The Environmental Element in Space Law
Studies in Space Law General Editor
Frans G. von der Dunk International Insti...
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The Environmental Element in Space Law
Studies in Space Law General Editor
Frans G. von der Dunk International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University
VOLUME 3
The Environmental Element in Space Law Assessing the Present and Charting the Future
By
Lotta Viikari
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Viikari, Lotta. The environmental element in space law : assessing the present and charting the future / by Lotta Viikari. p. cm. -- (Studies in space law, 1871-7659 ; v. 3) Revision of the author’s thesis (doctoral), 2007. Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-16744-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Space law--Finland. 2. Aeronautics--Environmental aspects--Finland. I. Title. KJT3469.V55 2008 341.4’7--dc22 2008017590
ISSN: 1871-7659 ISBN: 978 90 04 16744 5 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands
Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Chapter One Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1. General Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2. Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3. Approach of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4. The Expanding Spectrum of Stakeholders in the Space Sector. . . . . . . . 21 1.4.1. States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1.4.2. Other Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Chapter Two Environmental Problems Related to Space Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Space Debris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Nuclear Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Solar Power Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Manned Space Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Exobiological Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v
29 31 45 49 50 50 52
vi
Contents
Chapter Three Space Law From an Environmental Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. UN Space Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1. The Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2. The Moon Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3. The Liability Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4. The Registration Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.5. The Rescue Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. The Nuclear Power Source Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. The International Telecommunication Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Developments within Certain Other International Organs . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee . . . . 3.4.2. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. The International Law Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. Environmentally-oriented National and Regional Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97 102 104 111
Chapter Four International Environmental Law in the Space Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. Sustainable Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.1. Components and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.2. Sustainable Development and the Space Sector . . . . . . 4.2.2. Sic Utere Tuo, Good Neighborliness and Due Diligence . . . . . . . 4.2.3. The Precautionary Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3.1. Components and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3.3. The Precautionary Principle and the Space Sector . . . . 4.2.4. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5. The Polluter-Pays Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5.1. Components and Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5.2. The Polluter-Pays Principle and the Space Sector. . . . . 4.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
119 121 127 129 129 144 150 157 157 161 173 178 184 184 190 203
Chapter Five From General Principles to Practicable Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. Complications of Traditional International Treaty-making . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. Improved Norm-setting Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1. The Framework Convention Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2. Selective Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3. Differential Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4. Promotion of Over-achievement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
207 210 215 215 222 225 231
55 58 58 62 65 73 81 83 85 93 93
Contents 5.2.5. Delegated Decision-making Powers and Self-correcting Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.6. Interim Agreements and Ratification Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.7. Common Rules of Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.8. International Standards and Mutual Recognition of National Authorizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.9. Information Sharing and Other Forms of Cooperation . . . . . . . . 5.3. Environmental Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1. History and Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2. Procedure and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3. EIA and Space Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3.1. Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3.2. The Future Potential of EIA in Space Activities . . . . . . 5.3.4. Strategic Environmental Assessment and Sustainability Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. Dispute Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. Dispute Settlement under International Space Law . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1.1. The Outer Space Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1.2. The Liability Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1.3. The Moon Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1.4. The International Telecommunication Union . . . . . . . . 5.4.1.5. Other Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. Adjudication vs. Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2.1. Benefits of Arbitration in Space-related Disputes . . . . . 5.4.2.2. The ILA Draft Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Related to Space Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. Improving the Dispute Resolution in the Space Sector . . . . . . . . 5.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii 233 238 241 249 257 260 261 268 273 273 278 280 285 287 289 290 295 295 296 298 301 305 309 317
Chapter Six Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Treaties, Other Instruments and Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . European Union Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents Prepared by or for the UNCOPUOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other International Instruments and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
359 359 372 373 376 385
Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 International Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 Other Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
viii
Contents
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monographs, Articles, etc., Attributable to Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References without an Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Websites of Organizations, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
325 325 352 357
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Acknowledgements This book is a slightly revised and updated version of my doctoral thesis, which I defended in June 2007. As so many Ph.D. candidates before me have noted, writing a doctoral thesis is a lonely enterprise. This has been particularly true for a person preparing a thesis on space law in Finland, which clearly does not rank among the major spacefaring countries and has little history in space law research. The solitary hours I have spent with this effort are countless. Nevertheless, numerous other persons and institutions have contributed to the process in one way or another. I am much indebted to them for assisting me during the research. Firstly, I have been privileged to be guided by Professor Kari Hakapää throughout my Ph.D. process. He was always willing to discuss any progress and read my drafts. His expert comments have been invaluable and his patience admirable. Indeed, I can hardly thank him enough. Professor Hakapää is also one of the few persons whom I know for sure has read the entire thesis. The other two are the external examiners, Professor David I. Fisher of the University of Stockholm and Professor Armel Kerrest of the University of West Bretagne. Both delivered their assessments of my work very promptly, which made it possible for the defense to take place just before summer holidays, for which I am very grateful. Professor Kerrest most kindly agreed also to act as my opponent in the public defense. I have been lucky enough to have had no major financial worries during the preparation of this work, which has obviously facilitated things significantly. Initially, I started to develop my Ph.D. in a project funded by the Academy of Finland. At early stages of the work, I also received a four-year scholarship from the second doctoral program in law in Finland, for which I am very grateful although I never actually used the funding. While writing the thesis, I have been ix
x
Acknowledgements
working at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland, the Department of Law of the University of Joensuu, and the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law (NIEM) at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland. The longest time I have spent at the Arctic Centre, where I have had the opportunity to be engaged in research and teaching in areas of international law also beyond the particular scope of my Ph.D. I have been fortunate enough to receive collegial support and encouragement from all of the places where I have worked. Principal thanks must go, however, to my colleagues at NIEM, especially our director, Professor Timo Koivurova, who also bears responsibility for luring me into the realm of Arctic legal questions. Additionally, I would like to mention in particular Leena Heinämäki and Maarit Klemetti, both of whom have tried to remind me of the existence of (different kinds of ) life beyond my office walls. Special thanks are also due to Txomin Hernández Bediaga. From the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland I wish to especially thank three of the professors who acted as dean while I was writing the thesis, Esko Linnakangas, Ahti Saarenpää and Terttu Utriainen. My warm thanks are also due to Professors Rauno Halttunen and Juha Karhu. Moreover, thanks must go to Professor Maurice Andem, without whose involvement my Ph.D. process would have been quite a different journey. Additionally, I want to thank Professor Tapio Määttä, Professor Tuomas Kuokkanen, and Dr. Tapio Puurunen, with whom I have had the pleasure of discussing my research at the University of Joensuu. Of the many other people who have provided me with different kinds of assistance and encouragement I would like to mention with gratitude Dr. Walter Flury from the European Space Agency, Professor Lauri Hannikainen from the University of Turku, and Dr. Leslie Tennen from Law Offices of Sterns and Tennen. The resources provided by the library of the University of Lapland have been invaluable to my work. During the past couple of years, the services of the library at Arktikum in the Arctic Centre have been particularly relevant for me. Most importantly, I have also been able to conduct research at the libraries of the European Space Agency in Paris, the International Institute of Air and Space Law at the University of Leiden, the Institute of Air and Space Law at the University of Cologne, and the Peace Palace in The Hague. I have had the pleasure of getting most helpful assistance from the librarians of these institutions, for which I extend my warm thanks to all of them. I am also grateful to Richard Foley, from whose proofreading this manuscript has benefited. I have received financial assistance for the proofreading from the Finnish Branch of the International Law Association, which has had a very supportive attitude towards my endeavors in legal research from their very beginning. My sincerest thanks for that. My thanks are also due to Markku Vartiainen and Risto Haavisto of the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland for various kinds of assistance during the final stages of my Ph.D. process. Finally, my heartiest thanks go to Dr. Leila Juanto, who has spent countless evenings, weekends and holidays with me at the university. Her inspiring
Acknowledgements
xi
example and constant support have been essential to completing this project. I must also thank my relatives, of whom I remember with special warmth my late Uncle Elmo. I dedicate this book to my family. Obviously, this book remains my own product and I alone bear full responsibility for the views expressed, as well as for any errors or omissions. Rovaniemi, November 2007 Lotta Viikari
Abbreviations ABM AIAA AJIL ARC BGBl CC CERES CETEX CFR CNES COMEST COSPAR DISCOS DoD EARC EC ECE ECJ ECSL ECSS EEZ EIA EMEP ENMOD
Anti-Ballistic Missile American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics American Journal of International Law Administrative Radio Conference Bundesgesetzblatt Claims Commission (of the Liability Convention) Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies Committee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration Code of Federal Regulations (US) Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales UNESCO World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology Committee on Space Research Database and Information System Characterising Objects in Space (US) Department of Defense Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference European Community (United Nations) Economic Commission for Europe European Court of Justice European Centre for Space Law European Cooperation for Space Standardization Exclusive Economic Zone Environmental Impact Assessment Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation and Protection Program Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
xiii
xiv ESA EU EUMETSAT
Abbreviations
European Space Agency European Union European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation FCC (US) Federal Communications Commission GAOR General Assembly Official Records GEF Global Environmental Facility GEO Geostationary (Earth) Orbit GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System GNP Gross National Product GPS Global Positioning System GSO Geosynchronous Orbit (or Geostationary Satellite Orbit) HELCOM Helsinki Commission HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit HIA Health Impact Assessment IAA International Academy of Astronautics IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAF International Astronautical Federation IAU International Astronomical Union ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICC International Chamber of Commerce ICJ International Court of Justice ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions / International Council for Science IGO Intergovernmental Organization IISL International Institute of Space Law ILA International Law Association ILC International Law Commission ILM International Legal Materials IMO International Maritime Organization INESAP International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization ISO International Organization for Standardization ISS International Space Station ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ITU International Telecommunication Union JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency LCIA London Court of International Arbitration LEO Low Earth Orbit MARPOL Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MEO Medium Earth Orbit MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
Abbreviations NASA NEPA NGO NPD NPR NPS ODCWG OECD OJ OSPAR OST PCA PSA PSN RARC RIAA RTG SDR SEA SIA SLW SopS SSN SUIRG TIAS UIC UK UN UNCED UNCITRAL UNCLOS UNCOPUOS UNECE UNEP UNESCO UNGA UNISPACE UNOOSA UNTS US USC USD UST
xv
(US) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (US) National Environmental Policy Act Nongovernmental Organization NASA Policy Directive NASA Policy Requirement Nuclear Power Source(s) Orbital Debris Co-Ordination Working Group (of the ISO) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Official Journal (of the EU) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Outer Space Treaty Permanent Court of Arbitration (UN) Programme on Space Applications Pasifik Satellite Nusantara Regional Administrative Radio Conference (UN) Reports of International Arbitral Awards Radioisotope Thermal Generator Special Drawing Right Strategic Environmental Assessment Sustainability Impact Assessment; Social Impact Assessment Schriften zum Luft- und Weltraumrecht / Studies in Air and Space Law / Etudes de droit Aérien et Spatial Suomen Säädöskokoelman Sopimussarja (Finnish Treaty Series) Space Surveillance Network Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group Treaties and Other International Acts Series Uranium Information Centre United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Conference on Environment and Development United Nations Commission on International Trade Law United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations General Assembly United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs United Nations Treaty Series United States (of America) United States Code United States Dollar United States Treaties and Other International Agreements
xvi WARC WARC ORB WHO WIPO WRC WTO ZLW
Abbreviations World Administrative Radio Conference World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Radio Conference World Trade Organization Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht
Chapter One
Introduction 1.1. General Background This book examines the current international legal regimes in space law and environmental law in order to ascertain their applicability and efficacy in addressing environmental threats in the use of outer space. Outer space is the space upwards from the airspace (atmosphere) surrounding the Earth. As the composition of atmosphere does not change dramatically at a certain height, it is impossible to physically determine exactly where the atmosphere ends and outer space begins. Consequently, the problem of limitation is more of a political and legal issue than a technical one. Various alternatives have been suggested over the years as the most suitable criterion for making this distinction. There are two predominant approaches, the spatial and the functional.1 The latter requires a definition of ‘space activities’, whereas the former allows a far more straightforward definition of outer space: one based on distance. One example of the difficulties related to the functional approach is the United States (US) Space Shuttle, which is launched like a rocket into Earth orbit but uses aerodynamic lift like an airplane when returning to the Earth’s surface. Functionally, the Shuttle might thus be classified both as a spacecraft and an aircraft and should be governed by space law and air law,
1 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, Annex I, para. 8.a. For a more detailed assessment of the delimitation issue, see, e.g., Metcalf 1999, pp. 56– 68.
1
2
Chapter One
depending on the phase of the mission.2 In accordance with the spatial approach, it has been proposed, for instance, that a realistic limit for the beginning of outer space might be the altitude of approximately 80 kilometers, given the composition of the atmosphere and the history of aeronautical and astronautical activities.3 Some kind of a fixed limit would be welcome because the airspace partly falls under national sovereignty,4 whereas outer space never does. Nevertheless, no legal boundary between the contiguous areas of the airspace and outer space—and hence between the areas of application of air law and space law, respectively—has yet been agreed upon.5 The Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) has discussed the definition and delimitation of outer space as an agenda item since 1967. Some nations have voiced the opinion that due to “scientific and technological progress, the commercialization of outer space, emerging legal questions and the increasing use of outer space in general”, there is a need for a definition of outer space that would delineate it from airspace.6 Some others, 2 Harris–Harris 2006, p. 6. See ibid. for a recent assessment of the delimitation problem; these authors are in favor of a fixed, spatial demarcation line, yet one “sensitive to technological advances”. 3 See, e.g., Andem 1992, pp. 152–153. An authoritative example of the spatial approach is the Australian Space Activities Act of 1998 (as amended in 2002), which now uses the limit of 100 kilometers as the altitude where outer space begins by, for instance, prescribing that to ‘launch’ a space object means to “launch the object into an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level” (or to attempt to do so; Sect. 8). Although such a limit of course applies only as regards domestic purposes, it is nevertheless the first regulatory attempt to define where space begins and thus also has certain wider relevance. 4 Airspace comes under national jurisdiction and sovereignty where it lies over national territory and territorial waters. Otherwise, it is not subject to national sovereignty, e.g., over the high seas. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Arts. 1 and 2; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts. 2, 58, 78, 87. Airspace over a state’s exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is comparable in status to airspace over the high seas. Haanappel 1986, p. 145. 5 Application of the law of outer space is indeterminate not only as concerns the height from the Earth where it begins but also its extent. It does not necessarily appear feasible (or justifiable) for humans to extend their legal regulation into the infinity of space. See Hobe 2004(a), pp. 28, 41. At the moment, only one of the five United Nations (UN) space treaties (the Moon Treaty; see below) explicitly limits its application to the Moon and other celestial bodies within our solar system only. The other space treaties only refer in a somewhat abstract manner to “outer space”. Of course, at the moment the ability of humankind to conduct activities in space remains relatively limited. Nevertheless, the question of the extent of our authority to regulate space activities and of the legal status of outer space are fundamental. 6 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 90. “Some delegations expressed the view that the lack of a definition or delimitation of outer space
Introduction
3
however, consider that the current legal framework functions well enough and hence no such definition is needed, at least as yet. It has even been argued that “an attempt to define … outer space” would currently be only “a theoretical exercise” and, moreover, even counterproductive as it “could lead to complicating existing activities and might not be able to anticipate continuing technological developments”.7 The issue remains unresolved. Despite the fact that the international community has not agreed on a set limit between the airspace and outer space, this has not (at least thus far) created notable problems in the utilization of either area.8 During the past half a century, humankind has managed to extend its active environment from the Earth and its atmosphere into outer space. Satellites are a major achievement of the human technology that has enabled this development, providing us with tools that facilitate the daily lives of millions of people worldwide. For instance, satellite navigation systems are used for positioning purposes in all fields of transportation today.9 Another important user of outer space is the remote sensing industry. To name but a few of the purposes it serves, it provides us with data for meteorological services (including weather forecasts), land and agriculture management, environmental planning and mapping, as well as national reconnaissance. A last, but by no means the least, branch of space activities that relies heavily on satellites is telecommunications. Telecommunication satellites enable us to receive radio signals, intercontinental telephone calls, TV programs and, practically speaking, any transmission of text, data, video, audio or graphics, and remarkably large volumes of data at that. Satellites provide smooth two-way exchange of data, making the range of brought about legal uncertainty concerning the applicability of space law and air law and that matters concerning state sovereignty and the boundary between air and outer space needed to be clarified in order to reduce the possibility of disputes among States.” Ibid., para. 91. 7 Ibid., para. 92. For a summary of the discussion concerning the question over the years, see the UNCOPUOS document “Historical summary on the consideration of the question on the definition and delimitation of outer space” prepared in 2002. 8 It has been suggested that as space exploration affects the “totality of the environment”, such physical separation of airspace and outer space would not even be necessary. See Bhatt 1979; Matte 1989, p. 421. 9 The primary system used throughout the world for satellite navigation is the US government Global Positioning System (GPS). Russia has a corresponding military network, the Global Navigation Satellite System (Glonass). The European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU) are now creating Europe’s own, exclusively civilian navigation system (called Galileo), which is scheduled to be fully operational by 2012 or 2013. See more at the European Space Agency’s Galileo website. The US and ESA/EU were long at odds over frequency allocation and interoperability between the GPS and Galileo, but they finally reached an agreement on the issue in February 2004. “EU and US a step further to agreement over Galileo satellite navigation following Brussels negotiating round” 2004.
4
Chapter One
possible applications almost unlimited. In addition to satellite activities, there are also other unmanned and manned space missions which operate in Earth orbits (such as the manned International Space Station) or beyond (e.g., unmanned planetary missions). The technological progress which has made space activities possible is admittedly impressive. Unfortunately, we have not proven equally successful in learning the lessons of terrestrial history regarding the importance of environmental protection. While decades of space ventures have led to significant advances in technology for the benefit of humans, they have also witnessed increasing space-related environmental problems. The world space community has long known that space activities contribute to pollution and contamination of the environment.10 Furthermore, the space environment is far less resilient than the Earth, as many parts of outer space cannot regenerate after disturbances in the way the terrestrial environment typically does.11 Nevertheless, especially at the beginning of the space era, all human space activities were so challenging that nearly any method seemed acceptable for placing objects in outer space.12 Although space has become far more accessible to us and the general attitude to environmental questions has changed quite dramatically, utilitarian policies have disproportionately dominated space activities until today. This has gradually led to substantial environmental threats that constitute increasing hazards to the environment of outer space as well as to human space activities and even to life on Earth. Although environmental hazards in outer space already pose a variety of threats, these threats often do not affect the particular operation which causes them but endanger other space (and even terrestrial) activities indiscriminately. This is a manifestation of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem: benefits of individual space missions accrue to the entities conducting these activities but the detrimental impact of space exploitation can usually hamper all those
10
The potential damage from experiments in space was recognized by the scientific community as early as in the 1950s, and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) formed a Committee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration (CETEX) to study the issue. The task was assigned to the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) when CETEX was disbanded in 1959. COSPAR then established a Consultative Group on the Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments (with a broad mandate to make recommendations regarding space activities) and a Panel on Potentially Environmentally Detrimental Activities in Space to consider the various problems related to the space environment. Matte 1989, p. 427. Today, there are numerous organizations and bodies concerned with the issue (to a greater or lesser extent, and for different reasons). 11 Williamson 2003, p. 47. 12 Williamson 2006, p. 45. Over half of the early attempts to put a satellite in orbit failed (23 out of 40). At the time of the first manned spaceflight, the overall failure percentage of space missions was still around 50. Williamson 2003, p. 47.
Introduction
5
involved in the sector (and even others).13 Given the typically high short-term costs of curbing environmentally harmful effects of the use of outer space, it is no surprise that many of the relevant stakeholders can be hesitant to take measures to prevent environmental degradation. A related concept is that of ‘free riders’, referring to entities which “benefit by the actions of others without sharing any of the responsibility or cost”.14 Such an approach often seems particularly tempting in situations where substantial costs (such as those of combating environmentally harmful consequences of space activities) must be paid now but the benefits generated by the efforts will mostly be realized only in the future. This narrowness of the time horizon appears to be a feature alarmingly widespread within humankind today. The free-rider problem is particularly tricky where the commons are concerned and thus intrinsically relates to all space activities, making conflicts in this sector even more complicated and difficult to resolve. It can considerably diminish the will of some states to adopt environmentally more benign management practices: as long as the benefits of regulated development of the use of outer space accrue more or less equally to all actors irrespective of their behavior, some of them will feel little incentive to accept any restrictions. Of course, if most of the relevant stakeholders take such a stand, curbing the environmental problems will be impossible. Even where there are only few ‘free riders’, their irresponsible behavior can at worst frustrate genuine efforts by the majority. It does not seem very likely that the traditional state community will—at least in the near future—be able to treat many global environmental problems with the efficacy these problems appear to require. There is no reason to expect the situation to be any better as regards the environmental effects of human activities in outer space. The future of the Earth and near-Earth outer space—and hence also that of humankind—appears gloomy unless a new environmental consciousness soon starts to emerge. As concerns the space sector, positive indications are provided by the efforts of some states and international organizations to alleviate environmental degradation of outer space. For instance, in the case of space debris,15 there is increasing awareness of the seriousness of the problem and both the governmental sector and the industry have made efforts to mitigate the hazard by developing procedures and standards for the operation and design of space missions.16 However, although unilateral action is a step forward, it does not alone suffice to remedy the proliferation of debris. The effects of human activities on the global commons of outer space have all the potential to be severe, irreversible and wide in scope. At the same time, the 13 For a more detailed assessment of the tragedy of the commons problem, see, e.g., Vogler 2000, pp. 10–15. 14 Susskind 1994, p. 23. 15 Space debris and other environmental problems related to space activities are examined in more detail below. 16 See Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report, p. 9.
6
Chapter One
tragedy of the commons problem renders many strategies adopted nationally or by a limited set of states for combating adverse environmental consequences of space activities ineffective. Accordingly, space debris is one of the central issues being discussed within the UNCOPUOS. There have also been other efforts to confront the issue at a wider international level but as yet there exists no binding international regulation either for alleviation of the hazards deriving from space debris or other environmental problems related to space activities. In the increasingly international, commercialized and privatized space sector global rules are essential, however. They would ensure a level (or at least relatively fair) playing field for all stakeholders and help avoid the free-rider problem. Common regulation could also synchronize the efforts already taken in this area. Indeed, now would be the time for truly international norms instead of fragmented and informal approaches to the problems identified.17 For such regulation to be effective there is a need for genuine collective responsibility.18 Even international regulation does not help unless it is widely respected. Otherwise, application of the norms will only hamper an actor’s competitiveness. Considering the typically high immediate costs of environmentally more benign space technologies and practices, there is no reason to expect entrepreneurs in this highly competitive sector to be any more hesitant than their sea-faring colleagues in shipping to seek advantages under a regulatory system that allows them to conduct their activities in the most remunerative way—essentially a flag of convenience for space activities.19 Given the inherent internationality of the space sector today, it would be surprising if such a development could be avoided by any other means than comprehensive international regulation.20 Moreover, it seems to be high time to reconsider the fundamental premises on which all human space activities are based. The more pressing the environmental threats related to the use of outer space become, the more often the profound
17 Many of the experts working with environmental questions related to space activities seem to share the opinion that an international-level set of rules is what is now needed. See, e.g., “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005. 18 As the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Working Group on the “Ethics of Outer Space” put it: “[e]thics must precede and guide the law and not vice versa”. The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 25. 19 See Kerrest 1999, pp. 258–259; Kerrest 2001, pp. 871–872. The most prominent example of such a development thus far is the Sea Launch company which launches satellites from a sea platform in international equatorial waters. It was created in 1995 and has completed some 20 launches to date. For more information, see the Sea Launch website. 20 All the more so, as space objects—once launched—are even more difficult to control than maritime vessels, which physically remain on Earth and, furthermore, have to visit harbors. Kerrest 1999, pp. 258–259.
Introduction
7
question of the legitimacy of the modern space sector is put forward. On what rights are the demands that humanity is making upon outer space ultimately based? How far can those rights extend? At what costs should the space sector be allowed to pursue its goals? Where do those goals derive from? Such questions are asked with increasing frequency, yet only few answers have been given to date.21 1.2. Structure This work consists of six main parts. After the introductory remarks, Part One presents the approach of the book and its basic starting points. It briefly contemplates the fundamental ideology of space activities, which builds upon industrial development and relies on a substantially anthropocentric worldview. Both of these orientations entail little environmentalist thinking. Part One also contains a presentation of the expanding spectrum of the various stakeholders in the modern space sector. They generate increasing complexity in the management of space activities, not least from a legal point of view. Part Two examines the various types of problems related to space activities which can be labelled ‘environmental’. Part Three proceeds to sketch the fundamental elements of environmental management of space activities by studying the current instruments of the international law of outer space and assessing their suitability for addressing environmental concerns. The presentation also examines focal developments within international organizations which have adopted recommendatory instruments for alleviating environmental degradation related to the use of outer space. Additionally, this part presents some environmentally inclined efforts to regulate space activities at the regional and national levels. Part Four reflects on the possibilities to use other, more distinctly environmental
21
Several of the organizations active in the space sector have been discussing questions concerning the ethical basis of space activities. The ethics of space activities have also been considered within UNESCO, whose World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) set up a Working Group on the “Ethics of Outer Space”. The very fundamental questions brought up by this group include: “What is the role of human beings in the Universe?; How can the links between the earth and outer space be organized?; Who is to determine the priorities and choices of science and space technologies and on the basis of which objectives for society?; How can the risks engendered by the space technologies be defined democratically and what risks can be regarded as ‘acceptable’?; What is the level of responsibility and solidarity to which individuals and groups must aspire for present and future generations?”. The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 8. Obviously, it is very difficult to find consensus on such issues. In 2005, COMEST decided that it would not develop a declaration of ethical principles for space activities. Instead, it intends to “emphasize and promote awareness of moral and ethical issues raised by space activities in the framework of reinforced international cooperation”. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, para. 44.
8
Chapter One
but not particularly space-related international legal instruments for the needs of the space sector. As the help available from international treaties remains quite limited, the examination turns to the principles of international environmental law for any relief they might be capable of providing. Part Five is the core contribution of the book. It concentrates on the prospects for developing new instruments for environmental management of the space sector. There is an obvious need to clarify the ambiguous obligations of the UN space treaties in one way or another. The presumption is that the international community could be made more receptive to the adoption of such reforms by mechanisms similar to those used in international norm-making in the environmental sector. Accordingly, one starting point is an analysis of the ‘framework convention–subsequent protocol’ approach commonly applied in global environmental diplomacy today. Other mechanisms examined which could facilitate the adoption of increasingly effective international norms include the use of selective incentives and differential obligations. Promoting overachievement of treaty obligations is yet another approach to the issues that are taken up. Considering the challenges encountered in international norm-making in the space sector thus far, Part Five also assesses the chances of making new international norms operative faster as well as the possibility of creating instruments whose provisions can readily accommodate changing conditions (including instruments of legally non-binding nature). This examination includes mechanisms such as interim agreements, self-correcting treaties, codes of conduct, supranationally adopted technical standards, and international certification mechanisms. Information sharing and other forms of cooperation at different levels are also important. Moreover, special attention is paid to the possibilities of environmental impact assessment (EIA), which is one of the focal instruments of contemporary environmental law. It has the potential to spare the space community from many environmental problems much as it has helped address terrestrial concerns. Part Five ends with a consideration of the dispute resolution. In an ideal world, neither liability mechanisms nor dispute resolution would be needed. In reality, however, regulatory systems seldom work so smoothly that no conflicts emerge. For instance, the occurrence of environmental harm is no rarity, which calls for authoritative settlement of disputes and just compensation and reparation of damage.22 Hence, whatever mechanisms for the alleviation of environmental problems related to space activities are employed, they can be of little significance unless accompanied by effective means of dispute settlement. Currently, there
22 Obviously, the existence of solid liability and dispute resolution mechanisms is also likely to make the actors more inclined to observe the relevant norms in the first place and hence diminish the need to actually resort to these mechanisms.
Introduction
9
are various problems in this respect and it is widely recognized that they can significantly retard the development of the space activities. In particular, the dispute resolution mechanisms provided by UN space law are incapable of satisfying the needs of the modern space sector. Part Six concludes the book by drawing together its contributions. It contains recommendations for meeting the environmental challenges posed by space activities, urging the international community to extend the principle of sustainable development, above all, to the space sector in order to ensure a proper balance between the pursuit of economic interests and the protection of the environment. 1.3. Approach of the Book Obviously, a thorough examination of the entire modern space sector from an environmental point of view would be a task far too demanding to be covered by one treatise (and a single author). Hence, some limitations are unavoidable. This book is a study of environmental effects related to space activities, the most significant such effect today being the generation of space debris and the threats posed by it. Accordingly, this problem receives the most attention in this study. The expertise of the author necessitates further limitations as regards the scope of the work: this is, above all, a legal examination of space activities from an environmental perspective. However, such a treatment entails considerations that rely significantly—or even primarily—on other than legal knowledge. Hopefully, the interpretations, conclusions and proposals put forward nevertheless are realistic even from the point of view of specialists from other fields than law. The aim of this book is to examine 1) what the environmental problems related to space activities are; 2) the relevance of the legal instruments currently available for regulating environmentally harmful space activities; and 3) the potential for creating better mechanisms for the purpose of environmental management in this respect. Given that satellite activities comprise a significant portion of the space sector today, this book also concentrates largely on the environmental effects of the use of satellites. Other types of space endeavors, such as human space travel, are touched upon where relevant. In any case, the environmental problems encountered in different kinds of space operations typically are quite similar (if not identical). This may change radically with the future conquest of outer space but such considerations are mostly left out of the scope of this work. The general concern of this study is thus the effects of space activities on the environment and their regulation. Environmental degradation is often seen as a significant problem only to the extent that it has adverse consequences for human activities. Even the term ‘environment’ refers to something (or everything) surrounding a subject—humans. There is no single scientific notion ‘environment’ and hence no single definition of the concept; ‘everything
10
Chapter One
surrounding us’ and the like obviously are excessively broad definitions to qualify as scientifically meaningful for most purposes.23 Law is no more explicit in this respect. Although the various instruments of international law regularly and increasingly speak about ‘environmental protection’, ‘environmental damage’ and so on, they hardly ever even try to define properly what this ambiguous ‘environment’ is. Even where definitions exist, they vary from treaty to treaty. Furthermore, even those international instruments that provide some sort of a definition of ‘environment’ usually prefer a sectoral approach by limiting their definitions explicitly for the purposes of that particular instrument only.24 This is not surprising, however, given the vague nature of the term. A slightly more complete, yet still only partial picture of what elements the ‘environment’ may comprise can be derived from the substantive provisions of environmental treaties and other instruments: as they strive to alleviate or compensate for environmental harm they have to define what kind of harm they consider ‘environmental’ and which consequences of it warrant compensation.25
23
The word ‘environment’ comes from the French word environs. It means, i.a., “the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or influences, especially as affecting the existence or development of someone or something”, or “that which environs”. Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1989, p. 477. For a discussion concerning the meaning of ‘environment’, see, e.g., Gilpin 1995, pp. 1–2. For an examination of the term ‘environment’ from the point of view of science, culture and international law, see Romano 2000, pp. 15–24. 24 An uncommonly broad and detailed definition of ‘environment’ in a legal instrument (although made only “[f ]or the purpose of this Convention”; Art. 2) can be found in the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, according to which “[e]nvironment means: natural resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors; property which forms part of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic aspects of the landscape” (Art. 2.10). It is considerably different than, for instance, the two decades older very vague, highly anthropocentric (and even gender-biased) reference to the environment in the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), pursuant to which “[m]an is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth … Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself ” (para. 1). In the 1986 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, called “Our Common Future”, ‘environment’ is defined merely as “where we all live” (and ‘development’ as “what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode”; Chairman’s Foreword, p. 14). The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development contains no definition whatsoever of ‘environment’. 25 See Romano 2000, pp. 21–24.
Introduction
11
Indeed, international law is rife with examples of very different kinds of approaches to how environmental harm is treated. For instance, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage took a narrow view, compensating for injury to persons and property only. A protocol to the convention adopted in 1997 broadened the definition of nuclear damage to encompass environmental damage and preventive measures as well.26 Another example is the definition of ‘pollution’ in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): it includes not only the introduction of substances (or energy) into the marine environment which may cause “hazards to human health” or “hindrance to marine activities” but also “harm to living resources and marine life”.27 Moreover, according to an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.28 The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities apply to “harm caused to persons, property or the environment”.29 An example of a particularly extensive concept of environmental damage in international law is provided by the holistic Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty which, in addition to the protection of the “Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific research”,30 is concerned about a broad range of other potential “adverse effects” caused by activities conducted in the Antarctica, including effects on 1) climate or weather patterns; 2) air or water quality; 3) atmospheric, terrestrial, glacial or marine environments; 4) flora and fauna; 5) endangered or threatened species; and 6) “areas of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance”.31
26
For more detail, see below. Art. 1.4. In a similar manner, Arts. 145 and 194 of the UNCLOS encompass a broad obligation to protect the marine environment. 28 Para. 29. Furthermore, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ found that a possibility of environmental damage could justify a plea of necessity (although not in the case in question; para. 54). 29 Art. 2.c. 30 Art. 3.1. 31 Art. 3.2. The 1992 Conventions on Climate Change (Art. 1.1) and Ozone Layer (Art. 1.2) also refer broadly to changes which entail significant deleterious effects on, i.a., “the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems”. The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities defines “damage to the Antarctic environment” to mean “any impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or those ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, 27
12
Chapter One
‘Degradation’ is an equally relative term: unless we consider a change taking place in an environment as a negative phenomenon, it cannot be considered degradation but merely a change.32 When such changes have wide enough harmful potential they are considered environmental problems. This harmful potential is most often evaluated in relation to human activities. Only quite rarely is any intrinsic value of nature acknowledged and changes in the environment that have no relevance for humans (not even from the point of view of aesthetic, cultural or moral values) considered adverse. Not surprisingly, the concern of international law-makers for the environment has also primarily been anthropocentric (in one way or another).33 Accordingly, international environmental treaties may often appear to be more concerned with the utilization of natural resources and protection of property than the ‘mere’ preservation of nature.34 Many modern instruments of international law nevertheless take cognizance of other losses than those of economic value to humans, such as damage affecting amenity values. Even considerations of the intrinsic value of nature occasionally appear. Furthermore, instead of concentrating on the protection of individual components of nature, international environmental law increasingly recognizes the far more comprehensive need to protect entire ecosystems.35 Although this study strives to apply an environmental perspective to the examination of legal problems related to space activities, this perspective is not very far-reaching in terms of the ecological and/or intrinsic value of the space environment. This is due partly to the strong human-oriented tradition evident in all space law thus far and partly to the significant gaps in our knowledge concerning the outer space environment. The fact that this knowledge still remains modest most likely also contributes to the resistance to environmentalist endeavors in the modern space sector. One of the biggest challenges seems to be the reluctance to see the space environment as worth protecting for its own sake. It is still an issue whether outer space has any intrinsic value or is merely a resource for human utilization.36 There presently exists no permanent human
marine or terrestrial life, beyond that which is negligible or which has been assessed and judged to be acceptable pursuant to this Convention” (Art. 1.15). 32 See also Morgan 1998, p. 31. 33 See Birnie–Boyle 2002, pp. 5–6. 34 Rantala 1994, pp. 99–100. 35 The Antarctic Treaty system extends the ecosystem approach even to an entire continent and its marine environment. 36 Some see outer space as a hostile place where there are nevertheless riches available for humans to use (mineral resources of celestial bodies, for instance). Some would even like to see us transform outer space into an environment more favorable for human beings, i.a., changing other planets into habitable, Earth-like environments (a process known as terraforming). Williamson Mark 2000(a), p. 721. For many, at least as long as humans remain unable to discover intelligence (or any forms of life) outside our globe, the universe is, in principle, ours to exploit in any way that suits us. Indeed, quite often
Introduction
13
settlement in space. Although space missions often seem to have great resonance with and evoke widespread interest among the public, the environs in which they take place nevertheless remain a somewhat remote issue in the everyday life of the vast majority of humankind.37 The dangers of space activities do not seem as imminent as those associated with many similar problems on Earth— including environmental ones. This apparently makes it easier to view outer space as a mere resource reserve (and a dump for the refuse produced by space activities) that is available for the benefit of humans.38 Even at the very most (from an environmental point of view) outer space is perceived as an area for the conduct of scientific research.39 The environmental movement has also largely ignored space utilization.40 life (in a form which we are capable of detecting) seems to be the only measure of worth as regards outer space. See ibid., p. 723. 37 Moreover, it has been pointed out that the entire “topic of outer space [is] distant from the daily issues of survival faced by the populations in [some African] countries”. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, para. 37. No doubt the same applies to many less developed nations all over the world. 38 For obvious reasons, “[a] policy of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ is considerably easier to establish when planetary environments are concerned.” Williamson Mark 2000(a), p. 721. 39 It has been argued that the reason for the lack of an environmental perspective in the UN space treaties is that at the time of their adoption the prevailing approach was one emphasizing the scientific utility of outer space. See Baker 1987, pp. 166–167; Hacket 1994, pp. 108–110. In turn, that environmental damage caused to planetary surfaces, for instance, has received relatively modest attention can be explained at least partly by the fact that such damage has thus far been mostly the result of scientific space missions. Activities labeled ‘scientific’ tend to be regarded generally as more valuable or acceptable than commercial, exploitative activities. This is particularly true where the activities are conducted in the global commons. Williamson Mark 2000(a), p. 720. 40 As one author put it, “everyone who lives on the Earth has a vested interest in protecting the planet’s environment, [whereas] no such interest exists for the Moon and Mars [or other celestial bodies beyond the Earth]”. Ibid., p. 724. Moreover, “[e]ven among environmentalists, concern about off-planet environmental issues has been slow in developing”. Hargrove 1986, p. ix. Quite few actually seem to consider outer space as part of our environment—despite the complete dependency of life on Earth upon the energy generated by the Sun, for instance. Hartmann 1986, p. 121; Williamson 2006, p. 183. It has been proposed that one way of making states more receptive to increasingly environment-oriented space policies is to educate the public on the space environment. “If the public opinion will not be changed then it will be easy for the spacefaring States to further their selfish policies on environmental matters in outer space”. Hacket 1994, p. 146. Considering how humanity has treated even its home planet, however, the prospects for a more environmentalist approach to space utilization do not seem very bright in the near future at least. Over time, this may change, though—even thanks to evolving space tourism, which might in part contribute to the development of positive attitudes towards planetary conservation. See Williamson Mark 2000(a), p. 724.
