Advanced Praise for The Drucker Lectures “Peter Drucker shined a light in a dark and chaotic world, and his words remain as relevant today as when he first spoke them. Drucker’s lectures and thoughts deserve to be considered by every person of responsibility, now, tomorrow, ten years from now, fifty, and a hundred.” —Jim Collins, author of Good to Great and How the Mighty Fall
“Rick Wartzman has brought Peter Drucker alive again, and vividly so, in his own words. These samples of his talks and lectures, because they were spoken not written, will be new to almost all of us. A great and unexpected treat.” —Charles Handy, author of Myself and Other More Important Matters
“Peter Drucker’s ideas continue to resonate powerfully today. His lectures on effectiveness, innovation, the social sector, education and so much more provide fresh insights that extend beyond his other writings and provide lessons for us all. This book is a gem.” —Wendy Kopp, CEO and founder of Teach for America
“Rick Wartzman has performed a great service in pulling together The Drucker Lectures. The collection is as far-ranging as Drucker’s thinking and writing. If you have sampled Drucker before, you will find things you haven’t seen. Peter’s ideas live on. You will be energized by reading them anew.” —Paul O’Neill, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
“Peter Drucker inspires awe. From the 1940s until his death a few years ago, he displayed a combination of insight, prescience, and productivity that few will ever match. This superbly edited collection captures both the range of Drucker’s thinking and the sweep of history that informed it. The Drucker Lectures is a riveting read that reveals the depth and subtlety of one of America’s most remarkable minds.” —Daniel H. Pink, author of A Whole New Mind and Drive
“Rick Wartzman really has brought Peter to life in The Drucker Lectures. Reading this book, I practically felt as though I were seated in the audience, listening to my friend and hero, Peter Drucker—truly one of the great geniuses of management. These lectures are as vital today as they were when Peter delivered them. They cover significant territory, from the importance of faith and the individual to the rise of the global economy. It’s a classic collection that belongs on every manager’s bookshelf.” —Ken Blanchard, coauthor of The One Minute Manager ® and Leading at a Higher Level
“Thank you, Rick Wartzman, for the pleasure of learning from the witty, informal Peter Drucker as his ideas unfold and his remarkable mind grapples with challenges of management that are still with us today.” —Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Harvard Business School Professor and author of Confidence and SuperCorp: How Vanguard Companies Create Innovation, Profits, Growth, and Social Good
The
DRUCKER LECTURES
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The
Drucker Lectures
E ssential L essons on M anagement, S ociety, and E conomy
Peter F. Drucker Edited and with an Introduction by
Rick Wartzman
New York Chicago San Francisco Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan New Delhi San Juan Seoul Singapore Sydney Toronto
Copyright © 2010 by The Drucker Institute. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978-0-07-175950-2 MHID: 0-07-175950-6 The material in this eBook also appears in the print version of this title: ISBN: 978-0-07-170045-0, MHID: 0-07-170045-5. All trademarks are trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than put a trademark symbol after every occurrence of a trademarked name, we use names in an editorial fashion only, and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. Where such designations appear in this book, they have been printed with initial caps. McGraw-Hill eBooks are available at special quantity discounts to use as premiums and sales promotions, or for use in corporate training programs. To contact a representative please e-mail us at
[email protected]. TERMS OF USE This is a copyrighted work and The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“McGrawHill”) and its licensors reserve all rights in and to the work. Use of this work is subject to these terms. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act of 1976 and the right to store and retrieve one copy of the work, you may not decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer, reproduce, modify, create derivative works based upon, transmit, distribute, disseminate, sell, publish or sublicense the work or any part of it without McGraw-Hill’s prior consent. You may use the work for your own noncommercial and personal use; any other use of the work is strictly prohibited. Your right to use the work may be terminated if you fail to comply with these terms. THE WORK IS PROVIDED “AS IS.” McGRAW-HILL AND ITS LICENSORS MAKE NO GUARANTEES OR WARRANTIES AS TO THE ACCURACY, ADEQUACY OR COMPLETENESS OF OR RESULTS TO BE OBTAINED FROM USING THE WORK, INCLUDING ANY INFORMATION THAT CAN BE ACCESSED THROUGH THE WORK VIA HYPERLINK OR OTHERWISE, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. McGraw-Hill and its licensors do not warrant or guarantee that the functions contained in the work will meet your requirements or that its operation will be uninterrupted or error free. Neither McGraw-Hill nor its licensors shall be liable to you or anyone else for any inaccuracy, error or omission, regardless of cause, in the work or for any damages resulting therefrom. McGraw-Hill has no responsibility for the content of any information accessed through the work. Under no circumstances shall McGraw-Hill and/or its licensors be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, punitive, consequential or similar damages that result from the use of or inability to use the work, even if any of them has been advised of the possibility of such damages. This limitation of liability shall apply to any claim or cause whatsoever whether such claim or cause arises in contract, tort or otherwise.
