The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending, and Policy-Making

The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality

This book explores the discursive constructions of gender equality and the implications of these understandings in a broad range of policy fields. Using gender equality as a prime example, this book offers a new vocabulary to identify and study processes of the reduction, amplification, shifting or freezing of meaning. The main aim of the book is to understand the dynamics of such discursive politics and to reflect on the consequences of discursive politics in recent policymaking on gender equality. It explores both the potential opportunities that are opened up for the promotion of equality through discursive politics and the limitations they impose. Distinctive features of the volume include:

s s s

chapters covering a range of case studies in Europe and the USA, tackling contemporary political debates on equality; contributions from a number of internationally renowned scholars including Carol Bacchi, Myra Marx-Ferree and Sylvia Walby; new insights of relevance to public policy practices such as gender mainstreaming, with theorizing on intersecting inequalities.

The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, public policy, comparative politics, gender and women studies. Emanuela Lombardo is Ramón y Cajal researcher at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Madrid Complutense University, Spain. Petra Meier is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Antwerp University, Belgium. Mieke Verloo is Professor in Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

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Edited by Luís de Sousa, Barry Hindess and Peter Larmour 56 Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments Edited by Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit 57 Political Parties and Partisanship Social identity and individual attitudes Edited by John Bartle and Paolo Belucci 58 The Future of Political Community Edited by Gideon Baker and Jens Bartelson 59 The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality Stretching, bending and policymaking Edited by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier, Mieke Verloo

ALSO AVAILABLE FROM ROUTLEDGE IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE ECPR: 1

Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe Edited by Frances Gardiner

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Private Groups and Public Life Edited by Jan W. van Deth

2

Democracy and Green Political Thought Edited by Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus

6

The Political Context of Collective Action Edited by Ricca Edmondson

3

The New Politics of Unemployment Edited by Hugh Compston

7

Theories of Secession, Edited by Percy Lehning;

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Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe Edited by Percy B. Lehning and Albert Weale

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Regionalism Across the North/ South Divide Edited by Jean Grugel and Wil Hout

The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality Stretching, bending and policymaking

Edited by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2009 Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier, Mieke Verloo selection and editorial matter; individual contributors, their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The discursive politics of gender equality : stretching, bending, and policy-making / edited by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier, Mieke Verloo. p. cm. – (Routledge/ECPR studies in European political science; 59) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Sex discrimination–Government policy–Europe. 2. Sex discrimination against women–Government policy–Europe. I. Lombardo, Emanuela. II. Meier, Petra. III. Verloo, Mieke, 1950– HQ1237.5.E85D58 2009 305.42094–dc22 2008038093

ISBN 0-203-88133-8 Master e-book ISBN

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Contents

List of tables List of contributors Series editor’s preface Foreword Acknowledgements 1 Stretching and bending gender equality: a discursive politics approach

xi xii xiv xvi xviii

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EMANUELA LOMBARDO, PETRA MEIER AND MIEKE VERLOO

2 The issue of intentionality in frame theory: the need for reflexive framing

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CAROL BACCHI

3 Beyond the politics of location: the power of argument in gender equality politics

36

SYLVIA WALBY

4 Stretching and bending the meanings of gender in equality policies

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VLASTA JALUŠIý

5 Stretching gender equality to other inequalities: political intersectionality in European gender equality policies

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EMANUELA LOMBARDO AND MIEKE VERLOO

6 Inequality, intersectionality and the politics of discourse: framing feminist alliances MYRA MARX FERREE

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Contents 7 Bending towards growth: discursive constructions of gender equality in an era of governance and neoliberalism

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MALIN RÖNNBLOM

8 Trading-in gender equality: gendered meanings in EU trade policy

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JACQUI TRUE

9 Stretching, bending and inconsistency in policy frames on gender equality: discursive windows of opportunity?

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EMANUELA LOMBARDO AND PETRA MEIER

10 Grounding policy evaluation in a discursive understanding of politics

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MARÍA BUSTELO AND MIEKE VERLOO

11 The discursive logic of ranking and benchmarking: understanding gender equality measures in the European Union

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MIEKE VERLOO AND ANNA VAN DER VLEUTEN

12 Conclusions: a critical understanding of the discursive politics of gender equality

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EMANUELA LOMBARDO, PETRA MEIER AND MIEKE VERLOO

Index

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Tables

5.1 5.2

Overview of codes referring to intersectionality broken down by country and the EU Overview of codes referring to intersectionality broken down by issue

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Contributors

Carol Bacchi is Professor of Politics at the School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide (Australia), and co-Chief Investigator of a research project on gender analysis. She has recently written an undergraduate text introducing a ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ approach to policy analysis. María Bustelo is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the Complutense University, Madrid (Spain). She leads the European QUING project team at her university, and has a number of publications on analysis and evaluation of gender equality policies. Vlasta Jalušiþ is Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Institute, Ljubljana, and Associate Professor of Political Theory and Gender Studies at Ljubljana University (Slovenia). She has written books, articles and chapters on gender and feminism, Eastern European politics and transition, war, violence, and Hannah Arendt. Emanuela Lombardo is Ramón y Cajal researcher at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Madrid Complutense University, and researcher in the European QUING and TARGET projects. Her research and publications concern theoretical and empirical aspects of gender equality policies in Europe. Myra Marx Ferree is Martindale-Bascom Professor of Sociology and Co-Principal investigator on the TARGET (Transnational Applied Research in Gender Equality Training) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (United States). Her work focuses on women’s movements, political discourse and feminist theory in the social sciences. Petra Meier is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). Her research and publications focus on theoretical and empirical approaches of gender relations in political decision-making and in gender equality policies. Malin Rönnblom has a PhD in Political Science and works as an Associate Professor at the Umeå Centre for Gender Studies, Umeå University (Sweden).

Contributors

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Her research and publications focus on gender equality policy, regional policy, women’s movement and feminist methodologies. Jacqui True is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland (New Zealand). She is author of Gender, Globalization and Postsocialism (Columbia 2003) and co-author of Theories of International Relations (Palgrave 2009) and Feminist Methodologies for International Relations (Cambridge 2006). Anna van der Vleuten is Associate Professor of European Integration at the Institute for Management Research of Radboud University, Nijmegen (the Netherlands). Her main areas of research are EU gender equality policies, comparative regionalism (EU, Mercosur, ASEAN and SADC) and gender. Mieke Verloo is Professor in Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at Radboud University, Nijmegen (the Netherlands), and Scientific Director of the QUING project at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna (Austria), working primarily on political dynamics of gender and other inequalities. Sylvia Walby is the UNESCO Chair in Gender Research and a Professor in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University (United Kingdom). She leads the intersectionality work in QUING comparing gender equality across the EU; and a project measuring inequality for the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission.

Series editor’s preface

There can be little doubt that gender equality has been one of the dominant themes of the politics of the past decades. To be sure, much has been achieved. The new women’s movement in Western societies has accomplished significant improvements when it comes to the role of women in politics, in the labour market and in society in general. While most cabinets in the 1960s would, at most, have one woman in their team – and usually in charge of a ‘typically female’ portfolio such as family or health care – women in senior political position have become normality. Other sections of modern society, however, have been more resilient. The top echelons of international business and banking are still an almost exclusively male domain, and the same is true for the top layers of higher education. Furthermore, these accomplishments have been limited largely to modern, Western-style democracies while fairly little has changed elsewhere. Yet, even there this brief list is likely to provoke objections as it reflects, as many will argue, a far too narrow concept of gender equality in that it is limited to the role of women instead of taking a more comprehensive view of gender relations. These brief remarks indicate that gender equality is still a hotly contested concept and the precise meaning of it remains subject to continuous change and, as a result, to political struggle. These ongoing – and contested – changes are the theme of the current volume, which analyses the underlying mechanisms and implications of shifts in the meaning of gender equality. To be sure, several meanings have co-existed throughout the history of the women’s movement, and these meanings have always carried different political and, more broadly, societal ambitions and ideals. As the editors write in their introductory chapter, the central ambition of this book is to understand ‘why and how gender equality does alter its meaning’, and they concentrate mainly on two perspectives in their analysis. First, stretching the concept of gender equality implies that it may be broadened to the degree that it can be in danger of losing some of its substantive meaning. Second, bending it may result in using the goal of gender equality in order to justify and legitimize goals that are, at best, partially related to it. Yet, it is far from agreed what the ‘correct’ meaning of gender equality is – or should be! In the first instance, the concept consists actually of two concepts – gender and equality – both of which are, of course, subject to controversy.

Series editor’s preface

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Analytically, the solution is to treat gender equality as an open concept that can – and has been – filled with various meanings. In practical politics, this has ranged from measures to improve female representation in politics, attempts to improve childcare, equal opportunity rules for the labour market to attempts to fundamentally transform gender relations. These few examples indicate the range of goals and policies that can be subsumed under gender equality, and it is not least the result of discursive struggles which policies are eventually pursued. After all, framing precedes political practice. Several chapters explore the relationship between the framing of political issues and policymaking. Inevitably, this involves fixing a specific meaning, even if this may entail the risk of temporarily choosing a static approach. However, as the editors point out in their concluding chapter, ‘fixing does not necessarily involve freezing it, as long as this meaning is under continuous observation and reflection’. The current volume reminds us that gender equality is a continuous process that may proceed at different paces across time and space. Also, there is no fixed endpoint. Rather, it is subject to continuous debate and political struggle, and this volume marks an important contribution to understanding the logics of such struggles. Thomas Poguntke, Series Editor Bochum, August 2008

Foreword Judith Squires

At a time when the pursuit of gender equality is more widely endorsed as a central policy goal by governments and international organizations around the world than ever before, it is particularly important to pause and reflect upon the dynamics of the discursive framing of ‘gender equality’ itself. Rather than straightforwardly assuming that gender inequality is a ‘real’ social problem that has been revealed and which now requires appropriate forms of policy intervention, we are enjoined by the contributors to this timely and thought-provoking collection to acknowledge that gender equality policies both reflect particular discursively constructed realities and construct the subjects that they address. When policy is understood as discourse, our attention is drawn not only to the processes that constitute something as an object of policy, but also to the political significance of what remains unproblematized. It invites us to explore how policymakers and policy subjects are produced, and how this makes particular practices possible. It also challenges us to consider whether discourses, which are neither immutable nor unchanging, can be subject to contestation, which, in turn, demands that we confront issues of agency and ponder the extent to which subjects are able to intervene in discourses, using them strategically as rhetorical tools, or are entirely situated within discourse. For feminists, the adoption of a discursive approach to policy analysis raises an additional challenge in that the approach appears to compel relativism, unsettling the moral authority of feminist evaluations of the adequacy of differing policy frames by locating feminist understandings as merely alternative discursive frames. The challenges of understanding gender equality policies from a discursive frame are addressed head-on in this collection. The contributors offer theoretically innovative and empirically rich accounts of the various ways in which gender equality has been constituted as an object of policy, in ways that both facilitate certain policy interventions and close off others. Perhaps not surprisingly, what preoccupy the contributors are the limitations of the dominant discursive framings of gender equality, with the constraining rather than the enabling effects of gender equality policies generating most attention. The introduction of the categories of ‘stretching, bending, shrinking, and fixing’ by the editors Lombardo, Meier and Verloo offers a particularly useful framework from which to analyse the processes by which discursive frames are

Foreword xvii constituted, highlighting the extent to which ‘gender equality’ is always inevitably discursively constituted as a policy problem in relation to other, frequently more well-entrenched, policy discourses. This insight will be invaluable for future policy analysis, providing a framework within which gender equality policy analysts can systematically explore the relation between, for example, the policy discourses of gender equality and economic growth. It might also facilitate increased attention among feminist scholars to the ways in which other less well-entrenched policy issues may equally be bent or perhaps stretched to fit in with pre-existing fixed gender equality discourses, possibly facilitating but also constraining the subjects of these discourses in ways that merit scrutiny. For one of the real strengths of this collection is the extent to which it demands that feminist researchers acknowledge that they too articulate discourses that both facilitate and constrain, constituting ‘gender equality’ in particular ways via their own claims-making. This call for greater reflexivity is compelling, reminding us that feminist critiques of dominant gender equality policy discourses must themselves avoid the degree of fixity that results in depoliticization. Collectively, the contributors to this collection show us that discourses, however well-entrenched, can and should be subject to contestation, but that those contesting dominant discourses need to remain sensitive to the limitations of their own discursive frames.

Acknowledgements

This book originated from the encounters of a community of scholars from Europe, the United States, Australia and New Zealand who work on the topic of ‘discursive politics’ and who are specialized in the field of gender equality politics. During the last five years, the authors and editors of this volume have met periodically at international conferences such as those organized by the European Consortium for Political Research, the International Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association, institutions that we wish to thank for the impulse they gave to our book. Some of the researchers work together in projects on gender equality policies, for whose generous funding we wish to thank the European Commission (Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission and Atlantis EU–US POM). From the debates we maintained in these different settings, an initiative arose to ‘materialize’ the existence of this research community and to work jointly on a book on the issue of gender equality policies as explored through a discursive approach. For her creative idea of ‘stretching and bending gender equality’ and for her comments on the book proposal, we are indebted to Anna van der Vleuten, to whom we wish to express our greatest thanks. Knowledge production is always the result of collective thinking and, in this particular case, we would like to acknowledge the team members of European research projects that we are or were involved in, such as MAGEEQ (Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe), QUING (Quality in gender equality policies) and TARGET (Transnational applied research in gender equity training), and the members of the ECPR standing group on Gender and Politics. With all of them, we have shared stimulating discussions on gender equality policy and frame analysis, and exchanged ideas that have converged in this book. It was a pleasure to work with professional, kind people such as our editorial team at Routledge, Heidi Bagtazo, Thomas Poguntke, Amelia McLaurin and Lucy Dunne, all of whom we wish to thank. We are also grateful to Judith Squires for kindly agreeing to write the foreword, to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on our book proposal, and to Florian Duijsens for his thorough proofreading. We thank Sage Publications for their kind permission to publish a slightly revised version of Sylvia Walby’s article ‘The politics of location’ (Feminist Theory, 2000, 1: 189–206). In addition, Emanuela Lombardo is grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science for funding her research through the 2006 Ramón y

Acknowledgements xix Cajal Program, to Eduardo Jáuregui for keeping up her sense of humour while editing the book, and to Adriana and Franco for reminding her not to overstretch herself through work. Petra Meier would like to thank Timon, Florian and Myra for reminding her of the importance of picnics, and Nicolas De Breuck for being such a nice person to live with. Mieke Verloo would like to multiply the thanks to everyone and extend them to her co-editors Petra Meier and Emanuela Lombardo. We hope that the ideas that we have brought together in this book will flourish and prosper. Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo

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Stretching and bending gender equality A discursive politics approach1 Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo

Introduction Gender equality has become widely accepted as a political goal over the last decades, and many countries and transnational institutions have committed themselves to this objective. Conventions have been signed, special bureaucracies and new political and administrative positions created, new policy and legal instruments developed and installed, and progress monitored in newly produced indices and rankings. While this might suggest a unity of meaning, gender equality has actually been hotly contested, been expressed by many different words and undergone various changes as a travelling concept in this global process. Grasping its specific changes in meaning but, more importantly, understanding why and how gender equality does alter its meaning, and thinking through why it matters what its meaning is, are the main ambitions of this book. We contend that, while it does matter greatly what meaning is attached to the concept of gender equality, the pros and cons of various meanings are not so clear-cut. This book therefore carefully explores what happens in these processes of change, and how we can improve our understanding of these changes. In its journeys through times and places – from the twentieth to the twentyfirst century, across different national borders, amidst different policy actors, at both institutional and non-institutional levels and across a variety of national and international organizations – the concept of gender equality is labelled differently. Scholars and political actors have tried to capture the various ways in which gender equality is understood, but they have also attempted to prioritize one meaning over another. While several terms designating gender equality are used in theory and practice, the various labels are seldom clearly distinguishable. Across countries, the label used can be equal opportunity or the promotion or advancement of women, but also emancipation, equality or empowerment of women, to give a few examples. While all these labels can be linked back to theoretical and political debates that articulate them as different forms of each other, research and practice show that what is labelled equal opportunity in one context can be very similar to what is called empowerment in another, while the content of similar labels can diverge tremendously. Labels matter, but they can be a misleading feature in understanding the content and strategy of gender equality policies.

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Also, as a political and policy concept, gender equality is frequently linked to other political and policy goals, adding yet another layer of meaning. In the 1960s, the EU linked gender equality to (un)fair competition, in the 1970s and 1980s to combating unemployment, in the 1990s to the Lisbon criteria of full employment and the knowledge economy and, most recently, to fighting discrimination and promoting diversity. The United Nations have connected it with development and demography, the International Labour Organization with ‘decent work’. Individual countries have associated it with civil rights or labour market conditions. Moreover, gender equality actually consists of two concepts – gender and equality – that have acquired meaning related to aspects of gender (for instance, division of labour, sexual difference, reproductive relations), but also related to aspects of equality (for example, class, race/ethnicity). In this sense, gender equality is a concept that is part of the multidimensional reality of equality, a term that is open to contestation of its meaning as much as gender is. The travelling nature of the concept of gender equality implies pros and cons for the gender struggle itself. To understand these, it is important to keep in mind that not only the content of gender equality travels, but also feminism as a form or process, meant as a practice of debate and struggle (among women mostly) over the different meanings of gender equality or feminism (Davis 2002; Schmidt-Gleim and Verloo 2003; Lombardo and Verloo 2009). During the travelling process, feminism as a form or process enables the articulation of a wider set of meanings of the concept that may include many different women’s positions. As Davis (2002) argues in her story of global feminism, what travelled well in the specific project of gender equality was the method of letting women talk and share their own experience and knowledge on the issue of body politics. When travelling across different contextual and conceptual borders, gender equality as a form of feminism sets in motion different debates that may have unpredictable consequences for the political gender struggle. In particular, they may trigger a multiplicity of (feminist) practices that take place in different contextual locations, continuously adapting ‘to the changing agendas and guises of the gender struggle’ (Schmidt-Gleim and Verloo 2003: 27). In this sense, the adaptation of gender equality in different directions could either serve the need to face the changing dynamics of gendered power relations or become co-opted for other political goals. The fact that the concept of gender equality has travelled so well across a variety of borders indicates that it is a concept open to contestation. It can encompass different meanings and therefore fit into a broad range of contexts, depending on how actors from these different contexts frame it. All this ‘travelling’, however, leaves its traces. The concept is always broadened, narrowed down or even submitted to other goals than that of gender equality to fit into existing policy frames. In each case, the changes in meaning are strongly connected to the political positions that are taken and the ideological strands (feminist or other) that are defended. These changes are the complex result of the activities of a wide range of actors who try to accommodate or co-opt other trends for their own purposes, or attempt to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, never fully able to steer the actual changes in their intended direction.

Stretching and bending gender equality 3 In this book, we explore the dynamics of a discursive construction of gender equality. We study how gender equality is fixed in different concepts, is stretched towards wider meanings or reduced to particular ones, according to the actors’ intentional or unintentional framing, and is bent to fit a variety of other goals. The main objective of the book is to understand the dynamics of discursive politics and to reflect on the possibilities and limitations of framing processes by exploring the opportunities that are opened up for the promotion of equality. The rest of this chapter sets out the main concepts, approaches and topics of the book. It introduces the different ways in which the meanings of gender equality are fixed, shrunk, stretched and bent in policy discourses. It links them to the underlying policy mechanisms and reflects on the possibilities and limitations of these discursive processes. It discusses gender equality as a continuously contested, open concept that can be filled with a variety of meanings. It theorizes discursive policies and framing processes. Finally, it attempts to set up an understanding of the discursive politics of gender equality, an issue to be picked up in the concluding chapter.

Shaping the meanings of gender equality The concepts of fixing, stretching, shrinking and bending define a process in between two moments through which the meaning of gender equality changes. Although this shaping process may open up opportunities for feminist achievements, it may also have unintended or intended negative consequences. In the process of shaping its meaning, the created definitions of gender equality can be fixed for some time. We do not use the term of fixing in the sense of repairing this meaning, but in the sense of freezing it temporarily. This freezing of its meaning is frequent, owing to attempts to define what is to be understood by gender equality. Fixing, then, is the result of a discursive struggle. The formal recognition of gender equality in legislation is a good example of when and how feminists stretched the existing frames on democracy and citizenship, and thereby reshaped the overall political opportunity structure for succeeding in their struggle. Feminist activists’ claims for gender equality in political decision-making – enshrined as parity democracy (France), gender democracy (Germany) or a balanced participation of men and women in decision-making (EU) – are more specific examples of such fixing of the meaning of gender equality. Fixing, in that case, is an achievement in the gender struggle, meaning that gender equality has been enshrined in legal or political documents and has become recognized as a no longer contested goal. The fixing of what is to be understood by gender equality also creates new opportunities. In many cases, the fixing of gender equality in numerical terms, through gender quotas, puts women into positions of political decision-making. Similarly, the fixing of goals with respect to gender equality in policy areas such as pension rights ensures that such problems receive attention and do not get overseen within broader attempts to reform the pension system. However, gender equality can also lose part of its dynamic when it is fixed to one particular understanding. This can be the case when a certain understanding is laid down in a text with a very authoritative status, e.g. the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

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Women (CEDAW), or when a certain understanding acquires an authoritative status through a process of negotiation, learning or diffusion, an example of which is the Council of Europe report on, and definition of, gender mainstreaming (Group of Specialists 1998; Verloo 2005a). The potential problem with fixing is the loss of reflexivity, as Bacchi puts it in this volume, the loss of awareness that the definition of what is to be understood by gender equality comprises but a partial understanding. Fixing might prevent reflexivity, which in its turn might deprive gender equality of a dynamic approach. If the concept of gender equality is pinned down to specific labels that might narrow down its content (Verloo 2005a), a shrinking of the concept of gender equality shapes the latter by reducing its meaning to something that is confined to a particular policy area or a specific interpretation of an issue. Gender equality can, for instance, be shrunk into non-discrimination in a strictly legal sense. Another typical example is the reduction of gender equality to equal opportunities for women and men in the labour market. Bacchi (1999) argues that most contemporary gender policies assume that women become equal to men when they have equal access to the labour market, which means that most provisions on gender equality target the area of employment or adopt a labour market perspective. Shrinking, then, and the same can go for fixing, often involves a simplification of social problems and of the required solutions. Reducing gender equality to a problem of labour market access and, for instance, improved reconciliation facilities allows for targeting child and other care infrastructure. While this enables a straightforward approach to the problem of reconciling paid and care work, and the concentration of resources in this sector, other aspects of gender inequality, let alone within the sphere of the labour market, are left aside. This becomes problematic once shrinking is inspired by a conscious choice to manage meagre resources, and effectively fixes gender equality more narrowly. Yet another example of a shrinking of the concept of gender equality can be seen in the already mentioned issue of gender inequality in politics, where it tends to be reduced, in policy and scholarly debates, to a problem of women’s political representation. This narrows the definition of the problem, as women’s quantitative representation is one of the many possible interpretations of the issue, and through its predominance in the debate leaves other relevant issues untouched, for instance, structural obstacles to women’s equal participation in politics, male domination and ‘all-male’ political networks, and the empowering role played by women’s political networks (Lombardo et al. 2007). Gender inequality in politics is also a good example of the relation between the shrinking and fixing of the concept of gender equality, on the one hand, and the question of depoliticization, on the other. The predominant framing of the issue of gender inequality in politics as ‘women’s political under-representation’ suffers from what Meier et al. (2005) have named the ‘benchmarking fallacy of women in political decision-making’. When the dominant focus of a gender equality issue is on increasing women’s numerical representation, there is a risk of depoliticizing the issue by suggesting that gender equality is a matter of achieving target figures rather than transforming power relations between men and women.

Stretching and bending gender equality 5 Stretching is the opposite of the processes involved in the shrinking of the meaning of gender equality. It points at the broadening of the concept of gender equality by developing a larger meaning that expands on its previous understanding in a given context. Stretching always incorporates more meanings of gender equality, and this extension can work in different directions. For instance, an initial definition of gender equality as non-discrimination can be broadened to include substantive equality, but stretching can also imply that a definition of substantive equality is to incorporate initiatives of equal opportunities. A good example of the stretching of gender equality can be found in Booth and Bennett’s (2002) definition of gender mainstreaming, which comprises a much larger array of actions than the definition put forward by the Council of Europe (Group of Specialists 1998), also including targeted actions. Both shrinking and stretching can reflect a lack of reflexivity, and reveal only a partial perspective on reality, but while shrinking tends to involve a reduction and simplification of gender equality, stretching often dilutes or blurs the previous meaning of gender equality. Stretching is also partly incited by the fact that gender equality ties together two independent – but interrelated – concepts, gender and equality. The multidimensional reality of equality incites stretching initiatives that extend the meaning of the concept, and this is a good example of where a tension between gender and equality can arise. Gender equality is a family member of other equality goals, and this can lead either to drawing borders between the different equality struggles or to stretching borders to readapt them in a more inclusive way (Walby 2005; Verloo 2006). In this sense, a stretching of the concept of gender equality to other inequalities may strengthen the struggle against different forms of inequality (Squires 2005). At the same time, the difficulties that public policies reveal as they stretch gender equality in order to address multiple forms of inequality are an important component of discursive processes, and need to be addressed (see Ferree and also Lombardo and Verloo in this volume). The last shaping of meanings that gender equality undergoes in policy discourses is bending, which mainly differs from the former shapings in its relation to the goal of gender equality. In the processes of fixing, shrinking and stretching, the goal of gender equality is firmly present. In the first two, the goal of gender equality is still central, even though it is often fragmented. In processes of stretching, the goal of gender equality might become one among many, but it is still central. Bending, on the contrary, is a process that shapes meaning at the expense of the goal of gender equality. Bending occurs when the concept of gender equality is adjusted to make it fit some other goal than the achievement of gender equality itself (on this also see the chapter by Lombardo and Verloo). The issue of reconciling paid and care work is an example of fixing, reducing or stretching gender equality when it is about the enabling of women to combine paid and care work. It becomes one of bending when the focus shifts to economic growth or demographic deficits. For instance, the framing of ‘family policies’ in the European Union (EU) over the last decade was at first connected with the idea of sharing tasks within the family. The need to share was a condition to create equal opportunities for women in the labour market, as can be found in the 1992 Council Recommendation on childcare. However, as

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Stratigaki (2004) argues, when this issue was later incorporated in the European employment strategies of the 1990s, it gradually shifted meaning from the goal of sharing to that of reconciling work and family life. The main accent was placed on the organization of labour, a shift that allowed the growing prioritization of competitiveness and the creation of employment. From an objective of gender equality, the issue of family policies was bent to become a purely market-oriented objective, which involved the reproduction and consolidation of women’s traditional roles as primary caregivers. Bending the concept of equality within the family to make it fit the dominant labour market agenda has contributed to degendering the issue, blocking gender equality goals such as the challenging of existing unequal gender roles within the family. In effect, reconciliation policies appear more focused on solving the problem of demographic decline and promoting economic development than progressing in gender equality (Meier et al. 2007). The reasons for actors to engage in bending initiatives can be multiple, such as, among others, legal constraints, available data or other resources, preferences of particular policy actors or resistances to the introduction of equality issues within the political environment. Bending the concept of gender equality can serve the need to strategically frame the issue in order to put it on the political agenda. Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2000), in their study on the application of gender mainstreaming in the European Commission, argue that gender advocates have strategically framed gender mainstreaming to make it fit the dominant frame of a given Directorate General (DG), in order to avoid potential resistance, particularly on the part of DGs such as ‘Competition’ and ‘Science, Research and Development’, which are more market oriented and less familiar with gender issues. Gender campaigners adopted this strategy to ‘sell’ gender mainstreaming to the most reluctant DGs ‘as an effective means to the ends pursued by policy makers, rather than as an overt challenge to those ends’, emphasizing the gains in ‘efficiency’ rather than equality they would derive from the introduction of gender in their policy areas (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000: 452–53). This had the advantage of introducing gender mainstreaming in departments that would probably have rejected the gender campaigners’ objective as such. While Pollack and Hafner-Burton’s rendering of the bending processes seems to emphasize the intentions of the actors involved too strongly (even if their choices might have been guided by implicit and intuitive, rather than explicit, strategic thinking), and seems to overlook the relevance of the relative power levels of the actors involved, their account is one of the best examples of research on the processes of bending gender equality. In its travels, the concept of gender equality grows out of different interpretations elaborated by a variety of institutional and civil society actors, following earlier tracks and understandings that have become dominant or embedded into common sense. The concept is labelled in different ways; it is institutionalized, mainstreamed or benchmarked. Be it intentional or not, for principled, practical or strategic reasons, gender equality concepts are thus fixed; they are shrunk within or stretched beyond particular labels and bent to fit particular policy frames. This makes the understanding of gender equality and the processes shaping its meaning a complex matter. In the concluding chapter, we will discuss the promises

Stretching and bending gender equality 7 and pitfalls of such discursive processes in an attempt to come to a critical understanding of discursive politics. Before analysing the theory of discursive politics that supports the argument of this introductory chapter, we need to focus on two important characteristics of the concept of gender equality: the openness of the concept in terms of its potential to be filled with a multiplicity of meanings and its contested character.

Gender equality as an open and contested concept Stretching and bending gender equality involves a certain openness of the concept. This refers to the fact that gender equality can be filled with a variety of meanings that arise from different political histories, contexts, struggles and debates. That is, gender equality is a concept open to interpretation and contestation by different actors. In particular, its contestation attributes meanings to the concept. This brings us to the theoretical discussion on ‘contested concepts’. There are slight differences among those who use the idea, but the main argument is that concepts have no fixed or essential meaning, yet are shaped by political goals and intentions, even if the processes and dynamics need not necessarily be intentional (see for instance Bacchi 1996). Gender equality is a contested concept in the sense that it is discursively constructed in particular ways that are not to be understood as fixed achievements that cannot be challenged. Examples of these ‘fixed achievements’ are the strategies and tools devised to achieve gender equality, such as mainstreaming or positive actions. These fixed achievements are to be seen as specific ways of labelling gender equality in a particular moment. Indeed, the labels through which we fix gender equality are necessary to produce results at all. Still, these labels are subject to ongoing change due to the dynamics of the gender struggle itself and the continuous emergence of challenging positions, which can take different forms, among which are feminist ones, in all their diversity (see Schmidt-Gleim and Verloo 2003). Treating gender equality as a contested concept, however, appears to be a difficult task even for feminist scholars and activists. Scholarly and activist work on gender equality often seems to suggest that there is a standard way to define the concept, a standard representing the norm to be followed. This is evident in discussions on the intrinsic meaning of gender equality and the goals to be achieved through it, for instance with respect to the strategy of gender mainstreaming and its fulfilments. As we argue elsewhere (Lombardo and Meier 2008), the concept of gender equality has, broadly speaking, evolved from its original, legalistic approach based on equal rights to equal opportunities supported by positive action and, finally, to gender mainstreaming, an approach that has the potential to expand thinking about the structural and institutional causes of inequality, and to involve men more closely in the measures planned to achieve gender equality. We could also say that the idea that there is ‘a’ meaning has remained stable, even as this meaning has continuously changed through contestations within feminism, which are shaped by a political dynamic between more and less powerful feminist voices.2 We realize that we, as researchers, are also contesting the meaning of gender equality

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by analysing interpretations of gender equality or offering interpretations that we think might have better outcomes. This suggestion of a norm for the definition of gender equality can also be assumed from the central topic of this book. If the concept of gender equality can be stretched, shrunk and bent, does this not mean that we assume that it has an original or intrinsic meaning? Or at least that we – as authors of this chapter – have a particular form in mind? The easy answer to this would be that our discursive understanding of gender equality only implies a previously existing meaning, and not necessarily an original one, nor an understanding that some meanings would be better than others. However, such an answer would deny our own normative assumptions about the need for a broader concept of gender equality, one that takes into account the structural causes of gender inequality and seeks to answer them through a transformative and empowering approach (see Lombardo and Meier 2006). Our understanding of gender equality takes into account the pervasive character of gender inequality as something that is present in all domains of reality and that intersects with other complex inequalities, the existence of structural obstacles to gender equality, the need to transform power relations between women and men and the empowerment of women (see Walby 1990, 2008; Verloo 2005a, 2006). This means that we carry our own, implicit or explicit, normative assumptions about the criteria to assess the shaping of the meaning of gender equality, and thus see some interpretations of gender equality as more limited than others, compared with our own more or less explicitly defined concept of gender equality, which we think might produce better outcomes. However, our interest in this book is in what happens to the concept of gender equality during the processes in which policy actors engage in conceptual disputes to assign meanings to concepts. Our focus is on the processes of fixing, stretching, shrinking and bending through which this contestation occurs, and on the consequences of these processes. Within this perspective, we, as feminist scholars and activists, will also reflect on our own attitudes towards gender equality as a contested concept. When feminists engage in debates concerning the concept of gender equality, related gender policy problems or equality strategies that should be adopted or improved, they bring into the discussion their own ‘deeper’ assumptions about what women are, what women’s interests are or should be and which strategies to improve gender equality are the most accepted or taken for granted at a particular moment. Over the course of these discussions, in which a variety of different perspectives are put forward, it may happen that, if particular definitions or strategies that they are more attached to are challenged, they immediately react by defending what they believe as the ‘right’ labelling or strategy. For instance, they can get upset if quotas are challenged by other feminist ideological positions because they are attached to the idea that quotas ‘should’ define women’s interests. Another example occurs when they uneasily accept criticisms of gender equality indicators and benchmarking, seeing mainly their positive value as fixing certain understandings of gender equality, measuring progress and allowing closer monitoring and sanctioning, but overlooking the omissions and political choices made in the benchmarks and refusing to question them. In fact, the labels through which we

Stretching and bending gender equality 9 fix gender equality may at times block further progress, as they can deactivate nonhegemonic ways of framing the issue of gender equality that result from different feminist positions (see Fraser 1989, 1997; Butler 1995; Verloo 2005a). The discursive approach that we adopt to explore the stretching and bending of gender equality ideally encourages a reflection on some of these ‘taboo’ feminist criticisms of existing concepts and strategies that may end up creating borders or silencing voices rather than opening the prospects of the gender struggle to productive criticism as much as possible. This criticism is similar to what Butler says about her deconstructive work, which is meant ‘not to negate or to dismiss but to call into question and to open up a term to a re-usage that previously has not been authorised’ (Butler 1995: 49). This calling into question can in turn create openings for more transformative and subversive ways of framing the debate on gender equality that may be more suitable to the continuously changing dynamics of gendered power relations. Here again, we, as researchers, contest the meaning of gender equality by suggesting that a dynamic approach to the ongoing gender struggle is more appropriate to reflect the changing realities of the gender struggle (see Schmidt-Gleim and Verloo 2003; Verloo 2005a; Lombardo and Verloo 2009). Similarly to the prejudice inherent in identity politics, which constructs the idea of a unitary identity for ‘women’, our attachment to particular gender equality strategies as if they were absolute concepts rather than temporary strategies (as in the examples of quotas or indicators) may be prejudicial to gender equality. Not only is the idea that women’s (and men’s) interests are inherent to their genders not grounded in any solid evidence (on this, see the 2008 special issue of Representation on ‘The substantive representation of women’; Celis and Childs 2008), but it also reveals a romantic attachment to particular gender equality strategies that may discourage internal criticism and debate within feminisms. As a result, it may risk creating hegemonic feminist discourses (based on ‘deeper assumptions’), which exclude voices that diverge from such discourses, and therefore hinder further improvement of gender equality policies (Lombardo and Verloo 2009). Discursive approaches to politics are particularly suited to explore the way power works in framing processes within both feminist and non-feminist debates. Power is at work in hegemonic discourses, which produce and limit the ‘truth’ that is available to us within specific contexts and times (Foucault 1980), thus excluding the emergence of alternative ‘possibilities for thought’ (Ball 1990). Power operates here by limiting, through dominant policy discourses, those visions and voices that express different options for change and transformation, and making it difficult to challenge hegemonic groups and discourses. In this sense, the power of discourse, while enabling agency and producing outcomes, also always constrains the subject’s potential for political ‘agency’ (Bacchi in this volume). The power of discourse especially affects the possibility for actors to challenge existing hegemonic discourses. This possibility appears more likely, according to Fraser (1989, 1997), when non-hegemonic actors are given some space to engage in policy debates and question dominant discourses. Concept contestation, then, appears to be very relevant if we consider, as Kantola (2006: 27) states, that ‘feminism does

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produce its own hegemonic discourses’. In order to expose existing hegemonic discourses that risk freezing the gender struggle and reproducing exclusionary mechanisms, the approach adopted in this book treats gender equality as a concept open to continuous contestation, not only in the sense of understanding this as a reality, but also as our normative preference.

Theorizing discursive politics The open character of the concept of gender equality and its ability to encompass different meanings force the understanding of the process of ‘stretching and bending’ to rely on the adoption of a discursive approach to politics. By discursive politics, we mean the intentional or unintentional engaging of policy actors in conceptual disputes that result in meanings attributed to the terms and concepts employed in specific contexts. This discursive approach to politics helps to analyse and interpret the processes through which the concept of gender equality acquires different meanings. Within the literature on public policies, Bacchi’s work on the ‘What’s the problem?’ approach is important because it develops an analytical approach to the analysis of public policies that helps to critically reflect on the ways in which policy problems get constructed within the nets of discursive policymaking (Bacchi 1999). Over the last few years, the theory of discursive politics has been further developed by a group of European scholars in gender policy and frame analysis. They draw both on Bacchi’s approach and on the work of other theorists3 in order to elaborate a ‘critical frame analysis’ that explores the various dimensions in which a given policy problem can be represented (Verloo 2007). They analyse how policy problems, as represented in policy documents, usually include a diagnosis (‘what is/ are the problem/s?’) of and a prognosis (what is/are the solution/s?) for the issue at stake, both of which can be interpreted in many different ways. Within the dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, they also identify implicit or explicit representations of who is deemed to face the problem of gender inequality, who caused it, who should solve it, to what extent gender and intersectionality (i.e. gender intersections with race, class, sexual orientation, ability, ethnic origin, religion, ideology, etc.) are related to the problem and its solution, and where the problem and its solution are located in the organization of citizenship, labour or intimacy.4 What characterizes this frame analysis as ‘critical’ is its identification of who has a voice in defining problems and solutions in official policy documents, enabling the detection of which actors are included or excluded from the possibility of framing an issue.5 A number of chapters in this book adopt or discuss this type of critical frame analysis (see this volume’s chapters by Jalušiþ, Lombardo and Verloo, Lombardo and Meier, and Bustelo and Verloo). Not only is framing an issue – that is representing what the problem is, what kinds of solutions are conceivable and which actors are addressed – a crucial aspect of a discursive approach to politics, but it is also highly relevant to relate this framing to existing organizational structures and interests. Ferree regards framing as an interactive process by which actors with agendas encounter specific discursive

Stretching and bending gender equality 11 opportunities in the form of institutionalized texts. She thus distinguishes the more active notion of ‘framing work’, which is what social actors do to give concepts meaning ‘by embedding them in networks of other more or less widely shared and practically relevant meanings, which are what I call frameworks’ (Ferree in this volume, p. 89). A framework for political debate is institutionalized in ‘authoritative texts’ such as constitutions, laws, judicial decisions, treaties and administrative regulations. In Ferree’s words: ‘an institutionalized framework of connections made among people, concepts, and events – that shapes the opportunities of political actors by making some sorts of connections appear inevitable and making others conspicuously uncertain and so especially inviting for debate’ (Ferree in this volume, p. 89). In her view, the effective meaning of the concept of gender is the result of this interaction between framework and framing work, which shows how policy discourses mix aspects of both ‘agency and structure’, and are at the same time ‘enabling and constraining’. Contributions to this book refer to, or directly employ, frame analysis to study what happens to the concept of gender equality when policy discourses fix, shrink, stretch and bend the latter in a variety of ways. However, our focus is not limited to how problems are constructed in particular public policies. It rather expounds on the nature of existing framing processes concerning gender equality, and on the consequences of different types of framing for the issue of equality, which in the course of these processes is fixed, shrunk, stretched and bent in different directions, for a variety of purposes. Frame analysis is helpful in this to the extent that it aims to identify the major cognitive schemata through which people interpret and give meaning to reality, or communicate about it (Goffmann 1974). A frame is, in the words of Ferree and Merrill (2000: 456), ‘a cognitive ordering that relates events to one another’ and ‘a way of talking and thinking about things that links idea elements into packages’. As a device for the representation of meaning, a frame is always related to basic elements (labelled idea elements or positions on dimensions such as roles in diagnosis, location, norms). Frame analysis starts from the assumption of multiple interpretations in policymaking, and seeks to address such implicit or explicit interpretations, in this case of the concept of gender equality, by focusing on socio-political actors’ different representations of the problem of gender inequality and of the solutions to the latter. The concept of ‘policy frame’ is crucial here, in the sense that Verloo (2005b: 20) suggests when she defines it as: ‘an organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included’. In critical frame analysis, a frame on gender equality is a configuration of positions on dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, including positions on roles, on location, on norms, on causality and mechanisms, and on gender and intersectionality. According to this conceptualization, policy frames are not only cognitive schemata to understand reality, but they at the same time include normative assumptions, of which actors are often unconscious, that affect the interpretation of policy problems and the construction of policy measures formulated to solve them. While background literature on framing in terms of a methodological approach to policy analysis is represented by Rein and Schön’s work (1993, 1994) on policy

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framing, the literature on social movements’ theory (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Gamson 1992; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998) has most prominently developed this type of analysis in order to understand the emergence and disappearance, and the success or failure, of different social movements. This literature is one of the references of our discursive approach. Contributors to this book are aware of the contested dimension of framing processes and the interactions between institutional and civil society actors, which they also take into account. However, the approach adopted in this book differs from that employed within the literature on social movements’ theory, not just because this book mainly analyses the framing of public policies on gender equality rather than the discourse of social movements, but also because our focus is on actors’ both intentional and unintentional framings. In contrast, scholars such as McAdam et al. (1996) conceptualize frames merely as the intentional intervention of actors to shape reality in a ‘conscious’ and ‘strategic’ way. Their concept of ‘framing’ goes back to David Snow’s original definition of ‘conscious strategic effects by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 6). In our view, frames are not to be understood as completely intentional and conscious (Bacchi 2005). Instead, we see frames as rooted in the duality of structures. Using a distinction made by Giddens (1984), policy frames originate in discursive consciousness to the extent that actors using them can explain discursively why they are using them and what they mean to do with them, but they also originate in the practical consciousness to the extent that they emerge from routines and rules that are commonly applied in certain contexts without an awareness that these are indeed rules or routines, or that they could in fact have been different. Understanding frames as rooted in explicit agency and intention, as well as in structures, enables an analysis of frames and framing in terms of interactional and discursive power. Either way, discursive or practical, policy frames have concrete and material consequences that set the conditions for future actions and realities (Verloo and Lombardo 2007). In a parallel, but paradigmatically different, understanding the unintentional dimension of frames is also connected to the fact that the actors’ agency is enabled and at the same time constrained by broader hegemonic discourses in a Foucauldian sense, such as neoliberalism or the traditional gender division of labour, that may steer the actors’ conscious shaping of an issue towards unintended directions (see Bacchi in this volume). Hegemonic discourses play a fundamental ‘enabling and constraining’ function (Foucault 1980) as they set the context for the fixing, shrinking, stretching and bending of gender equality. A concept lives in a semantic universe, and its potential meanings depend on the relation with other concepts present in that universe. There is room for shaping the meaning of a concept, but not beyond the existing universe that limits what is conceptually and politically possible. This has at least two different implications: it means, first, that existing hegemonic discourses affect the strength of the borders within which the different concepts can move by constructing the parameters of the possible and thinkable and, second, that there is an element of un-intentionality in

Stretching and bending gender equality 13 the process of making sense of reality and communicating it through frames. The main consequence of the latter is that actors do not have total control on the framing of concepts, as underlying discourses delimit the understanding of issues and unconsciously steer people’s frames in directions that express particular forms of gendering, racializing or sexualizing political issues and debates (see Bacchi’s and Ferree’s chapters; Ferree and Merrill 2000; Kantola 2006). This does not make change impossible, but it does hinder it, implying that it is necessary to define the (power) conditions required in order to be able to think ‘outside the box’. The ‘unintentional’ aspect of framing lies precisely in the lack of awareness of ‘deeper assumptions’ that underlie actors’ frames, which Ferree and Merrill (2000: 459) point out when they claim that ‘movement actors and institutional actors often participate in the same discourse, framing specific ideas differently, but without being able to examine the deeper assumptions that they share’. Within existing hegemonic discourses, however, actors will normally intentionally intervene to set the terms of the debate, influence the construction of concepts within the political arena and produce certain outcomes. In spite of their intentions, the frames they use are always trapped in webs of discourses (see Ferree’s chapter); framing processes are always contested, and many different actors and ideas are involved in the process. More importantly, actors can have very different access to resources and power positions, which affects the role they play in frame production. Public institutions such as courts, parliaments and bureaucracies have a strong role in fixing concepts, and they usually fix them for longer periods of time. This has different consequences for the actors who are regulated, because of the creation of norms and standards in relation to which people are measured, in- or excluded, and relations between subjects are perpetuated (Minow 1987, 1990).6 However, the public institutions are always caught within different processes and discourses themselves. For instance, while women’s policy agencies, on the one hand, are crucial actors in fixing gender equality concepts – be they actors with often limited power – women’s policy agencies’ norms and behaviour, on the other hand, are simultaneously influenced by gender regimes embedded in specific hegemonic discourses. Moving within webs of intentional and unintentional communication, actors participate in different types of ‘framing processes’, which, as Ferree and Merrill (2000: 456) clarify, consist of ‘the ongoing cognitive activity of picking ideas from discourses and the social negotiations involved in writing, speaking, and composing communications that relate events, ideas, and actions to each other’. By interacting in these types of processes, a variety of actors from public institutions, market organizations, civil society and social movements shape the terms and the outcomes of the debates. ‘Discourses’, in this case the ones on gender equality, are then the result of ‘all the multiple activities of people and groups engaged in framing processes’ (Ferree and Merrill 2000: 456). Because they include a multiplicity of actors who have their own different assumptions about, and interests in, specific issues, and have different levels of access to resources and power positions, discourses necessarily involve conflict and negotiation among the actors about the different interpretations that are attributed to particular concepts and

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issues (Ferree and Merrill 2000; Verloo 2005a). At the same time, each discourse has its own ‘underlying logic’ that links ‘concepts together in a web of relationships’ (Ferree and Merrill 2000: 455), and this logic is undergirded by the power relationships that support the institutionalization of these ideas in texts. In this sense, the frames, as ‘webs of relationships’ (think of a series of court decisions that frame what is to be judged as rape and what not), reflect the ‘webs of power’ (think of the rules of the court system, or the rules for appointing judges). To paraphrase Ferree and Merrill, there are many different ways of framing gender equality and many actors with different power positions engaging in the production of such frames, and the result of all this activity is the production of discourses on gender equality. The study of the way the concept of gender equality is framed by people interacting in different political contexts and debates requires the adoption of a discursive approach to politics. This has led us to discuss not only the concepts of (policy) frame and hegemonic discourse, but also strictly related issues such as frame analysis, framing processes and the unintentional and intentional dimensions of frames. The idea behind employing this type of approach is that the application of the analysis of discursive politics to the concept of gender equality can help to improve our understanding of the underlying dynamics of the construction of gender equality in political processes, as well as the consequences that shaping the meanings of the concept in different ways may have for the gender struggle and the gendered power relations in society.

Outline of the chapters In this chapter, we have offered some analytical elements for an understanding of discursive politics on gender equality, which the chapters of this book will explore in more depth. The volume is divided into five parts: introduction (Chapter 1); theoretical perspectives concerning a discursive construction of gender equality (Chapters 2–4); empirical studies that apply the theory of discursive politics to specific case studies to explore how, why and with what effects the shaping of the meanings of gender equality occurs in particular international and national contexts (Chapters 5–8); analyses of framing in relation to policymaking (Chapters 9–11); and conclusions (Chapter 12), in which we reflect on issues raised in the different contributions and explore the deeper normative assumptions on what gender equality is or should be, and possible ways to address them. In Chapter 2, Carol Bacchi focuses on the theorization of discursive politics in relation to the issue of intentionality in strategic framing, clarifying key concepts such as discourse and the role of subject agency within discourses. In the context of this book, the focus on stretching and bending processes and their (un)productive consequences might easily be interpreted in a relativist way. In Chapter 3, Sylvia Walby argues against such relativism and defends the importance of argument, rather than of location, in the analysis of gender equality policies. The understanding of gender equality as an empty signifier to be filled with different meanings, the labelling and fixing of gender equality concepts and their consequences for gender

Stretching and bending gender equality 15 equality in terms of de-gendering and depoliticizing the issue are the main themes of Chapter 4 by Vlasta Jalušiþ. In Chapter 5, Emanuela Lombardo and Mieke Verloo show the difficulties that European public policies reveal in stretching gender equality in order to address multiple forms of inequality. Myra Marx Ferree focuses, in Chapter 6, on the understanding of framing processes, in particular the extent to which the articulation of new frames is linked to intersecting inequality frames that set the context within which the shaping of the meanings of gender equality can take place in European and American contexts, and the contested character of framing processes that include the participation of both institutional and civil society actors. In Chapter 7, Malin Rönnblom analyses the influence of dominant frames, such as the political goal of ‘economic growth’ and the shift from government to governance, on the construction of gender equality in Sweden and the EU. Jacqui True reflects on the ways in which trade policies in the EU give gendered meanings to policy problems and solutions in Chapter 8, particularly the extent to which gender mainstreaming objectives are used to achieve other ends, such as economic competitiveness and growth. Specific reflection on the use of frame analysis for policymaking and evaluation is carried out in Chapters 9–11. Drawing on empirical evidence from various policy fields, Chapter 9 by Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier reflects on the inconsistencies to be found in gender equality policies stemming from the discursive shaping of gender equality, its relations to stretching, shrinking and bending processes and the discursive windows of opportunity these inconsistencies offer for promoting gender equality. Chapter 10 by Maria Bustelo and Mieke Verloo illustrates the need to consider the possibilities and consequences of the stretching and bending of policy aims and concepts in policymaking and evaluation. Anna van der Vleuten and Mieke Verloo discuss the role that discursive processes play in the ‘technocratic’ aspects of policymaking in Chapter 11, touching on the establishing of benchmarks, indicators and rankings, and highlighting the importance of exposing the inherently political character of these supposedly ‘technical’ processes. Finally, Chapter 12 by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo traces the implications of the issues raised throughout the book for understanding discursive politics on gender equality. All the chapters, in spite of their different angles and subjects, share an interest in addressing and understanding the discursive dimension of politics and are structured around the central theme of how the meanings of gender equality are shaped through processes of fixing, shrinking, stretching and bending. The book adopts a critical perspective about both the pitfalls and the possibilities embedded in these processes. This leads the contributors to pay special attention to the political and contested character of these policies. The focus on the different ways in which the concept of gender equality is shaped allows us to think about the underlying dynamics of gender equality, to get a grip on political mechanisms that try to make gender unidimensional or multidimensional. It also allows us to relate these issues to their political context, and the fact that this context is not static. In this sense, the discursive politics approach enables us to be critical about the fixing of women’s interests in a set objective, a

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process that may contribute to the reproduction of hegemonic discourses or discourage internal criticism and debate within feminism as a result, hindering further improvement in gender equality policies.

Notes 1 With special thanks to Carol Bacchi, Myra Marx Ferree and Anna van der Vleuten for their comments on a draft of this chapter. We are particularly grateful to Carol Bacchi and Myra Marx Ferree for helping us to clarify the concepts we use in this chapter. 2 Power here refers not only to the institutional support that feminist claims might receive but also to the recognition and visibility of the claims within the feminist movement itself. 3 Among them Connell 1987, 1995; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986; Walby 1990; Rein and Schön 1993, 1994; Verloo and Roggeband 1996. 4 In the organization of labour, the existing divisions between labour and care, and paid and unpaid work, are based on a hierarchy between men and women that places women in a subordinate position. In the organization of intimacy, the norms, values, institutions and organizations regulating sexuality, reproduction and private and family life reflect traditional notions of masculinity and femininity that result in unequal positions of men and women in private life. In the current organization of citizenship, a hierarchy exists between women and men concerning the enjoyment of the main civil, political and social rights. The typology of gender structures of labour, intimacy and citizenship was elaborated by the MAGEEQ project (see Verloo 2005b, 2007). 5 The frame analysis developed by the MAGEEQ project also related the analysis of diagnosis and prognosis to the mechanisms considered to reproduce or to overcome the problem, and the norms and balance present in policy documents (see Verloo 2005b). 6 Minow argues that the criteria of relevance that are commonly used in law to define differences are established in relation to the ‘norm’, which is in turn based on the points of view of the dominant social groups. Thus: ‘Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point of comparison: women are compared to the un-stated norm of men, “minority“ races to whites, handicapped persons to the able-bodied, and “minority“ religions to “majorities“’ (Minow 1987: 13). As a result, the fixing and application of legal provision perpetuates the consideration of certain subjects as different or deviant (Minow 1990).

Bibliography Bacchi, C. (2005) ‘The MAGEEQ project: Identifying contesting meanings of “gender equality”’, The Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 221–34. ——(1999) Women politics and policies. The construction of policy problems, London: Sage. ——(1996) The politics of affirmative action: ‘Women’, equality and category politics, London: Sage. Ball, S. (1990) Politics and policy making in education: Explorations in policy sociology, New York: Routledge. Booth, C. and Bennett, C. (2002) ‘Gender mainstreaming in the European Union. Towards a new conception and practice of equal opportunities?’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 9: 430–46. Butler, J. (1995) ‘Contingent foundations: Feminism and the question of “postmodernism”’, in S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell and N. Fraser (eds) Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange, London: Routledge.

Stretching and bending gender equality 17 Celis, K. and Childs, S. (eds) (2008) Representation, special issue on the substantive representation of women, 44. Connell, R.W. (1995) Masculinities, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1987) Gender and power: Society, the person and sexual politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Davis, K. (2002) ‘Feminist body/politics as world traveller’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 9: 223–47. Ferree, M.M. and Merrill, D.A. (2000) ‘Hot movements, cold cognition: Thinking about social movements in gendered frames’, Contemporary Sociology, 29: 454–62. Foucault, M. (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977, New York: Pantheon Books. Fraser, N. (1997) Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the ‘post-socialist’ condition, London: Routledge. ——(1989) Unruly practices: Power, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory, Cambridge: Polity Press. Gamson, W. (1992) Talking politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giddens, A. (1984) The constitution of society, Cambridge: Polity Press. Goffmann, E. (1974) Frame analysis. An essay on the organisation of experience, Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books. Group of Specialists (1998) Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good practices: Final report of activities of the group of specialists on mainstreaming, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Kantola, J. (2006) Feminists theorize the state, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lombardo, E. and Meier, P. (2008) ‘Framing gender equality in the European Union discourse’, Social Politics, 15: 101–29. ——(2006) ‘Gender mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a feminist reading?’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 151–66. Lombardo, E. and Verloo, M. (2009) ‘Contentious citizenship. Feminist debates and practices and European challenges’, Feminist Review, 92 (in press). Lombardo, E., Jalušiþ, V., Pantelidou Maloutas, M. and Sauer, B. (2007) ‘Taming the male sovereign? Framing gender inequality in politics in the European Union and the member states’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (1996) Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meier, P., Peterson, E., Tertinegg, K. and Zentai, V. (2007) ‘The pregnant worker and caring mother: Framing family policies across Europe’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Meier, P., Peterson, E., Tertinegg, K., Zentai, V., Lombardo, E., Bustelo, M. and Pantelidou Maloutas, M. (2005) ‘Gender mainstreaming and the benchmarking fallacy of women in political decision-making’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 35–62. Minow, M. (1990) Making all the difference, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ——(1987) ‘Foreword: Justice engendered’, Harvard Law Review, 101: 10–95. Pollack, M.A. and Hafner-Burton, E. (2000) ‘Mainstreaming gender in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7: 432–56. Rein, M. and Schön, D.A. (1994) Frame reflection. Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies, New York: Basic Books.

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——(1993) ‘Reframing policy discourse’, in F. Fischer and J. Forester (eds) The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Schmidt-Gleim, M. and Verloo, M. (2003) One more feminist manifesto of the political, IWM Working Papers 2/2003, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Snow, D. and Benford, R. (1992) ‘Master frames and cycles of protest’, in A.D. Morris and C. McClurg-Mueller (eds) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Haven: Yale University Press. ——(1988) ‘Ideology, frame resonance and participant mobilization’, International Social Movement Research, 1: 197–217. Snow, D., Benford, R., Rochford, E.B., Jr, Worden, S.K. and Benford, R.D. (1986) ‘Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation’, American Sociological Review, 51: 464–81. Squires, J. (2005) ‘Is mainstreaming transformative? Theorising mainstreaming in the context of diversity and deliberation’, Social Politics, 12: 366–88. Stratigaki, M. (2004) ‘The cooptation of gender concepts in EU policies: The case of “reconciliation of work and family”’, Social Politics, 11: 30–56. Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in movement, New York: Cambridge University Press. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2006) ‘Multiple inequalities, intersectionality and the European Union’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 211–28. ——(2005a) ‘Reflections on the concept and practice of the Council of Europe approach to gender mainstreaming’, Social Politics, 12: 344–65. ——(2005b) ‘Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 11–35. Verloo, M. and Lombardo, E. (2007) ‘Contested gender equality and policy variety in Europe: Introducing a critical frame analysis approach’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Verloo, M. and Roggeband, C. (1996) ‘Gender impact assessment: The development of a new instrument in the Netherlands’, Impact Assessment, 14: 3–20. Walby, S. (2008) Globalization and inequalities: Complexity and contested modernities, London: Sage. ——(2005) ‘Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice’, Social Politics, 12: 321–43. ——(1990) Theorizing patriarchy, Oxford: Blackwell.

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The issue of intentionality in frame theory The need for reflexive framing Carol Bacchi

Introduction Frame analysis has a diverse heritage, with interest in the approach expressed by sociologists, social psychologists, linguists and social movement theorists, among others (Fisher 1997; Hallahan 1999). The particular meaning assigned to the term ‘frame’ reflects the different methodological interests of these diverse groups. In the recent past, social movement theorists have used the concept of framing to discuss how social movement actors can best shape their arguments to win over supporters (McAdam et al. 1996). This particular usage of ‘framing’ implies a conscious and intentional selection of language and concepts to influence political debate and decision-making. The language of ‘strategic framing’ reflects this understanding. While there is no doubt that a study of strategic framing is a useful exercise, especially for those intent on influencing political debate (Verloo 2001; Ferree’s chapter in this volume), there are important reasons to reflect on possible limitations in this understanding of framing as intentional process. At the very least, it is important to consider where frames come from and if it is indeed possible to stand outside them and manipulate them to one’s purposes. The suggestion that frames may reflect deep cultural meanings raises the possibility that frames themselves have a certain power over how issues are represented. In turn, questions must be asked about the kind of politics that ensues if these influences are ignored. In this chapter, I explore the issue of intentionality in frame theory in several stages: first, I offer a brief overview of frame theories; second, I indicate how different frame theories align with different discourse traditions; and third, I emphasize the importance of examining theories of the ‘subject’ for understanding the social and political processes under scrutiny. From the insights generated, I develop the notion of reflexive framing, which alters the scope of what needs to be analysed in frame theory to include the tacit assumptions that shape one’s understanding of key concepts such as ‘gender equality’. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of reflexive framing for critical frame analysis.

Frame analysis Goffman (1974) is commonly attributed responsibility for initiating interest in human framing practices. Although some analyses identify ambiguities in the

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concept as Goffman developed it (Fisher 1997: 3, subsection 2.5), he doubtless did not intend frames to be understood as constructs open to human manipulation. Rather, in Goffman, frames provide ‘unconsciously used conceptual scaffolds’ (König 2004; 2007: 5) upon which human understanding is built. Influenced by Goffman, other authors (van Dijk 1977; Moscovici 1984) have pursued an interest in frames as cognitive structures involved in the human processing of information. In this tradition, frames are ways of bracketing out certain factors in order to reduce the complexity of the world and hence to make sense of it. Within this intellectual tradition, there are differences of opinion about the degree of human control over the processes of framing. Hallahan (1999: 209), for example, talks about ‘priming effects’ as either conscious (‘when a person purposefully uses message cues’) or as unconscious and automatic. In some accounts, there is an attempt to highlight the role of culture in shaping frames. Fisher (1997: 23), for example, identifies what he calls ‘social system frames’, but he refuses to ‘exonerate individuals or social groups within any social system of responsibility for the array of cultural frames on offer in that society’s “tool kit” at any one time’. In his view, while most individuals and groups rely exclusively upon existing cultural frames, ‘exceptional individuals and groups will significantly modify frames, or develop new ones’. These contributions signal the importance of reflecting on the issue of intentionality in frame theory, although the point needs to be made that even those in this intellectual tradition who talk about cultural influences have a specific focus on individual cognitive functioning. Their frames are very much like coat hangers on which bits of information get hung. This is clear in Fisher’s (1997: 24, Table 1) examples of frames: ‘some institutions/tasks are not for everybody; everyone deserves an equal chance’, etc. Social movement theorists have taken the study of framing practices in a different direction. An awareness of and sensitivity to media influences in shaping political arguments (Gamson 1984, 1989; Entman 1991, 1993) has led to a focus on frames as forms of explanation rather than as sense-making cognitive structures (as in the social psychological and linguistic traditions above). We see here a shift from a concern about the form of frames to their content. Because of this interest, it is understandable that social movement theorists pay particular attention to ways of intervening in the shaping of arguments and to identifying those social actors who seem most able to exert this kind of influence. In this way, frame analysis is conscripted to the study of interest group politics. In social movement theory, the issue of intentionality gets raised in a number of ways. ‘Collective action frames’ are understood as intentional shaping of political claims (Benford and Snow 2000). Some attention is paid to the impact of ‘ideology’, described as collective beliefs, on the frames adopted, but the central concern is how to negotiate a frame that will work politically. This can and often does mean forming ‘bridging frames’ that ‘fit’ within cultural belief systems. However, the emphasis remains upon conscious shaping of frames that act to convert others to your cause and that advance desired political goals. In the words

Intentionality in frame theory 21 of Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998: 2), ‘Frame analysis is concerned with the negotiation and (re)construction of reality by social/political actors through the use of symbolic tools.’ There are connections here with the older theoretical traditions of ‘claimsmaking’ and ‘rhetoric’ (Bacchi 1999: 55–60), and with newer studies of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Bacchi 2004). As in these cases, the emphasis in this branch of framework theory is upon the conscious shaping of political demands to ‘negotiate’ desired political outcomes. The whole idea of ‘strategic framing’ of political claims falls within this tradition (Verloo 2001). The idea here is that reformers would do well to adapt the language and arguments they use in order to win supporters and ward off opponents. Some qualms are expressed about possible deleterious political effects that might well accompany strategic framing. Primarily, the concern is whether, in their determination to devise a frame that ‘works’, social movement actors might take on board significant elements of the dominant political agenda and sacrifice important principles in the process. An example here is the way in which the women’s movement in many countries has decided to defend a form of argument that women are a necessary ‘resource’ for national economies, capitalizing on dominant economic growth agendas. The difficulty of drawing adequate attention to the importance of unpaid labour within this ‘frame’ stands as one possible drawback to this strategic framing exercise. At a deeper level, questions are raised about the extent to which social movement actors can or cannot step outside their cultural and institutional backgrounds in their formulation of specific forms of argument. In their comparative study of abortion in the UK and in Germany, Ferree et al. (2002) offer insights into the limits imposed on social movement actors’ ability to shape arguments by the particular institutional contexts within which they operate. At this level, we are beginning to see attention being paid to unconscious influences on framing practices. The implication of studies such as these is that we cannot understand the kinds of explanations put forward for specific social causes unless we dig deeply into the cultural and institutional traditions within which social movement actors are located. However, the further implication – that, as a result of these contextual influences, social movement actors need to pay particular attention to the shaping impact of social and political contexts on their views and frames – is not usually pursued. This chapter is addressed specifically to this implication, advancing the argument that social reformers need to become reflexive (discussion to follow) in the examination of their conceptual and theoretical commitments. To develop this argument, I need first to direct attention to the ways in which frame analysis intersects with diverse traditions of discourse analysis.

