Nicolas Wiater The Ideology of Classicism
Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte Herausgegeben von Heinz...
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Nicolas Wiater The Ideology of Classicism
Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte Herausgegeben von Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, Peter Scholz und Otto Zwierlein
Band 105
De Gruyter
The Ideology of Classicism Language, History, and Identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus
by
Nicolas Wiater
De Gruyter
Ph.D. dissertation, Bonn University, 2008
ISBN 978-3-11-025658-1 e-ISBN 978-3-11-025911-7 ISSN 1862-1112 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wiater, Nicolas. The ideology of classicism : language, history, and identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus / by Nicolas Wiater. p. cm. − (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, ISSN 1862−1112) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-025658-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-3-11-025911-7(ebk.) 1. Dionysius, of Halicarnassus − Criticism and interpretation. 2. Classicism − Greece − History. I. Title. PA3967.Z6W53 2011 880.91.001−dc22 2011010091
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. © 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New York Typesetting: Rhema − Tim Doherty, Münster Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ⬁ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany. www.degruyter.com
For Pamela, Tino, and Fabi
Preface This book is a revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation which was accepted by the Philosophische Falkultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn in 2008. I am grateful to my referees, Professor Thomas A. Schmitz and Professor Konrad Vössing, and the other members of the examining board, Professor Dorothee Gall and Professor Otto Zwierlein, for their criticism and support, and to the editors of the Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, Professor Otto Zwierlein, Professor Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, and Professor Peter Scholz, for accepting my manuscript for publication in the series; in particular, I wish to thank Professor Nesselrath who read the entire manuscript with extraordinary diligence and care and intercepted more than one error. To Professor Zwierlein I am most grateful not only for recommending this manuscript for publication in the UaLG series but also for his extraordinary support and encouragement over the years. Many thanks also to Katrin Hofmann and Dr Sabine Vogt of de Gruyter for their prompt assistance in bringing the manuscript through the final stages of publication. Many people have contributed to this book with their advice and support. First and foremost I would like to mention Professor Thomas A. Schmitz, to whom I owe more than could be expressed here. The longer I work in Classics, both as a researcher and a teacher, the more I realize how much I have learned from him. It was his work on Greek literature under the Roman Empire which first roused my interest in later Greek literature in 2004, when I wrote my Masters thesis on Diodorus Siculus, and the years since have been the most intellectually stimulating and rewarding of my life. Among many other things, Thomas Schmitz supported my application for a doctoral scholarship from the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes) which gave me two years in which I could pursue my research on Dionysius of Halicarnassus without teaching obligations and administrative duties. I am grateful to the Studienstiftung for their financial support during this time, especially during the wonderful year as a visiting research student at Pembroke College, Cambridge. I would like
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Preface
to express my gratitude to Professor Simon Goldhill and Professor Richard Hunter for discussing my ideas with me and for their manifold support both during my time at Cambridge and afterwards. Furthermore, I would like to thank my parents, Susanne and Alfred Wiater, without whose support this book would never have been written, as well as my godfather and his wife, Heinz and Ute Kutzner, and my grandparents, Josef and Lydia Müller, for their generous and constant support and interest in my work. Jamie Sutherland read the manuscript at an earlier stage and greatly helped me with my English. Among the numerous people who have, in one way or another, contributed to this project, I would like to single out the following three: Fabian Meinel and my partner, Pamela Hutcheson, who read the entire manuscript, discussed my argument with me, corrected my English, and provided moral support. Tino Schweighöfer, my oldest and closest friend, was, as always, an unfailing source of encouragement and sanum iudicium. The only adequate way to show them my gratitude and affection is to dedicate this book to them.
Table of Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
........
VII 1
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’ – A Novel Approach to Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Dionysius’ Classicism as a Cultural Phenomenon . . 1.1.2 Dionysius – an ‘Augustan’ Author? . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.3 A Cultural Identity Approach to Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Conceptual Framework of Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . 1.2.1 Criticism as a Struggle for Authority . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Dionysius’ Critical Method as Heir to the Tradition of Classical Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 The Power of the Text: Creating a Discursive Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Criticism as Constituent of Communities of Intellectuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47 52
2. Reviving the Past: Language and Identity in Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
2.1 Introduction: Language and Time in Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 FilÏsofoc
1 1 8 18 29 32 40 44
60 65 65 77
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Table of Contents
2.3 Language and Power: Getting the Romans into the Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Greeks, Romans, Barbarians: Dionysius’ Interpretation of Augustan Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Dionysius’ Interpretation of the Roman Present in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Greek or Roman? The Ambiguity of Dionysius’ View of Augustan Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Coda: How Historical is Dionysius’ Model of History? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. History and Criticism: The Construction of a Classicist Past
92 92 100 107 110 116
. . 120
3.1 ‘Metahistory’ avant la lettre: Dionysius on Historical Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Deconstructing Thucydides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Identifying with the Past: Why Herodotus Succeeded where Thucydides Failed . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Classicist History: Theopompus’ ‘Isocratean’ Approach to the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Between History and Criticism: Re-writing the Melian Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 A Greek Past for the Roman Present: The Project of Dionysius’ Antiquitates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 EŒjÃc ‚x Çrq®c: The Archaeology of Roman Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Identity and Difference: Be Roman, Go Greek? . . . 3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
121 130 132 149 154 165 171 198 223
4. Knowledge and Elitism: Being a Classicist Critic . . . . . . . . . . . 226 4.1 >Anàgnwsic Trofò LËxewc: Reading and Distinction in Dionysius’ Classicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 ‘Authentic Reading’: Becoming a Classicist Critic . . . . . . . 4.2.1 The Failures of Scholarship Past: Redressing the Balance between Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Misreading Tradition: Deconstructing Chrysippus . . 4.2.3 Refuting the Idea of a ‘Natural Word Order’ . . . . . .
230 235 235 239 243
Table of Contents
4.2.4 On Literary Composition : A Normative Aesthetics of Classical Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 Dionysius’ Writings: A Classical Course of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Mysteries of Education: Being an Elite Critic . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Knowledge and Elitism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 The Mysteries of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Classical Politicians and Classicist Readers: Knowledge and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
XI
246 257 263 264 267 270 277
5. Enacting Distinction: The Interactive Structure of Dionysius’ Writings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 5.1 Criticism as Dialogic Interaction: Creating an ‘Imagined Community’ of Classicists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Strategies of Distinction: Out-Group Reading . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 ‘Objective Critic’ vs ‘Subjective Critic’: The Peripatetic on Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The Aesthetics of Criticism: Dionysius vs the Platonists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Conclusions References
281 297 303 310 348
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 1. Key Notions, Persons, Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 2. Greek Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 3. Passages Discussed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study 1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’1 – A Novel Approach to Dionysius’ Classicism 1.1.1 Dionysius’ Classicism as a Cultural Phenomenon Ever since Bonner’s study of the development of Dionysius’ thought, now a classic itself, scholarly interest in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus has increased steadily.2 70 years after the publication of Bonner’s treatise, Dionysius’ linguistic and rhetorical theories seem to have been exhaustively explored; scholars have examined Dionysius’ conceptual vocabulary (and its consistency), such as Schenkeveld’s and Damon’s detailed analyses of Dionysius’ notions of aesthetic evaluation, especially his use of älogoc a“sjhsic, Vaahtera’s study of ‘Phonetics and Euphony in Dionysius of Halicarnassus,’ 3 or Pohl’s study on the Çreta– and qarakt®rec t®c lËxewc.4 Dionysius’ critical methods too attracted attention: Viljama examined Dionysius’ analysis of sentence structures; 5 de Jonge focused on the use of metathesis, the technique of re-writing a passage from a Classical author, 6 and assessed Dionysius’ importance as a historian of linguistics. 7 The linguistic-historical approach to Dionysius’ works culminated recently in de Jonge’s dissertation ‘Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of
1 Geertz (1973) 5. 2 Bonner (1939); earlier studies of Dionysius’ critical works, or aspects of them, are, e.g., Blass (1863); Roessler (1873); v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1899); Kalinka (1924) and (1925). 3 Schenkeveld (1975); Damon (1991); Vaahtera (1997); cf. also Görler (1979). 4 Pohl (1968). 5 Viljama (2003). 6 de Jonge (2005a). 7 Id. (2005).
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics, and Literature,’ 8 the most comprehensive study to date not only of the sources of Dionysius’ ideas, but also of how he combined theories from such various strands as musical, grammatical and rhetorical theory, and (mainly Stoic) philosophy in his own, original system of thought. Dionysius is concerned with questions of grammar, rhetoric, and the aesthetics of speech, and every scholar working on his œuvre has to be familiar with this linguistic side of his. But even a study like de Jonge’s, which takes Dionysius seriously as a theoretician of rhetoric in his own right, represents a shift only in the evaluation of Dionysius as a thinker, but not in method. With his predecessors de Jonge shares an approach to Dionysius which remains reconstructional in purpose: he, like the other representatives of the linguistic approach, attempts to identify the sources on which Dionysius drew,9 which elements he adopted from each of them, and how he used these elements as the constituents of his own approach. The individual studies adopting the linguistic approach thus differ from each other mainly in the degree to which the authors allow for Dionysius’ influence on the material he found in his sources. Such an approach neglects (and maybe has to neglect) the fact that the various rhetorical, grammatical, musical, and philosophical theories which Dionysius applied in his criticism were not an end in themselves, but served a purpose beyond satisfying a purely intellectual interest in classical language and literature. de Jonge rightly remarks that ‘Dionysius’ views on literature are always subservient to the production of (rhetorical) texts through imitation of classical models,’ 10 but he does not inquire further into the reasons for Dionysius and his addressees’ desire to write ‘Classical’ (or what they thought to be Classical) texts: 11 focusing on the What and the 8 de Jonge (2008); as I was writing this study, de Jonge’s book had not yet been published. I am very grateful to Dr de Jonge for sending me a copy of his study and granting me invaluable insights into the results of his research. 9 de Jonge’s approach should not, however, be confused with traditional nineteenth-century source criticism from which he rightly distances himself ([2008] 7–8). He explicitly rejects the attempt to speculate about concrete sources; instead, he defines as the aim of his study to ‘point to the possible connections between Dionysius’ discourse and that of earlier and contemporary scholars of various backgrounds’ in order to ‘draw a general picture of the set of ideas and technical theories that were available in the Augustan age’ (ibid .). 10 de Jonge (2008) 7. 11 As ch. 2 will show, ‘Classical’ is a highly symbolically charged term for Dionysius with not only aesthetical and stylistic but also moral and political implications. His conception of ‘Classical’ rhetoric is therefore very different from ours. Hence whenever reference is
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
3
How, the linguistic approach neglects the Why. The emphasis on mimesis as the aim of Dionysius’ criticism thus pushes the problem only one stage further back: understanding the purpose of Dionysius’ evaluation of the style of the classical authors helps us accept the fact that his at times harsh criticism of such authors as Plato or Thucydides is so different from our own. Accepting that Dionysius’ criticism served a specific purpose enables us to study his ideas and methods on their own and to appreciate Dionysius’ intellectual achievement, instead of criticising him for his lack of taste. 12 But it does not help us to understand this desire for mimesis itself which motivates his criticism and thus leaves a crucial element of Greek classicism unexplained. This study proposes a different way of looking at Dionysius’ classicism. Rather than as a linguistic, I will approach Dionysius’ classicism as a social-cultural phenomenon. This approach rests on the assumption that the fact that a group of Greek and Roman intellectuals in the first century BCE attempted to speak and write like authors who had lived three hundred or so years before their times is a phenomenon which requires explanation. Underlying this approach is a ‘semiotic concept of culture’ 13 and human interaction which was developed by the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Following Max Weber, Geertz describes man as ‘an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun,’ culture constituting those webs. 14 Human actions are never neutral, but acts of communication; they carry a significance which needs to be interpreted by the recipient whose re-action will be determined by this interpretation. Human action is ‘symbolic’: made to Dionysius’ particular notion of the ‘Classical’ and the world view bound up with it, ‘Classical’ will be written with a capital ‘C’ in order to distinguish it from other uses of the term. In the same way, ‘Classicists’ will designate those intellectuals who adopted Dionysius’ Classicist ideology as opposed to ‘classicists’ meaning ‘modern scholars of classics.’ ‘Neo-Classicists’ did not seem an appropriate term to refer to Dionysius and the members of his community because they conceived of themselves as genuinely ‘Classical’ (see ch. 2.2 below), an aspect of Dionysius’ self-definition which the prefix ‘neo’ might obscure to a certain extent. Consequently, ‘Classicism’ with a capital ‘C’ will refer specifically to Dionysius’ conception of classical language and way of life as opposed to other ‘(neo-)classicist’ movements at other times, for example in 19th-century Germany. See the discussion below, pp. 48–49 with n. 148. 12 de Jonge (2008) 7; however, de Jonge correctly points out that the latter attitude has been abandoned in recent scholarship (ibid. 8–9). 13 Geertz (1973a) 14. 14 Ibid. 5.
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings [is] the fact that human beings interpret or “define” each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their “response” is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning of one another’s actions. This mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of human behaviour. 15
The meaning of actions is understandable only from within the particular context in which they are performed. This context is culture: culture provides the parameters in which human beings expect each other’s actions to be interpreted: As interworked systems of construable signs (what, ignoring provincial usages, I would call symbols), culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is thickly – described.16
Therefore understanding human interaction depends on understanding how members of communities interpret each other’s actions. The anthropologist makes actions of members of a foreign society understandable to the members of his society by explaining the principles according to which the members of the foreign society invest their actions with meaning. Geertz calls this process the ‘thick description’:17 ‘descriptions of Berber, Jewish, or French culture must be cast in terms of the constructions we imagine Berbers, Jews, or Frenchmen to place upon what they live through, the formulae they use to define what happens to them.’ 18 In the past, archaeological and historical studies of the ancient world in particular have greatly profited from cross-fertilization with anthropological methods: reading the Odyssey with the system of gift-giving explored by Marcel Mauss, Moses I. Finley offered exciting new insights into the society of the Dark Ages; 19 Eric R. Dodds’ The Greeks and the Irrational explored Greek religion applying, among others, anthropological theories of shame and guilt cultures; more recently, Leslie Kurke has furthered our 15 Blumer (1962) 180; cf. Cohen (1985) 42: ‘any behaviour, no matter how routine, may have a symbolic aspect if members of society wish to endow it with such significance.’ This approach to human interaction ultimately goes back to George Herbert Mead and is now known under the name of ‘symbolic interactionism,’ a term coined by Herbert Blumer in 1969; see the overview in Rose (1962a) and the contributions collected in Rose (1962). 16 Geertz (1973a) 14. 17 Ibid. 6. 18 Ibid. 15. 19 The World of Odysseus (New York 1977).
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
5
understanding of the social mechanisms lying behind Pindaric praise poetry on the basis of native Indian potlatch. 20 This list could be extended considerably.21 Yet, apart from the novel ways of looking at individual areas of ancient culture and society such as age-setting, agriculture, burial-rituals, the family, gender-protocols, law, sexuality, slavery, and drama provided by anthropology, 22 ‘the greatest value to the classicist in the dialogue’ with anthropology, as Finley pointed out, is ‘the cultivation of an approach, a habit of thought – I might say a methodology.’ It seems to me that an investigation of Greek classicism can profit from this last aspect in particular. Anthropological studies remind us that the overwhelming influence of ancient culture on Western thought and civilisation can engender a sensation of familiarity with the ancient world which blinds us to the differences separating our culture from antiquity. In some aspects of ancient society these differences are blatant; Greek pederasty, the role of women, or slavery are obvious examples. In these cases comparison with other, non-Western societies can help us understand these phenomena. Intellectual activities such as studying classical Greek language and literature, by contrast, are more problematic because we seem to share these practices with the ancients. Here anthropology warns us against such cultural ‘false friends’ by reminding us that similar practices in different cultures can be deceptive as their respective meaning depends on the context in which they are performed, rather than on the activity being performed itself. To a Greek scholar from Halicarnassus, studying and teaching classical Greek grammar and rhetoric in Augustan Rome has an entirely different meaning than the same activity has to a twenty-first century Western European scholar. An in-depth discussion of the similarities and differences of classics and anthropology is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest certain aspects in which the work of an anthropologist attempting to give a thick description of, for example, Balinese cock fight can be viewed as comparable to that of a classicist investigating Greek classicism in the first century BCE.23 I hope that such a comparison will help to clarify my approach to Dionysius’ classicism. Anthropologists and classicists alike aim to interpret actions of members of a foreign culture and to make 20 The Traffics in Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy (Ithaca 1991). 21 See the discussion of anthropological methods in classical studies by Humphreys (1978), esp. 17–30; Cartledge (1995a); Finley (1986); cf. French (1982); Kluckhohn (1961). 22 These and other topics are listed by Cartledge (1995a); cf. Finley (1986), 116–117. 23 The example of Balinese cock fight is from Geertz (1973b).
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
them comprehensible to their audiences. An important difference is that anthropologists seem to be in a more advantageous situation than classicists in that they focus on societies which are contemporary, but separated from them by space. Classicists, by contrast, deal with a society from which they are separated by time and space. Therefore anthropologists can rely on first-hand evidence for their interpretations: they are able to travel to Bali and watch a cock fight while classicists have to reconstruct the performance of a Greek drama, or the activity of Greek and Roman intellectuals, from literary and archaeological evidence alone. This difference notwithstanding, both disciplines appear to be similar in that the very interpretation of the foreign culture, the ‘thick description,’ depends in both cases on informants from within the society which is being studied: the classicists’ informants are texts and archaeological evidence, whereas anthropologists rely on observations which they seek to contextualize by means of statements of people. Again, anthropologists seem to be in the more advantageous position because they are able to ask specific questions and thus obtain more comprehensive information. But this information itself must be evaluated by the anthropologist because even an informant from within a foreign society does not, and cannot, provide the one correct explanation of a phenomenon but only his own interpretation of it. A classicist’s and an anthropologist’s work might therefore be regarded as similar in the one fundamental aspect that both seek to render foreign cultural practices familiar to themselves and their recipients by interpreting interpretations, i. e., by providing a ‘thick description’ of the practices of a foreign culture on the basis of partial and selective information from within this foreign culture.24 Classicists and anthropologists thus seem to differ mainly in the kind of sources on which they draw, but the process of interpretation, which is carried out by each of them, is similar: it has a similar aim, it employs similar methods to achieve this aim, and it is subject to similar imponderables. 25 24 Cf. Geertz (1973a) 20; ibid. 15. 25 Cf. Lévi-Strauss (1949) 18: ‘the fundamental difference between the two disciplines [history and anthropology] is not one of subject, of goal, or of method. They share the same subject, which is social life; the same goal, which is a better understanding of man; and, in fact, the same method, in which only the proportion of research techniques varies. They differ, principally, in their choice of complementary perspectives. History organizes its data in relation to conscious expressions of social life, while anthropology proceeds by examining its unconscious foundations.’
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
7
The purpose of this book is to provide such a ‘thick description’ of Greek classicism, an interpretation, that is, of what meaning Dionysius and his readers attributed to reading and writing classical texts within their culture. Therefore the question I will pursue in this study is why it made sense to these intellectuals at this particular time and at this particular place to attempt to speak and write like classical authors. 26 An explanation of this phenomenon cannot be provided by an analysis of Dionysius’ critical and aesthetical categories, his criteria of evaluation, or by tracing similarities and differences between Dionysius’ opinion on classical texts and those of other critics, such as Ps.-Demetrius’ On Style or Philodemus’ essays. It must be sought in the way in which these scholars imagined their literary and rhetorical activity to be connected with their social and cultural surroundings, in their interpretation of the world, and of the role they ascribed to themselves in it, their self-definition. Such an approach is concerned with what may be defined as Dionysius’ ‘imaginary universe’ 27 which endowed his literary criticism with meaning. Recently, two studies have shown how fruitful it is to approach Dionysius’ critical writings from such an angle: Hidber’s Das klassizistische Manifest des Dionys von Halikarnass. Die praefatio zu De oratoribus veteribus: Einleitung, Übersetzung, Kommentar and Porter’s ‘Feeling Classical: Classicism and Ancient Literary Criticism.’28 Hidber shows that Dionysius’ Classicism implies an interpretation of Augustan Rome as the continuation of the Classical past and that Dionysius conceived of himself and his educational programme as the successor of Isocrates and his conception of civic identity. Porter draws attention to the importance of the reading experience for a ‘Classicist’s’ 29 construction of identity: Classicists saw reading classical texts as a means to overcome the temporal distance between present and Classical past and, in this way, to feel classical themselves. These studies have demonstrated that Dionysius’ literary criticism is bound up with a particular world view and a conception of identity; they have provided important insights into constituent elements of Dionysius’ ‘imaginary universe,’ and suggested ways of how to explore it. But their scope is necessarily limited: Hidber deals with only one, albeit programmatic, text of Dionysius’, and Porter 26 For an attempt to locate Dionysius within the culture of his times see Hurst (1982). 27 For this term see White (1969) 623; cf. Gehrke’s ‘imaginaire,’ which he glosses as the ‘Vorstellungshorizont einer Gesellschaft’ ([2005] 51). 28 Hidber (1996); Porter (2006b); cf. id. (2006a). 29 On my use of this term see above, p. 2 n. 11.
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confines himself to the role of the reading experience. Moreover, neither of them develops a theoretical framework in order to define their approach to Dionysius’ Classicism, to base their findings on a solid methodology, and to create a foundation for further investigations. Thus while paving the way for a fresh view on Dionysius’ criticism, they call for a comprehensive, systematic study of Dionysius’ Classicism as a social-cultural phenomenon. The present study aims to fill this lacuna. It will discuss Dionysius’ Classicism from the angle of cultural identity and explore the outlook on the world which is bound up with literary criticism and the study of classical texts and language. Dionysius’ criticism, I will argue, makes classical Greek language and literature constituents of a conception of Greek identity in Augustan Rome. Such an approach will, I hope, not only offer us a novel way of looking at Dionysius’ criticism; it will also permit us to re-evaluate Greek classicism as an integral part of the intellectual culture of Augustan Rome. In the following section I will explain the concept of ‘Augustan culture’ that underlies this study and offer some suggestions as to how discussing Dionysius’ literary criticism might influence our way of thinking about this concept. In section 1.1.3 I will then develop a theoretical framework which allows us to address Dionysius’ Classicism as a discourse of cultural identity.
1.1.2 Dionysius – an ‘Augustan’ Author? Based mainly on the works of Galinsky, Wallace-Hadrill, and Barchiesi, 30 our approach to the ‘Age of Augustus’ 31 has undergone what could be called a ‘discursive turn.’ 32 We have given up the idea of a uniform image of society and culture in Augustan Rome the different elements of which can easily be categorized as ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-Augustan.’ Instead, the prevailing notion of ‘Augustan culture’ is now that of ‘a time of transition, of continuing
30 See Galinsky (1996); (2005); the series of articles by Wallace-Hadill (1988); (1989); (1990); (1997); (1998); and, most recently, his comprehensive study (2008), esp. 3–37 (ch. 1: ‘Culture, Identity, and Power’); Barchiesi (1994), esp. 1–44. Other important works on the subject include the contributions collected in Powell (1992); Elsner (1996); cf. Phillips (1983). Further titles relevant to this subject are cited in my discussion of the relation of Dionysius’ historical work, the Antiquitates Romanae, to its Augustan context below, pp. 206–223. 31 For this term see the title of Galinsky (2005). 32 Cf. Barchiesi (1994) 8.
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experimentation’ 33 in which many institutions ‘were in a state of nascence and evolution.’ 34 Augustan society is no longer seen as controlled by a monolithic ideology which the princeps sought systematically to impose on all different spheres of society, but as a complex and ‘dynamic tension’ between ‘authorial intent’ (identified by Galinsky as Augustus’ auctoritas) and ‘latitude of response’: Augustus and his conception of rulership represented a ‘strong center of ideas’ which ‘encourage[d] creative response and interpretation’: 35 We are not dealing with a political, let alone cultural, model that involves constant top-down commands and Augustus as the sole agent. Instead of a rigidly hierarchical “organization of opinion” in particular, the emphasis is on the initiatives of many, especially in the areas of art and literature. 36 […] [Augustus’] actions suggested the broad themes […]. These themes were expressed, elaborated, and extended by individuals in their own way. By connecting them with other themes of their own choice, these participants extended the range of references even further. 37
The present study builds on this notion of ‘Augustan’ culture as a dynamic dialectics of different discourses (social, political, cultural, etc.) and the ‘master discourse’ of Augustus’ imperial ideology, which evolved by mutually influencing and shaping each other. The most important consequences of this new approach are, first, that we have realized that Augustus’ power was as much shaped by the different discourses as it sought to shape them: the notion of the principate itself was not a stable, monolithic given, but evolved and changed through the dialectics with other discourses. And second, we no longer view Augustan power as a process of actively imposing a political programme, or ‘propaganda,’ as it is often called, 38 on society. This does not mean, of course, that Augustus did not endeavour to influence different spheres of society and even use political reprisals to achieve his objectives – the fate of Ovid or Gallus clearly contradict such a view, and it is hard to imagine how Augustus could have achieved any kind of stability and control 33 34 35 36
Galinsky (1996) 9, following Feeney (1992). Ibid. 8. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13; cf. ibid. 20: Augustus’ rulership was not based on propaganda but ‘a reciprocal and dynamic process in which the emperor’s role is hard to pin down’; therefore, Augustus’ auctoritas was ‘directly reflected’ in, yet not imposed upon ‘literature and the arts, including the coinage.’ 37 Ibid. 37. 38 Cf. the essays collected in Powell (1992).
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
without a certain political pressure. But the crucial point is that Augustus did not exert such pressure systematically to suppress elements of contemporary society that did not fit some sort of a predefined and unchangeable set of rules. Consequently, no attempt should be made to explain the politics, culture, and society of the first century BCE as the result of any such ‘master plan’ of the princeps and discuss their different elements in terms of ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-Augustan.’ Yet, this discursive conception of ‘Augustan’ culture is sometimes employed in a way that seems problematic in that it onesidedly focuses on those spheres of society which are known, or can at least be reasonably assumed, to have directly interacted with the ‘master discourse’ of Augustan power. This narrow focus risks making the direct interaction with Augustan power the only standard by which we define (or exclude) certain elements of first-century Roman culture as constituents of ‘Augustan’ culture and, therefore, as relevant to our image of it. As a result, we are presented with an image of ‘Augustan’ culture which is as Augustus-centred as the one which the ‘discursive’ approach was supposed to correct. When applied in this limited way, the ‘discursive’ approach falls short of its possibilities: instead of offering the reader a novel conception of ‘Augustan’ culture it only offers a different way of conceiving of the way in which Augustus exerted his power within contemporary culture and society. This tendency, however, does not concern the increasing number of specialized studies of individual authors of the first century BCE. Primarily, it is found in those studies that endeavour to present a comprehensive account of ‘Augustan culture,’ such as Galinsky’s Augustan Culture. An Interpretive Introduction or The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus. 39 Therefore, in the following pages, I would like to address certain problems that seem to me to be inherent in the image of ‘Augustan’ culture offered in such comprehensive studies. Naturally, such studies have to be very selective in which aspects of ‘Augustan’ culture they discuss because it was so multifaceted. But for this very reason, they risk presenting a somewhat distorted image of their subject. This seems particularly problematic because titles such as Augustan Culture might lead readers to assume that all essential aspects of ‘Augustan’ culture have been covered. Moreover, because of their 39 The following discussion is therefore primarily concerned with Galinsky (1996) and (2005). Focusing on Galinsky’s conception of ‘Augustan culture’ seems justified as his Augustan Culture can and has, in fact, been regarded as ‘the most important single volume about the Augustan period since Zanker’s Power of Images’ (Smith [1997]).
