meetings on the general procedure for revolt were reiterated at the Batavian conference. Some members wanted more concrete discussion, but this was refused. The Prambanan decisions were in Iact very vague as to both timing and tactics, and an attempt to define party plans more clearly might well have revealed a serious division in its counsels. As it was, one such clash occurred: Abdulkarim, a .fiery Atjehnese, suggested that the party ought to teach people the art of bomb throwing as preparation for the revolt, tossing them by way of practice into the Indies' various representative assemblies. Sugono (who had not yet left for Singapore) reacted with hOlTor; such nihilism, he said, would merely bring the p~ into deep trouble before it was prepared for conHict. 5 Sugono himself seems to have been ambivalent about the proposed rebellion. He said as much in an article on the December 1925 VSTP "congress," warning the union that its enemies were purposely driving it to compromise itseU through violence. Anger alone wouJd not bring victory, he pointed out, "and now is not yet the time, even though the association is weU ordered, to take up the battle toward which they are trying to push us." 6 According to Tan Malaka, Sugono opposed the other PKI leaders in their plans for revolution at the Singapore meeting; but any chance of his becoming a locus of opposition vanished with his arrest and death in prison after arriving home.? Probably a recalcitrant Sugono would have had little influence, however, for the party's mood was one of blind commitment to rebellion. "A pure cause is worth death!" the Surakarta party organ declaimed at the time of the December confer324

The Rebellions enees. "A life without reason, based solely on self-satisfaction. is useless: is it not better that one dies? Struggle. but for a definite goal. Come, comrades, forward, close ranks! We shall not be able to reach our goal if we wait till the world has come to an endl" 8 Two years before Darsono had urged the PIC! to remember that the Communism of Marx and not the anarchism of Bakunin must govern the party; but now Api quoted Bakunin as its guide.D In a letter issued to the PKI locals on February 1. the PKI executive expressed the sense of impending conflict that gripped the party at this stage: The time for talking has passed; that for organizing our units has arrived. Existing trade unions must be strengthened wherever they are already in existence, but where no such unions are yet in existence, none should be set up. since that would only cause a loss of time. On estates which so far have no union, however, we must plant cells which wi11 be ready when the time comes. Furthermore all tani {peasants] should follow us even though they are neither members nor provisional members of our party. as long as they sincerely agree with the movement and our leadership.1 0

The party headquarters also appealed to the branches for money; it was incurring no more than the usual defiCit, it declared. but "costs have increased because of the ban on public meetings and other obstructions which are forcing us to work harder; this is the more difficult since we are forced to change our tactics." Moreover. because of fear that the government would clamp down on the transfer of money orders to the executive, it was necessary to collect the funds as quic1dy as possible.H The sense . of urgency was at least as great among the party fol. lowers. Expectation of an uprising on May 1, 1926, had been rife since 1925 and had even been aSSigned to groups other than thc PKI. t.2 As the time approached, the tension became unbearable in the areas where the PKI was most active: "News of the rebellion traveled from mouth to mouth, yet its source was never known and remained a matter of conjecture; all the time the threats grew increasingly reckless. Is it, then, surprising thatin the eyes of many people May 1, the day of the international proletariat, became the most likely day for the outbreak of the insurrection?" 13 There was good reason to believe the Communists had intended May 1 to be marked at least by strikes or other demonstrations, and certainly the Dutch were convinced of it. 325

Rise of Indonesian Communism Major railroad and sugar strikes were expected, and in March the Attorney Genera1 instructed the Residents to advise plantation managers to secure food supplies and arm their personnel in expectation of revolutionary outbreaks on that day. The Governor General called for preparedness, and predictions of disaster 6.lled the Dutch-language press. 14 Conscious of its own weakness and of government preparations to intercept action on May Dar, the PKl leadership decided to avoid any chance of a Confrontation. In April the party executive instructed its branches and .aJ1ied organizations not to celebrate May Day, in order to prevent the arrest of cadres whose services were needed "so that the hour of the struggle will find us all prepared and victory will certainly be ours." I~ Consequent1y, the only salvoes fired on May Day were those set off by the authorities. The most important government measure proclaimed that day was the addition to the criminal code of Article 153 bis and ter, which subjected to stiff punishment those who "intentionally express in word, writing. or illustration-be it obliquely, conditionally, or in disguised tenns-approval of disturbance of the public peace, or overthrOwing or interference with the established authority in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies, or who create an atmosphere favorable to this," and those who "distribute, exhibit, or publicize" materials of this sort. The inunediate result of this was the closing down of the revolutionary press and the formal disbanding. ~n May 3, of the units of the PKI and Sarekat Rakjat. u, The party was now effectively underground. It was not illegal, although membership was forbidden for employees of the state; but it could not hold meetings and it could not express itself openly-even sarongs with hammer-and-sickle motif were banned by the new law,I7 That the government did not move Simultaneously to arrest the remaining major party leaders was probably due to their inactivity on May Day and to the feeling that the PKI was a dying organization. The central party, it was known, was having a great deal of trouble collecting dues and maintaining the interest of the SR members, In the major Javanese cities, and especially in the Red strongholds of Surabaja and Semarang, government action seemed to have brought the movement to a halt. The party's remaining functioning union, the VSTP, was rapidly decaying, and police raids on the Conununist organizations in the Semarang area were so heavy that the (1egal ) PKI and SR units in that region had already been dissolved on April 26, 18 True, a number of incidents

326

The Rebellions wexe taking place in the hinterlands: an armed attack in Tegal and an attempt to blow up a munitions dump in JOgjakarta during March, disordex in Banjuwangi in April, an attack on a jail in Pulau Tello (Nias) in May, clashes in Atjeh during June, incidents of arson and murder in Surakaita during July and August, and bombings in Batavia and disorder in Bantam during August and September. 19 This was disturbing, but it was in a tradition of disorganized local protest with which the government was familiar and which, it seemed, cou1d best be dealt with by eliminating local Conununist leaderships (these outbreaks were followed by the arrest of numerous party leaders in the areas concerned) and by moving troops or constabu1ary forces into disturbed areas rather than by acting directly against the party as a whole.110 It was a boon to the PKI that the authorities were persuaded of the Communists' growing weakness, but the very factors that led the government to this conclusion also concerned the PKI leaders. The labor unions of Java, which were to have provided the major revolutionary thrust, were in a state of collapse. Secret terrorist organizations had been established in some regions, but the center had little or no control over them. In spite of the December decisions and subsequent resolutions for its establishment, the disciplined, centrally controlled DO had not yet been set up. Police raids on central and section headquarters in Java, carried out in early May, had supplied the authorities with much of the PKI archives. Contact with the outlying party sections was poor, and the transmission of the center's ideas had depended to a great extent on its now-banned publications. There were conflicts within the regional party organizations, and even subsections showed increased independence of section leadership.21 Disorganization and nervousness had led to a fear of spies in the movement's ranks of such proportions that the executive had to caution its followers against too much zeal in denouncing their comrades.22 With the fonnal dissolution of the PKI, the party executive finally established an illegal organization. In May PKI headquarters were moved to Bandung, apparently to make it less convenient for the government to observe party activities. The popular reaction in the Priangan, as elsewhere in Indonesia, had largely died out during the latter part of 1925, and Bandung was the only major city in Java outside the capital where the PKI organization was still relatively intact and where a general prohibition of assembly was not in effect. The 327

Rise of Indonesian Communism executive now consisted of Sardjono (chairman ), Budisutjitro (secretary, replaced during his imprisoruncnt by Karmani and Baharuddin Saleh), and Winanta (treasurer, replaced on his arrcst by Suprodjo, who was also vice-chairman). The party tried to improve contacts with its sections and to prevent unauthorized persons from presenting themselves to outlying units as emissaries of the central executive (there had been problems of false representation and of local groups refUSing to accept real delegates) .23 The DO was finally brought into being under Winanta's leadership; reportedly, its activities were divided into four deparhnents, one to recruit members of the anny and police, one to procure Red Guards, onc to collect money, and one to provide supplies.:~ So far as we can see, however, the DO did not become important as a centrally controlled force, and guerrilla organization remained largely in local hands. The Bandung PKI leadership found itself in an all but untenable position, for by this time the more impatient party branches were pressing the executive to proclaim a gen~al uprising in a mattcr of weeks; other units indicated that if rebellion started, they could not be counted on. Moreover, developments on the Dut.ch side added a new element of uncertainty: in March 1926, after a lengthy cabinet crisis, the De Geer government was formed in the Netherlands, with V. C. Koningsberger, the first chairman of the Volksraad, as its Ministcr of Colonies. KOningsberger appointed A. C. D. de Graeff to replace Fock as Governor General as of September 1926. De Graeff had been a close coworker of Idenburg and Van Limburg Stirum; his nomination was generally seen as a criticism of Fock's hard-handed treatment of the Indonesian opposition and an attempt to restore cooperation between the Indonesians and the govemment. 25 The more cautious leaders of the PKI could thus argue that it was better to see what the new regime would bring before engaging in a hopeless rebellion; however, to those who were intent on violence, it seemed the revolt must be carried out before the new Governor General had calmed Indonesian emotions by his modcration. From June 20 to 26 a conference at party headquarters assessed the preparedness of the sections for a revolutionary attempt. Of the major units represented there only four (Batavia, Bantam, the Priangan, and South Sumatra) indicated they were ready for revolt. Lengthy discussions showed, however, that although the party branches were widely divided on a number of issues, they were almost unanimously in favor 328

The Rebellions of rebellion in the near future. It was therefore decided to go through with the plan for .revolution but to postpone for some months the deadline by which all the sections must be ready for action.2ll No sooner had this agreement been reached than Suprodjo returned from his conference with Tan Malaka. He immediately held a council of war with the other members of the executive in Bandung and presented Malaka's position. The only result was to deepen divisions within the PKI command, for although some members tended to agree with Suprodjo's arguments, party chairman Sardjono was able to prevent the reScinding of the Prambanan program.21 Suprodjo was not willing to let matters rest with this, and during July he toured the Javanese branChes of the party, explaining 11alaka's standpoint and llTging the sections to reconsider the Prambanan commitment. Meanwhile, one of the regional representatives to the June party conference, the Sumatran PKI leader Djamaluddin Tamin, stopped in Singapore on his way home from Java. After some argument he was persuaded to Malaka's position and joined him and Subakat in their letter-writing campaign against the Prambanan project and for a new convention of PKI leaders at Singapore.28 The effect of this pressllTe, added to the hesitations already felt by a number of the less emotional party branches, was evident in deliberations held during July betwcen the PKI executive and section representatives. The cause of the discussions was the demand by the most hotheaded Communist locals, Tegal in Java and Padang Pandjang in Sumatra, that the party take revolutionary action in the near future; if the other branches did not agree, they hinted, they would move on their own.2ll Bantam, Bcngkulen, and Batavia joined them, urging revolution before Governor General Fock departed. so In this view they \vere supported by all the Sumatran sections; most of Java, however, dragged its heels, and the executive decision was, as before, that the uprising would be held, but not right then.al . In August the battIe waxed fiercer: from the Straits Tan Malaka and his allies continued their correspondence, winning allies not only among the hesitant Javanese sections but also among the Sumatrans, who, if they were general1y more determined on revolt, were also inclined to listen with respect to the arguments of their island's most · prominent Communist. The PKI executive, whose own feelings on the uprising were by now much less than certain, attempted to soften Malaka's blows by assuring him that the Prambanan decision had in329

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Indonesian Communism

tended not a revolution but rather a general strike that would have gone over into revolt only if it had proved successful and if aid came from Russia. Since it was impossible to hold a strike, and since other preparations had failed entirely, the executive argued, this plan had become a dead letter. Instead, the Java leadership declared, it wouJd wait until conditions were favorable to declare a revolution.82 Malaka, however, was not only interested. in renouncing immediate plans for revolt. In the first place, he replied, the Pramhanan decision must be fonnally rescinded and the PKl must concentrate not on preparing a revolution but on reorganizing its ranks. The party, he charged, had lost whatever discipline it had possessed; its trade unions, which were to have been the basis for the revolution, were in disorder: and the decision to rely on Moscow for aid had been born of a refusal to recognize that the people of the Indies, on whom the revolt must depend, were not then in a mood to support a revolution themselves. A Fitting the word to the deed, he refused to accept shipments of arms that Alimin and Musso had ordered for transmission to the Indies, and they lay piled in a warehouse in Tanjong Pagar. Malaya." Malaka's arguments made all too much sense to the BandunK leaders. who saw their movement visihly dissolving into anarchy. By this time their contact with the party sections was nearly severed. and some wtits refused to anS\yer even their urgent missives. Consequently, the executive, meeting in Bandung on August 22. voted to send mes· sengers to all the sections to review with them the general situation and discuss Malaka's proposals, and it warned the party branches not to take independent action in starting a revolt. A major point it ~oped to put across was the need to restore party diScipline : the "federative centralism" inaugurated in December 1924 would have to be replaced, it was asserted. by the tight control of the party's earlier clays.u [n Swnatra, this reversal created enonnous confusion. Padang Pandja~g, which was more than ready for rebellion and was already engaged in terrorist activity. appealed to Tan Malaka in the hope that he could be persuaded to give the signal for revolt. 36 Meanwhile, on August 31, a group of thirteen Swnatran revolutionaries conferred in Singapore (Malaka was at this time absent from the city) and estab.lished an "Indonesian Trading Association" (Sarelcat Dagang Irido-nesia ), which was to provide the framework for a party machine to be placed in the hands of A1imin and Musso when they returned from Russia. The organization would be centered in Penang and would have 3JQ

The Rebellions branches in Singapore, johore, and Kota Tinggi; Tan ~'ialaka would be a key participant hut not the man in control,37 This new body appears to have existed only as long as Tan Malaka remained out of town; on September 12 he, Subakat, and Djamaluddin Tamin led a meeting at which the "trading association" was ordered to disband. The gathering also denounced the Musso-Alimin expedition, pressed for the revocation of the Prambanan decision, and called for the formation of a new executive in Penang under Tan Malaka's leadership. ' Malaka's viewpoint on the uprising was thus endorsed; the organizers of the trading association were ordered to return to Sumatra, and the four messengers who had brought Padang Pandjang's appeal were given the meeting's decisions to take back as their reply. Within a few days, the Dutch spy at the PKI Singapore center reported, prominent party leaders were expected to arrive from Java, and it looked to him as if the whole PKI would then be brought under Malaka's control. 38 The Singapore agent's view of Malaka's position was overlyoptimistic. and one reason for his misjudgment may have been that he did not realize how much Bandung's control over the party had deteriorated. The ringleaders of the opposition in Java were the party units of the northern coast (Pasisir) towns of Tegal, Tjirebon, and Pekalongan. Of these, Tegal was the most impatient for action. Grievances in that area were numerous: the party leader, Suleiman, was eager to avenge the death of his brother, VSTP chairman Sugono; PKI adherents desired to avenge the casualties they had suffered in conflicts with the Sarekat. Hidjau and the police in the surrounding villages; and the population as a whole was in a desperate and angry mood because the regional authorities, having gotten four years behind in their collections, were now forcibly extracting thc payment of all back taxes. 311 Tegal therefore wanted no delay, and it called on the PKI central executive and the neighboring party sections to aid in an uprising that would extend over the north coast of Java and aim at assassinating Europeans and government officials.40 In response to this demand, a meeting between representatives of the Bandung executive, Pekalongan, Tegal, and Tjirebon was convened in a rice field outside the town of Tegal on the night of August 22, 1926. In the debate that took place at this gathering, the conferees split in three directions. The Tegal spokesman declared that the party should delay no longer and that it should not concern itself unduly over the 331

Rise of Indonesian Communism organization of the rebellion. Once the uprising had begun, the hesi· tant party sections would be forced to join in, since they could not aHord to see it defeated. PKI secretary Budisutjitro, the representative of the Bandung headquarters, topk the opposite view. Having come to agree with Tan Malaka's analysis of the situation, he urged that the party give up its plans for revolt as suicidal and devote its energies to building up its organization and popular support. Salimun, the repre. sentative of the Pekalongan section, attempted to mediate between them, urging that the PKI ~ake immediate steps to prepare for revolu· tion, but at the same time warning against an isolated attempt at . revolt.u It was SnaDy decided to send a representative of the Pasisir branches to Bandung for a full-rlress debate with party headquarters. Salimun was selected, and on August 29 he returned from his mission and conferred in Tjirebon with .the PKI section there and with representatives from Tegal. The executive, he reported, had rejected Tegal's proposal; it had implied that revolt would begin in the near future but had said the Srst task was to re-establish party diScipline and central contro1.n Neither Pekalongan nor Tegal liked the executive st.and, but they disagreed on how far to defy it: Tcgal declared that it would wait a little longer. but if no command for revolt were given in the ncar future, it would act independently; Pekalongan disagreed, saying that an isolated uprising would be madness. The result was a decision to poll the other party units in order to Snd out their views on revolt and to win them over, if possible, to an early action. Accordingly, Salimun of Pekalongan and Abdulmuntalib ofTjirebon set out to visit the other Java branches of the party.43 On September 16 the two delegates met again in Tjircbon. The result of the poll had been overwhelmingly in Pekalongan's favor: only the small Central Javanese branch of Temanggung had declared itseil ready for revolt. In the important centers of Jogjakarta, Magelang, and Surakarta the ·party was completely disorganized, and in Maruun the police were so watchful that no chance for a conference could be found.H On the follOWing day, Herujuwono. a leader of the Batavia party section and newly appointed head of the underground DO, arrived in Tjirebon and sympathized with Pekalongan's view. 4li On Sep. tember 18 the group called on Tegal to send representatives to them to discuss the situation. That recalcitrant unit sent only one delegate, 332

The Rebellions Sumitro; he apparently showed little inclination to water down his branch's views, for the final compromise reached by the conference represented a virtual victory for Tegal. It was decided that although the Batavia. Pekalongan. and Tjirebon leaders continued to feel on principle that a revolution should be carried out in a centralized fashion, they would neither oppose nor encourage an independent initiative by TegaI; and if that branch, bearing in mind the negative opinions of the other Javanese sections, was still determined on rebeIlion, its neighbors on the Pasisir would aid in the struggle.4ft Tegal was all too ready to take advantage of even a grudging acquiescence. Several days after the conference Salimun, who had returned to Pekalongan, received a wire from Tegal announcing that that section would revolt on September 28, only a few days off. Would Salimun come to Tegal and discuss his branch's part in the uprising? The Pekalongan party leader was reportedly horrified at this announcement of revolution on so short notice; but neither he nor the Pekalongan PKI secretary Tajib could make the trip to Tega!, for by now they were being c10sely watched by the already suspicious police. Consequently, they stood by helplessly, waiting for the imminent explosion in the neighboring city.n While Tega! was thus teetering on the brink of revolution, other plans for an uprising were being made in Batavia. The capital was one of the areas in which party sections, having raised both enthusiasm and cash by preaching imminent revolution, were finding themselves in an exceedingly dillicult position when they failed to produce a revolt. In some places people, caught up by chiliastic emotions, had responded to party appeals for funds by selling literally all their possessions. By now this exultant faith had given way to bitterness, and the Communists were in danger of being turned on by what had been their most fervent supporters. In order to check the anti-Communist backlash in its own community, the Batavia section sponsored a series of bomb throwings during August and early September, as a result of which a number of Communists were arrested. Those subsequently released found the pressures for rebellion as high as ever and, smarting from rough handling by the police, were detennined to take matters into their own hands. 48 Sometime during the latter part of August Sukrawinata, vicechairman of the Batavia branch, drew up an independent plan for revolt, based on his belief that an attack on the capital was all that was 333

Rise of Indonesian Communism necessary to set the whole country in flames . He formed a Committee of the Revolution, which was intended to rally the Communist revolutionary forces outside the authOrity of the hesitant central1eadership.u On September 13 he and other impatient leaders from both Java and· Sumatra (Herojuwono, Samudro, Baharuddin Saleh, Mahmud Sitjintjin, and Hamid Sutan) met in Batavia and formed the Committee of Supporters of the Indonesian Republic (Komite Penggalang Republik Indonesia ).~ This group, which was first headed by Baharuddin Saleh and was kept secret from the Bandung headquarters, decided to send its members out to the party sections in Java and Sumatra in an attempt to secure their acknowledgment of the Committee as the organizer of the revolution. n There were thus, in the latter part of September 1926, three centers claiming authority over the Communist Party of Indonesia: Tan Malaka and his supporters across the Straits, the revolutionary committee in Batavia, anil, last and by now clearly least, the official headquarters in Bandung. The reader has poSSibly been wondering what had become in all this time of Alimin and Musso, whom we last saw leaving for Moscow some nve months before. If so, he may comfort himself that his puzzlement was shared by Tan Malaka, who was expecting them any day in Singapore,~2 and by the Baodung executive, which was hoping their appearance would rescue it from its desperate position (not to mention the Malayan Chinese merchant in Tanjong Pagar, in whose warehouse all those unpaid-for weapons were stored). So far, however, no word of the two had been received, and they seemed to have vanished. This was far from the case, however; and to discover what had happened to them we must tum back to June 12. 1926, and observe M. N. Roy, who was sitting at his desk in Moscow writing a very worried letter. As the man then in charge of colonial affairs on the.ECCI presidium. Roy had every reason to be concerned over the state of the Indonesian party. Reports reaching Moscow were alanning: At first sight the situation appears favorable. But on closer examination, it looks less encouraging. Most of the stalwart fighters are either in exile or prison, whi1e those left at large ... are afRicted with the "infantile disease of leftism"; neither can they develop any extensive activity, since they are alI known to the police and are constantly shadowed by spies. Moreover, owing to the white terror, the organisation links of the party have been considmhly loosened, and the innuence of the Central Committee on the separate branches is not sufficiently strong; ...53

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Tile Rebellions Darsono had arrived some two months before, and presumably his account had done little to put the Comintern at rest; at the same time, as Roy noted in his letter, he had been out of touch with developments in the party long enough to prevent him from being of much help to the International in its efforts to find a way to deal with the situation. Roy's missive was directed to Sneevliet, who in 1926 was enjoying a brief period in the Communist sun as chainnan of the CPH; it informed him that the International thought the situation in Indonesia so alarming that it would send one of its own observers to find out just what was going on. Corrununications with the Indonesian party, Roy complained, were almost nonexistent, and there was good reason to believe that the.PKI was under an ultraleft leadership that was leading it toward a putsch. This suspicion had been supported by letters hom Tan Malaka received a month before 64 and by reports from some Javanese Communists that Bergsma had sent on to the Comintern. In dealing with this situation the ECCI was handicapped by the fact that the Indonesian representatives to the International, although they did not agree with the Prambanan endeavor, took positions that were no more orthodox: Semaun insisted on his own interpretation of the Indonesian revolutionary movement and its needs, and Darsono had agreed with him and was therefore no help. Semaun had drawn up an action program for the Indonesian party which was too unorthodox for the Comintern to accept; but at the same time the International did not want to fight on two fronts by declaring itself against both Semaun and the party in the Indies. In view of this most delicate situation, the agent the International proposed to send (a man named Miller, whom Roy described as quite unsuitable, but the only one available for the job )!ili was instructed only to observe, to talk with the party leaders, and to get their reactions to the Comintern's suggested program. After he reported back, the ECCI would decide on Snner steps. The next step, Roy continued, was to put the agent in contact with the party on Java; and this promised to be no easy matter. Neither Darrono nor Semaun could recommend any regular party leaders still at large who were reliable and safe enough from police surveillance for Miller to use as contacts. The only address they could give was that of a Dr. Kwa in Batavia,M whose membership in the party was supposedly a secret but might already have been discovered by the police (in which suspicion, we might say, Semaun and Darsono were quite right ). Sernaun had remarked that one or two of the Javanese studying 335

Rise of Indonesian Communism in HoUand might be willing to accompany Miller and help him contact the party in Indonesia, but the two people he cou1d suggest (Subardjo in Leiden and Gatot Tarunamibardja in The Hague ) were not party members. Semaun had proposed that he or Darsono go to Holland to talk to the young men he had in mind and, if they proved willing, to instruct them on their mission; but this procedure seemed too risky and too expensive to the Comintern. Instead, the ECCI was sending Miller to Holland to see Sneevliet, who was to supply him with instructions and addresses in Indonesia, which decision, Roy warned, was to be kept secret from Darsono ana Semaun, who had Violently opposed Miller consulting with the Dutch Communists and therefore had not been told. On July 10 Sneevliet wrote back. The Indonesian situation was, he agreed, a very touchy one, and the comrades in the Indies were unforhmately inclined to act without thinlcing of the consequences. As for the Comintem draft program for the Indies, which Roy had enclosed, he felt that. it was too radically nationalist to permit the party to operate on a legal basis, as the International wished: the Dutch authorities, he reminded, were extremely upset by references to independence. Semaun's program was of course all wrong, he agreed; and at the same time he put in a plug for his own ideas by remarking that Tjokroaminoto and the SI were due to regain their momentum and that it was a shame stupid PKI criticisms had destroyed the bloc within. As for the Intemationars emissary, Snecvliet opined that try as he might he would never be able to comprehend the situation in the Indies at a glance. The best thing, he suggested, would be to order Tan Malaka to risk a few weeks' journey to Java dwing August or September in order to contact the party and the Comintern representative and to help the latter straighten things out. Finally, Sneevliet urged that he himself be invited to Moscow to participate in the discussion of the Indonesian question and, if possible, to Gnd employment in the Comintern's colonial omce.~1 All these proposals seem to have run into the sand: Sneevliet did not get his job with the IntemationaJ, Tan Malaka did not return to the Indies, and there is no sign that Miller arrived either in Singapore or in Indonesia. Indeed, the Comintem agent may not even have left Moscow, for just after Roy wrote his letter to Sneevliet the whole situation was changed by the arrival of Alimin and Musso. u They first talked to Darsono and Semaun, informing them of their proposed petition to the

336

The RebeUions Comintern. ~o Immediately afterward the four leaders were brought before the ECC!. The International's worst suspicions about PIG plans were now confirmed, but at least there was the comfort that the Com· intern now possessed two more likely agents to send to the Indies. According to Semaun, Zinoviev and the other representatives of the failing Trotskyist left encouraged the two emissaries in their project, for they were eager to strengthen their influence among the foreign parties and to disprove Stalin's contention that the time was not proper for proletarian revolution in the East. so Musso and Alimin, who had as little idea of what was going on in Russia as the Comintem did of events in Indonesia, were at 6rst attracted by this support; but after having absorbed some advice from their more knowledgeable compatriots and seen just what the Soviet situation was, they thought better of backing the Trotskyist horse. In any event, the Comintern power relationship was made quite clear by the first ECCI decision on their request for support, which was an unequivocal no, based on the Stalinist reasoning that the current period of world economic prosperity was not conducive to revolutionary success.Ol The two PKI leaders, the ECC! declared, were to remain in Moscow for the time being in order to improve their Communist training, which, according to Alimin, consisted chiefly of instruction on the evils of Trotskyist deviation.62 During this period the Comintern drafted a new program for the Indonesian party, and SemaWl composed a sufficiently orthodox letter of criticism to the PKI. According to Semaun, the International's criticisms and suggestions were roughly the same as Tan Malaka's had been,03 and this claim is bolstered by two lengthy discussions of the Indonesian Communist situation that appeared in journals of the International in November 1926. They were written before the uprising in Java, but it seems most unlikely that they were composed before the Comintern discussed the Indonesian question or without knowledge of it, since one of the writers was Darsono, who was privy to the whole affair. Declaring that the PKI must greatly improve its discipline and· its ideological level, Darsono urged that the party concentrate on building up its mass national revolutionary base on the example of the Chinese bloc within: "The task of the Indonesian Communists in this period is the same as that of the Chinese comrades. They must support the Indonesian national revolutionary movement with aU their strength and after that strive to seize its leadership for themselves." 64 An 3:fl

Rise

0/

Indonesian Communism

a rticle appearing at the same time in the Profintem press decried the PKI aberrant course as follows: In general, attempts to attract the masses into the labor unions in Indonesia are not being carried on with sufficient energy. The reason for this is to be found not only in government terror, but also in the nature of the country itself. The unexpectedly swift industrialization (principally in the field of agriculture), the head-turning successes of the revolutionary movement in 1923-1924, together with the absence of battle-trained industrial cadres of the proletariat, created the situation referred to by comrade Stalin in 192:>the simultaneous overevaluation of the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and the underestimation of the significance of an alliance of the working class with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism . . . . The present period of reaction which we are experiencing demands other methods of united work nnd contact with the masses. The successes of Anglo-Dutch capitalism in Indonesia call for the organization of a broad struggle on the economic level as the primary step. In the inunediate fu ture [the Indonesian Communists] are faced with the task of carrying out longterm, methodical, painstaking work for the establishment of conned:ions with the masses 011 the basis of representing their daily economic and cultural needs. This is a very difficult task, but it is absolutely necessary during the period when the proletarian forces are gathering themselves against government reaction. The experience of the Soviet labor unions has shown that such a skillful adaptation to changing circwnstances, such a systematic and thorough penetration into the very depths of the working mass, such a slow and patient guiding of its various clements-however small they 00into the r~oluti onary struggle gives assurance of victory at the moment of the decisive engagement with the govemmcnt and the bourgeoisie. BG After some three months the Indonesian delegates met again with representatives of the ECCI, this time in the presence of Stalin himself. Stalin declared himself not unfavorable to revolution at the tim~for as 1926 wore on, the International's situation, particularly in China, was such that it began to talk increasingly of a revolutionary upsurge in the East-but he was opposed to an effort that showed every sign of disorganization and little promise of success.811 As a result, Alimin and Musso began their journey back to the Indies, bearing instructions denouncing their program and calling for restoration of the party's legal status and for radical nationalist agitation. It was now early October, six months from the time they had left Singapore. This was the result of the Alimin-Musso expedition as the Comintcm 338

The Rebellions saw it; but according to Semaun, there is a little more to the story.IT We wiII remember that while meeting in Singapore the Prambanan leaders bad discussed the possibility of Moscow's opposition to their project; they had then decided that in case of a Comintem refusal they wou1d carry on the battle by guerrilla warfare. The arguments of the International in rejecting the PKI plan were accepted readily enough by Alimin, but not by the strong-willed Musso. That leader. after chafing for a time at his enforced inactivity in Moscow, with little hope that the Comintem would reverse its position, detennined to send off the message that would set in motion the alternate Singapore plan. The problem was how to get the word through, and the key to this was Semaun, who before leaving the Netherlands for Russia had arranged with the CPH for an address through which, in cases of extreme need, messages could be forwarded to the PKI contact in the Indies. Musso, knowing of this, asked Semaun to provide him with the address; but Semaun, whom Musso had inadvisedly told of the Singapore conference's alternate decision, refused to do so. Musso was not easily defeated, however; he next proceeded to Semaun's· assistant (who, we will remember, seems to have been the student Iwa Kusumasumanbi) and told him that Semaun had said that he might send a message via the secret address. Sure enough, the ruse worked, and Musso triumphantly sent off the fateful wire.18 Semaun soon discovered what had happened, and he was now faced with a very uncomfortable problem. Should he confess what had taken pl9-ce to the Comintem, thus bringing the wrath of the ECCI upon his head? No, discrete silence would prevent unpleasant feelings all around: Semaun thus detennined to say nothing, and sh~rtly thereafter, when the meeting with Stalin took place, three of the four Indonesian participants knew it to be a farce. Alimin and Musso journeyed home to the Indies with no great haste; it would, after ali, have been embarraSSing to arrive before it was too latc. It would fonn a dramatic conclusion to our story if we could recount that the PIC! had received Musso's message and proceeded to battle as planned. Unfortunately, however, we have no evidence, either from the available police reports, or from confessions of the leaders of the uprising, or from circumstantial evidence, that the party ever received Musso's command. In the first place, the Communist contact on Java, Dr. Kwa, was not so secret as supposed, and he may never have gotten the message. On the other hand, if the government had intercepted the 339

Rise of Indonesian Communism wire and interpreted it corrcct1y, it would probably have made much of it in later reports on the Communist uprisings, since it was eager to prove the Communists were inspired by commands. from abroad. Could the Dutch Communists have gotten wind of the affair and refused to transmit the message? We have no record of this. Assuming, however, that Dr. Kwa received the command, to whom would he have given it? Presumably to the party leaders in Bandung, who fonned the official executive and who included those participants in the Singapore conference who wer:c still at large.~ D We have observed, however, that the Bandung executive had been growing increasingly disturbed by the party's descent into anarchy and had concluded that discipline must be restored before any further move toward revolt was made. A message assuring Comintem support might well have altered its position radically, but not one refusing aid; if that leadership re· ceived Musso's message, it showed no signs of being swayed by it. Tan Malaka's executive-ill-exile would, of course, have Batly opposed an independent revolt. ,As for the rebels gathered in the Batavia committee, they were already determined for an uprising, and Musso's message would merely have echoed the decision already taken. In point of fact, the situation · had already passed well beyond the stage where Musso's co~and would have made any difference. When we left the PKI on Java to recount the adventures of the mission to Moscow, it was September 1928, and the party section in Tegal was about to revolt on its own. The uprising was to take place toward the end of the month, and it was decided to give the sign by exploding a firecracker. Unfortunately, the gentleman to whom the signal was entrusted misWlderstood the date, and so the local revolu· tionaries gathered on one night but the firecracker did not go off until the next. The Tegal rebellion was thus literally stillborn, and the Indies was preserved temporarily from revolution. to The public peace did not remain undisturbed for long, however, for the Batavia committee, to which the initiative now passed, was proceeding apace with its plans for revolution. In the middle of October Dahlan, a West Sumatran Communist and one-time student at the school for native officials ( Stovia), returned to the capital and took over the leadership of the committee; in handing over control to him, Sukrawinata is reported to have advised him not to contact the Bandung executive because of that body's "weak-kneed viewpoint." 71 Meanwhile, the committee members had been polling the PKI 340

The Rebellions branches about the Batavia plans for immediate revolt: Baharuddin Saleh went to Padang (which agreed), Mahmud to Makassar (uncertain) , and Herujuwono to Surakarta (uncertain), Surabaja (refused), Semarang (refused), Tjirebon (refused,) and Tegal (agreed). Sukrawinata' went to Bantam and the Priangan (agreed), and Bakar, a friend of Mahmud, went to Palembang (which refused). 72 In spite of. this very mixed reception the leaders of the Batavia conunittee, meeting in the capital at the end of October, set their action for the nigbt of November 12, 1926. barely two weeks oH.T! On the night of November 6, the rebel leaders met in Tjirebon to discuss final arrangements for the uprising. At this conference, it is claimed. Herujuwono was put in charge of the action in West Java, Salimun and Abdulmuntalib were given command over Central Java, and the Semarang leader Mohanunad Ali was entrusted with East Java. a The revolt was set definitely for midnight on November 12; all Java and the West Coast of Sumatra were to rise up. Final instructions, it was stated, would be sent out to the sections by the revolutionary headquarters, which would henceforth be located in Tjirebon, where police surveillance was relatively lax. 70 Dahlan remained in the capital to organize the action there. On November 7, meetings were held by various party units on Java to commemorate the Bolshevik revolution and to receive the news of the revolt pians,18 and on November 8 Herujuwono is reported to have conferred in Tjirebon with the leaders of the VSTP, who with much reluctance agreed to support the uprising with a strike on November 13.71 Meanwhile, the revolutionary emissaries visited the major PKl sections to infonn them of the impending revolt: AbdulmWltalib traveled to Semarang, but he was too closely trailed by the police to contact the party there; Mohammad Ali journeyed to East Java and, having shaken his trackers, was able to talk with Communists in that area; Herujuwono went to West Java and talked to the leaders in Batavia and Bantam. The net result was, reportedly. that all the party sections consulted declared their support except those of Surakarta, Jogjakarta, Madiun, and some units from the eastern tip of Java. The last instructions for the uprising were sent out from Tjirebon between November 9 and 12, and the final go-ahead was given harely twenty-four hours before the revolt was to begin.18 Just how much the party leadership in Bandung knew of these events is unclear, although it seems most unlikely that it was com341

Rise of Indonesian

Comnllln~

pletely ignorant of so widespread a plot against its authority. The Singapore center was certainly aware of the Batavia committee's existence, for a few days before the revolt Djamaluddin Tamin wrote Dahlan and begged him and Baharuddin Saleh to come to Singapore as soon as possible to discuss party policy.19 According to one of the rebel leaders, Bandung made a last vain effort to avert disaster in November by issuing a circular to all the PKI branches calling for a purge of the party and a return to the strict centralization that had prevailed before the December 1924 conference. On November 10, a referendum for the election of a new executive was called for by the Priangan section an? Bandung subsection (the "leading unit" of the party), which nominated the antirebellion leader Suprodjo as chairman. so By this time, however, the central leadership actions were quite beside the point; the situation was far out of its control. We might also ask ourselves just what the police were doing at this time and whether all these events were unknown to them. Indeed, the attitude of the authorities is very curious, for they were well aware of all but the immediate details of the plot. From British intelligence sources and their own spy in PKI Singapore headquarters they knew of Musso and Alimin's journey and of the debate between Tan Malaka and the party leaders in the Indies; they were also well acquainted with the Batavia conunittee and its intentions, for one of the major sources I have used to describe this organization is a government report written not after the uprisings but in October 1926.81 The Netherlands Indies intelligence service had known the secret party code for some time, and the correspondence between the sections presented it with little difficulty. They knew and shadowed the leaders of the rebellion; but they did not act. On November 7, Abdulmuntalib sent a coded wire to the Pekalongan party chairman which gave the moment for the revolt; the local authorities deciphered it but somehow did not think it a matter of importance. The wire read. decoded: Urgent. Salimun. Pekalongan; also for Temanggung. The time is set for November 12/ 13, 1926, between midnight and 2 A.M. The people everywhere must revolt; all government officials and police must be killed. Abdulmuntalib, November 7, 1926.82 It was not until the evening of November 11 that someone thought this of sufficient intere.~t to show it to the Resident of Pekalongan. That 342

The Rebellions gentleman, being of a somewhat more nervous nature, warned Batavia and ordered the arrest of the Corrununist leaders in his distriCt. 83, While the government was rousing itself to action, Tjirebon's final instructions were being sent out to the party branches. The method by which these messages were distributed was . (we will remember here the plans laid down in December 1925 ) that coded messages were brought, generally by railroad and tram conductors, to the major party branches, which then put them into another code (each district had its own) and sent them on to the section leaders. The instructions were then decoded, written on little red notes, and distributed, generally by women, to the group leaders.8-4 One of the three main messages sent by the Tjirebon PKI was addressed to AbduImuntalib, who, we will remember, was in charge of the Central Java revolt. He, however, had been so closely watched by the police that he could not accomplish anything in Semarang; instead, he had returned on November 12 to Tegal. There he stopped at a Chinese inn, outside which the police took up their vigil. Their attention was soon rewarded, for a woman appeared looking for the PKI leader; when they searched the lady, the police discovered the instructions for the Central Javanese rebellion. u With knowledge of the party plans in Central Java now gained from two sources, the authorities arrested the leaders in that area and thus prevented the outbreak of revolt in the districts that had inspired it: Pekalongan, Tegal, Tjirebon, and Temanggung were silent on the night of November 12.86 Surabaja and Semarang, once the main source of PKI strength, were Similarly inactive; and in Jogjakarta, Madiun, and Magelang there was no sign of revolt. In Kediri and Banjumas some preparations for an uprising had been made · but, owing partly to the arrest of local leaders and partly to disorganization and lack of support, they yielded only a few belated scuHles. In the Surakarta area of Central Java there were disturbances; these took place five days after the uprising began and were led not by the regular party leaders, who were against participation, but by local unionists and, reportedly, remnants of the Mu'alimin movement. 87 In West Java, uprisings did break out on the night of November 12. They were not entirely unexpected. In Batavia, reports of coming ac· tion had been circulated for several days, and on the afternoon of November 12 it was learned that the railway workers were planning to set off a general strike on the follOWing day. However, partly because

343

Rise of Indonesian Communism of a lack of harmony between the European and Indonesian adrninis* trators of the area, no real preventive measures were taken. Toward midnigbt a number of armed bands appeared in the streets; clashes with policemen and watchmen tl?Ok place. an attack was made on Clodok prison, and the telephone exchange was seized. Bands comprising up to three hundred persons also appeared in the Tangerang and Meester-Comelis '(Djatinegara) areas, fought with police patrols and passers-by, started fires, and (in Tangerang) invaded a small police barracks. It was apparent that there were 'ccrtain general objectiVescutting off communications, opening prisons, and attacking police and officials-hut the attempt was, to say the least, badly organized. By morning order had been restored, and the revolution in the capital was over.88 Three hundred persons were immediatcly arrested and more were added as investigations revealed the names of others thought to he involved. Reportedly, an attempt was made to continue the 6ght by Suriasupamo, a previously undistinguished group leader who was proclaimed "resistance dictator"; but the authorities soon discovered and arrested him. 8V 11le situation was more serious in Bantam and the Priangan. for the government did not know enough about the West Java revolutionary plans to act in time against the leaders; at the same time rural unrest was of such proportions that the disorders extended into the countryside and consequently took longer to quelL Incidents in the Priangan. beginning on the night of November 12, consisted of sabotaging communications lines and assaults and arson committed by armed groups. Insofar as their actions showed purpose, they were directed against village heads, police, and lower Indonesian officials. In Bantam, the· area of widest revolt. the uprising took a religiOUS character; those who participated in it felt themselves to be engaging in a sabil-illah (holy war) and prepared themselves for it by the appropriate rituals.1Kl As in other areas, they were armed mostly with knives and cutlasses (kelewang ), but a few possessed firearms. Incoming troops and constabulary forces found communications lines cut and roads blocked, but they met with little or no resistance; the population did its best to vanish. The resistance took the form of brief, uncoordinated raids; during one of them a Dutch railroad official was killed. Although the murder of Europeans and Indonesian officials secms to have been a principal desire of the participants in the revolt, and although this would have been easy enough to accomplish physi344

The Rebellions cal.Iy, the momentum of thc rcbeUion never overcame the psychological barrier to this most extreme rejection of the social hierarchy: no other European, and no Indonesian official above the rank of wedonll, was harmed, although some raids were made on houses of those who were not home. The actions that put dO ....'1l the main part of the Java revolt were made on the orders of the Residents of the areas concerned. It was only on November 17 that the Attomey General ordered the arrest of all persons known to be Conununists and to have any sort of leading capacity. This was followed by mass arrests and the rapid decline of the movement; by December the uprisings were effectively over, al· though disorder and incidents of arson continued for some time. The revolution had not come to an end in Sumatra, however: in· deed. it had n~t begun. On November 4 Bakar. a representative of the Batavia committee, had been sent to that island to inform its leaders of the plans to revolt on the night of November 12. However, Arif FadilIah, the erstwhile prorebellion chairman of the Padang· PKI section, declared that he would go along with an uprising set off by the official party executive but not by the Batavia committee." Bakar traveled up and down the West Coast arguing with the local party units, but met mixed reactions and was himself arrested on November 22. Meanwhile, conferences were being held between the leaders of various Communist groups to agree on a date: one mooting decided on November 15, another wanted November 16, and the Sarekat Djin (Ghost Union. a Sumatran Communist terrorist group) decided that its units would revolt on November 21. Always someone disagreed or something went awry. however; and so the arguments continued into December, with the party leadership meanwhile diSintegrating under a wave of arrests. Finally, on January I, 1927, local groups in Silungkang proceeded to act, haVing come to the conclusion that: All we do is talk, talk, and once again talk. We are having an endless string of meetings. but nothing else. This way we will never get anywhere. We will go on meeting until nothing comes of the whole rebellion. We ean no longer go back. Whoever wants to stop us now gets killed--even if he is our own father, our own mother's brother! And if the subsection committee itself goes against us, then it will die, tool 02

The rebellion spread rapidly; fighting was heavier than in Java, and the rebels seem to have been better anned. Nonetheless, resistance was 345

Rise 0/ Indonesian Communism broken by January 4, and by the 12th it was all over. As in Java, one European was killed. While all this was going 00, Alimin and Musso were wending their way back from Moscow. By the time they bad gotten to Shanghai, they heard of the Java revolt; accordiog to DjamaIuddin Tamin, they wired the Singapore party center to expect them in from Bangkok on De· cember 15. 83 They next proceeded to Canton, w~ere they obtained false passports from the office of the Kuomintang foreign ministry, and then traveled, via Hongkong and Bangkok, to Singapore. Conveniently for the authorities there, their telegram had been sent to the spy who had been planh;d in PKI Singapore headquarters. The pollee did not close in immediately, however, and they were thus able to meet with Subakat and present the Comintem's now sadJy outdated mis· sives.H Together with Subakat and another companion, Umar Cirl. they proceeded to Kota Tinggi, Johore; it seems that Hadji. Moham· mad NUT Ibrahim, the Sumatra PKI leader who bad negotiated with them for procuring anns for the Sumatra rebellion, had made some arrangements to meet them in Johore on their return. 811 Subakat and Umar Giri, having good reason to suspect they were being followed, urged their companions not to stay in Johore. Musso and AIimin refused to become alarmed. but they did not calm their escorts, who fled alone." TIlls, it turned out, was the course of wisdom as well as panic, for on December 18 Musso and Alimin were arrested. At the time they were carrying with them $2,500 in U.S. banknotes, which they declared had been given them by sympathizers from the Philippines; it was apparently all the material aid forthcoming from the International.IIT With this, the adventure on which the PKl had embarked in December 1924 was brought to an inglorious end.

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XIII

Turning Points

The Communist International welcomes the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Indonesia and pledges its complete support. Workers of the world! Do not pennit the Dutch imperialists to drown the struggle for freedom of Indonesia in bloodl Hasten to the aid of the Indonesian nghters! Organize mass meetings, express your sympathy for the insurrection in Java, and protest against imperialist terror. Organize demonstrations before the Dutch Embassies and Consulates and demand freedom for the Indonesian people and the military evacuation of the colony. Suppressed peoples of the worldl The insurrectionary Indonesians are your advance guard, they express the will to freedom which is your common property. Do everything in your power to support them in their struggle! Down with imperialist terror! Long live the united anti-imperialist front of the workers and the suppressed peoples of the world! Long live the free people of Indonesia!l

With this manifesto, adopted by the ECCI on November 20, 1926, and made public the next day, the Comintern announced its acceptance of the Indonesian fait accompli and its full support for the revolutionary effort. We might well ask whether the International could have done otherwise and still demonstrated its support for the colonial antiimperialist effort. One possible alternative was the response taken by the Dutch Communist party. When it heard of the Java uprising, the CPH announced that the rebelJion had been consciously provoked by the Indies government in an effort to smash the revolutionary movement; it called for an investigation into its causes and urged amnesty for those who had been arcested.2 10 other words, it treated the affair as the end product of a govenunent campaign of persecution rather than as a spontaneous revolt against Dutch rule, and its response was aimed at exposing the injustices committed by the authorities and not at urging a continuation of the 6ght. The ECCI rejected this alternative, instructing the CPH to adopt a

3D

Rise of Indonesian Communism more positive attitude toward the Indonesian rebellion.s At its seventh plenary session, which began on November 22, 1926, the Comintern executive further criticized the Dutch party attitude; speaking for the ECCI, the Czech delegate SmeraI declared: I have seen extracts from the Dutch press that the Communist paper, instead of advocating for the Javanese insurgents the Leninist principle of national self-detennination to the point of separation and the establisrunent of an independent state, have proposed and supported jointly with the Social Democrats, a plan for a mixed investigation committee to be sent to Java. This is to be found in the press of our Party during the days in which blood Bows in Java. At such a time the party demands that the government grant Java "self-administration'" such as Great Britain has condescended to grant India. We are infonned that the Party even tolerates in its midst such a trend of thought as implies that the great mass uprisirig in Java was the work of provocateurs. 4

CPH representative De Visser attempted to ward off the stream of criticism by assuring that tbe Dutch Communists had seen their mistake and altered their position: How did it happen that the Dutch Party did Dot immediately take a sharp and correct standpoint? When the 6rst reports concerning the uprising were received, the Party was of the opinion that this was another provoked struggle. But since the Party rocognizcd that the Javanese workers had gone over to an annoo uprising. it did everything in its power to support them.~

It had been the CPH's misfortune to have been a political step behind the International. It was only a short space-for, as De Visser re. minded the ECCI, the minimum program of demands for Indonesia, which the CPH had presented at the time of the revolt's outbreak, had been drawn up with the help of the Orgburo (Organization Bureau) of the Comintem itseU.6 Nonetheless, the distance was important, for it marked the International's progress from the "stabilization of capitalism" period, with its emphasis on alliance with non·Communist groups and on organization rather than agitation, toward a more out· spokenly revolutionary line. Chief among the reasons for this change were the Chinese revolution and the Stalin-Trotsky feud: Trotsky, although his position had been greatly weakened, could not be completely written off as a political force, particularly since his criticisms of Communist strategy in the Chinese revolution seemed to be proving true. Since early 1926, Chiang 348

Turning Points Kai-shek had shown signs of breaking with the Chinese Communists; having consolidated his power within the Kuomintang. he began to remove CCP members from important functions and, in the coup d'etat of March 20, 1926, moved against the Communist organization in Canton. The Comintern was thus forced to consider whether it should advocate a strategy that would give the CCP greater independence from the Kuomintang (a move that would inevitably hasten a break) or whether it should continue to support the bloc within the KMT, hoping that if Chiang did decide to break with the Chinese Communists, he would at least continue his alliance with the Soviet Union. The International decided _on the latter course, for Stalin wished neither to lose the advantages of a Soviet alliance with China nor to give the Trotskyists a chance to claim that they had been right in the quarrel over Chinese Communist strategy. At the same time, the Comintern· sought to cover its retreat before Chiang and to prepare for a possible break by adopting a theoretical analysis of the situation further to the left. The period of capitalist stabilization wa~ in its final stages, it was announced; a new revolutionary wave was rising in the East, and this meant both that the struggle against imperialism would take a sharper fonn than before and that differences between the truly revolutionary and the hesitant elements in that struggle would increase. In claiming that the revolutionary tide in the East was on the rise, the Comintem was faced with an embarrassing problem: it had very little evidence for this, Chiang Kai-shek, it is true, had made remarkable progress in his campaign to secure north China, but Chiang was an increasingly doubtful revolutionary element from the Communist point of view. As for the rest of the East, it showed no noticeable revolutionary stirrings. Under these circumstances, the outbreak of the Javanese rebellion just before the ECCI's seventh plenum came as a most welcome event. Here was proof that the Comintern colonial strategy had been correct, that the period of capitalist stabilization was coming to an end, and that the flame of revolution was beginning to lick from China to the other countries of the East. 'The revolt against imperialism is spreading from one country to another. From China it has extended to Java," the ECCI manifesto on the Indonesian revolt proclaimed.1 Bukharin, opening the plenum, saluted both the Chinese and the Indonesian peoples for their revolutionary effort, and Manuil349

Rise of Indonesian Communism sky described the glowing revolutionary prospects the Comintem China policy had brought to the East: At the same time liberated China will become the magnet f~ aU the peoples of the yellow race who inhabit the Philippines, Indooeria, and the numerotU islands of the Pacific. China will becom~ a major threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism because the problem of spreading its gigantic population out over the Pacific confronts it even more intensely than it does Japan. China will fulfill this task among the island inhabitants of the Pacific, not with fire and sword, but bound up with the process of the revolutionization of the native population.' "That [the Comintem's] judgement over the role of the Chinese revolution is well-founded," he observed, "is proved by the uprising in Indonesia." , Semaun, who for once did not have to apologize for PKl behavior to the International, announced to the plenwn that the rebelUon in Java had sparked a "'real civil war": "Now a great uprising has broken out. The Chinese revolution has exercised a great inHuence on the Indonesian population and thereby contributed to its resort to arms." That the revolt had occurred directly under Communist leadership and not, as in China, under the aegis of a bloc within he ascribed to the fact that Java possessed no national bourgeoisie and hence no real nationalist leadership. Perhaps the Dutch would suppress the revolt, but, he assured, others would soon break out. "Long live the Communist movementl Long live the Cominternl'" he concluded, and was rewarded with resounding applause. 10 In nearly every Comintern reference to the Indies in this period, it was stressed that the r ebellion justrned the Comintern's China policy: The Chinese revolution is becoming morc and more a great centre of attraction for the awakening masses of the Colonial East. Indonesia (the Dutch Indies) is already in a state of revolutionary ferment which in some places has passed into an open civil war against foreign capital, above all Dutch.ll That the [Indonesian I revolt should occur just at this time, is doubtless to be attributed in no mean degree to the powerful effect produced by the recent events in China. It is the victories of the Canton army, which have strengthened the confidence of the Indonesian people in their power. . . . The Indonesian revolution will be victorious, just as the Chinese revolution will be victorious! 12 350

Turning Points The Chinese Revolution is becoming a Centre of attraction for the awakening of the Far East. This has been proved by the rising which has taken place in Indonesia against Dutch imperialism.13 On November 25 the Profintem followed the EGCI with a manifesto calling for demonstrations and strikes in support of the Indonesian revolution. On December 23, it issued a second proclamation, which announced that "blood is running in rivers in West and Central Java» and renewed its call for support of the ''heroic fighters of Indonesia." 14 By this time Java was hardly running red with blood, although the rebellion that took place a week later in Sumatra prevented the proclamation from seeming entirely unreal. However, such emphasis on a continuing Indonesian revolution was maintained in Comintem writings some months after it had become clear that the rebellion was quite d'ead. It may be doubted that the International's leaders themselves had expected that the Indonesian revolt would achieve major proportions, let alone lead to Communist victory. Not only had it recently rejected the proposals for rebellion on the grounds that the ill-prepared adventure was foredoomed, but Semaun left for Holland in the middle of the ECCl's plenary session in order to sign an agreement bequeathing command over the Indonesian revolutionary movement to the Perhimpunan Indonesia, a move he would hardly have made if he had thought the PKI had any chance of success. It had, in fact, been clear from the outset that the rebellion would be a disaster. The Dutch Communists had based their response on "this fact, but the defense of the Comintem's China policy at the seventh plenum caused the ECCI to deny it. Once having introduced the Indonesian revolution as a major evidence of its Asian success, the International found it hard to admit that the revolt had fizzled out, particularly since it was becoming increasingly clear that the China program was itself to end in disaster. Not long after the Indonesian revolts, Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist coup brought down the house of cards which the Comintem had so hopefully erected in China. For a time, the International insisted that that edifice still stood, and during the same period faith was still expressed in the continuance of the lndonesian revolution; but gradually the Comintem forced itself to face the facts in both China and the Indies, and by the early swmner of 1927 continuing revolutionary activity in Indonesia was rarely mentioned. This development, coupled with the Soviet Union's rapid retreat toward proletarian isolationism in 1927-1928, ensured that the argu-

351

Rise of lrulonesian Communism ments the Comintern offered to explain the failure of the Indonesian revolt took an entirely dilJerent line than those made in the ECCI, criticisms of 1925 and 1926. Gone now were the accusations that the PKI had ignored other political parties, that it had not made enough concessions to nationalism. and that it had not established itself as a bloc within the SR. There was no intimation that the rebellion should not have been undertaken-merely that it should have been better prepared: The whole course of the revolt, however. ·betrayed the lack of earnest political and orgarusatory preparation of this movement as a whole. It is extremely characteristic that the revolt was under the general sl~gan of the fight against Dutch imperialism, and without a concrete political and economic slogan which would have mobilized broad masses and would have made the revolt the last and deciding point of a general strike and a peasant insurrectionary movement. The Conununist Party sent out its best forces to occupy the various government institutions, without having sufficiently prepared them beforehand, and thus enabled the government to overcome easily the advance guard of the national-revolutionary movement in Indonesia.l~

This situation was no doubt enjoyed greatly by Alimin and Musso upon their return to Russia. They had been held for a short time by the Singapore authorities, and then. much to the annoyance of the Dutch (who had long been irritated by the haven afforded Indonesian Communists across the Straits) they were released because there was no evidence their activities had threatened the peninsular status quo. liS Expelled from Singapore, they returned via China to the Soviet Union. to discover that their once-rejected policy was now justified in spite of the fact that the revolution had proved an utter failure. Alimin took full advantage of this at the ensuing Comintem congress (the sixth, in August 1928), freely offering criticism of the International's new colonial program, which he considered insuffiCiently radicaJ. and declaring that the major failing in the Indonesian rebellion had been the Comintern's: The Indonesian delegation considers it necessary to give a short report regarding the latest events and the uprisings in Indonesia. The Party in Indonesia is very young. since it was only established in 1920, and during the development of the Party. we worked without any guidance of the Communist International, so that mistakes were inevitable, Despite the extraordinary and brutal white terror of the Dutch Covem352

Tuming Points ment, our Party grew rapidly and gained great influence among the masses. During our legal existence, from the year 1920 to 1925, OUI Party was able to eliminate the reformist leaders of the national movement and to create through the revolutionary movement Communist tendencies in the trade unions Dnd peasant movements. These unions are completely in the hands of the Communist Party. Our influence was not limited to the proletariat but extended also to the peasantry, the army, police force and some intellectuals. The government arrested and deported hundreds of Communist leaders, ordered the closing of the Farty headquarters and arrested the members of the Central Committee. We cOnsider it a serious mistake-tbat during the uprising which lasted two months, the Communist International remained inactive. The blame cannot be put on our. Dutch Party because our comrades did what they cou1d to support the rebellion. The Communist International ought to have instructed all its sections, especially in Germany, France and America to support the uprising and to make a campaign with demonstrations, through the press, etc., in favour of it. But this has not been done. It is a sad experience of the Communist International and we hope thilt such a mistake will not occur again. H "The task of the Communist Party," it was declared at the sixth congress, "'u to reconquer its legality, so that it can once more carry on its propaganda openly." III This, however, was impoSSible. Measures had been taken to destroy the Communists' mass following, 19 and 13,000 persons had been arrested in connection with the revolts. A few of them were shot for having been involved in killings; 5,000 more were placed in preventive detention, of which 4,500 were sentenced to prison after trial. This relieved the authorities of those persons whose participation in the revolt could be proved; however, many others whom they considered dangerous ( including the great part of the PKI leadership) could not be convicted under the existing laws. Consequent1y, the government decided to use its powers of banishment on a massive scale, and ordered the removal of 1,308 persons, and such family members as desired to accompany them, to a spot on the upper reaches of the Digul River in New Guinea. None of the internees successfully escaped from the camp, and only a very few (most notable of them Sardjono) survived phYSically and ideolOgically to take part in the movement after the fall of the Indies regime. 20 11ris action put an effective end to Communist activity in the Indies for the remaining period of Dutch rule. Thereafter an occasional real 353

Rise of Indonesian Communism or imagined agent was discovered to have been sent to the colony, and an occasional real or imagined plot was urunasked; but the movement itself showed no signs of returning to life, More than that, however, all mass political activity seemed to have been brought to an end by the defeat of the revolt. The Communist debacle seemed to have finished popular hope that anything was to be achieved by political action, revolutionary or otherwise; and the Indonesian masses retired from the stage, not to return until Japan's victory over the Dutch proved once and for all that the white ruler was not invincible. The PKI had been the last of the older generation of Indonesian political movements to play an active rolc; the others, as we have seen, had either given up entirely or retired from the struggle against Dutch rule. The removal of the Communists from the political scene caused the new generation, which had hitherto been gathering in the backv ground, suddenly to occupy the center of the stage. These were the secular nationalists, who saw their antivDutch cHorts direct1y in tenns of a striving for an Indonesian nation-state rather than in the internationalist framework of Islam or Communism or in the political and cultural particularism of the regional movements. The leaders of this group were to become the leaders of the Indonesian revolution, and their ~ppearance on the political stage thus fonned a major turning point in the development of the national movement. Willy-nilly, the organizations founded by the new generation were restricted to the elite: Not only was the general population apathetic to political proselytizing, but the government no longer allowed its opponents any benefit of doubt. The uprisings, setting off a violent reaction of Netherlands and Indies Dutch opinion, ended the political leeway afforded by the coexistence of Western democratic and colonial authoritarian standards. Those who had predicted disaster at the time tolerance was shown to the infant Sarekat Islam were proved correct, it seemed; political freedom could not be allowed to the population; the state should check and not encourage the transfonnation of Indonesian society, and it must be concerned above all else' with preserving its authority. Abuse was heaped on those who had sought "to apply the slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the Eastern peoples, against all reality and from humanitarian and sentimental considerav tions, having lost their belief in the mission of fatherland and race." 21 Even moderate opinion did not defend the Ethical stand on politics, but sought to disassociate it from that policy's other goals:

354

Turning Points When we think how much intelligence, good will, energy. money. and time have been spent both in the motherland and the Indies itself during the past 25 years in attempts to achieve the ideal of granting political rights to the native population-a Western-inspired blessing which it has neither desired nor appreciated-we ask ourselves if it would not have been better to have expended that enormous devotion on the economic advancement of the people, a gift that the Oriental mentality also understands and values. It is in our view not too late to change course. henceforth abandoning politics insofar as possible, in the first place ceasing to organize the people in socalled political parties, and instead cooperating to devote all energies to making the population stronger economically, through providing it with more practical knowledge and more capita!.:!:!

Governor General de Graeff, who in his inaugural address to the Volksraad had declared his desire for a reconciliation between the government and the non-Communist Indonesian opposition, found his hopes shattered, "I cannot conceal from you that I am deeply disappointed," he wrote Idenburg. "Wary of everything that smelled of 'politics' I came here \vith the purest of motives, hoping to create about the Government an abnosphere of trust and cooperation; and after fourteen months of unceasing labor I see as the only result that the gulf between white people and brown is wider than ever. that race instincts reign supreme, and that sober, reasonable argwnents fall upon deaf ears," n He soon found himself participating in the extension of repressive measures to the nationalists, who were themselves growing more intransigent in the fa ce of an intolerant Dutch conservatism, which was convinced that ~ the militant nationalists are as much the enemies of their own people as the Communists are" 24 and which viewed all political criticism as an attack on· the state. The stage was being set for the emergence of revolutionary nationalism, intellectually derived from the West but emotionally rejecting its institutions, which was to become the dominant strain in Indonesian political thinking and to provide the context for a resurgent Communist movement,

355

Notes and Index

CHAPTER I 1. Mikhail Pavlovich, "Zadachi Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi assotsiatsii vostoKovedeniia" ( The Tasks of the A11-Russi:m Scientillc Academy of Orientology), Novyl Vastok. I ( 1922) ,9. 2. T he revol ution which modem socialism strives to achieve is, briefly, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoiSie, and the establishment of a new organization of society by the destruction of all class distinctions. This requires not only a proletariat that carries out this revolution, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society have developed so far that they allow the final destruction of class distinctions . . . . The bourgeoisie, therefore, in this respect alSl;l is just as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself. Hence a man who will say that this revolution can be more easily carried out in a country, because, althOtlgh haVing no proletariat, it has no bourgeoisie eitileT, only proves that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism. Friedrich Engels, "On Social Relations in Russia," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Writings (Moscow, 1955), II, 49-50. 3. Marx himself had not completdy denied that the metropolitan powers brought progress to their colonies, for he noted that they destroyed the traditional "feudal" social systems and replaced them with Western, capitalist fanus, thus brioging the oolonies further aloog the road to socialist revolution. It was, however, a purely involuntary oontribution, arising from no kindly intentions on the part of the metropolis: England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was 'activated ooly by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulflll its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? H not. wha tever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India," in Marx aod Eogels, Selected Writing'. 1, 351. . ' 4. For a more thorough development of these views, see Eduard Bernstein, Eoolutwnary Socialism (London, 1919 ). pp. 169-175, and the same author's "Problome des Sozialismus" (Problems of Socialism ), in his Zur Theorle uoo Geschichle des SozialismU! ( Berlin, 1904), Part II. p. 96. Bernstein was the major theoretician of the Revisionist school of socialist thought and was one of the sponsors of the move to soften the socialist attitude toward colonialism at the 1907 congress. 5. For Lenin's view of the 1907 congress, see his article, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," in Lenin, Tlte National Liberatio n lIfovement in the East (Moscow, 1957), p. 40, 6. Intemalkmalcr Sozialisten-Kongreu zu Stuttgart, 18 bi.J 24 August 1907 ( In ternational Socialist Congress at Stuttgart. Aug. 18 to 24, 19(7 ) (Bellin. 10(1), p. 112.

7. lnlemalionaier Sozialisten-Kongreu. pp. 36-37. For a general deSCription of Van Kol's attitude toward the oolonial question at this time, see O. M. C. Koch, Hatlg Slot . Figuren uU lief oude loo/e ( Favorable Balance: Figures from the Bygooe I ndies) (Amsterdam, 1960), pp, 91-92. Koch, like Van Kol a moderate socialist, was later to become the SOAP's principal colonial expert. For the SOAP's official account of its colonial policy in this period, see Daan van der lee,

359

Notes, pp. 5-12 De S.D.A.P. en lruionesUi (The SDAP and Indonesia)

(Amsterdam, 1929).

pp. 31--36. 8. Intemotioooler Str..illllsten-Kongreu, pp. 36-37. 9. lnlemalfonaler Scniallsten-Kimgreu, p. 40.

10. Van Koi at the 1907 eongr=-;. IntenuJtimuder So;:.iDllsten-Kongren, p. 36, 11. Van Kal did not begin to urge independence for Indonesia as a final goal until 1919-1920 ( Koch, BoUg Slot, pp. 94-95). He advocated a native-owned heavy industry for Java not only because of his interpretation of wcialist doctriDe but also because of his admiration for Japan. To help finance this development. he suggested that Holland sell off all the Indies archipelago save Java, Swnatra, and the Lesser Sunda Islands. The therM of industrialization was taken up _~ Van KoJ's successor a5 SOAP parliamentary spokesman on colonial affairs. vliegen, who held that the establishment of ImlODe5ian-owned heavy industry was a prerequisite to independence. Soo Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 30-31, 34-36; H. A. Iderna, Porlementoire ge4IChieden;." 0011 Nederltmdsch-lndU!, 1891-1918 ( Parliamentary History of the Netherlands Indies, 1891- 1918) ( The Hague. 1924). pp. 295-296, 327. 12. Van der lee. De S.D.A.P., p. 5; Koch, Bolig Slot, p. 92.

CHAPTER II 1. Advertisement appearing in the SoerbojoMch Handeublad on 1uly 15, 1913; quoted in F. L. Rutgers, ldenburg en de Sarekat Islam (Idenburg and the Sarebt Islam ) (Amsterdam, 1939), p. 75. 2. Lenin. ''The Awakening of Asia," Pravda, May 7, 1913, in Lenin, NationtJ U berallon Movement, pp. 59-00. 3. For accounts of the Sl's beginnings, see Robert van Nie1, The Emergence of the Modem Indonesian Elite ( The Hague and Bandung, 1960), pp. 89-95; and Belcheidcn betre{fende d e vereenJg/ng 'Sorekat I&lam' ( Information Concerning the Association "Sareht lslam") (Netherlands Indie!! Government. cIassiIied, Batavia, 1913) , pp. 1-19. A pred~sor of the Surakarta organization, the Sareht Dagang Islamijah. had been founded In Batavia (Djakarta) by Raden M&.oi Tirtoadisurjo in 1909. Tirtoadisur}o also established an organization called Sarelcat Dagang Islam In BuiteDZOl'g ( Bogar) in 1911, and was afterward asked to come to Surakarta by Hadji Samanhudi to organize the batik merchants' association that Samanhl1di wished to promote. The Sl1rabrta organization WIl!II not related to its short-liwd predecessors, and Samanhl1dl ra ther than Tlrtoadisurjo is generally given th e credit for founding it. 4. For a summary of the then current arguments concerning the effect of the sugar industry on peasant agriculture, see A. NeijtzeU de Wilde. Een en onder omtrent den weIooartnoenllrnl der lnlarnhche beoolking (Concerning the State of Welfare of the Native Population) ( Weltevreden, 1911 ), pp. 98-128. 5. For analyses of the Sarekat lslam's character and its Implications, presented to the Governor General by the Adviser for Native Affairs for consideration in detennining whether to legalize the association, see BC$che/den betrefJemk de oereeniging 'Sorekat bl4m,' pp. 8-59. 6. Idcnburg, letter to Kuyper, June 1913; quoted in Koch, Billig Slot, p. 14. 7. See B. 1. Brouwer, De hcud/ng oo n Idenburg en Col/in tegenooer de Indoneri.fche beweging (The Attitude of Jdenburg and Colijn toward the Indonesian Movement ) ( Kampen, 1958 ). pp. 47"""""9; Idema, Parlementaire, pp. ~294; Buclleitkn betref!ende de vereeniging 'Sarekat blam: pp. 41-42, 11-77.

360

Notes, pp. 12-14 8. Koch, Ball{: Slot, p. 15. 9. See Rutgers, Idenburg. pp. 68-75; B. Alkema, De Sarikat Islam (The Samt Islam) (Utrecht, 1919), pp. 14, 1I~... 20; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 14; Brouwer, De houd/ng, p. 45. 10. For Idenburg's decision, and documents on its elL:ecution and justiGcation, see Beschefden betre{fende de oereeniging 'Sarekat Islam,' pp. 00-77. 11. SneevlJet, quoted in Voor orlfhefd en socia1isme (For Freedom and Social.ism) (Rotterdam, 1953 ), p. 44. The book, hereafter cited as VVS. is a memorial to Sneevliet by some of his former associates. Sec also Koch, 8atig Slot, p. 110, for a character sketch of Sneevliet. 12. For these data on Snecvliet's life, see VVS, pp. 45-47; W. van Ravcsteyn, De W01ding van het communisme In Nederland (The Development of Communism in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam, 1928), pp. 128-129; A. Baars and H. Sneevliet, Ret proces Sneevlfet. De socia1-demOCTatie In Nooerlanmcll-Indiii (The Sneevliet Trial. Social Democracy in the Netherlands Indies ) (Semarang. n.d. [1917]), pp. 77-78; and Koch, Batfg Slat, pp. llO-1l2. 13. See D. M. C. Koch, Veralltwoordlng; een halve eeuw In IlldvnesUi (JustiS. cation: A Half Cenhuy in Indonesia) (The Hague and Bandung. 1956) , pp. 69-72, fOf a description of the political atmosphere in Semarang at this time. It might be noted that the city's principal newspaper, De Locurrwtief, was one of the very few European foumals in the Indies to support the Ethical position; Its coverage of Indonesian political activity in the flrst quarter of the century was considerably more extensive and objective than that provided by the other Dutchlanguage dailies. . 14. See Koch, VeTllntwoordlng, p. 76, and Bat/g Slot, p. 112, for descriptions of Sneevliet's relations with the Handelsverenlging. 15. The first union in the Indies, the Staatsspoorbond. was also n railroad organization, founded in 1905 by employees of the state-run nlil line. The union was open to both Dutch and Indonesian workers, but its leadership remained in the hands of the Dutch and its character was essentially that of an association of salaried employees. The membership of the VSTP (Vereniging van Spoor- en TramwegpersoDlX'l-AssociatiOll of Rail and Tramway Personnel) was originally dnlWll almost e:o
361

Notes, pp. 14-17 Communist Movement in the Netherlands Indies [Haarlcm, 19351. p. 2, hereafter cited as Commurlid); VVS, p. 51; Maring. Die Okonomi.rche und polituche Bedeutung Indone6ietu (The Economic and Political Significance of indonesia) (n.p., 1924 ) , p. 15. "Maring" was Sneevliet's Comintem name; this source, an address before the AII·Russian Scientific M$OCiation for Oriental Studies, is hereafter referred to as Oekonomi.rche. 19. Maring, Oekonomuche, p. 15; Koch, VerantWOOTdlng, p. 89. 20. See D. M. C. Koch, lndifch-koloniale VTQQgstukken ( Indies-Colonial Questions) (Weltevredcn, 1919) , p. 3l. 21. Mating, "Le mouvcment revolutionnai1e aux lodes Neerlandaises" (The Revolutionary Movement in the Netherlands Indies), in Lc Mouuement communiste international (Pctrograd. 1921), p. 393; D. M. C. Koch, Om de orijheid: de natumali.rt.i.rc/ur beweging in lndonesie (For the Sake of Freedom: The Nationalist Movement in Indonesia) (Djubrta, 1950), p. SO. For an elaboration of the moderate point of view, see Westerveld, "Moo de ISDV bij den Inlander 'revolutionnair sentiment' opwekken?" (Must the ISDV Awaken "Revolutionary Sentiment" among the Natives?), HVW, Nov. 10, 1916, p. 22; and Westet'Veid and Snoovlict, "Toetreding van Europeanen tot de S.I." (Entrance of Europeans into the SI), HVW, Nov. 10, 1916, p. 21. 22. "Verkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vcrgadering dcr I.S.D.V." (Abridged Report oi the Fourth General Meeting of the ISDV ), HVW, June 10, 1911, p. 168. 23. Maring. "Nlederl.ii.ndisch-Ost-Indien. Bericht fUr den zweiten Koops der Kommunistischen Intemationale" (111e Netherlands East Indies. Report for the Second Congress of the Communist International), in BmichtfJ :::um .:::wci'en Kongrcu der Kommuni.ffbchen Inlemalionale ( Hamburg, 1921), p. 409; hereafter cited as Niederliind/$ch. 24. Maring. Ockonomische, p. 15; HVW, May 11, 1919, p. 298. 25. The paper described itself in the heginning as a "general independeut semimonthly otg:m" ( HVW, Oct. 10, 1915, p. 1) and only admitted officlalJy to being the lSOV's paper in June 1916 ( HVW, June 2..5, 1916, p. 165). Some idea of the paper's early circulation may be gathered from the fact that at the time of its fifth issue there were 511 subscribers, of wblch 228 were 'located in Semarang, 112 in Surabaja, and 35 in Batavia (HVW, Dec. la, 1915, p. I ). In October 1916 the newspaper estimated that 10 per cent of its subscribers were Indonesians (HVW, Oct. 10, 1916, p. 1). Het Vrife Woord gradually increased publication until it appeared three times a week. 26. See A. Miihlenfeld. "De pen in lowe" (The Press in the Indies), Kolonl.ale Tifd8chrifl, V (1915), IOj 'Courantier Djawa: "Uit de lnlandsche pets" (From the Native Press), Hlndla POOm, 1 (1916), 58. Marro was editor of the Indonesian-language journal Doenla BeTgerak and head of the Native Journalists' Association (Iruandse Journalistenbond), 21. For comments on Baars's character, see Idema, Parlementairc. pp. 366-361: Koch, Batig Slot, p. 113: HVW, Mar. I, 1919, p. 192. 28. Soeara MerdiM was begun in April 1911, its existence. being guaranteed by funds from the ISDV executive, Its editors ,-"ere Semaun, Notowldjojo, and Baars (HVW, Apr. 10, 1911, p. 119 ). 29. See Maring, Oekonombche. p. 15; HVW, Mar. I, 1919, pp. 124. 192; Hartogh, "Jaarvemag 1917-18 van den Secretaris" (Annual Report of the Secretary. 1911- 1918 ), HVW, May 10, 1918, p. 19B.

