The Foundations of Statistics LEONARD
J.
SAVAGE
"* BII,. . Higpu PrtJf,sJOr of Sl4IiShu YiIh U"w"si"
llCONO aBVISID BDI110H
DOVER PUBUCAnONS, INC. NEW YORK
Copyright © 1972 by Dover Publicationa, Inc.. CoP}rilbt © 1954 by I. IUchard Sante. All rights raerwd under PaD AmeriCaJI aad 1Dter'· national CopJrilht Conw:adonL
Tbit DoYer edition. fint publilbed in 1972. is a reviled and enIarFd YCnioa of the wort oripaall, pGblilhed by John WOey. Son. in 195f.
lfltma4tiOntJl SlImdMd Bool Number: tJ.41J6..62J49·1
Libr." 01 CO"VaI CaI4Zo, Cdrd NU1fIber: 7"1181'" Manufactured in the United Stata of America Dover PublicadoDs, lac. ISO Varic:k Street New Yort. N.Y. )OOlf
TO MY FA1HER
Preface to the Dover Edition CONTINUINO INTEREST HAS LlIoJOOUR.\OED PUBlJC4\TION OF A SEOOND
edition of this book. BecaU8e revising it to fit my present thinking and the new elimate of opinion about the foundatioDS of statiBtica would obliterate rather than nwtore, I have limited myself in the preparatioD of this edition much 88 though dealin, with the work of another. The objective erron that have come to my attention, mainly through the generosity of readers, of whom Peter Fishburn has my special thanJra, have been corrected, of eoUI'Ie. Minor and mechanical ones, sueb .. a name misspelled or an inequality that had peraiated in pointing in the wrong direction, have been silently eliminated. Other changes are conspicuous 88 additions. They consist mainly of thi8 Prefacey Appendix 4: Bibliographic Supplement, and several footnotes identified 88 new by the To enable you to pursue the many new developments since 19M according to the intensity and direction of your own interests, a number of new references leading to many more are listed in the Bibliographic Supplement, and the principle adV8Dces knowu to me are pointed out in new footnotes or in comments on the DeW references. Citations to the bibliography in the original Appendix 3 are made by a compact, but otherwise ill.advised, letter aDd number code; thoae to the new Appendix 4 are made by a DOW popular system, whieh is dective, informative, and flexible. Example: The historie papers (Borel 1924) aDd [D2] have beeD translated by Kyburg and SmokIer (1964). The following paragraphs are intended to help you approach this book with a more current perspective. To some extent, they will be intelligible and useful even to a novice in the foundations of statistics, but they are neeell8rily somewhat teehnieal and will therefore take on new m@aoing if you return to them as your reading in this book and elsewhere progre88e8. The book falla into two parts. The 11m, ending with Chapter 7, is a general introduction to the peJ"8ODalistic tradition in probability and utility. Were this part to be done over, radical revision would not be required, though I would DOW IUpplement the Jine of argument centering around 8 system of postulatea by other leas formal approaches, eaeb convincing in ita own way, that converge to the general coDe1wdon that peJ'IODal (or subjective) probability is a good key, and the best yet
.+.
...
IU
• IV
PREFACE TO THE DOVER EDITION
mown, to all our valid ideas about tbe app1ieationa of probability. There would also be IDaD1 new worb to report on and analyze more thoroughly
than can be done in footnotes. The origiDal aim of the aecond part of the book. beginning with Chapter 8, is aD too plainly stated in the aeeond complete paragraph on page 4. There, a personaliatie justification is promiaed for the popular body of devices developed by the enthusiastically frequentiatic aeboola that then occupied almOlt the whole statistical &ceDe and atill dominate it, though 1. . eompletAtly. The aecond part of the book is jndeed devoted
to perIOnalistie diae1l8Bion of frequentiatie dmC8l, but for one after another it reluctantly admits that jUBtifieatioD haa not been found. Freud aloDe could uplain how the rub and UDfulfilled promise on page 4 went UDamended through 10 many reviaioDa of the mlDWlCript. Today, as I see it, the theory of peraonal probability applied to statistics sbows that many of the prominent frequentistie deviees can at belt lead to accidental and approximate, not ayatematic and eopnt, 8IlCeelS, U is expanded upon, perhaps more optimistically, by Pratt (1965). AmODg the ill-founded frequentiatie devieea are minimax rul. almOit all tail-area tests, tolt-ranee intervals, aDd, in a 80rt of elaaa by itaelf, fiducial probability. If I have lost faith in the deviCftl of the frequentistic aehools, I have learned new re&peet for lOme of their pneral theoretical ideas.. Let me amplify first in eomaectiOD with the Neyman-Pearson aeboot WhUe imdating on long-run frequency 88 the basis of probabl1ity, that eehool wiaely emphaaizes the ultimate subjectivity of statistical inference or behavior within the objective coDStraint of 'c adm;';bility, " 88 in (Lebmann 1958; Wolfowitz 1962). But careful study ot admi';bility Ieada almOlt inexorably to the reeognitiOD of peraonal probabUitiea and their central role in statistica (Savage 1961, Section 4; 1962, pp. 170-175), 80 personalistie statistiea appears as a natural late deveiopmeDt of the Neyman-Pearaon ideas. One conseqUeDce of this sort of analyaha of admissibility is the extremely important likelihood principle, a eorol1ary of Bayea' theorem, of which I was not even aware when writing the first edition of this book This principle, inferable from, though nominally at variaDee with, Neyman-Peanon idea (Birnbaum 1962), was first put forward by Barnard (1947) and by Fisher (1955), members of what might be called the Fisher aehool of frequentiat& See alao (Barnard 1965; Bar.. Dard et aL 1962 ; Corn1leld 1966).
The views just exprMled are evidently controversial, and if I have permitted myself lOeb expre.ioDS .. "show" aDd Hinexorably," they are not meant with mathematical ftnality. Yet, eoutroversial though
v
PRF3ACE TO THE DOVER EDITION
they may be, they are today shared by a number of atatiaticiaDs, who may be aalled penonalistie BayMiana, or simply penoD&lists. This book baa played-and continue. to play-a role in the p8ft0Da}istie movemet, but the movement itself baa other sources apart from thoae from which this book itself was drawn. One with great impact on praetiea1 8tatiatiea and scientiiie manqeJDent is a book by Robert. Sehlaifer (1959). This ill a welcome opportunity to say that his idea were deve1· oped wholly independently of the present book, and indeed of other
penonalistie literature. They are in full harmony with the ideas in thia book but are more down to earth and leg spellbound br tndition. L. J. YaU U"""'" Juu,1971
&VA8
Preface to the First Edition A BOOJt ABOUT 80 CONTBOVEBSlAL A SUBJECT AS THE FOUNDATIOn
of atatistica may have some value in the classroom, 88 I hope this ODe win; but it cannot be a textbook, or manual of instruction, statiq the accepted facta about ita subject, for there scame1y are any. Openly, or ooyly screened behind the polite conventions of what we call a disinterested approach, it must, even more than other boob, be an airing of ita author'8 current opinions. One who 80 airs his opinions has serious misgivings that (as may be judied from other prefaces) he often tries to eommnnieate along with his book. First, he longs to know, for reasons that are Dot altogether noble, whether he i8 really making a valuable contribution. His O\\~ conceit, the encoU1'8plD.ent of friends, and the confidence of his publiaher have given him hope, but he knows that the hopes of others in his position ~ve seldom been fully realized. Again, what he has written is far from perfect, even to his biased eye. He bas stopped revising and caUed the book finished, becaUBe one must sooner or later. Finally, he fears that he himself, and stiU more such public as he baa, win forget that the book is tentative, that an author's most recent
word need not be his last word. The application of statistics interests some workers in almost every field of empirical investigation-not only in science, but also in commerce and industry.. Moreover, the foundations of statistics are connected conceptually l\ith many disciplines outside of statistics itae1f, particularly mathematics, philosophy, economica, and peycholOU a situation that, incidentally, must augment the Datura! misgiviDp of an author in this field about his own competence. Those who read in this book may, therefore, be diverse in background and interests. With this consideration in mind, I have endeavored to keep the book 88 free from teclmieal prerequisites 88 its subject matter and its restriction to a reaaouable aile permit.. Technical knowledge of statistics is nowhere &88umed, but the ..-del who has some general knowledge of statisties will be much better prepared to understand and appraise this book. The books 8tatiBlics, by L. H. C. Tippett, and On 1M Principia of 8tGtiaticol Ifl/~ by
...
VUl
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
A. Wald, listed in the Bibliography at the end of Appendix 3, are short authoritative introductions to statistics, either of which would provide some statistical backcround for this book. The boob of Tippett and Wald are so different in tone and empbaais tbat it would by no meaDS be wasteful to read them both, in that order. Any but the most casual reader should have lOme formal preparation in the theory of mathematical probability. Thole acquainted with moderately advanced theoretioal statistics will automatically have this preparation; others may acquire it, for example, by reading TI&«wr 01 Probability, by M. E. Munroe, or selected parts of AA l'*«ltlditm to Probability TMory and It. ApplictltioM, by W. FeUer, aceorcIiDg to their taste. In Feller's book, a thorough reading of the Introduction and Chapter It and a casual readjug of Chapten 5, 7, and 8 would be sufficient. The explicit mathematical prerequisites are not great; a year of calculus would in principle be more than enough. But, in practice, readers without some training in formal logic or one of the abstract bnmcbea of mathematics usually taupt only after calculus win, I fear, find lOme of the 10111 thoup elementary mathematical deductioDB quite forbiddiDg. For the sake of such readers, I therefore take the Uberty of giving some pedasogical advice here and elsewhere that mathematically more mature readers will find superfluous and possibly irritating. In the first place, it MDIlOt be too strongly emphasized that a long mathematical argument can be fully unde1'8tood on first readjDI only",1len it is very elementary indeed, relative to the reader's mathematical bowledge. If one wanta only the gist of it, he may read such material ODee only; but othenriBe he must expect to read it at least once spin. Serioua reading of mathematics is best done sittiDl bolt upright OD a hatd chair at a desk. Pencil and paper are nearly indispeDSable j for there are always figures to be sketched and steps in the &llWDent to be verified by calculation. In this book, as in maDY mathematical boob, when exercu. are indicated, it is absolutely euential that they be read and nearly essential that they be worked, becauee they coDStitute part of the exposition, the exercise form being adopted where it seems to the authol' best for conveyiDg the partieu1ar information at hand. To some mathematiciaDs, and even more to logicians, I must say a word of apology for what they may consider lapeea of rigor, such as using the same symbol with more than one meaaiDI and failinl to distinguish uniformly between the use and the mention of a symbol; but they will understand that theM lapses are sacrifices to what I take to be general intelligibility and will have, I hope, no real difficulty in repairing them.
PRJI:FACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
.
IX
Few J1rill wish to read the whole book; therefore introductions to the chapters and sections have been 80 \vritten 88 not only to provide orieatation but also to facilitate skipping. In particular, we fieroull are indicated around mathematically advanced topice and other digleuioD8. A few words in explanation of the eonventioDl, such 88 those by which intemal and external referencea are made in this book, may be uaeful. The abbreviation, 3.4 means Section 4 of Chapter 3; within Chapter 3 itae1f, this would be abbreviated Itill further to § 4. The abbreviation (3.4.1) meaDS the first numbered and displayed equation or other expreaion in § 3.4; within Chapter 3, this would be abbreviated stiD further to (4.1) and within f 3.4 simply to (1). Theorems, lemmas, eDftises, coronaries, figures, and tables are named by a similar system, e.I., Theorem 3.4.1, Theorem 4.1, Theorem 1. Incidentally, the proofs of theorems are terminated \\;th the special punotuation mark . , a device borrowed from Halm08'. Jl8tJ1Ur, f'luory.
Seven postu1atea, Pl, P2, etc., are introduced over the coune of several chapters. For ready reference these are, with 80Dle explanatoty material, reproduced on the end papers. Entries in the Bibliography at the end of Appendix 3 are designated by a eelf-explanatory notation in square brackets. For ezample, the works of Tippett, Wald, Munroe J FeDer, and HaIm08, &heady referred to, are (TJ), [WI], [M6], [FI], and [H2), respectively. I often allude to a set of UrI refert:tU"AI to a given u,pic. This meaDS a set of external references intended to lead the reader that wishes to pur8Ue that particular topic to the fullest and mOlt recent bibliographies; it baa nothing to do with the merit or importance of ·the worb retened to. Tecbnical terms (except for Don-verbal symbols) that are defined in this book are printed in bold face or italies (depending on the impor-
tance of the term for this book or for established U881e) in the context where the term is defined. These special fonts are occasionally used for other purpoee8 &8 well. Terms a~ sometimes uaed iDformaDyeven in unofficial definitions-before beiDg oflieiaUy defined. Even the official defiDitions are sometimes of neceuity very loose, oorrespoudiDg to the well-known principle that, in & formal theory, some terms must iD striet logic be left undefined. L. J. SAVAGB
Acknowledgement I IUVB IIAKY JPBIBNDe, PEW OF WHOM 8JlA.BE KY PBB8BNT OPIN-
iODl. to thank for criticism and encouragement. Though the list Beema 10D& I eannot refrain from explicitly mentioDiDg: I. Bma, A. Burks, R. Camap, B. de Fmetti, M. Flood, I. J. Good, P. R. HalmOl, O. Helmer, C. Hildreth, T. Koopman8, W. Kruskal, C. F. Mosteller, I. R. &Vap, W. A. Wallis, and M. A. Woodbury. Wal6a &8 chairman of my department and close friend has particularly encouraged me to write the book and facilitated my doiDg 80 in many ways. lira. Janet towrey and Miu Louise Foraytb typed and retyped and did 80 many other paiDStalring tMke 80 well that it would be inadequate to call their help secretarial. My work on the book was made possible by four organizations to which I herewith expn. thanks. During the yean l~ through 1964 I worked on it at the University of Chicago, where the work \\·88 supported by the Offiee of Naval Research and the UDiversity.itaelf, which also supported it during the summer of 1952. During the academic year 1951-52 I worked on it as a. research scholar in France under the Fulbrilht Act (Public Law 584, 79th Congress), and during the \\11ole of that year 88 a fellow of the John SimoD Gugenheim lfemorial F01JDdation. L. J. 8.
Contents Postulate. of a peraoaaliatio theory of deeision . . . . . . • • . . . End papers
I,
I1f'l"WQDvCTlQlC
1. Tbe mIe of foundatjone ,
1 1
!
2. Historical backcround
a, ae.ral outline of thiI book
.
,. PBVIMDf.ar (A)N81P ZJlAnON8 ON DECWON IN 'l'HJ: FAce OJ' UNCliBTAINft
J. Introduction
..,.,.!"
2. The penoD . . • . . . . . , . 3. The world. and ltata of the world . 4, Eyeota . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 6. CoDI8Quenoee, acta, and decisions 8. The simple orderiDl of acta with reIJ)eCt to preference 7. The aurH.hiDc principle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.
pPeoJlAlc
8 10 13 17 21
PRo.ABfLlTI
1. Introduction. . . . , . . . . '
2. Qualitative peraonal probability . 3. Quantitative pereonal probability .. Aqmt matbelD&Uaal details . . . • 5. Conditional prot.bility, qualitative and quantitative 6. The approach to certainty throgh experience 7. Symmetric aeqU8ncee of event.. . . . . . . •. CluTtCAL
6 7
2'1 30 33
43 48 50
Co.MAD ON P'sPONAL PaoBABILtTT
1. IDtroduetjOD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Bome abortoominp of the per8Onalist.ie view
56
a. ConnectiOD with other vieg, , . . •. Criticism of other views. . . . . . . . .
60
S. The role of aym.metry in probability . . . • 6. How can eeienee UIG a pen!Ona1ilt.ic view of prob&bility?
6'1 63 • 67
5. UTlLlTT
1, IDtroduction. . . . . . . . . . . . 2. GamtW . . . , . . . . . . . . . 3. Utility, and preference pmb1es 4. The exteDsion of utility to more poeraI act8 .
amoac
lit Smen wortda . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Historical and critical comment. on utility I" wtn
69
70 78 76 82 91
OONTENTS 8. 0 ....1'4'110" 1. Introductioa .
...............
..
... , 2. What aD nl1 • [J("!'Atlon is , . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Multiple obeot vatiou, and extmaiODI of obeervatiODl and of Beta of
105
acta . . . . . . . . • . . . .
111 114 116
7, PAJmTIOM hoBLZ"" I, IDtroduc;tioa. «
•
,
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
,.,
108
•
2. Structure of (twofold) partition J)rOhI!ma. • • . . • • , 3. The DIue of o_nation . . . . . ««
121 121
•
128 1M
1.tO
10
148 8. &r4naftCl borD I. Introduction 2. What, is statietiee proper? . 3. Multiperaoul problems . •. The mbrimax theory . . 0
9. IJiITaODVCDON
•
•
•
•
Mnnacu:
TO TJq
. . . .
•
,
.
,
•
•
•
•
•
•
«
•
•
1M
•
150
182
lea
6. must.r&tions of the minimp rule . . • . . . . . . 7. Objectivistic motivation of the minim" rule . . . . 8. Loaa .. oppoeed to neptive income in the minimax rule
10. A
.
,
.
1M 185 .
188 189
PaJU1OM4UJmC RzIN'TBILPU'I'4TJOK O. TJlB MINIMAX THEORY
1. 2. 3. 4.
Introduction, . . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " A model of croup decisiOD. . . . . . . . . . . • . . , , The crouP minimax rule, and the Il'OUP principle of admiasibility Critique of the minimax rule
croup
0
0
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
11. To P 4MLLEU8M
BITWUN TJI1I MINIMAX TaIOaT AND TI[& Two-hBlO1I OAYU 1. I~ucUon. . , 2. 8t.aodard pme! 3. Minimax play . -i. Parallelism and contraat with the minimax theories.
•
0
•
•
,
Tae
•
172 172 178 ITt
or
THIQ&Y
178 178 180 180
0
12.
1. •
TuWOBT
1. Introduction. 2. Tho behavioral;"';" outlook 3. Maed acta . . . . . . , , . .. .. Income and low ' , , . , 50 The minimax rule, and the principle of admiaBibility 0
1M 1M 1M
MATB&YAnca OF MINIMAX PBOBLBMI
1. Introduction. • . . . . 2. AbIt.raet
_DIM . . . . . . . . . .
.. .. . . . ,
1M t
1M
CONTENTS
a
...
BJi".. paw.. . . . . . . . . .
.. AD egmple of a bilinear pm!
11. Oaganows
70
TU Mpgy!X
. . .
Rm.,.
1. Introcluctioo. • . . • . • . • . • . • • • 2. A COIlfuIioIl between _ and neptive income Utili~y and the minir,;u rule .. . . . . . .. A Imget. IUb-mipjmp acta 5. The minimax rule doea not poerat.e a simple orderiDc
a.
•
s
14 Tn
~86
180 198
s
•
•
•
•
,
•
.,
t
200 •
... .
200
.
212
-.
•
201
•
Mnnv.x
TusoBx ArrusD TO O.g&yADOXI 1. IDtIoduotjon, , . . , . , , . • ' 2. Recapitulation of partition problema
3.
a,,5d_' ltatjatjca
. . • ' •
.. flm. dl~my! aD example I. The approach to certainty s
•
,
. . . . •
•
•
•
s
•
•
•
8. Coat of o'-rvation. . . . . , . . . . . 7. Bequeatial probability ratio procedures 8 t RaDdomiMtion ,
,
212 214 214
•
216
. .
216
.
16. Pol1ft' FAnuIA'ftON 1. IDtirocluetiOD.. . . . . • • . . . • . . . 2. The verbeMtic CQDeep\ of point Mtimation . . . . . a. Examples of problems of point estimation . . 4. Criteria tbat have been propoeed for point eetimatee . • a. A behavioraliltic review of the criteria for point estimation 8. A behavionliatic review, OOIltinueci • .... 7. A bebaYioraliatic nmew, concluded . .
ttT
.
,
.
...·.
11. TMnMo 1. Introduction. . . 2. A theory of testing a. in practice •
T..wa.
.
,
"""PIX 3,
221 221 228
229
• •
., .
.
. . . .. . . ..
. . . ..
17. Ilft'IIJlvAL EsmuTlO1! AND R"+TBD TOPIcs 1. EeU'Ntei of the aeeuracy of estimates . . 2. Int.ern.1 Mtimation ADd confidence int«yaJa S. ToJen.oce iDttmla • 4. Fiducial probability
Ar.1ND!X 1.
220
s
••
,
,
257
..
•
s
..
·
.
Exnqntp V4LD .
263
00lfY'U FuNcnon. . .
286 270
BrauoollAPHlc MA'l'BBlAL .
A......JD 4. BDuOOlU.PBJC Sl1PPLBIIDT
. . . .. . . .
..
283
299
a..,.tI. INOU
• ,
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..
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301
·.
305
CHAPTER
1
Introduction 1 The role of fouIldati0D8 It is often argued academically that no science can be more secure than ita foundations, and that, if there is controversy about the foundationa, there must be even greater controversy about the hiaher parts of the science. As a matter of fact, the fOundatiODS are the most CODtroversial part:a of many, if not all, sciences. Physics and pure matb~ matica are excellent examples of this phenomenon. As for statistica, the foundations include, on any interpretation of which I have ever heard, the foundations of probability, 88 controversial a subject &8 one could name. As in other sciences, controversies over the fOUDciatioDl of statistics reflect themae1ves to some extent in everyday practice, but not nearly 80 catastrophically 88 one might imagine. I believe that here, as elsewhere, catastrophe is avoided, primarily because in practical situations common seoae generally saves all but the moat pedantic of WI from flagrant error. It is hard to judge, however, to what extent the relative calm of modem statistics is due to its domination by a vigorous school relatively weD agreed within itself about the foundatioDS. Although study of the foundations of a science does not have the role that would be aasigned to it by naive first-tbjnp-firstiam., it baa a certain continuing importance 88 the science d~elope, influencing, and being influenced byI the more immediately practical parts of the acienca. 2 HIstorical backpound The concept and problem of inductive inference have been prominent in philosophy at least since Aristotle. Mathematical work on some aspects of the problem. of inference dates back at least to the early eighteenth century. Uribniz is said to be the first to publish a suggestion in that direction, but Jacob Bernoulli's posthumous Ar. Conj«>Iondi (1713) [B12] seems to be the first concerted effort. t This mathe-
t Valuable iDfonnatiOD on t.his and other topics of the early pbilottopbic bWtory of
probMiIity is attractively pramted in Keynea' treatile IX.), especially in Chapters VII, XXIII, aDd the bibHocraphy. 1
2
INTRODUCTION
[1.2
ma.tica1 work has always revolved around the concept of probability; but, though there was active interest in probability lor nearly a century before the publication of Ar. Ctmiedlmtli, earlier activity 8fJIIDDI Dot to have been concerned with inductive inference. In the present century there baa been and continues to be extraordinary interest in mathematical treatment of problems of inductive inference. For reasons I cannot and need not analyse here, tbia activity bas been strikingly concentrated in the EllIlish-apeakiDl world. It is known under several names, most of which stress some aspect of the subject that seemed of overwhelming importance at the moment when the name was coined. "Mathematical statistics," one of ita earliest names, is still the moat popular. In this name, "mathematical" seems to be intended to connote rational, theoretical, or perhaps mathematicallyadvanced, to distinguish the subject from thoae problems of gathering and condensing numerical data that can be considered apan from the problem of inductive inference, the mathematical treatment of which is generally relatively trivial. The Dame "statistical inference" recopisea that the subject is concemed with inductive inference.. The name "statistical decision" reflects the idea that inductive inference is not always, if ever, concerned with what to believe in the face of inconclusive evidence, but that at least sometimes it is concerned with what action to decide upon under such circumstances. Within this book, there will be no hann in adopting the shortest poasible D&1Ile,
'fstatistics. " It is uDuimoU!iy agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. But, as to what probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there has seldom been such complete disagreement and breakdown of communication since the Tower of Babel. There must be dOJleDS of different interpretations of probability defended by liviDa authorities, and some authorities hold that several different interpret&trioDS may be useful, that ie, that the concept of probability may have different meaningful geD8e8 in different contexts. Doubtleaa, much of the disagreement is merely terminological and would disappear under sufficiently sharp analysis. Some believe that it would all disappear, or even that they have themselves already made the necessary analysis. Considering the confusion about the foundations of statistics, it is surprising, and certainly gratifying, to find that almost everyone is agreed on what the purely mathematical properties of probability are. Virtually all controversy therefore centers on questions of interpreting the generally accepted axiomatic concept of probability, that is, of determining the extramatbematica1 properties of probability.
1.1)
BI8TORICAL
BACKGROm~
3
The widely accepted axiomatic concept referred to is commonly MenDed to Kobnogoroff [K7] and goes by his name. It should be mentioned that there is some dissension from it on the part of a small group led by von Mises [V2). There are also a few minor mchnical variations on the Kolmogoroff system that are sometimes of interest; they will be cliacuaaed in § 3.4. I would distinguish three main cl8JSSe8 of view8 on the interpretation of probability, for the purpoaes of this book, calling them objectivistic, perBOD&1istic, and neces.ry. Condensed descriptions of these three clMI. of views seem called for here. If some readers find these descriptions condensed to the point of unintelligibility, let them be uaured that fuller ones will gradually be developed 88 the book proceeds. Objectivistic views hold that some repetitive events, such 88 toaaea of a penny, prove to be in reaaonably cloee agreement with the mathematical concept of independently repeated random events, all with the same probability. Aceording to such views, evidence for the quality of agreement between the behavior of the repetitive event and the mathematical concept, and for the magnitude of the probability that appliee (in cue any does), is to be obtained by observation of lOme repetitiODl of the event, and from DO other source whatsoever. Penon.Batie view8 hold that probability measurea the confideuee that a particular individual has in the truth of a particular proposition, for example, the proposition that it wiD rain tomorrow. These views postulate that the individual concerned is in some ways "reasonable," but they do Dot deny the possibility that two reasonable. individuals faced with the same evidence may have different degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition. lfecealary views hold that probability measures the extent to which one set of propositions, out of logical necessity and apart from human opinion, confirms the truth of another. They are generally regarded by their holders as extensions of logic, which tel1a when ODe set of propositi0D8 necessitates the truth of another. After what baa been said about the intensity and complexity of the controversy over the probability concept, you must realise that the short taxonomy above is bound to infuriate any expert on the found ... tiODB of probability, but I trust it may do the less learned more good than harm. The great burst of statistical research in the Engliab-epeaking world in the present century has revolved around objectivistic views on the interpretation of probability. As "ill shortly be explained, any purely objectivistic view entaila a aevere difficulty for statistics. This difficulty is recopised by members of the British-America Sdtool, if I
INTRODUCTION
[1.3
may use that Dame without its being taken too literally or at all nationalistically t and is regarded by them &8 a If8&t, though not iDeurmountable, obstacle; indeed, some of them lee it 88 the central probJem of statistics. The difficulty in the objectivistic positiOD is this. In aD)' objectivistic view, probabilities can apply fruitfully ODly to repetitive eveDta, that is, to certain proeCfJ888; and (dependiDg on the view in question) it is either meaningless to talk about the probability that a pven proposition is true, or this probability can be only 1 or O. according as the proposition is in fact true or false. Under neither interpretation can probability aerve as a measwe of the trust to be put in the proposition. Thus the existence of evidence for a proposition can never, on an objectivistic view, be expressed by saying that the proposition is true with a certain probability. Again, if one mUd ChOOE amoDI eeveral COUl'I88 of actiOD in the light of experimental evidence, it is Dot meaningful, in terms of objective probability, to compute which of these actioDl is most promising, that is, which bas the highest expected income. ,Holders of objectivistio view8 have, therefore, no l8COllt'88 but to arpe that it is not reaaonable to &88ip probabilities to the truth of propositi0D8 or to calculate which of several actions is the most promising, aDd that the need expreaed by the attempt to set up such concepts must be met in other ways, if at all. The British-American School has had great success in several respects. The number of ita adherents has rapidly inereued. It baa contributed many procedures of strong intuitive appeal and (one feels) of lasting worth. These have found widespread .application in many aciences, in industry, and in commerce. The BUCceas of the school may pracmatically be taken as evidence for the correctneal of the general view on which it is based. Indeed, anyone who overthrow8 that view must either discredit the procedures to which it bas led, or show, 88 I hope to show in this book, that they are on the whole cOll8istent with the altem&tive proposed. Some, I among them, hold that the grounds for adopting an objectivistic view are not overwhelmingly strong; that there are serious logical objections to any such view; a.nd, most important of all, that the difficulty a strictly objectivistic view meets in statistics re8ects real inadequacy.
a
General outUDe of tbla book
This book presents a theory of the fOundati0D8 of statistics which is baaed on a per80Dal iatic view of probability derived mainly from the work of Bnmo de Finetti, ... expre • sod for example in (D2J. The theory
1.31
GENERAL OUTLINE OF TBlS BOOK
is presented in a tentative spirit, for I realiae that the serious bJemiahea in it apparent to me are not the only ones that wi1l be diecovereci by critical readers. A theory of the foundatioDS of statistics that appears contrary to the teaching of the moat productive atatisticiaDs will properly be reprded with extraordinary caution. Other viewl OD prot. bility will, of COUl'l8, be diae\l888d in this book, partly for their own interest and partly to explain the relationship between the penonaJistic view on which this book is baaed and other views. The book is orpnised into seventeen chapters, of which the present introduction is the lint. Chapters 2-7 are, 80 to spark, concerned with the foundations at a relatively deep level. They develop, explain, and defend a certain abstract theory of the behavior of & highl7 ideaJir;ed perIOD faced with uncertainty. That theory is shown to bave as implicatioDS a theory of perIODal probability, comwpondiDc to the per80n alietic view of probability basic to this book, and also a theory of utility due, in its modem form, to von Neum8.J)D and Morpostem
(V41. There is a trauaitiOD, occurring in Chapter 8 aDd maintained throughout the rest of the book, to a shallower level of the foundations of ItatiatiC8j I might -1 from pre-statistics to ltatiatica proper. In thoee later chapters, it is recopised that the theory developed in the earlier ones is too highly ideaUsed for immediate application. Some compromises have to be made, and the appropriate ones are sought in an aualyail of aome of the inventioDa and ideas of the British-American School. It will. I hope, be demODBtrated thereby that the superficially incompatible systems of ideas 8880Ciated on the one hand with a penona1istic view of probability and on the other with the objectivistical1y iDspired developments of the British-American School do in fact lend each other mutual support and clarification.
CHAPTBR
2
Preliminary Considerations on Decision in the Face of Uncertainty 1 IDtr04act1oD DeciaioDa made in the face of uncertainty pervade the life of fiery iDdividual aDd orpni_tion. Even anim al8 might be said COIl.muaUy to make IUch decilioDa, and the psychological mach. . . . by which men decide may have much in eoJDmon with thea by which animal. do 80. But formal reuoDiq pr-!mabty pia,. no role ill the deailiOlll 01 uimal., little in thOle of children, and 1. . than miabt be wished in thoae of men. It may be said to be the purpoae of this book, and indeed of statiatiea pneralIy, to diaeu. the implicatioD8 of re&8ODing for the making of deeisicma. ReuoniD& is enmmonly a.oeia.ted with 10lie, but it is obvious, .. many have point,ed out, that the implieatiODS of what is mdiDariIy called logic are meager indeed when uncertaiDty is to be faced. It baa therefore often been asked whether 1000e cannot be BtAmded. by priDciplee 88 aceeptable .. thOle of 1000e iteelf, to bear more fuBy OIl uncertaiDty. An attempt to extend logic in this way will be bepD in this chapter, differing in two important respeata from most, but not all, other attAmpta. First, since logic is concerned with implicatiODl &mODI propositiODB, many have thought it natural to extend logic by eettiq up criteria for the extent to which one proposition tends to imply, or provide erideDce for, another. It seems to me obvious, however, that what is ultimately want.! is criteria for decidiDc &mODI pallible counea of actiOllj and, therefore, pneraUsation of the relation of implication Ie elD8 a~ beet & roundabout method of attack. It must be admitted that lOKic itae1f does lead to lOme criteria for decision, becauee what ia implied by & proposition known to be true is in turn true and aometimea relevant to meJri. . a deciaiOll. Should eom8 DOtion of partial implication be demODltrably even better artioulatal with deciliOD thua is impUcatioa i&t
THE PERSON
2.2J
7
aelf, that would be excellent; but how is such a notion to be aought exeept by explicitly studying decision? RAmsey's diacussion in (RI] of the point at iaBue here is especially forceful. Second, it is appea1iDg to suppose that, if two individuals in the ame aituaticm, haviq the same taatea and supplied with the same information, act reasonably, they will act in the same way. Such apeement, belief in which amounts to a necesaary (88 oppoeed to a peraonalistic) view of probability, is certainly worth looking for. Penonallyt I bafieve that it does not correspond even roughly with reality, but, baviDS at the moment DO strong argument behind my peasimism OD this point, I do not iDaist on it. But I do iDaist that, until the contrary be demODStrated, we must be prepared to find reaaoniDg inadequatAt to briDe about complete apeement. In particular, the extensioDi of logic to be adduced in this book will not bring about complete apeement; and whether enough additioD&l principles to do eo, or indeed any additioDal principles of much consequence, can be addueed, I do not know. It may be, and indeed I believe, that there is an element in deeiaion apart from taste, about which, like taste itae1f, there is no disputiDg. The Bext four eeetiODB of this chapter build up a formal model, or acheme, of the situation in which a persoD is faced with uncertainty; the final two, in terms of this model, motivate and state lOme of the few principles that seem to me entitled to be taken as postulates for rational decision. S nepenon I am about to build up a higbly idealiRd theory of the behavior of a "rational" persoD with respect to decisioDS. In dome 80 I wiD, of eouree, have to ask you to agree with me that such and such maxima of behavior are "ratioDal." In 80 far 88 "rational" meaDS logical, there is no live question; aDd. if I uk your leave there at all, it is only 88 a matter of form. t But our person is going to have to make up hie mind in situ. tiOlUl in which criteria beyond the ordinary ODes of logic will be neceeeat)'. So, when certain mamn. are preeented for your consideration, you must ask younelf whether you try to behave in accordance with them, or, to put it differently, how you would react if you noticed youree1I violating them. t The a"mption that .. per8OD'. behavior is loaicaJ is, or ooune, far from YMUOUI. Ia pu'ticular, IUCh a penon caDDot be uncertain about deeidab1e mathematical propOIitioal. Thi.t .1. . . . . at Jaut to IDe, that the 1emptmc propam abtebed by Polya [PS) of .tabIiabiD, a theory of the probability of mathematical conjeeturee MOD'"
be fully eueceeduJ in that it caDDOt lead to a truly formal theory, but de FiDetti (W) _ _ more optimiltic about the pfOFUD..+ + Poly. hu ICfNtly rlaboralfld hi!' program, but nnt ill lb. di~oll of SHk· iug • tonnal theory. A ~riOU8 ftarly work by CfrNole (1915) is IIOmewhat )Mlrtincmt, and Hatting (1967) &rgUea for th. pnMihility of infOludinl' mathPlnatifal oftt'f'rtah.tv in a formal then".
