The Japanese Industrial Economy
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What was the role of ‘culture’ in the Japanese economic success? Why did Japan ...
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The Japanese Industrial Economy
• • •
What was the role of ‘culture’ in the Japanese economic success? Why did Japan industrialise when China did not? Of all possible nations, why was it Japan that most spectacularly utilised the technologies of the West to rise to economic superpower status?
This ground-breaking book reveals that the way to understand the Japanese industrial experience is to focus on the resources that the nation brought to bear on the task of responding positively – and in a sustained manner – to the superior technologies and institutions of the industrialised world, from the late nineteenth century. Japan’s economic history is one of technology transfer and industrial transformation under conditions of relative industrial backwardness. Ian Inkster argues that the history of the Japanese economy cannot be understood without a theory of cultural engineering – a process whereby the industrialising elite managed cultural attributes specific to Japan in order to modernise the economy. This book reveals that the manipulation of culture was of more importance than the character of the original cultural stock in explaining Japan’s modern industrialisation. Thus the features of private enterprise culture that are so often isolated as keys to the nation’s historical competitiveness may have been only temporary reflections of this wider process of cultural engineering: a necessary input into the programme of technology transfer and late development. Unlike many books on the Japanese economy which are either research-based monographs for the student or specialist, or directed at businesses and the media, this book provides a highly reliable guide to the industrial economy and history which is accessible, and covers a wide area; it will be of great interest to those involved in Asian studies, Japan studies, economists and professionals in business and enterprise culture. Ian Inkster is Research Professor of International History at Nottingham Trent University, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and editor of the journal History of Technology. His books include Clever City (1991), Science and Technology in History (1991), and Technology and Industrialisation (1998). This book is the sister volume to Japanese Industrialisation: Historical and Cultural Perspectives, also published by Routledge in 2001.
Routledge Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia 1 The Changing Capital Markets of East Asia Edited by Ky Cao 2 Financial Reform in China Edited by On Kit Tam 3 Women and Industrialization in Asia Edited by Susan Horton 4 Japan’s Trade Policy Action or Reaction? Yumiko Mikanagi 5 The Japanese Election System Three Analytical Perspectives Junichiro Wada 6 The Economics of the Latecomers Catching-up, Technology Transfer and Institutions in Germany, Japan and South Korea Jang-Sup Shin 7 Industrialization in Malaysia Import Substitution and Infant Industry Performance Rokiah Alavi 8 Economic Development in Twentieth Century East Asia The International Context Edited by Aiko Ikeo 9 The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia Contending Perspectives Edited by Ian Chalmers and Vedi Hadiz 10 Studies in the Economic History of the Pacific Rim Edited by Sally M. Miller, A. J. H. Latham and Dennis O. Flynn 11 Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia Vedi R. Hadiz 12 The Japanese Foreign Exchange Market Beate Reszat 13 Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Asian Countries Edited by Stefan Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Yung Chul Park 14 Chinese Firms and Technology in the Reform Era Yizheng Shi 15 Japanese Views on Economic Development Diverse Paths to the Market Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno 16 Technological Capabilities and Export Success in Asia Edited by Dieter Ernst, Tom Ganiatsos and Lynn Mytelka
17 Trade and Investment in China The European Experience Edited by Roger Strange, Jim Slater and Limin Wang 18 Technology and Innovation in Japan Policy and Management for the 21st Century Edited by Martin Hemmert and Christian Oberländer 19 Trade Policy Issues in Asian Development Prema-chandra Athukorala 20 Economic Integration in the Asia Pacific Region Ippei Yamazawa 21 Japan’s War Economy Edited by Erich Pauer 22 Industrial Technology Development in Malaysia Industry and Firm Studies Edited by K. S. Jomo, Greg Felker and Rajah Rasiah 23 Technology, Competitiveness and the State Malaysia’s Industrial Technology Policies Edited by K. S. Jomo and Greg Felker 24 Corporatism and Korean Capitalism Edited by Dennis L. McNamara 25 Japanese Science Samuel Coleman 26 Capital and Labour in Japan The Functions of Two Factor Markets Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Atsuhiro Taki 27 Asia Pacific Dynamism 1550–2000 Edited by A. J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu 28 The Political Economy of Development and Environment in Korea Jae-Yong Chung and Richard J. Kirkby 29 Japanese Economics and Economists since 1945 Edited by Aiko Ikeo 30 China’s Entry into the World Trade Organisation Edited by Peter Drysdale and Ligang Song 31 Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre Emergence and Development 1945–1965 Catherine R. Schenk 32 Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implication Edited by Christopher Findlay and Tony Warren 33 The Japanese Industrial Economy Late Development and Cultural Causation Ian Inkster
The Japanese Industrial Economy Late development and cultural causation Ian Inkster
London and New York
First published 2001 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 2001 Ian Inkster All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Inkster, Ian The Japanese industrial economy: a technological and institutional analysis / Ian Inkster. p. cm. – (Routledge studies in the growth economies of Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Industrialization–Japan. 2. Japan–Economic conditions. 3. Japan–Social conditions–1868– I. Title. II. Series. HC462 .I574 2001 330.952–dc21 ISBN 0–415–25001–3 (Print Edition) ISBN 0-203-47204-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-78028-0 (Adobe eReader Format)
2001019970
Contents
Illustrations Preface and acknowledgements 1
Introduction: achievements and outcomes
vii ix 1
Modelling Japan? 1 Preludes to the twentieth century 2 The short twentieth century 1912–71 10 Japan in the modern climacteric 1971–2001 14 Honing an argument 20 Analysing the industrial economy 21 2
Interpretations of Japan
23
Late development 23 Technology transfer 24 The social and the economic 25 Features of Japanese industrial history 26 Interpretations and perspectives 30 Wider contexts 32 The cake of custom and cultural engineering 32 3
Maturity: social problems of Japanese capitalism Introduction 35 Measures of Japanese society 35 The social underpinnings of fast growth 41 Underbelly or endaka society? 46 Traditions and modernities: the limits to convergence theory 49 Limits to Japanese growth 52
35
vi Contents 4
Forging explanations: technology
56
On modes of explanation 56 The conditions of technology transfer 58 Japanese exceptionalism: the primacy of technology transfer 63 Catch-up, culture and the creativity debate 75 Summary and conclusions 79 5
Cultural engineering
82
Problems of the cultural stock argument 82 Tokugawa and beyond: aspects of Japanese history 86 Fundamentals: the Meiji case 89 The avoidance system: on minimising cultural resistance 95 Summary and conclusions 101 6
The institutions of late development: private enterprise
105
Enterprise culture again 105 Culture and enterprise 106 Culture, ideology and institutions: the Masuda model 107 Late development: increasing agency 112 Late development in the endaka laboratory 113 Cultural studies: tacit knowledge and obligational drag 114 Summary and conclusions 117 7
Nationalism and globalism: Japan in world context
120
On being exceptional: global history 120 The Asian context: China, Korea and Japan 123 Exceptionalism as accumulative causation 126 History continuing 128 Notes Bibliography Index
131 139 154
Illustrations
Map Japan in East Asia
xii
Table Table 1 Public sector human capital formation 1868–1912
93
Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
Technology transfer, adaptation and indigenous capacity The cultural resources of bushido Cultural resources and Japanese industrialisation Technological change: types and resources of resistance
62 89 94 96
Preface and acknowledgements
‘There come no other foreigners here. All the men here are mine.’ So declaimed the Emperor of Japan to Will Adams of Gillingham, Kent, in the opening years of the seventeenth century. To an extent the point was well made. Prior to the nineteenth century, Japan was an isolated, primarily agrarian nation about which very little was known. If to Western observers Korea appeared as a hermit nation, then Japan was a sort of seminary, from which inmates were periodically exuded and towards which emissaries at times journeyed. Both movements of men caused more confusion than enlightenment. Even the forced intrusion of the American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 with his fleet of ‘black ships’ was not in itself sufficient to open up understanding or fruitful commercial relations. However, in contrast to the relative sluggishness of economic change in the long Tokugawa years, during the late nineteenth century Japan did emerge as an industrial nation. What was it that made Japan the Asian industrial success at a time when China was in the process of being carved up by the Western powers, when progressive opinion in Russia was yet struggling under the weight of Tsardom and when India was suffering the continued iniquities of British rule? Some historians have answered such a question by pointing to the role of economic change in the Tokugawa era (1603–1868) as a necessary prerequisite to industrialisation in the Meiji years (1868–1912). A large revisionist literature has in the last thirty years or so focused on the demographic, social and economic dynamics of the years prior to the 1868 Meiji Restoration as the essential key to any interpretation of Japan’s industrial success. This approach confronts an older and often Marxist tradition which stressed the backwardness, legalism and exploitative character of the Tokugawa regime, with frequent use of the term ‘feudal’ for general descriptions of its structures, attitudes and institutions. In his earlier work Kazushi Ohkawa, the most famous of Japanese economic historians, stressed such economic backwardness and the relative suddeness of late development. Because the progressive changes in the Tokugawa years were merely ‘limited regional phenomena’ (Ohkawa 1964: 166), modern economic growth began in the Meiji years. In the present book we illustrate major dynamics and discontinuities in Japan’s industrial development, which at key points were associated with the changing character of the nation’s interactions with the West. Furthermore, we identify several
x Preface and acknowledgements short periods in which the exploitation of technological and other opportunities inhering in such interactions depended upon political rather than commercial responses, upon expensive and imaginative investments in institutions and in human capital rather than large physical investments, and upon a deliberate process of cultural engineering as against a progressive momentum generated unproblematically from an identifiable set of unique cultural attributes. So this book does not fall easily into either the economist or the culturalist camp. In global terms, interactions between Western modernity and more isolated traditions normally failed. Cases such as those of Egypt or India or Turkey, held up by Western interests in early Meiji Japan as great exemplars of progress through new commercial, political, cognitive or technological interactions, had by the end of the Meiji era generated expensive failures and social traumas, rather than sustained industrialisations. In most cases the economic costs of technological modernisation created social costs that broke the reigns of progressive or modernising elites. In most cases technological interactions were merely a part of a wider process of Western imperial expansion, the agencies and institutions of which ultimately swamped indigenous authority and reduced or removed the economic sovereignty of existing regimes or power structures. In most cases political breakdown in late industrialising regions put an end to the very complex processes of sustained industrial modernisation based on imported Western ideas, technologies and institutions. Japan survived late industrialisation. Our argument is that Japan did so by sustaining industrial momentum through crisis periods such as the 1870s and 1880s, or the 1930s and 1950s, which involved adjustments and expensive institutional innovations that certainly impacted on the subsequent longer periods of sustained industrialisation, but in the main did so without causing halts or reversals of fortune. Cumulatively, this succession of critical and organic ages generated a long-term process of industrialisation, the major characteristics of which were a peculiar mixture of endogenous assets, political agency and institutional innovations and borrowings. In Japanese industrial history reactions to new conditions, and particularly creative responses to changed international circumstances and interactions, seem to explain as much about the ultimate long term as do such factors as geographical location, the possession of cheap and malleable labour or the achievement of high levels of physical capital investment. Of course, such response drew upon existing assets of all sorts, but the existence of those assets is never a sufficient explanation of the success or character of such response. The agencies, institutions and technologies of the critical ages of Japanese industrialisation are perhaps better examined in terms of the exact character of interactions between Japan and the West and the ability of the industrialising elite to promote and sustain industrialisation at relatively low political cost in the short term. Despite the exigencies of very late development, the traumas of the 1870s (opening up to the West) or of 1930 (economic depression brought about by failures of finance and production in the West) or 1945 (defeat in warfare at the hands of the two major capitalist nations of the West) did not actually lead to wholesale revolution or irretrievable industrial breakdown.
Preface and acknowledgements xi Some common illusions ought to be dispelled at the outset. Japan is not small but very large, with a present population of around 125 million: only China, India, the United States, Russia, Indonesia and Brazil are bigger. In area Japan is not as small as is often imagined, its area of 378,000 sq km is greater than that of the other recent ‘miracle’ economy of West Germany or of Poland, Malaysia or the Philippines. The climate is not relentlessly monsoonal – the temperate climate is mostly similar to that of the east coast of the United States. Nor is the nation isolated somewhere in the middle of the Pacific or an appendage of China. As our map indicates, the Japanese archipelago of four main islands – Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu – is strung out alongside and in very close proximity to China, Russia, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. Difficult terrain does cause a singular density of population, greater than that of major industrial competitors such as Germany or the UK, but less than that of such newly emergent economies as Taiwan or the Republic of Korea. The savings rate remains high, but this does not mean that Japanese households fail to purchase the goods of global capitalism: over 98 per cent of households own a washing machine, a colour television set, a vacuum cleaner and a refrigerator, and over 75 per cent own cameras, microwave ovens, cars and videocassette recorders. Again, the historical focus on economic growth has led to a lack of public amenities, but the Japanese have been prepared to make up for this when possible by private insurance initiatives: the number of physicians and hospital beds per head compares favourably with the figures for European nations, and only Sweden outcompetes Japan in the latter regard. Despite much periodic antiJapanese clamour in the Western press, there is little good evidence that the export of Japanese manufactures has caused Japanese industrial success at the expense of others. Economic growth has not come about through the massive expansion of the economy overseas – indeed most of the outward investments of the economy have occurred since 1985 when internal growth has slowed. Nor any longer is Japan a hermit nation: by the early 1990s some twelve million Japanese were travelling overseas annually, with North America, Europe and Oceania outcompeting Asia as destinations. Nor are the Japanese in any way religious fanatics, wedded to a singular cosmic ethos, for by the last decade of the old millennium the major religions boasted a total followership of around 214 million, far greater than the total population. This, together with the recent popularity of a great host of new religions, suggests that the Japanese continue to show variable allegiance to a variety of doctrines in the hope that some combination might satisfy their individual moral dilemmas. In this they are surely not unlike many Europeans or Americans. In short it is difficult to point to any overriding characteristic of Japan that either ‘explains’ its tremendous economic history or defines it as any more a singular nation than the United States or France or Indonesia. I have tried to make this text accessible and as unambiguous as an academic approach may allow. Notes and references have been kept to a minimum although the bibliography should be complete enough for most purposes. To help with the alphabetical listing and with the index, Japanese names in the text are rendered in Western fashion, with the family name coming second. With some exceptions the
xii Preface and acknowledgements
Japan in East Asia
sources are English, but I would once more like to thank Jerry Liu for assistance with Chinese materials. As with my other recent book for Routledge, Japanese Industrialisation 1603–2000, I have benefited from the critical awareness and general scepticism of my students in Australia, Taiwan and Britain from 1973. I would also like to thank my various editors at Routledge who, amongst other astute decisions, recognised the possibility of creating two workable texts out of one unmanageable manuscript. Finally, I would for the first time like to thank properly that great Japan scholar, Sidney Crawcour of the ANU, Canberra, for so strongly encouraging my research interests in Meiji Japan during 1976, when I delivered my first interpretative paper on Japanese industrialisation.
1
Introduction Achievements and outcomes
Modelling Japan? Prior to those quite recent social, commercial and industrial changes in Japan which have seemed to detract from its historical trajectory of ultra-fast growth, the nation was lauded as the best case of capitalist achievement. During the 1970s and 1980s a heady economic performance in the face of global recessions ensured that Japan became a focus of non-Marxist commentary, well-expressed in the writings of Ezra Vogel and Herman Kahn (Vogel 1979, Kahn 1973). Academic experts were at all times strongly involved in informing this general enthusiasm. At one point Ichiro Nakayama claimed that, in considering the potential development of poor twentieth-century nations, ‘Japan’s case is to be regarded as a model. She was able to transform herself almost overnight from her previous condition of retarded agrarian capitalism to a modern industrial country’ (Nakayama 1967: 171). Similarly adamant was the claim of Sumihito Hirai when he generalised that ‘there are universal conditions which must be satisfied in order for there to be development. Japan’s situation in the early Meiji era and also the gradual process of its development may serve as one formula for getting this important task underway’ (Hirai 1978: 16). For K. M. Panikkar the acquisition by Japan of Western science and technology at an early stage provided a model for the analysis of the later economic weaknesses of India, China and South-East Asia (Panikkar 1953). But the notion of Japan as exemplary is far from new. By the 1890s Japan had completed a first period of modern industrialisation based on textiles and was about to enter a second season of change centred on the heavier, military industries. The nation had established a somewhat more rational fiscal system, was gaining economic autonomy and, indeed, the beginnings of an empire in Asia. At just this time, previously sporadic Western accounts of Japan made way for a sharper focus on economic achievement, especially as centred on new industries, novel institutions and the use of introduced Western technologies. By this time the oyatoi, the Western experts employed in Japan to install machinery and modernise education, were returning, and added their own more certain opinions to those of writers and intellectuals whose views were often less personal but less informed. In particular, the scientific and technical journals of the West, whose editors and contributors were for ever debating the causes of supposed industrial stagnation or decline in the older industrialisers, applauded the unexpected vitality of Japan. Following the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
2 The Japanese industrial economy Board of Trade Journal, the Bulletin of the Department of Labour and the distinguished Consular Reports of both Britain and the USA, such eminent periodicals as The Engineer, Engineering, Chemical News and Nature were crammed with more or less informed accounts of Japanese society, culture and economic structure, including explanations as to why Japan ‘left China behind’, why the government was successful in its mining and manufacturing ventures, and why education and the institutions of scientific and technical training and diffusion were at the heart of the matter. Japan was being ‘modelled’, and from Harper’s Weekly to the London Times the non-technical ‘serious’ press was informedly clamorous. For every ‘special correspondent’ who appeared in Tokyo or Yokohama there were more than two explanations of the industrial rise of Japan. A particular feature of this early modelling of Japan was the attention given to the roles of the state and the array of associated new institutions in Meiji Japan. By 1903, with a successful war against China behind it, Japan became a model for emulation. In a highly publicised speech of September of that year, entitled ‘The Influence of Brain Power in History’, the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir Norman Lockyer, taunted his fellow experts with the query: ‘shall we follow Japan and thoroughly prepare by “intellectual” effort for the industrial struggle that lies before us?’ (Simmons 1904: 168). By June 1905, with a Japanese war against a European nation (Tsarist Russia) fully waged and won, Nature more soberly proclaimed that the ‘lesson which our educationalists and statesmen have to learn from Japan is that the life of a modern nation requires to be organised on scientific lines in all its departments . . . it must be consciously used for the promotion of national welfare’ (Nature, 8 June 1905: 872). In this the Western scientific and intellectual journals were following the many messages of such travelling Japanese as Baron Kikuchi Dairoku, sometime Japanese Minister of Education, who in 1907 was lecturing to the Edinburgh Royal Society on the educational system as the backbone of Japan’s recent economic and military successes.1 In the later twentieth century the modelling of Japan tended to move from tales of unusual agency and institutions and towards analyses of human and physical resources, labour surplus (Fei and Ranis 1964), structural explanations of motivation and behaviour (Hagen 1964, McClelland 1969), or generalised models of escape from low-level economic and demographic traps (Nelson 1956). Although ingenious enough, the analytical precision of such refined explanations did tend to undervalue the forces of late development as stressed here, that is the peculiarity of Japan’s circumstances, and the energy, creativity and costs invoked by Japan’s ‘response’ to the Western powers.
Preludes to the twentieth century The old idea of Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868) as a ‘purely feudal organisation of landed property’ (Marx 1867: 795) has given way in recent years to notions of ‘a merchant contingent’ demanding regime change, who had at hand a ‘labor force inured to long hours of disciplined work’ as well as institutions appropriate to the
Introduction 3 increase of capital formation beyond that characteristic of a stagnant ancien régime. The industrialisation of the Meiji years (1868–1912) did not result from either a spontaneous or a Western-induced generation of new forces inscribed on a tabula rasa, for ‘modern persons’ had long achieved positions of power and occupied sites of potential economic revolution (Nakamura 1981: 270, 281). Even in the sixteenth century Japan had not fulfilled all the requirements expected of a feudal system of closed social classes and immobility, rank-based distribution of goods and services, and a multiplicity of authorities with power in the hands of great lords based on their own possession of distinct landed regions and military bastions. The existence of concepts of an Emperor and of the ‘family nation’, the sometimes outstanding, centralised power of lay shogunates, and traditional ideas of the ie, or household – with its strong homage relations that might at times relegate obligations between lord and vassal to a comparatively lowly status – were all features even then that stood outside any straightforward system of feudalism. Modern views emphasise the pervasive changes occurring throughout Japan between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. For this period it is best to remain sceptical concerning exact socioeconomic quantities. Nevertheless it now appears that a population of some thirty million people were becoming increasingly urbanised and that even the most rural locations harboured an enormous variety and extent of non-agricultural by-employments, ranging from cotton dealing and retailing, dyeing and indigo trading, and silk rearing and reeling, to rice, tea and sardine dealing (the latter being important as nutrition and as fertiliser in the relative absence of livestock), cracker-making and oil-pressing, milling and shopkeeping. By the late Tokugawa era some 80 per cent or more of the population generated some 60 per cent of the nation’s income in agricultural activities. This suggests that higher productivity lay with the 4 per cent or more engaged in secondary manufactures and the 10 per cent or so engaged in trade, carriage, urban infrastructures and financing. (Up to 7 per cent of the population were of samurai or aristocratic ranking, most of whom did not contribute to national output.) Despite only a very mild population growth, most of which was probably occurring prior to 1720 or 1750, demand seems to have grown sufficiently to induce a doubling of the cultivated acreage, from around 5 million acres in 1600 to 11.5 million by 1868. As was often the case for Japan, the reaction to external forces set the scene for commercial and economic change. Prior to the seventeenth century Japanese economic history was a fraction of a regional, Asian tribute system centred on China and its fluctuating, complex satellite interrelations. From the later fifteenth century the growing turn towards silver as a means of taxation, military financing and private transaction within China led to the development of a large tribute silver trade, mostly in the hands of Asian and European intermediaries (Steensgaard 1990: 18–19). The Manchu conquest of China shifted a traditional conception of East Asian centrality, and permitted Tokugawa Japan to assume the mantle of a greater independence. Japan withdrew from China’s tributary system from the 1630s, and Chinese silver was increasingly supplied by Peru and Mexico through both Atlantic and Pacific routes, just as silver assets allowed Japan to finance improved home production of a range of rural products (O’Flynn 1991, 1986, Goldstone 1991). An
4 The Japanese industrial economy earlier vital relationship with China was based on exports of Japanese gold, silver and cotton in exchange for Chinese cotton goods, silk, porcelain, saltpetre, dyestuffs and sugar, and a prime motive of Tokugawa shoguns was to secure a greater isolation and independence from China through stimulation of a wider range of Japanese exports and to improve the use of labour and land in agricultural production as a substitute for imports (Latham and Kawakatsu 1994, Toby 1984). There is a real sense in which such rudimentary economic policy was merely one aspect of the overriding state project of increased internal control (Umesao and Matsubara 1989). The search for the internal dynamic should begin with urbanism and that peculiar institution of sociopolitical control, sankin kotai (alternate residence). This was the law enacted in 1634 by the Tokugawa Shogun that obliged all the daimyo (feudal lords, of whom there were around three hundred) or their close family members to reside alternately in their domains and in the government capital Edo (Tokyo), and to leave their wives and children as hostages in that city. This system, which was replicated throughout Japan by the daimyo themselves in an effort to control their own domain retainers, not only led to a vast improvement in transport and communications but also encouraged one of the great building booms in premodern history (Hall 1955–6, Smith 1960, Nakamura 1981). The redivision of lands consequent upon Tokugawa victory after the long civil-war period had meant that older military or commercial centres had become badly placed, and the years from 1580 to 1610 had seen the massive growth of Osaka, Kochi, Hiroshima, Edo, Kofu, Sendai, Hikone and Nagoya. An edict of 1615 abolished the right to have more than one castle town in each province, and sankin kotai merely hastened and concentrated a move towards the construction of large castle towns in the middle of the new territorial divisions. Competition amongst the lords ensured that cities, residences (including those of the hostages in Edo), hostelries and travelling courts would be superbly ostentatious, this dragging many lords into debt with the larger merchant groupings. The level of urbanisation was extraordinary. During the Tokugawa years, Edo (Tokyo) was one of the largest cities in world history, with a population at times of well over one million, mostly composed of administrative and aristocratic consumers of goods. Nor was Edo’s relationship to Japan like that of London’s to England. The new Japanese capital was surrounded by a network of other large (over sixty thousand) administrative, commercial and cultural centres, such as Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagasaki and Nagoya, and was endowed with a serviceable port in the expanding city of Yokohama. In Britain, the level of urbanisation (using a benchmark of those living in concentrations of five thousand or more) was no more than 13 per cent in the early eighteenth century, perhaps 15 per cent by mid-century and 25 per cent by 1801, by which time the first industrial revolution was well under way. In the later eighteenth century London was the home of perhaps three-quarters of the residents of large towns in Britain. By comparison, the urban population of Japan by the mid-eighteenth century was possibly 22 per cent or more, including thirty or forty castle towns with populations of over ten thousand each. The contrast in urbanism is no measure of degrees of industrialisation. This is not the point of
Introduction 5 the comparison. Rather, we would emphasise that in Japan such huge urban centres generated a consumer demand of increasing volume and sophistication, ensuring that modern manufacturing technique from the West could potentially exploit large new markets. Urbanism of this sort meant that Japan benefited from yet another distinct spatial force, the so-called ‘neighbourhood effect’. Within a neighbourhood of productive enterprise, pressure on laggards builds up as the number of innovative adopters grows. Such neighbourhood effects eased the passage of information, new cultural forms and novel techniques. More problematically, the city may well have generated some homogeneity of culture and institutions, some innovative social milling, side-effects which might well have eventually assisted the Meiji authorities in their efforts towards industrial modernisation. Such new cities were often dominated by samurai populations, newly divorced from the land and with little military function during the long years of internal peace and external isolation. Within such places literacy and talent might now be rewarded, and many middling and upper samurai solved the problems of service and income by adopting administrative and logistic functions. But centres of conspicuous consumption must be satisfied, and around the cities soon radiated a great system of supply. Merchant groups became the bridges that allowed arms and foodstuffs to pass into urbanism from ruralism. Merchants and artisans moved from older centres into the castle towns, and merchants often stood in close alliance with lords and retainers, for within the town they were protected and patronised, and from this base they became the moneylenders, the bankers and the adopted sons of their betters. Just as the upper classes of Tokugawa society became somewhat more divorced from the land, so too did transport improve, cities unify an emergent middle-class culture, and agriculture and artisanry respond to greater opportunities. Since the reforms of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98) during 1583–98, rice was the currency of extraction, the means whereby daimyo and retainers gleaned from agricultural producers up to 50 or 60 per cent of their rice output by the mideighteenth century. One hope for the peasant farmer was to diversify away from traditional crops in order to escape feudal taxation partially, and this was rendered more likely in regions proximate to the large urban centres or with good transport facilities. Perhaps this great move to by-employments permitted increased output in the absence of fast population growth, as an identifiable industrial base could be constructed by redeploying throughout the year an existing rural labour force. So there was less need than in Europe for any full-time movement of labour from agriculture to industry whether by attraction or by oppression. More certainly perhaps, in more prosperous by-employment areas many peasants were no longer under conditions of personal bondage but in effect became taxpaying tenants of the daimyo, a position more likely to generate ambition and mobility when the opportunity arose. At the same time tenancy and local markets together measured the spread of a money economy, opportunities for profit and savings in many niches of the nation, and rising frustrations amongst those who partook of improvement but were impatient of the political centralisation that at least nominally constrained their actions.