Framing and discourse In a number of accounts (van Dijk 1985; Triandafyllidou 1995), frame analysis is described as a form of discourse analysis. However, it is important to recognize that distinct disciplinary understandings of the term ‘discourse’ can be found in linguistics,

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anthropology, social psychology, sociology and politics. Discourse traditions include: conversation analysis, Foucauldian research, critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics, discursive psychology, Bakhtinian research, interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnology of speaking. There is also internal dispute about the meaning of the term discourse within some of these traditions (Wetherell 2001: 381–82). For the purposes of this chapter, it is helpful to highlight two central analytic traditions in discourse theory, a social psychological focus on patterns of speech (discourse analysis), and a political theoretical focus on the ways in which issues are given a particular meaning within a specific social setting (analysis of discourses) (Potter and Wetherell 1990; Burr 1995: 164). In the first tradition, the term ‘discourse’ means something very close to language. There is a focus on the ‘linguistic and rhetorical devices’ used in the construction of a text (Burr 1995: 184). In the second tradition, the goal is to identify, within a text, institutionally supported and culturally influenced interpretive and conceptual meanings (discourses) that produce particular understandings of issues and events. In the ‘discourse analysis’ tradition, much of the material analysed comes from interviews. The task is to identify how individual subjects negotiate their way through pervasive but conflicting ‘discursive structures/meanings’ (Stapleton and Wilson 2004: 46). The ‘analysis of discourses’ tradition includes a wide array of theorists united by the project of identifying and analysing ‘discourses’ within texts. This tradition includes policy theorists intent on textual analysis of policy speeches and documents (Bacchi 2000; Verloo 2007), and critical discourse analysts more generally, whose goal is to identify aspects of the ‘political nature’ of systems of thought (Roberts 2004: 34). This group is interested in ‘discourses’ in the plural, rather than in analysing ‘discourse’ (conversation). The distinction between these two traditions should not be drawn too sharply. Clearly, the interest of ‘discourse analysts’ in ‘discursive structures/meanings’ (see above) indicates sensitivity to the interpretive and conceptual systems of meaning that form the primary focus among those interested in the ‘analysis of discourses’. At the same time, those interested in the ‘analysis of discourses’ often pay heed to the use of metaphors and speech patterns within the texts studied. Despite these overlaps, it is possible to discern a tension between (and sometimes within) the two traditions around the issue of intentionality – over whether we ought to think of political subjects primarily as ‘discourse users’ or as constituted in discourse. For example Potter and Wetherell (1990: 209–10) direct their primary attention to subjects’ selective use of parts of what they call ‘interpretive repertoires’, ‘discernible clusters of terms, descriptions, common-places … and figures of speech often clustered around metaphors or vivid images’. In contrast to this focus on situated practice, Ian Parker (1990: 2000–1; emphasis added) states that ‘once we start to describe what texts mean, we are elaborating discourses that go beyond individual intentions’. For Parker (1990: 195–96), discourses are ‘sets of meanings which constitute objects’. Moreover, discourses in this latter usage contain (in the sense of define and restrain) political subjects (individuals), meaning that ‘we cannot avoid the perceptions of ourselves and others that discourses invite’.

Intentionality in frame theory 23 While the term ‘discourse’ appears frequently in the writings of most frame analysts, it is not always clear where they would be located within the above traditions. Most often, the term is used as a rough synonym for social conversation, indicating an alignment with Potter and Wetherell’s focus on ‘situated practice’ rather than with Parker’s deeper meaning-systems. There also appears to be a Habermasian influence in much of the work, with an emphasis on improving the quality of public ‘discourse’ or conversation (Ferree et al. 2002: 9, 216). Policy ‘discourses’ are seen ‘as the outcome of joint production of meanings among various policy actors’ (Mottier 2002: 2). At times, there is recognition that the term ‘discourse’ can mean something quite different from this, particularly if one is using Foucault’s work. Ferree et al. note, for example, that constructionist theory is indebted to Michel Foucault ‘in identifying discourse as the practices of power diffused outside formal political institutions, making use of seemingly neutral categories of knowledge and expertise to control others as well as to construct the self as a political actor’ (Ferree et al. 2002: 222). In contrast to the Habermasian meaning of discourse as ‘joint production of meaning’ (see above), for Foucault, ‘discourses’ are well-bounded areas of ‘knowledge’ that influence what can be thought and, hence, what can be said. In Stephen Ball’s (1990: 17–18) words, in Foucault, ‘We do not speak the discourse. The discourse speaks us.’ Foucault’s particular focus was the human/social sciences and the power they exert both in understanding social issues and in shaping political subjects (individuals), although at times he had in his sights what he described as ‘the Western episteme’, with its view of progress and human control of nature. Mottier clearly elucidates the meaning of discourse in Foucault: Foucauldian strands of discourse analysis do not use the term ‘discourses’ in the narrow sense of ‘texts’ but rather to refer to the ‘macro-level’ of structural orders of discourse (Foucault 1971): broad historical systems of meaning including any meaningful political practices (referred to as ‘discursive practices’) which are relatively stable over considerable periods of time. (Mottier 2002: 2) These ‘broad historical systems of meaning’ constitute what Graham Burchell describes as ‘the contours of the “goldfish bowl” we inhabit’ (Burchell 1993: 277 in Shore and Wright 1997: 17). For Foucault, the goal of social analysts thus extends beyond analysing talk and conversation in order to identify patterns of explanation. Rather, the task becomes identifying and explaining the a priori of talk, the ‘concepts, objects, strategies and subject positions that organize statements prior to individual reception’ (Blackman 2001: 84). His primary interest, therefore, is in ‘the limits and forms of the sayable’, what it is possible to speak of. And, as he explicitly explains, he tries to do this without ‘referring to the consciousness, obscure or explicit, of speaking subjects’ (Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al. 1991: 59; emphasis added).

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Clearly then, Foucault would have no place for the concept of intentionality. Rather, he wants us to rethink the way in which ‘thought’ is conceptualized. In Foucault, as Rabinow (2003: 47; emphasis added) explains, ‘Thought is not autonomous in any of the strong senses that it has been given in Western philosophy. Thought is not transparent, nor is it constitutive, nor is it a passive waiting or an intentional act of consciousness.’ Rather, for Foucault, thought becomes a practice called thinking. To study thinking, we need to study problematizations (Foucault 1997), how ‘problems’ are thought about. Hence, Foucault is keenly interested in the shape of arguments, as are frame analysts, but he wants to know which ‘knowledges’ make particular forms of argument possible. There are no identifiable ‘heroes’ or ‘villains’ in this analysis as the social processes of valuing certain knowledges over others are extremely complex. Rather, Foucault talks about the operation of a ‘strategy without a strategist’ (Foucault 1976a in Rabinow 2003: 52). Rabinow offers an example where Foucault reflects upon the role of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century France that helps to elucidate the implications of this position for conceptions of consciousness and intentionality: Although people might well be explicit about what they are doing, they are not capable of grasping what they did. There were feedback loops and counter-effects that escaped from all the planning, programs and paranoia these rational actors had produced and so proudly deployed. (Rabinow 2003: 53) This kind of challenge to conscious awareness of one’s activities and behaviours is quite different from that which occasionally appears in social psychological, linguistic and some sociological framework analysis. For example, Donald Schön (1993: 148; emphasis added) points out that ‘Often we are unaware of the metaphors that shape our perception and understanding of social situations’. Also, Anthony Giddens (1984: xxiii) develops the idea of ‘practical consciousness’ to refer to the almost instinctual monitoring of bodily display that we perform without being consciously aware of what we are doing, ‘all the things which actors know tacitly about how to “go on” in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression.’ Foucault, in contrast, is interested in the broad social unconscious that shapes our thinking and our conception of who we are. Is it possible that Foucault’s ‘broad historical systems of meaning’ align to some extent with Ferree et al.’s deep institutional meaning systems, sometimes referred to as ‘master frames’ (see Ferree’s chapter in this volume)? Foucault was definitely interested in the role of institutions in defending and replicating certain modes of understanding. Indeed, the human sciences themselves could be considered institutions in this sense. He explained that he was interested in the ‘history of these “things said”’, ‘discourses in the dimension of their exteriority’ rather than hidden meaning, and the ‘rules of formation’ that allowed particular discourses to be produced, the ‘conditions of exercise, functioning and institutionalisation’ of discourses (Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al. 1991: 60, 63, 65). Institutional contexts would feature as part of those conditions.

Intentionality in frame theory 25 However, crucial to Foucault and a topic generally unaddressed in frame analysis is the implication of this view of discourse for understanding the political subject and politics more generally. I pursue this topic in the next section, highlighting its importance for the issue of intentionality or unintentionality.

What is a political ‘subject’? It is perhaps unsurprising that reflections on intentionality should bring us at last to consideration of the long-standing conundrum in sociological theory, the agency/ structure relationship. The whole notion of intentional shaping of argument depends upon an acceptance of the individual as capable of agency (although agency, at least in Giddens (1984: 9), does not depend on a presumption of intentionality or motivation). ‘Structures’, when they are mentioned, are seen as providing constraints on agency, limits within which agential political subjects manoeuvre. This view of agency fits comfortably with an understanding of ‘discourse’ as conversation and a focus on ‘situated usage’. For Foucault, however, the idea of a subject outside of history simply makes no sense: … there are not on the one hand inert discourses, which are already half dead, and on the other hand, an all-powerful subject which manipulates them, overturns them, renews them; but that discoursing subjects form a part of the discursive field … Discourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions. (Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al. 1991: 58) This does not mean that Foucault portrays political subjects as dominated by forces operating upon them. Rather, his view of power as productive rather than as limiting means that, instead of thinking of political subjects as oppressed by power relations, ‘it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals’ (Foucault 1976b in Gordon 1980: 98). In effect, what we refer to as ‘subjectivity’ and ‘consciousness’ are produced by techniques of power-knowledge, such as the human sciences (Simons 1995: 47). Because of this view of the subject, Foucauldian scholars interested in politics always address governance in a broad sense as encompassing the role of the professions and other sites of ‘knowledge’ production (see for instance Dean and Hindess 1998; Dean 1999). From a Foucauldian perspective, for example, it would be unwise to examine domestic violence policy frameworks without examining how doctors and social workers ‘frame’ the issue. Likewise, discussions of environmental policy and foreign/immigration policy would need to include some consideration of the underlying premises in much Western philosophy about ‘man’s’ ‘rationality’ and economic ‘progress’. Hence, there is a good deal at stake in the particular meaning of discourse we adopt, suggesting that the term requires some elaboration when we use it. As we

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have just seen, those who accept a Foucauldian understanding of discourse define the parameters of their field of study well beyond conventional political actors. They also challenge any sense in which political subjects can be thought of as ‘outside’ ‘knowledge’. This, of course, raises questions about how political subjects are to proceed in examining and putting in question aspects of existence they find problematic either personally or for wider social reasons. Poststructuralist discourse psychologists offer some useful insights on this crucial topic. Operating within the ‘analysis of discourses’ tradition, they criticize conventional social psychology for its focus on internal psychic structures and processes, as if these inhere within individuals (Burr 1995: 159, 177). In contrast, they direct attention to the shaping impact of constitutive discourses, referring to cultural narratives and conceptual schema, on political subjects. Bronwyn Davies (1994), for example, elaborates the political situation of subjects operating within a society suffused by discourses that define their very being. At the same time, theorists in this tradition explain how political subjects can continue to have some impact on the world and their place within it. For Davies, for example, discourses ‘open up, or make possible, certain subject positions through and in terms of which we interact with the world’ (The notion of subject position appears in Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al. 1991: 58, quoted above.) In this view, there is no outside to discourse, but one can work to identify the discourses within which one is positioned and use them selectively. The goal becomes finding ways to position oneself differently in relation to existing discourses, which are multiple and contradictory (Davies 1994: 26). This understanding creates the possibility of theorizing a subject who is simultaneously made a speaking subject through discourse and who is subjected to discourse. As one example, Eva Magnusson (2005: 154), a poststructuralist psychologist, is highly sensitive to ‘seeing people’s identity projects as shaped within webs of culturally produced understandings’. She describes people as ‘active co-producers who use (adopt, transform, resist) available understandings of the world and themselves’. Along similar lines, for Stapleton and Wilson (2004), gender and nationality are identified as discursive categories that structure speakers’ ‘identities as particular types of people’, and that ‘interact in mutually defining ways’. However, social actors can achieve and maintain identity through ‘self-narratives and modes of discursive positioning’ (Stapleton and Wilson 2004; emphasis added): ‘the speakers actively negotiate these structures and constraints [i.e. gender and nationality] to produce specific versions of themselves’. So, while identity is necessarily formulated within constraints, contestation takes place: ‘people’s identity constructions are simultaneously shaped by prevailing discourses/cultural meanings, and locally negotiated to produce specific versions of the self ’ (Stapleton and Wilson 2004: 46, 48). As in Davies, discourses in a deeply constitutive sense, as well as subject practices, are kept in play. The implications for political practice are critical. Centrally, political subjects are directed to scrutinize their own discursive positionings. As Davies (1994: 45–46) puts it, ‘The viewer must catch themselves in the act of seeing in particular ways.’ Detailed introspection, ‘a consciousness turned upon itself’, becomes necessary in

Intentionality in frame theory 27 pursuing any reform agenda. The implications of this insight for political practice are taken up in the next section.

Reflexivity in political and research practices The distinction between Davies’ focus on detailed introspection and those frame theorists who talk about ‘strategic framing’ illustrates what is at stake in different meanings of discourse. The latter see discourse as outside the subject, as cultural constraints, within which intentional subjects can shape useful ‘collective action frames’. For the former, there is no subject outside discourse, and the subject therefore has work to do on him or herself to avoid falling into discursive positionings that may be exploitative of others. Foucault was clear that he subjected himself to the same kind of self-scrutiny he asked of others: ‘It would not behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware’ (Foucault 1973 in Simons 1995: 90). As a way forward, he called for reflexivity, by which he means ‘exercises of thought in which the act of thinking is itself made an object of thought’ (Rabinow 2003: 8). It is important here to clarify that, as with ‘frame’ and ‘discourse’, there are diverse and competing theoretical views about the meaning of reflexivity. Anthony Giddens dedicates considerable attention to the topic of reflexivity, but his understanding is very different from Foucault’s. This is unsurprising given that Giddens’ theory of structuration presumes subject agency whereas, as we have just seen, Foucault is intent on the need to put the ‘humanist subject’ in question (O’Donnell 2003). By reflexivity, Giddens (1984: 78) means the reflexive control of the body, that is ‘the reflexive self-monitoring of gesture, bodily movement and posture’. For Foucault, reflexivity refers to the need to put in question our categories of analysis. In fact, for Foucault, reflexivity requires a conscious interrogation of taken-for-granted presuppositions and beliefs. The difference in the two positions is nicely illustrated by the two theorists’ views of ‘mental illness’. For Giddens (1984: 79), the ‘controlled alertness’ that reflexive self-monitoring requires is something the mentally ill lack. For Foucault, the category of mental illness itself requires examination. He wants to know which ‘knowledges’ produce mental illness as an ‘event’. For Foucauldian scholars, it follows that researchers have to subject their research questions, their categories and their analyses to constant questioning. In this spirit, critical frame analysis calls upon feminist activists and researchers to subject their own frames to critical scrutiny (see Chapters 1 and 12 by Lombardo et al.). Admittedly, this is no easy task. As Shore and Wright (1997: 19) assert, ‘standing outside of one’s own conceptual schemas is always difficult’. An example illustrates the kind of reflexive scrutiny of conceptual premises that is required in this approach. Kantola and Squires offer a sophisticated historical analysis of the ways in which prostitution has been characterized as a ‘problem’ in public/political debate in Britain, contrasting these with Joyce Outshoorn’s description of the characterization of prostitution in the Netherlands as ‘sex work’ (Kantola and Squires 2004; Outshoorn 2004). Kantola and Squires show how

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community groups and public officials in the United Kingdom have constituted prostitution as a ‘public nuisance problem’, and how recently the discovery of trafficking has strengthened a ‘moral order discourse’.1 The intent of the Kantola and Squires’ article is to suggest to British feminist reformers that they ought strategically to try to change the shape of the argument around prostitution from a ‘moral order’ or ‘kerb crawler’ way of arguing (‘frame’) to a ‘sex work’ way of arguing (‘frame’). Hence, their work is a good example of a call for strategic framing. However, while in one place they (Kantola and Squires 2004: 84) note that the ‘sex work’ ‘discourse’ in the Netherlands is individualist and contractarian in character, there is no attempt to reflect upon the ways in which these systems of thought (or discourses in the Foucauldian sense) might delimit and constrain an agenda built around an understanding of prostitution as sex work. Specifically, the way in which a ‘sex work’ frame relies upon the value connected to paid labour in Western industrialized countries requires further comment. The suggestion that prostitution is a form of labour and ought to be valued as such takes as given that paid labour is an appropriate standard for assigning value. In other contexts, feminists have been at pains to challenge exactly this premise by demanding recognition of unpaid and caring activities (Beasley and Bacchi 2000). The point here is the need to scrutinize deep-seated cultural assumptions that underpin our analyses and to reflect on the effects of working within, instead of contesting, those assumptions. Therefore, while it is clearly useful for reformers to identify political arguments/frames that may well accelerate the uptake of their reform demands, there is also a need to be wary of placing too much emphasis on the ability to shape useful frames (intentionally) and too little attention to the shaping impact of dominant systems of meaning on reformers themselves and their interventions. The larger point here is that feminists need to reflect on the discourses, in the sense of interpretive and conceptual schema, operating within the ways they frame issues, and to consider the consequences of working within these discourses. I put forward the notion of ‘reflexive framing’ as a way of emphasizing this need to reflect on the frames we deploy. For example, in some contexts (Bacchi 1999: Ch. 9), feminist analyses of domestic violence buy into a law and order framing, with possible serious consequences for how the issues are dealt with. Specifically, a law and order problematization often leads to the targeting of members of specific groups, such as Blacks or working-class people. As another example, Canada’s 1993 guidelines on gender-related persecution employed the ‘imperial frame of the West’ and portrayed women who were seeking asylum as ‘supplicants seeking to be relieved of the disorder of their world’ (Razack 1995: 49). Clearly, it may not always be possible to avoid employing particular conceptual and interpretive systems of meaning in the shaping of arguments and analyses. Still, at the very least, the downside of working within, instead of contesting, dominant discourses needs to be considered. Reflexive introspection on the systems of thought (‘discourses’) influencing ‘ways of arguing’ (‘frames’), or reflexive framing, is necessary to prevent the development of agendas and proposals that may well help some women at the expense of others. To enable reflexive framing – to catch oneself

Intentionality in frame theory 29 ‘in the act of seeing in particular ways’ (Davies 1994: 45–46) – it is crucial to ensure that the perspectives and embodied experiences (see Beasley and Bacchi 2000) of diverse and often under-represented groups are foregrounded. Reflexive framing, I suggest, offers a way to rethink the issue of intentionality and to create a bridge across diverse framing and discourse traditions, as elaborated in the final section.

Reflexive framing and a dual-focus research agenda The notion of reflexive framing starts from the premise that concepts are ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1955–56), that concepts and categories have no fixed meaning but reflect specific contexts and uses. Hence, concepts and categories are ‘open signifiers’. At the same time, because they already operate as key political signifiers, concepts have accrued meanings (i.e. they are not completely open). That is, while terms of analysis may indeed be constructs, they also reflect specific combinations of historical and political meaning. For example, concepts such as ‘equal opportunity’ and ‘merit’ are grounded in commonly assumed political belief systems (Bacchi 1996: 3). The relatively open meaning of concepts and categories creates the possibility of deploying them deliberately in political contests to achieve particular goals – strategic framing. At the same time, however, the large historical and cultural investments in particular meanings create limited, often dichotomized, options for thinking about complex political processes. The languages of intentionality, and even of awareness and consciousness, seem somehow inadequate to capture the complexity involved in these processes. Indeed, Foucault’s view that consciousness itself is a construct indicates the limitations of these languages. Reflexive framing offers a new language to highlight the need to reflect on the conceptual logics we unintentionally adopt. While, as mentioned earlier, this is no easy task, neither is it impossible. Indeed, we are engaged in exactly this exercise in this chapter. To facilitate this kind of introspective reflection, feminists are encouraged to draw upon a wide variety of diverse women’s perspectives and experiences in order to lessen the possibility of adopting taken-for-granted cultural and/or class-based presuppositions in their analyses. In my own work (Bacchi 1999), which examines competing problem representations in some central areas of women’s policy, I was often kept ‘honest’ through reading analyses from feminists and women outside my white, middle-class, heterosexual perspective. On this issue, Ferree et al. (2002: 229) usefully identify a degree of common ground among diverse critical analytical perspectives around the issues of voice and empowerment.2 To help keep in focus the complexity of the processes we as feminist researchers need to track, I suggest a dual-focus research agenda. The first part of this agenda involves attending to discourses as meaning-systems within which we and others operate. The second part of the agenda directs attention to the clearly deliberate deployment of concepts and categories by those with both greater and lesser institutional power to advance specific political goals. This dual-focus agenda builds upon the idea in poststructuralist discourse psychology that people can use discourse/s to particular effect, while hanging on to its insights into ‘subjectification’.

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A number of authors contribute usefully to thinking through the meaning of this dual-focus agenda. Terry Threadgold (1988: 5), for example, describes the Foucauldian problematic as twofold – what the subject is able to say and what the subject is permitted to say. This dual problematic draws attention to both the power of discourses to delimit the meanings of topics of analysis and the power to make/ deploy discourses. For Stephen Ball (1990: 17–18), discourses are ‘about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority’. On the power of discourses, he explains: ‘discourses construct certain possibilities for thought. They order and combine words in particular ways and exclude or displace other combinations.’ On the power to make discourse, he states: ‘Meanings thus arise not from language, but from institutional practices, from power relations, from social positions. Words and concepts change their meaning and their effects as they are deployed within different discourses.’ In this vein, Foucault insisted on the need to confront questions about how specific discourses legitimate certain speakers – those who meet certain qualifications (Bernauer 1990: 92) – which statements have institutional force and the ‘set of rules which at a given period and for a given society define’ The limits and forms of appropriation. What individuals, what groups or classes have access to a particular kind of discourse? How is the relationship institutionalized between the discourse, speakers and its destined audience? How is the relationship of discourse to its author indicated and defined? How is struggle for control of discourses conducted between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural or ethnic collectivities? (Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al. 1991: 60; emphasis in original) In this struggle, it is important not to assume that elites have the sole power to marshal and deploy discourses for instrumental purposes, to advance their own interests, while the ‘common people’ are constituted within discourses and lack power to challenge repressive and dominant meanings. This kind of analysis makes it very difficult to theorize resistance. While acknowledging the constraints imposed by dominant discourses, it is important to theorize the ‘space for challenge’ (see Bacchi 2000). Reflexive framing therefore involves the necessary blending of internal scrutiny of reform objectives with the pragmatic shaping of reform proposals. While it is clearly crucial to pay due heed to the intentional shaping of strategic frames (Verloo 2001), this task needs to be accompanied by critical introspection on the conceptual and interpretive premises underpinning these frames. Important insights into limitations imposed by our own subject positionings are lost if only the first of these projects is pursued.

Conclusion The languages we use to describe our theoretical projects are complex and have histories. In this chapter, I have identified some of the complexities associated

Intentionality in frame theory 31 with the languages of frame, discourse and reflexivity. More explicit attention to the ways in which we use these concepts, I suggest, will assist in the development of useful political strategies. In this chapter, I have shown that divergences in the uses of these key terms hinge centrally upon the issue of intentionality. That is, strategic framing and Habermasian discourse theory accept a view of an agential subject that sits uncomfortably with Foucauldian discourse approaches. The notion of reflexive framing is offered as a way of building bridges across these traditions, insisting that we recognize and reflect upon the historical and conceptual legacies of the concepts we use, including ‘gender equality’, the primary focus of this book. The high degree of contestation around the meaning of gender equality requires some comment. A contributing factor here is the conjoining of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘equality’. Some concepts are so solidly grounded in history and culture that it is difficult to recognize their constructed nature. Such is the case with ‘women’ and ‘men’. Lakoff (1987: 99), for example, an important frame theorist in the linguistic tradition, accepts the uses of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as ‘a standard contrast in categorization systems around the world’. In this standard categorization, ‘women’ is conventionally positioned as other to a male norm (Bacchi 1990). To talk about women’s equality therefore creates the possibility of altering or challenging this taken-for-granted male–female positioning. The character of this challenge, or whether there even is a challenge, has revolved historically around the meaning of ‘equality’, itself a term that is the centre of heated political deliberation. Debates about the meaning of gender equality therefore touch upon fundamental beliefs about human political relationships. It is therefore unsurprising that the concept is consistently shaped and reshaped. Critical frame analysis, as developed and applied in this book, offers a useful methodology for identifying the dominant ways in which gender equality is understood and shaped in specific political sites. A grounding premise is that ‘gender equality’ is a contested concept. The various chapters chart the processes – stretching, bending – that shape the meanings of these terms in specific sites. ‘Discursive politics’ describes these conceptual disputes over assigned meanings. The commitment in critical frame analysis to address both conscious and unconscious assumptions in framing exercises (see Chapter 1 by Lombardo et al.) highlights the need, emphasized in this chapter, to study both explicit and declared intentions in gender equality policy statements, and the implicit and tacit understandings that lodge deep within those statements. It is this dual focus that makes it possible to remind feminists that their own frameworks for gender equality stand within culture, not outside it, and hence require questioning and scrutiny. The suggestion here is that feminists need to examine carefully how the institutional meanings attached to gender equality influence the parameters within which they operate and think, and within which they imagine themselves as political subjects. This commitment promises to keep open and under discussion the highly charged political question of what equality for women means.

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Notes 1 Elsewhere (Bacchi 2005), I have pointed to the ways in which Kantola and Squires use ‘discourse’ with two different meanings, in some places as underlying systems of thought (e.g. ‘sexual domination discourse’) and in other places (e.g. ‘kerb crawler discourse’) as characterizations of the ‘problem’ of prostitution. I would now suggest that these latter characterizations might more usefully be called ‘frames’, allowing the term ‘discourse’ to be retained for the more Foucauldian sense of deep meaning-systems. 2 On this issue, Popkewitz (1998: 14, 19) provides a timely warning against what he describes as a ‘project of redemption’ in which the ‘insertion of voice into postmodern discourses positions marginalized social and economic groups as agents of their own emancipation and liberation’. He reminds us that ‘participatory reform discourses embody norms about dispositions and capabilities for action that are not equally available to all’.

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Intentionality in frame theory 33 ——(1991) ‘Framing US coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran air incidents’, Journal of Communication, 41: 6–25. Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W.A., Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. (2002) Shaping abortion discourse: Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, K. (1997) ‘Locating frames in the discursive universe’, Sociological Research Online, 2: 1–31. Online. Available from http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socrsonline/2/3/4.html (accessed 27 August 2007). Foucault, M. (1997) ‘Polemics, politics and problematizations’; based on an interview conducted by P. Rabinow in May 1984; trans. L. Davis; appears in Essential works of Foucault, Vol. 1: Ethics. New Press. Online. Available from http://foucault.info/foucault/ interview.html (accessed 17 October 2006). ——(1976a) The history of sexuality: An introduction, trans. R. Hurley, Harmondsworth: A. Lane, Penguin. ——(1976b) ‘Two lectures’, trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham and K. Soper, in C. Gordon (ed.) (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–77, Sussex: The Harvester Press. ——(1973) [1966] The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences, trans. unidentified collective, New York: Vintage. ——(1971) L’ordre du discours, Paris: Gallimard. ——(1968) ‘Politics and the study of discourse’, Esprit, 371: 850–74, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) (1991) The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gallie, W.B. (1955–56) ‘Essentially contested concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56: 167–98. Gamson, W.A. (1989) ‘News as framing’, American Behavioral Scientist, 33: 157–61. ——(1984) What’s news: A game simulation of TV news, New York: Free Press. Giddens, A. (1984) The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Goffman, E. (1974) Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gordon, C. (ed.) (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–77, trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham and K. Soper, Sussex: The Harvester Press. Hallahan, K. (1999) ‘Seven models of framing: Implications for public relations’, Journal of Public Relations Research, 1: 205–42. Kantola, J. and Squires, J. (2004) ‘Discourses surrounding prostitution policies in the UK’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11: 77–101. König, T. (2007) ‘Routinizing frame analysis through the use of CAQDAS’. Online. Available from http://www.research/case_studies/hohmann/Frames_and_CAQDAS.pdf (accessed 29 August 2007). ——(2004) Frame analysis: A primer, Loughborough University, Department of Social Sciences: New methods for the analysis of media content. Online. Available from http:// www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/resources/links/frames_primer.html (accessed 1 April 2005). Lakoff, G. (1987) Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (1996) Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Magnusson, E. (2005) ‘Gendering or equality in the lives of Nordic heterosexual couples with children: No well-paved avenues yet’, Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies, 3: 153–63. Moscovici, S. (1984) ‘The phenomenon of social representations’, in R.M. Farr and S. Moscovici (eds) Social representations, London: Cambridge University Press. Mottier, V. (2002) ‘Discourse analysis and the politics of identity/difference’, European Political Science, 2: 1–3. Online. Available from http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/publications/ eps/onlineissues/autumn2002/research/mottier.htm (accessed 14 April 2006). O’Donnell, M.H. (2003) ‘Radically reconstituting the subject: Social theory and human nature’, Sociology, 37: 753–70. Outshoorn, J. (2004) ‘Voluntary and forced prostitution: The “realistic approach” of the Netherlands’, in J. Outshoorn (ed.) The Politics of prostitution: Women’s movements, democratic states and the globalisation of sex commerce, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Parker, I. (1990) ‘Discourse: Definitions and contradictions’, Philosophical Psychology, 3: 189–204. Popkewitz, T.S. (1998) ‘The culture of redemption and the administration of freedom as research’, Review of Educational Research, 68: 1–34. Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1990) ‘Discourse: Noun, verb or social practice?’, Philosophical Psychology, 3: 205–18. Rabinow, P. (2003) Anthropos today: Reflections on modern equipment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Razack, S. (1995) ‘Domestic violence as gender persecution: Policing the borders of nation, race and gender’, Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 8: 45–88. Roberts, C. (2004) ‘Sex, race and “unnatural” difference: Tracking the chiastic logic of menopause-related discourses’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11: 27–44. Schön, D.A. (1993) ‘Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy’, in A. Ortony (ed.) Metaphor and thought, 2nd edn, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shore, C. and Wright, S. (1997) Anthropology of policy: Critical perspectives on governance and power, New York: Routledge. Simons, J. (1995) Foucault & the political, New York: Routledge. Stapleton, K. and Wilson, J. (2004) ‘Gender, nationality and identity: A discursive study’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11: 45–60. Threadgold, T. (1988) ‘Language and gender’, Australian Feminist Studies, 6: 41–70. Triandafyllidou, A. (1995) ‘Second project report: A frame analysis of institutional discourse’, Report produced for the Sustainable Development Research Project, directed by the Centre for European Social Research, Cork, Ireland, submitted to Dr C. Ruzza, Professor N. Gilbert and Dr P. O’Mahoney. Triandafyllidou, A. and Fotiou, A. (1998) ‘Sustainability and modernity in the European Union: A frame theory approach to policy-making’, Sociological Research Online, 3(1): 1–20. Online. Available from http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/2. html (accessed 4 April 2005). van Dijk, T.A. (1985) Handbook of discourse analysis, New York: Academic Press. ——(1977) Text and context explorations in the semantics and pragmatics of discourse, London: Longman. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality in Europe: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books.

Intentionality in frame theory 35 ——(2001) Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation, IWM Working Paper 5/2001, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Wetherell, M. (2001) ‘Part four: Culture and social relations: Editor’s introduction’, in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds) Discourse theory: A reader, London: Sage.

3

Beyond the politics of location The power of argument in gender equality politics1 Sylvia Walby

Introduction Sometimes, the difficulties of feminist knowledge production have led to the conclusion that all we can aspire to is ‘story-telling’ (Haraway 1989: 8) or ‘political fictions’ (Braidotti 1994: 4). Differences of social location have been taken to mean that we can aspire merely to partial and situated knowledges (Haraway 1988), that is, a series of incommensurable knowledges, of forms of knowledge fundamentally separated from each other, and thus that we should settle for the politics of recognition of existing social groups, rather than the politics of redistribution or of transformation (Young 1990). This intellectual defeatism need not be the conclusion to be drawn from a full appreciation of difference. Rather, the power of argument and of knowledge is available as a more substantial basis for feminist knowledge projects. In this chapter, I am arguing for the significance of argument, of reasoned debate, rather than reducing differences in intellectual and political projects solely to social location. The power of argument in developing feminist projects has been underestimated. Differences of social location, such as those of class, ‘race’, ethnicity, nation, religion, linguistic community, sexual orientation, age, generation and able-bodiedness, as well as those based on gender, are important and need to be included in feminist theory (see Ferree, and Lombardo and Verloo in this book); there are significant forms of power associated with these locations that are important for the shaping of knowledge. However, the inference sometimes drawn, that differences of social location entail incommensurable knowledge projects, should be rejected. Knowledge can be and is changed by arguments. This question within feminist analysis and politics is paralleled in other debates in social theory and philosophy, such as that between Foucault’s (1972, 1979, 1980) work, where power and knowledge are almost reduced to each other, and that of Habermas (1986, 1988), where the human capacity for rational argument under defined circumstances is given priority. Sometimes, the focus on stretching and bending the concept of gender equality has led to relativist conclusions: that it is never possible to find a place from which to make claims concerning progress and regress in gender equality. However, such conclusions should be rejected. That the concept of gender equality is contested does not mean that there are not some commonalities between various approaches.

Beyond the politics of location 37 This chapter first explores theories of knowledge. Second, I address various theories of difference in feminist analysis, in particular in the analysis of feminist politics, postcolonialism and some issues in contemporary politics. Overall, I argue for the importance of argument, alongside power, rather than only location, in the analysis of gender equality politics.

Theories of knowledge Is knowledge relative to social location? Underpinning much of the politics of difference is an argument about the epistemological and ontological status of difference. The politics of difference is often underpinned by a standpoint epistemology in which knowledge is relative to social position. Forms of knowledge and values are considered so divided by communities that they are separate and incommensurable. This involves the rejection of the notion that knowledge can be routinely improved by ‘scientific’ forms of cumulation and contestation (Harding 1986, 1991). The politics of location draws on the alleged specificity of knowledge production in different social locations (Braidotti 1991, 1992, 1994). However, there are alternative epistemologies. It has long been argued that science is not a mirror of nature (Rorty 1980), that we cannot naively discover reality simply by gathering more and more empirical data (Hempel 1966; Kuhn 1970; Bhaskar 1979), and that, as data are collected using preformed categories and concepts, they are inevitably theory-laden (Quine 1960, 1981; Kuhn 1970; Nelson 1990). We cannot discover the nature of the world only by looking at it. The reason for this is partly that the processes and linkages that are the focus of the analytic interest cannot be directly read off from surface appearances; hence, we need theoretical constructs in order to process and understand the data collected through our senses (Bhaskar 1979). These insights are not unique to poststructuralism, but rather have been the orthodoxy in the philosophy and sociology of science for many decades. But uncertainty does not mean that knowledge development cannot be cumulative. Rather, there are complex procedures and processes through which theories can be compared, rejected, revised and developed (Latour and Woolgar 1979). These procedures themselves are contested and argued over, rather than given ‘naturally’. Science is both fallible and cumulative. Poststructuralists re-articulate this long-standing issue in the philosophy of science, of the theory-ladenness of observations, using new vocabularies that focus on the way that language mediates experience. The epistemological issue at stake in the politics of location is not whether we can naively discover the world by looking hard, but rather, given that our knowledge is inevitably constructed through a socially mediated process, what the implications of this are for methods of analysis. There are divergent views on how to address this position, and the politics of location is but one of these. There is a position derived from a reading of Foucault (1972, 1979, 1980, 1981) that power and knowledge are so inextricably connected that they are inseparable. Power constructs its own truth, while knowledge is the basis of power. The human sciences are discourses that contain the knowledge we have about the social world.

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These are riddled with power and we cannot think outside of them. While Foucault himself drew back from equating power and knowledge, they are nonetheless closely entwined in his work and, furthermore, such an understanding is the intellectual legacy he has bequeathed to much contemporary social and feminist theory (Fraser 1989; Ramazanoglu 1993). This view is drawn upon in the perspective that all knowledge is situated and partial, which posits that knowledge is irredeemably affected by the social position of the knower. It is important to make further distinctions between at least three views on the implications of the interconnections of knowledge and power. In the first, power is knowledge, power constructs knowledge, and there is no knowledge outside of the dominant position. In this perspective, it is the knowledge of the powerful that holds sway in society. This is most commonly found in writings that draw upon the writings of Foucault (even if they differ from him on some elements). In the second, often found in feminist standpoint epistemology, such as the work of Stanley and Wise (1983), Hartsock (1985), Smith (1988) and Hill Collins (1995), the truer, less distorted knowledge is held to be found among the least powerful, as they have less reason to be taken in by the myths of the dominants. A third perspective, often considered postmodernist, is that of situated knowledge, which declares knowledge to be local and partial, specific to each knowledge community. Haraway’s (1988, 1989, 1990) work can be situated in either the second or the third position. There is a basic contradiction between the first two positions. In the first, power is the basis on which knowledge is constructed; in the second, a lack of power is required for clear vision. In the first, utilizing a conventional reading of Foucault, power and knowledge are intertwined in such a way as to reinforce and mutually construct each other, so that the human sciences are part of the disciplinary technology of power. In the second, that of standpoint epistemology, it is the holding of power that blinds, while the view from the powerless is held to be the least distorted. Hence, Foucault’s work cannot be used as support for standpoint epistemology; rather, his work underpins one of its major alternatives. Does the third position overcome this opposition? In attempting to avoid this problem, it suffers from another, that of a tendency to relativism, although not infrequently writers hesitate at endorsing a full-blown relativism. What are the criteria by which knowledge claims can be assessed? If it is power, then knowledge is merely relative to power. If knowledge claims are always situated, always specific to location, then they are incommensurable and cannot be used to assess each other. It is not possible, within this perspective, to say that one position is better than another in terms of ‘knowledge’. However, the statement that it is not possible to say that one position is better than another is only as good as the statement to the opposite effect. In other words, relativism is self-refuting, in that it undercuts the grounds for its own position. It has no high ground upon which it can argue its own case. Relativism provides no basis for any position to be argued against any other. Thus, it is internally contradictory as a theory of knowledge. Haraway (1988, 1989, 1990, 1997) is poised between the second and third positions, between standpoint and postmodernist, while embracing some of each. She

Beyond the politics of location 39 argues that knowledge is socially situated and is always partial: ‘Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge’ (Haraway 1988: 583). She argues that the oppressed are more likely to have a clear vision than those who are dazzled by their own mythology as to the state of the world: Many currents in feminism attempt to theorize grounds for trusting especially the vantage points of the subjugated; there is good reason to believe vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful … The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god trick and all its dazzling – and, therefore, blinding – illuminations. (Haraway 1988: 583–84) What does Haraway seek to do instead? She seeks ‘to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism’ (Haraway 1990: 190). So what are her criteria for choosing between knowledges? It would appear that Haraway’s criteria are the ethics and aesthetics involved in story-telling: ‘I would suggest that the concept of constrained and contested story-telling allows an appreciation of the social construction of science. The aesthetic and ethic latent in the examination of story-telling might be pleasure and responsibility in the weaving of tales’ (Haraway 1989: 8). But are ethics and aesthetics really a satisfactory basis on which to prioritize knowledge claims? Where do ethics come from? They appear unjustified in Haraway’s account except as an assumed core (essence) of the feminist project. Indeed, one might say they are foundational. But this is in contradiction to her notion of local and situated knowledge. Further, while story-telling has its place in the world, is it really all that feminist theory can aspire to? However, in order to sustain her position, Haraway does sometimes move beyond an appeal to ethics and aesthetics. Thus, some of her detailed works (e.g. 1989, 1997) do not always follow the same epistemology of her much-quoted shorter articles (e.g. 1988, 1990). Even Haraway actually returns in part to a more conventional epistemology (although this is not the usual interpretation of her work). Haraway is not the only feminist theorist ostensibly to give up on routine knowledge development through theory and data. Similar conceptions can be found, for instance, in the work of Braidotti (1994). Braidotti sees reason as part of the masculine Enlightenment project. She considers that: ‘political fictions may be more effective, here and now, than theoretical systems’ (Braidotti 1994: 4). Myth, fiction, ethics and aesthetics are a very weak basis for feminist knowledge claims. This is because, first, by privileging persuasion over argument, they lose the significance of argument. Second, as they cannot appeal to those who do not share these ethics and aesthetics, they are restricted in their reach to a limited range of people. Thus, they are not adequate for projects that involve convincing others of arguments. Third, they are not actually the basis for many of those who are engaged in feminist projects. In practice, most feminist theorists actually mobilize traditional and everyday forms of rationality, for instance in appeals to theoretical and empirical consistency.

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This argument for the power of everyday rationality is supported by feminist philosophers such as Nelson (1990), who argues that pieces of knowledge can always be used to assess each other, that we can have a form of knowledge based on argument and evidence. Nelson argues that rationality transcends the ostensible boundary between science and non-science and is common to both. Such a position has certain parallels with that of Habermas (1986, 1988), who has long argued against Foucault that the power of argument, of communication under certain conditions, can lead to the improvement of knowledge. Habermas does not rely upon a notion of a distinct realm of science as a special type of discourse in order to argue his case for the capacity of humanity to reason. Rather, it depends upon the desire to communicate, which, when done in good faith, between people equally situated with regard to the relevant resources, can lead to improvements in knowledge. Habermas is not arguing that all communication takes this form; indeed, he is sceptical of the media, treating this rather as a vehicle of power. Rather, he is writing of the potential of human rationality within the lifeworld, the possibility of a public sphere in which argumentation is the basis of determination of outcome. My defence of Habermas against Foucault does not, however, extend to a full acceptance of Habermas’ position on all matters. Nevertheless, his work is important in demonstrating that there are philosophical alternatives to the reduction of knowledge to power that is so often understood to be the legacy of Foucault’s work. Thus, I reject the argument that there are insuperable chasms between the knowledges of different communities, and am against settling for the defeatism and isolationism of forever partial and situated knowledges. Rather, there is a space and need for argumentation, for the use of evidence and theory, in order to build knowledge. Indeed, this is what happens in practice. Social location should not be taken as limiting the development of knowledge. We should not restrict ourselves to views deriving from specific social locations.

Recognition, redistribution and transformation Whether feminist politics is understood to be primarily about redistribution, recognition or transformation is related to the underlying theory of knowledge. Is it, and has it been, primarily about redistribution (with a focus on equality and the same standard of justice) or about recognition (with a focus on different values) (Young 1990; Meehan and Sevenhuijsen 1991; Bock and James 1992)? Or can we move beyond this dichotomy, either by engaging simultaneously with both equality and difference (Scott 1988; Holli 1997) or by moving on to transformation (Fraser 1995)? The politics of equality, of redistribution, presumes that it is possible to know about and compare the situation of different groups of women and men against a shared standard. It is assumed that the standard of justice that is the basis of the claim for equality is easy to comprehend and makes sense to variously situated social groups, albeit after a process of argumentation and negotiation. It presumes sufficient in common (although not sameness) for this negotiation to be possible. Examples include demands such as equal wages for work of equal value, equal access to education, equal treatment before the law.

Beyond the politics of location 41 In contrast, the politics of recognition is concerned with respect for the cultural values of different social groups, and is predicated upon a presumed lack of shared values, upon profound differences. It assumes differences so great that there are irreconcilable chasms of values and cultural practices between social groups. It assumes that it is hard for people in one group to understand and share with those in another. This position is critical of the ‘equality’ position in the debate for a tendency to adopt the standards of the dominant group as the norm, neglecting the interests and values of specific devalued groups such as women. It focuses on the differences between different groups of women and men and respect for existing values. Young (1990) argues for the importance of the recognition of cultural difference and for the need for this to be built into the political system in order to guarantee justice. The denial of respect for those who are culturally different and for their ways of life is a problem that needs a political remedy. She argues for the recognition of groups as the bearers of these cultures within the political system, rather than only the individual of liberalism, and for a theory of justice that ontologically privileges groups rather than individuals: ‘Social justice … requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression’ (Young 1990: 47). Young argues that the politics of recognition has become at least as important in contemporary politics as the politics of redistribution. One of the reasons for this is that there is more to life and politics than simply the unequal distribution of material goods, and that uneven respect for the cultural dimension of life is important as well. Young seeks specific political mechanisms to enshrine the representation of minorities and previously under-represented groups in government. The politics of recognition maps more easily on to issues of difference than does the politics of equality as, rather than being premised on a single standard, it is premised on diverse and multiple ways of life (Taylor et al. 1994). This may be regarded as one of its strengths, in that it engages with practical diversity, or as a weakness, in that there is a tendency to relativism and a lack of confidence in a shared justice project. Further, the politics of recognition has a tendency to stabilize the status quo, as groups seek the affirmation of their identity, and this may more deeply sediment the social inequalities as well as differences involved (Squires 1999). This is a problem, for example, in attempts to provide access to citizenship for differently situated women, both women who are in paid employment and women who care (for children or the frail elderly). Attempts to provide welfare support to women, as mothers, can create dependency on either husbands or the state, because such support does not encourage more active involvement with the labour market, which might, in the long run, give greater opportunities for independence. Yet to deny to women, who do not on average have the same labour market access as men, special forms of support as mothers may be seen simply to create a different form of injustice (Lister 1997; Walby 1999). The politics of difference, or of location, assumes that it is possible to separately identify holistic communities each with their own distinctive values, but

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this is a dubious proposition. In the example just given, caring and employment may be undertaken by the same woman at different times in her life, rather than being the defining characteristic of different communities of women. Further, divisions run through most communities; for instance, gender, generation and class cross-cut most ethnic ‘communities’, creating both differences and inequalities. There is thus a problem in identifying ‘the’ representative or ‘the’ will of ‘the’ community for the purposes of political representation. Given the engagement of most people in multiple group social practices with which they have varying degrees of involvement at different times, the identification of clear communities is highly problematic. There have been a number of theoretical and practical attempts to develop the politics of recognition, of difference and of location, so as to avoid the problems of reification and de facto embracing of existing identities and inequalities. One is an attempt to move from identity politics to difference (Braidotti 1994). Another argues that the concepts of equality and difference actually entail each other rather than being mutually incompatible (Scott 1988; Holli 1997). A further alternative is to move to a politics of transformation (Fraser 1995). While the politics of recognition initially tended to equate issues of difference with those of identity, it has been suggested that these might be separated, so as to avoid the tendency to reification and essentialism held to be inherent in such an embrace of identity (Squires 1999). Identity politics involves the embracing of existing identities in a way that seals off ongoing changes and other relationships, while an alternative focus on difference opens up the possibility of greater recognition of the fluidity and changeability of identity. Braidotti (1994) attempts a move to the politics of difference rather than simply embracing identity partly to avoid such problems. She recommends thinking of ‘the other’ as positive. Within her myth of the nomadic subject, she hopes to: think through and move across established categories and levels of experience: blurring boundaries without burning bridges … the nomadism in question here refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and behaviour. (Braidotti 1994: 4–5) Yet even the metaphor of ‘nomadism’ between communities presumes not only communities between which it is possible to (metaphorically) travel, but a unified individual subject who is able to do the travelling, and one who is sufficiently privileged to be able to do so. Indeed, attempts to separate a politics, or philosophy, of difference from a politics of identity may lead to the evacuation of any substantive content to the differences themselves, rendering the position too abstract to have practical political meaning (Felski 1997; Squires 1999). For instance, in her effort to avoid the reification of identity politics, and move to an embrace of a fluid nomadic position forever in transit, Braidotti makes very little reference to the substantive content of the issues at stake.

Beyond the politics of location 43 An alternative theoretical approach to the politics of difference is to argue that the conceptual pairs of equality and difference, of sameness and difference, are not actually mutually exclusive opposites, but rather entail and require each other, albeit in varying and contested ways (Scott 1988; Holli 1997). In order to develop an equality project, there is a need to call upon a recognition of both existing differences (both positive and problematic) and similarities (some shared elements and values) (Scott 1988). It is necessary to state the ways in which the oppressed group has unequal access to the goods and services that are the object of a shared desire, that is the way that this group departs from the desired standard, has different access to the desired standard. It is only because of this different access to the desired standard that it makes sense to speak of inequality. In a symmetrical and reverse direction, it can be argued that it only makes sense to speak of groups being different if there is agreement upon the standard on which they are different. The notion of difference demands agreement on the significance of certain issues or goals, even if there are different positions on these. In this way, the concepts of equality and difference actually make implicit reference to each other, when they are examined in specific situations. The problematic aspect of the ‘equality project’ is, it has been alleged, that it entails endorsing a male standard, rather than one derived from women’s values. For instance, in the UK pensions system, women can have pensions equality only if the balance of their involvement in paid work and caring is the same as that of men. This is because the higher level private occupational pensions are only available to those who adopt the typically male pattern of full-time employment throughout adult life, while only the much lower valued state pension recognizes the contribution that women make as carers of their children outside the labour market. However, the actual content of the standard for equality can be a matter for negotiation. There is no inherent reason why the standard desired should be the one associated with men. For instance, if the state pensions system offered the higher level of benefits, then the national standard would be one that recognized caring as well as employment (see Ginn and Arber 1999). Indeed, some of the most contentious issues in recent gender politics have been when men have sought those things to which (some) women thought they had privileged access, for example custody of children after divorce. Like Holli (1997), I would argue that the concept of equality exists in relation to both sameness and difference, and that the content of equality is a moveable, negotiable notion. Indeed, there is no reason why the standard of justice that is desired should be one that currently exists within one or other gender or social group. As Fraser (1995) has argued, the politics of transformation is a further potential solution to the debates on equality and difference. Rather than having to choose between the politics of redistribution or recognition, we can have the politics of transformation, which seeks to change the system that defines current inequalities and differences. Rather than having to choose between the standards of the dominant or subordinate group, we can imagine and seek new standards. Such a politics is based on argument and imagination rather than embracing any already existing social identity. This is a conception of politics that has often been found in socialist

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movements. It involves a rejection of current identities as well as current inequalities in favour of a vast revisioning of the future, based on argument and planning, rather than the values of groups in any existing social location. Such an integration of the concerns of equality and difference, in the politics of transformation, in the context of specific examples, is a route out of the impasse of the politics of location. The role of argumentation, analysis and negotiation is important in the understanding of gender politics. Argumentation is essential for projects of transformation, as they go beyond the embrace of current differences.

Practical politics These theoretical issues in the politics of location are key to the underlying disagreements in the assessment of many feminist political projects. Three examples to be considered here are the development of procedures for representation in state legislatures, postcolonial politics and the United Nations Human Development Project. The representation of different interests in state-oriented politics is a long-standing, not a new, issue. While simple voting in a multiparty system is a necessary procedure for democracy, it has limitations, especially in its limited success in ensuring the representation of minorities and women. Renewed interest in finding a way of representing different interests within mainstream politics is now resurgent in political science (Young 1990; Mouffe 1992; Phillips 1993; Taylor et al. 1994; Squires 1999). This involves rethinking the nature of the boundaries of the constituencies that are to be represented (Squires 1999); rethinking the notion of women’s interests (Jónasdóttir 1988); the comparative assessment of the impact of different voting systems (Lovenduski and Norris 1993); reconsideration of quotas (Phillips 1993); as well as a renewed theoretical interest in conceptions of pluralism (McClure 1992; Mouffe 1992). The revitalization of interest in the procedures by which a democratic system can constructively take account of gendered interests is in part a reaction to the perceived failure of feminism to create its own viable internal democratic procedures. Second-wave feminism has experimented continuously with its political forms, but many have been discontented with the forms that have been developed. Feminist politics has often identified structures and formal procedures as a problem, in that they tend to concentrate power among those who are more privileged, for instance in mixed-sex groups to men, and in mixed-class, women-only groups to middle-class rather than working-class women. Yet, structurelessness itself is problematic, giving rise to power concentrated in friendship cliques (Freeman 1975; Phillips 1991). The recognition of this problem within feminist political practice has provided part of the drive towards the politics of recognition. There is an irony and paradox that feminists, when in political groups, seek community and friendship as part of the humanizing of the political project and in order to make the activity enjoyable, yet these very same procedures, which tend towards a politics based on friendship and shared values and community, inhibit the development of political groups which contain within them diversity (for instance of class, ‘race’ and

Beyond the politics of location 45 sexual orientation). Working with those who are ‘different’ is hard if the political form employed is based on empathy rather than debate, friendship rather than alliances, community rather than association, consensual agreement rather than majority voting. Political differences in this context can become highly emotive, fragmenting friendships, communities and the political project itself. The question of how to deal with difference is thus an important question for practical feminist organizing. The politics of location has been one response to this. However, I would argue that politics across difference demands instead the acceptance of greater difference within the organization, collegiality rather than friendship, respect rather than empathy, voting rather than consensus. That is, a politics based on appeal to principles rather than to identity. It is this that facilitates transformation, rather than an embrace of an existing identity. In short, a politics based on Habermasian argumentation, and procedures for effective trusted communication rather than that of communities sharing a common location (Habermas 1986). Phillips (1993) has similarly argued for the need to treat procedures as important, and not to dismiss them as merely a ‘liberal’ issue. The issue is how to go beyond the politics of location, to develop the procedures, principles and modes of argumentation by which this can be achieved, rather than simply embracing difference. This is not to deny the importance of difference, but rather to enable the possibility of going beyond existing configurations. The appeal to difference in feminist politics and theory has sometimes been taken to imply a rejection of the appeal to equality, that equality and difference are alternatives between which one must choose (Eisenstein 1984; Young 1990; Mohanty 1991). The argument is seen as one in which there are no common standards against which an analysis of equality can be made that are not ethnocentric and would not imply a false universalism. This issue is key to many analyses of difference, including those on ethnicity and racism and postcolonialism. For instance, in a much cited article, Mohanty (1991) criticizes much, although not all, ‘Western’ feminist theory for sweeping generalizations about women, and in particular for treating Third World women as a unity. She argues that the situation of women must be analysed in detail in its specificity and that it is not possible to make such generalizations. However, the practical analysis of difference actually demands a common frame of reference. In order to analyse difference, it is necessary to decide what counts as difference, thereby demanding a common frame of reference as to what is significant and what is irrelevant. In practice, what counts as a significant difference depends upon the social circumstances and context (Scott 1988; Felski 1997). To either assert or recognize the claims of the postcolonial feminists by ‘Western’ feminists means a sharing of the frame of reference, not incommensurability. Mohanty and other postcolonial feminists are often interpreted as arguing only for situated knowledges in popularizations of their work. In fact, Mohanty is claiming, via a complex and subtle argument, that she is right and that (much) white Western feminism is not merely different, but wrong. In doing this, she assumes a common question, a common set of concepts and, ultimately, the possibility of a common political project with white feminism. She hopes to argue white

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feminism into agreeing with her (Felski 1997). She is not content to leave white Western feminism as a situated knowledge, comfortable with its local and partial perspective. Not a bit of it. This is a claim to a more universal truth. And she hopes to accomplish this by the power of argument. When the issue of power is added to that of difference, the question of the relationship between the different knowledges becomes crucial. The less powerful group cannot impose its preferred knowledge on the more powerful. All they have is the power of argument, an appeal to shared procedures of argumentation, the possibility of sharing concepts and sharing data. To leave the matter as merely that of difference would be to acquiesce to the knowledge of the powerful group. To simply embrace difference is to endorse existing inequalities. If the defence of selected differences is not to have such an outcome, then there must be some selective rejection or acceptance of criteria of assessment. This is an argument for the de-ontologizing of difference, so that it is not elevated into a principle of feminist analysis, but rather something that is analysed pragmatically (Felski 1997). The dichotomization of equality and difference as two mutually incompatible frames of reference is theoretically and practically unsustainable (Scott 1988; Felski 1997; Holli 1997). In practice, one can only speak of difference if there is a shared framework as to what is relevant to declare a significant difference. For instance, only if it is agreed that ‘race’ is a relevant signifier of difference and that eye colour is not can there be a debate about the meaning of ‘race’ differences. Only if there is a common or potentially common set of values is it relevant for a ‘Third World’ feminist to attempt to argue with a ‘First World’ feminist about the significance of her experiences and knowledge. Comparisons demand agreement on common terms for the conceptualization and scaling of differences. In practice, feminist politics has usually involved a complex combination of conceptions, of inequality and difference, of redistribution and recognition, and of transformation, all at the same time. For instance, this can be seen in practice in the debates on postcolonialism and globalization, where the question of whose standards are to be taken as the benchmarks for the analysis has long been an issue of contention. Does universalism always mean ethnocentrism? Is embracing the local the way forward? If we embrace the local, why should the First World take any notice of the poor world? In practice, the poor South makes its claims in terms of values that it thinks the North shares. Otherwise, why should the North listen? Why do white Western feminists read Mohanty even as she berates them? Not because they simply embrace difference, but rather because they share values, such as the dignity of all human life, and analysis, and share the concepts and measures that enable the comparison and critique to have been made. A further example of the role of the analysis of difference and inequality in the context of the global is that of the UNDP (1995) indices. These construct a series of indicators to assess the extent of human development. The initial impetus for their development came from a desire to challenge the use of economic growth as the sole indicator of development, and to include dimensions that pertain to human, not merely economic, development. They have been developed so as to indicate the extent of gender-specific development, so that a concept of gender

Beyond the politics of location 47 equality is built into them. In this way, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proclaims a universal standard. Is this mistaken? Should there be none, or rather one that each nation state’s rulers make for it, or that the women in each country make? It is done by the UNDP in order to support the interests of women against the alternative global standards of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and similar bodies. It is assumed that the World Bank and the IMF are not about to seek out the separate views of women and rank them equally with those of the men in their societies, nor with the views of the world’s (largely) white, male bankers. In this unequal power situation, the UNDP index is an attempt to construct a universal index, which could acquire some legitimacy and thus power through the agency of the UN, in which women’s positions are better represented. This is an issue of power/knowledge. It can be easily recognized that the indices used by the UNDP are controversial and may be the subject of discussion (see also the chapter by Verloo and van der Vleuten in this volume). For instance, there is a question as to whether an increase in women’s paid employment (one of the elements of this index) really does improve the position of women in society. And, further, whether the answer to this question is different in different societies, raising the issue as to the extent to which it is generalizable. Rather than assume either response on a priori philosophical grounds, I would suggest that we should assess the evidence (Walby 1994). In this instance, I think the answer is that employment does improve the position of women if women have sufficient political leverage to enable them to control the ensuing income (cf. Standing 1989). The method of assessment best employed here is a comparative one, based on argument, evidence and theory, rather than a presumed specificity for each nation state. The significance of the UNDP indices is increased as a result of processes of globalization as, whether we like it or not, there are global bodies with power in many countries, such as the IMF, World Bank and the UN. Societies are not hermetically sealed from each other. While in some instances global processes may have locally specific rather than homogenizing effects (Robertson 1992), there are others where the effects are more general (Standing 1989). Further, political claims are often made in the knowledge of developments elsewhere. Claims to citizenship are made in one context, knowing the political vocabulary developed in other countries. For instance, demands have been made by immigrant groups in the European Union for rights that are related to citizenship that draw on ostensible universal standards of human rights (Soysal 1994). These groups have particular interests, such as access to welfare and family reunification, which they seek to further by an appeal to proclaimed universal, not merely local, standards of justice and human rights. The context is global. The communities overlap. The boundaries are permeable. Another example of interlinkages between different societies is that of suffrage claims that were made by women in the knowledge of victories elsewhere, utilizing ideas and materials from other countries (Jayawardena 1986; Ramirez et al. 1997). Many suffrage struggles were hybrid in the sense that they drew both on local circumstances and on knowledge of issues and victories elsewhere. For instance,

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it is hard to explain the timing of the near simultaneous suffrage victories in such diverse countries as the USSR (1917), UK (1918/1928), Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland (1919), Canada and the US (1920), without drawing on an analysis of the interlinkages between feminist movements in different countries. The separation between recognition and equality, while apparently clear at an analytical level, can be hard to make in practice and, indeed, many feminist struggles might be regarded as containing not only both elements, but also a third, that of a desire for transformation. For example, first-wave feminism sought to provide justice to the claims of women for both recognition and redistribution and, further, was instrumental in the transformation in the form of gender relations from a domestic to a public gender regime (Walby 1990, 1997).

Conclusion Gender equality is not an ‘empty signifier’; rather, it is a ‘contested signifier’, an ‘essentially contested concept’. The contestation is argumentative: inflected by power, but not determined by it. While difference and location are important for feminist theory, it is a mistake to interpret such differences as chasms between women in different locations which mean that their situations are incomparable. Theorists who have given up on science and systematic knowledge cumulation are left merely with moral and ethical exhortation. We do not need to abandon rationality in this way. Instead, we should seek evidence and assess theories. This is not an argument about the infallibility of scientific procedure; these procedures are themselves subject to contestation and argument. Rather, it is the power of doubt that can be harnessed to improve knowledge and investigate the extent and nature of gendered differences. Argumentation and comparison have long been key features of feminist politics. Boundaries between cultures and frontiers between states have not been obstacles to communication, mutual learning and collaboration. Societies are not hermetically sealed from each other with incomparable values and practices. Social location is routinely transcended. While the existence of communities should be noted, we should recognize that they are unequal both internally and in their relations with other communities. And most importantly, communities overlap, are not self-sufficient in a global context and change. Communities exist in a globalizing context, to which they make increasing reference. Particularism exists only relative to the global. Knowledge communities overlap, are not self-sufficient and do change. In all cases, argumentation and rationality are relevant to the processes of transformation. The politics of location depends upon notions of chasms between different communities and identities, in which interests and cultural values play crucial roles. It is based on a position that reduces knowledge to location and power. Yet, there are alternative views of knowledge and political procedure. Conceptions of politics that involve both procedure and argument have merit. There are continuing innovations in political procedure which attempt to deal with difference at the level of government, from quotas to voting systems. These provide new fora through which to argue for justice.

Beyond the politics of location 49 The argument here is to think through and to go beyond the politics of location to a wider solution. This involves the practical recognition of difference within the project of equality. It involves argument over the standards that should be used to constitute equality and justice. Feminist theory should embrace argumentation and the scientific method, rather than seeing knowledge as limited by social location. Feminist theory can be more ambitious in its claims than storytelling. A future-oriented transformatory politics requires argumentation and not confinement to historic locations.

Note 1 This is a slightly revised version of Walby, S. (2000) ‘The politics of location’, Feminist Theory, 1: 189–206. Reproduced with permission from S. Walby, ‘The politics of location’, Copyright Sage Publications, 2000, by permission of Sage Publications Ltd. Thanks to Mieke Verloo, Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier for comments.

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——(1990) ‘A manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s’, in L.J. Nicholson (ed.) Feminism/postmodernism, London: Routledge. ——(1989) Primate visions: Gender, race, and nature in the world of modern science, London: Routledge. ——(1988) ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14: 575–99. Harding, S. (1991) Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. ——(1986) The science question in feminism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hartsock, N. (1985) Money, sex, and power: Toward a feminist historical materialism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. Hempel, C.G. (1966) Philosophy of natural science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Hill Collins, P. (1995) ‘The social construction of black feminist thought’, in N. Tuana and R. Tong (eds) Feminism and philosophy: Essential readings in theory, reinterpretation, and application, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Holli, A.M. (1997) ‘On equality and trojan horses: The challenges of the Finnish experience to feminist theory’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 4: 133–64. Jayawardena, K. (ed.) (1986) Feminism and nationalism in the third world, London: Zed Press. Jónasdóttir, A.G. (1988) ‘On the concept of interest, women’s interests, and the limitations of interest theory’, in K.B. Jones and A.G. Jónasdóttir (eds) The political interests of gender, London: Sage. Kuhn, T.S. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edn, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. (1979) Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts, London: Sage. Lister, R. (1997) Citizenship: Feminist perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) (1993) Gender and party politics, London: Sage. McClure, K. (1992) ‘On the subject of rights: pluralism, plurality and political identity’, in C. Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions of radical democracy: Pluralism, citizenship, community, London: Verso. Meehan, E. and Sevenhuijsen, S. (eds) (1991) Equality, politics and gender, London: Sage. Mohanty, C.T. (1991) ‘Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses’, in C.T. Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres (eds) Third world women and the politics of feminism, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mouffe, C. (ed.) (1992) Dimensions of radical democracy: Pluralism, citizenship, community, London: Verso. Nelson, L.H. (1990) Who knows: From Quine to a feminist empiricism, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Phillips, A. (1993) Democracy and difference, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1991) Engendering democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. Quine, W.V.O. (1981) Theories and things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ——(1960) Word and object, New York: MIT Press. Ramazanoglu, C. (ed.) (1993) Up against Foucault: Explorations of some tensions between Foucault and feminism, London: Routledge. Ramirez, F.O., Soysal, Y. and Shanahan, S. (1997) ‘The changing logic of political citizenship: Cross-national acquisition of women’s suffrage rights, 1890–1990’, American Sociological Review, 62: 735–45. Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization, London: Sage.