.
.
8
PRELIMINAllY CONSWERATlON8 ON DECI8ION
12.3
It is brought out in economic theory that orpniaatioos sometimes behave Hke individual people, 80 that a theory originally inteDded to apply to people may alao apply to (or may even apply better to) such unite as families, corporatiODl, or utioDS. In view of this IQIibilitiy, economic tbeorista are sometimes reluctant to use the word "peraon," or even "individual," for the behaviDg UDita to which they mer; but for our purpoae "pereon" tbreateDI DO coDfwlion, though the poaaibility of umn , it in an extended BeDae may well be borne in mind.
a
The world, and ltatel of the world
A formal description, or model, of wbat the peraon is uncertain about win be needed. To motivate this formal deacription, let me begin in. formally by CODSidering a list of examples. The penon might be UDcertain about: 1. Whether a particular egg is rotteD. 2. Which, if any, in a particular doseD ega are rotten. 3. The temperature at noon in Chicago yesterday. 4. What the temperature was and win be in the place now covered by Chicaao each noon from January 1, 1 A.D., to January I, 4000 A.D. 5. The infinite sequence of heads and tails that will result from repeated t
mate of complexity in Example 7. Example 6 is a little anomalous in that anytbiDg the perIOD does not know about the description of .. he could know in principle by thinking sufficiently bard about it, that is, by logio alons. This point. banal to some readers, neede explaDatioD
THE WORLD, AND STATES OF THE WORLD
2.3]
9
for others. If, for example, .. is understood to be the area of a circle of unit radius, it follows by logic alone that .. is not greater than the area of a square circumscribing the unit circle, that is, .. S 4. By an elaboration of this method T can be computed to any dep-ee of accuracy, and by other purely logical methods many other facta about ... caD be establiahed, ncb as the fact that ... is not a rational number. b CODDection with the concepts ~ by the preceding paragraph, the following nomenclature is proposed as brief, augestive, and in rea80Da ble harmony with the usages of statistics and ordinary eli&-
eoune. Term thewodd altate (of the world)
the true state (of the world)
Definition the object about which the
p8I'8OD
is
coneemed a description of the world t IeaviDe no relevant aspect undescribed the state that doee in fact obtain, i.e., the true deaeription of the world
In application of the theory, the question will ariae as to which world to UII8 in a given context. Thus, if the peraon is interested in the on1y brown ea in .& dOseD, should that egg or the whole dosen be taken as the world? It Will be seen &8 the theory is developed that in principle no harm is done by taking the larger of two worlds 88 a model of the situation. One is therefore tempted to adopt, once and for all, one world sufliciently large, say Example 7. The moat serious objection to this is that Example 7 is vague, and some mathematical and philosophical experience 8U~ts that the vagueness cannot be removed without ruiniDg the universality of the example. It may aI80 be added that the use of modest little worlds, tailored to particular contexte, is often a simplification, the advantage of which is justified by a considerable body of mathematical experience \lith related ideas. The 8eDBe in which the world of a dozen ega is larger than the world of the one brown egg in the dozen is in some respects obvious. It may bp well, however, to emphasize that a state of the smaller world corre-
.tpmds not
to one state of the larger, but to 8 set of state8. Thus, '4The brown egg is rotten" describes the smaller world completely, and
therefore is a state of it; but the same statement leaves much about the Iarpr world unsaid and cOrTe8pOnds to a set of 211 state of it. In ihe 88D8e UDder discussion a smaller world is derived from a larger by negleeting some distinctions between states, not by ignoring 80me states outnpt. The latter sort of cODtraetiou may be useful in ~ certain
PRELIMINARY OONBIDEaATIONS ON DB0J810N
10
states are reprded by the penon can be ipcnd. ,
II
(2.4
virtually impoaaible 80 that they
BftDm
An ennt is a set of states. For example, in connection with the world of Example 2, the penon might well be conoemeci with the eVeDt tbat exactly one eg in the dosen is rotten (an event haviDl12 statee &8 elements), or, a little leas academically, that at least one of the ega is rotten (an event having 211 - 1 states 88 elements, i.e., aU the statee in the world but one). In connection with the world of Example 3, the person mipt be CODcerned with the event, having an infiDite number of states, that the temperature at noon in Chicago yesterday W88 below freesing. To give a final illustration, of a more mathematical flavor, cOlllider in CODIleetiOll with Example 5 the event that the ratio of the number of heads to tails approaches 3 as the sequence PI'OII( nnaa to infinity. In connection with any given world, there are two eventa that are of the utmost logical importance, though in ordinary discourse it may eeem banal even to mention their existence. The. are the univerDl and the vacuous eventa. The UDlftrlal event, here to be symbolded by S, is the event having every stafA! of the world 88 element. In 10 far a8 "world" baa a real technical meaning, S is the world. The ftCUOUI event, which can here be safely enough symbolised by the 0 of arithmetic, is the event having no states as element.. To illustrate, in Example 1 the event that the egg is rotten or good is the univenal event, and that it is both rotten and good is the vacuous event. It is important to be able to express the idea that a given event contains the true state among ita elements. Engliah U8ap eeema to otter no alternative to the rather stuffy expression, "the event obtaJnl." The theory under development makes no formal reference to time. In particular, the concept of event as here formulated is timeless, though temporal ideas may be employed in the description of particular events. Thus, it would not be said that Lincoln's &88MIPnation is an event that occurred in 1865 and that the next return of Halley'. comet is one that will occur in 1985, but that Lincoln's AMaMinatiOJl in 1865 and the retum of Halley'. comet in, but not before, 1985 are events that obtain. Modem mathematical U8ap, especially that of a branch of mathematics called Boolean algebra. suaests the followiq table of definitioDB in connection with the concepts of state and event. Some of theee are synonyms, othen abbreviations, and still others new terms compounded out of old.
11
EVENTS
Though the notatiODa introduced in Table 1 are very elem8Dtary and of great utility, they are Dot ordinarily taupt except in connection with iOlie or relatively advanced mathematica. A aet of earcilel iDuatrating their uee is therefore given below the form of • llumlMnd list of statements. Theee statements are true whatever the eeta A, B,
m
TABLB
1.
MA'l"IdUATICAL NO"L~CLATURB PBBTAUnNQ TO 8l'AD AND .v.1ftS
Definition
Term (Btuie Imu) let
. A , BC·· J ,
eveo'
generic symbola for event.
pnerie symbols for stat. the UDivenJal event the vacuous event
I, ". ,"
S
o
• IA. A c B (or B :::> A). A-B.
• is an element of A, te., a etate in A. t A is contained inB, i.e., every e1emeat of A is an element of B. A equals B, i.e., A 11 the lame let 81 B, te., A and B haw u:actly the IUD8
eJementi. (C~)
the compJemeDt of .A with
tbOl8 element. of 8 that are not in A
napectto8 ~A
the pion 0( the All
UlA,
AUB
the iD.tenectloA of the Al.
n,A,
AnB
the compJemeat of A with respect to 8 thoee e1emeota of 8 that are element. of &t least ODe of the aeta A 1, AI, etc.. the union of the Ale the union of A aDd B f i.e., thOle elementa of 8 that are elements of A or B (possibly of both) thOle elementa 01 8 that. are e1emeote of each of the eete A 1. At, e&e. the intenection of the Al. the intenectioll of A and B, i.e., thoee alemen.. of S that are e1emeota of both A and B
t Typocaaphical Dote: The Ponon font of the Greek alphabet (a, tJ, ,., I,
I,
t •... )
is the ODe aJm. . always printed, at 1eut in America, wbeD matbem.tieaI COMtaata Mel variabIee aft denoted by Greek letters. The symbol • OIled la tbie &ad lOme other pub1icatioDa to denote "element 01" iIt ~er. the epi&cm of the Vertical fOllt (., ~, T. 1, .. t. •.. ). Some pubUcatiOll8 1118 the apec(aI symbol ~; 8Dd the POI8OIl epaiIoo, plMlmably becaue of ita re.mblance to E:. The latter utap eataU8 eilller uIiD& • fOl' iwo different purpoI8I 01' elee AMainl fOIl. in mid alpbaW (a., ~ " ...... r, ...) - - ooutu. aDd ftriab1el aN deooted by Onek IeUea.
1OIDe".,
PRELIMINARY OOKSIDERATION8 ON DECISION
12
12.4
C may be. Alathematiciu8 would for the most part verify them by translating them into EDgliah and appealing to common seDIe, though in complicated cases explicit use might be made of Exercise 9. Diagrams, called VenD diqr&lDl, in which aeta aN symbolized by ant88, as illustrated by Figure 1, are often suggestive.
F'JIUI81
It is a remarkable and useful fact that any univenally valid statement about sets remains 80 if, throughout, U is interebaDpd with n, o with S, and c with =>. The dual in this sense of each exercise should be studied along with the exercise iteelf. For example, the dual of Exercise 7 is: A ::> B, if and only if A .. A U B. Note that the Brat parte of Exercises 1 through 6 are dual to the second parts. It may be remarked that, if Exerciees 1-6 are taken &8 axi0tn8 and 7 88 a definitioD, Exercises 8-21 and a180 the duality principle follow formally from them. For example, 10 can be proved thus: By 7, if A B is A, then A c B; but, by 1, A A is A; therefore A C A. Apin, 8 can be proved, usiDg 6, 3, 2, 1, 3, and 6 in that order. thus:
n
(1)
n
0
nA
-=:
(A
n ""A) n A
- ""A
n (A n A)
== <""A z=t
""A
n A) n A
nA
.. A
n "",A - o.
Such formal demonstration is fun and helps develop mathematical skill . In the present exercises the novice, however, should consider it as a possible supplement to, but not 88 a substitute for, demonstration by interpretation. If the exercises fail to render the notations familiar, it would be best to talk Vtith someone to whom they are already familiar or failing that, to read in any elementary book where the subject is treated, for example, Chapter II, "The Boole-Schroeder Algebra, U in the text of Lewis and Langford [L7].
Exercises illuatratiDg Boolean algebra 1. A n A .. A =- A U A. 2. (A n B) n c -= A n (B n (J);. (..4. U B) U C -= A U (8 U C). (These facti often render parentheeee superfluous.)
3. A
nB -
B
n .A; A U B .. B U A.
2·51
CONSEQUENCES, ACTS, AND DECISIONS
4. A n (B U C) == (A n B) U (.4. n C); A U (B (A U B) n (A U C). 5. S A == Aj 0 U A == A. 6. A n (",. 4) -= 0; A U (~A) S. 7. A c B, if and only if A == A n B. 8. 0 n A :;g O. 9. A =- B, if and only if A c B and B cA.
n C)
J3 :c
n
=t
10. .Ii cA. 11. (A n B) c A. 12. If A c B, then (A n C) c (B n C), and (A U C) c: (B U C). 13. (A U B) c C, if and only if A c: C and B c C. 14.0 C A cS. 15. A n (A U B) := A. 16. ~(~A) A. 17. ~(A U B) == (~A) (~B) (De Morgan's theorem). 18. ~ == S. 19. A n (~A U B) -= A n B. 20. A c B, if and only if (~B) C (",A). 21. A c B, if and only if A (~B) :IE O. 22. ~(UiAi) CI (~A,) (General De Morgan's theorem). 23. A U Bi ) (A UBi). 24. A n
n
n
n, en, ni n,
I
CooaequeDcea. acts, and decialons
To 88y that a decision is to be made is to say that one of two or more acta is to be ChOleD, or decided on. In deciding on an act, account must be taken of the possible .tate. of the world, and also of the consequences implicit in each act for each possible state of the world. A consequeace is anything that may happen to the person. CoDSider an example. Your wife has just broken five good ega into a bowl when you come in and volunteer to finish making the omelet. A sixth egg, which for some reason must either be used for the omelet or wasted altogether, lies unbroken beside the bowl You must decide what to do with this unbroken egg. Perhaps it is Dot too great an oversimplification to say that you must decide among three acta only, namely, to break it into the bowl containing the other five, to break it into & saucer for inspection, or to throw it away without iDspection.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON DECISION
l'
(I.a
DependiDg on the state of the eg, each of tbeae three acta will have aome eonaequence of coneem to you, .,. that indicatAd by Table 1.
State Act
Good bre&k iDlo bowl
aU... omelet
DO
omelet, aDd five pod ega
destroyed break into ..ucer omelet, and • -.ucer five eel omelet, and a aaueer towuh to wash throwaway fiV&zeg omelet, and ODe good five . . omelet
m-eg
ea destroyed
Even the little example concerning the omelet sugesta how varied the thinga, or experiences, reprded 88 cooaequences, C&D. be. They might in general involve money, life, state of health, approval of friends, well-being or otbers, the will of Ood, or anything at all about which the penon could poaJibly be concerned. Consequeneee might appropriately be called states of the penon, as opposed to states of the world. They might alao be referred to, with 80IDe exteDsiOD of the ecoDomio notion of income, as the poaJible incomes of the pel'8OD. In anyone problem, the set of consequences envisaged will be denoted by 1', and the individual COD8eQuencea will be denotAd by f. g. A, etc. In the omelet a-
ample, F oonsista of the six conaequeoees tabulatAd in Table 1: eix~ omelet; DO omelet, and five good ega destroyed; etc. If two different acts had the same cODBequeneea in every state of the world, there would from the present point of view be DO point in eon&idering them two different act. at all. An act may therefore be ide. tified with ita possible couaequencea. Or, more formally, an act is It function attaching a consequence to each state of the world. The notation f will be used to denote an act, that is, a fuDction, attachiDI the COD8equenee 1(') to the state ,.. The notation f is losica1ly a better name for a function than the more customary J(') for exactly the same reason that the word "logarithm" is a better term for loprithm than "logarithm of ZH would be. The notational distinction involved here is often justifiably neglected in mathematical work. but we will have special need to observe it, at least in connection with acta, as willlOOD be explained. When aevera1 acta are to be diacuMed at once, they may be
2.51
OONSEQUENCa, A.CTS, AND DECISIONS
16
denoted by dift'erent letten thUS: f, " hj by the UIe of primes thus: f, f', f"; or by subscripts thus: f), f l - The set of all acta available in a given situation will be denoUd by F or a aimDar Qmbol. In the example of the omelet, ,. has three acts &8 elements. fi, for example, f denotes the first of the three acts listed in Table 1, then f is defined thus: !(good) - Iix-egg omelet; (1)
J(rotten) -
DO
omelet, and five good eggs destroyed.
The argument might be raised that the formal description of decision that has thus been erected seems inadequate becauae a person may not know the consequences of the acts open to him in each state of the world. He might be 80 ignorant, for example, &8 not to be sure ,,·hether one rotten egg win spoil a six-egg omelet. But in that case nothing eould be simpler than to admit that there are four states in the world corresponding to the two states of the egg and the two conceivable &Dswe1'8 to the culinary question whether ODe bad egg will spoil a aix. . omelet. It 8eems to me Ob''10U8 that this solution works in the greatest generality, though a thoroUghgoing analysis might not be trivial. A reader interested in the technicalities of thi8 point or that of the succeeding paragraph will find an extensive discussion of a similar problem in Chapter II of IV4], ""here von Neumann and l{orgenstern diacUII the reduction of a general game to ita reduced form. Again, the formal deecription might seem inadequate in that it does Dot pro'\ide explicitly for the possibility that one decision may lead to another. Thus, if tbe omelet should be spoiled by breaking a rotten egg into it, new questions might arise about what to substitute for breakfast and bow to appMBe your justifiably furiou8 wife. But, just &8 in the preceding paragraph an apparent shoneoming of the proposed mode of description was attributed to an incomplete analysis of the possible states, here I would say that the list of available acts envisaged in Table 1 is inadequate for the interpretation that has just been put on the problem. Where the single act "break int.o bowP' now stande, there should be several, such as: "break into bowl, and in case of disaster have t.out," "break into bowl, and in cue of disaster take famjly to a neigbboring restaurant for breakfast." Appropriate COD8equence8 of these new acts can easily be imagined. As has just been suggested, what in the ordinary way of thinkiDg might be regarded 88 a chain of deeisiODS, one leading to the other in t.ime, is in the formal description proposed here regarded 88 a 8ingle decision. To put it a little differently, it is proposed that the choice of a
16
PRELIMINARY OON8IDERATIONS ON DECISION
[2.5
poliey or plaD be reprded 88 • .oncle decision. This point of view, though not always in 80 explicit a f0J'!ll, hu played a prominent role in the statistical advances or the present century. For example, the great majority of experimentaliats, eveD today, suppose that the Cunetion of statistics and of statisticians ia to decide what conclusions to draw from data gathered in aD experiment or other observatioDai program. But statisticiaos bold it to be lacking in foresight to gather data without a view to the method of analysis to be employed, that is, they hold that the design and aoalysia of an experiment should be decided upon &8 an articulated whole. The point of view under discussion may be symbolized by the proverb, "Look before you leap," and the one to which it i8 oppoaed by the proverb, "You can cr088 that bridge when you come to it." When two proverbs conflict in this way, it is proverbially true that there is some truth in both of them, but rarely. if eve" can their common truth be captured by a single pat proverb. One must indeed look before be leaps, in BO far 88 the looking is Dot ~nably time-cODSUming and otherwise expensive; but there are innumerable bridges one e&IlDot afford to era., unless he happens to come to them. Carried to ita logical extreme. the "Look before you leap" principle demands that one envisage every conceivable policy for the government of his whole life (at least from DOW on) in its most minute details, in the light of the vast Dumber of unknown at.a.ta of the world, and decide here and now on one policy. This is uttA!rly ridiculous, not-as some might think-because there might later be cauae for regret, if thinp did not turn out &8 had been anticipated, but because the task implied in making such a decision is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It is eveD utterly beyond our power to plan a piCDie or to playa game of chess in accordance with the principle, even ""ilen the world of states and the set of available acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest reuonable limits. Though the "Look before you leap" principle is preposterous if earried to extremes, I would nODe the 1888 argue that it is the proper subject of our further diacusaiOD, because to cr088 ODe's bridges when ODe comea to them me&DI to attack relatively simple problema of decision byarWicia1ly con6n ing attention to 80 small a world that the "Look before you leap" principle can be applied there. I am UD&ble to formulate criteria for eelectiq th818 amaH worlds and indeed believe that their ee1action may be a matter of judgment and experience about which it iI impoeeible to enunciate complete and sharply defined geeral prineipl., thouah aomethiDI more will be laid in this cODDeetion in 10.6. On the other hand, it is aD operation ill which we all nece.arily have
2.6}
THE ORDER 01.- ACTS WITH RESPECT TO PREl"ERENCE
17
much experience, and one in which there is in practice coDBiderable agreement. In view of the "Look before you leap" principle, acts and decisioDS, like events, are timeless. The person decides "now" once for all j there is Dothing for him to wait for, because his ODe decision provides for all contingencies. None the less, temporal modes of description, though translatable into atemporai ones, are often 8uggMtive. Thus, there 'rill be occasion to analyze and make frequent use of the idea of defer... ring a decision until an observation relevant to it has been made. 6 The simple orderinc of acts with respect to preference Of two acts f and I, it is possible that the person prefen f to I. Loosely speaking, this means that, if he were required to decide between f and DO other acts being available, he ,,'ould decide on f. This procedure for t.esting preference is not entirely adequate, if only beeause it fails to take account of, or even define~ the possibility that the person may not really have any preference between f and I, regarding them as equivalent; in which case his choice of f should not be regarded &8 significant. If the person really does regard f and g 88 equivalent, that is, if he is indifferent between them, then, if f or « were modified by attaching an arbitrarily small bonus to its conBequences in every state, the person's decision would presumably be for whichever act was thus modified. This test for indifference does not provide an altogether satisfactory definition, since it begs the question to some extent by postulating in effect that the tester knows what eODstitut.es a small bODus. Another attempted solution would be to say that the pel'8On knows by introspection whether he has decided haphazardlyor in resp01l8e to a definite feeling of preference. This sort of solution seems to me especially objectionable, because I think it of great importance that preference, and indifference, between f and I be detennined, at least in principle, by decisions between acts and not by response to introspective questions. In spite of the difficulty of distinguishing between preference and indifference, I think enough h&~ heeD said for us to proceed to a postulational treatment of them. The very meaning of the relationship of preference that I have attempted to establish in the preceding paragraph implies that the perSOD cannot simultaneously prefer f and I to f. In the postulational treatment of the relationships of preference and indifference, it will be technically cODvenient to work with the relation "is not preferred to" rather than directly with ita complementary relation "is preferred to." Thust rather than say that it is impossible that both f is preferred to I and , to f, I might say that, of any two acts f and I, f is Dot preferred
't
to,
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON DECISION
18
to I or I is Dot preferred to f, poaaibly both. Again, the de&nition of preference sugests that, if f is not preferred to I, and I is not preferred to b, tben it ja imp088ible that f should be preferred to h.
The two assumptioDS jU8t made about the relation "il Dot preferred to" is 80metimes expreaed in ordinary mathematical usap by aayiDg that the relation is a simple ordering aJDODI acts. Formally, a relation ~. amoog & set of elementa z, " z ..• , is called a Rmpl_ ord"" in this book, if and oDly if for every z, ,1, and ,: 1. Either % S- fI, or II S· z. 2. If z <. fI, and tI S- z, then z ~. J. Borrowing from arithmetic the sugestive abbreviation oS for the relation "is Dot preferred to, rt the 8I8UJDptioD that S is a simple order..
iDg can be expre.ed formally by a postulate, thus:
PI
The relation S is a simple orderiDg 8JDoug actB.
I t if noteworthy that PI makes no explicit reference to states of the world. Except pc88ibly for mathematical refiDemeDi8, t it aeeme to IDe that no additional poetulate8 can be formulated without makiDI such reference at any rate none will be in this book. PI by it8elf is not very rich in coDSequences, but one easily proved theorem followiDg from it may be mentioned. 1 If P is a finite Bet of acts, there exist f and h in P 8Uch that for alii in P ISaS h .
TDEOREM
Theorem 1 is especially relevant to application of the theory of decision, because I interpret the theory to imply that, if r is finite, the person will decide on an act h in r to which no other act in F is p~ fernd, the existence of at least ODe such h beiD, guaranteed by the theorem. I t is often appropriate to consider infinite sets of available acta. In eeonomie context., for e.yample, it is generally an inappropriate complication to take explicit account of the poaaibility that all traD8actiODI muat be in integral numbers of pennies. If infinite leta of available aeta are set up and interpreted without BODle mathematical tact, unreaIistie conclusions are likely to follow. Suppose, for example, that you were free to chooee any income, provided it be definitely lees than etOO,OOO per year. Precisely which income would you ehooee, abatraetiDg from the indivisibility of pennies?
t For eampie, lUell t.opoIocical • .wnptiona about the spece with oeiphorhcJod. defined in tenu of S aa CODDeCtedD-, local comp.dra e••, or deD8i~y.
2.6)
THE ORDER OF ACTS WITH RESPECF TO PREFERENCE
19
It ia sometimes convenient to supplement the relation S by other reiatiODB derived from it in accordance with the definiti0D8 in Table 1, analogous defiDitiona heiDg applicable to any simple ordering. The assumption of simple ordering~ PI, has several implications for the derived relationa ~, <, >, and ... Tlle.e are generally stroD&ly augpatAd by the properties of the corresponding relations in arithmetic. TABLC
1.
TABLB OF RZLA'ftON8 DBJUftD nOli
Definition
New Relation f> ,.
IS f.
f
< I, i.e., I > I.
f
== It i.e•• f is equinleDt to (or
f
S
is prefemd to f.
iIlcWrereat with n.peet to) ,.
I is between f and h.
It is false that I S f. 1< f. f
S " and I S f.
f~
ISh, or h ~ g S
f.
A few such implieatioDB of PI are listed below, with no intention of completeness, 88 exerciaes for those who may not already be familiar with the elementary properties of simple ordering.
Bxerdaea 1. The relation ~ is also a simple ordering. 2. AU the relatioDS S, ~, <, >, and :I.: are transitive, that is, they can be validly substituted for S in the second part of the definition of
simple ordering. 3. Between any pair of acta I, " one and only one of the three relations <. :6:, and > holda. 4. If f < I, and I == h, then f < h. o. If f = I, then I ~ f. 6. For any f, f .. f. 7. At least one of three acts I, g, b is between the other two. When can there be more than one 8uch? Two very different aorta of in~rpretatioD8 can be made of PI and the other postulates to be adduced later. First, PI can be regarded 88 a prediction about the behavior of people, or animals, in decision situations. Second, it can be regarded 88 a logic-like criterion of coDSisteney in decision situations. For us, the aeeond interpretation is the ODIy one of direct relevance, but it may be fruitful to discu88 both, calling the mat empirica1 and the second DOnutive.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON DECISION
12.6
Loaic itaelf admits an empirical 88 well 88 a normative interpretation. Thus, if an experimental subject believes certain propositioua, it is to be expected tbat he will also believe their logieal eonaequencee and disbelieve the negations of the. CODIeQuences. This theory of humaD psychology has some validity and is of great practical utility in our everyday dealings with other people, thOUlh it is very crude aDd approximate. For ODe thiDI, people ofteD do make elemeotary mistakes in locie; more refined theories would attribute theae mistakes to such thiDp 88 accident or subcoDacioua motivation. For another, if anyone who beHeved the axioms of mathematics also believed aU that they imply and nothing that they contradict, mathematical study would be superfluous for him; such & penoD would, as has been explained, be able to state the ten-tholl.D dth or any other ~ in the decimal expansion of ... on demand. To summari.Ie, logic can be interpreted as a crude but sometimes handy empirical paycholOlical theory. The principal value of logic, however, is in connection with ita DOrm&tive interpretation, that is, as a set of criteria by which to detect, with au1Iicient trouble, any ineoD8istencies there may be amODl our beliefs, and to derive from the beliefs we ahady hold 8Ueh new 00. . . conBisteDcy demands. It does Dot seem. appropriate here to attempt an analysis of why and in what contexts we wish to be conaistent; it is sufficient to allude to the fact that we often do wish to be 80. ADalogoualy, PI tocether with the postulates to be adduced la~r can be interpreted 88 a crude and shallow empirical theory predictiDg the behavior of people making decisiODS. This theory is practical in suitably limited domains, aDd everyone in fact makes use of at leaat lO1Ile .... peeta of it in predietiDi tbe behavior of othen. At the eame time, the behavior of people is often at variance with the theory. The departure is 80metimea flagrant, in which ease our attitude toward it is much like that we hold toward a slip in logic, calling the departure a miBtake aDd attributing it to such thinp as accident and ·subccmacious motivation. Or, the d~ may be detectable only by a long chain 01 argument or calculation, the possibilities becominl increasiDgly complicated .. new postulates are brought to stand beside Pl. Pursuing the analogy with logic, the main use I would make of PI and ita successors is normative. to police my own decisiona for cODSiBteDcy and, where poesibl~ to make complicated deciaioDs depend on simpler ones. Here it is more pertinent than it was in eonneetion with logic that something be said of why and when cODSiBt.ency is a dMideratum, thouP I cannot say much. Suppose 8OmeoDe says to me, "I am a ratiODal person, that is to say, I seldom, if ever, make mistakes in Josie. But I
2.71
THE 8URF.-THI!"G PRIXCIPLE
21
behave in flagrant diM.greement with your postulates, because they violate my personal t~te, and it Kt~~mR to me more sensible to cater to my taste than to a theon" ... arbitrtui)v r.(m('()(~ted bv ., .vou." I don't see how I could really contr()\~ert him. but I \V'ould be inclined to match his introspection "ith some of my own. I would, in particular, t('U him that., when it is cxplicitl~.. hrou~ht· to my attention that I ha,·e shown a. preference for f as compared wit.h I, for g as (~ompared "ith h, and for h as compared wit.h f, I feel uncomfortable in much the same way that I do when it is brought t.o my attention t.hid some of my belief8 are logically contradi(~tory. \Vhetl~ver I examine Stwh 8 triple of preferences on my own part, 1 find that it. is not. at. all difficult t.o reverse one of them. In fact, [ find Ol} (~ontemplating th~ three alleged prefe~DC(1'8 side by side that. at least one among them is not. a preference at all, at any rate not any more. There i~ sCJlne t.elnptation t.u explore the possibi1it-~s of analyzing preference among a(~ts 88 a partial ordering, that, is, in effect to repJaoo part 1 of the definition of simple ordering by the very weak proposition f S f~ admitting that some pairs of acts are incomparable. This would seem to give expression to intr08peeth·e sensations of indecision or ,-acillation, which we may be relue1llnt to identify with indifJeren~e. .My own conjecture is that it would pro\·e a blind alley losing much in power and advaneing little, if at all, in realism; but only an enthusiastic explorat.ion could shed real light on the question.
.
7
The sure-thine principle
., businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next presidential f'lection relevant to the attractiveness of the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew tha.t the Republican (".andidate were going to \\;n, and decides that he would do 80. Similarly, he eODsiders ,,"h~ther he would buy if he knew t.hat the Democratic ~andidate were goj~ to win, and again find, that he \\·ould do so. Seeing that be would buy in either event, he de<~ides that he should buy, c,"en though he does not. know which event obtains, or will obtain, as \\re would ordinarily say. It is all too seldom that a decision can be arrived at on the basizs of the principle u8ed by this businessman, but., except p088ibly for the aMumption of simple ordering, I leno,,· of no other extralogical principle governing dedsioDs that finds ~ch r~ady acceptance. Ha\ing suggested what. I shall t.ent.ath·cly call the sure-thiDc principle, let me gi\"e it relath"cly formal statement thus: If the person would not. prefer f to g, cit.her knowing that the eveont, B obtained, or knowing that the event ",B obtained, then he does not prefer f to I.
PRELIMINARY <XlNSmERATlONS ON DECISION
(2.7
Moreover (provided be does not regard B as virtually imp<8Jible) if he would definitely prefer, to f, knowing that B obtained, and, if he would not prefer f to ,. knowing that B did not obtain t then he definitely prefersl to f. The sure-thiDg principle cannot appropriately be accepted 88 a postulate in the sense that PI is, becauae it would introduce new undefined technical tel'Dl8 referring to knowledge aDd poseibility that would render it mathematically useleaa without still more postulates lovernbll these terms. It will be preferable to reprd the principle 88 a l00ee ODe that augeata certain formal postulates well articulated with PI. What technical interpretat.ion ean be attaehed to the idea that f would be preferred to ,. if B were known to obtain? Under any reasonable interpretation, the matter would eeem not to depend on the values f and I 888Ume at states outaide of B. There is, then, DO 1088 of generality iD 8Uppoeing that f and I qree with each other except in B,· that is, that f{a) .. g(.) for all •• ~B. Under this unrestrictive ... sumption, f and g are surely to be regarded .. equivalent given '"WB; that is, they would be considered equivalent, if it were lmown that B did not obtain. The first part of the aure-thing principle can now be interpreted thus: If, after being modified 80 as to agree with one another outside of B, f is not preferred to ,; then f would not be preferred to " if B were knoWD. The notion will be expressed formally by .yiDg that f S I liven B.+ It is implicit in the argument that baa just led to the definition of f S , given B that, if two acta f and, are 80 modified in ~B &I to agree with each other, then the order of preference obtaining between the modified acta win not depend on which of the permitted modifieatioDl was actually carried out. Equivalently, if f and I are two aeta that do agree with MOb other in ~B, and f S I; then, if f and , are modified in ,.,..,B in any way BUeb that the modified acta fl and C' continue to agree with each other in ~B, it will also be 80 that f' S t~ This ... sumption is made formally in the postulate P2 below and illustrated schematically in Figure 1, a kind of diagram I find suggestive in many such contexts. In Figure I, the set 8 of all states. and the set F of aU CODSeqUeDees J are represented by horizontal and vertical intervals raspeetively. In any such diagram an act I, being a function attaching a value f(,} • F to each , .8 is represented by a graph. This partieular diagram graphs two acta ·f and I that' agree with each other in ~B, and two other aeta I' and ( that also agree with each other in ~B and arise by modifyilll f and I respectively only in ~B, that is, acta agreeing with f and , respectively in B. + In thiB edition, the Mrreeponding deftnition Dl on the end papers hu becan .lightly strengthened to eompt!!aaate an inadvntftlt wNknMl in the t'nd paper venion of P2, poiDt~ out to me by P..w.r ~hhu1"b.
2.7)
THE SURE-THING PRINCIPLE
23
, ____~l~______~_~____~) Il~___'_l~ j -it 1 ~~----~------~.~--~------~I S
Piaure 1
If f, I, and f/, I' are such that: 1. in """B, I agrees with I, and I' &glees with 2. in B, f agrees with f', and I agrees with (, 3. f S ,; then f' :S (. P2
t,
Each of the relatiOll8 uS given B" is now easily seen to be a simple orderi.Dg, and the relations ,,> J <, >, .. given B" are to be defined mutatis mutandis. It is DoteWOrthy though obvioU8 that, if 1(,) - g(.) for all •• B, then f ... , given B. It is now poaaibJe and instructive to give an atemporal analysis of the following temporally described decision situation: The person must decide between f and I after he finds out, that is, observes, whether B obtains; what will his decision be if he finds out that B does in fact obtain? Atemporally, the peraon can 8Ubmit bilD8elf to the consequences of f or else of I for all. I B, and, independently, he can submit himself to the consequences of f or else of , for all , e ,...", B; which alternative will he decide upon for the 8'8 in B1 Finally, dateribing the situation not only atemporally but aleo quite formally, the persoD must decide amoDl four acts defined thus: ~
boo agrees with I on B and with f on ,..." B, bol &pees with f on B and with , on "-B, b lo qreea with I on B and with f on ,...",B, bll qreea with I on B and with I on ,....,B.
The question at iasue now takes this form.
Supposing that
DODe
of
PRELIMINARY CONSID(4!RATIONS ON DF£ISION
(2.7
the four functions is preferred to the particular one hi;' is i a: 0, or is i == 1; that is, does hil agree with I on B or with I on B1 I t is not hard to see that i can be 1, if and only if f S C given B.. Indeed, if i - I , hoJ S hi;' which means that f S C given B. Arguing in the opposite direction, if f < I given B; then boo
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1
The vacuous event, 0, is null. B is null, if and only if, for every f and " f == I given B. If B is null, and B :::> C; then C is null. If "-IBis null; f S I given B, if and only if f ~ ,. f :5 I given S, if and only if f S c. If S is null, f == I for every f and I.
Component 6 of Theorem 1 requires comment, because it corresponds to a pathological situation. In cue S is null, it is not really intuitive to say that S (and therefore every event) is virtually impoasible. The interpretation is rather that the person simply doesn't care ,,·hat bappens to him. This is imaginable, especially under a suitably restricted interpretation of F, but it is uninteresting and will accordingly be ruled out by a. later postulate, P5. A finire set of events Bi is a partition of B i if B. n Bj ~ 0, for i ~ j, and i Bf == B. 'Vith t.his definition, it is easily proved by arithmetic induction that
U
If Bi is a partition of B, and f S I given B; for each i, then f ~ , given B. If, in addition, f < I given 8 J for at least one j, then f < g given B.
THEOREM
2
The union of any finite Dumber of null events is null.
