TERRORISM IN INDIA (Volume - III)
Col. Ved Prakash
KALPAZ
TERRORISM IN INDIA
"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
TERRORISM
IN INDIA ("()llllll~-III)
Col. Ved Prakash
Terrorism in India (Volume Ill)
© Co/. Ved Prakash ISBN: 978-81-7835-747-8 (Set) ISBN: 978-81-7835-750-8 (Vo/. 3)
All rights reserved. No Part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without written permission. Published in 2009 in India by Kalpaz Publications C-30, Satyawati Nagar, Delhi-110052 E-mail:
[email protected] Phone: 9212729499
Lasser Type Setting by: Quick
Media,~elhi_
Printed at : Young Art Press, Delhi - 92
,-
Contents Page 14. India Fights Terror Joinily with Russia, • USA and Others
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15. Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
799
16. Countering N axalism
845
17. N axalism : Present Situation
889
18. Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
949
19. N axal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Jharkband
1010
20. N axa~ Terror in Orissa and some Other States
1067
Glossary
1101
Index
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"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
14 Indi a Figh ts Terr or Join tly with Russ ia, USA, and Othe rs INDIA AND RUSSIA: JOIN T FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM "Inter nation al comm unity should unite to face new threat s and challe nges posed by countr ies where there is a sympa thy for terrori sts. The world needs to focus adequ ate attenti on on such countr ies." There is obviou s if an obliqu e refere nce to P,akis tan in this statem ent. These are words of an emissa ry of Russia n Presid ent Vladim ir Putin, speaki ng to the press at New Delhi on 25 Oct. 2006. "AI Qaeda of today is not what it was in 2001. Clones of Al Qaeda have sprung up everyw here. They act indepe ndentl y but they are bathed in the ideology and radica lism of Al Qaeda "l, , says Anato ly E. Safonov, who is also Specia l Repre sentat ive of Intern ationa l Coope ration in the Fight Again st Terror ism and Transn ationa l Organ ised Crime . Safono v contin ues his plain- speak: "The Taliba n and al Qaeda are very active. Infiltr ation is taking place and hostili ties are taking place, too. Elsew here terrori sm is spread ing its roots, so the proble m is long-te rm. It is not enoug h to exting uish the flames , the need is for destro ying the breedi ng ground ." He was obviou sly drawi ng a parall el with the way the malar ia is contro lled - not by doctor s alone but by drying up the swamp s that breed mosqu itoes. Safonov was also critica l of Washi ngton' s role in Mgha nistan and US - backe d gover nment in Kabul , for their failure on narcot ic control: "Apar t from his will, which Mr. Karza i voices, we do not see noticea ble results . The rize of seized drug is larger
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and govern ors and officials may have been sacked or replac ed but the respo nse does not corres pond to the threa t .... Mgha nistan will see a record - breaki ng produc tion of heroin , most of which will reach Europ e via Russi a or funne led eastw ards throug h India. No effort is being made to stem the inflow of precur sors, used in the manuf acture of drugs, into Mgha nistan . Cartel isation of narcot ics indust ry is in its final stages ." A finer analys is of Pakist an's duplic itous role in its so - called counte r - terror ism fight is difficu lt to come across . Witho ut saying so in so many words , Putin' s emissa ry has left nothin g to imagi nation about Pakis tan fomen ting terror ism in Mgha nistan , as also in India. It has certain ly been appreh ending selecti vely some AI Qaeda oppera tives to garne r some Brown ie points from the US, which keeps pattin g it on the back and thank ing its 'frontl ine partne r in its war agains t terror. But the fact is that in spite of this public bonho mie, each feels it is using the other for its own purpos e. As for the rest of the world, it has no doubt that Pakist an is shelte ring Osama and his Qaeda cadres , as also the Taliba n, in the wild areas skirtin g the Mgha n border , especi ally in Wazir istan. If any proof of this double dealin g was requir ed, Musha rrafpr ovided it by signin g a peace accord with pro-Q aeda and Taliba n tribes men in North Wazir istan. Finally , let it be said clearly that Mush arraf and his coteri e of genera ls have not given up their long - cheris hed dream of having Mgha nistan at its beck and call for provid ing them 'strate gic depth' if need be. Safono v is being unduly harsh with Karzai . In best of times, no rules of Mgha nistan has ever contro lled its war-li ke tribes, includ ing the British . All they did was to leave the tribal leader s to their own device s and guard the border s agains t foreig ners, and that too not alway s successfully. Karza i is attem pting to restor e some order to a ravage d country. But he has neithe r the troops nor admin istrati ve appar atus to do so. Whate ver little he achiev es is undon e by the milita nts/ul tras crossi ng into Mgha nistan from their safe haven in border areas of Pakist an.
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If things continue as at present, Russia, India and other neighbors should be prepared to see the return of Taliban rule in that luckless company. None would then be in a position to say that they were not warned.
Returning to Safonov, he co-chaired the fourth meeting of the India - Russia Joint Working Groups on counter - terrorism in New Delhi on 24 Oct. He talked of high level oftrust between New Delhi and Moscow and said the two were determining "strategic goals" to bolster their "sectoral cooperation" in the fight against terror. Then he explained their cooperation in the field of counter - terrorism: "The intelligence agencies of both countries are sharing information. We are also sharing knowledge on movement of militants and of possible terrorist attacks by suicide bombers. Our agencies are creating a financial intelligence database too."
INDIAAND SAARC India and SAARK leaders take a 'small step' against terror: 4 April 2007 The SAARC leader on 4 Apr 2007 called for a joint fight against terrorism, with a specific mention on taking measures to suppress financing of terrorist acts. In concrete terms, the announcement was akin to a small baby step forward rather than a 'bold' stride. As officials of India and Sri Lanka had been stressing that terrorism was ve~ high on the Agenda, there was a lot of expectations of a 'bold statement, emanating from the Summit. The two paragraphs of the 30-paragraph Summit Declaration, however, do not seem to be ground-breaking, with the language being largely recycled from previous Summit Declarations. Similar to their previous declarations, the leaders condemed terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and against whomsoever committed", recommitted themselves to implementing the SAARC Regional and Additional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and called for urgent conclusion
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of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The Sri Lankan had been strongly pushing for specific mention of terror financing and they got it. The Declaration committed the members to "take every possible measures" to prevent financing of terror acts ''by criminalising the provision, acquisition and collection of funds including through front organis actions and also to counter trafficking of narcotic drugs, trafficking in persons and illicit arms." There wa; a minor victory of sorts for India, with the Declaration making a specific note of the Indian draft for a SAARC convention for mutual assistance in criminal matters. If added that Sri Lanka had offered to host a meeting of legal Advisers to examine the draft, before the Home Ministers have their joint meet in Oct 2007 in India. The leaders have urged that there should "regular followup and implementation of the decisions taken". This is despite the public opposition by Pakistan, both by its Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, who had categorically said that these matters should be dealt with only at the bilateral level. Officials say the working method of SAARC made it difficult for Pakistan to keep out this provision from the Declaration. Currently, India is negotiating Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with Nepal and Sri Lanka. Pakistan's reluctance on SAARC adopting a comprehensive convention on counter-terrorism needs a detailed examination.
INDIAAND SRI LANKA LTTE spill-over threat: India Beware: 2007
LTTE, a designated terrorist organization, is banned in India. But this fact should not induce' smugness and complacency among the Indian security minders. The development over the last some months mid-2006
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onwards, should be a matter of concern for New Delhi, and especially Chennai. A deeply worrying mix of political collusion, official complacency, mercenary considerations, and corruption has enabled the LTTE to exploit Tamil Nadu both as a source of supply and a base of operations. The chain of seizures by the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and the state police over the past three months (mid Nov-mid Feb 2007) points strongly to the LTTE's use of Tamil Nadu coastlal locations, especially landing points in the Rameswaram-Tuticorin-Cuddalore stretch, for a two-may terrorist traffic across the Palk strait. 2 The Coast Guard's 13 Feb 2007 seizure in Indian waters, off Point Calimer, of a boat bearing on A.K. 56, five grenades, chemicals, and most sensationally, a suicide jacket with belt, sent shock moves. through India's security agencies. It was quickly established th¥ the boat belonged to the LTTE's 'naval' arm, the Sea Tigers. Its fiv~-member crew included a 'Black Tiger' operative and an Indian decoy to mislead security personel. But the big shock some with the delayed discovery that the boat was lined with a huge quantity of TNT explosives - enough to blow up a harbour or warships - and also carried detonators and a charger to trigger a gigantic explosion. The Indian intelligence agencies are apprehensive that the LTTE boat, which according to the crew sailed from on islet off the Jaffna coast and came into Indian waters to avoid interception by Sri Lankan Navy, could be one of the several suicide bombing vessels. As if this were not en~)Ugh, the police have just unearthed (18 Feb) an aluminium unit in Madurai that supplied the Tiger's ingots for improvised explosive devices (lEDs); and arrested some members of the supply and smuggling network. The discovery of reactivated network of the LTTE in south India was not the result of any deliberate, preplanned operation. It was fortuitous, the chance outcome of a vehicle transporting boosters getting involved in a road accident near Madurai in Nov. 2006. There were some earlier developments in Tamil N adu
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and Andhra Pradesh indicative of links with the Maoist groups. And now the surge in the smuggling and other clandestine activities of the Tigers and their supporters in Tamil Nadu is cause for serious concern. In the days gone past, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi led to a wift crackdown that proved remarkably success fully in ridding the State of the LTTE's network and presence. But in the subsequent period, at a certain stage, there were doubts about Karuna Nidhi led DMK's line on the LTTE. DMK's 'perceived' sympathy for LTTE might have been the result of Tamil Nadu's contentious state politics. But presently, the situation is worse. Some parties like MDMK are openly supportive of the LTTE cause. Due to proactive policy of the present Government at Colombo, LTTE has been pushed on the backfoot in the East, creating sympathy weve in Tamil Nadu. The Sri Lanka is presently on the boil (May-Jun 2007) and exploits of 'air' arm of the LTTE in the recent weeks has given a new meaning to the LTTE threat, not only for Sri Lanka but also for the region. In the given circumstances, there must be zero tolerance of a weakened terrorist outfit's exploitation of fractious politics of Tamil Nadu and using it as a supply and landing base. In the context of these happenings, it was inexplicable to hear state's DGP seeking to downplay the significance of the Coast Guard's major catch by asserting (even before the investigations had got under way) that the 'dangerladen' vessel was not heading for Tamil N adu coast, and worse than this saft-pedalling of the threat, he pleaded virtual helplessness in dealing with a porous border. If the former assertion is suggestive of a political backing for the DGP, the latter part is an attempt to shift the responsibility to the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. Considering the security implications of the LTTE moves, the Central and Tamil Nadu governments must shake themselves out of their complacency and respond urgently and suitably to the extremist menace.
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3 LET,cadres arrested: Delhi saved an attack: April 2007 Divali blast mastermind Abu-ul-Kama had planned another violent outrage in Delhi as was indicated by arrest of three terrorists from the Dilli Haat on 26 Apr 2007 who had been trained for the 'job' by him at Muzaffarabad Camp in PoK. One of the arrested terrorists, a Pakistani named Abu Oasim and resident of Mandi Bhamal, was reported to be trained in Daura-e-Lashkar for fidayeen attack. He came to Delhi on 26 Apr afternoon from Patna by the Magadh Express. Raj met him after his arrival in Delhi. The two traveled from Old Delhi to Dilli Haat by a three wheeler. The two were met by Shafaqat and Shabbir at the Haat, as the latter were waiting for them at its main entrance. Shafaqat and Shabbir hail from Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir. "Raj has not as yet been nabbed by police who are still out searching for him. The three arrested terrorists were on a reece, though their motive is still unknown to us," said Karnal Singh, Joint Commissioner of Police (Special Cell), Delhi. The police disclosed that Abu Ammar, the Operational Chief ' Commander of LET in Jammu region had trained Shafaqat and Shabbir, and subsequently directed Shafaqat to deliver the consignment of arms and explosives to Oasim. "These terrorists have established their hideouts in Delhi and we are trying to locate them", police said. Raj knows the topography of Delhi and the job assigned to him is to bring terrorists from Patna and to familiarize them with Delhi. Oasim came in contact with LET men when he was in class XII. Some LET cadres came to his house when he was in the school and persuaded him to join their outfit. It is obviousthat the militant outfits are launching newly trained ultras for fidayeen attacks "who are not given enough time to change their mind till the mission is executed."
According to the police, Oasim alias Hussain got greatly influenced by the ethics of the militant outfit Lashkar. He. and ,
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one of his classmates were selected for further training. He undertook training of Daura-e-Aam in 2002 while in Jun 2003 he had training of Daura-e-Khas. After getting training of Daura-e-Laskhar in 2007, he was sent from Karachi to Nepal where he met one Vinod. Vinod kept his passport with him and took him to Patna to be introduced to Raj. They all were controlled by Abu-ul-Kama, who is presently based in Pakistan. Shafaqat had joined Harkat-ul-Jihad in 2000 and shifted to LET in 2004-05. In 2006, he came in contact with Abu Ammar. He along with Shabbir had came to Delhi on 26 Apr 2007 with the consignment, as mentioned above. After the arrest of the three at the Dilli Haat on 26 Apr (in South Delhi), the police made some seizures from them which included 2 kg RDX four detonators, two hand grenades, one timer and Rs 25, 000 in cash. 3 Intelligence suggests the ultras have in the past some years changed their infiltration / entry routes into India. Due to free cross-border movement from Nepal, the militants are now using it as an easy route to India. Even sea routes are gainingtavours for entry into India. Initially, the militants were using Kashmir border to enter India. But due to heavy losses, they have withed over to Bangladesh border.
LTTE threat along South-Eastern Coast: Aug 2007 The Indian Navy and Coast Guard on 23 Aug 2007 might conducted a massive search operation by mobilizing vessels deployed in the region almost simultaneously, the police, the Coastal Security Group and other agencies conducted a combing operations along the coast. These operations were in consequence of the red alert that was sounded along the southeastern coast of Tamil Nadu following a reported message from Sri Lanka that a group of suspected operatives of liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam hpd sneaked into the State for smuggling purposes. The message, which originated from Sri Lanka, was sent to all security agencies manning the east coast on 23 Aug, saying
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a group of 4 to suspected operatives were headed for Rameswaram in a boat. They began their journey from northern Sri Lanka [Jaffna Peninsula] in the late hours of 22 Aug. 4 On receipt of the message, the Coastal Security Group alerted all its check posts along the coast. All coastal police stations, including Rameswaram, Dhanushkodi, Keelakarai and Thondi, were asked to monitor the movement of suspected persons. The Intelligence Bureau and 'Q' Branch swung into operation. Likely landing points and villages known for smuggling were searched, and all new comers questioned. R Thirugnanam, SP, Ramnathapuram, told the said daily on 24 August: "Based on the information we received, police teams have conducted a search operation at various places along the coast. The police parties will continue their operation." Naval craft, including rubber boats, carried out a search operation in Palk Strait. Marine commandos were also pressed into service. Personnel manning the Forward Observation Post (FOP) at Dhanushkodi were asked to question those 'visiting' the area. Naval personnel at the detachments from Thondi to Nagapattinam searched for the suspected intruders.
LET Penetrates India's North-East: Cause for Concern . Three Lashkar-e-Toiba militants, all from Manipur [Mohd Salman Khurshid Kori, Abdul Rehman, and Mohd Akbar Hussain], were arrested from Red Fort bus stand about 7.30AM on 19 Dec 2006, along with 2 kg RDX, two detonators and one hand grenade, the police said. The arrests were made by the ~p.ecial cell of the Delhi Police. Initial investigations revealed some more information about their identities51. 1. Kalam Khurshid Kuri, alias Hussain, 23. 2. Abdul Rehman, alias Mohd Hussain, 24. 3. Mohd Akbar Hussain, alias Habib, 21.
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After the revelation made by these three terrorists, security agencies have reported that the LET and other terrorist outfits are trying to create bases in the north-eastern part of India. Joint Gommissioner Police (Special Cell), Delhi Police Karnal Singh has fuller details: "This is the first time that we have arrested a LET recruit from the north-eastern part of India. From information provided by them, it seems that terrorists are trying to establish their base in the North-East. The three revealed that had met the president of the People's Liberation Front Party of Manipur, and he had taken them to Bangladesh to meet up with the LET operatives there."5 The JCP further disclosed that, "we got information from two Bangladeshi terrorists, arrested by the Special Cell on 16 Oct (2006) that these three persons would be coming to Delhi. We worked on that information and arrested them." The trio had a plan to attack busy markets of the capital Delhi and then escape to Bangladesh. Here is some other information gathered by police: • Salman Khurshid had visited Aligarh in 2001 where he came in contact with Salim Salar, who later sent him to PoK for training. • In Oct 2004, he crossed the border and joined -other terrorists in Poonch area. • Later, Slam an was sent to Manipur to recruit persons there. He came in contact with one Noor of People's Liberation Front, who arranged a meeting with the LET operatives in Bangladesh. • The other two terrorists, Abdur Rahman and Mohd Akbar Hussian were recruite~ by Khurshid. They worked under the LET commander Abu Faris in -Poonch' and Abu!F.urkan of Sopore in the valley. At
t~e
end, it bears emphasis that it is the frrst instance of
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the Pakistan based terror outfit, LET, .recruiting cadres from the North-Eastern States. The three were arrested by the Special Cell sleuths as soon as they alighted from a bus, coming from Jammu, at the Red Fort bus stand. JCP Karnal Singh had added that this was the first instance of the LET infiltrating into the North-East. A status report by the MHA has emphasized the fact that Pakistan and its agencies are spreading their poisoning terrorist tentacles beyond the boundaries of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into central, western and eastern parts of India. These arrest show they are also focusing on the remote ~nd distant corners of the sub-continent.
INDIA AND UNITED KINGDOM "UK to Learn Counter-terrorism from India": UK Envoy In an exclusive interview to a daily, UK High Commissioner . to India Sir MichaelArthur, who was in London, 14-15Apr 2007, to attend the 10th UK-India Roundtable, said that the UK could gain from the Indian experience of addressing radicalism. "Both the countries have a lot to learn from each other and we are doing that. India and the UK are both diverse societies. India has faced the scourge of terrorism, and Britain is facing the problem, more in the last two years." The High Commissioner mentioned two ways of enhancing the cooperation to fight extremism. "It can be done in a practical way through government level. The second way is to generate a wider debate in the media, in conference and sound tables over ways to preserve diversity and defeat radicalization". Sir Arthur emphasized the importance of the civil society discussions at the Round table, which leads to valuable, recommendations for the Governments to reflect upon. During the interview, he said India and the UK face the challenge of combating terrorism along with preserving their diverse societies. There is a need to enhance the cOQperation in
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the fight against the terror. "It is necessary to increase the cooperation and the two countries are doing that." He touched upon another important aspect of cooperation in a larger field of economy: "India is emerging as one of the dominant global powers of 21st century and Britain wants to work closely with India in this context. India and the UK have fantastic potential for very close relationship. The two countries have so much in common in terms of shared values, legal and educational systems. 6 The 10th Round table was Co-Chaired on the Indian side by Nitin Desai, former Under Secretary General, United Nations. He told a daily, "The Round Table discussed the paper on the UK-India bilateral relations in 2020. It has recommendations to enhance bilateral relationship in almost all the areas. Desai told that the paper has a reference to counterterrorism initiatives. Both countries have high potential to work more closely on this area. The topics discussed included emergence of China and how Britain and India look to it. "There were discussions on democracy and diversity, education and scientific research as well as health care. The three-day deliberations ended on Sunday (15 Apr 2007)." UK frees two held in failed bombings case Two men, not publicly identified, who had been detained as suspects in connection with the failed bombings in London and Glasgow in Jun 2007, were released without charge, British police said on 15 July. The two men had been arrested at the residences of the Royal Alexandra Hospital, near Glasgow. It is the same hospital that employed one of the main suspects, Bilal Abdullah, the "passenger in the Jeep Cherokee that crashed into the Glasgow terminal two weeks ago." He has been charged with conspiracy to cause explosions. Of the eight people arrested in the case, two others have been charged and three released.
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The second main suspect, Kafeel Ahmad, an Indian engineer identified as the Jeep's driver, remains in critical condition from burns. The police have not been able to question him, so he has not been charged. The other suspects charged are his brother, Sabeel Ahmad, and a distant cousin in Australia, Mohd Haneef, Western officials close to the case it might he difficult to obtain convictions.
Indo-UK Pact to Protect Infrastructure from Terrorists British Foreign Secretary Margaret IJeckett said on 7 Nov 2006, at Mumbai : "Apart from drawing practical lessons from terrorists attacks on mass transit systems in Mumbai and London, India and UK have agreed to share best practice and planning for the Delhi 2010 Commonwealth Games and the London 2012 Olympics and to exchange ideas on protecting 'critical national infrastructure'. She was talking to the press after her meeting with Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, Chief Secretary DK Sankaran, Mumbai Police Commissioner AN Roy and ATS Chief KP Raghuvanshi. Referring to the-political agreement for closer cooperation on counter-terrorism reached between Prime Ministers Blair and Man Mohan Singh in Oct 2006 at London, Becket said: "We are already sharing our knowledge and expertise so that we can from past tragedies and try to prevent such events in the future. Our police forces and intelligence agencies talk to each other at all levels. But we are going to do more and have decided on a shared package of action based upon our shared values." "We are working to draw practical lessons from our experience of terrorist attacks on mass transit systems. The Metropolitan police have already sent a team out here to work with your Commissioner and were hugely impressed by what they found," she said.
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India to Discuss Terrorism with UK and EU (Oct 2006) Prime Minister Man Mohan said at New Delhi (on 9 Oct 06) on the even of his departure for 6-day visit to UK and Finland (EU chair, presently), "that his talks with the leaders of Britain and Finland would highlights India's fight against terrorism, which has become particularly significant in the wake of the recent attacks". Given the common threat "we face, cooperation in the area of combating terrorism has become particularly significant." During this visit, he would also attend the 7th Indo-EU Summit.
What the Others Say? Peter Foster of the Daily Telegraph writes in its issue of 16 Aug 2007 under the heading, "Delhi on alert after AI-Qaeda threat": "India has stepped up security ahead of [the] 60th anniversary of independence celebrations after threats by AlQaeda and other Islamist militant groups to target New Delhi. The city's landmark Red Fort, where India's Prime Minister, Dr. Man Mohan Singh, will make the annual independence day address, was sealed off to the public yesterday by 70,000 soldiers and police. "India has suffered multiple attacks from Islamist radicals in recent years, including the 2001 attack on its Parliament that brought the country to the brink of war with Pakistan and more recently the bombing of Mumbai's rail network in July 2006. "Security officials said they were taking the threat-made in an AI-Qaeda video released on 5 August -'very seriously' although they added there was no specific intelligence of any threat to today's parade."7
Learning Anti-Terrorism from India: Aug 2007 India especially its Army, has been fighting terrorism and
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insurgeI\cy ever since its emergence as an independence nations 60 years ago. It should come as now surprise that with the ever growing spectre of terrorism looming large over the globe -the apparition is growing bigger and fiercer by the day -more and more countries are keen to learn from the Indian Army's substantial experience in dealing with militancy, insurgency and sub-conventional warfare. Consequently, the 1.13 million Army, world's third largest, "will hold as many as 10 joint military exercises before the end of 2007", says are port in a daily dated19 Aug 2007. The countries slated to participate in this jointness range from Maldives, Seychelles, Thailand and Mongolia to Russia, UK, China and, of course, the US. "The thrust in most of these joint exercises will be counterterrorism, both in urban and rural settings." Apart from building "interoperability" the occasion also provides India with an opportunity to engage constructively with nations in Central and East Asia as well as those in the Indian Ocean Regiop and beyond. Intere.stingly, the banner of protest and doctrinal antiAmericanism displayed by the determined Indian Left notwithstanding; exercises with the US constitute a major chunk of this "encounter" with foreign armies. The (lndian) Army alone has held som~ 20joint exercises with the US forces over the past five years, with tneir codenames ranging from "Balance Iroquois" and "Judh Abhyas" to "Shatru Jeet" and "Vajra Prahar." In 2007 itself, India and US armies are slated to hold five joint exercises. If the joint exercises conducted by the Navies and Air Forces of the two nations are included, the tally during the last five years of joint Indo-US military engagements will climb to almost 50. Incidentally, ~the Army's elite Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairegate, Mizoram is a big hit among foreign armies for its unique facilities, which promises to teach them how to "fight the guerrilla like a guerrilla" Large number of armies from different corners of the world have been
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requesting and getting vacancies for their soldiers to be trained here, and the waiting list is growing. And returning to pet hate of Indian Communists, a team of VS Marin!'!s will be back ~t the CIJWS for another joint exercise between 25 Aug and 15 Sep (2007). 8 "Conventional wars as an instrument of state policy have become less relevant today. Sub-Conventional operations are emerging as the predominant form of warfare", a senior officer averred. He further added: "With India having fought terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East for decades, foreign armies are very keen to learn from our experience, especially after the 9-11 terrorist strikes." Even countries like Seychelles, Maldives, Thailand and Mongolia are keen to imbibe counter-terrorism skills. The exercise with the Royal Thai Army, code named "Maitree" (=Friendsh~p) and slated to be hold at Ramgarh (Jharkhand) from 1 to/19 Sep (2007), is meant to "share experiences in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism" as well as to improve interoperability. Terrorism against India too will be Fought: Powell: Oet 2001
New Delhi, Oct. 17,2001. Even as the V.S. Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powell, concluded his visit here today, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, will visit Washington next month to hold discussions with the V.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, on steering the global campaign against terrorism. Mr. Vajpayee is expected to visit Washington on November 9. He will address the V.N. General Assembly the next day in New York. Mr. Bush's invitations to the Prime Minister had been formalized on Friday, highly-placed Government sources said. Mr. Vajpayee may head for the V.S. from Moscow after concluding his three-day visit to Russia on November 7. During a day-and-a-half of talks, which hovered around
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developments in Pakistan, Kashmir and the region, the D.S. reinforced the view that the focus of the on-going international campaign against terrorism should remain fixated on Mghanistan and the Al-Qaeda network. Diversionary tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, therefore, had to be kept in check. India, on its part, saw in the dialogue, an opportunity to reduce terrorist violence in Kashmir and regain its strategic foot-hold in Mghanistan.
Restraint Urged On Kashmir, Gen. Powell appears to have "convinced" Pakistan to desist from provoking India, the sources said. Without referring to the recent incident of firing along the LoC, . the D.S. also urged India to exercise restraint. Gen. Powell advocated the resumption of a dialogue between India and Pakistan. India reiterated that a dialogue could resume only if Islamabad curbed the promotion of terrorism in Kashmir. Endorsing the comprehensive Indian approach on political extremism, Gen. Powell, at a joint press conference with the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, this morning, deplored "terrorism wherever it exists, whether it is the kind of terrorism we saw on September 11, or the kind of terrorism we saw on Oct 1 in Srinagar."
I
Retracting from his earlier position on Kashmir, Gen. Powell rephrased the formulation attributed to him that Kashmir was I "a central" issue in the India-Pakistani equation. Referring to his Islamabad press conference he said, "I didn't say 'a central.' If you look at it carefully, I said 'central' in the sense that I believe it is an important issue, and to suggest it isn't wouldn't have been accurate." India appears to have persuaded the D.S. that it needs to reassess the merit of accommodating a "moderate" wing of the Taliban in the future government of Mghanistan, the sources said. While the two countries agreed
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on resurrecting a broadbased, multi-ethnic post-Taliban dispensation, they differed with respect to the details. India's formulation revolved around accommodating representatives of the Northern Alliance and the former King, Zahir Shah, and additional representation for the Pushtuns. Pakistan is also understood to have persuaded the U.S. to ensure a prominent role for the Pushtuns in a postTaliban regime. The U.S., however, expressed discomfort with this arrangement. There is skepticism in Washington that King Zahir Shah and his followers, some of whom are prominent businessmen in Europe, may not be acceptable to fellow Pushtuns. It also has serious reservations on the Northern Alliance and apprehends that if it takes over Kabul, it may reaccommodate some of the hard core Taliban elements. That would undermine the very purpose of the anti-terrorist campaign. The U.S. has acknowledged that as neighbour who "lives down the street," (as distinguished from "next door neighbour"), India has a role in the political and economic reconstruction of Mghanistan. 9 D.S. Envoy Vows to end Terrorism in India: Nov 2001 New Delhi, Nov. 21, (2001). U.S. ambassador to India Robert Blackwill vowed that the fight against terrorism will continue until the scourge has ended in both India and the United States. "The fight against terrorism will not end until terrorism against the United States as well as India has ended," Blackwill told a news conference for foreign journalists in New Delhi. Terrorists can never be called freedom fighters and no country will be permitted to harbor terrorists, the envoy said in reply to a question on Pakistan's alleged supports of Muslim separatists in India's northern state of Jammu and Kashmir.