30. Mededeelingen omtrent en1cde ondenverpen van algemeen belang. A/guro-

362

Notes, pp. 17-20 ten 1 September 1917 (Conunun icatioDS <;:onooming Several Subfects of General Interest. Terminated Sept. I, 1917) (Batavia, 1918 ), p. 7. This series of govern· ment reports is hereafter cited as Meded«lingen. together with the year of the report's conclusion. See also De lndilche Gids. XXXIX (I917), 1466. 31. See Sneevlict, "00 nieuwste wandaad" (The Newest Misdeed ), HVW, Oct. 30, 1917, p. 17; '"Verkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vergadering der 1.5.D.V.," p. 168; Sneevliet, "Onze taak" (Our Ta5k), HVW, June 25, 1917, p. 189; De Indi.tche G/d.r, XXXIX ( 1917), 1466. 32. For discussions of the Indbcbe Partirs fate and of Insulinde's early a.ssociaticm with the ISOV, see P. H. }. Jongman!, De e%orbitante reehten oon den Gouvemeur-Gencraal in de prakti;k (Tho Extraordinary Rights of the GovemDl" General in Practice) (Amsterdam, 1921). pp. 129-137; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Indo-Europcc.sche beweging in Nederlaruhch_Indiij (The Eurasian Movement in the Netherlands Indies) ( Haarlcm, 1939), pp. 35-43; W. de Cock BUning, "Politiele StroomingCfl" (Political Current1l), KolonWle Studi6n, October 1917, pp. H~--20; Dc lnduche Cidr, XL (1918), 1123; Meckdeellngen 1917, p. 6; "Communisme" (Conununism), Encyclopaedic oon Nederumdsch-Indli:i (The Hague, 1932), VI, 527; Koch, Batig Swl, pp. 120-123. 33. Tjipto was allowed to return to the Indies in 1914, Suwardi in 1917, and Douwes Dekker in 1918. 34. See I1VW, Feb. 10, 1916, p. 8l. 35. "Verslag van de derde algcmeene vcrgadering der Ind. Soc. Dem, Vcr." (Report of the Third Genera] Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 25, 1916, p. 178. 36. H. O. S. T;okroamirwtD. Rldup dati Perd;uangann;a ( H. O. S. Tjokroominoto, His Life and Strugglc ) (Djakarta, n.d.), p. llS. This work, hereafter re(erred to as lIDS, was published by a present-day descendant of the Sarekat Is1ll11l, the Partai Sarelat Islam Indonesia, as its biography of the Sl's founder. See also A. An, L'Eooltdion politu,ue en l ndonesie de WOO a 1942 (The Political Evolution of Indonesia hom 1900 to 1942) (Fribourg, 1949 ), p. 185; VV5, p. 52. One of the important points for personal contact between the leaders of the Indonesian movement was the boardinghouse run in Sucabaja between 1913 and 1921 by Suh:milcin, the wife of the SI leader Tjokroaminoto. Among the young studen ts who stayed there werc Sukamo, Alimin, Musso, and Abiku.mo; the house WIL'l also used as headqu.uters for the SI, and among those who frequently participated in the discussions there were the ISDV leaders Semaun, Darsono, Baars, and Sneevliet ( HOS, pp. 53, 55--56). 37. Maring. Oekonomische, p. 15. 38. Baars, ~ Hct 5.1. oongress te Bandocng" (The 51 Congress at Bandung), HVW, June 25, 1916, pp. 166-167. This was the first article Ret Vri;c W(/()I"d devoted to the Sareht Islam. 39. Sarekat-l~la m congres (Ie nationool oongres) 17--24 lunl 1916 te Bondoeng (Sarekat Islam Congress (First National Congress] June 17-24, 1916, at Bandung) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1916), p. 20. Semauo, a membt:r of the Surabaja chapter of both the ISDV and the SI, acted as the ~ialist spokesman. 40. At the congress, Hasan Ali Surati, a wealthy SUfabaja hacker of the SI, argued that:

The rightcow teacher, our Lord the Prophet Mohammad, WIL'l the man who removed all inequality between the seXC5, did away with the difference between

363

Notes, pp. 20-23 ruler and subject, behvet!n rank and class. And all these changes were brought about by the Socialist par excellence, by our Prophet Mohammad. The Prophet carried out the socialist idea of equality in all branches of government affaiTli; economic and religious policy and administration were ruled by this idea. Sarelwt-hlam congrcl ... 1916, p. 32. See also lIDS, p. 63; Van Niel. Emergence, pp. 127-131; Mededeelingen 1917, p. 4, £or comments on the congress. The chief proponent of labor union wm:k at the meeting was Mohamnd Jusul, a member of the Sarekat Islam's Ct!otrai executive who also belonged to the ISDV. 41. For discussions of the decline in the Indonesian living standard in this period, see J. W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Hucnder, Ondcnoek naar den bewIIngdruk op de lnlandsche beoolking ( Investigation of the Tax Pressure on the Native Population) (Netherlands Indies government, Weltevrcden. 1926). pp. 2-12; and W. Huender, OO£r.;:/che 000 den eoonomischen toertand der lnheemwhe beoolking oon Jaoo en Madoera (Survey of the Economic Situntioo of the Indigenous Population of Java and Madura) (The Hague, 1921), pp. 243--247; for the cost of living increase, which continued through 1920, see Prl/z.en, Inde:tcitfert en wWclkoeFfen op Java 1913-1926 (Prices, Price IndeJCes, and Exchange Rates in Java, 1913-1926) (Netherlands Indies government, Batavia, 1927), Charts III and IV ( Index Numbers of the Cort of Uving) and Table VII (Index Numbers of the Retail Prices of Articles of Consumption of Native Origin). 42. See Mededeelingen 1917, p. 4; Koch, Balig Slot, p. 19; Blumberger, Communist, p. 3; Maring, "Le mouvement," p. 395. 43. A droft law R'Placmg Article 111 was introduced to parliament by the Dutch cabinet in 1912, and thereafter the prohibition was very loosely eruoroc.J by the Indies government. See !dema, Poriementajre, p. 308; Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 16-18. 44. In HaS, p. 116, it Is claimed that Sncevliet became a member of the SI in 1915. This seems unlikely, however, since in late 1916 he asked the centlal SI leadership about the possibility of Europeans holding membership in the SI (Westerveld and Sneevliet, ''Toetreding,'' p. 21). whieh would hardly have been nooessary if he had already joined it. Baan! stated that the ISDV EUropeans did not join the 51 because it was, after all, an association for Muslims (Baa~. "Een nieuwe A.P.-sche koloniale specialiteit," [A New AP Colonial Specialty], HVW, Aug. 23, 1919. p. 411) . It was not SI policy to admit non-Indonesians, though some exceptions were made for Arab residents of the Indies. 45. Interviews with Semaun and' Darsono, 1959; Rllpport betrefJende de netttralirecnng en bcstriiding oon reoolut/onnoire propagllnds. oOOer de inhecmsche beoolklng, In lid hi;zonder oon Java en Madoera (Report Conceming the Neutralizing and Combatting of Revolutionary Propaganda among the Native Population. Especially on Java and Madura) (Netherlands Indies government, classiBed, Weltevredcn, 1928), pp. 71)..71, henceforth referud to as NeulTali.reer/ng; .Chaudry. The lndorwsian Struggle (Lahore, 1950), p. 50; Malo/a enu/Idopedl/O po mezhdunarodncmu profdvWlenllu (Small Encyclopedia of the International . Trade Union Movement) (Moscow, 1927), col. 1622; HVW. Apr. 25, 1916, p. 130. 46. SarelmJ.lsfom congru . , . 1916, p. 93; Sareknt-ldDm ccngtu (28 natIOnaal congre.1') 20-27 Ocrober 1917 u Batal)/(! (Sarelcat 1sIam Congress [Second National CongressJ. Oct. 20-27, 1917, at Batavia) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1919). p. 73. Larger brall,ches in 1917 were Suraba'ja (22,000), Palcmbang (20,349), and Suhbuml (20,079); Tjirebon claimed the same number of members as Semarang. 47. Sncevliet, "Het noodwendige gevolg" (The Neoessary Consequence), HVW,

364

Notes, pp. 23-26 Oct. 20, 1911, p. 13. The Semarang 51 demanded that the movement organize itself In groups according to the occupation of its members, as the Semarang branch had already done In the convietion that this was the proletaria n manner. It further asked that the CSI take a stand against coolie contracts, for improved educ::ation, and for the introduction of elected counci.ls to which the village -heads wouJd be responsible. Semarang also required the CSI to publish a statement of principles and submit a work program to the bronches for discussion at least four months before cach congress-a demand that embarrassed the badly organized CSI leadership and which, if carried out, would have allowed the relatively well_knit and dyna mic Semarang group to fonn ulate better its precongress campaigns among the other 51 branches. See Baars, "Het aa05t."Iande S. I. congrcs" ( The Forthcoming SI Congress), llVW, Oct. 10, HH7, p. 1. 48. See Hartogh, "Jaarverslag 1917-1918," p. 198. The debate-between Muis, ' Hartogh, Baars, and T.iokroamlnoto--was held on Sept. 12, 1917. 49. De Roode S.l.'er, "Het S.r. congres te Batavia" (The SI Congress at Batavia), nyw, Nov. la, 1911, p. 29. SO. Sneevliet, "Het 5.1. congres te Batavia" (The SI Congress at Batavia), HVW, Oct. 20, 1917, p. 9. 51. The proceedings of the 1917 congress can be found in Sarekal-lslam COf1gru .•. 19 J7. See also C. A. J. Hueu, Ceheime mis.nve oon den RegeerIngscomworl.!r voor Inla ndsc1ze en Arll bisc1ze :wken VIIn 23 Augu.ttU.f 1918 ( Secret Communique of the Government Commissioner for Native and Arab Affairs of Aug. 23, 1918) (Netherlands Indies government, classiGed, n.p., 1918) , p. 2, Roode S.r.'er, "Het S.r. congres," p. 29; ]. Th. Petrus Blumberger, Dc notiOfl(Jliltische beweging In Ncderlan.cUch-Indie (The Nationalist Movement in the Netherlands Indies ) ( Haarlem, 1931), p. 65, hereafter cited as Nationalist; HOS, p. 112; Van Niel. Emergence, pp. 134-138. 52. See Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 120-121. Alkema (De 5arikot Islam, p. 22) thinks the SI momentum reached a peak in 1916, its clemy thereafter being shown by dwindling attenda nce at its congresses. Some indication of SI membership pattemli can be gained from the lists of branches represented at the congresses supplied in government accounts of the proceedings. These are not very reliable, since they are based on the membership claimed by each branch and do not Ust branches not represented at the congresses. They show, however, a rather steady increase in the ~ize of the big-city organn-.ations and a tendency of the more rural branches both to decline in relative importance and to flu ctuate greatly in membership from year to year. The total membership indicated in these lists is far less than the lotal membership claimed by the Sarekat Islam for any given year; this discrepancy is doubtless due In P.lrt to the fact that not all bronches were represented at the congresses, but it probably also indicates more realistic estimah..'S of branch size, since losses as well as gaill.'l are reported. 53. Note by the editors of HVW, attached to Roode S.I.'er, ~ Het S.I . oongres,"

p.3O. 54. See Socevliet, "Geweigerde vergadering te 5emarang" (Prohibited MeetIng at Semin ang) , HVW, Mar. 25, 1911, p. 104; Sneevliel, "Vergadenngen geweigerd" ( Meetings Prohibited ), HVW, Apr. 10, 1917, p. llS; "Reaetie in Indii:;" ( Reaction in the Indies), HVW, May la, 1911, p. 137. 55. An account of the trial, consisting for the most part of Snccvliet's address, was published privately as Baars and Snecvliet, Het proces Sneevliet, by the two ISDV leadel'$. Koch described Sncevliet's plea a.os masterly, "a feat of propaganda rarely eqtt.11ed in the Netherlands Indies" ( Koch, Balig Slot, p. 116 ). 56. VVS, pp. 55-57, 144; Koch, Billig Slot, p. 115.

365

Notes, pp.

27~O

57. HVW, May 10, 1917, p. 141. 58. FOT nn aceount of the congress proceedings, see "Yerkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vcrgadering der I.S.D.Y," (Abridged Report of the Fourth General Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 10, 1911, pp. 164--168; also De Cock Buning. "Politieke Stroomingen," pp. 21-22. 59, The ending of all ('()Operation between the two ' groups did DOt prevent some Indonesians from maintaining prominence in both organi7.aoons-ootably Mara Sutan and Alimin, who continued to edit Insulindc's Batavia newspaper, i\fod;opahit. along with Tjipto Mnngu nkusumo. See Sneevliet, "Iruulinde's aldan· king als volkspamj" (Inrulindc's Resignation all a People's Party ), HVW, May 30, 1918, p. 210; Dc Ind/schc GUill, XL (l9IS), 333-334.

60. Bartogh, "laarverslag 1917-1918," p. 198. 6l. Thi.o! was an article by Baars, "De Rusiliche revolutie" (The Russian Revolution), HVW, Nov. 2.S, 1917, pp. 35-38. 62. Baars, "De Russi.sche revolutic" (The Russian Revolution) HVW, Dec. 10, 1917, p. 59.

63. Quoted in De Tribune (The Tribune, newspaper of the Dutch Communist party), June 21, 1921. No immediate action was taken against Baars by the authorities for this speech, but it was given as one of the reasons for expe1ling him from the Inwes several years later. 64. "Ven;\ag van de vijfdc algcmcene vCTgadcring" (Report of the Fifth Gen· _e ral Meecting), llVW, May 30, 1918, pp. 210-212. 65. " Vcnlag van de vijfde algemecnc vergadering." p. 2 12. 66. See VVS, p. 58; "Communisme," p. 527, col. h ; lnd/ii een hei. De extcmeerlng oon Brandneder (The Indies a Hell. The Expulsion of Brandsteder) (Rotterdam, 1919). pp. 3-8. The action began with a $3ilors' meeting in SurabaJa on Dee. 11, 1917, and was extended to the soldiers shortly thereafter. It sbouJd be noted that politically oriel,lted associations of military penonncl were not unusual or illegal for the Dutch: both in Holland and the Indies there were S(Iidiers' IUld sailors' organizations. akin to unions, which were tied to various confessional IUld secular parties. Brand5teder, the principa1lcader of the soviet actio!!, had organized sailors for the socialists while in Holland; in the Indies, he was secretary of the Surabaja-based Bond van Minder Marinepersoneel (Union of Noncommissioned Naval Personnel ), which was ideolOgically allied with the ISDV. Other ISOV leaders who played a major part in the soviet action were Baars, Sneevliet, Van Burink, Bergsma, and Harry Dekker. 67. "Vemag van de vijfde algemeene vergadering," p. 2.34. 68. Since this was the first Indonesian Commurilit program-a second was not drawn up Wltil 1923--it is worthwhile summarizing its points: a. Election of local, regional, nnd national legislative bodies; extensive local and regional autonomy. b. Universal suffrage for men and women over twenty; direct election of locaJ and regioua] legislatures. c. Freedom of political action, speech, strike, and assembly. d. Compu1sory free public education to the age of fourteen; in5truction in the local language, with MaJay ( Indonesian) as a second language. e. Separation of church and state. f. AbOlition of the armed forces. g. Equality before the law. fa . Improved labOr legislation: eight-hour working day, proteetion for work. ing women and children, .rocial insurance, etc. i. AbOlition of proprietary land ownership (that is, ownership of land sold

366

Notes, pp, 30-34 by the government, usually to non-Indonesians, and bearing semifeu~ ri~ts over the population living on it): fanning to be carried OD under the direction of the village councils; prohibition of land leasing; extensive government aid and credit to peasant agriculture. ,. Nationalization of monopolies, b anks, and vital industries; govemroent regulation of medical services and food distribution. k. Housing aid, rent control, etc.; prohibition of usurious moneylending. L Unifonn taxes, with emphasis on a graduated income tax; abolition of unpaid services to the state. m. Prohibition of nonmedicinaI alcohol and opium. "Ontwerpen statuten, huishoudelijk rcglement, sh-ijd- en gemeente-program der Ind. Soc. Oem. Vereeniging" (Draft Statutes, Rules, and Action and Community Programs of the Indies SociaJ Democratic Association), HVW, Apr. 20, 1918, pp. 179-180. 69. "On twerp bcginselvcrklaring" ( Draft Declaration of Principles), HVW, May 10, 1918, p. 199. 70. "On twerp beginselverklariog," pp: 21~213. 71. See Soeevliet, "Onz.e eerste 1 Mei-viering (Our F'lI'St May Day Celebration), IIVW, May 10, 1918, pp. 196-197; Maring, Oekonomi1che, p. 15. 72. Koch, Verantwoordlng, pp. 98-99; Brouwer, De houdlng, pp. 70-72. 73. See De Inditche CIds, XU (1919), 374-375, for an SDAP acc
""'78... Sinor Hindia, Nov. 18, 1918, in lPO, no. 47, 1918, p. 11.

79. In a speech to th., Volksraad, Van Limburg Stirum promised that the relationship between that body and the government would change and that the Volksraad would be given additional functions . HI' further spoke of contemplated refOnDS in the rogar districts, among the anned forces, and in the matter of civil rights. See Brouwer, De houding, p. 71; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 144-145, 183-184; Ch. C. Cnuner, KolO1l161e Politiek (Colonial Policy) (Amsterdam, 1929), Part I , pp. 56-58. SO. Maring, Oekonomische, p. 15.

CHAPTER III 1. J1VW, Sept. 27, 1919, p ..450; Oct. 4, 19 l 9, p. 4; Oct. II, 1919, pp. 14-15; and VVS, p. 59.

Notes, p..'34 2. The e:\"pu6ions were authorized by the "extraordinary rights" held by the Governor General under the Regeringsreglemcnt of 1854. These powers, which permitted. the authorities to act when there was no legal basis fOf prosecution, . allowed the government, in the interests of the public peace, to expel from the Indies those who had not been born there and to choose the place of residence for those of Indies hirth. For a discussion of the application of these righb, including their use in the cases of Sncevliet, Baars, and Brandsteder, see P. H. C. Jongm:ms, De exoTbitante Tech/en van den Gooocmeur-Cencmol In de ·praktiik ( The Extraordinary Rights of the Governor Ceneral in Practice) ( Amsterdam, 1921 ). 3. Sneevliet accused the CSI leader Abdul Muls of having urged 1m removal from the Indies during his 1917 trip to the NctherL'mds on behalf oE IndUf Weerbor (Snecvliet, "De heer Abdocl Mocis volksleider" (Mr. Abdul MUd, Leader of the People), HVW, Oct. 10, 1917, p. 7; and see the Nleuwe RotteTdomsclle Courant (New Rotterdam News), July B, 1917. For that matter, Sneevliet's political agitation was too much for many radical socialists. His contract with the Sem.'Uang Handelsvereniging expired in May 1917; the association offered to renew it if he would refrain from revolutionary activity, which he refused. Sneevliet then became secretary-genCl'al of the VSTP, but he was forced to resign the follOwing year because the union felt he devoted too much time to party work and was too outspoken politically. He thereafter was employed as a propagandist for tbe ISDV. See HVW, Feb. 11, 1919, p. 125. 4. Of the reactions to Sneevlict', expulsion in the Indonesian press reported in lPO, only the government-subsidized Neratla approved, and its view was at. tacked. so strongly by the othtlr Indonesian papers that its editors were forced to apologize. See Neral;a, Nov. 18, 1918, in lPO, no. 47, 1918, p. 12; Neratfa. Nov. 25 and 2:1, 1918, in lPO, no. 48, 1918, pp. 2, 5; Neratia, Dec. 12, 1918, in lPO, no. SO, 1918, pp. 4-5. For other non·Scmarang Indonesian comments, all expressing sympathy for Sneevlict, see Octoe$(1n Hindla. Nov. 21, 1918, and DialJ)/ lIisworo, Nov. 20, 1918, in IPO, no. 47, 1918, pp. 12, 24-25, BII; PeNtr Oetara, Nov. 28, 1918, in IPO, no. 48, 1918, p. 29; Octoesan mndia, Dec. 5 and 7, 1918, in IPO, no. 49, 1918, pp. 27, 31; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 10, 1918, Damw Kondo, Nov. 11, 191 8, and Islam Bergerak, Dec. I, 1918, in IPO, no. 50, 1918, pp. 25, 8/2, Cf4; and Octoesan Hlndta, Dec. 18, 1918, in IPO , no. 51, 1918, p. 19. For comments in the Dutch-language Indies newspapers, overwhelm· ingly approving Sncevlicfs expulsion, see De Indhc;he Gids, XLI (1919), 384-386, 656-657. 5. Sncev\iet's account of his departure is given in the pamphlet Mijnc Ilituttlng ( My Expulsion), which he published on his return to the Netherlands. For other accounts of his extemment, see Jongmans, Dc ntffbltal1tc rachtan, pp. 139-142; E. A. A. van Heekeren, "Sncevliet \'Crbannen" (Sneevliet Banished), Dc IndUche Gillll, XLI (1919),65-89; Ncratia, Dec. 21, 1918, and Sinar H/ndio, Dec. 17 and 18, 1918, in IPO, no. 51 , 1918, pp. 4, 10. The final order for Sneevliet's expuJ. sion was given on Dec. 5, and he left on Dec. 17. The immediate fea.'\OIl given (or his banishment was his agitation among the .'SOldiers, ellPressed in several articles in lief Vri;c W Otffd. B. For an aewun! of the CSI meeting that agreed to support Sneevlict, see OetOOftln 1lindia, Dec. 23, 1918, in lPO, no. 52, 1918, pp. 22-23. Semauo's proposal met considerable objection and was only passed, very nanuwly. on T;o1c:roaminoto's urging. Subsequently the CSI $cl up a Fund for Martyrs of the Independence Movement, which was to aid both Indonesians and non-

368

Notes, pp. 34-36 ludoncsians PWR'Cuted by the government. There is no indication, however, that the CSI prOVided aid to Sncevlict on a rcguJar basis, as the original agreement had stipulated; in view of the movement's precarious financial state, it seems most unlikely that its leaders were serious in their plan to put him on their payroll. He may have received some funds from the VSTP, but· his principal source of support from the Indies was money sent by the ISDV. 7. A. Baars, "Waarom ik heenga" (Why I Am Leaving), IlVW, March 1, 1919, . p. 188, Ret Vrije W(XIrn offered the following comment,; on Baars' decision:

The ISDV cou1d hardly have been struck a harder blow than by the departure of these two men. In them the ISDV's activity was embodied. , .. If Sneevliet was the mao of Aery propaganda, the man of impetuous action, of elan. of dedi. cation, Baars was the sober thinker, the cool intellect, the man of clear. penetrating study•••. Baars will not take it amiss if we state that he still had a great deal to learn as a political leader. Though he was Sneevliet's masteT as far as theory was concerned, he simply did not possess Sneevliet's gift of leadership. And it is this which one must have in this period of reaction, with its nUIDerow trials, in order to maintain one's balance and to work on cheerfully, irrespective oJ the immediate rcsuJts of that work. These results were disappointing. and Baars t1Uowed it to depress him. The S.1. as a whole had remained idJe •.. ; and last but not least the native popuJalion had shown itself ready to bear sickness and hunger to a degree inconceivable to the Western mind. This failure of the native population and the native movement to react to stimuli which would havc ranned a Westcm land to a blaze was the thing whlch most d~ressed Baars. He did not pos."iCSS SnoovJjet's inner strength, which had helped [that leader} O\'cr all disappointments and which made it possible for him to show the same cheerful face and inexhaustible energy no matter how great his defeats.

HVW, Mar. I, 1919, p. 192. 8. Sec "Me
369

Notes, pp. 36-38 12. Raden Darsono was born in 1897, a member of the lesser nobility and the son 01 a police offieial in the Javanese city of Patio After a European-style primary education, he attended tho School of Agriculture in Sukabumi and later taught agriculture in Bodjonegoro. Leaving his job, he drifted to Semarang. where he was attracted to the revol utionary socialists and went to worle: for tho lefti5t newspaper Sinar Djawa. When ISDV headquarten moved to SllllIbaja in 1918, Darsono, who had been named to the party ~ecutive, was also transferred; shortly thereafter he was appointed the movement's flnt full-time Indonesian propagandist. 13. The proceedings of the 1918 SI congrcss are recorded in Sarekal-1814m congre, (36 nationaal CDngre,) 29 SfJpl.~ Oct. 1918 Ie SoerfJbalfl (Sareht 15lam Congress [Third National Congress) Sept. 29-Oct. 6, 1918, at Surabaja ) (Netherlands Indies government, c1assifled, Batavia, 1919). See also "OcrOO Nationaal Congres der Centrale Sarekat Islam" (Third National Congress of the Centrn1 Sarehl Islam ), De Ittdische CUb, XLI (1919 ), 223-225; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 142-144; B1umberger, Nationalist, p. 67; S. J. Rutgen, "De Indonesische nationale beweging tot 1927" (The Indonesian National Movement to 1927 ), Politick en Cultfjur, Jan. 1926, p. 47. At the congress, the Semarang branch claimed the 51's second largest membcnhip, with 30,000 alleged adherents. Palembang (S umatra) claimed the greatest number, 37,700; Surabaja claimed 22,000 (Sarekat·b14m congre.s . . . 1918, pp. 7 1-72). 14. Scmaun, Anti Indie We6rmwr, Anti Maille dan 3e Natwrwwl Congre.s Sarokat ' slam (Against Ind/il Weermwr, Against a Militia, and the Third National Congress of the Sarekat Islam) (Scmarang. 1918); see also Overzk:ht van de ge.stle tier Centrad Sarikat·lslam in het lOOt 1921 (Survey of the Activity of the Central Sareht Islam in the Year 1921) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1922). p. 3, hereafter Ooor.:iclll CSI 1921. 15. Van Limburg Stirum, anxious to have his Ethical viewpoint publicly appreciated and finding the existing newsp.1pers inadequate to the pmpose, subsidized both Neral/fJ and the Dutch-language Batflviaasch Nieuw,blad. Their editon were sympathetic to his policies. and this seems to have been the only thing the Governor General relied on for their favorable presentation of the news; however, many Indonesians uDdentandably felt they "''ere government tools. See Koch, VerantWQ(lrding, pp. 112-113; Van Niel. Emergence. p. 135. Muis resigned his editorship at the end of 1918 and was replaced by Hadji Agus Salim. 16. For the text of the mutual promises. see Sarekat-blnm CDng res . . . 1918, pp. 75-76. Specifically, Semaun and Darsono declared that they would adhere to the prinCiples of the CSt and that their quarrels with Muis would be discussed with the central 51 body before being aired publicly, If II connoveny did reach the newsIXlpen, they promised. the argument would be based on principles rather than personalities. 17. Semaun was not the only 15DV lTIember in the CSI executive. Of the fourteen CSl commissionen elected at the 1918 congress, Mohamad Jusuf, Hasan Djafldiningrat, and Prawoto Sudibio also belonged to the socialist organization. All three of them bore the aristocratic titJe of Raden; Mohamad Jusuf had preceded Semaun as leader of the Semarnng ISDV. and Hasan DjajadinlDgrat, the younger brother of the Regent of Serang. Will a member of the ISDV executive. However, their primary loyalties under the multiple-membership system did not lie with the revolutionary socialist group: Jusuf was generally seeD ill a Budi Utomo advocate, and Djajadiningrat was considered a proponent of the Sareht hbm; both were comidered moderates. even by the Dutch. They were

:riO

Notes, pp. 31>-39 both CSI members of long standing. Prawoto Sudibio was newly elected in 1918 and represented the leftist group in Jogjakarta. 18. The report. which contains a detailed analysis 01. grievances in the sugar districts, was published as Verslag 001'1 de Suiker-Enquete Commts.ne ( Report of the Sugar Inquiry Commission) (Surabaja, 1921). For accounts of the attempts to introduce the sugar-restriction motion into the Volksraad and· parliament, see Brouwer, De hooding. p. 77; Van der lee, De S.DAP., p. SO; De Jnduche Gids, 'XU ( 1919 ), 776; J. E. Stokvis, "Van Limburg Stirom," Indonern!, 1 (1948), 25-26. For comments on the rice shortage and sugar controversy in the Indies Dutch papers, see De lnduche Gids, XL (1918), 886--889, lOO2-Hl04; XU (1919),238-239,317-378; 632-633, 650-653, 775-780, 911-918, 1021-1022. 19. Meckdeelingen 1920, p. 2. This TCp!?rt on the development of the Indonesian DlOVeDlenU during 1919 summarized tho year's activity as follows: For political life in the Netherlands Indies 1919 was a Significant year, chiefly because the efforts of the various groups were directed more ronsciowly and openly t()ward goals that were stated more sharply than before, so that the sum of their activities and attitudes fonned a recognizable whole. The repercussions of the events in Europe forced them t() define their standpoints. The steep and swift rise in the prices of literally all- and particularly the basic-necessities provided a powerlul stimulus and led to inereased activity in economic affairs, in which the groups furthest 10 the political ldt did their be5t to gain a more or less important part in the leadership. A great deal of activity was displayed. The spirit of the masses seemed more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda than before, and those wh() held It their task to make clear to the masses that they were suffering miserable social conditions did not hesitate to proflt from this. The "making conscious" of the masses became the object of an intensified expenditure of effort. Mededeelingen 1920, p. L Sec also "Sarekat Islam," Encyclopaedic oon Nederlandsch·lndle (The Hague, 1927), Part V, p. 370, col. a, hereafter 51 v. 20. The peasants in the sugar-growing areas of the princely territories of Java were required to make haH their land available for leasing to plantations, as opposed to OIle-third in the directly governed territories. The 1918 land rdorm regulations guaranteed the sugar estates that this amount would he available to them fOf the next fifty years. In addition, the peasantry in the princely territories was obligated to render unpaid labor to the plantations for the next flve year.I'. Above a certain customary maximum, forced estate labor was paid at a rate determined by the government; however, as Acting Adviser for Native Affairs Kern noted in a letter to the Governor General, it was hard enough to decide on a fair rate in normal times and quite impossible in periods of rapid ioBation such as the IndieS was then experiencing. As it was, the greatest part ol the peasant's time was taken up in unpaid labor for the estates, for sugar cultivation required far more labor than rice. The condition of the population was one of "slavery under a veneer. At best it is highly unfree. It has been that way as long as anyone can remember: but what the people earlier endured passively, in their former lethargic state, they DO longer will bear, , •. Hence the enthusiastic agreement which the popular leaders found, the recuning resistance to forced labor, even though people mew very well they were laying themselves open to punishment. The changed mentality of the native, his con. sciousness or whatever one wants to call it, is no longer reconciled to conditions in the princely territories, neither with conditions as they are now nor with them as they will essentially remain after the completion of the reform. In this

:171

Notes, pp. 39-42 atmosphere the appearance of Dr. Tjipto Mangu nkusumo and Hadjl Mlsbach had the same effect as foxes in a henhouse," R. Kern, letter to Governor General FoeK, dated Weltevreden. Aug. 18, 1921, no. 166, c1assjfied, p. 5. For a dctai1ed account of the Surakarta anticorvee movement and the me3liUTeS taken "against it, see Mcdedee1lngen 1920, pp. 19-2.5. Other accounts may be found in De Indluhe Cid", XLI ( 1919), 1029-1032, 1144-1155, 1197-1198, 1273-1274; IUld M. Balfas, Dr. Tfipto MangunkusumD (Djakarta and Amsterdam, 1952), pp. 102107. A vote of thanb to Hadj i Misbach was tendered by the JUDe 1919 Iruullnde congress; De lndbche GUh, XLI (1919) , 1165. He was also received with applause by the 51 congress th at year, which discussed and defended the movement. See Sareknt-I.rlam c<mgre.r (46 not/onaal ccngru) 28 Oct.-2 Noo. 1919 te Soerabaja (Sarebl Islam Congress [Fourth National Congress]. Oct. 26-Nov. 2, 1919, at Surabaja) (Netherlands Indies government, c1assiBed, WeltevredeD, 1920),

pp.35-37. 21. See Mededeellngen 1920, pp. 28-31; Kolonlaal Verslag, 1918, Hoofdstuk B, cols. 72-74; Dc Indi$che Cltb, XU ( 1919), 1449-1450; Sorckot-l.Jlom congt'el . . . 1919, pp. 33-35 (report by Abdul Muis) . Muis, according to the government aCCO\lnt, had urged the aholition of corvee but had cautioned his audiences to fulllll thc obliga tions as long as they were sanctioned by the government. De Kat Angelino's fatal mistake seems to have been that he offended strict Muslim sentiment in Tali-toll, where relations between the authorities and the people were already weakened by a quarrel over the succession to the local throne, by making his visit during the month of Ramadan and refusing to postpone the execution of unfulRlled corvoo until the end of that fasting period. 22. C. 5., "Op den twoesprong" (At the Crossroads), HVW, Oct. 11 , 19 19, p. 12. The Dutch Communist parliamentary leader Wljnkoop attempted to absolve the Sarckat Islam leadership by asserting that Section B represented a religiOUS reaction to the CSI, Jed by hadjis who o p~ its increasingly secullU' orientatiOll. See lIandelingen der Sialen-Generaai, T weedc Kamer (Proceedings of the States General, Lower House), 19 19/ 1920, p. 1147: hereafter cited as Handelingen 2e Kamer. For d iSC\lssions of the affair and ib aftermath, see HandeIIngen 2e Kamer, pp. 1158-1162 (report of the Colonial Minuter) and 1108-1113 (remarks by the SDAP spokesman Albania ); Handelingen Volhraad, First Session, 1920, pp. 435-438: Second Session, 1920, pp. 364-365 (Abd ul Muis' remules ): MededeeUngen 1921, p. 7; Oetoemn Hlndla, Sept. 8, HU9, in IPO, no. 36, 19 19, pp. 31-32; Neratia, Aug. 19, 1922, in IpO, no. 35, 1922, p. 294: Sarekatblam congre.r . . . 1919, pp. 24-33: Tjipto Mangunku$.Umo, }let communlnne In Indw: nanr oorJciding tHIn de rellctf~ (Communism in the Indi~: In Conn~ tion with the Disturbances ) ( Bandung, 1926), p. 12; HOS, pp. 117- 118; Van Niel, Emerg«nee, pp. 145-150; Brouwer, De h01Jlling, p. 80: De Indl.sche Gid.r, XU (1919) , 1201- 1202, 1269-1272, 1298-1305, 1446-1449, 14SQ....1455. 23. Mededeellngen 1921, p. 24. See aLro Koch, Verantwoordlng, pp. 125-127. For a general discussion of the relationship between the sugar Industry and the population in the plantatiOli areas during the colonial period, see Sclosoemardjan, Social Cha nge.J In l ogjakart4 ( Ithaca, 1962 ), pp. 262-284. . . 24. See Mededeel/ngen 1920, pp. 4-5, 10. An Indies official later described the policy as follow, : Not only was the government advisod to maintain the favorably ne\ltral attitude which it had thus far shown toward the SI, but denyiog completely the enormous differences between the European and native societies. it was advised 10 accept not only favOl1lbly but even hoortily the new trend in the 51, which placed the

372

Notes, I'V 42--44 economic stru ggle in the foregooWld and aimt.-d at organizing the pt.'1lslInts in the villages and ,the workers on plantations and factories lor a struggl~ to be~er

their lot; and thIS was done on the grounds that the modem labor uruon tactics practiced in Europe seemed DOt to have proved harmful for the growth of the social organism there.

Instructions of the Resident of Banjumas,

J. J. van Helsdingen, no. 20974/4,

Banjumas, Dee. 11, 1926, p. 8; referTing to the very secret letter of the Government Commissioner, Dec. 9, 1918, no. 588, p. 8. Emphasis in the text.

25, TIms Baars responded to the revolutionary events of November 1918 by urging the Indonesian movements to demand rum! instead of parliamentary reform : ''We want no words or reports now: we must see deeds. Improve the distribution of water, build irrigation dams everywhere, away with the land rent ordinance! Nationalize the sugar factorics: make all proprietary lands communal property. After that village administration ought to be reformed; and on1y then can a parliament do useful work." Soeara Ra'jat, Dec. 6, 1918, in lPO, no. 15, 1918, p. 3. 26. See l/VW, Mar. 10, 19 18, p. 138; Sill(lr Hlndm, Oct. 20 and 31, 1918, In IPO, no. 44, 1918, pp. 2.0, 24; Paro Pati, Nov. 14, 1918, in IPO,

DO.

46, 1918,

p. 7; Koemandang-Dfawi, Dec. 9, 1918, in lPO, no. SO, 1918, p. 3; Medan8eTgCTak, Jan. 1919, in lPO, no. 5, 1919, p. 5. 27. Mededec/lngen 1921, p. 13. 28. In October 1915 a meeting was held between the eJ.:ecutives of the ISDV and various unions in which the socialists had influence in Older to form a committee to coordinate labo r and political actions. The committee was established, but to the radicals' displeasure it only included the labor unions; nothing seems to have resulted from it, probably because of the growing split between right and left socialists and between Indonesian and European-status employees (HVW, Nov. 10, 1915, p. 24; Jan. 25, 1916, p. 68; Aug. 18, 1919, p. 402) . In mid-1916, the VSTP endorned Scmaun's proposal to sound out other unions about a general action for a cost-of-Iiving bonus; this resulted in February 1918 in 'formation of a multiunion committee. Attempts to develop it into a federation foundered, however, because of the divergent interests of European and Indonesian worken; thereafter attempts to unite European and Indonesian unions were abandoned (Smar Hindia, July 31, 1920, in IPO, no. 31, 1920, p. 16; history of the establishment of the first Indonesian labor federation [PPKB} by its sectetary, Najaan ). 29. Quoted in HOS, p. 113; see further Hartogh, "De Wensch-de vader der gcdachte" (The Wish-the Father of the Idea), HVW, Aug. 16, 1919, p . 402; Blumberger, Nati01ltJfut, p. 133; Aldit, Sedfarah, pp. 40-41; Sl V, p. 370, col. b ; HVW, Mar. 10, 1918, pp. 136-137; llVW, May 24, 1919, p. 308; De Indilche GidI, XU (1919),1023-1027; Danna Kondo, Oct. 10,1920, in IPO, no. 48, 1923,

pp.33-34. 30. According to statistics proVided by Sernaun, a total of 7,000 workers went on strike in 1918, 66,000 in 1919, and 83.000 in 1920. The 1918-1920 strike wave had in gcneral economie rather than political aims, and omy about on~uarter of the actions ended in complete defeat. See Semaun's report in Peroyi ,"eul reooliutslormykh organizatlil Dafnego Vortoka, pp. 284-286; hereafter cited as Peroyi "'ezd. 31. Lul8terf/Dengatlumlahl (Listenl) (Surabaja, 1919). See also Hartogh, "De wemch," p . 403; HVW, Mar. 15, 1919, pp. 207-208; C. 5., "Op dec tweesprong," p. 13; Nota (Note [on the 1919 51 congress} (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, 1920 ), p. 15.

. :rl3

Notes, pp. 44-46 32. C. -S., "Het S. I. -con~" (The 51 Congress), lIVW, Nov. 1, 1919, p. 33; "Vieroe S.I.-coogres" (Fourth 51 Congress), IfVW, Nov. 1, 1919, p. 35; SI Y, pp. 370; 001. b-371, col. 3; BJumbcrger, NationolUt, p. 69; HOS, pp. 113-114; Aidit, Sed/arah, pp. 41-42. 33. C. S., "Het S.I.-congres," p. 33, See also Hartogh, "De wensch," p. 403. 34. C. S., "Op den tweesproog," p. 13. 35. According to E. P. ZaXaznikova, ''Prof!lOiuznoe dvizhenie v Indonezii v 191~1926 ggo" (The Trade Union Movement in Indonesia, 1918-1926 ), in lugoVostochnaia AzUIl, ocherki ekQllOmiki j istorii (Moscow, 1958 ), pp. IM-I55, the federation CQlJIbinoo in mid-1920 the sugar workeJS' union (30,000 members) , VSTP (over 8,000). dockworkers' (3,000), Semarang printers' union (2,000), pawnshop workers' (5,000), teachers' (4,000). public works employees' (2,000), and the metal workers', oU workers', chauffeurs', and other smaller unions. See also Tan Mahla, "Die Gewerbchaftsbewegung auf Holliindisch Ost-Indien" (The Trade Union Movement in the Dutch East Indies), Rott' Ct'werlachofuIntcmotionlJle (no. 5/B), 1923, p. 543. FO£ a description of the feder.ltion's organi2:.ation as O\ItIinoo at the DecembeT 1919 convention. sec Mededeelfngen 1921, p. 10. 36. Noto, p. 22; SI V, p. 371, col. b; P. B. [Bergsma}, "De Valccentralo" (The Concentration of Labor Movements ) , HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 109; HOS, p. 114. Surjopr3noto became Vice-chairman; Najoan (ISDV-SI) was named secretary, but he was soon replaced by Hadji Agus Salim (CSI ). Bergsma was made treasurer, and the other executive members-Sjahbuddin Latief, Kartorubroto, H. Sutadi, Sugcng, and Tjokromidjojo-were CSI adherents. See H. Sutadi, article in Darma KontkJ, Oct. 10. 19-20. in IPD, no. 48. 1920. p. 33. 37. P. B., "De VakceniTale," p. 109. 38. "Jaarvergadering Indische S.D.A.P." (Ann ual Meeting of the Indies SDAP), De lndi-sche Cids, XLI (1919). 1171-1172. 39. Sec "Jaarvergadering S.D.A.P." (Annual Meeting of the SDAP), HVW, June 21, 1919, p. 21. 40. A1imin, Riwajat Hidup (Autobiography) (Djakarta. 1954) , pp. 14-15. 41. HVW, Dec. 27, 1919, p. 97, "Vers1ag van de zevende jaarvergaderlng der I.S.D.V." (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of. the ISDV ), HVW. June I, 1920, p. 253. 42. The use of the word Per!erikatan, which strictly translated in its present usage means "association" or "union" rather than "party," does not seem to have bud any special significance, for the official Dutch equivalent was PartiJ del' Kom· munislen in Indii>-Party of the Communists in the Indies. See HVW, May 5, 1920, p. 229; ''Versing van de zevende Jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V." HVW, June I, 1920, p. 254. Since it did not consider that adopting a new name meant becoming a dif· ferent party, the PKI of the 19205 continued to refer to this meeting as its 5eventh congress. The Deeembcr 1920 and March 1923 congresses were not numbered, presumably because the fanner was "extrnordinary" and the latter a ~Coogres.'i of the PKI and Red SIISR." The December 1921 party congress was held at the time to be the eighth and the June 1924 congress the ninth. However, the January 1947 party convention, meeting during the war of independence, caUed itself the fourth congress, presumably in order to make clear the distinction between the Indonesian-led PKI and the Dutch.led ISDV. Subsequent Communist congresses have followed this numbering. Postcolonial party historians have stressed a qualitative difference between the ISDV and PKI. Usuany they have referred 10 the May 1920 congress as the party's first, though not invariably. For example, Njoto. in his

374

Notes, pp. 46--50 report to the 1959 congress, gives the December 1921 meeting as the fint; Blntong Merah (Red Star, tIlC present party journal ), special sixth congress issue, 1900, I, 178. The second and third congresses are placed before 1925 in recent party histories, but otherwise their dating is quite arbitrary. 43. Api, Aug. I, 1924, in IPO, no. 32, 1924, pp. 279-280: interviews with Darsono and Semaun, 1959.

CHAPTER IV 1. Baars, "Bricvcn uit Holland" (Letters from Holland ), dated 24 Apr. 1919; In HVW, July 21, 1919, p. 364. 2. The ISDV ncwspaper published numerous reports on the revolutionary situa· tion in Germany, however: it also ran as a serial the account by a British journalist, Arthur Ransome. of his "Six Weeks in Soviet Russia." An indication of the state of information and the slowness with which news was received is that on Aug. 30, 1919, Het Vrile Woord published a report of Maxim Gorky's death-a large, black·bordered report, for Corky, after Lenin, was the paper's favorite Russian revolutionary. It was not until January 1920 that the ISDV discovered Corky was stUl alivc; it had received a copy of the Dutch Conununist newspaper De Tribune of Nov, 1, 1919, in which Corky's current activities were mentioned (P. B., "Maxim. Corky," HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 108) . 3. 1.'he manifesto was published in instaUments in HVW, Sept. 13, 20, 27 and Oct. 4, 1919 (pp. 437-438, 446, 452-453, a nd 6-7). 4. ~Yerslag van de zesde jaarvcrgadcring dcr I.S.D.Y." (Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the ISDV) , HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 113: bereafter cited as Verslag Z&de. 5. Verslag wsde, p. 113. 6. The ISDV executive decision of December 1918, as quoted by Hartogh at the sixth party congress (Verslag u!dc, p. 114). 7. Ver.tlag ZC$de, p. 114. 8. Verdag zesde, p. 114. 9. See vBr.·H., "De jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V." ('The Annual Meeting of the ISDV). HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 120. At the May 1920 party congress Hartogh again took up the problem of Section B, declaring that, although it ~ understandable for such clandestine organlzations to arise, It was necessary for the popular leaders to keep clearer heads. He reprimanded those PKI members who were too admiring of the Section B action; Tjokroaminoto and a number of other non·Communists critici2:ed him sharply for acting as if he felt the entire SI were involved. See "Verslag van de zcvende jaarvergadering dec I.S.D.V," (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the ISDY), HVW, June I, 1920, p. 253, hereafter dted as Ver.llag uverule; Soeara Ra'jat, May 26, 1920, :in IPO, no. 23, 1920, p. 2. 10. AJI members of the previous executive who made themselves available were re-elected; the new leaders were Hartogh (Dutch, chairman), Dengah ( Indonesian, secretary), Krnan (Dutch, treasured, Cluwen (Dutch, executive member representing Lawang), and Semaun, Bergsma, and Darsono (executive members representing Semarang). See VersIag :::e!de, p. 123. II. Statement by Waworuntu on behalf of the Semarang delegation to the May 1920 congress, in Ver.llag ::;evende, p. 254. See also vBr.·H, "De parvergader:ing cer I.S.D.Y.," p. 120. 12. vBr.·H, " De jaacvergadering der I.S.D.V.," p. i20. 13. See v~r ..H, "Het nieuwste gevaar" (1be Latest Danger ), HVW, Jan. 31,

:ff5

Notes,

pp. 50-55

1920, pp. 135-138; P. B., HOe '{lomme' massa" (The "Stupid" Masses), HVW, Jan. 31, 1920, pp. 136-139; and Hgh., "Dom" (Stupid), HVW, Feb. 21, 1920, p. 161. 14. Ver&log .::evende. p. 253. 15. De Tribune, Aug. 16. 1920, p. 4; and see Venlag uvende, p. 253. Baars accused Hmogh of opposing th e name change because the party for which he felt the most sympathy-the German USP-had Dot adopted the Communist title. He added, however, that in his estimation Hartogh was not at heart an independent socialist but II CommWlist, albeit a cautious one (VCtslag zeoonde. pp. 267-268), 16. VersWg zevende, pp. 254, 265-268; see also De Tribune, Aug. 16, 1920, p. 4; Aug. 11, 1920, p. 2; Aug. 18, 1920, p. 2. 17. Verslag ::eoonde, p. 254; De Tribune, Aug. 19, 1920, p. 2. The rundown of votC$ given in D. N. Aidit's history of the movement rcl'ers to the results of the referendum held later among the party branches (Aidit, Sedlarah. p. 44); see llVW, Oct. 20, 1920, p. 9. 18. Venlag uuende. p. 254. 19. See Elias Hurwicz, m e Ori6n4polleik d6T Dritten lrUema/iOflQle (The Eastern Policy of the 11Iin1lntemational) (Berlin, 1922), pp. 12, 15, 26; Edward Hallett CIUT, The Bol.Jhevik RellOlulian, 1917-1923 (New York, 1953 ), Ill, 232, 234, 236; L. A. Modzhorian, "Borba demokratichcskogo lagena za oatsiona}'nulu nezavisimost' i natsional'nyi suverenitet" (11Ie Struggle of the Democratic Camp for National Independence lind National Sovereignty) , Sooet.tkoe gorudtJrltoo j provo, January 1953, p. 57; Xenia Eudin and Robert North, Soviet Ruufa and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957 ), pp. 46, 77-79; A. A. Guber, "Izuchenie istOOi stran Vostoka v SSSR :til 25 let" (Twenty-Five Years of Research on the History of the East in the USSR), in Dvadtsat' pint' let /&1orichukoi naukf v SSSR (Moscow, 1940), p. 232. 20. Achmed Z.-ilikov, ''The New Russia and the Peoples of the Orient," .Novaia Zhi:,,,', Jan. 19, 1918, II~ quoted in Hurwicz, Oriempolitik, p. 14. 21. Quoted in Hurwicz, Ori6n4polUlk, pp. 17- 18. 22. Zhi;m' Natsioool'rwstei (no. 5), Dec. 8, 1918, as translated in Elldln and North, Soviet Russia, p. 162. Tbi5 department developed twelve country sections, wbich extendL-d its authority beyond the exclU!livcly Islamic areas to include China, Korea, Japan, and India (Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 78). 23. K. Trolanovskil, Vo.rtok" i ,eooliu/3iia (The East and the Revolution) (Moscow, 1918) , pp. 66-67; and see Hurwicz, Orientpolitlk, pp. 17-18. The League was created at a conference that began in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1918. 24. Trolanovskii, Vo.rtok", p. 65. Troianovskii, one of the founders of the League, sets forth the program drawn up by the League at its 8rst congress. 25. Troianovskii, Vostok", pp. 66-71 ; see also Hurwicz, OrlentpolUfk, pp. 19-23. The League, apparently renecting Russian concem over Japanese expansion in the East, dedared that since the varied development of different Asian nationalities made possible an Asian imperialism, it would be best for Eastern countries to unite on a basis of equality: "It can begin with a narrower fedcration, say the Indian, and expand to a broader one, to a federation of the whole broad Asian continent, to the United States of Alila" (TroillflQvksii, Vo.nOkH, p. 67). The program further announced : In its ooonomic policy the League for the Liberation of the East proceeds from the principle of the natoral international division of labor and the highest utilization of the econemic and te<:hnical bases of this backward, predominantly agrarian continent. The Lca!r!e therefore does not pot forth the reactionary slogan of "Asia for the Asians' bot, on the contrary, strongly supports freedom of entry and

:J16

Notes, pp. 5iH57 penetration into Asia for all those who wish to exploit its inexhaustible resources by peaceful and cultural methods and at the same time to develop the productive capacity of the countries of the East. Troianovskii, Vostok", p. 69. The only countries capable of such altruistic exploitation, the League continued, were the European socialist republics, of which Soviet Russia happened to be the sole extant example. 28. The League's action program for the Asian revolutionaries included papuJar seizure of transportation and oomnlWlications facilities, the end of foreign m0nopolies and concessions. the replacement of indirect taxes by a progressive Income tax, the nul1i6cation of state debts and war loam, the demobiJiuttion of the army and its replacement by a people's militia, the repl acement of the existing credit system by non-interest-bcaring i OWlS from the state or conunune, the abolition of castes (the only visible concession made to Asian conditions), and no restrictions on international trade. This la:.t was probably linked to the plans for peaceful and cu1tural Soviet exploitation. (Troianovskii, VQ.I'tok", pp. 70--71) . 27. "Address to the Second AU-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East," in Lenin, NatloMl Liberation Movement, pp. 235-236. 28. For an early expression of this view, see his 1912 article on "Democracy and Narodism in China," in Lenin, National Liberation Mooemcnt, p. 43. For a detailed dl<;cussion of Lenin's early views on the East, sec Whiting, Soclet Policies In China, 1917-1924 (New York, 1954 ), pp. 12-46. . 29. The congress resolved to adopt a "polk.'Y of bringing together the proletaria ns an d semi-proletarians of different nationalities for a common revolutionary struggle agai n~1: the landowners and bourgeoisie," a ~trugg1e that was to include the colonial countries (Vo,,'moi S"e;ul RKP[b), p. 49, liS translated in Carr, Bolshevik Rcooiut/on, Ill, 236). 30. Carr. Bolshevik Ret;oluUon, III, 235-236. 31. Almost the only reCOgnition of the agrarian base of the Asian revolution expressed before the second Comintem congress WIIS in a speech by Bukharin to the Third AU-Russian Congress of Chinese Workers; We shall B.$t capitalism in its centers-in Paris, London, and other places; and you will help us by overthroWing it in Asia. You will be able to do this if you mobilize the broad mllsses of the popuilltion and give them deGnite aims. There can be here two watchwords; First, "The fight agllinst Europelln capitalism," which is clear to everyone . . . . The S(..'('()nd watchword theJ:efore is, ''Throw out the estate owners." The aim, comequently, /.t all agrarian revolution. You win be able to accomplish the rising of the masses through the war cry, as the slogan "Seixe the bnd from the estate owners" is clear to everyone.

l :'uenia, June 22. 1920, translated in TIw Second Congreu of tlw Communist lrllernatlcmal ( Wash ington. 1920) , pp. 133-134. Emphasis in the text. Since this meeting was held just before the second Comintem congress, it is quite possible that Bukharin's statement reflected the theses Lenin bad prepared for that gathering. 32. Zlnoviev added that the ECCI had organized two conferences with representatives from China, Korea, Armenia, Persia; Turkey, and other Eastern lands during the previous yea r, but these had not been enough to give the young revolutionary movements in those countries the direction they needed. G. Zinoviev, Bericht de.t Exekutiokommuus der Kommunlst/.tchen 1ntemat/onaIe em den II. W eltkongr6S8 der Kommuntstl:chen IntetnlltionaIe (Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Second World Congress of the Communist Intemntion:ll) ( Petrograd. 1920 ), pr. 35-36. 33. See VVS, p. 60; Tile Second Congress of the Communi.rt International,

377

Notes, pp. 57-60 p. 40; Dc TrilmM, July 24 and Aug. 14, 1920; JIVW, Dec. 21, 1920, p. 43; Der zweite Kongreu der Kommunisti4cMn Intenuztkmll1e (The Second Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg. 1921 ). p. 783 (hereafter cited as II Kongreu). The last-named source lists two delegates from the Netherlands Indies; it seems probable tliat this is a faulty stAtistic, however, since the unnamed second delegate never spoke at the congress and was not mentioned in any other sources. He could not have been an Indonesian, for Sneevliet declared to the meeting his hope that there might be real natiYe5 of that country to represent it at the next congress (II Kongreu. p. 189 ). It is also unlikely that he was Dutch, since the Netherlands Communist newspaper listed Snoovlict as the only delegate going from Holland to represent Indonesia; none of the throe delegates represeJ'!ting the Netherlands proper had been identified with the movement in the Indies (De Tribune. July 24 and Aug. 14, 1920 J. 34. De Tribune, Feb. 18, 1919. 35. "Het tiende jaarrongres van de communistischc parti;" (The Tenth Annual Congress of the Communist party ), HVW, Aug. 23, 1919, pp. 414-415. 36. Just how close SneevJict's contact with Indonesia W:lS after his expulsion is difficult to say. Het Vri;c Woord complained that registered mail between him_ self, his wife (still in Indonesia ), and the ISDV Wa.!; not coming through and accused either British or Dutch officials of intercepting it ( l1VW, Apr. 26, 1919, p. 270); but certainly he wa.~ by no means cut off from the movement in the Indies. In h is report on the Indonesian party to the second Comintem congress Sneevliet revealed that he knew the ISDV was planning to assume' the name PKI at a forthcoming congress, but apparently he did not know that the meeting had taken place nearly tw,o montlu before (Maring, Nleder16ntlisch, p. 4(9) . Since, however. he had IeIt Holland for Moscow in May (according to De Trioone, Aug. 14, 1920), this is , not surprising. 37. II Kongress, p. 192. 38. II Kongrcs$, p. 139. 39. II Kongrcsl, pp. 230-231. 40. 11 Kongrcn, p. 149. 41. For other points of difference between Roy's and Lenin's views, see Carr, Bolshevik Reoolution, Ill, 254. . 42. II Kongrcn, pp. 144-145, 230-231: and see Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 254-255. 43. II KongrelUl, p. 194. 44. It has been pointed out that Roy was finally persuaded by Lenin to modify the wording of his theses considerably, particularly in those sections dealing with bourgeois nationalism. By mistake, however, the original version was included in the stenographic report of the CODgtes.'l and in subsequent reprints of its proceedings; it was not until a second edition of the report was made in 1934 that the error was corrected; see Whiting, Soviet Poltc/cs, pp. 51-56. A good bit of Roy's analysis was later adopted by Stalin as part of his theory on the ~lonial question, and the view presented in the theses became an important part of the Comintem's explanation of the Asian situation be'tween 1928 and 1934, when the International held a less tolerant attitude toward the coloniaJ boU.fgeoisie. In general, the origin of these ideas w~ not mentioned-certainly they were not credited directly to Roy, who had since been estranged from the ComiDtem. When, however, the matter of the supplementary theses was brought up during this later period, it was explained that they represented the situation in the more highly developed dependent countries, such as India and China, where a

378

Notes, pp. 60-64 greater degree of clas!l differentiation had been reached, and that Lenin's pfOogram had been framed for the more backward Central Asian territories (Strategiio I taktdca Komintema 0 natrional'no-kolonwl'noi flwoliutsii. na primere Kita/a [Strategy and Tactic:s of the Comlntem In the National-Colonial Revolution, after the Example of China1 [n.p., 19341. p. 10; hereafter cited 85 Sfrategfla). This is interesting if somewhat precarious reasoning, for it implied that Lenin's program did not appl y in those areas which were the focus of Comlntem interest In the East. Certainly Lenin's the5CS derived much from Russia's Central Asian concern, but they were intended to apply to all dependent countries. 45. II Kong ress, p. 142. 46. II Kongre.'>f, p. 230. The original draft of Lenin's theses showed its origin In Russia's Central Asian interests clearly, for it neglected the Pan-Asian angle and reail :

Thirdly, it is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and similal" currents of opiniol) which attempt to combine the movement for liberation from European and American imperialism with a strengthening of the position of the khans, landlords, mullahs, etc. Lenin's theses, as given in Strategiia, p. 34. Lenin apparently thought the quemon of the Communist attitude toward the hlamic movement a knotty one, for when he sent his proposed colonial program to the congress dele gates for criticism shortly before the Comintern meeting, he included the provision on Pan-ulamism among those on which he particularly desired comment; text of Lenin's note to the congress delegates, as reproduced in Strategiio, p. 31. 47. Or. S., "Een mooic vergadering" (A Fine Meeting), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. US; opinion of the sixth ISDV congress on participation in the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements (see below). 4S. "Het S.1. congres en de Vakcentrnle" (The 51 Congress and the Concentration of Labor Movements) , HVW, Aug. 10, 1921, p. 4. 49. P. B., "De actie der bolsjewisten" (The Action of the Bolshevists), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 117. SO. ''Politieke Concentratie" (Political Concentration), lIVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 108. The Concentration's program docs not seem radical by present standards, but it was not much different from that adopted by the ISDV in 1915. Brw8y, it called for (1) a popularly elected parliament, (2) decentralization of government, (3) prohibition of child labor and restriction of woman labor, (4) a minimum wage, (5) recognition by the authorities of labor unions as bargaining agents £0'( workers organized by them, (6) abolition of aU indirect taxes in favor of taxes on proSts and capit.'ll, ( 7 ) enterprise in state hands wherever possible, (S) universal free public education. See Verslag zesde, p. llS; SI V, p. 371, col. h. 51. Quoted in vBr.-H., "De jaarvergadering der I.S,D.V." (The Annual Meeting of the ISDV ), HVW. Jan. 17, 1920, p. 121. 52, Hadji Agus Salim, explaining the difference between "national" and "nationalist" orientations to the October 1921 Sarekat Islam congress; quoted in SI V, p. 377, coL a. See also "Natianalistische beweging" (Nationalist Movement), Encyclopaedic van Nederlnndsch-IndlC, V, 878, col. a, for a concise differentiation between the protoDatfoDalist and nationalist phases of the Indonesian indepenlience movement. 53. P. B., "Het Bolsjewisme en het proletariaat in het Oosten" (Bolshevism and the Proletariat in the East) , HVW, Mar. 6, 1920, p. 179 (response by

:m

Notes.

pp. 64-66

Bergsma to a r.vorable nationalist: reaction to Troianovskii', work on the East and the revolution), See also P. B., "Communisme contra nationallsme" (C0mmunism against Nationalism ), lIVW, Feb. 7, 1920. For a general .Impression of Douv.~ Deller", political ideM, see his pamphlet Een JOCiogenetirche grondwet (A Sociogenetic Constitution) (Semarang. n,d,) and his autobiographical 10 loor Konrekwent (Seventy Years Consistent) (Bandung, 1950) . 54. See Alimin Prawirodiredjo, "LotJteren wij ON!" Open brief aon elk lid van de Sarekat IJam (Let Us Purify Ourselvesl Open Letter to All Memben of the Sarekat Islam) (Weltevreden, October 1919). pamphlet circulated by the Sambt Hindia at the tbne of the 51 congress. See also C. S., "Het S.l.-rongres," p. 33, Nota, p. 2; 51 V, p. 372, cols. a and h. The Sarekat Hindia's Dutch-language title was Nationaal Indische Pamj (National Indies Party); its official program may be found in the Volhraad Joorboekje (Volksraad Yearbook), I (1922-1923),52-59. 55. Mohammad Kasan, article in Sinor Hindia, Aug. 25, 1919, in fPO, no. 35, 1919, p. 15. See also Dengah, editorial in Soeora Ra'JcIt, Sept. 10, 1919, in lPO, no. 38, 1919, p. 1; and the debate between Douwes Dekker and Bergsma at the 1919 Insulinde congress, De lnd/.sche GkU, XLI (1919 ), 1169-1170, 56. The most exteruive treatment of this thesb in PKI literature is in Soegiman, Bankroetnla Pattal Kebangwan di Hfndoettan (The Bankruptcy of the Nationalist Party in Hi.ndustan) (Mlllang, 1926 ), This booklet IIscribes the differences be· tween the Indian and the Indones.ian movement! to the fact that in India it W1l.'l necessary for the Communists to rlruggle against both foreign imperialism and a native bourgeoisie, whereas in Indonesia the lack of a native midd1e class allowed the popular movement 10 concentrate singlemlndedly on the Gght against the Dutch (see especially pp. 13-15, 52 ). Sugiman concluded:

The Indonesian movement, though it does not possess such advocates as Gandhi and Oas used to be, faces Imperialism and capitalism more directly. 11Ie industrial workers, who are oriented about the PJO:, and the ruffermg people, who folkrN the Sarekat Ralciat [the mass movemenl then spoD$Ored by the PKI], wiD sooner reach their &naf obfective than the workers or peasants anywhere else in Mia, 'I'lili; is not becaU.'ie the inhabitants of Indonesia are of a higher level than the other inhabitants of Mia, but becaU.'ie of the nature of the economic and class conflicts in Indonesia between the people and Dutch ImperlaJism. Soegiman, Bankroetnia, p. 61. 57. Sneevliet and Berg.~ma were the most prominent proponents of this viewpoint, but it seems to have been rather generally accepted throughout the CPH, for party chairman Van Ravesteyn emphasized it in a ma;or meeting on the Indonesian question; see De Tribune, Feb, 27, 1925. 58. Ver,lag wvende, p. 265; emphasis in the text. Baan was a consistent and ou~ken antinationalist, as Indonesia's future President recalled:

1 confess that when I was sixteen and at high 5Chool in Sumbaja, I was inHucnced by a socialist by the n.amI!I of A. Baars who gave me lessons; he saM: do not bfolieve in nationalism, but believe in the humanity of the whole world, do not have even the least sense of oationaJism. That was In 1917. But in 1918, thanks be to God, there was another man who recalled me, and that was Dr, Sun Yat Sen. In his work San Min Chu I, or The Three People'6 Principlu, I found a lesson which exposed the cosmopolitanism taught by A. Baars. Sukamo, speech of June I , 1945, translated in The Birth 01 Pantfa Silo (Djakarta, 1961 ), pp, 13-14. Baars had been particul~y voca1 in his opposition 10 Indo-

380

Notes, pp. 66-69 nesian nationalism since his retwn from the Netherlands: "We know naUonalisrn and social patriotism here" he emphasized, "only as our opponents:' A. B., "Mel· • overpelnzingen" (May Thoughts), HVW, May 5,1920, p. 230. 59. The referendum was set up at a meeting of the executive on July 14, 1920. It took some time for the poll to be held; the results, announced in HVW, Oct. 20, 1920, p. 9, showed 33 branches in favor, 2 opposed, and 1 abstaining. A large number of ballots were received after the deadline and were therefore dlsqualifled. 60. HVW, Nov. 5, 1920, p. 13; from the executive's announcement of the December congress. 61. Sneevliet's participation in the Comintern meeting was announced in HVW, Sept. 5, 1920, p. 317; the paper said that it was leamed from reports in the Dutch Communist press. The Scmarang PKI/SI letter of authorization was dated the same day; it is reproduced in WS, plate facing p. 60. The C3:ccutives of the Semarang branch of the PKI and SI were at that time virtually' identical; they authorized Sneevliet to "act in the names of these parties, present proposals, and perform tasks assigned him. by the above-mentioned parties" as he saw fit. 62. This date is, of course, a good time after the July 1920 meeting of the International. However, Russia's isolation and the lade of international press interest in the less spectacular aspects of the Comintern meeting may well have meant that detailed news of the congress traveled back to Holland with the Dutch Communist delegation, which :urived home in September 1920, aDd from there came by sea mail to the Indies, a voyage then lasting about two months. In any event, November 20 is the first date on which Het Vri;e Woord published more than the bare descriptions of congress events that it could receive from normal news sources. Only the Lenin theses were reported; if the PKI was aware of Roy's alternate proposals, it did not mention them. 63. A. B., " Moskou" (Moscow), HVW, Dec. 4, 1920, p. 33; Baars's other comments are taken from this article, pp. 33-34. 64. Among the ISDVIPKI members that had held town council seats during 1919-1920 were Baars, Coster, Semaun, Hartogh, Hillet, Mohammad Jusuf, Reeser, Snel, Wakker, and Mohanunacl Kasan. Hgh., "Semaoen's standpoint," p. 106; P. B., "Een benoeming" (An Appointment), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 122; Ver:/ng zevende, p. 253. In the 1918 elections, the ISDV did Dot run in Batavia but thtew its votes to Insu1inde; in Surabaja It worked with the SI and Imrulinde; in Semarang it fonned a combination with the SI that was opposed by Insulinde. Sneevliet, "Gemeenteraads-verkiezingen" (Town Council Elec· tlons), HVW, Sept. 10, 1918, p. 309. 65. See " Verklaring van het hoofdbestuur der I.S.D.V. betreffende de Volksraadverkiezingen" (Declnrntion of the Executive of the ISDV concerning the Volkeraad Elections), HVW, Jan. 10, 1918, pp. 81-82. The ISDV campaign platform called for (I) Il Volksrnad elected direclly and without property qualifications for the voters; (2) recognition of the rights to political association and assembly, the rlgbt to strike, freedom of speech, etc.; (3) opposition to looie WeeTbaar; (4) heavier taxes on profits to ease the tax burden on the common people. The chief opposition to this platform came from Budi Utomo, which found it too radical; lnsulinde tried vainly to mediate the dispute. 66. The Ilrst Volhraad was composed of a chairman, named by the Crown, and 38 members, half of which were appointed by the Governor General and haH chosen by a 650-man electoral college, of which 500 members were named by the Governor General and I SO chosen by town and regency councils. According to law, at least one-fourth of the appointed and one-half of the elected

381

Notes, pp. 69-72 members were to be native lndones~s; in the first Volksraad there were five appointed and ten elected Indonesian members. Most of them belonged to the native bweaucracy (pangreh pradjG) and were very conservative. Indonesian suffrage was introduced May 1918. after the first VoJksraad was formed; it was restricted to those who had an income of at least 1,200 guilders a year and • lmowledge of Dutch equivalent to that obtained by grad u3tion from an HIS (school for native!! in which Dutch was the language of instruction). This resulted in an extremely skewed electorate: according to Van Ravesteyn, there were 68 Indonesian and 2,000 European registered voters in Surabaja in 1919 ( HandclingeR 2e Komer, 1918!l919. p. 2024). There were various complaints that qualilied Indonesians did not bother to register. either from lack of intere~1: or (particu1arly in the case of 51 adherents) as a gesture of noncooperation; thill seems to have kept the Indonesian electorate below what the restrictions allowed. See De Ind/.Jche Gid8, XL (1918), 995. (fl. Three-fourths of the branch emcutives of the 51 voted on Tjokroaminoto's participation in the Volkmad; of these, 28 favo.red it, 26 opposed it, and 22 abstained. One-third of the CSI members abstained in the vote on the subject; the w;ult was 6 for and 5 against. It was therefore decided that Tjokroaminoto would assume his seat, but the Gnal decision was left to the 1918 SI congress. See Dc Indbche Gids, XL ( 1918), 994. 'I'he strong opposition to p:lrticipation may explain why Tjokroaminoto and his radical colleagues criticized the govemment so much in the 6rst sessions of the Volhraad; it pained the Governor General and other Europeans who had hoped for constructive cooperation, but it also increased' the backing in their own organizations for participation. 68. For II discussion of the creation of the first Volksraad and the electioru for it, .see Brouwer, De houd£ng. pp. 52--69. 69. See, for example, Sioor HindEa, Dec. 31, 1918, in IPO, DO. I, 1919, p. 17. 70. Of the members of the 1918 ISDV executive, only Coster favored giving up the party;$ IlIlti_Volksmad stand and accepting the invitation to attend the Radical Concentration's founding conference; his sole reason for urging this was to persuade the Sarekat Islam representation at that meeting to keep out of the proposed alliance. The executive finally decided to send a telegram to Tjokroaminoto informing him that the ISDV would not attend the conference and urging him to send an SI representative as soon as possible to Surabaja to confer with the ISDV. Tjokroaminoto, however, did not respond; and so the executive sent Semaun to Batavia, where he made a final unsuccessful attempt to keep the CSI leader from committing his IIlOVCl'DImt to the Concentration (HVW, Feb. 15, 1919, p. 176). 71. See Cramer, Kolonwk Politlek, p. 53. 72. Semaoen, "Mijn standpunt" (My Standpoint), HVW, Jan. 16, 1920, pp. 106-107; Verswg zettle, p. 113; Hartogh, "Nog eens, Semaoen's standpunt~ (Once Again, Semaun's Standpoint), lIVW, Jan. 29, 1920, pp. 126-128. 73. HVW, Dec. 21, 1920, p. 37. 74. Baars, "Ons buiteogev.'oon congres" (Our Extraordinary Congress), HVW, Dec. 21, 1920, pp. 37-38. 75. Baars, "Ons buiteDgewoon congres," p. 38. 76. Baars gave the follOwing reasons for advocating Vollcsraad participation: ( 1) the Volksraad wouJd provide an outlet for PKI propaganda; (2) its members enjoyed parliamentary immunity; (3) the administration could be attacked directJy by Volksraad members; (4) the PK! would be in a better position to prevent the "weaker" opposition parties from being enticed into collaboration with the governmeot through the Vol1csraad. Agaiost these arguments, he noted, the

in

382

Notes, pp. 72-73 PKI must also consider that ( 1) the party might concentrate too much of its efforts on parliamentary activity; (2) it would be ~sary to accept nomination by the Governor General in order to get a seat. He did not bring up the Comintern in his discussion. See " "Verslag van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I." (Report of the Extraordinary Congress of the PKI), HVW, Dec. 31, . 1920, p. 47. 77. "Verslag van bet buiteng(!\\'OOn congres der P.KJ.," p. 47; see also the arguments by Bergsma (P. B.) in "ODS buitengewoon congres," p. 39. 78. " Verslag van het buitengewoon congres de r P.K.I.," p. 47. For Semaun's comments on the function of the European and Indonesian party members, see Semaoen, "Mijn standpunt," p. 107. 79. The .final vote recorded only the Bandung delega te and Mrs. Sneevliet (Semarang) as opposed. "Verslag van het bUitengewoon congres der P.K.I.," p. 47. 80. HVW, Feb. 5, 1921, p. 9. 81. Baars, Sowjet.Rusdond in de practljk. lndie tot leering (Soviet Russia in Practice. A Lesson for the Indies) ( Rotterdam, 1928), p. 5; De Tribune, June 21, 1921, p. 1. 82. "De uitslag der Volhraadverkiezingen" (The Result of the Volbraad Elections), llVW, Feb. 5, 1921 , p. 5, Blumberger, Commun/.rt, p. 26. Bluroberger elaims that the PKI candidate was withdrawn from the race for nomination, which would have been the lOgical step for the party to take at this point; however, from the account in Ret Vri;e W oord of the subsequent appointments to Volksraad seats, it appears that Baars had not been removed from the list. " Verblijdende duidelijkheid" (Pleasing Clarity), HVW. Mar. 18, 192 1, p. 101. 83. "De uitslag der VolksraadverkiCZingen," p. 5. M. The immediate grounds for Baars's expulsion, which was ordered on May B. 1921, were two articles written for Ret Vri;e W oord, one protesting the arrest of his fellow PKI member Van Burink lind the other discussing the German counterrevolution. By this time Baars had achieved quite a reputation as a Bolshevil: agent; rumors were widely current that he was receiving sUver, arms, blank p.'lSS(lOrts, an d a volumi nous correspondence in Russian from the Soviet republic. See Dc Tribune. June 21, 1921. p. 1; Baars, Sawfet. Rusdond in de ptClctt;k. p. 5; P. Eyquem, "Am:; lndes Neerlandaises: Ie syndiealisme musulman et la IIIe Intemationale," Revue du monde musulman, Ill, December 192.2, p. 73. Baan announced that he would go to Soviet Russia to help build socialism there, and he departed with a speech in which he promised that "the waves of the world revolution ....ilI wll.'lh WI hither again. just as the wave of world reaction has temporarily washed WI away" (De Tribune, July 12, 1921, p. 1; a somewhat different version of this speech is q uoted in Eyquem, "Am:; l ndes Noorbndaises," p. 73) . He stayed in Russia until late 1927, most of which time he served in an "autonomous colony" of foreign engineers headed by the Dutch Communist S. J. Rutgers and dedicated to bui1ding up industry in the Kuznetsk Basin. He retumed to Holland with his opinion of Russia the reverse of what he had expected and wrote a series of newspaper articles on his experi. ence, Sow;et.Russland in de practi;k, which appeared in the N/euwe Rotterdmn.whe Courant, Jan. 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, 1928. The Indies government thereupon rescinded its ban on his presence in the colony in the hope that he would convey his new viewpoint to the Indonesians (Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, May 6, 1929; Algemeen HClndeLsblad, Aug. 3, 1929). Baars, however, had given up the salvation of humanity as a bad job; he stayed in Holland and died an adherent of the fascist right. 85. "Verblijdende duidelijkheid," p. 10.

383

Notes, pp. 73-77 86. frl. 88. 89. 90. 91.

"Verslllg "Venlag " Verslag "Verslag "Venlag "Verslllg

van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.," p. 46. van het buitengewoon rongres der P.K.l.," p. 47. van het huitengewoon congres der P.K.I.... p. 47. van het buitengewoon congres de.- P.K.I.... p. 41. van he! buitengewoon congres det P.K.I.," p. 47. van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.," p. 48.