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
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apparent comprehensiveness such studies might often be the first or, indeed, the only works consulted on ‘Augustan’ culture and therefore have considerable impact on the prevalent image of first-century BCE Roman society and culture. The difficulties of the concentration on Augustus can be illustrated with Galinsky’s notion of ‘Augustan’ culture which he bases on Augustus’ own conception of auctoritas at RG 34,40 the essence of which he paraphrases as ‘Augustus navigated on the stream of history and was successful because he did not oversteer. He saw himself that way […].’ 41 This metaphor implies that ‘the stream of history’ is relevant only insofar as it directly interacted with the ‘steersman’ Augustus who attempted to find the middle ground between influencing and being influenced. The core of the metaphor is the idea of a direct reciprocity between Augustus and cultural and societal discourses which implies that only those spheres of first-century Roman society are relevant to (our image of) ‘Augustan’ culture which can be shown to have interacted with Augustus. Hence, ‘Augustan’ culture and society as a whole appears to be of interest only inasmuch it can help us understand the nature of Augustus’ principate and the structure of his power. Sculptures, coins, texts, paintings, and other artifacts are thus reduced to testimonies which further our understanding of the nature of Augustan power by allowing us to study the interrelation of political power and cultural discourse. 42 The focus of Galinsky’s studies 40 […] auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt. The fragments of Augustus’ works are cited by Malvocati’s edition, Caesaris Augusti Imperatoris Operum Fragmenta (Torino 1928). Galinsky gives a detailed discussion of Augustus’ auctoritas in (1996) 10–20. I do not intend to deny that authority and the re-definition of authority are crucial, probably the crucial elements of the Augustan principate without which an understanding of ‘Augustan culture’ is impossible; the importance of authority to Augustus’ rulership and its interaction with different areas of culture has also been demonstrated by Wallace-Hadrill in an illuminating study (1997). My point here is that the focus on authority risks reducing the complexity and diversity of ‘Augustan culture.’ For a similar criticism (although for different reasons) see Wendt’s (2007) discussion of Galinsky (2005). Heinze (1925) remains the fundamental discussion of the meaning of auctoritas. 41 Galinsky (2005a) 6. 42 The close connection between exploring different elements of ‘Augustan’ culture and understanding the specific nature of Augustus’ power is emphasised by Wallace-Hadrill (1997) 7: ‘that power is restructured and exercised in different ways under Augustus is obvious. What makes the Augustan restoration revolutionary is that it involves a fundamental relocation and redefinition of authority in Roman society. By focusing on authority, it may be possible to grasp something of the links between the refashioning of political
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
is clear from his distinction between two types of power on which political superiority lasts: ‘hard power,’ i. e., military domination, and ‘soft power,’ i.e., ‘culture in its various aspects.’ Any investigation of ‘Augustan’ writers is thus centred on the question of how Augustus ‘appropriated [the] practitioners’ of ‘cultural activity.’43 Underlying Galinsky’s approach to the ‘Age of Augustus’ is what Homi Bhabha has described as the assumption of a ‘preconstituted holistic cultur[e], that contain[s] within [it] the cod[e] by which it can legitimately be read.’ 44 With Augustus’ conception of auctoritas Galinsky provides such a ‘code’ to first-century Roman politics and culture the legitimacy of which is supposed to be guaranteed by the fact that it was introduced by the princeps himself: ‘he saw himself that way …’ The main problem with approaching first-century Roman culture and society through the spectacles of Augustan auctoritas is that it implies accepting a hermeneutical framework which pre-determines the questions which we address to social-cultural phenomena of first-century BCE Rome and the criteria by which we select certain phenomena as relevant while leaving others aside. Not enough attention has been paid to the fact that Augustus’ conception of auctoritas is not to be taken as an objective, factual description of the nature of his rule. Rather, Augustus’ definition of auctoritas, as opposed to potestas, as the foundation of his power is itself part of Augustus’ strategy to justify and maintain his superiority: defining himself as a primus inter pares, Augustus offered his subjects a conception of rulership which concealed his actual influence as much as possible and downplayed his attempt actively to impinge on the lives of his subjects. Augustus’ notion of auctoritas was thus a cornerstone of the illusion that the principate was firmly inscribed in the traditional constellation of power (potestas) of the res publica libera which Augustus claimed to have restored.45 Res Gestae 34, authority on the one hand, and the refashioning of moral, social and cultural authority on the other […].’ 43 Galinsky (2005a) 4. 44 On the attempt to understand other cultures by extrapolating from them ‘the codes by which they can be legitimately read’ see Bhabha (1994) 179. 45 It is significant that Augustus introduces the notion of auctoritas in the concluding sentence to the very paragraph in which he describes that his rise to power was based on the consent of the whole populace; that he had used this power to restore the res publica to the senate and the people; and that this was the reason why he was awarded the title Augustus (in consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia extinxeram, per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli. Quo pro merito senatus consulto Augustus appellatus sum […], emphasis mine).
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and the self-definition of Augustus which it proclaims, are themselves means of exerting power, of achieving unity and homogeneity by convincing the subjects to accept Augustus’ leadership. 46 By constructing a homogeneous image of ‘Augustan’ culture and society based on Augustus’ auctoritas, we are, in fact, adopting an Augustan perspective on the culture of his times. Augustus’ aim to control society by establishing cultural, moral, and political homogeneity through auctoritas lurks behind the current image of ‘Augustan’ culture as centred on Augustan power. Imposing this idea of unity on the culture and society in Augustan Rome can itself be seen as an act of cultural imperialism which excludes all those authors from consideration who cannot be assumed at least potentially to have influenced the princeps or been influenced by him. As a result, discussions of ‘Augustan’ literature are usually concerned exclusively with Latin authors and among these only those who were directly connected with the princeps. ‘Augustan’ literature thus appears to consist almost exclusively of Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, whose works are discussed under such headings as: how did these authors position themselves towards key topics of Augustus’ moral and political programme? how did they negotiate, transform, or even undermine Augustus’ power? what was the exact nature of their relationship with the princeps? The chapter on ‘Augustan literature’ in Galinsky’s Companion is a case in point:47 as has been pointed out, 48 all contributions in this chapter deal exclusively with poetry, re-investigating the relationship between the works and Augustan power. 49 The image of ‘Augustan’ culture emerging from this approach is highly paradoxical because it defines ‘Augustan’ culture as a self-enclosed entity within the culture and society of first-century BCE Rome at large. ‘Augustan’ culture thus appears as a ‘culture within a culture’ the constituents of which are selected according to their relevance to our understanding of Augustan power. Maybe the most problematic aspect of this conception is that it implies that the only factor relevant both to the formation of a
46 Although the exact meaning and implications of this passage are controversial, this point is acknowledged by virtually all interpreters, see, e.g., Eck (2007), 54; Hohl (1946), 114–115; Hoben (1978), 17–18; Diesner (1985), 34–36, 39. 47 Galinsky (2005) 281–360. 48 Brice (2006). 49 The same is true for Galinsky’s (1996) chapter on ‘Augustan Literature’ (pp. 224–287), Galinsky’s brief discussion of Livy’s preface (ibid. 281–283) notwithstanding.
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
culture and society and our understanding of it is the dominating political discourse. This is not to deny that the political discourse and its interaction with other discourses are objects worth studying, and the exciting new insights into the nature of Augustus’ principate which have been provided by the studies discussed in this section prove this. But the reduction of ‘Augustan’ culture to those artifacts which Augustan power could have directly influenced is at variance with the conception of ‘Augustan’ culture as a system of discourses interacting freely with each other because it reduces the diversity of cultural production in first-century BCE Rome. Yet, as Foucault has emphasized, it is the very diversity and co-existence of different, sometimes incompatible themes, which distinguishes a discursive approach to culture. Culture, as Foucault puts it, is a ‘system of dispersions’:50 What one finds are […] various strategic possibilities that permit the activation of incompatible themes, or, again, the establishment of the same theme in different groups of statements. Hence the idea of describing these dispersions themselves; of discovering whether between these elements, which are certainly not organized as a progressively deductive structure […] nor as the œuvre of a collective subject, one cannot discern regularities in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierarchized transformations. Such an analysis would not try to isolate small islands of coherence in order to describe their internal structure; it would not try to suspect and to reveal latent conflicts; it would study forms of diversion. Or again: […] it would describe systems of dispersion. Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say […] that we are dealing with a discursive formation. 51
In the contemporary debate about ‘Augustan’ culture, Foucault’s stress on the co-existence of incompatible themes has been profitably employed to explain the broad range of reactions to the principate and thus to refute the idea of Augustus’ rule as a monolithic, top-down system of propaganda and control. Yet, paradoxically, the focus on the nature of Augustan power carries the danger of turning the contemporary debate itself into an attempt to ‘isolate small islands of coherence in order to describe their internal structure’ rather than describing ‘Augustan’ culture as a ‘system of dispersions.’ 50 Foucault (1966) 41. 51 Ibid.
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One possible solution to this problem might be not to address the question of Augustus’ influence upon culture and society solely or primarily in terms of the diffusion of political power. Approaching Dionysius’ classicist criticism as a cultural phenomenon suggests a way of exploring ‘Augustan’ culture as a system of ‘discursive formations’ which owe their existence to Augustus but not to any direct influence of Augustus’ power or direct interaction with it. Although Dionysius seems to have had close connections with the Roman upper class there is no question of him being in direct contact with or in any way immediately influenced by the princeps in the same way as, say, Horace, Virgil, or Ovid. 52 Nevertheless, as will be shown in the next chapter, Augustus and the image of himself and the principate which he proclaimed were an integral part of what I will call Dionysius’ ‘Classicist ideology.’ 53 And although we can trace classicizing tendencies in Greek literature at least as far back as the third century BCE,54 it is only with Dionysius, as far as we can judge, 55 that classicism turned into a Weltanschauung, a world view, and classical Greek language became a model of identity of Greek intellectuals under Roman rule. It is only when the pre-existing classicist discourse interacted with the novel discourse of the principate and the responses it stimulated in a variety of other discourses that it was transformed from a rhetorical phenomenon into a model of cultural identity. Hence, though not directly influenced by Augustus and, compared with the works of Virgil, Horace, or Ovid, existing on the margins of the culture and society of his times, Dionysius’ criticism is nevertheless deeply informed
52 The social background of Dionysius’ intellectual activities will be discussed in the next section. 53 On my use of ‘ideology’ see below, pp. 21–22. 54 A Hibeh Papyrus (edd. B.P. Grenfell/A.S. Hunt, vol. 1, London 1906, No. 15, pp. 55–61, dated c. 280–240 BCE) contains a rhetorical exercise in classicizing style; furthermore, Photius (Bibl. cod. 176, p. 121b 9 Bekker) mentions that one Cleochares wrote a synkrisis of Isocrates and Demosthenes in the third or second century BCE, and Cicero reports (Orat. 67.226) that Hegesias of Magnesia, heavily criticised by Dionysius for ruining the classical style, regarded himself as an ‘imitator’ (imitari) of Lysias, see Dihle (1977) 168. As Dihle (ibid. 167) points out, this ‘rhetorical’ ‘Atticism’ should be distinguished from the grammarians’ attempt, equally dating back to the third century BCE, to install the vocabulary and grammar of the Attic dialect as the standard of correct Greek (<EllhnismÏc), on which see ibid. 163–167 and most recently, Czapla (forthcoming) with a good overview of this complicated intellectual phenomenon; cf. Swain (1996) 22. 55 Cf. Dihle (1977) 168.
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
by the princeps and the principate.56 Unlike the works of the three poets, Dionysius’ writings might not grant us any insight into the mechanisms of Augustus’ power. But just like the poems of his famous Latin contemporaries, Dionysius’ works contributed to implementing the principate into the culture and society of his times by turning key ideas of Augustus’ conception of leadership into the cornerstones of his Classicist ideology. Like Virgil, Horace, and (at least partially) Ovid, Dionysius disseminated Augustan ideas among his contemporaries. Adapting these ideas to and combining them with his own, he produced a discourse which was both ‘Augustan’ and ‘Dionysian’ and which inscribed the classical Greek cultural and political heritage into an Augustan framework, while re-interpreting this Augustan framework in terms of the classical Greek heritage. In order to explore ‘Augustan’ culture as a system of discourses, as a ‘group of statements’ in Foucault’s sense,57 we would therefore have to shift the focus from Augustus’ immediate influence on and interaction with the inner circle of society, his ‘appropriation’ of those who were closest to him. Instead, we would have to consider alongside each other the various ways in which the whole variety of discourses that constituted first-century BCE Roman society were shaped by the principate not by virtue of any political influence but because practitioners of culture such as Dionysius incorporated different aspects of ‘the principate’ into their systems of thought by adopting, adapting, and re-interpreting it. With regard to literature this means that Strabo’s Geography and Dionysius’ critical essays and Antiquitates Romanae are as important to our understanding of ‘Augustan’ culture as Virgil’s Aeneid, Horace’s Odes, and Ovid’s elegies. Only by studying the works of these authors in their variety, without giving priority to those closest to the princeps, will we be able to detect the regularities between their different statements and thus to describe ‘Augustan’ culture as a ‘system of dispersions.’ This might enable us to discard the Augustocentric notion of ‘Augustan’ culture and to conceive of ‘Augustan’ less in terms of a relationship between society and power (auctoritas) than a flexible construct 56 Luzzatto (1988) 240, too, stresses the importance of the cultural environment of Augustan Rome for the formation of Dionysius’ Classicism; similarly, Hidber (1996) 42–43 (the conception of education underlying Dionysius’ Classicism ‘conformed to the requirements implied in the Augustan empire,’ ‘[war ausgerichtet auf] die implizierten Bedürfnisse des augusteischen Weltreiches,’ ibid. 43); v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1900) 45–46 (the instalment of the principate prompted the Greeks to review their attitude towards their own language and literature). 57 Foucault (1966) 40.
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that applies to authors and their works regardless of whether they were Greek or Roman; 58 wrote poetry, scholarly literature, or historiography; were acquainted with the princeps or not; or even lived in Rome or abroad. Such a full scale analysis of ‘Augustan’ culture remains a desideratum and would probably require the joint effort of an equipe of scholars. It is, at any rate, far beyond the aims of this study although I will repeatedly read Dionysius’ works against those of contemporary Latin authors in order to locate his ideas within the larger intellectual context of his times. But discussing Dionysius’ Classicism as an element of ‘Augustan’ culture will, hopefully, make some contribution to paving the way for such an undertaking by demonstrating how central tenets of the dominating political discourse in first-century Rome cross-fertilized Greek rhetorical and literary criticism. This resulted in what might appear to us a somewhat idiosyncratic (re)interpretation of the principate and Augustan Rome but was, in fact, a conception of identity that seems to have appealed to Greek literati as much as to upper-class Roman politicians and intellectuals. Thus, although it is not the primary aim of this study to re-valuate Dionysius as an ‘Augustan’ author, it would certainly be a welcome effect if the subsequent discussion of his ‘ideology of criticism’ contributed to making us re-consider the parameters in which we conceive of ‘Augustan’ culture. I have argued in section 1.1.1 above that we have to shift the focus from classicism as a linguistic to classicism as a social-cultural phenomenon in order to appreciate Dionysius’ Classicism as an integral element of ‘Augus58 This point in particular deserves to be stressed as there is a noticeable discrepancy between scholarly interest in Roman cultural identity in the late Republic and early Empire and Greek identity in the Second Sophistic on the one hand and Greek cultural identity in the first centuries BCE and CE on the other: on Roman cultural identity see, e.g., WallaceHadrill (1988), (1989), (1990), (1997), (1998), (2008); Woolf (1994); Habinek (1998), and cf. the literature cited in ch.s 2.3 and 3.3 below; there is an impressive number of excellent studies on Greek identity in the Second Sophistic such as Bowie (1970); Gleason (1995); Swain (1996); Schmitz (1997); Goldhill (2001); Borg (2004); Whitmarsh (2001), (2010). The number of works with a similar interest in Greek intellectuals in the Roman Republic and early Empire, by contrast, is still remarkably small: see, e.g., Dueck (2000) and Dueck/ Lindsay/Pothecary (2005) on Strabo; Sacks (1990), Clarke (1999), Schmitz (forthcoming), and Wiater (2006) and (2006a) on Diodorus Siculus; Wiater (2008) and (forthcoming) on Dionysius of Halicarnassus; a wide range of different authors and genres is discussed in Schmitz/Wiater (forthcoming) with further literature; for a more detailed discussion of the state of the research on Greek cultural identity in the first centuries BCE and CE and how this research might affect our view of the Second Sophistic see Schmitz/Wiater (forthcoming-a).
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study
tan’ culture. For focusing exclusively on the linguistic side of his criticism entails perceiving classicism as a preposterous retrograde activity which sacrificed the present to worshipping the better days long past. After all, the aim of Dionysius and his recipients was to reinstall classical Greek style and authors active in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE as the only acceptable standard of literary and oral expression in first-century BCE Rome. 59 The question is therefore: how can we address Dionysius’ Classicist criticism as an activity which productively and creatively interacted with the cultural-political discourse in Augustan Rome? Or, putting it in the terms explained in the preceding section, how can we produce a ‘thick description’ of Dionysius’ Classicism? It is to this question that I will turn in the following section.
1.1.3 A Cultural Identity Approach to Dionysius’ Classicism Clifford Geertz’s notion of culture as a ‘web of significance’ and his conception of ‘thick description’ provide a helpful general framework in which to approach a foreign culture. But Geertz’s discussion is too abstract to provide an efficient heuristic tool for investigating concrete cultural phenomena. In particular, Geertz’s conception of the constitutive elements of culture requires some qualification. Statements such as ‘descriptions of Berber, Jewish, or French culture must be cast in terms of the construction we imagine Berbers, Jews, or Frenchmen to place upon what they live through, the formulae they use to define what happens to them’ 60 show that Geertz risks equating ‘culture’ with national identity. Hence his notion of ‘culture’ suggests a homogeneity of human beings’ perception of their actions which has no match in reality and produces a somewhat simplified image of social interaction. Social Identity Theory can help to devise a more complex conception of culture. Dealing not with culture as an abstract notion but with
59 See, e.g., Kennedy (1963) 330: ‘Atticism is the reaction against the excesses of Hellenistic prose style, but instead of creating good standards of contemporary usage, the new movement demanded an archaic return to the language, rhythms, and style of the classical period. Thus it is intertwined with classicism, the view that the great literary achievements of the Greeks was past.’ The relationship of past and present implied in Dionysius’ Classicism will be discussed in detail in ch. 2 below which will also argue against the view expressed by Kennedy. 60 Geertz (1973a) 15, quoted above.
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the question of how culture is realized in everyday social action, it can be fruitfully employed to complement Geertz’s discussion and thus provide the foundation for a ‘thick description’ of Dionysius’ Classicism. Contrary to Geertz’s assertion, people seldom define themselves and their actions exclusively, or even mainly, in terms of their being Berber, Jew, or French. Rather, ‘a society not only has a culture expected to be learned by all, but also distinctive groups with their own subcultures.’ 61 Living within the confines of the same city, obeying the same laws and regulations, completing the same course of education, or being subject to the same authorities constitute an overarching community and are important elements of the self-definition of the people who live in it. But social life is organized in a variety of sub-groups or ‘social worlds’ 62 within this overarching community, and the various social roles an individual plays in different sub-groups provide the framework for his/her interpretation of his/her own actions and the actions of others. 63 Social Identity Theory therefore speaks of ‘compartmentalized lives, shifting from one perspective to another as they participate in a succession of transactions that are not necessarily related. In each social world they [human beings] play somewhat different roles, and they manifest a different facet of their personality.’ 64 The various social worlds can take on very different, more or less flexible shapes, but this, it is important to note, does not necessarily affect their members’ feeling of ‘togetherness’:
61 Rose (1962a) 16. 62 Shibutani (1962) passim. 63 Cf. Hinkle/Brown (1990) 48: ‘our sense of who we are stems in large part from our membership of and affiliation to various social groups, which are said to form our social identity.’ 64 Shibutani (1962) 139. The term ‘compartmentalized lives’ should not give rise to the idea that these ‘compartments’ are hermetically closed units and that human beings live in a constant state of ‘social schizophrenia.’ Rather, the individual ‘compartments’ should be imagined as circles which partially overlap. It is the sum of all the different ‘compartments’ which constitute an individual’s personality in all its complexity. But the prominence and importance of different sides of an individual’s personality will vary according to the ‘compartment’ in which s/he is bound up at a given time, and some changes of context will require a more flexible role switching than others. For the present study this entails that Dionysius’ texts will allow us insight into only one ‘compartment’ of his life: reference to Dionysius’ identity should therefore be understood as referring to Dionysius’ social role as a literary critic in Augustan Rome, to Dionysius, that is, as a ‘social actor’ in one of the many ‘compartments’ that constituted his life, but not to his ‘personality’ as a whole; see the discussion below.
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study Social worlds differ considerably in their solidarity and in the sense of identification felt by their participants. Probably the strongest sense of solidarity is to be found in the various sub-communities – the underworld, ethnic minorities, the social elite, or isolated religious cults. Such communities are frequently segregated, and this segregation multiplies intimate contacts within and reinforces barriers against the outside. Another common type of world consists of the networks of interrelated voluntary associations – the world of medicine, the world of organized labor, the world of steel industry, or the world of opera. […] Finally, there are the loosely connected universes of special interest – the world of sports, the world of the stamp collector, or the world of women’s fashion. Since the participants are drawn together only periodically by the limited interest they have in common, there are varying degrees of involvement, ranging from the fanatically dedicated to the casually interested. […] Although these arenas are only loosely organized, the participants nonetheless develop similar standards of conduct, especially if their interests are strong and sustained. 65
The decisive factor for solidarity in the various groups is thus not how often their members meet, how closely acquainted they are with each other, or how limited the interests are they have in common; nor are the boundaries of groups, which distinguish a community from the outside,66 set by territory or formal group membership. Groups are constituted by the discursive practice, the communication among their members, and each social world is a ‘culture area, the boundaries of which are set […] by the limits of effective communication.’ 67 This communication keeps present the interests shared by all members and the symbolic value they all attach to them and it is responsible for the members’ adopting, and sharing, ‘special norms of conduct, a set of values, a prestige ladder, and a common outlook toward life – a Weltanschauung.’ 68 At the same time, the discursive practice of a group and the Weltanschauung created by it distinguish a group as an ‘in-group’ from the discursive practice and the Weltanschauung of other, ‘out-groups’:69 knowing who and what we are is as important as knowing who and what we are not. The existence of the boundaries which separate the different communities is ‘not a matter for “objective” assessment: it is a matter of feeling, a matter which
65 66 67 68 69
Ibid. 135–136. Cohen (1985) 2. Shibutani (1962) 136. Ibid. 137. Hinkle/Brown (1990) 48; cf. Abrams/Hogg (1990a), esp. 3–4.
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resides in the minds of the members themselves.’ 70 Therefore, ‘boundaries perceived by some may be utterly imperceptible to others.’ 71 Communities, and the commonality on which they rest, are mental constructs, they ‘exist in the minds of [their] members, and should not be confused with geographic or sociographic assertions of “fact.” ’ 72 Instead of ‘culture,’ we should therefore speak of the ‘cultures’ of different communicative networks of which an individual is a part. 73 The Weltanschauung provided by each of these networks is the common basis for the members’ ‘understanding and experiencing of their social identity, the social world and their place in it.’74 Thus it becomes the reference point for their perception of their own actions and for their anticipation of the other members’ interpretation of, and reactions to, them: 75 men living in groups do not merely coexist physically as discrete individuals. […] On the contrary they act with and against one another in diversely organized groups and while doing so they think with and against each other. These persons, bound together into groups, strive in accordance with the character and position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world of nature and society or attempt to maintain it in a given condition. […] In accord with the particular context of collective activity in which they participate, men always tend to see the world which surrounds them differently. 76
Following Paul Ricœur, I shall refer to the discursive practices through which a ‘group [gets] an all-encompassing comprehensive view not only of itself, but of history and, finally, of the whole world,’77 as a community’s specific ‘ideology.’ Thus understood, the term ‘ideology’ describes not, as in its Marxist use, the conscious manipulation of the lower classes by the ruling 70 71 72 73
74 75
76 77
Cohen (1985) 20–21. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 98. Cf. van Dijk (1988) 130; Davies/Harré (1990) 45 refer to such communities as ‘social practices,’ which they define as ‘all the ways in which people actively produce social and psychological realities.’ Davies/Harré (1990) 45–46. The group that provides the conceptual framework which a human being accepts as the standard for his behaviour is called the ‘reference group,’ as opposed to ‘the others’; see Shibutani (1962) 132, who defines ‘reference group’ as ‘that group whose presumed perspective is used by an actor as the frame of reference in the organization of his perceptual field’; cf. ibid. 138–139: ‘For each individual there are as many reference groups as there are communication networks in which he becomes regularly involved.’ Mannheim (1936) 3; cf. Cohen (1985) 2; Blumer (1962) 182. Ricœur (1978) 46.
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elite; rather, it describes a characteristic of human perception in general, the selective perception and concomitant shaping of the world according to a set of rules or norms which are provided by the social worlds in which we are organized – ‘something out of which we think, rather than something that we think.’ 78 Social Identity Theory thus helps us to complement Geertz’s conception of ‘thick description.’ The observer of a foreign culture has to take into account that the symbolic meaning of an action cannot be explained sufficiently when it is considered only within the general framework of a human being’s society. There is no uniform culture which permits us to explain all actions of a Berber, a Jew, or a Frenchman alike, but the significance man attributes to his actions varies according to the Weltanschauung of the different social worlds in which they are performed. An observer’s access to a foreign society is therefore limited to different compartments of the lives of the actors, and understanding the way in which a human being acts in one social world does not allow conclusions about how s/he will act in another, let alone about his or her identity in general. On the contrary, the compartmentalization of life often results in actions which are incompatible with each other, because an action which is acceptable, maybe even required, in one group might be unacceptable in another. 79 Social Identity Theory offers a novel perspective on a well-known historical fact, namely that Greek classicism was performed within a ‘circle’ or, as some prefer to call it, ‘network’ of Greek and Roman intellectuals to whom Dionysius addressed his writings. 80 His collection of essays On the Ancient Orators and his First and Second Letter to Ammaeus (Amm.I and Amm.II ) are addressed to one Ammaeus, about whom nothing else is
78 Ibid. 47; Ricœur also calls ideology a ‘code of interpretation’ (ibid.). 79 Shibutani (1962) 140. 80 Wisse (1998) rightly points out that this ‘circle’ should not be compared with ‘circles’ that were centred around one patron, e.g., the circles of Maecenas or Messalla. There is no evidence that Dionysius’ ‘circle’ was such a ‘tightly knit group,’ and the degree of Dionysius’ acquaintance with the individual addressees of his essays obviously varied: Pompeius Geminus, for instance, was certainly ‘not one of Dionysius’ closer associates’ (Usher [1985] 352 n. 1, quoted by Wisse ibid.). Nevertheless, this is no reason to abandon the term ‘circle’: pace Wisse (ibid.), it need not necessarily refer to such ‘ “circle[s]” in the stricter sense, i.e., in the sense in which we talk of the circle of Maecenas,’ or to any ‘tightly knit group’ in general (italics mine); it might simply be used (as in the present context) synonymously with ‘community’; cf. Luzzatto (1988) 235–237.