C O NTE NT S
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix
Part I 1940s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1. How Is Human Existence Possible? (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The Myth of the State (1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Part II 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3. The Problems of Maintaining Continuous and Full Employment (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Part III 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4. The First Technological Revolution and Its Lessons (1965) . . . . . 29 5. Management in the Big Organizations (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Part IV 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 6. Politics and Economics of the Environment (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7. What We Already Know about American Education Tomorrow (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 [
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8. Claremont Address (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9. Structural Changes in the World Economy and Society as They Affect American Business (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Part V 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 10. Managing the Increasing Complexity of Large Organizations (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 11. The Information-Based Organization (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 12. Knowledge Lecture I (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 13. Knowledge Lecture II ((1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 14. Knowledge Lecture III (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 15. Knowledge Lecture IV (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 16. Knowledge Lecture V (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Part VI 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 17. The New Priorities (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 18. Do You Know Where You Belong? (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 19. The Era of the Social Sector (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 20. The Knowledge Worker and the Knowledge Society (1994) . . . . . 157 21. Reinventing Government: The Next Phase (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . 165 22. Manage Yourself and Then Your Company (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . 173
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23. On Health Care (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 24. The Changing World Economy (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 25. Deregulation and the Japanese Economy (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 26. Managing Oneself (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 27. From Teaching to Learning (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Part VII 2000s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 28. On Globalization (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 29. Managing the Nonprofit Organization (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 30. The Future of the Corporation I (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 31. The Future of the Corporation II (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 32. The Future of the Corporation III (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 33. The Future of the Corporation IV (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 About Peter F. Drucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Books by Peter F. Drucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
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INTRO DU CTIO N
Y
ou can picture him perched on the edge of a classroom table, peering through thick glasses at the students who hang on his every word. His baritone voice washes over the room, his Austrian accent as thick as a Sachertorte. He doesn’t refer to any written notes. But every now and again, his eyes roll back in his head and he pauses, almost like a computer downloading a store of information, before returning to his point and underscoring it with a new set of facts and figures. His protean mind meanders from topic to topic—a discussion on cost accounting bleeding into a riff on Mesopotamian city-states before he veers into a lesson on the history of higher education or health care. But, somehow, he magically ties it all together in the end. In his hands, discursiveness becomes a fine art. And he delivers the entire talk with charm and humor and a genial style that, as one pupil has put it, recasts “the chilly lecture hall to the size and comfort of a living room.” Peter Drucker, widely hailed as the greatest management thinker of all time, is best known for the 39 books he wrote. Among them are such classics as Concept of the Corporation (1946); The Practice of Management (1954); The Effective Executive (1967); Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (1973); Innovation and Entrepreneurship (1985); and Management Challenges for the 21st Century (1999). But those who had the pleasure of attending a Drucker lecture, before he died in 2005 just shy of his ninety-sixth birthday, got to see another side of him. Featuring lectures from the dawn of the television age straight through to the Internet age, from World War II to the aftermath of September 11, 2001, from the ascent into office of Chiang Kai-shek to the emergence of China as a global economic power, this book is designed to provide a taste of what that was like.