CHAPTER V 1. II Kongreu, p. 140. 2. II Kongre'$, pp. 195-196. 3. On his return from the Comintem congress, Dutch Communist party chairman Wijnkoop announced: 'We for oW" part can disclose, 011 the basis of the various meetings devoted to the [colonial} question by the [Comintem) executive ..• that outside Moscow there will nowhere be established a center for propaganda by the Third International" Wijnkoop, "De Oostersche kwestie in de Exelcutive" ( The Eastern Question in the Executive), De Tribune, Sept. 27, 1920, p. 1; emphasis in the text. Wijnkoop sat on the colonial commission of the Comintem congress together with Sneevliet; this remark possibly reflected some hostility between them, as they frequently disagreed on questions of policy. 4. VVS, p. 62. Sneevliet WlJ.S preceded illJ Comintem representative in China by Voitinsky, who had arrived in China in the spring of 1920. See Robert North, A!OfCQW and the Chinue Communist" (Stanford, 1953 ), p. 54. 5. "Sneevliet over Rusland" (Soeevliet on Russia), HVW, Dec. 21, 1920, p. 44. This is a report of a farewell speech made to the Dutch transport workers' union. 6. Sneevliet traveled overland to Austria and then boarded the Uoyd Trie.rtino ship Acquila for the journey to the Orient (H. Sn., "Op reis naar het Oosten" [On the Way to the EastJ. HV\V. July 20, 1921, p. 3, interview with DuSODo, 1059 ). He traveled under an assumed name in order. he claimed, to avoid the humiliations the Indies Dutch passengers aboard ship would bestow on a notorious revolutionary. His movements were followed, however. by the Austrian police and by the British authorities along his route, who kept the Netherlands Indies government infonned of his progress towud China. Bataci4a.sch Nloow,blad, June I , 19"..4; H . Sn., "Op reis," pp. 3-4. 7. Interview with Darsono, 1959; H. Sn., "Op reis," p. 4. Baars and Sneevliet celebrated their reuwon and arrival in China by sending a postcard from their Shanghai hotel to the comrades In the Netherlands; text in De Tribune, July 20, 1921 , p. 2. 8. At the 1921 Comintem congress one delegate charged that Sneevliet's bureau had never put itself in contact with the European Couununist parties, that it played "only a platoniC role" in the Far East, and that the Comintem should take steps to correct the office's inactivity. ProtokoUe de, drittcn Kongreue, tIer Kommtmisti.schen lntemalionale ( Protocols of the Third Congress of the Communist International ) (Hamburg, 1921), p. 1034; hereafter cited as 111 Kongress. The charges were leveled by a member of the French delegation who disagreed on the colonial question y.rith the Comlntem leaders, however, and there is no evidence or any official response to his complaint. 9. See Nym Wales, Red Dtm (Stanford, 1952), p. 39; Eudln and North, Soviet Htwia. p. 139; Whiting, Soviet Policfu, p. 237. Chen T'an-cb'ju does not mention Sneevliet in his account of the first CCP congress and $tates that at the fir..t congress the party had no organi%lItlonal connection~ ,vith the Comlno

384

Notes, p. 77 tern, which it elected to enter only at its second convention. Tschcn Pan-tsiu, "Erinnerungen den I . Parteitag de T K.P. Chinas" (Reminisoonces of the F ir5t Congress of the Chinese cOmmuni~t Party), Die Kommuntstische Intemutiona/e, Sept. 30, 1936, pp. 900-904. Chang Kuo-fao, who attended the"meeting, claimed that Sneevliet wa~ not invi ted to the congress because he was disliked by Li Ta and Li Han-chiln (manuscript autobiography, cited in C. Martin Wilbur, introduction to Ch'en Kung-po, The Communist Movement in China (New York, 1960), p. 18; hereafter cited as WUbur, Introduction. Other participants in the meeting recalled, however, that two foreigners were present, Sneevliet and a Russian; Chou Fu-hai and Tung Pi-wu, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 18. Chou's account stated that the Russian was Voitinsky; Jelm Chesneaux gives his name as Lizonsky in Le mouvement auvrier chinois de 1919 d 1927 (The Chine...e Labor 'Movement from 1919 to 1927) (Paris and The Hague, 1962) , p. 258; he sa}'li Lizonsky participated in the first session of the meeting on SneevHet's invitation, in order to prescnt a report on the newborn Red Internationru of Labor Unions. Ch'en Kun g-po, "I and the Communist Party," in the collection Han Feng CM, I, 206-207, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 53, note 23, recalled that on the urging of Chang Kuo-fao the congress passed a resol ution forbidding party members to belong to other organizations; but the following day Chang reversed his recommendation ou the advice of the "Russian representatives" tl\Cre. May, June, and J uly have been given as dates for this congress; Wilbur, Introduction, pp. 15-21 , discusses the possibilities and concludes that it probably took place in late July. If Sneevliet was involved, it could not have occurred before June. 10. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How (eds.), Documents on Com~ munism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China ( New York, 1956), pp. 139 and 497, notes 5-8, citin g the followin g sources; H u H ua, Clnmg-kuo hsin minchu chu-i-ko-min shih (an orthodox Communist hi~lo r)' of the Chinese revolution published in 1951), p. 6; Li Chien-nung, Tsui-chin san-shill min Chlmg-kuo cheng-cltlh shih (a non-Communist history of modern China issued in 1930 ), p. 546; Wang Ching-wei, "On Separating the Communists from the KMT at Wuhan," in Ko-ming yii fan-ko-mlng (a series of essays on the Chinese revolu tion published by the Left Kuomintang leader in 1928), p. 593. Soo further Shao Chuan Leng and Nonn.m D . Palmer, Sun Yat-scn and Communism ( New York, 1960) , pp. 55-56, citing Tsuo Lu, Chung-kuo-min-tang shih~kao ( Draft History of the Kuomintnn g ), 1944, p. 304. Ch'en Kung-po, "I and the Communist Party," pp. 117-119, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 7, asserted that shortly before the meetin~ with Sun he saw Sneevliet in Canton. The Comintern representative had come from Shanghai together with the Kuominlan g leader Chang Chi, who was takin g h im to meet Sun in Kweilin. With Chang T'ai-lei acting as interpreter, they discussed the possibility of an amalgamat ion of the KMT am! CC'P, although this was not framed in tenus of the Kuomintan g talcing in the Communists as members. Ch'en stated that he felt sure Chrmg Chi and Snoovliet had already reached agreement on the matter; Chang was enth usiastic, and Sncevliet mentioned that he intcnded to discm;s it with Sun. II. Whiting, Soviet Policie8, p. 237, asserts that Sneevliet's mhsiOD "was apparently no more than one of $unreying the situation and establishing friendly contact with all sources of revolutionary activity." On the other hand, Jt is stated in the Sneevliet memo.riru vol~e that the International defined his task as bringing the CCP and Kuommtang .nto contact wi th each other "in accord with the decisions of the second congress of the Comintern"; VVS, p. 62.

an

385

Notes, pp. 77-79 12. In a comment datelined Shanghai, Sept. 4, 1921. Sneev!iet remarked: "I am at the moment unable to report on the results of the successive actions of the workers io Canton: I only Irnow that up till now the labor groups there have been used solely as instruments for establishing the Sun Yat·sen party." De Tribune, Nov. 10, 1921. 13. De Tribune, Nov. 10, 1921; see also Snecvliel's comments in De Tribune, Nov. 9, 1921, and Oct. 17 and 18, 1921 (report dated Shanghai, August 1921) . 14. U Chien-nung states that Sneevliet ccmmented on tlili to the Chinese Cooununist leader UaO Chung-leai after the meeting (cited in Wi1bur and How, Documents, p. 497) . 15. Sneevliet ccmplained that since his arrival in Shanghai the Dutch consul· general had kept his eye on him through his Japanese houseboy. His sudden departure caused the Dutch and other European consulates to instigate a police search for him, and after he returned they continued to observe his activities. Sneevliet, Jetter dated Shanghai, Mar. 19, 1922, published in De Tribune, May 6, }99..2. 16. De Tribune, May 6, 1922. Sneevliet reccunted that he left Canton for Shanghai as soon as the strike ended (Mar. 16, 1922 ). Chiang Kai·shek stated in his diary that Sneevliet met with Sun Yat-sen in Canton on Dec. 25, 1921 (Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Chiell-shih hrien-.sheng.Mln-kuo shlh-wu-nien-I-ch'ien chlll Chiang Chieh-shih hrien-sheng, III, 100, cited in Wilbur and How, D0cuments, pp. 139, 497); aemrding to Sncevliet's account of his trip, however, he did not reach Canton until Jan. 23, 1922 (De Tribune, May 6,1922). 17. See Snecvliet"s remarks on the Kuomintang and the strike in De Tribune, May 6, 1922, and his comments on the problem of organizing the Chinese workers in De Tribune, May 8, 1922. 18. De Tribune, May 8, 1922. 19. De Tribuf16, June 21, 1922, reporting a speed! by Sneevliet in Amsterdam, June 16, Ht22. Sneevliet's major critiCism of the KMT was that its discipline was too strict: "The new popular party. whose inBuence is again on the increase, has an Iron discipline, and it is to be doubted whether such rules as the one requiring a member to ClOecute immediately every task given him by the chair· man can be maintained in !he long run even in China." See also De Tribune, June 14, 1922, for an account of Sneevliefs return to Holland. 20. ''The Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on July 17th," IntematWnol Press Correrpondence (the newspaper of the Com· munist International, hereafter cited as lnprecor-r), July 28, 1922, p. 470; see also ''The Situation in China and Japan," lnprecorr, Aug. 25, 1922, p. 542. Aemrding to Tang Leang.U (The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution [New YOlk, 19301. p. ISS: see also Carr, Bolshevik Revolutlan, III, 517, note 2). SoeevUet at first advised the Soviet government to maintain its relations with Wu pej·fu as well as to cultivate Sun Yat-sen. H this is troe, he seems to have revised this opinion before the ECCI meeting. According to Harold Isaacs. The Trogedy of the Chinese Reoolution (Stanford, 1951) , p. 62, Sneevliet's report persuaded the Comiritern to abandon the previously fa.vored '1rkutsk line," which favored the warlord Wu Pei.fu; Whiting tends to discount this, however (Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 301, note 4 ) . 21. Maring, "Die revolutioniir·nationalistische Bewegung in Sud·China" (The Revolutionary-Nationalist Movement in South China.), Die Kommuni&ti.!-che Inter· nationa/e (no. 22), 1922, p. SS. 22. Isaacs, Tragedy, p. 62, and Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-.JeJl, p. 57, state

386

Notes, pp. 79-82 that Sneevliet's meeting with the EGCl took place in September 1922, but this does not correspond with the Comintem reports of that pe'"!od and ....,ould mean that his August conference with the Cflinese Communists took place before the Comintem meeting. which seems unlikely. 23. VVS, facing p. 60; a photograph of a dOC'Umcnt to this effect signed by Karl Radek for the Comintem and dated July 24, 1922. Sneevliefs new alias is spelled "PhiUpp" in another document. 24. VVS, facing p. 61 (photograph of the letter), The order to remove the Chinese Communist headquarters to Canton could not then be obeyed. for the Kuomintang had recent1y been forced to Bee that city. 25. vvs, p. 60. 26. Isa:1Cli, Tragedy. p. 61, claims that Snoevliet informed him in 1935 (after he had broken with the Comintem) that ~ had had no specific instructions from the Ioternational and that the majority of the central committee had accepted his proposal. Gh'en Tu-hsi u, CCP secretary-general at the time of the conferen~, claimed that the policy was imposed only through international discipline. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John Fairbank, A Documentary History of ChineS€ Communism (Cambridgc, Mass., 1952) , p. 52; Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise 01 Mao (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 41; Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-scn, p. 59. Chang Kuo-t'ao, who attended the conference, stated he could not remember that Sneevliet had asserted the Intern.1tional's authority operuy, though he may have done so in private (Wilbur and How, Dommenu, pp. 84 and 493, note 25). M. N. Roy, who also served as a Comintem rcpresentative in China during the 19205, states that "the original negative attitude of the Communist leaders was an ultra-leIt stupidity . . . corrected under the guidance of the Communist International," but he does not make it clear whether the "original negative attitude" refers to the CCp's stand at its first or second congress or whether Comintem "guidance" meant pressure or advice. See Roy, Reoolution and Counterrcoolution in Cliinil (Calcutta, 1946), p. 534. The German edition Is equally ambiguous; Revolution und Kontrareoolutian in China (Berlin, 1930), p. 411. '1:7. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, Documentary History, p. 68; Carr, Bolshevik Rioolutforr, Ill, 533; Lcng and Palmer, Sun rat.sen, p. 60; Wilbur and How, Document", p. 83. 28. Interview with Chang Kuo.fao, cited in Wilbur and How, Documenu, pp. 84 and 493, note 25; see also the aceount of the Hangchow conference quoted above. 29. a.'cn Tu-hsiu, cited in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, Documentary History, p. 52. 30. "The Session of thc Executive Committee of the Communist International on July 17th," p. 470. 31. A. B., "De beteekenis van het jongste S,1. congres" (The SigniScance of the Recent SI Congress), HVW, Oct. 12, 1918, p. 23. 32. Some indication that the Comintem endorsed the bloc within before the resolution of January 1923 is found in Sun Yat·sen's letter to Chiang Kai·shek of Nov. 21, 1922, where the KMT leader stated thut "the Ieadel'S in Moscow have advised the Chinese Communbis to join the Kuomintang" Tsung-fi ch'iian"h u (Complete Writings of President Sun), X, Part 2, 924-925, quoted in Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-.ren, p. 60. 33. The decision to transfer Sneevlict was officially made by the ECCI presidium on jan. 10, 1923, The minutCll of this session declared:

Notes, pp. 82-86 Point 7: ,Transfer of Comrade Maring Comrade Maring is named as the third member of the Office of the Eastern ~tiol1 of the Comintem in Vladivostok. Comrade Maring's previous mandate is canceled. The Presidium declares it desirable that Comrade Maring as well as Comrade Voitinsky take part in the next conference of the Chinese Communist Party. The Eastern Section will decide about Comrade Maring's further work. For the Secretariat of the ECCI V. Kolarav

WS, plate facing p. 60; the original version is in Gennan. 34. For the text, see Strotegifa. p. 112; nm1 Whiting, Sooiet Policiet, pp. 240-

24l. 35. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Sneevliet attended the third CCP congress and there pushed hard for fonn.'l1 adoption of the bloc within the KMT, opposing moves to restore some of the party's independence. In Chang's view, the manifesto of the third congress expressed Sneevliet's views, as endorsed by the Comintem ( interview w ith Chang, cited in Wilbur and Ho w, Document", pp. 85, 87). Snccvlict"s attendance at the congress ~ms to acrord with Comintern orders at the time of his tran$l"er (see above, note 33) . 36. Trotsky, The rl!1rcI Internationai after Lenin (New YorK, 1936), p. 223. 37. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 148-151; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 6S-70; HOS, p. 119. The last-named source estimates the membership Joss immediately follOwin g the Section B affair nt hllDdrcds of thousands. 38. See (CII. O. van der Plas), Rapport betrefJencle de IICtltraliseering en henriiding van de reoo/utiollnaire prOp6gancW onder de inileemsche heoolking, In iIe1 bljzonder txm Java en MadDera ( Report Concerning the Neutralization and Combating of Revolutionary Propaganda among the Indigenous Population, Especially That of Java and Madura ) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Welte vreden, 1928, p. 8, hereafter cited as Neutmllseering): Kahin, Nal/olillfiSf1I and Reooll.ltion, pp. 71-72; S. J. Rutgers, Indone8ie. R ef colonlale tiljsteem in de periode tllS-Jen de eerrte en de tweede wercidoorlog ( Indonesia: The Colonial System in the Period betwC('f\ the First and Second World Wars) (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 153, hereafter Indone.ne: Koch, Om de vrijheid, pp. 7l-72. 39. Nerot;a, pointing this out, regretted that the 51 leaders seemed to have no clear Idea which path the movement should tnke: SemallD urged revolutionary political action, Abdul Muis parliamentary political action; Tjokroaminoto seemed to be \caning to a religiolL5 course, and the author of the article (probably Hadji Agus Salim) wanted the 51 to become "a purely political association havin g general leadership oyer variow; labor unions, thus approdmatcly what the SOAP is in the Netherl ands." Nemtfa, Nov. 2, 1918, in lPO, no. 44, 1918, pp. 8-9. 40. Sosrokardono, statemen t on behalf of the CSI in response to SemallD's statement of his poSition at the time of the 1918 51 congress; in Sarekat-l&lom Cangre.s . . . 1918, p. 24. See also Mededeelingen 1918, p. 4; Mededeelingen 1922, p. 8 ; "De agenda van het 5.1. congres" (The Agenda of the 51 Congress), JIVW, Feb. 28, 1921, p . 141. Oetoesall mndla, June 4, 1920, in lPO, no. 23, 1920, pp. 30-31 ; text of the appeal. 42. Ouerzlcllt CS11921, p. 8; Ooerzicht CS11922, p. 5. 43. For discussions of Tjokroaminoto's positkm and the growing influence of the Jogjakarta faction, see Ovenlcht CSI 1921, pp. 2, 5, 64, 67; Ooer::Jcht CS I 1922, pp. 2-3; Neutmliseering, p. 7. Pan-Islamic agitation began in Indonesia

388

Notes, pp. 86-91 during World War I, with the aid of the Turkish consulate-general and money from India. At first it was a movement of the Muslim Indian minority, hut it secured adherents among the Jogjakarta 51 leaders in 1919. See Over:::lcht CSI 1922, p. 3; /IIcdedeelingen 1922, p. 8; Mardeka, June 21, 1920, in lPO, no. 27, 1920, p. 13.

44. Thus Hartogh wrote, in an early reaction to the Section B affair ( HVW. Aug. 16, 1919, p. 403): In a conversation with leading 51 people we expressed our opinion that the . same tactic that is now followed by the ISDV must also be pursued by the 51. In addition to the establishment or promotion of workers' and peasants' unions and cooperatives, particular attention should be given at present to intensive political propaganda, in contrast to the almost exclusively extensive propagandizing which has hitherto been carried out. In place of confu~d, centrifugal groups there must come a strictly disciplined curps of cadres, .which wi1J carry on the struggle for a better society under the slogan "one for all and all for one." One should not a,.o;sume that this organizationru work will be ea,.o;y, that everything will go smoothly just because one desires its success. But it will come aboutl If you just hold on like a bulldog to your work and don't let. go. Then it will come aboutl 4S. "Ter orienteering" (By Way of Orientation ), HVW, Aug. 25, 1920, p. 313, for a statement of principles of a similar nature, see "Bij den zesden jaargang," p. 1. 46. Sri Dio;ooo/o, June 14, 1920, in IPO, no. 25, 1920, p. 11; Boedi Defomo ( Dutch-language edition), Dee. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. SO, 1920, p. S7.

47. See P. B., "Samcnwerking in de vakbeweging" (Cooperation in the Labor Movement), HVW, Dee. 4, 1920, p. 21, for a Conununist conunent on this charncteristie. According to Bergsma, the unions affiliated with the PPKB made very little effort to keep in contact with each other or with the central body, with the result that the federation frequently did not mow when one of lts unions was about to strike. In an earlier article (P. B., "De Vakcentrale," p. 277), Bergsma bemoaned the difficulty of building a stable labor organization in Indonesia and added that the PPKB was having trouble collecting dues from memher unions. In the fnee of these difficulties and Jacking trained leaders, be said, the labor federation could not he expected to accomplish anything noteworthy in its first few yenrs. For the time being, Bergsma held, the organization should roncentrate on building up its existing lUlions on a sound basis and persuading some of the smaller groups to combine into unioflS of signiRcant size. 4B. Mededcclingen 1921, pp. 12-1S, 22: llandelingcn Volksraad, 1920---1921, First Ses..~jo~, pp. 00-97, and Bijlagen, Ond. I, Md. I, Stuk 7, pp. 3--6. 49. See SOCI"05O, "De Indonesische vakbeweging" (The Indonesian Labor Movement), Indonesia, Jubileum-nummer (Leiden, 1938), p. 212: Mardjohan, Api, June B, 1925, p. 2. Suroso was a prominent non-Communist ica{ier of the early Indonesian labor movement; Mardjohan was a PKI labor leader. SO. Neratja, June 14 and IS, 19"20, in IPD, no. 24, 1920, pp. 6-7. The meeting was held in Batavia on June 13; it was sponsored by the pawnshop and postal workers' unions (both CSI ) and led by Surjopranoto, Tjokroaminoto, Hlldji Agw; Salim, and Alimin. Semarang and PPKB representatives were notably absent. for Surjopmnoto demonstratively kept his union out of touch with PPKB headquarter! on the grounds that he did not want it in£l]lTaled by Conununists. SI. The cxpubion of the Conununisls was urged by Sutlln Mohammad Zain

389

Notes, pp. 91-93 in Nerotfo Ouly 29) to make it easier for PPKB unions to negotiate with employers (lPO, no. 3 1, 1920, pp. 5-6); the suggestion was denounced in the same issue by Abdul Muis. Zain was head of the Indonesian teachers' union ( PCHB ) and also },luis' chief ri ... al in the Sarebt Sumatra; probably their quarrel on the issue was influenced by thiJ competition. 52. Qoerzlcltt CSI 1921, p. 6; Ovenicht CSI 1922, p. 4 ; Blumberger, No· ti01lQ//st, p. 135; H. Sutadi, article in Dormo Kondo, Oct.. 10, 1920, in lPO, no. 48, 1920, p. 34; Swjopranoto. article in Sinor Jlinliia, No .... 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, . 1920, pp. 24-25. The executi...e elected by the congress consisted of Semaun (chairman ), SUrjoprnnoto ( ... ice.chainnan), Najoan (~tary), Bergsma (treasurer ) ,,IlJId Hadj i Agm Salim, Tedjomartojo, and Alimin (members). Semaun, Bergsma, and Najoon constituted the Semarang faction. 53. Ovcn;lcirt CSl 1921, pp. 6-8; Ooor.:icllt CSI 1922, pp. 4-5; Semaoen, "Ondisciplinair en on· Kommunistisch" (Undisci plined and un-Communist) . HVW, Dec. 4, 1920, p. 33; Neratlo, Aug. 12, 1920, in lPO, no. 33, 1920, p. 1; Oetoe.ron HiOOia, Aug. 12, 1920, in lPO , no. 33, 1920, p. 15; Oetoe.ran 1lind/a, Au g. 25, 1920, in l PO, no. 34, 1920, p. 17; Sinor HlOOia, No .... 3, 1920, in lPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 2.5-28; Ncrot;o, Dec. 7, 1920, in lPO, no. 50, 1920, p, 4; HorukUngcn V olk.rrood, 1 92~2 1 . Second $ession, BiJ1agen, Dnd. I , Stuk Sa, pp. 2-3. 54. Baars had wan ted the SI to sponsor a sugar 5trike in 1919; he cited hill disgust at Tjokroammoto's refusal as the immediate reason for his decision to lea ...e the Indies ( Baars, "Waarom ik heenga," p. 189). Furious at the attack by Baars, who.se domineering he had long resented, Semaun replied that he did not consider Commun ism to require irresponsible leadership and concluded: "I do not intend to discuss this matter any further, no matter wha t you say to ooerolOe me'" Semaun, "Ondiseiplinair en on-Kommunistisch," p. 33. Accordiing to Surjopranoto, Bergsma and Van Burink told him that Semaun's handling of the PFB 5trike was not appro\'ed of by the p... rty; Sinar moo/a, Nov. 3, 1920, in lPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 26-27. 55. At the height of Sur;opranoto's influence, the PFB claimed 31,000 members and the PKT and PK80--the workers' and peasants' organiutioru inherited by him from Scmar.mg-another 33,000. By 1922 the PFB wuld claim only 400 ad herents, and the PKT and PKBO had vanished entirely. Sinor Hfndia, Oct. 13, 1921. in l PO, no. 42, 1921, p. 134 ; Soeroso, " De Indonesisehe vakbeweging," pp. 2 11-213; Over=/cht CS I 1922, p. 6. 56. OlNlfzicht CS I 1921, p. 12; OlNlrz,icht CSI 1922, p . 7; Oetouan Hindia, Sept. 10, 1920, in Iro, no. 37, 1920, p. 16; Oetoe$Q" Hfndia, Sept. 22, 1920, in I PO, no. 3D, 19-20, p . 18; Neratlo, Oct. 19, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, pp. 5-6. Tjokroaminoto further indica ted his desire to avoid a split by publishing a declaration in the name of the CSl calling on all SI branches to concentrate their efforts on the struggle against capitalism (Odoesan Hlndla, Sept. 25, 1920, in lPO, no. 39, 1920, pp. 18-19 ). 57. The art icles were published in Sinor Hlndia, Oct. 6, 7, and g, 1920, in Iro, no, 41, 1920, pp. 7- 11 ; according to Darsono, he released them speci.6cally for the edification of delegates gathering for the SI congress. He also tried to run them in Soeara RIl'iol , but th is Surnbaja-based PKI faumal was printed by workers organized by the anti-Communist labor leader Jahja; they struck the paper, which was forced to movc to Semarang in orde r to resume pubucation. 58. Commenting on Darsono's revelations for the Dutch CommWlist newspaper, Baars c.>:pressed a discourngement that seemed to refer to more than just Tjolrrouminoto's SI :

Notes, pp. 93-94 Yes, when we 'Vestem revolutionaries become involved in the movement hefl' we are often brought to the brink of despair by this absolute lack of a senJ;e. of solidarity, which means that nearly every native who gets a few pennies belongm~ to the movement in his hands uses the money for his own benellt. And the UIllvernility of this evil is terrifying. I remain of the opinion that it is in fa?t that I~w,

ideal-less nationalism, which spewlates on the eo,".rscSt of human feelings, whIch has given rise to this kind of movement. In any case, it .....111 be $(Ime time before a core has been formed here of people who-like the Russian Communists-voluntarily take all the heavy and responsible work upon themselves, without thought of any reward. De Tribune, Jan. 7, 1921, p. 1. For l'Omments on Da~no's charges, see "Bij den zesden jaargang," p. 1; Ooer.;/cht CSI 1921, pp. 12-13; Ooenicht CSI 1922, PI" 7-8; Blumberger, Nationnlist, pp. 6S-70. 59. Darsono was accused by the Jogjakarta faction of haVing broken the pa.ct made at the time of the 1917 SI congress. Technically he had not, since his and Semaun's promise applied speciGcaUy to attacks on Abdul Muis; moreover, Darsono had discu~d his charges with Tjokroaminoto before publishing them; Ooonicllt CSI 1922, p. 9. 60. Darsono's original criticisms were leveled at Tjokroaminoto, Brotosuhardjo (accused of embezzling SI funds ), and Alimin and Musso (accused of accepting Tjokroaminoto's leadership unquestioningly) . Later-apparently in an attempt to mollify the Jogjaknrta leaders-Darsono described Tjokroaminoto's weakness as a reliance on dishonest characters like Brotosuhardjo and not on upright and selfsacrlScing associates like Salim and Surjoprunoto; Darsono, article in Dcloeum H/ndia, Oct. 23, 1920, in lPG, no. 44, 1920, p. 19. 61. Ncmt;a, Oct. 11, 1920, In lPO, 00. 41, 1920, p. 5; Oetoruan lfinditJ, Oct. 15, 1920, In IPO, no. 42, 1920, p. 11. By this time a number of Outer Island delegates had already arrived; moves were made to hold a rump congress under Surjopranoto (who may have seen some promise in the situation to replace Tjokroaminoto). but they were quickly abandoned; see Oetoesan HinditJ, Oct. 19 and 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, p. 13, and no. 43, 1920, p. 18. 62. Oetoesan llinditJ took an increasingly neutral attitude in the dispute over Darsono's criticisms. In November its acting editor, Partondo, resigned. Although he was not a PKI member at the time, hc was immediately invited by that party to edit Soeara Ra'iat; Detacaoo Hindia, Nov. 11 , 1920, in lPG, no. 46, 1920, p. 13; Sueara Ra'iat, Nov. 16/30 1920, in lPO, no. 47,1920, pp. 28-29. By January 1921 the condition of the Surabaja 51 org;mization was such that it had to cancel its alUlual conference because too few members appeared; OelocwrI Hirldia, Jarl. 22, 1921, in IPD, no. 4, 1921, pp. 22-24. 63. The transfer of CSI headquarler~ was announced in Oetoesarl lliruJitJ, Oct. 16, 1920; see IPO, no. 42, 1920, pp. 11-12. On Oct. 22, T;okroaminoto and Surjopranoto jointly confinncd the move; C51 aHairs were placed in the hands of an executive consisting of Tjohoaminoto (chairman), Surjopranoto (vice-chairman), Hadji Agus Salim (secretary-treasurer), and Alimin (commissioner). All reguJar busines.o; would be handled by the vice-chainnan and all financial affairs by the secretary; the chainnan would thus be left free to mal:e propaganda for the SI and to engage in "overcoming obstacles." Oetoeaan HiruiitJ, Oct. 23, 1920, in [PO, no. 43, 1920, p. 18: Sinnr Hlrnila, Nov. 3, 1920, in [PO, no. 45, 1920, pp. IS-20. M. For examples of these argnments, see Neratia, Oct. 19, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, pp. 5--6 (Tjokroaminoto ); Oetoesan Hiruiia, Oct. 16, 1920, in IPQ, no.

391

Notes. pp. 94-96 42, 1920, pp. 11- 12; Oetoesan lIIndw, Oct. 25, 1920, in IPO, no. 43, 1920, pp.

18-19 (Surjoptanoto ); Detoe,a" Hlndw, Oct. 23, 1920, in lPG, DO. 44, 1920, pp. ( Darsono ) and 20--23 (Reksodiputro ): Sinor Hindio. Oct. 23 and Nov. 3, 1920, in lP~, no. 45, 1920, pp. B-12 (criticisms of and defense by Darwno ). 65. Mededeelingell 1921, pp. 10-12: Soeroso, "De Indonesische vakbeweging." pp. 211-212: Koch. Vetantwoording. pp. 96-97. The Resident of Semamng prevented the failure of the printen' strike by intervening with employers. 66. For an account of the VSTP effort in 1920, see Mededeelingen 1921, pp. 16-18. The government, as is st.1tcd in this report, considered the union's deffillllm justified and the employers' standpoint unreasonable. For the attitude of Semaun and the VSTP executive toward rail strike agitation, see Si Tetap (the VSTP fournaI), MaylJune 1920, in lPO, no. 28, 1920, pp. 1-3: Si Tetop AugusU September 1920, in lPO, no. 46, 1920, pp. 16-17; Sioor Hindia, Sept. 7, 19'20, in IPO, no. 37, 1920, p. 10; Sinor Hlndia, Oct. 14, 1920, in IPO, no. 43, 1920, pp. 11-12. In a general statemen t of hU attitude toward labor organization (Pcf4.1lUln, May 4, 1920, in IPO, no. 22, 19-20, p. I ), Semaun argued that strikes should not be called without adequate organizational and Gnancial preparation and should be undertaken, at th is stage of Indonesia's development. only for ecooomie demands. ff7. See Oetoe.tan Hindia, Dec. 9, 1920, in IPO, no. SO, 1920, pp. 21-22; 1&lllm Bef"gerak, Dec. 10, 1920, in lPO, no. 51, 1920, p. 51 ; Sil1llr Hindia, Dec. 21 and 22, 1920, in IPO, no. 52, 1920, pp. 8-9; Pemberitll C.S.I., Jan. 24, 1921, in IPO, no. 15, 19-21, pp. 115-116; Soeara Ra'jat, Jan. 16/31, 1921, and Sinar H/ndill, Feb. 12, 1921, in IPO, no. 7, 1921, pp. 18-19, 33; " Moskow en bet PanIslamisme" ( Moscow and Pan-Islamism), HVW, Feb. 8, 1921 , p. 13; Sil1llf H/ndia, Feb. 14, 1921, In IPO, no. 8, U121, pp. 6-8; Soeara Ra';at, Feb. 16/28, 1921, in lPO, no. 11, 192 1, p. 22; Sll1llr Hindia, June 2, 1921, in lPO, no. 23, 1921, p. 459; and Sinar Hinelia, July 25, 1921, in IPO, no. 31, 1921, p. 219, for attacks on the Lenin theses and Conununist denials of being anti-Islamic. 68. Oetoe.wn Ilindill, Oct. 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 44,1920, pp. 21-23 ( Rebodiputro, for the Jogjakarta faction of the PPKB ); Sinar IIindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in lPO, DO. 45, 1920, pp. 22-28 ( Surjopranolo, announcing the prB standJXlint); Sino r Ilindlll, Nov. 9, 1920, in lPO, no. 46, 1920, pp. 9-11 (reply by SemaUD and Berg.'\I1la for the PPKB ); Oetoe.tan Hindia,.Dec. 9, 1920, in IPO, no. SO, 1920, pp. 21-22 (Tjihosubeno, for the PPPB ). 69. NetJlraliseering, p. 8; Koch, Om de Clrllheid, pp. 71-72; Overzicllt CSI 1921, pp. IS, 18; Ooorzkllt CSI 1922, p. 9. 1be Ooor::icllt for 1921 WIIS signed by the SOCiologist B. F. O. Schrieke; from its style an d approach the Hr22 report appears also to have been written by him. 70. Bergsma and Scmaun issued a ~tatemeDt that at~cked the CSt but denied that the PKI had authorized Darsono's articles; Sinor Hind/a, Nov. 11, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 9-11 . In his report to the First Congresll of th e Toilers of the Far East in early 1922. Semaun declared that Dursono had honestly wished to purge the movement of C'Onupt elements but that his action was ill advised and disrupted Communist relations with the SI lind weakened the movement as a whole; Semaun, " lndiiskoe dvizhenie v Niderlandskoi Indii" (11Ie Indies Movement in the Netherlands Indies ), Peroyi ,"trA, p. 275. Whether or not Darsono consulted with hiol colleagues, it seems probable thllt the attack was hi$ own inspiration and that, as he claimed, he had had it in mind for some time. All·out assaults were quite in his political style, and he had made simUal but thinly 1I~... 20

392

Notes, pp. 96-98 veiled charges immediately on his release from prison the previous June: Sina r llindia, June 21, 1920, and OcIOe1fJrl Hindia, June 28, 1920, in IPO, nos. 25 and 26, 1920, pp. 16, 40-43. 71. Socara Ru'ial, Oct. 16/30, 1920 (issued in November), in lP~, no. 47, 1920, pp. 28-29; 5inar Hindia, Nov. 17, 18, 23 and Dec. 14, 1920, in l"eO, no. 47, 1920, pp. 12-15; no. 48, 1920, p. 9; no. 50, 1920, pp. 8-9: 13. Darsono had been an editor of both papers before h4 arrest. See also Over::icht CSI 1921, p. 9. 72. Oper::icht CSI 1922; p. 11 ; HVW, Jan. 21, 1921, pp. 4, 6; P. B., "De Communiste" en de Vakcentrale," p. 4. 73. Oetocsan Hindia, Mar. 12, 1921; point 13 of the declaration. On the subject of international relations, it read as follows; '''The Sarekat Islam is convinced that these aims are in acoordance with the goals of the majority of popular movements and workers aU over the world. Therefore the Sarekat Islam desires cooperation with the international people's movement which seeks these goals for all mankind, in accordance with the precepts of Islam. In so doing the Sarekat Islam, bearing in mind the character of the world and the teachings of religion, refuses to become dependent on any part of the international movement, but jealously guards against all othen its independence and the purity of its goals" (points 15 and 16). 74. This was taken care of at a dosed meeting held on the Srst day of the congress, to the annoyance of many Indonesian intellectuals, who wanted the charges discussed openly; Ovenicht CSI 1922, pp. 12-13. 75. Ooerzicht CS11921, p. 22; Ooenicht CS11922, p. 13. There seem.~ to have been some feeling in the PKI that the party discipline motion on the congress agenda aimed not at direct e:o:pulsion of the Communists but at stricter control over factional activity. Thus Darsono, writing a few days before the congress opened, opined that the motion was a response to his attacks on Tjokroaminoto and presaged a demand that there be no open criticism of the movement's leadership. In principle. he declared, the PK] had no objection to such a requirement : 'We Communists are not afraid of such discipline. since we already po.~sess something like a discipline ourselves. However. we will always speak out whenever that discipline is used for dubious purposes." Darsono, "Partijdi~cipJine" (Party Discipline), HVW. Feb. 28, 1921, p. 3. 78. Point 11 of the declamtion of principles, as quoted in De Tribune, May 7, 1921. The CPH newspaper commented: "A cheering sign . . . is the declaration of principles adopted by the Sarekat Islam at its recent congress. . . . From the statement now lying before us it appe:m . . . that they have proclaimed that Islam is not in conflict with Communism." 77. Oetocsan Hlndia. Mar. 18, 1921, in lPO, no. 12, 1921, pp. 15-16. The other associations in which mcmbeahip might be prohibited were Budi Utomo, Sarekat Hindia, ISDP, Pamndan, Sarekat Sumatera, Sareht Ambon, Sarekat Menado, ·PEB, and NIVB. For further accounts of the March 19:21 con~ss, sec Ovenfcht CSI 1921, pp. 19-31; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 12-13; "Kongresmaund" (Congress Month ), HVW, Mar. 18, 19:21, pp. 2-3; Budisutjilro, Ver$lag Sarekat-I$lam Semarang dalam Tahoen 1922 (Report of the Semarang 51 for 1922) (n.p., n.d.), p. 2; Rutgers, l nt:ionesiii, pp. 153-154; Blumberger, Natioooilst, pp. 71-72; B1umberger, Communi.rl, pp. 28-29; Eyquem, "Am: Indes Neerlandaises," pp. 71-72, 78. OrlocsaTJ Hlndia, Feb, 22 and 23, 1921, in lPO, no. 9, 1921, pp. 20-26; Pemberita CSI, Jan. 17, 19, 2 1, in lPO, no. 9, 1921, p. 55; Sinn, Hind/a, Feb. 21, 1921 , in IPO, no. 9, 1921, pp. 10-11 ; Sinnr Hindia, Mar. 1, 2, and 3, 1921 , in

393

Notes, pp. 98-102 IPO, no. 10, 1921 . PI' 10, 11-12; Oetoesan lIindia, Mar. 2, 1921, in lPO, no. 10, 1921, pp. 18-19; Sirwr Hindw, Mar. 7, 1921, in lPO, no. 11, 1921, pp. 5-6; SOtUJra Boemipoeterll, Mar. I , 1921, in lPO, no. 16, 1921, p. 204. 79. "De agenda van het S.l. congres" ( The Agenda of the 51 Congress), HVW, Fcb. 28, 192 1, p. 2. 80. Ooerzicht CST 1921, pp. 9, 21, 23-26, 28-30; De Lecomotlef, Mar. 7 and B, 1921.

81. Ooerzicht CSI 1921, p. 21, 65. B2. HVW, Jan. 21, 1921, p. 3. 83. "Kongresmaand," p. 3. Similady, the editor.; of Sinor HindU! apologized on Mar. 9 for an attack on the CSJ published two days earlier. It had been printed before they had leamed the results of the COOgtei5, they explained; henceforth the papds attitude toward the CSI would be different. lPO, no. 11, 1921, p. 8. 84. "Kongresm.land," pp. 2-3; P. 8., "De Communisten en de Vakoenb'ale," p. 4; Sinar Hlndia, Mar. 9, 1921, in IPO, no. 11, 1921, p. 8 (Sudibio); Sinor Hindw, Mar. 12, 1921 , in lPO, no. 12, 1921, pp. 32--33 (5emaun); Oetoo$On Hlndia, Mar. 24, 1921, in lPO, no. 13, 1921, 17-19; Overzicht CSI 1921 , pp. 21, 32. 85. Ovenichl CSI 1921, pp. 22-2.3; Oetoeson Hindia, Feb. 23, 1921, in lPO, no. 9, 1921, p. 27. 86. For these arguments, and the maneuvering in some SI locals over the party discipline issue, see Ovenicht CSI 1921, PI" 32-35, 51, SS, 64; and alw Overrlchl CSI 1922, p. 3; Blumberger, Natlonolkt, p. 73. Salim developed most of these lines of attack; as PFB secretary be had presented a nwnber o( them at il:5 January 1921 congress; see HVW, Jan. 21, 1921, p. 6, and P. B., "De Communisten en de Vakcentrale," p. 4. . tn. Soeroso, "De Indonesische vakbeweging." p. 213. BB. Neratla, June 23, 1921, in lPO, no. 26, 1921 , p. 565. l1tis $DUrce states that fifteen labor group~ ""ere represented at the cooference and Usts them as the unions of dockworilers, metal workers, printers, employees of the DeHt Petroleum and Lindeteves companies, the coordinating council of Semarang SI unions ( Vakgroep S.I. Semarang), railroad workers and forestry personnel (aU centered in and loyal to Semarang); the drivers' and tailors' unions (with headquarters in Jogjakarta but loyal to Semarang); the neutral unions of public works cmployees, teacher training school employees, and teachers; and the PPPB and PFB. HVW, June 2~, 1921, p. 7, states that there were seventeen unions present but does not list them. The meeting took place in Jogjakartn on June 18 and 19; for il:5 an· nouncement and agenda, see OetOOMn Hindill, May 31, 1921, in lPO, no. 22, 1921, PI" 452-453. 89. Nerat;a, June 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 565-569; see also Overzicht CSI 1921, PI" 34-35; HVW, June 20, 1921, p. 7; P. B., "De c:onB.ict in de vakbeweging" (The Conflict in the Labor Movement ), IJVW, July 20, 1921, p. 1. The third Semarang representative on the PPKB executive, Najoan, was in prison at the time. 90. For the manifesto of the RVe, see Sinar Hlndill, June 25, 1921, in lPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 577-579; (or the manifesto issued by the Jogjakarta PPKB executive after the conference, see Boedi Octomo, June 22, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 580-581. The RVe executive consisted at the outset of Semann (Vakgroep S. I. 5emarang, chairman), Budisutjitrn (forestry workers, secretary), Bergsma (VSTP, treasurer), Wigno (VIPBOW, member; rep1aced by Tan Malaka), Sukindar (dockworkers, member), Sugeng (printen, memberl, and

394

Notes, l)P' 102-105 Najoan ( teamsters, member). The PPim was reconstituted at the PPPB congress of July 3 and placed under the temporary leadership of the pawnshop worker.;' union ( ehainnan, Tjokroaminolo; vice-cliainnan, Muis); Oetoesan Hirniia, July 9, 1921, in lPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 67-68. Statistics on membership of unions belonging 10 the PPKB and RVC are given for various years in the appendix to Semaun's report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East; "Indiiskoe dvizhenie," pp. 283-285. Semaun warned in his report (p. 254 ) that the 6gu res were at best estimates, since no real statistics existed for the Indonesian organizations. One can only add that his statistics correspond with those usually claimed at the time. According to his estimates, the uuited PPKB contained at the height of its strength in 1920 about 60,000 Indo.nesians, 75 Indies Chinese, and 150 persons of European status. In 1921 the RVC had about 27,000 Indonesians, 75 Chinese, and 100 Europeans; all the Europeans were in the VSTP. The 1921 postschism PPKB cont.1ined 25,000 Indonesians, 10 Chinese, and no Europeans. All un ions of both groups, except the VSTP, declined markedly in membership between 1920 and 1921. 91. See, for example, Sveura Ru';ut, Mar. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 13, 1921, pp. 26-27, 51 Tetup, Mar. 31, 1921, in lPO, no. 16, 1921, p. 201; Sinar Hlndia, Apr. 18, 1921, in IPO, no. 17, 1921, pp. 176-177; Sinar Hindia, May 17, 1921, in IPO , no. 21, 1921, p. 361. 92. For the announcement of the meeting and its agenda, see Oetve.!'an Hindia, July 27 and Aug. 8, 1921, in IPO, nos. 31 and 33, 1921 , pp. 218, 313-3 14. 93. For before and after views of T;olcmaminoto by Semarang, .see Sinar Hindia, Aug. 4, 11, 31 and Oct. 3, 1921, in IPO, nos. 32, 33, 41, 1921, pp. 266267,322-323,98; Soeara Ra'jat, Aug. 16 and 31 and Sept. 16, 1921, in IPO, DOS. 34,37,39,1921, pp. 400, 644, 34. 94. Overzicht CS I 1921, p. 48. According to this account, Salim had the congress 50 well in hand that he was able to put over his opinion even on matters where the meeting generally disagreed with him. See also the comment on the congress in De Loromo tief, Oct. 20, 1921. "nle following members of the central SI executive attended the Surnbaja meeting; , Abdul Muis, Hadji Agus Salim, Sernaun, R. Wiradimadja, Sjahbuddin Latief, and, on the second day, Surjopranoto. . 95. Ooot1.icht CSI 1921, pp. SO, 55; for accounts of the SI congress, pp. 44-57. See also Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in lPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 128-131 (the same version was given in Sinar llindia; see pp. 136-137 ); Blumberger, Natwnalm, p. 73; Blumberger, Communist, p. 29; De Locomotie/, Oct. 20, 1921; Malaka, Toendaek kepada Kekoeasaan, tetapi tidak Taendoek kepatk Kebenaran (A Step toward Might but Not a Step toward Right) (Berlin, 1922), p. 37, hereafter Taendvek.

CHAPTER VI 1. Oetaesan Hlndia, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in IPO , no. 42, 1921, pp. 130--131 ; Overzic1zt CSI 1921, pp. 56-57. Another vote against the party discipline measure was entered telegraphically by Gunawan, head of the Bandung SI; it was disallowed by the congress officials, however. The Semarang faction's newspaper commented that there was 500le doubt whether the Sukabumi SI would agree with the decision of its representative, 5ardjono, to break with the CSI; Sinar H/nd/o, Oct. 29, 1921, in lPO, no. 44, 1921, p. 242. 2. Semaun provided the follOWing 6gures on ISDV I PK! membership in his

395

Notes, pp. 105-112 report to the Fin;t Congress of the Toilers of the Fat East (Semallo, " lndHskoe dvizhenic," p. 283):

Europeam

1915 1919 1920 1921

OUnescand Eunuians

5

3 300

4 3

250 200

0

100 25 IS

5

Iodolle5laru

3, Neratla, Oct. 31-Nov. 5, 1921, in lPO. no. 45, 1921, p. 28l. 4. Soeara Ra';at, Nov. I, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 386, editorial by Budisutjitro. After the March 1921 51 congress Buoolltjitru had been one of the PKI leaders who argued for party discipline with an exception for PKI members. 5. Malala, Toendoek, p. 37. 6. MaJab, Toendoek, p. 37. 1. Mededcelingen 1922, pp. 1-7, 11- 12; Sinor HlnditJ, Nov. 19, 1921, in I ro, no", 47, 19'21, p. 370. See also Koch, Om de orllheid, p. 67; BJumberger, Nat/ooolirt, p. 111. For argumenu on the oveniding need for greater Indonesian unity. see Oetoesan llindw, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in lPO, no. 42, 1921, p. 124; DOmloKondo, Nov. 19, 1921, in l PO, no. 49, 1921. pp. 454-455; Sioor lIindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in lPO, no. 43, 1921, p. 240; Sirwr Hindia, Nov. 11, 192~, in 1PO, no. 41, 1921, p. 370. 8. Stimulating analy5a'!l of the change from Ethical to conservative Dutch colonial policy m:ly be found in Brouwer, De lioudlng. pp. 86-108; and Van NieI, Emergence, pp. 185-196,201-201. 9. The parliamentary debate on the 1925 Indies budget brought out the nrgu ments for and against r ock's budget-cutting and tax policies wi th particular sharpness; for a summary and the gove rnment's reply, .see ~Bcgrooting van Nederlandsch.l ndiC voor 1925" (Budget for the Netherlands Indie!; for 1925) , Biiwgen van lIel oorswg der handelingcn oan de Ttl!(!Cde Kamer Jet Staten· Ccnerool, 19-24-19"..5, Bipage B, pp. 195-199, hereafter lkgrooting 192ft It was estimated that at that tim e an Indonesian family on Java with the Income of fl25 a year paid f17 to /18 in taxes. . 10. Brouwer, Dc houding, pp. 102-103, citing charges made by Idenburg in the upper house of parliament. 11. Salim, together with Rivai of the Sarekat Hindia, led the Indonesian attack on the 1922 budget in the Volkstaad; for their arguments as presented to the Indonesian public, see Ncrm;a, Oct. 31-Dec. 3, 192 1, in IPO, nos. 44-49, 19-21, pp. 278-279, 316-319, 357-358, 442-444. 12. For Indies press accounts of the autonomy committee, see De Indl$che Gidr, XLIV (1922), 290-292, J50.-.353, 354-355 (denial by the committee's secretary of Communist leanings ), and 431-436. Fock's action against the participation of the regents was critlciud in pnrliament; see Handelingen 2e Kamer. 1921-1922, pp. 2760-2762 ( interpellation by Mnrchant ). General accounts of the efforts on behaU of constitutional revision and au tonom y may be found in Brouwer, De houding. pp. 86-91, and Koch, Verllntwoordlng. pp. 116-125. 13. Suwardi Surjaningrat, in Panggoegah, Apr. I , 1922, in l PO, no. 19, 192", pp. 230-231. For the socialists' growing reservations on autonomy and IIssociationism, see Van def lee, De S.DA.P., pp. 56--57, 81. For the text of the national unitr program, see De Indisclw Gid.r. XLIV (1922) , 87-88; for Indies Dutch

396

Notes, pp. 112-115 press reactions to the All-Indies congress, see De lndlsc;he Gids, XUV (1922), 816-820. 14. Mededeellngen 1922, p. 3. 15. In the opinion of B. F. O. Schrieke, the impact of the Indian movement on the political thought of the Indonesian elite was second only to that rnade by the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904; Overzjcht CSI 1921, p. 64. For some Indonesian arguments urging emu1ation of the Congress, see Oc1oesan Hindla, Feh. 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 9, 1921 , p. 27: DamlO Kondo, Nov. 12, 1921, in IPO, DO. 47, 1921, pp. 375--376: Benlh MeTdeka, Nov. 5-15, 1921, in IPO, DO. 47, 1921. p. 379; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 21-26, 1921, in IPO, no. 48, 1921 , pp. 41G-411; Dartllo Komia, Nov. 19, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, p. 455; Soca ra Ra'iat, Dec. 1, 1921, in lPO, no. 52, 1921, p. 573: I&lam Bergerak, Feb. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 17, 1922, p. 159; Socara Ra'iat, May 16, 1922, in IPO, no. 23, 1922, p. 395; Matahari, Aug. 3, 1922, in lPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 241 ; Sinar Hind/a, Dee. 3, 1923, in lPO, no. SO, 1923, p. 525. .16. For a description of the PPKB meeting, see O oerzicht CSI 1921, pp. 5S62: for a Communist appeal for a new and united labor federation , see Sinor Hlndia, Oct. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 44, 1921, p. 240. 17. In September 1921 the Bandung PPPB elected Gunawan its chairman and 5ugono vice-chairman; they were heads of that city's pro-Semarang 51 branch. Sugono had repeatedly warned the meeting that he was a Communist and that it would not be proper to elect him, but he was chosen anyway. Ncrat;u, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921 , pp. 53-56. 18. Socaru Ru'iat, Nov. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383: Sinnr Hindia. Nov. 21-26, 1921, in IPO, no. 48, 1921, p. 410. 19. De Locomotlcf, Dec. 27, 1921. One of the CSt delegates was Abdul Muis. Acwrding to Tan Malab, he and Sernaun had gotten Muis' promise to attend the Oct-ooor SI congress; they had also gotten Salim's promise, but he did not tum up. Malaka, Tocndoek, p. 37. 20. De Locotllotief, Dec. 27, 1921. 21. De Locomot/ef, Dec. 27, 1921. In Toendock (P(l. 37-42) Tan Malaka described his further arguments for reronciliation: (1 ) Indonesian unity was necessary in order to defend the country in case of war between the grea t powers in the Paclllc; (2) the schism wor"ed in the interests of Dutch divide_and_ruIe strategy; (3) the majority of CSI members were genuine revolutionaries and the disagreement was not on grounds of principle. 22. Tan Malaka, Dari Pendiam ke Pend/ara (Bu"it Tinggi, n.d. ), I, 74: hereafter cited as DP I. The increased tendency toward reconciliatiOl\ is conBnned in Mcdedeelingcn 1922 (p. 17) and in Overzicht CSI 1921 (p. 66); the latter report credits the appeal to the example of the Indian National Congress as the argument that persuaded the CSI leaders to agree to reconsider a common effort. 23. Bluroberger, Nat/ooollst, p. 112: Malab, DP I, p. 74; Malab, Toendock, p. 42; De Locot1lntief, Dec. 27, 1921. 24. De Loromotief, Dee. 27, 1921 : Malaka, Tocndoek, p. 42: Malaka, DP I, p. 75. 25. Malaka, Toendock, p. 42. 26. De Loromotief, Dec. 27, 1921 : Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 62: Mededeelingen 1922, p. 17. 27. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 17: De Lecomotief, Dec. 27, 1921 ; Malab, Tocrnloek, pp. 22, 27; Malaka, DP 1, p. 78. The telegram was signed not only by the Communist grou(l$ but also by the CSJ, the SI locals, and tIm PI'KB. The

3ff1

Notes, pp. 115-119 Indies governmen t, which strongly disapproved of the Indian Congress, utilized this telegram ItS a rcll50ll [or banishing Tan Malaka. For further praise by Tan Malaka for the Congress and Gandhi, see Malam, "Mijn verbanning" ( My Exile), De Tribune, May 20, 1922. 28. Sinar Hindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in 11'0, no. 43, 1921, p. 24.2; Soeara &';at, Nov. I , 1921 , in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 386; 5ioor Hind/a, Nov. 7, 1921, In IPO, no. 46, 1921, p. 328; Sinar Hindla, Nov. 5, 1921, in lPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 366; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 28-Occ. J, 1921, in 11'0, no. 49, 1921, p. 451; De Locomotief. Feb. 21 , 1922. 29. Malaka, Toendock, p. 20. 30. 51 V, p. 377, col. h. 31. For examples, see SiOOf mndio, Nov. 21, 1921, in 1PO, no. 48, 1921, p. 409, SfMT llindia, Nov. 28-Dcc. 3, 1921 , in IPO, no. 49, 1921, p. 447; Soeura lUJ'fat. Oct. 16, 1921, in IPO, no. 43, 1921, p . 256; and Sinor Hfndlo, Dec. 5-10, 1921, in lPO , no. 50, 192 1, pp. 487-488. 32. Malab, Toendoek, p . 43. Malaka was arrested Il week before he was scheduled to talk 33. The Volksraad electoral system was changed in 1923; Indonesian members, instead of being selected by a college composed of regency and town councils from the entire colony, were chosen separately by twelve districts, in which the electors were mcmbers of the regency, and town councils in that district. The proponents of participation mostly represented unit.'! outside Semarnng; see De Looomolief, Dec. 2:1, 1921. 34. Malaka states in his autobiography that he was much surprised by the appointment (DP I, p. 74 ). This seems undue modesty, however, lor it is clear that he had been considered Semaun's heir ever since October, when Semaun ldt the Indies; he had chaired the December part y congress in Scmaun's place. This view is supported by Semaun, "Bung Tan" ( Brother Tan) , PeTingatan SewindlJ HiIIlngn;a Tan lila/aka, 8apak Murba dan Rnpublik Indone8ia ( In Commemoration of Eight Years Since the Disappearance of Tan Malaka, Father of the Mwba [Party] and the Indonesian Republic ) ( Djnkarta, 1957 ) , pp. 23-24. hereafter cited as Penngawn. 35. Malab was born in 1897, according to the chronology of his liIe givcn in Peringatan ( p . . 29); in 1894 aC'COrding to another biogrnphicaJ sketch (Tamar Djaja, PU.Jaka I ndonesia [Indonesia's Heritagel, Bandung, 1951, p. 208) ; and in 1893, aC'COrding to Mohanunad Dimyati (Sediarah Perdjuangan IndonesitJ [History of the Indonesian Struggle] Djakart.1, 1951 , p. 122 ). 36. Malab, DP I , p . 21; Peringatan. p. 29; Tamar D;aja, PlUtJka , p. 209. 37. Hindla Poetra, September/ October 1916, inside back cover. This organization latcr became the radica1 nationalist Pcrhimpunan Indonesia, but at that time it was nonpolitica1. 38. Malaka, DP I , pp. 35-36. Thc account of Malalca's life until 1921 is taken, except as noted, from DP I, pp. 24-88. 39. Malaka, DP I, pp. 68-89; Semaun, "Bung Tan," p. 24. 40. Malaka, DP I, 66, 70; Semaun, " Bung Tan," p . 24. 41. r-.lalaka, DP I, 67. 42. The Semarang school began with 80 students and had ISO by February 1922; short1y after its eo;tablishment a branch was begun in Salatiga with 65 pupils and in Bandung 'w ith 200; Malab, Toendoek, p. 2.3, and Mededeelingen 1922, p. 7. Tan Mab ka described the aims and program or the schools in a pamphlet, S. I . Scnwfang dan Ondcrwi;z (The Semarang 51 and Education)

398

Notes, pp. 119-120 (Semarang. November 1921), and in a series of articles published in the Dutch Communist Tribune, May 29---31, 1922.

43. "Parlemen atau Sovjet?" (Parliament or Soviet?) appeared in SoearQ Ra'iat, June I-Aug. 16, 1921, in lPO, nos. 29, 33, 34, 1921, pp. 134, 341-342, 400-401; it also WIls published by the PKI executive as It pamphlet under the same title (Semarang. 1921) . 44. MaJaka, DP I, 74; Perlngatan, p. 30. 45. Semaun, "Bung Tan," pp. 23-24. The essentially introvert nature of PKI activity during the period before Malaka assumed office is remarked in McdedeeUngen 1922 (p. 18). That Scmaun intended it to remain that way seems indicated by his report to the First CongreS/l of the Toilers of the Far East, in which he asserted that the depres.~ion had weakened the labor movement without really increasing revolutionary fennent, inasmuch 35 those who were without work in the cities could usually find a livelihood by returning to the villages. "At

present, therefore, we are experiencing a period of 're!>1:' and 'internal concentration on study.' Both the leaders and rank-and-file workers are serious1y engaged in preparation for future activities, the study of international questions, etc." (Semaun, '1ndiiskoe dvizhenie," p, 276). In this report Semaun stressed the importance of the Semarang-sponsored schools and hoped the party wowd soon start a training seminar to provide teachers for a nationwide Communist ~bool system (p. 274). It was such activity, he claimed (interview, 1959 ), on which he had hoped Tan Malaka would concentrate. We might note that the use of ~hools as an idcologiUlI instnunent was not uncommon in Indonesia in the 1920s; the most sUcalSsful were Suwardi Surjaningrat's Taman Siswa schools, which avoided politics hut stressed cultural nationalism. 46. Malab, Toendoek, p. 33. 47. The debate centered about Sneevliet's expulsion; the Dutch party was not only concerned with the issue per se but wanted to support Sneevliet's efforts to get pennission to return to the Indies. For the major arguments, sec lIandelingen 2c Kamer, 1918--1919, p. 2047 (Albania) ; 1919-1920, pp. 1148--1149 (Marchant), 1163 (l\linister de GraafT), 1124-1125 (Van Ravesteyn); and Van der lee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 52, 55, 131- 133. 48. Although the right of association and assembly was recognized in 1915, it was only defined by the Royal Decree of Dec. 17, 1918, no. 38. nus determined that no official pennission was needed to found a political association, but in order fOf one to be recognized as a corporate entity its statutes had to be approved by the government. Associations deemed by the Indies ropreme court to be in conHict with public order were forbidden, as were secret societies. The police might attend and dissolve public meetings but not closed ones, and prior permission was needed only lor open-air meetings. After the unrest of 1919 it was decided that in any part of the colony where disturbance was threatened, the right of assembly could be restricted by requiring prior permission for all public meetings, police attendance at all meetings, and five days' notice for closed meet_ ings, which could be forbidden. These restrictions were widely employed in the ~'Ugar aroas durin g 1920. Mededeclingen 1920, pp. 17-18. 49. See Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 41-43. The government stated that too many officials failed to drnw the necessary conclusions from Baars's dismissal from hill government teaching job; the memorandwn pointing this out became commonly known as the "muzzling memorand1llll." (mullkorfcircul4ire). SO. The SOAP spokc.~man in the I1pper house of parliament charged that during 1920 "prosecution for infractions of the speech and press laws was carried

399

Notes, pp. 120-122 to such an excess that a secret memonmdum was issued by the Attorney GenernI to the prosecuting offic:ials Il5ldng them henceforth not to undertake such action without informing him 8.'5 head prosecutor" (Mendels, speech of Mar. 31, 1922, quoted in Van der lee, De S.D.A.P., p. 143). 51. Sinar Hindkl, June 25, 1921, in lPO, no. 26, 1921, p. 578; SOOlltQ Boemlpoetro, July I, 1921. in IPO, 00. 21, 1921, pp. 48-52; Octoc.Jt2n H/ndia, Ju1y 9, 1921 , in lPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 67-68; Nero'fa, July 13 and 14, 1921, in Ira, no. 28, 1921, pp. 115-118; Nerat/a.lu1y 19, 1921, in lPO, no. 29, 1921,. pp. 154-155, Soeara Boemipoctra, Ju1y 15, 1921, in IPO, no. 30, 1921, p. 197; Nerotia, Sept. 29, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51....5Et 52. For ,descriptions of PPPB debates 0 0 strike plans, _ Kaoom MoctW, Sept. 26-Oct. I, 1921. in lPO, DO. 40, 1921, p. 49; Nerat;a, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51-56; Oetoesan HlndkJ, Sept. 26-Oct. 1, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921, p. 61; Soeara Bocmipoetra, Dec. 1, 1921, in [PO, 00. 49, 1921, pp. 467-469. 53. Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. The background of the strike prcsented here is derived from Mededeellngen [922, pp. 21-29; T an Malaka's accounts in Toendoek (pp. 12-13) and "Mijn verbanning" (May 20,1922) give approximately the same IIIlIIlysis in less detail Other comments may be found in Ovcrzlcht CS I 1921 (p. 62) and Blumberge r, Communist (pp. 29-30). 54. Malab, Toondook, p. 49; see also Malah. DP I , 75. 55. The strike began in Ngupasan, near Jogjakarta, with lhe Bring of a pawnshop official who refused to carry an article to the auction place. Thereupon forty coworkers left their jobs in order, as they put it, to seek jU51ice from the Assistllnt Resident. They v.-ere discharged. The followin g day the strike spread to the ~..,rrounding areu, and 50 on until it covered most of Central Java; Med.rde..lIngen 1922, pp. 24-26; Tan Malaka, Toendook, pp. 12-13; and "Mijn verbanning." May 20, 1922. The walkout wu nnt completely spontaneous: the officia1 who began it had conferred with the PPPB executive the day before, and this body negotiated with the local p.wmshop service heads the evening before the strike; Medcdcelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. However, the actinn Wll.'l clenrly nol p ressed by the union leaders upon the workers; the reverse was true. 56. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 30. The ~act number of the workers who took part in the slrike is not known; some sources give 1,000 (out of a total of 5,000 pawnshop workers on Java, 2,000 of whom belonged 10 Ihe PPPB). Cuber, Indofl.Cz/ia: Souia/'no-ckonomiche$kkl ocherki (Indonesia: Socia-Economic Out· lines) (Moscow, 1933), p. 331; Blumbergcr, Comm!lni.tt, p. 30. Tan Malab, h<m'cver, stated that 2.000 were involved (Toendook, pp. 12-13); and this wa.~ also theJigure given by Sinor Hindla ( May 15-20, 19'22, in IPO, no. 21, 1922, p. 282). Not all the 5trikers seem to have been union members, and not all the union members went on strike. A Communist report on labor activity in this period laid the dcfeat of the action chieBy to the lack of solidarity shown by the pawnshop workers; Boedisoetjitro, Vusitzg, p. 1. It wa5 complained that nnly the Javanese 5truck and the government replace:d them with Sumatraru; Neral;o, Sept. 25-30, 1922, in lPO, nQ. 40, 1922, p. 4. Fnr that matter, the PPPB, altllough it contained the great majority of the organized pawnshop employees, did not in· clude them all; Dutch and higher Indonesian officials belonged to the PBOH and PPB. According to the government, the number of participants in the sbil:e was nowhere 50 great that the pawnshops could not do business; Mededeellngen 1922, p. 31. 57. Mede(leelingen 1922, p. 30; "Communisme," p. 532, eol. h. 58. "Communisme:' p. 532, col. b; Malah, Toendoek. pp. 3, 12-1 3; and DP 1, 75; Mecledeelingen 1922, p. 30.

400

Notes, pp. 122-125 59. Ovenlcht CSI 1921, pp. 62, 00. 60. Mcdedeelingcn 1922, p. 30; the clact number was 965 (out of 5,000) . is the government figure; Ncrat fa declared that the number who lost their jobs lU 1:1 result of the strike was 1,400 (May 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 347); Sinor Hind/a claimed thai it was about 2,000 (June 7, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 412; Aug. 27,1922, in IPO, no. 32, 1922, p. 198). 61. Mededcelinglln 1922, p. 32. 62.. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 31; Neratia, Apr. 10, 1922, in lPO, no. 16, 1922, pp. 88-89. For Indonesian Volksraad criticism of the government attitude towa rd the strike and Budi Utomo's role in it, see Hondelingen Volhraod, 1922, F irst Session, pp. 104-108, 131, 185-187, 189-192 (speeches by 'Salim, Dwidjosewojo, an d Sutadi ); for Indies Dutch views, see pp. 200-203. 63. Mededcelingen 1921, p. 9. M . Letter from the !luislant RCloidcnt of 5urakarta to the Budi Utomo elecutive, Feb. 22, 1922; leiter of the Budi Utomo elecutive to B. F. O. Schricke, Mar. 4, 1922; see also Handel/ngeo Vo/ksrtuJd, 1922, First Session, Bijlagen, Ond. I , Md. I, Stuk 6, pp. 9-10. The most radieaJ action with which Budi Utomo had been connected during the strike was Sutopo's acceptance of the chai nnanship of a committee to assis t the strikeI"$; this was promptly disapproved by the party's executive, however, and he resigned in favor of Suwardi Surjaningt"ll t. Hondefingen VolksrtuJd, 1922, First Session, p. 187 (Salim). 65. As a reswt of the strike, the membership of the PPPB dropped, according to one account, from 2,000 to 200 (C uber, Indonczjja, p . 3 11 ). See also Nerotjo , .Apr. 10, 19"22, in lPO, no. 16, 1922, p. 89. 66. The action against Malaka and Bergs ma was not because of their part in the PPPB strike, although thios was added to the charges against them; the Attorney General had propo~d their banishment to the Governor Ceneral on Dec. 23, 1921. This was before Malaka had become chainnan of the PKI; presumably the government thought him dangerous because of the great success of the SI schools. Bergsma was expelled from the Indies by a government decree of Mar. 2, 1922; the same directive banished Malaka to Kupan g, on the island of Timor. He requested to be allowed inslead to leave the Indics, and , as was custom.·u y, this was granted ; at the end of March he sailed for Holland. Malaka, DP I, 78--79, 88, and Tocndock, pp. 3-4, 12; De Indise/Ie elch, XLIV (19"22), 531-532; "Communisme," p. 532. col. b.

nus

CHAPTER Vll 1. Si Tetop, Oct. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 51, 1921, p . 543. 2. See Algemeen Indisch Dogblod, Aug. 15, 1925; Nicuwc Rotterdomsche Couront, Sept. 22, 19"25, for accounts of the spcculation5 current after Semaun's departure. On the other hand, rumors were circulated after Semauo's return that he had not really been in Russia at all, causing the VSTP to drculate two " torpedo letters" in indignant refutation (Nerotfo, Oct. 9-14, 1922; Oetoewn Hindla, Oct. I S, 1922; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1922; in IPO, nos. 42, 43, an d 45, 1922, pp. 127, 171-172,272). 3. SifUlr lIindia, June 6-10, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 406; hereafter cited as SU. A similar exposition of Semaun's purpose is given in Soeoro Ro'jat, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143. Fonnation of a committee to aid the starving Russian cbildren had been an item on the agenda of the 1921 PKl congress (Soearo Ro'jat, Nov. 1, 1921, in fPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383). Semaun declared on his retu rn 1I1al he had decided "the poo r rontlit iom are not to ~

401

Notes, 1'p. 125-128 blamed on incorrect administration by the Bolsheviks but on the many enemies that make things difficult for the Soviet Republic"-namely, opportunists in the party, non·Conununlsts who stiJl held Important positions, the economic boycott of Russia, and capitalist qlODsorship of counterrevolution (SH, p. 406). 4. SH, p. 407; Goenawan, Semaoen (Semaun) (Bandung. 1924 ) , p. 12. TIlt! latter work is a pamphlet defending Semaun and his program; it quotes most of Semaun's homecoming speech verbatim. 5. Semaun, editorial in Sinor Hindia, Dec. 1, 1919, and Soeara Ra'lat, Dec. 19, 1919, in lPO, no. 48, 1919, p. I , and no; 51, 1919, p. 1; and see Dfawli Tengah, Dec. 3, 1919, in 'PO, no. 49, 1919, p. 2. 6. For the development of the railroad strike issue during 1921 , see Sina, Hindia, June 20, 1921, and OetQeSllf'l Hindla, Jwy I , 1921. in lPO, no. 27, 1921, pp. 12-15; SI Tetllp, June 30, 1921, in lPO, no. 30, 1921. pp. 200-203; Defoe· tan mndia, Jwy 11, 1921, in lPO, no. 29, 1921, pp. 11S-119; Si Tetap Aug. 31, 1921, in lPO, no. 40, 1921. p. 86; Sinar Hlndia, Oct. 13, 1921, in lPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 135-136; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1921. in IPO, no. 46, 1921, pp. 353-354; and Mededeelingen 1921, p. 18. 7. 11mt this was the main substanCt'l of the quarrel was evident from the d ispute in the party on Semaun's return. Aceounts that claimed Semaun had been urged to visit Russia by European PKI members who considered him to have deviated from the orthodox international path also declared that the principal objection to hi! policie5 was that he refused to tale sufficiently strong antigovernment action ' (Algemeen IndUch Dagblad, Aug. I S, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdam.sche Courant, Sept. 22, 1925). "The same view of the essence of the quarrel is taken in the government reports Ovemcht V6n den Inwendigen politieken tvesfand in 1923 (Survey of the Internal Poutical Situation in 1923 ) (Nether. lands Indies government, Weltevreden, March 1924), p. 2, and Mcdedulingen 1924, p. 2. 8. "The summon s to the congress Wa$ addressed to the workers of Korea, China, Japan, and Mongolia. See Eudin and North, Soviet Rwrlll, p. 145; C . Safarov, "Von Washington bis Moskau" ( From Washington to Moscow), I"" p1'ckorr (Genean-Ianguage edition of Imp1'ecorr), Jan. 17, 1922, pp. 54-55; and "Theses Adopted by the Executive Conunittee of the Communist International on the Washington Conference," lnprecorr, Oct. 1. 1921, p. 3. 9. Semaun, interview, 1959; First Cong,e$l of the Tolle" of the Far East (Petrogr-ad, 19-22), p. 237, hereafter cited as Toilers; Ch. E. [Eidussl, " Der erste KODgres5 der revolutioniiren Organisationen des Femen Ostens," (The First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East) , Die Rotc Gewerkachaft.r-IntemotionoIe (organ of the Prolintern, hereafter RGI), DO. 9,. September 1922, p. 603. 10. Semaun, interview, 1959. 11. As Semaun stated in apology to the congress, he began to study English. the language of the meeting, only two months before it gathered in Moscow (thus, presumably, after he anived in Irkutsk ); and as there was no one at the meeting who cowd interpret Dutch or Indonesian, he was red~ced to silenCt'l ( Toilers, pp. 151 , 191). 12. In addition to the better-known accounts of the lDL'eting, a lengthy description written by Sneevliet can be found ill KHet kongres van Bakoc" (The Congress of Baku ) , De Tribune, Nov. I, 2, and 4, 1920. Aceording to this report, the meeting started late, because the special train carrying the ECCI and its retinue from Moscow did not reach Baku until 2 A . M. Revolutionary spirits were not

402

Notes, pp. 128-129 dampened by the delay, and the delegates poured into the Baku theater, where an orchestra played, everyone sang the "Internationale," Zinoviev made a speech, and greetings were read from innumerable participating and sympathizing organizations. Then everyone \llent home to bed; the following evening fonnal se~ sinns began. The day after that was Friday (Muslim sabbath ), and the delegates did not work but were entertained by a parade that culmin~ ted in the, unveiling of a statue of Man:, with explanations of his meaning for the East. Woodrow Wilson, U oyd George, and Clemenceau were burnt in effigy. On the next day, the proceedings were embarrassed by the presence of Enver Pasha, whose wish' to addre$ the meeting had to be diplomatically ignored. On the last two days practical policy discus.~ions were held. The congress ended on Sept. 7, 1920. 13. The text of the greeting may be found in "De Hotlandsche Omununisten aan de volkeren va n het Oosten" ( The Dutch Communists to the Peoples of the East ), De T ribune, Oct. 22, 1920, p. 1; see also De Tribu ne, Oct. 25, 1920, p. 3; Nov. 3, 1920, p. 3. 14. II Kongress, p. 195. This unenthusiastic conunent may refer to the primarily Central Asian orientation of the meeting or to the fact that the originru plans for the convention, which had been made before the second Comiutem congress, had been superseded by the events of that meeting. According to CaIT, BoLsllcvik Reuolution, Ill, 260, the only Far Eastern represen tatives at the meet· ing were eight Chinese. Sneevliet, however, mentions that among the 1,891 delegates representing 32 national groups there were small delegations from Korea, China, and India .( "Het kongres van BaJcoe," Nov. 2, 1921 )-in addition, of COUI5e, to himself for the Netherlands Indies. 15. For the congress resolutions, see Pervyi s"eul oorodoo Vostoka (First Congress of the People of the East) (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 183-186. 16. Huriez, OrWntpolitik, p. 33, suggests that the Baku meeting was intended to establish the Asian Internationru called for by the League for the Liberation of the East two years before. However, Wijnkoop's conll:dent statement after the second Comintcrn congress that there would be no center for Asian propaganda outside Moscow indicates that the council mlly have been thought up after that meeting or at the Baku congress itself. The head of the council was Mikhail Pavlovich (S. Vel'tman), who also became the fint director of the AlIRussian Scientille Association for Ori(''Dtal Studies. For descriptions of the council's functions and career, see Pertly; ,"eul naradov Vo.rloka, pp. 211_213; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, Ill, 280-268; Eudin and North, Soviel Russia, pp. 82-85. 17. " Mos"oll en het p.1D-lslamismc," p. 3 (a statement by the PKI executive). 18. The minutes of the congress list no delegate from the Indie5; see Protokolle des dritlen Kong. resses der Kommuni.stischen Intematlonale (Protocols of the Third Congress of the Communist International) ( Hamburg, 1921), pp. l~ 1071, hereafter III Kongress. But it seems certain that Darsono wa~ there ( Darsono, interview, 1959; Kahin, Nationdi..tm, p. 76; Djoehana, "History of the Indonesian National Movement," The Voice of Free llllhmeria, no. 15, 1946, p. 8 ). It is quite possible that he was included in the Dutch delegation or that the conwess listin): is incomplete. 19. Darsono, interview with C. McT. Kallin, 1955, and with the author, 1959. Darsono had learned German, the principal Comintern language, while in prison in the Indies. Rnd he made his report to the rongress in that tongue. 20. According to one Soviet source, Lenin was persuaded by a group of Near Eastern deleg.1 tes who ","'ere disturbed at the persecution of the Turlcish Commu_

403

Notes, pp. 129-131 nists by Kernal and the collapse of Communist rule in Gilao (B. Z. Shumiatskii, '12 istori! Komsomola I Kompartil Kilain" (From the Hislo!), of the ,Youth Movement and Communist Party of China). Reooliutsionnyl Vostok, no. 4/ 5, 1928, p. 218). 21. ShumiatsJdi, "b: Istorii," p. 219. 22. ShumJatsldi, " iz !stori!," p. 219. 23. Shumiabkii, "b; istarii," pp. 219-220. Chang', these, are given on pp. 220-222 and are traru!liatoo in part in Eudin and North, Sot."ict Ru.m'a, p. 144. 24. Omclusion of Chang's theses, 3.'l tran slated in Eudin aDd North, Soviet Rusrla, p. 144. 25. 1II KongrfMs, p. 1010. 26. III Kongress, p. 1018. Although Roy slated that "not one single member of the European and American delegations opposed this," he was supported by the French delegate Julien, who declared that the French Communi~-ts had come to Moscow prepared to ask for changes in the theses of the SC(X)Ild Cominlem congress that would make possible still greater cooperation with the nationalist movements (pp. 1029-1005 ). Julien's cri ticism was not, however, backed by the other Freneh representatives. '1:1. III Kong rel.S, p. 1016. In fairness to the Cominlern, it should be pointed out that limitation on the speaking time of the Eastern delegates was due at leart in part to Asian insistence on talking at great length and in resound ing generalities. As one commentator put it, ''\Vcstern indifference and Eastern Bowery eloquence .had combined to reduce the discussion on the Oriental question to a sort of neeusary eviJ, to be gotten over with as qUickly as possible." Demetrio Boersner, Bohheoib and the Notional and Colonial Que.rtion (1917-1928) (Geneva and Paris', 1957 ), p. 109. 28. III Kon~re.tS, p. 1035. This comment was made by Kolarov, speaking in the name of the prc~idium . 29. III Kongreu, p. 1016; emphasis in the text. 30. Semaun claimed to have visited China on the way; SII, pp. 406, 4(11, and Coenawan, Semllocn, pp. II , 13. A visit to Sneevliel is claimed in MataMm, Oct. 24, 1922: la oosche Courant, Aug. 16, 1923 {statement of the rcar,(m~ for Semaun's b.1nishment, in the official Netherland, Indies governmen t fournal l. A. K. Prin)tgodigdo, Sediarah Pergerakan Rakfat IndoRello (History of the Indonesian Popular Movement) (Djakarta, 1950 ), p. 38; and Tamar Djaja. Trio Komunis Indonesia (Three IndOne5ian Communists) (Bukit Tinggi, 1946? ), p. 29. Sneevliet:, it has been claimed, accompan ied Semaun to Moscow; J. H. Francois, 37 lar IndQnemclw orilhdthbewe~in~ (:.rr years of the Indonesian Independence Movement) ( n.p., n .d.), p. 16. It is also asserted that Sncevliet )'!llve him some letters to take baclc to Indonesia (Mataram, Oct. 24, 1922). That Semaun saw Snoovliet in Shanghai seems on1y natural; one would expect. too, that Sncevliet ,gave him some message to take back to Java. If he accompanied Semaun at all, however. it WM probably no farther than lrlmtsk, since we know that Snoovliet WlIS in China at the time Semaun Wall in Moscow. I have seen no other sources that indicate Sneevlict made a trip to Russia at this time. Semaun also claimed to have stopped for a time in Siam-whether going to or from Russi."\ is unclear, but the latter seems more likely-and in his homecoming speech he commented briefly on the political situation In that country. 31. Shortly after the Balm congress the ECCl decided to hold a CongTC!'l~ of the Peoples of the Far East, in Siberia: l :vcstiiD, Sept. 29, 1920, as cited in Whit_ ing, Soviet Pol/de!, p. 77. See also CllfT. Bol.Jhev/k Revolution, Ill, 1525. This

404

Notes, pp. 131-132 was apparently an attempt to nmke up for the almost exclusively Central Asian orientation of the Baku meeting. Nothing further came of the protect until the summer of 1921, when the great PO'"Ycrs announced plans for a conference on arms limitation in the Pacific; Russia was not invited, and the Soviets !w.w in the snub an indication of imperialist intentions to keep them out of the Paci6c. The ECCI, meeting just after the third Comili.tem congress, determined to reply to this threat with a demonstration of Asian opposition to the conference, through the medium of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. 32. l1\e meeting had been originally planned as a demonstmtion to which a ll revolutionary anti-imperia1ist organizations of the Far East should be invik-d. Disagreement arose, however, apparently as to whether bourgeois nationalht organizations shou1d be included. The problem was put off temporarily by deciding to '.invite everyone and to detennine which delegates should be admitted "to the congress at Irkutsk itself; Shumiatskii, "Jz istorii," pp. 223-2.24, referring to'll letter to this effect written by Chang ral-lei to the Far En;stem Secretariat of the Comintem on July 29, 1921. 33. The Congress met in Moscow until February 1 and held a final session in Petrograd on February 3. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), the move and the delay occurred beuuse of Lenin's illness; at aoy rate Irkutsk was an out-of-the-way spot for a congress in which malor Russian leaders had become interested. 34. The interpreta.tions given the published record of the congress by Western schoL1rii have differed rather widely; Boersner, Bolsheviks. pp. 114-115, sees Zinoviev representing the left wing and Safarov the right wing in the controversy, whereas Whiting, Soviet PoUcies, pp. 74-86, finds the enllie meeting controlled by a Zinoviev-Ied left. CalT, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 526-528, depicts Zinoviev as taking a dogmatic revolutionary view oriented about the Japnnesc proletariat and Safarov adopting a somewhat more cautious but still leftist stand, The official language of the meeting was English, but the English-language account of the proceedings (Toiler3) is less complete than the Russian one (Pervyi s'·e:::d ) , which contains additional reports, including Semaun's. In the English account, Semaun is referred to as Simpson, delegate from Java. 35. Shumiatskii, '"h; istorii," p. 227. Since Shumiatskii wrote in the period of Stalin's ascendancy, he possibly exaggerated that leader's role in correcting the deviant trend of the meeting; on the other hand, Stalin, who was then Commissar of Nationalities, seems to have been interested in the meeting even though not offieiaJly connectcd with it; .'iCe Carr. Bolshevik Revolution, III, 528. Lenin's interest ill the gllthering is remarked in Semaun's account; see below. 36. Toiler!, p. 151 (Semau n's statement of agreement with ZiTKIviev). In his greetings to the (:'Ongress, Sernaun observed: The industrial prolet.1riat that has sprung up due to the foreign capital invested in our country is already beginning to move on the road of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialists . . . . The peoples of the Far East, and also the proletariat of Java and the Dutch Indies will play, due to their geographical position, a decisive part, and they will be the chief base for the coming imperialist war. But the future war will be used by the proletariat of Java and the Dutch Indies, as well as the proletarillt of India for the purpose of making Ii joint at· tack with thejroletanat of the Far East upon world imperialism, At this congress I hope to lin comrades from the Far East, who will find means of uniting the proletariat of the entire world for the decisive struggle against imperialism and for the achievement of the final victory of the proletariat.