Beyond the politics of location 51 Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the mirror of nature, Oxford: Blackwell. Scott, J.W. (1988) ‘Deconstructing equality-versus-difference: Or, the uses of poststructuralist theory for feminism’, Feminist Studies, 14: 33–49. Smith, D. (1988) The everyday world as problematic: A feminist sociology, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Soysal, Y.N. (1994) Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Squires, J. (1999) ‘Re-thinking the boundaries of political representation’, in S. Walby (ed.) New agendas for women, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Standing, G. (1989) ‘Global feminization through flexible labour’, World Development, 17: 1077–95. Stanley, L. and Wise, S. (1983) Breaking out: Feminist consciousness and feminist research, London: Routledge. Taylor, C., Appiah, A., Habermas, J., Rockefeller, S.C., Walzer, M., Wolf, S. and Gutmann, A. (1994) Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. UNDP (1995) Human development report 1995, New York: Oxford University Press. Walby, S. (ed.) (1999) New agendas for women, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ——(1997) Gender transformations, London: Routledge. ——(1994) ‘Methodological issues in the comparative analysis of gender relations in Western Europe’, Environment and Planning, 26: 1339–54. ——(1990) Theorizing patriarchy, Oxford: Blackwell. Young, I. (1990) Justice and the politics of difference, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

4

Stretching and bending the meanings of gender in equality policies1 Vlasta Jalušiþ

Introduction: The ‘use’ of political categories Carol Lee Bacchi has turned our attention to the use and construction of political categories in the process of gender equality policymaking. She shows that categories always represent a political choice, regardless of whether they embody an analytical or a political mobilization category (Bacchi 1996: 2, 7). Although often discursively constructed in the process of academic communication, contests and battles over meanings, political categories depend less on ‘ontological disagreements’ than on their deployment in a specific context. This is why they can both structure understandings of social and political ‘problems’ and set their boundaries at the same time (Bacchi 1996: 5–6). Political categories are thus not only the base for interpretation and understanding of ‘what is’, thereby enabling the adequate ‘capturing’ of the presumed ‘reality’ of the phenomena and lived experiences. They can also display an important potential for transformation, opening space allowing for contestation, questioning and interpretation of their meaning in concrete circumstances. Contests over meanings are therefore always contests over the political potentials of concepts and over desired political outcomes (Bacchi 1996: 5–6). In this chapter, I discuss some of the challenges of the political uses of the ‘gender’ category in policymaking. More specifically, I explore the various meanings of the category of gender and their concrete placement into the locus of ‘gender equality’ policies, and how they affect the envisaged transformative political potential of the latter. ‘Gender’ as a conceptual category entered political theory relatively recently to become a specific concept of understanding and criticizing the world of existing inequalities, including politics and power. Gender also became a specific ‘tool’ of feminist political action and later of policymaking. Yet, from the very beginning, it has also been an ‘essentially contested’ concept, marked by ‘slippery terms’ (Squires 1999: 54; Eveline and Bacchi 2005: 497), because gender was linked with other concepts – especially with equality, difference and diversity. Subject to various discursive interpretations and uses, it was seen as a difference category, as a foundation for equality goals and often as a rather undefined, travelling concept that embraced many meanings. As such, ‘gender’ often proved to operate as an empty signifier that could be arbitrarily ‘filled in’ with diverse meanings by

Meanings of gender in equality policies 53 different political actors or institutions. This generated disputes among feminists over its subsequent use in both the analysis and the equality policy arenas (Kahlert 2005; Knapp 2005). The following questions appear significant for feminist gender theory. To what extent and how does the category of gender acquire diverse features, and how do these affect its envisaged political potentials? What kind of gender framings – stretching and bending the meaning of the concept – emerge when gender settles down in specific equality policies? How much are these policies really about gender and gender equality, and how much are they informed by the discourses of feminists and strategies of transformative gender politics (see Squires 1999, 2007; Verloo and Lombardo 2007)? Does the found spectrum of gender meanings support or obstruct the visions and strategies of political transformation that aim to challenge existing gender regimes (Walby 2005)? To find some answers to these questions, I will look in this chapter at the various meanings of gender and gender equality that emerge in gender theory and in some areas of policymaking in European Union (EU) countries, and examine how they are discursively constructed, stretched, shrunk, bent and eventually fixed within certain debates and policy processes. I begin with an overview of Western feminist discussions on the contested categories of gender and equality, asking how they envisaged a transformative gender equality politics. After that, I analyse some major patterns of the gendering of concrete equality policy issues. I take up the question of how much these patterns of gendering are informed by transformative, feminist or other gender framings. Finally, I reflect on some challenges that these diverse discursive uses of gender – processes of gendering – generate for transformative gender equality politics.

The meanings and political dimensions of gender in feminist thinking Recent debates on gender show an ongoing dispute on its further use and value. Some theorists suggest abandoning, transforming and/or replacing it with something else (Moi 1999; Scott 2004). Judith Butler suggests we should ‘undo’ its present dominant form – which maintains the link between gender and the persisting forms of hegemonic heterosexuality and heterosexual kinship relations (Butler 2004: 54). Gender is specifically criticized for no longer rendering an adequate service for the understanding of individual subjectivity, and therefore not taking into account intersectional elements that converge into an individual subjectivity – the experience of the embodied ‘lived being’ that is not an effect of one sole core mechanism (Moi 1999; Young 2005). Others criticize the conceptual career of the term as a hegemonic conceptual and political category or as an exaggerated substitution for the woman (Maynard 1995: 24 in Kahlert 2005: 53, 60; Wetterer 2002: 129), and write about the process of over-genderization (Kasic 2004). The latter claims that the concept of gender increasingly tends dangerously towards ignoring women as the original feminist political focus or that it unjustifyingly displaces the much more universal sexual difference category (Mitchell 2004). There are those who

54 Vlasta Jalušiþ disprove of the deconstructive epistemological feminist stance regarding gender, claiming that it displaces the political potentials for feminist politics by constantly revolving around the proper and knowledgeable foundations for action instead of becoming more ‘reflexively political’ (Zerilli 2000; Dietz 2002). Toril Moi (1999) and Linda Nicholson (1999) go a step further by claiming that the distinctions feminist theorists began with became totally abstract and disconnected from the embodied experience of individuals, and consequently had to be abandoned. All disagreements notwithstanding, the gender concept is still a common denominator for the processes, mechanisms and experiences that locate/fix us as gendered beings within certain norms, structures, discourses and pressures that we are exposed to as ‘social beings’. This is why Iris Young (2005) insisted that, in spite of its unsatisfying service in the understanding of individual subjectivity, we need gender as a conceptual tool, or else we will not be able to theorize gendered social and political structures of constraint, such as the division of labour, gendered hierarchies of status and power or structures of normative heterosexuality. Further, the use of the term in the political arena marks a political victory for the feminist discourse. Instead of abandoning the concept, Joan Eveline and Carol Bacchi (2005: 508) suggest that we should ‘reinstate a political dimension to the term’ and propose to understand gender not as a static signifier but as a process. Like others, they propose to make a move from aspiring to a fixed and unchangeable category with an unequivocal meaning to an understanding of gender as an open-ended political process of becoming, and to look at the concrete processes and results of gendering. To use gender as a verb and to try to understand ‘gendering’ enables us to describe not only relationships between women and men but the political processes of gendering institutions, norms and organizations, thus enabling us to uncover and challenge the systematically gendered character of the reproduction of power relations. Feminist writings of the 1990s, influenced by psychoanalysis and Foucauldian work, emphasized that gendered subjectivity is wholly discursively constructed. They saw gender not only as a social construction but as a particular effect of dispersed (gendered) power practices – discourses – in which we all participate. Judith Butler’s critique and deconstruction of the sex/gender distinction implies the radical performativity of gender and gendered power. Butler (1990) brings to our attention the possibility of ‘doing gender’ that could question the existing hegemonic discursive meanings on a wider scale. This contributed to the possibility of using and generalizing dimensions of gender in various domains other than direct ‘women’s group’ political activism – for example within state institutions and other (hegemonic) discursive policy surroundings. Gender policies and, more specifically, gender mainstreaming performed by various actors and backed up by a range of strategies and concepts have become the main domains and foci of the direct political deployment of the concept of gender, and therefore also function as co-producers of its further meanings. Today, we are faced with a variety of co-existing contested notions of gender. Earlier feminist terms illuminating gendered experience – such as patriarchy,

Meanings of gender in equality policies 55 women and men, femininity and masculinity, or sex and sexual difference – persist simultaneously with the increasingly central and comprehensive umbrella notion of gender. They were ascribed their specific meaning either within it or in relation to it. Newer categories and relations were added. In effect, one could argue that the term ‘gender’, to which many earlier feminist categories passed on, on the one hand, fixed and hegemonized various co-existing meanings of identity and subjectivity, structures of power and movements that were analysed by feminist authors. On the other hand, it was ‘filled in’ with so many other existing categories, groups, interactions and structures of power, norms and movements that actually ‘no simple definition [could] suffice’ (Butler 2004: 184). These various and contested features of gender are only multiplied in its translation in various political and discursive traditions. That is to say, at least in Europe, there are no non-English language contexts in which translation of the term gender has not been a problem.2 Gender is thus neither linguistically nor politically a unified notion nor can it – as a category – be uniformly and easily translated or transmitted to different languages or contexts; every translation is a reconstruction and adaptation.

Gender and equality The issue gets even more complicated if we speak about gender and equality. For equality, no less than gender, is not a fixed political category but rather a ‘contested ideal notoriously open to a variety of interpretations’ (Jaggar 1990: 239). Its meanings not only closely relate to concepts such as justice, rights and sometimes even development and progress, but they also depend on the context. Equality can be understood as a general frame of our common humanity, a universal norm, and also as a future goal or even a specific instrument. It can represent a strictly publicly and politically bound concept, or it can aspire to social equality and equality in the private sphere. It can be seen as purely legal in terms of equal rights, even as a demand for sameness, or as a path that recognizes and affirms diversity. There exists an inherent tension between equality and gender (understood as difference), and this has been the dominant theme of the debate over the place of women in Western societies (Jaggar 1990: 239). Gendering of the equality category in these debates mainly revolved around the relationship between equality and difference, i.e. how to reconcile the factuality of sex/gender difference with the norm or goal of equality and vice versa. But gendering has also been connected with the attempts at redefining the content and frame of the political (space), of its actors, agendas and scope, that is, of who, how and when something is going to become a public, political problem. Exactly this redefinition has brought about the transformative potentials of the notion of gender equality. The literature identifies three different visions of equality politics in the feminist tradition (Walby 2005). The first is described as a problem of achieving equality as ‘sameness’, and is linked to the strategy of equal chances or equal opportunities. The second represents difference affirmation – namely the difference from the seemingly universal but in fact male norm. The third vision has been described as

56 Vlasta Jalušiþ going beyond the equality/difference dichotomy, towards a thorough transformation of established institutions, norms and relationships. Judith Squires describes these three political strategies as ‘inclusion’, ‘reversal’ and ‘displacement’ respectively (Squires 1999). The formal equality vision has been criticized for aspiring to a gender-neutral world. Women are treated the same as men and are thus assimilated to the male standards and norms. The difference or reversal vision challenges the supposed sameness and offers the politics of recognition of women’s differences compared with the dominant male rule and norms (positive action, taking gender into account, differential treatment, etc.). However, it has often been deemed as promoting essentialism and excluding diversity among women. Displacement is supposed to overcome the pitfalls of the previous two and work as the politics of real transformation – as a ‘total problematization’ of the gendered norms and institutions, attempting to create new standards both for women and men (see Verloo and Lombardo 2007). This last vision – usually connected with deconstructive political discourses and with the gender mainstreaming theory and practices – can be seen as part of a complex of ‘new politics of gender equality’ (Squires 2007). With questioning of the gendered world itself (Verloo and Lombardo 2007: 25), the transformative notion of gender equality aims at challenging the current notion of the political – reframing and politicizing the relationships within and between the domains of citizenship, economy/society and intimacy. Its proponents hope to open up the potential for transforming the deeper structural conditions of relations between women and men, rather than simply providing for the inclusion of women and their assimilation into existing institutions. This also requires a comprehensive connection of gender with other (in)equality issues, including structural and political intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991). Finally, such a transformative vision aspires to overcome the pitfalls of a technocratic gender policy approach with a participatory strategy: it should open up space for various voices, from both ‘expert’ and ‘civil society’, inspire political action, and thus also empower women without essentializing their positions or reifying their eventually naturalized social statuses. Hence, a complex and knowledgeable strategy, one that is based on the reflexive notion of both gender and equality, as well as politics and policymaking, is at stake here. The proponents of such a comprehensive approach taking into account numerous dimensions may encounter many concrete and contextual problems with its ‘implementation’ (see Meier 2006) in the relatively unpredictable domain of ‘real politics’ (Eveline and Bacchi 2005) and its manifold actors, institutions and discourses.

Gendering processes in policymaking After reviewing recent debates and contested concepts of gender and equality, one can ask how the ‘slippery terms of gender’ are understood when deployed in the political arena (Eveline and Bacchi 2005). In this section, I approach the meanings and interpretations of gender in equality policies across several EU countries3 to see the extent to which the patterns of gendering are informed by the transformative,

Meanings of gender in equality policies 57 feminist or other gender equality framings. Feminist framings can be seen as specific ways of gendering equality discourses along some of the dimensions that became part of visions and strategies originating in the feminist tradition described above. They either declare themselves explicitly as feminist or are based on the highly diverse set of feminist theories, movements and normative attitudes that shape the described debates over gender and equality. Three policy issues that have considerable impact on the roles and lives of women and men are the focus of my further elaboration, based on the previous analysis of policy documents in the MAGEEQ project: gender inequality in politics, family policy and domestic violence.4 One of the basic presumptions of the preceding research was that gender (in) equality (thus also the notion of gender itself) is subject to a variety of interpretations that, consciously or not, affect the framing of public policies. Gender and gender equality have accordingly not been normatively defined in advance: the gender problematic was considered to be ‘messy’, without consensus or ‘closure’ about either the problem definition or the necessary solutions (Verloo 2005: 17). As feminist theoretical debates also show a great variety of contesting views about ‘what gender is’, and as many contextual and national differences determine the underlying competing or hegemonic understandings of the gender concept in policy practices, gender has rather been envisaged as a non-homogeneous category that is ‘under construction’ in the policy process itself. Such openness of the category enabled us to trace the concrete ways of gendering (Eveline and Bacchi 2005: 506–7) of the ‘open signifier’ of gender equality (see Verloo and Lombardo 2007: 31; as well as Bacchi’s chapter and Lombardo et al.’s Chapter 1 in this book). This does not mean that we denied any given content or history of ‘gender’ or ‘gender equality’ in political reality – such as its feminist origins, important non-governmental organization (NGO) contributions, expert or institutional definitions and so on – or that we maintain a neutral position. It only means that we acknowledged that gender equality as a discursively constructed political concept represents above all a signifying structure, an articulation that is built around the signifiers of ‘gender’ and ‘equality’ – which can never reach its ‘truth’ or ‘full meaning’ as no such thing exists outside the political ‘web of (human) relationships’ (Arendt 1959: 161). The goal was to find out the extent to which equality policies were framed according to gender dimension, and what notions of gender equality they assumed. What was ‘gendered’ and how and what was eventually ‘de-gendered’? To what extent are policies informed by feminists’ voices, by discourses and visions of transformative gender equality politics? And how are these meanings established or transferred, stretched and/or bent by other discourses, and maybe fixed in certain circumstances? There are three traceable ways of gendering the policy debates that are important for our discussion about the political uses of gender and its transformative potentials. They all involve the various ways in which the gender problematic appears in the public, and the specific ‘dialectic’ of its potential politicization. First, gender as an equality problem either might be unacknowledged and ignored (but assumed) or can be subsumed under other policy priorities. Second, gender

58 Vlasta Jalušiþ (in)equality can be a publicly acknowledged problem, but its meanings can be narrowed to the individual, private or social domains. And third, a gender problematic can be openly acknowledged as a relevant political problem, and supportive state solutions and comprehensive mechanisms may be established to address gender (in)equality. Yet this does not necessarily entail a deeper, substantive change in the problematic gendered structures, norms and institutions. It rather represents, as we shall see, an unstable result that can easily be overthrown – with the gender dimension narrowed down or ignored again. The first way concerns the often present form of elusive gendering. Gender here is usually ‘assumed but ignored’. Existing gender (inequality) relations are hidden under other policy problems. This occurs most often when policies that in fact concern gender relations do not really respond or refer to gender (in)equality as a problem but to some other more conventional (or seemingly urgent) problem representation. Strategies for solving these problems might sometimes even be explicitly gendered as the existing gender relations become functional for them. Policy frames subsequently do not embrace gender equality visions although they sometimes include equality as a norm – seen for example as ‘equality between women and men in the labour market’. They instead point to other problems such as equal opportunities in the labour market, or demographic or democratic concerns (see the chapter by Lombardo and Meier in this book). The meaning of equality is usually narrowed down to make it fit other goals than gender equality itself. For example, family policy issues predominantly revolve around the link between the labour market and the supporting caring–reproductive role of the family and do not refer to gender equality issues. The problems are mainly expressed through the so-called issue of reconciliation. Yet they are not articulated as gendered problems of inequality in the family but in terms of the supply-side problems of the labour market: they for instance target the long-term absence of women from the labour market, the underutilization of women’s capacities or the shortage of labour force (Meier et al. 2007: 119). Moreover, family policies can be seen as the means of solving the increasing demographic problems, especially the decreasing birth rate. In some circumstances, this can be additionally stretched to comply with exclusive nationalistic discourses (Tertinegg et al. 2005: 6). Similarly, the problem of gender inequality in politics is sometimes legitimized in terms of augmenting democracy, increasing societal progress or accelerating Europeanization of societies – cases that occur especially in countries that recently entered the EU (Lombardo et al. 2007). Such framing is harmonized with an EU jargon on the democratic deficit (see Lombardo et al. 2005). Measures for increasing the share of women in elected bodies should help states to conform with the EU policy prescriptions and other ‘more democratic’ member states’ regulations. Although these cases do not necessarily assume ‘gender neutrality’ of the whole policy issue, they de-gender or neutralize the factually gendered issues by putting gender and equality in the service of solving other problems or ‘helping’ other policies. Gender issues are thus suppressed either by giving in to the hegemonic discourses – currently the dominant neoliberal framing and the ascending nationalist discourses on birth rate and immigration – or by shifting attention to some other domain of life.

Meanings of gender in equality policies 59 The second way of gendering shows a tendency in the policy debates – even if they explicitly address gender (in)equality as a problem – not to address it as a relevant political problem. Gender inequality does not figure as a clearly defined political issue that requires comprehensive understanding of the problem and political responsibility, systematic efforts and respective institutions to be set right. If publicly acknowledged, the problem still figures as a socially articulated, ‘natural’ remnant. After breaking out of the domestic (or economic) spheres or being made public by feminist actors and movements, the gender problems that get politicized in such a ‘half way’ often shrink back to the individual, private realm. Or they remain in what Nancy Fraser (1989: 171) calls ‘the hybrid discursive space of the social’ in the Arendtian sense (Arendt 1959), where they are treated as (nobody’s) social problems. The major expressions of this mode of gendering are either articulations of gender inequality as a ‘social problem’ or articulations that point to some clearly visible manifestation of inequality. The problem of ‘women’s inequality’ (for example in politics) is noticeably underlined, and often the only additional observations are that (rather undefined) gender inequality still ‘persists’, as for example in family policy (Meier et al. 2007: 128). Otherwise, policies do not pay much regard to gender in their definition of the problem – although they might propose gendered solutions. They usually focus on women as a (‘natural’ or social) group, leave men out and do not tackle the deeper elements of gendered relations of power in the private and public domains. Moreover, as women themselves are seen at the centre of the problem of equality, they are also the most responsible problem bearers (Bacchi 1999: 65). For example, the importance that is given to descriptive representation and to pure ‘numbers’ of women in politics (quantitative representation) in the context of overcoming ‘women’s inequality’ in the current European policy arenas shows that the ways of gendering this policy field tend towards naturalization and essentialization of gender relations. This approach allows for very little differentiation among women, as they all figure as ‘equally unequal’ (Bacchi 1999: 69). Gender is often reduced to sex, dichotomies are produced, men are neglected and women held responsible (Lombardo et al. 2007). The remedy for the problems defined as women’s inequality is often seen in addressing individual women and their alleged deficits (a lack of resources or experience) or women as a social group and their alleged advantages (their special female qualities) while traditional institutions and norms are merely addressed formally, or in a de-gendered way. The equality vision remains attached to the idea that women should be ‘included’ or ‘added’ to the system, or have ‘equal opportunities’ (Meier et al. 2007: 121–22). This vision sees political institutions like the system of representation and its rules as not gendered, and thus not as physically and structurally controlled and over-represented by men. Only now and then is there mention (as regarding political representation) of a ‘male domination of political life and decision-making’, or of male ‘monoculture’, ‘old boys’ networks’ or even ‘patriarchy’ (Lombardo et al. 2005). Yet such labelling of gender problems mainly comes from the voices of gender experts occasionally involved in the policymaking process and not from mainstream policymakers.

60 Vlasta Jalušiþ Likewise, leaving men and structures out of the representation of gender inequality problems promotes traditional gender roles and norms in the private sphere, such as the gender norm that caring is the women’s duty (Stratigaki 2004). Eventual incentives towards a redefinition of traditional roles (women as carers and men as breadwinners) that can be found now and then in policy documents cannot be read as politically relevant gender equality solutions. They rather represent the above discussed labour market and demographic requirement, or appear as ‘subframes’ represented by the ‘enclaved [feminist] publics’ (Fraser 1989: 170). Although men might sometimes be progressively gendered – when family policies focus on the issue of reconciliation in the private sphere and call them ‘active fathers’ – they are referred to very little compared with women. A change in traditional family roles depends on individual or social initiative rather than on institutional and politically motivated transformations. Men are supposed to ‘help’ women (defined as ‘working mothers’) with domestic work to support their participation in the labour market. Stretching of the parental role between the ‘working mother’ and the ‘active father’ indicates the deep embeddedness of social roles in the traditional, unequal gender imagery of the essential sex difference and the persisting stereotypes of caring duties – whereby women as ‘natural carers’ additionally work in the economy and men as ‘natural breadwinners’ get motivated to be active as fathers in the family. The third way of gendering displays those cases where gender seems to explicitly matter, and inequality is explicitly addressed as a relevant political problem concerning the whole community and its institutions. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the substantial change in power relations towards greater gender equality would be envisaged and implemented. Moreover, issues that were quite promisingly politicized and consciously gendered soon after became de-gendered (the gender dimension was reduced, neutralized or abolished). Only rarely are gender equality issues consequently seen and kept as a political matter concerning not only women, ‘society’ and some specific institutions, but also explicitly involving men and the most relevant state institutions. Among the researched issues, this was the case in policies against domestic violence, yet only to a certain extent. In most of the researched countries (as in many other EU countries), governments have become increasingly engaged in this field in the last decade, and have introduced various measures to address the problem. Such politicization of domestic violence is an evident success of the women’s movement’s political engagement (Krizsán et al. 2005: 87). The articulation of the problem that was clearly addressed as a serious gender inequality issue substantially transformed the traditional borders of the intimate, social and political spheres. Yet the case of gender-based violence has also shown how the importance of gender equality as a policy problem may shrink and get depoliticized within the mainstream political debates when discussed and treated by the official institutions (Krizsán et al. 2007: 163). The emphasis soon changed from ‘violence against women’ to the ‘domestic violence issue’. With the shift away from feminist framing, not only did the emphasis of these policies alter from a gender equality to a human rights or even a public health intonation, but it also shifted from women,

Meanings of gender in equality policies 61 men and their relationships to other actors. The case was de-gendered in terms of reframing the roles: technocratic and neutralized language has brought about victims and perpetrators who became genderless (‘dependants’ in the family) and has occluded women victims from view. Simultaneously, the former clearly politically defined causes of the problems were reallocated back to the social or private space. The main ‘problem holders’ and therefore those who were supposed to find solutions or be affected by policies were again fixed as individuals, especially women.

Gendering, transformation and the ‘real politics’ The delineated ways of gendering/de-gendering processes in policymaking do not emerge as stable patterns but they are traversable, often appearing simultaneously in the discourses of different actors. Yet their features clearly point to the fact that even policies that explicitly concern gender relations and gender equality are not always about gender and equality. Few analysed policies were found to have been framed and politicized along more articulated gender concepts and gender equality visions. While the meanings that gender acquired through the main paths of gendering were often dichotomized and personalized categories of gender – seen as social categories of women and men, different female or male identities and behaviours – structures and institutions were only rarely acknowledged or treated as gendered. Policy discourses tended to essentialize differences, and present women and men as internally homogeneous groups. They repeatedly envisaged women’s interests as being self-evident, common to all women, given once and for all, and not debatable (Lombardo et al. 2007). Even if gender was acknowledged as a socially constructed and politically relevant category, a strong tendency to naturalize it and reduce it to the assumed biological ‘sex’ still existed. This was often done by stereotyping the existing roles and/or by naturalizing and de-gendering structures, norms and institutions. The gendering of policy issues that brings about elements of a transformative gender equality approach was usually informed by feminist ideas on gender equality and was based on more complex and sophisticated categories. Yet one could only rarely find more comprehensive definitions or receptions of gender or gender equality in the mainstream policy documents. Such definitions were rather represented by fragmented voices of women’s civil society organizations and feminist experts than by mainstream institutions, and they were not really visible. They mainly appeared in the fields of domestic violence policy (civil society voices) and in some documents concerning gender inequality in politics (gender experts’ voices). Yet they did not necessarily embrace transformative notions of gender and equality. As can be expected because of the variety of positions in feminisms, elements of inclusive, reversal and transformative gendering of equality policies were co-present throughout the processes of policy formulations. This can be seen especially in the area of domestic violence policies that made a decisive move towards reframing and transforming the traditional relationship between the private and the public. The fact that domestic violence almost always

62 Vlasta Jalušiþ appears in policies as a public matter represents a considerable success of the long-term feminist efforts for politicizing the personal and the private circumstances, and can be seen as a ‘successful transfer of feminist frames to policymaking’ (Verloo et al. 2007: 290). Here, gender equality became an issue that is clearly conditioned by the ‘spaces of freedom’ (Jalušiþ 2002) in the private sphere and cannot be achieved if it is bound solely to the public space. In other cases, the relationships between women and men tended to be redefined solely in the public space, and the conditions in the private space were neglected and depoliticized, for example in gender inequality in politics. The dominant gender equality vision behind the problem of ‘women’s inequality’ and ‘low numbers of women’ resembles the feminist vision of inclusion – equality for women here means to be included in the representative institutions. However, no policy measures are foreseen to seriously tackle the private power structures that substantially condition women’s and men’s possibilities for entering institutional politics. Likewise, no substantial structural and qualitative change in the public institutions is envisaged – the burden of participation comes down to women who should ‘bring the difference’ into politics (Lombardo et al. 2007). Hence, promoting gender equality does not necessarily mean either gender transformation or equality. Finally, the gendering of family policies often resembles the vision of reversal (equality as equal valuing of the ‘different contributions’ of women and men). How do these main meanings and patterns of gendering affect the transformative political potentials of gender? An explicit tension obviously exists between those feminist insights that strive for complex transformative strategies and consciously oppose essentialisms, and the main patterns of gendering in the policy field – the everyday adaptations, simplifications and stretching and bending in the political uses of gender. Despite their variety, the meanings encountered along the analysed processes of gendering are mainly based on the preservation of gender regime/s and only rarely on transformation paradigms. Even if the gender problematic is publicly acknowledged as a political issue, its meaning/s are often constrained to the individual, private or social domain, or stretched to the point where they can be linked with other issues and subsequently lose their gender focus. Hegemonic discourses are not often challenged. Is the conclusion then that the found ways of gendering of equality policies (that were supposed to include new and more comprehensive visions of equality) tend to block the transformative political visions of gender equality? Should one also conclude that such ways of gendering persist with conceptions of sex difference, which conceive gender as a dichotomous, homogeneous and fixed category (as seems to prevail in the inequality of women in politics)? Yet, framing was often inconsistent and incoherent, and we also found elements of transformative gendering – such as paying attention to the gender roles of men, or addressing both the public and the private structures of power – in most of the selected European equality policies. While they could represent a successful transfer of transformative approaches, the feminist policy framings found in the MAGEEQ research are neither consistent nor necessarily exhaustively informed by the transformative visions of gender equality. Even if they held more articulated views, they

Meanings of gender in equality policies 63 do not seem to influence the wider voices much, rather embracing ‘social issues’ and often balancing ‘between marginalization and co-optation’ (Fraser 1989: 170) into the main discourses. They, too, consist of contested gender equality views. A case in point occurs when the demands for inclusion and reversal are simultaneously present with the elements of transformative visions. The lack of transformative framing of gender or the inconsistency found in feminist framings may both be the result of strategically adopted essentialist views – examples range from promoting a dichotomous (maternal) difference to increasing the number of women in politics through quota. They might also be biased towards hegemonic discourses on gender and equality, even reproducing such discourses in particular contexts. And as we have seen, even the more coherent and consistent feminist framings are – usually soon after entering the official debates and institutions – (intentionally or unintentionally) stretched or bent and do not necessarily induce transformation.

Conclusions: The challenges of co-existing patterns of gendering What then are the challenges that co-existing (feminist and other) patterns of gendering generate for the attempts at transformative gender equality? Do they support or obstruct the visions of political transformation of gender regimes? Although they might not necessarily be incompatible among themselves (Squires 1999: 226), the variety of co-existing gender equality frames and the weak presence of transformative elements do not seem to contribute to an easy adoption of meanings that could run as top candidates for changes in gender regimes. They do not appear to support the strategies – that must to a certain extent be consistent and clear, in order to be ‘effectively’ implemented as policies (Lombardo and Meier in this volume) – but rather generate the circumstances in which the clarity of notions can be distorted (Meier 2006). Thus, existing gender equality frames – together with the surrounding hegemonic, ‘strong discourses’ (Goffman 1986/1974) – delineate the boundaries of what can be said and heard in the given political space. The found ways of gendering and gender equality framing thus neither automatically support nor obstruct the realization of visions of gender regimes’ political transformation. A range of feminist arguments to this day conceives of gender difference as the opposite of equality and vice versa. Whether other inequalities should be equally meaningful or whether gender should have a special position also remain open issues. The tension between gender and equality is not abolished by far, despite the increasing framing of equality in terms of democracy (Barrett 1991: 70), human rights or more structural relations (see Chapter 1 by Lombardo et al. and the chapter by Lombardo and Verloo in this book). This emphasizes that the opposite of equality is not ‘difference’ but inequality (Lister 2000: 51). Moreover, the research discussed above shows that policymakers, while using various (also feminist) political categories of gender and equality, often do not even know the meaning of the concepts they stick to. For example, policymakers seemed to ignore the meaning of the quantitative representation of women in politics, as they did not argue why raising the number of women should be

64 Vlasta Jalušiþ important or contribute to democracy (Lombardo et al. 2005). While it is true that they do not often consult feminist experts and are not familiar with transformative visions, the problem most likely does not lie solely in the fact that policymakers are not knowledgeable enough or lacking in clear and coherent conceptual meanings that are at their disposal. Some other reasons might interfere here. Not only the inevitable question of the coherence of conceptual meanings is at stake, but also what happens in the processes of ‘translations’ of the potentially transformative feminist concepts to the ‘real’ policy world. One cannot just replace essentializing notions of gender differences (expressed in terms of sex difference) by the more reasonable and ‘more knowledgeable’ concept of gender (Zerilli 2000), which only needs to be instrumentally politicized. Even the most elaborated concepts, visions and strategies of gender and equality that overcome the apparently misleading choice/dichotomy between equality and difference (see Scott 1999; Squires 1999: 116) will be powerless if those who want transformation cannot find a way of translating their theories and categories ‘into terms that make sense to policymakers’ (Eveline and Bacchi 2005: 151). Yet, what kind of ‘translation’ would this actually require? The above described processes of gendering the policy issues show that it might be very important for transformatively oriented gender theory to take a reflexive stance regarding the power of knowledge and take into account its own limits regarding the ‘use’ and ‘making sense’ of categories in the sphere of politics (see Zerilli 2000, 1998). No matter how big the epistemological strength of transformative conceptual ‘truths’ might be, in the arena of politics, their meanings represent only more or less convincing and powerful opinions and experiences. ‘Making sense’ of terms thus not only demands the ‘translating’ of ‘knowledge’ to ‘policymaking’ but paying much more attention to politics as action, to deployment of political categories within the everyday experience and to the voices and experiences of actors who are part of the policymaking process. How do they construct their meanings? What experiences and contexts do they emerge from? The ‘translation’ of meanings cannot be a one-way process. Any politically thoughtful attempt at transformation should be aware of the dangers of not taking seriously the ‘real politics’ of not fully recognizing the political character of contested meanings and of not taking into account the question of political action, opinions and democratic citizenship. It would lead to what could be called ‘the Schmittian trap’: losing political experiences, presupposing the automatic existence of the ‘political’ and political potentials and focusing on its alleged content, which should then merely be ‘transferred’ into the ‘real politics’. Thus, maybe one of the most important challenges of a politically reflective, discursive approach to gender policymaking, which would include the concept of politics as ‘action in concert’ (Arendt 1959), would be to keep the questions (of gender and gender equality) open while acknowledging that making sense of political categories is always structured through political contestation, and thus exposed to stretching and bending. While keeping this in mind, the task concerning the danger of the ‘Schmittian trap’ would be to keep open a space for the possibilities of discussion and contestation in the sense of thinking through different

Meanings of gender in equality policies 65 actors’ perspectives (also those who do not have a voice or whose voices are not heard). This could then result in a certain form of ‘Mitdenken’, an ‘enlarged mentality’ of thinking with others (Arendt 1968: 220), which includes seeing things from multiple perspectives and allows for mutual ‘translation’ of various meanings. Yet this cannot be an exclusively epistemic practice but rather a public citizenship activity, enabling the clear communication of particular concerns about gender and other inequalities, as well as a common space for judging the best political articulations and strategies to transform the existing inequalities. Such a move would also facilitate more vivid translations of concrete and contextualized feminist political experiences and struggles for equality back into political categories. This could, in turn, also allow for more reflexive shaping of feminist political categories, without freezing them into fixed and unchangeable systems/discourses that – although constructed by feminists – can thwart the future transformative visions of (gender) equality.

Notes 1 I would like to express my special thanks to the editors of this book for their valuable comments and suggestions regarding some crucial points in this chapter. 2 The distinction that Anglophone feminism has made between the presumably ‘biological foundation’ and its ‘social representation’ was not directly translatable into other European languages in the same way, neither could it be used easily in everyday language. The following main features of the use of the translated concept of gender in the non-English language contexts are visible: it is mainly used within academic feminist communities where gender is also used as a substitute for ‘women’. Concepts such as sex/gender, sexual difference, gender as both structural category and subjectivity path, femininity and masculinity, women and men as opposed/connected social groups, etc. co-exist (see Bahovec 2000; Puig de la Bellacasa 2000; Petö 2001; Vonk 2002). There is basically no ‘common sense’ unique meaning. 3 Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain. 4 This section builds on the insights from the EU-funded project MAGEEQ (Policy frames and implementation problems: The case of gender mainstreaming; see references in the text) and on a conference paper (Jalušiþ and Hrženjak 2006). I owe special thanks to Majda Hrženjak for some formulations in this section of the chapter.

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66 Vlasta Jalušiþ ——(1990) Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity, New York: Routledge. Crenshaw, K. (1991) ‘Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics and violence against women of color’, Stanford Law Review, 43: 1241–99. Dietz, M. (2002) Turning operations. Feminism, Arendt, and politics, New York, London: Routledge. Eveline, J. and Bacchi, C. (2005) ‘What are we mainstreaming when we mainstream gender?’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7: 496–512. Fraser, N. (1989) Unruly practices. Power, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Goffman, E. (1986/1974) Frame analysis: An essay on organization of experience, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. Jaggar, A.M. (1990) ‘Sexual difference and sexual equality’, in D.L. Rhode (ed.) Theoretical perspectives on sexual difference, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Jalušiþ, V. (2002) ‘Between the social and the political: Feminism, citizenship and the possibilities of an Arendtian perspective in Eastern Europe’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 9: 103–22. Jalušiþ, V. and Hrženjak, M. (2006) ‘The meaning of gender/s: The political dimensions of gender in policy practice’, paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, July 2006. Kahlert, H. (2005) ‘Beratung zur Emanzipation? Gender Mainstreaming unter dem Vorzeichen von New Public Management’, in U. Behning and B. Sauer (eds) Was bewirkt Gender Mainstreaming? Evaluierung durch Policy-Analysen, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. Kasic, B. (2004) ‘Feminist cross-mainstreaming within “East–West”. Mapping a post-socialist perspective’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11: 473–85. Knapp, G.A. (2005) ‘Race, class, gender. Reclaiming baggage in fast traveling theories’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 12: 249–65. Krizsán, A., Bustelo, M., Hadjiyanni, A. and Kamoutis, F. (2007) ‘Domestic violence: A public matter’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Krizsán, A., Paantjens, M. and van Lamoen, I. (2005) ‘Domestic violence: Who’s the problem?’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 63–92. Lister, R. (2000) ‘Dilemmas in engendering citizenship’, in B. Hobson (ed.) Gender and citizenship in transition, New York: Routledge. Lombardo, E., Jalušiþ, V., Maloutas Pantelidou, M. and Sauer, B. (2007) ‘Framing gender inequality in politics in the European Union and the member states’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2005) ‘Comparative frame analysis: Gender inequality in politics. The European Union, Austria, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and The Netherlands’, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Meier, P. (2006) ‘Implementing gender equality: Gender mainstreaming or the gap between theory and practice’, in S.K. Hellsten, A.M. Holli and K. Daskalova (eds) Women’s citizenship and political rights, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Meier, P., Peterson, E., Tertinegg, K. and Zentai, V. (2007) ‘The pregnant worker and caring mother: Framing family policies across Europe’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books.

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5

Stretching gender equality to other inequalities Political intersectionality in European gender equality policies Emanuela Lombardo and Mieke Verloo

Introduction Gender is not the only dimension of social relations that causes inequality. Moreover, because gender intersects with other inequality axes, various inequalities are often mutually constitutive. Therefore, the concept of equality is particularly exposed to processes of stretching that aim to extend the meaning of the concept, so as to encompass various dimensions that are seen to be responsible for inequality. Even if the political articulation of the concept may at times have privileged the treatment of some inequalities, it is nevertheless likely that the meaning of equality is stretched at some point to include other sources of inequality than the existing ones. In Europe, particularly since the postwar period’s development of a political machinery on gender equality policies, gender, while being to some extent privileged in terms of political attention, is still only one family member among the other equality goals.1 Stretching the concept of gender equality is necessary for the underlying goal of equality itself, to keep it alive as a political goal that is in continuous development on account of the ongoing emergence of groups claiming their right to inclusion and equality (see Young 1990; Phillips 2003). If in dealing with gender we do not look at its intersections with other inequalities, we are in danger of silencing ‘other’, often less privileged, voices. Moreover, because gender inequality and other inequalities are not separate, but interdependent and intersecting phenomena, it is impossible to reach gender equality as long as other inequalities still exist. The borders of (gender) equality should thus be stretched so as to accommodate the different equality struggles in a relatively inclusive way, thus strengthening the struggle against all inequalities (Squires 2005). European equality policies, at the level of both the European Union (EU) and the member states, are a good case to explore the more or less inclusive ways in which gender equality policies have been stretched to include other inequalities, both because the EU has started to develop a wider equality policy and because of the influence the EU has on the member states. At least from 1997 onwards, there seems to be a growing awareness in the EU that the concept of gender equality encompasses a wider reality of inequalities that deserve political recognition and legal protection. The recognition of the multidimensional reality of (in)equality

Political intersectionality in Europe 69 potentially encloses positive developments in the treatment of inequalities that have until recently been neglected, opening the way to the formulation of more inclusive policies in Europe. Owing to the obligation for member states to transpose EU provisions, the recent EU stretching of gender equality to other inequalities might have an impact on the formulation of more inclusive equality policies in all the European countries. However, stretching gender equality to other sources of inequality could also show a tension between gender and equality, because the process, rather than being inclusive, could lead to the drawing of borders between the different equality struggles (Walby 2005; Verloo 2006). The stretching of gender equality to include other inequalities has the potential to generate tensions not only between the different disadvantaged groups but also within equality policies defending the same disadvantaged group, i.e. women. This is because such policies had previously not paid much attention to how the intersection of gender with other sources of inequality should be politically articulated. Exploring the pros and cons of stretching gender equality to other inequalities leads us to these two questions: How has the EU’s stretching of the concept of gender equality been evident in the European gender equality policies in the last decade? And to what extent do the EU and member states’ gender equality policies mainstream intersectionality into their own policy discourses? We consider these questions first by discussing the concept of political intersectionality and our analysis of its practical application. We then explore the framing of intersectionality in European gender equality policies in order to understand to what extent gender equality policies refer to intersectionality in their policy discourses and, if they do so, how they conceptualize it. Our empirical case is represented by gender equality policies that are formulated at the level of the EU and of a selection of member states from the North, South and East of Europe. The analysis of how gender equality issues such as family policies, domestic violence and gender inequality in politics have incorporated the concept of intersectionality in their policy discourses draws on research carried out within the EU-funded MAGEEQ project and employs the methodology of critical frame analysis (see Chapter 1 in this volume, as well as the chapters by Jalušiþ, Bustelo and Verloo, and Lombardo and Meier). The analysis finally leads us to reflect on what the framing of intersectionality in gender equality policies, or its absence, suggests about the nature of the process of stretching gender equality to other inequalities, with particular reference to the related advantages and tensions. Our findings point to the difficulties that public policies show in stretching gender equality in order to address multiple forms of inequality.2

The concept of political intersectionality and its study through critical frame analysis While gender equality has been on the political agenda of the EU from its foundation, the launch of an anti-discrimination policy strand through the approval of a variety of policy measures in this area dates only to the last decade. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty,3 in 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights,4 two Directives5 and an article in the Treaty of Lisbon6 as well as other non-binding measures

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provided the Union with a legal basis for the adoption of measures combating discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, sex, age, disability, religion and sexual orientation. These developments in the EU equality policy are evidence of a move from addressing gender inequality to addressing multiple inequalities, which are currently treated as separate strands. In reality, however, rather than being separated, the different strands of inequalities often intersect with one another; gender inequality intersects with race, sexuality, class, ability, age and other complex inequalities. Now that the concept of equality is beginning to be stretched at the EU level to include other inequalities than just gender, does this also mean that the intersections between the different inequalities, and in particular between gender and other inequalities, are also politically articulated? Before we can assess whether and how gender equality policies in the EU and in the member states mainstream intersectionality, we need to define what the concept of political intersectionality is and how we can grasp its presence or absence in policy documents. The concept of intersectionality is increasingly used in gender studies, sociology and economics (see Anthias 1998; Hill Collins 1998; Brah 2002; Brewer et al. 2002; Browne and Misra 2003; Beisel and Kay 2004; Brah and Phoenix 2004; Gamson and Moon 2004; Risman 2004; Wekker 2004; Belkhir 2005; Yuval-Davis et al. 2005; Phoenix and Pattynama 2006; Weldon 2006; Hancock 2007; Walby 2007; Davis 2008). Crenshaw was particularly instrumental in theorizing the concept, introducing intersectionality as an escape from the problems of identity politics, to ‘denote the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women’s employment experiences’ (Crenshaw 1989: 139).7 Crenshaw distinguishes between structural intersectionality and political intersectionality (Crenshaw 1994). She talks of structural intersectionality when inequalities and their intersections are directly relevant to the experiences of people in society. This is the case, for instance, when a black woman is not considered for one job because she is black, as the ‘norm employee’ is a white woman, while other jobs are also unavailable to her because the jobs available to black people in that context are predominantly male. Structural intersectionality expects racism to amplify sexism, class exploitation to reinforce homophobia, homophobia to amplify racism and sexism and conceptualizes inequalities as mutually constitutive (Walby 2007). Crenshaw uses political intersectionality to indicate how inequalities and their intersections are relevant to political strategies. Political intersectionality points to the necessity to address the interdependencies between intersecting inequalities because strategies on one axis of inequality are mostly not neutral towards other axes. She uses an example of the unavailability of statistics on domestic violence police interventions broken down by Los Angeles district, which, given the racial segregation in this city, could provide information she needs on arrests differentiated by race. She found that this information was blocked by domestic violence activists because of fears that such information might be abused to reinforce racial stereotypes about the pathological violence of some specific groups. She argues that these concerns, while well-founded, could work against the interests of women of colour as they do not help to ‘break the silence’ within the respective communities,

Political intersectionality in Europe 71 thus hindering broad mobilization against domestic violence there. The concept of political intersectionality highlights the fact that feminism can marginalize ethnic minorities, or disabled women, that measures on sexual equality or on racism can marginalize women, and that gender equality policies can marginalize lesbians. In all these examples, gender equality cannot be reached because of failures to address political intersectionality. Although academic studies on intersectionality have been booming in the past five years, they mostly pay attention to structural intersectionality. One of the scarce studies on political intersectionality is Sainsbury’s, which shows that ‘intersecting struggles of recognition’ contributed to the surprising victory of the women’s suffrage campaign in Oklahoma in 1918 (Sainsbury 2003). In spite of its growing academic use, however, political and policy practice in Europe have seldom referred to both structural and political intersectionality when trying to deal with multiple inequalities. If the concept of intersectionality appears so underdeveloped in existing policy practices, how can we then grasp its presence or absence in existing policy documents? In this study of intersectionality in European gender equality policies, we employ the methodology of critical frame analysis that was discussed in the first chapter of this book (see also Verloo 2007) as a means to trace the concept. Critical frame analysis is particularly interesting for the study of intersectionality in policy discourses on gender inequality because it provides a method for identifying the different dimensions in which a given policy problem and solution can be represented, either implicitly or explicitly. This method enables us to grasp both the presence and the absence of intersectionality in the selected policy documents. In the analysis of policy documents, a code was entered when texts made reference to how gender intersects with any other structural inequality, such as country of origin, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, class, ability, etc. Such references could just mention social categories or they could outline more comprehensively how another inequality than gender was relevant in diagnosis or prognosis. The following section presents the results of the MAGEEQ research project’s coding of intersectionality. We analysed policy documents produced not only by the EU but also in six member states (Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and Austria) to be able to grasp the framing of intersectionality in a broader European context and to provide insights for the understanding of the complex relation between gender and other inequalities in European policymaking. In all these settings, gender equality policies are explored comparatively in relation to the issues of family policies, domestic violence and gender inequality in politics, while specific national contexts discuss the issues of prostitution (Austria, Slovenia), migration (the Netherlands, Greece), homosexual rights (Spain) and anti-discrimination (Hungary).8

Framing intersectionality in European gender equality policies9 To explore the extent to which EU gender equality policies mainstream intersectionality into their own policy discourses, we present data on the critical frame analysis of European official policy discourses on gender equality that reveals how the intersection of gender with other inequalities is framed. This pilot analysis

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of the presence and absence of intersectionality in official policy documents on gender helps us to detect whether and how intersectionality is politically articulated in existing gender policies in Europe, and helps us to reflect on the potential and pitfalls in stretching gender equality to other inequalities. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the data drawn from the coding of intersectionality in the MAGEEQ research, presenting the material broken down by country and the EU (Table 5.1) and broken down by issue (Table 5.2). Table 5.1 shows that the absence rather than the presence of reference to intersectionality is the rule, although there is a large group of texts that at least refer to some other social category than gender alone. In most cases, it seems that such reference is associated rather with diagnosis than with prognosis. The overview in Table 5.1 shows that the differences across the different countries and the EU seem substantial. While 41 of the 57 Dutch texts include at least one code on intersectionality, only 23 out of the 77 Slovenian texts do, and 15 out of the 43 texts for the EU. While this is an intriguing difference, there can be multiple reasons for these differences. They could be the result of variations in the type of documents analysed (for example, a comprehensive policy report, as in the Netherlands, is more likely to include some reference to intersectionality at some point than a concise legal text or a contribution to a parliamentary debate); they could be due to different policy contexts facing different problems (e.g. Slovenia has faced different migration movements from the Netherlands) or a differently composed population, which can raise different types of intersectionality issues; they could also be caused by a different policy frame in the text; or be the result of a different understanding/representation of what the policy problem at hand is, and who has which role in this problem or in its solution. Most of the times that intersectionality is present, it is in the diagnosis of the problem rather than in the solution to the problem (see also Table 5.2), with the exception of Hungary. This could suggest that, while some effort is being made by policymakers to incorporate attention to multiple inequalities in the diagnosis of the problem, policy documents on gender are still far from elaborating solutions that take into account complex inequalities. The stronger accent on diagnosis might also be caused by an understanding of certain social categories as ‘being’, not ‘having’, a problem. For instance, if Roma women are represented as a social group creating problems for native Italians rather than suffering from problems that policymakers are supposed to solve (for instance Roma women’s rejection by the native communities), they are stigmatized as ‘being a problem’ in the diagnosis of a policy document, but they are offered no solution to their problems that takes into account the intersection of gender and ethnicity and the dynamics of conflict or co-operation between different communities. The overview of the results broken down by issue in Table 5.2 is a second attempt to see and understand patterns. Table 5.2 shows a different kind of result, one that sees intersectionality more often included in the four issues studied only at the level of one or two countries (prostitution in Austria [AT] and Slovenia [SL], migration in Greece [GR] and the Netherlands [NL], homosexual rights in Spain [ES] and anti-discrimination policy in Hungary [HU]). This is to be

82

43

49

67

77

Austria

EU

Greece

Spain

Slovenia

448

73

Hungary

Total

57

Texts

Netherlands

Country

254

54

44

32

28

47

33

16

57

70

66

65

65

57

45

28

Intersectionality % code absent

194

23

23

17

15

35

40

41

43

30

34

35

35

43

55

72

Intersectionality % code present

91

7

15

8

6

11

17

27

75

15

5

6

9

21

10

9

In diagnosis and Only in prognosis diagnosis

Table 5.1 Overview of codes referring to intersectionality broken down by country and the EU

28

1

3

3

0

3

13

5

Only in prognosis

100

118

448

Political participation

Total

28 HU

Anti-discrimination

Family policy

20 ES

Homosexual rights

122

6 GR 12 NL

Migration

Domestic violence

25 A 17 SL

108

Country-specific subject

Prostitution

Texts

Issue

254

85

68

58

6 HU

20 ES

4 GR 1 NL

10 AT 2 SL

43

57

72

68

48

40

Intersectionality % code absent

48

33

32

64

22 HU

–

2 GR 11 NL

15 AT 15 SL

65

58

28

32

52

60

Intersectionality % code present

Table 5.2 Overview of codes referring to intersectionality broken down by issue

23

11

19

33

10 HU

–

8 NL

6 AT 5 SL

29

18

15

9

29

1 HU

–

3 NL

8 AT 10 SL

22

7

7

5

2

11 HU

–

2 GR –NL

1 AT –SL

14

Diagnosis Only in Only in and prognosis diagnosis prognosis

Political intersectionality in Europe 75 expected as the issues of migration and integration, homosexual rights and antidiscrimination policy are all directly connected to at least one other structural axis of inequality. Yet, the details of the separate analyses tell a different story. While anti-discrimination texts indeed refer to intersectionality in the majority of texts, the absence of references to intersectionality in the texts analysed for the issue of homosexual rights in Spain is striking. Platero (2007), who analysed these data on Spain, concludes that the main gender equality policies lack an intersectional perspective of sexuality and gender because policies do not acknowledge a common source of discrimination against women and homosexuals. Most equality policies make women’s sexuality invisible, although there is a trend towards increasing inclusiveness within some Basque texts, where lesbian activists have been appointed as political candidates. Here, key politicians have actively promoted the inclusion of attention to sexual orientation in mainstream politics. If the Spanish equality policies lack any mention of women’s sexual orientation, the Dutch material on migration and integration reveals a nationalistic and racist bias that presents migrant women as ‘the others’. In their analysis of the data, Roggeband and Verloo (2007: 286) find that there are two major shifts in Dutch minority and gender equality policies: ‘Minority and integration policies change from degendered to gendered policies, where unequal gender relations become a core focus of attention. Emancipation policies in the same period have become “ethnicized”, focusing almost primarily on the emancipation of “allochthonous”10 women.’ In these policies, Muslim women are singled out as a group in particular need of emancipation. While migrant women long remained invisible as the wives and daughters of immigrant workers, Dutch society and politics have recently discovered them as the other ‘other’ and placed new demands upon them. Policymakers argue that, as women are principally responsible for taking care of and educating their children, it is mainly women who can and should educate their family towards (cultural) change. This gives migrant women a special place in governmental policies and suggests that the practices of Muslim women might create an important bridge between liberal citizenship and Muslim identity. The dominant frames of modernization and individual responsibility are reinforcing a dichotomy between the autochthonous ‘us’ and the allochthonous ‘them’. As the problem is more and more defined as a cultural one (of non-Western cultures), it is implicitly stated that there is nothing wrong with the dominant culture and society. The attention has shifted from structural to cultural barriers to participation, and these cultural barriers are exclusively located in the migrant (Muslim) culture. According to Roggeband and Verloo, the negative representations of migrant women as traditional and backwards, and as (potential) victims, could limit the discursive opportunities for identification and participation of migrant women, and thus may have the opposite effect to what the government aims to accomplish. A similar racist–nationalistic–ethnic bias in the treatment of gender intersecting other inequalities can be found in the texts on prostitution and trafficking in Slovenia and Austria, where a similar image of the ‘other’ appears. Tertinegg et al. (2007)

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argue that the issue is framed in Slovenia (and similarly, although less explicitly, in Austria too) by reproducing a series of dichotomies that positively reinforce the role of the ‘national’ Slovenian prostitute who belongs to the high-class category, taking up the profession voluntarily to gain extra earnings. The ‘national’ prostitute is opposed to the ‘other’, the foreign prostitute who is involuntarily trafficked from South Eastern European countries, engages in low-ranking prostitution to earn a living and is criminalized and problematic compared with the legal, unproblematic, Slovenian form of prostitution. In these discourses, both trafficking and prostitution are framed in ethnic and nationalist terms rather than in gendered terms by distinguishing the ‘high-level’ and thus unproblematic prostitution of native women and the ‘low-level’ illegal prostitution of foreign victims of trafficking. The case of anti-discrimination policy in Hungary is different from the other cases analysed, as the framing of this policy has shifted from a more gender-specific agenda to a general equal opportunity agenda that addresses all inequalities. This explains the high number of references to intersectionality in the Hungarian documents on anti-discrimination (references present in twenty-two out of twenty-eight texts). In their analysis of the data, Dombos et al. (2007) argue that the EU had a significant role in favouring this shift in focus from the specific to the general in the context of the accession process. They highlight the problematic character of this shift as follows: Within the Hungarian context, gender discrimination, though covered in principle by the general equal opportunity language of the anti-discrimination debate, remains largely unaddressed in its specific terms. Even where gender discrimination is covered, it remains confined to identifying discriminatory behaviour. This dismisses important aspects of norms, symbols and institutions, which ultimately stand at the roots of reproducing the problem, and which remain issues only for women’s NGOs. (Dombos et al. 2007: 251) Considering the three other issues analysed in MAGEEQ in which intersectionality is less immediately evident than it is for homosexual rights, prostitution, migration or anti-discrimination, we find that intersectionality is hardly present in the framing of policies: in domestic violence, reference to intersectionality is made in half the texts, and in gender inequality in politics and family policies, such reference is found in roughly one quarter of the texts. The data for these issues include the EU and the six selected countries. With regard to the issue of gender inequality in politics, Lombardo et al. (2007) observe that most policy documents present women (and men, in the rare case in which they are mentioned) as homogeneous groups with either social or natural features that are deemed as essentially different from the other gender. They conclude that, as a consequence of these homogeneous genders, women as a category are not ‘internally’ differentiated in terms of social differences, and intersectionality is thus absent from most of the documents. ‘Differences only occur as differences in political ideology, that is among women belonging

Political intersectionality in Europe 77 to different parties’ (Lombardo et al. 2007: 91). In the EU policy texts on gender inequality in politics, this absence is evident in the fact that only two out of sixteen texts include reference to other social inequalities: class is referred to in only one document, and ethnicity, ability and age are mentioned in another text. The absence of intersectionality in the spheres of gender, political participation and representation denotes that sensitivity exists in the question of the under-representation of women, but that there is no such sensitivity for the underrepresentation of, for instance, working-class or migrant women. No reference that questioned the over-representation of more highly educated women in parliaments was found. Debates outside the analysed countries would probably show a similar pattern. In fact, some of the most articulate frames on gender inequality in politics, such as parity democracy, are founded on an understanding of gender as the most important social category for democracy, and seem to dominate the political discourse. In the texts on domestic violence, women also tend to be represented as a homogeneous group, without differentiation of their socio-economic or family situation; their problems and needs are supposedly the same, which in turn implies that measures proposed to solve the problem address all women in an undifferentiated way. However, as Krizsán et al. (2007) highlight in their analysis of data on domestic violence, intersectional – cultural or ethnic – elements can be found in most of the Dutch texts and in a small number of Greek and EU texts. In the Dutch case, the attention on domestic violence in migrant families seems to coincide with a diagnosis of migrant traditions as the main cause of the problem. Gender is also seen – although not very often – as intersecting with class (disadvantaged families and low education) and social exclusion (rural families) in a few of the Hungarian and Austrian texts. In general, the stronger references to intersectionality in domestic violence, when compared with the issue of gender inequality in politics, could be related to the particular attention that this issue devotes to victims, who are in some cases vulnerable groups of women. In the EU, these vulnerable groups are characterized by the intersection of gender with different factors of exclusion that include age, migration, disabilities, poverty, refuge and asylum seeking, minorities, women in detention and lesbians. Intersectionality is scarcely present in policy texts on family policies as well, appearing in 32 out of 100 supertexts. When it is addressed, the reference is to class, in particular economically poorer and needy families, and vulnerable groups that include, for instance, single parent families, large families, children, parents of handicapped children, Roma or foreign families. Age, urban/rural divide and ethnicity are also mentioned in some cases but on rather an illustrative basis and not as an integral part of diagnosis of the problem. In their analysis of the findings on family policies, Meier et al. (2007) point out how in some cases the introduction of intersectionality leads to the disappearance of gender equality as a goal. They find that when class or economic weakness is introduced, gender disappears. Through helping vulnerable groups of women, the most in need will be favoured not in the name of gender equality but rather in attempts related to the tempering of class equalities or the rescuing of children from poverty.

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The blurring and shrinking of gender and the strengthening of intesectional biases The coding of intersectionality in European policy texts on gender equality that we have analysed in this chapter allows us to make a number of observations on the extent to which gender is stretched to include other inequalities in European gender policies. In the conclusions, this then offers us the opportunity to reflect on some of the potential and tensions embedded in the process of stretching the concept of equality to other inequalities than gender. The first observation to make is that hardly any other inequalities were present in the analysed European documents on gender equality. For the issues of gender inequality in politics in all countries and in the EU, the absence of reference to other inequalities is particularly evident. Some references can be found in texts on the issue of family policies, but overall, the only presence we find is at best linked to an understanding of the problem of gender inequality as a problem of women ‘lagging behind’: either as a problem of them being excluded from certain parts of society or as a problem of their vulnerability. The case of anti-discrimination policy in Hungary presents a different story, one of a move (promoted by the EU) from a more focused agenda where gender was specifically addressed to a general equal opportunity agenda tackling different inequalities, but in which gender inequality is blurred. A second observation is that there is hardly any presence of intersectionality in the analysed European documents on gender equality. When other inequalities are mentioned in relation to particularly vulnerable groups, especially in domestic violence and to a certain extent in family policies, this is done at a descriptive level, simply mentioning specific social groups rather than analysing how these different inequalities interact with and influence each other in the diagnosis of the problem and in the solutions proposed to the latter at a deeper structural level. Similar to the blurring of gender in anti-discrimination policies in Hungary, the introduction of intersectionality in some cases concerning family policy, in the form of reference to class inequalities, translates into the disappearance of reference to gender inequalities. These are cases where the presence of attention to inequalities other than gender leads to the shrinking or even disappearance of gender, and to a process of bending in which gender equality as a goal is substituted by another goal, which is another form of absence of intersectionality. A third observation we can make is that the problem exceeds mere absence. It is not so much that gender equality policies are bent towards other inequalities, losing their focus on gender in the process of bending, but that they seem to lose their focus on equality as well. Instead of countering other inequalities, they bend towards strengthening other axes of inequality under the label of (gender) equality. We have found many cases of active biases towards other inequalities: it seems as if the configuration of race/ethnicity/country of origin is especially presented in racist/ethnocentric ways. This is characterized by blaming women for their problematic position, essentializing that part of their identity, and by refraining from positive interventions that could improve their position. In particular, we find

Political intersectionality in Europe 79 traces of homophobic, racist, ethnic and nationalistic biases in the issues that are directly connected to at least one structural axis of inequality or issues in which gender intersects sexual orientation (homosexual rights in Spain), race and ethnic origins (migration in the Netherlands and Greece) and prostitution (Slovenia and Austria) in the national contexts analysed. As the problem is then sometimes not framed as related to gendered power relations either, this means that issues tend to be de-gendered, losing their gender focus altogether. This can lead policymakers either to ignore some female subjects, as in the case of lesbians in Spain, or to express racist–ethnic–nationalistic biases concerning women who face multiple inequalities, as is the case with migrant women in the Netherlands and ‘foreign’ prostitutes in Slovenia and Austria. In short, we find we can point to a phenomenon of intersectional biases hiding under the label of gender equality.

Conclusions: Potential and tensions in stretching gender to other inequalities in European policymaking The findings on the rare presence of intersectionality and on biases strengthening inequalities in equality policies enable us to reflect on both the potential and the tensions that exist in stretching the concept of gender equality to other inequalities in European policymaking. As the presence of racist and ethnocentrist biases in official documents has shown, gender policies are not immune to the stereotypes that they impute to male-centred political approaches. Indeed, they sometimes reveal an understanding of gender that tends to maintain existing power hierarchies within women and to silence ‘otherness’. In this sense, stretching the concept of gender to include intersections with other inequalities might be in need of a ‘self reflexivity’ (Rönnblom 2007) or a self-awareness of their own cultural biases on the part of gender policymakers (see also Bacchi’s chapter in this volume). This in turn might improve the quality of policymaking by promoting the formulation of more inclusive equality policies. A crucial question that reveals the potential of stretching gender to other complex inequalities is: What do we lose if we do not consider political intersectionality in gender equality policies? The danger of homogenizing processes that would silence ‘other’ subjects is that they perpetuate power mechanisms among different subjects. Indeed, the absence of intersectionality in existing equality policies makes room for only a limited understanding of gender, one that does not take into account that inequalities are often mutually constitutive, that does not open to contestation of existing hegemonic discourses, and thus has little chance of being transformative, inclusive of different voices and defiant of oppressive social norms. For these reasons, the recognition of the multidimensional reality of equality seems to be advantageous not only for designing more inclusive equality policies but also for keeping the gender struggle alive. The adoption of a more intersectional approach to the treatment of gender has potential benefits for understanding gender, for increasing awareness of policymakers’ biases and for improving the quality of equality policies themselves. However, while it appears normatively necessary to incorporate intersectionality in current gender equality policy in Europe, for some reasons, this does not

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happen. Why are European gender policies so reluctant to stretch the concept of gender so as to include its intersections with other inequalities? And even when they do refer to other inequalities, why does policymakers’ attention to one axis of inequality lead to blindness or biases towards other inequalities? What is the problem with political intersectionality? The search for answers opens another whole set of questions concerning the causes of groups’ solidarity or competition and the institutional procedures that may, willingly or unwillingly, favour the former or the latter. Power is at the heart of these questions, as it can be expected that groups of citizens that are differently caught into the webs of various inequalities not only have different demands, but also have different positions in access to and influence on policymaking. Moreover, policymakers and politicians are to some degree also caught in the discourses that legitimate the various inequalities as well, and can be expected to reproduce, unintentionally or intentionally (see Bacchi in this volume), these discourses in their work. Some of the mechanisms that discourage political intersectionality are of a material character. When policymakers dealing with gender or women’s NGOs are asked to pay attention to multiple inequalities in the articulation of their policies and demands, they can be demotivated in carrying out the task by the limitation of economic and political resources and/or by particular institutional procedures that provoke the appearance or reinforcement of territorial mechanisms. The European Women’s Lobby’s (EWL) criticism to the Commission Green Paper’s approach to address inequalities through a general anti-discrimination strategy that squeezes all inequalities together is illustrative here. According to the EWL, the Commission’s ‘one size fits all’ approach to the treatment of inequalities (see Verloo 2006) fails to acknowledge that ‘different equality agendas have their specific dynamics of inclusion, exclusion, and marginalization and consequently need specific analysis and actions in order to find the best strategies’ (European Women’s Lobby 2004: 1). The other problem that is ignored is that an overall antidiscrimination strategy leads to a redistribution of resources that provides ‘less money and resources, and less precise and adequate mechanisms to deal with the complex issues of human rights, anti-discrimination, and equality between women and men’ (European Women’s Lobby 2004: 2). The EWL highlights the risks of particular institutional approaches that stretch gender to include other inequalities. Neglecting the social, cultural and political dynamics of each inequality might easily lead to conflicts and power struggles within different anti-discrimination groups and policies. Moreover, insufficient resources for completing the complex task of addressing multiple inequalities may provoke intergroup competition. If resources remain unchanged, but suddenly have to be shared among groups representing different axes of inequalities, existing gender equality organizations worry that this might deprive women of the funds they need to combat existing gender inequalities. Hence, territorial reflexes can be triggered by particular institutional practices that favour or discourage intergroup competition or solidarity. While the daily routine of social groups can be more or less territorial, and NGOs can work in a more or less monopolizing way, the character and mechanisms of institutions can hinder or favour such territorial attitudes.