6 The Japanese industrial economy In particular, long-time residence in the castle towns combined with internal peace to divorce many retainers from the land at the same time as their stipends were minimised by lords facing the pressures of forced conspicuous consumption. The decline of personal ties of loyalty was surely hastened amongst that minority exposed to rangaku or Dutch learning, which in embellished forms filtered through the communication systems of and between major centres. Such samurai groups provided social fodder for the late-Tokugawa dissidents, just as they were amongst those who would take industrial advantage of the commutation of stipends into lump sums after the Restoration of 1868. From all this we may paint a fairly colourful picture of change. By the end of the era, there was an escalation of political rebellion against the central regime, and this has been seen as evidence of a trapped modernity. Certainly Chosu and Satsuma were both leading areas of disaffection as well as foremost regions of commercial progress, the lord of Satsuma himself being a leading entrepreneur in pottery, in cannons and in the cotton spinning mill established in 1861 at Kagoshima on the basis of imported Lancashire machinery.2 With all this sketched out, we would not go on to argue that such changes in themselves were sufficient to generate the industrial revolution of the Meiji era. Certainly the Meiji modernisers inherited from Tokugawa a high level of literacy, a sturdy revenue base of around 25 per cent of national income, a balanced external trade (with annual exports of silk and silkworm eggs, tea, cotton and seafoods amounting to some $10 million), an agricultural population increasingly converted to tenancy (to perhaps 30 per cent of the total) in a sector that now marketed up to 50 per cent of the total product. But for every ‘modern’ merchant in late Tokugawa Japan there were several others who happily depended on usury, patronage and adoption into the upper classes and who were thus hardly apposite agents of either political or industrial revolution. The most intelligent of the commoners were usually immersed in the traditional land-based commerce of rice sales and guild organisation, as treasurers of domains and in the extension of credit to the shogunate and daimyo, rather than engaged in new industries. Amongst such groups had arisen a strong ideology that justified commercial profit in terms of service to the whole nation – this reflecting a samurai mode of legitimation – and had little to say about profits from industry. Again, for every region benefiting from proximity to new forms of demand, there were regions whose modes of supply had not altered in generations and whose inhabitants spoke a language and saw a world map entirely other than that of their urban compatriots. Nor was the search for new avenues of wealth and expression as great as the fear of China, Russia and Western Europe, particularly after the British wars against great China in the early nineteenth century. In all, we must beware confusing some seemingly necessary inputs into industrial modernisation with an argument about sufficient causation. The timing and character of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the subsequent industrialisation process was some complex compound of long-term internal changes and relatively short-term factors stemming from an enormous escalation in the interaction with other nations and their products, technologies, institutions and ideologies. It is in this conjunction of forces that we might discover some explanation of early Japanese industrialisation.
Introduction 7 Our major clue into the workings of this conjuncture lies in the scale of things. In 1868 Japan was exceedingly large by world standards; compared to its thirty-odd millions of people, the population of Britain stood at around twenty-four million.3 It is highly unlikely that the system was effectively mobilised in its entirety as a prerequisite of interaction with the Western world. The story of industrialisation is more likely to lie with particular sites and agencies, the effective compulsions of those modernisers in government, bureaucracy, industry and commerce who together saw the need to meet the coming Western impact fully, rather than to allow an insidious, powerful foreign influence to end in system corruption, perhaps colonialism and subjugation. Those historians who might see such an imperative as merely the delaying of the logic of interaction to the awfulness of 1937–45 should not forget that in the interim years Japan joined the ranks of the industrialised nations of the earth. It was the only large independent nation to do so. Spatial factors may well have partially determined Japan’s political position within the economy of nations. Late Tokugawa, Meiji and early twentieth-century industrialisation was to be forged within a world of aggressive competition, vicious commercial cycles, imperialism and war. But Japan was tucked in nicely behind China. By the time that the early Western religious, military and commercial agents arrived there they had lost something of their former vigour, having spent themselves on the unfortunate mammoth of the global foreground. Through Meiji and later years many influential Westerners saw a distant and seemingly commercially benign Japan as a bulwark against Russian imperialism and then communism, a view extended in modified form in the early years of the Cold War, when the more positive implementations of the Western occupying forces in defeated Japan after 1948 were surely conditioned by expansions of Asian and global communism and centralised planning regimes. Japan was at least capitalist, if strangely so. The limited revolution that brought in the Restoration of the Emperor during 1868 has been seen as the watershed of political and economic history, not so much because it demarcated definite periods of economic growth overall4 but because it saw the working through of forces of courtly decay at the centre, rising ambitions with economic change in the provinces, and fears generated by the growing interactions with industrial Western powers from the 1850s onwards. The western and southern clans used the ready symbolism of the Emperor against a shogunate that was seen as capitulating to alien powers, and they developed the popular formula sonno-joi, to venerate the Emperor and expel the foreigners. A mass of reforms were crowded into a decade: administrative departments replaced the fiefs of the daimyo (lords) and the whole class of lords were amalgamated into the kazoku (the noble class as a whole) and removed of privileges, just as conscription abolished any special status of the samurai (armed retainers). After the defeat of the more populist counter-resistance of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877, reforms escalated in national education, industrial projects, taxation and moves towards at least regional democracy. The immediate effect of reform and Western interaction was a move of the foreign trade balance from a healthy surplus to a trade deficit and an outflow of specie. The lack of protection from Western imports and the enormous demand for
8 The Japanese industrial economy Western products, raw materials, machinery and expertise meant that industrial modernisation was being led by imports paid for by Tokugawa accumulations of specie and traditional exports – tea and raw silk. The notion that trade stimulated industrialisation through increased demand has little to recommend it. Trade broadened horizons and provided the foreign inputs to later industrial production, and the deficit years from 1868 to 1881 were probably the most important ones in Japan’s entire history. Failure of the regime, collapse of traditional product lines, devaluation of specie, any or all might have rendered the aims of modernisers merely pipe-dreams and the probability of loss of sovereignty at the hands of Western colonisers that much more likely. The rise of the Japanese cotton industry and import substitution policies after 1881 meant that Japan escaped the initial development trap, and during the years 1890–1913 the average annual rate of volume growth of Japanese exports stood at 8.6 per cent in comparison to a second highest rate of 5.1 per cent for Germany and 3.5 per cent as the world average. By the end of the Meiji era Japan had reversed the original trading pattern: 50 per cent of exports were of manufactured textiles and one-third of imports were of raw cotton, soon to be increasingly supplied by US producers. Behind this performance lay a concentrated utilisation of foreign raw materials, machinery and skills in the production of textiles and, then, of iron and steel, shipbuilding and general engineering industries. The large internal market for textiles represented an original dynamic, later replaced by foreign sales: by 1909 over 50 per cent of manufacturing industry in Japan was textiles, and of this some 65 per cent of total raw silk and 30 per cent of all cotton yarn was exported. G. C. Allen was always of the opinion that the merchants and business class of late Tokugawa were not deviant and energetic agents of change, but rather consisted ‘for the most part of mere financial agents of the old regime, and few of its members were fitted to act as entrepreneurs in the new era’ (Allen 1968: 31–2). The alternative agency was government itself. Recent scholarship has tended to downplay the statist features of Japanese industrialisation, but in doing so has often missed the point. Naturally, much of government direct investment and experimentation in modern industry was costly and mediocre in quality and effect. But the strong argument concerning the role of government was never centred on its direct industrial activities, but rather on its ability to hold the system together, gather the threads of Tokugawa assets, build infrastructure (something no one else would or could do) and spread information and incentives. This essence of government has rarely been challenged by those historians who seek out dynamic market forces prior to 1912. It was government that established the early railways (1872–87), the telegraphic and postal services (1869), port facilities and new road building. However much Mitsubishi railed against the government at that time, it was officialdom stimulated by the British and American shipping monopolies that entrusted that old business group with the transportation of troops to Kyushu and Taiwan in 1874 and awarded grants of government ships free of charge, subsidised annually Mitsubishi’s operations, including special grants to maintenance of a naval college, and provided loans to the company for port equipment. Whilst government factories to an extent were designed to provide state needs for plate glass, bricks, cotton spinning, cloth
Introduction 9 weaving and so on, even more were such projects intended as models to be emulated and eventually transferred to the private sector. The famous Matsukata deflation of the early 1880s, which saw the selling-up of government factories to private interests at low cost, cannot be defined as a moment of failure. No historian has shown successfully that the state had intended to retain control indefinitely, indeed all statist declarations were of the opposite character, and the fact that government hung on to ownership or influence in military industries and in the case of the Hokkaido development project, founded by the authorities some ten years earlier, surely indicates that government saw its role as that of direction and persuasion.5 Those who would dismiss such points tend to consider Japanese markets (from consumer goods through to information) as they emerged from Tokugawa and the turmoils of the 1870s as somehow potentially optimal to industrialisation. Of this there is little convincing evidence. Perhaps the most important role played by the Meiji government lay in its successful resistance to foreign capital into the 1890s and its consequent adoption of a policy of information dispersal and rudimentary industrial planning. The industrial programme and the capitalisation of the previous annual expenditure on samurai stipends caused an increase in government debt by the late 1870s together with pressure internally to borrow from overseas (Inkster 2001). In fact moneyprinting and bond issues, land tax revenue (80 per cent of the total around 1880) and the subsequent deflation allowed the industrialisation of Japan to be essentially independent of foreign capital until well into the 1890s. The expenses of the SinoJapanese war of 1894–5 of ¥200 million were met with domestic bond issues, revenues from the occupied territories and indemnity. Subsequent expenditure on annexation of Formosa (Taiwan) and armament in the face of Russia was met mostly by indemnity, increases of sake, land and income taxation, and the beginning of foreign loans. The Russian war of 1904–5 cost ¥1,500 million and this led to a resort to great foreign borrowing, so that in 1907 50 per cent of the national debt was owed to foreigners, this falling to around 15 per cent by 1914. During the years 1896–1913 perhaps $800 million was borrowed from overseas, amounting to some 3 per cent of national income or one-third of capital formation (Emi 1963). What is most noteworthy is that such borrowings were late rather than early, were in the form of bond issues rather than direct foreign investment and represented a declining proportion of the total national debt of government at the end of the period. The indication is that government was inexpensive, that industrialisation was not based initially on large inputs of capital but rather of labour (Fei and Ranis 1964, Blumenthal 1980a) and that foreign borrowing when it did occur was absorbed in the growth rate and larger size of the total economy. The exclusion by law of foreign capital (and particularly of direct investment by foreign companies entering Japan) meant that a prime role of government was to substitute for the key functions played by these advanced external sources in other cases of late development, such as Germany or Tsarist Russia. Exclusion of direct investment entailed exclusion of foreign skills, organisational know-how and trading contacts and standards, all of which had to be provided by officialdom. This does much to explain the industrial projects, large investments in education and industrial
10 The Japanese industrial economy training and hiring of paid foreign employees in mines, industry and the bureaucracy. The Ministry of Education, founded in 1871, enrolled 28 per cent of children in elementary schools by 1873, a figure that had risen to 46 per cent by 1886. Against a background of new university and technical institutes, large numbers of foreign technicians and educators were employed from 1872 at an average salary ten times that of the bureaucratic Japanese and costing up to 50 per cent of the budget of the Ministry of Industry in the years 1870–90, this excluding the large number of students and officials sent to study abroad. Agricultural improvement through the use of veterans and school graduates was joined by government employment of German chemists and Dutch agricultural engineers.
The short twentieth century 1912–71 Growth accelerated in the interwar years, averaging around 4 per cent overall, 7 per cent for manufacturing. These rates were the fastest in the world. In income per head terms, a better measure of efficient performance, Japan grew at around 2.6 per cent in comparison to 1 per cent for Germany and about 0.8 per cent for the USA and the UK. Japan was now a net lender of capital to Manchuria, Formosa, Korea and China, and achieved a rate of gross investment as a percentage of national income of over 15 per cent, amongst the highest in the industrialised world. The supply of labour remained elastic, with the proportion of the labour force engaged in agriculture falling from 61 per cent in 1913 to 46 per cent in 1938. In terms of gold, export prices fell by 70 per cent during 1929–38, suggesting continuous low-cost production and an undervalued yen. Overall, government did not withdraw from the economy: government expenditure provided 40 per cent of net investment and many official loans went through the Industrial Bank of Japan to colonial enterprises, particularly the South Manchuria Railway Company. In these years subsidies went commonly to strategic production – sugar production in Formosa, chemicals and petroleum exploitation. Often these took the form of tax exemptions, but for the failing agricultural sector the support structure broadened to include price maintenance for rice and silk, relief measures in depression and grants for the formation of co-operatives. Tariff policy included high duties on chemicals and metals and in 1926 was extended to protect woollen spinning and weaving and rayon manufacture. More common and representative of the emerging Japan model were the controlling organisations such as the fishery guilds, export inspections and quality controls, and the link between political parties and the great zaibatsu companies (financial cliques) of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. In return for government contracts and licences the companies provided normal financing and special assistance to imperial expansion and development. During these years Japan became a colonial power. The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth after the war with Russia eventually led to the securing of Korea, which became the colony of Chosen in 1910. In its colonies Japan pursued a very purposeful policy of exploitation through food pricing and forced exports, confiscations of public lands and food catches, forced migration of skilled craftsmen to Japan, the formation of an alienated elite who increasingly managed the colonial
Introduction 11 system at key sites, and land alienation and the creation of a new tenancy exposed to increasing rents. By 1936 trade with colonial North-Eastern Asia represented 40 per cent of Japan’s total, in comparison to only 8 per cent with non-colonised SouthEast Asia. The period began with only the benefits of war. European conflict (1914–18) stimulated Japanese industries into the need to substitute for imports. Asian colonies of Europe were no longer being fully supplied from the West, and Japanese textiles flowed into China and India, and indeed Europe itself, just as Japanese shippers and insurance companies reaped the benefits of a new independence from the great foreign mercantile monopolies: income from freight carriage increased tenfold during 1914–18. Japan emerged from war as an ally of the capitalist West, and the blind eye turned by the West towards the aggression of the Siberian Expedition in 1918 (when Japanese troops penetrated Russian-controlled Siberia) together with the conclusions of the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, which gave Japan a seat amongst the Big Five of the League of Nations, and the further Washington Conference of 1921, which awarded the right to war shipping in the ratio of three Japanese ships to every five British or American, were altogether eloquent testimony to the unfolding of a new Japan. But the answer to Japan’s longer-term performance lies in the combination of high levels of investment and technological borrowing with relatively speedy recovery from those commercial horrors that more or less afflicted all advanced systems in these years – the world recessions of 1920–1, 1927 and 1929–31 – as well as that which belonged to Japan alone: the Tokyo earthquake of 1923, in which half of the buildings of that great city were destroyed. Speedy recoveries were some function of low-cost inputs to manufacturing within a context of technological borrowing (Inkster 2001). This was associated with a shift from growth in consumer industries during the 1920s to very rapid growth in heavy industries after 1931 and with the stronger emergence of a dual industrial structure. Modernism was concentrated in key areas in receipt of large investments and skilled labour at high wages, traditional supply and demand continued to be satisfied by a much modified by-employment sector and a strongly growing system of subcontracting, which utilised an unskilled casual labour market at extremely low wage levels. Whatever the negative welfare outcome of these relations, they permitted fast industrial and economic growth, particularly through speedy recovery from adverse external impacts. The character of the Japanese system is best illustrated by the depression of 1927–31. The postwar speculative boom collapsed in 1927 with the failure of thirtyseven main banks, and the zaibatsu bought up bankrupt firms. As the Diet’s two major parties were allied to Mitsui and Mitsubishi, the anti-zaibatsu feelings of small business were already translated into anti-Diet politics prior to the onset of the heavy depression of 1929. The collapse in industrial production was triggered by the fall in demand for Japanese silk products in crisis-ridden America. The fall in exports led to deflationary policies that aggravated market conditions and encouraged a movement of industrial labour back to the land, adding to the negative effects of already sinking agricultural prices. As at this time some 40 per cent of the value of the produce of the tenant farmer went to the landlord as rent, the price fall hit a wide
12 The Japanese industrial economy range of rural people. Rural discontent was worsened and politicised by colonial agrarian imports, and a period of riots, strikes and lockouts was compounded by bad harvests in 1931 and 1932. A rise of extreme nationalism was generated principally outside of Diet politics because the politicians were seen as linked to those zaibatsu who had gained from the depression and as promoters of an inefficient economic policy (for instance the return to the gold standard in 1930 at supposedly too high a parity, or the cutting of civil service salaries). Earlier notions of a liberal reconstruction of Japan along more Westernised lines were stillborn in the rise of an anti-capitalism that preached national socialism at home and imperialism overseas. Peasants and farmers hit by depression were the family members of soldiers and officers of the Japanese army. The period from late 1930 onwards saw an inexorable collapse of Diet politics, a flurry of assassinations and coups, a rise of Shintoism associated with extreme nationalism in school and college texts and curricula and the rise of military expenditure in the budget towards the 50 per cent mark. Yet Japan recovered from depression very quickly, and subsequent economic growth was at a higher rate than that of the 1920s or of other nations (Blumenthal 1980b: 10–25, Nakamura 1971). From December 1931 the government turned from conventional deflationary policies towards more expansionary instruments, using deficit budgeting, armaments expenditure and relief operations, and an effectively lower exchange rate. But this is an unlikely contender as the chief explanation of Japanese flexibility in comparison to other industrial nations at that time. The base of 1930s growth was a dual industrial structure whereby small-scale producers and casual workers took the brunt of the down-turn, continuing to work under appalling conditions and on short-time or poor contracts, while the large firms reduced output but did not move to full unemployment of their skilled workers. This system was maintained by the toiya merchants, those who contracted with a variety of small manufacturers to produce a general portfolio of goods for systematic sale when needed. Although seen as relics of Tokugawa production, such merchants allowed flexibility and quick recovery from depressions at the cost of the unskilled, and at the same time were at the forefront in the internal diffusion of new technologies, especially those associated with the electrical industry. Improvements in power within industry, extensions of efficient railway transport and the introduction of machine tools increased the quality of output of the skilled labour force. In the years 1929–33 annual imports of machinery and equipment averaged at around ¥120 million and fed the growth of Mitubishi Heavy Industries (shipbuilding, steel works, power stations, locomotives), Hidachi Engineering (locomotives, steam turbines, motor cars, electrical equipment), Shibaura (Mitsui) Engineering Works (electrical machinery), Kawasaki (shipbuilding) and Miike Machinery Works (mining machinery and electric motors) amongst several others, most manufacturing under licence from American or European firms throughout the 1930s. This combination of transfers of technique, low labour costs and infrequent shut-down of modern plant allowed a ready recovery from depression under the auspices of the post-1930 military-industrial programme. Japan lost one quarter of national income as a result of the Second World War and the longer aggression against China (1931–45) (Minami 1986: 181). The
Introduction 13 impacts continued after 1945 under the government of the Western allies, the Supreme Command Allied Powers or SCAP (1945–52), which rapidly introduced reforms in labour law, land tenure and industrial structure (with the dissolution of the zaibatsu) that were designed to introduce democracy rather than increase economic growth. The establishment of the Diet as the core of the democratic process at least formally moved the basis of sovereignty from the imperial system and towards popular accountability. During 1945–8 the healthy foreign trade balance of the 1930s had been converted to one in which exports as a percentage of imports averaged at around 35 per cent, and at this time income per head was around 60 per cent of that of the mid-1930s. Yet in the period 1955–70 Japan’s real national income grew at the staggering rate of 11 per cent per annum. Given a relatively slight population increase, this measured a rapid rise in the wealth of the nation. Although this growth was aided by fortuity – an undervalued yen, the Korean war from 1950 which sucked in military supplies from Japan, the long-term growth impacts of some SCAP institutional reforms, general expansion in the world economy – the underlying factors still surrounded technology transfers from the US and Europe, which induced very high rates of internal investment: gross investment as a percentage of national income rose from a high 25 per cent in 1955 to a phenomenal 40 per cent in 1969 (GATT 1971: 3–5).6 Manufacturing led this period quite markedly, the sector expanding from 22 per cent of output in 1955 to 40 per cent in 1969. Payments for technology imports rose in the same period from $20 million annually to $120 million by 1961 to $350 million in 1969. Blumenthal and others have argued that technology importing was complementary to increased domestic research and development throughout the high growth period – expenditure on R&D rose from $475 million in 1960 to $1,950 million in 1968, and more than half of this was carried out by private enterprise, a much higher figure than in other nations (Blumenthal 1976, 1979, Inkster 1993, 2001). Chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, the fastest-growing industries, absorbed most technology transfers and most R&D expenditures. Together with a surplus supply of labour that was disciplined and ready to move between sectors (for example, employment in services grew from 13.6 million in 1955 to 22 million in 1969), technology transfer dictated the overall trajectory of Japanese industrial and economic growth in these years. In particular, export growth might be seen as a reflection of such factors rather than as the cause of fast growth – new technology and organisation (much of the latter initiated by the SCAP occupation forces) in manufacturing led to a growth of labour productivity at an average annual rate of around 10 per cent (15 per cent between 1965 and 1969) and it was this that dictated the competitiveness of Japanese goods in foreign places. Imported techniques and a high investment rate created a new-vintage system in novel sites designed in terms of appropriate scale and organisational criteria. Other industrial nations did not gain the advantages of this productive combination to anything like the same extent. This was a golden age in which Japan reaped the benefits of a renewed relative backwardness in that inputs of capital and labour could yield bigger outputs than in other nations.