405

Notes, pp. 132-134 Toilers, p. 15. Most Asian representatives to the congress tOOk a far less speci6caUy proletarian stand, the tenor of their speeches being anti.imperialist rather than Communist; Carr, BohlU1trik Revolution, 528, and Boersner. Bolshevlkr, p. 116. Of the Asians attending the congrw, only about baH were declared Com·

m.

munists; the others ..... ere mostly revolutionary nationalists of one sort or another. Carr, p. 526; see also Eudin and North, Souiet RuuIa, p. 146. Semaun's mIl5.'!lage

was probably written for him-perhaps by Sneevliet-considering his poor English at the beginning of the conference. when it was delivered. Semaun also presented a detailed report on the Indonesian movement; he was unable to deliver it orally because of translation difficulties ( Tolle,.!, p. 191), but it was published later in the Russian.language account of the congress (Pertlyi t"ezd. pp. 254289).

37. Toikn, p. 6; "Gewerkschnftsfra gen auf clem Kongress der Wetktiitigen des Femen Ostens" (Labor Union Questions at the Congress of the Toilers of tho Far East), RGI, Mar. 192.2, pp. 214-216; «Die Tatigkeit des Vollzugsbtir05 der R.G.I." (The Activity of the Executive Bureau of the Prollntem), RGI, no. 2, Feb. 1922, p. 148. The rommission was fonned on the initiative of the Pro6ntem (Red Intemational of Labor Unions), which had been established the summer before and which found in the rongress an opportunity to get in touch with the representatives of the Asian labor movements. According to the Prollntern article 6rst cited, the rommission evolved into a separate conference of Far l!:astem labor union representatives which acted independently of the congress and did not report bade 10 it. The meeting Wa.'l beaded by Lowvsky, the Secretary General of the Pr06ntem. Work proceeded slowly at first, the account states, since the European and Asian representatives Icnew very little of each othen' movements; but the results of three days' discussions were very useful. As for the Indonesian representative on the rommittee, he is referred to as chieHy concerned with the inequality of pay for European and native workers in his country. 38. "Manifest des Kongresses deT Werktiitigen des Femen Ostens 1m' die Volker des Femen Ostens" (~ I anifesto of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East to the Peoples of the Far East), InprekorT, Feb. 14, 1922, pp. 143-144. 39. SIl, p. 407; the meeting with Lenin is also referred to in Semaun, "Brieven over den strijd in het Dosten" (Letters on the Struggle in the East), De Tribune, June 6, 1925. It has been suggested that Semaun's polley of caution was the result of ECCI instructions not to push revolution in Indonesia, advice inspired by the Soviel desire not to provoke the West at that time; Carr, Bolshevik Revolul/en, Ill, 481, note I. This may have been the case, but no evidence ha~ been offered for it. 40. Semaun, intel'Yit:w, 1959. 5emaun was then no longer a Conununist Party member. 41. According to Semaun, Lenin made his remark on the NEP speci6cally in connection with the question whether the soviet system should be advocated by Asian Communist movements. Zinoviev had urged this at the congress of the Toilers of the Far East; see Toiien, p. 154. Lenin, as We will remember from the account of the seeond Comintem congress, thought the idea too radical and had included it in his theses only as a compromise v.ith the more leftist sentiment of the congress colonial commission . 42. 511, pp. 4()6..407; Coenawan, Semooen, p. 12. 43. 511, p. 408; Cocnawan, Semaoen. pp. 13-14. 44. Tan Malab, "De beweging in lndiii" ( The Movement in the Indies), De Tribune. Sept. 5, lQ')..2; see also Eyquem, "Aux Indes Nllerlandaises," pp. 8()...81.

406

Notes, pp. 134-137 Tan Malaka complained that the Dutch papers were reporting that Semann had said. "Moscow cannot support the Indies; the Indies must help themselves; the Indies still need the Netherlands' aid," Malaka said he couldn't believe Semaun had said this, but that even if he had, it should be vie\\"ed as the aberration of an individuaJ and not of the whole Indonesian Communist movement. 45. See further SH, pp. 408-409: Djoehana, "History," p. 8; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. ll2; Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah. pp. 38-39. 46. Semann, article in 51 Tclap. June 30, 1922, in lPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 149. He has maintained rilis position to the prescnt day; see the analysis presented in Semaun, Konsepsi Pcrekonomian Dtlllia (A Concept of World Economics) (Djakarta, 1957). 47. 51 Tetap, June 30, 1922, in l PO, no. 30, 1922, p. 148. See also Oetoesan Hi!1dta, July 22, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128, reporting a speech by Semaun to the Tjirebon VSTP. 48. 51{, p. 407; Goenawan, Semaoen, p. 13. Scmaun may have been referring to independence achieved by overthrowing capitalism in Holland, as had been hoped in the revolutionary days of 1918, but he did not so qualify his statement. 49. Mruaka, DP 1, p. 98. Since this autobiography was written long after Malaka had broken with orthodox Communism, it is unlikely that his remarks were colored by oomiderations of loyruty. 50. Jo'or an anruysis of the early lcadcrship'~ deviationist tendencies by the prescnt party chaimum, see D. N. Aidit, "The Birth and Growth of the Communh1: Party of Indonesia" in his Problerrl$ of the I ndonesian Revolution ( n. p., 1963), pp. 68-72. 51. For Semaun's arguments, see Cocoawan, Semaoen, pp. 13-14; SEl, pp. 408-409; Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, DO. 30, 1922, pp. 148-149; Soearo Ra'jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Socoro Ra';at, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143; OctoeSlln Jlindia, luly 22, 1922, in JPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; SifUl r HilltUa, Aug. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 300. See also Semaoen. "Brievcn over den strijd in het Oosten," June 6. 192.5; Blumbcrger. Commun~. p. 311; Blumberger, NatiollOlist, p. 112; Djoehana. "Hhiory." p. 8; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3; Pringgodigdo, Sed/arah, pp. 38-39. 52. Tan Malab, "De beweging in Nederlandsch Indie," Sept. 5. 1922, citing reports in the Nieuwe Rolterdarrl$cllC Courant. 53. 51{, p. 409. 54. Semaoen, "Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten" June 6, 1925. 55. See comments by Ngadino in Sirwr Hilldia, May 29-June 3, 1922, in [PO, 00. 23, 1922, p. 377; by Daehlan in Soeara Ra';at, June 30. 1922, in lPO, DO. 33. 1922, p. 234: and by Sud,1nnan in Sinor mndia, Jan. I , 1924, in IPO, 1lO. 4, 1924, p. 148. Also Poesaka VSTP ( Heritage of the VSTP; Semarang 1923), pp. 17- 19: Blumberger. NatilJnallst. pp. 141- 142; l8lnm Bergerak. July 1 and 10, 1922, in l PO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 245-246. 56. VSTP membcr.;hip was broken do"'Jl by a union publication as follows:

Beginning 1920 End 1920 October 1921 End 1921 June 1922 End 1922

I ndonesian

Dutch

Chinese

Total

6,235 12,084 16,831 15,621 7,642 9,549

236

23

95 104

34

6,494 12,213 16,975 15.769 7,731

4f17

45

40 46 44

43

15

102

',=

Noteg, I1P' 1.'37-139 Poe~ka

VSTP, p. 19. During Scmaun's absence the VSTP was led by Harry Dekker; Sinar Hindia, Jlln. 5-12, 1923, In lPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 290. . 57. See Scmaun, in SI Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, pp. 148149. For discussloru of Seamaun's advice, see Sooaro Ra'jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Sinar Hindla, Aug. 14, 1922, in lPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 300; aDd Oetoo.ran H/ndla, July"22, 1922, In lPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; "Communisrne," p. 533, col. 3; Ooorzlcht 1923, p. 2; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. ~. 58. Programma Congres, ka 12 dan V.S.T.P. langgal 3-4 Februari 1923 (Program of the Twelfth Congress of the VSTP, February 3-4; 1923) (Sernamng. 1923?), leaOet. 59. For accounts of these propaganda tours, see Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in 11'0, no. 30, 1922, .p. 149; Sinar Hlndla, Aug. 21-30, in lPO, no. 36, 1922, p. 349; Mededeellngen 1924, p. 2; Ooerzicht van den inwendigen politieken toostand (April-December 1924) (Survey of the Intemal Political Situation [AprilDecember 19'24]) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden? 19M?). p. 2, hereafter Ovenicht 1924; Blumberger, Nationali.sf, pp. 141-142. 60. Sinar HinJia, May 1-7, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 204-205; report_ ing a Sarebt Postel congress that elected Sudibio (PKI ) chalnnan of the union. None of the previous executive member!! attended the meeting. which charged them with neglect leading to the union's virtual collapse. 61. Sudibia also became chairman of this union. It was remarked in Sinar lIindio, Dec. 19, 1922 (lPO, no. 52, 1922, pp. 591-592) , that the new executive had done its best to revive the PFB but that the sugar workers were generally content with the gains of 1920 and thus showed little interest in the union. 62. Motor, January 1923, in fPO. no. 4. 1923, p. 166; Oetoe.wn Hlndla, May 2-6,19"..2, in IPO. no. 19, 1922, pp. 210-211. This union, the ABBH, was chaired by Suradi; the Inlandsche Algemeene Politlebond (Ceneral Native Police As· sociation) was led by Prawirosardjono. 63. The cost of living for Indonesians on Java rose steeply until 1920. The jn~ price of poorest-qunlity rice was 110 in 1916 and 289 in the last quarter of 1920 (1914 = 100) and it then dropped rapidly to 147 in 1923; Prljzen, Indeu:ii!e", pp. 73-78, Table VII. Moreover, it appears that in some sectors wages of private employees were not reduced in spite of the slump; a government survey of wages in SUrab.lja, the renter of such industry as the Indies then possessed, stated that wages actually rose on the average until 19"..3. Nleuwe Rottef"damfChe Courant, June 29, 1926. 64. Sinar Hindio , Dee. 27/29, 1922, in lPO, 00. 1, 1923, p. 118, speech by Suroso to the December 1922 PVH congres.~. 65. See Octoe&an Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 58. !be meeting was attended by representatiYe$ from the VIPBOW, the Surabajn branch of the Sareht Postel, Kadasterbond (union of employees of the land-registry offices), Opiwnregiebond (union of employees of the opium service) , Inlandselle Douanebond (union of native customs offidals), Inlandsche Politiebond (union of Indonesian police), and Landskas Bond (union of treasury employees). 66. Oetoesan H/ndio, June 28, 1922, in lPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 58. The new league, it was declared, would be the Verbond van Inlandsehe Landsdienaren (Association of Native Public Servants). 67. See Soeara Boemfpoetcra, Sept. I, 1922, in lPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 506. Tjokroaminoto slated that he hoped the new body would be an alliance rather than a union, since a close relationship between Communists and non-Communists 4Q8

Notes, pp. 139-141 like that in the old PPKB had proved eminently unsuccessful. "May this pmiseworthy effort bear handsome fruit," he concluded, adding his regrets that he wa, too busy to attend the founding meeting. 68, Nerat;a, Sept. 25-JO, 1922, In IPO, no. 40, 1922, p. 3. 69, The federation claimed at its first congress ( December 1922) to represent eighteen unions, with 32,120 members. or these, 13,000 belonged to the VSTP, 4,500 to the VIPBOW, 4,000 to the PCB (assistant teachers), 2,200 to the PPPB, and the rest to fourteen smaller unions; report of the ·congress, ill Sinar H/ndla, Dec. 27/ 29, 1922, in l PO, no. I , 1923, p. 17. This figure is undoubtedly too large, however; the PPPB, for c1I"ampie, could claim some 2,200 membe~s before Its strike but not afterward, and the VSTP elsewhere gave its 5tren gt h at the end of 1922 as 9,607 ( Poesaka VSTP, p. 19). The PVH chainnan later claimed the federation had about 23,000 members at the start. Of these, only 1,600 were in p rivate employ, 400 of them representing the FFB; Soeroso, "De Indonesische vakbeweging," p. 213. Blumberger, Nationolld, pp. 141-142, estimates the federation at about 25,000 members. The (socialist) InternationaJ Federation of Trade Unions gave PVH membership as nineteen unions and about 33,000 members; De 10dUche GMs, XLVII, 1925, p. 452. 10. The fi rst pennanent executive of the PVH, elected at its. December 1922 rongress, consisted of Suroso (chainnan ), Mardikun (secretary-treasurer), Dj()kosuwamo, Kartodarmodjo, and Ngadino; Sinar HindiD, Dec. 27/ 29, 1922. in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 2 1. 11. Sinnr Hind/o, Dec. 27 !2.9, 1922, in IPO, no. I , 1923, p. 21; Ooor:.ichl 000 den Inwendigen politieken loe.rlond In 1923 (Survey of the Internal Political Situation in 19'23 ) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, WeJtevreden, 1923 ), p. 2, hereafter Over:.ichl 1923. 12. P. B., "Het Eenheidsfront in Indoncsie" (The United Front in Indonesia) , De Tribune, Sept. 8, 1922, qlloting a telegram Signed by Suroso and Semaun for the PVH. According to 5uroMJ, Berg!>w a helped dmw up a prote.>t against the impending withdrawal of the co_doOf_li ving bonlls, which the PVH sent the Dutch parliament; Sino r 1/indio, Dec. 27!2.9, 1922, in IPO, no. 1.1923, p. 18. The idea for a Netherlands committee probably st(''fllmed from the decision of the June meeting of government employees' unions to send a representative to Holland to plead for e.l emption of the I ndQflesian publie employees from the budget-cutting campaign; Oetoe8lln Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28. 1922, p. 58. 13. Sinar Hindla, Dec. 18, 1922, in IPO, no. 5 1, 1922, pp. 547-548, program and statement of principles of the PVH. The program contained many demands characteristic of poslindcpendencc Indonesian labor attitudes. In addition to the statist orientation, it emphasized welfare provisions, job scctlrity, and paymen t according to social ra ther than economic criteria; all these. have heen continuing features of the Indonesian labor viewpoint. 74 . Sinor Hindia, Dec. 27 / 29, 1922, in IPO, no. I, 1923, p. 18; SioaT lliruiia, Dec. 16/18, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 546. 75. This opinion is expressed in Blumberger, Communist, pp. 3 1-32; "Communisme," p. 533, col. 3; Over:.icht CS t 1921, p. 66; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 1. 16. Over::.icht 1923, p. 3; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. I, 3. 71. l1Kl expansion of 51 schools was particularly notable in West Java. One pro-Semarang newspaper in tlKl district reported that in short succession schools .... ere founded in Sukabumi, 5umedang, Tasibnalaja, Tjirebon, and "other 51

409

Notes, pp. 141-142 centers"; Matahari. Aug. 3, 1922, in lPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 240. The major West Java SI school Wll.'l in Bandung, Gunawan, head of the Bandung PKI/SI. had been a prime mover in establishing the SI school system. 78. Boedi Oet(1fllo. Feb. 24 / 26, 1923, in lPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418. 79. HOS, p. 134, quoting a letter by Wondoamiseno. BO. This proposal was entered formally :It a congress of the PPPB in August 1922, after PKI and Semarang 51 delegates pleaded for an end 10 party discipline. Soea1a Ra';a!. Sept. 1, 1922, in lPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491. 81. Oocrzicht 1923, p. 7. 82. For some of the Communist arguments agamsl party discipline, see Malahan, Aug. 27, 1922, in lPO, no. 37, 1922, p. 415; Soeara Ra'/at, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491, Malahari. Sept. 30, 1922, in lPO, no. 41, 1922, p. 97, Oetoe$tm Hi!idkl, Oct. 20, 1922, in lPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 173-174; Sina r Hindia, N.ov. 9, 1922, in lPO, no. 40, 1922, p. 299. 83. At the August 1922 PPPB congress Tjolaoaminolo declared he was undecided on the party discipline issue but thought it should be discussed at the next 51 congreliS, this apparently satisGed the PKl, for Soeara 8.a'/at, Sept. 1, 1922, in l PO, no. 3 1, 1922, p. 491, remarl:cd that Tjolcroaminoto's return to political life was a saving medicine for the ailing movement. 84. A government account of this period considered Tjokroaminoto's attitude toward reunification at least in part due to political naivete: "{The quanell centered once more about the principle of unity, for the Communist ISemaun1, who was in this respect more experienced, recognized bener than Tjolaoaminoto then did how wea\.: the position of the Indies popular movement was, in this socially underdeveloped and geographically divided land, when confronted with the united forces of foreign capital and the power of the colonial authorities; and he appredated more fully how much preparation and exertion were required to begin the realization of the desired better social order." Mededeelingen 1924, p. 3. 85. The study was first published seriaUy in the PPPB journal, Soeara Boemipoe/era, which Tjokronminoto edited, beginning with the issue of Sept. 1, 1922. 86. Sinal' Hindia, Nov. 4, 1922, in fPO , no. 45, 1922, p. 249. The congress convened on Nov. 1; for accounts of its role in the CSI-PI;:I feud, see MededeelingerJ 1924, p. 4; 51 V, p. 379, col. b. 87. Neratja, Od. 3O-Nov. 2, 1922, in lPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 240; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 5 and 12, 1922, in IPO, nos. SO and 51, 1922, pp. 490--491, 536; and sec Mcdedeelingen 1924, pp. 3-4; Dver;:icht 1923, pp. 3-4; Bhunberger, Communist, p. 31. 88. Neratia, Jan. 3, 192.3, in lP~, no. 2, 1923, pp. 59--60. 89. Tjokroaminoto, "Partij 5.1. : Voorstel terhadap Icepada ' Se\.:alian 5audara Kaoem 5.1. di Hindia" (The S.1. Party: A Proposal to All 51 Comrades in the Indies ), ParH; 5.1., Jan. ll, 192.3, pp. 7-10. 90. For the arguments on party discipline presented by both sides in this period, see Sinar Hindia, Sept. 1, 1922, in lP~, no. 39, 1922, p. 491; Oetnewn mmiia, Oct. 20, 19"-2, in lPO, no. 43, 19-22, pp. 173-174; Neratia, Od. 3O-Nov. 2, 1922, in lPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 240; SinaI' H/rniia, Nov. 0, 1922, in lPO, no. 46, 1922, p. 299; Sina l' Hindin, Nov. 21, 1922, in lPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 398399; Octoe.ron Hindta, Nov. 16, 1922, In lPO, no. 47, 1922, p. 347; Sneara Ra';m, Nov. 1, 1922, in EPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 420--421, OetOC8OJl Himikl, Dec. 5, 1922, in lPO, no. SO, 1922, pp. 400-491, Sino r Hindia, Dec. 13, 1922, in lPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 544; Sinal' H/ndia, Dec. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 545;

410

Notes, pp. 142- 144 Sinor II1ndiQ, Dec. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, pp. 545-546; Oetoesan Hindla, Jan. 23, 1923, in lPO, no. 5, 1923, p. 191; Sinor Hlndill. Feb. 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 349.

• 91. Semaoen, "Brieven over den 5trijd in het Oosten," June 6, 1925, referring to the Radical Concentration. 92. For IndoIJe5:ian conunent on these efforts and on the All-India Congress, see Panggocgah, Apr. 1, 19'22, in [PO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 230-231; Neralja, May 30, 1922, in lPG, no. 23, 1922, pp. 371--372; Neratfa, June 6, 1922, in lPO, no. 24, 1922, pp. 417--418; Darmo Kondo, June 24, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 60; Isfom Bergerak, July 1 and 10, 1922, in lPO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 244-246; Motallari, Aug. 3, 1922, in lPO, DO. 33, 1922, p . 240. The last is an article by the PKl leader Mohammad Sanun, iII which he ~lIpported the All·Indies Congress and the attempts to unite the Indonesian movements and at the same time wamed that these clTom should not be based on race or religion, since in the Indies these were divisi ... e elements. 93. The Radical Concentration was founded on the initiative of the ISDP at a IJ'Ieeting of IndieJi opposition parties held in Batavia in NO\'elllber 1922. See Sinor Rindla, Dec. 18, 1922, in 'PO, no. 52, 1922, p. 589; J. Stokvis, "VolwaardJg parlement voor Indonesle?" (A Real Parliament for the IndJeJi?), Het Volk, No .... 17, 1939; Blumberger, NatioTwlf.st, p. 31. Ib headquarten were also establUhed in the capital city, under a permanent interparty conunithle; Boedi Oefome, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, p . 103. 94. Budi Utomo had broken with the Concentration of People's Liberation Movements after a short flirtation wi th the argument that the coalition was too rndJcaJ. Now, however, growing disillusionment plus a rising young progressive elemeot in the Javanese party caused it to declare adherence to the new alliance on the grounds that the reactionary forces had become so powerful th at a united front against them wrus necessary; Boedi Odomo, Apr. 11, 19'23, in IPO, 00. 16, 1923, p . 103; Blumberger, Natwnalist, p . 31. 95. A list of major participating organizations and a summary of its manifesto is given in Sinor llindla, Jan. 9, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 75. 96. Semaoen, Sikapnfo Parti; Kommunist India (P.K.I.) terhadap pada RadicaleConcent ratl6 (Viewpoi nt of the Indies Communist Party toward the Radical Concentration) (Semarang, 1923), pp. 14--15, emphasis in the text. See also Semaun, in Soeara Ro'/at, Jan. 1923, in lPO, no. 5, 1923, pp. 212-213. 97. See the resume of Semaun's speech to the congress in Sinor llindUl, Dec. ZT/29, 1922, in lPO, no. I , 1923, p. 22. 98. This program consisted of five basic ~k'ffillIlds on the government: 1. Freedom of political action, assembly , speech, etc.; an end to banishment, t'xile, and political arrest. 2. Increased government aid lor the unemployed; lin increase in public worn; equal pay for all races. 3. Adequate government support for health and education. 4. Government encouragement of new industries; reduced military expenditures; increased taxation of large industries and decreased taxation of the common people. 5. Fulfillment of the promises for increased independence for the Indies made by the government in November 19 18.

" 1923-lndoocsia-Im," Indonesia Mertklw, Apr. 1m, p . 29; Semaoen, SilwPfl;a, pp. 11-14. 99. It is interesting to DOte in this connection that, as far as we can see from

411

Notes, pp. 144-146 the prw; di gest accoWlts, the Conununists did not attack Tfolcroaminoto directJy in the month~ just before the congress. The one heated deb:lle in which Semarang

engaged was with Salim's NcratitJ, not v.i th T;okroaminoto's Oetoesan Ilioo/a. The only article at all directly critical of Tfokroomfnoto hJmself was one that declared his inconsistencies a hindrance to the orderly development of the Imloncsian movement but also described the 51 leader as a Communist and an internationalist at heart. Sinar Hlndia. Feb. 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 8, 1923. p. 349. 100. The date of the meeting was also :tIl issue: Scmarang wanted it held as SOOJl as possible, and Tjokroaminoto wanted it delayed until he had completed his campaign. Semarang offered to pay the costs of the congress if it were held in that city. For the arguments, see Oe/oeMn Hlndhl, Oct. 28, 1922, Soeara Ra';at. Nov. 1, 1922, and Sinar Ilindia, Nov. 9 and 21, Dec. 12, 14, and 20, 1922, in lPO, nos. 44, 46, 48, SO, 51, 1922, pp. 218, 299, 399, 420--421, 503, 545-546 , Nero/fa, Dec. 30, 1922, and Jan. 6, 12. and 13, 1923, and Sinor Ilindla, Jan. 3, 6, and 10, 1923, in fPO, nos. 1-3, 1923, pp. 2.2-24, 65, 107-110. 101. Sutopo, article in 80edi Odorno, Feb. 24 and 26, 1923, in lPO, DO. 9, 1923, p. 418. The following aClCOl.lnt of the congress is drawn chieBy from E. Cohee, Kort verswg von hct verhandelde op Ilet congru der "Centraal 5arikat-I.swm" Ie Madioen oon 16-20 Februari 1923 (Short Report on the Transactions of the Congress of the "Centrnl 5arekat Islam" at Madiun on Feb. 16-20, 1923) ( typescript. by the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs). See further De lndische Gid.r, XLV (l923). 529-533; 51 V, pp. 380, cok a-b; Ovemcht 1923, pp. 4-5; Mededee/lngen 1924, pp. 4-5; A. A. Guber, "Natsional'no-
412

Notes, PI" 146-147 Sinor llindia, Feb. 21 , 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 419; Stuar Il/ndia, Feb. 27Mar. 6, 1~..3. in lPO. no. 10, 1923, pp. 482-483; Detoesan llindia, Mar. 3 and 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 19'23, pp. 577-578; SiRllf Hindio, Mar, 15 and 11, 18 21. 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 58th591; Sinar Hind/a, Mar. 20-24, 27, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 667-870; Islam Bergerak, Mar. 10 and 20, 1923, in lPO, no. 13, 1923, pp. 683, 685; SflOf 1/india, Apr. 3-9, 1923, in lPQ, no. 15, 1923, pp. 72-74; [$lam Bergerak. Apr. 1, 1923, in lPG, no. 15, 1923, pp. 85-86; R/Uo Do..mia, Mar. 1-22, 1923, in IPD, 00. 15, 1923, p. 95; Sinar lIirulia, Apr. 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, pp. 118-120; Mo1ahori, Apr. 4, 1923, in lPO. no. 16, 1923, pp. 129-130. 109. For examples, see Darmo Kondo, Mar. 3, 1923, in l PO, no. 10, 1923, p. 467; Doenia Horoe, Mar. 7, 1923, in lPG, no. 11, 1923, pp. 548-549 {article by Surjopranoto }; Dae,da Barae, Mar. 14 and 21, 1923, in lPO, no. 13, 1923, pp. 674-mS, 677; Baed! Oetomo, Mar. 30, 1923, In lPD, no. 15, 1923, pp. 50-51; Panggoegah, Apr. 4, Hr..3, In IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 88-89 (article by Suwardi SurjanIngrat); Panggaegall, Apr. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 89-91 (article by Sumarsano Sa.o;trruwnarto); Kemad;oean modle, Apr. 12, 1923, in lPG, no. 16, 1923, p . 115; Ponggoegalr, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 130131 (article by SuwardJ Surjaningrat); Danna Kondo, Apr. 11, 1923, in lPO, DO. 16, 1923; pp. 148-149. The only Indonesian-language periodical reported in the press survey as ~hing a plague on both hoU$es was Kaoem Mocda, the organ of the PEB ( Politiek Economische Bond ). llO. For reports on VSTP income and comments on the reasons for il'l increase, see Si Totap, Aug. 31, 1922, in TPO, no. 39, 19-22, pp. 507-508; Sept. 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 272; Oct. 31 and Nov. 30, 1922, In lPG, no. 1, 1923. p. 43; Dec. 31, 1922, in IPQ, no. 8, 1923, p. 387; January and February, 1923, in IPO, nO. 12, 1923, p. 635. The nwnher of new branches and correspondencies increased sharply over the preceding year. This growth was heavily influenced by the feeling that the union would ward off the threatened wage reduction; this is shown by the colla~ of the units formed that year, following the failure of the VSTP strike:

New units

Same units looctloe by June 1923

formed 1920 1921 1922

32 21 35

1

•

34

Poc8llka VSTP, p . 19. According to this source, VSTP membership passed. 10,000 in January 19'1..3 ( p. 19 ); at the time of the strike In May it was about 13,000. 111. Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3; and see Overzicht 1923, pp. 2-3. 112, Si Tetap. Nov. 31, 1922, in lPG, no. 1, 1923, pp. 43-44. 113. Si Tetap, Aug. 31, 1922, in IPO. no. 39, 1922, pp. 507-508; Soca ra Ro'jat, Sept. 16, 19'1....2, in lPG, no. 43, 1922, p. 190; Oetoesan Hlndia, Oct. 23, 1922, in Il'O, no. 44, 1922, p. 217; Sinar mndia, Dec. 16, 1922, in lPQ, no. 1, 19Z3, pp. 19-21. 114. Kaoem Mooda. Oct. 6-14, 1922, in IPQ, no. 43, 19-22, pp. 166-167; Pantiaran Ber/ta, Sept. 19-21. 1922, in IPO, nO. 42. 1922, p. 133; Oetae8lln Hindle, Dec. 4 and 12, in lPO, nos. 50 and 51, 1922, pp. 488-489, 535; Boed! QeMma, Feb. 17. 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 394; Doonia Barae, Mar. 3, 19-23, in lPG, DO. 11, 1923, pp. 553-554.

413

Notes, pp. 147-149 115. The congress was held in Scmarang on Feb. 3 and 4, 1923; according 10 the meeting's report, it WlIlI attended, in addition to the genera1 public, by 100 representatives from 79 branches of the unJon, representing a total of 9,007 votes out of a total VSTP membership of approximately 11,000. In addition to the regular VSTP spe31.:en, the meeting was addressed by the Scmarang Sarekat Hindia chainnan, Robbers, and by Langkemper, the secretary of the Netherlands

Transport Workers' Syndicate (NTAS), a Dutch labor grouping of Communistsyndicalist inclinations. A Dew executive was elected, with Sema~ again as chainnan; Sinar llindiil, Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in [PO, no. 7, 1923, pp. 289-296. 116. Sinar Hind/a, Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, pp. 293-294, gives the arguments of some of the delegate!!. According 10 Soeara Ro'/at, Feb. 16, 1923, in lPO, no. 10, 1923, p. 508, only three locals represented at the congress op-

posed a strike. 117. Sinar HfndM. Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, pp. 293-294, 295; see also Sf Tettlp, Dec. 3 1, 1922, in lPO , no. 8, 192.3, p. 387. T he latter reference is an article by Scmaun reviewing the VSTP congress ( the December 1922 number ol SI Tetop was published after that meeting); and SI Tettlp, January-February, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 636-637 (article by Semaun). That the decision to delay was the rerult of Semaun's efforts in the face of opposition by the branches is maintained in the government reports Mededeelingen 1924, p. 3, a11d Oocrzicht 1923, p. 3; and in "Conununlsme," p. 533, coL a. 118. Soeoro Ro'jot, Feb. I , 19'23, in lPO, no. 8, 1923, pp. 379-380; Baedl Oetomo, Feb. 17, 1923, in lPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 394. 119. AI; a result of the labor unrest of 19 19-1920, the gove rnment had formed a commission to determine whether it should institute govenunent_Iabor_management councils to settle disputes in public services and vital enterprises; Semaun had been one of the principal lndonesiam consulted by the commission. He, as well as the non-Communist leaders, had opposed the coun cils, arguing that they feared the government Qnd management members wouJd tend to ally agaimt the union representatives. On the otbcr hand, neutnll "arbitration courts" were long-standing objectives of both the PPPB and the VSTP and .figured pmminent1y as strike demands. Indies courts of law were considerably mom neutral in judging claimed infractions of political restrictions than were adm inistrative officials, and this may explain the preference of both Corrununist a nd non-Commun ist bbor organizatiom for a system of cou rts in which the uniom would have no representation to one of councils in whieh they would have a voice. For comments on the labor commission and its negative results, see De Indi.sche Gids, XLIV ( 1922), 259-260, 38&--392. 120. Sinar Hlndta, Dec. 27-29, 1922, in IPO, no. I , 1923, pp.20-22, with the text of the resolution. . 121. See Koch, Verontwoording, pp. 164-166; Brouwer, De houding, p. 120; and }. HuishoH Pol, " Het Indische bezoldigingsvraagstuk" (The Indies Salary Question) , De Indbclle Cids, XLV (1923), 577--584, for discussions of the salary question. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 205-207, discusses the division of legal status along ethnic lines; the 1919 measure, this account points out, was taken with an associa tionist eye to faciUlating the absorption of the population into European status, but the conservative attitudes prevailing after 1920 reversed illl function. 122. Kemadjoean mndio, Mar. 24, 192.3, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 112-113; Sinar mndta, May 5, 192.3, in IPO, no. 19, 192.3, pp. 253-254. 123. "Communisme," p. 533, col. a.

414

Notes, p. 150 124. The discussions

011

April 9 were with the railroad companies' representa-

tives, in Semanmg; those on April 12 were with the state railway officials, in Batavia. The VSTP asked for an eight-hour working day, postponement of the

oost-of-living bonus removal untiJ worlcers' 5alaries had been raised to compensate, compulsory arbitration of labor dispu tes by an independent government body, and an end of dIsmissals without cause; leaBet comprising a VSTP manifesto, written by Semaun, dated Apr. 23, 1923. The text of the manifesto is also given in Sioor HindUl, May 5, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 254-255. 125. Sinar H/MUl, Apr. 18, 1923, in IPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 163; "Communisme," p. 533, col. b; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 7-8; VSTP manifesto dated Semarong, Apr. 23, 1923. To the last-named leaflet was attached an announcement from the VSTP executive, which relayed the warning and assured that Sernaun was willing to sacriGce his freedom for the .....orlcers. Sinar Ilindla, Apr. 21, 1923, ventured more hopefully that the warning was probably intended as a joice; IPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 164. 126. Sioor H/ndlo, May 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 256-260; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 8; "Communisme," p. 533, col. b. Semaun uttered this challenge first at a VSTP meeting on April 30 and then before a mass VSTP-sponsored gathering in Semanmg on May 6. The Sinor H/nd/.a article cited above reports the May 6 meeting: according to it, Semaun and other VSTP leaders emphasized, as usual. that the strike was being forced on them; both speakers and audience were extremely agitated, and the spooches were interru pted by cries of "Strike, strike!" The Minister of Colonies' report on the strike to parliament gives a detailed account of the manner in which it spread from Semarang; see "Begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor 1924" (Budget of the Netherlands Indies for 1924), Bijlage B of Bijl6gen van 1wt verslag der handellngen oon de Tweede KameT der Statf!1l-Gencraal, 192.3-1924, pp. 195-196; hereafter Begrootlng 1924. 127. Boedi Octama, May 16, 1923, in lPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 338. 128. It is dear that the VSTP had not recl.:oned on such a prompt response to Semaun's challenge; in fact, it seems likely that it had not counted at all on Semaun's arrest before the strike began. The VSTP manifesto of April 23 said that in case of a walkout Semaun was appointed "strike dictator" and would ooordinnte aU strike actio",. According to Sinor Hindia, May 12, 1923, in IPO. no. 20, 1923, p. 800, Semaun was just about to form the strike organization when he was arrested. In his speech to the May 6 VSTP gathering Semaun announced a mnss demonstration for June 5, before new d iscussions of the railroad worker!!' demands; Sinar Hindia, May 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 19, 1923, p. 258. It may be that the strike was to begin after the predictable failure of these talles. 129. 1be actual total of railroad worlrers who joined the strike is not known, since the available accounts d isagree; Blumberger, Communi.rt, p. 33, gives the number as 2,500, and the Netherlands Indies wire service estimated it at 8,000; Aneta, cited in Sinor Hindia, May 31. 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, p. 433. A con· temporary Profintern report stated that 3,000 workers began the strike and that 8,000 eventually joined; 1.. Heller, ''Zur ee. . .erkschaftsbewegung im Osten" (On the Labor Union Movement in the East), RCI, August, 1923, p. 736. Sncevlict said 12,000 workers were involved; Oekonomisclle, p. 17. De Tribune, July 31, 1925, gives the number as 13,000 out of a total of 20,000 rail and tram employees on Java, and Aidit agrees; Scdfarah, p. 54. A Profuttem account, Me-.1tdunarodnoe proldoi:.hMle 1923-1924 gg. (International Trade Union Movement 1923-1924 ) (Moscow, 1924 ), pp. 290-291, gives 12,000; and the Prolintern encyclopedia, Malaia cnUtkloped/ia po mezhdunarodnomu profdviz/,eniiu (Small En-

415

Notes, pp. 150-153 cyclopedia of the Intemational Labor Union Movement) (MosCow, 1927), cuI. 560, gives 13,000. The avnUable Netherlands Indies government repom do not give any estimates. The railroad workers in Sumatra did not )oin in the strike; Tftlftl Sumatra, May 14, 1923, in l PO, no. 22, 1~..3, p. 351. According to another account, only the Javanese workers stmclc, and the employees of Madurese and Sundanese origin remained at their jobs; Darmo Kondo, July 21 and 28, 1923, in IPO, no. 31, 1923, pp. 197-198. Another report said that few employees of the NIS line, where conditions had been relatively good, had joined in the walkout; Kemadjoean JIindla, June 2, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 41s....4·19. 130. Koch, Verantwoording, p. 135. 131. Koch, Verantwoording, p. 136. Koch was, however, sent to jail for several days for baving written that the governmen t bad used Semaun's challenge to provoke the strike before the han~t season; he giYe$ an amusing account of his experience in his autobiography, Verantwoording. pp. 139-143. According to Koch, Bdonje, the editor of the West Java (Batavia) edition of the lnd~che COtlnlnt, also sympathized wi th the strikers; Lievegoed, of De Locomatief, dis. approved of the strike but asserted that wages were too low and the workers had serious reason for discon tent; p. 136. The rest of the Indies Dutch press shared the government view of the action. 132. Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., .pp. 76-78; and see Koch, Verantwoordlng. pp. 136, 139. Subsequently the SOAP presented its own motion asking only for withdrawal of Article 161 b~, but this was also rejected. 133. De Locomotjef, quoted in De lndische Gldt, XLV, 1923, 786; see also pp. 827 (comments from the Sumatra Pad) and 892-893 (comments from the Algemeen Handelshlad). The journal of Indies police commissioocrs, on the other hand, found the strike law and the new restrictions on the right of assembly confusing and vague; pp. 893-894, comments from the Nederwnd&ch-Indi!che PolitiegkU. 134. Lists of the more prominent of those arrested are given in Sioar fllMla, May 12, 14, 16, 19.22-28, and 31, 1923, in lPG, nos. 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1923, pp. 300, 305, 349, 380, and 433. According to Sneevllet, 120 leaders were arrested, of which UO were Communists; 50 of these were kept in prison after the strike had ended; Ockonomi&che, p. 17. The Dutch Communist newspaper claimed that 140 strikers were anested and that those sentenced received terms of three months to throo years; De Tribune, July 31, 1925. 135. Sioar HlndJa, May 12, 19, 22, 24, and 26, 1923, in lPG, nos. 20, 21, 2.2, and 23, 1923, pp. 303, 351-3.52, 383, 428, and 429-430. 136. See Mededeelingen 1924, p. 8. Collection of funds to support the striJcen' families Wa.'l, after some confusion, prohibited by the Resident of Semarang under the re&rulation forbidding aid to illegal strikes. 137. See Sioar Hlndla, May 22 and 23,1923, in lPO, no. 22, 1923, pp. 381-382. In these first repom of strikers returning to work, the newspaper strongly dis. approved their action. 138. VSTP leaBct issued June 4, 1923. According to Sugono, the state railways (SS) and the NIS took back no strikers, and the four other atrected companies (SJS, SCS, SDS, and OJS) took them back as DeW workers. with reduced wages; 51 Tetap, Jan. 31, 1924, in lro, no. 8, 1924, p. 440. 139. Sioar HlndM, May 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 258-259; leaflet issued by strike headquartel'S on May 10, 1923; leaBet issued during the strike by the "Conunittee of White-Collar Employees" to the "white-collar workers in all offices in Semarang."

416

Notes, pp. 153-154 140. See S/nar ll/ndla, May 19, 1923, in lPO, no. 21, 192.3, p. 351, quoting a manifesto issued by the VSTPj Sinor Hlndfa, May 22 and 26, 1923, In lPG, no. 2.3, 1923, pp. 425-428, 431; Soeara Ra'fat, June 1-16, 1923, in IPO, no. 2:1, 1923, pp. 36-37; leaBets issued by the VSTP headquarters at the time of the sbike. 141. See Neratja, May 14, 192.3. in l PO, no. 20, 1923, p.· 29 1 (announcement that the CSI had committed itself to support the strike); Kemadioean Hindla, May 12, 1923, in lPO, nO. 20, 1923, p. 287 (PVH manifesto In support of the sbike); Boedi Qetomo, May 12 and 16, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, pp. 338-339j Neratfa, May 17, 102.3, in lPO, nO . 2 1, 1923, pp. 347-348; Oetoe80n Melofoe, May 24. 1923, in IPQ, no. 25, 1923, p. 536; PerobaJum, June 7, 1923, In 11'9. no. 25, 1923; Doenla Daroe, J une 6/13. 102.3, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, p. 554; kmcd~n H/ndia, June 21 and 22, 1923, in lPO, no. 26, 1923, pp. 574-575; Oetouan Meia/oe, J une 14, 19"..3, in 1PO, no. 26, 1923, p. 58.5; Sri Dfofobojo, May 15 and 23, 19"..3, in IPO, no. 22, 1923, pp. 392-393; Boed/ Oetomo, May 28 and 31, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 403-404, 408; Darma Kondo, May 30, 1923, In IPO, no. 23, 1923, p. 411 ; Kemadfoean ll/ndla, May 31, June 1 and 2, 1923, in l PO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 416-419; Panggoegah, May 23, 1923, in lPO, no. 23, 19"..3, p. 44.2;' Panggoegall, May 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 491492, 492-493; Sri Dioiobojo, May 26, 1923, in lPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 502-503; Boed/ Oetamo, June 12 and 14, 1923, in lPO, no. 25, 1923, pp. 514-516; Darmo Kondo, June 9, 1923, in l PO, no. 25, 1923, pp. !i19-520; Kemadfoean HindkJ, June 14, 1923, [0 IPO, no. 25, 1923, pp. 52:h524. Of these, all exoept Suwardi Surjanlngrnfs neutral comment in Panggoegah of May 23 and the Boedl Oetemo articles expressed general sympathy with the strike, although some were critical of Semaun's haDdling of it. The C(lmffillnt in Boedl Oetomo ranged from sympathetic to mild1y critical, reSecting the dissension within that party, whose younger generation was much disturbed by the C(lnscrvative leaders' refusal to support the strike. The result of this dispute was reduced party activity during 1923; "Baedl Octomo," p. 940, C(li. b. 142. Sinar H/ndta, May 29, 1923, in 1PO, no. 24, 1923, p. 472. 143. Correspondence between the Bandung and Tapanuli locals of the VSTP and uniOD hcadqunrten, Ju1y 1923; Mataha ri, Sept. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 37, 1923, p. 496; SinM Hindla, Dec. 22, 1923, in lPO, no. 1, 1924, p. 19; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 444-445; Zakaznikova, " Rabochoo dvi7.henie," p. 166. According to this last account, the membersh ip of the railroad workers' union sank to 500 after the strike. The prohibition of assembly for the VSTP was maintained untiJ Oct. 1, 1923, and only after that did the union begin to rev ive. 144. Soeara Ra'iat, Ju1y 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 30, pp. 169--170. 145. Sinar Hlndla, Oct. 8, 1923, in lPO, no. 42, 1923, p. 99. The restrictions on the ri ght of assembly were lifted. in September 1923 except in Madiun, where the large number of unemployed fonner strikers made it inadvisable, the govemment thought, to allow froo expression of public opinion; Mededeelingen 1924,

p.8. 146. "Mistoke du mouvement syndicaliste IndonesiCnne" ( HiStory of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement ) Rewe IndoneslCnne (Paris ) I (n.d.), no. 2, p. 2; Suroso, "De lndonesische vakbeweging," p. 213. In the last-named article, the PVH chairman stated that the federation had not been consu1ted by the VSTP on the strike plans. The present PKI chairman maintains in his history of the Indonesian labor movement, however, that at a PVH meetin g of Apr. 29/30, 1923, in Surabaja, it was decided. that an industrywide rail strike would be held if any labor leaders were arrestoo; Aidit, Scdfllrall, p. 55.

417

Notes, pp. 154--156 147. Sinat H/ndia, Aug. 21, 1923, in lPO, no. 34, 1923, p. 355. Before his extcmment Sernaun was presented by the government "ith 102 questions about his political activity. to which he replied with a general essay of defense. Since there was no question about his fale, one might have expected an all-out attack on the authorities. Instead, he said that even after his return from Moscow he had believed the government should help destroy capitalism and introduce Communism in the Indies. It should have worked in this direction by developing the country's natural resources and industry and raising the living standard through a broad program of developmental projects financed by heavier taxes and forced loans from big business and hy borrowing from America; De Indi$c:he GkU, XLV, 895-897. Given Semaun's previous heretical inclinations, it is possible that he had in fact entertained these theories. However, he said, his arrest had d isillusioned him, and he proved it when be arrived in Holland by writing a pamphlet explaining that he now believed the colonial reL1tionshlp could only end in violence; Semaun, Hoe het HolLJfIlbche impcrialmne het brvine millioenen-oolk aonut tat un mauomcrd op Eurapeanen In Indone8le ( How Dutch Imperialism Encourages the Brown Millions to a Mass Murder of Europeans In Indonesia ) (n.p., 1923?).

CHAPTER VIII 1. The Bfteen PICI branches were Wirosari. Rantjaekek. Bandung, Surahrta. Sukabumi, Semarang. Randublatung, Bogor. Sumedang, Jogjakarta. Salatl~a. Tjirebon. Madiun, Surabaja, and Tjitjalenh; the Red SI delegates were from Sernamng. Wirosarl, Bandung, Tasilannlaja, Jogjakarta, Purwokerto. Salatiga, Madiun, Sukabumi, ICallwungu, Kendal, and Ungaron. In addition, there "'-ere representatives from thirteen labor un ions and from the Sarekat Hindia, Budi Utorno, Pasundan, a League against Unemployment ( Bond tegen Werkeloosheidl, and a local political action group (Pla~tselijk Comite voor Politieke Actie) ; ~ jnar Hlnd/Q. Mar. 7-12, 192.3, in lPO, no. 11, 1923, p. 545. A slightly different number of attending units is given in the government report Uittrcku l tift e'en rapport oon den WfUlana IAnd;oemln gela r Dmoe' Toe'manggoeng ler be.tchlkklng vim den Wd. Adt)~ur ooor Inlond"chc ZakeJI over het P.K.I. congre.f gchouden op 4 Moort le Bandoeng 6 Moort 1923 Ie SoektJboemi ( Excerpt from a Report by the Wooana Landjumin gclar Datuk Tumanggung, for the Use of the Acting Advisor for Native Affairs, Concerning the PICI Congress Held on Mar. 4 in Bandung and Mar. 6, 1923, in Suhburn!), hereafter referred to as Ulttrehcl; 3CCQrding to it, sixteen PK! and fourteen Red SI branches were represented ( p. 1) . A report to the Governor General on the congress by Acting Adviser for Native Affairs E. Gob6e (unti tled typescript, dated Mar. 13, 1923, no. E. 61, classified), hereafter cited as Report. states that there were delegates from sixteen PKI locals and thirteen ( out of a total of twenty-one) Red SI branches (p. 3). Possi bly these discrepancies reRect different attendance at the Bandung and Sulcabumi sessions. 2. Sfnar RInella, t.lar. 7- 13, p. 543; Ufttreksel, p. 1. 3. Sirw r Hindla, Mar. 7-13, p. 543. 4. Uittreksel, pp. 10-11, 12. 5. Uittreksel, pp. 4-12; and sec Sfnar Hinella, Mit, 7-13, 1923, pp. .544-545; SI V, pp. 380, coL b-381, col. a; Orer%icht 1923, p. 6. . 6. See Sinar H/ndia, Mar. 15, 1923, in lPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 591-594 (texts of the motions. passed at the Bandung and Sukabumf sesslorui); also Uittrebel, pp. 13, 23; CobOO, Report, p: 4.

418

Notes, pp. 156-160 7. 51nar IIIndia, Mar. 15, 1923., p. 594. Emphasis in the text. According to

Gobeo (Report. p. 4), the congress also resolved at its Sukaburni session to support the replacement of the name of the regent by that of the Chalif at the Friday services ( presumably on the grounds that the naming of the regen t in· volved mingling church and state). This embroiled the party in an extremely sensitive religious issue, for the use of the regent's name was a local tradition which those officials had a very lively interest in preserving. The Conununist'l

do not seem to have pushed this issue subsequently, hut the Muslim modernists dJd, for they also opposed the naming of the regent as an impwity of Islamic practice in Java. It became, in fact, a favorite project of Hadji Agw; Salim, and, as we shall see, it was to lead to violence in WC!;t Java in which both the 51 and PKI were victims. 8. Sinar RInella, Mar. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12,1923, pp. 594-595 ( text of the resolution on fonnation of the SR ). 9. Sinor Hindkl, Mar. 15, 1923, pp. 594-595. For comments on the resolution, see S. Dingley, [Iwa Kuswnasumantri? ), The Feasam:' Movement in Indonetio (Berlin, 1926?), pp. 38-40; Oven/cllt 1923, pp. 6-7; A. Cuber, "Natsional'nDosvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii" ( The National Liberation Movement in Indonesia), Reooliutsio,myj Vostok (no. 112, 1933) , p. 191; P. Bergmeijer, lIet Com~u~e in Indie (Communism in the Indies) (n.p., 1927), p. 3; "Commurusme, p. 534, col. a. 10. "Discussion Oil the Eastern and Colonial Questions," Inpreco rT', Dec. 7, ] 922. p. 895; Fomth Congre.u of the Commun/.st Intematwnal (London, n.d.), pp. 222-224; Bericht iiber den vierlen Kongreu der Kommunfstischen Internotlcnole (Report on the Fourth Congress of the Communist International) ( Hamburg, 1923) , Pl'. 141-142; hereafter Bencht IV Kongreu . 11. Bericht IV Kongres$, p. 213; Reso/utiotl.f and Thesc$ of the FQlJrlh Congren of the Communist Internal/onal (London, n.d.), p. 59, from the theses on the Eastern question. 12. For Liu's remarks, sec ProtokoU rk$ wrien Kongrcuu
419

Notes, pp. 160-162 and the pro-Communist Matahnn in the Indies published anxious spec:ulations as to his fate (A ug. 10 and 20, 192.2, in IPO, no. 34, 1922, p. 277), until it was assured by the better-informed Sinor Hlndia that Malaka had merely gone to "another country" in order to "broaden his vil;ion" (Aug. 21-30, 1922, In ]PO, no. 36, I9Z2, p. 347). 18. InprekotT, Nov. 8, 1922, pp. 1497-1498. 1be ECCI ~ion of Nov. 2 detennined the voting strength of the delegations at the fourth congre.u, dividing the countries into £lve nmb and allotting them 45, 30, 20, 10, or 5 votes. Thi.oi systelQ heavily favored Russia and the West European parties; of the Far Eastern countries represented, Japan received 30 votes, India and China 10 each, and Java 5. 19. MalaJca., DP I, pp. ~ 101. Emphasis in the text. 20. Mnlab, "Dc Islam en bet Bolsiewisme" (Islam and Bolshevism ), De Tribune, Sept. 21, 192<); emphasis in the text. 21. "Discussion on the Report of the Executive," InprewtT, Dec. 5, 1922, pp. 875-876. See abo ProlokoU IV Kongreu, pp. 186-189. 22. Bericllt IV Kongreu, pp. 131- 132; Protokoll IV Kongren, p. 590, 607; "Report on the Eastem and Colonial Questions," pp. 97S-988. 23. In 1926 the Grst World Islam Congress was held in Mecca; the Soviet Union sent six delegates. During the congress they voted consistently in favor of the Saudists, made anti-European propaganda, and contacted numerous Muslim delegates including Tjokroaminoto and Hadji Mansur; the latter represented the A1-Is1am Congress, which had been made a permanent organization 10 promote Pan-lslamism in Indonesia in 1924. According to Indies govemment reports, the Soviet delega tes told them that, although they had hitherto concentrated on contacting the Muslims in India. they now thought it time to establish linlcs wi th Malaya :md the Netherlands Indies. They staled that they hoped to meet with important Muslim Ggures from these arell' during the hadf; Politieke nota 000f" de Parti; KommurMt Indonena (Political Note on the Indonesian Communist Farty) (Netherlands Indies government, clauiGed, 1927 ), pp. 16-17, herea rtet PoUtieke nota PK1; Neutraliscering, p. 16. Returning from the Mecca congress, Tfokronminoto transformed the A1-1s1am Congress into the Mu'lamar al-Ala m al-Islami far'al Hind Asj-Sjarqijjah ( MAlUS, Wodd Is1am Congress, East Indies Bran.:-h ); in 1927 Hadji Agus Salim went to Mecca as MAlHS representative. At th is meeting it became dear that lhe World Islam Congress was not to be<:ome a pcnnanent body; Soviet and Ind ian delegates joined Snlim in establishing the Dam'jJllt Ansarul Hammain (Union of Supporters of the Two Holy Cities), and the MAIHS became its Indonesian branch; OVCTzlcllt 000 den fnlVe1ldlgen polit/eken toertond (1924-15 "prll 1928) (Sul'Vey of the Intemal Political Situation [1924-April 15, 1928] ), in Mededeelingen der Regecring omtrent enkek oncierwerpen oon algemeen belang ( Weltevreden, 1928), coL 22. For a Soviet discussion of the political aspects of the Chalifate qUC5tion lind the 1926 Mecca congress, see N. A. Smimov, Islam I .sot:remennyl V ostok ( Islam and the ContemIX'rTlI')' East) ( Moscow, 1928) , pp. 96-108. 24. Malnka, DP I, p. 101; see alsq ProtokoU IV Kongreu, p. 88; Boersner, BoLsllooih, p. 125. Tan Malaka was interrupted by the chairman of the meeting, who announced that his time was up; unabashed, the Indonesian delegate replied \vith II few pointed remarks about Western Communists who thought they could decide the situation in Asia without !mowing anything about it. 25. Reroluh'oll.l' and These" pp. 54-55. 26. See, for example, Matahan, Apr. 4. 1923, in lPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 126-127.

420

Notes, pp. 163-165 27. G, Safarov, "Natsional'no-kolomal'nyi vopros Da IV. Kongresse Komintema" (The National-Colonial Question at the Fourth Cominlcm Congress), N00!Ji Vonok. 1922, p. 74. 28. See Kan [sIc] Malaka and Van Reesem, "Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in

Indo-China ( Holliindisch.Ostindien )" (The Trade Union Movement in Indochina [sic] [the Dutch East Indies]), RCI, Octobel- 1922, pp. 660-861; Hammar, "Revolutionary Movement in Dutch East India," inprecorr, Dec. 7. 1922, p. 890; P. Bergsma, "A Great Political Strike in Java," ln precorr, June 21, 1923, p. 436, G. Vanier, "Dutch Imperialism in the East Indies," lnprecorr, Jan. 6, 1922, p. 11. Similarly, Tan Malakll, in the 1922 Dutch election campaign, and Snoeviiet, when he returned to Holland from his first China sotoum, made speeches in which they noted favorahly the restoration of the SI-PKI alliance; De Tribune, June 20 and 21, 1922. The only notable exc:eptions were two articles sharply critical of the SI leaders : Praniero, ''The Communist International in the Dutch Indies," lnprecorr, Aug. 12, 1922, pp. 541-542; and Soodjammo, "The Labour Movement in the East Indies," lnprccorr, Nov. 22, 1921, p. 81. These reports we~ apparently written by InrlotHlsians, though "Praniero" and "Soedjammo" are not recognizably the names of pK] leaders. We might suspect Darsono, who was wo rking for the Comintem in Europe at the time, who did not usually

publish his writings for the International under his own name, and who had an admittedly low opinion of the SI leaders. 29. Vtorol kongres$ Kr(l$flogo Internatsio1llJla profwiuwv v Moskve 19 no/abrio2 dekabrla 1922 goda (Second Congress of the fled International of Labor Unions in Moscow, Nov. 19--Dec. 2, 1922) ( Moscow/Pctrograd, 1923), p. 263; Malaka was referring to a report by Leo Heller given on p. 260. 30. Bericllt der E:r:ekutive der Kommumstfschen lnternationale 15. De:.ember 1922-15. Mai 1923 . (Report of the Executive of the Communist International, Dec. I5-May 15, 19"-3) (Mo~cow, 1923), p. 41. Tan Malaka referred to the Sarekat Islam as a "giant, revolutionary people's party, counting one and one·half million members." "Our Communist party," he continued, "numbers about 13,000 members." The reason for the Sarekat Islam's size and radical nature, Mala1ca explained, was that Indonesia had little in the way of a native hourgeobie, and Industrialization and plantation agriculture had created a largo proletariat, in· debted peasantry, and landless laboring group; "these relationships thus approach the line of a class struggle against tho factory and foreign plantation owners." 31. E:hegodnl~ Konuntema (Olmintem Yearbook ) (Petrogrnd / Moscow, 1923), p. 173.

32. Mer.hdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg., p. 286. 33, P. Bergsma and T. Malaka, "Communism in Java," Inpreoorr, Aug. 16, 1923, p. 601.

34. P. Bergsma, "Progress of the Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia," lnpreco", Dec. 31, 1925, p. 1366. 35. Bergsma and Malaka, "Conununism in Java," p. 001. Emphasis in the tm. 38. Tao Malaka, DP I, p. 94. 37. Sinar Hindi6, Feb. 19, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 354 ( article by Darsono); Darsono, interview, 1959. 38. Algemeen lndlsch Dagblad, Aug. 15, 1925; Nleuwe RotterrUJmsche Courant, Sept. 22, 1925. 39. See Schrieke, "Political Section," pp. 99-100. 40. Semaun and Darsono, interviews, 1959; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 11 3; PringgodJgdo, Sed/arah, pp. 38-39.

421

Notes, pp. 165-167 41. Darsono landed on Feb. 15; the congress agenda was published in Sinar ml1lila on Feb. 12. 42. See Sinar HindU!, Mar. 27 to Apr. I, 1922, in lPO, no. 14, 1922. pp. 18;-21 (e5S8.y by D.mono, who was then in Europe); SlnDr Hindla, Feb. 19, 1923, in lPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 354 (message by Darsono on his return to the Indies) ; Sinar 1IInd/a, Oct. 30 and Nov. I, 1923, in lPO, nos. 45 and 46, 1923, pp. 265W1,302-304 (speech by Darsono to the Semarang PKI, Oct. 2B. 1923); Sinar Hlndia, Dee. 17, 1923, in Iro, no. 52, 1923, pp. 615-618 (speeches by Darsono and AbduIradunan [the PKI secretary] to a mass meeting ~ponsored by the Semarang PKI on Dee. 16, 1923); Sinar Hindia. Oct. 30, 1923, In IPO. no. 45. 1923, p. 267, and Nov. 1, 1923, In lPO, no. 46,19"..3, p. 304 (speeches by Darsooo and Abdulrachman to a meeting of the Semnrang PKI on Oct. 28, 1923 ). 43. Darsono, interncw, 1959. 44. Sillar lIindia., Dec. " and 13, 1923, in lPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 525; 51001 Hlndfo, Dec. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 52, 1923, pp. 614-619; Kemad;oean mndfG, Dec. 31, 1923, in lPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 43-45; Sinar llindia. Jan. 2 and 3, 1924, in lPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 54-55; Sinor Hindia, Feb. 28, 1924, in lPO, no. 10, 1924, p. 414; Verslag oon her 9de Kommtmhten kongre! (P.K.O , gchouden te BDtatmJ op 7, 8, 9 en 10 Juni 1924 (Report of the Ninth Communist Congress (PKI1, held at Batavia on June 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1924), typescript, signed by R. Kern, Acting Adviser for Native Affairs, p . 22, hereafter Ver.rlag 9de; see Mededeelingen 1924, p. 11; Ovenicht 1923, p. 11 . 45. See Sinor Hindl4, Oct. 30, 1923, in lPO, no. 45,1923, p. 267; Sinor Hlndia, Nov. 1 and 5, 1923, in lPO, no. 46, 1923, p. 302, 309-310; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 22, 1923, in lPO, no. I , 1924, p. 20; Kemadfoean H/ndilJ, Dec. 31, 1923, in lPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 43-45: S/JIlJr H/ndilJ. Jan. 2 and 3, 1924, in lPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 54-55; Sinar llindia, Jan. 9, 1924, in lPO, no. 3, 1924, p. Ill; Doenia Mardeka, Jan. 15, 1924, in lPO, no. 4, 1924, pp. 162-183: Matahari, January 1924, in lPO , no. 5, 1924, p. 203; Sendjata Ra'jat, January 1924, in lPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 258; Socara & 'jat, January 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, p. 298. 46. SIMara Ra'jat, Jan. 1, 1924, in lPO, no. 7, 1924, pp. 296-297. See Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 12-13, 25: Blumberger, Natwnolht, p. 116; HI923-lndonesia -1924," pp. 29-32: Ooonlchl oon den inwendlgen pol/tieken toestand (Februari 1926-Moorl 1927) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation (February 1926March 1927]) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, typescript), pp. 23-24, . hereafter Over..icht 1927. 47. See Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 32, lIS-lI6; "Boedi Oetomo," p. 941, col. a. 48. For oonvnents on the Sl's decline, see Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 75-83; "Sarent Islam," pp. 945, cols. a-b, 948, col. h ; Ovenicht 1924, pp. 22-24; Mededeelfngen 1924, p. 5; Kemadfocan Hindia, Dec. 5, 1923, in lPO, no. SO, 1923, p. 513; Kem6d;oean Hiodia, May 19-24, 1924, in lPO, no. 22, 1924, pp. 369370; &madjoean Hind/a, June 29-July 5, 1924, in lPO, no. 28, 1924, pp. 62-63. 49. See articles by Surjopranoto, DIMnia Baroe, Mar. 7 and 21, 19-23, in 11'0, nO$. 11 and 12, 1923, pp. 549, 679-881 ; by Suwardi Surjaningrnt in Panggoegah, Apr. 4, 1923, in lPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 88-89; by SumarsollO Saslrosumarto in 1'anggoegah, Apr. 7, 1923, in 11'0, no. 15, 1923, pp. 89-91; and by Suwardi Surj:lningrnt in Panggoegah, Apr. It , 1923, in lPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 130-131. SO. In a meeting hcld . to reconcile differences in the ]Og}1karta group, the executive split, four in favor of the party di$dpline deciJ;ion, four against, and Surfopranoto (the chairman ) neutral. The result was two separate SIs in that city; Nerat;a, April 21, 1923, in lPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 154.

422

Notes, pp. 167-170 51. Kenuuljoean mndia, Dec. 5, 1923, in lPO, 110. 50, 19:.23, p. 513; Meaedeellngen 1924, pp. 17-21. 52. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 83. 53. 51nar Hlndla, June 26, July 4, Dec. 12, 1923, in IrO, nos. 28 and 51, 1923.

pp. 68, 74-75, 511-573. 54. 51nar Hindla, Mar. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 589. 55. He was considering the oHer, he declared, and at the same time he hiDtedthinking, perhaps, of the European sojourns enjoyed by some PKI leaders-that he also would be interested in going to HaDand to help strengthen the bonds between the Dutch and Indonesian workers' movements; Doenla Daroe (Sllrjopranato's newspaper), Mar. 7, 1923, in lPO, no. 11, 1923, p. 549. Nothing seems to have come of these projects, however. He SOOD returned to the 51 fold and made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort to keep the pawnshop workers' union from falling into Communist hands. for which he was ",warded at the 1924 Sarekat Islam congress by an appointment as CSI commissioner. Verslog van het l1e kongru der Centrale Sarikat Islam, gehotulen te SQCTabo;a op 8 tIm 10 Augwtw 1924 ( Report on the llth Congress of the Central Sambt Islam, Held at SurabaJa, Aug. 8 to 10, 1924 ) (undated typescript, signed by the Adviser for Native Affairs, R. Kern), p. 7. He finally achieved his trip abroad as a CSI representative to the Cairo Chalifate conference of 1926; see F. von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia" (Berkeley, Cal., diss., 1957 ), l!iam, p. 188. 56. kmod;ocan Hindw, Aug. IS, 1924, in lPG, no. 35, 1924, p. 428 (open letter by Sosrokardono). 57. Sinor Rindw, Sept. 16, 1923, in lPG, no. 41, 1923, p. 55; Kemadjoean Hindfa, Dec. 5, 1923. IPO, no. 50, 1923. pp. 513-514; Neratfa, Dec. 15. 1923, in lPO, no. 51, 1923, p. 570. 58. Neutralt:eerlng, pp. 70-71; see also Tamar Djaja, Trio Komuniof lntionelio, pp. 36-38; HaS, p. 105; Alimin, RiWtJjot Hidup ( Autobiography) (Djakartai', 1955), pp. 7. 10-14; Alimin, "Tjokroaminoto Pemimpin jang Revolusioner dan Anti-Imperialis" ( Tjo1croaminoto, a Revolutionary and Anti-Imperialist Leader), in HOS, p. 32. 59. HVW, June 10, 1918, p. 229; Sept. 30, 1918, p. 327. 60. Boedi Detolno, Mar. 25, 1924, in lPO, no. 11, 1924, p. 444; Sin Po, May 28, 1924, in lPG, no. 23, 1924, pp. 423-425. 61. Kerrwd;oean HindU; Oct. 15, 1923, in lPO, no. 43, 1923, p. 143. A month Inter be and Musso resigned their editorship of the paper after a conference at Tjokroaminoto's home; Kerruulfoean Hindla, Nov. 26, 1923, in lPG, no. 48, 1923, p. 409, and Ja oa Bode, Feb. 7, 19-25. 62. Nerat;a, Apr. 26, 1924, and Sinor Hindfa, May 12, 23, and 24, 1924, in IPO, nos. 18, 20, and 22, 1924, pp. 196, 277, 381, 383. 63. Oetoesan Hindia and Nerolin, May 17, 1921, in lPG, no. 21,1921, pp. 349351. For biographical information, see Oimyati, Sed;arah, pp. 16, 193; Nieuwe Rntterdam:che Courant, Sept. 29, 1925; Soerabalasch Handellblod, Oct. 17, 1925; Neutraliaeering, pp. 70-71; Vergadering oon de Sarikat Ralat te Bandoerrg (Meeting of the Sarelcat Rakjat at Bandung) (typescript, 1924 ) , pp. 6-8; Handefingen Volkrraad, 1922, First Session, p. 228 ( Hadji Agus Salim); Darsono, "Toenemende verwaning in Indonesie" (Increasing Confusion in IndoDesia) , De Vlarn, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 4; HaS, pp. 53, 55; "Hendak Kemana Kamu, Musso?" (Quo Vadis Musso?), Mad;allah Menkka, Oct. 2, 1948, p. 3. According to the last source, Musso attended the agricultural college at Bogor (Buitenzorg) alfer finishing teachers training school. His n~me is frequently spelled Muso.

423

Notes, pp. 170-174 64. Sinar llindla, hlaT. 3 and 18, 1924, and Nerat;a, Mar. 6, 1924, in 11'0, 10-12, 1924, pp. 420-421, 463, ·526. Djamaluddin Tamin, written statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono Djojoprajilno, P.K.l.·SIBAR Colllrd Tan Malaka (PKI·SIBAR Agairut Tan Malaka ) (Djakarta, 1962), p. 19, claims that both Musso and Alimin were converted to Communism in TJipinang prison by a fel· low ilIternee, the PKI leader Condojuwono. It is quite possible that CoudoJuwono played a major part in ma1cing up their min
tremely successful in securing followers for the party. However, both had belonged to the ISDV before tbeir imprisonment, and, contrary to Djamaluddin Tamin's account, they re.sumed connections wi th the SI as well as with the Communist'l on their release. 65. Mededeelingen 1924, p. 25. 66. Mededeelingen, 1924, p. 12; and see R. Kern, Ooorzicht oon den {"wend/. gen polit/eken toestand, bestemd ooor tU buprekingen hi; de aanstaande Ru/. dentenconferentie, afgesloren 9 Febnwri 1924 (Survey of the Internal PoUtical Situation, as of Feb. 9, 1924, Intended for the Discussions at the Forthcoming Resi. dents' Conference) (typescript, classified), pp. 7-8, hereafter cited as Ovenich~ Residentenconlerentie. fn. Boedi Oelamo, May 13, 17, and 20, 1924, in IPO, nos. 21 and 22, 1924. pp. 314-315, 319. There were three varieties of Islam on Java, Budi Utamo argued: that of the Muhamrnadijah (with which the CSI was identifled). of the traditionalists, and of the MU5lim Communists, all were based on the Koran,

and none exclusively commanded the truth. Budi Utomo objected both to the attempts of the Muhammadijah to impose its own interpretation and to its approval of individualism, capitalism, and imperialism (the last presumably referred to its Pan·Islamic tendencies). For other comments on the religious limita. tions of the White SI appeal, see Bi;lage van het algemeen uerslag OveT 19.24; politick overzicht (S upplement to the General Report for 1924, Political Survey) (typescript, Signed by the Resident of Semamng, dated 1925 ), p. 7, hereafter HI/lage Semarang; Verslag 9de, p. 25; Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. fn, 71. Although the PKl of the 1920s was not a clearly abangan party, as it has been since the Indonesian revolution, the Communists were occasionally labeled abangan by their SI opponents; for example, Moh. Usman, in Neratfa, Sept. 20, 1922, in lPO, no. 39, 1922., p. 477. . 68. Sinar lIindio, May 7-8, 1924, in 11'0, no. 20, 1924, p. 274; Hoed'Oetomo, May 13 and 17, 1924, in IPO, DO. 21, 1924, p. 314. 69. Idam Bergcrak, May 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 29. 1922, pp. 206-207. 70. Bi;lage Semarang, pp. 12-13, lndische Courant, Feb. 23, 1924, BataPiamch Nleuwsblad. July 2, 1924; Algemeen lndl$ch Vagblad, June I, 1926; Soeraba;aasch lIandelsblad, Oct. 29, 1925, and May 26, 1926; Koch, Veranhcoording. p. 155, "Communisme," p. 534, col. a, l ava Bode, May 26, 1926. 71. Api, May 22 and 26, 1925. Misbach was exiled to Manokwari, North New Guinea, in June 1924. At first be maintained contact witb the movement, sending articles to the Muslim Communist journals in Java and attempting to organize Sawkat Rakjat branches in New Guinea; as a rerull, the govenuncnt clamped down on his correspondence. His wile, who joined him in exile, died in 1925, be then petitioned the govenuncnt to be allowed the alternative of residence in Holland. This was granted, but he bad no lJIOney for the trip. and the PKl, which tried to raise funds Cor him, did not collect enough. He died in early 1926. 72. Api, Mar. 10, 1926, in lPO, no. 10, 1926, p. 495. FOT the general back:.