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
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known than that he corresponded with Dionysius.81 Dionysius also wrote a letter-essay to a certain Pompeius Geminus who had received a copy of On the Ancient Orators from a common friend, Zeno, and had criticized Dionysius for his judgment on Plato; the Letter to Pompeius (Pomp.) replies to, and refutes, Pompeius’ objections. 82 Furthermore, Dionysius communicated with Roman nobles, politicians, and writers like Q. Aelius Tubero, 83 the dedicatee of Dionysius’ essay On Thucydides (Thuc.), and Metilius Rufus, to whom he addressed his On Literary Composition (Comp.). 84 The
81 See Klebs (1894) 1842; Bowersock suggests plausibly that he might be Roman (Bowersock [1965] 130 n. 4). On the Ancient Orators consists of a preface, Dionysius’ ‘Classicist Manifesto,’ which is commonly abbreviated as Orat. Vett., and a series of essays on individual orators, On Lysias (Lys.), On Isocrates (Isoc.), On Isaeus (Is.); probably, also Dionysius’ treatise On Demosthenes (Dem.) was part of On the Ancient Orators, but see below p. 233 n. 606. 82 Hidber (1996) 7 n. 50 points out that attempts to identify Pompeius Geminus with the astronomer and mathematician of the same name (see Géminos. Introduction aux phénomènes, ed. Germaine Aujac. Paris 1975, XXII–XXIII) are as hypothetical as the assumption that he was a freedman of Pompey the Great (Schultze [1986] 122) or that he may in some way have been connected with him (Rhys Roberts [1900] 439). His nationality (Greek or Roman) is still a matter of dispute: some scholars assume that he was Greek (Lendle [1992] 239; cf. Bowersock [1965] 130 n. 4; Rhys Roberts [1900] 439– 440), but there is epigraphic evidence that in 98 CE one Pompeius Geminus was senator, most likely even consular, which implies that this person must have been a free-born Roman (Hanslik [1952]); Delcourt (2005) 32; cf. Goold (1961). 83 Tubero was part of the Roman patrician gens of the Aelii: he himself was a historian (HRR, 308–312 = Beck/Walter [2004], 346–357) and jurisconsult (in 68 BCE he lost a case against Ligarius, who was defended by Cicero); his sons, Q. Aelius Tubero and Sex. Aelius Catus, were consules in 11 and 4 BCE, respectively (Bowersock [1965] 129; Beck/ Walter 346–348; see further Wiseman [1979] 135–139; Bowersock [1979] 68–71). Dionysius refers to Tubero’s historical work at Ant. 1.80.1–3 (HRR F 3 = Beck/Walter F 4), and Tubero most likely defined himself as an ‘imitator’ of Thucydides (cf. Beck/Walter [2004] 347). Whether Dionysius’ contact with the Tuberones brought him in touch with other Greek and Roman acquaintances of theirs, such as Strabo (the only contemporary author to mention Dionysius at 14.2.16) or the Roman politician Sejanus (Bowersock [1965] 124, 129), is, at best, a plausible conjecture; even more speculative is the idea that it might have been via the Tuberones that Dionysius became familiar with Roman Atticism and with intellectual and literary discussions and trends among the contemporary Roman educated elite in general (ibid. 68–69). For a reassessment of the influence of Cicero’s rhetorical theory and practice on Dionysius see now Hidber (forthcoming); Fox (forthcoming). 84 Rufus Metilius might be identical with the proconsul of Achaea and legate to Galatia under Augustus; references in Bowersock (1965) 132 with n. 2; id. (1979) 70; Hidber (1996) 6; Delcourt (2005) 33.
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renowned Greek critic Caecilius of Caleacte was also among Dionysius’ closer acquaintances. 85 So far, this information has been used only to place Dionysius’ writings into a historical framework. Social Identity Theory allows us to assess the literary circle from a social perspective and, thus, offers a novel interpretation of the role of Dionysius’ writings in it. We can now identify the literary circle as one of the social worlds constituted by an ideology which is shared by its members and endows their activity with significance, thus allowing them to define their place in the world. Heterogeneous though they were, Dionysius’ addressees were united by their common interest in and knowledge about Classical Greek language and literature, by a common repertoire of methods and a common conceptual vocabulary with which they expressed their knowledge and shared it amongst each other, and by the common purpose of their studies, to write Classical texts themselves. 86 Analyzing, discussing, and writing classical texts is the discursive practice which defined them as a community.87 The ideology which provided them with an interpretation of the world, a Weltanschauung, in which their attempt to be Classical made sense is the Classicist doctrine which Dionysius expounds in his critical writings. Being the medium through which the discursive practice is carried out, his writings created and sustained the communicative network, and thus the common ideology, on which the members’ shared outlook on the world was based. It is not of importance that the literary circle, as Wisse asserts, was not ‘a closed school of thought, with official members, and an official policy and
85 Caecilius of Caleacte, whom Dionysius mentions in his Letter to Pompeius Geminus (Pomp. 3.20; Bowersock [1965] 124 n. 1), is regarded as the second most important representative of Greek classicism after Dionysius and probably was a younger contemporary and friend of the latter (cf. Hidber [1996] 5 n. 43 and ibid. 41 n. 184). His œuvre included critical writings as well as an Atticist lexicon, historical works, and works on the theory of history, cf. Brzoska (1897); Kennedy (1972) 364–369; Weißenberger (1997); the fragments of his works are collected by Ofenloch (Leipzig 1907). 86 Dionysius’ conception of mimesis will be discussed in ch. 2.2.2 below. Suffice it here to point out that Dionysius does not mean by mimesis simply combining characteristics of the styles of various Classical authors (quite to the contrary, this he regards as a serious mistake) or imitating the style of one Classical author in particular; mimesis means writing as the Classical authors would have written, in the ‘Classical spirit’; for a comprehensive discussion of Dionysius’ notion of mimesis see now Hunter (2009). 87 Cf. Meyer (1992) 396 on the function of the term ‘practice’ in discourse theory; on classicism as a ‘discursive practice’ cf. Porter (2006a), esp. 51.
1.1 ‘Webs of Significance’
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programme.’ 88 Apart from the fact that it is questionable whether anything like ‘a closed school of thought, with official members, and an official policy and programme’ ever existed in antiquity at all, the above considerations have shown that social identity is not a matter of objective assessment, but of subjective experience of those involved in it. A person’s identity is shaped by the communicative frameworks of the different communities in which s/he is engaged. These communities do not require such physical realities as Wisse’s official membership, policy, or programme in order to be experienced by the social actors as real; they are mental constructs which are constituted by their members’ feeling of being part of them. Dionysius’ writings prove that a regular, communicative structure united him and his addressees. This is sufficient for the literary circle to qualify as a ‘social world’ with a specific ‘culture’ which informed the members’ perception of the world and of themselves. 89 Dionysius’ essays are the ‘informants’ on which our ‘thick description’ of Classicism is based. They grant us access to one compartment of the lives of a group of Roman and Greek intellectuals and allow us glimpses into their world view and their self-definition as intellectuals in Augustan Rome, in short, into their ‘imaginary universe.’ Therefore the task of this study is not to go ‘beyond the text’ and to use Dionysius’ writings as documents to discover ‘historical realities,’ such as how closely acquainted Dionysius and his addressees were, if they were Greeks or Romans, or whether Classicism was a ‘movement’ with real political or cultural influence in Augustan Rome. Instead, it addresses questions such as how Dionysius and his addressees defined their activity within their social and cultural context; what outlook on the world, what interpretation of history it implied; what ideals and ideas the Classical past represented for them so as to make this past so desirable to them; how they imagined their relationship with the Classical past; finally, how they conceived of the relationship between Roman present and Classical past.90 It might be objected that such an approach is hampered by the fact that we have access to the culture of the literary circle through the testimony of
88 Wisse (1995) 70. 89 Cohen (1985) 98 aptly paraphrases ‘culture’ as ‘the community as experienced by its members’ (emphasis mine). 90 For a discussion of such an approach to culture see Gottowik (1997), esp. 299; for an exemplary analysis of Maori culture see Hanson (1989) with the comments by Linnekin (1991).
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only one of its members. There is no denying that it would be preferable if the voices of other members of the circle had also been preserved so as to set Dionysius’ conception of Classicism in perspective. Yet, this objection does not hold, because it relies on the dubious assumption that all members of a community share the exact same outlook on the world. As seen above, communities exist first and foremost in the minds of their members and are not based on objectively assessable criteria. A community’s ideology is not a monolithic set of rules which imposes a certain world view upon each individual member of the group. Individual members of a group might not attribute the same significance to their actions, but this does not affect the feeling of community among them, provided that all members are convinced that a certain action has the same meaning to all of them. As Benedict Anderson has shown, what the members of a community think they have in common is more important than what they really have in common. 91 The decisive point is that the discrepancies between the world views of individual members of a community are kept within certain limits or, at least, pass unnoticed. The degree to which the world views of members of a community can differ without affecting the feeling of togetherness depends on the communicative structure which sustains the group. In large communities, such as nations, in which direct communication between all members is impossible, a feeling of community is more likely to be preserved despite great differences between the world views of individual members; smaller communities with a closer communicative network, such as the literary circle, by contrast, allow for less flexibility in the Weltanschauung of their members. But this does not entail either that all of them share one, uniform world view. Culture is a necessarily subjective experience and, therefore, accessible only through an individual’s ‘private, idiosyncratic mode,’ ‘for it is here that we encounter people thinking about and symbolizing their community. It is in these depths of “thinking,” rather than in the surface appearance of “doing” that culture is to be sought.’ 92
91 Anderson (1991), on which see below, p. 297 with n. 723; Cohen (1985) 18: the ‘symbols,’ on which the togetherness among the members of a community is based, ‘ “express” other things in ways which allow their common form to be retained and shared among the members of a group, whilst not imposing upon those people the constraints of uniform meaning.’ 92 Cf. Cohen (1985), the quotation 75.
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Even if the writings of all members of the literary circle had survived, a comprehensive study of the culture of the literary circle would nevertheless have to assess the conception of Classicism and the concomitant outlook on the world of each member individually. Therefore studying Dionysius’ conception of Classicism alone is not an insufficient substitute for a comprehensive analysis of the culture of the whole community. The Classicist outlook on the world does not exist; what exists, is the members’ conviction that they all share the same outlook on the world. Thus Dionysius’ writings permit us to study the constituents of the world view which one member of the circle thought he shared with all others. And even if we were able to compare Dionysius’ Classicist world view with that of his addressees and to extrapolate the elements all of them have in common, we would not have discovered the Classicist world view, but constructed an abstract concept of classicism detached from the individuals’ ideas and beliefs and their enactment in everyday discursive practice. But such an abstract construction would be of no heuristic value to understand the social reality of the individual actors each of whom performed their own actions and interpreted them and those of the others from within their idiosyncratic perspective. However, keeping these precautionary remarks in mind, we might argue that the fact that the literary circle appears to have been a relatively small community makes the assumption plausible that Dionysius’ conception of Classicism was shared by most of his addressees. A relatively high degree of conformity between the members’ Weltanschauung is more likely to occur in such a small community than in a large one; we might therefore take Dionysius to a certain extent as a representative of the world view shared by most of the members of the circle. Such an assumption is supported by the fact that Dionysius, as we will see in the second part of this chapter, claimed a leading role within the literary circle: his writings provided the ‘canon’ (Thuc. 1.2) to which his addressees were expected to subscribe, and according to the information which Dionysius gives us on the origins of his essays, most of them were written on request of his addressees who had asked for Dionysius’ advice on literary and critical matters. 93 This suggests that Dionysius’ conception of Classicism influenced that of his addressees and that his addressees willingly accepted this influence. Therefore, although we have no testimony from any other member of the circle to confirm this assumption, there is good 93 See the discussion pp. 22–23 above.
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reason to suppose that an interpretation of classicism based on Dionysius’ writings provides a fairly accurate idea at least of the major tenets of the Weltanschauung which was accepted by most members of the literary circle. It will be the purpose of the remainder of this study to explore the individual constituents of this Classicist Weltanschauung which is at the same time implemented and represented by Dionysius’ writings. Although this approach relies heavily on heuristic concepts drawn from anthropology and sociology, this study does not purport to contribute to an ‘anthropology’ or ‘sociology’ of the ancient world in the way in which the works of Moses I. Finley, Leslie Kurke, and Sarah C. Humphreys have so masterfully done.94 Rather, it is more appropriate to conceive of it as employing anthropological and sociological approaches to write a chapter of intellectual history. As Felix Gilbert defined it, the task of the intellectual historian is to ‘reconstitut[e] the mind of an individual or of groups at the times when a particular event happened or an advance was achieved.’95 This is an accurate description of the purpose of this enquiry: to reconstitute the outlook on the world and the conception of identity of a Greek intellectual (and, potentially, his recipients) in one of the most crucial and most influential periods of ancient history and, probably, of the development of Western civilization at large, the reign of Augustus. We can now undertake the first step of this enquiry. The second part of this chapter will be centred on the introduction to Dionysius’ First Letter to Ammaeus. As I will demonstrate, this text can be read as a programmatic statement in which Dionysius defines himself and his recipients as the members of a community of literati whose knowledge about and methods of dealing with classical texts distinguishes them from other communities of intellectuals, especially the representatives of the traditional philosophical schools. On the one hand, the introduction to the First Letter to Ammaeus will thus lend further support to the interpretation of the literary circle as a social sub-group; on the other, it will allow us to identify the conceptual framework in which Dionysius expects his recipients to conceive of their activities as literary critics. On this basis we will be able to define individual 94 See above, pp. 4–5 with nn. 19, 20. 95 Gilbert (1971) 94. The tasks and methods of intellectual history have been the subject of intense debate over the last few decades, see LaCapra (1982); id. (1983); id. (1985); White (1969); id. (1997); Kellner (1982); Poster (1982); Henning (1982). Cf. also the discussion of the ‘histoire des mentalités’ approach of the French Annales School, such as Barthes (1960) and Chartier (1982), in Schulze (1985) and Reichardt (1978).
1.2 The Conceptual Framework of Dionysius’ Classicism
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elements of the collective identity which constituted the literary circle. These will be discussed in the subsequent chapters of this study.
1.2 The Conceptual Framework of Dionysius’ Classicism In a programmatic paper on ‘Method and Ideology in Intellectual History’ Hayden White has pointed out that a specific interpretation of the world, such as I argue Dionysius’ essays aim to provide, is not conveyed to the readers through the content of the texts alone, but through a ‘dynamic process’ between texts and readers. Therefore, White argues, the relevant question is not What do Freud, Foucault, and so on, assert, allege, argue? but How do they establish, through the articulation of their texts, the plausibility of their discourse by referring to the ‘meaning’ of these, not to other ‘facts’ or ‘events,’ but rather to a complex sign system which is treated as ‘natural’ rather than as a code specific to the praxis of a given social group, stratum, or class? This is to shift hermeneutic interest from the content of the texts being investigated to their formal properties, considered not in terms of the relatively vacuous notion of style but rather as a dynamic process of overt and covert code shifting by which a specific subjectivity is called up and established in the reader, who is supposed to entertain this representation of the world as a realistic one in virtue of its congeniality to the imaginary relationship the subject bears to his own social and cultural situation. 96
There is no need to go as far as White does and to argue for a complete ‘shift’ of hermeneutic interest from the content of a text to the strategies by which an author invites the reader to accept his/her representation of the world as ‘natural’ and ‘realistic.’ But White’s point is crucial: in order to be convincing, an outlook on the world proposed by a text must be embedded into an appropriate reading situation which shapes the reader’s perception of the content. The relationship an author establishes between him-/herself and his/her reader as well as the way in which s/he links his/her texts and the very act of reading them to his/her and his/her readers’ particular ‘social and cultural situation’ already constitute the readers’ view on the world: the reading situation provides the framework in which alone both what the author says and how s/he says it will make sense to and be accepted by the reader. 96 White (1982) 193.
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Therefore a reconstitution of Dionysius’ world view, as this study proposes to undertake, needs to be preceded by an investigation of the general framework which Dionysius creates for his Classicist ideology which enables his readers to locate themselves and their intellectual activity in the context of their time. This section explores Dionysius’ view of contemporary critical discourse; what place he claims in it for his Classicist criticism; how he positions his recipients towards his criticism, and how he defines his relationship with his envisaged audience. It will be evident that Dionysius does not provide an objective description of contemporary critical discourse. Rather, he is constructing a framework in order to constitute a common basis between himself and his readers, a shared view on the function and nature of criticism in their times, which makes his Classicist ideology appear useful, even necessary, to his recipients. Once recipients have accepted the role which Dionysius ascribes to himself and his critical method and the position he offers them in this process, they will be ready to subscribe to the individual tenets of his ideology. The following discussion will be centred on the introduction to Dionysius’ First Letter to Ammaeus. In this ‘letter-essay’ 97 Dionysius argues against a Peripatetic who had claimed that Demosthenes had acquired his superb rhetorical skills from Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Amm.I , 1.1). 98 In the introductory paragraphs (ibid. 1–2) Dionysius explains to Ammaeus the purpose of the letter, to refute the Peripatetic. The argument itself evolves in four steps:
97 This term was coined by Stirewalt (1991) 147–148, who argues that Dionysius’ letters were not for private use, but were supposed to be read by a larger audience; therefore a more appropriate term for them would be ‘letter-essays.’ For the sake of convenience I will refer to Dionysius’ letters as either ‘letters’ or ‘essays’ indiscriminately, while conceiving of them as ‘letter-essays’ in Stirewalt’s sense. For a general introduction to Amm.I see Aujac V, 43–48; on the structure of the letter and the interrelation of its different parts see Stirewalt (1991) 156–169. 98 By omitting a detailed exposition of the Peripatetic’s argument, Dionysius makes his competitor’s statement seem more absurd than it might actually have been. Whereas Dionysius conceives of oratory in terms of language and style, i.e., endorses an essentially aesthetical approach to oratory, the Peripatetic might have referred to a conception of oratory primarily as the art of arguing. In a similar way, Cicero in Tusc. 2.9 defines the ability to ‘discuss both sides of every question’ ([consuetudo] de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi) as ‘the best practice in oratory’ (maxima dicendi exercitatio); this method, Cicero points out, was invented by Aristotle and continued to be practised by his successors (qua [exercitatione] princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt). The Peripatetic’s statement might therefore not have been as bizarre as Dionysius makes it appear.
1.2 The Conceptual Framework of Dionysius’ Classicism
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Dionysius starts with demonstrating that Aristotle’s Rhetorics was published when Demosthenes was already at the height of his life and career (ibid. 3–7). In order to do so, he first presents his readers with a short biography of Demosthenes, including a chronology of major speeches of Demosthenes, which demonstrates that Demosthenes had already given a great number of important symbuleutic as well as dicanic speeches before the Rhetorics was published (ibid. 4). Dionysius then presents a biography of Aristotle drawn from external historical sources (ibid. 5), followed by statements from Aristotle’s work concerning his life and writings. On this basis Dionysius constructs a relative chronology of Aristotle’s rhetorical writings and concludes that Aristotle wrote the Rhetorics at an older age (ibid. 6–7). In paragraphs eight and nine Dionysius forestalls a potential objection: the relative chronology, which he has presented in the preceding paragraphs, might be correct; this does not preclude, however, that Aristotle wrote all of his rhetorical treatises while still being a student of Plato’s. Dionysius refutes this view by citing passages both from Aristotle’s works and works of local Attic historians in which Aristotle’s writings are related to historical events. Having thus established an absolute chronology of the philosopher’s writings, Dionysius proceeds to proving that all important speeches of Demosthenes were delivered before the Rhetorics was published (ibid. 10). In the final two paragraphs, he adduces further passages from Aristotle which support this assertion (ibid. 11–12.7) and concludes the letter with the assertion that the Peripatetic’s statement has definitively been refuted (ibid., 12.8). From the discussion of the introduction to the First Letter to Ammaeus four main constituents of the general framework in which Dionysius places his Classicist ideology will emerge: first, Dionysius defines literary criticism as a highly competitive activity in which elite critics are engaged in a struggle for authority; second, Dionysius claims that in the struggle of criticism he and his critical method represent the tradition of Classical rhetoric itself; third, elite critics are representatives of communities of critics which are constituted by their members’ adoption of the standards provided by the elite critic and subscription to his opinions about the Classical texts; and fourth, in this process of distinction from other communities of intellectuals Dionysius ascribes a crucial role to his letter, and his writings in general, as material documents, i. e., as published texts.
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1.2.1 Criticism as a Struggle for Authority At the very beginning of the letter Dionysius describes the intellectual culture of his times (Â kaj+ômêc qrÏnoc) as teeming with ‘strange and paradoxical pronouncements’ (pollÄ xËna te ka» paràdoxa Çko‘smata, 1.1) about the Classical authors. 99 Dionysius’ emphasis on the multitude of such pronouncements and on their verbal diffusion (Çko‘smata; Çko‘santi parÄ so‹) creates the image of criticism as a constant and vehement dispute among competing scholars. In his essay On Literary Composition Dionysius even describes criticism as an Çg∏n in which the critic is under constant attack (katadrom†n) from other scholars.100 The quality of the individual pronouncements that constitute this Çg∏n, however, varies according to (and is thus indicative of) the competence of the scholars who utter them. Therefore not all of them deserve the same respect; on the contrary, most statements about the Classical authors are uttered by ‘someone out of the masses’ 101 (t¿n poll¿n tina, Amm.I , 1.2), i. e., by average scholars, and can therefore be disregarded. Only occasionally do the statements of a distinguished critic require deeper investigation, such as those of the Peripatetic: ‘but when I heard his name and found him to be a man whom I respect for both his char-
99 Amm.I , 1.1.: Poll¿n met+ällwn xËnwn te ka» paradÏxwn Çkousmàtwn ¡n ‚n†noqen  kaj+ômêc qrÏnoc, Èn ti ka» to‹to ‚fành moi pr∏twc Çko‘santi parÄ so‹ […] (‘Our age has brought forth many strange and paradoxical pronouncements; and the statement which you told me about seemed to me to be one of them when I first heard it from you,’ Usher’s transl. modified). Though Dionysius does not explicitly say that the ‘strange and paradoxical pronouncements’ are made by scholars about the Classical authors, this is evident from the fact that he counts the Peripatetic’s ideas about Demosthenes and Aristotle among them; cf. Aujac V, 50 n. 1. 100 Comp. 25.29: Õfor¿ma– tina pr‰c ta‹ta katadromòn Çnjr∏pwn t®c m‡n ‚gkukl–ou paide–ac Çpe–rwn, t‰ d‡ Çgoraÿon t®c ˚htorik®c mËroc Âdo‹ te ka» tËqnhc qwr»c ‚pithdeuÏntwn, pr‰c oœc Çnagkaÿon Çpolog†sasjai, mò dÏxwmen Írhmon ÇfeikËnai t‰n Çg¿na (‘I suspect that certain persons who have no general education but practise rhetoric on a street corner level without method and art, will inveigh violently against these statements. I must defend myself against these for fear of appearing to have left the battle-ground,’ Usher’s transl. modified). 101 Usher’s translation ‘an ordinary layman’ misses the fact that no layman in antiquity could have made a statement on the relationship between Aristotle and Demosthenes, because this required higher education in rhetoric and literary criticism which was available only to the elite. I therefore prefer the more literal translation ‘someone out of the masses (of average scholars).’
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acter and for his scholarly works, 102 I was astounded; and after much private thought I concluded that the matter needed more diligent enquiry […]’ (±c d‡ ka» to÷noma to‹ Çndr‰c ‚pujÏmhn, Án ‚g∞ ka» t¿n öj¿n Èneka ka» t¿n lÏgwn ÇpodËqomai, ‚ja‘masa, ka» polÃc ‚n ‚mautƒ genÏmenoc ‚pimelestËrac æmhn deÿsjai skËyewc t‰ prêgma […], Amm.I , 1.2). Dionysius distinguishes between two categories of critics, the majority of ordinary critics and elite critics whose competence in rhetorical and literary matters (lÏgoi) and whose personalities (¢jh) distinguish them from the masses, but also from each other. 103 The Peripatetic is one example of such an elite critic, and Dionysius, who deems the Peripatetic worthy to argue with, is another. Competence in criticism is a criterion of distinction: by their statements about a Classical text critics substantiate their status as elite critics and, in this way, arrogate power and influence in the field of criticism (cf. ÇpodËqomai; ‚ja‘masa above). At the same time, such a position of superiority is fragile: Dionysius’ remark that at first hearing he had taken the Peripatetic’s claim to be one of the absurd statements usually made by ordinary critics (Amm.I , 1.2) shows that an incompetent statement can easily jeopardize the elite critic’s status and authority. In order fully to appreciate the role of authority and prestige in Dionysius’ debate with the Peripatetic, it is important to remember the Peripatetics’ powerful position in contemporary intellectual discourse. In Dionysius’ times, the Peripatetics were often regarded as the ‘leaders in the study of rhetoric.’ 104 Thus at On the Orator 1.43, Scaevola relates that Peripatetici autem etiam haec ipsa, quae propria oratorum putas esse adiumenta atque ornamenta dicendi, a se peti vincerent oportere, ac non solum meliora, sed etiam multo plura Aristotelem Theophrastumque de istis rebus, quam omnis dicendi magistros scripsisse ostenderent.
102 Dionysius is here referring to the Peripatetic’s pronouncements as a critic and not to his ‘literary accomplishments,’ as Usher translates lÏgoi. 103 Ch. 2.2.2 will show that it is one of the major tenets of Dionysius’ Classicism that a person’s statements and his character are two sides of the same coin. 104 Kennedy (1963) 272. Kennedy (1963) 272–290 gives an overview of the most important stages of the development of rhetorical studies in Peripatetic philosophy (esp. Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phaleron) and discusses the Peripatetics’ theories against the background of Hellenistic rhetoric in general (264–336); see Aujac V, 50 n. 2. On the tradition of Aristotelian-Peripatetic philosophy after Aristotle see Richardson (1993); Meijering (1987); Schenkeveld (1993); Wooten (1994); Abbenes/Slings/Sluiter (1995).
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1. Introduction: The Aims and Methods of This Study The Peripatetics […] would prove that it is to them that men shold resort for even those very aids and trappings of eloquence which you deem to be the special aids of orators, and would show you that on these subjects of yours Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote not only better but also much more than all the teachers of rhetoric put together.