14
Chapter One
Despite the shift towards an increasingly less anthropocentric attitude towards the terrestrial environment since early 1980s with the introduction of the idea of ecosystem protection for the benefit of not only humans but all other species as well,41 there has been no comparable development in the space sector. There exist many other concerns, however, which are very much dependent upon the condition of the space environment. For instance, those concerned with the utility of outer space for commercial applications worry about the negative effects of environmental degradation on their activities. Others may be concerned about the purity of the space environment for the purposes of scientific research.42 Still others may consider an unclean space environment an aesthetic nuisance.43 Furthermore, the preservation of historic sites of human space exploration, such as the Apollo 11 landing site and the first human footprints on the Moon, may be regarded as valuable.44 All such approaches consider the space environment worthy of protection, but only because of different instrumental notions of outer space; environmental protection of space is not an end in itself.45 See Romano 2000, p. 20. For instance, the Saha crater on the far side of the Moon has been suggested as deserving special protection because its particular suitability for the search for extraterrestrial intelligence and scientific investigations. In accordance with such concerns, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) issued in 1997 a recommendation (RA. 479–4) which established a “lunar quiet zone” where certain frequencies are afforded protection on nearly the entire lunar far side. See Sterns–Tennen 2000. There is another ITU recommendation (RA.1417) on quiet zones dealing with “a radio-quiet zone in the vicinity of the L2 Sun-Earth Lagrange point”. See also Williamson 2006, pp. 163–164. 43 At worst the (un)aesthetic effects of space activities might be detectable even from the Earth. For instance, extensive strip mining on the nearside of the Moon could have impacts easily visible to us. Williamson 2005, p. 164. 44 See Williamson 2003, pp. 47–48. Very likely, these would also be among the top destinations for any future space tourists (once lunar tourism becomes feasible). Williamson 2006, p. 133. For a proposal for designating Tranquility Base (where humans first landed on the Moon) as a UN World Heritage Site, see Rogers 2004. UNESCO has, however, rejected the possibility of designating the Moon or particular areas of it as World Heritage Sites; the World Heritage Convention applies on Earth only (and, moreover, to the territories of contracting states only). See Williamson 2006, p. 135. There have also been several other suggestions for preservation of parts of celestial bodies, for different reasons. These include a proposal for a system of “planetary parks” on Mars. See Cockell–Horneck 2004. For a more detailed treatment of the question of conservation of particular areas of outer space either for their historic importance or special natural qualities (“space wilderness areas”), see Hartmann 1986, pp. 130–131. 45 For an evaluation of the environmental effects of space activities from a clearly instrumental point of view, see, e.g., Perek 1983, p. 221. According to Perek, “[a]s all natural resources, also outer space should be managed to allow for an orderly and efficient utilization”. Ibid., p. 222. One more example of fundamentally instrumental values is the argument that the outer space environment “represents freedom, by providing an almost unlimited expanse for mankind to explore, understand and, if he so wishes, to conquer” 41 42
Introduction
15
One author has identified three levels in the evolution of environmental ethics: anthropocentric, biocentric, and cosmocentric. At the first level, the measure of the value of nature is tied to its utility for the needs (present and future) of humans. The environment can be exploited or protected, but both processes are driven by humanity’s instrumental ends. International law regarding outer space has designated space and its resources as a common good for humans, thus espousing a very anthropocentric way of thinking. A more environmentalist approach is represented in biocentric attempts to maximize the well-being of the totality of living existence, pursuant to which all living organisms—not only humans—have a value in themselves. The intrinsic value of all life is focal. Hence, possible indigenous life forms on Mars, for instance, would need to be respected. Even more ‘extreme’ is a cosmocentric ethic, which entails a value system where the cosmos is the priority rather than humans or other biological entities. “An intrinsic value permeates all levels of both ecological and geomorphologic hierarchies; all ‘named’ features and those to be discovered have an inherent right of existence.” In terms of space policies, this would entail the protection and preservation of all features on Earth and in outer space in the name of the value of mere existence. Obviously, space activities today lie on the first, anthropocentric level, extending at most to biocentric considerations only.46 This work applies an approach which recognizes other than solely instrumental conceptions of outer space, at least to an extent. It attempts to consider and that this ‘freedom’ should not be compromised by environmental degradation. Williamson 2003, p. 48. In a way, any values (even the less instrumental ones) we attach to outer space (or other environments or entities) are inevitably human values— ultimately even the intrinsic value we attribute to entities or phenomena. However, this is quite unavoidable, as there is no other lens but the human one through which we are capable of viewing the world. 46 See Sadeh 2002. According to the UNESCO/COMEST Working Group on the “Ethics of Outer Space”, “[t]he main objective of the ethics of space policy is to keep in mind the place of human beings”. However, this does not refer to a cosmocentric approach; the Working Group’s considerations also appear to reflect primarily anthropocentric, at most biocentric considerations. Tellingly, the questions on which the Working Group focused were “the presence of man in space and manned flights, the development of science and space technology, the use of space technologies, protection of the environment and protection of public freedoms and cultural identities” (excluding military considerations, except for issues regarding dual use of space technologies). The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 6. In addition, a recent international study on space traffic management mentions the lack of “provisions on the environment” when speaking about the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). However, this refers to the lack of rules concerning “avoidance of pollution of the atmosphere/troposphere” only, not preservation of the environment of outer space. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 12.
16
Chapter One
development in the space sector as something which “needs to take place with reference to environment” and, conversely, to examine environmental degradation of outer space in relation to development issues.47 Despite some early efforts to introduce more environmentalist elements into the space sector,48 such an approach is still not very common today.49 This is particularly true where space law is concerned. In addition to the lack of adequate environmental concern within space law, general international environmental law has paid relatively little attention to the space sector.50 The development of a distinctively space-centered environmental vision would clearly require a far more original approach than the current study can provide. In all likelihood, this would have to draw on philosophy to a degree that would disqualify the current treatise as See Kütting 2000, p. 6. E.g., Bhatt 1979. 49 For an attempt to develop a more sustainable model for lunar exploration in particular, see Williamson 2005. The same author has proposed the adoption of an ethical code for space exploration and development along the lines of the goal of sustainable development, i.e., a balance between exploitation and protection. According to his vision, “space ethics would cover, for example, the impact of our actions in space on each other, on each other’s property, on the Earth … and on the space environment”. Williamson 2003, pp. 48–49. (These ideas have been developed further in Williamson 2006.) For another proposal concerning a space code of conduct, namely, a code of ethics for conducting business in outer space (called “Code of Ethics for Off-Earth Commerce”), see Livingston 2003. The above-mentioned proposal concerning Mars, with the formation of a “Planetary Park system” (which could be applied also to the Moon), also evinces an increasingly sustainable ideology, even with a partly cosmocentric slant: the reasons listed for the need for Martian Planetary Parks are (1) the intrinsic worth of the environment; (2) responsibility for future generations; (3) protection of sites of natural beauty; (4) utilitarian value (for the purpose of scientific investigation); and (5) historical value. Cockell–Horneck 2004. For an example of general recognition of the need to shift from anthropocentrism to more environmentalist approaches in space utilization, see Tatsuzawa 1998. 50 See, e.g., Birnie–Boyle 2002, where the protection of outer space is afforded a mere one and a half pages (pp. 534–535). In the recent “Judicial Handbook on Environmental Law” of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the term ‘environment’ has been defined in geographical terms even as narrowly as referring “to a limited area” or encompassing “the entire planet, including the atmosphere and stratosphere”. Shelton– Kiss 2006, p. 4. Hence there is no mention of the environment beyond the Earth (or environmental regulation of outer space). On the other hand, some scholars perceived already early on the potential for mutually beneficial developments within space law and international environmental law. See, e.g., Christol 1976, p. 31: “Through the peaceful and continuing use of space objects in [remote] sensing activities there will be the progressive development of international space law. With the maturity of such law there will also be a very substantial inducement to international environmental law to enlarge its expanding frontiers. The mutuality of relationships between these two areas of international law will prove to be beneficial to both” (emphasis added). 47 48
Introduction
17
a legal study. However, as historical and ideological background for the rest of this work, I take the opportunity to briefly emphasize in this introductory part the profoundly anthropocentric nature of all space activities—and space law. The anthropocentric slant of the space sector derives from the historical phenomenon of industrial development. All human activities in outer space have been made possible by achievements of technology. Accordingly, the ideology prevailing within the modern space sector emanates from the fundamental concepts which this industrial tradition entails, above all the myth of unlimited industrial development. In such a setting, nature equals resources—resources which can be utilized to promote further industrial development. In a way, these resources are taken for granted; industrial development is dependent on technical and economic capacities rather than on the natural resource base— despite the fact that many natural resources are in fact limited.51 In the space sector, the limitedness of the outer space resources which we are currently capable of utilizing cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the total resource base of outer space seems quite unlimited (to our understanding at least).52 It has even been hoped that space resources will provide a solution to the increasing shortage of resources found on Earth. The faster our technology improves, the more feasible the utilization of outer space becomes—and we surely seem eager to take all available advantage of it. Ultimately, the ideology of industrial development is based on the (absurd) thought that human society is able to achieve independence from nature.53 At the moment, the inherent extreme hostility of the space environment to humans still places significant restrictions on space activities, keeping us ‘at the mercy’ of this environment. However, the (increasingly realistic) visions of permanent space colonies, for instance, clearly reflect the familiar ideology of humans as masters of nature—even in outer space.54
See Chatterjee–Finger 1994, p. 27. Humans have found a variety of natural resources in outer space; even our own solar system is expected to contain a vast supply of virtually all of the mineral resources used extensively on Earth today. Lee 2000, p. 409. Most likely there are still numerous new resources to be found, including minerals, energy sources, and organic and nonorganic substances. 53 Chatterjee–Finger 1994, pp. 27–28. 54 See also Williamson 2005. Considering how fundamentally reliant human life is on the terrestrial environment (the Earth being the only place where we can live without having to resort to advanced technology for life support), efforts to create self-sufficient space colonies can be seen as representing a striving for not only mastery of but even independence from nature. They may also reflect an ideology which considers the entire Earth as but one resource available for human utilization; after its depletion, we can move on to exploiting other planets. Such an approach has been referred to as the “disposable planet mentality”. See Hartmann 1986, p. 122. 51 52
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Chapter One
In keeping with the ideology of industrial development, the answers proposed to environmental problems such as resource depletion and pollution typically rely on scientific progress, better technologies (technology being the application of science55) and better policies: further scientific, technological and political development is suggested to solve the very problems that development is causing.56 This is true also in the space sector where the root causes to environmental problems created by space activities are often ignored. That is by no means surprising, considering the inherent connection between technological development and the use of outer space. Moreover, modern space activities are a large and multinational business, and large-scale industries typically result in accelerated environmental destruction. The salient ideology in the space business revolves around the maximization of economic profit. While recognized as valuable objectives, waste reduction, risk management, pollution control, energy efficiency, and the like should not cut into growth; on the contrary, if at all possible, they should enhance growth.57 This, however, often is an impossible goal. In most areas—and definitely in the space sector—increased environmental awareness is an imperative without which any activity will eventually become impossible. Whether humans understand and accept these conditions and react to them soon enough is a question largely dependent upon the development of a new environmental ethic. Obviously, scientific research can contribute to creating a more environmentalist (preservationist) ideology by revealing new knowledge about natural phenomena, their interrelatedness, and importance for human activities. It can also gradually broaden our appreciation of the environment as such—including the space environment. However, scientific research alone cannot produce a new awareness. “[S]cientific research can only answer scientific questions”: it can help to implement an ethic but is not (alone) capable of establishing one.58 Neither is science capable of determining political preferences.59 The decisive issue for the acceptance of international environmental regulation may not be so much the question of states’ desire to guard their sovereignty or other considerations of what they might lose by acquiescing to internationally agreed rules on environmental protection. Some of the relevant actors might simply fail to see what they have to gain by compliance with common environmental governance. Obviously, governments are reluctant to encumber their sovereignty unless they perceive that they are getting significant enough advantages in return. Baarschers 1996, p. 27. For a more detailed account of the role and mutual relationship of science and technology, see, e.g., Skolnikoff 1993. 56 Chatterjee–Finger 1994, p. 8. 57 See ibid., p. 21. 58 Byerly 1986, p. 97. Obviously, legal science has far smaller role in the development of new attitudes than natural sciences. 59 See Underdal 2000, p. 5. 55
Introduction
19
However, international treaty negotiations (within the environmental sector in particular) have often seemed to focus primarily on the allocation of costs, while devoting little or no attention to the potential tangible benefits which will accrue from the instruments under negotiation or to how such benefits will be shared. Within such a limited perspective, the costs of environmental protection may appear as mere constraints on ‘development’ and thereby a factor which will put the states taking part in regimes combating environmental degradation (on a global scale in particular) in an unfavorable position compared to those who remain outside such regimes. Admittedly, adverse environmental impacts and the costs of alleviating them are rarely distributed ‘equally’ and some parties may lose more than they gain, even in the long run.60 Solutions to a single problem may also merely shift the risk or the impact to another domain (and, at worst, even magnify it on the way). This could be offset by guaranteeing the ‘losers’ other kinds of benefits through a linkage of international environmental efforts with economic and security-related issues, for instance.61 In the space sector, numerous stakeholders are primarily concerned about getting their share of the benefits of these activities. Also, free-riding is by no means an unknown phenomenon in this international area: many seem to assume that others will make enough effort for increased environmental safety, from which they, too, can benefit—without shouldering any of the costs. The increasing role of the commercial space industry magnifies the problems since commercial actors largely follow the reasoning of any other investment decisionmaking. The environmental effects of space activities, however, involve a time frame that often is considerably longer than that in most other investment decisions. For instance, policies remedying orbital debris may span decades, a century, or even more. Hence, it will very likely be some other generation that obtains the benefits of debris mitigation measures than the one which incurs the (potentially very high) costs.62 In this light, the current problems of the space sector in addressing environmental degradation caused by its activities are not very surprising. However, these problems need to be overcome, even quite soon, if humanity wishes to conduct activities in outer space also in the future. This study presents some options for improved environmental cooperation and decision-making in the space sector. It examines what kind of environmental problems relate to space activities and which norms of international law might be applicable in addressing these threats. This examination includes international legal instruments that address space activities directly as well as potentially relevant instruments from the sphere of international environmental law. The study goes on to present various prospects for the future development of the international regulation of
60 61 62
Susskind 1994, p. 23. Ibid., p. 36. See Greenberg 2003, p. 381.
20
Chapter One
space activities. Above all, it proposes the use of some innovative mechanisms of environmental standard-setting and implementation which could facilitate new, efficient institutional arrangements and more productive working relationships between the various stakeholders in the space sector. This book centers primarily on the possibilities for negotiating new instruments of international space law or otherwise introducing more environmentalist elements into the legal regime of outer space. Another approach would have been to study alternatives for reinterpreting the existing instruments of space law from a more modern, environmental point of view. That, however, would merit a treatise of its own and thus such aspects are only touched upon in passing in this work. The same applies to questions concerning national implementation of international space law as well as to the use of national regulation to bridge gaps in the international law of outer space: national legislation is discussed only where it is considered particularly relevant for exemplifying the implementation of international space law or augments the international legal regime. Furthermore, there are international legal aspects directly related to environmental consequences of space activities which are in this treatise not afforded attention commensurate with their importance. Liability issues are obviously of focal significance here. Extending this study to include a thorough treatment of such questions would have broadened the scope of the work excessively and hence made it quite unmanageable. Moreover, it has been questioned whether it is wise to spend what are often scarce negotiating resources on the challenging task of developing liability regimes in the first place.63 Consequently, in addition to a brief examination of the liability-related norms of UN space law, liability is touched upon mostly in the context of the polluter-pays principle only, ‘making the polluter pay’ being among the most relevant goals of any environmental liability regime.64 Despite the above limitations, the findings of this work should enable far more than limited applications. Although the focus of the study is environmental management of space activities, it has in many respects the potential to have relevance for the development of space law more generally. The analysis draws on experiences from a variety of multilateral legal regimes in different areas— bearing in mind, however, that each case has its specific characteristics, which necessitates caution when making use of analogies.65 Furthermore, this study Churchill 2003, p. 32; Brunnée 2004, p. 351. Other important aims of environmental liability typically include the compensation of victims and protection of environment, sometimes also the protection of developing countries against environmental risks. Ibid. 65 Space law has long traditions of being developed in view of analogous areas of international regulation, the law of the sea in particular. It seems that the modern space sector, characterized by increasing privatization and commercialization, could draw equally useful lessons from experiences in other fields with similar challenges; the sectors providing apt analogies might only be somewhat different than earlier. Nevertheless, 63 64
Introduction
21
tries to avoid the presupposition that the legal approach is always the best way to resolve complications in the international system. Thus, in addition to international conventions and other legal mechanisms, various less formal cooperative means for ameliorating environmental problems are discussed. Such an approach seems particularly suitable given that the space sector is a domain where legal conceptions are supplied by many other disciplines, above all, the natural sciences, politics, and economics. 1.4. The Expanding Spectrum of Stakeholders in the Space Sector 1.4.1. States In public international law, the state is still very much the foremost actor. States can enter and carry out international treaty-making negotiations and are addressed by the provisions of such instruments: international law traditionally is a system of rules created by states for states.66 Accordingly, treaties between states have even been seen as the principal form of all international cooperation. Such a perception used to fit the reality of space activities well. For decades, only states—and very few of them—were capable of carrying out activities in outer space. States entered into international space treaties under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) but practical international cooperation in the sector long remained modest. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, carried out their space programs quite independently and, furthermore, in a highly competitive setting. At the beginning of the space era, not many other states possessed any capacity to engage in space activities. Nevertheless, the UN space treaties constantly use phrases such as “province of all mankind”, “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries”, or “common heritage of mankind” when referring to outer space and the activities relating thereto. Accordingly, one would imagine that this ‘mankind’ (or humankind) plays a prominent role in the governance of space activities. In the same vein, speaking about outer space and its resources in terms of ‘global commons’67 suggests that it is the global community that is in charge of the management of these areas which fall outside the scope the law of the sea will most likely continue to be a fruitful source of analogy in many respects. For instance, as concerns the possibility of drafting a new, comprehensive space convention, the UNCLOS has been considered as a useful source of comparison, both as regards the content of the regime and experiences of the process of negotiating it. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 46. 66 Kütting 2000, p. 3. 67 The ‘global commons’ are Antarctica, outer space, the high seas and the deep
22
Chapter One
of national jurisdictions. This global community has been, first and foremost, the community of states, which has concluded international conventions for managing outer space relatively early in the history of human space activities. In practice, the language of the space treaties promises much more for the humankind as a whole than what space utilization actually provides it with. The benefits do not accrue evenly among humanity (or even the state community) in accordance with some common regime. Instead, the space sector largely follows the far less noble principles of the modern industrial economy. Furthermore, states are increasingly not the unitary rational actors of the traditional assumptions. Neither are they autonomous but embedded in a framework of interactions among numerous entities in the international system. Despite the fact that space activities continue to be extremely hazardous and costly, there exist today a variety of different actors who are willing to invest in this sector. This is obviously due to the significant potential benefits which the use of outer space entails. The universe contains a myriad of natural resources, varying from solar power to minerals in celestial bodies. Also outer space as a whole has been depicted as a resource: one need only consider, for instance, the possibilities that the mere existence of Earth orbits provides for satellite activities. Now that technological development has enabled the utilization of space also for those capable of lesser investments, states comprise only a part of the global network of entities active in the space sector. In such a setting, the management of space activities by states alone is proving increasingly complicated and inefficient. Indeed, states are facing serious legitimacy problems in the space sector. In order to retain their focal position, states need to demonstrate that they are relevant agents also as regards the new challenges confronted in this area. They have not succeeded very well here, however. The international legal instruments thus far adopted for the regulation of space activities have mostly proven far too vague, and the state community has failed to reach agreement on new instruments (other than legally non-binding declarations and the like) for some decades already. Moreover, considering that states have faced major difficulties in achieving substantial improvements in any natural conditions of global magnitude, their possibilities in the environmental management of outer space seem less than promising. Nevertheless, in the formation of the international law of outer space, the focal organ still is the United Nations. It was originally founded for very different purposes than solving today’s global crises, which center around environmental and development issues rather than questions of world peace.68 As an organization of states, the UN also directly reflects the problems related to states and their role in the international system. One is the fact that there seabed. See, e.g., Kegley–Wittkopf 1999, p. 316. For a more detailed treatment of the global commons, see Vogler 2000. 68 See Chatterjee–Finger 1994, p. 111.
Introduction
23
are many kinds of states. For instance, although sovereign states formally are all equal, some of them are in reality far more influential and active in the space sector and, accordingly, have much greater practical interests in the international regulation of this area. In addition to being ‘big business’ economically, space activities play a major role politically. This was particularly evident during the Cold War in the ‘space race’ between the US and the Soviet Union, but the political and strategic relevance of space by no means vanished at the end of the Cold War.69 The space sector also needs to cope with the global differences in development. Despite the global commons rhetoric, the relationship between more and less developed areas (‘the North’ and ‘the South’) is most often depicted in terms of conflict. Outer space as an environment and a resource is typically perceived as some sort of a limited ‘pie’ of rights, to which all states aspire. However, such rights often appear in practice as something very close to a right to destroy and pollute the environment if needed (in the name of utilization). Conflicts will unavoidably arise, as more or less all states today share the same basic ideology of industrial development, for the purposes of which outer space is seen as a mere resource available for exploitation by all who have the necessary means. This is only likely to intensify the competition for the limited possibilities. In such a situation, it is no surprise that the North, which has the means to conduct space activities, is eager to perceive outer space and its resources as common property, available on the basis of the ‘first come, first served’ principle. The South, on the other hand, is concerned about being guaranteed adequate possibilities for equal benefits either now or in the future. Southern states expect technical assistance to enable them to utilize outer space, the reservation of ‘their share’ for possible future use, or financial compensation for allowing the exploitation of ‘their’ resources by others.70 Typically, those states have also been in favor of the inclusion of liability regimes in international environmental agreements whereas the North has more often resisted provisions to that end.71 Environmental degradation is making the picture increasingly complicated: 69 Quite the contrary: it has been estimated that the strategic relevance of outer space is only increasing as the role of information and hence satellite telecommunications, remote sensing and satellite navigation systems are more important than ever. Also, the modern military relies essentially on high technology, space technology included. Hobe 2004(a), pp. 40–41. 70 An interesting case in this respect is the relatively recent ‘innovation’ of reserving satellite frequency spectrum and orbital slots for future use and/or subsequently renting them out to other users. This is done by filing with the ITU proposed satellite systems which only exist on the paper, as a mere registration of a satellite system with the ITU is enough to hold a slot open. The result has been a severe backlog of applications at the ITU and, to some extent, blocking of access to spectrum and orbital resources. This so-called ‘paper satellite’ problem will be discussed in more detail below. 71 Brunnée 2004, p. 351.
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Chapter One
if space activities need to be limited already in the name of environmental protection, the prospects for the current non-spacefaring nations to realize their ‘reserved’ rights in the future do not look too bright. As a matter of fact, increased environmental standards could generate even more benefits for the technologically most developed nations and thereby widen the gap between the North and the South. If, for instance, technical standards or pollution reductions are made mandatory, this will give a competitive advantage to the countries which can afford the technology needed to comply with such norms. Moreover, such requirements would necessitate further development of technology, which is likely to create still further competitive advantage. Hence, it seems inevitable that tensions between the environment and development cannot be averted in the space sector, nor can a setting be avoided where many of the key issues pit developed against developing countries. A positive view of international competition in the development of space facilities is that it stimulates scientific and technological progress—and did so already at the time when practically only the two superpowers were capable of conducting space activities. The particular industrial production which space activities tend to promote is military-induced: the link between space technologies and military applications is obvious. Nearly all space technology is at least potentially dual-use (military and civilian). Business, industry and the military pursue the same goals in many areas, because they share the same core values of industrial development. Accordingly, governments may include military advisers in their delegations to international treaty negotiations, for instance. Unfortunately, military applications have contributed significantly to environmental degradation worldwide (and even in outer space): the military is one of the largest polluters in terms of the amount of waste produced and energy consumed. Interestingly, while trying to make sense of themselves in a world where the importance of traditional military security is eroding, many military-industrial complexes have been converted for use in the space industry. 1.4.2. Other Entities In addition to states, the other entities which currently occupy significant positions in the space sector comprise a variety of sub- and transnational actors. They play major roles both as agents and targets of governance efforts. Among these actors are intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), both those operating on a global scale (such as the International Telecommunication Union—ITU—in space telecommunications) and those working on a regional basis (such as the European Space Agency, ESA).72 Some IGOs are concerned with international
72 For more information on the ITU, see the International Telecommunication Union website. On the role of the ITU in the space sector in general, see, e.g., Noll
Introduction
25
regulation of space-related activities. For instance, the ITU has developed an intricate international regulatory system to guarantee undisturbed telecommunication activities—including those that are space based.73 The primary purpose of some other IGOs, such as ESA or international weather satellite organizations, is to undertake joint operational space activities. (Obviously such cooperation necessitates the adoption of some international regulation in most cases.74) The spectrum of both operational and regulatory space organizations is indicative of the extreme risks and costs involved in space utilization.75 There are also different kinds of non-state actors trying to influence developments in the space sector not only domestically but, increasingly, internationally as well. Some of these can be characterized as space-related interest groups but most are groups that have an interest in space activities only among other issues in their respective areas of operation. These actors include environmental organizations, scientific associations, as well as the vast business sector. The effectiveness of non-state actors in their attempts to influence domestic and international developments varies widely according to their funding, focus, lobbying skills, means of exercising pressure, and so on.76 Governments may even have an interest in involving these actors in political processes, for they often possess special expertise which governments find advantageous to be channeled into decision-making. Furthermore, their inclusion may serve as a tool to reveal relevant societal views, yet in a manageable way, which can enhance the decision-makers’ sensitivity to domestic opposition and support. Involvement of the nongovernmental sector can also contribute to legitimizing governmental decisions and build commitment and loyalty, which may, for example, facilitate subsequent (national) implementation of (internationally) agreed obligations.77 1999. For more information on ESA, see the European Space Agency website. For an assessment of the role of international organizations in the law of outer space in general, see Kerrest 1999. 73 There are various other non-space specific international legal regimes which can also influence space activities, for example those in international trade and intellectual property rights. Worth mentioning here in particular is the World Trade Organization (WTO), as satellite communications are today also an object of global trade. See Salin 2000, pp. 69. Another example of potentially relevant regulation is that enacted by the European Union. 74 E.g., the Convention for the Establishment of the European Space Agency. 75 von der Dunk 2002, p. 445. The focal role of IGOs in the space sector has also been reflected in the UN space treaties. For instance, several of them allow IGOs (provided that they fulfill certain conditions) to become parties to the treaty regimes. See Art. 6 of the 1968 Rescue Agreement; Art. XXII of the 1972 Liability Convention; Art. VII of the 1975 Registration Convention; and Art. 16 of the 1979 Moon Treaty. 76 See Birnie–Boyle 2002, p. 67. 77 Stokke 1997, p. 56. It has even been argued that the inclusion of nongovernmental actors in treaty negotiations may represent “a wider trend towards viewing international society in terms broader than a community of states alone and in the progressive democ-
26
Chapter One
For non-state actors, their inclusion in the formulation of foreign policy of a state may heighten their influence nationally. Moreover, the fact that states promote (or at least permit) the participation of such groups in the domestic preparation of international accords enhances the possibilities of those groups to be involved in subsequent international deliberations as observers, for instance. Some nongovernmental groups have gained significant roles even within international organizations, achieving not only observer but consultative status of some sort. This may give them an opportunity to influence negotiation processes, even for legally binding international instruments.78 The expertise and contacts these groups gain at the international level are likely to further enhance their influence,79 particularly if they are capable of coordinating their policies and taking cooperative action.80 The space sector is inherently international. Due to the high costs of space activities, there exists today plenty of inter-state cooperation, as well as cooperation involving private, commercial actors. The importance of the latter entities has increased very fast and they have a major interest in the regulation of space activities.81 The focal role of the private sector today is also to be seen in the significant development of national space legislation in many states recently. Nevertheless, domestic processes are often largely ignored when analyzing the adoption of international treaties, although the presumed effects of international regulation at the domestic level are obviously a major factor in determining the national standpoints in treaty negotiations.82 In areas where domestic political attention is slack or diffuse, government authorities may find it difficult to identify their exact interests, which understandably complicates international treaty negotiations. This seems to be still the case in many countries as regards space activities. Moreover, even those states which are very active in the space sector can encounter problems in defining their preferences, due to the fact that
ratization of international norm making process”. Training Manual on International Environmental Law 2006, p. 10. 78 Birnie–Boyle 2002, p. 67. In the 1992 Rio Conference, for instance, nongovernmental organizations were allowed to take part in the work of the preparatory committees in a significant manner. Ibid., p. 42. 79 Stokke 1997, p. 56. 80 Consider, for instance, the networking of NGOs at the Rio Conference. Birnie– Boyle 2002, p. 67. 81 The first request by a private company to conduct space activities (suborbital tests) was presented to the US Government by Space Services Incorporated of Texas in 1982. The company launched a rocket later the same year. Henaku 1990, p. 46. 82 Stokke 1997, p. 55. National developments are relevant for international law also in that implementation of international agreements remains the responsibility of national governments; without effective implementation, even the most innovative international regimes can be even worse than worthless by giving an erroneous impression that ‘all is well’ when the reality may be quite the opposite. Freestone 1999(b), p. 360.
Introduction
27
space activities sometimes invoke highly emotional reactions which can blur the big picture. Occasionally, governmental interests and those of the national space industry (or other domestic stakeholders) may also collide. Despite the traditional focus on states as stakeholders at the international level, domestic politics and non-state actors increasingly affect international developments. Although nongovernmental entities still mostly lack formal standing in the international legal system and, accordingly, a formal role in international treaty-making, their influence may in fact be considerable. The private sector comprises a central part of what space activities are today and has significantly shaped the way these activities (and even space as an environment) is looked at. Private companies are no longer mere national-level lobbyists but partners of governments globally. Sometimes governments even seem to have turned into spokespersons for business. Such contradictions between the formal and the actual status of the different stakeholders in the space sector are proving increasingly problematic—not least from the point of view of international norm-making. One more type of actors with increasing influence even internationally in many areas is interest groups of individuals. Pressure from such groups can affect governmental policies and their implementation significantly.83 Unlike in many other fields of globalized activities, civic activism in the space sector has been rather modest. This is definitely the case as regards space-related environmental questions. Given that the role of grass-roots groups has traditionally been moderate in foreign affairs, this is no surprise, however. Foreign policy issues which substantially deal with state security in its different forms tend to be relatively unfamiliar to the public (if compared with domestic politics). Such activities are also traditionally presumed to require stability and consistency in policy, best ensured by as extensive centralization as possible.84 The space sector is inherently concerned with matters involving significant security and military interests and, furthermore, high levels of scientific expertise that is difficult for the non-expert to understand. Moreover, considering that a focal inspiration for space enthusiasts has always been that of exploration, even conquest of new worlds, it is not surprising that neither the resulting environmental degradation nor the idea of the non-weaponization of outer space evokes great general emotional resonance.85 Nevertheless, the situation seems to be gradually changing even in this respect. There are some nongovernmental and non-industry interest groups Stibrany 1998, p. 132. See Stokke 1997, p. 55. 85 See Stibrany 1998, p. 133. International space law only prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbits (Outer Space Treaty, Art. IV.1). Hence, the stationing of other weapons in outer space or its use for military purposes is not prohibited, except where the Moon and other celestial bodies are concerned; they are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Art. IV.2). 83 84
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which consider themselves stakeholders in the space sector and thus aspire to influence policy-making in this area, such as the Planetary Society, “a nonprofit organization that promotes exploration of the solar system and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence”.86 Nongovernmental actors with a long history in the space sector include international organizations of scientists and legal scholars, such as the International Council for Science (ICSU),87 International Astronomical Union (IAU),88 International Astronautical Federation (IAF),89 and International Institute of Space Law (IISL).90 All of these organizations have on many occasions also drawn attention to environmental problems in the use of outer space. Additionally, there are nongovernmental organizations concerned with the weaponization of and use of nuclear power in outer space,91 both of which have considerable potential environmental implications. The environmental movement concerned with space utilization is, however, still quite fragmented and hence cannot yet provide a counter-force to the strong economic-military-political mainstream ideology of this sector. From an environmental point of view, such a counter-force would be very welcome.92 Unlike the space industry and states, such groups usually have no economic interest in environmental protection and hence are more likely to pursue genuinely environmental interests.