There are still other interesting consequences of Theorem 2, which may be most conveniently mentioned informally. If, in Theorem 2, B == S (or, more generally, if ~~ is null), it is superfluous to say "given
THE SURE-THING PRINCIPIIE
2.71
Btl in the conclusions of the theorem. If f ..:. g given B, for each i, then f I given B. So much for the consequences of P2. Acta that are con-.t, that is, acta whose consequences are independent 01 the etat.e of the world, are of special interest. In particular, they lead to a natural definition of preference among consequence8 in terms of preference among acf.6. F ollo"ping ordinary mathemati(Wal U8age, f .. g will mean that f is identically g, that is, for every a, J(,) - g. A formal definition of preference among consequences can now conveniently be expre88ed thus. For any consequence8 g and g', g < g'; if and only if, when f Iii g and f' == g', f ~ f'. In the same spirit, meaning can be &88igned to such expressioll8 88 f ~ g, g ~ f given B, etc., and I will freely use such expressions without defining them explicitly. In particular, J ~ g given B has 8 natural meaning, but one that is rendered SUperflUOU8 by the next postulate,
=
PS. Incidentally, it is no,,· evident how awkward for U8 it would be to use/(,) for f; because!(,) < g(8) is a statement about the eoneequence8 J(') and g(,) , whereas f :s g is a statement about acts, and we \\ill have frequent need for both sorts of statements. Suppose t.hat f = gt and f' e g', and that 9 S g', is it nuonable to admit that, for some B, f > I' given B1 That depends largely OD the interpretation we choose to make of our technical terms, &8 an example helps to bring out. + Before going on a picnic with friends, a person decides to buy a bathing suit or a tennis raeket, not. having at the moment enough money for both. If we call ~on of the tennis racket and po88e86ioD of the bathing suit consequences, then ...~e must say that the cODSeqUf'nces of his decision ,vill be indepeDd~nt of where the picnic is actually held. If the person prefers the bathing mit this deciBion would presumably be re,"ersed, if he learned that the picnic were not going to be held Dear water. Thus the question ",,'bether it ean happen that f > f' given B would be answered in the affirmative. But., under the interpretation of "act" a.nd "COD.CJe
+ The rolt' nf .n.-h f.-..dom thTOQllhoat QainfO (1951).
~c-i~n~
iA brilliantly
~
by
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON DECISION
[2.1
to assume the negative &D8Wer 88 a postulate. The postulate is 80 couched 88 not only to usert that knowledge of an event cannot estab-
Jish a new preference amODg coaaeqUeDees or reverae an old ODe, but also to 888ert that, if the event is not DuD, no preference amoDI COD8equences can be reduced to indifferenee by knowledge of an event. If f !!! 9, fl only if 9 S g'.
P3
=g', and B is not nuD; then f S f' given B, if and
Applying Theorem 2, it is obvious that
'it
3 H B, is a partition of B; and if (for all i and .) Ii S J(') == Ii, and g(B}. == Ii when, I B,; then f ~ I given B. If, in addition, IJ < Ii for BOIDe j for which Bj is not null, then f < I given B. THEOREM
Theorem 3 is logically equivalent to P3 in the presence of PI and Pl, and Theorem 3 caD as eMily be given an intuitive basis as the postulate P3. Therefore the aanunptiOD of P3 88 a poatulate iDetead of Theorem 3 is only a matter of taste. Theorem 3 has been widely accepted by the British-American School of statiatici&D8, special empbasis having been giveD to it, in connection with his notion of admissibility, by the late Abraham Waldo I believe, 88 will be more fully explained later, that much of ita particular ailnifieance for that school stems from the implication that, if several different people agree in their preferencea amoug consequences, then they must also agree in their preferences amoDl certain acta. This brings the present chapter to a natural conclusion, sinee the further postulates to be proposed can be more conveniently introduced in connection with the uses to lvhich they are put in later chapters.
CHAPTER
3
Personal Probability 1 Introduction I personally coDSider it more probable that a Republican president will be elected in 1996 than that it will snow in Chicago eometime in the month of May, 1994. But even thi81ate spring mow seems to me more probable than that Adolf Hitler is still alive. Many, after careful eonsideratioD, are convinced that such statements about probability to a penoD mean precisely nothing, or at any rate that they mean nothiq preciaely. At the opposite extreme, others hold the meaning to be 80 ee1f-evident 88 to be uDanaJysable. An intermediate position- is taken ill thia chapter, where a particular interpretation of probability to a penon is given in tel'JD8 of the theory of consistent decision in the face of UDeertainty, the exposition of which was begun in the 1aat chapter. Much as I hope that the Dotion of probability defined here is tonaistent with ordinary usage, it should be judged by the contribution it makes to the theory of decision, not by the accuracy with which it aDalyleS ordinary usage. Perhaps the first way that auaeats itself to find out which of two eventl a person considers more probable is simply to uk him. It might even be argued, though I think fallaciously, that, since the question eoneems what is iD8ide the person'8 head, there can be no other method, just &8 we have little, if any, access to a person's dreams except through his verbal report. Attempts to define the relative probability of a pair of events in terms of the answers people give to direct interrogation bas justifiably met with antipathy from moat statistical theorists. In the fint place, many doubt that the concept "more probable to me than" is an intuitive one. open to DO ambiguity and yet admitting no further analysia. EVeD if tbe concept ""ere 80 completely iDtuitive, which might justify direct interrogation 88 a subject worthy of 80Dle psychological study, what could such interrogation have to do with the behavior of a person in the face of uncertainty, except of course for his verbal behavior under iDterrogation? If the stat.e of mind in qUe8tion is Dot eapable of manifestinc itself in some sort of extraverbal behavior, 27
28
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
(3.1
it is extraneOU8 to our main interest. H, on the other hand, it does manifest itself through more material behavior, that should, at least in principle. imply the paasibility of testing whether & person hold. one event to be more probable than another, by some behavior expreaing, and giving meaning tG, bis judgment. It would, in short, be preferable, at least in principle, to interrogate the person, not literally through his verbal answer to verbal questions, but rather in a figurative aense somewhat reminiscent of that in which a scientific experiment iIJ sometimes spoken of as an interrogation of nature. Severa1acbemes of behavioral, 88 opposed to direct, interrogation have been propcad. The one introduced below W88 suggested to me by a paaaage of de Finetti's (on pp. 5-6 of (D2]), though tbe pasaap itae1f does not emphasise behavioral interrogation.. To illustrate the seheme, our idealised person has just taken two eggs from his icebox and holds them unbroken in his hand. We wonder whether he thinks it more probable that the brown ODe is good than that tbe ,,·hite one is. Our curiosity being lWU, we are prepared to pay, if necessary, to have it satisfied. We therefore addreu him thus: uWe see that you are about t~ open thOle ega. If you win be 80 c0operative as to guess that one or the other egg is good, we will pay you a dollar, should your guess prove correct. If ineorrect, you and we are qUitd, ex(.~pt that we will in any event exchange your two eggs for t.wo of guaranteed goodness." If under these circumstances the person stakes his chance for the dollar on the brown egg, it seems to me to cormspond well \\·ith ordinary usage to say that it is more probable to him that tbe brown one is good than that the white one is. Thouch, of course, I hope for your agreement on this analysis of ordinary usap, I repeat that it is not reAlly fundamental to the subsequent arpment.. as indeed no such lexicographical point eould be; for the utility of a construct or definition depends only secondarily on the aptness of the expression in terms of \\-hicb it is couched. There 1S a mode of interrogation intermediate between ",-hat 1 have called the behavioral and the direct. One ean, namely, aak the perBOll. not how he feels, but what he \\·ould do in such and such a situation. In 80 far as the theory of decision under development is regarded 88
an empirical one, t·he intermediatt.e mode is a compromise between economyand rigor. But, in the theory's more important nonnative interpretation as a set or criteria of consistency for U8 to apply to our own decisions, the intermediate mode seel1l8 t.o me to be just the ript one. Though it entails digreasion from the main theme, some readers may be interested in a few words about actual experimentation on strictly
3.11
INTRODUCTION
empirical behavioral interrogation.
29
Some key references bearing on
the subject are [Mol], [RaJ, and [\VB). In the first place, a little reflection shows that an experiment in which human subjects are required to decide among actual acts may be very 8Xpen.sive in time, money, and effort, especially if the consequencea envisaged are expensive to provide, 8 point discu880d in detail in [W8J. Questions of morality, and even of legality, toward the subject may further complicate the investigation. For example, ~lostelJer and No~, as de;cribed in Section 3B of (:\-14). made certain tha.t every subject in one experiment of theirs would be financially ~,nefited, though they kept this security secret from t.he subjecta. There is also a difficulty in principle. SUpp05e that I wish to discover a person's preferences among several acts-three acts f, &, and h are sufficient to bring out the difficulty. If I in good faith otTer him the opportunity to decide among all three, and he decidftS on f; then tbere is no further possibility of discovering \\~hat his preference W'88 between I and h. Suppose, for example, that a hot man actually prefers a 8Wim, a shower, and a glass of beer, in that oroel'. ()nce he decide.s (,n, and thereby becomes entitled to, the 8wim, he can no longer appropriately be &8ked to decide between shower and beer...~ nah·e attempt to do 80 would result in biB deciding between a swim and shower on the one band, and a swim and beer on the other-aD alt4lgether different situation (rom the one intended. The difficulty can sometimes be met by special devict'S. For example, the investigator might wait for a different. but "similar" occlbion. But Allen Wallis has mentioned to me an interesting and very general device, which ,vill no,v be described. with his pennission. t Suppose that the hot man is instructed to rank the three acts in order, subject to the consideration that two of them will be drawn at random (e.g., by tard drawing or dice rolling), and that he is then to have whichever of these two acts he has &&riped the lower rank. He is thus called on to select one of six acts, that iaf one of the 8ix po88ible ran kings. If he does, for example, select the ranking tswim, show'er, beerf, it follow8 (l.asily from the theory of decision thus far developed that. for him 8wim ~ shower ~ beer, barring the farfet~hed possibility that he regards one or more of the three dra,,·ings 88 virtually impossi.. ble and provided that his preference aD)ODg the three acts swim, sbo,\-er, beer given any of the three drawings is the same as his original preference. The investigat.or could in practice design the drawing in such a
w.
t I have t!lin~ 8(I4!O this same devic:e used by If.
Allais.
PEBSONAL PROBABILITY
30
way as to be well satisfied that the required "irrelevance" obtained, except for very "superstitious" people. This ends the present dipeaaioD on actual behavioral interrogation. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of pel'8OD8l probability that was indicated in the example about the two ega. The concept will be put on a formal basis in § 2 by introducing two DeW postulates, P4 and PS, to be ueed in conjunction with Pl-3. This will lead to a formal &D&lyaia of the notion that one event is DO more probable than another. Several deductions about this notion reminiscent of mathematical properties ordinarily attnDuteci to probability will be made; but only in 13, after adjunction of still another postulate, P6, can the notion be connected quantitatively with what mathematicians ordinarily eatl mathematiea1 probability. Section 4 is devoted to some mathematically technical criticisms of the notion of pel'8OD8l probability, which can safely be skipped or skimmed by those not interested in such matters. Section 5 diacusaes conditional pel'8OD8l probability; 6, the approach to certainty through a long sequence of conditionally independent relevant observations; and 7, an extension of the concept of a sequence of independent events, particularly inten.tiDg from the
t
viewpoint of personal probability. S
QuaUtadve penonal probabWty
When I spoke in the introductory section of offering the person a dollar if hia gllesa about the egg proved correct, it was tacitly assumed that his gueea would not be affected by the amount of the pri. offered. That aeema to me correct in principle. It would, for example, eeem UDreasonable for the person with the two eggs to reverae his decision if the priM were reduced from a dollar to a penny. He might reverse himself in going from a penny to a dollar, because he might not have found it worth his trouble to give careful consideration for too amall a prise. I think the anomaly can best be met by deliberately pretending that consideration costa the pereoD nothing, though that is far from the truth in actual complicated situations. It might, on the other hand, be stimulating, and it is certainly more realistic, to think of CODSid~ tion or calculation as itself an act OD which the person must deoide. Though I have Dot explored the latter poasibility carefully, I 8U8p8Ct that any attempt to do 80 formally leads to fruitleea and endless re• gJ'tBlOD.
t The
term "personal probability" .... -lgMted to me orally by ThomtoD C. Fry. Some other terme IQIPIIted for the I&IDe concept. are "subjectiye probability," "paycbolOlical probabUity," aDd "d.- of oooviotion."
3.21
QUALITATIVE PERSONAL PROBABILITY
31
To offer a ~ in ease A obtains means to make available to the pereon an act fA such that for'IA,
(1)
for. c ~A,
where J' < I. The 888UDlption that on whieh of two events the penon will chooee to stake .. given priae does not depend on the prise itae1f is 8XpMA 00 by the following postulate, which loob formidable only because it contains four definitions like (1). The reader may find it belpful to grapb an iD8t.a.nce of the postulate in the 'Pirit of Figure 2.7.1.
1.
" ,,; A, B; fA, fB, IA. IB are such that: g' < g; f <J,
2&.
'A('}
P4
If I, "
2b.
I, / .. (,) - f,
gA(') == g
for, • A,
IIA(') - g'
for,
IB(') - I,
IIB(') - II
for, I B,
f',
IIB(') - g'
for •• "'B;
a
/B(') -
3.
I ~A;
fA S fs;
tben IA SIB. In the light of P4, it will be said that A is DOt more probable than S, abbreviated A ~ B; if and only if when f < f and fA, fB are such that IA(') - / for, • A, fA(') for •• "'A,
r
IB(') - / then fA
for, I B,
'B(') .. f'
for •• ",B;
S fs.
The assumption that there is at least one worth-while ptiJe is innOCUOU8; for, thoulh a context failing to satisfy it might arise, such a eonteJtt would be too trivial to merit study. I therefore propose the following postulate. P5
There is at least one pair of cODSequences/, /' such that
r
< /.
All the implications to be deduced from Pl-5 for 80me time to come
are tbemaetves impiicatious of the three easily established eonclusiODa. which are introduced by the following definition and theorem.
PERSOX.o\L
32
PROBA8II~ITY
[3.2
A relation ~. between events is a qu.Jitatlve probability; if and only if, for all events B, C, D. ~.
is a simple ordering, 2. B 5:. C, jf and only if BUD 1.
C
n D = OJ 3. 0 S· 8, 0
S· C U D provided B n D t
=
<. S.
I t may be helpful to remark that the second part of the abo,'e definition says, in eft'ect, that it will not affect the person's guess to offer him a consolation prize in ease neither 8 nor C obtains, but D happens to. TR£OR!"'~
1 probability.
The reJation
<
as applied to e\pents is a
qualitat~ive
You will ha,"e no difficulty in pro'''ing that Theorem 1 fonows from PI-5. Theorem 1 has many consequences of the 80rt one \vould expect it S meant "not more probable than" in any sense having the mathematical properties ordinarily attributed to numerical probability. This is illustrated by tbe follo""ing list of exercises, l'Iilieh should not only be proved fonnallYt but also int.erpreted intuith"ely. One easy exercise not included in t.he Jist belO\V, because it is not strictly a eonsequence of Theorem 1 alone, is to show that B .!. 0, if and only if B is a nun event. Exercises
1. If B c C, then 0 ~ B < C ~ S. 2&. If B n D = enD = 0; then B
< C,
if and only if BUD
<
CUD.
2b. If 0 < C, and B n C == 0; then B < B U C. 3. If B < C, then ~C :5 ,.....,B; and conversely. Hint! l)raw a '~enn diagram of the fourfold partition B n C, ",8 n C, B n ",C, ~B n
,.".,C. If B 5 CJ and enD = 0; then BUD S CUD. If B < 0; then B U C == 0, and B == o. If S S B; then B n c == C, and B == s. If BUD S C U D t and B n D = 0; then B ~ C. 5a. If Bl S Ct , B2 < C2 , and C1 C:J, == 0; t-he-n Rl U 8 2 S C1 U C2 • Hint: Exhibit B2 and C1 in the fonn B2 ~ Ba' U Q, C1 == 0 1' U Q with 8 2' tel', Q disjoint. Justify the following ealculation, step by step. 4a. 4b. 4e. 4d.
n
I &12-' BUD
whence Bl U B2
_ CUB 1 2' <
< C.
U C2 •
== C1' U Bt)_
_ CI ' <
U C_, t)
3.3]
QtTAl\"rITATIVE PERSONAL PROBABII..ITY
88
5b. If Bl U B. S C1 U Ct and Bl n B2 - 0; then Bl S C1 or B t S C2 • 6. If B S ,...,B and C ~ ~C, then B S C; equality holding in the conclusion, if and onlr if it holds in both parts of the hypothesia.
I
Quantitative penonal probability
As I have said, the exercises tenninating the preceding section 1U1gest a close mathematical parallelism between penonal probability and the mathematical properties ordinarily attributed to probability, though the postulates asaumed thus far do not (88 could easily be demOJUltrated) make it po88ible to deduce from this parallelism the unambiguou8 . . aipment of a numerieal probability to each event. But, if, for example (following de Finetti (D21), a new postulate aaeertiDg that 8 can be partitioned into an arbitrarily large number of equivalent sublets were ..umed, it is pretty clear (and de Finetti explicitly ahoWB in (D2D that numerical probabDities could be 80 assigned. It might fairly be objected that such & postulate would be flagrantly ad hoc. On the other band, mob a poatulate could be made relatively acceptable by observing that it will obtain if, for example, in all the world there is & coin that the person is finnly convinced is fair, that is, a coin such that any finite sequence of heads and tails is for him no more probable than any other eequence of the same length; though such a coin is, to be sure, a considerable idealisation. Mter some general and abstract discussion of the mathematical CODnection between qualitative and quantitative probability, a postulate, P6, will be propoeed. which, though logiea1ly actually stronger than the U8UDlptioD that there are partitions of S into equivalent eventa, seems to me even easier to accept. Once P6 is accepted, there WIll scareely again be any need to refer directly to qualitative probability. To begin with, let me say precisely what is meant, in the present context, by a probability measure, this being the standard term for what I would here otherwise prefer to call a quantitative probability, and what it means for a probability measure to be in aareement \\;th a qualitative probability. A probability measure on a aet S is a function P(B) attaching to each B c S a real number such that: 1. P(B) ~ 0 for every B. 2. If B n C - 0, P(B U C) 3. P(S) - 1.
= P(B) + P(C).
This definition, or something very like it, is at the root of all ordinary mathematical work in probability.
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
[8.8
If 8 carrie. a probability measure P and a qualitative probability S- such that, for every B, C, PCB) S pee), if and only if B ~. Cj then P (strictly) agrees with S-. If B 5- C implies PCB) S P(C), then P .Imoat qre. with ~ -. ThiI terminology is obviously CODsistent in that, if P agrees, that is, strictly agrees, with < -, P also almost agrees with S-. It is also easily aeeD that, if P agreoa with S·, then knowledge of P implies knowledge of ~.. But, if P onIyalmoet &&reee with it may happen, 88 examples in 14 mow, that PCB) P(C), though B < - C, 80 that knowledge of P may imply only imperfect
.s.J
knowledge of 5:-. The rest of this section is mainly a atudy of qualitative probabilities generally. with a view to discovering interestiDg conditioDi under which there is a probability measure that agrees, either strictly or alm08t, with a given qualitative probability. Theae eondiuODB 8IJgest a new postulate goveming the special qualitative probability S. The work is necessarily rather tedious and burdened with detail. I t will, therefOle t be wiae for most readers to skim over tbe material. omitting the proofs but noticing the more obvious logical cODDectioDB aJDODI the theorems and definitions. Some may then find themselves aufliciently interested in the details to retum and read or supply the proofs, .. the eue may require. Othere may u.fe1y go forward. Here, as elsewhere, technical tenns of interest for the moment only are introduced with italics rather than boldface. An n-fold almost uniform partition or B is an n-fold partition of B such that the union of no r elements of the partition is more probable than that of any r + 1 elements. If there exist n-fold almost lmoorm partitioDB of B for arbitrarily large values of ft_ then there exist m-fold almost unii'onn partitions for every positive integer tn.
THEOREM 1
Let B i , i = 1, .", A, be an ",",fold almost uniform partition (of B) with n ~ m2• Using the euclidean algorithm, let n be written n = am + b. where a and b are integers such that m < a and 0 ~ b < m. N ow let Cj, j :.;; 1, ... , m, be any m-fold partition such that each Cj is the union of a or a + 1 of the Bls. The union of any r of the C/s, r < m, is the union of from ar to (0 + l)r of the Bli and the union of r + 1 of the C/s is that of from a(r + 1) to (a + l)(r + 1) of the Bla. Since r < m S a, (a l)r -= or r < or + (J - o(r + 1)• • PROOP.
+
+
2 If there exist n-fold almost unifonn partitions of 8 for arbitrarily large yalues of Pl, then there is one and only one probabllity measure P that almost agrees with S e. Furtbennore, for any p, 0 S p THEOREM
QUA.'~ITATIVE
3.3)
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
35
:S 1, any B c 8, and the unique P just defined, there enlt. C c B
= pP(B). t
such that P(C)
The proof is broken into a sequence of easy stepe, left, for the moat part, to the reader. These steps are grouped in blocks. only PROOF.
the last step in each being needed in the proof of later steps. 1. There exist n-fold aJmost unifonn partitions of S for every positive n. 2&. If PI, . · '. P. are real numbers such that 0 S 1'1 S 112 :S · · · S Pttl and ~Pi == 1; then
,.
:E Pi S Tin,
(1)
T--l , ... , n.
I
2b. If further ,.+1
1l
EPi> L
for r == 1" ...
Pi
k-r+1
1
ft -
l',
then r
(2)
L
~
Pi
>
{r -
E
and
l)/n,
1
Pi
S
(r
+ l)/n.
ft-,+1
2c. The sum of any r of the p/slies between (r - l)/n and (r + l)/n. 2d. U P alm08t agrees ,vith S·, and C(r. n) denotes bere and later in this proof any union of r elements of any n...fold almost unifonD par-
tition (not necessarily the same from one context to another), then (3)
(r - 1)/n
S
<
P(C(r, n»
(r
+ l)/n.
3. Let k(B, n) denote the qest integer r (poesibly sero) such that some C(r, fa) is not more probable than B. The function k(B, n) is well-defined, and 0 S k(B, n) S n. 4&. For any P that almost agrees with (4)
(k(B, 'n) - 1)/"
S P(B)
S·, S (k(B,
n)
+ 2)/n.
4b. At most one P can almost agree with S· Sa. If Bi and C, are n-fold partitions (not necerearily almost uniform) 80 indexed that B1 S· BJ S· ... S· B,., and C1 ~. C, ~ •... ~. e,,; then (6)
" B.~· U " Ci, U
"-r
t Techoiea1
r
== 0, ... , n - 1.
ft-t'
note: The mathematical eaenoe of the terminal conclusion of lhiI t.heanm, and other coocluaioos related to it, are liven by 80beayk and Hammer (815). It miPt be conject~ in 8061017 with couat&bIy additive meMUNI, that thIa OODclUIioD meaDI ooIy that P .. DOD.tomiC, bat tM\ coojectun it (alee [Nil.• + A key reteftn~ for further information on tht- 8tnIdure of ftnitely addi... tift meuanB ill (DubiDII 1969). 8utainM tI. . of flnit.I~· additiv«' probability ill illuatrated in (Dobins and 8. . . 196';).
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
36
(3.3
6b. If in addition the two partitioD8 are almost uniform, then ,.
r+2
U c·• -<. U B·I,
(6)
I
(Proof.
1, ' .. ,
T -
fa -
2.
1
r+2
"
•
,.
1
.-r
JI-,.
J
U Bi ~. U Bi ~. U C. ~. U Ct.)
00. The union of any r element. of one almost uniform .fold partition is Dot more probable than the union of any r 2 ~lements of aD... other. M. If B n C =: 0, then
+
(7)
k(B t n)
+ k(C, n} -
2 S k(B U C, ta) S k(B, n)
+ k(C, n) + 1.
6&. If a C(r, m) is not more probable than a C(a. n), then
r:~ e:~ $
(8)
+ ;;;.
(Consider an mn-fold almost uniform partition, and use the easily established fact that t.he union of any l + 2 elemeDts of an alm08t uniform partition is actually more probable than that of any t elemeDtB.) k(B, ~ _ k(B, n)
6b.
m
n
I ~ ! + 3 + 2-. Imnm"
6c. It is meaningful to define P(B) by PCB) = Dr lim
(9)
k(B, n)
A-- "
'
that i8~ the limit exista. 7. PCB), as just defined, is a probability measu~ and the 0Dly one that almost agrees \\itb S·. 8a. There exist tlVO infinite sequences of sets C. and D" contained in B such that: 1. eft n D.
== O.
2. Cft C C,,+h and D" c D"+l, 3. P(C.) ~ pP(B) _ n-', 4. P(D,.) ~ (1 - p}P(B) -
n- I •
8b. P(U" C,,) 2! pP(B), P(U" D.) ~ (1 - p)P(B), and (U" D.) = O. Sc. P( C,,) - pP(B) . •
cU. C.) n
u.
A few technical terms of localized interest oo1y are now introduced. If aDd only if, for every B >·0. there ill a partition of S. DO element of
QrANTIT.-\TIVF,
3.31
PJ.~RSONAI..
PROBABILITY
37
whi(eh iR as probahlt~ as Il; :s;. is Ii~' (:. + B and C are aIm o.t tqUiVdlent, written B ¢ . C; if and only if for all non-null G and H such that B n G =: C n H = 0, BUG >. C and C U H ~. B. It is ob'''iou8 that equivalent events are also almost equivalent. Finally, if and only if every pair of almost equivalent events are equivalent, <. is tight.. THEOREM
:!
S . is fine.
HTP.
1. If B >. 0, and C >. 0; there exists Dee such that o < . D <·B. 2. II B Q. 0, C ¢ .. /1, and B n C = G n If =- 0; then B U C o·G U H. 3. It B o· C, G ¢ . H, B U C o· G U H, and B n C = G n H == 0; then B o·G. 4. Any partition or S into almost. equivalent events is an almost uniCONCL.
partition. 5. Any event can be partitioned into two almost equivalent events. 6. Any event can be partitioned into 2" almost equivalent events, for any non-negative integer n. i. There exists one and only one P that. almost agrees with <-. For any B. p (0 < p ~ 1), and the unique P just. defined, there exists C c B such that P(C) == pP(B). If B >. Ot P(B) > O. Finally, B c- C, if and only if P(B) = P(C). fOl"lB
The parts of the eonclusion are so arranged that ea~h is easy to prove in the light of its pnadecE'SSOr'S, but proofs (or Parts 3 and 5 are given below. I t may be remarked that all parts are trivial consequences of the Ja...~t one and have therefore relatively little importance in PROOI'.
themselves. Part 3. Suppose, for example, B U E <. G, B n E = 0, and E >. 0; and consider two CASeS: (a) If B U C <. S, it may be assumed without 1088 of generality that (," E = 0, whence (B U C) U E ~. G U H. Therefore, C >. H. Let E be partitioned into two non-null event8 Eland E 2 ; then (since it is absurd to suppose that the part of G outside of C is null, which would imply C ~. G >. B U E) there is in G an E' such that C n E' - 0 <·E' ~ .. E2' No'\\" CUE' >·H U H' ~.G >. (B U H.) U E 2 •
n
whence C >. B U E I, which is absurd. (b) If B U C ==. S, it can (setting aside the easy special case enG :iiI.O) be shown successively that: HUG =as; C <. BUB <. '0, where E >·0 and E c (' n G; (8 n H) U E <- (G n C); (C n H) <. (G B); and II U E <. G, which establishes 8 contradiction.
n
+ In the fiJ'Rt Nlition, thifl df'nnitiol1 If'alt''olm Pikf!'~
WIU~
a triftt' tnn "tp&k. u point..! nut by
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
38
11.1
Part 5. There exists a sequence of threefold partitions of B, say C,., D,., and G., such that:
D,., and D. U G. ~. ell, 2. 0"+1 ~ c., D.+1 ::> D., and 0.+1 C G., 3. ~.+1 n G. ~. G,,+I; whence Ga' contaiDS two disjoint evena each at least as probable 88 0,,+11. Crt U G.
~.
For any H >·0, G.
~.
H for sufficieutJy large ft, 18 may be I88Il by coD8ideriDg some m-fold partition DO element of which is more probable than H. and letting n be such that 2"-1 > m. If G. were more probable than H and therefore more probable than each element of the partition, it would follow tbat the union of all elements of the partition, namely S, is leas probable than 0 1 , which would be absurd. The two events Bl = U. Cra, Bt = G.) partition B in the required faahiOD...
If S· is both fine aDd tight; the only probability measure that almost agrees with S· strictly agrees with it, and there exist partitioDl of 8 into arbitrarily many equivaleat eveDta. CoaOLLARY 1
4 ~. is both fine and tight, if and only if, for every B <. C, there exists a partition of 8 the union of each element of which with B is less probable than c.
THEoREM
The proof of thia theorem is easy.
In the light of Theorems 3 and 4, I tentatively propoee the foUowiq poetulate, P6', IOverJling the relation S amoDi events, and thereby the relation S amoDI acta. U B < 0, there exists a partition of 8 the union of each element of which with B is less probable than c.
PS'
It aeems to me rather eamer to justify tbe &88UDlption of Pe', which _ye in eft'eet that ~ is both fine and tight, than to justify the .-unption, which was made by de Finetti {D2J and by KoopmaD (Kg), (KIO], (Kill in closely related contexts, that there exist partitions of Slnto arbitrarily many equivalent events, though 10liea1ly P6' implies that ••nmption and somewhat mOle. Suppose, for example, that you y0urself consider B < C, that is, that you would definitely rather .take • gain in your fortune on C than on B. Consider the partition of your own world into 211 events each of which corresponds to a particular sequence of R heads and tails, thrown by youraelf, with a coin of your own choosing. It fW!D\8 to me that you could euily ch~ such • coin and chooae ft sufficiently large 10 that you would continue to pre-
3.8)
QUANTITATIVE PERSONAL PROBABILITY
fer to stake your pin on C, rather than on the union of B and any particular aequence of n. heads and tails. For you to be able to do 80, you need by no means consider every sequence of heads and tails equally probable. It would, however, be disingenuous not to mention that some who have worked on a closely related concept of probability, notably Keyns [K4] aDd Koopman [K9], [KIO], [KI1], would object to P6' preciBe1y beawae it implies that the agreement between numerical probability and qualitative probability is strict. Koopman, for example, bolds that, if A ::> B and A ,14 B, then A is necesaari1y more probable thaD 8, though the numerical probability of A may well be the 8aDle as that of B. Thus, if. marksman shoota at a wall, it is logically contradictory that his bullet should fall nowhere at all, but it is logiea1ly coJl8istent that a preacnDed mathematically ideal point on the bullet should strike a praacnDed mathematicaUy ideal line on the wall Since the event of the PN8Cribed Point hitting a pre8CnDed line is logieally possible, Koopmall would insist that the event is more probable than the V&eUoua event, uamely that the bullet goes nowhere, though the numerieal probability of both events is sero. I do not take direct issue "ith Koopman, becaQ8e he is preaunabJy talking about a somewhat different concept of probability from the particular relation S; but I do not think it appropriate to suppoee that the penon would distinctly rather stake a pin on the line than on the Dull eet. The issue is Dot really either an empirical or a normative one, because the point and line in qumtion are mathematical ideali_tions. If the point and line are replaced by & dot aDd • band, respectively, then, of COUr&e, no matter how small the dot and band may be, the probability of the one bitting the other is greater than that of the vacuous event. But it teems to me enUndy & matter of taste, conditioned by mathematical experience, to decide what idealization to make if the dot and band are replaced by their idea1iMd limits. So much for hair 8plitting. All far &8 the theory of probability per 8e is concerned, postulate P6' ia all that, need be assumed, but in Chapter 5 a slightly stronger &88WDption will be needed that bears on acts generally, not only OD thoee very special acta by which probability is defined. Therefore, I am about to propoae & postulate, PS, that obviously implies P6' and \'till therefore su.peraede it.. This atronpr postulate 8ee1M to me acceptable for the lUna reason that P6' itself does.
P6 If I < h. and I is any consequence; then there exista a partition of 8 such that. if , or h is 80 modified on any one element of the partition 88 to take the value I at every 8 there, other values being un-
PE&c;oNAL PROBABILITY
disturbed; then the modified I remains less than h, or than the modified h, as tbe case may require. ,
13.4
« remains less
Some mathematical details
Are there qualitative probabilities that are both fine and tight, that are fine but not tight, that are tight. but not fine, that are neither fine nor tight but do have one and only one alm08t agreeing probability measure? Examples anBwering all these questions in the aflirmative will be exhibited in this sectioD. To indicate a different t.opic that will also be treated here, thoee of you who have had more than elementary experience with mathematical treatments of probability know that it is not wrual to suppose, 88 has been done here, that all sets have a numerical probability, but rather that a sufficiently rich cl888 of seta do 80, the .remainder being considered unmeasurable. Again, it is usual to suppose that, if each of an infinite sequence of di8joint sets i8 measurable, the probability of their union is the sum of their probabilities, that is, probability meuu1e8 are generally 88SUIIled to be countably additive~ But the theory being developed here does 8IJ8Ume that probability is defiDed for all events, that is, for all sets of statal, and it does not imply countable additivity. but only finite additivity. The present section not only an8\\~ra the questions raised in the preceding paragraph, but also discusses the relation of the notions of limited domain of definition and of countable additivity to the theory of probability developed bere. The general conclusions of this discussion are: First, there is no technical obatac1e to working with a limited domain of definition, and, except for expository complicatioDB, it might have been mildly preferable to have done 80 throughout. Second, it is a little better not to 888Ume countable additivity as a postulate, ,but. rather &8 a special hypothesi8 in certain contexts. A different and much more e.."(tensive treatment of these questions has been given by de Finetti (04). Finally, before entering upon the main technical work of this section, one easy question about the relation between qualitative and quantitative probability will be ans\vered and several 88 yet unanswered ones will be raised. Are there qualitative probabilities "ithout any strictly agreeing measure? Yes, becauae any qualitative probability that i8 fine but Dot tight is easily shown t.o provide an example. It is, bo,ve,·er, an open question, stressed by de :....inetti [D5). whether a qualitati\re probability OD a finjte S always hu a strictly agreeing measure. I t would also be technically interesting to know about the existence of almost acreeinl measures in the same context..+ + EVf'D this has eint"e bHn answftJ'.-d in th~ negatift by Kraft, Pratt. and Af.idflubP.,. (19M). Rfle (Filhbnm 1970. pp. 21f).211).