424

Notes, pp. 174-178 J.,'Tound of the post-Misbach Islamic Communist groups, see the Nieuwe Rotlerd017UChe Courant, Mar. 15 and 16 and May 2, 1926. For the suppression of the Mu'almin movement, see Api, Feb. 16, 1926, Dorow Kondo, Feb. 20, 1926, Mowo, Feb. 4 and 18, 1926, and Nlola, Feb. 19, 1926, in IPO , no. 9, 1926, pp. 423-433, 437-438, 448-450, 456-451; and Api. Mar. 10 and 23, 1926, in [PO, no. 10, 1926, pp. 493-495, 498-499. 73. This accoun t of Oatush's career is drawn primarily from n. Kern, Scheu tl6n den politieken tocstond dCT reridentle Sumatra'a Westkust (Sketch of the Political Situation in the Residency of Sumatra's West Coast) (typescript, dated Batavia, J une 30, 1924, by the Adviser for Native Affairs), pp. 19-22, 26-28; L. dt. Tocmenggocng, Geheime nota lIOor den AdVi.seur OOOT l nland:che zaken ooor het communlsme ler Westkust va n Sumatra (Secret Notc for the Adviser lor Native Affairs Concerning Communism aD the W est Coast of Sumatra) (typescript, dated Weltevreden, J uly 30, 1925), pp. 1-3; and R. Kern, letter to the Governor General, da ted Wcltevredcn, July 23, 1924, no. F/206, classified ( typescript, advising on the internment of Batuah and Zainuddin) , pp. 1,5-7. See also Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 13--15; IPO, no. 45, 1923, pp. 28 1, 287; D;ago! D;agof, Oct. 8, 1923, in IPO, no. SO, 1923, p. 541; "Moeharnmadyah," Encyc10paedle oan Nederwnd.sch-IndU!, VI, 915, col. b; Dimyati, Sed/arah, pp. 19-20; " Verslag van bestuu! en staat van Nederlandsch-Indie, Suriname en Cum!rao 1925" (Report . on Administration and Government of the Netherlands Indies, Dutch Guiana, and Cura~o, 1925) , Bi/lagen oon het undag der handel/ngen oan de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generoai, 1925-1926, Bijlage C, pp. 9-10, hereafter cited as Verslag bestuur 1925; Api, Mar. 4, 1925; Hamh, Kenang-keMngon Hidup ( Memoires) ( Djakarta, 1951), I, pp. 68--76. The lart source, by one of Indonesia's major literary flgures, describes his own reaction as a yOlUlg man to the teachings of the Islamic Communists in Padang Pandjung. The Pta account Pemberontakan November 1926 (The November 1926 Rebellion) (Djakarta, 1961) , p. 73, gives the West Sumatra party leadership at this time as R adji Datuk Datuah (chairman ), Djamaluddin Tamin (.secretary). Natar Zainuddin, Datuk Mangkudun Sati, M, A, A. Perpatih, Achmad Chatib, Abdul Aziz, and Mahmud (members) . 74. Leaflet .sent from the West Coast to a number of religiou.~ teachers in South Tapanuli and Djambi and presumably also distributed in the Minangkabau area itself; quoted in B. F. O. Schrickc, "Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," in Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies ( The Hague and Dandung, 1955) , I, 155. For a discussion of the religious background of Islamic Communism in the Mimmgka bau area, see pp. 149-159. See also Hendrik Bouman, Enlge be$Chouwlngcn over de ontwikkding oon het Intloncmch noti01lalisme op Sumatra'" Westkust (Some Observations on the Development of Indonesian NationaJism. on Sumatra's Wert Coast ) (Croningen, 1949), pp. 6S-71; von der Mehden. Islam. pp. 205--207. 75 . Bi;lage algemeen versing: politick over.:icht 1925 (Supplement to the GeneraJ Report: Political Survey 1925) (typescript, February 1926, signed by the Resident of Semarang. p. 11; hereafter Bi/loge 1925) ; Bi/lage Semarong. p. 8; Polftlek wrslag over 1926 in 11et Gewest Semorang (political Report for 1926 in the Semaran.'( Region) (typescript, February 1927, Signed by the Resident of Semarang, p. 18, hereafter Politiek Verslag 1926 ); "Verslag S. J. Merah dan S. R. Sernarang Tahoen 1924" ( Report or the Semarang Red SI and SR for 1924), Api, May 28 and 27, 1925; Api, Nov. 3--18, 1924, in lPG, no. 46, 1924, pp. 292..293; Api, Mar. 11 and 18, 1925; Mowo, Dec. 7, 1925, in IPO, no. 51 , 1925. p. 615. 76. Soeara Ra'jat , Aug. 1, 1923, in IPO , no. 35, 1923, pp. 419-420; Sinor

425

Notes, pp. 178-179 Hindia, Nov. 1 and 5 and Dec. 11, 192.3, in lPO, no:>, 46 and 51, 1923, pp. 3OZ304, 309, 571-573; Sinar lIiooia, Apr. 19, 23, 30, May 23, and 24, 1924, in lPO, nos. 17, 19, and 22, 1924, pp. 161-162, 230-232, 382. 77. Overzlcht 1927, pp. 23-24. There follows a list of some Indones.ian journals that represented the PKI or were very close to the movement from 1921 to 1925. Many were very shortlived; however, Blumberger, Communist, p. 127, estimates that the 1926 ban on the Communist press affected about twenty publications. Sinar HindU!, later Api (Semarnng. Red SIISR, ed. Semaun, Samsi, Subakatl; Sooara Ra'jal (Semarang. PKI, ed. Pllrlondo, Abdlllmuntalib ); 1:1am Bergerak. later RIl';at Bergemk (Surakarta, Islamic Communist, ed. H. Misooch); M6dQfl Moc.tlimin (Surakarta, IsJamic Communist, ed. Haron Rasjidl; Bendel'a Merah (Temate, MoluC'CaS. PKI, ed. R. M. Gondojuwono); Diogo! Djago! (Padang Pandjang, W. Sumatra, Islamic Communist, ed. N. Zainuddin, Djamaluddin Tamin) ; Pmnandangan Islam (Padang Pandjang, W. Sumatra, Islamic Com· munist, ed. H. Dt. Batuah ); Pasatoean Ha'jot (Surakarta, Ialer Sabliga, New SR, ed. Sosrokardono, Sudiro); Senopatl (Suraka rta, SR, ed. Sandjojo, S. Basah Sentot) ; Bari.wJn Moeda (Semarang, Barisan Muda, ed. Sulebnan); Perlr ( Padang, W , Sumatra, Communist, 00. Baharuddin); Hobroma,koto (Surakarta, SR, ed. S. Sastrodihardjo); Klfahi-DJagoer ( Batavia, Communist, ed. Suba gio); Kromo Mardiko (Jogjahrta, PKI, in Javanese, ed. Wignjosumarto); Mataharl (Bandung, Red SIISR, ed. Sanum, Gunawan, Winanta ); OetOC.JIJn Rafat (Langsa, ..... tjeh, radJcal, ed. Abdw Karim); Malaram ( Bandung, Red SI, ed. Gunawan, Winanta ); SendjatD &J'fat (Pekalongan, SR, ed. Salbnun); Soerapotl (Bandung. in Sunda· nese, PKI, ed. K. Kartawirja); Doenla Achlrat (Bukit Tinggi, W. Sumatra, radical, ed. lain Almalild); Hrililintar (Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. A. C. Salbn, S. M. Anwar); DoenJa Merdekn (Punvokerto, SRI; Sll$aran Ra'jat (Solak, W. Sumatra, SRI; Persamoan (Sibolga, N. Sumatra, Commun[~, ed. Abdulkarim, St. Said Ali); NfaW (Batavia, PKl, ed. Condojuwono); Signal (Sawahlunto, W. Sumatra, SR, ed. Hadji Arl£); Torpedo (Padang, W. Sumatra, SR, ed. Madjid); Battery (Langsa, Atjeh, SRI; Berani ( Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. Careem) ; r elita Ra'jot ( Malcassar, Celebes, SR) ; W arta BomeQ ( Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. Bowie); Profetar (St1rabaja, PKI, ed. Musso); Mowo (Surakarta, in Javanese, PKl); Titar (Bandung. SR); Dfam ( Palcmbang, Communist) ; Cunt"r (Mcdan, Communist). There were also a number of PKI-oriented union ;oumals, the most important of which was 51 Terop (Semarang. VSTP, ed. Sudibio). 78. For example, Sumsi, Itn editor of Sinat Hind/a, refening to the Djojobojo prophesy (see below), noted that it was said that when the kalara) (dried banana leaf) banner Wltves, the Ralu Adil would rome. This interpretation, he declared. was wrong: it showd be at the kola$ 'Mane mati ( the time of most extreme need) that the promised ruler would appear. He would, however, not come in the form of a monarch but as a people's government, for there were now 50 many people that no one man cowd rule them justly. The just role inaugurated by the Ratu Adil would be Communism; it would spread over the entire world and would not need to be founded by anned struggle in lodonesia as it had io Russia, The new era would bring universal prosperity; It was still uncertain when it would come, but it was the duty of the Indonesian people to prepare themselves for it. Sinar Hfndla, Jan. 13, 1921, in [PO, no. 3, 1921. p. 12. For a discussion of the Ratu Adll belief and examples of nincteenth-century movements oriented about it, see C. W. J. Drewes, Drlc jaOOlJruche goeroe',. lIun leven, onderrlcht en meuiasprediklng (Three Javanese Gurus. Their Life, Teachin,l":, and Messianic Prophecy) (Leiden, 1925) . Dre\\'es rellwl:ed that the Hatu Adil belief was used

426

Note" pp. 179-181 by movements thnt sought to introduce new ideas; the most recent phenomenon of this sort, he noted, was the equation of the socialist utopia with the Just Realm of the Rotu Adil (p. 182). He considered the marked decline in traditional messianic movemento;; after the nineteenth century .to have resulted prillcipally from ,t he rise of the modem Indonesian politica1 organizations. These mi ght use the Ratu Adll belief as a propaganda tool, but by proviwng an alternate outlet for the expression of popular protests and hopes and by channeling them in Ol"ganized and modernizing directions, they were fWldamentally changing the way in which the populace expressed itself ( p. 192). That clements of the messianic traditions exist in present Indonesian political behavior is the argumen t of ]wtus M. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cu1turnl Context," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1959, pp. 299-323. Nonetheless, a considerable shift in favor of more "modem" appeals for popular support has taken place since the revolution, as is evidenced in an interesting comparison beh....een the approaches of the modem PKI and the Gerinda (a party basing itseU doctrinally on the Ratu Adil concept) in the Jogjakarta area; Selosoemardjan, Social Clumgn In !ogjokorta, pp. 185-194. 79. Thus Nerat;a, conunenting editOrially on the desertion of CSl leadefS to the PKI, declared that they could not have done so on grounds of principle heeause the principles of Communism and the CSI werc the =e; Nerat;a, May 8, 1924, in IPO, no. 20, 1924, pp. 267-268. SO. The description of society under Conununism is taken from an essay by "0" (Darsono?), in Soeara Ra';at, June 10, 1920, in IrO, no. 25, 1920, p . 9; the characteriw.tion of past SOCiety and the European effect on it from an essay by Darsono that appeared in Soeora Ro';ot, Sept. 1, 1920, In IPO, no. 36, 1920, p. 1, and also in Oetoesan llindia and other opposition journals. Darsono was jailed for some months for t his widely publicized attack on European rule. 81. A connection with Turkey was sometimes consciously propagated by PKI leadefS among the religiously oriented rank and file. For example, at a major meeting of the Surabrta Sarekat Rakjat it was claimed that when Alimin attended the PaciGc T ransport Workers' Conference in Canton (see below), he met with delegntes from Egypt and with Kema1 Pasha, who declared that he was in agreement with Communism and desired a linn union with the Communists; Medan MoesUmln, Nov. 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1925, p. 147. Since the leadefS of the Surahrta SR (Marco and Harun Rasjid) were fairly highly placed in the Communist movement and must have Known the character of the Canton meeting, it seems highly unlikely that this represented a naive response to rumon by provincial Communists. 82. OetOC611n Hilldia, Dec. 11, 1919, in IPO, no. SO, 1919, p. 21; Kaaem Maeda, Dec. 17, 1919, in IPO, no. 51, 1919, pp. 5-6. 83. Oetoelan Hindin, Jan. 8, 1920, in fPO. nO. I, 1920, p . 19; Sept. 22, 1920, in IPO, no. 39, 1920, pp. 15-16; Sept. 29 and Oct. I, 1920, in Iro, no. 40, 1920, pp. 8-9. The September rumors seem to have rurted with an article in the Amsterdam newspaper De Telegraa/ that the Third International was planning to establish a propaganda center 00 Java and had sent gold to the Nctherlaru:l.s Cor the purpose. Oetaesan Hindin pointed out encouragingly that it ..... ould be easier for the Comintem to influence British India from Java than from its prop.'1ganda base in Tashkent. 84. The PKI acknowledged the Russian famine by establishing a committee to aid stamng children in that country; Soeara Ra';at, Nov. I, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383. Nothing sccms to have come of the project, however. The

4Zl

Notes, pp. 181-183 party explanation of the hard times in Soviet Russia WQ5 along the same line that given by Scmaun on his return .to Indonesia. Another aspect of Soviet life that raised popuJar doubts was resumption of international trade; this lndf· cated that the country still relied on a money economy, whereas (money being equated with profit.seeking. capitalism, and Ewopean ru1e ) many PKI followers thought that under Communism there should be only barter trade. The party journal explained that Russia's patey was necessary because it rti1l stood alone; when the rest of the world Imd become Communist, batter would prevall. SoeorG Ha'fat, Oct. 16, 1921, in IPO, no. 44, 1921, pp. 256-257, 85. The actual membership of the PKI and Red SI!SR during this period is difficult to state, since statistics rarely agree. In 1922, a Comintem article claJmed that the party had 200 memben on Java; Praniero, "'The Communist International in the Dutch East Indies," p. 542. The report of the fourth Comintem congress later that same year placed the Dumber of PKI members at 1,300; IV V&enUmyi KDngreu Kommunistlche8lwgo Intematsionala. lzlmmnye tklk1ody, rech! I rezol£u. Uil ( Fourth W orld Congress of the Communist International Selected Reports, Speeches, and Resolutions) ( Moscow/Petrograd, 1923), p. 20. The first total may well have been based on the 1921 figures provided in Semaun's report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. The CPH Indonesia specialist Rutgers also gives 1,300 :l.'l the PKI's membershi p in 19" ..3; the party bad then. he claimed, sixteen branches and the Red Sl/SR had 30,000 to 55,000 members; Rutgers, "De Indonesische nationaJe heweging tot 1927," p. 48. Sneevliet, in February 1924, said that the Red SIJSR had si.r:teen sections and 50,000 members and the PKl had 2,000 members; Oekonomische, p. 17. The same total of PKl members in 1924 is given in the Profintem encyclopedia, but the Red SI/SR following is stated as 60,000, organb.ed in fUty-six sections; Malaia entt/kloped/ia po mezhdtmarodnomu profdol::.heniiu, col. 562. At the June 1924 PKI congreSli party membership was stated as less than a thousand; Vt'f,lag 9th, p. 5. According to Sernaun, the SR had 100,000 members in early 1925; Semaoon, "Brieven,~ June 10, 1925. Tan Malaka also claimed Ihis (for the "Red biamitic Party," which he said had been formed at the March 1923 congress from the units that broke away from the 51), in T. Malaka, "Die Arbeiter in der Zuckerindustrie auf der Insel Java" (The Workers in the Sugar Industzy au the Wand of Java ), RGI, May/June 1923, p. 546. Bergsma declared that after the 1923 split with the Sarelcat Islam the PKI had thirty-two sections and, together with the Red SI, 50,000 members; Bergsma, "A Letter from the Dutch East Indies," InpreCOTT', Sept. ZT, 1923, p . 699. T an Malam is said to have told the ECCI sess.ion of June 1923 that the PKI had 13,000 members; Bericht der Erekutlve-15 Mol 192J, p. 47. This was also claimed in Bergsma an d Malaka, "Communism in Java," p. 607. Either this was in tended as the combined total for PKI and Red SI membership, or it should have read 1,300. 86. VlIlrslag btJstllur 1925, p. 9. SeIIl also Ooer%lcht oon den politie1ren toemand ter SIlmatr4" Westkust aanduitend op het over.dcht M o. 6 Apf"il1927 (S urvey of the Political Situation on Sumaba's West Coast, Continuing the Survey Dated Apr. 6, 1927) (mimeo, da ted Padang. May 10, 1927, signed by the Resident of the West Coast of Sumatra and the Chief of the Regional Intelligence), pp. 2-30; heuafter Ovenlcht SWK; De Indi5cht' Gids, XLVI, 1924, 266-270; L. dt. Toemenggoeng. Geheime noto, pp. J-..4; Kern, SCMu oon den pollt/eken toemond, pp. 27-28; B. F. O. Schrieke, '"Political Section of the West Coast of Sumatra Report," in Harry J . Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., Tile Communi.st Uprislng~ oJ 1926-1927 In Indo1\enll: Key Documents ( Ithaca, N.Y., ItS

428

Notes, pp. 183-184 1960 ) , pp. 100-104. The last is a translation of Schrieke. De ga ng det CommunUtUcM beweging fer Sumatra's West1.ust (The Course the Conununist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra ) (Netherlands Indies government, classifled, WeltcvredcD, 1928), Pa.rt I. For an analysis of the sociolOgical aspect'5 of the movement, see Schrieke, "Communism on the \Vest Coast of Sumatra," pp. 95-166. Irl. Kern, Overzicht Residentenconferentie, pp. 11-13; Harian Rokiot, July 17, 1962; Kokmiaal Verdag, 1923, pp. 26-27. 122; Verslag bestuur 1925. pp. 8, 13, 23,26-28,30-31; Soeara &'fot, Oct. I, 1922, in IPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 192-194; De lndische Gids, XLIV, 1922, 725-727, Blumbcrger, Communist, p. 42. 88. "The Bantam Report," in Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings. p. 4L Interesting material on the social background of the Communist leadership can be found in W. M. F. Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en Clmmunisme" (Education and Communism), Kolon/ale Stoolen, XII ( 1928), Part I, a study of 1,000 people who were interned after the revolts of 1926-1927. These were all persons considered b y the authorities to have been leaders of the Communist movement; however, most of them claimed to have been only ordinary members of the PKI or Sarekat Rakjat or to have belonged to neither. No doubt, as Mansvelt remarks, this was due in good part to their reluctance to compromise themselves any more than was necessary; it might also be noted that the decisions to intern were taken rather summarily and based on considerations that differed from area to area; an investigation in 1930 showed that many of those interned actually had litUe or nothing to do with the party. In other words, the s... mple probably consists mostly of person.~ with some standing in t he movement but also contains simple followers and some outsiders. With th is caveat in mind, we might note that Mansvelt reports the average age of the internees to ha\'e been 31 yeal"ll; 71.6 per cent were literate, compared with 5.91 per cent literacy for Indonesia as a whole and 5.01 per cent for Java and Madura at the time (p. 2.06). None had had higher ed ucation; 2.4 per cent had had some academic secondary education, 9.7 per cent had attended trade school, 64 per cent had attended primary school, and 23.9 per cent had had no schooling. Few graduated from the schools they attcnded, but considcring the highly pyrnmided structure of the Indies educational system, they had done rather well (pp. 208--209) . Of the 857 primary schools attended at one time or another by the internees, 48 were village (desa) schools, 62 Islamic religioU!l schools, and 511 second-class and standard schools; of the last, 238 u.d It European languagc. The internees thus tended to belong to the subelite, which had had some Western-style schooling but not enough to be classed with the educated elite (pp. 2 11-2 12 ). They changed professions rather frequently; 27.2 per cent of the total number of jobs held were in state employ, 19.6 per cent in the employ of Western entcrprises, 45 per cent in the native economic sector ( fanning, small manufacturers, and especially trade and transport); 2.9 per cent were in journali.o;m, 3.8 per cent teaching in native schools, and 1.5 per cent miscellancoU!l. The large number of fobs in the native economic sector is somewhat misleading, Mansvelt notes, as they reflect employment these persons resorted to whcn they lost jobs in the Wesh'rn sector (pp. 215-2 17 ). Five internees were from the high nobility, bearing the title Rode" Mas; fifty-two were from the lesser priiap (Raden or Mas), and flItynine \veTC hadiU. Moreover, the fact that 45 per cent had enjoyed some Wcstcrn~tyle schooling in the early ycars of the century indicated that their parents had some means and were either lesser prljaii or well-off peasants living near large cities. They them.>;elves could not be reckoned to the advan taged groups

or

429

Notes, pp. 184-186 ei ther by standard of living or rank of employment, however; Mansvelt therefore rejects the thesis that the revolutionary movement was Jed by an emergcot midd1e class and argues that it appeared to have been headed by people ~ri. eneing proletarianization (pp. 218-220). 89. An example of PKI support from local traditional elites was adherence of the noble association Rukun Asli to the party when it penetrated Bantam in 1925. The PKI did not usually addres:s specific appeals to the prifafl at a higher level, although occasionally this was done-for example, Semaun's pamphlet KellGriWn Indonesia jong Dfangkat &tonal! Bekmda Tiop2 Tahoen (aUae 500.000.000 (f5OO,000,000 in Indonesia ProSts Are Taken to Holland Each Year) ( Europe. January 1925), which urged the prl/ali and the Indonesian soldiery (appealed to as Latriia. warriors) to join in the struggle against the Dutch because colonialism injured all Indonesian classes. 90. ThU.'l Musso offered himself as leader of the Sarekat Postel, saying that although he knew nothing of p>stal affairs, he would throw himself energetically into the workers' cause; Sooa ra Ponel, May 1920, in lPO, DO. 22, 1920, p. 3, article by Musso. Tjoboaminoto and Salin}. who then led the CSI-sponsored union, gave him a position in it. n e SI leaders lost interest in the Sarekat Postel after the pawnshop strike; for a while it languished, but in 1924 Musso again took it in hand; Sooara Ponel, May 3 1, 1925, in IPO, 00. 27, 1925, pp. 4546. In a similar vein Prawirosardjono, leader of the Surabaja Red SIISR, explained to the August 1924 CSI congress why he had chosen to eltchange his allegiance to the Sarekat Islam for loyalty to the PICI : he was in need of financial support after imprisonment for It political offense: none had been forthcoming from the SI, and so he had switched to the Communists; VBT.lag (l(Jn hd H e Kongre. fU r Centrale Sarikat hlam, p. 12. The importance of the movement as a source of employment is stressed in Man.welt's study of Communist internees. Noting that they lost jobs frequently for political and other rea50nS and often were unemployed for considerable periods. Mansvelt found it small wonder that they took positions, even at very low remuneration, as 5R school teachers, propagandists, and as party, union, and SR officiak "Since it appears that these functionaries often had to support themselves from the dues they received, they had an interest in eltpandlng the number of memben [of the organizations they headed]," he added; Mansvelt, "OndelWijs en Communisme," p, 220. 91. An instance of this tolerance was the PKI attitude toward Mas Marco, the journalist the ISDV had defended In 1916. Marco had become a party member and had a popular following In the Suralarta area. In late 1920 he was wooed away from the PKi by a CSI offer of its .o;ecretarysbip. He promptly appeared as a major anti-Communist agitator, attacking the party on the sensitive subject of the Lenin theses and religion. Soon, however, he had a spat \l.ith the CSI and announced his retirement from politiCS: the PKI expressed sympathy and was rewarded by his return to its camp. 92. Typical of the ambivalent PKl attitude toward religious Communists, the party newspaper did not mention the Dutch Communist nomination of Hadji Misbach for parUament ( a1though .the CPU had obviously intended it to be accorded wide publicity in Indonesia) eltccpt to announce, on inside pages, his nomination and rejection; Api, May 22 and 26, 1925. At other times, however, Api c:.:pressed strong concern for religion, usually to defend "true Islam" against the "perverted doctrine" of the Muhammadijah. 93. Vemag De, p. 24. For other oomments on the varied Dature of the discontent mobilized by the Communists, see Schrieke, "Political Section," pp. 101-

430

Notes, pp. 186-188 103, 108-112; Mededeel/ngen 1924, pp. 6, 10, 12-13; Blumbergcr, Nat/onali.rt, pp. 115-116; "Communisme," p. 553, col. h. 94. Sfnar Hfndla, Jan. 22. 1924, in lPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 194; from an editorial expressing admiration for the program of Auguste Blanqul. 95. SQeaTa & 'fat. May 26, 1920, in lPO, no. 23, 1920, p. 2; Sinar Himlla, Apr. IS. 1921, in lPO, no. 17, 1921, p. 176. The latter article offers a week-long "Communist course," open to all at a ten-cent entrance fee ; it was to deal with Communist theory, history, and organization and also with oratory. journalism, and

how to lead the people. 96. Mededeelingen 1924, p. 11 ; Overzicht 1924, p. 11; "Verslag SJ. Merah dan S.R. Semarnng Tahoen 1924," May 26, 1925; Api, Jan. 5 and 20, 1925. Among those arre..1cd, on Oct. 23, 1923, were Aliareham, Partondo, Budisutjitro, Suradi, Rabijan. Ambijah, Misbach, and Suwamo. All were released for lack -of evidence on Feb. 24, 1924, except Suwamo and Misbach. who were banished. 97. Sinor H iooia, Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, n05. 45 and 46, 1923, pp. 264-267, 302-304. 98. K. Radek, "Lenin's Life and Work," Itlpr6corr, Mar. 6, 1924, p. 147. Radek was then chief of the Eastern SectjOD of the Comintern. 99. When il annoWlced plans to convene after the February 1923 51 congress, the PKI had indicated its intention to discuss a new program and declaration of principles; this was done in a closed. session at the March 1923 meetiDg. Sloor H/ooia Feb. 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 298; Apl, Feb. 28, 1925. 100. The draft version was published as Patioman Persarekatatl Kommunirl Iooia (Guideline for the Communist Party of the Indies) (Semarang, November 1923) , together with the Indies Communist Manifesto of 1920 (which explained in terms of the European Socialirt-Communist schism why the ISDV changed it. name 10 PKI) and the 1918 ISDV program for its lown oouncil election campaigns. A second preliminary version of the action program was published in Soeara Ra'iat, Feb. I, 1924; the final version of the program, statement. and statutes was published as Parlai-Reglement dan P.K.l. (Corutitution of the PKI ) (WeitevrOOen, 1924). 101. 'I11e items of the 1924 action program arc summed up as follows:

a. Establishment of representative bodies in the ' fonn of soviets (village, factory, district, province, island, and central soviets). (The reader who was not acquainted with the soviet system was referred in a footnote 10 Tan Malab's Parlemen alau Sovfct?) b. Freedom of political action, speech, pres.'l, assembly, and strike. c. Labor legislation, an eight_hour day, no night worlc. where possible, DO labor for c:hlldren under seventeen, protection of working women, extensive sodal insurance for worlcers, improvement of worlcing oonditions, labor inspection, abolition of the contract coolie system, aid to orphans and abandoned children, abolition of Wlpaid labor for village and state authorities (heereoolensten and desadiemten). d. Abolition of proprietary lands; fannin g to be carried on under the direction of village councils; government aid and interest-free credit to Indonesian agricu1tum; DO government aid to the big plantations; prohibition of land-leasing. e. Nationalization of monopolies, banks, and all essential industries. £. Steps to remove aU encouragement of the desire for se16sh gain and undesirable rivalry among the various groups of the working people. g. Prohibition of reoeiving interest.

431

Notes, pp. 188-190 h. Universru taxation based 00 a steeply graded income tax, with the only direct tax a lu:rury tax. i. Universal free education until the age of seventeen, In the local language, with Malay as a possible second tongue. Education compatible with local em. tOffill and needs; more technical, agricultural, and un.ivcl'Sity education. j. Equality before the Jaw; free !ega] aid; no imprisonment without charge. k. Improvement of prison conditions. . I. Separntion of church and state, DO government aid to religion. m. Replacement of the anncd forces by a people's militia. n. Law enforcement by people's councils. o. Improved public health and hygiene; food distribution 10 be directed by public bodies. p. Improvement of housing conditions. q. Strict prohibition of nonmedfcinal a1cohol and drugs.

r. Open diplomacy. s, Avoidance of aU policies that cou1d worsen Indonesia's relations with other countries or Involve it in war.

Parlol-Reglement darl P.K.l., pp. 13-20. 102. It might be noted that the draft of the new action program publ.ished in November 1923 was almost identical with the 1918 version. The February draft did not contain the June 1924 dem.1nd for SO"iets but kept the passage on free and secret elections from the 1918 program (but left out In the .Gnal 1924 versions). It called lor Malay (Indonesian) as the .Gm language of Instruction, althou gh the June 1924 program reverted baclc to the 1918 demand that the regional language he given fim place with Malay as a possible second language. The February draft did contain the final version's new provisions against the acquisitive ~plrit (no. 6), against receiving interest (no. 7) . for open diplomacy (no. 18 ) , and against involvement In foreign conl1icb ( no. 19) . This last provision probably originated in the current Cor¢ntem campaign against a presumed imperialist plot to attack Soviet Russia. The February version also contained a provision that Indonesia should recognize Soviet Russia and establish trade relations with It in order to overcome tbe depression In the Indies; this was omitted from the final version. This may have been a concession to nationalist sentiment, or it may rel1eet the objections to Soviet engagement in international trade that v.'e noted earlier. 103. The November 1923 draft sfatement of principle!! is contained In Padoman Per.wrekaten Kommunm Indio, pp. 1-4: the June 1924 version was published first in Soeara Ba'jat, June 20, 1924 (lPO, no. 28. 1924, p. 91), and then in Parlai-RegiemCTl t dati P.K.I., pp. 3-11. The declaration described how capitaJism, the embodiment of greed, had risen in Europe and spread to America and Japan and how in Indonesia it had separated the people, who had once lived freely, from thcir means of existcnce and made them slaves of the factories and planta. tions. Workers, pe.'\sants, and intellectuals all suffer under thb S)'!item, the declaration stated, and they must all unite against it; their struggle mU!t he class-based and intemationaJ and must not be affected by nationality or reUgion. 104. Partaj.Reglerrnmt dati P.Kl., pp. 7, 9. Emphasis in the text. lOS. Article 4, "Statuten dari Partai Kommunisf Indonesia" (Statutes of the Communist Party of Indonesia ) , Parlal-Reglemcnt dati P.K.I., pp. 23-24. 106. Dingley, TIle Pea$!lnts' Movement, p. 39. This system of SR organimtion bad already bet-n put into prnctil.'e by the latter part of 1923; Kern, Qverz{cht

432

Notes, 1'P, 190-191 R&idelllencfJflfef'fmtie, pp. 7-8. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 122, gives a somewhat dilferent version of the limit on SR voting strength at PKI congresses: he states the maximum was one-fourth the number of votes possessed by the party, PKI b.ranehes could send up to ten delegates to a congress, but SR branches could send only three. See further Semaoen, "Srieven." June 10, 1925; Cuber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v lndonezli," 1933, p. 191; Meded£eZingen 1924, p. 10; Bergmeijer, Ret Commllni.nnc in Indlii, p. 3. "DingIey" estimates that about half the Sarekat Hakjat membership was poor and middle peasants, and another quarter small shop owners, traders, artisans, and so on ( p.40) . 107. Semaocn, "Brieven," June 10, 1925; and see DingIey, The Peasants' Movemelll, p. 39; Cuber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii," 1933, p. 191 ; S. Rutgers, "De Indonesische nationale beweging tOl 1927," p. 48. 108. Police report on the Semarang SI meeting of Apr. IS, 1923 (typescript, D.p., n.d.), at which Aliarcham. its chairmnn, reported on the recent SI and PKI congresses. 109. Some Sareknt Rakjat units were established in that year, but these seem to have been new groups introduced to combat the local White SI in accord with the decision of the 19"...3 PKI congress; there were not many of them. See Kemadioean Ilindia, Oct. 10, 1923, in [pO, no. 42, 1923, p. 89. Other new leftist mass Wlits were established not as SRs but as Red SI branches; see SinaI' H/ndla , Jan. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1924, pp. 110-113. 110. Quoted in Vergadering IJGn de Sarikat Raiat te Bandoeng (Meeting of the Sarekat Rakjat at BandWlg) (unsigned typescript, dated 1924, Stokvis Collection, Intemationaal instituut voor sociaal geschicdenis, Amsterdam), p. 5. For description of the congress, see pp. 4-17. See also Algcmeen Indisch Dagblad, Apr. 22, 1924; De Locomolief, Apr. 26, 1924; Soerapati, Apr. 20, 1924, and Ma/ahari, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 19, 1924, pp. 240-241, 246. The meeting took place in Bandung on Apr. 20-21; its fi rst public session was attended by a claimed 1,200 people. The !}Ilhering was led by Alimin and Musso (Batavia), Sardjono (Sukabum[) , Kartawirja, Winanta, Mohammad SanU'li, Cunawan, and Bassach (BandWlg), Djunaedi ( Tjiamis ), Muchlar (Bogor), and Sastrosuwirjo ( Tjlrebon) . Aliareham, c1",;rrnan of the St:marang SI, represen ted that unit and PKI headquarters. 111. This was decided a t a congress held in Semarnng on Apr. 22-24 by the FOISO (General Fund for SI Education), a supervising body for the school system establi~hed at the March 1923 congress. At the same meeting the FOISO changed ils nnme to Fund for the Peoplc"s Education (Fonds Onderwijs Rakjat; FOR). Since Ihe SR schools were fad of Communist influence, note the places where they then existed: Semlmmg, Surabnja. Bandung, Kertosono, Pate, Sumedang, Tjimahi, Purwokerto. Tjirebon. Ngandjuk, Salatiga, Ungaran, Ambarawa, Madiun, Sukabumi, Tjiwidej. Tjiljalenka, Tjiamis, IGntelan, Ngoro, and Ngrambe. The FOR congress discussed whether political education should continue to be given in the schools, apparently beeause the penalties for it were so great; it was decided that it was important to educate the chUdren in the proper political spirit. Plans were also made to establish trade schools, publish school books and periodicals for young people, and to spread the school system outside Java. SifUJr Hindia, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, pp. 198-199. 112. Soeara Ra'fat, Jan. 16, 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, p. 299. The Manifest Kommunist oleh Kilrl Man: dan Friedrich Engels (Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) (Scmamng. 1923) was translated by PartoDdo,

433

Notes, pp. 191-195 who provided all explanatory introduction in which he apologized ror the awk_

wardness that resulted because the document, which Wa5 about European conditions, could not be rendered easily into Indonesian (p. 1 ). It was published serially in Soeara Ra'lat, beginning on Apr. 12, 1923, and subsequently issuocl as a pamphlet. The 2,000 copies of this edition, printed on the VSTP press in Semarang, were sold out within a year. A second edition was put out in 1925, this time with an introduction by Alr:an Zain (Subakat ); Manlfen Kommunilt oleh Karl Man: dan Friedrich Engel! (Semarang, 1925) p. 1. 113. Indb cm Courant, Sept. 18, 1924. 114. Hobromarkoto, Nov. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 50, 1924, p. 498. 115. De Loromotlef, Sept. 30, 1924. 116. Over:Jcht von het resultant oon het gehouden ontkrwek der rommunl.sCbcm beweglng In de aldeeling Pali (Survey of the R~ult of the Investigation of the Communist Movement in the Pati Dimict ) (typescript copy of a Netherlands Indies government report, Stokvis collection), hereafter Ooer.:icht Patio 117. "Ons congres" ( Our Congress) , translation into Dutch of an article i.o Soe/lTa Ra';at, May 30, 1924, pp. 2, 5; emphasis in the text. See also the $UIDDW}' of this article In IPO, no. 25, 1924, pp. 588-569. 118. Other members of the cxecutive were Budisutjitro (secretary-treasurer) and Marsum (commissioner); members-at-large were to be appointed from Semnrang, Sumbaja, Padang, and Temnte. This made a total of seven executive members, although rune were required by the p.:uty statutes; this was pointcd out by Sinor Hindia, June 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 27, 1924, pp. 19-20. Possibly the party was reluctant to put more leaders than absolutely necessary in prominent positions because of the danger of arrest. The newly elected leaden were by no means straw men, however, in spite of the fact that several of them were relative newcomers to the organization. Djamaluddin Tamin, written statement, dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.1.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, pp. 18-19, jurtiGably describes the d ectlOlJ of the June 1924 executive as marking a major shift in party power. The account of the congress presented here is drawn from Verslag 9dc ( the report of its proceedings by the Aeting Adviser for Native AlTairs ) and from Overzlcht 1924, pp. 3-7. The congress agenda W8!i published in Sinror mndla, May 19, 192-1, and in Soeara Ra'jat, May 10, 1924 (lPO, no. .21, 1924, pp. 329, 44111 9. The branches represented at the ninth party congress were primari1y from West Java: Batavia, Bogor, Su1cabumi, Tjiandjur, Bandung, Tjimahi. Garut, Tjibatu, Tasikm.1laja, Uadjapclah, Tjiamis, Bandjar, and Tjirebon. Other Javanese branches attending were Semarang. Salatiga, Ambarawa, Djepara, Wirosarl, Tjcpu, Randublatang, Sunthaja, Purworedjo, Kebumen, Jogjalcarta, Kiaten, Madiun, Blitar, and Kertosono; from the Outer Islanm Padang, Langsa, Makassar, and Temate sent delega tes. 120. Ver.l"lag 9de, p. 4. 121. Verslag gde, p. 9; emphasis as in the text of this account of the highlights of Darsono's speech. 122. Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. According to Djam~uddin Tamin, one of Tan Malab's most prominent d isciples, the theses were given to AJimin when he visited Singapore in February 1924 ; we do mow that AlImin made a trip to Singapore at that time. Nerat/a. Apr. 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, p. 196, and see SiMI lIindia, Mar. 8, 1924, in IPO, no. 11, 1924, p. 47. Later publication of these theses as a PKI pamphlet indicates that they were considered very important; Sukindar, These bagi Kcada'an Socltil dan Ekonom/# I"Crta TIara bagi

434

Notes, pp. 195-199 Mengadokan Organisatle don Taktfek dl Indorwria (Theses on the Social and

EconorrUc Situation and on the Formulation of Organization and Tactics in Indonesia) (Weltevreden, 1924) . If Malaka was indeed the author of the theses. . it Is interesting to note his endorsement of the relationship between the Sarekat Ra1clat and the PKI. 123. Suldndar, These. p. 22; see also the summary of Sukendar's report in VeT,lag 9de, pp. 19-20. 124. Suldndar, Thew. pp. 25-26. 125. Sukindar, These, pp. 33-34. 126. Suldndar. These, p. 34. 127. The PKI reported on the Sekolah Rakjat school system that although the authorities removed many teachers (in some cases forcing the schools to close), the schools were generally able to take advantage of the many unemployed teachers after the governmen t curtailed its education budget. Similarly, although parents in public and private European employ withdrew their chilmen from the schools for fear of dismissal, new pupils were easily gotten because the demand for education was far greater than the supply of schools. S. W. Pannono, "Sekolah Ra'jat Akan DibocnoehP" (WiU the People's Schools Be Stopped?) Api, Jan. 2. 1925. A Comintern report on youth activity in Indonesia claimed that by 1926 there were some fifty schools, with 4,500 students, and it gave the Barisan Muda membership as over 1,000; " YCI," InPTeeorr VII (1927), no. 47. 1060. The FOR sponsored a monthly publication, Barl.wn Mocda, for the youth 'group and pupUs in the SR schools. 128. For financial complainl5, see Soeara Ra'jat, June 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 26, 1924, pp. 62S--629, and June 30, 1924, in IPO, no. 29, 1924, pp. 144-145. The membership was given by Darsono at the June 1924 congress; Versing 9de, p. 5. 129. See Soeara Ra';at, Apr. 30, 19-2-:1, in lPO, no. 23, 1924, p. 440, and May 20, 1924, in IPO, no. 25, 1924, p. 5fJ7; De Laeorrwtief, Sept. 30, 1924; MedcdeelingeR 1924, p. 13; "Communisme," pp. 534, col. b, 535, 001. a.

CHAPTER IX 1. Begrootlng 1927, pp. 209, 229 (parliamentary query and government reply on the refusal of entry to the CentrosoillZ agent Kcmalopov) . 2. Ret V,;;e Woord (Mar. 18, 1921, p. 8) responded to an article in De Lveomotief, which said that Baars was trying to arrange for Communist propagandists to be brought from the Netherlands to the Indies, that they were to come oot from Holland but Soviet Russia. Very likely thu was sarcasm; in any event, there was no sign that such efforts bore fmit. 3. Pavlovich, "Zadachi Vserossiiskoi oauchnoi assotsiatsli vostokovedeniia," p. 9; and M. Pavlovich, ''Zadachl sovetskogo vostokovedenila" (The Tusks of Soviet Orientology), NOfJy/ Vostok, no. 16/17, 1927, pp. iv-v. Nooyi Vostok (Tho New East) was the journal of tho association. 4. A. A. Guber, '1zucheniia istom strnn VO-I'tOKa v SSSR 1.a 25 let" (Twenty. Rve Years of Historical Research on the Countries of the East in the USSR), in Varga, Volgin, and Pankratov, eds., Dvadtsat' pkIt' let fstoricheskol naukf tI SSSR (Moscow/Leningrad, 1942 ), pp. 274-275. Gubcr was one of the few Soviet Southeast Asia $Cholars of stature in this early period; he began publishing on indonesian political and economic history in the mid·I920s. According to his essay, the Rrst Communut Asia experts were greatly hand ica pped by lack of contact wi th the countries of interest and by L1nguage barriel"5. Their .first producl5

435

Notes, pp. 199-202 tended to be political trncts noto'tble more for revolutionary fervor than for of the area _reoeemed. After a time there was a reaction against this, resulting in concentmtion on Adan social and eronomic conditions. particularly the agrnrian problem; but these efforts were also frequently or limited value. S. For a discussion of these irutilutions, see I. Bomzdin. "Izuchenie Vostoka sovremennol Rossii" (Research on the East in Con temporary Russia), in Sultanlade, 00., KoToniafnyl VO$fok ( Moscow, 1924 ), PI? 345-353; Rapport. ttl, fa preparation par Ie gouoomemem rovUtfque da reoolta colonWlu (Report on the Preparation of Colonial Revolts by the Soviet Government) (TIle Hague, D.d.), pp. 16-25; Eudin and North, Soviet Ruu/a, p. 81; Gw;tave Cautherot, Le Bolcheoisme aux colonlu et fimperialiMrle rouge ( Bolshevism in the Colonies and knowled~e

Red Im perialism) (Pari~. 1930), pp. 33--40. 6. II Kongre&~. pp. 195- 196. 7. The Brst director of the university was Broido. then Deputy Conunissar of Nationalities. It is not apparent which government body controlled the Wliversity after the dissolution of the Commissariat of NationaJities io 1924, but in 1936 it was directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Eudin and North, Soofet Ru.rriD, p. 85. See further pp. 85-89 and Carr, &l.throfk Reoolut/on, III, 268-269; Prauda, July 25, 1922; Neutmliseering, p. 9, note 3. 8. Eudin and North, Soviet Ruuia, pp. 86-87. According to this source, the school was restricted to Chinese nationals. Karl Radek, its rector, so stated in a press interview, at which he also dedared that it would be strictly scienti6 e and not involve itseH in propaganda or any sort (wOe Chlneesche Wlivettiteit te Mookou" (The Chinese University at Moscow), De Indl8che CKh, XLVII, 19"'-5, 1105. Presumably thb claim wa~ to mollify European opinion concerning Soviet encouragement of colonial revolution; Indonesians were in fact asked to attend the university, and a Netherlands Indies government report, based on British intelligence sources, claimed that there were i1so Japanese, Koreans, and Indochine$C attending. Politick pol/tloneel ooomc1!t ot:!eT de maand Nooomber 1927. Ertrem/stuehe beweglng ( Political Police Survey for the Month of November 1927. Extremist Movement ) mbneo. (n.d., clusi6ed), no. II, p. 43. 9. Dtehet l$polkoma Kominlema (Ap1'er 1 925~.-lantlO r' 19!!6g.) ( Report of the Executive Committee of the Comlntern [April 1925-January 1926]) ( Moscow/Leningrad. 1926), pp . .50-.51. 10. Dlehet l$pollroma Komlntema, pp. 50-5 1. II. The March 1925 ECCI plenum sent directives to aU its $Cctfoos announcing the plan to establish courses and asking (or students; Otchet lspolkoma Komintema, pp. 50-5 1. 12. PolUleke nota PKI, p. 9. The Comlnlem letter said that row students who had already arrived were progreSSing weU but does not indicate whether these ...:ere Indonesian students. It was added that the candidates sbou1d be in good health and have had adequate preparation fOf their study; a knowledge of French, English, or German was recommended. 13. PoUtleke nota PKI, p. 9. 14. Semaun, interview, 1959. 15. Blumber2;cr. NatioooJue, p. 358; "Communisme." p. 955, col. b. 16. See IIVW, May 25, 1917, p. 160; HVW, Fcb. 20, 1918, p. 124. 17. Nleuwe Rotterdamsehe Courant, Mar. 18, Apr. 14, and Aug. 6, 1929. 18. I np1'ecorr, Sept. 4, 1928, pp. 1042, 1186, 1206; Oct. 4, 1928, pp. 12291231, 1250, 1254. n.e dele~te, who used the name "n. Alphonso," Is usually assumed. to have been Tan Malaka: but according to Danono and Semaun (ID-

436

Notes, pp. 202-203 terviews, 1959) , Malab was not at the meeting. Malaka does not claim to have attended It in any of his later writings, and his orthodox Communist opp::ments.

although anxious to pin the Trotskyite label on him, have not made a point of this incident. According to Darsooo, "AlphODSO,» whose real name seems to have been Mohammad Tohir, went to Moscow about 1925 CIT 1926 after attending a youth ronference in China. This may be the 1926 Communist Youth Congress heM in Canton, to which the PKI had indicated its intention of sending a delegate; see Politiek verslag 1926, p. 16. He remained in the Soviet Union W1ti1 about 1933, bot his career as It Comintem agent ended when he refused to foUow the party line. 19. Alimin, interview, 1959; and Alimin, Riwoiat Hidup, pp. 24-28. Alimin stated that he began his studies afte r the sixth Comintem congress and mm.-lined at the school for three years. 20. Nwwc RottcrdiJmsclle Courant, Sept. 8, 1930. Th.il; story is very interesting if true, since Subalmt, Djamaluddin Tamin, and the other members of this faction had set out in an independent direction under the leadenhip of Tan Malab; although they did not openly rejcd the Comintem nor WCl'e they rejected by it, they did not feel themselvcs bound by the International's decisions. 21. This docs not, however, exclude the possibility that Indonesians other than revolutionary trainees and established party leaders may have visited Soviet Ru~ia during the early period. In 1923, for example, a Sumatran new5paper published a letter purportedly written by "Mohammad Thahir" from Vladivostok, expressing enthusiasm over the conditiom he had observed theI-e; Pantjaran Beri/a, May 9-13, 1923, in lPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 484-485. Thahir's identity is unclear; possibly he was an ordinary seaman, but he may have been the "Alphonso" of the sixth Comintern congress (see footnote 18 above ), or perhaps even Mohammad Taber gcla r Mara Sutan, who was active in modernist Wamic education in West Sumatra, had once helped Tjipto Mangunkusumo and AJimin edit the Batavia lnsulinde journal Modjopall lt, and was involved with the Communist movement in its ISDV days. 22. Darsono and Semaun, interviews, 1959. Tan Malab, who describes his stay in Russia in some detail in his autobiogI1lphy, does not mention having attended any school there. Baars, wri ting after his break with Communism, claimed that he had met Semaun and Darsono a number of times during their sojourns in Moscow; according to him, they worked for the Comintern and ProBntem tlJere and spent their time reading newspapers and letters for news from Indonesia, from which they could· then write reporU. They lived in a hotel with other foreigneT"S, he claimed, and led very iwlated lives; Baars, Sowjet Rtlof8/afl(1 in de proct.i;k, p. 9. 23. See Euclin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 84-85. 24 . .Soeara Ra'jat, Sept. · 16, 1921 , in IPO, no. 39, 1921, p. 34; ]alXUche Courant, Aug. 16, 19-23; De Locomotief, Feb. 21, 1922; Tamar Djaja, Trio, p. 22: Malab, " Mijn verbanning," May 10, 1922; Malaka, TCJeJKWek, pp. 18, 25-27, 32. SneevJiet himself reported having conferred with Subakat on PKI affairs whUe in Canlon, De Baanbreker, Feb. 15, 1930. Malaka also related that not long before his banishment in 1922 Najoan "vanished" from Indonesia and was reported Variously in Shanghai and Bombay; it was rumored that his trip was somehow connected with his activity as leader of the dockworkers' union; Malah, Toendoek, p. 87. 25. Snoovliefs dbillusionment with the Comintem began, according 10 some of his fonner associates, while he was in China; VVS, p. 62. His unhappiness with certain aspects of Communist policy came oul strongly in an article written

437

Notes,

pp. 203-205

on the ill·fated Canton strike of February 1923; Maring, " Krovavyi epizod v istorii Kitaiskogo rabochego dvizheniia" (A Bloody Episode in the History of the Chinese Labor Movement), Kommun/st/sche,kll Internattional. (no. 26/27). 1923. As Whiting remarla, Soulet Policies, p. 101, the article displayed marked evidence of un·Communist "bourgeois sentimentality" in its condemnation of the violent and futile affair. Oddly enough, the Comintem jouma! pubUshed the report. a1though its edilol'li noted they did not completely agree with it. 26. VV5, p. 82. 27. This is the report cited as Maring, Oekooom/sche. 28. Sinar Wildie, May 29-June 3, 1922, in lPO, no. 23, 1922, pp. 377-378; Soeara &'jot, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 192.2, p. 144. 29. Sinar Hindia, Nov. 11, 1922, and Hoedi Detamo, Nov. 2-16, 1922, in IPO, nos. 46 and 47, 1922, pp. 300, 331; SinaT Hint&, July 4, 1923, and Soearo Ra';.at. July 16, 1923, in lPO, nos. 28 and 32, 19"....3. pp. 72, 369; De IntilscM Gid.r. XLV, 1923, 831-833; Mededeellngen 1924, pp. 8-9; BegrooUng 1925, pp. 198, 218. 30. Samin, "The Situation in Indonesia," l"precotT, Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1245 (coreport on the colonial revolutionary movement at the sixth Comintem congress). For oomIDCnt of SO€ara Ra'fat on Aug. I , 1923, see lPO, no. 35, 1923, pp. 419420. 31. FrOfn the Fourth to the Fiftll World Congreu (London, 1924 ), p. 103. At the third Prolintem congress, which ran concurrently with the 1924 Comintem meeting. it was announced th at the ProBntem had succeeded in the "establishment of regular connections wi th Dutch and British India"; MrJrdunarodrwe

profdoi:henle 1923-I924gg., p. 6. 32. De Tribune, June 26 and 21, 1922. The foreign leaders prc5ellt were listed as Cachin from France, MacManus from England, Pied: from Germany, IlfId Tilfl Malaka from Indonesia. 33. Malah, DP I, p. 10"2. The work, Tan Malalca, lndone:iia I eli menD rnJ probu:hdaemsia Vostoka (Indonesia and Its Place in the Awakening East), was published by the Krasnaia Nov' (Red News) publbhing house in 1924, and then, apparently considered worthy of wider distribution, was reissued by the government publisher (Gosizdat) in 1925. It received very favorable reviews; see B. Puretskin, review in Pechof f Reooliulsila, no. I, 1926, p. 214; and Kim, review in Novyi Vostok, no. lOl lI , 1925, pp. 325-328. In another account of his Soviet stay, Mala!.:::! remarked that he did not have much time for reading but was absorbed in studying Communism in action and in writing on Indonesian affairs for the Comintem; }'falaica, Madilog: Materfali.mw, Di4lektika, Logikil ( Mad.i1og: Materialism, Dialectics, Logic) (Djakarta, 1951 ), p. 14. 34. Bergsma in Franekcr, the Netherlands, to Semaun in Sematang, Feb. 20, 1923. This is the omitted portion of the letter quoted on p. 240. 35. In a letter to "B6" (Baars' wife?) dated Feb. 2, 1923, Bergsma wrote: "At the end of December I returned from Moscow. Was there about a month. . . . Jep is staying in Moscow for the time being. He's studying." Bergsma further remarked that he had neither money nor II job: '"The party in Holland does nothing for me," he complained, not even helping him pay for material sent to Jep in Moscow or to the party in Indonesia. The PKI, hOW6vcr, had sent some money to help him out. He had received a letter from Sneevliet the week befoTe; "He was in Moscow. Still had the plan to come here, 1 don't know if it'll go through though:' 36. Malab, DP I, p. 104; Tan }.falaka, Them (Buldt Tinggi. June 1946 ),

438

Notes, pp. 206-210 p. 39; and see Peringatan, p. 30. Kahin, NatiofI(Jlism, p. SO, states, however, that Malakn claimed he was assigned the port of Comintcm representative for Southeast Asia at the Comintem congress of November 1922, effective at the beginning of 1923. 37. In addition to the evidence to be brought out in the course of this narra_ tive, we have Sem:l.un's support for Malaka's claim ( Interview, 1959) . although Semaun said he received his appointment at the Pacific Transport Workers' Omference in 1924. In Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communin 51ruggle in Mala!la (New York. 1956 ), p. 6, reference is made 10 a Japanese Intelligence report from World War II stating that in 1925 Tan Malaka was the chief Comintem representative in Southeast Asia; Tsutsui. Chijin. Mampo guruci-ron ( Military Government in the Southern Regions) ( Tokyo, February 1944), p. 335. Postcolonial PKI accounts tended to deny or minimi7.e Malaka's claims to a role in the Comintem until the publication in 19tH of Pemoo,.ontakon November 1928, an account compiled by the party's Historical In~-titute. In this work Malaka is described as having repre_ sented the PKI in the Comintem and having been a member of the secretariat of an ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, based in Shanghai, in which he represented the PKI (p. 123). It does not appear that Malllka actually worked in Shanghai during this period, but Comintern China headquarters were for a time located in that city. Possibly the account confuses the Comintern office with the Red Eastern Labor Bureau in Canton (see below). 38. Malab, Them, p. 39; see also Kahin, NatloMiism, p. BO, note 52. 39. Alimin, Analyns (Jogjakarta, 1947), p. 14. 40. Semaun, interview, 1959. 41. Malaka said he also inquired of Sun the possibility of obtaining a Chinese passport; Sun replied that he could be of little service, since a Kuomintang pass would be worse than nothing as far as travel outside KMT territory was concerned. Ho .......,ver, he suggested, if Tan Malaka were to contact the Seamen's Union in Hongkong, that organization might be able to help him to a more serviceable document. Malab, DF I, pp. 105-107: and see Tamar Djaja, Pusalca Indonesia, p. 211: Pcringatan, pp. 30, 50. 42. Malaka, DF I. p. 114. 43. Malab, DF 1. p. 114. For an announcement of the establishment. of the office, see Trctii kongre!-S Krasnogo Interruu.rionola pro/80iuzov 8-22 julia 1924g. (Third Congress of the Red Intemationru. of Labor Unions, July 6-22, 1924) (Moscow, 1924), p. 345, hereafter 1II Kongres.f Kramogo; and Api, Apr. 4, 1925. For references to Malakn's position with this office, see Folilieke nota PKl, p. 4; Soerabaja&ch HandeIsblad, Aug. 26, 1924. 44. L. Heller. "Die Pazi6k-Konferenz der Transportarbeiter in Kanton" (The Pacific Conference of Transport Workers in Canton), RGI, July/August 1924, p. 54; and see Malaia ent.nklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdl)/zilenllu, col. 1808. 45. Malaka, DP I, pp. 116-119. 46. MaJaka, DP I , pp. 120-121. 47. MaJaka, DP I, p. 120; the ted of the request is given in Api, Jan. 3, 1925, p. 1; see also 1000 Bode, Mar. 17, 1925. Malaka wrote that he had been- working as a correspondent for Chinese and Philippine newspapen for about a year, but he refused to name the papers or the doctors he had consulted in Canton. He asked to go to Sukabumi or Salatiga or some other place on Java, saying that he had friends in those places who could nurse him. 48. De Trilnme, Feb. 27, 1925.

439

.. _••

Notes, pp. 210-211

49. The text of the government reply, dated Mar. 12, 1925. is reprinted in Api. '~.1_~.~~.1~1_

1~.~_

emment said it would detennine Tan Malaka's place of residence, that he would not be informed of it beforehand. but that in any case it wouJd not be Java. 50, Text of Malab'! Jetter in Api. Apr. 30, 1925; and Nievwe JWtterdtJmsche Courant, June 3, 1925. 51. MaIaka, DP I, pp. 121-123; Peringatan, p. 30, Malaka said that In Canton he had gotten to know a "Miss Carmen," the daughter of a former Philippine revolutionary, wh().'J!l mother ran a hostel for Filipinos there. She had given him valuable tips on Philippine life and had taught him some Tagalog, which he picked up caliily since it was related to Indonesian. He also got to mow a guest of the hostel. Dr. Mariano Santos, who was 0 0 his way home from Europe and was to become vice-president of the Univel"llity of Manila. Santos a proponent of the wlity of the Indonesian peoples; since Tao Maim was already strongly drawn to Pan.lndonesianism, the two of them strock up a friendship, acamling to MaJal:a, and maintained contact until World War II. 52. Semaun, interview, 1959; ''Pidato Semaun: Adjaran2 Tan Malab Sewadjar dengan Adjamn Marx, Engels dan Lenin" (Semau n's Speech: The Teachings of Tan Malaka Are in Aecordante with the Teachings of Man:, Engels, and Lenin), in Perlngatan, p. 103. The Communist Party of the Philippines was established in 1930; Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958 (New York. 1958 ), p. 140, claims that Tan Malllica "p.lid a quiet visit" to the Philip" pines in 1929 and there got in touch with several Filipino Communist leaders who had been in Moscow and who subsequently founded the party. MaJaka however, does not claim in his autobiography to have been in the country after 1927 or to have been connected with the founding of the group; since he was not reticent about describing his revolutionary aecomplishrnents, his participation is dubious. More probable is the suggestion by Dapen Liang, Thl: D~lopml:nt 0/ Philippine Political Partie, (Hong Kong. 1939), p. 256, that Malaka helped inspire moves that ended in the formation of the party by his contact with sympathetic FUipinos during h is 1927 sojourn in the coun try. 53. Malaka, Them, p. 47; and DjamaJuddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 54. Api, Mar. 16 and Apr. 7, 1925; Java Bock, Apr. 24, 1925; Malaka DP I, p.143. 55. The establishment of a Red labor international was called for in July 1920; see Pro/intem 0 rezoliulsiiakh (The ProGntern in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1928 ), pp. 9-11. In the following month a sort of pre-Profinlern, the International Councll of Trade and Industrial Un.iOIU, was established (pp. 12-15 ). 56. Si Tetap, Jan. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 8, 1921, p. 31 (article by Semaun on the YSTP congress); De Loromotlef, Feb. 21, 1922, citiDg De Volhardfng (Dutchlanguage organ nf the YSTP) of Febroary 1921, no. 1/2; JaV(l$Che Courant, Aug. 16, 1923. The PKI journal, publishing Zinoviev's call for the unification of the labor movement in the Profintem at the R1LU founding congress. called on Indonesian workers to become conscious enough of their own strength tn join the world movement. This indicates that no Indnnesian union had yet affiliated with it; Soeora Ra'fot, Aug. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 37, 1921, pp. 643-844. 51. Letter from Walter C. Smith (an American Communist) to W. A. van Knrdcnoordt in Semarang, dated Seattle, May 21, 1923. The delegate was premmably Darsono, who attended the concurrent third congress of the Cominlern. Smith's letter included an Inquiry, on behalf of some American Communlsb who

was

440

Notes, pp. 211-214 had attended the congress, about the missing Indonesian delegate. On the other hand, Profintern records of the congress listed as present one delegate from Java, who possessed voting rights; Deslat' let Pro{interno u rC"'-Oliub//akh (Ten YeatS of the Profintem in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1930), p. 36; see also Carr, Bolsheuik Reoolution, III, 401. It is possible that Darsol\o was there on paper but not in fact. 58. "Brief des revolutionaren GewerkschaItszentrums an das Vollzugsburo de, R.C'!." (Letter of the Revolutionary Labor Federation to the Executive Bureau of the ruLU), RGI, November 1922, p. 328. See also Ezhegodnik Komintema, p. 775; Musso, "How the Influence of the Amsterdam International Is Penetrating in Indonesia," Eastern aOO Colallial Bulletill, no. 11, November 1929, p. 22. 59. "Aus der GewerkschaIts-Bewegung in Nicderliindisch-lndien" (From the Labor Movement in the Netherlanru Indies ), In prekorr, Apr. 11, 1923, p. 368. 60. ''The Governor General's lkport" in Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings, p. 5, note 4; MdJt, Sediorah, p. 53; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 27-28. The flrst-named account is a translation of the abridged version of Politieke nota PKl prepared for public CQnsumption. 61. II. KOllgress Kra.snogo 1ntematsionakl profsciuwv v Moskoo 19 no/abria-2 de1wbria 1922 godiJ (The Seeond Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow, Nov. IS-Dec. 2, 1922) (Moscow / PetTOgrnd, 1923) , p. 260, hereafter II Kongrcss Krasnogo; MaltJia cntsiklopedi/a po mczhdunarodllOmy profdviuwniiu, coL 558. 62. Programma Congres, ka 12 ckrj V.S.T.P. Tanggal 2-4 Februari 1923, p. 1. 63. See Prolinlem v rC"'..oliutn/akh, pp. 95--96. 64. Ch. E., "Der erste Kongress der revolutJoDaren Organisationcn des Fernen Ostens," p. OOJ. Emphasis in the text. 65. Mezhdunorodrwe profdvitllerlic 1923--1924gg. (The International Labor Movement, 1923-1924 ) ( Moscow, 19"..4 ), p. 291; see :llso II Kongress Krasnogo, p. 291, (or expressions of admiration for thc revolutionary quality of the Indonesian labor movement. Semaun was elected 10 the presidium of this congress as the representative for the Far East. The discussion of the Profintcrn's activities in the CQlonial and semicolonial areas was led by Leo Heller, with Semaun as one of the two comporters. There were two delegates fTOm Java listed as present at the congres,~, one with and one "dlhoul voting rights. The fonner was probably Scmaun and the latter the Dutch fonner VSTP leader Harry DeUer, who attended the CQncurrent fifth Comintern CQugress as a representative of Indonesia. See Deswt' let Prolintema, pp. 121-122. 66. "Tiitigkcilsbericht des Vollzugsbtiros det RC.J. tiber die Zeit von Juli bis September," RGI, October 1922, p. 687. ffr. L'I.S.R. au tral'oil 1924-1928 (The RlLU at Work 1924--192.8) (n.p., 1928), p. 11. In C<'lntrast, "Java" was discussed only once by the Profintern executive in the eighteen month~ between its 1922 and 1924 C<'lngresses; Detriat' let ProlintemQ, p . 125. 68. The most striking ProBntern deviation from the Comintern line CQnoerning Indonesia during this period was the favorable comment accorded the decisions of the PKI CQngress of December 1924 in the ProSntern executive report to its fourth ( 1928) CQngress. Die InteTf.llltionale Cewerhchaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1924-1927 (The International Labqr Movement in the Years 1924--1927) (Moscow/Berlin, n.d.), p. 64. In Comintcm accounts, including that of the sixth (1928) con~ntion, these PKI decisions were l'Onsistently decried lIS an example of the "infantile disease of leftism."

441

Notes, pp. 214-216 69. Thus a leading student of the early history of Chinese Comm\1nism bas remarked: With remarkable consistency. attitudes on each of these issues [bourgeoisie, ~ antry. proletariat, inlelligenl5ia, political grouping$, and role of the foreign powers in China] differed according to definite groups within the Comintem, and among the Comintem, the Narkomindel, and the Pro60tem. . . . Far from being monolithic, the Soviet structure of the early twenties presents. fascinating picture of clash and conllict, rooted both in theOretical differences and in political intrigue. Whiting, Soviet Pol/cia. p. 9, . 70. Semaun, interview, 1959. .n. "Die Tatigkeit des Vollzugsbiiros der RC.!''' (The Activity of the Rtecutive Bureau of the RILU). ReI, February 1922, p. 148. The functions of this bureau are described in some detail in L'I.S.R. au travail 1924-1928, pp. 82-84. In the resolution setting up the office, its task was described as "developing a broad agitationaJ activity among the workers of the East"; Pro/irrtem v rezoliut4iiakh, p. 96. 72. II Kongreu Krosnogo, pp. 319-320; Second World Congreu of the Red

International of Lobot UJIioru (Chicago. n.d.), p. 38; Mezhdunarodnoe proldvfzhen/e 1923-1924gg. (1st ed.), p. 108; Pro/inlem 0 rezolluUU4kh, pp. 99-101. 73. "Resolutions and Appeals of the Third Session of the Red International of Labor Unions," lnprecoff, Dec. 6, 1923, p. 725; Profintem v re-...ollubiWkh, pp. 101-103. 74. III KOngTen Kra.mogo, p. 345; Mczhdunorodnoe profdoWumle 19231924gg., 1st ed., p. 108; 2d ed., p. 105. Also IV uwila T.rentrtd'nogo sooeta KJ.amogo lrnemotronak pro!sofu;;ov, 9-15 marta 1926g. (The Fourth Sewon of the Central Council of the Red International of Labor Unions) (Moscow, 1926 ), pp. 85, ffT. 75. "Die Tlitigkeit des Exekuti...bi.i.r05 der R.C.I ....om 15. Dezember 1922 his 1. Juli U)23" (11le Activity of the Executive Bureau of the RILU from Doc. 15, 1922, to July I, 1923 ), RCI, May/June, 1923, p. 579. For a further description of these offices and their function, see A. Chain, "Die intemationaJen Hafenburos" (The Intemational Harbor Offices), RGI, August 1923, pp. 751753; and Cautherot, Bolchevi.rme, pp. 104-106. 76. Malo/a enUil.:lopedlio po mezhdunorodnomu proldolWnUu, col. 1623; O. I ., "Osnovnye momenty istonl Prolintema" (Bnslc Moments in the H istory . of the Pro.6ntem), Krasnyl Inlematrio1l(JI Pro/soiuzov, Ju1y/August 1925, p. 39. Semaun was appointed to this post at the Pro.6ntem congress of Ju1y 1924. 77. Semaun, interview, 1959; "Communismc," p. 536, co1s. a and b; Bifwge Semamng, p. 9; "Gezagschemering in Nederlandsch·Indie (Twilight of AuthOrity in the Netherlands Indies), Voll.: en Vaderwnd, Sept. 21, 1935, p . 7; Ouer:tichf 1924, p. 8; M. A., "Die Arbeiterbewegung in Indonesien" (The Labor Movement in Indonesia), RGf, Derember 1924, p. 288; }aoo Bode, Nov. 21, 1924; Nkuwe RoHerdolll.'/che Courant, No.... 23, 1929. 78. M. A., "Die Arbeiterbewegung in lndonesien," p. 288. According to this account, the SPLI contained 3,000 seamen and 2,000 dockers. In 1925, accord· ing to the ProI1ntem encyclopedia, the union contained 3,000 seamen and 9,000 dockworken; MaIolo entJil.:lopedi/a po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu, cot 559. This is probably the total after it had joined forces with the SPPL, which absorbed aU the PKI.sponsored seamen's aDd docken' unions in that year. 79. L. Heller; "Die Pazifik-Konferenz.," p. 42; Heller, "The Trade Unions Con-

442

Notes, pp. 216-219 ference of the Pacific Ocean Countries and the Labour Movement in the Far East," InpretXJJT, JUDe 23, 1927, p. 763; MedldufllJrodnoe profdvizhenJe 1923-1924gg., 2d. ed .• p. 108; Profintern v rewliutsiwkh, p. 83. SO, Semaun, interview, 1959. 8 1. MalaJca, DP I, pp. llQ.--lll, 114. Because the original leader of the delegation deserted, the bip was probably a last·minute affair; Alimin, in any case, was still making speeches at Red 51 meetings in late May; Sinar Hindia. May 23 and 24, 1924, in IPO, JlO. 22, 1924, pp. 38 1-382. 82. Heller, "Die Pazifik-Konferenz," pp. ~. Tan Malalm related that Sun Yat-sen was supposed to address the meeting, but since security condition! in Canton at that time were poor the CCP leader Lino Chung-leal was the major Chinese speaker; Malaka, DP I, p. 115. 83. Heller, "Die PaziGk-Konferenz," p. 55. According to this report, one of the Javanese spoke no Indonesian; but this must be wrong. What is likely, however, is that one of the Indonesians (Buclisutjitro) spoke no internationally useful tongue. 84. Malaka DP I , p. 123. 85. IV SfWiia T.wntral'nogo, p. 85. 88. IV 8eS8lia Tlrntrafnogo, pp. 85, 87; Profintem 0 rc:wllutnlakll, pp. 90, 110. rn. Ten Year.t of Inkmatlonal Red Aid (USSR, n.d.), p. 177, for the found· ing and purposes of the organization, see pp. 15-16. SS. From the Fourth to tile Fifth W orld Congren (London, 1924 ) , p. 99. 89. SemaWl, Rapolan lull kongre.t:Z di MO.tkou dan hal konfenmtie di Hamburg (Report on the Congresses in Moscow and the Conference in Hamburg) (mimeo, 1924?), pp. 35-36. 90. SemaWl, "Brieven," June 6 and 8, 1925. Abo note that on Mar. 9, 1926, Api printed, with enthusiastic editorial commeot, a letter from a provincial Russian IRA group expressing sympathy and promising moral and material aid; the message, dated Aug. 8, 19"..5, seems to have been not designed speciBcally for lDdonesla but the product of a letter-writing campaign. 91. PolUiek ver.tlag 1926, p. 11. 92. Semaun, intelView, 1959. On the other hand, the government claimed that the police uncovered correspondence betwcen the PKI and Sneevliet's NAS (National Labor Secretariat, a Communist-syndicalist labor federation) concerning financial support for the 1925 strike effort. Of the money reportedly sent by this organization, f200 was allotted to Surabaja; PoUtiek verdDg 1926, p. 11. This wa.t probably the bulk of the grant, since Swabaja was considered by the Communists at that time to be the most important strike area. 93. Thus the Ind/sche Courant, commenting on speculatioos of foreign support for the PKI, noted that the party's allies abroad seemed better at providing it with reading material than with money: the Indies Communist press seemed well acquainted with what Soviet and Dutch party readers were saying, but the PKI, VSTP, and SR were perennially out of funds, their newspapers were continually being bankrupted, and even Api wa.t appearing irregularly. Sept. 17 and 18, 1924. 94. Api, Oct. 18, 1924. in lPO. no. 43, 1924, pp. 156-157. 95. At the time of Darsono's 1920 attack. the Jogjakarta group had replJed that Musso and Alimin (then associated with Tjokroaminoto) would be able to clear up the issue if only they were out of prison. since they had been involved in the affair. Either Musso was not really infonned or he was Ted by partisan zeal to renew Darsono's charge at a major Sarekat Islam rally on May 25, 1924;

443

Notes, pp. 219-221 set off a new round In the SI-PKI fight. Mata Norl, May 26, 1924; HlndkJ Borae, May 3 1, June 2-7 and 10, 1924 ; Sinar lHndla, May 28 and June 10, 1924; in IPO, nos, 22-24, 1924, pp. 395--396, 413-418. 477-479, 48J.--485, 532-534, Musso stated that Allmln had given the funds for Salim's trip to Tjolcroaminoto; his opponenu denied it, and Alimin himseH Wll.'l unavailable, pre$Umably on his way to Canton. When he returned in July, he was pressed for an answer and he gave one: the funds had never existed. Contributions from the 51 branches had not come in, and so the receipt of the money Wa.'l announced in order 10 shame the delinquent locals into doing their part; RincJla Baroe, Ju1y 24-30, 1924, in lPO, no. 31 , 19"..4, pp. 220-221. This explanation had the ring of truth, and Salim's }[india Boroe published it in exoneration of TjoKroaminOlo. However, at the Sarekat Islam congress a month later, anotheT version of the affair was presented as part of the meeting's anti-PKI drive. Salim and Tjohoamiooto claimed there that the money had actually existed and gave a loog list of legitimate purposes for which they said it had been used, demanding that the Communisb; reciprocate by providing a publJc accounting of the funds they received from Moscow and Shanghai; Verslag oon het 11e Kongres der Centrale Snrikat Islam, pp. 13-1 4. 96. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. SO, 1923, p. 525; Semauo, Rapotfln, pp. 48-49. 91. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 48-49. 98. Penolong Kaum Buruh ( PKB ). This organization had sprouted from an older fund, the Peuolong Isteri Korban Pergeraken (PIKP, Fund for the Aid of Wives of Victims from the Movement). At the same time it announced the establishment of the PKB, the party also declared its intention to found a Fund for Victims in the Cause of Freedom (Fonds Karban Kemerdekaan), this in response to n proposal by the nationnli.d leader Sutomo; Api, Mar. 28, 1925. 99. The list was found in a raid on the Sarekat Postel headqua~ers in Surabaja; it was designated for "Support for China and Canton"; Poli«ek 1Jef'1lag 1928. p . 18. 100. "11le Peasants International to the Peasants of the Whole 'Vorld," Inprccorr, July 19, 1924, p. 44(1 ; " Hands off China," lnpreeorr, Sept. 11 , 1924, p. 769. There were two other Asians 00 the Krestintern executive, Sen Katayama and Ken Hayashi, both of Japan. For the text of the Krestintern appeal to the colonies, ~ Dcr W eltbund der Bauem (The Peasant International) (Berlin, 1924), pp. 48-49. The Krestintern also challenged the August 1925 congress of the Second International to act on behalf of the peasants in the colonies; it did so, it claimed, pn the urging of severa! members of Asian national revolutionary organizations. The text of this message was reprinted in Api, Jan. 23, 1926. 101. Shutoi rMSllfrennyi plenum IgpolkonuJ Komtmem/J (Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Conunittce of the Comintern) (Moscow/Leningrad, 1927), p. 3; Leon Trotsky, The Third International after Lenin (New York, 1936), p. 346, note 74. 10:2. Nleuwe Rotterdarruche COtIrant, July 27, 1930, reporting the government decision to intern Iwa Kusumasumanm. It is possible that he was working for the International Agrarian Institute (MAl), which opened In Moscow on Mar. 8, 19"...6, as a research branch of the Krestintern. The institute p\1blished a journal, Agramyc Problemy (Agrarian Problems), which was also put out in Berlin as Agrarprobfeme. The MAl was divided into four departments. of which one 'was conoorned with the international peasant movement; one section of this division devoted itself to Asia. "The International Agrarian Institute of the lDtemationai Peasnnt Council," Inprccorr, May 13. 1926, p. 665. till.'!