In order to understand why Dionysius took the Peripatetic’s claim so seriously, it is important to keep in mind that the Peripatetics not only claimed leadership in their own domain, philosophy. They also contested the orators’ competence and authority in rhetorical education (quae propria oratorum putas esse). Moreover, the Peripatetic’s arrogation of leadership in rhetorical education occurred against the backdrop of the controversy between philosophy and rhetoric the origins of which dated as far back as Plato’s controversy with Isocrates and the Sophists in the fourth century. 105 Mainly, this debate seems to have been centred on the question of whether or not rhetoric was to be considered an art. 106 Given the close interrelation of rhetoric and politics in antiquity, however, this rather abstract question was bound up with a topic of much more concrete implications, namely the controversy over whether rhetoricians or philosophers were entitled to train statesmen and politicians and, thus, profit from the Roman demand for Greek culture and education. 107 105 A detailed discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope of this study. The classic treatment is still von Arnim (1898) 1–114; more recent discussions include North (1981) and Brittain (2001) 298–312; cf. Luzzatto (1988) 233, who argues that it was in the rich intellectual climate of Rhodes that the opposition between rhetoric and philosophy turned into a ‘competition among schools of thought’ (‘concorrenza fra scuole’). On the role of Plato’s criticism of Sophistic rhetoric for the Hellenistic controversy see North (1981) 251. 106 The main arguments are collected in Brittain (2001) 299–300 who also gives a helpful overview of the attitude towards rhetoric adopted by the representatives of the different philosophical schools (Critolaus, Diogenes the Stoic, and Charmadas) ibid. 301–302. 107 von Arnim (1898) 88 already suggested that the Romans’ interest in Greek education was one of the reasons for the reawakening of the controversy between rhetoric and philosophy in the second century BCE; similarly North (1981) 240–250. Brittain’s (2001) 302 sceptical remarks notwithstanding, the ancient evidence shows that the controversy was not simply an intellectual dispute over the status of rhetoric as an art but had strong political implications. Already at the early stages of the conflict the debate about rhetorical education was inextricably bound up with the question of who was entitled to educate the elite, especially the future political leaders. Thus the Stoic Diogenes asserted that ‘good speech presupposes political wisdom or the virtue of justice’ (Brittain [2001] 301) which he claimed to be the exclusive domain of philosophy. And in his account of the philosophers’ chief arguments against rhetoric Cicero has Crassus remark that ‘there
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The philosophers had turned out to be the winning party of the dispute, and among them the Academics and Peripatetics in particular. In Dionysius’ times these two philosophical schools played a leading role in the market of rhetorical education, as shown by Cicero’s assertion that ‘for the budding orator – and hence for the budding statesman’ it was these two schools that provided the best training. 108 Moreover, at On the Orator 3.71 it is precisely the ability to produce orators of the rhetorical perfection of Demosthenes that is explicitly ascribed to the Peripatetics:109 Sin veterem illum Periclem aut hunc etiam, qui familiarior nobis propter scriptorum multitudinem est, Demosthenem sequi vultis et si illam praeclaram et eximiam speciem oratoris perfecti et pulchritudinem adamastis, aut vobis haec Carneadia aut illa Aristotelia vis comprehendenda est. If […] you chose to follow the famous Pericles of old, or even our friend Demosthenes with whom his many writings have made us better acquainted, and if you have grown to love that glorious and supreme ideal, that thing of beauty, the perfect orator, you are bound to accept either the modern method of Carneades or the earlier method of Aristotle. 110
The Peripatetics’ claim to leadership in rhetorical education and literary criticism was supported by the fact that they took pride in a long tradition of literary criticism 111 and that both Academics and Peripatetics ‘taught a form of argument useful to the orator,’ the Peripatetics the ‘practice in debating both sides of the question’ and the Academics the ability to rebut any
108 109 110
111
were many other men outstanding in philosophy and society all of whom unanimously postulated that orators should be driven from the steering-oar of State’ (multi erant praeterea clari in philosophia et nobiles, a quibus omnibus una paene voce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis civitatum […] videbam, de or. 1.46; transl. mine); cf. the similar statements ascribed to Charmadas ibid. 1.85 and see further ibid. 3.63 (the ideal orator is both an excellent speaker and statesman); 3.76. Griffin (1997) 9, citing Cic. de or. 3.57[–76]; Brut. 119[–121]; Tusc. 2.9. Cf. Luzzatto (1988) 218–219 on the role of Demosthenes in ancient literary criticism and ibid. 240–241 on Demosthenes as a model of oratory. Rackham’s transl. modified. An appropriate rendering of vis, translated here as ‘method,’ is difficult. According to Leeman/Pinkster/Wisse (1996) on 3.71 (262), the term probably refers to the philosophers’ oratorical competence (vis dicendi) but might also be taken to refer to their ‘intellectual powers’; they point out, however, that it is improbable that the term refers to their ‘dialectic power’ (a translation suggested by Wilkinson). On the role of literary criticism in Peripatetic philosophy see Podlecki (1969); there is a good overview of rhetoric in Peripatetic philosophy in Luzzatto (1988) 220–225.
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argument. 112 These considerations remind us that the controversy between Dionysius and the Peripatetic did not take place in an intellectual void. The Peripatetic against whom Dionysius is arguing in his letter was not simply an isolated figure whose statement on the superiority of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory over Demosthenes’ rhetorical practice could easily be dismissed. He was a representative of a community which had been the most serious competitors of professional critics and teachers of rhetoric like Dionysius for several centuries and which denied Dionysius both the competence and the right to provide rhetorical education. Moreover, there is another element of the Peripatetic’s claim, and Dionysius’ response to it, the full significance of which becomes evident only when considered against the particular situation of Peripatetic philosophy in the first century BCE. The Peripatetic, as mentioned above, claims that his assertion is firmly based on the writings of Aristotle himself. The last sentence in On the Orator 1.43, which was quoted above, suggests that in the competition for leadership between Peripatetics and teachers of oratory it was a common strategy to legitimise one’s claims by attributing them to the founder of the philosophical school (or his immediate successor). 113 This demonstrates that being able to lay claim to representing a long and distinguished scholarly tradition played a crucial role in the process of distinction between (communities of) intellectuals in Dionysius’ times. In an important study, David Sedley has shown that ‘in the GrecoRoman world, especially during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, what gives philosophical movements their cohesion and identity is less a disinterested common quest for the truth than a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure.’ 114 Both Stoics and Epicureans ‘equally were ruled by a set of canonical texts,’ the Stoics by the writings of Zeno, the 112 Griffin (1997) 9–10. An important exercise employed by both Peripatetics and Academics was the thesis which taught pupils to argue for and against a general question; as this question was generally of a philosophical content (at de or. 3.107 Cicero enumerates possible topics of a thesis including virtue, duty, equity and good, moral worth and utility, etc.), the thesis represented the most obvious area in which rhetoric and philosophy overlapped; on the role of the thesis in Philo’s Academy see Reinhardt’s (2000) instructive study, on the differences between the Academics’ and the Peripatetics’ use of the thesis see ibid. 542–543. 113 Cf. Gottschalk (1990) 65: ‘Much of [the work of the Aristotelian commentators] consisted of straight exegesis and even where they disagreed with Aristotle’s doctrine or were dealing with different problems from his, they often chose to present their views as an interpretation or development of his ideas’; cf. Donini (1994) 5038. 114 Sedley (1997) 97.
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Epicureans by the works of Epicurus himself and his leading co-founders Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus; 115 and the dissent within the Academy and among Plato’s successors notwithstanding, ‘there is every reason to believe that all academics presented themselves as loyal to Plato’s thought, on some interpretation of what that thought amounted to.’116 To a Peripatetic, by contrast, being able to employ the same pattern of reasoning, to endow his own position with autority by stressing the conformity of his ideas to the writings of Aristotle, had a particular significance, as, even at the beginning of the first century BCE, such a claim would have been impossible. It was only in about the middle of the first century BCE that Aristotle’s writings had been made accessible again in Andronicus of Rhodes’ edition, which included a commentary on selected treatises.117 The publication of Andronicus’ edition ended a period of eclipse during which philosophical schools took startingly little notice of Aristotle’s philosophy. 118 David Sedley has argued convincingly that part of the reason for this situation was the importance of the existence of a ‘set of canonical texts’ for the identity of Hellenistic philosophical schools: as the Peripatos did not have any such set of Aristotelian writings, ‘there was simply no motive for Stoics, Epicureans, Academics, or Pyrrhonists to seek out Aristotelian authority for their doctrines.’ 119 After the publication of Aristotle’s writings, by contrast, activity in the Peripatetic school experienced an upsurge: no less than five commentaries
115 Ibid. 97–98. 116 Ibid. 99. 117 On Andronicus’ edition, which was the culmination point of a process of consolidation that can be traced back to the beginnings of the Peripatetic school, see Gottschalk (1990) 55–60. The exact date of Andronicus’ edition is a matter of debate, see Gottschalk’s discussion ibid. 62–63, who argues that Andronicus began his work in the sixties and published its individual parts (potentially separately) during the subsequent decades (63). It is doubtful whether there also existed a ‘Roman edition’ of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus by Atticus, as was first suggested by H. Usener; see Gottschalk (1990) 60–61. It seems relatively certain, however, that Andronicus cooperated with Tyrannio of Amisus who provided him with copies of Aristotelian works brought from Athens to Rome by Sulla in 86 BCE (ibid. 55). For a balanced discussion of the fate of Aristotle’s writings see Gottschalk (1987) 1083–1088. 118 Gottschalk (1990) 55; Sedley (1997) 118. 119 Sedley (1997) 118. Gottschalk (1987) 1083 remarks that it was well know already in antiquity that the intellectual activity of Aristotle’s school declined about fifty years after the death of its founder, and this decline is attributed by ancient authors to the loss of Aristotle’s writings (Strabo 13.1.54, 608–609C Radt; cf. Cic. fin. 5.13).
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on the Categories were published before the end of the first century, two by a Stoic and an Academic, respectively, the other three by Peripatetics. 120 Moreover, between 68 and 51 BCE Ariston and Cratippus left the Academy for the Peripatus. 121 As Gottschalk points out, this only makes sense ‘if there was some organisation recognised by contemporaries as the legitimate successor of Aristotle’s school and official representative of his teaching.’122 Moreover, this also points to an increase in prestige and authority of the Peripatetic school which had now become again a serious competitor of the other philosophical schools and the Academics in particular.123 The fact that two Academics joined the Peripatus is all the more remarkable as only at the beginning of the first century Antiochus of Ascalon had attempted to establish Plato’s philosophy as the ‘master doctrine’ and its representatives, the Academics, as a sort of ‘master school’ which incorporated all other philosophical schools: 124 Antiochus appreciated Aristotle as ‘an important Platonist’ and blamed the Stoics for systematically having drawn on, or worse, having stolen Plato’s doctrines while trying to conceal this ‘behind their sophisticated philosophical jargon.’ 125 Andronicus’ publication of Aristotle’s work changed this situation radically. His edition ‘presented 120 Simplicius enumerates five early commentators on the Categories: the Academic Eudorus, the Stoic Athenodorus, and the Peripatetics Andronicus, Boethus, and Ariston, see Gottschalk (1990) 69; cf. id. (1987) 1121–1139. 121 Index Acad. Herc. col. 35.8–16, pp. 112–113 Mekler. 122 Gottschalk (1990) 61, thus convincingly contesting the view, put forward mainly by Glucker (1978) and Lynch (1972), that after Sulla’s sack of Athens in 86 BCE Peripatetic philosophy existed only as an ideology but not as a proper philosophical school: ‘the life of a learned institution does not depend on buildings or even administrative continuity; what matters is that there should be an identifiable body of men whose members feel that they are the heirs and representatives of an intellectual tradition and that their claim should be admitted by those contemporaries who are sufficiently interested to hold any decided view on the matter’ (ibid. 62). 123 On the popularity of the different philosophical schools at Rome see Griffin (1997) 5–11. 124 The most detailed discussion of Antiochus of Ascalon and his philosophical doctrine is Glucker (1978). Antiochus’ claim that Platonic philosophy represented the master discourse from which all other philosophical schools were derived is itself part of his attempt to gain prestige and authority for his own philosophical community. Antiochus rejected the ‘sceptical school’ in the Academy, which was represented by its head Philo of Larissa, and founded his own school which he programmatically called the ‘Old Academy.’ It was his school, rather than the sceptical Academy, he claimed, that was the true heir to the Platonic tradition, see Glucker (1978) 102, 111; cf. Griffin (1997) 7. On Philo of Larissa see now Brittain’s (2001) comprehensive study. 125 Karamanolis (2006) 58, citing fin. 5.12 for Antiochus’ view of Aristotle and fin. 5.22 for his view on the Stoics (cf. Cic. Acad. 43); cf. ibid. 57. On Antiochus’ ‘syncretism’ see
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Aristotle’s philosophy as a system like those of the Stoics and Epicureans, which his adherents were expected to understand and propagate.’126 And the case of Ariston and Cratippus suggests that the Peripatetics were rather successful in propagating their philosophy: instead of being appropriated and subsumed under Platonic dogmatism by Academics like Antiochus, now it was the Peripatetics who sought to subsume as many discourses as possible under the heading of Aristotelian philosophy. The preceding considerations provide us with the intellectual-historical backdrop of Dionysius’ controversy with the Peripatetic. We have to consider the Peripatetics’ outstanding position in contemporary intellectual culture, namely their claim to be the specialists in rhetorical education and, hence, political leadership, and their recent increase in prestige and authority due to the publication of Aristotle’s writings, in order to appreciate the significance and implications of the Peripatetic’s statement for Dionysius. Antiochus of Ascalon had rather successfully attempted to deny Aristotelian philosophy its independence by defining it as an element of Platonic dogmatism and to reduce Stoic philosophy to a mere derivative of Plato’s doctrines. Dionysius might have perceived a similar threat to the independence of rhetorical theory and literary criticism and, going hand-in-hand with this, to his own standing in the intellectual culture of his times, if the Peripatetic’s claim was accepted by a majority of intellectuals. In the wake of their new success, it might not have seemed unreasonable that the Peripatetics would eclipse Dionysius’ Classicist ideology; after all, philosophical schools had already threatened (successfully) the independence of rhetorical education in previous centuries. Furthermore, this intellectual background also helps us understand better why Dionysius emphasized certain aspects of the controversy with the Peripatetic and employed specific argument strategies. It explains, for example, why prestige and authority play such a prominent role in Dionysius’ reply to the Peripatetic; furthermore, the image of contemporary intellectual culture as a struggle for intellectual leadership between different schools of thought seems to have had a certain foundation in reality. 127 This does not mean, however, that we should take Dionysius’ statements on his intellecBarnes (1997), esp. 79; cf. Sedley (1981) 73 (Antiochus based his epistemology on ‘the “corrections” of those minor Platonists Aristotle and Zeno’). 126 Gottschalk (1990) 64. 127 Luzzatto (1988) 239 points out that there must have been an intense competition also among different schools of rhetoric, as is shown by the ‘Atticist’ opposition to ‘Asianism’; she refers to Seneca the Elder’s characterisation of the orator Craton, an ‘outspoken
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tual environment simply at face-value. Dionysius uses prominent tendencies of his times to locate his Classicist ideology within a framework of competition among different schools of thought and the (traditional) opposition of philosophy and rhetorics. This allows him to define Classicist criticism not as a neutral activity but as a contested field of intellectual pursuit in which defining oneself as a ‘Classicist’ necessarily entails not defining oneself as a Peripatetic, Stoic, Epicurean, or the like. This aspect of Classicist criticism as a constituent of a distinct community of intellectuals will be discussed in section 1.2.4 below. In the following sections I will turn to two elements of Dionysius’ argument with the Peripatetic which are directly connected with the preceding considerations: Dionysius’ emphasis on the unity of theory and practice as the distinctive characteristic of the tradition of Classical rhetoric (section 1.2.2), and the stress he lays on his letter as a published document as opposed to the oral statement of the Peripatetic (section 1.2.3).
1.2.2 Dionysius’ Critical Method as Heir to the Tradition of Classical Rhetoric In a striking passage Dionysius condenses the consequences for the tradition of Classical rhetoric and his own activity as a literary critic, should the Peripatetic’s opinion turn out to be right or be accepted by a majority of intellectuals (Amm.I , 2.3): [To‹to dò pepo–hka] —na mò Õpolàbwsin Ìti pànta perie–lhfen ô peripathtikò filosof–a tÄ ˚htorikÄ paraggËlmata, ka» o÷te
o… per» JeÏdwron ka» Jras‘maqon ka» >Antif¿nta spoud®c äxion oŒd‡n e›ron, o÷te >Isokràthc ka» >AnaximËnhc ka» >Alkidàmac o÷te o… to‘toic sumbi∏santec toÿc Çndràsi paraggelmàtwn teqnik¿n suggrafeÿc ka» Çgwnista» lÏgwn ˚htorik¿n, o… per» JeodËkthn ka» F–liskon ka» >Isaÿon ka» KhfisÏdwron Isokràtouc te ka» >Isa–ou kosmÏumenoc paraggËlmasin, e mò tÄc >AristotËlouc Asianist’ (professus Asianus), as ‘fighting a war against all Atticists’ (qui bellum cum omnibus Atticis gerebat, contr. 10.5.21; transl. mine); cf. the discussion in ch. 2.3.4 below.
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tËqnac ‚xËmajen. OŒk Íst+Ítumoc lÏgoc o›toc, ¬ f–le >Ammaÿe, oŒd+ ‚k t¿n >AristotËlouc teqn¿n t¿n ’steron ‚xeneqjeis¿n o… DhmosjËnouc lÏgoi sunetàqjhsan […]. I should not want them [the Peripatetics] to suppose that all the precepts of rhetoric are comprehended in the Peripatetic philosophy, and that nothing has been discovered by Theodorus, Thrasymachus, Antiphon and their associates; nor by Isocrates, Anaximenes, Alcidamas or those of their contemporaries who composed rhetorical handbooks and engaged in oratorical contests: Theodectes, Philiscus, Isaeus, Cephisodorus, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines and all their associates. 128 Indeed, even Demosthenes himself, who surpassed all his predecessors and contemporaries, and left his successors with no scope for improvement, would not have achieved such greatness if he had equipped himself only according to the precepts of Isocrates and Isaeus, and had not thoroughly mastered the handbooks of Aristotle. “That story is not true,” my dear Ammaeus, nor in fact were the speeches of Demosthenes composed in accordance with the precepts of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which was published at a later date.
At first sight, the impressive list of names seems little more than a boastful attempt of Dionysius’ to show off his knowledge about the tradition of rhetorical doctrine and the art of speaking. But this passage contains the key to Dionysius’ self-definition as a critic and explains why the Peripatetic’s assertion presented such a threat to him. The sheer length of the list of names demonstrates to the reader (and, above all, to the Peripatetic) the length of the tradition of classical rhetoric and represents a history in nuce of its development. The most striking characteristic of Dionysius’ conception of classical rhetoric is the interaction of theory and practice, of o… paraggelmàtwn teqnik¿n suggrafeÿc and Çgwnista» lÏgwn ˚htorik¿n.129 The rhetorical skills of a Demosthenes can be explained only as the result of this combination: Demosthenes was the pupil of the two men who excelled in both rhetorical theory and practice, Isocrates and Isaeus (toÿc >Isokràtouc te ka» >Isa–ou kosmo‘menoc paraggËlmasin).130 Demosthenes and his 128 On these names see Aujac’s V commentary, 51 nn. 1–5. 129 In the context of Dionysius’ controversy with the Peripatetic it is important to note that Aristotle, as Luzzatto (1988) 221 points out, was the first to separate rhetorical theory and practice. 130 Dionysius might be referring here to a handbook on rhetoric written by Isaeus, on which nothing else is known, see Thalheim (1916) 2051–2052 (his reference to Ps.-Plutarch’s Life of Isaeus is erroneous). According to the Pseudo-Plutarchian Life (840F), Isaeus taught Demosthenes rhetoric (kajhg†sato d‡ DhmosjËnouc), an information found also in Dionysius’ essay On Isaeus 1.1 and 1.2. Isocrates was for Dionysius the most outstanding
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accomplished rhetorical technique thus encapsulate Dionysius’ conception of the Classical rhetorical tradition. If the Peripatetic’s claim were accepted by a majority of scholars, the entire tradition of Classical rhetoric, as Dionysius conceives it, would be annihilated and accomplished oratory would be reduced to a product of one work of rhetorical theory alone, Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This, in turn, would entitle the Peripatetic ‘to suppose that all the precepts of rhetoric are comprehended in the precepts of Peripatetic philosophy’ 131 and thus corroborate his and his school’s claim to be the ‘leaders in the study of rhetoric.’
teacher of rhetoric in Classical times (Isoc. 1.5: […] toÃc krat–stouc t¿n >Aj†nhsi te ka» ‚n t¨ äll˘ <Ellàdi nËwn paide‘sac, ¡n o… m‡n ‚n toÿc dikanikoÿc ‚gËnonto äristoi lÏgoic, o… d‡ ‚n t¿ polite‘esjai ka» tÄ koinÄ pràttein di†negkan [‚tele‘ta t‰n b–on], ‘[he passed away having become] the teacher of the most eminent men at Athens and in Greece at large, both the best forensic orators, and those who distinguished themselves in politics and public life’); Ps.-Plutarch reports that ‘some people’ (tinËc) held that Demosthenes was the pupil of Isocrates (844B), but that the opinion prevailed that Demosthenes was a pupil of Isaeus who, in turn, had been taught by Isocrates (ibid.; cf. Is. 1.2). In Dionysius’ day Isocrates was thought to have composed a handbook on rhetoric: Cicero, inv. 2.7, mentions an ars by Isocrates which he was sure existed, but which he could not get hold of (cuius ipsius [Isocratis] quam constet esse artem non invenimus, ‘although it is certain that a handbook on rhetoric of Isocrates exists, I have not found it,’ transl. mine), and Quintilian, inst. 2.15.4, bears witness that in his time an ars was circulating which was ascribed to Isocrates but of which the authenticity was debated (haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen re vera ars quae circumfertur eius est, duxit, ‘this idea originated with Isocrates, provided that he really is the author of the rhetorical handbook generally ascribed to him,’ transl. mine); see the discussion in Münscher (1916) 2224, who regards the ars as pseudepigraphal. 131 Dionysius might have in mind such claims as that made by Piso, himself a representative of Antiochus’ ‘Old Academy,’ regarding the early Peripatetics (Peripatetici veteres) and Academics at Cic. fin. 5.7: Ad eos igitur converte te, quaeso. Ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem inlustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. Ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes exstiterunt. Ut ad minora veniam, mathematici poetae musici medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum officina profecti sunt (‘Do you then join them, I beg you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians’).
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This would directly affect Dionysius’ position as a literary critic in the present. Dionysius’ conception of the tradition of Classical rhetoric as an interaction of theory and practice provides the legitimation for his critical method: it is precisely the combination of theoretical reflection and rhetorical practice which is the cornerstone of Dionysius’ criticism. 132 This emerges clearly from Orat. Vett. 4.2, where Dionysius defines the aim of his criticism as identifying ‘who are the most important of the ancient orators and historians? What manner of life and style of writing did they adopt? Which characteristics of each of them should we imitate, and which should we avoid?’ 133 Like Demosthenes’ speeches, the texts of Dionysius’ recipients will be based on sound theoretical foundations which will be provided by Dionysius. This implies that Classical rhetoric can be learned only with Dionysius’ method, because it alone is based on the same principles as Classical rhetoric itself and offers teaching along the lines of Isocrates and Isaeus. 134 Therefore it is a vital question to Dionysius whether rhetorical skills of the quality of a Demosthenes can be acquired from studying Aristotle’s Rhetorics or whether they have to be acquired from a guided study of the Classical texts. Dionysius’ authority as a critic is based on the assertion that his method continues the Classical tradition of rhetoric; if it turned out that the most exemplary representative of this tradition did not owe his skills to the particular combination of theory and practice but to Aristotle’s theoretical work alone, Dionysius’ criticism would be superfluous and reduced to a useless appendix to Peripatetic philosophy. Thus what at first glance appeared to be a slightly absurd question of purely philological interest, ‘Who was first, Demosthenes or Aristotle?,’ 135 and, consequently, ‘Who
132 Cf. de Jonge (2008) 11 (following Gelzer [1979] 10–11): ‘it is typical of classicism that the creation of new works of art is based on an explicit theory.’ 133 Orat. Vett. 4.2: t–nec e s»n Çxiolog∏tatoi t¿n Çrqa–wn ˚htÏrwn te ka» suggrafËwn
ka» t–nec aŒt¿n ‚gËnonto proairËseic to‹ te b–ou ka» to‹ lÏgou ka» t– par+·kàstou deÿ lambànein £ fulàttesjai […]. 134 Dionysius conceives of his essays as providing an original, Classical programme of rhetorical training, see below, ch. 4.2.5; on the role of Isocrates in Dionysius’ Classicism see below, ch. 2.2.1. 135 Cf. Amm.I , 2.1: [‚maut‰n pËpeika] DhmosjËnouc Çkmàzontoc ¢dh ka» toÃc ‚pifa-
nestàtouc e rhkÏtoc Çg¿nac tÏte Õp‰ >AristotËlouc tÄc ˚htorikÄc gegràfjai tËqnac (‘[I have satisfied myself that] it was not until Demosthenes had already reached his prime and had delivered his most celebrated orations that the Rhetoric was written by Aristotle,’ emphases mine) with ibid. 3.1.
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learned from whom?,’ 136 touches upon the very foundations of Dionysius’ legitimation as a critic and his authority in contemporary critical discourse. The controversy with the Peripatetic thus turns out to be a controversy between two mutually exclusive conceptions of Classical rhetoric and of how – and by whom – it is to be taught. 1.2.3 The Power of the Text: Creating a Discursive Tradition Dionysius further underlines the claim for superiority of his position by investing the fact that his letter is a written and published document with a symbolic value: until now the Peripatetic’s claims are part of the multitude of Çko‘smata, oral pronouncements, with which the field of criticism is teeming. But another stage of the controversy would be reached if the Peripatetic succeeded in publishing his ideas: thus fixed permanently, they would gain wide-spread acceptance among the masses of scholars and would then become a real threat to Dionysius and his conception of criticism. It is at this crucial point of the controversy that Dionysius interferes with the publication of his own letter in order ‘to persuade the person who has adopted this view and is prepared to put it in writing, to change it [his opinion] before giving his treatise out to the masses’ 137 (—na t‰n o’twc ‚gnwkÏta ka» gràyai ge pareskeuasmËnon, pr»n e c Óqlon ‚kdÏnai t‰ s‘ntagma, metabaleÿn pe–saimi tòn dÏxan, Amm.I , 1.2). Thus the publication of the letter is directly linked to the elite critic’s authority in the field and his influence among the multitude of scholars (Óqloc). 138 Forestalling the pub136 Dionysius illustrates the perversion of the normal relationship between theory and practice, which the Peripatetic’s claim entails, at Amm.I , 10.1: the term which describes the usual development of style through one author ‘emulating’ another, z†lwsic, is here applied to the orator Demosthenes ‘emulating’ the philosopher-theoretician Aristotle: >ApÏqrh m‡n ofin ka» ta‹ta ˚hjËnta fanerÄn poi®sai tòn filotim–an t¿n Çxio‘ntwn tÄc >AristotËlouc ‚zhlwkËnai tËqnac DhmosjËnh (‘enough has been said to expose the exaggerated claims of those who assert that Demosthenes emulated the Rhetoric of Aristotle,’ emphases mine; Usher’s transl. modified). 137 Usher’s transl. modified. 138 The word Óqloc need not be pejorative (‘crowd, throng,’ LSJ, p. 1281, s.v. I.1) and may simply mean ‘mass, multitude’ (ibid . s.v. I.2). However, given the fact that Dionysius carefully distinguishes between elite critics and the multitude of average critics, the word is likely to have negative implications in the present context. As o… pollo– in Amm. I , 1.2, Óqloc does not refer to the masses in general, but to the multitude of intellectuals and scholars active in Dionysius’ day whom he regards as ‘average intellectuals,’ cf. p. 32 with n. 101 above.
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lication of the Peripatetic’s opinion, Dionysius settles the dispute with the Peripatetic before the latter has even had a chance to get the support of ‘the many’ for his claim. As will be shown in chapter 5.2.1, Dionysius designs the whole letter as a trial in which the Peripatetic, represented by a fictus interlocutor, is defeated by Dionysius and Aristotle himself, who participates in the controversy through verbatim quotations and confirms Dionysius’ point of view. Thus the letter represents a permanent document of how Dionysius reveals the absurdity of the Peripatetic’s claim and how he defeats him with the support of the founder of the very tradition which the Peripatetic claimed to represent. Reading the letter, the reader will re-enact the dispute in which Dionysius dethroned the Peripatetic’s authority and through which the Peripatetic lost his status as an elite critic. Any real controversy which might have arisen from a publication of the Peripatetic’s statement has forever been substituted with the virtual controversy acted out in Amm.I . Thus as a published document, in contrast to the unpublished assertion of his adversary, Dionysius’ letter is a symbol of the superiority of Dionysius’ method over the Peripatetic’s and substantiates his claim to leadership in the study of rhetoric. The symbolic value with which Dionysius charges Amm.I sheds new light on the function of the numerous cross-references to other works of his which pervade his writings. One example of such a cross-reference is found in Amm.I itself (Amm.I , 3.1):
OŒk Íst+Ítumoc lÏgoc o›toc, ¬ f–le >Ammaÿe, oŒd+‚k t¿n >AristotËlouc teqn¿n t¿n ’steron ‚xeneqjeis¿n o… DhmosjËnouc lÏgoi sunetàqjhsan ÇllÄ kaj+·tËrac tinÄc e sagwgàc; Õp‡r ¡n ‚n d–¯ dhl∏sw graf¨ tÄ doko‹ntà moi; polÃc gÄr  per» aŒt¿n lÏgoc, Án oŒ kal¿c e⁄qen ·tËrac graf®c poi®sai pàrergon. “That story is not true,” my dear Ammaeus, nor in fact were the speeches of Demosthenes composed in accordance with the precepts of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which was published at a later date. His speeches are indebted to other treatises, about which I shall disclose my view in another work, since the subject demands full discussion, which could not properly be made a subordinate part of a work on another topic.
