The Fundamental Interrelationships Between Government and Property THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS, Volume 4 Series Editor: Nicholas Mercuro, Michigan State University
STATEMENT OF SCOPE The Economics of Legal Relationships monograph series is dedicated to publishing original scholarly contributions that systematically analyze legal-economic issues. As with other monograph series, each monograph can take a variety forms: (1) Each monograph may be comprised of a collection of original articles devoted to a single theme, edited by a guest volume editor. (2) A monograph may be a collection of refereed articles derived from the series editor’s “call for papers” on a particular legal-economic topic. (3) An individual may wish to author an entire monograph. Each monograph is published in hardback, approximately 250 pages in length and is dedicated to: • Formulating and/or critiquing alternative theories of law and economics-includingthe new law and economics, the economics of property rights, institutionalist and neoinstitutionalist law and economics, and public choice theory. • Analyzing a variety of public policy issues related to the interface between judicial decisions and/or statutory law and the economy. • Exploring the economic impact of political and legal changes brought on by new technologies and/or environmental concerns. • Examining the broad array of legal/economic issues surrounding the deregulationreregulation phenomena. • Analyzing the systematic effects of legal change on incentives and economic performance.
CALL FOR AUTHORS/VOLUME EDITORS/TOPICS An individual who is interested in either authoring an entire volume, or editing a future volume of The Economics of Legal Relationships should submit a three to five page prospectus to the series editor. Each prospectus must include: (1) the prospective title of the volume; (2) a brief description of the organizing theme of the volume whether singleauthored or edited; (3) an identification of the line of literature from which the proposed topic emanates; and (4) either a table of contents or, if edited, a list of potential contributors along with tentative titles of their contributions. Send prospectus to the series editor. Please note that the series editor only accepts individual manuscripts for publication consideration in response to a specific “call for papers.” Send prospectus directly to the series editor: Professor Nicholas Mercuro Institute of Environmental Toxicology
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The Economics of Legal Relationships Series Editor: Nicholas Mercuro, Michigan State University
Volume 1. Compensation for Regulatory Takings Thomas J.Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, University of Connecticut 1996, 253 pp. $73.25/£47.00 ISBN 1–07623–0111–2 CONTENTS: Preface. PART A: INTRODUCTION. Review of the Case Law and Literature on Takings. PART B: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS. The Basic Model. Landowner vs. Regulator Incentives. A Re-examination of Taking Doctrines. Capitalization and Takings. Investment-Backed Expectations and Compensation. The Timing of Development and Compensation. PART C: APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RESOURCE USE. Applications of Historical Significance: Mining, Zoning, and Historic Landmarks. New Concerns: Protection of Wetlands and Endangered Species. Extension to Non-land Based Resources: Water Allocation. PART D: CONCLUSION. Volume 2. Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap David A.Anderson, Centre College 1996, 237 pp. $73.25/£47.00 ISBN 1–07623–0139–2 CONTENTS: An Introduction to Dispute Resolution, David A.Anderson. Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement Decision, Bruce H.Kobayashi. Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, Samuel Issacharoff, Charles Silver and Kent D.Syverud. Issues of Informational Asymmetry in Legal Bargaining, Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino. Theoretical Analysis of Settlement Devices, Tai-Yeong Chung. Empirical Research on the Success of Settlement Devices, Thomas D.Rowe, Jr. and David A.Anderson. The Structure of the Legal Bargaining Game, W.Kip Viscusi and Robert L.Scharff. Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Legal Costs, James W.Hughes and Geoffrey R.Woglom. The Dawning of Arbitration Techniques, Mette H.Kurth. Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Settlement Gap, Gary B.Charness. Index. Volume 3. The Law and Economics of Development Edgardo Buscaglia, William Ratcliff, Stanford University and Robert Cooler, University of California at Berkeley 1996, 348 pp. $73.25/£47.00
ISBN 0–7623–0107–4 CONTENTS: Preface, Hernando de Soto. Introduction, Edgardo Buscaglia. PART I: GENERAL FRAMEWORK. What Makes Poor Countries Poor?: The Role of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, Michael J.Trebilcock. Law’s Contribution to Economic Growth, Thomas S.Ulen. PART II. PRIVATE LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. The Economic and Legal Context of Contemporary Technology Transfer, John H.Barton. The Rule of State Law versus the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development, Robert D.Cooter. Making the Other Path Efficient: Economic Analysis and Tort Law in Less Developed Countries, Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei. A Quantitative Analysis of the Legal and Economic Integration in Latin America, Clarisa Long and Edgardo Buscaglia. PART III. PUBLIC LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. An Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law, J . G.Backhaus. Jurisprudence of the Antitrust Commissions in Chile, Ricardo D.Paredes-Molina. Competition Policy and Deregulation in Mexico in the Late Nineties, Gabriel Martínez. PART IV. PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Impediments to Judicial Reform in Latin America, Edgardo Buscaglia and Pilar Domingo. Judicial Reform: Institutionalizing Change in the Americas, William Ratliff and Edgardo Buscaglia. Index.
In memory to our colleague and friend Walter Adams …someone who did not treat the subject of this volume lightly and uncritically…
The Fundamental Interrelationships Between Government and Property Edited by Nicholas Mercuro and Warren J.Samuels Michigan State University This book was undertaken under the auspices of: Professor Stuart Nagel Policy Studies Organization, University of Illinois
JAI PRESS INC. Stamford, Connecticut
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The fundamental interrelationships between government and property/ edited by Nicholas Mercuro and Warren J.Samuels. p. cm.—(The economics of legal relationships; v. 4) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7623-0600-9 1. Property—United States. 2. Right of property—United States. 3. Economic liberties (U.S. Constitution) I. Mercuro, Nicholas. II. Samuels, Warren J., 1933– . III. Series. KF562.F86 1999 346.7304—dc21 99–31825 CIP Copyright © 1999 JAI PRESS INC. 100 Prospect Street Stamford, Connecticut 06901–1640 JAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored on a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, filming, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. ISBN 0-203-48465-7 Master e-book ISBN
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CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS AN INTRODUCTION TO ESSAYS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY Warren J.Samuels THE ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT Richard Adelstein GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PROPERTY OWNERSHIP: HOBBES MEETS GILLIGAN David Anderson DISAGGREGATING THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW C.Edwin Baker A PROBLEM ABOUT PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND CUSTODY: DISPUTES ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF “FROZEN EMBRYOS” Scott Brophy and Douglas E.Edlin PROPERTY APPROPRIATION AND THEORY OF THE FIRM David Ellerman GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS Louise A.Halper PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE Herbert Hovenkamp TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND POLITICS: THE CASE OF PRODUCT STANDARDS Samuel Krislov THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: ORDER AND EFFICIENCY S.Todd Lowry THE GOVERNMENT-PROPERTY RELATION: CONFESSIONS OF A CLASSICAL LIBERAL Steven G.Medema GLOBALIZATION, DECLINE OF THE NATION-STATE, AND FOUCAULT Gary Minda CREDIBLE TESTAMENTS, PROPERTY, AND THE ROLE OF
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GOVERNMENT Barry M.Mitnick GOVERNMENT, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND PROPERTY: RESTRAINING THE LEGAL-ECONOMIC NEXUS Laurence S.Moss PROPERTY: QUESTIONING EFFICIENCY, LIBERTY AND IMPERIALISM Pitman B.Potter WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO FOR PROPERTY (AND VICE VERSA) Carol M.Rose WORDS FROM A LARGELY FORGOTTEN MAN John Henry Schlegel GOVERNMENT, PROPERTY, MARKETS…IN THAT ORDER…NOT GOVERNMENT VERSUS MARKETS A.Allan Schmid INDIVIDUALS, CHOICE AND INSTITUTIONS: AN AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY Linda A.Schwartzstein ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: GOVERNMENTS AND THE ALLOCATION AND USE OF PROPERTY Kathleen Segerson PROPERTY LAW AND EFFICIENT RESOURCE USE Thomas S.Ulen A RETROSPECTIVE INTERPRETIVE ESSAY ON THE DIVERSE APPROACHES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY Nicholas Mercuro and Warren J.Samuels INDEX
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Richard Adelstein Department of Economics Wesleyan University David Anderson Department of Economics Centre College C.Edwin Baker Law School University of Pennsylvania Scott Brophy Philosophy Department Hobart and William Smith Colleges Douglas E.Edlin Practicing Attorney with Friedman Siegelbaum LLP Roseland, NJ David P.Ellerman Economic Advisor to the Chief Economist World Bank Louise Halper School of Law Washington & Lee University Herbert Hovenkamp School of Law University of Iowa Samuel Krislov Department of Political Science University of Minnesota Todd S.Lowry Williams School of Commerce, Economics, and Politics Washington & Lee University Steven G.Medema Department of Economics University of Colorado at Denver Nicholas Mercuro Lyman Briggs School Michigan State University Gary Minda Brooklyn Law School Barry M.Mitnick Katz Graduate School of Business University of Pittsburgh Laurence S.Moss Economics Division Babson College Pitman B.Potter Faculty of Law University of British Columbia Carol Rose Yale Law School Yale University Warren J.Samuels Department of Economics Michigan State University John H.Schlegel School of Law State University of New York Buffalo A.Allan Schmid Department of Agricultural Economics Michigan State University Linda A.Schzuartzstein School of Law George Mason University Katheen Segerson Department of Economics University of Connecticut Thomas S.Ulen College of Law University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
AN INTRODUCTION TO ESSAYS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY Warren J.Samuels
INTRODUCTION In 1989 under the auspices of the Policy Studies Organization directed by Stuart Nagel of the University of Illinois, Warren J.Samuels published Fundamentals of the Economic Role of Government (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press). This was a collection of commissioned essays responding to the question-What are the most fundamental things you can say concerning the economic role of government? The present book is a sequel, a collection of commissioned essays responding to the question-What are the most fundamental things you can say concerning the interrelations between the institutions of government and property? What the earlier volume had to say about government, about the diverse approaches to the economic role of government, about the various models of polity and economy, and about the legal-economic nexus, obviously bear on the topic of the present collection. Inter alia, it is clear from the earlier collection that while there are positive and normative theories of government, many of which describe the relation of government to other parts of society, government is not a given concept. The collection also established that government is important; that the study of government can be undertaken on various a priori ideological or on closely argued empirical grounds; that multiple taxonomies of the economic role of government are deployed; that most writers theorize about government in the context of liberal democracy; that power and selective perception are both important relevant concepts, that both selective perception and especially power can be conceptualized and theorized about in numerous ways; and that in establishing any social process, normative direction is given to government, and thereby the process in which the determination of whose interests government is to be used to protect is worked out. As will be seen below, many of these same themes pertain to property and to the fundamentals of the interrelations between the institutions of government and property. As with the earlier volume, the authors of commissioned essays come from numerous fields. Each author was given complete discretion in formulating their essay. They were told that the editors’ desire is that the fundamentals they identify be positive and nonnormative, though we are aware that a strict
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approach would be question-begging and perhaps unduly narrowing. We also said that we would like their essays not to be property-government system specific, but that this too should not be taken to unduly narrow discussion. We asked that, apropos of both ideology and particular property-government systems, their essay identify the subjects with respect to which both ideology and specific property-government systems take positions, adding that their specific points should penetrate to the deepest (most fundamental) levels of property-government organization, to the existential problems that define that level and not with the various positions, or sets of social relations, that can be taken on them. As the reader will see, the authors took full advantage of the discretion given them, and responded to the question posed to them, and to these general admonitions, in various ways, all illuminating both severally and jointly.
PROPERTY It will be useful to commence this introductory interpretive essay by reproducing, with the kind permission of the publisher, Edward Elgar, the entry “Property” authored by Warren J.Samuels for the Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics (Samuels 1994, pp. 180–184). Many of the themes presented in that entry clearly pertain to our understanding of the present subject. William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England postulated the right of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” One of the “absolute rights,” says Black-stone, “inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land” (II.I.2). This understanding pervades the mentality of modern Western civilization, as belief in private property and the autonomous individual replaced the institutions and mindset of medieval feudalism. Yet the Blackstonian conception obscures some fundamental aspects of the nature and operation of private property in modern economy and society. Property is one complex form of participation in economic decision making; it therefore is a form of power understood as participation in decision making and/ or the bases thereof. Property rights, accordingly, are interests given legal protection as property. To have property is to have one’s interests (however identified by the individual) defined and protected as property and thereby to participate in economic decision making. Property, or the system of property, including its distribution, is part of the larger social system. The law of property is part of the constitution of society. Indeed, in the absence of a written constitution, the law of property becomes for many practical purposes the constitution of society. Property is not an absolute; it is a bundle of rights and obligations or duties.
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Each right, or each bundle of rights, is relative to other rights, or other bundles of rights, and to legal and nonlegal (for example, customary) determinations of limitations on rights. Moreover, although in principle it is better for the individual to have property rights than not to have rights (rights represent protected interests), the economic significance of property rights is of contingent, problematic significance: The economic value of a right is dependent upon market and other conditions, including the legally protected interests of others which permits them to compete and thereby potentially to reduce the economic value of one’s property (the very nature of competition). Thus, the meaning of private property can change with a changing system of economic organization. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued in The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933) that the rise of the modern corporation, and its management, has been accompanied by a fundamental change in the locus and nature of private property. Berle and Means demonstrated centrifugal dispersion of ownership and centripetal concentration of control. The discretion of legal holders of equity interests is confined to holding or selling stock. The managerial class has discretion over the issuance of stock and the acquisition, use and disposition of corporate assets. The stockholders have only pro forma control over management. Formal ownership of property may or may not provide for participation in economic decision making—a view also stressed, in the context of central planning, by Milovan Djilas in The New Class (1957). Property is not protected by government because it is property; it is property because it is protected by government. The slogan, “the role of government is to protect property,” is misleading because it fails to acknowledge that what is thereby understood as property is already established protection of interests and that it was government which made property what it is in the first place by selectively protecting interests. One of the functions of government is to determine, in the case of conflicting interests and claims, which interest is to be recognized and protected as property. The putative exclusive nature of rights and the ubiquitous conflicting interests and claims pertaining to property underscore the importance of the dual nature of rights, notably property rights. Whenever economic actors are in the same social space, for one actor to have a right is for all other actors to have a nonright and thereby to be exposed to the exercise by the actor of his or her rights. The dual nature of rights underlies the reciprocal nature of externalities: Whether Alpha is allowed to harm Beta or Beta is allowed to harm Alpha, and thereby the substance of the realized externality, will depend on who has what rights and whose interests are protected by rights. Property rights can be defined, mistakenly, as if they existed independently of the regulatory or police, and tax, powers of government, in which case the exercise of its regulatory or police and tax powers by government becomes a fundamental infringement on and loss of property rights. Alternatively, property rights can be defined so as to recognize and encompass the ongoing role of the regulatory or police and tax powers of government, in which case the exercise of
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those powers is a constituent part of the nature of property itself, and no such fundamental infringement or loss occurs. In this regard, regulation is the functional equivalent of deregulation; each is a mode of protecting interests as rights, albeit the interests of opposite parties. Thus, the Blackstonian formulation of a “sole and despotic dominion… without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land” commences by seemingly affirming the first definition but effectively adopts the second. In Adam Smith’s “Lectures on Jurisprudence,” he utilizes the concept of the impartial spectator as a mode through which social control exercised by changing beliefs in what constitutes property and the use of property is administered. In modern society and economy, property rights are what the law says they are, granted within the penumbra of belief and customary usage, a penumbra which is heterogeneous, thereby permitting and indeed requiring the exercise of legal choice. Conflicts arise typically not over whether there will be a covering body of law, as there always is, but over legal change of law and thereby legal change of the interests to which government is to be used to give its protection. A distinction needs to be drawn between the institution of private property and particular property rights. To have the institution of private property does not necessarily mean that some particular private property rights are to be adopted, or that there cannot be change of property rights and thereby of the interests to which government gives its protection. Private property rights have sometimes been juxtaposed, often in a pejorative manner, to human rights. The juxtaposition is incomplete and misleading, although perhaps of rhetorical value in the mobilization of political psychology. Property rights are the rights of human beings, either as individuals or in organizations, such as corporations. Apropos of the corporation, the corporation as a legal entity is juxtaposed between management decision making and those who feel the effects of decisions. Corporations arose in part as a legal buffer for owners and, eventually, for management. This permits evasion of public accountability for decision makers on most but not all issues. Yet this insulation applies to most if not all private property, corporate and individual. Moreover, inasmuch as property signifies the selective protection of interests and thereby established participation in economic decision making, it is necessary to recognize other modes of legal protection of interests and establishment of participation in decision making. These modes, for example, labor relations and protective labor legislation, social insurance and various other “entitlement” programs, not recognized de jure as property rights, constitute private property equivalents in performing the same functions as property rights, albeit often if not typically for different individuals. The genesis of extant property rights can be comprehended in two ways, ways which appear to be mutually contradictory but which are both nonetheless historically true, although they give rise to two different legitimations of property as an institution and of particular property rights. In one respect, property rights can be seen as deriving from the control of government by those
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otherwise in a position of power or influence, such that they are able to get their interests protected as property by government. In this case, property is established through the control of government power. In another respect, property rights can be seen as emerging from efforts to protect private interests against government, or against the use by others of government to adversely impact the interests already protected as property. In this case, property is a limitation on government, not a consequence of not government. One can argue that different particular rights arose in each of these contexts, although it is not always clear in which context a particular fits. It is also important that even when understood as protection against government, private property is in fact a matter of legal rights; thus, in both respects property rights are a matter of law, even when the law is understood to limit government-law itself. Moreover, also even when understood as protection against government, private property rights function to structure private power; that is, particular private rights are relative to both government and to other private rights. Property rights have, therefore, a dual private and public character. They eminently are private rights but they have a public, that is, legal, character to them; the private rights that are of economic significance are public or legal in origin and status. Moreover, property rights have the technical public-good character of all rights: determinations of private rights for one party is not only a matter of public or legal action, but applies to all other relevant parties, without ability to exclude and without additional cost. There are theories that explain and theories that legitimize (and others that denigrate) property as an institution and property rights in general, and a fundamental distinction must be drawn between them. Theories which purport to explain property are concerned with how and why particular private property arrangements have arisen and deal with what is, or has been, the case. Theories which propose to either legitimize or delegitimize particular private property arrangements are normative in character and deal with questions of desirability, of what ought to be the case. Inasmuch as one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” alone, but only with additional normative premises, there is a fundamental disjunction between theories of description-explanation and theories of legitimation-delegitimation. Nonetheless, in practice the two are often conflated. In the conventional interpretation and use of John Locke’s theories of property and government, for example, one finds that his labor appropriation theory of property is taken to be both explanation of the origin and legitimation of the existence of property in the state of nature, though these are quite two different matters, and that the labor appropriation theory is cavalierly applied to civil society, whereas Locke himself argued that in civil society the rights that count are a function of civil law itself. In conventional microeconomic theory, property (and arguably all other rights) constitute the initial entitlements on the basis of which trade takes place, leading to Pareto optimal resource allocations. A central thesis of institutionalist theory (if not also that of other schools) is that there is no unique Pareto-optimal allocations, only power-structure- or rights-structure-specific outcomes. In such
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a context, the allocation of resources is a function of the initial determination— definition and assignment—of rights, including property rights. Broadly, resource allocation is a function of market demand and supply, which is in turn a function of power, which is a function of property rights (understood as a mode of participation in decision making, or power), which are a function of law, which is a function of government, which is a function of the results of the contest over the control of government to use it to protect certain interests rather than others. Government and property, therefore, are interdependent variables; each is both dependent and independent relative to the other; each is formed and influenced by the other. The ineluctable problems are always: which, or whose, interests are to count; through which institutional or power structure are they to be defined so as to count; and with what legal change of law are legal rights to be revised.
