THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS
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THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS
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THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS A study in nineteenth-century intellectual history D
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STEFAN COLLINI DONALD WINCH JOHNBURROW
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON NEW YORK NEWROCHELLE MELBOURNE SYDNEY
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www. Cambridge. org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521257626 © Cambridge University Press 1983 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1983 Re-issued in this digitally printed version 2008 A catalogue recordfor this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 83-7696 ISBN 978-0-521-25762-6 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-27770-9 paperback
. . . that noble Science of Politics,. . . which, of all sciences, is the most important to the welfare of nations, - which, of all sciences, most tends to expand and invigorate the mind, - which draws nutriment and ornament from every part of philosophy and literature, and dispenses, in return, nutriment and ornament to all. T. B. MACAULAY(l829)
CONTENTS
Preface
ix
PROLOGUE:
The governing science: things political and the intellectual historian i The system of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils 11 Higher maxims: happiness versus wealth in Malthus and Ricardo 111 The cause of good government: Philosophic Whigs versus Philosophic Radicals iv The tendencies of things: John Stuart Mill and the philosophic method v Sense and circumstances: Bagehot and the nature of political understanding vi All that glitters: political science and the lessons of history VII The clue to the maze: the appeal of the Comparative Method V I I I Particular polities: political economy and the historical method ix The ordinary experience of civilised life: Sidgwick and the method of reflective analysis x A separate science: polity and society in Marshall's economics
vn
i 23 63 91 127 161 183 207 247 277 309
viii
Contents
xi A place in the syllabus: political science at Cambridge
339
EPILOGUE:
A nebulous province: the science of politics in the early twentieth century
365
Index
379
PREFACE
The intellectually respectable reasons for writing this book are given in our Prologue. Here we should record that our collaboration is the outcome of common tastes and interests, shared teaching duties, and, above all, friendship. Every stage in the planning and execution of the book has involved very close, and often highly convivial, co-operation; both the closeness and the conviviality have made it difficult in some cases to remember who should now be credited with particular ideas or phrases. We have decided, therefore, to accept full collective responsibility for the book as a whole, and to mark this fact by not assigning authorship to the individual essays in the main text. For those - apart from ourselves - who are interested in such matters, the Prologue is the joint effort of all three authors; Essays i, n, and in were written by Winch; Essay iv by Collini; Essays v and vi by Burrow; Essay vn by Burrow and Collini; Essays VIII and ix by Collini; Essay x by Winch and Collini; Essay xi and the Epilogue by Collini. The only exception to our practice of collective responsibility is the following sentence. Donald Winch and John Burrow wish to pay tribute to the qualities of energy and tact, at times much needed, with which Stefan Collini has discharged the dual office of being both the team's captain and its leading scorer: but for his promptings this book would most probably not have been started, and without his coaxing, his reproaches, and his example it would almost certainly never have been finished. All three authors are indebted to the University of Sussex for support and stimulation of various kinds. For assistance and congenial surroundings, Stefan Collini is in addition grateful to the History of Ideas Unit of the Australian National University; Donald Winch to the King's College Research Centre, Cambridge; John Burrow to the Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California at Berkeley. Collectively we would like to thank Patricia Williams for her encouragement and advice; ix
x
Preface
Sheldon Rothblatt for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of Essay xi; and Janice Bowen for her help in preparing the final typescript. We particularly wish to express thanks to our friends Geoffrey Hawthorn, David Lieberman, and John Thompson, but for whose searching and immensely thorough reading of the script as a whole this book would have appeared somewhat sooner.
PROLOGUE a
p
The governing science: things political and the intellectual historian I take this defect among the Brobdingnagians to haverisenfrom their Ignorance; by not having hitherto reduced Politicks into a Science as the more acute Wits of Europe have done. For, I remember very well, in a Discourse one Day with the King; when I happened to say, there were several thousand Books among us written upon the Art of Government; it gave him (directly contrary to my Intention) a very mean Opinion of our Understandings. J O N A T H A N S W I F T , Gulliver's
Travels
(IJ26)
Is not the pastness of the past the profounder, the completer, the more legendary, the more immediately before the present it falls? THOMASMANN, The Magic Mountain (1924)
book deals with some of the forms taken by the aspiration to develop a 'science of polities' in nineteenth-century Britain. By speaking of an 'aspiration' we point to a project which was in some sense perpetually falling short of its realisation; by referring to 'forms' we indicate the diversity of the endeavours which issued from this common aspiration; and by limiting ourselves to 'some' of these forms we signal that we have not attempted a comprehensive survey or continuous narrative. Instead, we have conducted our enquiry by means of a set of linked essays, organised in rough chronological sequence, which consider the fortunes of a variety of intellectual enterprises that may often seem to be united by little more than the persistent invocation of the labels 'science of politics' or 'political science'. For what brings together the figures considered in this book is certainly not best thought of either as their common articulation of a corpus of knowledge, or as their shared allegiance to a single idea whose progressively more sophisticated expression could be traced in a uniform sequence of chapters. Rather, they gain their place by virtue of their interest in pursuing the notion that 'things political' - the vagueness of the traditional phrase is convenient at this stage - could be treated in ways which were at once systematic and concrete, ways which it would be unduly restrictive to describe as 'empirical' but which certainly aspired to a form of knowledge that was objective, explanatory, and useful. This notion is, for reasons to be explored below, only indirectly related to what the twentieth century has come to know as the discipline of political science. Indeed, during the nineteenth century it embraced much of the territory now assigned to the semi-autonomous dominions of economics and sociology, just as it was itself constituted by unspecified areas of the larger continents of history and philosophy. Moreover, we are also concerned with what might be called its external relations, with its place in the larger and scarcely less traditional category of the moral sciences. We are dealing, therefore, with a subject which no longer appears on modern maps of knowledge, at least not as the extensive though vaguely delimited empire it once was. Consequently, although some of the figures who appear in these pages have been the objects of intensive study in other contexts - this is true, in varying degrees, of Malthus, Macaulay, James and John Stuart Mill, Bagehot, Maine, Sidgwick, Marshall and Wallas they are here seen from a distinctive point of view and set alongside other figures whose comparative obscurity has followed from the historiographical neglect of the subject-matter as a whole; the list here would include Dugald Stewart, James Mackintosh, William Stubbs, E. A.
THIS
4
The governing science
Freeman, J. R. Seeley, T. E. Cliffe Leslie, W. J. Ashley and James Bryce. Macaulay's extravagant encomium, from which our title is taken, is sufficient indication that the aspiration with which we are dealing was in its heyday hardly a modest one, just as from this distance the enterprise it describes may now seem a curiously alien one. In our choice of a sub-title we are also making something of a declaration of intent, and it is one which is bound up with what we have already said about our subject-matter's lack of an easily recognisable modern identity. For there is an unfortunately familiar way of simplifying the complexity of the intellectual life of the past into a conveniently unified story, one that is particularly favoured when supposedly tracing the history of a modern academic discipline, especially, perhaps, a discipline drawn from what are now regarded as the social sciences. In essence it consists in writing history backwards. The present theoretical consensus of the discipline, or possibly some polemical version of what that consensus should be, is in effect taken as definitive, and the past is then reconstituted as a teleology leading up to and fully manifested in it. Past authors are inducted into the canon of the discipline as precursors or forebears, and passed in review as though by a general distributing medals - and sometimes reprimands - at the end of a successful campaign, with the useful implied corollary that if medals can be distributed the campaign must have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion and the discipline duly established. The list of canonical precursors, arrayed in chronological order, each wearing a label conveniently summarising his 'contribution', then becomes the history of the discipline in question. As with 'official histories' in recently established republics, rival teams of great predecessors may be assembled in this way, ostensibly to proclaim and honour a tradition of surprising antiquity, but in fact to legitimate the claims of the current protagonists in the struggle for power. The approach exhibited in these essays can be defined by its conscious rejection of this notion of the history of single disciplines - in this case, prima facie, of political science - as a way of writing about the past. However polemically useful or pedagogically suggestive such a practice might be within the discipline itself, possibly as a way of drawing nourishment or some other form of comfort from the past, it can have no claim to adequacy or even interest as intellectual history - our common concern here. By implicitly assuming that the discipline has in some ideal sense long existed, though in ways that were only partially disclosed and understood in the past, the teleological history of disciplines superimposes the intellectual map of the present, or some version of it, on the usually significantly differing ones employed in earlier periods, often to the point of obliterating them entirely. New lines of intellectual division are enforced on those who were quite capable of drawing their own, and connec-
Things political and the intellectual historian
5
tions which transgress twentieth-century distinctions are dismissed or obscured. The 'contributions' made by past authors are approvingly sifted from the texts in which they occur, and the residue, along with the contexts which gave these texts their contemporary point and which still give intelligibility to their underlying assumptions, are tacitly ignored. The distortions which arise in pursuing discipline history in this fashion are essentially those classically denounced by Herbert Butterfield as 'The Whig Interpretation of History', and in the extended sense that has since been given to that term the authors of this book would be glad to be described as 'anti-whig'. There are, of course, further, though less immediately pressing, forms of distortion which, in attempting to recover the past in its own terms, we also intend to repudiate; we are not, for example, indulging any of those covert forms of reductionism implicit in studies of 'ideology'. However, even within the work of those who are committed to a genuinely historical re-creation of the past there lurks a subtler kind of distortion, one which we feel a particular wish to disown since it seems to occur most readily in the history of political thought. While we have, we trust, been properly respectful of our authors' intentions and continually alert to their contexts, we have tried to avoid either an overly rationalistic construal of the former or a too mechanical deployment of the latter. For, in recovering the contemporary questions which past authors may have been addressing, the historian may easily lapse into portraying the complex process of thought and feeling involved in, let us say, writing a book, as little more than an automatic response to a few very selectively described outside events. In striving to reconstitute an intention which could intelligibly be embodied in the work in question, the historian may not always avoid the danger of turning its author into an implausibly single-minded and clear-sighted deliberator who unerringly arrived at what has insensibly come to seem the only rational solution to the reconstructed problem. These lapses may arise as much from a failure of art, no doubt, as from any oversimplification in the methodology which the practice claims to be following, but they are exacerbated by a tendency - again, historians of political thought may be particularly prone to this - to confine the intellectual historian's task, with needless austerity, to that of re-assembling a set of arguments which, when bolted together at the appropriate angles, constitute the logical structure of a theory (the restriction of the interesting past to 'theories' is a characteristic accompanying distortion). We take it, by contrast, to be part of the defining vocation of the intellectual historian to be alive to the several dimensions of the thought and feeling of the past. Without in any way scouting the logic of their arguments, we have certainly attempted in these essays also to attend to the
6
The governing science
sensibilities of our authors, to the emotional and aesthetic satisfactions they derived from their views, to the styles and genres in which they chose (and in some cases could not but choose) to express them, and to the constant tensions between, on the one hand, the unevenly experienced pressure towards coherence, and, on the other, the desire, not always articulated or even acknowledged, to hold on to certain deeply felt intuitions, a process of internal negotiation which was itself always subject to the demands of occupying a particular station or of addressing a particular audience. We have, accordingly, not confined ourselves to our authors' formal treatises and dress-suited programmatic pronouncements, but have gratefully accepted the illumination provided by occasional writings, letters, contemporary reminiscence, and similar sources. And while we have generally organised our essays around individuals and groups of individuals, we have tried to make room for the independent operation of the power, at once stimulating and constraining, of intellectual tradition, and to allow for the role of fashion, circumstance, and chance. Just how successfully we have realised these rather grand aspirations is, of course, another matter, but at least the failings of the essays which follow are not attributable to our taking a narrow or one-sided view of the intellectual historian's metier. Before proceeding to a fuller description of our subject-matter, there are two final features of the approach adopted here about which it may be as well to counter possible misapprehensions in advance. The first involves what might be called a variant of the 'fat oxen fallacy', that is, the common assumption that in choosing to write about a particular, and often particularly articulate, past figure the intellectual historian is thereby endorsing thisfigure'sviews or in some other way subscribing to the 'position' which he is taken to represent. Although a scholar's choice of subject may often reveal certain affinities, and although some element of imaginative sympathy with those about whom one writes may be indispensable to good history, we wish to emphasise, what the tenor of parts of the following essays will in any case soon reveal, that in drawing attention to figures who have suffered certain kinds of scholarly neglect or misinterpretation we do not take ourselves to be recommending their views or advocating a return to their methods. Indeed, the diversity of views and methods, some of them mutually contradictory, would make this a pretty unpromising venture anyway. It is certainly true that some of our cast display qualities we find attractive - qualities of historical insight or analytical discrimination, of respect for complexity or sense of proportion, and much else besides. But these positive qualities were very unevenly distributed among the figures discussed here -James Mill is not readily associated with respect for complexity nor Freeman with a sense of proportion - and a list of their
Things political and the intellectual historian
7
less attractive traits could be compiled no less easily. At all events, our treatment should make clear that we are hardly offering this book as a celebration of a lost Golden Age of political wisdom. This naturally raises the second matter about which there may be some misapprehension, namely, that we may be thought to be assessing the faltering performances of our cast against the standard of some ideal form of political science, a ghost at the feast, unseen, yet sitting in judgement on all. What we have said about our aversion to discipline-history should already have done something to dampen this expectation, and we hope it is unnecessary to labour the point that we are not conducting an inquisition in which all the victims are bound to be found wanting in a doctrine that is both exacting and esoteric. In individual cases we have certainly not refrained from remarking some of the more obvious limitations and confusions in the ideas discussed, and we have throughout observed the unresolved tension between the claims of inductive and deductive approaches to the kinds of political knowledge thought to be available and desirable. But to make such observations does not require us to be in possession of the political scientist's stone: we remain agnostic on such fundamental and ultimately epistemological problems, content, as perhaps historians should be, to leave their resolution to the philosophers. Having rejected the retrospective teleology of discipline-history, one is, of course, left with the problem of delimiting one's subject-matter in other ways. We certainly believe that our protagonists and their concerns have something in common, something which separates them from other figures and issues in the general field of nineteenth-century social and political thought, and something which by its very nature encourages us to distance ourselves from the main historiographical dispensations that prevail in writing about this field. Put negatively, as is appropriate here, we do not consider our authors - though some, in another context, might warrant such treatment- as political philosophers, chiefly concerned to deduce from general moral ends the nature of the good life for men in society; nor, conversely, are they primarily philosophers of history for whom the category of the political is deprived of all significant autonomy by incorporation in some larger story of the unfolding and mutation of social and economic forms. It is perhaps easier to grasp the demarcation of our subject-matter from the first of these types than from the second. Although all our authors could no doubt be said to have pre-supposed certain fundamental notions about the grounds of moral obligation or the nature of a just polity, and although some of them, notably Mill and Sidgwick, dealt explicitly with such matters in other works, it is clear that our concern with their projects for a science of politics is addressed to a
8
The governing science
different type and level of enquiry. But the boundaries between such projects and what we are here calling philosophies of history may be more difficult to locate, especially where our authors tied their understanding of politics to some more general notion of progress, as in the case, to single out only the best-known examples, of Mill, Macaulay, and Maine. In part, these boundaries must be allowed to emerge in the course of our discussion of the particular figures, especially in Essays iv, vi, and vn. But it may be helpful at this stage to observe that the philosophies of history which we take to fall outside the limits of this book are characteristically distinguished by their claims to universal, even cosmic, purchase, their compression of history into a single teleology, and their specification of both the moral or social goal and the series of stages by which it is to be realised as such functional wholes that instructed political action comes to seem either impossible or irrelevant. Comte, Spencer, and the diverse followers of Hegel provide the most familiar nineteenth-century examples, though as the special case of Hegel's own theory suggests, the grounding of such comprehensive teleologies in a more general metaphysical or evolutionary scheme was not of itself sufficient to displace the political from its traditional centrality. On the other hand, in nineteenth-century Britain the extreme historicist position is represented rather, as in the case of Spencer, by the systematic deduction from a beneficient historical process of a radically individualist, even anarchist consummation. Such decidedly negative conceptions of political action fall outside anything considered here, and while philosophies of history, especially in the form of schemes of social evolutionism, exercised a growing attraction in mid-Victorian Britain, and although several of our authors were clearly responsive to them, it is on account of their engagement with a different set of enterprises that they merit inclusion here. To have a notion, for which there can of course be numerous specific vocabularies, of 'the political' as embodying possibilities of circumscribed initiative, conditioned but not wholly determined by circumstances, was obviously to hold a balance: to believe both that there are external conditions, either perennial or at least of sufficient generality to be worth identifying in more than purely local terms, which effective political activity must respect, and also that political activity of an instructed and considered kind and of potentially far-reaching significance is possible. To press further in the voluntarist or optimistic direction would be to become the adviser to or imaginary embodiment of an all-but-omnipotent legislator, for whom, apart from goodwill, the chief desideratum is clarity of mind and purpose: Rousseau and the early Bentham offer familiar examples. At the outer limit in this direction lies Utopia. Press instead in the opposite direction and there are the familiar features of the historicist as
Things political and the intellectual historian
9
obstetrician, or, in another idiom, the advocate of praxis, gambling that next time the machinery of the historical process is bound to deliver the jackpot if banged hard enough. These extremes have an arresting emotional flamboyance which challenges the reader, demanding rejection or conversion; and with the latter, one is immediately rewarded, as converts usually are, with established procedures for finding the world less puzzling, and for becoming articulate and authoritative. This, together with the fact that their coherence and high level of abstraction make them suitable for pedagogical summary, has ensured that when the histories of social and political thought are written it is the extremes, the closed doctrines, that tend to provide the recognised moments of the story, and out of which the 'isms' and 'traditions' are constructed. What we have tried to present here is not a rival 'tradition' or parallel story of transmission and development, so much as a succession of attempts to occupy and explore the role of informed student of the conditions and possibilities of politics, and of the institutional structures through which it works. Our authors showed no close agreement on, or even identical degree of interest in, the extent to which politics was or was not merely a matter of accepting surrounding necessities. None of them held - what few in fact hold, though more proclaim - that politics is so much a matter of time and place and circumstance that all political wisdom is necessarily purely local and essentially inarticulate. But some were more attracted to the study of the historical and institutional frame, others to the possibilities of legislation and foresight - differences that may themselves be susceptible of historical explanation. It is only by contrast with the extremes that we have an identifiable middle ground, and at the margins there was inevitably a good deal of intellectual exchange and flirtation, a mingling of concepts, vocabularies, and beliefs. There are two currently available historiographical categories to which this subject-matter might be assigned, neither of which, in our opinion, would be altogether appropriate. The first is that of the history of political theory, that familiar procession of dignitaries stretching, in England during this period, from Bentham and Burke to Mill and Green, all decked out in their most ambitious philosophical finery, all shorn of distracting involvements in current political affairs, all fixing their gaze on the distant question of the grounds of political obligation, all carrying banners inscribed with the mottoes of the larger 'isms'. An informed nineteenthcentury observer, confronted with the sight of this well-drilled procession, might have some difficulty in identifying his erstwhile contemporaries: Burke, for example, looks distinctly uncomfortable in his tight-fitting philosophical collar, and even Bentham seems more at home with a neighbouring group of Law Lords than in a fitting-room dominated
io
The governing science
by busts of Plato and Aristotle. But our nineteenth-century observer, having more or less inferred the theme, would particularly remark the absentees: where, for instance, was Bagehot, shrewdest analyst of the realities of the constitution; where Maine, whose method dominated a whole generation's reflections on politics; where Seeley, Sidgwick, and half a dozen others? And in so remarking, our hypothetical observer would not so much be pleading for the procession to be enlarged by the inclusion of one or two underrated figures, as challenging the whole notion that the varieties of reflection on things political that were important in nineteenth-century Britain could be represented in this way at all. He might vary his complaint by explaining that two of the most prominent sources of practical political wisdom for him and his contemporaries had been, broadly speaking, history and political economy, yet neither of these seemed to figure in the procession at all. This observation calls up that other historiographical category to which our subject-matter might, at first sight, seem to belong, the history of the social sciences. The procession here is rather more disorderly, partly organised in terms of the alumni associations of the various constituent disciplines, partly in terms of an affiliation to a central conception of the nature of the distinctively 'social'. The fact that it is usually led by such sociological nabobs as Comte, Durkheim and Weber indicates how far it is from providing congenial company for our cast, and the fact that it has often been thought difficult to assemble a respectable British contingent at all may suggest a more radical mis-match still. Indeed, the very category of 'social science' has been construed in ways which make it unreceptive and even hostile to the more traditional notions of the centrality and relative autonomy of politics entertained by our figures. Insofar as social science has been identified with the discovery of essentially self-regulating or historicist models of 'economy' and 'society', it has been taken to undercut any independent treatment of'polity', reducing it, in fact, to something which is necessarily epiphenomehal or subservient to more powerful forces. That the procession of canonical political theorists is generally regarded as petering out at roughly the point at which the social sciences seem to be picking up strength has been interpreted as 'the erosion of the distinctively political' by the rise of the 'sociological perspective'. Interestingly, the timing of this takeover seems very uncertain, some placing it fairly precisely in the 1840s, others more loosely in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,x but in 1
The most arresting and inclusive statement of this thesis can be found in Sheldon Wolin's Politics and Vision; Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, i960), chs. 9 and 10: the case for placing the change in the 1840s, on the grounds that it required making a clear distinction between political and social relationships, is rehearsed in W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1963), ch. 2.
Things political and the intellectual historian
11
either case it is hard to accommodate the continued vitality of the idea of a science of politics in nineteenth-century Britain. There is a good deal of irony in all this, as there usually is with teleological and anachronistic readings of history. Thus, many of the figures who appear in our early essays, far from feeling threatened with extinction when writing on politics, acted and wrote as though they were building on foundations for a science of politics that had been well and truly laid in the eighteenth century by some of the very same authors who, according to modern discipline-historians, were in the business of founding social sciences that would fatally undermine the serious study of politics. The best examples here are Montesquieu, who was to be praised, somewhat condescendingly, by Comte and Durkheim for having perceived the importance of 'social laws' and 'social facts'; Adam Smith, whose concept of the 'invisible hand' and of the self-regulating properties of a competitive economic system could be made to seem quintessentially a-political; and those Scottish moral philosophers and historians of civil society, again including Smith, usually in the company of Adam Ferguson and John Millar, who were, without knowing it, creating the preconditions for a materialist form of historicism. 2 Fortunately, as we remark below, more scholarly work has recently done something to rescue these eighteenth-century figures from the grosser forms of misrepresentation, but the nineteenth century has been less well served. Partly this is because the category of 'the political' is then faced with genuine challenges from other, related, and often more comprehensive intellectual projects, especially from the mid-century onwards; and there has been a tendency to extend this insight backwards and sideways to cover a longer period and a larger number of writers than is really legitimate. As we shall see in some of our later essays - most strikingly, perhaps, in that on Sidgwick - devotees of the science of politics in the second half of the nineteenth century increasingly had to come to terms with the cultural hegemony of 'the philosophy of history' and 'the science of society'. To study ideas of a science of politics in the later nineteenth century, in a climate of expansive optimism about the prospects for social science generally, may appear to have some affinities with the business of tagging a species threatened with extinction. To recognise them as still retaining a discernible intellectual identity and family resemblance may often seem to require a rather finicky sense of discrimination. Nevertheless, the recognition that they do have distinctive qualities, and that important elements of nineteenth-century discourse, habits of thought 2
The last of these positions is particularly associated with the work of R. L. Meek on the Scottish historical school: see, for example, his Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge, 1976).