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Drucker can be humble and self-deprecating in his comments, variously conceding: “I don’t even know where to begin” and “I know I don’t make sense.” But mostly he is authoritative, speaking in absolutes. “Not one government program since 1950 has worked,” he declares in a 1991 address at the Economic Club of Washington. He can be shockingly bold. For example, in a 2001 lecture, Drucker goes so far as to call W. Edwards Deming, the quality guru, “totally obsolete.” He can also push too far, suggesting in a 1997 speech on the changing world economy that “it is anybody’s guess whether there will be a united Canada in 10 years.” Many of these lectures are notable for their erudition; an offhand reference to an eighteenth-century politician or a nineteenth-century novelist is not uncommon. At the same time, Drucker was never one to lose his head in the clouds. “Will you please be terribly nuts-and-bolts-focused in your questions,” he requests at the end of a lecture at New York University in 1981, “because we have dealt in the stratosphere much too long.” Those acquainted with Drucker’s oeuvre will find many familiar themes here: managing oneself, the value of volunteering, the need for every organization to focus on performance and results. At times, he’d use his lectures to test out ideas that would later find their way into print—the classroom serving as a kind of petri dish for his prose. If there is a single subject that threads through this book it is one that Drucker spent the last half-century of his career contemplating: the historic shift from manufacturing to knowledge work. In these lectures, Drucker explores the implications of engaging our brains, instead of our brawn, from a variety of angles. He starts in 1957, where his remarks to an international management conference contain one of his earliest known references to “people who work by knowledge.” Yet there are also plenty of fresh insights—and more than a few surprises—to be found in these pages, even for the most diehard Drucker devotee. As a speaker, Drucker tends to be a bit less formal than in his writing. He is also apt to personalize his lectures, leavening his oratory with stories about his wife, Doris, his children, and his grandchildren. The
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shape of the audience can also make things interesting. It is one thing, for instance, for Drucker to hold forth on the vital importance of nonprofits. But this topic gets a new twist when he contextualizes his thinking for a group of Japanese. Perhaps what makes this collection most remarkable, though, is the sheer span of time that it covers—a testament to Drucker’s long and extraordinarily productive life. I have attempted to give a glimpse into the evolution of Drucker’s philosophy by offering brief commentary at the beginning of each section of this book, which is divided by decade. The first lecture here is from 1943, when Drucker was being billed in promotional materials as “stimulating and highly informative” but also as someone “with his feet on the ground,” capable of communicating “in terms that the average businessman can understand and appreciate.” The last lecture, when those exact same traits were still very much on display (even though Drucker’s own hearing was then failing), came 60 years later, in 2003. I selected these two talks, along with 31 others in between, with the help of Bridget Lawlor, the talented archivist at Claremont Graduate University’s Drucker Institute. We looked, specifically, for lectures that hadn’t been published before, at least not in book form. I then edited each one for clarity and readability. I have also tried to minimize the overlap among the lectures in this book; you should hear a few faint echoes, but no outright redundancies. A handful of the lectures were given from behind a lectern, where Drucker left a polished text to draw from. But most were pulled from transcripts of videotapes of Drucker speaking more casually in the classroom, and with these I have taken considerably more liberties—cutting an immense amount of verbiage, moving pieces around, and composing new transitions. This was major surgery, not a minor cosmetic job, and these lectures are best thought of as “adapted from” rather than simply “excerpted from.” Purists may grumble about this approach. But anyone who wants to see the originals is welcome to visit Claremont to do so. In the meantime,
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I have tried my best to make this collection accessible and enjoyable while abiding by a standard that Drucker believed should be the first responsibility of every manager but is sound advice for any editor, as well: Above all, do no harm. Rick Wartzman Claremont, Calif.
The
DRUCKER LECTURES
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Knowledge has to be improved, challenged, and increased constantly, or it vanishes. —PETER F. DRUCKER
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PART I
1940s
B
y the time the 1940s rolled around, many of the seminal events that would shape Peter Drucker’s core philosophy had already unfolded. Most notably, the Nazis—who burned and banned some of Drucker’s earliest writings—had swept across Europe, prompting the Austrian native to leave for England in 1933 and then immigrate to the United States in 1937. In between, while attending a Cambridge University lecture by economist John Maynard Keynes, he had an epiphany: “I suddenly realized that Keynes and all the brilliant economic students in the room were interested in the behavior of commodities while I was interested in the behavior of people.” In 1939, Drucker wrote The End of Economic Man, exploring the rise of fascism on the continent he’d left behind. In 1942, he published The Future of Industrial Man. At its heart was the notion that the modern corporation had to justify its power and authority, while providing the individual with dignity, meaning, and status—bedrock beliefs that would infuse Drucker’s writing for the next six decades. By dissecting the inner workings of a single enterprise, Drucker’s work took on a new cast in 1946 with the release of Concept of the Corporation. The book examined General Motors not just as a business but also as a social entity that existed in the context of the broader community. Not everyone was impressed with this deep analysis of organization and management—topics that seemed to fall into a netherworld between politics and economics and that heretofore were largely unexplored. One reviewer expressed the hope that Drucker would “now devote his considerable talents to a more respectable subject.” Thankfully, Drucker declined.