14 The Japanese industrial economy It follows from our argument that the most important aspects of public policy were not those relating to foreign trade – however marked they seemed at the time – but rather those that aided technology transfer, encouraged a high rate of savings and investment and increased R&D in manufacturing towards levels higher than would have been reached under normal market forces. Indeed, the most profound of policy instruments relating to trade at that time was the undervalued yen combined with the high elasticity of yen-priced goods; that is, a small fall in Japanese export prices at this time led to large increases in the volume of exports (Shinohara 1962: 33, 68–75, 110–205, Kojima 1977: 9–17). Yet this was the period of the International Monetary Fund and an international fixed exchange-rate system, so that the exchange rate was not that dictated by specifically Japanese policy-makers. Indeed, US policy at Bretton Woods, which established the international exchange system from 1944 to 1971–3, and activities during SCAP, together with the huge traded supplies of high technologies, provided just the necessary inputs to the Japanese trajectory. We might conclude that US global policy was of more importance than any Japanese trade policy in creating a high-growth, commercially competitive Japan. Although debate continues on this theme, there is a case to be made that an imperial-based bureaucracy remained at the real heart of the political system, and that this provided a continuity of policy regime, of networks and mutual understandings, that together may not have yielded a great democracy but did beget growth and ‘growthmanship’, a consensus on economic growth as an ‘ideologically neutral focus for the whole society’ (Edwards 1997: 7, Stockwin 1982, Johnson 1982, 1984). Within this environment developed indicative planning, including the famous Income Doubling Plan of 1961–70, and the crucial networking and suasion role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which by the 1960s was in a unique position from which to guide (but not finance) micro-industrial policies in growing industries. Low government spending on social services and the military reduced current expenditure below that of most other nations at that time. Birth control policy and encouragement of labour movement from agriculture together increased the population of working age in manufacturing.7 Investment in public utilities (transport, power, water) created positive external economies in manufacturing and required sophisticated imported technique. Household savings were channelled into productive investment through banks and post offices and encouraged by a policy framework that neglected expenditure on social services, particularly unemployment and health insurance and old-age pensions – it is difficult to separate such ‘forced’ saving from that due to natural consumption propensities derived from ‘traditional cultural practices’. By the later 1960s personal savings were twice those found in the USA despite the latter’s higher personal income levels.
Japan in the modern climacteric 1971–2001 At the beginning of the 1970s several forces combined to move the economy on to a more genuinely expansive trajectory. Although core technology continued to be imported into key new industries, particularly microelectronics in all its many forms,
Introduction 15 automatic systems, biotechnologies and marine technology, there is a real sense in which the years since 1971–3 have represented a catching-up from previous relative backwardness and have acted as a watershed equivalent to that of 1868–81. The global abandonment of fixed exchange rates – initiated when the gold convertibility of the US dollar was terminated in August 1971, ushering in a period of floating currencies in an effort to effectively devalue the dollar – coincided approximately with the OPEC crises which hoisted the price of one of Japan’s principal productive imports, crude oil. General commercial crisis together with an emerging Japanese trade surplus prompted pressures (mainly from the USA) on Japan to increase the value of the yen and liberalise its trading regime in order to allow greater imports of products and of foreign capital and enterprise, just that element so avoided in the crisis of the Meiji era. Internally, a growing labour shortage in manufacturing began to exert some pressure on wages and a need to seek new sources of productivity in order to retain export competitiveness. By the mid-1980s the rising yen had not dampened Japanese exports but had encouraged a massive boom in the export of capital from Japan: foreign assets seemed cheaper in Japanese yen terms just as Japanese enterprise began to produce abroad in order to escape the higher costs of production at home. A newly voiced middle class wielding very significant consumer power began to demand changes in welfare policy and in policies to reduce environmental hazards relating to space, high rents and pollution, and the character of cityscapes. An outcome of this was a new pressure on the monopolistic Liberal Democratic Party to operate a more open politics with less cronyism, corruption and cultural conservatism. It is hardly surprising that such a combination of circumstances should have given rise to predictions of slower growth from around 1970. In fact, the expansion of the economy outwards, associated with large investments in labour-intensive manufacturing in Asia and increased productivity from technological innovation within Japan itself, and a continued high investment rate, caused the rising yen to keep pace with a growing national income into the beginning of the 1990s. The impacts of the structural features of the 1970s, which we might summarise as a move towards a complex maturity, were waylaid until the last decade of the millennium. Most significantly, the interim years of c. 1970–90 saw the most expansive economic growth in Japanese history. If there was a phase of Japanese capitalist expansion in the modern era, then this was it. Japan’s current account balance moved from a surplus of $20,799 million in 1983 to one of $57,157 million in 1989, to one of $117,640 million in 1992 (Japan 1991: 47, Japan 1994: 46). As the yen rose in value from its 360 to the US dollar in 1970, through the speedy rise of 1985–6 to a rate of 168, to the high of 110 in 1993, so too capital poured out of Japan as low labour costs were sought in Asia and global assets were purchased by Japanese yen-holders. Whilst from the Japanese end this appeared as an incremental shift, in smaller receivers of Japanese capital it acted as a marked new element: thus from 1970 to 1971 direct Japanese investment into Australia tripled and went mostly into resource projects such as iron ore, coal, alumina and woodchips in the form of joint ventures with substantial local equity participation (Senate Standing Committee 1973: 63–6). This change in one comparatively micro-bilateral relationship
16 The Japanese industrial economy represented very well the general shift of the Japanese growth trajectory. Japan’s direct overseas investment moved from a total of some $12,000 million during 1985 to $22,300 for 1986, and to a high of $67,540 during 1989 (Japan 1991: 56, Japan 1994: 54). Yen revaluation had failed to curb Japanese exports but had created a massive export of capital from Japan, one that entailed the purchase of real estate, film companies, automobile plants and oil refineries from the USA to Indonesia (Komiya and Wakasugi 1990). Although foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into Japan were less than 1 per cent of world FDI inflows by 1997, Japan’s FDI outflows constituted around 6 per cent of total world FDI outflows. Given that Japanese national income represented around 7.5 per cent of world income, it follows that Japanese expansionism still showed its very late characteristics. That is, the Japanese totals remained small in proportion to world levels, especially the levels of older investors such as the UK or the USA: they tended strongly to a balance in favour of Japan, and tended equally to be concentrated in non-manufacturing areas and in newly industrialised Asian nations (Drysdale et al. 1999: 2–9). Such characteristics combined to make this expansionist phase extremely visible and subject to a great deal of world criticism, especially from American commentators, who saw Japan’s commercial expansion both as a threat to the American economic system and as a measure of the failure of US policy-makers to curb Japanese trade through revaluation of the yen upwards. Into the mid-1990s the global pundits were still referring to the coming new century as ‘the Asian Century’, a time of a new, perhaps more humane, capitalism located in new places and new industries. The industrial and economic growth experience of Japan in the rest of the 1990s was such that the ‘Japan model’ at last fell from grace – an annual average rate of growth of over 4 per cent during the troubled 1980s fell to around 1.5 per cent during the terrible 1990s. Indeed, in official quarters in the USA and in some European nations, Japanese industrial performance, foreign trade and government economic policy were all seen as contributory to global malaise, increased uncertainties about defence policy in the Pacific arena and exacerbations of the financial disasters in East Asia more generally. The seeming contemporaneous ‘recovery’ of the US economic system, which attained a 3 per cent average annual rate of national economic growth for the decade, confirmed a feeling that the global talk of a Pacific or Confucian industrial ‘renaissance’ had been voluble rather than lucid, and that the Western sceptics who had criticised the ‘Asian model’ for inattention to conventional public policy, peculiar institutional linkages between public and private sectors, and immature market development, had shown better historical judgment (World Bank 1996, Economic Commission for Europe 1997, Hamlin 2000).8 Seen as caused by avoidable human error, and involving a great deal of injury and fear, the nuclear accident at the fuel-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, on 30 September 1999 appeared to demonstrate the rise of a new, vulnerable and misguided Japan. In fact, for industrial Japan itself most problems follow from difficulties of international relations, the slow-down effects of a greater industrial maturity, increased costs related to environmental limitations (especially on space),
Introduction 17 demographic down-turn, and the failure of the political system to provide the growth focus of earlier years. Although this certainly represents a considerable list of constraints on growth, several points might be made. First, even in combination, these constraints do not equal a collapse of the Japanese industrial system, which still benefits from the earlier advantages of a skilled labour force, good industrial equipment and infrastructures,9 and a relative quickness of technological and institutional adaptation and innovation, at least within industry. Second, the significant shift to services, real-estate and external commercial transactions relating to trade, capital, insurance and financial services more generally, whilst perhaps dramatic in a comparative historical context, is part of a general process of catchup and maturity that can be identified as occurring from around the early 1970s. Third, physical environmental constraints are perhaps more severe for Japan than for many industrial systems in Asia or elsewhere – densities and congeries which were advantageous to earlier industrial development have become cost-inducing limitations. Fourth, changing external geopolitical and economic circumstances have been beyond the control of Japan entirely. Particularly this is true of the industrial and commercial development of China. Demographic transition, which has added to the social costs and responsibilities of central and local governments, is hardly the outcome of faulty government policy or of the waning of entrepreneurial zeal. Yet it is of great import: the population of 126 million in 2000 is projected to drop to 101 million by 2050, one third of whom would be older than 65. This alone would create sustained negative industrial and economic growth. Finally, although shaky in operation, under different leaderships and philosophies, central government has, in fact, attempted more of a neo-Keynesian growth-inducement and employment policy than would have been acceptable in other, industrial mixed economies. Indeed, it is the budgetary and commercial implications of such official policy that has brought so much criticism from Japan’s industrial competitors. But it is also precisely in this decade that the Japanese system has shown a greater tendency towards flexible entrepreneurship, the development of an independent venture-capital market, especially associated with new Internet and related technologies, admittance of foreign companies and investors involving a variety of joint agreements,10 and something of a breakdown in old political monopolies and corruptions. In addition, during this decade the external economy continued to expand; in October 1998 the Obuchi government pledged over $30 billion in loans to the hardest-hit of the Asian crisis economies, and Japan remains the largest foreign aid donor in the world. If the Japanese bubble economy collapsed in 1990, there was no identifiable turning-point towards fast growth up to the year 2000. With an average annual growth of around 1.5 per cent for the decade, and definite negative growth in 1997 and 1998, the Japanese economy has suffered its worst long-term growth performance since 1868 (Economist, 27 November 1999: 156–7, Samuelson 2000). The collapse of the real-estate and stock markets has continued into the new century. In industry profits have been falling and unemployment rising and wages declining. The resultant fall in domestic consumer demand has tended to encourage an
18 The Japanese industrial economy increase in exports, a further point of contention with the USA and Europe, but also increasingly with industrialising East Asia. A major criticism of public policy centres on the failure of government to turn the trade surpluses and yen appreciations of the 1980s into increased domestic demand (Okita et al. 1987). It is commonly argued that this failure results from the intransigence of protective legislation across farming, banking and retailing as well as manufacturing, which has been designed to extend employment and investment security. Such protectionism, it is claimed, has promoted excess capacity in manufacturing and forced budget-deficit spending as the only feasible public policy strategy. Only belatedly are major production companies reducing capacity: at the opening of the year 2000, fifteen chemical plants were reported as cutting capacity, and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph planned to eliminate some 21,000 jobs by 2003. The G-7 Tokyo meetings in January 2000 were used by Europe and the United States to advise Japanese policy-makers further on the need for greater deregulation and financial planning. At around 105 yen against the US dollar, both Japanese and international commentators have speculated on the negative impacts on the world economy of further yen appreciations, a position reversing that of the 1970s when American policy was wholly geared to raising the value of the yen from the very low level of the golden age. In opposition, the Asian industrialisers are equally wary of any fall in the value of the yen towards the 150 to the dollar mark, for this might quickly reduce Asian sales to Japan and shrink Japanese investment in Asia, worsening the region’s debt problems.11 The value of the yen in 2000 epitomised the position of Japan in the world. The 1990s witnessed a furthering of a ‘new dualism’, with highly regulated older industrial areas such as steel and shipbuilding falling into shrinking markets,12 followed by automobiles and consumer electronics, but increasingly offset by the fast emergence of smaller, flexible high-tech and services companies led by entrepreneurs who have escaped the regulations of the larger enterprises. Although major firms such as Sony, NTT, Shin-Etsu Chemicals and Fujitsu have successfully moved over to restructuring into new high-tech enterprises and subsidiaries , the socalled ‘new economy’ is better encapsulated in the brashness and zeal of Softbank and its founder president, Son Masayoshi, aged 40. Compared to the earlier modern enterprises, both services and electronics firms of the new economy tend to be smaller in size and stimulated by a wave of foreign money and Internet brokerage. Official figures have recently shown that firms with fewer than ten employees account for over 60 per cent of retail sales on the Web. The failure of the bubble has meant that the major Japanese banks have accrued a huge amount of bad debts, most of which originated in the earlier, basically nonindustrial, investment booms of the 1980s but have been continued under the protection of old regulations which have curtailed market competition in the financial sector. This situation was worsened in 1997–8 with the impacts of the financial crisis in Asia and the continued fall in residential and commercial land values.13 Much investment expansion had been into industrialising nations in the region, and this continued through the period 1992–7. By 1998 some $125 billion had been placed at risk in Asia. This combination of circumstances meant that by
Introduction 19 late 1997 the large banks of Japan faced approximately $658 billion of nonperforming loans, around 16.3 per cent of GDP, this representing a huge wasting asset trapped outside the operations of the traditional industrial sectors (Fukui and Fukai 1998: 24–33, Lincoln 1998: 57–62, Krugman 1998, Iwata 1999: 55–73). This series of relationships led to large bankruptcies in the financial sector, failures and bail-outs involving prestigious banks or finance houses such as Takushoku Bank (1997),Yamaichi Securities, Sanyo Securities and the Long-Term Credit Bank (late 1997 onwards). In addition, this same grouping of large financial enterprises was further damaged by an outburst of corruption and racketeering charges and scandals embracing also Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba and Nomura, and involving the Ministry of Finance. Many of these related to blackmailing and stockholder payoffs of the sort described in Chapter 3 (pp. 47–9).14 Towards the end of 1999 banking chose to lever itself out of such a quagmire through mega-merger. The Industrial Bank of Japan, Dai-Ichi Bank and Fuji Bank planned to create the largest bank in the world by forming a joint holding company, one which would eliminate redundant investment, close branches, phase out jobs, and write-off problem loans. Against this background, the public sector has attempted several methods of demand stimulation. During the decade the government has pumped approximately ¥82 trillion or $683 billion into the economy, mainly by public works projects. By early 1997 the accumulated state debt had reached ¥416 trillion, or about 90 per cent of Japan’s GDP in that year. In the later years the monetary authorities maintained very low interest rates in order to stimulate investment activity: by September 1998 the Bank of Japan discount rate fell to its lowest level ever at 0.25 per cent. At the same time taxes have been kept relatively low. This combination of instruments yielded an annual budget deficit of 3.4 per cent of GDP in 1997. The major criticisms of government economic policy in 2000 advocated drastic moves away from the expensive bolstering of inefficiency, and towards fiscal reform and an industrial policy that would assist the restructuring of large enterprises15 by revising outmoded labour laws, and a movement of government spending from construction to manufacturing. Interestingly, in an article published in The New York Times in April 1999, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi agreed that ‘Japanese companies can no longer afford to make social stability a priority and keep workers on the payroll regardless of earnings’. But electoral politics alters moods. In December of the same year, Obuchi was reported by the Far Eastern Economic Review as restating the more conventional view that the ‘strengths of Japanese-style management should be retained’ and applauding the tradition whereby ‘Japanese companies have a strong sense of responsibility to society’ (Dawson and Chanda 1999: 17). A popular explanation of industrial slow-down lies in the failures of the political system to maintain its traditional ‘growthmanship’ orientation. Thus in 1998, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was blamed for failing to come to grips with the banking troubles, and much of this uncertainty could be ascribed to the weakening of the power of the Liberal Democratic Party,16 especially as evidenced in the upperhouse legislative elections of July that year, when the LDP was left short of a majority, resulting particularly from the loss of support in the great industrial centres
20 The Japanese industrial economy of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. The consequent rise of Keizo Obuchi to the LDP presidency and hence as Prime Minister involved the formation of an ‘economic reconstruction cabinet’ which set out to resolve the banking crisis by purchasing the stock of weak banks in order to recapitalise into productive concerns. Later in the same year the government increased the spending programme and reintroduced a limited tax rebate (Bristow 1998, Sender 2000). One perspective, then, on Japan in the 1990s would be to lay at the door of politics the faults of the economic system. In turn this might be seen as an inevitable function of time passing, which has resulted in a complete removal of the late-development imperatives and tactics of ‘growthmanship’, a recently risen and powerful middleclass voice, and an erosion of the twin mechanisms of technological lag and institutional innovation. These three processes together represent the underlying internal constraints for the Japanese industrial economy into the new century. In time, the system has transcended its own ‘developmentalism’. At the same time, more than for any other large industrialised nation, growth in Japan is severely constrained by its environmental costs and the geopolitical location of the nation in developing East Asia. Together these two factors might be visualised as corresponding exogenous constraints. Whether these five important underlying constraints can be converted into working conditions for future economic success has yet to be established.
Honing an argument From the rather rolling terrain that we have already surveyed, it should be clear that the present text is wary of all simplifying models of Japanese industrialisation, whether these be economistic or culturalist. Similarly, the text departs from the only position on which Jacobs and Braudel seemingly agree (Jacobs 1958, Braudel 1985).17 That is, it is not necessary to argue that those features which separate Japan from Asia also somehow bring Japan closer to the European experience. To argue with either Jacobs or Braudel that bureaucracy in China contrasted with pluralism in Japan and held back industrial and social development does not, even if correct, in itself permit a slide towards an identification of Japan with Europe. Such an identity must be independently established, and we would suggest that Japan in fact sits neither immediately to the left of Asia nor immediately to the right of Europe or the West, a position to which we return later. The natural scientist T. H. Huxley once gibed that the social scientist Herbert Spencer’s idea of a tragedy was a deduction killed by a fact. Somewhat more recently, Robert Solow has argued powerfully that, although economic activity itself is always ‘embedded in a web of social institutions, customs, beliefs and attitudes’, much formal analysis proceeds in implicit denial of this, ‘as if economics is the physics of society’ (Solow 1985: 328). Something equal to this may be said of those cultural or social historians who find in one feature or model the deciding demarcation, the final explanation of Japan’s industrial success. This does not mean that anything goes. The intention of the present text is to point to the importance of the relationships between what might be thought of as
Introduction 21 physical factors or assets on one hand, and the institutions within which – and agencies through which – such assets are estimated, gathered, protected, valued and dispersed. Sometimes such institutions are markets. Sometimes they are not. Historians are periodically faced with a barrage of institutional arrangements which decisively impinge upon the activities of economic agents but which exist only in terms of law, power and the nation state. On two very large canvases David Landes has pointed to a number of non-market institutional factors which induced the innovative activities of the European bourgeoisie. Here the arbitrary actions of the state were minimised, protection of property was optimised and individual contracting between ‘free’ economic agents thereby replaced force and obligation (Landes 1969, 1998). In contrast, with equally massive scope, Joseph Needham might have argued that China in many ways represented a more viable alternative setting for industrial development, witness its high levels of literacy, classical educational system and meritocracy (Needham 1986). We suggest here that, in cases of late development and technology transfer, the relations between market and non-market forces are systematically different from those found in either the earlier, Western industrialisers or in those nations which do not pass through a specific phase of industrial transition at a later date, whether this be the result of missing assets or colonisation. In this we develop, although we do not directly follow, several of the ideas of Alexander Gerschenkron (1966). Of necessity the nation state is our unit of analysis, and national development is a term which encompasses social and political development as well as industrialisation.
Analysing the industrial economy Throughout this volume we will rehearse an approach to the dynamics of Japanese industrialisation which revolves around the importance of technology, institutions and the historical interventions of the state, particularly in so far as the latter helped determine the character of the relations between Japan and other, more advanced industrial systems. Chapter 2 surveys major aspects of Japanese industrialisation and illustrates the unhelpful character of many existing general approaches, particularly those which confine explanations solely to economic factors. Chapter 3 treats broadly of Japanese society. Some years ago the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, told her public that there is no such thing as society. There are only individuals. A majority of Japanese believe the exact opposite about themselves. There are no such things as individuals. There is only society. Many analysts have concluded that this stark difference of image reflects a real difference in the manner in which Japan operates in comparison to Western nations more generally, that in the way in which identity is constructed lies the secret of Japanese industrial efficiency, if not economic growth. The treatment of the social underpinnings of Japanese industry takes up this issue and argues for the importance in Japan of key institutions. Centring on theories and processes of technology transfer, Chapter 4 argues that such a theme best explains Japanese success but is understandable only in terms of contemporaneous processes of institutional innovation. Furthermore, such
22 The Japanese industrial economy institutional change was itself at least partially dependent upon the use of foreign models of enterprise structure and behaviour. Thereby, ‘late development’ conditioned both technological progress and institutional development. It is this which serves to render problematic the historical relations between Japanese culture and Japanese industrialisation, the subject of the following chapters. Chapter 5 evolves an approach to cultural engineering, visualised as an historical process wherein the state initiated a manipulation of traditions and values in order to reduce the financial and political costs of late industrialisation. Japanese success followed not merely from the possession of certain cultural assets but from their deliberate mobilisation, especially across periods of particular technological and institutional transformation. But industrial modernisation was sustained in Japan because this process did not remain locked into the fortunes of the state as such, but was passed on into the culture of private enterprise itself. Chapter 6 takes up the theme of Japanese enterprise culture in more detail, and agrees with other commentators that much of Japan’s modern advantage may well have rested on key features of Japanese enterprise organisation and behaviour. However, for reasons that may now be obvious, our argument departs greatly from any approaches which begin with such features as explanations of Japanese economic performance. Chapter 7 reverts to a more explicitly comparative perspective. Clearly, Japan is an exception, but it is not necessarily one which proves any golden historical rules. Indeed, whether juxtaposed with the West or with China, Japanese historical experience tends to strip most grand theories of their power as tools of historical explanation. Comparison, or setting Japan in global historical context, seems to force out a mixture of the mundane with the profound. Japan’s industrialisation may well have depended on its escape from colonialism, but if so this was itself an outcome of the conjunction of mundane factors of timing, location, topography, climate, density of settlement and efficiency of transport and communications, as much as it had anything to do with social structure, political regime or even human resources. Furthermore, such relatively basic features of historical Japan may have been of very great importance in conditioning Japan’s subsequent industrial success, particularly perhaps in providing a good environment for the speedy mobilisation of scarce resources.