.1""
The matters to be treated in the rest of this section are rather teeh.. nieal mathematicalJy, and, though I would not delete them altogether, it does not seem justifiable to lay the necessary groundwork for presenting them in an elementary fashion. Some may, therefore, find it necessary to skip the rest of this section altogether, or to skim it rather lightly. It is well kno\m that there does not exist a eountably additive probability measure defined for every subset of the unit interval, agreeing with Lebesgue measure on those sets where Lebesgue measure is defined, and assigning the same measure to each pair of congruent sets+ (Problem (b). p. 276 of [112]). On the other hand, there do exist finitely additive probability measures agreeing with Lebesgue measure on thOle sets for which Lebesgue measure is defined, and 8.8Bigning the same measure to each of any pairs of congruent sets; cf. p. 32 of [B4J. The existence of such measures shows, amoDg other things, that a finitely additive measure need not be eountably additive. Again, calling such a finitely additive extension of Lebesgue measure P and defining B S· C to I1lMD P(B) ~ P(C), we see an example of a qualitative probability that is both fine and tight. An example of a qualitative probability that is tight but not fine may be cODStructed by taking for S two unit intervals, 8 1 and~, in eaeh of which finitely additive extensions of Lebesgue measure, PI and P2J are defined. The generic set B in this example is therefore partitioned into BI - B Sl and B2 B 8 2 , respectively. For this example, let B <. C; if, and only if P1(B 1) < P 1 (C 1 ), or else P 1 (B 1 } - P1(Ct ), and P 2 (B2 ) < P 2 (C2 ). This ~. is not fine, because, for example, 8 cannot be partitioned into events none of which is more probable than 8.. On the other hand, it is easily seen to be tight. Next, take 8 to be the union of 8 1 and 8 2 with the measures of PI and P2 88 defined in the preceding example, but modify the definition of S·, saying B <·0; if and only if Pl(B 1 ) P2(B2 ) < Pl(C 1 ) + Ps(Ct ), or else P 1 (B 1 ) + P,(B2 ) - PI(el ) + P t (C2 ), and P1(B 1) S p.(C 1 ). This is an example of a qualitative probability that is fine but not tight. Combining the ideas of the two preceding examples, it is easy to ex.. hibit a qualitative probability that is neither fine nor t.ight but is such that 8 can be divided into arbitrarily many equally probable events. Thus all the questions raised in the opening paragraph of this section are answered in the affinnative.
n
:BE
n
+
+ R. Ulanl (1930)
)l~
that any nonatomil'J, oountably additive probability ftleutln! d~ftned on aU thf'lInlw-tR of thfl unit int.-TVa] is inMnRiRt~nt with tbp Mnt~nU1lhl hypothesis.
42
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
To get a fee1ing for the question whether literally all seta should be regarded 81 measurable, IUppoae that 8 is a cube of unit volume and that the probabDity IJ18IIIUN P that strictly agrees with S is such that the probability of a parallelepiped is equal to its volume. It foUowa that the probability of any .,t having Jordan content is ita Jordan content, but, if a aet baa not Jordan content, & eontinuum of poIIibilities i8 still open. Thou&h other po88loilitiea are conceivable, it is not
unnatural to conaider an idealized person for whom the numerical probability attached to each Borel set, or even each Lebespe mea.aurable let, is ita Lebespe measwe. To go further and take seriously oompuiaoDS between aeta that are not Lebeacue measurable, or even betweeD those tbat are not Borel measurable, aeema to me to be without any implication bearing on reality. I suppose it might be argued, on the contrary, that there is DO feature of reality that caD properly be interpreted by poetuIatiDg that the peraoD is able to compare only seta from • aufticiently narrow field, 80 that it is simpler and more eleput to admit all &eta. The question seems to be one of taste, but the fonowing remark illustrates what I eODBider an awkwardness in auPpoeiDI probability to be attached to all seta. It would seem, at first aIanee, that the peraon should be able, if he is 80 eoDBtituted, to reprd all pain of pometrieally congruent sets for which he makes any comparison at all 88 equivalent, but the famous Banach-Tarski paradox {B5] show8 that this cannot be done if all sets are regarded as measurable. I think it a little more graceful to abstain from comparison between the more biarre aet8 than to give up, or even much modify, my everyday DotioDS about the symmetry of such probability problems assooiated with
geometry. If one is unwilling to insist on comparison between every pair of .ta, or events; then, in the same spirit, it is inappropriate to inaiat on comparison between every pair of acta. All that has been, or is to be, formally deduced in this book concerning preferences among sets, could be modified, mutatis mutandis, 80 that the class of eveDta would Dot be the class of aU subsets of S, but rather a Borel field, that is, a cr-aJpbra, on S; the set of all consequences would be a measurable apace, that is, a set with a particular ...algebra singled out; and an act would be a measurable function from the measurable space of events to the measurable apace of conaequencee. Indeed, the whole thing could be done for abstract ,·algebraa without reference to seta at aU, and this might have some actual advantage, since it would make po88Iole the identification of events with propositions in almost any formallaquage, even one unable to formulate at all the complete descriptions I call states.
8.6)
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
It may seem peculiar to insist on cr-algebras 88 opposed to finitely additive algebras even in a context where finitely additive m~ are the central object, but countable unions do seem to be essential to some of the theorems of la-for example, the t.erminal conclwnooe of Theorem 3.2 and Part 5 of Theorem 3.3. 80 much of the modem mathematical theory of probability depends on the 8MUmption that the probability measures at hand are countably additive that one is strongly tempted to assume countable additivity, or its logical equivalent, as a postulate to be adjoined to Pl-6.+ But I am inclined to agree with de Finetti [D2], (D4) and Koopman (K9), (KIO] , (KIll that, however convenient countable additivity may be, it, blte any otber assumption, ought not be listed among the postulates for a concept of personal probability unless we actually feel that its violation deserves to be called inconsistent or unreasonabl.e. I know of no argument leading to the requirement of countable additivity, and many of us have a strong intuitive tendency to regard &8 natural probability problems about the nec~M&rily only finitely additive uniform probability densitiM on the integers, on the line, and on the plane. It therefore seems better not to a..'mume countable additivity outright as a postulate, but. to recognize it as 8 special hypotbesis yieldillg.. wllere applicable, a large el888 of usef1l1 theorems.
Conditional probability, qualitative and quantitative Conditional preferences among acts in the light of a given event were introduced in § 2.7. Since the relation S among events baa been d~ fined in terms of the corresponding relation among acts, we may well expect to attach meaning to statements of the form B ~ C given D, provided that D is not null. The natural way to do 80 is to take a pair of acts f and , that test whether B < C (as Pre8cribed by the definition of < between acts in § 2) and say that B S C given D, if and only if f S I given D. Since there is more than one pair of acts f, I by which the proposition B S C can be tested, it is at first sight conceivable that not allauch pairs would be in the 8&Dle order given D, which would frustrate the propoeed definition of S given D. However. it i8 easily seen that for any I, g testing B ~ C. f S g given D (D not null) is equivalent to B n D sen D. Thus it is seen not only that the proposed definition is unambiguous, but also that it is expressible in terms of probability comparisons amoDg seta, without direct reference to acta at all, and, still further, that the postulates Pl-6 apply to the condiI
tional preference relation S given D among acta. This preamble sufficiently motivates the following definition and easy theorem about qualitative probability relations generally. t- rarrifd 'lUt lJy Vil1PgBS (lSlB·I).
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
(3.5
If ~. is a qualitative probability, and 0 < . D; then B S- C Pftll D, if and only if B n D S· enD. THEOREM
1
If
D. If in addition fine or tigh t.
<. is a ~.
qualitative probability, then 80 is ~. liven is fiDe or tight, then S - given D is correspondingly
<. is fine,
then, for any D that is not null, there exiBta, in view of Theorem 3.3, one and only one probability meuure P(B D), the (conctitiooal) probabWty of B pven D, that alm08t agrees with Se. But, just 88 one would expect from the traditional study of Dumerit81 probability, and as may be eaaily verified, P(B n D)/P(D) cODBidend as a function of B for fixed D is a probability measure that almOlt &gree8 ,,'ith S· given D. Therefore,
If
(1)
I
P(B I D) == P(B
n D)/P(D).
As was explained in 12.7, preference among acts given B can aug.. Restively be expressed in temporal terms. Analogously, the eompariaon among events given B and, therefore, eonditioD&l probability given B can be expressed temporally. Thus P(C I B) can be regarded 88 the probability the person would assign to C after he had observed that B obtains. It is conditional probability that gives expression in the theory of personal probability to tho phenomenon of learning by experience. In accordance ,,·ith established usage, a pair of events B, C are ealled independent if P(B n C) == P(B)P(C). More genenlly, a 88t of eventa are called independent, if for every finite set of them, say B 1, .... , B., (2)
P
(n B.) :. IIi PCB,). i
Obviously, if D is not Dull, B and D are independent; if and only if PCB I D) == PCB), in which case D may fairly be called irreleftDt to B. The notioDB of independence and irrelevance have, 80 far &8 I can aee, no analogues in qualitati,,~ probability; this is surprising and UDfortunate, for these notions seem to evoke a strong intuitive respoDBe. The absence of these analogues is traceable to the absence of a qualitative analogue for propositions of the (onn P(B I C) ~ P(G I H). Working under a rather different motivation from that which ","des this book, B. o. Koopman (K9}. [KIO], and [KIl] baa developed a system of qualitative possibility in which it is meaningful to compare B giVeD C with G given H. I t is true also that for qualitative probability, even 88 it is defined here, some interconditional comparisons might be naturally defined. If, for example, B S· ",B given C and ~ S· G given H, it would not be unreasonable to establish the convention that B
given C S· G given H. 'Chis sort of extension is not, however, highly
3.5)
CONDITION All PROBABII"ITY
pertinent to my purpose, for here I have little interest in qualitative probabilities, except as a foundation for quantitative probability. The following partition formula is well known and easy to prove: (3)
pee) - L
p(e I Bj)P(Bj )
j
",ilere Bl is a partition of S into non-null sets. If, further, C is not nun, it is also trivial to derive the celebrated Bayes' rule (or theorem), (4)
I P(Bi I
p(e I Bi)P(B.) C) = - - - P(C)
I
P(C B,)P(B i ) ~
L
I
p(e Bj)P(BJ}
j
Illustrations of these formulas are found in all elementary texbooks OD probability, 88 well as in later sections of this book. Finally I if neither B nor C is null, (5)
PCB I C)
PCB)
-
P(C i B)
P(C)
P(B
n C)
-=---P{B)P(C)
which may be given the suggestive reading: Knowledge of C modifies the probability of B by the same factor by which knowledge of B modifies the probability of C. The concept of random variable enters into almost any discussion of probability. Experts are fairly well agreed on the follcming definition. A raudOlll variable is a function x attaching a value x(,) in some set X to every 8 in a set 8 on which a probability measure P is defined.t Such an 8 together with the measure P is called a probability space. Beal-valued random variables are the most familiar, though in general the values X can be things of any sort. Ir, for example, x and 1. with values in X and Y, respectively t are random yariables on t.he same measure space, a new' random variable Z Ix, yl is defined by setting Z(8) - lr,(.), Y(8»). The values of z are thus elements of ,,·hat is ealled X X Y (read the cartesian product of X and Y), the set of ordered pai1'8 'witb first elemeDt in X and second in Y. The same sort of thing can be done, of course, for ordered n-tuples and also for infinite sequences of random variables. IIr
t In many applications of the theory of probability. not all
RubHttta of S or of X
are eatuddered meuurab1e. It ie then required 88 part of t.be de-finition of random variable that z be measurable, i.e., that (or eve", measurable Y c X, the aet of .'Iauch that z(.) f Y be measurable.
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
(3.8
Two random variables % and J defined on the aam8 measure apace 8 are eaIled (ltatiatlcally) independent; if and only if, for every Xo eX ad Yo c Y, the two events (i.e., subaeta of 8) defioed by the cmacJi... tiona %(.) I Eo and U(,), Yo, respectively, are independent. t 'The extension of this definition from pain to 8Dy number of random variables is obviou8. 8
The approada to ,certalDty throu&b aperleDC8
In § 3, the theory of penonal probability W88, from the purely mathematical point of view, reduced to that of probability measures, a BUbject that baa been elaborately studied, more or lesa explicitly, for eenturies. Any mathematical problem concemiug peJ'8OD8l probabilit.y is nece oaarily a problem eoneemiDg probability me&8U1'efJ the study of which is currently called by mathematici8D8 mathematical pmbabDltr --and conversely. The particular outlook and interpretation impHcit in a personalistic concept of probability leads, however, to problems that, though perfectly meaningful for mathematical probability, riaht Dot otherwise have been emphasized. This section and the BUcceediDI one each briefly diacua one 8uch problem. Theae two problema are selected from among many p088ibilitieB for the iDsight they provide into the concept of personal probability. Before studying theae problema, it is neeeeaary to be converaant with
the material in Appendixes 1 and 2, which is used in the jmmediate sequel and often throughout the rest of this book. As was brought out in 15, the person leams by experienee. The purpose of the present section is to explore \\ith a moderate d.egree of generality how he typically becomes almost certa.iD of the truth, when the amount of his experience increuee indefiDitely. To be specific, BUppoee that the person is about to observe a Iarae number of J'8Ildom variables, all of which are independent given Bi for each i, where the B, are a partition of S. It is to be expected iDtuitive1y, and wiD 800D be shown, that under general conditions the penon is very sure that afU!r making the observation he ",ill attach a probability of nearly 1 to whichever element of the partition actually obtains, To deaeribe the 8ituation formally. let Bi be a partition of 8 with P(B,) == #(i). Let ~,., r :a 1, 2, ... f be a aequence of raDdom varlableB, each taking on only a finite number of values (which can without )088 of generality be thought of 88 integers). The restriction to a finite let of values could be removed, but to do 80 would raise problems of mathematical technique that, however interesting, are rather beside the point t ,\\'bere not all seta are meuurable, Xo and Yo must., of COUI8ey be required to be measurable.
&6J
APPROA.CH TO CERTAINTY THROUGH EXPERIENCE
4.7
of this book. Let J: denote the firat A of the nmdom variables z,.. It is to be bome in mind that z depends on n, so, strictly speaking, it should be written z(n). The 888Umption that, given B, the x/a all have the same diatributioQ is expreeaed by (1)
P(%r(')
==
%1'
IB i)
== ~(xr Il),
wheN f(z,.ll) is defined by the context.
Combining (1) with the aumptioD that the Z,'8 are independent given B t , (2)
I
P(z B i )
8&-
111
- DI P(z(s)
lXI, ' .• , %nll B i )
-
-
II ~(x..1 i),
when a coDventioDaisymbol has been used for equal by ddultion. Theae hypotheees having been laid down, it fonows from Bayes' rule and the partition formula (5.3) and (5.2), that (3)
P(B. I x)
I
P(z B,)P(Bi ) - ----
P(z)
/lei)
II,. f(z,. I J)
-=:----P(z)
and (4)
P(r.) -
L
fj(i)
IT f(z,. 1i).
i
r
In cormeetion with (3). it may be obeerved in p888ing that, if the a priori pIObabUlly, /J(t}, of Bi is 0, then, no matter what value x is obeerved, the a poeteriori probabDlty of Bi, P(B, I x), is also o. This is an example of the general principle that, if some event is regarded &8 virtually impoeaible. then no evidence what80ever can lend it credibility. Similarly, (3) implies the equally CommOD-8eD8e principle that, if an obeervation ~ is virtually impossible on the hypothesi. (i.e., given) B i , and % is ob8erved, then Bi becomes virtually impoeaible a posteriori. It is particularly interesting to compare the probability of two ele. menta or the partition, say BJ and B2 for definiteness, in the light of x. (5)
PCB) I x) _ P(I) p(B,1 z) 1l(2)
II ~(~ II) l'
~(X1' I 2)
== ~(l) II R'(% ) 1J(2)
r
_ 6(1) R(x) 8(2) ,
'
[3.6
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
where self-explanatory abbreviatioDl have been introduced. Equation (5) is meaningless, if both the numerator and denominator of ita lefthand side vanish. U the denominator alone vanish., the fraction may properly be regarded as infinite. This wiD happen; if aDd only if B, is DUlJ, and B. is Dot null giveD z. That is, it will happen if &ad only if ,,(1) pi! 0, ~(2) =- 0, or if ~(1) ~ 0, and R{~) lD co. In modem statistical ueap, R'(Z~) and R(z) are the IjbtihcwJ ra'" of Bl to B, given %, and %, respectively, quantities of importaDee in many theoretical eontexta. H a peraon coDtemplatee makinl the observation z, that is, findins out the value of z(a) for the _ tbat is the true state of tbe world, it may properly be asked bo\v probable he considers it that It will turn out to have a particular value. It "ill be abOWD, barriDg two baDaJ exeeptiODS, that, for ft mftieiently large, the probability, given BJr that R is greater than any preassigned number is almost 1. The poeaibUity P(B.) ~ 0 is to be excepted, for then the conditional probability in question is meaningless. The other exception occurs when t(zt' 11) f(zr 12) for every Z~t that is, when the common distribution of XI' giVeD B 1 is the same as it is given B2 j for then obeervation of Kr is simply irrelevant in distinguishing B I from 8 2 , or, a little more technically. :lr is irrelevant to Bl given Bl U B2 , and
(6) Formally, it is to be demonstrated that, unless P(B I )
=a
0, or (6)
holds, (7)
..
lim P(R(z)
,,-
> p I B 1> ==
1
for 0 S p
< aD.
The problem is quite simple when account is taken of the fact that R(J:) is the product of n random variables, R'(zr), tbat are independent given B 1 - In attacking the problem, two cuea are to be diatiDguished, according 88 there are or are Dot values of % that, have positive pr0bability given BI but Ie1"O probability given B2 • It is in practice rather fortunate to find iD8taDce8 of the firat cue, for then (7) applies ~;tb a vengeance. Indeed, BUppo&e that P(R'(~)
(8)
< GO IB.)
= t/I,
Then
peR .. co I B s>=-= 1 - ••,
(9)
which
ob\~jous1y
approaches 1 "ith increasing n.
3.61
APPROACH TO CERTAINTY THROUGH EXPERIENCE
The second cue, namely " == 1, is more interesting. Since much is known about awna of identically distributed independent random variablea, it is uatural to investigate
log R(x) =
(10)
L log R'(X,.), r
thereby replacing a product by a awn. It is easily eeen from the definition of R'(zr) that P(R'(zr) > 0 B l ) == 1, 80, in the cue DOW at band, the fUDctiona Jog R'(x.,) are independent real bounded random variables.
I
Letting (11)
tbe weak law of large Dumbers (12)
t
implies that, for any
lim P(log R(x) ~ n(1 - e) I B l )
-
E
> 0,
1,
a- •
equivalently, (13)
lim P(R(x)
> eflU-e) I B I ) = 1.
The objective \\;11 therefore be achieved, if it is demonatra.ted that
1
> 0 unless
(14)
(6) holds. But 1 - B(log R'(zr) IB I ) ~ -log E(R,-I(Z.,)
I B1)
- - log 1 - 0, may be argued thU8: The inequality in the above calculation is 88signed as Exercise 8 in Appendix 2, together with the fact that equality can hold in (14) if and only if R,-I(Xr ) is constant with probability one given B 1• But the expected value of R,-l(z..) given Bl is equal to 1, 88 (14) 888erts and 88 may be easily verified from the definition of R,-J(xr ). So, barring the exceptions provided for, 1 > 0, and the demonstration of (7) is eomplete. Before the observation, the probability that the probability given ~ of whichever element of the partition actually obtains will be greater than a is 88
(Ii)
~ ~('lp(p(B.1 ~)
,
>
I
a B~,
where summation is confined to tboee i'8 for which /l(i) jill! O. Application of (14) (edeDded to arbitrary pairs of i'a) shows that the coefficients t For the definition of this law, _, if DecOIlE,)" p. un of FeUer. book [Fl).
PEBSONAL PROBABILITY
[3.7
of each /J(t.) in the quantity (15), and therefore the quantity itself, approaches 1 as n increases; provided only that no two funetiODB f(ZrI i) and ~(Xr i') are the same, if ~(t.) and /J(i') are both different from sero. To summariJre informally, it has DOW been shown that. with tbe observation of an abundance of relevant data, the peraon is almost certain to become highly convinced of the truth, and it has also beaD shown that he bimaelf knows this to be the cue. It may be remarked, for those familiar with certain theorems, that many refinementa of (7) and its COD8eQUeDces could be worked out by application of the strong I&w of large numbers, the central limit theorem, and the law of the iterated logarithm to R'(z..). The quantity 1 is coming to be called the iDfODDation of the distribution of Xr given Bl with respect to the distribution of x.. given B". More generally, if P and Q are probability measures, confined (for simplicity) to a finite set X with elements 2:; the information of P with reepect to Q is defined by
I
1: P(z) log per) .
(16)
:I
Q(:r)
This usage stems from work of Claude Shannon in communication engineering, a good account of which is given in [SI1J; and also from independent work of Norbert Wiener in a related contAnct [WIOJ. The ideas of ShanDOD and of Wiener, though concerned with probability, seem rather far from statistics. It is, therefore, somethiDg of aD accident that the term "information" coined by them should be not altopther inappropriate in statistics. The situation is still further confused, because, as long ago 88 1925, R. A.. Fisher emphasized an important notion, which he called "information," in connection with the theory of estimation (Paper 11, Theory oj 8uJtiMical t~timalitm in (F6J). At lint glance, Fisher's notion seems quite different from that of Shannon and Wiener, but, 88 a matter of fact, his is a limiting fann of theirs. A useful but rather technical exposition relating the several aen8el of "information n is given by Kullhack and LeihJer (K15], and I return to tbe topic in § 15.6....
7 Symmetric sequence. of 8YeJlts A problem often posed by statisticians is to estimate from a eequenee of observatioDB the unknown probability p that repeated trials of aome 80rt are successful. On an objectivistic view, this problem is natural and important, for on such a view the probability that a coin falla heads, for example, is a property of the eoin that ean be determined by experimentation with the coin and in no other way. But on a personalistic .,
~
aiM
(Knllhar~
1001).
8.7)
SYMMETRIC SEQUENC&'J OF EVENTS
II
view of probability, strictly interpreted, no probability is unknown to the pel'8OD concerned, or, at any rate, he can detennine a probability only by interroptiDg himselft not by reference to the external world. This situation has been interpreted to imply that the pel'lODalistic view is wrong, or at any rate inadequate, because it apparently cannot eVeD express one of the most natural and typical problema of atatistiea. Thus far in this book, I have not argued against the poIBibDity of defining some U8ef'ul Dotion of objective probability, but have contented myself with presenting a particular notion of pel"8Oll&1 probability. Therefore, at this point it might be tempting to seek a dualistic theory admittiDg both objective and personal probabilities in some kind of articulat.ion with one another. De Finetti fD3] haa shown, however, that it is not necesaary to do so, that the notion of a coin with unknown probability p can be reinterpreted in t.erms of personal probability alone. The present section is de,·oted to outlining this development due to de Ymetti. In the organisation of tbe book &8 a whole, it playa DO lop. ea11y 888eJltial pan; it is, rather, a digression intended to give a clearer understanding of the notion of personal probability, especially in relation to objectivistic views. The ideas presented. here are but a fl'&lment of those OD the same subject in [D2]. z,. be a sequence of random variables taking only the values 0 and 1. The Z,.'8 &re, to all intents and PUrp0ee8, & aeqUeDee of events, the rth of which is the event that %,.(8) - 1. To say that these events are independent, each occurring with probability p, is to aay that the probability of any finite pattern, %1, ••• , x"' initiating the sequeDce %r(') is given by the formula
ut
(1)
P(%,.(,) .. %,.; r -= 1, •.. ," I p) .. ,,(1 - p)"-',
where II is the number of 1'8 among the %,.'8 for r z:: I, ••.• n. Mixtures, in a certain sense, of sequences of random variables are often of interest, as they already ha,,~ been in the preceding section. SUPP088, to be explicit, that the world is partitioned by Bl and that, liven Bit the x/a are independent "ith P(r,.(I) == 1 B.) having some fixed value p(i). Then the unconditional probability of a particular initial aequence is a mixture of tbe probabiUtiee given by (1) tbu8:
I
(2)
P(~(,) ..
x,.; r - 1, ..• , 11) -
L
•
p(t)·(l - p(I)"-'P(Bi) .
It is natural to pneralise (2) formally thus: (3)
P(z.(.) - :r,.; r - I, .'., n) -
f P"(I -
p)." dM(p),
(3.1
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
where M is a probability measure on the real numbers in the interval [0, 1). It is noteworthy that equation (3), UDderatood to apply for every ft, is equivalent to the cODdition that the probability that every fa of each prescribed set of n of the Zp's takes the value 1 is
f
(4)
p'"dM(p).
This follows by arithmetic induction from the obvious formula (5)
P(Zr(a)
-= z,.; r
:. 1, •.. J ta)
-= P(z..(,)
II:
:rr; r
+ P(S,.{,)
ID
II:
1, ... , n; Za+l(')
w=
0)
z,.; r .. 1, .•. , fa; %-+1(') - I),
wbich app1iee to aDy sequenee of random variables t.aJring OIl only the values 0 and 1. Equation (3) caD very well have an interpretation in such terma that the meaaure JI is not merely an abstract probability measure, but is actually a peraonaI probabilit.y. Thus, if p is a random variable tbat. is (for a giVeD perIOn) distributed aecordiDa to Jl, and, Hlor each 'P the eonditiODal distribution of the %r'a given p is independent, with p(z,.(e) - 1) .. p; then (3) obtains. Strictly speaking, the notion 01 conditional probability .. it OCCUI8 in the preeediDg sentence is uaed in a aomewhat wider aenae than has been defined in this book, for the probability of any particular p win typically be zero. At least for countably additive measures, the neee sary exteDIiOll of eonditioaal probability and cooditional expectatioo is presented by Kolmogordf in [K7); it is a concept, of the p-eateat value in adV8Dced mathematical statistice and in probability generally. However, in moat contexta where objectivista apeak of an 1mbown probability 'P, there is, 80 far 88 aD exclusively persooaJistio view of probability is concerned, DO unknown parameter that can play the role of p in (3). Examination of aituati0D8 in which "unlmoWll" probability is appealed to, whether juatifiably or not, abOWI that, from the persoD&liatic standpoint, they alwaye refer to 8)'DlDletric eequenc. of events in the 8eDle of t.he following definition. The sequence of random vanabl. z" ta1rinl only the values 0 aDd 1, is a IJIfIIfftdric t ~, if and only if the probability that aD7 b of the %,,(.)'8 equal 1 and aDy c other ~(.)'8 equal 0 depends only on the intepre II ad c.
t De FiDeUl ... the 1PreDeth word for "equi..at."+ + Be aDd oUtfl,. DOW preter "-elaarllCMhl•." Tb~ C'ODf4tpt ....ms to ha.,~ '-n ftNt ~ by Jl1lM Bug (1928).
3.7)
8YMMETBlC
~UENCES
OF EVENTS
&3
It is euy to verify that any mixture of independent sequences in the leDle of (3) is a symmetric sequence. De Finetti has di.seovered that the converse is a1ao true. These conclusions can be fonnally 8WIlDlarized thU8: THEOREM 1 A sequence of random variables z,., taking only the valUe8 0 and 1, is symmetric, if and only if there exiBta a probability
measure M on the interval [0, 1Jsuch that the probability that any prescribed n of the zr(8fs equal 1 is gi,"en by (4). Two such measures, M and M', must be eseentiaUy the same, t in the sense that, if B is a subinterval of [0, 11, then M(B) .. JI'(B). CODBidering that de Finetti haa published a proof of Theorem 1 in [D2) based on the Fourier integral, that &U1 proof of it must be rather technical, and that the theorem is not the basis of any formal inference later in this book, it eeems best not. to prove it here. t I t is Theorem 1 that makes it possible to express propoejtiODS referring to uDknown probabilities in purely personalistic terma. If, for example, a statistician were to say, U I do not know the p of this coin, but I am sure it is at most one half," that would mean in personalistic terms, "I rteard the sequence of toeses of this coin 88 a symmetric sequence, the measure M of which 888igns unit measure to the interval [0, t)." This condition on M meana in tum that for every n the (personal) probability of n consecutive heads is at most 2--, &8 is easily verified. I do not insist that propositions couched in tenns of a fictitiou8 unknown probability are bad~ if undel'8tood &8 suggestive abbreviations, but only that the meaningfulness of such propoaitioM does Dot cODstitute an inadequacy of the pel'8Onaliatic \iew of probability. The mathematical concept of probability me&8Ul'C or, a trifle more generally, bounded mea...ure is fundamental to mathematics generally. Probability measures, often under other Dam~ are, therefore, employed in many parts of pure and applied mathematics completely unrelated to probability proper. For example, the distribution of m&88 in a not necessarily rigid body i8 expressed by a bounded measure that tells how much of the body is in each region of space. We must, therefore, not be A1rprised if, even in studying probability itself. we come &C1'088 some probability measures used Dot to measure probability
t TechnieaJ note: If "probability measure" were here uDderstood to mean a COWl"" ably additive probability meuure on the Borel . . of (0, I). the theorem would remain true, aDd the __tiaJ wdqu__ or M would beoome true uniquene-. ~ Teclmical DOte: Theorem 1 can be proved very quickly and naturally by applyina tbe theory or the lIasdodr moment problem (pp. 8-9 of 18130 ~ M t but; method does !lOt _m to pneraliae readily. + + New ad pneral utelhodl are in Hewitt and Savap (1955) aad ByllNardzewUi (1961). For related work see Biihlmann (1960), Freedman (1962, 1_), Milier-Gnu.ewaka (1949, 1950), and ReDyi and Reves& (1963).
to.
PERSONAL PROBABILITY
proper but only for auxiIiaty purpoIe8. In the event that p is not aotually an unknown parametsr, the measure M pr8leDted by Theorem 1 seems at first sight to be such & purely auxiljary measure, but, aa a matter of fact, M does measure certain inteJeeq probabilities, at least approximately. For example, JettiDg 1 •
(6)
I. - -
ft
E%,., 1
it can be shown that
......
(7)
lim P(I.(.)
S ') - M(p S
I).
In words, the person considers the average of any larp Dumber of future obaervatioDS to be distributed approximately the way 11 is distributed by M. This is an extension of the ordinary weak law of larp Dumbers, proved in (D2] alODg with a correspoDdiDg eDemIion of the strong law.
If the first n terms of a symmetric aequenoe are obaerved, how does the rest of the sequence appear to the penon in the liIht of this obeervation? In the first place, it aIao is a symmetric eeqUeDce but paerally of a structure different from that of the original eequenee, as may be shown thus: Let ..(y, n - 1/) .. Df P(z1'{&) - Z1'; ,
(8)
as one may for a symmetric sequence. (9)
P(z,(,)
-= 1, ••• , A),
Then
+ 1, ... , n + m 1%1'(8) P{Xp (') -= XII' P .. 1, ... , n + m) == P(Zr(8) == Z", T = 1, ..• , n) r(1/ + z, (n - 1/) + (m - z»
-= z,; q
la
fa
2:,-,
-
r - 1, .•. ,.)
:Ii: - - - - - - - - - -
"(11,
n - II)
where a is the number of 1'8 among the Z,'8, q - n
+ 1,
+ "'-
.•. , ft. Equation (9) shows that the aequence q > n, given that s ..(.) r =- 1, .•. , A, is a new symmetric sequence characterised by
x.,
(10)
~~m-~=ru
"(1/
+ z, (n -
r)
"'(11,
fa -
~1'J
+) (m - z» . fI
The measure M' associated with the new sequence is, aceordiDa to Theorem 1, esaentially determined by the CODdition that
&7J
(11)
8YMMErRIC SEQUENCES OF EVENTS
f
p'" dM'(p) - "'(m, 0) ...(m
+ 7/, n -
1/)
=-----r(y,1I - y)
f p..+tt(1 -
p) ....... dM(p)
=.---------------"'(J/, n - 71) ==
f",. ,-(1 -
p)"--' d.V(p). "'(,1, n - 1/)
Equation (11) makes it plausible that, except for the slight ambiguity .,.mitted by Theorem 1, M' is defined (for Borel seta B) by (12)
M'(B) - 11'-1(1/. n - 1/)£P"(1
- p)"" dM(p),
and this ean in fact be demonstrated with some appeal to slightly advaced methods pertaining to the Hausdorff moment problem (pp. 8-9 of [813]). It is noteworthy that, if M(B) -= 0, then M'(B) 0 also. In tbe event that p reaUy is an unknown parameter, this rne&D8 that, if the peraon is virtually certain that the true p is Dot in B, no amount of II:
evidence can ait« that opinion. Equation (12) shOWl that M' is generally different from M. Indeed, for fixed ft ~ 1, Jl' is clearly the same as M for every tI for which ...CJ/, fa - If) > 0, if and only if M assigns the measure 1 to lOme one value of p~ That is, the person regards evidence drawn from a symmetric sequence 88 irrelevant to the future behavior of the sequence, if aDd 0Dly if at the outset he regards the sequence Dot merely 88 aym:netrie but also as independent. It can be shown that the person regards it 88 highly probable that, if he obeerves a eufticiently lonl ..,'bent of a symmetric eequence, tbe cODtinuation of the sequence will then be one for which the eOJ1ditionaJ variaDce of p, (13)
wiD be small. In tbe event that p is really an unknown parameter, this implies that the person is very sure that after a Ioog sequence of obaervatiODB he will aaaign nearly unit probability to the immediate neigh.. borhood of the value of p that actually obtaine--a paraDel to the approach to certainty discus8ed in 16.
CHAPTER
4
Critical Comments on Personal Probability 1 Introduction It is my tentative view that the concept of personal probability introduced and illustrated in the preceding chapter is, except poeaibly
for 81ight modifieatioDl, the only probability concept essential to aeience and other activities that call upon probability. I propoaa in this chapter to discusa the ahorteominp I Bee in that particular peraoDaliatic view of probability, which, for brevity, shall here be ea1led simply Uthe personalistic view"; to point out briefly the relationships between it and other views; to criticize other view8 in the light of it; aDd to diecuss the criticisms holders of other views have raised, or may be expected to raise, against it. From the standpoint of strict logical organization such critical ~ marks are somewhat premature, becauae the personalistic view jtself insists that probability is concerned with consistent action in the face of uncertainty. Consequently, until the theory of such action has been completely outlined in later chapters, the view to be criticised cannot even be considered to have been wholly presented. Practically, however, it aeoms wise not to confine critical comment. to the one part of the text that logic may 8Uggest as appropriate, but rather to touch on criticism from time to time, even at the cost, of some repetition. Thus, some of what is to be said here has already been said in the introductory chapter and elsewhere, and some of it will be said &pin Views other than the personalistic view are to be diacueed here, but it cannot be too distinctly emphasized that the account given of them will be very superficial. t One function of diacWl8ing other view. is to provide the reader with at leut some orientation in the larp and diversified body of ideas pertaiDing to the foundation of 8tatistiea that t
~fucb
more extensive comparative material ia given by Keynes (KtJ, by N.pI (NIl. and by Camap (CJI. Koopmao IK121 should &lAo be mentlofted in tbi8 COD-
Det"tion.
".21
8HORTCOAflNG8 OF THE PERSONALISTIC VIEW
51
have been accumulated. A less obvious, but I think no less important and legitimate, function is to cast new light on the personalistic view, especially for thoae who already hold, or tend to hold, other ,·iew8.