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How Is Human Existence Possible? 1943
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here has never been a century of Western history so far removed from an awareness of the tragic as that which bequeathed to us two world wars. It has trained all of us to suppress the tragic, to shut our eyes to it, to deny its existence. Not quite 200 years ago—in 1755 to be exact—the death of 15,000 men in the Lisbon earthquake was enough to bring down the structure of traditional Christian belief in Europe. The contemporaries could not make sense of it. They could not reconcile this horror with the concept of an all-merciful God. And they could not see any answer to a catastrophe of such magnitude. Now, we daily learn of slaughter and destruction of vastly greater numbers, of whole peoples being starved or exterminated, of whole cities being leveled overnight. And it is far more difficult to explain these man-made catastrophes in terms of our nineteenth-century rationality than it was for the eighteenth century to explain the earthquake of Lisbon in the terms of the rationality of eighteenth-century Christianity. Yet I do not think that those contemporary catastrophes have shaken the optimism of these thousands of committees that are dedicated to the belief that permanent peace and prosperity will inevitably issue from this war. Sure, they are aware of the facts and are duly outraged by them. But they refuse to see them as catastrophes.
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Yet however successful the nineteenth century was in suppressing the tragic in order to make possible human existence exclusively in time, there is one fact which could not be suppressed, one fact that remains outside of time: death. It is the one fact that cannot be made general but remains unique, the one fact that cannot be socialized but remains individual. The nineteenth century made every effort to strip death of its individual, unique, and qualitative aspect. It made death an incident in vital statistics, measurable quantitatively, predictable according to the natural laws of probability. It tried to get around death by organizing away its consequences. This is the meaning of life insurance, which promises to take the consequences out of death. Life insurance is perhaps the most representative institution of nineteenth-century metaphysics; for its promise “to spread the risks” shows most clearly the nature of this attempt to make death an incident in human life, instead of its termination. It was the nineteenth century that invented Spiritualism with its attempt to control life after death by mechanical means. Yet death persists. Society might make death taboo, might lay down the rule that it is bad manners to speak of death, might substitute “hygienic” cremation for those horribly public funerals, and might call gravediggers “morticians.” The learned Professor [Ernst] Haeckel [the German naturalist] might hint broadly that Darwinian biology is just about to make us live permanently; but he did not make good his promise. And as long as death persists, man remains with one pole of his existence outside of society and outside of time. As long as death persists, the optimistic concept of life, the belief that eternity can be reached through time, and that the individual can fulfill himself in society can therefore have only one outcome: despair. There must come a point in the life of every man when he suddenly finds himself facing death. And at this point he is all alone; he is all individual. If he is lost, his existence
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becomes meaningless. [Danish philosopher and theologian Soren] Kierkegaard, who first diagnosed the phenomenon and predicted where it would lead to, called it the “despair at not willing to be an individual.” Superficially the individual can recover from this encounter with the problem of existence in eternity. He may even forget it for a while. But he can never regain his confidence in his existence in society: Basically he remains in despair. Society must thus attempt to make it possible for man to die if it wants him to be able to live exclusively in society. There is only one way in which society can do that: by making individual life itself meaningless. If you are nothing but a leaf on the tree, a cell in the body of society, then your death is not really a death; it is only a part of the life of the whole. You can hardly even talk of death; you better call it a process of collective regeneration. But then, of course, your life is not real life, either; it is just a functional process within the life of the whole, devoid of any meaning except in terms of the whole. Thus you can see what Kierkegaard saw clearly a hundred years ago: that the optimism of a creed that proclaims human existence as existence in society must lead straight to despair, and that the despair leads straight to totalitarianism. And you can also see that the essence of the totalitarian creed is not how to live, but how to die. To make death bearable, individual life has to be made worthless and meaningless. The optimistic creed that starts out by making life in this world mean everything leads straight to the Nazi glorification of self-immolation as the only act in which man can meaningfully exist. Despair becomes the essence of life itself. The nineteenth century thus reached the very point the pagan world had reached in the age of Euripides or in that of the late Roman Empire. And like antiquity, it tried to find a way out by escaping into the purely ethical, by escaping into virtue as the essence of human existence. Ethical Culture and that brand of