Dionysius is referring his reader to a treatise which has not yet been written but which, once published, will be based on his successful argument with the Peripatetic. As such it adds another piece of evidence for Dionysius’ claim to superiority to the already existing Amm.I and provides further proof
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that Dionysius’ method is the only appropriate way to learn the Classical language. Dionysius’ individual writings are thus connected to a network, ‘a stone-by-stone construction of an edifice’139 and result in what could be called a ‘field of statements.’ Dionysius’ individual statements, i. e., every single one of his works, are ordered to ‘enunciative series,’ the elements of which mutually depend on and refer to each other. 140 In their totality, then, Dionysius’ writings bit by bit constitute a tradition of Classicist criticism. The opening chapter of Dionysius’ essay On Thucydides, considered briefly above, is particularly illustrative of this aspect of Dionysius’ writings (Thuc. 1.1–4): 141
>En toÿc proekdojeÿsi per» t®c mim†sewc Õpomnhmatismoÿc ‚pelhluj∞c oœc Õpelàmbanon ‚pifanestàtouc e⁄nai poihtàc te ka» suggrafeÿc, ¬ KÏinte A“lie ToubËrwn, ka» dedhlwk∞c ‚n Êl–goic t–nac Èkastoc aŒt¿n e sfËretai pragmatikàc te ka» lektikÄc Çretàc, ka» p¨ màlista qe–rwn ·auto‹ g–netai katÄ tÄc Çpotuq–ac […], —na toÿc proairoumËnoic gràfein te ka» lËgein efi kalo» ka» dedokimasmËnoi kanÏnec ¬sin, ‚f+¡n poi†sontai tÄc katÄ mËroc gumnas–ac […]; 142 ÅyàmenÏc te t¿n suggrafËwn ‚d†lwsa ka» per» Joukud–dou tÄ doko‹ntà moi, suntÏm˙ ka» kefalai∏dei graf¨ perilab∏n […] t®c eŒkair–ac t¿n grafomËnwn stoqazÏmenoc […]. So‹ d‡ boulhjËntoc d–an suntàxasja– me per» Joukud–dou grafòn âpanta perieilhfuÿan tÄ deÏmena lÏgwn, ÇnabalÏmenoc tòn per» DhmosjËnouc pragmate–an õn e⁄qon ‚n qers–n, ÕpesqÏmhn te poi†sein, ±c pro˘ro‹, ka» telËsac tòn ÕpÏsqesin Çpod–dwmi. In the treatise On Imitation which I published earlier, Quintus Aelius Tubero, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding. I indicated briefly the good qualities of content and style contributed by each, and where his failings caused him to fall furthest below his own standards […]. I did this in order that those who intend to become good writers and speakers should have sound and approved standards by which to carry out their individual exercises […]. When I came to deal with the historians, I gave my opinion of Thucydides, but expressed it in a brief and summary manner […] because I was concerned with presenting my material on a scale appropriate to the work in 139 I am adopting this expression from Foucault (1969) 62. 140 Cf. ibid. 62–70, esp. 62–63. 141 Cf. Amm.II , 1.1–2; Pomp. 2.1; 3.1; Thuc. 1.4; Din. 11.4; Lys. 34.1; see Bonner (1939) 25–38 for further references; cf. above, p. 27. 142 Due to its length the sentence is an anacoluthon and lacks a main verb.
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hand […]. But when you expressed the desire that I should write a separate essay on Thucydides, including everything that required comment, I promised to set aside the work on Demosthenes that I had in hand, and do as you preferred. Here is the essay, in fulfilment of my promise.
This passage not only demonstrates that Dionysius conceived of his treatises as elements of a network of both works already written and works yet-tobe written and that he expects his recipients to do likewise. It also points to another constituent of Dionysius’ Classicism: his essays are inextricably bound up with a lively discussion within a community of intellectuals. As in the First Letter to Ammaeus, Dionysius presents his essays as both the product of and the driving force behind Classicist discursive practice. His essays regulate the discursive activity within the community by providing guidelines of how to deal with the classical texts. 143 And the exercises and discussions which they provoke might, as with Tubero, result in requests for further treatises. Dionysius’ essays document and represent the existence and activity of a community of literati from which they are sprung and to which they are directed. Constituting an archive of the knowledge that defines ‘those who make a serious study of politiko» lÏgoi,’ they provide this community with a discursive history. This aspect of Dionysius’ Classicist ideology will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.
1.2.4 Criticism as Constituent of Communities of Intellectuals Dionysius presents himself and the Peripatetic as representatives of communities of scholars. It is striking that throughout the letter the Peripatetic remains anonymous – in stark contrast to Dionysius and Ammaeus. Therefore, an attempt has been made to identify the Peripatetic with Andronicus of Rhodes.144 But the fact that the Peripatetic remains anonymous serves a purpose. It signals to the reader that Dionysius’ adversary is less important as an individual scholar than as the representative of the Peripatetic school of thought. As Dionysius says at Amm.I , 1.1, the motivation for the Peripatetic’s attempt to make Classical rhetoric depend on Aristotle is the desire ‘to show all respect to Aristotle, the founder of his school’ (pànta qar–zesjai boulÏmenoc >AristotËlei tƒ kt–santi ta‘thn tòn filosof–an). 143 Cf. above, p. 27. 144 Wooten (1994) 121–123.
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The underlying purpose of Dionysius’ letter itself, to convince (par§noun, Amm.I , 1.2) Ammaeus to side with him against the Peripatetic, reveals that Dionysius too conceives of himself as the representative of a community: subscribing to or denying a particular opinion on the Classical texts is not a neutral task but implies associating oneself with one elite critic and, necessarily, distinguishing oneself from others. The group Dionysius claims to be representing is named explicitly at Amm.I , 2.3: the letter against the Peripatetic is written ‘for the gratification of all those who make a serious study of politiko» lÏgoi’ (t®c Åpàntwn t¿n per» toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc ‚spoudakÏtwn qàritoc). 145 This passage suggests that the term ‘o… per» toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc ‚spoudakÏtec,’ and similar expressions which pervade Dionysius’ works,146 does not refer to ‘those who make a serious study of civil oratory’ in general, as Usher translates it. Rather, the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ are Dionysius’ ideal readers, i.e., those readers who are defined, and define themselves, by adopting Dionysius’ conception of Classical rhetoric (politiko» lÏgoi) and by subscribing to his critical methods.147 Given this specific meaning of politiko» lÏgoi in Dionysius’ writings, it is not adequately rendered with the expression ‘civil oratory.’ In most quotations I have therefore decided to leave the term untranslated; a possible, albeit not entirely satisfying, alternative rendering of expressions such as ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi,’ of which I shall make occasional use, is ‘Classicists.’ 148 The opening paragraph of On Thucydides (Thuc. 1.1–4) provides further evidence that Dionysius conceives of the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ as a distinct community that is defined by the particular competence provided in his writings: 149 145 Usher’s transl. modified. 146 o… Çsko‹ntec tòn politikòn filosof–an/toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc: Orat. Vett. 4.2, Comp. 1.3, Pomp. 6.5; o… filÏlogoi: Thuc. 2.4, 25.2; also expressions like eŒpa–deutoi, Comp. 22.35, Dem. 46.3, or e dÏtec, Dem. 14.2, 23.3, Comp. 16.18, 22.35, belong in this category; cf. further Dem. 32.1, 35.2 (list not meant to be exhaustive); cf. Hidber (1996) on 4.2 (p. 130) and see the discussion of knowledge as constitutive of the Classicist community in ch. 4 below. 147 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the notion politiko» lÏgoi see ch. 2.1, below, where I will demonstrate that the expression is a technical term for a conception of language and identity which Dionysius adopts from Isocrates. 148 This translation, too, is problematic, because it imposes our view on Dionysius’ and his readers’ activity; to us, they are classicizing, but, as the next chapter will show, they conceived of themselves as being Classical. Cf. my remarks in n. 11 above. 149 Cf. the discussion of this passage under a different aspect above, pp. 46–47.
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>En toÿc proekdojeÿsi per» t®c mim†sewc Õpomnhmatismoÿc ‚pelhluj∞c oœc Õpelàmbanon ‚pifanestàtouc e⁄nai poihtàc te ka» suggrafeÿc, ¬ KÏinte A“lie ToubËrwn, ka» dedhlwk∞c ‚n Êl–goic t–nac Èkastoc aŒt¿n e sfËretai pragmatikàc te ka» lektikÄc Çretàc, ka» p¨ màlista qe–rwn ·auto‹ g–netai katÄ tÄc Çpotuq–ac […], —na toÿc proairoumËnoic gràfein te ka» lËgein efi kalo» ka» dedokimasmËnoi kanÏnec ¬sin, ‚f+¡n poi†sontai tÄc katÄ mËroc gumnas–ac mò pànta mimo‘menoi tÄ par+‚ke–noic ke–mena toÿc Çndràsin, ÇllÄ tÄc m‡n ÇretÄc aŒt¿n lambànontec, tÄc d‡ Çpotuq–ac fulattÏmenoi […]. In the treatise On Imitation which I published earlier, Quintus Aelius Tubero, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding. I indicated briefly the good qualities of content and style contributed by each, and where his failings caused him to fall furthest below his own standards […]. I did this in order that those who intend to become good writers and speakers should have sound and approved standards by which to carry out their individual exercises, not imitating all the qualities of these authors, but adopting their good qualities and guarding against their failings.
The summary of On Imitation recalls Dionysius’ Classicist programme in Orat. Vett. 4.2. 150 His analyses of the Classical texts, of their style and their contents, and his judgment on their quality are the ‘sound and approved standards’ for his readers. Dionysius envisages his readers as a group of recipients who all share his approach to and aesthetic judgment on the Classical texts and who implement it in daily exercises along the standard set up in his writings. 151 It is Dionysius who defines which features of the Classical texts are worth imitating and which are not. Thus he creates a specific idea of what is ‘Classical’ to which he expects his readers to subscribe 150 Cf. above, p. 43. 151 Cf. Comp. 20.23, where Dionysius describes his treatise as incomplete in so far as his explanations need to be complemented (prosupoj†somai) by daily exercises with Rufus: Ìsa d‡ oŒq oŸà te ™n, ‚làttw te Ónta to‘twn ka» ÇmudrÏtera ka» diÄ pl®joc dusper–lhpta miî graf¨, ta‹t+‚n taÿc kaj+ômËran gumnas–aic prosupoj†soma– soi, ka» poll¿n ka» Çgaj¿n poiht¿n te ka» suggrafËwn ka» ˚htÏrwn martur–aic qr†somai (‘But there are others [elements of an attractive and beautiful style], less important and more obscure than these, which I could not mention because their numbers made them difficult to include in a single treatise; and these I shall submit to you in our daily exercises, and shall support my case with evidence from many good poets, historians and orators’). In so doing, Dionysius defines what at first sight seems to be an autonomous work as firmly embedded in the larger discursive practice of the community of o… Çsko‹ntec toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc (Comp. 1.3); see below, ch. 5.1.
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and which they are supposed to implement in their writings; only thus will they become not only competent critics, but also competent writers and speakers whose excellence is due to the (itself Classical) combination of a sound theoretical knowledge and practical exercise. The common pursuit of Dionysius’ conception of the Classical distinguishes the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi.’ All those who adopt a conception of the Classical other than Dionysius’ are excluded from the community of Classicists. 152 The frequent use of the first and second person and of the vocative in Amm.I , 2.1–2 substantiates Dionysius’ claim to be acting on behalf of a community of literati. At Amm.I , 2.1, for example, Dionysius addresses Ammaeus directly and praises him:
OŒk ‚laq–sthn dË moi sà parËsqou ˚opòn e c t‰ mò parËrgwc ‚xetàsai tòn Çl†jeian, parakal¿n faneroÃc poi®sai toÃc lÏgouc oŸc ‚maut‰n pËpeika DhmosjËnouc Çkmàzontoc ¢dh ka» toÃc ‚pifanestàtouc e rhkÏtoc Çg¿nac tÏte Õp‰ >AristotËlouc tÄc ˚htorikÄc gegràfjai tËqnac. The strongest of my motives for making a systematic investigation of the truth was supplied by yourself, urging me to publish the arguments with which I have satisfied myself that it was not until Demosthenes had already reached his prime and had delivered his most celebrated Orations that the Rhetoric was written by Aristotle.
‘And again,’ Dionysius goes on immediately afterwards, ‘you seem right to urge me not to rest my case upon mere signs or probabilities or pieces of evidence extraneous to it, […] but rather to call as my witness Aristotle himself […]’ (‚dÏkeic tË moi ka» to‹to Êrj¿c paraineÿn, mò shme–oic mhd‡ e kÏsi mhd+Çllotr–aic t‰ prêgma pist∏sasjai martur–aic […], Çll+aŒt‰n >AristotËlh parasqËsjai […], 2.2). Dionysius’ essay is thus presented as the result of a discussion between two intellectuals who share the same knowledge about Classical texts and who agree on the method with which this knowledge has to be acquired. This agreement unites Dionysius and Ammaeus and sets them in opposition to the Peripatetic and his point of view. As the consequence of this agreement, the letter itself testifies to the community of literati to which it owes its existence. Within this community, Dionysius claims a leading role for himself. He is keen to point out that he had already decided on the 152 The connection between knowledge and aesthetics and their importance as criteria of distinction will be discussed in detail in ch. 4 below.
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procedure of how to refute the Peripatetic before Ammaeus suggested it (toÃc lÏgouc oŸc ‚maut‰n pËpeika […]) and that Ammaeus’ suggestions needed to be approved by him before they could be applied (‚dÏkeic tË moi […] Êrj¿c paraineÿn). Moreover, it is Dionysius who is writing the letter, and not Ammaeus. Developing his own approach in opposition to the Peripatetic’s, Dionysius creates an image of ‘the Classicist critic’ and of his position in contemporary critical discourse to which he invites his reader to subscribe. This procedure might be called identity through distinction: on the one hand, Dionysius envisages his readers (and invites them to see themselves) as a community like the Peripatetics, which is defined by a distinct approach to the Classical texts and which represents a long tradition. In order to do so, he adopts and adapts crucial elements of the strategies of self-definition and self-distinction of the philosophical schools such as the claim to be continuing an intellectual tradition which owes its present accomplished state to Demosthenes as its quasi-founding father (chapter 1.2.2); the assertion that this attitude towards this tradition is shared by others and that this shared attitude is a bond strong enough to define himself and them as a distinct community (chapter 1.2.4); 153 and the emphasis on the role of his works as constituents of a written discursive tradition (chapter 1.2.3). On the other hand, this entails that he and his Classicist community need to distinguish themselves from the philosophical communities, and the Peripatetics in particular, and this distinction is acted out in the quarrel over the relationship between Aristotle and Demosthenes. The tradition of Classical rhetoric is represented by the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ alone and therefore Classical rhetoric is their domain. As seen above, the agonistic nature of criticism entails that one community can establish its discourse only at the expense of other communities, as the Peripatetics 153 Based on Seneca the Elder, Luzzatto (1988) 238 has argued that there were several schools of ‘Asianist’ declamations, each led by one famous orator, cf. below, p. 113 n. 326. If she is right (but see Wooten [1975] 94), these ‘Asianist’ communities would provide an interesting parallel in the field of rhetorical education to Dionysius’ attempt to define himself and his (ideal) recipients as a community of Classicists, especially because the ‘Asianists’ served Dionysius as the paradigmatic out-group in opposition to which he conceived his ideal of ‘Classical’ language. It is important to note, though, that because of this importance of ‘Asianists’ as the antagonists of ‘Classicists,’ the image of ‘Asianism’ which Dionysius presents in his writings differs fundamentally from the historical reality of ‘Asianist’ style and ‘Asianist’ schools of declamation, see the discussion in ch.s 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.4 below, esp. pp. 113–116 with nn. 326, 328.
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had established their claim for superiority in intellectual discourse at the expense of the Academics (chapter 1.2.1). Dionysius now claims the same right for himself and his community whose authority he seeks to establish at the expense of the Peripatetics. As the visible ‘monuments’ of the power and influence of Dionysius’ critical method, Dionysius’ writings themselves demonstrate that he is the worthy heir to and representative of the tradition of Classical rhetoric and that his Classicist criticism can easily compete with or even overpower such long-established and renowned schools of thought as the Peripatetics. The First Letter to Ammaeus thus turns out to be a manifesto which demonstrates that the Classicist community is on a par with and claims the same authority as such renowned schools as the Peripatetics and that the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ are prepared to challenge the Peripatetics’ position as the ‘leaders in the study of rhetoric.’ 154
1.3 Conclusions In the first chapter of this study I have argued that Dionysius’ Classicist criticism can fruitfully be approached as a cultural rather than linguistic phenomenon. So far discussions of Dionysius have focused on the grammatical and rhetorical traditions which Dionysius combines in his discussions of and judgments on the classical authors, and on the methods by which he combines them to create his own, unique critical approach. Such a linguistic approach to Dionysius, however, leaves a question unanswered which is essential to our understanding of Dionysius’ Classicism: why did it make sense to Greek and Roman intellectuals in Augustan Rome to attempt to speak and write like Lysias, Isocrates, or Demosthenes? What was their outlook on the world, their Weltanschauung, that made this intellectual pursuit seem worthwhile to them? The relevance of such an approach to Dionysius’ critical and historical writings, I have argued, extends beyond the confines of Dionysian scholarship. It challenges us to view Classicist criticism as a cultural strategy to cope with and constructively adapt crucial elements of Dionysius’ cultural and political environment rather than as a retrograde ‘movement’ which sacrifices the present to the preposterous attempt to resuscitate a past buried centuries ago. This, in turn, invites us to reconsider our conception of 154 For a detailed analysis of Dionysius’ argument strategy in the letter and of the image of Dionysius and his critical method which results from it see ch. 5.2.1.
1.3 Conclusions
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‘Augustan’ culture itself: so far, definitions of ‘Augustan’ have generally been based on the notion of a (potentially) direct and mutual interchange between Augustan power and the various spheres of society. Dionysius’ Classicism suggests a different, more flexible conception of ‘Augustan’ culture: although we can safely exclude any direct influence between Dionysius and Augustus’ power, his Classicist ideology, as will become apparent in the next chapters, is deeply informed by Augustus and the image of himself and his reign which the princeps disseminated. Thus Dionysius’ Classicism helps us to understand how the principate was implemented in the intellectual culture in Rome in the first century BCE and how it shaped contemporary culture beyond the boundaries of political power. Social Identity Theory provides a suitable theoretical framework to approach Dionysius’ Classicism as a cultural phenomenon. It allows us to conceive of Dionysius’ ‘literary circle’ as a social sub-group which provides its members with an ideology in Paul Ricœur’s sense, i. e., with a set of discursive practices through which a ‘group [gets] an all-encompassing comprehensive view not only of itself, but of history and, finally, of the whole world.’ 155 Dionysius’ writings allow us insight into this discursive practice and the conception of identity that united Dionysius and the members of the ‘literary circle’ or, as Dionysius prefers to call them, the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi.’ A discussion of the introductory chapters to Dionysius’ First Letter to Ammaeus has shown that Dionysius himself conceived of himself and his ideal recipients as a community of intellectuals and presents himself as the head of this community. In this process Dionysius adopts and adapts the strategies of identity and distinction of the traditional philosophical schools of thought, especially the Peripatetics. Like the communities of philosophers Dionysius lays claim to a long scholarly tradition, the tradition of Classical rhetoric itself. The distinctive feature of this Classical tradition is the combination of oratorical theory and practice which also distinguishes Dionysius’ critical method. Dionysius thus presents his method as the only legitimate continuation of the tradition of Classical rhetoric and himself as its only legitimate representative. His writings represent the discursive tradition of the community of Classicists. As written and published documents they demonstrate the continuity of the tradition of Classical rhetorical practice-cum-theory, but they also underline Dionysius’ claim to be the leader of a school of thought 155 Ricœur (1978) 46.
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the writings of whom have the same canonical status to his followers as the works of Epicurus, Zeno, Plato, or Aristotle have to theirs. At the same time, as both the driving force behind and the product of the discussions among the members of the Classicist community, they represent the existence of this community itself and its claim to be on a par with or even superior to the traditional philosophical schools of thought. This claim is further substantiated by the very act of turning the strategies of self-definition of Dionysius’ competitors, the philosophical schools, into constituents of the discourse of Classicist criticism: the similarities between the philosophical and the Classicist discourse are a demonstrative assertion that Classicist criticism has the same right to authority in Augustan intellectual culture as the communities of philosophers, while at the same time underlining the differences between philosophy and criticism. It will be the aim of the subsequent chapters to explore further the outlook on the world and conception of self and other that are bound up with defining oneself as a ‘practitioner of politiko» lÏgoi.’ The first major part of this study, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, will explore the interpretation of Classical past, Augustan present, and Roman history and their interrelation that is conveyed by Dionysius’ Classicist ideology. It will examine the way in which language becomes the basis of the self-definition of Dionysius and his ideal addressees as Greek intellectuals working and living in Augustan Rome: which role did they ascribe to their Greek literary, cultural, and political heritage in the Roman present? How did they define their own position in relation to this heritage? What was their view of their Roman contemporaries and their history? How did they define their own role as intellectuals between Greek education and Roman power? The focus of Classicism, I will show in chapter 2, is on the present rather than the past. Dionysius offers his recipients an interpretation of history which allows them to integrate the Classical Greek cultural and political heritage and the spread of Roman power under Augustus. Rather than an escapist attempt to turn back time to the Golden Age, Dionysius’ Classicism is an attempt to overcome the temporal and spatial gap separating Classical past and Augustan present; Dionysius, one might say, invites his recipients to read Augustan power through the lenses of Classical Greek language and literature. The preceding discussion has shown that the term politiko» lÏgoi plays a key role in Dionysius’ Classicism. After a brief consideration of the role of time in Dionysius’ Classicism in chapter 2.1, my investigation of the
1.3 Conclusions
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Classicist conception of identity will begin with a discussion of the meaning and implications of the notion politiko» lÏgoi. This will lend further support to the assertion that politiko» lÏgoi does not simply refer to the rather vague notion of ‘civil oratory,’ as it is often translated; rather, the term refers to a specifically Isocratean conception of language and civic identity. Drawing on an analysis of Dionysius’ On Isocrates, chapter 2.2.1 will show that Dionysius conceived of language as the carrier of a set of moral and political values which were acquired and implemented through language; to Dionysius, practising Classical language meant implementing Classical identity in the present. A discussion of On Mimesis and On Dinarchus in chapter 2.2.2 will then illustrate Dionysius’ conception of mimesis, the process through which Classical identity is acquired and enacted through language. Since Classicists aimed to implement Classical Greek identity in the Roman present and to achieve continuity between Classical Athens and Augustan Rome, chapter 2.3 will focus on how Dionysius interprets the role of the Romans and their relation to the Classical Greek past in order to accommodate them in his Classicist world view. Chapter 2 being centred on the conception of the present inherent in Dionysius’ Classicist ideology, chapter 3 will turn to Dionysius’ image of both the Classical Greek and the Roman past. Recently, there has been a controversial discussion about the construction of the past through historical texts, the relation between historytelling and past realities, and narration as a means of historical understanding. Our view on and assessment of Dionysius’ construction of the past can benefit from the results of this controversy. Chapter 3.1 will offer a brief overview of the major tenets of this debate and thus provide the background against which Dionysius’ image of the past will be discussed in the subsequent sections of chapter 3. Drawing on Dionysius’ discussion of the principles of good historiography and his criticism of the portrayal of the Athenians in Thucydides’ History in the Letter to Pompeius and On Thucydides, chapter 3.2 will explore Dionysius’ vision of the Classical past. Dionysius uses criticism to substitute Thucydides’ ‘inappropriate’ image of the Athenians with an image that he regards as ‘appropriate.’ This offers us novel insights into how Dionysius imagined the Classical Athenians as historical actors and furthers our understanding of the foundations on which Dionysius’ image of the Classical past was based. Chapter 3.3 will then discuss Dionysius’ historical work, the Antiquitates Romanae, and its relation to his Classicism. The Romans, as chapter 2.3 will have demonstrated, are an integral part of Dionysius’ ideology, which is
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based to a large extent on the idea that Augustan Rome is the continuation of Classical Athens. This was not a commonly accepted idea among either Greeks or Romans and therefore required justification. Chapter 3.3 will demonstrate how the Antiquitates substantiates the interpretation of the Roman present on which Dionysius’ Classicism is based, by proving that the Romans had been Greek, both ethnically and ethically, from the very beginnings of their history. A main concern of Dionysius’ Classicism is the definition of the relationship between Romans and Greeks. It is a concern which Dionysius shares with major Roman writers, such as Cicero and Virgil, who deal with the same questions but propose answers which are entirely different from Dionysius’. The essential elements of Dionysius’ view of the relationship between Greeks and Romans will emerge clearly only when read against alternative interpretations of Dionysius’ Latin contemporaries. There is no direct evidence that Dionysius ever read the works of either Virgil or Cicero, and it is difficult to assess his competence in Latin. The fact that his acquaintance (friend?) Caecilius of Caleacte wrote a comparison (s‘gkrisic) of Demosthenes and Cicero makes it plausible that Dionysius was familiar with at least Cicero’s writings, but we cannot be sure. Therefore, when comparing Dionysius’ approach with that of Latin authors, I do not presuppose that Dionysius is deliberately reacting to their views or that he had first-hand knowledge of their works. Rather, these comparisons help set Dionysius’ point of view in context and, thus, highlight aspects of his Classicism which have passed unnoticed so far or shed new light on already well-known features of his works. The first part of this study explores the world view implied in the discursive practice, the literary and rhetorical criticism of the Classical texts, which constitutes the literary circle as a community. The second part, chapters 4 and 5, will then turn to this discursive practice itself. While chapters 2 and 3 discuss the self-definition of Dionysius and his addressees as Greek intellectuals in Augustan Rome, chapters 4 and 5 investigate their self-image as literary critics and the discourse of authority and superiority associated with it: how did Dionysius and his addressees imagine their relation to the Classical authors? How did this influence their image of themselves and their critical method vis-à-vis scholarly tradition and, in particular, with regard to alternative approaches to the Classical texts? How is this image of self and others implemented in Dionysius’ texts? How do they contribute to constituting the community of ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ by means of strategies of integration and exclusion?