I can aDSWer, to my own satisfaction, some criticisms of the perBODalistie view that have been brought to my attention. These points are mscuSBed later in the chapter, but in this section I state and discu~ &8 clearly as I can those that I find more difficult and confusing t.o answer. According to the pel'8Oll&1istie view, the role of the mathematical theory of probability is to enable the pe1'8On using it to de~et incoDsistencies in his own real or envisaged beha,ior. It is also understood that, baling detected an inconsistency, he ",,11 remo,·e it. An incoDsistency is typically removable in many different ways, amoDg which the theory gives no guidance for chOO8iDg. Silence on this point does Dot seem altogether appropriate, so there may be room to improve the theory here. Consider an example: The persoD finds on interrogatinl himself about the possible outcome of tossing a particular coin five tim. that he coDSidera each of the thirty-t,,·o possibilities equally probable, 80 each baa for him the numerical probability 1/32. He also finds that he considers it more probable that there will be four or fh·e heads in the five toI8e8 than that the first two tAl.as will both be heads. Now, reference to the mathematical theory of probability soon shows the persoD that, if the probability of each of the thirty-two p08Bibiliuea is 1/32, then the probability of four or five heads out of five is 6/32, and the probability that the first two toe&es wUI be heads is 8/32, 10 the person has caught himself in an inconsistency. The theory does not tell him how to resolve the inconsistency; there are literally an infinite number of poabilities amoDg which he must choose. In this particular example, the choice that first comes to my mind, aDd I imAJPne to yours, is to hold fast to the poaitioD that all thirty-two poaJibilitie.s are equally likely and to accept the implications of that position, including the implication that four or five heads out of five is Ieee probable than two heads out of two. I do not t.hink that there is my justification for that choice implicit in the example &8 formally et.ated, but rather that in the 80rt of actual situation of ,,-hieh the example is a crude schematization there generally are considerations not incorporated in the example that do justify, or at any rate elicit, the
choice_ To approach the matter in a 80mewhat different ,,·ay, there seem to be some probability relations about which we feel relatively "sure'" as
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON PERSONAL PROBABILITY
[4.1
compared with others. When our opinions, as reflected in real or envisaged action. are inconsistent, we sacrifice the unsure opiniODB to the sure ones. The notion of "sure" and "unsure" introdueed here is vague, and my complaint is precisely that neither the theory of personal probability, as it is developed in this book, nor any other device known to me renders the Dotion less vague.+ There is some temptation to introduee probabilities of a seeond order 80 that the person would find himaelf saying such things 88 "the probability that B is more probable than C is greater than the probability that F is more probable than G. u But such & program seems to meet insurmountable difficulties. The first of theae pointed out to me by Max Woodbury-is this. If the primary probability of an event B were a random variable b with respect to eeeondary probability, then B would have a "composite" probability, by which I mean the (secondary) expectation of b. Composite probability would then play the allegedly villainous role that secondary probability was intended to obviate, and nothiDg would have
been accompliahed. Api", once second order probabilities are introduced, the introduction of an endleA8 hierarchy seems mescapable.. Such a hierarchy . . "'very difficult to interpret, and it seems at best to make the theory less realistic, not mote. Finally, the objection concerning composite probability would seem to apply, even if an endless hierarchy of higher order probabilities were introduced. The composite probability of B would here be the limit of a sequence of numbers, E.(B.. _1 (··· E2 (Pl(B»· .. ». a limit 'that could scarcely be postulated not to exist in any interpretable theory of this sort. The reader may wish to evaluate for himseH the arguments in favor of such a hierarchy put forward by Reichenbach (Chapter 8, [R2)), takiDI proper account of the differences, between Reichenbaeh'. overall view. and his mathematical theory, of probability on one band and, on the other, the personalistic view and measure-theoretic mathematical theory that are the basis of my critique of higher order probabilities. The interplay between the "sure" and "unaure" is interestiDll1 expreaaed by de FiDetti (p. 60, [D2D thus: "The fact that a direct estimate of a probability is not always possible is just the reason that the loPcal rules of probability are useful. The practical object of these rules is simply to reduce an evaluation, scarcely aeceuible directly, to others by meaD8 of which the determination is rendered easier and more
precise." It may be clarifying, especially for some Madera under the away of the objectivistic tradition, to mention that, if a person is '~8Ure" that ... One teolptillg representation of the l1Jl8un is to replace the penGn'.lingle probability nU!!UUrfI P by a ..t of .\l~h measures, especially a OODvex set. Some .xploratioDS of thia are Dempster (1968), Good (1962), and 8nuUa(1961).
4.2)
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PERSONALISTIC VIEW
the probability of heads on the first toss of a certaiD penny is i, it does not at all foUow that he considen the coin fair. He might, to take an extreme example, be convinced that the penny is a trick ODe that always falhJ beads or always falls tails. Logic, to which the theory of personal probability can be closely paralleled, is similarly incomplete. Thus, if my beliefs are inconsistent with each other, logic insists that I amend them, without teUing me how to do 80. This is not a derogatory criticism of logic but simply a part of the truism that logic alone is not a comp1ete guide to lile. Since the theory of personal probability is more complete than logie in some reapecta, it may be 801Ilewhat disappointing to find that it represents no improvement in the partieular direction now in question. A leCond difficulty, perhaps closely associated with the fim one, stems from the vagueness aaociated \\ith judgments of the magnitude of personal probability. The postulates of personal probability imply that I can determine, to any degree of accuracy whatsoever, the probability (for me) that the next president will be a Democrat. Now, it is manifest that I cannot really determine that number with great aecuracy, but only roughly. Since, &8 is widely recognized, all tbe IDte~ ing and useful theories of modern science, for example, geometry, relativity, quantum mecbanics, Mendelism, and the theory of perfect competition, are ine.uct; it may not; at first sight seem disquieting that the theory of personal probability should also be somewhat inexact. As wiD immediately be explained, however, the theory of personal probability ca.DIlot safely be compared with ordinary scientific theories in this respect. I am not familiar with any serious analysis of the notion that a theory is only slightly inexact or is almost true, though philO8Opbem of science have perhaps presented some. Even if valid analyses of the Dotion have beeD made, or are made in the future, for the ordinary theories of science, it is Dot to be expected that those analyses wiD be immediately applicable to the theory or personal probability, normatively interpreted; because that theory is a code of consistency for the penon applying it, not. & system of predictioDs about the world around him.
The difficulty experienced in § 2.6 with defining inditJerence &ee1Dl eloeely &88OCiated with the difficulty about vagueDe88 raised here. Another difficulty with the theory of personal probability (or, more properly, with that larger theory of the behavior of a person in the face of uncertainty, of which the theory of personal probability is a part) is that the statement of the theory is not yet necessarily complete. Tbus we shan in the next chapter come upon another proposition that. demands acceptance as a postulate, and, sinee even this leaves the per-
eo
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON PERSONAL PROBABILITY
(4.4
a great deal of freedom, there is DO telling when someone will come upon still another postulate that clamors to be adjoined to the others. Strictly speaking, this is not 80 much an objection to the theory &8 a warning about what to expect of ita future development. SOD
3 Connection with other ft8WI All view. of probability are rather intimately connected with one another. For example, any necessary view can be reprded 88 an extreme persooaliatic view in which 10 many criteria of consistency have been invoked that there is no role lelt for the peJ'8OD'S individual judptent. Again, objectivistic views can be regarded as penonalistic views according to which comparisou of probability can be made only for very special pairs of events, and then only a.coording to such eriteria that all (right-minded) people agree in their comparisons. From a different ~dpointt personalistic views lie not between. but beside, necetRry and objectivistic views; for bot.h Decessary aDd objectivistic view8 may, in contrast to personalistic views, be called objective in that they do not concem individual judgment. ,
Criticism of other vi....
It will throw some light on the personalistic vie\v to say briefly bow some other views seem to compare unfavorably \\~itb it. It is one of my fundamental tenets that any satisfactory account of probability must deal ,lith the problem of action in the face of uncertainty. Indeed, almost everyone who seriously considers probability, especially if be has practical experience with statistica, does sooner or later deal with that problem, though often only tacitly. Even BOme pel"8OllaJistie view8 seem to me too remote from the problem of action, or decision. For example, de FiDetti in (021 gives two approaches to personal probability. Of these, one is almost exactly like the view 8pOD8Ored here, except onJy that the notion "more probable than" is supposed to be intuitively evident to the person, without reference to any problem of decision. The other is more satisfactory in this . . apect, being couched in terms of betting beha\ior, but it seems to me a BOmewhat Ie. satisfactory approach than the one apoD8Ol'ed here, because it must assume either that the beta are for infiniteeimalaumB oranticipating the language of the next chapter-that the utility of money is linear. The theory expressed by Koopman in [K9), [KIO], and [KIll and that expressed by Good in [02] are both peraoDaiiatic views that tend to ignore decision, or at any rate keep it out of the foreground; but the personalistic view expressed by Ramsey in [Rl1 like the one 8pOIl8OJ'ed here, takes decision as fundamental. If any neceasary view
4.4)
CRITICIS~I
OF OTHER VIEWS
61
can be formulated at all, it might well be poesible to formulate it in terms of decision, but, so far as I know, the notion of decision has Dot appeared fundamental to the holders of any necessary view. It seems fair to .y that objectivistic views, by their very nature, must in principle regard decision as secondary to probability, if relevant at all. Yet, the objeetivist A. 'Vaid has done more than anyone el8e to popuMae the notion of decision. As bas already been indicated, from the position of the personalistic view, there is no fundamental objection to the possibility of CODstruCting a necessary view, but it is my impression that that p08Sibility has Dot yet been realiJed, and, though unable to verbalize rea8ODS, I eonjeetul'8 that the possibility is not real. Two of the most prominent enthusiasts of necessary views are Keynes, represe1lted by [K41, and Carnap, who has begun in {ell to state what he ho~ will prove a satisraetory necessary (or Dearly Decessary) view of probability. Keyoes indicated in the clOBiDg pages of [K4) that he was not fully satisfied that he had solved his problem and even sugestAd that aome element of objectivistic views might have to be accepted to achieve a satisfactory theory, and Carnap regards (ell as only a step toward the establiahmeut of a satisfactory Deee88ary view, in the existence of which he declares confidence. That these men express any doubt at all about the poasibility of narrowing a personalistic view to the point where it becomes & necessary one, after such extensive and eareful Jabor directed toward proving this possibility, speaks loudly for their integrity; at the same time it indicates that the task they have set themselves, if poesible at all, is Dot a light one. KeyDe8, writing in 1921 of what a.re here called objectivistic views, complained, "The absence of a recent exposition of the logical basis of the frequency theory by any of its adherents baa been a great disadvantage to me in critici.ing it." (Chap. VIII, Sec. 17, of [K4]). I beUeve that his complaint applies as aptly to my position today 88 to his then, though I cannot pretend to have combed the intervening literature \vith anything like the thoroughneM Keynes himeelf would hAve em· ployed. Reichenbach, to be sure, preaenta in great detail an interestiDg view that must be classified 88 objectivistic [R21, but it &eeDl8 far removed from those that domiDate modern statistical theory and form. the main 8ubject of the following discU8lion. Whatever objectivistic views may be, they seem, to holders of necessary and peraonaHstic views alike, subject to two major lines of eriticiam. In the first place, objectivistic view8 typically attach probability only to very special events. Thus, on no ordinary objectivistic view would it be meaninlful, let alone true, to say that on the basis of the available evidence it
ClUTICAL OOMMENTB ON PEBSONAL PROBABILITY
is very improbable. though Dot impolllibleJ that France will become a monarchy within the next decade. Many who bold objectivistic views admit that such everyday statements may have a meaning, but they insist, dependiDg on the extremity of their positions, that that meanjDI is not ~evant to mathematical concepts of probability or even to acienoe generally. The peraonaJistie view claims, however. to ana1yae such statements in terms of mathematical probabilityt and it CODSideni them important in science and other buma activities. Secondly, objectivistic viewa are, and I thjnk fairly, cbarpd with circularity. They are generally predicated on the existence in nature of processes that may, to a sufficient degree of approximation, be repreeented by a purely mathematical object, namely an in6Dite sequence of independeDt events. Tbis idealization is said, by the objectivista who rely on it, to be analogous to the treatment of the vague and extended mark of a carpenter's pencilaa a geometrical point, which is 80, fruitlul in certain contexta. When it is pointed out to the objectivist that he uses the very theory of probability in determiDing the quality of the approximation to which he refers, he retorts that the appHecl pometer--a fictitious cba.racter whose reputation for 80lidity in acience is unquestioned-likewise U8e8 geometry in determining the quality of his approximatioDL Let the geometer then be challenged, and he replies with a tllreefold reference to experience, saying, "It is a common experience that with sufficient experience ODe develope good judgment in the uee of geometry and thenceforth generally experiences 8U.ooeI8 in the predictiODS he baaee on it." "Now,".ya the objectivist, "the geometer's answer is my answer." But it seems to critics of objectiviatia views that, though the geometer may be entitled to make 88 maDy aUusioDS to experience 88 he pleases, the probabiliat is Dot free to do 10, precisely because it is the bwlinees of the probabilist to aoalyze the concept of experience. He, therefore, cannot properly support his position by alluding to experience until he baa analysed that concept, thoqb he can, of course, allude to 88 many experiences as be wishes. Two eorta of mixed views call for special comment here. First, some {amODl them Camap (el]; Koopman [K9], [KlO), aDd (KII); and Nagel [Nl)) hold that two probability concepti playa role in inference, an objectivistic ODe and a personalistic or a nece-uy one. This dualism is typically justified 88 neoesaa.ry to the analyaia of such a concept 88 that of a coin with unknown probability of failiDg heada. But, as 13.7 explains, de Finetti has provided a satisfactory aulyaia on the buia of personal probability alone. 8e00Dd, othere--for example, van Dumg (VI] and Feraud [F2]fiMinl the conventional objectivistic viewa circular for the re&IOD8 I
4.5]
THE ROLE OF SYl\fMETRY IN PROBABILITY
have cited, try to break the circle by relatively iaoIated uee of subjective ideas. Very crudely, it seems to be their position that in any ODe context it is allowable for a peraon to act &S though some one event of aufticiently small (objective) probability, cboaen at his di8cretion, were impc_ible. Quite apart from the relatively technical question of whether any consistent mixed view of this kind ean be CODatrueted. holders of personalistic aDd neeeasary views alike criticise them 81 unneeeaaarily timid, for they embrace subjective ideas, but only giDpdy. I
1'he role of lIJDUDetrJ In probability
An important and highly controversial question in the foundationa of probability is whether and, if 80, how symmetry CODSiderations can deteandne the probabilities of at least some events. Symmetry eoDSideratioDS have always been important in the study of probability. Indeed, early work in probability was dominated by the notion of symmetry, for it wu uauaUy either coneemed with, or directly iupired by, symmetrical pmbJiDg apparatus such &8 dice or cards. To illustrate those cJaasieal problema, suppose that a pmbler is offered eeveral beta concerning the poeaible outcome of rolling three dice, where it is to be understood that refraining from any beta at all may be amODl the available "beta." Which of the available bets should the gambler choose? Pemapa I distort history somewhat in inlilting that early problems were framed in terms of choice among beta, for many, if not most, of them 'Were framed terms of equity, that is, they ISked which of two pJayen, if either, would have the advantage in a hypothetical bet. But, especially from the point of view of the earlier probabilists, such a question of equity is tantamount to a question of choice amoDg beta, for to uk which of two "equal" betters has the advantage is to ask which of them baa the preferable alternative, U W84 pointed out quite explicitly by D. Bernoulli in [BIO). In elect, the clusical worken recommended the foUowiDllOlutiOD to the problem of three dice, with corresponding solutions to other pmbliDg problema: 1. Attach equal mathematieal probabilities to each of the 216 (- 63 ) lJ(aI"ble outcomes of roUiDg the three dice. (There are 61 poeaibilitiea, becauIe the firat, eecond, and third dice can each ahow any of six 8COJ'eI, all combinatiODS being poeaible.) 2. Under the mathematical probability established in Step 1, compute the expected \\innings (possibly negative) of the gambler for each available bet. 3. Choose & bet that has the largest expected winnings among thOle available.
m
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON PERSONAL PROBABILITY
('.6
At present it is appropriate to refrain from criticisms of the use made of expected wimUnp until the next chapter and to coneentrate discussion on the notion that the 216 possibilities should be coDSidered equally probable, which can coDveniently be done by drastically reducing the class of beta cOJl8idered to be available. Say, for definiteneaa, that the only beta to be eoDSidered are simply even-money beta of one doUar, tha.t the triple of ac0re8 falls iD a preasaiped sublet of the 216 possibilities. When attention is focused on this restricted cIaaa of bet.. the total recommendation is seen to imply that the probability meaaure defined in the first step of the recommendation be adopted 88 the personal probability of the gambler. To put it differentlYI a gambler who adopts the recommendation will hold the 216 possible outcom.. equally probable Dot only in some abstract 8eD8e, but also in the sense of personal probability as defined in § 3.2. The notion that the 216 possibilities should be repnled 81 equaDy probable is familiar to everyone; for it is taken for granted wherever gentlemen gamble 88 weD 88 in the standard biglHehool alpbra eoune8, where it serves to illustrate the theory of combiuatioDi and permutatioD•• Traditionally, the equality of the probabilities W88 auppoeed to be established by what was called the priDdple of msafRdeat reum., t thus: Suppose that there is an argument leading to the eoncluaion that one of the possible combinations of ordered scores. ..y t1, 2, 3 J, is more probable than some other, say 16. 3, 4). Then the information on which that hypothetical argument is baaed has such symmetry 81 to permit a completely parallel, and therefore equally valid, argument leading to the conclusion that t6, 3, 41 is more probable than 11, 2, 31. Therefore, it was ~rted, the probabiHtiea of aD combiDatiODB must be equal. The principle of iDBUfficient reason has been and, I think, will continue to be a most fertile idea in the theory of probability; but it is Dot so simple as it may appear at first sight, and criticism has frequently and justly been brought against it. Holden of DecelBBIU')' viewa typically attempt to put the principle on a. rigoroua basis by modifyiDc it in such a way 88 to take account of such criticism. Holders of per8OIIAIistic and objectivistic views typically regard the criticism as Dot altogether refutable, 80 they do not attempt to establiah a formal postulate corresponding to the principle but content themselves 88 I shan here -with exhibiting an element of truth in it. One of the first criticisms is that the principle is Dot strictly appHeable for a person who has had any experience with the apparatus in qUe&t Perhaps wh&t I here call the principle of insufficient reuoo should be called the principle of ropnt reaaon. See Section 3 of (Bill for the diatiDdion iDvolwd.
4.11
THE ROLE OF SY'fMETRY IN PROBABILITY
tion, or even with similar apparatus. Thus, attempts to use the principle, as I have stated it, to prove that there is no such thing as a run of luck at dice, as actually played, are invalid. The penon may have had relevant experience, directly or vicariously, not only with gambling apparatus itself, but also with people who make and handle it, includiq cheaters. It is Dot always obvious what the symmetry of the informatiOD ia m a situation in which one wishes to invoke the principle of jDl81fficieDt reason. For example, d'Alembert, an otherwise great eighteeDth-century mathematician, is supposed to have argued aeriously that the prob.ability of obtaining at least one bead in two toues of a fair coin is 2/3 rather than 3/4. (Cf. (Tal, Art. 464.) Heads, aa he said, might appear OD the Jim tOSB, or, failing that, it might appear on the second, or, finally, might not appear on either. D'Alembert conaidered the three poaaibilitiee equally likely. It .ems reasonable to suppoee that, if the principle of i n ad6 cieDt reason were formulated and applied with sufficient care, the eooclusiou of dtAlembert would appear simply as a mistake. There are, however, more serious examples. Suppose, to take a famous one, that it is known of an um only that it contains either two white balls, two black balla, or a white ball and a black ball. The principle of insuffieient reason baa been invoked to eonclude that the three possibilities are equally proba• ble, 80 that in partieular the probability of one white and one black ball is concluded to be 1/3. But the principle hu also been applied to conclude that there are four equally probable possibilities, namely, that the first ball is white and the second also, that the first is white and the 8eCOud black, etc. On that basis, the probability of one white and one black ball is, of coune, 1/2. Personally, I do Dot try to arbitrate between the two conclusions but consider that the existence of the pair 01 them reflects doubt on the notion that a person's knowledge relevant to any matter admits any full and precise description in terms of propositions he knows to be true and others ahout which he knows nothing. Afost holders of personalistic views do not find the principle of insufficient reason eompelling, because they envisage the possibility that a person may consider one event more probable than another without haviDg any compelling argument for his attitude. Viewed practically. this position is closely associated \1i;th the first criticism of the principle of iblUflicient reason, for the holder of a personalistic view typically 8Upp0ge8 that the person is under the influence of experience, and poe.ibly even biologically determined inheritance, that expmaaes iteelf in his opinions, though not neeesaarily through compelling argument.
cnmcAL COMMENTS ON PERSONAL PROBABILITY
Holders of personalistic views do see some truth in the principle of insufficient reason, because they recognize that there are frequently pal'-
titioDB of the world, associated with symmetrical-looking gambling apparatus and tbe like, tbat many and dive. . people all consider (very nearly) unifonn partitions. As was illustrated in the preeedmg section, we often feel more "awe" about probabilities derived from. the judllllent that such partitions are uniform than we do about others. Such partitioDs are, moreover, very important in that they provide some events the probability of which to diverse people is in agreement.. Though the events eoneemed are often of no importance in themaelvea, agreement about them can, through the statistical invention of randomization, contribute to agreement about all sorts of issues open to empirical investigation. Widespread though the agreement about the near unifonnity of some partitions is, holders of personalistic views typically do Dot find the contexts in which such agreement obtaine sufficiently definable to admit of expression in a postulate. Holders of purely objectivistic views see no seuse at all in the original formulation of the principle of insufficient reason. for it U88I '·probability" in a manner they consider meanin&iess. But they too Bee all element of truth in the principle, which they consider to be establisbed 88 a part of empirical physics. Thus, for example, they regard it .. an experimental fact, admitting some explanation in terms of theoretiea1 physics, that three dice manufactured with reasonable symmetry WI11 exhibit each of the 216 poesible patterns with nearly equal frequency, if repeatedly rolled ",,;th sufficient violence on & suitable surface. Holders of personalistic views agree that experiments Of, more pnerally, experiences determine to a large extent when people employ the idea of insufficient reason. Thus, though experiments with pmblinl apparatus, quite apart from gambling it8elf, have & fascination tbat perbaps exceeds their real interest, such experiments are not altogether worthlese. On the one band, they provide strong evidence that a perSOD cannot expect to maintain a symmetrical attitude toward any piece of apparatus with which he has had IODg experience, unless he is vIrtually CODVinCed at the outset that the p088ible states of the apparatus are equally probable and independent from trial to trial. To say it in the more fanu1iar and sometimes more eongeniall8Dguage of objective probability, long experiments with coins, dicet cards, and the like have always shown some bias, and often 8O~e dependence from trial to trial. On the other hand (and this has the utmost practical importance), it has been shown that. with skill and experience, gambling a.pparatus, or its statistical equivalent, can be manufactured in which the bias and the dependence from trial to trial are extremely small. This implies
'.6)
HOW CAN SCIENCE USE A PEBSONALISTIC VIEW!
that groupe of very diverse people can be brought to agree that repeated triaJa with certain apparatus are nearly uniform and nearly independent.. Thus eertain methods of obtaiDing random numbers and other outcomes of uniform and independent trial8, which are vital to many 80rta of experimentation, have justifiably found a~eptance with the scientific public. A stimulating account of practical methods of obtainiDg laDdom numbers, and random samples generally, is given by Kendall in Chapter 8 (Vol. I) of (K2].
6 How can lCience use a personalistic view of probabiUq? It is often argued by holders of necessary and objectivistic view8 alike that that ill-defiDed activity known as science or scientific method CODaiate largely, if Dot exclusively, in finding out what is probably true, by criteria on which all reasonable men agree. The theory of probability relevant to science, they therefore argue, ought to be a codification of universally acceptable criteria. HoJders of necessary views eay that, just as there is no room for dispute as to whether one proposition is logically implied by others, there can be no dispute 88 to the uteat to which one proposition is partially implied by others that are thought of as evidence bearing on it, for the exponents of necessary views reprd probability 88 a generalization of implication. Holders of objectivistic views say that, after appropriate observations, two reaaonable people can DO more disagree about the probability with which trials in a sequence of coin toeses are heads than they can disagree about the length of a &tick after measuring it by suitable methods, for they con.. Bider probability an objective property of certain physical systems in the same sense that length is generally considered an objective property of other physical systems, small errors of measurement being contemplated in both contexts. Neither the necessary Dor the objectivistic outlook leaves any room for personal differences; both, therefore, look on any penonalistic ,,;ew of probability 8B, at beat, an attempt to predict some of the behavior of abnormal, or at any rate unacientme,
people. I would reply that the personalistic view incorporates all the universally aeceptable criteria for reasonableness in judgment known to me and that, when any criteria that may have been overlooked are brought forward, they will be welcomed into the pel'lODalistie view. The criteria incorporated in the personalistie view do not guarantee agreement on all questions amoDg all honest and freely communicating peoplet even in principle. That incomplereness, if one will call it sucb, does not distre88 me, for I think that at least some of the disagreement we see around us is due neither to di8bODesty, to errors in rea8ODing. nor to
68
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON PERSONAL PROBABILITY
(4.6
friction in communication, though the harmful effects of the latter are almost ineapable of exageration. As was mentioned in connection with aymmetry, there are partitioDi that diverse people all cousider nearly uniform, though not eompe1led to that agreement by any poatulate of the theory of peraonal probability. As has also been mentioned and as will be expJained later (e. pecially in § 14.8), through the statistical invention of randomisatiOD, agreement about partitions pertaining to gambling apparatus of no importance in itself can be made to contribute to agreement in every part of empiric.1 science. Another mechanism that brings people baviDl some, but. not all, opinions in common into more complete agreement was illuatrated in 113.6-7. Indeed, it was there shown that in certain contata aDy two opinions, provided that neither is extreme in & technical sense, are almost sure to be brought very close to one another by a suf6ciently large body of evidence. It b88 been counteredt I believe, that, if experience syatematicaDy leads people with opinions orilinally ditJerent to hold a commOD opinion, then that common opinion, and it only, is the proper eubject of acientific probability theory. There are two inaccuracies in this argument. In the first place, the conclusion of the personalistic view is not that evidence brings holders of different opiniODS to the same opiniona, but rather to similar opinions. In the second place, it is typically true of any observational program, however extensive but preecribed in advance, that there exist pairs of opinions, neither of which can be called extreme in any precisely defined aense, but which e&Dnot be expected, either by their holders or any other person, to be brought into cloee agreement after the ob8ervational program. I have, at least once, beard it objected against the personalistic view of probability that, according to that view, two people might be of different opinions, according 88 one is 'pessimistic and the other optimistic. I am not sure what position I would take in abstract diacuMiOD of whether that alleged property of pel'8Onalistie views would be 0bjectionable, but I think it ia clear from the formal definition of qualitative probability that the particular per8OD8listic view 8pODSOJed here does not leave room for optimism and pessimism, however these traits be interpreted, to play any role in the pel'8On'e judgment of probabilit.ies. + See (Fiaber 1934), p. 287.
CHAPTER
5
Utility 1 Introduction The postulates P4-6, introduc~ in Chapter 3, have already led to simplification of the relation S in so far as it applies to acts of a special but important fonn. Indeed, through the introduction of numeriea1 probability, those special comparisons have been reduced to ordinary arithmetic comparison of numbers in such a '9tray that many relatiOll8 &mODI acts are deducible by simple and systematic aritbmetic calculation. In this ciaapter it \\ill be shown that the arithmetization of comparison among acts can, with the introduction of one mild new postulate, be extended to virtually all pairs of acts. This far-reaching arithmetization of comparison among acts is achieved by attaching a number U(/) to each eOD8eQUence! in such a way that f S I if and only jf the expe<.~ted value of U (f) is numerically leaa than or equal to that of U(&), provided only that the real-valued funetiODB U(f) aDd ll(1) are e88eDtially bounded. The pro,\ision can fail to be met only if there exist acts that are, so to speak, distinctly preferable to any fixed reward or distinctly \vorse than any fixed punilh-
mente A function U that thus arithmetizes the relation of preference amonl acta will be called a utility. It wiD be shown that the mUltiplicity of utilities is not complicated. e,·ery utility being simply related to every other. I have chosen to \lse the name "utility" in preference to any other, in spite of some unfortunate connotations this name has in connection with economic theory, because it W88 adopted by von Neumann and MoIpD8tern when in (V4] they revived the concept to which it Mfem, in a most stimulating \\"ay. Their treatment has been of such widespread intaeBt that the introduction of a Dame other than Uutility" at the present time would cause more confusion than it could alleviate. The next three sections are concerned \lith the t.echnical exploration of the utility concept. I think readers interested in the details will find it best to read these sections twice as & unit, in the fashion I have been recommendiDg for other material in which definitions and propoeitiooa 69
UTILITY
(1.2
are interlarded with proors; others will be content with a cureory readiDa, omitting proofs. Taking advantage of the simplicity afforded by the introductian of utility, I try in 15 to make BOrne progreaa with the problem, pointed out in 12.5, of specifying criteria for the construction of "small worlds. " Finally, t 6 briefly reports the history of tbe utility idea. A aeparate critical aeetion is Dot necessary, becauae the criticisms of the theory of utility known to me are incorporated conveJlientJy into the hiItorial section.
2 Gamblea Before di8cllasi o l utility, it is expedient to eatabliah certain facta, the first beiDg that at least amoDI • rather ricb. clue of acta, name.,. acta coufined with probability one to a finite number of CODaequen0e8, preference depends only on the probability distributiOD of the COIUI8qUeDceB
of the acts.
TBBOREY
1
Hyp. 1. f., ... , I. are" elements of F, ft ~ 1. 2. Ph ••• , p,. are numbers IUch that ZPi - 1. 3. I and h are acta such that P(g(a) - Ii) == P(h(a) == Ii) - Pi,
i - I , ••• ,
ft.
CoNCL.
The theorem is obvioU8 for n - 1. It wiD be proved by induction, supposing henceforth that ft > 1. l.et B denote the intersection of the two events that ,(.) -I. and A(.) ~ I., and let C denote the intenection of the two events thafr A(.) - f. and g(,) ~ I,.. It is easy to see that PCB) == P(C). C caD be partitioned into Co, Cit ... , C.. - It where Co is a null event and Cit i - I • ... t fa - 1, is the interaectioD of C with the event that 1/(') - lie By repeated application of Conclusion 7 of Theorem 3.3.3, B can be partitioned into events Bo, B., ... , B,,-1 such that P(Bi ) - pee,), i - 0, •.. ," - 1. Let Co ca " and define li+l step by step for i c: 0, ..•• 1l - 2 thus: PaOOJ'.
(1)
gi+1 (.) -
I,.
CI+1, for, t B'+I, elsewhere. for
8 •
It is easily seen from the facts of conditional probability that "+1 .. ~ given Bi+l U Ci +h and it is even more obvious that '*1 ... Ii liVeD '"'"'(B'+I U C,+,). 'lberefore 11+1 • ,,, 10 L-l .. ,. ~t
1.2)
GAMBLES
71
P{g4+1(') - 'i) - P(g,(.) -Ii) - Pi, 80 P(g.-l(') - /i) - Pi, j - 1, • • ., n. Thus '._1 is not only equivalent to I but also satisfies the hypothelis of the theorem relative to h, 80 it will suffice to prove the theoarem. for L-l and h in place of I and h. Now 1.-1 has been constructed to equal f. in C, except OIl a nuD let. Therefore h given CUD, where D is the subset of ~C which 1.-1 =- h == f •. Itremaina oD!ytoahowthat'._I" hgiven"-'(C U D). If",(C U D) is null, that is true automatica1ly; henceforth concentrate on the lees trivial situation. If "'(0 U D) is not null, then ~ given ~(C U D) aatisfie8 all the postulatal assumed thua far, and therefore the COD8equencee/l' .. ·'/.-1; the numbers Pi' .. pJ(l - ,.), i .. I, ... ," - 1; the acts and h; and the relation S given ~(C U D) satisfy the hypothesis of the theorem for a case in which it is supposed already to have been proved. •
'.-1 ..
OD
'.-1
In this chapter the notation T,pJ. will denote the class of all acts f· for which there exist partitions B. of8 such that P(Bt} - Pi andJ(.) Ie for - I Bit Here the li8 are a finite sequence of consequences (not neeesaarily distinct), and the Pi'S a corresponding sequence of nODneptive real numbers such that ~Pi =- 1. In view of Conclusion 7 of Theorem 3.3.3, such a class of acta, which will in this chapter be ~ ferred to 88 a gambu and denoted by I, I, " or the like, always bu at least one element. Theorem 1 says, in effect, that the person reprds all elements of allY pmble as equivalent. To put it differently, if the events B, of a partition have the probabilities Pi, and if the act f is such that the cOD8eQuence!. will befall the person in case B. occurs, then the value of f is independent of how the partition B, is chosen. Gambles can be mixed, in & sense, to make new gambles, thus: Let Ii be a finite sequence of gambles, I..
(2)
I
a:z
"P . .J, .. ~., '"
•
and tlJ a corresponding aequence of non-negative real numbers such that ,%(11 - 1. The mUture of the Ij's with weights'l, denoted Zo-IIj, is defined by (3)
'J:,tri'l
== ~ (Ii { ~ Pti!ii} -=
L
«(1iPii)J&/,
i.j
which is meaningful, the fils being consequences and the (tlj#lii)'S being numbers such that 'X,(tliPiJ) == 1. Such mixtures are exemplified by an iDaurance policy in which the benefit is an annuity payable during the
(6.2
UTILITY
72
life of the beneficiary, and by a lottery in which the pri&ea are tickets in other lotterieL In view of Theorem 1, it is natural to say that'S I meaDS that, lor
every act f in the class of acta corresponding to I, f ~ ,. Correaponding definitiona are to be understood for / S I, I < fI, J ~ " etc.
< p .s
TIIEOREJI 2 If I, ,. and " are gambles. aDd 0 (1 - p}6 :S P8 (1 - p)lt, if and only if IS,.
+
1; then
pi
+
Let f, I; Ii, gi; and B i , Cj be acts, couequences, and partitiODl 8Uch that f and , are among the acta repreeented by , and ., respectively. with J(,) == I, for _. Bi aDd ,(I) i!=I g; for, e CJ. Coaatruet DiJ C Bi CI such that P(D,;) .. PP(Bi el). and let D - U Dijo Then P(D) - p, PCB. I D) - PCB,), and P(Cj I D) p(ej). What is to be proved is, in effect, that f S I given D, if and ooly jf f S I. In view of Theorem 1 it is clear that whether that is 80 or Dot for f and I does Dot depend on the particular choice of Dj 80, with an obvious temporary exteuion of terminology, it is to be proved that f S I pven p, if and only if f S .. If f .. I given a for every 0 < (I ~ I, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise it can be assumed without 1088 of gener&lity that, for some PROOF.
n
n
given ao· In view of 'Theorem 2.7.2, if a fJ ~ 1, f ~ C given a, and f ~ C given fJ; then f ~ I given (<< fJ), and similarly f ~ I given a/2. Making use of P6 and Theorem 2.7.2, it can easily be shown that, for any CI sufficiently close to cro, f < I given cr. The prececiiDI three paragraphs imply that, in the case at, hand, f < I given a for every ex, 0 < a St.. ere, f
+
3 U I (1 - cr),_
THEORDl
,,1 +
< I,
+
and 0 S
< pSI,
fI
then pi
+ (1 -
p),
<
PRooF. In view of the immediately verifiable identities, pi
+ (1
- p), - (p - t/)I
+ [1 -
(p {
_») X fS
I
(1 - p) I} . 1 - (p - 0')
1 - (p - 0')
(4)
+
tTl + (1 - cr), - (P - 0'), + (1 - (p - 0')] X {
(f
1 - (p - cr)
I
} + 1 -(1 (p- -p) .) ••
5.3)
UTILITY, AND PREFERENCE AMONG GAMBLES
this theorem is a 8pecial case of Theorem 2; unless p - 1, and (/ in which case it is trivial. •
'1 < 12 and 11 < I S 1
THBoIWI 4 If ODe p such that P'1
+ (1 -
2)
73 ~
0,
then there is one and only
p)ft .. I.