12
The governing science
and intellectual aspiration are lost if we lose sight of them in attending to what may now seem the bigger and more portentous battalions of Historicism, Social Evolutionism, and Social Science, is one justification for writing this book. Our cast may not be distinguished by having a numerous twentieth-century progeny, and in this as well as other senses their aspirations may not seem to have reached a satisfactory fulfilment; but we do not consider it a reason for ignoring them that their relationship to their seed was less like Abraham's and more like Onan's. There is one further feature of our subject-matter which calls for comment here, especially since it may seem to be the weakest part of our case for eschewing discipline-history. In several of the following essays, most notably Essays i, n, iv, vm, and x, we deal fairly extensively with political economy. Our reason for this is, of course, that during this period political economy was regarded as, in the phrase used by Adam Smith himself, 'a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator' (a classification which we consider more fully below), and it is this which has dictated our treatment. We have, that is to say, not directly concerned ourselves with the development of a body of economic theory, but rather with the ways in which the conclusions of the subject, which were themselves disputable and, from various quarters, disputed, seemed to contemporaries to bear on the solution of the most general political problems, and also with the ways in which, in its reasoning, it provided something of a model for the other moral sciences, or at least the arena in which methodological battles of wider import could be fought out. Economics has, on the whole, been better served by discipline-history than any of its neighbours, though at the usual cost of losing sight of some of the most important ways in which political economy was woven into the fabric of nineteenth-century intellectual life. If we have only infrequently cited this extensive and, by its lights, excellent secondary literature here, that is because it does not seem to have gone very far towards capturing what is of interest about such figures as Malthus, Mill, Marshall, or the historical economists when considered in relation to the aspiration to develop a science of politics. The final way in which we must clarify the scope of this book is by explaining its chronological limits, and here, too, the existence of established bodies of secondary literature is relevant, if in a different way. It follows from what has already been said about our anti-whig convictions that we have not selected some preferred moment in the academic history of the twentieth century as our telos. Nonetheless, the arrival in the early part of this century of university departments of politics or political science does provide a convenient terminus, though this certainly does not mean that the enterprise we have been considering has at this point grown up or reached fruition. There is both continuity and discontinuity here. It
Things political and the intellectual historian
13
is noticeable that the majority of the figures discussed in the second half of the book held university posts of one kind or another at some point in their lives, though rather fewer of them could properly be regarded as professional academics; and, like their twentieth-century counterparts, they were anxious to secure a place in the syllabus for their version of the study of things political. In fact, Essay xi is entirely devoted to an episode in which they achieved a remarkable degree of success in this. At the same time, as we observe in our Epilogue, the familiar processes of specialisation and professionalisation were beginning to work, or at least accompany, a modification in conceptions of 'polities' - and, for that matter, 'science* - the proper discussion of which would require a separate and rather different book; and thereafter much of the story disappears into the archives of university departments and professional associations. From the vantage-point we hope to have established by the time we reach the end of the nineteenth century we cast a very brief glance over later developments, but essentially they do not form part of our subject-matter. Our starting-point requires a fuller justification, for the belief that politics could be made the subject of a systematic body of knowledge, useful to statesman and citizen alike, can, if one is not too fastidious about apparent discontinuities, be traced back to Thucydides and Aristotle. Even for more modern notions of a science of politics as involving a particular kind of ordered knowledge about civic life in units other than the ancient city-state, there are various possible points of departure, each enjoying a certain amount of scholarly endorsement and plausibility: Machiavelli, Harrington, and Montesquieu are obvious, and suitably diverse, examples. There is, we shall argue presently, good reason for regarding the last of these names, and a group of writers on politics who followed in his footsteps in the eighteenth century, as marking some kind of turning-point even when the focus is confined to British authors, as is the case here. On those grounds it might have been appropriate for us to have extended our coverage backwards in time to incorporate that period. But apart from the usual excuses for not extending the scope of a book such as lack of knowledge and the shortness of life - we have been willingly influenced by the fact that in recent years a number of important studies of individual authors and modes of political argument in the eighteenth century have appeared, studies which have no equivalent for the nineteenth century. Moreover, the best of this work - some of which will be noted below - has been distinguished by just that historical sensitivity and attention to context whose absence from so much writing in the history of political theory and the social sciences in the nineteenth century we have already criticised. While our book differs in both range and approach from this literature on the eighteenth century, its existence allows us to feel
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The governing science
justified in beginning our study with figures who can hardly be seen, and who did not see themselves, as the original founders of a modern science of politics. At all events, this relationship requires us to say something, albeit brief and selective, about the nature of the eighteenth-century legacy, although precisely because this area has been well served by recent studies, we shall not attempt any systematic account of how this 'legacy' was related to and abstracted from the fabric of eighteenth-century social and political thought. The 'acute Wits of Europe' essayed much more than the reduction of politics to a science, but it is to what later generations took to be their particular contributions to this operation alone that we shall confine ourselves here, and since that phrase is so closely associated with Hume's famous essay on the subject, we may let his remarks guide our discussion.3 The sense in which Aristotle had spoken of politics as the 'master-science' was still a current one in the eighteenth century, and it was in this sense that Hume spoke quite simply but comprehensively of politics as dealing with 'men united in society and dependent on each other'. During his lifetime, the project of creating a science of politics, or a science of the legislator as it was also called, acquired renewed vigour and confidence as part of the more general attempt to apply the Newtonian or experimental method to moral subjects. There were - both then and later - two basic approaches to the question of how the reduction to science could best be effected, one emphasising the lessons or maxims that could be drawn, more or less systematically, from historical evidence, the other concentrating on those constant 'springs' of human nature, those psychological propensities that seemed not to vary greatly across time and place. In the eighteenth century a combination of these two approaches was generally thought to be essential, with the action of the enduring passions or motives being called upon as a theory capable of interpreting the historical record. An idea of 'science' which made it interchangeable with 'philosophy' could prize systematic knowledge and objectivity in the assignment of causal influences, but it did not entail anxiety to achieve what a late nineteenth-century generation of social scientists would call 'value-neutrality'. The ultimate purpose of any science of politics remained that of its earliest cultivators, namely to furnish prudential maxims, draw practical inferen3
Any discussion of Hume's science of politics must now begin by reference to the work of Duncan Forbes, whose most recent studies on the subject are as follows: Introduction to Hume's History of Great Britain, The Reigns of James I and Charles I (London, 1970); Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge, 1975); 'Sceptical whiggism, commerce and liberty' in A. S. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford, 1976), pp. 179-201; and 'Hume's science of politics' in David Hume, Bicentenary Papers, edited by G. P. Morice (Edinburgh, 1977).
Things political and the intellectual historian
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ces, and formulate clear criteria for judging the fitness of laws and institutions which could guide the conduct of wise legislators and thereby serve, as Macaulay proclaimed, the 'welfare of nations'. In this way, 'science' could easily be extended to embrace the 'art' of government and legislation - as it was by Swift, speaking through Gulliver- provided the usual caveats were registered concerning the obstacles that might impede the journey from theory to practice. The relationship of the natural to the moral sciences remained correspondingly relaxed and non-exclusive. There were good reasons why the experimental method had not been adopted as the appropriate one in morals and politics as early as it had been in studying the physical universe: the opportunities for controlled experimentation were also fewer, making it necessary, as Hume said, to 'glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures'. 4 By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it was possible to speculate seriously as to which philosopher should be awarded the accolade of Newton of the moral sciences, and which the prior and only slightly less prestigious role of Bacon. Confidence, then, was partly the result of a belief that a post-Newtonian generation was in a better position to assess the regular effects of those constant motives which underlie human behaviour in social settings. But it was equally supported by a realisation of the greatly increased fund of political experience which could now be drawn on in framing maxims and inductive generalisations. Hume was not alone in believing that his generation was in a position to improve greatly on anything that had passed for a science of politics since ancient times. This included, for example, the work of 'a great genius' like Machiavelli, whose knowledge was confined 'to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of Italy'. 5 Machiavelli might be considered 'modern' in his attempts to assign causes impartially, without regard to personal or party dispositions, but generalisations based on such restricted experience could be of little relevance to a world that had witnessed the emergence of civilised monarchies out of the break-up of feudalism. A sense of the new opportunities and requirements was an aspect of that reassessment of the guidance offered by Greek and Roman experience which is associated, in the eighteenth century, with the idea of progress. If the historical experience of modern Europeans was in some respects without precedent, classical notions of history as a succession of closed cycles 4 5
See A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), p. xxxiii. 'Of Civil Liberty' in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols. (London, 1875), 1, p. 156.
16
The governing science
were necessarily in some degree undermined as a basis for inferring political maxims. New grounds for political understanding would have to be sought in the nature of the unprecedented historical process in which the nations of modern Europe were currently involved. The older conception of historical lessons as maxims derived from the contemplation of repeated analogous political circumstances, to which Polybius had given classic formulation, and which was revitalised by Machiavelli, remained a powerful intellectual legacy. In nineteenth-century England, as we show in Essay vi, the use of historical analogy, and even the notion of cycles, continued to form part of political discourse. But it was increasingly supplanted by a view which saw modern circumstances as the intelligible consequence of past history, but in significant respects without exact analogies in that history; no cyclical formula was adequate to account for either the range or the uniqueness of modern political experience. The most sustained attempt to grasp its uniqueness through an analysis of the political implications of commercial society will be considered in Essay i, and to a lesser extent in Essays n and in as well. But its variety, too, constituted a pressing intellectual challenge. Post-feudal Europe exhibited a diversity of constitutional forms, from the absolutism epitomised by Louis xiv's France to the English Whig oligarchy and the federalism of the United Provinces, as well as the more archaic varieties represented by the Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland, and Venice. Compared with Aristotle's Greece and Machiavelli's Italy, it also represented a scene of considerable social and cultural variety. Religious and economic divergences were accompanied by divergences of manners and culture. French observers, like Montesquieu and Voltaire, saw England not merely as another polity, but also as in some respects a quite different kind of society from their own. Spain and the United Provinces, once politically linked, were even more sharply distinct, as were the Scottish Highlands and Lowlands. The steady encroachment of the Ottoman Empire on Europe, culminating in its great effort to take Vienna in the late seventeenth century, brought closer another social and political species, Asiatic Despotism. Further outside Europe, the range of political experiments and social comparison had been vastly expanded by voyages of discovery, the settlement of the New World, missionary zeal, and colonial expansion, to encompass China, India, Persia, Africa and the Americas - powerful and persistent despotic empires as well as small-scale primitive societies, like those of the Hottentots or Iroquois, with apparently only rudimentary systems of law and government, and far 'ruder' customs and manners than were to be found in the polished nations of Europe. The first and most influential author to respond to the challenge of the
Things political and the intellectual historian
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new opportunities for the comparison of law and government across space as well as time was Montesquieu; and in his De ly esprit des lois (1748) he created what Hume described as 'a system of political knowledge which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is not wanting in solidity'.6 The conceptual tools for reducing diversity to system were, as always, partly old, partly new. Thus Montesquieu employed a modified version of the categories established by Aristotle for discussing constitutional forms and their corrupted counterparts - monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy - by treating the last two of these as types of republican government, and by creating a large space for such interesting hybrid varieties as the English form of government, which Montesquieu described as 'a republic disguised as a monarchy'. He also made extensive use of another available vocabulary which dealt with the separation of the powers of government between legislative, executive, and judicial functions. But much of the intellectual vitality and novelty of his 'system of political knowledge' lay elsewhere, appropriately enough in the notion of esprit, and in the comparative survey of manners and morals to which it gave rise. Whereas in the past the content of the science of politics had often been exhausted by its treatment of constitutional forms, their strengths and weaknesses, their characteristic diseases and the tried and trusted remedies for restoring them to health, Montesquieu's work was more broadly cultural and comparative, a veritable museum of moeurs et manieres, encompassing every clime and polity. Apart from its qualities as a monument to the cosmopolitan social curiosity of the Enlightenment, Montesquieu's book demonstrated, in Hume's words, that: cThe laws have, or ought to have, a constant reference to the constitution of governments, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society.'7 Hume questioned the durability of Montesquieu's achievement as well as his method of establishing rapports between the various influences. In company with most Scottish and French writers who acknowledged the pioneering qualities of Montesquieu's book, Hume also wished to play down the role accorded to climate in determining the esprit general. Hume's own discussion of these matters laid more stress on pliability, on the part played by custom, imitation, and sympathy, by political institutions and moral as opposed to physical factors, in shaping law and manners. 8 But Montesquieu had shown that the task of a modern science of politics could not be confined to the 6 7 8
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1902), p. 197. Enquiries, p. 19711. See especially 'Of National Characters' in Essays, 1, pp. 244-58. On the relation between Hume and Montesquieu in general, see P. Chamley, 'The conflict between Montesquieu and Hume', in Skinner and Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith, pp. 274-305.
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The governing science
taxonomy of legal and constitutional forms, or even to those questions of civic morale, of corruption and virtue among rulers and the populace at large, which Machiavelli had discussed at length. Laws and constitutional practices now had to be firmly connected with the state of society as a whole. Hume's compatriots, chiefly Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and John Millar, transformed Montesquieu's states of society into an elaborate sequence of stages in the historical development of civil society in order to account for the process for which a new word had to be coined, namely 'civil-isation'. The stages led from rudeness to refinement, from such archetypal nations of hunter-gatherers as the Iroquois, who provided evidence of the zero point in the scale of civilisation, to the commercial societies of modern Europe, all of which enjoyed a considerable measure of security under the rule of law, regardless of the precise form of government under which they lived. Such histories of civil society conformed to the experimental injunction to consider man where he was always to be found, namely in some form of society rather than in the pre-social state of nature posited by contractarian treatments of the origins and legitimacy of government and the 'first principles' of obedience. Those questions of social subordination and cohesion that were so important in understanding the nature and form assumed by political authority could no longer be treated fruitfully as the outcome of voluntary acts by sovereign individuals. They were more readily explicable in terms of such features of human nature as sympathy, sociability, habits of deference, and a learned sense of the public utility attached to the regular administration of justice. The revolution associated with commerce was not only the most recent, but also the single most important development affecting the study of politics in the eighteenth century. It gave enhanced status to self-interest as a regulating principle in human affairs at the expense of more cyclical and moralistic conceptions of politics based on the dialectic between virtue and corruption9 - though never completely so, as the example of Ferguson shows. It also made such brilliant generalisations as that propounded by Harrington in the seventeenth century, connecting the balance of power in society with the balance of property, seem outmoded, chiefly applicable to an exclusively agrarian society in which landed property was the only form of property with military and political significance. In post-feudal societies, especially those enjoying a measure of 'free government', states of opinion had become at least as important as states of property in 9
The author who has done most to establish the relationship between these two modes of political argument is J. G. A. Pocock; see especially his Politics, Language and Time (London, 1972), and The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975).
Things political and the intellectual historian
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determining the legitimacy and stability of government.10 It was precisely with regard to the connections between property, opinion, manners, and justice that Hume, in company with other Scottish writers on jurisprudence, felt he could extend the reasonings not only of Harrington, but of the seventeenth-century natural lawyers, Grotius and Pufendorf, as well. The shift towards a politics of interest brought with it an increased emphasis on constitutional and other types of institutional machinery as a means of both releasing and restraining an active yet potentially harmful driving force. This concern with machinery that would check and balance interests was, of course, to become the keynote of the deliberations of the American founding fathers when they set about the task of constructing a constitution for a federal republic that had to survive in a continent of 'wide extent' and among a people that could no longer be regarded as Virtuous' in either the ancient or the technical sense defined by Montesquieu. In designing many of the checking and balancing mechanisms Madison and Hamilton drew freely on the work of Montesquieu and Hume as representing, along with other writings, the established conclusions of the eighteenth-century science of politics.11 By the end of the century, however, there was another line of thought, quite different in its idiom, which cast severe doubt on mechanical imagery when applied to the business of framing constitutions. The French Revolution marked a high point of constructive political optimism, with the Abbe Sieyes playing the role dear to the philosophes, of theoretician as constitutional artificer, just as Turgot had earlier been the embodiment of another ideal, that of philosophe as enlightened administrator. Seen from Britain, Turgot's failure evoked more sympathy than that of Sieyes. Under the influence of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, the entire episode was seen as neither distinguished nor reassuring. Throughout the nineteenth century, the insufficiency of 'paper constitutions' - especially after the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 began to make barricades and their concomitant, a newly-drafted constitution, seem an ineradicable French 10 11
See Hume's 'Of the First Principles of Government' and 'Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy or a Republic' in Essays, 1, pp. 110-12, 122-6. The pioneering work on this was done by Douglas Adair, '"That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science"; David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist', Huntington Library Quarterly, 20 (1956-7), 343-60. Since then, studies of the part played by political ideas during the American Revolution and the formation of the new constitution have undergone a major transformation. The following works are merely a selection from a vast modern literature: B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); G. S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969); G. Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970);]. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (London, 1966); and Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, ch. 15.
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The governing science
disease - became a stock theme of political admonition and self-congratulation in Britain. A distinctively nineteenth-century Romantic distrust of mere constitutional machinery and political rationalism generally, as in the chapter on the French Constituent Assembly's labours in Carlyle's French Revolution, was added to the older English Whig veneration for precedent and the indigenous ancestral constitution, and both seemed to be endorsed by the failures of successive French experiments. Essay vi shows how this theme was woven into the work of nineteenthcentury historians writing on the accumulated deposits of a long run of political experience in England. Burke provided an English admixture to a largely Scottish inheritance, though he did not acquire, in his native heath at least, immediate canonical status as conservative organicist. Many of the early nineteenth-century devotees of the science of politics with whom we shall be concerned in Essay i were not anxious to endorse his writings on France. They smacked too strongly of what one commentator spoke of as 'the undisguised fury of an eloquent advocate', and in this respect were inferior to Hume's capacity to write with 'the well-dissembled partiality of the philosophical judge'. 12 Even those who came to share Burke's views on paper constitutions were not inclined to accept his diagnosis of the causes of the Revolution and especially his wholesale condemnation of philosophical speculation on political matters, though they were forced to recognise that events in France had revealed weaknesses in the eighteenth-century science.13 Nevertheless, a kind of diffused Burkeanism is often a hidden, where not an avowed, presence in the work of some members of our cast, a presence best revealed in the commonplaces which later became part of the intellectual stock of Liberals as well as of Whigs and Tories, with their references to successful political institutions as built up by slow accretions, their favourite image for constitutional change as the repairs and piecemeal additions to an inherited mansion, and their recommendation of respect for tradition as a major part of political wisdom. Such language does not suggest that extravagant hopes should be entertained of the practical benefits likely to be derived from a science of politics, at the constitutional level at least, though how far the Burkean injunctions could coexist with something like a science of politics will be considered in several of the ensuing essays (especially v, vi, and vn). A more immediate effect of the French Revolution of 1789, and indirectly of the writings of Burke and his radical English opponents, was to 12 13
See Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honourable Sir James Mackintosh, 2 vols. (London, 3 5) ) » > P P 7 3 See Hedva Ben-Israel, English Historians on the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1968), PP- 33-43-
Things political and the intellectual historian
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make discussions of 'first principles', of the origins and legitimacy of government, even less promising or respectable than they had been after Hume, Smith and others had rejected theories of a social contract as an approach to such matters. The discussion of the British constitution also had to be more overtly respectful to escape suspicion, and a tradition was available to make this possible which drew some inspiration from Montesquieu's admiring portrait of the constitution. It was a tradition that stressed mixture, balance, and separation of powers, and it appeared in varying guises in the writings of Blackstone, De Lolme, and Paley. The discussion of balance within the mixture of elements which was believed to be the main source of strength and stability within the constitution continued to provide a useful way of interpreting the changes that were taking place during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. But by then such well-established ways of discussing things political were confronted with other, more self-consciously novel and iconoclastic idioms, and at this point the Prologue must give way to the first act. However, in looking ahead, the outlines are already discernible. Even in the eighteenth-century contributions we have been discussing, there was, among other things, an unresolved tension between the claims of, on the one hand, proceeding deductively from the laws of human nature, and, on the other, arguing inductively from the evidence of the historical record; and this tension, in different and not always immediately recognisable forms, recurs throughout the following essays as the traditional project is re-interpreted in new ways. One can see it when the legatees of the Scottish inheritance and the spokesmen for the varieties of Whiggism grapple with the challenges provided by Benthamite Utilitarianism and the Ricardian extrapolation from Smith; one observes it again in J. S. Mill's efforts to transmute this divided inheritance into a still more ambitious synthesis, and in Bagehot's deliberately less systematic rendering of some of the elements into a quite different vocabulary; and it is evident in the diverse programmes arising out of the fresh enthusiasm for the historical and comparative approaches from the 1860s onwards, and in the responses, variously hostile or accommodating, of figures like Sidgwick and Marshall. If the story seems to become an increasingly academic one in the second half of the nineteenth century, this does not betoken the triumph of any one conception of the project, nor does it signal any radical discontinuity with the competing versions discussed in our earlier essays. Confidence in the prospects of the science ran scarcely less high in the nineteenth century than it had in the eighteenth; but its proposed content and strategies remained irreducibly diverse, and the acute Wits among Gulliver's countrymen would still have had to impress the Brobdingnagians, if at all, more by the quantity of their productions than by the unanimity of their conclusions.
:D
The system of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils He supplied both young and old with philosophical ideas on what they had scarcely been accustomed to think philosophical subjects, unfolded the elements and the ends of that noble science, and so recommended it by the graces of his eloquence that even his idler hearers retained a permanent taste for it. HENRY COCKBURN, Memorials of His Time (1854) . . . as a preparation for the writing of various articles, the system of Edinburgh is enormously superior to that of Cambridge. The particular, compact, exclusive learning of England is inferior in this respect to the general, diversified, omnipresent information of the North; and what is more, the speculative, dubious nature of metaphysical and such like pursuits tends, in a really strong mind, to cultivate habits of independent thought and original discussion. WALTER BAGEHOT, The First Edinburgh Reviewers' (1855)
Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh from 1785 to 1810, was the eloquent lecturer being praised by Cockburn in the passage from which the first of our epigraphs is taken, and 'that noble science' was the science of politics as it had been cultivated during the second half of the eighteenth century by an international community of scholars within which the names of Scottish authors were prominent. Adam Smith had significantly enlarged and modified the shape of the science in his Wealth of Nations by giving philosophical status to political economy considered as a branch of the science, but when Cockburn pointed out that as a result of Stewart's teaching 'the liberal young' of Edinburgh lived upon Smith, he added a longer list of authorities: 'With Hume, Robertson, Millar, Montesquieu, Ferguson and De Lolme, he supplied them with most of their mental food.'1 The nourishment came as part of the larger and more varied diet provided by the moral philosophy curriculum, which included metaphysics (or philosophy of mind), ethics, and jurisprudence as well as politics. Bagehot's tribute to 'the general, diversified, omnipresent information of the North' was also, therefore, a tribute to Stewart, the educational source of many of the 'metaphysical and such like pursuits' which helped to form the intellectual habits of the founders of the Edinburgh Review - Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, Francis Horner, and Sydney Smith. Of this group of Stewart's pupils Cockburn said that 'they formed a distinct and marked set, distinguished by their reputations, their Whiggism, and their strong mutual coherence'. This essay will be concerned with those aspects of Stewart's teaching and related writings which bear on the noble science, and on the way in which they were reflected in the intellectual careers of this set of young philosophic Whigs during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. For it was Stewart, more than any other figure, who acted, more or less self-consciously, as the bridge between that late eighteenthcentury generation of Scottish moral philosophers and historians of civil society of whom we spoke in our Prologue, and that new generation of Scottish-educated writers who founded the leading intellectual periodical of the day. For it was through the pages of the Edinburgh Review that this group transmitted to the English world in which they increasingly moved, many, though by no means all, of the ideas on the 'modern' science of politics - its method of enquiry, content, scope, and practical significance - that will feature in the next two essays. D U G A L D STEWART,
1
H. Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (Edinburgh, 1910) (1st edn, 1854), p. 41. 2
5
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The system of the North
As his academic pedigree alone makes clear, it would be hard to better Stewart's general qualifications as an interpreter and intermediary. He was the pupil of Thomas Reid, who had been Adam Smith's successor as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow; and he was himself the successor to Adam Ferguson in the equivalent Chair in Edinburgh. This Chair occupied a crucial role in the curriculum of the university as a whole because moral philosophy provided the medium through which the findings of all sciences, natural and moral, were mediated and assessed. 2 Stewart also became the 'official' memorialist of Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and William Robertson; the foremost contemporary proponent of philosophical (or faculty) psychology of a non-materialist kind in Britain, enjoying considerable influence in France during the first half of the nineteenth century; and the author, after his retirement, of the Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters in Europe that was published as the introduction to another major Scottish enterprise, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in 1820.