See the Planetary Society website. The Planetary Society was founded in 1980. See the International Council for Science website. The ICSU was established in 1931 as the International Council of Scientific Unions (it changed its name in 1998). 88 See the International Astronomical Union website. The IAU was founded in 1919. 89 See the International Astronautical Federation website. The IAF was founded in 1961. 90 See the International Institute of Space Law website. The IISL was founded in 1960. 91 See, e.g., the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation website; the Union of Concerned Scientist website; and the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space website. Greenpeace also has a Stop Star Wars campaign; see the Stop Star Wars website. For a general assessment of the role of NGOs in space arms control, see Stibrany 1998. 92 Interestingly, some international environmental organizations have been solicited for input in the environmental impact assessment processes of space missions in the US at least. For instance, Friends of the Earth, the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, and Greenpeace were consulted in the preparation of EIA documentation for the ongoing New Horizons mission to Pluto. See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the New Horizons Mission 2005, Vol. 1, Chapter 6. 86 87
Chapter Two
Environmental Problems Related to Space Activities Space exploration is a polluting industry in various ways and in all its phases.1 As is typical for all industrial production, the production of space technology and the transport of its products on Earth are far from being environmentally friendly activities. Also, the launching stage is a polluter: it produces noise pollution, dust and emissions. A recent example of the adverse effects of launch activities is provided by a study which claims that launches at Russia’s space base in Baikonur, Kazakhstan, cause serious health problems among people living below the rockets’ flight path. For instance, the levels of endocrine disease and blood disorders in children are reported to be over twice the regional average. This is due to highly toxic propellants (notably hydrazine) which are dumped onto the land located along the flight trajectories: by a rough estimation, dozens of liters of unburned fuel is sprayed over several square kilometers of land with every launch. Local environmental groups have campaigned against the polluting launches, but with little success.2 Baikonur Cosmodrome is operated by the Russian Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) which leases it from Kazakhstan. Also both NASA and ESA pay to have craft launched from Baikonur.3 Considering that Baikonur ranks among 1
As the UNESCO Working Group on the “Ethics of Outer Space” pointed out, “space technology … represent[s] a factor of damage to the circumsterrestrial [sic], terrestrial and planetary environments”. The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 7. However, it can also provide an effective tool for the protection of the environment. E.g., Lebeau 2000, pp. 62–63. 2 “Russian Space Agency Denies Launch Site Causes Sickness Among Local Children” 2005. 3 These agencies explain that they only buy services at Baikonur and cannot be held
29
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the busiest launch sites in the world (being the world’s largest space launch facility) and, accordingly, is a considerable source of income for the Russian government, it is no surprise that Rosaviakosmos rejects the conclusions of the study indicating health problems:4 according to Rosaviakosmos, space activities at Baikonur do not impact directly on the health of nearby residents. However, the agency confirms that heptyl, a substance used for launches, causes environmental degradation. Nevertheless, Rosaviakosmos points out that all possible rocket fuels are environmentally harmful and declares that it does not intend to replace heptyl with other substances.5 Instead, it professes to be improving the ecological characteristics of existing launch vehicles6 and has signed an agreement with Kazakhstan which calls for the creation of an “ecologically safe space rocket complex”.7 Furthermore, on its way to outer space, a space vehicle necessarily travels through the atmosphere, where discharges from rocket motors deteriorate the ozone layer, diminishing the protection for life on Earth against ultraviolet radiation. Another environmental impact in this respect is acid rain. All rockets release or create products that contribute to depletion of the ozone layer, such as oxides of nitrogen.8 The potential threats to the ozone layer associated with responsible for possible problems associated with the site. Giles 2005. Considering that most other major launch bases used by these agencies send rockets out over the sea, one could even get the impression that for NASA and ESA the health of the Kazakh people is not among the top priorities. 4 Ibid. 5 “Officials Deny Russian Spaceport A Threat” 2005. 6 Unlike the current Proton rocket, which uses a toxic fuel, new Russian rockets are to be powered by a cleaner fuel mixture of liquid oxygen and kerosene. See “Kazakhs, Russians Create Space Venture” 2005, and “Russia and Kazakhstan to Build Commercial Rocket” 2005. 7 However, the primary purpose of the Russian-Kazakh agreement was apparently to enable Russia to continue to use Baikonur. “Space Complex Bill Sent to Duma” 2005. Considering the volume of launch activities in Baikonur, prospects for any improvements in the health of the local residents seem rather poor: in 2004, Russia carried out approximately 40 per cent of all rocket launches in the world. Of these about three-fourths (approx. 30 per cent of all launches globally) were conducted at the Baikonur Cosmodrome. “Russia Led In 2004 Space Launches” 2005. Moreover, Kazakhstan has announced a plan to build another space complex for launching small civilian spacecraft into low Earth orbit. “Kazakhs Plan New Space Complex” 2005. 8 Rothblatt 1993, p. 308. However, solid-fuel rockets, such as have been utilized in launches of the US Space Shuttle and Titan-4, as well as the Ariane 5 (ESA), are the biggest source of rocket pollutants that damage the atmosphere. The solid fuels contain, i.a., chlorine, which is a major contributor to depletion of the ozone layer. Christol 1995, pp. 254, 258. Another particularly harmful component of solid rocket propellants is aluminum, aluminum oxide being produced as a major exhaust by-product. Such
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space activities were acknowledged already decades ago.9 It has been argued, however, that the degradation of the atmosphere caused by space activities is negligible.10 In any case, the most severe environmental hazards in the space sector are those taking place after the launch phase. These are also the ones which this work concentrates on. 2.1. Space Debris The most prominent environmental problem connected with space activities is space debris. ‘Space debris’ is a general term referring to all tangible man-made materials in space other than functional space objects. Debris thus includes spent satellites themselves, ejected instrument covers, upper stages (orbital transfer stages), fragments thereof, etc., that is objects which originate from what were functional space objects but which no longer serve a useful purpose.11 The definition also encompasses leaking fuel and coolant droplets,12 paint
exhaust has “the potential to perturb atmospheric chemistry” and may contribute to the hazards of orbital activities as well. Aluminum oxide can act as a nucleation site for condensation of hydrochlorid acid, leading to increasing acidity, or can be further converted into aluminum chloride, which is a toxic irritant capable of affecting the mucous membranes. Christol 1993, p. 264. Particularly where long-term exposure is concerned, the aluminum oxide dust ejected by solid rocket motors can also cause erosion of exterior surfaces, chemical contamination, and degradation in operations of such vulnerable components as optical windows and solar panels. Greenberg 2003, p. 385. Even the release of such an ‘innocent’ chemical compound as water (as in Space Shuttle operations) at 100–200 km above the Earth can cause interference with ionospheric conditions, resulting in disruption to radio communications, for instance. Matte 1989, pp. 424–425. Resorting to alternative fuels, e.g., liquid fuels, would presumably significantly reduce the adverse effects of launch activities on the environment. Christol 1995, pp. 258–259. 9 The concern was reflected also in the Environmental Impact Statement for the Space Shuttle Program in the late 1970s, for instance. See Christol 1976. 10 See Perek 2001, p. 422 (referring to a study on the impact of aircraft and space launches on atmosphere and climate prepared by the French Academy of Sciences and the French National Air and Space Academy in 1998). 11 In addition to man-made space debris, there is also naturally occurring debris: meteoroids. Initially, the particulate environment against which satellites were designed was that of natural debris. Today, however, the population of debris that dominates concerns is clearly that of man-made origin. 12 For instance, in the 1990s, NASA observed an unexpectedly dense population of small particles in orbits around altitudes of 900–1000 km. This was determined to be to a considerable degree a consequence of the release of NaK (sodium potassium) coolant from thermoelectric Soviet reactors in the 1980s. Johnson 2005(a), p. 554.
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flakes13 and microparticulate matter,14 as well as tools dropped during space walks and garbage dumped in outer space by manned space missions, for instance. Hence everything launched into outer space has the potential to become space debris.15 Such items are occasionally also called space refuse, space junk or space trash.16 However, no international legal instrument gives a definition of space debris. None of the UN space treaties even expressly mentions the term ‘debris’. Nevertheless, it has been used in international law: in 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibited nuclear explosions in these environs as well as “in any other environment if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted”.17 Although international law does not define the term ‘space debris’, several definitions of it have been developed at the international level. These include the definition given by the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), according to which orbital debris is “any man-made Earth-orbiting object which is non-functional with no reasonable expectation of assuming or resuming its intended function, or any other function for which it is or can be expected to be authorized, including fragments and parts thereof. Orbital debris includes nonoperational spacecraft, spent rocket bodies, material released during planned space operations, and fragments generated by satellite and upper stage breakup due to explosions and collisions”.18 A Technical Report on Space Debris (1999) by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS uses the following definition: “Space debris are all manmade objects, including their fragments and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, in Earth orbit or re-entering the dense layers of the atmosphere that are non-functional with no reasonable expectation of their being able to assume or resume their intended functions or any other functions for which they are or can be authorized.”19 The
13
Coating degradation and the chipping of paints and their binder agents is largely due to exposure to ultraviolet radiation and atomic oxygen. Expansion and contraction stresses related to major changes in temperature also contribute to the effect. Baker 1988, p. 187. 14 Microparticulate matter released during space operations includes particle and gas emissions, water dumps, cabin leakage and outgassing of heavy molecules. Ibid. These forms of pollution are relatively harmless and can usually be averted by protective shielding. “Space Debris: assessing the risk” 2005. 15 Baker 1988, pp. 207–208. 16 The term ‘debris’ could possibly also be replaced by ‘pollutant’, ‘contaminant’, or ‘flotsam’, for instance. See Fasan 1993, p. 282. Even space ‘garbage’ and ‘wreckage’ have been used. See Jasentuliyana 1998, p. 139 and Góbriel 1987, p. 113, respectively. 17 Art. I.1. This instrument is known also as the Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty. 18 Position Paper on Orbital Debris 2001, p. 3. 19 Para. 6.
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Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) employs a more concise definition: “[s]pace debris are all man made objects including fragments and elements thereof, in earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non functional”.20 As the definitions imply, there are many sources of space debris. One is space vehicles which have ceased to function: in principle, entire, intact satellites, for instance, are considered space debris if they are no longer functional but only adrift in outer space.21 This may, however, be a more complicated issue than it might seem at first sight. Pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty, a state on whose registry a space object is carried has jurisdiction and control over the object.22 It has been proposed that this implies that the same state (and only that state) is also the one entitled to determine whether its space object is functional or not. Although others might perceive a space object as completely useless, it could in reality still have some value. An inactive space object may, for instance, be in reserve for future activities, carry valuable classified information, or be of some other interest unknown to other states. Hence the criterion of ‘functionality’ (at least if understood in purely technical terms) may not be the most feasible one for distinguishing space debris from other space objects; even seemingly nonfunctional space objects may constitute valuable assets.23 Accordingly, the Draft Convention on Space Debris adopted by the International Law Association in 1994 defines space debris as “man-made objects in outer space, other than active or otherwise useful satellites, when no change can reasonably be expected in these conditions in the foreseeable future”.24 Hence at least this instrument takes into account other criteria than ‘objective’ functionality when determining the usefulness of spacecraft.25 Furthermore, space debris may be generated by explosions (intentional or accidental), collisions, or degradation of spacecraft.26 It has been suggested that
IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Section 3.1. It has been pointed out that “[w]ithin three weeks of the launch of Sputnik I, the Earth satellite population consisted of only space debris: the inoperative Sputnik I and the derelict rocket stages which placed it into orbit”. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, pp. 30–31. 22 Art. VIII. 23 Perek 2005, p. 588. 24 Art. 1.c; emphasis added. 25 The expression “or otherwise useful” was added to the article precisely because of the above criticism. For a more detailed assessment of the discussion concerning this matter prior to the adoption of the ILA Draft Convention, see Report of the 66th Conference of the ILA 1994, pp. 309–311. 26 Examples of debris generated by intentional explosions include debris from military weapons testing, such as anti-satellite tests, and deliberate explosion to prevent recovery of certain satellites. Unintentional explosions usually result from a propulsion 20 21
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space debris could even be deliberately introduced into outer space in order to prevent access to a particular orbital region.27 Such actions will hopefully remain mostly hypothetical. Currently, about 9800 man-made objects are being tracked in orbit;28 of these only some 600–700 are operational spacecraft, leaving 93 per cent of the population space debris.29 The rate of increase in space debris has recently been some two per cent yearly.30 The figures only include officially catalogued objects, i.e., objects larger than 10–20 cm in diameter for low Earth orbit (LEO)31—altitudes up to 1500–2000 km—and one meter in diameter in
system failure. Baker 1988, p. 186. The most frequent objects to explode are cast-off launch vehicle upper stages (most launch vehicle lower stages fall back into the atmosphere and burn up). Spacecraft are usually designed so that there is spare fuel available to secure a successful launch. Once the upper stages are discarded, any extra fuel typically remains in pressurized tanks, which with the wear and tear over time become increasingly susceptible to explosions. “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005. Engine failures during operations are also known to have resulted in satellite explosions. The cause of many explosions has remained unidentified. Baker 1988, p. 186. The first known accidental break-up of a satellite occurred in 1961, when an Ablestar rocket exploded for an unknown reason, creating hundreds of pieces of debris. Matte 1989, p. 422. One of the more recent examples is the explosion of the third stage of a Chinese Long March 4 rocket on 11 March 2000, which generated over 300 fragments detectable from Earth. Flury 2000, p. 40. 27 For instance, a state could deem some regions valuable to its enemies and therefore decide to litter them with so much space debris that entering these regions would be dangerous. The calculated placement of space debris could also interfere with surveillance activities. Space debris could even be used as an offensive weapon: planned collisions between space debris and military targets could cause significant loss or damage. Baker 1988, p. 196. Hence, one could destroy or incapacitate very sophisticated spacecraft with, e.g., loads of rock or metal pellets only. This could be very costly, however. Moreover, it has been pointed out that “[e]ven if you were to put tens of thousands of particles out there, it would pale in comparison to what is already out there”. Stenger 2002 (interview of Nick Johnson from NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office). Functional space objects could also be used for offensive purposes by exploding them into a cloud of space debris. Apparently, at least 10 known satellite fragmentations have been deliberate, the intention being to destroy other satellites. They have been carried out by the Soviet Union and the US. See Williamson 2006, p. 52. 28 Orbital Debris Quarterly News 2006, p. 9. 29 Flury 2000, p. 40. The percentage of operational spacecraft is constantly getting smaller. 30 Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 2. Thanks to international mitigation efforts, the rate of debris production was reduced in the mid-1990s (after a sharp increase in the early 1990s). Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 4. Currently, it seems to be increasing slightly again. Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 2. 31 In recent years, however, even much smaller particles in LEO have been catalogued, thanks to technological progress. Johnson 2001, p. 13.
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the Geostationary Orbit (GEO).32 Such objects are tracked and maintained in a data base by the US Space Command’s Space Surveillance Network (SSN).33 The most common source of space debris is on-orbit break-ups: over 40 per cent of the catalogued objects (and approximately 85 per cent of all space debris larger than five centimeters in diameter) consist of fragments from breakups in space;34 some 17 per cent are derelict rocket bodies discarded after use;
32
The geostationary orbit is situated above the Equator at an altitude of approx. 35 786 km. It is referred to as ‘GEO’ (Geostationary Earth Orbit) but quite often also as ‘GSO’ (Geostationary Satellite Orbit). However, GSO should be used only for ‘Geosynchronous Orbit’, of which the geostationary orbit is a special orbit with a zero inclination. Although satellites on all GSOs will complete their orbits in the same time as it takes for the Earth to rotate around its axis, a satellite in GEO—in principle—only moves in a west-east direction (hence staying ‘stationary’ in relation to a particular point on Earth). Satellites in other GSOs are in inclined orbits, thus moving north and south of the equator over the 24 hours. According to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (see more below), GEO is an “Earth orbit having zero inclination and zero eccentricity, whose orbital period is equal to the Earth’s sidereal period” (Section 3.3.3). 33 Position Paper on Orbital Debris 2001, pp. 2–3. The SSN tracks and catalogues space objects in the most systematic and comprehensive way globally. For a more detailed description of the SSN, see Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 16. Many other countries also have space surveillance capabilities and maintain registers of space objects. ESA has the Database and Information System Characterizing Objects in Space (DISCOS), which contains information from the SSN as well as from European tracking facilities. ESA is also developing a Space Debris Avoidance Service. Russia has its own Space Surveillance System and maintains a catalog of its space object observations. However, the Russian database is not widely available and the capacity of the observation systems remains unclear. Ibid., p. 17. See also Blagun et al. 2001. Currently, the US and Russian networks are the only global observation networks for space traffic monitoring. Other countries focus primarily on monitoring their own space assets. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 35. China maintains a space object catalog, for which it has been using data from the SSN. Now it seems to be striving for self-sufficiency: it has recently announced the establishment of its first Space Target and Debris Observation and Research Center. “China Establishes First Space Trash observation Center” 2005. Also Canada is developing new space object tracking systems. Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 17. In 2004 Japan opened a new radar station solely for space debris observation in LEO. Ibid., p. 18. All this improves the overall space-tracking capability. However, the development of independent surveillance capacities has also been considered an indication of increased mistrust internationally. Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 9. Moreover, the US decided in 2004 to impose restrictions on the provision of information on the orbital debris characteristics of spacecraft and debris (for fear that they could be employed, i.a., to damage or jam satellites). This has increased calls for collaborative international space monitoring capability. Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 18. 34 For more detailed information on the causes of such fragmentations for example, see Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, pp. 11–12.
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and about 22 per cent are defunct spacecraft. The remaining approximately 13 per cent consist of ‘operational debris’, i.e., mission-related objects released during space operations.35 Furthermore, there is a much larger number of smaller (uncatalogued) objects in orbit that cannot be observed directly but are nevertheless equally capable of puncturing spacecraft due to hypervelocities.36 Of greatest concern are objects between one centimeter and ten centimeters in diameter, referred to as ‘the lethal population’ (or ‘deadly objects’) as they cannot be individually tracked or catalogued but are capable of causing catastrophic damage if they collide with other space objects.37 The expected lifetimes for debris depend primarily on its location: in low Earth orbits, the air drag of the upper reaches of the atmosphere will eventually cause the debris to decelerate and heat up so that it breaks up under friction, whereas in higher orbits the atmospheric drag is virtually nil.38 Despite the cleaning effect of the atmospheric drag, it has been calculated that if removal of LEO spacecraft at the end of their lifetime is not conducted within 25 years or so, we can expect a marked increase in the number of accidental collisions later in this century.39 Interestingly, it has been discovered that greenhouse gasses produced on Earth result in a decline in temperature and density of the thermosphere (the uppermost part of atmosphere, above the altitude of about 90 km) and thereby reduce atmospheric drag. This in turn may allow space objects to remain in orbit longer. The positive result is that operational satellites save on fuel; the other side of the coin is that space debris becomes more persistent. It has been estimated that the density of the thermosphere may be as much as halved by the end of this century, meaning that orbital lifetimes of objects can be extended by up to 24 per cent (depending on the altitude and prevailing solar activity). What is most alarming is that the number of on-orbit collisions would increase exponentially.40 35 Position Paper on Orbital Debris 2001, p. 3. These percentages have remained roughly the same. 36 For more detailes on the velocities of objects in Earth orbits, see below. 37 “Space Debris: assessing the risk” 2005. According to one relatively recent estimation, the number of non-catalogued objects may be more than 500 000. “Spotlight On Space Debris” 2004. The population of small (intermediate) debris larger than 1 cm in size is estimated to comprise at least 100 000 objects. Flury 2000, p. 42. 38 Ibid. As altitude increases, drag diminishes. Above the altitude of 600 km its effect is already so weak that debris there can remain a threat for decades, centuries, or even thousands of years. Orbital Debris: a technical assessment 1995, p. 30. 39 “Accidental Collisions of Cataloged Satellites Identified” 2005, p. 2. 40 Emmert et al. 2005. It has been predicted that at the current rate of satellite launches and de-orbiting maneuvers, the number of space objects larger than one cm will increase by 30 per cent and those larger than ten cm by ten per cent by the year 2100. Lewis 2005, p. 248. The consequent increase in the number of on-orbit collisions would be about 17 per cent. “Space Debris Poses Collision Threat” 2005. The effects of longer orbital lifetimes and rising collision rates are expected to be most critical at
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37
As the origin, form, size and lifetime of space debris vary, so do its effects. Even astronomers complain about the harm that debris causes by hindering observations of far away stars and galaxies from the surface of the Earth.41 However, this does not exactly fall under the scope of the term ‘environmental damage’ as discussed in this work. Far more relevant to the present study is, for instance, the fact that debris may interfere with the radio communications of functional satellites and other spacecraft and disturb the receiving frequency bands on which such sensitive instruments as (Earth-based) radio telescopes operate.42 Even more significant a problem is the risk of collisions, particularly between space debris and orbiting spacecraft, which can cause significant human and economic losses. The harm that space debris may cause to an operational satellite can range from minor damage to total loss of the spacecraft.43 Fragmentation debris produced by collisions poses the most severe threat to space activities. Collisions can also release radioactive contamination and other harmful substances.44 The potential damage of even the tiniest debris particle circulating in outer space derives from the fact that impact velocities in orbits are enormous (0.1– 0.8 km/s in GEO; 6–14 km/s in LEO);45 at best (or worst) debris is traveling about 17 times faster than a machine gun bullet.46 Velocities of space debris also vary according to their mode of movement. Debris can move with orbital velocity, be falling to Earth—in which case it shows lower than orbital velocity— or move faster than orbital velocity—at escape velocity—orbiting in an outward bound manner.47 The danger of damage lies mostly in objects moving at orbital
altitudes between 250 and 1200 km, which are of great value for human space activities. Lewis 2005, p. 248. 41 Traces of orbiting debris and functional man-made space objects are frequently recorded in photographs taken by ground-based telescopes. Matte 1989, p. 424. Multisatellite systems and possible large solar reflectors can cause particularly intense light pollution. Pursuant to recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) in 1999, “[a]ttention should be given to preserving or restoring astronomical observation conditions to a state as close to natural as possible by any practicable means”. Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1999, para. 73. 42 Baker 1988, p. 194. 43 The various contributing factors include at least the mass, relative speed and impact angle of the debris particle, as well as the mass, material composition and structural composition of the satellite in question. 44 Ibid., p. 186. For a more detailed assessment of the risks related to the use of nuclear power in outer space, see below. 45 Jahku 1992, p. 206. 46 “Spotlight On Space Debris” 2004. 47 Objects moving at escape velocity ultimately fall into the Sun, get caught by
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velocity around the Earth, as they will continue to circle it practically indefinitely if not intentionally removed or redirected.48 Due to the extreme velocities, a particle no more than one cm in diameter can easily incapacitate an entire functional satellite, and an even smaller piece of debris entering the body of an active satellite can trigger a fatal reaction.49 Accordingly, near-Earth missions (manned space missions like the ISS in particular50) use ever-more sophisticated shields against debris impacts. However, this is expensive.51 Moreover, it is practically impossible to prevent damage in the case of impact by a piece of debris larger than one centimeter.52 Even collisions with less fatal consequences result in more debris, as larger pieces fragment into smaller ones, increasing the risk of further collisions. Furthermore, space debris experts worry that (particularly in orbits between 700 and 2000 km) debris pollution will increase to such a level that at some time in the near future a collision might start a chain reaction which will cause small pieces of debris to tear apart larger objects in a cascading event.53 Especially in such a setting, the explosion of a satellite could be catastrophic also for any neighboring ones. The potential severity of the space debris problem was realized already in late 1970s and early 1980s.54 Today, inconsequential impacts of small meteoroids and man-made debris are routine for most operational spacecraft.55 The probability of a significant collision with space debris still remains relatively low, although as another celestial body of the Solar System, or even move into interstellar space beyond the Solar System. Fasan 1993, p. 286. 48 Ibid. 49 Jahku 1992, p. 209. Examples of damage that a 1-cm object can cause include penetrating the pressurized crew module of a space station, killing the crew and causing the station to break up; piercing the window of a spacecraft, killing its occupants and seriously damaging the craft itself; and disabling or destroying a satellite in GEO. A fragment no more than 0.5 mm in size could puncture a standard spacesuit and kill an astronaut. Baker 1988, p. 188. 50 NASA has recently announced its intention to install more protective shielding on the ISS. It has also studied possibilities to prevent the accumulation of debris in the orbital path of the station. Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 4. The ISS is protected by continuous tracking by ground radar of orbital debris and the use of collision avoidance maneuvers where needed. Since mid-2002, the ISS has been moved five times to avoid collisions with debris. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 65. Operational and design practices are also constantly developed in order to minimize risk to the station and its crew. Greenberg 2003, p. 382. 51 Although shielding of a spacecraft can extend its operational lifetime, it typically also leads to increased satellite cost and mass, thus increasing the cost of transportation and/or reducing capability. Ibid., p. 325. 52 “Spotlight On Space Debris” 2004. 53 Williamson Ray 2000, p. 31. 54 See Kessler 1986, pp. 47–48. 55 Johnson 2005(b), p. 8.
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many as hundreds of passes within less than one kilometer between catalogued objects occur daily.56 The average time between destructive collisions is 10 years but considering the economic interests at stake and, moreover, the threats debris poses to manned missions, even such a risk becomes serious.57 Several incidents have in fact already occurred. The first confirmed damage to an operational spacecraft by space debris was the US Space Shuttle Challenger windshield incident in June 1983, in which a particle of thermal paint about 0.2 mm in diameter struck the Shuttle’s windshield at a speed of some 3–6 km/s. Due to the pitting left by the collision, the window could not be reused.58 The first (and so far only) confirmed collision between two catalogued objects took place in July 1996, when CERISE, a functional French satellite launched in 1986, was hit and seriously damaged by a fragment of a launch vehicle stage of an Ariane I rocket which had exploded ten years earlier.59 There have also been many incidents where a space object has exploded into smaller fragments without a ‘good reason’: the cause may have been a collision with an unknown object. Several ‘serious encounters’ between two objects in outer space have also taken place, sometimes necessitating collision avoidance maneuvers. For instance, in December 1992 the pilot of the Space Shuttle Discovery only narrowly managed to avoid a catastrophic collision with a 10-cm piece of debris by swerving the craft.60 Debris may pose other kinds of hazards, too, as seen in the Soviet ‘trash “Accidental Collisions of Cataloged Satellites Identified” 2005, p. 2. Although a kilometer may sound like a relatively long distance, it is not in space activities; all passes within this range are described as close approaches. Ibid. 57 “Space Debris: assessing the risk” 2005. 58 Baker 1988, pp. 189–190. Later, small-particle impacts (including those caused by both natural and man-made debris) on the Space Shuttle have required replacement on average of one of the eight main windows after each flight. See Flury 2000. On debris impact risk to the Space Shuttle, see also Williamson 2006, p. 64. 59 As a result of the collision, a 4.2-meter portion of the gravity-gradient stabilization boom of CERISE was torn off. “Space Debris: assessing the risk” 2005. Since then, earlier collisions of catalogued objects have also been identified. For instance, a collision involving a Russian non-functional navigation satellite (Cosmos 1934) and a piece of debris from another, similar spacecraft (Cosmos 926) took place in December 1991 but was not recognized until 2005. The latter impacting piece of debris could no longer be tracked after the incident; it apparently broke up into much smaller, very dangerous pieces of debris. An example of a collision which both happened and was identified recently is one that occurred in January 2005. Then a 31-year-old US rocket body collided with a fragment from the third stage of a Chinese launch vehicle (which had exploded in March 2000). For a more detailed account of the incidents, see “Accidental Collisions of Cataloged Satellites Identified” 2005. 60 Only the previous year, two similar incidents occurred due to encounters with Cosmos rocket upper stages, and such maneuvers have been necessary on Shuttle flights ever since. See Flury 2000, pp. 42–43. Once in orbit, the Shuttle is also turned ‘backwards’ 56
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bag incident’ in 1987, where a cosmonaut risked his life to remove a plastic bag that was preventing an astrophysics module from docking with the Mir Space Station.61 Obviously, other than manned spacecraft are also at risk. Despite the high costs, it is thus today standard practice for near-Earth satellites to carry an allowance of fuel simply for evasive maneuvers necessitated by space debris.62 Space debris is also dangerous because it can crash to Earth, as in the case of the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 954, which crashed in northern Canada in 1978,63 or the Soviet Salyut 7 Space Station, which disintegrated over Argentina in 1991.64 Space objects returning to the atmosphere usually burn up completely but large pieces that survive the extreme heat inevitably return to Earth, impacting on the ground or in the oceans.65 Only few of those pieces are
so that its sensitive systems are better protected from collisions with debris. Furthermore, NASA operational restrictions prescribe that extravehicular activities are to be conducted such that the Shuttle serves as a shield from debris. Mirmina 2005, p. 652. The trajectories of orbital debris are constantly examined and if an object is expected to come within 2 km of the Shuttle, an avoidance maneuver is normally made. Williamson 2006, pp. 69–70. The threat of space debris is taken into account also at a much earlier stage of missions. For instance, NASA will call a launch hold in case “a debris object is predicted to violate a 5 × 25 × 5 km box around the [Space Shuttle] during the first two hours of a mission”. Such delays have occurred at least twice. Williamson 2006, p. 69. 61 Schwetje 1988, p. 168. During the time of the Mir Space Station, it was routine practice to dump trash bags in space. Dunn 2004. In a similar manner, the US Apollo astronauts left their waste on the surface of the Moon. Williamson 2005, p. 163. The ISS has no such practice, although it has also been reported to have released some garbage in space due to lack of storage room in the station. Dunn 2004. 62 “Space Debris: assessing the risk” 2005. In ESA, for instance, the Operations Centre uses a debris warning system, whereby a computer automatically issues a daily email message to operations staff who carry out avoidance maneuvers if the risk of collision is deemed too high. “Spotlight On Space Debris” 2004. 63 See more on the Cosmos 954 incident below. 64 Kim 1998, p. 315. These two incidents (amazingly) caused no major damage but before them there have been cases in which pieces of debris have damaged property or even health. In the 1960s, parts of a US satellite fell in Cuba, damaging property and killing a cow; a serious incident occurred at sea in which Japanese sailors were injured when their ship was struck by fragments of a Soviet satellite; and a German ship was hit by fragments of space debris in the Atlantic Ocean. Ibid., p. 313. 65 There is a 30-percent chance of an object hitting land, and a much smaller chance of it landing in a populated area. However, such odds are obviously of little comfort when the accident actually happens. Ibid. It has been estimated that the likelihood of a debris re-entry resulting in personal injury is about one in 10 000. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 79. At this writing, the latest incident was the launch failure of the European ice research satellite CryoSat, which fell into the Arctic Ocean in early October 2005. This satellite never even managed to reach the intended orbit, as it crashed only minutes after take-off. “ESA Begins CryoSat Launch Failure Probe” 2005.
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usually recovered.66 Most of the debris returning to Earth is out of control but the return may also be a pre-planned phase of a space mission. Even then all risks cannot be eliminated, however, as it is never possible to calculate the exact position or time of the impact, particularly if malfunctions occur. In addition to the risks to human space activities and life on Earth, space debris is pollution in the space environment as such. Hence it constitutes a severe long-term hazard from many perspectives. Space debris is very difficult (if not impossible) to clean up and the amount of it is increasing steadily, despite the decline in the number of launches per year.67 Currently, a particularly severe threat posed by space debris is that found in the so-called geostationary orbit (GEO). The spectrum of radio frequencies and GEO (often described as the spectrum/orbit resource) are two unavoidable natural components of communication by satellite and have been designated scarce natural resources.68 GEO is the orbit most suitable for telecommunications and weather satellites and is therefore densely occupied by them—and the increasing population of debris these satellites generate. The special importance of GEO in telecommunications (and its ensuing great economic value) derives from the fact that a satellite placed in this orbit has the same period of rotation around the Earth as the Earth has around its own axis, whereby the satellite will appear stationary to an observer on the surface of the Earth—i.e., geostationary – 24 hours a day. This geostationary character of the orbit minimizes the operational requirements of Earth stations receiving the satellite’s signals, as the ground terminals do not need the capability to constantly reorient their antennas and track signals themselves, given that the satellites always transmit their beams from a fixed position.69 Furthermore, a satellite in GEO has a constant view Flury 2000, p. 44. Ibid., p. 40. It has been estimated that at the current rate of yearly debris increase “nothing [will] be able to enter space orbit by 2300”. “China Establishes First Space Trash Observation Center” 2005. 68 Salin 2000, p. 45. Geostationary orbital positions and the radio spectrum cannot be separated from one another if appropriate coordination and regulation are to be effected for GEO services (see below about the ITU regime for this purpose). 69 Also, the Doppler shift in radio frequency signals is minimized (as the source of the signals is stationary with respect to the receiver). Wilson 1998, p. 256. In reality, however, certain natural forces, such as the elliptical shape of the Earth’s Equator and the gravitational pull of the Sun and the Moon, cause even a geostationary satellite to drift somewhat from the optimal position, necessitating some kind of active station maintenance propulsion systems on board a satellite to enable it to stay within the desired orbit. Ibid., p. 254. Obviously, geostationary debris does not stay put in GEO either. In practice, the Earth’s non-uniform gravity creates two stable orbit points in the geostationary ring, one above India and one over the Pacific. Debris cannot be maneuvered and hence it will drift towards the nearest stable point and oscillate through it in a pendulum-like manner, which creates a continuous collision risk. One example of the ensuing hazards is the US satellite Telstar 401, control of which was accidentally lost 66 67
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over a large area of the Earth and is always visible from any point within that area; communication services provided by one geostationary satellite can cover up to one-third of the Earth’s surface, meaning that as few as three geostationary satellites are enough to provide global coverage.70 However, only the particular position of GEO which enables a satellite to efficiently cover the area that it is required to serve is of use to each country. This results in congestion of certain areas of this orbit, which is unevenly occupied to begin with given that about three-quarters of the Earth’s surface is water-covered areas, where demand for satellite communications is smaller. This situation in turn leads to an increased risk of interference and hence diminished possibilities for safe access and operation of satellites in the sections of GEO in most demand.71 Until recently, finding a physical position for a new system in GEO has not been a problem, although difficulties of coordination have been growing—and will only continue to grow, considering that there is constantly increasing demand for both the radio frequency spectrum and orbital slot allocations.72 However, the question is not merely one of access, since there are still many frequency bands that are thinly or not at all populated. Rather, it is a question of access using technology that is affordable even for less developed countries and can be operated on otherwise feasible terms, too.73 (due to a magnetic storm) in 1997. Since then the satellite has been drifting along the geostationary ring, forcing a number of active satellites to interrupt their services and carry out collision-avoidance maneuvers. Muir 2005; see also Jehn et al. 2005. 70 Wilson 1998, p. 256. On the other hand, some countries, particularly those near the North Pole, cannot benefit very much from the use of geostationary satellites. These areas are located at such an angle in relation to GEO that buildings and terrain shadow them severely enough to make GEO transmissions highly cumbersome. Such areas can utilize analogous polar satellite systems, located on orbits above the North Pole. 71 Jahku 1992, pp. 210–211. 72 For a more detailed assessment of the situation, see Space Security 2004 (2005), pp. 9–16. Orbital slots may also be shared between several satellites. Obviously, the more satellites there are placed in the same orbital position, the better they have to be controlled in order to avoid interference. See Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 65. 73 At least once a country has already had to accept a less-than-ideal position for its first satellite on GEO: India had to compromise on both the positions and the technical characteristics for its Insat satellites, because it had difficulties finding positions for the system. This had implications both in financial terms and regarding the services provided. Moreover, the conflict arose despite the fact that only few countries had assignments in that particular part of GEO. Mexico has also had difficulties in placing its Morelos satellites between the US and Canadian systems. Jasentuliyana 1999(a), pp. 260–261. Even more dramatic have been the problems that Vietnam has encountered with its first telecommunication satellite “Vinasat”. Initially, the satellite was planned to be launched in late 2005. “Vietnam To Launch Its First Satellite In 2005” 2003. However, the project suffered major delays, especially due to difficulties in coordinating frequencies with the
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The major constraint on the efficient use of GEO still is radio frequency interference between systems,74 which can in broad terms also be called ‘environmental’ harm.75 While technical progress has made it possible to decrease potentially harmful interference between satellites, space debris now poses an increasingly significant threat. Although the probability of interference and collisions between active satellites remains low, the risks multiply if hazards posed by defunct satellites, let alone fragmented pieces of debris, are taken into account. Collisions within the defunct satellite population itself are obviously relevant as well, because these add to the number of pieces of debris in GEO, which in turn increases the hazards faced by active satellites.76 The expectation of collisions is reduced due to the fact that all objects in GEO move in the same direction (east). On the other hand, GEO collisions or explosions can start countries holding rights to neighboring satellite positions. These are Japan and Tonga, the latter of which does not even have a satellite to occupy its orbital slot. Tanner 2003. At the moment, the plan is to launch the Vinasat in 2008. “Vietnam Aims To Launch First Satellite In 2008” 2005. 74 Due to the considerable distance from the Earth and the use of high bandwidth signals for TV applications, for instance, GEO satellites need to generate high-power transmissions that tend to cause interference. Moreover, in practice GEO satellites are often placed within distances that are not sufficient to avoid signal interference. Space Security 2004 (2005), pp. 13–14. Currently, frequency interference is a daily occurrence: about 5 per cent of satellite operators’ time is spent addressing interference issues. Tanner 2003. 75 The Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group of 1988 seems to be in no doubt that radio frequency interference constitutes environmental harm. According to the report, “harmful interference, though not a form of space debris in the normal sense of the term, is certainly a form of pollution” (emphasis added). The ESA report defines the “over-use of orbital slots in combination with the unlimited use of frequencies” as “two additional forms of pollution specific to the geostationary orbit”. The Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group 1988, p. 66. At least in its common understanding, the term ‘pollution’ should equate to ‘environmental harm’. 76 Wilson 1998, pp. 257–258. A study carried out by the satellite Artemis has shown that only approximately one-third of the space objects in GEO can be found in the US Space Command Catalogue; the remaining two-thirds are unknown. The majority of these particles are less than one meter in diameter. Earlier, it was expected that the GEO debris population would consist mainly of entire old satellites, launch vehicle motors and microparticulate matter, such as particles released during rocket motor operations. Debris of the size 1–100 cm was expected to be non-significant in this area. However, the Artemis study shows that the pieces of debris that we are currently aware of represent only a minority of all GEO particles above one centimeter in diameter. This means that there must have occured numerous uncontrolled break-ups of abandoned space objects (satellites approximately 20 years old) which we have simply not been able to detect. Moreover, the situation is expected to worsen dramatically very soon as the extensive current generation of satellites begins to deteriorate. “Avaruusromua GEO-vyöhykkeellä” 2001.
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chain reactions that may cause debris to begin orbiting in a westerly direction and at greater velocities.77 Furthermore, space debris in GEO will in practice remain there if not removed. Although GEO has long been the orbit of particular concern when talking about telecommunication satellites (and demand is still greatest for orbital slots in GEO78), attention should also be focused on satellite activities in the close vicinity of the Earth as part of the LEO systems that the US Federal Communications Commission in particular has been licensing since 1994.79 Existing LEO systems circle the Earth mostly in the lower LEO regime, at altitudes below 1000 km. LEO appears to be the region of greatest interest for space activities today and in the near future.80 LEO satellites are typically used for remote sensing.81 They tend to be smaller than satellites in GEO but they typically operate in large constellations. What is more, the smaller the satellites’ size, the more vulnerable they are to smaller pieces of debris.82 The fact that there are many possible orbits for LEO satellites further adds to challenges in coordination. On the other hand, objects in LEO are much closer to Earth and have more unstable orbits than those in GEO, the result being shorter hazardous lifetimes for debris.83 Hence, the environmental consequences of a collision in LEO may be less severe, but the much higher relevant velocities of objects there mean that the risks posed by debris are nevertheless far greater.84 Moreover, extra-vehicular activities mostly take place within this region.85 Also,
77 Jahku 1992, pp. 206–207. This is also known as the ‘cascade effect’ or ‘Kessler effect’. 78 Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 1. The population of space objects in GEO is also the most diverse as regards ownership: over 35 countries and organizations own assets there. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 25. 79 Salin 2000, p. 45. 80 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, pp. 24, 26. In 2003, approximately 43 per cent of all space missions to reach Earth orbit were LEO missions, while GEO missions accounted for 38 per cent. Ibid. 81 Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 12. 82 Brisibe–Pessoa-Lopes 2002, p. 316. 83 Unlike in GEO, the atmospheric drag (in principle) slowly clears the LEO region. However, the Space Debris Evolutionary Study conducted by NASA in 2005 indicated that if no removal of space objects from LEO is carried out, the debris generation there will continue to increase—even if no new launches are conducted. See Johnson 2006, p. 12. 84 Brisibe–Pessoa-Lopes 2002, pp. 311–312. The third known accidental collision in LEO (at approx. 900 km above Earth) between catalogued objects took place on January 2005. It involved an orbital stage of a US launch vehicle (Thor Burner 2A) and a piece of fragmentation debris from a Chinese (CZ-4) orbital stage broken up in 2000. Johnson 2006, p. 8. 85 For instance, the International Space Station orbits about 400 km above Earth.