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Chapter 4 will therefore return to the notion of criticism as a struggle for authority and explore further the role of literary criticism as a criterion of distinction in Dionysius’ writings. Reading the Classical texts plays a crucial role in the formation of a community of Classicists because reading is the primary means to connect with the past. Chapter 4.1 will assess the general importance of reading in Dionysius’ Classicism. Chapter 4.2 will then demonstrate that Dionysius promises to provide his readers with a reading technique that enables them to experience the Classical texts authentically, i. e., as the Classical authors intended them to be experienced by their audiences. Such an ‘authentic reading’ requires Classical competencies in literary composition: writing Classical texts was based on knowledge of a complex set of rules of literary composition which enabled the Classical authors to determine the emotional effects of their texts upon the recipients. Therefore readers in the first century BCE need to acquire the same competence in literary composition as the Classical authors in order to be able to reconstruct what effects their texts were intended to have. Classicist reading is a process of analysis and reconstruction which presupposes Classical knowledge. This knowledge can be obtained from Dionysius’ On Literary Composition which claims to provide the original, Classical rules of composition and a Classical course of education. Since ‘authentic reading’ requires a long and demanding training in the Classical art of composition, defining oneself as a ‘practitioner of politiko» lÏgoi’ goes hand-in-hand with an awareness of elitism. Chapter 4.3 demonstrates that Dionysius constantly reminds his readers that the specific knowledge, which they can acquire exclusively from his works, distinguishes them as elite readers. Reading and learning from Dionysius’ essays, they become members of an exclusive circle of literati comparable only to the Orphic mysteries or the Classical elite itself. This feeling of communion, and its counter-part, exclusion, is conveyed not only through explicit statements and comparisons of the Classicist readers with other elite communities but is also deeply ingrained in the very design of Dionysius’ writings. Chapter 5 will argue that the very act of reading Dionysius’ texts creates a feeling of being part of an exclusive circle of Classicists – or of being excluded from it. The peculiar reading situation created by the design of Dionysius’ works implements a feeling of elitism: his essays perform criticism as an ‘in-group’/‘out-group’ reading. Chapter 5.1 will be centred on what I suggest to call the ‘dialogic’ or ‘interactive’ structure of Dionysius’ criticism. In Dionysius’ writings criticism is enacted as a virtual dialogue between Dionysius, his addressee,
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(virtual) adversaries, who are represented by a fictus interlocutor, and the Classical authors themselves, who participate in the discussion through extensive verbatim quotations. Through various formal devices, such as direct questions, addresses to the reader, and use of the first person plural, Dionysius invites the recipient to participate actively in the process of criticism and to subscribe to his interpretation of the texts and his judgment on them; thus his texts aim to establish a virtual communis opinio between himself and his recipients. By making the creation of a feeling of communion (or exclusion) an integral part of criticism itself, Dionysius’ texts transcend the historical readership to which they were originally addressed. In accordance with Dionysius’ aim to spread Classical Greek identity over the whole world, they are designed to include all readers, no matter where or when, into an ‘imagined community’ of ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi.’ This process of integration is inseparable from the self-image of Dionysius and his addressees as privileged representatives of the Classical literary tradition itself and is bound up with a process of exclusion. Dionysius frequently couches his discussions of the Classical texts in terms of virtual controversies with adversaries, who are often identified with representatives of renowned schools of thought such as the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Platonists. In these virtual arguments Dionysius unmasks the incompetence of his opponents and demonstrates the superiority of his particular approach. This reminds the readers of the force of criticism as a criterion of distinction. Dionysius’ texts urge the readers to make a choice: they can accept Dionysius’ point of view and consider themselves members of the Classicist community or they can reject it and consider themselves excluded from Classicist criticism and, with it, from continuing the Classical tradition. Practising Classicist criticism can thus not be abstracted from asserting the superiority of one’s own method over that of other communities. Chapter 5.2 will discuss two examples of such virtual discussions: first, Dionysius’ controversy with the Peripatetic, which he stages as a trial in which Aristotle himself supports Dionysius’ position as his ‘witness’ through verbatim quotations (chapter 5.2.1); second, Dionysius’ controversy with the ‘Platonists,’ who claim that Plato, rather than Demosthenes, should be the only model for any kind of literary expression. Dionysius refutes this claim by developing two ‘styles of criticism’: his own, a simple, ‘true-to-nature’ (Çlhj†c) kind of criticism – which corresponds to the plain and ‘true-to-nature’ style of Lysianic rhetoric and, like the latter, is the direct representative of Athenian democracy – and a ‘dithyrambic’ style of the Platonists which distorts reality just as Plato’s ‘dithyrambic’ style, which he
1.3 Conclusions
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employs in political passages of his works such as the Funeral Oration in the Menexenus, distorts the image of Classical Athens and thus risks debasing its dignity and splendour (chapter 5.2.2).
2. Reviving the Past: Language and Identity in Dionysius’ Classicism 2.1 Introduction: Language and Time in Dionysius’ Classicism Being a Classicist is bound up with a distinct interpretation of past and present. At the very beginning of his ‘Classicist Manifesto,’156 Dionysius expounds the Classicist model of history which provides the framework for his and his readers’ activity and gives it a general historical dimension (Orat. Vett. 1.1–2; 3.1):
Pollòn qàrin ™n e dËnai tƒ kaj+ômêc qrÏn˙ d–kaion, ¬ kràtiste >Ammaÿe, ka» ällwn mËn tinwn ‚pithdeumàtwn Èneka n‹n kàllion ÇskhmËnwn £ prÏteron, oŒq °kista d‡ t®c per» toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc ‚pimele–ac oŒ mikrÄn ‚p–dosin pepoihmËnhc ‚p» tÄ kre–ttw. >En gÄr dò toÿc pr‰ ôm¿n qrÏnoic ô m‡n Çrqa–a ka» filÏsofoc ˚htorikò prophlakizomËnh ka» deinÄc ’breic ÕpomËnousa katel‘eto, ÇrxamËnh m‡n Çp‰ t®c >Alexàndrou to‹ MakedÏnoc teleut®c ‚kpneÿn ka» mara–nesjai […]. A t–a d+o⁄mai ka» Çrqò t®c tosa‘thc metabol®c ô pàntwn krato‹sa
156 Coined by Croiset, this expression has become a common denomination for the preface of Dionysius’ De Oratoribus Veteribus (Orat. Vett.) since Hidber’s Das klassizistische Manifest des Dionys von Halikarnass (Hidber [1996]). 157 Usher’s transl. modified.
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In this passage Dionysius explains a conception of history which he shares with other representatives of classicism, ancient or modern. This conception has been termed Klassizistischer Dreischritt, 158 which translates as Threeperiod model of classicism. Dionysius uses the rhetorical category of politiko» lÏgoi or Çrqa–a ka» filÏsofoc ˚htorik†159 to subdivide history into three periods: the remote, Classical,160 past, the end of which is marked by the death of Alexander; the present, the beginning of which is identified with Augustus’ rise to power;161 and an intermediate, Asianist, period.162 These three periods are further reduced to the opposition of the ‘periods of politiko» lÏgoi’ (remote past and present) and a ‘period of non-politiko» lÏgoi’ (intermediate period). Scholars have criticized in particular two aspects of this model of the past. First, they maintained that Dionysius ignored the chronological sequence of time in favour of a ‘retrograde idealism’ (to paraphrase Norden). In so doing, it is maintained, he disassociated the evolution of rhetorical style from the progress of time: the Çrqa–a ka» filÏsofoc ˚htorik† connects the remote, Classical, past with the present and defines them as belonging together despite their temporal separation; this denies any development of rhetoric in the intermediate period. Moreover, the intermediate period is defined as an interruption and is dismissed as irrelevant, even detrimental to the present. 163 This seemed problematic to some scholars because from a chronological point of view the present forms a continuum with, and is the product of, the immediately preceding period rather than the remote past. Dionysius turns this chronological relationship between past and present upside down: in his conception of history, ‚p–dosic, ‘progress’ 158 159 160 161
On which see Gelzer (1979). Henceforth I will use both these terms synonymously, as Dionysius himself does. On the origins of the term ‘classical’ see the brief overview in Gelzer (1979) 4–11. Hidber (1996) 78–81, argues convincingly that at Orat. Vett. 3.1 Dionysius refers to the establishment of Augustus’ principate and the unification of the oikumene under his rule after the end of the Civil War. Thus the remarkable upsurge of cultural, esp. literary, activity in Rome after the battle of Actium (White [2005] 327; cf. Hidber [forthcoming]) provides the broader cultural framework into which Dionysius integrates himself and his Classicism; see below, ch.s 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. This assumption is supported by Dionysius’ statement at Ant. 1.7.2, that he came to Rome immediately after the end of the Civil War; Dionysius thus defines the beginning of the principate as marking not only the rebirth of filÏsofoc ˚htorik† but also the beginning of his own activity as a literary critic and a historian. 162 Cf. Hidber (1996) on 1.2 (p. 100) with his comm. on 2.2 (p. 114). 163 Cf. Gelzer (1975) 166–167; Weitman (1989), esp. 180–181; Hose (2002).
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or ‘advance,’ 164 is a ‘progress backwards,’ 165 insofar as the term refers to the present becoming more and more like the Classical past. 166 Second, Dionysius is criticized for neglecting ‘historical synthesis.’ 167 Historical synthesis conceives of literature and politics as two separate strands of history which must not be intermingled. But this is precisely what Dionysius did: he sacrificed the clear-cut distinction between political and literary history to his (allegedly superficial) attempt to provide literary history with a symbolically charged date, viz., the death of Alexander. 168 Dionysius, it is argued, should rather have referred to the death of
164 LSJ, p. 631, s.v. IV. 165 Cf. Dionysius’ characterization of time as the ‘saviour’ of good men, good arts and ‘practical pursuits and […] every other worthwhile activity’ (ÇllÄ gÄr oŒ mÏnon Çndr¿n Çgaj¿n qrÏnoc swtòr äristoc katÄ P–ndaron, ÇllÄ ka» teqn¿n nò D–a ka» ‚pithdeumàtwn ge ka» pant‰c ällou spouda–ou qr†matoc, Orat. Vett. 2.1) and his assertion that time ‘has restored the ancient and sober Rhetoric to her former rightful place of honour’ (ÇpËdwke t¨ m‡n Çrqa–¯ ka» s∏froni ˚htorik¨ tòn dika–an tim†n, õn ka» prÏteron e⁄qe kal¿c Çpolabeÿn, ibid. 2.2; emphases mine, Usher’s transl. modified). 166 Eduard Norden, in his still influential account of Antike Kunstprosa, is probably the most severe critic of this aspect of the classicist conception of time. He describes the practitioners of classicism as pursuing an ‘idealism’ that is not only out of tune with the progress of time (‘zeitgemäß’) but even a reactionary anachronism. Asianism, on the contrary, though inferior to the Classical style from an aesthetical point of view, is the result of the ‘natural’ evolution of rhetorical style (Norden [1909] 151 speaks of the ‘supreme law of literary evolution,’ ‘höchst[e] Gesetz literarischer Entwicklung’). This evolution was stopped and reversed by the ‘Atticist reaction’; cf. ibid. 151: ‘being the modern style of oratory, “Asianist” rhetoric was intrinsically justified, whereas “Atticist” rhetoric,which was an archaizing style, was not; the former provided the realism that was appropriate to the changes which the world had undergone, the idealism of the latter was out of tune with the progress of time […] the continuing idealism substituted progress and creativity with backwardness and acquiescence’ (‘die “asianische” Beredsamkeit hatte als die moderne innere Berechtigung, die “attizistische” als die archaisierende hatte sie nicht; die eine brachte mit ihrem Realismus das, was die anders gewordene Welt brauchte, der Idealismus der anderen war nicht mehr zeitgemäß […] der fortdauernde Idealismus vertauschte den vorwärtseilenden, schöpferischen Charakter mit einem nach rückwärts gewandten quieszierenden […]’). It is worth pointing out that Dionysius and Norden’s approach to (literary) history do not differ in principle but only in what either of them regards as the ‘natural order’: Norden opts for the constant change of rhetorical style, whereas Dionysius regards the preservation of the Classical as the ‘supreme law of literary evolution’; similarly, v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1900) 22, 51–52, and passim. 167 On historical synthesis see v. Fritz (1971). 168 See Hidber (1996) 19, 23, but cf. ibid. on Orat. Vett. 1.2 (p. 103); Heldmann (1982) 125.
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Demosthenes as marking the end of the period of Çrqa–a ka» filÏsofoc ˚htorik†. 169 Each of these critiques relies on debatable assumptions. First, there is no reason to accept the idea of a natural progress of rhetorical style. Language is not a self-enclosed entity, but language and style, especially those of literary works, are always shaped by the people who use it. 170 From this point of view, the Classicists’ choice to write like orators of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE is no more or less natural than that of the representatives of Asianism to write in a different manner. As far as the relation between literature and politics is concerned, we have come to think of politics as a dynamic discursive process. Political ideas are not simply imposed by the government. They are shaped, propagated, and implemented in society in a variety of media, often even without any initiative from an official side. 171 Language in particular was instrumentalized at all times by different social groups for their political aims. 172 Separating the spheres of literature and politics is an analytical instrument of the historian to come to terms with the wealth of facts and events presented by a given period. But such an approach distorts reality by oversimplifying the complex interrelation of politics and culture. We cannot blame Dionysius for adopting a view of the interrelation of rhetoric and politics which is different from ours; instead, it might be more fruitful to explore how he imagines this relationship. Nevertheless, these criticisms point to several aspects of Dionysius’ Classicism which deserve further consideration. Norden, for example, observed correctly that the Three-period model of Classicism gives up the linear sequence of time in favour of what I suggest might be called a ‘semiological’ approach to history. ‘Semiological,’ because the relationship between past and present is defined by the ‘meaning’ which is assigned to 169 Thus explicitly Heldmann (1982) 127. 170 A further important point should be stressed here: Norden’s association of ‘Asianism’ with the ‘natural development’ of language risks obfuscating the fact that ‘Asianism’ is by no means to be identified with ‘natural,’ common language use. On the contrary, as Luzzatto (1988) 238 points out, the controversy between ‘Asianism’ and ‘Atticism’ was not between (artificial) ‘rhetorics’ and (natural) spoken language (‘il conflitto non fu dunque tra retorica e lingua viva’) but between two rhetorical styles, each of which was equally artificial and equally remote from everyday spoken language (‘due diverse opzioni retoriche, ambedue lontane da quella parlata quotidiana’). 171 There is a good discussion of the alleged dichotomy of literature and politics and its bearings upon our approach to ancient, esp. ‘Augustan,’ literature in Feeney (1992) and Kennedy (1992). 172 See Bourdieu (2001); Burke (2004).
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individual periods rather than by their relative position in time. Dionysius defines the limits of the individual periods by well-known events in political history. Once established, he invests each of these periods with meaning by categorizing them as either ‘Classical/positive’ or ‘Asianist/negative.’ Instead of a neutral, temporal development, history thus appears as a dialectic of positive and negative. This urges the spectators in the present (that is, Dionysius’ readers) to locate themselves and their own times within this interplay. By choosing one style or the other, they can determine whether the present is to be Classical/positive or Asianist/negative and, consequently, to which period in the past it is connected. Tradition becomes a matter of choice rather than of chronological development. Moreover, Dionysius’ selection of events from political, rather than literary, history as sign-posts in the development of rhetoric suggests that Dionysius saw rhetoric and power as interrelated phenomena. The terms with which Dionysius describes Classical rhetoric confirm this view: politiko» lÏgoi and politikò filosof–a means ‘political discourse’ and ‘political philosophy.’ Dionysius seems to conceive of a particular kind of rhetoric as representing a particular form of power, and Alexander and Augustus represent to him the kind of power which corresponds to Classical rhetoric. As shown in the last chapter, Dionysius defines himself and his envisaged audience as ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi.’ Our understanding of his ideology depends on our understanding of what the term politiko» lÏgoi meant to him and his recipients. This question will be addressed in the present chapter, and the preceding considerations suggest an approach to this problem. Two aspects are of particular importance in Dionysius’ conception of politiko» lÏgoi: the relationship between time and language on the one hand, and the relationship between language and power on the other. This subdivision should not lead us to believe that these aspects are independent of each other. Politiko» lÏgoi can represent different epochs in history, because the term implies more than just a way of speaking. Rather, ‘time and language’ and ‘language and power’ provide the conceptual framework in which Dionysius’ notion of politiko» lÏgoi will be discussed in the present chapter. A discussion of Dionysius’ essay On Isocrates (Isoc.) in chapter 2.2.1 will show that Dionysius’ conception of Classical identity is based on Isocrates’ conception of Athenian civic language and identity. Following Isocrates, Dionysius defines language as the medium through which Classical identity is both acquired and enacted in the present by composing texts in the Classical manner.
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The term mimesis describes the process through which Classical identity is enacted through language and, thus, continuity with the Classical past achieved. Chapter 2.2.2 will explore Dionysius’ conception of mimesis and offer a new reading of his essays On Imitation (Imit.) and On Dinarchus (Din.). Since being a Classicist is less a linguistic activity than a conception of identity that is centred on language, the main focus of Classicism is not the past, but the present in which this identity is acquired and acted out. This raises the question which will be discussed in chapter 2.3, namely how Dionysius comes to terms with the fact that the Classical Greek past had had to cede to a Roman present.
2.2 FilÏsofoc
173 Hidber (1996) 44–51, following Gelzer (1979). 174 Too (1995) 7; she compares the function of the term lÏgoc politikÏc to that of a sphragis ibid. 24. 175 Cf. Too (1995) 109 and 200–234, esp. 206, 211, 221; Hidber (1996) 45. 176 Too (1995) 7; cf. ibid. 87–89 (speaking in public defined by Isocrates as political activity).
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Athenian identity through language,177 lÏgoi and b–oc formed a unity: it is impossible to speak like a genuine Athenian without being one, and being a genuine Athenian necessarily involves speaking like one. This Isocratean conception of ‘Rhetoric of Identity’ 178 played a major, but not the only, role in what Hartog has called the ‘Rhetoric of Otherness’: 179 Greek literature in the aftermath of the Persian Wars 180 was concerned with defining Greek and, more specifically, Athenian identity. The recent victory over the Persians invited to do this by contrasting the Greeks with a stereotyped image of the ‘Barbarian Other,’ a process known as the ‘Hellene-Barbarian antithesis.’ 181 This theme not only pervades such different literary genres 182 as epigram, elegy, 183 historiography, 184 tragedy, 185 and oratory, in which Isocrates’ panhellenic discourses and the Athenian
177 Too (1995) 139; ibid. 147, 229. 178 Thus the title of Too’s (1995) study; it is tempting to compare Isocrates’ conception of identity-through-language with the modern linguistic theory of ‘language socialization,’ on which see Ochs (1990) and (1996). 179 Hartog (1980) ch. 6. 180 That the Persian Wars were a watershed in Greek history and brought about decisive changes in the Greeks’ self-definition as opposed to their image of the Persians/Barbarians is now communis opinio among scholars, see, e.g., Hall (1989) 9; de Romilly (1993) 283; Hall (1996) 92; Lund (2005) 12, 16. The Battle of Marathon in particular has been the subject of a series of articles which explore how this event became a cornerstone of Athenian self-image in classical times, see, e.g., Flashar (1996); Schmitz (2006); Evans (1993), esp. 279–280, 303–307; Gehrke (2003) 20–21. On the reception of the Battle of Marathon in literature see Schmitz (2006); Gehrke (2003); Flashar (1996); Hölkeskamp (2001). Numerous attempts have been made to reconstruct the details of the battle itself, but results are highly speculative, see, e.g., Evans (1993); Doenges (1998); van der Veer (1982); Hodge (1975). 181 Secondary literature on the topic abounds. For a first overview see Losemann (1997); on Greek ideas about Barbarians in general see, e.g., Schwabl (1961); Diller (1961); Weiler (1968); id. (1989); de Romilly (1993); Lund (2005); Speyer (1989); Dörrie (1972); Hall (1996); Lévy (1984); Trédé (1991); Moggi (1992). 182 For a general overview see Kierdorf (1966); Nohaud (1997); cf. the essays collected in Malkin (2001). 183 See, e.g., Boedeker (1995) and (1996) on Simonides’ elegy on the soldiers fallen at Plataea; Wiater (2005) on Simonides’ elegy on the soldiers who died at Thermopylae (both with further literature). 184 This concerns, above all, Herodotus, on whom see, e.g., Hartog (1980); Cartledge (1995); Laurot (1981); Rossellini/Saïd (1978); Thomas (2001); Bichler (1988); Heubner (1985); Hegyi (1977); Konstan (1987); Evans (1993); cf. the references given in the preceding and the following notes. 185 See Hall (1989); Kierdorf (1966).
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‚pitàfioi lÏgoi occupied a particularly important place.186 The HelleneBarbarian antithesis was also present in a variety of non-literary media, such as statues, pottery, pictures (e. g., the famous depiction of the Battle of Marathon in the Stoa Poikile), and cultic performances and feasts. 187 The result was a world view in which the Greeks represented a set of moral and political virtues, the most important of which were ‚leujer–a, dikaios‘nh, eŒsËbeia, Çndre–a, and swfros‘nh. The Barbarians, on the contrary, were portrayed as slaves by nature who sought to enslave the rest of the oikumene. 188 Their souls were corrupted by luxury (truf†/ Çkolas–a) and cowardice; Çmaj–a also figures prominently on the long list of their vices. 189 The Greek victory over the Persians was thus explained as the result of Greek moral and cultural superiority. The Athenians in particular linked this moral superiority with their democratic constitution 190 and their alleged eŒgËneia/aŒtoqjon–a.191 These moral and political virtues, they claimed, had distinguished the Athenian constitution from the origin of their history. Preserved in their constitution and handed down by their ancestors (prÏgonoi), they were responsible for all Athenian victories in major battles, be it the fight against the Amazons, the fall of Thebes, or the Battles of Marathon and Salamis. 192 In so doing, the Athenians laid claim to being the primary exemplars of ‘Greekness’ in its purest and oldest form. This precis is not intended as a comprehensive characterization of classical Greek literature. Nevertheless, the themes mentioned here are salient 186 On Isocrates see Too (1995); Kennedy (1958); Perlman (1957) and (1969); Buchner (1958); Bringmann (1965). On ‚pitàfioi lÏgoi see Loraux (1981); Wilke (1996); Rosivach (1987); Walters (1981); Jacoby (1944); v. Loewenclau (1961); Welwei (1991); Carter (1991). 187 On the Greek cult of the dead, esp. of the soldiers fallen in the Persian Wars, see Welwei (1991); on feasts and their social function in antiquity cf. Jacoby (1944); Ulf (1997); Zimmermann (1991); Spawforth (1994). 188 Cf., e.g., Ai. Pers. 50, 72, and esp. 584–590, 591–594, and passim; Herod. 5.11.6, 6.45, 94, 101, 109. 189 Cf. Isoc. 4.150: ‘[Most of their population is a mob] educated more effectively for servitude than the slaves in our country’ (pr‰c tòn doule–an ämeinon t¿n par+ômÿn o ket¿n pepaideumËnoc, emphasis mine; Norlin’s transl. modified) and 12.209; see further Ai. Pers. 537, 541, 543–544, 608, 755; for references from Greek tragedy see Hall (1989) 121–133. 190 Hall (1989) 58–59, 190–200 considers the influence of the rise of democracy on the development of the Hellene-Persian antithesis. 191 On autochthony see, e.g., Wilke (1996), esp. 238–241; Rosivach (1987); Parker (1987); Loraux (1981) 210–215; cf. Hidber (1996) on 1.2 (p. 100) and 1.6 (p. 110). 192 See, e.g., Isoc. 12.42–54, esp. 42: ‘Now our ancestors will be seen to have preserved without ceasing the spirit of concord towards the Hellenes and of hatred towards the
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features of the works and the culture of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. As the subsequent discussion of On Isocrates will show, they shaped Dionysius’ image of the Classical Athenians. Focusing on the content of Isocrates’ works, the pragmatik‰c tÏpoc, Dionysius extrapolates from Isocrates’ speeches an idea of Classical ethos which is bound up with politiko» lÏgoi. This makes On Isocrates not only a ‘best of’ Isocratean rhetoric, but also a vademecum for anyone who wishes to know which ethos he has to adopt in order to be truly Classical. 193 At the beginning of his essay Dionysius gives a brief overview of Isocrates’ life. Throughout, Dionysius adopts the self-image Isocrates created in his writings (kajàper aŒt‰c e“rhken, Isoc. 1.3). The dominant feature of Dionysius’ sketch of Isocrates’ life is the idea of the orator being a primary exemplar of perfect harmony of speech and life, lÏgoc and proa–resic: Isocrates embodied Athenian identity and his works were its verbal expression. This close affinity with Classical Athenian identity finds its last and most drastic expression in Dionysius’ report of Isocrates’ death: he committed suicide a few days after the battle of Chaeronea ‘having decided to end his life with his city’s heroes’ (gn∏m˘ qrhsàmenoc âma toÿc Çgajoÿc t®c pÏlewc sugkatal‹sai t‰n ·auto‹ b–on, ibid. 1.6). Dionysius stresses that Isocrates received the best possible Athenian education (Çgwg®c d‡ tuq∞n eŒsq†monoc ka» paideuje»c oŒden‰c >Ajhna–wn qeÿron, Isoc. 1.1; cf. ibid. 1.2);194 however, physical shortcomings prevented barbarians which they inherited from the Trojan War and to have remained steadfast in this policy’ (O… m‡n to–nun ômËteroi prÏgonoi fan†sontai t†n te pr‰c toÃc ìEllhnac ÂmÏnoian ka» tòn pr‰c toÃc barbàrouc Íqjran, õn parËlabon ‚k t¿n Trwik¿n, diafulàttontec ka» mËnontec ‚n toÿc aŒtoÿc; 4.66–72; Jost (1936) 131–132). This idea is prominent also in the ‚pitàfioi lÏgoi, although the Athenian achievements against the Amazons and the Persians play a more important role in them than the Trojan War (Loraux [1981] 109–113), see Lys. 2.4–6 (Amazons), 20–47 (Persian War); Hyp. Epit. 35–38. Cf. Loraux (1981) 99–113, esp. 99: ‘by linking the dead of the day with all those of earlier wars, mythical and historical, this catalog deploys the whole of Athenian history […]. The breadth of such a point of view […] makes mythical Athenians the mere predecessors of those of the Pentecontaetia […],’ and her ch. ‘The Athenian History of Athens.’ 193 Cf. Gabba (1982) 49: Classicist mimesis ‘sought to absorb, by means of thoroughly analyzing stylistical and literary aspects, precisely that richness of idealistic and moral content. Isocrates is offered as a prime model for the typical values he extolled – patriotism, justice, pietas, and moderation.’ 194 The combination of an adjective (usually denoting a lesser degree, such as qe–rwn, ‚làttwn, and °ttwn) in the comparative with oŒdenÏc is a formulaic expression of
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him from embarking on an active political career (ibid. 1.2). Therefore Isocrates decided to be the theoretician of Athenian civic identity and to publish works on ‘Hellenic and royal affairs and constitutional matters, the study of which he believed would enable cities to manage better, and individuals to improve their characters’ ([tòn proa–resin ‚poi†sato per»] t¿n <Ellhnik¿n ka» basilik¿n pragmàtwn, ‚x ¡n Õpelàmbane tàc
te pÏleic ämeinon o k†sesjai ka» toÃc di∏tac ‚p–dosin Èxein pr‰c Çret†n, ibid. 1.3). It was Isocrates, Dionysius says, who turned rhetoric into a proper political genre and brought about a paradigm shift in the development of rhetoric. His predecessors, especially Gorgias and Protagoras, had been interested only in ‘dialectic and natural discourses’ (‚ristiko– te ka» fusiko» [lÏgoi], ibid.); only with Isocrates (pr¿toc ‚q∏rhsen, Isoc. 1.4) did rhetoric become a genre which specifically dealt with political issues and civic identity, its ultimate (and only) goal now being ‘to benefit the state by counsel, word and deed’ 195 (t‰ boule‘esjai ka» lËgein ka» pràttein tÄ sumfËronta, ibid.).196 Dionysius intimates that Isocrates’ influence embraced virtually every aspect of Classical Athenian life: he was ‘the outstanding figure among the famous men of his day, and the teacher of the most eminent men at Athens and in Greece at large’ (‚pifanËstatoc d‡ genÏmenoc t¿n katÄ t‰n aŒt‰n Çkmasàntwn qrÏnon ka» toÃc krat–stouc t¿n >Aj†nhsi te ka» ‚n t¨ äll˘ <Ellàdi nËwn paide‘sac, ibid. 1.5) and his ‘school came to represent Athens herself in the eyes of literate men abroad’ (ka» t®c >Aj†nhc pÏlewc e kÏna poi†sac tòn ·auto‹ sqolòn katÄ tÄc Çpoik–ac t¿n lÏgwn, ibid. 1.6). Isocrates’ works made Athenian identity accessible to anyone, whether they lived in Athens or not. They created Çpoik–ai of identity. This aspect must have been of primary importance to Dionysius and his readers, who were separated from the Classical past by time and space. 197
amplification indicating that a quality applies to a person or object to a particularly high degree. For examples see Schwyzer-Debrunner II (1950) 98 with n. 3; cf. Kühner-Gerth II.1, p. 316 n. 6, who paraphrase the meaning of this ‘combination which is frequently found in and peculiar to Attic authors’ (‘bei Attikern häufig vorkommend[e] eigentümlich[e] Verbindung’) as ‘the greatest of all, secondary to none’ (‘allergrößter, keinem nachstehend’). 195 Usher’s transl. modified. 196 Cf. Aujac’s I, 49–50 remarks. 197 See the discussion of this aspect below, pp. 90–91.