In mounting lectures on politics as a regular part of the moral philosophy curriculum, Stewart was merely following Scottish academic precedent - a precedent endorsed by Ferguson but which could be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith's teacher, Frances Hutcheson, in Glasgow. The formal connections with the other parts of the curriculum were as follows: a study of man's intellectual powers (understanding) was completed by an account of his active or moral powers (will); and these two enquiries into metaphysics and ethics dealt with those questions which related directly to the capacities and duties of the individual. The edifice was completed by a consideration of man as 'a member of a Political Body', of what constituted happiness in a community and the means by which it could best be promoted. Stewart justified this third element in the course by claiming that only by considering those principles of human nature that were brought into play by membership of a political community was it possible to form 'a just idea of our situation in the world, and of the most important duties we owe our fellow creatures'. Politics was intimately connected with metaphysics and ethics because 'it is in the political union, and in the gradual improvement of which it is susceptible, that nature has made a provision for a gradual development of our intellectual and moral powers, and for a proportional enlargement in our 2
A number of studies on the central role of moral philosophy in the Scottish university curriculum have been published since George Davie's pioneering study on the subject; see his Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1961); R. Olson, Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1880 (Princeton, 1961); and A. L. Donovan, Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1975).
Dugald Stewart and bis pupils
ij
capacities for enjoyment; and it is by the particular forms of their political institutions that those opinions and habits which constitute the Manners of nations are chiefly determined'. 3 Much of this justification follows standard lines, and Stewart regarded his lectures on politics partly as a mark of recognition for what had already been established in an essentially revitalised branch of modern knowledge. In addition to the authorities mentioned by Cockburn, decisive contributions had been made in France by Quesnay, Turgot, and Mirabeau, and in Spain and Italy by Campomanes, Beccaria, and Filangieri. Stewart was, therefore, building on a firm European foundation and frequently spoke as though he was merely drawing his students' attention to established findings and methods of enquiry. But the process of transmission and application of accepted principles to new problems also entailed transmutation of the inheritance. Thus even in the formal justification given above, the reference to 'the gradual development in our intellectual and moral powers' signals a novel emphasis within the Scottish tradition which Stewart was to make peculiarly his own. The nature of this transmutation can best be appreciated by returning at the outset to some of the themes touched on in the second part of our Prologue, especially those arising out of the writings of Hume and Smith on related subjects. Although Hume produced no single or systematic treatise on politics, his writings on justice in the Treatise on Human Nature and in the Enquiry into Morals, his History of Great Britain, and, above all, his essays and political discourses were regarded by his contemporaries as notable contributions to the noble science, and consequently as a valuable source of political analyses and maxims. Hume played little part in working out, as Smith, Ferguson, and Millar did, the details of an elaborate 'philosophical' history of civil society couched in terms of a sequence of social stages. But according to Smith, Hume had made one of the most important discoveries relating to the latest of those stages of development, the one crucial to an understanding of how modern European societies differed from their feudal or agrarian predecessors. Smith believed that in his History Hume had been the first to demonstrate how 'commerce and manufacturing gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with 3
See D. Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy for the Use of Students in the University of Edinburgh, 5th edn (Edinburgh, 1829) (1st edn, 1793), pp. 12-13, anc^ Lectures on Political Economy in The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by W. Hamilton, 10 vols. (Edinburgh, 1854-60), vn, pp. 16-20.
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The system of the North
their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors'.4 Smith incorporated this insight into Book m of the Wealth of Nations, where it provided the centrepiece of his account of how the spread of commerce had brought the downfall of feudal/military society and thereby established the pre-conditions for liberty defined as the regular administration of justice and the security of individuals under the rule of law. The elimination of 'servile dependency' and the growth of a 'middling rank' offered new safeguards for this system of liberty by diffusing landed property and the arbitrary powers previously associated with it, and by introducing a more gradual descent of fortunes between the rich and powerful at one end of the spectrum, and the mass of society at the other. The result was a science of politics in which the achievement of security by means of the regular administration of justice was seen as the main criterion for assessing the success or failure, and the degree of advancement, of differing forms of government. Hume's treatment of justice as an 'artificial' virtue or social convention, derived from man's experience of living in society, presupposed a historical learning process. But, again, it was Smith who, according to the report on his lectures on jurisprudence given by his pupil John Millar, endeavoured 'to trace the gradual progress of jurisprudence, both public and private, from the rudest to the most refined ages, and to point out the effects of those arts which contribute to subsistence, and to the accumulation of property, in producing correspondent improvements or alterations in law and government'.5 The connections between these lectures and Smith's two main published works, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, were somewhat obscured by Smith's failure to complete the 'account of the general principles of law and government' which he promised at the end of the former of these works. Nevertheless, those students who attended the lectures, such as Millar, were capable of appreciating, in outline at least, the nature of the comprehensive enterprise Smith had planned in the 1750s. Millar's own writings drew heavily on the lectures, and his report on their content reached a larger audience when published as part of Stewart's account of Smith's life and writings in 1793. Moreover, readers of the Theory of Moral Sentiments were aware that Smith regarded justice as the foundation of the social fabric, and that he believed that precise rules of a negative kind could be laid down with regard to justice. Readers of the Wealth ofNations would be equally struck 4
5
See An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner in The Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1976-83), 11, p. 412. As quoted by Dugald Stewart in his Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith reprinted in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, edited by W. P. D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I. S. Ross in Works and Correspondence, in, pp. 274-5.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
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by the frequency with which Smith fortified his analysis of the inexpediency of various forms of political intervention by calling on the stronger language of justice and injustice. Although the emergence of commercial society presupposed the existence of a more sophisticated system of justice, and might itself generate the preconditions for liberty, Smith did not commit himself to the view that such a society was necessarily becoming more equal or more just. On the contrary, he often stressed the inequalities and injustices of the existing distribution of social burdens and rewards, and regarded it as one of the main duties of the legislator to go beyond the removal of obstacles to the 'system of natural liberty' to curb those abuses and unjust privileges which were the source of oppression.6 The connections between commerce and liberty and the acceptance that commerce and manufacturing operated in concert with agriculture in producing national opulence gave what was by now commonly known as political economy an enhanced role within the science of politics. Appreciation of the importance of such matters was one of the main factors differentiating modern versions of the science from their ancient and Renaissance predecessors. Hence Hume's decision to deal with economic topics as part of his political essays because they now provided the best examples of the value of 'general reasonings' in politics, and his statement in 'Of Commerce' that: 'The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to commerce.' The writings of the Economistes had focused on the existence of an underlying 'natural order' in economic affairs, and to this Smith had added an account of the 'natural progress of opulence' which could be contrasted with the actual historical process which had produced present European arrangements, often largely as a result of mercantile theories of statecraft which it was Smith's object to condemn. Hidden mechanisms, involving unintended results, appeared to control the everyday economic life of nations, and the wise regulation of internal and external commerce, taxation, public debt, and the whole range of duties belonging to the sovereign assumed greater importance. Building to some extent on Hume's economic essays, Smith created a major branch of the science of the legislator, extending it to cover the correlative art of legislation in Book v of the Wealth of Nations, where he dealt with the responsibilities of the sovereign with respect to defence, justice, education, and other public works. 6
For a more detailed treatment of the issues raised in this section see Donald Winch, Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, 1978); see also Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge, 1981).
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The emphasis on commerce and liberty, and the concern with the administration of justice, deflected attention away from forms of government as the main focus of Hume and Smith's science of politics. The diversity of forms of government to be found in Europe showed that commercial society could flourish under quite different political arrangements. Moreover, if liberty was a modern European phenomenon, shared in some measure by all post-feudal societies, political debates centring on such local political events as that which occurred in England in 1688 could be made to seem insular and parochial. The 'matchless' English constitution and the process by which the English people had come to enjoy a form of monarchy limited by Parliament could now be interpreted as an accidental departure, no matter how fortunate, from a more general European pattern which tended to favour absolute monarchy in large states. Hume stressed the fact that absolute monarchies like that of France, though by no means 'free', nevertheless possessed the more fundamental type of liberty, namely personal and civil liberty, and that France was, in this and other respects, at least as civilised as England. Hume certainly did his best to show that much of the rhetoric of English party contest that centred on the events of 1688 and their aftermath was, in a useful phrase that has been coined to describe it, a form of Vulgar' as opposed to 'scientific' or 'sceptical' Whiggism.7 In his essays on parties, when explaining the necessary role played by 'influence' or 'corruption' in managing the Commons, and in his discussion of the possible fate of the British constitution in absolute monarchy, Hume opened up themes which ran counter to popular political understanding, but which continued to be cited by later political analysts and commentators. In one of these essays Hume gave classic expression to an assumption which he shared with Smith when he said that: Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government and fixing the several checks and balances of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to public good.8 The assumption that, by and large, self-interest rules collective behaviour in political as well as economic settings entailed giving greater emphasis to impersonal institutional machinery as a means of checking, balancing, and 7
8
The distinction between Vulgar' and 'scientific' Whiggism was introduced by Duncan Forbes; see especially 'Sceptical whiggism, commerce and liberty* in A. S. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford, 1976), pp. 179-201. 'Of the Independency of Parliament' in Essaysy Moraly Political and Literary, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 volumes (London, 1875), 1, pp. 117-18.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
31
harnessing self-interest and containing its more destructive results. Smith's version of the same idea can be found in his statement that 'such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that he always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he cannot or dare not use the bad one'; 9 and in the Wealth of Nations he displayed considerable ingenuity in proposing novel institutional devices for checking self-interest and turning it 'to public good'. 10 Accompanying this move towards impersonal machinery was a conception of the role of the legislator as an essentially adaptive one, avoiding the 'violence' of ancient statecraft by accommodating measures to 'the common bent of mankind', and even, where necessary, to 'the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people'.11 Within such a conception the prevailing state of opinion occupied an important place among the concerns of legislators, especially those called upon to operate in 'free' governments like that of England. It was in this sense that Hume stated that 'it is . . . on opinion only that government is founded'; and it explains why Smith was so concerned with the responsibilities of the legislator with respect to education as a means of moderating the more pathological states of popular opinion: In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgement which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.12 The ideal legislator to whom Smith's science was addressed was differentiated from the mere politician by virtue of the fact that his deliberations were 'governed by principles which are always the same'. By contrast, 'that insidious and crafty animal', the politician, was guided by the 'momentary fluctuations of affairs', and hence was more at the mercy of clamorous interest groupings.13 Just as Hume expressed several anxieties about developments within the English system of government, notably those connected with public debt and the absence of discretionary powers, so the pressures capable of being exerted on the legislature by mercantile and manufacturing interests were of particular concern to Smith. Hume's treatment of the benefits associated with commerce, however, was far less 9 10 11
12 13
Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence; 11, p. 799. See N. Rosenberg, 'Some institutional aspects of the Wealth of Nations', Journal of Political Economy, 68 (i960), 537-70. The first of these expressions can be found in Hume's 'Of Commerce' in Essays, 1, p. 202, and the second in Smith's discussion of the legislator in Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976) in Works and Correspondence, 1, p. 233. Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, n, p. 788. Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, 11, p. 468.
32
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troubled by worries about concomitant drawbacks. Smith, on the other hand, drew attention to the consequences to the mass of society of the narrowing effects of the division of labour. In Smith's account, the dexterity of the manual worker in a particular occupation is often 'acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues'. 14 Here was a major case where the legislator was called upon to remedy, chiefly through education, an undesirable unintended consequence associated with the natural workings of commercial society. This problem was of considerable concern to Ferguson and Millar as well, and having been placed on the agenda of the science of politics was to surface frequently during the early part of the nineteenth century. For reasons mentioned earlier, Stewart's treatment of politics originally formed the culminating part of his course on moral philosophy. In the first of his publications based on this course, the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792), he included a chapter on 'Abstraction' in which there was an important section 'On the Use and Abuse of General Principles in Polities'. It served as a statement of Stewart's methodological credo roughly equivalent to Hume's essay on the opportunities for reducing politics to a science, and it was, in effect, a defence of the possibility, indeed necessity, of applying general principles to politics. In advancing this position Stewart drew particular attention to the exemplary qualities of the Economistes and cited Condorcet's life of Turgot. Appearing as it did in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, and not long after the recent Paris massacre, an event in which Condorcet was then thought to be implicated, Stewart's endorsement of speculative ideas in politics, and French ideas to boot, required a measure of moral courage. Stewart's Whig sympathies may have already made him the object of suspicion to the Tory interest that controlled Edinburgh; he had visited France in 1788-9, and he shared fully in the early enthusiasm for the Revolution until 1793, when events took a more violent course. The publication of the Elements provided his Edinburgh opponents with an opportunity to attack him for citing Condorcet with approval: two Lords of Session joined in a request that he should retract 'every sentiment [he] had uttered, in favour of doctrines which had led to so giant a mischief. In a dignified refusal to comply with the request Stewart claimed that he was 'aware of the mischiefs to be apprehended from a spirit of innovation, and from sudden changes in established institutions'; and that being 'impressed with a sense of the importance of my situation' as an instructor of youth, he had always stressed the excellence of the British constitution 14
Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, 11, p. 782.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
33
and avoided reference to party politics. He admitted, however, that he would 'ever regret that [he] dishonoured some of [his] pages by mentioning with respect the name of Condorcet', though he maintained that the passage he had quoted breathed 'a spirit of moderation'.15 Though trivial in itself, this incident reveals the difficulty experienced by a prominent teacher in lecturing on the science of politics after the French Revolution, and the consequential obligation to vindicate its patriotic or citizenly purposes. The science had to go beyond explanation and description to inculcate attitudes that were favourable to adopting animating, yet non-inflammatory opinions. John Millar had been the object of similar suspicions in Glasgow in 1784-with perhaps greater justification.16 In Stewart's case, the criticism affected his Account of the Life and Writings ofAdam Smith; it led him to withdraw certain passages from his memoir on William Robertson; and it explains numerous hints, asides, and circumlocutions that appear in most of his writings. Stewart opened his defence of general principles in the Elements by taking his stand on the Baconian view that theory and experience could never be opposed whenever principles were drawn inductively from experience. He then set out to show that precisely because it was more difficult to conduct experiments in human affairs, or draw reliable causal inferences from historical evidence, it was necessary to adopt a 'philosophical' approach. What this meant emerged more clearly from Stewart's responses to a number of common objections to political theorising. Philosophy, he stated, was the remedy for a form of narrow political empiricism, which he identified with 'an unenlightened veneration for maxims which are supposed to have the sanction of time in their favour, and a passive acquiescence in received opinions'. As opposed to 'the history of actual establishments', a broader and sounder basis for political reasoning could be derived from 'an examination of the human constitution, and of the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs'. Stewart cited Hume in support of the 'danger of dwelling too much on details and of rendering the mind incapable of those abstract and comprehensive views of human affairs, which can alone furnish the statesman with fixed and certain maxims for the regulation of his conduct'. Theories were essential to successful legislation because the practical difficulties arose out of 'the passions and opinions of men, which are in a state of perpetual change'. Hence the past was a poorer guide than 'the sagacity of our conjectures with respect to the future', especially in an age when the rapid communication and diffusion of knowledge was making modern societies essentially different from those of the past.17 15 16 17
See the letters reprinted in John Veitch's memoir on Stewart in Works, x, pp. lxx-lxxv. See W. C. Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgowy 1735-1801 (Cambridge, i960), pp. 71-2. Elements, Chapter 4, Section 8, as reprinted in Works, 11, pp. 219-23.
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In the mechanical arts it was possible to test theory by means of experiment, but the complexity of political experience often meant that in 'opposing experience to speculation, we are only opposing one theory to another*. The historical record could not always tell us how apparently unchanging constitutional forms had been modified 'by gradual and undescribable alterations in the ideas, manners, and character of the people'; and since 'the errors of human art are frequently corrected and concealed by the wisdom of nature', there was a tendency to exaggerate the effects of statesmanship. Similarly, where so many 'natural' forces were at work, besides those associated with statesmanship, good legislative practice could not be guided by experience uninterpreted by general principles. The anti-philosophical or 'sceptical disposition' not only led to 'a bigoted attachment to antiquated forms', but was especially dangerous to those modern governments whose stability depends 'on the coincidence between [their] measures and the tide of public opinion' - a tide that was constantly moving in an enlightened direction. Under such circumstances, 'gradual and prudent accommodation of established institutions to the varying opinions, manners, and circumstances of mankind' was the only way to combat a revolutionary 'rage of innovation'. 18 At this point Stewart moved on to one of his favourite perorations on 'enlightened views with respect to the possible attainments of mankind', the fame of which 'cannot fail to increase as the world grows older, by being attached, not to a particular system of variable opinions, but to the general and infallible progress of human reason'. The invention of printing, liberty of the press, the effects of rapid communication and higher standards of education were emancipating man from 'the tyranny of ancient prejudices' and other types of despotism, setting on foot a general 'spirit of reformation'. Such changes were peculiarly favourable to the science of politics and its practical realisation in legislation that would focus on those principles that were most agreeable 'to nature and to justice'. Compared with earlier conceptions of political wisdom, the modern view concentrated on the natural mechanisms governing the everyday life of men in society, rather than on 'the conduct of mankind in their political capacity' alone. By recognising that most political disorders arose out of failure to respect these mechanisms, legislation would in future become far simpler, often chiefly a matter of removing obstacles which prevented the underlying natural order from manifesting itself obstacles that had been erected as a result of earlier and less enlightened ideas of statesmanship. Stewart's main example of modern speculations which embodied these 18
Works, II, pp. 225-30.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
35
insights was, as we have noted, the work of the Economistes; they had accomplished the first task of any science of politics by describing what would constitute the 'ideal perfection of the social order' and how it could be realised by legislation. This ideal represented a limit, in the mathematical sense, 'towards which governments may be expected to approach nearer and nearer as the triumphs of philosophy extend'. But this limit or ideal should not be confused with earlier 'Utopian plans of government' which depicted political order as a problem for 'human contrivance' and 'skilful management', usually requiring 'a miraculous reformation in the moral character of a people'. It recognised that good morals were the effect of good laws rather than a precondition for them; and by concentrating on 'the whole plan of civil society' it discouraged partial expedients and 'indiscriminate zeal against established institutions'. The imperfect institutions of the present were accommodated to one another and to the existing state of human improvement; they could, therefore, only be improved gradually.19 Finally, Stewart gave reasons why 'the good citizen of the world whatever may be the political aspect of his own times, will never despair of the fortunes of the human race' by giving way to the sceptical interpretation of history as one of cyclical change from advance to degeneration precipitated by accident. The progress of civilisation in modern times was a process of unilinear advance; the ancient experience of cycle, mitigated only temporarily by political contrivance, was no longer relevant. The moral and political sciences had before them the same prospects of improvement as physics had when it was first taken up along systematic lines. And even if such hopes were based on illusion, it would still be important to cultivate them for their conduciveness to the ultimate interests of humanity; they fostered exertion in the public service by overcoming despair and by reinforcing the conviction 'that prejudice, slavery and corruption, must give way to truth, liberty and virtue'. A regard for the principles underlying the general interest was daily gaining at the expense of prejudice, folly, demagoguery, factional intrigue, and caprice - such were the achievements of public spirit based on 'the liberal and manly pursuits of political philosophy'. 20 Although this reads like a recital of the commonplaces we associate with standard accounts of the Enlightenment, notably the French Enlightenment of the philosophes, it contains much that was characteristic of Stewart's position generally, and helps to explain the attraction of his views to the 'liberal young' of Edinburgh during the long period of reaction to events in France. When Stewart published the second edition of the 19 20
Works, 11, p p . 231-40. Works, 11, p p . 2 4 1 - 5 1 .
}6
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Elements in 1802, he retained the section which had given offence and added a number of cryptic footnotes indicating that although it had been the object of 'uncandid misinterpretation', he still felt that it inculcated a doctrine which was 'favourable to the good order and tranquillity of society*. At the same time he took the opportunity to refer his readers to the fourth section of his memoir on Adam Smith.21 According to Stewart, in the Wealth of Nations, Smith had made a major contribution to the study of 'by far the most complicated class of phenomena that can possibly engage our attention, those which result from the intricate and often imperceptible mechanisms of political society'. As a systematic pursuit, this science owed little to classical precedent because ancient philosophers had confined their attention to forms of government and the means of perpetuating them, leaving to modern authors the more significant task of investigating 'those universal principles of justice and of expediency, which ought, under every form of government, to regulate the social order'. One of the main conclusions of the new science, for example, was that 'the happiness of mankind depends, not on the share which the people possess, directly or indirectly, in the enactment of laws, but on the equity and expedience of the laws that are enacted', thereby confirming that the 'general spirit of government' was a prior concern to philosophers when compared with questions of form and legitimacy, the latter being the main focus of those interested in 'first principles'. For if 'the only infallible criterion of the excellence of any constitution is to be found in the detail of its municipal code', the question of what value should be set on political rights and freedoms becomes secondary to 'those legislative improvements which the general interests of the community recommend'.22 Stewart's aim once more was to stress the gradualist implications of a philosophical or scientific view of politics. Such a view proceeded 'not by delineating plans of new constitutions, but by enlightening the policy of actual legislators'. Though capable of bringing enormous benefits to mankind, it could be attractive only to the 'speculative few'; it had 'no tendency to unhinge established institutions, or to inflame the passions of the multitude'. By implication, of course, the reverse was true of discussions of the first principles of obligation and legitimacy. Stewart defended Smith and again by implication himself - from charges of encouraging 'a rash application of political theories' by drawing attention to the passages in the 21 22
Works, 11, pp. 219, 237, 240-1. See his Account as reprinted in Essays of Philosophical Subjects in Works and Correspondence, i n , pp. 309-11. Stewart had cut short this part of the memoir because, as he explained in 1810, 'it was not unusual, even among men of some talents and information, to confound, studiously, the speculative doctrines of Political Economy, with those first principles of Government which happened unfortunately at that time to agitate the public mind'(p. 339).
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
37
Theory of Moral Sentiments in which Smith speaks of the wise legislator as one who, when he 'cannot establish the best system of laws, will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear'. The fact that this passage was added by Smith in 1790, possibly as a response to the French Revolution, made it peculiarly applicable to Stewart's own predicament three years later when the memoir was composed.23 Stewart's memoir on Smith, when taken in conjunction with the defence of the application of general principles to politics given in the Elements, provides a fairly complete basis for the position he was to adopt in 1799 when he decided to mount a separate course on the science of politics. The course was considered to be an important innovation largely because of the amount of attention Stewart devoted to political economy, broadly defined, as well as to the 'theory and forms of government'. The attendance of this course - given annually prior to Stewart's retirement in 1810 - was small when compared with his regular lectures on moral philosophy, but the interest aroused was intense, and the distinctiveness of what was being offered was widely appreciated.24 Stewart's definition of political economy covered all those speculations which have for their object 'the happiness and improvement of political society', and hence not merely those subordinate and instrumental questions suggested by the terms 'wealth' and 'population'. The philosopher tackling such subjects should address himself directly to the legislator in an attempt to delineate the legitimate functions of government, and to enlighten those who are destined either to carry them out or to judge the conduct of legislators. Such aims also dictated a different pedagogic strategy from that employed in earlier treatises, where a discussion of the theory and forms of government preceded political economy on the grounds that law and government were a precondition for regular social and economic existence. Stewart felt, however, that in this case, as elsewhere, 'the most obvious arrangement is not the most natural; and that it would be better to invert the arrangement commonly followed, by beginning, first with the Principles of Political Economy, and afterwards proceeding to the Theory of Government'. 25 His reasons for this inversion were precisely those given in his 23
See Account
in Works and Correspondence,
i n , p p . 3 1 1 - 1 8 . T h e passage added t o t h e 1790
edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments appears in Works and Correspondence, 1, pp. 24
25
23!-3See H . C o c k b u r n , Memorials, p p . 168-70; and J . Veitch in Stewart's Works, x, p p . 1-liii. Francis H o r n e r n o t only attended the course for three successive years, but advised his b r o t h e r in 1803 t o m a k e good use of the comparative advantage they conferred o n E d i n b u r g h as o p p o s e d t o L o n d o n : ' T h e r e are in L o n d o n m o r e than a dozen courses of lectures o n chemistry, t h o u g h n o n e certainly so valuable as those in E d i n b u r g h ; but there are n o lectures whatever o n political science': see Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Hornery M.P., edited b y L. H o r n e r , 2 vols. (Boston, 1853), 1, p . 245. See Lectures on Political Economy in Works, VIII, p p . 2 1 , 2 2 - 5 , 44; ix, p p . 299—300.