A SYNOPTIC INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME Now, in the light of these observations on property, let us consider the several contributions to this collection, the purposes being both to introduce them and to interpret and critique them (in the sense of literary criticism) in the context of the foregoing. Be the latter as it may, each essay stands on its own as an answer to the query—What are the most fundamental things you can say concerning the interrelations between the institutions of government and property? Richard Adelstein: Adelstein’s essay illustrates one manner in which property and government are institutions, not only both expanding and contracting freedom (John R.Commons) but also comprising some set of beliefs (Thorstein Veblen). The essay deals with the ways in which the relation of property and government is a matter of ideology and sentiment and theory, as well as of empiricism which itself is influenced by ideology and sentiment and theory. One illustration is the multiplicity of possible interpretations and applications of constitutional clauses (e.g., the takings clause in relation to the police power versus eminent domain) as different ideologies, sentiments and theories are read into them. At bottom is the conflict between the Lockean idea that property is pre-governmental and the Benthamite idea that property is what it is because of government action or inaction—but always in combination with selectively specified property rights, which is often the point at issue. Here we have the critical role of the courts—and therefore of the ideology, sentiments and theories held by the judges. One example of the vast subtleties involved is in Adelstein’s quotation from Justice Field in Allgeyer: the language “in all lawful ways” points to the role of the courts in determining as between eminent domain and police power reasoning; after all, what is “lawful” is precisely the point at issue. The predicament is precisely that having to do with Blackstone’s definition of property, discussed in Section II, supra: property is an
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absolute right subject to the law of the land, which determines what is “lawful” and therefore what is property. David Anderson: Anderson’s essay is a good example of what Adelstein calls the Lockean approach to property, but a more subtle version of that approach than one often finds. Private property of sorts can exist without government, though perhaps not too securely; in any event it hardly pertains to the existing economy, with intangible and incorporeal interests, for example, given protection as property. Government protection of property is a matter of the relative costs of private versus governmental protection, the norms and ethical standards of a community, and the degree of contest over established property distribution. Anderson calls attention to the critical roles of definition of terms and of authority status. Interestingly, Anderson’s treatment of the Coase Theorem does not apply to Ronald Coase. Coase emphasizes the non-zero transaction cost case and how different transaction cost systems yield different allocations of resources, hence how legal rules and institutions matter. The example of the Coase Theorem being formulated in a manner to indicate the irrelevance of government is indicative of both the ideological use to which certain lines of economic analysis can be put and the role of antecedent assumptions, in matters of property and government, which may bear no relation to existential reality. Edwin Baker: Baker rejects the notion of private property as an undiffferentiated singularity in favor of property as a collection, or bundle, of diverse rights each with putatively different functions which have different normative valences, none of which rights necessarily go with any other. The unified conception serves no meaningful descriptive or analytical function, and is mainly a rhetorical—ideological or sloganizing—device. Baker’s is a social constructivist conception of property: The bundle of rights which comprises private property is given by neither nature nor theory. It is a product, necessarily, of social decision-making processes which work out the details of what constitutes property. The most relevant decision-making process is that of law/politics; property is essentially a political or governmental phenomenon, at the levels of both constitutional and ordinary politics. Moreover, there are no universally recognized (or recognizable) decisional criteria or rules. Baker’s analysis requires that distinctions be made between rights as (1) claims, (2) legally recognized claims, and (3) the relevant protective sanctions and/or procedures. The disaggregation of property calls attention to the variety of and conflict among different claims and values, all of which must be worked out. Such is made further complicated by recognition of the different functions served by property: allocative, sovereignty, protective, privacy, use, personhood and welfare—much of his article explores these complications and considerations. Different functions are involved, are at stake, in relation to different property claims, and choices/ tradeoffs must be made. Law and politics are the essentially and inherently collective processes through which choices are made. Inasmuch, for example, as there is no unique best allocation, governmental choices
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between competing property claims govern the actually existing set of property (and other) rights and thus help determine the achieved allocation. Moreover, as Baker says, no singular plausible normative or economic theory can abstractly govern those choices or conclusively explicates the array of relevant legislation and decision. Determinations have to be made as to when uses of property are abusive and when they are not; when government actions are improper or invidious; when regulation goes “too far” and when not; when a taking is a taking and when not (in the process he tries to make sense of the takings’ decisions), and so on. Property is willy nilly power, and exchange is an exercise of power; structuring property serves to structure and channel the exercise of power. Moreover, Baker recognizes that property always exists within, indeed is an important aspect of, the structure of dominance in society and the partisan interests of important classes. Baker’s concluding section gives effect to two points: (1) the fact of social construction of property, that somehow, somewhere decisions are made in its composition and to change it, and (2) liberal democracy as the form of decision making taken by social construction. Baker’s analysis thus puts into perspective the conventional language, for example, (1) that government protects property: government determines the interests it will protect, and some of those protected interests are what we call property; and (2) that courts determine when legislation is a constitutional violation of property rights: this involves court, rather than legislative, determination of whether Alpha’s or Beta’s interest will be given the protected status of property. Scott Brophy and Douglas E.Edlin: Brophy and Edlin discuss the problem of frozen embryos permitted by in vitro fertilization. Their contribution illustrates several important points, including (1) the ineluctable necessity to have a body of covering law pertaining to any area of human relationships, such that with new medical technology, new conflicts arise, leading to recourse to courts and/or legislatures to make new law; (2) the multifaceted nature of legal relationships and thereby of legal issues, leading to a multiplicity of approaches that interested parties and courts/legislatures can take to working out a solution; (3) that property concepts and discourse constitute but one of these approaches; (4) that legal reasoning tends to look backward to formulate analogical treatments of new problems—an approach which so far from avoiding multiplicity of approaches serves as a means of their coming to fruition; (5) that adoption of one approach or another may substitute for direct consideration of the question, What policy do we want? which is to say, How should frozen embryos be treated? such that reasoning by choice of analogy is a means of solving the problem—or of stating the solution, given whatever basis on which the choice was in fact made; and (6) the utter complexity, messiness, and ultimate exercise of choice involved in working out/ socially constructing the law to cover novel situations. Also clear are (7) that any desire to avoid having the state intrude on a private decision is logically fallacious, insofar as the state willy nilly must decide whose private decision it will be; (8) that any desire to
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have a uniform treatment across jurisdictions of people similarly situated confronts the federal nature of government in the United States; and (9) the relativist nature of all idealized, absolutist, natural-rights expressions of any or all of the approaches which might be followed—no less and no more relativist than the solutions actually chosen. David Ellerman: Ellerman’s argument is essentially as follows: (1) the government treats as property that which comes about through private contract; (2) included in/as a result of private contract is the determination of who has right/title to the product; (3) the resultant entitling (property right creation) will vary between capital hiring labor, and labor hiring capital; the factor which does the hiring secures title to the product; and (4) the corollary that the structure of social power “determines” who does the hiring. Ellerman’s explicit focus is on the theory of the firm, not on the question concerning the interrelations of property and government. With regard to that matter, however, his argument is that government, by enforcing the titling due to contract is reenforcing and giving effect to the structure of social power. The analysis of the firm is instrumental to that result. Government prohibits slavery but not contracts which alienate the final output from labor and leave it in the hands of capital, hence the appearance, the “myth,” that capital, which only appropriates the output by force of contract, is only getting its rights of ownership. It has been said that the law of property is the de facto constitution of England; somewhat the same thing is true here. Ellerman shows not only that the right of ownership (and the related ideology) is separable from the right of appropriation, but how that is so and, by implication, how government, by enforcing contract rights generated by capital hiring labor, gives effect to and reenforces the structure of social power which (as Rodbertus and Marx understood) results in capital employing labor and not vice versa. Ellerman identifies the “myth” that rights to the product are due to the ownership of the means of production, its role in the justification of distributive shares, and its application to both capital theory and corporate finance theory. Government action and inaction is seen to be fundamental to basic economic concepts, categories and theories. The key, Ellerman says, is neither ownership per se nor the market mechanism for appropriation, but the legal validation of the capital-hiring-labor employment contract; all else flows from that. Though surely the owners and managers of capital must believe that ownership conveys the right to employ, Ellerman argues it is a matter of contract, and that the private-property economic system would be different if the capital-hiring-labor employment contract was not enforced and if law facilitated self-employment and labor hiring capital. Eller-man’s arguments are both positive and normative, and the normative argument rests upon his positive analysis of the role of government with regard to the capital-hiring-labor employment contract. Louise A.Halper: Halper examines property and government in a complex context whose elements include (1) the conflict between two ontological positions, (a) property rights as antecedent to government, hence the implication
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of nonintervention, and (b) property rights as empirically based on the systems of economic of political relations, hence (by implication) the legal-economic nexus; (2) the twin beliefs that (a) market economies require political democracy and (b) political democracy requires market economy; (3) the tension between (a) markets as a function of rights and (b) rights as a function of markets; and, inter alia, (4) the relevance and importance of (a) the structure of domination and (b) the distribution of wealth. (For (5) and (6), see below.) The abstract autonomous individual takes on actual form within all these elements, and legaleconomic policy debate is conducted within a tension between emphases on historical facts and on eternal truths, the former seen by the latter as neglecting the latter and the latter seen by the former as out and out selective reification of the status quo. Halper then points to the system of property which comprises both property and propertylessness, as a function of the distribution of wealth, with the corollaries of (1) a saving-investing and employing elite and (2) those who have nothing to sell but their labor. A fifth element, therefore, is (5) the system and structure of dependence and independence; and the sixth is (6) the system and structure of security and insecurity. Halper concludes her analysis with a discussion of aspects of the role of government in the formation of propertylessness which both is reminiscent of and asymptotic to Ellerman’s analysis concerning the conditions and consequences of who gets title to the final product and also points to the more general point that government is used to structure markets, allocation and distribution by hierarchically superior groups in their favor, thus leading to a seventh element, (7) the conflict between (a) using government to advance already protected interests and (b) using government to advance interests not as yet (or as much) protected, and an eighth element (8) rival theories of how property promotes or does not promote interests, especially of the masses of the propertyless. Herbert Hovenkamp: Hovenkamp’s approach to property and the state combines three elements: a neoclassical view of how the economy operates, a constructivist view of property, and a view of modern property as emerging through both state and contract. He envisions perfectly competitive markets with full information and fully defined property rights as generating efficient results, with effi-ciency—or maximum value of output—understood in terms of exhausting gains from trade. The role of the state in fully defining property rights is critical. Governmental decisions about the recognition and scope of property rights through property rules affects value but most distinctive modern property rights arise, in his view, from contracts, thereby making government recognition and enforcement of property rights an affirmation of the will of the contracting parties. (Ellerman, for one, might suggest that government exercises choice in doing so.) Property rights are also influenced by the laws which insinuate into the valuation process values and considerations other than those of the contracting parties. But in a “perfect” world, the assignment of rights will have no affect on their final ownership, because the property will end up in the hands of the party who values it most—the logic of the Coase Theorem.
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Hovenkamp is aware that actual markets are far removed from perfect markets: adoption of different transaction cost systems will affect allocation (the assignment of rights is not allocatively neutral), and bargaining in the image of the Coase Theorem is bilateral, and probably with asymmetrical information, thus suspending two of the critical assumptions of the “perfect” model. So there is no unique maximization of value, or of physical output, or of property values, only maximization influenced by actual property rights systems. Property rights are a function of both state action and the actions of contracting parties. Governmental corrective action, say, in the case of externalities, must choose between which of each pair of reciprocal externalities it will support. Interestingly, Hovenkamp’s analysis also implies that taxes—and presumably also government spending—can be considered part of the system of property rights. Also implicit in Hovenkamp’s analysis are (1) the irrelevance of natural rights theory for analyzing and justifying property rights (or very much of the simple liberal theory as set forth in the last essay of this volume by Nicholas Mercuro and Warren J.Samuels) and (2) the importance of power in bargaining (contract making) and in determining whose interests government will support as property rights. Relevant to both points is the ubiquity of standardized contracts, to which the nondrafting parties either adhere or reject, bargaining in the classical sense being relatively limited. Samuel Krislov: Krislov knows what very few seem to appreciate: the importance of product standards for an industrial economy. It is always a matter of collective action, sometimes governmental, other times not. And he is aware that because of standards—and because of the process by which standards are formed—the relationships between freedom, property and government are highly problematical. More than that, too, he shows (a) the difficulties of overly general theorizing, (b) the multiplicity of arrangements, practices, and results, as well as relational patterns, (c) technology as both constraint and as chosen and shaped by political and economic agents, (d) how the systems of formal and informal product standards are deeply embedded in culture and social system— and that such is also true of markets, and (e) that the relations between nominally political and economic agents is symbiotic, two-way, and so on— such that all forms and uses of power are problematic, laden with potentialities not certainties. The paper is rich in showing diversity and complexity, and how much the story of property and government is in the details—details typically eclipsed and finessed by general formulations, whether or not driven by ideology of immediate material interest. S.Todd Lowry: Lowry envisions different economic systems—ranging from the traditional and flood-plain agricultural economies of the ancient world to feudalism and industrial capitalism—as so many different administrative systems. Each has its own rules and structures of rights which give systemspecific orderliness and predictability facilitating rational planning and effective production. Each is also profoundly influenced by the dominant technique of production (technology). But each actual system, especially each’s legal and governmental structure
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and system of policy, is, on the one hand, a hybrid reflection of previous economic and political conditions and, on the other, a hodgepodge of historically explainable premises rather than a coherent and logically consistent intellectual fabric. Although the modern distinction between “privat” and “public” does not strictly apply to all historical systems, they all involve various systems of governance in the form of various combinations of ruling institutions and participative rights. It is always difficult to separate the governmental from the economic, especially in the ancient civilizations, in which the system of formal control and the system by which a livelihood was obtained were coterminous; in the modern system, the legal-economic nexus is also present, only more recondite. Modern states, in particular, exhibit a tension between incentive and productivity in matters of regulation and taxation. In all systems, property rights, in such form as exist, are synthetic and historical, emanating from a multiplicity of sources. Steven G.Medema: Medema identifies elements of the deep legal bases of the economic system—its existence, structure and performance. He identifies and shows the unrealism and wishful-thinking nature of sentimental, ideological beliefs about property and government, which are powerful but misleading. Like much else about property, the idea of natural rights is only a part of the belief system which people bring to issues of policy (see the essay by Richard Schlegel) and only beg the issue, while simultaneously both obfuscating the fact that an issue exists and channeling selective perception of whose interest is to count. Medema establishes that the social control of property is both ethical (nonlegal) and legal, using both Janet Landa’s example of socially and ethnically close people and Robert C.Ellickson’s example of cattle men and farmers, providing meat to the importance of the passing of non-stranger situations to understand the increased reliance on legal action (legal social control) pertaining to property, thus providing added meaning and empirical weight to the Benthamite positivist view that the rights that count are those of the law (apropos of the stranger-non-stranger distinction, see also Carol Rose’s essay). Government and property are both involved in the choosing, that is, valuational process, but property itself is a function of the governmental exercise of choice as to whose interests are to count. Some of this exercise of governmental choice takes the form of choosing between different series of precedents, and some, however inadvertently, the structure and level of transaction costs. Gary Minda: Minda seemingly is silent on private property, seemingly concerned only with the economic role of government. But there is more to what he says than what might first meet the eye. Minda points to a technologicalmarket nexus replacing the legal-economic nexus. However, he notes (1) that the economic role of government will remain important, however much relegated to the background and (2) the growing importance of international organizations, as well as of (3) coordinated regulatory efforts by nation-states. Certain implications may be drawn from the foregoing: (1) the international corporate system will tend strongly to replace the nation-state system, and is
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doing so increasingly; (2) conflicts among corporate entities will generate the future’s international equivalent of the Law Merchant—a form of government; (3) international organizations will comprise, de facto or de jure, the “formal” government of the future international order—the prelude to world government, one dominated by the international corporate system probably more than by the nation-state system; (4) the United States is a critical force behind the international organizations and the combination of it and them constitute an amorphous first, de facto world order; (5) the institutions and the order will become transformed as more is expected of them; (6) the world order will be the situs of efforts to regulate concerning the environment, working conditions, and “local” conflicts. (The germs of international policing of local conflicts are present, and growing.) Minda says that nation-states can promote but cannot control the Internet (a proxy for other things, too). But different ways of promotion represent, in fact if not in belief and aim, different modes of regulation—just as different ways of institutionalizing private property constituted its regulation. What, then, of property? What Minda’s analysis amounts to is that, whether or not localized in the legal-economic nexus, a system of governance has existed and will continue to exist, involving the power to make important decisions affecting others, some in nominally public (government) hands and some in nominally private hands. The “background” operation of government is pertinent in this regard, as are the actions of the international organizations. But the corporations will, through the internal policies and their contracts with others, form and reform the new system of governance, in effect the new property system—just as they have done in the past under national capitalisms. Minda correctly emphasizes the critical roles of (1) technology and (2) belief systems-ideas-ideology-intellectual paradigms. These latter, in changing form, will fuel the new order, the new system of governance—and people will more or less so come to believe in them that they will consider them the definition of reality. Apropos of the other essays, for example, Ellerman’s analysis concerning who gets the title to output, and thereby the question of the structure of social power, will remain critical. The greater mobility of capital in relation to labor will be critical, as firms use contracts to work out the new institutions of the market, as they have been doing all along, facilitated and sanctioned by governments. The new international order will approximate what Laurence Moss, in his essay, calls “Civil Society” but it will also constitute governance, with, apropos of Moss’s fears, the same problems as government. The future international order will have problems and potentialities more or less comparable to those of the past. But they will, it seems be more constituted by the international corporate system than in the past and with greater diversity of factors and forces, including strong residues of the present nation-state system, especially the presently hegemonic states. Barry M.Mitnick: Mitnick identifies and analyzes a very deep account of
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government as part of the social construction of reality in a world cognitively constructed and valorized by its participants. In his view, government helps create and legitimize arrangements which enable reliable bases of action, facilitating and stabilizing inter-agent relations through what he calls credible testaments: statements about events and conditions of the past and present which help in the construction of the future. These include government records and private documents, such as contracts, which constitute the legal forms serving as the critical bases of property and other relationships. Exchange involves not only rational calculation and the transfer of assets but also the use of socially constructed forms and participant beliefs, in whose construction government participates. Mitnick effectively uses the work of Douglass North and Barry Weingast, among others, to trace the devolution of the critical forms of checks and balances within government, and the role of government finance in forming capital markets and banking institutions—including in both respects arrays of instruments of credible testament. The actions of government officials and the promulgation of official ideological rationalizations have helped build credible commitments through the erection of belief systems, official documents, and various means of enforcement of and limitation on government power, including public expenditures. The public and private sectors have each contributed to the development, for example, of credible procedures and language for the auditing and financial reporting of both joint stock companies (corporations) and government. Mitnick’s analysis establishes the historical and social constructivist nature of both property and government, neither given, transcendent or self-subsistent, but each involving so many systems of belief—beliefs abetted by governmental creation of various means of certification. At one point, Mitnick writes of the king still being “able to act outside the rules of the system, remaking them to serve his own ends.” There are three points here: first, the content of the rules of the system are precisely the matter to be determined; second, the ostensible rules outside of which the king acted were those which may be seen as desired by others; and third, the king, the nobility and the common people were engaged in a continuing process of working out/ revising those rules—a process which continues to the present day. Apropos of Mitnick’s discussion of principal-agent relationships, one distinguishing feature of government as an agent is the political cum legal process of working out both ends and means. Two interrelated processes are therefore involved, that working out the rules of the system and that working out both ends and means, neither of which is established once and for all time; this is what Samuels has called the legaleconomic nexus. In this context, the construction of credible testamentary evidence is suf-fused with the problem of continuity versus change and is therefore problematic in its economic significance. Credibility promotes continuity (reliability) which promotes Schumpeterian dynamic constructive change; but dynamic constructive change generates alteration of both the rules
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of the system and the operative ends and means—and it is confident belief in constitutional and other doctrines, establishing the deepest credible testaments, which both make it all possible and help structure the results. Laurence S.Moss: Moss presents a sophisticated version of the Lockeanlibertarian position, with its important concerns over tyranny. His essay nicely illustrates how much the focus of relevant literature has been on providing an intellectual defense of the property system in the status quo—ironic because the status quo property system not only “works” but involves multitudinous continuous change. Security of rights is important, and so is “abuse” of government power, though “abuse” is subjective. But the institution of property is itself the means of securing interests through property rights, and the institution “works” to that end, Richard Epstein and colleagues’ lamentations notwithstanding. Moss appreciates that the advent and eventual cultural hegemony of capitalism, during the last three centuries at least, involved ubiquitous changes in law, including, indeed especially, the law of property, derivative of the rise of business; to wit, the transformation from landed property law to nonlanded property law. The law was transformed to institutionalize business and was further transformed during the reign of business, to this day. Gradually and incrementally, not all at once, but in truly multitudinous ways, constantly. Yet people still have believed, or been induced to believe, that law protects existing property arrangements. Ironically, this belief system nonetheless thereby enables the incremental but nonetheless wholesale change of property arrangements. Moss’s sentiments concerning disincentives to much legal change are important but must be kept in context. If they were wholly and unequivocally correct, (1) the transformation from landed to nonlanded property would either not have happened or happened only partly so, with disincentive effects reckoned in terms of the past, but then-hegemonic, landed property system, focusing on agriculture and landlord (economic and political) interests (that was what the corn law controversy was all about—plus zillions of other legal changes; and (2) we would not have had the enormous economic development/rise in living conditions which accompanied the aforementioned continued transformation of the law of property. The problem, as Moss appreciates, is which/whose changes are to take place, and how is the process of change to be regulated. The editors’ published analysis of the compensation problem (takings clause) conclusively demonstrates, we think, that it is impossible to compensate for all losses due to legal change of rights; the substitution of eminent domain for police power thinking is futile, because necessarily selective—whether we like it or not (Samuels 1974, pp. 113–134; Samuels and Mercuro 1979, pp. 157–194; Samuels and Mercuro 1980, pp. 103–128). The literature on takings thus has turned into a quest for rules, with the conclusions, we urge, that no set is conclusive or self-enforcing and that not all losses will be compensated; in part because different tests define injury and evidence of injury differently. The search for ubiquitous compensation is futile;
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so is the search for rules. But the search performs the function of maintaining belief that property rights are being protected. One can see this as a fraud, or as a cultural necessity, that is, absolutist legitimation. The apparent willingness of various writers to rely on utilitarian considerations in the reformulation of property rights (often but not only, the reconciliation of conflicting past property rights) brings to mind a modern version of the old saw, that no man’s property is safe when the legislature is in session (how ineluctably true!): no man’s property is safe in the hands of the benefit-cost specialist. All one needs is to “prove” by utility calculation that Alpha’s dollar means more to Beta than to Alpha, and property is changed. How ironic when in the hands of those who affirm that property precedes (or should be treated as if it preceded) government and that takings, broadly defined, should be compensated! Moss’s position is a good example of the sensible and commonplace (I do not mean to denigrate it by saying that) understanding of property in relation to government. But with regard to how much change of rights is permissible and when such change is compensable, no formula will suffice to apply his argument, however agreeable his sentiments—and he knows it: vide his concluding sentence. Pitman B.Potter: Potter shows as well as can be done that property has no independent ontological existence; that, if anything, property has a realpolitik and social constructivist nature; and that theories of property are not about something ontologically given but form the contents of political discourse about whose interests should count and the means of their counting. He provides a broad-gauged survey of classical and contemporary classical liberal and contemporary approaches to private property, for the most part theories of legitimation of property, with their differing economic and political and communitarian rationales. These theories accept private property but differ as to the grounds of their acceptance, the nature of the justification (absolutist versus relativist), and the putative strength of a presumption against legal change of property rights. The belief, however, in “largely undiminished property rights” fails to reflect the empirical facts that these rights are always situational, a temporary product of evolution, and that the redetermining of the situation, and therefore of the content of what constitutes property and its various protections, is always the point at issue. Absolute property, so-called, is only relatively absolute. The realpolitik and social constructivist nature of property interestingly is identified and explored by Potter in regard to the various inevitable privileging of certain interests and marginalizing of others in the formation through international organizations and conventions creating a body of uniform international commercial and property law under the rubric of globalization. Globalization does not just create uniformity; it creates uniformity that entrenches certain norms and certain interests and not others, thus replaying on a global stage the process historically operative within nation-states. Insofar as the unifying law limits the power of states to the advantage of certain interests, one