India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
787
India accuses Pakistan of fueling militancy in its only Muslim-majority state. Pakistan denies the accusation, saying it is only lending moral and political support to the separatists, whom it refers to as freedom fighters. New Delhi has urged Washington to ban several militant groups that operate out of Pakistan. India has even submitted proof to the V.S. of terrorist training camps in Pakistan, though Islamabad denies their existence. While some major militant groups have been banned following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the V.S., New Delhi would like to see the list enlarged. Blackwill stressed that India and the V.S. are on the threshold of a major relationship especially since the recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Washington. During the visit, Vajpayee met with V.S. President George W. Bush and the two leaders agreed to cooperate in fighting terrorism. IO
USA, India and Terrorism There is a serious mismatch between Indian and American perspective on the terrorism. India has proved it by supplying incontrovertible facts and figures influential world capitals, including Washington, that Pakistan continues to be the epicenter of terrorism posing a serious threat to world peace. This does mean that the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, once based in Afghanistan, has to be a major worrying factor for the international community. India, like America does have proper appreciation of the AI-Qaeda problem and the VS-led major campaign against it. The difficulty, however, is that the VS policy-makers do not give the Indian viewpoint the seriousness it deserves. A large number of the outfits, most of them directly or indirectly linked to AI-Qaeda, with their bases in Pakistan and Occupied Kashmir (PoK), have been involved in large-scale Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India. Pakistan's ISI has been providing all terrorism in kinds of support to these outfits,
788
Terrorism in India
which have their well-equipped training camps on the other side of the border. These are part of the well-known facts and figures documented by India. In the wake of the Sep 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, the super power did force Pakistan to take action against the well-organized terrorist elements in that country and President Pervez Musharraf gave a solemn promise in this regard to the world community, the USA included. But Pakistan is yet to fully implement its commitments. Perhaps, Russian President Vladimir Putin did mention this ugly reality while talking to President George W. Bush on the telephone, as indicated by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. During his recent New Delhi visit the Russian leader had openly asked Pakistan to dismantle' the terrorist infrastructure which remained intact despite General Musharraf's promise to the contrary. Mr. Putin fully realizes the gravity of the situation as Pakistan succeeds in misleading the world vis-a.-vis terrorism. India hpes it will be able to convince the USA that the fight against terrorism will be of no use unless the Kashmir-related terrorist outfits with their vast infrastructure are destroyed root and branch. Pakistan, perhaps, believes that the USA is not going to raise serious objections to its designs aimed at fomenting trouble in India. That is why on the occasion on Friday President Musharraf and Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali declared they would not amend their destructive policy on Jammu and Kashmir -which means no let-up in Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism in India. Is the US taking note of this? America's silence at this juncture will strengthen the belief that it been maintaining double standards on terrorism. As against this, the USA acted quickly when Pakistan expresses its discomfort at any Indian move even if it was aimed at strengthening relations with Afghanistan. Here the reference is to A.m~rican demarche recently issued to India to avoid its enthusi~stic involvement in the economic and political reconstruction in Afghanistan. Why? Because India's increasing presence in Afghanistan (the two have had traditionally friendly relations except for the brief
Indiq Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
789
period of Taliban rule) is seen by Pakistan as a threat to Islamabad's designs for subjugating that impoverished land again. India has been America's supporter in the drive against terrorism. Agreed that Pakistan has utility for the purpose owing to the locational advantages it offers. But there is a thing called fair play. The super power should not be so unreasonable as it was pampering an ally known for its deceptive behaviour. 11
'Cross-border Terrorism has not Ended' New Delhi June 13 (2003). The Vnited States today frankly admitted that Pakistan had not stopped cross-border terrorism against India and vehemently denied that Washington was putting any pressure on New Delhi to send its troops to Iraq as part of the "stabilizing forces" in the war-ravaged country. "Terrorism emanating from Pakistan (against India) is not over. Global terrorism will not end until cross-border terrorism against India ends permanently," the V.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, told reporters here. Disagreeing with suggestions that the V.S. was adopting double standards in measuring terrorism, he said, "a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist ...they are killing innocent people." Mr. Blackwill said the V.S. would do everything it could to see that terrorism emanating from Pakistan against India ended permanently. Global terrorism will not end until terrorism against India ends permanently. On Mr. Advani's statement on Thursday that Pakistan was the epicenter of terrorism, he said "we are not going to associate ourselves with any particular articulation." Asked whether Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, was not going .soft on terrorist outfits, the Ambassador said, "this is a matter of judgment .... he has been a close ally for us. Some 500 AI-Qaeda activists have been apprehended with the assistan~e of Pakistan." The V.S. had the resolve and stamina to end terrorism. "Nether India nor the V.S. can accept terrorism for political purposes," he said.
Terrorism in India
790
Mr. Blackwill said the US would like India and Pakistan to move more rapidly towards the normalisation process. "The extraordinary statesmanship shown by Prime Minister Vajpayee in extending his hand of friendship to Pakistan hopeful will create enough political space for the two countries to move forward towards normalization. "The U.S., he said, would' encourage a dialogue between the two countries but hastened to add that "the control process lies in the hands of India and Pakistan." On the V.S. proposal that India send its troops to Iraq, Mr. Blackwill said the decision was entirely in New Delhi's hands. "If India were to decide against sending troops to Iraq, this is not going to damage the Indo-V.S. relationship." However, Indian troops would not be used for combat operations and would operate under the Indian flag if New Delhi decided to send its men to the war-torn nation. The V.S. Ambassador said that his country would certainly want Indian troops to be part of the stabilizing force as they were highly professional and very experienced in peacekeeping operations. decision on India's part to send its troops to Iraq would further enhance the Indo-VS relationship.
Any
The Pentagon team, scheduled to arrive here on Monday, was not coming with any brief, he said. "It is not coming here to suggest to India to decide one way or the other." The Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, currently in the V.S., had himself stated that the V.S. had not put any pressure on him to send Indian troops to Iraq, the Ambassador said. 12
STATE DEPARTMENT APPLAUDS US-INDIA COUNTER TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP ULFAAdded to Terrorist List says the US Embassy in New Delhi In its 2004 Country Reports on Terrorism released April 27, the U.S. State Department cited India as an important ally in
India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
791
the Global War on Terror, and underlined both countries' continuing political commitment to combating terrorism together. Among the highlights, the report added the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) to the Other Selected Terrorist Organizations (OSTO) List and recognized important changes in India's counterterrorism legislation, particularly the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and its replacement by a revamped Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (ULPA) ... It stressed that India suffered from hundreds of terrorist attacks during the year, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and the "Naxalite Belt" and noted the Indian government's supporting Bhutanese and Nepalese counterterrorism efforts. Referring to Jammu and Kashmir, the Interim Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) said April 27 there was, on average, a terrorist attack nearly every day in Kashmir. According to the NCTC in 2004 there were a total of 284 attacks in Kashmir that met the statutory criteria for significant terrorist incidents. The report said that ULFA was added to the other Selected Terrorist Organizations (OSTO) List as a consequence of its continuing targeting of civilians. (Note: Groups on the OSTO List are terrorist organizations that do not target the national security ofthe United States or its citizens). Referring to ULFA as the most prominent insurgent group in India's Northeast, the report noted ULFA's use of extortion to finance military training and weapons purchases that it reportedly procures and trades in arms with other Northeast Indian groups, it may have linkages with other ethnic insurgent groups active in neighboring states, and it receives aid from unknown external sources. The report reflected the merger of the primary N axalite groups into the Communist Party of India (Maoist), added this
!
792
Terrorism in India
group to the OSTO List, and expanded the description of lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) to include its operation under various' fronts and names of convenience. V.S.-India cooperative counterterrorism training expanded in 2004, with hundreds of Indian military and law enforcement officers trained in V.S.-sponsored programs. The report also includes a section on global jihad, which gives a brief overview of the violent Sunni jihadi movement. I3
India's Fears of Terror-via-sea Real: US: Aug 2007 The VS feels India should ratify counter terrorism measure like the Container Security Initiative (CS!), given its fears that terrorists might use sea-route to spread mayhem.
VS Pacific Command Chief Adm Timothy Kealing said on the issue: "Such (Indian) fears are realistic as terrorists are feeling hemmed in their present sanctuaries ... The VS has stressed in meetings with Indian officials that there can't be any let up in pressures mounted on terrorists." Towards this end, the top American seaman said his country was in dialogue with a number of like-minded nations, including India, on measures like CS!. "Ratification of this will lead to sharing of data base, which is essential to keep track of terrorist movements," the Admiral said. Much like the controversial PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), CSI was floated by the VS in the aftermath of the Nine-Eleven strikes in 2001. It stipulates that all cargo bound for America be checked by VS customs officials at the originating ports. The participating country, in turn, gets reciprocal rights to do the same.
US officer Learns Counter-insurgency from India: April 2007 India and the VS seem to be seriously engaged in learning from each other in various fields of warfare. A senior VS Army
India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
793
officer was in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir mid-Apr 2007, to exch~ge notes on Indian army's long battle to defeat Insurgency in the Valley. The four-day Visit of Brig Gen Patter Vangjal, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy of the US Department of Anny (DoA), was aimed at increasing military engagement between the US and India. If the Indian Army was keen to exchange notes on counter-terrorism operations in the state with the visitor, the latter meant to gather information on new tactics used by terrorists and current methodology adopted by Indian troops to tackle insurgency. The senior officer from the DoA had been invited by the Indian army. The situation faced by the US Troops in Iraq and methodology adopted by Indian troops in counterinsurgency operations in the State figured prominently in the discussions. Sources averred that the US Army is looking at Indian experience to learn new tactics to cut troop losses in Iraq. A senior Indian Army officer said: "They have been facing a war (in Iraq) for the past five years and are looking for solutions from across the world. Doctrine as well as current problems and methodologies in operations were discussed during the visit." Brig Gen Vangjal had led the investigation into the 2005 fatal shooting of an Italian intelligence agent, Nicola Calipari, and wounding of journalist Giuliana Sgrena by American troops in Iraq. The exchange visit is a continuation of increasing Indo-US cooperation in counter-terrorism operations. While there have been a number of high-profile visits between senior officers in the recent past, a joint counter-terrorism exercise was also conducted between Indian Infantry troops and the US Marines in Belgium in 2006.
India-US must Fight Terror Together: Chairman, JCS The seniormost US military officer and the Chairman of its Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), Gen Peter Pace, on 5 Jun 2006 at New
794
Terrorism in India
Dethi hoped India and the US would seize on the "golden opportunity" to work jointly against terrorist threats. But he refrained from dwelling on the specifics and, while praising the Proliferation Security Initiative (PS!), felt it was up to India to weight the advantages and disadvantages of joining this multicountry effort to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the media after meeting senior Indian security officials, he said India and Pakistan were justified in arming themselves with "defensive" weapon systems, because "if you have sufficient capacity, you would not act too quickly if you feel you could respond". It is stabilizing to have a country know it has sufficient defenses and intends to use it only for defense, said Pace; adding that the formulation held for an American weapons package for Pakistan and, India's bid to test Agni IH, its longest range missile. Dwelling on the trust of Indo-US military ties, Gen Pace indicated that the intention is to reach a stage where potential enemies have to not only to contend with individual militaries but also "the two of us [who] could work together to maintain peace and friendship". In the meantime, "we must understand that terrorists know no boundaries and they don't play by the rules. To be effective in the long-term, single nations can not fight alone. We have to find ways to share intelligence and ideas so that boundaries are not a benefit to terrorists." "Differences don't matter." Gen Pace downplayed bilateral differences on some security issues because "there are 10 per cent of the things you may not like us to do and there would be 10 per cent of the things we may not like you to do. But there are 80 per cent of the things that are good for both. Let us focus on that." He said Pakistan had been a good partner in the war against terrorism immediately after 9-11 when the US needed to go into Afghanistan. "We could not have done that without Pakistan's support."
India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
795
On Taliban bases in Pakistani territory, Gen Pace said the tribal areas in Pakistan are difficult -':'or its Government to "work through and win."
Most Foreign Jihadis in Iraq are Saudi Arabians: Jul 2007 Here is an irony of situations. Although the US has been accruing Syria and Iran of helping insurgents in Iraq, it is US ally Saudi Arabia which is the largest source of foreign insurgents in the war-torn country. The Los Angeles Times reported on 16 Jul 2007 that the largest number of foreign militants targeting the US security forces and Iraqi civilians are from Saudi Arabia. The proportions in comparative terms are: 1. Saudi Arabia
45 per cent
2. Syria and Lebanon 15 per cent Some other points made by the paper follow: • Nearly half of the 135 foreigners in the US detention facilities in Iraq are Saudis, a senior US military officer is quoted as saying. • Fighters from Saudi Arabia are thought to have carried out more suicide bombings than those of any other nationalities. • 50 per cent of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. • This has left the US military in the awkward position of "battling an enemy whose top source of foreign fighters is a key ally that at best has not been able to prevent its citizens from undertaking bloody attacks in Iraq, and at worst shares complicity in sending extremists to commit attacks against US forces, Iraqi civilians and the Shiite-Ied government in Baghdad". • Although the Saudi government does not dispute some of its youths are ending up as suicide bombers in Iraq, it asserts it has done everything to stop the bloodshed.
Terrorism in India
796
Gen Mansour Turki, spokespersons for the Saudi Interior Ministry explains his country's helplessness: "Saudis are actually being misused. Someone is recruiting them to be suicide bombers. We have no idea who these people are. We are not getting any formal information from Iraq. Iraq war: Lives lost till 15 Jul2007 (since war began on 19 Mar 2003) Coalition Forces US
3,614
UK
159
Other nations
128
Iraqis Military Civilians
4,936-6,401 67,058-73,372
India-US counter-Terrorism Exercise Troops from 21 Punjab and US Marine's 2/4 Regiment participated in a counter-Terrorism exercise called Shatrujeet 2006 from 25 Oct to 3 Nov 2006 at Indian Army's Commando Training School, Belgaum in North Karnataka. Around 320 soldiers from both countries were involved in this joint training. After some tough operations like cordon-and-search and house-clearing, the Americans would take off for non-combat pursuits for lighter diversion like playing 'kabaddi', and learning some rudimentary cricket. An Indian officer certified that the Americans are quick-learner so what if they pronounced the game as 'cuppa tea'. The guest officers had a great time. Lt Lee, one of the American platoon commanders, said, "My troops are playing 'Kabaddi' in barracks, too". After the 'kabaddi', cricket and jokes, the 45 Marines would sit down for a session of yoga, lest critics said the Indians did not impart the spiritual lessons besides the usual combat
India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others
797
Trends in West and India: A contrast Here is an interesting observation on the trends in terrorism in India and the West. Indian experience was possibly the most unusual at least, different from the one in the West. The revival of Hinduism among the intellectuals at the turn of the 20th century contained millenarian influences - a foreign theme in the Hindu tradition - and these helped create the Bengali terrorism/terrorist. But the enthusiasm and, indeed, the leading members of that movement eventually got absorbed into the passive resistance tactics, reversing the process in the West where the failure of the passive resistance movements often provide justification for terror. Contrasting developments, these! But these observations about contrasting situations to two ground realities belong to a period exactly one century ago. But the objective situation today in India as also the most is totally different: That glaring contrast is missing, absent. The shape and contours of terrorism are totally different today: for the simply reason that most of the terrorism is externally sponsored and supported. India has suffered ravages of the terrorism for long decades, in fact, the unhappy experience is as old as India's Independence, one consistent ingradient of terrorism in India in all areas has been foreign hand : • Terrorism III North-East. It stated with Naga ensurgency, fallowed by the Mizos and many others. It is still on some states. Foreign hand to begin with belonged to China, followed in course of time by Pakistan, Mynmar and Bangladesh. • Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was and still remains the country that provides support and succour to the Islamist terrorists, all the "confidence building measures (CBM)," notwithstanding. In addition, militants from more than a dozen countries have joined the jihad to help their coreligionists on the invitations from the latter.
798
Terrorism in India
• The Khalistan terrorism in Punjab (1977-93) was substantially helped by Pakistan, as most of the insurgent leaders were, at one time or other, ensconced in the safety the hospitality extended by that country. Same is true for the last decade or so. Besides the support they got from across the border, the Khalistan movements got a considerable help in 'men, money and material' from the NRI Sikhs settled abroad, especially in the UK, Canada and the US. • In the recent years, the terrorist violence has also spread to other parts of India, beyond the confines of the three regions mentioned above. Here again, of Bangladesh are the major culprits.
Notes 1. Cited, Ramesh Ramachandran, Asian Age, 26 Oct, 2006. 2. Editorial, Hindu, 22 Feb, 2007. 3. Faizan Haider and Anand Prakash, Pioneer, 28 Apr, 2007. 4. C Jaishankar, Hindu, 25 Aug, 2007.
5. 'ihbune, 20 Dec, 2006. 6. Statesman, 20 Dec, 2006. 7. Nandini Jawli, Pioneer, 16 Apr, 2007. 8. Reproduced in Indian Express, 26 Aug, 2007. 9. Rajat Pandit, Times of India, 19 Aug, 2007.
10. Hindu, 18 Oct, 2001. 11. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi MOWDQ/is 2001 Nov 26/ai 8182804. 12. http://www.tribunelndia.com/2002/2002/209/edit.htm (9 Dec, 2002). 13. Hindu, 14 Jun, 2003. 14. US Embrassy, New Delhi, press release dated 28 April, 2005.
15 Naxal Terror: Initial Phase Naxalism in India: A Broad Picture Naxalism or Naxalite violence has come to denote the LeftWing Extremism (LWE) in India. After merger ofthe two major factions, it has assumed a new but more glamorous rubric of Maoism left wing elites prefer the term, some analysts believe, because of recent victory of their cousins, Maoists, in Nepal. In this work, the term N axalism will be found used more often that its imported version, Maoism. This Chapter is laid out in four parts: I. Analyses and Review of N axalism in India. II. Measures and institutions for combating the menace of LWE, described by the Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh, as gravest treat to nation's internal secui-ityeven bigger and more serious than the cross-border terrorism. Ill. Naxalites, strategies, plans and documents. IV. Events and incident. The N axalism in the States will be covered in the next two chapters as indicated below: Chapter 18: Naxalism in Chhattisgarh. Chapter 18: Naxalism in other states (except Chhattisgarh) ANALYSES AND REVIEWS: NAXALISM IN INDIA Violence, Attacks and Casualties The MHA has confirmed (April 2006) an increase in the number of attacks by the Left extremists. The police casualty has gone up by 53 per cent and civilian casualty by 11 per cent. 9 Worst-Affected States The table below shows the attacks and relevant casualty data for the nine worst-affected states: UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh.
800
Terrorism in India Naxal Violence: 2002-2006
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1 Jan. 30Apr
Maoist Attacks
1,465 1,597 1,533 1,594 550
Civilians
Killed Policepersons
Maoists
382 410 466 516 219
100 105 100 153 62
141 216 87 223 93
Source: Home Ministry.
Naxalite activities during 2006: ACHR Report: Jan 2007 As many as 749 people were killed in the N axalite conflict in 2006, says the Asian Centre for Human Rights Report (for 2006) released on 10 Jan 2007 at New Delhi'! Statistical details The report, "Naxal conflict in 2006", gives the break-down of these 749 fatalities: Civilian 285 Security Personnel 135 Naxalites (alleged) 329 Total fatalities 749 The data on state-wise killings is given below: Chhattisgarh 363 Andhra Pradesh 135 Jharkhand 95 Maharashtra 60 Bihar 45 Orissa 25 West Bengal 22 Uttar Pradesh 2 Karnataka 1 Madhya Pradesh 1 Total 749
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
801
Naxalite-inflicted fatalities: 2004-2006: Government figures Naxalites have killed as many as 129 people's representatives and 411 government officials mostly policemenbetween 2004 and 2006. Almost all the people's representative, except JMM leader Sunil Mahato, killed by Maoists during the period represented village, block, and district-level groups. Sunil Mahato was, incidentally, the lone MP who became a victim of the Red ultras. These facts were placed on the table of the Rajya Sabha on 5 Sep 2007 by Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal. Other details from the Minister's reply are tabulated here.
Fatalities Caused by Naxalites Year
2004 2005 2006
People's Represented No. of Attack Killed
114 111 31
45 64 20
Government officials (Mainly Security Personnel)
100 153 158
Physical Spread of Naxalism 2005 A total of 1608 incidents of Naxalite violence were reported from 460 police stations in 11 states. 2006 The figure for 2006 dipped slightly to 1509 incidents which were reported from 395 police stations that constituted 4.65 per cent of the total number of 8,488 police stations in the affected (11) states. Compared to 2005 when 892 people lost their lives, there ' was decrease in killings during 2006(749). But "the Salwa Judum campaign and its disastrous consequences, such as the rights violations by the Naxalites, the security forces and the Salwa Judum activists, captured centre stage" during the year (2006). The Report said the campaign led to the forcible displacement of 43,740 persons as of Dec 2006 in Dantewada district, the spread of conflicts to 1,427 police stations, and an increase in the striking capability of the Naxalites.
802
Terrorism in India
"These acts of Maoist constitute serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court", according to Suhas Chakma, Director, ACHR. Ironically, the Naxalites, who frown at the lack of development, were blocking many development initiatives in the areas where they exercise control by targeting labourers, officials and companies. They were systematically targeting all government buildings that could provide shelter to security personnel.
Report is Harsh on the Security Forces The claims of the security forces that all persons killed were "Naxalites" are far from the truth. "There have been credible reports of torture, rape and extra-judicial executions by the Salwa Judum activists and the security forces, especially in the process of forcibly bringing the villagers under the Salma Judum fold", Chakma said. The Report further says : "The Centre is supporting wrong policies" "The Salwa Judum campaign, which was responsible for 48.50 per cent of the total killings in Chhattisgarh, had more to do with local political considerations than resolving the Naxalite conflict", Chakma said. The ACHR expressed concerns over the continued 'law andorder" approach of the Government in dealing with the crisis as reflected by the creation of a division within the Home Ministry to address the Naxalite conflict. The Report recommended the creation of a separate Ministry for speedy development of the N axal-affected areas, similar to the Ministry for Development of the North-Eastern Region. The ACHR also wanted the Centre to intervene and ask the Chhattisgarh Government to end the "Salma Judum" campaign, not to bring civilians in conflict with the N axals, and investigate all allegations of human rights allegations. The list of 55 district affected by N axalism receiving financial assistance
Andhra Pradesh 1. Adilabad
2. Karimnagar
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase 3. Khammam 4. Mahbubnagar 5. Medak 6. Nalgonda 7. Nizamabad 8. Warangal
Bihar 9. Aurangabad 10. Bhojpur
11. Gaya 12. Jehanabad 13. Kaimur (Bhabual) 14. Nalanda 15. Patna 16. Rohtas
Chhattisgrah 17. Bastar 18. Dantewada 19. Jashpur 20. Kanker 21. Kawardha 22. Rajnandgaon 23. Surguja
Jharkhand 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
Bokaro Chatra Dhanbad Garhwa Giridih Gumla Hazaribagh
803
804
Terrorism in India
31. Koderma 32. Latehar 33. Lohardaga 34. Palamu 35. Ranchi 36. Simdega
Madhya Pradesh 37. Balaghat 38. Dindori
Maharashtra 39. Bhandara 40. Chandrapur 41. Gadchiroli 42. Gondia
Orissa 43. Gajapati 44. Ganjam 45. Mayurbhanj 46. Malkangiri 47. Koraput 48. Rayagada 49. Nawrangpur
Uttar Pradesh 50. Chandauli 51.
Mirzapur~
52. SonbhadTa
West Bengal 53. Bankura 54. Purulia· 55. Midnapur
805
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana Funds to the States States
No. of Naxaliteaffected districts
Amount to be released by the Centre Rs. in crore
Amount released upto 2006-07
Cumulative expenditure reported by the states
Andhra Pradesh
8
360
195
125.68
Bihar
8
360
195
154.44
Chhattisgarh
7
315
277.50
181.40
13
585
495
369.18
Jharkhand
63.49
Madhya Pradesh
2
90
Maharashtra
4
180
112.50
69.32
Orissa*
3
135
97.50
80.42
Uttar Pradesh
3
135
120
69.34
West Bengal
3
135
75
47.55
90
*Excludes the four KBK districts Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada and Nawrangpur which are covered under the Special Plan. Source: Ministry of Panchayat Raj website.
125 Naxal-hit districts • Bihar
25
• Jharkhand
20
• Andhra Pradesh
19
• Orissa
14
• Chhattisgarh
10
• West Bengal
9
• Madhya Pradesh
6
• Maharashtra
6
• Uttar Pradesh
6
• Karnataka
5
• Kerala
2
• Uttarakhand
2
1 • Tamil Nadu (Recognised by the Planning Commission as such; Times of India, 22 Sep 2007).
806
Terrorism in India
Is the Maoist Threat overblown? India has 28 states and 12 are affected by Maoist violence, or is it insurgency? Incidentally some hold that 13 states are affected by the Naxalism germ!
It seems an alarming picture: the Maoists have areas of influence stretching from Kathmandu to Karimganj in the east (Assam) or from Amlekhganj (Nepal) in the north to Adilabad (Andhra Pradesh) in the south. Colour these 'red' states in red on the map and you get a quadrilateral in the middle of the Indian state, more than one-third of its total expanse. As of today, the 'red' corridor from north to south cuts the east of India from its west. This corridor, analysts fear, would become a compact revolutionary zone, where the writ ofthe Indian state would not run. The concept of the zone is said to have originated at a Siliguri meeting in Sep 2001 of Maoists from India, Nepal and Bangladesh2. "If the Maoists control this zone, trains would not run from east to west". This has serious implications for India's economy and security. If the 550 incidents of Naxalites violence reported in 2006 (1 Jan to 30 Apr), 26 were attacks on public transports, including railways. If train services are disrupted, there would not be any foreign direct investment in the zone, and consequently the minerals of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh would not reach the industries of Maharashtra and Gujarat. And, analysts conclude, finished goods from these industries would not be allowed to be transported to Kolkata, Haldia, Paradip and Visakhapatnam for export to the east. Is it an overdrawn scenario? Perhaps. Hence the question from some quarters: If the Maoist threat can be so debilitating to India's security, stability and economy, why is the government not acting as it indeed did against the militants! insurgents in the North-East, Kashmir, and Punjab? The answer possibly is that the picture is indeed overdrawn. In a rumbustious democracy like India's, certain disorder is inevitable, and perhaps even welcome. We had a sandal wood brigand operating in the jungles on the borders of two South Indian States who defied the law with impunity for long years
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
807
till someone at the centre got serious. In the instant case, apparently impressive statistics are being distorted to point a threatening scenario. After all, statistics can hide more than they reveal!
12 states, indeed, have a Maoist problem. But as a Home Ministry official asked, how much of territory do the insurgents really control in the red-crayoned districts-forget the states? Another statistic, given out by the MHA, gives a more accurate picture. In 2003, as many as 518 police stations in these 12 states reported some sort of Maoist activity within their jurisdiction; 517 in 2004 and 509 in 2005. These police stations reported this activity in some corner of their areas. Put together, these states have 8,695 police stations. That means hardly 6 per cent of the police stations in the reportedly affected states witnessed Maoist activity. Most security specialists believe that the Maoist threat is more hype than real. An analyst, who studied Maoist insurgency in Nepal, positg, "the threat of Maoists creating a compact revolutionary zone from Amlekhganj in Nepal to Adilabad in India is somewhat far-fetched"3 This realistic assessment is not meant to foment complacency among the security agencies, neither to belittle the dangers posed by the Maoists. In fact, after the success of their counterparts in Nepal, the Maoists in Indian might start having dreams of replicating that success story in India. But then India is neither Nepal, nor its security structure so brittle. The Naxal violence in India is certainly manageable but then there ,is political angle to it which comes in the way of it being handled more effectively-as will be seen here. There are other factors also that delay the adoption of harsher measures. The Maoists cannot challenge the might of the Indian state, given their countrymade rifles and crude landmines fashioned as the IEDs. Prakash Singh, a former DGP of Uttar Pradesh, who recently authored The Naxalite Movement in India, points out two hurdles in the way of the N axals realizing a compact revolutionary zone: "one, the discontinuities in the areas under the influence ofleft-wing extremists, and two, the fragmentation and factionalism within the movement."
808
Terrorism in India
A member of the National Security Advisory Board has another but more important angle t~ the Naxalite movement: "Their striking power is extremely limited. But they are of more than nuisance value. They can politically influence the inhabitants of these (affected) districts." Now this is the language that any political class understands instantly, and Indian politices do so fastest. That should explain why harsher measures in a coordinated manner in all the states have not been as yet instituted. All such things, unfortunately in India, fall prey to party politics, which can be a dignified definition of 'vote bank' politics. Prime Minister may characterize Naxalism as the "most serious internal security threat" to the country, but his government would to initiate coordinated effective steps to curb the menace lest his party accuses him of damaging the party's poll prospects. Forget about Naxal threat which is still not so potent, India is unable, to frame a tough, no-nonsense policy on the terrorism which is a serious threat to country's sovereignty and integrity. It is deemed a "soft state" against terrorist depredations. After every terrorist act, be it Mumbai 1993, Mumbai 2006, or Malegaon 2006 outrages, all we hear are cliches mouthed by governing party leaders, including Prime Minister. Even on 25 Nov 2006, Prime Minister Singh refused to institute any harsher laws to curb the terrorism, but asserting all the same to display zero tolerance towards it but acting within the existing laws." If critics accuse the central government of pulling its punches while dealing with terrorism, they could not be wrong. But having rescinded the POTA within weeks of its coming to power, to appease a particular community as the NDA so often explains to please its Left allies, the UPA seems to be an idle spectator when the country is coming under repeated, periodic terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the UPA is hampered by double disability: the 'vote bank' politics and the Left, the major supporter of the Coalition Government, breathing down its every other day. This distraction was necessary to show the realities of life in India of 2006-and its inability to deal effectively with the NaxaLthreat. So reverting to Naxal threat, the political considerations of interests of the ruling party explains the reluctance on the part of the Union government to deploy the Army or the heavily-
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
809
armed paramilitary forces. Even at the recent meeting (April 2006) held with the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the affected states, the thrust was on the need for building up security and intelligence Capabilities at the state level and for preparation of the action plans to address the development concerns of the regions, rather than about sending ParaCommandos or armed helicopters which some states had demanded. Most analysts believe that only positive state action can solve the problem, not the armed might of the state. But a former police chief pointed out that most states are not willing to address this issue: "I remember telling a minister in Andhra Pradesh that the only solution is land reforms. His reply was, that was not the reply expected from me." A researcher says insurgency has spread to more districts in the recent years because of the launching ofthe large mining and other resource-based industries in the 'forested areas'. Such projects have displaced a lot of tribals who are not adequately. compensated, and even worse, the pie is not shared with them. Such are the people who fall easy prey for the recruiting agents of the Naxal 'army'. Understandably, the Maoists talking against the big corporations and foreign investors get lager listeners among the affected people. "Naxal activity on the decline": Home Secretary: Dec 2006 Union Home Secretary v.K. Duggal on 28 Dec 2006 at Bangalore, expressing satisfaction over the decline in Naxal activity said focus on development would go a long way in containing the menace. The states witnessing displacement in the wake of industrialization should have better resettlement and rehabilitation policies. Addressing the press at the end of two-day 22 nd meeting of the National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN), he added: "The Naxal-affected States should make the optimum utilization of funds under various Central schemes for development and improvement of connectivity in rural areas." , Home secretaries and/or DGPs of the 13 Naxal-affected States were present at the meeting. Some other points made by Duggal are 8uTT'mpd 1"~ llPre.
