The Philosopher's Dictionary

ThePhilosopher's Dictionary

secondedition

RobertMartin

BroadviewPrrsc . 1994

01994bmrdviwprur Reprinted1994,l9%, 1997,l9gg All righs reserved.The uscof ury part ofthis publicrtion reproduced, tren$ritted in any form or by *y means,electronic,mecbanicd, photocopyi recording, or othcrwisc, or storedin e rcEievd systern,without prior written consent ofthe publisher -ss in thc cescof photocopytng,a liccncc from

cancopy (Csudian Copyright LicensingAgsncy) 5 A&laide StreetEast, Suite 900, Toronto, Ontario n5c rn6 -is an inGingementof thc copyright law. Cenedirn Crtaloguing in Publicrtion Detr Martin, Robert The philosopher'sdictionary, 2nd ed. r s B Nr - 5 5 I I I - o 4 4 - X 1. Philocophy-Dictionarics. I. Tide. B4r.M37 1994 to3 ca493o264-3 Broadview Press PostO6ce Box 1243, Peterborough,Ontario, CanadaK9J7H5 in thc Unitcd Statcsof Amedca: 3576 Catifomia Road, Orcherd Perk, Nv 14127 in the UnitedKingdom: B. R. A. D . Book Representation& Disaibution Ltd', 244A,London Road, Hedlcigh,Esex. ss72DE

Broadvicw Pressgratefirlly acknowlcdgesthc suPPortof the curada council, the Ontario Arts Council, and the Ministry of Carudian Hcritage. PRINTED IN CANADA

To Fran, who loves fivedollar words.

I love words but I don't like strange ones. you don't under_ stand them and they don't underrtand you. Will Rogas

feathen la: one of the light horny epidermal outgrowths that form the external covering of the body of birds and that consist.of a shaft bearing on each side a series of barbs which bear barbules which in rurn bear barbicels commonly ending in hooked hanruli and interlocking with the barbules of an adjacent barb to link the barbs into a continuous rrane. Websln's Satenth Nat Collegiatc Dictionary

Philosophy has its own rechnical vocabulary_ probably more than any other academic field-and philosophers often use ordinary words in special wap. yet dictionaries of philosophy have tended to concentrate on historical obscura, and to ignore many terms in wide conremponrry use. In vain will one look in most other philosophy dictionaries for such terms as ,rigid designator', .veii of ignorance','Godel's proof , or .prisoner's dilemma'. Moreover, other philosophy dictionaries tend toward long definitions that can too easily tempt the student into treating them as a substitute for actually reading philosophy. In this dictionary, Robert Martin works from very different premises. The central aim is to provide a comprehensive and uptdare guide to philosophicnl terms. Definitions are brief, clear and user-friendly. Notes on usage, spelling and pronunciation are included, and there are brief entries on hundreds of the best-known philosophers. Throughout, Martin writes in a style ar once informal and authoritative, enlightening and entertaining, making difficult conceprs intettigible withour distorting them. The Philosopher's Dictionary is an essential reference work for everyone who reads or writes philosophy. Practising philosophers will consult it ofren; students will rely on it for quick reference; anyone interested in philosophy will find ir as interesring ro browse through as it is invaluable for reference. Edtuated, at Columbia IJniucnity and tlu Uniaenity of Michigaa Robcrt Martin is o Professorin tlw Phihsophy Departnwrt at Dalhttrsic Uniursity. He is the author o/The Meaning of Language (MIT Pras, 1987),There Are Two Errors [n The The Title Of This Book, and. of many scholarb aflblzr.

About This Dictionary PnrlosopHERs H A v E T H E r R o w N t e c h n i c ar lp cabulary-perhaps mor€ of it than in any other academic field-and often use ordinary words in special ways. Thus this dictionary. I have tried to locate terrns in here where you'd likely look for them first, but there is a great deal of cross-reference,in case you look somewhere else. Alphabetization ignores spaces and punctuation. Phrases are defined in entries alphabetized according to the real order of the words: for example, there is an entry defining'general will'among the G's, cross-referencedunder'will, general' among the W's. Contrasting or very closely related terns are defined together: thus'analytic' and'synthetic' are both defined in the entry for 'analytic / synthetic', to which the entry for 'synthetic' will refer you. Slashes are used to separate such related terms. Before the modern era, people were formally referred to often by their lirst names. So, for example, the entry for 'Thomas Aquinas' is alphabetized under the T's (though cross-referenced under the A's). I have often grven philose phers' full names when they are commonly referred to only by a shorter narne. Parentheses tell you what to leave out when mentioning them. For example, J(ohn) L(angshaw) Austin is almost always called J. L. Austin, and we talk of Auguste Comte, not (Isidore) Auguste (Marie Frangois) Comte. Some definitions use words I define elsewhere; where it might be helpful for you to look up these words, they are in sMALL cAptTAIs. For brevity I ignore obvious grammatical variations (for example, 'coNsIsrEtIT' in one definition refers the reader to the entry under 'consistency'). When a term inside a definition is defined elsewhere, but not under its own heading, the entry in which it is defined is noted in

a'See ...'comment. I note related terms which it might be helpful for you to consult in a 'See also ...,comment. I have given spelling variations, warnings about common misspellings, usage directions, and pronunciations, where useful in square brackets.When it would be uncommon, or pretentious, or very diflicult for English speakersro use the original pronunciation of words or names that come from other languages,I have given the best acceptable English (mis)pronunciation. (I ignore the French 'r' and nasalized vowels, for example; but pronounce them if you can.) There is a Greek or l,atin name associatedwith almosr every philosophical concept talked about before 1600, and there is a non-English word for many concepts associated with non-English-speakingphilosophers. I have included non-English words when they are likely to be found unrranslated in English philosophical writing. The non-English terms are in italics,though most of them have been naturalized into working philosophical English and need nor be underlined or italicized in your writing. Some Greek and Latin words have a line over a vowel (example: 'agape');this mark is optional in English writing. To keep this book short enough to be handy, I have kept definitions brief and basic.There is much more to be said! A useful (but cumbersome) reference work, far longer and more detailed than this, is The Enqclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967). And, of course, there's no substitute for reading philosophical works themselves. I hope that you'll find this book friendly, informal, and helpful. My aim has been to give definitions that can be understood by people who don't already know what the defined term means. (Surprisingly, other philosophical dictionaries don't seem to have been written with this in mind!) I have tried to include all thc basicphilosophical words, and to be even-handed; but this book must reflect my own philosophical biases and training. If you find unhelpful definitions, or important words left out, or implicit philosophical bias, please write me at the Philosophy Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scoria, Canada B3H

I

3J5. Your suggestions will be gratefully acknowledged, and will be considered for future revised editions. I have several people to thank for their great help on the first edition of this Dictonary: the anonymous readers for Broadview Press, and (in alphabetical order) David Bray' brooke, Steven Burns, Doug Butler, Rich Campbell, Mary Macleod, Roland Puccetti, Tom Vinci, Sheldon Wein, and Anna Zaniewska. After the publication of the first edition, I received a large number of very helpful suggestions and corrections. For these, I express gratitude to: Sheldon Wein again (St. Mary's University); Terry Tomkow (Dalhousie University);Josefine Papst (Institut fi.ir Philosophie, Universiriit Graz); Robert Nadeau and G6rald l,afleur (Universit6 du Qu6bec ir Montr6al); Paul C. L. Tang (California State University, Long Beach); Robin Smith (Kansas State University), and Roderick T. Long (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

obdrclbn

obficfut

obductionThe processof inference to the best explanation. The term is associatedwith C. S. puncn. Ab6lord,Peter (or Fierre) (1079-l142)French philosopher with works mainly on THEor.ocy, Loclc, METApHysICs, and ethics. Noted for his position on uNlvERsnts: he argued that only INDIvIDUALs exist, and that general terms stand fior.+nstnec TroNSof the mind. obsolule'Absolute' as used in philosophy often means 'complete, perfect, independent, unchanging, not RELATIvE'. 'the Some philosophers think that something called abso lute' exists, basic to the EXrLANATIoNof other things; but perhaps this is only a RETFICATIoN. HEGELidentified the absolute spirit with God, and thought that it manifests itself in developmentsin the world (saeHrsroRrcAt-NTATERTAUSM/ mEeltst*,t).Other philosophers associatedwith this term are ScHELLING and gReoLgy.Sometimes capitalized: 'the Absolute';'Absolute Spirit'. obsolute spo(eondlime The view that space and time exist independently of the objects and eventsin them. This was Newton's view, rejected by Einstein, among others (SeescteN-

rrsrs). obsolulism, ethicol / cuhurolSeeRnL.,qrrvrsM / ABSoLUrrsM. obslroction An abstractionis a generalsort of thing,asopposed to a particular (SeeINDIVIDUALs)-forexample, greenness,as distinguished from any and all particular green things. It seems that abstractions aren't directly perceived; we can see

dqdty

oC/ogoot'mmhb

particular green thingr, and see that each is green, but we can't see greenness itself. perhaps greennesJ is known by the process of abstraction-i.e., as the result of thinking about green thingr-or perhaps (as rmro and others have argued) we must have independent prior knowledge of greenness in order to be able to classify the particulars (see pLAToNrcronus). The question whether abstract things exist is one way of putting the problem of urqrvnnsms. (seaalso coxcnpr). obsurdity l. Something clearly false or sElF.coNrReorctony. Deriving an absurdity in this sensefrom the denial of what is to be proved is what happens in a reductio ad absurdurn-an INDIp.tcTpRooF. 2. Something unreasonable, meaningless, inappropriate, without structure, incoherent, failing to make sense.ExIsTENTIAI-rsrs hold that reality, and our place in it, are absurd in this sense. AcodEmyThe Ahadlmia (Greek: "Academy") was the place in Athens where pLATotaught. Thus, the word came to refer to the disciples of Plato, the tLeroNISTs,and more generally (with a lower
t2

odbn

fifinluilrffib

people do (act morality); others thir* that what'r baric to moral theory is the peneonwho acts (rcnNr morality). KANT argued that good actions were those done by people with the right sort of motives, so his ethical theory is a variety of agent morality; the tmureRrANs thought that the basic kind of ethical thought evaluates actions, whatever the motives or moral worth of the people who do them, so their ethics is a variety of act morality. oclion A human action is distinguished from just any bodily movement, usually on the basis that an action must be intended. Thus your accidentally spilling your coffee is not an action; neither is the motion of your tongue while you drink your coffee, because you do not think about that motion, or intend that it be the way it is. ('Act' is used in the same way.) oction-of-o-dishnce The effect that one thing can have on anorher that it is not touching and to which it is not connected by something in-between. Gravitation is an example. Some philosophers and scientists-e.g., LErBNrz-thought that this was impossible. One way they tried to explain gravitation is to suppose that bodies that gravitationally attract each other are connected by some intervening invisible thing that fills the space between them, and transfers the gravitational force. oclionfteory The branch of philosophy that considersquestions about ACTIoN.Examples of these are: What differentiates an action from other movements?Can there be actions that are refrainingp from acting? Where does an action end and its consequences begin? Moral questions (about, for example, ACTS/ oMISSIONS) and the questions of rnnE wrLL and responsibility are sometimes included in action theory. ocliveeulhonosio SeeEUTHANAsTA, ACTTVE / pAssrvE.

trls/ommi$ons

dtnc

ocls/ ommissionrAn act is doing something, by contrast with an omission (or refraining), which is merely failing to do something. some philosophers think that there catt be a morar difference between these even when they have the same outcome. For example, it has been argued that an act of killing someone is worse than merely refraining from saving someone's life, even when they have exactly the same mo_ tives and results. ocls,speechSecsprncu ecrs. od ufilitorionismSrae rmlrrerue.xlsu. od hoculun(Latin: "[appeal] to force") An illogical means of persuasion in which one attempts to convince not by giving reasons that provide genuine logical support, but by threatening. Example: "Druid non-Euclidianism has the only correct philosophical view on this matter. If you don'r think so, wait to see what mark I give you on the next exam." One of the informal raI,recrcs. ['ad BAK-you-lum'] odhu (Latin: "to this" i.e., "specially for this purpose") An ad loc essuupttoN is one that is introduced illicitly in an attempt to save some position from a contrary ARGUMENT or couNTER nt<.lMILE intended to show that the position is false. It is illicit becauseit is designed especially to accommodate the argument or counter.example,and has no inde pendent support. One of the informal M,Lt.ncres.An example of ad ioc reasoning (adapted from St. eucusrnn):

'Suicids isolwoys wrong.' 'Well,how (hristion obout olllhose womon whoin eorly times killed themselvss rothor thonbeing roped bypogon soldiers, ond youcount whom ossoints?' 'Thot doasn'l show thotsuicide is permissible. In those coses, thoymust hovsboon octing under direct socret orders fromGod, sowhottheydidwos0(.'

ftt

dffisn

'to the penon") A logicdly mirtaken (but odhonlmrn (Latin: form of rnouuslrr in which, instead persuasive) sometimes of giving good reasons against some position, one irrele vantly attacks or abuses the person who held that position. An example: "Plato's theory of forms can't be correct because Plato was a known, practising homosexual." One of the informal ne,naclrs. Also refers to the non-fallacious practice of arguing for a conclusion on the basis of assumPtions you do not accept, but your audience does.['ad' + 'HAH-ma-nem' or'HOH-mee-nem'] 'to ignorance") A logically mistaken (but od ignorontian(Latin: sometimes persuasive) form of encuusr.IT in which one argues f,or some position by claiming that nobody can show that it's false (or that a position is false because no one can prove that it is true). Example: "God must exist, because it's impossible to give any definite disproof of His existence." One of the informal reltecns. ['ad' + 'ig-na-RANT-ee-am' or' ig-na-RANCEee-am' J This distinction among kinds of stateA / E/ | / 0 propositions ments, used in TRADITIoNALLoclc, is best explained by examples: A :A l lp i g so r em o m m o l s . [: llo pigsoremommols. l: Somepigsoremommols. p i g so r en o tm o m m o l s . 0: Some oeslhetis The philosophical study of art, of our reactions to it, and of similar reactions to thingp that are not works of art. Typical questions here are: What is the definition of 'art'? How can we judge aesthetic worth? Is this an objective matter? ['ass-'or'es' +'THET-iks'; sometimes (especiallyin the U.S.) spelled'esthetics'] ogfier SeeETHER.

qcnl

clbbgy

orliology The study of the causesof something or some sort of thing. ['eeteeAH-lejee'; sometimes (especially in the U.S.) 'etiology'l spelled An incorrect mode of reasoning involv' affirmingfie consaquonl ing the coNDITtoNAI. in which one derives the antecedent from a conditional plus its consequent. Example: wouldbewefnow. thepovement thismorning, lf it roined is wot. Iho povement thismorning. it muslhoveroined Ihoreforc o fortiwi (Latin: "from what is stronger') With even stronger reason. "Killing even one innocent Person is wrong, so 'ay FORHitler's actions are, a fortiori, immoral." [usually sheOR+e', sometimes'ah FOR-tee-ORee'J cAoS (Greek: "love') In Christian philosophy, Christian love, including our love of God and His of us; also refers to a christian ceremony of worship and fondnessof the worship pers for each other. Sometimes contrasted with aros (pas' sionate or erotic love; for the pteroNISTS, the love of the eternal perfect PLAToNIcFoRMs,such as truth and beauty) and with phitia (brotherly love, fondness' or friendship)' ['AHga-pee'] 0g0fi0n/ orct[ The first is a Greek adjective associatedwith the 'AretE' is ordinarily translated as second a Greek noun. ,V1RTUE, with the associationof excellenceand fulfilment of 'agathon' is for the Greeks a function and potentiah thus, 'good'. praise: of term ['AH'reh'tee'] The peruon who does an AcTtoN.In law the term is used ognl to referio a person who, by mutual consent, acts for another person who is known as the principal. In jurisprudence an is one who can perform a genuine intentional action, "g.trt*ho is thus morally responsible for what he/she does. "id This excludes people, for example, who are unable to Per-

l6

qFntordh

ohiltk

ceirc relevant facts, or who can't reason about conse quences. ogrnl ousofion Often it is thought that causes and effects must be eventrfor example, human actions and decisions. This In releads to problems (saarnnn wu.l and DETERMINISU). sponse to these problems, some philosophers have claimed that the cause of our actions is not a (determined) event (such as a decision), but rather an AcENT(the person who acts); this is supposed to get around these problems. cgonlmorclities seeAcrl AGENTMoRAUTTES. ognoslichmSr? ATHETsM / THETIM/ AcNosrrclsM. mofiodol SeeMrLUsMETHoDS. ogrcomonf, Al

SeeaRrncrAl

TNTELLTcENcE.

okrosio(Greeh "lack of strength," "lack of self control or moderation") The character trait in one who knows what is right to do but doesn't do it; weaknessof will. This notion is puzzling: doesn't one always do what one really, overall, thinks best? For similar puzzles, Jrd BURIDAN's ASSand snrrDEcErnoN. ['ah-kraSEE-ah' or'uh-KRAY-zha'] Alberlus llognus, St. (or Albert the Great; original name Albert, Count von Bellstdd$ (1206?-1280)German scHolAsrrc philosopher and theologian, known for his efforts to combine Greek, Arabic, and Christian thought; teacher of rrrouns AQUINAS. olelhk Means 'having to do with necessity and possibility'. Alethic logic is that branch of uooel Locrc concerned with the connections between sentences involving'necessary', 'possible', 'impossible', 'It's necessary etc. that P' is often 'it's symbolized'EP'; and possible that P'as 'lP'. ['ah'LEEthick.l

1/

dffi

ontrgt/dsmhgy

ol-FrtibiSaarlnlri clgorithmA mechanicalmethod (i.e., one determinedby strict rules,needingno creativityor ingenuityto apply)for carrying out a givencalculationin a finite number of steps. alicnollonEsrangement, separation. The EXISTENTIALISTS thought that an impbrtant and inevitablepart of the human condition was our alienation from nature and from each other. In MARX,'dienation'means the separationfrom the productsof our labour(asemployees, we don't own whatwe produce)aswell asfrorh societyand from ourselves. Ahhusscr, Louis(191&1990) Frenchphilosopherassociated with the srnucruRAusrs, known for his applicationof that theory to MARxIsrthought. olfuism l. Generosity.2. The philosophicalposition that one ought to act for the benefit of others(Sa alsoEcoIsM). ombiguify SaargurvocArroN. omorolilysearruuone:U'lTv / AMoRALTTY. The symbol'&', meaning'and'. Secsvvnors oF sENompcrsond TENTIALLOGIC. omphibolyA shrcment whose meaning is unclear because of its 'If the ambiguous grammatical construction. For example, Dodgerr were playing the Yankees, I would root for them.' For whom? Also the name of the informal FALL-AcYthat arises because of this ambiguity. ['am-FlB-oh-lee'] 0n0l0gy/ disonologyAn analogy is a similarity of two thingr. Rcasoning from (or by) analogy is concluding that because two thingp shar€ one or more characteristict, they share another. For example, some philosopherc think they can solve the PROBLEM oFoTHERMINDSby analogy: other people share my

l8

onohb

ond4icdf,Getrn

general outward appearance and behaviour, so that's evidence that they also have minds. (This argument is associated with DEScARTES.) A disanalogy is a difference between compared thinp; disanalogies between thingr reduce the strength of an argument from analogy. onolytit Some thingp are capable of being understood in terms of their component (sometimes conceptual) parts; analysis takes thern apart into their simpler elements. Reductive analysis aims to show that what is analyzed does not constitute a basic existent-or need not be thought of as existing at all (seeREDUCTroNrsu). Something to be analyzed is called the 'analysandum', and what provides the analysisis called the 'analysans'. Seealro ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. onolysis, linguislicSaenNnLyrrc pHrI-osopHy. cnolyfiolbehcviouism . SaannHnvrouRrsM. onolylirily SeenN.tLyrrc / syNTHETrc. philosophy onolyfic A major tradition in philosophy, associated especially with the English-speaking philosophers; contrasted with speculative or coNTTNENTATphilosophy. The distinction arose during the first few decades of the twentieth century when English philosophers (including RUssELL and MooRE) revolted against the dominant HEGEUAN school. ,A,nalyticphilosophers were so-called because they thought that a major part of philosophy is the exeLysls of coNcEprs. Becauseof their frequent emphasis on language, this school is sometimes called 'linguistic philosophy' or 'linguistic analysis'. Impressed by the methods of science, they tended to think that philosophers had no business making substantive claims that are not VERIFIABLE. Nowadays both the analytic and the continental traditions include such a broad variety of approaches that these distinctions aren't very precise. These names tend mostly to be used as derogatory epithets for the competition. Contemporary

ildy{r/$tlfttfic

onotyric /slnfhlic

analytic philosophen-roughly speaking-are those who have been influenced by EMptRIcIsM,rRAGMATIsM, and LocrcAL POSITIVISM, though few contemporary analytic philoso phers accept all the basic tenets or methodologies of any of these positions. onolylit/ synthrtk These words were introduced by KANT, referring to the difference between two kinds of luocnunNr. Iknt called a judgement analytic when the "pnEDlcATEwas contained in the subject"; thus, for example, the judgement that all bachelors are unm^rried is analytic because the subject ('bachelors') "contains" the predicate ('unmarried'). This possibly makes the notion the same as that of coxcnpMost philosophers think that this distinction is TUALTRUTH. better made in terms of sentences: a sentence is analytic when the meaning of the subject of that sentence contains 'unmarried' is part of the the meaning of the predicate: 'bachelor'. In other words, an analytic sendefinition of tenc€ is one that is true merely because of the meanings of 'It's snowing or it's not snowing' is true merely the words. 'or' and 'not', so because of the meaning of the words perhaps we should count this as analytic too. But since the relevant words in this case are "logical" words, this sentence is more particularly known as a LocIcALTRUTH.A synthetic truth is a sentencethat is true, but not merely becauseof the 'Pigs don't fly' is true partiall1 bemeaning of the words. 'pigs' meant causeof the meaning of the words, of course:if 'woodpeckers', then that sentence would be false. But since 'pig' tells us nothing about flying, this the definition of not is true merely because of the meaning of the sentence words. One can speak also about analytically false sen'There exists a married bachelor'. Be tences, for example, careful to distinguish among the analytic / synthetic, Locland A PRIoRI CoNTINGENT, NEcEssARy,/ cALTRUTH,/FALSITY, For example, analytic sentencesare necessar/ A POSTERIORI. ily true, and may (sometimes) be known a primi; but there may also be synthetic a priori statements (Kant thought there were). QUINEargued that the analytic / synthetic

20

0tuftrt

dlinbn

distinction is not a good one, because one cannot distinguish between matters of meaning of the words of a sentence and matters of fact. onorthhm The view that government has no right to coerce citizens, that the best society iS one with the least government, or with no government at all. A well-known advocate of philosophical anarchism is pRouDHoN. Anoxogoros(500?-?428 B.C.) rnrsocRArrc Greek MErApHysIctnN and cosMolocIsr. His writingp contain speculations on the origins of the universe and the constituents of matter. ['an-ak .SAC-uh-rus'] (c. 610<. 546 B.C.) pREsocRATrcGreek scientist Anoximonder and uErepHysIcIAN. Believed in a single suBsrANcE(called "the indefinite") out of which everything was formed. ['uhNAX-uh-mander'] (d. c. 528 B.C.) rnnsocRArrc Greek MErApHysrcrAN Anoximenes and coslroI.oclsT. His candidate for the single suBsrANcE that composed all existence was air (or mist). ['an-a:r-IHmuh-neez'] ondenlphilosophy Ancient philosophy began in primitive form, we suppose,in prehistory; the earliest Western philosopher of whose work we havea historical account is THaLrs (c. 580 B.C.). The end of this period is often marked by the beginning of vrolrvel pHrt-osopHy, with the work of St. (about A.D. 400). AUGUSTINE onguishSeeexrsrrxrrAl- ANGUTSH. onhedonioThe state of being without happiness or pleasure. ['an-he-DOAN-i-a'] onimismThe view that things not normally thought to be so are alive, or at least are understandable in terms of features

fttr*n,

mtlrrym/*

normally associatcd only with living things, This is usually associated with primitive religion, but a recent animistic view in science is the Gaia hypothesis-that the earth is (or is in some ways like) a living oqganism. Sceabo ANTHRopoMoRPHIC. Ansolm,St. (1033-1109)Italian-born, English scHolAsrrc theo logian / philosopher, Archbishop of Canterbury. An important philosopher of the early middle ages; known for his defense of rational THEotocy and the oNToLocrcAL ARcuMENTFORGOD'SEXISTENCE. onletodent conditionsThe events or states of affairs that come befiore a given event and that cause it, or are necessary or sufficient (Saanncnsstty / sumcrENT coNDITIoNS)for it to happen. onlocodsil/ tonscquonlSeecoNorrroNAl.

printlplo onfiroplc

What we obgerve is restricted by the conditionr necessaryfor our presenceas observers.In scientific cosmology (the study of the features of the univeroe) this principle tells us that scientistscan expect to find that the characteristics of the current universe are not fatal to humansl

onlhroponnlrismSaasPEcrsM. onfiropomorphk Having human form, or human-like. pntMtflvs thought, for example, anthropomorphized nature, seeing it as characterizedby aims, emotions and desires(for instance, seeing a thunderstorm as a manifestation of anger). Some religious thought conceivesof God anthropomorphically, in that God is thought of as having human desires and aims. ['AN-throw-po-MOR-fi ck' ] antmomy Saapen,tpox.

srlh*m

ofhl/opffifrt

onfhcolbm&a nneusu,/ ANTTREAUsM. onlilhcsil Saeore:-ncrtc. opodiak/ osscrlorit/ problcmoticl. Apodictic (sometimes spelled 'apodeictic') statements assert that something must be the case; assertoric that something is the case; problematic that something may be the case.2. An apodictic statement is one that is clearly proven or INDUBITABLE. Apollonion / DionysionNrErzscHEdistinguished these two sorts of approaches to art and, more generally, to life. The former tends toward order, rationality, harmony, clarity, and intellect; the latter toward disorder, spontaneity, imagination, energy, and creativity. Nietzsche associated Dionysian attitudes with the wrLLTo PowER. opologislOne who defends a doctrine. The term is used histori. cally especially for the early Christian teachers who wrote apologies for (defenses of) their religion. In this technical use, the terms do not carry the implication that the apologist expressesregret and begp pardon for what he did. 0 posteioil Secn pnroRr/ A posrERroRr. 0pp00r0ncc / rcolitl The difference between the way things seem to us and the way they really are. Philosophers have often been concerned with this difference-with how to tell when (if ever) the way thingp appear is how they are. o priori/ o postlfiori (Latin, 'from before / ftomafter") Two different ways in which something might be known to be true (or false). It can be known a priori if it can be known before, or independently of, sense-experienceof the f,act in question. It can be known a posteriori if it can be known on the basis of, after, sense-experienceof the fact. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried a priori; one doesn't need to observe even one bachelor to know this is true. In this

23

aFirtrffir

orytxnont

case (but perhaps not in all cases) a priori knowledge is possible because what's known is a cor.IcrpruAl TRLTTH or becausethe sentencethat expressesthis truth is eNeLyttc or LocIcALLY TRUE.The terms are associated with r
k"Y'l arslt SeeAGATHoN7 nnrrE. orgumonlAn argument in ordinary talk is a debate, especiallya heated one. But in philosophical usage, an argument is one 'premises';singular 'premise' or or more statements(called 'premiss') advanced in order to support another statement (the conclusion). Thus philosophers need not get angry when they argue. Premises actually support a conclusion only when there is the appropriate sort of logical connection between the premises and the conclusion. In pnoucTM arguments, the conclusion must be true given the truth of the premises; in an tNoucrlvE argument, the truth of the premirer maLes the conclusion more probable. Any deduc' tive aqgument in which the premises really do have the appropriarc logical connection with the conclusion is called a'lralid'argumenq in invalid algumenm, this connection is lacking. A valid argument may, however, fail to support its conclusion because one or more of its premises is false-for example:

?a

fitohgy orsnrlt'itfrom

lrblolh

All pigsfly. Allflyingthingsorelightor thonoir. Iherefore ofl pigsorelighterthonoir. This atgument is valid, but it fails to convince becauseboth of its premises are false. An argument with at least one false premise is called 'unsound'; a sound argument is a valid argument all of whose premises are true. A sound argument provides a proof of its conclusion (though in logic it's often said that a proof is provided merely when the argument is valid). [The word 'argument' is sometimes misspelled by students:pleasenote that it is not spelled 'arguement'.] fronronologySeeeNeLocy. orgumonl clgumenlfromdesignSeereLnolocrcAL ARGUMENT. orgumenl of o funclionSaeFUNcrroN. orgumonls for God's exislenceSee the following well-known ones: COMMON CONSENTARGUMENT, DEGREESOF PERFECTIONARGU. MENT, FIRSTCAUSEARCUMENT, MORAL ARGUMENT, MYSTICAL EXPERIINCE ARGUMENT, ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, PASCALS WAGER,TELEOLOGICALARGUMENT. orgumenlfrom illusion The argument (against NArvE nrer-rsu) that the existence of perceptual ILLUsIoNs and hallucinations shows that we really directly perceive only SrnSn-o,trr and not an independent world. 0rgumenl,open question saa opEN QUESTToNARGLTMENT.

fuistippus(435?-?356 B.C.) Greek sopHrsr, founder of the cYRENAIcschool; follower of socnerEs, known for his unDONISTIcethics. ['ar-is-TlP-us'] Arisffilc (38+322 B.C.) Hugely influential Greek philosopher and scientist; some think the greatest philosopher. He was

Msltrmn

ct$dlhbhita

PLATo'sstudent; like his teacher, he was cenrally concerned with knowledge of reality and of the rightway to live. Unlike Plato, however, he accepted the reality of the EMIIRIcAL, changing world, and attempted to discover what sort of understanding we must have in order to have knowledge of it. He argued that INDIVIDUII thingp must be seen as belonging to kinds of thingp, each of which has EssrNnAL properties that give it potential for change and development. (For Aristotle's distinction of kinds of properties, sacEFFIcIENT/ FoRMAL/ MATERIAL / FINALcAUsEs.)Investigation into the essential properties of humans can tell us what human good is: he conceived it as a life lived in accord with the mord and intellectual vtRrurs. Aristotle's writings cover all sorts of areas in natural science and philosophy. He began the sysrematic study of locrc. furort thcorcm Seavorun's pARADox2, 0rl

l. The processand the product involved in painting, sculp ture, etc. (Seeabo AEsrHETlcs.)2. Also, in a wider sense,in 'term of art' 'ARTIFACT"). t. A any intentional creation (or (also called'technical term') is thus a term used in a special, invented, technical way. Looking at this dictionary will show you that philosophy is full of terms of art.

orilfocf A product of human work, as distinguished from a naturally occurring object. In science, a piece of data or experim€ntal result which has been produced or signifi' cantly altered by the process of observation. (Also spelled 'artefact') orlilidolinblligcnc An area of study in computer science and psychology that involves building (or imagining) machines, or programming computers, to mimic certain complex intelligent human activities. The creation of a program that Artificial can play chessat a high level is one of its successes. intelligence is of philosophical interest insofar as it might shed light on what human mentality is like, and insofar as its

26

qfid/mtdhsnlr

orylmrfii

successesand frilurcs enter into argumentr about MATEnIAL su. [sometimes abbreviated'AI'J oilifkiol/ nolurollonguogoA natural language is one used by some actual group of people, that has developed on its own, culturally and historically. An artificial language is one developed for some purpose. Philosophers use the term to refer especially to IDEALLANcUAGES. Computer languages are artificial language; syMBoLIc Loclc provides other examples. os(elicismThe practice of living under extremely simple conditions, with minimal enjoyment, pleasure, and comfort. Sometimes ascetics even intentionally produce pain or discomfort. Certain religious enthusiasts thought this was a good idea. St. eucusrlNE and scsopENHAUERgave philosophical arguments in favour of certain forms of asceticism. ['ahSET-a-sism'] osserliOnA statement or sentence used to state a fact, to make a claim, true or false, about the way things are; or the act of sa)4ngor writing such a sentence. Distinguished from other sentences or acts that express feelings, ask questions, etc.: these sentences are neither true nor false. An indicative sentence that does not state anything that is true or false ('Tuesdays more than twelve pounds long juggle deeply') may be poetic, but isrt't an assertion. 0sserfion sign SecsyMBor.soF SENTENTTAL Locrc. 0sserloli(Seeepoosrcnc / AssERToRrc,/pRoBLEMATrc. 0ssumplionl. Something taken to be true, without argument or justification. 2. = premise (saaencuurur.) 0symmolrkSeasyuueTHc / AsyMMETRTc / NoNsyMMETRrc.

dtdsn/ilt*m/olrodidrn

A,gtrlip,

ofirhm/tlnim/ognortidsm Atheism is the view that God does not exist. People who have never given a thought to the 'atheists'-the word is matter aren't called used only for pcople who believe there isn't any God. Atheists sometimes (but not always) in addition think that religious practice is foolish, or that the morality fiostered by religion is wrong. Because atheism has been, at times, so unpopular, atheistic philosophers have sometimes disguised their views. LUanother cRETIUSand Huur were probably atheists. RUSSELL, famous atheist, was open about it (and got into trouble). Not every religion includes the belief in God-Buddhism, for example, is sometimes said to be an atheistic religion. Atheism is contrasted with its opposite, theism, the view that God does exist, and also with agnosticism, the view that there isn't any good reason to believe either that God exists 'atheism','theist', or that He doesn't. [Note the way'atheist', 'e' bef,ore'i'.] and'theism'are spelled: 0fomi(fods/ proposiliomSecLoGICALAroMtsM. dlomismThe view that things are composed of elementary basic parts. From ancient times till the present, physics was often 'atom' is no longer atomistic (though what's now called an regarded as a basic comPonent-contemPorary physicists think that much smaller parts might be basic).Philosophical atomism is associated with DEMocRITUS,EPIcURUS,LUand many more modern philosophers of nature. CRETIUS, (Seeaho LocrcAL AToMISM) oilribuls Seaqunlny/

pRopERTy. ATTRIBT..ITEl

oilribules,divine SeeDIVINEATTRIBUTES. Auguslino,St. (354430) Philosopher and theologian, born in N. Africa; converted to Christianity in 386. An important figure in the establishment of Christianity as an intellectual and political force, and in the transition from ancient to

ldh,

I

oq/lot'iftu|ffin

medievd thought; the first important Christian philoso pher. ['aw4U$tin', or sometimes'AWgus-teen'] Auslin,John (1790-1859)English legal philosopher known for his position that LAWI is the command of the sovereign. Auslin,J(ohn) L(ang:shaw)(19ll-1960) English (Oxford) philosopher; a leading figure in onon,q,ny LANcUAGEpHrt,osopHy. He drew philosophical conclusions from nNllysrs of our uses of language in general, and of particular philo sophically relevant words. oufhoritorion A government, church, etc., that demands strict and unquestioning obedience, and thus denies freedom of thought or action, is authoritarian. oufientidty See sen EArrH / cooD FArrH / Ar..rrHENTrcrry/ rNAUT}IENTICITY. 0ulom0l0These are (arguably) mindless devices that imitate the intelligent and goaldirected actions of people-robots, for example. DEscARTEs thought that animals were automatamerely physical "mechanisms," without mind. ['automata' is plural; singular'automaton';'aw-TOM-a-ta','aw-TOM-aton'] Sceolso RRrtrtcIAL INTELLIGENCE, CvBERNETICs. 0ul0n0my / heteronomyAutonomy is self-governance-the ability or right to determine one's own actions and beliefs. Some ethical theories see the respect for autonomy as a central ethical principle. Heteronomy is its opposite: dependence on others. Seealso pATERNAUSM. 0v0r0ge/t0l0lutilitorionism urrLrrARrANrsu needs to specify how to understand the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Is a society better when it produces the greatest average urILITy, or when it produces the greatest total? Make sure you understand why these are not the same thing.

AYfiS

Ayu,

Avonods(also spelled 'Averrho€s'; in Arabic, ibn-Rushd) (l1261198) Spanish-born Arab philosopher; important Islamic philosopher, influenced by ARrsrorLE and plero. ['uh-VERoh€ez' or'a-ver0H+ez'] Avicenno(Arabic full name Ab 'Al al-Husayn ibn'Abd-Allh ibn Sn) (980-1037) Persian philosopher, the most influential medieval Islam philosopher. His comprehensive philosophical system was based largely on ARISTOTL,E, and was a strong influence on THoMASAeurNAs. oxiologyThe study of the general theory of values. oxiomofi(thoory SeeAxrow/ posrul.Arn. oxiom/ po$ulofo An ariom is a statement regarded as obviously true, used as a starting point for deriving other statements. An axiomatic TlIEoRy is one that is based on a:
l

hol,

'hilofuu!mrnh

Bocon,Francis (Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans) (15611626) English philosopher and scientist.Best known for his work on scientific method, he is often considered the father of modern science. 8ocon,Roger (1214?-71292)English philosopher and scientist, known as 'Doctor Mirabilis'. An influential early EpISTEMoLoctsrand theorist of scientific method. bodfoift / goodhrfh/ oufienticily/ inouthsnficilyThese are all terms associated with senrnE's ExISTEIITIAUSM. Bad faith is one's (to try to avoid existenattempt to deny one's own FREEDoM tial nucursH-the anxiety Sartre thought the recognition of one's freedom brings) by trpng to pretend that one's actions, values, or preferences are determined by something in one's past-heredity, environment, social expectations, objective values, personality, etc. Good faith, its opposite, is the accepting that one is the author of, and responsible for, actions, values, and preferences. Authenticity is a state thought praiseworthy by existentialists; it is a state of good faith, in which one actively creates one's long- and shortterm ideals, projects, and plans, and owns up to having them and to having created them. 'boll

of uox'eromple DEscARTEsused this example to show the necessity of believing in physical sUBSTANcE. Imagine you see a ball of wax, at room temperature. Put it next to the fire, and in a while, all its characteristics have changed: its shape, colour, odour, hardness, etc. Yet it is the same object we saw earlier (not something else). Thus samenessin this sense cannot be explained in terrns of having the same

0sfirg,

8qh,

characteristics; so there must be something other than characteristics-an unchanging and invisible substance-which accounts for this sameness. Seealso IDENTIfi 3, PRoBlrM oF IDENTTTY, QUAUTY/ ATTRIBUTE/PROPERTY. loilhos, Roland (1915-1980) French philosopher associated with the srRUcruR.ALIsrs,known for his application of that theory to literary criticism. hsit otlion If someone did x by doing y, then x is not a basic AcrIoN (it's a non-basic action). Sally murdered Sam by shooting him, so Sally'smurdering Sam is not a basic action. Sally shot Sam by discharging her revolver, so Sally's shoot' ing Sam isn't a basic action either. What action of Sally'swas basic? Perhaps her moving her finger (when she shot the revolver)-she didn't do this by doing something else. This distinction has relevance in ecttoN TtlEoRY. hslt SlOlrmonfThe truth or falsity of some statements is determined by appeal to some others (by means of uoclc or scientific method), but some philosophers think that there must be a starting point: basic statements. Whether there are basic $tatements,what they are, and why they are acceptable, are all controversial questions. Seeako AXIoM/ PosruSENTENCES. PROTOCOL LATE.LOGICALATOMISM, An a{iective referring to a variety of related aspectsof BoyOSiOn PROBABILITvtheory, associated with the work of Thomas Bayes,English mathematician. l. Bayes'theorem is a mathe' matical formula relating conditional and prior probability. 'Bayesianism' sometimes refers to the view that prob2. ability should be understood as subjective;or 3. to the view that rational choice is choice that maximizessxprCrEDUTIL trv. [Pronounced'bayz','BAYZ'ian'] philosopher' Boyls, Pierre (164?'l?06) French ENLIGHTENMENT an important influence on HUME,VoLTAIRE,and others be' causeof his destructive scEPTIcALattackson prior views.

3?

8{il*,

hhuiuisn

luwoh, Simone de (190&1986) French writer and philoso pher, known for her ElilsrENTIAusu and her FEMINISM. broming/hing Being is whatever exists. Some philosophers thought that in the real realm of being, nothing changes; thus the realm of becoming, the visible world where things change, was thought to be unreal or "less real." Philoso phers who hold this view face the necessity of explaining how we know about the real world, and what the visible world has to do with it. These worries were a central feature of ancient Greek philosophy, and often also concerns of MoDERNPHILoSoPHvand science. beeilcin thebox wlrrcENsrnn tells the following philosophical fable: 'beetle' in 0 Suppose eochperson he/shecollso hodsomelhing box,butcouldseeonlywhot'sin his/herbox.lt's possible thot eochperson differenf, or evennothing ol oll, in hossomething box ore his/herbox,or thot the contents of someperson's 'beetle' c0nstontly wouldthenhoveno use rhonging. Ihe word i n o u rl o n g u o g e . This fable can be taken to be an attack on the idea that there are nRIVATE objects-for example, mental events that only the person having them can know about. At least on the idea that we can talk about such private things in public language (saa PRTvATE LANGUAcEencuurNr). bcgging fie queslionSeacrncuLARREAsoNTNG/ DEFrNrrroN. behoviOurism Early in the twentieth century, many psychologists decided that INTRospECTToN was not a good basis for the science of the mind; instead they decided to concentrate only on external, observable behaviour (rd, pRIvAcy).Methodological (psychological) behaviourism is the view that only external behaviour should be investigated by science. METApHystcALor ANALyrrcAr. behaviourism is the philosophical view that public behaviour is all there is-that this is

hi[

8df*y,

what we're talking about when we refer to mental events or characteristics in others, and even in ourselves.It's a form of MATERIALISM.J.B. Watson and B. F. Skinner (SeescmNnsrs) were two American psychologists who were very influential in arguing for methodological and analytical behaviourism. 'u'] [The American spelling of these words omits the boing SaeBEcoMTNG/BErNc. bringfor itsclf/ in ilsolf saerN rrsELF/ FoRrrsELF. boliof saeKNowLEDcE,/BELTEF. bongvolente SaesvupetHy,/ EMpATHy / BENEvoLENcE. Benlhom,Jeremy (1748-1832)English founder of urrutterulNlstr,t,influential in moral and political theory. Borgson,Henri (Louis) (1859-1941) French philosopher in whose work evoLLJ"rIoNplays a central role. Among his central notions is the "fLAN vITAL"-the non-MATERIALISTIC vital force supposed to cause change and develoPment. He was a champion of ttttutttoN against rationalistic "concep' tual" thought. Borkoloy,George (1685-1753) Irish philosopher, Bishop of Cloyne; known for his EMPIRIcIsTand tonrrusr METAPHYSIcS and rplsrrMolocY. Berkeley rejected the idea that a world independent of pERcEPTIoNscan be inferred from them; perceptions are all there is. (But they can exist externally and independently of us-in the mind of God.) Since only individual particular perceptions are Possible, he argued ideas. His views may be against the possibility of ABsTRACT construed as a form of pHnNouENALIsM.['BARK'lee': 'BERK-lee' is the pronunciation of the name of the California city named after the philosopher.]

b6tof oiltrsilbmd&

8hd,

but of ollpo:siblorodds e phrase associated with lurNrz, who believed that God, being perfectly good, knoving, and powerful, cqrld not have created anything lessthan perfect; thus this world (despite how it sometimes appears, especially on Monday morning) is the best of all possible worlds (sae PRoBLEM orevll). bitonditionolA material biconditional (sometimes merety called a lbiconditional') is a TRUTH-ruNcrroNALconnective. It is true when both sentencesit connects are true, or when both are false; it is false when the sentenceshave different TRurH\ALUEs.It is symbolized by the triple-bar ( = ) or the doublearrolv (<+) (seesyMBoLsoF sENTENTIAL LocIC), and may be interpreted as "if and only if" (sometimes abbreviated'iff'). It is called the biconditional becauseit means the same as a conjunction of two coNDITIoNALs: p=q is equivalentto (p:q)& (qcp).A logical biconditional is a biconditional that is LocrcALLyrRUE.Anorher name for the material biconditional is'material equivalence'. biosthicsThe ethics involved in various sorts of biology-related activities, mostly centring on medical matters. Examples of issues considered in bioethics are abortion, mind control (e.9., through drugrs),genetic control, Eu-rHANAsrl, and iz urtrofertilization. binorypredirolr ScapREDrcArE. binoryrolofion SeeRELArroNs. bivolgnto&e law of the excluded middle, in lerrs oFTHoucHT. Block,Max (1909-1988) Russian-born American philosophe4, professor at Cornell University. Inf luential in the philoso phies of Loclc, mathematics, language, science, and knowledge.

35

bofthtrfurr

Boydo,

intmhongcThis is what would happenif the sirmeperson bodfly existed at one time in one body and at another time in or in a another body, for example, through REINcARNATIoN, variety of science-fiction ways, (such as brain or memory transplant). The topic is important to think about not only in religious contexts or as entertainment, but as a thoughtIDENTITY. experiment about PERSoNAL Bodhius, (Anicius Manlius Severinus) (c. 480'524) Roman philosopher and statesman, translator of Aristotle. Best known for his influential work in Loctc, and for his book Tlze Consolationof Philnsophy.['bo'EE-thee'us'] Bolzono,Bernard (1781-1848) Czech philosopher, theologian, logician, and mathematician. His work in eptsrruot-ocY and t-octc, unrecognized in his time, has received recent attention. lonovonturo(in ltalian, Bonaventura), St. (Original name' Giovanni di Fidanza) (1221-1274) Italian scHol-nstlc phi' losopher / theologian. His work is strongly influenced by

St.rucusrrun. Bonhorffcr,Dietrich (1906-1945)German theologian. Active in the resistance to Hitler, he died in a Nazi concentration camp. His radically secularized and ecumenical religious views have been of great interest in contemporary THEoLOGY. 8oolo,George (1815-1864)English mathematicianresponsible for the development of the idea of treating variablesin logic LoGIc) in ways analogous to (saesvuno$ oF QUANTIFIER those in algebra; this was the first real step in the development of modern logic. LocIC. boundvoriobleSeasyMBoLSoF quANTIFIER Boyle, Robert S?cscIENTIsrs.