Political intersectionality in Europe 81 Policymakers who aim to stretch the meaning of gender equality to other inequalities then need to be especially aware of what the reasons are behind groups’ solidarity or competition, and how institutions could promote intergroup co-operation to address the intersection of multiple inequalities. There seem to be at least two perspectives to this. The first is based on paradigms in social psychology and in deliberative democracy. These point to the importance of mutual goals, learning processes and rules for deliberation. Educational techniques for teaching co-operative behaviour have developed methods of learning that can be used to reduce racial prejudice through interaction in group efforts where every one needs everyone else (to co-operate) if the group as a whole is to succeed (the ‘jigsaw class’; see Aronson et al. 1978). The idea is that intergroup contacts that give emphasis to mutual goals and fates, and require to cross-cut one’s group memberships, so that an individual in one’s outgroup in one context will be in her ingroup in another context, have proved helpful in decreasing both biases and competition (Bettencourt and Dorr 1998). A second perspective can be found in the work of Butler (1993) on productive antagonism, Mouffe (2000) on radical democracy and agonism, and SchmidtGleim and Verloo on ‘Principesse’ (2003). Their theoretical perspective is that antagonism is not only unavoidable, but can be destructive or productive depending on the institutions that are created to accommodate the antagonistic struggles. In such a perspective, citizenship is always dynamic and best understood as an ongoing process or a struggle about the creation of citizenship grants, rights, duties and opportunities. Although there are hardly any practices that have been developed starting from such understanding, they seem to point in a different and potentially more transformative direction from the first stream of conceptualization described above. The challenge then is to design processes or institutions that can accommodate intersecting struggles for recognition, representation and redistribution (see Fraser 2007). This body of literature can suggest ways of looking at how institutions frame the terms of debate, and the demands institutions make of policy actors. Are these terms and demands framed so as to promote deliberative or co-operative activities among groups or to foster territorial mechanisms? How could institutional procedures improve in order to promote the mainstreaming of intersectionality into policymaking? An analysis of the context in which equality policies are elaborated, of the terms in which policy actors are asked to participate in the debate and of the policymaking process in the European and national contexts could provide interesting elements for understanding the institutional dynamics that discourage or promote the emergence of territorial mechanisms. A final reflection concerns the implications of our study for the discursive construction of gender. Our analysis of the articulation of political intersectionality in European equality policies seems to point to the fact that gender equality is especially ‘vulnerable’ to discursive processes, of stretching in this case, that shape the meaning of gender in ways that sometimes exclude or remove aspects of the multidimensional reality of equality. One possible understanding of this characteristic of gender as being particularly exposed to discursive processes could be the fact that gender is pervasive and omnipresent as a differentiating concept and

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therefore creates an inherent tension with equality, which is often understood as eliminating diversity. A reflection on how this inherent tension between gender and equality can be understood in ways that generate exclusionary mechanisms seems to require greater attention on the part of feminist scholars and activists. To address this issue, Butler’s suggestion ‘to displace territorial elements’ and find ways to work out tensions and contestations among and within groups, while at the same time keeping the ongoing debates alive, seems a regulatory ideal to keep in mind in the process of theorizing and making equality policies in Europe.11

Notes 1 Gender is not the only inequality that was politically institutionalized in Europe. Class is even more institutionalized all across the European welfare states, through political parties and social partners. 2 In this chapter, we focus on the process of stretching gender equality to other inequalities, rather than on other discursive processes analysed in this book, because we are interested in exploring the inclusive possibilities embedded in the concept of intersectionality. Another perspective could be to look at bending (from the point of view of gender equality); then the centrality of the goal of gender equality would be replaced by another form of equality than gender. However, to deal with intersectionality, we considered it more appropriate to explore processes of stretching equality, which enabled us to adopt a more inclusive approach, rather than to consider processes of bending, which are excluding as they replace one goal with another. 3 Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty states that the Council ‘may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. 4 Article 21 of the Charter prohibits discrimination on grounds of ‘sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’. OJ 2000/C 364/01. 18.12.2000. 5 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22 and Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 6 Article 5b Title II of the Treaty of Lisbon states that: ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01). 7 Brah and Phoenix (2004) rightly point out that there has been earlier attention to the interlocking of major systems of oppression, as in the Combahee River Collective (1977). 8 The selected policy documents date from 1995, the year of the United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing. which represents a milestone in the governments’ formal commitment towards mainstreaming gender in the policy process, to 2004. The selection of texts includes primarily official documents declaring policies on gender equality elaborated by the main political and administrative institutions. A secondary source of analysed texts was produced by the media, i.e. written press that was useful in giving a sense of the existing public debate on the issues in the different national contexts. Finally, the selection included, to a lesser extent, texts originating within the feminist movement and gender experts. For the list of analysed texts, see Verloo (2007).

Political intersectionality in Europe 83 9 This section draws on chapters published in Verloo (2007). Thanks to Anouta de Groot for compiling the overviews used in this chapter. 10 This Dutch term refers to citizens who are born in a non-Western country or who have at least one parent who is born in a non-Western country. 11 Judith Butler’s inspirational suggestion comes from the speech she pronounced at the Lodz conference on gender and citizenship in a multicultural context, 1–3 September 2006.

Bibliography Anthias, F. (1998) ‘Evaluating “diaspora”: Beyond ethnicity?’, Sociology – the Journal of the British Sociological Association, 32: 557–80. Aronson, E., Blaney, N., Stephan, C., Sikes, J. and Snapp, M. (1978) The jigsaw classroom, Beverly Hills: Sage. Beisel, N. and Kay, T. (2004) ‘Abortion, race and gender in nineteenth-century America’, American Sociological Review, 69: 498–518. Belkhir, J.A.A. (2005) ‘Race, gender, and class bibliography’, Website of the American Sociological Association. Online. Available from http://www.asanet.org/sections/ rgcbiblio.html from (accessed 6 August 2005). Bettencourt, B.A. and Dorr, N. (1998) ‘Cooperative interaction and intergroup bias: Effect of numerical representation and crosscut role assignment’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24: 1276–93. Brah, A. (2002) ‘Global mobilities, local predicaments: Globalization and the critical imagination’, Feminist Review, 70: 30–45. Brah, A. and Phoenix, A. (2004) ‘Ain’t I a woman? Revisiting intersectionality’, Journal of International Women’s Studies, 5: 75–87. Brewer, R.M., Conrad, C.A. and King, M.C. (2002) ‘The complexities and potential of theorizing gender, caste, race and class’, Feminist Economics, 8: 3–17. Browne, I. and Misra, J. (2003) ‘The intersection of gender and race in the labor market’, Annual Review of Sociology, 29: 487–513. Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of ‘sex’, New York: Routledge. Combahee River Collective (1977) ‘A black feminist statement’, reprinted in L.J. Nicholson (ed.) (1997) The second wave: A reader in feminist theory, New York: Routledge. Crenshaw K.W. (1994) ‘Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color’, in M. Albertson Fineman and R. Mykitiuk (eds) The public nature of private violence, New York: Routledge. ——(1989) Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Legal Forum. Davis, K. (2008) ‘Intersectionality as buzzword. A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful’, Feminist Theory, 9: 67–85. European Women’s Lobby (2004) ‘EWL response to the European Commission Green Paper’. Online. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_ rights/pdf/greencon/euwomlob.pdf (accessed 22 June 2008). Fraser, N. (2007) ‘Mapping the feminist imagination: From redistribution to recognition to representation’, in J. Browne (ed.) The future of gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gamson, J. and Moon, D. (2004) ‘The sociology of sexualities: Queer and beyond’, Annual Review of Sociology, 30: 47–64.

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Hancock, A. (2007) ‘When multiplication doesn’t equal quick addition: Examining intersectionality as a research paradigm’, Perspectives on Politics, 5: 63–79. Hill Collins, P. (1998) Fighting words: Black women and the search for justice, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Krizsán, A., Bustelo, M., Hadjiyanni, A. and Kamoutis, F. (2007) ‘Domestic violence: A public matter’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Lombardo, E., Jalušiþ, V., Pantelidou Maloutas, M. and Sauer, B. (2007) ‘Taming the male sovereign? Framing gender inequality in politics in the European Union and the member states’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Meier, P., Peterson, E., Tertinegg, K. and Zentai, V. (2007) ‘The pregnant worker and caring mother: Framing family policies across Europe’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Mouffe, C. (2000) The democratic paradox, London: Verso. Phillips, A. (2003) ‘Recognition and the struggle for political voice’, in B. Hobson (ed.) Recognition struggles and social movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Phoenix, A. and Pattynama, P. (eds) (2006) European Journal of Women’s Studies, special issue on intersectionality, 13. Platero, R. (2007) ‘Overcoming brides and grooms. The representation of lesbian and gay rights in Spain’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Risman, B.J. (2004) ‘Gender as a social structure – Theory wrestling with activism’, Gender & Society, 18: 429–50. Roggeband, C. and Verloo, M. (2007) ‘Dutch women are liberated, migrant women are a problem’, Social Policy and Administration, 41: 271–88. Rönnblom, M. (2007) ‘“How is it done?” On the road to an intersectional methodology in feminist policy analysis’, paper presented at the ECPR 4th General Conference, Pisa, Italy, September 2007. Sainsbury, D. (2003) ‘U.S. women’s suffrage through a multicultural lens: Intersecting struggles of recognition’, in B. Hobson (ed.) Recognition struggles and social movements. Contested identities, agency and power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt-Gleim, M. and Verloo, M. (2003) One more feminist manifesto of the political, IWM Working Paper 2/2003, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Squires, J. (2005) ‘Is mainstreaming transformative? Theorizing mainstreaming in the context of diversity and deliberation’, Social Politics, 12: 366–88. Tertinegg, K., Hrženjak, M. and Sauer, B. (2007) ‘What’s the problem with prostitution? Prostitution politics in Austria and Slovenia since the 1990s’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2006) ‘Multiple inequalities, intersectionality and the European Union’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 211–28. Walby, S. (2007) ‘Complexity theory, systems theory, and multiple intersecting social inequalities’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 37: 449–70. ——(2005) ‘Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice’, Social Politics, 12: 321–43.

Political intersectionality in Europe 85 Wekker, G. (2004) ‘Still crazy after all those years … Feminism for the new millennium’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11: 487–500. Weldon, L.S. (2006) ‘The structure of intersectionality: A comparative politics of gender’, Politics & Gender, 2: 235–48. Yuval-Davis, N., Anthias, F. and Kofman, E. (2005) ‘Secure borders and safe haven and the gendered politics of belonging: Beyond social cohesion’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28: 513–35. Young, I.M. (1990) Justice and the politics of difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

6

Inequality, intersectionality and the politics of discourse Framing feminist alliances1 Myra Marx Ferree

Introduction As critical frame analysis has shown, even when concepts are expressed in the same words, they may have different meanings (Verloo 2006). Intersectionality is itself one of these contested terms within feminist thought. In this chapter, I take up the challenge of considering the debate about what intersectionality means. Leslie McCall (2005) and Ange-Marie Hancock (2007) provide an overview of the debate, classifying ways of understanding intersectionality and arguing for expanding the concept from its frequent focus on groups and identities. Although each affirms the important contributions made by challenging the givenness of categories and by attending to the specific perspectives of women of colour and women in other marginalized locations, they argue that these approaches excessively privilege the individual level and describe static structural locations on ‘axes’ of oppression in a ‘matrix of domination’ (Hill Collins 2001). Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that ‘what is at the heart of the debate is conflation or separation of the different analytic levels in which intersectionality is located, rather than just a debate on the relationship of the divisions themselves’ (2006: 195). Intersectionality as a concept derives from the activist critiques that women of colour in the US and UK made in the 1970s and 1980s about overly homogeneous political discourse in which ‘all the women are white and all the blacks are men’ (Hull et al. 1982; Brah and Phoenix 2004). Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) put the term ‘intersectionality’ into more international use, emphasizing structural intersections of inequalities as adding, multiplying and reinforcing particular hierarchies in specific locations. Using the metaphor of many intersecting streets called ‘patriarchy’, ‘colonialism’ and the like, Crenshaw (2001) attempted to direct attention to movement along these different axes, without actually giving up an emphasis on specific points of intersection and the people and groups found there (Prins 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006). This meaning of intersectionality emphasizes it as a set of infinitely multiple substantive social locations, generates a long list of important intersectional locations to be studied and offers voice to the perspectives of many marginalized groups. However, this locational approach may also encourage what Martinez (1993) called the ‘Oppression Olympics’, in which each group contends for attention and respect

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 87 for the distinctiveness and importance of their unique location (Hancock 2007). I share the critical view of intersectionality as a static list of structural locations and as leading to a problematic form of identity politics, but still contend that only an intersectional analysis can do justice to the actual complexity of political power and social inequality. In this chapter, I adopt a more dynamic and institutional understanding of intersectionality, following McCall (2005) and Hancock (2007). Rather than identifying points of intersection, this approach sees the dimensions of inequality themselves as dynamic and in changing, mutually constituted relationships with each other, from which they cannot be disentangled (Walby 2007). This gives historically realized social relations in any place or time an irreducible complexity in themselves, from which the abstraction of any dimension of comparison (such as ‘race’ or ‘gender’) is an imperfect but potentially useful conceptual achievement of simplification, not an inherent property of the world. Categories, and the dimensions along which they are ordered, are not therefore deemed ‘false’ or ‘insignificant’, even though they are imperfect and variable. Intersectionality is not a concept added on to an analysis formed on some other theoretical ground, but is part of basic explanation of the social order as such. This version of intersectionality insists that it cannot be located at any one level of analysis, whether individual or institutional. The ‘intersection of gender and race’ is not any number of specific locations occupied by individuals or groups (such as black women) but a process through which ‘race’ takes on multiple ‘gendered’ meanings for particular women and men (and for those not neatly located in either of those categories) depending on whether, how and by whom race-gender is seen as relevant for their sexuality, reproduction, political authority, employment or housing. These domains (and others) are to be understood as organizational fields in which multidimensional forms of inequality are experienced, contested and reproduced in historically changing forms. This is what Prins (2006) defines as a ‘constructionist’ rather than ‘structural’ understanding of intersectionality, but I prefer to call it ‘interactive intersectionality’ to emphasize its structuration as an ongoing multilevel process from which agency cannot be erased (Giddens 1990). Walby (2007) introduces complexity theory to develop further this idea of intersectionality as an active ‘system’ with both positive and negative feedback effects, non-linearity of relations and nonnested, non-hierarchical overlaps among institutions. In such a complex system, gender is not a dimension limited to the organization of reproduction or family, class is not a dimension equated with the economy, and race is not a category reduced to the primacy of ethnicities, nations and borders, but all the processes that systematically organize families, economies and nations are co-constructed along with the meanings of gender, race and class that are presented in and reinforced by these institutions separately and together. In other words, each institutional system serves as each other’s environment to which it is adapting. To Walby’s notion of system, I add an emphasis on discourse as a political process by which this co-creation occurs. My approach rests on understanding the co-formation of knowledge and power, stresses the historical development of

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institutions that shape consciousness and practice and identifies discourse as a crucial arena of political activity (Foucault 1977). Two of the central processes of discursive politics are categorizing and ordering. These human actions have political consequences in themselves because of the inherent reflexivity of the social world; that is, we use categories and ranks not only to understand but to control the world, and feedback from the environment to the system comes in terms of information about success and failure (Espeland and Sauder 2007). As lists, ranks, metaphors and distinctions proliferate, they guide our understanding of who we are and with whom we are more or less related. Thus, for example, when the dimension of ‘race’ is constructed and ‘fixed’ in national censuses, it generates meaningful and contestable categories (such as ‘Asian’) that can always be further decomposed, but which serve to distribute real resources and recognition in response to which identities and activities become oriented. But in offering this interactive definition of intersectionality, I acknowledge that it will still not fully capture the complexity of reality. Like the concept of ‘gender equality’, which takes its meaning from the discursive and institutional contexts in which it appears, ‘intersectionality’ is also an open and contested term. Across different political contexts, various social and political actors engage in trying to ‘shrink’ the meaning of intersectionality and limit the areas in which it can be applied, to ‘bend’ it to better fit with other issues on their agenda and to ‘stretch’ it to meet emergent needs (see Lombardo and Verloo’s chapter in this book). Moreover, the understandings of both gender equality and other forms of inequality are mutually stretched and bent as they encounter each other. Like other forms of social reflexivity, framing intersectionality is being done in a social world that already incorporates intersectional relations in historically specific and yet contestable and changing ways. Rather than framing ‘gender equality’ as intersectional in the locational sense, by which ‘gender equality’ means something different for people who are situated in diverse social positions along the axes of oppression, this chapter argues that ‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’ are framed through processes of conceptual abstraction and simplification that are inherently and inevitably intersectional as well as imperfect and contested. The rest of the chapter will attempt to show how particular political histories of interpreting and institutionalizing class, race and gender as abstract dimensions of inequality continue to shape gender discourse in interactively intersectional ways. In the next section, I argue that intersectionality as a dynamic process pervading political discourse is better understood as a web of meaning on a framework of opportunity than in terms of ‘master frames’ in some single hierarchy. In the second section, I provide an example of contrasting discursive opportunity structures by comparing Germany and the United States as intersectional frameworks of meaning for gender, race and class. In the third section, I show how these different frameworks are dynamically important for the active framing and accomplishments of institutional change in feminist politics in each context.

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 89

Frameworks and framing work: A meeting of structure and agency Framing means connecting beliefs about social actors and beliefs about social relations into more or less coherent packages that define what kinds of actions are necessary, possible and effective for particular actors. The point of frames is that they draw connections, identify relationships and create perceptions of social order out of the variety of possible mental representations of reality swirling around social actors. By actively linking people, concepts, practices and resources, frames allow for a co-ordination of activity for oneself that also is open to interpretation by others (Goffman 1974). The relationship or connection, not the individual element, is the key unit for framing work. Framing creates the known world: it actively gives concepts meaning by embedding them in networks of other more or less widely shared and practically relevant meanings, which are what I call frameworks. Frameworks in politics can be understood in part as analogous to how systems of meaning work in other areas. For example, scientific disciplines have histories that privilege certain ways of knowing and direct those who would be productive within them to follow certain practices rather than others. Political entities such as nation-states and transnational organizations similarly institutionalize frameworks for politics in which particular issue debates and rivalries among the leading actors are embedded. Rather than by a disciplinary canon, the framework for political debate is given by authoritative texts such as constitutions, laws, judicial decisions, treaties and administrative regulations. Such texts never ‘speak for themselves’ but need to be interpreted, implemented and enforced. But they offer a discursive structure – an institutionalized framework of connections made among people, concepts and events – that shapes the opportunities of political actors by making some sorts of connections appear inevitable and making others conspicuously uncertain and so especially inviting for debate. Such frameworks will be variably useful or constraining to speakers; thus it makes sense to speak of them as discursive opportunity structures (Ferree et al. 2002). As critical frame analysis emphasizes, the authoritative texts in any particular context have themselves been created by ‘fixing’ their meaning in a network of strong connections with other concepts, a process that always takes political work to accomplish and, once achieved, shapes future political work. A discursive opportunity structure is thus open, dynamic and imbued with power, not just something that exists passively as text ‘on paper’. Looking at a discursive opportunity structure as a set of authoritative texts (e.g. laws), in other words, should not obscure how the authority they hold fits into a wider system. A given law is part of a wider legal culture in which ‘law’ in the abstract and any law in particular are seen by actors within this system as more or less legitimate, as likely to be enforced by meaningful penalties or rewards and as narrowly or widely applicable. Each such text also provides a resource over which politically mobilized actors struggle by offering interpretations and drawing out implications for actions. By its very nature, law is a system of dispute; if there were no opposing interests, there would be no need for treaties, regulations or decisions. Laws, constitutions, treaties and directives thus form policy

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frameworks that are historically constructed, path-dependent opportunity structures for the discursive struggles of the present time. Changing the frameworks in which politics gets done is therefore simultaneously an end of social movement activity and the means by which social movement actors attempt to reach their other objectives. Critical frame analysis of policy texts themselves – such as that offered in this volume and in influential studies by scholars such as Deborah Stone (1988) and Carol Bacchi (1999) – becomes more dynamic when it is complemented by studies of the political processes through which these texts were created, interpreted and used as resources for mobilization. Historical studies of policy development, such as Pedriana (2006) offers with regard to equal employment law in the US and Zippel (2006) provides for sexual harassment law in Germany, the US and the EU, provide an important window into these processes. They also indicate the reflexive impact of securing, institutionalizing and applying new ways of thinking about rights, making them real in their consequences. The relationality and fluidity of meaning carried in and to frames even in institutionalized text is what makes the idea of a ‘master frame’ (Snow et al. 1986) problematic. Although there is a strong consensus among many scholars that ‘rights’ is an exceptionally powerful idea in the United States, it is also clear that what ‘rights’ means is contested on an ongoing basis in the courts, legislature and executive branch and shifts over time in its application. For example, ‘equal rights’ claims made in the civil rights movement were ‘shrunk’ over time to no longer imply any but the most formal legal rights, separated from the concept of ‘social justice’ and tied instead to the idea of ‘diversity’, which was in turn carefully restricted to imply that no ‘special rights’ could be considered (Edelman et al. 2001). Because frames are not isolated concepts, but connections to other concepts that provide the meanings of words-in-use, framing is relational and intersectional. Frames are ideas captured in a web of meanings in which self-references and cross-references are inherently multiple. Thus, rather than thinking of US political discourse as providing ‘rights’ as a singular ‘master frame’ that exists outside of or above the web of meaning in which more particular frames are being constructed, I believe it is useful to consider rights as one of the most centrally located and densely linked ideas in a network of political meanings. ‘Rights talk’ draws on one or more of the particular connections available to the concept of rights and thus ‘stretches’ it in some particular direction (e.g. to include gay marriage or not; Hull 1997). The density and stability of the cross-referencing system of meaning at the core of American thinking about ‘rights’ offers a rich and diverse periphery of potential interpretations to actors in a variety of positions along its ‘edges’. Seeing rights discourse as a framework in which rights is centrally located highlights both how all the elements in it are shaped by the ways they are linked to each other and also how ‘rights’ is itself defined by how it is linked to these other ideas. This is what I call a rights discourse. Rights discourse differs from rights as a master frame in the same way that a dynamically intersectional system differs from a locational understanding of intersectionality.

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 91 Rights as a framework pervades and shapes the meanings of all the concepts in its web and is reflexively understood in relation to that web of meaning; ‘rights’ as a concept is one of the terms being shaped by the discourse as a whole and changing its meaning over time and space. In contrast, rights as a master frame would be the one most important element and carry a single fixed definition. It would then connect hierarchically to a range of abstract and interchangeable elements such as ‘equality’, ‘difference’ or ‘protection’. These ‘subordinate’ concepts would be thought to have stable definitions regardless of the local framework in which they are found, and vary only in how likely they are to be embraced, rather than taking their meaning from the discourse in which they are used. In the interactional definition of intersectionality, ‘race’ takes its operational meaning in any given situation in part from the multiple institutions in play (such as family or nation) and in part from the other dimensions of inequality that are also engaged in giving meaning to each other and to the institutional context. This is what Walby (2007) means by avoiding the ‘segregationary reductionism’ that places class, race and gender each into just one key institutional ‘system’ (economy, state or family) and instead looks for the interpenetration of meaning and action in systems that are not ‘saturated’ by one concept alone. Similarly, in the dynamic definition of discourse, there is an equally complex (i.e. non-nested and non-saturated) system of meanings being referenced when we speak of ‘rights’ in the US or the ‘rule of law’ (Rechtsstaat) in Germany. These terms reach across a variety of institutional contexts but can neither fully determine nor be determined by them. Each of these dynamic approaches specifically rejects the emphasis on generating long lists of diverse ‘frames’ and of ‘axes of inequality’ that has been part of the study of both intersectionality and framing (and critiqued by McCall 2005 and Benford 1997 respectively). Instead, both discourse and intersectionality can be more productively approached through the study of configurations, a term McCall (2005) uses to describe attention to patterns, interactions among elements that have paradoxical and conflicting meanings depending on the specific context as a whole. Such configurations – both of discourses and of intersectionality in this and other aspects of the social order – are stable but also change. It is an empirical matter in any given context to see which concepts are important to the configuration of inequalities in discourse and in practice by people in many different social positions, and locational studies of intersectionality can contribute to this discovery process. In sum, ‘rights’ is not a master frame that has a ‘real’ meaning that could ever be fully known or ‘correctly’ used, but is a more or less meaningful and discursively powerful way of speaking depending on the panoply of meanings attached to it. Unlike the way that Benford and Snow (2000) talk about ‘frame amplification’ or ‘frame extension’ as if it were an operation performed on a single conceptual claim, I contend that actors who make political claims that ‘stretch’ the meaning of a concept do not ‘extend’ their single ideas to apply to new groups or new elements that were simply missing before, but rather ‘stretch’ their whole web of meaning to encompass people or practices that were connected in different patterns. They

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thereby change the shape and structure of the web as a whole. So, for example, to argue, as contemporary transnational feminist organizations do, that ‘women’s rights are human rights’ is to stretch the concepts of both ‘human’ and ‘rights’ to mean something different from what they did before, not just to extend their stably existing meanings to a ‘new’ group, women. Because ‘gender equality’ is framed in the discursive structure of a political system through its relationships to other ideas, actors and actions, some actors’ frames for gender will embrace many of these existing connections (what I have called ‘resonant’ frames; Ferree 2003), while other efforts will aim to transform the framework in which the idea of gender equality is embedded (what I have called ‘radical’ framing). Framing gender transformationally has implications for what race and class also mean in the reconfigured structure of discourse.

Intersectional frameworks in Germany and the US Germany and the US provide two quite different discursive frameworks for the intersectional discussion of race, class and gender. Germany’s discursive opportunity structure has been shaped far more by class struggle than by racial privilege, while the reverse has been true of the US (Ferree 2008). Each of these histories offers conceptual opportunities for making the web of meaning for gender inequality intersectional, but each also does so in very distinctive ways. By outlining a few of the aspects of discursive opportunity structure in each case, this section lays the groundwork for exploring intersectional feminist framing in the following section. The class-centric meaning of inequality in Germany is evident in several ways. First, it is a general example of contested global relations around capitalism. The conflict between capital and labour in Germany made it the home of the world’s strongest socialist party at the end of the nineteenth century, the centre of socialist internationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century and the world’s earliest welfare state. The Bismarckian institutionalization of maternity benefits, protection for men as primary earners and emphasis on motherhood as a service to the state are today strongly anchored in the framework of a ‘social welfare state’ in much of the twenty-first-century world, with the important exception of the US. Second, German connections between class and gender reflect its particular history of authoritarian governments. The political power of the working class (defined as male) was linked with that of women by the Prussian state before World War I, which outlawed both socialism and all political associations of women. The class and gender connection was also a key but contested element in mobilizations for the vote and abortion rights in the Weimar Republic (Allen 1991). As the struggle against social injustice became tied to the struggle against political repression, gender relations became framed as ‘like class’ in demanding voice for the disenfranchised (Gerhard 1990). When working-class organizations gained political voice, they succeeded in making economic support for the ‘socially vulnerable’ a shared premise for politically responsible actors. In contrast, race in Germany reflected a definition of the polity in ethnic terms, as representing a single ‘nation’

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 93 or people. When the Nazi definition of Jewish ‘otherness’ led, in shocking fashion, to the extreme of genocide, ‘nationalism’ itself became a suspect category for most Germans. As race discourse invokes the Holocaust, not subordination within the nation, the ability to see gender as in any way like race is limited (Lutz 2006). Third, class relations gave two different shapes to the Cold War states formed after World War II (Moeller 1993). The ‘system competition’ between East and West Germany often invoked gender relations to legitimate their political arrangements (Ferree 1993). The ideal worker, the ‘natural’ family and beneficial work–family politics were framed in diametrically opposing visions of ideal state–citizenship relations in East and West (Ferree 1995a). German class politics reflects a wider Cold War politics which aligned national state–family–market relations into the housewife– breadwinner couple of the West and the heroic worker–mother of the East. Fourth, within its posited framework of ‘modern’ political development, socialist theory identifies the working class as a social collectivity defined by its relation to production, not by the biological or personality characteristics of individual members. ‘Class’ as a theoretical concept is strongly linked to many other ideas and actors in Germany (and in much of the world) in ways that are largely alien to US political discourse. Moreover, the German working class had also, through struggle, won entitlement to have the state respond to needs expressed by a political party on its behalf. At least since World War II, inequalities among citizens were normatively defined as socio-economic class relations, rather than racialized as biological. These aspects of the political framework shape German discourse around gender. A resonant framing of women is as ‘mothers’, but in this web of meanings, motherhood is understood as a social relation (in the relations of reproduction rather than production) rather than as a difference among individuals. For example, in the West German Basic Law of 1949, the principle that women and men are politically equal was explicitly affirmed in Paragraph 2, Article 3, as it still has not been in the US Constitution. But this German constitutional provision was consistently interpreted as allowing unequal pay, gender-exclusive opportunities and family authority based on a supposedly ‘functional’ difference between men and women in their ‘reproductive roles’ in the family. Historically and today, both the German left and right find little to like in an ‘equal rights’ version of feminism, as they agree that women, as mothers, are entitled to the active protection and support of the state, just as workers and employers were entitled to be treated as groups for the purposes of state-led social policy (Moeller 1993). Moreover, by framing citizenship in the context of socio-economic relations based on both class and gender, the state actively draws a line between the ‘public’ matters of production and the ‘private’ relations of family and reproduction; this provides feminists with an important point of entry in criticizing social policy that is largely absent in the US (Gerhard 2001). In unified Germany today, the analogy to class politics as a mobilization to make the state responsible for its citizens, rather than leaving them to the mercy of ‘private’ exploitation, offers a framework in which feminist claims for rights to political representation and to protection from male violence in the home resonate with the institutional protections afforded to ‘workers’. The successful institutionalization of a discourse of intersectional class

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and gender interests allows resonant claims to be made on the state to address profoundly social relations, which both class and gender are understood to be. In contrast, the United States is well known as a polity institutionalized along lines of liberal individualism and lacking any socialist movement or class-based political party. Socio-economic relations are thereby obscured as political issues. But although the claims of classical political liberalism – individualism, selfdetermination, independence – were incorporated in the founding documents of the US, these same documents institutionalized racist slavery and permitted the virtual extermination of native peoples. Race has therefore dominated the framework of American debates over rights and citizenship (Glenn 2002). The actors who both justify and challenge racialized differences in status can appeal to the founding documents and their histories of interpretation to find resonance for their claims (Hill Collins 1998). The race analogy enters into American thinking about gender and citizenship in four different ways. First, there is the narrowly political struggle over who within the nation is actually a citizen with rights. Because the strong claims to freedom and selfdetermination in America’s founding documents co-existed with interpretations justifying slavery and subordination, the framework of rights created contradictions. This ‘American dilemma’ (Myrdal 1944) was negotiated through framing women and members of racialized groups similarly as ‘dependents’ and thus not fully rights-bearing individuals (Fraser and Gordon 1994). Dependency, unlike its meaning in the German class struggle, is not connected to legitimating the claim for state concern but is framed as a marker of personal insufficiency. Second, because the Declaration of Independence claims that it is ‘self-evident’ and ‘natural’ in how people are ‘endowed by their Creator’ that they should have rights, American movements for social justice struggle with the idea of ‘nature’ and ‘natural difference’ as justifications for inequality. Were it not for their ‘difference’, construed as biological, women and racialized minorities would have equal rights, and so equality and difference are placed in opposition: to claim equality is to deny difference and vice versa (Vogel 1993; Gamson 1995). The discourse closely connects concepts of difference and stereotype with those of discrimination and inequality and thereby encourages a deliberate ‘blindness’ to gender and to race. Third, the relative weakness of the working class in American politics has left dependency and difference to be packaged together with ‘merit’ as defining a ‘natural’ hierarchy in the competitive relations of capitalist production. Both women and racial minorities are framed as competitively ‘disadvantaged’ by their group membership, and as less able to achieve in what is framed as an inherently fair and yet hierarchical system. Thus, state intervention is understood as helping those who cannot help themselves and becomes connected to the idea of ‘disability’, most positively as an intrinsic physical or mental incapacity and most negatively as moral failure. In a framework in which ‘competition’ and ‘merit’ are connected to positive evaluations of the political–economic system, open acknowledgement of state assistance carries an implication of competitive disability (Bacchi 1996).

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 95 Finally, of course, American women and members of racialized groups have long worked together for their rights and have been joint beneficiaries of equal rights politics (Skrentny 1996). Not only were the struggles for women’s rights and for the abolition of slavery interwoven in the nineteenth century, the policy shifts of the twentieth century also institutionalize race and gender as similar inequalities to which the state can and should respond in parallel. State action frames gender and race in the same discursive structure from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to various executive orders promoting the increase of ‘under-represented groups’ in science, sports and education in general, to court decisions that are slowly making gender into a ‘suspect classification’ like race (Lens 2003). The ‘likeness’ of gender and race is also open to challenge, with speakers arguing that one or the other is more socially significant, based on any or all of the above criteria for judging political deservingness. The very ‘likenesses’ affirmed by analogy also tend to define each as a ‘separate’ dimension of inequality, and thus can be seen as spurring the critiques by feminists of colour from the start (Hull et al. 1982). In sum, for both countries, the webs of meaning in which class, race and gender are framed implicate all three terms as well as shape the opportunity structures for changing how other forms of intersectional inequalities (age, sexuality, religion) are related to them. It is not only the framework for thinking about class in Germany that matters for framing gender inequality, but the cognitive distance that race, religion and nationality have from these two concepts. American discourse makes it much easier to ignore class relations as such, precisely the opposite problem to that confronting German feminist speakers. Dynamic intersectionality understands the structure of institutionalized discourse as shaping the meaning of all these types of inequalities together across multiple institutions. Similarly, the relatively long ‘stretch’ needed to connect the concept of class to the race-and-gender dyad in the US affects all three of these conceptualizations as well as the nature of the institutions that have and have not developed, from the weak welfare system for poor families to the strong protection of women’s self-determination in reproductive choices (not only abortion but surrogacy and in vitro fertilization), as O’Connor et al. (1999) note. As it is the concept ‘race’ that is laden with taboos in Germany and ‘class’ is the concept that evokes negative echoes in the US, each web of meaning in which the terms are articulated has a different structure, making the use of race or class language not merely encounter a lack of resonance but become actually disturbing.

Implications of intersectional frameworks for feminist gender framing The different institutionalized relationships among gender, race and class in the frameworks of the US and Germany offer opportunities for pragmatic victories and prospects of radicalization in different discursive dimensions. Because each framework makes very different feminist issues radical or resonant, each offers different opportunities for intersectional challenges to be articulated. In each context, the gender claims that are easy to conceptualize and can find sponsors

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who have institutional power to advocate for them are ‘resonant’. These are good choices for pragmatic actors whose goal is to ‘make a difference’ in the particular institutional structure, while these same claims, in a different opportunity structure, are experienced as radical challenges to the status quo as a whole and will be hard to articulate, sponsor or achieve, especially in the short term. The national contexts of Germany and the US therefore offer contrasting stories of what proves easy or challenging to feminists. In this section, I offer a few examples of how this contextual contingency directs feminist intersectional politics into different paths (and dead-ends). The framework for gender institutionalized in the US privileges seeing both gender and race as forms of second-class citizenship. Thus, it is resonant to challenge both gender and race subordinations with framing that denies the extent and natural basis of any difference from the normative (white male) citizen. An effective, pragmatic American politics of gender is one that undercuts the importance of group membership and attempts to help ‘disadvantaged’ individuals achieve their (presumably biologically given) full potential. ‘Liberal feminism’ is often simply ‘feminism’ in the US. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, the type of feminism that was understood as simply ‘feminism’ in Germany was defined in the US as ‘radical feminism’ (Ferree 1987). The ‘radical’ label fitted appropriately to these ideas in the US in the 1970s, but would have been a misnomer in Germany. The emphasis given to women’s differences from men and the structural organization of reproduction as demanding attention to mothers that characterized most German feminist groups in the 1970s and 1980s was certainly not unknown in the US. Such ‘maternalist’ feminism has roots going back to the beginning of the twentieth century in the US, when Progressive era feminists allied with labour unions made significant gains (Vogel 1993). But by the late 1960s, discursive opportunities had shifted in another direction. As ‘second-wave’ feminism was developing in the US in the late 1960s, classcentred frames were challenged by feminists as inadequate for understanding the intersections of gender and race. American labour unions were seen as on the wrong side of the controversy over the continuation of the Vietnam War, racial justice was the leading cause of protest, and American feminists were actively allied with civil rights movements in challenging union seniority rules and other workplace exclusions. The resonance of seeing gender as like race facilitated this alliance and helped win significant legal victories for women’s rights in employment, marriage and civil contracts (Skrentny 2006). This web of meaning mobilized a backlash that also connected religious conservatives who opposed school integration and abortion into a movement that framed ‘the decline of the family’ in terms of black women’s single parenthood, welfare entitlements and black men’s moral turpitude (Hancock 2007; Mayer 2008). Nonetheless, seeing gender as like race in the US has been quite fruitful in terms of generating a broad, strong, anti-discrimination regime in American social policy (von Wahl 1999). The resonance of anti-discrimination claims within this institutional framework allowed sexual harassment to be brought relatively easily under this umbrella and has encouraged courts to impose significant penalties in a

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 97 small number of highly publicized cases (Zippel 2006). The ‘anti-discrimination’ framing for equality also resonated with hierarchical structures based on competitive high-stakes testing and was an effective tool for opening up college and university admissions, male-dominated professions and competitive sports to women and racialized minorities. But competitive high-stakes testing also legitimated the backlash against ‘affirmative action’, allowing it to be framed as ‘discrimination’ against meritorious whites (and Asians). Moreover, the centrality of ‘anti-discrimination’ as the framing for gender equality created little resonance for the ongoing feminist critiques of American social policy as giving employed women no time for having children and creating systematic poverty for families supported by mothers (e.g. Gornick and Meyers 2003). This affected practical alliance strategies for feminist activists and organizations. Feminists who emphasized family poverty and care work issues were increasingly found in welfare rights and child welfare movements; women’s movement groups were engaged instead in defending reproductive rights from the assault on them by social conservatives. The leading feminist organizations in this struggle adopted a framing of reproductive ‘choice’ as ‘the one that works’ (Ferree et al. 2002). Social conservatives strategically confounded ‘poor women’, ‘black women’, ‘welfare’ and ‘the destruction of the family’ to mobilize racism against all women’s citizenship rights (Roberts 1997; Hancock 2004; Mayer 2008). Across the board, it was difficult for feminists, even feminists of colour, to challenge increasing economic inequalities in the United States. Both ‘white privilege’ and ‘male privilege’ can be acknowledged as individual advantages without providing a resonant discourse to contest the limited American framing of ‘gender equality’ as being about non-discrimination, individual opportunities and a ‘level playing field’ (Browne and Misra 2003). The ‘tilt’ given to the gender equality discursive terrain by the institutionalization of capitalism and the discursive advantage held by concepts of ownership, competition and merit in the US does not mean that American feminists do not speak out in favour of economic redistribution, government regulation of markets and investments in public goods. But their interpretations of what ‘rights’ means in practice are far less authoritative than those already embedded in the framework of American institutions. The story of feminist alliances and the power of intersectionality is quite different in Germany. Throughout the twentieth century, justice for women was seen as having little to do with anti-racism (Gerhard 1990). In recent decades, ‘race’ itself has gradually been shifting meaning. In the 1970s, the idea of race was strongly connected to the highly charged history of the Nazi period, so analogies between the Holocaust and women’s status (e.g. by emphasizing the persecutions of witches in early modern Europe) were more scandalous than effective. As immigration of ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s grew, concern with ‘otherness’ shifted to focus on ethnicity, nationality and religion. But the lack of citizenship rights among ‘guest workers’ made analogies with Turkish or other immigrant groups worse than useless as a means of demanding more rights for women citizens.

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The widening and deepening of the EU changed the discursive opportunity structure for German gender politics. The 1982 entry of a Green party into the EU parliament brought attention to the dimensions of politics neglected by both left and right, including environmentalism, feminism and personal autonomy. The resultant ‘ping-pong’ game between national level and transnational mobilization among feminists and power-holders began to open up spaces in which women had more voice, both as elected officials and in administration (Ferree 1995b; Zippel 2006). But the formal structure of government offices and networks for women’s affairs that emerged in the 1980s was completely separated from that concerned with immigrant/foreigner affairs. This placed these groups in competition for funding in the 1990s, while separating both concerns from the more routine operations of the welfare state. In this context, ‘gender mainstreaming’ became a discursive as well as a practical challenge to the operation of politics-as-usual by bringing consideration of gender into the ‘ordinary decisionmaking’ of the responsible policymakers. The European Union’s integration of gender policy in the ‘mainstream’ of politics is a way to hold states accountable for meeting women’s needs, and fits into the framework of ‘social rights’ as an aspect of welfare state citizenship where women have legitimate, unmet claims (Verloo 2007). But this framing does not speak directly to the needs of non-citizen women or consider the gendered implications of migration for both women and men. Attention to these concerns appears to be increasing with the pressure for redefining citizenship in multiethnic terms in Europe (Snow and Corigall-Brown 2005; Hellgren and Hobson 2008). Both racist and anti-racist mobilizations in Europe have made the symbolic salience of women’s rights within this discourse difficult to overlook any longer (Cichowski 2007). Higher levels of mobilization by immigrants and their second- and even third-generation descendants have brought loosening of restrictive citizenship rules and limited grants of political power to non-citizens (Williams 2003). EU-level attention to labour mobility and market harmonization has also brought increased attention to anti-discrimination measures in both employment and civil contracts such as housing and credit. The gradual and grudging compliance by the German parliament and constitutional court has provided a set of new authoritative texts in the form of anti-discrimination laws and decisions with which claims for institutional action can resonate (Zippel 2006). The framing of gender as something quite distinctively anchored in the reproductive sphere makes a politics of maternity support resonant and allows even a conservative woman chancellor to advance this goal (Ferree 1995a). But it also creates problems for women in the labour market, as a frame in which ‘normally, men are the breadwinners’ and ‘all women are mothers’ leaves nonmothers in paid employment under-recognized and leaves employment issues on the margins of feminism. For example, the strike by daycare workers on the Berlin payroll in 1989 drew little support from either the feminists in leadership positions in city government (who considered this a labour issue on which they represented the employer side) or the unions of city workers (who were mostly

Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 99 men and did not see daycare work as comparable to their own jobs) (Ferree and Roth 1998). Despite these limitations, the class–gender analogy has been extremely fruitful in Germany and in most European states with traditions of social democracy. Organizing women to be a group for themselves as well as in themselves in relations of production and reproduction is a logical strategy that raises little concern about essentializing natural difference, as ‘women’ are like ‘workers’ in being understood as positions in social relations, not so much as types of persons (Allen 2005). Overall, German women’s mobilization as a group, when perceived as like ‘earlier’ class conflict, offers a model of group mobilization that legitimates women’s political action within and through representation in government (that is ‘voice’). The institutionalized framework for understanding gender as a form of social inequality ‘like class’ affirms the active role of the state in regulating and reshaping family relations. Attention to gender relations in the form of reproductive relations leads to childcare leaves and subsidies, abortion and contraception laws, and affirmative action policies directed at mothers. But women’s lives outside the institutional context of family and reproduction are much harder to describe critically in ways that will generate a strong response from either the state or civil society. Looking at both Germany and the US reveals new challenges emerging in different forms in each context. The global re-orientation from a competition between East and West has both encouraged neoliberal frames for structural reform of economic policies around the world and also highlighted a new competition between secular modern nations and frameworks and those of religious fundamentalist ones. While the rise of economic inequalities stimulated by neoliberalism is a challenge to US feminist intersectional thinking, the redefinition of immigration as intertwined with gender relations offers a new challenge to European feminist movements. This dual re-orientation provides a shift in discursive opportunity structure at the transnational level. Feminists framing gender justice will be making their intersectional choices of alliances on a terrain that is remarkably different from that of the previous decades, and yet one on which the legacies of the past remain visible.

Conclusion: Intersectionality and political transformation Full citizenship for women remains a goal rather than an achievement in both Germany and the US, but the available discursive tools for the necessary activist framing work that movements in both contexts pursue differ. By beginning from an analysis of social inequality that is already understood to be intersectional in a dynamic sense, the frameworks that connect race, class and gender with rights and citizenship can be examined for how they empower and disempower people in different structural locations. Rather than lists of intersectional positions or frames, we can begin to develop an analytical model of framing as processes that actively connect concepts. These connective processes will systematically push some ways of thinking into the definitional background and foreground different concerns

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in specific cases while remaining comprehensible as comparable systems. The meaning of gender inequality is not simply different across countries or contexts but is anchored in a history in which the boundaries and entitlements of racialized nationhood, the power of organized class interests to use the state and the intersection of both of these with the definition of women as reproducers has been part of politics all along (Yuval Davis 1990). Seeing a system of inequality that is not hierarchically nested inside particular institutions or able to be simplified into a competition to identify the most important oppression reveals the reflexively institutionalized understandings that enable political practice. We make categories to understand the world, and do so from the standpoints that we occupy, but the point of our understanding this world of inequality and injustice is to change it. Descriptions of inequalities feed back in both positive and negative ways into the continued existence of these configurations of inequality. Positive feedback reinforces the status quo in the classic ‘vicious circle’ identified with the analysis of path-dependencies in systems, but the institutionalization of certain patterns with their inherent contradictions also allows for negative feedback, in which small changes multiply and drive a system further and further from its previous, precarious equilibrium. This instability – whether noted as the ‘dialectic’ of class, the ‘dilemma’ of racial exclusions or the ‘paradox’ of gender difference and equality – affects all forms of inequality and gives mobilizations to transform frameworks of inequality their hope for success. But transformatory politics will not be identifiable by some list of their particular characteristics, any more than politically significant frames or social inequalities can be captured in a list, however long. The underlying understanding of feminist transformation offered here relates change strategies in each case to the particular intersectional configuration there to be challenged. This relational understanding of radicalism also recognizes the inherent potential of reforms, however modest, to be the ‘butterfly wings’ that begin a longer process of change that is difficult for even its advocates to foresee. Politics is – as Linda Zerilli (2005) reminds us – the action of taking risks in a future that is unknowable because it is being co-determined by all the other actors with whom one must necessarily struggle. Political struggles as a form of self-making are inherently intersectional; they are ‘identity politics’, but understood as an indeterminate project extending into the future rather than a static reflection of the locations of the past. They also actively construct the meaning of ‘feminism’ by the choices of with and against whom feminists engage politically. Feminist actors can never predict how their actions will ultimately be understood or how the process of struggle will unfold, as they are not the only actors engaged in contests over meanings, resources and power. Yet, uncertain as the ends of a framing process must be, framing cannot be avoided if action is to be taken. A modest claim to limited, fallible, but strategically useful framing might open the door to dialogue with others, who have developed their own frames from their own circumstances, allowing a reflexive approach to finding alliances with which we can more broadly challenge the frameworks of inequality that enmesh us all.

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Note 1 My thanks are extended to the editors of this volume for their encouragement to write this in the first place and for their constructive comments that pushed it to be much better that it would otherwise have been. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions from Lisa Brush, Hae Yeon Choo, Axeli Knapp and Pamela Oliver not only a this paper but on the entire project from which it is drawn.

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Intersectionality, framing feminist alliances 103 Lutz, H. (2006) ‘Doing gender and doing ethnicity: Intersectionality in the debate on social inequalities’, paper presented at the conference ‘Re-visioning the future: Perspectives on gender studies’, Braunschweig, Germany, May 2006. McCall, L. (2005) ‘The complexity of intersectionality’, Signs, 30: 1771–880. Martinez, E. (1993) ‘Beyond black/white: The racisms of our times’, Social Justice, 20: 22–34. Mayer, V. (2008) ‘Crafting a new conservative consensus on welfare reform: Re-imagining citizenship and redesigning social provision’, Social Politics, 15: 154–81. Moeller, R. (1993) Protecting motherhood: Women and the family in the politics of postwar West Germany, Berkeley: University of California Press. Myrdal, G. (1944) An American dilemma: The negro problem and modern democracy, New York: Harper Brothers. O’Connor, J., Orloff, A.S. and Shaver, S. (1999) States, markets, families: Gender, liberalism, and social policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, New York: Cambridge University Press. Pedriana, N. (2006) ‘From protective to equal treatment: Legal framing processes and transformation of the women’s movement in the 1960s’, American Journal of Sociology, 111: 1718–61. Prins, B. (2006) ‘Narrative accounts of origins: A blind spot in the intersectional approach?’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 277–90. Roberts, D. (1997) Killing the black body: Race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty, New York: Pantheon. Skrentny, J. (2006) ‘Policy-elite perceptions and social movement success: Understanding variations in group inclusion in affirmative action’, American Journal of Sociology, 111: 1762–815. ——(1996) The ironies of affirmative action: Politics, culture, and justice in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Snow, D.A. and Corrigall-Brown, C. (2005) ‘Falling on deaf ears: Confronting the prospect of non-resonant frames’, in D. Croteau, W. Hoynes and C. Ryan (eds) Rhyming hope and history: Activists, academics and social movement scholarship, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Snow, D.A., Rochford, E.B., Jr, Worden, S.K. and Benford, R.D. (1986) ‘Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation’, American Sociological Review, 51: 464–81. Stone, D.A. (1988) Policy paradox and political reason, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2006) ‘Multiple inequalities, intersectionality and the European Union’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 211–28. Vogel, L. (1993) Mothers on the job: Maternity policy in the U.S. workplace, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. von Wahl, A. (1999) Gleichstellungsregime: Berufliche Gleichstellung von Frauen in den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Walby, S. (2007) ‘Complexity theory, systems theory, and multiple intersecting social inequalities’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 37: 449–70. Williams, F. (2003) ‘Contesting “race” and gender in the European Union: A multi-layered recognition struggle for voice and visibility’, in B. Hobson (ed.) Recognition struggles and social movements: Contested identities, agency and power, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Yuval Davis, N. (2006) ‘Intersectionality and feminist politics’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 193–209. ——(1990) Gender and nation, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Zerilli, L. (2005) Feminism and the abyss of freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zippel, K. (2006) The politics of sexual harassment: A comparative study of the United States, the European Union, and Germany, New York: Cambridge University Press.

7

Bending towards growth Discursive constructions of gender equality in an era of governance and neoliberalism Malin Rönnblom

Introduction The Lisbon strategy launched by the European Union (EU) in 2000 is just one example of the strong growth focus in politics.1 With this strategy, the EU announced its ambition to make Europe a world leader with regard to growth and employment. The goal of the Lisbon strategy is to make the EU the most competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, adding to the possibilities of sustainable economic growth with increased employment and social cohesion. In 2005, the Lisbon strategy was revised with the ambition to further strengthen and focus the efforts used to promote the goals of the strategy: They [the member states] committed themselves to making the European Union the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment. (European Commission 2005: 3) This quote serves as a good example of how growth is presented, or framed, in politics. Although the dimension of economic growth is almost always mentioned first, there is a clear intention to define growth in three dimensions: an economic, an ecological and a social one. In a world increasingly characterized by globalization, and where neoliberalism tends to dominate political discourses, the concept of ‘growth’ has gained a status that has enhanced its political scope. From strictly being a part of the economic sphere, it has now stretched to such an extent that ecological and social dimensions are also described in terms of growth, or sustainable growth. Another interpretation is that the economic dimension of politics has stretched and has become an integrated component of all politics to a larger extent than before, including for example both welfare policy and overall democratic ambitions. Aspirations of sustainable growth are articulated in an increasing number of policy areas and are very visible in regional policy. Although there is no agreement on what growth means, not even in regional policy, growth is still presented as the self-evident policy goal (cf. Lindström 2005). Eva Friman shows how the contemporary dominating growth discourses portray its advocates as

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optimists and its opponents as pessimists. She relates this discursive construction to the self-evident position of growth in modernity: ‘Unlimited growth fits perfectly into the logic of the narrative of progress and into modernism’ (Friman 2002: 218). Following Friman’s argument, growth could be perceived as a ‘master narrative’, such an obvious political goal that it is impossible to question. This chapter revolves around two, as I see them, frequently used political buzzwords, ‘growth’ and ‘gender equality’, the analysis of which will enable me to show how the political dynamics of regionalism and gender mainstreaming are tied together. Gender equality as a political goal has long been accepted in Swedish politics but can be imbued with both different and contradictory meanings (Rönnblom 2002). In this chapter, I scrutinize how growth is constructed through implementation of the Lisbon strategy and what this dominant growth discourse means for the construction of gender equality. My analysis will focus on the way dominating articulations of gender equality are produced within regional policy – both in Sweden and in relation to EU regional policy. The understandings of politics – as an analytical concept and as an empirical field for feminist analysis – are central in this analysis. I will analyse politics as both discursively produced and as producing ways of thinking. Taking this analysis one step further, I will scrutinize how politics itself can depoliticize issues such as gender equality. My understanding of politics as discursive will be elaborated in the next section. After that, I will contextualize my analysis of the content of regional policy, discussing shifts in how politics is organized. The following two sections analyse the content of regional policy through the lenses of growth and gender equality, first in Sweden and then in the EU. I will conclude by discussing the possibilities of politicizing gender in regional policy.

The political, politics and politicizing One prominent feature of feminist struggle evident in both feminist theory and research, as well as in feminist political practice, has been the stress placed on the importance of politicizing gender. This has, for example, led to feminist scholars questioning the dominant figure of the citizen in liberal political theory, as well as the women’s movement struggles to increase the numbers of women in parliament. In her analysis of the Swedish political system, Maud Eduards (1992) has concluded that, although women to a large extent are included as representatives in Swedish decision-making bodies, gender is not constituted as a political dimension in Swedish politics. Class, or more correctly the right–left political scale, is still the dominating – and only – way of articulating conflicting interests. Women are included as individuals, but gender is not regarded as a conflict dimension, and thus not regarded as a political dimension. In this chapter, a theoretical discussion of politics serves as a point of departure and as a theoretical strand. I am interested in scrutinizing both the form of politics and the dominating and overarching political goals, and what they mean in relation to the possibilities of politicizing gender. In taking this path, I have been inspired by researchers such as Carol Bacchi (1999), Bacchi and

Bending towards growth 107 Joan Eveline (2003) and Katherine Teghtsoonian (2004), who have studied gender mainstreaming in relation to what they call a neoliberal societal context. My intention, also inspired by Chantal Mouffe (2005), is to discuss how a (neo) liberal definition and practice of politics creates difficulties politicizing ‘new’ dimensions such as gender. This argument will be developed in the concluding section of the chapter. Politics influences people’s everyday life just as people in turn influence politics. A discursive approach to politics means seeing politics as a constant process of action in which people act and dominating discourses are (re)produced and challenged. Here, I focus on the existing, dominating discourses of what politics ought to be and the kind of subject positions that are produced in these processes. The emphasis, then, is on what Ferree in this volume defines as ‘framework’. I will discuss how dominating political discourses hinder and/or open up the possibilities for politicizing gender using a number of empirical examples of how gender equality is articulated in regional policy – both in EU documents and in documents coming from the Swedish government and Swedish national authorities. The idea is to place regional policy in an analytical context where neoliberal trends in politics are highlighted. By placing the constructions of gender equality in this theoretical setting, it is possible to reach a more thorough understanding of the meanings of gender equality that are (re)produced in policy(making). By recognizing processes of stretching, but especially of bending and shrinking, the ambition is to understand how a dominant discourse of growth plays down gender equality as a possibility of politicizing gender. My understanding of politics is also informed by the distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, developed by Chantal Mouffe: by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean a set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. (Mouffe 2005: 9) Central to my analysis of how gender equality is produced in regional policy is the way discourses of politics also produce discourses of the political. Mouffe stresses the conflictual dimension of the political, an aspect that I regard as especially important in studies of how gender equality is articulated in policy. In countries such as Sweden, and also in the larger EU context, gender equality is and has been on the public agenda for quite some time. In line with Mouffe’s argument, and also drawing upon the work of Maria Wendt Höjer (2002), I believe it is important to stress that public articulation of a question is not enough for that question to be politicized. Wendt Höjer argues for three prerequisites to be fulfilled in order for a question to be politicized: it must be articulated in a collective and not an individualistic manner, be placed on the public agenda and be articulated in terms of conflict. To stress the dimension of conflict when deciding whether a question is politicized or not is a way of highlighting the element of power in the theoretical

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understanding of politics. To politicize a question is to acknowledge existent power relations in society and thus create opportunities for change. Although the main questions in this chapter are related to the content of politics, I also see the form of politics as important in scrutinizing the bending of gender equality in regional policy. Articulations of political goals and measures are intertwined with the organization of politics, especially at the regional level. Changes in the ways in which politics is organized create space for articulating the content of politics and vice versa.

From government to governance From the late 1980s onwards, the nation-state has been put under pressure and new forms of governing are developing. This process of change is described as going from government to governance, i.e. going from strictly institutionalized and hierarchical forms of doing politics to looser and network-based ways in which new actors are also invited to participate (see Heywood 2002). Contemporary European states are challenged both from above, by ‘the complex of major transformations captured by the shorthand term “globalization”’, and from below, through the increasing importance of the regional level and the growing power of local and regional movements (Keating 2002: 201). In Europe, the growing importance of the EU is highlighted in relation to the changing forms of institutionalized practices, and multilevel governance is a central concept that is used to describe these processes. An important feature in this context is the growing significance of regionalism. As the importance of the nation-state decreases, the regional level has gained importance, not least because regions have simultaneously gained political autonomy. Money coming from the European Structural Funds2 has contributed to the creation of a more autonomous regional level in politics, and new forms of governing have also appeared in the regional context, of which regional partnerships are the most prominent. In this context, regional policy has achieved increased importance as a policy area and as a separate policy level during the last twenty years. Traditionally, Swedish regional politics has been concerned with issues such as infrastructure and incentives designed to encourage large companies to establish their production plants in sparsely populated areas. In recent years, however, there has been a shift away from focusing on assisting ‘weak regions’ suffering from, for example, a decline in their industrial base and outward migration, towards promoting growth and vitality in the whole of Sweden. Focus has moved from a national governmental regional policy aimed at lagging or declining regions to one that promotes growth and vitality in the whole of Sweden, requiring the active contribution of all the country’s regions in order to achieve development (SOU 2000:87, 2000:36; Prop. 2001/2: 4; DS 2002: 34). One example of a new form of doing politics, which also marks the shift from government to governance, is the establishment of regional partnerships in order to handle regional policy in the EU member states. Michael Keating discusses these processes in terms of ‘new regionalism’, emphasizing the territorial dimension in which politics – in both form and content – is being reshaped in the

Bending towards growth 109 twenty-first century. Especially in relation to processes of economic restructuring, Keating argues for a new position of place, or locality, in politics. Through the change in regional policies, and the one in research approaches, locality – and the region – has received a new, more prominent political place: The basis unit of production is no longer the individual firm, but the whole productive space of the region. The old idea of comparative advantage under which every region had a place in the national and international division of labour, underlying traditional regional policy, has given away to absolute or competitive advantage in which regions, not just firms, compete for investment, markets and technology. This has radical implications for politics since it postulates a common regional interest in competition overriding other solidarities of class, sector, gender, age or ethnicity. (Keating 2002: 205) Here, Keating points to a process I would call depoliticization, in which the dominance of economic competition over-rules potential conflicts between different groups in society. From the 1970s onwards, politics has changed from dealing with redistribution connected to ideas of a just society to formulating economic growth as an overall political goal (Rose 1999). This change also relates to processes of globalization in which the borders between politics and economy are constantly transgressed. This also means that it is important to discern the relations between changing forms of politics and the overall political goals (cf. Teghtsoonian 2004). My understanding is that the shift from government to governance also means a shift in the content of politics, in overall political ideology, where (economic) growth increasingly stands out as a non-questionable goal of politics. In sum, two shifts – in both the form and the content of politics – seem to appear simultaneously. A looser form of governing, where a broader spectrum of actors is involved and where actors representing companies, ‘the market’, are given a special status, goes hand in hand with the increased status of ‘economic growth’ as an overarching political goal. The downplaying of the nation-state, combined with the neoliberal notion of politics as growth, undermines possibilities of regional solidarity and introduces regional competitiveness instead. This goes hand in hand with Swedish regional development policies in which the creation of the ‘strong region’ is pushed to the fore. The need to create strong regions leads to a downplaying of aspects connected to ‘political struggle’, such as the dimensions of gender and ethnicity. There is no room for politics inside the regions. While calling for a return to the nation-state would not be ‘the solution’ to this problem, and while gender and ethnicity have not necessarily been politicized before, this process points to the importance of connecting the form and the content of politics.

Understandings of gender equality in regional policy3 Turning to empirical examples of how gender equality is articulated in regional policy, I also return to the three prerequisites that Wendt Höjer (2002) argues

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need to be fulfilled in order for a question to be politicized, namely the need for articulation in a collective and not an individualistic manner, placement on the public agenda and articulation in terms of conflict, i.e. in terms of relations of power. By treating these conditions as an analytical point of departure, my intention is to explore the extent to which representations of gender equality raise the possibility of politicizing gender. There is a long tradition in Swedish regional policy of dealing with what in the 1980s was called women’s issues and from the late 1990s onwards became known as gender equality issues. During the initial launch of a ‘new’ regional policy in Sweden, gender equality was presented as one of two horizontal dimensions to be included in the whole policy area (Prop. 1997/98: 62). Together with the ecological dimension, gender equality should be regarded at every stage of policymaking within this policy field, a statement that coincided with the general implementation of gender mainstreaming in Swedish politics. In the latest White Paper on regional policy published in 2001, A policy for growth and vitality in the whole country (Prop. 2001/2: 4), the political ambition of sustainable growth was strongly promoted, and gender equality was transformed from a horizontal goal into becoming part of one of the three dimensions of sustainable growth, i.e. the social dimension. This dimension was to be given equal political status with both the economic and the environmental dimensions, and together these were to create sustainable growth. It is far from self-evident how gender equality’s transition from horizontal goal to part of the social dimension of sustainable growth should be interpreted. Should this be seen as completing a process whereby gender equality has moved from being ‘special efforts on behalf of women’ to being an integrated part of regional growth policies? My analysis of this latest White Paper on regional policy shows how gender equality is both represented as an important ‘asset’ in the drive for sustainable development and growth, while at the same time almost vanishing when political intentions are being transformed into policy measures. The first part of the White Paper lists fifteen areas of importance for regional development, gender equality policy being one of them. Here, emphasis is put on making both men’s and women’s conditions, needs and interests visible, and also on implementing this perspective through concrete actions in compiling the regional growth agreements (one of the main instruments for creating regional development and growth). There is mention of the need to increase the representation of women in the regional partnerships, and improved methods and education in the area of gender equality are also called for. Competence is presented as a key concept, and new strategies for women’s entrepreneurship are highlighted together with projects that break with the labour market’s traditional divide between men and women. In the labour market, these are highlighted as important tools to ‘increase gender equality’. In this section, where gender equality is discussed explicitly as an important policy area for regional development, gender equality is constructed as an overall problem related both to differences in the needs and interests of women and men and to the issue of representation. Gender equality is also presented as a problem that is rooted in a lack of competence and

Bending towards growth 111 where activity and change are needed. Although power relations between men and women are not mentioned explicitly, the discussion of different interests could be interpreted as a kind of recognition of gendered power relations in society. Although brief, this section of the text provides some tools for articulating gender as a political dimension. Gender equality is placed on the public agenda, men and women are discussed collectively, as two social groups, and the articulation of the relation between men and women as having different interests could be interpreted as a potential way of acknowledging gender in terms of conflict. In the later sections of the White Paper, where the new policy is presented in more detail, one could then expect that there should be some traces of the earlier discussion of the importance of gender equality measures. It is also here that we find a presentation of the implementation of gender equality in regional policy, and both mainstreaming and particular efforts directed at women are pointed out as important here. Despite the fact that this was the second White Paper on regional policy in which an integration of gender equality was articulated, it is difficult to discern any ambitions for the integration of something that could be called a ‘gender equality perspective’. Reference is made to ‘women’ in relation to representation in regional partnerships, in a special section regarding support to women’s resource centres4 and also several times in relation to the need for special measures to increase women’s entrepreneurship, especially in rural areas. In these contexts, women are presented either in need of extra support or as an additional resource that is needed to reach the goal of creating regional development and growth. Apart from these gendered exceptions, the text talks of people and citizens, of actors, businesses and entrepreneurs. Subject positions explicitly articulating men, such as male entrepreneurs, are not found in the text. It is also difficult to conclude that the initial intention of giving the three dimensions of sustainable growth – economic, ecological and social – the same status in regional development has been achieved. While the ecological and social dimensions are presented together in the introduction to the White Paper, these dimensions are not, in contrast to the economic dimension, articulated in terms of measures and strategies. Instead, economic growth is given a privileged position and a hierarchical relationship is created between the three dimensions, placing economy on top, ecology in the middle and the social dimension last. Moreover, when gender, ethnicity and age are articulated in relation to the implementation of regional policy, groups such as women, immigrants and youth are constructed as static categories, an approach that limits the articulation of more complex subject positions. To sum up, the principal approach to gender equality in regional policy is still to undertake special measures on behalf of women, both by explicitly giving means to women’s resource centres but also through implicitly constructing gender equality in terms of special measures directed towards women. Women are presented as either in need of support, for example in order to become entrepreneurs or resources that society cannot afford to disregard, thus bending gender equality to the goal of regional development. Women are constituted as either deviant or a resource for regional development, but both constructions place the ‘problem of gender equality’ mostly in women’s hands and do not construct

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it as a mainstream problem for politics. Rather than occupying an active place in the creation of regional policy, women thus become objects of regional measures. This also means that there is no room for articulating the relationship between women and men in terms of conflictual social relations. Although gender equality is part of the regional policy agenda, the strong focus on women and the failure to articulate gender equality in relational terms, thus in terms of power, leaves gender un-politicized. Instead, women are transformed into ‘useful’ actors in the process of creating regional growth, and thus the understanding of gender equality is ‘reduced’ to that of ‘women’ and the category women is ‘fixed’ to a set category of factors. In the field of regional policy in Sweden, government authorities such as ITPS5 and NUTEK6 are involved in the shaping and creation of the policy field to a large extent. More importantly, they have a responsibility to assist national and regional administrators as well as politicians in implementing national policies. Several policy documents produced by NUTEK and ITPS also illustrate how the economic dimension of growth is ranked highest in creating ‘strong’ and ‘sustainable’ regions (cf. NUTEK 2002, 2004). Strong regions are discussed in relation to clusters and innovation systems placed in the production and management sectors. Growth is thus to a large extent defined in terms of increasing the economic surplus. Ecological growth and social growth are constructed as the results of economic growth – not as dimensions of parallel importance. This hierarchical ordering shrinks – and bends – the integration of gender equality to a consequence of economic growth, whereby economic growth is regarded as gender-neutral. In the governmental evaluations of the regional growth agreements and programmes, the emphasis on articulation of ‘the problem of gender equality’ seems to change from minor to almost non-existent during the first three years, after which it reappears on the agenda.7 In the first evaluation, the dimensions of gender equality and ecology are singled out as two areas in which the policy has failed, and the government underlines the importance of these dimensions in the years to come (DS 2000: 7). It is also established that, although the demand to include gender equality has failed, all regions are aware of this failure and of the need to intensify efforts within this field. The second evaluation merely states that a large majority of the members in the regional partnerships feel that their knowledge and understanding of gender equality issues has not increased (DS 2002: 34). In the third evaluation, there is no reference to horizontal goals, dimensions or demands. Instead, the text talks about sustainability and aspects of sustainability and, in this context, gender equality is presented as an example alongside ecology and integration (DS 2003: 43). In that sense, the establishment of the concept of sustainable growth has downplayed issues of gender equality. In the fourth evaluation, gender equality is more explicitly on the agenda again, and several regions have increased ambitions in the field of gender equality, especially concerning the creation of ‘networks of competence’ – in relation to gender equality, environmental issues and integration. In all these four evaluations, the issue of increasing the number of women representatives in the regional partnerships is mentioned as important in the

Bending towards growth 113 context of gender equality. That is, explicit presentations of gender equality are often found in relation to women’s representation. It is also interesting to note that, more or less consistently, gender equality and ecological sustainability are either presented in terms of ‘finally, it is important …’ and ‘in addition …’ or they are placed at the end of chapters or sections in the text. The first evaluation carried out by NUTEK (2005), i.e. the fifth of the programmes, constitutes an exception. Here, sustainable growth is presented as the main focus of the evaluation. Despite this intention, the discussion of gender equality is quite limited. A majority of the regional partnerships believe that issues of gender equality are well integrated in the regional growth programmes, although the women in the partnerships seem to be more hesitant than the men in coming to this conclusion (NUTEK 2005). In conclusion, the evaluations show that the perception of the actors responsible for the regional growth programmes seems to have shifted from one of ‘failure’ in respect of gender equality to one of ‘success’, while the meaning of gender equality has more or less stayed the same. When made explicit, gender equality is about representation of women, about support for women and about women as an unexploited resource. Thus, the same forms of gender equality’s ‘bending’ and ‘shrinking’ are reproduced as they are found in the White Paper, and an articulation of gender in terms of conflict seems beyond reach.