810
Terrorism in India 1. The Government's approach was to bring the Left-wing extremists back into the social mainstream. But firm action would be taken if they attacked police personnel or innocent people. 2. Naxal menace was now limited to Bihar, Jharkhand, Oris sa, Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Eastern Maharashtra and West Bengal. 3. While a total of 510 police stations faced Naxal violence in 2005, the number came down to 372 in (Dec) 2006. 4. Different States making various demands for Central assistance were assured of additional support to help strengthen their police forces by improving the intelligence set-up and by imparting training to the personnel. 5. He reiterated that the Government was ready to hold talks with the N axalites if they gave up arms. 6. He urged the affected States to adopt a surrender policy for the N axals on the lines of the one in Andhra Pradesh.
A Critique of Centre's Stance It is rather difficult to understand, much less accept or appreciate, the Centre's strange stand that Maoist menace is not a national problem. Is there a parameter or a guideline to classify a situation as national problem? Perhaps not if one takes Home Ministry's view into account. As already mentioned above, Home Secretary Duggal says N axallLeft-wing extremism is not a national problem. It is obvious that he is only voicing the views of his Ministry. It is interesting to note that like a generous overlord, the Home Ministry is assuring all help to states to deal with 'their' problem of Naxalism. But this repeated but misplaced munificence is jarring and grating to the national sensibility. This stance needs close examination and objective analysis. The MHA records say at least 900 people were killed in Maoist activities in 2005, while 420 people have already faJlen to ' violence by Oct 2006. If a certain kind of violence results in the death of 900 people, what is wrong in describing it as a national problem, ask many analysts. Prime Minster Man Mohan Singh, while chairing the meeting of Chief Ministers of Maoist-infested States in
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
811
Apr (2006) had described the problem as the ''biggest internal security challenge". And now, Home Ministry speaking through its secretary confined the problem as those of the concerned states and steadfastly refused to give it national perspective. To repeat Duggal's arguments, Maoist-infested violence is on the wane because against 510 police stations that reported Naxalite violence in 2005, the figure for 2006 came down to 372. But 225 districts of the country are affected by various kinds of militancy with as many as 8,695 police station areas being hit by Maoist activities. There are about 9,500 Maoists spread across these 13 States. Duggal, however, expressed satisfaction over the coordination between the Central agencies and those of the states in combating the Maoist menace. But situation demands more than coordination. Against the Centre's insistence on not calling Naxalite threat as national, what does one say when the same Ministry (MHA) in its 2006-07 Report released early Apr 2007 expresses serious concerns about CPI (Maoist) spreading its tentacles into southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka-the states which were not so threatened by the menace so far? India: March of the 'Red Army': Status Report: 2007 India is not known to have dealt effectively with the terrorism within its border. Same can be said about the left-wing· extrem.sm which is, slowly but surely, spreading in the country. Till recently, the Central Government was not serious about ultra-left extremism. It was rather positively evasive, dismissing the Naxalite threat as 1\ law and order problem. Oflate, it deems it more than a law and order, problem. Happily of the country, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has publicly acknowledge the seriousness ofthe Maoist threat. Here aspects of threat as they impinge on the country as a whole will be examined. The situation in various states will be reviewed in their respective sections. Extent of spread of Maoist influence "A big chunk of Central India is completely under the control of Naxalites, Maoists or what ever they may be called locally. It is their writ-and not that of the Tmlian State-that runs
Terrorism in India
812
in 92,000 sq km. from Gadchhiroli in Maharashtra to Abujmarh in Chhattisgarh. They make "the laws and implement them. The state and its mechanisms are simply off the radar in these parts of India."4 . The above is truth, disturbing and unpalatable, but truth al the same. It is stark, even if a little exaggerated. That is not alL See what Ajay Sahni of the KPS Gill-led Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, says: "while a huge chunk has, already been lost, if the government does not wake up, there is serious danger of losing more. Large parts of Chattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal are already under the influence of Maoists and close to being completely over run." The Red corridor, extending from Nepal down to Andhra Pradesh, encompasses nine states and has been categorized by the Union Home Ministry as "badly affected" by Maoist violence. - Official estimates peg the armed strength of Maoist cadre at about 10,000 to and over ground sympathizers/workers around 45,000. Security experts over the numbers are much higher. What lends Maoists a deadly edge is the fact that they are armed with modern weaponry. Here is some factual information-fairly disturbing. 1. They are equipped with • AK-47 rifles .IEDs • INSAS and SLRs. 2. In 2005 and 2006, they claimed 677 and 678 lives respectively. In either year, the fatalities are more than the deaths in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East· put together. 3. In the first 4 months of 2006, they had killed 130 persons, including the security personnel and civilians. 4. For more details on casualties, see the tables later in this section.
5. 160 districts designated 'most affected' by Maoist extremis~. This is 27 per cent of the total number of districts in India.
813
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
Official recognition that India has a full-blown crisis at hand' came mid-Jun 2006 when Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh admitted that 160 districts across the country are slipping out of government control. He reiterated that Maoist problem has assumed proportions bigger than militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and insurgency in the North-East due to its sheer spread and organized linkages. Maoist threat must be taken seriously, particularly so in view of their plans to expand their influence within the next five years. Documents of the Central Military Commission of the CPI (Maoist) seized by intelligence officials in Feb 2006, revealed plans to set up military commands in the following unchartered territories: 1. Delhi 2. Haryana 3. Punjab 4. UP 5. Uttaranchal and to extend violence to urban areas and targeting industries. Finally, they have ambitious plans of controlling 30 per cent of the country in next five years. State-wise Spread The districts/areas more seriously affected in some states are mentioned here. Jharkhand Garwa Palamu Chatra Hazaribagh Bakaro Dhanbad Latehar Gumla Simdega Lohardagga Maharashtra Gadchhiroli Chandrapur Bihar Patna Aurangabad
Chhattisgarh All the five districts of Bastar region Orissa Koraput Malkangiri Gajapati Rayagada Mayurbhanj Andhra Pradesh North Telangana and surrounding areas.
Nepal 140fthe 75 districts severely affected.
814
Terrorism in India
Gaya Jehanabad Nawda (Source: Outlook, 15 May 2006).
Centre stitches up an action plan The Centre has of late realized that the ultra-Left activism is not a mere law and order problem. Maoists are executing a well thought-through strategy. The decisions taken at the 9 th Congress of CPI (Maoist) in Jan-Feb 2001' and how they are being put in practice methodically is an object lesson for security establishment of the country. The successes achieved by Maoists in its spread across the states and scale of terror unleashed by them has finally persuaded-may be, goaded-the Union Home Ministry under Shivraj Patil to draw up a strategy, encompassing security issues and other aspects germane to the Maoist problem. Its main contours are delineated here. • Acknowledge it is more than a law and order problem. Pursue a holistic approach, simultaneously focusing on development, providing employment and land distribution. • Provide funds to affected areas to modernize the police: improve infrastructure, acquire weapons and communication equipment. • Other states should follow the Andhra Pradesh model where the state has succeeded in checking tll~ Maoists by raising special forces. • Start people's movements, like the Salma Judum (SJ) in Chhattisgarh, to fight Maoists. • Deploy security forces in worst-hit areas. Centre bears costs for three years. • Increase employment opportunities by earmarking 40 per cent recruitment in central paramilitary forces for areas affected by militancy and Naxalism. • Allocate Rs 2,475 crore for 55 worst affected districts under the backward districts initiative.
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
815
• Ensure a collective and coordinated approach and response from the states. On paper, the government seems to have got it right. In any case, making a plan of action, be it on economic development or on fighting N axal menace, is never a problem, and it constitutes the first baby step. And paraphrasing a cliche, the devil lies in its execution. In the instant case also, security reports feel that most of its provisions will be difficult to implement not only unless the state governments (i.isplay a political will to act but also, and even more importantly, the Centre itself does the same unmindful of the compulsicns of coalition government and its own Home Ministry functions more determinedly and purposefully in leading the states in the antiNaxalite drive. The details of problem that come in the way of this drive are discussed in the following part.
Reasons for spread and problems of combating Naxalism As the law and order is a state subject, the Centre all along tried to keep its role minimal/stepping in only to supervise and help with additional forces and finances. But of late, the union Home Ministry has realized that it is more than a mere law and order problem. Consequently, it has worked out an anti-Naxal strategy, contours of which have been etched out earlier. Question of political will takes centre stage. Lack of political will to act poses a problem. Sahni says: "It is well-known secret that politicians have used Naxalites for their vested interests." He cites the example of Andhra Pradesh which has a long history of politicians hobnobbing with the Maoists. "NT Rama Rao did it. He even described the Maoists as 'deshbhaktalu' (= patriots). Subsequently, the Congress, under Chenna Reddy, did it. In recent times, Congress ally TRS has been accused of having struck a deal with the Maoists before the 2004 General Elections," he says. In Bihar, politicians are known to have used both-the MCC and the Ranvir Sena of upper-caste Bhumihars-for political ends. Likewise, the SJ, seen by many as a successful anti-Naxal civil society initiative has become controversial, essentially because Liberal-Intellectual elite and some NGOs have started criticizing the SJ for pitting tribals against the Naxals, as cannon fodder.'
816
Terrorism in India
In fact, Union Home Secretary told a weekly in May 2006 that the Chhattisgarh government has been asked to stop the SJ till it can consolidate the group and arm them better, adding, "The state of Chhattisgarh is being treated as a testing ground by the government. If the SJ experiment succeeds there, then it will be replicated elsewhere."5 Even more surprising is the fact that the states facing the most intense N axal violence do not have their police forces even up to the authorized strengths. This lacuna is inexplicable, knowing as we do that the security experts feel that even authorized police strength is not enough to fight the Naxal menace. The states like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand must be sanctioned additional police for over and above their authorized strength to mount an effective anti-Naxal drive. Against the advice for additional police strength, some such states are, in fact, short of even their authorized strengths-this shortage, for example, is 4,000 in case of Chhattisgarh and 20,000 in case of Bihar. And to wit, these figures comes from Union Home Secretary Duggal. Some experts are expressed doubts about so many affected states achieving any credible measure of coordination in their anti-N axal operations. The solution, they suggest, lies in the Centre having a greater role in tackling the problem. Former IB Director AK Doval suggests the way out: "The right strategy will be for the Centre to move into the worst-affected pockets, take over the administration and make roads, set up schools and other infrastructure. Each state has a different problem. Just giving extra money and security forces will not help. Tough decisions and tough measures are required. Once the state establishes its presence in the affected district, then development work can be taken up." There is not revolutionary, or even unexceptionable in this suggestion except the part that the Centre should supplant the district administration, establish 'state' presence in area by building roads and opening schools and then "the development work can be taken up." Either the former IB Director has not applied his mind or the reported has misrepresented his views. Isn't building roads and opening schools itself 'development'.
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
817
Why should Centre undertake this chore? How is the Central bureaucracy better qualified to do it than the state officials, who know the area better, know its problems better and can even do the job better. The only way the Centre can help it is to give requisite forces to the states so that they can proceed with the development schemes in the face of the Naxalite threats of violence. Presently, though, it is a vicious circle for some Naxalism-affected states. Government agencies cannot move in because of the fear and threat of the Maoists, making it easier for the latter to have a free run-expanding the area under their influence. As per their documents, they have ambitious plan of controlling 30 per cent of the country in the next five years. Obviously, state cannot sit back and let that happen. The development work cannot wait in a state till it establish full control on the disturbed areas. The development and anti-Naxal fight must proceed simultaneously.
CPI (Maoist) 9 th Congress and aftermath A month-long 9 th CPI (Maoist) Congress, Jan-Feb 2007, was held in a 'secured' liberated zone ('Muktanchal' in their parlance) along the Jharkhand-Orissa border after an interregnum of over three decades. Attended by top leaders, it mulled over the long term strategic goals and as well a list of what they planned to do over the next coming months. Some six months down the line, the militant cadre is going about their assigned tasks in a manner that is chilling and seems to be as good an indicator as any about how it operates. The message emanating from the conclave was loud and clear: while they would continue with their tried and tested method of armed struggle, the major new decision was to offer all-out resistance to mega projects including steel and bauxite projects in Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh as also, SEZs planned in other regions. The reason: They were leading to "massive displacement and marginaliza tion" of the Adivasis and farmers. 6 This clarion call translated into: (1) A major mobilization exercise to augment the strength of Naxalite cadre, which would enable them to establish a presence in the areas where they had till now been absent or inactive; (2) sourcing of arms; and (3) a 48-hour economic blockade in June (2007) that paralyzed
818
Terrorism in India
life in many parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. The latest intelligence inputs indicate that the ultra-Left extremists "have managed footholds around cities and industrial hubs in Haryana, Punjab and Delhi." That they were planning to extend their presence to these areas was also referred to in their Central Military Commission's documents seized by the intelligence in 2006. Besides this, parts of Uttar Pradesh particularly Sonebhadra and Mirzapur-and Uttarkhand have also reported the presence of the N axalites. As for the South, the Naxal presence does not end at the borders of the Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka and Tamil N adu too are waking up to the threat. The result of the latest mobilization: 185 districts across/6 states of the Union have now Red footprints to be concerned about. The result of the decisions made at the 9 th Congress are there for all to see. A senior police officer involved in tracking the Maoists confirms: "They are now present where ever an industrial or development project is coming up. After all, their strength lies in exploiting the sentiments of people in areas that are underdeveloped, so they want to resist all kinds of development." It is not that the Centre is unaware of such developments in the field of N axal activism. Surely, they are kept informed about such happenings by their intelligence sources. A meeting held in New Delhi in Apr 2007 saw senior officials from these states being 'sensitized' to the threat. Additional Secretary (Naxal Movement), Union Home Ministry, Vinay Kumar, said: "We asked them to be watchful and be prepared in view of the pattern seen in the Naxal-affected states in the past,"
These officials also seem to be aware of the new Naxal strategy of tar!~eting communication, transportation, railway and other esserltial services. But as the said 48-hour economic blocked should, the security forces-eould find it tough to counter ' their new tactics. After all, it is well-nigh impossible to guard every inch of power or communication lines. Analysts opine that when the Naxals are not engaged in major attacks, they are busy consolidating. Chhattisgarh has
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
819
been, in the recent months, at the receiving end of the Naxal depredations. The state Government sees this increased attention as sign of success of their Salma Judum campaign as also an indication of the frustration in the Naxal camp as a result. And hence the brutal reaction as at Rani Bodla. They claim to be teaching a lesson to the SJ activists. Mter all, 37 of the 68 killed these were SPOs, Mahendra Karma, the founder and leader of the SJ himself offers this interpretation of the intensified Naxal attacks on his state. Even the Centre is known to hold the same view on the issue. In Orissa, where the N axals have had their presence for many years by now, the state Government wants to raise the number of the "Naxalite-affected districts" from the nine identified as such in 2003 to 14. And interestingly, the new areas experiencing the N axal activism include Deogarh, Sambalpur, Kandhamal, Jajpur and Dhenkanal, essentially the regions that· are either witnessing development or fall within the so-called Red Corridor that reputedly extends from "Pashupati to Tirupti" (in explicable landmarks-both being highly-venerated Hindu temples-for the godless Naxals), referring to the large swathe that cuts through the forests from Nepal border to Andhra Pradesh (and now to Tamil Nadu). Orissa DGP A. Patnaik, however, is not all that pessimistic: "The situation is under control. The number of incidents have gone up this year (2007) but the instances of violence have not. Figures are low compared to those obtaining in heighbouring states, particularly Chhattisgarh." The DGP must understand that being a little 'better' than the worst should not be a cause for complacency. In fact, the warning bells had begun sounding well before the 9 th Congress. Figures put out by the Union Home Ministry tell the story. • The total number of security forces personnel killed in N axalite violence in the past two years was more than the figure killed in J ammu and Kashmir or even the North-East during the same period. • The number of civilians killed in Naxalite violence is far more than those killed in insurgency-hit Jammu and
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Terrorism in India
Kashmir. The figure civilian mortality in the North-East is marginally up till 31 Mar 2007. • Yet, the total number of Naxalites killed by the security forces is far less than the number of terrorists/insurgents killed in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East. There are a number of-some would say a plethora ofcoordination mechanisms at the centre to ensure certain degree of joint and cooperative inputs in anti-Naxal efforts and operations. Some would suggest that the multiplicity of such mechanisms must be making coordination between Naxalaffected states a bit difficult. At least results so far suggest this reality. Anyway, these mechanisms are briefly mentioned here:· 1. Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) headed by Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil. 2. A Standing Committee of the Chief Minister of Naxalaffected states, again headed by Patil. 3. National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) headed by the Union Home Secretary and comprising the Chief Secretaries and DGPs of 13 Naxal-affected states. 4. A Task Force headed by the Special Secretary (Internal . / Security) in the Union Home Ministry. 5. An Inter-Ministerial Group (lMG), headed by Additional Secretary (Naxal Management), again in the Union Home Ministry. The multiplicity of coordination committees are not only avoidable, it is also wasteful. The three official level mechanisms is indicative of 'empire building' mentality. The Centre also has its hands on the purse strings, even though in a certain manner. The Union Home Ministry operates a Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, under which it reimburses expenses incurred by the states on security matters, including the anti-Naxal operations. Strengthening and modernizing the police and its equipment is also covered under security expenses. Over Rs 100 crore have been spent under this head so far in 2007 (till June), but "there is concern over improper utilization, particularly in states like Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh" That indeed is something unfortunate, as thes~
821
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
two states are also the ones which are worst hit by the Naxal violence. The Centre has also been helping the states in raising India Reserve Battalions (IRBs). On the development front, there are two schemes : the Backward Districts initiative and the Backward Regions Grant Fund programme. Under the former Rs 1,700 have been spent. The Centre maintains that is up to the states to deal with the situation on the ground. "Law and order after all is a state subject we are providing all the assistance we can", a senior official says. It is time that tliey give up this paternalistic mindset. In fact, it is worse: It is feudalism at its worst! But as everyone agrees, it is a long haul. Statistical and Miscellaneous Information Relevant information on the N axalite movement is given here. Fatalities: Naxalite violence Sr.
Category
2005
2006
2007 (till June)
1.
Civilian Security Forces Total 0+2) Naxalite Grand Total
524 153
521 157
118 91
677 225 902
678 272 950
209 52 261
2. 3. 4. 5.
(3+4)
Fatalities: Jammu and Kashmir
1.
2. 3. 4. 5.
Category
2005
2006
2007 (till June)
Civilian Security forces Total 0+2) Militants Grand total
557 189 746 917 1663
389 151 540 593 1133
37 30 67 70 137
(3+4)
822
Terrorism in India Fatalities: North-East Category
2005
2006
2007 (till June)
393
309
148
70
76
30
l.
Civilians
2.
Security Forces
3.
Total (1+2)
463
385
178
4.
Militants
406
395
114
5.
Grand Total (3+4)
869
780
292
Fatalities: Security Forces
2005
2006
Naxalite violence
153
157
91
401
,Jammu and Kashmir
189
151
30
370
.70
76
30
176
Category
North-East
2007 (till June)
Total
Fatalities: Civilians
2005
2006
2007 (till June)
Naxalite violence
524
521
118
1163
,Jammu and Kashmir
557
389
37
983
North-East
393
309
148
850
Category
Total
Fatalities: NaxalitieslMilitants Category
2007 (till June)
2005
2006
Naxalites
225
272
52
549
Militants
917
593
70
1580
406
395
114
915
Total
Jammu and Kashmir Militants (North-East)
(Source: Six tables above: Sunday Express, 22 July 2007).
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
823
MAJOR NAXAL ACTIVITIESIINCIDENTS IN 2007 4 Mar 2007: East Singhbhum (Near Jamshedpur), Bihar Naxalites kill JMM MP Sunil Mahato while he is watching a foot ball match. He is shot dead after being shot dead by N axalites, including several women. Their anger and provocation: Mahato had organized a campaign against N axalites over the past few years, leading to the killing of some top Naxalleaders. 15 Mar 2007: Rani Bodli (Bijapur district), Chhattisgarh Rani Bodli was the site of a massacre that left 55 (later rose to 68) security personnel, including 37 Special Police Officers (SPOs), dead at a Salma Judum base camp. It was a strong message against SJ activists.
31 Mar 2007: Riga, Bihar Naxalites storm a bank and a police station at Riga, Sitamarhi district. Attack has its own significance since it targeted area close to the site where Kosi irrigation project is coming up. The Kosi project, which successive government have promised/claimed, will transform the face of north Bihar, is one of the targets of the N axalites. 26-27 June 2007: Economic blockade in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and neighbouring state Power and transmission lines snapped, rail and road traffic disrupted. Supply of minerals and ores in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh came to a halt during the 48-hour blockade. No loss of life but had major impact on economic and industrial activity in these areas. Affected States Chhattisgarh
Andhra Pradesh
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Orissa
Maharashtra
Bihar
Madhya Pradesh
West Bengal
New Presence Kerala Tamil Nadu
Naxalites are learnt to have set up regional committnps in these
824
Terrorism in India Uttar Prade sh Uttara khand Delhi Harya na Punja b
states , a depart ure from their earlier practice of operat ing throug h legitimate overg round organ izatio ns. It could be the result of decisio ns taken at the Jan-Fe b 2007 9 th Congr ess of the CPI (Maois t).
Arme d cadre : Mid-2 007 Some 13,00 0-14,0 00 ultra- Left extrem ists are believ ed to be active in 185 distric ts across 16 states. Their streng th was about 9,000 two years ago. Some worst affecte d areas, of late Chhat tisgar h Rani Bodli, Bijapu r distric t in Basta r region Jhark hand East Singb hum distric t Uttar Prade sh Soneb hadra and Mirza pur distric ts Karna taka
Weste rn Ghats , Shimo ga, Chika magal ur, Daksh ina Kanna da and Udupi Orissa Deoga rh, Samb alpur, Kand hmal, J ajpur and Dhenk anal. Is the Maois tlNax al move ment on the declin e? Mar 2007 The Maois t leader ship is concer ned that the curren t set back to the Naxal jte movem ent in Andhr a Prade sh (AP) could have an advers e impac t on the movem ent in the countr y, partic ularly in the neigh bourin g states of Orissa and Chhat tisgar h. A crackd own by the state, for over six years forced the ultras to vacate their strong holds and reduce their armed strugg le to a mere strugg le for surviv al. The three party comm ittees overse eing the Naxal movem ent in North- Teleng ana, Andhr a-Oris sa border and the State (AP) comm ittee have now conced ed that the movem ent is on the wane. But rebel activit y in the Basta r forest of Chhat tisgar h is extrem e intens e, while in the Orissa distric ts abutti ng AP, their hold contin ues to be unhind ered. The Maois t think- tank is now devisi ng strateg ies and tactics that could rejuve nate the movem ent in AP. "This was the subjec t
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of discussions at the meeting of the Polit Bureau (PB) of the CPl (M), held at an undisclosed locations three months ago." The secret meet has been briefly discussed earlier. How mych importance the PB accords to AP is obvious from the fact that the party General Secretary Ganapati feels the review of the movement in this State should be deemed as a review of revolutionary activity in the entire country. The minutes of the review committee meeting are claimed to be available with a daily. 7 The meeting felt the CPI (M) made a tactical error in not ordering the retreat of its cadres from North Telengana in 2001 when the police were just getting the better of them. The thinking that the repression could be countered through equally harsh resistance was total misplaced. As the police continued to deliver blow after blow, the N axals, instead of retreatingas Mao famously advocated-formed platoons to hit back and consequently suffered irreparable losses in North Telengana and State Committee areas. As a result, in alrqost all districts of AP, the party had reverted to one-plus-one formation: just two units moving together, according to priority to self-defence. As a result of this relentless State onslaught, the rebel activity in South Telangana, Guntur and Prakasam districts as well as the Rayalassema and N allamala forest areas weakened considerably. The minutes make it clear that tactical retreat was not ordered essentially because of differences of opinion among the leaders. The review meeting was attended by prominent Naxal leaders Ganapathy, Katakam Sudershan, Cherukuri Rajkumar, Akkiraju Haragopal, Wadkapur Chandramouli (shot dead since), Namballa Kesava Rao and some others. 40 years of Naxalbari: An appraisal: May 2007 Naxalbari, the term, symbolizes the revolutionary fervour of the 1960s. But the area where it was all born, no longer, resonates with that spirit. It is 40 years since that police firing on 25 May 1967, which killed 11 people including 6 women and 2 children and lit the Prairie fire. Paradoxically, that event is but a fading memory
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- in and around Naxalbari, even if it produced several Red organizations which are active in a north-south swathe of India, engaged in generating a Maoist heaven in the area under its 'control'. It is obvious that 40 years of Naxalbari deserves somewhat detailed analysis.
The way it all started and developed The 25 May 1967 police firing, killing 11 of the peasantry, might popularly and almost universally have become the starting point of the revolution, but the old timers insists that the N axalbari peasant uprising was not an event but a process that had started back in the early 1950s. But that day Naxalbari exploded into the national consciousness. And within a few years, N axal became synonymous with any Red extremist evoking fear among landlords and policemen alike. That was then. Now as the peasant ins,urrection completes its 40-years-on 25 may 2007-Naxalbari still evokes images of peasants and tea garden workers up in rebellion. For the radical red groups of different shades, including the Maoists, it is still an emblem and an idea that inspires. But this inspiring image in wider India is in sharp contrast to the realities one finds during the visit to the villages around N axalbari, once the heart beat of the insurrection and revolutionary fervour. In Naxalbari, revolution is a yesterday word, as a reporter indeed found during his visit just before 25 May 2007. 8 But before this all, some introductory remarks on N axalbari. Naxalbari, the iconic village, is surrounded by picture postcard villages. The Naxalbari block is located in the Darjeeling district of North Bengal. Naxalbari railway station is barely 5 km. from Nepal. As hinted above, Naxalbari movement was the outcome of mobilization carried out by the Communists at the ground level since the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s though a group of radical led by Charu Mazumdar within the Darjeeling district committee of the CPI CM) wanted to carry out an armed struggle. The slogan was: "Land to the Tillers." But the movement was not just about seizing land from the jotedars. "We believed that to take the land permanently, you must also take state power: Country," says veteran activist Shanti Munda, 64, of Shebdella vill ~JO"(' • f
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The movement's social base came from adiuasis (Mundas) Oraons and Santhals) and Rajbongshis, a scheduled caste. "Even now, these groups have a lot going for them", says Abhijit Mazumdar, 45, General Secretary, CPI (ML) (Liberation) Darjeeling district. But these groups are a minority now. It should be of interest that in 1967, the N axalbari insurrection made China's People Daily go ballistic-one analyst prefers the adjective to be 'orgiastic'-in its 5 July editorial: "A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India .... Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red are of rural revolutionary armed struggle has been established in India. The spark in Darjeeling will start a Prairie fire and will certainly set the vast expanses of India ablaze."
But the Chinese mouth piece was abviously off the mark. Presently, radical mass politics appears comatose in Naxalbari. We can not blame the children of Benguijote primary school for not knowing who Charu Mazumdar was. (Details of this ignorance a little later). Now a word as to how the Naxallegend was born, and later achieved the iconic status. For Kanu Sanyal, 78-year-old being the sole survivor or the original trio (other two being the la;e Charu Mazumdar, the top Naxal leader and its top ideologue, and the late Jangal Santhal, one of the key mobilizers of the adivasis in the Naxal uprising), 24 May (1967) is Naxalbari day. That day hundreds of peasants and tea garden workers, agitating for their land ownership (rights) in the Naxalbari region, killed a police Inspector with arrows in Boro Jhorojut village, barely 7 km away. Now here is an eye witness, Paban Singh of Benguijote village. "Some memories are like fire fli2s gently twinkling in the dark." But for Paban Singh memories of that sunny (25) May afternoon are like pieces of a broken mirror. The shards each telling their own story-about police killing those 11 'original' martyrs of the cause. Paban remembers: The next day women activists had organized a secret meeting by the Mechi river on the Nepal border. Some informer must have told the police because when they came back to Pn?-sadojote village, the police was waiting. Recalling this aJ ,
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Paban says he at that time was in neighbouring village of Benguijote, just a kilometer away. In the book, In the wake of Naxabari, Sumanta Banerjee writes: "while the police version of the incident was that the rebels had attacked them from behind a wall of women and children, forcing the police to open fire, the dissident Marxist leaders alleged that the police deliberately killed the women and children." Kanu Sanyal of CPI (ML) says: "It was a revenge killing." To this day, Paban can hear the sound of those gunshots: "I immediately picked up my bow and arrows, and ran towards the twin oak trees in Prasadojote. On my way, I saw Gaudrau Shaibani and a child being hit." Manoj Saha whose shop is barely 100 yards from the spot, recalls his father, a migrant from Bihar's Madhepura district, telling him that he hid under the bed on hearing the gunshots. By the time Paban reached the spot, most agitators had run away. But the injured and the dead were lying on the ground. "I saw 1shwara Boudi bying on the ground and screaming. She was struck by a bullet on the lowle"r part of her leg. I could see the bullet and tried to pull it out. But it was not easy doing that. She was screaming." Paban continues: "At this point of time I just wanted to find out who was hit and who had died. I found my mother Dhaneshwari Devi lying beside a muddy pathway off the road a few yards away from the twin oak trees. She was dead. I went round the village looking for a piece of cloth to cover her. I found a sack cloth and covered her. That is all I did. There was a warrant against my name. I left the spot." Those were the traumatic days, over laid with personal tragedies. Even the memories of those days for people like Paban must be painful. He continues, telling his story to the journalist: "Much later, I learnt that the police had come back the next day. They arrested everyone injured and took away the bodies. I don't know what they did with the body of my mother: whether they burnt it or just dumped it in the river." In all 11 people were killed, including six women and two children. Naxalites now commemorate 25 May as Martyr's Day.
Naxal Terror.' Initial Phase
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The names of the (11) dead are inscribed on a marble slab next to the Benguijote Primary School. It needs recording that Jyoti Basu was the Home Minister of West Bengal at that relevant time. Who led the two-month-Iong struggle? A radical group from CPI (M)'s Siliguri Unit. Charu Mazumdar was the key ideologue, Kanu Sanyal was among the leading organizers, and Jangal Santhal mobilized the adivasis. By 1969, this group had split from CPI (M) and formed CPI (ML). What were the long term effects the Naxalbari uprising? It resulted in the redistribution of land among the peasantry and formation of the CPI (ML). Between 1969 and 1971, the Naxalite movement spread to various parts of the country taking on a more violent and in places, an urban character. Shades of it remains in today's CPI (ML) groups and the Maoists.