36

bru*ding

Bmod,

brockcfingHUssERL'sterm, referring to the process of suspendi.g normal ASsuMprIoNs I and pREsupposlTloNs. He thought that by "bracketing off" the assumptions of science we could see things as they fundamentally appear to coNsclousNEss. Secalso pHENoMENoLocy. Brodley,F(rancis) H(erbert) (1846-1924)English tonet-rsr phi losopher, known for his works on Loclc, METApHysrcs, and ethics. Outside the British EMpIRICTsT tradition, his work is more in the continental Hncrlian spirit. His central metaphysical notion is "the ABSoLUTE"-acoherent and comprehensive whole that harmonizes the diversity and sBLr-cot.tTRADICTIoNS of appearances. broinin 0 vol Imagine that you are, and alwayshavebeen, merely a brain suspendedin a vat of nutritive liquid, connected to a comput€r that feedsyou electronic signals (thereby simulating senseexperience).All your experiencesare thus hallucinations (seeltr-ustoN/ HALLUcTNATToN/ DELUsIoN). Have you any good reason to think you are not a brain in a vat? This thought experiment, suggestedby Hilary purNAM,is used by philosophers to consider the form of sCEFrnCrsM about the external world it raises. Franz (1838-1917)German philosopher and psyBrenfono, chologist, an important influence on later conttNENTAL philosophers;known for his theory of "rNTENTroNALrry" 2; the view that mental acts refer to (sometimes"inexistent") things beyond themselves. Bridgmon, PercySeescrnNrrsrs. Btood,C(harlie) D(unbar) (1887-1971)English philosopher who contributed to a wide variety of topics;a collector and systematizerof traditional philosophical ideas who neverthelesstook account of contemporary philosophy and science.

37

Bruruu,

burden olproof

Brouwer,Luitzen Egbertus Jan (1881-1966) Dutch mathematician, a founder of mathematical INTUITtoNIstr,t, with important work in the philosophy of mathematics. Bruno,Giordano (154&1600) Italian Renaissancephilosopher. He worked in various European countries after religious persecution forced him to flee ltaly; burned as a heretic. His work is now seen as an imporhru step toward the scientific views of nature that followed. Buber,Martin (1878-1965) Austrian Jewish philosopher and theologian, worked in Germany and Palestine.Best known for his thought on the differences between the relationships we have with things and with people: he called the latter the "I-thou" relationship. lheory HUME'stheory of pEnsoNnLIDENTITY.He argued bundle that since we can't perceive any continuing self in us, our idea of a person, which has to come from prRcrprtoN to be valid, can't be of a continuing mental sunsrnrucE.All we can perceivein ourselvesis a continuously changing "bundle" of mental events,so this is what our coNcEpr of the self must consist of. This bundle theory of a person is a particular application of a bundle theory of everything advocatedby who argued that things in gen' many classicalEMPIRIctsrs, eral are nothing more than a bundle of properties, burdgn of proof When there is a disagreement,it's sometimesthe case that one side is expected to Prove its case, and if it can't, the other wins by default. The side that must provide proof is said to have the burden of proof. If one position is surprising, or unorthodox, or if it runs counter to other well-acceptedbeliefs, then that position tends to have the burden of proof. Thus, for example, people who claim that we have been regularly visited by aliens from outer sPace have the burden of proof.

38

l

Eurihr,

Bulh,

Euddon,Jean (1295-1356) French philosopher and scientist; work on physics, Locrc, and ugrepHyslcs. His thought on will and reason resulted in his association with the example now known as BURIDAN'S Ass. Buridon!oss BURIDANbelieved that one must do what and only what seems to one to be the greatest good. One problem raised by this position is illustrated by the story known as Buridan's ass(though Buridan himself is not responsiblefor this story): imagine a hungry ass standing between two equal and equidistant piles of hay. Neither would seem more desirable to it than the other, so if Buridan's principle were right, the animal would starve to death. Buile, Edmund (1729-1797) British statesman and political thinker, associatedwith conservative political views. Builer,BishopJoseph. (1692-1752)Englishtheologian and moralist, known for his work on moral psychology and rnrou OGY.

39

mkulus

cordinol scohlronking / ordinol

colculusAn abstract system of symbols, aimed at calculating something. A calculus is interpreted when its symbols are given meaning by relating them to things in the real world. Some philosophers think of the various sciencesas interpreted calculi. One can call each symbol-systemof svuBoLIC LoGIc a'calculus': for example,the SENTENTIAL and queNrt'calculi') rlnR calculi.('Calculus'is singular;plural: sea colculus, felirity/ felicific / hoppiness. / pleosure-poin / hedonic LICIFICCALCUI.US.

FE.

(olvin, John (original name Jean Chauvin or Caulvin) (15091564) French (lived in Switzerland)theologian and religious reformer. His moral, theological,and socialviews ("Calvinism") havebeen extremelyinfluential. (omus,Albert (1913-1960)Algerian-born French novelist and philosopher, associatedwith the ExISTnNTIALISTS. (onon A basic and important rule. ftnlor, Georg (1345-1918)Russian-bornGerman mathematician and logician, best known fior his creation of spr theory. topitolismAn economic system characterized by private proPerty and a free market, contrasted with socleLlsu / coMMUNISM

cordinol/ordinolstale/ronkin[ A cardinal scaleassignssome number to each item on a list; the number reflects the "size" of each item, Thus, fior example, a cardinal ranking of the

f0

ftmop,

cotrgofullogk

urILITy of actions would assign a utility to each item reflecting its degree of value. We would expect that an item with a utility of 1000 is ten times as good as an item with a utility of 100. An ordinal scale arranges items on a list merely in order of their size, without giving absolute values. Thus, if one action is higher on an ordinal list of utilities, that means that it has more utility; but we aren't told how much more. (ornop, Rudolf (1891-1970) German-born philosopher who spent his later life in the U.S., to which he transplanted LocIcAL posITIvIsMwhen the vrnNNn cIRCLEdisbanded in pre-World War II Austria. He is important also for his work on philosophy of scienceand loctc. (orfesionThis means'pertaining to DEscARTEs'. Cartesianismis a school of thought derived from Descartes'philosophy. (oilesiondoubt e philosophical method (associated with orscenrrs) in which one begins by assuming that any belief which could be doubted is false-even the most ordinary AssuMprloNsl of common sense.One then searchesfor a starting point that is TNDUBTTABLE. (ossirer,Ernst (1874-1945)German philosopher (working in his later life in the U.S.) who extended KANT'Sviews in considering symbolic representation and culture. cosuislryThe determination of right and wrong by reasoning involving general principles applied to particular cases,taking into account their particular characteristics. Because casuists (especially in religious contexts) sometimes reasoned in overly complex ways to silly conclusions, this word has come to have disparaging overtones. ['KAZH-you-istree'l tologoriollogicThe theory of the logical relations between sentences with the following forms: All A s are B's; No A's are B's; Some A's are B's; Some A's are not B's. These are the

mbgorid / lryiltoftdhnpcnlivo

cotfrmb

standard forms of the categorial propositions. See also l7 E /r/oPRoPosrTIoNs. imperotiveKANr's distinction. An imperacolegodol/ hypolhoticol 'Categorical' means absolute-not detive is a command. 'hypothetical' pendent on particular aims or circumstances; means relative to, depending on, particular aims or circum'Tell the truth' is a categoricalimperative, but stances.Thus, 'If it is to everyone'sbenefit, tell the truth' and 'If you want others to trust you, tell the truth' are hypothetical imperatives. Kant argued that hypothetical imperatives, while sometimesgiving useful practical advice,do not expressthe truths of morality, which are expressedonly by categorical imperatives. He argued further that there is one command central to all morality-tia categorical imperative: Act in a way such that the general rule behind your action could consistentlybe willed to be a universal law. He argued that this was equivalent to saying that others should be treated as ends, never as means only. c0l0g0ri0sUsed by ARIsrorLE and xnur to refer to our most basic concepts. Kant thought these were A PRIoRI,and they and sussrnNcs. included cAUSATIoN mistoksGilbert RYLESave this example of a category c0f0g0ry mistake: someone is shown a number of classroom and administrative buildingp, libraries, student residences,etc., but says,"I have seen all those, but where is the university?" His mistake was to think that the university is just another building, whereas the university is in a different category. Ryle argued that some philosophical mistakes-for instance, the separation of mind from body and its behaviour-are thus made by people who don't understand what categories their concepts belong in. colhoris ARIsrorLE's term for the purging or cleansing of the emotions that he thought happened to the audience at the

12

omo{irt$I

cuddrdl

end of a dramatic tragedy, when pity and ternor produced in the audience are calmed. [also spelled'hathanis'l tousolchoinA series of events in which each event causes the next. couioloxplonofionSeeExpLANArIoN. couslsui sec c.rusr-oF-ITsELF. (0us0li0nThe relation that holds between a cAUsEand its effect. Also called'causalitv'. couseThat which Urirrg, something about, or, in a wider and old-fashioned sense, merely ExpLAINs it. (For this wider sense,

Jee EFFICIENT /

FOR.MAL /

MATERIAL /

FINAL CAUSES.)

Long-standing philosophical problems are concerned with the nature of cause, and how wb find out about it. t-tuun argued that we think that A causes B when A's have regularly been followed by B's in the past (i.e., have been "constantly conjoined" with B's); but that the notion that A has a "power" to produce B "necessarily" (seeNECESSARY,/ coNTIN" cENTTRUTH)is not something we can observe,so this is not a legitimate part of the notion of cause.Critics object that this fails to distinguish between causal connections and mere accidental but universal regularities. [The adjectival form of this word is 'causal'-be careful not to spell this 'casual'.] folse Seermss cAUSE. couse, (0use-0f-ilself (Latin; causa sui\ Narrowly, a thing that causes itself to exist (or to be the way it is). God is commonly thought to be the only thing that is capable of this. This notion is difficult to understand, given that, in the common notion of CAUSE, for x to causey, x must exist before y does, and it's nonsense to think of something existing before it itself does. A broader (and more old-fashioned) notion

43

cd[e,florim/Bmlt

ceFllbrpl0r$

thinks of causeas ExpLANATIoN. This doesnot lead to the sameabsurdity,but has its own problems:how can something providethe explanationfor its own existence? (0u50, prorimofo REMoTE CAUSE. / remofeSecpRoxruATE/ efficient cousos, / formol/moteriol / linal SeerrncrpNr / FoRMAL / MATERIAL,/ FTNALCAUS$.

cousas / roosonsSeeRsesorus/ cAUSEs. cove In The Republic, PLATo imagines a group of prisoners chained inside a caverwho never seeanything in the outside world; all they see are shadowscast on the wall of the cave by objects inside the cave that are copies of real things outside. This is presented as an analogy to how Plato sees our status: what we experience is not reality, but merely a shadowy representation of it. The philosopher's job is to figure out what reality might be like. (See also PLAToNIC FoRMS). SecrrllrrnrALrsM. m0t0ri0lism c0nlrol-sloto 'certain' in ordinary talk when it is corloinA belief is called believed very strongly, or when one is unable to think, or even imagine, that it might be false. Philosophers often don't want to rely on such subjective and psychological matters, and demand proof that some belief really is beyond rational doubt. porihus(Latin: n'otherthings being equal") This is used in ceteris comparing two things, assuming they differ only in the one characteristicunder consideration. For example, it could be said that, ceteris paribus, a simple theory is better than a complicated one; though if everything else is not equal-if, for example, the simpler theory has fewer true predictions'SEH' + '-ter-iss then it might not be better. ['KEH' or PAR-uh-bus'l

11

choir, otrd

0nmsky,

choin,cousolSeecAUSALcHArN. chonceSomething happens by chance when it is not fully onrrnMINED by previous events-when previous events do not necessarilybring it about, or make it. the way it is; in other words, when it's a random event. Sometimes, however, we speak of chance eventsas those we're unable to predict with certainty, though they might be determined in unknown ways. (For example, how a flipped coin turns up may be fully determined by how it's flipped, but in practice, we don't and can't do the measurementsand calculations, so we sayit's a matter of chance.)We can sometimes know the PRoBABILITvof chance events in advance. A third way of using this term refers to an event.as merely coincidental with another; thus we might say that it was mere chance that the eclipse occurred on Fred's birthday. We don't mean here that either event was uncausedor unpredictable. thoos l. Early phitosophers used this term to refer to rhe unformed and disorderly state of things which, they supposed, preceded the imposition of order that produced the universe (the cosMos). 2. The term has been used recently (in 'chaos theory') to refer to a branch of mathematical study concerned with complex and in some ways unpredictable phenomena such as the weather. chimeloIn Greek mythology, this is a monster with a lion's head, goat's body, and snake'stail. By extension, in philosophy this means a non-existent object which we imagine by combining features of real things. ['ky-MEER-a' or 'kuhMEER-a'l (homsky,(Avram) Noam (b. 1928) American linguist (known for ground-breaking work in SEMANTTc theory) and philosopher (associatedwith the TNNATENESs hypothesis.) Recently in the public eye for his strong left-wing political views.

0cero,

ffinoy0ffe

fitoto, (MarcusTullius) (10643 B.C.) Roman orator and statesman, writer of works on politics and oratory. drdo,viciourSaavrcrous crRcLE. 0rclg,YiennoSeevrnNNecrRCLE. circulor toosoning / definitionA osptt{trloruis circular (and thus useless)when the term to be defined, or a version of it, occurs 'free action' in the definition; for example, the definition of 'action that is freely done'. Circular reasoning defends as some statement by assuming the truth of that statement; e.g.: 'Why you do l h i n kw h o t h eB i b l es o y si s l r u e ? " " B e c o u tsheeB i b l ei s t h ef { o r do f 6 o d . ' '||ow you of6od?' k n o wt h o ti t i s t h eW o r d do 'Becouse i t s o y s oi n l h eB i b l eo, n de v e r y t h ilnhge r si s t t u e . " 'vicious Reasoningthat is bad becausecircular is said to be a are all circles not argue that philosophers Some circle'. vicious-some sorts of circular reasoning are accePtable,for example, when the circle is wide enough. Circular reasoning 'begging the question'' Carelessspeakers is also known as 'raising the sometimes think that this is synonymous with called is sometimes question it Begging the question'; isn't. 'petiti,oprincipii'['peh-TlTee-oh prin-KIPby its Latin name, 'piTlSHceoh prin-SlP'ee'ee'] "postulation of the ee€e' or beginning." A public, non-violent, conscientious political civildisobsdienco act contrary to the law, done with the aim of Protesting a perceived injustice the law. civilrights SaaRrcuts. doirvoyonc SeepennNoRMALPHENoMENA.

f6

fts

cognitivbm / noncognilivim

dossSaesnr. ideos ptscnnrns (and others) have used this to cleoronddistinct refer to the kind of ideas they thought philosophers should seek as the foundation for any other beliefs, and which are An idea is clear according to completely reliable or cERTAIN. Descartes,when it is "present and apParent to an attentive mind"; and distinct when it is "so precise and different from other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear." There is some problem in interpreting just what Descartesmeant here, and in showing why this sort of idea might be especiallyor completely reliable. clesr/ holdcoseA clear casein law is one in which, if all the facts (including the facts of legal history) were known, all reasonable people would agree on what legal outcome was proper. Reasonablepeople would disagree on the proper outcome of a hard casedespite this full knowledge. (OE]C|ON SdE COMPULSION.

(oexlensive Two TERMS or PREDICATES are coextensivewhen they in fact apply to exactly the same objects (seaexrENsloN / TNTENSTON). cogiloeryosum (Latin: "I think, therefore I exist") DEScARTES' famous argument (sometimescalled'the cogito', for short), which he took to be the starting point in his search for Whatever else he might be mistaken about, he cERTAINTY. reasoned, he could not be mistaken that he was thinking, becauseeven mistaken thinking is thinking. It followed that he must exist-at leastas a thinking thing. ['KO-' or'KAH'+ '-gee-to air-go soom'] cognilionThe mental processby which we get KNowLEDGE. (ogniliyism Cognitivism is the position that some/ noncognilivhm thing can be known. Ethical cognitivism is the view that

47

cdcnno/iroheure

ommon comaforytmont fu 6od's erishnce

ethical statements'are statements about (supposed) facts and thus are true or false,and might be known to be true or false. This is opposed to the noncognitivist position that ethical statements are not knowable. A species of ethical noncognitivism is nuonvtsu, which argues that ethical statements are not fact-stating, but are expressions of ap proval or disapproval (like'Hooray for that!'), or invitations 'Please do that!') and are thus neither true to action (like nor false, and not knowable. (ohercnce A srr of beliefs or sentencesis coherent / incoherence when it fits together in a logical way-that is, when everything in the set is consistent,or when the items in it coNrlnra others in it. A set in which one item would be false, or probably false, given the truth of others is not coherent (is incoherent). A coherentist position is one that claims that the coherence of a group of beliefs or sentencesis what counts fior their truth or reliability-and perhaps the only thing that counts. thooryof truth ScerRurH. cohorenca What applies to a group collectively aptolledively / distributivoly plies to it as a whole only, i.e., not to its individual members (not distributively). The atoms that constitute a pig collectively, but not distributively, outweigh a fly. €ommilmonl1. A binding oBLIGATtotlvoluntarily undertaken by hold that one the person thus obligated. nxsTENTIALISTS freely and arbitrarily makes.upone's commitments, and that this is the only source of one's moral obligation. 2' See oNTol.oclc.tt commitment. (0mm0n for God!oxhlen(oThe supposed fact that consonf orgumonf so many cultures in all historical periods have believed in God is given as evidence of His existence.Common criticisms of this argument are that not all cultures share belief

cornnmemsnrobm

com*rih6

in God, and that it wouldn't prove anything even if they did. Here's a particularly bad version of this argument: The Bible has been translated into hundreds of different languages, but in every single translation, it says that God exists! So He must exist. (ommon-$nse roolismseeNllvn REAUSM. commons, lrogedyof fie SeaTRAcEDYoF THEcoMMoNs. (ommunism.seasocreusM/ coMMUNrsM. (ommul0liyit!,SeesvlrruerRrc/ ASYMMETRIC / NoNSYMMETRIC. compotibilism Any philosophical position that claims that two things are compatible (they can both exist at once). In particular, this word is often used to refer to the view that FREEwILL and oTInRMINISMare compatible-that is, that people's ACTIoNSare (sometimes) free even though they are fully causally determined. They argue that we're not free when we're acting under coMputsloN (that is,forced to act), but that this is a different thing from the action's being determined or caused. complemenl The complement of one sETis another set containing everything not in the first. The complement of the set of pigs includes all non-pigs (cows, planets, toes, days of the '-p' stands week, etc.). If 'p' stands for the set of pigs, then for its complement. The complement of the term 'pigp' is the term'non-pigs'. (omplcleness These terms have a variety of techni/ incompletenets cal senses,but in a common use, a LoGICALsystemis complete when every LocrcALLyrRUEsentenceis DERIvIBLE, and otherwise incomplete. complex ideos SeesrMpLE/coMpLEXrDEAs.

ompilixr

@nql

(0mp0slliOnThe fallacy of composition is the incorrecr reasoning from properties of parts of a whole to properties of the whole itself. For instance, it's true that each atom of a pig weighs less than one gram, but it's a mistake to conclude that since the pig is composed of nothing but these atoms, that the pig weighs less than one gram. compulsion An ecrton is said to be done under compulsion (also known as 'constraint' or 'coercion') when it is "forced" by internal or external circumstances,and thus the doer of that action can't be held morally nEseoNsIBLE for doing it. If you steal something, for example, because someone is forcing you to do it at gunpoint, or becauseyou are a kleptomaniac (i.e., you have the psychologicaldisorder that is supposedto create an irresistible tendency to steal),that doesn't make your action any better, but it does mean that you're not to about FREEWrLL argue that compulblame. CoMPATTBLISTS sion is the sort of cause that makes one unfree and not responsible, but when one's action is caused (onrnnutNro) but not due to compulsion, one is free and responsible. (omle, (Isidore) Auguste (Marie-Franqois)(1798-1857)French Postrlvlsr philosopher. He emphasized the evolution of explanation. He is thought toward scientific, EMPIRICAL credited with founding the scienceof sociology. con(opl l. In ordinary talk, this word often has little meaning, and is best omitted when it's just a pretentious synonym fior 'idea'. 2. Philosophers may use this word to refer to the ability to categorizethingp; thus to saythat someone has the concept of duck is to say that that person can sort things correctly into ducks and non-ducks.A concePt is sometimes distinguished from a percept, which is a particular mental item had while sensing a particular thing. A concept, then, may be thought to be a generalization or ABsrRAcnoNfrom one or many percepts.Thus a percept is sometimes called a particular idea, and a concePt a general or abstract idea.

concoplulfnfh

(ondliond

(oncopluulfuthA statement that is true merely because of the nature of the coNcErrs that make it up. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried is a conceptual truth, because the concept of being a bachelor involves being unmarried. Compare the fact that snow is white: this is not a conceptual truth, becausebeing white, despite being true of snow, is not part of the concept of snow.We can imagine, consistentwith our concept of snow, that snow is alwaysgreen. (Substitute 'word' for 'concept' in this definition, and it turns into the definition of 'nulLytlc rRUTH'.) (onclusion SeeeRcuunNr. condusion morkelsTerms which indicate what the conclusion of an argument is, for example, "therefore,' "hence," "accordingly, "thus." ContrefeContrasted with 'AnstRACT', something is concrete when it is particular and real (perhaps material-saeuerrruALISM).The reltecv of misplaced concretenessmistakenly argues that something abstract is real (saeuvrosrtTrzlrroN). fundilloc,Etienne Bonnot de (1715-1780)French philosopher, with influential works on theory of knowledge. ['kondeeyak'l conditionolA statementof the form 'if p then q', for example, ,If it's raining, then you'll get wet'. What this sort of statement means (and what would make it true) is a surprisingly complicated matter, but a core of that meaning is trloonuno by the (much simpler) material conditional in snrurnNTrAl LocIC. A material conditional of the form 'if p then q' is defined as a statement that is rue when p is false or q is true (or both); so it is false only when p is true and q is false.The first sentence in thiis material conditional is caled the 'anrecedent', the second the'consequent'. To symbolize this sentence we connect letters representing the antecedent and

ondfbod,oom|}tofu

onffnmlhn/ftconfrmofpn/voriff cdion/hbftotion

consequent by the horseshoe (=) or the arrow (+) (see LOGIC). To see why the material SYMBOLS OF SENTENTIAL conditional is only a rough match for the English condi'If Bolivia is in Asia, tional, consider the English sentence then pigs f ly.'Is this true or false or neither? It's hard to say. 'BlP'. But suppose we translate this into symbolic logic as 'B' ('Bolivia Now the antecedentof this material conditional is in Asia') is false, so'Bf P' is true. This and other strange results of modelling the English conditional by the material of the material conditional are known as the PARADoxES conditional. It's clear also that the material conditional A material condidoes not model the couNTEREAcruAL. tional is also known as a material implication, though'implication' can also refer to a relation between whole statements. Material conditionals should be distinguished from strict implications: these are conditionals that are Locl. 'If some pigs are sloppy eaters, CALLYTRUE,for example, then some sloppy eatersare pigs.' cl ScecouNrEREAcruAL. conlrory-to-fo condifionol, probobililySeepnosA,srLrry. conditionol no(essory condition, / sulficientSeeNrcessARy/ suFFIcIENTcoNDITION. (ondottel, Marquis de (1743-1794)French mathematician, phi' losopher, and social theorist. ['kondor-say'] ftndorcolp0r0d0xseevorsn's pnReoox 2. Confirmation is confkmolion/distonfkmolion/verificotion/folsificotion the collection of evidence to show that a statement is true. Because there might be some evidence even for a false statement, a statement might be confirmed though false. 'dis' Collecting evidence that a statement is false is called confirmation'.'Verification' means'confirmation', and 'falsification' means'disconfirmation', though one tends to

52

ofirffit

orErs,crtbbrt

speak of a statrm€nt as having been rarified (or falsified) only if the statement is really true (or false), and has been shown to be so by the evidence. ottittillim The logical relation expressed in English by connect' ing two s€ntences by'and'; also the sentence thus formed. The sentences connected in a conjunction are called'conjuncts'. A conjunction is true when both conjuncts are true, 'It's raining and it's and false otherwise. Thus the sentence 'It's Tuesday' Tuesday' is true when both 'It's raining' and are true. If one or both conjuncts are false, the conjunction is false. A conjunction is symbolized in logic by connecting letters standing for the conjuncts with an ampersand (&) or Loclc) a dot ( .) (seesyMBors oF SENTENTIAL (0nnol0lionSaconnorlrroN / coNNorATIoN. conscioncThis is the sense of right and wrong. It is sometimes supposed that this is a way we have of knowing moral truths, perhaps by some sort of reliable internal "voice' or senseperception, perhaps provided by God, which tells us moral 'coNfacts. [Students sometimes confuse this word with

scrous']. (onsdousness l. The state that we are in when awake: mental events are going on. 2. Awareness of something. (You aren't usually consciousof the position of your tongue). 3. = mind (though it might be that the mind exists even while we are asleep or not aware of anything). The fact that we are conscious is supposed by some to distinguish people from machines and other non-living things, and perhaps from (at least the lower) animals. SeealsoSELFcONSCIOUSNEss. (onsoquenl SecCottottIoNAL. (0ntequonfiolism The position that people's actions are right or wrong because of their consequences(their results). This sort of ethical theory is also called 'TELEoLoctcAL', and is

oldifrrliy| / ryhtiUlruls

oflIisbny

contrasted with deontological theories (associated with' KANT and others), which hold that results of actions are morally irrelevant. Thus, for example, a Kantian rnight think that lying is always wrong just in itself, whereas a consequentialist might think that lying is morally permissible in those circumstances in which the lie results in good consequencesoverall. consislonqA srr of statements is consistent if it is logically possible that all the statements in that set are true. It is inconsistent if one statement CoNTRADICTS another, or if a contradiction results from reasoning from the set. For example, these three statementsform an inconsistent set: F r e di s g o o do t l o g i c . Nobody whofoiledthistestis goodot logic. Fredfoiledthistesl. Note that there can be a consistentset in which some, or all, 'Pigs fly' the statementsare false. The two false statements, and'Grass is alwayspurple' make a consistentset: they don't contradict each other, and no contradiction arises from assuming both of them. Each is false, but each might have been tru€, and both could have been true together. The set consisting of this one statement 'It's raining and it's not raining' is inconsistent, because this statement is sglr.couTRADICTORY. consl0nlsaesyMgoLsoF QUANTTFTER LoGIc. coniunclion Saeceusr. conslonl (onslofivsSeepnRronMATrvE/ coNsTATrvE. rule a regulative rule. merely tells people consfilufivo / regulolive 'Keep off the grass').Constituwhat to do or not to do (e.g., tive rules (according to sEARLE)may "create or define new forms of behaviour' and "often have the form: X counts as

51

l

ontrt

(onstminl

'Moving the ball across the goal line while Y." Thus, the rule in play counts as a touchdown' creates a new form of behav' iour (a touchdown, nonexistent without this rule). ['con' STlT-you-tiv'l (onslroinlSaecouruworu. (onsllucliye dilemmoAn argument with this form: [ i t h e rA o r L lf A thent; if I thenD. Therefore C or D. is: dilemmo simpler formof construclive Another, [ i t h e rA o r B . l f A t h e nC ;i f B t h e n( . Therefore [' (see arsooruruue). proof In mathematics, one gives a construcexislente tonslruclive tive existence proof of some mathematical entity when one produces an example of it, or at least gives a method for producing an example. INTUITIoutsrs in mathematics may, for example, reject the existence of infinity because no constructive existence proof of it can be given. conslrucf, lheorelicolScetheoretical nNrntts/

coNsrRucrs.

Meditation, thoughtfulness. Some philosophers conlemplation think that the contemplative life-one filled with thought (especially philosophical thought!)-is the best or happiest. It's not obvious that this is true. (onlexl The relevant surroundings of something. In Loclc, the context of a group of words is the rest of the words in its sentence. One logically interesting distinction between contexts is their ore,guE/ TRANspAnuNtcharacter; and see also TNTENTIoNAI3. In ethics, context is relevant to those who

onli0rily

c0nlinum

think that the surroundings of some act are relevant to its rightness or wrongness. conliguifyProximity (touching) in space or time ('spatial' or 'tgtr.tpoRl,Lcontiguity'). Two events are spatially and temporally contiguous when there is neither space between them nor time between their occurrence. conlinenhlphilosophy This expression is used by philosophers in English-speakingcountries to refer to what they take to be the "speculative" style of philosophy done on the European continent during the l9th and 20th centuries, associated with (among others) HEcEL,HUSSERL, HEIDEccER,sARTRE, FoucAULT, and HnsEnMAs.The contrast implied is with ANALYTICphilosophy. Philosophers on the continent never call themselves "continental," and it's a misleading term, and best avoided, insofar as it implies that they are uniform in style and methodology. Philosophical styleson the Continent is diverse, and are much more informatively characterized as IDEALISM, EMpTRICISM, RATIONALISM, EXSTENTIALISIr and so on. To saythat a true (or false) statementis contingent is conlingoncy to deny that it must be true (or false). METArHvSIcAL contingency is contrasted with necessary truth and falsity (sae NECESSARY TRLJTH); logical contingency is con/ CONTINGENT trasted with loctcAL TRurtI ANDFALsITv.Each sort is sometimes simply called'contingency'. This makesthingp confusitg. ofgumonf for Godt0xisl0n(0Seenve wAys conlingonry problomof future SeepRoBLEMoF ruTUREcoNrrNcENrs. conlingonls, Conlinuuml. A process of gradual development with no sudden changes.t. A series with no gaps in it, i.e., continuous, not composed of discrete elements. Time is a continuum if

56

confiffiomlfnc&m

onfi!psilitfl

between any two times, no matter how close, there is a third. ['con-TlN-you-um'] (onlro-cousolfreodom LTBERTARTANS sometimes believe that a free ACTIoN-one we're RESPONSIBLE for-could only be one that is not caused by previous events. Thus, the sort of freedom they attribute to some of our actions is contra-causal (see FREEwrLL). (onllodorionism SeesocrAl coNTRAcr. controdidion / conllory Two statements are contradictory when the truth of one logically requires the falsity of the other, and the falsity of one requires the truth of the other-in other words, when it is impossible that both are true, and it is impossible that both are false. 'It's raining' and 'It's not raining' are contradictory: exactly one of them must be true. Two statements are contraries when it is impossible that they are both true, though they might both be false. 'No pig:sfly' and 'All pigs fly' are contraries, not contradictories. It is logically impossible that both of them are true, though they both might be false (were it the casethat some, but not all, pigs fly). One can also call a sELF{oNTRADIcrroNa 'contradiction'. (onlrodidion, lowof Saar-AwoF coNrRADrcrroN. conlroposilionl. A rule of srNrEhrrrAl Locrc that saysthat from any sentence of the form 'If p then q' one may reason correctly to the corresponding sentence of the form 'If not q then not p'. 2. A rule of cnrecoRrAl Locrc that saysthat one may create a logically equivalent sentence fi'om any categorial sentence by replacing its subject terms with the coMpLEMENTof its pnnorcntn term, and by replacing its predicate term with the complement of its subject term. For example, the contrapositiveof 'All bats are mammals'is'All non-mammals are non-bats'.

onluy

ordenntU

onlrory saacoNTRADrcTloN/ coNTRARy. conlrory-llfotf conditionolScacouNrsRFAcruAL. 'conventional convcnlionIn ordinary use, behaviour' is what one calls accepted, especially artificial or customary, behaviour, sometimes resulting from explicit or tacit agreement. In current philosophical use, associatedwith David LEwrs,a convention for behaviour arises when it would be to everyone's advantage that actions be coordinated in any of a variety of arbitrary ways, and a convention is a rule that picks one of these ways. Thus, it is a (North American) convention that one drives to the right. RrcHTs. SeeREALTSM conv0nlionoliiln / ANTTREALTSM, (onvolso / obversgTerms of tneotttoNAL Locrc. The converseof a statement is obtained by interchanging the subject and 'All pigs are sloppy eaters' PREDICATE; thus, the converseof is 'All sloppy eatersare pigs'. (You can see that conversion is not alwaysa correct way to reason.) The obverse of a state'All' (or vice versa),or ment is obtained by changingnNo'to 'Some...arenot' (or vice versa); by changing'Some...are'to and by changing the predicate term to its coMPLEMENT. 'All pigs Thus, the obverseof 'No pigs are non-mammals' is 'Some pigs are non-flying are mammalsn,and the obverseof 'Some pigs are not flying thlngs'. All obversions things' is are valid (saelncur,tnNr). (opornicus,Nicolaus SecsctrNnsrs. (opulo In rnepntoNAl Loclc, the words that connect subject 'are', 'are not', etc. and pnBptcATE 2, such as'is', ['COP-youluh'l 2-nouns or noun phrases-are co-referco-rcforonliolTwo TERMS ential when they nrrun to exactly the same thing, or the same group of things. Coreferential terms do not always

corpormlsbstolto

omufrdul

'animals with have the same meaning. In QUINE'sexample, 'animals with kidneys' are co-referential (behearts' and cause all and only animals with hearts are animals with kidneys), but these two terms have different meanings. The 'the tallest mountain on earth' terms 'Mount Everest' and are co-referential. (orp01e0l sub$oncesre suBSTANcE. fieoryof truth SeerRUrH. correspondence corrigibilitySeerr.IcoRRrcrBrt.rry. cosmogOny Theory about the origins of the universe. ['kozMOG-uh-nee'l cosmologicol for God!exislen(eSeeFrRSrcAUsEARGUMENT. olgumenl cosmology Philosophical or scientific theorizing about the cos t'toS. Early philosophers often had ideas about where the cosmos came from, how it developed into the current form, and what its basic structure and laws were. (osmosThe universe as a whole, especiallyas the Greeks saw it. [sometimes spelled the way it's transliterated from Greek: 'hosmos'l counlerexomple An example intended to show that some general claim is false. Reasoning by counterexample is frequently a useful philosophical tactic for arguing against some position. counlelfoduolA counterfactual (also called a 'counterfactual conditional' or a 'contrary-to-fact conditional') is a CONDITIoNAL statement whose antecedent is false. In English we use the subjunctive in counterfactuals: 'If Fred were here, you wouldn't be doing that'. (This is properly said only if Fred isn't here.) One interesting and controversial area in

59

q,nHh0ilittt

oto, lwd*[

modern Loclc is concerned with figuring out what makes certain counterfactual conditionals true or false. A powerful and widely accepted way of understanding counterfactuals (associated with David LEwIs and others) uses the notion of possIBLEwoRLDs: a counterfactual is true when the consequent is true in the nearest possible world (i.e., a world as much as possible like ours) in which the antecedentis true. SeerNrurrroN. countorinluiliYa (ovoringlou A general I-nw applying to a particular instance, The covering law theory of ExplnNntloN saysthat a particular event is explained when one or more covering laws are given that (together with particular facts) IMPLYthe event. For example, we can explain why a piece of metal rusted by appealing to the covering law that iron rusts when exposed to air and moisture, and the facts that this metalis iron, and was exposed to air and moisture. This theory of explanation is associatedwith MILLandHEMPEL. The religious doctrine that the world was created by cleotionism a divine being, or that it owes its present form to divine agency. This term is frequently used to refer to the idea, associated with religious fundamentalism, that the world was created in exactly the way the Bible says it was, and more particularly to the idea that living things are the way they are becauseGod designed them that way; this is op' posed to the view that they developedthrough the natural processesof nvolurton. criterionA test or standard for applying a word, or for the truth or falsity of some claim. This word is singular; its plural is 'criteria'. ftoce, Benedetto (1866-1952)Italian philosopher best known for his rDEALlsrtcAESTHETtcs. ['CROW-chay'] ILLUSIoN. cube,reversing(Necker cube) SaavuLt-BR-LYER

60

odtrdr*fttm/obolrli$'|

ty,rflrk

cuhwolrelofivism / obrnluti$n&a nsLArIvIsM / ABsoLUrIsM. t-', meaning'not' or 'it is not the case that', turl The symbol also often called the rnou.) (saeswnols oF SENTENTIAL LOGrC). The science of systems of control and communicacybernotics tion in animals and machines. See also nRurtcIAL INTELLIcENcE.['sigh-bur-NET-iks] cynics / cynicismIn ordinary talk, a cynic (someone who is cynical, who practices cynicism) is one who doubts the existence of human goodness and offers unpleasant reinterpretations of apparent examples of this, in which people are seen as less virtuous and more self-interested. The philosophical source for this word is the Cynics, ancient Greek philosophers who denounced the conventional methods of seeking happiness (possessions,family, religion, rePutation, etc'), and advocated self-control, self-knowledge, and escguclsM. The best-known Greek Cynic was DIocENnsof Synope. (yrenoicPertaining to the school of philosophy founded by (in Cyrenaica), which held that pleasure was the ARISTIPPUS only good in life.

Dmh

fitihmofiir

Donle SaewRrrERs. Dorwin, Charles SeasctrNtrsrs. DorwinismSaenvolurtol. or dotum (Latin: "the given") Something crvEN-an AssuMPTIoN premise (saanncuuENr) from which other claims may be or a starting point for knowledge . A snnsr-pnruu is DERIVED, that bit of internal experiencewe get when our sensesreveal the world to us; some philosophers think that this is the basis for knowledge of the external world. The nncuunxr FRoMILLUSIoNconcludes that sensedata are what are always directly present to our minds when we use our senses;any information about externals must be inferred from these. 'data'] ['Datum' is singular; plural Dovidson,Donald (b. l9l7) American contemporary METAPHYSIcl.tN and philosopher of mind and of language. molrir A table designed to display the features involved dacision in various options and outcomes of a decision. For example, DILEMMAis shown the decision matrix for the PRISoNER's below (onfesses 0therdoesn't confess 0lher(onfesses 0lher

tyoor;inpri Youconfess Youdon'tconfess Inside the four boxes are listed the consequences f,or you, given your action and that of the other prisoner.

52

docffiltuliot$m

dodufnn/'ndrfut

A sceptical and frequently anti.intellectual dctOnslruCliOnhm movement which seeks to interpret texts and the positions held in them by "deconstructing" them - showing the hidden presuppositions, prejudices, motives, and political aims behind them. de dido/ dera (Latin: "about what's sud" / "about a thing") Usually a distinction concerning belief. A de re belief is a belief considered with respect to the actual thing that it's about. Thus, if someone mistakenly thinks that the moving thing in the sky he's looking at is a satellite, whereas it's actually a meteor, then he has the de re belief that a meteor is moving in the sky-more clearly: about that meteor, he believes it's moving in the sky above him. But he has the de dicto belief that a satellite is moving in the sky'above him. ['day DIK-tow','day ray'f deducfion / inductionl. In an outdated way of speaking, deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular, and induction is reasoning from the particular to the general. 2. Nowadays, this distinction between kinds of reasoning is made as follows: correct ("valid") deductive reasoning is are reasoning of the sort that if the premises (saaARGUMENT) true, the conclusion must be true; whereascorrect inductive reasoning supPorts the conclusion by showing only that it's more probably rue. Examples: Porky doesn'l llo pigsfly; Porkyis o pig;therefore, Deduclion:

flv. in o Porky, Petunio, ondolltheotherpigsobserved Induction: nopigsfly. don'lfly;therefore widevoriety ofcircumstonces Theseexamplesin fact fit definition l; but here are exalnples of deduction accordingto definition 2 that do not fit definition l: things. Nopigsfly;thereforo ollpigsorenon{lying notollpigsfly. iso pig;therefore Porky fly;Potky doesn'f

63

dlddturmfl

hfrtu/dffin

The two main sorts of deductive logic are sENTENtrer and LOCIC. QUANTIFTER A common form of induction works by enumeration: as support for the conclusion that all p's are q's, one lists many examples of p's that are q's.

drducfivemodcl SeecovERrNGLAw. deductivs-nomologicol modsl &e covERrNGLAw. dedudivevolidity &e pnoucrror.r. deep/ surfoco slruduro The deep structure (or depth grammar) of a sentence is what linguists take to be its underlying structure at the basic level; this is contrasted with its surface structure (or surface grammar), which includes the charac'grammar'. Thus, for exteristics that English teacherscall 'Fred loves Zelda' has the same deep ample, the sentence structure as'Zelda is loved by Fred', though they have different surface structures.The study of deep structure is associated with Noam cHoMSKy,who is also known for his posiprovided feature of tion that deep srructure is an INNATELY Ianguage. 'defeatible', in the senseof 'capable of being defaosibleMeans overruled'. A driver's license confers a defeasible right to drive, for example, because under certain circumstances (e.g., when he is drunk) the holder of a valid license would neverthelessnot be allowed to drive. SeapntsoNnR'sDILEMMA. defecfion / cooperolion 'to be defined") is a definiens / definiendunA dzf.niendum(Latin word or phrase to be defined, and the definition is the definiens (Latin: "defining thing"). ['duh-fin-ee-ENS','duhfin-ee-EN-dum']

ddh'rlo nilodocrnnbn / indofi

definitftn

definilr/ indofinitodoscriplionA definite description is a term of the form 'the x', for example, 'the tallest man in Brazil'. A definite description can apply to at most one thing. An indefinite description, by contrast, can apply to any one of a 'a number of thingp: tall man'. A famous controversy involving definite descriptions concerns whether or not statements containing them have ExTSTENTIAL IMpoRT: that is, whether a sentencewhose subject is a definite description that refers to nothing is therefore false. Consider the sentence 'The present king of France is bald'; does the fact that there is no present king of France make the sentencefalse? On Russntt.'saccount of the definite description it does. srRAwsoN,however, argues that the existence of the present king of France is merely pRESUpposEo by this sentence, as the statement 'Fred has stopped beating his wife' presupposes that Fred had been beating her. If what the statement presupposesis not true, then the statement itself is neither true nor false. definilionA procedure for giving the meaning of a word or phrase. There are various kinds of definition, including: L. Vnbal dcfinition: using other words, giving synonymous words or phrases. This is the sort of definition found in dictionaries, but note that dictionaries often do more than merely this: they tell you, for example, facts about things to which the words refer-facts not definitionally associated with these words. Contrasted with: 2. Ostensivedefinition:done by giving examples.One might define the word 'green' by showing somebody a number of green things, or'bird'by listing many different sorts of birds. 3. Functional definition: done by giving the typical use of the kind of thing, or its the typical cause-and-effectrelations with other things (seeTNcflONAL xrNo) 4. Operationaldzfinition: done by giving a list of procedures or measurementsfor telling when the word applies. 5. Stipulatiaedefinition: determines the meaning of a freshlycoined term, or a new meaning for an old term. A precising

d{rs 0fp.rhcthn or$rm.d fo Gd'rorHffro

drism

definition stipulates a new meaning when the old one was insufficiently precise. 6. Recurciuedcfinitim-see REcuRsIvE. 7. Pnnnsivc definition: When a word has acquired laudatory (or derogatory) overtones, it is sometimes redefined in accord with a speaker's evaluations. For example, even though the usual usagewould count rock music as music, somebody who hated rock might refuse to call it that, becauseof the word's laudatory overtones. ("Nothing tftot loud is music!") 8. Emotivedzf.nition: The sort of definition appropriate for a word that has evaluativeas well as descriptive implications. 'courage', for example, must saymore than The definition of 'steadfastnessin the face of danger', for this defines 'foolhar'Courage' is steadfastness in the face of diness' as well. danger that one approves of. 9, Circalnr definition: re cIRoULARREASoNINc I DEFINITIoN. 10. Aristotelian definitiorz= definition by genus and species. Seeabo FAMILVRESEMBLANCE. Seacpuus,/ spEctES. for Godtoxisfon(s This argument has of perfocfion orgumonl degrocs been proposed in many different forms. Here's onel d e g r e eosf o p p r o x i m o t ioosnu p e r l o ' I o m p o r o t ilveer m sd e s c r i b s h o rot f t h es u p e t ' l i v et e r m sS. on o l h i nvgr o u l(do u not sf o l l i n g sre l o t i v eu n l e stsh es u p e r l o t itvhei n ge x i s f e d0.r d i n o rtyh i n g o perfett; completely lessthonp0rfoct, solheremustbes0m0thing o n dw h o it s c o m p l e t epleyr f e ci st G o d . An objection to this argument is that comparative terms do not imply the existenceof a superlative instance. For exam' ple, the existenceof people who are more or lessstupid does not imply that someone existswho is maximally, completely, perfectly stupid. dcism A form of religious belief especiallypopular during the Deists believe that God produced the uniENLIGHTENMENT. verse with its lews 3 of nature, but then left it alone to operate solely by these laws. This f,orm of religious belief

66

ilrhr

htlryrtbvt

seemEincompatible with some aspectsof conventional relig' ion, for example, with the notion of a loving God, or with the practice of prayer. voLTAlRE, RoussEAU,and x.ltlt were deists. dclwion SacrttustoN / HALLUcINATIoN / DELUsIoN. dcmiurgeAn anglicised version of a Greek word that means 'craftsman'. In pLATo'sTimaansa Demiuqge is pictured (perhaps just as a symbol or personification) as creating the universe, in conformity, as far as physical limitations al'd' is towed, with rationality and goodness. [sometimes the Godl refer to capitalized when the word is thought to dcmocroq That form of government whose actions are determined by the governed (or by their elected representatives). Often the meaning of this word is extended in a rather imprecise way to imply that democratic societies are EGALITARIAN,and respect individual rights. Drmocrilus(460?-?370B.C.) Greek philosopher, known for advocating the theory of eroutstvt. He conceived of the world as consisting only of tiny indestructible atoms in motion, and empty space; the properties of these atoms determine their combinations and interactions, and explain the visible world of change. ['duh-MOCK-ruh-tus'] domomlrolive / indexicolA demonstrative term gets its Rrrr,Rrxcr by "pointing"-for example, 'this' in 'This is mine'. An indexical term similarly gets its reference from coNTEXT:the word'today' changes its reference daily. Dcllorgon, Augustus (1806-187f) British mathematician and logician, known for his work on [,oclc, the foundations of algebra, and the philosophy of mathematics. Dct*orgontlous The rules (named for Augustus DEMoRcAN)for correct reasoning in SuNIEIITIALLoclc that state that one

6l

forohlim / onnolulion

hn

may reason correctly from a coNJtNcTIoN of NEcATroNsto the corresponding negated DIsJUNcTIoN,or vice versa; or from a disjunction of negations to the corresponding negated conjunction or vice versa. It is easier to see this when put in symbolic form: it is correct to reason from a statement in any of these forms to its equivalent: -(p v q) (-p t -q) is equivolenilo ( - p v - q ) i s e q u i v o l et o n t- ( p & q ) (Saesvuaols oF sENTENTTAL Loclc). Thus, for example, from 'It's not the case that it's raining or it's snowing' one may 'It's correctly derive not raining and it's not snowing'. ['duh MORE-gan'l The denotation or REFERENcE dsnololion of a word is / connofolion what that word refers to-the things in the world that it "names." The connotation or senseof a word is, by contrast, its meaning. (rnEcE argued that the reference of a sentence Thus, a word can have connotation was its TRUTH-vALUe.) 'unicorn' but no denotation: has meaning but no reference. (Synonymous with 'EXIENSToN / INTENSIoIi'.)Note that the philosophical use of 'connotation' is different from the ordinary one, in which it refers not to what a word means,but to more or less distant associationsit has; for example, the 'roses' may carry word the connotation of romance to many people. 'having to do with clnucATroN'. Deontic logic is deonlicMeans that branch of uonel Loclc dealing with connections of sentencessaying what one ought to do, must do, is permitted to do, etc. deontologySeecorusnquENTrAr,rsM. srRUcruRE. depthgrommorSeeDEEI/ suRrACE dere SeeDEDrcro / DERE

68

d.ri,ffio

ffi,ognnttom

drrlvotion A method for proving deductive validity, in which one writes down the premises, then moves to succeeding eventuating at the steps using accepted RUIrs oF INFERENCE, conclusion (saanncuunnr). There are other methods of proof, for example, in snrnNTIALLoctc, the TRInH.TABLE._ Dorido, Jacques (b. 1930) Algerian-born French philosopher, best-known of the post-srRucruRAusrs. He seeshis project as the "deconstruction" of our ideas and other cultural products to reveal their underlyrng AssuMPTIoNsl, PRESUPPosITIoNs,and meaningt. Destorles,Ren6 (1596-1650)French philosopher and mathematician, the founder of uoosnN pHlt.osopHv. Earlier scHoLAg TIcIsM saw the job of philosophy as analysing and proving truths revealed by religion; Descartes' revolutionary view (which got him into trouble with the Church) was that philosophy can discover truth. His famous recipe for doing this is the method of systematic doubt (scaceRtrsIAN DoUBT); this is necessary to begin the search for the TNDUBITABLE foundations for knowledge, the first of which is the truth of his own existence as a thinking (not a material) thing. Although he was a champion of uscHeNISTlc thinking about the external material world, and in fact contributed substantially to the new scienceand mathematics,he was a DUAUST, and believed that minds are non-material. ['day-kart'] DESCRTpdescriplion, definite / indefinileSae oenNrrE / TNDEFTNTTE TION.

description, knowledge by See KNowLEDGEBy AceuAINTANcE/ By DESCRIMION.

descriplive efhics SeeNoRMATTVE,/ DEscRrprrvE. from SeeTELEoLocrcALARGUMENT FoRcoD's Exdesign, orgumonl ISTENCE.