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By way of his biographical introduction Dionysius thus shaped his readers’ perception of Isocrates and his works: Classical identity was defined by Isocrates and can be learned from his speeches which are as powerful an instrument of civic education for Isocrates’ readers in the first century BCE as they had been to their original, Classical, audience in the fourth (ibid. 4.3–4): 198
>Ex ¡n [sc. t¿n >Isokràtouc lÏgwn] oŒ lËgein mÏnon Çpergàsait+ãn toÃc prosËqontac aŒtƒ t‰n no‹n, ÇllÄ ka» tÄ ¢jh spouda–ouc, o“k˙ te ka» pÏlei ka» Ìl˘ t¨ <Ellàdi qrhs–mouc. Kràtista gÄr dò paide‘mata pr‰c Çretòn ‚n toÿc >Isokràtouc Ístin eÕreÿn lÏgoic; ka» ÍgwgË fhmi qr®nai toÃc mËllontac oŒq» mËroc ti t®c politik®c dunàmewc Çll+Ìlhn aŒtòn kt†sesjai to‹ton Íqein t‰n ˚†tora diÄ qeirÏc; ka» e“ tic ‚pithde‘ei tòn Çlhjinòn filosof–an, mò t‰ jewrhtik‰n aŒt®c mÏnon Çgap¿n ÇllÄ ka» pragmatikÏn, m†d+Çf+¡n aŒt‰c älupon Èxei b–on proairo‘menoc, Çll+‚x ¡n polloÃc ≤fel†sei, parakeleusa–mhn ãn aŒtƒ tòn ‚ke–nou to‹ ˚†toroc mimeÿsjai proa–resin. The influence of these [Isocrates’ speeches] would make anyone who applied himself to his works not only good orators, but men of sterling character, of positive service to their families, to their state and to Greece at large. The best possible lessons in virtue are to be found in the discourses of Isocrates: I therefore affirm that the man who intends to acquire ability in the whole field of politics, not merely a part of that science, should make Isocrates his constant companion. And anyone who is interested in true philosophy, that is, who does not confine his studies to the speculative branches of philosophy but enjoys studying its practical branches as well, and is seeking a career by which he will benefit many
198 In a similar vein, Dionysius stresses that Isocrates’ advice to Philippus of Macedon is valuable to anyone in a ruling position, see Isoc. 6.1: ‘What man in high office and power would not delight [in Isocrates’ letter to Philip of Macedon]’ (t–c d+oŒk ãn Çgap†seie mËgejoc Íqwn Çnòr ka» dunàme∏c tinoc ôgo‘menoc […]); ibid. 6.3: ‘any potentate reading this letter’ (toÃc Çnagign∏skontac ta‹ta dunàstac). Since the Greek origins of Isocrates’ addressee were at least debatable, this points again to the universal applicability of Isocrates’ moral and political precepts. Furthermore, Dionysius emphasizes that Isocrates’ advice to Archidamus is directed not only to the Lacedaemonians but ‘to all Greeks and all men’ (ka» toÿc älloic ìEllhsi ka» pêsin Çnjr∏poic, Isoc. 9.10). Finally, the general appeal of the rhetorical questions (t–c oŒ […]; see below) by means of which Dionysius summarizes the main themes of Isocrates’ major speeches implies that Isocrates’ works exert their moral influence not only on his original addressees but on everyone, including Dionysius and his readers in the first century BCE.
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people, not one which will give him a carefree life, would be well advised to follow the principles which the orator adopts.199
This passage reveals how Dionysius imagines the effect of Isocrates’ texts. He adopts Isocrates’ conception of the unity of morals, rhetorical practice, and political activity: the thorough study of Isocrates’ works trains the students’ rhetorical abilities as much as their characters, and this training provides them with all those qualities (¢jh) which successful politicians need. 200 Moreover, the passage allows us to conclude how Dionysius envisages the role of the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi’ in Roman society: his readers’ study of Classical rhetoric is a process of moral and political education which imbues them with rhetorical skills as well as moral and political values; thus it enables them to fill leading positions in contemporary public life and to enact the Isocratean ideal of the statesman in Augustan Rome.201 Presenting Isocrates as a brilliant thinker, a rich and successful intellectual, an influential politician, and devoted Athenian, Dionysius also invites his recipients to identify with Isocrates as a person: the Athenian orator becomes the model for Dionysius’ and his recipients’ own conception of life (note tòn ‚ke–nou to‹ ˚†toroc mimeÿsjai proa–resin). Dionysius plays a decisive role in the acquisition of this Classical ethos. He extrapolates the various elements of Isocrates’ conception of identity in his discussions of the subject matter of four of the major speeches of Isocrates, the Panegyricus, To Philippus, Against Archidamus, and On the Peace. Therefore Dionysius’ discussions of these speeches focus on the moral and political lessons which they supposedly contain and present a very selective picture of their content. 202 Dionysius’ discussion of the Panegyricus, for example, is based almost exclusively on §§ 76–81 of Isocrates’ work and does not follow the order of Isocrates’ arguments. 203 There is 199 Usher’s transl. modified. 200 Cf. Fox (1993) 41. 201 The relationship between rhetoric and political power in Dionysius’ Classicism will be discussed in detail in ch.s 2.3 and 4.3.3 below; on the opposition between philosophy and rhetoric, which is implied in the above quotation, see below, ch. 5.2.2, esp. pp. 332–337 and cf. the discussion above, pp. 33–36. 202 Cf. Gabba (1982) 50. Dionysius’ ‘summaries’ are similar to paraphrases, an exercise by which pupils learned how to extrapolate the sense from a text in their own words. On paraphrasis see Clark (1957) 182–186; Viljama (1988); Morgan (1998) 203–219; Gallazzi (1986) and Bastianini (1980) discuss two examples of paraphrases of Homeric text passages. 203 See Aujac I, 121 nn. 2–4, who speaks of a ‘very free paraphrase’ of the Panegyricus (ibid. n. 2); Fox (1993) 41.
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no reference to Sparta, although the opposition between Athens and Sparta occupies a large part of the Panegyricus (§§ 100–128), and Dionysius also ignores the ‘symbuleutic section’ 204 (§§ 133–186). This does not mean that Dionysius gives an entirely distorted idea of the speeches’ contents. But themes which in their original context are only part of a larger argument appear in Dionysius’ paraphrases as the only themes that matter.205 This reduction of Classical works to a few relevant aspects is in accordance with the programme of On the Ancient Orators, 206 to cut down the works to those elements Dionysius thinks worthy of being preserved (t– d‡ deÿ par+·kàstou lambànein £ fulàttesjai, Orat. Vett. 4.2).207 At the beginning of each discussion Dionysius summarizes in a rhetorical question the main political or moral effect he thinks the speech was supposed to have upon the recipients. The section on the Panegyricus (Isoc. 5) 208 is introduced with the question ‘Who could fail to become a patriotic supporter of democracy and a student of civic virtue after reading his Panegyricus?’ (T–c gÄr oŒk ãn gËnoito filÏpol–c te ka» filÏdhmoc £ t–c
oŒk ãn ‚pithde‘seie tòn politikòn kalokÇgaj–an ÇnagnoÃc aŒto‹ t‰n PanhgurikÏn; Isoc. 5.1); the paraphrase of the Philippus (Isoc. 6) begins with ‘What man in high office and power would not delight in his letter to Philip of Macedon?’ (T–c d+oŒk Çgap†seie mËgejoc Íqwn Çnòr ka» dunàme∏c tinoc ôgo‘menoc É pr‰c F–lippon aŒtƒ t‰n MakedÏna gËgraptai; Isoc. 6.1); Dionysius repeats this statement in slightly different form at the end of the discussion (Isoc. 6.3), stressing the speeches’ positive moral and political effect: ‘any person in a leading political position reading this letter is absolutely bound to become imbued with a nobler spirit and a greater desire to achieve excellence.’ 209 Dionysius’ discussion of On the Peace (Isoc. 7), to cite one last example, is introduced with ‘What greater exhortation to justice and piety could there be, for individuals singly and collectively for whole
204 Buchner (1958) 8–10. 205 The same is true for Dionysius’ ‘summaries’ of the other speeches. The paragraphs Dionysius singles out for treatment from the individual speeches are listed by Aujac I, 123 n. 2 (Philippus), 124 n. 1 (On the Peace), 125 n. 2 (Areopagiticus), and 127 n. 2 (Archidamus). 206 Aujac I, 121 n. 5. 207 On Dionysius’ ‘eclectic mimesis’ see Hidber (1996) 56–75. 208 On the Panegyricus see Buchner (1958); on Isocrates’ political ideas in general see Bringmann (1965). 209 pollò gÄr Çnàgkh toÃc Çnagin∏skontac ta‹ta dunàstac fron†matÏc te me–zonoc Õpop–mplasjai ka» mêllon ‚pijumeÿn t®c Çret®c (Usher’s transl. modified).
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communities, than the discourse On the Peace?’ (t–c d‡ ãn mêllon ‚p» tòn dikaios‘nhn ka» tòn eŒsËbeian protrËyaito kaj+ÈkastÏn te ändra d–¯ ka» koin¨ tÄc pÏleic Ìlac […]; ibid. 7.1). 210 Read alongside each other, these introductory questions present a list of what Dionysius regards as the key elements of Classical identity and give On Isocrates the character of a ‘handbook of Classical identity’ which provides the readers with a standardized, easily accessible definition of what it means to be Classical.211 Thus Dionysius’ essay demonstrates that Classical rhetoric is not simply a certain rhetorical style among others, but is coupled with a well-defined set of political and moral values. ‘Practising politiko» lÏgoi’ implies respect for the moral and political tradition of the prÏgonoi (Isoc. 6.2, 7.2, 8.2, 9.3, cf. 9.6), commitment to the polis and its citizens (filÏpolic and filÏdhmoc, Isoc. 5.1), and the will to achieve political excellence (politikòn kalokÇgaj–an, ibid.), a notion which incorporates a whole complex of Athenian ancestral virtues (Isoc. 7.3): eŒsËbeia/jeofil–a (Isoc. 7.1), dikaios‘nh (ibid., 7.2, 9.4, cf. 7.1; 5.4), swfros‘nh (ibid. 5.2, 8.3–4), and ‚leujer–a (ibid. 5.1, 8.3).212 These virtues provide the basis for unity (ÂmÏnoia) among all Greeks (in past and present) against the threat from the Barbarian Other (ibid. 6.2). 213 The discussion of On Isocrates confirms the affirmation made in chapter 1.2.4 above that politiko» lÏgoi means much more than simply ‘polit210 Cf. Isoc. 8.1 (‘Who would not become a more responsible citizen after reading the Areopagiticus?,’ T–c d‡ t‰n >Areopagitik‰n ÇnagnoÃc lÏgon oŒk ãn gËnoito kosmi∏teroc, £ t–c oŒk ãn jaumàseie tòn ‚piboulòn to‹ ˚†toroc;); 9.1 (‘There are many examples of Isocrates’ unrivalled power to persuade men and states, but what better one could there be than the speech addressed to the Spartans, entitled Archidamus?,’
T–c d+ãn mêllon pe–seie ka» pÏlin ka» ändrac to‹ ˚†toroc pollaq¨ m‡n ka» äll˘, màlista d+‚n tƒ pr‰c toÃc Lakedaimon–ouc grafËnti lÏg˙, Ác ‚pigràfetai >Arq–damoc […];). 211 The attempt to standardize the image of the Classical Athenian past and his readers’ reception of the Classical works plays a key role in the constitution of a Classicist collective identity in Dionysius’ works (see ch. 4.2 below). 212 For an overview of the Çreta– of the ancestors in Isocrates see Jost (1936) 138–139. The virtues listed here above are commonly ascribed to the ancestors in classical rhetoric and are familiar especially from the Attic Funeral Oration, see, e.g., Dem. 60.4 (gegen®sjai kal¿c ka» pepaide‹sjai swfrÏnwc ka» bebiwkËnai filot–mwc), 7 (dikaios‘nh), 23 (‚leujer–a); Lys. 2.7–10, 17–19, 22, 24, 41; Plt. Mx. 237c7, d7. 213 On Isocrates’ conception of unity among the Greeks under (preferably) Athenian leadership cf. Perlman (1976) 25–29; Too (1995) 147; further Perlman (1957), (1967), and (1969); on ÂmÏnoia and its importance for Greek political thought see, e.g., de Romilly (1972); Sheppard (1984); West (1977); Funke (1980); Spawforth (1994).
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ical’ or ‘civil oratory.’ Such a rendering is not entirely wrong. As generic names these expressions do refer to Classical political oratory as opposed to, for example, Homeric poetry or Plato’s dialogues. 214 The translation ‘political’ or ‘civil oratory’ is correct, insofar as it grasps that in Dionysius’ view he and his readers, as the ‘practitioners of politiko» lÏgoi,’ continued specifically the tradition of Classical political oratory, and not that of Homeric verse or Platonic dialogue. But in a larger sense for Dionysius, as for Isocrates, politiko» lÏgoi are the carriers of a conception of Classical identity. Classical language is seen as encapsulating the essence of the Classical past. 215 By practising Classical language, the speaker revives the past itself and thus glosses over the gap which separates it from his own times: Classicism is a ‘politically and culturally charged act of repetition.’ 216 Speaking or writing as Isocrates or any Classical author would have spoken or written217 implies subscribing to certain Classical moral and political values. They are the standard of Classicist behaviour (proa–resic), and the texts (lÏgoi) are the most important means of expressing this Classical way of life.
214 At Dem. 23.4 Dionysius distinguishes between the genres of ‘ethical philosophy,’ represented by the Socratic tradition, and ‘political oratory,’ the most outstanding representative of which is Demosthenes. See my discussion below, ch. 5.2.2, esp. pp. 325–332. 215 Such a conception of language as the carrier of a conception of the past is by no means unique to Dionysius but has been studied by socio-linguists in various cultures and civilizations: ‘[t]he context and patterns of use tend to become understood as features of the language. […] Language users tend to view these attributes not as social or cultural effects but as essential characteristics of their language as against another language. A consequence of language characterization is the habit of identifying patterns of life, allegiances, and identities with the language itself’ (Bloomer [2005a] 2); ibid. 6. 216 Hunter (2005) 196, commenting on the use of Greek local glosses in Hellenistic inscriptions. Their function appears to have been similar to my interpretation of the role of practising Classical language in Dionysius’ Classicism: at the court of the Ptolemies, the Doric dialect was regarded as the language of Argos and Macedonia and was thus ‘marked’ ‘as the preserver of genuine Greek tradition, in particular of the rightful claim of the Ptolemies to be heirs of Heracles and Alexander.’ At the Ptolemaic Court, use of the Doric or of Doricizing language was tantamount to a ‘linguistic mimesis of Greek heroic culture’ (ibid.). 217 The difference between written and oral texts is of secondary importance for our purposes, and ‘text’ is meant to cover both: for the same reasons, ‘speaker’ or ‘author’ are used here for the agent of both an oral or a written utterance alike. As Hidber (1996) 47 points out, in Dionysius’ times the ideal of efi lËgein referred to written, rather than spoken, prose.
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Such an identification of language, character, and way of life, which Dionysius assumes, conforms to ancient conceptions of ethos. 218 The term ™joc describes what could be called a process of ‘self-fashioning’ through texts: the image a speaker creates for his audience cannot be sharply separated from his self-definition; rather, the one influences the other. Texts are the primary means of establishing ‘a distinctive personality, a characteristic address to the world, a consistent mode of perceiving and behaving’ 219: the way a speaker expresses himself is a representation of how he conceives of himself as an individual, both in public and in private. As Brinton points out, ‘[t]here is not generally in classical thought such a sharp distinction, as is now commonly made, between a person’s moral character and a person’s public behavior’: ‘Character for the classical Greeks and Romans is not generally regarded as separable from public image or public behavior. Individuals are what they are partly in relation to society.’ 220 The crucial importance of the text for this process of self-fashioning is brought out well by Aristotle’s notion of ethos because it is devoid of all moral implications and only a product of the speaker’s words. Aristotle counts ethos as the most important among the p–steic Ínteqnoi (Rh. 1356a1– 13). For him, the speaker’s ethos is a function of the speech which has nothing to do with the speaker’s character, but is created in every speech anew with the sole purpose of convincing the audience in that given moment.221 Such 218 On ethos in ancient rhetoric see Sattler’s (1947) overview; Lockwood (1929) 180–181 (I do not agree with his interpretation of the meaning of ™joc in On Dinarchus); on ™joc and its use in rhetorical theory cf. further Fantham (1973); Gill (1984); Carey (1994), esp. 34–43. Generally, three basic meanings of the term can be distinguished: first, the accomplished character of the ideal orator in holistic pedagogical projects like those of Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, on which cf. Winterbottom (1964); Brinton (1983); Morgan (1998), esp. 240–270; ead. (1998a); second, the purely technical use of ™joc in Aristotle. Here ethos is created through the speech alone (Rh. 1356a9–10, quoted in n. 221 below); finally, especially in Roman rhetoric, ethos describes an emotional effect of the speech on the recipients, a ‘mild emotion,’ designed to conciliate the hearer, which comes close to pathos (cf. Quint. inst. 2.4.8–13): cf. Sattler (1947); on the distinction between ethos and pathos see Gill (1984). 219 Greenblatt (1980) 2. 220 Brinton (1983) 174 (commenting on the connection between the moral qualities of an orator and his effectiveness as a speaker in Quintilian); cf. ibid. (on the virtues enumerated in the Nicomachean Ethics such as liberality, pride, and friendliness): ‘the inseparability of character and public behavior come through […] on what might be called “social virtues.” ’ 221 Arist. Rh. 1356a1–13, esp. 1–2, 5–8: ‘The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we
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a purely technical notion of ethos is not applicable to holistic pedagogical conceptions of language and identity, such as those of Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysius. They used ethos in the sense of the speaker’s qualities of character. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s position illustrates that the primary means of displaying these qualities, be it to oneself or to others, are texts and language: 222 ‘the style is the man.’ 223 Only when considered against the ancient conception of ethos, can the close connection between a speaker’s language and his way of life, between feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute’ (DiÄ m‡n ofin to‹ ¢jouc, Ìtan o’tw leqj¨ Â lÏgoc
πste ÇxiÏpiston poi®sai t‰n lËgonta; toÿc gÄr ‚pieikËsi piste‘omen mêllon ka» jêtton, per» pàntwn m‡n Åpl¿c, ‚n oŸc d‡ t‰ Çkrib‡c mò Ístin ÇllÄ t‰ Çmfidoxeÿn, ka» pantel¿c); on the ethos as a function of the speech only see ibid. 1356a8–10: ‘But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker’s character […]’ (deÿ d‡ ka» to‹to sumba–nein diÄ to‹ lÏgou, ÇllÄ mò diÄ to‹ prodedoxàsjai poiÏn tina e⁄nai t‰n lËgonta […], emphasis mine); see also Rh. 1378a6–19, where Aristotle lists frÏnhsic, Çret†, and e÷noia as those qualities which will induce the audience to believe the speaker; cf. Quint. inst. 4.2.125 on the importance of auctoritas for the success of a speech. On auctoritas in rhetoric in general see Calboli Montefusco (1992), esp. 1178–1182 (1181 on the relation of ™joc and auctoritas); Wheeldon (1989) 40–41. 222 Cf. Gelzer (1979) 19–23. The idea that moral, cultural, and political values are related to language and rhetorical training is common also elsewhere in ancient rhetorical theory, e.g., in Quintilian’s definition of the ideal orator as vir bonus dicendi peritus, on which cf. n. 218 above. The idea that education is the precondition of rulership seems to go back to Stoic ideas on education and power, esp. the ‘philosopher king,’ cf. Devine (1970). 223 With Dionysius’ definition of the purpose of his work at Orat. Vett. 4.2 (‘Who are the most important of the ancient orators and historians? What manner of life and style of writing did they adopt? Which characteristics of each of them should we imitate and which should we avoid? t–nec e s»n Çxiolog∏tatoi t¿n Çrqa–wn ˚htÏrwn te ka»
suggrafËwn ka» t–nec aŒt¿n ‚gËnonto proairËseic to‹ te b–ou ka» to‹ lÏgou ka» t– par+·kàstou deÿ lambànein £ fulàttesjai, emphasis mine), cf. Ant. 1.1.3: ‘it is a just and a general opinion that a man’s words are the images of his minds’ (‚pieik¿c […] âpantec nom–zousin e kÏnac e⁄nai t®c ·kàstou yuq®c toÃc lÏgouc), referred to by Hidber (1996) 48–49 n. 278, and the similar statement in Cic. de or. 2.43.184: ‘[S]o much is done by good taste and style in speaking, that the speech seems to depict the speaker’s character. For by means of particular types of thought and diction, and the employment besides of a delivery that is unruffled and eloquent of good-nature, the speakers are made to appear upright, well-bred and virtuous men’ (tantum autem efficitur sensu quodam et ratione dicendi, ut quasi mores oratoris effingat oratio; genere quodam sententiarum et genere verborum, adhibita etiam actione leni facilitatemque significante efficitur, ut bene morati, ut boni viri esse videamur); see Hidber (1996) comm. on 1.5 (p. 108–109); Dominick (1997a); Michel (1972).
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his lÏgoi and his proa–resic, in Dionysius’ Classicism be fully understood. Learning Classical language has strong ethical implications for Dionysius because Classical style is the expression of the speaker’s adherence to certain moral and political values. The speaker uses language to demonstrate his proa–resic to others and to reassure himself of it. This feeling of being Classical through reading and writing Classical texts is the core of the Classicist’s self-definition, as Porter calls it, the ‘habitus of classicism.’ 224
2.2.2 Classicist Self-Fashioning: Re-enacting the Past through
M–mhsic The term which designates the process of Classicist self-fashioning is mimesis. 225 What Dionysius meant by this term is accessible to us mainly through two of his works. The fragments preserved of the essay On Imitation (Imit.) give us an idea of how Dionysius imagined the process of mimesis in general, and in his essay On Dinarchus (Din.) he gives a critical discussion of one concrete example of an orator who tried to be Classical, but failed. Dionysius’ treatment of mimesis in these essays will further our understanding of two aspects of Dionysius’ conception of Classical language as the carrier of Classical identity. The first aspect concerns language as a means of self-fashioning: how exactly did Dionysius imagine language to represent the speaker’s way of life? The second aspect is related to the first one and regards the temporal dimension of language. Since Classical identity is acquired and enacted through language, ‘practising politiko» lÏgoi’ implies a stance towards past and present: by acting out a Classical way of life in 224 Porter (2006b) 308–309. Porter defines the expression ‘habitus of classicism’ as ‘the sensation one has when reading a classical author’ (ibid. 309), but writing Classical texts is the necessary complement to reading them and should be included in the definition. Cf. ibid. 307: classicism ‘describes not a series of properties in the world but a set of attitudes about the world’ with ibid. 309: ‘in the realm of literary criticism, the question of what one feels is bound up with the question of how one experiences a classical text.’ 225 I agree with Halliwell (2002) 13–14 that ‘imitation’ is an insufficient rendering of the Greek mimesis; Halliwell therefore opts for leaving the term untranslated. Scholarly literature on mimesis in antiquity and its various forms abound; I found most helpful Halliwell (2002); for a useful survey see Clark (1951) (condensed version of id. [1957] 144–176); Bompaire (1958); Koller (1954) is still of interest, but see the critical remarks in Else (1958); Russell (1981) 99–113; Too (1998); Kardaun (1993); on imitation and literary criticism see McKeon (1936); on Dionysius’ use of the term mimesis in particular see Hidber (1996) 56–75; Classen (1993) 326–329.
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Augustan Rome through language, the Classicists claim to be continuing the Classical tradition. This raises the question of how Dionysius imagines the relationship between continuity of language and continuity of time. On Imitation is generally assumed to be an early work of Dionysius’. 226 Only parts of On Imitation have been preserved, a few fragments of the first and a late, very corrupt epitome of the second book. In addition, we have a brief summary of the content of the work given by Dionysius himself in the Letter to Pompeius (Pomp. 3.1). According to this precis the first book dealt with the ‘enquiry into mimesis’ (ô per» t®c mim†sewc z†thsic); the second book provided a list of authors, poets, philosophers, historiographers, and orators whom Dionysius regarded as suitable for mimesis; finally, the (then unfinished) third book explained how to practice mimesis (p¿c deÿ mimeÿsjai). At Pomp. 3.2–6.11, following this summary, Dionysius then repeats his assessment of the value of different historiographers for mimesis from the second book of On Imitation. 227 For our purposes, the opening chapters of the second book of On Imitation offer several interesting insights, insofar as they are accessible in the epitome. 228 There Dionysius illustrates the effects of mimesis by means of two famous anecdotes. The first one describes how an ugly farmer invents a trick to beget beautiful children, the second one relates how Zeuxis painted a picture of the naked Helen (Imit. 1.1–5). Because of its importance, I have quoted this passage in full:
ìOti deÿ toÿc t¿n Çrqa–wn ‚ntugqànein suggràmmasin, —n+‚nte‹jen mò mÏnon t®c ÕpojËsewc tòn ’lhn ÇllÄ ka» t‰n t¿n diwmàtwn z®lon qorhghj¿men. Andr–, fas–, gewrgƒ tòn Óyin a sqrƒ parËsth dËoc mò tËknwn Âmo–wn gËnhtai pat†r.
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O’tw ka» lÏgwn ÂmoiÏthc t–ktetai, ‚pÄn zhl∏s˘ tic t‰ par+·kàst˙ t¿n palai¿n bËltion e⁄nai doko‹n, ka» kajàper ‚k poll¿n namàtwn Èn ti sugkom–sac ˚e‹ma to‹t+e c tòn yuqòn metoqete‘˘. Ka– moi par–statai pist∏sasjai t‰n lÏgon to‹ton Írg˙; Ze‹xic ™n zwgràfoc, ka» parÄ Krotwniat¿n ‚jaumàzeto; ka» aŒtƒ tòn <ElËnhn gràfonti gumnòn gumnÄc deÿn tÄc par+aŒtoÿc Ípemyan parjËnouc; oŒk ‚peid†per ™san âpasai kala–, Çll+oŒk e k‰c ™n ±c pantàpasin ™san a sqra–; Á d+™n äxion par+·kàst˘ graf®c, ‚c m–an öjro–sjh s∏matoc e kÏna, kÇk poll¿n mer¿n sullog®c Èn ti sunËjhken ô tËqnh tËleion e⁄doc. Toigaro‹n pàresti ka» so» kajàper ‚n jeàtr˙ kal¿n swmàtwn dËac ‚xistoreÿn ka» t®c ‚ke–nwn yuq®c Çpanj–zesjai t‰ kreÿtton, ka» t‰n t®c polumaje–ac Íranon sullËgonti oŒk ‚x–thlon qrÏn˙ genhsomËnhn e kÏna tupo‹n Çll+Çjànaton tËqnhc kàlloc. We have to dwell on the writings of the ancient authors not only to find material for the content, but also to appropriate their features of style. Under the influence of constant observation the reader’s soul attracts a similarity to the style of the Classical author, as is illustrated by the anecdote about the wife of the peasant. A peasant, it runs, was of ugly appearance and feared to beget children who looked like him. So his fear taught him the following trick to have beautiful children: he formed handsome likenesses and accustomed his wife to look at them; and when he had slept with her afterwards, the beauty of the likenesses exerted their positive influence [on their children]. In the same way, similarity in language is procreated, if one adopts what seem to be the best features of each of the ancient writers and, as if one were channelling many streams into one river, conveys these features in one channel into one’s soul. I will substantiate this idea with an example from practice: the painter Zeuxis was famous among the Crotonians. When he wanted to paint a portrait of the naked Helen, the Crotonians sent him all their maidens naked so that he could look at them. They did this not because the maidens were all beautiful, but because it was likely that they were not ugly in every respect. Zeuxis assembled those parts of them which were worthy of being painted to a picture of one body, thus combining many parts into one image of perfect beauty. Thus you too can watch out, as in a theatre, for appearances of beautiful bodies, pick the best parts of their souls, gather together a banquet of varied learning, and thus form a likeness which will not vanish through time but be a piece of art of immortal beauty. 229
Two aspects of these anecdotes deserve particular attention and will be discussed in greater detail on the following pages. First, metaphors of the 229 Transl. mine.