2
Interpretations of Japan
Late development During most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the industrialisation of late starters under conditions of relative economic backwardness was replete with tensions and traumas, often disabling internal political conflicts, and the tortuous decisions and interventions of the modernising state itself. Across an array of cases, international commodity and investment flows and the constant threats of political encroachment posed massive problems for late developers and for the social elites and interest groups within them. This latter distinction is of real importance. It was surely rare indeed that a large ‘nation’ somehow ‘responded’ to the West. In nations or empires such as Russia and Japan, with their many millions of peoples living in relative isolation, industrial modernisation resulted from the activities of a relatively small elite whose own motives were prompted and directed within the very process of international interaction itself.1 From the middle of the nineteenth century, the growth in power and influence of such early industrialisers as Britain, the USA, Belgium or France, together with the increased availability of investment funds and advanced technologies in the growing international economy, sparked political reactions and commercial responses amidst a group of European late developers. Even amongst nations with already established commercial or cultural links to the industrialising core, late development was hardly a matter of smooth, organic transition. Huge injections of foreign capital, the organisation of joint ventures and of migrant labour, and the large importations of advanced industrial and transport equipment were closely associated with the new initiating and controlling roles of the nationalist state at all levels of intervention, from tariffs and direct investment in model installations, through technology search and application, to labour regulations and training institutions. Modernising technological projects in the metallurgical districts of south Hungary might involve a great range of advanced machinery from several nations, in combination with a labour force of thousands of workers and skilled technicians drawn from Britain, Germany, Italy and France as well as from Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. From Bismarck onwards, most leaders of late-developing nations visualised their task as the harnessing of scarce resources and their concentration within new projects and institutions as a requisite of military industrialisation programmes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
24 The Japanese industrial economy During the attempted industrial drives of relatively backward nations there was thus a higher likelihood of income distribution shifting quite speedily towards capital and away from consumption to a greater degree than had occurred in early-start nations at the time of their own industrialisations (Gerschenkron 1966). Within many parts of Europe, Russia and elsewhere the need for a concentration of resources in order to effect technology transfers into heavy transport and military industries caused the strategic role of government to embrace both industrial enterprise and political control in a much more intensive manner than ever witnessed before in world history. But the transfer of technique is not readily divorced from the transfer of ideologies and ambitions. The social displacement and the devaluation of existing assets of entire social groups and classes, which necessarily occurred within late developers as they sought industrial transformation, together with the general fear of the unknown amongst even wider social and religious groupings, created environments within which grew new ideologies, interests and political alternatives. We argue here that it is precisely in this context of industrialisation under conditions of relative economic backwardness that the Japanese industrial experience belongs. A principal trigger was the expansion of the leading early starter, Britain, into China during the British industrial revolution. The British seizing of Singapore in 1819 and the growing tensions in the opium trade with China signified to many, including Japanese observers, that the next focus of British commercial interests would be in the Far East. The British fought and defeated the Manchu dynasty in the Opium Wars of the 1830s, and by the Treaty of Nanking (1842) forced upon China the first of a great succession of unequal treaties between the industrial and commercial West and the agrarian and commercial East. In Japan the movement towards political reform and military-based industrial change was undoubtedly hastened by the expansion of British interests and the collapse of the traditional authority of the Chinese empire. The recurring worries over Russia remained evident in the writings of Hakumin Aizawa , but Shinen Sato in his Kondo Hisaku emphasised that a China weakened by the West exposed Japan to a new challenge. Shozan Sakuma gave early warnings of the danger of Britain, whilst others, such as Genzui Kusaka, made wary study of the British techniques of warfare in China.
Technology transfer As we have already suggested, technology transfer across nations does not normally lead to sustained industrialisation. The history of even eighteenth-century Europe is a history of failed technology transfers to France and to Britain, as well as in Spain or Russia. Very few nations have managed to repeat the performance of the clutch of a dozen nations that succeeded in industrialisation on the basis of such transfers prior to 1914. For reasons outlined, relative backwardness is by definition a disadvantage. In terms of its specific transfer components, apart from the obvious problems of capital cost and lack of precise information, the phenomenon of technological interrelatedness means that single components of a production process can seldom be simply replaced or ‘borrowed’ in a piecemeal fashion. The higher
Interpretations of Japan 25 the level of sophistication of the technologies, the greater the difficulty of transfer. Technology transfer requires organisation and involves some calculation of risks. As we have suggested, for a host of reasons forward planning is seldom found in relatively backward nations undergoing industrial modernisation and open to foreign ideologies and political influences. Yet Japanese industrial success was based on just such technology transfer. For Edwin Reischauer, ‘Western science and cheap oriental labour made an excellent combination for low-priced production’ (Reischauer 1964: 92). For Sumihito Hirai ‘the first step to economic development was to learn and imitate Western technology’ (Hirai 1978: 16). In an extremely influential account, two of the most distinguished economic historians of Japan find a positive feedback mechanism between technology transfers and institutional innovations across the period from the nineteenth to the later twentieth century. Ohkawa and Rosovsky note that only a well functioning ‘socio-political infrastructure’ can close the gap between advanced imported technologies and their efficient absorption, and that ‘Japanese economic history shows both the significance of a rapid absorption of imported technology and also the development of specific institutions that facilitated the entire process’ (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973: 219). The econometric historian Ryoshin Minami has similarly suggested that ‘the rapid growth of Japanese manufacturing, compared to that of other countries, was largely dependent on rapid technological progress, as a latecomer Japan had the advantage of exploiting modern technologies developed in advanced countries’. Minami acknowledges that ‘simply having a backlog of technology available is not a sufficient basis for the successful emergence of a modern economy’, and singles out labour bias, government initiation and utilisation of existing social overhead capital as the reasons for Japanese accomplishment. Of especial importance, Minami concludes that ‘according to the Japanese experience, policies to develop the social capacity to absorb modern technologies are of great significance’ (Minami 1979: 308, 314).
The social and the economic A purpose of the present text is to develop an interpretation of the Japanese industrial economy from the points at which a more conventional approach might conclude. Every one of the causal or conditioning features isolated by the above analysts demands serious consideration of the dynamic and unforeseen relations between social and economic forces. Thus, ‘institutions’ were neither automatic nor fortuitous facilitators of Westernised technological transformation. New institutions depended on search and selection processes and, at times, required very costly investments, which had to be chosen in the face of viable industrial alternatives in a situation of resource scarcity. Chapter 5 highlights the huge expenditures on education and training required for successful industrial transition at times of great social upheaval. Again, policies which effected an increase in ‘social capacity’ of the sort meant by Minami were not simple outcomes of either inherited national resources or perfect information, but were arrived at in situations of imperfect information and internal social and ideological conflict.
26 The Japanese industrial economy So, this volume takes up the challenge of Japan’s unique industrial experience. The transfer of the layers of Western influence to Japan was initially the concern of intellectuals, bureaucrats and han (clan) authorities and government, but through time passed into the hands of the entrepreneur. An important period of transition was that of the industrial drive, c. 1868–81, when a host of new institutions and formulae were adopted in order to reduce yet satisfy the traditional privileges of newly displaced elites. Land tax reforms during the years 1872–3 established some basis for government revenue, and the state forged new systems of education, property rights and commercial security. During these years there was a speedy introduction of a range of infrastructural, military and manufacturing technologies from Europe and America, and without doubt this soon began to yield an increase in the growth of industrial production. The continuing industrialisation was dominated by the state, which retained its political control in the face of cultural and political conflicts. The later Meiji years witnessed a greater spread of industrialisation, and the continuing prominence of government during the build-up of a militaryindustrial complex and the successful waging of major wars against China (1895) and Russia (1904–5). For both nations engaged in the second of these conflicts, war had profound outcomes in the longer term. In Russia defeat was an element in the civil breakdown of 1905, the prolongation of recession and the ideological turmoil that was to lead to the Revolution of 1917. In contrast, Japan’s victory led to a surge of foreign investment into the nation, an increase in the pace of technology transfer and a confirmation of the statist industrialisation programme. Yet it might be reasonably claimed that the military result had been founded in the immediately prior processes of late development. The low standard of the Russian railway, especially during the winter at Lake Baikal, drastically reduced the ability to mobilise and concentrate resources: 80,000 troops were fielded against the 180,000-strong army of Japan. The debate over whether Russia could hold Port Arthur, the nation’s only ice-free port on the Pacific rim, on the basis of a naval engagement, centred on technological capabilities. When the Russian Baltic fleet eventually arrived in May 1905, it compared badly with Togo’s modernized navy, this resulting in Japan’s naval victory at Tsushima on 28 May 1905.2 The estimated cost of the war to Japan was around £100 million, to Russia only somewhat less. From around this point, in Japan the decisions of many private businesses replaced the earlier direct activities of the state. In Russia the movement towards private enterprise in these years was more uncertain and far less fruitful. In Japan, from the end of the Meiji era, shocks of depression (1930–2) and war (1937–45) were followed by renewed phases of catchup based on more advanced imported technologies. It was in this period of industrial modernism that there emerged most strongly in Japan the seemingly unique relationships between technological progress and institutional change which became so characteristic of the economy during its golden age of the 1960s and 1970s.
Features of Japanese industrial history No approach to Japan has won the day, and interpretations of the nation’s industrialisation vary between those strictly economistic and those which are just
Interpretations of Japan 27 as assuredly cultural. The first of these groupings of interpretation sees Japan as a valuable case study in economic development and is based on theories of surplus labour absorption, or of high levels of investment or of skill transmission across the Meiji Restoration divide of 1868. Very often, such interpretations derive from even more general perspectives gained from the history of other, especially Western, nations or regions. This is particularly so of what we might label the ‘Rostovian’ approach to Japan, that which greatly emphasises a long build-up of internal ‘prerequisites’ to industrialisation throughout the Tokugawa years.3 Those historians who stress the long-term role of indigenous Japanese culture fall into two major camps, amongst and between which there are several distinctions and overlaps. One major tradition postulates that it is possible to isolate specific Japanese traits which were and are either similar to or functional equivalents of cultural traits found in Western history. So social mobility and an ethos of individualism and commercialism may have been ingrained in Japan at an early date, there may have been competing points of authority rather than the extreme centralism of the Chinese or other social systems, traits in neo-Confucianism may have acted on commercial behaviour in a way analogous to the ‘Protestant ethic’ in the West, and so on. Other writers stress the unique character of ‘Japanese culture’, but then argue that this gave rise to a unique and non-replicable case of ‘Japanese industrialisation’. The first culturalist approach allows great generalisation to and from the Japanese case, the second approach forbids all generalisation. We argue here that amidst this eclecticism of interpretation lies the wonderful complexity and breadth of change of Japanese industrialisation, much of which is impossible to express or explain in firm economistic or adamant culturalist terms. Our general position is that Japan succeeded as a late developer because Japan reallocated energies and a motley collection of resources towards a process of industrialisation based on creative searching, learning and adaptation. Modelling of the historical experience is difficult once we acknowledge some of those very unusual features of the Japanese case which go back into the early part of a long industrial prelude and which were noted briefly in Chapter 1. The extremely large population of around thirty million for most of the Tokugawa era contained by the end of that time a labour force of approximately twenty-four million, some 70 per cent or more of whom were employed in agriculture. Figures for England and Wales show a population of around six million in 1701, some growth by mid-century and over nine million by 1801 (Deane and Cole 1969). Whatever the final outcome of the dispute about population growth in England in the earlier as against the later eighteenth century, the overall comparative picture is of the gentle increase of a small population associated with the early development of the first industrial nation. In Japan by contrast, the pre-industrial population growth was negligible, remained gentle during Meiji industrialisation, and was at all times generated by a very large population base. Again in comparison, late twentieth-century underdeveloped nations were small: of eighty-five nations classified as undeveloped by the United Nations in 1965, forty-five had populations of up to five million and fifteen of five to ten million, the median size being five million, the arithmetic mean seventeen mllion. In summary, the large and relatively stable population of Japan represented
28 The Japanese industrial economy enormous production potential and a very large market for the consumermanufactured products of the West. In a much smaller global economy than today, with a much smaller and less sophisticated technological system, the thirty to forty millions of Meiji Japan offered a far greater base for technological transfer, usage and diffusion than can be hazarded for either early starters or present-day poor nations. As we have noted, most of the Japanese rural workers were engaged also in some form of commercial or industrial by-employment, especially in the traditional pursuits of silk and textiles, sugar, glass, pottery, paper and fertiliser production. At first this may not seem to be a feature much removing Japan from early modern European experience. After all, European historians now commonly describe seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe as ‘a differentiated patchwork of interdependent regions, specialising in a wide array of agricultural and industrial activities, and trading in mass commodities through a network of towns and cities’ (Ogilvie 1995: 221). This ‘proto-industrial’ model of European industrialisation depicts a continuing progressive relationship between such proto-industries and population growth, labour surpluses and mobility, commercialisation of agriculture (the movement to commercial crops for non-farm markets, contract labour, money rents and so on), technological innovations stemming from rising demands (through higher incomes, greater numbers and the equipment needs of agriculture) and the fading away of traditional restrictive institutions and statist instruments as they made way for more strident, vigorous market forces and nascent entrepreneurship.4 However, several of the components of this particular ‘European model’ are in fact missing from Tokugawa Japan, particularly those relating to demography, technology and entrepreneurship (Mendels 1972). For although Japan was most certainly awash with rural industries, in contrast with the more advanced regions of Europe these were not servicing export markets, were not metallurgically based or situated in or around production-oriented towns and cities. As described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, institutional factors stemming from internal political imperatives determined that Japan was commercially isolated compared to nations of equivalent development, and that the large cities were, with some exceptions (outstandingly Osaka), principally centres of conspicuous consumption. Perhaps of equal importance, Japan differed from Europe in the location and character of its productive innovations. In the Tokugawa years the principal technical improvements were found in the villages, in the increased use of commercial fertilisers, irrigation, new threshing machinery, multiple cropping and crop diversification. The wooden-framed thresher first appeared around Osaka prior to 1700 and replaced the koki-hashi in drawing of rice stalks. Saved labour at harvest times did not result in labour movements but appears to have been used in other farm pursuits, including the planting of winter crops immediately after the late harvest. Innovation was land-saving rather than labour-saving. Only in the later decades of the eighteenth century did iron technology begin to make inroads on production levels, and in several han the leading industry changed from rice culture or gold mining to iron mining and working. Different techniques were used to produce cast iron, pig iron and steel, and there is evidence of a merging of traditional methods with Iberian metallurgical techniques. It is possible that the increased production of threshing
Interpretations of Japan 29 forks, scissors and carpenters’ tools might have been of importance to the incorporation of European methods of iron-smelting during the Meiji years. But none of this was sufficient to establish an industrial trajectory of the West European sort. Such rural industrial employments were by no means to fade away during the acceleration of modernised industrialisation in the later nineteenth century. Indeed the rural industries of the Meiji period thrived in both the domestic and the foreign markets, and acted as a site for labour absorption into higher productivity work as well as for the reception of Western technologies in transport and power supply. A very high population density of around a hundred persons per square kilometre in early Meiji Japan, greater than that found in any other industrialising system at that time, and dense settlement on major alluvial plains, meant that an efficient transport system became quite speedily converted into an efficient information system, especially when the techniques of the telegraph and printed media were introduced during the 1870s. It might be concluded that Japanese topography in itself created a density of settlement which encouraged a movement of people and ideas at a speed and efficiency not attainable in China or India even a century later. As Hagerstrand has been at pains to point out, such characteristics have profound impacts on transmission and diffusion processes, whether of ideas or of artefacts (Hagerstrand 1968). Once opened to foreign threat and competition, Japan’s spatial characteristics allowed an efficient diffusion of Western technologies or of Japanese best practice techniques and organisations through geographically proximate and therefore competing enterprises, a process which worked well in the context of the relatively simple metal technologies of the later nineteenth century and earlier twentieth century. Aided by new public sector institutions for education, training and information collection, testing and diffusion, the positive effects of such mundane, given features must not be neglected. Japan was also very lucky. Despite disasters of diplomacy and formal commercial arrangements, Japan was fortunate in its foreign commercial dealings and with the timing and global impacts of the opening in 1869 of the Suez Canal, which markedly reduced transport costs between Europe and Asia generally. Indeed, Japan’s eventual trading competitiveness in a world of increasing tariffs and colonial trades was such as to neutralise the stifling effects of the unequal commercial treaties which Japan was forced to sign with the Western powers, and these latter were revoked during the 1890s. There was one instance of extreme good fortune. It was precisely during the late 1860s and early 1870s that a dramatic infection destroyed the silkworm eggs of Italy, southern France and elsewhere. As raw silk was one of the principal staples of the period, Western commercial interests soon searched out alternative sources, and the Japanese began to supply the world with a simple basic product. But silk was not such a staple as coffee or copper, for it was more readily manufactured using cheap labour and improved machinery. By the 1890s, the business acumen, labour organisation and export revenues of the Japanese silk industry were providing the immediate context for the development of the Japanese cotton textile industry, the second core industry of the Japanese industrial revolution.
30 The Japanese industrial economy
Interpretations and perspectives A major feature of the present study is to question the meaning and use of such terms as ‘began to supply’, or ‘using’, or ‘providing the immediate context’ in this sort of narrative of Japanese success. Such notions become intrinsically problematic when we recognise that flukes must be converted. Response was not automatic, nor success assured. The major active agents of change did not in fact ‘know’ what was going to happen next. In the case above of the silk industry, Western investigations in Japan uncovered imminent dangers to the Japanese cocoons, and a meeting of foreign merchants in May of 1871 advocated quality control, especially in the reeling process, through the better instruction of both dealers and growers (Adams 1874, Japan Weekly Mail 1871: 188–9). Western recommendations included the limiting of further production to the most suitable provinces, confining production to only full-sized silk, the use of improved reeling and twisting machinery and a stoppage of the export of silkworm eggs. Western advice was based on considerable treks into otherwise forbidden corners of Japan, at one point involving detailed reportage of a marketing association of sixteen villages, the Matsukawa-gumi, members of which were all engaged in the cultivation of the oak silkworm in the province of Shinshiu near Matsumoto. At this time such associations might market up to twenty million cocoons annually. As early as the late months of 1870, F. O. Adams of the Londonbased Silk Supply Association was advising commercial and official agents that the decline in quality was due to the disease pebrime, a contagious blight that had destroyed the Italian silk industry. Adams advocated the testing of Japanese worms using the recent techniques of Pasteur, Tyndall and others, and denounced the introduction of foreign eggs into the breeding process. The work of the British was bolstered by the researches of Gravier and Brunet, who recommended and gained the support of provincial governments for the establishment of silk-reeling establishments (filatures) of two to three thousand basins. Brunet returned to Europe in order to procure the necessary machinery, and news of such activity was readily spread in such specially created official organs as the Shimbun Zasshi, which were filled with reports of European methods of silk-egg rearing and even animal husbandry. By August 1871 the International Bacological Congress met in Austria and announced Japanese progress, and during the following months it became clear that Japanese silk merchants and growers were adhering to European advice. On one trip into the countryside, the British expert Russell Robertson distributed within a week over two thousand pamphlets warning against inferior birriti seed, not only in towns and villages but ‘at every roadside cottage’ (Japan Weekly Mail 1870: 479, 498–9). Most of the above paragraph describes an information system only, and such description can not predict the character of the Japanese response, which patently involved a great number of agents and institutions, from village associations to newspapers, to official interventions. Clearly, the advice of foreign experts to limit some outputs or invest in new machines threatened many existing interests and involved immediate costs, with no assurance of success other than the dubious ‘science’ of strangers. Yet the early response ensured Japan an industrial leading
Interpretations of Japan 31 sector based on exports to the West. By the end of the decade twenty-seven different prefectures boasted over seven hundred modernised silk filatures based on a mixed water (over 80 per cent), steam and hand-power technology. This became the first major industrial object lesson for the Japanese: ‘Silk affords the best example of what may be done in other branches of business and who, in the face of the examples we have quoted, can assert that industrial undertakings will not flourish in Japan?’ (Mainichi Shimbun, 13 November 1879: 5). Our summary position at this stage is simple enough. This combination of features in itself distinguished Japan from other late developers in Meiji and later years, and provided good conditions for the absorption of Western technology across a range of employments and for the manipulations and persuasions of government agencies. Such features also go some way in elucidating the sprightly performance of agriculture proper throughout the transition towards the more mature industrial economy. Even if we accept that the earlier tax return data tended to inflate the seeming growth rate of Meiji agriculture, a present estimate of around 1.5 per cent per annum growth is not unreasonable, and lies above a population growth of less than 1 per cent. Even the food importing of the early twentieth century was as much a reflection of the policy imperatives of a new empire as it was evidence of any failure on the part of agriculture to satisfy food requirements, just as the rural producers moved more towards industrial crops such as silk and indigo. Efficiency increases arose not from large inputs of machinery or capital but from dissemination of existing best practice, biological innovations led by Western techniques or inputs (for example, novel rice varieties), double cropping and improved irrigation. Much of this was motivated by a key institutional change, the introduction of a land tax which demanded money payments but did not allow sufficiently for the effects of inflation in the early Meiji period. Less than income-maximising to the state, the land tax from the early 1870s may well have been motive-optimising to the producer or landholder. It provided the great bulk of government revenue for ordinary expenditure until the 1890s. Innovation in Japanese agriculture was, thus, labourusing, and the failure of wages to be a principal cause of inflation for most of the years prior to 1937 testifies to a considerable amount of underemployment prior to 1868, despite the much-vaunted improvements of the Tokugawa years. A final outstanding feature of the Japanese case, which furthers the difficulties in the way of constructing adequately smart explanatory models, is the peculiarity of government intervention. For example, during the highly significant transformations of the Meiji years, government taxation averaged well below 10 per cent of national income. In international terms this represented a very modest level of revenue and expenditure. Yet without doubt government was the principal agent of technique and knowledge transfer and usage, social and cultural control and melioration, institutional transformation and international transactions. At the same time, the decidedly unequal treaties signed with the Western powers, and the consequent absence of control over tariffs, reduced a potential source of revenue and removed the possibility of pursuing any direct policy of export promotion under protection. The only focus left for the industrialising state was cost reduction and quality control
32 The Japanese industrial economy over a wide front. In this book we argue that it was this context, together with the Meiji internal policy decision not to import foreign capital (see Chapter 1), which forced upon the entire industrialising system a concentration upon cultural engineering, technology transfer and human capital formation. Such building blocks of industrial transformation were created relatively quickly by the state, but exploited more or less effectively by the private sector during the 1890s and onwards.
Wider contexts To emphasise for very good reasons those historical features of Japan which combine to preclude the simple application of Western-based models is not in any way to equate Japanese experience with that of Asia more generally. As we have tried to show, many of the characteristics of industrialising Japan are those of late development. They are not necessarily those of an Asiatic mode of production, or clearly representative of a wider Confucian culture. So if we juxtapose Japan with the great civilisations of India or China we find very obvious points of contrast, all of which impinged upon patterns of industrialisation. Compared to these two giants, Japan was isolated and beyond the ambitions of the great Western powers. Japan was densely settled and obviously maritime. For Japan communications were easier and taxes more collectable: even the monsoon was far kinder. In Japan the multiple authorities of emperor, shogun and han emerged historically rather than through the application of a coherent and unchanging ideology, and this allowed greater diversity and deviance. Whereas in China classical learning not only dictated status but also represented belief, in Japan the educational system was deliberately managed to reduce or ameliorate the contradictions between traditional ideals and Tokugawa or Meiji realities. Brushing even more broadly, we might hazard that, in both Japan and the more advanced parts of Europe, population was densely settled, iron techniques allowed increasingly efficient power transmission, and distances between regional markets and more advanced production sites were relatively small compared to India or China. Perhaps primarily because of this, in both Japan and Europe there is evidence of multiple tensions between traditional values and new commercial practices. It is true that the expenses of the individual han, both in satisfying the control needs of the state and in establishing its own internal controls, could be very high indeed, even in comparison with China: the outlays on sankin kotai, (or forced alternate residence for the nobility) in Tokugawa Japan could at times come to 70 per cent of annual han revenue. But the expenses of the central state in maintaining sovereignty were surely less in Japan and advanced Europe than in China and India, and the methods less draconian. In turn, this permitted more secure market transactions in Japan than could be found elsewhere in Asia.