38
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memoir on Smith, namely that constitutions should be judged by 'the detail of [their] municipal code'. The happiness of the people at large depended immediately on wise systems of political economy, whereas the effect of forms of government in producing such systems was more contingent and remote. As a result of 'ignorance and prejudice' on the part of an unimproved populace, even advanced constitutional and administrative agencies could sanction inexpedient laws. On the other hand, the effect of bad forms of government could be mitigated 'by an enlightened system of internal policy'. Once more too, there is a suggestion that a mixture of academic and prudential considerations supported this rearrangement. The establishment of just principles of political economy opened up to students 'distant prospects of general utility . . . which . . . interest the calm benevolence of speculative men'. Theories of government, particularly those inspired by a Lockean concern with the first principles of allegiance, political liberty, and rights, were more likely to attract the attention of the 'ambitious and the turbulent'. Moreover, Stewart stated that the wide diffusion of the principles of political economy was an essential precondition for making other improvements in forms of government possible. Clearly, what Stewart had in mind here was the 'democratical' trend of political and social speculation since the French Revolution. He asserted that 'in the present state of the world' democratical constitutions were likely to be unfavourable to enlightened systems of political economy; and he maintained that only when 'true principles of political economy were completely understood' would it be safe to accelerate the natural processes at work in modern commercial societies by which hereditary rank and power were being undermined. 26 Stewart's main object might be described as an attempt to steer a middle course between enthusiasm for constitutional innovation on one side, and political scepticism on the other. Post-revolutionary circumstances had cast doubt and suspicion on the discussion of forms of government, but pursuit of political economy, broadly conceived, revealed that improvements in legislation could be achieved regardless of constitutional forms. But while these priorities owe something to the atmosphere created by the French Revolution, Stewart was also able to cite the opinions of Hume and Smith in support of his position, and this makes it necessary to consider just where he was merely voicing the opinion of his distinguished predecessors, and where he was developing them in a direction of his own. 26
Lectures in Works, vm, pp. 9-29; and ix, pp. 376, 319-40. With regard to ranks see also Elements in Works, 11, p. 239.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
39
Despite the diffuse qualities of Stewart's academic prose, as well as the obligations imposed by his role as a public teacher, there are many echoes of positions that are recognisably Humean or Smithian. The most obvious continuity can be found in Stewart's emphasis on universal principles of natural justice, and on personal and civil rather than political liberty - an emphasis which, as was noted earlier, had already shifted attention away from forms of government towards the 'general spirit of government' as judged by its degree of civilisation, the qualities of its judicial system, and the sophistication of its municipal code. From this point of view, Stewart was merely making the presence of an enlightened system of political economy, judged mainly according to the degree to which legislators had heeded the discoveries of Smith and the Economistes, an explicit mark of advance towards a regime in which general rather than particular interests were allowed to determine policies. Stewart's stress on those gradual historical processes by which modern establishments had evolved to their present state, the consequent concern with 'natural' rather than 'violent' or 'artificial' policies, the emphasis on accommodating laws to a given state of society - all these are part of a general inheritance dating back to Montesquieu, Hume, and Smith. Nevertheless, the manner in which Stewart upholds his position, even when purporting merely to describe that of his predecessors, sets him apart from them. And one of the main differentiating factors seems to be his more thoroughgoing adherence to a form of intellectual and moral 'perfectibilism' that may have francophile origins, but also embodies an optimistic teleology centring on the growth of objective knowledge which has a religious and Reidian base.27 Stewart admitted that some exponents of the idea of indefinite progress had given way to 'the exaggerations of a heated fancy', but considered the 'constant susceptibility of improvement [his translation of perfectibilite] as one of the characteristical qualities of the human race' to be the most conclusively established doctrine of modern times. In fact, hisfinalword on this subject in 1820 was merely a fuller and franker restatement of the views he had expressed in 1792, including the long quotation from Condorcet's life of Turgot which had 'dishonoured' his earlier pages.28 Nothing comparable to Stewart's perfectibilist speculations can be found in Hume or Smith. Indeed, one of the remarkable features of Smith's work is what can only be called a principled unwillingness to indulge in political extrapolation; and when he does so, as in the famous case of his 27 28
On this subject we have benefited from reading a chapter of an unpublished work by Knud Haakonssen entitled 'Political Economy and Jurisprudence in Dugald Stewart'. See Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters in Europe, in Works, 1, pp. 492-7.
40
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prediction about the chances of free trade being implemented in Britain, it is to indulge in the kind of scepticism regarding the future that Stewart was anxious to combat: 'To expect. . . that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it.'29 Hume and Smith were occasionally prepared to indulge in Utopian speculations: witness Hume's essay on the 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth' and Smith's proposals for a legislative union of Britain and her American colonies. But in both cases they warned their readers that they were, so to speak, operating selfconsciously within quotation marks.30 Stewart had removed these marks by treating speculation about the ideal perfection of the social order as a deduction from the progressive principle of human nature, and therefore as something that should not be confused with 'Utopian plans of government'. Hume maintained that 'the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics which will remain true to the latest posterity', but he ventured a few predictions with respect to the future of the British constitution in his essays on 'Public Credit' and 'Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic' which were doom-laden, with absolute monarchy, fqr example, being described as 'the easiest death, the true Euthanasia of the British Constitution'.31 Stewart might well have regarded this as another example of debilitating world-weariness; and in the circumstances of the day it probably came too close to a discussion of possible defects in the British constitution for safety. Holding lofty ideas about the human prospect was for Stewart both an antidote to the 'sceptical disposition' and the proper culmination of what might otherwise become mere historical studies. He was anxious to remedy the defects associated with the study of past history, namely passivity and the idea that nations 'contain within themselves the seeds of their decay and dissolution', by invoking future history: hence his stress on those features of the modern world which made it qualitatively different from the past. When discussing the fruitful combination of history, philosophy, and jurisprudence which had been achieved since Montesquieu first laid the ground-plan for such work, Stewart specifically warned against identifying the science of jurisprudence with the historical method 29 30
31
See Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, n, p. 471. See Hume's opening remarks to cIdea of a Perfect Commonwealth* and his statements that a long disquisition on the subject would be 'both useless and chimerical', and, of his own plan, that *I cannot, In theory, discover any considerable objection'; see Essays, 1, pp. 481-2 (emphasis supplied). Smith said of his plan for union that he was not concerned with its practicability, but that it was the kind of Utopian speculation that was not improper in the work of a philosopher; see Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, 11, p. 934. See Essays, 1, p. 126. For his dire predictions on public credit, see pp. 367-74.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
41
entirely. The method was justifiable when studying earlier periods of society, where institutions could properly be attributed to 'circumstances and emergencies'. In enlightened ages, however, there cannot be a doubt, that political wisdom comes in for its share in the administration of human affairs; and there is reasonable ground for hoping, that its influence will continue to increase as the principles of legislation are more generally studied and understood. To suppose the contrary would reduce us to be mere spectators of the progress and decline of society, and put an end to every species of patriotic exertion?1
Another way of approaching this difference of emphasis between generations is to focus on the role of 'opinion' in political affairs. Any theory that defines wisdom as a process of accommodating legislation to the state of manners must set great store by opinion, and by education as a means of forming opinion. Although Smith had a good deal to say about the civic and moral purpose of education, there is no sign that he shared Stewart's confidence that the tide of opinion was necessarily moving in the direction of general 'enlightenment'. Opinion has many dimensions, including superstition, pride, folly, ignorance, and prejudice. Smith suggests ways in which these volatile and frequently destructive human proclivities might be contained or modified, but he does not maintain, as Stewart does, that they are in process of being replaced by their virtuous opposites. Similarly, while Smith attaches importance to 'natural aristocracy' in politics it is not defined in terms of its intellectual qualities.33 For Stewart, on the other hand, the great hope for the future lay in the advanced intellects of the age, those who possessed the capacity to go beyond mere practice to arrive at general or abstract truths. The benefits of the division of labour in such matters were more striking than in any otherfieldof human activity. Philosophical truths always served the cause of public happiness, and since the moral and material world showed every sign of being the result of divine beneficence, Stewart had no difficulty in describing philosophers engaged in revealing the underlying order as 'fellow-workers with God in forwarding the gracious purposes of His government'.34 Neither Hume nor Smith could be accused of underestimating the social import of philosophy, but Hume would have made short work of any argument that defined its task in terms of divine collaboration. Smith, however, employs many images based on the idea of providential design, and this has given rise to considerable disagreement as to how far he 32 33 34
See Dissertation in Works, 1, pp. 191-2 (emphasis supplied); see also pp. 487-520. O n the role of opinion and the natural aristocracy in Smith's work, see Winch, Adam Smith's Politics, pp. 101-2, 120, 155-7, 168-71. See Dissertation in Works, 1, p p . 492, 504-5, 517-20; and Elements in Works, n , p p . 2 0 3 - 1 4 o n the differences between philosophical and Vulgar* m o d e s of understanding.
42
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personally subscribed to the religious hypothesis, and whether it has an important teleological role in his explanations of the efficient as well as final causes of the social order. 35 Even if we adopt a positive position on both these questions, thereby minimising the gap between him and Stewart on such matters, it would still be possible to discern an important difference. Thus Nature in Smith frequently achieves her design by employing deceit and artifice. The philosopher, therefore, has to accept the task of unravelling unintended consequences, tracing out the differences between the intentions of short-sighted individuals and the resulting social outcomes, without pretending to usurp the role of God, let alone collaborate with Him. Stewart's notion of progress, by virtue of its emphasis on unilinear intellectual advance, leaves less scope for Nature's deceit or unintended consequences, particularly when dealing with future prospects, and his expectations of the philosopher are, in consequence, more confident and ambitious. For the same reason, although Stewart always maintained an appropriate academic caution when dealing with practical applications of science to human affairs, he displays little of Smith's detailed interest in the problems of persuasion and the processes of implementing desirable policies in an imperfect world. This could account for Stewart's tendency, evident from earlier quotations, to conflate improvements in society with improvements in science. Knowledge seems to operate as an exogenous force to produce spontaneous improvement. The Baconian maxim that knowledge is power could hardly be taken further towards a moral-cum-intellectual fusion of the purposes of science with the art of legislation. As we shall see in a later essay, this particular style of reasoning was to re-surface in the work of one of Stewart's more vociferous pupils, and it has, perhaps, earned Stewart the reputation for advancing the posture of the Virtuous expert' at the expense of the Virtuous citizen'. 36 Like Hume and Smith, Stewart wished to rely more on 'imperceptible' or impersonal machinery in politics than on 'political sagacity', but he was also, on the one hand, more concerned about the dangers of adopting a purely spectatorial view of human affairs, and on the other, more optimistic about an imminent future in which legislation would be reduced to a minimum as a result of the diffusion of enlightened views. There is little evidence to suggest that Smith believed, especially on those legislative questions which entailed justice as between individuals and social orders, 35
36
For an interpretation that stresses S m i t h s 'theological functionalism', see T. D . Campbell, Seven Types ofSocial Theory (Oxford, 1982), ch. 5. See, however, the contrary position as upheld by Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator, pp. 74-9, 135-6. See N . Phillipson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment' in R. Porter and M. Teich (eds.), The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 38-40.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
43
that there was any prospect of a withering away of the sovereign's responsibilities. In spite of his recommendations for curbing behaviour contrary to the public good, Smith sometimes gave way to exactly the kind of despair against which Stewart warned his students: {The violence and injustice of rulers is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy'. 37 Such remarks appear quite frequently in the Wealth of Nations, and they could account for Stewart's semi-apologetic distinction between this work 'and those speculations of [Smith's] earlier years, in which he aimed more professedly at the advancement of human improvement and happiness'.38 The characterisation of Hume and Smith as Sceptical Whigs' captures a consistent feature of their political stance - a quality of detached realism, a willingness to face up to unpleasant consequences, to advocate changes that would bring improvements in the conduct of human affairs, without expecting perfection to be achieved in this world. 39 In this special sense of the term, it seems possible to speak of Stewart being a far less sceptical Whig than either Hume or Smith; and one reason why this should be the case is Stewart's announcement that European man was becoming emancipated from his past, with the result that attention could be shifted towards future ideal standards that were now within his grasp. As we have noted, Stewart's fusion of a morality concerned with public happiness with the March of Mind was designed to overcome what might otherwise become a passive or contemplative notion of science. He was aware that a stress on 'machinery' and the role of those impersonal causal influences which had been at work in bringing society to its present state could have implications that were at odds with the active or citizenly qualities that a teacher was expected to inculcate, and even with the basic Baconian idea of knowledge as power. Stewart's predecessor in the Chair, Adam Ferguson, had expressed similar worries when faced with the work of Hume and Smith, and he had resolved them by emphasising the dangers to public spirit inherent in modern commercial society.40 Stewart's answer was to rely upon the diffusion of enlightened opinion as a substitute for public virtue; it was valuable precisely because of its self-fulfilling properties: belief in it enjoined 'patriotic exertion' on behalf of the common good. But it is not clear that this resolves Stewart's dilemma. The auto-suggestive qualities of the belief in progress, when widespread in society, seem to reintroduce an impersonal teleology, even determinism. The debilitating effect on the 37 38 39 40
See Wealth of Nations in Works and Correspondence, 11, p . 493. See his Account in Works and Correspondence, 111, p . 314 (emphasis supplied). O n this see especially Forbes, 'Sceptical whiggism', p p . 180-2. See A . Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society, edited b y D . Forbes (Edinburgh, 1966), pp. 248-61; and D. Kettler, 'History and theory in the Scottish enlightenment', Political Theory, 5 (1977), 437-60.
44
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active disposition of concentrating on the past and immediate present reappear as the inevitabilities of the future, leaving the legislator with a mere obstetric role. Nevertheless, although Stewart frequently comes close to replacing history by historicism, it should also be remembered that he felt that a more detailed knowledge of the springs of human nature enabled precise norms of equity and justice to be established, towards which enlightened legislators could now move more purposefully. If it is the fate of teachers to live on through their students, fortune was kinder to Stewart than to most of the breed. He wrote prolifically on many of the subjects that made up the moral philosophy curriculum, but his separate lectures on politics and political economy were not published until the 1850s, by which time, such were the developments in political economy in particular, they had become little more than historical curiosa. But it was in relation to this part of his teaching that it could truly be said that 'his disciples were among his best works'. The list of those who attended his separate course is an impressive one, including as it does the names of several men who were to achieve prominence in public life; but there can be no doubt that his teaching had greatest impact on and through the founders of the Edinburgh Review.*1 Their tributes to his influence gain rather than lose credence from the fact that, alongside expressions of admiration, they recorded reservations on matters of style and doctrine, and, between themselves at least, poked gentle fun at some of his foibles, notably his timidity and abiding fear of being misrepresented. None of the members of the group can be described merely as Stewart's disciples, but they did comprise a distinct coterie. Brougham and, more especially, Horner, later established reputations as experts in political economy, but all of the founders of the Edinburgh Review attended Stewart's lectures on the subject and retained a considerable interest in it. In common with the others, Jeffrey had, of course, worked his way through the Wealth of Nations, andhe took a keen interest in the articles on political economy which passed through his hands as editor. Indeed, the reputation of the Review as the leading periodical for 41
The remark concerning Stewart's disciples can be found in J. Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 2nd edn (Edinburgh, 1837), p. 345. Apart from the Edinburgh reviewers, Stewart's better-known pupils were Henry Temple (Viscount Palmerston), Lord John Russell, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (Marquis of Lansdowne), Lord Lauderdale, John Ward (Earl of Dudley), and Alexander Baring (Lord Ashburton). There were two nineteenth-century studies of the Edinburgh reviewers: W. Bagehot, 'The First Edinburgh Reviewers', in The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, edited by N. St John Stevas, 9 vols. (London, 1965-78), 1, pp. 308-41; and, under the same title, by L. Stephen in Hours in a Library (London, 1907), in, pp. 88-126. The definitive modern study is J. Clive, Scotch Reviewers: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1815 (London, 1957).
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
45
expositions of all the new doctrines and applications of political economy could not have been established without Jeffrey's active sympathy, though he relied a good deal on the advice of Horner initially, and on that of J. R. McCulloch later.42 Despite some misgivings about the Scottish propensity to reason abstractly on human affairs, even Sydney Smith was not oblivious to the importance of the subject, though, as befitted a parson, he concentrated on such questions as population and the Poor Law. In other words, they all adopted Stewart's view that political economy was, for their time, a most important branch of the science of the legislator, and they did their best to promote this view in the Edinburgh Review. But first it is necessary to emphasise the broader matrix of studies which originally helped to make sense of political economy. As students, the members of the coterie were distinguished by their precocity, voracious reading habits, and general efforts to master the various branches of knowledge which made up the moral philosophy curriculum of a Scottish university. More remarkable is the way in which they attempted to maintain their academic interests throughout their subsequent careers. Through the pages of the Edinburgh Review, of course, they were to perform a broadly educational role at a fairly high level of sophistication; and their journals and correspondence frequently seem like those of academics manque;, required by the exigencies of life to devote their energies to more worldly and less intellectually satisfying pursuits. They certainly confirm Bagehot's remarks cited at the beginning of this essay concerning the comparative advantage conferred by an Edinburgh education so far as the writing of articles of a speculative kind was concerned. To the original members of the group can be added the name of James Mackintosh, a friend of Stewart's who was closely associated with the review from its inception, and who was also a prominent member of Whig circles centring on Holland House which the other Edinburgh reviewers joined when they shifted their activities to London.43 His career has certain exemplary qualities, and he features persistently in the margins of subsequent essays. Mackintosh achieved early fame for his Vindiciae Gallicae (1791), an answer to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in 42
43
For the importance of the Edinburgh Review in the early history of political economy, see Clive, Scotch Reviewers, ch. 5; and F. W. Fetter, 'The authorship of economic articles in the Edinburgh Review, 1802-47'', Journal ofPolitical Economy, 61 (1953), 232-43, and 'Economic controversy in the British reviews', Economica, 32 (1965), 424-37. The main biographical source is Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honourable Sir James Mackintosh, 2 vols. (London, 1835). There is also a comprehensive study by Jane Rendall, 'The Political Ideas and Activities of Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832): A Study in Whiggism between 1789 and 1832', unpublished P h . D . thesis, London University, 1972. See also L. A. Mackenzie, 'The French revolution and English parliamentary reform: James Mackintosh and Vindiciae Gallicae*, Eighteenth Century Studies, 14 (1981), 264-82.
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France from a radical Whig perspective which had strong native roots in Scotland. Like Stewart and other early defenders of the French Revolution, Mackintosh revised his position after the events of 1792. He not only made elaborate apologies to Burke himself, but took the opportunity to retract his opinions publicly in an 'Introductory Discourse' to a popular series of lectures which he gave to lawyers in London on the Law of Nature and Nations in 1799. These lectures devoted to the science of jurisprudence led to the offer of a post as jurist-cum-codifier in Russia, but in 1803 he accepted a knighthood and the post of Recorder in Bombay, where he hoped to make his fortune and bring to fruition various philosophical and literary projects, including a work on morals and politics which he once described as 'the final cause of [his] existence'. During the next eight years of exile in India he spent much of his time reading philosophy and history, attempting to master all the contemporary German metaphysicians, while at the same time berating himself for his failure to begin writing. Upon his return to England, he became a Member of Parliament and resumed his place at the centre of the fashionable Whig society. In 1818 he was appointed to the Chair of Law and Politics at the East India College at Haileybury, which brought with it an opportunity to return to earlier interests in ethics and jurisprudence. When Thomas Brown, Stewart's successor in the Edinburgh Chair, died in 1820, Mackintosh reluctantly turned down the chance of becoming a candidate on the grounds that his political services were needed in Parliament. This meant relinquishing an early dream, and he was heard to 'sigh for the Professorship' on many subsequent occasions.44 Mackintosh did succeed Stewart in one respect when he agreed to complete the latter's unfinished introductory dissertation on the progress of ethical and political philosophy in the eighteenth century for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Even so, he did not have the time or stamina to complete the political side of the undertaking, and was forced to omit the treatment of continental ethical doctrines on which he had done so much work in India. The work was to bring him an inverted kind of posthumous fame when it became the object of a bitter attack from another of Stewart's pupils, James Mill, for its patronising treatment of the Benthamites as a sect. 45 There are some parallels between Mackintosh's career as a Scottisheducated Whig and that of other members of the Edinburgh Review circle. Like Mackintosh, Jeffrey, Brougham, and Horner were lawyers, the last two becoming MPs. But Mackintosh's career also illustrates the way in which scholarly projects, whose origins can clearly be traced back to the Scottish moral philosophy curriculum, remained part of the ideal towards 44 45
Memoirs, 11, pp. 369, 502. See pp. 99, 113, 121 below.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
47
which a man, otherwise active in public life, should strive. As we shall see, there are definite parallels with Horner's career - even down to the failure to write the great work on morals, metaphysics, and politics which Mackintosh felt was needed to express his life's work. Jeffrey regretted that his friend should have lived under the burden of this self-imposed obligation; his own writings conformed more to the pattern of a professional man of letters than a would-be Professor.46 The same is true of Sydney Smith, who insisted that he wrote solely for money or his own amusement. Even so, and for all Smith's gentle mockery of Scottish intellectual habits, he not only read many of the serious philosophical works of the day, including those published by Stewart, but was once guilty of giving a fashionable course of lectures on moral philosophy which was later to be published by William Whewell.4? Of Horner and Brougham, the youngest members of the coterie, a good deal more can be said about their academic interests. As university students, they became the leading lights in such established debating clubs as the Speculative Society, as well as founding clubs of their own, notably the Juvenile Literary Society and the Academy of Physics. Both of them took considerable interest in natural as well as moral philosophy, and Brougham became an accomplished mathematician and physicist, publishing papers in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society while still in his teens.48 Horner translated Euler's algebra from French at the age of twenty and added a biographical memoir, both of which were later published. Professors Playfair (mathematics) and Black (chemistry) were, therefore, at least as important as Dugald Stewart at this stage of their careers. But the science of mind and moral philosophy remained at the heart of the curriculum and provided the means by which the enterprise was held together and interpreted. Horner's journal provides the most outstanding evidence of Stewart's influence in this respect. He was certainly the most dutiful and earnest of Stewart's pupils, though this did not prevent him from suspecting Stewart of 'excessive timidity on the subject of political innovation, and the practicability of improvement by 46
47 48
SeeJ. Gross, The Rise and Fall ofthe Man of Letters (London, 1969), pp. 12-19. But it is also worth noting that Jeffrey was encouraged to apply for the Chair of History at Edinburgh in 1801, and in 1803 he was tempted by the Chair of Moral and Political Science at Calcutta; see H . Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey with Selections from his Correspondence, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1852), 1, pp. 117, 152. See Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy, delivered at the Royal Institution in the years 1804, j , and 6 (London, 1850). O n Brougham's natural science and its context see G. N . Cantor, 'Henry Brougham and the Scottish methodological tradition', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 1 (1971), 69-90; and J. Charles Robertson, 'A Bacon-facing generation; Scottish philosophy in the early nineteenth century', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 14 (1976), 35-45-
48
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individual exertion'; and from wondering whether cerror and involuntary sophistry might insinuate themselves undetected' when clothed in Stewart's elegant rhetoric. 49 After taking his degree, and as soon as he began his legal training, Horner drew up the first of several plans of self-improvement. He wanted to master the science as well as the practice of law; he had to keep up his knowledge of mathematics and all branches of natural philosophy; and to cap this, he wished to use his knowledge of the philosophy of the human mind as the point of entry to the theory of morals and hence to the 'general science of politics, legislation, and jurisprudence, as systematised by reasonings and illustrated by history'. At about the same time Horner's reading extended towards political economy and the history of government and manners. Scots law was mixed with Hume's History, Montesquieu, Filangieri, and Kames's Sketches. Law, being a necessity, was given three hours a day. Physical science was rationed to attending lectures on anatomy and physiology and pre-breakfast chemical experiments and note-taking. The evenings were to be consecrated to political philosophy, history, and natural jurisprudence. In the course of the next months, however, other pursuits had broken in on the plan geology, mineralogy, chemistry, and philology. No wonder then that in his sketch of his own character, Horner regretted his lack of 7'attention suivie' and of a 'systematising head' like that of Turgot or Bacon: 'Why have I discernment to perceive that the "Opus Magnum" should be written anew every century perhaps, and yet want genius to execute the undertaking myself!'50 The desire to attain a comprehensive perspective on all branches of science could not be suppressed; it was encouraged by a reading of Condorcet's life of Turgot, as well as by Stewart's perorations on the 'love of arrangement' which accompanied the philosophical perspective. By 1799 this desire had hardened into a project for writing a work on the 'General Principles of Philosophical Investigation', or, as it emerged a few months later, a 'View of the Limits of Human Knowledge, and a System of Principles of Philosophical Inquiry'. 51 Horner was fully aware of the audacity of the plan, but he wished to keep the ultimate aim in sight as a means of measuring his rate of advance. Bacon was the model to be followed in order to be superseded by a modern compend; and there is no doubt that Stewart's enthusiasm for Bacon, together with the confidence he instilled with regard to the philosophy of mind as 'the foundation of the great fabric', was crucial to Horner's ambitions. Together with Lord Webb 49 50
51
See Memoirs, 1, p . 136. Memoirs, 1, p . 87. F o r the plans of self-improvement and the record of his studies, see p p . 48-53» 57~9> 6 l ~5> 68 ~9> 102-19, 122-45, I 5 I ~ 7 9 Memoirs, 1, p . 102.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
49
Seymour, he embarked on a thorough study and translation of Bacon's works; and he continued to follow his ambitious plan right up to the moment he decided to leave Edinburgh permanently to seek his fortune at the English Bar in 1803. Intellectual projects of an academic as well as practical kind remained a feature of his London life; and six days before his premature death in 1817, aged thirty-eight, when faced with enforced leisure, he sketched in another massive project, written, as he admitted, 'under the auspices of opium and returning spring'. It lacks the Baconian ground-plan, but it covers a theory of justice, history, politics, belles lettres, the classics, and 'an introduction to the art of reasoning, for the use of students'.52 Horner's actual accomplishments as a writer were chiefly confined to a few essays on political economy for the Edinburgh Review, but it is clear that his plans embodied a regulatory ideal. Whether or not, granted a longer life, he would have ended up in Mackintosh's predicament seems less important than the nature of the ideal. Indeed, the term academic manque may be subtly distorting if it suggests the modern distinction between amateur and professional scholarship. Horner's Scottish education furnished him with criteria of liberal accomplishment which overrode this distinction. His studies were partly undertaken to mitigate 'the illiberality of professional character', but the effort went so far beyond mere diversion that it deserves to be treated as evidence of an ideal of character formation or Bildung. It was certainly for his integrity and force of character that his contemporaries remembered him; and Bagehot took Horner as proof for his view that 'Whiggism is not a creed, it is a character'.53 Few people then or since would think of Brougham in the same terms. Indeed, Bagehot left him out of his portrait of the early Edinburgh reviewers on the grounds that Brougham's unstable, opportunistic, and 'rushing' qualities would disturb the balance of the picture. He out-lived and out-wrote all his contemporaries by surviving into his nineties as a prodigious author of political, literary, and scientific works. At the outset, however, in addition to the similarities in their Edinburgh education, there were clear parallels between Horner's career and Brougham's, particularly during the early years when they were both making their way at the English Bar, being feted in Whig circles, and later given seats in Parliament. One of the most important things they had in common was a developed interest in political economy. It was one of their main 'Scottish' accomplishments and gave them a distinct air of being modern Whigs when they arrived in London. 52 53
Memoirs, 11, p . 433 and Appendix E. Bagehot, T h e First Edinburgh Reviewers' in Works, 1, p. 326. See also the tributes t o Horner printed in Memoirs, 11, pp. 4 3 9 - 7 1 .