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can say that government is not restricted but actually is deployed in favor of those interests and not others. The role of elites within industrialized countries and of industrialized countries per se in the formation of a body of law which favors them, in part through their control of the international organizations, also replays parallel historical intra-national developments. Generalizing, if property and associated law is drawn up effectively on behalf of Alpha interests, and Beta interests are sacrificed, (1) it is not surprising that Alpha interests will adhere to an absolutist theory of property—even though their activities may belie same; (2) Beta interests will likely eventually seek a redress of their grievances; and, inter alia, (3) the issue will not actually be the attractiveness of, say, the economic and/or utilitarian justifications of property, but whether only some or putatively all people are to have their interests, as they see their interests, represented in the continuing reformulation of property. The problem, in other words, as Potter recognizes, is the conflict between hierarchy and equality, between institutions of property and government generated on behalf of some interests and institutions responsive to all interests, between economic and political oligarchy and economic and political democracy. This is as true of industrialized and unindustrialized societies in a global context as it was of landlord and peasant and of capitalist and laborer in historic nation-states. Potter also provides a critique of the ubiquitous rational utility approach, raising such questions as: whose utility is to count, and how; whose liberty is to count, and how; and what about group or universal interests, such as environmental protection. He shows how the operative question is not “government or no government” but which/whose conditions of utility maximization and liberty will government support, especially with regard to reconciling competing claims. Instead of a preoccupation with elite interests and justification and accountability in elitist terms, Potter raises the question of broader, more widespread interests and accountability. Institutions of property and government produced under elitist conditions will likely be different in material respects from those produced under democratic, or pluralist, conditions. Discourse which reifies Alpha law, law generated under Alpha auspices, is still discourse; the same is true of discourse which reifies Beta law. Absolutist theories, including theories of efficiency, will build in and give effect to existing rights by considering only those interests registered and valorized in markets, may be appealing for their seeming logicality, but they are not empirically accurate, however much they may be useful for selective parties to advance their interests. Carol Rose: Rose’s essay suggests much of the vastness of property and of proerty-government relations. Her approach of identifying bottom-up and topdown sources of property is useful; and her argument that both are simultaneously present and empirically important is sensible. Her emphasis on the importance of large-number, large-scale, hence impersonal “stranger” relations is important, inter alia, for the relative rise of legal in contrast to informal, non-legal social control. Interestingly, though with some passing allusions, Rose does not discuss the
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vast extent to which property substance arises bottom-up, through contract (e.g., vide Ellerman’s essay). Rose’s discussion of the origin of government comprises an implicit blend of rational choice, public choice, social choice, game and social contract theory. She considers neither the history of feudal-monarchical residues and evolutionary developments that empirically have been so important nor government as a means of rule by those with the power/means of checking others with power—part of the Enlightenment experience. John H.Schlegel: Schlegel’s essay deconstructs the rhetoric of property and government. Schlegel’s argument is opposed to the reification of government and of property. Both are seen to be belief systems in the process of development, through social construction and selective perception, though deployed to defend or aggress positions and interests. His argument is that these patterns of habitual behavior and belief are used to obfuscate as much as, if not more than, to reveal. This is especially important because that which are obfuscated and hindered are critical issues of policy. The obfuscation is precisely the goal of those who want property and government so perceived that they can assure that it is their felt interests, and not those of others, which will count. Property and government, as he puts it, are each a conclusion, not a premise, though the pretense often is made that they are premise, that is, given and transcendent, and though, selectively perceived, they do serve as premises for reasoning. The same is true of publicness and privateness, of course. His point concerning the symmetry of selective perceptions between stories is highly apposite and effective; and his examples, the bulk of the paper, are strikingly useful for his purpose. A.Allan Schmid: Schmid presents in a concise manner the point of view largely taken in this introduction; not surprisingly, inasmuch as he and Warren Samuels have co-authored several publications on the topics covered herein. Schmid treats property in an empirical manner. He argues that the institution of property establishes relationships among people, that it is a product of collective action, that it governs people’s respective status in the economy under conditions of intedependence and scarcity, and that it is part of the larger social process of continuity versus change. Property is therefore a normative phenomenon, reflecting choices among conflicting interests, including changes in the interests protected as property. Moreover, inasmuch as property emerges through legal-governmental processes, those processes are an arena in which conflicting parties struggle to get their respective interests recognized and protected as property rights. The on-going result is a structure of rights, including rights to seek, within the legal process, to change rights. One means through which rights change is called regulation, with deregulation being a functional equivalent thereof. Linda A.Schwartzstein: Schwartzstein presents an exposition of the conventional Austrian view applied to our subject, one complementary to that in Moss’s essay. Individuals engage in decision making and exchange under uncertainty within markets which coordinate actors’ actions. Two critical roles are of expectations and entrepreneurial searching for niches. Autonomous
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individual decision making takes place within institutions acting to provide knowledge and rules, as social control. A critical role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty and to provide stability and predictability to the decision-making environment. Government should maintain a system of law which both provides, through its stability, a high degree of certainty while being flexible to adapt to change. The common law, she argues, is more suitable in providing this function than is legislation. This argument can be understood in a larger context. First, government— including common, statute, administrative and constitutional law—is a major source of change. But business—economic activity generally—is also and arguably a greater and more pervasive source of change, hence of uncertainty and of Schumpeter’s combination of creation and destruction. Law—court and statute law—is an object of control and use by economic entrepreneurs, and has been since the advent of the modern Western economic system. Law for them is a means of change, not only a response to change. Much of the burden of change is arguably visited, through unemployment and threat of unemployment, on workers, but much is also visited on other property owners—and government is ineluctably involved. Second, considering the vast magnitude of state and federal court decisions and of state and federal legislation, it is not entirely conclusive that one is more incremental and less totalist and large-scale than the other (with due regard to differences of jurisdiction); it is partly a matter of definitions of relevant domain and period. Nor is it the case that legislation is more salient and court decisions less conspicuous; some of each type of change of law is salient, but much, perhaps most, is not. Third, court-made law is in principle nondemocratic, whereas legislation is in principle democratic; though insofar as judicial appointments and elections and legislation reflect power, influence and money, it is not clear that any branch is democratic in the sense a wide range of interests is allowed to count. Fourth, the key question is, whose interests count, not only in law making but in price-cost formation. Considerations of government action “interfering” with market price formation, especially “distorting” prices, must be comprehended within a larger system of understanding, in which the structure of prices (and therefore costs) is in part a function of the state of the law, the law governing whose interests are to count. There is no given or transcendental price-cost structure with which government only “interferes” and which it “distorts” (Samuels and Schmid 1997). Nor is there a given and transcendent market, or set of markets, independent of government. Markets—and the prices made in markets—are a function of the institutions, especially legal institutions, such as property, which both form and operate through and channel them. Fifth, law does have to respond to change. But the critical issues are: how does law respond to change, to whose interests does law give its protection in the face of change? Sixth, the problem of balancing stability with flexibility, like so much else pertaining to government and to property, is not conclusively amenable to
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solution by formula; it must be worked out—and also to be worked out is the process by which such balancing is to be worked out. Seventh, property, as an institution, is already a mode of giving special protection to interests. Restriction of the modes of changing property law further enhances that special protection. Kathleen Segerson: In the context of considering several conventional topics, such as “market failure,” Segerson makes a number of useful points: the connection between (1) government allocation and protection of property rights and (2) incentive structures and efficient allocations; the role of inalienability rules; the potentially further narrowing or expansive role of Richard Epstein’s nuisance exception; the reciprocal and inclusive nature of damages, that is, limiting polluters as damaging their property versus polluters’ actions as damaging the property rights of others—with government inexorably having to putatively “take” someone’s rights, hence the impossibility of universal compensation; the differences between strict liability and injunctive relief; a tendentious identification of governmental redefinition and/or reassignment of rights as constituting communism; the key issue of governmental determination of the rules by which rights can or cannot be changed over time; and the difference between liability and property rules in protecting property interests. Thomas S.Ulen: Ulen identifies several relations of government to property: Government determines what is to be given the protection of property law, how that protection is to be given (injunction or compensation for injury), the dimensions of property rights, and the limitations to be put on property (police power regulation and eminent domain). He also applies a particular logic to a particular slice of legal-economic issues: the utilitarian logic of value maximization through benefit-cost comparisons having to do with externalities and transaction costs, and transaction-cost considerations in other types of cases, with the role of law seen as facilitating and, where necessary, substituting for, but trying to mimic, private contractual solutions to disagreements. Two points are immediately clear. One is the futurist nature of legal decisions, in other words, the law of property sets the stage for future actions of economic actors, thereby helping channel their behavior. The other is the subjective nature of ostensibly utilitarian “calculations”—really judgments influenced by various factors—as to when social benefit exceeds social cost. Ulen thus deals with a slice of a large subject. Moreover, mimicing market solutions, as he appreciates, competes with pursuit of other social goals, such as public goods and moral and distributional considerations. Ulen also appreciates that while the institution of property (as distinct from particular bundles of rights designated as “property”) can help facilitate economic growth, economic growth generates problems of interdependence which can lead to calls for reconstituting the bundle of rights that is property at any time. What is conventionally—and sometimes pejoratively—called “regulation” are limitations on property in the process of redefinition of the bundle of rights. What property is at any point in time is in part a function of past regulation, and is open to future regulation. Government must, in a wide
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range of cases, resolve conflicts between interests based upon some notion of public purpose; the nature of politics and litigation is to influence the notion of public purpose employed. Sometimes the conflicts are between property owners; other times, between property owners and advocates of claims of interest to be protected by government as yet unprotected. In all this, property is neither independent to nor preexistent to government. Government is the process by which the interests to be protected as property are continually being worked out. And the combination of (1) both property and non-property interests and (2) official government form part of the totality of “governance.” Moreover, what is here called “efficient” is itself neither independent of nor preexistent to government. What becomes the efficient use of resources is a function of circumstances, and among those circumstances are (1) the law which determines what is given protection as property and thereby becomes a resource of economic significance and (2) the law which governs whose interest will be protected by law, and whose not, and therefore whose interest will count, in part as costs to others. Efficiency is rights-structure specific, and among the rights that are relevant are the various, and changing, bundles of property and nonproperty rights. No unique efficient solution exists, nor does any unique structure of prices and costs; that which becomes operative is in part a function of law. As Ulen knows, the standard Coase Theorem formulation, involving zero transaction costs, is misleading: different sets of laws yield different systems of transaction costs and thereby different results, different sets of “highest valued uses.” As already noted, Ronald Coase, after whom the Coase Theorem is seriously misnamed, insists that institutions matter, not least legal institutions, including, perhaps most especially, the law of property. It should be clear, and no surprise, that not only are the meanings of government and of property a matter of selective perception, and therefore subject to multiple interpretation, but that the relationships between government and property are likewise. And that applies to the positive, nonnormative renderings as well as to the normative ones. Moreover, government and property are so important in modern society and to our sense of both self and personal situation that we must have some personal conception of property, government and their interrelations. These personal conceptions often are quasi-religious and ontological in nature. They are readily subject to wishful thinking, grandiose ideology, and personal material interest. It is, therefore, manifestly difficult to treat these personal conceptions in an objective, arm’s length, and critical manner. The reader is asked, nonetheless, to subject his or her own ideas, the ideas articulated by the contributors, and the ideas presented in this chapter and in the concluding chapter to an objective, arm’s length, and critical analysis. On every point, it is suggested, the reader should ask him or herself, why some position is “true,” in what sense of “true,” over against what alternative position, on what basis does one prefer one position over the other, and on what deeper ground does one prefer that basis over against some alternative basis, and so on. To the expected objection that taking such an approach will result in asking
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questions about the status quo that are dangerous and should not be asked, the replies include, first, what status quo? second, what does that concern about danger say about what property, government, and their interrelationships are really all about? and third, what do you make of alternative answers to the foregoing questions? Like it or not, property and government and their interrelationships are important matters. Unless one has a pretty good idea about what they involve, one is left hanging subject to the winds of wishful thinking, ideology, and personal material interest—hardly a sensible basis on which to conduct civic discourse. All of which brings us to the premier normative premise underlying this work—the value of serious public discussion of important, fundamental issues.
REFERENCES Berle, A., and G.Means. 1933. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan. Blackstone, W. 1765–1769. Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vols.) (II.I.2). Djilas, M. 1957. The New Class. New York: Praeger. Samuels, W.J. 1994. “Property.” Pp. 180–184 in Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics (vol.2), edited by G.M.Hodgson, W.J.Samuels, and M.R.Tool. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. Samuels, W.J. 1974. “An Economic Perspective on the Compensation Problem.” Wayne Law Review 21:113–134. —. 1989. Fundamentals of the Economic Role of Government . Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Samuels, W.J., and N.Mercuro. 1979. “The Role and Resolution of the Compensation Principle in Society: Part One-The Role.” Research in Law and Economics 1:157–194. —. 1980. “The Role and Resolution of the Compensation Principle in Society: Part Two-The Resolution.” Research in Law and Economics 2:103–128. Samuels, W.J., and A.A.Schmid. 1997. “The Concept of Cost in Economics.” In The Economy as a Process of Valuation , edited by W.J.Samuels, S.G.Medema, and A.A.Schmid. Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing.
THE ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT Richard Adelstein
INTRODUCTION In every social system, property stands at the center of the relationship between the individual and the state. Not just the political quality of the regime, but the institutions of its economy and the customs of its people are largely determined by whom the state recognizes as having the authority to control the disposition of objects and ideas, and in whose interests that authority is exercised. This is most obvious in totalitarian systems, where all rights to property lie ultimately in the state, and individuals exert only the control over things that the state, in pursuit of its own interests, chooses to allow them. But it is equally true of market orders based on private property and the individuality of interests. If, as James Madison (1788, p. 356) put it, men were angels, they would see that respecting the property of others is both a guarantee of peace and a means to the advancement of their own purposes, and act accordingly without external compulsion. But real men and women need the power of a state to protect their property and the market that surrounds it, to ensure that they do what they must to preserve the regime of freedom itself. Without the state, then, there is no property. Yet there are obviously profound differences in the political character of states, and much of this variation can ultimately be traced to the attitude of their governing ideologies toward the nature and origins of property, or more specifically, to the answers they offer to the question of whether property precedes the existence of the state or is itself necessarily a product of the state. At any moment in time, and more clearly than in any of their other aspects, it is in the way that different regimes address this question that their essential political and moral qualities are revealed. And as even a brief glance at the constitutional history of the United States suggests, the differing answers given to it by a single people over the course of time may leave a deep and lasting imprint on the development of its political culture and institutions.
LOCKE AND BENTHAM For John Locke (1690), hoping to justify resistance to the sovereignty of a king claiming to govern by divine right, the property of men sprang from the will of God, and government was the instrument men devised to protect it from one
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another’s predations. Much as Luther had argued that man’s spiritual relationship to God was direct and personal, unmediated by the established church, Locke maintained that God did not vest political authority in a king whose prerogatives could only be challenged by an act of blasphemy, but had touched every man as an individual, granting him personal sovereignty in the form of natural rights to liberty and property and the authority to punish those who would deprive him of these rights. The state of nature was thus a regime of private property and free exchange, in which only the unreasoning few would deny their fellows the peaceful enjoyment of their rights. But the threat to order and prosperity posed by these few, coupled with the problems of discipline and proportion that would inevitably attend the efforts of wronged individuals to vindicate their rights on their own, made it rational for every person to renounce the state of nature and join in a contract with the others that would establish a political entity endowed with powers sufficient to secure their liberty and property. The terms of this contract define the nature and the constitutional contours of the state embodied in it. Locke’s contractors do not surrender all their rights; to protect their natural rights to liberty and property, they agree to designate some of their number as agents of the state, a government, and vest in them only their personal right to punish transgressors, and this only so long as the agents use these rights to violence for the specific purpose they were given, the protection of the individual’s remaining pre-existing rights. The contract is not a covenant between individuals and the state, but an agreement among these individuals themselves to create a government of fallible men authorized to exercise limited powers in the name of the state. Like the intangible conventions that induce men to trade useful or beautiful objects for the otherwise worthless bits of paper they agree to call money, the state is an abstraction, a state of mind representing consent to a monopoly of legitimate force that may be benign and protective, threatening and dangerous, fragile and contested, or all of these at once. And as with any ordinary contract at common law, nonperformance is grounds for rescission; if government proves unable to protect the God-given rights to liberty and property it was constituted to defend, or if it threatens those rights itself, the people may withdraw their consent to its powers and, in so doing, dissolve the state and deny legitimacy to its agents. The political implications of this quintessentially liberal vision are crucial. For Locke, the rights and interests of living men and women are not just the starting point of the analysis but, in the end, its only point. Civil society is not, as many American intellectuals would come to understand it two hundred years after the Second Treatise, a reified, purposive collective, ontologically distinct from and politically superior to the individuals who comprise it (Tariello 1982, pp. 53– 69), nor is the abstract state embodied in the contract the active manifestation of this social being in the world of affairs. Government exists solely to protect the pre-existing rights of its individual creators, and has no warrant to make any person an instrument for the welfare of others, individually or collectively, without his consent. The protection of every person’s liberty and property, the
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raison d’etre of government itself, imposes an implicit constitutional constraint on its powers, for in taking one person’s property against his will for the benefit of another, the state’s agents themselves transgress the law of nature and become the very thieves they were commissioned to punish. By 1800, the principle that protecting the right to property was a defining duty of government, enforceable by the courts even against the will of the legislature, had become an axiom of American constitutional jurisprudence. “I cannot,” wrote Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull (1798, pp. 386, 388), “subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legislature or that it is absolute and without control.” A statute that “takes property from A. and gives it to B.” must be void, even if it is not expressly forbidden by the Constitution, since an “act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Nor was this early postulation of natural rights an isolated or idiosyncratic assertion of judicial authority. As the nineteenth century unfolded, where it could not appeal to explicit constitutional text to defend personal property against hostile legislation by the states, the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked the “nature of society and government,” the “principles of natural justice” and “the fundamental maxims of a free governmen” to justify its holdings. 1 As the moral philosophy of John Rawls (1971) and the “constitutional economics” inspired by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s Calculus of Consent (1962) make clear, the contractarian perspective retains great power even today as a framework for the normative analysis of political relations. But as social science, Locke’s theory was dealt a fatal blow by Charles Darwin. Darwin saw human beings not as fully formed, atomistic individuals who had once lived in a presocial state of nature and then purposefully chosen to leave it, but as descendants of the great apes, whose territoriality and group behavior suggested the existence of primitive and culturally heritable forms of property and social organization well before the arrival of homo sapiens and made it impossible to argue seriously for the historical reality of the state of nature or the social contract. And by replacing the teleology of Genesis with the directionlessness of natural selection, Darwin cast the idea of universal, natural human rights itself into grave doubt, making it very hard for modern liberals to argue for their existence to those not already persuaded of it. But the central tenets of Locke’s politics had been challenged well before this. In the midst of the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham (1791, p. 501) derided the idea of natural rights held independently of the state as “nonsense upon stilts” and dismissed the notion of a social contract designed to protect them. The only meaningful rights men possessed were those the state chose to enforce, he argued, and the state’s purpose in creating and allocating these rights should be to maximize the aggregate of individual utilities (Dinwiddy 1989, pp. 25–28, 49–53). The effect of Bentham’s insistence that property was the creation of the state was to stand the relationship between the individual and the collective implied by the Lockean contract on its head. Where Locke had seen the state as the lifeless tool of its sovereign creators, politically subordinate to them and
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constructed to protect their rights, Bentham gave primacy to the interests of the state over those of its individual constituents and assigned it a clear purpose of its own, and if his own characterization of that purpose is at least arguably compatible with the liberal spirit, he nonetheless cleared the way for successors less liberal than he to portray the modern nation-state as an organic, selfinterested being and to ascribe other, more collectively defined objectives to it. And where Locke’s government had been strictly limited in its powers by the constitutional principle of consent and the natural rights of its citizens, Bentham’s legal positivism made the liberty and property of every individual an instrument of the public interest, and freed government from any constraint on its authority not consistent with this broad and malleable collective purpose.
THE TRIUMPH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST For 75 years after the Civil War, variants of these contrasting visions vied for supremacy in the American political economy. As the successful movement to liberalize state incorporation laws and new technologies of mass production and distribution combined to transform the nation’s economy in the second half of the nineteenth century, property that had once been held by real men and women in the form of sole proprietorships and small partnerships increasingly passed into the metaphorical hands of huge limited liability corporations. Clearly not living souls granted liberty and property by the law of nature, but endowed by the law of man with legal personality distinct from their owners and the rights to own property and enter contracts in their own name, these new corporations were an anomalous presence in the Lockean universe. The vast new material wealth they produced brought with it wrenching economic and social dislocation, and as first progressive intellectuals and then the public at large gradually came to perceive these changes in terms of their effects on a broadly defined public interest or on the health of the social organism, state legislatures began to experiment with utilitarian measures that redistributed wealth and regulated private property in ways that could not be reconciled with the contractarian ideology of Calder v. Bull. 2 The response of the federal courts was to use the newly ratified fourteenth amendment to resist these initiatives in the name of fundamental rights whose existence preceded that of the state governments and sharply limited their powers. The fifth amendment, ratified in 1791, protected citizens against deprivation of their lives, liberty and property by the federal government “without due process of law,” protection now extended by the new amendment to state governments as well. Due process had traditionally been held to require only a fair hearing before an appropriate public body before a person’s liberty or property could be taken, but now, led by Justice Stephen Field, the Supreme Court began to add substance to the guarantee of fair procedure by reading into the fourteenth amendment specific limitations on the power of the states to adopt laws that denied or interfered with the individual’s fundamental rights and
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freedoms. But in the new world of Darwin and Bentham, profoundly skeptical of the God-given rights at the core of Locke’s system, what was the origin of these inviolable, pregovernmental rights, and how, precisely, were they to be defined? Field’s solution, first proposed in the context of the new amendment’s privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), was to locate them in the common law brought by the colonists from England as part of their “indubitable rights and liberties” to become the basis for the new legal institutions they would construct in America. Field’s invocation of the common law brilliantly addressed both of the major objections raised by his contemporaries to the older logic of natural rights. If the state of nature had never really existed, and the contract that emerged from it could no longer be taken seriously as fact, no one could doubt the historical reality of the common law and its ancient sources, or the centuries of tradition and practice prior to the creation of the American states that had legitimized it as a judicial check on the power of kings and parliaments. And if the specific content of Locke’s broadly defined natural rights remained contested and uncertain in a complex, modern world, the common law, despite the permanent ambiguity at its margins that propelled its evolution, offered an easily apprehended set of principles from which a closed and relatively fixed list of rights could be derived. Dissenting in Slaughterhouse, Field had unsuccessfully invoked the common law right to ply a lawful trade in support of Louisiana meat packers who claimed that a legislatively enforced monopoly in the local market denied them their fundamental rights. But the Court was soon persuaded of the virtues of reading pre-existing individual rights into the Constitution. By 1887, stressing that “the courts are at liberty—indeed are under a solemn duty—to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority,” it made clear that it would strike down on due process grounds any state statute it found to be “a palpable invasion of the rights secured by the fundamental law.” 3 Ten years later, Field’s crusade to establish the sanctity of Lockean rights against the rising tide of Benthamism was crowned with success in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), as Justice Rufus Peckham, voiding a statute regulating insurance contracts, expansively defined the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment against the state’s claim of power to legislate in the public interest. That liberty, he wrote, means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. “Has not,” he asked, “a citizen of a State…a right to contract outside of the State
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for insurance on his property—a right of which state legislation cannot deprive him?” 4 Thus began the era of substantive due process, a period of some 40 years in which the Court struck down dozens of state and federal regulatory statutes intended to advance the public interest on the ground that they unreasonably abridged fundamental liberties protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, most often the freedom of contract identified in Allgeyer. In this, the Court reflected the ambivalence of the people themselves. On the one hand, the rapid changes in economic relations and the conditions of daily life brought about by industrialization seemed to threaten the well-being of the nation as a whole and fueled the demand for corrective legislation, but on the other, it was clear that the movement for reform had greatly extended the reach of government and resulted in new and sometimes questionable limitations on rights and freedoms to which the majority of Americans had long been accustomed. 5 But the Court’s defense of Lockean principle was fatally compromised from the start. Urged on by Stephen Field, the Court held in 1886 that corporations as such were “person” within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and thus as entitled to the protection of the due process clause as any living man or woman. 6 For this, there was no justification, either in the logic of natural law or the liberal impulse that motivated legislation to preserve the autonomy and dignity of ordinary people against the corrosive effects of industrialization. By 1920, it was apparent that the principal beneficiaries of substantive due process were not working men and women, as Peckham’s rhetoric seemed to imply, but their corporate employers, shielded by the Court from legislation meant to level the playing field in their dealings with workers. Soon, an antimajoritarian doctrine that had always been unpopular was made intolerable by the Depression, and in 1937 the Court abandoned it, reading liberty of contract out of the fourteenth amendment and forswearing interference in the states’ efforts to legislate the greatest good for the greatest number. 7 The triumph of positive law in the public interest seemed complete.