PaooJ'. It follows immediately from Theorem 3 and the principle of the Dedekind cut t that there is one and only one Po such that
+ (1 <111 + (1 tI'l
(5)
0)'2
< I,
11)12 > I,
> Po if (/ < Po.
jf 11
According to (5), no number, except possibly Po, can satisfy the equivaJence demanded by the theorem. Finally, using (5) and P6 (much &8 it was used in the proof of Theorem 2), it follows that Po does indeed satisfy the equivalence. • 3 Utility, and preference &mODI gambles
The idea of utility can most conveniently be introduced in connection with gambles or, equivalently, acts that with probability one are confined to a finite number of cOIlSP.Quences, thus: A utility is a function U 8880ciating real numbers "itb consequencea in such a way that. if '%PJi and II - ~(TRJ; then 1 ~ II, if and only if ~p,U(fd S '1:,"jU(g/). Writing U(I) for 'Z,PiU(f.), the condition takes the fonn flff].s Similarly, it is convenient to understand that, for an act f, ,
:=II
(1)
ur,].
U[f] - B(U(f).
In this notation the following obvious theorem gives a slightly different characterization of utility.
TBBoRllll 1
A real-valued function of consequences, U, is a utility; if and only jf f S C is equivalent to U(f) < UflJ. provided t and C are both with probability one confined to a finite set of consequences.
Do the postulates thus far assumed guarantee that any utilities exist at all? Can Theorem 1 be extended to an even wider cl888 of acta? Does a great diversity of utilities exist, or does the relation ~ practically detennine the function U? These questioDS, here mentioned in the order in l\iUch they most naturally arise, are manjfestly of great importance in understanding utility. 'For technical reasons, they will
t cr., if necelllal'Y. any introduction to the theory of the n!al numbers for e~plan. lion of t.hia principle, e.g.,
Cha~r
II of (G3).
(a.a
74
be anarwezed in a different order-the third followed by the first in this aectiou, and the a!>COIld in the next aection.
U there is a utility at aU, there is aurely more than one, because • utility plus a coD8tant and a utility times a positive coDStant are aJeo obvioualy utilities; thU8: 2 If 11 is a utility, and p, then 11' - pU + (I is aleo a utility.
TBBORDI
(I
are real nwnbera with
p
> 0;
If there exista a utility, and if J < g; then there ex... ists a utility U for which U(J) and U(g) are any preassigned pair of
COROLLARY
1
numbers, provided UCJ)
<
U(g).
Theorem 2 says that any increasing linear function of a utility is " utility. The next theorem. says that, cODvemely, any two utilities are neeeasarily increasing linear funetiona of ODe another.
3 If U and U' such that U' - pU + (I, p >
THEOREM
anl
o.
utilities, there exiat numbera p and
t1
The finJt step of the proof will be to demoDBtrate the following identity for the two utilities U and U' and for any three COIl8&quences I, g, h. 1 1 1 (2) U(f> U(g) U(h} - o. PROOJ'.
U'(/)
U'CJI)
U any two of the consequences I,
U'(h)
" A are equivalent, two column8 of
the determinaot in question are equal, and therefore the determinant vanishes. It can be assumed, then, that no two of /, g, and,. are equivalent; and there is no 1088 in generality, as may be eeen by permutiDs columns, in aasuming J < g < A. Theorem 2.' now pennite the couclusion that there is a p such that pf (1 - p)1a - g. Therefore,
(3)
+ 1 =- pI + (1 U(g) == pUU) + (1 U'(g) pU'(J) + (1 :I
Thus the middle
COlUJDlI
p)l
p)U(I&) p)U'(Ia).
of the determinant i.4J linearly d(lpendent on
tbfl other two~ so th~ d~tertnin8nt vaDjsh~8~ 88 ""u a~rtf'd. Now let g and A be any fixed pair of cOD8eQuences such that g < II, the existence of such a pair being IlIUm by P5. Equation (2) can be
1.3]
UTILITY, .UTD PREFERENCE AMONG GAMBLES
mceeaaively rewritten, where (4)
J
is an arbitrary CODBequeaC8, thus:
l[U(g)U'(h) - U(h)U'(g») - U(f)[U'(A) - U'(g)]
+ U'U)[U(h) (5)
U(g») - 0,
U'(h) - U'(g) U(g)U'(Ia) - U(Ia)U'(g) U'(/) - U(A) _ U(g) V(/) U(A) - U(JJ) •
which proves the theorem; for U'(h) - U'(g) and U(A) - U(g) are both positive. • If V and V' are utilities such that, for 80me , < A, U(g) = U'(g) and U(A) = U'(h); then U and V' are the same, that ii, for every I, U(f) .. U' (f).
COROLLAay 2
To 8Um marize, if there is a utility at all, there are an infinite number, but the array of utilities is Dot complicated; for all can be generat«l from anyone by increasiDg linear traD8i'onnations. Tum now to the question of existence. THEOREM
4
There exists a utility.
PllooJ'. Von Neumgn and MorpDBtern prove eseentially this theorem, as weD &8 the preceding one, in the appeDdix of (V4). The following proof is thein, expreeeed, as the teacher used. to say, in my own words. For this proof only, certain special nomenelature is introducecL A set of gambles' is corwex; if and only if, for every " I I , aDd p, 0 ~ p S 1, ,1 + (1 - P)II'. An inlenJall of pmbles is the let of all pmbles I BUch that, for some fixed 9 and " (which detennine the in.terval), , SIS 1. A hyper-vlililll V on a convex set F is a real-valued function of the gambles of f, such that , ~ I, if and only if V(I) S V(I),
+
+
and such that V(pl (1 - p),) ell pVC'> (1 - p)VC,). The fonowing remarks about this special nomenclature are obvious and will be repeatedly used in the proof, without explicit reference. The set all pmbles is convex. The intersection of two convex aeta is convex. Every interval is convex. There is an interval containing any fini~ Bet of gambles. If there is a hyper-utility on the set of all pmblea, it ia a utility when eonfined to consequences. By the same method that led to the proofs of Theorems 2 aDd 3. if there is a hyper-utility on f containing. and II, with I < It, then there is one and only one hyper-utility V on f such that V(I> - 0 and V(') -= 1.
or
7.
UTlLlTY
[6.6
If , is the interval determined by , < la, then, according to Theorem 2.4, there is for every' in I a unique Dumber, call it V (I), such that (6)
, II.
(1 - V(f), + V(I)1a..
By repeated use of Theorem 2.2, it follows for any I, , ., that (7)
pi + (1 - p)' - ,{ (1 - V(I»g
+ (1 =s
+ V(I)A}
p) {(I - V(I')g + V(f')h)
+ (1 + (PV(f) + (1 -
11 -
[PV(I)
,)V(I'))), ,)V{f'»)h,
V is a hyper-utility on the convex aet •. From here OD in this proof, let I, ]a be a fixed pair of CODaeqUeDce8 with IJ < h. Making use of the precediug two paraarapha, there is • UDique hyper-utility asaiping the values 0 aDd 1 to g and I&, respectively, OIl any one interval containinI , and h. The interaoctiOD of two lIIe1l tervals is a convex set containing, and h, and on the intenectiOD the hyper-utilitiea &88Oeiated with the two intBvall &1'8 both hyper-utilitiea attaching 0 and 1 to g and la, respectively; they must, therefore, be equal to one another on the intemection. Any gamble I is an element of some interval containing g aDd A. Let V(I) be the common value . .igned to , by all the hyper-utilitie8 that are defined on intervals containin,l, g, and A aDd that AMip the values 0 and 1 to , and h, respectively. Since there is always at leut one such interval for any pmbJe I, the function V is defined for all pmblee. The proof will be complete when it is shown that V is a hyper-utility for the convex set of all gambleL Let, and , be any two pmblea and , a number, 0 S , S 1. There is aD interval containing " " I, A. and pI + (1 - p)f'. In that interval the function V is a hyper-utility. Therefore V(PI + (1 - ,)1') - pV(f) + (1 - p)V(,) aod V(f) S V(I'), if and only if' ~ , . • 80
m-
,
The extension of utDlt7 to more paera! acts The requiremeDt that an act have only a fiDite Dumber of COD8equences may seem, from a practical point of view, aim. . DO requirement at all. To iUustrate, the Dumber of time iDtervaJa that milbt poasibly be the duration of a hUll1&D life caD be regarded 88 finite, if you agree that the duration may 88 well be rounded to the DIUeIIt minute, or aecond, or microeecond, aDd that there is almost; DO poBbility of ita exceeding a thousand years. More geDera1ly. it is plauaible
S.fl
that,
THE EXTENSION OF UTII"ITY TO "lORE GENERAl" AC7S
77
matter what set of consequences is envisaged, each consequence can be practically identified with some element of a suitably cboaen finite. though poeaibly enormous, subset. It might therefore seem of little or no importanoo to extend the concept of utility to aets having an infinite number of consequences. If that argument ,vere valid, it could easily be extended to reach the conclusion that infinite seta are irrelevant to aD practical affairs, and therefore to aU parts of applied mathematics. But it is one of the most profound lessons of mathematieal experience that infinite seta, tactCully bandIed, can lead to great simplification of situations that could, in principle, but only with enormous djfficulty, be treated in tenns of finite sets. How diffieult it would be to study geometry if ODe made at the ou~rtet the "simplifying 888Umption" that to all intents and purpoees at most 101 ,000 points in space can be discriminated from one another! Again. it is generally more convenient and fruitful to think of the annual ea.~h income of an individual or finn as a continuous variable with an infinite number of poesible values tban as a discrete variable confined to some large finite Dumber of values, even if it is knoVlD that the income must be some integral number of cents less, say, thaD 1010. ODe way to extend the concept of utility to acts with an infinite number of consequences would be to postulate: If U(f1 and UlIl boUl exist (the values +00 and -co being regarded as possible); f I, if and only if U(f] S U[c]. I see no serious objection to making this assumptiOD outright, though it might be complained that the &S8Umption is motivated more by general mathematiea1 intuition and experience than by intuitive standardH of consistency among decisioD8, ,,·hich I have tried to take 88 my sole guide thus far. A statemeDt almost &I strong 88 the one in question can, however, be derived on adjoining a new postulate, P7, more in the spirit of Pl-6. 'rbat rather technical program "iD be carried out in the next several paragraphs. Those not intereatAd can safely skip to the paragraph following Corollary 1 on DO
s:
pap SO.
Suppoee that every possible conseqtience of the act g is at leMt B8 attractive to the person as the act f considered as a whole; then it seems to me within the spirit of the sure-thing principle to conclude that f S Ii the same might 88 fairly have been said for the relations ~ J and also for the two relations < given B and > given B. This idea is formalized in the following postulate, which, aceording to the conventiODS of mathematical double-talk, is to be interpreted as t,vo propositioD&-One having S and the other ~ throughout.
P7
If f
S
(~)
g(,) given B for every BIB, then f
S
(~),
given B.
rIA
78
Attention haa been called to the mathematically u.eeful fact that. if PI~ apply to a relation S J then they &lao apply to any ze1ation S given B, provided B is Dot nuD. It ia obviOUI that the aame is true for PI-7, a fact that will be used often. It is also noteworthy that Pl-7 obviously imply the propositions that ariae if in them every iDataDee of the sip S is replaced by ~ and every iDataDce of ~ is replaced by S. Therefore in any deduction fJ'ODl Pl-7 every iDataDce of the mil'l and ~ can be reversed to produce a deduction that may be caJIed the qmmdric dual the original deduction. This remark, a leaitimate child of the principle of inmflicieDt re&8OIl, has not been important heretofole t because almost all deductiODS thua far made have been their own symmetric duals. Since that will Dot be 80 of some of the lemmM in the preeent section, much needless writm, and thiDkiDg caD be saved by agreeing at the outset that, once a result is proved, it and its 8YIDmetria dual may be UBed as if both had been explicitly proved. Before goiDg to work with P7, some may wish to Bee all example of a mathematieal structure satisfying PI-6 but not aatiafyiDg Fl. Moreover, undel'BtaDding of such an example will do much to clarify the UBe8 to be made of P7. To construct the example, begin by lettiDa S be a set carrying a finitely additive probability measure P under which 8 can be partitioned into subsets of arbitrarily amaU probability. Let the set of consequences be the half-open interval of numbers 0 ~ f < 1. Let U(J> I : J, U(f) - 8(1), and
s
or
(1)
VII] - lim PI/(,) • -0
~ 1-
.1 .
Since the probability in (1) decreaaee with ., there is DO question about the existence of the limit. Now let Wlf) - utI) VlIl, and define f S I to mean that W[f) S WlIJ. Checking postulates Pl-6, it will be found that the < thua defined satisfies them all, and that what haa here been called UU) is indeed & utility for S. But if, for example, there is an f such that U[fI - VII) ~ 1, P7 is violated, 88 can be seen by compariq f to the act that, for each " takes &8 value the maximum. of t and 1(.). Whether there can be such an f, mayI 80 far as I know, depend on the choice of S and P. But, if the positive integers are taken as 8, and P is 80 chosen that though the probability of anyone integer is 0 the probabDity of the set of even integers is 1/2, a poaaibUity 888UJ'ed by the Dote to Section 3 of Chapter II on p. 231 of (B4]J the function equal to 0 at the odd intege1'8 and equal to (1 - lin) at each even A is such an f. Finite, 88 oppoeed to countable, additivity P!IND8 to be essential to this example; perhaps, if the theory were worked out in & countably additive spirit from the start, little or no oounterpal't of FI would be necesaary.+
+
+ .Fishburn (1970, .'dercise 21, p. 2lS) haa sua-ted an appropriate ..t-
eningof P7.
6.4J
THE EXTENSION OF UTILITY TO MORE GENERAL Aar8
79
Several lemmas depending on P7 are now to be proved ~tory to proving that U[I) governs preference for a very large cluI of acts. It is to be understood throughout the section that U is any fixed utility. The truth of each lemma is intuitively clear, in the seD8e that each could justifiably be aeeepted 88 a postulate if need be. Since they are also easy to prove and of secondary interest, condensed proofs "ill suftice. LEMMA
If, for every consequence h, f
1
< A, and I < "; then f
.. I.
PaoOF. Conaider in the light of P7 that f S ge,) and , S f(,) for every •.• If there exists a consequence 10 such that f S lOt and if U(J(.) S Uo for every I, then there exists a pmbJe • such that f S • and U(,) < Uo• LEMMA,
2
If UUo) SUo, then • can be taken to consist of 10 alone. Otherwise, let /1 be any consequence such that U(fl) S Uo and let. be the unique mixture of 10 and 11 such that UC.) - Uo•• PROOF.
IIDOIA
Hyp.
3 1. Tbe Bl8, i ;: 1, ... , n, are a partition, and the Ui's are
corresponding numbers. 2. f is an act such that U(J(.» < U, (or, • B,. 3. I is a pmble such that I :S f. UrI]
CoNCL.
oS 'XUtP(B.).
PRooF. If the lemma were falae, it would be falae even for some' < f. Then it may be &88UDled, modifying t if need be by meaDS of P6 and Lemma 1, that there exists for each i an fi such that f < fi given BiNow, in view of Lemma 2, there exists for each i a gi such that f S Qi
ut g = ~P(B.)g"
given B, and Ulgil < U ,. f S g. Therefore, utf) S Ufo]
=:
and obseJve that , %'P(Bi ) U(fli) S %P(B~) U. . .
<
An act will be called bounded if its utility is, according to ordinary mathematical ueap, an essentially bounded random variable; the notion is put in a more formal and self-contained way 8B follows: A boutadt4 ad is aD act, f IUCh that, for eome two numbers U0 and UIt PI U0 ~ U(J(a» S UJ) ~ 1. The de8Dition is clearly not, dependent on the
choice of U. TaEoRlDl 1 U(f) ~
If f and I are bounded, then f S " if and only if
UlIJ·
PRooF. If there exist , and " such that g S f S A, then there is, by Theorem 2..4, a mixture , of , and " such that , .. f. The null event
UTILITY
80
which VUe,»~ i8 not, between Uo and UI may as weD be diareprded; the rest caD be partitioned into ft -+ 1 events B, defined by the condition that • e Bi if and only if V i-I S U(J(.» < Vi, i -= 1, •.• , ,,+ 1. where OD
(2)
i - 0, ... , "
+ 1.
Applying Lemma 3 and ita symmetric dual, :ZVi_1P(Bi )
(3)
S
U[I)
S
~vJ>(Bi ) ..
Similarly, acconlilll to Exercise 3 of Appendix 1, ~V._IP(Bi) ~
(4)
U(f]
~
ZV,(B.).
Therefore (6)
I U(fJ -
I
U[I] S l:(VI - V'_l)P(B,) - (U I
-
Uo)/n,
whence U(f) -= U(I). To consider the remaining case, suppose that the bounded act f exeeeda (is exceeded by) every CODaequeneej caD it for the moment big (l","). Aceonlinl to Lemma 1, all big (aDd, dually, alllitt1e) acts are equivalent to one another. Furthermore, it is, for example, eaeily aeen that, if an act is big, then for ~ > 0, (6)
p{ U(/(8»
~ sup U(f) I
II!} -
1.
(Some may be more familiar with the notatiOD "LUB" and "GLB," read "least upper bound" and Ugreatest lower bound," thaD with the conespondiDg "sup" and "w," read "supremum" and "infimum." If even theae older terms are not famUiar, see Exercise 4 of AppeoWs 2.) Therefore, if there are big (little) acta, they all have the II8Dle expected utility, namely sup U(J> (inf UU». . Suppoee now that f S I. It is poaaible that f and I are both little; that f ia little, and I is equivalent to lOme pmble; that f is Htde and I big; that f and I are each equivalent to some pmble; that f is equiv.. lent to some pmble, and , it big; or, finaDy, that they are both bil" In each of these eases, a simple argument showe that U(I] ~ UIIJ. The CODveI8e arguments are similar. • COROLLARY 1 If t and C are bounded, and P(B) > 0" then f S I given B, if and ollly if E(U(f) - U
I
+ Peter Pishbum (1970, pp. 1M,208-207) ADd I have .usee diIeoverea to my 8urpriae that tIleee postulates imply bounded utility, ..veraI paragraph. ill • Dew light.
wId_
pat. the ue.d
5.41
THf;
l'~XTEN~ION
0." UTII.ITY TO 1iORE G[t;NERAI. ACTS
81
I do not think, however, that the question is 8Ufficiently intereetiDg to warrant attention here, especially since there is some reaaon t first stated by Gabriel Cramer in 8. letter partially reproduced in [BIO), to postulate that there are upper and lower bounds to utility, in which cue all acta would necessarily be bounded. Even without P1, the postulates imply, in the following RnS8, that no gamble has infinite or minWi infinite utility. An act f has ifl.Jiniu (minU8 infinite) utility; if and only ifJ for some fI < (» h and for every f > 0, there is a B with PCB) S f and suoh that, the act equal to f on B and to g on ",B exceeds (is exceeded by) h.
A gamble or a coD8eQuence would be said to have infirtib! (mi,.U8 if&finiU) vliLily, if one of the acts correspondinS to it had infinite (minU8 infinite) utility. Indeed, Theorem 2.4, a deduction from Pl-6, ob\iously implies that there are no infinite or minus infinite gambles or consequenCe8. It may, however, be mentioned that Pascal held that, in just the aense at hand, salvation is an infinite consequence «P2), pp. 189-191). Again, it is often said, in etlect, that the utility to a pet'8OD of immediate death is a COIUlequenee of minus infinite utility, but ca8ual obsen-ation shows that this is not true of anyone-at least not of anyone who ,,·ould CJ'088 the street to greet a friend. In the same \?ein, medicine often gives lip aervice to the idea that the death of & patient is of minus infinite utility, and, of course, doctors do go to great lengths to keep their patients alive; but a doctor who took the idea too seriously would make a nui8&Dee of himaelf and soon find himaelf with no patients to treasure. H the utility of consequences is unbounded, lay from above. t then, even in the presence of Pl-7, acta (though not gambles) of infinite utility can easily be constructed. My personal feeling is that, theological questioos aside, there are DO acts of infinite or minua infinite utility, and that one might reasonably 80 postulate, which would amount to aanuning utility to be bounded. Justifiable though it might be, that aasumption would entail & certain mathematical awkwardness in many practical contexts. For ex.. ample. sa will be discu8&ed at greater length in Chapter 15, it sometimes _rna reuonable to auppoee that the penalty for acting as though a particular unknown number were 11 iDstead of its true value, 1', is proportional to jI -= (p - p)2. But, if the possible values of II are uDboUDded, then 80 are the possible valUe! of I, 80 utility is here taken to be unbounded. On close scrutiny of such an example one alway8 finds that
t That hi, ift for every V. there ia a eoneequenee J IUch that V
82
[5.6
UTILITY
it is Dot really reasonable to 888UDl8 the penalty even rouchlY propor· tional for large values of ''', but rather that larp values are 80 improbable that the error made in mjaappraiainl the penalty .BBOCiated "ith them is negligible compared to the saviDg in simplicity resultiDg from the misappraisal. If the 88SUmption of bounded utility were made part of the theory of pelSODal probability. then any example in whieh unbounded utility is used for mathematicallimplicity would be in CODtradiction to the postulates. I propose, therefore, Dot to assume bounded utility forma1ly, but to remember that problems involviDg unbounded
to"
utility are to be handled cautiously. To take stock of the chapter thus far, utility baviDg been established, it is DOW superfluous to cODlider that CODI8qUeDceI may be of all aorta, since the postulates imply that in virtually every context a consequence is adequately characterised by its utility, lOme one uti6ty function having been chosen from the linear family of p(aibBitiea. Therefore, unJeg the contrary is clearly indicated, /, " and " wiD henceforth mean not exactly coDBeQueneea in the BeD. used to date, but rather real numbel'8 measuring utility in unite to be called um... Correspondinaly, an act f will henceforth be understood to be a real-valued random variable. The entire theory of preference, at least for bounded acts, can now be summarized by the following rMum': R
f ~ C given B, if and only if PCB) == 0, or E(t -
II B) S o.
From DOW on, though not formulated as a postulate, it is to be 88SUDled without further quibbliDg that R holda, provided only that E(l) and BC6.) exiat and are finite; no attempt will be made to compare acta for which tbe expected value does not exist or is infinite. If a person is free to decide among a 88t F of acta, he Wl1. presumably chooee one the expectation of which is f1(F), where
(7)
,,(F) - aup E(f), 's)
provided that 8uch a one exists. This provision must be mentioned, even though a set F for which ,(F) == 00 will, by cODvention, not be considered to give rise to a valid decision problem; for, if F is infinite in number, there may be no act in F with expectation quite as great 88 v(F). Nonetheless, tI(") may, in a sense, be regarded as the value or utility of the set of acta P, as is discussed in the penultimate parqraph
of 16.5. I
Small worlds Allusion was made in the penUltimate paragraph of § 2.5 to the practical necessity of confining attention to, or i80latiDg, relatively simple
6.6]
SMALL WORLDS
83
situations ill almost all applicatioDS of the theory of decision developed in this book. As was mentioned there, I find it difficult to say with any completeness how such isolated situations are actually arrived at and justified. The purpose of the present section is to take some steps toward the 801ution of that problem or, at any rate, to set the problem forth as clearly as I can. This section, though important for a critical evaluation of the thesis of this book, is not essential to a cuual readinl. MakiDg an extreme idealisation, which has in principle guided the whole araument of this book thus far, a pel'8OD has only one decision to make in hia whole life. He must, namely, decide how to live, and this he mi,bt in principle do once and for all. Though many, like myself, have found the concept of overall decision stimulating, it is certainly highly unrealistic and in many contexts unwieldy. t Any claim to realism made by this book-or indeed by almost any theory of personal decision of which I know-is predicated on the idea that some of the individual decision situations into which actual people tend to subdivide the single grand decision do recapitulate in microcosm the mechanism of the idealized grand decision. One applieation of the theory of utility to overall decisioDB has, however, been attempted by Milton Friedman in [FII). The problem of this section is to say 88 clearly 88 pouible what con... stitutAWI a satisfactory isolated decision situation. The general method of attack I propose to follow, for "'ant of a better one, is to talk in terms of the grand situation-toDpe in cheek-and in those terms to &Daly. and discusa isolated decision situatioDS. I hope you \\ill be able to agree, as the diSCU88ion proceeds, that I do not lean too heavily on the concept of the grand decision situation. Consider a simple example. Jones is faced \\ith the decision \\iletber to buy a certain sedan for a thOU8&lld dollars, a certain convertible also for a thousand dollars, or to buy neither and continue carleea. The simplest &Dalysis, and the one pnera11y aBlDled, is that Jonee is deciding between three definite and sure enjoyments, that of the sedan, the convertible, or the thousand dollars. Chance and uncertainty are conaidered to have nothing to do with the situatioD. This simple analysis may well be appropriate in some contexts; however, it is not difficult to reeopjm that Jones moat in fact take account of many uncertain future poEibiHtiea in actually making his choice. The relative
t Umealilt.ic tbc'II.gb the eooeept i.e, it would be •
mletake, arising out of elliptical
p.....f&tion. to auppo8e that the CODcept predicatee the eboice of & oomplet. life-IODI poney by new-bom babiM. If a per80D eYer reaebed lUeh a level of maturity as to be able to make a lifelq choi08 for his life lrom that time on, be would then beoome a pencm to whom the CODcept could be literallJ applied.
UTILITY
(5.5
fragility of the convertible will be compeuated only if Jones's hope to
arrange & loug vacation in • warm and 8CeDic part of the country actually materialir.es; J ODes would not buy a car at aU if he thought it likely that he would immediately be faced by a financial emergency arising out of the sickness of hjmself or of some member of his family; be would be glad to put the money into a ear, or almost any durable goods, if be feared extensive inftation. This briDge out the fact that what are often thought of 88 COJUJeqUenC88 (that is, sure experiences of the deciding person) in isolated decision situatioDS typically are in reality highly uncertain. Indeed, in the final analysis, a coDBequenee is an idealization that can perhaps Dever be wen approximated. I th~ fore suggest that we must expect acta with actually uncertain CODlequenees to play the role of 8U~ COD8eQuences in typical isolated decision situations. Suppose DOW, to elaborate the example, that Jones is preaented with a choice between tickets in several different lotteries such that, whichever he chooeea and whatever tickets are drawn, he wiD win either nothing, the aedan, the convertible, or a thousand doUara. None of these four CODaeqUence8 not even "notbingu-i8 actually a sure consequence in the striet aense, &8 I think you will now undel'Btand. I propoee to analyze Jones's present decision situation in terms of a "small world." The more colloquial Greek word, mierocoem, will be reserved for a special kind of small world to be described later. To deaenbe the atate of the small world is to say which prize is assoei&ted with each of the tickets otJered to Jones. The small-world aet8 actually available to Jones are acceptance of one or another of the tickets. The generic small-world act is an arbitrary function taking as its value ODe of the four sm.a.U-world consequences according to which lJIDallworld state obtains. It will be noticed that the small-world states are in fact events in the grand world, that indeed they constitute a partition of the grand world. If there are an infinite number of small..,,·orld states, as indeed there must be, if the small world is to satisfy the postulates Pl-7, then the partide:. in question becomes an infinite partition. t Theee CODaideratioDl lead to the following technical definitions. Let the grand tDOrld 8 be, as always, a set with e1ementa ., ", •. -. The grtmd-t.r1orl4 ~, F may 88 well be taken to be & bounded
t Teclmica1 Dote: It is mathematicaUy more aenera1 ADd elepot Dot to mM.t that the ema1J world have stat. at, all, but rather to apeak of • apecUl e.... of enoUl .. emall-worldeventa.This class should be cloeed UDder eomplemeDta and &Dite UDioN. ID ~ UIe IIDaIl-world event., and thereby the small world ite&1f, coutmJte •
B001em IUbalpbra of the Boolea alpbra of the IraDd-world events.
5.S)
SMALL WORLDS
let of real numbers. The gran4-tDorid ad4 are then real-valued funetioo8 I, I. h, ...• The preference ordering between acts is determined by the conditiOD that f S I if and only if
E(f -I) SO,
(1)
where the expected value indicated in (1) is derived from a probability measure P characteristic of the grand world or, to be more exact, of the penon's attitude toward the grand world. The construction of a mall world S from the grand world 8 begiD8 with the partition of 8 into subsets, or ~ld . . . i, i ' t • • • (not necessarily finite in number). Throughout this technical discu88ion, it wiD be D.8C-!$8ary to bear in mind certain double interpretatiODB such 88 that I is both an element of S and a subset of S. Strictly speaking. a ~ltl ~ B in B is a collection of subsets of 8 and not itself a sublet of S. However, the union of all the elements of B, regarded &8 IUbaeta of 8, ill an event in 8; call it (B). The lImal) world, &8 I mean to define it, is determined Dot only by the definition of a state, but also by the definition of small-world consequences. A ~ld consequence is a grand-world act. A set 1 of grand-world acts, regarded as small-world CODaeqU8nC81, is thU8 part of the definition of any given small world. It will be mathematically simplest, ad coat little if anything in insight, to suppose that the elementa of II are finite in number. They will be denoted I, " " ... ; and, wheD the small-world consequence I is recognized a8 a grand-world act, 1(') will denote the grand-world coMeQuence of / at the grand-
world atate •. A 1Dlal1-world act I is, of course, a function from small-world states I to walLworld conaequences J. In this isolated technical discussion. we will bobble along with the notations J(') for the smalJ.world OOD8equeoC8 attached to. by I, and 1('; J) for the grand-world COMequence attached to·. by 1<.) recognized as a grand-world act. Each small\vorld act , gives rise to & unique grand-world act I, defined thw.: J(,) .. DII('; 1(.»,
(2)
where 1(_)
meaD8
th&t small-world state I of which the grand-world
state • is an element.
The' diatinction between I and I, like aome other diatinctiooa I have thoqht it worth while to make in the pneent complicated context, is perhaps pedantic. At any rate, it is to be undentood as part of the definition of a small world that f S I if ad 0Dly if f that is, in
s a,
·
~ ~~ view of (1), if and only if B(b ~ B(t). In tbi8 CODIlectiOD, it is UI8ful to note that
(3)
E(l) ==
l: E(111('(a»
f.' == I: , E(~ IJ(I(,»
-= £)P(J('(,» -= i)
.. £jP(j('('»
- I).
It may be advantageous to review (3), and thereby the whole technical definition of & small world, in terms of an example. A lDIalLworld act. typified by the purchase of a lottery ticket, amounts to acceptiDI the consequences of one of several ordinary grand-world acta accordiDc to which element of a partition does in fact obtain. For eumple, the participant in a lottery may drive away a car, lead away a goat, face a firing squad, or remain in the status quo, according to the terma of the lottery and aceordiDg to which ticket he hae in fact drawn. LettiDs the example of the lottery stand for the general aituatiOD, the expected utility of a lottery ticket can be computed by the partition formula (3.5.3) from the conditional expectation &8IOCiated with each ticket, which is what (3) does. It may fairly be .id that a lottery prize is not an act, but rather the opportunity to cbooee from a Dumber of acta. ThUl a cash prise puts its p088e88or in a position to choose amoDl many purcbaaea he could not otherwise aft'ord. I believe that analysis to be more nearly correct, but it is more complicated; and, if ODe thiDka of each set of acta made available by a lottery prise 88 repreaented by a best act of that eat, the more complicated analysis seems BUperfluous, at least in a first
attack. A small world is completely satisfactory for the use to which I mean to put it, if and only if it jtee1f satisfies the leVan postulates and leads to-more technically, agrers with--& probability P such that (4)
(or all (5)
PCB) - P([S»
B c S and baa a utility n such that rJ(])
::I
E(])
for all J I P. For the preeent context, call lOch a completely satisfactory small world a microcoam; if the small world aatiafiee the postulates, but does not neeessarily admit P 88 its probability nor rJ ... utality. call it a paeudo-micrOCOBm. To display the circumstances under which a small world is & pseudomicrocosm, I shall briefly comment on each of the postulates in the form given on the end papers of this book, referriDg to them here as
8.IJ
91-7,
SMALL WORLDS 88
87
opposed to Pl-7, to emphasise that they are here beine
COD-
sidered with respect to B and P.
PI
Simple ordfJrtng.
Automatieally.tis&ecl. Indeed it is directly implied by Pl.
112
CmuliIitmal pre/mmt'A wll deftn«l.
Automatic.
1'3
Conditional fn/erenu dou not effed ~.
Requires exactly that, for every J. &.
1S ,
b.
1& ~ , given (B),
giVeD
[SI,
,
I',
and! c S, either:
jf and only ill
< I, or
for every Ii, , e ,.
In these inequalities the e1ementa of , are of course interpreted as grand-world acts•
.P4
Qualit4li. peratmtJl probabilitr wll defined.
Requires exactly that, if 1 < , aDd hi S he, where 1&j(.) - ,
-I
far a I [B)
for I e ~{B] ·
(6) Ao(.) - ,
-/
for. «[C] for a I "'IC);
then Ia'i S h'c. where It'j and It'c are defined in terms of/',,,, I' < I', in aualogy with (6). This postulatB is automatic in case , has at moat two elements.
P6
TAl 1*"8Oft, b
ItnM
tkJimt. pre/~.
, for some J, , • ,. ParIWm 0/ tDOrlda into liny eventa.
Requiresl <
Ps
It is clear that this postulate is not automatic, that is, it is Dot implied by the validity of Pl-7 for the grand world. It is Dot eYeD implied by Pl-7 together with Pl-5, though in the presence of aU theae 1'6 could undoubtedly be weakened. There seems to be little to pin in the present context by reducing !S6 to such minimal termB, nor by expreaaiDg it, as tsl-5 have been expresaed, in gra.Dd-world terms alODe; for :P6 does Dot lend itself easily to such treatment, though it would be
(5.1
UTILrTY
88
easy to decide in any instance whether P6 obtained without undue reference to the grand world.
Pi
Strong form of BUre-thing principle.