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liberal Protestantism that sees in Jesus the “best man ever lived,” the Golden Rule and Kant’s “Categorical Imperative,” the satisfaction of service—those and other formulations of an ethical concept of life became as familiar in the nineteenth century as most of them had been in antiquity. And they failed to provide a basis for human existence as much as they had failed 2,000 years ago. In its noblest adherents the ethical concept leads to a stoic resignation, which gives courage and steadfastness but does not give meaning either to life or to death. And its futility is shown by its reliance upon suicide as the ultimate remedy—though to the stoic, death is the end of everything and of all existence. Kierkegaard rightly considered this position to be one of even greater despair than the optimistic one; he calls it “the despair at willing to be an individual.” In most cases, however, the ethical position does not lead to anything as noble and as consistent as the Stoic philosophy. Normally it is nothing but sugarcoating on the pill of totalitarianism. Or the ethical position becomes pure sentimentalism—the position of those who believe that evil can be abolished, harmony be established by the spreading of sweetness, light, and goodwill. And in all cases the ethical position is bound to degenerate into our pure relativism. For if virtue is to be found in man, everything that is accepted by man must be virtue. Thus a position that starts out—as did Rousseau and Kant 175 years ago—to establish man-made ethical absolutes must end in John Dewey and in the complete denial of the possibility of an ethical position. This way, there is no escape from despair. Is it then our conclusion that human existence cannot be an existence in tragedy and despair? If so, then the sages of the East are right who see in the destruction of the self, in the submersion of man into the Nirvana, the nothingness, the only answer. Nothing could be further from Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard has an answer. Human existence is possible as existence not in
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despair, as existence not in tragedy—it is possible as existence in faith. The opposite of Sin—to use the traditional term for existence purely in society—is not virtue; it is faith. Faith is the belief that in God the impossible is possible, that in Him time and eternity are one, that both life and death are meaningful. In my favorite among Kierkegaard’s books, a little volume called Fear and Trembling [published in 1843], Kierkegaard raises the question: What is it that distinguishes Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, Isaac, from ordinary murder? If the distinction would be that Abraham never intended to go through with the sacrifice but intended all the time only to make a show of his obedience to God, then Abraham indeed would not have been a murderer, but he would have been something more despicable: a fraud and a cheat. If he had not loved Isaac but had been indifferent, he would have been willing to be a murderer. But Abraham was a holy man, and God’s command was for him an absolute command to be executed without reservation. And we are told that he loved Isaac more than himself. But Abraham had faith. He believed that in God the impossible would become possible, that he could execute God’s order and yet retain Isaac. If you looked into this little volume on Fear and Trembling, you may have seen from the introduction of the translator that it deals symbolically with Kierkegaard’s innermost secret, his great and tragic love. When he talks of himself, then he talks of Abraham. But this meaning as a symbolic autobiography is only incidental. The true, the universal meaning is that human existence is possible, only possible, in faith. In faith, the individual becomes the universal, ceases to be isolated, becomes meaningful and absolute; hence in faith there is a true ethic. And in faith existence in society becomes meaningful too as existence in true charity. This faith is not what today so often is called a “mystical experience”—something that can apparently be induced by the
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proper breathing exercises, by fasting, by narcotic drugs or by prolonged exposure to Bach with closed eyes and closed ears. It is something that can be attained only through despair, through tragedy, through long, painful, and ceaseless struggle. It is not irrational, sentimental, emotional, or spontaneous. It comes as the result of serious thinking and learning, of rigid discipline, of complete sobriety, absolute will. It is something few can attain; but all can—and should—search for it. This is as far as I can go. If you want to go further, if you want to know about the nature of religious experience, about the way to it, about faith itself, you have to read Kierkegaard. Even so, you may say that I have tried to lead you further than I know the road myself. You may reproach me for trying to make Kierkegaard accept society as real and meaningful whereas he actually repudiated it. You may even say that I have failed in relating faith to existence in society. All these complaints would be justified, but I would not be very much disturbed by them—at least not as far as the purpose of this talk is concerned. For all I wanted to show you is the possibility that we have a philosophy that enables men to die. Do not underestimate the strength of such a philosophy. For in a time of great sorrow and catastrophe such as we have to live through, it is a great thing to be able to die. But it is not enough. Kierkegaard too enables men to die; but his faith also enables them to live. From a lecture delivered at Bennington College, where Drucker had joined the faculty in 1942.