444

Notes, pp. 221-222 lro. S. Dingley, The Peasatlts' Movement in Ind~nesia (Library of the Farmen' and Peasants' InternatiowJ [Krestinteml. R. L. Prager, Berlin. n.d. (1926]). In the government's charges against Iwa Kuswnasumantri. this pamphlet is referred to as Bor'ba Krest'ian.sfoo, which is taken from the title of Its Russian version : S. Dwgli, Bor'ba Krerl'kmstoo v IndonezU (The Struggle of the Peasantry in Indonesia) (Blbllotelca Krestinlema, Moscow, n.d.). 104. Sem:mn, Hapotan. pp. 45-46. 105. Wongso. Kitch Tani; Boekoe Boeat Kaoem rani Indonesia (The Pea5anfs Guide; a Book for the Peasants of Indonesia) (Amsterdam, May 1925, no indication of publisher or printer). "Wongso" is almost certainly a pseudonym. My helOt guess as to the author is Semann, a1though if it is he, it is puzzling that he did Dot use his real name as in h is other writings from abroad. The pamphlet is written in very simple Indonesian, almost market Malay, and its author assumes the role of a peasant talking to his fellows. 106. The demands were as follows: a. Proprietary lands should be conflscated and distributed without charge to the peasants living on them. b. The lands of the Sunan of Sumkarta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta should also be con6scated and distributed among the peasants of those regions. c. Taxes on the peasantry shouJd he reduced to accord with the general wishes of the peasants. d. Unpaid labor for the authorities (radi, IleerendieM) in the Outer Wands shouJd be completely abolished, and not Simply replaced wi th cash payments. e. The payment of premiums or rewards to village heads or other state officiw involved in fixing and collecting taxes shouJd be halted. f. PiantatiOll$ should be strictly forbidden to give rewards to village officials who inII uence the renting of lands to sugar factories or other capitalist enterprises. g. The state shouJd prohibit the leasing of land by sugar fatcorias for more than one cane-growing season, and the rent should be calculated anew each season. h. The peasants shouJd be given a right to participate in the management and control of the irrigation systems, so that the plantations cannot arbitrarily dispose of the wa te!' supply. 1. Numerous rural banks shouJd be established, providing cheap credit for the peasantry. j. Moneylenders who ask exorbitant interest rates should be punished. k. Schools and courses should be set up to spread literacy among peasants of both sexes. 1. Sufficient scllools for pea~ nt children shouJd be provided. m. Schools of agriculture shouJd be established from primary to advanced levels. n. Rural community centers shouJd be set up to provide libraries, courses on agrarian and genernl affairs, art work, etc. o. The defense budget should be reduced; anns shouJd be given to the workers and peasants in order that they may establish an independent nation, free of foreign and domestic capitalists. p. Vi11agers shouJd be given the right to regulate local affairs by meetings in which all vi1lagers eighteen years and over have the right to participate and vote. q. ViJlage officials should be elected yearly by the town meetings and may be disn:rlssed by them at any time. r. Representatives to district assemblies should be elected by all adult peas-

445

Notes, pp. 222-223 ants, workers, petty bourgeois, and Intellectuals in a ratio of about 1 for 3,000 people. 5. There should also be assembUes for every major ethnic group (bong3a), eleded by the district assemblies. t. The bang.to-level assemblies should elect memben to an Indoueslan People's Assembly. u. All the above bodies should elect eIecutives at their respective levels, and In such a manner as to enrure the inclusion of peasants in them. v. Assemblies above the village level showd meet at least every six months to detennine school arrangements, the government budget, foreign affairs, etc., and, having chosen people to state affairs, shou1d disband, so that every delegate could return to the assembly that had elected him and report on what had been trammcted. The decisions would thus be passed had: down to the people themselves, who wowd put them Into practice. w. Local and regional assemblies should have the power to govern their individunl districts, in accord with the general line provided by the Indonesian People's Assembly. x. The Indonesian People's Assembly should have the right to elect an Indonesian People's Government and to determine affairs affecting the country as a whole. Wongso, Kitab Tani, pp. 14-19. 107. Wongso, K/tab Tani, p. 21. 108. Wongso, Kltab Tanl, p. 23. 109. Wongso, KUab Tani, pp. 24-25. 110. During the Madiun cou'gress the CSI devoted a conference to the agrarian question, which decided to form a Sarekat Tani. Its program was to protect peasants from disadvantageous land·rent contract5 made with plantations by the village heads or closed by the peasants themselves for ready cash. All landow~T!l except village officials cowd belong to it; the members were to pay dues to the local branch of the association and not rent land or borrow money without consulting the local. 'The ST groups were to use their funds for crop loans, the purcha$e of tools, seed, and livestock, and, if poSSible, to start cooperative enterprises; Portlj 51, Mar. 11- 21, 1923, in IPO, no. 18. 1923, p, 223. Nothing seems to have come of thi$ project, probably becau$e of the genera1 coUap$e of the 51. Ill. "Manifest des Kongresses der Werktlitigen des Femen Ostens an die Voll::er des Femen Ostens," p. 144. 112. Heller, "The Trade Union Conference of the Pacific Ocean Countries and the Labour Movement in the Far East," p. 763; Mezhdunarodnoe pro/del. wnie 1923-1924gg., 2d ed., p. 108; Profontem v rewllubiiakh, pp. lOS, 110; A. Lozovslcy, "Kuda idet razvitiia mezhdunarodnogo profdvizheniia?" ( In What Direction Is the International Labor Movement Developing?), Kramyi Imernatsional Pro/ w iuwo, February 1926, p. 144; IV $f?uUa T.rentrafnago, p. 85. 113. Polltieke nata PKI, p, 4. 114. See C. Lai-Shou, ''The International Union of the Oppressed Peoples of the East," Inprerorr, Dec. 24, 1925, p. 1350. The organization is called the League of Oppressed Peoples In Eudin and North, Soviet RuuIo, p. 280, and Association of Oppressed Peoples of Asia in People'.! CltiM, Dec, 16, 1950, p. 14. 'The Chinese Communist leader Liao Chung.kai was also instrumental In setting up the Union. Its constitution declared its purpose to he the "gathering together of all forces of the oppressed nationaUties in order to carry through the Uberating revolution"; Lai.Shou, '''The International Union," p. 1350. At 8rst the Union

446

Notes, PI'. 223-226 concerned itseU with China and the countries bordering it ( India, Indochina, and Korea), but at its serond conference in 1925 it declared its intention to establish connections with the revolutionary movement in Japan and with na· tionalist organizations in India, the Philippines, Java, and Africa (p. 1350). There is no evidence that the Union linked with the PKI in the Indies, though it may have established cOnnedions with the PKI group in Singapore. It ended in 1927, with the break between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintallg. 115. Api. Apr. 4, 1925, citing Tan Malllka's paper, The Dawn. 116. Semaun, interncw, 1959. 117. One of the more esoteric: profects lor th is purpose was to utilize It radio station owned by the Trade Unions Council of New South Wales to relay short-wave messages from Moscow and Canton to the revol utionaries in Sootheast Asia; M. P., " Rabochee dvi~hcnie Avstmlii i Tikhookeanskaia konferentsiia profsoiuwv" (The Workers Movement Australia and the PaciSe Conference of Labor Unions), Krasnyi. Internatsional ProfsoiuzolJ, November 1926, p. 439. 118. Voitinsky, "Go-min'-dan i kompartiia Kitaia. v bor'be 5 impcrializmom" (The Kuominbng and the Communist Party of China in the Struggle with Imperialism) , NOIJyi. Vostok, no. 6, 1924, p. xxvi. 119. Sneevliet, "Onze eerste 1 Mei-vicring," p. 197. This was described as a gathering of the [seamen's?] union Kung Tan Hwee Koan, which had its headquarters in Shanghai and several hundred members in its Surabaja division. Apparently the ISDV leaders' appearance was not very successful; Snoovllet ' notcd that language was a major stumbling bl()Ck 120. De Indische Glds, I, 1919, 642. According to this report, Semaun urged the SlIrekat Islam to ask the Indies Chinese organizations to inBuence the government in C'tiina to press for equality and freedom of political activity for all residents of the Indies. This may have been an appeal to the widespread feeling that the recent advances in the legal rights of Japanese and Chinese residents of the Indies were due largely to their identification with foreign states. The CSI was not particularly tal:en with the idea, however: it rejected it, according to this report, six to three and one abstention. 121. Soeara Ra'/at, Aug. 10, 1922, in lPO, no. 32, 1920, p. 4. 122. Sinor Hind/a, Sept. 13, 1921. in lPO, no. 40, 1922, pp. 11-l2. 123. CeDe D. Overstreet and Marsh.all Windmiller, Communi.tm in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960 ), pp. 40-42. 124. At the May Day celebrations in Sernarang, pictUI"CS of Lenin, Marx. Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Sun Yat-sen, Semaun, and Tan Malaka. were displayed; lPO, no. 19, 1924, p. 2.33. The same constellation was shown at the June 1924 congress; Ver&lag 9dc, p . 2. 125. Batavioosch lIandelsbwd, July 21, 1924; Bijwge Semamng, p. 12; Ovenicht 1924, p. 8; Poliliek ver~lag 1926, p. 2; NIeIlWfJ Rotterdam.rche Courant, Aug. 4, 1925; Blilage 1925, pp. 14-15; Semaun, " Dcr internationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens" ( International ImperiaJism and the Communist Party of Indonesia), DkJ Kommunisti.tche lnlemationale, 1925, Sonderheft, p. 58; Sinor Hindia, June 27, 28, and 30 and July I, 1924, in lPO, no. 28, 1924; Api, Aug. 19-23, 1924, in lPO, no. 35, 1924, pp. 415-417; Api, Aug. 25-30, 1924, in IPO, no. 36, 1924, p. 457. The last-named source reports the fonnation of the China flood committee (Comite Penjokong Korban Babaja Kebandjiran di Tjiongkok ); its ehairman and secretary "'-ere Indonesians and its treasurer an Indies Chinese. 126. Vcr&wg 9!k, p. 7. 127. Soeara & ';al, Aug. 20/ 30, 1924, in lPO, no. 37, 1924, p. 54.5.

or

447

Notes, pp. 227-229 128. A,n, Aug. 19--23, 1924, in IPO, no. 35, 1924. pp. 415--417. 129. Overzicht 1924, p. 8; lPO, no. :n, 19M, pp. 503-506. 130. Api, Mar. 30, Apr. 14 and 16, 1925; 51 Tmp. Mar. 31, 1925, in lPO. no. 21, 192.5, p. 341 ; Goenawan, T/onglwk dan Dr. Sun Yat-.ren. Marhoem (China and the Late Dr. Sun Yat-sen) (B8Ildung. 1925). 131. Api, June 22-27, June Zg....July 4, July 6-11, July 12-17, July 20-25,1925. in lPO, DOS. 27-31, 1925, pp. 3-8, 52-54, 99-100, 107. lOO-lIO, 148, 202-203. The paper urged that contributions be sent to Sin Po and declared that money collected by PKI-aHilillted organizations was being transferred to that newspapet. wlUcb was oriented toward the Indies-born Chinese and took a radically noncooperative stand toward the colonial regime. 132. See, for ~ample. 5edio Tomo (a Bud! Uwmo organ), July 13, 1925. and Sri Dfofobofo (an SI paper) , Ju1y 16, 1925, in lPO, no. 25, 1925, pp. 170-171,

189. 133. See, for example, the articles by Hadji Agus Salim in Hindli2 BQffie, July 18 and 22 and Sept. 10, 1925, in IPO, nos. 30 and 38, 1925, pp. 162. 165166, 546. 134. For remarks on the Kuomintang oonspimtorial groups in the Indies during tho 192.0s, see Dng Eng Die, Cllineezen in NedeTlandsch-IndUl (Chinese in the Netherlands Indies) (Assen, 1943), p. 257; J. Th. MoI1, De Chlnee:.en In Ne
448

Notes, pp. 229-232 the end of 1924; this was probably because it was hoped Chinese saUors in the archipelago would enter it. "Communisme," p. 536, h; Toer, Hoa Kiau, p. 94. 140. Pol/tieke nota PKI, pp. 7-8; Neu trali.reering. p. 10; and see M. M., "De Partai Kommunis Indonesia. de stem van Moslcou" ( The Communist Party of Indonesia, the Voice of Moscow), Internationale Spectator, May 18, 1951, p. 6. 141. Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Folice Background (London, n.d), pp. 106, 1l0-1l2. 142. Hanrahan, The Comm unist Struggle In Mowya (New York, 1956), p. 6, cites wartime Japanese military intelligence documents to the eITect that Alimin. stopping in Singapore in the early spring of 1924 on his way to the Pan-Pacific Labor Conference [sic; Pacinc T ransport Workers' Conferencel, seems to have carried out limited recruitment among radical elements there. He evidently made a full report on his activities to the Comintcm at the conference, this account continues, for early in 1925 Tan Malaka persuaded CCP leaders in Canton to infiltrate left-wing groups in Singapore; aocordingly, a special CCP representative, reportedly named Fu Ta-ehing, was sent to Malaya to effect a liaison with resident Chinese and Indoncs.ian revolutionaries. H Alimin did take up contacts with Malayan radicals in 1924, it seems more likely that he did it on hls earlier visit (where he reportedly met with Tan Malaka, who gave him the theses presented at the June 1924 PKI congress) than on the way to Canton: what we Imow of his schedule indicates that he spent very little time in Singapore on the second journey. Since it also appears that Tan Malaka spent some time in Singapore before the Canton conference and that he found Canton inconvenient as a base, we may ""'ell wonder whether he and not Alimin initiated the idea for activity in Malaya. Nei ther Malaka nor Alimin mention playing such a role In their autobiographies, and I have found no corroborating evidence for it, a1though (given the patchy and unreliable nature of the available reports) this is not to say something of the sort might not have taken place. 143. Danono, interviews with the author in 1959 and with George MeT . Kahin in 1955. 144. Semaun, interviews, 1959. 145. Just when Subakat arrived in Singapore is not certain. Aocordiog to Darsono (intervjew with G. MeT. Kahin, 1955), he had been planning to leave at the time of the December 1924 PKI congress, since proceedings for his internment were already under way. A possible clue is an article published in Api by " Exter" (Extemeerd, Exiled?), datelined Johore and apparently written before- May Day, which said that its writer had been in Pontianak, Borneo, had stayed there about a month, IlI1d had then traveled to the Riouw Islands, Singapore, and Johore. On the way he had tried to recmit seamen for the SPPL but without much success; he also noted that a1though there were many workers in Singapore, it loolced as if they wou1d be hard to organize. A,n, May 22, lQZS. 146. Organisation et actioile I'Inremot/oM!e Communl.s1e (Organization and Activity of the Communist International ) ( Paris, n.d.) , pp. 15-16. The partie5 of the "semicolooial" lands, to which no speciHc metropolis cou1d be assigned (China, Korea, Mongolia, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Syria. and Palestine ), were usigned to the eleventh ~tion. secretariat ammgement was distinct from that of the Comlntern Eastern Section, which was rubdivided Into Near Middle and Far East groups and was concemed primarily with rupplying th~ Comln~ tern with information on the Communist movements In these areas and with overseeing the execution of ECCI decisions in the Asian countries. See Berlcht der Eul..utioo 15. Dezember 1922-15. Mai 1923, p. 9.

ere

nus

449

Notes, PI)' 232-235 147. Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943, Document, (London, 1956 ), I, 327, quoting an ECCI resolution of Mar. 4, 192.2; LosowUy, "Vor dem dritten KOIlgress dec R.C.I." (Before the Third Congress of the Profintem), RGI, June 1924, p. 335; "Theses on Tactics," 1nprecorr, Aug. 29, 1924, p. 652; "Resolution on the Question of the Relations of the Comintein with the International Peasants Council," lnprecorr. Sept. 5, 1924, p. 686. 148. Van Ravesteyn, De u-'Ording con het CommurU.tme In Nederlond, 10071925, p. 140. 149. "Jaarvergadering Indische S.D.A.P.;' p. 1114; HantkUngen 2e Komer, 1918-1919; pp. 2044-2045 (speech by Albania). ISO. JIandeUngen 2e Kamer, 1921-1922, pp. 270-274. In the Volksraad the autonomy action leaders Van Hinloopen Labbcrton (NIVB), Cntmer ( ISDP ), and Vreede (ISDP) had urged the adoption of lndonesie, the Dutch.language equivalent of Indonesia. Van Ravesteyn declared in the Dutch parliamentary debate that this was not going far enough; only the completely Indonesian version would do. The SOAP spokesman Albania maintained, however, that Indonesia/lndonesie, like the earlier sobriquet Insulinde, was a "fad of the moment" and that it was only necessary to remove the possessive Netherlands from the colony's title. 151. Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202. 152. Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202; Handelingen 2e Komer, 1918-1919, pp. 2022, 20'1:1. Van Ravesteyn also caned for a halt to further development of a commercial economy in the indies, on the grounds that only through improving peasant agriculture could the population be fed. The SOAP, we win remember, favored the development of indigenously ron industry in the colony, and the Socialist spokesman Albania denounced the CPR position as reactionary and aimed at preserving Indonesia as a preindustrial area; Handelingert 2e Komer, 1918-1919, pp. 2047-2048. The Communists may have realized how unfavorably the argument could be construed, for they did not make a point of it again. 153. " Ret tiende jaarcongrcs vnn de communistische partir (TIle Tenth Annual Congress of the Communist Party), HVW, Aug. 23, 1919, p. 414-415; Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202; vBr., "Sneevliet Slamatl~ ( Hurmh for Sneevlietl), llVW, Aug. 23, 19 19, p. 409. The last article notes that the Indies Com· munists had 8Jlpected the Dutch party to give Sneevliet au important post immed iately on hi~ return; they had been pumed by its failure to do so, but apparently its leaders had wanted to wait until the party congress. It had also been proposed that Sncevlict fain the editorial staff of De Tribune, the article continued; th at position ....'Quld probably have been more to Sueevliet's liking. but the CPH leadership seemed to prefer him in the role of propagandistadministrator. 154. HVW, Feb. 2 1 and 28, 1920, pp. 161-163, 171- 172. Van Ravesteyn appealed to the Minister of Colonies to review the case and Introduced parliamentary motions to abolish erlraordinary rights and abrogate the dedsioo extemiDg _Sneevliet; the first was defeated 19 to 36, the second 20 to 26. EIVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 1. 155. JIVW, Oct. 20, 1920, p. 1. 156. H. Roland Holst, "Het Amsterdamscb bureau der Communlstische Internationale" (The Amsterdam Bureau of the Communist International), HVW, Feb. 28, 1920, p. 170. 151. "De internationale communistische confereotie te Amsterdam" (The International Communist Conference in Amsterdam), De Tribune, Mar. 20, 1920,

450

Notes, pp. 235-241 supplement, p. 1; De Tribune, July 8, 1920; 1'heOO0re Draper, The Roots 0/ American Communism (New York, 1957), pp. 233-234. 158. De Tribune, Nov. 14, 16, and 18, 1921 ; Gerald Vanter, ''The Congress of the Dutch Communist Party," Inprecorr. Dec. 13, 1921 , p. 134. 159. The resolution as tramlated in Gerald Vanter, "Dutch Imperialism in the East Indies," InprccoTT, Jan. 6, 1922. p. 11; emphasis in the text. For the Dutch text, see De Tribune, Nov. 18, 1921. 160. Tan ~falab, Toomloek, pp. 3~; Jallfllche Courant, Aug. 16, 1923; V. Tribune, JWle 22, 1922, supplement, p. 1. 161. Malaka, Toendook, p. 98. 162. De Tribune, Apr. 29, May 2, 3, and 11, 1924; Malaka, Toendoek, p. 98; Malaka, DP I, p. 92. 163. Malab, Toendoek, p. 98. 164. Handelingen 2e Kamer, 1921-1922, pp. 2756, 2762-2765, 2772. Wijnkoop also protested the persecution of the Ternate PKI leaders, the action taken against the SI leaders Abdul Muis and Rehodiputro as a result of the pawnshop strike, and the general resbictions on freedom of speech and press. His motion was defeated, 60 to 23. 165. De Tribune, May 11, 1922 (from the alUlouncement of Tan MaIah's candidacy) . 166. For information on Malaka's campaign, see Malaka, DP I, pp. 92-93; Malah, Toendoek, pp. 98-99; De Tribune, June 22, 1922, supplement; SoelU'n lin'lat, Sept. 1, 1922, in lro, no. 39, 192.2, p. 491; Gerard Vanter, "Die Situation in Holland" (The Situation In Holland ), InprekoTT, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 1514. 1Re CPH vote in the 1922 elections was Wljnkoop, 44,054; Van Ravestcyn, 1,709; Tan Malab, 5,211; Kruil, 577; De Visser, 1,006; plus five minor candidates. 167. P. B., " Het eenheidsfront in Indonesii,i" (The United Front in Indonesia), Dc Tribune, Sept. 8, 1922. 168. P. B., " Het eenheidsIront in Indonesie," emphasis in the text 169. Leiter from Bergsma in Franeker, Holland, tn Semnun in Semarnng, Feb. 20, 1923. 170. Semaun, interview, 1959. 171 . Sioor HindEa, Sept. 27, 1923, in lPO, no. 41 , 1923, p. 56. 172. Slnnr Hindla, Sept. 26, 1923, in IPD, no. 41, 1923, p. 56; Sinar Hlndla, Nov. I , 1923, in lro, no. 46, 1923, p. 305 (letter from SemaWl); Goenawan, Semaoell, pp. 17-18. 173. On Dec. 16, 1924, the government claimed, Semaun wrote the PKI executive a letter describing his efforts among the students and opining that he seemed to be getting good results; Neutrallseering, p. 10. Scmaun stated (interview, 1959 ) that he found it easy to work among the students; this was not particularly becaU5C of their attraction to Communism, though a few did become party members, others sympathized strongly with the movement but did not join it, and still others were. Man:ists but not pro-Communist. Nationalist emotions were, he declared, the real drawing card. 174. "Comrnunistische invlooden in het Dosten" (Communist Influences In the East), Gedenkboek 1908-1923. lndonemche Vcreeniglng (n.p., n.d.), pp. 118119.

175. Sec Nicuwe Rotterdamsclie Courant, July 27 and Sept. 3 and 23, 1930; NeutraU.reering. p. 10; "Communisrnc," pp. 536, col. 8; J(l\J(l Bode, Nov. 21, 19'24. 176. Nieuwe Rotterdarmche Courant, Sept. 3, 1929 and June 30 and July 27, 1930; Rapport Door de S.K.B.I. (Report on the SKBI) (typescript report by the

451

Notes, pp. 241-246 Indies socialist party [lSDP) to the Dutch socialist party. ISDAP]. n.d.) . pp. 2, 7. Which of the universities is not apparent; :according to Semaun ( interview, 1959), it was the Lenin School. but the Nleuwe Rotterdalmche Courant, July 27, 1930, reporting the government's charges, refers to it as the "Eastern University," thus perhnps the KUTV. 177. From the original English as quoted in Neutralbeering, p. 13. 178. Semaocn. Hoe IIct floflarnUche imperio1isme het bruine mlUioncnoolk ODnzct tot cen manomord op Europeanen in InJoneaic, p. 30; announcement by the CPH executive following the text of a pamphlet written by Semaun shordy dter his arrival in Holland. 179. "Onze taal;" (Our Task ), Pandoe Merah, I , 1 [May. 1924], p. 1. 1BO. Indl4che Courant, Sept. 18, 1924. From the summaries of PoruWe Merah contents in the Indonesian press survey, this would seem a quite accurate remarlc:. See lPG, no. 34, 1924, pp. 407-408; 00. :n, 1924, p. 564; no. 46, 1924, p.339. 181. Semaun, interview, 1959, The 6.rst government action against the importation of p(Jrldoe Meroh and other Communist material from Holland was a raid on the Incoming ~ger ship lnsulinde; the police conBscated a suitcase full of letters and publications brought in by a cabin boy who was the '!oonrul" for the SPU on that ship. Api, Oct. 1 and 2, 1924, in lPO, no. 41 , 19-24, pp. 52-53. And see /Goo Bode, Sept 30, 1924. 182. "Discussion of the Report of Comrnde Zinoviev," lnprecorr, Mar. 10, 1926,

p.278. 183. Semaun and Darsono, interviews, 1959. 184. In May 1920 the SDP/ CPH had boasted between 3,000 and 4,000 members. Wijnkoop, "Ueber die holliindische kommunistische Bewegung" (00 the Dutch Communist Movement ), in Benchte zum zweiten Kongreu ckr Kommunhtlschen ltltemotlonale, p. 250. At the beginning of 1923 it was noted that membership had shrunk to 1,480; Bericht der Exekuti_ 15. Deu mbe, 1922- 15, Mal 1923, p. 47. It was thus about the same size as the Pta in the mid-I92Os. 185. See Lee,boek 1lOOr de arbeidersbeweging ( Textbook for the Workers' Movement ) (Amrterdam, 1953), p. 142 (a history of the Dutch Communist movement from the StaJinist viewpoint), and Otchet l spolkoma Komitltenul (aprel' 1925g.-ionvor' 1926g.) ( Report of the Executive Committee of the Comintem, April 1925-January 1926) (Moscow / Leningrad, 1926), pp. 26-27. According to the laUer source, 518 of the 1,526 members of the CPH had voted (or the "rightist" (WljnkOOp-Vao navesteyn ) group when the party split. At the beginning of 19"26, when the report was written, the dust was still settling from the feud, and the Communist Party was really functioning only in Am·

sterdam. 186. Semaun, interview, 1959; 'and see the text of the Sneevliet·Dekker letter below. Semaun's appointment had certain publicity advantages for Indonesia; it was noted enthusiao;tically. for example, in the Budi Utomo organ Sedlo Torno, June 8, 192.5, in lPO, no. 25, 19-25, p. 534. 187. Leerboek 1lOOr de orbeider$beweging. pp. 111- 112. 188. Sernaun and Danono, interviews, 1959. 189. From 1116 Fourth to the Fifth World Congreu. p. 71. 190. [nprewrr, July 23, 1924, p. 488. 191. "The V. World Congress of the Communist Intemational; Continuation of the Discussion of the Report of the Executi\'e," [npreco,.,. July 24, 1924, pp. 500-501. Sernaun's own account of hit diospute with the CPH It the fifth

452

Notes, pp. 246-258 Comintem congress can be found in Seroaun; Hapotan, pp. 15-16. There he added that the European Communist parties should "begin DOW to really help OUT movement in the colonies and stop simply talking big while doing nothing," 192. "The V. World Congress of the Communist International: ContiDuatlon of the Discussion of the Report of the Executive," p. 504. 193. "Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zinoviev," lnpreoorr. Mar. 10, 1926, p. 278; Inprecorr, Mar. 13, 1926, p. 304; and see Boermer, Bolsheviks, pp. 198-199. 194. Letter to Semaun from Aliarcham, dated July 20, 1924, appen'ded to Sematm, Report to the Eas/em SectiorJ.7 of the Comintem and Pro/inlem (typescript. dated Moscow, Nov. 15, 1924), hereafter cited as Eastern. Semaun translated the letter into English; I have made some grammatical changes for the sake of readability. 195. Semaun and RlL'ltam Effendi, interviews, 1959. 196. At this juncture Semaun appended the letter by Aliarcham quoted above; presumably, therefore. SneevUet had been instrumental in pushing the creation of a Dutch section of the PKl (though it had fint been proposed WOft! his return to the Netherlands) and had done so at least in part to counter Semaun's position as the PKl's sole European representative. 197. Semaun, Eastern, pp. 1-5. The original of this report is in English; sinre SemaWl's grammat' in that language was rather shaky, I have made changes in the interest of readability whi1e attempting to preserve his imagery. Emphasis is as in the original. Prerumably the quarrel over printing materials on II non· CPH press referred to Pandoe Merah. which was put out by a private Amster· dam finn. 198. Neutraliseerlng, p. 13. 199. Politicke nota PKl, p. 8; from the original English as quoted by this source. 200. Letter from Sneevliet and Dekker to Tan Malaka and Sugono. dated June 1925. The Comintem denunciation of Semaun's policies to which the letter refers is in all likelihood the April 1925 ECCI session, where the PKI leftist deviation and the party's relation to the Sarekat Rakjat were denounced. The articles in De Tribune are Semaun's "Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten" (Letten on the Struggle in the East), in which he reported the ECCl decisions and, although admitting his error in plaCing the Sarekat Rakjat under the PD, made the most of his rl?le as ch:Iirman of the Indonesian party. 201. PoUtieke nota PKl, p. 8. 202. Both Semaun and DaISOno emphasized in interviews in 1959 that the Comintem had little Imowledge of or interest in the Indonesian movement.

CHAPTER X 1. HI/lage Semarang, p. 8; "Communisme," pp. 534, col. band 535, col. a. 2. Sinar BlOOkl, July 8-29, 1924, in IPO, no. 31, 1924, p. 230. It was IlIso asked that requests be made in writing, apparently to avoid later denial that the propagandist had been sent on the branch's initiative. 3. Api, Dee. 16-17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 603. 4. The PKl executive reported that from May through September 1924 It received a monthly aV'Crage of f28 in entrance fees, f650 in conbibutions and dues from the party, f20 in contributions and dues from the SR, f35 from the sale of pamphlets and 1210 from the press; expenses were about f800 a month.

453

Notes, pp. 258-259 This would indicate the ezecutive was able to keep its head above water: but whereas the party had a balance of 1159.22 in May 1924, it reported itself f117.49 in debt at the end of September; Soeal'/J Ra'lat, Oct. 10120, 1924, in lPO, no. 50, 1924, p. 541. In contrast, the VSTP had reported that in the prestrike month of December 1922 it had _received /2831.60 (in January 1923. /2751.08) in COIltributlons. ,449.62 (/248.20) in entry' fees, and had a total of 11791.15 in its press fund; Si Tetap. December, January/February 1923, in lPO. nos. 8 and 12, 1923, pp. 381 and 635. Semaun, although he was chairman of both the PKI and the VSTP, drew sa1ary only from the union, which paid him the Europeanscale wage of f250 a month. 5. For expressions of Fock's attitude, see the government reply to Volksraad demands. foUowwg the expulsion of Tan Malab and Bergsma, that all Communist and revolutionary socialist activity be prohibited; Handel/ngen VolkaT(uul, 1922. First Session, Bijlagen, Onderwerp 1, Md. I, Stuk 8, pp. 8-9. See also its reply to demands that the Dutch PKl member C. van MUru;ter be removed from Iili: position as head of a government schoo1; Onderwerp I, AId. v, Stuk B, p. 2. 6. These laws, popularly called the hale-sowing articles (hDmzaai-arlikelen), made liable to punishment thore who made public "a writing or illustration, in which feelings of hostility, hate, or contempt toward the Government of the Netherlands or of the NetherlancU Indies are awakened or encouraged" (Article 155) and those who ~intentionally awaken or encourage f~lings of hostility, hale, or contempt among or toward groups of the population of the Netherl:mcU Indies" (Article 156). Both laws were much objected to by the Indonesian opposition, particularly the latter provision, which was not employed against Indies Dutch journalists, though the government itself complained of the derogatory manner in which the Dutch-language press tended to refer to the native popu1ation. In 19"..3 the Attorney General urged the addition of a temporary censorship In times of tension and the expansion of the hate-sowing articles with II prohibition on sowing cLus hatred, "which would provklc a simple weapon, in the opln1on of its proponent, especially against the Native pres.!l"; Kern, Ovenlcht Retidentenccmferentie, p. 37. 7. During the 19205 numerous complaints were addressed to the government in the VolLraad and Dutch parliament about preventive detention for political purposeS; however, the government was generally reluctant to furnish information on the subject. It did state in the 1923 Volksraad budget debate that at the end of 1921 there were 12,346 persons in preventive detention but that it could not specify which v.-ere held on political grounds; Hflrwlellngcn Volhraod, 1922, First Session, Bijlagcn, Ond. 1, Md. II, Stuk 7, p . 3. It was similarly disinclined to fum ish information on the number of prosecutions for breaches of the speech aDd press laws: in the 1927 parliamentary Indies budget debate the Minister of Colonies replied to long-standing demands for the number of such a~ts for 1923 and 1924 by saying that he had not yet received word from the Indies on the subject; Begrooting 1927, p. 224. B. Alter the arTCSts the party newspaper requested the PKI bmnche5 to he patient about replies from the executive, for the imprisonment of Aliarcham and Budirutjitro, who had charge of its correspondence, publications, and financial matters, had thrown il5 affairs into mnfusion; Sinor I-lindia, Oct. 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 43, 19-23, p. 149. Presumably this also affected foreign mmmunicatioru. since Allarcham and Budisutjitro handled mnlact with Tan Malak.. 9. For a summary of the main measures taken during 19'J..J-1924, see De

454

Notes, p. 259 Indlsche Gidr, XLVII, 1925, 163-169; and further, XLV, 1923, 632.-633, 736738; XLVII, 1925, 24~244, 263-264, 354-J57: Ooer.:icht 1924, pp. 11-12: Begrooting 1924, pp. 181- 182. 196; Begrooting 1925, pp. 197-198. 214-216: Api. July 9, 1925, in IPO, no. 29, 1925, pp. 103-105. 1be restrictions on travel and residence were chiefly aimed at preventing the spread of political activity from Java to the Outer Islands. The Attorney General had Originally suggested the tightening of the 1918 tmvel reguJation in November 1922, and the response was such that an even ' more restric~ve measure was drafted, giving to the Residents the power to keep persons out of their territory or to admit them only under spedu\ conditions. The Adviser for Native Affairs . strongly opposed th.i.'l, asserting that the Residents could not really be expected to know who was currently dangerous and who not among }avenese political leaders, especially the minor ones, and that as the Residents were inclined against taking chances this would mean "that the outer territories wiJl be closed for politica1 persons from Java. . . . In point of fact nothing remains of the 1918 regulation; a.'l the General Secretariat's note states, a 'went burial' is being prepared for it"; R. Kern, letter to the Governor General. dated Weltevredeo, July 4, 1923, no. E/194, classified, p. 3. He pointed out that the Residents had expressed considerable satisfaction with reoont security conditions in the Outer Islands, whcrea.'l in the years preceding the 1918 regulations the government had had to quell unrest by force of arms in Celebes (1911, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916). Amboina (1911), Bali and Lombok ( 1911 , 1914 ), Sumatra's West Coast (1912, 1915) , Tapanuli (1912, 1914, 1916 ), West Borneo ( 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915 ), Ben1culen (1914). Temate (1914), Palembang (1915, 1916). Djamhi (1916), South and East Bornoo (1917) (p. 6). Why, he asked, should it be necessary to tighten regulations now when it had been thought possible to relax them then? (p. 6). His argument was uruuccessful for. as Kern himself certain1y realized. what had changed sinoo the 1918 regulations was the government's whole attitude toward the spreading of modem political conoopts and OJgan~­ tions among the Indonesian population. 10. De Stondaard, Sept. 12, 1923, quoted in Brouv.'et, De homllng, p. 92. The article Wrul probably written by H. Colijo, the eminence grise of Dutch colonial policy during De Graalf's ministry; he was chief political editor of De Swndaard, the organ of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. 11. Minister of Colonies de Graaff, memorandum of reply to the lower house of parliament in the debate on the 1925 budget; 8egrootlng 1925, p. 214. To give an example of the ease with which deviations from the customary were ascribed to Communism, espcciruly by Bmnenlands Bestuur officials outside Java. A local religious controversy arose in Celebes. Its source appeared to be one Ibrahim Mulla, a trader in batiks and religious books from Makassar. who was a disciple of Sheik Ahmad Surkati, an Arab leader of the AI I rsJad religious school system in Ja~a. The district COJltrdleur, on investigating the dispute, reported with ruann that "this Mulla is also a proponent of rnther Communist tendendes in religion, maintaining for example that all men are equal. that powerful men must take no alms, and in short that he wishes more equality in religion. Where the Mohammedan religion in its old-fashioned fonn i'i a force opposiog Communism, it would seem appropriate to view with reserve every effort and tendency toward modemization and democratization of the religion. which will indirectly further Communism even though it is aimed at another goal. I therefore thought it necessary to report this to Your Excellency, the more so because Hadji Ibrahim alias Guru Nandi and some others, who

455

Notes, pp. 259-260 ~m to sympathize with the new line of lbrahlm MuUa, an: said to belong to the PKl, a1though they let nothing be observed of this outwardly." Letter from H. T. Lanting. ContrOleur of Sidenrcng-Rappang, to the Assistant Resident of Pare-pare, dated Aug. 24, 1924, no. 24, classiSed, n.p. The Assistant Resident agreed with his concern and passed the report on to the Governor of Celebes, who pointed. out that Islamic modernism d id not necessarily lead to Conununism. l.etters from the Assistant Resident of Pare-pare, De Wilde de Ugny, to the Governor of Celebes, Aug. 29, 1924, no. 24/classwed; from the Governor to the Adviser for Native Affairs, Kern, Sept. 8, 1924, no. LXIV/classified; and from Kern to the Governor, Dee. 18, 1924, no. 1387. In this case more enlightened opinion won out, but it was not alwa)'$ so. nor were the liberals themselves a1waY$ a force for tolerance. The Ethid bad a very deep geDSe of personal in'lOlvement in the Indonesian movement. 11ley were likely to be most tolerant of opposition by lndonesiaru whose educational and cultural background was not European and who therefore could not be expected to appreciate fully their efforts on the population's behalf. They tended to be deeply aggrieved when members of the Westem-educated eUte, with whom they had had personal contact, did not evidence complete faith. in them. Thus Kern opposed the proposed banishing of Hadji Misbaeh for his part in the 1919 antico .....ee movement, but urged it for Tjlpto Mangunkusumo; Tjipto, he argued, had been decorated for his service as a physician during the Malang plague, only to throwaway both income and honor for the sake of irresponsible political activities. He had become, Kern asserted, sly, hardened, and careful not to lay hiDl5elf open to legal pr05Ceution; Kern, letters to the Governor General, Weltevreden, Aug. 18, 1921, no. 166, classified, pp. 6-7. Similarly, Kern was unenthusiastic about the internment of HadJi Batuah and Zainuddin but approved the January 1924 proposal by the Resident of Sumatra's West Coast to banish Abdul Muis from that area. He rejected the Resident's opinion that Muis had. been re.'iponsible for the Toll-toll incident and the paWfl,.5hop workers' $t:rike; moreover, Muis, the nn1y anti-Communist pollticallcader of any stature in West Sumatra, was the chosen $JlOkesman of the Karapatan Minangkahau, and Kern was currently arguing that only a strong, localJ.y led anti·Communist movement would check the spread of PKl inBuence in the area. However, he found Muis gui1ty of udishonesty and had faith" and a general lad: of frankness and concluded that expulsion would teach him a good IC$SOll; Kern, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, July 9, 1923, no. E/203, classified, pp. 3-5. Something of the extent of this personal feeling was conveyed to me in an interview in 1960 with Professor G. F. Pijper, who had worked in the office of the Adviser for Native Affairs since the 1920s and later became Adviser for Islamic Affairs. Di.~C\lssing Hazcu's career as Adviser, he remarked that Hazeu', associat~ had thought he placed too much trust in the Indonesians and that they oon~idered it the most telling mark of ingratitude that Alimin, whom he had raised in his own home, became a Communist. I mentioned that I had visited Alimin some months before, and he had taken me about his house, showing me the pictures on the walls and lecturing me on their significance for him. They were all of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin except for the fi:rst, a photograph which hung above his desk and which showed him in the midst of the Hazeu famil.y, for which he expressed great affection. Professor Pijper seemed most surprised and gratiSed to hear this and stated that he wou1d tell the $tory to some of his acquaintances who still felt indignation at the Indonesian betrayal of Hazeu, 12. Sedjc Tomo, Oct. 21-25, 1924, in 'PO, no. 44. 1924, p. 223.

41XJ

Notes, pp. 260-263 13. Api, Aug. 25-30, 1924, in IPO, no. 36, 1924, pp. 461-471; Soeara Ra'jat, Oet. 10/20, 1924, In lPO, no. 50, 1924, p. 541. 14. The government was considering prohibiting both public and closed Communist meetings, which would in effect have made the movement illegal; Overzicht 1924, p. 15. IS. Sinar Hindia, Mar. 3, 1924, in IPO, no. 16, 1924, p. 123. 16. Soeara Ra'fat, Sept. 10, 1924, in lPO, no. 39, pp. 656--657. 11. Overzicht 1924, p. 10. The Resident of Semarang reported a great in· crease in the number of SR meetings in that region as a result of the new tactics: 1,003 gatherings .....'CTC recorded for 1924. The chief subjects discussed were (1) the poverty of the people; (2) the aims of Communism; (3) the imporlance of joining the SR; ( 4 ) protests against the antistrike law and extraordinary righu; (5) the need for women to support their husbands in the anticapitalist struggle; (6) the importance of sending children to the SR schools; (1) homage to imprisoned and banished leaders and assurances that the struggle would continue in spite of persecution; (B) government efforts to increase Indies de· fense expenditures; (9) the necessity of paying enb'ance fees and dues promptly; (10) the coming Pacific war; (11) unequal justice for European and Indonesian inhabitants of the Indies. Biiwge Semarang, pp. 2, 5. 18. Api, Sept. 4 and 6, 15-20 and Oct. 13-18 and 24, 1924, in IPO, nos. 31, 39, 43, and 44, 1924, pp. 512--513, 615--619, 160, 203-204, 1924; and Soeara Eta'fat, Sept. 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 39, 1924, pp. 656-651. 19. Over.ticht 1924, p. 16. 20. Bljlage Sem6rang, p. 11. In August, Darsono mamed the daughter of a retired Indonesian government official and thereafter spent much of his time at her parents' home in Salatiga. 21 .. 0ver.ticht 1924, p. 16. 22. Api, Dee. 16-11, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 600; Mataram, Dec. 22, 1924; Aidit, Sedfarah, p. 56. According to the last·named source, Alimin chaired the meeting. 23. Alimin. Riu;ajat Hidup, p. 47. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), Aliarcham had opposed his concept of a m.1SS revolutionary movement led by a small Conununist elite- the idea behind the Sarekat Rakjat. Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959) asserted that Aliarcham had spoken against the SR to the party leadership at the Junc 1924 congress; at that time his views were rejected, for the other PKI leaders were still too enthusiastic over SR growth to consider it. Aliarcham is virtually the only PKI leader of the 1920s to be viewed favorably by both the present...{lay PKI and Murba (Tan Malaka faction ) hil.-tories of the period; both groups claim him as their own martyr because of his refusal to compromise in any way with the authorities during his internment in spite of disastrously poor health. See Sudijono, P.K.I. ·SIBAR Con tra Tan Malaka, for the Murba view and Pemberontakan November 1926 for that of the present PKI. 24. This account of the 6'Ceeutive recommendation is drawn from the descriptions in Api, Dec. 16 and 17, 1924, in lPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 600-604; Soeal'tJ Ra'fat, Dec. 11, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 604-60'7; Semaun, "Brieven," June 10 and 11, 1925; "Communisme," pp. 535, col. a-536, 001. a; Schrieke, Political Section, pp. 105-106; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 45-46; Dingley, Peasantl Movement, p. 43; Cuber, "Natsional'no--osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v In. donezil," 1933, pp. 192-193; Pol/tlefre Nola PKl, pp. 1-3; Mdit, Sedfarah, pp. 5657. 25. "The Governor General'.~ Report of January 1921," pp. 4-5; '·Com.

457

Notes, pp. 263-269 munisme," p. 536, col. a ; Rapport 00,. het hoold I)Qn het Ktmtoor oon arbeid ooor de arbeidstoertonden in de mctoolindwtrie te Soeraooja (Report of the Head of the Labor Office on Labor Conditions in the Suraba;o. Metal Industry) ( Netherlands Indies gove rnment, Weltevredeu, 1926), p. 96, hereafter cited as Rapport van het hoofd; "De Partal Kommunis Indonesia, de dem van Moskou," (TIle Partai Komunis I ndonesia, the Voice of Moscow). IntnMtiooole Spectator, May 16, 1951, p. 6. 26. Interviews, 1959. <J:f. C. Voltinsky, " First Conference of the Transport Worker:s of the Paci6c," Inprecorr. Sept. 11, 1924, p. 705. For Heller's comment, see L. Heller, "Die Pazifik.Konferenz," p. 53. 28. The conference manifesto, as quoted in Voltinsky, "First Confereoce," pp. 705-706. 29. ''The Governor CeneraJ's Report of January 1927," p. 4. 30. ''The Governor General's Report of January 1927," p. 4. 31. C , Zinoviev, "The Fifth Congress of the Communist International; Orcular of C. Zinoviev to all the Sections of the Comintem." 'npreco", Apr. 17, 1924, p. 231. Emphasis in the text. 32. lnpreco", July 25, 1924. pp. 518-519. 33. "Resolutions on the Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist InternationaJ," 1npreC{)rr, Aug. 29, 1924, p. 646; see also "'I1leses on Tactics," lnpreco", Aug. 29, 1924, p. 652. 34. Fifth Congreu of the Communist IntenlOtional: Abridged Report of Meetlng$ Held. ot Mwcow June 17th to July 8th 1924 (London, n.d.), p. 188. 35. Fiflll Congren . . . lnlernationul, p. 188. 36. According to his account, Semaun traveled to Moscow from Holland in May 1924: he returned to Am.~terdam in the middle of August, after attending a Proflnlcrn.$ponsored conference of Communist labor unions in Hamburg; Semaun, Rapotan, p. 15. At the Comintem meeting. he represen ted Java on the committee that di.5Ct1S$Cd the nalional and coloniaJ question; Plotll kongru, Kommunl#lchetkogo lmernals/onala (Fifth Congress of the Communist International) (Moscow, 19-24), p. 252. According to the Qnnintem account of the lifth congress, Semaun was not the only Indies representative. 1be other delegate is rderred. to In the Comintem report as "Joseph"; Piolil Kongreu, pp. 252, 296. He was the former Y,STP leader Harry Dekker, who, we will remember, had left the Indies in 1922. Apparently he did not speak at the meeting, aDd he Is not mentioned in other accounts, including Semaun's. 37, Semaun, Rapolon, pp. 30, 32. 38. Semaun, Rapotan, p. 32. The ECCI had asserted at the meeting that, "in addition to winning the support of the peasant mas:o;es and of the oppressed national minorities, the Executive Committee, in its iostructions, always emphasized. the neeessity for winning over the revolutionary movements for the emancipation of the colonial peoples and for aU peoples of the East so 115 to make them the allies of the revolutionary proletariat in the capitalist counbies"; "Resolutions on the Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International," p. 642. 39. Semaun, Rapotan, p. 34. 40. ActuaJly, the Comintem's onginaJ dedsion on the rwrganiz.ation of the colonial parties had provided that the IntemationaJ's Eastern Bureau and Organization Bureau were to cooperate in d rafting model statu tes for Asian parties. 1bese 5tntutes ,,""ere flrst published by the Comintem on Jan. 29, 1925, and

458

Notes, pp. 269-272 were presented to the ECC! for approval in its session of March and April, 1925. 41. Semauo, Rapotan, p. 38. Emphasis in the teJCt. 42. SemaUJl, Rapotan, pp. 45-46. 43. Bataviaasch Nicuwsb16d, July 21, 1924. 10 August, Alimin was reported as giving an extensive description of his Cantoo trip to ao SR meeting in Tasilanalaja; Api, Aug. 12-18, 1924, in lPO, no. 34, 1924, p. 370. 44. Pandoe Merah, 00. 5, 1924, as reported in Polilieke nota PKl, p . 2; NetItralisecring, p. 10; Blumberger, Communist, p. 56. Reports 00 the fifth congress had beeo published earlier io P,mdoe Mcrah, 00. 3, July 15, 1924, In lPO, no. 37, 1924, p. 564. 10 August 1924 the PKI thoorcti cal journal published a translation of Ziooviev's speech to the coogre~s, accompanied by an editorial asserting that the speech disproved opposition claims that the Communist position was unreasonably far to the left; Soeura Ra'iat, July 3O/ Aug. 10, 1924, in lPO, 00. 35, 1924, p. 437. 45. It appeared in the Api issues of Feb. 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1925. 46. Petif, Dec. 20, 1924, aod Jan. la, 1925, in IPO, no. 4, 1924, pp. 208-209. 47. Api, Dec. 16 and 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p . 002. 48. Dingley, Peasants' MovemCflt, p. 43; Darsono, Interview, 1959; DjamaJuddin Tamin, interview, 1959; Rapport Mn Iwt hoofd, p. 96; Semaun, "Brleven over den strijd in het Oosten," June 10, 1925. 49. Dingley, Peasants' Movement, p. 43; Guber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v lndonezii," 1933, p. 193; Cuber, lno:/oneziia, Sot.rial'no-ekonomfcheskie ocherki, pp. 314-J15. 50. This account of the opposition argument:! is derived from Api, Dec. 16 and 17, 1924, in lPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 601--604; "Communisme," p. 536, col. a; Semaun, "Brieven," June 10, 1925; Dingley, Peasonts' Movcnwnt, p. 43; Cuber, "Nabional'no-osvoboditel'noe dw.henie v lndonezii," 1933, p . 193; Rutgers, "De Indonesische nationale beweging," p. 159; Aidit, Sedfurah, pp. 56-57; Schriei:e, "Political Section," pp. 105--106. 5L Polit/eke nota PKI, p. 24; Report of the Assistant Demang X Koto, Sutan Bandaharo, to the Dcmang First Class at Padang Pandjang (typescript, dated Padang PaDJiang. Feb. IS, 1925, pp. 3-4; hereafter Report of the As.rt. Denumg. According to the latter source, the December conference listed the requirements for graduation from SR to PKI membership as (I) payment of dues; (2) pre· paredness to act as a propagandist; (3) possession of a revolutionary spirit; (4) respect for party discipline; (5) extension of Knowk..J.ge through attending open meetings and party courses and by reading PKI literature. 52. According to the Report 0/ the Asst. Demong, p. 4, it was decided to divide the PKl scctions into foUl' classes based on si7.c: the first-class sections, of which there were five (SuraMjn, Batavia, Bandung, Scmarang, and West Sumatra), were to aim at achieving 250 members each; the ten second-class divisions were to have 75 members apiece, twenty-five thinl-class sections were to have 25 members, and thirty fourth-class sections were to have 10 members each, for a total of 2,925 members. 53. Dingley, Pcasonts' Movement, p. 43. Criticilims of the PKI decision from the international Communist viewpoint continued even alter the post-I927 Comintern turn to the left; see Guber, "Nabional'nCKl$voboditel'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii," 1933, pp. 192-193; Rutgers, "De Indonaische nationale heweging," pp. 159-160. 54. E. Cohee, untitled report to the Governor General, elated Mar. 13, 1923,

459

Notes, pp. 272-275 no. E. 61 (typescript account of the March 1923 PKI/Red 51 congress by the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs, classified), p. 5. According to DarSOIlO (interview, 1959), Sardjono was not the first: choice for the post; it was first proposed that Darsono brx:ome party chairman, but since he expected to be arrested and did not wish to hasten the evil hour, he declined; the second choice was Subalcat. and when he refused for similar reasons, the honor fell to Sardjono. FQr the election of the executive, see Api. Dec. 20, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p,, 607; lava Bode, Jan. 2, 1925; Report of the kst. Demang, Feb. 15, 1925, p. 3. In addition to Sardjono, the new executive consisted of Budisutptro (secretary), A. Winanta (treasurer ), Aliarcham and Alimin (commissioners); executive members outside party headquarters were Mard;ohan (Semarang), Abdulkarim (Atjeh and East Sumatra), Suun Said Ali (West Sumatra), S, H. Assar (Temate), Suwamo (Suratarta), Kumo (Dandung ), Prnwirosardjono (Surabaja). and Sukimo (Tjilatjap), 55. Report of the Aut. Demong, Feb. IS, 1925, p. 3, "Verslag S.I. Merah dan S.R. Semarang Tahoen 1924," p. 1. Soeara Ra';at had required a subsidy of f50 a month from the party, PKi executive announcements would henceforth be conveyed by communique or through Api and the Batavia PKI paper N;ala. CORP had not been used by PKI units outside the Semarang area, and this may have prompted the p.:1rty to drop it; Biilage Semarong. p. 5. Responsibility for publishing PKI literature was given to the Conunission on Reading Materials ( KomW Batjaan ) of the Semarang PKI (the VSTP press, the only one owned by the Communists, was in Semarang). 56. Repo rt 01 the .w1. Demang. Feb. 15, 1925, pp. 3-4; Mataram, Dec. 22, 1924. SR d ues were raised from /0.75 a year to 10.10 a month. A monthly basis may have been chosen to make payment easier and to weed out those who did not show sufficient interest to pay regulatly. 57. Text of the resolution, as given in Mataram, Dee. 22, 1924; see also Socllra Ra'lat, Dec. 17, 1924, in lPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 606-607. 58. Api, Dec. 16, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 600. 59. Soeara Ra'jut, Dee. 17, 1924, in lPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 804-605. 60. Politicke flotu PKI, pp. 1-2; Rapport van het hoold, p. 98; Report 01 tlw Asst. Demang, Feb. 15, 1925, p. 3; "Communisme," pp. 536, col. band 952, col. a. It is possible this concept was patterned on the "Ten-Man Leagues," one of the illegal fonns or Kuomintang organb:ation in the Indies. 61. B. F. O. Schrieke, Notes on the Java Uprisings (unti tJed manuscript. Schrieke Collection, University of Leiden), p. 1; hereafter cited as Note!; referring 10 a statement made by the PKI leader Manudi to the police in 1927. 62. Politick tler!wg over 1926 in het gewe# Semorang ( Political Report for 1926 in the Semarang Region) (Netherlands Indies government, typescript, Signed by the Resident of Semurang, dated. February 1921), p. 12. 63. Api, Dec. 11, 1924, in lPO , no. 52, 1924, p. 604. 64. Nicuwe RoUerdam.l'che Courant, Feb. 22, 1926 (report by MayOJ' de Jongh to the Semarang town council) , and June 29, 1926 (report by the government committee investigating the Surabaja strikes of 1925) . 65. See "Communlsme," p. 537, col. a; Bergsma, ''The Sha'1xming of the Class War in indonesia," Inpre~N', Mar. 5, 1925, p. 261; ]aoo Bode, Jan. 19, 1925; Politicke nottl PKl, pp. 4-5; Rapport van het hoo/d, p. 98; Pemberontakafl Nooember 1926, p. 44. Fifteen hundred people were present at the meeting's one public session; they incl uded representatives of the VSTP. PPPB. Inlandse Douuneoond (customs officials' union), Sarekat Buruh Tjeto.k (prin ters' union) ,

460

Notes, pp. 275-277 Chauffeursbond Indonesia (drivers' union), eleven branches of the severa1 harbor worken' unions, the PKI, SR, and Madureezenbond (Madurese League). 66. Api, Jan. 6, 1925, editorial. (51. Die intematwnaie GeweTklcltafUbewegung In den Jahren 1924-1921 (The International Trade Union Movement In the Yean 1924-1927) (Berlin, n.d.), p. '1R1; Tan Ma1aka, DP I, p. 112; Api, Feb. 24, 1925; "Communisme," p. 537, col. a; 1aoo B0
461

Notes, pp. 277-282 Union), to organize workers on all types of plantations except the sugar estates. The two unioru were kept separate because the sugar plantatioru were in low, thickly settled parts of the country and the other estates were generally in hilly, sparsely populated areas. Within a year, according to Musso, the SKBO claimed 12,000 members In West-Java, but in East and Centrn1 Java government pressure was too great for the organizers. When the PKI was made illegal in early 1926, the SKBO leaders were thrown in }ail and the union came to an end; Musso, Prlnuditel'nyf trod, pp. 17-19. 75. Api, June 8, 1925; Bliwse 1925, pp. 7-8. Government reaction to the strike wave that broke out just alter the union was C5tablisbed prevented it from gaining mu ch substance, and it Is doubtful if it actually took steps to establhh in ternational ties. 76. Semaun, letter of Dee. 25, 19"..4, quoted in Netdral/seerlng. p. 10. 71. Neutrali.reeTing. p. 10. . 78. Api. Feb. 27, 1925. Api began publishing "Sooloeh Communisme" on Feb. 24; the article:o; were later issued by the party in Semarang as a pamphlet, under that titJe. 79. Executlf Elargi de nntemationole COlllmunltte. Compte rcndu anolyCique de la .relnon du 21 mar! au 6 avril 1925 (En1arged Executive of the Communist International: Abridged Report of the Session of Mar. 21 to Apr. 6, 1925) (Paris, 1925), p. 270, hereafter cited as Executif. The PKI history Pcmberontakan November 1926, p. 123, says Tan Malaka made a pro- Trotskyist speech at this meeting. He did not attend; probably this is an erroneous reference to Semaun's report to the session, which was said to have been criticized. so. Ezecutif. p. 286, and see also Bukharin'J speech on the peasant question, pp. 133-152. &/,heviring tlul Communist International (London, n.d.), pp. 7173, 157-159, 169--1SO. 81. Scm.,un. "Brieven:' June to, 1925. At the ECCI meeting, Sernaun sat on the Peasant Commission, the Trade Union Unity Commission, the Dutch Commission, and the Colonial Commission; Inpreccm, June 4, 1925, pp. J50.....351, Bohheviring the Communirl lntemationol, pp. 12, 14, 15. 82. ECC'I letter, quoted in Nelltrali.reerlng, p. 12; emphasb in the text. 1be letter, addressed to the PKI on May 4, 1925, is partially reproduced in the original English in the above-cited government rnport; the full text in Dutch is contained in Sernaun, "8rieven over den strijd in bet Oostt'fl," June 19, 1925. for other references to the ECCI opinion, see Inprecorr, Apr. 28, 1925, p. 513, Dingley, PCMOnt,' MOI)Cment, p. 58; Cuber, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noo dvixhenie v Indone:zii," 1933, p. 193; Rutgers, "De Indonesische nationale beweging," pp. 159-160, Aidit, Sed;arah, p. 57. 83. Sernaun, "Brieven," June 12, 1925, emphasis in the text. 84. Sernaun, "Brieven," June 17 and 18, 1925. 85. Neutrallseerlng, p. 12; Polilie~e nota PKI, p. 18; Schrielce. "Poutical Section," p. 138. The original letter was found by the police in a raid on PKI headquarters late in 1926. The date (a mouth after ECCI session had concluded) leads one to think that discussion of the Indonesian question continued after the regular plenary sessions had closed. We know, for example, that Sernaun remained in Moscow fOf over a month after the ECCI meeting had officially ended, for he attended a Comintern InIonnatlon Conference there on May 6, 1925; lnprccorr, May 6, 1925, p. 532. During his absence from Holland, Bergmta was in charge of the PKI office there; Api, Feb. 24, 1925. 86. ECCI letter of May 4, 1925, as quoted in Neu traliseering, pp. 12, 64. The program was also given in Sernaun's report.

462

Notes, pp. 282-287 87. Dingley, Peasant:' Movement, p. 44. 88. Stalin, Marrlsm and the Natio"al and Colonial Que&tlon (London. 1936), p. 220; from a speech 10 the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May S, 19'25. 89. Abdul Mui.5, series of articles in Kao.Jm Kilo, Oct. 27-Nov. 10, 1924, in lPO. no. 46, 1924, pp. 307-308. Muis' suggestions brought no immediate official response from the PKI, hut they seem to have been favorably received by some party leaders; sec, for example, the enthusiastic comments by A. C. Sallm in Halilinta, Hiooia, Nov. 26, 1924, in IPO, no. SO, 1924. pp. 543-544. 90. Kcmodioean HindU!. Feb. 12, 1925, in lPO, no. 10. 1925, p . 471. 91. Api, Mar. 30, 1925; cmpha.o;is in the text. See further Kemadjoean 1JindiD, Mar. 10, 1925, and Soeara Perdamaian, Mar. 12, 1925 (reply of the CSI), in [PO, no. 12, 1925, pp. 569, 587-588; and Sutardjo, "Tingkat Baroe dan Pergerahn Keban gsa'an" ( A New Step by the Nationalist Movement), Api, Mar. 12, 1925. 92. Darsono, "Salim Pendocsta" (Salim the Liar), Api, May 13, 1925. 93. Api, Mar. 30, 1925. 94. For example, on Nov. 3, 1925, the PKI exeeutive wrote the East Java party leader Sugiman th at "some sections lin your bookJ-in the light of the tactics to be adopted by our Party oif-a-t>u the Indonesian nationalists, such as the B.V. and also the former N.I.P . .(Sarekat Hindia) at the present timecreate a rather spiteful impression; we are therefore changing the passages, so as not to give offense to the nationalists whom we have hopes of winning ovcr to cooperation with us"; quoted in Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 142, nole 97. The publication in question was probably Sugiman, Bankroetnia Partai Kebang$lion di Hindoestan (The Bankruptcy of the National Party in Hinduslan) (Malang. 1928). It denoun~d the Indian National Congress and affinned that only Communists were consistently anticolonial. 95. Api, Jan. 2, 1926, reviewing events in 1925. Emphasis in the text. 96. P. Bergsma, "TIle Revolutionary Movement in Java," Inprecoff, Oct. 8, 1925, p. lOSS. Semaun declared that "our party is working for the creation of a national anti-imperialist bloc, and Muhanunadijah, the Sareht Ambon. and other national organizations are currently making progress in the revolutionizing of their spirit and the number of their members, though not so quickly as our party and the Sarekat RakJat organization, which is under the inBuenoo of the Communists." Semaun, "Der internationale Imperiali.'ilIlus und die KommunistisciJe Partei Indooesiens," p. 59. f¥T. TotlgkeiUbericht der E:rekl>tloo dc, Kommunistischen Internationale 19251926 (Report of the Executive of the Communist International 1925--1926) (Hamburg. 1926), p. 362; "Resolution on the Chinese Que~tlon," lnpreexm. May 13, 190-6, p. 649: "The World Economic and Political Situation," InpreoorT, Jan. 22, 1928, p. 104; Scmaun, "Der internationale Imperialis:mus und die Kommunistiscbe Partei Indonesiens," p. 58; IV semia Tsentrarnogo 8Ot)Cta KrO$nogo Intematsianala profsieuzoo. p. 4; Bcrg~ma, "ProgTe5S of the Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia," InprcoorT, Dec. 31. 1925, p. 1366: Bergsma, "Labour Struggles in the East Indies," Inprecoff, Oct. IS, 190...5, p. 1106; Darsono, "Die Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens" ( TIle Situation of the Indonesian Popular Movement), Die Kommunlsti.Jclle Intematwna1e. Nov. 9, 1926, pp. 415, 419. 98. Aidil, Sed;arah, p. 57. 99. Scmaun, "Der internationa1e Imperialismw: und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesicns," p. 60. 100. "Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zinoviev," Irrpreccrr, Mar. 10, 1926, p. 278.

463

Notes, pp. 287-292 101. Semaun, " Pmfessional'noe dvizhenie v Indonezii" ( TIle Trade UnfoD fo.lovement in Indonesia), Kra.myi Intematrional Pro/8OI1lwv, March 1926, p. 356. Semaun also urged at the Profintem meeting that the PKI form celli via labor unions in as many enterprises as possible; it should unite its unlom in a Central Committee of Trade Unions IUld should put forward sJogans for the Indonesian independence movement such as "'Indonesia for the Indonesians." "A Federal Government Structure," and NA Cenbal People's Assembly"; pp. 350, 356.

102. Shelloi rossll/renyi plenum ispolkomtJ Kominlema (17 feoralla-15 mdmJ 1926g.) (Sum Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Qnnmittee of the Comintcm, Feb. 17- Mar. 15, 1928 ) ( Moscow/ Leningrad, 1927). p. 1. Other Asian members of the ECCI presidium at this time were listed as Sen Katayama (Japan ), Roy ( India ), and Su-fan (China). 103. TotigkeiUbcricht der Erekulioo der Kommunistbchen lnternatlonole 19251926. pp. 362-364. 104. Schrieke, "Politica1 Section," p. 145.

CHAPTER XI 1. Soera1xJ;mch Handeltblad. Aug. 10, 1925; according to this account, the system was used princip.1JJy among urban worken. 2. Blfltlge algmneen vcrslog: Politick oven/eht 1925 ( Appendix to the General Report: PoUtical Survey 1925 ) (Typescript, signed by the Resident of Semarang. dated Semarang, February 1926), pp. !-...3; hereafter dted as BIj14ge 1925, N/{tuwe Rotte..dam.Jc/lf' Courant. Sept. 8, 1925; Polu~k Verdog 1926. pp. 2-S. During 1925 only one open meeting was held by the PKI and SR in Semarang. as against tv.'O eJcccuti ve and nineteen membership meetings of the PKI and four. e:tecutive and fifty_five membership meetings of the SR, In the regency of Salatiga 188 meetings were held in · all, in Kudus 140, and, in Pat! 33-an illustration of the tactic of holding numerous small gatherin gs: Bfjlage 1925. p. 2., and see De TelegTfUl/. Jan. 1, 1926. In Bandung alone, the PKI held 50 separate meetin&, on Jan. 1. 1925: Api, Jan. 2. 1925. 3. &pport oon het hoo/d, p. 99, footnote 1; Ooonkht Patl, p. 15. outlining a meeting of the Scmarang PKI in October 1925, at which the reorganization was set down for that area; and De Telegraaf. Feb. I, 1926. In aetna] practice there seems to havo been no universally adhered .. to system, however: in early 1926 the organizationa] pattern reported to be in general use In the Semarang region had each party subsection run by five members (chairman, secretary, treasurer, and two commissioners); these were aided by twelve directors, who were given the rank of sergeant. Under each of these directors was a cadre. and each cadre had charge of ten ordinary members, or soldiers; Polltiek verslag 1926.

p.8.

.

Polilieke nota PKl, p. 7. For Sanusi's trip to Canton, see Api, Mar. 13 and Apr. 7, 1925; Jaoo Bode. 24, 1925. DjaDlaiuddin Tamin ( interview. 1959) clabned Alimin visited Malaka in early 1925 and was informed of his ideas on party strategy; Malaka mentions in his autobiography that Alimin visited him twice while in e:rilc before his journey to the Philippines in 1925: DP I. p. 143. Malaka's pam.. phlet, Naar de 'Republlek ..lndonetla' (Toward the Indonesian Repuhlic), was writ .. ten at the end of 1924 and was fi rst published In Canton in Apri1 1925; it is further described below.

4. 5. Apr. Tan

464

Notes, pp. 292-296 6. Api, Apr. 27, 28, and 29, 1925. 7. Bljlage 1925, p. 3. 8. Api. July 12-17, 1925, in lPG, no. 30, 1925, pp. 154-155; Mou>o, Dec. 7, 1925, in IPG. no. 51, 1925, p. 614: De lnd/.sche CicLJ. XLVII (1926),456-457: Politiek Veqlag 1926, p. 16. According to the last accou.ot, the OPI, with headquarters in Semarang, was a pet project of Darsono's. Its headquarters and leaders' homes were raided in early 1926, and it thereupon expired. 9. Over:z:fcht 1924, p. la, describing the situation at the end of 1924. 10. See "Nadere beantwoording van bij de behandeling der begrooting en clet suppletoUe begrooting van Noocrlandsch-lndie voor het dienstjaar 1926 geste1de wageD" (FW'lhcr Reply to Questions Submitted Owing the Discussion of the Budget and Supplementary Budget of the Netherlands Indies lor 1926 ). in Begrooling 1927, p. 244, hereafter cited as Nadcre 1927. The case was that of Woro Ati, who had made the statement at a public ' SR meeting in 1925; she was sentenced by the Malang district court in January 1926. 11. Scbrieke, "Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," pp. 146-147. Such pressure was considered to have been used with success in Atjeh, the Lampung districts, and Paiemhang, however; Verslag 1926, pp. 11, 14-15; Verdag 1927, p. 21. 12. De GraaH, memomndum of reply to parliament in the debate on the 1925 Indies budget; Begroollng 192.5, p. 214. 13. Api, Sept. 1,2, and 3, 1924, in lPG, no. 37, 1924, pp. 508-510, 511-512; Api, Feb. 16, 1925; SoeraboJasch HandeLsblad, Sept. 2, 1924; Ovenicht 1924, pp. 8, 16. 14. R. Kern. Oprichtlng van con,ra-vereenlglngen tegen het communJsme (Establishment of Counterassociations Against Communism) (typescript report by the Adviser fOf Native Affairs to the Governor Ganeml, dated Weltevreden, . June .15, 1925, 00. e/189, classified), pp. 1--3. 15. Kern, Opriehllng van COl1i'fa-tlCree,lIgingen, p. 7. The turning in of cards had a particular force, as Kern notes, because of the great weight Indonesians gave to symbols. To hand in a card was regarded as a true sign that its owner had broken with Communism, and those who did so often became enthusiastically IIIId Violently Illlti·PKI. 16. Api reported roaming bands in the Prlangan who asked people whether they were "'Vltite" or "Red" and beat those who answernd "Red"; Feb. 20-23, Mar. 2-7, 1925, in IPO, nos. 9 and 11, pp. 412, 503. The stated goals of the Sarekat Hidjau were to cherish arid protect religion, prince, government, teachel'll, f:lther, and race; Soerapati, June 8, 1925, in IPO, no. 28, 1925, p. 3&5. The purpose of Anti-Communisme was said to have been to tight Communism, promote religion, :lnd keep an eye on Indonesian political movements in general; lI/ndla Baroe, Feb. 15, 1925, in IPO, no. 9. 1925, p. 420. 1be Kaum PalllHrall, which was centered in Bandjarnn, had been founded several yean before a!O an am:lteur theatrical group, with the broader purpose of strengthening ties between the prljaji and the people; In 1924 it turned into an anti-PKI mutual aid association in response to local SR activity. The Communists did not aceuse the 51 of being Involved In any of the Sarekat-Hidjau type of organization. 17. Kern, Opr/ellllng van conlra-cerelffiigingen, p. 4. Two other reports in the Kern collection deny vehemently any government coDlicction with the Sarekat Hidjau groups, which are described as purely 5pontaneous associations of respectable and olderly Indonesians defending themselves against Sareht Islam and SR aggressiveness; letter from Attorney General Wolterbeek Muller to the

465

Notes,

pp.

296-299

Governor General, dated Wcltevrcdcn, ~lay 28, 1925, no. 1978 A.P., classified, and report from Resident of Priangan Eijken to the Attorney General, dated Bandung, May 19, 1925, W. lSO / 25;l.C., classified. Apparently these were composed to mollify Volksraad deputies who had charged the government with collusion in Sarekat Hidjau violence and demanded an inquiry. For Salim's article-; against the Sarekat Hidjau, see lIindw Barae, Feb. 19 and 26, 1925, in [PO, nos. 9 and 10, 1925, pp. 416-418, 463--464, and in Kaoem KUa. Feb. 9-19, 192.5. in lPG, no. 9, 1925, p. 420. For other statements condemning the Sarekat Hidjau and similar org:mizatiOIlS in the non-Communist op~ition press, see Hlndla Bol"Ofl, Feb. 15 and 18, 1925, Bolatentara Islam. Feb. 14-21, 1925, and Panggoegoh, Feb. 18, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 19'25, pp. 418, 420, 431, 434-435; Sri Dfojobofo. Feb. 14, 1925, in lPG, no. 10, 1925, p. 484; Dormo Kondo, Mar. 4-7. 1925, Hlndio Bame, Mar. 5-11, 1925, Kaoem Kita, Mar. 2-9, 1925, Kemadlooan Hlndio, Feb. 28, 1925, in IPO , no. II , 1925, pp. 508-509, 511-5 14, 516-519, 522; Hlndio Bame, Mar. 12-18, 1925, Kaoem Kita, Mar. 11-16, 1925, Kemadjoean H/ndio, Mar. 9-14, 1925, Sedlo Oetorno, Mar. 10, 1925, in IPO, no. 12, 1925, pp. 560-583, 567, 574-575. 18. H/ndia Baroo, Mar. 5-11 , 12-18, &loom Mooda, Mar. 3, Kaoem Klta, , Mar. 11-16, 1925, in IPO, nos. II and 12, 1925, pp. 511-514, 519, 560-568. 19. The first report of the League, in an enthusiastic letter by «Memh," was published on the first page of Api, Mar. 25, 1925. However, the editors commented that the writer should investigate more clO5ely before he committed him_ sell to the organization. It seemed to be composed of heterogeneous class elements (the letter had mentioned not only PKI followers but also members of the Chinese, Arabs, and Dutch [Eurasian?] minority groups who felt themselves threatened by the Sarekat Hidjau) , and the party therefore must warn against it. See also Api, Mar. 31, 1925. Dne of the government reports on the Sarekat Hidjau refers to the League as having both SR and SI members; Eijken to the Attomey Cenernl, p. 3. Dingley, Peawnts' Movement, p. 44, speaks of the leagues as endorsed by the party, however. According to ''l1le Covernor General's Report," p. 10, they were recrui ted from strong-arm clements and existed in Batavia, Peicalongan, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Kepiri, and Tjiandur in the Priangan. 20. Sarekat-18lam Congre! (3e nationaal eongrell), pp. 6-7, describes the discussion of this point at the 1918 SI congress; see also ''The Bantam Report," p. 47. 21. Api, Mar. 24, 1925; the appeal, written in Sundanese by the Bandung Communist leader Gunawan, was spread about the area in leaflet form by the PKI. See also Api, Feb. 26 and Mar. 25, 1925, for simllar appeals. 22. Api, editorial of Feb. 15, 1925. For a similar analysis of the problem COIlfronting the PKI, see the editorial in' Panggoegah (Suwardi Surjaningrat's paper ), Feb. 18, 1925, in lPO, no. 9, 1925, pp. 434-435. 23 . Api, editorial of Jan. 6, 1925. 24. This was claimed by some rebel leaders to have been their calculation, according to Ovenlellt oon den Inwendigen poliHeken tocstQnd (Februari 1926Maart 1927) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, February 1926-March 1927) (Netherlands Indies government, typescript, clnssified) , p. 24. 25. Samin (Darsono], "The Situation in IndoneSia," Inprerorr Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1246 (coreport on the revolutionary movement in the colonies, presented to the sixth Comintem congress) . 26. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. IZ2, quoting Instruction No.2 issued by l'KI headquarters on Mar. 24, 1925. The reference to proletarian dictatorship here is one of the relatively rare instances in which it W:l.'l stated that therf!