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As a result of attending Stewart's lectures on the subject, and following up the recommended reading, Brougham and Horner were about as well equipped to become experts in political economy as it was possible to be in the early 1800s. Stewart's aims as a lecturer were modest: he did not pretend to be constructing a new system or even closing an old one; he saw himself as supplementing his students' reading of the Wealth of Nations, indicating where Smith's doctrines needed qualification, drawing attention to recent empirical investigations, and illustrating applications to contemporary problems. His main sub-headings were population, national wealth, treatment of the poor, and education of the lower orders a list which suggests a practical orientation, though it allowed him to take up a number of 'speculative' questions en route. Stewart was aware that in following this plan he would 'necessarily deprive [his] speculations of the systematic form affected by those writers who bring every particular question (however complicated by existing or by local peculiarities) to the test of a few abstract principles', but he felt that the additional variety of materials to which his students' attention would be drawn was adequate compensation.54 Stewart's knowledge of the available literature before and after Smith, English and French, is remarkable: a listing of his sources would be a fairly complete guide to the state of the subject as it stood at the beginning of the nineteenth century, prior to the minor explosion which took place after 1815. Stewart's pupils were introduced to the Wealth of Nations via the writings of the Economistes, and they were taught to treat some of Smith's 'metaphysical' distinctions with reserve. Thus Stewart held that Smith had been unjust in his criticisms of the Economistes and had fallen into error in his use of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour. 55 His conclusion on this subject - a faintly damning one - is of some interest as a clue to the attitude later adopted by his pupils to Smith's work. . . . if, on the one hand, the language of the Economists be more precise and definite, and the result of a more accurate metaphysical analysis than that of Mr Smith, and if some of the fundamental principles of the former are of a more scientific nature, and more universal application, the doctrines inculcated in the Wealth of Nations are, on the other hand, with very few exceptions, of greater practical utility to those who are to engage in the general business of the world, especially to those who have a more particular reference to the business of political life.56 Brougham wrote as fluently as Mackintosh is reputed to have spoken, and suffered from none of the inhibiting self-consciousness that was part of Horner's character. In the first five years of the Edinburgh Review he 54 55 56
Lectures in Works, v n , p. 132; see also pp. 44-6, 59, 151. See Lectures in Works, v i n , pp. 253-308. Lectures in Works, vin, p. 306.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
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wrote no less than fifty-eight articles on almost every subject imaginable. This may help to put into perspective his willingness to devote the last two years of his stay in Edinburgh to a single project, his two-volume Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers (1803) - a work which Mackintosh regarded as the best to appear on political economy since the Wealth of Nations. From the tone adopted in the book (by a man of twenty-five) and from the author's later reflections, it seems likely that Brougham would have considered such praise to be on the niggardly side. The book has been seen as an attempt to curry favour with those who could further Brougham's political career, but the stated intention was to extend Smith's reasoning on colonies beyond an examination of trade monopoly, the harmful effects of which, Brougham believed, Smith had exaggerated. One of the book's remarkable features is the authoritative, almost patronising, tone adopted towards Smith, who is criticised for being excessively under the influence of the American dispute, and (to take a more surprising example) for ascribing ctoo much to positive institutions and political events, in explaining their effects upon the progress of national wealth' in Book in of the Wealth of Nations - 'the most finished part of the whole book'. 57 In the following year Brougham wrote a withering attack on a work by another of Dugald Stewart's pupils, the Earl of Lauderdale's Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth (1804). Again, since Lauderdale was the leader of the Scottish Whigs, it has been claimed that this too was part of a campaign to gain favour with the Tories. But it is more relevant to notice that most of Brougham's review was taken up with what he described as cthe pure metaphysics of political economy', and with the merits of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour employed by Smith and the Economistes in particular. 58 These were exactly the kinds of issues that preoccupied Stewart in several of his lectures, and it is therefore not surprising to find Brougham (and, incidentally, Lauderdale) adopting the same critical stance towards Smith. Horner's reputation as a political economist was more solidly based; it chiefly derives from his contributions in the Edinburgh Review to the debate on the currency issue, his parliamentary speeches on the subject, and his chairmanship of the Bullion Committee. 59 It was certainly not 57
58
59
See H . Brougham, Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1803), 1, pp. 8, 144. For the biographical background see C. W . N e w , The Life of Henry Brougham (Oxford, 1961); and A . Aspinall, Lord Brougham and the Whig Party (Manchester, 1927). Edinburgh Review, 4 (July 1804), 343-77. O n productive and unproductive labour, see pp. 3 54-8. Half a century later Brougham was still claiming that this review established his credentials as the first person to uphold the correct scientific position o n the subject; see his Lives of the Philosophers of the Time of George III, 4th edn (London, 1862), p. 222. See F. W . Fetter's introduction to The Economic Writings of Francis Homer (London, 1957)-
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fanciful to believe that he would have been a natural candidate for the Chancellorship of the Exchequer in any future Whig ministry. But the details of Horner's later standing as a political economist are less important here than the educational context out of which his interest in the science arose. Education in political economy at this time was of necessity mostly self-education. Stewart's lectures may have been helpful as a stimulus, for their ordering of topics, and for 'the general manner and spirit with which he unfolds his speculations', but they were not well adapted to the task of teaching close economic reasoning of the kind that most of the leading issues of the day seemed to require. Horner's interest in the subject not only pre-dates Stewart's lectures, but most of his learning was done by private reading with other students. It goes without saying that Horner had carefully worked his way through the Wealth of Nations more than once, both by himself and in collaboration with his friend, Lord Webb Seymour. H e was by n o means uncritical; and as early as 1800 he confided to his journal the following doubt: Did not Adam Smith judge amiss, in his premature attempt to form a sort of system upon the wealth of nations, instead of presenting his valuable speculations to the world under the form of separate dissertations? As a system, his work is evidently imperfect; and yet it has so much the air of a system, and a reader becomes so fond of every analogy and arrangement, by which a specious appearance of system is made out, that we are apt to adopt erroneous opinions, because they figure in the same fabric with approved and important truths. That illustrious philosopher might therefore have contributed more powerfully to the progress of political science, had he developed his opinions in detached essays; nor would he have less consulted the real interests of his reputation, which indeed may have been more brilliant at first, by his appearance as the author of a comprehensive theory, but will ultimately be measured by what he shall be found to have actually contributed to the treasures of valuable knowledge. 60 Three years later this doubt had blossomed into a conclusion which is a more confident version of the view adopted by Stewart in his lectures: . . . I should be reluctant to expose Smith's errors before'his work has operated its full effect. We owe much at present to the superstitious worship of Smith's name; and we must not impair that feeling, till the victory is more complete. There are few practical errors in the Wealth of Nations, at least of any great consequence; and, until we can give a correct and precise theory of the nature and origin of wealth, his popular and plausible and loose hypothesis is as good for the vulgar as any other.61 It is significant that Horner's original doubt should have arisen as a result of reading Bacon's warning about 'premature systems'. For, as was noted earlier, everything Horner undertook at this stage had to be 60 61
See Memoirs, 1, pp. 126-7. See Letter to T. Thompson, 15 August 1803 in Memoirs, 1, pp. 237-8.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
53
measured in terms of where it might be fitted into his project for a new Baconian map of learning, a project which first required investigation of the logic of scientific enquiry. The study of Lord Bacon's writings is still uppermost in my mind, and that with an ultimate and steady view towards the philosophy of legislation . . . It is as a chapter in the great system of logic that I wish to understand the transcendental geometry; and it is with my eyes bent upon the philosophy of politics and law, that I have always been studying that system. Political science can only be prosecuted after the manner of the Baconian logic, and the practice of that must be more effectually learned from good models; it will be of inestimable value indeed, if to those we already possess in some of the physical sciences, may be added existing models of philosophical investigations relative to mind. But farther, political science ought to be erected on the philosophy of mind, as its basis; and the study of what has been ascertained in the latter is the only introduction to discoveries in the former.62 Stewart's influence in stressing the connections between political science, scientific method, and the philosophy of mind was crucial in determining Horner's priorities and pattern of studies. And the same was probably true of his early concentration on the works of Turgot, Quesnay, and other Economistes. As we have seen, Condorcet's life of Turgot was one of Stewart's favourite sources, and Horner not only read Condorcet's eloge carefully, but attempted to mount a collaborative effort among Stewart's pupils to publish a translation of all Turgot's political and philosophical writings. Horner, like Stewart, believed that the best approach to the Wealth of Nations was via the Economistes, and in 1802 he was prepared to place Turgot's works 'at the very head of all works of Economical Philosophy', partly on the grounds of doctrine, partly because 'they represent a model for the style of reasoning in this science'. 63 As in the case of Lauderdale and Brougham, though with less vociferousness, Horner felt it necessary to continue the search for the 'correct and precise theory of the nature and origins of wealth' which he could not find in Adam Smith. There was one subject which Stewart, following Smith and Ferguson, had dealt with at some length in his lectures which appears to have been of considerable concern to Jeffrey, namely the detrimental effect of the division of labour on the labouring classes. In his memoir on Smith, Stewart had noted the possibility 'that the same causes which promote the arts, tend to degrade the mind of the artist; and, of consequence, that the growth of national wealth implies a sacrifice of the character of the 62 63
See Memoirs, 1, p p . 214-16. See Letter to Duke of Somerset, 19 January 1802, Horner Papers, British Library of Political and Economic Science. For other references to Horner's reading of Turgot and the Economistes, set Memoirs, 1, pp. 68, y6, 101, 118-19, I29> I^°» 204-5.
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people'. 64 For someone as committed as Stewart was to opposing the 'sceptical disposition' described earlier, coming to terms with this 'very melancholy conclusion' was a matter of some importance. In his lectures Stewart criticised Smith for exaggerating the benefits of time-saving and manual dexterity when dealing with the effects of the division of labour, and for underestimating the role played by machinery in abridging labour. The substitution of machinery for labour also provided, at the possible cost of short-term unemployment, another long-term solution to the problem of 'living automatons'. By giving a new emphasis to technology, and reiterating the importance of public education, therefore, Stewart was able to keep the March of Mind on the road, and preserve the optimistic view that 'economy of labour' would join the 'action and reaction of manufactures, commerce, and agriculture on each other' in generating a system capable of 'consolidating the social union, and . . . organising the political system, by multiplying the mutual connections and dependencies of the different members of the community'. 65 And here, after all, was the main justification for including politics alongside ethics in the curriculum. Of all the Edinburgh reviewers, Jeffrey was the one who had most difficulty in not giving way to the 'sceptical disposition'; and he was frequently chided for this by his collaborators, and most effectively by Sydney Smith: 'What's the use of Virtue? What's the use of wealth? What's the use of honour? What's a guinea but a damned yellow circle? What's a chamber pot but an infernal hollow sphere? The whole effort of your mind is to destroy.' 66 In one of his earliest discussions of the drawbacks associated with the division of labour - a review of Millar's treatment of the theme -Jeffrey called upon the emergence of the middle classes as a partial antidote: 'The example of the middle classes descends by degrees to the ranks immediately below them; and the general prevalence of just and liberal sentiments, which are thus spread by contagion through every order of society, serves in some degree to correct the debasing influences of mechanical drudgery on the labourer.' 67 This belief in the mediating and ameliorating role, political as well as economic, of the middle classes was to become a major article of faith shared by philosophic Whigs and some of their opponents, but expression of it in this context seems to have been the highest point in Jeffrey's hopes. Subsequently, he had difficulty in avoiding a far more fatalistic conclusion than anything his teacher would have approved. By 1813 Jeffrey had broadened his pessimistic diagnosis to 64 65 66 67
See Account in Works and Correspondence, i n , p. 315. See Lectures in Works, v n , pp. 316-32. See also Dissertation in Works, 1, pp. 510--14 on the education of the lower orders. See Letters of Sydney Smith, edited by N . C. Smith (Oxford, 1953), 1, pp. 95-6 and 121. Edinburgh Review, 5 (October 1803), 175.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
55
take in the larger 'dream of perfectibility' of which the division of labour, intellectual as well as manual, was part. In direct contrast with Stewart's account of this dream, he drew attention to the persistence of war, faction and intrigue, to the unlikelihood of resolving disagreements on many questions that did not lend themselves to scientific demonstration, and to the effect of wealth and refinement in increasing the vices of sensuality and selfishness while undermining intellectual vigour and originality. Although much of this took the form of a literary exercise, the treatment of the economic dimension has a ring of personal conviction: The effect then which is produced on the lower orders of society, by that increase of industry and refinement, and that multiplication of conveniences which are commonly looked upon as the surest tests of increasing prosperity, is to convert the peasants into manufacturers, and the manufacturers into paupers; while the chances of their ever emerging from this condition become constantly less, the more complete and mature the system is which originally produced i t . . . The state of the operative manufacturers, therefore, seems every day more hopelessly stationary; and that great body of the people, it appears to us, is likely to grow into a fixed and degraded caste, out of which no person can hope to escape, who has once been enrolled among its members. They cannot look up to the ranks of master manufacturers; because, without capital, it will every day be more impossible to engage in that occupation - and back they cannot go to the labours of agriculture, because there is no demand for their services.68
Such conclusions were in marked contrast with those of other members of the Edinburgh Review circle, though they remained united in hoping that a universal system of education would encourage foresight and self-respect among the lower orders. According to Jeffrey's diagnosis, this left a great deal to be done by education, but none of the circle can be accused of leaving this matter to the system of natural liberty. 69 Jeffrey was a far more orthodox student of Stewart when it came to constitutional matters. Stewart's lectures on the theory of government became an addendum that could either be tacked on to his course on ethics or placed at the end of his lectures on political economy. They chiefly rehearsed, in the light of standard eighteenth-century sources, Montesquieu, Ferguson, Hume, Blackstone, and De Lolme, the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the three simple forms of government. A brief general treatment of the classical theory of mixed government from Polybius to Montesquieu was followed by a longer discussion of the 'excellencies' of the British constitution as the most successful example of that theory in practice. The chief virtues of the British system were seen as the unity of the executive power embodied in the prerogatives of a 68 69
Edinburgh Review, 21 (February 1813), 2 3 - 4 ; see also idem, 11 (January, 1808), 39-40. See Clive, Scotch Reviewers, p p . 136—9, 145, 174 o n this subject.
$6
The system of the North
Monarch with known and limited powers, and a division of the legislative power between King, Lords, and Commons which ensured stability and balance. Stewart's version of the doctrine of balance, however, drew attention to the gap between theory and practice by stressing the regular social gradation of ranks in Britain and the fact that the legislative power was no longer separated between King, Lords, and Commons, each representing a distinct order in society. In practice, all three powers, regal, aristocratic, and popular, were now represented within the House of Commons itself, leaving the King and Lords with an indirect but necessary influence on the nature of the balance struck.70 In a series of articles written between 1805 and 1812 Jeffrey took Stewart's account of the nature of the balance within the British constitution, with its implied defence of influence along Humean lines, as the basis for his own interpretation of the constitution and his views on parliamentary reform. In reply to the claims of Cobbett and the Burdettites on the one side, and of Tory upholders of the royal prerogative on the other, he maintained that as a result of influence, and in order to counteract the growing power of the Commons, the King and Lords no longer functioned as distinct and clashing powers; they now operated 'not against the united Commons of England, but among them'. Although war and high taxation had created too many placemen, influence was still essential to the maintenance of balance, and as long as the composition of the Commons contained 'a sufficient number, and a sufficient variety of persons, to make sure that every class and every part in the country, will there have an advocate', reform of the system of representation designed to increase the power of the popular element was irrelevant.71J effrey's validation of the role of the Whig opposition in the Commons, by claiming that it held the balance between the people outside Parliament and the King and Lords within the Commons, has been described as sanctioning 'the inactivity of uncertain men' on the subject of parliamentary reform.72 As the editor of what had become by then the organ of the Whig party, Jeffrey's use of Stewart's theory of balance was certainly no longer subject to the limitations imposed by academic caution on such matters. But it also shows the flexibility of the eighteenth-century constitutionalist position; it continued to provide a language and a set of themes upon which endless variations could be played. When the Whigs did espouse reform, in the form of Edinburgh Review articles written by Mackintosh in 1818 and 70
71 72
See Lectures in Works, ix, 'Of Politics Proper, or Theory of Government', especially pp. 4I7-5 2 ; See Edinburgh Review, 10 (July 1807), 386-421; idem, 14 (July 1809), 277-304; idem, 20 (November 1812), 315-46. See J. W . A . Gunn, 'Influence, parties and the constitution, 178 3-1832', Historical Journal, 17(1974), 322.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
57
1820, Jeffrey's arguments about the composition of the Commons could be modified to uphold the benefits of a system of mixed and virtual representation, as opposed to one based on uniform and universal suffrage.73 What conclusions regarding Stewart's teaching on the science of politics can be drawn from these selective and largely biographical reflections on the careers of the Edinburgh reviewers? Stewart clearly played a significant part in stimulating their interest in a modern version of the science, which they in turn passed on to a larger public. He was less successful in convincing them of the promise embodied in the Reidian approach to the philosophy of mind, though there were ample compensations in this respect to be had from the interest shown abroad, particularly in France.74 Horner was reputed to favour Hume's metaphysics over that of Reid; Jeffrey remained unconvinced that anything useful could be derived from an observational (i.e. non-experimental) knowledge of the human mind; and Sydney Smith made it known - in response to Stewart's repeated statement that the philosophy of mind was still in its 'infancy' - that he proposed 'to wait till it comes to years of discretion'.75 Nevertheless, Stewart's treatment of the science of politics as an integral part of a new map of learning which all his students could join in exploring was surely a major part of his attraction as a teacher. Such grand visions of a Baconian compend which united belief in the March of Mind with high moral purpose and a sense of being part of the wave of the future would perhaps be attractive to the 'liberal young' at all times. But the vision came at a price. Looking back, somewhat ruefully, on his Scottish education, Mackintosh said that when so much activity was devoted to uncertain, speculative, and metaphysical subjects: 'Strength was exhausted in vain leaps to catch what is too high for our reach.'76 The grandiose projects left uncompleted by Mackintosh and Horner testify to this exhaustion. Brougham remained indefatigable to the last, and does not appear to have left any unfulfilled projects. In 1843 he produced a massive two-volume treatise on Political Philosophy covering everything from the fundamental principles of government, through a comparative account of existing forms, to the rights and duties of citizens and the functions of the state. The work astounded and amused Jeffrey, and was rumoured to have broken the finances of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, under whose auspices it appeared. The 73 74 75
76
Seep. 98 below. See D . P. D o c k w r e y , 'Dugald Stewart and the Early French Eclectics, 1796-1820', unpublished P h . D . thesis, Cambridge University, 1977. See Letters of Sydney Smith, 1, p. 190. Jeffrey's criticisms of Stewart's experimental claims for the science of mind are discussed by Robertson, 'A Bacon-facing generation', pp. 4 3 - 8 ; and P. Flynn, Francis Jeffrey (Newark, 1978), ch. 2. See Memoirs, 1, p. 29.