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The Myth of the State 1947
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he word myth is a very queer word. If you look it up in the dictionary, you will find it defined as “a tale, a fabrication, usually invoking the supernatural to explain natural phenomena.” This definition is literally correct, or at least as correct as a dictionary definition can hope to be. You can test it for yourself; just see how neatly it fits the “myth of the state” we’re going to talk about tonight. And yet the rhetorical emphasis on the definition and its propagandistic aim are the exact opposite of what we today usually mean when we talk about the myth. What the standard definition conveys is that myth is a silly superstition, an old wives’ tale. At best, it is tolerated as a harmless flight of fancy, as an ornament, a glittering trinket for children or for the leisure hours of the tired businessman. At worst, it is condemned as the invention of unscrupulous quacks—greedy priests, power-hungry demagogues, ruthless capitalists—who use it to frighten the gullible, uneducated, and stupid into submission and tribute. Now, I am not saying that myth cannot be abused or misused—in fact, in talking about the myth of the state the main questions are precisely: What is the proper, the right use of the myth? And what is demagogic, obscurantist, tyrannical misuse? But when we use the term myth, we are nevertheless not talking about a superstition or an old wives’ tale. We talk about some[
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thing that is real, rational, and true: the symbolical expression of an experience common to all men. The radical change in the connotation of the term means a radical change in basic philosophical concepts and beliefs and, above all, in the concept of human nature. It’s a shift from a philosophy that sees man as reason, with the rest of his being— body, emotion, experience—either as an illusion or a weakness, to a philosophical position which again attempts to see all of man, that is, to see a being. The myth, as even the extreme eighteenth-century rationalists saw, deals with experience. It deals with what we know, not with what we can deduce or prove. Experience is not reason; it is experience. To the Cartesian rationalist and to his successor, the German idealist philosopher, reality, truth, and validity existed only in reason, and reason could only be applied to what was in reason to begin with. There was no bridge from the truth of reason to the illusions and phantasma of experience. Experience was not just nonrational; it was irrational. And the myth was worse: It was a lie. Every myth attempts to present the nonrational experience in a form in which reason can go to work on it. And that, to the rationalist or idealist, is, from his point of view, the worst crime; it is a dishonesty, which can only have the purpose of enslaving reason. The moment, however, we see man again as a being—as a creature that has existence rather than as an isolated particle of reason—the myth becomes central. The myth symbolizing it opens experience to reason. It makes it possible for reason to understand and to analyze our experience, to criticize, direct, and change our reaction to experience. Instead of being irrational, the myth is seen as a great rationalizer—the bridge between experience and reason. The myth makes it possible for our reason to order experience in a rational, meaningful way—that is, it makes possible the rit-
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ual. It enables our reason to direct and to determine our reaction to experience. By making us understand what it is we know from our experience, it makes possible action, which is our term for movement directed by reason, when otherwise there would only have been superstition. Without the myth, we would be slaves to panic; the myth enables man to walk upright; it liberates his reason from the nameless terror of the incomprehensible outside and in. It is because it is so real, so central, so potent, that I say, “Beware of the Myth.” Because it is the basis of all ritual and of all institutions, it is all-important that it be a true myth, truly interpreted. For a false myth, or one that is interpreted falsely, is the most vicious, the most destructive thing we know. But you may ask, how can a myth be true or false? Isn’t it an open contradiction to apply such philosophical or ethical value terms to experience? But the myth is not just experience; it is the symbolical expression of experience, which means that the myth itself is already a product of our consciousness, of our reason, of our beliefs, the product of a decision as to what is relevant in our experience and what our experience actually means. And this applies with even greater force to the interpretation of the myth—that is, to ritual and action. You can say that any myth is a valid myth if it has stood the pragmatic test, the test of time. It could not have survived unless it expressed in a plausible symbol an experience common to the human species. The myth always raises the right questions, always registers the right seismic disturbances, but it does not by necessity give the right answers. In fact, it gives no answers at all. The answers are given by our interpretation of the myth and of the experience it expresses; they are given, in brief, by philosophy and theology, the two disciplines that are exclusively concerned with the analysis, interpretation, and critique of the basic myth. These answers may be right, but they may also be
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wrong, depending upon the principles, methods, and aims of the philosopher and theologian. All this, as you may now have realized, has been by way of introduction to my assignment tonight, to speak on the “Myth of the State.” The people who first talked of the state as a myth did not understand the term to mean what I make it mean. On the contrary, by calling the state a myth they meant to say that there really is no such thing as a state, that there are only individuals existing by themselves, and that it is a lie and worse to pretend that there is a state. Nevertheless, the state is a true myth in the sense in which I have been using the term. The experience of belonging to a group, the experience that the group is real, has existence and has definite qualities and, you might even say, has a body, is one every one of us has had. And we also know, beyond rational proof and beyond contradiction, that there are situations in which this phenomenon we call “group” has more reality and more life than the individual, situations in which the individual is willing to die so that the group may live. You may try to explain this phenomenon rationally and develop the state from the biological necessity of the family to care for infant and nursing mother, or from the utilitarian principle that half a loaf is better than no bread at all. But you won’t get very far this way. Certainly you could not explain rationally that central political experience, the experience we call “allegiance.” You can only deny that there is such a basic experience, that there is anything but the individual—but that makes little more sense than to deny any other basic experience, such as that of our senses; it also makes you incapable of any political effectiveness and action. If you are in politics, you must accept the reality of the organized group as a basic experience of man’s life. You must accept the myth of the state as a real myth, as a symbolical expression of a genuine experience, common to all of us.