Au tomatic, in view of the explicit assumption that F has only • finite number of elements. To summarize, a smaU world is a pseudo-microcosm, if and ODly if it satisfies Pa~" The possibility of enlarging an arbitrary small world in such a, way as to satisfy those conditions has already been implicitly discussed in connection with P3-6. To recall the arpmenta that were adduced, ODe might review the e.umple about the egg in 13.1, aDd the further diseU88ion of that example in the opening paragraph of § 3.2; the remark in § 3.2, introducing P5; and the example about the coin following P6' in § 3.3. I t is encouraging to poesese the arguments just, cited tending to ahow that any small world can without overwhelming difficulty be embedded in a somewhat larger small world that is a pseudo-microcosm. A pseudomicrocosm is, however, completely satisfactory, omy if it is actually a microcosm, that is, only if it leads to a probability measure and a utility well articulated with those of the grand world. The problem of deciding under what circumstances that oceurs is much facilitated by the fact that the probability measure and a utility of a pseudo-microcosm can be written do\vn explicitly, as the ne.~t fe\v paragraphs ahow. "ro study the problem, suppose the small world is a pseudo-microcosm. Then, in vie\v of 1'5, let I, Ii, be elements of , such that, < Ii, and let
(7)
Q(8) ==
E(h - DI (B)) p([BJ) DI E(1i, _ I)
== E-1(h - g)
r f1&(8) -
JIIJ
g(8) I dP(8).
By using P3 to check the positivity, it is easily verified that Q is a probability measure on B. The probability measure Q agrees \\ith the relation < between small-world events, which is easily verified on rewriting (3) for the special small-world act Ij that takes the value Ii for s ! Band g for i ! ""B thus: (8)
I
+ E(g I ",(BJ)p(~(B]) ,1 (B])p«(BJ) + 8(0) g)Q(B) + E(J).
E(lj) == Jt:(h [B])p«(B))
== l~'(ii = E(h -
a.11
S)IALL WORLDS
89
to CODatruet a probability me&81J.n! that acreea with the relation S between amaU-world events, but, in the preeenee of 151-6, aD of them mUit (in view of CorolJary 3.3.1) be the same 88 Q. That consideration leads to the formula Since , and , are esaentially arbitrary, there are many
E(] - /' ((BDP([B» == E(j - J')Q(IJ}
(9)
for 41l1t J'.' aDd
11 c B.
UIiDg (9) aDd recalling that. U(]) has been defined be rewritten tbus: (10)
way8
E(I) == B(I)
&8
+ ~ E(~ - "/('(8» == ~)P(](i(8»
E(]), (3) can
== Ii)
t
=
~ U<')Q(}(i) = ') .
•
The question whether a given peeudo-microe08lD is really a microcosm is the question whether Q(B) = P([S» and whether U is a utility for the pseudo-microcosm. The answer to the eecond part is immediate and, I t.bink, somewhat surprising, for (10) shows that for any peeudomierocoam U is indeed a utility. UDfortuDate1y, the condition Q(B) == p([B) is Dot also automatic. The po88ibility of its failing to be satisfied is illustrated by the following simple mathematical example. Let 8 be the uDit square 0 S %, r ~ 1, andJet
LL I
(11)
E(f) -
1
f(z, If) dz dlf·
It is of DO real moment that the integral in (11), jf undentood in the Lebelpe or Riemann 8eIl8e, is Dot defined for all bounded functi0D8. Let the elemeota of S be the vertical line segments, s - constant. FiDally, suppose that the elements of , consist of the funCtiOD sero and amy 6Dite number of non-negative multiples of a fixed positive functioD h - n,. It is easy to verify that S as t.hUl defined is a peeudo-mieroc08m aod that (12)
where (13)
Q(B)
-i,.s_
q(z') dz'
UTILITY
Unlelll q is 1 for every
Zl,
[6.&
which will Dot at all typically be the cue, B
is not really a microcosm.
The general conditioD that & peeudo-miC1Oeoem be a micfOCoam-i..e., that Q(B) == P«(B})-iB evidtmtly, in view of (9), (14)
E(] -
I' I [B)) :. E(J - J')
every B for which p([B]) > o. Incidenta.UYJ that condition alone practiea1ly implies that • ema1l world S, not nicea sarily assumed to be a pseudo-microcosm, is a real microcoam. More exactly. it implies all the postulates :P1-7, except P6; and it implies that the probability meaaure P agrees with the relation ~ between small-world events. Also, if a small world is a pseudo-microcosm, it is enough that (14) should hold for eorM pair of functiODl for which the for every
J. I' ., and
right-hand side of the equation does not vanish. Equation (14) is, however, UD8&tisfactory in that it Beema incapable of verification without taking the grand world much too aerloualy. Some cODBOlation may derive from the faet that if J and f are constants they automatically satisfy (14). Two such absolute, or puld-world, CODSequences would suffice, for, .. has just been remarked, it ;, aufIicient that (14) be satisfied for two materially different small-world COD88quence8, in the preeence of IS 1-7 (which are verifiable without any detailed knowledge of the grand world). It must, however, be admitted, &8 has already been mentioned, that the very idea of a grandworld consequence takes the grand ,,·orld pretty aerioualy-a point forced into my reluctant mind by a conversation with Francesco Bram-
billa. I feel, if 1 may be allowed to say 50, that the poesibility of beiDl taken in by a pseudo-microcosm that is Dot a real miorocosm is remote, but the difficulty I find in defining an operationally applicable criterion is, to say the least, ground for caution. There certainly seem to be C88e8 in which one could confidently &Bsume (14), though thU8 far formal analysis of the source of such ... eurity eseapea me. CODSider, for example. a lottery in which numbel'ed tickets are dral'ln from a drum. It seems clear that for an ordinary person the outcome of the lottery is utterly irrelevant to his life, except through the rules of the lottery itself. In other terms equally 10088. the value of a thousand dollars, or of & car, to a person would not ordinarily depend at all OD what numbers were drawn in a lottery, unle88 the person himself (or perhaps some other person or organization with whom he had some degree of contact) held ticket8 in the lottery. A more precise fonnulation, which does indeed imply (14), is that the events that represent the outcome of the lottery are all statistically
1.8)
IDSTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON UTILITY
91 -
independent of the grand-world &COl, or functions, that typically enter 81 prbres in a lottery. This suggests once more that it would be desirable, if poaaible, to find a simple qualitative personal description of independence between events. (Compare the first paragraph after (3.5.2).) 6 IDItorica1 and critical comments on utility A casual historical sketch of the concept of utility v.ill perhapa have some interest as history. At any rate, most of the critical ideas pertaiDiDg to utility that I wish to discu. find their plaeee in such a sketch as cODveniently 88 in any other organization I can devise. Much more detailed material on the history of utility, especially in 80 far 88 the economics of risk bearing is concerned, is to be found in Arrow's review article (A6]. Stiper's historical study [818] empbasir.ee the history of the now almost obsolete eeonomic notion of utility in riskless aituationa, a notion still sometimes confused with the one under discussion. Aa was mentioned in § 4.5, the earliest mathematical studies of probability were 1argely concemed ?tith gambling, particularly with the questioD of wbich of several available cash gambles is most advanta.geous. Early probabilists advanced the maxim that the gamble with the highest expected ,,·inninga is best or, in tel"lDl of utilityr that wealth measured in caah is a utility function. Some sense can be seen in that maxim, which will here be caned by its traditional though misleading name, the prindple of mathematical upectatiOD. First, it has of~n been argued that the principle fonows for the long run from the weak law of large numbers, applied to large numbers of independent bets, in each of which only sums that the gambler considers smal) are to be won or lost. Second, Daniel Bernoulli, who, in [BIO], was one of the &rat to introduce a general idea of utility corresponding to that developed in the preeediDg three sections, made the fonowing analysis of the principle, which justifies its application in limited but important contexts. If the eonaequences / to be considered are all quantities of cash, it is reasonable to auppose that UU) will change amoothly with ebaDge8 in J. Therefore, if a person's present wealth is /0, and he contemplates various pmbles, nODe of which can greatly change his wealth, the utility function can, for his particular purpose, be approximated by its tanpnt at /0, that is, (I)
a linear function
UCJ>
~
U(fo)
+U-
/o)U'Uo),
of J. Since a coDBtant term is irrelevant to any com-
parison of expected values, the approximation amounts to reprding utility u proportional to wealth, that is, to following the principle of
UTILITY
15.8
mathematical expectation. 80 far 88 I know, the oaly other &I'JUDlent for the principle ibat bu ever been advanced is one cODceminc equity between two players. AI Bernoulli lAye, that &I'JUDlent is irre1evaDt at beat; and neither of the relevant &I'JUDlenta justifies eatecoria1 accept.. ance of the principle. None the lesa, the principle was at first eo categorically accepted that it aeemed paradoD~ to mathematicians of the early eighteenth century that presumably prudent iDdividuala reject. the principle in certain real and hypothetical decision situati0D8. Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782), in the paper (BIO), seems to have beeD the first to point out that the principle is at best & rule of thumb, and he there augested th. maximi.tion of expected utBity 88 a more valid principle. Daniel Bernoulli'. paper reproduces portioas of • Jet,ter from Gabriel Cramer to Nicholas Bemoulli, which establishes Cramer's chrono1ogical priority to the idea of utl1ity aDd most of the other main ideu of Bernoulli'8 paper. But it is Bernoulli'. formulatioa. topther with some of the ideaa that were epecifica1ly his that became popular and have had widespread in8UeDC8 to the PJ'8l8l1t day. It is therefore appropriate to review Bernoulli'. paper in BODle detail.. Being unable to read Latin, I follow the German edition [BIll. Bernoulli begi n 8 by reminding his readers that the principle of mathematical expectation, though but weakly supported, had theretofore dominated the theory of behavior in the face of uncertainty. He_ys that, though many &I'JUDlenta had been pven for the principle, they were all based on the irrelevant idea of equity aJDODI players. It hard to believe that he had never heard the arpment juatifying the principle for the long run, even though the weak law of Iarp numbenl was then only in its mathematical inf&DOY. An Ctmjet:ltmdi lB12]. then a fairly up-to-date and most eminent treatise on probability, does seem to give only the argument about equity, and that in countleaa f0nD8. This treatise by Daniel's uncle, Jacob (- James) Bernoulli (16M-17M), incidentally, contains the first ma.tbematical advance toward the weak law, proving it for the special ease of repeated trial•. Many examples show that the principle of mathematical expectation is not univetally applicable. Dauiel BernouDi promptly presents one: "To justify these remarks, Jet us suppose & pauper happens to acquire a lottery ticket by which he may with equal probability win either nothing or 20,000 ducats. Will he have to evaluate the worth of the ticket as 10,000 dueata; and would he be acting foolishly, if he sold it for 9,000 ducats? " Other examples occur later in the paper as iUustratiODS of the u. of the utility concept. Thus a prudent merchant may iJl8Ul"e hie abip apb18t 1011 at 88&, though he undentaDda perfectly wen that he •
18.,.
6.61
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON UTILITY
93
thereby increasing the iDaurance company's expected wealth, and to the same extent decreasing his own. Such behavior is in flagrant violation of the principle of mathematical expectation, and to one who held tbat principle categorically it would be 88 absurd to insure &8 to throw money away outright. But the principle is neither obvious nor deduced from other principles regarded 88 obvious; 80 it may be cbaJ1enpd, ami must be, becaU8e everyone agrees that it ill Dot really iD8AI)e to •
1D8lIle.
Bernoulli cites a third, now very famoU8, example illustratinl that lDeIl of prudence do Dot invariably obey the principle of mathematical expectation. This example, known 88 the St. Petersburg paradox {because of the journal in which Bernoulli's paper W88 published) bad earlier been publicized by Nicholas Bernoulli, t and DaDjel acknowledges it as the stimulus that led to his investigation of utility. Suppoee, to state the St. Petersburg paradox succinctly, that a per80D could choose between an act leaving his wealth fixed at ita present magnitude or one that would change his wealth at random, increuiDg it by (2- - f) dollars with probability 2-- for every positive integer fl. No matter how Iarp the admission fee I may be, the expected income of the random act is infinite, as may easily be verified. Therefore, accordinc to the principle of mathematical expectation, the random act is to be preferred to the status quo. Numeriea1 e.YRmplee, however, lOOn convince any sincere persoD that he would prefer the status quo if f is at all large. If f is 8128, for example, there is only 1 chance in 64 that a persoD choosing the J'8Ddom act wiD 80 much as break even, and be will othenviae loee at least 164, a jeopardy for which be can seek compeDl&tion only in the prodigiously improbable winnjng of a prodigiouSly high prize. Appealing to intuition, Bernoulli says that the cash value of a pereon's wealth is not its true, or moral, worth to him. Thus, according to Bemoulli, the dollar that might be precious to a pauper would be nearly worthless to & millionaire-or, better, to the pauper himae1f were he to become a millionaire. Bernoulli then postulates that people do seek to maximise the expected value of moraJ worth, or what has been ealled moral expectation. Operationally, the moral worth of a penon'. wealth, 80 far as it con· cerna behavior in the face of uncertainty, is just what I would call the utility of the wealth, and moral expectation is expectation of utility. t Damel refers to thia Nicbol.. Bernoulli u his uncle, but, in view of dates meD~ tiooed ill the last eemOll of Daniel'. paper aDd the pnea10Cf in ChapW 8 of (891. I think he must have mean\ his elder couin (1687-1759), perhaps "unclet . . . • term of deference.
-rIC
[1.1
UT1LlTY
It aeema mystical, however, to talk about moral worth apart from probability and, having done so, doubly mystical to postulate tha.t this undefined quantity aerv.. aa a utility.. Theee obvioua criticisms have naturally led many to diacredit the very idea of utility, but 112-4: ahow (rollowing von Nenmann and MorpD8tem) that there ia a more copnt, though Dot altopther unobjectionable, path to that concept. BemouDi argued, elaborating the eDJDP1e of the pauper and the millionaire, that a fixed increment of cash wealth typically reaulte in an ever amaDer increment of moral wealth ae the basic caeh wealth to which the increment applies is increaaed. He admitted the potIIibility of examplea in which this Jaw of cUmfnitbtnc IIW'IiuI utility, as it baa come to be eaDed iD the literature of economica, might fail For example, a relatively amall sum might be precious to a wealthy priIoDer who required it to complete his raoaom. But Bernoulli iD8isted that lOch examples are unusual and that aa a general rule the law may be aaaumed. In mathematieal terms, the law .y. that utility 81 a IUDetion of money is a concave (i.e., the negative of a convex) function. t It fonows from the basic inequality eoncemiDg CODvex functiODB (Theorem 1 of Appeodix 2) that a peraoD to whom the law of dimiDWriq marginal utility applies wiD always prefer the status quo to any fair gamble, that is, to any random act for which the change in hie expected wealth is sero, and that be will always be wilIiDg to pay eometbina in addition to ita actuarial, or expected, value for izunJranoe &pinlt any 1088 to himaelf. The Jaw of diminishing marzinal utility has been very popular. and few who have conaidered utility.mee Bernoulli have diecarded it, or even realised that it was not neceaaarily part and parcel of the utility idea. Of course, the law baa beeD embraced eaprly and uDcritically by those who have a moral aversion to gambling. Bernoulli went further than the law of diminishing marginal utnity and augested that the slope of utility as a fUDction of wealth migbt, at least 88 a rule of thumb, be suppoeed, not only to decrease with, but to be invenely proportional to, the cub value of wealth. This, he pointed out, is equivalent to postulating that utility is equal to the logarithm (to any base) of the cub value of wealth. To this day, DO other function bas been sugeated 88 a better prototype for Everyman'. utility function. NODe the Ieee, 88 Cramer poiDtai out in hie aforementioned letter, the logarithm bas a serious disadVADtaPi for, if the loprithm were the utility of wealth, the St. Petenbtlrl paradox could be
t Often the meaninp of "convex" and "concave" as applied
to
IUDCtiODa ....
iIl-
t«ebaDp:i. A function ill here eaIled CODVex if it appean convex, in the orcIiaaI7 .... 01 the word, when viewed from below. Such a function is, of COUlII, &Ieo . .cave from above, whence the eoDfuaion. Appendix 2.
a.
1.1)
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON UTILITY
86
amended to produce a random act with an infinite expectAd utility (i.e., an infinite expected logarithm of income) that, again, DO ODe would really prefer to the status quo. To take a less elaborate example, suppose that a man's total wealth, including an appraisal of hill futuN eamiDg power, were a million dollars. If the logarithm of wealth were actually his utility, he would 88 soon as not flip & coin to decide whether his wealth should be changed to ten thousand dol1are-roughly tsoo per year-or & hundred million doll&r8. Thia aeeml prepost«0U8 to me. At any rate, I am sure you can construct an example alone the eme lines that will seem preposterous to you. Cramer therefore c0ncluded, and I think rightly, that the utility of cash must be bounded, at least from above. It seems to me that a good argument caD also be adduced for supposing utility to be bounded from below, for, however wealth may be interpreted, we all subject our total wealth to slight jeopardy daily for the sake of a large probability of avoiding more moderate 1088e8. But the logarithm is unbounded both from above and from below; so, though it might be a reaaona.ble approximation to a peI8OD'. utility in a moderate range of wealth, it cannot be taken .riously over extreme ranges. Bernoulli'. idesa were aeeepted wholeheartedly by Laplace [LII, who W88 very enthusiastic about the applieatiODS of probability to alllOl'tl of decision problems. It i8 my casual impresaion, however, that from the time of Laplace until quite recently the idea of utility did not strongly influence either mathematical or practical probabiliats. For a 10Dl period economists accepted Bernoulli'. idea of moral wealth as the measurement of a person'. well-being apart from any coDlideratioD of probability. Though "utility" rather than "moral worth" baa been the popular name for this concept &mODI EnglishspeakiDg economists, it is my impression that Bemoulli's paper is the prineipal, if not the BOle, aource of the notion for all economiata, though the paper itae1.f may often have been 100 sight of. Economiats were for a time enthuaiaatic about the principle of diminishing marginal utility, and tbq saw what they believed to be reSections of it in maDY aspect. of everyday life. Why eIae, to paraphrase Alfred Marshall 0(pp. 19, 96 of [M2]), does a poor man walk in a rain that induces a rich man to take a cab? DuriDg the period when the probability-Ieee idea of utility wsa popular with economists, they referred not only to the utility of money, but also to the utility of other eonaequencea such &9 commodities (and services) and combinations (or, better, patterns of consumption) of commodities. The theory of choice among cOD8equenees was expn: Mad by the idea that, &mODI the available consequences, a persoD prefers those
UTILITY
[1.8
that have the highest utility for him. Also, the idea of diminiabiDI marginal utility was extended from money to other commoditiee. The probability-less idea of utility in economica has been completely discredited in the eyes of almost all economists, the fonowing argument against it-originally advanced by Pareto in pp. 158-159 and the Mathematical Appendix of [Pl]-being widely accepted. If utility is regarded as controlling only consequences, rather than acta, it is not true-a.s it is when acta. or at least gambles, are coDBidered and the formal definition in § 3, is applied-tbat utility is determined exeept for a linear transfonnation. Indeed, confining attention to CODJJequences, any strictly mODotonically increasing function of one utility is another utility. Under these circumstances there is little, if any, value in talking about utility at all, unless, of course, special economic cousideratioDS should render one utility, or say a linear family of utilities, of partieu1ar interest. That possibility remalDS academic to date, though one attempt to exploit it was made by Irving Filber, 88 i8 briefly discussed in the paragraph leading to Footnote 155 of [818J. In particular, utility as a function of wealth can have any shape whatsoever in the probability-less context, provided only that the function in qUe&tion is increasing with increasing wealth, the provision following from the casual observation that almost nobody throws money away. The history of probability-less utility has been thoroughly reported by Stigler [SI8]. What, then, becomes of the intuitive arguments that led to the notion of diminishing marginal utility? To illustrate, cOD8ider the poor man and the rich man in the rain. Those of us who consider diminishing marginal utility nonseDSical in thi8 context think it sufficient to say simply that it is a common observation that rich men spend mODey freely to avoid moderate physical suffering whereas poor men sutler freely rather than make corresponding expenditures of money; in other terms, that the rate of exchange between circumstances producing physical discomfort and money depends OD the wealth of the person involved. In recent years there has been revived interest in Bernoulli's ideas of utility in the technical sense of §§ 2-4, that is, 88 a function tbat, 80 to apeak, controls decisions among acts, or at least pmbles. Ramsey's essays in (RIl, which in spirit closely resemble the first five chapters of this book, present a relatively early example of this revival of interest. Ramsey improves on Bernoulli in that he defines utility operationally in terms of the behavior of a person constrained by certain postulates. rtam.sey's essays, though now much appreciated, seem to have had relatively little influence. Between the time of Ramsey and that of von Neumann and MorgeD-
5.61
HISTORlCAli AND CRITICAl..
CO~f~IE~~
ON UTILITY
ftI
stern there was interest in breaking away from tbe idea of maximisi", expected utility, at least 80 far 88 economic theory was concerned (cf. [Tla]). This t.rend w88supported by thoae who said that Bemoulli gives DO reaeon for supposing that preferences correspond to the apected
value of some function, and that therefore much more general poI8ibilities must be considered. Why should not the range, the variance, and the skeWDeM, not to mention countlea other features, of the distribution of lOme function join with the expected value in determining preference? The question was anawered by the construction of Ramsey and again by that of von Neumann and Morgenstern, which baa been atiahtlyextended in 1,2-4; it is limply a mathem atiea1 faet that, almost any theory of probability haling been adopted and the sure-thing principle having been suitably extended, the existence of a function whose expected value controls choices can be deduced. That does Dot mean tbat as a theory of actual economic behavior the theory of utility is abeolutely established and cannot be overthrown. Quite the contrary, it is a theory that makes factual predictions many of which can easily be observed to be false, but the theory may have some value in making economic predictions in certain contexte where the departures from it bappen not to be devastating. Moreover, &8 I have been arguingt it may have value as 8 normative theory. Von NenmanD and Morgenstern initiated amoQg economists and, to a lesser extent, also among statistieians an intense revival of interest in the technical utility concept by their treatment of utility, which appea.t'8 as a digression in [V4]. The von N eumann-Morgenatern theory of utility has produced this reaction, because it gives strong intuitive grounds for aeeeptiDg the Bemoullian utility hypothesis as a eonsequenee- of well-aceepted maxima of behavior. To give readers of this book some idea of the von Neumann-lforgenstem theory, I may repeat that the treatment of utility &8 applied to pmbles presented in § 3 is virtually copied from their book [V4). Indeed, their ideas on this subject are responsible for almoet all of my own. One idea now held by me that I think von N.eumann
and l\lorgenstern do not explicitly support, and that 10 far as I know they might not wish to hal"e attributed to them, is the nonnative interpretation of the theory.
Of course, much
ot the new interest in utility takes the form of criti-
cism and controversy. The greater part of this diScuS9ion that baa come to my attention has not yet been published. A list of references leading to most of that which has is [B7], [W14], [81], [04], (F13], [A2J. I shall successively discuss each of the recent major criticisms of the modern theory. of utility known to me. My method in each cue will
(6.8
UTILITY
be first to state the criticism in a form rarembliDl those in which it is typically put forward, regardless of whether I eonaider that form well chosen. I \\ill then discuss the criticism, elaborating its meaning and indicating its rebuttal, when there seems to me to be one. (a) Modem economic theorists have rigorously shown that there is no meaningful measure of utility. More specifically, if any function U fulfills the role of a utility. then 80 does any striotly monotomealJy illereasing function of U. I t must, therefore, be an error to conclude that every utility is a linear function of every other. This argument bas been advanced with a aeriousneaa that is surprising, considering tbat it concedes little intelligence or leaming to the proponents of the utility theory under diseussiun and eonaidering tbat it results, 88 will immediately be explained, from the baldest sort of a terminological confusion. To be fair, I must go on to 8&y that I have never known the argument to be defended long in the preaence of the expJauation I am about to give. In ordinary economic usage, especially prior to the work of von Neumann and Morpnatem, a utility associated v..ith gambles would pre8umably be simply a function U associating numbers with gambles in such a way that , ~ fI, if and only if U(I) ~ U(g); though economic discussion of utility was, prior to von Neumann and Morgenstern, almost exclusively confined to consequences rather than to gambles or to acts. It ia unequivocaUy true, as I have already brought out, that any monotonic function of a utility in this wide classical sense is itBe1f a utility. "nat von Neumann and ?\.lo1"geostem have mown, and what has been recapitulated in § 3, is that, granting certain hypotheeea, there exists at least one classical utility V satisfying the very 8pecial condition
(2)
V(cJ
+ (jt)
:s
aV(1)
+ tJV(g),
where , and ., are any gambles and a, fJ are nOD-negative numbers such that CI fJ = 1. Furthermore, if I may for the moment call a cl88frical utility satisfying (2) a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, every von Neumann..?forgenstem utility is an increasing linear function of every other. To put the point ditTerently, the essential conclusion of the von N'eumann-~{ol'len8tem utility theory is that (2) can be satisfied by a classical utility, but not by very many. The eoDlusion arises only because von Neumann and ~forgenstem use the already pre-empted word "utility" for what I here call "von Neumann-MorgeDStem utility." In retrospect, that seems to have been a mistake in tactica, but ODe of no long-range importanee.
+
1.6]
HISTORICAL
~~D
CRITICAL
CO:M~IE..'\TT8
ON UTILITY
99
(b) The postulates leading to the von Neumann-Morgenstern concept of utility are arbitrary and gratuitous. Such a view can, of COW'8e, always be held without the slightest fear of rigorous refutation, but a critic holding it might perhaps be persuaded away from it by a reformulation of the postulates that he might find more appealing than the original set, or by illuminating examples. 1D particular, Pl-7 are quite different from, but imply, the postulates of von Neumann and :ltforgenstem. Incidentally, the main function of the von Neumann-llorgenstem postulates themselves is to put the e&I8Iltial content of Daniel Bernoulli's "postulateU int.o a fonn that is lesa gratuitous in appearance. At least one serious critic, who had at first found the system. of von Neumann and ~forgenstem gratuitoU8, chaDpd his mind 'when the poesibUity of deriving certain aspects of tbat sy&tem from the sure-thing principle was pointed out to him. (c) The sure-thing principle goes too far. For example, if two lo~ teries with cash priles (not necessarily positive) are based on tbe same Bet of lottery tickets and 80 arranged that the prize that will be asaigned to any ticket by the second lottery is at least &8 great as the prize a&signed to that ticket by the first lottery, then there is no doubt that virtually any person would find a ticket in the first lottery Dot preferable to the 8&tDe ticket in the second lottery. II, however, the pri&es in each lottery are themselves lottery tickets, such that the prize aasociated with any ticket in the first lottery is not preferred by the person under study to the prise aaaociaf4d with the same ticket by the eeeond lottery, the cODclusion that the person will Dot prefer a ticket in the first lottery t.o the same ticket in the second is no longer compelling. This point resembles the preceding one in that the intuitive appeal of an &8SUmption can at most be indicated, not proved. I do think it cogent, however, to stress in connection with this particular point that a cash pme is to a large extent a lottery ticket in that the uncertainty 88 to what will become of 8 person if he baa a gift of a thousand dollars is not in principle ditTerent from the uncertainty about what will J>e. come of him if he holds a lottery ticket of considerable actuarial value. Perhaps an adherent to the eriticism in question would think it relevant to reply thus: Though cash sums are indeed essentially lot~ry tickets, & sum of money is worth at least &8 much to a person as a. smaller IWD, in a peculiarly definite and objective 88D8e, because money can,. if one desires, always be quickly and quietly thrown away, thereby making any sum available to a pe1150n who already has a larger sum.
But I have never heard that reply made, nor do I here plead ita cogency.
UTILITY
100
16.8
(d) An actual syafaIlatie deviation from the 8ure-thing principle and, with it, from the von Neumazm-MotpDStern theory of utility, can be exhibited.. For example, a pel'8OIl might perfectly reasonably prefer to IUbsist on a packet of Army K ratioDl per meal than on two OUIlces of the best caviar per meal. It is then to be expected, according to the aure-tbiDI principle, that the perIOD would prefer the K rations to a lottery ticket yielding the K rationa with probability 9/10 and tbe caviar diet with probability 1/10. That expectation is no doubt lulfi11ed, if the lottsy is underatood to determine the peIBOn'a year-long diet once and for aIL But, if the perIOD iI able to have a.t each meal a lottery ticket offeriDc him the K rauODI or the caviar with the indicated probabilities, it is Dot at all unlikely, panting that he Iikea caviar and baa 8OlDeltorage facilities, that he wiD prefer this "lottery diet." This conclusion is in de6uce of the principle tha~ "the theory of coDlUmer demand is. static theory." (Cf. [WI4].)
I admit that the theory of utility is not atatic in the indicated aeD8e, .. the foregoiDa example coocluaively shows. But there is not the eligbtest reaaDn to tbjDk of a lottery producmg either a steady diet of caviar or & steady diet of K ratiODS 18 heiDI the same lottery 18 one having a multitude of different prizes almost all of which are mixed chronological programs of caviar and K rations. The fact that a theory of CODsumer behavior in riskless situations happeua to be static in the required IeD88 (under eertain 8pecial &88UIDptioD8 about storability and the linearity of pricea) is DO argument at all that the theory of eODSUDler behavior in risky circumatances should be static in the same 1eD88 (as I mentioD in a note appended to [W14]). (e) If the von NeumaDn-Morgenstern theory of utility is not static, it is Dot subject to repeated empirical observation and is therefore
vacuous.
(Cf. [W14J.)
I think the diacU88ion in 13.1 of how to determine the pref'erenceB of a hot man for a. swim, a shower, and a glass of beer, and the disoussion in § 5 of the practicality of identifying pseudo-microcosms are steps toward showing how the theory can be put to empirical test without making repeated trials on any one pel'8OD. (f) Casual observation shOWI that real people frequently and ftagrantly behave in di••ccord with the utility theory, aDd that in fact behavior of that. 8OI't ill DOt. at all typically considered abnormal or ir-
rationaL
Two different topiea call for discussion under this heading. In the first place, it is undoubtedly true that the behavior of people doee often
6.6)
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAl.. CO!\fl\fENTS
O~
UTILITY
101
ftqrantly depart from the theory. None the leas, all the world knows from the leaaona of modem physics that a theory is not to be altogether rejected because it is Dot absolutely true. I t seems not unreasonable to auppoee, and examples could easily be cited to confirm, that in the extremely eomplicated subject of the behavior of people very crude theory eaD playa useful role in certain contexts. Second, many apparent exceptions to the theory can be so reinterpreted 88 not to be exceptiODB at all. For eumple, a flier may be observed doing a stUDt that risks his life, apparently for nothing. That seen.' to be in complete violation of the theory; but, if in addition it is known that the flier has a real and practical Deed to CODvince certain colleapes of his courage, then he is simply paying for advertising with the risk of his life, which i8 not in itaelf in contradiction to the theory. Or, IUppoee that it were mown more or less objectively tbat the flier baa a need to demonstrate his own courage to himaelf. The theory would again be reecued, but this time perhaps not 80 convincingly ae before. In general, the reinterpretation needed to reconcile various 10$ of behavior with the utility theory is sometimes quite acceptable and sometimes 80 strained 88 to lay whoever propoees it open to the charae of trying to save the theory by rendering it tautological The ••me 80rt of thing arises in connection with many theories, and I think there is pneral agreement that DO hard-and-f88t rule can be laid down .. to when it becomes inappropriate to make the necessary reinterpretation. FOl" example, the law of the conaervation of energy (or jt. atomic ap variant, the law of the conservation of mass and eneflY) owee it. 8UCee88 largely to ita being an expreasion of remarkable and reliable facta of nature, but to some extent &lao to certain conventions by which new sorta of energy are 80 defined as to keep the law true. A stimulating discussion of this delicate point in connection with the theory of utility is given by Samuelson in [81]. (s) Introspection about certain hypothetical decjaioD situations 1Ugpate that the sure-thing pnnciple and, l\ith it, the theory of utility are DOl'ID&tiVely Ull88.tisfactory. Consider an example based on two decision aituatioDi each involving two gambles. f
Situation 1. Choose between Gamble 1. 1500,000 with probability 1; and Gamble 2. t2,500,OOO with probability 0.1, tsOO,OOO with probability 0.89, status quo with probability 0.01.
t T1IiI partieuJar example is due to Allaia (A2). ADother late......... namp1e .... pi lIaW . . . .ha, earlier by Geo'a- Moria' lC4}.
UTILITY
102
11.1
Situation 2. Choose between Gamble 3.
t5OO,OOO with probability 0.11, status quo with probability 0.89; and
Gamble 4. e2,SOO,OOO with probability 041, status quo with probability 0.9. Many people prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2, becauae, spealdDI qualitatively, they do Dot find the chance of winning a wry large fortune in place of receiving a large fortune outright adequate CODlpeos&tiOD for even a small risk of being left in the statua quo. Many of the .me people prefer Gamble 4 to Gamble 3; beca.U8e, speaking qualitatively, the chance of winning is nearly the same in both gambles, 80 the one with the much larger prise seems preferable. But the intuitively aoceptable pair of preferencee, Gamble 1 preferred to Gamble 2 and GambJe 4 to Gamble 3, ia.Dot compatible with the utility concept or, equivalently, the sure-thing principle. Indeed that pair of preferences impUee the following inequalities for any hypothetical utility function. U (t500,OOO)
> O.IU (12,500,000) + 0.S9U (t500,OOO) + O.lU (to),
(3) 0.1 U ('2,500,000)
+ O.9U (eo) > 0.11 U (t500,OOO) + 0.89U (to);
and these are obviously incompatible.
Examples t like the ODe cited do have a strong intuitive appeal; eveD if you do not peraonally feel a tendency to prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 and simultaneously Gamble 4 to Gamble 3, I think that a few trials with other prizes and probabilities will provide you with an example appropriate to yourself. H, a.ftB thorough deliberation, anyone maintains a pair of distinct preferences that are in conflict with the sure-tbin, principle, he must abandon, or modify, the principle; for that kind of discrepancy seems intolerable in a normative theory. Analogous circumstances foreed D. Bernoulli to abandon the theory of mathematical expectation for that of utility [BIO). In general, a pe1'8On who has tentatively accepted a normative theory must conscientiously study aituatiODB in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he must decide for each by reflection -deduction will typically be of little relevance-whether to retain hie initial impresaion of the situation or to accept the impllcatiooa of the theory for it. To illustrate, let me record my own reactions to the example with
t ADaia baa aDDOUDeed (but Dot yet. pubUahed) reapoue8 of
an empirical InveetiptioD of the
prudent, eduea" people to mch eDlDpIee (At].
5.6J
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
OOMME~"TS
ON trrILITY
103
which tbia heading waa introduced. When the two situatiODS were 6nt presented, I immediately expre.ed preference for Gamble 1 18 opposed to Gamble 2 aDd for Gamble 4 as opposed to Gamble 3, and I still feel an intuitive attraction to those preferences. But I have since accepted the following way of looking at the two eituatiOll8, which amounts to repeated use of the sure-thing principle. One way in which Gambles 1-4 could be realised is by a lottery with a hundred numbered tickets and with prizes according to the schedule shown in Table 1. TABLB
1.