BENTHAM AND LOCKE REDUX But the Lockean impulse could not be entirely stilled. By 1973, a Court committed to fundamental liberties had once again made the due process clause the vehicle for a challenge to Benthamism, first in its expansion of the procedural rights of criminal defendants in state courts 8 and then in its resurrection of substantive due process, this time in the context of a fundamental right to privacy in matters of contraception and abortion. 9 More recently still, the idea of pregovernmental rights has also been revived in the area of constitutional law that speaks most directly to the concept of property as Locke and Bentham understood it, the problem of “takings.” The Framers themselves provided that private property “shall [not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,” thus writing into the fifth
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amendment both the ancient doctrine of eminent domain, the power of government to take private property for public use against the will of its owner, and its limiting corollary, firmly established in common law by the seventeenth century, that fair payment must be made for the taking. 10 But they also recognized that the same common law that encoded the Lockean principle of compensation also gave government broad, often implicit police powers to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public through appropriate legislation, with no need to compensate those dis-advantaged by the enactment. The Framers saw no contradiction in this. The takings clause was not intended to abrogate the police power, but to ensure that the government’s actual taking of title to land or other property would always be accomplished by eminent domain, with just compensation paid to the owner. Because the concept of property itself was closely linked to physical possession or control of tangible objects, the line separating eminent domain from the police power was sharply drawn. Legislatures typically employed the police power to regulate or limit the use of private property rather than to take title to it, so regulatory legislation, even where its effect was to render property whose title remained in the owner all but worthless, was rarely seen to raise the question of compensation under the takings clause. Thus, for example, in Mugler v. Kansas (1887) the Court, despite its foreshadowing of substantive due process, denied compensation to owners of breweries for the substantial devaluation of their property in the wake of the state’s prohibition of liquor. By 1900, however, the law’s traditional identification of property with possession had largely been supplanted by the more complex idea that property is, as the economist Richard T.Ely (1914, p. 60) put it, a “bundle of rights” with each stick in the bundle representing the legal authority to use or dispose of an object in a particular way. Property in an object was thus not just one right of possession or control, but a potentially infinite number of rights to specific uses that might be held (or traded) simultaneously by different individuals and the state itself. In Mugler, for example, the state could now be said to have taken from its owner only the single right to use his facility as a brewery, leaving him in full possession of the other sticks in the bundle, the rights to use it for all the other purposes not addressed by the prohibition statute. New legislative regulation of private property could thus be interpreted as a seizure of one of the sticks, and thus a compensable taking of property, even where the owner’s legal title was not disturbed. Ely himself, decidedly a Benthamite but not always a friend of aggressive government, made just this argument (1914, pp. 200–226), and saw it adopted by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon (1922), in which owners of subsurface coal were granted compensation for the almost total destruction of the economic value of their property by a statute that forbade mining the coal but left title to it in the owners. But Mahon opened a Pandora’s box for the Court. The new principle it announced remained extremely vague; all Justice Holmes could say was that “The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking” (1922, p.
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415). The clarity of the earlier distinction between eminent domain and the police power was entirely lost, and every new act of regulation now raised the question of whether compensation must be paid to those adversely affected by it, a question to which Locke and Bentham suggest very different answers. For the Lockean, government’s defining role as the guardian of pre-existing rights implies that any regulation of property, no matter how urgent the public’s desire for it, must be compensated unless the regulation is intended to eliminate a common law nuisance, that is, to prevent an owner from using his property so as to infringe upon the rights of others. But for the Benthamite, for whom property rights are granted solely by the state in the interests of the public, the essential subordination of individual interests to those of the public presumptively places all legislation within the police power and requires compensation only where the larger public interest would be served by paying it. Cut from the moorings of the earlier rule, the Court since Mahon has vacillated for some 80 years between these contrasting philosophies, carried this way and that by the ideological currents of the day, unable to settle upon any clear or durable theory of the takings clause. 11 In the mid-1960s, Frank Michelman (1967) offered a general solution to the problem, anchored in a Benthamism that, unlike the standard of wealth maximization that had by then come to dominate neoclassical welfare economics, left room in the calculation of social utility for personal, subjective costs and benefits created by such nonmaterial factors as the fairness of the income distribution and the degree of sympathy observers might feel toward those affected by the regulation. Michelman’s utilitarianism, itself a reflection of the commitment to active government characteristic of the 1960s, encouraged an expansive view of the police power and left its mark on the court, which in 1978 denied compensation to owners of structures designated as historic landmarks for the costs imposed by statutory restrictions on their use. 12 But by then, the ideological winds had already begun to shift, and Michelman’s analysis was soon countered by the explicit Lockeanism of Richard Epstein (1985), who argued for strict limits on the government’s power to regulate without compensation and who, like Stephen Field, drew the fundamental rights and obligations at the base of his system from the English common law. Epstein’s position too found support in the Court, which in 1992 held that compensation must be paid to owners of seafront property adversely affected by environmental regulations. 13 But the tortuous history of the takings problem makes clear that it, like the larger ontological dispute between Locke and Bentham that underlies it, is not a matter to be settled by logic or experiment. As Richard T.Ely recognized long ago, the controversy turns ultimately on the ontological and normative commitments we bring to it, and as these commitments change with time, the line separating the police power from eminent domain will shift along with them. “The police power,” he wrote in 1914, “is the power of the courts to interpret the concept property…and to give the concept a content at each particular period in our development which fits it to serve the general welfare” (Ely 1914, pp. 206–207). For good or ill, in a
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democracy such as ours this may in the end be the most important thing of all to be said about the relationship between government and property.
NOTES 1. Fletcher v.Peck (1810, p. 135); Terrett v.Taylor (1815, p. 52); Wilkinson v.Leland (1829, p. 657). See also Tribe (1988, pp. 560–562). 2. Tariello (1982, pp. 97–114); Wiebe (1967); Fine (1956). 3. Mugler v. Kansas (1887, p. 661). 4. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897, pp. 589, 590–591). 5. Compare Fiss (1993, pp. 155–184). 6. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886). 7. West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (1937). 8. Through the doctrine of “selective incorporation,” the Court found certain of the procedural rights protected by the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937, p. 325) and thus binding upon the states as well as the federal government. See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio (1962); Gideon v. Wainwright (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana (1968); Henkin (1963). 9. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); Roe v. Wade (1973). 10. Thus, the right to compensation “is not inherent in the concept of eminent domain but is imposed upon the sovereign government by constitutional and statutory enactments. So universal has the requirement of compensation become, however, that for practical purposes any working definition of eminent domain must now include it” (Netherton 1968, p. 39, emphasis in original). On the historical origins of these principles, see Lenhoff (1942, pp. 596–601); Ely, Jr. (1992, pp. 23–24). The “takings clause” of the fifth amendment was held to bind the states through the fourteenth amendment in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago (1897). 11. Cf. Michelman (1967, pp. 1183–1202). 12. Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City (1978). 13. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992).
REFERENCES Allgeyer v. Louisiana 1897. 165 U.S. 578. Bentham, J. 1791. Anarchical Fallacies . In The Works of Jeremy Bentham (vol. 2), edited by J. Bowring. Edinburgh: William Tait. Buchanan, J., and G.Tullock 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Calder v. Bull 1798. 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago 1897. 166 U.S. 226. Dinwiddy, J. 1989. Bentham. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duncan v. Louisiana 1968. 391 U.S. 145.
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Ely, J., Jr. 1992. The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights . New York: Oxford University Press. Ely, R.T. 1914. Property and Contract in Their Relation to the Distribution of Wealth (2 vols.). New York: Macmillan. Epstein, R.A. 1985. Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fine, S. 1956. Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Fiss, O. 1993. History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Volume VIII: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888–1910 . New York: Macmillan. Fletcher v. Peck 1810. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87. Gideon v. Wainwright 1963. 372 U.S. 335. Griswold v. Connecticut 1965. 381 U.S. 479. Henkin, L. 1963. “‘Selective Incorporation’ in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yale Law Journal 73: 74–88. Lenhoff, A. 1942. “Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain.” Columbia Law Review 42: 596–638. Locke, J. 1690. Two Treatises of Government , edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 1992. 505 U.S. 1003. Madison, J. 1788. “Federalist #51.” In The Federalist , edited by B.F.Wright. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961. Mapp v. Ohio 1962. 367 U.S. 643. Michelman, F. 1967. “Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law.” Harvard Law Review 80:1165– 1258. Mugler v. Kansas 1887. 123 U.S. 272. Netherton, R. 1968. “Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain.” Land and Water Law Review 3:33–57. Palko v. Connecticut 1937. 302 U.S. 319. Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City 1978. 438 U.S. 104. Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon 1922. 260 U.S. 393. Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roe v. Wade 1973. 410 U.S. 113. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 1886. 118 U.S. 394. Slaughterhouse Cases 1873. 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36. Tariello, F. 1982. The Reconstruction of American Political Ideology, 1865– 1971 . Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Terrett v. Taylor 1815. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43. Tribe, L. 1988. American Constitutional Law (2nd ed.). Mineola, NY: Foundation Press. West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish 1937. 300 U.S. 379. Wiebe, R. 1967. The Search for Order, 1877–1920 . New York: Hill and Wang. Wilkinson v. Leland 1829. 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 627.
GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PROPERTY OWNERSHIP: HOBBES MEETS GILLIGAN David Anderson
INTRODUCTION For life itself, property and government are inessential and separable, but from the standpoint of maximizing social welfare, they are essential and inseparable. While government is not a necessary ingredient in property creation, the lineage of government goes back to the desire to allocate and defend property. Traditionally, conservatives have asked government to protect existing, often inherited property rights so as to preserve the hierarchical order of society. Liberal capitalists favor competitive individualism and the natural right for middle-class workers to own property as a reward for labor. Socialists want a cooperative society based on the collective ownership of property. And in their Communist Manifesto (1848), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels suggest that with collective ownership, a government with the primary function of protecting property rights would be unnecessary. Today’s governments reflect a sometimes healthy conflict between these influences. Secular governments are relatively new, the act of governance at all is older. Many primitive societies appear to have been quite democratic: Sumeria (5000 to 2500 BCE), Native American Anasazi (1000 CE to present) and nineteenth century New Guinea were all run by elders who were also responsible for overseeing the religious sector. Egyptian government from c. 3000 BCE to Roman times was a national phenomenon, both religious and political. People have been living in groups for some 40,000 years, usually with the cooperation of the religious and political sectors; the holy rites were used to empower the leaders and hold off chaos. Until modern times, however, most parts of the world were not under any government at all or for long. Consider America before Cortes arrived in 1426; the Aztec controlled Mexico in a theocratic dictatorship begun in 1300, but all of North America and Canada hosted nomadic populations whose use of land was not protected by the authority of government. What is the relationship between the institutions of government and property? Generally speaking, government is the elder sibling that takes care of property when it is in trouble. Government is not necessary for property to exist, but in a state of anarchy, it would be easier for the envious to take property and for the disrespectful to abuse it. Of course, what big brother does with property is not
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always what is best for society. Government can mishandle property with greater force than the individuals it dominates, or it can improve and protect property with less combined effort. This essay explains the fundamentals of the relationship between government and property, with an emphasis on government’s potential to serve the common good.
DEFINITIONS Too many of the main points of contention regarding the tangled roles of government and property result from inconsistencies in the definitions of both institutions. Thus, semantics are the first order of business. To define property to include one’s self, as English philosopher John Locke did (1947, Second Treatise, chap. 5, p. 27), trivializes all issues of whether property is necessary for life or whether government is necessary for the existence of property. Sure, we can say that every person is his or her own property, but abstraction from this consolation permits a more meaningful discussion. On the other hand, the fact that we have bodies pre-cludes us from excusing ourselves from the issues discussed here by saying we are not materialists. To exist is to have a body that necessitates space, food, and shelter. A similar inability to make significant statements exists when government is loosely defined. The difference between a brain trust and an effective government, as between a band of brigands and a corrupt government, is largely size. Saint Augustine quotes a captured pirate as saying to Alexander the Great, “Because I [keep hostile possession of the sea] with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art styled emperor” (1934, p. 140). Size and strength can convey authority. Government authority can be gained by acclimation from the populace as in a democracy, or solely through military might. Neither source of authority assures prosperity or despair, although democratic elections provide obvious incentives for selfish goals to translate into actions that benefit larger contingencies. The history of property allocation under each type of authority bears evidence that these incentives matter. The socialist governmental system speaks of ownership by all, but how does this differ from ownership by none, if the individual has no ability to alter or sell what is “owned”? It is of little virtue to own title to property if the title does not convey privilege. Austrian political economist Carl Menger (1963) described property as the only solution to the disparity between requirements for and the availability of resources. This allocative function of property is not achieved if ownership does not convey the ability to master a scarce resource. A meaningful definition of property must include a provision for the ability to control or make decisions about the resource in question. To own something and not have control over it is different from non-ownership only due to one’s ability to say, “I own this.” This type of ownership may have value in one’s mind; many would find enjoyment in knowing they own a national park or a star, but if
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ownership has no associated prerogatives, why not decree that everyone owns everything? Government ownership of land, buildings, and infrastructure means that citizens can gain access, if that, and occasional access is not ownership. If it were, we would own every free country and every retail establishment, by virtue of being able to gain occasional access to them. For the purposes of this essay, let property be defined as anything in which one can have a vulnerable controlling interest, and let government be defined as an organized body that exercises authority.
IS GOVERNMENT NECESSARY? Many authors have argued that government is essential. English philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote that “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war…. In such a condition there is no place for industry…no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short” (1946, p. 82). Locke also speaks of insecurity in a stateless society: “This makes [an individual] willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others…for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name—property” (1947, First Treatise, chap. 9, p. 123). English philosopher T.H. Green (1964, p. 53) said, “It is only through the guarantee which society gives him that he has property at all, or strictly speaking, any right to his possessions.” And according to Italian theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, “It is lawful for a man to hold private property; and it is necessary for the carrying on of human life” (1964, II-II, q. 66, art. 1). In the United States, movements against government involvement in religion, and more recently in the arts, the welfare of the poor, and “big government” itself have elevated the proportion of government’s responsibility that lies with the protection of property. Is government necessary for property, and indirectly, for life itself? Government, as defined above, is not necessary for the existence of property. There is property in the absence of government, although in an immoral world, it can be more difficult to control than under the best possible government. On the other hand, governments can and do seize property. And Marx (1948, p. 23) summed up the theory of the Communists as simply, “Abolition of private property.” Thus, private property is only possible in the absence of a communist system of government. We need not fall into a fantasy akin to Gilligan’s Island to see property ownership without government. Cave dwellers enjoyed property ownership without government, as have people in nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Africa, for example, when and where a government was not in
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effect. If Washington, D.C. were to fall into the Potomac, property in the United States would not disappear; it would simply go to those who can defend it for as long as they can defend it, and then it would belong to someone new. That system of property ownership also applies today, but our need for defense is less common, and our defensive tools include the courtroom and police in addition to weapons and other anti-theft devices. As populations become more dense and less respectful, the private defense of property becomes more costly and less successful. It is the norms and ethical standards of a community that determine its need for government protection of property. In Osaka, Japan, for example, coins placed in shrines on public sidewalks are untouched despite the existence of notably few police officers. In London, England, police seldom find it necessary to carry firearms. In other places (not named to avoid offense, not for lack of examples), government gunmen line the streets to counteract immoral behavior. In the United States, the aggregate burden of crime exceeds $1 trillion annually (Anderson 1999). French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1901) argued that humans are essentially good, but corrupted by society. Governments play a role in shaping society. Through education and welfare programs, and with leaders who are good role models, government itself can foster the type of moral climate that makes its capacity as forceful defender less necessary. In 1913, German sociologist Max Weber wrote that “the modern economic order under modern conditions could not continue if its control of resources were not upheld by the legal compulsion of the state” (1978, p. 65). This is probably closer to the truth. Property would exist without government, but its allocation might be different from that which would exist under a particular governmental system. Consider a few scenarios for the need and influence of government. Where property is uncontested, organized protection is unnecessary, and a government interested merely in providing security would have little effect. As new lands were discovered on the earth and new galaxies are discovered in outer space, there is little or no immediate need to protect them. Similarly, we do not currently need assistance to own a controlling interest in some air. Every continent, ocean floor, and planet experiences a period during which some of its riches are as abundant as the gold in Voltaire’s E1 Dorado. Government is not necessary to allocate that which is free for the taking. We also do not need government protection where property is scarce but uncontested. This can be the case among groups with too little to be worth stealing (monks), too much for it to be worth the trouble to steal (Harvard board members), or too much respect to challenge one another’s property. The satiation of wants, moral enlightenment, and having too much to lose from conflict also dim contention. Of course, a governmental body could exist to reallocate property or serve other functions, for better or worse.
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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT? Government does not create property, but it can help to minimize the cost of property ownership. Government can protect our property from other individuals and other governments, and from ourselves. Some parts of a government may even protect us from other parts of the same government. In the preamble to his Economic Bill of Rights, then-President Ronald Reagan (1987) said, “To protect your right to own and use your property, my administration will pursue successful efforts in the courts to restore your constitutional rights when the government at any level attempts to take your property through regulation or other means.” Government regulations on pollution, efforts towards diplomacy, and limits on the power held by any person or organization prevent ignorance and greed from bringing apocalypse or Armageddon that would end the usefulness of everything we own. The destruction of war, the desperation of poverty, and the agony of disease are all within the bounds of government intervention, and all are addressed by some governments today. Unfortunately, Darwin’s theory of evolution foretells that those who act to benefit themselves endure, and governments guided by selfish human nature tend to work towards alternative goals. Property is too often allocated to satisfy short-run goals with little attention to the long-run consequences. We see this in the alleged destruction of the ozone, rainforests, and native habitat at the expense of future land (due to erosion, and an increase in ocean levels resulting from global warming), oxygen (due to the loss of green plants which produce it), and medicinal cures (due to the loss of plant and animal species). When acting more wisely, government can increase the value of our property by providing public goods and correcting for external effects as discussed below. As English economist David Ricardo (1911) points out, the easy exchange of property is crucial to our production and standard of living. Allocating property to those who are able to enhance its value, or those who value it the most, is the key to efficiency. The harder it is for a potter to receive clay, the fewer and more expensive are pots. If the owner of a cow values it at $100 and can deliver it to another who values it at $200, and the cow sells for a price between $100 and $200, both parties are better off. It is a role of government to facilitate such commerce by providing infrastructure and protecting each side from fraud and breach of contract. It is apparent in the economic literature that incentives matter. Humans respond to incentives, and if the incentive is to conquer the property of others, that will be attempted. But government can assist by setting up incentives not to create property disputes. If property is contested and government does not exist, property will be allocated to those with the greatest might. One can imagine that in prehistoric times, the strongest cave dwellers held controlling interests in the largest caves near a water source. Likewise, dominant Native American tribes,
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outlaws, and settlers held the lion’s share of property in the western United States prior to the emergence of government rule. Property exists without government, but relative to its provision under a capitalist system, ownership belongs to those individuals or groups who are best able to defend their property, and when there are many capable parties in competition, ownership may change hands frequently. One purpose of government is to protect our rights to property by limiting the expense and uncertainty associated with uncivilized dispute resolution. Dispute Resolution The instinct to acquire keeps us alive, but tempts our moral fibers. At the time of this writing, the richest person in the world is in court trying to acquire even more through allegedly monopolistic activities. The proletariat are abusing the commons, the bourgeoisie are mowing their lawns a few feet wider than their true property lines, and the bureaucrats are taking credit for each other’s contributions in an attempt to win the corner office. It is natural for those who do not own a valuable piece of property to envy those who do, or challenge those with conflicting claims. If one’s envy or need for another’s property is strong, government may be asked to defend the property, carrying its unique license for the legal use of physical force in its back pocket. It can also offer assistance with the needs behind the quest for others’ belongings. If property rights are not clearly defined, government can determine who gets what. When property is not protected by dominant government, civilized dispute resolution becomes less likely. Courts, the keystone institution of dispute resolution at last resort, have little influence when they do not have the backing of a stalwart government. International conflicts reveal the dangers of limited authority. Because there is no government with authority over the planet, decisions made by international courts often have little bearing on disputed property ownership. Check today’s newspaper for the latest example of property being allocated based on contests between deadly war machines. Dispute resolution within regions that lack a government or other form of decision making exacts large tolls from everyone involved. Public Goods Beyond defining and protecting property rights, government helps to allocate goods and services that would be over- or under-consumed if private individuals were left to their own devices. When hungry mouths are fed and roofs are put over children’s heads by a government program, society benefits. The recipients need not resort to desperate attempts to steal the property of others in order to survive. They need not exhibit their humiliating state as beggars on public sidewalks, grating on the consciences of passers by and depressing property values. Crime rates decrease and life becomes relatively pleasant for rich and poor alike. The benefits from not having to live amid starvation and despair are
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non-rival and non-excludable; one’s enjoyment of a relatively safe, happy environment does not preclude another’s enjoyment, nor can one exclude another from this enjoyment. Economists refer to goods defined this way as public goods. Individuals looking to maximize their wealth have an incentive to claim disinterest in such goods, hoping to rely on others to provide them. The ensuing free rider problem is that the private provision of roads, parks, and the military, which enhance and protect property values, would be inadequate as individuals feign disapproval. Government collects taxes and pays for public goods for the benefit of all. Externalities Property owners also make decisions that effect the property of others. When we decide how many miles to drive in our cars, how many widgets to produce in our factories, and how many years of education to fund for our children, our choices are likely to be based on private costs and benefits, without consideration of their effects on others. To the extent that this is true, the invisible hand which Scottish political economist Adam Smith (1776) said would guide self-interested parties to promote the public interest, might mishandle the situation. We drive our car until the additional benefit to us from going another mile is less than the additional cost. From a societal standpoint, however, we will drive too far if we only consider the cost of auto maintenance and gasoline, and not the cost of pollution, road congestion, and other potential harm to others. Likewise, we will produce too many widgets and educate our children too little if we do not internalize the costs and benefits felt beyond or “external to” ourselves. The work of English economist Ronald Coase (1960) suggests that market failure will not result from such externalities if all affected parties can bargain to an efficient solution. For example, if noise from the cobbler’s work is eroding the value of the rental property next door, and the harm to the property owner is $200 a week while the cobbler’s profit from that work is $100 a week, the property owner could pay the cobbler some amount between $100 and $200 (say, $150) a week to end that type of production and both parties would be better off. This assumes agreement that the cobbler has the right to make noise. It also assumes that the transaction costs associated with the negotiation-the costs of identifying and contacting the relevant parties, assessing costs and benefits, and creating and enforcing contracts-are not prohibitive. Efficient private solutions to problems involving many parties or complex issues are less likely. In those cases, government can step in to tax or limit activities causing negative externalities, and subsidize or otherwise promote activities that cause positive externalities. This is why we see governments subsidizing research, education, tree planting, and drug rehabilitation, while taxing or restricting the use of tobacco, gasoline, alcohol, and toxic emissions.
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CONCLUSIONS Government is not a creator, but a crutch, for property ownership. Property would still exist in the absence of government, but it might be allocated differently, and the costs of any necessary protection or public goods provision would be higher than under the best-possible system of government. Of course, the property allocations enforced by governments are not necessarily superior to an every-man-for-himself scenario. Governments can and have abetted destruction and despair. In the view of this author, the most fundamental statement that can be made about the relationship between government and property is that in the face of covetousness and transaction costs, governments have the potential to define property ownership and reduce the costs of its provision.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to a number of contemporary American philosophers for their contributions and critiques, including Daniel Stroup, Donna Anderson, Nayef Samhat, Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Anderson, Sarah M.Harvieux, and Kevin Floyd.
REFERENCES Anderson, D.A. 1999. “The Aggregate Burden of Crime.” Journal of Law and Economics 42(2) (October) Forthcoming. Aquinas, Saint T. 1964. Summa Theologica . New York: McGraw-Hill. Augustine, Saint. 1934. The City of God , translated by M.Dods. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Coase, R. 1960. “The Problem with Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3(October): 1–38. Green, T.H. 1964. The Political Theory of T.H.Green , edited by J.R.Rodman. New York: Meredith. Hobbes, T. 1946. Leviathan , edited by M.Oakeshott. Oxford: Blackwell. Locke, J. 1947. Two Treatises of Government . New York: Hafner. Marx, K., and F.Engels. 1948. The Communist Manifesto . New York: International. Menger, C. 1963. Problems of Economics and Sociology , edited by F.J.Nock. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Reagan, R. 1987. America’s Economic Bill of Rights. Speech, July 3. Ricardo, D. 1911. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation . New York: E.P.Dutton.