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most space debris resides in the LEO area as most debris-producing activities are carried on there.86 In addition to GEO and LEO, there is a third basic orbital arc where satellites operate: Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). This is the area at the altitude of about 5000–10000 km from Earth. It is particularly suitable for navigation systems such as the GPS and Galileo. Currently, there are about 620 operational satellites in orbit: some 270 in LEO, 50 in MEO and 300 in GEO. Additionally, there are specific applications increasingly using Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO).87 With time, space debris can develop into a serious threat in any orbital area. In the future, if human activities in and around the Moon increase significantly, lunar orbits may also become congested with man-made debris. There, the situation could deteriorate much faster because the Moon has no appreciable atmosphere which could burn up debris.88 2.2. Nuclear Contamination A problem closely connected with that of space debris is the threat of nuclear contamination. A major source of such contamination in outer space would be accidental satellite collisions and explosions that create nuclear space debris and radiation.89 Clearly, the launching phase also involves particular risks in the case of space objects using nuclear power. The first satellite with a nuclear power source (NPS) was launched in the early 1960s. Once solar cell technology improved, the space industry started to use that power source increasingly instead. The last satellite with an NPS intended for operations in Earth orbit was launched in 1988.90 However, a renewed interest in nuclear power and propulsion 86 Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 2. There are areas of particular concentration of space objects at the altitudes of 800, 1000, 1400, and 1500 km. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 32. 87 Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 12. 88 For a more detailed account of lunar orbital debris, see Williamson 2006, pp. 105– 109. Obviously, similar problems may occur in relation to other celestial bodies as well. Ibid., pp. 251–252. 89 For an assessment of the risks of collision between space debris and nuclear power sources, see, e.g., the UNCOPUOS working paper “Collisions between nuclear power sources and space debris” 2001. Previously, intentional nuclear explosions, i.e., nuclear tests, were also conducted in outer space by both of the superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. Such operations were prohibited in 1963 by the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 90 The same year, the US and the Soviet Union even made a joint proposal to ban the use of nuclear power in Earth orbit. See Space Law: basic legal documents, Vol. 2, Part B.III.10. According to the proposal, such a ban would be not only feasible but also desirable, from both the military and the environmental point of view. However, the ‘environment’ this proposal was concerned about was not that of outer space: “[t]he proposal … grows out of our efforts to prevent both the radioactive contamination of the
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systems could easily multiply the amount of nuclear materials in outer space.91 In particular, the numerous current plans for deep space missions most likely involve the use of NPS.92 The plans put forward to use nuclear reactors to provide electricity for future lunar bases are at least equally disturbing.93 Nuclear reactors may also be needed for Earth orbital missions requiring particularly high power.94 Moreover, the NPS-equipped spacecraft which are moved to disposal orbits for long durations further amplify the probability of collisions involving radiation
earth’s surface and the extension of the arms race into space” (emphasis added). A decade earlier, the decay of Cosmos 954 had already prompted many proposals by scholars to ban the use of nuclear power in Earth orbit. See, e.g., Haanappel 1978, p. 149; Gorove 1978, p. 144. 91 There are countries which are currently considering (or have already started to develop) new NPS for potential use on Earth orbital missions or for missions where the NPS might remain in Earth orbit even for years before departure on deep space missions. Johnson 2005(a), p. 553. The NPS used in space missions include radioisotope and fission reactor systems, as well as small radioisotope heater units for providing local heating of spacecraft components. “Proposed outline of objectives, scope and attributes for an international technically based framework of goals and recommendations for the safety of planned and currently foreseeable nuclear power source applications in outer space” 2005, Annex, para. 1. Currently, there are at least eight radioisotope thermoelectric generators, 13 nuclear reactor fuel cores, and 32 nuclear reactors in Earth orbits below 1700 km. Johnson 2005(a), pp. 551–552. 92 See, e.g., para. 64 of the Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 43rd session 2004. For instance, solar panels are not capable of providing a suitable source of electric power for interplanetary missions because such missions are, firstly, very long and, secondly, operate at too great a distance from the Sun. “Proposed outline of objectives, scope and attributes for an international technically based framework of goals and recommendations for the safety of planned and currently foreseeable nuclear power source applications in outer space” 2005, Annex, para. 1. 93 Smith 1993, p. 312. For instance, one concept for the design of such nuclear reactors is to bury them in lunar soil or surround them by berms rather than a proper containment structure. This would mean that humans could not safely come closer than 180 meters to an operating reactor, which could render large areas of the lunar surface uninhabitable. After the operational phase of the reactors is completed—calculated at some seven years—they would be decommissioned by in situ abandonment, whereafter the area around the reactor would need to be isolated for at least another few hundred years. Ibid., p. 319. Nuclear waste on the Moon is nothing new, however: both US and Soviet missions have already left nuclear materials there. For instance, all Apollo missions carried an experiment package powered by a plutonium-fuelled radioisotope thermal generator (RTG), and all these packages (a total of six) were left on the Moon. Apparently, the Soviets contributed to nuclear contamination of the Moon in a similar way during their two Lunokhod missions in 1970 and 1973, which used polonium-fuelled RTGs. Ibid., p. 313. 94 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 43rd session 2006, Appendix, para. 4.b.
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hazards.95 Obviously, disposal strategies for spent NPS spacecraft necessitate considerations of both nuclear safety and debris mitigation.96 A collision involving a NPS-equipped spacecraft can involve both immediate and long-term consequences, just like any other collision in outer space. If control of the spacecraft is lost, this will in all likelihood render any active disposal plans, such as maneuvering to a safer storage orbit, unfeasible. If an NPS is directly hit, the worst-case scenario is the creation of radioactive orbital debris. Due to its notorious reputation, nuclear contamination may even be deemed deleterious for the space environment per se, although the consequences usually considered most detrimental are those affecting human activities. Generally speaking, radioactive debris is not a greater risk to space activities than non-radioactive.97 However, nuclear radiation may create serious hazards for participants in manned space flights. At worst it can even affect the terrestrial environment. The threat of nuclear explosions in outer space is particularly serious because with no atmosphere to cushion them, their impact is extremely powerful. The radiation generated can therefore freely spread out over a radius of thousands of kilometers, extending even to the Earth. In addition to health hazards, the electromagnetic field caused by a nuclear explosion may be strong enough to break all electronic equipment within thousands of kilometers.98 Even when functional and in orbit, the reactors of NPS satellites See Johnson 2005(a), p. 551. It has also been suggested that “circum-solar space at a great distance from the Earth offers unlimited storage capacities for indefinite duration” and hence wastes of terrestrial nuclear industry could—technology permitting—be stored there. Of course, this is not feasible today (or anytime in the foreseeable future). Besides, it would require “the attainment of conditions of absolute safety”. The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, pp. 22, 26, and Lebeau 2000, p. 63. It can be argued whether such “absolute safety” can ever be achieved even in principle. 96 The disposal of NPS-equipped spacecraft has been a source of concern for as long as such power sources have been utilized in space. It has been estimated that, for instance, for the Soviet Cosmos 1818 spacecraft (with a thermionic reactor) on its orbit at 800 km, the chance of a collision with a 1-mm particle within one year is almost certain while the chance for a similar collision with a 1-cm particle is only about 0.04 per cent per year. However, given that the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft is around 400 years, even optimistic scenarios (in the light of the expected growth of the debris environment) indicate that it is very likely that the spacecraft will be hit by a 1-cm particle before re-entry. Johnson 2005(a), pp. 552–553. 97 Ibid., p. 553. 98 In 1962, a nuclear test known as the Starfish was carried out in outer space (at the altitude of approx. 400 km). The experiment included the explosion of a hydrogen bomb above the Pacific, resulting in, i.a., a short circuit and power outage in Honolulu. Also, phenomena resembling the Northern Lights were observed. On the other hand, should nuclear explosions take place in outer space, much of the material damage that would occur in a similar explosion on Earth would be avoided, because no pressure wave can form in the vacuum of space. Riihiaho 1989, pp. 170–171. Nevertheless, the Starfish 95
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can create problems. For instance, they may emit radiation which adversely affects astronomical observations.99 From a human point of view, the most severe of the risks posed by the use of nuclear power in space currently seems to be the possibility of radioactively contaminated objects returning to Earth. This poses a real risk for the population living beneath the orbit of an NPS, as was demonstrated by the notorious unprogrammed re-entry on 24 January 1978, of the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 which was equipped with a uranium-fuelled nuclear power source. The orbit of Cosmos decayed, and it re-entered the atmosphere and disintegrated in Canada, scattering hazardous radioactive debris across a large tract of land. Some of the refuse found was lethally radioactive. Fortunately, it landed in the uninhabited Canadian north (the Northwestern Territories), resulting in no more than cleanup operations. Had the debris of Cosmos 954 come down in populated areas, massive damage to health and property could have occurred.100 Finally, an obvious risk of nuclear contamination derives from the possible deployment, let alone use, of space-based nuclear weapons. Even the use of non-nuclear weapons in environs where there are NPS-equipped spacecraft can be deleterious.101 Accordingly, it has been pointed out in reports of the UNCOPUOS to the UN General Assembly that “the testing, deployment and use of space weapons would create an environment where such weapons would become a threat and target to global security and that States possessing nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles could explode a nuclear weapon in space that could cause uncontrolled damage to satellites”.102 The seriousness of such risks can hardly be overemphasized. I shall only make brief references to risks deriving from space weaponization, however, as this book is concerned primarily with the environmental threats related to peace-time space activities.103 test alone damaged about one-third of all satellites in LEO. Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 128. 99 Matte 1989, p. 426. 100 It has been speculated that the decay of Cosmos 954 might even have been caused by a collision with another space object, possibly debris. Kim 1998, p. 313. For a more detailed account of the Cosmos 954 incident, see, e.g., Gorove 1991, pp. 239–241. In 1983, the reactor core of a similar ocean reconnaissance satellite—Cosmos 1402—re-entered over the South Atlantic. Flury 2000, p. 44. 101 The stationing of “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space is banned by the Outer Space Treaty, Art. IV.1. Furthermore, the Moon and other celestial bodies are reserved for “exclusively peaceful purposes” (Art. IV.2). However, there is no commonly accepted definition of ‘peaceful purposes’; the interpretation supported by state practice seems to be that ‘peaceful’ in this case merely means ‘non-aggressive’. Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 23. Moreover, states may violate legal rules and not all states are even parties to the Outer Space Treaty. 102 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2005, para. 141. 103 In principle, the mere deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space can be seen
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2.3. Solar Power Satellites One still largely unpredictable source of environmental risks in space activities is the use of solar power satellites. Solar power satellites would collect solar energy in space, convert it first to electricity and then to microwave beams for transmission to Earth, where it would be reconverted into electricity. This would in principle be a non-polluting, practically unlimited power source.104 Solar power satellites can be positioned so that they receive constant direct sun light, which would enable the use of solar power also at night time and during less than optimal cloud conditions. Other advantages of solar power satellites are that there would be no need to use large terrestrial land areas, unlike with ground-based solar collectors.105 Solar power satellites may, however, have serious impacts on the space environment, and the possible transmission of solar power to Earth may not only harm the ozone layer but also impact life on the surface of the globe directly. Furthermore, it could result in harmful electromagnetic interference with aerial navigation systems, for instance.106 Of particular concern is the long-term impact of exposure on humans and biota on the ground in the receiving area and in the airspace that the beams transverse.107 Exploitation of solar power will also require orbital positions for the satellites, which will be potentially very large in size108 and thus more susceptible to collisions than smaller space objects.109 It is likely that not all of the risks connected to the utilization of solar power satellites are even known in detail yet. Moreover, later on, lunar materials are likely to be used for the construction of solar power satellites and solar cells. This would entail new kinds of environmental concerns. Considering in particular the plans as falling within the category of peaceful activities, but it is forbidden by the international law of outer space (Outer Space Treaty, Art. IV.1; see more below). 104 Williamson 2006, p. 250. 105 For a relatively recent assessment of the potential of solar power satellites, see Boswell 2004. For comparison, see, i.a., Space Activities and Emerging International Law 1984, pp. 473–503, which provides an assessment of solar power satellites carried out two decades earlier. There have also been plans for placing solar power stations on the surface of the Moon. These stations would transmit energy to the Earth through a microwave beam and a complex system of mirrors in terrestrial orbit. See Courteix 1993, pp. 272–273. 106 Ibid., p. 276. 107 Gorove 1991, pp. 175–176. 108 Some designs envision solar arrays even several kilometers in size. Thus far, the largest solar panels in space have been those of the ISS, with a coverage of over 830 square meters (73 meters long and 11 meters wide). Boswell 2004. 109 On the particular risks related to sizeable space objects, see also the next chapter, which briefly examines another type of large space structures, namely, manned space stations.
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to establish permanent lunar colonies,110 and the fact that a research group has already managed to use simulated moon dust to make a key component of a working solar cell,111 such concerns might become topical surprisingly soon. 2.4. Manned Space Stations Another new source of hazards worth mentioning is manned space stations, which can compound the detrimental effects of space activities in their vicinity due to the simple fact that they are stationary. For instance, the existence of large space structures such as space stations (or solar power satellites) further increases the probability of interference and the risk of collisions.112 Their long shadows may cut off solar power to other satellites.113 Moreover, the utilization of solar and nuclear power by these stations poses threats, particularly to their immediate surroundings in space (in addition to the health risks to station personnel). Space stations may also litter their surroundings—at worst by deliberately dumping the waste from missions directly into outer space. Fortunately, this is not standard practice any longer. 2.5. Exobiological Contamination Finally, two additional types of potential environmental hazards should be mentioned, namely organic contamination of outer space (‘forward contamination’) and its converse, ‘back-contamination’ of the Earth by unfamiliar organisms and like contaminants transported by returning spacecraft.114 Such threats were discussed intensely in the infancy of space exploration in the 1950s and 1960s.115 110 Already in 1989, US President George Bush Senior announced plans for a manned base on the Moon and manned exploration of Mars as major US space policy objectives. Hintz 1992, p. 59. In 2004, the next US President Bush announced his space vision, including, i.a., a permanent lunar colony. See for more detail “President Bush Delivers Remarks On U.S. Space Policy” 2004. The latest news is that NASA plans a permanent Moon base to be established in the 2020s. Leary 2006. 111 See Horton et al. 2005. 112 Jahku 1992, p. 207. Despite the relatively extensive shielding (some 200 shields) used to protect the ISS, for instance, the risk assessment conducted for the Columbus Orbiting Facility (ESA’s contribution to the ISS) has shown a 20 per cent chance over ten years that a debris particle will penetrate the shielding. Flury 2000, p. 43. 113 Gorove 1991, pp. 78–79. 114 The two types of contamination are also referred to by one single term, ‘crosscontamination’. See Robinson 1992, p. 325. 115 The issue of possible contamination of celestial bodies was brought up at least as far back as 1956, at the Seventh International Congress of the IAF. Ibid., p. 326. As early as 1958, the ICSU investigated the problem of contamination of
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The Apollo missions to the Moon, particularly the landing of Apollo 11 in 1969, further fuelled the debate. The 1969 mission was the first to make direct contact with the lunar surface, with astronauts walking on the Moon and collecting soil and atmospheric samples.116 The Apollo missions included procedures for the crew that were carried out already in flight in order to prevent contamination of the Earth. These involved the recovery of the spacecraft and transport of the crew, samples and mission equipment to a quarantine site, as well as procedures for human quarantine and sample isolation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union also implemented sterilization procedures for unmanned platforms impacting the lunar surface, pursuant to national planetary protection policies.117 The issue of planetary protection has taken on renewed relevance with the various plans for new (manned and unmanned) Moon and Mars missions.118 The introduction of terrestrial substances onto a celestial body, for instance, could permanently jeopardize the existence of possible indigenous life forms. If such life were to exist, interaction with organic substances from Earth could cause mutations, destroy the indigenous life forms or otherwise alter the natural development of life on the celestial body. Terrestrial contaminants could cause deleterious environmental consequences to celestial environments in many other ways, too. Analogously, extraterrestrial substances, transported via satellites or celestial bodies through the special CETEX committee it established for the purpose. CETEX issued some recommendations on how to balance freedom of space activity and environmental concerns. COSPAR published recommendations concerning planetary quarantine requirements in 1964. These recommendations have since then been reexamined periodically. See Sterns–Tennen 1981; Tennen 2003. In essence, COSPAR can be described as representing NASA’s planetary protection policies internationally. Sadeh 2002, p. 158. In principle, NASA participates in international missions only if the COSPAR planetary protection policies are followed. Pursuant to Chapter 2.1.2.a of NASA’s Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions, “NASA will approve the flight of NASA-developed instruments and/or experiments on non-U.S. planetary spacecraft only if the launching organization adheres to the COSPAR-approved planetary protection policy and its requirements”. However, active decontamination of spacecraft appears to be taken far less seriously today than in the early days of the space age. For a more detailed treatment, see Tennen 2003. 116 However, by the time of this mission, several spacecraft had already been intentionally impacted on the Moon. In addition to the debris resulting from them, a number of failed soft-landing attempts had contributed to littering of the lunar surface. In total, over 20 lunar impacts had taken place prior to the Apollo 11 mission. Williamson 2006, pp. 93–94. 117 See Robinson 1992, pp. 326, 331–332. For a more detailed account of spacecraft decontamination, see Williamson 2006, pp. 115–127. On planetary protection and NASA, see the NASA Planetary Protection website. 118 Currently, at least the US, India, Japan, Canada, China and Russia are planning Moon and/or Mars missions. Finarelli–Pryke 2005, p. 97.
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other spacecraft, might cause equally catastrophic consequences on Earth or in inhabited space facilities.119 Furthermore, the re-introduction to terrestrial surroundings of Earth organisms possibly mutated during a space mission— through irradiation, for instance—might have dramatic consequences. Although such threats obviously pertain mainly to space missions involving the landing of a spacecraft on a celestial body, it is at least theoretically possible that orbiting space objects could also introduce harmful organic substances into outer space, and possibly back to Earth if they return. Although there is no consensus among the scientific community on the threat of cross-contamination risks, the possibility of exobiological contamination from space activities cannot be excluded from potential scenarios either. Traditionally, main concern regarding biological contamination of non-Earth environments has not, however, been primarily an environmental one but rather one about the integrity of scientific experiments.120 2.6. Conclusion Human space activities involve a variety of risks that can be termed environmental. The detrimental effects may concern the space environment per se, the atmosphere, the Earth, and/or human activities in these environments. The worst-case scenario includes danger even to terrestrial life. Admittedly, health risks posed by space activities to humans on Earth in particular may seem rather hypothetical at the moment. However, the situation may change dramatically—at least faster than the international community is currently able to react effectively, as already demonstrated by the space debris problem. Environmental problems related to the use of outer space are mostly considered detrimental because of their negative impacts on human activities in economic and health terms: environmental degradation is harmful for current space utilization, can compromise potential future uses of outer space, or may impair the integrity of scientific investigation, for instance. Despite these human-centered perceptions, some also share a less anthropocentric concern for the changes our activities cause in the natural environment of outer space in many ways. For example, the Moon has no substantial atmosphere, weather or other natural processes which could effectively smooth its surface, meaning that even seemingly minor changes such as vehicle tracks and human footprints Sterns–Tennen 1992, p. 96. An interesting recent experiment (taking place in June 2005) showed that lichens can in fact—at least for a period of two weeks—survive exposure to the harsh conditions of outer space unharmed; they even retained their ability for photosynthesis unchanged. This obviously supports the propositions that there exist possibilities for the transfer of life between celestial bodies. “Lichen Survives in Space” 2005. 120 Hargrove 1986, p. x; Tennen 2003. 119
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on the Moon are practically permanent.121 Concern for such changes is not very common, however. Furthermore, recent practices in space exploration have shown an alarming tendency towards recklessness. For instance, in 1999 the Lunar Prospector was targeted at the pristine lunar south pole, with the hope that the impact would liberate water molecules from suspected ice deposits. The Prospector had not been sterilized or actively decontaminated; what is more, it carried some cremated remains of lunar geologist Eugene Shoemaker.122 In all likelihood, in the not too distant future we will witness a variety of new kinds of uses of outer space, all of which are not necessarily very benign from an environmental perspective. For instance, the launching of cremated human remains into Earth orbit is already even a business.123 Such deliberate launches Williamson 2006, p. 105. It has been calculated that, for example, the combustion products and cabin leakage from only twenty lunar landings of the Apollo type could double the mass of the tenuous lunar atmosphere. Hintz 1992, p. 60. Such additions to the atmospheric gases of the Moon would be temporary, however, as the solar wind, above all, would soon clear them. Nevertheless, continuous lunar activities (mining or permanent settlements, for instance) could result in permanent modifications. Williamson 2005, p. 164. 122 See Williamson Mark 2000(b), p. 4. There is nothing new in crashing spacecraft and related debris onto the Moon: there have been about 80 impacts thus far. Williamson 2006, pp. 101–102. The first spacecraft (Soviet Luna 2) was crashed on the Moon already in 1959. Ibid., p. 91. Later, spacecraft have also impacted such celestial bodies as Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, for instance. For a list of lunar and planetary impacts, see ibid., pp. 94–98. As a consequence, there is even more than 100 tonnes of spacecraft and rocket-body debris on the lunar surface today. Apparently, this is not a very widely known fact even among space professionals. Moreover, quite few of those aware of the situation consider this debris a problem. In line with this, current space mission plans seem to suggest that numerous planetary impacts will be made within the next couple of decades. However, even if the practice of impacting spacecraft on the Moon, for instance, were abandoned immediately, the debris already there might constitute a real safety hazard to human activities in the future. Ibid., pp. 101–104. Obviously, it also constitutes pollution of the formerly ‘pristine’ lunar environment. 123 Dying seems to be becoming a profitable business in the space sector: the Space Services Inc. of Houston (which formerly operated under the name Celestis Inc.) sells a service called the “Memorial Spaceflights”: they arrange launches of cremated human remains into Earth orbit. Actual space tourism is feasible for extremely few, but the services of the Space Services can be accessed for a mere USD 995. For this, they will “entomb a gram of cremated remains in a container the size of a watch battery and fly it”. For the price of USD 5,300, they will “capsule the size of a lipstick tube with about seven grams of cremated ash, pack it into a small canister and arrange to have it flown into space”. Other options are to have a portion of one gram launched either into lunar orbit or onto the lunar surface, or into deep space (the cost of these options is USD 12,500). Relatives can attend the launch and participate in a group memorial service afterwards, and they will receive “a keepsake video of the launch preparations and blastoff”. For more information about such services, see the Memorial Spaceflights website. In the future 121
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of seemingly useless, potentially dangerous debris can hardly be considered a very sustainable use of outer space. They highlight the fact that, in addition to ascribing outer space little more than instrumental value for ourselves, we do not pay much attention to the rights of future generations.124 The current extensive space utilization by satellites and other spacecraft has turned nearEarth outer space into one more environment impaired by the greed of the present generation. As space exploration expands further into outer space and takes more extensive forms, such as construction of permanent facilities and the utilization of natural resources for the support of missions, anthropogenic alterations of this environment and the related hazards will be of an order of magnitude far greater than those seen today.125
Space Services plans to operate regularly scheduled space memorial launch services three or four times a year. The cost of actual space tourism, on the other hand, continues to be prohibitively high for the vast majority of humankind. As one author has put it, “[t]he sorry truth is, right now, for ordinary people to get into space, they have to be dead”. Klotz 2004. 124 See Baker 1987, pp. 170–171. 125 See Sterns–Tennen 1992, p. 99.
Chapter Three
Space Law From an Environmental Perspective The field of international legal regulation most obviously applicable to space activities is the international law of outer space. The body of international space law consists of five United Nations treaties: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter ‘the Outer Space Treaty’, or OST); the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereinafter ‘the Rescue Agreement’); the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereinafter ‘the Liability Convention’); the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereinafter ‘the Registration Convention’); and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter ‘the Moon Treaty’). Unfortunately, the UN space treaties have relatively little to say about environmental issues. At the time of their conclusion, such considerations were not among the highest-ranking items on the agendas of spacefaring nations, and it has later proven very challenging for the actors in that arena to agree on new legally binding international rules. Even the most recent UN space treaty, the Moon Treaty, dates back to 1979. Moreover, it did not gain the five ratifications required for its entry into force until 1984 and has at this writing attracted no more than twelve ratifications, all by states that do not conduct independent launch activities.1 In practice this renders the treaty void. In contrast, the first
1 The states parties to the Moon Treaty are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, and
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and most fundamental of the UN conventions, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, has received virtually universal acceptance and has been ratified by about half of the nations on Earth, including all states active in space utilization.2 Another important regulator of space activities is the UN-sponsored International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU strives to guarantee undisturbed telecommunication activities, including those that are space based. It also produces legally binding international instruments, but their focus in the space sector is somewhat different from that of the UN space treaties, as will be discussed below. Nevertheless, the instruments of the ITU have relevance from an environmental point of view. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly has adopted five sets of principles applicable to the use of outer space: the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space; the 1982 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting; the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space; the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (hereinafter ‘the NPS Principles’); and the 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interests of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (hereinafter ‘the Space Benefits Declaration’). The most relevant of these for the present study is the Uruguay. A further four nations have signed but not ratified: France, Guatemala, India, and Romania. Despite the small number of states parties, the Moon Treaty at least sets out some kind of an international viewpoint on how activities on celestial bodies, particularly the Moon, should be conducted. It thus has a certain relevance despite the lack of adherent countries. Moreover, at least the fact that France and India have signed the Moon Treaty may gain significance, considering that both countries have an orbital launch capability (France is a major partner in the cooperation within ESA, the spaceport of which is the Guyana Space Centre in Kourou, French Guyana). Pursuant to Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when … it has signed the treaty … until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”. Thus France and India should not be involved in operations which entail substantial conflicts with the Moon Treaty. Moreover, Australia and Pakistan, both ratifying states to the Moon Treaty, possess sub-orbital capability, which is enough for a spacecraft to enter space (but not to achieve an orbit around the Earth). Over time, these states may develop independent orbital launch capabilities which could generate renewed resonance for the Moon Treaty. For a list of states with launch capabilities, see Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 43. 2 Whether this denotes wide acceptance or not can be debated. With its nearly hundred ratifications (98, at this writing), the OST has been considered both a very successful international convention (e.g., Hobe 2004(a), pp. 29–30) as well as an instrument “with only a hundred” states parties (e.g., Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006).
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1992 NPS Principles, which will be taken up in more detail later. These rules are not legally binding, however. One author has described the history of the international law of outer space in terms of three eras: the “classical period” (1957–1979), the “transitional period” (1980–1991), and the “modern period” (1992–). The “classical period” was the time for creating the basic structure and main principles of space law. It was also the time of the Cold War and domination of military and foreign affairs. Consequently, UN space law at the time reflects a “pro-state, anti-free enterprise” ideology. Starting in the 1980s, the number of states involved in space activities began to increase rapidly. The variety of new practical interests in the space sector made it impossible to find agreement such as that which had enabled adoption of the UN space treaties in the previous decades by consensus. Particularly relevant was the emergence of commercial space applications. With international space law having come to a standstill, other areas of legal regulation had to step in. Hence, the “transitional period” was marked by the development of transnational contracts among states and corporations and domestic legislation. The UNCOPUOS, unable to produce new space treaties, concentrated on the development of non-binding norms and guidelines instead, i.e., the Principles Declarations of 1980s and 1990s.3 With continuing development in technology and markets, space commerce has further expanded, often taking the form of transnational corporations and international joint ventures. Although national and military considerations remain relevant, the increasing cooperation on various levels has diluted many of the ideological and nationalistic underpinnings in the space sector. The “modern period” of space law has also witnessed the demise of the Soviet Union (and the end of the Cold War). Consequently, space law has focused increasingly on the commercial development of space. Today, there seems to be a new activeness even in international space law, albeit only in the form of declarative statements and non-binding standards thus far.4 It remains to be seen whether and how the international community manages to produce new norms of a more binding character for the regulation of the evolving space sector. This is the fundamental question in this work. From an environmental perspective in particular, UN space law continues to provide very little. Fortunately, more recent—and more plausible—efforts to alleviate environmental problems related to space activities by common norms have taken place. For instance, recommendations to promote environmentally more benign practices in the use of outer space, especially as concerns the problem of space debris, have been issued by many organs. This study examines in more detail the work of such organs as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the International Law Association (ILA), and the UNCOPUOS, all
3 4
Goldman 2002. Ibid.
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of which have been trying to mitigate the hazard of space debris above all. Also, the International Academy of Astronautics issued a Position Paper on Orbital Debris5 in 2001. A subcommittee of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has started working on standards based on space debris mitigation guidelines developed by the IADC.6 Moreover, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) has long been working on issues related to planetary protection7 and has also discussed other environmental aspects of space activities to some extent.8 Additionally, there is an increasing number of national efforts that deserve attention. Although the international level is the focus of this treatise, a short review of environmentally oriented regulatory efforts undertaken at the regional and national levels is included to provide a more comprehensive perspective. 3.1. UN Space Conventions 3.1.1. The Outer Space Treaty The most environmentally relevant articles of the space treaties are to be found in the ‘Space Constitution’, the Outer Space Treaty. The leading principle in space activities is that of the freedom of use and exploration, as provided by Article I.2 of the OST: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
This access might be compromised by pollution of outer space, particularly by the growing amount of space debris.9 Moreover, the first paragraph of the same article reads: For more detail, see, e.g., Flury–Contant 2001. See more below. 7 COSPAR has, i.a., developed the “COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy”. 8 COSPAR prepared, for instance, a study for the UNCOPUOS entitled “Environmental Effects of Space Activities” in 1983. The study discussed harmful effects for scientific research of gaseous and other materials released in space, the impact of launching and operation activities, and the impact of chemicals and electrical propulsion systems. See also the report “Environmental Effects of Space Activities” from 1988, which was a follow-up study with a particular emphasis on space debris. Perek 2002, p. 126. 9 See, e.g., The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 7. Space debris is “a prime threat … to the continued access of the global community to the benefits of outer space”. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2006, para. 129. Accordingly, it 5 6
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The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Article II further specifies: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
Although the starting point is the freedom of use and exploration,10 outer space in its entirety constitutes an international resource and hence utilization of space cannot be totally unrestricted. As the above provisions clearly establish space activities as the province of all humankind and not of a single state, preservation of the space environment can be regarded as a basic condition for guaranteeing equal opportunities in exploration and use by all countries. This urges, albeit in a rather general way, responsible behavior on the part of all users of outer space. Another central principle is that the launching state retains jurisdiction and control over a space object and “over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body”. The ownership of objects launched into outer space (or of objects constructed on a celestial body) is not affected by their presence there or by their return to Earth.11 At the time the Outer Space Treaty was drafted, it was obviously presumed that each state wanted to maintain the ownership of a spacecraft at all times. This is not necessarily the case with space debris, however, because of the responsibility and liability provisions,12 as will be examined in more detail below. Limitations on conducting space activities in environmental terms in particular are dealt with more directly in Article IX, which is the basic provision for all environmental protection of outer space. It requires states parties to conduct their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, has been proposed in the deliberations of the UNCOPUOS that “in order for States to continue having unrestricted access to outer space, all spacefaring nations should be implementing space debris mitigation measures as expeditiously as possible”. Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, para. 97. In addition to the threat of orbital debris around the Earth, man-made debris could become a problem in the future also as concerns access to other celestial bodies. See Williamson 2006, p. 154. 10 It does not seem important (or even feasible) to make a strict distinction between the two terms. ‘Exploration’ has been understood as activity of a more investigative nature (research) while ‘use’ appears to refer to exploitation and other activities applying the knowledge typically acquired by ‘exploration’. See Hacket 1994, p. 67. 11 Art. VIII. 12 Arts. VI and VII of the OST, respectively.
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“so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, [to] adopt appropriate measures for this purpose”. It should be noted that although the OST prescribes that states are to avoid any harmful contamination of outer space, the terrestrial environment is only protected from “changes … resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter” (i.e., back-contamination). Another observation is that the determination of which measures should be regarded as “appropriate” (and when it is “necessary” to adopt such measures) is completely at the discretion of the state conducting potentially harmful space activities. Moreover, the OST fails to give guidance in determining the meaning of both “harmful contamination” and “adverse changes in the environment”.13 Article IX includes a principle of cooperation and mutual assistance in the exploration and use of outer space that could serve as a basis for the duty of states to prevent contamination. Furthermore, there is an obligation to conduct space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties”, similarly pointing towards an obligation to avoid creating hazards that could adversely affect the safe conduct of space activities by other states.14 Article IV.1 forbids the stationing of “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space. It also reserves the Moon and other celestial bodies for “exclusively peaceful purposes”, banning all military activity on them.15 As for more concrete obligations, Article IX establishes a requirement for a state party to undertake “appropriate international consultations” before proceeding with a planned space activity or experiment that might cause “potentially harmful interference” with the space activities of other states parties. Another state party may request such consultations— but only if it “has reason to believe” that the planned activity “would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space”. Prior consultations and cooperation can admittedly be very important, particularly when introducing new types of activities whose consequences are as yet unclear. By talking about harmful interference with others’ space activities, the consultation clause of the OST clearly aims not to protect the environment per se but merely to safeguard other states’ space activities. Yet, a spill-over 13 For a discussion concerning the terms “contamination”, “harmful”, and “adverse changes”, as well as the “necessity” and “appropriateness” referred to in Art. IX, see, e.g., Report of the 64th Conference of the ILA 1990, pp. 156–161. 14 The duty to pay due regard to the corresponding interests of other states in the OST (and in the law of the sea) is examined in more detail in Hacket 1994, pp. 86–103. 15 Art. IV.2. The focal idea that outer space should be used merely for peaceful purposes has a long history. It was, in principle, shared by the two superpowers of the time, the US and the Soviet Union, already in the aftermath of the mission of Sputnik I in 1957. See Fisher 1990, p. 63.
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effect of international consultations may of course be better environmental protection. It can even be argued that since space objects tend to turn into (or at least produce some) space debris that may gravely interfere in the space activities of all states, such consultations might be necessary before any future launch of a space object.16 However, the obligation of the OST to enter into consultations does not entitle the potentially affected state to bar the planned activity, nor does it specify any procedure or time limits for the consultations (or disputes arising therefrom) or requirements for providing the other state(s) involved with information of any kind. Furthermore, the consultations need not lead to a certain (or any) result, and even if they do, there is no obligation to take into account the result in any way when eventually conducting the space activities concerned.17 Therefore, although consultations could provide a positive force for environmental protection the obligation of Article IX to enter into consultations remains rather trivial in practice. Even the basic notion of “appropriate international consultations” remains quite ambiguous.18 Although all consultations have the potential to contribute to enhanced cooperation and hence the consultation requirement of the OST is in principle a positive step forward, its ambiguity makes it rather meaningless. Not surprisingly, states are not particularly eager to consult with each other about their planned space activities, at least not if the ensuing harm to other states is not direct. Consider, for instance, anti-satellite tests, which clearly have the potential to create orbital debris that can be harmful for all other spacefaring nations: apparently, international consultations never preceded such experiments.19 A 16 See Fasan 1993, p. 285. Also Hacket 1994 points out that the environmental ineffectiveness of the consultation requirement of the OST can be overcome by the interpretation that any “unsound use of outer space” is potentially detrimental to the freedom of use of other states (p. 122). See ibid., pp. 120–131 for a treatment of the OST consultation clause in general. 17 Initially, the Soviet Union favored a cooperation provision with reference to consultations and agreement but this was opposed by many as a veto contradictory to the freedom-of-use principle. Baker 1987. For a detailed overview of the negotiation history of Art. IX of the OST (beginning from the negotiations concerning the preceding Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space of 1963), see ibid. 18 It has been suggested that “international consultations” under the OST should be undertaken at various levels, including the national level (within relevant national space agencies) and the international level (in bodies of ESA, the ITU, and the UNCOPUOS, especially its Legal Subcommittee). The Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group 1988, pp. 65, 67. On the other hand, the consultation requirements of the space treaties have been called “merely cosmetic”. Uhlir–Bishop 1986, p. 206. 19 Jasani 1999, pp. 37–38. A state reluctant to consult can in many cases also easily claim that it was not aware of any potential threat by its plans to other states’ space activities. Hacket 1994, p. 124. However, there are more developed consultation systems outside UN space treaties. The most advanced manifestation of the general consultation
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recent example is the anti-satellite test carried out by China in January 2007— with no prior international consultations.20 One more provision of the OST worth mentioning here is that giving states parties the right to inspect each others “stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies”. Such inspections can be undertaken provided that “reasonable advance notice of a projected visit [is given], in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited”.21 Although this right is (at least currently) quite difficult to implement, it can at least in principle serve as a preventive measure to restrict illegal space operations—including those violating environmentally oriented obligations of the law of outer space. 3.1.2. The Moon Treaty The provisions of the Moon Treaty apply to the Moon but also to other celestial bodies within the Solar System, except the Earth.22 The Moon Treaty is the most advanced of the space treaties in an environmental sense. Nevertheless, even this instrument only contains a general environment protection clause resembling its OST equivalent: In exploring and using the Moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the Earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise.23
This provision is a step forward in asserting the need to preserve the status quo of the environment of celestial bodies. “Disruption of the environment” also seems to be a somewhat more extensive concept than the “harmful contamination” applied by the OST, as harmful contamination is but one form of environmental disruption.24 However, also the Moon Treaty fails to establish any system of requirement for avoiding harmful interference in international space law is the ITU coordination procedure for the allocation of geostationary radio frequencies and orbital slots (see more below). 20 See more below. 21 Art. XII. 22 Art. 1.1. 23 Art. 7.1. 24 It should be noted, however, that the treaties themselves give no definition of either ‘harmful contamination’ or ‘adverse changes’. Hence it is somewhat difficult to assess the meaning and scope of these notions.