69

dcd$rofof, rigid/hftid

dddr

dcsignolol, ri$d / floaid ScaRrcrD/ FLAccrDDEsrcNAroR.

dchrminhm The view that every event is necessitated by its previous causes, so that given its causes, each event must have existed in the form it does. There is some debate about how (and whether) this view can be JUSTTFTED l. The view that at least some events are not fully caused is called 'indeterminism'. Determinism is usually a IRESUIrOSTTION of science; KANT thought it was NECESSARY; but quantum physics saysthat it is false. One of the main areas of concern about determinism ariseswhen it is considered in connection with FREEWILL. dclgrrencoPreventing future occurrences of undesirable acts by punishing present instances, or by threat of puNrsHurNr. This is one of the yusuncATroNs I philosophers give for punishment. Thus, for example, one may try to justify jailing criminals by claiming that such a practice will discourage them and others from future crime. Nuclear deterrence attempts to prevent a future nuclear attack by threatening massiveretaliation. The moral status of deterrence is controversial. Preventing nuclear war is of course a good thing, but is nuclear deterrencejustified, given that it involves the willingness to go through with really horrible retaliation? Dewey, John (1859-1952) American philosopher associated with pnecuATISMand n:rstnuMENTALISM, with the notion of ASSERTIBILITY in the explanation of truth, and WARRANTED with educational theory and reform. diochtonicSeesyNcnnoNrc,/ DrAcHRoNrc. diolecticThis word stems from a Greek root meaning'conversation', but it has come to have many meanings in philosophy. Some of the more important of theseare: l. The method of philosophical argument used by the pRE-socRATIcs and socRATES,typically refuting opponents' positions by drawing

70

ddldtdmoidtrt/ififrn

ffirrn,mdndd

(saaso out unacceptable consequences of those positions cRATlcurrnoo).2.Forpuro,asforhispredecessors'dia' lecticisaprocessofquestion.and.answerdiscussion,but general n"a ..prrasized that ihis was aimed at discovering andunchangingtruths.S.lntstrotgUrNdialecticisreason. ingfromp'o'u"ut.premises.4.HecnueNdialecticisaproc. esi of reasoning starting with disagreement and argument' proceeding thr;ugh rev-ision toward greater sophistication at agreement' Hegel thorrght that and adequacy, -Joi-ing of nature and history; his piocesies the described also this viewisoftendescribedasholdingthatchangetakesplace when some thing (the thesis) and its opposite-(the.antithe' which sis) interact to produce a new unity (the synthesis)' dialectical Hegelian becomes the thesis of another change. than logic emphasizes the processesthings undergg' rather the LoGICALFoRM of sentences,and-denies the universal validity of the so
gtuiplo dffenna

d'rUnclion

prindploThe second principle ofjustice in nAwrs's thediffersnce ory. It saysthat in ajust society,goods are to be distributed equally unless unequal distribution is to the benefit of the worst off group. Seeako pRrNcrpLE oF LTBERTv. differentioS,, GENUS/spECrES. dilemmoPeople often use this word inaccurately to mean any sort of problem. Its correct use refers to that sort of probIem in which one has a choice between two unpleasant alternatives (called 'horns of the dilemma'). A moral di lemma is a forced choice between two incompatible but apparently binding oBuCATroNS,or between two morally unacceptable alternatives-for example, when telling the truth would hurt someone, but lying would also be wrong. Philosophers sometimes use this word to refer to a kind of ARGUMENT that forces the opponent to choose between two possibilities (seeako coNSTRUcrrvnorlouue). Dilthoy,Wilhelm (1833-19ll) German philosopher,known for his analysesof nature and of the methodology of hurnan studies. dingon skh Sn rHrNG.rN-rrsELF. Diogonesof Sinope (412?-323B.C.) Greek philosopher associated with the cyNICs. Known for his advocacy of a self-contained unconventional Iife. ['dy-AHjen-eez'] Dionysion.Sca eponoNrAN / DtoNysrAN. dhonologySca.q,Nerocy. disconfirmotionScccoNFrRMATroN / DrscoNFrRMATroN. disiundionA sentence constructed out of two (or more) sentences connected by 'or'. The sentence 'It's raining or it's snowing' can be s€en to be composed of the disjunction of

72

eWir.qnogbrt

ddrh,tivoh

thc two sentences'It's raining'and'It's snowing'. Two sentences connected in this way are called'disjuncts'. It is often thought that there are two sorts of disjunction ambiguously expressedby'or' in English. (1) The exclusivedisjunction is true when one of the disjuncts is true and the other false, and false otherwise (when both are true, or when both are false). (2) The inclusive disjunction is true when one or both of the disjuncts are true, and false only when both of the disjuncts are false. Suppose, then, that both snow and rain 'It's snowing or it's are coming down at once. Is the sentence 'or' raining' true? If this is taken to be inclusive, it's true; if exclusive, it's false. Standardly in SENTENTIAL LocIC, the wedge, also called the vee (Y) symbolizes the inclusive disjunction (scesvunors oF SENTENTTAL Loclc). disiunclive syllogismA form of reasoning using a DTsJUNCTToN as one premise (seaARGUMENT), and the negation of one of the disjuncts as the other premise; the other disjunct follows as conclusion. For example: we'llgoto thezooor we'llstoyhome. Either Butwewon'tstoyhome. Therefore we'llgo to thezoo. disposilionA property whose presence or absence would be manifested-would make an observable difference-only under certain conditions. Brittleness is a dispositional property: to say that something is brittle is to say that it will shatter if struck with sufficient force. Two pieces of metal, only one of which is brittle, may seem identical. The difference will be revealed only if both are struck.

disfribufive iustkoSce.yusrrcE. distlibutivcly Sea cou.ncavELy / DrsrRrBUTrvELy.

T3

doficsprtttnry

drw[Jo

disvolur The opposite of 'value'. Something has disvalue not when it merely lacks value, but rather when it is positively bad. Pain has disvalue. divinsoftribuf$ The characteristics often thought to be true of God. These include oMNrporENcE, oMNIScIENCE,and nnNEVOLENCE.

LAw D.IImOdglS3, COVERING Saaecrs / oMISstoNS. of ochondomissions doctrine dogmoA particular belief or system of beliefs proclaimed by authority (especially religious authority) to be true. Thus, this word has also come to mean anything someone believes merely on authority, without reason, especiallywhen stated arrogantly and intolerantly. 'exercising dominanto1. The ordinary meaning of this word is the most influence or control', and in this sense,dominance is a concern of ethics of personal relations, and political philosophy. 2. In a technical senseused in decision theory, one choice is said to be dominant if it has better features or consequencesthan the alternatives,whatever happens.The dominance principle tells you to pick the alternative that dominates. Of course, sometimes there is no such alterna' tive, so this is of limited applicability. Other principles of decisiontheory are the MAxIMINprinciple, and the principle UTILITY. that one should maximize EXPECTED Fyodor Mikhailovich SeewRIrERs. Dosloyevsky, dot The symbol r.ocrc).

'.', me?Ding'and' (se,SYMBOLS oF sENTENTIAL

fteory S'eeouel AspEcrrHEoRY. double-ospen

dodbd.cf

ildcn/ mo"bm / plrxtcn

doublccffod The doctrine of double effect holds that, although it is always wrong to use a bad means to a good end (saauNo / MEANs),one may act to bring about a good result when also knowingly bringing about bad results, under the following conditions: (l) The bad result is not caused by the good result-both are caused by the action (thus 'double effect'); (2) there's no way of getting the good result without the bad; (3) the good result is so good that it's worth accepting the bad one. For example, a dentist is allowed to drill, and thus cause some pain (the bad result) for the sake of dental improvements (the good result), since these conditions hold-most notably (l): the pain doesn't cause the improvement-both are results of the drilling. This principle is associated with Catholic morality, and has been applied most frequently in contexts of medical ethics. It is disputed by some philosophers, who sometimes argue that the distinction between double effect and bad means / good end is artificial and not morally relevant. doubt fio doubt something can mean either to be uncertain or undecided about it, or to believe that it is false. When philosophical scnrrtcs present arguments for doubting ordinarily acceptedstatements,they may attempt to show that one should be uncertain or undecided about them, or should actually think they are false. But often the sceptic wants to show that the ordinarily accepted statement can't bejustified-that it is without foundation. doubt,(ortesionSeecARTEsTAN DouBT. duolospect fieory A theory (associatedwith sprruozeand others) that mind and body are just different aspects of, different ways of looking at, the same sUBSTANCE or thing; so it's a form of monism (sedDUALTSM Also / MONTsM / PLURALTSM). called the'double aspecttheory'. duolism / monism / plurolismeU three are views on the basic kind(s) of things that exist. Dualists hold that rhere are rwo

dfihffiy

dysioph

sorts of thingp, neither of which can be understood in terms 'dualism' refers particularly to the view of the other. Often in philosophy of mind in which the two are the mental and occASIoNALIsM,and peRthe physical (seeINTERAcTIoNISM, ALLEuSM for particular varieties). ContemPorary dualists sometimes don't insist that there are two sorts of things; their dualism is instead the claim that mental phenomena can't be explained solely in physical terms. Other sorts of dualism distinguish the visible and invisible, the actual and the possible, God and the universe, etc. Monists believe in only one ultimate kind of thing, and pluralists in many. To be a pluralist about value is to believe that there are many incompatible, but equally valid, value systems. dubitobilityscerNousttnBll-lry / DUBITABILITY. ILLUSIoN. du*+obbit SeeN{0I-LnR-I-yER Duhom,Pierre SacsclpNlsrs. dunceNot a philosophical term, but you might be amused to know that it's derived from the name of ouNs scorus (his followerswere called'dunces'by their opponents). Scolus, Duns John (1265?'1308)Scottishtheologian and philosopher; interests in rHgoLocv and METAPHYSIcS. Emile (1858-1917)Seescleursrs' Durkhaim, duf SaaoBLIGATIoN. dyslopioSeautoptn.

76

Effnghn,

{'in,dhrd/Fddo*d

[ddington,Arthur sd, sclENrrsrs. [dwords,Jonathan (17 03-1757) American puritan THEoLocIAN. effsd, double Seeoousu EFrEcr. effkient/formol/ moteriol /finol tousesAristotle's "four cAUs$': l. The efficient cause of something: what brings it into existence 2. The formal cause: its abstract structure-its "blueprint." 3. The material cause: what it's made of 4. The final cause: its purpose or aim. Aristotle did not mean by 'cause' exactly what we do, though the sorts of explanation we give when we say "because...' can correspond with his four "causes":perhaps his four causesshould be understood as the four basic kinds of characteristics that things have, which are useful in categorizing them and explaining what they're like and how they work. egolilorionimThe view that people are equal-that they are entitled to equal rights and treatment in society. See EMprRrcAL/ ego,empiri(o| / tronscendenlol

TRANscENDENTAL

EGO.

egoism, olhicol/psychologicol Psychologicalegoism is the position that people in fact act only in their own INTERxrs. If you think this is true, be careful that your belief is not merely an empty thought. It's sometimes argued that even the most generousact is done for the doer's own satisfaction;but this might simply be a way of saying that even the most generous act is motivated-something nobody would deny. [f someone

oidos

Imalon,

is motivated to act for others' benefit, and gets satisfaction from those actions, this shows that psychological egoism is not universally true. Ethical egoism is the position that I (or people in general) ought to act only in my (their) own interests. 'Egotism' is sometimes used synonymously, but precise speakerstend to use'egotism' to mean the tendency to speak or write of oneself too much, or too boastfully. ['EE-goism' or'EH-geism'] See also: sntltsHNEss,RATIoNAL SELF.INTEREST. FoRMS, eidw SeePLAToNTc linslein, Albert SeescmNrsrs. 6lonvitol Seavrrlusu. elemenlsThe elements of something are its basic compon€nts. The Greeks believed that all physical things were composed of four basic elements: earth, air, fire, and water. Nowadays, of course, we believe in different elements, and there are many more of them; neither are they basic (they can be into sub-atomiccomponents). ANALYZED oliminofivism SeeunrsruAusM. smtrgsnfploporliosThese are characteristicshad by a group of things considered as a whole, but not by the things that make up the group. A group of people, for example, can have the property of electing an official, while no particular person does this. We can understand what it is to elect an official in terms of the voting of individuals; but a stronger and more controversial version of emergentism holds that emergent properties are those that can't be nnnlyzED into different properties of individual components. Emcrson,Ralph Waldo Saawnltsns

ilrTfriirm

.fffil

rnolfuhn A position in metacthics (saaNoRMATIVE/ DEScRIPnve), that holds that ethical utt€rances :rre to be understood not as statements of fact that are either true or false, but rather as exprelsions of approval or disapproval, and invitations to the listcner to have the same reactions. Expressions of approval don't state facts: when I express my liking of ice cream by saying "Yum!" what I'm saying is neither true nor false. Neither is what I say when I urge you to try some. HUMEmight be construed as holding a form of emotivism; in this century, the position is associatedwith A. J. evnn and the American philosopher C(harles) L(eslie) Stevenson(190&1975). cnpfiy

&c svuprtHy/

EMrATHv/ BENEvoLENcE.

tmpodala (490?430 B.C.) Greek philosopher; his poem "On Nature'contains elaborate theories of the origin and constitution of the universe. rrnpilkol This means having to do with sense-experience and experiment. Empirical knowledge is knowledge we get through experience of the world; thus it is a post*riori (seett PRIoRI/ A PoSTERIoRI). An empirical coNcEPTis one that is not INNATE;it can be developed only through experience. rmghkol/ fonrtcndcntolcgo (In Latin, 'cgD'means "I.') The ego is the "I'-the self. This distinction is KANT's.The ttvtplRtcll ego is the collection of characteristics and mental events that we can sense,perhaps by turnoseEcTloN; the tneNscrxDENTALego is what unifies-what ias-these characteristics, perhaps a mental suBsrANcEwe can't sense(saealso BUNDLE

nrnonv). rnghkirn The position (usually contrasted with neloNAI-rsM) that all ourcoNcEprs and substantive knowledge come from experience. Empiricists deny that there are INNATEconcepts. While they grant that certain kinds of trivial knowledge (of coNcEpruAt., ANALyrrc, and rScrcAL TRurHs) can

ompiddrt

ends / moons

be gained by reason alone, independently of experience, they deny the existence of the synthetic (seeANALyrrc / n rntoRl. ARISToTLE is perhaps the founder of SYNTHETIC) empiricism; the position is mosl strongly associated with among the Greeks. The classicalMODERN empiriEPICURUS and Hut',tr. MILL was a strong cists were LocKE, BERKELEv, empiricist. The view has been an important influence on contemporary ANALYTICPHILOSOPHY. ['em-PEER-uh-sism', 'em-PEER-uh-kl'] ompiridsl Seesl"tprRtctsN,t. omplysel SaeSEr. sndin itssll l. Something sought for its own sake;an INTRINSTc good. 2. Someone is seen as an end in him / herself when that person'saims are seenas having valuejust becausethey are that person's aims. Treating someone as an end in him / herself is respectinghis / her aims, and not thinking of, or using, that person merely as a means to your aims. A central principle of KANT'sethics is the necessityof treating others and not as means only. as ends-in-themselves, ends/ msonsA long-standing controversy in ethics is whether one might be permitted to use bad means to a good end: does the endjustify the means?For example, is it permitted to lie to someone if everyone will be better off in the long run as a result?Sometimesthe slogan "The end does not justify the means" expressesthe radical position that no action that is bad in itself is ever permitted no matter how good the consequences.This position is taken by the more Notice that this extreme opponents of cousEquENTtALISM. means that telling a little lie is not justified even if it would prevent really horrible consequences,such as the torture to death of all your friends, loved ones, and pets. Do you think this is right? A more reasonableinterpretation of this slogan thinks of it as warning against actions which are so bad in

onlily

tn$tnmnt

themselvesthat the good consequencesdo not overwhelm this badness. The distinction between ends and means parallels the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodsSee / EXTRINSIC. see INTRINSIC / INSTRUMENTAL ,/ INHERENT IMPERAcATEGoRIcAL also: nounlE EFFECT, / HYPoTHETIcAL TIVE. A cultural and philosophical movement of the [nlightenmenf seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its chief features were a belief in rationality and scientific method, and a tendency to reject traditional religion and other traditions' FoR-lrsELF. on soi SeerN-ITSELF/ enhilmenl One sentence entails another when the second fol' lows logically from the first-that is, when the argument with the first as premise and the second as conclusion is valid (see ARCUMENT). enlelechyA non-material force or purpose that is supposed to also causesomething to come into existence.In ARISTOTLE, the state of achieved potential that things aim at (seeerrt' 4). ['CN.TEL.Uh. CIENT,/ FORMAL / MATERIAL,/FINALCAUSES kee'] enferloinTo entertain a pRoposITIoN necessarilybelieving it.

to consider it without

enfiymemeAn argument with some steps left unstated but understood. 'All pigs are sloppy eaters, so Porky is a sloppy 'Porky is a pig'. eater' is an enthymeme, leaving unsaid ['EN-thuh-meem'] enlilies,hypofielicol / theoreticolSeetsEonErtcAL ENrtrIES. enlily A thing, an existent being.

onmsolivo idrlivohfonrro

Elilomobgy

onumorolivt Inducilvo inforenroS?, DEDUcrroN/ rNDUcrroN. lpiclelus(60?-l l7) Greek srorc; his views emphasizedduty and inner freedom. ['ep-ik-TEE-tus'] opicuroonism The ordinary use of the word'epicurean', meaning devoted to pleasure, especiallythat of fine food, has distant connections to its philosophical use, in which it refers to the philosophy of sprcuRusand his followers. Chief teners are an emphasis on the visible world (as opposed to the world imagined by religion or many philosophies), and the advocation of calmnessof mind. ['epuh-kew-REE-an-ism'] Epicurus(of Samos) (342?-?270B.C.) Greek philosopher known for his MATERTALTsT and AToMtsr views, and for his position that the good life was one based on pleasure.['ep-uh-CUREus'] p0r0d0xSeerr.rR'spARADox. [pimenides' opiphonomenolism A variety of oueLrsrr.rin which menral evenrs arejust "by-products" of physical ones: physical eventscause mental ones, but not vice versa.As an analogy, think of the noise your car makes:it's caused by the mechanical goingson inside, but it has no effect on them. ['epee-feh-NOM-inal-ism'] epislemicHaving to do with knowledge. Epistemic logic is that branch of uooel Loclc dealing with relations between sentencesinvolving'knows','believes', etc. ['epis-TEE-mik'or 'epis-TEH-mik'l epislomology Theory of knowledge: one of the main branches of philosophy. Among the central questions studied here are: What is the difference between knowledge and mere belief? Is all (or any) knowledge based on sense-perception?How, in general, are our knowledge-claimsjustified? ['eh-piss-tehMOLUh;iee']

82

lsm/oatdnt

t 0ropotlliort I proposilionSeee,/ E/ r/ oPRoPosITIoNs. reflsclivoSeennrucnvn oquilibrium,

EquILIBRluM.

rquivclancoSecntcoNoITtoNAL. equivotolionAn ambiguous word, or a shift in the course of speaking or reasoning from one meaning of a word to another. Equivocation is sometimes used to mislead; and sometimes it results in faulty reasoning (the rauncv of equivocation). An example, which equivocates on the word 'law': tholthereis o lowmoker. Theexistence of onylowshows wosnotmodeby humons. Ihe lowof grovity lawmoksr-60d. thetemustbeo non'humon Iherefore [' ih-kwiv-uh-KAY-shun'] [tosmus, Desiderius SeewRttnps. ecepE/ enos / vututt otos See. crolclic Means having to do with questions. Erotetic logic is the logic of questions. Having to do with "the last matters"-especially, in csrhofologicol Christian thought, with death, the end of the world, the Last these for Judgement, Heaven, Hell, and the significance of'scatologiour present lives. Don't confuse this word with cal', which means something quite different. ['es"kat-uhLODGE-i
83

csruhl/ admtl Sdly/ propdly / (ffift

tlhkd hilhisnl

was not a plant, it could not be a tree. By contrast, a tree that in fact is thirty-three merers high could still be a tree if it weren't thirty-three meters high; thus this characteristic is accidental. (Note that'accident' and'accidental' don't have their ordinary meanings in this philosophical use.) Some philosophers think that the essence/ accident distinction does not concern the real characteristics of something, but is only a consequence of the words we apply to them: being a plant is said to be an essential characteristic of a tree only becauseit's part of the definition of 'tree'. But essentialist philosophers believe in real, objective essences. ossontiof SeeEsSENCE / oaidontolquolity/ propeny / chorocteristic / Ac. CIDENT. essactt pltcipi (Latin: "to be is to be perceived") This slogan is associatedwith snRrnt.Ey,who thought that nothing existed except perceptions in a mind, See also rHENoMENALTSM. ['essayest pur-KlP-ee']

sslhofics ensrnmcs. Sae domol rolurnThedoctrinethateveryeventandseries of events has occurred, and will occur, over and over again, identical in every detail, an infinite number of times. This was held by a number of lttctEttt, MEDIEvAL, and nineteenth-century philosophers. Also known as'eternal recurrence'. ethor The invisible "stuff' formerly thought to permeate everything, including apparently empty space,supposedto be the medium for apparent. AcrroN-AT-A-DIsrANcE. ['EE-thur'; sometimesspelled'aether'] efiicolcognilivism Sre cocNrrrvrsM/ NoNcocNrrrv/ non(ognilivism tsM. dhicolDorwinismSaaEvoLUrroN.

odrkolegdrn

tehologicol othks,

athicof ogoitmSaeEcorsrr,r. SeaEXTERNALTsM,/ dhicoloxfgrnolism TNTERNALTsM. ethicolinlelnolismSeeEXTERNALTsM,/ rNrERNALrsM. efiicolnoturolism Those who think / supernolurolism / nonnoluralism that the ethical words like 'good' and'right' may be defined in terms of natural properties (the ordinary properties of the physical world) are ethical naturalists. For example, some ethical naturaliststhink that'the right act'means 'the act that produces the most happiness'.Ethical supernaturalism is the view that ethical properties really are properties having to do with the supernatural or divine: for example, the view that calling an action good is the same as saying that it conforms to the will of God. Nonnaturalists deny that ethical words are equivalent in meaning to words that name the natural (or supernatural) world, though good things may as a matter of fact share some physical properties. They claim that ethical properties are basic properties on their own, not really properties in some other realm. The Open Question Argument, due to G. E. MooRE, argues against ethical naturalism by claiming that one might find that something had any natural property you might name, but still find it an open question (that is, a question not yet settled) whether that thing had an ethical property. Moore thought that any reasoning which based on the false assumption that ethical propertieswere actuallynarural properties committed what he called the "naturalistic fallacy." Seeako: Is / oucHT rRoBLEM. elhicolrelolivism SeaRELArrvlsM,/ ABSoLUrrsM. / obsolutism EIhiCS SCE MORALITY. elhics,normolive / dexripliueSeeNoRMArrvE/ DEScRrprrvE. efiics,leleologirolSeerELEoLocy.

85

dhnoantk

uilstrirt

clhnocnllk Someone is ethnocentric who regardr the viewr or characteristics of his r/ her own race or culture as the only cornect or important on$. ofiology Saaenrrolocv. 'living well") Since ARlsrorLE thought that cudolnonlo(Greek: the happy life was the good life, this word might be taken to 'happiness',particularly the complex and long-lasting mean kind of happiness that Aristotle had in mind. His position can be called'eudaemonism"-the view that this is the real 'eudeaim of life. ['you-duh-MO-nee-ah';sometimes spelled monia' or'eudaemonia'] Eulor!diogramSeaVENNDIAcRAM. eulhonasioEuthanasia is mercy-killing, the intentional killing of someone, presumably for his own good, when his life is judged not to be worth continuing, often when that person is suffering from an untreatable, fatal illness causing horri' ble unavoidabte pain or suffering. Voluntary euthanasia is killing done at the expressedwish of that Person; this wish is not expressedin the case of involuntary euthanasia (for example, when the person has mentally deteriorated beyond the point of being able to exPress,or perhaps even to have, coherent wishes). Passiveeuthanasia involves refraining from providing life-prolonging treatment to someone suffering from a fatal condition; active euthanasisis killing' for example, by administering a fatal injection. Ethical opinion is deeply divided concerning euthanasia. Often those who argue in favour of its permissibility would accePtit only when voluntary, and,/ or only when passive.['you'tha-NAYzee-ah'or'you-tha-NAY-zha'] evilgeniusAs part of his technique of cnRrEslANDoUBT'DEscARTEsimagined that a powerful but evil spirit could be systematically fooling us about everything we thought we

ol evil,problem

erhhnce

knew. (The French term for this evil genius is'malin genie', roughly,'ma-lah zhay-nee'.) ol SeerRoBLEMoFEVTL. evil,problem evolulionBroadly speaking, any process by which something gradually changes into a different, usually more complex, form. Most often used to refer to theories of changeof kinds of living things, especially to the view nowadays held by almost all biologists that living creatures owe their present state of complex adaptation to their environment to a long natural process in which inherited characteristicsvaried at random; the characteristicsthat were more adaptive in the bearers' environment allowed those bearers to survive and reproduce, passing those characteristicson. This scientific THEoRYis associatedwith Darwin (saasctrrutlsrs), so it is sometimes called Darwinism; his name is also associated with some moral and social theories (ethical and social Darwinism) that hold that the good can be identified with the more evolved,and that social policies ought to be based on the furthering of evolution (for example, by refraining from interfering with "natural" processes, and allowing those with less "fit" genetic endowment to die ofQ. Darwin was not a socialor ethical Darwinist. excluded middle, lowof the See 'law of the excluded middle', in LAWS OFTHOUGHT.

0r/ disiunrtion exrlusive SeeDr.s.JUNCrroN. p0r0d0x execulionert SeasuRpRrsE eurzpARADox exhouslive see rr.r wuRr,Ly Excl.usrvE/ JorNTLyExHAUSTTVE. exislenceThe subject of many different philosophical problems, for example: Is all that exists mental in nature (seetuneltstvl) or physical (sec naerrnrnl-rsu)?Are wejustified in believing in things-fbr example, THToRETIcALENTITTLs or uNrvER-

87

oxpocfod uliftry

oxblonliol

sAls-that we don't perceive (see RnLt-tsu)?This word is 'existance'.Don't do that. sometimes misspelled 'existence' and the exislentiolThe adjectival form of the word 'EXISTENTIALISM'. For some of its uses sea root of the term the following entries. ['eggp-iss-TEN-shul'] The horrible feeling the nxtslexrlAusrs sup exislenfiolonguish pose we have when confronted with our own complete and irremovable rnnroou l. and RESPoNSIBILITY. import Said to be true of a sentencewhen it nssnnts or exislenfiol the existence of something. [f we IMPLIESor PRESUPPOSES 'All unicorns have horns' to have existentake the sentence, tial import, it implies that unicorns exist, so it is false. A school of philosophy developed largely in twenexislenfiolism tieth<entury France and Germany, closely associatedwith sARTREand HntoeccER.Although existentialists have had thingp to say about many areas of philosophy, they are best l. and RESPoNSIBILITY. known for their views on FREEDotrl They tend to believe that we are totally free-that we are never caused to act by environment, heredity, or personality; and thus that we individually create all our decisionsand values (the only source for ethical obligation) and are responsible for all our actions. ['eggs'iss'TEN'shul'ism' ] Loclc. sxislciliolquonfifiorSeesYt'lsoLsoF QUANTIFIER oxptdoduliliry The expected utility of an rcroN is calculatedby multiplying the urlLITY of each possibleresult of that action and adding uP the results. For example, by its PRoBABILITY, consider this betting game: you get $10 if a random draw from a deck of cards is a spade; and you pay $4 if it's any other suit. Assuming the utility of each dollar is 1, to calcu' late the expected utility of this game we add:

+ x l0 (thsutilityif if'so spode) of o spode) .25(probobility

88

mysticol sxporhro, / religious

explonolion

x '4 (theutilityof o non' .75 (thoprobobility of o non-spode) spode). Since(.25 x l0) + (.75 x 4) = (2.5 - 3) = -.5,the game thus has an expected utility of -.5; not playing at all has an expected utility of 0. One (conroversial) theory for rational decisionmaking advocatesmaximizing expectedutility, so you should not play this game. (But if you just enjoy gambling, this has to be figured in too, and might make it worthwhile.) Seeako MINIMAX, DOMINANCE.

ARGUMENT mysticol experience, / religiousSea:r'rvsrrcAt-EXIERIENcE FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE, MYSTICISM.

experinenlun crucis(Latin: "crucial experiment") This is an experiment whose outcome would provide a central or conclusive test for the truth or falsity of some position or scientific HYPorHEsIs.['ex-pair-uh-MEN-tumCROO-chis'I explonons An explanandum (Latin: "to be ex/ explonondun plained") is something that is being explained: what does the explaining is the explanans (Latin: "explaining thing"). ['ex-pluh-NANS','ex-pluh-NAN-dum'] explonotionAn explanation answers the question 'Why?' and provides understanding; perhaps it also provides us with the abilities to control, and to predict (and nnrnoucr) the world. This is fairly vague, and philosophers n-avetried to provide theories of explanation-to give a general account of how explanations work, and what makes some good and some bad. one important account is the covERINc LAw model. One (but only one) sort of explanation is cr\LtsAL:we explain something by sayingwhat its causesare. Sometimes, instead, we explain by telling what something is made of, or by giving reasons for human AcrroNS (htt see REASoNS / cAUSES), as in some explanations in history.

89

exclusion sxphnofory

oxtrinsic

exclusionThe principle of explanatory exclusion explonolory holds that there is ultimately no more than one complete and independent explanation for a given phenomenon. 's' in 'intension'; be careful not to exlension / intension[Note the 'intensional'with 'tNTENTIoNel'.]l. Sometimes'exconfuse tension' is used synonymouslywith'denotation' and'inten'connotation' (seeDENOTATIONcoNNorATIoN)' sion' with / is the srr of Thus the extension of a term or a PREDICATE things to which that term or predicate applies (seaconxtnuSIVE).2. An extensional coNrgxr is one in which CoEXTENVERITA'I'E. SALVA bC iNtCT-SUbStitUtCd CANNOT SIVEPREDICATES Contexts which are non-extensional are called intensional or MoDAL.Some philosophers have argued that any referencoNTEXTmust tially transparent (seeoraquE/TRANSPARENT) be extensional. [f so then all referentially opaque or inten't') contexts are also interuional' Note tional (notice that 'intentional' and however that this needs argument, and 'intensional'should not be used as bare synonyms.An exlogic. 3. The extentensional logic is a TRUTH-FUNcrIoNAL sion of somethingis its dimensionsin sPace.Having extension is characteristic of things composcd of extended 'physicalsubstance'.Mental subalso known as suBSTANcE, stanceis unextended-it has no sPatialdimensions.(In this 'extensional'does not contrastwith a corresponding sense, senseof intensional'.) 0xl0rn0litm / inlernolhmExternalismis the uetRnTHIcALdoctrine which holds that the fact tbat something is good does not by itself automaticallysupplythe motivation for someoneto do it; in addition, nrotivation mttst be supplied. lnternalism is the view that the judgement that something is good itself guaranteesor includesthe motivation to do it. PHENoMENA. pol(oplionSeepnnnNoRMAL 0xf10s0ns0ry ExTRINSIC. oxltinsi( SeetNtRtNslc/ INHERENT / INSTRUMENTAL//

90

folky

fotftity An nxlsrnxtlAt-lsr term meaning the sum of facts true of a person and his / her world. For Hntorccrn, facticity is our world seen as not of our creation, something we involuntarily find ourselvesinserted into. gop Saers/ oucHT IRoBLEM. focl-volue foilh Belief in something (usually God) despite lack of adequate evidence, or even in the face of contrary evidence. In religious circles, 'faith' also often refers to love of and trust in God, and other attitudes thought religiously appropriate. foilh,bod/ good see sen EAITH/ GooD EAIrH / AUTHENTTITTY / INAU"THENTICITY.

follocy A fallacy is an eRcuMENr of a type that may seem correct to someone but in fact is not. (Thus, not just any 'fallacious'.) Formal mistaken argument should be called fallacies are mistakesin reasoning that spring from mistakes in LocIcAL FoRM; an example is an argument involving Infrrmal fallacies spring in.{FFIRMINcrHE coNSEQUENT. stead from ambiguities in meaning or grammal or from psychological tendencies to be convinced by reasons that 'fallacy' is 'paraloare not good reasons. A synonym for gism' (seenennoox). Fallaciesdefined in this dictionary are AD BrclLaM, AD Hoc reasoning, AD HoMINEM,AD IGN2RANTIAM, ttoN,

AFFIRMING THE misplaced

GAMBLER'S MODAL

EALLACY,

nALLACY,

CONSEQUENT, AMPHIBOLE,

coNcRETENESS, EeuIvocATIoN, GENETIC

Monte

Carlo

EALLACY, fallacy

COMPOSI.

EALSE cAUSE,

IGNOR,{TIO ELENCHI, (see cnunlER's

EAL

9l

houro

tom&y,

posthocergo lecv), NATURALISTIc rALLAcy, pATHETtc EALLACv, (see hoc EALsE causr). FoPter folsecouseMistaken reasoning about the cause of something. \rft sometimes misidentify x as the cause of y because x happened befiorey (for example, if someone thought that a falling barometer causedit to rain); this sort of reasoning is called 'post hoc ngo proptn hoc' (Latin: "after that, thereficre becauseof that," ['post hock AIR-go PROP-tur hock']. And sometimes when two things tend to occur together because they are both caused by a third, we mistakenly think that one causesanother. fofse,fogicollySeeLocrcAL rRUrH / EALSEHooD. fohificbilitySeevs,RrnnBrLrrY. fohificotionSeacoNHnMATroN/ DrscoNFrRMArroN / vERrFrcATIoN EALSIFICATION, ,/ By nNe,locy with the waysmembers of a famfomilyresomblonce ily resemble each other, this is the sort of similarity that things classified into certain groups share:each sharescharacteristicswith many but not all of the others,and there are for belonging in no NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS that classification. wtrrcENSTrtN argued that many of our coNcnprs are family-resemblanceconcepts, so they cannot be defined by necessaryand sufficient conditions. His bestknown example is the concept of a game, Ffr[tf al- (more fully Abil-Nasr Muhammad al-FIribi; Latin names Alfarabius or Avennasar)(873?.950)Philosopher of Turkirh origin, considered one of the greatest Muslim phi. losophers. His views were based on PLAToand ,tRtstottr, modified by the doctrines of Islam. Forodof Michael SeasctrNrsrs.

92

fodctt

hhfrobln

foscismA ficrm of government characterized by ar extremely strong and etmToRITARIAN right-wing, nationalistic, and often racist gwernment in which the INrEREsrsof the state supersede any individual's interests; thus fascist states deny 'F', it individual RrcHTs and m.reooMs. 2. With a capital refers to the government of Mussolini's Italy; with a lowercase 'f', it characterizes Nazi Germany and some other governments. Most of the philosophers known to us today were hostile to fascism; one exception was HEIDEGGF.R. ['FASH-ism'] fotolismThe position that our futures are inevitable, whatever we do-that events are "fated' to happen. It's important to distinguish this from DETERMINISU, which claims merely that our futures are determined. A determinist who is not a fatalist thinks that our futures are not inevitable-they depend on what we do. feel Some philosophy studentsexpresstheir philosophical positions by saying, "I feel that..." This suggests that they regard their positions as mere feelings-vague attitudes that can't be defended and shouldn't be trusted. Don't be so modest. Philosophers are supposed to make clear claims and argue for them, so it's better to say"I think that..." or *[ believe that...,' orjust to make an ASsERTIoN unmodified by any of these phrases. fehcific colculusBENTHAMthought that the best ACrroN was the one that produced the greatest happiness firr the greatest number of people (seeunlrrnRlANrsM), so he proposed that we determine what was right by quantifying the amounts of happiness produced by each result of an action, adding them up, and comparing this sum to the sum for other possible actions (seanxnncrED {-rrrLITy). 'Felicific' nreans 'having to do with happiness',so this processis called the 'felicific cALCULUS'; also sometimes called the 'felicity', 'pleasure-pain','HEDoNIC', or'happiness calculus'. ['fel-uhsIF-ik'l

feminbm

firstmuse orgument fq Godtexismnce

feminismThe name of various philosophical-especially ethical, social, and political-rnnontns and movements that see elements of our society as unjust to and exploitative of women, and which advocate their change. Feminists often advocate equality under the law, and equal economic status, especially in employment opportunity, for women; but many go further, arguing in favour of preferential treatment ficr women to counteractpast injustices.sometimes they extend their analySis,finding male bias in many basic parts of our personal,social,and intellectuallives. Fichle,Sohann Gottlieb (1762-1814)German philosopher,student of KANT. Knowledge for him is the product of a free self-determining creative intellect; a central notion is the "ABsoluTE"-identified with God, and containingthe moral order of the universe. ['FICH-tuh', where the 'ch' is a throaty hiss,as in the German word'icft'] fidekm The position that knowledge,especiallyof a religious sort, depends on faith or REVELATToN, finolcoussSeerrncrnNT/ FoRMAL/MATERTAL/ FrNALcAUSEs. firsltouseorgumonl for Oodtcxislon(sHere's one version of this arSument: Everynoturol eventhoso preceding couse; trocing thiscluslr c m t rb o c ki n t i m ew o u l dl e o dt o o n i n f i n i tsee r i e sw, i t h o uot n y s t o r t i,f t h e r ew e r en o f i r s l ,s u p e r n o t ucr0oul s sB. u to n i n f i n i t e s e r i e os f i h i ss o r ti s i m p o s s i b l e - s o m 0 twh i tnhgo u0f s t 0 r t d o e s no' tx i s t5. 0t h e r e m u shl o v eb e e o n f i r s l s, u p e r n o t ucrooul s e ( o n' u t . l t o v tnoo t t t ' ) : G o d . This argument is often criticized by questioning its ASSUMrTIoN that an infinite series is impossible. It is sometimes thotrght that the ancient,Greeks, for whom the notion of infinity was unthinkable, found this assumprion plausible;

?{

folkFyd'ology

firstmovel

but we now are able to think accept it.

about infinity,

and need not

filsl movel SeauNuovED MovER.

assumptions from which other firstprinciplesThe TNDUBITABLE AxIoMS,Poslrs. Some phitruths are derived; ASSUMprIoNs, losophers think these must be the starting point for any reliable systemof belief. Seeako FoUNDATIoNALISM. fivewoys St. rHouns AgulNes'sfive arguments for God's existence: ( l ) I h i n g so t em o v i nogn dc h o n g i nl g h ;u sl h e r em u shl o v eb e e n CAUSt. 0 ilRST ( 2 ) T h i n gnse e d ofirst c o u s et ose x i s tt;h u st h e r em u sht o v eb e e n c 0u s e . . ( 3 ) T h i n gosr ec o n t i n g e(ns te ei l t c t s s A/ t yc 0 t l l t t { c t t st I0)t,h e r e mustbes0mething thof'snecessory. ( 4 ) T h i n gfso l l s h o rot f p e r f e r t i otnh;e r e f o sr eo m e t h i p ne gr f e c t At6ur,ttNI). exists.(5eeDt6rIts 0f ptRIttIt0t{ ( 5 ) T h i n gosr eo r d e r loyn dc o l l e c t i v e d universol t el yn dt o w o r o n tr d e r e( S o i m ;t h u sl h e r em u sbt eo n i n l e l l i g eO r e el t t r o t o e t c l L ARGUMTt'|I) flocciddesignolorSeaRrcrD/ FLAccrDDESTcNAToR. folkpsyehology The name given by some philosophers of mind to our ordinary everydaywaysof thinking about people and their minds, seen as a THEoRycommitted to the existenceof beliefs, desires, personality traits, etc. Some philosophers argue that folk psychologyfails various tests for good scientific theories_(not merely becausethere is not much of the sort of observation and experiment we would expect in good science), and so, like other primitive belief-systems (e.9., astrology,belief in witches) it should be replaced by a more rigorous science of the mind not committed to the existenceof beliefs, etc. (seeeliminative unmntnt-tsu).