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Rousseau, J.J. 1901. “The Social Contract.” In Famous Utopias. New York: Tudor. Smith, A. 1776. The Wealth of Nations . New York: Penguin. Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society , edited by G.Roth and C.Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.
DISAGGREGATING THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW C.Edwin Baker
INTRODUCTION 1 Defending or critiquing property has long been the stuff of politics. The libertarian assertion that taxation is theft duplicates neatly the Marxist claim that property is theft. Thus, no political theorist would be surprised that constitutional disputes often involve assertions about property rights. More interesting is the extraordinary lesson taught by the Supreme Court’s treatment of property claims. To put this lesson most boldly, property is not a single concept; it is not a single package to which a Justice offers a level of protection based on her particular ideology. Rather, property involves a diverse set of claimed rights that further different functions which have different normative valances. In contrast, the popular view of property as a single concept gives the political right undue ideological leverage by allowing it to rely on those rights of property that should be immune from political control to prop up public support for other property rights. And a unified conception inclines the left toward misguided Utopian projects. Modern theorists see property as a bundle of rights. An owner, for example, might have a right to use land or objects to relax, eat, sleep, play, or create. And she might also have a right to be able to invite others to engage in these activities with her; to keep others, including the government, out; to prevent the government from taking her property or prevent it from doing so unless various conditions, such as payment of compensation, are met; to build an aesthetically atrocious structure or cut down her beautiful sugar maples; to give her land or objects to another; or, finally, to sell or exchange them for desired performances by an exchange partner. The point of the notion of a bundle of rights is that a person could have almost any of these rights without having others. The lesson from constitutional law embodies but implicitly goes beyond this modern “bundle of rights” notion of property. The additional point is that the normative status of a particular type of property right varies depending on the function the right serves. Different normative status does not mean so much how important the function is but rather how the claim should be treated by the collective political and legal order. Therefore, once this normative disaggregation of the bundle occurs, the unified conception of property can be seen to serve mainly ideological or sloganizing functions. By allowing a claimant of a particular right to associate her claim with other entirely different rights which have different normative implications, the unified conception
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distorts thought. In contrast, disaggregation opens up intellectual space-for example, it makes a view such as “libertarian socialism” a plausible entry into political debate rather than an oxymoron. Interestingly, the crucible of constitutional litigation has often focused attention in a manner that has led the Supreme Court, with periodic lapses, to follow the recommendations of this disaggregation approach. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will quickly review the main provisions in the United States Constitution relating to private property. Then I will discuss this disaggregation thesis.
THE LAW The source of property-as opposed to the source of material objects-is in collective practices such as custom or, more relevantly for the modern world, law. Property (or ownership) is not a natural matter; it is a legal relation between people or between a person and government and it exists only in communities. This insight might imply that in democracies the collective should have unrestricted authority to decide what property rights to recognize and how to sculpt their content. But this has not quite been the case in the United States. Courts have often found government decisions to be constitutional violations of property rights. This history of court intervention suggests one common reading of the American experience: conservative judges use constitutional protection of property (and of freedom of contract) to block progressive, often egalitarian, democratic policies. If this were the entire report, the obvious lesson would be that a democratic country should avoid either the institution of judicial review or any constitutional status for property. However, on closer examination, the American experience teaches a more complex lesson. Under the single rubric of property, very different claims serving different values are made and their constitutional treatment has varied depending on the value at stake. This observation suggests the thesis of this paper: the notion of property should be disaggregated with the status of any claimed right varying depending on the value or function it serves. Constitutional provision for private property 2 is sometimes thought to consist of two texts in the Fifth Amendment: the so-called “due process clause” that “[n]o person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” and the “takings clause” – “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Commentators also often consider the provision prohibiting a state from “impairing the law of contracts” [Art. I, Sec. 10], which was frequently invoked during the second half of the nineteenth century to strike down progressive legislation, to involve constitutional protection of property. Despite the common focus on the above texts, other provisions can involve property. 3 The First Amendment often protects a person’s use of property in her
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expressive or communicative activities 4 –leading, for example, to Liebling’s suggestion that freedom of the press belongs only to the person who owns one (Liebling 1981, p. 32). The Third Amendment restricts the government’s authority to quarter soldiers in people’s houses. 5 The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” of the people’s “houses, papers, and effects.” The Eighth Amendment protects property by prohibiting “excessive fines.” The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits ownership of people. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of the “equal protection of the laws” has little obvious relation to property rights. Still, early in this century courts invoked equal protection to strike down various economic regulations that were said to unequally restrict property rights. More recently, the equal protection clause has supported some egalitarian claims to those resources needed to serve a person’s basic needs. Finally are the aspects of the Constitution that Americans would be most likely to forget. As many as ten provisions in the original Constitution directly or indirectly supported treatment of human beings as property, specifically as slaves (Wiecek 1977, pp. 62–64). Still, because of their centrality in constitutional history and direct relevance to the ideological debates about private property, the Fifth Amendment’s due process and takings clauses merit special attention. First, consider due process. Some commentators reasonably prefer to read the guarantee that a person will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” only to require appropriate procedures (Linde 1970). Nevertheless, through logic that was internally coherent but relied on premises now almost universally rejected, the Supreme Court once used this guarantee to protect substantive property rights. During a 40 year Lochner-era (Lochner v. New York 1905), the Supreme Court issued by some counts over 175 decisions finding laws regulating property or economic activities unconstitutional. It invalidated laws providing for minimum wages or maximum hours of work, regulating prices or entry into business, and prohibiting discrimination against union members. After the Court rejected the reasoning underlying Lochner (West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 1937), repudiation of the Lochner approach to due process became a major cornerstone of modern constitutional law. Later generations divided only on the question of precisely where the earlier Court went wrong. Was the mistake: (1) that the activist Court was generally too ready to invalidate laws as unconstitutional, thereby thwarting democracy? Or (2) that it ignored the specific language of the Constitution? Or (3) merely that its substantive conclusions about property and liberty were misguided, leading to improper protection of property and market freedom? The clear result of this history, however, is that the Court and all but a few extreme right-wing scholars now accept as unproblematic that the Constitution does not significantly limit governments’ power to regulate the economic sphere-at least as long as the regulation avoids unconstitutional discrimination, for example, on the basis of race or sex, and violates no other specific protection of individual’s civil liberties, such as their rights of free speech and freedom from unreasonable
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searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment’s takings clause—“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”—has a somewhat different history. Commentators agree that the takings clause has proper applications but often disagree about what those applications are. Three elements receive considerable attention: (1) What action constitutes a taking? (2) Does the constitutional provision implicitly deny government the power to take property except for public use and, if so, what is a “public use” and who decides? And (3) what compensation is just? I put the third question aside except to note that courts assert that compensation requires a “perfect equivalent” and then, in an overtly ideological reductionism, apparently assume that such a “full and exact” equivalent can take the form of money. Although a monetary equivalent for goods held for sale is easily imaginable, an exact equivalence makes much less sense in respect to a sacred site, a local community, or an ancestral home. As to the second question, most commentators agree that a taking, even with compensation, 6 is only permissible for a legitimate “public” as opposed to a mere private use. However, essentialist criteria for “public” have been rejected at least since 1937. This leaves only democratic discussions and decision to identify or formulate the public’s interest. Consequently, the political decisions about “publicness” are not seriously reexamined by the judiciary (Berman v.Parker 1954; Hawaii Housing Authority v.Midkiff 1984). Identification of a “taking” is controversial. Mandatory transfer of title or effective ouster of an owner from possession of land, manufacturing plants, or moveable property is routinely considered a “taking” unless the government properly imposed the deprivation as a punishment or forfeiture due to misdeeds. The area of controversy is whether regulations that, for example, destroy all or a significant portion of the economic value of property or prohibit particular desired uses or require (limited) pubic uses of property constitute a taking? Throughout the twentieth century, the consistent answer is “yes” for regulations that go “too far” -but what is “too far” is endlessly disputed (cf. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 1978). Certainly, regulations can be almost as detrimental to the owner as loss of title and can serve the government’s interests as well as gaining title. Imagine the government wanting a park. Rather than buying the land, the government might zone the particular private plot of land as scenic, prohibit all commercial uses, deny the owner power to exclude trespassers, and require the owner to maintain park-like facilities. Has a taking occurred? A judge might find that, individually, none of these regulations is a taking. A likely “yes” answer to their combination reflects the fact that courts sometimes find regulations to be takings for which the Constitution requires compensation even though title is not taken and some “ownership” rights remain (cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 1992).
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DISAGGREGATION THESIS The “disaggregation thesis” embodies five points: First, a variety of rights are asserted under the common label of property. Second, collectively, property rights serve multiple values or functions. Third, most individual property “rights” relate predominately to some values or functions and not to others. Fourth, normatively persuasive reasons support constitutional guarantees relating to some of these values but not to others. Finally, from these three points it follows that the constitutional question should not be how much protection to give property; rather the question should be whether particular values justify constitutional protection for the type of claim asserted. Constitutional litigation reveals seven functions served by property. 7 First, property rights, and the rules relating to property, serve to structure the societal allocation of resources to productive or otherwise desired uses. This is the allocative function. Second, especially within the process of exchange, control over property is a basis of personal power. Property provides the owner with a means to get another to do what that other would not choose to do except for the owner’s ability to transfer ownership of property. This normatively ambiguous power I label the sovereignty function (Cohen 1927; see also Kessler 1943). Third, both injustice and civic passivity can result from the government’s capacity to invidiously pick on, burden, manipulate, or discriminatorily exploit a person. Property rights that provide (limited) protection from this invidious, arbitrary treatment perform a protective function. Fourth, property can serve a privacy function to the extent that an owner controls space from which she can exclude others. As the negative example of George Orwell’s 1984 illustrates, the capacity to escape periodically from unwanted observation can be essential for the development of personality, for dignity, as well as for the thought, discussions, and experiments crucial for developing cultural and political alternatives. Fifth, without any orientation toward eventual market exchanges, people constantly use property in their everyday life. This is the use function or “use value” of property. Two sorts of use might be highlighted for their special normative importance. People sometimes intertwine their identity or personhood in certain objects. Rights in these objects can support a personhood function (Radin 1982). Finally, resources can satisfy various basic needs-for example, for food or warmth or medical attention needed for survival. Property rights serve a welfare function to the extent that they provide for at least minimal levels of those goods or opportunities perceived as basic to meaningful life and full membership within a given society. Although other functional listings are possible, most could be restated in terms of one or more of these seven-the allocative, sovereignty, protective, privacy, use, personhood, and welfare functions. Thus, the first important observation is that property rights play normatively distinguishable roles. Even
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more important, different property claims usually implicate different functions. This variability makes possible varying the constitutional treatment or status of the property claim depending on the function at stake. Below, I briefly consider the constitutional treatment of each. Allocative Property rules make contributions to achieving desirable allocations of resources. A modern society depends heavily on the effectiveness of its economic order. A desirable allocation involves getting resources into the hands of people who can and will use the resources wisely or productively. Nevertheless, since the best allocation is always a culturally variable and socially disputable matter, no particular set of property rights necessarily generates the best allocations (Kennedy and Michelman 1980; Baker 1975). Neither private property combined with market exchange, bureaucratic allocation according to need, common property shared by all people in a community, allocation to serve cultural or religious visions, queuing, governmental or public control, nor any other method of identifying valid property claims is necessarily best or best for all circumstances and all property. The best allocation is essentially contested. The choice between and scope of alternative allocative mechanisms can only be resolved collectively. Whatever prevails requires acceptance (whether voluntary or coerced) by diverse potential claimants. Given this inherently collective aspect, the rules of the allocation practice should be a matter of democratic political choice, that is, a matter of collective self-definition that takes into account varying considerations of efficiency, justice, and individual and community identity. Failure to recognize that choice among property rights is inherently a collective matter was possibly the most fundamental jurisprudential mistake of one of the worst periods of American constitutional law, the so-called Lochner era referred to above. But for the last 55 years, the Supreme Court has carefully rejected all claims that the Constitution requires specific methods of allocation or offers any protection of free markets-although the lessons of both history and reason may be forgotten as a new generation of conservative judicial activists gain power (Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation 1998; Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 1998). No plausible normative (or economic) theory can abstractly rank ways of performing this function. Therefore, despite being absolutely vital, the allocative function and the rules that relate to it receive no constitutional protection but are left entirely to the political process. This does not mean, however, that private property receives no constitutional protection-only that the allocative function of property receives none, leaving market-oriented uses protected only when the government action also interferes with some other function. Of course, lack of constitutional protection does not prevent democratic political bodies from deciding to rely heavily on market mechanisms for allocative purposes-but such a political choice is subject to any modifications that are democratically adopted.
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Sovereignty Often intertwined with the allocative function is what I label the sovereignty function, with “sovereignty” here understood to mean the ability to get others to comply with the sovereign’s wishes without themselves wanting what the sovereign wants. This label highlights that one reason people want property is the capacity it gives them to obtain desired performances from others. Property is power. People use property the way governments use law (as well as property): to get other people to behave as the power holder desires. In a market exchange, an owner gets another to do something the other would presumably otherwise not do. Of course, each party to the exchange exercises power over the other, each usually favors the result (although often only as compared to the prior status quo), and each usually can (and in all failed exchanges, does) resist the exercise of power. But these facts do not detract from the exchange being an exercise of power-an offeree uses property purely instrumentally in order to get the other to act in a way she would not wish except for the offer. Obtaining performances through the exercise of power is, however, only one way of structuring relations among people. One alternative, for example, is the exercise of influence through communicative action. This method of structuring relations results in solidaristic interaction reflecting agreement on what is good or right rather than power (Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 472, 486–487). Of course, some opportunities to use power rather than influence can usefully reduce the burden of discursive coordination and can be socially and individually useful. A modern economy would hardly be imaginable without such mechanisms (Habermas 1987). Nevertheless, as I will argue further below, exercise of power over another is not intrinsic to the normatively significant notion of individual liberty or autonomy. Availability of such opportunities ought to be and is left by the Constitution to democratic, self-defining choice. Thus, governments often limit the agreements people can enter or enforce and the exchanges they can make. Governments sometimes limit even the transactions that a person can reject. Civil rights statutes prohibit the refusal of many transactions, for example, transactions that would be offered to others of the “favored” racial, sexual, or ethnic group. These statutes impose on private sovereignty normative requirements identical to those that the Constitution imposes on governmental sovereignty. The Court occasionally interprets the Constitution itself to limit private sovereignty rights. Property owners cannot enforce an agreement to racially restrict who can buy the purportedly restricted property (Shelly v. Kraemer 1948). The Court likewise held that the Constitution denies the private owner of company town power to deny people an opportunity to speech on their property (Marsh v. Alabama 1946). 8 But more significant than these Constitutional limits on property’s sovereignty rights is the fact that the Constitution permits the government to block any type of exchange to which it objects-that is, it can always restrict the use of property as power. 9 Thus, the Constitution gives virtually no constitutional protection to the
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allocative or sovereignty rights of property. This contrasts sharply with the situation of the five remaining functions. Protective As conceptualized here, the protective function refers to relatively specific, limited, but normatively significant rights. No law or constitutional provision can protect a person from all adversity or danger or mistreatment. But the Constitution recognizes property rights that offer a person some protection against being improperly picked on by her government. Many criminal procedure guarantees, such as the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the government obtain a judicial warrant based on probable cause before it searches a person’s property, relates in part to this concern. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on deprivations of property (and of life or liberty) without observing proper procedures reduces the likelihood of invidious or arbitrary treatment. The normative goal of protecting a person from being “picked on” helps identify government actions as “takings” for which compensation is required. The Constitution does not compel compensation for many legal changes that greatly reduce a person’s wealth. Most zoning or environmental laws, regulation of commercial uses of property, or huge tax increases are fine. I suggest that the government must compensate primarily in situations where the likelihood is especially high that the legal change is an invidious imposition on an individual. Acts like mandated transfer of title, actual government ouster of an individual from control, or permanent government occupation of property are highly vulnerable to invidious abuse since usually the government could have as easily used someone else’s property. This danger makes the requirement of compensation appropriate. In contrast, more general justifications explain the identity of property subject to most regulatory policies, even those causing drastic reduction of the value or significant limitations on the use of specific property. These impositions suggest democratic policy making-general evaluations of activities or attempts at redistribution-rather than invidiously picking out specific people to bear costs. This benign characterization, however, becomes less convincing if the deprivation results from ad hoc individualized decisions, as in spot zoning not guided by general criteria or in cases where a property holder relies on a governmental promise given especially to her and then the government reneges. Thus, a takings could result if the government explicitly tells a developer that she could continue to control access to a lagoon if she constructs on her property a channel that connects her lagoon to the sea but then, after she relies, the government applies navigation law to grant unrestricted public access (Kaiser Aetna v. United States 1979). Privacy Some privacy may be essential to human flourishing. Because I agree with
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Brandeis that “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people” (Whitney v. California, Brandeis, concurring 1927), I am troubled by current inclinations to protect and reward people’s retreat into private spheres. It is arguably perverse to reward those who avoid public life with greater protection from defamation (Gertz v. Robert Welch 1974). Nevertheless, people’s autonomy or dignity may require some protection from the government’s gaze. Under the Fourth Amendment, “houses, papers, and effects” as well as “persons” cannot be searched or seized unreasonably, which normally means only if a magistrate issues a warrant based on probable cause. These property rights allow a person to engage in activities outside the public or government’s routine view. The property right to exclude trespassers also partly responds to this concern. This right of exclusion is generally not constitutionally enshrined. Surely states could rescind this right in respect to non-damaging trespasses on uninhabited property. The privacy value, however, might dictate a different outcome in respect to spaces being personally occupied or currently used by an owner. Use Property’s role in people’s chosen activities is possibly its most obvious function. Here I refer to all non-market-oriented “uses” of property but especially emphasize those that a person substantively values and that do not involve violence or exercise power over others. These uses are expressive of people’s identities. A non-paternalistic government will usually leave decisions about these uses to private property holders. Most modern government’s regulations relate either to the property’s instrumental uses in violence or its commercial uses. The most common rationale for regulating non-violent personal uses of property involves significant spill-over effects on others. Residential zoning, building codes, and other forms of land use planning can provide efficient solutions to collective action problems. Recreational uses of property-speeding in my BMW-are sometimes regulated to reduce the risk of violation of other’s rights. Still, regulations of use can be constitutionally questionable interferences with individual liberty or auton- omy (Baker 1997; Mill 1859). When regulation represents majoritarian repugnance towards other’s self-defining expressive conduct, courts sometimes intervene to protect property rights. The Supreme Court invalidated a zoning regulation as applied to prohibit a home owner from living with her extended family (Moore v. East Cleveland 1977). It also protected people’s use of birth control devices within a valued form of association (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) and possession of obscene pictures within the home (Stanley v. Georgia 1969). Personhood People sometimes invest a portion of their identity or self-conception in particular items of property-in ancestral homes or wedding bands, to take individualistic examples, or in religious shrines or territory (Kymlicka 1989, pp.
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146–147) for more collectivist illustrations. Because different individual’s personhood might require conflicting uses of the same resource and because a person could find her personhood tied to immense quantities of valuable property, society neither could nor should honor all property claims based on personhood. Still, respect for human dignity suggests these claims’ special ethical importance, which appropriately could receive some constitutional recognition. Since an object’s uniqueness is often key to its personhood role, usually no “perfect equivalent” 10 can be given. Arguably, a governmental taking of personhood-identified property should be impermissible if an alternative “taking” would reasonably serve the government’s need. Although unfortunately in dissents, several justices argued that the Constitution requires the government to take account of this type concern when deciding whether to build a road that would destroy a site pivotal to Indian religious identity (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, dissenting 1988). Moreover, since the person who invests objects with personhood significance often values the object much beyond its market measure, if a takings occurs, arguably justice requires the government to go beyond market value in providing compensation. Welfare Finally, possession of property-at least, access to and use of some minimal level of resources-is essential to survival. Surely a key reason for people’s concern with property is their dependence on it for the necessities of life. A major measure of a society’s legitimacy is how well its property rules serve this welfare function. Michael Walzer reads history to indicate that all democratic societies guarantee their members those goods or opportunities that the particular society considers basic for meaningful membership-although the precise content of these goods and opportunities varies from society to society (Walzer 1983; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Marshall dissenting 1973). Of course, as society changes, the needs considered fundamental, and hence the property rights that the state should guarantee, will change. Today, a right to minimal education probably falls into this category. Similarly, although material goods might suffice to serve certain basic needs, a society might conclude that human dignity requires recognition of a universal property right to (meaningful?) employment (Macpherson 1973, pp. 133–134). Amartya Sen claims that major modern famines never result from mere inadequate production of food but rather from a country’s mal-distribution of entitlements. He further argues that severe famines never occur in democraciesdefined as countries with competing political parties and a free press-thus, implicitly endorsing Walzer’s observation at least in respect to food (Sen 1993). With an obvious intellectual debt to John Rawls (Rawls 197), some constitutional scholars argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause requires the government to provide people with entitlements to at least a
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minimal level of goods, especially welfare-based goods considered basic by American society (Michelman 1969, 1979; Baker 1983). Society and even government often recognize this responsibility. Once it has, any lapse in provision for a specific group ought to be characterized as invidious discrimination. At times the Court has agreed. Some controversial, sometimes inadequately rationalized Court decisions as well as powerful judicial dissents are only comprehensible on the basis of a constitutional status for claims to property that serve this welfare function. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional legislation that denied otherwise available welfare benefits to people who had recently moved into the jurisdiction (Shapiro v. Thompson 1969), that denied food stamps to people involved in unusual living arrangements (United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno 1973), and that denied a public education to illegal alien children (Plyler v. Doe 1982). It invalidated practices that discontinued welfare benefits or public housing without providing an adequate pre-termination hearing to see if the person continues to qualify (Goldberg v. Kelly 1970). It also refused to allow lack of property to cause the loss of certain fundamental opportunities. Between 1963 and 1983, the Court held it unconstitutional to deny to indigents unable to pay the opportunity to stay out of jail, to marry or get divorced, or to obtain a criminal defense attorney in initial appellate proceedings. 11 Some state courts have gone further and found state constitutional guarantees to minimal food, shelter, and education. These egalitarian decisions protect claims to property (or to opportunities that property can buy). Even if these property rights are in tension with a market society’s standard notion that ability to pay or produce or obtain transfers is the source of property, these rights arguably (partly) replace readily available land in serving property’s historically crucial welfare function. Ideological or historical unity? This brief review of constitutional doctrine shows different property rights relating to property’s different functions. In most circumstances, recognition of one right does not require or imply recognition of the others. Nevertheless, under some historical conditions, it may have seemed best (at least to people within the dominant element of society) to recognize a single conceptual amalgam under the term, “property.” An owner’s unified dominion over land or objects might have appeared to have been an appropriate way to serve all of these functions. Moreover, governmental authority to regulate the sovereignty aspect of property may have seemed less urgent because the power aspect of private property may have seemed less dangerous. At least, these conclusions might be true if a person can secure a livelihood almost entirely from land and if land is readily available to anyone who will work it. That may describe a real or imagined Jeffersonian world of small, independent farmers (cf. Macpherson 1973, pp. 135–136) and, thus, help justify constitutional protection of property in that society (Mensch 1982). Within this arguably mythical (ideological?) vision, making normative distinctions between differing aspects of property might seem relatively unimportant for either policy or legal purposes. And even if this unified conception were overtly inadequate to
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serve some of property’s functions for many people, the conception may have served the partisan interests of a new class of entrepreneurs. But surely today a single concept distorts more than it enlightens. Today, in culturally plural, market societies where most individuals do not own means of production, only more specialized property rights, often requiring affirmative state provision, will adequately serve the welfare and other functions. The various different rights suggested by the concept of property ought to be distinguished, with different policy and constitutional treatment following from the normative role and status of the function involved. Some extraordinarily important property rights should be sculpted by positive law. They should not and do not receive significant constitutional protection. Others should and do-with the differing nature of the constitutional protection related to the functions served.