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task of reviewing the book for the Edinburgh Review eventually fell to Nassau Senior, an English-educated Whig; he treated it respectfully but a little distantly, concluding that it dealt with 'some of the most important, and, at the same time, most doubtful questions on which the human mind can be employed'. 77 Bagehot was less circumspect; he felt that 'an excitable, ungenial nature . . . incapacitates Lord Brougham for abstract philosophy'. After all, 'he who runs may read, but it does not seem likely that he will think'.78 The system of the North was still better suited to writing articles. Stewart maintained, long after the prevailing style of political economy had departed from the one he employed, that 'it furnishes no objection. . . that some of the best treatises on questions of political economy have proceeded from men who were strangers to metaphysical studies. It is enough for my purpose if it be granted, that it was by habits of metaphysical thinking that the minds of those authors were formed, by whom political economy was first exalted to the dignity of a science.' 79 But the statement is clearly in retrospective mood, and if political economy had not yet fully escaped its moral philosophy integument, Stewart's 'natural' arrangement in giving priority to political economy was soon to become the 'obvious' one, as we shall see in the next essay. Stewart's opinion that political economy had strict bearing on those improvements in the municipal code which were the chief marks of modern civilisation was certainly echoed in the careers of his students. Legal reform and political economy went well together as fields in which professional expertise could be brought to bear on the municipal code by public-spirited men with a modern philosophical training, but lacking independent means. Brougham's 'rushing' qualities, particularly his willingness to become engaged in the more dangerous questions of foreign policy, again make him a partial exception to this or any other generalisation. But even he made his early and most solid reputation in Parliament as a legal reformer, acting in concert with Mackintosh, Romilly, and Horner. Once more though, Horner's career, which advanced more rapidly than Brougham's, provides the best example. Horner was aware that his academic projects, and more especially his mastery of law and political economy, had particular relevance to his prospects in life. To a man of talent who lacked 77 78
79
Edinburgh Review, 81 (January 1845), 46. 'Lord Brougham* in Biographical Studies (London, 1889), p. 79. See also letter from Jeffrey to Brougham, 1842, Brougham Papers, University College, London; and letter from Jeffrey to Napier, 21 October 1843, in Selections from the Correspondence of the Late Macvey Napier, edited b y his son, M. Napier (London, 1879), p. 438: 'The subject is a great one; and though I suspect it will be found to have been but cumbrously treated by our Omniscient, that is n o reason w h y the Edinburgh Review should not treat it better.' See Dissertation in Works, 1, pp. 477-8.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
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political connections, Stewart's teaching offered a way of serving the noble cause of human advancement by means that were largely independent of forms of government. By extension, it also held out the prospect of a political career which might not entail loss of independence and excessive embroilment in party politics - what Horner described as the problem of finding 'a happy medium between the prostitution of faction and the selfish coldness of indifference'. Stewart's lecture on the priority of 'the general principles of internal economy and regulation' over 'the comparative advantages of different constitutions' led Horner to make the following comment in his journal: [Stewart's] view of political speculation falls in with the train of reflections on which my mind has lately dwelt a good deal, as to the share which the contagious spirit of party disputation almost insensibly leads most people to take in the parties of the day; a subject on which I ought soon to bring myself to a decision. The plan of sentiment and conduct can scarcely be difficult to form in my situation, and with my views; at too great a distance from the scene of public action for a man of liberal ambition to entertain any desire of political eminence, it can be no arduous task for me to fix myself in uncontrollable independence, and, by the intrenchments of liberal opinion and candid judgement of character, to insulate myself altogether from all forms of faction. My great difficulty is to ascertain the exact degree and tenor to which an interest in the general welfare of the state, ought to be kept up; for a scepticism or cold indifference about these seem to be both criminal and contemptible. Perhaps the remark of Dugald Stewart. . . may help me to a solution of this problem.80 Stewart gave more practical help in advising Horner to move to London in 1803 to practise law, and by furnishing introductions to such valuable contacts as Samuel Romilly. By 1806 Horner was being offered, and accepting, a 'place' on the official commission set up to deal with Nabob of Arcot's finances; and the sequel to this was the offer of a seat in Parliament under the patronage of a Whig magnate, the agonisingly self-conscious decision about which can be followed closely in his correspondence and journal. 81 Despite his own involvement in party politics, it was Horner who seems most to have regretted the increasingly partisan tone of the Edinburgh Review: knowledge of politics as a science should presumably add more distance. 82 80 81 82
Memoirs, 1, pp. 131-2. Memoirs, 1, pp. 266-7, 278-80, 362, 371-81, 386-97, 411-12. Of the famous ' D o n Cevallos' article in 1808 which caused so much trouble H o r n e r said:
'Are all the fruits of a long continued study of politics, great opportunities of seeing both affairs and men very near at hand, and the best talents nature could give, to be thrown away upon slashing declamations to suit a temporary purpose or give vent to the humour and fit of the day'; see letter from Horner to Murray, 9 December 1808, Horner Papers, British Library of Political and Economic Science. See also letter to Jeffrey, 12 June 1809, urging caution before committing the Review to parliamentary reform in Memoirs, 1, pp. 494-5.
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Stewart's teaching may also have been responsible for the declining enthusiasm shown by his students towards that largely Scottish intellectual genre which he had christened as 'theoretical' or 'conjectural' history. The use of such history could best be reserved to earlier stages of society which were more at the mercy of physical and social circumstances than modern forms of polity, where 'political wisdom' and enlightened opinion was increasingly becoming the moving force in history. Hence perhaps the feeling that something had happened to the whole approach if Stewart could blandly announce that in writing conjectural history it was more important 'to ascertain the progress that is most simple, than the progress that is most agreeable to fact'.83 It seems to be the kind of dismissive remark that goes well with his warnings against relying too much on the history of existing political establishments in arriving at conclusions. If the modern science of legislation could now concentrate on 'those universal principles of justice and of expediency, which ought, under every form of government to regulate the social order', future goals rather than past adaptation were the main priority. There was no lack of appreciation for earlier models. Mackintosh could praise Hume as 'one of the earliest cultivators of that philosophy which attempts to reduce the progress of society, the diversities of national character, and the large events of history, to fixed general laws'.84 Jeffrey too maintained that the 'masterly sketches' of Smith and Millar 'unquestionably hold a most important rank among the investigations of moral science'. But the genre had become an academic fashion and fallen into hands that lacked the necessary 'profound skill and delicate management'.85 While the young radical Mackintosh could speak of history as 'a collection of experiments rather than as a series of precedents', a few years later, after the disastrous experiment in France, he spoke rather less urgently of history as 'a vast museum'.86 Homer's brief use of conjectural history was confined to an uncivilised society, namely the Scottish Highlands;87 and in 1813 Jeffrey regretted writing an article which was 'in considerable danger of being attacked and ridiculed, as a caricature of our Scottish manner of running up everything to elements and explaining all sorts of occurrences by a theoretical history of society'.88 Sydney Smith had in fact ridiculed the habit: 'The Scotch, whatever other talents they may have, can never condense; they always 83
84 85 86 87 88
See Account in Works and Correspondence, i n , p. 296. See also the earlier remark that 'when we cannot trace the process by which an event has been produced, it is often of importance to be able to show h o w it may have been produced by natural causes' (p. 293). Memoirs, 11, p. 248. Edinburgh Review, 2 (April 1803), 206-7. See Miscellaneous Writings of Sir James Mackintosh, 3 vols. (London, 1854), 1, pp. 358-9 and in, p. 60. See Economic Writings, pp. 115-32. See Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey, 11, p. 139.
Dugald Stewart and his pupils
61
begin a few days before the flood, and come gradually down to the reign of George the third, forgetful of nothing but the shortness of life.'89 Stewart's influence was not confined to the Edinburgh Review coterie. Another figure who will feature prominently in the next two essays could also record that he owed to Stewart 'the taste for the studies which have formed my favourite pursuits, and which will be so till the end of my life'.90 Although Stewart seems not to have remembered him, the faithful student in question was James Mill, later to become the populariser of Ricardian political economy and the vigorous proponent of the Benthamite science of government and legislative reform. In neither of these capacities would it seem that he earns a place alongside those considered in this essay. Proper consideration of this proposition will be given later, but Mill is a useful reminder that when Stewart's pupils shifted their activities to London, they increasingly encountered not merely the personal challenge of matching educational ideals to opportunities and political realities, but also ideas on the science of politics that had a different provenance. 89 90
See Letters of Sydney Smithy i, p. 327. See letter to M. Napier in 1821 cited in A. Bun, James Mill; A Biography (London, 1882), p. 16.
II D
D
Higher maxims: happiness versus wealth in Malthus and Ricardo The truths of political economy form but a class among the principles of administration, and in their practical application must often be limited by higher maxims of state, to which in theory too they are held subordinate, as being less general. FRANCIS HORNER, 'Observations upon the Bounty upon Exported Corn', Edinburgh Review (1804) Wealth, population and power are, after all, only valuable, as they tend to improve, increase, and secure the mass of human virtue and happiness. T. R. MALTHUS, Observations on the Effects of the Corn Laws (1814)
could accuse Horner, the most assiduous of Dugald Stewart's pupils, of adopting a constricted view of the map of knowledge, and the first of our epigraphs seems to indicate that in spite of the enlarged and more autonomous status granted to political economy by his teacher, he continued to adhere to the older Smithian definition of its domain, namely as 'a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator'. When applying the principles of political economy to practice, a more general science had to adjudicate in cases of conflict between wealth and indisputably higher objectives of policy. On the occasion in question, Horner was dealing with the problem made familiar by Smith's dictum to the effect that defence was more important than opulence; and this conflict between security and abundance remained an issue in the running debate on the Corn Laws which took place during and after the Napoleonic Wars. But it was Robert Malthus who had, somewhat earlier, widened the arena of potential conflict between policy objectives by speaking in his first Essay on Population (1798) of a more dramatic choice facing legislators, namely between 'wealth' and 'happiness', or, as he also expressed it in a way that brings home its significance for these essays, as a conflict between the concerns of political economy strictly delimited, and those of a more general science of morals and politics. This theme was to become a recurrent one in Malthus's writings; it featured in his work on population, the Corn Laws, the nature of post-war distress, and in the theory of optimal growth which he advanced in his Principles of Political Economy (1820). This work was conceived as an attempt to counter the orthodoxy which had begun to coalesce around the doctrines propounded by his friend, David Ricardo, whose own version of the Principles of Political Economy had appeared three years earlier. Although Ricardo was more inclined to confine his attention to questions which fell within the narrow province of political economy, in correspondence he found himself drawn by controversy into the wider circle of Malthus's speculations concerning the limitation and exceptions to this more constricted branch of knowledge when it was applied to legislative matters. It is with these broader dimensions of a dispute that is normally studied for its doctrinal and methodological consequences as part of the discipline history of economics that this essay will chiefly be concerned.
NOBODY
As a result of Malthus's Essay on Population and such urgent policy topics as the Poor Laws, the Corn Laws, the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England, and questions of taxation and debt thrown up by the Napoleonic Wars, post-Smithian political economy acquired a 65
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number of new 'laws' and 'principles', chiefly those regulating population, rent, profits, wages, and the causes and consequences of capital accumulation. But how imperative were such laws as guides to the art of legislation? What counted as legitimate 'higher' modifying conditions, what merely as the constraints on action imposed by vested interests and the state of public opinion? At the lowest level such questions counterposed technocracy and political expediency, knowledge and performance; but there was a higher level, rarely confronted explicitly, which concerned the entire relationship of economic laws to political institutions. Malthus was frequently driven to invoke 'higher interests' and 'higher considerations', but he found it more difficult to specify what systematic guidance could be given to legislators when faced by a conflict between lower and higher interests. The laws of political economy might be subject to a court of appeal, but to what body of knowledge worthy of the term 'science', even in its looser contemporary sense, were they subordinate? An appeal to 'higher maxims' could not simply be a euphemism for something as vague, and possibly sinister, as raison d'etat. For, as Horner pointed out when using the expression, it should not be employed as a cloak for deviating from general principles 'whenever a statesman takes fright at a temporary inconvenience, or is captivated with some specious project of a remedy'.1 Malthus was sometimes accused of over-reacting to 'temporary inconvenience' by Ricardo and his followers, but his reputation as an original contributor to postSmithian developments in the science, notably on questions of population and rent, hardly suggests that he underestimated the weight to be attached to the concept of law in economic affairs: his popular opponents certainly did not think this was the case. As the works by Ricardo and Malthus indicate, the first attempts to draw up new conspectuses of the shape of post-Smithian political economy as it had emerged from a quarter of a century of debate, mostly conducted in topical pamphlets, review articles, and parliamentary inquiries, were made after the Napoleonic Wars. But none of these attempts sought to match the Wealth of Nations over the whole territory mapped out in that protean work. Indeed, the first effort to do this did not come until 1848, when John Stuart Mill published his Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. This movement in a more specialised direction was accompanied by a tendency towards closure of common boundaries with neighbouring disciplines, and both moves were perhaps best symbolised by the substitution of the term 'principles' for Smith's more open-ended 'inquiry'. Dugald Stewart's separate lecture course gave an early indication - in effect if not by design 1
Edinburgh Review (October 1804) as reprinted in The Economic Writings of Francis Horner, edited by F. W. Fetter (London, 1957), p. 108.
Happiness v. wealth in Malthus and Ricardo
6j
and content - of the more specialised direction in which the fledgling science was to move when initiative for its development passed southwards from Scotland to England. Thus Malthus, who had praised Stewart's enterprise in mounting his course, and regretted the backwardness of English universities in this respect, was appointed to a Chair of Modern History and Political Economy at the newly established East India College at Haileybury in 1805, the first of its kind to be created in England. It is also significant, however, that the original title was Professor of General History, Politics, Commerce, and Finance, but that another appointment had to be made to take care of the departmental duties which came under 'General Polity and the Laws of England' - the post which Mackintosh took up in 1818.2 As Malthus's friend and biographer, William Empson, pointed out, once Malthus had transformed his polemical first Essay into the respectable and much-enlarged treatise of 1803, he 'embraced political economy as his intellectual profession'. His appointment at Haileybury was, from the outset, tailored to suit this profession; and his teaching was entirely confined to commentary on the Wealth of Nations and matters connected with his own population theory.3 Ricardo was never encumbered with teaching duties of any kind: by devoting his leisure and retirement fairly single-mindedly to the subject, he was quickly placed 'at the head of Political Economy' - though it took some heavy badgering from James Mill to convince him that the defects of his earlier education did not debar him from assuming this role. 4 With the possible exception of Francis Horner, none of the group of Stewart's pupils who founded the Edinburgh Review specialised in political economy to the same extent as Malthus and Ricardo. But contraction of the scope of the subject was accepted just as readily by all those Scottish-educated political economists who transferred their activities to London as it was by their native English counterparts. As we have seen, it was Horner who criticised Smith for erecting a 'premature system' and favoured 'detached essays' as the best means of developing the subject further. In common with Stewart, Horner also expressed doubts as to whether, despite the continuing practical value of the Wealth of Nations, Smith had discovered the 'correct and precise theory of the nature and origins of wealth'.5 Much of the development of political economy in this period certainly took the form of examinations of the limitations of Smith's theoretical system, with further differences later emerging as to 2 3 4 5
See P. James, Population Malthus: His Life and Times (London, 1979), pp. 172, 178. See J. M. Pullen, 'Notes from Malthus: the Inverarity Manuscript', History of Political Economy, 13 (1981), 794-811. The relevant parts of the Mill-Ricardo correspondence are reprinted in D. Winch (ed.), James Mill: Selected Economic Writings (Edinburgh, 1966), pp. 179-88. Seep. 52above.
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whether Smith had been wise to combine an exposition of the science with questions involving what became known as 'the art of legislation'.6 The introduction of rigid distinctions between science and art belongs more to the 1830s and 40s, when attempts were made, chiefly by Nassau Senior and John Stuart Mill, to codify the scope and method of what had by then become a fairly mature science. But there is much to be said for Senior's retrospective claim that Ricardo was 'the first English writer who produced Political Economy in a purely scientific form'.7 Malthus challenged both the method and the substance of Ricardo's version of the science, and he also advertised what he took to be his greater concern with 'practical applications' in the subtitle of his Principles. Something will have to be said about the merit of these claims in what follows, but initially it seems worth stressing that the relationship between theory and practice is separable (though not always separate) from the larger question posed by 'higher maxims'. A more precise and specialised treatment of the conditions favourable to the growth of material wealth does not have as its corollary a claim that such knowledge has overriding status in legislative affairs. Ricardo was no more likely to make such a claim than Malthus. A clearer distinction between science and art was later to serve as a screen behind which a strategic retreat could be made from earlier and stronger claims to furnish direct guidance in policy matters.8 During this period, however, there was another change which operated in the opposite direction. Once more, the origin of the change can be traced back to Stewart's decision to give priority to political economy within the science of politics on the grounds that its findings could be implemented without regard to different forms of government. Prudential considerations may have originally had something to do with this move, but by 1825 the same conclusion was being supported by J. R. McCulloch on more matter-of-fact grounds: The science of Political Economy was long confounded with that of Politics; and it is undoubtedly true that they are very intimately connected, and that it is frequently impossible to treat those questions which strictly belong to the one without referring 6
7
8
See Nassau Senior's comment that: 'I have often doubted whether we ought not to wish that Adam Smith had published his fifth book as a separate treatise with an appropriate title. It is by far the most amusing and the easiest portion of the "Wealth of Nations", and must have attracted many readers whom the abstractions of the first and second books, if they had formed a separate work, would have repelled. On the other hand, the including by so great an authority, in one treatise, and under one name, many subjects belonging to different arts, has certainly contributed to the indistinct views as the nature and subjects of Political Economy, which appear still to prevail.' Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (London, 1852), pp. 44-5. Four Introductory Lectures, p. 54. On the history of the science/art distinction and methodological debate in general, see T. W. Hutchison, 'Positive' Economics and Policy Objectives (London, 1964), ch. 1; and M. Blaug, The Methodology of Economics (Cambridge, 1980), Part 11. See pp. 139-40, 320 below.
Happiness v. wealth in Malthus and Ricardo
69
more or less to the principles and conclusions of the other. But, in their leading features, they are sufficiently distinct. The laws which regulate the production and distribution of wealth are the same in every country and stage of society.9 It is not difficult to detect here the basis for that confident universalising tendency of English political economy which was to be the object of so much criticism later in the century.10 The desirability of annulling the long-established marriage between political economy and politics does capture some features of the RicardoMalthus controversy. Ricardo was never as explicit as McCulloch on the subject, but the very fact that he applied to James Mill for guidance on the larger 'science of legislation* makes it clear that he did not regard it as synonymous with political economy.11 Moreover, according to the conventional view, Ricardo was the archetypal economists' economist, the author of the famous 'Ricardian vice' of proceeding to clear-cut theoretical and policy results on the basis of simplified 'strong cases' and deductive reasoning, and who, even as an MP, was described by Brougham as speaking in the House of Commons like a man 'from another planet'.12 Much can be said for this view: Ricardo, more or less self-consciously, and with due regard to the deficiencies of his education, did confine his attention both to and within political economy. Without making explicit claims to universality, but by devoting most of his analysis to the economic problems, habits, and institutions of a modern commercial society remarkably like Britain, he did not seem the best candidate for leading the search for exceptions to general principles. Malthus, on the other hand, sometimes seemed intent on reversing these priorities and deductive procedures; he certainly found it necessary to call on comparative and historical evidence more frequently to support his diagnosis of modern problems, potential or actual. At this point, however, we encounter what appears to be a major paradox. Malthus's Essay on Population, the publication for which he was chiefly revered or reviled by a general public that cared little for doctrinal and methodological refinements in political economy proper, does not seem to be the work of a sensitive relativist concerned to point out the limitations of general laws. It certainly does not seem to be a good example 9
Principles ofPolitical Economy (London, 1825), p. 38. See Essay VIII below. * For Ricardo's use of the education he received from Mill on the larger science see pp. 106-9 below. 12 For Brougham's remark see The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, edited by P. Sraffa, 11 vols. (Cambridge, 1952-73), v, pp. 56 and 85; he gave a politer version of the same sentiment after Ricardo's death, see vol. v, pp. xxxii-iii. The term 'Ricardian Vice' was coined by J. A. Schumpeter; see his History of Economic Analysis (New York, 1954), "7*-
10 1
jo
Higher maxims
of a work dedicated to the idea that economic laws are far from being imperative and must in consequence take account of a variety of political institutions and moral circumstances. Whatever may have been its subsequent career within political economy and the debate on the Poor Laws, the initial contribution of Malthus's first Essay is probably best described as that of a political moralist. By giving dramatic emphasis to the consequences of the uneven race between numbers and subsistence, Malthus intended to advance a decisive argument against the perfectibilist and egalitarian theories of Condorcet and Godwin. The Essay was a powerful anti-utopian tract designed to show that the poverty of the mass of society could be neither attributed to political institutions nor alleviated by changes in the existing structure of property and society. Malthus openly announced his defence of this structure and acknowledged the 'melancholy hue' of the conclusion which he drew from the perpetual dilemma posed by the constant tendency of population growth to outrun subsistence.13 Parson Malthus's answer to the pessimism of Population Malthus - a theodicy in which the creative mental pressure exerted by physical necessity was depicted as part of God's purpose in designing a universe in which men would be forced to exercise their creative energies - merely served to confirm the apologetic features of the Essay.14 Economic laws seem to be equated with God's laws in an effort to deliver the quietus to any prospect of beneficial change in social and political circumstances; human devices of any kind seem puny and helpless in the face of Nature. It is not so much a case of economic laws, but of biological necessity determining social and political arrangements. It is well known that Malthus modified his position in the second Essay by emphasising the preventive check of moral restraint; he also withdrew some of his more heterodox theological speculations.15 Nevertheless, neither the natural theology nor the moral categories of vice and virtue disappeared when the Essay became a more academic treatise on demography.16 Moreover, the fact that Robert Owen was added to the list of 13
14
15
16
See the Royal Economic Society's facsimile reprint of An Essay on the Principles of Population (London, 1798) in a volume entitled First Essay on Population (London, 1926), p. iv and chs. 10 and 15. By 'present structure of society* Malthus meant 'the necessity of a class of proprietors, and a class of labourers' (p. 287), to which he later added 'the system of barter and exchange and the general moving principle of self-love'; see the letter to Godwin in J. Bonar's endnotes to First Essay, p. v. See First Essay, chs. 13 and 14. While 'apologetic' was given a pejorative connotation by some of Malthus's critics, Malthus, as a sincere believer, would have had no difficulty in accepting the term in its straightforward natural theology sense. The background to this withdrawal is described by Bishop Otter in the memoir he wrote for the posthumous 2nd edition of Malthus's Principles of Political Economy (London, 1836), pp. xlvii-liii; see also James, Population Malthus, pp. 116-21. See J. M. Pullen, 'Malthus' theological ideas and their influence on his principle of population', History of Political Economy, 13(1981), 39-54.
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visionaries attacked in later editions shows that the work continued to serve an anti-utopian purpose. 17 It would seem, therefore, that Malthus takes his place in a long tradition of Anglican apologetics for inequality and poverty. With suitable modification, his work could be absorbed into nineteenthcentury versions of this tradition to supply the groundwork for the explicitly Christian political economy of Thomas Chalmers and Archbishop Whately, and give rise to hopes on the part of William Whewell and Richard Jones that he would become an ally in constructing an anti-Ricardian form of inductive political economy. It is certainly worth bearing in mind these features of Malthus's work that differentiate him from more secular-minded devotees of political economy. As an ordained minister of the established Church, Malthus was as much the successor to Abraham Tucker and William Paley as to Adam Smith, and as much the contemporary of someone like Bishop Sumner, who did so much to make his doctrines acceptable in Anglican circles, as of his friend Ricardo.18 But the significance of all this for Malthus's views on politics and the science of political economy should not be exaggerated. When Malthus found himself at odds with Stewart's pupils and with Ricardo and his followers, he conducted his side of the resulting dispute without decisive recourse to theodicy. Malthus's population doctrine proved capable of being absorbed into political economy, with or without its natural theology overtones. Dugald Stewart took it on board, in spite of his own optimistic views on social and intellectual progress,19 and this was characteristic of a later generation as well. As John Stuart Mill said of the Malthusian theory, speaking for a younger generation of students in the 1820s, This great doctrine, originally brought forward as an argument against the indefinite improvability of human affairs, we took up with ardent zeal in the contrary sense, as indicating the sole means of realizing that improvability by securing full employment at high wages to the whole labouring population through a voluntary restriction of the increase of their numbers.20 17 18
19 20
See An Essay on the Principles of Population, 8th edn (London, 1878), pp. 282-6 and Book iv, chapter 12 for the discussions of O w e n added in the 5 th edition published in 1817. See J. B. Sumner, A Treatise on the Records of Creation ... with particular reference... to the Consistency of the Principle of Population with the Wisdom and Goodness of the Deity, 2 vols. (London, 1816), especially 11, chs. 3-5 for an attempt to combine traditional Christian sources with the Malthusian population principle and a wide range of eighteenth-century Scottish social theorising on the question of commerce, progress, the division of labour, and inequality. It is of particular interest because Malthus made changes in the 5 th edition of his Essay to accommodate Sumner's views and endorsed Sumner's w o r k ; see Otter's memoir, Principles, p . lii, and the letter cited in James, Population Malthus, p . 351. F o r the subject in general, see R. Soloway, Prelates and People; Ecclesiastical Social Thought in England, 1783-1852 (London, 1969), ch. 3. See Lectures on Political Economy in The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by W . Hamilton, 11 vols. (Edinburgh, 1854-60), v m , pp. 68, 86, 104, 203-7. See Autobiography and Literary Essays in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,
(Toronto, 1981), 1, pp. 107-9.