95

foole, the

foundotionolism

foole,fie sre HoBBEs'sFooLE. foreknowledge Knowledge of the furure. It is often assumed thar God has perfect ficreknowledge. formol As philosophersuse this term, it doesn't have the ordinary implications of stiff and ceremonious. It means pertaining to structure (as opposed to content);or rigorous and rule-governed. SeeLoctcAL FORM,FoRMAt.sysrEM,and rnrLACY. formoltous€SeeEFFTcTENT/ FoRMAL / MATERTAL / FrNALcAUSES. formollogic SeaLocrcALFoRM. fomolsyslemA systematicand rigorous set of starements,rules, etc., whose total structure and proceduresare specifiedIike syLtsoLICLoctc, but unlike ordinary language,which doesn't state(and perhapsdoesn'tevenhave)rigorousrules. form,logicolSeaLocrcRL FoRM. forms,PlolonicSeepLAToNrcFoRMS. formufoAny seriesof symbolsin syunoLrc Locrc. SeeabowELr.. FORMED FORMULA.

formulo, well-formed Seawrll.roRMED FoRMULA. tourouh,Michel (1926-1984) French philosopher, historian, author, associatedwith the sTRUCTURALISTs. Bestknown for his works attempting to uncover the underlying structure and pnmupposlTloNsof the ideasof madnessand sexuality in \itrbsternciv ilization. foundotionolism The position that there is a particular sorr of statement (sometimes thought to be INDUBITABLT) from which all other statementscomprising a sysremof belief 96

for musos

free wil

should be derived. There are foundationalist theories of knowledge, of ethics, etc. fourcousesSeanrncrEr.rrl FoRMAL/MATERIAL/FINALcAUs$. freedoml. Personal freedom (searRnr wru-). 2. Political freedom is what people have insofar as they are unrestricted by laws,or insofar as they haveRIGHTS. What constitutespolitical freedom, and to what extent it is a good thing, is a central concern of political philosophy. 3. A variable is free when it is unbound (seesyMBoLSoF qUANTIHEDLoGIC). problemSince public goods can be enjoyed even by free-rider those who do not participate in payrng fcr them, it seems rational firr each person to avoid contributing to a public good (if possible) but to free-ride on the contributions of others. But if everyone did this, the public good would not be provided. This is a general problem in social philosophy which has the fiorm of the pRrsoNER's DILEMMA. freewill Free will (or rnnnnorral) is the supposed human characteristicthat our decisionsand actions are sometimesentirely (or at least partially) "up to us'-not forced or DETERMINEDby anything internal or external to us. \4b can then either do or not do x-we have alternatives. It seems that only if we have free will can we be ntspoNstsLnficr what we do. But if determinism is true, then everything must be the way it is given its previous cAUSES, including all our actions and decisions: because these causesare themselvesdetermined by still earlier causes,ultimately whatever we decide or do is determined by events that happened a long time ago, and that are not up to us. Thus, it seemsthat determinism is incompatible with free will. There are three main responsesto this apparent problem: (l) Hard determinists accept determinism, so deny free will. (2) LIBERTARTANs accept free will, so deny determinism, at least for some human events(seecoNrRn{AUsAL rnnEoou). Both libertari anism and hard determinism are incompatibilist (seecorvr97

fqs,

futdiott

nrtntusu); that is, they hold that the freedom of an act is incompatible with its being determined. (3) Soft Determinists are compatiblists, in that they attack the reasoning above, and argue that otrr actions might be determined, but also free in some sense-that a determined action might nevertheless be up to the doe4, and one that the doer is morally responsible ficr-when ids determined but not compelled (saecourulsloN). troge, Gottlob (184&1925) German logician and philosopher of language, the founder of modern mathematical logic. He is best known for inventing quantification in logic (seesvuLoctc), ficr his arguments that matheBoLSoF QUANTIFIER matics should be understood as an extension of logic, and for his investigations into the relation between sense and reference (seaonxornrloN / coNNorATIoN) in philosophy of lang uage. [' FR,,V-guh' )

frrqucncy ficoryofprobobllity seepnonnsrlrry. Froud, Sea Sigmund scrBNrrsrs. funcfionl. Loosely speaking, a correspondence between one group of things and another. The notion has its home in arithmetic, where, for example, y is said to be a function of x in theprmulay - x2.Thus, each value of x corresponds to a value of y: if x is I then y is l, if x is 2 then y is 4, and so on. The value you stick in (in place of x, in this case) is 'argument' of the function, and what 1ou get out called the (the corresponding value of y, in this case) is called the 'value' of the function ficr that argument. Given the a4gument 3, the value is 9. Saa,also, TRI-rrH-ruNcTIoNeltry.2. The function of something is its use,goal, proper or characteristic activity, the way it normally fits into cnusnt relations with other things (searuwcrroNAllsM, FUNcTIoNAL xrNo).

98

fimdiomhm

pmbhm futura onlingents, of

funclionolism The view that a certain sort of thing is actually a ruNcrIoNAL KIND.A widely discussedview is functionalism about mental states: that each sort of mental state is a functional kind, definable in terms of its typical causesand effects. Functionalists tend to be token (scarypn / rorpll) MATERIALISTS, becausethey think that a particular internal state described functionally would be a particular physical state of the person's brain, though each type of mental state need not correspond to a type of physical state (see,by analogy, the can-openerexample, in FUNCTIoNAL KIND). funclionolkindn functional kind is a categorization in terms of what things can do-what their cause-andeffect relations with the world are-and not in terms of what they are made of, or how they are constructed. 'Can opener', fior example, names a functional kind, becausea can opener is anything whose operations result in a can being opened; this kind admits a wide variety of different physical kinds of things (compare an old-fashioned lever-tool, the can opener you turn, the electric can opener). (Seealro orrtNnloN 3). funclion,truth SeeTRUTH-ruNCTIoN. problemol SeepRoBLEM fulureconlingenls, oF FUTURE coNrrNGENrs.

99

frfloo

gencmlizofitn

GolileoGalilei Saescrnruusrs. gomblertfollocy lbu might think (as many people, not only gamblers, do) that the fact that a fair coin has been f lipped five times and has come up heads every time means it's much more likely to come up tails the next (to 'try" to even out the frequency). If you do, you're wrong. If it's really a fair coin, the PRoBABTLITY that it will come up tails is .5 for the sixth f lip, as it is for each f lip. (Also called the 'Monte Carlo fallacy'.) gome In philosophical usage, this term includes but is not limited to contestsand sports. To play a game is to attempt to achieve a certain state of affairs using only those means permitted by the rules; a game is a choice situation where more than one individual is choosingand where the choices made by the participating individuals determine how well the other individuals' choice turns out, Game theory is a systematicmathematical theory of human interaction that sees it as a rule-governed,sometimes competitive, group activity with certain aims and strategies.Most centrally a theory of economic behaviour, but also applied to other sorts of human interactions, such as political and moral ones. gener0l ideo seecoNcEPr. generoliz0lion A statement or judgement that nnsrRAcrs or reasons from particular casesto a more broadly or universally applicable statement or judgment, or the process of doing this. Generalization occurs in inductive logic (saeDEDUc100

gonomlwil

hfliorsmmph

TIoN / INDUcTIoN)when we reason from characteristics of one or a few individuals to a statementabout all individuals of that type; in deductive logic when we derive a quantified (seaguex-nnER LocIC) statemenu and in ethics when we think about rules that everyone should fcllow. generolwillWhat is desired by, or desirable for, society as a whole; sometimes tal..ento be the appropriateJusrlFlcATroN for government policy. This notion has seemed to many quite mysteriouswhen it is taken (in its classicalformulation by noussreu, for instance) to mean something other than what's revealed by majority vote or unanimity. Seea/so..soCIAL CHOICE THEORY"

gonelic follocyThe mistaken argument that the origins of something are the thing itself, or that its origins prove something about it. One form of this is the en HoMINEMargument. genius, evil SeeEvrL cENrus. genus / speciesFor philosophers, nor jusr biological hierarchical divisions, but divisions anywhere. A genus is a general classification; a speciessubdivides the genus. This nomenclature is especiallyassociatedwith ARrsrort-E,who thought that a speciesought to be defined by giving the essENfleL characteristicsof its genus, plus the differentia (Latin: "differences") that distinguish that speciesfrom others in the genus. Fior an argument against the universal applicability of this sort of definition, seaFAMtLyRESEMBLANCE. GellierexomplesA series of examples of the sort originally proposed by Edmund Gettier to shorrythat knowledge cannot merely be justified true belief. Imagine, ficr example, that you see a clock which saysthat it's noon, and you believe it's noon as a result. It is in fact noon, so your belief is true. The clock is normally reliable, so your belief is justified. But in fact the clock stopped at noon yesterday,so it's just lucky that the infirrmation it gave you is true, and you don't know

r0r

ghoslinltemdine

G0&1,

that it's noon, despite having justified true belief. Seeabo TRACKING THETR.UTH. ghostin fie mochineRyLE's disparaging rerm for how mind / body ouel-tsrs see persons: as a physical, mechanical body containing a ghostly, non-material mind. He argued that minds are, like ghosts, thought to exist because of philosophically mistaken reasoning. (saecATEGoRy MIsTAKE). given The given is the sort of thing that is the ground f loor of our knowledge: that for which there is no evidence, but which counts as evidence for anything else. For example, perception is often supposed to provide the given. Some philosophers doubt that there is anything that is given in this sense.(Seeako DAruM,FoUNDATIoNALISM). gnoslicitmThe doctrine of the Gnostics, an early marginally Christian sect, who offered salvation through otherwise hidden knowledge of spiritual truths (rather than through faith), and advocated transcending the material world. ['NOS-ti-sizm') God Among traditional Christians andJews, God is the supernatural creator of the universe,who provides the sourcefor morality, answersour prayers, is all-powerful and all-knowing, cares for us, and provides for immortality and salva'g', 'god' refers to any other suPertion. With a lowercase natural being believedin by other religions.There has been frequent philosophical debate about whether God's existence can be proven rationally. For a list of many classical FoRGoD'sExlsrENcE. attempts to do this, ra ARGUMENTS Gddol,Kurt (190&1973) Austrian-born American mathematician and LocICIAN,widely known for Godel's theorem: his of any coNsIsrENTlogic strong proof of the INcoMpLETENEss enough to include elementary number theory. [The closest many English-speakerscan get to pronouncing his name is 'girdle'-that's closer than'godel', anyway] l0?

goHin moon

Gnllhtpomdor

goldonmmn SacMEAN. lulo A principle of morality associatedwith ChristianGolden ity: "Do unto others as yor.rwould have them do uruo;ou." INgood,inlrinsic seelNrruNslc/ EXTRINSIC,/ / exlrinsic / inslrumenlol GOOD. STRUMENTAL goodfoi$ Seeneo FArrH / GooD EArrH / AUTHENTICITv / INAUTHENTICITY. (Henry) Nelson (b. 1906) Contemporary American Goodmon, philosopher associated(together with guntr) with contemporary rRAcMATIsM;influential writings in theory of knowledge, philosophy of language and of science, and METAPHYSICS.

good/ righl Both terms of moral approval. The distinction be'good' is taken tween them isn't very strict, but sometimes 'right' to actions. (seeako to apply to people or things, and ACT/ AGENT UOnelrrrES). grommorPhilosophers use this word in a wider way than English teachers do. It, means the form, that is, the general structure, of a sentence.This can include its LoclcAL FoRM as well as its svntnx. Linguists sometimes include in grammar the sEMANTICS and pHoxnttcs of a sentenceas well. For the distinction between depth and surface grammar, Jcc DEEP / SUREACE STRUCTURE.

greolesl principleSeaunLrre RrANrsM. hoppiness GreekAodem! SeeACADEMY. Grellingtp0r0d0xNamed for the German logician Kurt Grelling. Some adjectives apply to themselves,for example, 'English', 'short','polysyllabic'. Call these'autological' adjectives. Some a{ectives do not apply to themselves, for example,

r03

Orico,

Crygc, ilrgol

'French','long','monosyllabic'. Call these,heterological' adjectives.Now consider the adjective'heterological'. Is this a heterological adjective?This, like the LrAR,smnnoox, is a paradox of sELr'-ntreRENCE. Grice,H(erbert) P(aul) (1913-1988)English phitosopher with inf luential work on METApHysIcs,EpIsrEMoLocy,and phi_ losophy of language. gruo A colour name invented by Nelson cooDMAN, defined as follows: x i s g r u si f o n do n l yi f: ( l ) l t i s b e f o rtei m et o n dx i s g r e e no;r ( 2 ) l t i s t o ro f t eo r n dI i s b l u e . Let t be somefuture rime, saymidnight ronight,All emeralds observed so far havebeen green, so they havealso been grue. Using the usual inductive reasoning process(seannnucnoN you conclude that they will be green tomorrow. ,/ INDUcTION), But all those emeralds havealso been grue; the same reasoning shows that they will be grue tomorrow; but that means they will be blue tomorrow. Both predictions can't be correct; why do you think only the first is?Goodman raised what he called the "new riddle of induction" (seepRoBlEMoF INDUcTIoNfor the "old riddle"): we all think that green is a PRoJEcTIBLE property and grue isn't, but Goodman argued there's noJUSTIFIcATIoN for this. Gygos, ringof Secr{oBBEs'sFooLE.

r01

J|obmrr,

Mdoffinhkn

Hobetmos, Jiirgen (b. 1929) German social philosophea widely known for his rejection of posrrrvtsu and EMpIRIcTsM in favour of an ANALvsISof knowledge in terms of social theory. hoecceityThis penny looks a lot like any other penny, and some other pennies look exactlyalike. Is there some characteristic that only this penny has, and only this one could have-for example, the characteristic of bei,ngthis penny? This is a peculiar sort of characteristic, but some MEDIE\AL and contemporary philosophers argue that it's necessaryto distinguish any particular thing from every other actual and possible thing. This sort of characteristicis called in Latin a 'haecceitas'(a "this-ness"),in Englisha'haecceity'.The belief that such characteristics exist is haecceitism. ['hex-EYE-ihtee' or'hex-AV-ih-tee';'HEX-ee-a-tizm'] hollucinolion SaerLrusroN/ HALLUCTNATToN / DELUSToN. p0r0d0xSecsuRpRrsE hongmont eurz pARADox. hoppiness Some philosophers, especiallythose who believe that happiness is one, or the only, basic element in a good life, think of happiness not as merely feelingjolly, but in a more complex way; fcr example, as characterizing a life that achieveswhatever they consider to be its highest goal. hoppiness tolculusSaarnLlcrnc cALCULUS. horddebrminismSaeFI'EEwrLL.

r05

Jhm,

t|dmhdtr,

llorc, R(ichard) M. (b. l9l9) Contemporary British philoso pher, best known for his views on ethics. hodonkmlculus&a rpucrnc cALcuLUs. hodonismIn ordinary talk, this is seekingor desiring what some call the 'lower' pleasures-wine, persons of the opposite sex, and song. In philosophical talk, this term also has to do with pleasure. Philosophical hedonists, however,often distinguish between the "higher" and'lower" pleasures,making the former more important. As in the caseof ncolsM, we may distinguish psychological hedonism, the claim that people in fact seek only pleasure, from ethical hedonism, the claim that people otrght to seek pleasure (or only pleasure). The philosophical hedonists include EprcuRus,LocKE, HoBBEs,HUME,BENTHAM,and utLt. ['HEE-dun-izm'. 'Hedonic' means 'pertaining to pleasure'; pronounced 'hehDON-ik' or'hee-DON-ik'f }|ogel,Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)Foremostof the German IDEALISTS, still an enormous inf luence on coNTINENTALphilosophy; at the end of the nineteenth century, most English-speakingphilosophers were Hegelians.Known for his "DIALECTIcaL"philosophy of history, of thought, and of the universe as a whole, which is seen as the progressive unfolding of reason--of rhe "Absolute ldea". ['HAV-gul') Heidcggog Martin (1899-1976)German founder of rxsrrrunnrISTPHENOMENOLOGY. He attempted to provide a theory of the "authentic self" based on rhe fceling of dread and the awarcnessof death. ['HlGH-diggcr'] HolnnbOtg,Vrbrner Sa scrEl.lTrsTs. Hdrnhrg un(fffolnlyprlnclpfc.Sa uNcERrAlNry pRrNcrpLE. Hdmholh, Hermann Ludwig ron &c scrENTtsrs.

t06

lLrnd,

l*ilidffirtrn/{Cqrt

llompel, Carl (Gustav) (b. 1905) German-born American phi' losopher, member of the vIENNA cIRcLE, importara in phi' losophy of science and contemfi!,rt*y EMPIRIcISM. ['HEMPl'l HempeltporodoxSecuvnN PARADox. Heroclilusof Ephesus (5th century B.C.) enrsocRArrc philoso pher who taught that all thingp were comPosed of fire, and in constant f lux. ['hair-uh-KlY-tus'] heresy An opinion rejected as contrary to the official doctrine of a religious group, and officially prohibited by that relig' ion. The practice of interpretation or EKPLANATIoN; hgrmeneulics once closely associatedwith int€rPretation of the Bible, but now used (especially in coNttNENTAL circles) to mean a general scienceor methodology of interpretation. [English speakersusually say'her-man-OO-ticks' or'her-man-YOUticks'l HETERODOX. helelOdoXSeaORTHODOX./ saeuorr,rocENEous/ HETEROGENEOUS. helerogeneous heterologicolSeesnLr-neFERENcE. heleronomySeenuronoMy / HETERoNoMv. moleriolhm hisloricol / ideolismPhilosophers of history sometimes argue about what sorts of things are the most basic items at work in the process of history. ltG ordinarily think that these factors are people, economic conditions, countries, etc., but some philosophers have speculated that there is some sort 'spirit' whose operations underlie, at of invisible "idea" or the most basic level, the most general historical Processes. Those These philosophers are called'historical IDEALISTS'.

r0/

holrsm / indlviduolign

hishtidsm

who insist that history Sets its structure from merely physical things and processesare the historical uarnrueLISTS;this view is especially strongly associated with uenx. Seealso .DIALECTICAL

MATERIALISM / IDEALISM.

historicisml. A view that emphasizes the variability of belief 2. among hisorical periods; thus it tends to RELATIvISM. The view that certain human phenomena cannot be understood in isolation from their historical development and from their significance to the particular historical period in which they existed, and to the people in this period. Hobbu, Thomas (1588-1679) English philosopher, a crucial figure associated with the birth of MoDERNPHILoSoPHY' Hobbes was instrumental in replacing the earlier ARIsrorELtaN view of changeas motion from potentiality to actuality view: atoms in MEcHANISTIc with a modern MATERIALISTIc, motion, interacting becauseof their physical Properties, not purposes,explain the world. Hobbes is also associatedwith - the view that strong government is justified by a soctel coNTRAcr in which naturally selfish citizens bind themselvesfirr their mutual protection and well-being. ['hobz'] FooleA characte[ created by Honnns,who decides that Hobbest it would be more rational for him to pretend to be just than actually to be just. Other philosophers have created similar charactersto raise similar philosophical questions.HUME's Sensible Knave pretends to be just but really is not. In PLATo's Republic,Glaucon tells the story of a Lydian shep' herd who finds the Ring Of Gyges which allows him to become invisible. Glaucon asks why the shepherd, who could commit immoral acts without detection or punishment, should act morally. It is sometimes held that certain sorts of holbm/ Indlvlduolhm thingo, events,or Processesanemore than merely the sum of their parts-that they can be understood only try examining 'holism' (rarely them as a whole, This position is called 108

lumolodum

lumgunts/htmguur

spelled'wholism'), sometimes contrastcd with'individual' ism'. In social science and hisory, for example,.holists ar' gue that one can't explain what's going on on the basis of individual people's AcrtoNs, because these get their signifi' cance only by virtue of facts about the whole society. Voting, for example, is notjust the sum of the individual actions of marking on a piece of paper or pushing down a lever: its significance can be explained only by thinking about it as voting-that is, by appealing to characteristics applying only to the society as a whole. Holism about meaning (associated with quINn) insists that words and sertencesget their meaning only through their relationships with all other words and sentences.Holism about living things refuses to see them merely as the sum of their nonJiving parts. Seeako EMERGENT PROPERTIES, REDUCTIONISM,

VITALISM.

Something that's homogeneous is homogeneous / hehlogeneous the same throughout; heterogeneous collections contain diG 'ho-mo' + '-JE-nee-us'] ferent sorts of things. ['het-er-oh' or homologicol SaescLr-RTFERENCE. honoulificAn honorific term is one that carries, as Part of its of praise. To call someone'brave', meaning, an IMPLICATToN ficr egwmple, is notjust to saythat that Person is steadfastin the presence of danger-it's also to praise that Person. 'Brave' and 'rash' are applied to someone depending entirely on whether you want to praise or disparage that Person's steadfastnessin the face of danger.If you refuse to call someone who runs from battlefield danger a'soldier', /ou are using that word as an honourific, in away not central to its basic sensein English: some soldiers are faint-hearted.See alsooEpINtrtoN7. [spelled'honorific' in the US] hornsof o dilemmoSeeorlnuuR.

horsoshm

llussod,

horsoshoo A syMsor-oF sENTENTIAL Locrc, '=', used to fiorm a material coNDITroNAL.'PfQ' is roughly equivalent to 'If P then Q'. humonismAny view that centres on the value and dignity of humans, or that malcesactual human values and relevance for humans the central starting points. Associatedwith the Renaissance movement, which turned away from medieval supernaturalism and other-worldlinessand emphasized human worth and rnnrooM 2. 'LIBERIL'(or'secular')'humanist' has come to characterize anlone who decmphasizes religion and adrrocatesLIBERTv2, tolerance, and human welfare seen in terms of "earthly" values. It's sometimes a derogaory term, when used by right-wing believers to characterize left-wing ATHETsTS or anything thoughr to be consistent with their views. llumo, David (17ll-1776) Scouish philosopher and hisrorian, among the greatest philosophers of all time. A thoroughgoing nurnlclsr, he believed that all our ideas werc copies of sense impressions (scatnne / rMpRrssloN);he argued that many of our notions (such as the continuing "self,' and the necessaryconnection we supposeexists between cnusE and effect), since unsupported by perception, are mistaken, and that A, pRIoRI knowledge must derive merely from logical relations between ideas. He is famous also for scEFrrcAL conclusions regarding moral "knowledge": our ethical reac. tions, he argued, come merely from the psychological ten. dency to feel syMpATHywith others. His scepticism and empiricirm wene enormously inf luential in the ANALvTIc pHlI.osopHlcel tradition, and malc him seem quite contemPorary 8ouE. Husrd, Edmund (185$1938) German-Czech philoropher and mathematician, founder of purNoMENoLocy; inf luenced by BRENTANo,and greatly inf lueruial on ExtsrENTtALtsM.Hic mcthod lnrclrrd "BRAcKmNc" experience-conlidering

lr0

||uldrmo,

hpoftfrtir*r'ntl

limited aspects of it so that the EssENcEsof things are rerrealed. Hdchuon, Francis (169+?1746) Irish-born philosopher who worled in Ireland and Scotland; known for the theory of the "moral sense,' a kind of perception whereby feelingp of approval or disapproval are raised in us. scrcttnsrs. Huxlry Thomas .Saa SeeRErFICArroN. hyposlotizotiott hypotheshA tentative suggestion that may be merely a guess or a hunch, or may be based on some sort of reasoning; in any case it needs further evidence to be rationally acceptable as true. Some philosophers think that all scientiflc enquiry 'hypothesis'; plural begins with hypotheses. fNotz: singular 'hypotheses'] hypofieficol enfifies SeerHeonsrrcAI- ENrIrIEs. hypoftoficol imperoliveSaecetncoRlcAt- / HyporHETIcAL IMIERATIVE. A form of valid deductive reasoning (saa hypofieticolsyllogism

nncuunur): lf p ftenq. lf q thenr. if p thenr. Therefore, hypolhelico-dedudive modelThe view of the structureof science that seesit as the processin which first a ttvpotHsslsis formed; then statementsabout particula4,observablefacts from this hypothesis;and then the hypothesisis areDERIVEu . SeealsocovERtestedby courmuATloNof thesestatements ING LAil.

ill

kleol bnguoge

idoo

I idgo In general, any thought or perception in the mind. Sometimes used to refer to a PLAToNIcFoRM.HUMEused this word in a special way (seetDE / IMPRESSIoN). idoo,generol / obstroctSeacoNcEpt. In HUME,an impression is the mental event (= ideo/ impression one has as the immediate result of, and while, sENSE-DATUu) using one's senses.Impressions leave their imprint on the mind, and ideas, the fainter copy of these impressions,may be called up later in the absenceof sensation. ideolhmIn the ordinary senseof the word, an idealist is one who adheresto moral principle, or who is an impractical dreamer.This has little to do with its philosophical sense' Philosophically,unTIPHYSICALidealism is the view that only minds and their contents really or basically exist-a and ficrm of monism (seaounltsM / MoNISM/ PLURALIstr,t); idealism is the view that the only things EPISTEMOLOGICAL we know (or know directly) are our own lDEAs. hiltolicol sceHrsroRrcAl MATERIAI".ISM ideolism, / IDEALISM. An artificial language (saennrlrtclAL/ NATURAL ideollonguogo LANcuAcE)constructedin such away that it containsall the we'd want to make in a certain area, in unambi' AssERTIoNS guous and simplestform, and only theseassertions;and so that the logical relations between these assertions are clear and unambiguous. Natural languages are clearly not ideal languages.Some philosophersthink that the construction of an ideal language is an important steP in producing a

dcoldsffillroily

klonfify

THEoRY.An aim of syuaoulc Loclc is to produce an ideal language. ideolobservsr fteory A theory of ethics that attempts to explain what is really good by relying on the ethical reactions of an ideal observer-that is, someone who would have all the relevant information, and who would not be misled by particular NTERESTS or biases. ideos,obslloclSeecor{cnpr. ideos,cleoronddistinctSaacLnen ANDDrsrrNcr TDEAS. ideos,innole SeeruNernNrss. ideos,Plolonic'SeepL.lroNrc FoRMS. ideos,simpfe/ compfexSeesruytn 7 coMpLExrDEAs. idenfity l. \rbur identity is what you are-what's important abour you, or what makes you different from everyone else. Z. x and y are said to be identical when x and y are in fact the same thing-when'x'and',y' are two different names or ways of RsrrRRIttc to exactly the same object. This differs somewhat from the ordinary way of talking, in which two different things might be said to be 'identical' when they are exactly alike in some characteristics. Sometimes philosophers call this second kind of identity 'qualitative identity'i.e., identity of qualities or characteristics;and the first sort of identity 'quanritarive identity'. (Quarrtitative) identity is thus the logical relation that holds between a and b, when a and b are actually the same thing. This is symbolised using the equals sign: a = b (seesyMBoLSoF euANTrrnn locrc). l. Identity (over time) is the relation between something at one time and that same thing at another time: they are said to be two 'temporal stages'of the same continuing thing. Note that two stagesof the same thing are not quantitatively identical (they're different stages),and need not even be il3

idrnfrydi*ontt6

itetdbffil

qualitatirrcly identicak yu,r're nol taller than when )Du w€ne an infant. &e alsopRoBLEMoF IDENTITy,pERsoNALIDENTrry, neLL oF wAx, syNcHRoNrc/ DrAcHRoNIc. idrntityof indixcrniblcs&e

LnN oF rHE rDENrrry oF rNDr$

CERNIBLES.

idcnfifl lov ol seaLAils oFrHoucHr. idonfifypcrsonolSeapnpsouAl rDENrrry.. idonfityficory of mind The view that each mental state is really a physical state, probably of the brain. Ofrcn identity theorists believe in addition in the rypB-identity of menral and physical states(saerDENTrry2). idcologyA systemof values and beliefs, especiallyone concerning social and political matters. MAru( thought of official ideological systems as delusions resulting from the false consciousnessof the classsocieties in which they developed. Even in the mouths of non-Marxists, the word 'ideology' may suggestofficial mass illusion. ['eye-' or'ih-' + 'deeOL o-jee'] idiolcct A language or variant on a language used by only one percon. ['ID'eeo-lect'] lf ondonlyif scaBrcoNDrrroNAL. lff

An abbreviation for 'if and only if'. SaaBIcoNDITIoNAL.

lgnorolloolcnchl(Latin: "by ignoring the issucr") The sort of rearoning that is faulty because the premirer ane irrelevant !o the conclucion, or becaule it refutcs romething which is not at iggue, or becaure a well-knor+'nand obvianc ARGU. MENT to the contrary is ignored. ['ig-no' + '-f,[!lfJ ep '-RAHTZ' i'€e€ eh-LENKce'J

ll1

itoq,tionory fit / hhntkn / F holionory

ftnhr/l*'droth/ddrho

illocufionory ocl/ infrnfion Distinctions associated / pcrlorutionory withJohn SEARLE andJ. L. eusrrN. Illocutionary and perle cutionary INTENTIoNSI are intentions of special sorts that we have when using language in communication. An illocutionary act is one that is accomplished merely by the hearer's (or reader's)understanding what we're doing: thus, illocutionary acts include informing somebody of something, asking sbmebody about something, ordning somebody to do something, and so on. Of course, often we have further intentions regarding the hearer: when I say'Please close the door' I intend not only to perform the illocutionary act of requesting that yotr close the door, but also to perfcrm the further act of getting you to close the door becauseof this request.This further act is a perlocutionary acu getting you to respond in some way because of my illocutionary act and your recognition of it. My intentions to perform illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are called illocutionary and perlocutionar y intentions. Austin, Searle, and others algue that agood way to explain the meanings of parts of a language is to specify how the rules of the language create the potential for each bit to perfiDrm illocutionary acts. illusion / hollutinotion / delusionl. Illusions and hallucinarions are 'false" perceptual experiences-ones that lead, or could lead, to mistakes about what is otrt there. A hallucination is the apparent perception of something that does not exist at all (as in dreaming, mirages, drug-induced states). An illusion is the incorrect perception of something that does exist (examples are the uUr-lEn-l-ynRrLLUsroN,and the familiar way a straight stick half-immersed in warer looks benr). A delusion is a perception that actually results in a false belief; illusions and hallucinations can delude, but often do not. The eRculrENT FRoMILLUsIoNdraws EpIsrEMoLocIcAL conclusions from the existence of these things. 2. 'Illusion' and 'delusion' are sometimes used to refer to any false belief: 'illuFreud (seascnNrrsrs) and MARXcalled religious beliefs sions." ll5

kmfrdht

inpilfhr,cotrgiliol / hyplfiolicd

imoglnolionIn the ordinary sense,this is orr faculty for thinking thingp up, especiallyunreal things. Some philosophers have us€d this word to refer to the faculty of having images-mental pictures. immononlSaarnnnscENDENT//TMMANENT. immoloriolism The view that some things exist that are not material: that are not made of ordinary physical stuff, but instead of mental or spiritual-immaterial (synonym: 'incorporeal')-stuff. This is the denial of uersrueusr'r. The most extreme ficrm of immaterialism is the view that no material thingp exisc this is ronelrslr . Seeako suBsrANcE. immoleriol rubsfonc0SaesussrlNcr. immgdiotol. In the ordinary sense,this means 'without delay' but 2. in its more technical philosophical sense it means 'without mediation'-that is, 'directly', In this sense,for example, philosophers ask whether external things are sensed immediately, or mediated by the sensingof internal images. 'conrrary to morality'; the immorolity / omorolityThe first means 'without morality'. second, Someone who knows about moral rules but intentionally disobeysthem or rejects them is immoral; someone who doesn't know or think about morality is amoral. lmmorlolltyThe supposedcontinuation of the soul or spirit or mind or person foreve4 after the death of the body. It is, of course,a central feature of the beliefs of most religions, but philosophershavesometimesargued againstthe possibility (and even the desirability) of immortality. imporolivoA statementtelling you what to do. imporotlvr, colcgorlcol/ hypothtticolsec cnrEGoRrcAL/ HyporHETI. CALIMPERATIVE. ll6

imdkution/hfum

hd[nolion

implicofion / infusnto l. Implication is a logical relation that holds between two statements when the second follows pn' from the first. The first is then said to'imply'the DUCTIvELY second. This relation is sometimes called'implication'' Be careful not to confuse'implication' with'inferencei: the first is a relation between statements,but the second is something people do, when they reason from one statement to another (which the first statementimplies). A rule of inference is an acceptableprocedure for reasoning from one set of statementsof a Particular form to another statement' 2' Sometimes a sentence'implies'what it doesn't literally state. For example, if I said "Fred is now not robbing banks," I imply that at one time he was robbing banks. This sort of implicature is sometimescalled'conversational'or'contextual' implicature, to disting uish it from'logical' implicature' 3. For a different sort of use' sd' (See also PRESUPPOSITIoN') 'material implication' and 'strict implication', in coNDITIONAL.

implicolureSeett'tpLtcRttoN/ INFERENCE. imply/ inler SeeIMrLIcATIoN/ INFERENcE. imporl,exisfenliolSaerxts'rexTlAL IMPoRT. SserDre / IMPRESSIoN. impression righl SeaRIcHrs. inolienoble / INSezgen FAITII/ cooD EAITH/ AUTHENTIcITY inoulhenficity AUTHENTICITY.

Any desire,or pro or con feeling.Some philosophers inclinolion (reut is a good example) think that acting from inclination cannot be moral action; the only right actions are those motivated by an understanding of duty, and are often contrary to inclination.

ll7

in&ilnc/dsnctitn

lndifipoof

inclusivc ol / disiunctionSacDrsJUNcrroN. incoharcnfSeeconnRrxr. incompfiblismSaeFREEwrLL. incomplclonoss SeecoMpLETENEss / rNcoMpLETENEss. inconsistoncy SeacoxsrsrENcy. incorrigibility / conigibilitySomething is incorrigible when it is impossible to correct it, or when it is guaranteed correct. 'Corrigibility' means'correctibility'. Some philosophers have thought that our beliefs about our own mental srates are incorrigible. For example, if you sincerely believe that you anenow feeling a pain, how could you be wrong? incorporoolity seesussreNcB. indefinifo desaiplionSeeosrrNrrE/ TNDEFTNTTE DEscRrprroN. indolsrminory of tronslotion The view, associatedmosr closelywith QUINE,that there are many possible ways to translate another language into your own, and that there may not be conclusive reasons to prefer one translation to another. Quine argued that there is no fact of the matter about what someone means by what he / she says; there is only a preferred translation.Secabo RADToAL TRANsLATToN. indclrrmlnoqprlncipla of SecpRrNctpLE oF rNDErERMrNAcy, indolormlnlsm SaconrnRurNrsM. Indrxkol SaaonuoNsrRArrvE,/ rNDExrcAL. Indhrclploof Proof of a rtatement accompliohed by AssuMrNc2 itr denial and deriving a sELF.coNTRADtcrroN or ABsuRDrry

ll8

irdiscernbh

irArfnn

from that. Also known as reductioad absurdun (Latin: "re' duction to the absurd'). oF INDIScERNIBLEs. Seeu*l oF THEIDENTITY indiscemibles LocIC. individuol consfonlSeesvt'tsoLsoF euA NTIFIER esseo(eSear,ssr,ncn. individuol 'individual' l. In ordinary talk, the word indiyiduofion individuol/ 'organiza'group', can be used correctly as a contrast to synonym as a pomPous misused is tion', etc., but frequently 'person'. 2. In philosophical talk, an individual is a for single thing (not necessarilya person) that is basic in the into Parts. Individuation is senseof not being ANALYZABLE distinguishing between one thing and another: philosophers sometimes try to discovercriteria for individuation of some sort of thing, that is, the tests we use to tell things of that sort from one another, and to count how many of them 'Particulars' is a synonym for there are in a group of them. 'individuals'. vorioble.9eeraruanLE,/coNsrANr. individuol individuotion SzerNDrvrnuAI./TNDIvIDUATIoN. 'Dubitable' means 'doubtable'. Dubiindubitobility / dubitobility table statements are not just ones we are psychologically capable of doubting, but ones about which even highly fanciful and unlikely doubts might be raised, doubts that no one in his / her right mind would seriously have. Thus thought that becauseour sensesmight be fooled, DESCARTES information from them was dubitable. He then went on to try to discover what sort of belief was really indubitable: about which it could be proven that no doubt can be raised. Seeako cERTAIN. inductionSaenEoucrroN / TNDUCTToN. I t9

problem induclion, of

imilsslf / fodtsslf

problam inducfion, of SeeIRoBLEMoF rNDUC.rroN. ineffobleIndescribable,nor communicable.some rerigious or mystical experiencesare said to be ineffable. inferenceSeerupLrcnrroN/ TNFERENcE. infinilerggrossA sequencethat musr conrinue backwardsendlessly.For example, if every event must have a cause,then a present event must be caused by some past event; and this eventby another still earlie4and so on infinitely. sometimes rhe fact that reasoning leads to an infinite regressshows tl.at it is faulty. One then calls it 'vicious' regress. informolfollsciesSeapnllecy. informol / formolfogicThe larter is that kind of logic that relies heavily on syMBoLs and rigorous procedures much like mathematics;it concentrateson reasoning that is correct becauseof syntax, (seasnnaeNTrcs,/ syNTAX/ pRncumcs). Only a small fraction of the ordinary sorts of reasoningwe do can be explained this way,and there is a vast .scopefor informal logic, which analyzesgood and bad arguments semantically,and relies lessheavily on symbolsand mathematics.styleprocedures. inhcronlSeetNrRtnstc/ INHERENT,/ TNSTRUMENTAL/ ExrRINsrc, in-ilsalf/ lot-itnll These are the two fundamenral caregoriessnn rnn thought the world was divided into. The realm of the for-itself (in French, 'pour-soi',['poor swa']) includes free thingp-things that are conscious,create their own characteristics, and are REspoNSrBLr for everything they do. This realm is often though to include only rnnsons, The realm of the in-itself (French: 'en-soi', [roughly, ,ah-swa']) includes everything else.(For a different senseof in-itself', JerTHINcrN.rTSELF.)

l?0

innolono$

infirxido

innoloncssA belief, coNcEPT,or characteristic is innate when it is inborn-when it doesn't come from experience or educa' tion-though experience may be thought necessaryto malc consciousor actualize something that is given innately. An argument ficr the innateness of something is that experience is not sufficient to produce it in us. \ftll-known innate' nessviews are pLATo's(for the innatenessof concepts) and cHoMSKY's(for the innatenessof concepts and of the basic structures of language). theory of PUNISHMENT innocence ondguih tne DETERRENcE claims that inf licting punishment is.;usrtrmn if this prevents future undesirableacts. But supposethat punishing some' one who was in fact innocent preveited a great deal of future crime (by others); it seemsthat this would bejustified by the deterrencetheory. Does this show that the theory is wrong? A second way innocence and guilt enter into a philosophical argument is in the theory of the "just war." Many people are willing to allow that going to war under some circumstancesis morally justified; but in every war innocent people are hurt and killed. Does this show that it's acceptableto harm innocent people? Or that there's some'Justwar" theory? thing wrong with 'in fact' or 'in practice'. Philosoin plincipleContrasted with phers talk about things we can do in principle, meaning that we could do them if we had the time or technologl or if other merely practical difficulties did not stand in the way. For example, we can VERIFYthe statement.'Thereis a red pebble lying on the north pole of Mars' in principle, though at the moment we can't test this by observation. \4b might forever be unable to test statementsabout extremely distant stars,but these are verifiable in principle. In principle, one can count to one quadrillion, becausewe know the rules for doing it, though in fact we lack the patience and wouldn't live long enough anyway.

l2l

ilrslrumenhl

inslrumonhfsca rurRrrusrc/ TNHERENT / TNsTRUMENTAL / ExrRrN. SIC. insflumenlolismSaaopERATroNALrsM,/ TNSTRUMENTALTsM. inlelligence, 0rtifi(iol SeeenrrrrcrAL TNTELLTcENCE.

intolligibility Something is intelligible when / unintelligibility possibleto understandit; otherwise,unintelligible.

IS

inlensionol SearxrnNsroN,/INTENSToN. inlgnlionolNote the second 'r' in rhis word; be careful nor ro confuse it with 'intensional'(saetxtrNstoN / INTENSToN). l. Sometimes 'intentional' means 'on purpose', or 'having to do with intentions'(i.e.,plans or desiresabout ecrtorus).2. Intentionality is the idea that mental events have objects which they "point to" or are "about"; thus, if you think that Venus is a planet your thought has intentionalitl' or aboutness:it is about Venus.BRENTANo held that intentionalitywas the distinguishing feature of the mental. Intentionality is problematic becausethe items we think about do nor seem to be identical to things in the external world. Thus if you think Santa Claus lives at the north pole, your thought is about Santa-it has Santa as its intentional object-even though (bad news) there is no Santa. (seea/so sUBSTSTENT ENTITv.)Likewiseit seemsthat there is a differencebetween thinking about the Morning Star and thinking about the Evening star-you might think something about one thar you didn't think about the other-even though the morning star is tuBxrtcel 2 with the evening star (they arejust different names for Venus). So there seem to be two intentional objects even though there is only one planet. g. A sentence is said to prwide an intentional (or oblique) coursxr if co-REFERRtNc TERMScannot be substituted within it selu vERITATE, that is, if it is referentially opAeuE.

t?2

inlnocfionicn

sfi htunrtbn/mhof

inleroclionismA form of mind / body DUALISM.It holds that mind and body can interact-that is, that mental events can cause physical events (e.g., when your decision to tcn'rch something causes your physical hand movement) and that physical eventscan causemental events(e.g., when a physi' cal stimulation to your body causesa mental feeling of pain). A standard objection to this commonsenseposition is that it's hard to see how this sort of causal interaction could take place, since the mental and the physical work according to their own laws: how could an electrical impulse in a (physical) nerve cell causea non-physicalpain in a mind? Perhaps this even violates the law of conservation of energy. DEscARTESwas a classicalinteractionist' inlereslsNot, as in an ordinary sense,those things about which you are curious or fascinated;rather, that which is of value to you. Something may be thought to a (real) interest of yours even though you don't think you want it-it's an objective, not a subjective,interest.Sometimesinterestsare distinguished from needs: you can't do without the latter. Thus food is a need, but watching TV is only an interest. inlernolismSeenxIERNALISM / INTERNALISM. rodicolSesReotceL TRANSLATIoN inlelprelolion, / INTERPRETATIoN. inlerpreled colculusSeecelculus. inlerseclion / unionof sels The intersection of two sETS (also known as the 'product' of the two) is the set of things these two sets hold in common; the union (also known as the 'sum' of the two) is the set of things including both of them. Thus the intersection of the set of dogs and the set of brown things is the set of brown dogs; the intersection of the set of dogs and the set of cats is empty (i.e.,there is no thing that is both a dog and a cat); the union of the set of dogs and the set of cats is the set of dogs and cats (that group of things consistingof all dogs plus all cats).

r23

hnursilivl

infdlilnism

inlronsilivoSeetR n Nsrrrv E/ rNTRANsrrrv E,/ NoNTRANSITrv E. inlrinsic / inherent / inslrumenlol / exlrinsicsomething has intrinsic value when it is valuable for its own sakeand not merely as a means to something else.Pleasure,for example, is intrinsically valuable. The contrast is with instrumental value. Something has instrumental value when it is valuable as a means to some other end. The value of money is primarily instrumental (though some people also value it intrinsically -they like having it for its own sake.)An intrinsic or inherent or natural RIGHTis one people have permanently or essentially,because of the very nature of a person. An extrinsic right is one people have only temporarily, or one they don't have unless they are granted it. Seeaiso RrLR. TIONAL / INTRINSIC PROPERTIES.

properfiss pRopERrrES. inlrinsic SaeRrlRrroNAL/ rNTRrNSrc inkospecfion The capacity for finding things out about oneself by "looking inward"-by direct awarenessof one's orvn mental states.\6u might find out that you havea headache,fior example, by introspection.This is contrastedwith the wav someone else might find this out, by observing your outward behaviour-groaning, holding your head, erc. Sometimes called 'ref lection' [a chief ly British alternativespelling is'ref lexion'l inluiliOnA belief thar comes IN{MEDIATELy, wirhour reasoning, argument,or evidence.Some philosophersthink that certain intuitions are the reliable,rational basisfor knowleclge of certain sorts.Some beliefsthat ariseimmediatelywhen we perceiveare the basis of our knowledge of the outside world (though perceptualintuitions are not alway'sreliable). Our ethical intuitions are sometimestaken to be the basis of, and to test,ethical theories. Seeako INTUITIoNISIV{. inluilionism Intuitionism is any theory that holds thar rNTUrrroN is a valid source of knowledge. DEscARTEs, sptNozA,and 121

lllUS ondfbo

lptopdlin

LocKE are associated with intuitionism about certain kinds of knowledge. Ethical intuitionism is the position that ethical truths are intuited. MooRE, for example, held that there is a special sort of facility for intuiting ethical truths. Nowadays, ethical theorists mostly doubt this, but many rely on what they call ethical intuitions (i.e., ethical reactions not based on theory or reasoning) as data to coNFIRMethical theories anyway.Intuitionism in mathematics has a rather special meaning: it holds that any sort of mathematical entity exists only if it is possible to give a coNSTRUcrIvE pnoor of it. EXrsrENcE lllUScondition'INUS' is an acronym; an INUS condition is an Insufficient but Necessarypart of an Unnecessarybut Sufficient condition. (seeuncnssARy/ sUFFIctENT / coNDITIoN) For example, lightning striking a house is an INUS condition for the house'sburning down: it's a necessarypart of a complex of conditions fior one way (not the only way) the house might burn down. J. L. Mackie (English philosopher; l9l7-1981) coined this term while proposing this complex sort of condition as part of an analysisof ceusr. ['EYE-nus') involidorgumenlSeeRRcuurr.rr. involiditySeeRncuMeNr. inverled speclrum Supposethe visual imagessomeonegets when seeingcoloured things are "inverted'from the normal ones, so that when she seessomethingred, she getsa violet visual image, and when she seessomething yellow, she get a blue image,and so on. She usescolour wordsjust the way everyone else does. This supposition is part of an argument fior the existenceof qunltA, and against any FUNcrtoNALrsror BEHAVIOURIST theory of mind. iofooperolorSaesyunols oF euANTTFTER Locrc. lproposilionSeee/ E/ r/ o pRoposrrtoNs.

r25

inotbnol/ iroionofity

poblem is/ oughr

irrotionol / inotionolitySaennrroNAL/ rRRArroNAL. ineflexivgSaaRnrLnxrvE/ TRREFLEXTvE/ NoNREFLEXTvE. is/ oughtploblemThe controv..ry ioncerning whether "is-statements' (statementsthat say what the facts are) can imply "ought-statements"(statementsof morality that say what ought to be done). Huttlnis an important exponent of the view that they can't; ETHTcAL NATURALTsTs typically claim that they can. Those who think that they can't sometimes refer to this as the "fact-valuegap,"

126

ifr,iltfn

Jomes,William (1842-1910)American (Harvard) philosopher and psychologist, the ficunder of modern psychology; to a wide audience. A strong brought PEIRcE'sPRAGMATIsM who argued, nevertheless,in favour of religious EMrTRICIST belief on the grounds of its good practical effect on our lives. Jospers,Ibrl (1883-1969)German ExlsrENTIAtnr philosopheq 'inauthentic' known ficr his analysesof the "authentic" and self. ['YAS-purs'] E' v E/ JoINTLYExHAUSTIV ioinllyexhousliveSaeMUTuALLvEXCLUSI iudgmenlThinking that something is the case or not the case. Sometimes this word is also used as a synonym fcr'pnopostTIoN' or for'nssERTIoN'.[may also be spelled'judgement'] Jung, Carl Gustav SeesctgNrtsts. jusliceFair or correct treatment or social arrangements. A legal system is just to the extent that it treats those under it fairly, or with equal concern and respect, or as free and equal moral Acf,NTS.Distributivejustice is fairnessof distribution of goods and benefits in a society.There is a good deal of philosophical controversyabout what the principles ofjustice are.John Rnvm has presentedan inf luential contemPorary theory ofjustice. refibulive SecnntrunurtvtsM. iuslice, 127

lrtnkonn

iusrifkofion

iusfilicolionl. An argumenr to show thar some srarementis rrue, or that some act is morally acceptable.2. The explanarion required for each step in a DERI\ATIoII,which tells which preceding stepsand which rule of TNFERENcE were used ro derive that step.