THE PRIORITY OF DEMOCRACY OVER SOME ASPECTS OF PROPERTY Constitutionally, two functions-the allocative and sovereignty-have been left completely subject to democratic decision making. Our society routinely relies on private allocation of property through markets but accepts virtually any legal deviation or regulation as constitutional. Against this teaching of constitutional history, challengers claim that reliance on decisions of private owners within markets (often 12 ) should be constitutionally mandated because of the normative value of autonomy and its companion concept, voluntariness. They argue that people enter into market exchanges voluntarily-except for the occasionally “coercive” force of need or desire 13 –and that the exchanges benefit both parties. Market exchanges embody exercises of liberty that merit some constitutional protection. This view is wrong. Use rights and exchange rights differ fundamentally in: (1) the type of capacity the right gives the owner in relation to other people; (2) the right’s relation to the owner’s capacity to define or express herself; and (3) the primary societal significance of the right. 14 First, using property in an exchange always involves exercise of power over another person. The owner gets the other to do something that she would not choose to do except for the offer of the property. This exercise-of-power quality does not make market practices necessarily objectionable-society wisely leaves much of economic life to this form of coordination. But it does distinguish exchange from uses of property within a person’s own activities. It even distinguishes exchange from other uses of property within joint interactions. In the non-exchange voluntary interaction, like in having a guest over for dinner, conducting a jointly desired political or religious meeting, or using a contraceptive device in a sexual association, the interaction can involve solidarity and a person can value both her own and the other person’s participation. The property creates a joint opportunity rather an exercise of power.
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Second, the dominant liberal conception of liberty involves free choice about one’s own development or self-expression. If society respects people’s autonomy and self-definitional choices, it must respect their substantive value choices. Thus, respect for people’s autonomy may require a presumption that the law permit a person to use resources that the society leaves in her hands within the actual activities that she chooses and values. But this conception of liberty does not imply opportunities to exercise power over another. Moreover, in contrast to use of property within the substantively self-realizing aspects of a person’s activities, property is valued by the owner only instrumentally when used in an exchange to obtain another’s performance. It serves only as a means to obtain something else the owner wants. Given scarcity and the societal selfdefining as well as distributive consequences of one or another means of obtaining property for use, society need not allow any particular privately favored method of obtaining resources. The various reasons for recognizing a person’s use rights do not additionally require allowing the person to employ property to exercise power over others. Third, since the primary social role and individual significance of exchange is to allocate resources, since exchange is merely one possible framework for arranging allocations, and since exchange as compared to other frameworks advantages some people and some societal self-definitions and not others (Kennedy and Michelman 1980), the scope of and limits on exchange as a means to create a preferred allocation are properly political matters. This collective or political role follows for other reasons too. The parties to the exchange are not the only people with an interest in how or what allocations occur. The methods and the resulting allocations are matters of society’s cultural and ethical self-definition (Radin 1996). And they affect the chances for particular persons to obtain desired opportunities. Moreover, since allocations require collective recognition of when a person has a proper claim in respect to property, the allocative framework is logically a collective matter. Only collective practice (whether originating in culture and history, democratic reflection, or forceful imposition) can determine the rules or principles or framework that identify allocations. Radical decentralization of the choice of allocative frameworks is impossible. Hence, individual autonomy here is most advanced by democracy-everyone having a part in the public liberty to choose these frameworks. In contrast, substantively valued “uses” of property most fundamentally involve self-definition or self-realization. These matters usually can and usually should be decentralized to individuals’ decisions over use of resources collectively recognized as their private property.
CONCLUSION I have advanced three claims. (1) At least in present historical circumstances, a unified notion of property improperly distorts policy and normative vision. Politics should follow constitutional law in distinguishing various types of
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claimed rights that might be combined into a uniform concept of property. (2) The most important normative values embodied in the Constitution, particularly respect for people’s dignity, liberty, and equality, explain why claims to resources needed to satisfy basic needs, that is, welfare rights, merit constitutional protection. They also help justify constitutional protection from intrusions destructive of privacy, special deference to claims to property central to personhood, and property rights that provide some protection against individualized, invidious exploitation by government. (3) Combining liberal normative premises and a disaggregated notion of property also explains leaving market practices or economic activities aimed at market transactions completely subject to democratic decision-making.
NOTES 1. This essay is based on Baker (1986) and is revised from a talk given in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 1993. 2. Since my topic relates to private property, I do not consider provisions such as that in Article IV, Sec. 3, providing that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” 3. In addition to those mentioned in the text, many provisions not generally thought of as relating to property might so relate from some perspectives. For example, consider the Article I power granted to Congress to legislate to regulate interstate and international commerce or the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of aspects of the federal debt. The Fourteenth Amendment also ruled out certain property claims by prohibiting state payment of any debt incurred by the states engaged in rebellion against the United States—assuring the worthlessness of Confederate script-and by prohibiting states paying any compensation to slave owners due to loss caused by the emancipation of former slaves-thereby providing the precedent for denying compensation when previously legally recognized claims are now seen as sufficiently unjust. 4. Cf. Ladue v. Gilleo (1994) (right to place at least non-commercial signs on one’s residential property) with City Council v Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) (no right to place signs on public property such as utility poles). 5. “No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” 6. The requirement of compensation was slow to take hold in the early nineteenth century. In contrast to the assumptions implicit in the question in the text, some early courts thought that the inapplicability of the takings requirements to government takings for private use meant that not only were they permissible but also that they did not require compensation (Horwitz 1977, p. 65). 7. This list should not be taken as canonical. Any commentator can formulate different categories; this list or any alternative should be evaluated for its usefulness for the particular inquiry. 8. The Court initially reached but then rejected the same conclusion as applied to private owners of shopping centers. See Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan
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Valley Plaza 1968; Hudgens v. NLRB 1976. 9. I ignore here limits on governmental power to restrict the use of property to pay for speech. See, e.g. Buckley v. Valeo 1976; Meyer v. Grant 1988. 10. In what might be seen as an ideological commitment to a market system of value, the Supreme Court states that just compensation requires that government provide a “perfect equivalent” for what it takes (Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 1893). 11. Tate v. Short 1971 (prison for non-payment of fine); Bearden v. Georgia 1983 (revocation of parole for non-payment of fine); Zablocki v. Redhail 1978 (marriage); Boddie v. Connecticut 1971 (divorce); Douglas v. California 1963 (attorney on appeal). See also Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections 1966 (invalidating the poll tax). Development of this line of constitutional doctrine has been largely stopped by the mostly conservative judges appointed by the Republican Party’s last four presidents. 12. Most challengers to state power would still permit regulation to handle overt externalities and collective action problems as did the Court during the Lochner period, at least where the benefits were clearly “public.” 13. Kronman concludes that the mandate of no coercion would commit a consistent libertarian to an egalitarian distribution of wealth (Kronman 1980; see also, Macpherson 1973, pp. 146–147). 14. For a different but quite persuasive argument on this point, see Michelman 1992.
REFERENCES Baker, C. E. 1975. “The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 5:3. ——. 1983. “Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131:933. ——. 1986. “Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 134:741. ——. 1997. “Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech.” Southern California Law Review 70:979. Cohen, J. L., and A.Arato. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cohen, M. 1927. “Property and Sovereignty.” Cornell Law Quarterly 13:8. Habermas, J. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action (vol. 2). Boston: Beacon. Horwitz, M. J. 1977. The Transformation of American Law , 1780–1860 . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Liebling, A. J. 1981. The Press . New York: Pantheon Books. Linde, H. A. 1970. “Without Due Process: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon.” Oregon Law Review 49:125. Kennedy, D., and F. Michelman. 1980. “Are Property and Contracts Efficient?” Hofstra Law Review 8:711. Kessler, F. 1943. “Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
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Contract.” Columbia Law Review 43:629. Kronman, Anthony T. 1980. “Contract Law and Distributive Justice.” Yale Law Journal 89:472. Kymlicka, W. 1989. Liberalism, Community, and Culture . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Macpherson, C.B. 1973. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval . London: Oxford University Press. Mensch, E. 1982. “The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights.” Buffalo Law Review 31:635. Michelman, F. 1969. “Foreword: Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Harvard Law Review 83:7. ——. 1979. “Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy,” Washington University Law Quarterly : 659. ——. 1992. “Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method.” University of Chicago Law Review 102:91. Mill, J. S. 1859. On Liberty . Radin, M.J. 1982. “Property and Personhood.” Stanford Law Review 34:957. ——. 1996. Contested Commodities . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sen, A. 1993, May. “The Economics of Life and Death.” Scientific American 40. Walzer, M. 1983. Spheres of Justice . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wiecek, W.W. 1977. The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America : 1760–1848 . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cases Amalgamated Food Employees Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998). Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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Lochner v. New York, 199 U.S. 45 (1905). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998). Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
A PROBLEM ABOUT PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND CUSTODY: DISPUTES ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF “FROZEN EMBRYOS” Scott Brophy and Douglas E.Edlin
INTRODUCTION The law of property is the law of ownership. Relations among individuals and between individuals and the state are structured by legal principles governing ownership. The law structures these relations by defining what sorts of things can and cannot be considered property, and by delimiting what sorts of things can and cannot be done with property as the state has defined it. 1 New technologies have raised difficult questions about the fundamental nature of property and the role governments might play in regulating it. Just as computer technology has raised problems about intellectual property, medical technology has raised problems about biological property that have forced courts and legislatures to address fundamental legal and philosophical concepts. One such problem has recently arisen in connection with the reproductive technology of in vitro fertilization. In several cases, marriages dissolved and there were disagreements about which former spouse had decisional authority over cryogenically preserved zygotes created during the in vitro fertilization process. Some courts have treated these “frozen embryos” as property, and others have not. Some courts have held couples to prior directives and contracts, while others have not. The courts have begun to offer rules and principles for deciding these disputes, and so have some legislatures, but many of the issues at stake remain controversial. In what follows, we propose to untangle some of the fundamental relations between property and government involved in this problem by examining the responses of the courts to these cases. In vitro fertilization technology has forced state courts and legislatures to determine whether a fertilized egg is something that can be “owned” by the progenitors of that zygote, whether it is not property but a person, or whether it is neither of these. This review of different governmental efforts to categorize and control individuals’ use of the zygotes that are produced via in vitro fertilization reveals the powerful connection between definition and determination. Where a court or legislature defines a zygote as property or as a person, this leads directly to the determination of what rights a progenitor can exercise over that zygote. Where the zygote is defined as neither property nor person, the principles of determination are more subtle and interesting.
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PRE-EMBRYOS Many couples who wish to have children cannot do so without medical intervention and the assistance of some kind of reproductive technology such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. Of all life choices, perhaps none is more fundamental and personal than deciding to have a child. This is clearly a realm of life we prefer to keep out of the reach of governmental regulation of any kind, whenever that is possible. But when agreements break down, circumstances change, and disputes find their way to the courts, it is not possible for government to remain silent about the principles underlying the resolution of these disputes. Several cases arising from the use of in vitro fertilization have raised particularly interesting puzzles about fundamental legal concepts, including questions about the nature of property and personhood. The courts’ resolutions of these disputes have depended on the extent to which the frozen embryo has been understood to be disputed property or the subject of a custody disagreement. At the heart of these issues is the question of what, as far as the law is concerned, “frozen embryos” are. While there is nothing in particular objectionable about using the term “frozen” for something subjected to cryogenic preservation, many scientists and physicians object to calling the thing that is frozen an “embryo.” A few words of clarification about the process may help avoid some confusion. The in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedure begins with hormonal control and stimulation of a woman’s ovulation. This control and stimulation allows the retrieval of more than one egg at one time and permits the egg retrieval procedure to be scheduled for a specific time. The eggs are then removed by laparoscopy or ultrasound directed needle aspiration and placed into a glass petri dish. Sperm are then introduced to the eggs in the dish. If a sperm fertilizes an egg, this conceptive product, or zygote, divides until it reaches the four- to eight-cell stage. At this point, there are two options for individuals seeking children. First, the zygote can be transferred immediately to the woman’s uterus via a cervical catheter. If this procedure succeeds, the zygote will attach itself to the uterine wall, develop into a fetus, and be carried to term. Second, the zygote can be cryogenically preserved in liquid nitrogen for later use. Because the initial hormonal stimulation often results in the retrieval of more eggs than can be implanted at one time, cryopreservation affords several advantages: (1) the woman need not undergo the invasive burden of the hormone stimulation and egg harvesting procedure with each attempt at impregnation; (2) the woman (or couple) saves the financial burden of paying for the egg retrieval procedure; and (3) the chances at a successful pregnancy may be increased because only the strongest embryos survive the cryopreservation process, and the uterine wall is more receptive to impregnation after some time passes (Feliciano 1993; Kass v. Kass 1998). The first court of last resort to rule on the disposition of cryopreserved
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zygotes was the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Davis v. Davis (1992). In Davis, the Court realized that the words chosen to describe this process can shape the ensuing discussion of the rights and interests at stake. As the Tennessee Supreme Court put it: “[S]emantical distinctions are significant in this context, because language defines legal status and can limit legal rights. Obviously, an ‘adult’ has a different legal status than does a ‘child.’ Likewise, ‘child’ means something other than ‘fetus.’ A ‘fetus’ differs from an ‘embryo’” (Davis 1992, pp. 592–593). For this reason, linguistic precision is important. The popular term “frozen embryo” is not consistent with current medical and scientific practice. Summarizing the testimony of Dr. Irving Ray King, one of the expert witnesses who testified before the trial court in the Davis case, the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote: The currently accepted term for the zygote immediately after division is “preembryo” and that this term applies up until 14 days after fertilization. [Dr. King] testified that this 14-day period defines the accepted period for preembryo research. At about 14 days, he testified, the group of cells begins to differentiate in a process that permits the eventual development of the different body parts which will become an individual….[T]he first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates to physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing entity up to this point as a preembryo, rather than an embryo (Davis, 1992, pp. 593–594, emphasis supplied). Given the discussion in the next section, this distinction carries some significant weight. We will, therefore, use the more precise term “pre-embryo,” rather than “embryo,” to describe the fertilized egg in its two- to eight-cell stage at cryopreservation. 2 Whatever one calls these eggs that have been fertilized ex utero, the substantive legal question is who gets to decide what happens to them when a couple divorces. The answer to this dispositional question depends upon the same issues raised by the definitional question. That is, it depends upon how the law understands and defines what these fertilized eggs are. The biological, developmental characteristics of a cryogenically preserved pre-embryo could turn out to be morally or legally relevant in distinguishing it from people or even from more fully developed embryos in utero.
CUSTODY The trial court in the Davis case treated the pre-embryos as people. The trial court was apparently taken with the expert testimony of a French geneticist, Dr. Jerome Lejeune. Insisting that there was no recognized, scientific distinction
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between the terms “pre-embryo” and “embryo,” Dr. Lejeune referred to the four- to eight-celled pre-embryos as “early human beings,” “tiny persons” and “kin” (Davis 1992, p. 593). 3 The trial court reasoned that, if there is no distinction between pre-embryos and embryos, then Dr. Lejeune’s conclusion that “human life begins at the moment of conception” must have been correct (Davis, 1992, p. 594). Accordingly, the trial court determined that the eightcelled pre-embryos were “children in vitro.” After reaching this determination, the trial court applied the doctrine of parens patriae and held that it was “in the best interests of the children” to be born rather than destroyed. Applying this “best interests analysis,” the trial court awarded custody of these “children in vitro” to Ms. Davis rather than Mr. Davis because Ms. Davis wanted to see them brought to term and Mr. Davis did not (Davis 1992, p. 594). The Davis trial court’s reasoning and result are mirrored by a Louisiana statute. According to Louisiana Revised Statute 9:121 (1998), the intentional destruction of a cryopreserved pre-embryo is prohibited and any disputes about their disposition must be resolved in the “best interest” of the pre-embryo. The reasoning and ruling of the trial court in Davis are legally 4 and medically 5 suspect, as is the Louisiana statute. But they underscore the important connection between definitions and determinations. If one conceives of a preembryo as a person, then legal principles of custody will apply and will require that these people are not destroyed.
PROPERTY If one concludes that pre-embryos are not people, it is tempting to conclude that they must be the parents’ property. In this regard, we might ask whether the preembryo is “owned” by the individuals who donated the constitutive egg and sperm that were joined to make the pre-embryo. This was the understanding employed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in York v. Jones (1989). In York, as a result of an IVF process, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) had a pre-embryo cryogenically preserved at the Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine (the “Jones Institute”) in Norfolk, Virginia. The plaintiffs asked the Jones Institute to transfer the frozen pre-embryo from the Jones Institute in Virginia to the Institute for Reproductive Research at the Hospital of the Good Samaritan in Los Angeles, California. The Jones Institute refused. After several requests by the plaintiffs and their California physicians were unsuccessful, the Yorks sued the Jones Institute seeking transfer of the preembryo from Virginia to California. The parties focused on the language of the plaintiffs’ agreement with the Jones Institute. The parties’ agreement provided, in pertinent part: We [the plaintiffs] have the principle [sic] responsibility to decide the disposition of our pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be
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released from storage for the purpose of intrauterine transfer without the written consents of us both. In the event of divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand we may choose one of three fates for our pre-zygotes that remain in frozen storage. Our prezygotes may be: (1) donated to another infertile couple (who will remain unknown to us) (2) donated for approved research investigation (3) thawed but not allowed to undergo further development (York 1989, p. 424). The Yorks argued that the Jones Institute’s refusal to transfer the pre-embryo in accordance with their wishes was a violation of the parties’ agreement (York 1989, p. 424). The Jones Institute argued that “plaintiffs’ proprietary rights in the pre-embryo are limited to the ‘three fates’ enumerated in this provision [of the agreement] because there is no established protocol for the inter-institutional transfer of pre-zygotes” (York 1989, p. 425). The Eastern District of Virginia decided this dispute by noting that the parties’ agreement consistently referred to the pre-embryo as the “property” of the Yorks (York 1989, p. 425). 6 After determining that the Jones Institute explicitly acknowledged the Yorks’ property rights in the pre-embryo, the York Court concluded that a bailment relationship was created by the parties’ contract. 7 The York Court appeared interested in deciding the case before it, and nothing more. The agreement executed by the Yorks and the Jones Institute permitted the Court to apply the legal rules applicable to bailment and detinue and resolve the issues before it without engaging in any esoteric debates about the epistemology of ownership or the moment at which life (or personhood) begins. As we discussed in the previous section, once the Davis trial court concluded that pre-embryos are persons, its task in determining that dispute became fairly simple. Similarly, by defining pre-embryos as property, the York Court simplified its task as well. But as with the Davis trial court’s reasoning, there are problems with the York Court’s conception of pre-embryos as property. 8
PRIVACY Neither the treatment by the trial court in Davis of the pre-embryo as a person, nor the treatment by the York Court and the intermediate appellate court in Davis of the pre-embryo as property seems to capture the unique characteristics of preembryos (Davis 1992, p. 597). In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that pre-embryos are neither people nor property. Properly understood, pre-embryos are more than property and less than people. Justice Daughtrey of the Tennessee Supreme Court was sensitive to this intermediate status of pre-embryos in her discussion of what she termed, “The ‘Person’ vs.
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‘Property’ Dichotomy” (Davis 1992, pp. 594–595). In her discussion of this dichotomy, Justice Daughtrey relied on the ethical standards articulated by the American Fertility Society in attempting to articulate a “third position,” according to which: The preembryo is due greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential (Davis 1992, p. 596; citing American Fertility Society 1990, pp. 34S–35S). Relying on the Report of the American Fertility Society’s Ethics Committee, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life. It follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos in this case is not a true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning the disposition of the pre-embryos” (Davis 1992, p. 597; Robertson 1990a, p. 447). This is a crucial distinction. Saying that a pre-embryo “belongs” to its progenitors simply reflects the progenitors’ authority to determine the disposition of the pre-embryo. Put differently, terms of property or ownership apply to pre-embryos as a reference to the locus of decision-making authority rather than as a statement about the nature of pre-embryos themselves (Robertson 1990a, pp. 454–455). Having drawn these conclusions, the Davis Court determined that the biological progenitors of the pre-embryo have legal authority to determine the fate of the pre-embryo: “[T]he progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, retain decision-making authority as to their disposition” (Davis 1992, p. 597). The legal and philosophical justifications for leaving decision-making authority and autonomy in the sole control of the pre-embryo’s parents are compelling. Legally, the United States Supreme Court has established and repeatedly reaffirmed “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter” (Prince v. Massachusetts 1944, pp. 158, 166). 9 The Supreme Court has also expressly determined that the Constitutional right of privacy protects “individual autonomy in matters of childbearing (Carey 1977, p. 687). 10 The stringent protection of individuals’ right to procreate traces to the philosophical foundations of American society: Procreation and child rearing are necessary conditions for individual and social well-being. Because of the central importance of childbearing decisions, individuals and couples have been granted
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substantial autonomy in their decisions about whether and when to bear children. The size of their families and the timings of the births are matters of personal judgment, not government mandate (Andrews 1986, pp. 357, 359). 11 In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly held that parental autonomy is central to our society’s formation and organization because the family is “the institution by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural” (Bellotti v. Baird 1979, p. 3035). The overarching, philosophical importance of autonomy is not solely a socio-political facet of American society. Autonomy is fundamentally important as a matter of normative ethics generally and biomedical ethics, in particular. 12 For these reasons, the use of IVF and cryogenic preservation of pre-embryos is a form of individuals’ fundamental right to procreate (Andrews 1986, p. 361). 13 Understood as an element of the fundamental right to procreate, any governmental restrictions placed upon the decisions of a pre-embryo’s progenitors about the disposition of that pre-embryo will be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny: “The reasons for protecting childbearing decisions justify protecting decisions to use alternative reproduction. Consequently, state actions that restrict, prohibit, or mandate alternative reproduction will be subject to a strict standard of review. State actions that infringe that right will be justified only if they further a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner possible” (Andrews 1986, p. 361). Justice Daughtrey of the Tennessee Supreme Court sought to preserve the rights of the Davises to determine their procreative fate without interference from the state. Indeed, Justice Daughtrey indicated that no state interest was compelling enough to justify any intrusion into the Davises decision about the disposition of their pre-embryo: It is further evident that, however far the protection of procreational autonomy extends, the existence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that their decisions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status….[N]o other person or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference with the gamete-providers’ decision to continue or terminate the IVF process, because no one else bears the consequences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do (Davis 1992, p. 602). 14 All of this leads to one conclusion: the progenitors of the pre-embryo must determine the fate of the pre-embryo, unfettered by governmental circumscription. 15 This seems a very workable and reasonable conclusion. And it is, provided that the “parents” of the pre-embryo agree about the disposition of the pre-embryo. 16 But the problem posed by Davis is how to resolve a dispute that arises when the “mother” and “father” of the pre-embryo do not agree. There
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are several options available to courts and legislatures seeking guidance in resolving these disputes. But, as we have discussed, the propriety of each option depends upon the underlying understanding of what pre-embryos are.
OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PREEMBRYO’S “PARENTS” Mandatory Parental Implantation The first option for resolving disputes where one of the pre-embryo’s parents desires to implant the embryo and the other parent does not is to establish a rule requiring that the embryo be implanted either in the egg donor or in the partner of the sperm donor. 17 The rationale behind this rule is easy to understand, particularly where one’s underlying conception is that the pre-embryo is a human life from the moment of fertilization. 18 The parents have a right to procreate that is constitutionally protected. Therefore, a proponent of mandatory parental implantation would argue that if one parent wishes to implant a preembryo in an effort to realize her or his right to reproduce, then the law must always permit that result. This was the reasoning of the Davis trial court 19 and the American Bar Association has proposed a policy that would award frozen pre-embryos “to the spouse who favors gestation,” at least where no prior agreement of the progenitors exists (Carelli 1998). Letting the Facility Decide: Institutional Autonomy Another possible route for resolving disputes between the pre-embryo’s parents is to allow the facility at which the pre-embryo is stored to decide its fate (Andrews 1986, pp. 357, 406). Granting the storage facility the right to determine the pre-embryo’s fate would, of course, deny the progenitors their right to determine whether, when and how they will become parents. For this reason, this solution is disfavored even by those who view the pre-embryo as human life at conception (Browne and Hynes 1990, p. 120). For those who consider the pre-embryo to be property, it would be a very odd bailment relationship to resolve a disgreement among “co-owners” of property by allowing the storage facility to decide which of them, if either, will receive it. Critics therefore insist that whatever the pre-embryo is, decisional authority over it should rest with its biological progenitors, not the storage facility. Mandatory Third-Party Implantation or Donation to Research Another option available where the pre-embryo’s parents disagree is a rule requiring implantation of the pre-embryo into a third-party. This has been described as the “adoption” of the pre-embryo (Wurmbrand 1986, pp. 1079, 1099).
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The problem with this approach is that the wishes of both parents are frustrated. The parent seeking to achieve procreation must know that his or her offspring will be born and raised by a stranger. The parent seeking to avoid procreation must live with the knowledge that he or she has been forced into genetic parenthood against his or her will (Andrews 1986, p. 405). Dividing and Distributing the Pre-Embryos Yet another approach would simply divide up the remaining, frozen preembryos and give half to the egg donor and half to the sperm donor. But this Solomonic “splitting of the babies” seems the worst of both worlds. The parent that wishes to avoid procreation knows that he or she may be a parent against his or her will if the other progenitor’s efforts at implantation are successful. Likewise, the parent that opposes destruction of the pre-embryos knows that at least some of his or her inchoate progeny will be destroyed (Davis 1992, p. 591). Exclusive Female Decisional Autonomy Another resolution of disagreements between gamete providers is simply to award sole decision-making authority to the female partner, in every instance. Their are two independent rationales for this rule. The first is the “sweat equity” model. The “sweat equity” rule grants complete decision-making authority to the female gamete provider based upon her greater effort and role in the IVF process (Davis 1992, p. 590). The second rationale for granting the female gamete-provider complete decisional autonomy is the abortion analogy. This rationale equates the status of a cryogenically frozen pre-embryo to a fetus growing in woman’s womb. 20 To be sure, the physical demands IVF techniques currently place on women are substantial. The woman’s role in the IVF process requires far more inconvenience, effort and discomfort than the man’s role (Davis 1992, pp. 591– 592; Feliciano 1993, p. 307). But the mere fact that the IVF procedure presents genuine physical discomforts for the female participant does not necessarily enhance her moral and legal rights as a prospective parent or diminish those of the male participant (Poole 1990, p. 81). After all, if medical science devises a procedure tomorrow that allows immediate and painless egg retrieval this would not suddenly alter the balance of the procreative rights at stake. Moreover, imagine that the new, painless IVF procedure is substantially more expensive than the current method. This could not mean that a wealthy woman who can afford the painless procedure has less of a right to procreative liberty than an impecunious woman who cannot afford this more advanced technique. The abortion analogy also is problematic. This reasoning equates the status of a female IVF participant with a pregnant woman who is considering an abortion. But the female participant in the IVF process is not pregnant. This is critically important because “none of the concerns about a woman’s bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion decisions is applicable
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here” (Davis 1992, p. 601; cf. Robertson 1990a, pp. 454, 456). In the IVF procedure, the bodily intrusion for the woman is split into two phases with a flexible window of time and deliberation interposed. First, the woman undergoes the egg retrieval process. Second, the woman undergoes the implantation process. This is the sui generis aspect of in vitro fertilization: “the fact that in vitro fertilization is a technology that severs the traditional link between gestation and maternal identity” (Caplan 1990, p. 99). The separation of these two processes-egg retrieval and implantation-distinguishes IVF fertilization from traditional pregnancy and renders the abortion analogy inapposite (Kass 1998, p. 174). Prior to implantation, no invasion of a woman’s bodily integrity is necessary to terminate the development of a pre-embryo. IVF’s bifurcation of the pregnancy process into separate stages of fertilization and impregnation leaves both progenitors in a equal position to determine the fate of their progeny. Prior to implantation, there is no reason (other than “sweat-equity,” which was discussed above) to grant the woman greater autonomy or authority over the childbirth decision. Put another way, in the IVF context, no concerns of bodily integrity can allow a woman to force a man to procreate (or not to procreate) against his will. The Contract Enforcement Rule As was discussed above, the York Court enforced the contract executed by the Yorks and the Jones Institute (York 1989, p. 425). The Davis Court also indicated that it would have enforced a contract between the Davises, had they signed one (Davis 1992, p. 597). The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the Tennessee Supreme Court. In Kass v. Kass (1998) New York’s highest court ruled that “agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their prezygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them” (Kass 1998, p. 565, citing Davis 1992, p. 597). The Kass Court then enforced the parties’ prior agreement to donate their pre-embryos to scientific research (Kass 1998, p. 569) over the objections of Maureen Kass that the argument was ambiguous and this was her only chance at genetic motherhood (Kass 1998, p. 569). The notion that a couple’s prior agreement should control the disposition of frozen pre-embryos has appealed not just to the courts, but to commentators as well (Robertson 1990b, pp. 407, 414). There are two general types of prior agreements addressing the disposition of pre-embryos in the event of a future dispute between progenitors: (1) an agreement that the pre-embryos will be implanted in the egg donor or in a person of the sperm donor’s choosing, or (2) an agreement that the pre-embryos will be discarded or donated to a third-party (Poole 1990, pp. 91–92). Generally speaking, these contracts are triggered by events such as divorce, death or incapacitation of a progenitor (Kass 1998, pp. 565–566). Without question, enforcement of prior contracts governing disposition of pre-embryos simplifies
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the resolution of subsequent disputes. The expediency and efficiency of a contract enforcement rule has led two states, New York and New Jersey, to consider legislation codifying the rule. 21 Those courts and commentators who have embraced enforcement of contracts concerning the disposition of pre-embryos all indicate that changed circumstances cannot vitiate the contract. In making advance agreements, the parties must consider all possibilities: “Knowing that advance agreements will be enforced under-scores the seriousness and integrity of the consent process; advance agreements as to disposition would have little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties continued to agree” (Kass 1998, p. 566). A rule of contract enforcement seems neutral, objective and equitable. Moreover, proponents of a contract enforcement rule cite that rule as respecting and promoting procreative choice. 22 Although the contract enforcement model is gaining acceptance among courts and commentators, it does have its detractors. The fundamental criticism of contract enforcement is that it avoids the true, human realities underpinning IVF agreements. Consider the couple who signed a contract concerning disposition of their pre-embryos, underwent the IVF process and are now divorced: [A] person involved in a happy and secure marriage who has no anticipation of divorce may be unable to imagine what he would want done with the embryos in the event of divorce. Even if he would be able to determine his own feelings with sufficient introspection, he may not treat the exercise seriously because he does not anticipate that the situation will arise. In addition, couples might avoid serious discussion of the topic out of a fear of causing disagreement. If the contract was formed without sufficient thought and introspection, it may be unfair to enforce it after disagreement arises. If it is impossible for the parties to truly anticipate their feelings, then enforcement of the contract would also be unfair (Poole 1990, pp. 91–92). For the opponent of contract enforcement, this is not just a function of people not treating the contractual exercise seriously or insightfully. Many people simply cannot know, and cannot be expected to know, years earlier, how they will feel about procreating, or about procreating with a particular person (Davis 1992, p. 597). Many people divorce who took very seriously the decision to marry. After a person has already decided not to remain another person’s spouse, it makes little sense for the courts to enforce an agreement predicated upon the very condition that no longer exists. 23 In response, the proponent of the contract enforcement rule might argue that prenuptial agreements and other partnership dissolution contracts exist for precisely these reasons, and that the enforcement of advance agreements about the disposition of pre-embryos is in principle no different. The problem, however, is that this treats the pre-embryo merely as property. If pre-embryos were property, a contract between the “parents” might be binding. If pre-
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embryos were children, however, it would be no more binding than a prenuptial agreement specifying the custodial disposition of future children. So if we suppose that the pre-embryo is something “in between” a person and property, the contract enforcement model is problematic to the extent that the pre-embryo is “more” than property. Opponents of the contract enforcement model also disagree with the premise that this model reinforces a couple’s procreative choice. While it is true that preembryo disposition agreements manifest the couple’s procreative choices at the time the contract was made, the contract enforcement rule then seals that decision in amber. Stated very carefully, the contract enforcement rule promotes the couple’s procreative choice, not the individuals’ procreative choice. After all, the contract enforcement rule seeks to enforce the couple’s decision even after the progenitors have decided no longer to be a couple. Opponents of the contract enforcement rule argue that at least in some circumstances, procreative choice should include being able to reconsider such “a quintessentially personal, private decision” (Kass 1998, p. 565). The Implied Contract Model Some have suggested that participation in the IVF process constitutes a “commitment to reproduction and would require transfer either to the female provider or to a donee” (Davis 1992, p. 591). One version of this position states flatly that “by enrolling in an IVF program an implied contract to reproduce is formed, and one partner wishes to reproduce and can show that he or she relied to their [sic] detriment on the other party’s participation in the program, then the partner who opposes implantation of the embryos should be estopped from asserting his or her right not to reproduce” (Feliciano 1993, p. 346; see also Trespalacios 1992, pp. 828–829). Such a view is susceptible to the same criticism as the contract enforcement rule. The dissenting opinion in Kass points out that: [T]he ex-husband’s participation in the IVF program [cannot have] constituted a waiver of his right to avoid procreation. By participating in the program, the ex-husband indicated his desire to father a child with his then-wife, and absent evidence to the contrary, he did not waive for all eternity any objections to his ex-wife bearing his child long after the termination of their union….It is naive to cavalierly conclude that a marital attempt to conceive constitutes a waiver of the right to avoid procreation in a nonmarital context. Clearly, when two people pursue the extraordinary steps of in vitro fertilization to conceive a child in the context of their marriage, the termination of that union is an intervening event which may provide the parties with an opportunity to reconsider their decision (Kass 1998, p. 177). In addition to the question of whether individuals should be bound to their prior
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decisions, the implied contract model introduces the interesting problem of what exactly is the implicit agreement implied by participating in an IVF program with one’s spouse. One could argue that it is to conceive a child; but one might also argue that it is to conceive a child with one’s marital partner. If it is the latter, then the termination of the marriage may be sufficient reason to uphold one former spouse’s wish destroy the frozen pre-embryos. After all, the IVF process was undertaken in order to conceive a child in the context of a marriage. Critics of the implied contract could therefore argue that without a clear, persuasive case for interpreting the behavior of participating in an IVF program as implying one or the other of these two implicit agreements, this principle provides little guidance for resolving the dispute over the disposition of the preembryo. The Balancing Test To resolve disputes between progenitors about the disposition of pre-embryos, the Davis Court adopted a balancing test (Davis 1992, pp. 603–604). This was the same approach favored by the Appellate Division dissent in Kass (1998, pp. 177–178). The Davis Court indicated that the balancing test should be employed only if there is no prior agreement of the progenitors in place (Davis 1992, p. 604). Although in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court viewed a balancing test as an option available only in the absence of an agreement, there is no conceptual reason that the balancing test could not be employed in the first instance, in all cases, as the Appellate Division dissent argued in Kass (1998, p. 561). Employment of a balancing test would require courts to consider and weigh “the parties’ respective interests and burdens, as well as their personal backgrounds, psychological makeups, financial and physical circumstances… independent ability to support the child and the sincerity of [the parties’] emotional investment in this particular reproductive opportunity, as well as the burdens attendant upon a respondent’s unwanted fatherhood [or motherhood]” (Kass 1998, pp. 561–562). There is great appeal to such a test. It seems flexible, equitable, progressive and sensitive. But as a practical matter, it poses two fundamental problems. First, consider what the test would require of a trial judge. That judge would be forced to review and digest voluminous, discursive and probably desultory materials describing each progenitor’s personal history, psychological health, financial and physical strengths and weaknesses, and reach a decision without the guidance of legal principles about how to weigh the competing interests at stake upon which a family court judge would have to rely. To the extent that the frozen embryo is not a child whose interests should govern the outcome, the balancing test asks a judge to weigh the competing rights of the parents with little guidance from the law in how to strike the appropriate balance. While some favor such an open-ended approach, others see it as inviting unequal treatment under the law. Without articulating the principles to be used
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in weighing the competing rights and interests at stake, the balancing test could very well leave citizens in different jurisdictions, similarly situated, being treated dis-similarly. Moreover, both aggrieved parties can argue persuasively that their constitutionally protected rights have been violated. We may still be left with one litigant arguing that her right not to procreate has been violated and the other arguing that her right to procreate has been trampled. Neither of these problems implies that the rights and interests of those involved in the dispute should not be weighed and balanced, but more analysis is needed about the principles by which this can be accomplished. The Appellate Division concurring opinion in Kass, which is discussed below, is an interesting step in that direction (Kass 1998, pp. 591–594). The Parties’ Intentions In J.B. v. M.B. (1998) the Superior Court of New Jersey became the most recent court to resolve a dispute between former spouses concerning the disposition of their frozen preembryos. J.B. is unusual in two respects. First, the former husband (rather than the former wife) sought “custody” of the pre-embryos, and the former wife sought their destruction. Second, a child was born to the couple by natural means while the couple was in the midst of the IVF process. Although complementary of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s reasoning in Davis, the J.B.Court opted for a different analysis. Rather than the balancing test employed in Davis, the J.B.Court chose to infer the parties’ intentions in embarking upon the IVF procedure (J.B. 1998, pp. 5–6). The J.B.Court concluded that “this couple went through the I.V.F. process in an attempt to conceive a child for themselves. They were happily married to each other and desired a family” (J.B. 1998, p. 6). In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the former husband’s argument that “frozen embryos are living entities that are endowed with a status greater than property” (J.B. 1998, p. 6). The Court also rejected the former husband’s argument that “the agreement between the parties was to ‘create life’” (J.B. 1998, p. 7). The problems with the J.B.Court’s “intentions of the parties” analysis are twofold. First, the court searches for the parties’ “intentions,” but the husband explicitly argued that his intention was to “create life” (and he claims this was his ex-wife’s intention, as well). In searching for the parties’ intentions, the J.B.Court ignored this stated intention of one of the parties in reaching its decision. The second flaw is related to this first one and to the problem with the express and implied contract models. An intention of the parties analysis will always be indeterminate because the party seeking to avoid procreation can (and will) always argue that his or her intention in entering into the IVF procedure (and/or contract) was to have a child with this partner. Like the implied contract model, the intentions of the parties model provides little guidance in precisely the disputes it is intended to resolve, where one party intended to create life, and the other intended to have a child within a marital relationship (which no longer
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exists). Like the balancing test, it appears to invite inequality of treatment by allowing judges to disguise their own beliefs about what the outcome should be as a principle for resolving disputes. 24 The Veto Rule The Davis Court recognized that procreative autonomy encompasses both the right to procreate and the right not to procreate, and that these are rights of “equal significance” (Davis 1992, p. 601). Moreover, the Court in Davis also appreciated that “the equivalence of and inherent tension between these two interests are nowhere more evident than in the context of in vitro fertilization” (Davis 1992, p. 601). A rule that attempts to balance the need for clarity and guidance for the courts and litigants, fairness to the progenitors and respect for their equal and intractable rights to reproduce and not to reproduce is a rule permitting the progenitor who does not want to reproduce to veto implantation. 25 The veto rule can take two forms: a per se rule or a rebuttable presumption. A per se veto rule provides that, in all cases, the progenitor seeking to avoid procreation can prevent implantation of the pre-embryos to which he or she contributed gametic material. It is based on the principle that no law should coerce a person to reproduce, at least when terminating the reproductive process amounts to no more than the destruction of cryogenically preserved preembryos. The per se rule is certainly a bright and clear line for courts and litigants to follow. Although clear, opponents of the per se rule consider it overly rigid. For example, if one of the pre-embryos’ progenitors had lost the ability to reproduce (for whatever reason) after the pre-embryos were frozen, then these pre-embryos represent that person’s last opportunity at genetic parenthood. The per se rule affords no weight to the intervening, permanent loss of one progenitor’s ability to reproduce at any time in the future. Some suggest that the intervening loss of one progenitor’s reproductive capacity is irrelevant to the other progenitor’s right to prevent implantation. This is the most forceful argument in support of this position: [T]here is no reason to believe that the harm of never achieving parenthood is ever greater tha[n] the harm of being subjected to unwanted parenthood such that the donor desiring parenthood should be favored over the donor wishing to avoid it…. The pain in being childless, though great, cannot haunt a person in the same way as the knowledge of unwanted parenthood. Therefore, one donor should be able to veto the implantation of the embryos by the other donor even when the embryos represent the other party’s last chance at parenthood and that party agrees to shoulder all childrearing responsibilities (Poole 1990, p. 81). Not only is the per se rule clear and easy for courts to apply, it “would probably
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be upheld as constitutional” (Davis 1992, p. 598). But opponents can point to two potentially serious problems with it. First, the statement upon which the per se rule is based, that “the pain in being childless…cannot haunt a person in the same way as the knowledge of unwanted parenthood,” is far from self-evidently true: Parenthood and the deprivation of parenthood are unique and profound experiences that invariably impact deeply upon the lives of both the willing and unwilling potential parent. It is a particularly precious experience to individuals who are required to resort to the extraordinary procedures of IVF. To the party resisting implantation after a relationship has failed, the psychological and financial burdens of unwanted parenthood will be a bitter pill to swallow. For the party who has suffered physically and invested heavily, emotionally, and financially in a desperate attempt to achieve parenthood, deprivation of this possibly singular opportunity may be devastating (Kass 1998, p. 182). 26 Indeed, the knowledge that one cannot and will not ever reproduce, despite one’s heartfelt desire to do so, may be one of the most poignant, personal and haunting emotional pains a person can endure. 27 Second, a critic of the per se rule might argue that it is insensitive to a genuine and perfect equality between one progenitor’s right not to procreate and the other progenitor’s right to procreate. Where the progenitor seeking implantation will have the opportunity to reproduce in the future, it seems equitable to view the other progenitor’s right not to procreate as paramount. Where the progenitor seeking implantation has lost the opportunity to reproduce in the future, it is not so simple. Consequently, some advocate a more flexible rule to account for the rare situation where a progenitor’s right to procreate may override the other progenitor’s right not to procreate, because this is the last hope of achieving genetic parenthood for the progenitor seeking implantation. This variant of the veto rule is the rebuttable presumption. A rebuttable presumption veto rule would presume that the right not procreate of the progenitor opposing implantation will prevail; however, the party seeking implantation can rebut this presumption by proving that she or he has lost the ability to reproduce in the time since the pre-embryos were frozen. This version of the veto rule was the solution favored by Justice Friedmann in his concurring opinion at the intermediate appellate level in Kass: It is my belief that the party seeking to implant the pre-zygotes-here the former wife-should be required to establish as a threshold matter that she cannot undergo IVF with a new partner or a sperm donor because, for example, she has lost her ability to ovulate or has some other major medical contraindication to egg retrieval. Mere discomfort, expense, or other potentially surmountable difficulties should not
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suffice to defeat the defendant’s fundamental right to avoid biological fatherhood in a case of this sort. In addition, adoption should be regarded as among the “other reasonable alternatives” to pre-zygote implantation. The wife’s mere preference for genetic parenthood should not override her former spouse’s prerogative to elect not to procreate in circumstances such as these. Only following a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that she lacks all other means of achieving genetic parenthood and that adoption is not a feasible or satisfactory option for her should [a court consider permitting her to implant the pre-embryos] (Kass 1998, p. 182). Although Justice Friedmann viewed prior agreements between progenitors as dispositive of subsequent disputes between them (Kass 1998, p. 165), a rebuttable presumption rule can exist independent of an antecedent contract enforcement rule. Such a proposed solution is not without its problems. Those objecting to such a rule might point to the outcome from the point of view of someone who had never wished to procreate outside a marital relationship, and now sees him or herself as being compelled by the state to reproduce. While it differs from the per se veto rule only in rare cases where, after the pre-embryos are frozen, one of the progenitors loses the ability to procreate, this difference is of great conceptual interest. In providing a principle for “balancing” the reproductive rights of both prospective progenitors, this case provides something of a litmus test. Opponents of the rebuttable presumption veto rule will argue that a person’s interest in the pre-embryo as the last chance at genetic parenthood is simply not weightier than the other person’s claim not to be “forced into reproducing.” The arguments on both sides of this particular question go to the heart of the puzzles posed by the cases we have discussed in this chapter.