Regional policy in the EU: Equal opportunities, gender mainstreaming and the Structural Funds In the EU, the Structural Funds are the main instrument for improving regional and local economic development as well as labour market integration. Especially those regions that were previously included as ‘Objective 1 regions’ more or less totally design their regional development policies in relation to the demands and objectives of the Structural Funds. The Structural Funds could hence be seen as an integrated part of the Swedish regional development policies (see Hudson and Rönnblom 2007). The main aim of the Funds is to help reduce economic and social disparities. Since the late 1980s, the issue of equal opportunities for men and women has been included in the guidelines of the Structural Funds. However, it was not until the 2000–2006 programming period that the gender mainstreaming approach was fully introduced and established as a horizontal goal of the Funds, together with sustainable development.8 In order to analyse how gender equality is represented in the EU regional policy context, I will take a closer look at two central documents, The guidelines for programmes in the period 2000–2006 (European Commission 1999) and The communication on the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the Structural Funds programming documents 2000–2006 (European Commission 2002). Similarly to the Swedish White Paper on regional policy, the demand for integrating gender equality as a horizontal goal is clearly stated in the introduction to the guidelines for programmes in the period 2000–2006: Equality for men and women is a basic democratic principle underpinned by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Its incorporation into all policies is no longer

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Malin Rönnblom an option but an obligation. In this context, an overall mainstreaming approach for equal opportunities must be introduced into all Structural Funds programming. This involves both efforts to promote equality and specific measures to help women and the mobilization of all general policies by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the respective situation of women and men. (European Commission 1999: 2)

This statement in the document raises the possibility of articulating gender equality, here defined as equal opportunities, in political terms.9 The question is articulated in a collective manner, placed on the public agenda and presented in terms of a democracy. To present gender equality as related to democracy could at least open up an understanding of gender in terms of conflict, but the remaining parts of the document give another impression. Most of the text is ‘gender-blind’, and the above quote is one of only four occasions in the 34-page document where the text is not. The second ‘exception’ to the document’s gender-blind language comes in a section about support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which states that young people, women entrepreneurs or those from disadvantaged groups should be targeted for assistance. The third ‘exception’ occurs in the presentation of ‘Objective 3’, where it states that a mainstreaming approach for equal opportunities between men and women is essential. However, it is not specified how this should be done and, in the following sections, the text shifts between ‘young people’ and ‘individuals’, and the need to give special attention to the disabled, ethnic minorities and ‘other groups and individuals who may be disadvantaged’. This way of presenting women, as a specific group of entrepreneurs together with young people, constitutes women as an exception to the norm (and young people as young men) in the same way as the Swedish documents do. The few exceptions to the ‘gender-blind’ language used in the document serve to reinforce the implicit ‘male’ norm. Women are made an exception from the dominant construction of ‘the entrepreneur’. The lack of references to men also means that the relational dimension (and thus the conflictual dimension as well) of gender equality is non-existent. The last exception is a section on Positive action for women, which states the importance of complementing gender mainstreaming with specific positive actions: Programmes and measures should be designed to fully address the genderspecific obstacles to equal access and participation in order to make sure that discriminatory effects are neutralized and that gender equality is promoted and a balanced participation of women and men in decision-making structures should be ensured. (European Commission 1999: 26) Here, the talk of ‘obstacles’ and ‘discriminatory effects’ opens up a possibility of politicizing gender, which stands in contrast to the earlier emphasis on ‘strengthening’ women. Still, the measures suggested to change this are again

Bending towards growth 115 directed towards women, e.g. through activities aiming to improve women’s career progression and level of entrepreneurship. Contrasting (Rönnblom 2005b) the way in which gender equality is presented in this EU document with the representations of gender equality in the national Swedish regional policy discourse, my conclusion is that the EU discourse is more contradictory. Although the dominant articulation of gender equality, including the dominating ‘gender-blind’ language that promotes the usual actors, is bent towards economic growth and shrunk to mean ‘just women’, gender equality is also presented in terms of ‘discriminatory effects’. Even though the concept of discrimination is mostly applied to individuals and generally not in a collective manner (which I believe is necessary for politicizing a question), this articulation at least enables an understanding of gender equality in terms of relations and conflict. That is to say, this articulation of the problem of gender equality creates a space for politicizing gender and thus a possibility to challenge how ‘normal’, ‘gender-blind’ politics is constituted. In its Communication on the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the Structural Funds programming documents 2000–2006 (2002), the European Commission provides an overview of the extent to which the gender mainstreaming dimension has been taken into account in the Structural Funds programming 2000–2006.10 While earlier specific measures for women are regarded as important, the Commission states that these do not suffice to remedy structural inequalities. Thus, gender mainstreaming is put forward as a necessary strategy for change. One overall conclusion is that gender equality is more effectively dealt with than during the earlier programming period, and that gender equality is promoted in the field of employment and human resources development, but neglected in areas such as environment, transport and rural development. It also concludes that most of the programmes’ priorities concerning gender equality are focused on improving either women’s access to, and participation in, employment, education and training or the reconciliation of work and family life. Although it is not explicitly stated, implicitly the reconciliation between work and family life concerns women, not men, because it is related to improvements that women need. On the whole, and even though the Commission stresses the need to give priority not ‘just’ to so-called special measures for women, women are presented as the main focus of gender mainstreaming activities. Other initiatives are presented in a gender-neutral, or ‘gender-blind’, manner, including the need for more information and statistics, for ‘gender expertise’, for training people involved in programming and implementation, as well for sufficient resources in order to allow the dual approach (gender mainstreaming and specific actions). This ‘gender-blind’ language, including the use of the expression ‘gender balance’ when discussing the issue of representation, means that the problem of gender equality is made out to be more administrative than political. As a result, gender equality is given two different, and contradictory, meanings. Articulations of structural inequalities outlined at the beginning of the document are linked to activities directed to ‘help’ women to reach already existing goals and norms for the Structural Funds.

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It seems as if the road to growth is already fixed. What is needed is to get women on board and, for this to happen, women have to learn the skills in order to have access to these growth areas. In sum, this Communication illustrates the same contradiction I discussed in the Swedish case: initial statements on the need to change structural inequalities between women and men are transferred into problem representations that support women and also hold them responsible for this change. The potential for gender equality to be articulated in terms of conflict, i.e. for gender to be politicized, fades the closer the text gets to questions of implementation and activities.

Conclusions: Constructions of gender equality in a neoliberal discourse In this chapter, I have gone through some central policy documents regarding regional policy and gender equality in Sweden and the EU. I do not claim to have given an exhaustive picture of how gender equality is constructed in regional policy, although the problem representations illustrated here agree with other research on how gender equality is given meaning (cf. Magnusson et al. 2008). One main conclusion after scrutinizing the way gender equality is produced in the documents at hand is that the dominating discourse of regional policy – both in a Swedish context and at the EU level – offers very little room for politicizing gender. In spite of gender equality’s clear articulation on the regional policy agenda, to some extent also in collective terms, there are just a few cracks in the discourse that indicate the potential to articulate gender relations in terms of conflict. Still, to articulate a question in public and in collective terms does not mean that this question is articulated in terms of power relations. Thus, gender and gender equality policy remain issues that can be ‘added on’ to ordinary politics and not challenges to what are regarded to be the political dimensions of regional policy. Primarily, gender equality is bent into an issue of growth, and mainly an issue of changing women in order to make them fit into the overall aims of regional policy. These aims are articulated in ‘neutral terms’ at the same time as they privilege ‘normal’ actors whose gender, class, race or age need not be mentioned. This also means that the scope of gender equality has been shrinking. From an issue dealing with all parts of human life (in regional policy formulated in terms of economic, ecological and social sustainability), gender equality has become a narrower question of women as entrepreneurs and self-employed people. Sweden frequently takes pride in being the ‘most gender-equal country in the world’, often referring to the United Nations’ rankings of the position of women. Since the late 1990s, the policy on gender equality presented in the governmental White Papers is even spelled out in terms of feminism and ‘gender power order’. In this chapter, I have shown that, although gender equality is put forward as a horizontal goal of Swedish regional policy, there are few traces of the articulation of gender in terms of conflict or power relations. Actually, the potential for politicizing gender seems greater at the EU level than in Swedish politics. Although gender

Bending towards growth 117 is articulated in terms of conflict in Swedish national gender equality policy, this dimension seems to disappear when mainstreamed into a specific policy field. My conclusion is that the closer gender equality gets to the arena of political implementation, the more it is bent and shrunk and the more difficult it becomes to politicize gender. Could it be that the closer you get to the actual implementation of policy, the closer you get to the established practice of politics that tends to depoliticize potentially conflictive issues? However, it is worth highlighting that it is not ‘just’ gender equality that lacks a politicizing dimension. Swedish regional policy also lacks dimensions of conflict in general, with the possible exception of the territorial conflicts between regions. This lack of articulated conflicts does not mean that this policy field lacks opposing interests and power relations; the documents are filled with problem representations connected to the lack of sustainable growth, but these are not connected to different societal interests. Instead, they are presented as problems for ‘all citizens in all regions’. This lack of conflict is quite similar to what Chantal Mouffe calls ‘pain-free politics’ in which there are no losers, but which is: ‘led by a closed circle of elite white males who enjoy power and do not want to give it up’ (Mouffe 2000: 112). What then is the problem with so-called pain-free politics? The main answer lies in the prerequisite of this argument, which implies that all actors have the same possibilities to join on their own terms. Mouffe argues that to adopt the belief that it is possible to combine the interests of multinational corporations with those of so-called weak or non-profit organizations is to surrender to the interests of the former. She also relates the occurrence of ‘pain-free politics’ to increasing globalization and the neoliberal trends it contains, a situation that limits the possibilities of the nation-state to perform politics. Instead, politics is transformed into a game with all winners and no losers. But does this really mean that the nationstate is losing ground in favour of the market? Researchers such as Nikolas Rose and Kathy Teghtsoonian argue that neoliberal politics (or advanced liberalism as Rose calls it) is not about dismantling the state, but about transformation of the state into a market-friendly one (Rose 1999; Teghtsoonian 2004). Neoliberalism is about transforming, not shrinking, the scope of the state, and about changing the form of governance (see also Bacchi and Eveline 2003). The neoliberal project demands another form of state and another form of politics, which Bacchi and Eveline argue is exemplified by new public management. They argue that gender mainstreaming goes hand in hand with a neoliberal political agenda, and their main argument is that different mainstreaming models are encapsulated in a way of thinking in which the otherness of women is highlighted. So long as the focus remains on presumed biological characteristics, a neoliberal argument for freeing up economic arrangements to encourage individual success is uncontested. By contrast, insisting that ‘difference’ emerges from relationships of power rather than inhering in individuals or in members of particular groups puts those relationships and the factors sustaining them under critical scrutiny. (Bacchi and Eveline 2003: 7)

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Could it be that gender equality is particularly vulnerable to processes of shrinking and bending, and thus to depoliticization? To articulate gender in terms of conflict challenges the essential part of liberal democracy, which regards citizenship as a public and universal part of human life (Young 1990). The bending and shrinking of gender equality could then be seen as a way of keeping troublesome dimensions of the ‘private’ away from politics, while at the same time encouraging inclusion of all citizens in the political realm. In conclusion, processes of bending and shrinking gender equality illustrate how dominating discourses of the political keep a politicization of gender out of politics (Mouffe 2005). I also suggest that this production of politics as ‘pain free’ is made possible through the development of governance as a form of organizing politics. Making politics loose and inclusive on the surface while not acknowledging the importance of societal power dimensions tends to enhance the influence of traditional political actors and thus the dominant understanding of the political. In this chapter, I have mainly discussed different forms of barriers to politicizing gender in regional policy, barriers that in different ways hinder a conceptualization of gender in terms of conflict. Constructing women as a homogeneous group either in need of support or as a resource to development and growth limits the space to articulate gender in terms of power relations. At the same time as I strongly argue that contemporary articulations of gender equality in regional policy, in both Sweden and the EU, are at best bent towards an inclusion of ‘the marginalized group women’, I see the need to also highlight cracks, potential possibilities for change, both in this discourse and in my own analysis of it. I have also tried to show that initial articulations of the issue of gender equality open up possibilities for representing the relationship between women and men in terms of conflict, but that this ‘window of politicization’ is closed again by the shift from overarching goals to strategies and activities for their implementation. Regarding my own analysis, there are of course cracks relating to the material I used and the conclusions I draw. However, I hope that I have succeeded in showing how my analysis is applied and that this approach could prove fruitful for other studies. A feminist researcher often has to take the risk of stabilizing gendered power relations despite one’s own firmly held belief in emancipation. For me, drawing attention to exclusionary practices in policymaking is a way of illuminating how traditional versions of gender relations prevail, while concurrently showing that power is constituted through ongoing practices of inclusion and exclusion, which also means showing a potential for change. When thinking of politics as discursively produced, there is always an opening for change.

Notes 1 I would like to thank Carol Bacchi for useful comments on a draft of this chapter. 2 The EU Structural Funds are composed of the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. 3 Another version of this section was published in Rönnblom (2005a). 4 Resource centres for women were established in all Swedish counties and many municipalities during the second half of the 1990s with the purpose of strengthening the position of women in regional development (see Rönnblom 2002).

Bending towards growth 119 5 The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies. 6 The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth. 7 The evaluations are predominantly built on surveys distributed to the members of all the regional partnerships and carried out by the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications (the first four years) and NUTEK (the last two years). 8 See Braithwaite (2000) for an overview of how equal opportunities between men and women, gender equality and gender mainstreaming have been taken into account in relation to the Structural Funds since the 1980s. 9 Here, I use equal opportunities as synonymous with gender equality. The concept of equal opportunities has however been discussed and criticized for not allowing positive action as a strategy for change (see Lombardo and Meier 2006). 10 In contrast to the Swedish case, the EU has drawn up special guidelines in relation to the Structural Funds. In Sweden, there are no specific documents or guidelines that define what gender equality and gender mainstreaming should mean in this context.

Bibliography Bacchi, C. (1999) Women, policy and politics, London: Sage. Bacchi, C. and Eveline, J. (2003) ‘Mainstreaming and neoliberalism: A contested relationship’, Policy & Society: Journal of Public, Foreign and Global Policy, 22: 98–18. Braithwaite, M. (2000) ‘Mainstreaming gender in the European Structural Funds’, paper presented at the Mainstreaming gender in European public policy workshop, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States, October 2000. DS (2003) Rapport om tillväxtavtalen, tredje året – Från tillväxtavtal till tillväxtprogram (Report on the regional growth agreements, year three – From regional growth agreements to regional growth programs), Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, Näringsdepartementet. ——(2002) Rapport om tillväxtavtalen. Andra året (Report on the second year of the regional growth agreements), Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, Näringsdepartementet. ——(2000) Rapport om tillväxtavtalen – Tillväxt i hela Sverige (Report on the regional growth agreements – Growth in the whole of Sweden), Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, Näringsdepartementet. Eduards, M. (1992) Rethinking change: Current Swedish feminist research, Stockholm: Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga forskningsrådet. European Commission (2005) Communication to the spring European Council, Working together for growth and jobs – A new start for the Lisbon Strategy, Brussels: European Commission. ——(2002) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the Structural Funds programming documents 2000–2006, Brussels: European Commission. ——(1999) Communication from the Commission. The Structural Funds and their coordination with the Cohesion Fund. Guidelines for programmes in the period 2000–2006, Brussels: European Commission. Friman, E. (2002) No limits: The 20th century discourse of economic growth, thesis, Department of History Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden. Heywood, P. (2002) ‘Executive capacity and legislative limits’, in P. Heywood, E. Jones and M. Rhodes (eds) Developments in West European politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Hudson, C. and Rönnblom, M. (2007) ‘Regional development policies and the constructions of gender equality – The Swedish case’, European Journal of Political Research, 46: 47–68. Keating, M. (2002) ‘Territorial politics and the new regionalism’, in P. Heywood, E. Jones and M. Rhodes (eds) Developments in West European politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lindström, B. (2005) Regionalpolitiken som tillväxtpolitik (Regional policies as growth policies), Stockholm: ITPS. Lombardo, E. and Meier, P. (2006) ‘Gender mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a feminist reading?’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 151–66. Magnusson, E., Rönnblom, M. and Silius, H. (2008) Critical studies of gender equalities: Nordic dislocations, dilemmas and contradictions, Gothenburg: Mukadam. Mouffe, C. (2005) On the political, London: Verso. ——(2000) The democratic paradox, London: Verso. NUTEK (2005) Heading for sustainable growth? The government’s growth programs 2004, Stockholm: NUTEK. ——(2004) Strong regions – for increased competition and welfare, Stockholm: NUTEK. ——(2002) Strong regions – for national growth in a global economy, Stockholm: NUTEK. Prop. (2001/2) En politik för tillväxt och livskraft i hela landet (White Paper: A policy for growth and vitality in the whole country), Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. ——(1997/98) Regional tillväxt – För arbete och välfärd (White Paper: Regional growth – For work and welfare), Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. Rönnblom, M. (2005a) ‘Letting women in? Gender mainstreaming in regional policies’, NORA, 13: 164–74. ——(2005b) ‘Challenges in comparative studies of gender equality’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 235–49. ——(2002) Ett eget rum? Kvinnors organisering möter etablerad politik (A room of one’s own? Women’s organizing meets established politics), Statsvetenskapliga institutions skriftserie, Umeå: Umeå University. Rose, N. (1999) Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SOU (2000:87) Regionalpolitiska utredningens slutbetänkande (Final report from the State Commission on Regional Policy), Stockholm: Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer. ——(2000:36) Utgångspunkter för 2000-talets regionalpolitik (Starting points for the regional policies of the 21st century), Stockholm: Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer. Teghtsoonian, K. (2004) ‘Neoliberalism and gender analysis mainstreaming in Aotearoa/ New Zealand’, Journal of Political Science, 2: 267–84. Wendt Höjer, M. (2002) Rädslans politik. Våd och sexualitet i den svenska demokratin (The politics of fear. Violence and sexuality in Swedish democracy), Stockholm: Liber. Young, I.M. (1990) Throwing like a girl and other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

8

Trading-in gender equality Gendered meanings in EU trade policy Jacqui True

Introduction Mainstream economists and political scientists assume that trade liberalization is a gender-neutral process. They consider the absolute gains from trade to be a rising tide that will lift all boats and are relatively silent about the inequalities and deleterious social impacts that may result from greater dependence on global markets. Feminist scholars, activists and policymakers have questioned this neoliberal view, highlighting the mutual, two-way linkages between trade policy and gender, and the often adverse, differential impacts of economic liberalization and crises on women relative to men (UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality Task Force on Gender and Trade 2004; Williams 2004). Trade exacerbates existing gender inequalities that result from societal, structural hierarchies. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, for example, trade-related employment losses disproportionately affect women as the industries that are most globally competitive and penetrated by imports (such as the textiles and footwear industries) are also the most female labour intensive. At the same time, structural gender inequalities serve as barriers to building a country’s trade capacity to take advantage of the global market opportunities that come with liberalization. Developing countries, for instance, tend to concentrate women in low-skilled production and reproduction as a strategy for achieving comparative advantage, and thus underutilizing women’s human capital. These mutual impacts of trade and gender make it vital that we analyse trade policy from a gendered perspective and inform trade negotiations that are usually not transparent and do not have good tools for taking into account social as well as economic costs and benefits. European Union (EU) trade policy is crucial to study as the EU has made substantial commitments to gender equality in its internal policies towards the construction of a single market. Contrary to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which considers employment equity laws to be potential ‘behind the borders’ barriers rather than enablers of trade integration, gender equality realized through equal pay and anti-discrimination law and policy was a legal precondition for the establishment of a common market in Europe. Today, gender equality is seen as ‘a fundamental right, a common value of the EU, and a necessary condition for the achievement of EU objectives of growth,

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employment and social cohesion’ in the Amsterdam Treaty and Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 2006a). Moreover, the EU has adopted gender mainstreaming, which ‘promotes the equality between women and men in all activities and policies at all levels’ (European Commission 1996). Mainstreaming is an approach to achieving gender equality that goes beyond equal rights and equal opportunities concepts to rectify unintended male bias within the institutional and policy processes of organizations (Lombardo 2005; Lombardo and Meier 2006; Prügl 2008). In contrast with the WTO view that opportunities for global trade are maximized when trade occurs among ‘neutral’ parties and is stripped of social and institutional baggage, in the EU, an integrated regional market was created by harmonizing institutional, ostensibly ‘non-market’, rules and norms among member states. This chapter explores the discursive politics of trade policymaking and its significance for the EU’s gender equality commitments. By discursive politics, I refer to the politics of language and meaning around the discussion and conceptualization of gender equality and difference reflected and reproduced in institutionalized norms, policy procedures and organizational identities, as well as material structures such as the international division of labour. If we consider gender inequalities and hegemonic gender identities to be located in discourse, then feminist strategies for gender transformation will involve struggles over the meanings of women and gender embedded in institutional rules and norms. Alison Woodward (2003) argues that the success of gender mainstreaming as a policy strategy for integrating awareness of gender inequalities and differences is ultimately judged by whether or not languages change. Gender transformation requires engagement with states and international organizations such as the EU to disrupt and/ or change their discursive practices. Such an approach is consistent with feminist understandings of gender mainstreaming as a practice that has the potential to change organizations from within (True 2003; Lombardo 2005; Lombardo and Meier 2006). The chapter is in three parts. The first section analyses the discursive politics of gender and trade in the EU in terms of what is discussed and what is not discussed, which actors are included and excluded, whose voices are able to frame and whose are silent. Building on this analysis, the second section considers how gender mainstreaming commitments have been framed in EU external trade and development policies. Using critical frame analysis, two policy frames are identified, one dominant, the neoliberal frame, and one subordinate, the human rights frame; these frames reflect two different ways of conceiving and leveraging the power of EU trade. The final section of the chapter discusses the opportunities and trade-offs in EU efforts to mainstream gender issues in trade.

Gender mainstreaming and trade objectives, actors and outcomes The boundaries around international trade policy, what is included in trade policymaking and negotiations and how they are conducted, have been changing radically in the years since the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’ protests against the WTO. For

Trading-in gender equality 123 example, European non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the European Parliament and European Commission Directorate Generals and officials have begun to recognize the relationship between trade and gender. Some actors acknowledge that trade is structurally gendered and therefore part of the problem of gender inequality, whereas other actors conceive of trade as a tool for defending and promoting women’s rights and therefore as part of the solution to gender inequality (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006). The first approach recognizes the structural gendered power in trade. Trade liberalization led by and in the interests of the EU (with the largest market share of world trade) may have a disproportionate effect on women because of unequal gender divisions of labour, resources and power. Trade may also affect gender relations beyond the market because it increasingly involves changes to domestic rules and policies (non-tariff barriers created by domestic regulations and investments). Gender mainstreaming is the EU policy response to this gendered structural power. Mainstreaming is intended to address any gender biases inherent in trade policymaking, ensuring that trade is non-discriminatory (through the use of gender-disaggregated data, indicators and impact assessment), that all sources of human capital are tapped and markets expanded. A major discursive shift in the European Commission Directorate General (DG) for Trade from talking about ‘non-trade’ issues such as the environment, consumer issues, human rights, gender, labour standards to discussing them as ‘trade and’ issues, i.e. issues that can and must be addressed by trade policymakers, recognizes the structural gendered power of trade. This shift has brought about greater transparency in trade policymaking, including openness to public participation and broader consultation with non-governmental actors as well as member states. The Civil Society Dialogue (CSD) programme at DG Trade, based on the principle of ‘a voice, not a vote’, is a way for civil society organizations, including those NGOs concerned with the intersection of gender equality, human rights, environment, to keep up to date with what is happening in trade negotiations and to make their views heard. It gives trade policymaking an appearance of ‘transparency and openness’ without necessarily affecting the outcome of trade negotiations (ECORYS 2006; Kaluzynska 2006; Dur and De Bièvre 2007). Despite the political commitment to civil society dialogue and to gender mainstreaming, their implementation in trade policy has been quite limited compared with other areas of EU competency. In terms of operational procedures, there has been little or no change in DG Trade from a gender perspective. Few women are among the ranks of senior trade negotiators, and there is no administrative unit and/ or leadership for gender mainstreaming in trade to co-ordinate the mainstreaming strategy within DG Trade. However, trade officials are tasked with co-ordinating research and policy on trade and social issues, as well as the civil society relationship, trade and environmental issues. When the creation of a gender focal point or desk for trade policy was suggested in a 2006 parliamentary discussion, Commission representative Joe Borg replied that monitoring human rights in third countries is the job of DG RELEX (External Relations), not DG Trade, and that DG RELEX already has a gender helpdesk (European Parliament 2006). This highlights the discursive

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politics in DG Trade, in particular how it seeks to maintain the conceptual separation of trade from other issues, and therefore to deny that gender equality or women’s human rights concerns are an integral part of EU trade policy. The second way of conceptualizing the trade and gender relationship recognizes the soft power of trade to promote women’s rights. Trade agreements provide opportunities for the EU to transform structural gendered power into normative power to spread the EU model of market integration with common social standards (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006; Young and Peterson 2006). The exercise of trade power to promote women’s rights may serve to increase EU legitimacy in the global trading system and broaden participation in trade as well as address the concerns of European institutions, social movements and publics about the potentially negative impacts of the EU in the developing world. Promoting women’s rights to participate in the labour market and the (paid) employment sectors of developing country trade partners has been the primary way in which the EU has used its soft power in trade. This approach illustrates the path-dependency of EU external policy, as it closely parallels the framing of gender inequality as a potential market barrier and gender equality initiatives as ‘market enhancing’ in the EU’s internal market integration. The ‘Trade and Social Issues’ analyst in DG Trade maintains that although the ‘focus on jobs and work, may not cover aspects [of gender inequality] outside of work … it is probably the most effective way of targeting the impacts of trade’. He argues that ‘you need to have the most concrete lever to use in trade negotiations … to determine how best to increase the life chances and benefits of trade to women … to make the short-term impacts better or worse’.1 The EU is apparently keen to promote a form of social development as part of the multilateral trade liberalization agenda they are pushing. But there are significant difficulties in the dialogue between trade and gender. Former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has continually said to civil society that they are ‘asking trade policy to do too much’.2 The EU Trade Directorate General Commission sees trade primarily in a positive light as a powerful development tool ‘to kick start economies and help them grasp the opportunities of global trade’.3 Thus, to the extent that they recognize the relationship between trade and gender at all, they tend to frame gender equality as relevant in removing barriers to trade opportunities and spreading the benefits of trade, rather than only as a cost, albeit unintended, of rapid market liberalization.

Framing gender inequality in EU trade policy Given the two broad gendered approaches to trade power discussed above, how have various actors framed the initiatives to mainstream gender in EU trade? In particular, what are the dominant and subordinate frames of gender equality in trade policy, for what purpose are they advanced and do they show any mutual learning between liberal trade and gender equality discourses? Moreover, how compatible is the framing of gender equality as a fundamental, enabling condition in the EU’s internal market with the framing of gender equality with respect to global trade?

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Maximizing women’s productive potential The dominant frame used by the Commission when discussing gender mainstreaming and equality between women and men in all policies – internal and external – is a neoliberal one, whereby arguments for gender mainstreaming are based primarily on economic factors. Thus, incorporating women into the labour market and ensuring equality between women and men are seen as good for growth, employment and development, and women are viewed in terms of their ‘productive potential’ or as ‘human resources’ to be maximized (European Commission 1996: 3, 2006a: 3). In the words of the Commission’s 1997 Annual Report on equal opportunities: ‘equality of opportunity is a matter of economic interest’ (European Commission 1998: 2). The business case for gender equality bends the concept to serve goals other than its own achievement and, in so doing, diminishes the achievement of gender equality as a worthy end in itself. The neoliberal frame is strongly evident in the EU discussions of gender within trade policy based on an analysis of official EU documents and dialogues. In a 2006 EU parliamentary discussion on women’s perspectives in international trade, DG Trade analyst Borg stated that ‘[t]he European Commission believes that clear social conditions underpin sustainable productivity growth and promote the efficient production of high-quality goods and services generating a net added value’ (European Parliament 2006). ‘Social conditions’, which include social dialogue and respect for fundamental social rights, are valued not because they are inherently good, or because they contribute to the quality of life of citizens, but because they increase productivity and efficiency. Further, social conditions, of which gender equality is seen as one, are considered marginal to the mainstream negotiation of trade agreements. In 2000, it was suggested that gender impact assessments be incorporated into the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) that are prepared for a developing country partner during a trade negotiation and prior to the ratification of liberalization agreements. SIAs can highlight impacts on women and men and gender equality, and suggest mitigating or flanking measures to be adopted by the developing country partner to reduce negative social impacts. However, gender equality is included in SIAs as a ‘second-tier’ indicator and thus is seen as of minor importance to trade discussions (Karadenizli 2003). Moreover, NGOs argue that gender equality indicators have not typically been included at all in SIAs. Women in International Development Europe (WIDE) reports that the terms of reference for the SIA of the European–Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) makes no mention of the word ‘gender’. Thus, the contractor was not required to pay specific attention to gender-related impacts of the trade agreement. In their draft report, however, the contractor found significant negative differential impacts of the proposed agreement on women. Regardless of these findings, the dominance of the neoliberal frame, which stresses comparative advantage and the need for countries to undergo domestic structural adjustment to benefit from trade and opening markets, makes it unlikely that EU negotiators will alter their negotiating positions in light of negative results of SIAs. These SIAs are an EU

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unilateral initiative, intended primarily for the information and policy guidance of developing country trade partners often ‘where [the EU] faced strong resistance … to have any sort of negotiation or dialogue on labour standards or social development’ (see Raza 2007).4

Women’s rights as human rights There is evidence that the EU’s dominant neoliberal frame has been influenced by women’s rights considerations, as they are increasingly being taken seriously in Commission documents and permeating more areas. The human rights frame, in particular, seems to be applied more broadly in later European Commission documents. The 1997 Annual Report on equal opportunities for women and men identifies ‘gender as a key issue for economic growth, social development and respect for human rights’ (European Commission 1998), presenting the human rights frame alongside the neoliberal one. An example of how the human rights frame to gender equality has been stretched to serve development policy ends can be seen in the 2006 Roadmap for Gender Equality, where it is recognized that ‘[g]ender equality is a goal in itself, a human right and contributes to reducing poverty’ (European Commission 2006a). This is a powerful recognition of gender equality as a human right, although it is interesting that it is still placed alongside the instrumental argument that equality helps to reduce poverty. Catherine Hoskyns argues that while the Commission may pay lip service to human rights considerations, in fact economic considerations are the only ones that are taken seriously. She claims that ‘[g]ender equality is accepted when it serves what are currently defined as [the EU’s] macroeconomic interests – not when it might change or challenge them’ (Hoskyns 2008: 118). Macroeconomic fundamentals are stretched to include gender equality objectives but, when they conflict, for instance when greater gender equality does not advance economic growth or participation, they are dropped from the policy discourse. She illustrates this point with the example of the European Employment Strategy (EES), which encourages women to enter the labour market, but does not pay any attention to the fact that many of the newly created jobs are insecure, part-time and low-paid. The economic goal is to increase employment and productivity, and the EU does not go beyond this to concern itself with the quality of the jobs women have taken on or the impact of women’s labour market participation on their unpaid care work in the family household (Hoskyns 2008: 117). Rather than integrating neoliberal and human rights frames as do Commission communications, the European Parliament (EP) champions the human rights frame for gendering trade policy. For instance, the EP Committee for Women’s Rights is driven more by women’s rights considerations than economic ones. In MEP Angela Kokkola’s report on gender mainstreaming for the Committee on Women’s Rights, the neoliberal frame whereby ‘women are seen as a “reserve” to be drawn on when necessary’ is rejected (European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights 1997: 10). The Committee also takes on an economic as well as civil and political definitions of women’s rights, arguing that ‘[e]qual rights and equal access to full

Trading-in gender equality 127 professional activities, and equal pay for those activities result in the most important element of rights, that is, in independence, including economic independence’ (European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights 1997: 15). A 2008 European Parliament report prepared by German MEP Uca Felekans argues that the use of trade to strengthen the position of women in developing countries warrants closer examination than it has been given by EU officials (European Parliament 2008). The report is highly critical of the 2007 Commission Gender and Development Communication, which acknowledges that trade liberalization can have ‘short-term negative consequences for vulnerable groups’ (European Commission 2007). The Commission makes no reference to EU free trade agreements or Economic Partnership Agreements with developing countries. Nor is its acknowledgement of potential implications for women’s human rights addressed by developing concrete gender equality indicators or tools to monitor and assess the impact of these trade agreements (van Staveren 2007). Like the European Parliament, European NGOs are strong supporters of the human rights frame for gender and trade and, in some cases, they explicitly argue against economic justifications for gender mainstreaming (see Debusscher and True 2008). WIDE, for instance, argues for a new frame that would make economics, including international trade, an instrument for promoting development, social justice, human and women’s rights, reduction of inequality and poverty eradication; rather than these concepts being subordinated to economic concerns or being included as added ‘extras’ tacked on to trade and development agreements (WIDE 2001). Despite the powerful human rights frame at work in these EP and NGO policy statements, there is evidence that they too have been influenced by the neoliberal frame. Economic arguments are usually included in NGO reports and EP documents because they hold more persuasive power in the eyes of the Commission. That is, to convince the Commission, it is necessary to present arguments about the efficiency gains as well as equity norms. For example, in the parliamentary discussion on perspectives of women on international trade, MEP Maria Carlshamre states that ‘equal opportunities for women and men is not just an issue of human rights or some sort of luxury’, because the gendered nature of power structures ‘hampers growth and every kind of sustainability’ (European Parliament 2006). Her statement implies that arguments appealing to human rights are not strong enough, as human rights could be considered a kind of ‘luxury’ that can only be addressed once economic interests are secure. The fact that gender inequalities are bad for growth is portrayed as a stronger reason to act than the fact that they violate human rights. Here, as a quintessential example of gender mainstreaming, trade concerns are being stretched to include attention to gender inequalities on economic grounds.

Labour standards promote gender equality In attempting to merge the neoliberal and human rights frames, and achieve coherence across its internal and external policymaking, the EU has advanced gender

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concerns in trade by advocating the institutionalization of core labour standards in bilateral and regional trade agreements. Not only do these standards include the principle of non-discrimination (including on grounds of sex in ILO Convention 111) and equality of remuneration for women and men (ILO Convention 100), but they are seen as especially relevant to women, who are often more vulnerable than men to the negative effects of trade liberalization in terms of job insecurity, poor work conditions and low wages. However, many WTO members, particularly developing countries, have consistently rejected the inclusion of these standards in trade agreements. Indeed, feminist scholars have argued that enforcing labour standards could be harmful to some women’s livelihoods and cause loss of employment, especially in developing countries where they have secured comparatively good jobs in export-oriented manufacturing sectors (Kabeer 2004). In spite of this opposition, the EU has nested gender equality within an institutionalized labour standards frame supported by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and its international decent work agenda (European Commission 2006b). Labour standards have been incorporated into many of the EU’s bilateral, non-reciprocal, preferential trade agreements, sometimes even allowing for WTO enforcement. This is the case with the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and in the Cotonou Agreement (Grynberg and Qalo 2006). All countries that applied for the EU GSP had ratified the ILO labour conventions by September 2006. Since 1998, the EU has been granting further preferences under the GSP special incentives arrangements to those developing countries that ensure the respect of core labour rights as defined by the ILO. In the framework of the new GSP+ scheme adopted in June 2005 by the EU Council of Member States, an incentive for sustainable development provides additional tariff preferences for countries that have signed and effectively implemented the core ILO labour rights and UN human rights international conventions. The EU has yet to provide trade incentives for developing country partners that have ratified or eliminated reservations on CEDAW – the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. But EU bilateral and regional trade and economic co-operation negotiations must include a ‘human rights clause’ (European Commission 1995), and the European Parliament is an important check on this mandate. In a 2008 report, the European Parliament approved the EU free trade agreement with the ten countries of the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) subject to ratification and application of the basic ILO conventions (that address four ‘core labour standards’: non-discrimination, freedom of association, child labour and forced labour). In promoting the international labour standards frame for achieving gender equality, the EU has joined forces with the ILO. The EU and the ILO have coalesced on international labour standards for good reason. For the EU’s part, it does not want to be seen to be using labour standards as a protectionist tool in trade agreements, whereas the ILO can promote the ratification of the eight fundamental conventions, but has no enforcement mechanism and needs to be seen as impartial by its member states. By extending preferential market access incentives to countries that ratify these conventions under GSP+ since 2002, the

Trading-in gender equality 129 EU gives teeth to the implementation of ILO standards. For its part, the ILO can play a monitoring role on countries’ ratification and implementation that helps to inform EU decisions to grant or withdraw tariffs (Orbie et al. 2008). Advancing the decent work agenda by working together to develop gender equality indicators that would allow for an assessment of the impact of trade on women’s and men’s jobs at a minimum is a further extension of EU–ILO collaboration. In 2005 and 2006, the Commission funded an ILO pilot project in Uganda and the Philippines designed to develop decent work indicators for examining the relationship between decent work and trade liberalization in developing countries.5 The project seeks to develop ‘gender indicators’ based on disaggregated gender statistics on employment, working hours and wages that could be applied widely in sustainable impact assessments of trade agreements (Floater 2006).

No democracy without gender equality An additional discursive frame present in EU policy is that based on democratic principles and legitimacy. This frame is not as prominent even as the human rights frame or certainly the neoliberal and labour standards frames, but it is nonetheless referred to repeatedly. Examples of this are found from the earliest EU documents on gender mainstreaming, where gender equality is entitled ‘a basic principle of democracy’ (European Commission 1996: 1), to the most recent, where a lack of female political participation is described as a ‘democratic deficit’ (European Commission 2006a: 6). This frame is most often adopted with respect to women’s representation in decision-making, including trade policymaking and negotiation at the Commission level. It suggests that the gender balance among high-level policymakers would be most likely to ensure that trade and development policies address gender equality issues. Renate Nikolay, a member of the Cabinet of former Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, argues that increasing the number of women among the senior ranks of trade negotiators – rather than a specialist gender unit – would promote gender as a ‘horizontal cross-cutting issue’ in trade policy.6 She argues that DG Trade stands out internationally and also within the European Commission for the lack of women in senior positions. The traditional European way of making trade policy is not merely the closed club model of trade policymaking (Hocking 2004), but a male club model that both excludes women and is offputting to them.7 Contrary to this frame, WIDE claims that participation and integration of women into economics have been falsely viewed as a ‘panacea in the neoliberal regime of free trade’ (Wichterich 2005: 36). They argue that a complete restructuring of the trade agenda is needed, taking equity and sustainability into account from the outset and leaving ‘space and political options to developing countries to protect domestic markets’ (Wichterich 2005: 36). Consistent with the democratic frame on gender and trade, the EU has promoted the involvement and consultation of non-state actors, with special emphasis on women’s organizations, in trade and economic development policymaking. For instance, in the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African Caribbean and

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Pacific (ACP) countries, ‘for the first time, the involvement of non state actors was included in the definition of national development strategies, giving them a role complementing that of state institutions’ (European Economic and Social Committee 2004: 3). However, an EESC report notes that ‘[r]eal participation in the decision-making process by non state actors in general, and women’s organizations in particular [is] still a long way from being fully realised’ (European Economic and Social Committee 2004: 1). This is because ACP governments are often reluctant to engage with civil society organizations that lack organizational capacity and financial resources. This reluctance of ACP governments is compounded by the lack of specific guidelines set out in the Cotonou Agreement for the involvement of non-state actors (European Economic and Social Committee 2004: 4–5). These barriers to civil society participation are heightened for women’s organizations by the difficulties women often face in accessing resources and exerting political influence, especially in developing countries. Although only in a limited way, the democratic frame mandating the inclusion of non-government women’s organizations in trade and development policy consultations holds considerable promise for engendering policymaking. It is an example of how the internal EU focus on women’s participation in decision-making has become politically relevant in external policy, potentially countering the neocolonialist tendencies of the EU in trade relations. If women’s advocacy organizations are at the policymaking table and there is gender expertise in the trade negotiation teams of EU and developing country partners, it is much more likely that gender equality issues will be part of the discussion of the social dimensions of a particular trade or economic partnership agreement (Arts 2006).

Trade-offs and opportunities of gender mainstreaming The EU aims to extend its own model of economic integration with harmonization of social standards through external policy, although this model is contested within Europe as it is without. ‘As we pursue social justice and cohesion at home, we should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards and cultural diversity, around the world’ (European Commission 2006c: 5). This European approach opens some crucial political opportunities for gender equality advocates not seen in other global or regional trade organizations. Its integrated social and economic mandate has allowed EU institutions to recognize the structural gendered power embedded in trade relationships and the need to adopt gender mainstreaming and development policies to mitigate potentially negative gender impacts. It has also opened the space for participation of NGOs, including gender and development NGOs such as WIDE, APRODEV and One World Action, in EU trade policy discussions and monitoring of trade agreements. Also, the EU–ILO coalition on decent work has made possible at least some attention to gender equality, as well as potential concrete indicators that could assess the gender impacts of trade liberalization and enable them to be taken into account, if not in trade negotiations then in broader development policy frameworks.

Trading-in gender equality 131 As well as opportunities, there are some trade-offs of this EU approach to engendering trade policy for development that need to be explored further. They include: the shrinking of gender equality to economic relations in the marketplace; the technocratic treatment of gender equality as a policy input rather than a normative ideal; the rhetorical attention to mainstreaming gender without budgetary support to implement the strategy; and the failure to address the way negative impacts of trade liberalization may undermine the political and material resources for realizing human rights goals. In different ways, these trade-offs manifest the contradiction between the structural gendered power of the EU shrinking gender equality to fit an economic rationale and bending it to EU economic interests, and the impact of this bending on the EU’s soft power role in spreading prosperity, democracy and human rights beyond its borders. This tension reflects the debate within Europe between those actors who advocate a market-based Union and those who seek a social Union bound by common social standards and norms. A first trade-off is associated with the reduction of women and men to economic subjects in EU trade and development policy. From a gender equality perspective, this is an advance on earlier policy in which women were completely absent and women’s economic independence was not a political economy issue for the EU or a focus of its policymaking. Yet women and men are economic subjects for the EU only in terms of their participation in the formal labour market and cash economy. As such, the social and political power relations that underpin the market economy, including the gender relations in the household that hold women primarily responsible for the social provisioning of individuals, families and communities, continue to be invisible. When the unpaid, reproductive economy is neglected in SIAs of trade and economic association agreements and in labour standards provisions, so too are the human development concerns of developing countries. Yet economic development and market expansion require the social and economic provisioning of individuals as a precondition, and this provisioning is typically carried out by women more than men (Cagatay 2001). While the path-dependency of the EU’s approach to social equality through labour market mechanisms has implications within the EU, it has even greater implications beyond the EU. The informal, unpaid economy constitutes a much greater share of economic activity in developing countries, where many more people depend on non-market mechanisms for their livelihood. In internal EU policy, the neoliberal market framing of gender equality has been incrementally challenged with directives extending the same benefits to part-time as to fulltime workers, the introduction of family life and work reconciliation policies that somewhat address the care economy and the policy measures on gender-balanced political decision-making, all of which represent a shift from the previous exclusively economic focus of gender equality policy in the EU. Such a shift needs to affect EU external policies as well. However, so far, EU trade and development officials only give lip service to the problem, noting the difficulty of developing policy tools to affect the sizeable informal economies of developing countries and stressing the concrete mechanisms they do have to affect and monitor employment in their formal economies (Floater 2006; European Commission 2007).

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A second trade-off is associated with the transformation of gender equality from a normative goal demanded by women’s movements into a technical, bureaucratic (and measurable) repertoire of powerful state and suprastate actors involving indicators, checklists, benchmarks and other tools (see van der Vleuten and Verloo in this volume). Within the EU, one effect of this transformation is that gender mainstreaming becomes a form of rationalization in disguise, an argument for getting rid of budget lines devoted to gender expertise and budgets for women’s projects (Stratigaki 2005). Such rationalization could serve to undermine any priority on meaningfully addressing gender inequalities and injustices in external relations, let alone trade policy. For instance, in a 2008 report on ‘gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU development co-operation’, the European Parliament observed that, despite the 1995 Communication on integrating gender in all development co-operation and the 2007 Gender Equality Strategy, gender issues are now largely absent in the plans for the 17 billion euros in development assistance to countries in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and South Africa (European Parliament 2008). A third related trade-off concerns the gender mainstreaming strategy itself. The strength of mainstreaming in extending a gender perspective across all international policy areas and jurisdictions is also precisely its weakness, as encapsulated in the NGO slogan, ‘everywhere but nowhere’ (Painter and Ulmer 2002). Only 5% of the Development Cooperation Instrument funds for the thematic programme ‘Investing in People’ (2007–13) are allocated to gender equality and … regional and country strategy papers do not give an overview of budget allocation to gender equality since gender is only mentioned as a cross-cutting issue and thus no financial details are provided. (European Parliament 2008) There are no specific targets for improving the situation of poor women and girls and, while the potential negative consequences of trade liberalization are mentioned by the 2007 EU gender and development strategy, there are no concrete measures to address them. Gender equality has been shrunk and bent so far from a focus on making impacts on women and men visible that it has achieved near erasure rather than mainstreaming in EU external policies. The argument made by feminists inside internal EU institutions that gender mainstreaming only works together with positive action strategies that target resources and projects at vulnerable women and girls needs to be reasserted for external EU policies (Stratigaki 2005). Yet a fourth trade-off concerns the EU’s external promotion of both trade and human rights. Europe claims to be promoting gender equality and defending women’s rights when it gives incentives to less developed countries to ratify labour and human rights conventions in preferential trade agreements. Yet the SIA of the European–Mediterranean Free Trade Area and European Partnership Agreements illustrate adverse gender impacts on women’s activities in formal and informal

Trading-in gender equality 133 economies. Thus, even preferential trade agreements may have the opposite of the intended effect in vulnerable, commodity-dependent, developing countries (Khan 2006; WIDE 2007). In developing countries, the process of rapid liberalization may, in the medium term, diminish the material resources and the political will needed to implement women’s human rights as a result of diminishing revenue from tariffs and government structural adjustment through deregulation and cutbacks in social spending. Prioritizing economic efficiencies to be gained from gender equity initiatives in trade agreements over other goals such as women’s economic empowerment or the achievement of women’s human rights and the spread of European principles of democratic participation also undermines the EU’s own legitimacy in international relations. In short, the EU is asking other, more powerless countries to make trade-offs between their economic and social development that EU member states would not make themselves. The EU Commission recognizes that ‘[t]rade has proved to be one of the most effective tools to foster development’ (European Commission 2005). But this approach has both progressive and neocolonialist tendencies. Tariff-free access to European markets for developing country exports would contribute significantly more revenue for their development than foreign aid. However, trade agreements are not negotiated on equal terms and may offer these market access benefits at a high cost to developing countries. For instance, the European Partnership Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries require liberalization of developing country markets for investment and services and prevent them from using any tools to support domestic producers and grow their own economies (Oxfam 2008). This last trade-off and the neocolonial tendencies of the EU may be tempered as civil society organizations in these countries build their capacity to participate in development policymaking. The EU has itself contributed to this empowerment of non-state actors in developing countries, which may work to counter EU economic interests. In no sense can the EU be seen as a singular, unified actor. On the contrary, its multitiered system offers different entry points for equal development and human rights advocates to strengthen their political influence. EU awareness of its own democratic deficit pushes it to call for greater civil society participation, and this participation provides political opportunities for NGOs to challenge neoliberal framing of the trade and gender relationship. For example, alliances of civil society groups in the EU and in developing country partners increasingly point out the contradictions between the EU’s structural and soft power objectives. This transnational activism may serve to bolster the relative bargaining power of developing country negotiators vis-à-vis the EU, and concerns about gender equality and human development versus liberalization agendas.

Conclusion The EU’s framing of gender equality has begun to be applied to the EU’s global trade and development policy. The EU has made some progress in recognizing the structural impact of trade on gender equality, the importance of empowering

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women’s civil society organizations in developing countries to participate in economic decision-making, and the close relationship between gender equality and decent work initiatives in addressing the social dimension of globalization. But the European Commission has not yet demonstrated sufficient leadership or allocated adequate financial resources to implement its gender equality commitments in trade, particularly in agreements with developing countries. EU gender mainstreaming is largely framed as a neoliberal economic strategy for maximizing human capital and removing barriers to economic participation and trade. But even when gender issues are cast purely in economic terms, they are largely excluded from global trade discussions and negotiations. Some small steps taken towards gender mainstreaming in trade policy have opened opportunities for gender and trade advocacy and analysis, but they are greatly in need of strengthening. Incorporating gender analysis into SIAs of trade agreements being negotiated is a positive initiative, but the SIA findings on the potentially negative gender impacts of trade liberalization need to be more widely publicized and debated. Moreover, for this analysis to have ‘teeth’, EU gender equality mandates based on existing commitments in the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties and international human rights agreements need to inform the parameters within which trade negotiators bargain. But in order for gender equality objectives to be implemented as part of the mandate of EU trade policy, the neoliberal frame must be modified by human rights, labour and democratic participation frames that this chapter argues are increasingly present in European discussions about the global role of the Union. Just as the original market-enabling acts of the European Coal and Steel Community led to many unintended consequences that have engendered today’s enlarged EU with its significant social and political commitments, incremental institutional changes, including the shrinking and bending of gender equality to fit economic goals, have the potential to transform trade policymaking. The EU has attempted to involve outside actors – including European and developing country NGOs – in the trade policymaking process and to increase the legitimacy of trade, which has been subject to significant challenges by global civil society in recent years. This involvement does not constitute direct influence over policies, and NGOs still remain on the margins of the policymaking process; yet the new consultative space does provide possibilities for gendering trade policy and stretching it to fit with EU gender equality objectives and values. The EU’s own experience of market integration with social standards is a counterpoint to the neoliberal model of global trade. The institutional market-enabling language and social policy precedents within the EU provide entry points for prying open the processes of trade policymaking and for broadening the mandates of trade negotiators. Yet this internal European model is increasingly being sustained through a neocolonial ‘global Europe’ strategy that pursues trade liberalization at the expense of developing country trading partners. Developing countries must be able to participate on equal terms with the EU in the discussion and framing of their trade relationship in order for gender issues to be understood as genuine development concerns rather than vehicles for Northern protectionism or neocolonial power.

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Notes 1 Personal interview, Mr Graham Floater, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels, 20 November 2006. 2 Former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue, Brussels, 23 November 2006. 3 Personal interview, Mr Graham Floater. 4 Personal interview, Mr Graham Floater. 5 Personal interview, Mr Graham Floater. 6 Personal interview, Ms Renate Nikolay, Cabinet of the EU Trade Commissioner, European Commission, Brussels, 20 November 2006. 7 Personal interview, Ms Renate Nikolay.

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European Economic and Social Committee (2004) Opinion of the Section for External Relations on: The role of women’s organisations as non-state actors in implementing the Cotonou Agreement, Brussels: European Commission. European Parliament (2008) Gender equality and women empowerment in development cooperation, rapporteur Uca Feleknas, Brussels: European Parliament. ——(2006) Plenary discussion of Resolution (A6–0254/2006) on the report on perspectives of women in international trade (2006/2009(INI), rapporteur Hildred Breyer, Brussels: European Parliament. European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights (1997) Report on the Communication from the Commission – Incorporating equal opportunities for women and men into all Community policies and activities – ‘mainstreaming’, Brussels: European Parliament. Floater, G. (2006) ‘Trade negotiations and decent work: A gender perspective’, paper presented at the workshop on Gender in Global and Regional Trade, Centre for Globalization and Regionalization, Warwick University, Warwick, April 2006. Grynberg, R. and Qalo, V. (2006) ‘Labour standards in United States and European Union preferential trading arrangements’, paper presented at APEC workshop on Best Practices in Trade Policy for RTAs/FTAs: Practical Lessons and Experiences for Developing Economies, Ha Noi, Vietnam, June 2006. Hocking, B. (2004) ‘Changing the terms of trade policymaking: From the “club” to the “multistakeholder” model’, World Trade Review, 3: 3–26. Hoskyns, C. (2008) ‘Governing the EU. Gender and macroeconomics’, in S. Rai and G. Waylen (eds) Global governance: Feminist perspectives, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kabeer, N. (2004) ‘Globalization, labor standards, and women’s rights: Dilemmas of collective (in)action in an interdependent world’, Feminist Economics, 10: 3–35. Kaluzynska, E. (2006) Civil society outreach at DG TRADE, Brussels: European Commission. Karadenizli, M. (2003) SIAs, EU trade policies and the gender analysis, Report from the DG Trade seminar ‘Sustainability Impact Assessments of trade agreements: Making trade sustainable?‘, Brussels: WIDE. Khan, Z. (2006) Making trade work for women: The likely impact of the economic partnership agreements on women’s rights and gender equality in Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia, London: One World Action. Lombardo, E. (2005) ‘Integrating or setting the agenda? Gender mainstreaming in the European constitution-making process’, Social Politics, 12: 412–32. Lombardo, E. and Meier, P. (2006) ‘Gender mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a feminist reading?’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13: 151–66. Meunier, S. and Nicolaidis, K. (2006) ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 906–25. Orbie, J., Martins-Gistelinck, M. and Kerremans, B. (2008) ‘The social dimension of EU trade policies’, in J. Orbie and L. Tortell (eds) The European Union and the social dimension of globalisation: How the EU influences the world, London: Routledge. Oxfam (2008) Partnership or powerplay? How Europe should bring development into its trade deals with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Oxfam Briefing Paper, London: Oxfam. Painter, G. and Ulmer, K. (2002) Everywhere but nowhere: Assessing gender mainstreaming in European Community development cooperation, London: APRODEV and One World Action.

Trading-in gender equality 137 Prügl, E. (2008) ‘Gender and the making of global markets: An exploration of the agricultural sector’, in S. Rai and G. Waylen (eds) Global governance: Feminist perspectives, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Raza, W. (2007) ‘European trade politics: Pursuit of neo-mercantilism in different fora’, in W. Blass and J. Becker (eds) Strategic arena switching in international trade negotiations, Aldershot: Ashgate. Stratigaki, M. (2005) ‘Gender mainstreaming vs positive action: An ongoing conflict in EU gender equality policy’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 12: 165–86. True, J. (2003) ‘Mainstreaming gender in global public policy’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5: 368–96. UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality Task Force on Gender and Trade (2004) Trade and gender: Opportunities, challenges and the policy dimension, New York and Geneva: UNCTAD Secretariat and United Nations. van Staveren, I. (2007) Gender indicators for monitoring trade agreements, WIDE Briefing Paper, Brussels: WIDE. Wichterich, C. (2005) On the road to Hong Kong: Towards a sustainable, gender-fair, just governance: The EU’s responsibility at the WTO: Environment, gender and development, Brussels: WIDE. WIDE (2007) EU bilateral and regional free trade agreements: Bringing women to the centre of the debate, Report of a WIDE public consultation at Amazone, Brussels, 22 November 2007, Brussels: WIDE. ——(ed.) (2001) Programme of action for the mainstreaming of gender equality in Community development co-operation: Submission from NGOs for consideration by the European Development Council, Brussels: WIDE. Williams, M. (2004) Gender mainstreaming in the multilateral trading system, London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Woodward, A. (2003) ‘European gender mainstreaming: Promises and pitfalls of transformative policy’, Review of Policy Research, 20: 65–88. Young, A. and Peterson, J. (2006) ‘The EU and the new trade politics’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 795–814.

9

Stretching, bending and inconsistency in policy frames on gender equality Discursive windows of opportunity? Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier

Introduction While the concepts of fixing, shrinking, stretching and bending have been defined in the Introduction, and the preceding chapters provided theoretical and empirical perspectives on the discursive construction of gender equality, this chapter deals with the question of how to capture processes underlying these concepts in public policies and what these concepts can mean within the everyday practice of policymaking. It focuses on the detection of processes of fixing, stretching, shrinking and bending in public policies and analyses the possible consequences of such processes. It does so specifically with respect to public policy texts and the amount of consistency – or lack thereof – found in them. The focus is on how the content of public policy documents is shaped in different ways, which allows us to think about the underlying dynamics of inconsistency as a discursive window of opportunity for gender equality policies. We have chosen not to analyse our material in terms of ‘rationality’, a notion frequently adopted in public policy literature, which conceives of it as the best possible fit between means and goals in a policy process (see the concept of ‘procedural rationality’ in Bustelo and Verloo’s chapter in this volume) producing consistency in that respect. Stating ‘rationality is consistency’ is far too limited an equation though, because it does not consider, for instance, the rationality embedded in processes that strategically frame an issue to make it resonate with existing dominant goals (Verloo 2001) and might thereby produce inconsistent policy documents. It also ignores the fact that the mere construction of policy problems and solutions can take many meaningful forms, which do not necessarily pass an external judgement of rationality or consistency. It also overlooks the fact that parts of policies can be consistent at a specific moment, and they will appear consistent to us if we analyse them at that stage but, because of the dynamic process of policymaking, they might turn inconsistent when considered at another time. Nevertheless, policies might appear ‘rational’ in their attempt to seek some coherence among different actors, contexts and times. In this chapter, we therefore define consistency as the attempt to pursue some coherence in the framing of a policy issue. Consistency defined as such, however, should be understood as consistency in a specific moment in time or context. Policies are indeed a dynamic

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 139 reality, constantly changing and adapting to different actors’ discourses and contexts. Thus, although policies might appear consistent at some point, a moment after they may have changed towards a new and inconsistent relation between their internal dimensions. But a ‘momentary inconsistency’ does not mean that policies are ‘irrational’. We consider policies as normally inconsistent in some parts, but still ‘rational’ to the extent that they show some tendency to pursue a certain coherence among different actors, contexts, times and spaces that is reflected in policy frames, an understanding that comes close to what Bustelo and Verloo in their chapter call ‘political rationality’.1 To analyse consistency and inconsistency in public policies, we rely on the methodology of critical frame analysis (Verloo 2007) and, more precisely, its attention to balance between different dimensions of a policy document. We assume that looking for ‘momentary consistency’ in specific policy documents is a good starting point for exploring concrete processes of stretching, shrinking and bending gender equality, as well as the discursive windows of opportunity they provide for the formulation of gender equality policies. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the issues of intentionality, rationality and objectivity of the public policy approach, and relates it to the methodology of critical frame analysis, especially focusing on how to study the stretching and bending, as well as the extent of consistency, in public policies. Section two looks into the main policy frames found in Dutch and Spanish policy documents2 with respect to family policies, domestic violence and the issue of gender inequality in politics over the last decade. It analyses processes of stretching, shrinking, fixing and bending within these frames’ broad dimensions. The third section digs deeper into these frames, focusing on specific aspects such as the causes of the problem, the means to solve it and the attribution of roles. The conclusions relate the findings to a discussion on the relation between the intrinsic concept of gender equality and its stretching, shrinking and bending, and the consequences these processes have for normative assumptions underlying the goals and processes of gender equality policies approaches.

Studying processes of stretching and bending in policymaking In his textbook on public policy, Parsons characterizes the policy approach as based on the Enlightenment idea that human reason and knowledge of problems could deliver adequate solutions for a better society (Parsons 1995). This ‘clinical’ attitude of the ‘policy sciences’, as Hill and Hupe (2002) call it, treats the social sciences as a ‘medicine’ that will help cure society’s problems. Public policy is initially conceived as originating from the intentional rational relationship of a set of means to achieve particular ends previously selected by governmental bodies. In this sense, it is ‘a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern’ (Anderson 1975: 3). The selection of a given policy can be formulated as resulting from a process based on ‘maximum rationality’, meaning that the actors in the process supposedly have clear objectives. They gather exhaustive information on the issue they deal with, the available

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resources, the different lines of action that these resources allow for and the foreseeable effects of each alternative. On the basis of this information, they select the alternative that leads to the optimum result with the minimum possible cost. This model has been criticized because it is based on conditions that are both perfect and impossible to find, because in real life objectives are not always clear, information is limited and biased, resources are scarce, prediction of effects is incomplete, and human beings are limited by their psychological context (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Out of this criticism comes Simon’s model of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1991), which, within the mentioned limitations, is still considered to be able to produce ‘rational decision-making’ through ‘selecting goals and courses of action that will best achieve the values or purposes’ expressed (Parsons 1995: 278). Distancing himself from the notion of rationality, even a limited one, as a process of adapting goals to means, Lindblöm suggested the idea of ‘incrementalism’ in the policy process. In this perspective, the idea of intentionality in policymaking is replaced by a model in which policies are the result of permanent negotiations between different actors concerning the definition of the problem, the goals, the costs and so on. Actors not only diverge in their vision of the most adequate policy ends and means, but they also often have no clear idea of what they want to achieve and how to achieve it. Under these conditions, the study of the policy process is a ‘science of muddling through’ (Lindblöm 1959). Incrementing the amount of resources to solve the problem, without debating in depth about the definition of the problem itself, appears a common way to ‘muddle through’ the policymaking process. More radical in its approach, the ‘garbage can’ model (March and Olsen 1979) does away with the idea of both rationality and intentionality. The decision-making process shows no relation between ends and means because ends are ambiguous for all actors involved in the process, means are arguable, and participation in the process is discontinuous. In this situation, the adoption of a particular policy is the result of a casual coincidence in which the solution to a pending problem is found not by selecting the most appropriate means to the established ends, but rather by a random grab from the ‘garbage can’ of the policy process. Theoretical approaches to critical frame analysis such as those set out in the introductory chapter diverge from the models of public policies that are based on the assumption of an intentional and rational selection of the most appropriate means to achieve established policy ends. This is because they instead assume that unintentional frames, which affect the representation of problems and solutions, have infiltrated policy formulation. Frames are commonly conceived as the subject’s unintentional representation of reality (Bacchi 2005). They mostly steer our attention towards those aspects of social reality where our socio-cultural bias leads us, while at the same time they can make us neglect others. As a result, policy actors may provide a representation of a given policy problem that is more gender or race biased than they actually intended, as socio-cultural frames, more or less implicitly, infiltrate their representation of problems and solutions. An example of this is the recent trend in gender equality policies to ethnicize problems; they focus on subgroups facing particular problems with respect to schooling, the job market or violence, and thereby (implicitly) stigmatize this group, presenting the majority

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 141 as the norm no longer facing problems in this policy area (see for instance Celis and Meier or Lang in Outshoorn and Kantola 2007). The analytical perspective of critical frame analysis comes closer to those theoretical approaches of the study of policy process, such as incrementalism or the ‘garbage can’ model, that do not presume public policy to be a rational or intentional selection of the most adequate means to the ends set. However, critical frame analysis still differs from them, as well as from all the other public policy approaches set out above. This difference resides in the fact that the critical frame analysis approach assumes that policy problems are constructed – albeit not necessarily consciously – and that many different interpretations can enter into the construction of policy problems (Bacchi 1999). For instance, ‘reconciliation between work and family’ can be constructed as a problem of the labour market or of an unequal division of roles between the sexes. Incrementalism and ‘garbage can’ models, but also the more rationalist approaches to the public policy process, might assume that problems are constructed in processes of negotiation, but they still do not acknowledge that individual actors construct these problems through their frames. These models might even employ a ‘discovery/response approach to policies’ (Bacchi 1999) whereby, upon discovery of a problem, policymakers try to solve it objectively, as casual, confused and discontinuous as the policy process may be in practice. From a frame analysis perspective, however, even if the definition of a policy problem is informed by quantitative and qualitative data, and in that respect is well grounded within a modern public policy approach, the problem and its subsequent solution(s) are always a construction. And that construction is a mix of intentional and unintentional elements. In this sense, critical frame analysis distances itself from both that public policy literature which highlights the intentional character of policies that are reflected in a supposed relationship between ends and means, and the other, which, although it discards intentionality, still maintains a positivistic perspective that conceives of solutions as responses to objectively existing problems, even if all of them are subject to processes of negotiation. Given the constructed nature of policy issues, we could assume a certain amount of rationality, in the sense that policy issues should be constructed as consistent entities. The degree of rationality here depends on the matching of policy frames. The scope of the diagnosis delineates that of the prognosis, and the other way around: if women’s under-representation in politics is a problem, the solution, in one way or another, consists of overcoming it. If all men have to participate in childcare, the fact that they do not all participate in it is – at least implicitly – considered to be part of the problem. In that respect, the diagnosis sets up the prognosis and the other way around, if only latently. Even the most implicit and unintentional frames that are detected in policy texts can be consistent in their construction of a policy issue and define a problem together with a solution that fits it. For example, a coherent solution to a problem of ‘gender inequality in politics’, which is represented as ‘male domination in power’, could be to introduce measures that challenge such male domination by requiring a lower number of male politicians. Diagnosis and prognosis would then correspond in a meaningful way, even though they may be guided by unintentional

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frames. This expected rationality can, for instance, be found in gender equality policies such as processes of gender mainstreaming or policy tools such as gender impact assessment or gender budgeting. Through the introduction of the dimension of balance between diagnosis and prognosis, frame analysis can help to assess whether the diagnosis of a problem in a given text corresponds to the proposed solution and vice versa. We expect policy issues not to be consistently constructed entities from an external point of view. It is not because a policy frame is an ‘organizing principle’ transforming information into a ‘structured’ and ‘meaningful’ problem involving some kind of ‘solution’, as has been set out in the introductory chapter, that a frame needs to be coherent in the sense of making all its elements fit in a fixed deductive logic. Structured and meaningful understandings of problems can take many forms, and the definition of a structured and meaningful understanding as such is therefore open to discussion. This is, to a certain extent, what Bustelo and Verloo refer to as ‘political rationality’ in their chapter in this volume. Inconsistencies at the level of policy formulation can arise from different understandings of what would be a meaningful solution to a problem. Incoherencies can also arise from a lack of awareness of the frames that operate in the representation of a given policy area, in this case that of gender equality, and from which we probably cannot completely escape, even if we take a reflexive position. We would simply not be aware of such a ‘frame trap’. A dominant understanding of what gender equality is might have a hegemonizing effect, thereby also shaping our understanding of gender equality. Different groups of actors with different understandings of gender equality might actually be caught in different frame traps. This also goes for us as authors, engaging in a discussion on inconsistencies within gender equality policies and their implications for the dynamics of policymaking. The criteria by which we identify how the meaning of gender equality is shaped in the processes of contestation, and by which we assess the coherence of gender equality policies, are also dependent on our own conceptual frames. The question might be to what extent we can set standards of knowledge about gender equality and knowledge production on gender equality. To be explicit, our minimum normative assumptions as authors, at least those that we are more explicitly aware of, refer to the need for a holistic, transformative and empowering understanding of the problem of gender inequality. This ought to take into account the pervasive character of gender inequality and its intersection with other inequalities throughout all spheres, the existence of structural obstacles to gender equality, the need for transforming power relations between women and men and of empowering women (see Walby 1990, 2007; Verloo 2005). Finally, inconsistencies may also infiltrate policy documents consciously, for instance in order not to make far-reaching policy commitments. Policy documents might thus proclaim equality without determining the means to reach this policy goal. Similar to ‘strategic framing’, through which policy issues are packed in a discourse in order to fit the political agenda (Verloo 2001), ‘strategic shifting’ may allow issues to be addressed without really tackling them. Rather than focusing on the causes of inconsistency, we will concentrate on how the revealing of such inconsistencies in

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 143 public policy texts helps us to understand the dynamics underlying the processes of stretching, shrinking and bending, and the kind of windows of opportunity these might open.