(onf,

[eynes,

Konl, Immanuel (1724-1804) German philosopher, one of the most important figures in the history ot'philosophy His EptsrEMoLoclc.{t. concern was with thc "truths of reason" (for example, that everything has a (IAUSE) that l{L,\lL, seeured to have shnrvn cannot be supported by experience, and are not Ai'*Al\''rtc cotlsequences of the relations between ideas. Kant thought that such knowledge was A PRIoRI and svru.rHr,TlC,and that it could be accounted for by the rvay that any rational mind necessarily thinks. Similarly, he argued that the basis of ethics is not EMptRICAt.or psychological (for example, it cannot be based upon our actual felt desires). Ethical knowledge can be derived merely from the a priori form any ethical ASsERTtoNmust have: it must be UNIvERSALIZABLE-thatis, rationally applicable to everl'one. Kant argued that this is equivalent to saying that the basic ethical truth was that everyone must be thought of as an end, never merely as a means (seeaLsoCATEGORICAL/IlypoTHETICALIMPERATIVE).Kant's ethical theory has become a major consideration in contemporary ethics. korno In Hinduism and Buddhism, harma is the sum of the results of one's actions, and is supposed to determine one's destiny, both in this life and in future RETNCARNATIoNS.

Saecetue,nsrs. kothorsis |(eplegJohannes SeescrENrrsrs. Keynes,John Maynard SeescrENTrsrs.

129

[bfiepod,

lfierkegoord, S6ren (Aabye)( l8l3-1855) Danish philosopherand theologian; a Lutheran minister,though a critic of conventional religion. His views on pure choice in an ABSURD Kierkegaard, context were the origin of nxtsreNTlALISM; however,concentratedon individual subjectivity and freedom in a Christian framework. [KEER-kuh-gard] kind,notulolSeeNnruRALKIND. seapHILosopHER-KINGs. kings,philosopher FooLE. SruHoBBES's knovs,sensible thol Two sorts of knowing: one knows frour knowing how/ knowing to ride a bicycle;one knows /hal Saskatoonis in Saskatchewan. Believing and knowing something both inknowledge/belief volve thinking that it's true. One can correctly-be said to know something,however,only if it's true; but one can have a false belief. There is philosophicalcontroversyabout what else is different about knowledge:Must one be.Jusrtrteoin thinking what one does in orden to be said to know it? Must one be connectedin some way with the fact one is said to know, for example,when that fact causesone's belief ? If you have never been to knowlodgo byocquoinlonce /by destriplion the top of Mount Everest,you know it only by descriptionby how others havedescribedit, or only insofar as it's called 'the top of Mount Everest'.lbu have knowledge by acquaintance through actual personal experience of the thing known. This distinction is due to RUSSELL. pwa/empiri(ol Seatt*.lptnlcRl. knowledge, kosmossz cosMos.

l(ripke,SaulA. (b. ltl40) Contemporary Arnerican philosopher known lbr lris rvork on philosophy of language atrd of ps,vchology;aud on the losslsLE \{oRt-Dsanalysis ol necessity anclpossibility.

lohurtheory of'mlue

longuoge, obiect / men

lobour theoryof volue The theory of (economic)value associated with unnx, which measuresthe value of a commodity that is in demand by the amount of labour necessar)',given current technology,for its production. IA merican spelling is 'labor'] Loton,Jacques(1901-1981 ) Frenchstnucn;Ralts'r philosopher, known for his application of structural methodology to psychologyand for exploring its philosophical FREUDTAN and cultural implications. (French:"let [them] do") Pertainingto an economic: loissez-foire policy of allowing free competition, without government interferenceor direction. A feature of what was formerlv sonow (confusingly)called'conservative', called'LIBERAL', cial policy. [English-speaking philosophersusually approximate the pronunciation of this as 'less-ayfair'] lomork, Chevalier de SeesctENTrsrs. longuoge-gome wrrrcENsttttt used this term for languageand its uses, in a broad sense, including the way our langttage inf luencesthe way we think and act. The emphasishere is on the similarity of a languageto a game: both are rule-gov' erned systemsof behaviour,and the rtrles varv over times and contexts. longuoge, ideol SaerDEALLANGUAcE. longuoge, obied/ mef0- SeeMETALANGUAGE.

l3?

adknry hngnge,

lurofhpnumha

pHtLosopHy. longuoge, ordinorySeeoRuNnRyLANGUAGE LANGUAcES. longuoges, orfifidol/ noturol.searnrrncrAt-y' NATURAL loploce,Pierre SeaSCIENTISTS. forgenumbers, lowol Seet*v oF LARcENUMBERS. low l. A nuln or principle establishedand enfcrced by government ('civil law'),or of society.2. A rule of morality ('moral law').3. A formulation of the general regularitiesof the way things work, especially in nature ('ruerunnt-LA,v').A law of nature may be more than merely a correct description of regularities,however(sreNotutc). low,coveringSree covuntNc LA,v. lowlikeslolemenlsStatements which have the LocrcAL ronu of LA,vs3 whether they are true or not. Part of the philosophical study of lawsis the attempt to specify the logical form of any lawlike stat.ement. low noturolSaaNnruReL LAil. low0f... Seethe following entries; or under what follows 'of'; or under'PRINCIPLE oF...'. lowof conlrodiclion SeeLAilsoF rHouGHT.

lowofexcluded middleSealnvs oFrHoucHr'. fowof identitl seeL,!wsoF THOUGHT. lowof lolgenumbelsSupposeyou f lip a fair coin four times. pRoBABILITYtheory tells you that you're most likely to get two heads, but you wouldn't be surprised to get three heads, or one, or four, or none. But if you f lip a coin one thousand times, you'll very likely get very close to one-half heads.The

r33

hwd lh idbcemilrility olklenticols

lorvs ofthought

law of large numbers saysthat it is more probable that the observedfrequencywill be closero the frequencypredicted by theory as the number of observedeventsincreases. lowof theindiscernibility of identicolsThe supposect law of MErAPHYstcs(associatedwith t-glsNIZ,thus also called 'Leibniz's law') that saysthat if x and y are TDENTTcAL 2-rhar is, if x is \', then x and y are indiscernible (shareall the same properties). Distinguish this from its reverse,the law of the identity of indiscernibles:if x and y are indiscernible,then they are identical. Imagine two things that are alike in every detail: they even occupy the same space at the same time. Why then think of them as two? Wouldn't there really be onlv one thing? lows,Deilorgont SeeITMORGAN'sLAMS. lorn of thoughtRefers to whar were rraditionally taken to be the three basicprinciples of Loctc, and of all rational thought, clearlytrue and in need of no proof. These are: The law of identity: If anything is P (i.e., has the property P), then it is P. The law of contradiction: A sentence and its NEGATIoN(i.e., its denial) cannot both be true; alternatively, nothing can be both P and not-P Also known as the law of noncontradiction. The law of the excluded middl.e'. Either P or not-P. This is sometimes distinguished from the principle of bivalence: Every statement is either true or false. Given an intuitively appealing definition of truth, these principles are equivalent. 'laws These are now only rarely called of thought' (except as a historical reference) because it is widely doubted that all three (especially the second and third) must hold of all rational thought; certainly they are not all laws of all rnodern

systems of logic.

131

prdlem lefthond

lemmo

lefthandproblemIf you're right-handed, you probably will accept the truth of this statement:"If you have to have one of your hands cut off, then you want to have your left hand cut off"' Now suppose that you have to have a hand cut off. Presumably, it follows from this that you want to have your left hand cut off. But this conclusion is clearly false: you don't want to lose either of your hands. Where has this reasoning gone wrong? Is there something wrong with modusponens? legolpositivismThe doctrine that the law is a set of rules eachof which has the "law-making pedigree" - that is, which are made by whatever the law-makingprocedures are. (Perhaps this amounts to their having been enacted by the proper officials in the proper way.)Thus it holds that there is no necessaryconnection between law and morality. An immoral law which is enacted in the appropriate way is neverthelessa law. legolreolismseenrRLIst,t legilimocyIn general, legality or appropriateness.In political theory a ruler is legitimate when he / she has the right to rule; there are many different theories of what makesa ruler legitimate. teibniz,Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-l7tO) German scientist, mathematician, and philosopher. He and Newton (seascleNTlsrs) independently developedthe differential and integral calculus.Known firr the view that all propositions are necessary (seeNEcEssARy / coNTINcENTTRUTH),in this "best of all posstBLE woRLDs."['LIBE-nits'] leibniztlow SeeLA,voF THErDENTrryoF INDIScERNIBLEs. lemmoA sub-proof: something proved in the course of, and for the purpose of, proving somethingelse.

135

Lenin.

Lenin,V(ladimir)

I(lvch) (Original sur-n:une Uly,anor,) (1g701924) Russian thinker and political leader; besr-known firr h i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e s t n t c t u r e < > ft h e c o m r n u n i s t s t t i t e :

but also the author of rnorc abstract phikrsophir.:rl rvor-k, w h e r e h e a r g u e d a g a i n s t a n t i m e t a p h v s i c a l r , ( ) s t 'Itv t . s \ r . leonordo da Vinci Scz scrgrrrrlsls. L6vi-SlrousC s ,l a u d e ( b . 1 9 0 8 ) f i r e n c h s t ' R L : ( ] T r r R A l . r spr h i l r i s o pher, known for his application of structuralisnr to iurthr.opology, and for drawing philosophical conclusions fi-ornthis application. L e w i s ,C ( l a r e n c e ) I ( r v i n g ) ( l B B 3 - 1 9 6 . 1 A ) meric:rn phrlosophcr, b e s t - k n o w n f o r h i s r v o r k i n M O t ) A l .l o g i c a n d t , r , r s r f . \ . { ( ) r . ( ) ( ; \ ' . L e w i s ,D a v i d K ( e l l o g g ) ( b . 1 9 4 1 ) C o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n p h i l o s o p h e r k n o w n f b r h i s u ' o r k o n ( . o t r N r t . R r . A c t - L i . \ at .nsd t : r x , VENTIONS. liort porodoxConsider rhis senrence: I h e s e n t e n ci n e t h e b o xi s f o l s e Is it true? If it is, then what it says-that it's not true-is corrcct, so it's not true. But if it's not true, then it's true. It seemsthat i t c a n ' t b e e i t h e r t r u e o r f a l s e . T h i s p A R A D o xa r i s e s f r o m t h c SELF-REFERENcE of the statement. [,ogicians conside r-what t
r36

lihdorinnism

Lockeon oroviso

RIcl{TS and (limited) freedom from state constraint is a classical moderate firrm of liberalism in this sense. Nowadays, however, those who hold this view ar-e more likely to be called'conservatives'; liberals often advoindividual

cate more government intervention, especially whelr that is thought necessary for what contemporary liberals value: for freeing people from ignorance and misery, or for solving other social problems such as poverty. Contemporary liberals also characteristically advocate DEMocRACY,rule by all. Sometimes the word is used these days merely to designate any left-wing position (or any position left of one's ownthus possibly fairly far right.) For a contemporary use, re6' 'liberal humanism', in suueNIsu. liberlolionisml. The position that some of our actions are free in the sense of not being caused (sra rRm wtLL and coNTRAcAUSALFREEDOM). 2. The political position that people have a strong right to political LIBERTY.Thus libertarians tend to object to restrictive laws, taxes, the welfare state, and state economic control. A more specific variety of (traditional) LIBERALISM,though nowadays this position tends to be espoused by some of those who are called "conservatives." liberf

.SeeFREEDoM,I and 2. Seea/so pRrNcrpLEoF LIBERTv.

pHn-osopHy. linguislic onolysis SeeRNeLyrrc / philosophy Locke,John (1632-1704) English philosopher and political theorist. None of our ideas is INNATE, he argued, so all our knowledge must come from experience. This position makes him the first of the three great British nuprRrcrsrs (the others are BERKELEv and HUME).Inf luential also in political theory, he is known for his advocacyof (traditional) LIBERALTsM and natural rights (seerNrRrNSrc/rNHERANT/ INSTRUMENTAL / EXTRtttStc). lockeonproyisoThe principle of property rights advocated by John t-ocxE, that in legitimately acquiring previously un137

hgk

boicolform

owned property one must leaveas much and as good of the same for others. logic Loosely speaking, logic is the process of correcr reasoning, and something is logical when it makessense.philosophers often reserve this word for things having to do with various THEoRIES of correct reasoning. TRADITIoNALLocrc included various sorts of categorization of some types of correct and incorrect reasoning, and includecl st.udyof the SYLLoGISM. Nowadays,most logical theory is done by exhibiting the types of sentences,and giving rules for what correctly may be reasonedon the basisof sentencesof different t)?es, in svMaor-rcf,orm (that is, with symbols taking the place of logically relevant words or connections); though INFoRMAL logic is also important. For a description of the two main sorts of logic, Jrl DEDUcrtoN/ INDUCTION. logicolotomisfi The position, associared with RUSSELLand WITTcENSTEIN,that language might be analyzed into "atomic pRopoSITIoNS," the smallestand simplestsentences, each of which corresponds to an "atomic fact," one of the simplest bits of reality. logicolbehoviourism SeesEHnvrouRrsM. logicolequivolence SeeBrcoNDrrroNAr-. logic,olethicSeeeLrrurc. logicolfolsehoodsaeLocrcAL rRUTH/ EALstry. logicolformThe form of a sentenceis its general structure, ignoring the particular contenr it has. Logical frrrm is the structure of a sentencehas becauseof the logical words it contains.Thus, for example, '[f it's Tuesday,then I'm late fcr class' and 'If Peru is in Asia, then Porky is a frog' have the same overall logical form ('if P then Q'). The sort of Locrc that works by exhibiting, often in swnolrc noration, the

r38

logicoltuft /folsity

logicol imposibility

'ficrmal logic'. 'Formal' logical form of sentencesis called SYSTEM. here may also refer to logic as a FORMAL logicolimposibilifi saeLocrcAL rRUrH / EALSrry. propernomesSeepnopeRNAMES. logicolly logicof necesify SeeLocIcAL TRUrH/ EALstry. / contingency logicolposilivism A school of philosophy, subscribed to by many English-speaking philosophers during this century. Its whose best-known member source was the VIENNACIRCLE, was Rudolf cARNAp;its propagation in the English-speaking world is due largelyto Carnap,who moved to America, and to A. J. AvERin England. Greatly impressed by nunntctsu and by the successand rigour of science,the logical positivists advocated that philosophers avoid speculation about matters only scienceand experiencecould settle; if a sentence was not scientificallyventnABLEor a matter of t-octCAI- TRUTH

OT CONCEPTUAL TRUTH,

it

WAS NONSCNSC ANd

should be discarded.Thus a central tenet of logical positivism is the vERIFIABtLITy cRrrERIoN.Ethical statementswere thought not verifiable, so they didn't have any literal meaning: they were sometimes thought merely to be expressions of feelings of approval or disapproval; (saeruorlvtsu). Arguments against the verifiability criterion resulted in the virtual demise of logical positivism, but its inf luence among English-speaking philosopherswho do eNnLyuc pHILosoPHYis still strong. logicolpossibility seeLocrcAL rRUrH / EALSrry. / impossibility fogicof symbolSet, syMBoLSoF quANTTFTER Locrc, syMBoLSoF SENTENTIAL LOGIC.

logicaltuth / folsity A sentenceis logically true (or false) when it is true (or false) merely because of its logical structure. Examples:'All pigs are pigs' or'Either it's raining or it's not

r39

logk,ddudive

logicism

raining'. These should be distinguished from eNeLyrrc truths / falsehoods,which are true / falsemerely because of the meaning of its words: ficr example, 'All fathers are male'. Logical truths / falsehoodsare also called 'logically necessary but theseshouldalso be / impossible'sentences, distinguished from (rrlrrerHvsrcAI-I-y)necessaryrruths / falsehoods(seaNrcEssARy TRUTH):those that / coNTTNGENT mustbe true or false.All logical truths are necessarilytrue . but somephilosophersthink that thereare necessary rrurhs that are neither analytically nor logically true. KANl'AIl thought that event.s havea cause'is necessarilytrue, burnot logically true, or analyticallytrue. 'Tautology'is sometimes used as a synonymfor'logical truth', though in ordinary talk a tautologyis something rhar saysthe same rhing twice.Thus,'It'sraining and it's raining' is a tautologyin the ordinary sense,though not in the philosophers'sense.Sentencesthat are neither logically true nor logically talse-thar are merely true or false-are said to be logically contingent truths or falsehoods. logic,deductiya SeeDEDUcrroN / rNDUCrroN. logic,deonlicSeeoroxrrc. logic,diolecticol SeeDrALECrrc. logic,ephlemicSeeEPrsrEMrc. logit,elotelicSaarnorrrrc. logic,formol SaernroxuAI-/ FoRMAL Locrc. fogic,induclivaSeeDEDUcrroN/rNDUCrroN. fogic, informolsearNponMAL Locrc. / FoRMAL logicisml. The view that all urcessaRyrRUTHS are coNCEprLrAl or ANALvTIcor LocrcALTRUTHs. HUMEmay be thought of as l{0

logk,moryrmbd

love,Plohnic

a champion of this view; nUnRICISTS tend to be logicists. Opposed to logicism is the view that some necessityis not a matter of the way we think or talk, but a feature of external reality. KANT argued ficr this position. 2. The view that mathematics can be derived from Loctc: associated with FREcEand nussnLL. logic,mony-volued SeeMANv-\ALUED Locrc. logic,modol sacMoDALLocrc.

predicole logic, SeeqUINTIFIERLoclc. logic,quonfilierSeeguaNrrFrERLocrc. quonlum fogic, SaaqueNruM Locrc. logit,senlenliol SeessNtrNTrALLocrc. logic, symbolic Seesyunolrc Loclc. logic,lemporol SeeTutrrpoRRL. logic,kuth-fundionolSeeseNrnNrrALLocrc. logos (Greek: "speech," "thought," 'reason,' *worfl," "meaning,' 'statement,' "explanation") As you might expect, given its multiplicity of meanings in Greek, this word has been used in a great variety of ways;often it refers to the principle of rationality or law that some philosophers think is responsible for the way the universe works. loye,PlolonicSaapLeror.rrcLovE.

l1l

Lydion shepherd

Lutrelius(full name: Titus Lucretius Carus) (96?-55B.C.) Ancient Roman poey'philosopher, who popularized the scientific and ethical views of the AToMISTS. ['loo-KRE-shus' lydionshepherdSeeHOBBES'S FOOLE

112

tW /lffi/

mibrhm/Fomho

lloch, Ernst (1838-1916) Czech / Austrian physicist and philosopher. The father of contemPorary philosophy of science, he argued for a postrlvlsrlc view of knowledge based on our sensations gathered into economical theories. in which the "I" is Known as well for his pHENoMENALISM, unreal. ['mach', where the 'ch' is a throaty hiss as in the German'iclz'] Niccolo (1469-1527)Italian statesmanand political Mochioveffi, theorist, famous (sometimes infamous) for his political theories in which he de-emphasizedthe place of morality in practical politics. ['mackee-uh-VELlee'] (or Moses ben Maimon) (1135-1204)Spanish-born lloimonides philosopher and theologian; codifier of the Talmud. Jewish moior/ middle/ minorlem / premiseDistinctions made in rReorTIoNALLocrc to talk about syI-I-oclsMs.The major TERM2 is the term that is the pREolcATE2 of the conclusion. The m{or premise is the premise (seaARGUMENT) containing the major term. The minor term is the term that is the subject of the conclusion. The minor premise is the premise containing the minor term. The middle term is the term that is in both of the premises but not in the conclusion. So, for example, in the syllogism

Allpigsoresloppy eoters. l'|othing thotiso sloppy iso friendly eoter thing. Iherefore nopigsorefriendly things.

113

Morcus Aurelius

The major term is 'friendly thing'. The minor term is 'pig'. The middle term is 'sloppy earer'.The first premiseis the minor premise,and the secondpremisethe major. Molcolm, Norman (1911-1990)American philosopher,known for expounding and applying Wrr-TGENSTETN's ideas and methodology. l,{olebronche, Nicolas (1638-1715)French philosophet influ. enced by onscenrrs; known now mostly for his occAsroNAr.. ISM.['mal-uh.brahnsh'] molingonioSeenvrL cENrus. Mohhus,Thomas SeescrtNrlsrs. moni(hoeism An inf luential religion of the ancienr world. Its best-known feature is its view that evil is a separateand basic feature of the world, along with goocl, and not (as some Christians held) to be seen as merely the absenceof good. ['man-uh-KEE-ism';alternative spellings'manicheism','manichaeanism''manicheanism'] mony-voluod logic It is commonly thought that each indicative sentencemust be either true or false (sae'law of the excluded middle', in lnls oF THoucHr). But the possibility, that a sentencemight be neither true nor false, and that there might be a third possibility,or many, or an infinite numbe4 has led to two-, three-,infinite- (etc.)valued logics ('valued' here refers to TRUTH.\AI-uE), which work out the laws, systems, and techniques such many-valued logics might include. Also known as'multi-valuedlogic'. llorcel, Gabriel (1889-1973)Frenchphilosopherand dramatisr; A THEISTIC EXISTENTIALIST.

(or MarcusAureliusAntoninus)(l2l-180) RoItorcusAurslius man Emperor,srolc philosopher.

[lorcuse,

imolicslitn motedol

Herbert (1898-1979)German-bornAmerican philosoMorcuse, and exlsttNTIALIsMhad pher, whose blend of MARX,FREUD, a great inf luence on revcrlutionaryAmerican youth in the 1960sand 1970s. filoriloin,Jacques(1882-19?3)French Catholic philosopher,inf luential on contemporary THoMISM. Motx, Karl (1818-1883)German philosopher and social theorist who constructed the basis for socialist and communist IDEoLocY (see SocIALlsM / couuuNtsvt). He accepted nature of change, but reHEGEL'sidea of the DIALECTICAL Fbr Marx, it is material-economicjected Hegel's IDEALISM. causesthat interact, and understanding these leads to understanding the sourcesof past oppression and the goal to which historical progress is directed: the revolution of the working class, and the development of a classlesssociety. Marxism is today one of the major sorts of general philosophicaI methodologT.Nevertheless,communist society (see SocIALIsM/ CoMMUNIsu)based on Marx's thought as developed by LENINand Stalin in the fiormer Eastern Bloc states has disappeared,and with it.the goal of a classlesssociety to be realized by governmentenforced measures. MoRALITV. moslermorolilyssesLAvE/ MASTER moleriolSaeuereRIALISM. srcoNoITIoNAL. biconditionol,sae moferiol (0us0 SaaEFFIcIENT moleriol / For.tvrlL/ MATERIAL/FINALcAUS$. SeecoNorrroNAL. moleriolcondifionol Seerqutrer-nucr. equivolcnce moleriol moleriolimplicolionSeecoNottroNAl.

115

rmtsbhm

motoriolimThe ordinary meaning of this term is the desire for consumer goods, comfcrt, and money, rather than for more "spiritual" goods. But as a philosophical term, it means something quite different: it is the philosophical position that all that exists is physical.LUcRETrus and Honnrs are rwo of the many philosophers associatedwith this position. Materialists about mind sometimes argue that apparently non-physical things like the soul or mind or thoughts are actually material things (saeloENrrry rHEoRy).Central-state materialists identify mental eventswith physical eventscen'tral in the body (i.e.,in the nervoussystem).Some materialists, however, think that categorizing things as mental is altogether a mistake (like believing in ghosts), and that mental eventsdo not exist and this sort of talk ought to be eliminated as scienceprogresses.They are called 'eliminative materialists'.The terms'materialism' and'physicalism' are usually used as synonyms,though 'physicalism'sometimes means the position that everything is explainable by physics.For the distinction between type and token materialism, sceTypEl ToKEN.See also DIALEcTtcAL MATERTALISM, HISTORICAL MATERI ALISM/IDEALISM.

moleriolism, diolecticol SeaDlnt.rcrrcAL MArERrALrsM. moleriolism, historicol SdeHrsroRrcALMATERTALTsM,/ rDEALIsM. moleriol subsfonce SaesunsrnNcn. mollorol locl/ rololionof ideos HUME'sdistinction. A marrer of fact is a coNrlNcENTstate of affairs, to be discovereda posteriori (seet rruoru / A rcsrEarou): a relation of ideas is a coNcnp. TUALor ANALyTICor LocTcALTRUTH, which can be known a priori. moxim In KANT,a rule for action. moximin A rule for choice among alternatives, telling lou to moximize the zrinimum-that is. to choose the alternative

i4oxwell,

philosopfry medievol

whose worst features or consequencesare better than the worst features or consequencesof any of the alternatives. (Also known as 'minimax': perhaps the emphasishere is minimizingthe maimum harm.) It's not clear that this rule is one that ought always to be applied: we might want to choose an alternative with possible but unlikely consequences worse than consequencesof all other alternatives. Other rules talked about in decision theory are the principle of DoMINANcsand the principle that one should maximize nxprcrED UTILITY. Moxwell,James S/c sclENTlsrs. Mcloggorl, John (McTaggart Ellis) (1866-1925)English MErApHysICIAN,known for his IDEALIsT views and his denial of the reality of time. meun ARIsToTLethought that a general principle of the good was that it was a mean (i.e., a point in between extremes). Courage, firr example, is a good thing, half-way between rash fioolhardinessand cowardliness.Sometimes called the 'golden mean'. Students sometimes automatically argue for a compromise between opposing positions, thinking that the mean position is alwaysthe best; but this doesn't always make for good philosophy. l. SeevnrurlABILIrYcRITERIoN meoningful / meaningless Having to do with the sorts of causesand effects we mechonisti( suppose operate in merely physical processes.A mechanistic explanation would avoid talk of aims, desires,Purposes, and ruNcrtoNs. medieThe dividing lines between ANCIENT, medievolphilosophy pHll-osopHYare rough, but it's often said val, and MODERN that medieval philosophy starts with St. AUcusrINE(about (about A.D. A.D. 400), and ends just before DEScARTES 1600). Some of the best-known medieval philosophers are 147

ilolnong,

BOETHIUS, ANSELM, ABELARD, THOMAS AQUINAS, DUNS SCO.

TUS,and ocKHAM.[sometimesspelled'mediaeval'l

Itleinong, Alexius (1853-1920)Austrian philosopher;developcd BRENTANO's views on the different sorts of "existence"of " the objectsof thought. Known for his v iew that the "So-Sein (character)of objects is independentof their "Da-sein"(existence). mombors of o sel Seesnr. monlion / usg If you heard someone say "The pig is short," you might be unsure whether he meant that a pig is not tall, or that the phrase 'the pig' is a short phrase.If he was saying the first, then he wasusingthe term 'the pig'; if the second, then he wasmentioningit.Hacl he said "The phrase 'the pig' is short" then it would havebeen unambiguousthat he was mentioning that phrase, not using it. In written English, ambiguity can be eliminatedby,putting the mentioned part in quotes:'The pig' is short. A frequent philosophical custom is to put mentioned bits of languageinto singlequotesthat has been done in this dictionary. One sometimessees philosophers wiggling two f ingers of each hand in the air tcr indicate quotation marks in spoken English.Double quotes are used fior reporting what someone said (and for other uses). filolloou-Ponry Maurice (1908-1961)French pHENoMENor.ocrsr,/ follower of HusssRL.Known ficr his applicaExISTENTIAttSt, tions of PHENoMENoLocTcAL methods to perception and language. melo- This prefix often means'beyond',or 'about',so thinking about meta-x is (sometimes) thinking about the structure or and nature of x. Examples of its use are 'METALnNGUecn' 'METAPHYSit is used differently, however,in METAETHIcS); ICS'.

mehefiks

methodohgicolsofiPsiw

metoelhisThe study of the meaning of moral language, and of and foundations of ethical assertions. theJUSTIFICATIoN melolonguoge / obieAlonguogeA metalanguageis a language used in talking about another language' In LoGIC, one distinguishes between the object language and the metalanguage. Thus, for example, particular inferencesare symbolized in the object language, but general forms of valid inferenceare symbolizedin the metalanguage.[sometimes hyphenated:'meta-language'] SeenruRvtouRISM. behoviourism melophysicol One of the main branchesof philosophy,having to melophysits the ultimate components of reality, the types of with do things that exist, the nature of clusE, change, time, God, FREE wILL, etc. It is said that this word derives from the fact that later editors called one of Aristotle's books The Meta'next' or 'bephysia,merely because'meta' in Greek means ,vond', and the editors placed it after Aristotle's book on "physics"-i.e., nature. In this case the etymology suggested 'META-', above,does not work: metaphysin the definition of ics is not precisely the study of the structure or of the ultimate components of physicsor nature. SaeRETNcARNATToN. melempsychosis elc. SaaMILLSMETHoDS. of ogteemenl method / disogreemenl method of doubt SaeceRrrsrAN DouBr. behoviourisfi SeeBEHAVIoURISM. meftodologicol mefhodologicolsolipsism Jerry Fodor's term for what he claims is the method that is (or should be) used by psychologistsand philosophers of psychology:one concentrateson what's going on "inside the head" only, ignoring its connection with

119

micmduCknbm

the outside world. (Scc solrrsrsu-though ANALOGvto solipsism,not a form of it.)

minor hrm/ pomi*

this is just an

mkro-loductionism SeaREDUcrroNrsM. middfslam / promisoSeeue;on7 MTDDLE,/ MrNoRrERM,/pREMrsE. Mill, ;otrn Stuart (180&1873)The mosr inf luential Englishphilosopher of his time. Known for his thoroughgoing nunnr. CISM,his work on the principles of scientific enquiry, his development of urrLrrARrANrsM, and his LTBERAL political views. MillSmefiods Five rules proposed byJohn Stuart urll ficr inductive reasoning (see DEDUCTTVE/TNDUCTTvE). They are: (l) The Method of Agreement:If two (or more) insrancesof a phenomenon have only one condition in common, that condition is its (or their) cause.(2) The Method of Difference: If an instance of a phenomenon and an instance in which this phenomenon doesn't happen are the same except for one condition of the phenomenon, that condition is the causeof the phenomenon. (3) The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference: Uses both the above methods. (a) The Method of Residues:Subtract from a phenomenon what's known to be the effect of certain conditions, and what's left is the effect of the orher conditions. (5) The Method of Concomitant Variation: When two phenomena vary together, either .one causes another, or they have a common cause. problemWhat is rhe relation between menral and mind-body physical events?Is one sort of event reducible (seaREDUc. TIoNISM)to the other? Or are they distinct? Are mental eventsmerely a sort of bodily event? minimoxSeaunxrurN. minorlorm/ plomiseSeau4on 7 MTDDLE / MrNoRTERM/ pREMrsE.

r50

mbphced concretenas

philosophy modem

conrelenestSeecoNcnnrE, REIFIcATIoN misploced modol .t sentence or coNTExr is said to be modal if corxrnNcannot be substituted with in it snr-ravrRIsIvE pREDICATES tRrn. Sentencestraditionally regarded as modal include: sentencesabout cAUsEand effect, about the pRoposITIoNAL about NoMICand tugrepHYSIcALNncrsstrv and ATTITUDES. possibility, and couNrERFAcruALsentences.(SeanxrrxstoN 7 INTENSION)

modolfollocyA fallacy in modal reasoning (seeuooel loctc) in 'It's necessary that: if p which, for example, the premises 'It's necessary 'p' are used mistakenly to derive then q' and that q'. modollogic The loctc of uoneL sentences;often more particularly the study of the logic of necessity and possibility (el-erHtc logic), but there are also modal logics of moral obligation and permission (oroNuc logic), of knowledge and belief (nrtsrEutc logic), and of time (tnuroRAL logic). modelA model, in the sense in which scientists and philosophers use the term, is a tool fcr studying something, which sharessome features,in a simplified way,with what is being studied. syMBoLIcLocIC, firr example, is a model of ordinary language, in that it represents,in a simplified way, the logical connections in language. A scientific theory can explain some natural phenomenon by proposing a model for it an ANALOcousphenomenon, or a simple and abstract system of u'vs 3 and equations, that represents its behaviour. pHlt-osopHy modelnphilomphyThe borderline between MEDIE\AL and modern philosophy is rough, but it is usually said that was the first modern philosopher (around 1600). DESCARTES The era of modern philosophy can be said to extend through the present, though it's sometimes distinguished from nineteenth- and twentiethcertur y philosophy.

l5r

modgsNormally means kinds or manners of things; sprNozA used this to refer to accidental(seeESSENTIAL/ ACcTDENTAL) properties or modif icationsof attributes. nodusponens(Latin: "method of putting") A rule for correcr DEDUcTIoN of the fiorm: 'If p then Qi pl rhereforeq'. Also 'affirming called the antecedent'(seecoNurroNnl). modus tollens(Latin: "method o f t a k i n g [ o r r e m o v i n g ] " ; t h u s denying [the consequenr]A rule for correct DtnucrloN of the form: 'lf p then q; ir's not the case that q; therefiore it's not the casethat p'. AIso called 'denying the consequent' (saecoNoruoNAt-). nonld A simple, basic, indivisible, impenetrable, self-determining thing. The term is associatedmost closely with LEIBNIZ, who thought that the universewas to be understoocl as an infinite number of monads,in perfect harmony. monismSeeoueLrsrr.r / MoNISM/ PLURALTSM. Monloigno,Michel SeawRrrEns. llonte(ollo follocy SeeGAMBLER's FALLACv. monothoism Monotheism is the belief in / polytheism / ponlheism one (and only one) God. Polytheismis the belief in many gods. Pantheismis the belief that God somehow exisrs in everything, or that everything is God. llonlosquieu, Boronda Saawnrrrns. lloore, G(eorge) E(dward) (1873-1958)English (Cambridge) philosopher; led the revolt early in this century against IDEALISM;father of nNlLyrrc pHrt-osopHy;a frequent defender of common s€nseagainst abstrusephilosophical theory and PARADox,and for a philosophical method based on clarification and analysisof meanings. t52

muolregonsibility

beliefsSome beliefs of common senseheld so strongly Mooreon that one is more inclined to doubt an argument against the belief (no matter how good the argument seems) than to abandon the belief. The term comes from G. E. uooRE, who used this notion to argue against certain scErtlcAI- conclusions. for Godiexislen(eHere is one versionof this ARcum0r0lorgument MENT: i g hot n dr r l r 0 nbgu, t l b i e c l i vdei f f e r e nbceet w e er n I h e r ei s 0 r e 0 0 s e n soef t h i si st o t h i n ko f i t o so r i s i nfgr o m t h eo n l yw o yt o m o k e G o d 'ws i l l .S ot h ee x i s t e noc fem o r o l i tsyh o wtsh o tG o de x i s l s . Critics of this argument dispute its premise that morality is objective, or its premise that the only sense that can be made of objectivemorality is to think of it as God's will. morofdilemmoSeeDILEMMA. ocl/ ogenl Seelrcr / AcENTMoRALITIES. morofilies, morolityOne's morality is one's tendency to do right or wrong, or one's beliefs about whaCsright and wrong, good and bad' 'Morality' and'ethics' (and'moral' and'ethical') are usually used as synonyms, though the second, not the first, is generally used as the name of the philosophical study of these vn). Philosophers usually matters (seenoRunrt v E/ DESCRlrrt avoid the tendency in ordinary talk to restrict the word 'ethics' to an official code of acceptablebehaviour in some 'professionalethics'). area (as in MoRALIry. morofiry sfove/ mosterSeestnvn 7 MASTER m0r0lruponsibilitySaeRESpoNsrBrLrry.

mor6r, unmoftd

mutuolly exchrsive exhoustive / pintlry

m0v0tunmovodseeuNMovEDMOVER. il0llor-Lyor illusionAn optical TLLUSToN (named for the German philosopher Franz Mriller-Lyer, 1857-1916)in which two lines of equal length appear different in length. A standard illusion useful in the philosophyof perception.Other drawings often used as philosophical examplesare the Necker (reversing) cube, which reversesas you stare at it, and the duck-rabbit,which can be seenas a representationof a duck or of a rabbit. wtrrcENSTElNused this in his discussionof "seeing-as.")

muhi-volued logic saaMANY.\ALUED Locrc. nutatisnutandis(Latin: "having changed the things that were to be changed") One says,'This caseis, mutatis mutandis, like the other," meaning that the two casesare alike except ficr certain details-that one can derive one c:rsefrom the other by making the appropriate substitutions or changes.['myouTAH-tis myou-TANdis'l mutuolly oxclusiyo / iointlysxhousliveTwo mutually exclusive snrs do not overlap each other in membership. For example, each item on the list: 'mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, amr5f

for0d'serbtence otgumeil mgiolexpedena

npfidsm

phibians' is exclusiveof the others, since nothing belongs to more than one of these categories.The list isjointly exhaustive of vertebrates, since every vertebrate is included in these categories. It is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive because every vertebrate is included in exactlyone of these categories. for GodtexitlBn(eSometimes the existorgumenl mysli(olexperience ence and nature of the mystical experiences some people have are thought to provide evidence fior God's existence. Thus, mystical experience is the basis of an argument for God's existence.One criticism of this argument is that even though religious experience sometimes provides compel' ling motivation fcr belief in God, this sort of convincing is not a matter of eRcutvtgNT.The relevance of mystical exPerience was explored at length byleurs. myslicismA variety of religious practice that relies on direct experience, supposed to be of God and of supernatural truths. Mystics often advocate exercisesor rituals designed to induce the abnormal psychological statesin which these experiencesoccur. They commonly hold that in these experiences we achieve union with God or with the divine ground of all being.

r55

l{ogrl,

nofurolism

l{ogel,Ernest(b. l90l) American philosopher,with imporrant work on philosophy of scienceand locrc. noivereolismWhat's supposed to be the ordinary view abour perception:that it revealsexternal objectsto us direcrly,thc way they really are. The implication here usually'isthat this naive view is overturned by philosophical sophistication (see,for instance,the ,rncuprENT FRoMILLUSToN). AIso called common-senserealism. ['naive' is sometintesspelled witlr those two dots over the 'i'] noturolBe very carefulwhen using this word-it has a variery of meanings.It can mean "pertaining to nature" (in the narro!{ senseof treesand bugs, or in the wider senseas contrasted 'spontaneous', with what we create),'original', 'PRIMITIvE', 'undisguised','physical','INNATE','usual','accepted', or'the way things ought to be'. nofurol/ convenlionol rightsSeenrcurs. nofuroldeduction Natural DEDUcrroNis a sysremfor oeRrrarroN supposed to match relativelyclosely the ways we actuallv think. noturolism Many phitosophershaveaimed at philosophicaltheories which accountfor things in terms of the sort of NnruRRL objects and processeswhich are studied in the natural sciences.A "naturalized rplsrgMolocy" fiorexamplemight try to explain when our beliefs are justified by referring to the sorts of belief-production which have been evolutionarily selectedbecauseof their survival value. A naturalized phi-

r56

noturuhrn, elhicol

notumlhw

losophy of mind includes the belief that mental phenomena are (or are caused by) the neurophysiological processesin the brain. Some philosophers think that ethical characteristics can be explained naturally; rre ETHIcALNATURALISM / SUPERNATURALISM / NONNATUR ALISM.

NATuRALIsM ethicolSaeETHTcAL norurolism, / / surERNATURALISM NONNATURALISM.

follocy See ErslcRL NATURALTSM noturolistic / I SUPERNATURALISM NONNATURALISM.

noturolkind\itft can see the world as divided into all sorts of categories,but many philosophers think that only some of these divisions correspond to the way nature really is di'things within fifty miles of vided. The category named by the Eiffel Tower', fior example, is an artificial kind, one invented by us; but sorting out things by difference in mass might be supposed to be a categorization that is in natureone that is important for cAUSEand effect, and that will figure in real science.Categorieslike this, that "cut nature think at the joints," are called'natural kinds'. NoMINALISTS there are no natural kinds-all kinds are artificial-though they agree that some sorts of categorizationswill be more important in science than others. Scientific Rnellsts who believe in natural kinds need to explain what makes a kind one of these.(Seeabo UNIvERSALs.) SeerR'nncrAL/ NATURAL LANcuAGEs. nolurollonguoges nolurollawThere are several philosophically relevant sensesof this phrase. Its ambiguity is due partly to the variety of 'LA'v'. A natural law can be: l. A law of naturemeanings of i.e., a formulation of a regularity found in the natural world, the sort of thing sciencediscovers.2. A principle of proper human action or conduct, taken to be God-given, or to be a consequenceof "human nature'{ur structure or function. In this sense,there are "natural law" theories in ethics and

157

philosophy noturol

necessory trutir / conlingent

in political philosophy.rFroMAS AeurNASis perhapsthe phiIosophermost closelyassociatedwith these.3. The name of a theory of societal law that holds that the validity of the laws of a legal system depends on their coherence with Godgiven or otherwise objectivemorality; it says,in other words,that social law dependson natural lau'in sense2,just above. nolurolphilosophy SeaSCTENCE. nolurol righlsseerNTRrNSrc / TNHERENT / TNSTRUMENTAL / EXTRTN. SIC.

nolurolselecfionSeervoI-urroN, noluro,sloleof Sassrnrn oF NATURE. ne(essory lruth The word 'necessary'has a specialuse / conlingent in philosophy, differenr from its ordinary sense.\4b say things like 'It's necessarythat I Bo to the bathroom', but in philosophy a necessarytruth is a statementthat is true and could not possibly be false; a contingent trurh could be false (but isn't,just as a matter of fact).Such statementsas '7 + b = 12' and 'All bachelorsare unmarried' and 'Every event has a cause'are often thought to be necessary;'Pigs don't f ly', 'More than a million grains of sand exist', and'The Earth is bigger than Mars' are conringent truths. (Similarly, there are necessaryand contingentfalsehoods.)Many philosophers think that the necessityor contingencyof some fact is a METApHystcALmatter-is a matter of the way the external world is-but some philosophers think thar this difference is merely a matrer of the way we think or talk about the world-that a truth taken ro be necessaryis merely a coNcEPTUALor LOGICALor ANALYTIC TRL"TH(secaho tOct_ ctsM). 'Contingent' is sometimesalso used to contrast with 'LocICALLy rRUE/ EALSE'. A necessaryrruth is also called a 'necessity', and a contingeru.truth a 'contingency'.

r58

tondilin nec$ory / srffkiont

llerycomb's Eudor

(ondilionX is a sufficient condition for Y ne(essory / sufficient when: if X is true, then Y must also be true. This is the same as saying: X can't be without Y. For example, the fact that something is a pig is sufficient for that thing to be an animal. X is a necessarycondition for Y when: if Y is true, then X must also be true. In other words, Y can't be without X. Thus the fact that something is a pig is not necessaryfor that thing to be an animal, for something can be an animal but not a pig. But the fact that something is an animal is necessary for something to be a pig. X is necessary and sufficient ficr Y when both are true: if X is true, Y is true, and if Y is true, X is true. In other words, you can't have one without the other. Thus, the complex condition that something is f lammable, heated above a certain temperature, and in the presenceof oxygen is (roughly-perhaps you can think of exceptions) necessaryand sufficient for the thing to catch on fire. Sayingthat X is sufficient for Y is the same 'If thing as sayingthe conditional statement X then Y', and 'If saylng that X is necessaryfior Y is the same as saying Y then X' (seecouotrtoNAI-). ILLUSIoN. lleckelcube SeeMULLER-LyER 'It's negolionThe negation of a sentenceis obtained by putting not the casethat'in front of it (or by removing that phrase). Negation is often symbolized by the tilde (-). (seesYMBoLs oF SENTENTTAL LOGIC).

'new' or 'a later version of'. It is often neo- This prefix means put in front of the name of some philosophical movement to signify a later movement based on the earlier one, but 'neo-PLATG including significant changes, for example, NISM"

.NEO-KANTIAN"

tlewcombtporodox Suppose you are faced with the ficllowing choice. Box A contains either a cheque for $1 million or nothing (you don't know which). Box B contains a check for $l thousand. br can take the corrtents of box A alone, or

r59

l{ewfon,

nihilism

the contentsof both boxes.A very smart computer has been fed information about you; if it predicted you'll take both, it has already put nothing in box A, but if it predicted you'll take only A, it has already put $l million in there. The computer has almost alwaysbeen right in predicting other people in the past.What shouldyou do? The paradox ariscs from two equally convincing contrary strategies:(l) What's in box A won't changedepending on your choice.If you take just A, you'll get whatever'sin there; if you take both, yotr'll get that plus the thousandin B. Takeboth boxes.(This is the DoMINANTstrategy.)(2) The computer has almost certainly predicted you correctly, so if you pick both boxes,it probably' has put nothing in there, and you'll get only $ I thousand.Il' you pick only A, again the computer predictedthis, so you'll probably get $1 million. Pick only A. (This strategycak:ulates nxpecrEDurtLlrv,) Is (l) or (2) the better stratefil'? Debate about this puzzle has led to interestingconsiderations in decision theory and other areas. ilewlon, IsaacSeaSCIENTISTS. American Protestanttheologian iliebuhgReinhold(1892-1971) and social critic. l{ietzsche, Friedrich (Wilhelm) (1844-1900)German philosopher famous for his attacks on Christianity, LIBERALISM, DEMocRACy, and soclALISMas "sl.AvEMoRAI-lrY,"and for his advocacyof a morality appropriateto a superior individual, the "supERMAN,"who is above the common herd and embodies the "wILL To PowER"-to self-assertionand selfmastery. Hitler loved Nietzsche'saggressive,shocking, and iconoclastic writings, though it is often argued that and militarism Nietzsche'sassociationwith German EAsclsM is unjustified. ['NEE-chuh', though often carelessly pro'NEE-chee'] nounced nihilhm The name of various sorts of negative belief: that nothing can be known, or that nothing generally accepted in

r60

nonsymmetric

science,religion, or ethics is correct, or that the current social order is worthless,or that nothing in our lives has any 'NEE-' + 'al-izm' or 'hill-izm'] value. ['NY-' or nirvonoThe state of enlightenment thought by Buddhists to occur when the self is extinguished' 'having to do with t-nv 3'. A nomic regularity is nomic Means distinguished from a mere (accidental)regularity or coincidence, in that the first representsa law of nature. One way this differenceis explainedis by sayingthat a nomic regularit's not only the casethat all ity supports couNTERF:ACTUALS: if somethingwere an A, that it's also the case are B's, but As 'nomological'] it would be a B. [synonym: SeeuNIveRSRLs. nominolism Seattolrtc. nomologicol nomosSeePHYSIS / NoMos / rx;nrtE. nonbeingSeeruotFIINc. SaecocNITIvISM/ NoNCOGNITIvISM. non(ognilivisfl SEAETHICAL NATURALISM/ NONNATURALISM/ NONNOIUTOIi$N

SUPER.