The cake of custom and cultural engineering For the constitutional theorist and historian Walter Bagehot, in his Physics and Politics of 1873, the modern and enlightened Age of Discussion awaited the dissolution of
Interpretations of Japan 33 the ‘cake of custom’. By definition, perhaps, cultural traditions held back progressive change, but for Bagehot the urge to conformity or stasis was not inherent in or natural to cultures per se. It was an outcome of particular beliefs stemming from religious or moral ideas which were themselves historical and intrusive cultural artefacts. Culture could shift. For Bagehot, change towards modern democracy depended on the improved education of the masses within a social system of continued hierarchies, whereby the political and moral choices of the newly enfranchised would be guided by the enlightened intentions of sovereign cultural elites. In contrast, the nation of late industrialisation was faced with immediate choices forced by rapidly changing international circumstances, where the principal goal of elites and interest groups was to maintain control while instigating industrial revolution in order to survive pressures stemming from both within and without. A crumbling of the ‘cake of custom’ would mean disaster. Retirement into cultural conservatism might mean worse. Most commonly commentators on Japan’s industrial history eschew the sociocultural and ideological contexts. Yet industrial revolutions cannot occur in emotional vacuums, for in such an artificial space there could be no entrepreneurs, no agents motivated through their own private concerns, no decisions informed by the instructions of others. For instance, the performance of the Meiji government could be measured fairly narrowly (though with difficulty) in terms of the costs of its interventions, the effects of crowding-out and so on, as if the absence of government would have been filled by optimising economic agents operating fairly in a system of recognised and stable property rights. This would be no reasonable description of early Meiji Japan, a place where merchants gulled producers, employees absconded at will, where ex-samurai armed themselves against the regime, where Westerners of every complexion hid deep within the protection of extraterritoriality, and where compradore agencies extracted incomes from any producing pocket that they could uncover. Any interpretation of Japanese industrialisation must surely incorporate a story of regime survival at low cost. If effective resource utilisation had depended wholly upon public-sector investments in human capital formation, technology transfer and Western ideas, then the system would have collapsed entirely some time well prior to the outbreak of hostilities with China in the 1890s. The subsequent history of Japan would then belong to the realm of imaginative counterfactuals. It is postulated frequently enough that Japan’s industrial transition occurred at low cost because modernised industry was gently but firmly grafted on to a culture either acquiescent or flexible. Thus Inazo Nitobe uncovered bushido (the samurai code of loyalty and honour) as the cultural or behavioural mainstay of Japanese modernity, a view followed by modern analysts such as Everett Hagen, who depend very much upon the notion of the nation ‘following’ the samurai (Nitobe 1907, Hagen 1964). No doubt this sort of approach does echo the judgments of influential contemporaries. Thus the great Meiji minister and political thinker Shigenobu Okuma (1838–1922) believed that ‘Bushido had the power to change feudalism into constitutionalism’ – itself a distorted echo of Bagehot? Other writers have even more explicitly linked specific cultural traits to modernising behaviour patterns.
34 The Japanese industrial economy However, too much is assumed about the social mechanisms whereby the ethics of an elite became the values of a nation. More realistically, subsequent chapters of this book argue that the cost of transition into and sustenance of industrialisation in Japan was relatively low, not simply because of the intrinsic character of cultural traits but because such traits were selected and harnessed to the process of change by a determined industrialising elite acting under the tough conditions of relative economic backwardness. Late development demanded cultural engineering, a theme to which we return in Chapter 5.
3
Maturity Social problems of Japanese capitalism
Introduction Until recently the Japanese economy has been lauded as the most flexible, aggressive and successful of the large capitalist nations in coping with the slower growth and greater complexity of the global economy. The failures of the 1990s changed all of this. Both foreign and Japanese commentators have begun to doubt the quality of the nation’s social and political institutions. On the one hand it has been suggested that the social characteristics of industrialising Japan are not those that will sustain further expansions in the economy and in social welfare into the new century. On the other hand, in a somewhat different vein, it has been suggested that economic growth in Japan has occurred at the cost of retardation in social and psychic welfare, that capitalist success has kept democracy at bay and that Japan is a powerful example of aggressive capitalism – unencumbered by distributive policies, socially divisive and environmentally disastrous. In an effort to throw some light on an at times heated but obscure debate, this chapter considers some key aspects of Japanese society and institutions.
Measures of Japanese society In many ways Japan represents a typical, mature capitalist society. Japanese households spend just less than 20 per cent of their disposable income on food, about equivalent to Germany and the UK, somewhat more than the USA. Expenditure on clothing and housing takes up almost the same proportion of household income in all four of these nations, but the Japanese spend more on medical care and education than do the Europeans, less than do the Americans. The Japanese are normal capitalists. Almost all Japanese households have a colour television set, refrigerators with freezers, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and microwave ovens, whilst over three-quarters of households possess cars, video decks, and air-conditioning. Pianos have long been popular, with nearly a quarter of households boasting one. Satellite receivers are owned by a third of the population, word processors, stereos and compact disc players by around a half. Japanese people consume much like Americans or Europeans. Despite very different cuisines, the Japanese eat much the same amount of protein as the British or the Germans, of which animal protein constitutes about the same proportion (around 55 per cent).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
36 The Japanese industrial economy Fewer people die of cancer or heart disease than in comparable industrial nations, but many more die of pneumonia. Japan may be ‘greying’, but this is in line with demographic transitions in all other industrialised nations, where universally the proportion of the population of those aged 65 and over lies in the range 13–17 per cent (Japan: 14 per cent in 1994). Japan’s suicide rate is now much higher than that of the UK or the USA, but lower than that of France. Per capita expenditure on health is well below that of the USA, but comparable with expenditures in the UK, Sweden, France or Belgium. Where the number of trained doctors in Japan is proportional to the numbers in the UK, the number of hospital beds per capita is far greater in Japan than in the UK, the USA or any major industral nation other than Sweden. Similarly, Japan can boast an equivalence with Britain, the USA or Germany in the supply of trained teachers. Japan produces as many different book titles per annum as does the UK, and with ease exceeds all other nations in the circulation per capita of daily newspapers and the production of new movies. By 1992 record, cassette and compact disc sales in Japan totalled $3.4 billion, and the Japanese music industry became the second largest in the world. By about the same time, cocaine seizures by the Japanese police had reached approximately the same level as US seizures in the 1970s, and there was growing evidence of a similar Colombian connection. The Japanese pornography industry was by then generating perhaps $10 billion a year, dominated by the sale of some fourteen thousand new home video releases annually (Japan 1994, 1998). Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, Japanese society is not homogeneous but capitalist, this involving much of the competition and many of the status differentials between groups and individuals that might be found in Europe and the USA, if manifested within and between contrasting institutional complexes. More carefully, Waswo makes the point that, on any sure measures, Japan is probably no more ‘middle-class’ than Western industrial societies and that, if anything, the gap between rich and poor, the advantaged and disadvantaged, within Japan may well be widening, as the children of parents with the highest incomes continue to do proportionately better than others in securing the educational credentials that provide access to high-income futures and as property ownership becomes increasingly skewed. (Waswo 1996: 129) Furthermore, Japan too has an underclass, composed mostly of resident Koreans, recent Asian immigrants (see below), labouring in small companies, the burakumin (a segregated social group), the Ainu (the Hokkaido minority population who have historically faced discriminatory treatment amounting to social exclusion),1 and a mass of the casually employed. In important respects Japan is unlike everywhere else. But in many such instances the difference may be explained in simple geographical and historical terms. Housing prices and office rentals in Japan are far above those of Europe or the USA, although this has not prohibited a rise in the amount of home ownership, still below that of the USA or UK, but above that for France (that is, around 60 per cent).
Maturity 37 Urban squalor is a general feature of late development, in Japan exacerbated by industrial dualism and extreme spatial restrictions: in 1950 the majority of Japanese still lived in towns and villages, but by 1990 77 per cent of a much larger population were city dwellers, this directly reflecting the shift in resources towards manufacturing outlined in Chapter 1. Public utilities are measurably expensive or undeveloped, space always at a premium. In Japan the cost of mail, electricity, gas and public transport is much higher than in other nations, although the telephone system is efficient and cheap. The proportion of the Japanese population linked directly to an underground sewerage system is considerably less than in other, comparable nations, this reflecting the physical realities of industrial dualism and the preponderance of small businesses, the self-employed and run-down dormitory towns, illustrated in the extreme by the frequent public squalor of the one hundred or so ‘bedroom communities’ that encircle Tokyo and contain some twenty million souls. In like fashion, Japan as ‘welfare laggard’ may be explainable in terms of late development. State welfare expenditure in Japan lies far below that of most industrial nations, although such public expenditure has been rising, from 5 per cent of GDP in 1970 to over 10 per cent by the late 1980s. On the other hand, late development yielded in Japan a younger population (requiring less welfare expenditure), closer communities (providing voluntary welfare in lineal families) and a corporate welfarism, especially amongst larger firms, which yielded health and pension schemes analogous to public expenditures elsewhere; these together allowed lower official expenditures. As the economy matured, so too did communities weaken and workers age – the ratio of elderly folk living with their married children fell from 87 per cent in 1960 to 65 per cent in 1985 – and so too did government expenditure begin to rise. By the mid-1990s, for instance, public health expenditure was equivalent in GDP terms to nations as variable as Australia, Italy, Sweden and the UK. Unemployment, in total and amongst youth and women, remained well below that of other nations. Again, the precise institutional formulations of government and enterprise in this field may also be considered as at least fragmentary features of late development. The Meiji poor law of 1874 and the Civil Code of 1896 together formalised the household system as a welfare institution for the aged, infirm or unemployed. What had long been a moral duty became a legal requirement. Late development of the sort analysed in Chapters 4–5 demanded a statist focus on technology, physical infrastructures and training programmes, and a minimisation of expenditure on any form of public assistance.2 Even the Occupation reforms under the Revised National Assistance Act of 1950 defined public expenditures as supplementary to familial welfare. Again, much of the character of corporate welfarism may be explicable in terms of the late-development struggle to retain the loyalty of scarce skilled workers, an attempt renewed by private enterprise in the 1950s and 1960s in the face of government welfarism. The loyalty of scarce skills could be secured by lifetime commitment on one hand, health care and pensions on the other, especially where welfare entitlements accumulated greatly but were instantly lost through disruption or departure.
38 The Japanese industrial economy Late development may explain features of Japanese life that are too readily visualised as both traditional and immutable, such as the interventionist industrial activities of the state, the character of education and training or the ability to absorb foreign artefacts and ideologies within relatively unchanged frames of reference. In the early stages of industrialisation in Europe the mercantilist state intermittently attempted interventions under the banner of national competition. The European state sui generis did little for formal education prior to the First World War, and apprenticeship loomed very large, a form of industrial skilling at least analogous to Japanese in-house training. Eighteenth-century Europe was replete with technology transfers from areas of comparative advantage to regions of relative backwardness, transfers which often failed. In viewing Japan as a late developer we might choose a perspective which admits to the existence of analogous features between modernising Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and modernising Japan in the twentieth century.This perspective may even be extended to the field of gender relations. The notion in Tokugawa Japan that women should be ‘good wives and wise mothers’ is identical to the gender assumptions of Enlightenment Europe and wonderfully captured in Rousseau’s conviction that women were intended by very nature ‘to make us love and esteem them, to educate us while young, and take care of us when grown up, to advise, to console us, to render our lives easy and agreeable – these are the duties of women at all times, and what they should be taught in their youth’.3 In most nations of nineteenth-century Europe women could not hold or inherit property, earned dowries and wasted their talents in precisely the manner of Tokugawa and Meiji Japan. Early but informal versions of the Japanese Civil Code of 1898, which formally iterated the subjugation of women, could be found in most nations of the West. Women in the West even yet receive lower wages for equal work in otherwise ultra-modern industries, and by such comparison we get very much closer to Japan today. Again, when through war or demographics the work of women became vital, so too in both the West (after 1918) and Japan (after 1950) the avenues of opportunity (if not of equality) slowly opened. Although the culture of the ‘salaryman’ continues to resist career women in private enterprise, an Equal Employment Opportunity Law was passed in 1985, and second incomes became of especial importance with the inflation of the following years. A 1987 survey of leading Japanese corporations found that in 72 per cent of cases it was at least claimed that no preference was shown for men over women in recruiting amongst new college graduates. Against such precise statistics we might note the failure of most female graduate employees to rise above the ranks of lower management and the common phenomenon of the overqualified ‘office lady’. During the Recruit scandals of 1988 it was the female vote which was most volatile and threatening to the then ruling LDP cronies, causing major setbacks in the House of Councillors election in 1989.4 When we witness Japan we see the partiality and time-lags of accelerated change in the late-development mode. Even the exaggerated character of elite networks may be explicable in terms of late development. Thus, the University of Tokyo is indisputably ichiban, or number one. Entrance examinations are approached only after months of expensive cramming; exam failures at times result in suicide. Entry to the Todai (Tokyo
Maturity 39 University) club brings tangible rewards, arrogance and confidence: nearly all of Japan’s prime ministers have been graduates, 25 per cent of all Diet members are graduates, over 90 per cent of Ministry of Finance senior bureaucrats are graduates, perhaps a third of the presidents of Japan’s top thousand firms are graduates. Something like this has been the case since the Meiji foundation year of 1877 and today represents the complex aftermaths of a deliberate move towards the creation of an industrialising meritocracy at a time of severe relative backwardness and foreign intellectual and technological supremacy. As Waswo has summarised, it was to secure to the new industrialism ‘well-qualified officials and technicians for the state that the university, first created in 1877, was expanded in the late 1880s and early 1890s, and for the entire period until 1945 most bureaucrats in the service of the central government were graduates of its faculty of law’ (Waswo 1996: 162). A more unusual category of socio-institutional differences comprises those which may be attributed to the reforms of the Occupation forces after the Second World War, and as outlined in Chapter 1. Many seeming oddities of the ‘Japanese’ social system may have originated in the educational, enterprise, labour, legal, agricultural and financial administrative changes which resulted from that most peculiar juxtaposition of defeated Imperial Japan and the victorious West, basking as indeed the latter was in the idea of the supremacy at war of the institutions of constitutional democracy over those of the authoritarian personality. Fifty years later, the new instrumentalism of those years has left its mark on many aspects of Japanese life. Several of these have been touched on elsewhere in this text, but we might add here some comments on the place of agriculture in Japanese social life and public policy. By the mid-1990s only 14 per cent of land in Japan was devoted to agricultural purposes, as compared to 31 per cent in Germany, 47 per cent in the USA and 71 per cent in the UK.5 At the same time, the proportion of workers employed in agriculture in Japan was around 6 per cent, compared to 3 per cent in the USA or slightly more in Germany, but even more on a par with European nations. Yet the social position of the agricultural sector, the cultural status of the rice economy and the power of the agricultural lobby were higher in comparison to most industrial nations than might be expected from such objective measures. This anomaly is at least partially explicable in terms of the land reforms of 1947–50, which effectively removed tenancy and absentee landlordism, transferred 6 million cho of land to 6 million small-owner households (one cho is about one hectare), and thereby strongly encouraged the trend towards part-time farming and dual occupations. Even in the late 1980s some 4.5 million farm households remained, many of whom provided the continued allegiance to the policies of the Liberal Democratic Party which at once secured its repeated victories and ensured an equally continuing commercial protection of the Japanese agricultural sector and official price-maintenance schemes. Other differences are not so readily dismissed as late-development effects. Despite high incomes, close proximities and a great chaos of consumer durables, Japanese criminality per capita remains far below that of the major industrial nations. Not only are crimes at a level of around one-third to one-quarter of the levels elsewhere, in Japan since 1970 there has been no significant increase in the rate of reported
40 The Japanese industrial economy crime in total. Even at the end of the 1990s Japan had around one lawyer for every 6,600 people, compared to one for every 300 in the more criminal and litigious USA and one for every 650 in even milder-mannered Britain. Indeed, with the rise of corporate and personal bankruptcies at the turn of the century, Japan was increasingly seen as in great need of improved and less elitist law training. In the early 1990s juvenile crime in Japan had reached perhaps one-tenth the level of the USA and was composed far more of neighbourhood larceny and involved far less violence. In Japan juvenile delinquents continue to attend school. Yet such crime was and still is seen in Japan as one of the biggest of all the social problems that beset the endaka society. Again, Japanese households continue to save far more of their disposable incomes than anybody else other than the Germans and the Italians. In the recent past such high personal savings were explicable in the need for household coverage of intermittent shocks – from earthquakes to the expenses of female marriage, to unemployment or illness. Such urban white-collar savings were most commonly held in the form of small blocks of shares and originated in periodic bonuses as well as less formal goodwill money gifts within neighbourhoods, between business dealings and from clients to a wide array of public servants, teachers and local bureaucrats. As with other supposedly extreme social differences, such as the extension of systems of familial obligations into business and labour organizations, or the strength of the work ethic, the high-savings propensity has been explained in broadly cultural terms on both supply and demand arguments. In this sort of approach, the supply of savings has traditionally come from frugality, gift-giving (of which bonuses are a special effect) and hard work, all of which may carry the cultural assumption. The demand for savings may be attributed to the traditions of selfhelp, obligation and gift-giving, and status expenditures (as in marriage expenses and dowries), all of which may carry the equal cultural assumption. We might summarise that many measures of comparison suggest that the institutions of Japanese society are those of late industrial capitalism, and are unique in the same sense that the social institutions of Germany, Britain or the USA are peculiar to their national settings. General late-development effects have been and are yet complicated by the instrumentalist interventions of the postwar years of Occupation, when the Western nations led by the USA construed Japan as a complex experiment in Eastern democracy as a bulwark against Western-inspired communism. Several aspects of modern Japanese society – including low crime rates and high savings rates – may not be so readily explained in terms of a simple late-development model, although even in such cases we have suggested that late development may have exerted indirect effects which encouraged such social features. The next section extends such notions of social difference (at times viewed as cogent measures of cultural particularity) into the theme of the social underpinnings of Japanese industrialisation. Here we might note that, in the particular case of savings, the phenomenon itself is unusual rather than unique (some European nations surpass the Japanese in personal savings levels at lower levels of disposable income), on the decline rather than the increase (as with working hours and other
Maturity 41 ‘work ethic’ indicators) and possibly explicable entirely in non-culturalist terms. In this case, we might, other things being equal, expect high personal savings in a society where public welfare has been set at a low level, where urban facilities lag behind the growth of private incomes, where there has been a high degree of sectoral occupational movement and where there is a disproportionate amount of risky small-business and self-employed activity as well as a general tendency towards sporadic non-monthly receipts of income. Each of these elements has been met with already in the present text, and none demands an explanation based on unique cultural processes. But it is indeed such identifiable socio-institutional (if not strictly cultural) differences between Japan and other industrialised nations that are often seen as the final cause of the nation’s good industrial performance. Consistently enough, the more recent problems of the economy are then explained in terms of changing social processes and institutions, particularly centred on family, neighbourhood, private enterprise and the ethos and functions of the public sector
The social underpinnings of fast growth The most powerful single approach that directly links social and cultural processes to a history of industrial success is that which centres on a world of loyalties and duties, of individual obligations and group identities. Quite commonly it is argued that the seemingly radical adjustments of modernity have not in fact removed the secular importance of group orientation over individualism, that there profoundly continues and ever has been ‘a stress on duty and loyalty rather than on rights and a right to change, a preference for consensual rather than majoritarian decisionmaking, and respect for hierarchy, seniority, and family. Stirred in with all these patterns has been a sensitivity to those lower on the social scale in the common pursuit of group harmony.’ Henderson points to the Confucian basis of the ‘five relationships’ of Tokugawa Japan (lord–man, father–son, husband–wife, older–younger brother, friend–friend) as being at the core of modern groupism and loyalty codes (Henderson 1977). Aptly we might refer to Yamamoto’s Way of the Samurai: ‘Being a retainer is nothing other than being a supporter of one’s lord, entrusting matters of good and evil to him, and renouncing self-interest. If there are but two or three men of this type, the fief will be secure.’ Major interpretations of Japanese industrialisation have, indeed, been predicated on a distinction between Japanese neo-Confucianism, with its early stress on hierarchical relations and obligations, and the Confucianism of China, with its traditional focus on relations between equals. So, the essential claim of Michio Morishima is that Japanese Confucianism was fundamentally different from that of China and elsewhere. Where many anthropologists and sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s emphasised the dampening impacts of ‘traditional’ cultural formations on industrial modernism, Morishima isolated Confucianism as a cultural machina of Japanese industrialisation (Morishima 1982). Other writers have stressed Shintoist elements as the key to the virtue of loyalty which, in opposition to individualism, unlocked a door of modernity by securing the legitimacy of those modernisers amongst the Japanese elite who
42 The Japanese industrial economy wished to appropriate Western technologies and industrial ideologies without wholesale cultural revolution. We might generalise that this mode of argument poses a dualistic distinction between the social underpinnings of early Western industrialisation, which is composed of the rise of individualism as the carrier of creativity, competition and innovation, and the cultural underpinnings of late development, composed of all those elements which served to harness the innovations of the West to the attributes of the East without undue or costly social disturbance. In particular, this culturalist approach serves to explain late industrialisation as a process forced into the cultural system by an industrialising elite utilising the technologies of the individualistic West. Where late-development programmes elsewhere have almost invariably broken down under internal political pressures, the complex Confucian nexus in Japan has served to dampen all forms of public expression of disquiet. Koschmann has summarised that overt rebellion or dissent ‘breeds isolation from the social and political hierarchy, which remains the primary source of wisdom and paternal care. Therefore, inherent in the system are the preservation of harmony through repression of conflict and the failure of a universal concept of individual rights to fully replace power as the central principle of hierarchical relationships’ (Koschmann 1972: 14). Japanese industrialisation becomes a story of cultural hegemony, almost regardless of the exact character or form of particular, prevailing cultural artefacts or traits. It is possible to take the argument some steps beyond consensus as merely a permissive element of industrial and technological followership. Thus Yasuzo Horie has argued for a direct link between Confucianism and Meiji entrepreneurship. Horie suggests that Japanese Confucianism was essential in that its very accessibility and simplicity meant that it acted as a medium of cultural translation, blending Confucianism and Shintoism into an emphasis on loyalty and filial piety associated with the further spread of a bushido ethos during the Meiji period. In turn, Horie argues that the essential rationalism of this admixture ‘bred habits of mind that facilitated the introduction of Western technology. Intellectual discipline coupled with a flexible pragmatism made the Japanese quick to take up Western learning when its practical utility for national defence and other purposes became clear’ (Horie 1965: 196). A more extreme version of this social-underpinnings approach was briefly noted in Chapter 2 (pp. 32–4). Expressed most popularly and stridently by Inazo Nitobe during the Meiji years, it was argued that the bushido ethic (bu-shi-do: military-knightly ways), originally a subculture of the samurai, survived the Restoration of 1868 after having already ‘filtered through the social class for which and by which they were developed and leavened the whole nation’ (Nitobe 1936: 124–41). Thus Meiji industrial leaders, shown by Silberman and other modern writers to have been composed mainly of ex-nobility, were naturally enough ‘followed’ by the multitudes of lay folk, just as the practice of honour forged Japanese society into an encampment, highly prepared, readily mobilised, cemented in service (Silberman 1964). With its strong Confucian infusions brought to the contemplative methods of Buddhism, the cultural ‘elements’ of bushido were not exclusively in the patrimony of Japan. Rather, in Nitobe’s own view, it was in the historical ‘aggregation of moral