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It was on this basis that a large measure of agreement among political economists could be established concerning the need for a fundamental reform of the Poor Laws - to which James and John Stuart Mill added the advocacy of a more positive solution than Malthus could contemplate, namely birth control. As on other matters, James Mill coupled the blackest of diagnoses of the present state of the labouring classes with the whitest of hopes about future prospects: 'indefinite improvement' in standards of living could be achieved once the 'superstitions of the nursery were discarded'.21 There was also as much room for positive, not merely dutiful, human agency in Malthus's position as there was in Smith's more secular use of 'invisible hand' arguments. In fact, while both Malthus and Ricardo believed in a 'system of natural liberty' in economic affairs, Malthus's political economy required him to invoke legislative agency more frequently, especially with regard to the Corn Laws and remedies for a general glut. Finally, any interpretation of Malthus that depicts him as an extreme necessitarian, or any other kind of extremist for that matter, has to overcome the evidence of his commitment to moderation and the golden mean as a methodological principle, and deal with an anxious and rather old-fashioned form of Whiggism on the perils faced by the mixed constitution in Britain. From the very beginning of his career as a political moralist Malthus had posited a conflict, actual or potential, between the preconditions for an increase in wealth, the subject-matter of the science of political economy proper, and 'higher considerations' of 'health', 'comfort', 'virtue', and 'happiness', the subject-matter of the science of politics and morals. And while he has often been charged with and convicted of errors of reasoning on these matters, there is a remarkable continuity in his thinking which connects the first Essay with the Principles. He was never again to express the paradox with the same force as he did in the first Essay, but the gradual retreat merely prepared the way for the position he adopted in the final chapter of the Principles, in which he stated the conditions which had to be fulfilled in order to reconcile wealth and happiness, while at the same time keeping the actual rate of growth of wealth within the boundaries set by the potential rate of growth of the economy. In addition to what might fairly be described as the pro-agrarian bias of his economic contributions to the debate on subsistence, there is also a systematic political dimension that can be traced in the fragments of his earliest work, an unpublished pamphlet entitled The Crisis (1796); it informs the anti-utopianism of the Essay in all its editions; and it surfaces frequently in the Principles. 21
See Winch (ed.) James Mill, pp. 196-7, 238-9.
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In the first Essay Malthus questioned Smith's identification of increases in national wealth with improvements in the 'happiness and comfort' of the mass of society. He did so in a chapter devoted to 'a probable error of Dr Adam Smith in representing every increase in the revenue or stock of society as an increase in the funds for the maintenance of labour'.22 This chapter contains the nub of the problem that was to dominate post-Smithian political economy, whether as cultivated by Malthus himself, or by Ricardo later. It was Smith's view that only in 'flourishing' or progressive states, those in which capital accumulation was taking place, could both wages and population be rising and the mass of society obtaining a share in the benefits of economic growth. But Malthus queried whether there were not circumstances in which the wealth of a nation, as conventionally measured, might be growing, while the standard of living of wage-earners remained stationary or fell. Suppose wealth expanded and nominal wages rose as a result of investment in manufacturing, that is without a corresponding increase in investment in agriculture: would this not create a situation in which the price of subsistence goods would rise as fast as, if not faster than, nominal wages, thereby denying benefit to the labouring poor? In other words, were there not circumstances in which economic growth might be incompatible with rising standards of living for the wage-earner under conditions of rising population and increasing costs of domestically produced subsistence goods? Ricardo might be said to have adopted this problem as his own, but to have given a different theoretical answer. Ricardo and his followers also endorsed what seem, in retrospect at least, to have been the forwardlooking solutions to the problem by arguing that with the abolition of restrictions on food imports, a tax system that favoured capital accumulation, and with birth control in the background, it would be possible for Britain to support a growing population at rising standards of living by shifting resources from agriculture into manufacturing, and by relying on foreign trade to provide essential food and raw materials. Malthus contested this orthodoxy across the board by expressing fears about excess capital accumulation, by upholding the need for a landowning class capable of using their rental incomes for 'unproductive' consumption, and by questioning the wisdom of allowing manufacturing to grow rapidly at the expense of agriculture. All these matters were extensively rehearsed in correspondence with Ricardo, and later in Malthus's Principles, where once again Ricardo was able to record his disagreement in extensive notes. Malthus also came to believe that more fundamental methodological 22
See First Essay, ch. 16. The changes in an optimistic direction made to this chapter in successive editions have been charted by G. Gilbert, 'Economic growth and the poor in Malthus' Essay on Population', History of Political Economy, 12 (1980), 83-96.
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differences lay at the heart of his doctrinal divergence from what he now described as 'the new school of political economy'. The economic doubts expressed in the first Essay concerning Smith's reasoning on wealth and capital accumulation reappeared in Malthus's Corn Law pamphlets as arguments in favour of protection as a means of maintaining agricultural prices, encouraging domestic food production, and sustaining a steady demand for home manufactures by those in receipt of rental incomes.23 The case was supported by arguments concerning the likely direction and magnitude of movements in prices, wages, profits, rent, and production, but the ultimate decision facing legislators was still framed as one in which a choice had to be made between 'wealth' and 'happiness'. Protection might entail a slower rate of growth of wealth and population, as well as a redistribution of gains in favour of the agricultural classes, but Malthus argued that the question of the Corn Laws could not be settled by recourse to the principles of political economy alone; it had to be considered in conjunction with higher considerations derived from the science of politics and morals.24 And what makes Malthus's case all the more interesting is the fact that he did not follow the usual polemicist's practice of placing all the moral and political benefits on the side of the scale which he favoured. Thus in depicting the balance that had to be struck, Malthus made use of the contrast between agrarian and commercial societies as refined in eighteenth-century discussions of the history of civil society. In common with the standard versions of these histories, Malthus acknowledged the benefits of commerce and manufactures to be as follows: They infuse fresh life and activity into all classes of the state, afford opportunities for the inferior orders to rise by personal merit and exertion, and stimulate the higher orders to depend for distinction upon other grounds than mere rank and riches. They excite invention, encourage science and the useful arts, spread intelligence and spirit, inspire taste for conveniences and comforts among the labouring classes; and, above all, give a new and happier structure to society by increasing the proportion of the middle classes, that body on which the liberty, public spirit, and good government of every country must mainly depend.25
Against these benefits, however, had to be set the social costs associated with manufacturing towns, where wages and employment fluctuated with fashion, foreign competition, and war; where 'discontent and tumult' were consequential evils; and where, even under the best of conditions, the 23
See Malthus's Observations on the Effects of the Corn Laws (London, 1814); and Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn (London, 1815) as reprinted in The Pamphlets of Thomas Robert Malthus ( N e w York, 1970), pp. 120-1,
24
Pamphlets, Pamphlets,
25
130, 139-45* i$i-7h
pp. 117-19. p. 118.
Happiness v. wealth in Malthus and Ricardo
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situation of the town worker was 'unfavourable to health and virtue'. Any purely agricultural state could be shown to be inferior to one in which commerce and manufacturing also existed, but this did not mean that the happiness of 'a country the most manufacturing of any ever recorded in history' would be served by a further relative increase in its manufacturing population. The legislator was called upon to make a decision based on the 'doctrine of proportions' about an optimal state: 'Many of the questions both in morals and politics seem to be of the nature of the problem de maximis et minimis in Fluxions; in which there is always a point where a certain effect is the greatest, while on either side of this point it gradually diminishes.'26 It should now be clear why necessitarian or deterministic interpretations of Malthus, in which political or legislative agency are allowed no part to play, seem wide of the mark. What has been said so far about Malthus's attempt to bring considerations of 'national quiet and happiness' to bear on legislation consorts well with his conservative defence of existing forms of property in the Essay without turning him into the reactionary, not to say corrupt, upholder of aristocratic society and polity of popular legend. Indeed, Malthus seems to have been remarkably consistent in sustaining a particular view of the dangers to the established system of civil liberty posed by the unhappiness and easily exploitable distress of the mass, whether derived from high food prices, a Poor Law which eroded 'independence' by creating paupers, general gluts, or the instability and unhealthiness of life in manufacturing towns. It is a view that is eminently 'political' in the sense that it depends on an interpretation of the virtues of the mixed British constitution, a view of what threatens the balance of the mixture, and of how such threats can best be avoided. If publishers had been willing, the first Essay would have been preceded by a straightforward political pamphlet entitled The Crisis, a View of the Present Interesting State of Great Britain, by A Friend of the Constitution. The surviving extracts show that this attack on Pitt's administration called upon 'the country gentlemen, and middle classes of society' to exercise their traditional restraining influence by 'removing the weight of objections to our constitution by diminishing the truth of them'. 27 In other words, Malthus was employing the standard oppositional language of opponents of executive encroachment, the eighteenth-century language of someone with 'Country' rather than 'Court' sympathies. That this remained the basic framework for Malthus's political views, rather than a 26 27
Pamphlets, p . 119. The extracts can be found in Otter's memoir, reprinted in Principles, pp. xxxvi-vii, and Empson's article o n Malthus for the Edinburgh Review (January 1837), as reprinted in Occasional Papers ofT. R. Malthus, edited by B. Semmel ( N e w York, 1963), pp. 241-4.
y6
Higher maxims
youthful enthusiasm, is confirmed by the chapters added to later editions of his Essay in which he considered whether 'a doctrine which attributes the greatest part of the sufferings of the lower classes of society exclusively to themselves, is unfavourable to the cause of liberty, as affording a tempting opportunity to governments of oppressing their subjects at pleasure, and laying the whole blame on the laws of nature and the imprudence of the poor'.28 Anybody capable of posing the question that way must be about to give a negative answer, though this does not reduce our interest in the supporting arguments. Against the presupposition of the question, Malthus argued that where the distress of the people is attributed to their rulers, the potential despot is furnished with 'the fatal and unanswerable plea of necessity'; it also allows the appointed guardians of society in free governments 'to become daily less jealous of the encroachments of power'. Such doctrines were the main source of revolutionary discontent and the decline of revolutions into military despotism and further revolution once events proved that governments were unable to relieve distress. The conclusion is that the mob recruited from 'a redundant population goaded by resentment for real sufferings, but totally ignorant of the quarter from which they originate, is of all monsters the most fatal to freedom'.29 Malthus wrote the first Essay with the French Revolution in mind, but he was able to add in 1817 that the British government had 'shown no great love of peace and liberty during the last twenty-five years'.30 Visionaries like Paine and Owen could keep Malthus's fears alive, and Peterloo and other civil disturbances confirmed his diagnosis that economic distress among the un-propertied mass undermined respect for free institutions, retarded the prospects for moderate reform, and created conditions favourable to executive tyranny.31 Malthus also revealed himself to be a rather old-fashioned Whig in describing himself as 'an enemy to large standing armies', though chiefly in order to regret that their existence had proved necessary during the food riots of 1800 and 1801.32 As in The Crisis, the appeal is to the English country gentlemen to resist corruption and resume their traditional role as defenders of liberty against executive tyranny. The entire chapter is written in the forthright language of a 'Country' Whig appealing to the intellectual conventions and to the traditional checks and balances of the mixed constitution in a style well established by eighteenth-century popular debate. Even without the references 28 29 30 31 32
Essay on the Principle of Population, Book iv, chs. 6 and 7. Essay, p. 418. Essay, p. 426. See Ricardo's Works, v m , pp. 107-8 for Malthus's reaction to Peterloo. Essay, p. 418.
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yy
to Hume's euthanasia of the constitution in absolute monarchy, there is no doubt that Malthus's reasoning conformed to a style that Hume and Smith would have recognised, though they might have regarded much of it as distinctly 'vulgar* as opposed to 'sceptical Whiggism'. Malthus's advocacy of state-supported education of the poor on the grounds that it would make them 'better able to detect the false declamation of interested and ambitious demagogues', was in fact a direct reference to Smith's opinions.33 Malthus also recognised that the indirect influence of government on the prosperity of its subjects was 'striking and incontestable' - a reference to the effect of security of property and 'good and equal laws' in encouraging prudence, dignity, and respectability among the lower classes.34 That Malthus was, in simple 'party' terms, some kind of moderate Whig can be inferred from his support for such measures as educational reform, religious toleration, and Catholic emancipation.35 And these Whig credentials help to explain his membership of the 'King of Clubs' and his good standing with members of the Edinburgh Review coterie. But they also make it necessary to account for the failure of that journal to take a more sympathetic view of Malthus's views on political economy - a failure of considerable significance to his efforts to mount an alternative to Ricardo and his followers. There were, after all, some grounds for believing that Stewart's pupils might have been well disposed towards a moderately pro-agrarian position. Stewart's own physiocratic tendencies were fairly pronounced; and he acknowledged that the export bounty on corn had found its 'ablest advocate' in Malthus - his pamphlet on The High Price of Provisions (1800) - without accepting Malthus's conclusions.36 Homer's analysis of the corn bounty, like that of Malthus, differed from Smith's in allowing that it would give a temporary stimulus to domestic production, and hence that its removal would be attended by temporary distress. He also accepted on 'higher maxims' grounds that 'an independent supply of subsistence lies at the foundation of the means of defence'. But he went on to leave the reader in no doubt as to his preference for avoiding artificial expedients in this, as in other matters affecting economic life.37 When the Corn Law debate was revived in 1815, Horner conceded that Malthus's espousal of the landowners' cause was disconcerting; and in a letter to Malthus he even spoke of himself 'as one whose conversion from heresy some hopes may be entertained'. But this seems to have been mere 33 34 35 36 37
Essay, p. 439. Essay, p. 424. See James, Population Malthus, pp. 50-1, 94, 140-1, 153-4, 234, 422. See Stewart's Works, v m , pp. 202-7, 247-52, 284-5; Jx> pp. 47—53, 118. See Economic Writings of Francis Horner, pp. 108-14.
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politeness; he offered detailed criticisms of Malthus's pamphlets on the subject, hinting that Malthus's own theories of population and rent could be used, as Ricardo was later to use them, to undermine the case for protection.38 Moreover, Horner's interpretation of the political background to the Bill was similar to the one adopted by Ricardo and fortified by James Mill: It is this audacious and presumptuous spirit of regulating, by the wisdom of country squires, the whole economy and partition of national industry and wealth, that makes me more keenly averse to this Corn Bill of theirs than I should have been in earlier days of our time, when the principles of rational government were more widely understood, and were maintained by stronger hands at the head of affairs.39 Malthus's mild heterodoxy could not be supported on economic or political grounds. Horner's position is not merely revealing but marks an important juncture in Malthus's career. Jeffrey, as we have seen, shared Malthus's doubts about the growth of manufactures, and hoped that Malthus's views would be published in the Edinburgh Review; but he allowed himself to be overruled by Horner's advice on the matter.40 Malthus's Corn La^ pamphlets were reviewed unfavourably by David Buchanan, and from this point on, in spite of the maintenance of friendly relations, Malthus could no longer count on the support of the most influential periodical of the day. Horner's judgement on the unsoundness of Malthus's position was delivered before it was possible to speak of a Ricardian alternative, but when McCulloch began his long reign as the chief economic reviewer in 1818, his discipleship to Ricardo and personal hostility to Malthus ensured that the Edinburgh Review became a vehicle for the Ricardian version of political economy.41 This blow to Malthus's chances of advancing his economic opinions in Whig circles was compounded when another of Stewart's pupils, MacVey Napier, asked McCulloch, James Mill, and Ricardo to write most of the important articles on political economy in the new edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Malthus found it necessary to resort, therefore, to the pages of the Quarterly Review - the Tory periodical that had published several bitter attacks on his population theory - in order to register his protest against the way in which the 38 39 40 41
See Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Homer, edited by L. Horner, 2 vols. (Boston, 1853), 11, pp. 222,227. Memoirs, 11, p. 226. See also a more strongly worded letter on the same subject to James Brougham, 15 November 1814, Brougham Papers, University College, London. See pp. 54-5 above, and H. Cockburn, Life and Letters of Lord Jeffrey, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1852), 11, pp. 120, 145-6. See F. W. Fetter, 'The authorship of economic articles in the Edinburgh Review, 1802-47', Journal of Political Economy, 61 (1953), 234, 238-41; and D . P. O'Brien, / . R. McCulloch; A Study in Classical Economics (London, 1970), pp. 314-19.
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Encyclopaedia had fallen completely under the spell of the 'new school' led by Ricardo.42 It was in the Quarterly Review, too, that Malthus continued the counter-attack against Ricardo's methods of reasoning which he had begun in his Principles by declaring that 'the science of political economy bears a nearer resemblance to the science of morals and politics than to that of mathematics.43 This echoes in reverse one of Ricardo's complaints that Malthus's great mistake lay in not recognising that political economy was 'a strict science like mathematics'.44 Ricardo also acknowledged his concern with 'strong cases' and the long term or 'permanent state of things' as compared with Malthus's concentration on 'the immediate and temporary effects of particular changes'. Slightly modifying the terms of the contrast, Ricardo said: 'If I am too theoretical, which I really believe is the case - you I think are too practical. There are so many combinations - so many operating causes in Political Economy, that there is great danger in appealing to experience in favour of a particular doctrine, unless we are sure that all the causes of variation are seen and their effects duly estimated.'45 Despite Malthus's misgivings about Ricardo's methods and conclusions, he cannot be treated, either in praise or condemnation, as the embodiment of a pure inductivist position - though this is not meant to deny his great concern with short-run disturbances and attention to limiting circumstances that Ricardo either overlooked or assumed away. It was, after all, Malthus, the Cambridge mathematician, who introduced the misleading precision of the arithmetic and geometrical ratios into political economy, and who employed the algebraic language of a 'given quantity' to describe the effect of the constant passion between the sexes. It was also perhaps characteristic of Malthus that he should use a mathematical image drawn from the theory of fluxions to express his doubts about Ricardo's mathematical approach. It is true that Malthus introduced a large mass of inductive and historical material into the later editions of his Essay, but the simultaneous emphasis on moral restraint gave an air of tautology to the theory, making the empirical evidence seem like purely confirmatory illustrations. When he was not arguing with Ricardo, Malthus was just as capable of defending 'theory' against the reasonings of mere practical men along lines similar to those employed by Hume and Stewart, and repeated by Ricardo and James 42
43 44 45
See Quarterly Review (January 1824) as reprinted in Occasional Papers, pp. 171—208; see also F. W . Fetter, 'The economic articles in the Quarterly Review and their authors, 1809-18 52', Journal of Political Economy, 66 (19 5 8), 4 7 - 6 4 . Principles of Political Economy (London, 1820), p . 1. See Ricardo's Works, v m , p . 331. Works, VII, p . 295.
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Mill.46 We also know that he declined to give whole-hearted support to the efforts of Whewell and Jones in their attempt to discredit Ricardo's deductive methods and his mono-causal conclusions with regard to rent and profits.47 Ricardo must now be brought more firmly into the picture, though it might seem as though this is unlikely to add much to an understanding of 'higher maxims', apart from a few standard concessions to 'gradualness' in legislative affairs. That Ricardo was not quite as implicit in his methodological convictions as is sometimes supposed can be gleaned from the statements quoted so far.48 But it also seems worth rehearsing the grounds of his self-conscious limitation of the science of political economy, and recording some of his reactions to Malthus's speculations about the sources of conflict between happiness and wealth. It must first be acknowledged that a simple but potent source of disagreement on this subject lay in Ricardo's unwillingness to grant the possibility of conflict so far as many of Malthus's main positions were concerned - agricultural protection, capital accumulation, and general gluts. A straightforward implementation of the system of natural liberty would, in Ricardo's opinion, harmonise happiness and wealth; a difference of view within the science, narrowly defined, could determine whether or not higher maxims needed to be invoked. But even ardent supporters of Malthus are likely to have some sympathy with another of Ricardo's complaints against his friend, that: 'He first begins by disputing the position whether certain measures will make corn cheap, but before the end of the argument he is endeavouring to prove that it would not be expedient that it should be cheap, on account of the moral effects it would have on the people. These are two distinct propositions.' And it was on this occasion that he went on to endorse the opinion that the duty of the political economist 'is to tell you how you may become rich, but he is not to advise you to prefer riches to indolence, or indolence to riches'.49 This point was of more than purely formal significance to Malthus's position on the conditions for sustained economic growth - a position that often required as much appeal to Smith's history of the impact of commerce and manufacturing on feudal or agricultural societies as it did to what is now known as a theory of under-consumption. At the heart of 46
47
48
49
Thus a chapter was devoted to the Necessity of general principles' in the later editions of the Essay (Book iv, ch. 13), which began by citing Hume's view 'that of all sciences there is none where first appearances are more deceitful than in polities'. See N . B. de Marchi and R. P. Sturges, 'Malthus and Ricardo's inductivist critics: four letters to William Whewell', Economica, 40 (1973), 379~93For a fuller demonstration see N . B. de Marchi, 'The empirical content and longevity of Ricardian economies', Economica, 37 (1970), 257-76. See Works, 11, pp. 337-8.
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Malthus's alternative system lay his views on the need for the stimulus of 'effectual demand' from some quarter to ensure that actual and potential rates of growth coincided, thereby minimising the chances of cyclical and long-term unemployment and stagnation.50 Within this context Malthus criticised Ricardo for paying insufficient attention to 'so general and important a principle in human nature, as indolence and love of ease'.51 What would happen if, once a people had fully supplied itself with necessaries and conveniences, they preferred indolence to luxuries? Without a demand for luxuries any further attempt to employ revenue as capital could not succeed. To Ricardo, who always approached such problems from the side of production or supply, the answer was simple: yes, indolence might be preferred to luxuries, and there might in consequence be no further motive to increase production. But once goods were produced, this would in itself generate enough income for them to be consumed.52 Malthus furnished a number of illustrations of situations and countries in which the preference for indolence over 'the rewards of industry' had altered the career of prosperity. But again Ricardo had no difficulty in agreeing that poor countries that were content with 'limited wants' and therefore lacked a motive for accumulation would remain poor and underdeveloped. An argument about the effects of accumulation was being shifted in mid-course to the prior but separate question of the motives for accumulation. Faced with evidence of stagnation and slow growth in the European feudal past, in China, in Spanish America, and in Ireland, Ricardo grew impatient with the change of question. How could any of this be relevant to a civilised country like Britain, or, slightly more generally, 'to countries with a dense population abounding in capital, skill, commerce, and manufacturing industry, and with tastes for every enjoyment that nature, art or science will procure'?53 But Ricardo and Malthus were not always to be found speaking across each others' shoulders. There were genuine, if unresolved, doctrinal differences; and Ricardo made some effort to join Malthus in making use of Smith's 'progress of opulence' arguments, though he showed more resistance to using the language of Divine Providence, despite Malthus's wish to put the theory of rent in that light.54 For example, Ricardo con50
51 52 53 54
From a massive modern literature o n Malthus's underconsumptionist challenge, o n e recent reconstruction, with a g o o d bibliography, can be mentioned: see W. Eltis, 'Malthus's theory of effective demand and growth', Oxford Economic Papers, 32(1980), 19-56. See Works, 11, p. 313. Works, 11, pp. 313-15. Works, 11, p. 340. Thus Ricardo denied that his position o n rent was a reproach against the bounty of Nature, but he did n o t agree that 'in a treatise o n Political E c o n o m y it should be so considered. The gift is great or little according as it is more or less, not according as it may
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ceded in fairly devastating fashion that economic development in Spanish America and Ireland might not be accompanied by benefits to the populace at large: Happiness was the object to be desired, and we cannot be quite sure that provided he is equally well fed, a man may not be happier in the enjoyment of the luxuries of a neat cottage and good clothes. And after all we do not know if these would fall to his share. His labour might only increase the enjoyments of his employer.55 On other occasions, however, he gave a more conventional account of the transition from agricultural to manufacturing society. It was possible to imagine an agricultural nation more militarily powerful than any country in which both agriculture and manufacturing took place, but it would never be as wealthy, and Ricardo clearly felt the entire line of speculation was otiose: there were no such nations. Give a country wealth, or let it acquire wealth, and it ceases to be purely agricultural, not because there is any thing which necessarily obliges it to be any thing else, but because with wealth a desire for manufactures is excited, and this desire becomes a powerful stimulus to the accumulation of capital in order that the desire may be gratified.56 The mechanisms of ordinary prudence and pursuit of self-interest might not always operate, or even bring net benefits to the individual beyond a certain point, but they certainly had to apply at the social or aggregate level, otherwise no proposition in the science was secure. It would be no answer to me to say that men were ignorant of the best and cheapest mode of conducting their business and paying their debts, because that is a question of fact not of science, and might be urged against almost every proposition in Political Economy.57 Ricardo had every reason to believe that Malthus accepted these elementary propositions; they were a standard part of the Smithian inheritance. What he could not understand was why, in order to support his views on 'effectual demand', Malthus was willing to abandon the concept of economic man on what seemed like a purely ad hoc basis.