NATURALISM. SUEREFLEXIVE,/ IRREFLEXIVE / NONREFLEXIVE. NONTEfIEX|YE NONSEN'ESCET'INENNGFUL / MEANINGLESS.

nonsequitur(Latin: "it does not follow") An encuMENTin which the conclusion is not supported by the premises,or a statement that is supposed to follow logically from some others but does not. ['non SEK-wuh-ter'] sdeSYMMETRIC nonsymmetic / NONSYMMETRIC. / ASYMMETRIC

l6l

nonfronsilivo nonlronsiliyo SeeTRANstrtvE/ rNTRANsrrrvE/NoNTRANstrrvE. norm Standardficr morally correct action. normclivo A starement is descriptive when it says / descripfive what the facts are; by contrast, it is normative when it says what ought to be done, or what is right or wrong. (The clarity of this distinction is attacked,howeve4by philosophers who claim that what ought to be done, and what is right or wrong, count as facts.) Philosophersdistinguish betweennormative ethicsand descriptiveethics.The first is supposedto tell us what's right and wrong, good and bad; the second,what this or that person or group holds is right, etc. Descriptive ethics is probably more the job of anrhropologiststhan of philosophers,unlesswhat'sat issueis what we hold is right, etc. A philosophical task different from each of theseis undertakenin urterrntcs. n0l0fi0n, PolishSeapolrsH NorArroN. nofiing Non-existence, non-being. Somerimes philosophers wondered whether there could be perfectly empty space,a *void", some argued that the universemust be a "plenum"filled at every point with somethingor other. It's lesseasyro makesenseof the worry othershad aboutwhether'norhing' names a thing. Some puzzlementhas been occasionedby HEIDEGGER's famous statement,"Das Nichtsnichtet"-"The nothing noths." EXrsrENTrALrsrs distinguish "nothingness" from mere emptiness: the fiormer is a perceived lack of being-a gap that we might find where we need or expecror would think of something. NOUMONOSEE PHENOT"TENA,/ NOUMENA.

nousA Greek term that refers to the rational part of the mind or to a principle of rational ordering, especiallyas thought to be a causal or explanatory factor in the way things are. ['noose']

162

nullset

numerkdbnfily

nullsel Saesrr. NUMBERS. lowofloryeSeerpwoFLARGE numbers, idenlilySaetnnNtltv. numericol

163

ohoctivrm

0ckhom

obiodiyitml. The oppositeof RrlmvrsM. 2. The opposireof SUBJECTIVISM, 3. The position of Ayn Rand, the contemporary American novelist known for her LIBERTARIAx and individualistic political and ethical views. obiect longuolaSeeMETALANGUAGE/ LANcuAGE. oBJECT obligofionGenerally, something one morally must do, a synonym for 'duty'. What one rnusfdo is perhapsnot.all there is to morality, since some good things are not obligations. It might be thought good, ficr example, to go out of your w^y to help a random strangerin a small, unexpected,and unusual way, but it is not obligatory: no one would blame you if you didn't. Actions that are good but not obligatory are called 'supererogatory'-aboveand beyond the call of duty. (onlexf SearNrrrurroNAL3. oblique obvglseSaacoNvnnsE/ oBvERsE. 0((0si0n0lism Occasionalistshold that matter is inert, so the force needed to move things does not come from within them, but from God, who is constantlyintervening in the world to bring about change.Occasionalistsabout mind and body deny that the two interact: they are arranged by God on each occasion to move in parallel. Occasionalism is PRE-ESassociatedwith ueLEsRANcHE.Seealso:pARALLELISM, TABLISHED HARMONY.

English theolo0ckhom(or Occam), William of (1285?-?1349) gian, known for his nominalism (saeuNtvEnsnls) and ficr

l6f

existence for6od's orgument ontologicol

mzot Ockhom's

ocKHAM'sRAZoR.His work was largelyin Loclc and theory of meaning. r0z0r (or Occam's) A general principle of ExpleNaOckhomt TIoN that saysthat, everything elsebeing equal, the correct or preferableexplanationis the one that is simpler-i'e., that needs fewer basic principles or fewer explanatory entities' Named fi:r William of ocrueu. ondocB SeeRcts / oN{ISSIoNS. omissions Totally, perfectly good and desiring the good. omnibenevolenl Often thought to be a characteristicof God. omnipolenlAll-powerful, able to do anything' Often thought to be a characteristicof God, though some philosopherswonder whether this notion makes sense:could God make a contradict.ion true, or change the past, or manufacture a stone too heavy ficr Him to lift? Everywhere at once, or inf luential in everything. omnipretenl Pantheists (see UoNoTHEISM/ PoLYTHEISM PANTHEISM) sometimesbelievethat God is omnipresent. omnis(ienlAll-knowing. Often thought to be a characteristic of God. To be omniscient is to know everything not only past and present, but also future. ['om-NISH-ent'] onlologitol Means

'having

to do with existence' (SeeourolocY).

orgumenffor GodtexislenceA variety of arguments that onlologicol rely on the coNCErr of God to prove His existence. In the best-known version it is supposed that part of the concept of God is that He is perfect: since something would not be perfect if it did not exist, it follows that God exists. A famous version of the ontological argument is due to ANSELM.

ponimony ontobgicol

0p0que / r0n$0r0nl

porsimony ontologicol The characteristica rHEoRy has when it relies on a comparativelysmall number of basic kinds of things, or a minimum of THEoRETICAL ENTrrtFs. Often thonght to be a valuable characteristic for a theory to have, and sometimes thought to provide rational grounds for choice between competing, otherwise equally good, theories. SeealsoOCTHeM'S RAzoR. onlologicolrelotivism A relativistic (seeRELArrvrsM / ABSoLUTTsM) position abour oNToI-ocy.Ontological relativistshold that there is no external fact about what sorts of basic things exist:we decide how we are going to categorizethings, and what sorts of things we will count as basic, depending on context and what way of thinking suits us. onlologyThe philosophical study of ExrsrENcEor being. Typical questionsare: What basicsorts of things exist?What are the basic things out of which others are composed?How are things relatedto each other?The ontolog/ (or the "ontological commitment") of a tHronv is the list of the sorts of things whose existenceis pRrsupposED by that theory. Op0que A transparent coNTEXTis that part of a sen/ lransporenf tencesurrounding a TERM2 (a noun or noun phrase),which is such that any other term referring to the same thing may be replaced in it sAL\AvERrrATE, i.e., without changing the truth or falsity of the sentence.For example,consider the true sentence i e r r yk i c k eF d r o n c' so t . NoW we may replacethe term'Fran's cat'with any other term referring to the samething, and the sentencewill still be true. Fiorexample, Fran's cat is named Tabitha, so Terry kicked Tobitho must also be true. The context'Terry kicked ' is transparent. Compare, howeve6 a context inside quotation marks, for example,this sentenceis true: Iorrysoid,"Toheilwithlobitho!" But this is false:

t66

orgumenl openqueslion

operotionolism / instrumentolisn

I e r r ys o i d", I o h e l lw i t hF r o n c' so t ! " Quotational contexts are oPaque, that is, terms cannot alwaysbe replacedwithout changing the truth or falsity of the original sentence.It is often thought that belief contexts are opaque: thus, if Terry doesn't know that Fran's cat is also Bob's cat, then T e r rby e l i e v eFsr o n c' so ti s h e r e' might be true, while T e r rbye l i e v e8so b ' cs o ti s h e r e is false. orgumenlAn argument against ethical naturalism openquestion (sae ETHTCEL NATURALISM,/ SUPERNATURALISM / NONNATURAL.

rsM)due to G. E. MooRE.Ethical naturalists supposethat an ethical term is synonymous with some natural term, for 'the right action' is synonymouswith 'the example, that action that procluces the greatest happiness'. But Moore argued against this synonymy (and any synonymy with a natural IREDIcATEl) by claiming that one might be convinced that an action produced the greatest happiness, while still finding that it was an open question (not a question thereby settled) whether that action was the right action. Locrc. opensenlencgseesyMBoLSoF QUANTTFTER 0perolioncl definitionSaeorrnrrloN. operolionolism/inslrumenfalism Operationalism is the view that scientific coNcEprs are to be defined in terms of experimental procedures,and that the meaning of these terms is given by these procedures. Operationalists argue that any terms not definable in this way should be eliminated from science as meaningless.For example, to be an operationalist about

0 proposition

y Goset, 0rtego

the tiny particles physics talks about is to think that there's nothing we mean by saying they exist except that certain kinds of visible effects exist under certain experimental conditions, and that cerrain results will be obtained when certain measurement procedures are carried out. Instrumentalism shares with operationalism the view that onc should understand what scientific theory sals in rerms ol' experimental procedures and predictions. The difference rs that operationalists are REAr..rsrs about the objects scientific theory talks about: they say that electrons, for example, really exist, and statements about them are (sometimes) true. Instrumentalists, by contrast, are anti-realists. They say t h a t t h e T H E O R E T I c A LE N T I T T EiSn s c i e n c e d o n ' t r e a l l y e x i s t , and that theoretical statements don't really have rRutll\ALUE; such statements are actually only instruments, recipes, tools, or calculating devices to relate observations to 'Instrumentalism' predictions. is also the name of'the view associated with pRncMATtsM, especially with John DEwEy, that emphasizes the way our thinking arises through pracrrcal experience and represents a way of coping with our environment.

0 proposition seen7 E/ r/ opRoposrrroNs. oplimitmSeapsssrr,,rrsM / oprrMrsM. philosophy ordinory longuoge A branch of twentieth-centuryphilosophy (most closelyassociatedwith wrrrcENSTErN and J. L. nusrn) that held that philosophical problems arose because of confusions about, or complexities in, ordinary language, and might be solved (or dissolved)by attention to the ways the languagewas used. Thus, for example,problems about FREEwlr-r. might be solved (or shown to be empty) by close examination of the actual use in English of such words as 'free', 'responsible',and so on. y Gossef, Ortego Jos6 (1883-1955)Spanish essayistand philosophe4 associatedwith ExrsrENTrALrsM.

168

orthodox / heterodox An orthodox belief is one that is officially orlhodox / heterodox accepted,or conventional,or traditional, a belief that is not orthodox, or is contrary to orthodoxy, is called'heterodox'. definitionSeeorplNtrtoN. oslensive MINDS. OFOTTIER problem ol seePROBLEM olherminds, An eventis overdeterminedwhen two or more OVerdelerminOlion eventshave happened, each of which is individually a suff ifor it. CONDITIOT'1) SUFFICIENT cient condition (seeNECESSARY/ is she given when is overdetermined Thus someone's death a fatal dose of poison and then shot through the heart' (Compare this with uNDERDETERMINATIoN') overmonseesuprRN,tRN.

r69

trnWchbm

p0npsy(hism The position that everything in the universe,nor just people,contains"mind"-an inner psychologicalnature. A few of the philosopherswhoseviews are at leastrelatedto this position are THALES,pLortNUS,LEIBNIZ, and scnoprNHAUER. ponlheismSeat,toNorHErsM// polyrHErsM/ pANTHETsM. polodigmI A completelyclear,rypical, and indispurableexample of a kind of thing. A paradigm case ARcuMErvT is an argument that tries to solve SCEPTICAL doubts about the existence of something by poinring at a paradigm of that sort of thing. Often the reasoning here is: if a word or phrase has rules for use,and fully acceptableactual uses,it must refer to somethingreal. 2 A global wayof seeingrhings which is relativelyimmune to disconfirmation from experience.['PAR-uhdime',where the'a' soundis as in'pat', the adjectival ficrm is'paradigmatic', pronounced'PAR-uhdigMAT-ic'l p0r0d0xA clearly false or sELFcoNTRADrcroRy conclusion deduced apparently correctly from apparently true ASSUMI. TIoNSl. Philosophers often find principles of wide-ranging importance while trying to discoverwhat has gone wrong in a paradox. KANT'Sterm for 'paradox' is 'paralogism'. Kant argued againstcertain positionsby claiming that they imply either A or B; but both A and B lead to impossibilities.He called theseargumentsvia paradox'antinomies'.bu'll find accounts of some well-known paradoxes in the following entries: Achilles and the tortoise paradox, Jre zENo'sIARADox; Condorcet paradox, s/e vorER's pARADox 2; Epi-

170

pmllebm

trmnormlphemmem

menides' paradox, Jre LIAR'S PARADoX; GRELUNG'SPARADoX; Hempel's paradox, sre RAVEN PARADoX; LIAR'S PARADoX; material implication / conditional paradoxes' see coNDITIoNAL andtr.rr HAND PRoBLEM;NEwcoMB's PARADox; PRI$ oNER's DILEMMA; RUSSELLSPARADox; sorites paradox, see SORITES;SURPRISE QUIZ PARADOX; VOTER'SPARADOX; ZENO'S PARADOX porollelism Because of the difficulties in lnrrRncrIoNISM some philosophers were led to the belief that mind and body events don't cause each other, but just run along independently; they are coordinated, howevet in some possibly inexplicable way, or perhaps God sets them up in advance to run in parallel, like two clocks set in advance to chime the hour simultaneously. Parallelists thus believe in the PRE-E$ TABLISHEDIIARMoNY of mind and body' LEIBNIZwas a parallelist. Compare occASIoNALISMt proponents of this theory might think that God on each occasion produces the two sorts ofevent.

porologism SeepnRnoox. phenomeno p0r0n0rm0l A collection of kinds of eventsand human abilities whose existenceis controversial,including: pnception(e.s.p.):the ability to know facts not Extro-sensory perceivedby the ordinary senses. (sometimes called teleportation): the ability to Tblekinesis move things at a distance by power of the mind alone, without physical contact. Precognition:knowledge of events in advance, without the usual kind of physicalscientific evidence. Clairuoyanca:e.s.p or precognition by a sort of internal "seeingthings." 'sending Tblepathy:communication by "mind reading" or one's thoughts" directly.

r7l

Porclo,

Poscol's woger

The studyof theseallegedphenomenais called parapsychology or paranormal psychologyor psychicalresearch.Sometimes this studyalso includesinvestigationof one'sprevious lives,ghosts,spiritualhealing,contactwith the dead('spiritualism'), and the mysteriouspowersof pyramids and cryst a l s . M o s t s c i e n t i s t sa n d p h i l o s o p h e r st h i n k a l l t h i s i s hogwash.A synonym for 'paranormal' is 'psi' ['sigh' or 'psigh', sometimesabbreviatedby the Greek letter psi, 'Y' Potolo,Vilfredo SeescrrNrrsrs. Pormenides of EIea (5th century B.C.) pRE.socRArlc Greek philosopher. His central doctrine was that reality did not change. p0rsimony Means 'economy',in the senseof 'using restricted means',thought to be a virtue in theories.['PAR-si-mo-nee'] SaeocxHRM'sRAzoR,oNToLoctcALpARstMoNy. porlicipolion l. SeepLAToNrcFoRMS. 2. In a DEMocRnrrcsocierl', the activeinvolvementby citizensin the processesof government. porliculors SeerNorvrounL. Poscol3wogor An argumentfor the reasonableness of believing in God, due to the French philosopher and mathematician BlaisePascal( 1623-1662).He argued: If we believein God, then there is great potential benefit if He exists (eternal salvation)and very small risk if He doesn't (merelywasting a little time, and fioregoingsome minor pleasuresficrbidden to believers).But if we don't believein God, there is great potential risk if He exists (eternal damnation) and very small potentialbenefit if He doesn't(somesmall pleasures). So even if there isn't any evidencebne way or the othel it's obviously worth it, on practical grounds, to believe. One problem with this argument is the questionable view that

172

posive aitmnos'ro

pottbtlc phnmopl',y

we can choose to believe something if it would be worthwhile to believe. postiye euftonosioSeerutHeNASIA,ACTIvE/ PAssIvE. poternolism Paternalistic action provides ficr what are taken to be people's needs, without giving them responsibility for choosing their own aims or actions. It arises from a sort of benevolenceplus lack of trust in people's ability to decide what's to their own benefit or to act fcr their own real long-range good. Criticisms of paternalism include the argument that the only real grounds for thinking that something is a need for someone is that that person wants it, and will act to get it, so we're notjustified in acting for what we take to be his or her benefit. Another argument is that, even when people can't be trusted to seewhat they need, or to act to get it, rRruDou 2 and AUToNoMYare of overruling moral importance. This sort of issue arises most importantly in political theory and medical ethics, since governmentsand physiciansoften act paternalistically. pothefic follocy The mistake of seeing human emotions, intentions, etc., in things that do not have them. ('Pathetic' here 'stupid' or 'dreaddoesn't have the colloquial meaning of 'having to do with ful'-it's used more strictly, meaning feelings'.) polriorchySocietal and familial institutions are patriarchal when they systematically embody male dominance over women: when they arrange things so that men hold Power emphasize the widespread and women do not. FEMINISTS incidence of patriarchal institutions in historical and contemporary families and societies. polrislicphilosophyThe philosophy-largely theology-associated with early Christian philosophers, especially the Church Fathers.

l /3

Peirce,

Nt s0

Peitco,Charles Sanders(Santiago)(1839-1914)American philosopher and loctcteN. Very little of his work was published during his life, and he did nor hold a regular teaching position; his views were, until recently,unknown except in the version popularized bylnr.ars. Nowadays,however,he is regarded as the father of pnecunrtsM and a significant contributor to philosophy of scienceand logic. ['purse'] porlccidansSeepERsE. p0r(0pfsaacoNcepr. p0fc0pli0n In its broadest use, this means any sort of mental awareness,but it's more often used to refer to the awareness we get when using the senses. pelformolive A constativeutterance is the usual kind / conslofive of statement we mi*e, saying something that is independently true or false. A perficrmative utterance is one that makeswhat is said true, as when a properly constituted authority says,"I now pronounce you husband and wife". What is said here is true-the speaker does in fact pronounce them husband and wife-because this act is performed by uttering this perficrmative (when the utterer is duly empowered,and under the proper conditions).J. L. AUSTINdiscussedperformatives while considering problems about meaning. rt ocl/ inlsnlionSaerllocurroNA Ry/ pERLocurroNARy perfoculionol ACTl TNTENTTON, 'by P$ sa (Latin, "through [i.e., on account ofl itself") Means 'This is not a valuable house par itself', 'INTRINSICALLY'. se-iCs so expensive merely because of its good location." Sometimes philosophers say that something has a characteristic per sewhen that characteristic is essentialto it, this is contrasted with a characteristicpn accidtns(Latin, "accidentally') (seerssnNrIAL/ AccTDENTAL). Beware of the habit of

l/1

peromlilentity

pfison throwing saY']

'per se' meaninglesslY into what you

['Prt

pefsgnPhilosophers sometimesuse this word in such a way that persons do not necessarilycoincide with living human organisms. The idea here is that a person is anything that has (for example, the right to life, or to self-deteripecial RT6HTS mination) or special dignity or worth. what characteristics must something have to be a person in this sense?Various have been suggested:having a mental SUBSTANCE CRITERIA 3, being self-aware,able to think of one's or coNSCIoUsNEsS past or future. If something like this is what's important to teing a person, then a human organism devoid of any mental life-for example, in a permanent coma due to brain damage-would no longer be a person, and could be killed or left to die without continuation of life-supPort (this is impermissible for persons)' Some philosophers who are pro.hoi." on the abortion issue say that fetusesare living h,rrnutr, but not yet Persons.And it has been argued that some persons are not living human organisms: many have thought that the person (soul or mind) could survive bodily death. If God and angels exist, they are Persons' Some philosophers think that certain higher animals exhibit charicreristics that give them something like the rights and dignity we have-thus they might also be thought of as IDENTITY' persons.Seeako PERSONAL pertonqf idenfity l. Wharever it is that makes yov you.Is it your body, your mind, your personality, your memories, or something else?2. In an important recent use, this term refers to the problem of (re-)identifying a person-that is, of telling whether this is the same person as that. For example, what makes it the case that some Person you saw yesterday is the same person you see today? Is it that he or she has the same continuing body? Or mind? That the later temporal stage (saetorntrv 3) remembers experiences that happened to the earlier?

p€60n0lism

pnenomen0 / n?unenl

p0lsOnolism The view that pERsoNS constirutea basic caregory for oNrol-ocy and EXpI.ANATIoN,

persuosive dofinition saansrrNrrroN. pesimhm/ opfimismOptimism is a hopeful attitude, or the view that things are fundamentallygood, or will improve,or can be fixed; an extreme version of optimism holds that this is the BEsroF ALLpossrBLE woRLDs.pessimismis the reverseof any of these views. Some philosophersargue that these optimistic and pessimisticviews are not just wayswe might happen to FEEL,but that religiousor METApHysrcAl consicl_ erations offer rational grounds for or againstthem. LEIBNTZ was a philosophicaloptimisr,scHopENHAUER a pessimist. petilioprincipiiSeecrRcuLARREASoNTNc / DEFrNrrroN. phenomenolhm Phenomenalistsbelieve(on the basis,for example, of the nncuuENT FRor\{rlt-ustoru)that all we're ever awareof is appearancesor SENSE-DATA, the mental eventswe have when using our senses.Accepting the ttrrprnrctstrule that we're entitled to believe in only what's given by our senses,they deny the existenceof external objects inde_ pendent of perception. Ordinary .,objects"like tables and chairs are thus thought to be collections of these appearances-actualand perhapspossibleones.Thus, this is a fiorm of lnneLlstvt.HUME,MILL, MACH,and RUSSELL were pheno_ menalists. phenomeno / noumenoPhilosophers sometimes use ,phenomenon' in the ordinary sense,referring merely to something that happens, but often it's used in a more technical way, referring to a way things seem to us-to something as we perceive it. Noumena are, by contrast, the insensiblebut perhaps rationally ascertainablethings as they really areIHINGS-IN.THEMSELVES. (Thus, the adjective'phenomenal, doesn't have the ordinary senseof 'remarkable'.)This is a distinction thar runs through much of philosophy, though

176

philosophy

phenomenology

'phenome-

the terms are associated with raNr. [singular 'phenomena','noumena'; non','noumenon', plural: ['NOOmuh-na']] 'Phenomenologically' phenomenology

means

'as

it basically ap-

pears to us'. Phenomenology is a school of philosophy, deriving from the thought of HussERI-, and continued by MERLEAU-IowTv and sARTRE.Phenomenologists believe that INTUITIONs or direct awarenesses ficrm the basis of truth, and the foundation on which philosophy should proceed: by of the "inINTRospEcrtoN, BRACKETING, and exploration ner," subjective world of experiences: that is, of consciousincluding that the external ness without PRESUPPOSITIoNS, world exists.

philio SeeAGAPE / ERos / PHrLrA. philosopher-king This term is associatedwith plnro's idea that philosophers alone can have those characteristics needed for the best kind of ruler (ficr example, real wisdom and knowledge of the good). Don't you think he's right? pHILosopHnRscalled ARISToTLE'the PhiMEDIE\AL Philosopheg a term as of respect,since they found his thought losopher' so important. (French: "philosophers") Refers to the eighteenthphilosophes century French philosophers (noussneu, DIDERoT,Voltaire (saewrurrns), and others). ['fill-oh-soff'] philosophy Oddly, philosophers have a great deal of difficulty defining this word, partly because they disagree so much about what they should be doing. The word comes from Greek rcots, and originally meant'love of wisdom', but this definition is very unhelpful. Better but still inadequatedefinitions say that it is the study of first or most general principles, or of the pREsupposlrloNsbehind ways of thought, or of ultimate reality. The best way to understand

philosodry, onohtic

phrsb/nnns/tuhna

what philosophy is is to take a look through this book, or through a general philosophy text, to see what kinds of things are done. Most philosophers agree that ordinary ficlks' uses of this word don't have much to do with their 'a philosophical attitude'-a feeldiscipline: ficr example, in ing of acceptanceor resignationbased on a generalizedor detached standpoint-or in 'my philosophy', which usually refers to a clichd about how to live. Good advice for using this word in the company of philosophers: don't confuse philosophy with what might be written on a bumper sticker. philosophy onolflicSeeRueLyrrc pHrLosopHy. pHrLosopHy,MEphilosophy oncienl / medievol/modernSeeANCTENT DIE\AL PHILOSOPHY, MODERN PHII.OSOPHY.

philosophy .See conlinenlol coNrrNENrALpHrLosopHy. philosophy nolurolSeeuRruRnLpHrLosopHy. pHrt.osopHy. philosophy oldinory longuoge SeeoRuN,rRyLANcuAGE polrhlic Saepnrnrsrrc pHrLosopHy. philosophy phonelicsThe study of the sounds of a spoken language. 'practical wisdom" "theoretical reaphronesis / sophiolcreek: / son") ARIsrorLE'sdistinction. The first is knowing what to do-the right goals to seek, and how to get them; this is supposed to come from experience in life. The second is thought about the abstract and eternal-supposed by Aristotle to be the highest function of humans, and (of course) what philosophers are best at. ['fro-NEE-sus] physicolism SeeruernRrALrsM. 'Physis'is related to the Greek word meanphysis / nonos/ lechnl ing'to be' or'to grolr'. It sometimesrefers to nature, the way

178

Phton'r love

Pngst,

things really are, or to the active principle behind being. It is 'physics'.Nonrosis, by contrast' conventhe root of the word tion or law,techn7is what is created by humans. Piogel, Jean SeescIENTISTS. Planck,Max SeesclENrtsrs. Plolo (428?-?348B.C.) (original name Aristocles) Ancient Greek philosopher, student of socRetrs, possibly the greatest philosopher of all time. His writings, which often take the form of dialogues with Socrates as one of the characters, contain the first substantial statementsof many of the questions and answersin philosophy. It is difficult to know, howevel how much of this is due to Plato, and how much to Socrates. Plato's best-known doctrine is the theory of the "forms" or "ideas": these are the general or perfect versions of characteristics we ordinarily encounter (seePLATONIC FoRMS).To understand ordinary experience, Plato argued, we must first have understanding of these forms, and this must be INNATE,not given by experience. The Republic presentshis picture of the ideal state:not democratic, but ruled by dictators who have knowledge of the fiorm of the good, and who arrange things in accord with this' PlolonicThe adjectival fiorm of

'Pt-nro'.

lotms For PLATo,thingrshave the characteristicsthey do Plolonic becausethey "participate" in a "form' or'idea' (in Greek, 'tidos'\, something in the realm of Being (secnuNc/ BEcoMING) that is eternal and unchanging, and exists inde'participates" in it (for pendently of any earthly thing that "participates" in the thing beautiful particular as a example, firrm of beauty). SeauNlvnnsAls, ABSTRAcTIoN. Plolonic love This notion actually derives from Plato's theories abont love (expressed for example, in his Symposium)though for Plato it doesn't exactly mean'without sex'.

Phton'rm

Popper,

Plolonism Various sorts of views growing from aspects of PLATo'sthought. Platoniststend to emphasizePlato'snotion of a IRINScENDENT reality, believing that the visible world is not the real world, and Plato's RATToNALISM-that the important truths about reality and about how we ought to plortNus is often thought of as a live are TRu"tHsoF REASoN. Platonist, or, more particularly, as a neo-platonist.[sometimes the'p' is lower-case.] pleosure-poin colculus sff FELrcrFrc cALCULUS. PlekhonoV Georgii Valentinovich(1856-1918)RussianMARxrsr philosopher and revolutionary. His thought, developed from that of ueRx and LENIN,wasvery inf luential on Soviet philosophy until the 1950s. plenumSeeNoTHrNc. Plolinus(204?-270)Egyptian-born Roman philosopher, inf Iuenced by pLATo, ficunder of neo-pLntoNrsM,which emphasized the TRANscENDENT "One"-the unknowable basis for all existence, plurolismSaeouerrsN,r / MoNrsM/ rLURALTsM. Pointo16, Henri SeescrrNrlsts. PolkhnolotionA non-standard syMBoLrc Locrc noration in which, for example,one writes 'Kpq' insteadof 'p & q'. pofythaism saeuoNorHErsM/ poLyTHErsM / pANrHErsM. Poppeg(Sir) Karl (Raimund) (b. 1902)Austrian-Britishphilosopher of science,famous for his emphasis on falsifiability rather than on vERIFIABILITv in science.and for his defence of r-lsnnntlsu in social theory.

r80

pocl

Fogmofidsm

posil A posit is an AssuMmIoN,esPeciallysome thing assumed to exist; to posit something is to assumeit (sacTHEORETICAL Synonym:'postulation'. ENTITIES / CONSTRUCTS). posilivismThe philosophy associated with Auguste coMTE, which holds thar scienrific knowledge is the only valid kind of knowledge, and that anything else is idle speculation' Sometimes this term is loosely used to refer to LOGIcAL PoslTIvISM,which is a twentieth-century outgro$'th of more general nineteenth{entury positivism. Seeako LEGALPoslTIVISM.

possible worldsThis world-the collection of all facts-is the actual world. A possibleworld is a non-actual world, a world in which one or more things are not as they actually are' The notion of a possible world has been used to explain and notably by explore MoDAL LoGIc and couNTEREACTUAt-s, Divid LEwrS,who has recently argued that possible worlds are real (nnnltsl,t about possibleworlds). posthocltgo ptlptet hoc SeeFALsEcAUSE. In philosophy, this recent movement is characpoStmOdernism an interest in terized by a rejection of FOUNDATIoNALISM, antagonism to textual interpretation and DEcoNSTRUCTIoN, ANALYTIcPHILoSoPHY,and a rejection of the goals of the ENLIGHTENMENT.

posluloh SeaA,xlol"li/ PosruLATE. poilulofionSeepostr. p0ursoi Saen-ttsrLF/

FOR-ITSELF.

REAsoN. pr0cti(01 t00s0n SaepuRs,/ PRACTIcAL progmolicitmScePnecil{AilsM.

Fogmlic

pdtoro/fodidion

progmolics SeesEMANTrcs/syNTAX/ pRAcMATrcs. progmolic thooryof truth SecrRurH. progmofhmA school of philosophy associated mainly with American philosophers in the beginning of the twentieth century, especiallyCharles pErRcE,William JAMEs,andJohn DEwEy.(Peirce called his version 'pragmaticism'.) Pragmatists emphasized the relevanceof the practical application of things, their connections to our lives, our activities and values.They demanded instrumental definitions of philosophically relevantterms, and urged that wejudge beliefs on the basisof their benefit to the believer.SaaoprRenoNALrsM also 'pragmatic theory of truth', in / INSTRUMENTALISM, rRUrH). proxisMeans 'accepted practice or custom' or 'practical human activity,' used by MnRXto mean the union of theory and practice. pHENOMENA. pro(0gnili0n SeepTRRNoRMAL predelerminism An ambiguous term, meaning 'DETERMINISM' or 'FATALISM' 'PRLDESTINATION'. or Because of this ambiguity, it's probably best avoided. pledestinolion The position of some religions that some or all aspects of our future-our character, what we will do, and what will happen to us-are determined in advanceby God, and thus are not determined by our preferences,decisions, or efficrts. A religious ficrm of mrellsrrl; like fatalism, it must be distinguished from DETERMTNTsM. Also known as'preordination'. 'Predicate' pledicole is somerimesused by philoso/ preditolionl. phers to mean what it does in grammar: the part of the sentence that says something about the subject, including verb, objects, and modifiers of these. Thus the predicate is

182

predicce bgic/mlcuhrs

'pesent king ofFmnce'eromph

'The cat dson the mnt'. 2. In rneptthe italicized part of (o4 more precisely, the predithe predicate LocIC, TIoNAL cate term is the part of certain sentencesthat follows the 'are', 'is not', etc.). So it's the italicized part of copul-A ('is', 'AII pigs are sloppyeattrs.'3. Most often these days philoso' phers use this term to mean any Part of a sentenceexcluding a noun or noun phrase: thus, these italicized parts are 'The cat is on the mat' and'The cat l'son the mat'. predicates: In this use, a predicate is a broader way of sayingsomething 'The about something, or of delimiting a grouP of things: cat is on -' delimits a classof things such that the cat is on them. Predicatesmay be one-place('unary'), two-place ('binary'), etc. The above are one-place predicates (i.e., they '- is on contain one blank to be filled with a term); -' is a 'is three-place. to -' owes two-place predicate; One-place predicates are words that name properties (see predicates with more than QUALITY/ ATTRIBUTE/PROPERTY); Predication is saying that a one place name RELATIoNS. 'x predicate applies to something. In the sentence above, is 'The cat is on x' is on the mat' is predicated of the cat, and predicated of the mat. predicole logic/ colculusSeequeurIFIERLoclc. pre-estoblished hormonyThose like LrBNtz who didn't believe in needed to explain the apparent interACTIoN-AT-A-DIsIANcE action of separated things, and argued that God had arranged, in advance, their apParent coincidence of behaviour. Seaa/sooccesIoNALIsM, PARALLELISM. premiseSeaeRcuunur. premise, m0i0r/ minor SaeMAJoR/MIDDLE/MINoRTERM/PREMISE. proordin0lionSeepnnoEsrrNAnoN. 'presenl exompleSecosrNtrE DEscRIprIoN. kingof Fronce"

183

prFsocmli(s

primory quolities / secondory / tertiory

pre-So(r0fi(5 The ancient Greek philosophers before socRArES (sixth and fifth centuries B.C.), whose thought marks the beginning of the V,bsternphilosophicaltradition. The earliest on record is tHRLrs (c. 580 B.C.), other well-knownones are pyrHAGoRAS. HERACLrrus. and pARMENEDES. prelupposili0n Something assumedbeficrehand,for example as the basisof an ARGUMENT. The statement'He has stopped drinking excessively'presupposesthat at one time he was drinking excessively.A controversyabout DEFINITE DESCRIP. TIoNSconcernswhether they involvepresuppositions:Does the statement'The presentking of Franceis bald' statethat there is now a king of France (in which case it would be false)or does it merelypresupposeit (in which caseit might be thought neither true nor false)?RUSSELL and srnnvsoN had a well-known debate about this question (seealso nxrs. TENTIALIMPoRT). prinafocie(Latin: "at first appearance") Based on the first impression: what would be true, or seem to be true, in general, or before additional information is added about the particular case. Thus, philosophers speak of 'prima facie duties', those things that by and large people ought to do, but that might not turn out to be real duties in particular cases, given additional considerations. [usually'PRY-ma Fr\Y-sha'or '-shee'] primcly/secondory /leiliuy quolitiesLocKE (and others) argued that some characteristics we perceive are really, as perceived,in external objects(the primary qualities),whereas others (the secondaryqualities) don't exist as perceivedin the real world, but are just powers of external objects to produce ideas in us which don't resemble what's out there. For example, the dimensions of something are really objective characteristicsof it, but its colour is not really out there; we atffibute colours to things just because of sensations causedin us by some other real (primary) characteristics.In addition, sometimes tertiary qualities are distinguished.

r81

pnme

principle of..

These are characteristicsby which something has the power to produce effects in something else, such as a magnet's being able to align iron filings. plime Philosophers sometimes use a notation to distinguish between an original and an amended version of something by writing a singlequote or apostrophe (') after the name of 'prime'. Thus, if Definition D is the second. Read this 'D prime'. amended, one might get Definition D', read Further amendment might result in D" ('D double-prime'), 'D*', etc. A similar convention would call the amendment read'D star'. primemover That which is uncaused(or causr-oF-ITsELF); it's the first (or the basic) cause, the entity that existed at the beginning and caused everything else. This is often identified with God. It is debatable whether it's necessary that there be a prime mover (seennsr-cAusEARGUMENT). primiliveIn ordinary use, this used to refer to behaviour, cultures, or people that are undeveloped or simple; nowadays, it is sometimes thought politically unacceptableand deroga'primitive'. Philosophers often tory to call a tribe or culture use this word (acceptably) to refer to what is simple and basic in the ANALystsof something. ptincipio(Latin: "principles") Often used as the first word of the title of books. Two such books are called Principia Mathmtatica, one by Newton, the other by nussrLL and wHITEHEAD.Each is sometimes called 'the Principia' for short. Another philosophically important Principia is MooRE'shincipia Ethica.['prin-KlP-ia'] principfe, in SeerN PRTNCTPLE. principle 01... See(in many cases) under what ficllows 'of', or under'LA,voF...'.

r85

prindplo ofdodty

principle reoson ofsufficient

principle of chorily l. One of the principles used in "translating" someone else'sstatements,in the senseof understanding what that person meansby what he / she says.This principle saysthat we should understand the other person's words in a way that maximizes the number of true statementsthat person is translated as uttering. Note that if you don't use this principle, you might translatesomeone'sutterancesany old way;also that this isn't the only principle for translation (if it were we could simply translate everything as 'Snow is white' and it would all be true). DAvrDsoN and gulur discuss this principle. 2. Logic includesa similar principle of charity: when trying to understand the structure of someone's argument, we should fill in the details in a charitable wayi.e., in away that would make the argument a good one. principle of dominonce Seaoor'rrNRNcE. printipleof double offscl SeeDouBLEEFFECT. plinciple of oxplonolory ox(lusionSeerxpLeNAroRy ExcLUsroN. principle 0f idontity of indiscsrnibles SeeL/w oF rHE rDENrrryoF rNDrsCERNIBLES. principle 0f indolormin0cf SeauNcERrArNrypRrNclpLE. principlo of induOionSeupRosLeMoF rNDUcrroN. principlo of libeily The first principle ofjustice in RA,vLS's theory. It says that each person has an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Seealso DTFFERENCE PRINCIPLE.

principle o[sufficisnl rocsonIn general, this principle says that everythinghas a completeor full ExpLANATroN. LErBNrz arguedfurther that, in the last analysis,God'sreasonsare the reasonsfor everything.

r86

pdnciph ofnolure ofunllormity

pisons's dihmnm

principle of nofureSaepnonuMoF INDucrIoN. ofuniformity printiple The principlethat everyeventhasa ofuniversal tousolion cAUSE. Seeako DETERMINISM.

principle of utility SeaurrLrtq.RIANISM. prior l. Earlier than. 2. More fundamental or basic than. priorprobobilityseepRoBABILIry. prisonert dilemmoA situation in which two or more people (or groups) face a decision illustrated by the following story. Suppose you and an accomPlice have committed a crime. The police have evidence sufficient only to give each of you a short jail sentence,and they want to get a confessionfully implicating both of you. They seParateyou, and tell you that if your accomplice doesn't confessyou'll get one year in jail if you confess, but two years if you don't confess. If your accomplice does confess,then you'll get three years if you confess,and fcur years if you don't confess(saathe table in MATRIXficr a summary of the situation). They also DECISIoN say that the same deal is being offered to your accomplice. lbu reason that whether he confessesor not, you'll get a shorter sentenceif you confess(saeuoulNeucr). Confessing here - the dominant option - is called "defection." as contrasted with "cooperation". He reasonssimilarly, so he confessestoo; thus, both of you get three years.But something has gone wrong: if neither of you confessed, both of you would be better off (two-year sentence).''Sothis is a someon sELF-INTEREST what paradoxical situation, since RATIoNAL each of your parts has resulted in an outcome worse fcr each than an alternative. Many philosophers think that prisoner's dilemmas of this sort are an important t'loorl. for thinking about real
r8/

probobiliry privocyl. The private realm, in political theory, is thar area of our lives(if any!) supposedro be immune from public regulation. Does government have any business in our bedrooms?2. (nnsrnurC) privacy is the supposedfact that your own mental statescan be known directly only by you. See also pRIvTLEcED AccEss. privolelonguoge 0rgumenlLudwig wrrrcENSTErN's argumenr rhar, if there were eRI\ATEevents,we would be unable to categorize or talk about them. For it to be possible to name or categorizesomething,there must existrules of correct.naming and categorization.Without rhe possibility of public check, there would be no distinction between our feeling that we reported them accuratelyand our really doing so, so nothing could count as our doing so correctly or incorrectly. Thus, there could be no such thing as a "private language"a language naming private events. lsee ako BEETLE rN THE

noxl.

plivileged 0((0is The special way rhat you alone (it is supposed) can find out about your own mental events.Other people need to infer what's in your mind from your external behaviour, but you can discoveryour mental statesdirectly. Seealso INCORRIGtBILITy,

INTROSPECTION, pRI\ACy.

probobiliry Something is probable when it is neither impossible nor definite, but likely to some degree. Probability is a measureof how probable something is: when this is given a number, it's usually on a scale from 0 (impossible) to I (definite). To say that something is probable may be to say that it has a probability of more than .5, thus, becausethe probability of a fair die coming up six is about . l7 ( I / 6), we wouldn't say that it's probable it will come up 6. There has been philosophical controversyabout what it really means to say that an event has a certain probability. Some philosophers algue that saying a die has a probability of I / 6 of coming up six means that the frequency of sixes in a large number of throws will tend toward | / 6 (seeLAlvoF LARGE

r88

pmblemotic

'dentity problem of

this is the frequency theory of probability' But NUMBERS); what if a die is only thrown once? A competing theory, the subjectivist theory, holds that it means that one is justified in ixpecting it to come up six only to the degree 1 / 6, or that ihis number should measure the strength of this belief. Probability theory distinguishes between conditional and unconditional (also known as a priori or prior\ probability. Suppose it rains where you live on averageone out of five days, the unconditional probability that it rains (which 'P(r)') is thus I 5' But supposethat / might be symbolizedas it rains in April one day in two, then the probability that it rains given that it is April-"conditional upon" iCs being 'P(r April-symbolized as /a| or'P(rla)', is | / 2' PRoBLEMATIc' SeeRpoostcrrc / ASSERToRIC/ probfemolic problem of evil R problem for religious believers: God is supposed to be all-powerful (He can do anything He wants)' Lenevolent(He wants whateveris good ficr us), and all-knowing (He knows everything that goes on). Evil is what is bad foi us, so God must eliminate all evil. But there clearly is evil. so God cannot have all of these features. see also THEODICY. The problem, first discussedby nnts problem of futureGgnlingenls about a future (metaphysi a statement TorLE, of whether event is now true or false. If it is true (or cally) CONTTNGENT false) now th?it it will happen, how can that event 'fail to happen (or happen) in the future? If it can't fail to happen (oi if it can't happen) in the future, how can it be contingent? problem of identityWhat is it for something at one time to continue to exist at another time (i.e., for it to be Innuucnl 3 with something at another time)? Some changes in the world mean that one thing ceasesto exist, and is replaced by another, but other changesare counted as merely alterations in a continuing thing. on what basis do we make this distinc-

fobhmofinduAion

proof

tion? Saa pERsoNAL IDENTITv, BALL oF wAx EXAMPLE, suB_ STANCE.

problom of inductionEveryonebelievesthat rhe basic regularities we have observed in the past will continue into the future, this principle is called the 'principle of induction' or the 'principle of the uniformity of nature'. It is difficulr to see, what good grounds we have ficr believing this-perfrowever, haps it's merely an unjustifiable habit of mind, as HUME argued. The problem ofjustifying this belief is called the 'problem of induction', (There is also a somewhatdifferent "new problem of induction,' due to cooDMAN_J?ecRUE and eno.;ncrrnrlrrv.) problem of othorminds tf you suppose that the exisrenceof your own mind, and its contents,can be ,,perceived"directly only by you (srspRI\Acy),and thus that you can't directly perceive anyoneelse'smind or its contents,this raisesthe problem of what ground (if any) you have for thinking that anyone else has a mind, and is not, for example,just i body with exter_ nal appearance and behaviour much like yours. Some phi_ losophers (for example, nvlr) think that the absurdity of this problem shows that there's something wrong with the view of the mental that leads to it. producf of seb SaarNTERsEcrroN / uNroNoF sETS. ptoicclibilf \rft sometimes think that the fact that all As have been B's so farjustifies us in believing that future As will be B's. Thus, being a B is a projectible property. But we don't all properries as projectible: being cRUE isn,t pro_ :ount jectible. Philosophers (most famously, coooueN) have dis_ cussed the possibility of finding the difference between projectible and unprojectible properties. Goodman called this the "new problem of INDUcftoN." proof .seeARGUMENT.

r90

uopsitindottitdos

pmof, ildirocl proof,indire(f saznonEcr PRooF.

p10p0r n0m0sTerms that refer to exactly one thing, but not by 'Mount Everest'is a proper name, but'the describing them. For DESCRIPTION). highest mountain' is not (it's a DEFINITE 'logical refers that term a is name', RUSSELL, a ProPer ,directly ', that is, not via associateddescriptions. (Russell did not think that thtat what are called ProPer names in grammar are logically proper. ) rnlen argued that ordinary proper names are usually RIGIDDESIGNAToRS. SaantspostttoN. properlies, dispositionol ploperlies, emelgenlSaenuEnceNTPRoPERTIES. Sz EssENCE ondoccidenlol / ACcIDENT' essenfiol propeilies, / pilm1ry/ serondory prgpeilies, / tertiory SeepRtue1y / SEC6NDARY TERTTARY QUALITIES. PR9PERondinfinsit ScaRnLnttoNAL/ INTRINSIC prgperlies, lelofionol TIES. propertyseequnltrY/

PROPERTY. ATTRIBUTE/

plopositionThis term has been used in a confusing variety of ways.Sometimes it means merely a sentenceor a statement. Perhapsthe most common modern use is the one in which a proposition is what is expressed by a (declarative) sentence: an English sentence and its French translation express the same proposition, and so do'seymour is Marvin's iather' and'Marvin's male Parent is Seymour'. (A proposiwoRLDS') tion then might be eNetvzEDas a sEr of PossIBLE proposilionol ofiiludesThese arejour mental stateswhich are, so to at PRoPoslrIoNS.For example, toward the directed speak, proposition It wilt snilo on Christmas, one can have the propositional attitude of wishing ('I wish that it will snow

pfopositions,A/E/l/0

psychologirol hedonism

on Christmas"), believing, fearing, and so on. Compare these with mental stateswhich are not directed at propositions: feeling happy, enjoying an ice cream, remembering Mama.

p r o p o s i fA i o/ n Es/ l,/ 0 S exe7 E / r / o p R o p o s r r r o N s . proposilions, olomicSeaATOMrcpRoposrTroNs. Prologoros of Abdera (490?-?421B.C.)Most famous of the ancient Greek sopHtsrs,known for his doctrine that ,,man is the measureof all things." prolo(olsenfon(os Those sentencesthat express (what are supposed to be) the basic facrswe learn IMMEDTATELv by senseexperience. proviso, lockeonSeaLocrreN pRovrso. proximolo couseImagine a seriesof evenrsin which each / remole causesthe next. The first eventis a remote causeof the last (separatedby interveningeventsin the seriesof causes),but the next-to-lastis a proximate (near) cause.see alsocAUSAL CHAIN.