Situation today in Naxalbari region As mentioned at the start of this analytical piece, in Naxalbari revolution is a yesterday word. There are new realities at play. Most radical ,Reds here are septugenarians. A young CPI (ML) worker is a rarity. Incidentally, there are more MarxistLeninist Parties-New Democracy, Liberation, Janashakti, Kanu Sanyal Group, Mahadadeb Mukherjee Group, to name somethan cadre. Posters with Charu Mazumdar's photo still adorn these parts. But, as veteran CPI (ML) J anashakti group activist Khokan Mazumdar ruefully points out, there is not even a book on the 1967 rural uprising in the local Subroti Sana library, although dozens were written in Bengali. Is it any surprise if a reporter says that "barring old activists like him who spearheaded the uprising, there is no real battle between memory and forgetting?" Youngsters admit the uprising rarely figures in their conversations. They remember it primarily because 25 May is celebrated as an annual ritual with politicians para dropping from Kolkata. Consequently for the young today, Naxalbari uprising is a story, not a way oflife. A telling fact of Naxalbari uprising not being even a story came to light when a reporter 9 visited the local 'Benguijote Primary School. The teacher asks his student: who is Charu
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... Mazumdar? The latter shakes his head sadly and says, "Sir, I don't know." The teacher calls six more students from class IV and repeats the question. He gets the same negative answer. He then, being helpful, throws a broad hint through a leading question: "Don't you remember the 'function' we had once"? Boys and girls group for an answer, but to no avail. One of them finally gets up to say: "Jani na, Sir, Charu Mazumdar ke (= Do not know, sir, who is Charu Mazumdar )." It was rather ironical. Barely 10 yards from their class room and just outside the low boundary wall of their' school, is the bust of Charu Mazumdar, along with those of comrades Lienin, Stalin and Mao. Beside them is a plaque in the memory of 11 _ martyrs, mentioned earlier here. What could be reason for this indifference-even neglecttowards an iconic figure of his time on his own turf? A major, if not the only one, reason could be changed demographic picture of the area. Over the years, N axalbari and its surrounding villages have been flooded by an influx of migrants from Bangladesh-men and women with no historical memory of the .event. As.a result of this influx, mostly illegal, the adivasis, who had mIgrated to these parts as labour from south Bihar (now Jharkhand) and the Rajbongshis, who performed the insurrection's spine, have been reduced to minority. The migrants, who have been gradually legalized through political \. patronage, serve as a vote-bank for the CPI (M), and are averse to radical politics. Over the past three decades, the CPI (M) has always retained the Phansidewa assembly seat of which the N axalbari block is a part. So, Naxalbari is a secret trinket tucked away on the edge of month Bengal's Darjeeling district. Nepal is just 5 km away. Back in the 1960s, it acted as a sanctuary for 'underground' Communist leaders. Furlongs of tea estates, paddy fields, bamboo forests and banana gardens-the villages appear born to lead a green, not a red, revolution. One enters N axalbari to be welcomed by a statue of a Kargil Martyr Suresh Chhetri and a Lion's club signboard, not by a statue/pictures of Charu Mazumdar. Sitting in his tin-roofed are sons of former CPI (ML) workers have joined CPI (M). "They are the new prosperous political elite" he says. In BeI).guijot village, Arti Sarkar, a former CPI (ML) (Janashakti) worker's
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son, was picked up by the police for allegedly being a Maoist. In jail for two months he has joined CPI CM). As Abhijit Mazumdar, Charu's son and district secretary CPI CML) (Liberation), says: "Over the years, there has been a systematic witch-hunt against any body who opposes the CPI CM). Sources insist that CPI (M) and Congress politicians do not even fight each other because they allegedly share a common financial interest: border smuggling of mainly clothes and electronic goods. Returning to the demographic realities of the area, here is shopkeeper Manoj Saha of Prosadojote village giving a rough estimate of ethnic and communal breakdown of the families in his village : Biharis
2
Rajbongshis
20
Bengalis
2
Bangladeshis
50
Nepalese
10
These are telling statistics. Bangladeshis are already having overall majority, and the influx in West Bengal, as in Assam, is still, continuing. It must be understood that in the totality of circumstances the Bangladeshis help the local CPI CM) in West Bengal in their political battles against the CPI CML). This gets confirmed by the locals when they interact with the visiting journalists. Says villager Pusha Oraon: "The Bangladeshis, mostly lower-caste namasudras, have been coming in over the past few decades." Being migrants, the Bangladeshis are keen to be accepted and coopted. Opting for radical politics would mean going against the ruling coalition and, consequently could invite trouble for them. A villager, talking to a reporter makes the points simply, mother-of-factly but honest-to-the-bone manner: "The CPI (M) leader takes them under his wings because it helps him gain bulk votes. They get land and ration cards, in return. It is a relationship of convenience." In the circumstances explained above, rebuilding radical movement is not easy. "The process is slow and painstaking," says Abhijit Mazumdar, son of the legendary Charu Mazumdar and CPI (ML) (Liberation), Darjeeling District General Secretary. More so, with CPI (ML) splintered into several factions. Without unity, the radical left is unable to offer (and
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function as) genuine opposition. For instance, the CPI (ML) (Liberation) is marginally present in nearly Kharibari block, Kanu Sanyal's CPI (ML) is there in Hatighsha are. Some factions such as the Mahadeb Mukherjee group have just one or two members in the entire block. Notwithstanding all this, the spirit of Naxalbari survives. Shanti Munda says that when government officials recently came asking for this land for an irrigation, project, the entire village rose in revolt. "We still love our land. And just like the Naxalbari day, we will die for it. Jaan doongi, zamin na doongi," she says. In N andigram, the radical Reds see hope. The killing of 14 anti-SEZ protestors on 14 March (2007) by the police has ignited the spark again. Says teenager Shefali Bishwakarma, whose uncle Babulal was one of the first martyrs of the movement: "Earlier, nobody wanted to listen when we spoke of Naxalbari. Now students say we must have another Naxalbari to stop Nandigram from . " recurrIng. One tends to believe Shefali even when primary school children at Benguijote primary school say they are unaware of Charu Mazumdar, the icon of Naxalbari. Kanu Sanyal: inconsequential leader today Kanu Sanyal was the leading figure of the Naxalbari movement, next only to Charu Mazumdar. In the 1960s, the following slogan echoed through the bylanes of Calcutta and paddy fields of Naxalbari : Jail ha tala tootega/ Kanu, Jangal Chhootega (The locks of prison will break, now Jangal (Santhal), one of the key mobilisers of the adivasis in the N axalbari uprising, is dead (Charu Mazumdar had died in 1971). And Kanu, a top leader of the N axalite movement, is ailing and frail. But the 78-year-old General secretary-of the original-CPI (ML), who lives in a one-room party office in Hatigisha and sleeps on the floor, remains committed to the revolution through mass struggle. What follow are the excerpts from an interviews by a reporter published in the 20 May 2007 issue of a daily.1o It is of interest to note that what the old revolutionary says about the 1960s revolution has a ring of authenticity. Moreo?er, what he
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says on Nandigram has a contemporary resonance. Let us put it this way: Even 40 years after the conflagration, the 78-yearsold romantic still has fire in his stomach. Q. Your memories of that fateful day of 25 May 1967?
A. For us, 24 May is Naxalbari day. That day, the police were informed that some leaders of the N axalbari movement were hiding in Boro Jhorojote village. There were no leaders there but a huge gathering of peasantry and tea garden workers. One police officer was killed. Since the peasants understood and accepted our politics and took up arms on their own, we celebrate that day as a victory of our political ideas. Other groups observe 25 May as Martyrs Day when 11 persons were killed in police firing. Q. Why did the Naxalbari movement fail? A. We had a strong base among peasants and tea garden workers. But the movement lacked a proper party structure. That was the main shortcoming. Q. Did you meet Mao secretly in 1967? A. Yes. During our N axalbari struggle, there were differences within the party. We thought the Chinese leaders could help us understand what was right or wrong. It was a 45-minute meeting. We went by road to Kathmandu. From there, Chinese comrades took us by jeep to Peking. We reached China on 30 Sept (1967). The next day we saw them celebrate 1 Oct as National Day. I could see people weeping at the sight of Mao. We met Mao, Chou En-Iai and the C-in-C. Mao's advice was: Whatever you learn in China, try to forget it. Go to your own country, try to understand the specific situation and carry the revolution forward. Q. In retrospect, do you think that Charu Mazumdar's annihilation of class enemy line was a historical error? A. It was not only a historical error but a fundamental deviation from Markism-Leninism and thoughts of Mao. But remember we did not follow the annihilation line (forming small squads and killing landlords, policemen and other class enemies) in Naxalbari. Only
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one landlord was killed (in N axalhari) during the struggle. In practice, the annihilation line was first followed in Srikakulam area of Andhra Pradesh in late 1969. Q. What are the movement's long term gains? A. There was no protection to share croppers earlier. We captured land in N axalbari and the peasants are still in control of the land. Mter 1977, West Bengal government was forced to bring the Bargadari Act through which some hereditary rights were given to sharecroppers. The CPI (ML) was formed in 1969 to organize the movement. But that too was not successful in the long run because Charu Mazumdar's annihilation of class enemies line prevailed. In a very subtle way, he said that peasant committees and mass organizations were not necessary. Just form small squads and start annihilation of class enemies. Q. If you were the Chief Minister of West Bengal today, how would you have dealt with Nandigram?
A. I can only answer the question from a peasant organizer point of view. I feel the issue can not be resolved. Nandigram is not just about the 14 March police firing. It is a question of policy. They say that agrarian reform is done, so we are opening for industrialization. But the truth is that they have not completed the task of agrarian reform in West Bengal. Besides, thousands of the industries have been closed. The entire 150-year-old tea industry is facing a deep crisis. Q. The Maoists are present, in greater or lesser degree, in over 150 districts. What is their future? A. The Maoists are sure to meet with failure. In an Andhra Pradesh village, where they are very powerful, I found that some peasants were not tilling their land. I asked them, why. They said, if we do so, the landlords will come and ask for the produce. And if we do what the Maoists tell us, the forces will come. The Maoists, in spite of having guns, have failed to assure the peasants that they should serve a radical land reform in the countryside.
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Back in 1969, when CPI (ML) was formed, we used to say after one action in a district that agrarian revolution is going ahead. The Maoists have started the same thing in a wider form. The Maoists can not see. Earlier this month (May 2007) people revolted in Ranchi against Reliance Retail. The Maoists are active in the area in and around Ranchi but they can not see what is happening. They just want state power first.
Q. In time of globalization, how do you build a workers' and peasants' movement? The basic needs of the people are not being met. Pleasants need land which is being snatched away in the name of development. There is no difficulty in mobilizing the people because the government is not attending to so many needs of the common people. What we need is dedication and commitment to win tl~e people's confidence for a mass revolution. This interview should be deemed to be one of the more important subjects dealt in this work because of the personage involved in the interview, its historical value and finally its ramification for contemporaneous issues like Nandigram and Maoist movement. Naxalbari versus Nandigram: Comparisons and contrasts On 14 Mar 2007, 14 activists protesting against SEZ were killed in police firing at Nandigram; three more than the number shot dead on 25 may 1967 in Naxalbari, over 600 km away to the south. On both occasions, the protestors were fighting for land. And on both occasions, the ruling party fired on its own people. On both occasions, CPI (M) was 'the ruling party: In 1967, it was part of a front, but in 2007, it was the main and leading party of the left coalition. If in 1967, J yoti Basu was the Home Minister, Bhattacharjee was the Chief Minister in 2007. But then, there are the differences too. The Nandigram, protests were spontaneous, the N axalbari movement was more planned although the events of 24/25 May (1967) were not. Naxalbari also had a larger perspective: land was merely a means to obtain state power. In N andigram, there is no such
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sweeping VISIOn. Radical Left activists explain why and how N axalbari is relevant in times of N andigram. • Abhijit Mazumdar, 46, CPI (ML) (Liberation), Darjeeling District General Secretary. "History does not replicate itself. Ideology does. In N andigram, one finds an echo of the same causes that led to N axalbari. People are standing up for their basic right to livelihood that is getting jeopardized by government action". • Punjab Rao, 77, CPI (ML) (New Democracy) "Naxalbari was an unfinished revolution. Nandigram shows that peasants are rising again. Nandigram also proves that you can't fool all the people all the time." • Shanti Munda, 64, CPI (ML) "Naxalbari will always be contextual. As long as the government and private companies keep coming for people's land as they did in Nandigram, it will be relevant". • Arti Sarkar, 56, ex-CPI (ML) (Janshakti) "There is much to learn from Naxalbari. Though radical opinions are limited now; there is an urgent need to change the direction of politics today. It every village reacts like N andigram, we can change the government's policy.
Are the States beating 'Red' terror? An assessment: Oct 2006 Towards the last quarter of 2006, analysts were opining that "outlawed Left-wing extremists, the CPI (Maoist), are down, but certainly not out." After the mass acre of tribals at a relief camp at Erra bore in Chhattisgarh in July 2006, the extremists have suffered a series of set-backs. In Andhra Pradesh, the State Police scored a "victory of sorts" when it killed Burra Chinnaiah, State Committee Secretary of the CPI (Maoist) and seven others in the Nallamala jungles. Then it seized a cache of 42 rocket launchers, rockets and IEDs in Mahbubnagar and Prakasam districts. 11 This is also a pointer to how the N axalites in different states, after uniting under the rubric of CPI (Maoist), are working on a more ambitious strategy. Gone are the days when they targeted and gunned down landowners. Now, they are executing more audacious attacks on those opposing them: the police
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
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generally, and jails occasionally to free their comrades. Ironically-no, 'meaningfully'-most of these attacks (for instance, the Giridih weapons loot or the Jehanabad jail-break in 2006) were outside Andhra Pradesh, the State that remained a nursery of insurgency for nearly three decades. The State police having gained upper hand, helped essentially by more credible information about their movement with an exclusive intelligence gathering machinery and better combative tactics employed by the special anti-Naxalite commando force, forced the extremists to shift base form north Telangana to other parts of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, besides the less developed districts across neighbouring states.
After Andhra Pradesh Success The Maoists are particularly successful in Chhattisgarh where the state-backed counter-insurgency formation, the Salma Judum, has suffered heavy casualties in Bastar region. The innocent tribals, mostly Muria, have become easy targets ever since they supported the movement that has pitted tribals against the Naxalites. With the ultras enjoying the support of the Gutti Koya tribe in parts of the State, the conflict has turned into sectarian strife between the two tribes. "Most of the hardcore militants in Chhattisgarh are Andhra migrants," says Chief Minister Raman Singh, architect of the Salma Judum movement. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister YS Rajasekhra Reddy says, "What is needed urgently is a common strategy that is implemented by all States."
Claims of Union Home Ministry and counter-terror measures After launching an inter-state coordinated offensive in the N axalite-affected areas in 2006, the Home Ministry says the number of "affected" districts is down from 126 to only 60 and 609 police station areas. It is also raising a special combat force comprising personnel from the Central paramilitary forces and policemen from the 13 effected states. Of the 14,000 to be enlisted, some 6,000 will be ex-servicemen trained in fighting terrorism and dealing with IEDs and mines. About 62 companies of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) and India Reserve Battalions (IRB) are being trained to carryout anti-Naxal tasks
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Terrorism in India
at the army-run Kaner anti-insurgency school in Chhattisgarh. The Army is also providing inputs on explosive detection equipment ana sophisticated jammers to the Naxal-affected states. Simply put, the Home Ministry is emphasizing that the violence can be checked considerably with its integrated security-cum-offensive strategy that has enabled smoother flow and sharing of intelligence among the states. It is also creating an anti-Naxal cell in the Ministry for direct monitoring.
Maoist claims and statistical data The Maoists understandably would want to counter the changing perception about their strength by demonstrating strike capabilities. They claim they wield influence in 165 of the 602 districts in the country. They are avowedly planning to increase their area of influence, particularly in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Uttaranchal. In states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, MP, Orissa, and Bihar, the focus of N axalites are the back woods and the tribal pockets where they whip up support citing neglect of the poor by the State. Over 930 incidents claiming 486 lives occurred in 2006 (till mid-Oct) compared to 1,608 incidents in 2005.
Situation in Chhattisgarh Critics have already dubbed Salma Judum a failure. Repeated attacks by Naxals have forced about 55,000 tribals to move into camps along a highway that runs through Bastar, vacating some 600 villages which have consequently fallen under the control of the Naxalites. Worse still, those in the police are reported to be opting for posting in Bhilai, Bilaspur and Raipur. More than 50 per cent of the than as in N axalite areas are without Station House Officers (SHO). "The Salma Judum has failed, the government has no alternative plan and poor tribals are left to be slaughtered, says former Chief Minister 1\jit Jogi (obviously a subjective opinion, certainly not balanced). The police response is 'found' to be knee-jerk. "Our main challenges are the IEDs and landmines. We have now requisitioned trained dogs from the Army to detect the mines", says DGP OP Rathore.
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
~39
Situation in Bihar The situation is not very different in Bihar where the ultras~ have a sizeable presence in 30 of the 38 districts. The absence of trained personnel and modern weapons is a big problem. DGP Ashish Ranjan Sinha has recalled 12 IPS officers on deputation to the Centre. "We are not short of funds, but we do not have sufficient infrastructure," says Bihar's ADGP GS Rath.
Home Ministry: Corrective and counter measures Concerned about the ability of the militants to garner support in the backward districts, the Ministry has suggested intensive and rapid economic development of such areas. Unfortunately, the states have failed to use the funds under the Backward Districts Initiative. "Only Rs 990 crore of the Rs 2,295 crore made available in the past three years for 55 districts in nine states has been spent"~'1rhe political changes in Nepal have emboldened the Maoists to go in for an upgrade to match up to the Rs 1,800 crore investment in modernization of the state police forces by the Ministry. The regular meetings that the Home Ministry has with the police chiefs of the affected states have led to the launch of joint cross-border operations and greater funding to contain the militants. Public perception, security and development are the elements of a holistic plan that is part of the changed strategy in dealing with the militants. The counter insurgency operations, particularly in Chhattisgarh, are to gain a new dimension with the deployment of an Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to gather ground data on the movement of the militants. The Indian Air Force is to provide air support for taking up combing and to transport and evacuate security forces airdropping of food and medicines.
Empowered Group of Ministered (EGoM) set up At his recent (Aug 2006) meeting with the Chief Ministers, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh the formation of an EGoM and emphasized New Delhi's resolve to contain Naxalites. "The states will now have to take up joint operations against Naxalites and Central funding would not be wanting," assured the Prime Minister, "While inputs become available, it is now for the states to get their act together", exhort the analysts.
Terrorism in India
840
How one wishes the insurgency situations were so simple and as amenable to solutions! Select Statistical Data 1. Naxal-affected districts as claimed by MHA
50
2. Districts under their control as claimed by CPI '(Maoist)
165
3. Incidents of Maoist violence in 2006 (till mid-Oct)
930
4. Civilian lives lost in 2006 (till mid-Oct)
486
5. Incidents of Maoist violence in 2005
1608
6. Police lives lost in2006 (till mid-Oct)
130
7. Naxalite killed in 2006 (till mid-Oct)
454
8. Total of people killed in Naxalite violence in 2006 (till mid-Oct)
1070
(Source: India Today, 23 Oct 2006)
Countering Naxalism: Some select measures Development Fast-paced economic development in the areas affected by N axalite violence is seen as the main counter-dote to this extremist depredations. Special packages have been announced. Linking 12 violence-affected districts of Orissa by a two-lane state-of-the-art highway is seen as an effective way to bring dev~lopment to these areas. Coordinated operations Coordinated effort at various levels has been set in motion to achieve better results: Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) set up by the Prime Minister. (2) Anti-Terrorist cell planned in the MHA. (3) Joint Task Force of police Chiefs of affected states already functioning. (4) National Coordination Centre against Naxalism (NCCN) functioning under the Union Home Secretary. (5) Counter-Maoist cross-border operations to be jointly undertaken by more than one state as envisaged by the Prime Minister must become a practice. (1)
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
841
Police modernization The MHA is investing Rs 1,800 crore for modernization of the state police forces. Tech support Some states like Chhattisgarh have requested the Centre for the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to support combing and monitoring operations. Chhattisgarh is believed to have already got one. An over-optimistic assessment The above analysis reads over-optimistic to the extent that it seems to be suggesting that Left-wing extremism and violence related to it will be defeated, if not eliminated during the calendar year 2007. This is utterly unrealistic. Without going into too much detail, a word of caution should be sufficient here. Given India's lackadaisical administration, corruption in public services and projects and lack of political will due to a, variety of reasons, defeating home-grown Left-wing extremism/terrorism will be much more tougher task than seeing the back of the terrorism sponsored from across the border. lA patient, brick-by-brick and painstaking approach is in order than high-sounding1verbose proclamations and resolutions. And more importantly, India has capacity to 'succeed~
"Naxalism is States' problem": MHA status paper: Dec 2006 The government has ruled out Centre's intervention in antiN axal operations, as law and order is a state subject. Instead, the Centre, will help the affected states with equipment, weaponry, logistical support and intelligence inputs, to curb the menace. This is what a recent status paper from the MHA tells the states, as reported by a daily in its issue of 23 Dec 2006. The Centre is not short on advice: "Naxalism being an inter-state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it. The states will need to improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against N axalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly." The status paper says the Government has three-pronged strategy to tackle the N axalite menace. Firstly, the government
842
Terrorism in India
will deal sternly with Naxals indulging in mindless violence. Secondly, since N axalism is not merely a law and order issue, efforts would simultaneously be launched on the political, security, development and public perception management fronts. Thirdly, the government will focus on socio-economic development of the backward regions, which are prone to Naxal influence. The status paper makes it clear that the government will not enter into dialogue unless the N axalites lay down arms. At a parallel level, the government wants the political parties to strengthen their cadre-base in Naxal-infested areas, so that the youth can be weaned away from the path of Naxal ideology. Special focus has been given on accelerated socio-economic . development of the backward areas and regular interaction with NGOs, intelligentsia and civil liberties groups, in order to minimize the overground support for the N axalite ideology and activity. Significantly, the status paper approves ofthe Salma Judum approach too build up people's resistance against the N axalite violence. "Efforts will continue to be made to promote voluntary local resistance groups against N axalites, but in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces," it says. It further adds: "The states should announce a suitable transfer policy for the Naxalite-affected districts. Willing, committed and competent officers will need to be posted with a stable tenure in the N axalite-affected districts. These officers will also need to be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and step up government presence and above all improve governance in these areas."12 Will the Naxals join mainstream? Apr 2007 A senior operative of CPI (Maoist) contested the 29 Mar 2007 Palamu Parliamentary by-elections on the BSP ticket while he was lodged in the Garwah jail. Kameshar Baitha is the first senior leader of the party to take part in democratic elections. Baitha, a former self-styled Area Commander of CPI (Maoist), finished a close 22,327 votes behind the victorious Ghuran Ram of Rashtriya Janata Dal. Incidentally, Baitha joined the Bahujan Samaj Party (ESP) just before the polls, held on 29 March. 13
Naxal Terror: Initial Phase
843
The fact of a former senior cadre fighting the elections gave rise to the questions like the one at the top of this narrative. Analysts are already speculating: "With Nepal's Maoists putting down their arms and entering the electoral arena, could the same be happening in Jharkhand after an ex-Maoist extremist came a close second in the 29 March elections? Is the party edging towards the mainstream politics?" These are no longer theoretical questions. Nor could it be kite flying. The reasoning is simple: Baitha coulcI:not have joined the electoral fray without a nod from party leadership. A glance at his active past is rather frightening-literally. During his active days, Baitha's depredations spread across the border regions of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh for 24 long years. As an analyst puts it: "His name would send a chill down the spine of any police officer in the region." As the records show, soon after his arrest, several additional cases of murder, ammunition looting, forcible collection of money and other crimes were registered against him. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that presently Baitha is being tried by the courts for the 78 such cases lodged against him. With all these cases against him, Baitha would have spent the rest of his life in jail almost anonymously-like so many other rebels spending their days in various jails unknown unsung! All this stands changed. His debut in the Parliamentary democracy has again brought the limelight on him. Speaking to a daily from the Garwah jail where he is presently serving his term, Baitha sounded confident to clinch the Parliamentary seat if another chance comes his way. In fact, he is already speaking like a seasoned politician: ''Yes, I was an extremist, even little kids know that. But, so what? The day I joined BSP, I left everything behind. I have documented my feelings in my brochure, which I wrote from this cell, and have circulated among the electorate of Palamu. Today I strodgly feel that to voice one's demands or speak out for justice and development, one has to go through laid down systems." "The lomorrow of Palamu is BSP and the people of this area know me and my ways of dealing with things" Can one imagine it is an ex-rebel speaking? He is so confident of what all he says. "To remains the system, all that
Terrorism in India
844
matters is how best you can serve your constituency and the people at large. Out there, they know I can deliver", the bespectacled leader added, pointing towards the main gate of the jail. May be, he has his reasons for speaking in such a selfassured manner. Baitha led by comfortable margins from Vishrampur and Bhavnathpur assembly segments and was close on the heels of the JD candidate after the votes from Garmah, Husseinabad and Chhatarpur assembly segments were counted. Here is a political observer speaking from Ranchi: "Mr Baitha's contesting of the Palamu by-elections is a significant thing in the history of the Maoist extremism. Until now, no ,senior operative, other than Mr. Kameshwar Baitha, has . contested any form of elections. It is a clear indication that there is tacit support from the Maoist leadership behind the entire process." For the State and Central security and intelligence agencies, there is nothing to do except wait in the wings. Presently, there is no straw in the wind to indicate any trend. Till date (Aug 2007), there has been no development on this front. May be, the _analysts will have to wait till early 2009 when the next Parliamentary polls are due in the country to know if Indian .. Maoists will go the Nepal way. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
Hindu, 12 Jan 2007. R. Prasannan, Week, 11 Jun 2006. Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, cited, ibid. Bhavna Vij-Aurora, Outlook, 15 May 2006. Outlook, 26 May 2006. Vinay Jha, Indian Express, 22 July, 2007. K. Srinivas Reddy, Hindu, 9 Mar 2007. These observations are based on the article penned by Avijit Ghosh after visiting the area) that appeared Times of India, 20 May 2007. Ibid. Avijit Ghosh, Times of India, 20 May, 2007. Amarnath K. Menon and Neeraj Mishra, India Today, 23 Oct., 2006. Venkat Parsa, Asian Age, 23 Dec 2006. -. Dipankar Bose, Statesman, 6 April, 2007.
16 Cou nter ing Terr orism Too many discu ssions on anti-M aoist policy : Apr 2007 The spate of meetin gs and discus sions by officials of the Centr al and State Gover nment s in the recent month s (mid 2006- mid Apr 2007 period ) have failed to produc e an effective counte r-Mao ist policy for the countr y. The lack of agreem ent on a unified strateg y to counte r the Maois t violence, which is based on oft-str essed and much- neede d coord inatio n among the affecte d states and real-ti me sharin g of the intellig ence among them is a cause of concer n among the securi ty community. All this is grea_tly hampe ring the fight agains t the increa sing threat to India's stabili ty posed by the Left-w ing ideology. Sharp differe nces among the affecte d States once again croppe d up in the latest meetin g of the Task Force on AntiMaois t Opera tions, held on 13 Apr 2007. Presen tly there are three operat ional model s adopte d by variou s States to contai n the Maois t terror. These are summ ed up here. • Andhr a Prade sh Gover nment 's model . Under it, the strateg y is to mix combi ng operat ions in remote forest areas by specia list battali ons with the arrest of Maois ts and their sympa thizer s in urban areas. • Chhat isgarh Model. This model is based on extend ing help to the locals (mainl y tribals , in this case), includ ing supply of arms and ammu nition , to enable them to resist the depred ations of the outlaw s. The plan is commo nly known as Salwa Judum . The Leftis t elite (amon g them is Arund hati Roy), expect edly, dubbe d it as the policy aimed at dividin g the tribals . • The third model is based on the strateg y of launch ing anti-M aoist campa igns on specif ic iriform ation and initiat ing develo pment measu res to aliena te the" Maoists.
846
Terrorism in India
Centre's preference is for the first two models, as it feels the third model has proved to be slow in achieving desired results. But the officials from the concerned states are opposing the Centre's advice on the plea that the adv:ised models, involving active operations against the Maoists, could aggravate the social problems. Sources disclosed that Maharashtra tried to practice the Andhra model but it failed to pick up due to the Dalit Movement getting mixed up with the Maoist activism in certain pockets. Likewise, Jharkhand attempted replicating Chhattisgarh model but following the killing of Sunil Mahato, it had to shelve operations. 1 Then there was inter-ministerial meeting held in Patna on 16 Apr 2007, chaired by the Additional Secretary (Anti-Maoist), . MHA-Vinay Kumar-to review the Maoist situation. At this conclave, Bihar's representatives said they preferred to adopt the development model to eradicate Maoism from their State and sought a special package of Rs 1,900 crore for revamping the irrigation and road infrastructure in their State. The issue was_ to come up for detailed discussions at the meeting/of the National Coordination Centre (NCC) headed by the Union Home Secretary, Madhukar Gupta, on 26Apr 2007. Meanwhile on 20 Apr, Cabinet Secretary BK Chaturvedi convened a meeting of the Chief Secretaries of all the concerned States to understand and discuss the problems involved in adopting a unified strategy throughout the country to counter the Maoists. The MHA sources indicated that various political and social problems that would result from adopting hardcore combat tactics in remote hinterland and catching the Maoists and their sympathizers in urban areas would come for detailed discussion at the 26 Apr NCC meet. Some of the more important issues discussed at the 20 Apr 2007 meeting presided over by the Cabinet Secretary BK Trivedi were: • The question of how to empower the States in upgrading their social and related infrastructure . • Food security, Sarva Shiksha.Abhyan, National Rural Health Mission, improvement of business climate, and strategy for toning up governance were also clubbed together with the review of internal security situation for fhis meeting.