55 56 57
be m o r e o r less morally useful': Works, n , p . 210. This seems blunt enough, b u t see Ricardo's praise for J. B . Sumner (note 18 p . 71 above) as 'the author of a clever b o o k o n the Records of Creation, in which Malthus' system is n o t only defended for its truth, b u t for its affording proofs of the benevolence and goodness of the Creator': Works, v n , p p . 247-8. Works, VII, pp. 184-5. Works, VII, p p . 102-3. Works, vi, p . 64.
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There are parts of Malthus's Principles, particularly those concerned with the effect of commerce and manufacturing in bringing about a more equal distribution of landed property, where he appeals to 'higher interests' of a political rather than moral character. These remind us of his 'Country' style of Whiggising, or what others have described as championing the ideal of aristocratic polity. Following Hume and Smith, he speaks of the benefits due to the break-up of the 'unequal and vicious division of landed property', but appealing once more to the 'doctrine of proportions', he defended primogeniture. By forcing the younger sons of the nobility 'to be the founders of their own fortunes', primogeniture had 'opened the fairest arena for the contests of personal merit in all avenues to wealth and honours'; it had 'infused a greater degree of energy and activity into professional and commercial exertions than would have taken place if property in land had been more equally divided'. In turn, this had favourable economic results in that it produced 'a very large class of effective demanders, who derive their power of purchasing from the various professions, from commerce, from manufactures, from wholesale and retail trade, from salaries of different kinds, and from the interest of public and private debts'. The clinching reason for favouring this deluge of downward social mobility on the part of the younger sons of the aristocracy was political, and it could be reinforced by fears of what was likely to happen in France as a result of laws designed to break up large properties. The fear, of course, was military despotism: a decisive alteration in the delicate balance of the mixed constitution through erosion of that bastion of English liberties, the landed aristocracy. 58 Ricardo did not share these 'fears of the duration of free government', 59 but his remarks on primogeniture are notably vague for someone with a reputation (which he rightly denied) for being the sworn enemy of the rent-receiving classes. He believed that landowners had a permanent interest in desiring protection from grain imports, whereas manufacturers had only a temporary interest in similar protective measures on their goods; 60 but his criticisms of James Mill's scheme for taxing the incremental element in land values suggest that he had a high regard for the expectations generated by existing property rights. 61 Of considerably more interest than primogeniture is the highly signifi58 59 60 61
See Principles of Political Economy ( L o n d o n , 1820), ch. v n , section v u . In the p o s t h u m o u s second edition of 1836, this became a section in B o o k 111. See Works, 11, p . 387. See Works, 1, pp. 312-14; 11, pp. 199-200. See Winch (ed.), James Mill, pp. 198—9, 338-42 for Mill's scheme and Ricardo's criticisms (also in Works, ix, pp. 132-3). See also C. Shoup, Ricardo on Taxation (New York, i960), p. 82. For Ricardo's views on security of property rights see Works, v, pp. 500-1; and vn, p. 370.
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cant note which Malthus added to his discussion of the political benefits of aristocracy after the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832. Imperious circumstances have since brought on a reform of a more sudden and extensive nature than prudence would have perhaps suggested, if time and circumstances could have been commanded. Yet it must be allowed, that all which has been done, is to bring the practical working of the constitution nearer to its theory. And there is every reason to believe, that a great majority of the middle classes of society, among whom the elective franchise has been principally extended, must soon see that their own interests, and the interests and happiness of those who are dependent on them, will be most essentially injured by any proceedings which tend to encourage turbulence and shake the security of property. If they become adequately sensible of this most unquestionable truth, and act accordingly, there is no doubt that the removal of those unsightly blots, of those handles, which, with a fair show of reason, might at any time be laid hold of to excite discontents and to stir up the people, will place the British Constitution upon a much broader and more solid basis than ever.' 62
This lengthy afterthought seems to be quintessentially Malthusian in flavour. For all his special regard for the landed gentry they had been linked with the middle classes as protectors of English liberties in his earliest pamphlet; and in the successive editions of the Essay, the references to these useful classes became steadily warmer, such that by the time Malthus wrote the Principles they were allowed to be a major source of effectual demand as well as a safeguard against executive tyranny. 63 But the statement makes perfectly clear that Malthus would hardly have been a firm supporter before the event of 'a reform of a more sudden and extensive nature than prudence would perhaps have suggested', though he was content to endorse it afterwards. This provides what could be the main clue to an understanding of Malthus's position on legislative matters, but first a word must be said about his consistent claim, partly confirmed by Ricardo himself, that he was more concerned with 'practical applications' than Ricardo. Ricardo's belief that political economy was 'a strict science like mathematics' does not mean that he relinquished practical objectives. For as he said: 'Political Economy, when the simple principles of it are understood, 62 63
Principles of Political Economy, 2nd edn (London, 1836), p. 380. This parallels the increasing emphasis in the Essay on the beneficial effects allowed to manufactured goods in inspiring a taste for comfort among the lower classes: see M. Gilbert, 'Economic growth and the poor', p. 92. Malthus repeated Smith's warning against merchants and manufacturers — 'that the interests of these classes d o n o t always prepare them to give the most salutary advice* on parliamentary matters - in both editions of the Principles (1820 edn, pp. 438-9; 1836 edn, p. 381), but he added the note o n the Reform Act quoted in the text, and strengthened his statements in favour of the middle classes: see pp. 350-1, 371, 374-5 in the 1836 edition. The middle classes were not, of course, identical with merchants and manufacturers.
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is only useful as it directs Government to right measures in taxation.'64 This constitutes a fairly restricted view of the guidance to legislators furnished by the science, but it accurately reflects Ricardo's heavy commitment to the system of natural liberty. It may explain why, apart from the incidental reflections on the Poor Laws, the chapters on taxation are the only concessions to the legislative art in the Principles. Taxation was the one case where 'interference becomes absolutely necessary', and even within this sphere Ricardo had little to say about the controversial questions of tax equity. 65 It goes without saying that there is no Ricardian equivalent to Smith's Book v on the duties of the sovereign with respect to defence, justice, education, and other public works. But it should also be noticed that there is no Malthusian equivalent either. Malthus makes many more remarks on possible remedies for cycles and gluts, but he does not deal with the principles of taxation - something which Ricardo regretted because it was on such topics 'that the most perfect knowledge of the science is required'. For all Malthus's talk about the 'doctrine of proportions' and the laws of de minimis et maximis, he found it difficult to derive specific maxims, high or low, which could be used to guide the legislator in the difficult choices which he constantly posed. What was more damaging - though it is a tribute to his candour - was his admission that the golden mean applicable to any given situation could probably not be ascertained. Thus when faced with Whewell's actual use of the theory of fluxions to express some propositions in political economy, he confessed that: 'The grand difficulty, however, with a view to practical utility, is the getting data to work upon, sufficiently near the truth; and such as can be stated distinctly in mathematical language. In many cases where one should wish to come to definite conclusions I should fear this was quite impracticable.'66 There is clearly a major tension between emphasising 'practical applications' and admitting that the statement of them, let alone their implementation, was 'quite impracticable'. A science of morals and politics so frankly vague must always be close to either accepting what was expedient, or adopting a post hoc ergo propter hoc view of science and art. 67 The only case where Malthus took up a fairly unambiguous policy stance on an issue requiring positive legislative action was in advocating abolition of the Poor Laws. 64 65 66
67
Works, viii, p. 133. See Shoup, Ricardo on Taxation, p. 249. See de Marchi and Sturges, 'Malthus and Ricardo's inductivist critics', p. 387. For an extensive study of the doctrine of proportions and Malthus's views o n its ascertainability see J. M. Pullen, 'Malthus on the doctrine of proportions and the concept of the optimum', Australian Economic Papers, 21 (1982). This feature of Malthus's thinking is well brought out by James, Population Malthus: see, e.g., pp. 256-7.
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On agricultural protection, his position, after rehearsing all the arguments, was one of standing pat. Yet even here he was inclined, in the face of popular opposition to the Corn Laws, 'to yield to the prodigious weight of petitions, and let the people have their way'. 68 He felt that he had discharged his duty in putting the case for the Corn Laws in as fair and unemotional a fashion as possible, but his friend Empson caught the flavour of Malthus's virtuous indecision when he gave this verdict on the episode: This duty he never regretted that he had performed. But his general principles in favour of freedom of trade were so absolute, that, at times, doubts came over him, whether any exception ought to be admitted. It follows, that he was far from continuing always equally satisfied that the necessity of the particular exception, which he had argued, in behalf of restriction upon the importation of corn was sufficiently made out.69 The self-adjusting properties of the system of natural liberty could seem, under these circumstances, to be the least hazardous method for determining the golden mean. Ricardo, who reached similar conclusions by more direct methods, could only see a man arguing with himself. As he commented at the end of one of Malthus's arguments which concluded in favour of leaving matters to the 'uninfluenced operation of individual interest' - cwho has ever proposed to leave it to any other'. 70 Walter Bagehot later joined a small chorus of Malthus's contemporaries in saying that 'there is a mist of speculation over his facts, and a vapour of fact over his theories'; but he added a slightly more generous note in stating that 'he has connected his name with the foundation of a lasting science which he did not plan, and would by no means have agreed in'. 71 For Malthus was also arguing with Ricardo, and much of his contribution to the science must be seen as antithesis to Ricardo's thesis. He cast himself in this role by consistently attempting to keep open questions that seemed to have been excluded or foreclosed by a more remorseless and universalising logic. An equivalent judgement on Ricardo was given by J. L. Mallet when he described him as 'herisse deprincipes\ as a man 'who meets you on every subject he has studied with a mind made up, and opinions in the nature of mathematical truths'. 72 On all the matters which fell within his purview, and this now includes his parliamentary speeches as well as his Principles, he was usually able to deliver unambiguous statements of his short- and long-run priorities, though more especially on the latter. 68 69 70 71 72
See letter t o H o r n e r , 14 M a r c h 1815, cited in J a m e s , Population Malthus, See E m p s o n m e m o i r as reprinted in Occasional Papers, p . 259. Works, 11, p . 450. W . Bagehot, Economic Studies ( L o n d o n , 1908), p p . 193-5. A s cited in Works, VIII, p . 152.
p . 267.
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Mallet also thought that James Mill had 'no doubt contributed to the formation of many of [Ricardo's] opinions', a judgement frequently echoed by later commentators, either in mitigation or as a means of compounding the charge of narrow dogmatism. Ricardo was certainly an apt, but by no means slavish, pupil for Mill's teachings - though his special talent for deductive reasoning, his poor education, and even his modesty could be regarded as 'accidental' features in the larger process of narrowing that accompanied specialisation in political economy. Mill was more confident in following Ricardo's lead in his Elements of Political Economy (1821), a 'Schoolbook' in which he aimed cto detach the essential principles from all extraneous subjects'. 73 But detachment did not imply for Mill any separation of science from art; he considered that to say 'something was true in theory but required correction in practice' was nothing more than 'a vulgar form of speech'. 74 Like his master, Bentham, Mill believed that science and art should be fused together in order to focus on the essential questions of 'what ought and ought not to be done by government'. But this is merely one aspect of what Mill fortified when he united Ricardian economics with the Benthamite science of legislation. The anti-landlord implications of Ricardo's rent doctrine, which were played down by Ricardo himself, were almost tailor-made to support Mill's analysis of the interest-serving properties of Britain's aristocratic system of government — a diagnosis he had formulated on political grounds much earlier. 75 He also gave the rent doctrine a central role in determining the goal of the land revenue system which he and his son attempted to apply to India. 76 But the important point to note about Mill's contribution is that the Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number promised to provide this kind of precise forward-looking 'criteria of excellence' or 'standard of perfection' which Malthus's vague and slightly regressive invocations of 'higher interests' lacked. 77 Malthus's timid 'Whiggising' was exactly the kind of thinking on constitutional subjects that Mill set out to discredit in his Essay on Government, and which Macaulay, with some important modifications, set out to defend in his attack on the Benthamites. This forms part of the sequel to the story considered here, but there is room for a final reflection on the reaction of the Edinburgh Review circle to developments in political economy in this period. In the course of his attack on the Utilitarians, Macaulay complained that they 'have already 73 74 75 76 77
See Elements in Winch (ed.), James Mill, p. 204. SeeJ. S. Mill's Autobiography in Works, 1, p. 35. See Winch {td.), James Mill, pp. 8-10, 198-9. See Winch (ed.) James Mill, p p . 391-4; and m o r e especially E . Stokes, The Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), ch. 2. See p p . 116-19 below for further detail o n Mill's criteria.
English
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maxims
made the science of Political Economy - a science of vast importance to the welfare of nations - an object of disgust to the majority of the community'. 78 Sydney Smith also complained that the science had become too 'metaphysical', by which he probably meant that intellectual refinements were being cultivated at the expense of practical utility; and he was probably speaking for himself as well as Mackintosh when he said of his friend after his death that 'he knew what is commonly agreed upon by political economists, without taking much pleasure in the science'. 79 The connections forged by James Mill between Ricardian economics and Benthamism could not have helped. Nevertheless, it seems significant that these Whig grumbles did not develop further, and that Smith coupled Malthus with Ricardo in assigning blame for what had happened. We have also seen that the Edinburgh reviewers were not inclined to rally to Malthus's methodological banner when they did not accept his substantive conclusions. Despite his antagonism to Malthusian economics, McCulloch was much closer to Malthus on primogeniture and constitutional issues than he was to Mill, whose 'incorrigible' radicalism and abstract style in the Elements he deplored. 80 Moreover, whatever Macaulay might say in the midst of his controversy with Mill, he could come to the defence of Malthus's population doctrines and cite a law of political economy as one of the discoveries of modern times, strictly comparable with earlier discoveries in physics and mathematics; and the doctrine which he cited was that quintessential Malthus-Ricardo contribution to post-Smithian political economy, the law of rent. 81 Mackintosh is reputed to have regretted the declining interest shown in the science of ethics since his youth, and he attributed the decline in part to the fact 'that political economy, more especially, had usurped its credit and interest among the philosophical reasoners of the day'. 82 Yet in founding the Literary Society of Bombay in 1804, he had given a possible reason w h y this should have happened when he said that 'of all kinds of knowledge, Political Economy has the greatest tendency to promote quiet and safe improvement in the general condition of mankind'. The safety was 78 79 80
81
82
See Macaulay's attack o n Mill's Essay on Government as reprinted in J. Lively and J. Rees (eds.), Utilitarian Logic and Politics (Oxford, 1978), p. 177. See Letters of Sydney Smith, edited b y N . C. Smith, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1953), 1, p. 409; and Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, 2 vols. (London, 1835), 11, p. 502. For his criticisms of Mill's Elements see J. R. McCulloch, The Literature of Political Economy (London, 1938) (1st edn, 1845), P- l 8 - O n primogeniture see D . P. O'Brien, /. R. McCulloch, pp. 288-9. For Macaulay's defence of Malthus see the pair of articles he wrote for the Edinburgh Review attacking Michael Sadler in The Works of Lord Macaulay, edited by his sister Lady Trevelyan, 8 vols. (London, 1866), v, pp. 419-44, 470-97. O n the rent doctrine see the essay on 'John Dryden', Works, v, p. 85. See letter from Lord Holland in Memoir, 11, p. 448.
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due to the fact that 'the counsels of this science . . . [were] adapted to all forms of government: they require only a wise and just administration'.83 This was what Stewart and later McCuUoch had in mind when suggesting that political economy could be studied separately from the science of politics. To judge from the reception given to the divergent efforts of Malthus and James Mill to unite them once more by drawing attention to the higher or additional dimensions of problems raised by political economy, few devotees of the subordinate enquiry were willing to forego the safety and convenience of the separation. Alternatively, returning to Adam Smith's original image, one could say that this layered branch of the science of legislation had formed distinct roots of its own. 83
See Miscellaneous Works of the Right Honourable Sir James Mackintosh, 3 vols. (London, 1854), 11, p. 567.
Ill D
D
The cause of good government: Philosophic Whigs versus Philosophic Radicals A philosophic Whig is firm to the popular principle of our government, and consequently firm against any encroachment, whether from the monarchical or democratical side. HENRY COCKBURN, Life ofLord Jeffrey (185 2) Those whom . . . we call philosophic radicals, are those who in politics observe the practice of philosophers - that is, who, when they are discussing means, begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of causes. JOHN STUART MILL, 'England under Seven Adminis-
trators', Westminster Review (1837)
the definitions offered here by Cockburn and Mill amount to little more than slogans, they signal an interesting divergence between the two groups who were most anxious to claim philosophical standing for their political diagnoses in the years leading up to, and immediately following, the Reform Act of 1832. Cockburn spoke for that generation of largely Scottish-educated Whigs which figured prominently in the first of these essays; while Mill spoke for a new wave, those younger followers of Bentham's Utilitarianism who took their cue from James Mill, regarded the Essay on Government as 'a masterpiece of political wisdom', and adopted 'enmity to the Aristocratical principle' in government as their motto.1 Rivalry, challenge, and supersession have frequently been taken to be the keynotes of the relationship between philosophic Whigs and Radicals in this period, with the narrower, harder-nosed, 'English' doctrines of the Utilitarians eventually emerging victorious over their more generous 'Scottish' counterparts. Such themes of rise and fall, success and failure, turn on questions of influence and durability which are not the immediate concern here. Rivalry, however, can be amply demonstrated by James Mill's choice of the philosophic Whig position as the one that particularly needed to be discredited, and by the consequential decision of both Mackintosh and Macaulay to attack the Benthamites as sectarian radicals, with Macaulay's assault on the Essay on Government serving as a suitable climax to the dispute, though by no means as the last word on the subject raised. The Mill-Macaulay dispute will feature prominently later in this essay, but it is first necessary to remember that rivalry was not the only, or even the most significant, dimension of the relationship between philosophic Whigs and Radicals.
ALTHOUGH
Once more, the teachings of Dugald Stewart on the science of politics provide a convenient benchmark. For if, as Stewart had maintained, improvements in 'the detail of the municipal code' were now the main items on the agenda of any modern science of politics, Bentham's claims to be addressing himself to that agenda could hardly be bettered. Bentham was, after all, the archetypal legal codifier and legislative machiniste, and lack of attention to detail is not among the charges usually levelled at him. Before his acceptance of the need for radical reform of Parliament in 1808, Bentham's indifference to forms of government consorted well with Stewart's doctrine that 'the happiness of mankind depends, not on the share which people possess, directly or indirectly, in the enactment of 1
See J. S. Mill, Autobiography and Literary Essays in The Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill, edited b y j . M. Robson and J. Stillinger (Toronto, 1981), 1, pp. 105-7.
93
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The cause of good government
laws, but on the equity and expediency of the laws that are enacted'.2 Bentham's willingness to cut through the maze of fictions that surrounded the first principles of obligation also matched Stewart's priorities; there was a common dislike for the enthusiasms of more libertarian cases for democracy, American, French, or British; and a shared basic notion that security was perhaps the most important form of freedom.3 It is true that Bentham had rather different continental heroes from the Scots - for example, Helvetius rather than Montesquieu - and that having rejected natural law, along with natural rights, as 'nonsense on stilts', he was apt to be patronising when faced with such performances as Mackintosh's lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations given in 1799-1800: how could such a talented man waste his energies 'in teaching the anatomy and physiology of two chimeras' simultaneously?4 Furthermore, Bentham remained largely indifferent to much that had preoccupied Scottish historians of civil society, the origins and historical development of forms of law and government: he saw some merit in the work of Ferguson and Kames, but history was more often regarded by Bentham not merely as a record of error (which it could also be to Scottish historians), but as a record of uninstructive error, constantly in danger of succumbing to the Chinese or Blackstonian disease of ancestor-worship. De Lolme could be praised for avoiding Blackstone's 'spirit of obsequious quietism9, but Bentham was impatient with all the discussion of the British constitution that ran in terms of 'mixture' and 'balance': 'Talk of balance, never will it do: leave that to Mother Goose and Mother Blackstone.'5 Although Stewart was more appreciative of 'conjectural history' and had paid court to the constitutionalist tradition in his lectures, his gestures in this direction had become pious, if not perfunctory. His lectures, as we have seen, also heralded a shift from the sceptical and explanatory focus of Hume and Smith towards a more explicitly normative concern with future goals of enlightened legislation that could be attained regardless of specific 2
3 4
5
See above, p. 36. For the most complete account of Bentham's 'Transition to radicalism, 1809—10* see the article by J. R. Dinwiddy, Journal of the History of Ideas, 35 (1975), 683-700. See Douglas G. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham's idea of liberty in relation to his utilitarianism (Toronto, 1977), especially ch. 3. See letter to Mackintosh in 1808, in The Works ofJeremy Bentham, edited by J. Bowring, 11 vols. (London, 1843), x, pp. 428-9. See also his remark that 'I leave it to Adam Smith, and the champions of the rights of man (for confusion of ideas will jumble together the best subjects and the worst citizens on the same ground) to talk of invasions of natural liberty . . .' in Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings, edited by W. Stark, 3 vols. (London, 1952), in, p. 257. Plan of Parliamentary Reform as reprinted in Bowring (ed.), Works, in, p. 450; and for the remarks on De Lolme and Blackstone, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London, 1977), pp. 124, 473, and 498; on Kames see pp. 313-14, 330, 430.
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forms of government. It was precisely this shift that Bentham advocated when he criticised Grotius, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, and, with more contempt, Blackstone, for confusing historical and expository questions with those that were part of the more important province of 'critical' or 'censorial' jurisprudence.6 If Bentham had known more about the content of Smith's lectures on jurisprudence, it is possible that he might have added him to the list. Bentham's science of legislation achieved its novelty by concentrating on the detail of 'what the Legislator ought to do in future'.7 Stewart endorsed Bentham's Defence of Usury as a legitimate extension of Smith's system of natural liberty to an important branch of the art of legislation, and he cited the Panopticon scheme as an example of enlightened thinking on penal law reform.8 The general tenor of Stewart's teaching, therefore, might be said to have prepared the ground for the collaboration that later took place between his pupils and Bentham. Thus when Mackintosh, Horner, and Brougham first took up their careers as lawyer-politicians in London, they joined another Whig lawyer, Samuel Romilly, in collaborating with Bentham on matters of legal reform. Later, in the field of education, Lancasterian schools, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and University College, London, were added to the causes that united Stewart's pupils and Bentham's followers.9 James Mill was one of the prime movers in these educational causes, and rivalry certainly does not describe his relationship to his Scottish upbringing. He rightly claimed that Stewart had been a major influence on his thinking, and was to show throughout his career that his Scottish credentials were every bit as good as Mackintosh's and a good deal more direct than Macaulay's.10 Indeed, they are displayed in unalloyed form in his pre-Benthamite writings and they provided many of the theoretical underpinnings for the work on which his reputation was first founded, his History of British India (1818). There was ample foundation for John Stuart Mill's description of his father to Comte as 'the last survivor' of the Scottish school, even when it is granted that Mill was not the most reliable reporter on his own intellectual biography, especially where his father was 6 7 8
9
10
See Fragment in Works, pp. 397-404, 437, 498. See Fragment in Works, paragraph 13. See The Collected Works ofDugald Stewart, edited by W. Hamilton, 10 vols. (Edinburgh, 1854), ix, pp. 46, 156. See also his qualified agreement with Bentham's criticisms of abstract natural law doctrine, 1, p. 187. E. Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (London, 1928) remains a c