Maturity 43 qualities’ that bushido took on its uniquely Japanese character (Nitobe 1907: 169). It may, then, be possible to visualise bushido both as a motor force of change and as a unique configuration evolving from cultural undergirdings derived from China, Korea and elsewhere. What were the social conditions in Japan which produced this sort of outcome and its associated modern characteristics of groupism and consensus? Why did a mixture of cultural attributes and borrowings coalesce in a particular functional pattern? Ruth Benedict identified giri as the fundamental underpinning of such cultural traits.6 From a sophisticated anthropological perspective and taxonomy, Benedict brilliantly isolated giri as a form of relational cement, a type of obligation, found in Japan but nowhere else. Where systems of reciprocal obligations between individuals and the Emperor, parents, ancestors, teachers and lords existed in China and elsewhere, only Japan placed giri debts within the central core of a complex system of relational obligations. Giri are those debts which must be actively repaid ‘with mathematical equivalence to the favor received’ and upon which there are time limits. Giri may be paid not only to lords and family but to non-related non-superiors as the reciprocal of any previous obligations incurred, which may have been as money, gifts or work contributions. Non-translatable, giri is much better explained by Benedict herself: It is specifically Japanese . . . giri she owes to no Chinese Confucianism and to no Oriental Buddhism. It is a Japanese category and it is not possible to understand their courses of action without taking it into account. No Japanese can talk about motivations or good repute . . . without constantly speaking of giri . . . But ‘repaying giri’ is full of malaise. The difficulties of being a debtor are at their maximum in ‘the circle of giri’ . . . Giri to the world can roughly be described as the fulfillment of contractual relations . . . The great traditional giri relationship which most Japanese think of . . . is that of a retainer to his liege lord and to his comrades at arms. It is the loyalty a man of honour owes to his superior and to his fellows of his own class . . . now ‘repaying giri’ is no longer loyalty to one’s legitimate chieftain but is fulfilling all sorts of obligations to all sorts of people . . . In peasant villages, in transactions in small shops, in high circles of the Zaibatsu and in the cabinet of Japan, people are ‘forced with giri’ and ‘cornered with giri’. (Benedict 1946: 133–40) Although critical of too generalist an approach, R. P. Dore has extended this perspective very usefully. Dore suggests that Tokugawa and earlier traditions did not merely stress Japanese Confucian-like hierarchical relationships, but rather imposed an ethic which by no means neglected horizontal relationships, and which in its texts, schools and acts taught the duty of maintaining harmonious relations of mutual support, that is, giri relations – see for instance the example of this in Chapter 2 concerning the Matsukawa-gumi. It is this which is at the core of the ‘dependent society’, that which induces ‘in the individual a humble respect for the established institutions of his society’. Japanese industrial modernisation is a tale of
44 The Japanese industrial economy reapplications of this ethic to new circumstances and institutions, first demonstrated in the switch of loyalties from community to nation: ‘The modern city Japanese was thus, provided with standards of behaviour which were more generalized than those of the Tokugawa villager and hence more useful to him in the more varied circumstances and problems of his everyday life’ (Dore 1958: 378–80). A recent and well-known extension of this approach to the social underpinnings of Japanese industrialisation is that of the social anthropologist Chie Nakane. A key element in Nakane’s approach to Japanese society involves the translation of the general notion of groupism and relational identities into the character and structure of particular institutions. Thus the notion of kaisha, often rendered simply as ‘enterprise’ or ‘company’ in the West, in fact ‘symbolizes the expression of group consciousness’. Kaisha does not mean that individuals are bound by contractual rerlationships into a corporate enterprise, while still thinking of themselves as separate entities; rather, ‘kaisha is “my” or “our” company, the community to which one belongs primarily, and which is all-important in one’s life’ (Nakane 1974: 3). This analytical translation of an anthropology into an institutional format seems very close to the judgments made by Ruth Benedict about giri relations, and thereby serves to identify Japan as institutionally distinct from other East Asian societies. Although the cultural causation may thus be unique and highly qualitative, in institutional result the difference is one of degree, and in the example of the kaisha ‘what distinguishes this relation in Japan is the exceedingly high degree of this emotional involvement’, evidences of which ‘always receive social and moral appreciation and approbation’. Although Nakane sees the immediate institutional backdrop of such enterprise culture as the ie family system, this is not primarily the traditional household, but rather ‘the ie is a corporate residential group, and, in the case of agriculture or other similar enterprises, ie is a managing body’, a definition which does seem to incorporate fully the giri relations of Benedict in a fairly central position in the interpretative scheme. Thus the lifetime-employment system, commonly visualised as a key element in the corporate culture of Japan, is not explainable in any formal contractual terms, but is an extension of the ‘belief that employer and employee are bound as one by fate in conditions which produce a tie’, where the enterprise really employs ‘the total man, as is shown in the expression marugakae (completely enveloped)’. Nakane concludes from such examples that Japan is a society held together not so much by neo-Confucian virtues of respect within a hierarchical frame as by ‘vertical stratification by institution or group of institutions’. That is, groups attach themselves not through horizontal bonds but through vertical allegiances to higher status groups, generating an institutional complexity deriving fairly equally from the deeper undercurrents of both groupism (à la Benedict) and hierarchy (à la Morishima).Thus in Japan workers do not face capitalists, but the members of one family or firm do face those of another and, potentially, all others. Conflicts between management and labour within the firm are quarrels of a household, expressible in company unionism, not industrial unionism. As Hess has summarised, ‘it is relatively difficult to establish horizontal bonds such as a national trade union movement that would cut across company unions’ (Hess 1995: 146). Competition takes place between parallel groups, and these may be villages,
Maturity 45 companies or schools, or between groups within a religious sect. Most importantly in terms of any historical approach to Japan’s industrial modernity, it is this configuration of institutions which has lent itself so broadly but consistently to statism and followership. Nakane’s position is best rendered by Nakane: These characteristics of Japanese society assist the development of the state political organization. Competing clusters, in view of the difficulty of reaching agreement or concensus between clusters, have a diminished authority in dealings with the state administration. Competition and hostile relations between the civil powers facilitate the acceptance of state power and, in that a group is organized vertically, once the state’s administrative authority is accepted, it can be transmitted without obstruction down the vertical line of a group’s internal organization. In this way the administrative web is woven more thoroughly into Japanese society than perhaps any other in the world. (Nakane 1974: 3, 15, 90) In contrast, the central administrative systems of such great civilizations as China and India could never influence much more than the ‘upper strata of society’, except perhaps by due force. The diffuse power of central administration was well established during the Tokugawa years and became ‘an essential basis for the rapid modernization which has taken place since the Meiji period . . . there was already an effective root in the Japanese soil long before the advent of western influence, and it was by grafting to this living, native root that modern bureaucracy grew’ (Nakane 1974: 106). The ‘social-underpinnings’ approach in total appears to borrow from a social or cultural anthropology which stresses hierarchy as in Morishima, and groupism as in Benedict and the giri theory, these elements together yielding the phenomenon of social ‘followership’, and the approach of Nikane which links such traits to particular institutional characteristics, including those of private enterprise. A first class of possible problems relates to assumptions about homogeneity and the neglect of historical resistance to modernisation.7 That is, there are important problems arising from the veracity of the cultural anthropology and what have been considered its problematic psychological assumptions (Bennett and Nagai 1953, Glazier 1974). Thus Mead felt it proper to highlight the end-passages of Benedict’s seminal book: ‘Japan’s motivations are situational. She will seek her place within a world at peace if circumstances permit. If not, within a world organized as an armed camp’ (Mead 1959). However sophisticated the analysis of giri obligations, the tone is psychological and insinuates a national homogeneity of motive and response. The second category of problem relates to the institutional manifestation of this anthropology in private enterprise, propensities to save or peculiarities in state intervention in the economy as designated by Nakane and others. Many such institutional features may be explicable in quite other terms. As we have stressed throughout, late development may manifest itself in various institutional forms, especially under the pressures to reform and innovate which build up during the technology transfer process. The specific presumptions of SCAP after 1945 further
46 The Japanese industrial economy removed the institutional basis of Japanese society away from any longer-term ‘anthropological’ determinants, and served to muddy the analytical waters in the modern period. As we will further argue, deliberate processes of cultural engineering instigated by the modernising elite within a sovereign Japan further created an institutional complexity difficult to align with any model of traditional Japanese society and its purported value systems. Finally, as suggested in Chapter 6, alternative theories of culture or society might yield equivalent institutional results to those of Benedict or Nakane. Whilst this latter point is by no means sufficient to act as a sturdy critique of the conventional liberal anthropology, together with the other considerations it suggests a certain looseness of fit between existing theoretical approaches to Japanese society and the actual performance of the industrial economy. If essential features of the institutional life of Japan are only problematically linked with an anthropology of groupism, then change in such institutions and the outward behaviour patterns associated with them may or may not reflect any fundamental changes in Japanese society and its so-called ‘traditional’ values. A fall in household savings, an abandonment of lifetime employment, a rise of neighbourhood crimes may reflect those economic and demographic changes or alterations in Japan’s global commercial and strategic position that are more certainly associated with endaka Japan.
Underbelly or endaka society? Without much doubt, the bubble economy inflated prices, expectations and the value of assets held by relatively new social groups. The real-estate inflation of the mid-1980s and onwards engendered a host of endaka phenomena, from designer boutiques, nouvelle cuisine and Bentleys and BMWs to bar hostesses, live sex shows, bosozoku motorcycle speed tribes and the young girls of the ari-burei zoku, the earlybreakfast clubs of those nightlifers who just made it back to the suburbs in time for the pretences of a more traditional respectability. The strident youth of Roppongi or Shinjuku in their neoprene bodi-con styles, kept their ghetto-blasters firmly tuned to techno or disco as the Emperor lay slowly dying. Karl Taro Greenfeld summarised well a notion of a real turning-point, perhaps based on a demographic force of numbers as much as on new wealth and mobilities: The twenty-five million Japanese between the ages of fifteen and thirty bear little resemblance to the twelve-hour-day salarymen or kimono-clad geisha familiar to westerners; they are a far cry from their generational predecessors, the shinjinrui, the Japanese baby-boomers. The speed tribes, the children of the industrialists, executives, and laborers who built Japan, Inc., are as accustomed to hamburgers as onigiri (rice balls), to Guns N’Roses as ikebana (flower arranging), and are often more adept at folding a bindle of cocaine or heroin than creasing an origami crane. (Greenfeld 1994: xiv)
Maturity 47 Such vivid reportage emphasises social change, and convincingly so.8 To the new youth, the commanding pre-endaka corporate ethic of ‘burying your bones with the company’ seemed somewhat less attractive to say the least. Many such youngsters gave up the old ambitions of saving for house-owning, and substituted spending on luxury goods and services and travels overseas, which in turn further shifted consumer demands. Both youth generally and women in particular lead the popular move away from the Liberal Democratic Party. The acceleration in geographical mobility forced by the heightened demands of the inflating economy was bound to loosen old neighbourhood loyalties and sanctions: as a Japanese adage has it, ‘the traveller leaves his shame behind him’. And deeper than this, the bubble economy was associated with far closer and more powerful network alliances between established yakuza9 syndicates, real estate and finance, right-wing political parties, local bureaucracies and the black marketeers of the youth culture. One official survey based on two thousand companies reported that one-third admitted paying the crime syndicates regular annual amounts based on fear of commercial ruin or embarrassment. More importantly, the bubble economy saw yakuza elevated to the managing boards of major companies, and more commonly appearing as principal shareholders of companies such as Nippon Steel or Nomura Securities. From the ultra-right-wing uyoku political parties – who openly espoused racism, eugenics, Shintoism, a second restoration of the Emperor, the return to Japan of the Kurile Islands, abolition of Article 9 (that which in the constitution limits the military to self-defence), and the rewriting of schoolbooks to minimise or omit the atrocities committed by Japanese forces after 1936 – to the Liberal Democratic Party itself, the years of endaka witnessed a noxious growth in the entwinement of crime and politics. Ominous and still remembered was the 1989 shooting of the Mayor of Nagasaki, Hitoshi Motoshima, by a member of a right-wing organisation with strong yakuza ties, the members of whom reacted to the mere criticism of the Japanese Emperor. A question hangs over our judgment of the degree and timing of change. The multitude of right-wing dissidents who wish to change Japanese society by force draw upon such traditional legitimations as The Way of the Samurai, a tract of the seventeenth century written by Tsunetomo Yamamoto. The yakuza were always if intermittently influential in politics – witness the resurrection of Nobusuke Kishi as Prime Minister in 1957 nine years after he was imprisoned for war crimes. Many crooked syndicates and corrupt networks are now run by Japanese who broke the backs of communists or labour leaders during the 1950s and 1960s. The bosozoku descend from the Tokyo motorcycle gangs of the same era. Amphetamines were a common resort of Japanese soldiers before 1945. The shunga woodblock prints had been the pornography of much earlier eras. Today’s hostesses were the jokyu (‘cafe girls’) of the 1920s, who were the geisha of tradition. As much as anything, the shift is in sensibilities, not in structures. Such features of Japan were secular and endemic because the fast and latedeveloping style of Japanese industrialisation always involved much more than Todai salarymen. As we have emphasised, modern manufacturing epitomises but does not represent the entire industrial economy. For every salaryman who managed to
48 The Japanese industrial economy secure a metropolitan home during the real estate inflation, there were many less fortunate who were forced further out into depleted suburbs two hours’ commuting time or more from their workplaces. Services employ more people than does manufacturing; 40 per cent of workers are women; over 90 per cent of all businesses (including services and agriculture) employ fewer than ten workers. The modern sector of Japanese industry rested on a mass of blue-collar and service-sector employees, small firms and the self-employed, contract and casual workers, and an enormous employment of dormitory-housed cheap female labour, most of whom in their many millions became residents of suburban wasteland communities. Justly enough, such suburbs have been described as the vassals of the economic miracle. Here are located many of the subcontactors or further offshoots of that large enterprise system described in more comfortably abstract terms in Chapter 6, as well as the bulk of the many casual workers employed in large modern enterprises. Kanban and ‘just-in-time’ production systems (see Chapter 6, note 1) have for many years been reliant upon the existence and dependencies of many multitudes of suburban suppliers of parts and materials. It is in such districts that the unskilled casual worker is found, and amongst such small firms that the weight of unemployment is periodically felt. A reason why official unemployment remained so low in Japan during the 1990s in comparison to the industrialised nations was that the burden of industrial down-turns or market failures was mostly borne by the casual workers, small subcontractors and women of the suburbs, rather than the full-time employees of the cities. As late as the mid-1980s, workers in firms of less than a hundred employees earned incomes barely more than half those of the large enterprises, a scale-based wage differential significantly greater than in other industrial systems. Again, such a socio-geographical mechanism has tended to reduce the power of unionisation or alternative labour movements across industries, to reinforce familystyle identities within the enterprises of the modern sector and to minimise the days lost by annual labour disputes.10 That is, in a secular or longer-term sense the distasteful underbelly of Japan supplied the institutional requirements of fast, latedevelopment industrialisation. Recent cyclical effects have merely helped to identify the key relationships. In times of boom such suburbs were generally socially viable but very hard-working and undersupplied with all forms of public utility. When bubbles burst, much of the hard work stopped and neighbourhoods changed in character, became locations for the furosha (street tramps), youth gangs and drug peddlers. We may push this argument a little further. Much has been written about the ‘flexibility’ of Japan’s manufacturing system, particularly during the years of inflation, rising labour costs and changing global markets (Dore 1986). Although the weight of the argument has been to identify the large enterprises as carrying such flexibility (see Chapter 6), we have argued here that small enterprises have been foremost in the flexibility stakes. It is they that have not only suffered from labour shortages and cyclical down-turns but also been leaders in the application of micro-electronic technologies and the introduction of new production equipment (such as automated soldering or winding machinery) to components manufacture and services provision. It was the very market uncertainties of the 1980s and 1990s that caused large
Maturity 49 manufacturers to hesitate to enter unknown territory, and induced growth and innovation amongst the smaller independent firms, who entered even such advanced field as robotics. More than half of the small and medium enterprises of Japan in the early 1990s were subcontractors to larger enterprises. These firms were forced to adopt new techniques in order to produce components for increasingly demanding and cost-conscious large enterprises serving more precise, niche markets. Thus, in automobiles, subcontractors responded to ‘just-in-time’ stock management systems of large parent enterprises through focusing on increased precision or on reducing defect ratios to near infinity, or on shortening the time between order and delivery. The endaka economy acted as a pressure-cooker on a great multitude of such small firms, upon their workers and their communities. The endaka years have been strongly associated with the tendency on the part of large manufacturers to reduce the number of their subcontractors while extending their production responsibilities.11 Amongst survivor contractors these years have been associated with a relative fall in the number of total employees in production departments but a rise in the proportion of female production workers, especially in quality control.12 Flexibility in Tokyo required a Darwinian struggle in the suburbs.
Traditions and modernities: the limits to covergence theory Late-development theory does not necessitate any resort to so-called convergence theory, in that features of late development which may alter or weaken with further capitalist development tend to be limited to such instruments as banking or technology. Industrial investment by the state or central bank in conditions of relative backwardness might well be replaced over time by more ‘normal’ instruments of private enterprise investment. Over time the state might thereby relinquish controls over trade and production; this in turn yields more power to individuals and markets (Inkster 2001). The mechanisms of industrial capitalism in late developers will, over time, begin to appear increasingly like those of the early starters. In contrast to such instrumentalism, most theories of an ultimate convergence of systems attempt to say something about the final confluence of the fundamental social and cultural configurations of advanced societies, and to this extent are more akin to recent theories about the ‘end of history’, the approach of an era wherein the historical demise of all alternatives leaves only a hegemonic liberal capitalism within which change is merely evolutionary and from which more paradigm-disturbing ideological and other conflicts have been removed. This perspective will be returned to as our exit from Chapter 7. Unfortunately, it is relatively easy to slip inadvertently from one identity to the other, to claim that the removal of relative backwardness over time is equivalent to a more fundamental convergence of systems. This book has argued that much of Japanese economic history might be explained in terms of an historical departure from an initial Meiji position of relative economic backwardness and catch-up. Here we adopt a sceptical attitude to claims that the changes of the endaka or earlier years amount to convergence with a mythical Western or capitalist norm. The convergence theories
50 The Japanese industrial economy associated with the classsical studies of ‘modernisation’ were only ever convincing in so far as they concentrated solely on the relatively early stages of industrialisation, wherein one might expect a certain co-variance of rates of change in various institutions. As Eisenstadt summarised, at a time when convergence perspectives were still popular, the assumptions of such approaches ‘predicated that the processs of modernization of the different economic and political institutional spheres tended to coalesce in relatively similar patterns’ (Eisenstadt 1978: 169). Whether it was ever really legitimate to move on from such early imperatives of industrial revolution to the claim that continuing national successes would depend on further ‘moves in a general commmon evolutionary direction’ was always problematic. In 1996 Toyota’s co-op union began to offer its 205,000 members a new service: the visiting and cleaning of family grave sites. At a cost of ¥5,000 (around $50), the union would send out someone to tidy up around the grave, leave flowers and incense, pour water, pray and then snap a picture. Both Western and Japanese commentators have made a great deal indeed of this sort of cultural and instrumental admixture. Greenfeld writes well of those Japanese grandmothers in kimonos who ‘bow in gratitude to their automated banking machines’ (Greenfeld 1994: 271) Another side of a similar coin is seen in the ancient Chinese characters inscribed on the uniforms of the Tokyo bosozoku gangs. Or in the pinstriped salarymen as they lie satiated in sake on the early-morning platforms of high-tech commuter stations. But in this Japanese suspension between traditional mores and modern artefacts there is little that is really new or unique. In 1953 when Japanese were asked to choose between the comparative weights of ‘tradition’ and ‘individual evaluation’ in deciding on matters of social morality, 35 per cent chose tradition. In 1978 this had mildly risen to 42 per cent, the opposite of what we might find for the UK or USA. But from just this sort of evidence such Western analysts as Peter Berger have identified a real movement, ‘that Japanese culture is indeed changing toward more individuated patterns’. Following a conventional sociological line, one of Berger’s cardinal premises is that ‘all over the world, at least in nonsocialist societies, modernization has an individuating effect’ (Berger 1986: 167–70). For Berger convergence spells a general weakening of social subordination as a characteristic feature of Japan, a change which could well reduce the capacity of the social system ‘to continue integrating individuals into groups with a strong sense of identity and common destiny’. His tentative pre-endaka (1986) judgment on East Asian societies more generally was that the cross-national evidence on individuating modernity is strong enough to make one very skeptical about the ability of these societies to continue on their merry course of happy ‘groupism’ . . . it is likely that these societies will sooner or later face some of the current problems of western society, both in areas of economic productivity and of political governability. (Berger 1986: 170) The salience of the immediate prediction should not overcome the weaknesses inherent in this approach. What are our proper measures to be? The modern ‘office
Maturity 51 lady’, out every night in city clubs, will still utilise or fall social victim to the omiai, the meeting designed to arrange an appropriate marriage. How then to measure filial authority and familial respect in a world where youth moves freely and without much friction into and out of the sphere of the salaryman? What is it that is supposed to be changing in the social life of Japan, the public character of individuals (tatemae) or their true character (honne), and how may surveys in 1953, 1978 or 2000 successfully and consistently separate the one from the other? A major question relates to the sources of seeming convergence or, more generally, Westernisation, as well as to its measurement. Are such recent social changes generated by cultural diffusion or emulatory convergence on one hand, or by historical or evolutionary convergence on the other, or by some mixture of the two? Emulation is bound to occur given the capacity of international media and technologies both to contain and to transform social practices. When technology transfer occurred over time as a major feature of dynamic development, so too did sociocultural diffusion occur, especially in the consumption of the products of such foreign technologies, from media products themselves to household goods to contraceptives or new dietary standards. Historically, and conditioned by war, they also contained an implicit cultural message concerning the instrumental superiority of the democratic, liberal, individualistic cultures from which they came. So we might well expect this level of ‘convergence’ through the interactions and emulations of catch-up. Thus, the then shocking but since symbolic riots at the University of Tokyo, led by the Non-Sect Radical Movement in 1968, may easily be seen as an epiphenomenon of the global student and radical unrest of that year, and directly attributable to international media radiating influences from core areas of advanced social change and experiment. Similarly, the increased availability of cocaine, Ecstasy and marijuana may be explained with reference to the travels overseas during the 1980s of thousands of children of the bubble executives of Japan Inc. Again, the life of the clubs and their hostesses may be put down to the increased presence of large numbers of illegal foreign workers and migrants. Evolutionary convergence, the postulate of most real convergence theories, acts only as systems converge because of the natural imperatives of capitalist development through time. Japan has clearly been subjected to the emulatory form of instrumental convergence for a considerable time. But the difficulty of isolating measurements makes it risky to claim a significant process of evolutionary convergence, although it is plausible that this process in now at its initial stages. It is certainly feasible that the later developers of East Asia are now strongly subjected to the forces of emulatory convergence. The weakness of convergence theory is that it trivialises real cultural, social and institutional distinctions. By the 1990s Japanese authorities tended to translate social change as those transformations in institutions which have long been seen as central to fast economic growth. Thus in its White Paper on the Life of the Nation in 1994 the Economic Planning Agency itemised such factors as the ageing of society, growing international awareness and the increase in two-income families as influential in altering individual perceptions of the company.
52 The Japanese industrial economy Resistance to changing jobs in mid-career has lessened and the system of seniority-based pay raises and promotions has come under review. With these trends, the feeling of unity and strong sense of belonging that employees used to feel towards the company have weakened, as have the degree of restraint the company exercises over employees and the employees’ dependence on the company. The idea that personal development can be realized through duties and personal communication in the workplace is expected to gain ground. In the future, it is predicted that people will live full lives on many levels, and personal contact will not simply be work-related but will take place everywhere, especially within the family and in the community. (Economic Planning Agency 1994: 3) The implicit model here seems to be that demographic or economic factors have forced a real change in institutions but not in basic cultural traits. That is, the theme is not a loss of duties and relationships but a switch in their institutional operation, away from the postwar company and back towards more traditional sites of family and community. Such an approach serves to insert further dynamic elements into the Nakane model (above) of Japanese society. We shall return to aspects of this theme in Chapter 6.