Countering Terrorism
847
• The one-day meeting was organized by the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances. It was intended to serve the twin purpose of assessing the performance of different states over a period of time, especially in respect of various flagship programmes of different central nodal ministries. • The meeting sought to remove the impediments in speedy implementation of centrally sponsored schemes, which could prove useful in alienating the Maoist activists at the village levels. Intelligence inputs had underlined the vulnerability of the stock market, sea routes and the uninhabited islands, which could be used as a safe haven by terrorists of various shades. It is yet too early to examine ifthe plethora of meetings held under different officials have produced any articulate policy options for the States subjected to violence by the Maoist terrorists. It is high time India has a policy to counter Maoist violence in various States. COMBATING NAXALISM MHA to set up Anti-Naxal cell: Desparate bid: May 2006 Rattled by unabated Naxal violence and its own inability to come up with a containment strategy, a concerned Home Ministry (MHA) has decided to set up a dedicated Anti-Naxal Cell to coordinate intelligence, development outre aches and impleIJ1entation of policies to check the rising Red menace. 15 The cell, to be headed by an IAS officer, will have smaller group to deal specifically with development issues and armed police response in the affected district. For the first time there will be numerous police officers tasked with the jobs of tracking policies regarding policing and deployment. What the MHA has asked the government in terms of human resources is indicative of its intention of creating a gigantic task force to wage anti-N axal war, as also an acknowledgement of the stark fact that the Centre has so far, failed in its anti-Naxal exertions. It plans to ask for this cell a new post of Additional Secretary, one Joint Secretary (JS) and four Deputy Secretaries (DS) besides 16 secretarial staff, which in financial terms adds up to an additional expenditure of Rs 52 lakh a year, a daily reported on 9 May 2006. One ofthe two JS posts will be tenable by a police offlcer of'\ IGP rank, mandated to tour the Naxal-hit states and to monitor
848
Terrorism in India
the implementation of the anti-Naxal plan while holding consultations with DGPs and Chief Secretaries. Of the four DS posts, two will be tenable by the DIG rank police officers, who will report to the said IGP. The Naxalaffected states will be equally allotted between them as exclusive responsibility. Two non-police DSs too will be charged with monitoring the development scheme in the respective states allotted to them. The government has identified lack of development as an important factor contributing largely to the growth of Naxalism and wants concerted effort in that direction to remove the 'root causes' the spread of the menace. Special Cell: Will it deliver? May 2006 The Home Ministry long last seems to have recognized the seriousness of the threat the Maoists pose to Nations security " by setting up a special cell within it. It will be headed by an Additional Secretary (an IAS officer, of course), backed up by two Joint Secretaries, four Deputy Secretaries, 16 secretarial staff an9, as a cynical analyst put it, "God alone knows how many stenos, peons and whatever else is required to make a sahib feel like one." The measure has not been received well by some analysts and newspapers. One from the latter fraternity is quoted here, more for its unconcealed cynicism than any constructive reasoning: "........ somehow the theory of nipping the trouble in the bud has eluded North Block, but the outcome of series of the conferences on the subject inspire little confidence. For it remains rooted in a bureaucratic approach. Practical utility of this (plethora of officials and their staID remain questionable, except on the files beyond which 'babudom' does not function. Some of the mini-secretariat will be drawn from police-would not those cops love an armchair assignment? The Special Cell staff would set about monitoring the anti-Naxal operations and what passes off as development activity. Sounds terrific, comprehensive. What the Army would laud as efficient 'staff work".2 This from a daily. It does sound cynical but here is more than kernel of truth in this verbiage. It continues in the same vein: "Important though staff work is, it does not suffice to win battles, , but the Ministry appears little concerned with translating plans
t
Countering Terrorism
849
into action. The need to convince or inspire the political leadership in affected states into taking hard decisions gets little or no priority, nor is much stock placed in gearing up the local police to tackle extremists (the Central forces can never supplant them), or get the district authorities to generate the 'Roti, kapda aur makan' for which the population turns to Naxals, having lost faith in the 'Sarkar'. It is customary for New Delhi's politicians and bureaucrats to diagnose such situations as 'more than law and order problems', but an injection of additional khaki is all the medicine they administer. Simply because going beyond that means getting their 'hands dirty'. Something abhorrent to the dandified leadership to which this critical ministry is now condemned" . This editorial from a daily has been advisedly quoted in extensor. Respite the apparent cynicism, the editorial has a lot to say on the issues which is widely believed by majority of Indians. First some comments to restore balance to some of the observations made by the daily. Why blame the bureaucracy for not going beyond the bureaucratic? They are trained to work that way and the system does not allow them to cross the limits even of some bureaucrat is inclined that way or determined to do so. Just to cite one instance on this Special Cell itself: We have no system under which a knowledgeable, capable and willing person from academia, journalism, strategic community or commentariat can be appointed to head such a cell. Again it is unfair to expect mere bureaucrats to god state political leaders ." into taking harsh decisions on anti-Naxalite strategy. Not can they god district administration into completing socio-economic development plans. As for the dandified leadership of the Union Home Ministry, a bigger truth has never been spoken. No one disagrees that the vital Ministry could have been entrusted to a less competent hands. For the reasons well known, it is a given that cannot be changed. Yet again, there is no denying the fact that the Special Cell will only create more hapen work to justify its creation/existence, without adding anything worth-while to the fight against the Naxalites. Yes, it will be the fourth, avoidable addition to the three consultative, deliberative mechanisms already in place: (1) Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM); (2) Joint Task Force from the 13 Naxalite-affected states; (3) National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) under the Union Home Secretary.
850
Terrorism in India
. Incidentally, the Cell will cost the exchequer Rs 50 lakh annually. Having said it all, some analysts would still like to give some time to this fledgling creation to see if it indeed can deliver something to justify its continuance! .. Dealing with Naxals: A divided home? May 2006 That N axals are creating havoc in the country is known to alL But when Union Home Minister recently proposed a specific measure to tackle the Naxal violence, his cabinet colleagues came in the way. This was reported by a daily on 15 May 2006. Shivraj Patil had at a recent cabinet meeting proposed setting up an Anti-Naxal Cell in his Ministry to deal more effectively with the Left-wing Extremism, only to have Parliamentary Affairs Minister Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi intervening to say this was a political issue and the Cell should devise a strategy against all Left-wing extremism. As if this was' not bad enough, the senior Minister Arjun Singh bluntly said . ., the Home Ministry was unable to handle the problem. . An agitated Home Minister told the HRD Minister that he had not only handled the N axalite problem but could also .. provide details about the situation in Kashmir and in other trouble spots to prove how well his Ministry had fared on the internal security front. Have the Naxals succeeded in dividing the Union Cabinet,. or are the senior ministers indulging in one-up-manship at the cost of national interests? New Set-up to fight increased Naxal violence The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has been contemplating certain additional measures in the wake of spurt in Naxal activities, the ever increasing expanse of the militant-Left menace and reports of inter-state arms procurement by the militants. In its bid to recover lost ground to curb the Naxal menace, the MHA decided, among other initiative, to set up a special Desk in the Ministry and to propose an empowered group of ministers (E-GoM). Analysts reported these developments on 25 Oct 2006, just two days ahead of the 27 Oct meeting of the Task Force on Naxals. _The plan to set up a N axal Desk in the MHA has been in _ the works for quite sometime, but it assumed urgency in Aug 2006 in the wake of increasing incidents of Naxal attacks. Till
Countering Terrorism
851
Aug 2006, 115 security personnel and 401 civilians were killed by the N axals, while the figures for the corresponding period of 2005 are 94 and 364. 3 Chhattisgarh remained the worst-affected state, with N axal violence registering a sharp rise in the first 8 months of 2006469 against 265 for the same period of 2005. The Naxal Desk headed by an officer of the additional secretary rank "is likely to be operational soon, once senior officers in the rank of IG and DIG police are deputed", sources said. Besides the N axal Desk, there will be mechanism for an inter-ministerial committee for carrying out a detailed review of the implementation of development schemes in the affected areas. "The committee will meet ahead of the quarterly meetings of the Coordination Centre on N axalism." The new trend of inter-state arms procurement by N axals, evident from the recovery of huge consignment of ro.ckets, launchers and explosives in Andhra Pradesh is a disturbing news for the security officials. The Task Force on N axalism was constituted in Oct 2004 "under the chairmanship of Special Secretary (Internal Security), to deliberate upon the measures to deal more effectively and in a coordinated manner with the N axal threat. Overarching all these institutions will be E-GoM "to be constituted shortly." It will be needed to oversee the massive investments needed for the infrastructure development. The development of Naxal-ravaged areas is an ideal counter-measure to defeat the lure of Naxalism that draws idle youth to its fold. It is an effective CBM, even if slow and laborious, to check the ultra-Left violence. . It is necessary to caution that these bureaucratic set-ups, too many in this case, create their own problems, before they get down to undertake the task they in the first place have been created for. The only hope is that an alert Home Secretary and all-powerful PMO keep them on the rails.
Fighting the Maoists In 2005, the MHA directed security personnel deployed N axal-affected areas to use plain clothes and travel in unmarked vehicles. It was obviously meant to obfuscate easy identification that makes them coveted targets without any difficulty.
Terrorism in India
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The Union government is reported to have formulated a strategy to control the N axal violence, which includes: • Sharing of intelligence. • Intensified developmental efforts in affected areas. • Speeding up of land reforms. • Modernization of police force. • Adoption of a collective approach by the affected States.
Private copters to fight Red terror: Oct 2006 It is not unoften that the analysts and security experts got irked with the Centre's stand on fighting the Naxalite violence that is threatening country's integrity and sovereignty. Union Home Ministry's constant refrain has been: Left-wing extremism is a problem concerning the individual states, and hence it ., cannot elevated to being a "national" problem. Of course, the Ministry also made proforma promise to "extend all necessary help to states to fight the menace-financial package, additional security forces, intelligence inputs et al. It seems to have gone beyond these routine promises now by arranging helicopters from private companies for the affected states to enhance their anti-Naxalite capability. This is the development that could contribute significantly to the war against Maoist terror. To wit, the Centre has concluded a deal with a private company for the supply of helicopters to security forces in Naxal-infested states.
More specifically, the Home Ministry has signed an agreement Mls Vertex Ltd of Hyderabad for the supply of two helicopters on lease for non-military purpose to security forces deployed in Naxalite-affected states ofChhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. It is believed the CRPF has already used it on two occasions during the last couple of months in Chhattisgarh to air drop personnel in remote areas for specific operations. This information was published by a daily on 25 Oct 2006. 4 The Andhra government will be the nodal agency coordinating use of the two machines among different states. An expense of some Rs 8 crore would be borne by the Union Home Ministry from the Security Related Expenditure (SRE).
Countering Terrorism
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The decision to rope in private players reflects the government's concern to gain an upper hand in the situation that reveals a rising trend of casualties suffered during the Naxalite violence. The comparative figures for two years are given below to show the increasing costs in human lives of the Naxalite depredations. Period
Fatalities suffered Security personnel
Civilians
2005
94
364
2006
115
401
(Till Aug)
Surprisingly, the development-clinching the deal-comes close on the heels of private companies refusing to enter into the deal as they were apprehensive about the safety of the helicopters given the fire power of the militants. The rockets recovered recently in Andhra Pradesh with a potential range of 400 mtrs had added to their apprehensions. Not only the private companies, even the security forces were concerned since part of this consignment of 850-and-odd rockets seized. in Prakasam and Mehboobnagar have already fallen into Naxalite's hands. DG, CRPF JK Sinha on 24 Oct 2006 told the reporters: "They only have to fill the rockets with explosives and use them against security forces". Precautionary measures have already been taken against any potential danger from these rockets. Another important development, said officials, was the launching of operations by the CRPF on its own against militants in Chhattisgarh. Earlier, the role of the central police forces was mainly to supplement the efforts of the state police but the change was the fall-out of a proposal mooted by the Security Adviser to the State Government, KPS Gill, that was supported by the Union Home Ministry. A senior official elucidated the point: "The G Branch for intelligence that was inaugurated (only) five months ago for the CRPF has started giving results. Enough information was pouring in on the Naxalites that is supplemented by the State Police". Brushing aside the controversy on the Salma Judum movement in Chhattisgarh, the DG, CRPF said it was a "people's
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Terrorism in India
movement" that needed to be supported. Asked about the possibility of infiltration by the ISI into the paramilitary organization he was categorical: "Jawans did not have access to sensitive information and that an efficient surveillance system was in place to monitor the activities of the senior officers." Another Counter-Insurgency School The Union Home Ministry has given in-principle approval for setting up a specialized school where Para-military personnel will be trained in subjects concerning the internal security duties-commando operations, counter-guerrilla tactics, explosive, detection and disposal, jungle warfare and antisabotage operations. The BSF has been entrusted with the task of establishing this counter-insurgency (Cl) institution. The BSF, essentially guarding nation's border presently, and thus not directly involved in the Cl operations, will establish a world-class institute to train Para-military forces and the state police personnel for the said internal security duties. DG BSF AK Mitra explains: "the contours of anti-insurgency operations ar.~ fast changing. We need to update our personI)el to familiarize them with the latest techniques and to sharpen their skills."5 / 400 acre's of area on the outskirts of Bangalore h~s been earmarked for this BSF institute, first of its kind to be opened by a Para-military force. Mitra disclosed the Centre had asked the BSF to set up this institute at Hazarib'agh in Bihar but it suggested Bangalore area for the purpose as jungle land was available there-an ideal location for it. The proposal is awaiting Home Ministry's final clearance. This will be third institute of its kind, as such a training is already available at two centres: the Indian Army has counterInsurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Warangte, Mizoram and the NSG Training Centre at Manesar, near Gurgaon in Haryana. Task force discusses anti-Naxal operations: 27 Oct 2006 New Delhi: 27 Oct 2006. The Task Force of nodal officers of nine N axal violence-affected States-Andhra Pradesh, . Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya . Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal-discussed ways of improving "ground-level response".
Countering Terrorism
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The meeting attended by the nodal officers in the rank of Additional DGP from these nine states, who shared their experiences and exchanged information on anti-Naxal operations, was presided over by GS Rajagopal, Special Secretary (Internal Security), MHA, and it reviewed the progress of anti-Naxal operations. The meeting also decided to fine-tune "operational coordination" among these States. CISF to be Expanded Talking to the press after reviewing the passing-out Parade at the National Industrial Security Academy (NISA), Hyderabad, the premier training institute of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Home Minister Shivraj Patil urged the States to establish tackle growing units on the lines of the CI~F to security needs, including terrorist threats likely to be faced by industries and vital installations. Other points made by him: • CISF would be expanded in the wake of increasing demand from various sector for protection by it. Initially raised to provide security to public sector undertakings, but was later tasked to guard airports. PresentlY it was also providing security cover to scientific institutions, including those of space, atomic and electronics. ' • The growing demand for CISF security showed the high degree of professionalism adopted by it. It was also presently providing consultancy to private sector. • Alluding to the challenges country was witnessing from new quarters, he said "terrorism is a matter of great concern". • If any important private industry, financial institute or other installation was likely to become targets of terrorism, protection would be required by them and all these aspects would be kept in mind while expanding the CISF. Neutralizing and eliminating Naxalism: some ideas: 2007 When the atrocities perpetrated by the ultra-Left extremists beat their own record of past brutalities, nation must sit up and take notice. It can no longer be the case of 'business as usual'
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Terrorism in India
that the govern ment of the day would like to preten d. The first quarte r of the year 2007 can be deeme d a period when the Naxal ites showe d their inform ed ways of execut ing their usual chores --of grueso me and mania c killing s of the innoce nts and mindl ess destru ction of their village s and the neighb ourhoo d indus trial and socio- econo mic develo pment proje cts-w ith increa sed techno logica l sophis ticatio n and milita ry precisi on. Some of the Naxal ite brutal ities are briefly recoun ted here for record : 1. 15 Mar 2007, 68 police person nel of Chhat tisgar h were killed in a 2 AM attack on a Salma Judum camp (Rani Bodli) in Basta r area. The dead includ ed 38 Salma J udum activis ts. Rocke t launch ers, grenad es, detona tors and petrol bombs were used to deadly effects . Long, meticu lous planni ng had gone into the operat ion. They had even brough t a genset with them to inflict maxim um fatalit ies and to ensure that no inmat es escape . 2. A few days earlier , a servin g JMM MP Sunil Mahat o was murde red in the broad day light near Jal:1sh edpur while watch ing a football match (4 March ). 3. Durin g Jan-Fe b 2007, a month -long 9 th Congr ess of the CPI (Maoi st) was conve ned in a libera ted zone C'Muk tancha l' in their parlan ce) along the Jharkh andBihar border at a 'secure d' site. Decisi ons taken at the Congr ess after due delibe ration s aimed at: (1) extend ing the Naxal influen ce/pre sence in the south beyond Andhr a Prade sh into Karn ataka and Tamil Nadu; (2) mobili zation for fresh recrui tment into their ranks; and (3) oppos ing and disrup ting minin g (bauxi te) operat ions and Indust rial projec ts in Orissa and Bihar and block the establ ishme nts and spread of netwo rk of SEZs as they cause displa cemen t of the village rs and farmer s. 4. In Janua ry, a landm ine blast in Bokar o distric t caused the death of 13 police person nel. Maois t plans and inten tions Such heinou s incide nts would contin ue to kill the civilia ns and under mine the Indian state unless the basic struct ure of the Naxal movem ent and the nature of the forces sustai ning it are studie d and under stood by the securi ty minde rs of this nation and factor ed into their counte r-Naxa lite strateg y. They canno t offer an alibis for inactio n or framin g an effective plan
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of action, pretending ignorance of the intentions/plans of the bloodletting opponent. Courtesy their own intelligence resources, the government is well aware of the future plans and intent of the Maoists. All these are well laid out in the documents-'" discussed in the 9 th congress in early 2007 and of their Central Military Commission deliberations in 20.06. Presently, the Naxalites are much better organized, much better led and much better motivated than their predecessors in the 1960s when they burst like a "spring thunder" in the N axalbari area of north West Bengal. At' that time, they got easily drunk on the romantic and revolutionary slogans of the ideological creed then raging in their neighbourhood: "power flows from the barrel of the gun". "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire" Carried away by their revolution any passions, after all their leaders had gone over to China on a pilgrimage and met the Great Oarsman in person, they declared all landlord§, big or small, and all bourgeoise, powerful or petty, as class enemies and had to be eliminated by violent mr;ans. They were led by a brilliant but impulsive leader Charu Mazumdar, who was unfortunately swept off his feet by a few initial successful adventures and accompanying gust of accompanying publicity. He "talked of a great upsurge" and boasted that "every corner of India was becoming inflammable". 6 His domineering nature alienated his colleagues and led to , the split of the party during his life time. The faction-fighting' led to the weakening of the party and the movement soon started petering out, particularly after the death of Charu Mazumdar-its Charismatic leader. Jangal Santhal too demitted the scene. The rump is still led by the last surviving member (Kanu Sanyal) of the original trio; leading a life by his original ideological beliefs but unknown to most outside his own village! The Naxals have learnt their lessons. Today, the position is far different. The movement has undergone a change both in policy and strategy. It has been strengthening itself since 1990s. A major change for the better came in Sep 2004, when two major left-wing groups (MCC and PWG) responsible for 90 per cent of the activities of the movements merged to form a united outfit, designated CPI (Maoist). Before merger, the two groups had engaged in serious, violent war of mutual attrition. Having called that period "the black chapter in the history of Indian revolution", they want to forget it as bad dream.
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Along with the merger was also raised an armed wing-the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). The CP! (Maoist) has rechristened its political programme as 'New Democratic Revolution'. Its strategy too has been given a make over. The new strategy translates into a protracted armed struggle whose objective, no more, is seizure of land, crops or other such immediated goals but the seizure of the state power. This formulation rejects participation in elections and engagement with the prevailing bourgeoise democracy. The entire effort is firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power. The struggle against "feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism" is, as hithertofore, reiterated in the new programme which also reaffirms that the party would support the struggle of the nationalities for self-determination, including the right to secession, and would pay special attention to mobilizing and : organizing women as a mighty force of revolution. The unity of various groups, the renewed vigour and enthusiasm of the leaders and their realization of the damage done by infighting in the past have ushered in a new more purposeful phas~ for the movement. Some other factors, summed up below, have also helped it to acquire a new impetus and a new sense of purpose: • The rural people have come to believe that the economic policies, initiated in 1991 and enshrined in globalization, marketisation, liberalization and deregulation, are essentially pro-rich and are increasing the disparities in the society. • These policies are new faces of imperialism and hegemony. The newly acquired prosperity of the rich around them-landlords, bourgeois, businessmen, industrialists and bureaucrats-only add to the resentment simmering within. All this creates a fertile ground for their propaganda blast and helps the Naxalites to add to their cadre. • Whatever the benefits of the Panchayati Raj in theory and so loudly tom-tommed by its protagonists, its total effect at ground level has been placing more power in the hands of the comparatively well-to-do class of peasants, which has further alienated the poor and the landless who consequently show little hesitation in joining the Naxalite ranks.
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• They already stand transformed into a modern guerrilla force. The Naxalites no longer use the rusty rifles and country made pistols. Flush with funds, they have international illegal weapons market to exploit at will, having sophisticated weaponry and modern technology to choose from. Their cadres are now equipped with sophisticated communication and rocket launchers, lED, land mines, petrol bombs et al. Augmented Strength and Strike Power Their militia strength is estimated at 25,000 cadres, well trained and highly motivated unlike earlier times, a good percentage of their cadre is well educated including those holding professional skills and postgraduate degrees. The sophistication has added immensely to the striking power of the Naxalites. The increased strength and its efficient use have been on display in the recent years. Some recent incidents are recounted here at random to highlight this aspect of their strength and efficient organization: 1. 13 Nov. 2005. Some 1,000 disciplined members of Naxalite cadre participated in a well-planned and wellexecuted night attack on Jehanabad, barely 50 km from Bihar's capital of Patna. They were in virtual control of the city for several hours; freed 340 prisoners from the jail including their comrades and their leader Ajay Kanu; and killed two leaders of the Ranveer Sena lodged in the same jail. The attacks on the jail, police lines and offices of the district headquarters were carried out simultaneously. Some analysts concluded that the mass support of the rural hinterland of Jehanabad was obvious for the raiders, since there was hardly any resistance. This assertion begs a question, and is facile. 2. 6 Feb 2004. A group of 200 Naxal cadres swooped upon the district armourey at Koraput and made away with 500 weapons. 3. 11 Feb 2005. Some 250 male and 50 female members of the Naxal cadre suddenly descended on a Karnataka police camps, killing six policemen and looting 10 rifles. In the same manner, some 300 Naxalites attacked Madhuban, Bihar, and shot dead five policemen and plundered arms as well as the money from the post office and a nationalised banks.
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4. In another raid on the Home Guards Training Centre, Girdih, Jharkhand, some 200 weapons were looted. 5. 3 Dec 2006.14 policemen of the Special Taks Force were killed in a land mine explosion. 6. 15 Mar 2007. This is the last serious crime to be included in the list here. Some 400-450 N axalite militants attacked a base camp at Rani Bodli, Bastar and systematically killed 68 policemen, effectively making use of petrol bombs. 38 civilian SPOs killed in the attack belonged to Salma Judum campaign of Chhattisgarh. The above incidents are recorded to show the deadly intent and military precision the Naxalite desperados are able to bear upon their operational forays against the security forces and civilian targets alike. These are not only indicative of their increased numerical strength but also the enhanced sophistication of their weaponry and tactics and over-all strategic planning. The new strategy, obviously, is to incite and exploit people's resentment against the police. Some analysts go beyond this and assert that "the new strategy is to pit the police against the masses who have, rightly or wrongly, been made to believe that they are victims of injustice and inequity. Besides this, the brutality of attacks and rough and ready justice is meant to convey a message to the people targeted in their attacks. Sunil Mahato and Salma Judum activists were killed because' they were guilty of taking a public stance against the N axalism and organizing people against it. The logic is simple: How dare the oppose N axalite movement? Enlarging the Red Corridor-dangerously Is it because of people's sympathy with their movement that the area of the Red Corridor is expanding rather fast? The following figures tell the story quite convincingly: 1. From 156 districts in 13 States in Sep 2004, the Naxal violence spread to 170 districts in 15 states in Feb 2005. 2. The above are official figures. Informed analysts assert that as of today-Aug 2007-186 districts in 16 states are in the grip of N axalite violence. 3. Yet again, here is Intelligence Bureau, Government of India: At present, about 40 pet,-eent of the geographical area of the country and 35' p~r cent of its population is affected by the N axal violence. 7
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The Red Corridor, extending from the jungles of North Bihar to Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra, Maharashtra and Karnataka, is fast emerging. The Annual Report, 2004-05 of the Union Home Ministry, admits as much: "Despite strenuous efforts by the security forces, there has been no let up in the effectuation of CRZ (Compact Revolutionary Zone) with the gaps in North Bihar 'md North Chhattisgarh being steadily plugged by the Naxalite outfits to link up with their strong holds in API Danda-Karanya with those in Bihar/Jharkhand. Coupled with the steadily increasing Naxalite influence in North OrissalSouthEast Jharkhand, it is apparent that the Naxalite groups remain steadfast in their efforts to realize the CRZ." The objective is to establish a "Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ)" in the heart of India and use this zone and the Red Corridor for extending the Naxalite movement to the cities and . ultimately to seize the power structure of the states. The ultimate goal, of course, is the establishment of the Maoist state, no matter how many bones are broken and how much blood is spilled in the way. The Home Ministry Annual Report quoted above is more than two years old. In this interregnum, not only the CPI (Maoist) seems to have filled the gaps mentioned in the report, it also has planned further advances. One need not look for the evidertce far and wide for the advances made by the ultra-left outfit since the said Report. A brief look at the decisions taken during the 9th Congress of the Maoists held during their JanFeb 2007 conclave held in the Muktanchal (= liberated zone) along the Jharkhand-Bihar border at a 'secured' site and the deliberations of their Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2006. These are: 1. They will advance further into the South, beyond the
current limit of Andhra Pradesh, into the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 2. The CPI (Maoists) decided to extend their activities to urban areas and Industrial area, going against the teachings of Mao who wanted consolidation and occupation of rural area and countryside before focusing on the cities and urban areas.
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Terrorism in India 3. The CMC decide d to set up zonal comm ittees in the new areas such as Delhi, Harya na and Punjab . 4. The CMC also decide d to conve rt the People 's Guerr illa Libera tion Army (PGLA ) into the People 's Libera tion Army (PLA).
What is impo rtant is that the state and Centr al Gover nment s must keep pace with the ever advan cing plans of the CPI (Maoi sts) to expan d their influen ce beyon d the areas curren tly under their influen ce. The anti-N axalite strateg y must match -if not outma tch-th e rebels strateg y. Sugge sted Coun ter-N axalis m Meas ures The states which are Naxal- affecte d and covere d by the CRZ and throug h which the Red Corrid or passes must make an effecti ve institu tional arrang ement for coordi nated police action agains t the Naxali tes. This cooper ation coordi nation betwe en the two neighb ouring states is sine qua non for succes s agains t the Naxal s who are operat ing across severa l states. Beyon d bilater al cooper ation, collec tivity of more than two affecte d states too :-: would have to plan cooper ative and coordi nated joint anti-N axal opera tions. For this, intell igenc e sharin g is extrem ely impor tant-i nclud ing the real time variety . Specia l anti-N axal task forces , traine d and equipp ed for jungle warfar e agains t the rebels , will be requir ed. The hound of Andhr a is a well-k nown examp le of this kind. Some other states two have specia l task forces for the anti-N axal operat ions. More impor tantly, all such specia lized forces need to be traine d at school s like Count er Terror ism and Jungle Warfa re School (CTJW S) recent ly set up by Jharkh and at Kanke r. These school s impar t guerri lla tactics and jungle warfa re traini ng to the securi ty forces to equip them to neutra lize the Naxal ism. Where ver such specia lly-tra ined securi ty forces were deploy ed agains t the rebels over a sustai ned period of time, the result s have been encou raging . But narrow politic al consid eration s will have to be kept aside in nation al intere sts. But that does not alway s happe n. The excell ent results achiev ed by the specia l units during the tenure of Chief Minis ter Chand ra Babu Naidu 's TDP Gs>vemm_e.nt were fritter ed by the YSR Reddy Gover nment that came to power
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after the 1994 poll. How did this come to happen? On the eve of these 1994 elections to the Andhra Assembly (and also __ General Elections) and during the run up to the polls, with a view to securing the support of the N axalites and their over ground supporters, promises to declare a 'cease-fire' and hold negotiations with them, were made by the then Opposition Congress Party: Mter coming to power both at the central and state levels, prolonged negotiations were held with the Naxal ledaers, whoinsisted and mere allowed to come armed with their weapons. Expectedly, they made a show of it all and at one stage insisted on dismissing the personal security provided to them by the state government, and the latter gave in. This has been discussed earlier also-including the futility of it all. All this infused new life in the movement. Mter the rebel leaders had achieved equality of status with Chief Minister which not only added to their respectability but also enhanced their stature in the eyes of their cadre. By the time negotiations ended sans any agreement or understanding, the N axalites, having m~e good use of the interregnum to regroup and reequip their militants, were able to take the field with renewed confidence and "evolved a new strategy of action at the ground level." It was, of course, not the first that the politics of vote bank vis-a-vis the Naxalites has been played by a Chief Minister in Andhra. NT Rama Rao played it with consummate skill in 1982, calling the N axalites true patriots ('deshbhaklalu' was the term used by him) who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes. Honeymoon did not last long and thank God for that. By 1985, he was forced to take action against them. M Chenna Reddy, Congress Chief Minister, acted no differently. In 1989, he, too, declared that the Naxalites were patriots. Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, for a change, adopted a firm stance against the Naxal outlaws. But it was YS Rajasekhra Reddy's turn now to appease them, as just discussed.
In some other states too, political parties and individual leaders have not hesitated to arrive at an understanding of mutual help with the N axalites. "This has enabled the latter to came out an unhindered space for their activities while the 1 former have been getting electoral support of the N axal cadre at the time of elections. This mutual understanding has been widely noticed in Bihar and Jharkhand."
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Politics has been the bane of effective anti-terrorism policies in India. In more specific terms, vote-bank politics has hobbled . these policies at various stages, and that has already been discussed. The same flaw marks the anti-Naxal policies of various state governments. It is, indeed, unfortunate that shotterm political gains are often given precedence over the need for pursuing a clear, consistent and firm line. The centre and the states must craft an anti-Naxalite strategy, above the interests of party politics, and then deploy their available resources Including the special police units and paramilitary task forces to gain an upper hand against the rebels. Otherwise, the Naxalites could not be blamed for believing that they are only facing a compromised, indecisive and even a 'tottering foe'. The country has to expect its political leaders at the Centre and the state levels to soar above their narrow party and personal . considerations and put up an effective united fight against the enemy growing at its vitals methodically-even if slowly. Tomorrow may be too late. It must be understood that this battle will be fought and won on the political front.