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sanctions.25 As already mentioned, the treaty suffers from a chronic—very likely fatal—lack of adherents. According to the second paragraph of Article 7, states parties have the obligation to inform the UN Secretary-General of the measures being adopted for the prevention of environmental harm in the Moon or back-contamination of the Earth. This could partly increase the effectiveness of the duty to prevent disruption of the environment. Even more importantly, states parties are obligated to make prior notification (“to the maximum extent feasible”) of placements of radioactive materials on the Moon (as well as of the purpose of such placements).26 They must also inform the UN Secretary-General of any phenomena in space that could endanger human life or health27 and report to him or her “concerning areas of the Moon having special scientific interest” which might be worth designating as international scientific preserves.28 Such 25 The Moon Treaty (and the OST) have also been criticized for not making any distinction between the environment of the Moon and of other celestial bodies of the Solar System, although these can be very different from each other. Uhlir–Bishop 1986, pp. 197, 201. According to these authors, the differences in celestial environments would call for “specialization of provisions to meet the different requirements of each environment” and, moreover, through a regime which allows for flexibility to reassess environmental standards according to new scientific information obtained (and even requires periodical updates). As one solution which could accommodate the need for such specialized treatment they suggest a system of zoning areas of outer space and celestial bodies for “certain uses or nonuses”. Ibid., p. 205. Also others have proposed that some areas or orbits in space could be reserved for particular types of activities or space objects only. For instance, space stations and other large space structures may require special protection. Kopal 1990, p. 46. Even if not completely prohibited, certain space activities could be restricted in certain regions so as to avoid interference with other space activities, especially in key orbits. In particular, advertising in outer space and the launching of cremated human remains could be limited to certain orbital areas (if allowed at all). The ITU regime for GEO already establishes some sort of “limited de facto zoning” as concerns the use of this particular orbital area. See Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, pp. 69–70. 26 Art. 7.2. 27 Art. 5.3. Also the OST includes an obligation to immediately inform the UN Secretary-General or other states parties of any phenomena in space that could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts (Art. V.3). Such threats could be caused by, i.a., environmental degradation of outer space, such as nuclear contamination of a particular area or the explosion of a spacecraft resulting in a significant amount of new pieces of space debris. 28 Art. 7.3. It may even be argued that all areas of outer space and celestial bodies are in fact “of specific scientific interest”, at least until extensively explored and scientifically investigated. Sterns–Tennen 1992, p. 100. Although no international scientific space preserves have been established yet, there have been proposals to provide special protection for such areas. See, e.g., Hartmann 1986, pp. 130–131, for a proposal to establish “space wilderness areas”, where only scientific research would be allowed.
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reporting requirements constitute a refinement vis-à-vis the OST, pursuant to which states parties only have to provide the UN Secretary-General (as well as the public and the international scientific community) with information about the nature, conduct, locations and results of their space activities “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable”.29 However, also the Moon Treaty lacks sanctions if a state fails to disseminate the information as required. Article 15.2 of the Moon Treaty obligates states to enter into consultations in a manner similar to the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty also reaffirms the right conferred by Article IX of the OST of each state party to inspect other states’ facilities in space.30 Furthermore, it repeats the Outer Space Treaty requirement that the Moon be used for peaceful, non-military purposes only,31 and further consolidates the prohibition against placing nuclear or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space in orbits around the Moon and other trajectories to or around it.32 Such requirements contribute to the environmental protection of outer space, as it is well known that military maneuvers and nuclear weapons may create serious environmental disruption.33 However, the Moon Treaty expressly permits the removal and collection of samples of the lunar surface and subsurface,34 the landing of objects on and launching of them from the Moon,35 and placing and freely moving personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations on or below the lunar surface or subsurface.36 All such activities involve obvious potential for environmental degradation of celestial bodies. Article 9 of the Moon Treaty somewhat diminishes the environmental threats posed by activities on the Moon by requiring that if lunar stations are established, only the area which is required for the needs of the station be used. Moreover, the treaty expressly designates the Moon and its natural resources as the “common heritage of mankind”.37 Article 4.1 further provides that 29 Art. XI. However, there is, for instance, no indication of the manner in which the information must be conveyed to the scientific community and the public, nor any standards for determining when human life or health may be endangered such as to trigger the reporting requirement. 30 Art. 15.1. 31 Art. 3.1. 32 Art. 3.3. 33 On the other hand, the resources of the military—its observation capabilities in particular—can also play an important role in the management of space activities (environmental management included). See Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, pp. 18–19. The military has also been more willing to invest in radio frequency interference detection equipment than many commercial operators, for instance. Bates 2005. 34 Art. 6.2. 35 Art. 8.2.a. 36 Art. 8.3.b. 37 Art. 11.1.
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[t]he exploration and use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Outer space is an environment that in principle is shared by all states, populations and generations, and its contamination could jeopardize their rights of exploration and use. Most interestingly, paragraph 5 of Article 11 requires the establishment of an “international regime” before exploitation of lunar resources becomes practicable. The main purposes of such a regime include the orderly and safe development of the resources, together with their rational management.38 Nevertheless, the Moon Treaty leaves ample scope for interpretation—not least as regards the ‘international regime’. Besides, if a space mission is conducted by an entity which does not include a state party to the Moon Treaty—as will most likely be the case—the provisions of the instrument may be wholly inapplicable.39 3.1.3. The Liability Convention A central concern when talking about environmental harm caused by space activities is responsibility and liability.40 In principle, the UN space treaties provide a party suffering a loss as a result of space activities with a very favorable international liability regime if compared to most other areas of hazardous activities. The general rule, according to Outer Space Treaty Article VI, is that states bear international responsibility for activities in space. Article VII, moreover, establishes international liability of launching states. The launching state is liable for damage to another state party or to its natural or juridical persons caused by its space object “or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies”. The Liability
Art. 11.7. For a more thorough treatment of the Moon Treaty and its regime for the exploitation of lunar natural resources, see Viikari 2002. 40 It should be noted that there are several schools of thought as to how the two terms should be used. ‘Responsibility’ and ‘liability’ may even be used rather interchangeably. See, e.g., Hacket 1994, pp. 154–159. In this book, ‘state responsibility’ refers to answerability contingent upon a breach of an international obligation, whereas ‘liability’ relates more generally to remedying harm (whether it has resulted from a violation of an international rule or not). Such an approach also reflects the manner in which the terms are used in UN space law. 38 39
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Convention complements these provisions by setting out more detailed rules for cases of ‘space damage’ involving different states. First, the Liability Convention establishes two separate regimes of liability: one of absolute liability (without any ceiling) to be applied in the case of damage caused by a space object “on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft flight”,41 and another based on fault liability which applies when the damage occurs in outer space.42 All space activities are ultra-hazardous and it has been deemed appropriate that those engaged in such activities (and gaining profit from them) should also bear the risk of any ensuing damage, whereas possible victims on Earth deserve full compensation.43 In particular, if nuclear power sources are used, such damage can be considerable. Article V improves the possibilities of
41 Art. II. Pursuant to Art. VI, exoneration from absolute liability is to be granted “to the extent that a launching State establishes that the damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents”, except in cases where the launching state has caused the damage by violating international law. 42 Art. III. Such inclusion of two parallel systems of liability within a single multilateral convention is quite unusual in international law. Another example is the 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Arts. 4 and 5). Silva Soares–Vieira Vargas 2003, p. 94. 43 The intention of the liability regime of the UN space treaties has been to give a high level of protection to third parties not involved in a space project. Pursuant to the preamble to the Liability Convention, a focal motive for the convention was the “need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage”. As is stated in a document called “Advantages of adherence to the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects” (produced by a Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space under the Legal Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS), “[b]y concentrating internationally the concept of absolute or objective and unlimited liability for any damage caused by space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight, the [Liability] Convention has become a unique case and a real novelty in contemporary public international law concerning the protection of victims”. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 45th session 2006, Annex I, Appendix, para. 3. On the other hand, the Liability Convention does not apply at all to “damage caused by a space object of a launching State to: (a) Nationals of that launching State; (b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State” (Art. VII).
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victims of damage to obtain compensation by establishing joint and several liability of all launching states for joint launches and the right of the victim state to seek the entire compensation from any or all of the launching states. However, although this system may by and large afford victims of space operations considerable protection, it can appear far less just from the point of view of the states involved in the launch of a space object. A major problem is the overly extensive definition of a launching state. Pursuant to the Liability Convention, [t]he term ‘launching State’ means: (i) A State which launches or procures the launch of a space object; (ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.44
Hence, most launches will involve several launching states, of which only few typically have a real say in the operation of the space mission. Application of the Liability Convention may thus result in liability of states that are in fact little more than ‘innocent bystanders’. It may even be complicated to determine which states constitute the launching states under the Liability Convention. Above all, the procurement of the launching of a space object is anything but an unequivocal expression, particularly where space objects launched by private entities are concerned.45 Application of the UN space treaties may thus result in somewhat questionable outcomes. The Liability Convention also regulates situations where damage is caused
44 Art. I.c. Para. 3 of Art. V of the Liability Convention further specifies that a state “from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching”. See also UNGA Res. 59/115 on the concept of launching state, adopted on the basis of a resolution of the UNCOPUOS in 2004 (Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2004, para. 149 and Annex II). 45 ‘Procurement’ may be interpreted to include financial backing for a launch, a request by one state to another to launch a satellite of the requester or a private individual or enterprise providing payload for a launch, for instance. Any such link could cause a country to be considered a ‘launching state’. Even state members of an international organization requesting the launch services of some state could be considered states “procuring” the launch of a space object. On the other hand, such activities as supplying minor components to the payload or the sale of a satellite should not be enough to qualify as ‘procurement’. Christol 1995, pp. 271–272. The Liability Convention does not, however, define the concept in detail. It has been pointed out that “[n]ew developments in the field of launching technology and the privatization of this sector could lead to the conclusion that [the definition of the term ‘launching state’ in Art. I of the Liability Convention] is not sufficient”. “Review of the Status of the Five International Legal Instruments Governing Outer Space” 1998(a), para. 11.c.
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In principle, this means that, for instance, if a piece of space debris hits a spacecraft of another state and this causes further damage to a third state, both the launching state of the debris (where its identity can be established) and that of the (‘innocent’) spacecraft damaged by it are jointly and severally liable for possible damage to any other states. In the case of damage which occurs in outer space, fault liability applies,47 whereas for damage on Earth (or to aircraft in flight) liability is absolute.48 If a spacecraft with an NPS is involved and parts of it fall back to Earth, the damage may be very grave and the ensuing absolute liability accordingly significant. Moreover, the victims are allowed to ask for full compensation from any one of the liable states, who are then to apportion it between themselves according to fault.49 Consequently, if there is no fault on behalf of the launching state of the NPS-equipped spacecraft but only on the part of the launching state of the piece of debris (no matter how small that piece is), the latter is to pay all of the compensation pursuant to the Liability Convention.50 Even in such a case, the victims of damage on Earth can, on the other hand, legitimately demand the entire compensation from the ‘innocent’ state, which may eventually encounter difficulties in collecting it from the state at fault (despite its undeniable right to do so pursuant to the Liability Convention). As concerns the amount of reparation for damage, Article XII provides that compensation for harm caused by space activities shall “provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred”. This standard could result in very high damages, particularly in the case of harm to the health or lives of people. On the other hand, the very general reference in Article XII to “international law and the principles of justice and equity” for
46
Art. IV.1. Art. IV.1.b. 48 Art. IV.1.a. 49 Art. IV.2. “If the extent of the fault of each of these States cannot be established, the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally between them”. 50 This illustrative example has been presented by Kerrest 2001, pp. 870–871, who suggests that liability rules should be amended so as to avoid outcomes where damage resulting from nuclear pollution is not compensated by the user of the NPS. Ibid., p. 873. 47
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determining the compensation is open to a variety of interpretations.51 Damage is, moreover, only compensable if it results in “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations”.52 This excludes any damage to the environment itself, whether occurring in outer space or on Earth in areas outside the national sovereignty of states. Hence, a potential polluter does not need to worry much about environmental losses, even when they can affect the environment significantly, as long as there is no damage to ‘foreign’ property or persons.53 The Liability Convention does not even mention such environmental problems as pollution; it is merely concerned with direct damages suffered by states or legal or juridical persons due to the space activities of others. Only Article XXI can be interpreted as referring to the environmental consequences of space activities: it mentions damage caused by space objects presenting “a largescale danger to human life” or seriously interfering “with the living conditions of the population or the functioning of vital centres”, i.e. major catastrophes. This article does not, however, regulate issues of responsibility or liability but merely aspires to guarantee “appropriate and rapid assistance to the State which has suffered the damage”, if that state so requests. The Liability Convention restricts its scope also by excluding damage caused to citizens of the same country which launched the space object in question, as well as to foreign nationals participating in that space operation.54 Furthermore, under Article III, persons (as well as property) must be on board a space object in order to recover damages, a condition which in principle would, for instance, exclude incidents in which astronauts engaged in extravehicular activities are killed. It is also questionable whether the Liability Convention’s “damage” actually covers anything but clearly material damage. If it is interpreted to include only strictly material damage, interference caused by telecommunication satellites to space activities of others, for instance, would at worst not fall under the scope of the Liability Convention’s provisions at all but only under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.55 Moreover, the ambiguous terminology of the Liability Convention can even be interpreted to exclude all damages caused by space 51
The preamble to the Liability Convention states equally ambiguously that the payment should be “a full and equitable measure of compensation”. 52 Art. I.a. 53 As the salience of ‘environmental health’ as a concept incorporating notions of both human health and environmental protection increases, this may open up new possibilities to interpret the “impairment of health” (and thus “damage”) in the Liability Convention in a more expansive way. At the moment, however, little support for such interpretations can be derived from the practices of the modern space sector. 54 Art. VII. 55 It was argued by the US already during negotiations concerning the OST that “damage” as referred to in OST, Art. VII concerning liability would exclude
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debris: it applies to damage “caused by a space object” and the only definition Article 1.d gives for a space object is that it includes “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof ”.56 Such a definition is very vague, being nearly no definition at all. This provision appears to refer to space objects that are entire units, extending at most to component parts (also unitary) thereof.57 There seems to be no great difficulty in designating inactive satellites as well “space objects”. The situation gets most complicated in the case of little pieces of debris, as one can argue that such an item constitutes neither a space object nor a component part of one (nor a launch vehicle or a part thereof ). It seems especially debatable whether a piece of fragmentation debris and microparticulate matter can be regarded as a “space object” or a “component part”. Even less clear is the situation with other types of pollution and contamination, including space mission litter. Questions have also been presented regarding the legal status of rockets that never reach outer space, for instance, due to a launch failure.58 If space debris does not qualify as a space object for the purposes of the Liability Convention, the instrument becomes largely meaningless in establishing liability for space activities. The most common and hazardous form of potential damage related to space activities would then fall wholly outside the scope of any international legal regulation.59 Consequently, it has been argued that “anything which has been launched into outer space whatever its size”
electronic damage. Hence jamming of telecommunications would only be covered by the consultation requirement of OST Art. IX. See Christol 1979, pp. 447–450. 56 This definition is repeated in Article 1.b of the Registration Convention. 57 The provision has even been interpreted as dealing with not only entire but preferably fully operating units, i.e., “functioning unitary entities”. Christol 1995, p. 256. (According to the author, harms produced by space debris nevertheless invoke liability under the existing treaty regime. Ibid.) 58 Baker 1988, p. 209. It has been pointed out that if an object simply ceases to be functional, this should have no influence on its legal status. The fact that even an attempted launch qualifies as “launching” under the Liability Convention (Art. 1.b) also seems to support the conclusion. See Hacket 1994, p. 58. 59 Even if this were the case, the Outer Space Treaty would offer some protection from space debris as it demands that space activities be conducted “with due regard to the corresponding interest of all other States Parties” (which may be hampered by the introduction of debris) and, furthermore, that exploration of celestial bodies is to be conducted “so as to avoid their harmful contamination” (Art. IX). Art. VI establishes international responsibility for assuring that space activities are conducted “in conformity with the provisions set forth in the [OST]”. Obviously, such general requirements are, however, not in themselves (without more specific international standards defining the threshold of harmfulness, for instance) enough to prevent proliferation of space debris. For a discussion concerning the scope of OST Art. VI in respect of space debris and pollution, see Report of the 64th Conference of the ILA 1990, pp. 162–164.
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qualifies as a “space object”.60 Alternatively, space debris can even be regarded as a “component part” of a space object.61 Such a practical approach with a focus on safety and environmental concerns—by considering space debris as constituting either a space object or at least a component part of it—indeed seems as the only feasible interpretation given the hazards space debris poses today.62 Regardless of the interpretation of “space object”, mere activity involving a risk of damage, no matter how hazardous, can never result in liability under the provisions of the UN space treaties. Moreover, even in cases of indisputable material damage, proving the fault and the causality required is often an insurmountable obstacle. For instance, even if debris particles of all sizes were included in the legal definition of a ‘space object’, great practical difficulties would remain in establishing liability of the launching state. In most cases it is almost impossible to prove in a given case that the damage was even caused by space debris, that a particular piece of debris is part of a registered space object of a certain state and, furthermore, that there exists such fault (when the incident takes place in outer space) on the part of the launching state that it can be held liable for the damage.63 More generally, there are obvious difficulties involved in establishing any fault when standards of conduct for handling the 60 See Kerrest 2001, pp. 870, 873 fn. 1. See also the European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation which defines space debris as “[a]ny man made space object including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere, that is non-functional”, and space object as “[a]ny man-made space system and any of its components or fragments” (pp. 13–14). 61 This is the position taken in The Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group 1988, p. 67. 62 One explanation presented for the lack of a substantive definition of the term ‘space object’ in the Liability Convention (and other UN space treaties) is that there was a common understanding of the meaning of the term at the time these instruments were drafted. See Hacket 1994, pp. 56–57. For a discussion concerning the notions ‘damage’ and ‘space object’ in UN space treaties, see, e.g., Report of the 64th Conference of the ILA 1990, pp. 164–167. The question of a legal distinction between valuable spacecraft and worthless space debris has been identified as one requiring consideration by the UNCOPUOS. If space debris should be defined as a space object under the UN space treaties, it has been recommended that an additional protocol be elaborated for determining exactly which provisions of the space treaties apply to space debris and which to valuable space objects. If space debris is not deemed to be a space object, the protocol could determine when it is perhaps permissible to remove or re-orbit space debris in order to prevent collisions or close encounters with functional spacecraft. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 15. 63 The situation is typically less complicated where damage is caused by space debris falling down to Earth: there is no need to establish fault because the absolute liability regime applies and, moreover, objects that are capable of entering the Earth atmosphere tend to be large and heavy and thus more likely to be identifiable. See Kerrest 2001, p. 870.
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environmental hazards of space activities have yet to be adopted.64 This seems problematic particularly in the case of damage caused by space debris. Moreover, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what kind of damage certain debris can cause, let alone when a particular form of damage will occur. Even where some kind of a prediction of a possible collision can be made, there rarely exists any possibility of carrying out maneuvers to avoid it.65 Further problems limiting the effectiveness of the Liability Convention include its poor dispute settlement mechanism,66 which will be examined in more detail later in this book. The only claim that has ever been presented under the Liability Convention was that of Canada in the Cosmos 954 case, where a former USSR nuclearpowered satellite disintegrated over remote northern areas of Canada in 1978. The Canadian claim for some six million Canadian dollars was based on the Liability Convention, the Outer Space Treaty and general principles of international law.67 It covered, i.a., the costs of restoring the territory rendered partly unfit for use by radioactive debris scattered over large areas, hence constituting damage to property within the meaning of the Liability Convention.68 Canada also reserved the right to present additional claims, e.g., for compensation for the costs of establishing a Compensation Commission under the Liability Convention. Eventually, however, the dispute was settled not in accordance with the system of the Liability Convention but by a protocol between the two states in 1981. The Soviet Union agreed to pay three million Canadian dollars “in full and final compensation” which Canada in turn accepted “in full and final settlement of its claim”.69 However, the Cosmos 954 case provides an interesting precedent in one important respect concerning the interpretation of the Liability Convention: at least in this incident space debris was evidently considered a ‘space object’ as it sufficed, in the light of the initial Canadian claim, to establish liability under the Liability Convention.70 Matte 1989, p. 435. Not surprisingly, the rationale for fault-based liability for damage caused in outer space has been frequently questioned; e.g., Baker 1988, pp. 214–215; Hacket 1994, pp. 211– 212. 66 Provided in Arts. IX and XIV. 67 Statement of the Canadian Claim, paras. 14–24. 68 The total costs of the Canadian government were apparently much higher, however (some 14 million Canadian dollars); what is more, the US helped with the cleanup operations. Reiskind 1981, p. 463. 69 Protocol Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1981. For a more detailed treatment of the Cosmos 954 case, see Sands 2003, pp. 897–898. 70 Perek 2005, p. 289. However, the Soviet Union never officially admitted liability and the dispute was ultimately not resolved by invoking the Liability Convention. Besides, it can be argued that the case only supports the conclusion that particularly 64 65
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3.1.4. The Registration Convention The Registration Convention also has relevance, if only indirect, for environmental problems related to the utilization of outer space. The convention obligates launching states to register all objects “launched into Earth orbit or beyond” in a national register71 as well as to furnish the UN Secretary-General “as soon as practicable”72 with various types of information concerning space objects registered in the national registry. This information is then entered into a UN register maintained by the Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). The register of the UNOOSA has been established pursuant to Article III of the Registration Convention. In addition to this ‘Convention Register’, there is also another UN register on objects launched into outer space, the ‘Resolution Register’ established pursuant to an earlier General Assembly resolution from 1961.73 This resolution called upon states to furnish information to the UN Secretary-General for registering launchings of space objects.74 The Resolution Register has been maintained since 1962 (also by the UNOOSA, formerly the Outer Space Affairs Division). After the entry into force of the Registration Convention in 1976, the information on launchings provided by the states parties to the convention has been recorded in the Convention Register. The two registers are complementary in nature. The Resolution Register is still used for information provided by states which are not parties to the Registration Convention.75 The 1961 Resolution does not specify the information that should hazardous (radioactive) space debris constitutes a ‘space object’ under the UN space law. Baker 1988, pp. 211–213. 71 Art. II.1. At this writing, 17 notifications have been made to the UN SecretaryGeneral of the establishment of national registers (including notifications made by EUMETSAT and ESA) for space objects pursuant to Art. II (the latest one being Belarus, in July 2006). See Index of Notifications by Member States and Organizations on the Establishment of National Registries of Objects Launched into Outer Space. According to Art. II.3, “the contents of each registry and the conditions under which it is maintained shall be determined by the State of registry concerned”. Where a space object has several launching states, they are to determine together which one of them is the “State of Registry” (Art. II.2); hence they have to make some kind of an agreement on that. 72 Art. IV.1. 73 UNGA Res. 1721(XVI), Section B, para. 2. 74 Section B, para. 1. 75 They account for nearly one-third of the over 30 states and international organizations that have provided information on their space objects to the UN. “Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects” 2005, para. 15. Of all the states that have launched space objects into outer space, some 60 per cent are parties to the Registration Convention. Ibid., para. 95. If compared to the other UN space treaties (with the exception of the Moon Treaty), the Registration Convention
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be provided but since 1976, the information recorded in the Resolution Register has usually been identical to that required by the Registration Convention.76 The information to be registered with the UN pursuant to the Registration Convention includes a) the name of launching state(s); b) an appropriate designator of the space object (or its registration number); c) the date and territory or location of launch; and d) basic orbital parameters.77 The “general function of the space object” should also be notified.78 Furthermore, the Registration Convention requires notification of space objects which are no longer in Earth orbit.79 In addition to the more specific registration requirements, states are expressly allowed, “from time to time, [to] provide the [UN] SecretaryGeneral … with additional information concerning a space object carried on its registry”.80 The practice of states (even the states parties to the Registration Convention) in registering space objects differs in many respects. For instance, the time for submission of information to the UN varies from weeks after launch to years (the average being two to three months).81 As concerns the particular information which is registered, the only coherent data provided seems to be the name of the launching state(s). The Registration Convention allows states themselves to determine the “appropriate designator of the space object”, for instance.82 Moreover, the notion “basic orbital parameters”83 is open to interpretation. Consequently, the units of measurement used vary, as does the level of detail provided.84 The notion “general function of the space object” allows for even more discretion in the registration. Accordingly, “the amount of information on the function of the space object ranges from a two-word statement of its
has a relatively small number of states parties. It has been presumed that this might be due to the (false) assumption that the Registration Convention can be useful only for launching states. Perek 2002, p. 124. 76 For a more detailed treatment, see “Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects” 2005. The UN register “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space” is accessible on the Internet. 77 Art. IV.1. The basic orbital parameters include: i) nodal period; ii) inclination; iii) apogee; and iv) perigee (Art. IV.1.d). 78 Art. IV.1.e. 79 Art. IV.3. 80 Art. IV.2. 81 Occasionally, the UN has received registration information on space objects before they have even been launched. After a successful launch, the data provided have been confirmed and the registration completed. “Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects” 2005, para. 49. 82 Art. IV.1.b. 83 Art. IV.1.d. 84 For a more detailed assessment, see “Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects” 2005, paras. 54–77.
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function to a detailed account of its mission objectives, the science payload and radio frequency plans”. The information provided by most states remains “very basic”.85 There is no mechanism for controlling the accuracy of the information provided. A telling fact is that apparently no state has ever registered a launch of a space object as having a military purpose.86 About one-third of space objects launched are not registered with the UN at all.87 Furthermore, only about 50 per cent of re-entries of space objects (of states parties to the Registration Convention) to the Earth’s atmosphere are notified to the UN.88 The Registration Convention operates in conjunction with the Liability Convention in particular. Availability of information such as that registered with the UN pursuant to the Registration Convention can be focal in the case of a collision between space objects as it can facilitate identification of the launching state(s) involved. Without such identification, it is impossible to establish liability. If the affected state is not able to identify the space object which has caused damage to it (or to any of its natural or juridical persons) or “which may be of a hazardous or deleterious nature”, other states parties are to assist in the identification if requested.89 The Registration Convention entails problems similar to those in the other UN space treaties. For instance, it relies on the same definition of a launching state as the Liability Convention,90 whereby the same problems of interpretation occur in its application.91 Also, the term ‘space object’ is (once more) in need of clarification.92 A fundamental problem is that the Registration Convention, too, appears to envision only the registration of unitary space objects when they are launched and therefore provides little help in cases where the cause of damage is, for instance, a tiny piece of fragmentation debris from a satellite. On the other hand, the recording of orbital parameters required by the Registration
85 Ibid., para. 78. An example of an entity providing comprehensive information on the space objects’ function is ESA. Ibid. For a Matrix of Registration Practices of States and International Organizations, see ibid., Annex III. 86 Goldman 2002, p. 168. 87 At least in 2002 it was found that about 30 per cent of space objects that had been launched in 2000 were not in the UN register. Perek 2003, p. 464. 88 “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 81. 89 Art. VI. States have never requested this kind of information through the UN, yet the exchange of such information is common practice. Ibid., para. 92. 90 Art. I.a. 91 Both the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention have been deemed “not fully reflect[ing] the needs and realities of ongoing commercialization and use of space for research”. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 142. 92 E.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 43rd session 2004, para. 118.
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Convention may prove incomplete or imprecise in the case of large satellite constellations.93 Such problems are partly remedied by the practice of states in registering space objects, which often goes beyond the obligations of the Registration Convention. However, this practice is by no means uniform and it always remains at the discretion of each state. Space objects registered in the UN register include both functional space objects and non-functional (or formerly functional) objects. There are states that provide information on functional objects only,94 yet many go far beyond that; as a matter of fact, over half of the registered space objects are non-functional. Some states provide information on all space objects (functional ones as well as objects generated any time during and after launch) that are detectable by surveillance systems from the Earth, thus including many pieces of space debris.95 Some limit their information to functional space objects and objects which are generated during or just after launch.96 Hence debris produced by later explosions, for instance, may not be registered. Registration of launch-related non-functional objects is usually carried out by the state providing the launch service.97 Where there are multiple launching states, they jointly determine the “State of Registry”;98 hence the state that provides the launch service sometimes also registers the ‘foreign’ payload.99 Some launch service providers only register space objects related to the launch vehicle.100 Considering the numerous multinational space missions (and thus Salin 2000, pp. 49–51. Examples are Israel, Japan and the Russian Federation. “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 27. 95 France, for instance, records the break-up fragments of spacecraft domestically. All information registered on the national level is passed on to the space object register of the UN. France considers the concept ‘space object’ to include “a spacecraft whatever is its status: active or inactive (derelict)”; “a part of a launched spacecraft when this spacecraft is separated in several parts, deliberately … or involuntarily (break up)”; “a launcher stage which remains in orbit after the launching mission is complete”; “a part of the launcher which remains in orbit after the mission is complete”; and “a part of an in-orbit launcher stage when a fragmentation occurs”. Trebaol 2005, pp. 583–584. The US also provides information on all space objects, functional or non-functional. “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 25. 96 This practice is followed by China, India, and ESA. Ibid., para. 26. 97 Ibid., para. 25. 98 Registration Convention, Art. II. 99 At least China has been reported to have done so on behalf of many of its international launch clients. Ibid., para. 40. 100 Examples are at least France and the US. Ibid., para. 41. France and the Russian Federation also include a notification in their registrations that their launch vehicles have been used for launching another state’s space objects (without including the foreign objects in the national registry). Ibid., para. 42. 93 94
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multiple ‘launching states’), it is not always easy to determine who should carry out the registration. Consequently, there are space objects that have even been registered by more than one state101 (and many that have been registered by none). Transfer of ownership of space objects in orbit is one more factor causing complications in registration. Changes of ownership from one commercial entity to another are particularly common in the case of geostationary communication satellites, which can be leased or sold years after their launching.102 Such transfer of ownership is usually not reported to the UN, even though the initial launching state may no longer have any control over the satellite.103 If new environmental standards for space activities are established, more exacting registration requirements could provide an increasingly important mechanism for assuring compliance.104 This might necessitate registration of different and more detailed information. For instance, bearing in mind collision hazards, it would be most useful to have information about a space object’s power source registered—above all where this is nuclear power. Currently, that is not required. The Registration Convention also does not differentiate between geostationary and other satellites. The orbital parameters required by the Registration Convention are very similar where GEO satellites are concerned as they reside in the same orbital region, yet the convention does not require the registration of the most distinctive orbital parameter for GEO objects, namely, the location of the object relative to the surface of the Earth.105 Another very simple improvement would be to require registration of information on the mass of the objects.106 Furthermore, although the Registration Convention requires notification of space objects which are no longer in Earth orbit,107 there are no 101
For a list of such objects, see ibid., Annex IV. Ibid., para. 36. 103 Ibid., para. 37. A rare example where a change of ownership was registered was the transfer from the United Kingdom (UK) to China of the satellites Asiasat-1, Asiasat-2, Apstar-1 and Apstar-1A in 1997. The UK informed the UN that these satellites had been removed from its national registry, while China respectively submitted information that the same satellites had been added to the Chinese national registry. Sometimes a state has also explicitly notified the UN that it does not consider itself the “State of Registry” when a commercial entity incorporated in its territory has purchased a space object in orbit. See ibid., paras. 37–39. 104 Uhlir–Bishop 1986, p. 199. 105 This is usually expressed as the corresponding longitude on the Earth’s Equator. “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 73. Nevertheless, despite the lack of an obligation to do so, most states with space objects on GEO have also registered their GEO positions (which usually are also registered with the ITU; see more below). Ibid., para. 74. 106 See “Review of the Status of the Five International Legal Instruments Governing Outer Space” 1998(a), para. 11.b. 107 Art. IV.3. The record of notifications by states parties to the Registration Convention concerning re-entering space objects is not laudable, however: only about 102
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requirements concerning explosions and break-ups of registered space objects or changes of orbital positions. The convention also says nothing about furnishing information regarding defunct satellites still in orbit or other types of space debris, nor does it provide for registration of different parts of a space object. Moreover, there is no requirement to register possible transfer of ownership of space objects in outer space. All such deficiencies hamper the identification of deleterious space objects and the states responsible for them. Obviously, any additional information can be furnished to the UN already now on the basis of Article IV.2 of the Registration Convention. As mentioned above, registrations of transfer of ownership of space objects in orbit are rare, yet some examples exist. The registration of other kind of ‘additional information’ has been more common. For instance, information has been provided when a satellite has ceased to function. Article IV has been also used for notifying the international community in potential emergency situations involving an impending re-entry of space objects and—even more importantly—decay of nuclear-powered space objects.108 Such additional registrations are, however, always completely voluntary. One of the proposals made for improving the situation is that states could register the functional status of their space objects and thus themselves define whether, for instance, intact satellites that are no longer active should be regarded as debris.109 Technically, the simplest register along these lines would be one that contains information on those objects which are considered ‘functional’ (or which a state wants to protect).110 Another approach would be the registration of objects considered debris (or notification that a space object is not functional). Although it could be unfeasible to register very small objects, registration of at least the bulkier parts of spacecraft that have become debris, such as used launchrelated rocket bodies and stages, would seem not only possible but potentially
50 per cent of re-entries are notified to the UN. “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 81. 108 Ibid., Chapter IV.C.7. In order to strengthen the role of the NPS Principles (see below) in case of an accident or if a space object is malfunctioning with the risk of re-entry of radioactive materials, European states have proposed that NPS Principles 5 (Notification of Re-entry), 6 (Consultations) and 7 (Assistance to States) should be “included into the supplement to the Registration Convention”. “Review of the Status of the Five International Legal Instruments Governing Outer Space” 1998(a), para. 11.e. 109 See “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 109. Furthermore, it has been proposed that an inter-agency body similar to the IADC (something like “Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee for Registration Practices” or “IARP”) could develop international guidelines for the practice of registering the functionality of space objects. Perek 2005, p. 588. 110 See the proposal of Perek to that end in Report of the 65th Conference of the ILA 1992, pp. 144–145.
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very beneficial as well.111 As mentioned, information concerning space debris is already entered into some national registers and even transmitted to the UN Secretary-General. Some states also register launch vehicles and payloads separately.112 Such more detailed registration practices can greatly facilitate the identification of hazardous space debris, possibly providing an incentive to prevent the generation of debris.113 Other additional registration requirements which could prove useful concern at least such information as the GEO location and date of decay or re-entry of space objects, as well as web links to official information on space objects.114 Currently, the registration practice varies greatly, both nationally and internationally. Moreover, it has been argued that there has recently been a considerable overall decrease in the registration of space objects, which undermines all of the UN space treaties.115 Obviously, this also compromises the reliability of the registration of space objects by the organization. Accordingly, it has been suggested not only that the current Registration Convention should be applied in a uniform and complete manner116 but that its implementation and applica-
111 Perek 2005, p. 588. Where a collision in space between space objects of different states results in debris, determination of the nationality of the new pieces of debris could be very difficult, though. The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 22. 112 E.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 132. Mandatory separate registration of launch vehicles and their parts, as well as registration of transfer of ownership of space objects in orbit, has also been suggested. Ibid., Annex III, para. 8.c. 113 Kerrest 2001, p. 873. 114 “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 109. Among the other suggestions made is the registration of not only the states involved in a space mission but also of other legal entities participating in it. Kopal 2001, p. 380. 115 E.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 135. About seven per cent of the total population of functional space objects launched into outer space since 1976 have not been registered with the UN. “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 94. For a list of such objects, see ibid., Annex V. The factors contributing to non-registration include the multiplicity of parties involved in many space missions and the number of space objects owned and operated by intergovernmental organizations. Sometimes modules of space stations are not registered, nor are probes and recoverable capsules which separate from a space object to eventually enter the atmosphere of the Earth or crash on another celestial body. Also, space objects performing national security functions may be left out of registers. Furthermore, it is commonly understood that international registration is required only for objects launched after the accession of a state to the Registration Convention. See ibid., Chapter V. 116 E.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 134; “Practice of States and international organizations on registering space objects” 2005, para. 108.