CONCLUSION We have sought in the preceding pages to clarify the relationship between the question of what pre-embryos are and the question of what should happen to them when there is a dispute about their future. Our goal has been to provide a conceptual framework which clarifies the complex interrelations among the fundamental principles, and may therefore add clarity to the puzzles that have already emerged. The principles for resolving the question of who is given decisional authority over frozen pre-embryos are easy enough to isolate if one believes that the preembryo falls under the traditional concepts of property or person. If the preembryo is a “tiny person” or “kin,” then the principles of resolving custody disputes apply, and decisional authority should be granted to the person whose decision will be in the best interest of the “children in vitro.” That may require, contrary to the wishes of both “parents,” putting their zygotes “up for adoption.” If the pre-embyo is jointly owned biological property, then the rules of
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property and contract law apply. Private contracts and advance directives would be binding, as they are in prenuptial agreements. If no prior contract existed, one could impose by judicial or legislative fiat an interpretation of the agreement or intentions a reasonable person would have had in entering an IVF program, but courts will have to adjudicate the opposing agreements or intentions “to create life” and “to reproduce with my marital partner.” Perhaps we can at least rule out the kind of claim made by the storage facility against the Yorks, that the storage facility should be granted decisional authority even where both prospective progenitors wish to have the pre-embryos transferred to another facility. If, however, the pre-embryo is neither property nor person, then several policy options appear plausible, even if there are problems for each to overcome. As Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals appreciated in Kass, where progenitors’ disagree about the disposition of their pre-embryos, “what is plain...is the need for clear, consistent principles to guide parties in protecting their interests and resolving their disputes” (Kass 1998, p. 564). Many find the contract enforcement model appealing for this reason. Where contracts exist, enforcing them may call for the least governmental intrusion into decisions that are best left a private matter. But a persuasive case must be made for the assertion that contracts should be binding for non-property entities such as preembryos, and for the assertion that they should be binding when circumstances change one’s situation in a way one could not appreciate in advance. Of course, if one holds the contract enforcement view, and there is no contract in place, one must still adopt a way to resolve the dispute. An implicit agreement or the prior intentions of the parties could be inferred from the behavior of the parties who undertook IVF. Or one could decide that without an explict contract governing the disposition of the pre-embryos, a balancing test or one of the veto rules should be invoked to resolve the dispute. However, if one believes one ought to be able to reconsider prior decisions, advance directives, contracts, and intentions, then the balancing test and the veto rules will be more attractive. If the balancing test is too open-ended, then the best policy is one of the veto rules. And if the per se veto rule is overly rigid in never permitting any considerations to override the interests of the person wishing to destroy the pre-embryos, then the rebuttable presumption veto rule will allow, in some cases, the interest in not reproducing to be overridden. But in so doing, the rebuttable presumption veto rule allows the law to dictate that a person must reproduce against his or her will. If one believes this grants the government excessive power to intrude upon what should be a private decision, then one might be forced to reconsider either the per se veto rule, or go back to the drawing board and, perhaps, reconsider whether private contracts about these matters should be binding. There will no doubt be further case law and legislation about the disposition of pre-embryos in the near future, and the solutions that are adopted are likely to be among those discussed in this chapter. In the existing case law and literature on this issue, there is a tension between the need to find the best principle for
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settling these disputes and the fear that embodying any such principle in law will constitute judicial or governmental interference in a quintessentially private realm. Although the courts have no choice but to settle the legal disputes between individuals, legislatures could choose to remain silent by considering it a private matter unsuitable for public, statutory law. While current and pending legislation may be challenged on a variety of constitutional grounds, the disposition of disputed “frozen embryos” continues to become a legislative issue in several states, including Florida, New Hampshire, and New Jersey (Booth 1998, pp. 993, 1010). At the moment, however, the courts remain the principal governmental institution involved in recognizing and defining the boundaries of the privacy, property, and reproductive rights of individuals in the unique circumstances arising from in vitro fertilization technology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to thank Laura Brophy and the editors of this volume for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
NOTES 1. In addition to public, statutory law, we understand the courts and the state’s administrative agencies to be substantively involved in structuring property relations. We see no need, for the purposes of this paper, to distinguish this role as a function of the state properly speaking, such as in legislation and criminal law, from the law embodied in the established precedents which govern judicial decisions in “private” cases. 2. “The most technically accurate name for the four- or eight-celled structures is ‘preembryo’” (Trespalacios 1992, p. 803). Another point worth clarifying is that the term “zygote” refers to the fertilized egg, so the occasional use of the term “prezygote” in the literature and court documents to refer to the pre-embryo at the twoto eight-cell stage is inconsistent with ordinary scientific use. We have avoided it, but cited others who use it without our taking issue in each instance. 3. Dr Lejeune is not alone. For another argument in favor of treating pre-embryos as “human” in both the biological and moral senses, see Tiefel (1990). “The embryo is indeed someone. The biologic definition of the start of individual human life should coincide with the scope of our ascriptions of human status. The burden of proof should lie with those who would divide them. Nor should we avoid the costly dilemmas that follow from drawing the circle of humanity so widely as to include all human life” (Tiefel 1990, pp. 132–133). Nonetheless, Tiefel believes, as Dr. Lejeune apparently would not, that “the unborn have and should have fewer rights than the born” (Tiefel 1990, p. 133). 4. The law does not recognize any principle for the protection of pre-embryos as “persons.” Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to identify any independent rights possessed by a fetus in utero (Roe v. Wade 1973, p. 705; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1986, p.
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6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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2169). The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that “viability remains the critical point” for recognition of any independent legal rights (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989, p. 3040). And, as the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in Davis, as a stage of fetal development, viability “is far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from that of the four- to eight-cell preembryos in this case” (Davis 1992, p. 595). See also Robertson (1990a, pp. 437, 450). As with the law, medicine does not recognize pre-embryos to be persons. Dr. Lejeune’s testimony in Davis notwithstanding, the consensus of medical opinion is that pre-embryos cannot properly be envisioned as “persons” in any biologically or medically meaningful sense of that word. Recalling the testimony of Dr. King before the trial court in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that Dr. King’s testimony was corroborated by the American Fertility Society, an organization of 10,000 physicians and scientists who research infertility issues (Davis 1992, p. 593). The Court also refers to “the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights in the pre- zygote” and legal ownership of the pre-embryo being “determined in a property settlement” (York 1989, p. 425), pointing out that “defendants fully recognize plaintiffs’ property rights in the pre-zygote” (York 1989, p. 427). “The Court begins its analysis by noting that the Cryopreservation Agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants” (York 1989, p. 425). The problems might be summarized in the following way: First, as the litigants and the Court recognized in Davis (1992), pre-embryos are not what we ordinarily understand to be “property”: “[A]sking whether or not they constitute ‘property’ is not an altogether helpful question. As the appellee points out in his brief, ‘[as] two or eight cell tiny lumps of complex protein, the embryos have no [intrinsic] value to either party.’ Their value lies in the ‘potential to become, after implantation, growth and birth, children’” (Davis 1992, p. 598). Second, pre-embryos simply do not comport with our traditional, legal conceptions of property: “Property designated relationships between people and tangible objects. Over these objects, owners had essentially exclusive control. Interference with property, by the state in particular, required the weightiest justification…The vital idea and ideal of this conception were reflected in Blackstone’s description of property as a man’s place of ‘sole and despotic dominion’” (Krier 1990, p. 75). Simply put, pre-embryos are not just furniture to be placed wherever the owners wish. Literally and symbolically, pre-embryos represent the hope and dream of genetic parenthood so desperately desired by so many people. “To clients, the embryo symbolizes hope and potential parenthood. It affirms the wife’s femininity, the husband’s masculinity, and the couple’s potency. It is a powerful symbol with which clients establish emotional connections. It may be the closest thing to parenthood the wife and husband experience” (Robertson 1990a, p. 448). See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977, pp. 678, 687). “[T]he Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.” See, for example, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942, pp. 535, 541) describing procreation as one of the “basic civil rights of man;” Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925, p. 510); Meyer v. Nebraska (1923, p. 390).
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11. See also Davis, 842 SW.2d at 601. Cf. Ronald Dworkin (1996, p. 111). “[T]he principle of procreative autonomy, in the broad sense, is a principle that any remotely plausible explanation of our entire political culture would have to recognize.” 12. See for example, the examination of autonomy in the context of biomedical ethics Beauchamp and Childress (1983, pp. 66–102). Gerald Dworkin also discusses the “special” role of autonomy in health care in Dworkin (1988, pp. 112–120). 13. “[T]here is a fundamental right to make procreative decisions, and the state has a compelling interest only after viability” (Poole 1990, pp. 67, 74). 14. For this reason, the Louisiana statute is likely unconstitutional “because of its potential interference with couples’ right to privacy to make procreative decisions, the Louisiana law is constitutionally infirm” (Andrews 1986, p. 409). 15. It might seem that this conclusion is incompatible with the view that the preembryo is more than property but less than a person After all, if the pre-embryo deserves some special respect as a result of its potential for life, it may seem inconsistent to conclude that the pre-embryo’s progenitors enjoy complete autonomy to determine its fate. But there is no incongruity between these positions because of the nascent stage of the pre-embryo’s development: “The burdens on the couple of overriding their decision-making control over the embryo are great. In contrast, few claims of harm can be made on behalf of the embryo. It is not viable and has no right to life. There is no evidence that an embryo at this stage can feel pain, so there is no claim that there is a duty to avoid pain” (Andrews 1986, p. 406). 16. Some commentators have argued that a problem is presented even where both progenitors want the pre-embryo destroyed. In this instance, one argument concludes that the progenitors’ right to procreate as they see fit is outweighed by the pre-embryo’s “right to life” (Browne and Hynes 1990, p. 116). 17. “Once an embryo has been created, efforts must be made to protect its life and liberty by arranging for it to be implanted as soon as possible to avoid its death or its parents’ death before implantation…. When one natural parent competes for custody against the other who is the spouse or former spouse, the embryo must be considered a person, and the matter of custody must proceed as if the embryo were born, without regard to property law. The best interests of the embryo are of utmost importance. If one parent wishes to make his or her best efforts to implant the embryo, facilitate its birth, and raise the resulting child, that parent must receive priority over the other, barring evidence that such parent is unfit” (Browne and Hynes 1990, pp. 97, 118, 121). 18. “Ideally, embryo legislation should declare that human life begins at conception and embryos must, therefore, be legally protected from the moment fertilization occurs” (Browne and Hynes 1990, pp. 117–118). Panitch (1991, pp. 543, 573–574) argues for a mandatory implantation rule without a “right to life” basis. 19. “He [the trial judge]…held that it was ‘in the best interests of the children’ to be born rather than destroyed. Finding that Mary Sue Davis was willing to provide such an opportunity, but that Junior Davis was not, the trial judge awarded her ‘custody’ of the ‘children in vitro’” (Davis 1992, p. 594). 20. In Kass v. Kass, the trial court granted the egg donor exclusive custody, reasoning “that a female participant in the IVF procedure has exclusive decisional authority over fertilized eggs created through that process, just as a pregnant woman has
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exclusive decisional authority over a nonviable fetus” (Kass 1998, p. 561). 21. New York Senate Bill No. 5815, 220th Sess (1997); Booth (1998, p. 1315). 22. “Advance directives…maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal, private decision” (Kass 1998, p. 565). “Prior directives present the best way to maximize the couple’s reproductive freedom” (Robertson 1990b, p. 565). 23. This is also the reason that the “reliance” arguments in favor of contract enforcement fail. Some argue that pre-embryo disposition agreements must be enforced because the progenitor who seeks enforcement of the contract relied upon the other party’s position as stated in their agreement (e.g., Robertson 1990a, p. 466). There are at least three problems with this argument. First, as will be discussed below, contract enforcement is not the only way to provide the certainty and clarity needed for couples and programs to proceed with IVF procedures. Second, this argument begs the question in that it concludes that these contracts must be enforced because people presumed they would be enforced (Poole 1990, p. 92). Third, this argument ignores a more fundamental form of reliance that underlies the very formation of the contract itself. The parties relied upon their continued marriage (or relationship) as a prerequisite to entering into the agreement. Once that element of reliance is removed from the equation, enforcement of the contract predicated upon that precondition becomes far less compulsory. See Dehmel (1995, pp. 1377, 1400). 24. Moreover, like the contract model, prior intentions are considered to be binding. Critics of the contract model who argue that prior contracts ought to subject to revision would no doubt argue that the same is true of prior intentions. 25. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976, pp. 2831,2850– 2851). Applying Danforth to the competing rights at stake in a dispute over the disposition of pre-embryos renders the principle gender-neutral and eliminates the bodily integrity issues associated with an abortion decision. With these modifications, the logical extension of Danforth would support the veto rule by acknowledging that, all things being equal, a progenitor’s constitutionally protected right not to procreate outweighs the other progenitor’s constitutionally protected right to procreate. 26. Justice Friedmann views adoption as an alternative to implantation and he would require the party seeking implantation to demonstrate not just that biological parenthood is no longer possible, but also that adoptive parenthood is not a viable option. We are not convinced that the rebuttable presumption veto rule should require proof that the party seeking procreation and genetic reproduction through implantation cannot become an adoptive parent. 27. “She offered him all the kingdom/but he wanted only this—/a living thing/to call his own/And being mortal/who can blame him?” (Anne Sexton, 1982).
REFERENCES American Fertility Society. 1990. Report of the American Fertility Society (June). Andrews, L.B. 1986. “The Legal Status of the Embryo.” Loyola Law Review
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32:357–409. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979). Beauchamp, T.L., and J.F.Childress. 1983. Principles of Biomedical Ethics . New York: Oxford University Press. Booth, M. 1998. “Assembly Bill Would Control Fate of Contested Frozen Embryos.” New Jersey Law Journal 151 (September 28): 993, 1010. Browne, C.M., and B.J.Hynes. 1990. “Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law.” Journal of Legislation 17:97–122. Caplan, A.L. 1990. “The Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization.” In Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies , edited by R.T.Hull. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Carelli, R. 1998. “Frozen Embryos: Lawyers’ Association Mulling Policy Statement.” (February 2) at www.oakridger.com/stories/020298/aps_frozen.html . Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Davis v. Davis, 842 SW.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert, denied sub nom., Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911,113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657. Dehmel, J. M. 1995. “Note, To Have Or Not To Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail In Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?” Connecticut Law Review 27(Summer): 1377–1403. Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy . New York: Cambridge University Press. Dworkin, R. 1996. Freedom’s Law. MA: Harvard University Press. Feliciano, Tanya. 1993. “Note, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?” Connecticut Law Review 26(Fall): 305–350. Hull, R.T. (Ed.). 1990. Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies . Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth. J.B. v. M.B., Superior Court of New Jersey, No. FM–04–95–97, slip op. (Law Div. September 28, 1998). Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998). Krier, J. E. 1990. “The (Unlikely) Death of Property.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 13(Winter): 75–83. Louisiana Revised Statute , 9:121 et seq. (1998). Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). New York Senate Bill No. 5815, 220th Sess. (1997). Panitch, A. R. 1991. “Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over Frozen Preembryos.” Case Western Reserve Law Review 41: 543–579. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2850, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). Poole, E.K. 1990. “Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Embryos.” American Journal Family Law 4(Spring): 67–102. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Robertson, J. A. 1990a. “In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos.”
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Virginia Law Review 76(April): 437–516. —. 1990b. “Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos.” Ohio State Law Journal 51: 407–424 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Sexton, A. 1982. The Complete Poems . New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,106 S.Ct. 2169,90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986). Tiefel, H.O. 1990. “Human In Vitro Fertilization.” In Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies , edited by R.T.Hull. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Trespalacios, M.J. 1992. “Comment, Frozen Embryos: Towards An Equitable Solution.” University of Miami Law Review 46: 803–834. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 529, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Wurmbrand, M. J. 1986. “Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications.” Southern California Law Review 59(July): 1079–1100. York v. Jones 717 FSupp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989).
PROPERTY APPROPRIATION AND THEORY OF THE FIRM David Ellerman
WHAT ARE THE QUESTIONS? In some fields of intellectual inquiry, it is the questions that are difficult, not the answers. Once the questions are well-formulated, the answers might be quite straightforward. Questions involve assumptions and a conceptual framework. Much of the work in developing a theory-such as a theory of the firm-is in building up the conceptual framework to pose the right questions. What are the questions that a “theory of the firm” is supposed to answer? Many theories of the firm are aimed at answering vastly different questions, so the theories do not give competing answers to the same question; they provide different answers to different questions. I will approach the theory of the firm from the viewpoint of a positive, descriptive property theory. A positive property theory describes how property rights are initiated, transferred, and terminated in a private property market economy. The usual “economic” approach to the firm is to emphasize cost minimization or, more generally, allocative efficiency. 1 “The main hypothesis is that contractual designs, both implicit and explicit, are created to minimize transaction costs between specialized factors of production” (Holmstrom and Tirole 1989, p. 63). While this economic approach has its domain of applicability, it operates within a framework of mechanisms for the initiation and termination of property rights and for the transfer of property rights. That framework is our topic.
THE LIFE-CYCLE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT A positive theory of property for a private property market economy should describe how property rights are created or initiated, how they are transferred from party to party, and finally how property rights are terminated. Property rights are created in firms and households, and property rights are also terminated by firms and households. In between is the market where property rights are transferred. The instrument for transferring property rights is the voluntary contract which is fulfilled by the transfer of the de facto possession and control of the property from the old owner to the new owner (usually in exchange for other property going in the opposite direction).
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Theory of Appropriation While it is well-known that property rights are transferred by voluntary contract, the question remains-what is the legal means by which property rights are initiated and terminated in a private property market economy? It will be helpful to first establish some notation and terminology. Consider a simplified description of a productive opportunity Q = f(K,L) where the outputs Q are produced by applying the labor L to the capital services or non-labor inputs K. 2 The initiation of a property right is called the “appropriation” of the property right. Symmetrically the termination of a property right might be called the “expropriation” of the property right but that word has now been corrupted to mean the forced transfer or “taking” of property by the state. 3 The word “expropriation” can be avoided by referring to the “expropriation of the assets X” as the “appropriation of the liabilities -X.”
Figure 1 . “Life-Cycle” of a Property Right In the productive opportunity Q = f(K,L), the property rights to Q are initiated and the property rights to K and L are terminated so this could be described as the appropriation of the assets Q as well as the appropriation of the liabilities -K and -L. It will be useful to adopt a simple vector notation with three components representing outputs, non-labor inputs, and labor inputs respectively. Thus the vector of outputs or assets appropriated in production is (Q,0,0) and it will be called the “positive product.” The vector of liabilities (signifying the used-up inputs) appropriated in production is (0,-K,-L) and it will be called the “negative product.” Sum-ming the positive and negative products component-wise gives vector of assets and liabilities appropriated in the productive opportunity (Q,-K,L) which I will call the “whole product.”
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The “whole product” is simply a property-theoretic name for the production vector familiar to economists in the production set treatment of production where the outputs are listed positively and the inputs are listed negatively. 4 How does a private property market economy determine who appropriates the whole product? There is a “laissez-faire” or market mechanism of appropriation. Better known is the alternative non-market assignment of liabilities by the legal authorities which takes place in a trial for property damages when the defendant is found guilty and held liable for some property that was destroyed. To understand the market mechanism, one must consider who would appropriate the liability -X (i.e., terminate the property right to X) if the property X is usedup, consumed, or otherwise destroyed when the legal authorities do not intervene (i.e., the laissez-faire case). In that case, the liabilities -X are borne by the last legal owner of X. Thus one could say that in the absence of any state intervention to reassign liabilities such as a trial for damages, the liabilities -X for used-up or destroyed property Xis assigned by the “invisible judge” (the juridical version of the “invisible hand”) to the last legal owner of X. Any new property created in the process of using up the old property would be assigned by the “invisible judge” to the same legal party who bore the liabilities for the used-up property since that party in the absence of any reassignment of the liabilities would have the defensible legal claim on the produced property if the case were brought before a (visible) judge. Market Mechanism of Appropriation: Let the liabilities for the used up inputs lay where they have fallen (i.e., in the hands of the last owner of the inputs), and then let that party have the claim on any produced outputs. It should be noted that this mechanism of appropriation only works for produced outputs as opposed, for example, to gifts of nature. In terms of our example, the last legal owner of the non-labor inputs K and labor inputs L would laissez-faire appropriate the negative product (0,-K,-L). In the absence of any state intervention to reassign those liabilities, that same party would have the defensible legal claim on the positive product (Q,0,0). Putting the two products together, one has the market mechanism for the appropriation of the whole product (Q,-K,-L). The legal party who appropriates the whole product of a productive opportunity will be called the “firm” (with respect to that opportunity). Since that party would pay for the liabilities -K and -L and receive the revenue from the outputs Q, the whole product appropriator is also called the “residual claimant.”
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THE FUNDAMENTAL MYTH ABOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS The “market mechanism of appropriation” might all seem like a fancy way to restate the obvious, but it has quite strong implications. For instance, it shows that in order for a legal party to be the “firm” with respect to a given productive opportunity, it is sufficient for the party to be the last legal owner of all the inputs used up in the production process. Then that party has the defensible legal claim on the outputs that emerge in production so that party would appropriate the whole product. Since it is the fact-pattern of the input contracts (e.g., whether capital hires labor or labor hires capital) that determines who is the last legal owner of the used-up inputs, the identity of the “firm” (= whole product appropriator) is contractually determined. There is no need for the legal party to additionally “buy” or “own” the production function or production set. There is no such thing as the “ownership” of a production function or production set in a private property market economy. It is not by the “ownership” of a production set that whole product vectors are assigned to legal parties but by the market mechanism of appropriation. The idea that there is a property right (variously called “ownership of the firm,” “ownership of the production function,” “ownership of the productive opportunity” and so forth) which determines which party legally appropriates the whole product of a productive opportunity is such a pervasive and important idea that it will be called the Fundamental Myth about property rights. An understanding of the Fundamental Myth is important to our argument because if it is thought that the whole product is already owned by the “owner of the firm” then the entire question of appropriation (initiation and termination of property rights) in production is not even formulated. The question of appropriation in production is not well-formulated in the law and economics literature. For example in the Putterman and Kroszner anthology (1996) on the “economic” nature of the firm, none of the papers pose the question of appropriation in their treatment of the firm. The question of appropriation in the firm is similarly ignored in the “economics of property rights” (e.g., Furubotn and Pejovich 1974) and in the so-called “property rights approach” to the firm (e.g., Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995). Any discussion of the appropriation or initiation of property rights is ordinarily relegated to a rather mythical original state of nature [e.g., in the philosophical literature] or to a situation where unowned international resources are being privatized. For instance, Harold Demsetz (1967) considers how private property in land with fur-bearing animals was established as a result of growth in the fur trade. John Umbeck (1981) considers how gold rights were established in the 1848 California gold rush on land recently ceded from Mexico. Yoram Barzel (1989) considers how minerals under the North Sea were privatized. But in Barzel’s book (see particularly Chapter 5 “The Formation of Rights,” 1989) as elsewhere in the economics of property rights literature, there is no recognition that the appropriation of the
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outputs (and the symmetrical appropriation of liabilities for the used-up inputs) takes place in normal production. Only the conversion from unowned property to private property is considered in the law and economics literature; the question of appropriation when private property is used up in the production of other private property is not considered. Thus the question of appropriation at the heart of the theory of the firm is not even posed in the “economics” literature on property rights and the firm. This illustrates our opening remark that in some fields it is the questions that are difficult. Once the question of appropriation is asked, the descriptive answer of the market mechanism of appropriation is relatively straightforward.
“OWNERSHIP OF A FIRM” AND OWNERSHIP OF A CORPORATION What are the origins of the Fundamental Myth that firmhood is established by an ownership right (“ownership of the firm”) rather than by the contractual status of being the last legal owner of all the inputs to production? Perhaps the most common origin is a misinterpretation of the “ownership of a corporation.” Before turning to that, it might be noted that economists use the notion of “ownership of the firm” in more general contexts independent of corporations. In an abstract model, entrepreneurs are “bidding for ownership of the firms” (Hirshleifer 1970, p. 124) and become the “owners of the productive opportunity” (p. 125). A proprietor may sell “the rights to the transformation function” or “his rights to the venture” (Fama and Jensen 1996, p. 341) to another proprietor. The entrepreneur is the “owner of a production function” (Haavelmo 1960, p. 210). There is no corporate law in Crusoia, but Robinson Crusoe nonetheless “owns the firm” (Varian 1984, p. 225). The most common or “standard” origin of the “ownership of a firm” notion is to (mis)interpret the ownership of a corporation that is currently undertaking a production opportunity Q = f(K,L) (by virtue of its contractual position) as being “ownership” of the productive opportunity. But this interpretation can be easily defeated by changing the contractual position of the corporation without changing its ownership. For instance, if the capital services K were hired out rather than the labor services L being hired in, then the “firm” in the sense of whole product appropriator would shift but the ownership of the corporation would be in the same hands. The role of the corporation would shift from being the firm (with respect to that opportunity) to being an input supplier to the firm. This argument might be better understood by considering a productive opportunity both outside and inside a corporate form. Consider a simplified process where the labor L is applied using the services K of a widget-maker machine in order to produce the widgets Q during each time period. If the machine is owned by an individual, then it is clear that the person could hire in the labor L and produce Q-or could hire out the services K to another party. The pattern of contracts determine whether the individual operates as the firm (with
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respect to that opportunity) or as an input supplier to the firm. Now suppose that the individual incorporates a company and issues all the stock to himself in return for the machine. This legal repackaging changes nothing in the market logic of the argument that separated capital ownership from residual claimanc