Framing gender equality policies in the Netherlands and Spain, 1996–20053 The Dutch and Spanish policy texts reveal much similarity in the framing of gender equality within the various policy issues. Not only is there a recurrent framing of policy issues of gender inequality in politics, of family policy and of domestic violence, but the same frames also tend to show up in both the Netherlands and Spain. The issue of gender inequality in politics in the selected Spanish and Dutch policy texts from 1996 to 2005 was predominantly framed as a problem of women’s quantitative under-representation in political institutions. In Spain, where the texts analysed cover the period from 1995 to 2004, during which the Popular Party was in government, the debate is polarized between the Socialist Party, in favour of quotas, and the Popular Party, who are against such measures.4 In the Netherlands, the debate focuses on the fact that the target figures set by the government might not be met. The problem focuses less on the position of women in politics than on government meeting its targets (and the underlying causes for this failure of state policies). Less frequent ways of framing the problem of gender inequality in politics address the existence of male domination and patriarchal structures that hinder women’s political representation. Solutions to the problem in Spain are mainly framed as a response to the problem of women’s under-representation in politics through quotas for women and electoral reforms facilitating their access to positions of political decision-making. State institutions are also supposed to solve the problem by encouraging women in politics through training and qualifying them, making them gain the competencies necessary to win and maintain a position in politics. In the Netherlands, solutions tend to remain vague, focusing on how to meet the target figures that have already been set. A specific solution is the discussion on maternity leave rules for MPs, facilitating the reconciliation of a political mandate with a family life. Conversely, in neither country is a solution offered to the problem of male domination. Changing male political elites is a minor frame that appears in Spain only in one case of self-criticism on the part of a male socialist leader concerning the existence of machismo within his own party. Family policies tend to be framed as a problem – mainly for women – of reconciling family and work responsibilities. Especially in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands, they also tend to be framed as a labour market problem, in the sense that women’s participation in the labour market is too low, and as a problem of structural gender inequality, in both the private and the public spheres. In the Netherlands, the problem is also defined as a failure of state policies to tackle existing problems, which are left open. Proposed solutions tend to focus on an improved reconciliation in order to achieve an increased participation of women in the labour market. They do little to change the status quo and usually tend to perpetuate a traditional division of roles, as the emphasis is placed on reconciliation measures in order to facilitate women’s double workload as both mothers and workers.

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Domestic violence is framed as a public issue that political institutions are supposed to solve. In Spain, the issue is framed as both a problem of structural gender inequality and a gender neutral problem. The latter frame, which is present in the texts of the Popular Party government (1996–2004), tends to weaken attention to the patriarchal component of violence by using the more neutral concept of ‘family violence’. However, Spain also shows a policy frame that represents the problem as gender violence. This frame became increasingly dominant after the election of the Socialist Party government in 2004. The diagnosis in this frame refers to the existence of a patriarchal culture as the cause of the problem of violence against women, and suggests consequent solutions that are related to a structural change in society. Unlike the Spanish, Dutch policy documents exclusively tend to frame the problem as violence produced by ‘perpetrators’ and directed at ‘victims’ without specifying gender. Another frequent definition of the problem is that of a government failing to tackle the problem of domestic violence, without indications of what this failure entails. Domestic violence is only marginally defined as a problem of gender inequality. Solutions focus on an improvement in the situation, but do not investigate the field. They instead focus on gathering and controlling information about the field through means such as co-ordination, exchange of information, research and monitoring. The recurrence of a limited number of frames seems to reduce the potentially broad scope of gender equality issues to a limited number of policy problems and subsequent solutions, shrinking the scope of what gender equality is about. This tendency is also reported from other countries than the two presented here (see Lombardo et al., Meier et al. and Krizsán et al. in Verloo 2007; see also the chapter by Jalušiþ in this volume). While the problems addressed should not be underestimated and a persisting focus on problems allows for an articulated approach, this limiting of the scope excludes other problems, regardless of whether this exclusion is conscious or not. The dynamic does not consist of constructing a universe of problems and then deciding deliberately on which ones to focus. It rather consists of a routine through which a problem of gender inequality is – without much further interrogation – equated to a particular (group of) problem(s) and specific solutions. In this respect, we can speak of hegemonic discourses and of a hegemonic discourse trap at work. The hegemonic discourse is not an overarching comprehension of the issue at stake. It is rather a partial but hegemonizing understanding of the problem of gender inequality and of its solution. The shrinking of a problem of gender equality through its definition may fix the issue, appearing whenever a particular frame configuration re-emerges in different texts, within one issue or even across issues. Gender equality problems are then ‘assigned’ a specific meaning that remains unquestioned as such for some time (see also Ferree and Chapter 1 by Lombardo et al. in this volume). Parallel to the recurrence of a limited number of frames within the various policy fields, a shrinking of the issue of gender equality can be found in family policies as they move from diagnosis to prognosis. Texts lean towards the diagnosis of the problem, which can be strongly articulated, and in some cases actually defines traditional gender roles as problematic. However, solutions are less elaborate or

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 145 complex and tend to present the same traditional roles of caregiving women and breadwinning men as normative. In either case, we face a problem of narrowing down the framing of a policy issue to a particular dimension, which might reduce the chances of tackling the issue in an articulated and comprehensive way. Contrarily, the gender inequality in both politics and domestic violence texts tends to overemphasize the prognosis of the problem over its diagnosis. For instance, the debate on gender inequality in politics is focused on how to increase women’s numbers rather than on a diagnosis of what the problem of gender inequality in politics actually is. Domestic violence shows a similar trend: the diagnosis of the problem and its underlying causes are poorly developed in the analysed texts and the emphasis is placed on the solutions rather than the problem. While this could open perspectives for a comprehensive or far-reaching tackling of problems of gender inequality, the solutions tend to take the form of shopping lists that enumerate potential measures without specifying priorities or clear implementing strategies. One of the consequences of policy texts that provide solutions without a deep analysis of the problem could be such an inverted relationship between policy consistency and effectiveness in achieving the goal. For instance, an increase in the number of elected female candidates may leave other structural aspects of gender inequalities in politics, such as the deeply rooted sexist culture that dominates political institutions or the unequal gender division of work, untouched. An inconsistency between diagnosis and prognosis can create openings, discursive windows of opportunity that reach beyond the initially limited or fixed focus on the issue at stake. The absence of a logical sequence between the diagnostic and prognostic frames can allow for the introduction of new perspectives in either one, as there is no matching frame in the other to begin with. Inconsistency could, for instance, reside in the introduction of a gender perspective in prognosis when it is found lacking in diagnosis. In practice, we seldom found this to be the case. Even though not necessarily all the diagnostic frames in a policy document have a matching prognostic frame or the other way around, at least one diagnostic and prognostic frame is related to another in the majority of cases. This result is rather surprising from the point of view that policy problems and solutions are constructions. Apparently, this construction often only consists of the adoption of circulating (master) frames with a hegemonizing effect. The important role of supra- and international institutions in the formulation and diffusion of, but also the enforcement of commitments to, gender equality goals might be at work here. Nonetheless, a spectacular lack of a logical sequence of diagnosis and prognosis can be found in the analysis of the males’ status and behaviour. The diagnostic frame on the existence of male domination in politics has no matching frame at the level of solution. Similarly, the diagnostic frame that highlights the unequal sharing of tasks between men and women or the fact that domestic violence has its roots in gender inequality lacks a prognosis. Whenever the issue of gender equality, focusing on the relation between men and women, is addressed in the diagnosis, a logical prognostic frame addressing this relational category is replaced by one focusing on women as a non-relational category. Spanish texts presenting a diagnosis of the problem that identifies the causes of gender inequality in the unequal gender

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division of labour provide solutions that perpetuate women’s traditional role as carers. As a result, in spite of their broad and gender-sensitive diagnosis, reconciliation policies appear to be more addressed at solving market problems by promoting economic development than at progress in gender equality. We find a similar shift when the emphasis, in both the Dutch and Spanish texts, is placed more on policies aimed at promoting the reconciliation of family and work than on measures to favour a more equal sharing of responsibilities between men and women, and solutions generally follow accordingly. Structural gender inequalities represented in the diagnosis are related to solutions perpetuating a traditional gender bias, thus eventually undermining the political efforts for achieving a more equal society. Here is where we not only find processes shrinking the meaning of gender equality, but also processes that can lead to depoliticizing the issue of gender equality altogether. The meaning of gender equality appears to be narrowed down when gender is addressed in the diagnosis but only women are addressed in the prognosis. It is a masked shrinking of the issue of gender equality, as the issue is still addressed as a problem and is seemingly put on the table, but any subsequent solution is lacking. Similarly, a process of bending through which the goal set in the diagnosis is replaced by solutions that address other problems than gender equality also depoliticizes the issue of gender equality. This is for instance the case when the problem of gender equality is turned into a labour market issue, as in the example just given, instead of into a problem of unequal power relations between women and men. More frequently than a lack of logical sequence between diagnostic and prognostic frames, an inconsistency appears within the diagnosis or prognosis itself. The actual definition of the problem may shift, changing throughout a single policy document. Similarly, the solution set out at the beginning can be bent towards other solutions. At a broader level, the goal underlying the policy initiative might be replaced by another one. Again, while such inconsistencies within the text may allow for introducing new perspectives on gender equality, in practice, they tend to undermine them. The shift in Dutch and Spanish policy documents from sharing concerns to labour market supply-side concerns mentioned earlier can be understood in this manner. The debates on domestic violence reflect a shift whereby the problem of violence turns into one of public health or of the costs for society it entails. The Dutch debates on gender inequality in politics reflect a similar shift, in which the demanding character of politics and the lack of a maternity leave regulation for MPs turn into a lack of leave regulation for general health reasons. Similar shifts in goals can be detected in prognoses, for instance from gender equality to a minimum number of women, or to other demographic and economic goals (see also Duncan 2002 or Stratigaki 2004). This kind of bending tends to bypass gender equality concerns to the advantage of other policy priorities.

Inconsistency in policy frames and processes of stretching and bending Apart from looking at the frames as such, it is interesting to consider specific aspects of their diagnostic and prognostic dimensions, such as the causes of the problem,

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 147 the means to solve it and the role attribution (the actors and institutions considered to have the problem, to cause it or to be involved in solving it). In neither Spain nor the Netherlands do we find articulated diagnoses of the causes of the problem in the issue of gender inequality in politics or in that of domestic violence. In the first case, the few causal references are to the political system and, less often, to the traditional gender division of labour. In the second case, causes of violence are often related to individual pathologies rather than to structural factors or to family and social deterioration. In family policies, there is a more articulated reference to the causes that lie in the unequal gender division of labour, while means of solving the problem include public social services, labour reconciliation measures (flexibility, part-time) and legislation on maternity and parental leave, and are almost exclusively targeted at women. Spanish texts on gender inequality in politics and domestic violence are more profuse in the suggested means of solving the problem. In the case of politics, documents mix voluntary and awareness-raising actions with binding regulations such as quotas and zipper systems in electoral lists that alternate female and male candidates. In the case of violence, means of solving the problem include welfare support actions for victims, awareness-raising measures targeted at society and sanctioning measures addressed at the perpetrators. In the Dutch case, means of solving the problem of gender inequality in politics refer to existing target figures but remain vague on how to solve the problem. Most policy documents tackle means broadly. As mentioned before, means are often a shopping list of potential measures that then lack a clear indication of priorities, allowing policymakers to pick and choose. However, we can also detect masked processes that subtly shrink, fix and bend gender equality. For instance, in the issue of domestic violence, the means put forward to solve the problem do not appear to be solving the problem as such, but rather to be describing it by placing the emphasis on policy tools such as data-gathering and monitoring. While the explicit policy goal is fighting domestic violence, a glance at the means put forward actually reveals the goal’s shrinking as these policy measures only allow for preparation of the field for concrete policy measures that might eventually be taken at a later stage. Similar dynamics can be detected in what we have defined as a benchmarking fallacy (Meier et al. 2005). A simplistic translation of gender equality into target figures that establish a minimum of women candidates, as in the Dutch case, reduces the goal at the outset. Such minimum target figures do not allow for gender equality, not even in the quantitative understanding prevailing in Dutch and Spanish gender equality policies. Even more importantly, and this is the benchmarking fallacy, a focus on minimum target figures also fixes the meaning of gender equality for an amount of time, thus steering the opportunities of political actors towards a particular interpretation of the issue (see also Ferree’s chapter in this volume). Finally, the Dutch case of gender inequality in politics also reflects a depoliticizing form of bending in that the concern is a technical one, focusing on how to meet the target figures, rather than a political one that would deal with fighting gender inequality. Finally, similar dynamics can be detected in role attribution between the actors. In the various policy areas considered, women are treated as the group that holds

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the problems of gender inequality in politics, of reconciliation and of violence. Men are treated in two ways. On the one hand, in politics, they are considered as the standard of ‘normality’ that women should attain in order to be equal. It is not men’s over-representation that is depicted as a problem, but women’s underrepresentation. On the other hand, men are absent from the definition of the problem, as in reconciliation issues, or are invoked in the most gender-neutral way, as in domestic violence. In both the Dutch and the Spanish cases, documents make no reference as to ‘who’ caused the problem; either nobody appears as responsible or institutions such as traditions or society carry the blame. Also, Dutch texts on both family policy and domestic violence tend to ethnicize the issue by attributing the problem mainly to ethnic minorities. When it comes to attributing roles in solutions, in the three considered policy fields, women are again the target group of the actions, while men are not called upon to act and are never targeted by the proposed measures. Women are supposed to enter politics, to enter the labour market, to reconcile work and care and to react to violence. In the Dutch texts, these calls specifically emphasize migrant women. A typical example of this ‘male’ absence can be found in the issue of domestic violence, which is characterized by the clear representation of victims as women, while the perpetrators are addressed in gender-neutral language, and society in general is mentioned as the target group for awareness-raising measures to prevent violence against women. In family politics, too, women are called upon to reconcile and to (re)enter the labour market, while men are not addressed in the same terms when it comes to the combination of paid and care work. And, as we mentioned before, men are not called upon to share political power with women. The concept of gender equality is shrunk to a particular meaning that then remains fixed for some time through the creation of labels, such as ‘gender inequality is a women’s problem’ or ‘domestic violence is an ethnic minority problem’. While a clear definition of target groups allows for concrete measures, these labels stereotype specific social groups, possibly blocking solutions because they exclude the relational category of gender and assume that some normative groups (for example those of a particular ethnicity) have no gender inequality problem. Making men, or other normative groups, no part of the solution may also have a depoliticizing effect by not questioning the roles of privileged groups. Framing women as the almost exclusively responsible group for caring risks perpetuating gender inequalities as it does not foster equal sharing of labour and care between women and men. The tendency to represent women as subjects who hold the problem and as a target group for action hinders a deeper transformation of gender hierarchies in the political sphere. The use of gender-neutral language can reflect shrinking processes as much as it can entail some stretching towards gender equality. For instance, the avoidance of direct attribution of responsibility to men (and women) both in the problem and in the solution to domestic violence can open discursive windows of opportunity. In a context that tends to focus on women with respect to gender equality issues, gender-neutral language might be a first step, allowing for an indirect inclusion of the male subject that might eventually become an explicit reference to men at a later stage.

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 149 The shrinking of the problem of domestic violence to an issue that only affects ethnic minorities, as in the previous example from the Dutch case, can have several consequences. It can block the adoption of policy measures for fighting gender inequality on the part of native Dutch women, because it assumes that Dutch women no longer face problems in this area. Another interpretation is that the Dutch tendency to ethnicize gender equality issues in family policies and domestic violence stretches gender equality to other inequalities. In this respect, it might indeed create an opening in the future political treatment of intersectionality because it at least addresses the issue of gender and ethnicity. However, it does so by bending the issue so that it is no longer about gender equality as such, but about problems within specific ethnic or religious groups dealing with their adaptation to Dutch social standards (see also the chapter by Lombardo and Verloo in this volume). In this sense, it can block the opportunity for adopting policy measures to tackle violence against migrant women, generate defensive reactions on the part of the stereotyped individuals and collectives and actually increase ethnic inequality.

Conclusions: Processes of stretching and bending and their consequences for gender equality policies This chapter’s findings reveal that the diagnosis and prognosis of policy issues do not necessarily match: solutions only partially – if at all – address the problems raised, means are not adapted to the problems detected, and target groups do not always appear as the most relevant targets. We also found inconsistencies within problem definitions and the defined goals that revealed shifts towards other policy fields, generally to the detriment of gender equality. Gender equality policies in both the Netherlands and Spain reflect a conservative reading of gender roles and norms, at least at the level of proposed solutions, the means put forward to achieve them and the addressed target groups. The policy documents present limited or no challenge to existing gender relations, notwithstanding the overarching goal of gender equality. Also, constructions of gender equality problems had no matching prognostic frames in any of the policy fields in either country. Both Dutch and Spanish policy documents reveal a certain resistance to gender equality as a political goal. While the issue of gender equality manages to infiltrate the diagnosis, it is not addressed when it comes to solving policy problems. In many of the analysed cases, there appears to be a strong relationship between such inconsistencies and the processes of shrinking, fixing and bending of gender equality. While inconsistencies might provide for discursive windows of opportunity, in practice, they tend to narrow down gender equality’s meaning. While this might not necessarily happen intentionally, it seems to be structural in all considered cases. Shrinking the meaning of gender equality by attaching a specific label to it can lead to gender policies that address the issue of gender inequality with a limited perspective, which does not necessarily transform existing power relations between the sexes. Bending the meaning of gender equality produces incoherent results to the extent that these policies ultimately address another goal than that for which they were designed. The combined result of discursive

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processes that produce incoherent public policies is often the depoliticization of gender inequality as a policy problem. What are the consequences of our analysis for existing approaches to the study of public policies? The inconsistencies found in Dutch and Spanish equality policies tell us that policy issues are not necessarily constructed in a conscious way, and may indeed have unintentional parts to them, but they are still articulations of the policy actors’ perception of reality, expressing normative frames on gender relations that show the dominance of patriarchal discourses and often contain sexist biases, be these explicit or implicit. The inconsistencies found in the policy documents might partly explain why gender equality policies are not necessarily successful in fostering gender equality. It is unlikely that policies are successful if means and target groups are not adapted to the proposed solutions, especially if the latter do not relate to the represented problems. In this respect, one of the lessons that discursive politics has for policymaking is that awareness of (latent) inconsistencies embedded in policy discourses can be a powerful tool for sharpening the formulation of public policies. If consistency of policy documents is a factor contributing to successful policies, then public policies should be tested for consistency. In this sense, the present analysis underlines a need for more impact assessment and evaluation as early as at the policy design level. Frame analysis might be a useful tool to develop ex ante evaluations of public policies, assessing consistency in order to prevent (collateral) damage (see also Bustelo and Verloo’s chapter in this volume). While, on the one hand, we argue here that consistency is a legitimate goal to be aimed at in public policies, and policymakers should be aware of this and pursue this consistency, on the other hand, we found that inconsistencies can also be discursive windows of opportunity for future transformation. When can this be the case? Inconsistencies might open the way to the exposure of alternative and weak frames expressed by different constituencies of actors involved in the development of the policies. One example of the promising role of inconsistencies is the finding of the weak diagnostic frame on the existence of male domination in politics, which has no prognostic frame challenging such dominance. Consistency of this frame with the prognosis might involve that the problem as such would not be addressed at all. In that respect, inconsistency in public policy documents is not necessarily unintentional. It can also reflect a deliberate choice not to address certain issues in certain parts of the policy, similar to what we find in strategic framing. This shows that inconsistency, in some cases, may allow for a progressive introduction of new policy frames at the level of diagnosis, which could spill over into prognosis in the future. Even a narrow framing of policy issues might be beneficial in the long run. The fragments of frames present in either the diagnosis or the prognosis provide just as many opportunities for policy actors to amplify or shrink diagnoses and prognoses to better fit their interests later on. In this respect, even apparently inconsistent policies can be ‘rational’ to the extent that they strive for an overall coherence in the framing of a policy issue among different actors’ discourses, times and contexts. If we read the findings presented in this chapter in this light, we could consider the existence of these discursive opportunities as

Inconsistency in gender equality frames 151 a reminder of the dynamic and evolutionary nature of the policymaking process (see Verloo et al. 2007). However, the recurrent depoliticization of gender equality issues makes it necessary to further reflect on the conditions under which the processes of stretching and bending can be discursive windows of opportunity for promoting gender equality.

Notes 1 We wish to thank María Bustelo for commenting about political rationality in a former draft of this chapter. 2 The selection of texts primarily includes official documents declaring policies on equality elaborated by the main political and administrative institutions: legislative texts, plans, parliamentary debates, political speeches and declarations. A secondary source of analysed texts was produced by the media, i.e. written press, which was useful to grasp the public debates on the issues in the two national contexts. Finally, the selection included, to a lesser extent, texts originating from the feminist movement and gender experts (for a full selection of documents, see the references mentioned in note 3 or Verloo 2007). 3 With respect to the content of the Dutch and Spanish policy documents analysed, this section draws on the following MAGEEQ research reports: Bustelo et al. 2004a,b,c, Lamoen 2004, Lamoen et al. 2004a,b. 4 The Zapatero Socialist government approved an Equality law between women and men (Law 3/2007) in March 2007 that obliges political parties to respect a percentage of any sex between 40% and 60% on candidate lists. The Spanish Constitutional Court has supported Law 3/2007 by answering negatively to the Popular Party’s accusation of the unconstitutional character of the provision.

Bibliography Anderson, J.E. (1975) Public policy-making, New York: Praeger. Bacchi, C. (2005) ‘The MAGEEQ project: Identifying contesting meanings of “gender equality”’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 221–34. ——(1999) Women politics and policies. The construction of policy problems, London: Sage. Bustelo, M., Lombardo, E., Platero, R. and Peterson, E. (2004a) Country study Spain. Domestic violence, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. ——(2004b) Country study Spain. Family policy, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. ——(2004c) Country study Spain. Political participation, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Duncan, S. (2002) ‘Policy discourses on reconciling work and life in the EU’, Social Policy and Society, 1: 305–14. Hill, M. and Hupe, P. (2002) Implementing public policy, London: Sage. Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003) Studying public policy. Policy cycles and policy subsystems, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamoen van, I. (2004) Update preliminary country study. The Netherlands. Domestic violence, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Lamoen van, I., Paantjens, M. and Verloo, M. (2004a) Update preliminary country study. The Netherlands. Family policy, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.

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Lamoen van, I., Meier, P. and Jeuken, Y. (2004b) Update preliminary country study. The Netherlands. Political participation and representation, unpublished research report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Lindblöm, C. (1959) ‘The science of muddling through’, Public Administration Review, 19: 79–88. March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1979) Ambiguity and choice in organizations, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Meier, P., Lombardo, E., Bustelo, M. and Pantelidou Maloutas, M. (2005) ‘Gender mainstreaming and the bench marking fallacy of women in political decision-making’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 35–62. Outshoorn, J. and Kantola, J. (2007) Changing state feminism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Parsons, W. (1995) Public policy. An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Simon, H. (1991) ‘Bounded rationality and organizational learning’, Organization Science, 2: 125–35. Stratigaki, M. (2004) ‘The cooptation of gender concepts in EU policies: The case of reconciliation of work and family’, Social Politics, 11: 30–56. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2005) ‘Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 11–32. ——(2001) Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation, IWM Working Paper 5/2001, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Verloo, M., Lombardo, E. and Bustelo, M. (2007) ‘Conclusions on framing gender inequality as a policy problem in Europe’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Walby, S. (2007) A review of theory and methodology for the analysis of the implications of intersectionality for gender equality policies in the EU. D13 and D14. QUING Research Report, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. ——(1990) Theorizing patriarchy, Oxford: Blackwell.

10 Grounding policy evaluation in a discursive understanding of politics1 María Bustelo and Mieke Verloo

Introduction This book aims to address and understand the discursive dimension of politics, through a focus on the shaping of the meanings of gender equality through processes of fixing, shrinking, stretching and bending. In pursuit of this aim, this chapter makes a case for the need to consider the potential inherent in, and the consequences of, stretching and bending of policy aims and concepts in policymaking and evaluation. If discursive processes affect the meaning of gender equality as well as the framing of gender policies – as this volume shows – they should also be explored as a key dimension and included in the analysis and evaluation of gender policies in order to better understand, enlighten, improve and be accountable for those policies. As pointed out in the Introduction to this book, in the course of its discursive construction as a policy problem, gender equality undergoes a variety of shaping processes that transform its meanings in different ways. This discursive construction of any policy problem – in this case gender equality – shapes the policymaking process from the very beginning and constantly keeps on shaping it. It shapes the very conceptualization of any policy proposal, the way the policy problem is defined and represented, how it is addressed and implemented, and how it evolves and changes over time in different contexts and is taken on board by various actors. This continuous shaping, then, affects the entire policymaking process, including problem articulation, agenda formation, formulation, implementation and evaluation dynamics. Consequently, these discursive processes also shape – and are shaped by – the definitions, proposals, actions and impacts of policies. There is thus a need not only for exploring and understanding those discursive processes, but also for including them as a key dimension and variable in policy evaluation. Basic typologies of evaluation identify design evaluation, implementation evaluation and impact evaluation, based on which aspect or ‘phase’ of the policymaking process is emphasized. Policy design evaluation is the most relevant here as it focuses on the conceptualization of a policy rather than on policy implementation or results. This far less common type of evaluation is important not only for the assessment of policy coherence and relevance, but also for offering a rationale for interpreting policy implementation and results (Bustelo 2003). In this chapter, we argue that the need to include attention to the dimension of discursive politics becomes especially

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apparent in design evaluation. We will also elaborate on the fact that this type of evaluation is not only less common than the others, but also that the few academic references to this type of evaluation in the field have tended to ignore the dynamic discursive dimension of policies. The need for evaluation of the very conceptualization and ‘design’ of policies is very clear in the case of gender equality policies. As we can see in this book, the meaning of gender equality, on account of its travelling and open nature (see Chapter 1 by Lombardo et al.), is especially vulnerable to processes that stretch, bend, shrink or fix its meaning. Evaluating how a policy problem such as gender inequality is conceptualized, articulated and ‘translated’ into policies is important in exposing and assessing the coherence, relevance and consistency of those policies, and also in understanding the potential problems and strengths policy proposals might have in their implementation and in the achievement of their expected and intended results. In fact, studies on implementation problems of gender mainstreaming strategies suggest that they might be rooted in a lack of sufficient recognition and exploration of multiple interpretations and representations of the concept of gender (in)equality (Verloo 2005b). It is therefore especially important to introduce the discursive dimension in the evaluation of policy design when evaluating gender mainstreaming. This chapter does not stop at arguing in favour of design evaluation but also provides some ideas about the way a design evaluation of gender equality policies can be performed. As an offshoot of empirical and comparative research at the European level, this chapter explores the possibilities of critical frame analysis as an important part of design policy evaluation, as well as its use as a tool for including discursive processes as a key dimension in the evaluation of gender policies and, especially, gender mainstreaming. We discuss first the nature of the gender (in)equality concept and its multiple meanings, as well as their specific implications for policymaking processes in gender policies, and thus for the evaluation of policy proposals. Second, we present an overview of design evaluation in theory and practice, highlighting the problem of the ‘rationalistic trap’ in current understandings of design evaluation and stressing the need to use methodologies that are sensitive to the discursive processes that shape gender equality policies. In the third section, this chapter discusses the possibility of using a methodology – critical frame analysis – that has proven its value in comparative gender equality policy analysis (see Chapter 1 by Lombardo et al.) and that, when used in design evaluation, could provide an alternative methodology that does not fall into the rationalistic trap. Finally, we identify and discuss both the potential and the challenges of using critical frame analysis in design evaluation, and conclude with comments on the importance of design evaluation and on the usefulness of this methodology for the advancement of gender equality policies.

Gender (in)equality: Implications of contested and multiple meanings for evaluating gender policies Gender inequality as outlined above is a controversial and dynamic policy problem, which (in a way that is not unique to gender equality) results in implementation

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 155 problems. All over the world, many different and/or competing interpretations of the gender inequality problem have appeared alongside a variety of strategies to solve it. A typical example is how differently framed the prostitution issue is in the Netherlands, where it is conceived as a job in need of better labour conditions, as opposed to Sweden, where it is considered to be an expression of gender inequality and gender violence, and therefore becomes a crime that needs to be eliminated. Owing to its travelling and political nature, the meaning of gender equality acquires different interpretations during the policymaking process, stretching and bending in resonance or reaction to different contexts and actors. Changes in what is considered to be gender equality also always affect what is considered to be the problem. In that sense, changes in the meaning of gender equality are changes in what is seen to be gender inequality, and vice versa. If we take a look at the recent construction of gender equality as a policy problem and at the global history of gender equality policies, we see a specific, important and constant presence of international and supranational influences in those policies. We could never fully understand the history of Western gender policies without taking into account the role of the UN’s organization of the first World Conference and its declaration of the year and the decade for Women in 1975. At the European level, the EU has been documented as a considerable influence on gender policies in most of its member and candidate states (Liebert 2002; Lombardo 2004; van der Vleuten 2007). This has been studied as the ‘boomerang effect’ (see among others Keck and Sikkink 1998; Roggeband and Verloo 1999; Zippel 2004; van der Vleuten 2007) or the international obligation frame on gender equality (Verloo 2007). The meaning of gender equality has to accommodate cultural and institutional differences in order to fit international requirements or receive international funding. These dynamics between national and international arenas also enable new concepts and actors to enter the national policy arenas. This would help explain, for example, how in the early 1990s the frame of ‘sharing care and domestic responsibilities’ in Spain changed to a very different one of ‘reconciliation of work and family life’ in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, when Spain had a conservative national party in government and was simultaneously implementing European policies in the introduction of the Lisbon objectives. The Spanish example implies a shift to a stronger accent on problematizing women’s position in the labour market. Depending on the terms of reference of an evaluation of gender equality policies, these background dynamics might be taken into account. At national levels, knowledge of ‘international’ understandings of gender equality may therefore be necessary for the understanding of gender equality policies, and hence also for their evaluation. As with any other representation of a policy problem, the concept of gender (in)equality also travels across time, constantly evolving. Both what is considered to be the problem (gender inequality) and what is considered to be the desirable outcome (gender equality) vary. Gender equality as a political goal is dynamic because it is continually struggling with the evolving ‘status quo’, and it can be expected to co-evolve with the dynamic political contexts in which public issues are constructed, addressed and contested. At some moment in time, political

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actors have framed something to be gender inequality and then reacted to it in order to achieve gender equality. It was the feminist movement, framing the lack of sexual autonomy to be part and parcel of gender inequality, that first started to question the traditional (and sometimes religious) custom that sexuality was a duty for women in marriage. The old custom was often ‘fixed’ in marriage laws, and in many countries there was no such a thing as rape within marriage (the Netherlands defined this as a possibility in 1992; before then, rape was defined explicitly as happening only outside marriage). Defining marital rape as rooted in gender inequality implies that the definition of gender equality comprises an equal autonomy of, and lust for, male and female bodies, and that it entails that sex within marriage requires consent from both partners. Hence, in this process, both gender inequality and gender equality change meaning. The strong political and contested character of equality policies is in part due to the fact that gender inequality – whatever definition we want to give it – is deeply rooted in social structures, and reproduced and maintained through strongly established power relations. As contesting those established power relations is revolutionary in a way, and almost always threatens the status quo, ‘new’ concepts of gender (in)equality often require time to enter the political agenda through a long process of perseverance, strategy, adjustment and re-adjustment by different actors. Such processes are not always successful; certain ways of framing the issue of gender equality can even bend the meaning to ‘traditional’ understandings of gender relations, reproducing gender-unequal relations or normalizing them in policy proposals. Changes over time can also result in erratic policy proposals. Any evaluation of such policies should take into account their dynamic, and its often inconsistent and ‘normalizing’ nature. As we will conclude in this chapter, this supports the need to evaluate gender policies in their conceptualization or design. Finally, the concept of gender (in)equality – besides travelling across borders and time – also travels across different policy actors, at both institutional and noninstitutional levels. In the case of gender policies, this multiplicity of actors has increased as a result of gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is the strategy internationally and officially adopted by numerous nations at the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 as a new and complementary way to achieve gender equality through examining the overall policymaking process. It is defined as ‘the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policymaking’ (Group of Specialists 1998: 19). The Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming of the Council of Europe pointed out from the very beginning that a broader concept of equality was needed for the development of the mainstreaming strategy. They recognized that gender equality is often misunderstood and that the concept implies much more than anti-discrimination or an exclusive focus on women’s issues. However, they did not recognize at that time that gender equality is also a deeply political concept that can be interpreted in very different ways (Verloo 2005a).

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 157 The fact that effective gender mainstreaming requires the involvement of very different actors increases the complexity of different meanings, understandings and interpretations of what should be achieved by this strategy. In fact, although the variety of interpretations might enrich the policymaking process, the different ways of understanding gender inequality are a continuous challenge to previously shared problems and objectives during the implementation process. Because the label ‘gender inequality’ (or gender equality for that matter) does not mean the same to every actor, the chances are that each actor will implement different measures, or will implement the same measures differently depending on his/her own interpretation of the concept at a specific time. Taking for granted some common understanding of the concept without articulating this specific understanding will result in diverging implementations. In the context of the European Union and its conditions of multilevel governance, which have produced their own set of representations of gender mainstreaming and the gender inequality problematic (mostly related to labour market issues), such competing and diverging representations are especially connected to implementation problems. The recognition of the complexity of different meanings, understandings and interpretations of gender (in)equality does not and should not mean that we need to search for a common interpretation in order to be able to perform neat and rational public interventions that could provide the ‘real’ solution to the gender inequality problem. On the contrary, multiple interpretations of every public issue – not only gender equality – are at the very heart of democratic processes in which different actors are supposed to actively participate. Precisely the recognition, analysis and exploration of these different interpretations can contribute tremendously to the understanding of policies and the policymaking process. As we will see in the following section, we are thus in need of analysis and evaluation tools that are sensitive to this. Such tools have to include in their very conception the multiple, uncertain, open and changing nature of the meaning of gender (in) equality as a policy problem, and consequently recognize the discursive, contested and dynamic nature of gender equality policies. We will argue that gender equality policies are a good case for an attempt at design evaluation that is not based on assumptions of a common and unique interpretation of the problem and its solution, as there is little consensus on what is the problem, who is responsible for it or what could be the solution in this field. This type of evaluation, which focuses on the analysis of the ideas or theories underlying policy action and policy strategies, helps to understand and explain discursive processes such as stretching, shrinking, bending and fixing the concept of gender (in)equality, and helps to clarify some implementation problems that have been identified in gender policies and, more concretely, in gender mainstreaming strategies.

Public policy evaluation: The importance of design evaluation and the potential of critical frame analysis Following the rationale developed in the previous section, design evaluation calls for a tool that allows us to grasp and assess the dynamic, changing and contested

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nature of the discursive processes around the meaning of gender (in)equality in policymaking processes. However, traditional evaluation models and approaches have not been especially sensitive to this dynamic discursive nature of policies. Some more recent evaluation models (such as the ones proposed by Stake 1967; Guba and Lincoln 1989; Monnier 1995; Patton 1997), which are developed under a more constructionist approach, recognize that the (discursive) complexity of policies and actors must be at the very heart of the evaluation process. These models, however, tend to focus on the evaluation of policy implementations and results, and not so much on the design or conceptualization of programmes and policies. Indeed, until now, design evaluation has mostly developed in a positivistic paradigm, leading to the construction of cause–effect relationships as a primary way of ‘understanding’ the underlying design of policies (Dahler-Larsen 2001). This means that design evaluation until now has mostly been based on assumptions that policymaking is a highly rational–logical process. However, it can be argued that what lies at the heart of the policymaking process is a political rationality, as opposed to a kind of logical, procedural rationality. For us, political rationality is related to the framing of a public problem. Policy frames make sense of, give meaning to and also imply certain solutions to the problems they address. Political rationality would imply that the framing of problems and solutions relates to the actors involved in this framing at a certain time. There is – and must be – a tendency among different actors, times and contexts in the dynamic and complex process of policymaking to search for coherence between how a problem is diagnosed and how a solution is suggested. However, a total consistency between diagnosis and prognosis might be difficult to find, as the dynamics of policymaking might often involve a change in frame elements. The existence of these kinds of potential and always temporary inconsistencies does not necessarily mean that a frame is not rational in political terms. This provides a counterpoint to procedural rationality, which claims there is a logical coherence between needs, objectives and solutions, and implies that a policy proposal or action is consistent because all its elements fit a fixed deductive logic, providing the best solution to an already clear and uniquely defined problem. As there is a wealth of empirical evidence and theoretical thinking that has challenged these rational–logical assumptions, there is a need for concepts of design evaluation that avoid this rationalistic trap. The following section expands on criticisms of such assumptions and presents a methodological framework – critical frame analysis – to engage in design evaluation while avoiding assumptions of logical rationality in policymaking. Currently, design evaluation is closely linked to what other authors have identified as ‘program theory’, which indicates what can be tested or evaluated in a policy design (Wholey 1987; Bickman 1990; Chen 1990; Weiss 1998). The program theory is ‘the set of beliefs that underlie action [ … ] It is a set of hypotheses upon which people build their own programs’, and ‘an explanation of the causal links that tie program inputs to expected program outputs’ (Weiss 1998: 55). These authors see ‘program theory analysis’ as a necessary prior step for getting to know the programme or policy under evaluation, and as a key step to provide information on what a policy attempts to achieve. Yet these authors, whose perspective has

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 159 been widely accepted among evaluation theorists, do not see the identification or definition of a policy design’s program theory as a type of evaluation. Nevertheless, as Carol Weiss recognizes, ‘the notion of defining program theory has not typically been a component of evaluation’ (Weiss 1998: 55). For her, many evaluations pay more attention to the outcomes than to the paths through which they are produced. In order to enable useful evaluations that really contribute to improvements in programmes and public policies, a more holistic and complete view of public intervention is needed. Thus, any useful evaluation must not only answer the question ‘Did the program work?’, but also ‘What made it work?’, ‘Why was it successful or unsuccessful?’ and ‘How can we make it better?’ For Weiss, ‘to make a respectable contribution to such discussion, it helps if the evaluator understands – and investigates – the program’s explicit or implicit theory’ (Weiss 1998: 55). Unfortunately, although formally recognized as an important type of evaluation, or even as a necessary step for performing a complete and useful evaluation, this evaluation area has not yet been fully developed in practice. This might also at the same time be the cause and effect of the lack of references – either theoretical or practical – to this kind of evaluation. In fact, the available literature that addresses theories, models and methods for doing design evaluation or program theory evaluation is much less abundant than that for any other kind of evaluation. Because design evaluation is not part of the evaluation ‘canon’, it has so far been unable to challenge current evaluation practices. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, most available references pertain to a concrete scientific tradition, mainly rooted in a positivistic and hypothetical– deductive paradigm. The rationale behind the importance of, and the need for, defining program theories portrays programmes and public interventions as complex and complicated phenomena, ‘generally born out of experience and professional lore’ and ‘not likely to be laid out in rational terms with clear-cut statements of why certain program activities have been selected and which actions are expected to lead to which desired ends’ (Weiss 1998: 55). Nevertheless, the theory behind program theory is based on a highly positivistic and rationalistic perspective. In fact, for the program theory authors, defining a program theory consists mainly of constructing a model of cause–effect relationships. This can be seen in the definitions some of these authors have given to the concept of program theory. For Bickman (1990: 5), it is ‘a plausible and sensible model of how a program is supposed to work’, and for Wholey (1987: 78), program theory identifies ‘program resources, program activities, and intended program outcomes, and specifies a chain of causal assumptions linking program resources, activities, intermediate outcomes, and ultimate goals’. Furthermore, approaches such as ‘theory-driven evaluation’ (Chen 1990), which stem from the program theory concept, have developed around the idea of defining or identifying the cause–effect relationships that compose the program theory in order to test them subsequently. All these approaches are positivistic and tend to be very quantified-oriented. Other approaches of conceptualization or design evaluation that are less linked to program theory are also related to rationalistic approaches. Based primarily in the ‘logical framework’ approach, some authors have developed guidelines for

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performing design or conceptual evaluations. As an example, Osuna and Márquez (2000) define this kind of evaluation as one that aims to review the program elements that justify its existence and the way in which the program is formulated and articulated. They identify two crucial evaluation criteria, rationality and coherence, in assessing the quality of policy designs. Consequently, although this approach acknowledges that programmes and policies might not always be logically rational, it is argued that they ought to be rational and strive for procedural rationality. That is, the norm (perfectly expressed through the evaluation criteria proposed for design or conceptual evaluation) for a ‘good’ programme or policy is to be rational in logical terms. In contrast to this, a great deal of public policy literature has repeatedly shown that public policies and programmes are far less logically rational than the first rationalistic analysts believed and maintained (see Lombardo and Meier in this volume). In particular, authors studying problem and agenda setting (Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1995) have pointed out that public problems and issues are social and political constructions, and that policymakers are not absolutely rational or necessarily logical in dealing and negotiating with the different actors involved, in addressing public issues or even in defining and representing the public issues that should be addressed. The amount of actors and factors influencing the policymaking process from the very beginning – even in the very process of constructing and articulating the public issues to address – does not allow public programmes and policy to be or work in such a logically rational manner. If, as we have seen in the previous section’s concrete case of gender (in)equality, policy problems are often constructed from highly contested concepts that are dynamically and continuously stretched and bent in relation to political contexts, the existence of a perfect program theory with clear cause–effect relationships seems quite impossible and certainly naive. Concept or design evaluation can form an extremely important methodology and key puzzle piece for a better understanding and further development of social intervention. It is indispensable to revisit the concept of program theory in conceptual evaluation as it has been developed so far. The idea of program theory as the set of beliefs or assumptions that underlie action remains a fully valid idea, and an excellent contribution to evaluation theory. A key point of improvement should involve the fact that ‘sets of beliefs or assumptions’ are frequently organized in frames and discourses that are constantly being shaped by different actors. Consequentially, there is a need for a conceptual or design evaluation that recognizes the discursive and dynamic nature of program theories in its analysis of those frames and discourses (and not only cause–effect relationships) and how they change across space and over time. More than developing a new concept, what is needed most is the development of other methodological approaches that better take into account the complexity and dynamics of the policy design process. Undoubtedly, the complex, dynamic and discursive nature of policy proposals is directly related to the different actors who intervene, interact and shape those policy proposals and processes, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Wrapping up what we have already pointed out, our criticism of positivistic design evaluation is twofold. First, its underlying assumptions do not match the reality,

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 161 because policies or intervention programmes are the outcome of struggles that result from political considerations of how best to solve a given problem. This process is unavoidably trapped in historical logic, in what was seen as the problem before, what has been tried before and which institutions have already been created to deal with the problems. Understanding these background dynamics is crucial in understanding and hence evaluating gender equality policies. Second, policies are better understood as ‘assemblages’ than as rational sets of interventions for certain purposes. Policies are constructed configurations of problems and (at best, matching) solutions resulting from struggles, and they often combine elements from different competing actors, either from within the state or from different mobilizing networks outside it. Policies then are rooted in a history of successes and failures of different actors with whom the current policymakers do or do not identify. Policies are constructed in a context of existing and emerging dominant discourse frames, and linked to existing and emerging diffusion channels, and they do not operate under conditions of complete information. How then to conceptualize a framework that can identify, describe and analyse such an assembled ‘program theory’? Critical frame analysis presents a framework that has been developed for comparative research of policies that are understood as such assemblages.

Critical frame analysis methodology as an approach to studying divergences in policy frames and to evaluating gender policies and mainstreaming strategies As pointed out before, implementation problems of gender mainstreaming strategies might be rooted in a lack of sufficient recognition and exploration of multiple interpretations and representations of the concept of gender (in)equality, and result from the stretching and bending of the concept of gender equality during policymaking processes. Different interpretations, as expressed through different policy frames on gender equality, can explain existing differences in the character and impact of gender equality policies across nations and contexts. Frame analysis is thus a crucial component in the understanding of gender equality policies. Our key point in this chapter is that critical frame analysis, as an approach to study the character of, and divergences in, policy frames, is also suitable for evaluating the design and conceptualization of gender policies and mainstreaming strategies. The methodology of critical frame analysis has been used in studying gender equality policies in Europe (see Verloo 2007). This approach assumes that the policy frames that are found in policy texts have a typical format of (representation of) diagnoses and prognoses of the tackled problems. Hence, every policy contains a representation of a diagnosis (a social aspect or fact that is considered problematic and needs changes) and a prognosis (the measures proposed as a solution to the problem, specifying what should be done), and these are the two main elements in the frame creation process (Snow and Benford 1988: 199). Typical questions guiding this analysis are: What is the problem and how is it represented? What is the solution offered to this problem? Who has the problem, and who are

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the problem holders? What is the normative group? What is the target group? Who are seen as responsible for creating or solving the problem? Who has a voice in defining the problem and its solution? The critical frame analysis methodology focuses on the analysis of the crucial elements of policy frames, on an assessment of the diversity in problem interpretations and solutions proposed for those problems and on critical reflection about (in)consistencies in gender policies. The methodology consists of a set of ‘sensitizing questions’ that must be answered by open coding. In this way, the analysis aims to identify the frame’s (implicit or explicit) internal logic, and the exclusion processes by which some actors do not have a voice in the representation of a problem and its solution. Critical frame analysis provides a rich description of the content of these policies, which makes it possible to incorporate the dynamic discursive nature and the kinds of inconsistencies in policy design that arise from the complex process of policymaking. To a certain extent, as the coded answers to the ‘sensitizing questions’ (called ‘supertexts’) attempt to analyse the theories underlying action and the articulations of solutions and actions, they are a kind of extraction of the ‘program theory’ of a certain policy. As such, critical frame analysis enables the evaluation of policy design while including a different epistemological approach from the one driving traditional program theory or theory-driven evaluation that is linked to more positivistic approaches to evaluation. Why is critical frame analysis adequate for grasping the complex and dynamic discursive processes that are present in framing gender (in)equality and in conceptualizing gender policies? The frame analysis approach is rooted in an understanding of policy problems as constructions based on competing interpretations of the problem, and in recognition of the fact that policy solutions contain built-in representations of the problem. In mapping the different representations of gender in/equality as a policy problem, frame analysis adopts a deconstructionist approach, treating gender (in)equality as an empty signifier and studying it as an open concept that in practice is filled with a multitude of meanings. The ‘sensitizing questions’ allow for ‘relative’ norms rather than absolute norms against which policies are measured (see also Stake 1967). Although the questions, with all their ideological and political implications, allow for normative assessment, they are not absolute models of reference fixed once and for all, but are instead open to periodical revision and transformation in order to better adapt to both the variegated nature of policy texts and to the changes in the researchers’ theoretical perspectives (Verloo and Lombardo 2007). How can critical frame analysis then be used for the evaluation of gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming strategies? Generally speaking, critical frame analysis allows for the evaluation of content, consistency and coherence in gender policies through questions such as: How is gender (in)equality defined or represented under this policy? Do the explicit diagnostic elements in a policy (text) ‘match’ the implicit elements in the prognosis of a text? How inclusive is a policy regarding the actors who are supposed to participate? The conceptual framework of critical frame analysis is developed to not only highlight the general elements of any program theory and policy frame, such as diagnosis, prognosis, role attribution in diagnosis, prognosis – who is responsible,

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 163 who should do something, who is the target group – and voice – who is speaking and who has a say – but also specific elements that enable the description of the theoretical assumptions underneath gender equality policies (dimensions of gender, location, mechanisms, intersectionality). More specifically, the ‘sensitizing questions’ require coding whether intersectionality is taken into account, which dimensions of gender are addressed, in which structures of gender inequality the problem is seen to be located and which mechanisms (material or discursive) are seen to drive the (re)production of gender inequality. Voice is looked at in a direct and an indirect way, as critical frame analysis asks who is referred to as an important actor that has contributed to, or been consulted about, a given policy. It also asks who is given a role related to either the addressing of the problem (for instance because they have ‘exposed’ a problem) or in the proposed strategies and policy actions (for instance because they are asked to provide a service). In the analysis and evaluation of gender mainstreaming policies, critical frame analysis transcends the distinction between the expert–bureaucratic approach (where gender impact is to be assessed by specialists, gender experts and/or administrators) and the participatory–democratic approach (where a range of individuals and organizations are encouraged to contribute) to gender mainstreaming (Beveridge et al. 2000). This is because it not only analyses the gender content and frames but also integrates a voice analysis, an analysis of who is included or excluded in the texts or debates, and who is given standing (Ferree et al. 2002). In its analysis of the ‘gender content’ of gender equality policies, critical frame analysis differs from ‘gender impact assessment’. Gender impact assessments are also a form of policy design evaluation in that they evaluate policies at the stage of their design (similar to ‘environment impact assessments’) and try to measure the potential impact of mainstreaming a gender equality perspective into all kind of policy fields. However, the main difference is that gender impact assessment tools also often subscribe to the rationalistic approach described and criticized earlier in this chapter. In that sense, gender impact assessment belongs to the category of expert–bureaucratic approaches, all the more so because they are rarely performed by civil society organizations. The different contribution of critical frame analysis mainly resides in the fact that it leaves the definition of gender equality open. This offers the possibility of analysing and evaluating the ‘meaning’ of gender equality, while gender impact assessment tools often fixed gender equality to a specific definition and tried to see to what extent the design of policies met this definition. Also, gender impact assessment was meant to be an ex ante analysis or evaluation, something that should be done before the policy proposal’s implementation. Policy design evaluation, however, might be performed at any stage, as it addresses policy theoretical foundations and policy frames as organizing principles that give meaning to the policy proposals. Critical frame analysis can expand the way gender mainstreaming policies have been evaluated so far, because the few attempts at evaluating gender mainstreaming (see Bustelo 2003) have been developed around the idea of evaluating impact, that is the impact that this strategy might have on public policies. As yet, there is hardly any evaluation of the gender mainstreaming strategy’s impact on society.

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However, if we consider gender mainstreaming as a public action in itself, apart from evaluating impact, we also need to evaluate how this strategy is designed (and implemented). Critical frame analysis can provide important clues for evaluating the conceptualization of gender mainstreaming strategies, as it allows for identification of the various discursive processes and policy frames that might be operating – in the senses of facilitating or preventing – in gender mainstreaming processes. It can also help to evaluate gender mainstreaming’s impact, as it might be used to evaluate the gender component of other public policies. In this manner, critical frame analysis could be used to evaluate how other public policies address the gender component at the policy design level, which then allows for assessing which gender equality perspective they incorporate. As a last step, it can then address normative questions concerning the extent to which policies contain a gender bias. As such, it can increase the awareness of the ‘conceptual prejudices’ unintentionally shaping policy discourses and, consequently, it can reveal latent inconsistencies, or even gender bias, embedded in the design of public policies.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have explained how critical frame analysis may contribute to grasp and take into account the discursive processes that are continuously shaping the meaning of gender (in)equality as it is used, stretched and bent throughout the policymaking process. Consequently, as any analysis or evaluation of gender policies should take into account its dynamic, discursive nature, we have also pointed out that this methodology could be a sensible tool for useful evaluations, which could contribute to the improvement, accountability and clarification of those policies. In this concluding section, we want to identify some additional challenges and opportunities of critical frame analysis as a tool for evaluating gender policies. As we have pointed out above, any solid, systematic evaluation is done with the aim of learning, in order to improve the evaluated action. Evaluation, however, has two more important aims: one is related to the democratic role any evaluation must play with regard to being accountable, as evaluating public policies is also a matter of transparency and accountability of public actions; the other regards the fact that evaluation can also provide enlightenment on the public action and policy area. That is, systematically evaluating gender policies within their contexts helps to better understand where those policies stand and what direction they might take in the future. In a similar manner to the improvement and enlightenment functions of evaluation, critical frame analysis might also help policymakers and stakeholders to be more conscious of the often inconsistent and prejudicial different discursive processes and policy frames at work. As framing is often unintentional, there is a need for more reflexivity (see Bacchi in this volume). Critical frame analysis can be helpful in stimulating reflexivity because it offers a deep understanding of the frames and discourses embedded in policies. The idea of evaluation as a tool for creating awareness and as a way of being more (self)-conscious about actions and

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 165 frames should not be exclusively reserved to policymakers, but should recognize the multiple actors and stakeholders involved in gender policies, especially in gender mainstreaming strategies. As such, design evaluation can contribute to more accountability through necessary processes such as collective awareness, shared visions and negotiation. In other words, evaluation processes that recognize different actors and are aware of the open and dynamic nature of policies can themselves be excellent negotiation arenas in which actors recognize each other and exchange visions, creating collective awareness and consciousness. This shared consciousness helps stakeholders’ accountability, enlightens public action and can be a good ‘weapon’ to fight against fixed understandings of gender relations or gender prejudices. The critical frame analysis approach, with its accent on voice and who are included and excluded actors in framing processes, is especially suitable for such an endeavour. This consciousness and the need for reflexivity should also apply to researchers’ and evaluators’ own frames and discourses that inevitably influence the analysis and evaluation; they should be as accountable as other stakeholders. Bacchi develops the notion of reflexive framing that has critical implications for political practice; for her, ‘Centrally, political subjects are directed to scrutinize their own discursive positionings’ (Bacchi in this volume: p. 26). As critical frame analysis calls upon feminist activists and researchers to subject their own frames to critical scrutiny, this reflexive framing could and should be present in evaluation processes, allowing for accountability, especially of evaluators. At the same time, evaluators under this critical frame analysis approach could facilitate other stakeholders’ participation and reflexivity. Without assuming that they can control the influence of their biases in policy analysis and evaluation completely, professionals working in the everyday life of gender policies might also take special advantage of this approach for reflecting on what they do, ‘translating’ this approach into ‘everyday life reflection’, which can add a more conscious participation in programme design in addition to their ongoing unconscious participation (Lipsky 1980). Finally, any evaluation using the critical frame analysis approach will allow improvement in policy design and conceptualization through pinpointing different discourses and framing components that might be adjusted to create stronger gender policies. There are a number of limitations and problems concerning the application of critical frame analysis for policy evaluation. We will not extensively highlight the usual practical problems of resources (time and expertise) needed, although it is a fact that critical frame analysis cannot be performed without comprehensive knowledge of the dynamics of gender relations and will need time and money to be executed. In the absence of a ‘canon’ of gender expertise and a full recognition of gender studies as an academic discipline, there might be problems with choosing the ‘right kind’ of expertise in policy and evaluation practice. Moreover, while evaluating the ‘program theory’ that underlies any policy is necessary to expose the foundations of a policy and address the contributions a policy can make to the reproduction of unequal power relations, it can never completely foresee the effects of a policy’s implementation. Yet, the various ways one and the same policy can be implemented can have very different impacts on gender

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relations. To evaluate this, other evaluation methods are needed. Also, it might be difficult for policymakers to see how they can address the problems that a design evaluation using critical frame analysis exposes. It may be necessary to complement the design evaluation with a method to create alternatives to the parts of a policy that have been evaluated as problematic. There are certainly also a number of methodological and epistemological challenges to the further development of critical frame analysis as an evaluation tool. The first is the methodological tension that can result from a need for combining qualitatively context-related analysis and closed codes. While open-ended coding can incorporate the wide set of meanings available in the texts, this open-endedness of coding creates problems for comparisons, as the subjective interpretation of codes can favour the multiplication of synonymous ways of coding, thus generating confusions and delays when the codes have to be interpreted. In the context of the comparative research in which critical frame analysis has been developed, this tension between context specificity and subjective interpretation versus standardization has been dealt with by adding a (collective) process of revising codes, and by adding summaries, comments and quotations for each of the studied dimensions. For its use in design evaluation, critical frame analysis would also need to develop some measures that might partially close the coding when large-scale comparisons are needed. Lastly, we will focus on an important challenge for the use of critical frame analysis in evaluating gender policies, namely normativity. When the policy frames (or the program theory) of a certain text are analytically exposed in their different components, the biased assumption of logical rationality is avoided. Rather, the ‘supertext’ maps out both consistent and inconsistent, and both logical and illogical elements. In this sense, critical frame analysis is a method that ranks low on normativity. It does not seem to explicitly take a position on what is good and what is bad in policies. This might seem contradictory to a method that aims to ‘evaluate’. How can an evaluation method not be normative? The answer is twofold. While, at the level of explicitness, critical frame analysis does indeed not take a normative stance, simultaneously some normative understandings remain hidden at the level of implicit understandings of the method. Asking which dimensions of gender are referred to, which structures of gender inequality and which mechanisms of (re)producing gender inequality are addressed, as well as asking who is given a voice in the policy text only makes sense if the (normative) idea is that it matters how deep the gender analysis is, that it matters who is given voice. Underneath the ‘sensitizing questions’ is a positioning of gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming as rooted in normative concepts of displacement rather than in goals of inclusion or reversal (Squires 1999). Its understanding of gender mainstreaming is that this strategy should go ‘beyond gender’, displacing patriarchal gender differences and deconstructing discursive regimes that engender the subject (Verloo 2005a). It also assumes that both gender mainstreaming and gender policies should be linked to the concept of intersectionality and the recognition of diversity. The link to empowerment is present because it can help to identify how particular discursive strategies within the policymaking

Policy evaluation and discursive politics 167 process can modify the process itself by means of excluding some actors from the debate. Therefore, the methodology is able to provide visibility to processes of exclusions active in policy discourses, and to assess who is given standing.

Notes 1 The authors want to thank Petra Meier very much for her challenging comments and smart suggestions.

Bibliography Beveridge, F., Nott, S. and Stephen, K. (2000) ‘Mainstreaming and the engendering of policymaking: A means to an end?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7: 385–405. Bickman, L. (ed.) (1990) Advances in program theory. New directions for program evaluation, 47, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Bustelo, M. (2003) ‘Gender mainstreaming evaluation: Ideas from a meta-evaluation study of eleven evaluation processes of gender equality policies in Spain’, Evaluation, 19: 383–403. Chen, H.T. (1990) Theory-driven evaluation: A comprehensive perspective, Newbury Park: Sage. Cobb, R.W. and Elder, C.D. (1983) Participation in American politics: The dynamics of agenda-building, 2nd edn, Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Dahler-Larsen, P. (2001) ‘From program theory to constructivism: On tragic, magic and competing programmes’, Evaluation, 7: 331–49. Ferree, M., Gamson, W.A., Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. (2002) Shaping abortion discourse: Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States, New York: Cambridge University Press. Group of Specialists (1998) Gender mainstreaming; Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good practices, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1989) Fourth generation evaluation, Newbury Park: Sage. Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kingdon, J.W. (1995) Agenda, alternatives, and public policies, 2nd edn, New York: Harper Collins College Publishers. Liebert, U. (2002) ‘Europeanizing gender mainstreaming: Constraints and opportunities in the multilevel euro-polity’, Feminist Legal Studies, 10: 241–56. Lipsky, M. (1980) Street level bureaucracy: The dilemmas of individuals in the public service, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lombardo, E. (2004) La Europeización de la política Española de igualdad de género, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch. Monnier, E. (1995) Evaluación de la acción de los poderes públicos, Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda. Osuna, J.L. and Márquez, C. (2000) Guía para la evaluación de políticas públicas, Sevilla: Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, Fundación Universitaria. Patton, M.Q. (1997) Utilization-focused evaluation. The new century text, 3rd edn, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Roggeband, C. and Verloo, M. (1999) ‘Global sisterhood and political change: The unhappy “marriage” of women’s movements and nation states’, in K. van Kersbergen, R.H. Lieshout

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and G. Lock (eds) Expansion and fragmentation: Internationalization, political change and the transformation of the nation state, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Snow, D.A. and Benford, R.D. (1988) ‘Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization’, International Social Movement Research, 1: 197–217. Squires, J. (1999) Gender and political theory, Cambridge: Polity Press. Stake, R.E. (1967) ‘The countenance of educational evaluation’, Teachers College Record, 68: 523–40. van der Vleuten, A. (2007) The price of gender equality. Member states and governance in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate. Verloo, M. (ed.) (2007) Multiple meanings of gender equality. A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. ——(2005a) ‘Displacement and empowerment: Reflections on the concept and practice of the Council of Europe Approach to gender mainstreaming and gender equality’, Social Politics, 12: 344–65. ——(2005b) ‘Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis’, Greek Review of Social Research, 117 (B’ 2005): 11–35. Verloo, M. and Lombardo, E. (2007) ‘Contested gender equality and policy variety in Europe: Introducing a critical frame analysis approach’, in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, Budapest: CPS Books. Weiss, C.H. (1998) Evaluation. Methods for studying programs and policies, 2nd edn, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Wholey, J. (ed.) (1987) Organizational excellence: Stimulating quality and communicating value, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Zippel, K. (2004) ‘Transnational advocacy networks and policy cycles in the European Union: The case of sexual harassment’, Social Politics, 11: 57–85.

11 The discursive logic of ranking and benchmarking Understanding gender equality measures in the European Union Mieke Verloo and Anna van der Vleuten Introduction Strategies to promote gender equality are developing continuously. While the main strategies remain equality in legislation, positive or affirmative action and gender mainstreaming, the last decade has seen a proliferation of instruments to measure and monitor progress towards a gender-equal society. Resonating well with ‘new public management’, the introduction of indicators and more complex indices results in country rankings that are seen as indicative of their achievement of gender equality. The recent increase in such rankings makes them more important for the assessment of countries’ performances in this field.1 A common feature of ranking and benchmarking is the underlying idea of the concern for reputation as a motor for implementation. At first sight, gender rankings based on indicators seem to be a prime example of ‘fixing’ the meaning of gender equality. As outlined in the Introduction, such fixing can have positive and negative consequences. While it can enable the evaluation of progress, and create a chance to take measures if there is a lack of progress, it is not unlikely that the indicators represent only a few dimensions of gender equality. These instruments possibly show evidence of shrinking the meaning of gender equality, or stretching or bending part of its meaning. This chapter will address the discursive politics of ranking and benchmarking, because we consider the discursive dimension of these phenomena to be undervalued. Ranking appears to be a technical undertaking based on expert knowledge and depoliticized facts and figures, and is often discussed as such. Yet, power is unavoidably as central to it as to other policy instruments. This has led us to investigate the origins and consequences of what we consider shifts in ‘the politics of reputation’ as a result of the increased importance of new policy methods such as ranking. We examine the power-based mechanisms that operate between each pair of the following three concepts: reputation, ranking and performance. How does reputation relate to ranking? A good reputation seems to influence the way in which rankings are constructed as much as rankings are constitutive of a good reputation. How does performance relate to reputation, and to what extent do we see disparities between them? Does ranking improve or hamper good performance? In this chapter, we try to conceptualize the consequences of the ‘new’ politics of

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ranking in order to contribute to a political understanding of their impact on the meaning of gender equality and on the quality of policy implementation. Our subject is gender equality policies in the European Union (EU). In the 1990s, this field has seen a shift in policy and implementation style from legal instruments aiming at harmonization of national policies, enforced by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), to policy instruments such as the co-ordination of national policies (Open Method of Coordination, European Employment Strategy), benchmarking and scoreboards (Héritier 2003). Here, the European level reflects broader changes within countries and in the private sector (see Benschop and Brouns 2006 on the Netherlands’ Glass Ceiling Index, which ranks companies; or Grosser and Moon 2005 on corporate responsibility). Although the emergence of ranking as a policy measure can be found in many domains at the European level,2 its effects on reputation and performance can be assumed to be stronger if the policy domain is less ‘technical’ and more ‘ideological’, i.e. linked to power relations and policy paradigms. For that reason, gender equality policies constitute the domain par excellence where the political aspects of these mechanisms – if any – should be most visible. In the next section, we explore the mutual influence between ranking, reputation and performance. Subsequently, we will trace the development of ranking in the field of gender equality in Europe with special attention to the role of power and some particular effects of the politics of ranking. In closing, we will discuss how this new type of tool affects the meaning of gender equality, how stretching and bending are as much active in these tools as in any other type of strategy, and how existing power structures influence the construction and use of indicators, benchmarking and ranking.