466

Notes, 1'1'. 299-303 would be any prelude to the achievement of Communism after the revolution. 27. Schrieke, "Political Seetion," pp. 122-123, citing In$lmction No.2, Mar. 24, 1925. 28. 'The Governor General's Report," p. 3. 29. Alimin, Louteren wi; ons! p. 85. 30. D. H. Meijer, "Over bet bendewezen op Java" (Concerning Gangs on Java), IndtmemJ, Ill, September 1949, p. 188, suggests that the reason not much note was taken of these groups during the colonial period was that they operated only among the Indonesian part of the population, that local officials were either afraid to complain or in league with them, and that the regents did not like to bring these groups to the notice of the Dutch, who would only accuse them of being unable to keep order. For an explanation of the . phenomenon in psycholOgical tenus, see P. M. van Wulfften Pruthe, Over het bendewezen 01' Java ( Concerning Gangs on Java) (Amsterdam, 1948?). 31. ''The Bantam Report," p. 23. 32. Special areas for outlawry have been cited as North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, Bogor, Tjirebon, Indrnmaju, and Krawang in West Java; Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and the north coast of Central Java; and Madlun, South Kediri, Patjitan, Bodjonegoro, Ngawi, Gresilc, Puger, and Kraksaao in East Java.; Meijer, "Over het bendewezen op Java," p. 179; D. H. Meijer, Japan tofnt den oorlog: Dooomenten over / (JOa (Japan Wins the War: Documents on Java) (Maastricht, 1946), pp. 26, 96. The Communist lll1its that most strongly urged rebellion during 1926, or engaged In the uprising, were from North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, and Tjirebon in West Java and Suralcarta and the north coast of Central Java. Anti-Commlll1ist fighting groups were from the Priangan, Bogar, Tjirebon, Kediri, Ngawi, Madiun, and Djepara, and Anti-Ruffian Leagues were in the Priangan, Batavia. Peka1ongan, Jo~akarta, Surakarta, and Kook!. 33. Others included the SI-Anjar (Sukabumi), Sarekat Sedjati (Semarang), Sarekat Abangan {K1aten}, and Sareknt Setya Warga (Southeast Borneo); SI V, p. 374, col. a. Similarly, such groups in West Java took advantage of the Dutch collapse at the. time of the Japanese invasion to extract contributions from the population in the name of the advancing Japanese (who were portrayed as bringing the promised utopia) and to present themselves to the incoming forces as the effective localleade\"S; Meijer, "Over het bendewezcn op Java," pp. 182-193, citing Slamet Sudibio, "Perampokan" (Banditry), series of articles in Asia Raya, 1942. 34. Samin, "The Situation in Indonesia," p. 1247. 35. "The Bantam Report," pp. 42--43. For a similar description of propaganda in the Minangkabau area, see Schriclcc, 'The Causes and Effects of Communism on the W('_~ Coa.d of Sumatra ," p. 161. 36. Venltlg 192$, pp. 9-33; Vc,sla~ 1926, pr. 8-33; Over;r.lcht SWK, p. 8. 37. Kenuulfoetln Hindia, Dec. 5, 19-23, in TPG, no. SO, 19"...3, pp. 513--514. An earlier action of the Scram!: SI may have been the reason for one of the mom curious charf(es in the Jogjakarta-Semarang feud that followed Darsono's attack on Tjokroaminoto. At the time (late 1920 and early 1921) participation in the se(X)fld Volksraad was debated in the SI: the left generally ury::ed noncoopera _ tion and the ri~ht wanted to accept a scat. Serang supported the candidacy of F. van Lith, S.J., a well-known West Java missionary who outspokenly supported toleration of the IndoflCl<,ian national mnvemcnt; see H. C. Heijting. } al}(l" onru.rt (Java's Unrest) (Amsterdam, 1927) , pr. 10-12. Presumably it did so not For reason of religious sympathy (Serang was a center of Islamic orthodoxy), but

487

Notes, 1'1'. 30:hJ05 bccall5C it thought his presence in the Volksraad wouJd provide the Indonesian opposition with a defender who, being European and Christian, could not be considered a representative of the 51 itself. Serang'$ initiative also received some backing from the pro-Semarang Handung 51. Their sympathy for the Jesuit's candidacy seems the most likely reason why }ogjalcarta, accu$ing the Communists of being Christian agents, declared them tools of the Catholic Church. For Hasan Djajadiningrat's entrance into politics, see A. DJajadiningrat. Herinneringen van PangeraD Aria Achmad D;aiadiningrat (Memoirs of Prince Aria Achmad Djaj3diningrat; Amsterdam and Batavia, 1936), pp. 286-287. 38. For a discussion of the source of PKI support in Bantam, see "lbe Bantam Re port." pp. 4()...47; Pemberonlakan, November 1926, pp. 58--62. 39. Arguments presented at a PKI meeting in Sawah LUDla, July 1926, in Reporu of the Resident of Sumatra's West Coast to the Attorney Ccncrv.l of the Netherlands Indies on the Extremist Organizations in the Sawah Lunto Area .( uDtitled, mimeographed, transmitted by the Attorney Ceneral to the Govemor General with the date Jan. 10, 1927, no. 39/A.P., classiSed), no. 1227, pp. 3-1; hereafter cited as Repon, of the Resident. The story of Lenin, the Tsar, and the Tsar's ashes seems 10 have been widely popu1ar in West Sumatra; it was reported going the rounds in the Silungkang area at the lime of the rebellion. De Locomoticf, Feb. 4, 1927. 40. Schrieke, I'he Causes and Effect!; of Communism on Sumatra's West Coast," p. 148; Repon, of the Resident, DO. 1229, p. 5; "n.e Bantam Report," p. 43; Verslag butuur 1926, p. 30. An Indonesian official aSSigned to study the development of the movement in West Sumatra reported that Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, a well-known anti-Communist religious teacher from the Minangkabau, had told him that, "Before I left for Batavia a short time ago, my mother asked me: 'will the Hadji stay long in Batavia? I ansv.'ered: ' No. But why do you ask that, Mother? She replied: 1 have jl.L~t heard that it will not be much longer before the people of Kol:t Lawns and Panda.i Sibt will go 10 war with the Hollanders. Therefore I asked the question, for I fear the report is true:" It was the Hadji's opinion that three-quartcn of the ~n , women, and children in Kola Lawas were Communist!;. (L. dt. Toemenggoeng, Geheime nota ooor den Adoiseur ooor lnlandsche :taken oon- het ccmmunlsme ter \Ve.ftkwt oon Sumotra , p. 8 ). 41. N/euwc Rotterdanuche Courant, Oct. 19. Nov. 2 and 7, 1926. Api, ]u1y 7-11, 1925, in lPO . no. 29, 1925, p. 97, reprinted an article from Musso's SurabaJa paper, Proletar, which su,l!;gested that Communist girls should no longer demand that their husbands merely Join the party; they should also have made propaganda for the movement and brought at least 500 members into the Sarebt Rakjat. Either the ladies of the PKI were seen as being extremely choosy or it was easy to get people to buy SR cards. 42. 'krhe Bantam Rcport," p. 40. On Sumatra's East Co'-1St, it was estimated that about 1,200 persons entered the party within a few months in 1925; VerJag butllllr 1926, pp. 11, 14. 43. Nieuwe RolterdarTI$Che Courant, Sept. 25, 1925. How much of the locally collected money reached the center is hard to say; it seems, hO\\'eVer, to have been n relatively small proportion. According to a goVernment Investigation of the movement on the \Vest Coast of Sumatra, only 30 per cent of contributions and dues was sent on to the section treasury by the local units; some of thi! was then transferred to the main executive, but the report docs not note how much; Ovenlellt SWK, p. 10. From the way in which the revolutionary prepara-

468

Notes, pp. 305-308 tions developed it would not appear that the center had any linallcial preponderance over the major party units; there is no indication that possession of money Of arms by the center inllucnced the arguments whether or not to heed its decisions when the party split In 1926 over staging the revolt. 44. Sarekat Tani groups were most important In West Sumatra, but they also existed in Java and Celebes. The name varied: sometimes they were referrctt to as Sareht Kaum Tan~ Sareht Tani Indonesia or (in Java) Perkumpulan Kaum Burnh dan Tam (apparently an attempt to resurrect the movement founded earlier by Baars). 45. "The Bantam Report," p. 46; Schrieke, ''Political Section," pp. 106--107. 46. "Communisme," p. 537, col. a. Tho strike first broke out among the printers at the end of July an d spread to the hospital employees and dockworkers; in ad.dition, unrest ,"vas noted on plantations in the Scmarang area. The various strikes were met with extensive police measures; Nieuwe Rotterdam.sche Coura/lt, July 28 and 31, Aug. 1, 2, and 5, 1925; Bijlage 1925, p. 6. 47. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 114, citing Instruction no. 8, dated Aug. 5, 1925. 48. Politleke nota PKl, p. 5; Biilage 1925, pp. 6-7. The VSTP indicated that it would not be prepared for a general strike before May 1926. Reportedly, the pK] executive assigned Winanta to visit the VSTP sections iii West Java in order to win them over to the Idea of a general strike; he was only able to confer with the section in Batavia, however, and was told there by the union executive that the VSTP would on1y participate in such an action if it were so well prepared as to be guaranteed to spread over all Java and receive general popular support. 49. Politleke nota PKl, p. 6, note 5. 50. Botovwll$Ch Nieuwsblad, July 22, 1925; Soerabojatl&ch Handelsblad, Aug. 8, 1925. Those present at the conference included the members of the Council of the Indies ( Road van 1ndW), the direetor of the Civil Service, the Attorney General, the government spokesman to the Volksraad, the advisor fOf Chinese affairs, and the GovernOf General. 51. NIeuIOO Rotterdarmche Courant, Aug. 6 and 9, 1925; BI;loge 1925, pp. e and 8. 52. Blllage 1925, p. 8. 53. N/etJwe Rotterdamsc1w Courant, July 31 and Aug. 20, 1925; BataviaQJc11 Nleuwrblad, Dec. 29, 1925; Alimin, RlltXljat Hidup, pp. 15-20. Kern, the Adviser for Native Affairs, strongly opposed both the government's uncompromising attitude on the strikes and the proposal to banish the PKI leaders. He argued that such policies, unaccompanied by refonns, merely made martyrs of tlle Com. munists, attrncting more half-baked you ngsters to their ranks and giving them the impression that the government waS afraid of the PKI. "The Attorney General now proposes to banish four rather arbitrarily selected Communists," he rem:rrked. "of whom the only thing th...,.t Can be said is that they are prominent Communists. I feat that their banishment will perhaps result in a brief decline in Communist activity, but that it will swiftly recover. Others stand ready to take their plane; they too can be hanished, will find replacements, and where is the end?" R. Kern, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, Sept. 25, 1925, no. G/234, classilled, p. 3; for his remarks on the strike countenneasures, see Kern, letter to the Governor General, Aug. 13, 1925, no. Gj21d, pp. 1-3. 54. Biflagc 1925, pp. 3, 10; Dc Tewg raal, Dec. 29, 1925; Ooorzicht Pati, p. 10. 55. Report of the Asst. Demang, (no. 51, classifled), Oct. 9. 1925, p. 1.

469

Notes, pp. 308-310 Similar alann was ' expressed at a meeting of Sumatran PKl heads in Padang Pandjang on Oct. 16; Arif Fadillah, a rnafor Sumatran PKI leader, was accused

of anarchist activity and of ignoring the party executive's instructions not to provoke government reprisals unne<:eSS
470

Notes, pp. 310--311 65. Mauawar [Musso], report to the sixth Comintem congress. [npreC{1fT, Oct. 17, 19'>...8, pp. 1324-1325. Mll!I'so was viewed by the government as the archi· tect of the Surabaja strikes; Rapport oon he! hoofd, p. 86. He could not have been directly responsible for their outbreak, however, as he was in prison from August to mid-October. 66. Rapport oon Ilet I/Ootd, pp. 86, 100; Polit~ke nota PKl, pp. 5-e. (rl, The prohibition of the right of assembly was imposed for the PlO, SR, sugar worker.;' union (SSG), and union of machinists and elect:rical worken> (SBBE) by govenunent decision of Nov. 28, 1925; on Dec. 15 this was ex~ded to ~c1u~e the SPPL. VSTP, and the naval station employees' union, SBME. Communlsmc, p. 538, coL a. 68. Geheim verslllg, p. 1. 69. Mowo, Dec. 7, 1925, in lPO, no. 51, 1925, p. 614. Among the party leaders listed as having arrived were Sardjono, Winanta, Aliarcham, Sutan Said Ali, Kumogunoko, Hadji Umar, Samsuri, Wirasuharta, Abnaswnarta, Marco, and Sastrowidjono. 70. The exact date of this gathering is uncertain, although most lilcely it was Dec. 25. Schrieke, ''Political Section," pp. 115-116, mentions a letter written on Dec. 16 on behalf of the PKI executive reporting the meeting. However, according to Djamaluddin Tamin ( interview, 1959, and written statement, dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudifono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 24) , the date was Dec. 25, the same day the VSTP CQngress convened in Surabrta. This date is also given in the PKI account Pemberontakan Nooember 1926, p. 51. Both these reoent accounts give the place of· the meeting as the Prambanan shrine itseH, which is possible, as it is customary for people in the general area to visit the major monuments of Borobudur and Prambanan on holidays, and a small group would have had an ootensibly legitimate purpose in going there and could be inCQnspicuous in the general crowd. That the Surakarta and Prambanan meetings v.'ere essentially two parts of the same discussion is indicated in the PKI con.Gdential report of a conference it held shortly thereafter; Geheim Qer.tlag, p. 5. December 25 is also the date referred to in an account by Tan Malab; Malaka, Them, p. 38. At any rate, all the existing reports (see, in addition, Polit/eke noto PKI, p. 11; G. 1- van Munster, "The Background and History of the Insurrection on lava," Inprcrorr, Dec. 16, 1926, p. 1499; Djoehana, "History of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement," no. 15, p. 9) agree on Deoember as the month of the Prambanan meeting, except for Musso's report to the sixth Comintem congrCSli (Mauawar, report in Inpreco", Oct. 17, 1928, p. 1324) . Either by a slip of the tongue or for reasons of his own, MIl5$O said the conference had taken plaoo in October 1925. 71. Aocording to DjamnJuddin Tamin (interview, 1959 and written statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 19), the group consisted of eleven persons, five of whom were members of the PKI central executive; they included Sardjono, Alimin, Musso, Budisutjitro (mentioned in interview) and Winanta (mentioned in statement). Schriclc:e, ''Political Section," p. 116, a100 lists eleven participants: Alimin (in charge of the meeting), Sutan Said Ali (representing the West Sumatran PKI), Budisutjitro, labja, Aliarcham, Sugono, ~urat Hardjomartojo, Jatim, Sukirno, Suwamo, and Kumo (-gunoko). If AJimin attended the meeting, he must have sUpped back to Java secretly. 1nere is no further evidence that he did, and he claims (interview, 1959, and Alimin, Rfwafat Hfdup, p. 20) that he met with the other PKI leaders only after they arrived in Singapore. The PKI account of the rebellion lists

471

Notes, pp. 311-315 "among others" Sardjono, Budisutjitro, Sugono, Suprodjo, KUSDOgunoko, Najoan, Herujuwono, Winanta, GondojuwoDO. Sumo Said All, Abdulmuntalib, and Marco; Pemberontakan NooomblJT 1926, p. 52. The VSTP leader Onglto D also gave the number of participants in the meeting as eleven; written statement, dated Apr. 14, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 64. 72. Pemberontakan Nooembcr 1926, p. 52. 73. Darsono, interview, 1959; Reports of the Resident, pp. 3-4, referring to statements made by Sutan Said Ali and Dahlan on their return from the con· rerence. 74. June 18, 1926, was the date given by Tan Malah (Thesis, p. 38), by Damaluddin Tamin ( interview, 1959, and statement dated Apr. ,2, 1962, in Sudijono, P,K.l.·SlBAR'contra Tan Malaka, pp. 19,24), and by Nurut (statement dated Apr. 19, 1962, in Sudij<)(lo, P.K.l.-SIBAR contra Tan Maiaka, p. 86); Pem1N1rontakan November 1926 also gives June (p. 53). 75. Mauawar (Musso), in inprecorr, Oct. 17, 19-28, pp. 1324-1325; "CommWlisme," p. 951, col. b; Schrieke "Political Section," p. 116, citing a letter sent the PKI branches on Dee. 16, 1925, signed by Sardjono, Winanta, and Budisutjitro on hehalf of the party executive and calling on the Communlsts to be ready to revolt in July 1926. 76. Ceheim versing, pr. 3-5. 77. Biilngc 1925, pp. 7-8. See also Politck venlng 1926, p. 2; Api, Dee. 21-25, 19"..5, in IPO, no. 1, 1926, p. 5. 78. Minutes, pp. 1-2. That all eighty.two representatives were at this meeting seems unlikely, unless the hotel were run donnitory style; but the minutes of the conference do not indicate thnt it was a smaller group. 79. Minutes, pp. 1-7: and see Gelldm versing, pp. 1, 5. The Dee. 22 party meeting had called for a referendum of PKI units. SO. Politwke nota PKI, p. 11, citing a letter ....'ritten by SubalCat in Singapore to the PKI e~ecutive on Java on June 12, 1926; and see Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 1I6. . 81. Ceheim OOf3lng, p. I : Musso, ''The \Vhite Terror in Indoneo;ia," lnprecorr, Mar. 8, 1929, p. 13: Blumberger Communist, p. 59. The initials were taken from its Dutch name (Dubhele or Dictatorialc Organisatie) : its Indonesian name, rarely used, was P.K.1. ke-Dua (Second PKI), which was reminiscent of the IndoneSian-language name of the Section B (5.1. ke-Dua ). 82. SemaWl, Rapotan, pp. 35-36. &3. Sernaun, ''Brieven,'' June 8, 1925: see also the issue of June 6, 1925. 84. Api, Nov. 16, 1925. The text of the resolution, which was dated Oct. 26, 1925, is giveo in "Doloi terror v Indonezii" (Down with the Terror in Indonesia ), Kro.myi Intcffll1t.sional Profroiu:nv, December 1925, pp. 122-123. See also "The Struggle of the Indonesian Proletariat," l!tpTi!corr, Nov. 12, 1925, pp. 1214--1215. 85. Api, Mar. 9, 1925. The cablegram was datelined Amsterdam, Mar. 8, and signed by Bergsma; it seems to have been an outgrowth of a major protest rally sponsored by the Dutch Communists in Amsterdam 00 Feb. 26, 1925, which adopted resolutions against the government's Indonesia policy aDd supported independence: De Tribune, Feb. 27, 1925. The parenthetical iofonnation seems to have been supplied by Api; I have no more idea than the newspaper what BKST stood for. . 86. Tiitigkeltsbaricht der Eukutive dct Kommunisti,fC~n Intemationale 19251926 (Report on the Activity of the Executive of the Communist International 1925-1926) (Hamburg, 1926) , p. 362; sec also Scmaun, "Dcr Internationale

472

Notes,

pr. 315-316

Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens," p. 58; P. Bergsma, "Labour Struggles in the Eru.t Indies," p. 1106; P. Bergsma, "~rogres.s of the Rev(}o Intioruuy Movement in Indonesia," p. 1368. fji, Darsono, "Die Lage def Volksbewegung Indonesiens," p, 418. 88. Minute!, p. 3. 89. For example, see the Report of the Assistant Resident of Pati, Ranneft, to the Resident of Semarnng (untitled typescript, dated Nov, 25, 1926, no. 97411 68) p. 2, hereafter cited as Report of the Assistant, Pati; "The Bantam Report," p. 43; Dverzicht Pati, p. 27; Palitiek verslag 1926, pr. &-9; Nieuwe RatterdtlmscM Courant, Mar. 10, 1925, and July 13, 1926. 90. According to Djamnluddin Tamin (interview, lOS!)), thi~ solUlion 10 the arms procurement problem was proposed by Alimin in discussing the Pramba nan decision with Tan Mabka in eany ]926; Semaun (interview, 1959 ) stated tlult it was suggested to him by Alimin and Musso when they arrived in Moscow a few months bter. 9!. Schrieke, "Political Sedion," pp. 115--116, citing the report on the Prambanan conference issued by the PKI executive on Dec. 16, 1925; and see Min'!tes, p.4. 92. According to Tan Malaka, the main purpose of tlle PKl emissaries' trip to Moscow was to seek Comintem authorization; Malaka, Thesis, p. 38. This was also stressed by Darsono (interview with C. MeT. Karon, 1955). Musso declared that the PKI chiefly hoped for Comintem aid in preparing a program that would appeal to the broad national revolutionary forces of Indonesia ( InpreCOrT, Oct. 17, 1928, pp. 1324-1325), but his statement was probably taUored to what the Comintem actually decided to do about the Indonesian proposal. At the Pasar Pon mediug, Sugono discussed "secret business of the VSTP which wi1l also be ta!.:en up with Soviet Russia via a secret route; when this has eventually been wor!.:ed out, it will be possible to carry on a very violent resistance." He also read passages from a con6dential letter sent by the Perhimpunan Indonesia from Anu.1erdam in October 1925, which, he declared, promised ~trong support if the VSTP undertook resistance IUld assured that aid would also come from "other Red countries"; Minutes, pp. 4-5. How much Sugono was reading into the PI expmssion of sympathy, it is difficult to .say; the part of the letter quoted directly in the minutes of the meeting simply expressed general anti-Dutch and prorevolutionary nationalist feelings. Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959 ) said he had visited PKI headquarters on Java just alter the December conferences and was informed then of the decision to revolt. The party leaders explained th at pressure from below was such that action could no longer be delayed, and since they cou1d not finance a rebellion, they had decided to appeal to Moscow for ald. 93. Politick vcrslag 1926, pp. 1- 2; Api, Jan. 18 and 22, 1926. Darsono sailed for Singapore on Jan. 29, 1926, and proceeded from there under police escort to Shanghai, where he stayed a short time before continuing to Vladivostok and Moscow; Darwno, interview, 1959. 94. Bataviaasch Nleuwsblad, Jan. 13, 1926; Api, Jan. 12 and Feb. 1, 19~6; Java Bode, Feb. 5, 1926. 95. Alimin, Riwaiat W d up, pp. 20, 22; and see Tan MaJaka, DP, I, p. 143. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), the PKl leaders first wanted Semaun to come to Singapore to discuss the situation with them, since :u a member of the ECCl presidium he was the top Comintem representative for Indonesia (and because thcy knew Tan Malaka disapproved the Prambanan propo~aJ.~?) .

473

Notes. p. 316 However, the Comintem rejected ru5 going to Singapore, and the party leaden then decided to appeal to Malab. The PKl history of the rebellion asserts that the party exenttive first sent Alimin and later Musso to contact ODe of the ECCI representfttives in the Far East In order to get an opinion on the Prambanan decision. They heard nothing from this mission for some time, and so Sardjono and Budisutptro were sent as envoys to Singapore to meet with Tan Malaka. Malaka refused to leave the Philippines, and so Alimin was sent to see him in M~ila; Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 53-54. It does not seem likely to me that the PKI contacted either SemauD or other ECCI representatives In the time between the Prnmhanan conference and Alimin's visit to Tan Malaka, in view of the distance and dlfficuJty of communication. What is poS$ible is that the party had made earlier efforts 10 acra!lge a meeting with Semaun (we will remember that there were attempts to bring him 10 Singapore during 1925) and that Alimin tried to press this or to get in touch with International representatives in the Far East during his visit to Canton in nbout August 192.5. However, Alimin does not mention such efforts in his aUlobiography or his polemic with Tan Malnlca. Musso is recorded as attending the Prambanan conference in ODe of the three lists of participants, and the Dutch-langurlge press reported only that the police had missed him since early January 1926. He could not have left Indonesia much before the Prambanan conference, as he was in the oountry in laic November. I have seen no further evidence for a mission by Musso at this time. Nor does it seem likely Ihat Sardjono and Budisutjitro left Indonesia simply as emissarie.~. They were not the only ones 10 depart after the December meetings; virtually the whole of the top party leadership appears to have left Indom.'Sia between January and early April 192.6. It seems to m.e most probahle that the entire execulive expected to be arrested and its members sought to avoid this by decamping to Singapore, where they couJd more easily contact Comintem representatives and where they couJd safely wait out any further repercussion.• of the Surabap strikes. 96. Tan Malnlca, Them, p. 38, says he met with Alirrun at the end of March 192.6; Schrieke, " Political Section," p. 163, place5 their meeting in Febn.uuy; and Djamaluddin Tamin, in a statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.SIBAR Contra Tan Ma/aka, pp. 24, 30, So"\;d that Alimin left Singapore for the Philippines early in January, was persuaded by Malaka's viewpoint after a week or hvo of arguing, and then spent more time discussing the theses Malab was drawing up and making arrangements for communications between Manila and Singapore. He left Manila on Feb. 15, having been about a month in the Philippines. A January or February meeting would seem likely if Sugono attended the second Singapore conference, which it seems probable he did. Other references to the Malaka-Alimm meeting may be found in Pembe1"ontakan November 1926, p. 54; Politieke nota PKl, p. 12, which cites as the source of its information a letter written by Subakat in Singapore, dated June 12., 1926, to PKI headquarters on Java; and also "Dibclnlcang Lajar Komoenis" (Behind the Communist Veil), Santapan Rakfat, Sept. 18, 1948, p. I ; Xahln, Natil;lnalhm, p. 82; Dimyati, Sedfarah, p. 24. 97. Alimin. Aoolym, p. 14. 98. Tan Malaka said he had received weekly reports on PKI developments from Aliareham when the L-ttter was party chairman. Malan had heard from him of the decision to abolish the SR Md had written him protesting the decision; hut Aliarcham was jailed while they were still debating the point; Malaka, Them, p. 4~. In addition, Malab is said to have laken up the December conference

474

Notes, pp. 316-321 program with Alimin on when he visited the Philippines in 1925; DJamaluddln Tarnm, interview, 1959. 00. According to Tan Malaka, he wrote this pamphlet in China in the last days of 1924; Malaka. DP I , p. 113. It was published fust in Canton in April 1925 and then in Tokyo in December of the lame year. The Outc:h CommWllst paper received a copy of the Cblna edition and reviewed it very favorably ; De Tribune, July 24, 1925. 100. T . M.taka, Noor de "Republlek.lndonesia" (Canton, April 1925) , pp. 26, 36-3'1; iCC also Tan Malab, Senwngal Maeda (The Youthful Spirit ) (Tokyo. January 1926), pp. 58-65, 73-74. 101. Vetsions of the program are given in NtI(lf de " &publlek-Indonuaa," pp. 21-23; Semangat Moeda, pp. 59-65; Tan Ma1ah. Mas» AcHe (Mass Action ) (Dja1carta. 1947 ). pp. 69-75. loz.. Noor cU "&publiek-Indonuill," p. 27; Senumgat Moeda, pp. 12-73. 103. Naar rIa "Republlek-lndonukr," p . 28; and see M.uw Actie, pp. 48, 51. 104. N(l(Jr de "ReptWliek-lndoneria," pp. 18-19. 105. Noor de -Republlek-Indone.ria," p. 47. For Malab's comments on the PaciBc war, see pp. 41-43. and on revolutionary strategy, pp. 34-36. 106. Malaka, Semangot Maeda (Tokyo, 1926 ), p. 86. For the oommenu on revolutionary strategy, see pp. 73-75. 107. Ma1aka, DP I, pp. 143-145. Ebe where, however (Them, p. 43 ) , Malaka stated that he had heard of the dedsion only when Alimin returned from Singapore. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 135, stated that MaJaka &rst learned of it through "the written report of Aliarcham and Budisutjitro"; but it is unlikely that Aliarcha.m helped write such a report. as he had 'been in jail since Dec, 5. 108. Malaka, TheN, p. 38. Emphasis in the ten, 109. Malaka., TheN, p. 38; Schrleke, " Political Sectioll," pp. 153-154, 110. Malaka., AffU$tJ Actie, p, 48. This pamphlet Wrull lirst published In Singa. pore in 1926. Ill . Malaka, Mtu$lJ Actie, p. 56, note 1; and see pp. 47-50 on lega] activiUcs, p. 51 on party democracy, pp. 55-.56 on the national front, and pp. ' 62-63 on terrorism. 112. Matua, Mtu$lJ AcHe, p. 61. 113. Malab, TheN, p. 38; Scluieke, ''Political Section," p . 154; PolitkLl nota PKI, p. 11, citing the Subaht letter of June 12, 19'26; Kahin, Natlanalirm.

p.82. 114. MaJaIca, TheN, p. 40. lUi. Sehrieke, "Political Section," p . 154; Politleke fIOta PKI, p . n , citing the Subakat letter of June 12, 1926. Kahin, Nafunali.lm, p. 82, and Djama1uddin Tamin, in Sudljono, P.KJ.· S1BAR contra Tan Afala/w, p. 27, claim, however, that Alimin did not indicate Tan Malalta', opposition. The PiCI history Pcmb6ront4k4n November 1926 does not mention the theses as mch, but states that AJim/n pretented MaJaka's opinion, which did not agree with the Pnlmbanan dedsion (p. 54). The second Singapore meeting took place in Apri1 1926, according to Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 154, and Polltl6ke nota PK1, p . 25. DjamaJuddln Tamin, however, gives it as Mat. 11, 1926; interview, 1959. If Sugono took part, it is likely It was held in March, as he was arrested when he retumed to Indonesia, on April 7; Polltlek verdag 1928, p . 11. The meeting wu attended by Sugano, Budisutjitro, Winanta, Musso, Subakat, Suprodjo and Alimin, aCCOfding to Djamaluddin Tamin; interview, 1959, and statement in Sudijono, P.K.I .·SIBAR contra TIItI MalGkJJ, p. 25. PemberontGkon Nouember 1926, p. 54, mentions Sard-

US

Notes, p. 321 jono and Sugono as present in Singapore throughout this period. Tan Malalca mentions Sugono's partiCipation in the .second meeting; Them, p. 38. However. Schriek-e. ''Politica1 Section," p. 154, and Politieke nota PKl, p. 25, note as participants all tne above except Suprodjo and Sugono; and AlimfD, Rlwofot Hkiup. p. 22, mentions only three conferees-MlISSO, SubaJcat, and himself. 116. Polilieke nota PKl, p. 25, states that Musso played the major role in urging adherence to the Prambanan decbion; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, claims that party chalnnan Sardjono denounced Malaka's position and gave the orders for the Musso-AUmin expedition and the retw;n of the other party leaders to Indonesia. Both Musso and Sardjono were subsequently promi. nent in preventing any retreat from the Prambanan position. 111. Semaun, interview, 1959. According to $emaun, Musso knew the code that was to relay the message from Moscow, but Alimin did not. 118. Malalca claimed he did not hear from Alimin for nearly two months after his departure from Mantia; MaT~k-a , DP I, p. 146. 'I1te most probable dates are those given by Djamaluddin Tamin, and they place AlImm's departwe from ManUa on Feb. 15 and his letter from Singapore on Mar. 16, a lapse of a month. Possibly the letter was sent by a circuitous route and took several weelcs to arrive; if so, it would provide a reason other than Ulness for the delay in Mala1ca's departure from Manila. . 119. Malab, DP I, p. 146. However, according to MalaJca's d.i5ciple, Djamaluddin Tamin (statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, m Sudijono, P.K.l.-SIB.AR contra Tan Malaka, pp. 21-28), Alfmin sent a letter to Tan Malalca on Mar. 16, 1926, the day be and M~ departed for Moscow. The letter stated that the party uccutive had refused to aCcept MnJalca's views and had decided to scncf Alimin and Musso to Moscow. Malah felt that the PKI leadership would not have rejected his theses unless there had been foul play on Alimin's part, and so he made every effort to get to Singapore lIS soon Il$ he was able. The Pta account Pemberonlakan Notlember 1926, p. 54, itates that Musso and Alimin were flrrt to go to Canton to contact a representative of the Comintem Eastern Section and then to Moscow to confer with the ECCI. PoliUeks nota PKl, p. 11, says that A1imin and Musso intended either to confer in Canton with Borodin or to ~o to Moscow and talk to Comintem leaden there (the latter alternative would premmably have been in case Borodin WIIS unwilling or unable to approve the project hImseH). Alimin, Riwa;at Rldl/p, p. 2.2, mentions that he and Musso went to Russia by way of Canton and Shanghai. It Is most likely that they did get in touch with Soviet or Comintem representatives while In China, if only to arr.m!!e for travel to Russia. No awareness of their Impending visit was shown by the head of the ECCI Eastern Section, M. N. Roy, In a letter written to Sneevliet on June 12, 1926; however, this may have been due to faulty communications. The length of time involved in their trip (nearly three months, if we tale Mar. 16 Il$ the date of their departure) is plalL'Jible COPsidering their illegal status, inadequate funds, and lack of prior Soviet permission for the bip. We have no indication what discussions, if ·any. Alimin and Musso had with Comintem representatives In China; however, one bit of infonnation may pmvide a c1oo. Budisutjitro was an-ested in Temate on his way back from the Singapore meetings; it was reported that he had gone from Singapore to Hong Kong and Shanghai, returning through Hong Kong and ManUa to Temate, where he was captured; Nlcuwe Rotttmlanuche Courant, June 15, 1926. This Indirect itinerary sul'tgesbl that he might have accompanied Alimin and Musso on the first leg of their journey; I can think of no other obviolL'l reason why he would

476

Notes, p. 322 have gone as far afield as SIl:lnghai. His Manila visit might I.lave been simply to make connections for Indonesia, or he might have intended to inform Tan MaJaka of what had been done. Apparently he did not meet with MaJaka; very likely he arrived after Malaka had left for Singapore. Nurut, the then vice-chairman of the Makassar PKI, has recounted that Budisutjitro unexpectedly appeared in Makassar in May 1926; written statement dated Apr. 19, 1962, Jo Sudijono, P.K.l.-SIBAR contra Tan MoJaka, pp. 84-85. He was using a false passport and, disguised as a trader, was trying to avoid the police. Nurut, who had knOv.'O him earlier, met with him in II brief and ftutive conference. Budisutjitro told him that at the beginning of 1926 he had secretly left Batavia tor Singapore and had received a mandate from the party eJl:ccutive for II mis.olion abroad. He had been forced to return in roundabout fashion, via Makassar to Surabaja. He did not mention the Prambanan CQnference (about which, according to Nurut, the Makassar branch had still received no news) and said only that the PKI had been forced to dissolve as a legal organization, that unexpected events might take pb.ce, and that the Communists must guard against provocation. The next day, according to Nurut, he left for Surabaja. Ternate is hanDy on the way from Makassar to Surabaja, but Budisutjitro may have had what he thought was safe passage aboard a vessel making the trip through the eastern islands and then around to Java. U Nurufs story is bue, it is strange that Budisutjitro would not have informed the Malcassar party branch of the Prnmb.:urnn decision, for it was certainly never intended to keep the revolt plans secret from the outlying PKl sections. The only likely reason seems that, either because of his own sober second thought or because of his knowledge of the reaction the Alimin-Musso expedition received in China, he had come to doubt tOOt the plan would in fact go through. Accounts differ as to Budisutjitro's attitude when he left prison, but he ended up on the antirebellion side. 120. Malaka, Them, pp. 38, 38-39; Pemberontakan NooembCT 1928, p. 54; Djamaluddin Tamin, in SudifollO, P.K.l.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 28. According to Malab, he anived in Singapore on May 8. See also Oimyati, Sedjarah, p. 24; Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.l.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 28. He was spotted aboard a Japanese ship beaded from the Philippines for Malaya on Apr. 30, according to a Report of the Attorney General to the Resident Df Sumatra's West Coast (UDtitled, mimeograph, dated We!tevreden, Sept. 2:1, 1926, classified), p. 2. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 155, gives the date of his arrival as early June. This seems unlikely unless Suprodjo's journey (see below) was unusually hasty. 121. Politieke nota PKI, p. 11, citing letters from Singapore to the Java executive; Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 155. Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.l.SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 29, states that Malaka wrote the first of a series of letters to the Java party on May 6, the day of his arrival in Singapore, calling on all members of the executive to come to that city in order to learn from him the truth of what Alimin had done and to rescind the Pmmbanan decision. He also requested them to send comrades representing the outlying party sections, in order that he might explain the situation to them and give instructions for bunching local activities that would culminate in a national mass action. According to this ac'('Qunt, the fID;t reaction received from Java was a letter from Sardjono stating that the Prambanan decision was not subject to discussion and that further correspondence on the question was not desired. 122. Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR cOntra Tan Malaka, p. 30.

477

Notes, pp. 322-325 For Suproojo's visit, see abo Malab, Them, p. 39; Dimyall, Sedjarah, pp. 24-25, 35; Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 155. Acconling 10 Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, Sugono !U well as Suprodjo came to Singapore at Malab's request, and Sugono W!U arrested when be arrived back in Indonesia. This does not seem likely: Sugono W!U captured on returning from Singapore, but on Apr. 7, thus presumably after the Singapore executive meetings and before MaJah arrived:. nus account ill also the only one to place Suprodjo among the group in Singapore from January through March. Dimyati's hi~10ry states that Suprodjo anived in Singapore on June 15. 1926, and spoke in Banduog, after his return, on JUDe 29. Djama1uddin Tamin's account says that he arrived in Singapore about the end of June and was back in Banduog at the beginning of July. Schrieke's account states that he returned to Bandung. then PKl headquarters, at the end of June, having b'aveled there via Bandjermasio and Surabaja. U he had returned by late June or early July (which seem probable both because of the agreement of the accounts and the subsequent chain of events) it is not possible that he arrived in Singapore at the end of June aDd unlikely that he came as late as Juoe 15 if he took the circuitous route described by Schrieke.

CHAPTER XII 1. CentraJ e:<ecutive representatives were Sardjono, Winanta, Osman gelar Sutan KeadiJan, and Dawud. There were four representatives from the most important (class I ) sections: Sutigno (SwabaJa), Sugono (Semarang), Sardjono (Batavia), and Sutan Djenain (Bandung ). From the class II branches were Samyarata (Jogjakarta), Marco (Surakarta), Sosroabnod;o ( Madiun ), Tannudji (Kedhi), Muchsin (Tjirebon), Salimun (Pekalongan), S. Prapto (TegaJ), Engku Djamaluddin Rasad (West Sumatra), Abdulbrim (Attell), A. C. Salim (Makassar ), Samsjurun ( Medan ) , and O. Natoan (Temate); Cehclm OO1'llag, p. 1. 2. Cehclm vertfag. p. 2. 3. Gehelm versiag, pp. 2-3. 4. CeMim ~r$lag, p. 2. 5. GellCim versiag. p . 3. 6. Article by Sugono in SI Tetop, Dec. 31, 1925, in IPO, DO. 6, 1926, p. 300. 7. Malaka, Them, p. 38; Politiek verslag 1926, p. 11 . Sugooo's opposition may explain why the PKI history Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, claimed that he hnd met with Tan Malaka in Singapore. The government version of Sugono's death was that he committed suicide in prison six weeL; aller his arrest; the Commwlists claim he died under questioning and that the police therefore a1lo .....-cd only his immediate family to prepare his body for burial; Pemberontakon November 1926, pp. 54-55. 8. Mawo, editorial of Dec. 18, 1925, in IPO, no. 1, 1926, pp. 35-36. 9. Beginning with the issue of Jan. 2, 1926, Api published quotatiODJ (rom Bakunin on the character of revolutionary action. 11ley were printed io Italics on the first page; nothing similar was done at the time for statements by any other political thinker. The editor in chief of Api was then Herujuwono, one of the most active proponents of a resort to arms. 10. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 119, quoting PIG executive letter no. 59, Feb. 1, 1926. U. Schrieke. " Political Section," p. 120, quoting· circulars sent to PKI sections for distribution to subsections, dated Jan. 23, 1926. However, it was later decided, at least in the case of West Sumatra, that only regular dues should

478

Notes,

pp. 325-327

be sent on to the center. Gifts (uang derma) we re retained by the section for use at its own discretion; Schrieke. "Political Section," p. 120, citing a leiter

from PKl headquarters to the Padang section, dated Mar. 11 , 1926. The West Sumab'an group decided that the proper use for its money was to b uy arms and armnged to buy guns abroad; Hadji Mohammad Nur Ibrahim seems to have been the chief Bgure in the arms procurement effort and to have negotiated with Alllnin and Musso to secure guns from across the Straits; p. 120. 12. In the western Priangan, plans for a May revolution were popu1arly as· signed to the Asror movement, a secret society whose members belonged to the 51 and which taught the secret of invulnerability; Nadert; 1927, p. 244. In Atjeh, , people were told by PKl leaders that the uprising would commence in June; Ver:log bestuur 1927, p. 8; Nfeuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 9, 1926. 13. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 151, referring to the situation in West Sumatra. 14. A. "Indische chroniek" (Indies Chronicle), De Opbouw, June 15, 1926, p. 50; Nieuwe Rotrerdamsche Courant, May 25 and 31, 1926; De Telegroof, lime 3, 1926. 15. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 153, quoting Instruction no. 5 of Apr. 13. 1925. In the Semarang area, party leaders were reported to have been busy during April visiting their followers and insbuctillg them that the section executive had decided against any May Day celebration that year; Politiek verslag 1926, p. 8. The vice-cha.innan of the Makassat" .';1ection reported that in May a communique from the party executive was received; it bitterly criticized the government measures, which it admitted had severed the center's connections with the outJying branches. It advised all local leaders to continue their work as best they could and above all to avoid responding to provocations. Nurut, written statement in Sudijono, P.K.l.-SIBAR contra Tan Malokn, p. 85. TIlls may have been the executive's Apr. 13 instruction, which cou1d well have arrived late in Makassar. 16. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, May 3, 11, and 18, 1926; Dingley, PeManu' Movement, p. 49. 17. Batilc c1oth$ with the hammer a.nd sic1cle or star and crescent (the SR emblem ) WCrll favored by Mu'alimin adherenu; manufactured by the Surakarta batik industry, the subversive sarongs also found a good market on the West Coast of Sumatra. It was forbidden to or wear them; Nieuu;e Rotterckmsche Courant, Nov. 2 and 8, 1926. IS. Politiek versIng 1926, pp. 9--11, 16-17. The VSTP had had 68 branches and 9,000 members at the beginning of 1926 but sank to 6 locals and several hlmdred active members during the COUTSe of the year. Communist union activity in the Sem:mmg area was halted, according to this report, part1y because so many suspected leftists were Bred from their jobs that the workers were afraid to have anything to do with the revolutionary unions. 19. Nieuwe RotterdnmscT!e Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; "Communisrne," p. 952, col. a; Verslag bestlJur 1927, pp. 8-9, 19. 20. The Indies government belief in the ineffectiveness of the PKI in 1926, and its lack of knowledge concerning the real state of affairs in the areas where the movement Wll$ becoming a serious threat, was stressed to the writer by Pr0.fessor C. F. Pijper (interview, 1960), who in 1926 was assistant to the Adviser for Native Affairs. 21. For complications in the West Swnatra leadership, see Schricke, ''Political Section," p. 116; for the Semarang area, see Po/ltiek verslag 1926, p. S. The lack of contact with outlying sections is illU$trated by a letter sent by the central

r..

sen

479

Notes, pp. 327-329 e.ecutive to the West Sumatra PKI on June 7, in which data on the number

of PIO members, candidates. and SR and union members was requested. with the explanation that Hour activities are beiDg rendered Jncreaslngly more diIIlcu1t; now we are no longer allowed to publish a paper carrying information concernIng the overall sJtuaUon of the movement. We therefOR! very sincerely hope that you, comrade. will send us a detailed and clear report concenting all movements In your Section. In this report: you are, tuged not to omit a descriptiOn of popular sentiment ui.t-d-l1fl our movement .• ,"; quoted in Schrieke. "Political Section," p. 1M, note 12.5. 2.2. Api, editorial of Jan. 13, 1926; Schrleke. "Political Section," p. 153, citing a communication from the central committee to the Padang party section. 23, On June 9 the elecutive issued an instruction providing that "representa. tives of the Central Committee have to be in possession of an authorization from us, written on the back of their personal photographs. The authorizations

will also be provided with a rubber stamp from the Central Committee, and with the slgnatures of the Central. Committee chainnan ~d secretaty or their alternates, Persons unable to produce photographs and authorizations as explained above a~ not to be accepted as our representatives"; quoted In Schrieke, . -Political Section," p. 153. 24. Politfek verslDg 1926, p. 12. The VSTP also. according to this report. acquired a Double Organiz.ation. under the chairmanship of SaJeh. a Semarang union leader of notably rebellious inclinations. The Batavia branch suggested that the union also organize itself in sections and subsections In the manner of the PKI. hut Kadarisman. chairman of the union and of the Semarang PD. refused on the grounds that he doubted the party structure was sound. 25. Brouwer, De houding, pp. 116-118; Koch. 8atig Slot. pp. 35-39. 26. Djamruuddin Tamin, interview, 1959. It was perhaps this meeting which Musso referred to m his report to the sixth ComlJltem congress as the PKl's third conference on the revolution, at which it was decided to postpone the date of the revolt; lnpreco", Oct. 17, 1928, p. 1325. According to Djama1uddin Tamin, who represented South Sumatra at the meeting. he opposed the dedsfon to go through with the rebellion after the other units indicated the de~ of their unpreparedness. However, no one else shared this view. and he was persuaded to change his mind. ZT. Dimyati, Sedlarah. p. 35. According to this SOUl'Cle. the meeting took place on June 29. See also Pembcrontoktm November 1926, p. 55; DjamaIuddin Tamln, in Sudijono. P.KJ.·SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 30. 28. Djamruuddin Tamin, interview, 1959; Schrieke, "Political Section," pp. 155-156; t.falaka, Them, p. 39; Kahin, Nalioflllllsm. pp. 82-83; Pembcronlnkan Notlember 1928. p. 125. The last two sources claim DjamaluddJn Tamin retumed to Java to propagandize the party; he denies it. According to his account and that given by Malak-a. none of the three Singapore leaden attempted to retum to Indonesia in this period. The reason for this, outside of fear of being urested. appears to have been that Malalca hoped that if he cowd get the PKI eJ:ecutive to convene with him m Singapore he could persuade It to stay in that city. Malaka and Subakat bad urged this in letters to the party in Indonesia, declaring that if the drain of leaders through internment continued the party would not recover for another decade; Schrieke, ''Political Section," p. 155. Some of the conespondenC(! between the Singapore and Bandung groups was found in a police raid on Suprodjo"s house; according to the Nfeuwe Rotftlrdam.!che Courant. Feb. 20, 1927, the argwne.ot was framed in theoretical concepts COI!-ceming the

480

Notes, pp. 329-330 party program and its plans for revolt; the two groups seemed to misunderstand each other completely. 29, Schrieke, '"Political Section," p. 156; Schrieke. Note" referring to a police report of Sept. 25, 1926. 30. Schrieke, MPolitical Section," pp: 156-157, note 128; Schrieke. Note" citing a statement to the police by the PKI leader ManudL See also Alim [Alimin?J's comment in 'Ihe Terror in Indonesia," InpreOOfT, Mar. 24, 1927, p. 429, that the progressive promise of the new governor general weakened the Indonesian revolutionary spirit. 31. Scbrieke, Notes, citing Marsudi's statement to the police. According to Marsudi, a poll was taken in which Bantam, Batavia, Tjirebon, Pekalongan, Taga!. Malcassar. and all the Sumatran sections supported the proposa.l; Semarang, Koohi, Surabaja, the Priangan, and Magelang opposed it, Tjilntj(lp and Surakarta were undecided; and Banjumas, JOglakarta, Remban g, Pasuruan, Bewki, and Madiun did not vote. The executive opposed the proposal on the grounds that it was stil1 waiting for reports from A1imin, Musso, and Tan MaJaka. 32. Schrieke, " Political Section," p. 156, citing a letter from Sardjono to Tan MaJaka, dated Aug. 13, 1926. The PKI may actu.,lly have revised its plano;. In June, it was reported, the original Prambanan strategy of a feint in Sumatra followed up by a major action in Java was abandoned, and Herujuwono was sent to visit the various PlCI sections to work out a new plan of action with them; NieuWf.l Rutterdarruchc Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. 33. Schrieke, "Political ' Section," p. 156. nus may be the letter from Tan Malaka which Schrleke elsewhere refers to as having been dated Aug. 17, 1926; Schrieke, Reccmtrudie oon de opnandsplannen in Augwtu.t-Scptember te Cherlbon-Pekakmgan--Tegal (Reconstruction of the Uprising Plans in AugustSeptember at Tjirebon-Pekalongan-Tegal ) (man uscript notes), p. 1, hereafter cited as Reconstructie. 34. Report of tire Attorney General to the Resident of Srmwtra': W est Coast, Sept. 27, 1926, pp. 2-3, hereafter cited as Report of the Attorney General, transmitting reports from a spy for the Nethe rlands Indies govemment who was highly placed in the Singapore party «Junci1~. According to this source, Alimin and Musso had ordered the weapons; Tan MaJaka had said there were 2,000 pistols in Singapore, 200 of them destined for Medan, 300 for Atjeh, and the re.<¢ for Surabaja: in Manila there were 2,000 pistols on order for Padang. Whether Malaka refused primarily on principle or because he could not pay for the weapons wa.~ not stated. See also Overzlcht SWK, p. 10. 35. Schnclre, Reconstruct/e, pp. 1-2; "Politica1 Section," pp. 156-157. 36. Reporl of the Attorney General, p. 2. See also Schrielre, Note7 and "Politica1 Section," p. 157. This appeal was contained in a letter brought to Singapore on Sept. 10, 1926. According to Pemberontakan November 1928, pp. 7'5-76, .. committee to organize the West Sumatra revolt had been formed under the leadership of Manglcudun Sati. He approached the German assistant administrator of the Sawah Lunto coal mines about acquiring anns and found him ready to help supply revolvers and carbines. Likewise, the manager of a gun ~hop and the director of a firm in Medan, both Dutchmen, were willing to procure small arms. Other weapons were homemade; grenades were concocted with gunpowder purchased from Batavia and Sumbaja. By the end of 1926, according to this account, over one thousand carbines, revolvers, rilles, and homemade guns had been «JUected In West Sumatra, in addition to grenades, sharp \veapons, and four automobiles.

481

Notes, pp. 331-332 37. Report of the Attorney General, p. '2; according to this aocount, Malalca was then in Batu Pahat, Malaya. The meeting was attended by the Dutch spy in the Singapore PKI. The chainnan of the "trnding assoCiation" WIU Bahusanah, treasurer Jusuf, secretary the Dutch spy, conunissioners Salem and Marah. and propagandists Abdul Murad and Narbi. It was decided that Tan Malab, Megas, Abdu1hrim, and Suprodjo would be stationed at the Penang headquarters; Musso, Subakat, and the spy ...."QuId be in Singapore; Alimin, Budisutjitro, Dugk-o D, and lainui Abidin would be in Johore; Umar and Bukera would be in Kota Tinggi; and Djamaluddin Tarnin would be stationed either in Penang or Singa- . po~.

38. &port of the Attorney General, p. 2. According to the spy, Suprodjo ( BandWlg), Onglo D (Surabaja), and Djamaluddin Tamin (Padang; he had gone to the Malay peninsula at the time the spy's report was written) were supposed to anive in Singapore in a rew days; also e~ed shortly were A. C. Salim (Padang Pandpng) and Abdulkarim (Atjch). We know that Djamaluddln Tamin did retum, but there ill no sign that the others appeamd or that the conference was ever held. A. C. Salim, who had been hiding from the law since Sept. 13, was arrested in Med,'m on Oct. 12; Schrieke, Notelt. He may have been trying to make his way to Singapore. PKI leaders' reported visiting Singapore in Odober were Murrad gelar Sutan Maharndja, Mahmud Sitjintjin ( Mohammad Jusuf ), and Mandi; Schrieke, Notelt. 39. Nieuwe RotterdtlmltChe Coumnt, Dec. 28, 1926; ~he/rM adie thr commumrt/.lche leidnt (Secret Action of the Communist 'Leaders) (report 01 the local administration of Pekalongan to the Resident of Pekalongan, no. IM8/G, dated Pekalongan, Oct. 27, 1926, typescript, c1as~ifled), p. 2, hereafter cited as Gehe/me actie; letter from the Resident of Pekalongan to the Attomey Genera] in Weltevmden (typescript, dated Pekalongan, Sept. 28, 1926, no. 1074, classiBed), pp. 1-2. Because the authorities had not exercised suffident supervision, a great bad:log in tax pRyment built up between 1921 and 1925. '!bit WIllI discovered hy the internal revenue inspection in the middle of 1925, and payment was then demanded hut generaJly not received. Forcible collections of all unpaid taxes were therefore begun in 1926, as a result of which there was considerable unrest. According 10 PemberontaJ"IfI NOVIimber 1926, pp. 69-70, Tegal, Tjirebon. and Pekalongan were }jnked by a regional commissariat headed by Abdulmuntalib. 40. Gehe/me adie, p. 2. According to this source, Tegal first conferred with the Tjirebon section on this plan; Tjirebon advised Tegal to take the matter up with Bandung before proceeding further. See also Nieuwe RottetdamltChe Coumnf, Dec. 28, 1926. 41. Schrieke, &ccnstrodie, p. 1; Geheime actie, p. 2. 42. Schrieke, Rcconstrodie, p. 1; Geheime lJcfie, p. 3. 43. Scluieke, ReCOflJ'tructie, p. 2; Geheime actie, pp. 3-4. Abdulmuntalib, who took Tegal's view, visited Batavia and Bantam and presumably also consulted with his own section in Tjirebon; Salimun went to Semarang (Sept. 7-8), Temanggung (Sept. 8-9). Jogjalcarta (Sept 9-11, where he also consulted with a representative of Magelang), Sura1carta (Sept. 11-13) , and Madiun (Sept. 13-15). 44. Schrieke, &COMructie, p. 2; Geheime lJcfie, pp. 4, 9; N/euwe Rotterdamltche Coumnt, Dec. 28, 1926. 45. Gcheime actie, p. 4; Schrieke, Recon.structie, p. 2. Winanta, the Pta trearurer and: 6n t 00 leader, had been I\1Tested In connection with the Batavia bomh incidents of August 1926: he was banished to New Guinea at the

482

Notes, pp. 3J:hJ34 beginning of September; Nleuwe Holterdamsche Courant, Dec. 20, 1926. Herojuwooo also used the .namas Hcrujono. H eromuljono, and Heropranoto. He had been. active in the party in Semarang and was editor-in-chid of Api when it took to admiring Bakunin; he had also been chairman of the PKI section in Pekalongan and propagandist in Tegal. 46. Celieime actie, pp. 4, 9; Schricke, Recorn1ructie, p. 2. 47. Geheime actie, pp. 4-5. It has been claimed that this plan had been entertained by Tegal ever si nce the end of August; Nieuwe Rotterdnm.rche Coura,., Dec. 28, 19'26. On August 25, the authorities heard of an 5R meeting in TegaI that had decided in favor of terrorist action; a few houses were bumt, but nODe of those responsible could be IOWld; Letter from the Resident of Peka10ngan

to the Attorney General. Sept. 28, 1926, p. 1. 48. Schrleke, Notu, from Suhawanata's statement to the police, Jan. 18, 1927; Schrieke. Recon.Jtructie, p. 1; Dngleo D. statement dated Apr. 14, 1962, in Sudijono, P.Kl.-SIBAR comro Ton Malaka, pp. 65-66. A similar bacldash appelU"$ to have been responsible for some of the violence involved in the Satekat Hidjau the year before. In some areas of the Priangan. it was reported, people were led to expect that the revolution-the day when the new order would begin, the land would be equally divided, and one would no longer have to pay taxes-would take place on Feb. 1, 1925; when nothing happened, they turned on the local Communists. R. Kern, Oprlcilting VIIn contra-vereefligingen tegen het communi.smc, p. 7. The Batavia violence was called the Credit Action (Credit Alcsi) by its sponsors, according to Ongko D's account; It was carried out chiefly by diuaro" from tile Kampung Karel neighborhood, and the Bandung executive apparently did not Irnow of the decision to set it off. Party members who asked the BandW1g leaders about the incident were told that it had no significance and that they should continue working as before. Ongko D, a Surabaja PKl leader, claimed that on the urging of that branch party secretary Kus.nogunoko was sent to Batavia to discuss the affair with the section leaders there, only to report back that local leaders refused to meet with him. 49. Schricke, Note", remarks that Sukmwinata told the authorities he was quite aware that his view was in con8ict with Malaka's analysis. Acconllng to SchrieL:e, "Political Section," p. 185, Sukrawinata declared that "it is not necessary that all the Netherlands Indies take part; it will be enough if Batavia acts, Cor it is the center of the governmen t." Schrieke further says, Recomtructie, p. 2, that Herojuwono was appointed as this eonunittee's chief propagandist. The title is given ill Dutch as CamitC VllIl de Revolutie and sometiIIlCll as Uitvoeronde Comitc van de Revolutie (Executive Conunittee of the Revolution) in documents of that time. It is possible that the latter refen to the Batavia group as head of the revolutionary committees set up by various other party branches on its urging. I have soon the Indonesian name Comite Pemberontak (Rebellion Committee) used only in the recent PKI aOOJUnt Pemberontnkan November 1926 and in the pro-Malaka reply by Sudijono, P.Kl.-SIBAR contra Tan Malalw. Neither of these histories (except for Ongko D's account given in the preceding footnote) imply that the revolutionary committees acted outside the approval of the Bandung executive; in fact, the PKI account states that Kusnogunoko was asSigned to form them; Pcmbcrontalron November 1926, p. 52. The PKI history asserts that the committee5 were set up to implement the Prambanan decision and, although it gives no date, implies that they were founded" soon after that conference. However, all the activities referred to that 1 have been able to check took place just before the rebellion, so that it does not seem probable the

483

Notes, pp. 334-335 committees were founded before the d'ltes given here or that they were the same as the DO. Both the PKI and pro-Malaka accounts have reasons for wishing to identify the committees with the regular party leadership: the PKl vernon because it wishes to stress party sponsorship of an important rebellion against the Dutch and because it seeks to emphasize the enonnity of Tan MaJa1:a's opposition to the Prambanan decision; the pro-MalaXa rejoinder because it wishes to underline the foolishness of those who would not listen to reason as revealed by Tan Mabka. What we know of events from accounts contemporary to the rebellion maL-es it seem most unlikely that the Bandung ~tive as ruch spoo· sored or approvccr of the Batavia committee. However, the executive was Dot united; as we shall see, an attempt was made just before the Java revolt to replace Sardjono as chainn:m by the moderate vice-chainnan Suprodjo. U the Bandung executive's retreat from rebellion reflected not a change of heart on Sardjono's part but a weakening of his power in that body (as seems probable, given his diehard adherence to the Prambanan project in earuer arguments), then an intere.sting alternative possibility arises. It is not inronceivahle that K~ gunoko, who is described in both PKl and pro-Malaka accounts as a principal al1y of Sardjono, was in fact received by the Batavia committee leaders on his visit to that city (see the prece
484

Notes, pp . .'J35-3J7 1926. It might be noted that Tan Malaka mentions in his autoblogmphy that while he was in Manila he had written the Commtem on the Prambanan decision and his feelings toward it, Malab., DP I. p. 146. 55. Conceivably, this may be the Miller mentioned in the Protl.otem encyclopedia all having been a revolutionary mllroad union leader in India; MaJai/J enUiklopedHo po medtdunarodnomlJ rrofdvizhenilu, colo;, 1222-1223. However. Miller is hardly an uncommon name, and It may not even have been hls own, although Roy did not use Comintem aliases elsewhere in this correspondence. 56. This was Kwa Tjoan Siu, a Chinese-Indonesian medical doctor in Batavia, who' acted as mentor to the Indonesian revolutionary movement, both Communist and nationalist, before and during the war against the Dutch. 57. Sneevliet in Amsterdam to Roy in Moscow, letter dated July 10, 1926. 58. According to Darsono and Semaun (intetViews. 1959), the two d'clegates arrived in Moscow about mid-June; Darsono even mentioned (also in an interview with G. MeT. Kahio In 1955) that he remembered the date as June 12, thus the same day that Roy wrote to Sneevliet. There is no indication from Roy's letter that Musso and Mimin had already seen him or that Miller's mission had been conceived as an emergency response to their proposals; so ·that if Darsono is correct as to the date, it seems that the letter had been sent off before the two Indonesians got in touch wi th Roy. From Sneevliet's Jetter of July 10 it would appear that the International had not yet informed him of their arrival. 59. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), Darsono at fi ~1: sympathized with their project, but Darsono (interview, 1959) claimed that he had always opposed the Prambanan decision, which he first heard from his brother at the dock on departing from the Indies. 60. Semaun, interview, 1959. According to Semaun, Musso was especially involved with the Zinoviev group at first. 61. Darsono and Semaun, interviews, 1959. Alimin, in his account of the meeting ( Analysis, p. 22), relates that the four Indonesians "received a favorable impression" from the meeting, but he does not say whether this impreS$ion related to the Comintem attitude toward the Prambanan program. Elsewhere, he virlually admiu the International's refection In attacking Malaka's position on ' the revolt: '!hose people who disassociated themselves from and condemned what happened in 1926 were correct-they d id not act wrongly. They did not act wrongly because they d id not act at all; and a person who does not act cannot possibly act wrongly." Analysis, p. IS. In his autobiogra phy Alimin, although he discusses the meetings with the Comintem, does not mention the International's response to his mission; Riwajat Hldup, p. 32. The PlCI history of the rebellion states only that Alimln and Musso met Stalin and then returned home; Pembcrontakan. November 1926, p. 54. The pm-Malaka critique of this ACCOunt twiu the PICI for failing to mention th.. results or th.. discussions in Moscow, saying the obvious reason is that the Comintem rejected the project. Sudijono, P.K.l .. SIBAR comra Tan. Malaka, p. 10. In the same volume, Semaun asserts that the Comintem agreed with MaJaka's judgment of the Prambanan profect and ordered the Musso-Alimin expedition to return to Indonesia, bearing a resolution that declared the PKI mwt become more a mass party before it oould contemplate revolt; SemaWl, written statement dated Apr. 9, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.l.-SIBAR conlra Tan MalaIw, p. 39. 62. Alimin, Analysis, p. 12. 63. Semaun, interview, 1959. This is also claimed by Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959), who said that he had seen the Comintem progra m wben

485

Notes,

pp.

337-341

Alimin and Musso presented it to the PKI leadel'li in Singapore. SemaUD said he had criticized the party in his Jetter for trying to act independently in the matter of revolution and particularly for attempting to revolt without an adequate mass base; he called on the party to renew il
486

Notes, pr. 341-343 ( perhaps Mohammad Nur Ibrahim) also attended, as did the Tcgal leader Suieirnan and an unknown Indonesian womun; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926, and Karl verskzg betreDende den polit/eken toostand In het gewest Pekalongon ( Short Report Concerning the Political Situation in the Pekalongan District ) (typescript, addressed from the Resident of Pekalongan to the Governor General, dated Pekalongan, Nov. 20, 1926, classified), pp. 4-5, hereafter cited as KoI1 oof$lag Pekalongan. 75. Karl oorslag Pekalongan, pp. 4-5; Nicuwe Rotwrdamsclle Courant, Nov. 30 and Dec. 28, 19"26. The Resident of Tjirebon at Brst denie
p.3. 86. See Kort vcrslag Pekalo ngun, pp. 3-4; Nieuwe Rotterdomsche COIJrant, Dec. 28, 1926; Blumberger, Communi&t, pp. 78-79. 87. The Surakarta Communist unions were joined in a Trade Union Council (Raad van Vakbonden); they and not u... party section formed a revolutionary committee to organize the local revolt; Pemberantakan NOIJ(ffllber 1926, p. 16, and see the obituary of Suhadi in llarlan Ruk/at, July 3, 1962. For comments on Mu'alimin participation, see u... Nieuwe Rotterdomsche COIJtant, Dec. 28, 1926; and for the details of the Surnkarta disturbances, see Blumberger, Commumrt, pp. 79-80. The PKI history of the rebellion states that only in Batavia, Bantam, and several places in the Priangan had revolt preparations really been canicd out. In East Java there was very little rebel organization except in Kedmj in Sumatra there was very little outside the West Coast, several places on the East Coast, and in Sibolga. A considerable amount of money for the revolution was collected

487

Notes, pp. 343-347 in Temate, this report asserts, and there was a belated attempt at revolt in western Bomeo. which failed because its leaders were a'rrested beforehand. Pemberontakara Nooember 1926. pp. 83, 116. 88. For a description of the Batavia upmIng and the events immediately procediog it, see A. Djajadiningrat, JIerinneringen, pp. 332-34 1: Djajadiningrat was Regent of Batavia at the time. One of the major obfectives in Batavia was to storm Tjipinang prison; 500 persons gathered for the attack. but it did not take place because those who were to lead it failed to appear. One of the participants later recounted that he aocr his comrades. belieyed that someone sent from China would temporarily take control over the country. in order, when the situation"was in hand, to tum it over to Semaun; the .final goal of the revolution would be to restore power to the Javanese princely houses; De Teiegraal. jWle 7, 1927; Nietlwe RouerOOnuche Coural'll, June 17, 1927. 89. Nleuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dee. 20, 1926. 90, For the religiOUS aspectli of the Bantam revolt, see "The Bantam Report," pp. 44-45. 91. 100 PKI history of the rebellion charges that Arif Fadillah was one of those won over to Tan Malab's viewpoint by Mamuar, a west Sumatran deputy of Malaka. He went to Singapore, aecoming to this account, and thereafter actively opposed the revolt plans. Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 124-

125.

92. Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 177, quoting a statement reported to have been made by Kamaruddin, one of the rebel leaden. For a description of the

Sumatra revolt and the events leading up to it, see pp. 15~177; also Ovemcht SWK, pp. 10-19; and Blumberger, CommunUt, pp. 80-91. 93. D}amaluddio Tamin, interview, 1959. In his autobiography Alimin says they chose the Shanghai-Canton-Hongkong-Bangkok route because it was the only safe one at the time; Alimin; Riwafat Hldup, p. 22. 94. Alimin, R/wa;at Hidup, pp. 22-23; Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 95. Over:.icht SWK, p. 10; Schrieke, "Political Section," p. 166, citing the noteboob of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim (who had been 8ITCSted on Nov. 14, 1926). 96. Alimin, R,lwa;at Hidup, pp. 22-23; DjamaIuddin Tamin, interview, 1959. rn. ''The Governor General's Report," p. 8, note 8; NieuW{) Rotterdanuche Courant, Jan. 24, 1927.

CHAPTER XIII 1. "Manifesto of the E.C.C.I. on the Insurrection in Indonesia," [nprecorr, Nov. 25, 1926, p. 1390. 2. The party's immediate response to the uprising was, for the Communists, extremely moderate. Apparently in an effort to do what it could to soften the retaliation ag~1: the PKI, it sent De Graeff a wire blaming everything on his predecessor: "NAS-CPH executives in combined meeting view uprising West~ Java as result misru1e by former Governor General Foek. Provocative stand of authorities paved way for this expression despairing resistance, True guilty peTSOlU former Governor and his advisers. Protesting against numerous recent arre5ts we ask general amnesty for poJitica1 prisoners, persecuted people, and internees. With this deed beginning of new course could be demonrtrated in visible manner, NAS: Sneevlict, Dissel; CPH: De Visser, Bergsma. Nov. 13, 1926." Quoted in De A,beid, Nov. 20, 1926, p, 1.

488

Notes, pp. 348...,J52 3. Vanter, "The Revolts in Indonesia," Inp1'ccorr, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 102. 4. Inp1'ccorr, Dec. 1, 1926, pp. 1430-1431. 5. lnprecorr, Dec. 1, 1926, pp. 1635-1636. 6. ProtolroU. Erweitcrtc Eukutioe der Kommunlrlischen lntemationale. M08kau, 22. November-l6. Dezember 1926 (Protocol. Enlarged Executive of the Communist International. Moscow, Nov. 22-Dec. 16, 1926) (HamburgtBerlio, 1927), pp. 480-481 , hereafter cited as ProtokoU. The program had called for aOlllCsty for political prisoners, compensation for the victims of the "White Terror" in the Indies, and the appointment of a workers' commission to investigate the situation in the colony. 7. "Manifesto of the E.C.C.1. on the Insurrection in Indonesia," p. 1390. Emphasis in the text. See also "Ocherednye voprosy mczhdunarodnoi revoliutsii" (Special Questions of the Intematiomu Revolution), Bol'shevlk, Jan. 1, 1927, p. 4 . For an analysis of the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese situation in 1926, and in particular of the role of the seventh ECC1 plenum regarding CCP strategy, see Schwartz, Chinese Communism, pp. 54-60, 79-83. 8. Manuilsky, "Discussion of the Report on the Situation in China," InprecorT, Dec. 30, 1926, p. 1595. Emphasis in the text. For Bukharin's remarks, see ProtokoU, p. 5. 9. ProtokoU, p. 345. 10. Protokoll, pp. 8-9. Semaun sat on the Chinese Commission and the Agrarian Commission at the seventh plenum and was re-elected to the ECCI presidium; pp. 12-13. 11. Bucharin, "The World Situation and the Tasks of the Comintem," lnprccorr, Dec. 3, 1926, p. 1456. 12. Semaun. "The Rebellion in the Dutch East Indies," In precotT, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 1438. 13. Kitaigorodsky, "Leninist Teachings on the Colonial and National Revolutionary Movement and the Current Problems of the Revolutionary Movement in the East," InprecorT, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 95. See further Van MUnster, "The Background and Hi~1:ory of the Insurrection in Java," p. 1499; "Before the Sixth Congress of the Comintem," lnprecorr, JWle 7, 1928, p. 566; Kja! Samin [Darsono], "Der Aufsland auf Java und Sumatra (Indonesien)" (The Uprising on Java and Sumatra [Indonesia]), Die Kommunl.ttlsche lrltemationale, Mar. 29, 1927, p. 643; ''The Echo of Chinese Events in India," InprccorT, Feb. 4, 1927, pp. 245-246. 14. Krasnyi lntematslonal Profroiuwv, December 1926, p. 644. For the November manifesto, see lnprecorr, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 1438. IS. '!he E.C.C.I. on the Tasks of the CommWlists in Indonesia, lnprecorr, Dec. 8, 1921, p. 1562. For other criticisms, see "&foro the Sixth Congress of the Comintern." p. 566; and Semaun, 'Vokrug vosstanie na l ave" (Concerning the Uprising on Java), Krasnyi lntematsional Prof:wiuzoo, January 1927, p. 71. Semaun's report criticized the poor coordination of the revolutionary e1I'orts, which prevented the rebellion from spreading throughout the country. Neither, he claimed, had sufficient work been done to subvert the soldiers and police. " . In the political aspect, too, the uprising was prepared in a far from satisfaotory manner. This is apparent from the fact that the masses did not support the anned outbreaks in sufficient measure, either by powerful strikes or by the seizure of banks, etc." 16. The British authorities for their part seem to have taken the attitude that their Indies counterparts were heavy-handed and unsuhtle in dealing with their R

489

Notes, pp. 352-353 opponents. See the comments of the Singapore police commissioner on his interrogation of Alimin and }.Iusso; Rene Ooraet, Singapore: A Police Background (London, 1947?), p. 110. 17. InprecoTT. p. 849. Darsono (Samin) explained the failure of the revolution to the sixth congress on more orthodox line!; ; il lay, he $aid, in the mistaken line developed by the December 1924 congress, the arrest of party leaden and the consequent inexperience of those at its head, the (aiJure to draw the Indonesian masses into the struggle, the lack of an effort to subvert the police an d armed forces, inadequate organization and political preparation. faiJure to pre5ellt clear popular demanw, and lack of contact with the Comintem and: other Communist parties; Inpreccrr, pp. 1245-1246. Mwso, writing a few yCaJ3 later on the Java uprising. rejected the claim that the revolt had not been sWlicient1y well prepared: i1le uprising was well prepared, but unfortunately it began too blc; that is, when it began all the experienced leaden had already heen arrested and thrown in prison. Aside from thill, the slogans which <'!l'Uld have drawn the dm::ontented peasantry and working class were not popu1arized cnough. Although even the Dutch govcrnment u_ pected that the uprising wouJd become a general one, it only included Batavia, Bantam, and the Priangan." Musso, Prlnudltel'n!li trod tl Indcnez/l, p. 19. 18. "The Situation In Indonesia," p. 502. Emphasis in the text. 19. For example, the Resident of Banfumas, Van HeJsdingen, ordered in his inmuctioru to the Assioltan t Residents of Probolln ~o, Pur">l:olrerto, and Tjllatjap and the Regent of BanjUffillll (typescript, dated Banjumas, Dec. II, 1926, no. 20974/4) that in the rural areas Communists were to be boycotted by putwan de$O (village decision, nominally reached by conscnsus) to the effect that "(I) their part of commun~1 property shall be denied them; (2) they shaU be granted no help in building house.~, the cultivation of their land, or at funerals or other occasions; (3) they shall be denied penniolsion to hold celebrations; (4) they shall be ",Uowed no 10.... n5 from the village banl: or grain storehouse." Moothly urn of villages applying these rneamres and the persons agairut whom they were enforced were to be provided the ResJdent; pp. 1- 2. 20. For a description of government measures in response to the rebellion, see Blumbergcr, Communist, pp. 107-123. 11le thousand internees of Mansvelt's study (made before most of the west Sumatran internment dedsiolU were made but after nearly all those from the other district.'! had been detcrmined) were £rom the following region~ : Bantam 84, Bogor 16, Central Priangan 18, other West Java residencies 193, Pe!calong:m 38, Semarung 125, Rembang 17, Banjum.u 20, lCedu 21, Jogjalcarta 34, Surakarta 83, Madinn 47. Surabaja .oil, Kediri 77, Pasuruan 32. Bemid 21. Djembe!- I , Madma I , Lampung 8, Palembang 5, East Coast of Sumatra 19, Benkulen 23, West Coast of Stlmatra 11 , Tapanuli 9, Atjeh I, Menado 2, Celebes 9, Pontianak II, Moluccas 33. Eight wern women and thirteen were Chinese; none had European status; Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en Communisme," pp. 204-205. The regional origins of the first 838 pel'5Oll5 interned may be found in "Ovenlcht van den inwendlgen politielren toestand (1924-April 1928)" (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, 1924-April 1928). Metledee-lingen ckr Re~eerlng omtrent enkele onderwerpen van al~emcen befone (Weltcvreden, 1928), col. 2. More internees were added after the ori~inal 1,300: there were abotlt 3,000 in the DiguJ camp at the beginning of 1930; Ds Te1egraat, Feb. 18, 1930, citing a stalcm~t by the Dutch govcrnment. The rollowin~ year, however, the government began to reduoe their numbe!- after an investigation showed: many were not dangerous or bad been banJ.shed for InsufBcient reason;

490

Notes, pp. 353-355 see Nieuwe ROUerdam,lche Couran1, Jan. 14, 25, 31, and Mar. 3, 1931. As the major concentration colony for opponents of the Indies regime, the camp on the Digul became a prime nationalist revolutionary symbol. For descriptions of the camp and life of the internees, see "Overz.icht van den inwendigen politieken toestand (1924-15 April 1928):' cols. 11-18; A:tge Kramp-Nielsen, "Met de COIIlD1unisten naar den Boven-Digoer' (With the CoIIlD1unists to the Upper Digul) , Haag.rch Maandblad, 1927, pp. 233-244; L. J. A. Schoonheyt, BovenDigoel (Upper Digul) (Batavia, 1936 ); Mev. Philippa-Raden Soekasih and G. van MUruter, I ndonesia, een politiestaat ( Indonesia, a Police Stafe) (Amsterdam, n.d.), pp. 6-10; Sjao/azad {Sutan SjahrirJ, I ndorlesi.rche Overpeinzingen (Indonesian Reflections) ( Am~ie rdam, 1945 ), pp. 50-70. 21. H. H. A. van Gybland Oosterholf, Het Communim1e tegenover de gekleurde rauen (Communil;m against the Colored Races) (reprint from De NedetwndeT, Oct. 29 and 31 and Nov. 2, 19-27) , p. 10. 22. H. G. Heijting, Jaoo', onmst (Java's Unrest) (Amsterdam. 1927), p. 38. Emphasis in the text. 23. Letter of Oct. 30, 1927, quoted in Brouwer. De hooding, p. 119. 24. M. W. F. Treub. Het gist in I ndie: cen analyse der hedendoag.rche In-wnd.rche beweging (Fennent in the Indies: An Ana1ysis of the Contemporary Native Movement) ( Haarlem, 1927), p. 61.