Limits to Japanese growth From a mess of possibilities we might here suggest that there are three major perspectives concerning the present and future social underpinnings and social problems of the Japanese economic system. Each of these more or less draws on recent analyses of Japanese social history. The first perspective argues that for various reasons it is at least premature to claim that social changes in Japan are undermining the trajectory of economic growth. It is quite feasible that the fundamental loyalties and obligations of ‘historical’ Japan have not altered and continue to underpin economic change. Furthermore, Japan shares many of such key cultural assets with parts of East Asia that in very recent years have also achieved spectacular economic growth. It is reasonable to argue that recent economic, demographic and other changes have altered key institutions in a manner which hardly touches underlying social mores. It is also reasonable to posit that many of the reigning institutions of Japan, especially those in the public and commercial spheres, are not particularly reflective of underlying social mores, have indeed arisen through the conjunctures of late development, of Occupation and through global media influences. They were temporary phenomena of late development, just as emerging new institutions in both private and public spheres may be temporary features of a capitalist, but increasingly post-industrial, maturity. In contradiction, a second perspective suggests the likelihood that a lack of institutional social change will act as a barrier to continued growth and prosperity. That is, the institutions of late development are not appropriate to a mature commercial, technological and political incorporation into the increasingly complex global system. In this perspective the real problem for Japan is caused by the cost and
Maturity 53 slowness of social response to the social and institutional imperatives of modern capitalism, the technologies and sites of which have increasingly moved from manufacturing industries to services and the ever-shifting worlds of non-work: tourism, leisure, sport, entertainment and the life-needs of the increasingly large numbers of older, retired peoples of the prosperous nations of our globe. In this second perspective, then, the endaka elements of social change must, in the main, be encouraged as ingredients of a further flexibility, where the sources of commercial dynamism pass from private enterprise or government agencies to individual interests and groups. Thus, fast growth has been often associated with such social features as cultural homogeneity, a standardised education system, group co-operation at work, a high savings propensity etc. However, such attributes now stifle the exploitation of those imminent opportunities that are associated with changing global circumstances. As Mitsuko Shimomura, the editor of the Asahi Journal, summarised in a luncheon lecture in Tokyo in April 1990, such institutional attributes ‘resulted in the establishment of a climate that hinders individuality, creativity, responsibility, spirituality, ethics and value standards and broader well-balanced visions of the world; qualities that are increasingly needed as Japanese society struggles to effect positive change’ (Shimomura 1990: 11–15). Shimomura went on to warn of the essential ‘poverty of diversity’ which is symptomatic of the Japanese social system and fostered by an ingrained educational system which is ‘generally more adept at implanting technical expertise and knowledge than nurturing creativity and an individual’s own thought and values’. Analogously, within private enterprise the relatively recent traditions of lifetime employment and seniority structures ‘do not provide for flexibility and dynamism in dealing with an outside world with different values’. The old Todai-based elite networks may have served the functions of concentration and conservation of talents and energies during the struggling phases of catch-up from relative economic backwardness, but within the mature economy they induce an ‘incessant protectionism’, which may only be altered by the intrusion of new social elements – women, the young and the foreign. In this chapter we have already suggested that the first two of these elements might be expected to emerge as powerful vehicles of social change as relative backwardness disappears in almost any system: scarcity of labour and higher wages make a pragmatic difference. Here we might now suggest that the newer foreign elements have hitherto served more to measure the degree of ‘incessant protectionism’ in Japanese society than to effect much in the way of social re-evaluation. By 1990 the number of illegal foreign workers in Japan had exceeded 100,000, rising rapidly to an estimated 290,000 by November 1992, still a much smaller proportion of the workforce than could be found in Europe or the USA or, indeed, in most other nations of the world. Yet in Japan, the general social and official reactions to the new influx were pervasive and often very vocal. Some of this could be explained by the nature of the illegal foreign employment: almost 90 per cent of women apprehended as illegal immigrants were working as bar hostesses, strippers and prostitutes. However, the actual number of such female workers seems to have been far below that of male factory and construction
54 The Japanese industrial economy labourers from the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and elsewhere. Most of such workers have entered medium and small enterprises faced with rising labour costs, and have thus permeated into the underbelly of the economy (pp. 46–9). Thus the endaka economic changes have forced a type of solution which has in turn created social friction as reality rubbed against notions of homogeneity, particularity and purity. Amongst Japanese liberals the short-term solution was seen as improved training of foreign workers, but the permanent policy solution was seen as closure of the influx alongside better training of the domestic workforce and improved technology to allow Japan once more to become reliant on only its own labour force. In recent years, the Japanese educational system has become a particular focus of this second perspective. Western commentators have quite commonly attributed Japanese economic success to the efficiency of its education. Authors such as Rohlen, Duke and White have in different ways seen education as behind the creation of key human resources: the inculcation of loyalty, training in specific skills, superior work practices, late selection and late reward of abilities, diligence and positive attitudes and so on, all of which have been seen as outcomes of a superior system (Rohlen 1987: 42–9, Duke 1986, White 1987). Believing with White that Japan ‘is homogeneous and middle class in character’ (White 1987: 46), such approaches underplay the social costs and exclusions involved in selection processes and discipline building. In a catch-up context requiring fast basic training, memory, discipline and emulation, such a system was appropriate but elitist. In the modern economy it is no longer appropriate but remains elitist. James and Benjamin, and Horiuchi, have shown that during the 1970s the higher educational system became if anything more selective and that students from poor backgrounds received poor education. Horiuchi went on to argue that, given that the Japanese educational system was probably less responsive than other subsystems to changes in the economy, then its continued growth might involve a serious misallocation of resources (Horiuchi 1980). Of equal importance is the known lack of facilities for vocational, part-time and evening education for those engaged in the smaller enterprises. Because truly vocational education is attached to the large private enterprises, a good deal of human capital is locked into small and medium-sized firms and continually wasted on a large scale. Whilst this exclusion mechanism has been a feature of Japan for some years, the opportunity cost of the educational neglect of workers in small firms and part-time employment in generally undernourished city suburbs is now much greater. The third perspective would identify Japan’s major problems as arising once more from developments in the outside world as these coincide with recent internal economic factors of maturity and natural limits imposed by size, location, demography, climate and so on. However, the obvious prospects of further but unidentifiable advanced technological changes render even such physical, objective constraints problematic, and by elimination increase the importance of the external factors revolving around altering global institutions and diplomatic relations. In this perspective internal social constraints or resistances may cause problems of adjustment and control, but rarely a halt to all those agencies and sites of economic
Maturity 55 progress and expansion that Japan has accumulated over the last hundred years and more. Future gowth is therefore more likely to be limited by an unfortunate combination of internal physical environmental forces and externally generated global frictions and disturbances. The physical and the social have come together in recent years in the initiatives of the women’s environmental movement, perhaps best personified in Michiko Ishimura (born 1927), who in a series of non-fiction novels exposed the horrors of ‘Minamata disease’, the mercury poisoning caused by industrial pollution, and created a collective bible for Japan’s environmental movement from the 1970s.13 Interestingly, in her major work Ishimura argues both that such a case condemns the whole trajectory of industrial modernism and that only women may with any veracity address and solve the environmental problem. This dual claim sketches a remarkable parallel with radical feminist conservationism in the West.
4
Forging explanations Technology
A historical perspective suggests that the central questions are not whether industrial technologies will be transferred, but rather when it will happen, where it will happen, which technologies will be transferred, how they will be modified in the process, and how rapidly this process will occur. (Nathan Rosenberg, 1982) No Man can set Bounds to Improvements even in Imagination; and therefore, we may still assert, that the richer manufacturing Nation will maintain its Superiority over the poorer one, notwithstanding this latter maybe likewise advancing towards Perfection. (Reverend Josiah Tucker, 1758)
On modes of explanation In Chapter 2 we suggested that economistic arguments may at times be insufficient as sturdy explanations of economic effects. In our example the early Meiji silk industry and its thriving exports did not emerge as an automatic outcome of some naturally existent comparative advantage. Such advantages had to be converted into the reality of commercial operations, this involving key Japanese agents in the recognition of both the threat and the opportunities afforded by the European silkworm disease, in selection of Western advice on scientific matters, in technological investigation and applications, and in production and marketing cooperation and co-ordination at new levels of organisation involving sophisticated interactions with Western agency. None of the items on this list was somehow ‘natural’ to the purely economic context of the time, none was automatically ‘calledup’ by new commercial circumstance and all posed institutional demands. We might specify this point further by a brief consideration of the well-known Caves test relating to the role of foreign trade in overall growth. A classic economistic view would run as follows. If the common export-led growth model for Japanese industrial success is to be upheld, then it must pass the test formulated by R. E. Caves in 1971. If the true motor of growth in the later Meiji years or of the so-called ‘miracle’ years of the 1960s was a sustained increased
Forging explanations 57 demand for Japanese goods in foreign markets, then there should be strong evidence of a significant volume increase of Japanese exports together with an equally significant increase in the foreign prices of such exports (Caves 1971). Similarly, K. Akamatsu derived his gankokeitai or ‘flying geese pattern’ to describe changes in the composition of trade. In this model, an initially high level of importation of capital equipment and technology is paid for by a significant volume increase in exports of manufactures and this gradually gives way to a rise in the production of such goods internally (Akamatsu 1962). In history the Caves test is seldom passed, and Shinohara posited a famous thesis that, in the post-1945 years and probably before, the strong export performance of the Japanese economy was a direct function of an undervalued yen, that is Japanese exports were artificially cheap in foreign places (Shinohara 1962, 1970). We agree that Japan usually fails the Caves test and that fast export growth was some reflection of the comparatively low price levels of Japanese goods in foreign markets. But our position arises from a form of social economics eschewed by the more formal approach of the economists. Using the same sort of trading data we may depart from the economistic style of argument on at least two pathways. First, we have stressed the vital role of imported technologies, materials and ideas in reducing the internal production costs of export products. Export prices were not a mere function of low labour costs and a declining terms of trade, and the major function of trade in Japanese industrialisation was on the import side. But more extensively, we also claim that such productive relationships were the outcome of broadly ‘social’ forces, particularly those which induced the efficient workings of institutions that harboured transferred technologies and ideas and those that allowed the modernising elite to pursue policies of industrial and commercial reform, as in our silk example above. An economistic version of Japanese trade would not work because it would not explore why technology transfer worked in Meiji Japan, or which institutions outside of those of very rudimentary markets really determined the character of commercial relations, and so on. Again, the actual workings of the Akamatsu model depended on the retention of economic sovereignty, particularly the move from government instigation of import substitution activity (1881–1996) towards protection of infant industries (1896–1914), an impossible shift in the absence of the gaining of tariff autonomy during 1897–9, a result of official political, commercial and diplomatic activity whose character and effectiveness lies beyond the reach of formal economics. Martin Fransman notes something similar in his astute summary of the modes of presentation resorted to in ‘explanations’ of Japan’s successful transfer, assimilation and improvement of advanced technologies in the twentieth century. Noting that major economistic accounts acknowledge the development of technology as a key element in Japan’s economic growth and then commonly resort to a closing formula of the sort which raises the image of the ‘social capacity’ to import and receive and adapt, Fransman judges that such a tactic ‘does not take us very far down the road towards an understanding of Japanese eonomic success . . . it is clearly necessary that we develop a more penetrating analysis of the process whereby technological knowledge is acquired, assimilated and improved’ (Fransman 1988: 87).
58 The Japanese industrial economy We have noted the insufficiency of the economistic explanatory mode, particularly with reference to the character and mechanisms of inward technology transfer in Japanese industrial history. In this chapter we forge an explanation of Japanese industrialisation which centres on the processes and mechanisms of technology transfer, assimilation and adaptation, but depends on neither a technological nor an economic determination of the causal regress. This is not to say that there are no valid sufficient arguments derived from purely economic considerations. Thus in an industry very dependent on producer demand, such as the early Japanese chemical industry, it is obvious that technology transfers might be either curtailed or directed by the small size of the market. This might help explain the Japanese transfer and use of the lead-chamber process over the contact process (in sulphuric acid manufacture), or the Leblanc process over that of Solvay (in soda production). Yet such choices might be equally well explained in terms of the close commercial relations at that time with Britain, where both processes were retained, or by insufficient search operations, or in terms of licensing problems (as with Solvay) and so on. But more importantly, even if scale determined original choices or limitations, this argument does not in itself lead to the conclusion that subsquent increases in scale of operation will automatically induce the transfer and diffusion of what are considered best-practice technologies elsewhere. Apart from different mixtures of factor endowments or raw material qualities, and varying commitments to complementary technologies in related industries, choices will be constrained by institutions and by visions of what is possible amongst key agents of change.
The conditions of technology transfer Technology transfer, especially from rich to poor, nearly always fails at high cost. As Edwin Mansfield emphasised so long ago, this is principally because it is a complicated and extended process requiring systematic linkages, reasonable calculations and thus a constancy of regime. Mansfield distinquished between vertical technology transfer (when information transfers from basic research to applications, to design, to commercialisation in a linear-type model) and horizontal technology transfer, (where technology of one system is transferred to another). In the case of significant transfers into Japan, both levels were in operation in the process whereby complex artefacts were diffused into more common usage. As Mansfield noted, ‘the difficulties and costs are much greater under these circumstances than if only a horizontal transfer is involved’ (Mansfield 1975: 374). In other words, transfers between systems of like capacity are difficult, transfers involving a complex learning process through new institutions may be impossible. An interesting variation on this theme occurred during the Crimean War when British policy-makers attempted to overhaul their military production by adopting the central features of the ‘American system’ of manufacturing, the system based on interchangeability and mass production. During the years 1853–4 British private interests and a Parliamentary Committee combined to ‘search’ the American system for those of its components susceptible to emulation. At the time it was frankly
Forging explanations 59 accepted that for the most part the Americans possessed little advantage over the British in terms of technique (actual machine design, construction and performance), that in Mansfield’s sense there seemed little vertical diffusion involved. But what the USA had captured to its great advantage was the organisational innovation of interchangeability, which over the next half century was to be a fundamental mode of operation in the industrial economy. The ‘technology’ to be transferred across the Atlantic was far more than the specific tools and machines, many of which had been previously transferred from Britain, for, as Rosenberg has stressed, it involved the use of tools in a different workshop space, a systematic arrangement of machines through the ‘progress of material through the manufactury’ and the ‘discipline and sobriety of the employed’, or what we might label a contrasting context of cognition and action (Rosenberg 1969: 193). Technology transfer of this sort included intrinsically the immediate organised environment of the artefacts themselves, a perspective which accords with the systems approaches of such modern analysts as Shrum or Hughes (Bijker et al. 1987, Shrum 1985). In the end the ‘American system’ did not diffuse throughout Birmingham or London as a result of such searches, and this was almost certainly because of its highly institutionalised features. Machine arrangements and related work processes were embedded in a distinctive technological system, itself evolved within a non-British enterprise, factor, market and skills environment. Vertical institutional transfer may be of greater salience than even Mansfield’s vertical technological transfer. Yet Britain and the USA spoke the same language, shared the same core technologies and understood the same basic scientific or logistical principles. Tokyo Electronics snatched America’s electronics lead by purchasing the transistor in the mid-1950s. The transistor had been invented in the USA in 1947, but apparently stood beyond the pale of the main market inducements created within that nation’s technological system. Just as the British had searched America for the elusive X-factor which when transferred would revitalise their own system, so the Japanese one hundered years later ventured abroad in an effort to increase the array of marketable electronic appliances. The difference between the two cases might be clear enough. The British failed in their quest because they were aiming to transfer the closely nested central elements of a distinct technological system, where the artefacts concerned were of small relevance – indeed, the US artefacts could be created in Britain. The Japanese succeeded because they purchased a discrete artefact that was demonstrably superior to anything produced within their system but was amenable to all but instant diffusion within that system. The lesson is that techniques and institutions are closely associated, transfer of the one will involve innovation in the other, and this may be costly, time-consuming and conflict-generating. The more contrasting the techniques, the more difficult their transfer, as caught in Mansfield’s approach. But in addition, even technique transfers between similar systems might fail if seemingly detachable physical artefacts are socially embedded. Finally, the success of the Japanese might be explained as a contrast. An inferiority of technological know-how was compensated for by a speedy search operation, institutional adaptation and an ability to recognise the new product possiblities inherent in a new process technology.
60 The Japanese industrial economy The sociology of this theme has been extended by writers such as Randall Collins, who depart with the assumption of the ‘embeddedness of technology in a social context’ and move on to the conditions of technological advancement. Collins argues that, in terms of adoption of technique from an advanced core, success is much more likely in cases of planned geopolitical development, precisely of the sort associated with Meiji strategies for the escape from imperialism or dependency by utilising the production techniques of the advanced aggressors. From a very general global perspective, Collins concludes that technological innovation in new sites may not result from market forces at all, but from ‘something analogous to the market in the military sphere . . . This allows the time period for the successive technological improvements of an arms race’ (Collins 1986: 84, 94, Schroeder 1995). We have noted the function of arsenals and military demands in the technology transfers of the Meiji years (Inkster 2001, Yamamura 1977). Appraising Henry Rosovsky’s summary of Japanese experience, that ‘Western technology need not be treated as a given; simple and small improvements suited to local conditions are frequently possible’, Nathan Rosenberg highlighted the necessary conditions for successful technology transfer, all of which centred on indigenous technological capacity (Rosenberg 1982: 270–5, Rosovsky 1972: 248–9). Original transfer requires search, selection and modification, processes described for Meiji and interwar Japan in Chapter 1. Subsequent adaptation processes may be through the use of second-hand machinery and other less-than-best techniques, through the use of cheap labour in longer shifts and for repairs, or through the use of domestic materials in construction and maintenance, all of which may be found in the Meiji years. This formula is identical to the position of Abramovitz, who at one point concludes that ‘tenacious societal characteristics normally account for a portion, perhaps a substantial portion, of a country’s past failure to achieve as high a level of productivity as economically more advanced countries’ (Abramovitz 1986: 387). This touches upon methods of resistance reduction or removal, a theme of Chapter 5. But for Abramovitz social capacity is technical competence, measured by an ability to ‘adapt to the requirements of change’. If a nation exposed to technology transfers transcends its own dependency, then the gradual closing of the technology gap does not inevitably mean a fall in productivity, a point made evident in the postwar ‘golden age’ of catch-up, when Japan and some European nations transcended their relative backwardness to the USA through transfers aided by the Marshall Plan and transnational corporations, but then went on to further increased productivities in the 1970s and 1980s. The erstwhile receiver of technique can become a creator of technique and ‘the evolution of social capability connected with catching up itself raises the possibility that followers may forge ahead of even progressive leaders’ (Abramovitz 1986: 389), as evidenced in the more general East Asia Edge of the 1980s and 1990s. The exploitation of advanced technology requires the diffusion of information within a responsive technological system, the movement of resources from one area to another, and a high level of investment. Although Japan has historically evidenced a high rate of savings and investment, we have argued that investment has itself been induced by the historical process of technology transfer, and that in the period
Forging explanations 61 of initial transfers to around 1890, much was accomplished in face of a scarcity of investment funds, yet without resort to significant foreign capital prior to 1895. Our argument has been that Japanese history illustrates the value of explicit institutions of information dispersal and inducements to resource-shifting which have been initiated in various ways by the public sector. Such an argument does not in itself explain the responsiveness of the private sector to new information or other inducements, although this subject is broached in Chapters 1 and 6. In the period when a great technological lag is evident, as for Japan to the 1950s, the creation of an internal sequence of technological progress does not have to entail breakthrough innovation. Findlay has argued that progress in a technological system does not require the ability to innovate beyond the level of the existing imported best technique (Findlay 1978). Solo’s notion of ‘social competence’ entails the ability to recognise what can be transferred and adopted, adaptation facilities (for example arsenals and dockyards in Meiji Japan) and institutional responsiveness to ‘provide a more hospitable environment for the advanced technology’. Because core knowledge is ever-advancing, Solo judges that it is ‘the problem-solving, information-producing apparati that must be mastered, adopted and applied’ if technology transfer is to be successfully sustained at reasonable cost to the existing system, and we have argued that the satisfaction of such desiderata is institutionbound (Solo 1966: 93–5). Solo goes on elsewhere to suggest the need for an exhaustive capacity, one that can ‘contain the generation, recapitulation, dissemination of information, the determinants of creativity, the process of learning by individuals and groups, the disintegration and re-creation of ideology and values, the receptivity or resistance to novelty, and the scope of the power and the nature of opportunity and the motivation to transform technology’ (Solo 1969: 863). Whilst this is an admirable description of absorption capacity within a mature system, development under conditions of relative backwardness by definition meant a lack of most of these functions or capabilities and the need to create them with reasonable felicity from the nation’s existing cultural, political and informational resources. This is a subject of the analysis throughout our text. We might usefully begin our elaboration by suggesting that much of Solo’s framework may be constructed within the process of industrial transformation (that is as co-requisites) rather than as necessary prerequisites to such change. Figure 1 posits an institutional feedback system which may serve to reduce the level of initial requirements and which appears to fit attributes of Japan after c. 1868. Allowing that in the years of initial industrial transformation there is little direct interaction between blocks A and B, over time a process of adaptation and incremental technical and institutional innovation may ultimately lead to flow X4 (Japan in the 1960s). The Meiji need to adapt transferred technology created some limited, specific capacity in textiles and military-related metallurgy and engineering in block C (flow X1), which in turn impacted back on various areas of Japanese industry (flow X3). During the twentieth century the indigenous technological capacity developed sufficiently to create inputs for further adaptive-developmental work, perhaps especially evident in the transfers of the 1930s. Flow X2, composed of such elements as informed choice (bounded rationality), screening and the assessment of foreign
62 The Japanese industrial economy technology strengthened throughout the years of Meiji. In this model of Japanese industrialisation much of the new capability is directed at the adaptation of technique in block C, possibly predominant until the 1970s or even later. We argue that Japan fits well the dictum of Harry Johnson that through time a nation ‘could achieve leadership in applications by drawing on knowledge provided by the basic research conducted by the scientists of other countries, confining its participation in basic science to the minimum required to keep in touch with developments elsewhere and “fill in the holes” where necesssary’ (Johnson 1975: 14). Blumenthal tested the more common, reverse thesis of an inverse correlation (or substitution effect) between levels of imported technology and domestic R&D for six nations, and found that Japan and two others exhibited a positive correlation between the two variables (Blumenthal 1979: 304). In other words, historically, technology transfer into Japan has been complementary to domestic technological development, an econometric finding very compatible with the analysis of this book and this chapter, which incorporate more specific institutional elements.
Indigenous technology system
Technology transfer A X1
Scientific research (R&D)
X2
B X3
X4
Technology adaptation and development C
Industrial production
Figure 1 Technology transfer, adaptation and indigenous capacity
Design and engineering
Forging explanations 63 The following sections examine some features of Japanese technology transfer in the light of the above discussion, suggest the key role of institutions in capturing the potential advantages of relative backwardness, and attempt to place the recent and still current debate on Japanese technological ‘creativity’ in the context of its history.