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tion could be enhanced by, i.a., standardization of the form and content of the information delivered to the UN, setting a reasonable deadline for the registration of space objects, and facilitating access to national space object registers.117 Clearly, the harmonization of content and format of information transmitted by states would at least contribute to increased uniformity of the UN register.118 A set deadline for registration, as well as better access to national registers, could improve the registration rate in general. It has also been suggested that the Registration Convention be supplemented with provisions requiring pre-launch notification.119 However, such improvements cannot remedy the fact that many expressions of the Registration Convention would still leave ample room for interpretation and remain inadequate without more sophisticated requirements concerning the information submitted.120 117 E.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, paras. 127– 128. See also Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on the Practice of States and International Organizations in Registering Space Objects, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, Annex III. 118 Unilateral improvements in registration practices could, on the other hand, cause further differentiation between the national registers. Kopal 2001, p. 384. 119 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 39. There are some other instruments which partly remedy the lack of prior-notification provisions in the Registration Convention. The ITU provides for a mandatory pre-launch notification system concerning the use of GEO (see below). One idea to improve the overall situation is to link or merge the ITU information system with the UN registration system. Ibid., p. 90. Another type of existing notification systems is the legally non-binding International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2002 which provides for the “exchange [of ] pre-launch notifications on … Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test flights”, including “such information as the generic class of the Ballistic Missile or Space Launch Vehicle, the planned launch notification window, the launch area and the planned direction” (Art. 4.iii). The Code already has far over a hundred subscribing states (in January 2006, the number was 123; UNGA Res. 60/62, para. 1) and hence carries significant political weight despite being a legally non-binging instrument. In 2000, the US and the Russian Federation had already agreed on prior notification with regard to launch activities, but only among themselves (Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches). Moreover, the Russian Federation has made an initiative in the Conference on Disarmament announcing its willingness to provide prior notification of spacecraft launches, their purpose and main parameters. It called on the other states with launch facilities to join the initiative “to promote openness and to build confidence in the domain of outer space activities”. Letter dated 2003/06/11 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament. For the spacecraft launch plans of the Russian Federation, see “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Schedule of spacecraft launches in the Russian Federation”. 120 As regards the method for adopting additional rules to the Registration Convention, states do not seem eager to amend the convention itself. Thus one suggestion has been to adopt a protocol to it, leaving the convention itself intact. Another idea is the
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3.1.5. The Rescue Agreement Finally, the Rescue Agreement, although mainly regulating quite different aspects of space activities, may have some relevance in cases involving environmental damage in the space sector. As the name of the instrument indicates, it provides guidance for situations where space objects or astronauts are in one way or another in distress. The distress could derive also from environmental hazards. Articles 2 and 3 of the agreement obligate states to render assistance to astronauts in such situations. Another potentially relevant article from an environmental point of view is Article 5. Pursuant to paragraph 2, a non-launching state can, “upon the request of the launching authority and with assistance from that authority if requested”, recover a space object (or its component parts) which have returned to Earth and have been discovered in its territory. Paragraphs 1 and 3 indicate that a recovery by a non-launching state might be possible also where a space object has been found in areas “not under the jurisdiction of any State”—hence possibly even in outer space;121 however, a request by the launching authority still seems to be required. Paragraph 4 regulates situations where a state party “has reason to believe that a space object [of another launching state] discovered in territory under its jurisdiction, or recovered by it elsewhere, is of a hazardous or deleterious nature”. In such a case, once the launching state has been notified about the situation, it is obliged to “immediately take effective steps … to eliminate possible danger or harm”.122 It has been suggested that Article 5 could even allow a state threatened by a spacecraft or a piece of space debris launched by another state to unilaterally recover such an object in outer space. Here, too, vagueness of terminology creates
introduction of new rules by a resolution of the UN General Assembly (and thus on a non-binding level only). Kopal 2001, pp. 383–384. An initiative made by European states consists of a number of proposed improvements to the Registration Convention which would clarify and possibly supplement the convention. Pursuant to the proposal, the improvements would be agreed upon in the UNCOPUOS and adopted by UNGA Resolutions, and eventually transformed into international law “as supplementary international legal instrument to the Registration Convention” to be ratified by states. “Review of the Status of the Five International Legal Instruments Governing Outer Space” 1998(a), para. 12. 121 Para. 1 obligates a state party to notify the launching authority of the return of its space object once it learns that such an object has been discovered in its own territory or in any place not under the jurisdiction of any state (i.a., outer space). Para. 3 requires that “upon request of the launching authority”, a space object found beyond the territorial limits of the launching state (i.e., either in the territory of another state or beyond national territories) be returned or “held at the disposal of representatives of the launching authority”. 122 Art. 5.4.
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uncertainty; what constitutes a space object still remains disputable, as does the question whether the expressions “beyond the territorial limits of the launching authority” or “elsewhere” pertain to outer space.123 The Rescue Agreement does not seem to allow such an interpretation, considering its requirement that the launching authority request any recovery operations. It should also be remembered that Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty assigns the jurisdiction, control and ownership of a space object to the state of registration for an indeterminate period of time, which militates against the unilateral removal of such an object by another entity. On the other hand, as the debris population increases, hazards may become so severe that there might not always be time to negotiate about the need to remove a certain space object with the state that has jurisdiction and control over it. Eventually, it might be necessary to exempt space debris from such ‘protection’ by space law.124 It is no new idea that where space debris poses severe threats, a state other than the launching state could legitimately remove such an object. For instance, it has been suggested already several decades ago that the principles concerning jurisdiction and control of Article VIII of the OST balanced with those of Article IX regarding states’ obligation to conduct their activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states would result in a qualified right to de-orbit inactive satellites, comparable to that concerning removal of derelict vessels on the high seas. This particular procedure would require prior notification to the launching state / state of registry of the threat posed by the satellite. The launching (or registry) state would still have the opportunity to eliminate the threat itself. If this were not done, there would be consultations on the means of removing the danger and, finally, independent verification of the need to de-orbit the satellite by a third party (an international organization such as COSPAR, for instance). The possibility of de-orbiting a foreign space object would be available only in cases entailing imminent danger to life and property from the unprogrammed re-entry of a space object. Hence security and economic threats deriving from the mission of the satellite could not justify de-orbiting of foreign satellites.125 Matte 1989, p. 433. For a more thorough assessment of the possibilities of resorting to unilateral responses to danger posed by space debris, see Christol 2001. 124 Perek 2005, p. 589. 125 DeSaussure 1978, pp. 389–394. The right to such protective intervention has even been described as a right of unilateral humanitarian action. Ibid. Numerous proposals concerning possibilities to take measures as regards non-functional space objects of other states have been presented, very often drawing on analogies from the law of the sea. For a treatment of ‘salvage of space objects’, see, e.g., Schwetje 1990, pp. 36–40; Christol 1990, pp. 268–276; Hacket 1994, pp. 189–199. On unilateral measures as a response to space debris, see also, e.g., Christol 1990, pp. 276–280. It has even been proposed that—in an extreme situation—a state could invoke its “inherent right” of self-defense pursuant to Art. 51 of the UN Charter. This, however, would require the space debris in 123
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It would seem more feasible to accept rights to remove fragments originating from foreign satellites rather than intact satellites themselves, albeit nonfunctional. This is particularly true as concerns fragments which cannot be identified.126 On the other hand, it has been suggested that registering space objects in accordance with their functionality could even entail a general right to remove from orbit (where feasible) those spacecraft that are not registered as ‘functional’. Considering the serious doubts which the idea of unilateral action raises, this is likely to remain a distant possibility.127 However, it has also been suggested that the Outer Space Treaty Article IX and Rescue Agreement Article 5 be supplemented with the following: If the state of registration, after notification and consultation, is not going to remove debris which endangers outer space or the Earth within a reasonable time, a nonstate of registration or a non-launching state will have the right to salvage, take away or destroy that object.128
At present, such removal is obviously unfeasible in most cases due to inadequate technology. Nevertheless, future regulatory mechanisms for debris removal could even require that space debris be declared to be under no one’s “jurisdiction and control”; otherwise removal mechanisms not capable of distinguishing between different kinds of objects could end up being in violation of the UN space law.129 3.2. The Nuclear Power Source Principles A positive step towards more advanced environmental protection by legal means in the space sector was taken in December 1992, when the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the “Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space” (the NPS Principles). However, the NPS Principles only apply to nuclear power sources for electricity generation—not to the possible use of nuclear energy for propulsion purposes (as a means to place a space object into orbit) or nuclear substances found in space.130 Also, the safety requirements adopted in the Principles are rather general, allowing those utilizing question to be so threatening as to constitute an “armed attack”. See Matte 1989, p. 434. Justifying preventive action on such a basis would be very extraordinary and would entail a considerable threat of misinterpretation of the intentions of debris impacts, for instance. See Baker 1988, pp. 191–192. 126 See Gál 1997, pp. 134–135. 127 See the proposals to this end in Report of the 65th Conference of the ILA 1992, pp. 144–145. See also Report of the 64th Conference of the ILA 1990, p. 170. 128 Diederiks-Verschoor, according to ibid., p. 145. 129 Perek 2005, p. 589. 130 Sixth paragraph of the preamble.
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NPS considerable freedom of choice.131 Furthermore, principles adopted by a General Assembly resolution do not of course have the legally binding force of a convention, even when they are adopted without a vote.132 In the main, the NPS Principles reflect already well-accepted principles and rules of space law dealing with such matters as safe use, safety assessment, notification of re-entry, emergency assistance, responsibility, liability and compensation. However, they also contain some innovations. Principle 3 attempts to restrict the use of nuclear power in space by limiting it to “those space missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable way”. The general goal is to “protect individuals, populations and the biosphere against radiological hazards”.133 Furthermore, the principle calls for the fuelling of on-board nuclear reactors by “highly enriched uranium 235” only.134 It also prescribes that “nuclear reactors shall not be made critical before they reach their operating orbit or interplanetary trajectory”.135 To this end, there is a further requirement that a nuclear reactor’s design and construction be such that it “cannot become critical before reaching the operating orbit during all possible events, including rocket explosion, re-entry, impact on ground or water, submersion in water or water intruding the core”.136 All such recommendations contribute to increased safety of space operations.137 Another innovative principle is Principle 2, which offers a definition of a launching state as “the State which exercises jurisdiction and control over a space object with nuclear power sources on board at a given point in time relevant to the principle concerned”.138 However, the NPS Principles still leave largely unresolved the question of the nature and status of the launching state where accountability for damage and harm in the case of an NPS incident is concerned. According to Principle 2.2, “[f ]or the purpose of principle 9 [on liability and compensation], the definition of the term ‘launching State’ as contained in that principle is applicable”; but Principle 9 only refers to the Outer See also Christol 1995, p. 266. Despite their generality, the NPS Principles may contradict some other existing norms concerning the use of NPS in space activities. Their conflict with the IADC Space Debris Guidelines will be examined below. 132 The UNCOPUOS has discussed the need for a possible revision of the NPS Principles, even “the elevation of the Principles to the level of international legal norms”. See, e.g., agenda item 9 “Review and possible revision of the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space”, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 43rd session 2004, paras. 60–66. 133 Principle 3.1.a. 134 Principle 3.2.c. 135 Principle 3.2.d. 136 Principle 3.2.e. 137 To guarantee complete safety in the use of NPS is, however, impossible; technology can always fail. 138 Para. 1. 131
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Space Treaty and the Liability Convention for a definition of launching state.139 It should be noted, however, that state responsibility and liability are very seldom referred to at all in non-binding UN resolutions, particularly in those relating to environmental issues.140 Accordingly, the provisions of the NPS Principles, although non-binding, are of special importance and show the seriousness of the intentions of the countries involved.141 3.3. The International Telecommunication Union The fundamental role of the UN space treaties and principles cannot be denied but, given their vagueness in terminology (and disagreement concerning interpretation of the provisions), the most important actor in the regulation of the international satellite sector in practice is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU is a specialized organization of the UN. It was established back in 1865 for the purpose of facilitating telecommunications internationally. Of course, it was not initially involved in the use of outer space but it has been concerned with space radiocommunication since the late 1950s: as the telecommunication sector began to utilize satellites, the interests of the ITU expanded accordingly. Today, space applications play a prominent role in telecommunications and the ITU is very active in this field.142 The ITU has three major functions in regard to satellite communications: it regulates the use of the radio spectrum, sets international equipment and other standards for telecommunications, and has a focal role in the utilization of GEO.143 The major mechanisms for discharging these functions are the allocation of particular radio frequencies for particular uses in what are known as World Radio Conferences,144 the establishment of technical and operational standards, and the minimization of harmful interference through the monitoring and making public to other users of the assignment by states of particular frequencies to specific stations.145 Because all states use telecommunications, they share an interest in guaranteeing undisturbed telecommunication activities See also Christol 1995, pp. 271–272. Even international environmental agreements have until quite recently often sidestepped these questions. Since the 1990s, however, liability has been an issue (in one way or another) in the negotiations of nearly all multilateral environmental agreements. Brunnée 2004, p. 359. 141 Benkö et al. 1994, p. 238. 142 On the role of the ITU in the space sector in general, see, e.g., Noll 1999. 143 Lyall 1989, p. 311. 144 These conferences used to be called World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARC) until WARC-92. Since 1995, the name ‘World Radio Conference’ (WRC) has been used. 145 Lyall 1989, p. 345. 139 140
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and the need to cooperate in this area.146 At the time of writing, there are 191 member states in the ITU, i.e., virtually all existing states (and a number far higher than the number of states ratifying any of the UN space treaties).147 The basic legal instruments of the ITU are its Constitution and Convention. Administrative Radio Conferences, conducted on global, regional or more limited levels,148 produce supplementary agreements which have the technical status of binding international treaties between ITU member states. Collectively, these agreements form what are known as the Radio Regulations, which are negotiated and revised regularly in the ITU. The ITU has also issued numerous non-binding decisions and recommendations which are appended to Radio Regulations. The ITU procedures are by and large in tune with the UN space treaties, although the basic approach of the ITU is quite different. Furthermore, the ITU is clearly not an environmental organization. Nevertheless, its interest in guaranteeing undisturbed telecommunication activities in general and the effective use of GEO for satellite communications in particular have resulted in certain regulations also relevant to environmental aspects of space activities. The main concern of the ITU in space telecommunications has been to maximize effective use of the radio spectrum and to minimize radio frequency interference, for which purposes it is to effect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the allotment of radio frequencies and the registration of radio-frequency assignments and, for space activities, of any associated orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated characteristics of satellites in other orbits.149
146
Military communications are left outside the Constitution of the ITU, yet even military radio installations must “so far as possible, observe statutory provisions relative to giving assistance in case of distress and to the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such installations” (Art. 48.2). “Moreover, when these installations take part in the service of public correspondence or other services governed by the Administrative Regulations, they must, in general, comply with the regulatory provisions for the conduct of such services” (Art. 48.3). 147 The latest state to join the ITU is the Republic of Montenegro (21 June 2006). For the development of the ITU in more detail, see “International Telecommunication Union, History”. 148 World (Administrative) Radio Conferences (WARC/WRC); Regional Administrative Radio Conferences (RARC); Administrative Radio Conferences (ARC), respectively. Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conferences (EARC) may also be convened. 149 See Art. 1.2.a of the ITU Constitution. The more detailed instruments of the ITU aim at the same goal with provisions of more precision. For instance, regarding radio emission characteristics, the ITU has issued recommendations about antenna design which, among other things, aim at minimizing the power transmitted outside the service area of a given satellite. See, e.g., Recommendation of the International Telecommunica-
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Thus, the ITU registers physical GEO slots as well as corresponding radio frequencies for different services by geographical region. It also, i.a., “coordinate[s] efforts to eliminate harmful interference and to improve the use made of the radio-frequency spectrum for radiocommunication services and of the geostationary-satellite and other satellite orbits”.150 However, interference can never be completely eliminated because all communication systems radiate some energy outside the intended service areas and frequency bands. Hence efforts to eliminate all interference would unnecessarily limit radio communications. Accordingly, the goal of the ITU is to minimize harmful interference. Harmful interference is defined by the ITU as “interference which endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations”.151 The ITU Constitution requires that “[a]ll stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members or of recognized operating agencies”.152 While radio frequency interference can be considered an environmental problem of sorts (a problem space objects using telecommunications encounter in their immediate environment), more relevant for the present study is the regulation regarding the use of GEO as a physical orbit. The ITU has long been concerned over physical overcrowding of GEO by functional satellites as well as non-functional space objects. As early as in the beginning of the 1970s, the Union declared GEO to be a limited international natural resource to which all countries are entitled to equitable access.153 In the 1980s, the problem of spent satellites and collision risk in GEO was discussed in the WARC.154 The current Constitution and Convention of the ITU were adopted by the tion Union ITU-R S.672–4. Another way of avoiding frequency congestion is frequency re-use, which enables the assignment of the same frequency bands to satellites sharing the same orbital slot provided that their signals are polarized differently or their beams limited to different areas. Wilson 1998, p. 262. 150 ITU Constitution, Art. 1.2.b. 151 ITU Constitution, Annex. 152 Art. 45.1. 153 Pursuant to the 1973 International Telecommunication Convention, “[i]n using frequency bands for space radio services Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal” (Art. 33.2; emphasis added). 154 The ITU held in 1985 and 1988 the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It (WARC ORB). The 1985 session discussed the problem of space debris. Perek 2002, p. 126. However, no attempt to make any recommendation concerning re-orbiting of spent GEO satellites was made. Ibid., p. 134.
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Additional Plenipotentiary Conference in Geneva in 1992. Article 44.2 of the present Constitution provides that “Member States shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and economically”. The same paragraph requires that the above use be such that “countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of particular countries”. Space debris not only threatens the safe operation of GEO satellites but can make access to the orbit more difficult and thus render the ITU’s stated aim of guaranteeing equitable access to GEO ineffective.155 In 1993, the ITU adopted a recommendation on environmental protection of GEO which, most significantly, calls upon states to ensure that geostationary satellites are transferred at the end of their lifetime to a “supersynchronous graveyard orbit” which does not intersect GEO.156 The transfer to a graveyard orbit should be carried out with particular caution in order to avoid radio frequency interference with active satellites.157 Other paragraphs of the recommendation require that “as little debris as possible should be released into the geostationary-satellite orbit … during the placement of a satellite in orbit”158 and that “every reasonable effort should be made to shorten the lifetime of debris in the transfer orbit”.159 These non-binding provisions adopted for the purpose of avoiding physical interference in the use of GEO remain far more modest that the ITU rules aimed at guaranteeing undisturbed radiocommunications. This disparity between the international regulation of physical and radio-frequency interference apparently results from the ITU’s interest in telecommunication: even where it is concerned with the positioning and functioning of objects in space, its prime interest is space radio stations, not the spacecraft on which these radio stations are installed.160 Moreover, despite the Union’s status as an international organization producing legally binding decisions, its role may be perceived more as that of a coordinator than a regulator. Accordingly, the ITU mechanism has been described Jahku 1992, p. 212. Recommendation of the International Telecommunication Union ITU-R S.1003, Point 3. In 2004, the ITU revised this recommendation to endorse use of the formula of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (Section 5.3.1) for calculating minimum disposal altitudes for GEO spacecraft (see below). Already the 1982 UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE II) had recommended that the ITU include in its regulation a stipulation that satellite owners should remove their satellites from GEO at the end of their operational lifetime. Perek 2002, p. 125. 157 Point 4. 158 Point 1. 159 Point 2. 160 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 44. 155 156
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as a regime “less concerned with ‘rights and duties’, and more as providing a set of ground rules within which those with competence within radio communications can arrive at compromises and arrangements”. The ITU mechanism enables “engineers and technicians … [to] try to get international and national systems of telecommunications up and running with a minimum of problems of system interference and system incompatibility”. Politicians and lawyers are usually unskilled in such matters, whereby it seems preferable not to let them dominate the ITU process.161 However, this renders the ITU less important a forum from the point of view of international law. Furthermore, the safety of satellite operations and the preservation of the space environment face increasingly severe challenges, ones which can hardly be overcome by an organization whose primary goal is to guarantee interference-free telecommunications. Moreover, the ITU’s role even in its core area of operation has become increasingly demanding. Although it has no mechanism to enforce compliance (legal powers of enforcement), for a long time it has been relatively successful in minimizing interference—already for the simple reason that usually any interferer would also suffer interference.162 However, as competition for the spectrum/orbit resource has intensified, problems have multiplied. For instance, some actors have begun to file requests for satellite frequency bands and orbital positions prematurely or in excessive quantity, even for the purpose of subsequent resale. Until the late 1980s, most of the satellite systems filed with the ITU were designed to fly: states filed only for the capacity they really needed.163 The tiny nation of Tonga was the first to apply for clearly ‘speculative’ positions through the ITU allocation process in 1988. Instead of directly utilizing them itself, Tonga put the orbital slots and satellite frequency assignments it was awarded up for auction and began renting them out to other operators. Requests for the registration of desirable orbital positions and frequency bands that are not actually needed in order merely to reserve them for possible future use or commercial resale have since become a common phenomenon. As the filings have accumulated, even ‘innocent’ operators have been forced to over-file to get at least some orbital positions successfully coordinated.164 Such satellite over-filing is also called the ‘paper satellite problem’. The result of over-filing has been a considerable increase in the workload of the ITU, even to an extent which has begun to erode its effectiveness. According to the ITU, [w]hile the Union recognizes and upholds the right of all nations—rich and poor alike—to equitable and affordable access to the satellite orbit, there’s an urgent need to reconcile this with an effective way of reducing the mountain of casual 161 162 163 164
Lyall 1989, pp. 345–346. Williamson 2003, p. 51. See Cohen 2004, p. 144. Sung 2004.
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No matter how speculative, the ITU has to coordinate all registration requests. Each of them has to accommodate the frequency and positioning requirements posed by all systems previously approved (whether real or non-existent) in order to avoid potentially harmful interference. This is not easy, given also that new satellites use ever more complex technology. In practice, the consequence is a great deal of unnecessary work as well as increasing technical demands for the genuine satellite systems. Hence, paper satellites can add significantly to the costs of real systems and block access to spectrum and orbital resources. They result in a waste of resources on the part of satellite operators, national administrations and the ITU.166 Furthermore, paper satellites can undermine credibility and legitimacy of the entire ITU regime in space radio communications.167 In practice, over-filing has resulted in timeframes for ITU coordination running into as many as several years. Quite alarmingly, many operators have started to launch their satellites before the ITU has completed its coordination process.168 One attempt to alleviate the problem (and to cover the administrative costs of the ITU) has been the introduction of sliding-scale administration and processing fees to cover satellite applications in accordance with what is called the principle of cost recovery of the processing of satellite filings, adopted initially 165
“Paper Tigers: The scramble for space spectrum”. “Scrambling for Space in Space: ITU Plenipotentiary to tackle ‘paper satellite’ problem”. There are even over eight times as many filings as actual physical satellites. Consequently, a single registration request may need to be coordinated with as many as some 20 countries. Tanner 2003. 167 An alarming example of what kinds of conflicts may follow is the incident which took place in 1992. Tonga had registered a particular orbital slot but had not placed a satellite there. The Indonesian Pasifik Satellite Nusantara (PSN) company decided to launch its own satellite into the same GEO slot. The following year, Tonga leased out this slot to a US firm, which launched another satellite into the position. In 1996, Tonga leased the slot again, this time to a Chinese company. The PSN responded by jamming the satellite. Two years later, the conflict was resolved—but only due to financial crises at the PSN. What makes the episode particularly worrying is the fact that Indonesia (a member of the ITU since 1 January 1949) consistently refused to acknowledge the ITU regime for GEO slot allocation and the ITU was not capable of stopping the illegal actions of the PSN. Space Security 2004 (2005), p. 14. Another example of misuse of the ITU system for GEO is that at least Pakistan has evidently launched a satellite “essentially to occupy the orbital slot” assigned to the country. Ibid., p. 15. For similar examples, see also Supancana 1998, pp. 194–197. 168 The coordination of frequency filing requests is complicated enough even when all stakeholders play by the book. If there are, in addition, operators who compose their own rules, the system may soon end up in chaos, given particularly the need to place satellites within increasingly short distances from each other. Tanner 2003. 166
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by the 1998 ITU Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference.169 Filings can be cancelled due to non-payment of charges. Such fees have been opposed by both large satellite-operating countries and some developing countries. The former see them as an additional financial burden on the satellite industry. The latter are trying to defend their share of GEO (for use now or in the future); for them, the imposition of fees appears as a contravention of the international principle of fair and free access to orbital slots and the frequency spectrum (and thus a mechanism that favors rich over poor).170 Since their adoption, the ITU satellite filing fees have gradually been raised (in accordance with different kinds of formulas).171 The system remains disputed. Many states are increasingly skeptical about the justice of the fees.172 A worrisome consequence has been the increasing failure to pay fees and the resulting tension between the ITU and satellite operators.173 It has even been suggested that unless the cost recovery 169 Resolutions 88 and 91. The possibility of adopting financial requirements to deter over-filing had already been discussed the previous year. However, states regarded the idea with suspicion. They feared that it could create “a precedent for charging fees for spectrum use”. Instead, they adopted an administrative due diligence requirement urging that the names of the satellite manufacturer and launch vehicle provider, as well as the dates of satellite delivery and launch, be submitted at the time of filing. This did not prove very efficient in reducing speculative filing, however. The adoption of the cost recovery fee the next year was facilitated by the fact that it does not link the fee with spectrum usage. Sung 2004. 170 See “Paper Tigers: The scramble for space spectrum”; “Scrambling for Space in Space: ITU Plenipotentiary to tackle ‘paper satellite’ problem”; and “Plenipotentiary 2002: Stepping up the pace of change”. 171 See for more detail, Oberst 2005 and Sung 2004. For instance, average cost recovery fees rose from USD 1,126 in 2000 to as much as USD 31,277 in 2003. Ibid. ITU has also established an Ad Hoc Group on Cost Recovery for Satellite Network Filings to consider the filing charge methods and make recommendations to the ITU Council. See “International Telecommunication Union, Ad Hoc Group on Cost Recovery for Satellite Network Filings”. At the ITU Council meetings in July 2005, the cost recovery procedure was again modified, entailing, i.a., new cost recovery fees (effective 1 January 2006). The issue was left to be revisited at the 2006 Council meetings. Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), p. 7. 172 Initially, the fees were justified by the need to hire additional staff to process the satellite filing backlogs. However, the ITU has since begun to tap the revenues to supplement its general budget—despite the requirement of the Resolution 91 adopted by the Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference that cost-recovery charges cover “no more than the actual costs of providing products and services” to which they relate (Resolve 4.i) and the recognition that they not be used to generate revenue or profit. The same resolution also called for “open and transparent accounting for costs and receipts” (Resolve 4.ii), another requirement which does not exactly correspond to current ITU practice. Sung 2004. 173 If the fee is not paid, the filing is cancelled. What complicates the situation further is that although it is the satellite operator who should pay the fee, the
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fee disagreement is resolved, operators may develop alternative mechanisms to coordinate satellite networks outside the ITU.174 Furthermore, the increasingly intensive utilization of near-Earth outer space by LEO systems, for instance, essentially falls outside the scope of the existing ITU space regime. The rules of the ITU are primarily designed for GEO; it is the only orbit in which one can assign orbital positions in the first place. LEO activities are covered by ITU regulations only to the extent that they use radio frequencies, like any other radio transmission activities on Earth or in outer space. Many stakeholders share the concern about the overcrowding of GEO, yet they do not appear equally worried about the effect of satellite activities in LEO or MEO. A small step forward is that also other orbits than GEO have now been recognized by the ITU as constituting a “limited natural resource”.175 Nevertheless, beyond the standard regulations concerning the use of radio frequencies, international law currently has little to offer LEO- and MEObased satellite networks other than the modest, harmless-interference rule, i.e., the obligation set out in OST Article IX requiring a state party to undertake international consultations if a planned activity might cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other states parties. Otherwise, the assignment of positions remains free. With no obligation to notify the use of particular
Radiocommunication Bureau of the ITU has considered states as ultimately liable for the overdue invoices (since there is no legal relationship between the ITU and the operators). The Bureau has even suggested that unpaid invoices could lead to the loss of voting rights or even of the right to submit new satellite filings. The states with unpaid fees include most of the major satellite-launching countries. Additionally, some states have reduced their voluntary contributions to the ITU. Ibid. 174 Ibid. Recent initiatives concerning regional harmonization of frequency allocation seem to promise at least some help in alleviating the ITU’s filing backlog. Such initiatives have been taken in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU and the US. For a more detailed treatment, see Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006), pp. 5–6. It has also been suggested that national authorities should require, i.a., submission of realistic business plans so as to ensure that they do not notify the ITU of systems that will never materialize. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 74. 175 Pursuant to the current ITU Constitution “radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including [but not limited to] the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited natural resources and they must be used rationally, efficiently and economically” (Art. 44.2; emphasis added). Under the 1973 and 1982 International Telecommunication Conventions, GEO was the only orbit defined as a limited natural resource: “[i]n using frequency bands for space radio services Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal” (Art. 33.2; emphasis added). The amendment to the 1992 ITU Constitution replacing “geostationary satellite orbit” with “any associated orbits” was made in 2001.
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non-GEO orbits, the planning of future activities in LEO and MEO is also becoming more challenging.176 Interestingly, given the inability of the international community to provide common rules, satellite operators have begun to act on their own to coordinate their procedures. They have established a Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group (SUIRG), which is comprised of representatives from both private industry and the public sector.177 SUIRG has worked for about a decade towards “identifying and mitigating the growing problem of satellite interference and the economic harm it inflicts on the industry”. It manages information on radio frequency interference and possible remedies. For instance, SUIRG has established a global database into which operators can enter frequency interference information. It also cooperates with the satellite industry to define equipment standards and facilitate better training for operators.178 Although SUIRG has not been trying to alleviate physical interference, there is no reason why this problem, like others, could not be dealt with by a nongovernmental industry organization.179 3.4. Developments within Certain Other International Organs 3.4.1. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee The IADC is an organization of national space agencies founded in 1993.180 It works on consensus, meaning that it can be demanding to reach agreement on common norms (even voluntary ones). Yet the attendant compromise has good prospects of satisfying most of the relevant stakeholders and hence of guaranteeing wide observance of the rules—considering, in particular, that members of the IADC are space agencies which directly carry out space activities in practice. The purpose of the IADC is to exchange information on 176
51.
See Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 72; Salin 2000, pp. 49–
SUIRG has over 30 members, including the founding members Intelsat, PanAmSat, Inmarsat, New Skies Satellites, QinetiQ, and Glowlink. 178 See Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group website; Bates 2005. 179 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 75. 180 The members of the IADC are ESA and space agencies from ten countries: the Italian Space Agency, the British National Space Centre, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) from France, the China National Space Administration, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., the Indian Space Research Organisation, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), NASA, the National Space Agency of the Ukraine, and the Russian Federal Space Agency. For more information about the IADC, see the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee website. 177
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space debris research activities and facilitate cooperation in the area, to review ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify options for debris mitigation.181 For example, it has issued the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. The UNCOPUOS asked the IADC to develop a set of such voluntary guidelines in 2001182 and they were submitted to the UNCOPUOS in late 2002183 for consideration at the 40th session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in February 2003.184 The “orbits and protected regions” to which the IADC guidelines apply include GEO,185 the so-called Geosynchronous Region,186 Geostationary Transfer Orbits,187 and LEO.188 The guidelines aim to limit debris released during normal operations, to minimize the potential for on-orbit break-ups and collisions, and to facilitate removal of non-operational objects from the densely populated orbits. For instance, they urge depletion or passivation of on-board energy sources once they are no longer needed189 and avoidance of intentional destruction of space systems.190 They also call for post-mission disposal of spent spacecraft. The IADC guidelines require disposal of objects from GEO by re-orbiting them to an orbit above GEO (at a minimum altitude of 235 km plus a term depending on the spacecraft characteristics),191 and from LEO by
181 For more detail, see Terms of Reference for the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. 182 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 38th session 2001, para. 130. 183 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.260). 184 See Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 40th session 2003, para. 121 et seq. For a treatment of the work of the UNCOPUOS on space debris, see below. 185 Section 3.3.3. 186 GEO +/- 200 km. Section 3.3.2(2). 187 Earth orbits which can be used to transfer space systems from lower orbits to GEO. Section 3.3.3. 188 Up to an altitude of 2000 km from the Earth’s surface. Section 3.3.2(1). 189 Section 5.2.1. 190 Section 5.2.3. 191 Section 5.3.1. The exact minimum altitude is calculated in accordance with a formula that depends on the ratio of the cross-sectional area to the mass of the satellite and on the solar radiation pressure coefficient. The formula generally results in disposal altitudes of 235 to 450 km above GEO. The aim is to guarantee that the disposed spacecraft will never return to within 200 km of GEO. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 34. Apparently, many are of the opinion that “using a single number like 300 km” would be quite as efficient and much simpler than the IADC formula. Williamson 2006, p. 87. It has been defined to be the altitude where solar radiation pressure and other forces can no longer push the spacecraft back into the GEO area. “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005.
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de-orbiting.192 For the LEO region, the instrument further suggests a 25-year post-mission orbital lifetime limit.193 Hence the IADC guidelines constitute a considerable advancement in the sense that they attempt to regulate the use of LEO as well.194 Furthermore, there is a more informative IADC supporting document on mitigation practices (“Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”) that provides the rationale for the guidelines and technical information for their implementation. For the purpose of the document, all the issues dealt with by the IADC guidelines have been analyzed in view of the best debris mitigation practices of the space sector.195 The IADC guidelines provide only the fundamental standard practices, while more detailed technical issues and practical implementation will be addressed by lower-level documents.196 Moreover, the guidelines expressly provide for the option of updating them
Section 5.3.2. De-orbiting means a deceleration maneuver which results “either in an immediate atmospheric re-entry or in an orbit with limited residual lifetime” (moving a spacecraft to an orbit where the atmospheric drag accelerates its decay). In case of reorbiting, the spacecraft’s orbit is raised to an altitude where it causes no interference with the orbits of operational spacecraft. See “ESA, End of Life De-Orbit Strategies”. The latter is also referred to as a ‘graveyard orbit’. (The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS agreed in 1998 that ‘disposal orbit’ would be a preferable term. Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on the work of its 35th session 1998, para. 88.) In addition to placement in a higher Earth-orbit, re-orbiting may take place from Earth-orbit into a heliocentric orbit (see, e.g., the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, 4–1.b.IV). De-orbiting is feasible for spacecraft in LEO but it remains too expensive for GEO satellites, for which the only available option is re-orbiting. However, this option solves the problem only partly, as a spacecraft which is sent to a graveyard orbit will remain there uncontrolled and hence constitutes a potential source of space debris in those particular orbits. In the future, technological development may make it possible to bring down spent spacecraft even from GEO; a promising example is the new ion-thrusting electric propulsion engine of ESA’s SMART1 satellite, which needs only about five per cent of the fuel of a traditional spacecraft engine. “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005. 193 Section 5.3.2. As will be examined below, several national space agencies also endorse this 25-year rule. 194 The debris mitigation guidelines of major national and regional space agencies (NASA, Rosaviakosmos, JAXA, ESA) also try to limit the presence of spent spacecraft in the LEO region. 195 Yakovlev 2005, p. 591. 196 At the moment, one such document has been issued, namely the IADC Recommendation on Re-orbit Procedure for GEO Preservation. Additionally, the IADC is planning a document “Assessment Procedure for Re-entry Safety”. “Report of the IADC Activities on IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines & Supporting Document” 2003. 192
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in keeping with the development of space science.197 The IADC also has a regularly revised Protection Manual, which describes design measures to protect spacecraft against space debris.198 The manual is regularly updated in accordance with evolution of knowledge and experience in spacecraft protection.199 The IADC guidelines appear essentially as a codification of common practices of space agencies; they do not introduce major new innovations in the area of debris mitigation. Moreover, not all space activities are carried out by space agencies and the agencies’ norms in this area are largely recommendations only. The guidelines have been criticized for containing no advice as to their practical implementation and enforcement by states or how they are to be integrated into national processes of approving space launches.200 One doubts whether such voluntary guidelines could ever achieve the compliance required for solving the space debris problem, considering the competitive global market and the small profit margins afforded to space launch entrepreneurs.201 The IADC guidelines also contain no provisions for the protection of the environment as such.202 Despite their deficiencies, the guidelines constitute an important step towards more effective common regulation in environmental management.203 Furthermore, they are already widely used by national and regional space organizations when identifying their own standards for mission requirements and establishing norms of a more general nature, as well as in the development of new international standards, such as the space debris document of the UNCOPUOS.204 197 “These guidelines may be updated as new information becomes available regarding space activities and their influence on the space environment” (Section 6). 198 IADC Protection Manual 2004. For instance, the number of small parts released during operations can be reduced by new designs. 199 For a more detailed assessment of the Protection Manual, see Schäfer et al. 2005. 200 Hitchens 2004. 201 Walter Flury, according to Hitchens 2004. See also, e.g., The Ethics of Space Policy 2000, p. 22, where the UNESCO Working Group on the “Ethics of Outer Space” emphasizes the significant distorting effect debris mitigation measures have on competition and concludes that there is a need to have rules for the prevention of the debris problem to be “uniformly imposed on all users of space technology” and “embodied in international law”. It perceived the elaboration of an international legal instrument for the purpose as “a matter of priority”. Ibid., p. 26. 202 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 12. It should be noted that when mentioning the lack of “provisions on the environment”, this study refers to rules concerning “avoidance of pollution of the atmosphere/troposphere” only, not preservation of the environment of outer space. Ibid. 203 The IADC guidelines have also been defined as the first international “rules of the road” document for space traffic management. Yakovlev 2005, p. 597. 204 Countries which directly use the IADC guidelines or have their own space debris mitigation guidelines and practices consistent with the IADC guidelines include at least the US, Japan, France, Italy and the UK. Report of the Scientific and Technical
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3.4.2. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space The principal international body in the development of the international law of outer space is the UNCOPUOS, which was established in the late 1950s.205 Despite the slowing down of the process during the past couple of decades, the UNCOPUOS is continuously working in trying to elaborate international space regulation. It has two subcommittees, the Legal Subcommittee and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. The UNCOPUOS and its subcommittees all operate on the basis of consensus.206 There are four principal steps in the process of developing space law in the UN. Firstly, the Legal Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS examines and discusses proposals for new regulation in its annual meetings. The UNCOPUOS may also ask the Technical and Scientific Subcommittee to examine technical aspects of legal issues. The deliberations of the subcommittees are considered in the Committee proper. After the endorsement of the UNCOPUOS, the proposal is taken to the main committee of the UN General Assembly and, finally, to the General Assembly to be approved. The approval of the General Assembly takes the form of a resolution containing the text agreed upon by consensus in the UNCOPUOS. If the text adopted is a new treaty, for instance, states can (individually) decide whether they want to join the instrument (in accordance with the procedure set by the provisions of the treaty).207 The UNCOPUOS is one of the largest committees in the UN today: it has 67 member states as well as a number of international organizations that have Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, para. 91. Regulations of ESA are also congruent with the IADC guidelines. Even China and Malaysia have been reported to use IADC guidelines “as their reference in developing a national regulatory and licensing framework”. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2005, para. 130. For a more detailed treatment of developments at the national and regional levels, see below. 205 The UN General Assembly first started it as an ad hoc committee in 1958 by UNGA Res. 1348(XIII). The next year the UNCOPUOS was established as a permanent body by UNGA Res. 1472(XIV). The Outer Space Affairs Division (later Office of Outer Space Affairs) was established to serve the needs of the UNCOPUOS and its subcommittees. 206 The consensus process was a compromise between majority voting and unanimity. It was put in practice in 1962 with a statement by the Chairman of the UNCOPUOS that the committee members have agreed through informal consultations that they aim to reach agreement in the work of the committee and its subcommittees without having to resort to voting. It was understood, however, that if consensus could not be achieved, the decision would be made by majority voting. See Galloway 1978, pp. 107–108. On decision-making in the UNCOPUOS, see also Christol 1981, pp. 568–571. 207 Jasentuliyana 1992, pp. 33–34. For a more detailed assessment, see ibid., or Jasentuliyana 1986, pp. 220–221.