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And it is a real myth, according even to the dictionary definition I gave you at the beginning: “a tale, a fabrication, invoking the supernatural to explain a natural phenomenon.” We may not consciously personify the state as supernatural, though the process that gave us the person of Uncle Sam and the symbolism of the flag is probably not so very different from that that gave our ancestors the corn goddess or the sacred oak of Dodona. But even without the externals of personification, we see the state as a supernatural being. We endow it with immortality and, though we cannot see it, we give it reality and effectiveness, which means that we give it the invisible body of the supernatural. All this, however, does not mean, as the rationalists thought, that we deal with a mere superstition, which dissolves before the light of logic and reason. It means, on the contrary, that we are up against a reality and that the myth alone makes it possible for us to deal with it rationally. It makes no sense, then, to question whether there is a state or whether there should be one. The very fact that we have the myth of the state shows that the only question that is meaningful is: What myth should we have, and how should we interpret it, to have a true myth and a true state? Often the answers have been given in an indirect form—that is, by changing the title of the myth, by putting a different term for state: tribe, polis, society, law, nation, race, etc. Of course, each new title starts out with a different meaning and is brought in with a definite propagandistic purpose. But very soon the same old questions come up in connection with the new title, which, to answer once and for all, the new title had been devised for. Hence we have always been forced to do the job the hard way: by working out the answers ourselves. This job of working out the answers has been the central, perhaps the only problem of political philosophy over the ages. Therefore, I can hardly be expected to give you the solution in the few minutes left to me tonight.
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But there seem to me to be implicit in the fact that it is a myth certain absolute prerequisites for a true interpretation of the myth of the state. First, the organized group is undoubtedly a reality, not a fiction, an elementary experience, not something deduced, derived, or secondary. Man is by nature a social animal, a “zoon politikon” [Aristotle’s term for a social or political creature]. He does not exist except in the group. Any interpretation of the myth that does not accept this seems to me prima facie invalid and untrue, and likely to lead to untold harm. But secondly, the very fact that we have a myth of the state— that is, that we can rationalize our experience—also shows that man is not all political animal, and that his existence is not described or circumscribed by his belonging to the group. Ants and bees are as much social animals as man. An ant or a bee can even overthrow the ruler of the swarm and establish his own rulership. But only man can change the basic order of the group itself, only man has the myth of the state. Hence man is also and always not a political animal that exists in the group; he also and always exists outside the group as an individual. Finally, the myth of the state expresses always the nonbelonging, the nonallegiance to all the other groups. It establishes a group ritual, it leads to group action, but at the same time it excludes from group ritual and opposes group action. Yet the very fact that it is universal myth expressing an experience common to all men—black, brown, and white, American, Russian, or Hottentot—shows conclusively that, as in all other essential experiences of human existence, we are alike in our political experience. No myth of the state, I submit, could be a true myth or be truly interpreted unless it expressed the fact of separation of group from group. But no myth of the state could be a true one unless it also expressed our common humanity. In fine, the myth of the state, to be a true myth, truly interpreted, has to express
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symbolically the polarity of human existence. And, in the last analysis, to express symbolically that man is a dual being by his nature—animal and individual at the same time—is the basic purpose of all myth. From a lecture delivered at Bennington College.