Socio-economic Disparities and Poverty India is experiencing an economic miracle: It is world's second fastest growing economy, next only to China. It is going to be one of the world's five super powers by 2020. The fact is accepted not only at national level but also in the international arena. But there is an unsavory underbelly to this miracle: Fruits of this economic revolution are not being shared by the lower strata of the Indians. In fact, some economic analysts assert that the gap between rich and the poor is widening, as the intended benefits are not reaching the latter. Poverty is widely believed to be fertile ground that swells the ranks of the Naxalite cadres. In fact, rural distress, which, of late, has assumed serious proportions, needs to be addressed urgently and effectively. So far this socio-economic disparity and stark poverty prevail in the society, Naxalism will be always there. It is a simple question of 'demand and supply.' Varavara Rao, the poet and author, puts it matter-of-factly: "If there is need, movement will be thet:e."
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A recent national survey carried in a daily dated 2 Apr 2007 has revealed some disturbing facts, summed up here: • 33 per cent of India's population, that is, about 200 million ruralites, live on only Rs. 12 a day. They spend as much as 70 per cent of their income on food and, consequently, cannot afford to buy nutrition like green vegetables. • 36 million young people between the ages of 15 and 29 years are "usually unemployed", on some days, as many as 58 million remain without work. • Hundreds of peasants in debt are committing suicide. • Thousands of poor ruralites are also getting displaced consequent to their land being taken for development projects. In view of these dismal facts, anger and frustration of the poor and the dispossessed and their attraction for a movement like Naxalite's are understandable. It speaks volumes about the failure of the Indian polity, Indian leadership and Indian social and cultural values of post1947 period that a very large number of people in the country should still be grinded by hunger and haunted by unemployment every day, while millions of others are getting more and more affluent and sucked into the orbit of consumerism. The Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (REGS) may provide some relief to the hungry and the unemployed but this can not be the complete answer to the stark picture painted above. A more comprehensive, long-term plan, conceived by more enlightened vision of future India, needs to be formulated and implemented.
A closer link needs to be established between urban, semiurban and rural areas. A planned process of de-ruralisation and simultaneous urbanization, industrialisation, and "serviceisation" should be initiated. It should be assured that those who are displaced from the rural areas consequent to the execution of the development are absorbed in those very projects and given pre-service and in-service training to acquire requisite skills and improve them further. The money compensation received by the claimants should be invested in the company in the form of
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shares with guaranteed return equivalent to the amount of compensation. This would provide four-fold benefits: (i) The risk 'of c-ompensation money being squandered would be eliminated; (ii) The recipient, by virtue of his investment, would develop an interest in the advancement of the company, (iii) In the event of failure of the company, the rock-bottom amount would be available to the investors of this category; (iv) The erstwhile ruralite would become a skilled person, and if he seizes the opportunity to further upgrade his skills, a brighter future would be opened to him and his family. This seems to be a good, workable solution to the large scale displacements mining operations, industrial and commercial enterprises and the establishment of the SEZs. Most importantly, the nature of the Naxal movement must be understood by the Indian society and state. Being inherently dangerous and destructive, it can bring no good to any class of people. "It can only ensure for India a blood-soaked grammar of anarchy." Its ideology is total import, wholly imitative of the Chinese model of the thirties and forties of the last century, and takes no cognizance of great many changes that have occurred all over the globe in various spheres of life. The N axalites can indeed entice the poor impressionable youth into their ranks with catchy but century-old slogans. An adventurous and romantic notions of life painted by the propagandists soon turns into one of mindless and murderous violence against the defenceless civilians. The Naxal movement sets one class against another, one caste against another and what is even worse, it often declares yesterday's comrades as today's police informers and traitors-deserving of physical elimination through trials' rough and ready.
Naxalites are Foreign to Idea of India What ever their grandstanding on class war and professed theories, the N axalism has killed more poor-"informers", petty government officials, smallleurinessmen than their chss enemy. As for idea of India, they are not only ignorant of it but also inimical to it. Nihilists as they are, the Naxalites are unaware of or indifferent towards India's underlying unity and her distinct culture. Enamoured of the right of self-determination and even secessionism granted to the nationalities in the
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constitution ofthe Soviet Union, they advocate the same for socalled nationalities of India. They do not seem to be aware of the fact that this right to the constituents of the Soviet Union was phoney, even fictional. Forget about secession, even minor dissent was crushed with a heavy hand. And then the Soviet Union was an artificial creation, nations forcilily 'shoved' intoit as is alevious from the post-1991 implosion which broke the fiction known as the Soviet Union into 15 independent nations. India is an old nation and 5000-year-old civilization. It has already accommodated ethnic and tribal communities within its fold by granting them statehoods. Any wreckless concession on this issue will lead to endless discord and atomization of Indiaextinction of India that we know it since the time memorial. Creation of any more Pakistans is simply out-and that is exactly what the nihilistic Naxalites would want to see. Today the N axal movement presents a huge challenge to India's peace, security, and over-all well-being. Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has termed it biggest threat to India's internal security. The issues imbedded in the challenge are multi-faceted and formidable. Nevertheless, they could be successfully neutralized by political will and all concerned rising above their selfish, petty interests. But the anti-Naxalite entities involved in eradicating the evil, including the government, must clearly understand the truth enunciated so unambiguously by Paul Wilkinson: "Rebellions do not generally fade away; they have to be put down, if normal life and business are to be restored."
Unholy Nexus KPS Gill is rightly hailed as the man who is credited with retrieving the Punjab from the proverbial brink of the Khalistani Homeland insurgency. When he says something almost 'unbelievable', it needs to be taken seriously. What he has written in an article titled "Callous about Maoist terror"8, in a daily of 28 Apr 2007 is paraphrased and summed up in the following paragraphs for their shock value, and if the powers that be can draw some lessons from it, so much the better. "There is much focus now on the Maoist threat in India. Despite entirely inconsistent assessments by various government agencies, there is an increasing consensus
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Terrorism in India around the view that this is the greatest internal security challenge confronting the country. There is rising concern at the 'police failure' or 'security forces failure' to contain this rising menace. "It needs to be recognised at the outset that a professional and motivated police force, with a sufficient numerical strength and adequate material and technological resources, and with a clear political mandate, can defeat any insurgency in India, including this latest bogey-the Maoist 'protracted war'. "If there is a failure to contain and defeat the Maoists, it is because the necessary capacities and mandate are deliberately kept in abeyance; indeed, the limited and entirely deficient capacities that do currently exist are systematically undermined by a cabal of corrupt political, administrative and police leaderships that have developed a deep vested interest in the persistence of the Maoist insurgency. "Unless the dynamics of the implicit or explicit nexus between this leadership group and Maoist violence is understood, an effective strategy to defeat the Naxalites can neither be framed nor implemented. "The reality of situation on ground-the theoretical and supposedly ideological constructs mouthed by the 'intelligentsia' in mock discourses, notwithstanding-is that this is a fight between two corrupt entities that finds mutual benefits and enrichment in fake engagements which can be sustained in perpetuity. A few hapless members of the constabulary and subordinate ranks in the security forces, and equally luckless leaders of the so-called revolution Aries are, of course, killed off from time to time. But no one is really concerned about such massacres, despite the brouhaha ..... "A close scrutiny of the operational situation and the conditions under which the forces are working will demonstrate unambiguously that, in most states and areas, nothing really changes on the ground in the wake of major incidents. "That explains why no State-and some have been at it for 40 years or more-has been able to eradicate permanently the ultra-left extremism.
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"The Maoist movement over the decades has become a massive trans-state exercise in organized extortion and protection racketeering. "And everywhere, opportunistic alliances between the Maoists and 'over ground' political parties and entities are in place, most visibly around elections, but in a constant intercourse at all times. "Almost all political parties have become mirror image of each other in India today, but in this regard they are even more so, with a multiplicity of corrupt parties and organizations women together in a complex tapestry of duplicity and fraud that grows increasingly more dynastic in all parties overtime. "Small cabals of violently criminal adventurers manage to break into the charmed circle of political privilege, from time to time, by their sheer ferocity and lack of restraint. The Maoist leadership and the many criminals in the State and national legislatures fall, naturally, into the second category. "Drumming up a sense of crisis has become an integral part of efforts at 'resource mobilisation' in this broad enterprise and that is why this development solution' to Naxalism find such a strong advocacy among political leaders and state bureaucracies every where. "If years back, only 15 paise from a rupee reach the reach the targeted beneficiaries in all development scheme, the rest being swallowed up in the black hole of 'power brokers', in the insurgency-affected states today, the proportion of the development funds reaching the intended scheme/people would be even smaller-virtually the entire sums, totalling thousands of crores, find their way into the pockets of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and their hangers on, and through their symbiotic relationship with the 'insurgents' into the pockets of the Maoists as well. "Among various reasons behind the 1962 debacle of the Indian Army was also the one of the Border Road Organization having built many roads but on the maps only. Similarly, many roads have been built on paper in the N axalite-affected areas and the funds distributed among the local 'stakeholders', with the N axalites cornering a considerable share to bolster up their 'revolution'.
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Terrorism in India The existen ce of wide-s pread corrup tion is no secret but KPS Gill has over worke d the scenar io. He can see not a single hones t indivi dual in the entire line of politic ians, bureau crats, police officials et al. There is no point search ing reason s behind this outbu rst. Many may be tempt ed to attrib ute it to his own frustra tions, not exclud ing his less-th an-hap py tenure of a year as securi ty advise r to the Chhat tisgar h Gover nment . Let the issue rest here. ISI joins Hand s with Maois ts, too: Early 2007 Of late, intelli gence report s have come in about the ISI establ ishing contac ts with the CPI (Maois t) to widen its antiIndia nexus of terror ist/ins urgen t outfits operat ing within and in the immed iate neighb orhood of India. The arrest of a Nepal ese gun runner , Pasan g Lama, in Baramullah in early Feb 2007 is unrave ling clues that confir ms the expan ding netwo rk of terror in and aroun d India, aided by Pakist an-bas ed terrori st outfits like LET and the bigges t ofthem all, the IS!. Lama a reside nt of Humla distric t near Kathm andu, has been acting as a condu it betwe en the Maois ts in Nepal and LET in Jamm u and Kashm ir, orches trated by the ISI, which since the peace proces s betwe en India and Pakist an in 2004, has been attemp ting cobbli ng togeth er a coaliti on of terror groups target ing India. The ISI has been active in Nepal indulg ing in anti-In dia activit ies for long years. But the strateg y this time is new. The chang e fits in neatly with the over all plan to raise the level of terror ist threat to India witho ut gettin g Pakist an into dock. Lama is the new tiny cog in this wheel. 9 Lama had rented out a room in G-49, Vikas Marg, Laxmi Nagar (a low-m iddle class, crowd ed localit y in East Delhi for his clande stine busine ss but fronte d as a shawl and carpet dealer . He was a freque nt visitor to Jamm u and Kashm ir, and lived for three month s in a year in Srinag ar each year. His main contac t in Srinag ar was a High Court lawyer , Abdul Latif Wani while in Delhi; Lama took orders from Kunju p Tserin g, the gun runne r for Maois ts. Lama made fortun e buying weapo ns from Kashm iri terrori st groups and selling at a higher price to Tserin g. The transa ction was facilit ated throug h Wani's accoun ts in J ammu and Kashm ir Bank and Vijaya Bank. What was the scale of his operat ions? One instan ce, the last by him, would do. In Dec 2006, Lama paid
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Rs 4,77,000 to buy AK-47 rifles, hand grenades, rocket lallIl-chers and pistols, which he delivered to Tsering hidden in a fruit truck. Lama and Tsering have been in the business of gun running for the last four years. Gun-running was not the only business Lama was running under the tutelage of his masters. He was executing even more serious anti-India crimes, as his interrogation revealed. He was an ISI agent networking with Maoists as well as terrorist groups like LET, establishing not only a conduit for weapons but also for training for violent ends. He was Iiaisoning with LET members to set up joint training camps, imparting training for making lEDs. Lama's disclosures are not really surprising. Evidence has been gathering for quite a while about the regrouping of ISIbacked Muslim outfits outfit funded by some West Asian entities. Terrorist outfits like the LET have been active in Nepal, especially in the Terai region, traditional recruitment and training ground for the ultras. Muslims constitute 4.2 per cent of the Nepalese population of which 96.7 per cent live in the Terai region. Almost all the recent terrorist attacks in India-Ayodhya in July 2005, Delhi blasts of Oct 2005, Varanasi in Mar 2006 and the Mumbai train serial blasts of July 2006-have Napalese links. LET operations, involved in the attacks have either used Nepal as a transit point between Pakistan and Bangladesh or masterminded terrorist operations in India from Kathmandu and other towns. '!\vo days after the Mumbai blasts, two Pakistanis involved in the planning of the attacks carried out by the LET-Moiddin Siddiqui and Ghulam Hasan Cheema-were caught from a fivestar hotel in Kathmandu. In the huge arms cache caught in Maharashtra early 2006, two months before the Mumbai blasts, one of the key operatives caught in the aftermath was Akif Biyabani, an associate of Zahibuddin Ansari alias Zaby a LET commander who planned the operations in Nepal early 2005. Although Nepal has been known to play host to the ISI and its various front organizations, there has been a significant shift in the strategy after)9-11. Instead of operation its own units, as it was doing in the part, the ISI has been keen on Establishing
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networks with Maoists and Muslim NGOs to plan and execute anti-India operations. In Nov 2006, Nepal Maoist ChiefPrachana revealed that the ISI had offered to help his group through direct or indirect means. Some of the NGOs known to be setting terrorist groups (like LET) in Nepal are mentioned below: 1. Kashmir J ama Masjid Democratic Muslim Association. 2. Nepal world Islamic Council 3. Nepal Islamic Yuva Sangh 4. Jamat-e-Ahle-Hadis 5. Millet-e-Islami 6. Jan Seraj-ul Alam. The number of such NGOs/institutions, accordingto a recent report prepared by Sashatra SeemaBal(SSB) coul'd be as high 73. The report detailedthe involvement oflSl(andPakistan High Commission Officials) in using there organisations for anti-India operations. These organisations are largely funded by charity organisations and banks based in West Asia and Pakistan. There is evidence of the involvement of the Islamic Development Bank (Ieddah) and Habile Bank of Pakistan, which has a partner stake in Nepal's Himalayan Bank, in facilitating the transfer of funds for anti-India activities. The latest report only confirms the findings of an earlier report, 'Pakistan's anti-India Activities in Nepal (2002)', which gave details of ISI's modus operandi, including the use of NGOs and madrassas in anti-India operations. One of the districts where Jihadis are regrouping rapidly is Sansari where a large number of illegal Bangladeshis have settled in the recent times. The NGO which is active in the area is Nepali Islamic Sangh which is working in tandem with Bangladesh-based Jamat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an associate of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) - Huji, known as the Bangladeshi Taliban, is an AI-Qaeda clone and has been recruiting terrorists in Bangladesh and India. JMB is known as the operational arm of HUJI. As investigations in the terrorist attacks in the last two years in India have shown, both HUJI and JMB have aligned with LET and SIMI to establish terror networks across India. "Lama's arrest in Srinagar this month (Feb 2007) confirms this widening network." intelli~ence
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Naxal ism has to be put down As mentio ned above, the rebelli ons have to be put down. The Indian s must recogn ize the fact that the Naxali te insurr ection can be no except ion to this rule. The rebels would come to the negoti ations table only if they percei ve it as an oppor tunity for compl eting their agend a throug h the peace talks. If they fail to get at the table what they earlier tried but could not in the field, they would return to their old, violen t ways. This is exactl y what they did when the talks failed mid-20 04. They had used the interre gnum to augme nt their weapo nry and re group their comba t arms. The ULFA had done exactl y the same in 1980s and 1990s. The only except ions in this regard seem to be the decade -long the Naga- Centre negoti ations presen tly in progre ss at mutua lly-agr eed interva ls. Thoug h the NSCN (I-M) leader have threat ened period ically to walk out of the talks if New Delhi does not concede their main deman d, but they have avoide d concre ti 7.ing these threat s so far. In fact, they have agreed to extend the ceasef ire indefin itely till the talks contin ue, in June 2007 agains t their early practic e of its six-mo nthly renew als. Once in the recent path, they had agree d to a mere two-m onth extens ion. An uncha ritabl e comm ent links this indefin ite extens ion to the fact that the Naga leader s have reache d the end of the tether as far as thefr ability to sustai n the insurg ency is concer ned. Rever ting to the N axals, the Andhr a Gover nment securi ty forces have put it down effect ively- or so they claim early 2007. It is essent ial that the Naxali sm is put down in the neighb ouring states also, lest the rebels after regrou ping and recoup ing there return to Andhr a Prade sh to re ignite the fire. This is exactl y the season that all analys ts and those in senio r gover nmen t positi ons have advoc ated joint, well.coordi nated inter-s tate operat ions agains t t_he rebels. Broad Areas of Cause and Effect Beside s some specific states like Andhr a Prades h mentio ned above, what has been discus sed so far concer n three areas: (1) Politic al will to enforc e effective anti-N axal policy throug h interstate coordi nated operat ions. (2) Develo pment route to elimin ate econom ic dispar ities and poverty. (3) The decisio ns taken at the 9 th congr ess and their effect on the subse quent N axalit e activit ies.
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Now the focus will be on some broad vis-a.-vis the Naxalite movement. Incidentally, of late, the ultra Left violence or LeftWing Extremism Extremists has popularly come to be identified with its acronym-LWE. Parallel Government by Hoodlums It must be recorded that various authors and analysts have given different figures about N axalite-affected districts in India. This analyst says "the Naxalite peasant movement which started from the unknown non-descript village of Naxalbari in North (West) Bengal in the late 1960s, has now become a powerful militant movement engulfing 170 districts in 15 states. In over 55 districts, Naxalites and the PWG or Maoists or LWE, as they may be called, run parallel Government. While the LWEs have assumed a Robin Hood mantle, they often behave more like hoodlums resorting to extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and dastardly acts of violence. The philosophy of upliftment of the poor through a mass movement has more or less degenerated into a game of power and money. Till recent months, it was a fashion to show the issue off as a law and order problem to be dealt with by the States. Its exponential growth, followed by merger of various Naxalite and Maoist groups into a single behemoth, designated CPI (Maoist) and finally its membership of Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)lO and some other militant organizations is South Asia have brought the LWE on the centre stage of India security architecture. Problem Recognized At long last, the Centre has finally acknowledged that this is a national problem. The Prime Minister in his Independence day address on 15 Aug 2006 from the ramparts of Delhi's Red Fort specifically mentioned the great danger of the growth of Naxalism and asked the State Governments to focus on speedy welfare and development of tribal who might otherwise provide the cadres for the LWE. The first meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the affected States was convened in Sep 2005 at New Delhi to plan coordinated counterNaxalite strategy and in Mar 2006, a status paper on the subject was tabled in the Parliament by the Union Home Minister. The first step to resolve a problem is to recognize that it exists. The Central Government has, long last, taken the first step by acknowledging that this is a national problem.
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Go after the Causes, not the Symptoms As someone noted correctly: "N axalism is not the problem; rather it is a symptom of a problem." Why does not Naxalism flourish in the markets of Gujarat, the farmlands of Punjab or in the IT parks of Gurgaon or Hyderabad? Obviously, the areas where the LWE takes root and spreads are relatively poor, experience oppression by certain segments of society, government in different and uncaring about their plight and little hopes of things getting any better in future. Using force to stop their depredations, arrestikill/imprison their leaders / cadres and induce mass surrenders is only part of a solutionessential and unavoidable initially. The state must address the root causes of alienation felt by the disadvantaged sections. Deny the rebels their raison d'etre, their reason for being. If that was done, they will have no grievances or abominable poverty to exploit to entice or mislead the disadvantage into the romance of adventure and ideological battles against their tormentors-the state, its agencies, and the dirty rich.
Security Forces Some elements of efficient counter-Naxalite security forces are mentioned here: 1. A nominated central authority for coordination of int~r state efforts. In India, it obviously is Union Home Ministry. A variety of mechanism for the purpose have already been mentioned. 2. The states concerned must have adequately equipped and trained police forces for the task. They must get paramilitary forces to augment their resources.
3. Special anti-Naxalite task forces under their designa~ed chiefs. The Gr2Y hounds of Andhra Pradesh are reputpd to have acquitted themselves well. 4. Intelligence sharing among the States and between them and the Centre is important. 5. Transparent policy on promotion and postings, especially in Naxalite-affected areas.
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6. They must be assured of modern weaponry, equipment, clothing and means of mobility including helicopters.
Developmental Activity An aspects of it has been mentioned earlier. Socio-economic disparities invite violent protest and consequently N axal movement. In India, barely 1.3 per cent of land has been distributed among the landless and poor. In China, the figure is 43 per cent. In West Bengal, the Left Front government did a good job of it. In Andhra, YSR Reddy Government has launched the project. Other affected states must follow.
The states must persist in building infrastructure even in the face of violent N axal disruption. There is no other way to wean the poor away from this evil.
Local Resistance Group Ultimately people have to defeat LSE, of course, with some help from the security forces. Local Resistance Groups will be of great help. Such groups need to be created since it is the innocent local populace that is bearing the brunt of the atrocities of the LWE, and at times even from the police and government . officials. Of course, it is easier said than done. An important caveat here is that we dJ not need the usual run-of-the-will NGOs whose aim often is self-publicity and also selfaggrandizement. Neither are we referring to the types of Ranveer Sena here, which initially achieved some good results hut later fell to the same bad ways the Naxalite blood letting cadres are accused of. The Salma Judum comes closest to the ideal civil society initiative against the Naxalite excesses. It is only two year old experiment. With some more experience and effective leadership, it is a model other states must emulate-mindless criticism by a circle of intellectual elite, not with la~ding.
Psychological Warfare The psychological warfare-Psy-war for short-aims at making the target audience think and act the way its sponsor wants. In the instant case, psy-war must mean away the bulk of the local populations including the Naxal cadres, to make them believe in the futility of the movement and benefits that, will accrue being part of the democratic system prevailing in the country,
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Community radio / television sets are ideally suited to convey the message. The programmes must have a realistic mix of development taking place in the area, healthy entertainment and psychological themes. Empty propagandist cont~'nts, employing bluff and bombast, will prove counter-productive. Enlisting media in the endeavor is a risky proposition. If on the one hand, it will see it as an attempt at controlling it, others will accuse the state of squandering public money to create favorites and divide the media. The state must avoid falling into the trap of believing its over agenda. It must monitor and at regal intervals, broadeast the benefits of its economic policies on the areas experiencing LWE. The public must be periodically informed about the per capita income, literacy rates, percentage of school dropouts percentage of college graduates, as well as crimes against women and the under privileged/disadvantaged. Transparency is always useful in such situations. It is better that the public learns the unvarnished truth from the government than half-truths and' exaggerated misrepresentations from the vested interests. Surrender Policy A well-conceived surrender policy is an integral part of any counter-insurgency plan of a government. It should embrace withdrawal of minor cases against the surrenderees, proper rehabilitation package including initial grant and loan for any enterprise he wante to start, training in job-oriented skills, his protection and security, and cash payment at graded scale for weapons surrendered. Yet again, the benefit should be directly proportional to the status of the surrenderee and number of years he put in the organization. Interestingly, Orissa in its package included a grant ofRs 15,000 in case the militant enters matrimony. The Status Paper says the government will not hold peace talks with the Naxalites until they give up arms. This precondition is inexplicable when the centre is holding talks with the NSCN (I-M) without such a pre-condition. National Police University Recommended: Nov 2006 The country's first University to train serving and future police officers in key areas like biological warfare and other
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forms of terror attacks will come up in the National Capital Region (NCR), said a senior police officer on 3 Dec 2006. The five-member high-power committee "formed by the MHA to prepare a detailed action plan for setting up the National Police University (NPU) submitted its report last weak." The NPU, conceived on the lines of the prestigious National Defense Academy (NDA) is aimed at addressing the fast-changing requirements in policing in view of the worsening internal security situation and back of serious research and development work.
Army Dogs to help Police Fight Naxals: Jan 2007 It is known for long time that Army is wary of getting involved in internal security battles now being fought in so many states by their police and central paramilitary forces. It is also on issue of public knowledge that Army is willing to help the State authorities in all other manners short of direct involvement with its soldiers.
Then there was some news in 2006 about certain Naxal" affected States wanting to requisition Army dogs to strengthen their counter-Naxalite strategy. A daily newspapers dated 20 Jan 2007 in a mixed metaphor published a story, opening with an attention catching paragraph: "Army Chief Gen JJ Singh on 15 Jan 2007 professed that he was willing to help anti-Naxal operations in every way except by active deployment of troops. And what he is not willing to allow his men to get into will now he undertaken by Army Canines" Chhattisgarh Home Minister Ramvichar Netam "is scheduled to meet Defense Ministry's Additional Secretary A.K. Jain and the Army Remount Veterinary Corps head Maj Gen N arayan Mohanty shortly to chalk out a deployment plan for army sniffer dogs and dog handlers along the Naxal-infested areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, with a special package for training of the state police and security agencies. Mohanty told the daily: "Some of our dogs have already been there to get accustomed to the area. The state has desired a more holistic approach to the deployment, and decisions will be taken shortly."
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A team from Chhattisgarh police is already in Meerut to train in dog handling techniques from the Army. Six dogs, an Army officer and seven other Army personnel have spent the last four months in the forests of Chhattisgarh getting the dogs ~ accustomed to the environment and "signature vapours" of explosives and weapons used by N axals. The army trains Labradors and German Shepherds-it takes a months and some Rs 11 lakh to train a dog-in conventional and unconventional explosives detection, lED and plastic explosives detection and tracking. All missions, like the one to be conducted in the Naxal-hit areas, will involve two dogs and two handlers. Mohanty said: "I will be visiting the UK shortly to obtain more expertise in dog training. The Royal Veterinary Corps has . dogs deployed in Iraq. We have put the best of practices from around the world in our own breeding and training programme. Our dogs have the maximum exposure to militancy."12 Meanwhile, on 15 Jan 2007-Army Day, incidentallY-two I dogs, Bhama and Hema, deployed in Jammu and Kashmir' received the Chief of Army Staff's badges for specific counterterror missions in the State. Army Chief Gen JJ. Singh was talking to the press, when he made some of the statements quoted above, on the Army Day celebrated every year with a grand Parade in Delhi Cantonment.
Rs. 23,000 Crores spent on Paramilitary Forces: Aug 2007 The cost of fighting terrorism, Naxalism and maintaining law and order situation by the Central paramilitary forces alone stands a little over Rs. 23,000 crores. The sum was paid by the Centre to the paramilitary forces and excludes the expenses by the state government on policing front. The actual cost of fighting insurgency, ultra Left violence and terrorism could be more as the figure does not include loss of public infrastructure and civilian lives. In a reply to a Parliament question, the Centre has admitted giving large amount to paramilitary forces for their up-keep and to the families of the personnel who were killed while doing their duty.
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"The figure is just a tip of the iceberg because it does not include several other costs borne by the government in fighting insurgents and Maoists", said a senior security officiaP3 He further added, "If all the costs are calculated and included in the list, then the figure would be much higher." The amount spent for a company of 120 personnel costs about Rs 40,000 a month, which translates into Rs. 333 per person her month. The salaries and training expenses are over and above this amount of 333 per month. Over Rs 31 crore was paid to the family members of the personnel killed in action against the insurgents and Maoists in the last two years. Realising the extent of expenses incurred for fighting these insurgents, the Centre is believed to have now directed the affected states to raise 29 (additional) India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) on their own to counter thL ultras and maintain law and order in their areas. If only the expenditure by the Centre is calculated in raising the additiOllal manpower for IRBs of the states, the figur~ stands at Rs 1,555 crore in the past three years. The Centre has also allotted Rs 2,475 crore to the backward districts for their social and infrastructure development. Some of these backward districts are heavily affected by prolonged violence perpetrated by the ultra-Left outfits and other insurgents. Counter-Naxalite Strategy Long Last: Jan 2007 Till recently, the analysts would blame the Centre of being non-serious on the issue of fast-spreading Naxalite menace-or, at least not framing a national policy to counter the Naxalite threat aimed at the very integrity and sovereignty of the country. The refrain used to be: "The N axal violence is the problem of certain states hit by the rebels, and Centre will extend all help as and when requested by them." Long last, that chant seems to have been given up, if one goes by the address at a Delhi seminar on 27 Jan 2007 by the No. 2 man in the Union Home Ministry, Sriprakash Jaiswal, Minister of State for Home. He signalled that the government favoured a multi-pronged strategy to deal with the growing menace of Naxalism. "It was not merely a law and order problem but has deep socio-economic dimensions to it." He further added: "The problem of N axalism continues to plague us and we have to view these matters as not merely law and order problem but as issues which have deep socio-economic dimensions.