Japanese exceptionalism: the primacy of technology transfer All major economic historians of Japan acknowledge the primacy of technology transfer since the Meiji Restoration.1 Here we wish to isolate some important features of that historical process in order to suggest a social economics of Japanese development, and in particular to show the importance of institutional innovation and adaptation over time. By the interwar years the major institutional vehicle for the transfer of technology was the foreign firm, operating in Japan through branch plants or through acquiring a minority interest in Japanese firms in exchange for patent rights, equipment or engineering skills. Through such arrangements, Siemens, General Electric and Westinghouse introduced a number of electrical goods and processes, Ford and General Motors the automobile. The Mazda lamp was developed in Japan as a result of the affiliation of the Tokyo Electric Light Company with General Electric, which began in 1905. Because the patent rights on the GE tungsten filament expired only in 1927, the firm secured monopoly over the new technologies. This was a case of tied licensing, with TELC not being permitted by GE to export except to the Japanese colonies. The large and expanding home market meant that the cost of technology importing could be easily borne by innovating private enterprise. New firms such as Nitchitsu or Nissan Chemicals emerged on the basis of exploitation of the Haber-Bosch and related technologies, utilising hydroelectricity and an existing capacity to produce chemical fertilisers prior to the introduction of synthetic ammonia. This seems to have been an example of Findlay’s dictum (p. 61) concerning the minimal requirements for technology transfer, and perhaps of Collins’s theories concerning the geopolitical imperative: during the 1914–18 war the supply of Chilean sodium nitrate was clearly put at risk, a problem removed by the commercial efficacy of the Haber-Bosch process. Rather than improve on the core techniques, Japanese transfer firms tended to license down to users, and any early attempts at Japanese improvements in electrochemicals were left to the Special Nitrogen Research Laboratory founded by the government in 1918, which subsequently concentrated on cost-reducing investigations into the use of different catalysts. Such enterprise strategy replaced the earlier transfer mechanisms of the foreign trading companies and merchants (Inkster 2001). These had included such firms as the American Frazer and Co., agents for Baldwin locomotives, who operated in Japan into the late 1930s. By that decade the phenomenal growth of the Japanese chemical industry was entirely dependent upon co-opted Western technology at a time when competition amongst Western suppliers permitted choice at relatively low cost, and where many basic processes were quite free of property rights constraints: that is they no longer
64 The Japanese industrial economy had patent protection. In chemicals, initial large transfers were soon followed by improvement and adaptive innovation. The Japanese synthetic fuel industry owed much to a group of foreign core processes, including the Fischer-Tropsch method which synthesised gases with the aid of a catalyst and was purchased outright by Mitsui Mining. In the meantime Mitsui Bussan Kaisha sent out its experts to Germany and purchased the machinery of the Fischer method for its 30,000-ton plant on the Miike coalfield in Kyushu. The signing of the 1936 German– Manchukuo Trade Treaty regulated a triangular trade, with Japan importing machinery and chemicals from Germany and exporting materials, machinery and textiles to Manchukuo. In return, Manchukuo exported staples to and imported machinery from Germany. From late 1937 the German firm of Otto Wolff extended credit to Manchukuo for their purchase of machinery for heavy industry. Under a separate treaty with Italy, Manchukuo supplied staples to Italy and in return received machinery and manufactures, much of which was re-exported to Japan. It seems clear that during the 1930s the national programme of military or strategic technology transfers was delivering a new institutional complex which served to bind the energies of both the public and private sectors. Again, this is suggested in developments in the chemical industry, particularly those centred on the naval demand for oil. Whilst the imported Fischer-Tropsch process allowed a synthesis of oil from coal, the more advanced method of coal hydrogenation of the Bergius technology produced a range of products including acids and construction materials. A range of Japanese institutions focused on this aspect of fuel chemistry, including the Japan Steel Laboratory and Mitsubishi Mining, but the Naval Fuel Depot at Tokuyama was the core site for the study of improvements in fuel technology as well as for attempts at commercialisation within the colonies through the offices of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Korean Synthetic Oil Company. Most of the engineering and shipping firms operating in Japan in the 1930s were linked to foreign technology by licensing. Mitsubishi produced turbines under licence from Escher Wyss and Ljungston, Hidachi manufactured boilers under licence from several Yarrow-based enterprises. In addition, joint agreements were common in engineering. Thus Toyo and Babcock was a joint concern of Mitsui and Babcock and Wilcox; Shibaura Engineering Works was a joint concern of GE and Mitsui; the Japan Steel Works resulted from a joint agreement between ArmstrongVickers and Mitsui. So, in key areas technology transfer was dominated by large zaibatsu concerns in some form of partnership with leading Western enterprises. As G. C. Allen pointed out in 1940, one reason for this was that ‘the necessity of acquiring foreign patent rights precluded concerns without great capital resources from embarking on certain lines of manufacture’ (Allen in Schumpeter 1940: 345). Thus in Japan the drawn-out processes of technology transfer could impinge on market structure. There certainly appears to have been an identity between the phase of fast technology transfer and the growth spurt of all industry, but particularly the heavy industries. Catch-up here crowded into the years 1927–31 and ‘although technique and organisation had improved in other countries, the gap between Japan and the leading Western countries in industrial efficiency had appreciably
Forging explanations 65 narrowed’. American fighter pilots eventually fought against Japanese aircraft whose origins could be traced back to US draughting boards, whose design was improved by the skills of Japanese trained at MIT, Stanford and Cal Tech, and whose production was dependent on Japanese who had been apprenticed to Curtis, Douglas, Boeing and Lockheed. There can be little doubt that the interwar period saw a strengthening of technological sovereignty at certain institutional levels. Despite the move to militarisation and the very fast growth of the heavy industries in the 1930s, Japan yet remained an insignificant net importer of foreign capital, which meant that the mechanisms of tehnology transfer remained with trade, licensing and government inducements. Industrialisation was now strongly associated with mechanisation, electrification and machine tools; by 1930 the engineering industries employed a hundred thousand workers mostly within zaibatsu firms linked by licence with GE and other leading Western firms and with vast imports of machinery and equipment: between 1929 and 1933 imports of the latter totalled some ¥120 million and came overwhelmingly from the USA. Advanced technical areas witnessed a high degree of foreign ownership: GM and Ford owned some 80 per cent of the Japanese automobile industry, and thereby were diffused into Japan key Western technologies, such as electric smelting, the contact process for sulphuric acid manufacture and the new-style open-hearth furnaces. Much private-sector activity was aided by a government intent on high levels of heavy industry growth: the machine tool industry as represented by Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Nissan was heavily subsidised by government and responsive to military contracting. Around that time Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter argued that the principal function of government was in regulating the institutional structure for technology transfers. A process of cultural persuasion, coercion and militarism was used to secure cheap labour in the small supplier firms, just as a ‘first class labour market’ was created for metals and chemicals based on graduates and a complex of loyalty institutions embracing the notions of family nation and the institutional realities of group incentives, in-house training and the famous ‘Three Treasures’ of lifetime employment, seniority wage systems and enterprise unions (Schumpeter 1940: 613, 678). Government was also important to the emergence of a research and knowledge diffusion structure not unrelated to technical advance. Although it is true that chemical and engineering industries generally suffered from a lack of applied scientific knowledge and of practical experience, the absence of a well-defined researcher role in such a late developer had the advantage of ensuring that most Japanese scientists were at least involved in a range of consultancies, public services and commissions. Several scientists became important go-betweens, translating elements of Western scientific and technical knowledge to Japanese officialdom and students, and this tendency was only hastened in the war of 1914–18. The blockade of Germany caused the isolation of Japan from its major scientific and industrial partner, and the imperatives of war saw the foundation of ten new university chairs in technical fields despite financial stringency elsewhere. Private enterprise expanded into the research field. In 1915 a research division was founded at Takeda Pharmaceuticals, and Marumiya built its first research laboratory, this being
66 The Japanese industrial economy followed by research facilities in such other chemical firms as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsui. In 1918 Asahi Glass began its applied chemical laboratory, and Tokyo Electric Company its research laboratories. In 1917 private enterprise and government combined to finance the Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry, and in the subsequent postwar years scientific missions directed at the silk industry, fuel, metallurgy, nutrition or nitrogen fixation were now far less influenced by the Ministry of Education and received greater support from private enterprise. Japanese recovery from around 1950 was associated with US aid and procurements expenditures, a large amount of technology importing through licensing, a surge in Japanese investment in science and technology, and an increase in Japanese patenting. Between 1956 and 1972 some 176,000 foreign licence agreements were signed, mostly with the USA in such fields as electrical machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and synthetic fibres. Clearly, during the 1950s and 1960s technology importing was particularly complementary to the building of an internal technological capability, and was a firm component of a related commodity trade: 60 per cent of all commodity imports were raw materials and fuels, 20 per cent machinery and equipment. The efficiency of the economy from that time was illustrated in the Japanese response to the 1973 oil crisis (Inkster 2001). Despite a very high dependence on oil and oil-related inputs, continued increases in productivity led to a higher industrial growth rate than in any other capitalist economy and the continuation of a buoyant export sector in the face of a general depression in world trade. The institutional backdrop to this technology transfer and industrial performance was very much that of government, first through the Japan Development Bank’s subsidies and cheap loans to innovating firms, then through MITI’s ikusei policy of monitoring new industries through strategic policy phases. Technological and commercial information-gathering and goal-setting was followed by the growth of exchange facilities and loans, the issuing of licences for foreign technology importing, tax incentives and cartelisation. Micro-economic policy involving repeated interventions in the area of R&D and technology transfer were deemed necessary in order to push resources into areas where the potential for fast growth was high but where the unaided operation of market forces would be unlikely to sustain the necessary levels of investment and infrastucture. It has been frequently argued that it was the emerging synergy between government and enterprise which permitted the speedy moves fom technology transfer to import substitution to export promotion. By the 1980s a similar procedure was followed for declining staple industries, such as iron and steel, pharmaceuticals and textiles, all high-technology recipients of foreign transfers during the 1950s and 1960s. Policies which quickened the relocation of resources from such industries, such as retraining schemes, job search, allowances for scrapping and rebuilding or converting of equipment, could be used also to direct the geographical location of enterprises or aim assistance at particular groups of small firms. Certain features of the modern technology transfer process do stand out. Technologies were transferred partially and selectively after a great deal of screening
Forging explanations 67 based on local R&D capability. Foreign technology in non-strategic industries was particularly discouraged by highly bureaucratic selection processes and standards specifications. The existing large industrial base and the collective bidding of business and government raised bargaining power against foreign firms and agencies. Foreign firms were generally in a minority position in joint ventures and their activities were often tied in to strategic production areas. So, although the Japanese paid out a great deal in royalties, there was a low level of direct investment income remittance compared to such nations as Britain or Germany.2 Yet the domestic and foreign sales induced by technology transfer were very high indeed, particularly in electrical machinery and chemical products, with weaker impacts in the older industries. On the whole, exchange earnings from final product exports far exceeded original royalty payments, and at any rate most foreign technology entered very large Japanese firms whose general strategies included adaptive innovation and plant layout novelties. During the 1960s some 30 per cent of total R&D expenditure in the private sector was allocated to adaptation and improvement of imported technologies. There can be little doubt that the success of transfers in modern times arose from institutional innovations, mostly in the private sector. The reformulation of zaibatsu entities such as Sumitomo or Mitsui in the guise of co-ordinated enterprises with a shared banking facility – the keiretsu structure – dominated the high-growth phase. Such institutional structures permitted co-operation in decision-making, the pooling of information and research facilities and the sharing of risks, especially in areas of high technology associated with transfers. Scale plus multifunctional linkages gave rise to the ‘flexible rigidities’ nominated by Dore as a key to Japan’s success in those years. Dore stressed that the obligational net within the units of the keiretsu group (including bank and trading company) meant that changes in market forces might not immediately disturb agreed arrangements (Dore 1986). Fransman rightly emphasises that what we might here label ‘obligational drag’ (for which see further in Chapter 6) is conducive to technological change in so far as greater certainty induces greater investment in skills and machines and inter-firm co-operation becomes institutionalised and familiar (Fransman 1990). Of equal significance are the more general claims of Mansfield and others that very large firms are the most likely to institute chains of incremental innovation, which may be centred on diffusion of existing and newly transferred technique but are not necessarily technology leaders in core innovation. Azumi has carried this further by suggesting that the lower bureaucratisation allowed for in the keiretsu structure allows a capture of the advantages of scale with the flexibilities required for greater innovative moves. In summary, during the high-growth phase the keiretsu format assisted technology transfer because its total size boosted the bargaining power required for contracts with foreign agencies or firms and created a wide circle of certainties and cooperations in the development of technical systems shared between different producing units, eliminating many contracting costs (Azumi 1985, 1987: 15). Linked banks were more likely to finance technological projects, and the role of shareholders as a check on innovative activity was strictly limited. We have elsewhere questioned the thesis that Japan ‘caught up’ with best technique generally during the 1970s (Inkster 2001) Although there was certainly
68 The Japanese industrial economy a decline in the demand for foreign technology in the machine sector, there was if anything an increase in demand for overseas technologies in the high-growth areas, especially in electronics and chemicals. But in a world situation where major trading partners, particularly the USA, were sceptical of Japan’s trade liberalisation, it was less permissible to wield the traditional Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) weapons of infant-industry protectionism or other restrictive practices in an effort either to stimulate the new or to control the old. Higher incomes combined with newly expressed social and environmental problems (Chapter 3) to force wider policy goals, from the provision of social infrastructure in the cities to incometransfer policies for agriculture and small businesses. To an extent policy did turn from growth to the monitoring of declining industries, to energy and resource conservation, and to the ‘administrative reform’ of the bureaucracy in an attempt to cut the budget deficit. In total, the new environment prompted new policy measures designed to increase the capacity of the Japanese technological system to evolve a new generation of processses and products away from the old machinofacture trajectories of the golden age of catch-up.3 The promotion of ‘high tech’ in microelectronics or biotechnology has been seen as the hallmark of the new technology policies of the 1980s and 1990s. By direct activity and by incentives to enterprise, the government intention was the generation of industrially specific R&D for the high-tech sectors at a level beyond that of best technique elsewhere. In fact, increases in basic research were mostly generated within the enterprise sector itself, with government activity concentrated in taskoriented research involving novel institutional combinations. Thus the Technopolis strategy, designed sensibly enough to create sites of new industry and renovation for old industries, has since become buried in rhetoric, yet might be seen as an institutional response to new conditions of technology transfer and new demands for the diffusion of ‘core’ technologies between sectors rather than as fundamental to the creation of new high-technology processes. Government R&D expenditure is in fact relatively low, and funds to MITI have always been small (Inkster 2001). In such areas as telecommunications the direction of technical change has been affected much more by the patterns and levels of government orders and procurements, tax write-offs, loans and subsidies: most of this does not come under the accountancy of official R&D. To this should be added the operations of MITIsupported research links and co-operative R&D projects which were not necessarily financed by government at all. During the 1980s there was a movement towards private-sector funding of the applied life sciences, which by 1985 provided twice as much funding in this area as government. In the specific area of ‘application of living bodies’ 82 per cent of expenditure was by enterprise. In the same year gene recombination received ¥36.2 billion, of which companies spent ¥19.3 billion. In contrast, any planned run-down of older so-called ‘saturated’ industries did not then involve any drastically reduced R&D expenditure. Indeed, in such industries there was something of a shift towards basic research in an effort to ‘find new frontiers’, and the 1980s saw increased expenditure on steel, non-ferrrous metals and ceramics R&D. Most of the increased R&D expenditures of the 1980s remained outside the universities. By the mid-1980s
Forging explanations 69 companies expended three times the combined expenditures of universities and research institutes on R&D, over two-thirds of which went into ‘developmental’ work, the largest commitments being in electrical machinery, communications, chemicals and transport. Between 1975 and 1985 Japan increased its share of US patents from 8.8 per cent to 19.3 per cent, more than the total granted to British, French and West German applicants combined. This directly reflected the increased emphasis of private enterprise on research-intensive activities, although it also accorded well with cries from the public sector concerned with the needs of restructuring. When Michiyuki Uenohara, an executive vice-president of the leading electronics company NEC, summarised that it ‘is a question of feeding back new technologies into existing mature products’ (Bell et al. 1985) he succinctly stated the essence of a strategy closely linking the public and private sectors, one which was to become a basis for such later institutional experiments as the Multifunctional Polis, the plan by MITI to establish a high-tech city in Australia (Inkster 1991b). Thus high-tech additions such as four-wheel steering and electronic controls were sought in order to rejuvenate and differentiate the market in the automobile industry, a strategy which appeared to benefit such companies as Nissan. A fall away in consumer electronics in the late 1980s, and a shift to the offshore manufacture of mass-produced products such as audio equipment, spelled not an entire abandonment of that sector to lower-cost competition but a shift to such product innovations as high-definition television systems, miniature camcorders and Super-VHS format video recorders. At the same time major enterprises increasingly focused on non-consumer products such as microchips, office machines and telecommunications, and began to command global heights in such high technology areas as high-density random access memories (D-RAMS), the most highly used category of chips for office equipment. In older industries the early switch was to process innovation, heralded by the massive investments in semiconductors between 1975 and 1985 in such areas as pulp and paper manufacture, chemicals, iron and steel and non-electrical machinery. This was joined by a definite strategy of diversification based on product technologies. Among steelmakers, Kobe Steel moved into biotechnology, Nippon Steel into information systems, NKK into electronics. Many textile makers shifted into plastics, foodstuffs and even medical products. Furthermore, new technologies were a basis for the switch from manufacturing into service investments associated with the endaka years. As the value of knowledge-intensive software and systems increasingly outstripped that of basic hardware, electronics firms moved from manufacturing to services as a logistic switch as much as in conformity to domestic demand for banking, transport and general business services. Spanning various of these strategies, by the late 1980s firms such as NEC or Fujitsu had R&D budgets which exceeded 10 per cent of their annual turnover. If there was a catch-up switch in technology policy, its results in terms of industrial and technological growth have not been clear. The new policies necessitated proper recognition of a lucrative technology at the early stage of the product cycle, the regulation of competition – as in MITI’s control over the introduction of the Basic
70 The Japanese industrial economy Oxygen Furnace Process by arranging for equal access – and organised co-operative R&D, as in the computer industry and the infamous Very Large Scale Integration technology project of 1979–85, the Supercomputer project of 1981–9 and the Fifth Generation Computer project of 1982–91. Enterprise participation in such projects required some diffused ‘average’ techniques to exist already; otherwise leading firms would be unlikely, whatever the inducements, to ‘share’ knowledge and techniques or personnel. Thus the VLSI circuit memory chips research programme was designed as exemplary for the catch-up phase of institutional and technological growth. Yet, according to its contemporary analysts, the project developed little in the way of breakthrough technique, and a great deal of administrative effort was required in order to co-ordinate the co-operative activity of five major enterprises, four co-operative labs and MITI specialists. Many commentators rightly centre on the novelty of the institutional context when attempting to capture the essence of the modern technological system. Thus for Fransman the ‘Japanese technology-creating system’ refers particularly to the manner in which the institutional complex allows for research co-operation between commercially competing firms, usually by devolving to the lower-range task of coordinating the separate in-house research of individual companies in a group rather than truly joint research effort. As we might expect in a competitive market environment wherein government inducements and assurances cannot be everything, co-operation tends to operate at the node of co-ordination rather than that of creative advancement. Importantly, this sort of analysis focuses not on the creation of information but on its studied relocation to sites where the pressure to innovate might be greatest, as at the group level on the shop floor of a kanban production system (Fransman 1990, Inkster 2001). The evidence is that, through information strategies of this sort, technology and information transfer agreements, as between Hitachi and RCA, NEC and Honeywell, and Toshiba and GE, have historically provided a useful learning base for the growth of indigenous capabilities. Fransman argues that the pre-commercial, co-operative research agreements advocated by MITI encouraged the development of ‘oriented basic research’ within private enterprise. During the 1970s when a combination of the Nixon Shock (the decoupling of the US dollar and the gold standard in August 1971, as noted in Chapter 1) and IBM’s System 370 forced Japanese computer businesses out of the market, the three survivors, Hitachi, Fujitsu and NEC, were all members of NTT’s group of supplying firms, and to that extent influenced by government activity. For many years NTT and government were together fundamental to the establishment of co-operative research, as with the mainframe computer project of 1972–6 which was designed to address the competitive advantage of System 370. Clearly the institutional frame within which Japanese industrial technologies have operated since the 1970s is not that of Europe or the USA, where there was a tendency towards financial weakness, short-term strategies and inadequate institutional linkages between production, quality control and marketing, together with a fragmentation of brand names. Progressive firms attempting to escape such historical constraints did not possess the advantages of Japanese enterprises, where a growing gijutsu-rikkoku ideology of technocratic nationalism was encouraged by
Forging explanations 71 government agencies responding to the commercial aggression of the USA, and where a tradition of long-term technological financing and planning was fostered by a complexity of government agencies, large firms and prefecturally based advice and guidance, the latter often intended to assist the technological improvement of small and medium-sized businesses. In some areas of very advanced technique the Japanese case suggests that it is at least possible for official activity to initiate a trajectory of response to rapid advances in other systems. Thus although in Japan there had been pressure from the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) to explore the commercial possibilities inherent in the life sciences from the 1970s, MITI took up biotechnologies as part of its wider restructuring strategy (see above) only from around 1980 as a response to Genentech and the Cohen-Boyer patent for rDNA technology. MITI’s interest in the chemical industry and the need to reduce oil imports led directly to the establishment of the Bioindustry Office, a main function of which was to plan aspects of the long-term development of the new field, to search out areas of international co-operation and to establish the new legislation required for intellectual property rights in this area. Official support for the industry in the form of protection, subsidies and incentives was not so important as might be predicted by the simple ‘Japan Inc.’ perspective. As we might now expect, it was the institutional context of policy and the response of the private sector, especially Mitsubishi Chemicals and Kyowa Hakko, which dominated events. It appears that MITI’s involvement strengthened its self-image as the new hataburiyaku, or standard-bearer, of Japanese high technology policy. We would argue on the available evidence that the strategy of technology transfer is still available to and operated by the Japanese industrial system, and that several recent institutional strategies, from techno-cities to co-operative research, are designed to situate the Japanese system as an optimal user of global core techniques, from wherever these may arise. A strategy of ‘waiting and transferring and adapting’ may operate for some time into the future. The existence of an efficient technologyproduction organisation, including remarkably quick ‘down-times’ between shifts in factories (see further Chapter 6), means that Japanese enterprise may continue to produce final products cheaply, variously, quickly and reliably. If product life cycles are shortening, this still remains a possible strategy. As one Japanese chemical firm is reported to have declared, even if ‘the Americans try to stop us by slapping patents on the results of their genetic engineering research, university research and the contents of patents eventually become public’ (Moritani 1986: 13). Japanese trading companies remain closely tied to production processes and have secured tremendous intelligence systems, despite the frights and disturbances of the endaka years. Japanese firms continue to buy into university research in other nations and frequently gain control over intellectual property. Others will continue to establish their own research facilities in advanced industrial systems, where they can employ sophisticated skills and techniques generated originally in the technological systems of the host nations. The restrictions on electronics trade of the European Union may have acted as the principal inducement to the growth of Japanese electronics investments within Europe, additionally attracted by the
72 The Japanese industrial economy possibilities of capturing local strengths in telecommunications and defence electronics. Similar moves may be expected repeatedly in the near future. Again, whatever the restrictive policies of the US government might be concerning technology leakage to Japan, individual firms will still benefit by licensing (or making equivalent arrangements) to Japanese enterprise in exchange for access to Japanese finance or marketing expertise. Private enterprise will indubitably strive to benefit from continued co-operative schemes aimed at fusing private and government R&D activity, as was evidenced to a degree in the Next Generation Base Technologies Development Programme, which combined initially the facilities of twenty-eight government labs, eighty-six private enterprises and thirteen universities. Although the ‘creativity’ strategy has often been envisaged as replacing that of technology transfer (see pp. 75–8), even now a lack of clear trends in technology policy or development suggests a continuation of Japanese eclectic pragmatism. This may be composed of the traditional transfer strategy, but with more attention given to feedback arrangements, as indicated first as long ago as 1982 with the offer to foreign companies of participation in MITI’s Fifth Generation project, and more recently in the attempt at joint research arrangements between NTT and several US firms and international participation in the Human Frontiers Project. Such a reciprocal strategy may be expected to surge with the observed increased attempts in Europe to mount large co-operative programmes and to encourage pre-commercial collaborative research across nations embracing partnerships between public and private. At the same time individual European firms have been pursuing technological innovation through joint ventures with Japanese companies, such as the Fujitsu-ICC partnership. Europe may increasingly see the solution to some of its own technological problems in a growing technological dialogue with Japan. This would be quite complementary to the observed shift of Japanese private enterprise into basic or generic research – as early as the mid-1980s, NTT spent twice as much as MITI on R&D. It would also fit comfortably with the continuation of policies designed to redefine and rejuvenate declining or ‘saturated’ industries before they become a social and budgetary drag on the entire national system: this may be what will keep Japanese social and economic efficiency above that of Western competitors in the years to come. Finally, we might also expect the Japanese government to make very serious attempts to continue in its long historical role as governor of conflict, especially that which might stem from technological discontentment. Whereas in Europe and the USA from the 1970s, dissatisfaction over the environmental wastage of many techniques was added to by the new hazards of high-technology research, including the threats to health that might arise from experimental manipulation of the genetic materials of living organisms, little discussion of such matters appeared in Japan. When this movement became increasingly politicised in the West, as it was shown how biotechnology in Western universities had become privatised and syphoned off into the private sector, again there was little debate in Japan, and the move towards techno-scepticism is only now developing real political strength. In her study of Japanese micro-electronics and the computer society, Morris-Suzuki makes it clear
Forging explanations 73 that a central feature of Japan’s ‘information