491

INDEX Entries followed by an asterisk represent first references to works cited 1ater in the book by short title. Figures appearing in parentheses are note numbers.

Abangan, !2. !L !1Q.. 424n !.m ABBH (Driven and Mechanics Union) , 4080 (@ Abdul Am, 4250 tlll Abdul Murad, 482n 00 Abdulkarim, 42& '-TIl. 4SOn (M1. 478n ill 4820 ~ ;m1 AbdulmuntaJib, ~ ~ 4260 4720 '-1!1 4820 ~ 4860 (1Ql. 48'70 (17) Abdultaclunan, 157 Abidin, Zainul, 482.n (37) Abihuno,363o (36) Achmad Cbatib, 425n (73) Adat, lQ. 40 Adidarmo, 43 AlInan, Hadji, l'M Mandl, 4820 (38) "Agenda van het S. L oongres," 388n

m

crn.

(40)Agrarian 37tn

m

m

mm

, gQ, ~ ~ .we also Peasantry,

"Louteren wi; 011:11," 3800 ( 54) · Riwalat Hldup, 3740 (40)· Alkema, Sarekat 1:1am, 361n ~

All-Indies Congress. !!!. l42. All-Muslim League. Indian, ill All-Russian Gongres.'! of Muslim Communist Organizations, first, M.. 55 All-Russian (later All-Union) Scientific AlISociation for Oriental Studies, ~ 403n

uru

A1maJiJd, ZaiD, 426n '-1'l.l

AmbaraWQ, 4330 Ull1 434n !..!!ru: Ambijah, 43In (96) America, !tl. Sf Anarchism, M. !§'l.. ~ 4840 (!.'l) Ansor movement, 479n ( 1.2 ) Anti-Communist groups. gQL 2M Anti.imperialist organixation, ~ 2.2.3 Antl+Ribut Bond, 296 Antistrike law, ~ 310 Anwar, S. M., 4260 (77 ) ApI,178 Arbitration courts, 4140 (119) Arif, Hadji, 426n (77) Arii F adillah, ~ 470n 488n ffi1} Army of Labor, see Adidarmo Article l53 1M and fer, 326 Articles 155 and ~ 258 Article 161 bu, ~ 416n (132) An:, L'Evolution. 363n (36) · Associationiml., 1m.. ill Assar, Said Hamid, l.8a. 460n (54) Atjeh. lQ. ~ 1M. ~ 426n LTI1. 460n {M1 464n l!!1 478n i l l 479n {1g1 481n (M1 482n {M1 490n ( 20); see oW Langsa Atjeh War, l.O. Abnasumarta, 471n (69)

mm

m

493

Index Baan. Adolf (continued ) ill 3730 (M1 376n UR 380n ~ 381n U!:!1 3830 {M1 3840 ill 390n (M. ~ 399n ~ 4370

Bergmcijcr, Hot Communl$me In 1ndll, 419n ~ Bergsma, Pieter, ;!!, ~ ~ !ill. ~ ~ 7l. 1Z. ~ ~ ~ !QL ill. !]l, ~ l23.!M. ~ Nl.. ~ ~

(g!)

uBrieven uit Holland," 3750 ~ "Ret aanstaande S. L congres," 3650

"<>ru

<1,')' uitengewooD


''Russi

m

rongres," 3820 ~

e revolutie," 366n

48Bn

Souljet-RU#land in de procti/k, 3830

361n~

Babu$3nllh, 4820 ( 37)

Bahasa Indonesia, ll2 Dakar, ;Ml. M5 Baku congress• .rce Congress of the Peoples of the Ea'lt, firrt Bakunin, !.ffl.. ~ 478n M, 4830 ~ Bala Tentara Nabi Muhammad, 112 Bali, !M.. 302. Bandjar, 4340 £..!.lru Bandung, ID... ~ !.OO.. ~ ~ l.M..

m

gjil. ~ ~ ~ 3950 ill 4l8n ill 426n tTI1 4330 (110, Ill), 4340 (119 ), 4590 ( 52), 460n (M), 4680 m1 478n U1 4820 ~ 1Q1483n ~ 4840 (ft.l BaRjumas, 481n (M149On (gQl Banjuwangl, 321 Bantam. !M, ;E!l, 3M.. ~ 3274SOn 4670 (JID, 481n ~ 4820 ~ 4870 001 490n (20) "Bantam Report," 429n ~ Barisan Muda, l.OO. 426n lTI1 4350 (27) Barkah. 369n U1l Bassach, 4330 U!Ql Batavia, g1,. ~ ~ ~

ill..

m

m m m

rnru.

m

3.21t 33.Z.

m :H5. 426n tTI1

m

~

~

4260

4330 ill!11 4340 L.l.illl. 4S9n ~ 4660 U2l. 4870 ~ 478n ill 481n (M1 4820 til. 4840 (fi1 4870

Batu~ Hadji

m

Datuk, !:H.

(TI1 4560 Ul1 "Before the Sixth Cfn~e5s of the Com-

. intern," 489n 13BegrooUng 1924, 415n (126 ) Begrootlng 1925, 396n ~ &nlculen, m 490n (gQJ

W

"Labour S,ijles in the East Indies,"

~ 'Waarom ik heenga," 3690 ~ and Sneevliet, Ret ,"ocel Sneedlet,

m m m

m m m

!.!!;!. ~ ~ ill. ~ ~ 366n (M1 3740 Qru. 3150 UQ1 380n ml. 390n ~ ffi 394n (2Q1 401n (001 409n {1g1 4380 Qa 4620 LM1

463n 97 "Revolutionary Movement in Java," 463n (96)"Sharpening of the CIa" War in Indonesia," 4000 ( 65 ) Bericht ckr Exeklllioe der KommunlsUt-

chen IntemalionaU IS. Dezember 1922-15. Alai 1923, 421n (30 )Bericht IV Kongrefl, 41£01 ~ Belcheiden betref/cndfl de veretJniglng 'Sorflkat lJam,' 360n ~ &suki, 481n (M149On (20) Bliltlge 1925, 425n (75 ) Bi;ltlge Sttmorang. 4240 (61). Binnenlands Bestuur, a, u 455n illl Blanquf. Auguste, 431n ( 94) Bloc within, g2, ~ !Qg,

:rn.

!M..

~

~Ml.~mMfLm~ m.~352

Blumberger, CommllnUt, 361n ~ NatiorlaJlst,365n ( 51)Bodfoneguro. 467n ( 3.2) Boermer. BoLsheoih, 404n ~ Bogor, 418n (1) . 433n illQl. 434n (119), 46'7n ~ 4900 (20) Bollheoi.ring thfl Commllnlst International, 462n ( 80)Bond van Minder Marlnepersoneel (Association of Noncommissioned Naval Personnd) , 366n (63) Borneo, 461n 001 488n (Ml; see also Pontianalt Boulie, 426n lTIJ: Bourgeoisie, L ~ ~ lm. ~ !U. !Yl. t;ID. 13.2 Boycott. 4900 !..Nl Brandsteder, ~ ~ g.@. ~ 368nW Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank. Documentary History, 387n ( 26) -

m

m

Bre~, 182

Brotosuhardjo, 3910 (60) Brouwer, Houdlng. 380n ~ Budi Mulill., 183

494

Index Budi Utomo, !.Q'L !Q!!. ~ ~ lQ 1M. l.5Q. l.M.. lOO. !1.1

uru.

m

~

1M.

~ 38ln 3930 lTI.1401n (M147On 4IIn (M1417n lli!1. 4240 (67) Budlarto Martoatmodjo, i l l BUW5Utjitro, ~ ~ ;rut ~ 3940 LOO1 3960 (A1 4310 (96), 4340 (118), 4430 (§.11 4520 '-1Ml. 4540 t.ru. 480n {M1 463n UM.1 47lo L!!1 4720 LTIU.

m

474n

Chen Chun-ming, General, 7B Ch'en Tu-h.slu, 'I§.. 387n (26) China, 1.., 'Z§::Sl ~ ~ ~ g§Q, .J:M.. 384n 388n ~ 488n (88) Chinese example, ~ ~

m

rnu.

m

~

4750

m

~

4760

~

4820 (n1486n ( 69) V cliog. 3930 (77 ) · Bukera. 4820 ( 37) Bukbara, l.O3. Bulcharin, Nikolai, ~ ~ 3770 ~ Bureaucracy, Indonesian, !li h:C also Prijajl Bureaucracy. Netherlands Indies, ue Binncnlands Bestuur Bmink, C . van, ~ 2,2;1 3660 lOO1 3830 {M1 390n (M1

m

Canton, M, ~ 21'l Canton Bureau, $CC Comintcm Canton Conference, see Pacific Tmnsport Workers Conference Capitalism, ~ ~ ~ 00. ~ !H.. llrr. ~HO ~

national.

Kginful," ~

M. !.Q;l, !Q1, !M, 131 31. ~ §§, M. 11.3

uu.

m m

m m

mm

33'l

m

m

m

Chinese minority, H !!M. ~ 447n ( 120). 44& ( m 139 ). 490n

[W Christianity, ~ l.O4 Cluwen, 375n UQJ Cock Buning, W. de, "Politieke Stroomingen," J63n (32.) Colijn, !:L.. 45Sn UQ1 Comiotern. 1, !. gg, ~ ~ SQ. g, g ~ 71. ~ ~ lli. ~ 1M; $ee also ECCI Amsterdam office, ~ 2.35 Berlin offiee, l65. ~ 2.3.5. Canton Bureau, Colonial Bureau, ~ ill Eastern Section, TI!. ~ ~ ~ 431n tru!1 449n ~ 458n (40 ). 476n c..!Nl Far Eastern Bureau, Th ~ 2.03. PKi affiliation with, ~ 'M Comintern congresses 61"$t (1919 ), ~ 57 second ( 1920 ), ~ ~ 'll... Th-m. ~ !M. l.ll. 377n {l!J third ( 1921) , TL ~ 1m 1M fourth (1922 ), ~ 1M..

:m.

m m m

a.

m m

Careem, 426n (11l Carpentier Alling, lOB 2113 Carr, Bohllcolk Revolution, 3760 {19)fifth ( 1924 ), ~ ~ 200, Celebes. J2.. 4550 U!1 400n (gQl; see m458nOO aLro Makassar, Menado, Toll-toli sixth ( 1928) , 352. Center for Revolutionary Propagnnda Comlte Kehonnntan Bangsa-, 226 (CORP). !M. 21.2 Committee for Indies Autonomy, ill Central Leadership of the Rail and Tram Committee for Red Aid, 2.2Q Strike in Netherlands Indies, l52. Committee for Strengthening the Spirit Centrale Sarekat Islam, lee CSI of the Movement, lO7 Centralism, democratic, i l l Committee for the Support of Flood Centralism. federative, 3.JO Victims in China. 447n ( 125) Centrists, 21.. 28 Committee of Supporters of the IndoneCentrosoiuz. 198 sian Republic, 3:M Ch. E. "Erste Kongress," 402n ~ Committee of the Revolution, ~ Chalifate, Turkish, 56 4830(49) Chmnberlain, Houston Stewart, 63 "Commulli.mI C," 363n (32)Chang Chi, 385n Wll Communist International, IIeC Comlntem Chang Kuo-t'ao, 385n 387n (gill Communist Manifertc, 1.9l Chang Tal-lei, ~ 385n QQ1405n ~ . Communist Party of Holland, 'ce CPH Cbartism, 19 Communist Party of Indonesia, see PKI Chaudry, Indonesian Struggle, 364n Communist University of the Toilers of (45)' China ( Sun Vat-sen University) , Chaulfeursbond Indonesia, 461n ~ .200. 436n 00

mm

m

m

uu.

495

Index Communist University of the Toilers of the Fllr East ( leUTY ) . 200 Concentration of People's Liberation Movements (PPKR ), ~ ZQ, !Q1 ~ 379n (M1. 411 n (94) Con!,rres! of Muslim Toilers of Russia an d th e EI\Sl: 51 Congress of the Peoples of the East, first, @. l..@. 131 Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, 404n (31) Congl'C55 ofiIle Toilers of the Fi r East, nrst, ill. ~ 399n ~ 405n rul Cooperatives, 1M, 211 CORP, 6CC Center for Revolutionary Propagancla Correspondence, restrictions on, 20J Corvec, 2. a2. ~ 372n (.gQl, 431n UQl1 445n ( 106) , 4 86~ Coster, B., 369n U!.138ln 64 382n

m m

rn

1MJ

Council for Action and Propaga rnl a for the Peoples of the Ea$t, ~

m

202

CPU (Communist Party of Holland ) , U. 1§, ~ !.Q§. ill.. ill. 1M.

m.

mm.mgoo,~m~ goo, ~ ;HL 452n (185),

m.

488n (2) Cramer, cfi':;"""31 Kolonlalc Politick, 367n (79) Credit Action, 4S3n ~ C. 5 .• "Het S. L congres." 374n (32) "0" den tweesprong," 372n (22) CSI (Centrale Sarekat Islam ), 2l. gg, ~ ~ M. :IT. ZQ, 84-86, ml.

ru.

21. rm. lQg, ll1'i ill. 1M, ~ ~

m

W!. ~ 2M. 36.5n 47 369n Uti. 446n ( 110 ), 447n H20);

"c cI.fO Sarekat ISJam CSI conference, September 1920, ~ CS I congresses 1916. 20 1917, 2J:2.5 1918, :rr. M.. !H. m 370n (ill 191 9. 11. ~ m 372n (iQ.)

March 192 1, 00. !@. !M.. ill October 1921. 102-105, ~ l.la. llB February 1923, 143-146, 412n 0(0)

DaMan.

~

tN.l:

m

~

4860 {ll1 487n

a

Damno, 3Z. ~ ~ ;n, .fi. ~ 12 ~!M..26. l..OO.. liS. m

!R li!Q. ll!:f. !E lit. 202.,

mm

mm

lli. 2.1l, ~ ~ gzQ, 29:4, m~mm§~m 3630 {M1 369n l!l1 3700 (!g. lID. 3750 (JQl. lOOn {E1 39 1n

goo.

m

m. m

~ 3920 (1Q1 (ggl. 440n 57 457n 20 ( 931. 4850 59 "Lage der Yo

om

3930 00. 4370 4430 (M1 448n 4600 00. 473n 4900 il11 g Indonet-

iens," 463n (97) · DDwn, The. ill Dawud, 47& ill Decentralization Law of 1900, ~ Degras. Communirt International, 4SOn ( 147)· Dekker, Harry, 1M. gQt 366n ff!ru. 441n (651. 458n 00 Dengah. J. C., Ia. ~ ~ 375n

m

m

l!Q1

a

.

Department of Intern ationnl Propaganda lor the Eastern Peoples, .5i DepcC$.'iion, ~ ~ 138 Depression committees, M1 DtTck natlcnaDl Congru , 370n ~ De.rim'let l'rojintema, 441 n (57) · Detention, preventive, 4:59n Digul concentration colony, m 4900 (gQ) Dimyati, Sedjarah, 398n (35) Dingley, 5 .• 221 Peasant,' Movement, 419n (9.) Discipline, party, ru!. 2:!L !.QQ. ID2, 1M, ~ l.M. !1l. ~ ill. ~ 393n

m

1m

"Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zlnoviev." 452n ~ Diogo! Djagol. 115 DjaJadiningral: Hasan, ~ 369n illL 370n U'D D}am'ijat Ansaru1 H:ullmain. 420n (23) Dlonm, 2'l6 Djember, 49On (20) OJenain, Sutan, 478D ( 1) Djepara, ~ ~n tlli!1 467n ~ Djoehana, "HiStory of the Indonesian National Movement," 403n ~ DjojoboJo, 1M.. 426n (1§l Djokosuwamo, 4090 (70) Djuara, 483n tID Djunaedi, 433n U!Ql DO ( Double Or£antzation ), ill. ~ ~ 4Bon (Ml. 484n ~

m

~

R

~

, ~

"Doloi tClTor v IndonC%ll," 472n ( 84 ) -

496

Index

n

Douwes Dekker, E. F. E., l§. ~ ~ ~illm~~363n 33 380n (53) EMtem, 453n (194)-

ECCI, [l. ~ 'ffi. 337 manifesto on rebellion, 341 ECCI sessions July 1922, 8.1 November 1922, 1BQ June 1923, !§;1205. July 1924, Z68 March 1925, goo, 3f4n (313) February 1926, ~ 2B8 November 1926, ~ 351 Eiduss, Ch., i l l Elections, gl, ~ ~ 11 i l l ill ~ 381n (J!§l; see also Pa rliamqntary action, Town councils, Volksraad Engels, Friedrich, 52 England, see Great Britain Enver Pasha, 403n u.gj Ethical Policy, ~ 2. !.L !b !.!. ~ 1Q.. 11 ~ ~ !lQ, -lM. 456n

mm

m

m

ill!

Eudin Bnd North, Sooiet RIlSSio, 376n ~

Eurasian minority, ~ !Q§.. lAB European minority.

Fonds Korban Kemerdekaan, 368n (6), 444n (98) FOR (People's Education Fund) 433n lli!l.. 435n Uill Foreign aid, m m 369n (§1 443n ffim. 473n (92); sec aOO InternaUonal Red Aid From the Fourth to tire Fifth World Congretl, 438n ~ Front, anti.imperialist, 280 3l.9 Front, national, Fu Ta-chi"g, 449n (142)

m

Gandhi, !J..g. !..H. ~ ~ gg§. 380n ~ Garut, 1!!.. '!1., 434n ~ Gautllerot. Bolchooinne, 436n ~ Gelleime actie, 482n (39) Ceheime versiag, -1700 ( f!1). Gemeen teraad, see Tov.'Il councils ~ !M, 376n l!.[l Germany, "Gewcrkschaftsfragell," 406n ~ Golx:-e, Kart versiag. 412n ~ Gocnawan, Semaocn, 402n ~ Gondojuwono, ~ J.aa. ~ 424n (§11 426n tTI1 461n (1!1 472n

m

m

IW

Gorky, Maxim, 375n W Government policy, 8.. !l. ~ ;H.. ~ 00. ~ 108-110, rn l.l2. m

U. W. ill.. g !H.. L

~

il, J.g,

"'1.152 European party members,

H.

W. ~

m

~

IT..

gl,gg,g2,;'!La;t~~1!!,~ ~!ll.§g,§,i.7Q..-rg,~~22.

!OO. J4;l. l.2[. !M.. 128

Exccutif, 402n (79) Executive Committee of the Revolution. 483" lfl.l: Extraparliamentary action, l43. Euhegodnik Komintcrna. 361n ~

~

m mm um.

;m, :u.Q.. .ru!.

~

368n 416n (132), 4590 (11 4700 4790 01.1 4900 tgQl; Ule also Ethical policy; Rights, civil; Rights. extraordinary Governor Gcneral'$ conferences July 1922, J01 September 1924, 259' February 1925, Z9fl "Governor General's Report," 441n (60) -

M. ~ 98

Fachrudin, Hadjl. Fascism, 2TI. 2llli.

m

2.99

Federasi Kaum Buruh Transport, 2T1 "V. World Congress of the Communist International," 452n (191) Fimmen, Edo, m 2.Sl Five-man system, 305 Fock, Dirk, Governor Genera1, !.Q!t. !lQ, ill ill!. 00 lJli.. ~ ~ ~ 372n (gQl. 488n W FOISO (sarelcnt Islam Education Fund). 433n U!!l

m

m

m

m m

Graaf, Simon de. Minister of Colonies, ~ Am. ill.. 258. Graeff, A. C. D. de, Governor General, J55. 488n (!1 Creat Britain, !IT. i l l Gresik, 467n ~ Guber, A, A., 435n W lndone=iia, 400n (56)"Izuchenie istorii,'" 376n ~ "Natsional'nQ-(lsvoboclitel"noe dviz henie," 412n (10UGunawan, ~ gg'L ~ 395n ill. 397n 01.1 4100 LTI1 426n m1. 433n l!!QJ

497

m

m

Index Jndie Wl.-.:rbaar, M!. g,"1 ".M., g§.. ;rr. ~ 381n (65) Indies Bureau, 2:j2 Indies National Congress, !TI.. ggft 283 Indit.'5 Revolutionary l nfonnation Service, 2:M Indische PatUj, !!. 18 IndiS<'he Vereniging, ref! alto Pcrhirnpllnan Indone
Ihlli2aai-artikclcn, see H ate-sowing ar· ticles Hadi1cusumo, Kiai Hadji Tubagus, .!H.

ill Hadj Committee. 116 HlUJlid Sutan, ;}M. 484n (51) Handel/ngen 2e Kamer, 372n (22)lIandeUngen Volbraad. 367n ~ Hartogh. J.. 48-51, !!;!. 'll. ~ 369n Ul1 375n l!Q1 376n 3810

m m

o.a

Iffi

"Jaarvcrslag 1917-18," 3620 (29) "Oru vierde laar," 369n ~ "Wensch," 3'730 ~ Baron Rasjid , 426n m1 427n (Ml Hate-sowing articles, 4540 Hattn, Mohammad, l l i Hayashi, Ken, 444n (100) Hazeu, C. A. J., !!. ll!!t 4560 U!l Hcerendiensten, ;reB Corvee Hdler, Leo, gQ§. ill ?M.. 441n

221 Indonesian Study Club, 2Bl Indramajll, 467n (32) Inlandse A1gemeene Politiebond ( Native General Police Association),

un

~408n ~

Inlandse Douaneband, 4BOn ( 65) Institu te of Living Asian Languages, llI9: Insulinde, !£ li!. g!!, ~ ;g ~ ~ !'Q, I !!1, 68--70, 3Bln !..M, !&1.; tee I al.so Sarekat Hind ia Intellectuals, gQ, gg, ~ aL ~ 2.12. International, Asian, 403n 00 International, St.'COnd (socialist) , 2-5, 16, 46 Intern ational, Third, sea Comlntem Internaliont' Ararian Institute ( MAl ) , 4440 102 International Council of Trade and Industrial Uniol1$, 440n lSS.l International Debating Club, 115 International Lenin University, 200 /ntcn wliollol Preu Correspondence ( In·

m

"P~k-Konfcrenz," 439n ( 44 ) -

'Trade Unions Conference of the

Pacific Ocean Cou ntries and the Labour Movement in the Far East," 442n (79) "Zur Ccwerkschaftsbewegung im as-

len," 4150 ~ H erojuwol'lO, 332. ~ 471n l1!1 478n 48 1n ~ 483n ~

m

m

m

4840 lQQ.. ill "Het tiende jaarcongres," 3780 (35)1Iet V rije W oord. ill !L ;}5. ~ 22. ~

203.

3620 (25)

Hinloope:n Labberton, D. va n, ill. !m!. 4SOn ( 150) "Hlstoire du mOllveme nt syndicaliste Indonklenne," 417n ( 146)Ho Chi Minh, 220. ~ i l l 1I.0 .S., 3630 (36) Hu Han-min, 2m: HUrwicz, Ole Orlentpolillk, 376n ~

prccorr ),

zoa.

386n (20 )

m

Int ernational Red Aid, 1m!. 443n ~ 444n (98) I nternational Transport Workers' eration (tTF), m m International Union of Oppressed ples of the East, 2.23

m

3lJ. Fed· ill Peo-

Illtcrnationale Gewerbclwftsbewegung In den Jahren 1924-1927, 441n

Jderna, Parlem entalre, 360n ~ l denburg. A. W. F., Governor General, U~355

Imperialism, I.:::i. ~ 55. Income, see PKI finances. Sarekat Islam finances India, 380n (56) IlIdi,1n National Congress. ~ ug, 114l.l§.. l.iZ. ~ ~ 3970 1..!Q. 39Bn ( 27 ), 447 n ( 114 ), 463n l!Ml

m

Indw een hel, 366n ( 65)-

(68) -

I ntefnationn/eT So;:;iaUrten-Kongreu.

359n tru Internationalism, fli. !'Q, 00. 1.0:3. ~ ll!O !PO. 367n ( 74 ) IRA, lee In ternational ned Aid i SMCS. Tragedy. 386n (20) ISDP (Indies Social Democratic Party) , ~ f!Z. 62, 'ill. S5.. !!!. ilL ~ ~ l!13. m 393n m1 411n

"Indie los van Holland," 233

(93)

498

Index ISDV ( Indies Social Democratic Association) conference (December 1918), i9 ISDV congresses first (1914) , ~ ~ M.. 58 second ( 1915) , 16 fifth (1918) , ~;M!.. ~ 62 sixth (1920 ), ~ ~ 50 Islam, 'L !Q.. m gQ, §;!. M, ~ ~ ~ M. BS. 00.. ~ 00. ~ !QQ. 114M ~ JAg, H1. ~ l1Q, 3!ll, 393" rn1 419n (11 430n ~ 455n l!!J Soviet ropport of. 111 IJam Bergerak, 113 h lam dan Soclall$me, 142 Islamic Communism, l1l. ~ 424n ~ 455n Oll Ismael. Hadji, fQ.. 4.l L£.R. au Iraooa 1924-1928, 441n (61) lIT, ree International Transport Workers' Federation M!. I wa Kusumasumanbi, 4440 (102), 486n (68)

m

m

m

m

"Jaarvergadering Indische S. D . A. P.," 374n (38) "Jaarvergadering S. D. A. P,," 3140 (39)Jabja, 47ln {1!l Japan, !ll.. 6i. a2.. ~ 315 Jatim, 47lo L1!l Java, 'L ~ 2.!l Central. ~ !.1. 193 East, ~ 13 West. ~ lll6 ,ee also individual cities and districts JOgjakarta, ~ !H!.. 89. 00. lQ!,

M

ru...

J..gQ, lZL ~ li!7. ~

m

321.. m 3iL m 418n ill 426n lTI1 434n t.l.Nl. 466n

~

m

rn

W!1

4670

lMl. 482"

~ ~

478n ill 481n 4900 tgQJ:

Joogh, D. de, 21 Jongmans, E:torbitante fechten, 363n (32)-

Judohadil>Oto. 369n l!1l Jusuf, Mohammad, 3640 {1Ql. 370n U11381n (M1 4820 (37)

m

Kadarisman, ~ ~ 4SOn ill.} Kalimantan, see Borneo Kaliwungu. !.9Q, 418n ill Kamarl, 484n t§l}

Kamu, 201 Karapatan Mlnangkabau, l1!. !1Q, ll!;1 4560 till Kannani, 328

Kartawirja,

K.,

4260

tTIl.

4330

li!Ql

Ko.rtooalTIlarojo, 409n (1Ql Kartosubroto, 3140 00 Kasan, Mohammad, ~ 3810 (64) Katayama, Sen, ll!Q, 444n UQQl. 4640 ( 102) Kaum abangan, $e(! Abangan Kaum p utman, ~ Santri ' Kautsky, Karl, 1.. ~ 1lB Keadilan, Osman gelar Sulan, 478n ( 1) Kebumen. 4340 t!.!i} Kediri, ~ !!L !fQ, !a, ~ ~ 461n lli1 4660 L.ffi1 4670 ~ 478n ill 4810 (M1 4870 lffI1 490n (20) Kedu, 12. 400n (20) Kemal Ataturk, .M!!. !§L 4040 (20), 419n (ill Kendal. 418n ill Kern, SChetl, 4250 (13)Kertosono, 4330 ill!.1 4340 L!.!!U leho TjUD Wan, 2.26 KinleJan, 433n (Ill) Klalcn, 4340 L.l1.i1 4670 ~ Koch, D. M. C ., ~ !.§Q. 416n ( 131) Batfg Jot, 3590 ~ Om de or/iheld, 3620 ~ Verantwoording. 3610 ~ ICol, H. van, 1. [, 3590 " Kongressmand," 3930 ~ Koordenoordt, W. A. van,

m

m

m

m

m

m «On

(57)

Korea, 129 Korl verslag l'eknlongan, 4870 (74 ) · lernan, g, 3750 UQ.) Kraksaan, 4670 ~32~ Krawang, 4670 32 Krestintcrn, ggQ, 4440 ( 100) Kudu5, 4640 (gJ KUD, Bda, l.2.B Kung Tan Hwee KOlin. 447n l.!.1ru Kuomintang. 7L TIt ~ ~ gM, goo.. ~ ~ 385n l!Q1 4480 (137) Kusnogunoko, 460n (M1 47ln ~ 4830 ~~ KUTV, ,ee Communist University of the T Dilen of the F af East Kwa, Dr. Tjoan Siu, 335.. 339. 4840 (56) K weekschoolbond, l49

4W

m

m

mm

Index Labor federat;ons, fg, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ aQ. g[l; ICe abo PPKB, PVII, RVe Labor unions, Q. gQ, 1.1 ~ H. &l. !IT. 00. 19Q, zg, 3730 ~ 4080 ~ 4140 ~

~~~W.J76n ~W.

m

mn

tg§]. 403D U!U uerboek ooor de arbeldfn'.rbewegfng, 4520 (185)-

m m m

Leftism,

00. 1M.

Leiden, !.OO. ill

460n ~ 487n !.ml automobile drivers and mechanlCll.

mm

441n (68)

Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen, 385n (10)Lenin, V. 1. ;1 ~ 0. 1.. aQ. 55--M. 60.

~lUoUoABBH

w.§1.~~m~m. w.. 3780 44 .rosn 4060 (!!1447n ( 124 )

communications workers, Ie#J Sarekat

~

Postel

customs officials, see Inlandse Dou-

anebond machinists, #e Saubt Bumh Dengke! and Sankst Buruh Bengkel dan Elektru metal workers, 138 miners and oilworkers. 6(Je Seribt Burub Pelikan Indonesia pawnshop worken, _ PPPB plantation workers, see AdidamlO, PerkumpulaD UntWc Kaum-Bunlh Ondememtng Gula, PFB, PKBO. PKBT, SBG, SKBO policemen, lee Inlandse Aigemeene Politiebond printers. let Sareb.t Bumh Tjetalc

National L/beralion Movemm' In the E.4rt, 359n ~ Liao o.ung-bi, 443n @. 446n

(114)

m

Liberalism, !!. !.OO. 110 Lieblcned!t, Karl, !!.;!. 4470 (124) Limburg 5tirum, J. P. graal van, Governor General, ~ ~ t!. 69. 12.

00.

~ ~ 3670

tm1 370n Ml

Lith, F. van, 46711 (Ml Uu Jen-ch'ing. l.SIb.l.59. LfwnUy. 3BSo (jj LocomDt/ef. 3610 tu1 Lombok, 1M Lozovsky, G., 406n (37)

!M. 447n

public $el'VRnts, _ Verbond van Inlandse Landsdienaren

Lw:emburg. Rosa,

public works employees, lee VIPBOW rai1w rken, we Staalsspoorbond ,

M. A., .. Arbeiterbewegung In Inooneaien," 4420 (77)Madiun. HI. l..4j. !f1 ~ W, lB2., ~;m, m:}fi. ai3. 418n W. 4330 Ol!.l. 4341\ illil. 4670 ~ 478n ill 48In (l!1 482n

Vrn

seamen and dockers,

lM. ill

&eC

~

m

461n

aOO PKBP, Sarekllt

Kaum Bumh Pelabuhan, SBME, Sorilagu. SPU, SPPL

(124)

tm49On~) Madura, 490n 20

tcachet'S, sec PGHD teachers training school employees, _ Kweehchoolbond transport workers, 2Tl . Labor Unions, Revolutionary Socialillt

Madure:lenbond, 46In (65) Magas, l.TI5 Mag1~t ~ ~ 4Bln Wl. 4821'1

Federn.tion of, 43 Lunpoo~ ;m ill1 '9On l!!ll Land m onn, ~ 74. Land.lea.!lng, 2D.. 431n l!Q!1 445n

Mah~Sitjintjin, ~ iH!... -425n rnl.

M~~r- Ml1mI.d getal Sutan, 482n

'65.

l!OO.1

446n (110)

Lands, scignorial. lO8 Langsa, 426n (111 434n L.lW LaUef, SJahbuddin, ~ 374n ~

3950 £.H} Leadership, Q, 63.. ~

482n ~ 484n U!Q.

.

as. ~ ru.. 2il l2!!. 1M. ~ m 308. 429n tM1

430n 00l. 4340 !..!ill League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression, 22& League ror the Liberation of the Eut,

ill 486n

(73) MAl, &ee International Agrarian Insti-

tute MAIHS, 42011 {g,'tl Makassar, l.IH, ~ ~ 426n (77), 4341'1 L!lru.. 4780 U1 4810 @!} AifllalD etlttiklQpedilD, 364n ( 415 ) 10 Mllab, Tao, lO3. !QL l.lH.l.I, 121_ !M. 1M. ~ !.M.. Ll9, lS5, !f!Q. ~ !!!:1. ~ ~, .w, gga, ga .2.53,

500

m

m mmm

Index Maiaka, Tall (CQlljinued ) ~mmmm.n§.,m

m

~

394n U!Q1 397n ~ 398n @ 401n ~ 4070 .(!11 420n (24), 435n (122), 447n (124), 449n I..!m 454n uu, 474n \.M1

480n (g.!il,481n !..1!1482n (11.1 484n @1 485n (54) DP I. 397n (22 ) -

"Gewerkschaltsbcwegung,» 374n (31))Massa Actie, ~ "Mijn VeIbanlling," 398n (27)N(J(Jr de "Republiek-Indonesia," ~ Semangat Maeda, 475n ( 100)Toendook,395n ( 95 )Malaya, 449n (l42 )

Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, 230 Manchuria, 129 Manglmcun Sati, Datuk, 425n (n1481n (36) "Manifesto of the E.c.c.L on the Insurrection in Indonesia," 4880

m

ill'

m

Manila, 481n tM1 48511 (54) Mansuar, 4880 ~ Mansur, Hadji, 420n (23) Mansvelt, W. M. F., "Onderwljs en Commullisme," 429n ~

m

MlUlUIlsky, D., Mao Tse-tung, 52

489n

W

Mara Sutan, 3660 ~ Marah, 482n GIT.l Marco Kartodikromo, l!!. 362n ~ 427n (M143On (Q!1 411n @!l. 47Zn lI!1 478n ill Mardi Busano, l13 Mardiku n, 409n (:m) Mardjohan. ;!OO. ;!Q'[, ~ 389n t1!!1 480n (MJ Maring, "Mouvement," 362n ( 21)Nlederliindisch,382n (23 ) OCkOl1Of7lische, 382n t!.§r: ace also SneevHet Marsudi, 400n. t§l1 481n Gill Marsum, 434n U!.§l Man, Karl, !.~!Q!. 1M, 447n ( 124 ) and (nfeu, Selected Writing", 359n

m

••

Masduld, KJ, 32l Medan, ~ 426n {111478n

ill 48ln (34) Medon Moe"limin, 113 Megas, 482n lTIl Meijer Ranneft and Huendcr. Oll(ier-

zoek, 364n ~ Mcnado, 4901.\ J...gQJ Merdeka, l18 Messianism, !M. !§Q, ~ 426n {1§l

!M..

~

m

MezhdUfl4rodnce profdvi:heflle 19231924 gg., 41Sn (129 ) Military COllege for Asian Studies, l.99. Miller, ~ 485n ( 55) Minute!, 470n (56)Misbach, Hadjl, ~ ~ ~ !.§1 rrg, 3720 (gQ1 4240 {1!1 426n (111. 4300 ~ 4310 ~ 456n

m

lill

Modjo, Kjai, 1M "Mochammadyah," 425n ( 73)Mohammedan Central Commissariat, 51 Moluccas, ~ ~ 490n (gQl; see olw Sula Islands, Temate MQPR, see Intemational Red Aid Morocco, 3J.5 Mu'alimin movement, ,l1;t ;!!Q, m 479n l!1l Muchsin, 478n (1) Muchtar, 433n lli.QJ: Muhammaddijah, ~ !!.!. ill ill gsQ, ~ 424n 1..[[1 463n ( 96) Muis, Abdul, ~ M. ;H. g ~ @.. 'Q, ~ ~ !Ql. lQ,'!, !..H. ~ l4Q, ~ ~ ~ ,368n tll. 370n L!.!!. !!!1 372n '-lli.1 388n ~ 390n {g1 395n (J!Q, 397n tm.1 451n u.M1 456n Ul} Multidass alliance, l.29 Multidass party, 8l.::82. Munster, C . J. van, ~ 454n l[l "Background," 4710 ( 70)Musso, -!!. ~ ~ goo..

m

m

m

m

m

m

m

~ ;nQ. :;t!§.

m m m .:m.. m

mm~~363o~

39In @1 426n tTI1 430n U!Q1 4330 (M. no>. 460n (1!1 471n ~ i l l 473n U!Q1 4740 ~ 47511 l!.!ID.. 476n ~ 1171. 479n t!!1 481n (1!. Ml. 482n (J1.1 485n ~ !W.. ill 486n um, 4900 UTI Prinuditel'nyl trod t) [ndone:U, 4filn ~ Mu:nling memorandum (mudkOTf clrculalre ), 399n ~

Nadere 1927, 465n ( to ) Najoan, 0 ., ~ 374n

501

m

~

390n

Index

m

Najoan, O. (continued) (g1 3940 ~ 395n (J!Q1 4370 (M1 472n (1!1 418n W Nan Yang [South Seas] Communbt Par-

Youth ), i l l 465n UU OprichUng oon contra-oereenlgfngen,

Narbi, 482n ( 37) N AS (NationifLabor Secretariat), 4430 (91" 488n W Nationa amunittee, MIT. ilL ~ lld Nationalism, 'L ill. ~ ' ;m.. M. ~ 58-61. ~ 00. rrr... 'm. 'J1, ~ lQ3,

~chel

.,. 230

a.

ill.

~

!M.

m

~~~355

ITL

~ ~

"NationalistiJche beweging," 3790

(52)NeTotja, ;IT., ~ 370n (![) NeutraIi&eering, 3640 (45 ) · ~ l.33 New Sarekat Raqat (5R-Batu) , !TI.. 4260 (77) Ngadino. 409n (70)

46Sn~

Or. S.. '·Een mooie vergadering,M 3790

LID"

(66)~

m !M. ~ 4330 ill!l Ngawi. m 4670 ( 32)

Ooorzlcht SWK, 42811 (86)Pacillc Transport Worken Conference, goo.. ~ mm.,m~m m m 427n {M143911 ( 37)

Ngandjuk,

Uill ill!2

Ngrambe, 4330

Nias Island, m 3.2'l "1923-lndonesla-1924,"
m

!M.. ~ 3820 ( 66 )

Notu, 460n ~

Notowidjojo, 362n ( 28) November Promises, -m.. i l l Novyl Vo.rtok, 4350 NTAS (Netherlands Transport Workers' Syndicate), 4140 ( lIS) Nur Ibrahim, Hadji r-fOIIirnmad, ~ 479n Ul1 4870 tI!l Nurut, 417n NVSTP ( Netherlands Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel ), 13

rn

um

Detdewn HindU!, ~

IJlll

!M.

~

:n. m m

Outer Islands, ffi!. 1.96 OutJawry, 464n ~ Ot;er;;icht CSI 1921, 37011 ~ Over;;lcht 1923, 40911 ~ Over;;icht 1924, 40811 ~ Ot.'erzicht 1924-15 April 1928, 420n ( 23)- . Over;;icht 1927. 422n (46 ) Overzlcht Patl, 43411 ( 116 ) Oven/dlt Retidentenconjerentie, 424n

New Economic Policy.

Ngom, 4330

l:polkoma Kom/mema, 436n

00-

!Q'l. !§1.

m

Ongko D, 471n tTI.1 48211 Q1.. 483n ( 48 ) Onraet, Singapore: A pol~ Background, 44911 (141)uO ntwerp r;eginselverklaring," 367n ( 64 ) " OPI (Organization of Indonesian

PaciSe war, 1.2£ 311 Padang, M!. 43411 ( 118, 119 ), 481n (M1 482n (38) Padang Pandjang, 482n (38) Padoman PerlOrcirotan KommunUt Indio, 43111 (100 ) · Palembang, !.!H. 426n (11.1 46511 U!.1 490n ( 20 ) Pan-Asianism, !ll. 100

m m

m m

PandO(! Meroh, ~ ~ ~

m

452n

( 181) Pan.lnaonesianism, 440n (51) Pan·Islamism, ill 00. 'M. 00.. ~ ~ !QQ.. !M. ~ ~ !ID.. !§'l. !TI.. 379n ~ 388n (43) Pan·PaciSe Labor Co----.uerence, 4490 (142) Pan·Paci6c Trade Union Secretariat, 230 PaIl!, 4330 Uill PlU'liament, Netherlands, ~ !.!!!.

258

m

Parliamentary action, g.;!, §.. l4. ~ ~ ~ 68-74, .!!L l..l2. ~ ~ .ill, ~ ?&!; lee also Elections, Town councils, volbraad Partai Komunis Indonesia, IU PKI Partal Reglement dari P.K.I., 43111 ( lCI(W Partondo, 391n {J!gh 4.26n (11.1 431n

( 96 ) Pasundan, ~ !:!;!, !.1;!, 393n

I'asuruan, !ID... 4900 ( 20) Pati, 464n W

502

tTIl

Index Patjitan, 467" (32)

uru

Pavlovich, Mikhail, ~ 403n "Zadachl Vserossl.iskoi nauchnoi assoWalsii vortokovedeniia," 359n

(1)'

P. B. (Bet'gsma) "'Een benoemiog." 3Bln (64) "Het eenheidsfront in Indonesie,"
"Vakcentntlc," 374n (36) Peasant committee!, 218 Peasant International, ICe Krestintem Peasant organixatioru,

.:m.. 1!. l..e8.

al.Io Sareltat Tanl Peasan try. §., ~ !Q.. .M. ~

ggl;

/lee

~

;m.

~

~Q1,~~'ffi,~~~M..

~m!M.~m~&ee

al$O Agrarian activi ty. Sugar dis-

"""

PEB (Politica1-Economlc Association), !£l.. 393n lTIl, 413n ( 109) Pe1calongan. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 466n 19 478n l!1 481D (M1 4820 ~ 483n ~ <00n (20) PembeT01Ittifiin NopemlJe, 1926, 425n (73)Penolong lster:i Korban Pergembn, 444n

m

m

(98)

Pcnolong Kaum Buruh, ggQ, 444n (98) People's parties, 265 People's schools. $U Sekolah Rakjat Perhhnpunan Indonesia, ~ ~ ~ ~ 398n ~ 473n ~ Ice a1ao lndi5chc Vereniging Paringafan, 398n (34) · Perkommind, ~ 212. PeikuIIIpulan Radja, ~ Pcrlcum pulan Untuk Kaum-Buruh Ondememin g Cub ( Association for Workers on Sugar Ertates ), 4BIn

m

llil

Pcrpatih, M. A. A., 42.5n t73 ) Perserikatan Buruh Pelilbu an dan Lau· tan ( H a rbor ane!. Sellmcn'~ Associa. lion) . 461n IT!.)

Perscrikatan Kommunist di India, ~ 374n (42) Pertlyi ,"~36 1n (16) · Peroyi ,~ezd fIOWJOilVostOka, 403n (15)· PFS (sugar workers' union). ~ ~ ~ !QI1!.Qg,~138

strike, QO.....94. ~ 390n (54) PeHS (Netherlands Indies Teachers'

Union), H9

m

m

PhHippines, goo. ;n§.. ;H§, 439n L11.1 44On (51), 447n ill.1.1 474n ~ see o~fanIla Philippines, Communist Party of the. m 440n (152) "PhUlps," 79 Piatii kong ren, 458n (36) · PKBO (Estate Workers' Association) .

'"

PKBP ( Harbor Workers' Union) , 2'1ll PKBT ( Workers' and Peasants' A~a· tion) , ~ ~ 168 PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia ), 6fi. rut !QQ, ~ !1!!. .w!. 374n (igh 381n (59) agrarian program. 22.2 ('Onstitution, 188 finances. ~ ~ g§!, m m ~ 368n (ru, 443n t211 444n (98), «8n ill!1 468n lfll. 470n (M1 478n illl membership, gg, M. ~ !OO.. !M. .I1ill. !m., M!. ~ 364n (.M. 46), 365n (g1369n ~ 370n l.!ll 374n ~ 390n {M1 395n Oill., 409n ~ 413n illQl. 428n @'il. 429n 433n '-1.00.1 452n t!.!M1 45911 (g1 4790 00 name, ~ 50-51, 374n ~ Netherlands bureau, goo, 242. organization, l.M. ~ goo, 434n ill§l program of demands, ~ 62

m

m

m

m

uru.

m

m

sell /11.$0

m

mm

m

ISDV

PKI conferencel ~mbcr

1924, ~ gg ;rn!. 316

mm m March 1925, 298

m m

June 1925. 291 December 1925 ( Pmmbanan confer· enee) , ~ 447n

m m

m

(lgll, 4aln ~ 483n ~

485n (54,55, 61) January 1926, 3.23 June 1926. 32B. PKI congresses May 1920 (seventh ),!§. :ill. 66 extraordinary, Ikcemoor 1920.

m

00.

71-74 95

Dcce~1921 (eighth ), !H. !1§.. ill

~Iarch

1923 ( with Red SI lo ~ ~ 43 1n (99)

Index Proletariat, g, M. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q§, @.. 'm.. §g, M. ill 1M. 408n (63); _e flho Labor federations, Labor unioru Proletariat, didatorship of, Q1, l.2.6 Protokoll. 489n ~ Protokoll N Kongreu. 411m ~ PSI (Sareka t Islam Association) , 115-

PKI congresses (continued) June 1924 (ninth) , ~ ~ 4340 (118) PKI e.J:ecutive meeting (September 1924) , .2Bl

rn

F.X.l. ke-Dua, 4720 (Ml PKT ( Peasants' Association) , 42Pouoka V5TP, 4070 (55)-

Polit/ek politloneel overz/cht, 436n

~

lid

Politlek verJag 1926, 4250 ~ Politlelr. verslag otJe1' 1926 in het gewesl Samarong. 460n (62)· Polit/eke nota PKl, 420n (2.13) Pooorogo , l'M Pontianak, !M. 4260 LTI1 490n {gQ} Populism, 4840 (@ Porojltno, 42 PPKB (Concentration of Labor Unions),

PSI (Sarekat Islam Party ), 141_142. 144-145, l.M. lfI'l Puger, 467n 00 Purwo1c:erto. 418n i11426n l'l11 433n (lU)

Purworedjo, 434n

pvn

~mmm409n(1g.~

~~~ID.,~~ !Q!,~ !Q'L lll.. ~ l2l. ~ 389n {11l, 3940 3950 (90)

4170 (147)

uru. m

PPKR, .ree Concentration of People's Liberation Movements PPPB (pawnshop workers' union) , ~ ~ 1.21. m 19Q, l¥.!t 137 138, ~ 3950 U!Ql. 400n tMl. 460n (W Prambanan Conference, ue PKI conferences, December 1925 Pmpto, S., 478n (1) Prawiro5arojono, 430n (jQ1 460n (M147On U!gj Pra'NOto Sudibio, 370n U11 Press, liQ. ~ 1M. l1S.. ~ ~ 399n 426n (77) Priangan, 1Q. a:t lil. l.m. ![!. m m m ~ 341--342. ;M!, 4670 ~ 4790 ~ 481n ruL

m

rnm.

rnm

4830 ~ 487n !M.1 49011 Prijajl, !!. ~ !!!Q. !M.. 429n (Ml.

<>On (W

Frifzen, jndncl/fer8, 3640

~

PriDggodigdo, Setiitmm, 404n (30)· Prolfntem. m 2li!.. gM, m m 1H.. ~ 3850

Raad van Vakbonden, 48'7n (87) Rahijan, 431n (96~ Radek, Karl, ~ 36n 00 Radical Concentration, 1m. JAg, ~ 1M. ]J!;L lOO. ~ .?M. 382n 4lln ( 93) RadjapeIah, 434n !.l!ru Rahasia, 486n (70) Randublatang, 418n ill 434n £.!!!u Ran tajae1ce1c:, 418n ill Ropport t;(1n het hoofd, 458n (25) Rasad, Englcu DjomaJuddin, 478n W Ratu AdO, ill ~ 179-180. 426n COO Ravesteyn, W , van, ~ ~ ~ ~ 380n m1 4SOn (ISO ) , 4S2n (HIS) Wording, 3610 (12)Rebellion, m goo.. ~ 353 Red Eastern Labor Bureau, 208. Red Eastem Labor Secretariat, ~ 275 Red Cuardl5u, ~ .:M. ~ 3.Z8 Red Indonesian Labor Unions, Secretar3lD iat of, Red International of Labor Unions, IN Proflntern " Red" SI , 115 Rererendum, 00. 38ln 00 Regents, !Q. ~ ill 4190 W

m

am.

m m

m

m

L.!ill

(Indies Trade Union Federation) , ~la~!.i1.~lM.m.

m

4060 ~ 4380 @!1441n (68) Profintern congresses 1921 (first), m 440n (56) 1922 (second), ll!;l. 22.3 1924 ( third), 163, 252. 267 v re:.oliulsl/akh, 440n ~

mm

m

m

mm

Regeringtreglement. U III

Congre$. ka 1.2 clDn V,S.T.P. 3d. Februarl J923, 408n

Re1csodiputro. 451n (164) Rembang, in. lTI.. 481n Q!149On {gQ) Report. 418n ~ Report of lhe Asst., Patl. 473n ~ Report of the Aut. Demang. 459n (51) Report of the Attorney Geneml, 477n

504

=

Index Report' of the Resident, 468n (39)Resolutions and Theses, 4190 (11)"'Resolutions on the Report of the Eleculive Committee of the Communist International," 458n (33)Revision, constitutionaJ, i l l Revision Commission, l.l.O:dll Revisionism, H ~ U. ~ gr, ~ ~

tm

m

ru.

00,00..I.35

m

Revolution, Russian ( March 1917), g§.. liB Revalution, Russian (November 1917),

m

~~Ql,1l8

Revolution, Troclstra, ;rr, ;Q,
m

rn..

m

m m

m

rn

365n~

Roy, M. N., rul. 00,

~

6L

~ ~

!m..~mmw!'~~ g§§. ~ 378n (M1 381n (62), 3870 (g!ti, 404n (M1 464n (102), 4760 ~ 485n (58) Rnlmo Ash, 430n (89) Russia, sec Soviet Union Russian Communist Party, Central Bureau of the Muslim Organl7.ation of

the, M Russian Communist Party, 1919 congress, 56 Russian example, ~ ~ 1.3:4. Rutgers, S. J., 383n (M1 ~Indonesicho nationale howeging," 370n~

I ndonemi, 388n (38)-

Rutgers. S. L., ltknburg. 360D

Saleh, Baharuddin, ~ ~ m .;Mg, 426n tTI1 480n (M1 484n ~ 486n (73),4870 Salem, 4820 (37) SaJim, A. C., !M. 426n lTI.1 478n (I), 482n (38) Sallm, Hadji Agu!, ~ ~ ~ !ll.. 9300. M.. lQQ, llll, !m.. 1M. i l l !gQ. ~ H,g, !!IT.. ~ !TI. !.§!. ~ 3190 l1L 3700 (!ID.. 374n ~ 388n ~ 389n ~ 390n ~ 391n U!Q.. 3931t @ 395n (M1 396n Ull. 397n @ 444n (95) SaJimun, 426n lTI.1 478n

~

RVC (Revolutionary Federation of Labor UnJons), !Q!, ~ !jQ, ~ 394n (90)

Safarov, C., !@. 405n (34) Said Ali, Sutan, !§;!. 426n tTI1 4600 (54), 471n (69, 71 ) Salary Commission. ~ H9 Salatiga, !!§.. 418n ill 426n (TIl. 433n ill!.1 434n L.!N1464n 00

m m m

U1482n~

Sarna Rata Hindia Bcrgcrak, !1. 18 Samin. KijaJ, 448n ( 136) "Aufstand auf Java und Sumatra ( In· donesien) ," 448n (136)"Situation in Indonesia," 438n (30) Saminism, 116 Sams.!, 4260 (77) Samsjudin, 4780 (1) ' Somru, 3l2. Samsuri, 471n (69) Samudro, ~ 484n t§Q, ill Samyarata, 478n (1) Santos, Mariano, 440n (51) Sanlri, !Q, gQ, !1111 snnut g :n!!.. 4260 (]11 433n 110 . Sardjooo, ill ~ ~ ~ 39511 Ul. 433n illQ1 4600 tM1 471n ~ ill 472n (1!li. 474n mID. 475n ( 115 ), 476n (!!.§1478n U1 484n t@1 486n (69) Sarekat Ambon, ~ ~ 393n {TI1 463n (~) Sareht Buro Bengkel, 2I1 Sarekat Buroh Bengkel dan Eleklris (SB BE), 47111

r

m

1m

m

mm m m m

Burnh Tjetak, 4600 ~ Dagang Indonesia. J30 Dagang Islam, 8: Djin, 3i5 Hidjau, ~ ;llf, 465n ~ !11 483n (1§J Sarekat Hindia, ~ ~ M. ~ ~ lQQ, !.Q1, !.Q7. !Q§. ill u.g, ill !..U!. !M,. !.OO.. !!IT.. 393n 463n (94) Sarekat India,"M Sareknt Internasional. 14 Sueht blam, 10-12, ~ 21-22, ;H!,

Sarekat Sarekat Sarekat Sarekat Sarekat

505

m

m m

m

rrn.

-m.

Index

m

Sarekat Isiam (continucd) ~ [L 61-64, 00. 68-70, TI. ~ §l, ~ ~ M. ~ ~ ~ lOO. ill..

Seaport offices, ill Sectarianism, 51 Section B, ~ -m. !ffi. 1Q. ~ ~ 89. ~ 372n tgg1 375n 472n

m

~~m~!M.lJ!§.m

Sel:o~Rakjllt, m

~mm~mmm ~ ~65n l!11 1fe6 aIM CSI finances, ~ 91 membership, 1Q. IA6 program, 97-98, 103 398n schools. ,1,M. !.11!. ~ !1Q, ~ 399n ~ 40ln (001 409n (1'll 56rekat Illom congre.1, 1916, 363n ( 39 ) S6relwt Iriom congre!, 1917, 364n (46)Sareht Islam Party, see PSI SlIJekat Kaum Bumb Pelabuhan, 461n

m

ll!ft 435n CU7) Selosocmardjan, Social Changu In logfakarla, 372n (23 )Scmangat Maeda, 311 Semaoen, Anti IndUi Weerboar, 370n (14)" Brieven," 406n ~ Hoc hct llollondsche imperlldtsme, 41Bn (147)" Intemationale Imperialismus und die Kommuni5t ische Partei Indonesiens," 447n (125)"Mijn ~andpunt," 382n ( 72)"OndisciJ?!lnair en on-Kommunistisch, ' 390n (53)Raporon,443n (89)Sikapnja, 441n (96)Scmarang, !i. l2. ~ g-!, ~ ~ ;}Q, ;u,

m

illl

Sarekat Menado, 393n (77) Sarekat Minahassa, H3 Sarekat Postel, !Qg, ~ 408n @Q1 ~3On ~ 444n ( 99) Sarekat Rakjat, 115-116, !lIT.. ~

m

m

m

m m

~ goo. g{!l, ~ mmmm~~;ru!.

m

;rr.~~~~g,~oo.'lQ, ~ M.. !ill.. ~ ug, 116-11B, 120-122. HQ.. !M. lM.. lJ!§. !TI. llit. ~ W. ~~~~mmg:z§. ~ ~ ~;HI. ~ 3650 {ffi.

13.. 83-86,

um

~

433n 435n (122) , 471n (69) Sarclcat Sumatern, ;m. ~ 393n (77 ) Sarekat Tani, ~ ~ 446n ill.Q1 400n LMl Sarongs, subversive, ~79n U1l Sartono, 2.4l Sastrodlhardjo, 426n tTI1 Sastro.ruwirjo, 433n illQ) Sastrowidjono, 47l n ( 69) SBC (Sugar Workers' Union), m ll9. 461n (74), 47ln (61) SBME (Union of Naval Station Employen), 47ln (61 ) School of Asian Studies of the Red Anny Workers' and Pc.lsanu' Military Academy in Moscow, 199. Schools, SI, sec Sarelcat Islam, schools

rn

m

m

41Bn ill 4260 ITLl. 433n (110. !!l1 434n (118. 119 ). 4590 ~

4600 (M, SQl. 464n (!. ;u. 467n @ 47Bn l!l. 4790 Ull 4B1n @!1 482n (1;tl. 4SOn (20) Semarang Handelsvereoiging, l&. 3680 ~ Semaun, gQ, ~ ~ ~ ~ ;}g, ;H, ~ i!.. 43...46, g, M.. 'lQ, -rg, 1!. ~ M. ~ 92-94, 00. ~ !Ql. !Q;!. ~

~ !.m 1M. !M.. 1M!. H!. ~ !M. 1M.. !.SQ, !M, ~ l.M. li!Q. gQ!. m

m

!.OO... l..l&.. ~

m~mg]Q,m~m mmmm~MQ.m ~mmgoo.m~m

Schools, wild, 258 Schotman, Z1 Scbrieke, "Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," 425n ~ "Political Section," 428n ( 86 ) Reconnroclie, 4Bln ( 33) SOAP (Social Democratic Workers' Party), -!. ~ l&. lli 1..6. i t ;n. ;m.. !Q,1, ~ !.[L m 4SOn (150 ) SOAP, Indies, ~ ~ ;m.. 69 SOP (Social Democratic Party) , ~ ~ ~ 232-234; !ce abo CPH

m

~mm~~m~

~ 362n tMl. 368n (§1 389n U11 370n U§1 375n UQ1 38ln ffi11 390n ~ ill 392n (1Ql, 39~n tool. 395n (M1 397n Llitl. 399n '-1a 402n ill 404n ~ 488n (88), 489n UQ1 "Bung Tan," 398n (34)"Indiiskoe dvi;r.henie," 392n ( 70 ) Sentot, ill

506

Index Serang 51, 467n (37) Serikat Bumh Pelikan Indonesia, ~

ill

Serilagu, ~

m

461n (1!J "Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on Ju1y 17th," 386n ( 20)Setiabuddhi, see Douwes Deller

Sosrohrdooo, 1Q, Q 4:l. 1M. !M. !m,. 388n ~ 426n LTI1 Soviet Union, !. 1. 11. ~ 00. ~ . !IT.. ~ ~ !.Q;!, ~ ~ !§'L m~435nW famine In, ~ 427n

Soviet!, iil.. Ql!.

"b: btorii," 404n (2Q). 51 V, 37ln ~ S. L Portlf. 161

~

449n

m

4J4n

~

m

~

m

'-1m 446n ill.!1

474n

~

476n

4810 (Ml. 4820 ~ 484n

ill.!!1

um...

4860 LruU. 4870 rn1488n (Jill, 400n (M) Sjamsucldin, 461n {1!l SKBO (Plantations Worken' Union ), 461000

IT. l2. .?£ ~ ;!!.;M!.~1IT..oo.~'m.TLBQ. ag. a.1. [l, 1m. ill.. !g!1 lll. ~

Sncevliet, !h ~ li!..

gQ;!,mm~~mm ~m~~~363n~ 3640 tM1 3680 )66), 3680 (g, ;t

Q, 6),(amr. a ll ,3780 (33,36), 380n 57 3810 tm.1384n ~ 'L ~ 38:50 387n 001 3880 ~ 3990 (fl1 404n ~ 437n (M, gru, 438n (M1 443n ~ 450n (153), 4850 (M1 488n 00 "Het oOO<:IWendige gevolg, ~ 3640 ~ "Na oos Kongres," 369n ~ "Onze eerste 1 Mei-viering." 367n

m

~

"Toetrcciing," 362n ~ 51lOuck Hurgronje, C., 108

Soeara Merdik4, IT.. 3620 (28) Soeara Ho'i6t. !1.. !.TI!. goo.

SoenJ~/oo8Ch HQndekbkul,

m

390n

13 Soeroso, "lndonesische vakbewegmg," 389n (49)Soldiers, 29-30, Ie~ 01.&0 Red CIlardists, Soviets Sosroatmodjo, 4780 (1)

mm

1M.

~

SPU (Union of Indonesian Seamen ), ~ ~ ~ 442.0 crID, 452n O§ll SPPL ( Indonesian Seamen's and Dock;ID1, ~ ~ ers' Union) , 442n {1ll 448n (139), 449n ~ 461n {1l147Jn (67) [SRJ schools, lee QUo Sekolah Rakjat

m

m

!m. 1M. 1N. 203

Singapore. ~ ~ m

m

m

(101 ).

Sinar Hlndla. ~ ~

l.95. m

(53)

Shumiats1di. B. Z., ~ l.a3

Siam, 4040 (30) Siholga, 487n {Ml

U!:1J:

!!.§.. ~

4060 Ul1 4310 UQil, 432n (I02 ). 4840 ~ ~

SH, 401n ~

Shanghai, ~ 2D3 Shestoi rtl.J,'Jhirennyi plenum, 444n

11

m

m

SR-Barll, ree New Sarclcat Rakjat Staaupoorbond, 361n @

Stalin,

J.,

~

~ ~

!t!.

~ ~ ~

m

378n (M1 485n {IDl Stalin-Trotsky feud, ~ 34B Starn. J. C., g, -zg.. 73 Stokvi~, "Van Limburg Stirum," 371n ~ "Volwanrdig pariement," 4lln (93)SI~ateglla, 379n (44) -

Strike, general, ~ ~ !MI.. ~

'lOO.

au

m

Strikes, ~ 11. @.. ~ ~ ~ 126136-136, !ID.. ~ ~ ~ 373n @!1 4000 (Ml; #6 alm PFB, PPPB, VSTP 2&3 Study clubs, Suoogio, 426n (77)

m

m

mm

Subaknt,

1M.. !2!. 1M.

m

gm,

m

~mmmm.w!.426n 434n L!.!ll 437n (gQ,

un

m

l!1lil. 460n {M1 475n llill 48011 <.M.1 482n GITl.

44911

4860 !.m Subardjo, 33fI Sudibio, !Qg, 408n U!Q, lli 4260 !TIl Sudijollo, t l L Sibar, 424n (64)Sudiro, 1M.!11. 426n (77) Sugar acreage, restriction of, 3&39 Sugar districts, 1., ~ l4.. gQ, ;rr,. ~ ~ ~ @.. ~ ~ !.Q.,'t 371n {gQ1.

m

431n L!Q11 445n !.!.OOl. 446n ill.Q1 461n (79) Sugar syndicatf' ~ 2Q. 9.2 Sugeng,3740 36 394n (90) Sugbnan, 463n (94) Sugondo, ill

5117

H:

Index Suradi, 408n ~ 43in (96) Surakarta, Ii ll!. !!. ~ ~ ~ ~

gg:z. ~ ~ m~m~~~;m. 397n U1l. 470n 56 4nn (1ll,

Sugono, @.. ~ ~

m.lli..!Mt~mmm

m m

m

M!. 372n (jQ1 4.260 (11146On (M1 466n W!1 4670 ~ 4780 ill 4810 ~ 4820 ~ 490n (gQ) Suml Hardjomartojo, 4710 (1!l Suriasupamo, J«

4730 ~ 474n ~ 4750 ill.ID, 477n '--1m 478n U. ll. 4860 [§ID Suharijo, 4.2.

418n

Sukabumi,!§,!i!. ~ ~m395n U1 418n ill 433n (110, !!!1

ill

m

ill.!!1 467n ~ Sukamo, ~ 1M. ~ 3630 (M1 380n 4340

Surjopraooto, 42-45, ~ ~ 89-94, [L m M!7.. 3740 {M1 389n U!Q1 390n (g, Ml. 391n U!Q, ru.. 395n UMl, 4230 ( 55 ) Suroso, ~ 389n ~ 409n {1Q.

(lID Suursono, 155 Sul:endar, !.!M, ~ 394n (90), 470n (62) SukindM, These 4340 (122)· Sulcimo, ~ 400n (Ml. 4110 (1!1 Suhawlnata, ~ ;HQ.. ;H!. 4830 ~ 4840 (Ml Sula Idands, 183

m

mmm

vagi,

ill

m

Sutadi, !L 3740 00 Sutigno, ~ 470n (M1 478n W Sutomo, ~ 444n (98) Sutopo, ~ lM. ~ 4010 (65)

m

Sulawei5, see Celebes SuJeiman, 4260 LTI1 487 n (1!} Sumantri, 216

Suwami Surjaningrat, ~ 1M.. 363n Qm. 399n ~ 401n lM1 Suwamo, 431n ~ 4BOn (M1 471n

Sumatra, ~ 481n (Ml East Coast, 1M. 400n ~ 4900 (gQJ North, ~ 4260 (77)

SyndicaJism, ~ 11 4140 ~

m mm

South, 328 West. ' UL

~ ~

lli1

4870

m m

~

mJ

Tiilfgkeitsbericht

;}OO. ~ ~ ;HQ. 4260 (TIl.

45% ~ 460n

Sun Fo, 207

19~1 926,

tM1 478n U.

m m

Uill

m

University of the Toilers of China Suprodjo, 4750

t1!2

m. 3.28. m t!!ll

38),4840

478n

~

4720

IT!1

lIm 4820 00.

~~

Suraba/a, ~ lj,

!1..

gQ..

gg,

~ ~ ~

;ID.J1.-m.mg,~oo..M..!H..

!ll.

!.@.. 1M.

~ ;nQ.

too.. m m

ill ~

m

m..

~ 3910

ffiID.. 418n ill 426n (111 4330 ill114340 (!lli.119>. mo ~ 4590 (M1 460n (M1 4810 ffi1 478n ill 4810 t.;!!. 482n Q& 490n tgQJ.

m

Exekutjl)fl

der

4630 '--!ITr.

Tajib, 333 Tamar Djaja, PUlQka Indofl6rio. 3980 (31W Trio. 4040 (30) Tantin, Djamaluddin. ;m.. ~ 425n rn1 4260 (111 437n (Ml, 4820 4870 Tan Malako, ReooiuJl, 4190 (17)Tan Ping Tjiat, 448n lim 4610 t!!1 Tan Ping-shan. 2m: Tapanuli, 4900 (M1 Tarmudji. 478n ill Taskim31aja, 4340 (119) Tawalib schools, l.7H15 Taxes, ~ !m.. J4Q. 3960 00 Tedjomartojo. 3900. (52) Tegal. lliQ. ill. ~ ;HQ.. M!. 478n Ll1.. 481n ~ 482n ~ 483n ~ 486n (70) Temanggung, ~ 4820 (43) Ten-Man Leagues, 460n (60) Teo-man system, ~ 305. 4BOn

m m

mm

Sun Yat-scn, 77-80, ~ gg1, 380n ~ 3860 u.g, 4430 (82), 4470 (124) SUD Yat-sen University. see C;:::Ommunist

Sundah, 461n

4840

Kommunl.rti.Jclten IlItcrnatlQllale

11 ), 487n (87), 400n ( 20) aee aUo Atjch. Benlcu1en, Lampung. Langsa, Medan, Nias Island, Padang, Padang Pandjang, Pal· embang, Riau Islanru Sumedang. m 418n ill 433n Sumitro, 333

der

l!!..a

rnu

mm

m

m

m

. (60) "Ter orienteering." 389n ~ Temale, §!. ~ 4260 t1I1434n 119 ), 451n t!.M.1 460n

508

~

Index Temnte (contin ued ) (M1 4760 ill.!U. 4780

(87)

ill 4880

mmm

!JQ.. li!1.. ~ ~, m ~ 4820

Terrorism, !§1

"-1a

TI'ird llllcmalianui after Lenin, 4440 (100-

m..

Trotskyism, '!1!L. 33I Turkey, g M.. !!b §§.. ~ !§!. ;!Q1.. ~ 3890 ~ 421n 81

486n 70 . $88 aUo Anarchism Theses, Lenin, ~ ~ !IT.. 11 M.. ~ Th ~ !QQ. !!L m, 371n Uill,

"Uitsiag

Theses, M. N. Roy, 59::00 Theses, PKl (1920 ), 81=89 Theses, PKI (1924), m 4340 (122) Timor, !§:1.. 30.2 Tjepu, ~ m 4340 t!!m Tjiamb, 4330 ( 110, !!!.1 4340 ~ Tjiandjur. 434n ~ 4660 TJibatu, 434n ~ Tjilatjap, 4BOn (M1 4Bln Qll TjimabJ. 433n ill!1 4340 ~ Tjipto Mangunlruswno. !§.. m. ;m.. ~ Th !OO.. 363n ~ 366n ~ 3720 (.gQ1 4370 {1!1 456n U!l lief communt.mte In IndW, 3720

m

U!!J

3810 ~ 430n

uru

(22) · Tjirebon,

!M..

!§Q. ~

m :m.. m

ill 433n ( 110, !!!.1. 4340 L!!!U. 4670 ~ 478n ill ~

418n

481n (M1 4820

(70)

m

~

4860

ill 4330 l!ill U!!l

Tjitjll.Qa, 418n TjiwldeJ, 433n

Tjokroaininoto. Umar Said, ~

ill M..

~~'!!.1!~~~~M. ~rut§1,~~~!H..2§.~ !QQ. !Qg, ~ !gQ. ~ ~

rn.

~!1!.H!~~W'm ~ m ~ 363n 36 36811 ~ 3750 U!1 3820 urr.. 1Q1

388n ~ 389n ~ 300n ~

3910 (§Q. ~

m

395n

410n {M1412n

~

4080

um. 420n

(&ll. 4440 (95) MPartiJ S. I.," 410n (89)Tjohomidjojo, 3740 (36) Toemenggoeng, Geheime nota, 4250 (73)ToileT" 40211 ~ Toli-toli, '!Q. ~ 3720 (!!J Town councils, ~ ~ 1Q, 111

Traditionalism, ~ !!,

1M

l!.

~

!M.. !1!Q,

Tribune, De, 3660 @1 Troianovskii, K., 3760 (M1 3800 00 Vo.rtok'", 3760 (23) Trotsky, Leoo, ~ ~ ~ m ~ 4470 ( 124)

dec

@

Volksraadverkiezmgen,"

3830 (82)Uittreksel, 4180 ~ Uitvocrende Comne van de Revoiutie, $ee Executive Committee of the Revolution Umar,482n (37 ) Vrnar, Hadji, 471n (69) Umar Giri, :M6 Underground activities, m goo. ru ill ~ see alto DO Ungaran, 418n ill 4330 !.!ill Unioll.'l, ree Labor unions United front from above, ~ 11!. !.!..t 288. United front from below, ~ !Qg. 261 United States of Asia, 3760 ~ Utusan, 183

m m

v. Dr.-H., "Jaarvergadenog dec I.s.D.V.," 375n ~ Van Niel, Robert, Emergence, 360n (ll" "Verblijdende dUidelljkheid," 383n ~ Verbood van lnlandse Landsdienaren, 4080 (~) "Verkort vee ag van de vierde algemeene veegadering der I.S.D.V.," 362n (2.2)Verdag bestuur 1925, 425n (73) Ver.sklg 9de, 422n (-«)Ver.tlag S. L Merah, illn (75)"Venlag van de vijfde algemeeoe vec/o:aderin g," 3660 (64)"Verslag van bet buitengewoon congres dec P.K.1.," 383n ( 76 ) Verswg oon het 11e KongrCl, 42311

).55)'

.

Ver g zestle, 375n ~ Veto right, 200 "Vierde S. L congres," 374n ~ VlPBOW ( Union of Public Works Employees) , !!!Q. !Qg. ~ ~ l.!9 Visser, Louis de, ~ ~ 4880 00 Vladivostok, ~ 3880 (33) Voitlnsky, C ., TI!.. gQo!, goo,,~ 224, ~ 3840 t1.1 3850 \JU. 3880 (33) "First Conference," 4580 (27)-

509

Index Volhotding, De, 14

3.l. ;!g. ;m. M. 7 I !l!L !Q2. !!L ill. ~ lim.

Volksraad, ~ ~ ~

ii 00l.m m urr. zru..00. tm 36'7n

65 Volksraad.

3820

~true," ~ ~

381n

3980

m

62.

Vollenboven, J. van, 1.08 Vrijzinnige Democ:r:atische Partij. ~ J1l8

VSTP (U nion of Rail and Tramway

H. 22.. at g,

Personne] ), ~

~

~!2!. ~~~ mm.

!AQ..

!!1. ill ill. m

~ ~

~mmm~w.36In

(~ M!1 368n ~

4000

w.. 369n w.. 392n

lillU. 4140 ilia (ML 469n l1ru... 47lo tm 413n

4730 ~ 479n (M1 4SOn tm 4870 (77) strike, ill!. ~ ~ ~ ill Vloroi Kongrul Kromogo lntcmatrion-

ow, 4210

( 29 ) -

Wang Chmg-wei,

w..

Washington Conference, 128 3750 l!!.l Wawonlntu, Johannes, Wcntuk. Clemeru, ruu W esternlzaUon. ~ II Wcstervdd, !L gz. g§.. 68. \V~. van, 3690 ( 11) Whiting. Sooiet po1idU. 3770 ( 28 )· W ignj05umll.rto, 426n (77)

m

Wi j

"Ooslenche Kwestie In de Exekutive," 3840 ~ Wilbur, Introduction, 384n ~ and How, Documenll, 3850 ~ Wmanta, A., !2g. ;ng, 316, 426n IT!.L 4330 U!Q1 4690 ~ 47lo @ ill 472n till... 4750 ~ 478n l!1 4820 (§l. 4860 liru Wirasuharta, 4710 tim Wirosari, 418n ill 4340 t.!!!!l Wongso. KiUJb Toni, 445n (l05)Workers' and Peuants' Association, see PKBT World Islam Congress, 42.On tg.U World War !. ~ gQ.. §!. lil§. 111 Wu Pel-Eu, 386n (20)

llr5: D ., m m m m 3720 22 3840 Q1 4520 ( ISS)

m

m

Zainuddin, Natar, 1M. ~ 42Sn (ll1 .. 26n tTI1 "56n U!l Zako.wlkova, "Profsolu:moe dvizhenie," 37-4n (35)lee, O. van der, S.D.A.P., 359n ~ Zil'lOViev, G., §!. W. 130-132. ggQ, 377n @.1 ..OSn !.M1 "06n

m

(ilL ..SSn

m

( 60)

11 Kongre83, 378n ~ II Kongreu, Kra.tnOgo. "In III Kongreu. 384n ~

~

III Kongret Kramogo, "39n ~ IV Se.uHII T,ent,al' nogo.....2n ~

510