PRlZU IN UNIT8
or el00,OOO
GAMBI&6
1
Situatio 1 Gamble 1
tGamble 2
6 0
S· tuatio 2 {Gamble 3 1 D Gamble 4
5 0
D
IN A LarJ'EBT UALlIIMO
1-4
Ticket Number 2-11 12-100 6
6
25
5
5
0 0
25
Now, if one of the tickets numbered from 12 through 100 is drawn, it will not matter, in either situation, which gamble I chooee. I therefore focUII on the poasibility that one of the ticketa numbered from 1 tJuooch 11 will be drawn, in which cue Situations 1 aDd 2 are exactly parallel. The subsidiary decision depends in both situations on whether I would eeD aD outright gift of esoo,ooo for a 10-to-l chance to win 12,500,000a conclusion that I think has a claim to univeraality, or objectivity. Finally, consulting my pme1y personal taste, I find that I would prefer the gift of 8500,000 and, accordingly, that I prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 and (contrary to my initial reaction) Gamble 3 to Gamble 4. It IeEms to me that in reversing my preference between Gambles 3 and 4: I have corrected an elTOr. There is, of courae, an important senae in which preferences, being entirely subjective, cannot be in error; but in a different, more subtle sense they can be. Let me illustrate by a
simple example containjng no reference to uncertainty. A man buying a ear for a,134.56 is tempted to order it with a radio installedJ whiah will bring tbe total price to 12,228.41, feeliDg that the difference is trifliDg. But, when he reflects that, if he already had the ear, he certainly would not spend t93.85 for a radio for it, he realicea that he baa made an elTOr.
One thing that mould be mentioned before this chapter is closed is that the law of diminiabiDI JD8lIinal utility playa DO fundamental role
104
UTILITY
16.6
in the von Neumann-MorpDltem theory of utility, viewed either empirically or normatively. Therefore the pOl8ibUity is left open that utility as a function of wealth may not be concave, at leBA in IOIDe in-
tervals of wealth. Some economic-theoretical CODBequences of 1'eCOInition of the possibility of non-concave eegn1eote of the utility function have been worked out by Friedman and myaeJf (F121, and by Friedman alone [FlII. The work of Fri«Jman aDd myeeIf OD this point is eriticized by Markowitz (MIJ.+
+ See &JIO Anhibald (1959) aDd HWD880D (1970).
CHAPTER
6
Observation 1 Introdactlon With the constroction of utility, the theory of declaion in the face of uncertainty is, in a aeD88, complete. I have DO further postulates to propoee, and those I have proposed have been ahown to be equiva.lent to the aasumption that the person always decides in favor of an act the expected utility of which is as large as poEble, auPposiDI for simplicity that only a finite number of acta are open to him. At the level of generality that has led to this conclusion there seems to be little or nothing left to .y. To go further now meaDS to 10 into more detail, to investigate special types of decision problema. One type of decision problem of central importance is that in which the pel80ll iB called upon to make an observation and then to choose some act in the light of the outcome of the observation. The consideration of such observational decision problema is a step toward thoee problems of great interest for statistics in which the perBOn must decide what observation to make, that is, of coone, what to look at, not what to see. Tbey are the problems of designing experiments and other observational programs. Some remarks on observation were made in Chapter 3, but only DOW that the theory of utility is established is it poEble to give a relatively complete analysis of the concept. Observation is a concept esaential to the study of statistics proper, most of what has been said thus far being preliminary to, but Dot really part of, 8tatistit~; even after this chapter and the next one, on observation, there will still remain a major transition. One important feature of mud. uf wbat is ordinarily called statistics is, according to my analysis, concerned \lith the behavior not of an isolated peraoD, but of a group of pel'8OD8 acting, for example, in concert. ID later chapters I will deal, 80 far as I am able, with the problem group action, but preliminary considerations bearing on it will be made and pointed out from time to time in this chapter and the next. Though the details of these two cbaptel'8 may eeem mathematically forbiddinlt drastie simpIifyiDI &88umptioDa are made in them to keep
or
105
108
OBSERVATION
(8.2
extraneous difficulties to a minjmum. These typically take the form of assuming that certain seta of ads, events, and values of random varia. bles are finite. Even in elementary applications of the theory, theae simplifying assumptions seldom actually hold. In some contexta, it is quite elementary to relax them sufficiently; in others, serious mathematical effort has been required; and aome are still at the frontier of research. RelaxatiODS of the aaaumptiODB will be touched OD from time
to time, sometimes explicitly but sometimes only implicitly in the choice of suggestive notation and nomenclature. Beyond this introduction, the preeent chapter is divided into four sections: 12 analyses informally aDd then formally the notion of a coatfree observation; It 3 a.nd" discuss certain obvious but important c0nditions under which one observation, aDd similarly one set of acta, is more valuable than another; 15 abstractly discu_ problema of designing experiments or, perhaps more generally, obaervational programs.
2 What an observation is To begin with an informal survey of obaervation, coDBider a decision problem, that is, a person faced with a decision &mODI aevera! acts. Calling it the basic decision problem and the acta associated with it the basic acts, a new decision problem would arise, if the person were infonned before he made his decision that a particular event, say B, obtained. The new decision problem is related to the basic decision problem in & simple way; for the acts a.saoeiated with it are a1so the basic acts, and the decision is to be made by computiDg the expected utility given B of the basic acts and deciding on one that maximises the conditional expected utility. The basic problem may be modified in stiU another, though closely related, way. Let the person say in advance, for each possible Bit which of the basic acts he will decide on when he is informed, as he is to be, which element Bi of a given partition obtains. This will be called the derived decision problem arising from the basic decision problem aDd the observation of i, and ita acts will be called derived acts. Technically speaking, the derived acte are detennined by arbitrarily 888igning one basic act to each element of the partition. For any state " the consequence of a derived act is the cODBequence for , of the basic act A880ciated with the particular Bt in which 8 lies. The terms informaUy introduced in this paragraph are defined formally later in the section. A derived decision problem is not necesaarily clliferent in kind from the basic problem; indeed it is quite possible that the basic problem ean itself be viewed as derived from lOme other basic problem and obeer-
vation.
WHAT AN OBSERVATION IS
107
Formidable thouab the description of a derived problem may seem at fim reading, ita aolUtiOD is, in a aeoae, easy and has aIn.dy almost been given; for it is clear that, if P(Bi} > 0, the penon will decide to associate with B, a basic act the expected utility of which given B, is 88 high as possible, and, if P(B,) - 0, it is immaterial to the person which basic act is associated with B i . It is almost obvious that the value of a derived problem cannot be leaB, and typically is greater, than the value of the basic problem from which it is derived. After all, any basic act is amODg the derived acta, 80 that any expected utility that can be attained by deciding on a basic act can be attained by deciding on the same basic act coDBidered as a derived act. In ahort, the pel'BOIl is free to ignore the obeervation. That obvious fact is the theory'8 expression of the commonplace that knowledge is Dot disadvantapoua. It sometimes happens that a real pel'BOIl avoida finding something out or tbat his friends feel duty bound to keep something from him,t saying that what he doesn't know can't hurt him; the jealous apouae and the hypochondriac are familiar tragic examples. Such apparent exceptiODB to the principle that forewarned is forearmed call for anaIJ'Iis. At first sight, one might be inclined to _y that the peJ'801l who refWJel freely proffered information is behaving irrationally and in violation of the postulates. But perhaps it is better to admit that information that aeema free may prove expensive by doing psychological harm to ita recipient. Consider, for example, a sick penon who is certain that he baa the best of medical care and is in a position to find out whether bis mclme88 is mortal. He may decide that his own peraoDality is such that. though he can continue with some cheer to live in tbe fear that he may poaibly die 8OOD, what is left of his life would be agony, if he knew that death were imminent. Under such circumstances, far from caning him irrational, we might extol the person's rationality, if he abstained from the information. On the other band, such an interpretation may aeem foreed. (Cf. Critieiam (f) of '5.6.) Examplee of deciaioDS based on observation are aD every hand, but it will be worth while to examine one"in some detail before undertaking an abstract mathematical analysia of such dec,-isions. Any example would have to be hiehly idealiled for simplicity, becauae the complexity of &By real decision problem defies complete explicit description, but particular simplicity is in order here. The penon in the example is considering whether to buy some of the grapes he aees in a grocery store and, if 80, in what quantity. To hi8 taste, the grapes may be of any of three qualities, poor, fair, and excellent. CaD the qualities Qgenerically and 1, 2, and 3 individually. From
lOB
OBSERVATION
(U
what the perlOR knows at the moment, inciudiDg of coune the appearanee of the grapes, he caaDofr be certain of their quality, but be attaches peraonal probability to each of the three poaeibilitiea according to Table 1. T A.8L11 1. P(Q) Q(uatity)
123
1/4
P(robability)
1/2
1/4
The perIOD can decide to buy 0, 1, 2, or 3 pounds or 1faPI8; theae are the buic acta of the example. TV;", one consideration with &Dother, be finds the CODBeqUeDCeI of each act, measured in utilea, in each of the three poEible evente to be tho. Pven in the body of Table 2. The expected utilities in the riPt IIl&l1Pn of Table 2 follow, of coune, from Table 1 and the body of Table 2. TABLIt
2. UTtLIT!' 1(0)
)'OB .ACB
f
AND BAca
0
Q f
1
0
0
1
-1
2 3
-3 -6
2
3
B(f)
0 1 0
0 3 5
0 1
1/2
-2
6
-1
The entriea in Table 2 have not been ehoeen hapbuardly, but with an attempt at verisimilitude. ThUi it is IUppoeed that if the perIOD buys grapes of poor quality his di. .tisfaetioD with the barpiD will accelerate rapidly with the amount bought, which seems reaaonabte, especially if the keeping quality of poor grapes is low. He is., of course, unaffected by the quality if he buys DODe. Again, buyiDg & few fair grapes m&y be mildly desirable, but overbuyiq is not. FiDally, excellent grapea are worth buyiq, evan in large quantities, but the utility of the purchase increases 1888 than proportionally to the amount bouPt. The correct solution of the basic decision problem is to buy 1 pound of grapes; for that act baa, according to the right margin of Table 2, an expecUd utility of 1, which is the largest that can be attained. Now. suppoee the penon is free to make aD observation, that is, a new observation in addition to thOle that may have contributed to the determination of the probabilities in the basic problem. It may be, for example, that the grocer invites him to eat a lew of the grapes or that the penon is going to uk the woman beaide him how fJley look to her. Let there be five poaeible outcomes of his obeervatiOD; call them ~
109
WHAT AN OBSERVATION IS
8.2]
generically and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 individually_ I 888Ume, though this f.tore ill rather iDcidentai to the example, that low values of % tend to be IlUl(plltive of low quality. The joint distribution of % and Q. that is, the probability that % and Q simultaneoualy have &Dy given pair of values, is of eentral technical importance. ThOBe probabilities, each multiplied by 128 for limplicity of presentation, are given in the body of Table 3. The "'htrband and bottom margiDa of the table give, TABU:
3. 128P(%
n Q)
Q 1 2
3 4 6
1
2
3
128P(z)
15 10 4 2 1
5
21
15
1 2
27
24
4
32
15 5
10
15
'l7 21
32
64
32
128
128P(Q)
also multiplied by 128, tbe probability of each value of x and of each value of Q. The marginal entries are, of course, obtained by adding rows and columns. As indicated in the lower right-hand comer of the table, the probabilities assumed do indeed add up to 1, and the bottom marain recapitulates Table 1. Conditional probabilities can easily be read from Table 3. Thus, for uample, the conditional probability that % is 2, given that Q is 3, is 2/32, and the conditionaJ probability that Q is 2, given that % is 4. is 15/'Zl. It wiD be aeeD in later seetioDa that the distribution of z given 12 is, iD • eeo8e, even more fundamental than the joint distribution of 2: and Q. There are 4' - 1,024 derived acts, since one of the four basic acts can be &89igned arbitrarily to each of the five po.gible outcomes of the observation. It is an easy exercise, using Tables 2 and 3, to verify Table 4, \\·hich shows the conditional expectation of the utility of ea<-h TABLE
4. Eef I z) ~
f
1
0
0/11
1 2 3
-7/21 -40/21 -iN/21
2
3
4
..
,)
0/27 11/n -7IJrzt
0/32
0/27
81/81
43/27
8/32
J,4/11
72/21
-18/21
-48/32
18/'l7
14111
0/21 49/21
(0.1
110
basic act given each po88ible outeome of the obIeI'vauOD. For each z, the highest, expected utility, PVeD. that value of z, has been italioi.t Thus, for example, oBly if s is 1 will the peraon refrain from buyiDg grapes altogether, and ODIy if s is 5 will he risk buyiDg 3 pounds. In fuD, the best derived act~ call it I, is to buy 0, 1, 1, 2, or 3 pounds, if ~ is 1, 2,3, 4, or 5, reapectively. The value of the derived problem is the expeeted value of I, which is computed thus: (1)
BCg) -
1: E(& I s)P(%)
-= (0 + 11
+ 32 + 44 + 74)/128
== 161/128 ~ 1.26 utDea. Since the value of the basic problem is 1 utne, the envisapd observation is worth 0.26 utile; that is, the penon would if nece.-uy pay up to 0.26 utile for the observation. Bzerdse
1. Suppose that the person could directly obeerve the quality of the grapes. Show that his best derived act would then yield 2 util., and show that it could not po88ibly lead him to buy 2 pounds of the grapes.
The notion of a decision problem baaed on an observation will DOW be formaUy described, with 8pecial reference to mathematical notation and other technical details. 1. There is a set of basic acts, P with elements f, f', etc. In the example of the grapes II coDBiatal of the four enviaapd ac. of buying 0, 1, 2t or 3 pounds of grapes. The convention laid down at the end of § 5.4, requiring that the consequences of acta be measured in utiles, WIll be adhered to, and it wJ11 be supposed that v(ll) is finite. 2. The obaenatioD is a (not necessarily real) random variable z asaociating with each state 8 an obse"ed value X(8) in some set X of
pOlSible obaerved values %, z', etc. In the e.umple of the grapes, the states. (01 which the pc.tulates require that there be an infinite number) were never fuDy descnDed, and coDSeq11entiy the random variable z was Dot fully described. either. In the same senae it may be said that the basic acta, which are also really random variables, were not fully described either. All that is really important, however, is to know the simultaneous distribution of the conaequencee of the acta in F and of the values of z. In the example of the grapes that information was implicit in Tables 2 and 3.
8..3)
MULTIPLE OBSERVATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS
111
For mathematical simplicity in the formal work to fonow, it wiD pnerally be assumed that X has only a finite number of elements, thoqh the usumption can and must be relaxed in many practical aituatiODS. When X is aanuned finite, the random variable x is, (or all pu!'J)OE8 of the present context, simply a partition of B, namely, the partition into the sets on which % is constant. Indeed, earlier in tltia eection, the notion of observation was deseribed in tenns of a partition, but the description in terms of a random variable is more familiar in ltatisties and may have technical advantages, especially when the restriction that X be finite is relaxed. 3. The set of Ibv:IUfnI junctions is the set of all functions associating an element of P with each element z of X. Let the values of the generic atra~ function be denotAd by fez) and the function itee1f by f(x). The Dotion of strategy funetion was not introduced in the informal description of observation, nor in the example of the grapes, because it is but a mathematical intermediary to the definition of derived acta and did Dot seem to call for explicit expression in the less formal con-
texts. 4. To each strategy function f(x) corresponds a derived act It in the set of aU derived acta P(x), defined by for all, ,S.
(2)
It was explained that in the example of the gra.pes there are 45 d~ rived acta. In the same way, it can be seen in general that if X haa ~ and F hu ." tlements there are derived acts. 5. The mue of I' liven z,
.l
(3)
v(ll 12:)
This is the fUDCtiOD of by italics in Table 4.
%
..
- Df sup , E(f Iz).
indicated, for the example of the grapes,
3 Multiple observations, and extensions of observations and of seta of acta If eeveral random variables %1, ••• , :Ea , 8880Ciating elements of 8 with elementa of seta X t, ..• , X", are simultaneously under diacU88ion, it is natural to form the new random variable, denoted z - (Zit···, :Eta), that 8880Ciates with each element of 8 an ordered n-tuple of elementa of Xl. •.. , X,., respectively. If the context is such that Xl, ••• , z,. U'8 thought of 88 obaervatioDB, then Z can also be thought of as All obeerYation and will sometimes be called a multiple observation-to
OBSERVATION
112
16.3
emphasize the manner of if.8 formation. To illustrate., any item such as profession or body temperatU1'e t.bat might be entered on .. patient'. history can be thought of u an observation; but the whole history. or a filing cabinet of historie&, can a1ao be thought of 88 an observation, the history being a multiple observation of items, and the cabiDet a
mUltiple observation 01 histories. Consider two ob8ervatioDi x and,. It i8 an int.erestiDg p088ibility that x and y are 80 related to each other that knowledp of the value of x would (almOBt certainly) imply (aImoet certain) knowledge of J. In that cue, observation of z implies eMentially the obeervatioD of J and pnera1ly something besides, which augeeta the following tIuee definitiODS. U and ODly if x and 1 are obeervatiou such that, for aU • and " in eom8 B of probability one t %(.) - %(,') implies Y(tI) - Y(-'>i then z is aD ......00 of J, and y is a contractioa of x. If z is an exteDBioD of ,. and '1 is an exteoaiOD of x, then z and ., are equivalent. Strictly speaking, one should 8&y not that x and J are equivalent, but rather that they are equivalent regarded as obeervatioDa, for tbia would Dot be a good cOlleept of equivalence to apply to random variables regarded &8 such. For example, & pair of equivalent obeervatioD8 can obviously be a pair of real random variables with different expected valUaI. Some properties of the relatiODS of exUmaion, contraction, and equivalence between observations are given by the followiDg easy but important aercisee. Throughout ibis set of exerciaes it is unn8Cesaary to IUppoee the obeervatioDS confined to a finite 88t of values; in the ease of ExerciBe 3b, it is impossible to do 80. Exerciaea 1. z and y ~ equivalent, if and only if x is both an extensiOD and a contraction of y. 2a. If P (%(.) fI(') I ~ 1, z and y are equivalent. 2b. Any observation z is equivalent to itaelf. Sa. If there is a value flo such that P{W(.) - rol == 1, then every % is an exteDBion of 1, and any two such obee"ations are equivalent. Such an obaervatioD, of course, amounts to obeerving notbing at all and will therefole be called a DUll obler'fatIaDab. If %(.) - • for almost all , • S, then z extends every J. 4. If z is an exteDsion of 'I, and '1 i8 an extension of %, then z is an exteDsion of &. State and verily the analogous fact about equivalence. 5a. If Tit .. function &I8OCiatiDg an element of Y with each element of X, and x is an obeervation. then the obaervatiOD '1 such that 1 v(x) is a contraction of z. 1:11
MULTIPLE OBSERVATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS
6.31
113
5b. If '1 is & contraction of Z, then there is a function l' such that Ply(') - 11'(%(,»' -= 1. What freedom is there in the ehoice of the function 1'1 Se. What are the implications of Exercises 5a and 5b for equivalence between obeervations? 6. If x and J are observations and z == tx, 1) is the corresponding double obeervatioD, then z is an extension or z and of .,. (This exereiee seems to call for a eonverae saying that every extension can be n!prded as a double obeervatiOD, but DO really neat one sugests itaelf to me. None the lees, in thinkiog about extensions and eontractiODl, the aort brought out by the exercise is a typical and stimulatinl example.) 7. tx, 11 is equivalent to.x, if and only if x extends J. The relatiODS ot extension, contraction, and equivalence have parallels for seta of acts., defined thU8: If I' and G are (noD-v&euoua) sets of acts ~h that, for lOme B of probability one, there is for each, I G an f with lea) =- ,(1) for all , • B; then I' is an atBnlion of G, and G is a contraction of II. If .. is an exteD8ioD of G, aDd G is aD extension of F, then J' and G are equiv-
I'
al_t More nerdses 8. If:r is an extension of (equivalent to) G, then v(F) ~ (-) p(G). 9. Discu88 the analogues of Exereiaes 1, 2b, and 4: for seta of
acts. 10. H po ~ G, then P extends G. 11. If P(z) is derived from F on obeervation of x, then V(x) extends
P. 12. HTP.
F(x) is derived from P on obeervation of %; )'(1) is derived from F on observation of 1; F(x, y) is derived from F on obeervation of (x, ,..1; F(z; y) is derived from F(z) OD observation of J. CONCL.
1. r(x, 1) ia equivalent to P(.x; 1). 2. '(Zt y) extends F(z) and P(y) .. 3. If z is equivalent to 1, then P(z) is equivalent to F{J). 4. If 1 extend..z; then P(z, y) is equivalent to P(y), P(y) is equil-alent to Jl(z; 1), and PCy) extads F(x).
(64
114
13a. Under the hypothesis of 12, the equivalences and relatioDS of extension &mODI the seta of acta arising out of two obaervatioDB can, with evident coDventioDB, be diagrammed thua:
I
Zi J
Z, J
Ji Z
l
I
!
x-
.04
J
13b. If "1 extends x, the di&lram becomes
I
z, Y
Zi Y
Yi z-
J
I-
Z -
o.
l3e. If x and '1 are equivalent, the diagram becomes
Z,Y
XiJ
z
Jj Z J
-+
0•
14. If :F(x) and G(z) are derived from P and G, respectively, and if P extends G, then r{x) extends G(z).
I
15. II(F(z» - E[I/(F z)I" ,
f
I
II(F x(,» dP(,)
~ II(F).
Dominance and admgtdbiUty
According to Exercise 3.14. if one set of acta, reprded .. ba.aie, extends another, the first is at least &8 valuable as the secoDd in the liaht of any observation whatever. This aeetion splorea a relation, dominance, which haa the same property but is Dot 80 strict as exteD8ion. Dominance is of some importance for the theory of personal probability as it baa been developed thus far. But its ·importance will be even greater in the study of statistics proper, where interperscm.a.l agreement is of particular interest; for, as the definition shortly to be given will make clear, two people having different persow probabilitiee will agree 88 to whether one of two sets of acts dominates another, if ollly they agree which events have probability zero a condition generally met in practice, and one that could if desired be dispeDSed with by a alight cbange in the definition of domina.u~ I t will be seen that dominance and notions related to it are intimately a.ooiated with the sur&-tbiDg principle. Indeed, probability beiDa taken for granted, the basic facts about domiDance aeem to give a c0mplete expreB8ion of the sure-thing principle. Dominance aDd related concepts were much stressed by Wald, in [W3) for e.umple.
DOMINANCE AND ADMISSIBILITY
8.41
116
Two or three notiODa, the logical connectioDS among them, and those between them and exteDsion, are to be treated. The logical conneotioDS being many but simple, I think that the materiallenda itae1f better to formal than to expository treatment, for in such a context the reader who looks for the motivating ideas sees them himself more easily than he comprehends someone else's verbalilation of them. This section will therefore consist primarily of a group of formal definitions and
several exerci8ea.
,(8»
If and only if PUC,) ~ = 1, f domin.tes ,. If and only if some (every) element of P dominates (18 domina~ by) I, I' domlnatel (II dominated b,) I. If and only if :r dominates every element of 0, P domina. . G. If and ODiy if f dominates " but I does not domiDate f, f Itrlctly dominates,. If and only if f • P, and f i. Dot strietly dominated by any element of P, f is aclmisaible (with respect to F).
Involving as they do acta 88 wen 88 sets of aeta, the definitioDa, strictly apealdDl, introduce four different kinds of domiDanee. However, this complexity can be alleviated, with a alight lapse of logie, by identifying each act f with the set of acta of which f is the ODly element, for it is easily seen that this identification is in lOch harmony with the definition that, once it is made, the four kinds of dominance coJlapee illto one. BxerdIM la. Consider analogues of Exerciaes 3.2b and 3.4.
lb. When can two acts dominate each other? 2&. If F extends G, then :r dominates G. DiscU88 the converse. 2b. P(z) dominates F. 2c. If F :::l G t then P dominates G. 3&. If F c G, and F dominates G, then each admi88ible elf'ment of G dominates and is dominated by aD element of P. ab. Mter any finite number of nOD-adm;..ole elements is deleted from 1', what remains of any subset of J' that dominated .. continues to
domiDate F. 30. Though the set of admissible elementa of P may in eome iDstaDces
dominate rJ
DO
proper subset of the set of admissible e1emeDta can ever
do 80; but, if any other subset domiDates P, some proper subeet of it
at.o does 80. 3d. U:r is finite, the eet of admissible elements of :r domjnatee 1'. 38. DiacuI8 the role of "finite" in 3b and 3d.
118
4&. If the set of adm_Die elements of P dominatal G, and G dominates 1', then the set of admiMible elements of F is equivalent to the set of admissible elements of G. 4b. If F and G dominate each other, and either is finiU!, then the seta of admissible elements of P and G, respectively, are equivalent to each other, and each dominatea both I' and G. 5. If 'F dominatal G, then 11(1') ~ ,(G). 6. If .. dominates G J then, for any observation z, P(Z) dominates G(z).
I
Outline of the dellp of upedmenta
Often, eapecially in statistics, a decision problem can be seen 88 the problem of decidiDg which of aeveral experimente-or which of several obeervational programs, if that is really a more general term-to under-
take. In this eection the notion of the decision problem derived from a basic decision problem and an obeervation must be elaborated a little, because, as derived acta have been treated thus far, they correepoDd to the poesibility of making aD observation free of charge. Though obaervations are sometimes free, there is typically a cost 888OCiatA!d "lith making them; information must typically be bought either from other people or, mOle often from Datura, 80 to speak. The cost of iDfOJ'lD&otiOD may be money, trouble, one's own life, that of another, or any of iDnumerable poesibilltiee, but all can in principle be measured in terms of utility. The coat of an observation in utility may be neptive 88
well
zero or positive; witneIB the cook that tastes the broth. In principle, if a Dumber of experiments are available to a person, he bas but to ehooae one whose set of derived acts has the greatest value to him, due account being taken of the cost of observation. That simple formulation, like some others in this book, is, in a 8eD8e, oversimple; it abstracts from the enormous variety of coDSiderations that enter into the careful desip of any experiment. The poesibility of so abatmetiDg from variety does not remove the ultimate necessity of studying some aspects of that variety in detail. R. A. Fisher's TM Duign. 0/ EZlperimenta (F4], for example, is concerned almost exclusively with experiments baaed on a special technique called the analysis of variance, and it is but an introduction to even that important facet of statistiea. AgaiD, there is a growiDg literature (in which the work of A. Wald is outstanding) on sequential anaIyais, which is concerned in principle with aD experiments in which later parte of the experiment are conducted in the light of what happens in earlier parte; but this literature baa, by neee8lit,., been confined to a relatively tiny part of that domain. &8
e.II
OUTLINE OF THE DESIGN 01' EXPERIMENTS
111
Belore tumiDg to a more formal recapitulation of the outline of the desip of experiments, this may be & good place for a few speculative worda about the difference, if any, between experiment and obeervation.
Some aeiencea are commonly called experimental as oppoeed to others that are eal1ed obaenr&tional. Aerodynamics, the psychology of rote le&l'lliD& and the genetics of fruit flies would typically be called experimental sciences; and, to take parallel examples, meteorology, the paycholOlY of dreams, and human genetics would be called observational . But it is widely agreed, and the most casual consideration makes it clear, that any basic difference that may really be present resides Dot in the sciences themselves but in the methods typical of each. To illu8trate the role of observation in sciences ordinarily COD8idered experimental and vice versa, observations of wild populations of fruit flies have been useful in the study of the pnetica of fruit flies; the elects of fatipe, for example, on dream content may well be the subject of an experiment; and, e.'tcept for the atom, no topic in science is more popular today than experimental rain making. The illustrations could be utAmded indefinitely, and there is also a lees direct sort exemplified by the dieeipline called experimental medicine, which typically studies experiments on animals with the hope, often justified, that the findings thus obtained can be extrapolated to humans. The problem, then, is to distinguish an experiment from an observation. Except for brevity, it might be better to say mere observation, for, in general \l8IP, an experiment would be coruridered a special sort of observation. The first apparent contrast that comes to mind is that experimentation is generally thought of 88 active and observation 88 passive. But, upon examinatioD. it is Been that obaer/ation is also active, for obeervatiODS are typieally made by goiDg B'JlDewhere to observe, or waiting attentively till something happens. Often it is not only the observer bimMli who must be transported and put in readiness to make an observation, but also a considerable body of apparatus. What demands more activity than the modem observation of a solar eclipae? Another apparent contrast is that the experimenter acts on the tb.iq he obeerves. where&8 the observer acts only on himself and on instruments of observation that may be regarded 88 extenaioDB of his own 8eD8e orpns. If this criterion were accepted altogether DAively, there would be no such thing 88 a physiological experiment on one'. self; even 80phisticated interpretations might find it difficult to embrace plYchological experiments on one's self. Finally, experiments as opposed to observations are commonly suppoeed to be characterized by reproducibility and repeatability. But
118
OBSERVATION
(U
the observation of the angle between two &tara is easily Iep8&table and with highly reproducible rEaJlta in double contrast to an experimeat to determine the effect of upJodiDI an atomic bomb near a battleabip. All in all, however useful the distinction between observation and Bperiment may be in ordinary practice, I do not yet .a that it admits of any 80lid analysis. At any rate, no formal UI8 of the ctiatinction will be attempted in this book. Return DOW to the notion of obeervation subject to coat. It may be that the value of the random variable % is obaatvable but oDly at & coat c, a real-valued random variable meaaund in utilea. If, u heretofOIe, P(x) denota the set of acta derived from If on cost-free oblel,... tion of %, let F(z) - c denote the set of derived. acta subject to the laDdom coat c. This notation is interpreted to meaD that, if I is the generic element of F(z), then f - c (which, being a utility-valued function of I, is an act) is tbe generic act of the eet, P(z) - c. Very often the coR of an observation is independent of I, but not, for example, for him that testa the sharpness of a thorn with his finpr. Since obeervaticma are typically paid for before, or simultaneously with, maJriDI the oblerv... tion, the cost is typically obeerved along with the obeervation proper. Put differentlyJ the cost c is typically ,. contraction of the obaatvation z. Thus, if in some special context any advantage were to be gained by 80 doing, it would not be drastic to URlDl8 the cost of obeerriug z to be a function of the form ~ (x) j but, 88 a matter of fact, DO such advantage has come to my attention. It is not difficult to think of experiments to which the &88UDlptiOD does not apply. For example, in the present state of uncertainty about the long-term efJecta of X ..1'&)'8, anyone conducting a ahort--term experiment in which YOUDI huma beings were subjected to large doses of x-radiation would risk. coats that might not overtly manifest themselves for hall a century, or even for generations.
Much that would ordinarily be eaIled obeervation cannot be described by saying that the random COlt is simply to be subtracted from each derived act of the C01Te8pODd iD I obeervatiOD thought of 88 free of COlt. Allowing that it may be lepndary, the form of trial by ordeal in which the guilty Boated safely to be banged and the innocent drowned to be exonerated epitomUree such a situation; except in point of absurdity, ordinary industrial destructive testing of electric fuses and other products is much the same. Strictly speaking, discrepancy occurs even in the ordinary context in which the coet of obaatvation is a fixed IUID of money; for the utility of money is DOt, strictly linear, 80 tbe cost of observation typicaUy affects different derived acts somewhat differently. ThiB eort of situation is indeed 80 common as to introduce at leut a
8.51
OUTLINE OF THE DES(GN OF EXPERIMENTS
IJ9
alicbt error into almoet every application of the notion of cost 88 a subtraetive te1'lD. It would therefore be desirable to extend considerably the notion of cost of observation, but, thus far, I see no way to do 80 that does not destroy the mathematical advautage of singling problems of observation out of the class of decision problema generally. It is convenient now to analyze the appropriateness of regarding the Dumber 11(1") as a measure of the value of P. As must already be clear to tl:e reader, if a person is to make a preliminary decision limiting his next deeiaion to one or another of several &eta of acts, say, F, G, and H, then his preliminary decifJion will select a set that bas the highest value of P, and the preliminary and secondary decisioDS, regarded &8 a single p&Dd decision, amount to the problem of deciding on an act from PUG U B. So far 88 thia WJe of v is concemed, any increuing monotonic function of p such 88 " or 3- would be equally satisfactory, but ., baa an advantage in arithmetic simplicity when costs of obeervatioD are involved. Consider, for example, the problem of whether to make a particular observation at the random cost c or to make no observation at aIL The two seta of acta involved may then be symbolised by ~(z) - c) and F, respectively. The peculiar simplicity of 11 88 a mea&UN cl the value of a aet of acta, in this eontext, is exhibited by the almost obvious fact that 17(1'(:1) - c) == v(F(z» - B(c). It may be remarked in paring that v is a particularly good measure.in any problem where P, a, or His, 80 to speak, made available by lot, a poBbllity realised in (7.3.2), for example. FiDally, if one among several obeervations is to be ChoseD, each with it. own random coet (poBbly including the null observation), the perIOD will choose an ob8ervatioD for which v(l'(z» - B(c) is as large as poIIible. If the number of observations among which deeision is to be made is infinite, that function may not attain a maximum value. but the value of the situation to the persoD can reasonably be regarded 81 the auprem.um of the funotion; there are, of COUl'88, observatiODB &m.cmg those avajlable for which the supremum is arbitrarily nearly attained.
CHAPTER
7
Partition Problems 1 Introduction In the introduction of the preceding chapU!r it was explained that the treatment of decision problems in general had been carried to a logical conclusion, and that to study decision problems further it bad become DeeeIJ&ry to specialize. The notion of obeervation wu acc0rdingly chosen as the subject of specialization. The llituatioll now repeats it8e1f at a new level, for I have now covered the main pointe tbat occur to me about observation in general, though I see eODBiderably more to say about a certain type of obaervation. The type of observation problem to which the Pl8lBl1t chapter is devoted, though relatively special, is still very general. Indeed, ita generality is 8Ugested by the fact that no other type of problem is aystematically treated in modern statistics. In objectivistic terms, it would be descnDed 88 the type of decision problem in whieh the CODSequenC8 of each basic act dependa only on which of aeveral (pcaaDly jDfiaitel,. many) probability distributiona does in fact apply to the random vu;... able to be observed. f\fodem statiatics has no DAIIle for this type of problem, beeauae it recognises DO other type; and DO particularly sugestive Dame oecU18 to me. I am therefore tentatively adopting the noncommital name ''partition problem." Such motivation as there is for that Dame will be apparent when the concept is defined. In non-objectivistic terms, a partition problem bu the folIowiDa atructure. There are, of course, basic acts F and an observation z. The peculiar feature is a random variable b, which is typieally not lObject to observation, with the property that every f ill J is CODStant given that b has any particular value b. In many practical problems b takes on au infinity, even a non-denumerable infinity, of values, but systematic coDaideration of such problems would involve those advanced mathematical techniques that are explicitly being avoided in this book. Glossing over such queetioDS of technique for the moment, the state of the world, which is itaelf a 120
1.2]
STRUCTURE OF (TWOFOLD) PARTITION PROBLEMS
121
random variable, might play the role of b; with respect to this b, 8D7 observational decision problem would presumably be a partition problem. It may, therefore, be iDaoourate to eall partition problema special, but they are special whenever b is not equivalent to the state of the
world. AI has just heeD mentioned, the general poJicy of this book with .respect to mathematical teclmique restricts formal treatment of partition problems here to thoee in which b 888UDle8 only a finite number of different values, that is to say, those i