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"Multi-pronged strategy should essentially consist of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development of such disturbed areas to tackle the menace. "We have to build up local capabilities of the affected states is terms of improved intelligence gatheringand sharing mechanism and to ensure special training and adequate equipment for police forces to facilitate effective police action in a coordinated manner." "The state administrative machinery must be strengthened to make it more responsive, transparent, and sensitive to enable effective redressal of public grievances and ensuring improved total mechanism aimed at accelerating socioeconomic development, including enhanced employment opportunities and of falling prey to their (Naxal) propaganda. "At present, 76 districts in nine states are badly hit by N axalite violence. These are covered under the revised Security-Related Expenditure (SRE).14 Naxal-Hit States told to Share Intelligence: Patil: 6 Mar _ 2007 Rajya Sabha held 90-minute discussion on the assassination of Jharkhand MP Sunil Mahato by the Naxalites on 4 Mar 2007. Under fire from MPs across the party lines as well as the Chairman, Vice-President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, a visibly harangued Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil on 6 Mar 2007 tried to assure the House that the Centre has asked Naxaleffected states to reach an agreement for ensuring better coordination on intelligence to tackle the situation. Patil could not assure the vice President if Mahato had 'adequate security.' While the Minister admitted that "Central intelligence only deals with a general direction of possible extremist attacks", he emphasized that the measures taken by the Centre to help states tackle the N axalite menace have "shown some level of containment" . "In the country as a whole, the incidents of Naxalite violence declined from 1,608 in 2005 to 1,509 in 2006, signifying a 6.15 per cent decline", he said in an attempt to assuage the House. Andhra Pradesh, he added, has achieved "noteworthy success in controlling the problem through Special Forces, namely, Greyhounds and other measures." BJP's Yashwant Sinha, who himself hails from Jharkhand, accused the Home Minister of underplaying the problem. "It is
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an inter-state operation, everyone knows of the Red Corridor. If the efforts in Andhra Pradesh have been successful, why is not it being replicated in the other states? Last year, the Minister had met MPs and discussed measures to tackle Naxals. What happened to them?, Sinha asked. Politics, bane of the Indian polity, intervened at this stage. Taking a potshot at the Congress for supporting the Jharkhand government led by Madhu Koda-an erstwhile non-entity catapulted into Chief Minister's chair thanks to party politics practiced by the two rival political formations led by the BJP and Congress-Sinha pointed to the Treasury Benches and said: "your own MP from Jharkhand has said state government cannot continue. As her what she said. The Jharkhand Government is a joke. Parties supporting it should think again as they are doing grave injustice to the people of Jharkhand". A visibly concerned Patil said the issue about offences with ramifications in other parts of the country was pending before the Supreme Court which has asked the Soli Sorabji Committee to look into it. "We have to crystallize our views on federal crimes", he said. Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, Patil said that Rs 218.52 crore have been disbursed to Naxal-affected states. Under this scheme, re-imbursement is given to the state for expenditure on ammunition, mobility for peace personnel, . rehabilitation of surrendered Naxals and others. More over the total expenditure under police modernization since 2000-01 is worth Rs 4,000 crore. He informed the House that Rs 182.72 crore have been provided to Jharkhand in the last six years. A special grant of Rs 15 crore is being given to the state in the current year (200607) to purchase telecommunication, weaponry and de-mining equipment. So far, Rs 450 crore has been released to Jharkhand under the Backward District Initiative in a bid to address the issue on the socio-economic front. Governm'ent-records reveal that 16 armoured vehicles have also been provid~d, while five battalions of the CRPF are in the state for the last three years. Analysts feel the AP police deserves to be commended for busting a gang of inter-state smugglers which supplied weapons in exchange for cannabis. It had developed links with illicit arms suppliers in Bihar, MP, Nepal and other places.
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No doubt, this sut-cess by the police is a setback for the Maoists. Meanwhile, the killing of Mahato is seen as an act of desperation on the part of Maoists. Are they on back foot? It is too early to reach this conclusion. Drug smuggling as a source of funding terrorism, narcoterrorism in brief, is widely prevalent among major outfits, in the world. It is known for long that the LTTE is involved in narco-terrorism and uses the South-East-Asian route to smuggle drugs for guns. In India, the secessionist/militant outfits in the North-East used narco-terrorism effectively. Of late, it has obviously made deep inroads in the south. The LTTE involvement in helping the North-Eastern outfits in picking up threads of this nefarious practice to sustain themselves was well known. Do they have a hand in passing on the secrets of this trade to Maoists also? Possible. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has made considerable efforts against Left-wing extremism in 2006 and it is possibly because of this success that traditional sources of funding, such as extortion, appears to be drying up. Till recently, the Maoists virtually ran a parallel administration in the state, relying on extortion than ran into crores of rupees. Consequent to the government's silent but effective crack down on the Maoists, there is a change of mood in the state. Earlier, in 2004, the Maoists were brought to the negotiating table when the Government lifted the 12-year old ban on the PWG. The talks predictably broke down. Presently, the Maoists are on the back foot, as can be seen from the reports that at a recent meeting held in the sanctuary of Chhattisgarh forests, their leaders decided to halt operations and regroup. The AP Government m\lst be commended for the fact that it has not relied merely on the police but has also taken care to address the causes of economic alienation among the poor in the rural areas. The Maoists, like the terrorists, can be defeated by use of effective force against the fighting cadres, and simultaneously ameliorating the socio-economic deprivation of the lowest ~ung of the society. So while the Maoists can be defeated only by strong security measures, their influence among the impoverished masses can be cheeked if State Governments adopt a rapid development model that does not exclude vulnerable sections of society. This is where the challenge lies. There is little doubt that if authority is more sensitive to local grievances, and more transparent and responsive, Maoist will find it hard to recruit foot soldiers. So
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the bottom line is: The State governments must not let down their guards against the desperados and continue with harsh anti-Maoist measures, they must also ensure good governance. But it is easier said than done, essentially because of the human greed. A Central Minister has just said (Mar 2007) that most ofthe subsidised foodgrains meant for the poor in the NorthEast does not reach its targets, getting 'lost' enroute. Some times, 10 per cent of it! The worst scandal in the recent post is in Arunachal Pradesh, where investigations are under way. But all said and done, there is a cause for hope in the South. Tracing Sources of Naxal Money: Mar 2007 Concerned about the large amount of money available with the Naxal outfits, a daily on 11 Mar 2007 reported that Union Home Ministry was seeking the cooperation of Finance Ministry's Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRD and concerned banks operating in the Naxal-affected states to gather data on the funding pattern of these outfits. It is known that these outfits collect their funds through extortion and imposing "levy" on their targets. What is causing even greater concern is that inputs with the Home Ministry suggest "that Naxalite outfits plan to target the police and their establishments in the current year". The militants also plan to increase their organizational reach especially in Chhattisgarh and central Orissa. Besides, these outfits are likely to enhance their mass mobilization strategies in order to retain their present cadre strength and subsequently increase their numbers. The strength of the armed cadre of the Naxalites stand at 4,600 as per estimates till 31 Dec 2006. Other worrying trends, as a senior Home Ministry said, include hostage-taking by the Naxalite outfits and using Urban Centre for supplementing the cadres operating in the interior areas. This apart, the agenda of militants for the year includes exploiting the issues of displacement of human population due to mining and land acquisition to enlist support of the effected people. The militants also plan to regain the Naxal movement in Andhra Pradesh where the morale of its cadre is at its lowest ebb following significant elimination by the security forces. Some relevant information and statistics gathered by a daily follow: 15 1. The growing use of IEDs and landmines to target the security personnel is also an area of concern.
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2. The Home Ministry will hold a meeting with the Paramilitary forces later this month (Mar 2007) to sensitise them about strictly following the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in counter-Naxal operations. 3. As many as 133 Naxalites were killed by the security agencies in Andhra Pradesh in 2006 and the same amounts to 49 per cent of the total loss of the militants in the year. 4. The number of recruits, training camps and the so called 'Jan adalats' organized by the Naxal outfits has come down during 2006, the official said. During 2006, a total of 395 police station across 91 districts in 11 states had suffered Naxal violence. In 2005, the respective figures were 460 police stations across 90 districts. 5. The Naxal-affected states reported 678 casualties in 2006 compared to 677 deaths in 2005. 6. The Ministry is emphasing the use of mine protected vehicles (MPVs), sophisticated weapons and better telecommunication equipment. 7. An additional fund ofRs 100 crore was earmarked in the fiscal 2006-07 for police modernization in the Naxalaffected states. Hyderabad meet: Maoist-hit States Discuss Strategy: April 2007 Top officials of nine States like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnataka (Besides Andhra Pradesh, the host), affected by Maoist violence, opened, a twoday meet in Hyderabad on 13 Apr 2007 to discuss a common! joint strategy to tackle this Left-wing extremist problem. The meeting is being attended by police chiefs and other officials from these nine States to hold the periodic review of the situation. Senior officials of the Central intelligence and other security agencies are also attending the meetings and discussions. While the media was barred from the meeting, informed sources disclosed that the Central Government officials were all praise for success and effectiveness of the Andhra Pradesh government in handling the Maoist violence. Other States were urged to emulate its successful strategy. Andhra Pradesh DGP MA Basit explained: "The meeting of the nodal officers of the Maoist-affected States has been
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conven ed by the Centra l Gover nment to review the situati on. The meetin g will discus s the directi ons and instru ctions of the Centra l Gover nment ". ::h",!, The recen tly seized rocke ts and rocke t launc hers, symbo lizing the succes s of the Andhr a Prade sh police agains t the Maois ts, were also put on displa y in the Jubile e hall, the venue of the meetin g, amid high securit y. Coun ter-N axal Strat egies to be Finali zed: April 2007 With the N axalit es profes sing their object ive to target minin g hubs in Jhark hand develo pment works , includ ing irrigat ion projec ts planne d in Bihar, a crucia l meetin g of the Inter-M inister ial Group (IMG) on Naxal ism "to be held in Patna later this month (A pr 2007) will look at stops to streng then securi ty in these areas" , the report s said on 9 Apr 2007. This meetin g (of IMG, schedu led for 16 Apr to be held at Patna) , which follow s a spate of Naxal attack s in Chha ttisga rh, Jhark hand and Bihar, comes as the Centre and Securi ty forces work out a more proact ive approa ch to counte r Naxal violenc e. The CRPF, among others , are learnt to have advoc ated a three- pronge d action plan: going after promi nent leader s to break the N axali te netwo rk; taking contro l of specifi c areas which are the Naxal strong holds; and speed ing up develo pment work in areas where securi ty forces alread y have a strong presen ce. I6 The strate gies would be discus sed and given finish ing touche s during a series of meetin gs planne d for Apr 2007. In fact, and to be exact, there are three such meetin gs: first preced ing the IMG's and the third follow ing it. Some details are mentio ned here. 1. The first will be a meetin g of the Anti-N axal Task Force, heade d by Specia l Secret ary (Intern al Securi ty) in the Home Minist ry, on 13 April. 2. The IMG compr ising repres entativ es from the Minist ries of Home , Rural Devel opmen t, Tribal Affair s and the State govern ments will meet in Patna on 16 Apr to take stock of devel opme nt initia tives and secur ity prepa redne ss for big projec ts in areas affect ed by Naxal ism. 3. The third, to follow the IMG, will be a meetin g of the Nation al Coord ination Centre on Naxal ism (NCCN ) to be presid ed over by the Union Home Secret ary, head of the NCCN . This meetin g is expect ed to look at chang es needed in the Stand ard Opera ting Proced ures (SOPs ) of the Centra l param ilitary forces and the state police.
Countering Terrorism
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Meanwhile, the Home Ministry is said to have finalized a report on the attack on a CISF barrack in Bokaro, Bihar on 6 Apr which left its two men dead and three injured. Officials noted that any further damage had been contained after personal form a neighboring camp reached the spot, prompting the Naxals to flee. Referring to reports that CISF men were not in uniform when the attack came, a Ministry spokesman maintained they were off-duty then. Mean while, there could be another 'sort of reason' for some cold comfort as far as the Mar 2007 attack on a Salwa Judum camp in Chhattisgarh's Rani Bodli is concerned. "A preliminary assessment sent to the MHA by intelligence agencies had indicated that the camps was over run by Naxals since many of the camps members were in the habit of drinking and thus not alert when the attack came. "Paramilitary Forces do Tougher Task than the Army" Generally used to getting criticism each time militant and insurgent groups carry out a successful attack, the nation's Paramilitary forces came in for some rare praise on 9 Apr 2007 when no less a person than Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil averred that their job was more difficult than army's (This is not the place to comment on Patil assertion, but to give details of the place and occasion of the statement). He was speaking on the Valour Day function of the CRPF at New Delhi on 9 Apr 2007. His reasons for the statement: "These forces perform a tougher task than the Army since they battled terrorists and at the sametime protected the lives of innocent civilians." He praised the CRPF for the manner in which its men displayed extreme alertness in thwarting the terrorists designs while guarding the premises and killing all the outlaws. Valour Day is celebrated on 9 Apr every year to mark the heroic effort by a group of CRPF men at Sardar Post in 1965. "The group repulsed an attack by a full Pakistani Infantry Brigade to take over the crucial location in the Rann of Kutch." The others present at the function, where the Minister presented gallantry awards to CRPF personnel, included CRPF DG SIS Ahmed, DIG CV Mathew, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal, Union Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta and DGs of other paramilitary forces.
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Notes 1. Akhilesh Suman, Pioneer, 20 April, 2007. 2. Subodh Ghildiyal, Times of India, 9 May, 2006. 3. Editorial, Statesman, 11 May, 2006.
4. Asian Age, 26 Oct., 2006. 5. Rajeev Bhattacharyya, Indian Express, 25 Oct., 2006. 6. Cited, Manoj, C.G. Asian Age, 9 Oct., 2006. 7. Jagmohan, "Crimson Corridore", Statesman, 2 April, 2007.
8. Statesman, 1 April, 2007. 9. Pioneer, 28 April, 2007. 10. Wilson John, Pioneer, 14 Feb 2007. 11. Lt Gen (Retd) Madan Gopal, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, former Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Indian Army, in his paper dated 24 Nov., 2006. 12. Shiv Aroor, Indian Express, 20 Jan., 2007. 13. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 13 Aug., 2007.
14. Asian Age, 29 Jan., 2007. 15. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 11 July, 2007. 16. Vinay Jha, Indian Express, 10 April, 2007.
17 Naxalism : Present Situation Naxals spread to Southern States: MHA Report: April2007 Naxalites, who are posing the biggest threat to internal security, are trying to increase their influence and activities in Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, where they did not have a strong presence earlier. Tamil Nadu has been a threshold state but now the Naxalite are trying to expand base in the southern states. These are the findings/observations made in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) report for the year 2006, quoted by a - daily dated 2 Apr 2007. The report says the new areas are mostly in the said states. In Karnataka and Kerala, the N axal violence has only been on finges. Andhra Pradesh has been the epicenter of Naxal violence in the recent past. It has now shifted to Chhattisgarh. The attacks on railway and other property had been more prominent in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand, where the ultras were also targeting mines and mining-related activities. The Government has also appointed an Empowered Group of Ministers (E-GoM) to closely monitor the Naxal situation and evolve strategies to deal with the problem. The Naxalites have also been attempting to intensify their efforts at social mobilization. The Revolutionary Democratic Front
Jan-adalats (= Kangaroo Courts) are being convened by the N axalites to dispense crude and instant justice, 'supplant the state apparatus and assert their hegemony over rliral tracts. .
Terrorism in India
890 Statistically Speaking
Some other points made by the MHA report in terms of relevant statistics are mentioned here. 1. The Centre has also deployed 33 battalions of paramilitary forces on anti-Naxal duty, sanctioned 29 India Reserve Battalions (lRBs) and assisted states in the task of police modernization jn terms of modern weaponry, latest telecommunication equipment. Besides, Rs 219 crore has been re-imbursed so far under the Security-Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme for Naxalhit areas.
2. Of the total 12,476 police stations in the country, Naxal violence has been reported from 395 police stations in 2006, again 460 in 2005. 3. The current year saw the biggest Naxal attack in worsthit Chhattisgarh, when 55 policemen were killed by CPI (Maoist) when they stormed a police station in Bastar region on 15 Mar (2007). 4. A study of pattern of attacks showed that N axal outfits had been targeting police posts, railway stations, forest check points and other government and private property. 5. A total of 157 police personnel were killed in 2006 in 210 attacks on securitymen and in 335 encounters with police. This has been mainly due to frequent use of IEDs and landmine blasts by the N axals. 6. Sources in the MHA said that 854 arms and weapons such as SLRs, Sten Guns, 303 rifles, DBBL guns, grenades, landmines, and detonators were recovered from various N axal outfits in 2006. 1 Filling a Vacancy by Government and Naxals:AContrast: Jun2007 Analysts have noted a curious mismatch when it comes to the question of filling up sensitive posts by the government and the Naxalites.
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891
Even a month after Shirish Jain's transfer from the post of SP, Gadchiroli, the Government still has not announced a replacement for the crucial position in the state's Naxal heartland. On the other hand, the N axals were quick to replace Divisional Secretary of North Gadchiroli-Gondia Divisional Committee, Murali, by sending Anand, a senior cadre from Andhra Pradesh. Murali was arrested last month (May 2007) by Nagpur police along with Arun Ferreir of Mumbai and two others from Deekshabhoomi N agpur2. Anand joined within five days after Murali arrest, but in contrast, the Government has been making do with Gondia SP Cherring Dorje who is holding additional charge of Gad Chiroli since 6 May (2007). DGP PS Pasricha told a daily that he will issue the order for the new incumbent "either today or tomorrow". He however refused to divulge the name of the officer being sent. A month after Jain's exist, Naxals staged a bandh against Murali and Ferreira's arrests and they followed it up by an economic blockade. On 5 June, the Naxals began a week-long bandh against the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh. The rebels also resorted to civilian killings and attacks on policemen. On the 6th , they killed a relative of police officer at Mohangaon village in Kurkheda teshil, who the N axals suspected had killed a member of their woman cadre in an encounter last month (May 2007).
"It is widely known that nobody wants to take up the Gad Chiroli post for obvious reasons. That, unfortunately also highlights the motivational difference between the N axalites and police", said a senior official. Another reason why nobody wants to go there is that the promise to shift an officer from there is rarely kept. The daily in question has headlined the news story rather suggestively and meaningfully "Gadchiroli gets a new INaxal Boss ....... ". ;
Terrorism in India
892
MAOISTS STRATEGIES AND PLANS Maoists Convene 9th Congress: Feb 2007 The CPI (Maoist) held its 9 th Party congress deep in the forests of one of the guerrilla zones in the country, despite encirclement of the'area by security forces. Core leaders drawn from over 16 states took part in the party conclave. Its focus was on strengthening unity between the two streams ~f CPI (ML) 'and Maoist Coordination Centre (MCC), whose merger took place on.21 Sep 2007. The Maoist conclave assumes significance as it is the one of its kind since 1970. Outgoing CPI (M) Secretary, Ganpathi inaugurated the 9 th congress, where a new Central Committee was elected, signifying culmination of the 2-year-Iong process where the documents were discussed indepth and conferences held at the area, district, regional and the state level. Some days before this congress, Chandramouli, alias Naveen, was arrested, along with Karuna. Some other more import ants follow, which will show the long shadow the discussion's held at the Congress would cost on the future of the Indian political scene. The conclave adopted five documents of the unified party. 1. Hold high the Bright Red Banner of Marxism-LeninismMaoism. 2. Programme of the Party. 3. Constitution. 4. Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution. 5. Political Resolution. • The congress also undertook a detailed review of the past practice of two erstwhile Maoist parties since their formation in 1969, the People's War from 2001-2004 and also the issues of the day. • The Maoist conclave targeted the WTO-World Bank-led policies, resulting in the sanctioning of nearly 300 SEZs, Contractualisation of Labour, wage freeze, voluntary retirement scheme. Curbs on recruitment, and rural labour floating around urban pockets.
Naxalism: Present Situation
893
• The Maoists took the position that the present set of' policies led to marginalization of tribals and all forest dwellers, with huge projects causing displacements. Such projects listed by the congress are: 1. Mining and dam projects like Posco, Kalinganagar and bauxite mines in Orissa. 2. Chargaon and Raoghat in Chhattisgarh. 3. Bauxite mining and Polavarm Project in Andhra Pradesh. 4. Uranium mining in Jharkhand. • The 300 planned SEZs are all set to create de facto foreign enclaves within the country by grabbing prime agricultural land. Together with this, it charges that this was a move to turn urban centres into elite enclaves and pave the way for big business retail chains into India, while demolition of slums and even permanent housing " are going on 3 .
"Maoists' 9 th Congress (Jan 2007) Widens Agenda": Press That CPI (Maoist) successfully held its month-long 9 th party Congress somewhere in the "liberated zones" along the Jharkhand-Bihar border, as reported by a daily of22 Feb 2007, should be news as much to public as to the security and intelligence agencies of the country. Whether the event be attributed to the laxity of India's security minders or to the single-minded determination of the Maoist leadership is the real question. The venue of the 9 th Maoist Congress was named after \ Chandra Mouli, who was allegedly killed by security forces, and Karam Singh who died in Oct 2005. The Unity Congress, held after a period of 36 years after the 8t~ Congress in 1970 and the first to be held after merger of the Maoist communist Centre (MCC) of India with the People's War" Group (PWG) in 2004, was attended by 100 delegates from 16 states, and activists of the fraternal Maoist parties from Nepal, Philippines and Bangladesh. It concluded on 3 Feb 2007.
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Terrorism in India
The convening of the Congress, of course, must have come as a jolt to the Union Home Ministry, as the CPI (Maoist) is a rebel outfit fighting a low-intensity war with the Indian state along the "Red corridor" down a swathe of central India from the border with Nepal in the north to Karnataka in the south. What should be even bigger cause of concern to this Ministry is the fact that the so-called "Unity Congress" ended with a call to extend support for secessionist struggles ranging from Kashmir to Manipur. Before proceeding with other decisions of the 9th Congress, the role source of which of course is the CPI (Maoist) handouts, it is appropriate to put things in perspective. It needs to be understood that the facts about duration, venue and number of delegates who attended the Congress could be imaginary selfservingly made up, highly exaggerated or only partly true. The reason is simple: We are dealing here with CPI (Maoist) waging a 'war' with the Indian state and there in no means of authenticating the information churned out by the former. Even this daily,4 known for its investigative skills and reputation, got all the material it published in its issue of 22 Feb 2007 from the CPI (Maoist) hand-outs. Without debating the point any further, let us end the subject of authenticity or otherwise of this CPI (Maoist}-furnished 'facts'/figures/information with a simple suggestion: Treat it with caution. Some of the important issues discussed at the congress and the decisions taken consequently are summed up here after: 1. While vowing to fight the SEZs coming up in different
parts of country, the CPI (Maoist) Congress also supported the demand for pardon of Afzal Guru, convicted in the Parliament attack case, as well as for formation of separate states of Telengana and Vidarbha. 2. The Unity Congress also exhorted its cadres to use every possible means to free its detained activists, even if it meant organizing jailbreaks. 3. Muppala Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathi, who was reelected General Secretary, told the delegates: "We should
~
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895
support 'just struggles' of nationalities and subnationalities that demand a separate state for their development. Kashmiris and various nationalities of the North-East, such as the Assamese, Naga, Manipuris and Tripuris, have been long waging an armed struggle against the Indian government for their right to selfdetermination, including the right to secede from the socalled Union ofIndia." 4. Focusing on the Kashmir problem, Ganapathi said: "The conflict between the Indian forces and Kashmiris has generated fresh mass resentment in the wake of the Centre's designs to hang Mzal Guru. The Kashmiri people, along with the enlightened democratic sections all over India, have raised the just demand to desist from hanging the innocent Mzal Guru." 5. The Congress decided to form organizations like 'Committee to Release Prisoners', comprising intellectuals, democracy-lovers and members of the families of imprisoned comrades. The efforts are already way. The Credentials Committee report of the Unity Congress reveals that top six activists in Andhra Pradesh and 26 in Tamil Nadu are detained under POTA, while 16 in Karnataka and about 25 in north Chhattisgarh have been languishing in jails. 6. Upbeat about its "success" in organizing Dalit protests and demonstrations against SEZs, the Congress also resolved to further strengthen people's army, and deepen the mass base of the party. 7. Recognizing the role of caste in class revolution, the Congress made significant additions to party documents by pin-pointing the specific character of Indian feudalism and semi-feudalism as being "deeply interwoven with the caste system and Brahminical ideology". 8. The Congress reaffirmed the general line of the new democratic revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis _ and protracted people's war as the path of Indian revolution.
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Second Source Another dailyS made-attributed some additional point to the 9 th congress of the Maoists which are briefly mentioned below: 1. They vowed to oppose and resist the formation of the 300 SEZs, terming them efforts to form "de facto foreign enclaves" thereby enabling foreign and local sharks to grab prime agricultural lands. 2. The Congress was intended to fine-tune the course of armed revolution. /
3. The Congress was held in one of the guerrilla zones amid, what it called the Government's all-out efforts to disrupt it. 4. The meeting elected members of the Central Committee and successfully resolved the "disputed on, political i~ues" that arose after the merger. 5. The Congress which reaffirmed the line of revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis and protracted people's war as its path, resolved to develop guerrilla zones into base areas; strengtl:ten the mass base; transform the PLGA (People's Liberation Guerrilla Army) into PLA and advance guerrilla war into mobile was. 6. A press release, signed by Mupalla Laxamana Rao, who goes by the nom de guerre Ganapathi, said government policies were leading to further marginalization of Dalits, students, youth, women and tribals. It called upon the people to revolt and oppose the government programmes. 7. There was massive displacement of tribals and forestdwellers by huge mining and irrigation projects such as Posco, Kalinganagar, bauxite mines in Orissa; Chargaon and Raoghat in Chhattisgarh; bauxite mines and the Polavaram project in Andhra Pradesh; iron mines and uranium projects in Jharkhand. This compilation has one or two points repeated for sake of clarity, which was missing in the first one.
Naxalism : Present Situation
897
Maoist Chief gives Interview: 15 May 2007 (He justifies killing of MP Sunil Mahto) General Secretary of the outlawed CPI (Maoist), Ganapathi, has been elusive, wanted in several cases across states. In his first since taking over as party Chief, the "N axal Commander-in-Chief' dealt with questions on a host of issues-for his party's plans for armed struggle to its opposition to Special Economic Zones (SEZs). He justified the killing of JMM MP Sunil Mahto by his comrades and endorsed the much talked about thesis of Hezbollah Chief N asrallah that the Left should join hands with 'Islamists' to fight globalization. The daily had approached him just after his re-election as the Maoist party's boss at the outfits Jan 2007 congress-the first since the death of the legendary Charu Mojumdar in Sep 1971. The interview was published in the 15 May 2007 issue of the daily6.
Q. Where was the Congress held? A. Let the intelligence agencies keep guessing on that. As for the media, we can take you people to the place some time later. These places will assume great historical importance for future generations. Everyone come to know.
Q. Major decisions at the Congress? A. The general direction: to intensify people's war, taking it to all fronts. In particular, the Congress decided to take guerrilla war to a higher level of mobile war in areas where it is in an advanced stage, and expand it to more states. Destruction of enemy forces is on the immediate agenda. Likewise, there is an immediate need to transform a vast area into war zone so that there is enough room for manoeuverability for our guerrilla forces. Police and central forces will be taught how dangerous it is to enter our areas.
Q. What about issues like Singur and Nandigram? Are your people involved in inciting the violence in Nandigram as claimed by CPM? What are your views on SEZs? A. One should only be surprised if we are not involved· in such life-and-death issues of the masses. We intend to mobilize
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- masses against conspiracies and treacherous policies of the rulers to snatch land from people and hand it over to MNCs and big business houses in the name of development through ~ creation of hundreds of SEZs. SEZs are aimed at creating neo-colonial enclaves within our country where no laws of the land can be applied. Struggles against SEZs acquiring fartile farmlands and huge projects are turning more and more militant as witnessed in Kalinga N agar, Singur, N adigram, Lohandiguda or Polavarm. These will go on. As for Maoists inciting violence in Nandigram, the world will laugh at the temerity of these "Left" Front rulers. Even Goebbles will turn in his grave seeing how much his art of lying has been improved by "Marxists" like the Buddhas, Karats and Yachuris.
Q. JMM MP from Jamshetpur, Sunil Mahto was gunned down by your guerrillas along with five others. According to reports, Deputy Chief Minister Sudhir Mahto was also warned. Your take on it? A. We do not kill just because he/she is an MP or a minister. Though all legislators are responsible for government policies, it is mainly a coterie of leaders that plays a crucial role in finalizing policies. Such leaders are singled out for attacks. We had to eliminate Mahto since he was involved in unleashing repression on the revolutionary movement in Jharkhand. He was associated with the Nagrik Suraksha Samiti in the murder of 11 of our party Cadres in Longo village in East Singhbhum district in 2001. Of late, he was organizing armed campaign against the Maoist movement, to divide and pit a section of adivasis against the revolutionary movement, in the name of Salwa Judum. But annihilation of Mahto should not be interpreted as our antagonism to JMM. We are not against JMM as long as desists from anti-people activities and attacks against th~"l"evolutionary movement.
Q. Your opinion about the Islamic Upsurge? A. There is people's upsurge against the globalization all over the world and Islamic upsurge is an integral part of the world
Naxalism : Present Situation
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wide people's upsurge against imperialism, imperialist globalization, and War. In essence, we see the Islamic upsurge as a progressive anti-imperialist force in the contemporary world. It is wrong to describe the struggle that is going on in Iraq, Mgh~nistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir, Chechniya as a struggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a "clash of Civilizations."
Q. Hezbollah Leader N asrallah has said Left should come close to Islamists. Your view on that? A. I basically agree with what Nasrallah has said. One must understand that he is referring to the struggles for national liberation from imperialism in Islamic countries. Source:
[email protected]
NEXUS AND COORDINATION: ESTABLISHING LINKS ACROSS THE STATES A Bihar police officer says the Maoists have established links with internal and external agencies and the communist party of Nepal (Maoist)-CPN (M)-to acquire arms and sophisticated communication equipment that can intercept police conversation. Kameshwar Baitha, a Maoist leader, disclosed during interrogation that Naxalites in Bihar had "recently purchased eight AK-47 rifles from Andhra Pradesh for Rs 2 lakh each. Mter the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merged with the People's War Group (PWG) in Sep 2004 and declared a unilateral ceasefire with CPI (ML) Liberation in Jan 2005, the Maoist movement has understandably gained momentum. Bihar's DGP Asish Ranjan Sinha says "the Nepali and Bihari Maoists had formed a Bihar-Nepal border coordination committee to give shelter to each other's cadres. In view of this fact, it is difficult to give credence to the Nepalese Maoist leader Prachanda's statement-when he came to India in Nov 2006 to participate in the Hindustan Times-convened leadership Conference at New Delhi-that there was no understanding between the Nepalese Maoists and their Indian counterparts.