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been granted observer status with the UNCOPUOS and its subcommittees. The widespread participation of spacefaring states in the work of the UNCOPUOS obviously constitutes a considerable advantage in pursuing UN-based solutions to the problems of the space sector. The complex challenges of today call for the participation of scientific, legal and technical experts, in addition to politicians, and the UNCOPUOS and its subcommittees provide a forum for such multifaceted discussions.208 Furthermore, the consensus approach is likely to result in relatively durable outcomes, once the often time-consuming process of finding a compromise acceptable to all has been successfully gone through.209 Currently, the environmentally most relevant questions the UNCOPUOS is working on are those concerning space debris and the use of NPS in space. After several years of discussions whether space debris should be put on the agenda of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee or if this were premature, space debris has been included as a separate, annual agenda item since 1994.210 It has been suggested that space debris be placed on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee as well, but no consensus on that has been reached yet.211 In 1999, the UNCOPUOS issued a “Technical Report on Space Debris”. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee adopted its own space debris mitigation guidelines in 2007.212 This document is based on the IADC Space Debris Ibid., p. 222. Jasentuliyana 1983, p. 229. Consensus decision-making facilitates also further cooperation and compliance with commonly agreed standards. Galloway 1980, p. 165. 210 See Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on the work of its 31st session 1994, paras. 63–74. Previous attempts in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee to include the issue of space debris on the agenda had failed mostly because of opposition on the part of some industrialized states. See Report of the 64th Conference of the ILA 1990, p. 156. For a summary of the discussion concerning space debris within the UN prior to its adoption as an agenda item of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, see Hacket 1994, pp. 201–204. 211 See, e.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, paras. 150, 154. A proposal for an agenda item “Legal aspects of space debris” was made as early as in 1995. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 34th Session 1995, para. 47. The inability of the UNCOPUOS to discuss the problem of space debris also in the Legal Subcommittee has been referred to as a factor slowing down “the technical and scientific research because no definition of space debris can be adopted without considering legal implications”. Perek 2002, p. 134. For an extensive assessment of the discussion concerning space debris in the UNCOPUOS (and within the UN more generally as well), see ibid. 212 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 44th session 2007, para. 99. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS are contained in Annex IV to the report. Eventually, the aim is to have the guidelines adopted by the full UNCOPUOS. Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 43rd session 2006, paras. 102–103. Initially, it was expected the guidelines would be approved already in 2004. See Report of the 208 209
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Mitigation Guidelines. Given the evolving nature of space technology and debris mitigation practices, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee might also periodically consult the IADC for the purpose of amending its guidelines in line with possible future revisions of the guidelines of the IADC.213 A report of the Working Group on Space Debris [of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee] set the following frame for the guidelines document: a) It would use the technical content of the [IADC] space debris mitigation guidelines … as the basis; b) It would not be more technically stringent than the [IADC] space debris mitigation guidelines; c) It would not be legally binding under international law; d) The implementation of space debris mitigation remains voluntary and should be carried out through national mechanisms; e) It would recognize that exceptions might be justified; f ) It would be a living document that could be updated on a regular basis in accordance with evolving national and international practices on space debris mitigation and related research and technology developments; g) It would be applicable to mission planning, to the operation of newly designed spacecraft and orbital stages and, if possible, to existing ones; h) It would take into consideration the United Nations treaties and principles on outer space; i) The space debris mitigation document is planned to be a concise document containing high-level qualitative guidelines and making reference to the [IADC] space debris mitigation guidelines. The document will have annexes as decided by the Working Group during its work plan.214
The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee confirmed these basic conditions.215 Pursuant to the guidelines document adopted by it in 2007, “[t]he following guidelines should be considered for the mission planning, design, manufacture and operational … phases of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages”:
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 38th session 2001, para. 130. However, several states (Russia and India in particular) submitted comments asking for changes, which necessitated renewed discussions within the IADC. Hitchens 2004. 213 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 44th session 2007, para. 89. 214 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, Annex II, para. 5. 215 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 44th session 2007, para. 92, and Annex IV.
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Each guideline is followed by a short explanation of its meaning and significance. For instance, [s]pace systems should be designed not to release debris during normal operations. If this is not feasible, the effect of any release of debris on the outer space environment should be minimized. During the early decades of the space age, launch vehicle and spacecraft designers permitted the intentional release of numerous mission-related objects into Earth orbit, including, among other things, sensor covers, separation mechanisms and deployment articles. Dedicated design efforts, prompted by the recognition of the threat posed by such objects, have proved effective in reducing this source of space debris. (Guideline 1).
The fact that all major spacefaring countries take part in the work of the UNCOPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee which, moreover, operates by consensus can optimally facilitate not only the adoption of a relatively feasible document but also its extensive approval and implementation on the national level. However, consensus negotiations can also be very timeconsuming and may result in a watered-down lowest-common-denominator outcome only.217 Particularly as the technical and legal complexity of the widening spectrum of space activities and relevant stakeholders constantly grows, the UNCOPUOS may find it increasingly difficult to reach consensus decisions.218 Ibid., Annex IV, para. 4. As one author put it when talking about the UNCOPUOS decision-making process, “lengthy negotiations and national policy rivalries often overshadow the critical issues”. Baker 1987, p. 165. 218 Jasentuliyana 2001, p. 369. This author expects “a divergence between emerging space technology and the ability of international space law to stay abreast of and provide for the necessary regulations for this sector”. Ibid. In many respects, this seems to be a valid statement of the situation already today. The same author also pointed out earlier that the quality of some national delegates to the UNCOPUOS may have decreased from what it was when the UN space treaties were drafted (he was referring primarily 216 217
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A deficiency in the UN process is the exclusion of private entities and space agencies from deliberations.219 Considering the prominent role of such actors in modern space activities, this might prove to be a severe handicap. As has been explained above, the problem of space debris is linked to that of the use of nuclear power in space activities. Although nuclear power sources as such constitute an environmental threat in outer space, the risks are multiplied by the presence of space debris which can cause collisions and, eventually, more radioactive space debris. At worst, radioactive debris can return to Earth. Accordingly, states have agreed on the importance of “pay[ing] more attention to the problem of the collision of space objects, including those with nuclear power sources on board, with space debris and to other aspects of space debris, as well as its re-entry into the atmosphere”.220 The use of NPS in outer space is also a separate agenda item of the Technical and Scientific Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS.221 According to the current work plan of the subcommittee, the aim is to develop “an international technically based framework of goals and recommendations for the safety of nuclear power source applications in outer space”.222 As for the issue of space debris, the subcommittee has a special Working Group on Nuclear Power Sources in Space which has identified potential options for establishing such an international framework. Here, too, the idea is to develop a set of international, voluntary guidelines to promote safety in “the launch and operating life cycle of [NPS]”—including both “planned and currently foreseeable space [NPS] applications”. The planned guidelines are envisioned but not solely to the delegates of developing countries). Obviously, lack of such special expertise as is needed in the space sector is a factor which is likely to complicate and slow down any negotiations. See Jasentuliyana 1992, pp. 35–36; Jasentuliyana 1986, pp. 222– 223; also Zwaan 1988, p. 37. There is lesser homogeneity among UNCOPUOS members also for the simple reason that the number of states taking part in its work has increased considerably. Initially, the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the late 1950s consisted of 18 members only. Presently the number of UNCOPUOS members is nearly fourfold (67), yet the Committee continues to apply the same method of consensus in decision-making that was agreed upon in 1962. On decision-making and the development of membership in the UNCOPUOS, see Christol 1981, pp. 565–571. 219 Mirmina 2005, pp. 657–658. 220 Emphasis added. UNGA Res. 59/116, para. 25; Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2005, para. 125; Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, para. 90. Accordingly, also cooperation between the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee’s Working Group on NPS in Outer Space and that on Space Debris has been called for. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, para. 78. 221 E.g., Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 43rd session 2006, paras. 115–129. 222 E.g., Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, Annex III.
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to “provide a technical foundation for the development of national standards and allow national programmes flexibility in adapting such standards to specific nuclear power source applications and national organizational structures”.223 The aim is to develop the framework in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to ensure its compliance with the procedures of the IAEA.224 The new framework could even replace the existing NPS principles.225 Such new guidelines could constitute a step forward also in the sense that they would apparently be applicable to the use of NPS not only for electricity generation but for propulsion purposes as well. 3.4.3. The International Law Association The International Law Association has also been working in the area of debris mitigation: it produced the ILA Draft Convention on Space Debris in 1994. This instrument attempts to address the issue in a comprehensive way in its 16 articles. Prior to the adoption of the draft convention, the ILA discussed the legal aspects of space debris for eight years.226 The ILA Draft Convention expressly states that its provisions should not be considered incompatible with the existing space treaties;227 instead, they have been aimed at “correct[ing] the lack of precision of the Space Treaties in force”.228 A number of the rules embodied in the draft convention have even been regarded as norms of customary international law and hence binding on states regardless of their approval of the instrument.229 The ILA Draft Convention on Space Debris applies to “space debris which causes or is likely to cause direct or indirect, instant or delayed damage to the 223
“Proposed outline of objectives, scope and attributes for an international technically based framework of goals and recommendations for the safety of planned and currently foreseeable nuclear power source applications in outer space” 2005, Annex, para. 2. 224 It has even been proposed that this framework be modeled “on the format and structure of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Fundamentals publication entitled ‘The safety of nuclear installations’ ”. Ibid., Annex, para. 5. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee held a Joint Technical Workshop on the Objectives, Scope and General Attributes of a Potential Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space with the IAEA in February 2006. For more information, see Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 43rd session 2006, Appendix. 225 “Review of the use of nuclear power sources in space programmes and international cooperation” 2005, paras. 20–21. 226 The issue had been addressed in Reports of the ILA Conferences since the Seoul Conference of 1986. Additionally, special meetings concerning the matter were arranged in 1987 and 1988. See Report of the 66th Conference of the ILA 1994, pp. 8 and 306–307. 227 Art. 5. 228 Report of the 65th Conference of the ILA 1992, p. 143. 229 See ibid., p. 144.
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environment, or to persons or objects”.230 As the scope of application of the instrument thus includes even indirect damage, the concept of damage applied by it is wider than that embodied in the Liability Convention. Moreover, in addition to applying to existing damage, the ILA Draft Convention applies to situations where debris is likely to cause damage. Furthermore, the draft convention takes into account purely environmental damage; it even refers to such damage prior to mentioning damage to persons and objects. Hence, it clearly goes beyond the Liability Convention in many respects. What is more, the draft convention has no restrictions as regards the areas of outer space to which it applies.231 The draft convention also includes provisions on international responsibility and liability.232 Article 6 further specifies the application of the instrument in this respect by stating that its rules concerning responsibility and liability “apply to damage caused by space debris in the space environment and, in the absence of other international agreements on the matter, to damage caused to the Earth environment”.233 In addition to a general obligation of cooperation,234 the draft convention sets out a duty to cooperate in more detail: it contains specific obligations to “prevent, inform, consult, and negotiate in good faith”.235 These obligations concern prevention of environmental damage and dispute avoidance,236 development and exchange of technology for debris mitigation (in accordance with “national laws and practices”),237 information exchange,238 and consultations in the case of potential damage deriving from space debris.239 Moreover, there is an obligation to negotiate in good faith, which is specified to mean, i.a., “not only to hold 230 Art. 2. ‘Damage’ in this instrument means “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health, or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations, or any adverse modification of the environment of areas within or beyond national jurisdiction or control” (Art. 1.e). The wording is derived mostly from the Liability Convention (Art. 1.a)—with the obvious exception of the part concerning environmental damage. 231 Initially, the scope of the instrument was to be narrower: the early drafts were restricted to GEO and LEO only. Report of the 66th Conference of the ILA 1994, p. 311. 232 Arts. 7 and 8, respectively. 233 For a discussion concerning the question of responsibility and liability in the context of this instrument, see Report of the 66th Conference of the ILA 1994, pp. 311– 314. 234 Art. 3. 235 Art. 4. 236 Art. 4.a. 237 Art. 4.b. 238 Art. 4.c. 239 Pursuant to Art. 4.d, there is an obligation to hold consultations when there are “reasons to believe that activities carried out … or planned to be carried out, produce space debris that is likely to cause damage to the environment, or to persons or objects, or significant risk thereto”.
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consultations or talks but also to pursue them with a view of reaching a solution”.240 The needs of developing countries are to be given “special attention” in carrying out these obligations.241 The ILA Draft Convention also contains a review clause: pursuant to Article 14, the UN General Assembly is to consider ten years after the entry into force of the draft convention whether there is need for revision of the instrument “in the light of [its] past application”. Additionally, there is a possibility to convene a conference of the parties to review the draft convention once it has been in force for five years.242 3.5. Environmentally-oriented National and Regional Efforts In Europe, an ESA Space Debris Working Group prepared a study of space debris in 1988.243 The next year ESA adopted a resolution on space debris policy, where it noted that “the problem of space debris has become worldwide one of the major issues regarding the environmental protection of outer space and has reached a level which requires serious considerations especially for manned missions”.244 In 2000, it adopted another resolution245 which, i.a., invited ESA member states “to take measures in order that legal and economic aspects connected to space debris be studied in the most efficient ways”,246 “to coordinate the establishment and use of their space debris monitoring systems”,247 and “to expeditiously work … on the elaboration of technical standards for safety and debris prevention”.248 ESA has also a Space Debris Mitigation Handbook, issued initially in 1999,249 and 240 Art. 4.e. Pursuant to Art. 4.d, “refusal to hold consultations, or the breaking up of such without justification, shall be interpreted as bad faith”. Indeed, it has been suggested that a unilateral termination of negotiations without a sufficient cause is a breach of international law. See Report of the 65th Conference of the ILA 1992, p. 150. 241 Art. 4.f. 242 Art. 14. The ILA Draft Convention also contains an article (Article 9) on the settlement of disputes. The draft convention’s rules concerning resolution of disputes are not examined in detail here, however, as the subject of dispute settlement in space activities is treated more thoroughly later in this work. 243 The Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group 1988. 244 Resolution for a European Policy on the Protection of the Space Environment from Debris, preamble. Note here the clearly anthropocentric bias: the resolution puts particular emphasis on human survival, since debris is considered detrimental above all as a threat to manned missions. See Covert 2002, p. 120. 245 Resolution for a European Policy on the Protection of the Space Environment from Debris. 246 Para. 7. 247 Para. 3. 248 Para. 4. 249 With revisions released in 2002 (see Klinkrad et al. 2002) and a second edition published in 2003.
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a European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard, issued in 2002. The objectives of the standard are prevention of the generation of space debris and protection of space vehicles against space debris.250 It is based on the following principles: 1) avoidance of deliberate release of mission-related objects; 2) special protection of GEO and LEO; and 3) passivation (depletion of left-over on-board energy sources251) of satellites and launch vehicles at the end of their lifetime.252 It is one of the few space debris standards which concentrate on spacecraft protection in addition to debris mitigation.253 Furthermore, Europe’s Network of Centres on Space Debris (a grouping of Italian, British, French and German space agencies, and ESA) has prepared a voluntary “European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation”, which is being studied for final approval.254 It is consistent with the IADC guidelines (and the resolutions of ESA on its space debris policy) but more detailed. For instance, the European Code of Conduct not only recommends passivation of space systems at the end of their lifetime but also gives instructions applicable to situations where such passivation cannot be carried out.255 The code of conduct is to be applied by ESA, European national space agencies, The Standard has been developed from the 1999 CNES “Space Debris Safety Requirements” and is harmonized with the IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines. “The ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook together with the European Space Debris Mitigation and Safety Standard shall jointly define the Agency’s policies and implementation concepts concerning space debris mitigation and collision risk reduction for any mission under ESA control.” See “ESA, Update of the ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook”. 251 One way to do this is to run the engine until any remaining fuel is depleted. Depletion by burning also makes it possible to change the orbit of the spacecraft at no extra cost. Another possibility is to vent the extra fuel into space. 252 Alby et al. 2002, p. 3. 253 Schäfer et al. 2005, p. 44. 254 France’s space agency CNES already signed this document in October 2004. It has since been applied to all new CNES projects. “Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation” 2004. 255 Pursuant to Section 4.2.1, if the passivation requirements cannot be fulfilled, “the space system should comply with b) and c): b) When the residual pressure in propellant and pressurisation tanks cannot be removed, this pressure should be lower than 50 per cent of the critical pressure of the tank concerned. The critical pressure of a tank is the maximum pressure under which a penetrating impact does not cause an explosion, but will result in a leak. c) When the remaining propellants cannot be drained, the design should comply with all the following conditions: no explosive reaction of the propellant should occur as a result of a penetrating impact; no exothermal dissociation of the propellant should occur due to tank heating; no leak should occur that may cause the mixture of hypergolic propellants; design of tanks (for example, leak before burst design) and the efficiency of thermal protection should inhibit pressure build-up that may cause tank explosion”. 250
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as well as their contractors. Additionally, it should be followed in any other space project conducted in Europe or by a European entity (even outside Europe).256 The European Code of Conduct is accompanied by a “Support to Implementation” document which—as the name indicates—is designed to assist in the implementation of the code of conduct. Plans call for updating it “from time to time as needed”.257 Several states have been active in space debris mitigation also at the national level. The state with most advanced regulation of environmental aspects of space activities is the US.258 Initially, space debris was perceived by NASA mostly as a problem for the safety of human spaceflight at low altitudes. This conception changed quickly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, partly due to the explosion of a Delta launch vehicle second stage in 1981, the likely cause of which—as well as of many earlier incidents—was identified as residual propellants.259 In 1988, the national space policy of the Reagan Administration explicitly called for minimization of the creation of space debris.260 The next year, NASA and the US Department of Defense (DoD) began developing improved programs for monitoring the debris environment and the Bush Administration adopted orbital debris minimization as a formal goal of the national space policy (“consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness”). Additionally, the US announced its intention to “encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization”.261 NASA and the DoD thereafter adopted policies for orbital debris mitigation in all their space activities. The subsequent national space policies have since reaffirmed the earlier policies of the US government.262 In 1995, NASA was the first space agency globally to issue a comprehensive set of procedures for limiting orbital debris: the NASA Safety Standard 1740.14. In 1997, an interagency working group (led by NASA and the DoD) developed “U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices”,263 based on the NASA Safety Standard. The Debris Mitigation Standard Practices are European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation, Section 2.2. Ibid., Foreword. 258 The US legislation is usually considered the most advanced among national legal frameworks governing space activities. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, p. 86. 259 Johnson 2005(b), p. 5. 260 “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy” 1988. 261 National Space Policy Directives and Executive Charter 1989. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, research on space debris, too, intensified in the US. Perek 2002, p. 127. A detailed Report on Orbital Debris was prepared by the US Interagency Group (Space) for the National Security Council in 1989, and in 1990 a study appeared by the US Congress entitled “Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem”. 262 See Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report, pp. 9–10. 263 The Standard Practices were finalized in December 2000. 256 257
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intended for space systems (including satellites as well as launch vehicles) which are “government-operated or -produced”. In order to encourage voluntary compliance, the interagency working group has shared these guidelines with the aerospace industry.264 The standard practices have four objectives: 1) control of debris released during normal operations; 2) minimization of debris generated by accidental explosions (during and after missions); 3) selection of safe flight profile and operational configuration (to avoid collisions with man-made objects as well as meteoroids); and 4) post-mission disposal of space structures (either by re-orbiting, de-orbiting, or even by direct retrieval).265 For each objective there are mitigation standard practices.266 Furthermore, many government agencies in the US have in recent years developed additional guidelines and regulations pertaining to orbital debris production and mitigation in their respective areas.267 For instance, the agency responsible for regulating launch and re-entry (and 264
“NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Mitigation”. As concerns objectives 3 and 4, the standard practices state that “tether systems will be uniquely analyzed both for intact and severed conditions”. Such tethers are still in the stage of development only but they seem to promise a new, potentially relatively feasible way for the removal (re- or de-orbiting) of inactive space objects, for instance. Tethers “are essentially cables which contain conductive material, and are attached to a satellite while passing through the Earth’s magnetic field. The motion generates electric current along the tether, providing propulsion for orbital objects, like satellites. This propulsion provides thrust, which can be used to alter the satellite’s orbit”. Space Security 2005 Briefing Notes (2006). For a more detailed treatment of space tethers and their possibilities, see “NASA, Space Transportation with a Twist”. Other kinds of new techniques are also being examined, like “space-based lasers to slow then deorbit existing junk” and “grabbing objects with a huge sling”. Currently, however, there is no feasible way to retrieve space debris; even tethers remain too expensive to be practical. “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005. On innovative (yet not feasible) debris removal techniques such as robotic spacecraft, lasers, and “debris sweepers”, see also Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management 2006, pp. 70–71. 266 For instance, as concerns the first objective, the mitigation standard practice (1–1.) is that “[i]n all operational orbit regimes … [s]pacecraft and upper stages should be designed to eliminate or minimize debris released during normal operations. Each instance of planned release of debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that remains on orbit for more than 25 years should be evaluated and justified on the basis of cost effectiveness and mission requirements”. There also exists, i.a., a “NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation” which requires “formal assessment” on NASA programs of “[orbital] debris generation potential and debris mitigation options” (Art. 1.b). 267 Guidelines similar to the governmental Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices are found at least in regulations given by the US Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Commerce. Johnson 2005(b), p. 9; Greenberg 2003, pp. 359–360, 390–391. Additionally, programspecific debris/meteoroid protection guidelines have been adopted at least for the Space Shuttle and the ISS. Schäfer et al. 2005, p. 44. 265
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related activities) is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). A launch license requires safety approval from the FAA. To obtain such approval, the applicant must demonstrate … that for all launch vehicle stages or components that reach earth orbit (a) There will be no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle or its components and the payload after payload separation; (b) Debris generation will not result from the conversion of energy sources into energy that fragments the vehicle or its components …; and (c) Stored energy will be removed by depleting residual fuel and leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any remaining source of stored energy.268
A significant new step was taken in June 2004, when the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency responsible for licensing radio transmissions by private entities in the US and hence regulating, i.a., communication satellites, ordered a new comprehensive set of rules concerning mitigation of orbital debris.269 These rules essentially incorporate the recommendations of the IADC (and the ITU) concerning spacecraft disposal. They apply to licensing of commercial US satellites as well as to the use of non-US satellites when they provide service in the US.270 The FCC regulations include operational and disclosure requirements in basically three categories: avoidance of collisions with large objects during normal operations, post-mission disposal, and assessments and analyses for preventing a spacecraft from becoming a source of debris (including methods of shielding and explosion avoidance).271 They require, for instance, US-licensed GEO satellites to be put at the end of their lifetime into disposal orbits above GEO:272 a commitment to re-orbit satellites in accordance with these rules is a condition of receiving a license to provide 268 Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, Part 415.39. Apparently, these regulations do not really introduce anything new for the US launch industry; the debris remediation measures required by them are standard industry practice. Greenberg 2003, p. 360. 269 The title of the regulations is “Mitigation of Orbital Debris”. The FCC had proposed already in 1999, while developing rules for a new type of satellite service, that applicants (for authorizations in that service) be required to disclose debris mitigation plans. This proposal was adopted in 2000. Over the next three years, the FCC adopted the same requirement for most new services. The debris mitigation rules of 2004 thus largely consolidate practice that had already existed. However, they also provide more detailed guidance concerning the information to be submitted by the applicants and, for the first time, set out operational requirements for debris mitigation (regarding end-of-lifetime solutions in particular). Kensinger et al. 2005, pp. 571–572. 270 See Part III.D. 271 For a more detailed assessment of the FCC debris mitigation rules, see Kensinger et al. 2005, pp. 572–574. 272 The minimum disposal altitude required depends on the satellite’s size and other relevant factors; it is to be calculated in accordance with the formula of the IADC
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services in the US.273 The disposal requirement for GEO satellites was deemed necessary because the need to preserve a safe environment for satellite operations also in the future was not considered as an incentive sufficient enough to deter actors from environmentally harmful practices. Such incentives “may be countered by a more immediate incentive to obtain the most revenue from an operational satellite before decommissioning”.274 The effects of inadequate disposal can, moreover, impact quite a number of orbital locations and have detrimental effects far beyond the timeframe of the business activities of a single operator.275 Operators are also required, i.a., to submit an orbital debris mitigation disclosure, in which they confirm that the probability of accidental explosions during and after mission operations will be assessed and limited by, for instance, discharging stored energy sources on spacecraft at the end of its
Debris Mitigation Guidelines (para. 68). According to the same paragraph, the FCC’s reasoning behind the adoption of the IADC formula is the following: “We believe that application of this formula provides the best long-term protection to operational GEO spacecraft from orbital debris. Unlike the disposal practices for GEO spacecraft set forth by the U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (para. 4–1.b.III), the IADC formula takes into account the specific characteristics of individual spacecraft, such as its susceptibility to the effects of solar radiation pressure, which may cause a spacecraft eventually to drift back into GEO. Furthermore, use of the IADC formula establishes a 200-kilometer ‘protected region’ around GEO that provides protection to spacecraft that are operating above GEO either during normal station keeping operations or during transfer maneuvers … The IADC formula also represents an internationally developed consensus for disposal of GEO spacecraft, which has already been adopted into the revised ITU GEO disposal recommendation”. “We conclude that the use of the IADC formula for evaluating the post-mission disposal plans of GEO space stations is superior to other methods suggested by commentators” (para. 71). 273 This has been required of all satellites launched after 18 March 2002, which was when the FCC notified satellite operators of its plans to develop rules on the subject through the release of the Orbital Debris Notice (or “Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”). Satellites launched prior to this date are exempted from the new GEO disposal obligation (or “grandfathered”) because application of the IADC formula to satellites already in orbit was deemed to impose excessive additional costs on operators. See paras. 77–82. 274 Para. 72. The removal of a GEO spacecraft requires it to carry extra fuel specifically for this purpose, which of course adds to costs. Typically, the fuel needed for disposal of a GEO spacecraft equals the amount needed for two to three months of station-keeping. Hence, disposal reduces the operational lifetime by this amount of time. Another fact that can undermine proper disposal of spent GEO spacecraft is the operator’s wish to bring into use a certain orbital location in order to preserve its priority in the ITU system. Kensinger et al. 2005, p. 573. Similarly, requiring launch vehicle stages to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up within a specific period of time can affect payload delivery capability. See Greenberg 2003, p. 394. 275 Para. 73.
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operational lifetime.276 The new FCC regulation indicates that the FCC will examine the end-of-lifetime plans of non-GEO spacecraft as well in the light of the IADC recommendation that spent spacecraft remain in the LEO region for no more than 25 years.277 Given the focal role of the US in the space sector, the rules of the FCC provide a promising precedent internationally; as concerns the obligation to re-orbit spent GEO satellites, the new FCC regulation has even been described as a “regulatory standard that will be difficult for other nations to avoid”.278 On the other hand, considering in particular the highly competitive international setting in which the commercial space sector operates, unilateral application of debris mitigation measures can put private space industry in any country at a competitive disadvantage unless other states impose similar requirements on their firms.279 Promisingly, many other states worldwide have also issued or are currently developing debris mitigation guidelines. For instance, the Russian Federation,280 Japan, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom all have their own space debris guidelines.281 Due to the largely congruent interests of all operators and states in terms of debris mitigation, the various standards, handbooks and the like concerning this issue tend to be broadly consistent. Of course, there are some differences in detail but the fundamental principles are the same as those of the IADC guidelines both as regards—quite obviously—the antecedent debris mitigation norms, which provided a model for the IADC guidelines, as well as those instruments that have been developed subsequently. For instance, the national regulations all address debris minimization during normal operations. Typically, they also call for depletion or passivation of a spacecraft at the end of See paras. 29–33. Para. 84. 278 de Selding 2004. 279 See Greenberg 2003, pp. 382–383, 391–392. 280 The Federal Space Agency Standard “Space Technology Items. General Requirements for Mitigation of Space Debris Population” came into force in 2000. The Standard is obligatory when space vehicles are produced by the order of the Russian Space Agency, Rosaviakosmos. Other relevant documents include “Russian National Standard. Model of spatial—temporary distribution of density of Space Debris” from 2001 and “Space Technology Items. General Requirements on Spacecraft Shielding Against Space Debris and Meteoroids” from 2003. The development of “Russian National Standard on Space Debris Mitigation” is currently underway. Davidov 2006. 281 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, para. 91. In addition to space agency regulation, states may also have environmental provisions in their national space legislation. For instance, Russian legislation states (albeit very vaguely) that space activity is to be conducted in accordance with the principle “provision of safety in space activity, including protection of the environment” (Law of the Russian Federation “About Space Activity”, Art. 4.1). It also prohibits the creation of “harmful contamination of outer space which leads to unfavorable changes of the environment”, including deliberate destruction of objects in space (Art. 4.2). 276 277
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its operational lifetime. Most of them require at least the assessment of collision risks to avoid breakups. Additionally, they recommend the re-orbiting of GEO spacecraft—typically to the altitude of 235 km above GEO—and the de-orbiting (removal) of spacecraft from LEO within 25 years.282 However, there are also differences. For instance, some debris mitigation systems allow waivers in case a mitigation practice is considered too expensive.283 3.6. Conclusion The attempts to control the various environmental risks of space activities by international regulation, let alone tangible results of such attempts, have thus far been relatively modest. The conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty was admittedly a big step forward in the international law of outer space, but its obligations remain very general, particularly with regard to environmental aspects. Moreover, the OST is clearly oriented towards the exploitation rather than conservation of space resources.284 What is more, the environmentally most fundamental article of the international law of outer space, Article IX of the OST, is mainly concerned with contamination that has the potential to cause harmful interference with human space activities or life on Earth; it is only in such cases that even the relatively insignificant prior consultation obligation applies. The motivation for the protection afforded by the OST seems to be safeguarding human activities rather than environmental concerns.285 282 For a comparison of the recommendations and requirements of different space organizations, see Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, p. 3 (Table 2.1–1 Recommendations / Requirements Specified in Major Debris Mitigation Standards). 283 Hitchens 2004. 284 In addition to the numerous references in the OST to “exploration and use of outer space”, one should notice already the very first preambular characterization of states parties to the treaty as “[i]nspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space”. 285 It has been argued that the protection offered to outer space by Art. IX was never intended to extend to the space environment as such but was only meant to further scientific utility. Hence the environmental element in the OST remains modest. Baker 1987, pp. 163, 166–167. For a more detailed treatment of the negotiation history of Art. IX of the OST and the conflict between environmental and utility approaches, see, e.g., ibid. and Hacket 1994, pp. 104–120. On the other hand, it has been proposed that the obligation to avoid “harmful contamination” and “adverse changes” pursuant to Art. IX has even assumed a binding character as a general principle of customary international law. Matte 1989, p. 439. Considering the reality of space activities, however, this is an apparent overstatement to say the least (regardless of the function of protection). Even more far-fetched are proposals to the effect that the OST in its entirety be considered “as forming part of customary international law”. See Hacket 1994, pp. 137–138.