Proudhon,Pierre Joseph (180g-1865) French political rheorisr, associated with uroptnN socialism. psi

SeepenaNoRMAL IHENoMENA.

psychicollesgorch SeapnneNoRMAL rHENoMENA.

psychologicol behoviourism SaespFrevrouRrsM. psychologicol agoismSeascorsM. psychologicol hedonism SeesrooNlsr*,r.

192

psydoh0y, folk psychology folk seeFoLKpsycHoI-ocy. public / privoleSearruracv. punishmenl It is difficult to define this word. Must punishment be unpleasant?If so, then a judge who sentencedsomeone to not-unpleasantcorrective therapy wouldn't be punishing. Must punishment be given in response to a previous bad act? But this would mean that a jail sentence given to an innocent person, either by mistake or to set an example for future wrongdoers, wouldn't count as punishment. A continuing philosophical problem is the attempt to justify the existenceof punishment, either in the casesof legal, stateimposed punishment, or in personal instances,as when a parent punishes a child. For major theories, sreDETERRENcE and nrtRrgurlVISM. pwe/pr0di(01reosonPure reason is often taken to be reason working on its own, as contrasted with practical reason (which connects facts with desires and yields conclusions about what we ought to do). These terms are associatedwith KANT, though he couldn't have meant exactly this, since he speaks of "pure practical reason." Also contrasted with reason (seeTRUTHOFREASON). EMPIRICAL pulctiveMeans 'supposed', with the suggestion that what is supposedis debatable or false. Pulnom,Hilary (b. 1926)American philosopher with important contributions to philosophy of LocIC, mathematics, and mind. Originally the extremely scnrrtcRl- doctrines of the Pyrrhonism Greek philosopher Pyrrho (360?-?270)and his followers, hence, any extreme scepticism.['PEER'on-ism'] Pflhogoros(572?-?510B.C.) A PREsocRArtcGreek philosopher and mathematician, supposed to be the discoverer of the

theorem about the length of the sides of a right triangle, founder of a mystical religious cult that believed rhat relations between numbers were at the core of reality.

l9{

0.t.0.

0.t.0. Stands for'quod erat dtmanstrandum'(Latin: "that which was to be demonstrated"). Sometimes written after the conclusion of an eRcuMENTto mark it as the conclusion' 'consideredas a...'. Thus, one quE (Latin, "as') Means say that Fred is essentiallyrational gud human being' quglig l. = characteristics(old-fashioned use). 2. = sn'usu'-DAT'A" 3. The characteristics of sensations(of sensedata), distinguished from characteristicsof things sensed;for exa-mple, ihe precise f lavour of coffee, as tasted, or the precise feel of 'QUAH-lee-a" Its u pii.t. ['Qualia' is plural, Pronounced 'quale', pronounced 'QUAH-lay' or'QUAHsingular is lee'] quolitolivsidenfity SaeloexrtY. quolity/ oilributs/ proporfyThese words are synonyms. A quality is a characteristic of something, anything named by a rRrotcATE 3. Some philosophers argue that a thing cannot be composed entirely of qualities; there must be something else, the thing itself, which these are qualities of, in which these qualities are said to "inhere." SeasuBsrANcE'BALLoF WAXEXAMPLE. ACCIDENT' seeESSENCE/ quoliry0s$nfi01/occidentol qugfiryprimgry/ socondory / lerlior'l SeapRnraeRy/5EC9NDARY/rERTIARYQUALITIES. LOCIC. quontifierseesvrr.tgoLsoF QUANTIFIER

quonfilier cokulrn

ouotofronol context

quonlifior cokulusSaegunNrrFrERLocrc. quonfifier logic Quantifier Locrc is that part of logic which deals with sentencesusing logical terms such as .all', ,some,,.no,, 'there exists at least one'. Also called 'qua.tified logic', 'predicate logic', 'predicatecalcutus',and 'quantifier calculus'. Seea&o syMsoLSoF euANTIFIER Loctc. quonfitolive idenlily SeernBNrry. quonlum logic A Locrc that attempts to deal with the puzzling sorts of things said in quantum physics.For example, sup_ pose that a particle is 50Volikely to be in location A, and 50volil<elyto be in position B; quantum physicistsinsist that it's neither true that it is in one location nor true that it's in the other. queslion, begging lhe SaecTRCULAR REASoNTNc / ARcuMENl. quiddityIn (not terribly) or
r96

mdidtndotin/ inlerpetolim

mtiondlsrn

The processof understandinga lronslofion rodicol / inlerpretoti0n languageinitially totally unknown to you. The notion is associatedwith gulur, who argued for the INDETERMINACY on the basis of his discussionof radical oF TRANSLATIoN translation. RomseyFrank (Plumpton) (1903-1930)English (Cambridge) mathematician and philosopher. Inf luential works in the philosophy of mathematics and of science. rondomSeacunxcs. A fancy term meaning'reasoning'. roliocinolion rolionoleOne's reasonsfor doing something, or the support for some claim. 'reasonable' 'unreasonable'. I0li0n0l/ irrolionolMean, loosely, / These terms can refer to people, to their beliefs and attitudes, and to their methods of getting beliefs and attitudes. It is possible to distinguish between rationality of means and rationality of ends: a means is rational when it gets you the ends you want. It is more difficult to give a suitable test ficr the rationality of ends. IotionolismA philosophical movement usually contrasted with Rationalists believe that reason alone, unaided EMpIRIcISM. by experience, is capable of reliable and substantive knowledge; they also tend to believe in tNuern ideas.The classical MODERN TAtiONAIiStS ATE DESCARTES, LEIBNIZ, ANd SPINOZA.

197

mli0oFly

reobm / onlireolisrn

rolionolif SeenerroNAL/ rRRArroNAL. rolionolsslf-inlslest Acting from self-rNTEREsr is seeking one's own aims. Philosophers have sometimes argued that someone motivated to seek his / her own benefit sometimes can achievethis only by fulfilling others' intereststoo. Thus they argued that RATIouel self-interestoften involvesmore than narrow selfishness. r0v0nporodoxWhen you see a green leaf you see something which is non-black and which is a non-raven. So this coNFIRMs(to a small extent) the general statement that all non-black things are non-ravens.Now, it seems reasonable to think that anything that confirms a general statementS also confirms any statement logically equivalent to S (sae BICoNDITIoNnI).'All non-black things are non-ravens" is logically equivalentto 'All ravensare black." So this green leaf confirms (to a small extent) the statement,'All ravens are black." But that seemsclearly false: the Ieaf offers no confirmation ar all for that statement. What has gone wrong? This problem for confirmation rheory is due to Carl Hrupnt-,and is also known as Hempel's paradox. Rowk,;ohn (b. l92l) American philosopher,his work A Theory of Justicc is among the most inf luential twentieth-cenrury works on ethical and political theory. SeeorrruRr,NcEpRrNcrptn and PRINCIpLE oF LIBERTv. feolism/ontireolism Realism is, in general, the view that some sort of entity has external existence,independent of the mind; anti-realiststhink that that sort of entity is only a product of our thought, perhaps only as a result of an artificial coNvENTroN('conventionalism').Realistsquarrel with anti-realistsin many philosophical areas: fior example, in untapuyslcs, about the reality of uulvnRsAlS,in ethics, about the reality of the moral categories.Scientific realists sometimes hold that THEoRETTcAL EN'r'rTrES are mind-independent, or that u,vs in scienceref lect external realities (so

198

rdsm,mivo

duclionivn

are not just constructed by us), or that the UNIVERSALS \6u discoverid by science are real and mind-independent' 'legal realism', by analogy, to mean-the belief might exPect in Lgal principlis rhat exist independently of any legislation or adjudication, but in fact, it names the reverseposition: that law is not fixed by eternal principles or legislation, but is created, considering special casesand social conditions, by continuing decisionsofjudges andjuries (s'e LEGAL.It*' 'realism' (except possiblyin 'legal rSru).In philoiophical use, realism) does not haveits ordinary sense,in which it means 'free from illusion'. noive SceNAIVEREAusM. rGolhm, by onologYSeeeNntocY' reosoning REASON. re0son,puto scePURE,/PRACTICAL ]hl sometimes have reasons for doing somer00S0nS / tOUSeS thing, but is this to be understood causally?That is, does that mean that there is a special sort of ceusr ficr your action? one reason to think that reasons are not causes is that talk about reasons often mentions the future, but a cause of x must occur before x does. This is a controversy in EXPLANATION. ACTIONTHEORY.SEEOISO or a zuNCTIoN) rCtursiy! Something (fior example, a oEFTNITION its is recursive when it is to be applied over and over again to 'inteown previous product. For example, one can define get'by sa)4ngthat 0 is an integer, and if x is an integel then i * l.it an integer. Thus, aPPlylng the second part of this definition to the first, I is an integel aPPlylng the second part to this result, 2 is an integer, and so on. SceRECURSIVE' rcducliood ohwdun Sacnqotpesr PRooF. r3dUdiOnisnb reduce some notion is to define (or eNrrvzn) it in terms of otherc, and thus to eliminarc it from the list of

teduclivs onolysis

reflective eouilibrium

basic entities in the field under discussion,and sometimes even to show that the reduced entity does not really exist. Reductionism about some notion is the idea that that notion can be reduced-can be given a ,,reductiveanalysis"and perhaps that it thus can be eliminated.Reductionistsin social science,for example,hold that socialphenomenacan be defined in terms of the sum of individuals'behaviour,so they would claim that any statement about a social phenomenon may be reduced to talk about what individual people do, and social theory may be reduced (at least rN PRINcIILE, if not in practice) to psychology(see,by contrast, HOLISM).Micro.reduction is reduction to talk about small (perhapsinvisibly small) enriries,as somerimeshappensin physics.But reduction can as well go in the orher direction: INSTRUMENTALISTS somerimesargue that talk about these tiny invisible items in physics should be reduced to talk about visible large-scalephenomenaand measurements. reduclive onolysisSeenepucrroNrsM. rodundoncy fteoryof lrulh SearRUrH. rgference The connection betweena noun or noun phrase and something in the world-e.g., berween the word .pig' and any particular pig. referentiolly opoque / lronsporenlSeeornqur / TRANSrARENT. rofleclionl. The processof calm reconsiderarion,which may lead to a berter view of things. 2. SeeTNTRoSnECTToN [a chief ly British alternativespelling is 'ref lexion'] reflective equilibriumA goal somerimes thought to guide one in the construction of theories.A theory is in ref lectiveequilibrium when the basic general principles of the theory match the particular facts the theory is supposedto explain. \Ab start with the particular beliefs, and construct some general principles to explain these.The general principles

2m

reflexion

Reid,

sometimes conf lict with other particular beliefs, which might then be altered. \4b go through a continuing Process of altering general principles to bring them into accord with parricular beliefs, and of altering particular beliefs to bring them into accord with the general principles, until equilibargued that this is the structure of rium is achieved.RA,VLS theory-building in ethics, and others have seen this structure in other philosophic areas. reflexionSaaRnrtr,cttoN. is ref lexive if every' A RELATI9N rellexive I irreflexive / nonreflexive 'is the same thing has that relation to itself. For example, age as the same age as'is ref lexive,becauseeverything is 'has a different address than' is irref lexive, be' But itself. causenothing has a different addressthan itself. And'likes' is nonref lexive, because some things do like themselves, and some things don't. refulolionThe demonstration by means of ,tRcuuENT that some position is mistaken.Philosclphystudentsoften misuse this word to refer to any attemPt to rebut a position: "The Church refuted Galileo's claim that the earth travelled around the sun by appealing to Scripture." Something is refuted, properly speaking, only when it is successfully shown to be false. rule saacoNsrITUTIvE,/REcuLATIvERULE' regulctiYe REGRESS. infinife SaetNrtrut.I-e regress, Hans (1891-1953) German-born American phiReichenboch, losopher of science, with important contributions to philosophy of physicsand pRonnBILITYtheory. Reid,Thomas (1710-1796) Scottish philosopher. Founder of Scottish "common sense' school in reaction against the scEprIcISMof British EMPIRICISTS.

20r

roilkofion

rshtivbm / obsobtism

leificolionThe mistaken way of thinking about some ABSTRACT notion as if it were a real thing. Thus, it could be argued that although it makes sense to talk about something as being absolutely (i.e,, completely) such.and.such,the way some philosophers think of The ABSoLUTE, as if it were a real thing, is merely a reification. ['REE-uh-fih-KAY-shun', synonym:'hypostatization' though'hypostatization' sometimes does not carry the implication that the attribution of concretenessis a mistake;pronounced'hy-POS-tuh-ti-ZAVshun'] SeealsocoNcR-ETE. reincolnolion The reappearanceof the soul or mind or person, following bodily death, in a different body. Also called 'metempsychosis' and'transmigration'. properlies relofionol/intrinsic A property is intrinsic if things have that property in themselves,rather than in relation to other things. Thus being 100 meters tall is an intrinsic property, but being the tallest building in town is a relational property, becausethis is relativeto the heights of other buildings in town. SeeaKo INTRINSIC ,/ INHERENT ,/ INSTRUMENTAL / EXTRINSIC.

relolionof ideos SeeunrrnR oF FAcr/ RELATToN oF rDEAs. relofionsConnections, comparisons, or associations between two or more things. Thus 'smaller than' namesone sort of relation, in this case a two-place ('binary') relation. There are also three-place relations (e.g., the one named by the and so PREDIcATE'-is located between - and -'), for,rr-place, on. The items related by a relation ane called its 'relata' 'relatum'], [plural; singular frrm is Relativism is the position that there is no relolivism / obsolutism one cornect view of things. Relativistsargue that views vary among individual people and among cultures ('cultural relativism'), and that there is no good way of deciding who is right. This contrasts with absolutism (sometimes called

exblence lu God's oqument oxperime relgixrs

Elrfulivism

'objectivism'), the position that there is an objectively right view. The most common relativist views concern morality (.ethical relativism'), but some philosophers havebeen relativists about a number of other matters, including the naSeealso RELATIy1sU). ture of reality itself (saeONTOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVISM. grgumenl for GodtexislenteSae MY5TISAL g1ipERexperien(e religious EXISTENCE. FOR GOD'S ARGUMENT IENCE CAUSE. Iemofet0u50 seaPRoXIMATE / REMOTE \4b are said to be responsible fior an action we do responsibilily when it is "up to us' what we do. Moral responsibility is responsibility firr morally relevant(good or bad) actions; we can be praised or blamed only for those actions fcr which we are morally responsible. Collective responsibility, for example, of the whole German population for the Nazi atrocities, is a philosophically controversialnotion. Rising again from the grave. Christians think that resurrcclion Christ was resurrected, and that resurrection of the dead will occur at the LastJudgement. This is a theory of punishment that contrasts with refributivism theory. The latter claims that punishments the DETERREucE are justified when they have good effects: for example, the prevention of future bad acts by reforming the wrongdoer, or by threatening the wrongdoer or others with similar future treatment. Retributivists claim that such usesof punishment are immoral, and that punishment is justified for wrongdoers merely because wrongdoing demands it-because it's .;uslcr-or a restoration of the moral order-to inf lict punishment on wrongdoers. Retributivists also claim that the severityof punishment should fit the severity of the crime, sometimes they go so far as to advocate that the criminal's suffering should equal that caused by the crime (14.neye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"). Versions of retribu-

203

romcotjrolion

nghts

tivism are advocatedby KANT and HrcrL. It is sometimes criticized as merely advocating revenge. "Backward" causation, in which the effect occurs rolroccusoliofr beficrethe cause.The possibility of retrocausationis debatable. retrodidionMeans'prediction backwards'-"prediction" of the past. A historian might retrodict, for example,on the basis of certain historical documents,that a battle took place at a certain location. This retrodiction can be coNFTRMED by presentevidence,for example,by artifacts of war dug up at that site. rolurn,elernol SeeerrRNnL RETURN. rcvololionKnowledge revealed ro us directly by God, distinguished from what we find out by using our senses,or by reasoning. rhgloricl. Persuasiveor expressive,showy or elaborate language, or the study of this. Sometimes("mere") rhetoric is distinguishedfrom genuineARGUMENT, when it is supposed that the former is not a good meansfor persuasion.socReTEsaccusedthe sopHlsrs of substituting rhetoric for argument. But there are legitimate usesof persuasivelanguage, so the theory of rhetoric is an important areaof loclc. 2. A rhetorical question is one that is askedwhen no answer is expected, or when the answer is obvious. Some students have the bad habit of over-usingthe rhetorical question in their papers. Papers are supposed to answer questions, not merely ask them. righl SaeGooD/ RrcHT. righf nu are said to have a right to something or some action when it is thought that nobody should be allowed to prevent you from having that thing or from doing that action. Thus,

201

dgil/ftcddde$mfd

rigad/fuddoiomlor

we can speak of a right to ProPerty, or to vote, or to life. Having a right to do something doesn't mean you ought to do it, but merely that you're allowed to do it if you want. uTILITARIANsmight be able to justify according certain rights, but usually rights-theorists insist that a right is independent of ult-ltv: that someone morally can exercise a genuine right even if it is contrary to the general welfare. (For reasons like this, the arch-utilitarian snNtHeu called 'nonsense upon stilts.") An inalienable right talk of rights is a right that one cannot give up or get rid of. Thus, the right to my car is alienable; I can give it uP by selling it. But on some theories the right not to be enslavedis something one cannot not give up (for example, by selling one's self into slavery) even if one wanted to. A civil right is a right that is (or ought to be) guaranteed and enfiorced by Sovernment. (Nobody thinks that government ought to enfcrce all our rights. I have the right to whistle in the shower;but I don't want or need government enficrcementfor this.) coNVENTIoNALrights are rights produced or guaranteed by society (by government or agreement, or just by custom). Natural rights, on the other hand, are rights we are suPposed to havejust becausewe are human (perhaps because they are God-given). figid/floaid designolorA rigid designator (Saul xnlxE's term) is a term that refers to the same thing in every other PosSIBLE NAMES woRLDin which it exists. Kripke algued that PROPER are characteristically rigid designators. Thus, to say that Fred might have been bald is to say that there is another possibleworld in which Fred is bald. onnNITEDEScRIPTIoNS, on the other hand, are usually not rigid designators,so are sometimes called'f laccid designators' ['FLAK-sid']. In this 'the 'the highest world, highest mountain' is Everest, but mountain'does not refer to the same thing in other possible worlds. Thus, when we say'Mount Ranier might have been the highest mountain', we don't mean that there's another possible world in which Mount Ranier is Mount Everest (see COUNTERFACTUAL).

205

ringof6ygos

Russoll,

ringof GygesSaeHoBBEs'sFooLE Romonlicism The name of a wide variety of cultural and philosophical movementsassociatedwith the period from the late eighteenth through the mid-nineteenthcentury. philosophically,this is associatedwith the distrust of rationality and nNeLysls,and is thought of as a reaction againstearlier ENLICHTENMENT thought. SCHoPENHAUER is a good example of a Romantic philosopher. Rousseou, ( 1712-l778) Frenchrr.nrcHrnNl,trNrphiJean-Jacques losopher, responsible for important works in moral theory and ficr the view that societycorrupts the natural nobility of humans, and derives its legitimacy from a socrAl coN. TRACTthat represents the cENERALwtt_t-.His views were inf luential on the French Revolution. rule/ plincipleSometimesthe distinction is made in philosophy of uu betweena rule and a principle of (civil) law: a rule is strict, without exceptionsor borderline cases,but a principle is more \Acur and may be overridden. It is a principle (not a rule) of certain systemsof law, for example,that one can't profit from one's illegal acts; but one is nevertheless allowed to keep the money one has earned while out ofjail becauseof having escaped.Against this distinction, it has been argued that nothing in law should-or even could-be exceptionless,anticipatingall possibleexceptions. ruleof infelgncoA rule ficr reasoning from one sratementto another; for example, MoDUSpoNENs. ruleufililorionism SaeurrlrrARrANrsM. Russcll,Bertrand (Arthur William) (1S72-lg?0)British philosopher, perhaps the best-known philosopher of the twentieth century. Founder (with wHITEHEAD)of contemporary syMBot-tc Loclc; leader (with r"rooRn)of the twentiethcentury revolt against IDEALISM, though some of his views-for exam-

?06

io*i@r

Rvh,

ple, on our knowledge of externals (searHnNounNnustr't)tended to be less in accord with common sense than Moore's. A contrwersial public figure becauseof his pacifism, his criticism of Christianity, and his advocacyof freer sexual morality; because of his views he was fired from teaching positions and jailed. lulsrllt potodor Invented by Bertrand nussnn. Consider the snt of sets that are not members of themselves.Is this set a member of itself ? If it is, it isn't. If it isn't, it is. Considera' tion of Russell's PARADoxhas resulted in some complications in set theory. lylc, CitUert (1900-1976)English (Oxford) philosophet lead' leNcuecu phiing early figure in ex.lrvrtc and oRDINARY losophy. Important works in philosophy of LocIC and of mind; in The Conceptof Mind he argued that cARTESIAN MISTAKE. was based on a cATEGoRy DUALTSM

Soinl-Simon,

Sousure,

Soinf-Simon, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy,Comte de (1760.182b) French social (and socrnusr) philosopher. (Latin: "saving the truth") Means 'keeping the solvaveritote truth or falsity (of a sentence)the same'.A rEnu may always be replaced in a transparent context saluaueritate,but not in an opaque context (see OreqUE/ TRANSPARENT). ['SAL-rnrh ver-uh-TAH-tay'] sondionA good or bad result of an action that motivates(or is designed to motivate) us to do it (or not to), sometimesas provided by civil t-,1,v. Sonloyono, George (1863-1952)Philosopherand literary writer, born in Spain but grew up and worked in the U.S. His best-knownviews are that our belief in the material world is actually a form of "animal faith"; he believed that real knowledge involved rNTUrrloNof pt,croHtc FoRMS, Sorlre,Jean-Paul(1905-1980)Wictelyknown French proponenr of ExISTENTIALISM; author of important philosophical and literary works that express the view that humans have no fixed ESSENCE, but live in, and constantly attempt to escape from, a terrifying FREEDoM l. Though philosophicallyvery different, he and RUSSELL shared some ourspoken political views. [the closestEnglish-speakers usually can get to the French pronunciation is'sahr-truh'] Scussure, Ferdinand De (1857-1913)Swisslinguist and philosopher; known for his work on structural linguistics and his inf luence on contemporary French srRUcruRALrsM.

208

scepltbm

Schopenhornr,

sreplicirmThe view that knowledge in some area is not possible. Philosophical scepticism doesn't come just from a FEELING or personality quirk: it needs to be supported by ARGUMENT. Someone who holds this view is called a sceptic; the Sceptics were a group of (sceptical!)Greek philosophers, including rvnRuo and his ficllowers.HUMEis known as a champion of modern scepticism.Scepticsoften don't actually doubt the truth of the belief about which they are sceptical: their central claim is that we don't have;usnrlcATloN I for that belief, and thus can't be said to know it. [may also be spelled 'skepticism'and'skeptic';spellingswith'scep-' are preferred by the British] SeealsoDouBr. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775-1854)German Schelling, idealist philosopher. s(hemoA rule or categorythat we use to organize,understand, 'schemata'] and formulate what we think about. [plural Schlick,Moritz (1882-1936)German founder of the VIENNAclRcLr, leading figure in the developmentof t-octcAt-Poslrlvlsu. Killed by one of his students. Characterizes MEDIE\AI-philosophy (done by the scholosfirism scholastics-"schoolmen"-teachers in medieval European Christian THEoL' universities),especiallythe ARISToTELInn 'I'HOMAS DUNS AQUINAS, ocv typical of the time. a,nsr,LM, 'schoscoTUS,and ocxHnM were scholastics.The adjective lastic' has come to have pejorative overtones, suggesting pedantry, dogmatism, and exaggerated formality. Are the scholasticsthemselvesresponsiblefirr this? Arthur (1788-1860)German philosopher, known Schopenhoueg for his emphasis on "Will" in the world-an irrational and blind force behind all change-and for his advocacy of an attitude of detached rrsslutsrtc resignation.

209

scrsn(0

scisnlists

s(i0n(0Philosophershaveoften thought and written about matters we would nowadaysthink are the proper domain only of sctENTtsrs,occasionallywith strangeresults.entstotLg, for example, announced that men have more teeth than women, and that the brain was an organ for cooling the blood. BERKELEy wrot€ about the medicinal value of tarwater.HEcELconsideredphrenology (the study of how personality and mental ability are revealedby the shapeof the skull) at some length, and discussedan A pNoN proof that there were only six planets. What we now distinguish as scienceused to be a branch of philosophy,called 'natural philosophy'; the divorce of the two began only about rhree hundred yearsago, when scientistsand (some)philosophers began to think that specialruprRtcRLmethods of observation and experiment werenecessaryfiordiscoveringparticular truths about the world. Even after the divorce began, however, genuine scientists (Newton, for example) still called themselves'naruralphilosophers'.PhilosophicalnuptRICISTS,poslTIvtsrs, and LoctcAL postrtvtsrs have stressedthe inappropriatenessof philosophical tools fior discovery of particular scientific facts, But recent philosophers of sciencehave emphasized the a priori philosophical pREsupposrrroNs of science,and the necessityof philosophy (proper) taking into accountthe empirical findings of scientists, so perhapsthe divorce is not all that complete. s(isnfifi(roolismSeenEAr-rsr,,r. scignlhhMany people known primarily as scientists neverrheless have thought and written importantly about the philo sophical pREsuppostrloNs or consequencesof science,so they deservemention in here. They include: Boyle, Robert (1627-1691)English chemist/ physicist Bridgman,PercyWilliams (1882-1961) American physicist Copernicus,Nicolaus(Polishname:Mikolij Kopernik) (1473I 543) Polish astronomer Darwin, Charles(Robert) (1809-1882)English naturalist

210

Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie (1861-1916)French theoretrcal physicist Durkheim, Emile ( 1858-1917)Frenchsociologist Eddington, Sir Arthur (Stanley)(1882-1944)British astronomer / physicist Einstein,Albert (1879-1955)German-born American theoretical physicist Faraday,Michael (1791-1867)British chemist,zphysicist Freud,Sigmund (1856-1939)Austrian psychologist Galileo (Galilei) (1564-1642)Italian astronomer/ physicist Heisenberg,\Abrner( l90l-1976) German physicist Helmholtz, Baron Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von (18211894)German physician,/ physicist/ mathenatician Huxley, Thornas Henry (1825-1895)British biologist Jurg, Carl Gustav(1875-1961)Swisspsychologist Kepler,Johannes(1571-1630)German astronomer/ phys| cist/ mathematician Keynes,.|ohn Maynard (first Baron Keynes) (1883'1946) British economist Lamarck, Chevalier de (title ofJean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet) (1744-1829)French naturalist Laplace, Pierre Simon, Marquis de (1749'1827) French mathemati cian / astronomer Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519)Florentineengineer/ artist Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766-1834)English economist Maxwell,JamesClerk ( l83l-1879) Scottishphysicist Newton, Sir Isaac(T642-1727)English mathematician/ scientist Pareto, Vilfredo (1848-1923)French-born Italian economist / sociologist Piaget,Jean ( 1896-1980)Swisspsychologist Planck, Max (Karl Ernst Ludwig) (1858-1947)German physicist Poincar6,JulesHenri (1854-1912)French mathematician/ physicist Skinnel B(urrhus) F(rederic) (1904-1990)American psychologist Smith, Adam (1723-1790)Scottishpolitical economist

2ll

selftvkJont

Watson, ( I 878.19S8) Americanpsycholo. J(ohn)B(roadhus) gist \,rrbber, Max(1864-1920) Germansociologist/historian Scolus SeeDUNs scorus. Seorfe, John (b. 1932) Contemporary American philosopher known ficr his work on philosophy of language. quoliliossea pRrMARy s0(0nd0ry ^Ry / rERrrARyQUALT. / sECoND TIES. selfcoused SeecRuse.oF-rrsELF. self-consciousness In ordinary use, a selfconsciousperson is one who feelsembarrassedor behavesunnaturally, as if under critical observation by others. In philosophicaluse, this often meansthe sort of knowledgeone has of one's self that one gets by adopting the perspecrivethat orhers might have of one; or else the sort of self-awareness one gets by rNrnoSPECTIoN. The rxrsrENTrALrsTS thought that this self-awareness made ficr rRrgoou L self-confodicfion A staremenris self-contradictorywhen ir asserrs and denies the same thing ('It's raining and it's not raining'), or when it's logically false (JreLoctcAL TRUTH/ t'Ar,slrv). Sometimes (more loosely,and rather incorrectly) a statementthat is ANALvTTcAlLy false is called a selfcontradiction: for example,'Fred is a married bachelor'. self-docoplion The processof convincing yourself(or trying to) of the truth of what you know is false, becauseyou want to believe it. For the ExrsrENTrAlrsrs, BADFArrH is a typical fiorm of attempted self-deception.A problem: can you really succeedin convincing yourselfthat something is true while you also really believe it's false? sol[evidonlObviously true, so in need o[noJUsrrFrcATroNl.

212

seff{ilfillinghftef

semonlic / synlox / progmolia

sellfulfillingbelief A belief that makesitself true, or tends to. For example, the belief that other people think you're strange will often make you act strangely,and will as a result make people think you are strange. On a positive note, the belief that you will do well in an exam will sometimes be self-fulfilling, if as a result of this belief you go irrto the exam relaxed and confident, and thus do well. The belief that you have a belief is self-fulfilling (having that belief makes it true). Also called'self-fulfilling prophecy'. RATIoNALsELF-INTEREST. selFintelestSeesrLnsnNESS, Someone wh6l is selfish is interestedonly in his / het selfishness that is, self-interest(saeEGolsM).This is nasty benefit, own when it involves seeking one's own benefit only, and at others' expense;but some philosophersargue that the rational pursuit of one's own benefit would necessitatesometimes looking after others' benefit as well (seeR,tuoNelSELF.INTEREST).

Something is self-referentialwhen it nrrens to itSelf-referente 'word' refers to itself (among other things). word The self. 'This sentence is false' is self-referential' A The sentence synonymfor'self-referential'is'homological'; this word contrasts with'heterological', meaning non-self-referential. Self-referencecan lead to logical puzzlesand PAnnooxEs;sre, ficr example,LIAR'srARADoxand cRrLLlNc'sPARADOX. semonli(s / progmotiaThese terms name both aspectsof / synlox language and the study of these aspects'Semanticsis that part of language which has to do with meaning and nnrnnor LoGlcAL FORM' ENCE.Syntax has to do with GRAMMAR Syntax, then, can tell you whether a sentence is formed 'Is the on but but' is not ficrmed correctly (for example, correctly), but cannot tell you what a correctly formed sentence means. Pragmatics concerns the relations between bits of language and their usesby language-users.

2r3

somonlk thoory oftruti

pmb(ol senbncos,

thooryof truth SaerRurH. ssmonlir scmiolics The general study of symbols in language.For a description of its branches,seesEMANTtcs,/ syNTAx//pRAGMATlcs. ['seh' or 'see'+ 'mee' or 'my' + 'ah-ticks'] s0ns0 / sonsumseeSENSE-DATA. 50ns0-d010 What is given by the senses:the internal event or picture or representation we get when perceiving external objects-or sometimes,as when we dream or hallucinate, evenin their absence.A straightstick half under water looks bent; we then have a bent sense-datum,the same sort of internal picture we would have if we saw a bent stick out of water. EMPIRICISTS have sometimesargued that this shows that all we really directly (rt"ttrlrolerrI-y)perceive are sensedata, and that we only infer external objects from these (sze ARGUMENTFRoM ILLUSToN).The term was invented by MooRE.Note that'sense-data'isplural: the singular fiorm is 'sensedatum'. Also known as 'sensa'(singular 'sensum'). [Seeako onrn.] quolio Seequnue 2. sonse sense / lefetenceSaeonuornloN / coNNorATroN. sensible knove SeeHoBBEs'sFooLE. sensibles SeesrNsruLrn. Things capableof being perceived.Also called 'sensisensibilio bles'. senlen(e, opgn SeesyMBoLSoF eUANTTFIER Loctc. prolocolSaepRorocoL sENTENCES. senlen(es,

211

sentenlklbgk

shbofTheseus

'sentential' is the adjectival form of 'sentence'. SenlenfiOllOgiC 'the SententialLoGIC(also called'the sententialcelculus', calculus', etc.) is that part of logic which TRUTFI-FUNCTIONAL deals with the way sentencesare combined to fiorm other 'Snow is white'and'Pigs f ly' may be sentences.For example, combined by logical connectives to fiorm such sentencesas 'Snow is white or pigs don't f ly' and 'If snow is white then pigs f ly and snow isn't white'. 'members').Set theory is sel A collection of things (called its reason about sets. Somewe the way studv of the abstract 'class'is used synonymouslywith 'set',but they can be times distinguished in one or the other of these ways:(1) A set is any old collection (ficr example, there is a two-member set consisting of the Eiffel Towerand your left big toe), whereas a classis a collection of things defined by a common characteristic. (2) Set theorists sometimes say that sets can be members of other sets, but classescannot. The null set is the set with nothing in it-the empty set. A unit set is a set with exactly one thing in it (e.g.,the set of f irst presidentsof the U.S.). (seealsoINTERSECTIoN / UNIoNoF sETS). 'racism', this is the set of sexismBy analory with the word attitudes and practices involving discrimination and op pression on the basisof sex,most often against women. The central concern of rnMtnts.rshas been to exPoseand combat these. Empilicus(c. 200) The best-known ancient scerrrc; his Sexlus central view was that knowledge is impossible. FooLE. lydion SeeHoBBES's shepherd, A story used to raise a puzzle aborrt IDENTITY3: shipof Theseus Suppose that Theseus owns a wooden ship, which is renovated while in use by replacing one plank at a time; the removed planks are stored, and when the renovation is

simple irieos / complex

Smith,

complete, the stored planks are used to build a secondship just like the first. Which of the rwo is the original ship? simple ideosA coMpLEXidea is one rhar can be analyzed / complox into simpler ideas.'Brother', for example,namesa complex idea that is "composed"of the ideasof male and sibling;but 'green' perhapsnamesa simple idea. sinplkitlt(Latin: "simply") Without qualification, nor jtrst in certain respects.[usually'sim-PLISS-uh-tur'] skepficism Seescnruclsv. Skruiiii,Kristu (Latin name CristusScruius)(4th century) Albanian theologian, known for his anticiparion of thc: HEGELIA N DIALECTIC. ['SKROO-you'] slove/ mosler morolityNTETZSCHE thought that there were rwo sorts of "moralities"-waysofthinking about the self,right and wrong, and society.Slavemorality involvescooperation and self-negation,fear of change and obedience. Master morality more positivelyref lects the wrLLTo powER,and is appropriateficr the'supERMAN". slippery slope l. A form of moral reasoningin which it is arguecl that some act or practice is undesirablenot becauseit's bad in itself, but becauseits acceptancewill or might lead to a series of other acts that differ from each other in small ways, and eventuate in something clearly bad. It might be argued, for example,that a city's allowing streetvendorson one corner isn't in itself bad, but this might gradually lead to more and more permissiveness,resulting eventually in the clogging of city sidewalksby all sorts of undesirables. This sort of reasoning is a form of soRITESargument. 2. Sometimes,used more generally,'slippery slope argument' ='sorites'. Smith, Adam SeescrENflsrs.

216

ttreory sociol choice

5000bm / (0mmunlsm

sotiolchoitelheory The study of various methods for aggregating the preferences of many different individuals to yield a collective cENERALwlLL. sotiolconflocl A way of justifying the I,EcITIMAcY of a ruler or government, or the restrictions imposed by government or by moral rules, on the basis of an agreement (whether explicit or tacit) of the people involved. It is supposed that people agree (or would agree) to these restrictions because of the resulting long-range benef its to everyone. This agree'social contract'" Of course, few governmenrnent is called a rules are actually created by such agreement, tal or moral but it is sometimes thought that they are justified when people would have agreed, had they been asked, and had they understood the consequences. Thus, thinking about this (often merely hypothetical) social contract provides not an actual history of the origin of these rules, but rather a I of their existence and of their binding force. JUSTIFICATIoITI This is the sort ofjustification of rules given by contractarians, among whom are HOBBES,ROUSSEAU,and RAdt-S. See a/so: s.ret.r,oF NATURE.vEIL oF IGNoRANCE. sociolDorwinism SeeEVoLUTIoN. so(iolism / communismIn general, both socialists and communists advocat€ that there be a classless society, that there be public ownership of the means of production, and that people work according to their abilities and receive goods according to their needs. Both terms are closely associated with the thought of tvlRnx and with the former Eastern bloc countries, though both systems have existed (in various partial forms) elsewhere and at other times. In some uses, 'C') 'communism' (especially with a capital is a more restricted term, referring only to Marxist-LnNINIsr societies; communism is thought to be more AUTHoRITARTAN than socialism, and to use more extreme and repressive measures 'democratic (one hears the phrase socialism' but not 'democratic communism'). In a popular inaccurate use,

211

mettrodologicol solipsism, 'communism' refers

to any radical view regardedas revolutionary or subversive. (470?-399B.C.) Athenian philosopherwhose debates Socrolos were chronicled by nlnro. Extremely inf luential ficr his "DIALECTICUl" method of debate in which he led his opponents to analyzetheir own assumptionsand to reveal their inadequacy.He rejectedthe scEprtceLand RELATIVIS. ttc views of the professionaldebatersof the day,urging a return to ABSOLUTE ideals.He was condemned to death fior impiety and ficr corrupting youth. itony Socrates,as presentedin pLRro'sdialogues,often Socrolic spoke humbly about his own understanding,claiming great respectfor the wisdom of'those with whom he conversed, though clearly this was to a large extent ironic or insincere, often a technique to draw out his hearer'sviews. philosophicalmethods as represented Socrolic melhodsocRATES' in pLATo'sDialogues.He proceededby asking others continual questions,therebyto get them to revealand understand their errors. Sometimeshis aim was to lead them to their own discoveryof more adequatev iews;sometimes,however, the dialogues end with no solutions at all. (Seeako DIALECrrc l.) wrLL. SeeFREE softdelelminism solipshmThe position that one's own mind is the only thing that exists in the universe.Nobody saneever believedthis, but it is philosophicallyinterestingto try to REruTEit. Some'solipsist'. one who believed solipsism would be called a ['SAHl-ipsism','SAHl.-ipsist'] (SeeaJsollrrnoDot-oclcAtsol-rPSrsM.) SeeMErHoDoLocrcALsoLIpstsM. solipsism, mothodologicol

?18

$d'ists

sohntnlln

sllo nunerc (Latin: "by number alone") Two things differ so/o nurnerowhen they are precisely alike in every detail, but are two distinct things (i.e., are "numerically"-quantitativelS distinct) (s?dIDENTITY2.) The existence of difference solo nurnerois impossible according to the LAil oF THEIDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES.

consisting of a chain of smaller argusoliles An ARGUMENT ments. This sort of argumerrt is involved in the sorites pARADox,an example of which ficllows: (l ) Someon 3 ef e e t o l li s s h o r t . ( 2 ) l f s o m e o ni ses h o r tt,h e no n y o n e . 0 0 f0e1e tt o l l eirs o l s o s ho r t . ( 3 ) T h e r e f osroem e o n3 e. 0 0 0 1f e e t o l li s s h o t t . Applying premise (2) to step (3) yields a further conclusion, to which premise (2) is applied again; application of (2) to succeedingconclusions in this way,over and over,eventually 'Someone 7 feet yields the obviously false final conclusion, The obvious steP to gone wrong? is What has short'. tall criticize is premise (2), but if you think this is false, you need to produce some height such that a person of that height is short, but a person .0001 feet taller is not short; and there is, it seems,no such height. It's difficult to figure out what exactly has gone wrong here, and there are interesting consequencesfor LocIc of various proposals. The sorites paradox has something to do with the involvement of a rncur coNCEPT(of being short, in this case).['suh-RIGHT-eez'] sophismAn eRcuuENTthat is subtle and convincing, but mistaken. Sophistry is arguing using sophisms.Named after the Sophists, ancient Greek travelling philosophers who taught ficr a fee, becausethey were thought to use such arguments. Protagoras and Thrasymachus are two of the better-known Sophists.['SAHF-ism'] SophistsSaesopHrsu

219

s0und

Spinozo,

SOUNdS,, ARGUMENT.

soundnots Sae Rncuurxr. sp0(0, obsoluleSaeABsolurn spACE ANDrrME. sp0cistSeecrNus / spEcrEs. spo(itmBy analogywith the word'racism' (and later,'sExtsv'), this term was coined to refer to the way we tend to restrict certain considerationsof moral treatmentto our own species.Some philosophers-mostnotablythe Australian phi. losopher Peter Singer (b. 1946)-have argued in favour of according certain RIctITs to animals, and against certain widespreadways they are currently treated.Some philosophers prefer the term 'speciesism';a substitute for either ugly word is'anthropocentrism'-therestrictionof' consideration to humans.I'SPEESH'or'SPEES'+'-ism'] ipecfrum, inverledSeeTNvERTED sIECTRUM. philosophy spo(ul0tive seeANALylrc pHrl.osopHy. spee(h 0(l An act of communication done by means of language.The speechact theory holds that meaning in language can be explained in terms of its potential for use in certain ways:meaning is illocutionary-actpotenrial(seett;.r>CUTIONARY/

PERLOCUTIONARY ACTl

INTENTTON). AUSTTN was

a pioneer in developingspeech-acr rheory. Spenceg Herbert (1820-1903)English philosopher who emphasizedrvolurloN as the unifying force behind all of nature, and as the principle of unification of all the sciences. Spinozo,Benedict (or Baruch) (1632-1677)Durch Jewish philosopher.He argued that nature is a unity, equivalentto a highly abstractand all-pervasiveGod, and that its facrs are necessary,and can be derived by a method of rigorous

220

spiril, obsohie

stoicisrn

"proof' (as in geometry). Spinoza,believing that humans were part of nature, was a thoroughgoing oerrnMINIST; given this, he concluded that emotions such as regret. and anger were mistaken.He argued that love of knowledge was the highest good. spiril,obsoluleSeeABSoLUTE. 5t. ... Seeunder name following. sfoge,lemporolSeeIorrulrv 3. sloleof nolure The historical state humans were in prior to governmental or conventional rules regulating conduct, or the state we would be in without them. HoBBESremarked that life in such a state would be "solitary, Poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Considerations of the relative advantagesof a state where there were moral and political restrictions have been thought to justify the existence of these restrictions (seesoctel coNTRAcr). bosicSeeBASIcsTATEMENTS. slolemenlt, lowlike Szet-RvlIrr sTATEMENTs. slolemenls, proto(olSaapRorocol sTATEMENTs. slolemenls, sfipulofive definitionSeennrnrrroN 5. 'having to do with pnonnBILITY'.A stochastic Means slochoslic (as opposed to onTnRMINISTIc) law predicts outcomes as only probable. ['stuh-K AS-tik'] sloicismThe views of the Stoics, an ancient Greek and Roman school. They held that vIRTUEis the highest good, and stressedcontrol of the passionsand indifference to pleasure 'stoic'). \irrbll-knownstoics and pain (thus the ordinary use of and ueRcus AURELIUS. are zENoof Citium, EpICTETUs,

221

$r(Iwmon

subsistent enfity

sfrowmon Straw man ar'gumentor reasoning (or setting up a straw man) is a bad form of reasoningin which one argues against some position by producing and nrrtrrNc a false and stupid version of that position: a "scarecrow"that can easily be knocked over. Slrcwson, P(erer) F(rederick) (b. lglg) English phitosopher, leading practitioner of eNeLyrrc pHrLosopHy,Lspeciailyin its onotun RyLANGUAGE version. slrkl implicotionSeacoNDrrroNAL. slruclurolism contemporary wide-ranging and controversial French philosophical school of thought. Its cenrral idea is that cultural phenomena should be understood as manifesting unchanging and universalabstractstructuresor ficrms; their meaning can be understoodonly when theseforms are revealed. slrudure,deep/ surfo(eSaenrrp,/ suREACE sTRUCTURE. probobility sublective SaepRosnsrLrry. subieclivism Any of a variety of views that claim rhar something is subjective-that is, a feature of our minds only, not of the external "objective"world. (The oppositeof 'objectivism'in one senseof that word.) Ethical subjectivism,ficr example, holds that our ethical 'Judgments" ref lect our own feelings only, not facts about externals. subselSeesnr. subsislenl onlity nnrNTANo agreed rhar some TNTENTToNATobjects don't exist, at least in the usual way; instead,he used the word 'sunsistence' to refer to their peculial mode of "existence."