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PART II
1950s
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usiness historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr. has described the 1950s as a “Golden Age of Capitalism” in which big American companies fueled economic growth by exploiting “new knowledge-intensive as well as capital-intensive technologies in chemistry, pharmaceuticals, aircraft, and electronics.” One can easily add to that list another innovation of the era: management. And more than anyone, it was Peter Drucker who showed the way. His 1954 book, The Practice of Management, became the guide to which countless executives turned in order to master the basics: “What is our business and what should it be?” “Management by objectives and self-control.” “The spirit of an organization.” “Motivating to peak performance.” Years later, management scholar Jim Collins would note that when he dug into the backgrounds of “visionary companies” such as General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble, Hewlett-Packard, Merck, and Motorola, he discovered Drucker’s “intellectual fingerprints” everywhere. “David Packard’s notes and speeches from the foundation years at HP so mirrored Drucker’s writings,” Collins said, “that I conjured an image of Packard giving management sermons with a classic Drucker text in hand.” Drucker himself said that, after 10 years of consulting and teaching, he was simply filling a void with The Practice of Management. Nothing like it existed. “So I kind of sat down and wrote it, very conscious of the fact that I was laying the foundations of a discipline.” By the end of the decade, Drucker had also coined a new term: “knowledge worker.” And he would spend the rest of his days contemplating the ways in which knowledge had supplanted land, labor, and capital as “the one critical factor of production.”
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3
The Problems of Maintaining Continuous and Full Employment 1957
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here are three major forces in an industrial economy today that exert pressure toward making employment continuous and stable:
s 4HE lRST IS SOCIAL PRESSURE ESPECIALLY THROUGH ORGANIZED TRADE unions. Some suggest that it is natural that the worker should GIVE STABLE EMPLOYMENT lRST PLACE AMONG HIS CARES AND HOPES )N THE 5NITED 3TATES THIS IS A CONSIDERABLE OVERSTATEMENT SUCH THINGS AS WAGE LEVELS WORKING HOURS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR advancement are likely to rank as high among the “care and hopes” of many workers in this country as does stable emPLOYMENT !ND WHILE hNATURAL v STABLE EMPLOYMENT IS A RECENT CONCERN OF THE WORKER /NLY YEARS AGO WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN GIVEN hlRST PLACE v AND STABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT MIGHT A GENERATION AGO NOT HAVE BEEN AMONG THE CONSCIOUS CARES OF THE WORKER AT ALL 7E FACE IN OTHER WORDS A BASIC CHANGE IN THE GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS OF the worker in industrial society—and perhaps a change that offers opportunities as well as challenges of management. s 4HE NEXT MAJOR PRESSURE TOWARD MAINTAINING CONTINUOUS AND STABLE EMPLOYMENT IS MODERN PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY BOTH [
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in manufacturing and in distribution. The trend toward the HIGHLY CAPITALIZED PLANT OR STORE SHARPLY LIMITS THE ADAPTability of productive facilities to short-term fluctuations in DEMAND 3PECIlCALLY A LARGER AND LARGER PART OF THE WORKFORCEWHETHER RANK AND lLE OR MANAGERIAL TECHNICAL OR professional—has to be kept on regardless of the volume of PRODUCTION AS LONG AS THE FACILITY ITSELF IS BEING OPERATED AT ALL ,ABOR COSTS IN OTHER WORDS ARE RAPIDLY MOVING FROM THE CATEGORY OF hVARIABLEv TO THAT OF hlXEDv s &INALLYAND IN THE LONG RUN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEment in this situation—business increasingly employs people WHO ARE HIGHLY TRAINED AND WHO DO TECHNICAL PROFESSIONAL AND managerial work. Rapidly the workforce is shifting from beING COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF MANUAL WORKERS WHETHER SKILLED OR UNSKILLED TO BEING LARGELY COMPOSED OF PEOPLE WHO WORK by knowledge. This workforce represents increasingly years of training and development within the enterprise itself. It increasingly brings to bear on its work what is often literally irREPLACEABLE KNOWLEDGE EXPERIENCE AND SKILLS 4HE INVESTMENT in the training and development of these men—though hidden by our traditional accounting concepts—is often higher than the capital in machines and tools invested per man. The ENTERPRISE CANNOT EASILY ACCEPT THE DISPERSION OF THIS ITS MAJOR CAPITAL RESOURCE /N THE CONTRARY IT MUST INCREASINGLY TRY TO maintain this capital resource together and in its own employMENT &OR