Reputation, ranking and performance States value their reputation. Rönnblom (2004: 2) notes how Sweden proudly presents itself in policy documents as the ‘most gender equal country in the world’. Reputation is part of the power position of a state with regard to domestic society and to other states (van der Vleuten 2005). A good reputation legitimizes the course a government has chosen and may also serve to legitimize further inaction as a good reputation, once acquired, lasts a while. It is therefore an asset in international negotiations as well. If others are convinced of the qualities of a state in the past, this state is able to convince them more easily of the quality of its present ideas. Conversely, ‘being perceived as a cheater and free-rider undermines the bargaining power of a member state’ (Börzel 2003: 203). Reputation is based not only on actual past performance, but also on the way in which this performance is represented. Although this rhetorical dimension makes reputation malleable to a certain extent, reputation has to remain rooted in facts to avoid a sudden loss of credibility when the facts are checked. In effect, rhetorical action (defined as the strategic use of arguments) follows some rules, described by Schimmelfennig (2001) as requirements of consistency, credibility and a need to appear convincing, with a resulting preference for obscuring or hiding

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 171 inconvenient facts or norms. Schimmelfennig also points to an interesting unintended consequence of rhetorical action. Even if a state uses rhetoric to enhance its reputation in order to gain more leeway in negotiations at the European level, its marge de manoeuvre may be involuntarily limited by the ensuing rhetorical entrapment (Schimmelfennig 2001). The concern for reputation plays a role in explaining state compliance with ‘hard’ EU law. If a state prefers not to implement a policy, it will prefer this noncompliance to remain unnoticed, so that its reputation as a reliable member state does not suffer. As the EU monitoring system increases the probability that noncompliance is discovered, the threat of ‘being named and shamed’ is supposed to influsence the decision of a state to implement EU measures (Tallberg 2002). The ‘old’ politics of reputation consisted not only of monitoring but also – in the case of hard law directives – of enforcement measures. These enforcement measures enable the European Commission to investigate whether state rhetoric corresponds with the facts, and to unveil instances of non-compliance by taking a state to the ECJ. With each stage in the procedure, the publicity increases, as well as the ‘reputational costs’ (Börzel 2003). Member states prefer not to have infringement proceedings in front of the ECJ, as the European Commission usually wins the case and ECJ rulings receive a lot of publicity, ‘further raising the social costs of non-compliance’ (Tallberg 2002) and damaging their reputation. The involvement of the ECJ implies that an ‘absolute’ standard is applied, that is the standard as laid down in the specific European policy. As a third party, the ECJ interprets this standard, making it applicable to all member states, businesses and citizens in the same way. This enforcement mechanism enables the denouncement of disparities between reputation and performance. France, for instance, cherished its reputation as a social role model, defending gender equality from the very beginnings of European integration. The European Commission, however, took France to court more than once because it did not fully comply with the gender equality directives. When in 2000, just when it occupied the EU presidency, France risked being condemned to a daily fine of €142,425 if it did not implement the equal treatment directive, the French government succeeded in convincing the French parliament of the necessity to act immediately by pointing not at the financial consequences, but at the consequences for its reputation. To be the first member state ever to be condemned to a penalty payment over social policy was unacceptable for France as the would-be champion of a ‘social Europe’ (van der Vleuten 2007: 122). The ‘old’ politics of reputation, linked to legal performance, is thus based on ‘absolute’ standards authoritatively interpreted and enforced by a third party (the European Commission and the ECJ). Such absolute standards are a prime example of fixing the meaning of gender equality, necessarily involving only certain parts of its meaning. Equal rights in the labour market and equal pay are good examples of this, fixing ‘equality’ in a more narrow sense to be part of gender equality, while completely ignoring the division of care and household labour, or issues of reproductive rights. It therefore seems that absolute standards involve shrinking as well as fixing.

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In spite of the strong monitoring and enforcement system in the EU, differences persist when it comes to the legal performance of member states. Looking at the implementation of EU gender equality directives, some states are considered pioneers, while others are labelled laggards or poor performers (Liebert and Sifft 2003; Falkner et al. 2005). This kind of labelling focuses solely on legal equality between women and men, a strategy that has been criticized for not always being sufficient for the attainment of de facto gender equality (Lombardo 2003). For instance, although women have for decades been legally entitled to receive the same pay for the same work as men, the gender pay gap has not disappeared. Accordingly, we agree that the standard of ‘legal implementation’ is not an appropriate standard if one wants to measure actual performance (the attainment of policy objectives), but at least it is an ‘absolute’ standard that is applied to all states in the same way, making it possible to judge them accordingly. Conversely, the ‘new’ politics of reputation linked to ranking is based on relative standards of performance and excludes the possibility of judging and sanctioning low performance. While reputation is an old concept in, among others, theories of state behaviour, analyses of political leadership and management theories, ranking is a relatively new one. Since the 1980s, new public management and other similar trends in professionalizing bureaucracies have given birth to a panoply of indicators, procedures, measures and other innovations meant to assess the performance of public administration systems and to improve the performance and political accountability of governments (de Vries 2005). Intended to be instruments for improving the quality and transparency of policies, they have given new meaning to the old politics of reputation by changing both the basis on which reputation is built and the mechanisms by which reputation is judged. Ranking The relation between reputation and ranking varies, as ranking refers to different practices. It includes the establishment of indicators, which disaggregate policy goals in quantitative objectives. Based on their scores on such an indicator, states may then be ranked and classified as pioneers or laggards. Under conditions of measuring and ranking performance, reputation is no longer based mainly on shared understandings between state and society, and among states, but has to be ‘proven’ in technocratic processes. The development of technocratic processes to measure performance implies many decisions as to which aspects of a phenomenon will and can be measured. In policy practice, this has substantial consequences, as different states will be at an advantage or disadvantage depending on the chosen ways of measuring. It then also matters which procedures are chosen to select indicators and who has the power to decide what data have to be produced to fill them. Another method of ranking consists of selecting best practices, pilot projects and benchmarks. Best or good practices are assumed to offer the best solution to a problem and are then presented as the model to be copied. This method does not result in an absolute standard that all states have to apply in order to avoid

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 173 coercive measures in case they do not conform. Even shaming will be of limited use, as a good reputation does not necessarily presuppose the proposition of best practices, and the development of different practices does not necessarily lead to failing to solve the problem for which the ‘best practice’ was recommended. Nonetheless, there might be an interesting connection between this aspect of ranking and reputation that goes in the opposite direction: to launch a new strategy or tool, an institutional organization may decide to collect best practices, even if examples of the new strategy or tools are barely present in actual practice.3 The result to be expected if this happens is that practices proposed by states with a good reputation in the field will have more chance of being adopted than practices proposed by states that are perceived as laggards. Therefore the standard of ‘best practice’ models is neither a generalized absolute standard nor a relative one, but the specific standard of a state considered to be a pioneer (‘pioneer standard’), thus further confirming the reputation of the pioneer. We argue that the current politics of ranking, at odds with its presented ambitions of improving performance and policy learning (Trubek and Trubek 2005), works against the quality and even the transparency of policymaking, because its objectives are unidimensionally quantified and its concepts and indicators are chosen on the basis of availability of data, without any transparent democratic debate. The consequences are that concepts are stretched and bent to fit the available data. As a highly contested problem, gender equality is easily subject to such processes. As a result, the assessment of performance is of poor quality; it is unclear what kind of performance is actually measured or how performance could be improved. As the chosen indicators are not only informative about progress on gender equality, but also tell a story about the power relations among member states and between member states and the EU, this story needs to be unravelled to show the full effects of the politics of ranking.

Practices in measuring and benchmarking gender equality Gender equality is a domain in which the EU has strongly influenced national policies since the 1970s: it has developed directives that had to be transposed in national legislation; it has promoted the establishment of transnational networks; and it has financed projects on equal pay, equality and employment, and sexual violence (van der Vleuten 2007). Since the 1990s, the range of mechanisms to promote gender equality within European countries and at the EU level has been expanded from equal treatment in legislation – focused on providing equal access to the labour market – to a strategy of targeted gender equality policies, which often take the form of temporary projects for specific groups of women, and gender mainstreaming (Verloo 2001). There is also an increasing use of gender indicators and benchmarks (Luxembourg Presidency 2005). At the level of the EU, their introduction was part of the development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the European Employment Strategy (EES) and, in the field of gender equality policies, these European developments received a strong impulse through the Beijing review process, especially the Beijing +5 and the Beijing +10

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reviews in 2000 and 2005 (Rubery 2003). Last but not least, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently presented a new index (Gender, Institutions and Development, GID) that combines attention to both economic development and institutions. This index is relevant for European countries too, and includes some innovative features. Gender equality in the OMC and EES The OMC and EES processes have given member states new opportunities to represent their performance in the field of gender equality, and hence also their reputation. Gender equality has become embedded as a key component of the EES (European Council 1997, 2000). In its ambition ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, the European Council (2000: 2) has integrated gender equality in the guidelines by which member state progress on economic policy is to be assessed at the EU level. Interestingly, an important impulse to the inclusion of gender equality in the EES has been given by a country that does not exactly have a strong reputation in this field. According to Rubery: the Austrian ministers for women and for labour in post during the 1998 Austrian presidency, both of them women ministers, had their sights set on promoting equal opportunities further within the EES. To that end they organised an informal joint council of ministers for labour and gender equality, commissioned an extensive report and used this momentum to push for the successful inclusion of the commitment to gender mainstreaming in the EES guidelines at the December summit. (Rubery 2003: 3) For the assessment of progress in realizing the Lisbon ambitions, a new method of policy development, the open method of coordination (OMC), has been put in place. The OMC is a semi-voluntary form of co-ordination (Scott and Trubek 2002). It contrasts with the ‘old’ Community method in that it relies on a mix of ‘soft law mechanisms’ such as peer review, best practices and monitoring. Targets for member states are set at the meetings of the Spring European Council (using structural indicators, overseen by Eurostat). The Council organizes the annual monitoring of progress towards these targets through peer review, and the European Commission issues recommendations to individual member states. While the European Council sets the targets, each member state can develop its own strategy to reach the targets, paying attention to its national specificities. To promote mutual learning, a process of identification and exchange of best practices is organized between the member states, and guidelines based on these best practices are then incorporated in the National Action Plans. The implementation of the guidelines is monitored in the Joint Employment Report (JER), and leads to a renewed identification of best practices and to a new start of the OMC cycle (Biagi 2000). As part of their

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 175 mutual learning strategy, the OMC and EES processes aim to foster mutual learning and the generation and diffusion of new ideas and practices across Europe. This postulates the member states as a collective that is eager to learn and committed to finding the ‘best’ solutions to any of the challenges ahead. While this postulation can be questioned on the basis of past performance of states in implementing gender equality directives (van der Vleuten 2007), and there are fierce debates as to whether or not the OMC is delivering on its promises (Héritier 2003; Trubek and Trubek 2005), it is possible to draw some basic conclusions from the decade-long existence of this method for the field of gender equality. For gender equality, the most important commitments made by the European Council are those concerning the narrowing of the gender gaps in employment (by increasing women’s employment rate to 57% by 2005 and to 60% by 2010) and unemployment (European Council 2000), as well as the provision of childcare for at least 90% of children between 3 years and school age and at least 33% of children under 3 (European Council 2002), and the narrowing of the gender and pay gap (European Council 2003). A basic result of the OMC and EES processes is that there is an ongoing production of rankings of the member states on employment and employment-related issues. The targets, however, only have ‘a general orientation function’ (Héritier 2003: 118), and member states are pressured but not compelled to meet them. The peer review as well as the evaluation and recommendations by the European Commission constitute a monitoring mechanism without sanctions, other than ‘naming and shaming’ through publication of the performance schedules. For an underperforming state, the reputational costs of the OMC and EES processes therefore remain limited compared with the costs occasioned by the enforcement system linked to legal instruments. Another result is the production of best practices in the field. Member states are ‘encouraged to benchmark their performance against the best performer in the Union’ (Héritier 2003: 117). This implies that one of the national solutions is considered the best one, without questioning all practices and investigating which practice suits which national context best. National institutions are not called into question in the same way in which legal instruments could oblige a state to revise its central concepts or practices: the way in which, for instance, the equality directives required the Dutch and British governments to fundamentally revise their breadwinner-centred systems of pay and social security in spite of their arguments that this system served women’s needs well enough (van der Vleuten 2007). In addition to the information given by member states, the European Commission uses expertise from networks of gender experts to assist in its assessment of member state progress in this area. They are another source of best practice ‘labelling’, creating ‘pioneers’ in the process of doing so. In their review of all the performed pan-European gender impact assessments (GIA), Rubery and Fagan (2000) position the Netherlands as an early starter on GIA, together with the Nordic countries except Denmark. They then incorporate the Dutch conceptual framework for GIA as an academic model for what they recommend as a required further conceptual and practical elaboration of the GIA methodology (Rubery and Fagan 2000: 5). In practice, however, the Dutch GIA methodology has proven to be difficult to

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export because it is tailored to the Dutch context (Roggeband and Verloo 2006). This shows that best practices have no value if they are not contextualized. The Beijing review process Another important impulse to the development of measuring and benchmarking gender equality was given by the follow-up to the 1995 Beijing United Nations (UN) conference. Under the leadership of the UN, the Beijing Conference in 1995 resulted in a Platform for Action to bring about gender equality in the world, which has been adopted by all EU countries. At two points in time, in 2000 and in 2005, the UN took further action to monitor the progress made. On each occasion, governments were asked to report on their actions to implement the Platform for Action in the twelve critical areas of concern.4 In 2000, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution acknowledging: that various aspects of women’s life in the EU have improved since 1995, whilst deploring the lack of agreed indicators, gender-segregated data, benchmarks and a clear timetable in the Platform for Action, this being a major obstacle to proper evaluation of progress made over the last five years [and urging] the participants at the New York Conference on Beijing +5 to establish indicators, benchmarks and a precise time schedule. (European Parliament 2001: 260) This resolution clearly shows the importance of the Beijing review process for the development of pressure towards measurable output of gender equality policies at the European level. In recent years, the European Council has presented itself as playing a leading role in the development of indicators to operationalize the specific gender equality objectives (Luxembourg Presidency 2005). In 1998, the Council committed the EU to the development of a simple suite of indicators to monitor progress on all twelve critical areas of the UN Platform for Action. Although the set of indicators is still not complete, there have since been a number of proposals by a series of EU Presidencies: Finland 1999, women in power and decision-making; France 2000, reconciliation of family and working life; Belgium 2001, gender pay gap; Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, 2002–4, violence against women. In addition, as described earlier, some indicators related to employment have been agreed on by Councils as part of the EES. The EU now has indicators in five of the twelve critical areas: women and the economy (gender gaps in employment, unemployment and pay; provision of care for children and other dependents); women in power and decision-making (percentage of women among elected positions, ministerial positions, executive boards of top companies and boards of central banks); women and poverty (percentage of women among those ‘at-risk-of-poverty’); women and education (educational attainment, life-long learning, science and technology graduates); and violence against women (domestic violence: number of female victims, types of victim support, measures to end violence, sexual harassment at work).

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 177 In the period after 1995, progress reports on these issues have been prepared by the European Commission for the annual reviews of different critical areas of the Platform for Action by the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). Recent innovation: the OECD GID index and database The new OECD index on Gender, Institutions and Development (GID) includes variables on the economic development of countries, the economic role of women, the access of women and men to resources in health and education, as well as a set of variables on social institutions that are seen as crucial for gender equality (Jütting et al. 2006). The variables on social institutions are about family code (early marriage, repudiation practices, parental authority and inheritance practices), physical integrity (female genital mutilation, legislation on violence against women), civil liberties (percentage of women in parliament and among ministers, women’s freedom to leave the house, requirement to wear the veil in public) and ownership rights (access to bank loans, landownership and right to own non-land property). Most of the social institutions included in GID deal with legal arrangements, except for the indices on early marriage and female genital mutilation. This bias has been criticized because it suggests that mainly formal institutions matter in restricting the position of women (Van Staveren 2008). One could also question the choices made, as the chosen indicators seem biased against Islamic countries (‘requirement to wear the veil in public’ as an indicator of civil liberties), where they could just as well have chosen an indicator of social safety in public spaces that would have shown more negative results for Western countries. Including an indicator on repudiation practices rather than on the possibilities and conditions for divorce seems biased in a similar way. Countries are positioned very differently on the GID rankings than on the UN’s GDI and gender empowerment measure (GEM) rankings. Most notably, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany are in second or shared third position on the GID index, as opposed to a sixteenth and seventeenth position for the UK and Ireland on GEM and a twenty-first position for Germany on GDI. Iceland and Finland, on the contrary, although high-ranking on the UN indices, fall down to a shared thirty-sixth position on the GID. In the top ten of the GID, Korea is the surprise, ranking eighth. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse which indicators of the index privilege which country. To some extent, the OECD anticipates and facilitates debate over its index, by designing a new portal, Wikigender, which they hope will be instrumental in reaching out to the public and fostering a bottom-up dialogue on the importance of gender equality. The website aims to provide: an open forum to share and exchange information on the situation of women and [encourage] a frank discussion on the elements that prevent women’s social and economic empowerment. It welcomes an active participation of users who can contribute to the content of the website by posting comments, editing articles or creating new entries into this knowledge database. (Drechsler and Jütting 2008: 8)

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As the portal has only opened recently, it is too early to assess whether these ambitions will materialize.

The discursive politics of performance Having traced the development of new policy methods in the field of gender equality, what are the assets and drawbacks in the discursive politics of performance? The usual defence of the necessity of measuring gender equality and of developing gender equality indicators and the data to support them – whether done by policymakers or by academics – is that they are necessary to know whether gender equality policies are effective (Plantenga et al. 2003; Luxembourg Presidency 2005). It is no surprise then that there are complaints about the lack of indicators across Europe and about the lack of data to support the indicators (Luxembourg Presidency 2005). This chapter has set out to contend that the increasing use of gender indicators and benchmarks resulting from the EES and Beijing review processes presents a number of serious problems, even while it no doubt also contributes to a higher visibility of gender equality and potentially supports progress towards gender equality. These problems result from power processes in the construction or use of indicators, and lead to discursive dynamics. It is to these dynamics that the next section turns, discussing the shift to relative standards, the selection bias in the development of targets, benchmarks and indicators and the technocratization of performance measures. The shift to relative standards In spite of Europeanization and globalization, differences between states persist, so the annual reports show. The presentation of states’ performances on the chosen indicators seems to ‘prove’ which states are doing well and which states are underperforming. However, the ranking that results from these indicators is clearly problematic. The EES’ absolute targets are not de facto targets for everyone, as some member states are outperformers on these targets from the start. The indicators are used for relative ranking of member states, and the ‘EU average’ is presented as an important benchmark for member states. Mosesdottir argues that: the emphasis made by the EES of ranking countries according to their performance on narrowly defined targets like, for example, the female employment rate, runs the risk of making those countries that out-perform the others the unachievable standard for member countries falling behind. Economic, political and social contexts cannot be copied overnight. Moreover, those nations performing well tend to focus more on their relative position than on their distance from the EU’s employment and gender objectives. (Mosesdottir et al. 2006: 53) The shift from legal instruments to scoreboards and benchmarks also favours states with a policy-oriented style. Thanks to its pilot projects and corresponding rhetoric, a state such as the Netherlands will more easily be considered a pioneer

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 179 than a state such as Austria, with its legalistic governance style and less catchy projects, even though pilot projects do not necessarily result in better de facto performance than legal instruments. If analysed more closely, pioneers may therefore disappoint and laggards surprise; as described above, it was not gender champion Sweden but laggard Austria that took the initiative to include gender equality in the EES in 1998 to begin with. The shift from ‘absolute’ to ‘relative’ standards means that there is no authoritative third party for the interpretation and enforcement of a standard that is equal for all; in its place, we find a power-driven process in which targets and standards are chosen as a function of existing national practices. ‘Relative’ monitoring (through peer review) replaces ‘absolute’ monitoring. There is no sanctioning mechanism apart from ‘naming and shaming’. Reputational costs therefore remain more limited. In addition, the third parties (the European Commission and ECJ) have an interest in assuring compliance with EU (gender equality) legislation in order to keep up their reputation as guardians of the Treaties, whereas member states in a peer review process have an interest in keeping up their ‘joint’ reputation and showing their commitment to gender equality, not in blaming each other. The politics of ranking therefore reduces the reputational costs of poor performance compared with those of the old politics of reputation. Politics of ranking thus allows pioneers to do window-dressing instead of assuring real implementation, whereas some so-called laggards can actually be performing really well if we focus on their de facto performance. Ranking distorts the value of performance and is therefore problematic as an instrument for the improvement of performance, as both pioneers and laggards lack an incentive to do better. What gets stretched in these dynamics is the meaning of quality, and changing the meaning of quality from an absolute to a relative understanding also changes the meaning of gender equality to something that is achieved if other countries do worse. This again means shrinking gender equality to less than what an absolute standard would amount to, which is especially problematic for the European countries who do very well in most rankings. Nevertheless, relative standards can also offer new discursive opportunities. Recently, a very low ranking of Cyprus by the US State Department was used by a feminist non-governmental organization (NGO) to expresses its alarm and concern towards the Cyprus government in relation to combating trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation (MIGS 2008). In using the discursive opportunities that rankings offer, NGOs can ‘pinch’ their governments and successfully pressure them to action (van der Vleuten 2005). Selection bias in the development of targets, benchmarks and indicators After the presentation of the OECD GID database, some striking differences in ranking positions across indices have already been presented and discussed. A feasibility study for an EU gender equality index commissioned by the European Commission shows in more detail how various indices can produce very different rankings (Plantenga et al. 2003). One index showing the equal opportunity

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indicators would put the usual laggards Portugal and Belgium ahead of gender pioneers Denmark and Sweden, and would even put the often high-ranking Finland at position 9 (EU 15). The other index, based on a different set of equal opportunity indicators, presents a ranking that fits the classical expectations of ‘good’ gender equality states, listing Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the top three (Plantenga et al. 2003). Their comparison also shows that a different way of measuring the gender gap in participation, using a headcount basis instead of a full-time equivalent, would lower the position of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the overall ranking (Plantenga et al. 2003: 47). The point here is not to argue about the respective quality of indices and indicators, although it is obvious that such questioning is useful and necessary, but to accentuate the fact that the choice of one or the other has substantial implications for the ranking and, consequently, for the reputation of states. This points to the problem of the indicators’ implicit and explicit selection. The problem of selection bias is connected to the different ways in which states frame gender inequality as a policy problem and define gender equality as a goal. Consequently, some domains of gender equality that are close to mainstream fields of policymaking are emphasized over others in the construction of indicators. One can observe that there are more indicators about the public sector than about the private domain (EES), that inclusion will be more readily measured than structural progress and, in view of the absence of intersectionality in gender equality policies altogether (see Lombardo and Verloo in this volume), one can expect indicators to be based on the unitary category of women. Overall, it seems that indices rarely include indicators on sexuality, reproductive rights and relationships, with the exception of the GID index. Moreover, the accent on formal equality or on formal institutions can hide inequality in practice. Additionally, we can observe an absence of complex models integrating the indicators in the different fields, which obscures the complex interrelationships between gender inequalities in citizenship, knowledge, labour and intimacy. A further difficulty related to benchmarks, targets and indicators is that they are inherently normative, and that most actors are well aware of this in their actions, even if they play it down for the sake of strategy. This triggers ‘reactivity’, the phenomenon of actors strategically playing into indicators to raise their scores, regardless of whether they actually perform well (Ahmed 2007; Espeland and Sauder 2007). This phenomenon has yet to receive adequate attention. Academic debates on the content of indices are rare, as are crossovers between academia and policymaking institutions (but see Plantenga et al. 2003; Walby 2005). In academia, large-scale comparisons would be needed for such assessments, and there is a lack of funding for such research. Democratic debates and academic studies on the political dynamics of ranking are even more scarce (with the notable exceptions of Ahmed 2007; Espeland and Sauder 2007). Experiences with evaluation or monitoring independent from state actors are also still exceptional. The discursive dynamic not only influences the rankings that result from it. It also influences the politics of reputation. In 1997, a Protection Against Violence Bill entered into force in Austria. This is a law on domestic violence that is based

Politics of ranking and benchmarking 181 on an innovative model of conceptualizing state intervention in this field (Logar 2005). Six years later, after several other countries had adopted (parts of) what has come to be called the Austrian model, the Netherlands – an alleged pioneer – introduced a similar law after long studies and extensive debates. This example shows that what is seen as a laggard country can be the origin of much needed innovation. However, it has not changed Austria’s reputation as a laggard in gender equality policies. This could be connected to the fact that there are no targets, benchmarks or indicators on gender violence in the EES.5 After all, what is not measured does not count. Similarly, other inequalities intersecting gender also do not count at this moment, and the framing of gender in indicators is often based on the unitary category of women. Attention to intersectionality in current indicators would actually challenge the Scandinavian countries’ great reputation for their woman-friendly policies and for their egalitarianism, as becomes clear in a special issue on gender and multiculturalism (Williams 2008) that severely criticizes these countries for their reinforcement of the otherness of non-Scandinavian cultures and their stereotypical views of minority women. Currently, however, in the absence of intersectional indicators, the reputation of the Scandinavian countries goes unchallenged. Understanding quality of performance as a technical matter Problems with indicators are often understood as a matter of lack of expertise in a technical sense (Luxembourg Presidency 2005). Some of them are seen to be connected to a need for adequate and comparable data. This lack of data is not only a practical or technical problem, but also a political one. Serious problems can arise when data need to be collected to ‘fill’ the indicators; it does indeed take several years before substantial indicators can be available and, although comprehensive monitoring is possible, this is mostly still subject to the decision-making power of the different actors involved. The lack of gender mainstreaming at the level of official statistical institutions is a barrier, as well as the confusion about who exactly has the power to start implementation of agreed-upon indicators in the EU: the Parliament, the Council, the European Commission, Eurostat or the member states. Rubery (2003), while also representing the problem to be of a rather technical nature, gives two examples that show the political character of the use of benchmarks in the Joint Employment Reports (which provide the official review of national progress made towards achieving stated objectives). In one case, she notes, Greece was commended for closing the gender employment gap, but no reference was made to the fact that this was only achieved through a fall in the male employment rate. Similarly, changes in the segregation index were used to indicate progress in desegregating labour markets, without these changes being decomposed into effects related to structure change and labour force change or to changes in the gender shares within occupational categories. She rightly concludes that there is evidence of the misinterpretation of misleading indicators, but does not analyse this in terms of political processes and power. In this, she downplays these political processes and presents them as so-called technical ones.

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As a result, seemingly depoliticized facts and figures, as translated in a position on the scoreboard, ‘prove’ the quality of performance, and negotiations on the quality of performance between the European Commission, Council and Parliament, or between governments, the European Commission and the ECJ, are becoming rarer. We have also noticed that states with good reputations are able to strongly influence the design of further indicators in their areas of ‘excellence’. By being asked to send national experts to contribute to indicator design, they at least ensure that their national practice is optimally ‘known’, further strengthening their reputation. Hence, the choice of indicators is always a political decision, which therefore necessitates transparency as to who decides and to the involvement of political actors who can be held accountable for these decisions. Ranking is not merely a technical process but essentially a political process, which should be transparent and subject to democratic control. It would be interesting to reconstruct the decision-making process on the existing EU indicators to see to what extent not only the availability of data (a partly technical matter) but also the preferences of states have played a role in the choices that were made.

Conclusion: The perverse politics of performance and ranking? Here, we set out to discuss the consequences of shifts in policy instruments for the ‘politics of reputation’. We have explored the power-based configuration of performance, ranking and reputation that was created by these shifts, as well as their perverse effects on performance. In spite of the aim of improving performance through ranking’s potential consequences for reputations, the politics of ranking may therefore hinder the improvement in the quality of performance in terms of attaining policy goals and increasing the transparency and legitimacy of the political process. We contend that the politics of ranking has perverse effects on the link between performance and reputation. We have found specific stretching and bending processes in the construction and the use of benchmarks, indicators and rankings. The meaning of quality is stretched in a way that makes it relative. Most of all, the representation of these instruments as purely technical hinders democratic deliberation and struggle. It would be preferable to think of indicators, rankings and benchmarking as moments in processes of struggle (for the antagonistically inclined) or of learning (for the deliberatively inclined). This would highlight the discursive opportunities that these instruments can offer, and make the indices work as instruments for reflexivity as well. Indicators need to be continuously improved and developed in transparent democratic procedures, and independent actors are needed to interpret the results of the benchmarks, targets and indicators. More academic research parallel to, and critical of, these indices would also be beneficial. The OECD webportal can be seen as a good practice here (pun intended), because of its ambition to facilitate an open debate. While power will also be a factor in such debates, it at least acknowledges the highly contested, political nature of benchmarks, indicators and rankings.

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Notes 1 Think of the gender-related development index and the gender empowerment measure (UN Development Program); the gender equity index (Social Watch); the global gender gap measure (World Economic Forum); the social institutions and gender index (OECD). 2 The EU R&D Scoreboard, the State Aid Scoreboard, the European Innovation Scoreboard and the Internal Market Scoreboard are but a few examples. 3 The Group of Specialists on mainstreaming of the Council of Europe set out to ‘carry out a survey of measures taken and implemented for the mainstreaming of the gender perspective into general policies’ in 1996, just after the launch of this strategy (see Appendix B, Group of Specialists 1998: 80). 4 Women and poverty; Education and training of women; Women and health; Violence against women; Women and armed conflict; Women and the economy; Women in power and decision-making; Institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women; Human rights of women; Women and the media; Women and the environment; The girl-child. 5 The GID index ranks Austria third on violence against women legislation.

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Politics of ranking and benchmarking 185 Scott, J. and Trubek, D.M. (2002) ‘Mind the gap: Law and new approaches to governance in the European Union’, European Law Journal, 8: 1–18. Tallberg, J. (2002) ‘Paths to compliance. Enforcement, management and the European Union’, International Organization, 56: 609–43. Trubek, D. and Trubek, L. (2005) ‘Hard and soft law in the construction of social Europe: The open method of coordination’, European Law Journal, 11: 343–64. van der Vleuten, A. (2007) The price of gender equality. Member states and governance in the European Union, Ashgate: Aldershot. ——(2005) ‘Pincers and prestige: Explaining the implementation of EU gender equality legislation’, Comparative European Politics, 3: 464–88. Van Staveren, I. (2008) ‘Gendered institutions. Why women’s access to resources does not always translate into empowerment’, paper presented at NICE seminar series, Department of Economics, Radboud University, Nijmegen, February 2008. Verloo, M. (2001) Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation, IWM Working Paper 5/2001, Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Walby, S. (2005) ‘Measuring women’s progress in a global era’, International Social Science Journal, 57: 371–86. Williams, F. (2008) ‘Introduction: The challenge of gender and multiculturalism: Re-examining equality policies in Scandinavia and the European Union’, Social Politics, 15: 1–4.

12 Conclusions A critical understanding of the discursive politics of gender equality Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo Introduction The main aim of this book is to understand the dynamics of discursive politics and to reflect on the potential and limitations of framing processes for the promotion of gender equality. This concluding chapter draws up the implications of the analysis carried out throughout the book for the theoretical and political understanding of gender equality. In particular, it explores the consequences of our analysis, first for the concept of gender equality, second for the possibilities of feminist knowledge production, third for an understanding of discursive politics, and finally, for the analysis and practice of policymaking. In relation to gender equality, our starting point is that gender equality policies are social constructions in which issues of gender inequality and equality get their meaning through framing processes articulated by different actors. The contributions in this book identify a variety of discursive processes that shape the meaning of gender equality in different directions, shrinking the concept of gender equality, temporarily fixing a particular interpretation of it, stretching it to include new dimensions or elements or bending it to goals other than gender equality. These processes of framing may contain biases that are interpreted as negatively affecting gender equality by, for instance, depoliticizing and degendering the concept. However, these biases can also productively contribute to the further development of gender equality policies, or open new cycles of contestation. As well as theorizing what happens in discursive politics, we will explore to what extent these discursive processes and their implications are issue related, i.e. related to gender equality, and to what extent they are arena related, i.e. typical of specific national, international or local policymaking levels. The variety of discursive processes discussed in this volume and the ways in which authors interpret such processes and their consequences make us aware of the impact of hegemonic discourses on the production of feminist knowledge, and of the importance of developing counterstrategies. We consider it necessary not only to discuss the intentional or unintentional biases that gender equality policies contain because policymakers and activists are entrapped by their own frames, but also to realize how feminist researchers’ approaches to gender equality policies can get stuck in hegemonic discourses on gender equality, creating a different

Critical discursive politics 187 kind of trap. This has consequences for feminist knowledge production as well. In the preceding chapters, hegemonic discourses appear to influence our normative assumptions as feminist authors by leading us to place more attention on the negative consequences of discursive politics than the positive ones. Several authors in this book touch upon this subject and offer possible ways out, often referring to a need for reflexivity. Most importantly, in this chapter, we will provide new elements for understanding discursive politics. Discursive approaches challenge the very possibility of intentionally ‘fixing’ the meaning of gender equality, as any meaning is necessarily limited and biased by one’s own positioning. Without denying the existence of feminist knowledge developed so far, we discuss how our knowledge may be partial and unfinished based on our positioning. In this light, we explore the possibilities for feminists to produce knowledge on gender equality and to act on the basis of this knowledge. Yet, this does not necessarily delegitimize our normative fixing of the meaning of gender equality in a particular moment and context; it rather shows our intervention in a broader, continuously changing picture. The other element that we need to take into account here is the different material power base of each of the actors involved. We not only argue that a more ‘reflexive’ approach to discursive politics would be empowering in the sense of contributing towards feminist change, but also that a more ‘critical’ understanding of discursive politics that includes attention to the material world would benefit discursive politics analyses. A critical approach could help put our interpretative bias in a broader perspective and illuminate both the enabling and the constraining dimensions of discourses. Finally, we explore the consequences of a discursive politics approach for the analysis and practice of policymaking. We analyse four aspects of our understanding of discursive politics that can affect policymaking: the influence on policy design of reflexivity or awareness of one’s own bias; the tension between technical and political instruments; the dynamic and evolutionary character of the policymaking process; and the empowerment and creation of alliances between different political actors. Related to these four aspects is the ongoing relevance of material power bases. We argue that practices that promote awareness of one’s own and other people’s biases can have fruitful consequences for the analysis, formulation and evaluation of public policies. These practices not only help policy analysts and policymakers to moderate the impact of discursive pitfalls when analysing, developing and implementing gender equality policies, they also offer us the chance to see the partiality inherent in each knowledge positioning, and thus the importance of debates and alliances with others.

Varieties of stretching and bending processes: Implications for gender equality In the Introduction to this volume, we argued that the travelling of the concept of gender equality across time and space leaves its traces in terms of the meanings that are attributed to it through discursive processes of stretching, shrinking, bending and fixing. While adapting to the vocabulary developed in Chapter 1,

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the chapters in this volume provided slightly different interpretations of how the concept of gender equality is shaped in its process of adaptation to, and dialogue with, the surrounding context. What variety of stretching, shrinking, fixing and bending processes did we find? And what implications do these processes have for gender equality? Different examples of shrinking emerge from the arguments developed by the contributors to this volume. Shrinking is used to refer to cases in which a broader political scope of a concept is restricted to more limited meanings. This appears in Ferree’s discussion of the US civil rights movement, where ‘equal rights’ claims were progressively ‘shrunk’ to only imply the most formal legal rights, separated from the concept of ‘social justice’, and instead tied to the idea of ‘diversity’, which was ‘shrunk’ once more to mean that no ‘special rights’ could be considered. Shrinking does not necessarily happen over time; it can also be present in the earliest stages of developing a policy issue. This is the case in the European Union (EU) trade policy discussed by True. Gender equality is associated with ‘non-trade’ and ‘trade and social’ issues, and thus assigned a more marginal status with respect to the ‘core’ policy issue of trade. Shrinking the concept of gender equality also occurs when, in relation to a particular problem, only a limited number of frames is adopted almost automatically, as if there was not a broader pool of meanings to choose from. In this case, shrinking seems to be the result of assumptions that are taken for granted in the context of other dominant discourses. This becomes clear in Lombardo and Meier’s discussion of Dutch and Spanish gender equality policy texts that relate a particular problem of gender inequality – without further questioning – to a specific set of solutions. A specific configuration of problems and solutions, then, fixes a particular meaning of gender equality for some time. Examples of this process can also be found in Rönnblom’s account of the treatment of gender equality in Swedish regional policies, where gender equality is shrunk to mean ‘only women’, rather than the relation between women and men, or where gender equality is mainly associated with the issue of ‘women in political representation’. These shrinking processes are related to the fixing of concepts. It is inevitable that policy actors need to fix the meanings of concepts in order to be able to discuss them and take action. However, fixing labels, such as ‘gender inequality is a women’s problem’ or ‘domestic violence is an ethnic minority problem’, can stereotype specific ethnic groups in the latter case, and slow down the achievement of gender equality by not questioning privileged groups such as men in the first. Fixing shrunk concepts, however, does not necessarily have unidirectional consequences. Fixing a meaning of gender equality does not necessarily involve freezing it; it can also open discursive windows of opportunity for subjects to act, by implementing the fixed meaning. It can also be the starting point for actors to challenge another fixed meaning that is perceived as more limited, or indeed unjust. It can initiate processes of contestation that may result in a wider interpretation of a concept that is more inclusive of actors who were previously excluded, or that better reflects the complexity of gender inequality. For discursive opportunities to happen, some conditions need to be present. Verloo and van der Vleuten offer an

Critical discursive politics 189 example of what could be called ‘double’ shrinking, where a first round of shrinking reduces and fixes the meaning of gender equality for use in indicators, and a second round of shrinking occurs through the representation of such measures as technical, dulling its political edge. The possibility of both positive and negative outcomes of ‘fixing’ begs the question of when to expect which outcome. The meaning of a particular concept can also be stretched to include new groups and new elements, creating new ‘webs of meaning’, as Ferree argues in her chapter. In this interpretation, stretching the meaning of a concept to encompass a new dimension changes both the meaning of the concept that is stretched and the newly incorporated dimension. In one of Ferree’s examples, the feminist claim ‘women’s rights are human rights’ stretches ‘the concepts of both “human” and “rights” to mean something different than they did before, not just to extend their stably existing meanings to a “new” group, women’ (Ferree in this volume: p. 92). Similarly, in her argument on intersectionality, stretching the concept of class to include race and gender has implications for the meaning of all three concepts, not only for the initial stretched concept. This means that, in the framing of intersectionality, the understandings of both gender equality and other inequalities are mutually stretched as they encounter each other, as they all come with backgrounds of pre-existing meanings shaped within particular historical contexts. Similar to what we described in the case of fixing, processes of stretching may also move in different directions. The analysis of Lombardo and Verloo shows that stretching gender equality to other inequalities can not only be an inclusive process in which different equality struggles strengthen each others’ work against all inequalities, it can also be an exclusive process, in which different equality struggles develop defensive attitudes to new groups and dimensions to protect themselves from the supposedly negative consequences of this stretching. Again, the possibility of both positive (previously unrelated concepts are stretched to include elements of gender equality; gender equality is developed more intersectionally) and negative (gender equality is blurred or watered down) outcomes of ‘stretching’ begs the question of when to expect which outcome. A particular form of stretching occurs when relative standards are used as opposed to absolute standards, for instance in benchmarking. Verloo and van der Vleuten (in this volume: p. 179) show that ‘[W]hat gets stretched in these dynamics is the meaning of quality, and changing the meaning of quality from an absolute to a relative understanding also changes the meaning of gender equality to something that is achieved if other countries do worse’. This appeal for fixing the meaning of quality in standards resonates with Walby, who warns of relativism and an understanding of the multiplicity of meanings of gender equality that is linked only to location. While all discursive processes that shrink and stretch the meaning of gender equality leave their traces in the contents of the concept of gender equality, it seems that the authors in this book find that processes in which gender equality is bent towards some other goal have particularly critical consequences. Bending can happen when the concept of gender travels across other policy areas than gender equality. Through this mainstreaming process, its meaning then becomes something else than gender equality. Also, the distance between shrinking and bending

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seems to be small. We can find examples of the bending of gender equality goals towards that of economic growth in Swedish regional policy, as discussed in Rönnblom’s chapter, and towards EU trade policy goals, as tackled in True’s chapter. In both cases, the main goal of the policies does not appear to be gender equality in itself, but rather a dominant discourse of economic growth that refers to gender but only includes it in a shrunken version. Bending processes, however, can also happen within gender equality policies. In this case, as Jalušiþ argues, the paradox is that policies that are supposedly designed to achieve gender equality, such as reconciliation policies, do not articulate their targeted problems in terms of gender inequality. Rather, reconciliation (for women) is framed as a means of solving supply problems in the labour market and demographic problems caused by the decreasing birth rate, thus bending the meaning of gender to other policy priorities such as a more efficient labour market. In this case, we do not know whether this bending is the result of intentional strategic framing, or if it is due to the power of hegemonic economic discourses. Why are discursive processes that bend the meaning of gender equality to some other goal so critically assessed by the authors? A common finding is that processes of bending gender equality to some other goal depoliticize the issue of gender equality. This means, in Jalušiþ’s words, that: ‘Gender inequality does not figure as a clearly defined political issue that requires comprehensive understanding of the problem and political responsibility, systematic efforts, and respective institutions to be set right’ (in this volume: p. 59). But what gets lost in depoliticization? One key element that is neutralized is the ‘dimension of conflict’ that, as Rönnblom argues, is relevant because it highlights power dynamics. In her words: ‘To politicize a question is to acknowledge existent power relations in society and thus create opportunities for change’ (Rönnblom in this volume: p. 108). Depoliticizing an issue tends to obscure its conflictual relations, its hierarchy of power, which could otherwise have opened up possibilities for challenging that hierarchy. When the normative group of men is not even mentioned as part of the solution or the problem of gender inequality, the unequal power relations between women and men are left unquestioned, and this may block opportunities for change (see Lombardo and Meier). Similarly, when discourses, such as economic growth, are represented as unquestioned, overarching political goals, they limit actors’ possibilities of contesting them and of unveiling the power dynamics that are embedded (but silenced) in the process (see Rönnblom’s chapter), hindering political transformation. Depoliticization in gender equality, the specific case under consideration in this volume, is also expressed with the idea of de-gendering. This refers – as Jalušiþ (in this volume: p. 60) states – to how ‘issues that were quite promisingly politicized and consciously gendered soon after became de-gendered (the gender dimension was reduced, neutralized or abolished)’. The policy issue of domestic violence is mentioned as a good example of processes of gendering and de-gendering. The fact that domestic violence is considered as a public policy matter is evidence of the gendering of the issue and represents a success of the long-term feminist efforts for politicizing the sphere of personal and private relations. However, the issue has also suffered from

Critical discursive politics 191 processes of de-gendering, when new policy frames appear in which victims and perpetrators are described in gender-less terms, and power mechanisms get blurred. In sum, one finding that the different contributions share is that politicizing the concept of gender equality is crucial in order to be able to challenge power dynamics. In discovering this variety of discursive processes of stretching, bending, fixing and shrinking, one might ask: to what extent is this issue-related, to what extent are these processes typical (or untypical) of gender equality? While the question is not directly dealt with in the different chapters, it is apparent that gender equality is particularly ‘vulnerable’ to processes shaping its meaning, as it is also particularly vulnerable to depoliticization processes (see Rönnblom). One hypothesis is that, as a differentiating concept, gender is pervasive and omnipresent, which creates an inherent tension with equality, a term that is often understood as eliminating diversity. However, frame analysis studies of different policy issues (e.g. Tryandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998) show that many concepts are equally subject to discursive processes that stretch and bend meanings in different directions. In this sense, this is not necessarily typical of gender equality alone, but of all policies where matters of power and privileges are involved. Power games that depoliticize the issue can also be in effect in policies concerning agricultural, environmental or immigration issues. It seems that, particularly in cases where resources and rights need to be divided among actors who are unequally situated in terms of power, concepts are vulnerable to stretching, shrinking or bending towards other policy priorities because of the influence of dominant discourses and powerful actors. Related to the issue-specificity of stretching and bending processes for gender equality is the question to what extent this is also specific to one particular arena. Are discursive processes more typical of national, international/supranational or local arenas?1 Some contributions in this volume focus more on the role of international/supranational actors such as the EU, and we could argue that it is no accident that concepts are especially stretched and bent in supranational/international politics. This is not only because this level of politics has to accommodate cultural and institutional differences, but also because policy arenas there are less fixed and institutionalized, and thus enable new concepts and actors to enter the arena more easily than in highly institutionalized national contexts. Moreover, as Bustelo and Verloo point out, international and supranational actors (UN, EU, ILO) have greatly contributed to making gender equality a policy problem. The international and supranational levels have had an important influence on the shaping of the issue at the national level because of the need to comply with international/EU legal commitments or because of processes of norm diffusion from one level to another. In this interplay between different levels of governance, meanings are continually shaped to adjust international concepts to specific national contexts or to enable some national concept to enter the international arena. This opens up the possibility of investigating the way in which processes at one level of governance influence those at other levels. The interplay between international, national and local arenas can open up possibilities for change, but it can also entail risks for policies that aim at transforming the status quo, as in the case of gender equality. On this subject, authors seem to

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point in opposing directions, posing questions for further research. Rönnblom, for instance, alerts us to the risks that the shift from government to governance entails in terms of depoliticization and the predominance of unquestioned discourses such as economic growth. In her view, governance has an impact on the content of politics because of its ‘looser form of governing, where a broader spectrum of actors are involved and where actors representing companies, “the market”, are given a special status’ (Rönnblom in this volume: p. 109). Thus, the shift from government to governance places economic growth as a non-questionable priority of politics at the national, international and local levels. True, on the contrary, argues that the supranational/international arenas can have positive implications for promoting gender equality agendas. The nature of the EU’s multitiered political system also offers some space for non-state actors to exploit political opportunities to gender the political debates. For instance, in spite of the elitist character of EU policymaking, the EU’s weakness in terms of its ‘democratic deficit’ pushes the EU institutions towards more civil society participation, which can create conditions for challenging the EU’s economic frames in trade policy but also those of its gender equality policies, with positive consequences for gender equality agendas. In sum, it seems that discursive processes happen at different levels, and can have both constraining and enabling effects on gender equality. We have seen that ‘fixing’ is a necessary step that can ensure progress or lead to further contestation. We have seen that the positive effects of stretching and bending are likely to be found when the other frames involved are about equality, power or conflict, and that the negative effects occur when frames hide or ignore notions of power, conflict and equality. We have also observed that, in the analyses in this book (as elsewhere), the description of negative effects dominates. Our observations make us rethink framing processes and hegemonic discourses because these are the setting within which gender equality policies are discursively constructed. What does this variety of analyses of stretching and bending processes and their consequences for gender equality tell us about framing processes and discursive politics?

Hegemonic discourses on gender equality? ‘Feminist taboos’ and reflexivity Hegemonic discourses deserve some discussion, not only because they are present, implicitly or explicitly, in all the chapters, but also because of the influence they have on the production of feminist knowledge itself. In the Introduction, we referred to ‘discourses’, or more specifically ‘hegemonic discourses’, as the setting within which frames are shaped and gender equality policies are discursively constructed. Although we will here continue to use the term ‘hegemonic discourse’, other contributors suggest more subtle definitions that could contribute to a precise analysis in specific contexts. Some contributors in this volume – such as Bacchi – prefer to use the term ‘discourses’ with a similar meaning of overarching frames that may steer the actors’ conscious shaping of an issue towards unintended directions. Others – such as Ferree – distinguish between the more static ‘master frames’, which carry a single fixed definition that highlights one

Critical discursive politics 193 element as important and gives it a more central position, and the more dynamic and relational concept of ‘discourses’, which encompass the multiple interconnections and reciprocal references that exist among ideas within particular webs of meaning. Our attention for processes of stretching and bending is driven by the understanding that it matters what meaning is given to gender equality, and that discursive processes are best analysed as political, because the logic of discursive dynamics and their outcomes is political. As the analysis of gender equality policies shows that gender equality frames are regularly caught in existing, sometimes hegemonic, webs of meaning, how then can we conceptualize feminist actors working towards change? It is highly unproductive and not necessarily true to see hegemonic discourses shaping everything and everyone, but it is also evident that a simple agency concept would not do justice to the powers of discourse. What solutions to this age-old dilemma of agency versus structure do the chapters in this book offer? Bacchi calls for reflexivity as a way to capitalize on small margins for change. Ferree also sees discursive opportunities, accentuating the enabling part of Foucauldian power. Her ideas resonate with the idea of reflexivity as a way to increase the chances of using such opportunities, as do the ideas of Lombardo and Meier. Lombardo and Verloo call for the importance of struggle and contestation, in contrast to Jalušiþ who argues in favour of ‘Mitdenken’, a specific kind of deliberation. Walby stresses the power of argument, and the power of doubt which can be harnessed to improve knowledge, and Verloo and van der Vleuten point out that classic power processes involving material power bases should be taken into account as well, as they impact and are shaped by discursive processes themselves. These debates offer a set of interesting puzzles about how argument is related to classic material power; how reflexivity can be applied; whether elites/experts or subaltern groups are more likely to be reflexive; whether deliberation or struggle would produce the best results; and why so little attention is paid to the enabling part of discursive politics as opposed to its constraining parts. The analyses in the different chapters did not only identify hegemonic discourses on other forms of equality that influenced the frames and thinking about equality. They also highlighted the presence of hegemonic discourses about the economy, the nation or the state, and their specific demographic concerns that influence the frames on gender equality. In most cases, the authors see these particular hegemonic discourses as setting the goals towards which gender equality objectives are bent. But if some discourses are so hegemonic that they shape policy frames that are articulated by policymakers, why should they not also have an impact on frames articulated by feminist researchers? As Bacchi states in her chapter (Bacchi: p. 28), ‘there is also a need to be wary of placing too much emphasis on the ability to shape useful frames (intentionally) and too little attention to the shaping impact of dominant systems of meaning on reformers themselves and their interventions’. Bacchi makes us reflect precisely on the extent to which we, as (feminist) researchers in gender and politics, can actually stand outside hegemonic discourses existing master frames. In her opinion. ‘it is important to consider where [they] come from

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and if it is indeed possible to stand outside them and manipulate them to one’s purpose’ (Bacchi in this volume: p. 19). Some of our deeper, unquestioned normative assumptions as feminist researchers come from hegemonic discourses that move us to fix particular interpretations of gender equality issues in an automatic and unreflexive way. We notice that most of the authors in this volume interpret the processes of stretching and bending gender equality similarly. For instance, many of us find that gender equality is edged out to the advantage of other frames. Or we tend to see hegemonizing frames that exclude civil society actors from the political debates. Why do we share such similar interpretations? Is this rooted in our position and knowledge as feminist researchers? Which hegemonic discourses influence our own frame analyses? Apart from some knowledge of discursive politics, the authors in this volume share knowledge of gender equality policies. The different authors in this volume explicitly position themselves as ‘feminist’ or have more or less implicit normative understandings of what gender equality is or should be. We, for instance, position ourselves as feminist researchers in the Introduction, making explicit some of our own normative assumptions about the pervasive character of gender inequality as something that is present in all domains of reality, that intersects with other inequalities, and which structural causes should be tackled through a transformative and empowering approach. Jalušiþ’s chapter refers to a feminist understanding of gender equality as being transformative. Walby makes a strong case against relativism. Ferree refers to feminist movements and the importance of creating alliances. In general, we can identify a number of recurring normative aspects concerning the understanding of gender equality in the contributions to this volume. This makes us question the normative standard of what gender equality should be. What standard do all other definitions of gender equality explicitly or implicitly relate to? What standard are they rated by? Is there a (feminist) hegemonic discourses on gender equality? Should there be one? We state that we conceive gender equality as a contested concept, but do we contest it? What are (our) deeper normative assumptions of what gender equality is? One normative undertone about gender equality that we see in the authors’ feminist discourses is the tendency to think that ‘participation of non-hegemonic’ voices in gender equality policies is the only or best way of improving the quality of gender equality policies, while ‘improving the knowledge base’ in other ways is downplayed and presented as a ‘technical’ move away from politicization (see the chapters by Verloo and van der Vleuten, Jalušiþ, or Lombardo and Meier). Could this be a sort of ‘feminist taboo’ that comes from this pool of shared meanings on gender equality, which on the one hand has its reasons for being taboo but, on the other hand, if automatically and unreflexively applied, could also block further progress in gender equality policies? Bustelo and Verloo argue that, if ‘technical’ instruments such as gender impact assessment are based on sound feminist theory and empirical knowledge, and if knowledge is built into a technical tool, then ‘technical’ approaches should not necessarily involve depoliticization.

Critical discursive politics 195 Another trap that Bacchi highlights is that elites are assumed to be the only subjects with power to shape discourses for their own interests, while the ‘common people’ are mere receptors of discourses and have no power to challenge dominant meanings. This perspective – as she argues – could have a disempowering effect on people, as it does not even enable the theorization of resistance to master frames. Ferree also addresses this space for a subject’s agency to criticize existing dominant frames, revealing the enabling and constraining character of discourses. Bacchi and Ferree, in different ways, unveil a trap that could block feminists in identifying windows of opportunity for social movement actors to intervene and shape dominant meanings themselves. Another feminist taboo that we find in the contributions to this volume is the interpretation of processes of bending and stretching in mainly negative terms, or the tendency to look for negative effects first. Again, this mental trap risks overlooking the fact that discursive processes can be enabling and productive as well, and not only constraining. In one way or another, when we analyse gender equality issues, we seem to fall into different feminist traps that make us understand the problems we analyse in terms of pre-existing feminist discourses. Here, the ways out that the authors in this book propose are very useful. Combined, they argue in favour of the importance of ‘reflexivity’ (Bacchi) or ‘the power of doubt’ (Walby) as ways for the subject to deal with discourses that speak through us independently of our intention, to be able to create and use discursive opportunities (Ferree) and to engage in contestation or in ‘Mitdenken’ (Jalušiþ, Lombardo and Verloo, Verloo and van der Vleuten, Bustelo and Verloo). Reflexivity involves the need for awareness about the feminist academic discourses that we are all part of. In the preceding chapters, we could identify at least three different proposals on how feminist researchers could apply reflexivity to discursive politics analysis in order to become more aware about what biases shape our discourses, and thus to temper the possibility of adopting taken-for-granted assumptions in our analyses. A first is Bacchi’s suggestion of drawing upon a wide variety of diverse women’s perspectives and experiences, in particular by prioritizing the perspectives and embodied experiences of often under-represented groups. Although it falls within the first feminist trap that we mentioned (the participation of non-hegemonic subjects as a quality criterion for gender policies), this suggestion, also developed by Rönnblom, has the potential to reveal the predominance of traditional gender relations and power mechanisms in policy practices, particularly if it is reflexively applied so that it does not treat participation as ‘dogma’. A second type of applied reflexivity is the approach that looks at the reciprocal historical constitution of the different inequalities that is adopted in Ferree’s discussion of how both gender equality and other forms of inequality are mutually discursively constructed as they encounter each other. This applied reflexivity can also take the form of comparison and argumentation, as Walby explains. Finally, a third type of reflexivity is stimulated by encountering different epistemological perspectives that make us become more aware of our own ‘feminist taboos’. The encounter between more constructivist perspectives (that are biased against a positivist approach) and more positivist perspectives (that are in turn

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biased against a constructivist approach) can, in spite of the difficulties in understanding each other, be productive for reflecting on the cultural assumptions of participants in the debate. For instance, in the context of this book, Walby’s contribution has forced us editors to scrutinize our own assumptions, enabling us to identify a number of ‘feminist taboos’ hidden in our positions. This has widened the interpretative levels of our findings, for example by discovering positive aspects in framing processes that, on a first analysis, only seemed to embed negative consequences for gender equality.

Towards a critical understanding of discursive politics The discussion about ‘feminist taboos’, traps and the importance of reflexivity in frame analysis can have different implications for the understanding of discursive politics. An important consequence of our analysis for discursive politics is a reflection on the process of ‘fixing’ the meaning of gender equality that explores the possibilities of feminist knowledge production in the context of the partiality of each attempt at fixing a certain meaning of gender equality. This partiality needs to be understood as a set of ongoing processes of contestation. The fact that the authors tend to be so negative about the processes of stretching, shrinking, bending and fixing shows that we, as feminist researchers, fix the meanings as either good or bad. This already means taking a stand against the emblematic postmodern position that we cannot fix anything, as everything is in flux, simultaneously good and bad. Walby’s contribution warns us that the focus on stretching and bending processes and their (un)productive consequences might easily be interpreted in a relativist way, parallel to the story-telling position. The use of this discursive approach might lead to the conclusion that, as there is no feminist knowledge transcending particular locations, it is impossible to act on this knowledge in order to promote gender equality policies. Walby instead argues that it is possible to ground feminist knowledge on the power of argument and reasoned debate. This could be one way of creating common ground for the development of gender equality policies. However, we should keep in mind that power mechanisms are also at work in the conditions that enable ‘reasoned debate’ and ‘argument’. Argument and reasoned debate are not neutral, as some structural conditions (resources, authority, time and so on) may enable particular positions to acquire more power than others. Here, Bacchi’s suggestion about the need for feminists’ ‘introspective reflection’ can help us, as feminist researchers, to stay ‘honest’ about our own assumptions by reading analyses different from our own particular perspective. A greater awareness of where we come from, and of the existing differences in material power, might help us to understand how partial and ‘unfinished’ our positioning is with respect to the fixing of a certain meaning of gender equality. Similarly, research focusing on how power mechanisms are at work in reasoned debate and argument can increase our knowledge and provide ideas for dealing with power differences. And still this research does not delegitimize our intervention in the debate and our normative assessment of gender equality processes.

Critical discursive politics 197 This leads us to argue that fixing a specific meaning is in fact inevitable, and even necessary to be able to assess the process and move forward both in theory and in practice. As Ferree (in this volume: p. 100) writes: ‘We make categories to understand the world, and do so from the standpoints that we occupy, but the point of our understanding this world of inequality and injustice is to change it’. We do not mean to argue that any definition of gender equality is valid and that we cannot assess the value of any one over another. Indeed we can, but being aware of the fluid character of the concept of gender equality and of the fact that sometimes a particular, seemingly negative, fixing of the meaning of gender equality could in fact open up opportunities for gender equality in the future. This idea of the both enabling and constraining character of fixing the meaning of gender equality is argued convincingly in Ferree’s chapter, where we see that the whisper of a butterfly’s wings in Hong Kong can set off a tornado in New York. The way in which policy actors will use or reinterpret a fixed meaning is rather unpredictable in the sense that it can have different effects from the ones expected for both the actors involved in the meaning’s elaboration and the actors who engage in challenging this meaning. In this respect, fixing the meaning of gender equality could open ‘discursive windows of opportunity’, a term extensively discussed in Ferree’s chapter and also present in Lombardo and Meier’s, Rönnblom’s and True’s chapters. Fixing the issue of gender equality in laws and other authoritative texts, as Ferree suggests, can be both constraining and enabling depending on the actors that interpret and employ a certain fixed meaning and on the context in which a meaning is put ‘on paper’. She refers to the cases of Germany and the US and how gender equality gets its meaning from the conceptions of other forms of inequality. True shows how the framing of EU trade policy has not only resulted in trade-offs for gender equality but has also created opportunities for gender advocates to contest its meaning and for the International Labour Organization (ILO) to form coalitions with the EU. The identification of constraints in the fixing of certain meanings is a starting point for contesting such meanings, as Rönnblom does when she discusses how hegemonic discourses on economic growth constrain the politicizing of gender equality in Swedish regional policy. But the presence of inconsistencies in a discourse can also create windows of opportunity for future change, as argued in Lombardo and Meier’s chapter, as they might create a space for the expression of alternative and weak frames. As Rönnblom (in this volume: p. 118) writes: ‘When thinking of politics as discursively produced there is always an opening for change’. In this respect, Ferree’s argument also suggests that fixing does not involve freezing the meanings of gender equality and other inequalities, as one might perhaps think. In the struggle for gender equality, constitutional amendments, laws and policy plans are often indeed seen as crowning achievements, whereas they are still only a moment in time or an element in a much broader process. This perception of what a constitutional amendment or law signifies might also make us reconsider the value or weight of processes of stretching, bending, fixing and shrinking: do we not see them as processes leading to an ‘end’ product or as unilateral processes? If we look at issues

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more closely or over a long time span, we might find processes that stretch a bit, bend a bit, fix a bit and shrink a bit, simultaneously or consecutively. What does all this imply for our understanding of discursive politics? The first implication is that it is necessary to briefly ‘fix’ a certain meaning of gender equality, or of a specific gender inequality problem, in order to be able to achieve something by, for instance, interpreting it, contesting it or implementing it. A second point is that fixing a meaning does not necessarily involve freezing it, or thus limiting any possibility of further change, as long as this meaning is under continuous observation and reflection. Reflexivity is needed so that feminist taboos do not automatically affect our interpretations, thus blocking out certain attributions of meaning to gender equality, imposing certain discourses or negatively assessing particular policy practices. Reflexivity is also needed to be ‘kept honest’ – as Bacchi says – about the imbalance of power between different positionings, as actors’ different access to resources and power positions affects the role they play in frame production. Reflexivity is also necessary in order to be kept aware of the ongoing, dynamic process of construction of the concept of gender equality, which may transform what, at some point and in some contexts, may appear to be a negative meaning into a good opportunity, and vice versa. The bottom line here seems to be that the issue of gender equality is constantly moving, and the main underlying question pushing the process forward is ‘what is gender equality and what should it be?’. All these suggestions lean towards what we would call a more “critical understanding of discursive politics”. By discursive politics, we mean the intentional or unintentional engaging of policy actors in conceptual disputes that result in meanings attributed to the terms and concepts employed in specific contexts (see Chapter 1). A critical understanding of discursive politics would be based on attention to power and to reflexivity in its different forms and practices. It would draw on a renewed awareness of the enabling and constraining dimensions of discourses (discursive opportunity structures) and on the awareness of power mechanisms operating at different levels for a variety of actors. The terms of struggle are set in discursive politics, and this is therefore a crucial dimension of power. Discursive politics is a key concept for anyone interested in gender transformation because of the inherent possibility of transforming gendered societies, norms, behaviours and identities. Policy actors engaging in conceptual disputes, i.e. discursive politics, do so from various positions of material and institutional power. Powerful positions increase the actors’ ability to stretch new demands into old pacified ones, bend them towards a mainstream goal or close down such disputes in a way that (intentionally or not) resonates with their interests. Powerful positions can reinforce the use of argument or facilitate the use of discursive opportunities. A lack of such power positions means that the power of argument can still be used, if it can be presented as fitting the present hegemonic webs of meaning. Reflexivity can help to overcome the depoliticizing effects of more material power. Classical power mechanisms in access to and use of resources are also at work in the conditions that enable or hinder ‘reasoned debate and argument’. In this sense, ‘technical’ instruments are always also political.

Critical discursive politics 199 Policy actors working towards change are likely to have lower positions of material and institutional power, and will thus depend more on ‘discursive power’ in order to make progress towards change. Policy actors may use ‘fixing’ as a way to nail down progress, eventually starting a further process of contestation. If a meaning is ‘fixed’ in the form of an institution, this will be harder to contest. Institutionalized ‘voice’, on the contrary, may foster further contestation to some extent. Some ways of institutionalizing voice can trigger specific groups’ territorial defence mechanisms (when they are in competition or when one receives more rights or stronger representation). Inequality in resources may prevent further contestation, and contribute to a meaning that is ‘frozen’ rather than ‘fixed’. While coming closer to the centres of power increases the chance that one may ‘fix’ a particular meaning, it decreases the chances for reflexivity as it means less distance from mainstream discourses. Hence, we need to think especially of ‘reflexivity-enhancing’ devices also in policy practice.