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Subsequent space law instruments have not managed to rectify the shortcomings of the OST. Accordingly, legal protection of the environment in space law still depends on the violation of certain goods valuable to humans, as specified in the Liability Convention. Damage which does not affect the property of any entity or human health falls outside the scope of the Liability Convention—and thereby of what is even somewhat effective regulation by the international law of outer space. Hence, launching states cannot be held liable for the mere presence in outer space of any form of pollution or even for damage the pollution may have caused to the environment outside the sovereign territory of states. If the interests of states are not affected, the outer space environment is without protection. On balance, UN space law provides little guidance in the environmental management of space activities. Concepts such as environmental protection, due regard, cooperation, prior consultation, and interests of all present and future generations are considered important in space law but, at the same time, the particular provisions implementing them are vague and leave considerable room for interpretation. Terms such as ‘harmful’, ‘contamination’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘interference’ would need further clarification. Space treaties do not even mention ‘space debris’. On the whole, the provisions of the space treaties imply that there can be changes in the environment of the Earth, outer space, or celestial bodies that are not “disruptive”286 or “harmful”.287 Also, contamination below the threshold of ‘harmfulness’ is permissible. Evaluation of the impact of a particular activity is largely left to the very state responsible for conducting that activity. The prevention of a potentially harmful activity on purely ecological grounds, as well as compensation for such harm, is practically out of the question in the context of the current international law of outer space. Space law also expressly permits states to conduct a wide range of potentially environmentally detrimental activities on celestial bodies and in other areas of outer space as long as they are peaceful and otherwise in accordance with international law. A common perception of outer space is that it provides a mere laboratory for scientific activity and a resource for human utilization, the preservation of which serves solely to further purposes beneficial to humankind.288 This ‘utility approach’ is obviously the reason why the international law of outer space is so weak in the field of environmental protection: a truly environmental perspective was never adopted in the process of drafting these instruments. Some of the environmental problems connected with space activities have been diminished by the UN space treaties and the regulations of the ITU, but many difficulties remain.289 Even the regimes created by the UN space treaties Moon Treaty, Art. 7.1. OST, Art. IX. 288 This has been called the “sci-lab perception”. For more detail, see Hacket 1994, pp. 104–110. 289 Interestingly, it was the ITU that took the lead in addressing the space debris 286 287
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and the ITU include discrepancies. For instance, the ITU calls for “economic and efficient use” and “equitable access”, whereas the UN space treaties speak about “benefit and interests of all countries” and outer space being free for use by all without discrimination of any kind (irrespective of the economic or scientific development of countries). A request for “equitable” treatment is usually understood by the ITU as a demand for fairness of treatment in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, not unqualified equal treatment in all situations.290 Another potential source of conflict is the coordination procedures established within the ITU framework, which require states to ensure interference-free operations. These may be contrary to the general principles of space law, as established in the OST, providing access and use of outer space by all states and banning national appropriation. According to the ITU, the frequency and orbit assignments do not provide any permanent priority. However, the Radio Regulations guarantee indefinite protection of registered geostationary satellite frequency and position assignments against interference from new systems as long as the frequency and position are continuously used. This seems problematic considering that satellite communication networks are generally intended for permanent use.291 Even if space structures in GEO comply with the various technical criteria to minimize interference and are able to function physically very close to each other, they might still constitute “quasi-permanent occupation” or de facto appropriation of GEO.292 Moreover, by selling a satellite occupying a particular GEO position, the ‘ownership’ of that position can also be tacitly sold.293 However, without the planning system of the ITU a mere ‘first come, first served’ rule would apply and appropriation of GEO would amount to a ‘survival of the fittest’.294
problem: the ITU recommendation “Environmental Protection of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit” calling for re-orbiting of GEO satellites at the end of their lifetime was adopted in 1993, whereas the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS only managed to agree on the inclusion of space debris as one of its agenda items the following year. See Perek 2002, p. 128. 290 Jasentuliyana 1999(a), p. 259. Further confusion may stem from the fact that the terms ‘efficiently’ or ‘economically’ are not defined by the ITU instruments in any way. 291 Ibid., pp. 257–258. 292 Courteix 1993, p. 274. “[GEO] presents the best example of how the use of outer space can amount to something, which at least resembles appropriation, in the sense that it may exclude the use of others of the same resource.” Metcalf 1999, p. 224. For a more general assessment of whether different types of space activities amount to appropriation of outer space, see ibid. 293 Williamson 2006, p. 43. 294 Courteix 1993, p. 274. However, the ITU regime for GEO is also in essence much of a ‘first come, first served’ system: once a state has been allocated a slot, the subsequent applicants for adjacent positions have to negotiate with those who already have secured
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More advanced norms for environmental purposes in the space sector have been proposed recently by other organs at the international level, such as the IADC and the ILA. In the main, these have been recommendations concerning mitigation of space debris. Even the UNCOPUOS has managed to discuss these issues with new effectiveness. Most importantly, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee adopted its Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2007. In addition, many space agencies have adopted a number of selfimposed guidelines, above all, for the purpose of debris mitigation.295 Although these instruments are mostly legally non-binding, recent developments seem to promise a possible shift towards more binding regulation. Above all, the decision of the Federal Communications Commission in the US to make a commitment to re-orbit GEO satellites at the end of their useful lifetime a condition of receiving a license to provide services seems like a very importance precedent for the entire space sector. Eventually, the international community may even be able to agree on binding obligations to the same end. On the other hand, debris mitigation efforts have already been taken for decades even without binding obligations to do so. The risks associated with space debris have been acknowledged within academia and the space industry long before the development of any mitigation policies or guidelines.296 Some launch vehicle developers began themselves to study possibilities to mitigate the hazard.297 For instance, passivation of US launch vehicles started back in the early 1960s. By now, such measures have become relatively common worldwide, which is hardly surprising considering that passivation is quite an effective way to prevent upper stage explosions yet typically entails relatively small costs when planned in the early design phase.298 Many spent launch vehicle upper stages their rights in order to reach a mutual agreement about frequency use. The rights of the ‘first come’ always prevail. 295 A notable exception is China. Despite being an increasingly important spacefaring nation (and a member of the IADC), China has no national debris mitigation standards. However, it has also been reported to be developing national regulation on the issue: “as a member of the IADC, the Chinese Government will undertake the study and development of Chinese design norms to mitigate space debris in conformity with the principles appearing in the space debris mitigation guidelines, developed by the Coordination Committee”. “511th Meeting of the UNCOPUOS” 2003, p. 5. See also Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2005, para. 130. Nevertheless, China carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007 which created a large number of new pieces (approximately 300 000) of space debris. See, e.g., Covault 2007; Kaufman–Linzer 2007. 296 See, e.g., Perek 1978 for an assessment of potential problems related to the use of GEO, such as saturation of the orbits and the frequency spectrum (at a time when there were only about 100 satellites in GEO). 297 For a list of different kinds of techniques for reducing the creation of orbital debris, see Greenberg 2003, pp. 388–389. 298 Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report, p. 12. The passivation of batteries,
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and satellites have also been removed from useful orbits: the first end-of-lifetime disposal of a satellite from GEO to a graveyard orbit was performed by Intelsat already in 1977.299 Quite obviously, in principle, it is in the satellite operators’ self-interest to preserve the environment where they are conducting their activities.300 In practice, however, the Earth orbits are not well-preserved, despite the considerable number of guidelines and the like, and the voluntary efforts of some satellite operators. Removal of inactive spacecraft, for example, is still far from being standard procedure. Currently, only about one out of three spent GEO spacecraft is reboosted to a disposal orbit at least 250 km above GEO, for instance. Another third of the spent GEO satellites are removed to a lower, insufficient altitude from where they will sooner or later interfere with functional GEO satellites. The remaining third are simply abandoned once they have run out of fuel and are no longer useful.301 Such is the trend despite the fact that even if no new satellites were placed in GEO, the debris there already—and further colliding with itself and functional spacecraft—would be enough to render the area hazardous and the long-term effects of inaction could be disastrous.302
for instance, is generally more expensive than the depletion or venting of extra fuel. “Space Debris Mitigation: the case for a code of conduct” 2005. However, although some measures may have little impact on mission costs if planned early enough, many debris mitigation procedures typically are costly. This is obviously a prohibitive factor considering, moreover, that many space programs are on tight budgets. See Brisibe– Pessoa-Lopes 2002, p. 314. 299 Jehn et al. 2005, p. 373. Both governmental and commercial satellites have been removed from useful orbits. For instance, in 2005 a total of seven US spacecraft were decommissioned and placed on disposal orbits above GEO: three of these were commercial, four governmental. Johnson 2006, p. 4. 300 It has been pointed out that the commercial space sector may in fact have even more incentives to act in a responsible manner than non-commercial operators, as the financing of the activities of the latter “may have little to do with the ability of the spacecraft to continue revenue-producing activity”. Mitigation of Orbital Debris 2004, para. 32. 301 Between 1997 and 2004, 117 GEO satellites reached the end of their life. Of these 39 were re-orbited in accordance with the IADC recommendations. Another 41 were re-orbited below the recommended minimum altitude, while the remaining 37 were abandoned with no disposal maneuvers. Jehn et al. 2005, p. 377. As regards the figures of the most recent of these years, five of the 13 GEO satellites which were retired in 2002 were moved to safe disposal orbits. In 2003, the figure was six out of 15. de Selding 2004. In 2004, it was five out of 13 (another five satellites were reboosted to insufficient altitudes and three just abandoned). Jehn et al. 2005, p. 376. 302 Flury 2000, p. 47. As regards variations of attitudes towards end-of-lifetime disposal strategies for GEO satellites, statistics show certain trends. As examples of more creditable operators in this respect one can mention Intelsat and Japan, which have re-orbited all of their GEO spacecraft within the period 1997–2004 (though some of the
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It is obvious that even self-imposed guidelines are in many instances not observed.303 Of course, technical malfunctions sometimes render even the most genuine attempts at proper end-of-lifetime disposal of spacecraft impossible. Often, however, there is not even any serious attempt to achieve best practices. Environmental considerations are compromised due to economic realities, which is not surprising given that debris mitigation measures can increase the costs of missions considerably. Understandably, commercial space activity is essentially based on financial motivations. As one author has put it, “safety is always expensive and there are very few fields of human activities which prefer safety to profit on a voluntary basis”.304 The problem is that debris mitigation policies, for instance, typically increase the short-term costs of space missions, as the losses resulting from debris impacts avoided generally become a considerable factor only over time. Although the reduction of mission costs in the long term could be significant, this alone is not capable of providing economic incentives to make environmentally more benign policies attractive enough: normal, prudent business decisions do not operate with such lengthy time spans.305 In addition, deficiencies in knowledge make it quite difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of different measures.306 Furthermore, objects launched into outer space before the importance of mitigation requirements was understood continue to contribute significantly to the generation of the debris population: the measures currently feasible for minimizing debris creation will at best only stabilize the growth of space debris at its present rate.307 Thus there is need for common international regulation to alleviate debrisrelated problems. What is more, many see it as a duty of the international orbits reached were too low). Another extreme would be Russia, where only three GEO satellites were re-orbited in compliance with international recommendations, another three were reboosted to too low disposal orbits, and a total of 26 GEO spacecraft were abandoned. The Chinese record is even worse: re-orbiting was attempted only once but the spacecraft did not reach a safe disposal orbit, and the four other Chinese GEO satellites that reached the end of their lifetime during the period performed no disposal maneuvers. Jehn et al. 2005, p. 377. The record of the US commercial satellite industry has also been reported to be not a very laudable one in this respect. Muir 2005. 303 Perek 2002, p. 132. 304 Ibid., p. 134. 305 Greenberg 2003, p. 381. 306 In particular, it is difficult to forecast developments over time. See ibid., pp. 382– 383, 385–386. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS has also been discussing the question of the costs and benefits of debris mitigation measures and urging further research in the area. See, e.g., Reports of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 38th, 39th and 40th session (years 2001, 2002, and 2003). For an extensive attempt to develop a method to evaluate the economic impacts of orbital debris and mitigation options, see Greenberg 2003. 307 See Flury 2000, p. 47.
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community to act since the issue of space debris is essentially an inter- and intragenerational one.308 If there is renewed interest in using nuclear power sources for space missions and even for propulsion purposes, international rules for limiting hazards related to NPS will surely also be in demand. The efforts already taken by various stakeholders provide positive pointers to the existence of a common understanding on the need to adopt improved approaches to environmental management of space activities but these steps alone are not enough. Besides, there is no guarantee that any voluntary actions will be continued in the future.309 The diversity of the concerns and stakeholders involved and the need for longterm management call for persistent, extensive new environmental policies, which require international regulation. There might even be need for different regulatory regimes for different areas of outer space. In addition to GEO, another area specifically in need of improved environmental practices is LEO, as no particular UN- or ITUsponsored regulation has been adopted for LEO activities yet. Some initial attempts to protect this orbital area have been taken, however. For instance, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines include LEO in the “orbits and protected regions” to which they apply. In a similar manner, the Draft European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard uses the concept of protected region, which in the context of the instrument includes LEO.310 The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS urge that [s]pacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages that have terminated their operational phases in orbits that pass through the LEO region should be removed from orbit in a controlled fashion. If this is not possible, they should be disposed of in orbits that avoid their long-term presence in the LEO region.311
308
Accordingly, in the deliberations of UNISPACE III, many speakers referred to the need of the international community to urgently act for mitigation of the space debris problem. Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1999, para. 474. 309 Greenberg 2003, p. 395. 310 This region is “protected in relation to the generation of space debris” and the presence (permanent or periodic) there of space debris is limited to 25 years. Alby et al. 2004, pp. 1262–1263. 311 Guideline 6 [“Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission”]. The guideline further provides that “[w]hen making determinations regarding potential solutions for removing objects from LEO, due consideration should be given to ensure that debris that survives to reach the surface of the Earth does not pose an undue risk to people or property, including through environmental pollution caused by hazardous substances”.
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However, these are only recommendations of a non-binding character; no international rules of a binding nature have been adopted that would facilitate environmental protection of LEO in particular. Given the explicit reference in the current ITU Constitution to all orbits associated with the use of radio frequencies as limited natural resources, the development of a legal regime also for LEO should be considered. Indeed, it seems quite realistic to expect such a regime to emerge eventually, considering that basically all of the better-elaborated environmental norms in the space sector are concerned with the protection of commercially valuable orbits. The prospects for improved environmental regulation for areas with little practical value for humans seem the least promising.
Chapter Four
International Environmental Law in the Space Sector The statistics concerning accumulation of space debris indisputably show that the preservation of outer space necessitates something more than what the existing UN space law and recommendations adopted by various organs can offer. Those Earth orbits that are economically the most valuable to humans and hence ought to generate the strongest incentives for responsible conduct are in fact the ones most degraded. There has been some significant progress recently at the national level (above all, the new FCC regulations in the US), but this is not enough for resolving this global—or, rather, universal—problem. Effective regulation requires compliance by all major spacefaring states on an equal-terms basis. Debris mitigation practices need to become an intrinsic element of all space operations. Attempts have already been made to draft a treaty that would be more effective in protecting the outer space environment.1 In all probability, this will be a very See, e.g., Hobe 1992. In addition to proposals inspired by environmental concerns, a more general review of the international space law has often been suggested. A common idea is that of a sixth, comprehensive UN space convention to “meet the legal challenges presented by modern space activities and [to] ensure that outer space [is] maintained exclusively for peaceful purposes”. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2005, para. 31. See also, e.g., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 44th session 2005, para. 136: “Some delegations expressed the view that the present legal regime governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space was not keeping in pace with existing scientific and technological developments … a universal convention should be developed in a balanced manner with the aim of finding solutions for existing issues, giving legal binding status to the principles of outer space and supplementing provisions of the existing United Nations treaties on outer space”. 1
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time-consuming process.2 The variety of problems related to the adoption of international instruments in space law and international environmental law in particular will be discussed in detail later in this work. Prospects for the utilization of other than purely legal instruments are also examined. Before the adoption of any such instrument or procedure in the space sector, there will still be a pressing need to rely on the existing rules for the environmental protection of outer space, however. Since the space treaties have proven highly inadequate for that task, we shall now turn to international environmental law for possible relief and study the applicability of its instruments in addressing environmental problems related to the use of outer space. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty provides that space activities are to be carried out “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of … promoting international cooperation and understanding”, thus explicitly confirming the applicability of general international law and international environmental law to space activities.3
(On a proposal for the development of a “universal, comprehensive convention on space law”, see also para. 33). Some other delegations, however, found the current legal framework established by the UN treaties on outer space to be “coherent and useful for [the] increasingly widespread and complex activities in outer space carried out by both governmental and private entities” (para. 32) and it thus “adequately [meets] the needs of the international community”. What is more, “the consideration of a universal comprehensive convention with regard to outer space would hinder the work of the Legal Subcommittee and would create uncertainty on the status and validity of the existing outer space treaties and principles” (paras. 138–139). Moreover, the fear has been expressed that “[t]he effort needed to draft a new comprehensive convention … would considerably slow down the work of the [Legal] Subcommittee and would make less clear its message with regard to increasing the adherence to the existing outer space treaties and improving their implementation”. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its 45th session 2006, para. 48. Instead of discussing a new comprehensive space convention, states should thus “commit themselves to adhering to the existing outer space treaties” in order to “[strengthen] the legal framework for global space activities” (para. 47). 2 Many are in fact quite pessimistic about an environmental space treaty. See, e.g., Perek 2005, pp. 587–588: “Expecting that a comprehensive treaty on space debris would be adopted any time soon is overly optimistic after ten years of discussions of space debris in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and still no consensus on starting discussions in the Legal Subcommittee. Moreover, the trend in COPUOS instruments has to be taken in account, too. More modest solutions, such as an adoption of recommended guidelines or of an agreed opinion are, let us hope, within possibilities.” By the “trend in COPUOS instruments” the author refers to the fact that no new space treaties have been adopted since 1979; instead, the UNCOPUOS has adopted sets of non-binding principles only. Ibid., p. 587. 3 Of course, international law is applicable to all international activities of states, space activities included, even without explicit reference to such applicability in space treaties.
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4.1. Treaties Even though the distinctively different characteristics of outer space and the terrestrial environment often urge different approaches, some treaties of international environmental law can contribute to the environmental protection of outer space. No doubt other instruments than those mentioned below may also have some relevance in this respect. However, their role in mitigating environmental degradation in the space sector remains so marginal that only the focal instruments will be discussed here, and even these only briefly. Among the relevant instruments in this respect are the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Convention) of 1976. The Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space in order to prevent pollution by nuclear fallout.4 The ENMOD Convention has a more comprehensive objective, as it prohibits the “military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long lasting or severe effects”.5 Article 2 of the convention stipulates that the term “environmental modification techniques” refers to any techniques for “changing, through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes, the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth … or of outer space”.6 However, the ENMOD Convention expressly allows the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.7 Also applicable to space activities are the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, which were adopted by the IAEA in 1986.8 The Convention on Early Notification expressly covers “any nuclear reactor wherever located”9 and also “the use of radioisotopes for power generation in space objects”.10 It applies to any accidents involving facilities or activities “from
4 Art. I.1.a states: “Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas”. 5 Art. 1. 6 Emphasis added. 7 In accordance with Art. 3, “[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes”. 8 The NPS Principles have been also described as a “supplement” to the two IAEA treaties (and hence they “should be transformed into formal legal instruments with full, binding force to provide a complete set of legal rules to prevent radiological pollution”). Qizhi 1992, p. 170. 9 Art. 1.2.a. 10 Art. 1.2.f.
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which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State”.11 There is a possible exception to this applicability where the lunar surface is concerned, however: due to the ban on national appropriation on the Moon, states which may be physically affected should be few and “transboundary release” is hardly possible. The reference to an accident that “could be of radiological safety significance for another State” seems to limit the effectiveness of the instrument even further by leaving it largely for each state to determine whether ‘their’ accidents have the potential to be of such significance to other states.12 Furthermore, the IAEA Conventions in question only deal with measures to be taken after an accident has already happened, such as the duty to “forthwith notify, directly or through the [IAEA] … those States which are or may be physically affected … and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate”13 and to provide the potentially affected states and the IAEA with “available information relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences”.14 The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency further obligates the states parties to “cooperate between themselves and with the [IAEA] … to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases”.15 In addition to the Art. 1.1. See Sands 2003, p. 846. It is also disputable whether the convention applies to accidents resulting from nuclear weapons and their testing. For further criticism regarding the instrument, see ibid., pp. 846–847. 13 Art. 2 of the Convention on Early Notification. 14 Art. 5 of the Convention on Early Notification. 15 Art. 1.1. A state party in need of assistance “in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control … may call for such assistance from any other State Party, directly or through the Agency, and from the Agency, or, where appropriate, from other international intergovernmental organizations” (Art. 2.1). “A State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assisting party with such information as may be necessary for that party to determine the extent to which it is able to meet the request” (Art. 2.2). “Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party … whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of the assistance that might be rendered” (Art. 2.3). “States Parties shall … identify and notify the Agency of experts, equipment and materials which could be made available for the provision of assistance … as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such assistance could be provided” (Art. 2.4). “Any State Party may request assistance relating to medical treatment or temporary relocation into the territory of another State Party of people involved in a nuclear accident or radiological 11 12
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problem of exclusively ‘subsequent’ application of the IAEA instruments, it could prove in many ways difficult to interpret these conventions in an actual accident involving a nuclear reactor in space. One may ask, for instance, whether the loss of radio contact with a satellite carrying NPS already constitutes an accident in the light of these conventions.16 As mentioned above, even the launching of space objects pollutes the atmosphere to an extent, whereby instruments concerned with atmospheric pollution have relevance in the space sector. The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer requires states parties to “take appropriate measures … to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer”.17 The 1987 Montreal Protocol to the convention develops this precautionary approach further, particularly in its annexes, calling for the phase-out and reduction of certain ozone-harmful substances in a multiyear time frame.18
emergency” (Art. 2.5). “The Agency shall respond … to a requesting State Party’s or a Member State’s request for assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency by: a. making available appropriate resources allocated for this purpose; b. transmitting promptly the request to other States and international organizations which, according to the Agency’s information, may possess the necessary resources; and c. if so requested by the requesting State, coordinating the assistance at the international level which may thus become available” (Art. 2.6). 16 Courteix 1992, p. 118. For a more detailed account of the application of the IAEA Conventions to the space environment, see, e.g., Smith 1993, p. 316. Two other conventions have been identified as having potential relevance to the safety of NPS in space activities: Convention on Nuclear Safety and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. However, the latter convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport from one state to another (Art. 2.1). Thus it can have relevance only in relation to the transportation of nuclear material on Earth; it is not applicable to NPS in outer space, not even to the launch of NPS. Moreover, it does not apply to most radioisotopes—including plutonium-238, the type typically used for space radioisotope power systems (Art. 1.a). International transportation of uranium-235, which has been used for space nuclear reactors, would, however, fall within the scope of this convention. Applicability of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in space activities is also limited: it is explicitly restricted to land-based civil nuclear power plants and associated activities (Art. 2). However, the “General Safety Considerations” section (Arts. 10–16) of the convention contains provisions concerning quality assurance (Art. 13), radiation protection (Art. 15), and emergency preparedness (Art. 16), for instance, most of which have been deemed as having potential relevance even to space nuclear power sources. Malysheva–Chebotaryov 2005, p. 485. 17 Art. 2.1. 18 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has since been modified by the adjustments adopted in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna
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Finally, an international agreement (albeit ‘only’ a bilateral one) that had some relevance in respect of environmental preservation of outer space was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, concluded between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972.19 It prohibited the development, testing and deployment of “ABM systems or components, which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based”.20 However, the ABM Treaty expired on 13 June 2002, following its unilateral termination by the US Government. This left an international legal void which largely allows the weaponization of space again. Although the international law of outer space continues to ban the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) in space,21 the possible use of space-based conventional weapons is worrisome enough. The termination of the ABM treaty permits, for instance, research, development, testing, manufacturing, production and deployment of space-based weapons—including spacebased components of the US National Missile Defense System—to go forward. Although the US ballistic missile defense system has encountered technological and budgetary obstacles,22 the country seems steadfast in its ‘star wars’ plans.23 This has provoked other states to take similar measures, which is no surprise considering the growing interest in space control of the US military doctrine, defined even as the freedom of action in space for the US (and possibly its allies) while denying its enemies access and use of outer space when necessary.24 (1995), Montreal (1997) and Beijing (1999), which have further strengthened the control provisions of the protocol. 19 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. 20 Art. V.1 (emphasis added). 21 OST, Art. IV.1. 22 See, e.g., “Wishing Won’t Make Star Wars So” 2003; Crock 2003; “Missile Defense Test Failed As Support Arm In Silo Failed To Clear” 2005. 23 See, e.g., Zakaria 2003; Gilmore 2003. The US Missile Defense Agency is even planning the placement of a test-bed for missile interceptors in outer space by 2012. See “Missile Defense Agency, MDA Exhibit R-2 RDT&E Budget Item Justification” 2004. This “would constitute the first deployment of a weapons system in outer space”. Space Security 2004 (2005), pp. 140–141. 24 Ibid., p. 35. Such a policy obviously constitutes a drastic departure from the focal starting point of the UN space law, which considers space as “an environment open to all and belonging to none”. It also goes by the term ‘negation’. The US Space Command emphasized already in its “Long Range Plan” in 1998 the “control of space”, meaning “the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required ” (Chapter 5; emphasis added). Pursuant to this plan, “[n]egation is the ability to deny, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space systems and services. It involves military actions to target ground-support sites and infrastructure, ground-to-space links, or spacecraft” (Chapter 5). Another indicator of the direction of the US space security policy is the US Air Force document “Counterspace Operations” released in 2004. It also makes
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In fact, the US began the construction of a new missile interceptor facility in Alaska immediately after its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.25 Russia has expressed its concern about weaponization of space in general and the US plans in particular.26 Nevertheless, the Russian Minister of Defense suggested very soon after the termination of the ABM Treaty that if the US proceeds with its plans, Russia could deploy its own response to the US space-based weapons system.27 As regards other states, China has emerged as a focal player in this respect, investing heavily in commercial uses of outer space lately. Accordingly, it has been suggested that as such peaceful activities require a framework of stability, the American military dominance in space might, at worst, force also China into an arms race.28 Furthermore, China has had military as well as space-related cooperation with Russia.29 On the other hand, Russia and China have proposed a global ban (a multilateral treaty) on the deployment of space arms.30 Nevertheless, and most alarmingly, China actually carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007 by using a ground-based missile to destroy one of its old satellites. In addition to increasing military concerns, the test resulted in the creation of a large cloud of space debris (consisting of as many as 300 000 new pieces of debris). Many spacefaring nations have heavily criticized the test.31 Several other states as well are concerned with the use of outer space for furthering national security. For instance, some analysts fear that the US Star Wars scheme—however sluggish— may, quite contrary to the US hopes of having a deterrent effect, prompt “the North Koreans to speed up and expand their development of nuclear explicit mention of military operations “to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities” (pp. 2–4). Also, one of the goals stated in the White House document “U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Policy” of 2004 is the improvement of “capabilities to deny hostile use of any space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services” (p. 3). Other states may not have been equally explicit in this respect but it can be expected that also they want to guarantee the safety of their space operations and, if needed, even deny the benefits of space activities to their enemies, if possible. See Stibrany 1998, p. 133. 25 Williamson 2006, pp. 41, 250. 26 See, e.g., “Interview with Vladimir Putin” 2001. 27 “Canada Could Prevent Weaponization of Space” 2002. 28 See Carroll 2003. For a Chinese perspective on the issue, see, e.g., Zhang 2005. 29 See, e.g., “China Defends Sino-Russian Military Cooperation” 2000; “Russia To Help China’s Manned Program” 1999. 30 Russian-Chinese Joint Working Paper “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” 2002. For a discussion about the Russian-Chinese Working Paper and a possible space weapons ban, see, e.g., INESAP Information Bulletin 2002. See also “Russia Proposes Global Ban on Space Arms” 2003. 31 E.g., Covault 2007; Kaufman–Linzer 2007.
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weapons”32—a daunting prediction considering that North Korea has already performed a nuclear weapons test. Among other Asian states, India has been reported to have started working towards a space platform for nuclear weapons.33 It remains to be seen what kind of an arms race in space will ultimately follow. Obviously, any development of space weapons entails increasing environmental threats.34 Previously, at least at a rhetorical level, states seemed relatively unanimous in their desire to maintain outer space for peaceful activities only. Since 1981 the UN General Assembly has passed an annual resolution on “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (known as the PAROS Resolution) urging all states to refrain from actions contrary to peaceful uses of outer space and inviting negotiations within the UN Conference on Disarmament on the further development of international law in this area for the purpose of adopting an international agreement on the issue, above all.35 The voting patterns concerning the PAROS Resolution were traditionally very much the same year after year, with a vast majority of states in favor and none against the resolution. However, in 2005, there were 180 states in favor, nine not voting, and two that actually voted ‘no’, i.e., Israel and the US.36 Considering this together with the US termination of the ABM Treaty and its subsequent pursuit of further militarization of outer space, as well as the more general growing focus on military space applications, the development is quite worrisome—and not merely (or even primarily) from an environmental point of view.
Crock 2003. Gilani 2003. 34 For instance, it has been stated that “to date, insufficient attention [has] been given to the creation of debris that future anti-satellite weapons would cause through kinetic impact or explosion damaging or destroying space assets”. Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 42nd session 2005, para. 107. 35 The Conference on Disarmament, which works on consensus decision-making, has been unable to negotiate any such new measures. It has even been unable to agree upon a plan of work since 1998 and hence to address the PAROS issue formally. A critical actor, the US, has declared that it is not even willing to negotiate on the issue: “We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms race in outer space. We just don’t see that as a worthwhile enterprise”. Statement of John R. Bolton, “U.S. Department of State, G-8 Senior Group Meeting” 2004. Nevertheless, important discussions regarding the PAROS issue have been conducted between the Conference on Disarmament member states in informal sessions. For a more detailed account, see Space Security 2004 (2005), pp. 30–31. 36 UNGA Res. 60/54. Previously, Israel and the US used to abstain from voting. 32 33
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4.2. Principles Although playing important roles in their respective areas of regulation, the above-mentioned international conventions obviously do not provide enough help for environmental management of space activities. In order to enhance the possibilities of international law in this respect, more use could be made of certain general principles of law which are also a source of international law in accordance with Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).37 Above all, this would mean invoking general principles of international environmental law. In compliance with the notion of generality, such principles are potentially applicable to all states in respect of all kinds of activities and all types of environmental problems.38 General principles can be derived from conventions, international custom, juridical decisions, declarations, resolutions, and opinions.39 Some of them are embodied in international legal instruments, while others are based in customary law.40 Principles make it possible to take into account the evolving nature of international law as well as the varying needs of the world community.41 What makes the situation problematic is that although some principles of international law are already relatively well-established, many others are still only emergent. Additionally, principles tend to be rather vague, allowing for a number of interpretations. The status, content and effects of principles may vary according to geographical context and type of activities, for instance. Hence, the application of a certain principle to a certain situation must be considered on a case-by-case basis.42 The typical ambiguity in the legal status and content of international principles obviously impacts their usefulness in litigation in particular.43 However, even though invoking such general principles has often proven highly complicated, they may at least serve as a last resort in cases where the enactment of more specific norms is a question for the future, as in the regulation of space pollution. Moreover, principles influence environmental 37 This article of the ICJ’s Statute is generally considered an authoritative statement of the sources of international law. The sources listed in it are a) international conventions; b) international custom (“as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); c) general principles of law; and d) “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (emphasis added). 38 Sands 2003, p. 231. 39 See Rantala 1994, p. 99. 40 Training Manual on International Environmental Law 2006, p. 24. 41 Rantala 1994, p. 99. 42 See Sands 2003, pp. 231–232; Training Manual on International Environmental Law 2006, p. 24. 43 Brunnée 2004, p. 354.
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policy, offer important guidance in interpreting the existing rules and serve as starting points for developing the law further.44 Principles play a prominent role in environmental law—probably more so than in any other field of law. It has proven particularly complicated to agree on definite rules at the international level, making the role of principles focal in international environmental law.45 The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (known as the Stockholm Declaration) was “the first elaborate document on principles of environmental law”.46 However, it took another two decades before the role of environmental principles was truly boosted by the 1992 Rio Conference,47 after which environmental treaties began to include references to principles with increasing frequency.48 The environmental principles which have gained the most significance are those included in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.49 The declaration constitutes an important step towards an approach which increasingly recognizes environmental concerns and on a global scale: it is essentially a package deal reflecting a real consensus of all states— regardless of their level of industrial development, for instance—on the need to elaborate international law on environmental protection.50 Accordingly, the Rio Declaration has contributed to the progressive development of environmental law ever since its adoption. Many treaties refer to the Rio principles in general,51 but there exist also numerous references to individual Rio principles in treaty provisions (in preambular paragraphs or in operative articles52). International tribunals have also increasingly discussed the role of environmental principles. 44 Other functions which principles may have include enhancement of the normative power of existing rules, as well as of legal certainty and legitimacy in decision-making. See Verschuuren 2003, pp. 38–41. 45 de Sadeleer 2002, p. 1. 46 Verschuuren 2003, p. 77. 47 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992. 48 Only few treaties prior to the Rio Declaration make explicit reference to principles, one of these few being the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (see preamble and Art. 9). 49 Verschuuren 2003, p. 72. 50 Boyle–Freestone 1999, pp. 3–4. 51 See, e.g., preamble to the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: “Recalling the principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21”. 52 Obviously, only those references which are made in operational articles have the potential to enable a principle to be used as a binding norm (provided that detailed enough obligations can be derived from it); preambular references affirm at most that a principle is available to be used in the interpretation of the more precise rules of the operational articles. See de Sadeleer 2002, p. 23.
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In the following, I shall introduce some of the focal principles of international environmental law and examine their particular applicability to the space sector. The general goal of sustainable development is of highest relevance for all human activities, space activities included. The other, more detailed environmental principles which provide further assistance in pursuing the goal of sustainable development include the principles of sic utere tuo and good neighborliness; due diligence; the precautionary principle; common but differentiated responsibilities; and the polluter-pays principle. Some of these principles illustrate the application of principles of general international law to environmental issues,53 whereas others are more specific to environmental law. Many of the principles have developed from principles and obligations regarding domestic or transboundary harm (between states), and their application has been gradually extended within the sphere of international environmental law. Moreover, there is widespread international acceptance today of the idea that states are required to protect the global commons (Antarctica, the high seas, the deep seabed and outer space).54 4.2.1. Sustainable Development 4.2.1.1. Components and Evolution The basic goal of the principle of sustainable development is to balance environmental protection and economic development in a way that is sustainable for both present generations and the future of humankind. In this sense, it is only partly an environmental principle, yet it strives towards a holistic approach to environmental problems. Hence, sustainable development can be seen as an ideal for environmental policy, an ideal which can hardly ever be fully realized and, moreover, needs to accommodate also many other than environmental aspirations.55 Considering the traditional domination of other 53 Above all, the principles of sic utere tuo, due diligence, and common but differentiated responsibilities. 54 See Boyle 1997, p. 86. 55 See Verschuuren 2003, pp. 20–25. The author argues that sustainable development is in fact a mere ideal (which thus precedes principles) and not a principle at all. According to his reasoning, principles are the first step to make ideals more concrete, whereas the practical application of a principle further necessitates the development of more specific rules. According to the same author, underlying ideals, such as that of sustainable development (“a prime example [of ideals behind principles] in the field of environmental law”), cannot be applied in concrete legal practice together with rules whereas principles can be used in this manner. See ibid., pp. 25–27. “The more concrete a principle is, the more it can be treated as a rule and the easier it is to directly apply it in a concrete case”. Ibid., p. 33. In the present work, however, sustainable development
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than environmental considerations, the principle of sustainable development serves in practice primarily to ensure that development decisions do not disregard environmental concerns. It can be seen as crucial for the development of global environmental responsibility, too.56 The concept of sustainable development was explicitly introduced in 1987 by the report of what was known as the Brundtland Commission,57 entitled “Our Common Future”. According to the well-known definition given to the principle in this report, sustainable development is development that “meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.58 A few years later, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) extended the idea of sustainability to intragenerational and economic equity by stating that sustainable development requires use of the natural resource base in a way that underpins ecological resilience and economic growth as well as helps to achieve international equity.59 The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 frequently referred to such a balancing of interests in its 26 principles,60 and two decades later the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development set out the concept in more detail. The principle of sustainable development has been incorporated in various other international (and national) instruments, legally binding treaties included.61 It has attained
is considered a broad principle comprised of several inherent, at least somewhat more specific principles. It is also seen as potentially applicable in the day-to-day functioning of the legal system, capable of suggesting a course of action in situations where the more specific regulation does not provide detailed enough guidance as how to proceed. The current treatise does not consider it very relevant what the phenomenon of sustainable development is called (principle, ideal, or something else); what matters most is the practical effect it has. 56 See Birnie–Boyle 2002, p. 84. 57 World Commission on Environment and Development. 58 Section “From One Earth to One World”, para. 27. The report explained further that “[i]n essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations”, Part I, Chapter 2 (“Towards Sustainable Development”), para. 15. 59 Birnie–Boyle 1992, p. 4. 60 See particularly Principles 2, 3, 4 and 7, and the preamble. Concern for environmental degradation constituting a hindrance to economic and social development had been expressed ‘officially’ even earlier, in the UNGA resolution convening the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, for instance. See UNGA Res. 2398(XXIII) 1968. It was, however, not until the Brundtland Report of 1987 that a truly sustainable approach was adopted; before that, developmental and environmental interests were treated separately in practice (mostly to the detriment of the latter). See Birnie–Boyle 2002, pp. 40–41. 61 The 1985 Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
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widespread endorsement—especially after the Rio Conference—and influenced the policies of both international organizations and national governments. As a specific follow-up to the 1992 Rio Conference, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg undertook to set out ways to implement the goals agreed on ten years earlier. The most extensive document agreed to in Johannesburg was the over-60-page Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development.62 The Johannesburg Summit proved to be a disappointment to many, however, as several of the goals discussed during the negotiations were eventually either dropped or at least scaled back substantially.63 The principle of sustainable development as formulated in the above instruments has been criticized for utilitarianism and anthropocentrism. In all of these formulations, the principle seems to be implicitly or explicitly based on the presumption that ‘development’ means economic growth. Unlimited economic growth is regarded not only as desirable but also possible, as long as it remains ‘sustainable’. Nevertheless, many argue that the entire idea of sustainability is incompatible with that of economic growth.64 On the other hand, the principle of sustainable development was never meant to serve merely (or even primarily) the needs of the environment. The Rio Declaration, for instance, never even purported to promote a policy of no growth. Quite the contrary, it affirmed the was among the very first treaties to refer to the concept. Subsequent instruments making express reference to the term ‘sustainable development’ include the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (preamble and Arts. 2, 3, 4); the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (preamble); the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (e.g., preamble and Arts. 1, 6); and the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (preamble and several articles). Other, related concepts used in recent treaties include ‘sustainable use’ (e.g., Art. 5 of the 1995 Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks) and ‘sustainable utilization’ (e.g., Art. 5 of the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses). 62 In addition, the (much shorter) Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development was adopted. 63 For instance, the initial proposal to adopt a specific numerical target for the amount of energy to be obtained from renewable sources was not accepted. Some time-bound targets were nevertheless agreed on, such as halving the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 (Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, paras. 8 and 25). 64 See, e.g., Chatterjee–Finger 1994, pp. 21–22. According to the authors, sustainable development is “just another word for an economic process that is drawing on society’s techno-economic capacities, rather than on the natural resource base”. Even more, it is “based on the idea that gradually a society can make itself become independent of nature” (emphasis added). Ibid., p. 27.
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sovereign right of states “to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies”, albeit tempered by responsibility for transboundary environmental protection);65 refers to the right to development (subject to inter- and intra-generational equity);66 and demands a “supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries”.67 Economic growth is not inevitably unsustainable, whereas even zero growth in some cases may be. What matters is the content of growth: economic development ensuing from increasingly efficient use of natural resources or energy should be far more desirable from the point of view of sustainability than lesser growth generated by environmentally more degrading activities.68 The integration of environmental and development considerations is in any case more likely to guarantee that environmental values are taken into account in decision-making than separation of the two aspects.69 Furthermore, the principle of sustainable development promotes other kinds of welfare than purely economic. This is evident in the Rio Declaration, whose very first principle says that humans are “entitled to a healthy and