222

subston(e

super8logotory

subslon(eAny basic, independently existing entity or subject; the stuff of which things are made. Thought sometimes to be unavailable to our senses,but conceptually necessaryas that which "underlies" or "supports" characteristicswe can and as that sense (seaqueltlY / AT'TRIBUTE / PRoPERTY), which is responsiblefor things existing through time despite changes in characteristics (seeYlttt- oF wAx ExAMPLE,in argued for the existence of substance). which DEScARTES believe that there are two substances:physical and DUALISTS 'corpomental. Physicalsubstanceis also called'material', 'extended' (searxreNstoN 3) substance. It's what real', or physical things are made of-that to which material qualities (size and shape, weight or mass, etc.) apply. Mental (or immaterial or incorporeal) substance is what mental or spiritual things are made of, and to which a different group of qualities apply: thinking of something, desiring something, feeling pain, etc. in the sensein which subslrolum Synomymouswith'suBSTANCE', this is supposed to be necessaryas what underlies properties. Also called'substrate'. suffidenlSeeuecnssRRy/ suFFrcrENT coNDITIoN. sufficienf couseA causal condition that is sufficient for its effect (saeNncEsseRy coNDIrtoN). Some causal condi/ sUFFIcIENT tions are not (by themselves)sufficient: striking a match is not a sufficient causeficr the match lighting: it also has to be dry, ficr instance. sufficienf reosonSrepRrNCrpLE oF suFFrcrENT REASoN. sunnun bonumLatin: "highest good.' The central principle of all that one should strive for. SUMOISEISSaaINTERsECTIoN / UNIoNoF SETS. sup0rer0goforlseeoBLrGArroN.

$,0emon

p0r000x surpffi&qutz

tup0rm0nNot Lois Lane's boyfriend, but, according to NIETZScHE, a person who representsthe highest type. This sort lives a self-disciplined,creative,and joyful life, mani fests the wrLL To powER, and deserves to rule over the "common herd." Ti'anslates Nietzsche'sGerman term, "i)ber. mensch,"more literally translated as "overman". Seeako SLAVE / MASTER MORALITY.

supernofur0lism, elhir0l se, ETHTCAL NATURALTSM / SUPERNATURAT-ISM.

sup0lvenign(e Things of kind A superveneon rhings of kincl B when the presenceor absenceof things of kind A is completely determined by the presenceor absenceof things of kind B; there can be no difference of sort A without a difference in sort B (though there may be differencesin B without differences in A). For example, it is sometimes thought that ethical properties superveneon physicalones; this meansthat there can be no ethical difference without a corresponding physicaldifferencein things, so the physical determines the ethical; but the same ethical property can be realized in a variety of physical ways.Supervenienceis distinguishedfrom reduction:when to be somethingof sort A actually is nothing but something of sort B (seenrouc TIoNISM).Important in philosophy of mind as well: it is sometimesargued that the mental superveneson the physical but that mental categoriesare not identical with or reducible to any physical categories.Thus, there is no mental difference without a physical difference, but mental categoriesare not equivalentto physicalones. surfo(ogr0mmor srRUCruRE. / sltucluts SeeDEEI7 suREAcE p0r0d0xSuppose your teacher announces that there sulpliso-quiz will be a surprise quiz (i.e., one whose date you can't predict-you'll know when it happens only at the moment it happens) on one of the next five meetingdays of the class. Now, lrou know it can't be day 5, becauseif it hasn't hap-

221

syllogbm pened by the end of day 4, you'd be able to predict then, in advance,that it will happen during day 5, so it wouldn't be a surprise. But it also can't be day 4, because if it hasn't happened by the end of day 3, you already know it won't happen on day 5, so you'd be able to predict it would happen on day 4, so it wouldn't be a surprise. Similarly, you can predict that it won't happen on day 3, or on day 2. So you can predict that it must happen during My l; but therefore it won't be a surprise! So the peneooxlcAl conclusion is that it's logically impossible that there be a surprise quiz' euINE and others have considered some complicated matters in MoDAL Loclc that lead to this paradox. Another version of this, known as the hangman's paradox or executioner's paradox, imagines that someone is sentenced to death, but told that the day on which this execution is to be carried out will be a surprise. syllogismA onnucrlvE cATEcoRIALARGUMENTthat has two For exTERM/PREMISE. premises (see ue;onTMIDDLE/MlNoR ample: No reptiles are sloppy animals; all pigs are sloppy animals; therefore no pigs are rePtiles. Categorizing and explaining valid and invalid syllogisms was a primary con'syllogisLocIC (also called DEDUCTIVE cern of TRADITIoNAL tic logic'). SeaHv porsErICAL sYLLocISM. hypotheticol syllogism, logic The main sort of toctc studied in the twentieth symboli( Loclc, and nruch more Powcentury, replacing TRADITIONAL erful and general than what it replaced. It usessymbols (see Loclc and sYMsoLsoF SEIITENTIAL syMBoLSoF qUANTIFIER Loclc) to representLocIcAL FoRM,and certain of its special areas are closely related to mathematics. symbolsPhilosophers often use symbols to abbreviate logical connections (seesvrrlnol.soF QUANIFIERLOGICand Svt'lnOLS LocIC), and letters to stand for terms or oF SENTENTIAL sentences.Using letters this way is useful when showing the

slmbob ofquontifrr fuic

symhb ofsententhl bgk

ficrm of a complicated argument, or as shorthand when you're going to use them several times, but avoid doing this otherwise. If you merely want to say that a man crossesa street,it will impress no one to say,i{, man M crossesa street

s."

symboh of quontifior logic Predicates (or predicare-lerters) srand for properties (seeeuAt-rry / ATTRTBUTE / pRopERTy):ficr example, suppose 'B' stands for the property of being bald. Constants stand for particular tNotvtouALS.If ,f' stands for Fred, 'Bf' stands for the sentence,'Fred is bald'. Variables stand for any individual thing. They are said to be ,bound' by quantifiers. The two quantifiers are rhe universal quantifier ('all') and the existentialquantifier ('some',i.e., 'at least one'), sometimes symbolizedby 'V' and 'l', respectively. Thus in '(fx)(Bx)', 'x' is a variable bound by the universal quantifieq and the sentencemeans 'Everything is bald'. '(3x)(Bx)' means 'Something is bald'. An alternativeway to symbolize that universal sentenceis '(x)(Bx)'. '(Bx)' all by itself is not a meaningful sentence-it's called an 'open' sentence, because it lacks a quantifier, so the variable is unbound (also called'free'). The equalssign (=) symbolizes identity: 'a = b' means'a is identical with b'. The iota-operator 'r' (sometimes upside-down) symbolizes the DEFINTTE DEscRJprroN, so '(tx)(Bx)= f' means'The one and only thirig thing that is bald is Fred'. '(y!x)' (sometimesread 'E shriek x') means 'There exists exactly one rhing'; so '(y!x)(Bx)' is the false statement that there exists exactly one bald thing. symbols of ssnfsntiol logit ttre symbols used to stand for logical TRLTTH ruNCTIONALconnections between sentencesin snNTENTIALLoclc. The sentencesthemselvesare usually abbreviated by capital letters.The connectivesare: The ampersand(&) and the dot (. ), both commonly used ro stand for'and'. 'P & Q'(alternatively,'P . Q ) is the coNJUNCrtoN of the two conjuncts P and Q, and means 'P and Q'.

225

symmehic / nonsymmeii( / osymmetic

symmetic I nonsymmetk / osymmelrk

The horseshoe(=) and the arrow (+), both commonly used 'P f for if...then'. Q' is a material coNotrtoNAI. rvhoseante'P' and consequentis 'Q; it means 'if P then cedentis Q'. 'P v The wedgeor vee (v) standsfor the inclusive'or'. Q'is or means'P whosedisjunctsare P and Q and a DIsJUNCTIoN

a,.

The tilde or curl (-) standsfor'not'or'is not the casethad' -P is a negation, and means'it is not the casethat P'. Other negation symbolsare'-' and'-r'. The triple-bar (= ) or the double-arrow (<+) stand for'if and 'P =Q' is called a BIcoNDITIoNALor material equivaonly if'. 'P lence, and means if and only if Q. The assertion-signor single-barturnstile (F) was introduced by rnrcr as the sign of a sentencethat was being claimed to be true, and was not merely being mentioned (sazunNrtoN 7 usn). Often it is used to mean that the sentencethat ficllows can be DERIvEDfrom the sentencespreceding it; or, if no sentencesprecede it, that it is a THEoREM. The double-bar turnstile (ts) means that the sentencethat follows is ttlplrcp by the sentencesthat precede it. Thus {P, Q) pn means that it is impossible for P and Q to be true and R be false. If no sentencesprecede the double-bar turnstile, it saysthat what follows is a Loctcet- TRUTH. Characteristicsof certain xEsymmefri( / nonsymmelric / osymmelric LATIoNs.A relation is symmetric if it IMPLIEsthe relation in 'is neverseorder. For example, the sameage as'is symmetric, 'Fred is the same age as Zelda' imbecause the statement plies 'Zelda is the same age as Fred'. But'wants to know' is 'Fred wants to know Zelda' doesn't nonsymmetric, because 'Zelda wants to know Fred' or 'Zelda doesn't imply either 'is taller than' is asymmetric, want to know Fred'. And 'Fred 'Zeldais taller than Fred'implies the falsity of because

sympcthy / ampottry / hnevolence

systems, formol

is taller than Zelda'. Sayingthat a relation is 'commurative' is the sameas sayingit's 'symmetric'. sympofiy / ompothy / benevolence These three rerms are often used synonymously,but sometimesthere is a subtle difference: Sympathy is the act of taking on the same feeling another person has, or of feeling as they would feel. Empa_ thy is a statein which we intimatelyunderstand the feelings of someone else. Benevolenceis having a feeling of kindness toward others. All three of these are sometimes thought to provide a foundation for ethics, as opposed to mere self-interest. sympathy / empathy 'synchronic' synchronic/diochronic means ,ar the same time'; 'diachronic' 'at means different times'. So we can speak of synchronic rDENTrry2-when x (at some time) is y (at that sametime). For example,GeorgeBush in lgg0 is (synchronically) identical with the Presidentof the United Statesin 1990.Or we can speakof diachronic identity: when x (at one time) is identical with y (at another). Fior example, the person you see here and now is (diachronically) identical with the little boy in lg50 in that photograph. tynl0x s8' SEMANTTCS/ SYNTAX/PRAGMATTCS. S eaornt-ncrlc 4. rynfiosis

synthefic Scanunlync

/ sln{THETIc.

sysloms, formol Sa, FoRMALsysrEMs.

228

forGod's existence orgument teleobgiol

ruso tabulu

tdhuloruso (Latin: "blank slate') The term is associated with think that at LocKE; he and others opposed to INNATENTSS birth our minds have no concepts or beliefs in them-they are "blank slates"that will get things "written" on them only after experience. Ionki, Alfred (1902-1983) Polish-born American LoclclAN, best known for his semantictheorv of rRurH.

lol for fil Seertr FoRrAr. loufologySerLocrcAL rRUrH / EALSITY. technFSeePHYSIS / NoMos/ TECHNE. terhnicollerm Seaenr. Ieilhord deftordin, Pierre (1881-1955)FrenchJesuit paleontologist and philosopher whose thought, a mixture of science and religion, received much popular attention. [roughly, 'tay-ar duh shar-da'] teleologicol SeernLeoLocy. for GodtexislenteHere is a common version of teleologicol 0rgumenl this argument: orebuiltin to theirenvironmenl-they things oreodopted Living c o m p l eoxn dc l e v ewt o y st o f u n c l i own e l li n t h e i rs u r t o u n d i n g s . e de r e lbyyt h er o n d o omn dm e c h o n i ' T h i sc o u l n d o th o y eh o p p e nm

729

lshobgy

tempmlstoge

. e ym u s th o v eb e e nc o n s t r u c tf eh di s c o lp r o c e s soefsn o t u r eI h w o yw , i t ht h e i rf u n c t i o n i nsm i n db, yo c r e o l omr u c h m o r ec l e v e r o n dp o w e r f ut hl o nh u m o n sf h; u st h e yo r ee v i d e n cf oer G o d ' s exislence. Ihe usual reply to this argument is that Darwinian EvoLUTIoNARY theory provides a scientific account of how these things arose merely by the mechanical processesof nature, so one need not take the large step of POSITING something unseen and supernatural to accountficr them. teleologyThe study of aims, purposes, or functions. Much of traditional philosophy saw nature, and the universe in general, in teleologicalways.Contemporary philosophy tends not to, but is interested in teleological systems(those described in terms of purposes or functions, as, for example, when scientiststalk about what the pancreasis for, or about the function of individual organisms in the ecosystem):are they nrouctBlE to MECHANISTIC How are they to be systems? identified? Teleologicalethics seesthe aim of actions-good results-as the basic concept, from which the notions of right action and good person can be derived (seealsocoNSEQUENTIALISM). eHENoMENA. lelepothySeepRnnNoRMAL pHENoMENA. SeapeRRNoRMAL lelepoilotion 'Temporal priority' means lemporolHaving to do with time. 'Temporally the characteristic of being earlier in time. 'next is the logic in Temporal time'. proximate' means branch of uonlI- Loctc dealing with sentencesinvolving 'before', 'after', 'never',etc. SearDENrrrY3. lemporolsloge

230

term

lheorelicul enlrlies / constructs

ferm l. Loosely, any group of words. 2. More narrowly, a noun TERM/PREMor noun phrase. Seealso MAJoB//MIDDLE/MINoR ISE

lermof orl Seaenr. lerm,lechnicol seennr. lerlioryquolitiesSaepRt,rlRy/ sECoNDARy/TERTTARy euALrrrES. Tholesof Miletus (640?-?546B.C.) The earliest known Greek philosopher, whose view was that all matter was constituted of one element. water. lheism SeeATHETsM / THETSM / AcNosrrcrsM. theodicyThe study whose aim is to reconcile the goodness of God with the apparent existenceof evil in His creation. See PROBLEM OF EVIL. BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS.

fieology The study of religion, or of religious truths, especially those having to do with God. fieorem In logic, a theorem is a sentencethat can be proven in a logical systemby orruurloN from from the empty set of premises. In some areas of mathematics, howeveL something is called a theorem of a systemwhen it can be derived from the AXIoMsof that system. fheorem, Arrowt Seevorrn's penenox 2. lheolem,DeMorgontseaDEMoRGAN'S LAilS. lheorem, Godelt SaecoopL. fieoreticolenfilies/ conslrusbTheoretical (or hypothetical) entities (or constructs) are thingp we do not sense directly, but whose existence is assumed or argued for by a THEoRy.

231

thoory

Thomos Aquinos,

Atoms and their components are theoretical entities of modern physics.The word 'constructs' suggeststhat such things were constructed-thought up-for the purposes of the theory; that is, they aren't real (seeREALISM). fteoly In an ordinairyw^y of speaking,sayingthar somerhingis 'Just a theory" is a way of saying that it is just a guess or HyporHEstswithout proof. Scientistsand philosophersuse this term differently, however: some theories are extremely well fcunded. Usually 'theory' refers to a systemof interrelated statementsdesigned to explain a variety of phenomena. Sometimesa theory is distinguishedfrom a LA/vor set of lawsinsofar as a theory postulatesthe existenceof rnEo. (The word also has a wide varietv of other, RETICAL ENTITIES. more technical,uses.) fteory0xi0m0ti(Seeexrou/ posruLATE. lheoryof oclion Sd,AcrroN rHEoRY, lheoryof gomesSseGAME. lheoryof knowledge SeerprsrruoLocy. Iheseus, shipof Seessrp oF THESEUS. thingfor-itselfSeeru-rrsELF/FoR-rrsELF. fiing-in-itself Something as it really exists,as opposed to as it is perceived (saaIHTNoMENA A term associated ,/ NoUMENA). with rnNr; in German,'ding an sich'. For a different use (seRtRr's),sreIN-rrsELF / FoR.rrsELF. Thomos Aquinos,St. ( 1225?-l 274) ltalian-born scHolAsrrc theolopHILosopHERS. gian, perhaps the greatest of the MEDIE\AL Member of the Dominican orden worked in Paris and elsewhere. Most central source for the official doctrines of the modiCatholic church. His thought is based on ARISToTLn,

232

Thombfic

lit foff0t

fied to fit Christianity; for him, Aristotle's thought represents philosophical truth, which cannot conf lict with the revealed truths of Christianity. Thus, for example, he provided rational proofs of God's existence(seahis FIVEwAvs), which were adapted from Aristotle. Like Aristotle, he argued that the good life was based on the vIRTUFSof reason, but added that these are subordinate to (though not in conf lict with) the theological,Christian virtues. IhomisticHaving to do with the philosophy of St. ruoues equtnes. 'Thomism' is the name of the doctrines of Aquinas, or of his followers. ['toe-MIST-ic','TOE-mism'] '-', used for the negation; it means 'not' or lilde The symbol 'it's not the casethat'. SeesYMBoLsoF SENTENTIAL LoGIc. Tilli(h,Paul (Johannes)(1886-1965)German-born American theologian and educator; his religious thought, inf luenced has in turn been greatly inf lustrongly by nxIsTnNTIALISM, ential in some contemporary religious circles' spAcEANDTIME. lime,obsoluleSeeABSoLUTE limelrovel Interesting to philosophers because it seems to inand impossibilities. Imagine, for example, volve PARADoxEs that you traveled back to the time when your grandfather was a little boy, and killed him then. This would mean you never would have been born; but then who killed your grandfather? Would you be unable to kill your grandfather? Is time travel thus impossible? DIlil for tqt The strategy used in playing iterated PRISoNER's LEMMAgames (that is, severalgames in a row with the same players) in which one cooperates on the first interaction, and, on subsequentinteractions, doing whatever the other player did in the previous interaction. Psychologicalstudies have shown that this is a very good strategy. The same

hkon

trogody oftho(ommons

strategy except that one defects on the first interaction is called tat ficr tit. loken SeeTYPE/ ToKEN. tokonphyskolhmsaeIYPE/ roKEN fotolufililorionism rorAL urLrrARrANrsM. SaaAvERAGE,/ trocking lhcfiufi S's belief that P is said ro track rhe trurh, roughly speaking, if the belief is true and depends on P the facts that belief is about; that is to say,if P were not the case,S would not believethat P.[t is sometimesargued that a belief constitutesknowledge if it tracks the truth. This perhaps provides an answer to the problems posed by crrTIEREXAMPLES. lroclotus(Latin: "tract") The first word of the title of several 'the Tractatus' philosophical works. When one speaks of nowadays,this usually refers to Ludwig wITrcENsrEtN'sTractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a short but hugely inf luential 'trakbook on thought and language. ['trak-TAV-tus' or TAH-tus'l Logic beficre the twentieth century. Largely controditionollogic cerned with cataloging and describing some of the correct and incorrect fcrms of reasoning, irlcluding the EALLAcIES and the syt.I.octsM. Contemporary syMBoLIc toclc has largely replaced it (except in some logic textbooks). togedyof fie commoniConsider a public resource-a fishing grounds or open land on which cattle can graze. It is in the inter€st of each individual user of this common resource that it not be exploited beyond the level at which it can replenish itself. But supposeyou are a user of this resource. Su reason: your taking as much as you can will not (by itself) lead to the depletion of the resourcebeyond the point of no return. bu can't save it from this depletion if it's headed

231

tmmcendence

lnrdlir / i'msilivt/ nmlmnsiliur

that way merely by restraining lour use. So it's in your interest to take as much as you can. But if everyone reasoned this way and acted accordingly, the resource will be depleted and nobody would get any. This parable represents a general and central problem of ethics and social philosophy- It's DILEI\,IMA. a case of the PRISoNER's l. See TRANscENDEI{T lronscendence / IMMANENT.2. slRtnn's term for a person's plans and hopes for his / her future' ttre sort of thought that attempts to discover the lronscendenlol (perhaps universal and necessary) laws of reason, and to deduce consequences from this about how reality must be understood by any mind. KANT used this sort of reasoningthe "transcendental argument"-to argue in favour of 'c pRI' truths. (see olso TRANSCENDENT oRl METAPHYSICAL / IMMANENT). Eco. ego SeaEMIIRIcAL/ TRANScENDENTAL fronxendenlol 'Tianscendent' means 'higher than, existlronscendenl / immonent ing apart from or beyond . To think of God as transcendent is to think of Him as separate from the ordinary universe, in a different and higher realm. This is contrasted with an 'Ti"anscendend immanent God, who exists in His creation. truths were for KANT those that are unknowable, not the proper business of philosophy; he contrasted these with 'TRANSCENDENTAL' ones, which he tho.rght his transcendental reasoning could discover. Ti'ansitivity is a characteristic lronsilive / nonlronsilive / intronsilive of some relations, such that if A has that relation to B and B to C, then it follows that A has that relation to C. For example, 'taller than' names a transitive relation, becauseif Arnold is taller than Bernie, and Bernie is taller than Clara, 'Is a friend of' it follows that Arnold is taller than Clara. names a nontransitive relation, because it's possible that Arnold is a friend of Bernie, and Bernie is a friend of Clara,

235

fonslotion, indotorminocy of

truftl

but Arnold is not a friend of Clara. 'Is the father of' names an inransitive relation, becauseif Arnold is the father of Bernie, and Bernie is the father of Clara, then it followsthat it's false that Arnold is the father of Clara. fronsfolion, indelerminocy ol SeeTNDETERMTNAcy oF TRANSLATToN. lronslolion, r0di(o1SaeReucnL TRANSLATToN / TNTEReRETATToN. lronsmigrolion SeeRETNCARNATToN. lronsporenl conlexlSeeoeequr / TRANSeARENT. fiiple-borThe symbol ", meaning 'if and only if'. Seasylrsor.sot' SENTENTIAL LOGIC.

lriviol Something that is obvious or insignificant, so not worth saying. Logicians speak of 'trivial' proofs in this sense, Coursesin grammar, RHEToRtc, and LoGIc in t*.trntnrAL universitieswere called 'trivia', though the subjectmatter was not obvious or insignificant (and neither did they study obscure facts about sports records and movie stars); the word here derivesfrom its Latin use,meaning "placewhere three roads meet," and contrastswith 'quadrivia', the other ficur courses in their liberal arts curriculum (arithmetic, geometry,astronomy,music). futh fo define this term is to give a THEoRyof what it is that makesa sentenceor belief true. Here are some maior theories of truth: Correspondence theory of truth: Something is true when it corresponds with the facts. This is a commonsense view, but some philosophers have rejected it because they f ind that the notion of "correspondence' is completely unclear, or that we never have any grounds for thinking that a sentence or belief "corresponds" with external facts-all we have direct contact with is other beliefs.

236

truthfuncbnolity

lruth{utclionolty

theory of truth: The truth of something is the fact Coherence that it fits into a coHERENTser the srr of sentenceswe take to be true ones is that set which fits together best. Pragmatictheory of truth: Something is true when it is useful to believe(everything considered,and in the long run). This doesn't mean that anything you'd like to believe is therefore true: usefulnessis understoodin terms of allowingus to make successfulpredictions, and in general to function well in life. Redund,ancy theoryof truth:'It's true that it's raining' means 'Us raining'. That's all there is to say about no more than 'true'; truth is not a mystery.(There are genuine questions, however,about how we find things out.) Snnantic theory of truth: Truth is a property of certain sentences.Which ones, in general? To give an account of what it is, in a particular language, to be true, one should (in theory) give a list of conditions, one for eachsentencein that language, which obtain IF AND oNLYIF (seeucoNolrIoNAL) that sentenceis true. Thus, part of the list for English (written 'Snow is white' is true if and only in English) would contain: if snow is white. e truth-function is a TNCTIoN whose argutrulh-functionoliry ments and values are Truc and Fabe. Thus, a sentence con'and' is a structed out of two sentencesconnected with truth-function when its truth or falsity depends systematically on the truth or falsity of the comPonent sentences,and on nothing else (it's true whenever both components are true, false otherwise). When a sentence of this sort is a 'and' is said to be used truth-functionally. truth-function, But'and' sometimes isn't used truth-functionally, as when it's used to mean 'and then'. 'Fred went to the store and Fred lost $5' rnight be thought false if Fred lost $5 before he went to the store. It's often a mistake to think of uses of if... then' constructions in English as being truth-functional (seecoN-

237

Itulhofrcoson

truttwohr

DITIoNALfor a discussionof this). 'Thuth-functionallogic' is a synonymfor 'snurEttrlALLoctc', in which truth-functional connectivesare studied, truthof ltoton KANT used 'reason' to refer to our intellect in general, not to'reasoning'in the senseof argumentationor problem-solvingin particular. A truth of reason is a truth that can be discovered by the operations of puREREASoN alone, that is, which does not rely on sense€xperience. Thus this is synonymous with 'a priori truth'. EuprRtcrsrsand RATIoNALISTS disagree on the extent to which truths of reason are possible:empiricists usually limit these ro coNcEpruAL TRUTHS, ANALYTIC statements, and LocIcAL TRUTHS; but rationalists characteristicallybelievethat there are more truths of reason. lruth-tobltA diagram used in sENTENTTAL Locrc to display the systematicway the truth or falsity of a tnurH-FUNcrtoNAL sentencedepends on the truth or falsity of its component sentences.The following truth-table demonstrates the way the truth or falsity of 'P or not-P' depends on the truth or t"trt,y ot t,r .o-p;r.n , t , p o, no,_p

IF IT

Note, in this case, 'P or not.P' is true whatever is the case; thus it is shown, by this rruth-table, to be a LocrcAL TRr.trH. Tiuth-tables can also be used to prove certain other logical claims. fruth,lhoory ol SeeTRUTH. lrufi, vocuousSee\Acuous. lruth-volugTi.uth or falsity. The truth-value of a true sentenceis True; of a false sentence,Folsr.

238

Iurhgmahlne

type /token

TuilngmochinoA generalized and simple form of comPuter thought up by A. M' Turing (English mathematician, l9l2' 1954).This machine, rarely actually built, reads a taPe containing symbols; the symbols cause changes in the machine's internal states, and these changes cause it to erase and print symbols on the tape. It can be Pnoven that this simple machine can do anything any complicated computer can do, so showing how a problem can be solved by a Turing machine provesthat it can be computed. Analyzing a sort of behaviour as a comPlicated series of actions by a Turing machine is giving a calculational explanation of it' Can human behaviour be given a Turing machine analysis? Loclc. furnsfileSeesyr,rsots oF sENTENTIAL twin-eoilhAn imaginary place just like our Earth. This notion has been used by Hilary puTNAMand others in connection with philosophical problems. If on Earth, John loves Mary, then on Twin-earth, John's look-alike (call him Twin-John) loves Twin-Mary. But this shows that Earth and Twin-earth aren't exactly alike, becauseJohn and Twinifohn aren't exactly alike: the former lorresMary, but the latter doesn't-he loves'fwin-Mary instead.Earth andTwin-earth also differ in facts. Are John indexical (saenTuouSTRATIVE / INDEXICAI-) and Twinjohn psychologicallyalike? (saaunruoDoLoGIcAL Do their words have the same meaning? soLIPsISM) lype/ hken Two different things that are both of a certain sort are said to be two tokens of one type. Thus, in the sentence 'The cat is on the mat' there are six word tokens, but only is the five word types. Token physicalism (ret MATERIALISM) with view that each particular mental event is IorNlcel (the same thing as) a particular physical event (e.9., a brain event).Type physicalism adds that each kind of mental event is also a kind of physical event. FUNcrIoNALIsrs tend to be token physicalists but not type physicalists. IDENTITYTHEo' RIsts tend to be type physicalists.

unoxtondod

(yJugo), Miguel de (1864-1936)Spanishphilosopher Unomuno of life and writer. unorypredicaleSeePREDTcATE. voriobleSaesyilasoLSoF euANrrFrERLocrc. unbound principleAn important principle of modern physics.It uncerloinfy saysthat it is impossible to know both the position and the momentum of a basicatomic particle at once, and is associated with the view that the behaviour of these particles is not causallydetermined; it may show that DETERMINTSM is not true, at leastin the realm of the very small. Also called the Heisenberg uncertainty (or indeterminacy) principle, after the man who propounded it, \^ftrner Heisenberg (see scrENTrsTs). probobilityseepRonnuLrry. unconditionol undordolsrminolion Something is underdetermined by a set of conditions if these conditions don't determine how (or that) it will exist. Thus, the striking of a match underdetermines its lighting (becauseit's not sufficient-sz NECESSARy/ sUFFILanCIENT CONDTTTONS). compare OVERDETERMTNATTON. guage behaviour underdetermines a translation manual, since different equally adequatetranslation manuals can be constructed for that behaviour (secITDETTRMINACY oFTRANSLATTON). uncilondodSaa:nxrnNsroN/ INTENstoN3, suBSTANcE.

210

principle of ofnolure, unilormily

univerob

oF NAoF UNIF9RMITY oI SeePRINCIPLE of nolure,pilnciple uniformity TURE. unionof sels SeaINTERsECTIoN/ UNIoN oF SETS: unintelligibility SeeINTELLIGIBTLTTv / UNINTELLIGIBILITY.

unilsel Seasnr. cAUSAoF UNIvER5AL principle of SeePRINCIPLE uniVelsolCousolion, TION. frue of a particular action when it can be uniuniversolizabilifi versalized-chat is, when the rule behind it can consistently or reasonably be conceived of as a universal law (one that could apply to everyone). The test of consistent universalizability is roughly what KANT thought to be the test of ethically right action (seecATEGoRIcALIMPERAUvn)'The test of practical universalizability (not Kant's test) is perhaps what we apply when we think morally about some action by evaluating the consequencesif everyone were to do that sort of thing. Loclc. quonlifierSeasyMeol-soF QUANTIFIER universol These are'abstract" things-beauty, courage,redness, universols etc. The problem of universals is, at core, the problem of whether these exist in the external world-whether they are real things, or merely the results of our classification (nonexistent if there were no minds). Thus, one may be a RneLts'r or anti-realistabout universals.PLATO'stheory of fiorms (sea FoRMs)is an early and well-known realism about PLATONIC are associated and the EMPIRICISTS universals: ARISTOTLE with anti-realism. Nominalism is a variety of anti-realism that claims that such abstractions are menely the result of the wav we talk. Seealso NATURALKIND.

univorss ofdkouns

ufiliforhnism

univortoof distourssSometimes it is convenienr while doing Loclc to restrict the sETof things one is talking about in a series of statements;one then specifiesa "universeof discourse" for those statements.Given the restriction of the universe of discourseto cats, the statement'Everything is fuzzy' means 'All cats are fuzzy'. An unrestricted universe of discourseis the whole universe. movot [t is inconceivable to some philosophers that unmovod every event has a cause, proceeding back infinitely; thus they argue for the edstence of a flRst CAUSE, an unmoved mover-that which started up the whole seriesof causesthat eventuatedin what's happening today.This is usually identified with God. nntsrorlE thought of the unmoved mover as the ultimate purpose of everything,which draws the imperfect to itself. SeealsoFIRsrcAUsEARcUMENT. UnsoundSaaaRcur4nNr. Uso Seat*lBNtlON/ USE. ufile SeaurrlrrY, ufilifolianhm Utilitarians think that the moral worth of any action can be measured by the extent to which it provides valued results to the greatestnumber of people. Utilitarians usually hold that resultsare valuablewhen they bring pleasure or happiness.Thus, their general moral principle is the 'greatesthappiness principle of tntlltv, also known as the principle': 'Act so as to produce the greatest happiness for the greatestnumber of people."An important distinction is between act and rule utilitarians: the ficrmer think that moral thinking evaluates each act, in context, separately; the latter argue that morality is concerned with general rules for action, and that a particular action is right if it is permitted or recommended by a moral code whose accep tance in the agent's society would maximize utility, even if

212

ulilily

utoph / dystopn

that act in particular does not. The famous classical utilitari ans are t,ttLLand BENTHAM. Ufilily As used by philosophers (and economists), this term doesn't refer merely to usefulness(or to the electricity company). It means the quantity of value or desirability someit ittg has. Often it is thought that the utility of something .", b. given a number (the quantity of "utiles" is possesses), and utilities can be compared or added. seealso UTILITARIANISM ANd NXYNCIED UTILITY

cALcuLUs. ulilitycolculusSeeFELICIFIC of se, uTILITARIANISM. ufilifyprinciple utopio/ dystopioA uropia is a (usually imaginary) ideal society; a dystopia is the reverse,a (usually imaginary) bad society'

inlrinslc instrumonhl/ volus, axtrinsic . finhennt/

v0tuousMeans'empty',In toctc, the statement'AllAs are B's' is understood to be equivalentto 'For all x, if x is an A then x is a B', Supposethere aren't any As at all, Then it's always false that any x is an A: but this makesthe coxntrtoNAt-, 'if x is an A then x is a B'true (unlessone, non-standardly, takes the conditional to have sxrsrENTrALrMpoRT).It follows, then, that if there aren't any As, all statementsof the fiorrn 'All As are B's' are true. So, for example, becausethere aren't any unicorns, the statement'All unicorns are mammals' is true, and so is 'All unicorns are non-mammals.' This strangekind of truth is called vacuoustruth. V0gUOneSS In its ordinary usage,a vague statementor term is one not clearly expressed,or imprecise.Vaguenessin this sense differs from ambiguity (seargurvocATloN): an ambiguous statement or term has two or more meanings that may each be perfectly clear:what is unclear is which one is meant. In a more technical logicians'sense,a term is vague whose application involvesborderline cases:thus, 'tall' is vague, becausethere are some people who are clearly tall, some clearly not tall, and some who are in a borderline area, and are not clearly tall or not tall. Consideration about vague terms leads to interesting problems in loctc (.sae soRrrEs). volidorgumcll SaeARcuMENr. volidiry SeaeRcurrlnNr. volur,intinsicfinheront/instrumonhl/ oxlrinsi(. See HERANTIINSTRUMENTAL/ EXTRINSIC

211

rNrRrNSrc/rN-

Venn diogmm

volue ofofunction volue ofo funclionSaaruNcrroN. Locrc. oFeuANTIFIER voriobleSeesvNaeoLs vol,broin ino SeeBRAIN rNA \AT. vee The symbol

meaning

'or'.

Se, syMBoLS oF SENTENTIAL

LOCIC.

veilof ignoronce .fohn RAivLSargued that.;usrlce might be conceived of as (roughly) what everyone would agree to be the rules of society (seeako soctAt- coNTRAcr). These rules would not necessarilyguarantee each person an equal share of everything, and if you knew that you would be relatively disadvantaged under these rules, you wouldn't agree to them. Thus, he argued that the agreementbe conceivedas happeningunder a "veil of ignorance": that you not know in advance which place in the society you would hold. Under these conditions you'd want to make sure that the worst-off (who might turn out to be you) wasn't in a really terrible position. LocIC, and VenndiogromDiagrams used to illustrate QUANTIFIER to do logical proofs. They use interlocking circles to represent sErs; areasof these circlesare shadedto assertemptiness,and x's are inserted to assert the existenceof one or more thing. Thus, one diagrams: 'All pigsare slobs' Pigs

Slobs

245

Vmn dhgmm

Vmn diogmm 'No Pigsare slobs'

Pigs

Slobs

,l

'Somepigsare slobs'

Pigs

Slobs

x

One can use three interlocking circles to prove the validity of a SYLLoGISM. Venn diagrams are named after their inventer,JohnVenn (British logician, 1834-1923);he adaptedthem from those invented by Leonhard Euler (Swiss logician, 1707-1783;['oil-er']. Euler diagrams differ chief ly in that Euler thought that'All' and'No' statementshad rxtsrnNTlAL IMpoRT;so an Euler diagram for'All pigs are slobs' might look like this:

Pigs

246

rir, %t

Slobs

verbold'rpute

verifiobility crihrion

verboldispuleA disagreement that turns out to be merely a matter of words. The dispute about the answer to the old clichd question whether a tree that falls in the forest where nobody hears it makes any sound may be just verbal: the answer depends wholly upon whether you mean by'sound' an air vibration capable of being heard, or an air vibration actually heard. Verbal disputes aren't real disputes, and are uninteresting unless they reveal significant ambiguities in word use. 'truthful'. Its most frequent use concerns the veridicolMeans "truth" or "falsity' of perceptions: an ILLUSIONis a falsenon-veridica l-pe rception. verifi0bililyA statementis verifiable when there exist (at least lN procedures that would show that it is true or PRINCIPLE) false. 'In principle'is added here becausethere do not need to be proceduresactually availablenow or even as long as we can imagine what they are. So, ficr example, the statement 'There is a planet on a star seven million light years from here' is unverifiable given our current (and perhaps future) technology, but because we can imagine what would be evidence for its truth or falsity, it is verifiable, in principle. verifiobility criterionl. The verifiability cRrrERJoNfor meaningfulness was advocated by LocIcAL poslTlvlsrs; it said that was meaningless. any statement that was not VERIFIABLE Thus, for example, since it might be thought impossible to find evidence firr or against the statement 'God loves us', they would count this statement not as false (or as true), but as meaningless. EMpIRIcIsrsin general tend to share this position. Some logical positivists used this criterion to argue that statementsin urrepHystcs and ethics were meaningless. 2. Some logical positivists also thought that verification provided the answer to questions about meaning. The verification theory of meaning saysthat the meaning of a sentence can be specified by giving its procedures of verification.

21t

vodfkotion

vifolism

yolifl(olionSaacoNnnMATroN,/DrscoN!'tRMAt'roN / vERtrrcATroN / nALSIFTCATTON., vicious tittlg SeacrRcuLARREAsoNrNc,/ DEt'lNrrroN. vicious infinitsr0grossseerNlrNrrERr,cRESS, Vico,Giambattista (1668-1744) Italian philosopher mainly known for his views on history,which he sawas a divinell' guided developmentof civilizationsalong certain regular Patterns. (ircle A group of philosopherswho met in Vienna and Vienno elsewhereduring the 1920sand 30s. It includeclscllllcK, cARNAp, and cODEL, and was inf luenced deeply by Reacting against the CONTINENTAL ways of WITTGENSTEIN. thought that surrounded them, these philosophers produced the groundwork of t-octcRl postrrvtsM and wcre deeply inf luential on future ANALyrrc pHllosopny, especially in Britain and the U.S.,where many members moved during the rise of Hitler. virluo Moral excellenceor uprightness;the state of character of a morally worthwhileperson.Philosophersspeakof the 'virtues': those character traits that they think make for a good person. Some philosophers think that virtue is the central notion in ethics;this line of thinking derivesperhaps from RnlstorLE. Virtue ethics concentrateson virtues. vitolismWhat makes up a living thing? One could argue that living things are just certain sorts of combinations of nonin the PROPERTY living parts; life is just an EMERGENT 'emergent'.Vitalists, however, stronger or weaker senseof argue that living things contain a special(and irreduciblesort of thing (sometimes called, in sre REDUCnoNtsttl) 'ay'lah veeFrench, the'ilan uital'-"vrtal impulse" [roughly tal']) contained by no non-living things, and which drives is a well-known vitalist. BERGSON EVOLUTION.

?48

potodox voter's

v0id NoTHING. void .See

volifionThe exercise of the will-the Power of decidin$, destring, or wanting. WRITERS. SEE VOII0ITE voler!porodoxThe ambiguous name of two different PARADoxES:l. In elections with many voters, the odds are extremely small that your vote will make any difference to who wins, so even if you care very much who wins, there's no point in voting. This is true also of every other potential voter.So it seemsto follow that there's no point in anyone's voting. 2. Suppose there are three people (call them 1, 2, and 3) who disagree about the relativevalue of three actions (call them A, B, and C): P e r s oI np r e f e rAst o B ,o n dB f o C . P e r s o2np r e f e rBst o [ , o n dI t o A . P e r s o3np r e f e rCst o A , o n dA t o B . Suppose they agree to decide on what to do by voting on these actions two at a time. First they vote on A and B: 1 and 3 vote firr A. Next they vote on B and C: I and 2 vote firr B. Last they vote on C and A: 2 and 3 vote for C. Each "pairwise" decision has a majority favourablevote; yet this clearly does not decide matters.This example showsthe surprising result that in certain caseseven a majority vote of a group does not give a clear answer about what to do. This is also known as the 'Condorcet paradox', named ficr the Marquis de coNooRcnr who wrote about it. It has been generalized by Kenneth Arrow (b. f921) into the central problem of socteL cHoICE THEoRY.Arrow's Theorem shows that there is no rule for social choice that satisfies certain apparently minimal conditions fior rationality and DEMocRAcY.

?t9

mmntdGnillblllly

wrfifomrd formub

WX,YZ worrontod ostorfiblliryThe characteristican AssERTror.r has when it is JUSTIFIED in the proper way. Statements,for example in science, have warranted assertibility when they are cor:lFIRMEDby the appropriate scientific procedures. It seems that a statement with this characteristic might nevertheless be false, but some philosophers of science think that warranted assertibility is really all that we mean by 'truth' in science;this is a kind of scientific antirealism (seeREALTSM / ANTTREALTSM), wox0x0mpl0See"aett OFwAx" EXAMPLE. Waboffilox ScascrtrNrrsrs. wodga16. symbol 'r/, meaning 'or'. Scesyunots oFsENTENTIAL LOGIC. well-formed folmulo In addition to rules for going from one sentence to another, Loctcs give rules for being a sentence (as opposed to a bit of nonsense).These are called 'formation rules', and a sent€nceformed in conformity with these rules is called a'well-formed sentence'or'well-formed FoRMULA', Expressions not in conficrmity are sometimes called 'illformed'. Thus, by application of the firrmation rules of a 'P common form of SENTENTIAL Locrc, we can discover that &' is ill-fcrmed, nonsense,not a sentence(because'&' must connect two sentences).'\,tftll-formed formula' is sometimes 'wff' 'wiff' or 'woof']. abbreviated [pronor,rnced

250

Ulehourtwng

lTltlgonslsh,

(German: 'world view') A very general concep Weltonschouung tion of the way things are. ['velt-ahn-show-oong',where 'show' rhymes with'now'] wlf SeawrLL-roRMEDFoRMULA. AKred North (1861-1947)English (Cambridge)phi Whiteheod, the first losopher and logician; developed, with RUSSELL, modern systematic sYMBoLIc Loclc; known also for his "process" philosophy, in which change, not substance, is fundamental, and in which purpose is a feature of the external world. will, free .SeerRrn wrLL. wrLL. will,generolSeeGENERAL Williomof ()ckhom(or Occam) Seeocrn.r,u willto believeWilliam.lAMEs argued that certain beliefs ane acceptable despite the lack of good evidence for them, when they are good for us psychologically and help us get on in the world. These are the onesjustified by our will to believe them; James even argued that these would therefore be true. See'pragmatic theory of truth' in tRurrt. willto powerThe will to porryeris the disposition to superioritypower over others, but also over one's self. NIETZSCHE's term; he thought that this was the character trait that marked the best sort of person. Wilfgenslein, Ludwig $osefJohann) (1889-1951)Austrian-born, he did much of his work in England, where his thought was greatly inf luential on recent philosophical trends, especially on LocrcAL posrrrvrsM and oRottrARyLANGUAcEpHrLoSoPHY.He engaged many of the technical problems of contemporary philosophy, but is best known for his view of philosophy as therapy, designed to cure puzzles and confu-

251

Wolff,

leno(ofCfium)

sions resulting from misunderstandingsof the function of parts of language; thus, he can be seen as the father of oRDtNARy LANcUAcEpHtLosopHv.['VIT-gen.stine'or, more correctly,'-shtine'] f{offf, Christian Freiherr von (1679-1754)German ENLTcHTEN. MENTphilosopher, TtrilofsSome authors known primarily as writers of fiction, drama, essayg, etc., deservemention in here becauseof the philosophical importance of their thoughts expressedin or straightforwardly philosophical writing. They iT:i*t Dante (Alighieri) (original surname Durante) (1265-1321) Italian poet Dostoyevsky,Fyodor Mihailovich (also spelled in a variety of other ways)( 182l-1881) Russiannovelist Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1803-1882)American essayist/ Poet Erasmus,Desiderius(original name Geert Geerts)(1466?1536) Dutch theologian, scholar German poet / Goethe,JohannWolfgangvon (1749-1832) dramatist Frenchessayist Montaigne,Michel (Eyquem)(1533-1592) Montesquieu,Baron (de la Brbde et) de (title of Charlesde Frenchwriter,/ political theorist Secondat)(1689-1755) Voltaire (pen name of FrangoisMarie Arouet) (1694-1778) French dramatist / poet/ historian yolo The Hindu systemfor exerciseand meditation designed to produce self
252

offleo Zeno

porodol Ieno's

Greek philosophel Zenoof [leo (5th century B.C.) PRE-socRArtc student of reRunNIDEs,best known ficr his PARADoxES, which seemed to disprove the existenceof motion. ZenoiporodoxImagine a tortoise in a race with speedsterAchil' les, with the tortoise starting closer to the goal line. When Achilles has reached the point at which the tortoise started, the tortoise has gone a little further; when Achilles reaches this further point, the tortoise has advanced again; and so on. The ABsuRDconclusion is that Achilles will never pass the tortoise. zENo oF ELEA,who produced this PARADox, concluded that this shows there is no such thing as motion; but there are other waysof dealing with the paradox.