Implications of discursive politics analysis for policymaking The findings based on the analyses of discursive politics developed in this book have a number of implications for policymaking. Such implications are not meant as policy recommendations, but rather as suggestions for contributions that a discursive politics approach can make to the analysis of policymaking, particularly, but not exclusively, in the area of gender equality and other inequalities. These suggestions are, then, mainly targeted at analysts of public policies, although they could also benefit policymakers. At least four points were raised that may have implications for policymaking: the impact of reflexivity or awareness of subjects’ bias on policy design; the tension between technical and political instruments; the dynamic and evolutionary character of the policymaking process; and the issue of empowerment of excluded actors and creation of alliances between different political subjects. Reflexivity can have important consequences for the formulation and evaluation of policies. Political actors involved in pursuing any reform agenda need to ‘scrutinize their own discursive positionings’ (Bacchi in this volume: p. 26). This is necessary in order to have some control over the use of particular discourses that may favour some actors and be exploitative of others, for example by privileging the political treatment of some inequalities at the expense of others (see also Ferree or Lombardo and Verloo’s chapters). This call for self-reflexivity is targeted at both policymakers and researchers. As we have tackled the influence of reflexivity on feminist researchers in the previous two sections, we will focus here on the impact it can have on policymakers. One impact that reflexivity can have on policymakers is to help them formulate more inclusive and thus higher quality equality policies. As Lombardo and Verloo argue, the presence of racist and ethnocentrist biases in official documents shows that gender policies are not immune to the stereotypes that they impute to male-centred political approaches. Instead, they sometimes produce discourses that exclude some specific group of women. Exercising reflexivity about their

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own assumptions could make policymakers more aware of the biases that public policies show when they attempt to stretch gender equality to address other inequalities. Researchers should use feminist theory and the power of argument to explain that bona fide gender equality policies should not exclude others, but rather include intersectionality and work towards gender equality without increasing other inequalities. Another way in which reflexivity could help policymakers to formulate higher quality policies is by making them more aware of inconsistencies present in policy discourses, as discussed in the chapter by Lombardo and Meier. In this case, the awareness of inconsistencies between different elements of a policy frame (diagnosis/prognosis, goals/means, etc.) is presented as a means to help sharpen the formulation of public policies. The analysis of inconsistencies can reveal deeper, often sexist, biases that shape policymakers’ framing of policies, and can show attempts to shrink or bend the meaning of gender equality. The authors call for more gender impact assessment at the level of policy design, although Bustelo and Verloo warn of the limitations of this ‘expert–bureaucratic’ policy tool which fixes a specific definition of gender equality that policy design must supposedly achieve. Once again, this reminds us of the importance of applying continuous reflexivity to the analysis of policy tools adopted to foster gender equality. Bustelo and Verloo discuss reflexivity in relation to the evaluation of public policies. They highlight the importance of being aware of conceptual prejudices in policy design in order to go beyond what they call the ‘positivistic–rationalistic trap’ in public policy evaluation, where evaluators assume they can control the influence of their biases in policy design and evaluation. Such awareness, which can be enhanced by the application of critical frame analysis, will benefit the evaluation of policy design, an area that, according to the authors, would need more attention on the part of policymakers, researchers and evaluators. It seems that reflexivity is crucial for formulating and evaluating more consistent and inclusive policies. But how to put it in practice in policymaking? In the previous section, we saw different applications of reflexivity in achieving an understanding of discursive politics that have implications for policymaking as well. Bacchi warns us of the fact that it is not an easy task to stand outside our own discourses and conceptual biases. However, she suggests that one way of applying reflexivity in policy proposals would be to incorporate the perspectives and experiences of diverse and excluded groups, provided – as we argue in this chapter – that this recommendation is not used against policy measures that are not participatory but whose quality has been proved through argumentation (see Walby in this volume). Ferree applies reflexivity through the analysis of how inequalities in one context can be shaped by the construction of one particular inequality frame that predefines the way of looking at other inequalities. Her understanding of reflexivity can be particularly relevant for policymakers who wish to develop an intersectional policy analysis by considering how the meaning of gender equality may be anchored to a history of racialized nationhood in one context, or to the power of organized class interests in another context. Approaches that use critical frame analysis suggest different ways in which the use of this methodological tool can

Critical discursive politics 201 help policymakers to reflect on the biases, inconsistencies and exclusions present in public policy documents, and thus improve the quality of the latter. Walby argues in favour of argument over the use of standards to constitute equality and justice. The second finding of our research that has particular consequences for policymaking is the tension between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ instruments. Our discursive politics analysis revealed a glimpse of how power works in public policy, which seems important for analysts of public policies and policymakers to take into account. Verloo and van der Vleuten argue how supposedly technical tools such as ranking and benchmarking hide power mechanisms and are in fact highly political. In their view, the politics of ranking and benchmarking that increasingly characterizes EU policymaking, pushing it towards a more technical policy process, may have perverse effects on states’ performance. This is because these tools can be based on governments’ policy style rather than on actual performance, and because relative standards privilege the preferences of some states at the expense of others, as their assessment is not grounded on absolute criteria that set standards for all. Also, the presentation of ranking and benchmarking politics as technical hides their power dimension and the more political nature of its process, and hinders contestation. This has implications for policymaking as it affects the quality of governments’ performance in relation to their actual achievement of goals and the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the process. To mitigate the pitfalls of an unreflexive use of ‘technical’ policy tools, authors such as Rönnblom and Jalušiþ suggest the need to politicize gender. The awareness and representation of gender relations in more conflictual and relational terms is a way to address the issue of power (and politicize it) by showing the existence of conflict, rather than hiding it. One of the advantages of a discursive politics analysis is that this approach, by showing how power is constituted in processes of exclusion or inclusion, opens up possibilities for change. And political transformation – as the authors of this book also suggest – is a crucial goal of feminist politics. However, while the emphasis on politicization is a reminder of the need to scrutinize political tools presented as technical because they may hide power mechanisms and maintain an unequal status quo, this does not resolve the tension between technical and political instruments for gender equality. Walby’s contribution makes analysts concerned about gender equality policies and politicization more aware of the traps into which they could fall by unreflexively judging some tools as negative because they appear more ‘technical’ than ‘political’. We should not let too easy assumptions about the dangers of depoliticization influence our assessment to the extent that we disregard all technical tools per se. She defends ‘technical’ tools in order not to do away with useful instruments for gender equality in the name of politicization. If ‘technical’ instruments such as gender budgeting, benchmarking or gender impact assessment are based on solid feminist theory and empirical studies, then they do not necessarily lead to depoliticization. For instance, gender mainstreaming is a strategy that has mainly been framed in technical terms, framed not to challenge power and used as an excuse for depoliticizing

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gender. However, gender mainstreaming has in some contexts had positive effects in terms of broadening policy fields that were not gendered before, for instance in the EU, and it has promoted gender and other inequality training in contexts and for actors that were not gender aware before. Rather than creating feminist taboos about tools that are judged as ‘merely technical’, it can be helpful to assess policy strategies on the extent to which sound feminist knowledge is built into a given policy instrument, and to adopt a more long-term approach that might provide more elements for analysis. This brings us to a third reflection on the dynamic and evolutionary character of the policymaking process. Politics is a process of continuous change, as Ferree reminds us, and it is difficult to foresee which direction policy initiatives might take, because of the interrelated, unpredictable and complex nature of the policy process, nicely exemplified in chaos theory’s butterfly effect. Even inconsistent policy frames can offer windows of opportunity for policy actors to pick specific issues and develop them in unpredictable ways. This can mean, as Lombardo and Meier suggest, that even issues that, on account of inconsistent framing, seemed to narrow down the meaning of gender equality or not to match diagnosis and solution might at some other point offer opportunities for a more progressive development in the framing of gender equality. Bustelo and Verloo dub the dynamic and evolutionary character of policymaking a form of ‘political rationality’, and argue that the existence of inconsistencies in the framing of an issue is always temporary and that a frame can be politically ‘rational’ if we consider the framing work of a variety of actors in different moments over a longer time span. The contribution of a reflexive discursive approach to both the analysis and the practice of policymaking is the acknowledgement that established political meanings are always contested and discursively shaped in different ways. Keeping in mind the dynamic and evolutionary nature of the policymaking process, and understanding the political rationality of discursive outcomes can help policy analysts to put policy problems in a broader perspective and open up a wider range of interpretative possibilities. A last point with implications for policymaking that emerged throughout all the chapters is the issue of empowerment and the creation of political alliances. The focus on the extent to which policy processes empower people – which subjects do they exclude and to whom they give standing – is another contribution that a discursive politics approach has for the analysis of policymaking. It can promote policy studies that pursue a more complex picture of the policy process, a picture in which a multiplicity of actors develop frames, create different types of alliances and are given more or less voice in the policy debates, depending on the opportunity structures that are created for the articulation of their discourses. The awareness of such a complex picture of inclusions, exclusions and power positions can stimulate policymakers’ and scholars’ reflection about their own ‘fixed’ understandings of political meanings and categories. This can in turn help to counterbalance biases that block particular interpretations of policy problems, or hinder certain political alliances or specific policy solutions. Reflexivity in its different forms, in the sense of awareness of the ‘unfinished knowledge’ of each

Critical discursive politics 203 discursive positioning, might help us to keep our political meanings open to contestation and discursive shaping, and our door open to dialogue and alliances with other actors.

Note 1 We wish to thank Anna van der Vleuten for recommending us to discuss the issue of arenas.

Bibliography Tryandafyllidou, A. and Fotiou, A. (1998) ‘Sustainability and modernity in the European Union: A frame theory approach to policymaking’, Sociological Research Online, 3: 1–20. Online. Available from http:www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/2.html (accessed 17 June 2008).

Index

actors 8, 11, 61, 64, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 191; civil society actors 6, 12, 15, 56, 61, 123, 124, 133–4, 163, 192, 194; discourse 9, 13–14, 23; discursive politics 10–11, 89, 198–9; framing 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 90, 156, 158; gender equality concept 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 156, 157, 186, 187, 188, 191; gender mainstreaming 156–7, 165; institutional 6, 12, 15, 156; policymaking 140, 141, 147–8, 150, 156–7, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166–7, 186, 194–5, 198–9; politics 108, 113, 116, 117; trade policy 122–3, 124, 125, 130–1, 132, 133, 134; see also agency; discursive politics; framing; institution agency xvi, 12, 14, 27, 87, 195; agency/structure relation 11, 25, 89–92, 193; discourse 9, 25, 31; see also actors arena: national/international/supranational/ local 155, 186, 191–2, 203; policy 53, 59, 191; political 13, 54, 56, 59, 64, 88, 117; see also actors; politics argument, argumentation 193, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201; discourse 24, 25; feminist politics 14, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43–4, 45, 46, 47, 48–9, 196; framing 14, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28; see also framing; Walby, Sylvia Austria 56, 65, 73, 77; policymaking 174, 179, 180–1, 183; prostitution 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; suffrage 48 Bacchi, Carol xii, 7, 16, 19–34, 57, 79, 106–7, 117, 118; agency 14, 31, 195; discourse 14, 21–31, 32, 192–3; discourse analysis 21–5; discursive politics 9, 10, 14, 20–1 (power of discourse 9, 30); equal opportunity 4; frame 12, 19, 20, 28, 31, 32; frame

analysis 19–34 (theories 19–21); framing 19–34, 80, 193–4 (intentional 14, 19, 20–1, 22, 29, 31, 193; strategic 19, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31; unintentional 13, 21, 31, 140); gender equality 4; gendering 54; political categories 52; political subject 25–7; policies 10, 30; reflexive framing 19, 28–30, 31, 165 (dual-focus research agenda 29–30); reflexivity 4, 21, 27–9, 31, 79, 164, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200; see also framing; reflexivity benchmarking 4, 8, 46; discursive politics 169; fallacy 147; policymaking 15, 132, 147, 169–84, 201; see also policymaking evaluation Bustelo, María xii; critical frame analysis 10, 15, 153–68; policy evaluation 15, 150, 153–68, 194, 200; political rationality 142, 151, 158, 202; procedural rationality 138, 139, 158; see also policymaking evaluation Butler, Judith 9, 53, 54–5, 81, 82, 83 Canada 28, 48 caretaking, childcare xv, 43, 141, 175; Council Recommendation on childcare (222) 5; family policies 58; women 41, 42, 60, 75, 99, 126, 145, 155; see also labour; labour market; policy; women citizenship 3, 10, 41, 47, 56, 75, 81, 180; activity 65; democratic 64, 118; European Union 47, 98; Germany 93, 97, 98, 99; organization of citizenship 16; United States 94, 96, 99 class 10, 36, 77, 78, 82, 106, 189; class/gender analogy 99; Germany 92–4, 99; institutionalization 82, 88; see also intersectionality

Index Cyprus 179 Czechoslovakia 48 democracy, democratic 77, 81, 164; equality 63; European Union 58, 129–30, 192; gender equality xiv, 3, 58, 113–14, 118, 129–30; policymaking evaluation 164, 173, 180, 182, 201; representation in state legislatures 44, 58, 63–4; trade policy 129–30, 131, 133, 134; Western-style xiv; women 58, 63–4; see also policy; politics; state demography 193; demographic deficits 5, 6, 58, 190; family policies 58; gender equality 58, 60, 146 development 2, 46, 55, 108, 125, 128, 146; knowledge 37, 39, 40; regional 109, 110, 111, 113; trade policy 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133; UN Human Development Project (UNDP) 44, 46–7, 183; see also economy; trade policy difference 36, 37, 41–3, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 117, 166; equality/difference dichotomy 40, 42, 43–4, 45, 46, 56, 64; gender as difference 55; see also gender; Walby, Sylvia discourse 13–14, 21–30, 91; actors 13–14, 23; agency 9, 31; agency/ structure relation 25; argument 24, 25; Bacchi, Carol 9, 14, 21–31, 32, 192–3; constraining effects xvi, xvii; discourse analysis 21–5 (analysis of discourses 22, 26; discourse analysis 22); enabling effects xvi, xvii; Ferree, Myra Marx 13–14, 23, 193; Foucault, Michel 23–6, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 88; Giddens, Anthony 24, 25; Habermas, Jürgen 23, 31; hegemonic discourses 9–10, 12–14, 58, 62, 107, 118, 144–5, 161, 191–6; intentionality 22, 24–5, 31; knowledge 25–6; political subject 25–7; poststructuralist discourse psychology 26–7, 29; power 23, 30; power of 9, 12, 30, 193; psychology 22, 26, 29; reflexivity 27–9, 31 (reflexive framing 19, 28–30, 31); rhetorical tool xvi, 22; Schön, Donald 24; see also Bacchi, Carol; framing; hegemonic discourses; reflexivity discursive politics 3, 7, 9, 10–14, 118, 198; actors 10–11, 89, 198–9; agency 9; agency/structure relation 11; Bacchi, Carol 9, 10, 14, 19–34; concept 10, 122, 198; constraining effects 9, 11, 12, 192,

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193, 195, 197; critical frame analysis 10, 11, 16, 31; discursive opportunity structure/windows of opportunity 15, 89–90, 92–5, 96, 98, 139, 143, 145, 148, 150, 151, 182, 188, 193, 195, 197, 202; discursive power 9, 12; enabling effects 9, 11, 12, 192, 193, 195, 197; Ferree, Myra Marx 10–11, 86–103; gender equality 15–16, 31, 81–2, 122–4, 186–203; intentional 10, 31; intersectionality 87–8, 90–5, 97, 98; Lombardo, Emanuela 186–203; Meier, Petra 186–203; policymaking 10, 150, 153–4, 160 (evaluation 153–4, 160, 169, 178–82); power 198; reflexivity 198; trade 122–4; traps 13, 142, 144, 171, 186–7, 195, 196; unintentional 10, 31; Verloo, Mieke 10, 16, 186–203; Walby, Sylvia 16; see also discourse; framing; gender equality; hegemonic discourses; institutionalization; policy; policymaking; politics; power domestic violence 71; de-gendering 60–1, 190–1; depoliticization 60, 190–1; family violence 144; framing 25, 28, 144; policy 57, 60–2, 69, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78, 190–1; policymaking 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147–9, 180–1; politicization 60, 62; see also policy; policymaking; woman economy 56, 99; economic competitiveness 15; economic growth 2, 5, 6, 15, 19, 46, 105–20, 125–6, 188, 190, 192, 197 (depoliticization 109; gender equality 106, 110–16, 121–2, 126, 127, 131, 146; politics 105–6, 109; regional policy 105, 107, 108–9, 110–16, 117, 118); European Union 105, 106, 113–16, 125–6; globalization 105, 109, 117; hegemonic discourse 107, 190, 192, 193, 197; knowledge-based economy 105, 174; Lisbon Strategy 105, 106; neoliberalism 105, 109, 121, 122, 123–9, 131–4; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 121, 174, 177–8, 183; Rönnblom, Malin 15, 105–20, 188, 190, 197; sustainable growth 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 174 (economic 105, 110, 111, 112, 116; environmental 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116; social dimension 105, 110, 111, 112, 116); Sweden 106, 108, 110–13, 116, 188, 190; True, Jacqui 15,

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Index

121–37; women 21, 60, 125–6, 129, 131; see also development; European Union; globalization; neoliberalism; politics; trade policy education 81, 95, 115, 176, 177, 183; gender equality xiv, 110; women’s educational role 75 emancipation 1, 32, 75, 118 employment 4, 87, 105, 121–2; European Employment Strategy (EES) 126, 130, 170, 173, 174–6, 178, 179, 180, 181; gender employment gap 175, 176, 181; Joint Employment Report (JER) 174, 181; policy 6, 47, 82, 98, 105, 115, 121, 126; women 41–2, 43, 47, 70, 115, 121, 124, 125, 126, 128, 175; World Trade Organization (WTO) 121; see also labour, labour market; policy; trade policy environmental issues 123, 130; sustainable growth 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116; Sweden 110 equal opportunity 1, 7, 29, 55, 76, 78, 113, 114, 119, 125, 126, 127, 179–80; labour market 4, 5, 57, 171; women’s inequality in politics 59; see also gender equality equality 31, 36, 40, 41, 43, 48, 79, 113–14, 129; concept 55–6, 82, 191; equality/ difference dichotomy 40, 42, 43–4, 45, 46, 64, 94, 191; equality project 43, 49; gender equality concept xiv, 2, 5, 31, 55, 57, 63, 69, 82, 191; see also gender equality; intersectionality; Walby, Sylvia ethnicity 10, 36, 45, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78–9, 109, 111, 118, 140–1, 199; see also intersectionality European Union 108, 191–2; antidiscrimination 69–70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 75, 76, 78, 80, 118; citizenship 47, 98; democracy 58, 129–30, 192; domestic violence 57, 60–2, 69, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78; economic growth 105, 106, 113–16; European Commission 6, 80, 105, 113–14, 115, 122, 123, 125–31, 133, 134, 169, 171, 174, 175, 179, 181, 182; European Council 4, 5, 156, 174–6, 183; European Court of Justice (ECJ) 170, 171, 179, 182; European Employment Strategy (EES) 126, 130, 170, 173, 174–6, 178, 179, 180, 181; European Parliament (EP) 126–7, 128, 132, 176, 181, 182; European Women’s Lobby’s (EWL) 80; external policy 124, 127, 130, 131, 132; family policies

5–6, 57, 58, 59, 62, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78; gender equality 2, 3, 15, 57–61, 68–84, 113–17, 118, 121–34; gender equality policies 57–61, 68–84, 86–103, 105–20, 121–37; gender equality politics 57–61; gender mainstreaming 82, 113–16, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134, 157, 173, 202; homosexual rights 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79; International Labour Organization (ILO) 2, 128–9, 130, 191, 197; intersectionality 36, 63, 68–84, 88, 98, 180; Lombardo, Emanuela 36, 63, 68–84, 88; market 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 133, 134; migration 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79; non-governmental organization (NGO) 123, 125, 127, 129–30, 133, 134; Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 170, 173, 174–6; policymaking 15, 53, 56–61, 65, 68–82, 151, 155, 157, 169–84, 192; prostitution 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; regional policy 106, 113–16; regionalism 108; Rönnblom, Malin 15, 105–20; Structural Funds 108, 113–16, 118; trade policy 15, 121, 123–34, 188, 190; True, Jacqui 15, 121–37, 188, 190; Verloo, Mieke 36, 63, 68–84, 88; Women in International Development Europe (WIDE) 125, 127, 129, 130, 133; see also Austria; economy; Europe; Germany; Greece; intersectionality; Netherlands; policy; policymaking; politics; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Treaties, Charters, Directives, Documents; United Kingdom family xiv; division of labour 146, 147; labour market 143, 147, 155; policy 5–6, 57, 58, 59, 62, 69, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 115, 131, 141, 143, 146, 147, 155, 190 (reconciliation 58, 60, 115, 131, 141, 143, 146, 147–8, 155, 190); policymaking 139, 143, 144–5, 146, 147–8; see also policy; policymaking feminism xvi, xvii, 3, 7, 16, 56, 57, 61, 100, 186; activists 7, 8, 27, 82, 97, 121, 165, 186; alliances 86–103, 194, 199, 202–3; Anglophone 65; argument 14, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43–4, 45, 46, 47, 48–9, 196; as a form or process 2; critical frame analysis 27–8, 31; criticism 16; epistemology 38; feminist framing 57, 60, 63, 95–9, 100, 193–4; feminist knowledge 36, 186–7, 192, 194, 196, 202; feminist taboos 192–6, 202; feminist theory 38,

Index 39, 45, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57, 106, 194, 200, 201; first-wave 48; gender 53–6, 57, 60, 63; gender equality concept 2, 3, 7; Germany 93–6, 97–9; hegemonic discourses 9–10, 16, 63, 186–7, 192, 193; policymaking 62–5, 151, 199–203; politics 14, 37, 40–8, 55–6, 106–8 (of identity 42; of equality, redistribution 36, 40, 41, 43, 48, 55; of recognition 36, 40, 41–2, 43, 44, 48, 49, 55; of transformation 36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 55–6); postcolonial feminism 37, 44, 45–6; power/knowledge 38; practice 2; prostitution 27–8, 32; reflexive framing 29, 31, 165, 187, 192–6; scholars 4, 7, 8, 27, 82, 118, 121, 165; struggle 48, 65, 79, 106; suffrage 47–8; Third World/ First World feminism 46; United States 94–7, 99; Western feminism 45–6, 53–6; see also Bacchi, Carol; Ferree, Myra Marx; framing; gender; gender equality; gender mainstreaming; intersectionality; knowledge; policy; policymaking; Walby, Sylvia Ferree, Myra Marx xii, 16, 188, 1970; actors 15, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 147, 195; discourse 13–14, 23, 193; discursive opportunity structure 89–90, 92–5, 96, 98, 193, 195, 197; discursive politics 5, 87–8, 90–5, 97, 98, 195; framing 10–11, 13–14, 15, 19, 86–103, 144 (frame 11, 89, 90, 91, 92; framework 11, 88, 89–95, 107; framing work 11, 89–92; institutionalization 11, 14, 89, 97, 99, 100; master frame 24, 88, 90–1; unintentional 13; webs of meaning 13–14, 88, 90, 91–2, 93, 95, 96, 189, 193); intersectionality 36, 86–103, 189, 200; voice and empowerment 29, 99; see also discursive politics; framing; intersectionality Foucault, Michel 9, 12, 22, 54; discourse 23–6, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 88; knowledge 23, 24, 25–6; political subject 25, 26; power 23, 25, 54, 193; power/knowledge 25, 36, 37–8; reflexivity 27 framing xv, xvi, 10–12, 192; actors 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 156, 158 (social movement actors 21, 90); agency 12; argument 14, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28; Bacchi, Carol 14, 19–34, 193–4; concept 89, 90; constraining effects 9, 11, 12; critical frame analysis 10–12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 27–8, 31, 52–67, 68–84, 86, 89, 90,

207

122, 137–52, 153–68; discourse 12–14, 144–5, 192–5; discourse analysis 21–5; enabling effects 9, 11, 12; feminist framing 57, 60, 63, 95–9, 100, 193–4; Ferree, Myra Marx 10–11, 13–14, 15, 24, 86–103, 144 (framework 11, 89–95, 107; framing work 11, 89–92; webs of meaning 13–14, 88, 90, 91–2, 93, 95, 96, 189, 193); frame 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 28, 31, 32, 89, 90, 91, 92 (amplification 92; radical 92, 95, 96; resonant 92, 93, 95, 96, 138, 155); frame analysis 10–12, 14, 15, 19–34, 138–52, 138–52, 153–68, 169–84 (theories 19–21, 31); gender equality xvi-xvii, 3, 7, 9, 10, 14, 63, 88, 95–100, 142, 157, 162, 164, 186, 192–6; intentional, intentionality 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20–1, 22, 29, 31, 139–40, 141, 160, 190, 193; master frame 24, 88, 90–1; policy frame, framing 11, 12, 14, 25, 30, 57, 89–90, 138–51, 158, 161–3, 164 (discursive 12, 91; practical 12, 91); policymaking 138–51, 160, 161–3, 164; power 9, 12, 13, 14, 19; processes 3, 9, 10–11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 31; reflexive framing 19, 28–30, 31, 142, 165, 187, 192–6, 198; reflexivity 4, 21, 27–9, 31; Snow, David 12, 16, 20, 90, 91, 161; social movements’ theory 12, 19, 20–1; strategic 19, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31, 142, 190; structure 12; traps 13, 142, 144, 171, 186–7, 195, 196; unintentional 3, 7, 10, 12–13, 14, 21, 31, 140, 141, 150, 160, 164; see also actors; Bacchi, Carol; discourse; discursive politics; Ferree, Myra Marx; hegemonic discourses; institutionalization France 3, 24, 171 gender xiv, 2, 26, 31, 109, 121; challenges of co-existing patterns of gendering 63–5; concept 53–5, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 81–2, 118, 191 (contested 54–5, 57); de-gendering 15, 57, 58, 59, 60–1, 75, 79, 112, 114, 186, 190–1; depoliticization 15, 60, 62, 106, 109, 112, 118, 190–1; equality policies 54, 57–65, 190; equality politics 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 56–65; framing 88, 190; gender equality concept xiv, 2, 5, 31, 52, 55, 57, 63, 69, 82, 191; gender regime 13, 48, 53, 62, 63, 118; gender related persecution 28; gendering 54, 55, 56–65, 75, 106, 109, 110, 114, 115,

208

Index

125–7, 130, 131, 134 (elusive gendering 57–8; ‘half way’ politicization 57–8, 59–60; politicized gendering 58, 60–1, 62, 64, 106, 107); institutionalization 82, 88; Jalušiþ, Vlasta 52–67, 190; organization of citizenship, labour and intimacy 10, 16; policymaking 52, 53, 54, 56–65; political category 52, 53, 61; politicization 54, 55, 56–65, 75, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, 116–17, 118, 201; power relations 2, 4, 9, 14, 54, 59, 60, 79, 118, 142, 190; reduced to sexual difference 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64; roles 60, 61, 62, 75, 143, 144–5, 146, 149; trade/gender impact 121, 123–4, 125, 128, 129, 132–3; transformative gender equality politics 8, 9, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61–5; see also gender equality; policy; politics gender equality 1–16, 113–14; achievements xiv, 3; actors 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 156, 157, 186, 187, 188, 191; concept xiv-xv, 1–2, 3–10, 14, 15, 55–6, 57, 68, 88, 119, 156, 186, 189, 197 (contested xiv, 1, 2, 3, 7–10, 31, 36, 48, 63, 154–8, 160; development 7; openness 7–10, 57, 154–8, 162, 198; transformative 56); critical frame analysis 31; criticism 9; democracy xiv, 3, 58, 113–14, 118, 129–30; depoliticization xvii, 4, 15, 60, 62, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117–18, 146, 147, 150, 151, 169, 182, 186, 190–1, 192, 194, 198, 201–2; discursive politics 15–16, 31, 81–2, 122–4, 186–203; economic growth 106, 110–16; empty signifier 14, 48, 52–3, 162; European Union 2, 3, 15, 57–61, 68–84, 113–17, 118, 121–34; feminism 2, 3, 7, 186; frame on 11; framing xvi-xvii, 3, 7, 9, 10, 14, 63, 88, 95–100, 142, 157, 162, 164, 186, 192–6 (constraining effects xvi, 3, 4, 9, 192, 197; enabling effects xvi, 3, 4, 192, 197); gender and equality concepts xiv, 2, 5, 31, 55–6, 57 (inherent tension 55, 63, 69, 82, 191); gender struggle 2, 3, 9, 10, 14, 79; goal 5, 6, 7; hegemonic discourses 9, 142, 192–6; human rights frame 122, 124, 126–7; International Labour Organization 2; labels 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 59 (emancipation 1, 32, 75; empowerment of women 1, 8; equal opportunity 1, 4, 5, 7, 29, 76, 78, 179–80; nondiscrimination 4, 5; promotion of

women 1; substantive equality 5); Lombardo, Emanuela 1–16, 57, 138–52, 154, 186–203; meaning xiv-xv, 1–2, 3–7, 8, 15, 31, 52, 88 113, 114, 115, 116, 153, 186, 191; Meier, Petra 1–16, 57, 138–52, 154, 186–203; neoliberal discourse 116–18; policy xvi, 2, 3, 5–6, 15, 16, 36–51–3, 54, 56–65, 82, 109–16, 117, 138–52, 186, 193; policymaking 138–52, 153–68, 169–84, 186; politics 2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 55, 56–65, 106, 107, 117, 170 (new politics 56; political concept 2, 31, 155, 156; political goal 1, 68, 106, 155); power relations 111, 112, 116–17, 118; relativism 14, 36; strategies 8, 9, 169; Sweden 15, 106, 107, 110–13, 115, 116–17, 118, 119; transformative gender equality politics 8, 9, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61–5, 81, 142, 194; United Nations 2 (United Nations Human Development Project (UNDP) 44, 46–7, 183); Verloo, Mieke 1–16, 57, 154, 186–203; see also discourse; discursive politics; equal opportunity; gender equality, bending; gender equality, fixing; gender equality, shrinking; gender equality, stretching; gender mainstreaming; feminism; framing; intersectionality; policy; policymaking; policymaking evaluation; politics; reflexivity; woman gender equality, bending xiv, xvi, 3, 5–6, 8, 15, 36, 63, 78, 88, 117–18, 125, 131, 132, 139, 154, 186, 189–90, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; actors 6; Bustelo, María 15, 153–68; conceptual openness 7; discourse 12; discursive politics 11; economic growth 107, 111, 112, 113, 125; gender equality goal 5, 6, 78, 82, 125, 186, 189–90, 193; inconsistency in policy frames 146–9; Lombardo, Emanuela 3, 5–6, 8, 15, 138, 139–43, 146, 147, 149, 151, 154, 186, 189–90, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; Meier, Petra 3, 5–6, 8, 15, 138, 139–43, 146, 147, 149, 151, 154, 186, 189–90, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; policy shift 5–6, 111, 146, 149; policymaking 15, 138, 139–43, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 164 (evaluation 169, 170, 173, 182); Rönnblom, Malin 15, 105–20; True, Jacqui 15, 121–37; Verloo, Mieke 3, 5–6, 8, 15, 153–68, 186, 189–90, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; see also economy; framing; gender equality; policy

Index gender equality, fixing xv, xvi, 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 65, 147, 154, 186, 187, 188, 192, 196, 197–8, 199; Bacchi, Carol 4; discourse 12; discursive politics 11, 187, 196, 198–9; discursive windows of opportunity 145, 188–9, 197, 198; freezing the meaning 3, 10, 65, 188, 197, 199; gender equality goal 5; Jalušiþ, Vlasta 52–67; labels 7, 8–9, 14, 59, 188; Lombardo, Emanuela 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 138, 149, 154, 186, 187, 188, 192, 196, 197–8, 199; Meier, Petra 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 138, 149, 154, 186, 187, 188, 192, 196, 197–8, 199; policymaking 138, 149, 157, 165 (evaluation 169, 171, 182, 189); reflexivity 4; Verloo, Mieke 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 154, 186, 187, 188, 192, 196, 197–8, 199; see also gender equality gender equality, shrinking xvi, 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 78–9, 107, 112, 113, 116, 117–18, 131, 132, 139, 154, 186, 187, 188–90, 196; discourse 12; discursive politics 11; gender equality goal 5; labels 1, 4, 149; Lombardo, Emanuela 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 138, 144–5, 146, 148–9, 150, 154, 186, 187, 188–90, 196; Meier, Petra 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 138, 144–5, 146, 148–9, 150, 154, 186, 187, 188–90, 196; policymaking 15, 138, 144–5, 146, 148–9, 150, 157 (evaluation 169, 171, 179, 182, 188–9); Verloo, Mieke 3, 4, 6, 8, 154, 186, 187, 188–90, 196; Vleuten, Anna van der 188–9; see also gender equality; intersectionality gender equality, stretching xiv, xvi, 3, 6, 8, 15, 36, 63, 88, 107, 139, 144, 154, 186, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; Bustelo, María 15, 153–68; conceptual openness 7; discourse 12; discursive politics 11; gender and equality concepts 5; gender equality goal 5; inconsistency in policy frames 146–9; intersectionality in European gender equality policies 36, 63, 68–84, 189; Lombardo, Emanuela 3, 6, 8, 15, 68–84, 138, 139–43, 150, 151, 154, 186, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; Meier, Petra 3, 6, 8, 15, 138, 139–43, 150, 151, 154, 186, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196; policymaking 15, 138, 139–43, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 164 (evaluation 169, 170, 173, 179, 182, 189); reflexivity 5; Verloo, Mieke 3, 6, 8, 15, 68–84, 153–68, 186, 189, 192, 193,

209

194, 195, 196; see also gender equality; intersectionality gender inequality 4, 11, 57, 68, 99–100, 122, 127, 156; gender equality concept 4, 8, 156; pervasive character 8, 142; policymaking 139, 142, 143–50; politics 4, 57–61, 62, 63–4, 69, 70, 71, 74, 122, 143; social structures 156; see also gender equality; intersectionality; policy; politics gender mainstreaming 5, 7, 54, 65, 98, 111, 119, 122, 142, 156, 166, 169, 202; actors 156–7, 165; critical frame analysis 163–4; definition 156; democracy 129; discursive politics 122–4; economic growth 15, 106, 127; European Union 113–16, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134, 157, 173, 202; impact 163–4; neoliberalism 107, 117, 123; policymaking 154, 156–7, 161, 163–4, 165, 166 (evaluation 154, 156–7, 161, 163–4, 165, 166, 181, 183); strategy 132, 154, 156, 157, 161, 163–4, 166; trade policy 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134 (trade-offs and opportunities 130–3); True, Jacqui 15, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134; see also feminism; gender equality; policymaking; policymaking evaluation Germany 90; citizenship 93, 97, 99; class 92–4; gender democracy 3; intersectionality 88, 91, 92–4, 95, 97–9, 197; race 92, 93, 95, 97; suffrage 48; see also intersectionality Giddens, Anthony 12, 24, 27 globalization 46, 47, 108, 109, 117, 178; economic growth 105, 109; neoliberalism 117; social dimension 121, 134; trade policy 121, 122, 124, 134; see also economy governance 15, 25, 117, 118, 157, 179, 191; from government to governance 108–9, 192; Rönnblom, Malin 15, 108–9, 192; see also politics Greece 56, 65, 73, 181; migration 71, 72, 74, 78; see also intersectionality Habermas, Jürgen: argument, argumentation 36, 40, 45; discourse 23, 31; knowledge 40 health xiv, 60, 146, 177 hegemonic discourses 9–10, 12–14, 58, 62, 107, 118, 144, 145, 161, 191, 192–6; economic growth 107, 190, 192, 193, 197;

210

Index

feminism 9–10, 16, 63, 186–7, 192, 193; gender equality 9, 142, 192–6; nationalist discourse 58; neoliberal 58, 117–18; see also discourse; discursive politics; framing; power human rights 47, 80, 92, 189; domestic violence 60; equality 63; European Parliament (EP) 126–7; trade policy 122, 124, 126–7, 128, 131, 132–3, 134 Hungary 56, 65, 77; anti-discrimination 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78; intersectionality 72, 73, 74; see also intersectionality identity 26, 41; identity politics 42, 45, 70, 100 inequalities 41, 43, 63, 65, 68–84, 94, 95, 100, 189, 197, 199, 200; gender equality concept 5, 8; structural 115–16, 146; see also equality; gender equality; gender inequalities; intersectionality institution 63, 199; actors 6, 12, 15, 156; de-gendering 59, 61; discourse 24, 30; gender equality meanings 31, 122; gendered 56; intersectionality 80–1, 87, 89, 91, 95–6; over-represented by men 59; policymaking 80–1, 145, 147; public 13, 62; see also actors; agency; institutionalization; intersectionality; policy; policymaking institutionalization 108, 122, 191, 199; authoritative texts 11, 89, 98; class 82; discourse 24, 30; framework 11, 89; gender 82; intersectionality 88, 89, 93–4, 95, 97, 100; labour standards 128–9; texts 14; see also institution; intersectionality; policy; policymaking International Labour Organization (ILO) 2, 128–9, 130, 191, 197 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 47 intersectionality 10, 11, 15, 36, 56, 63, 68–84, 82, 86–103, 142, 163, 166, 199–200; ability/disability 10, 36, 69, 77, 82, 94, 96, 114; actors 89, 90, 91, 92, 96; age 36, 69, 77, 82, 111, 114; agency/ structure 89–92; antagonism 81; antidiscrimination 69–70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 96–7, 98; Austria 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; class 10, 36, 77, 78, 82, 87, 88, 92–5, 99, 189; competition, territorial mechanisms 80–1, 82, 86, 94, 97, 98, 100, 109; concept 70, 86–8 (interactive 87–8, 90, 91, 95, 99; locational 86–7, 88, 90, 91; political 70–1; structural 70, 71; system 87); configuration 91; critical

frame analysis 69–71, 86; discursive opportunity structure 89–90, 92–5, 96, 98; discursive politics 87–8, 90–5, 97, 98; domestic violence 69, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78; ethnicity 10, 36, 45, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78–9, 82, 87, 97, 111, 114, 140–1, 148, 149, 199; European gender equality policies 68–84, 88 (blurring, shrinking, bending of gender and strengthening of other inequalities 78–9; framing 71–7; potential and tensions in stretching gender to other inequalities 79–82); family policies 71, 74, 76, 77, 78; Ferree, Myra Marx 36, 86–103, 188, 189, 197; framing 88, 89–92, 99; Germany 88, 92–4, 95, 96, 97–9, 197; Greece 71, 72, 74, 78; homosexual rights 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79; Hungary 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78; ideology 10; inclusive possibilities 68, 69, 79, 82; institution, institutional 87, 89, 91, 95–6; institutionalization 88, 89, 93–4, 95, 97, 100; linguistic community 36, 82; Lombardo, Emanuela 36, 63, 68–84, 88, 149, 180, 189, 199; migration 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 97, 98, 111, 149; nationality 36, 75, 76, 78–9, 87, 97; Netherlands 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79; policymaking 79–82, 180, 181; power 80, 87, 89; prostitution 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79, 155; race 10, 36, 45, 69, 75, 78–9, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92–5, 199; religion 10, 36, 69, 82, 97 (Muslim 75); sexual orientation 10, 36, 69, 75, 79, 82 (lesbians 71, 77, 79); Slovenia 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; Spain 71, 72, 74, 75, 79; stretching 189; United States 86, 88, 90, 92, 94–5, 96–7, 99, 188, 197; Verloo, Mieke 36, 63, 68–84, 88, 149, 180, 189, 199; Walby, Sylvia 87, 91; women’s inequality in politics 69, 70, 71, 74, 76–7, 78; see also citizenship; framing; gender equality; inequalities; policy; rights intimacy 10, 56, 180; organization of intimacy 16 Jalušiþ, Vlasta xii; critical frame analysis 10, 52–67; de-gendering 15, 57, 58, 59, 60–1, 190; depoliticization 15, 60, 62, 190; gender 52–5; gender equality 52–67, 144; gender policies 54, 57–65, 190; gender politics 54, 55, 56–65; gendering 54, 55, 56–65, 201;

Index ‘Mitdenken’ 65, 193, 195; policymaking 52, 53, 54, 56–65; transformative gender equality politics 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61–5, 194; see also gender; gender equality; policy; politics knowledge 36, 37–40, 48, 64, 89, 180, 194; argument, argumentation 14, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43–4, 45, 46, 47, 48–9; discourse 25–6; feminist knowledge 36, 186–7, 192, 194, 196, 202; feminist standpoint epistemology 38–9; Foucault, Michel 23, 24, 25–6, 37–8; Habermas, Jürgen 40; knowledge-based economy 105, 174; policymaking 64; postmodernist 38–9; power/knowledge 25, 36, 37–8, 40, 46, 47, 48, 87; production 36, 37, 186–7, 192, 196; rationality 39, 40, 48; social location 40; theories 37–40; see also power; Walby, Sylvia labour, labour market 10, 174; division of labour 54, 122, 141, 145–6, 146, 147; equal opportunity 4, 5, 57, 171; family policies 58, 155, 190; gender equality 6, 57, 60, 110, 127–9, 143, 146, 157, 173, 180; International Labour Organization (ILO) 2, 128–9, 130, 191, 197; labour standards 127–9, 131, 134; organization of labour 16; paid 16, 28, 41, 43, 47, 98; prostitution 28; trade policy 121, 124, 125, 131; unpaid 16, 21, 28, 43, 126, 131; woman xv, 4, 5–6, 41, 43, 57, 58, 60, 98, 121, 124, 125, 126, 143, 148, 155; see also caretaking, childcare; employment; policy law 16, 89–90, 197; authoritative texts 11, 89, 98; constitutional amendments 197; see also Treaties, Charters, Directives, Documents location 14, 37, 41–2, 44, 45, 48, 49, 189, 196; intersectionality 86–7, 88, 99; social 36, 37, 40, 48; see also Walby, Sylvia Lombardo, Emanuela xii; critical frame analysis 10, 15, 27, 138–52; discursive politics 5, 15–16, 186–203; discursive windows of opportunity 15, 139, 143, 145, 148, 150, 151, 197, 202; gender equality 1–16, 57, 154, 186–203; intersectionality in European gender equality policies 36, 63, 68–84, 88, 149, 180, 189, 199;

211

policymaking 58, 63, 138–52, 160, 188, 190, 197, 200, 202; see also gender equality; intersectionality; policymaking Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe (MAGEEQ) xviii, 16, 57, 62, 65, 151; frame analysis 10, 16; intersectionality 69, 71, 72, 76; organization of citizenship, labour and intimacy 10, 16 market 146, 192; European Union 121, 122, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 133, 134 media 20, 40, 82, 151, 183 Meier, Petra xii; critical frame analysis 10, 15, 27, 138–52; discursive politics 15–16, 167, 186–203; discursive windows of opportunity 15, 139, 143, 145, 148, 150, 151, 197, 202; gender equality 1–16, 57, 154, 186–203; policymaking 58, 63, 138–52, 160, 188, 190, 197, 200, 202; see also gender equality; policymaking men 16, 31, 59, 111, 117, 129, 148, 188; active fathers 60; breadwinning 60, 93, 98, 145, 175; male absence in policy frames 59, 116, 148; male domination 4, 59, 117, 141, 143, 145, 150, 199; male monoculture 59; men’s political networks 4, 59; norm 31, 43, 55, 56, 114, 148, 190; organization of citizenship, labour and intimacy 10, 16; patriarchy 54, 59, 86, 143, 144, 150, 166 methodology: critical frame analysis 10–12, 14, 15, 19, 31, 71, 90, 154, 157–61, 200–1; inconsistency in gender equality frames 137–52; intersectionality in European gender equality policies 68–84, 200; meanings of gender in equality policies 52–67; policy evaluation and discursive politics 153–68, 200 (design evaluation 154, 161–4; limitations 165–6); stretching and bending gender equality 1–16; trade policy 121–37; see also framing Mouffe, Chantal 44, 81, 107, 117, 118 nation: intersectionality 36, 75, 76, 78–9, 87, 95, 97; nationalistic discourses 58; nationality 26; see also intersectionality; state neoliberalism 12, 15, 99, 117; economic growth 105, 109; gender equality 116–18, 121–34; gender mainstreaming 107, 117; globalization 117; hegemonic

212

Index

discourse 58; regional policy 107; Rönnblom, Malin 15, 105–20; trade policy 121, 122, 123–9, 131–4 (neocolonialism 130, 133, 134; neoliberal frame 122, 124, 125–6, 127, 131, 133, 134); see also economy; politics Netherlands 56, 65, 77, 156, 175; domestic violence 143, 144, 147, 148; family policies 143, 148, 149; gender impact assessments (GIA) 175–6; intersectionality 72, 73, 74, 148, 149; migration 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 83, 148; policymaking 139, 143–6, 147, 148, 149, 151, 188 (evaluation 170, 175–6, 178–9, 181); prostitution 27, 28, 155; suffrage 48; women’s inequality in politics 143, 147; see also intersectionality; policy; policymaking; policymaking evaluation network 108, 161, 173, 175; meanings 11, 89, 90; men’s political networks 4, 59; women’s political networks 4, 98 non-governmental organization (NGO) 57, 76, 80, 179; European Union 123, 125, 127, 129–30, 133, 134; slogan 132; trade 123; see also actors; agency norm, normative 13, 16, 32, 41; de-gendering 61; gender equality 7, 8, 10, 14, 139, 142, 145, 162, 164, 194; gendered 56, 60; men’s 31, 43, 55, 56, 114, 148, 190; normative assumptions 11, 14, 139, 142, 194; policy frame 11; policymaking evaluation 166–7 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 121; index on Gender, Institutions and Development (GID) 174, 177–8, 179, 180, 182, 183 Poland 48 policy 138–9, 191; anti-discrimination 69–70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 98; Austria 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; Bacchi, Carol 10, 30; concept 2, 57, 139, 161; de-gendering 15, 57, 58, 59, 60–1; discourse, discursive nature xvi, 3, 23, 30, 61, 157, 158, 161, 162 (analysis of discourses 22; discursive policies 3, 9); documents 10, 22, 57, 60, 61, 70, 71–2, 76, 78, 79, 82, 90, 107, 110–11, 113–16, 117, 125, 126, 138, 139, 142, 143–6, 147, 149, 150, 151, 161, 162, 199;

domestic violence 57, 60–2, 69, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78, 190–1; family policies 5–6, 57, 58, 59, 62, 69, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 115, 131, 141, 143, 146, 147, 155, 190; frame, framework, framing 11, 12, 14, 25, 30, 57, 89–90, 141–2, 158, 161–3, 164; gender equality xvi, 2, 3, 5–6, 15, 16, 36–51–3, 54, 56–65, 82, 109–16, 117, 138–52, 186, 193; gendering 57–61, 75; goal xvi; Greece 71, 72, 74, 78; homosexual rights 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79; Hungary 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78; intersectionality 64–82; labour market 4; migration 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79; neoliberalism 107; Netherlands 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79; pension system 3, 43; prostitution 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; public policies 10; regional 105, 107, 108–9, 110–16, 117, 118, 188; Slovenia 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; Spain 71, 72, 74, 75, 79; trade policy 15, 121–34; women’s inequality in politics 57–61, 62, 63–4, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76–7, 78, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147–8, 151, 188 (representation 44, 59, 63–4, 77, 106, 110, 111, 112–13, 115, 116, 129, 143, 145, 148); see also actors; discourse; discursive politics; economy; framing; gender equality; intersectionality; Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe (MAGEEQ); policymaking; policymaking evaluation; trade policy policymaking 52, 186; actors 140, 141, 147–8, 150, 156–7, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166–7, 194–5, 199; Bacchi, Carol 10, 52, 195; bending 15, 138, 139–43, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 164; consistency 138–9, 145, 150, 154, 158, 162; critical frame analysis 11, 15, 139, 140, 141, 154, 157–67, 200 (limitations 165–6); depoliticization 146, 147, 150, 151; discursive politics 10, 150, 187, 199–203; discursive windows of opportunity 15, 139, 143, 145, 148, 149, 150–1, 197, 202; documents 138, 139, 142, 143–6, 147, 149, 150, 151, 188; domestic violence 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147–9, 180–1; dynamic, evolutionary character of the policymaking process 199, 202–3; European Union 15, 53, 56–61, 68–82, 155, 157, 169–84, 192, family policies 139, 143, 144–5, 146, 147–8; feminism 62; fixing 138, 149, 157, 165;

Index framing 138–51, 160, 161–3, 164; gender 52, 53, 54, 56–65; gender equality 52, 58, 63, 68–82, 107, 110, 118, 138–52, 186; gender inequality 139, 142, 143–50, 154–7; gendering/ de-gendering 57–61; implementation 56, 65, 110, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 153, 154, 157, 158, 161, 163, 165, 169, 170, 172, 179, 187; inconsistency 15, 138, 139, 142–3, 146–9, 150, 156, 162, 164, 197, 200, 202; institutions 80–1, 145, 147, 161; intentionality 139–40, 141, 160; intersectionality 79–82; Lombardo, Emanuela 15, 52, 58, 63, 138–52, 160, 188, 190, 197, 200, 202; Meier, Petra 15, 52, 58, 63, 138–52, 160, 188, 190, 197, 200, 202; Netherlands 139, 143–6, 147, 148, 149, 151, 188; objectivity 139, 141; policy problem xvii, 10, 11, 139–42, 144–7, 149, 150, 153, 154–7, 158, 161, 162, 191 (constructed 10, 11, 141, 149, 153, 160; diagnosis 10, 16, 71, 72, 77, 78, 141–2, 144–6 , 147, 149, 150, 161–2, 200, 202; diagnosis/ prognosis balance 142, 149, 158; prognosis 10, 16, 71, 72, 141–2, 144–6, 149, 150, 161–2, 200); policymakers 59, 63–4, 79, 147, 150, 164–5, 178, 186, 193, 199–201; rationality 138, 139–40, 141–2, 158, 159–61, 163, 166 (political rationality 142, 158, 202; procedural rationality 138, 139, 158; rationalistic traps 154, 158, 161, 200); reflexivity 164–5, 187, 199–203; shrinking 15, 138, 144–5, 146, 148–9, 150, 157; Spain 139, 143–6, 147, 148, 149, 151, 155, 188; stretching 15, 138, 139–43, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 164; technocratic aspects 56, 61, 131; trade policy 123, 127–8, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134; unintentional framing 140, 141, 150, 160, 164; voice and empowerment 29, 32, 132, 133–4, 142, 166–7, 187, 194, 199, 202–3; women’s inequality in politics 139, 141, 143, 145, 147–8, 151 (representation 143, 145, 148); see also discursive politics; framing; gender equality; intersectionality; Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe (MAGEEQ); policy; policymaking evaluation; politics policymaking evaluation 15, 112, 132, 150, 153–68, 169–84, 187; Austria 179, 180–1, 183; benchmarking 15, 132, 147, 169–84, 201 (discursive politics 169);

213

bending 169, 170, 173, 182; Beijing review process 173–4, 176–7, 178 (Platform for Action 176–7); Bustelo, María 15, 150, 153–68, 191, 194, 200, 202; consistency 154, 158, 162, 170; critical frame analysis 154, 157–67, 200; democracy 164, 173, 180, 182, 201; depoliticization 169, 182, 194; design evaluation 153–4, 156, 157–67; discursive politics 153–4, 160, 169, 178–82, 199–203; European Union 169–84 (European Commission 171, 174, 175, 179, 181, 182; European Council 174–6, 183; European Court of Justice (ECJ) 170, 171, 179, 182; European Employment Strategy (EES) 170, 173, 174–6, 178, 179, 180, 181; Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 170, 173, 174–6); fixing 169, 171, 182, 188–9; France 171; gender equality 153–68, 169–84; gender impact assessments (GIA) 125, 163, 175–6, 194, 200; gender mainstreaming 154, 156–7, 161, 163–4, 165, 166, 181, 183; impact evaluation 153, 158, 163–4, 165–6; implementation evaluation 153, 158; inconsistency 156, 162, 164; indicators 15, 132, 169–84, 189; indices 1, 46, 47, 169, 174, 177–8, 179–80, 182, 183; intersectionality 180, 181; Netherlands 170, 175–6, 178–9, 181; normative stance 166–7; OECD GID index 174, 177–8, 179, 180, 182, 183; performance 169, 170–3, 174, 175, 178–82, 201 (quality of performance as a technical matter 181–2; selection bias in the development of targets, benchmarks and indicators 179–81; shift to relative standards 178–9); power 169, 170, 178, 181, 182, 193, 201 (power relations 170, 173); program theory 158–9, 160, 161, 162, 165; ranking 1, 15, 169–84, 201, (best practices 172–3, 174–5; establishment of indicators 172; new politics 169–70); reflexivity 164–5, 199–202; reputation 169, 170–3, 174, 179, 180, 182 (‘new’ politics of 172; ‘old’ politics of 171; shifts 169, 182); shrinking 169, 171, 179, 182, 188–9; stretching 169, 170, 173, 179, 182, 189; technocratic aspects 15, 169, 170, 178, 181–2, 194, 198; tensions between technical and political instruments 147, 169–70, 181–2, 187, 189, 194,

214

Index

199, 201–2; traditional models 158; Verloo, Mieke 15, 47, 150, 153–68, 169–84, 188–9, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202; Vleuten, Anna van der 15, 47, 132, 169–84, 188–9, 193; see also policy; policymaking; politics political science 44, 139 politics 100, 106; actors 108, 109, 112, 113, 116, 117; as ‘action in concert’ 64; authoritative texts 11, 89–90, 98; Bacchi, Carol 52; benchmarking 4, 8; categories 52–3, 55, 63, 64, 65, 111, 112; decision-making 3, 4, 19, 59, 98, 106, 114, 129, 130, 134, 182; de-gendering 15, 57, 58, 59, 60–1; depoliticization xvii, 4, 15, 60, 62, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117–18, 146, 147, 150, 151, 169, 182, 186, 190–1, 192, 194, 198, 201–2; discourse, discursive approach to 106, 107, 197; economic growth 108–9; feminist politics 14, 37, 40–8, 55–6, 106–8 (of identity 42; of equality, redistribution 36, 40, 41, 43, 48, 55; of recognition 36, 40, 41–2, 43, 44, 48, 49, 55, 56; of transformation 36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 55–6); form/content 109; from government to governance 108–9, 192; gender equality/inequality 2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 55, 56–65, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 106, 107, 109, 117, 122, 143, 156, 170 (political concept 2, 31, 155, 156; political goal 1, 68, 106, 155); gender politics 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 56–65, 106, 107, 110–16, 117; ‘Mitdenken’ 65, 193, 195; national/international/supranational/ local arenas 155, 186, 191–2, 203; ‘pain-free politics’ 117–18; political arena 13, 54, 56, 59, 64, 88, 117; political categories 52; the political/ politics 107, 117; political subject 26–7; politicization 107–8, 109–10, 115, 118, 201 (gender 54, 55, 56–65, 75, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, 116–17, 118, 201); power 44, 107–8, 118; reflexivity 27–9; regionalism 108–9; Schmittian trap 64; struggle xv, 2, 14, 94, 100, 109; suffrage 47–8, 71; transformative gender equality politics 8, 9, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61–5, 81, 142, 194; ‘transformatory’ politics 100; woman xiv, xv, 57–61, 62, 63–4, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76–7, 78, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147–7, 151, 188 (quotas 3, 8, 48, 63, 143, 147, 151; representation 44,

59, 63–4, 77, 106, 110, 111, 112–13, 115, 116, 129, 143, 145, 148); see also democracy; discourse; discursive politics; neoliberalism; policy; policymaking; power; Walby, Sylvia postcolonialism 46; and globalization 46; feminism 37, 44, 45–6 postmodernism 196; power/knowledge 38; voice 32 poststructuralism: knowledge 37; poststructuralist discourse psychology 26–7, 29 (political subject 26) power 44, 80, 118, 190, 193, 196, 201; depoliticization xvii, 4, 15, 60, 62, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117–18, 146, 147, 150, 151, 169, 182, 186, 190–1, 192, 194, 198, 201–2; discourse 23, 30, 54, 198 (power of 9, 12, 30, 198); feminism 2, 16, 54; Foucault, Michel 23, 25, 54; framing processes 9, 12, 13, 14, 19; gender 2, 4, 9, 14, 54, 59, 60, 79, 111, 112, 116–17, 118, 142, 190; intersectionality 80, 87, 89; material power bases 187, 193; media 40; policymaking evaluation 169, 170, 173, 178, 181, 182, 201; power/knowledge 25, 36, 37–8, 40, 46, 47, 48, 87; power relations 2, 4, 9, 14, 54, 59, 60, 79, 111, 112, 116–17, 118, 133, 142, 146, 149, 156, 165, 190; reputation 170; soft power 124, 131, 133; structural gendered power 123–4, 127, 130, 131, 133; voice and empowerment 29, 32, 132, 133–4, 142, 166–7, 187, 194, 199, 202–3; see also actors; discourse; gender equality; hegemonic discourses; knowledge; policy; politics prostitution 27–8, 32, 75–6; Austria 71, 72, 74, 75–6; Netherlands 27, 28, 155; Slovenia 71, 72, 74, 75–6; Sweden 154; United Kingdom 27–8, 32; see also intersectionality psychoanalysis 54 psychology 140; discourse 22, 26, 29; frame analysis 19, 20, 24; poststructuralism 26, 29; social psychology 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 81; see also discourse Quality in gender equality policies (QUING) xviii race 10, 36, 45, 69, 75, 78–9, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 91, 199; domestic violence 70–1;

Index Germany 92–3, 95; institutionalization 88; United States 94–5; see also intersectionality reflexivity 4, 5, 54, 56, 64, 88, 182, 192–6, 198; Bacchi, Carol 4, 19, 21, 28–30, 31, 79, 164, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200; Foucault, Michel 27; Giddens, Anthony 27; policymakers 199–201; policymaking 164–5, 187, 198, 199–203; political practices 27–9; reflexive framing 19, 28–30, 31, 142, 165, 187, 192–6, 198 (dual-focus research agenda 29–30, 31); research practices 27–9; see also Bacchi, Carol relativism xvi, 41; gender equality concept 14, 36, 189, 194, 196; knowledge 38; see also Walby, Sylvia research 109, 161, 162; reflexive framing 29–30, 166; reflexivity 27–9, 165, 165, 193–6 rights 90–1, 92; homosexual rights 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79; human rights 47, 60, 63, 80, 92, 189; United States 90, 91, 94–5, 96, 97, 188; see also intersectionality Rönnblom, Malin xii, 15, 105–20, 188, 195, 197; economic growth 15, 105–20, 190, 197; European Union 15, 105–20; from government to governance 108–9, 192; gender equality 105–20, 190, 191, neoliberalism 15, 105, 107; politicization 107–8, 197, 201; regional policy 105, 107, 108, 188, 190; see also economy; policy; politics Schön, Donald 24 science 37–8, 40, 89, 159; scientific method 49; see also knowledge Slovenia 56, 65; intersectionality 72, 73, 74; prostitution 71, 72, 74, 75–6, 79; see also intersectionality Snow, David 12, 16, 20, 90, 91, 161 Socialism 39, 43–4; Germany 92–3; Spain 143, 144, 151 sociology: agency/structure relation 25; frame analysis 19, 24; science 37 Spain 56, 65, 73; domestic violence 143, 144, 147; family policies 143, 155; homosexual rights 71, 72, 74, 75, 79; policymaking 139, 143–6, 147, 148, 149, 151, 155, 188; Socialism 143, 144, 151; women’s inequality in politics 143, 147, 151; see also intersectionality; policymaking Squires, Judith 5, 41, 44, 63, 68;

215

displacement 56, 166; inclusion 56, 59, 61, 62, 63, 166; reversal, 56, 61, 62, 63, 166 state 89, 143, 193; nation-state 89, 108, 109, 117; neoliberalism 117; power 170; representation in state legislatures 44; reputation 170–1; suffrage 47–8; see also democracy; policy; politics structure 10, 12, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63, 122; agency/structure relation 11, 25, 89–92, 193; de-gendered 61; structure of power 55, 62; see also agency; institution Sweden: gender equality 15, 106, 107, 110–13, 115, 116–17, 118, 119, 170, 181, 197; growth 108, 110–13, 116, 190, 197; politics 106; prostitution 155; regional policy 106, 107, 108–9, 110–13, 116, 117, 188, 190, 197; Rönnblom, Malin 15, 105–20, 188, 190, 197; suffrage 48; Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK) 112, 113, 119; Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS) 112, 119 Third World: developing countries 121, 124, 125–6, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133; feminism 46; Third/First World relation 46; women 45 trade policy 15, 121–34; actors 122–3, 124, 125, 130–1, 132, 133, 134; civil society actors 123, 124, 133–4; Cotonou Agreement 128, 129, 130; critical frame analysis 122; democracy 129–30, 131, 133, 134; developing countries 121, 124, 125–6, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133; development 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133; discursive politics 122–4; European Commission Directorate General (DG) of Trade 123–4, 129; European Parliament (EP) 126–7, 128, 132; European Union 15, 121, 123–34, 188, 190, 197; gender 121; gender inequalities 121, 124; gender mainstreaming 15, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134; globalization 121, 122, 124, 134; human rights 122, 124, 126–7, 128, 131, 132–3, 134, 189; International Labour Organization (ILO) 2, 128–9, 130, 197; labour market 121, 124, 125, 131; labour standards 127–9, 131, 134; market 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 133, 134; neoliberalism 121, 123–9, 131–4

216

Index

(neocolonialism 130, 133, 134; neoliberal frame 122, 124, 125–6, 127, 131, 133, 134); non-governmental organization (NGO) 123, 125, 127, 129–30, 133, 134; policymaking 123, 127–8, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134; soft power 124, 131, 133; structural gendered power 123–4, 127, 130, 131, 133; Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) 125–6, 131, 132, 134; trade/ gender impact 121, 123–4, 125, 128, 129, 132–3; True, Jacqui 15, 121–37, 188, 190; Women in International Development Europe (WIDE) 125, 127, 129, 130, 133; World Trade Organization (WTO) 121, 122–3, 128; see also economy; European Union; gender equality; neoliberalism Transnational applied research in gender equity training (TARGET) xviii Treaties, Charters, Directives, Documents 89–90, 179; authoritative texts 11, 89–90, 98; Amsterdam Treaty 69, 82, 113, 122, 134; Charter of Fundamental Rights 69, 82; Commission Green Paper 80; Council Directive 69, 82; International Labour Organization (ILO) 128; Lisbon Strategy 105, 106, 122, 134, 155, 174; Treaty of Lisbon 69, 82 True, Jacqui xiii, 121–37; democracy 129–30, 131, 133, 134; development 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133; European Union 15, 121, 123–34, 188, 190, 197; gender mainstreaming 15, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130–3, 134; human rights 122, 124, 126–7, 128, 131, 132–3, 134; neoliberalism 121, 123–9, 131–4; trade policy 15, 121–37, 188, 190, 197; see also trade policy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 48 United Nations 128, 155, 191; gender equality 2, 116; UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 177; UN Committee on Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 3–4, 128; UN Human Development Project (UNDP) 44, 46–7, 183; UN World Conference on Women, Beijing 82, 156, 176 (Beijing review process 173–4, 176–7; Platform for Action 176–7) United States 90, 93; anti-discrimination 96–7; citizenship 94, 96, 99; gender

equality 15; intersectionality 86, 88, 90, 92, 94–5, 96–7, 99, 197; race 94–5; rights 90, 91, 94–5, 96, 188; suffrage 48; see also intersectionality United Kingdom 175; intersectionality 86; pension system 43; prostitution 27–8, 32; suffrage 48 Verloo, Mieke xiii; critical frame analysis 10, 15, 27, 153–68, 169–84; discursive politics 5, 10, 15–16, 186–203 (policy frame 11); frame analysis 16; gender equality 1–16, 57, 154, 186–203; intersectionality in European gender equality policies 36, 63, 68–84, 88, 149, 180, 189, 199; policymaking evaluation 15, 47, 150, 153–68, 169–84, 194, 200; political rationality 142, 202; procedural rationality 138, 139; see also gender equality; intersectionality; policymaking evaluation Vleuten, Anna van der xiii, 16, 203; discursive politics 15, 193; frame analysis 15, 169–84; policymaking evaluation 15, 47, 132, 169–84; see also policymaking evaluation Walby, Sylvia xiii, 196, 201; argument, argumentation 14, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43–4, 45, 46, 47, 48–9, 193, 195, 196, 201 (power of 36, 196); difference 36, 37, 41–3, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49 (equality/ difference dichotomy 40, 42, 43–4, 45, 46, 56); discursive politics 16; feminist theory 38, 39, 45, 48, 49; Foucault, Michel 36, 37–8, 40; gender roles 60; Habermas, Jürgen 40, 45; intersectionality 87, 91; knowledge 36, 37–40, 48 (theories 37–40; power/ knowledge 36, 37–8, 40, 46, 47, 48; production 36, 37); politics 14, 37, 40–8, 55–6 (of identity 42; of equality, redistribution 36, 40, 41, 43, 48, 55; of recognition 36, 40, 41–2, 43, 44, 48, 49, 55, 56; of transformation 36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 55–6); politics of location 14, 37, 41–2, 44, 45, 48, 49, 189 (social location 36, 37, 40, 48); postcolonial feminism 37, 44, 45–6; power 37, 46, 48; power of doubt 48, 193, 195; relativism 14, 36, 41, 189, 194, 196; United Nations Human Development Project (UNDP) 44, 46–7; see also intersectionality

Index women 8, 31; citizenship 16, 41, 99; decision-making 3, 4, 114, 129, 130, 134; democracy 58, 63–4; domestic violence 60–1, 148; economy 21, 60, 125–6, 129, 131; educational role 75; entrepreneurship 110, 111, 114, 115, 117; European Women’s Lobby’s (EWL) 80; human rights 122, 124, 126–7, 128, 131, 132–3, 134, 189; labour market xv, 4, 5–6, 41, 43, 57, 58, 60, 98, 121, 124, 125, 126, 143, 148, 155; Muslim 75; networks 4, 98; organization of citizenship, labour and intimacy 10, 16; pension system 3, 43; politics xiv, xv; prostitution 27–8, 32, 75–6; rape 14, 156; representation in state legislatures 44, 58, 63–4; suffrage

217

47–8, 71; Third World women 45; traditional role 6, 75 (carer, mother, housewife 60, 93, 98, 145, 146); trafficking 28, 75, 76, 179; welfare support 41, 97, 147; women’s movement xiv, 21, 60, 106, 132; women’s resource centres 111, 118; women’s rights as human rights 126–7, 189; working mothers 60; see also economy; feminism; gender equality; policy; policymaking; politics Women in International Development Europe (WIDE) 125, 127, 129, 130, 133; see also trade policy World Bank 47 World Trade Organization (WTO) 121, 122–3, 128