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body and terms of visual perception are employed to describe both the reception and the effect of speech. Thus the tales associate language with physical perceptibility and illustrate the power of language as a means of selffashioning; second, since this self-fashioning-through-language bridges the gap which separates the model from its ‘reproduction,’ mimesis is invested with a temporal dimension. 230 The comparison between a beautiful body and beautiful speech, a feature common to both anecdotes, suggests that Dionysius conceived of the aesthetics of rhetoric in terms of the aesthetics of the body and vice versa (s¿ma, imit. 2.1; ·n‰c t‘poc logiko‹ s∏matoc, ibid. 5.7), and Dionysius employs the same imagery to illustrate the process of mimesis itself (kal¿n swmàtwn dËac ‚xistoreÿn, ibid. 1.5). 231 This is in keeping with the fact that words for the body and its parts are an important part of the conceptual vocabulary for the analysis of texts in ancient rhetoric and literary criticism. 232 Accustomed by her husband to look at beautiful likenesses regularly before going to bed, the peasant’s wife ‘internalizes’ 233 their beauty. In the appearance of her children this internalized beauty is converted into a real,
230 ‘Reproduction’ is as insufficient a rendering of mimesis as ‘imitation’ and is used here for the sake of convenience; see Hunter (2009) 112: the aim of mimesis is not ‘to reproduce the words of the ancients but rather to write new speeches as the ancients would have written them.’ This aspect of Classicist mimesis, which goes hand-in-hand with the idea that Classicists are able to surpass their models (imitatio vs aemulatio), has been widely discussed, cf., e.g., Heldmann (1980) and Wlosok (1993). 231 Hunter (2009) 118 comments that this comparison ‘holds out the possibility of a combination of art and nature […]; the repetition of s¿ma, even within such a complex and charged phrase, and the idea of nature improved by art both seem to pick up the Zeuxis anecdote, which may thus have been given a particular, programmatic importance.’ 232 See Most (1992) 406–408; Svenbro (1984) 221 points out that ‘the founding text of an entire rhetorical tradition which conceives of the speech in terms of the body’ (‘le texte fondateur de toute une tradition rhétorique pour laquelle le discours est un corps’) is Plato’s Phaedrus, esp. 264c–e; for a discussion of the metaphorical description of the unity of a literary text as a living organism with particular reference to Pindaric poetry see Most (1985), esp. 6–9. 233 Cf. ibid. 4; Battisti (1997) 101 speaks of ‘unconscious assimilation’ (‘inconscia assimilazione’); she also speaks of ‘the conviction that the continuous engagement with the literary model by itself can influence and shape the creative act’ (‘la convinzione che il costante rapporto con i modelli letterari possa già di per sé influenzare e plasmare l’atto creativo,’ ibid.).
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physical beauty. 234 The children are thus a direct expression of the beauty in their mother’s soul; this recalls the idea mentioned above, that words are the expression (e k∏n) of the speaker’s soul.235 Rather than a dichotomy, then, body and soul represent two different manifestations of the beautiful, an inner and an outer, which complement each other.236 The way beauty is transferred from the images into the woman’s soul and becomes visible again in her children illustrates how it is preserved by a process of reception and reproduction. In the same manner Zeuxis, in the second anecdote, converts the beauty of the invidual parts of the Crotonian maidens into a new, beautiful whole, the portrait of Helen. Perception plays a crucial role in this process because it connects its different stages. This explains the pervading notions of ‘seeing’ and ‘being seen’ in both anecdotes. They describe the passage (cf. the verbs of motion ‚fËlketai, 1.2, and metoqete‘˘, 1.3) of beauty from one manifestation into another. By looking at the beautiful e kÏnec, the peasant’s wife absorbs their beauty, and this beauty is manifest again in her children. This corresponds to Zeuxis’ looking at ( deÿn, 1.4) all of the Crotonian maidens in order to create an image of Helen, the mythic paradigm of beauty. These notions of perception are the key to Dionysius’ conception of the process which these anecdotes are meant to illustrate: how the Classical ideal is implemented in the present through language with an almost physical immediacy. Dionysius describes the act of reading the Classical authors as a parat†rhsic (1.2), a ‘close observation,’ and he likens it to a spectator watching a theatre performance (kajàper ‚n jeàtr˙ kal¿n swmàtwn dËac ‚xistoreÿn, 1.5). 237 Through this act of looking/reading, the qualities of the texts are channelled into the reader’s soul (yuq† […] ‚fËlketai, 234 Reeve (1989) has traced the idea that the appearance of the offspring is influenced by what a woman is looking at during the conception from the doxographer Aetius down to its reception in the twentieth century; he calls it the ‘Andromeda effect.’ For further examples of this theme in ancient literature see Battisti (1997) 100. 235 Cf. the passage from the Antiquitates 1.1.3, quoted above, n. 223 (‚pieik¿c gÄr âpantec nom–zousin e kÏnac e⁄nai t®c ·kàstou yuq®c toÃc lÏgouc); Hunter (2009) 111 notes that ‘the language of pregnancy and birth are […] ubiquitous […] in ancient discussions of literary production’; cf. ibid. 112–113. 236 Hunter ibid. 119 speaks of a ‘body-soul distinction’ which he traces back to Platonic philosophy, especially the Symposium. 237 Hunter ibid. 121 detects an echo of Herodotus’ proem in ‚xistoreÿn which ‘seems to reflect the effort of Dionysius or the epitomator not merely to “acknowledge” the coming debt to Herodotus but also to reflect the shift between the Zeuxis-anecdote and its moral from a purely visual and aesthetic activity to an intellectual …stor–h.’
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1.2; kajàper ‚k poll¿n namàtwn Èn ti sugkom–sac ˚e‹ma to‹t+e c tòn yuqòn metoqete‘˘, 1.3). 238 The result is an Çjànaton tËqnhc kàlloc, which is itself compared to modelling a visible object, a likeness (e kÏna tupo‹n, ibid.). The comparison of reading to visual perception and of texts to (representations of) bodies reveals how Dionysius imagined the effect of language. The impact of language upon the recipient is as immediate and as plastic as that of the appearance of a person (or its likeness). On the speaker’s side, this corresponds to the idea that language and style are as powerful an instrument of a person’s self-representation and self-definition, and as important a sign for a person’s belonging to certain communities, as their outward appearance, i. e., their bodies and their clothes.239 The notions of tËqnh and active, artistic creation in this process play a crucial role in both anecdotes240 as well as in Dionysius’ description of the process of mimesis which the anecdotes are supposed to illustrate.241 It is through this active, technical process that the transfer from the qualities of the external object (body/ text) into the reader’s soul is achieved. On this transfer, in turn, depends the subsequent one of the thus acquired inner qualities of the reader back into 238 Hunter ibid. 120 compares Lucian’s Imagines 23.11, where ‘ “perfect beauty” (‚ntel‡c kàlloc) is a combination of yuq®c Çret† and eŒmorf–a s∏matoc.’ 239 Dionysius’ remarks on Demosthenes’ style at Dem. 32.1–2 are another striking illustration of the ‘physical’ or ‘bodily’ quality which he ascribes to language: ‘Every reader […] would admit that the passage which I have just quoted [De Corona 199–208] is as different from the preceding one [Plt. Mx. 246c4–248e2] as are the weapons of war from those used in ceremonial processions, real things [literally, ‘appearances’] from images, and bodies developed by hard work in the sunlight from those that pursue a life of ease in the shade’ (oŒje–c ‚stin Ác oŒq Âmolog†seie […] toso‘t˙ diafËrein
tòn Çrt–wc tejeÿsan lËxin t®c protËrac Ìs˙ diallàttei polemist†ria m‡n Ìpla pompeuthr–wn, Çlhjina» d‡ Óyeic e d∏lwn, ‚n ôl–˙ d‡ ka» pÏnoic tejrammËna s∏mata t¿n skiÄc ka» ˚¯st∏nac diwkÏntwn, emphases mine). 240 The fear of begetting ugly children ‘teaches’ the peasant a ‘technique’ (‚d–daxe tËqnhn, 1.2) which allows him to overcome the problem; this ‘technique’ consists of ‘forming handsome likenesses’ (e kÏnac plàsac eŒprepeÿc, ibid.). And it is Zeuxis’ ‘technical skills’ (tËqnh) which enable him to create an image of perfect beauty (1.4). 241 The Classicist reader actively has to identify and combine the most beautiful parts of the models (zhl∏s˘, sugkom–sac, 1.3), thus conveying it himself (metoqete‘˘, ibid.) into his own soul. Similarly, it is he himself (note so–, 1.5) who has to ‘watch out for appearances of beautiful bodies […], pick the best parts of their souls,’ and ‘gather together a banquet of varied learning’ (kal¿n swmàtwn dËac ‚xistoreÿn ka» t®c ‚ke–nwn yuq®c Çpanj–zesjai t‰ kreÿtton, ka» t‰n t®c polumaje–ac Íranon sullËgonti, 1.5) in order to ‘form’ (tupo‹n) a ‘piece of art of immortal beauty’ (Çjànaton tËqnhc kàlloc, ibid.).
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external objects, as the reader turns into a speaker creating his own texts of Classical beauty. On the one hand, Dionysius thus emphasises that the process of both Classicist reading and writing/speaking presupposes a certain technical knowledge and competence. This idea, that reading Classical texts requires a process of learning in the same way as composing Classical texts does, is a crucial element of Dionysius’ strategies of authority and will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 below. On the other hand, the emphasis on the speaker’s self-representation through language as an active process brings us back to the idea of mimesis as a process of self-fashioning: representing oneself as a ‘practitioner of politiko» lÏgoi’ presupposes a conscious and almost artistic process of shaping one’s own soul according to the standards of Classical beauty by studying Classical texts. The Classicist’s identity, his soul, itself is a product of art, tËqnh, which is then re-presented, and re-enacted with an almost physical immediacy, in the Classicist’s own texts. Our discussion of On Imitation thus complements the results of the preceding discussion of Dionysius’ conception of Classical language as the carrier of a set of moral and political values in two respects. First, the close connection between language, morals, and politics established by Dionysius suggests that we should not conceive of ‘Classical beauty,’ as dealt with in On Imitation, as a purely abstract category. Rather, in Dionysius’ notion of ‘Classical beauty’ moral and political values are endowed with an aesthetic value just as the aesthetics of Classical style and language are politically and morally charged. Second, we can now understand more fully how Dionysius envisaged the interaction of Isocrates’ speeches and the reader: Dionysius did not simply expect his reader to learn the values encoded in Isocrates’ works by heart. Rather, he imagined Isocrates’ speeches, their content as well as their style, to exert a shaping influence on the reader’s soul and thus to render the reader’s soul ‘Classical,’ provided that the reading process was performed properly. Another significant aspect of Dionysius’ notion of mimesis is the interrelation of (self-fashioning through) language and time. The physical presence of the speaker’s soul through his language amounts to a physical presence of the past. The transfer of the qualities of the original into a new medium – be it children, a new image, or a text – is also a passage through time from past into present and from present into future. 242 In the first anecdote, beauty 242 On the classical as the basis of conceptions of the future cf. Gethmann-Siefert (1987).
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is passed on from the present (likeness into the wife’s soul) to the future generation (wife to children). In the second anecdote, the ideal beauty of the mythical past consists entirely of elements from the present: the artist’s product integrates past and present, and ideal and reality, into a unity. In the same way, the Classicist’s texts make the ideal of the Classical past an integral part of the present. Creating an Çjànaton tËqnhc kàlloc, the Classicist preserves the ideal of the past not only in the present, but also for the future (oŒk ‚x–thlon qrÏn˙). Read alongside each other, the anecdotes illustrate two interrelated key points of Dionysius’ Classicism: first, a person’s way of speaking is a powerful expression of his soul; second, since the speaker’s soul is imbued with the Classical past, the speaker himself and his language give the past an immediate, almost physical, representation by, quite literarily, ‘visualizing’ it.243 Dionysius’ essay On Dinarchus will now help us explore more fully this temporal aspect of Classicist mimesis. Whereas the preserved parts of On Imitation deal with mimesis in a rather abstract manner, On Dinarchus presents the readers with a concrete example of how mimesis should, or rather should not, be done. Dinarchus provides such an interesting case-study for Dionysius because he lived in the divide between the Classical and post-Classical periods. Therefore, in no other case would the necessity to overcome this break seem more obvious, or easier, because Dinarchus profitted from immediate contact with the Classical authors. Potentially, this makes Dinarchus an ideal example to illustrate how to continue the Classical tradition through language after its end. But despite spatial and temporal proximity to the Classical masters, Dinarchus fails: his style is not Classical, but a mish-mash of bits and pieces taken from Classical authors. His method is the same as Zeuxis’ in the second anecdote: he combined individual parts of his models. But unlike Zeuxis, he did not succeed in making a new, coherent whole out of them, i.e., in recreating the perfect beauty of the past. The result is not a Helen, but an assemblage of different parts of the bodies of Crotonian maidens. By demonstrating that immediate contact with the Classical past is not necessary, nor even sufficient, for being Classical, the example of Dinarchus helps Dionysius to solve a central problem of himself and his readers: their temporal and spatial distance from the Classical past is no hindrance for being Classical. What
243 Cf. Hunter (2009) 110: the Classicists’ ‘study of the past is, at least in part, a means to influence the present, not a hopeless admiration across an unbridgeable divide.’
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counts is the right technique of dealing with the Classical texts, the right technique of mimesis. In the biographical introduction at the beginning of his essay, Dionysius says that Dinarchus lived in the boundary between Classical and nonClassical times. As in Orat. Vett., the divide between both epochs is marked by the death of Alexander the Great (Din. 2.2–4):
De–narqoc […] Çf[–keto] d‡ e c >Aj†nac kaj+Án qrÏnon ¢njoun a— te t¿n filosÏfwn ka» ˚htÏrwn diatriba– […]. EŒfuòc d‡ per» toÃc politikoÃc lÏgouc genÏmenoc ÇkmazÏntwn Íti t¿n per» DhmosjËnhn ¢rxato lÏgouc gràfein ka» pro§ei katÄ mikr‰n e c dÏxan. Màlista d‡ ¢kmase metÄ tòn >Alexàndrou teleut†n, DhmosjËnouc m‡n ka» t¿n ällwn ˚htÏrwn fugaÿc Çid–oic ka» janàtoic peripesÏntwn, oŒden‰c d+ÕpoleipomËnou met+aŒtoÃc Çndr‰c Çx–ou lÏgou. He came to Athens at the time when the philosophical and rhetorical schools were in their heyday […]. Having revealed a natural talent for political oratory, he began to write speeches when Demosthenes and his party were still at the height of their power, and gradually acquired a reputation. His finest period was after the death of Alexander, when Demosthenes and the other orators had been sentenced to permanent exile or death, and no other orator worthy of note was left to succeed them.
Dionysius adopts Isocrates’ idea that the way of speaking correlates to the political system in which the speaker lives. Under the Athenian democracy philosophical and rhetorical culture flourished (¢njoun a— te t¿n filosÏfwn ka» ˚htÏrwn diatriba–). After Alexander’s death, oligarchy and civic unrest took its place (Din. 2.5, 9.2, 11.11). The changes of the political system are reflected by changes in the art of speaking: good oratory together with noteworthy orators such as Demosthenes virtually died with Alexander (oŒden‰c d+ÕpoleipomËnou met+aŒtoÃc Çndr‰c Çx–ou lÏgou). At first, the development of Dinarchus’ rhetorical competence seems to conform to this pattern: while Alexander was still alive, Dinarchus was (albeit gradually, katÄ mikrÏn) becoming famous for his talent in the art of speech. Above all, the genitive absolute, ÇkmazÏntwn Íti t¿n per» DhmosjËnhn, suggests that Dinarchus’ progress in rhetoric was directly related to the fact that Demosthenes and his peers were still alive and active as orators. 244
244 Cf. the discussion of suntrof–a (Din. 7.5) below, pp. 89–90.
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All the more striking, and probably deliberately so, is Dionysius’ subsequent statement that Dinarchus ‘flourished’ (¢kmase) in the years after Alexander’s death, when ‘no other orator worthy of note was left to succeed them [Demosthenes and the other great orators].’ Whatever Dinarchus’ fame as an orator was based on in these years, it was not Classical oratory. Classical orators had been the representatives of Athenian democracy, whereas Dinarchus supported the anti-democratic tendencies of the post-Alexander period (Din. 2.5):
>Ep» d‡ >Anaxikràtouc ärqontoc […] a t–an Íqwn âma toÿc ‚pifanestàtoic >Ajhna–wn, ka–toi xËnoc aŒt‰c ∫n, katal‹sai t‰n d®mon Âr¿n örejismËnouc toÃc >Ajhna–ouc ka» màlista tƒ plouteÿn ·aut‰n ÕforwmËnouc, 245 mò diÄ to‹to pàj˘ ti deinÏn, e seljeÿn m‡n e c dikast†rion oŒq ÕpËmeinen, ‚xelj∞n d‡ t®c pÏlewc ka» ‚lj∞n e c Qalk–da ‚n EŒbo–¯ [‚keÿ diËtriyen]. But during the archonship of Anaxicrates […] he was accused, along with some of the most illustrious Athenians, of subverting the democracy. Seeing that the Athenians were incensed, and that in particular they were suspicious of his growing wealth, in order to avoid suffering some dire penalty for this he did not await trial, but left the city and came to Chalcis in Euboia […].
Dinarchus’ attempt to ‘subvert democracy’ (katal‹sai t‰n d®mon) reveals his oligarchic mentality (cf. âma toÿc ‚pifanestàtoic >Ajhna–wn), which is explicitly labelled as such by Dionysius at Din. 9.2 and 11.11.246 Dinarchus’ behaviour must be read against the ideal of a Classical way of life which Dionysius extrapolates from Isocrates’ writings. Dinarchus’ acts are in neat contradiction to the main tenets of Isocrates’ conception of Athenian civic identity. Dinarchus could hardly count as a man ‘of sterling character, of 245 The ms has Õfor∏menoc, which Aujac adopts, but ka» màlista requires a precision of örejismËnouc, and this can only be ÕforwmËnouc, which was proposed by Radermacher: the Athenian people were already angry with Dinarchus, but in particular they disliked his wealth. This construction of the sentence requires a comma after ÕforwmËnouc. 246 Din. 9.2: ‘during the latter’s [Anaxicrates’] year [307/6 BCE] the oligarchy which had been set up by Cassander was removed and those who were impeached went into exile, inlcuding Dinarchus’ (‚p» to‘tou [>Anaxikràtouc] ô katastajeÿsa Õp‰ Kassàndrou Êligarq–a katel‘jh, ka» o… e saggeljËntec Ífugon, ‚n oŸc ka» De–narqoc ™n); 11.11: ‘it is surely not likely that Dinarchus, a friend of those who had established the oligarchy, should collaborate with those who were trying to overthrow it […]’ (o÷koun e k‰c f–lon Ónta t‰n De–narqon t¿n Êligarq–an katasthsàntwn toÿc katal‘ein ‚piqeiro‹sin sunagwn–zesjai […], emphases mine).
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positive service to [his] famil[y], to [his] state and to Greece at large’ (Isoc. 4.3), who would have emerged from Isocrates’ teaching. 247 Dinarchus’ flight from Athens and the detachment from his polis, which this implies, is incompatible with another essential element of Classical identity, being a filÏpolic and filÏdhmoc; 248 it also stands in stark contrast to Isocrates’ decision ‘to end his life with his city’s heroes’ (ibid. 1.6).249 From this point of view, Dinarchus appears like the caricature of a Classical orator. He even refused to defend himself in court, one of the main spheres of rhetorical activity in Classical Athenian democracy. It is also remarkable that after his return to Athens (granted by the ‘king’ [basile‘c], not by the d®moc, Din. 3.1), Dinarchus’ first lawsuit aimed at recovering the money which he had stolen from his closest friend Proxenus (ibid.). This shows him again using his rhetoric for his personal aims, but not to benefit the community of citizens, as the Isocratean ideal demanded. The distinctive characteristic of Dinarchus’ life (b–oc), which emerges from this description, is heterogeneity: Dinarchus lived in both Classical and non-Classical times, began as a Classical and ended as a non-Classical orator, he first supported democracy and then oligarchy. Dinarchus was a hybrid. This heterogeneity is directly reflected in his style (lÏgoi), which is as ‘difficult to define’ (dusÏristoc, Din. 5.1) as his way of life (ibid. 5.2):
247 Quoted above, pp. 70–71. 248 For these terms see Isoc. 5.1 with my remarks above, p. 73. 249 Dinarchus’ behaviour might also evoke the career of another master of Classical rhetoric as a contrastive foil, that of Lysias, as Dionysius describes it at the beginning of On Lysias. Both Lysias and Dinarchus have in common that they are xËnoi and received their education in Athens (Lys. 1.1). Lysias took part in the Athenian Çpoik–a to Sicily where he played a leading role in political life (ibid. 1.2), but after the Sicilian disaster in the Peloponnesian War, he was accused of collaborating with the Athenians (ÇttikismÏc) by the Sicilian people, was expelled, and then returned to Athens. There he became an outstanding representative of all kinds of political discourse. Against the background of Dinarchus’ actions, this last point is significant: although Lysias’ family was Sicilian by origin, he could not make a career in the homeland of his family, but flourished in the city where he had been educated, Athens. Dinarchus, in stark contrast, subverted the values of Classical Athenian democracy in which he had been brought up. Furthermore, Lysias’ success especially in those genres which are associated with the core institutions of Athenian democracy (‘he wrote many speeches for the lawcourts, and for debates in the Council and the Assembly, each well-adapted to its medium,’ ple–stouc d‡ gràyac lÏgouc e c diakst†rià te ka» boulÄc ka» pr‰c ‚kklhs–ac eŒjËtouc, ibid. 1.5), stands in stark contrast to Dinarchus’ refusal to defend himself in the Attic court.
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OŒd‡n gÄr o÷te koin‰n o÷t+“dion Ísqen o÷t+‚n toÿc d–oic o÷t+‚n toÿc dhmos–oic Çg¿sin, ÇllÄ ka» toÿc Lus–ou parapl†sioc Ístin Ìpou g–netai ka» toÿc
Dionysius’ main concern, labelled shortly after this passage at Din. 6.2, is Âmoe–deia, ‘uniformity.’ The Classical authors are characterized by their homogeneous style, and although every one has his own particular style, each of these styles is consistent within itself. Dinarchus’ style, by contrast, is conspicuous by the absence of Âmoe–deia. This lack of Âmoe–deia provides the unmistakable criterion by which to distinguish his speeches from those of the original Classical orators: Dinarchus ‘is neither uniform in all his speeches nor the inventor of an individual style by which one can recognise him with accuracy, except this way; he displays many examples of imitation and of difference from the original models of the speeches themselves […]’ (o÷te Ìmoioc ‚n âpas–n ‚stin o÷t+ d–ou tin‰c eÕret†c, di+o› gn∏seta– tic aŒt‰n Çkrib¿c, £ to‹ton t‰n trÏpon; polà gÄr ‚mfa–nei mim†seic te ka» aŒt¿n ±c pr‰c t‰ t¿n lÏgwn ÇrqËtupon diaforàn […], ibid. 6.5). The ‘Dinarchean’ about Dinarchus’ style is the fact that it cannot be positively described, because it does not have any original, Dinarchean, features; this, in turn, reveals it as non-Classical. Dinarchus’ failure recalls an important aspect of the anecdotes in On Imitation. The qualities of the original must be transferred into a new, and thus equally original, medium. This is the difference between mere reproduction and mimesis, as Dionysius conceives of it. His Classicism does not aim at turning the styles of the Classical orators into museum objects. On the contrary, Dionysius envisages development of style and stylistic originality as essential aspects of practising Classical language. But style must develop along certain guidelines, and these guidelines are provided by the Classical texts. Dinarchus, by contrast, creates such a museum of Classical rhetoric. He does not work with the Classical material, making a Helen out of Crotonian maidens, but sets Classical elements alongside each other as they are. This method confirms, rather than overcomes, the demise of Classical rhetoric after Alexander, because it constitutes Classical rhetoric as a self-enclosed entity, a linguistic anachronism which is neither tied back to the present nor fits it.
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Dionysius highlights this aspect of Dinarchus’ style by referring to his nickname ‘rustic Demosthenes’: ‘it is for this very reason [the heterogeneity of Dinarchus’ style] that some have called him a “rustic Demosthenes,” deriving their opinion about him from his inferior arrangement: for the body of the rustic differs from that of the city dweller not in its essential appearance but in his clothing and deportment’ (di+aŒt‰ gÄr to‹to ka» ägroikÏn tinec DhmosjËnhn Ífasan 〈aŒt‰n〉 e⁄nai, katÄ t‰ ‚llip‡c
t®c o konom–ac ta‘thn per» aŒt‰n dÏxan labÏntec; t‰ gÄr ägroikon to‹ politiko‹ s∏matoc oŒ morf¨, kataskeu¨ d‡ ka» diajËsei tin» t®c morf®c di†negken, ibid. 8.7). The terms politik‰n/ägroikon s¿ma and morf† recall the idea of a bodily quality of speech and of language as an instrument of self-fashioning on a par with a person’s physical appearance. Dionysius wants to illustrate that a style like Dinarchus’ can never become the speaker’s nature, but will always remain an outward attribute. As a rustic who tries to look like a ‘city-dweller’ is betrayed by his ‘clothing and deportment,’ Dinarchus’ attempt to look Classical, instead of being Classical, betrays him as an epigone, an imitator. Dinarchus’ heterogeneous life-and-style thus demonstrates ex negativo how historical continuity is to be achieved through homogeneity of style (Âmoe–deia). The only way to achieve this continuity is the right technique of dealing with the Classical texts, in short, through mimesis. Dionysius explains Dinarchus’ failure by referring to two different kinds of mimesis, which seem to be devised after the two phases of Dinarchus’ life (Din. 7.5–6): […] d‘o trÏpouc t®c diaforêc t®c pr‰c tÄ Çrqaÿa mim†sewc e’roi tic än; ¡n  m‡n fusikÏc tË ‚sti ka» ‚k poll®c kathq†sewc ka» suntrof–ac lambanÏmenoc, Á d‡ to‘t˙ proseqòc ‚k t¿n t®c tËqnhc paraggelmàtwn. Per» m‡n ofin to‹ protËrou, t– än tic ka» lËgoi; Per» d‡ to‹ deutËrou, tout» ãn Íqoi tic e peÿn Ìti pêsi m‡n toÿc Çrqet‘poic aŒtofu†c tic ‚pitrËqei qàric ka» πra, toÿc d+Çp‰ to‘twn kateskeuasmËnoic, kãn ‚p+äkron mim†sewc Íljwsi, prÏsest–n ti Ìmwc t‰ ‚pitethdeumËnon ka» oŒk ‚k f‘sewc Õpàrqon. Generally speaking, two different forms of imitation can be found with regard to ancient models: one is natural, and is acquired by intensive learning and common nurture