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If N axalism sprang up from the eponymous in West Bengal's Darjeeling district in May 1967, it was born in Andhra Pradesh - on the last day of Oct 1967 when a huge meeting organized by the Jatapur and Savara tribes in Srikakulam was disrupted by Medi Satyam of Congress and in the ensuing violence Satyam and two tribals were killed. From then on, West Bengal in East and Andhra Pradesh in south were sit to develop into some kind of epicenters for Naxalism-and violence related to it-in India. As of today, there are 18 dalams in Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram, Srikakulam, Gangavaram, Koraput and Gajapati. "The Maoist have declared this belt, including the Dandakaranya forest, as the Andhra-Orissa border."7 They now hope to open a link with neighbouring Jharkhand. The larger plan is to create an uninterrupted north-south corridor and Orissa's central and western regions for such a corridor. Interestingly, Maoists are known to be active in 10 of the 30 districts of Oris sa, but the State government denies Naxalistl Maoist 'problem'. On 24 Mar 2006, about 200 armed Maoists attacked the Ramagiri Udyagiri sub-jail in Gajapati district'and freed 40 prisoners, including Ghirsing a Majhi, a senior Maoist leader. They also attacked the police station, the camp of the 3 rd Battalion ofthe Orissa State Armed Police, the treasury, the tehsildar's office and a telecom tower. The officer-in-charge of the police station, Ranjan Kumar Mallick, and the jailor, Rabinarayan Sethi, were abducted. Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik told the Assembly that the Maoists had come from Vizianagram district of Andhra Pradesh. A Year Earlier (in 2005), the Kalimela police station in Malkangiri district of Orissa was targeted. The Golpadar police station in Rayagada district was attacked in 2002. The pattern of these attacks should be studied carefully. It seems t~ be reflecting a strategic design going for beyond freeing the Maoist prisoners', looting arms and demoralization of the police and paralysis of the administration. It possibly could be a determined bid to infiltrate the western and central regions of Orissa to create on uninterrupted north-south corridor. Even
,I
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more sinisterly, these could be ''blooding'' operations aimed at exposing the cadres to serious combat against the state forces and law enforcing agencies of the Centre to prepare them for a wider mobilization across the entire Maoist corridor along India's eastern board. ''Dalits to be Maoists' Driving Force": Documents: Dec 2006 Khair Lanji sparked a debate on the link between N axals and the protests by Dalits in Maharashtra. This need not remain a speculative postulation or a hypothetical proposition if we are to go by the policy documents of the CPI (Maoist) seized during the past two years-2004 to 2006-and the recent three letters believed to be written by CPI (Maoist) Secretary Chandra Kant to some newspapers. These documents show without any reasonable dout that the N axalite plan to absorb Dalits in their fold already appears to be in full swing. "Strategy and Tactics", a Naxal policy document issued by the Maharashtra State Committee to its cadres and seized immediately after the formation of CPI (Maoist) in 2004 with the merger of erstwhile PWG and MCC, is a lucid document. The Maoist leadership must be congratulated for clarity of thought and deep strategic insight that distinguish this document. The Maoist leaders are never short of thinking of new ideas in crafting its new strategic plans. The felicity of expression and the linguistic skills that marks this document compels praise. The excerpts from the document are quoted intensively by a daily dated 8 Dec 20068 . The document, "Strategy and Tactics" says: "The treated as a special social section that is peculiar to the obnoxious caste-ridden Indian society. Though a vast majority among them belong to poor and landless peasantry and- to the proletariat and other wage-earning sections, they are also the victims of social oppression and upper caste atrocities. ~ "While mobilizing the vast masses of Dalits who constitute around 17.5 per cent of the Indian population into the agrarian revolution, we must also lay special emphasis on
902
Terrorism in India'
the task of fighting all forms of social oppression and caste discrimination practised by upper castes against them." "Appropriate organizational forms should be evolved at various levels to fight the evils of untouchability, upper caste atrocities and other forms of discriminations. At the same time, we must desist from forming an exclusively caste-based organization for the Dalits, which will only lead to their further segregation." "We must expose the hollowness of the politics ofthe ruling class and the opportunist Dalit leaders who build their own electoral fortunes in the name of taking up Dalit issues". Another document seized in 2005 from arrested (Maharashtra) State Committee member Madan Lal, however tries to distinguish between Prakash Ambedkar and other Republican Party faction leaders. "Athavale (Ramdas), Gavai (RS) and Dhasal (Namdeo) have lost their independent public base and have become puppets in the hands of main ruling parties. By taking up a broad socioeconomic programme, Prakash Ambedkar tries to break ahead of the exclusive Dalit cordon, but it has not been able to gather momentum as, because of semi-capitalist class, Dalits remained within the political framework." While decrying the "petty bourgeoisie" exclusive Dalit organizations, the 2004 document, as a matter of strategy, advises to "sometimes work jointly with these bourgeoisie organizations while exposing the reformism and opportunism of the leadership." Interestingly, the 2005 document also eulogizes effort to establish a separate Maratha region called Shiv Dharma by Purshottam Khedekar, a state Public Works Department engineer. "It has come up to counter Hindutva politics and Brahminism", says the document. This (2004) document also refers to the murder of goon Akku Yadav in a Nagpur court two years ago, seeing in it the revival of the dormant women's movement. This only shows how
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903
'ideological blinkers' enable the dyed-in-wool ideologues to put whole meanings and implications into single such incidents. Now comes an official ofthe State Government with his own takes, perhaps well thought through on the issue: "The linking of the Naxalites to post-Khairlanji struggle attracted ridicule and criticism, but the documents clearly show how N axalities have been taking keen interest in Dalit struggle since the past two years. The attempt here is to exploit the Dalit ire to smell their ranks."
Maoists are raising an 'army' now: Mar 2007 The CPI (Maoist) is planning to upgrade its revolution army from the level of 'company' to 'battalions' in order to form an 'army' by rapidly inducting more armed personnel in its ranks and enhance its tactical and combat capability and expertise The expansion and improved tactical trainiug by the outlawed outfit is aimed at achieving a capability to destroy the police stations and camps in the areas of strategic importance to convert them into "liberated zones" 'Muktanch,al, as the' Maoist know them in their parlance. The improved training charter involves countering possible air raids on their hideouts by the troops and better coordination and mutual understanding between different N axal groups operating on various inter-state borders. All this information is culled from the Annual Report of the Central Military Commission of the CPI (Maoist), a copy of which is claimed to be held by a daily. 9 The Report says the Naxalites will convert guerrilla tactics into mobile warfare against security forces for "better results" and also intensify "psychological warfare" operations through political propaganda. They plan to intensify their operations against the security forces during 2007 adopting twin agenda: central attacks on them and decentralized propaganda mechanism agains,t the state governments.
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How do they want to achieve it all? They aim to realize their plans by strongly implementing the Maoist doctrine of people's resistance and by developing advance "military commissions and commands". They envisage to convert the revolutionary People's Liberation Guerrilla Anny to Peoples' Liberation Anny after they have completed rising of the baatalions mentioned at the beginning of this piece. The Report strongly advocates the Maoists attack and cut off the supply lines of the security forces by all means if they enter the "13 Naxal-dominated zones". It further recommends the ultra execute concentrated attacks on police camps and especially attack the foot soldiers of the police personnel engaged in anti-Naxal operations. The Standard Operationing Procedures (SOPs), evolved by the Union Home Ministry, understandably advise the security forces engaged in anti-N axal operations to avoid traveling on vehicles on a route through which ultras flee after carrying out strikes against them. So, the Becurity forces must march on foot as the N axalites usually plant landmines before fleeing to thwart the advance of the reinforcements, and possibly to cause injuries to them, including fatal ones. Hence the advice given above to target the "foot soldiers." i
Some other points from the Reports are summed up briefly here: 1. The cadres are advised to maintain extreme secrecy
about their plans and operations in order to foil the success of counter-guerrilla warfare launched against them by the security officers as soon as they (troops) come to know of the Maoist plans. 2. The Report note with concern the loss of 300 Naxalites while fighting with the security forces last year (2006) and vows to finish off the Salwa Judum and police personnel involved in the campaign with improved tactics, training and change in their formationsmeaning newly raised battalions as new operational Units. 3. A Naxalite company typically comprises 125 personnel while a battalion has 1150 men in it. The intelligence
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inputs available with the Union Home Ministry suggest that Maoist have already formed six armed companies for carrying out strikes at the police camps in the said Annual report. Interestingly, it is worth noting that N axalite companies and battalions are little larger in manpower resources' with each of these comprising 125 and 1150 personnel respectively, as the figures for an Infantry Company and Infantry Battalion are 105 and 850 respectively.
An important observation must be made before closing this Report. The Maoists do not seem to be running short of manpower. In the recent past, they are known to have mobilized a strength ranging from 500 to 1000 militant for their major strikes. 15 Mar 2007 Rani Bodli strike involved close to 1500 Naxalite fighters. The Report merely tells us they are formally allotting these militants to raise new operational sub-units ". (companies) and units (battalions). A company and battalion of the Naxalites will have designated manpower on permanent basis to be launched into action under their own commanders. This will greatly streamline their operating procedures and greatly cut short the preparatory time to launch their strikes against their intended targets-police stations on camps, Salwa Judum bases and marching columns of the security forces. One is reasonably certain that given the intelligence inputs available to them, the security establishments at various levels districts, States and the Centre-have factored in the improved capabilities of the Maoists' fighting machine, in their counter- \ N axalite strategic and tactical plans.
Naxals Create R&D Cells with Experts: Mar 2007 The Maoists may have hundreds of weapons in their armoury, almost all looted from the police, and they certainly form the backbone of their fire power, but their far-sighted leadership look far beyond this impressive treasure. They are now preparing to take hi-tech route. They have set up full-fledged research and development wings, tapping into a growing network among scientists, "extending up to sensitive institutions like Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)".
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The last bit may read incredible, but this and other information to follow was revealed by the government in the Maoists used an improved version of petrol bombs against policemen at Rani Bodli, massacring 55 of them. About the BARC connection, a married couple was recently found to have been working there, in whose case the intelligence discovered on ultra-Red background~ When confronted by the authorities, the two did not conceal their ideological leanings. The two have since left the facility but the incident has left the security establishment shaken over the network of activists and sympathizers that the Naxals (might) have built up among the scientists. Security agencies recently unearthed an R&D unit of the Naxals near Bhopal and found that a number of such wings wererunning in different parts of India. 10 Although N axals are known to have used such (petrol) bombs earlier, the preliminary reports of the 15 Mar Rani Bodli attack revealed their more potent use, suggesting Maoist expertise in improving and making the conventional bombs more lethal! deadly.
Maoists Adopt "Mobile Warfare" Tactics: MHA : Apr 2007 _, The attacks on the Ranibodli (Chhattisgarh) camp in which 55 policemen were killed and four dozen arms looted, confirms the 'mobile warfare' tactics of the Maoists and more such instances are expected in the near future. The incident also confirms the plan of the CPI (Maoists) to convert its guerrilla arm)' into a regular army by fine-tuning its war efforts and upgrading its fighting formations. The above is from an assessment report of the Union Home Ministry (MHA), a copy of which is with a daily 11 , or so it claims. Mobile warfare is conducted by using "fluid battle fronts and deployments", changing locations and having a capability to attack the enemy on its most vulnerable spots even outside established guerrilla zones and withdraw quickly.
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Besides, the Maoists have resorted to "tactical counteroffensive campaigns" in its zones by attacking security forces as they seek to check the Naxals in their strongholds. Some other important conclusions and observations from the MHA assessment are summed up here after: • The prevailing situation in the Left-wing extremismaffected states is grim and there is no immediate solution unless and until the core issues are addressed. • New warfare techniques/strategies are adopted by the Naxalites on a day-to-day basis with a wider networking base and improved armoury and finance. • Ultra left extremism is advancing steadily towards its goals in a systematic, methodical and well-deliberated fashion and more such instances can be expected in the future. • It is imperative to quickly assess the ground situation by duly recognizing the signs and symptoms and undertake appropriate measures by putting in place a proper response mechanism or strategy on a sustained or long-term basis at the earliest. The problem can no longer be ignored.
• The mobile warfare strategy aims at eliminating troops by launching military-style attacks on policeestablishments with the twin objective of looting weapons to equip its own army and demoralizing the .security forces. However, the strategy does not aim at retaining or capturing territory. The "Central Military r0.~mission" of the outfit has succeeded in military upgradation and l'lre operating in Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. The MHA report cites some instances of the mobile warfare undertaken by the CPI (Maoist) in the recent years in various states. These attacks are mentioned here. • 6 Feb 2004. Koraput (Orissa). 506 weapons looted and
three policemen killed.
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• 23 June 2005. Madhubani (Bihar). Nine weapons looted a~d one policeman killed. • 11 Nov 2005. Giridih (Jharkhand). 185 weapons looted ,and six pclicemen killed. • 24 Mar 2006. Udaigiri (Gajapati district, Orissa). 27 weapons looted and three policemen killed. • Murkinar • 2007. Ranibodli (Chhattisgarh). 49 weapons looted and 55 policemen killed. Naxalites Becoming Internet (Cyberspace) Warriors:Apr 2007
Intelligence agencies have asked the Centre to stop spread of Naxalite ideology in cyber space and initiate action against all websites which are engaged in spreading pro-Naxal ideology, a daily reported 28 Apr 2007 12 . A concerned intelligence officer explained to the daily in question: "Most of these networks are run by Naxalite outfits in the name of social organizations to spread their ideology, and also to communicate among themselves in coded language. On the face of it, these websites and blogs do not contain anything illegal and also do not promote violence directly, but the use of the Internet by the Red Army cadre would prove more dangerous than a direct attack by Naxalites". The Central intelligence agenci~s are already keeping a watch on such websites and monitoring all blogs, e-mails and' groups which may even be slightly pro-Naxalite. The officer added further: "Whatever information we nave received during thernonitoring of such networks has beet'\ passed on to the Centre as well as the states concerned". The 23 rd National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) meeting asked states to share information on and keep a constant watch on the moyement of Naxalite groups their weaponry, training camps, hideouts, source of weapons and funds, areas current activity and areas in which they plan to spread their violence and activity. States have also been asked to strengthen their security structures and intelligence
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gathering machinery and raise more India Reserve Battalions. Security forces emphasized the need for police to adhere to the field-craft and standard operating procedures (SOPs) during anti-Naxalite operations. On the development front, states were advised to review their resettlement and rehabilitation policies on priority basis. The need to put special focus on implementation of Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF), Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), NREGP and Scheduled Tribes'·and the other Traditional Forest (Reorganization of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, was emphasized, said a Home Ministry official. State governments were urged to fill vacancies at the bottom level of the district administration, especially in rural and tribal areas, through special recruitment drives to ensure that the development agenda was not neglected due to absence of grassroots machinery. / (
Some ofthe points adumberated in the preceding paragraphs are contained in the Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee' on Home Affairs (PSC-HA) tabled in the parliament on 26 Apr 2007; and others flowed from the meeting of the National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) convened by the Home Ministry under the Chairmanship of Union Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta, after the PSC-HA Report was received by it, to deliberate on its contents and recommendations. The Parliamentary Committee asked the Centre to constitute at unified command at national level to tackle the Maoist violence. The NqCD has decided to keep a close watch on movement of Maoists and inform States to launch a common offensive if situations required. The Parliamentary Committee Report said the Maoist problem has taken a national dimension. The Report recommends: "Besides the Central Para-military Forces, State Police Forces may also contribute to the unified command." The Parliamentary Committee Headed by the BJP MP Sushma Swaraj clearly mentioned that it was no longer a
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problem of a few States, and expressed strong displeasure over the lack of initiative by the States. "There was no Perceptible Change on the Socio-Economic Front", the Report Mentioned. The NCCN meeting Chaired by Home Secretary was attended by the Chief Secretaries and the DGPs of the Maoisaffected States along with officials from the Planning Commission and Central Ministries of Tribal Affairs, Panchayati Raj, Rural Development and Forest and Environment. 13 The Centre asked the State officials to fill vacancies in the Government at the bottom level of the district administration especially in the rural and tribal are through special recruitment drives to ensure that the development agenda of the government was not neglected due to absence of grass root machinery, However, the State officials presented their plans of action how they were going on the agenda. They also presented their plan of increasing the strength of police forces and ensuring their share in India Reserve force as suggested by the Centre. Naxals have become Tech-Savvy: Jun 2007 "Recent land mine blasts in Jharkhand, carried out by the Naxals, have forced the security forces to realize that the rebels are neither far removed from modern technology nor are they shy of making use of it", as a daily of 16 Jun 2007 reported 14 . A study conducted by forensic experts indicates that the N axals are discarding conventional methods of triggering the landmine blasts in favour of more technologically advanced ones. Consequently, instead of using fuse, gelatine and wire, they have graduated to using camera flash and cell phones. Some recent instances of the latter are noted here after, as informed by police. 1.
On. 8 May (2007), a landmine blast in Bokaro was triggered with a micro-wave-operated high frequency wireless set looted from the police earlier. An antenna was recovered from the site of the explosion.
2. A little earlier on 13 Mar, a landmine was exploded in . Garhwa which was triggered by ·a camera flash.
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3. In yet anoth er in Giridi h distric t, a cell phone was emplo yed to activa te a landm ine on 15 Jan. Policy is report edly busy findin g ways to counte r this newfangle d techno logy-e nabled threat . As a CRPF official discloses, the N axals have manag ed to reduce the use of manpo wer to carry out such explos ions. This has only added to the proble ms of the secur ity perso nnel engag ed in count er-Na xalite respon sibilit y. DGP JB Maha patra explai ns why and how: "Earlie r, we receiv ed tip-offs from village rs who spotte d them movin g about or laying the mines. But now the inform ers find it difficu lt to smell a rat as one person can under take to execut e the entire operat ion helped by (the latest) technology". Beside s this, faction s within the Maois ts have added to the troubl e. Severa l local leader s have set up outfits in the areas of their own influen ce like the Jharkh and Libera tion Tigers (JLT) and the Tritiya Prastu ti Comm ittee (TPC), which transla tes into 'Third Presen tation Comm ittee', and surpri singly ends u,P with the same acrony m (TPC). A numbe r of recent cases of eitorti on from corrup t officia ls, contra ctors and busin essme n have underl ined the multip le split which has virtual ly trigger ed a war of suprem acy, leadin g to inter-o utfitJf iction violen ce in South Chota nagpu r, North Chota nagpu r, and Palam u divisions. Some of such incide nts are noted below. • 29 May. Four comra des owing allegia nce to the CPI (Maois t) were kidnap ped and killed in Lateh ar by JLT. • 30 May. Two JLT cadres kidnap ped and shot by the TPC. • 2 June. Three TPC suppo rters were abduc ted and killed in Garhm a distric t by the CPI (Maois t) activis ts. • 6 June. Four villag ers suspe cted to be the TPC suppo rters were shot by the CPI (Maoi st) activis ts in Chatra . • 8 June. Sanjay Singh, who report edly patron ized the JLT, was shot in Palam u. The state too has respon ded with a two-pr onged strateg y. "The acting Chief Secret ary holds a meetin g with the police brass every month to have way for the admin istrati on and the
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police to work in tandem to maintain law and order", said Mahapatra.
Merger of Naxal Outfits and the Aftermath The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merges with the Peoples' War Group (PWG) in Sep 2004 to create Communist Party oflndia (Maoist), CPI (M), which has extensive reach into the country's hinterland (especially rural and Adivasi areas) and a massive armed cadre. Subsequently, they declared a unilateral cease fire with the CPI (ML) Liberation in January 2005. Presently, CPI (Maoist) controls "a quarter of the country's 602 districts. It has presence in more than 12 states, that the core area covers Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. "Naxals are India's biggest internal security challenge. It has gained in strength, and has spread to over 160 out of the 602 districts of the country... Maoists were controlling administration, policing and justice in certain 'liberated' zones." This is Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh speaking at a meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers called to discuss Naxal activities on 13 Apr 2006 15 . The Union Government has not underestimated and can't offered to do so--the threat of extremism in the country, as the Prime Minister feels it is "India's biggest internal security challenge" . A meeting of top police officers from 13 Naxal-affected States (out of28) in India held in Delhi on 31 Mar 2006 concluded that Naxalites had been spreading their tentacles across the country. Speaking in comparative terms. The MHA says, "76 districts in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are badly affected by Maoist violence."16 Significantly, for the first time the Army Commanders Conference on 6-7 Apr 2005 discussed the N axals threat. Army Chief Gen. Joginder Jaswant Singh then said, "we will try to
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nip the evil in the bud". He promised all Army support to police and paramilitary forces to counter the spread of the Maoists. There was a report that the Army was exercised over the prospects of being called out to combat Maoists. It seems the counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare (CIJW) School in Varangte, Mizoram, examined the problem at a theoretical level, and "we found that the situation in these states is different from the areas where we have our counter-insurgency operations." To wit, the Army cannot operate on a long-term basis without the Armed Forces Special Powers Act being imposed on the state/region. It is not like holding a flag march through a riot-hit city. Not many states would be willing to impose this Act, which bestows certain powers to the troops, over vast districts-not to speak of the entire state. "You would only be alienating even those sections of the population who are now sympathetic to the state," was the fear expressed. That perhaps was the reason the Army helped the Jharkhand police set up a Jungle Warfare School in Kanker, "before it was asked to get involved. A better way would be for the Army to set up a Jungle Warf9.re School in Kanker for itself." . This tongue-in-cheek exhortation emanates either from the ignorance of the Army's role or an attempt to be too clever by halfl Army should not be frivolously asked to take on police duties, and that is what the Naxal violence is all about. One remembers some well-intentioned but ignorant do-gooders who wanted the Army to be deployed to ferret the sandalwood brigand Veerappan out of his jungle hideout. Even counterterrorism is not strictly Army's jO,b. Army is and should be the instrument of last resort. If Army is asked out too often to do the police duties/chores, it will not only lose out its sheen but also its combat capability. We should not permit our state police forces to keep falling by the anyside due to lethargy, inefficiency or ill-discipline. Otherwise, Army will be too stretched on the ground, and consequently reduced to being a heavily-armed police-unable to defend nation's border as and when required.
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Its primary role is to defend the nation against the external aggression. The Centre formulated certain measures to fight and control the Naxal menace in Mar 2006. They included intelligence sharing, speeding up land reforms, anti-Naxal coordinated strategy among the affected states, modernization of police forces of various concerned states, etc. Obviously not impressed with the anti-Naxal strategy, secretary of the Dandakaranya special zone committee of CPI (Maoists), Kosa, said rather self-assuredly: "Given the growing base in Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, the Maoists would be able to capture about 35 per cent of India by 2010." There is something interesting, if not sinister, about all spokes personslleaders giving prominence to the 2010 dateline in all their pronouncements/assertions/prognosis. A light-hearted query could be: Has it something to do with the timing of the Commonwealth Games which India would be hosting that year. It does not remain a light-hearted query if the Naxals aim is to frighten away the visitors to this prestigious sports fixture. Or even more menacingly, are the Naxals suggesting that with m0re than one-third of the country under them, New Delhi might be well-advised to think of surrendering the event to some other country?
India's Left Parties' Advice Naxals to Adopt Nepal route: Jun2006 On 18 Jun 2006, the Left parties-CPM, CPI and Forward Bloc-asked the N axal groups in India to emulate the example of the Prachanda-Ied Maoists of Nepal and join the mainstream. The Left feels the historic accord reached between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) in Nepal would have a direct impact and bearing on the Maoist movement in India. The advice came in the context ofPrachanda deciding on 16 June to join the SPA and participate in the cOlIwetitive . parliamentary politics in Nepal. Prachanda's decision was the
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result of his marathon 10-hour meeting with Nepalese Prime Minister GP Koirala. The basis of the Left's advice to the Left-wing extremists is simple: The decision of the Nepalese Maoist to join the competitive political mainstream signified their rejection of the ideology of securing power through the bullet-or through the barrel of the gun, as Mao's sermon goes. The decision of the Nepal's Maoists came as a relief both to the Government oflndia and India's Left-ruling combine of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. Both were apprehensive, and rightly so, that the clout that ultras exercised in Nepal will spill over the border and on to the militant outfits in India. This apprehension is all the more relevant because of the "Red Corridor" running from border of Nepal to Karnataka in the South, covering all shades of Left-wing extremism and Islamist terrorists spreading their violent wings from Kashmir in the north to Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) in the South, encompassing the Central and Western Indian States en route. Politics is all about safeguarding one's political turf. Presently, the Maoists are posing a serious threat to the CPMled Left coalition in West -BEmgal as indicated by the active involvement of the Maoists in the Nandigram agitation. A determined political push by Mamta Banerjee helped by violent Maoists can indeed be unsettling for the 30-year long Left rule in West. No wonder, hoping that the Prachanda example would have a positive impact on his Indian counterparts, CPI General Secretary AB Bardhan said: "This historic accord will have far reaching repercussions in our sub-continent and on the Marxist extremist thinking all over the world". An apt example of hoping too much, this!
Annual Report (Oct 2005-Sep 2006) Reveal Terror Plans: Apr2007
The Naxal onslaught at Riga in Sitamarhi district of Bihar has been seen as first of the series of such attacks planned by the ultras in areas where large mining, irrigation or industrial projects are plann-ed to be set up. This is suggested by the fact
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that an annual report of the Maoist, Oct 2005-Sep 2006, seized by the security forces recently, had listed several up coming projects in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh for attacks, as reported by a daily on 2 Apr 2007. 17 The Riga attack may just be a symbolic call for battle to create Red terror in the nearby region, where the proposed Kosi irrigation project is to come up. Incidentally, Kosi project is on the top of the Maoist hitlist, with the Annual Report saying the region needed attention for not only repulsing the government machinery but also for mobilizing the mass support. The Maoists had made their intentions clear some six months ago when they met to observe the 6th anniversary of their armed wing, People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) on 8 Oct 2006. The Red ultras, in their Annual Report (Oct 2005-Sep 2006) finalized at this meet and copy of which is claimed to the held by the daily mentioned above, had specifically listed sites for planned attacks. Among these the following: 1. Areas embracing proposed bauxite mines of the Jindals,
near Visakhapatnam. 2. Polvaram irrigation project in Andhra Pradesh. 3. The projects of the Tatas, Essar and Jindals Chhattisgarh.
In
4. Rajghara-Raoghat-.1agdalpur rail line. 5. The Steel plants of POSCO and Tatas in Orissa. 6. Power plants of Reliance and ongoing N armada projects in Madhya Pradesh. The ultras, in this 8-page Report, asked their cadres to put up a brave front against these projects and initiate a Kalinga Nagar-type agitation. The Kalinga Nagar incident had witnessed killing of 12 tribals during a protest against Tata Steel's proposed project in Jajpur district in Orissa in Jan 2006. Thousands of tribals, backed by Maoists, had opposed the plant • fearing displacement.
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Besides touching upon their future plans, Maoists also listed their successful operations which included the following: 1. Jehanabad jailbreak in Bihar.
2. Killing of 11 Naga jawans and attack on Salma Judum camps in Chhattisgarh. 3. Killing of 14 cops in West Singbhum district in Jharkhand. 4. An attack on Malkangiri-Udaigirijail in Orissa. It seems clear from the contents ofthe Report that they had been successful in such operations despite the government putting up a large contingent of security personnel in place. It also indicate's N axal's intention to encourage their cadre by highlighting such incidents. Such self-congratulatory narration is understandable, at least for the morale oftheir cadre at the lower rung. Not to take ~ away any credit, it must also be said that they have achieved season success. Naxalites Plan Oct 2007 Rally in Delhi: May 2007 report Naxalite groups are planning a massive show of strength in the capital in Oct 2007. The decision for such a rally was taken in Mar 2007 when top brass of various N axalite outfits met to plan the 'non-violent' campaign. Even if the rally has been called to protest upcoming SEZs on agriculture land all over the country, its basic agenda is to get media attention, and to display its strength at the national level. Decuments seized by the security forces during various raids in Jharkhand Chhattisgarh and studied by senior officers, revealed these facts. It is a three-tier strategy, as explained by an intelligence officer on 28 May 2007:
1. They will launch/intensify their operations in areas, where" the SEZs are coming up, through their frontal organizations. These organizations will recruit locals for their violent activities. 2. Then the- Naxal groups will set up an overground workers' network in the Hindi belt, mainly Rajasthan,
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Terrorism in India Harya na, Punjab , UP, Chhat tisgar h and Uttara nchal so that they can hit the headli nes in Delhi. 3. Most impor tantly, they will make their presen ce felt in the capita l in a big way.
28 May Explo sions and Conse quenc es: Asses smen t: 31 May 2007 Chhat tisgar h contin ues to haunt the MHA. Recen t efforts to-hem in Naxal ite seem to come to a naugh t with 28 May killing of a police men in Bastar forest. The attack came a fortnig ht after the MHA wrote to the state gover nment , advisi ng them to streng then the intelli gence machi nery to tackle N axalism . The Union Home Secret ary's letter of 17 May offere d all help to impro ve intelli gence. 18 The 9 deaths were the result of a trap the police men walke d into ~nsuspectingly. After this attack , the MHA placed a helico pter at the dispos al of the state Gover nment for rescue and relief operat ions. The situati on in Chhat tisgar h has been partic ularly bad in the past few month s, the most distur bing being the attack on a Salma Judum camp in Bijapu r's Rani Bodli on 15 Mar (2007) . ' 500 Naxal ites swoop ed on the police camp at night, killing 55 securi ty person nel, mostly specia l police officer s (SPOs ) from Salma Judum , the state-s uppor ted civilia n movem ent agains t extrem e Left militan cy. Has this 28 May attack dampe ned efforts to curb Naxal ism? That will be a rash conclu sion. Securi ty person nel engag ed in anti-N axal operat ions have been deman ding that the state police make a greate r use of param ilitary forces like the CRPF for effecti ve campa ign. KPS Gill a Scape goat? He Speak s out: May 2007 A weekly48 asks in its issued dated 19 May 2007: "Is Gill being made a scapeg oat for police failure ?" This is in view ofthe fact that KPS Gill who had been appoin ted as securi ty adviso r to the Chhat tisgar h Gover nment in Apr 2006, diano t have his appoin tment extend ed/ren ewed at the end of a year.
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Alongside thi& came the news-of course, unconfirmed-that the State was considering to appoint former DGP, Andhra 'Pradesh, Swarna Singh Sen as Gill's successor. Andhra is widely regarded as the state that has best handled Naxalism, and this with Sen at its helm. Sources in the state government are eager to highlight Sen's record to buttress their point that appointing Gill was a mistake in the first place. The move to replace Gill is also seen as Chhattisgarh Government~s desparate attempt to find scapegoats after the embarrassing Rani Bodli massacre of March that killed 65 policemen-most of them tribals recruited as special police officers for the government-backed Salma Judum Campaign. That is not the only inconvenient fact the State has to worry about. Of the 749 people killed by the Maoists in India, 48 per cent were from Chhattisgarh alone. To cap it all, then came Home Minister Shivraj Patil's March Statement in Parliament that while Naxalite violence had declined in all other states, it had increased manifold in Chhattisgarh. Perhaps real reason for opprobrium coming Gill's way lay somewhere elso. Senior officials in the State were rattled by outspoken Gill's allegation that corruption in the police force by which constables are able to get themselves transferred out of the worst affected Bastar plateau, is responsible for the Naxal 'success' in the State. Sources in the state police told daily that Gill repeatedly requested massive recruitments in the police even as one particular police official was collecting bribes to transfer constable out of Dantewada district. A source in Raipur also said that it was only after the Rani Bodla massacre that the state Government acted on Gill's recommendation to appoint a special DIG whose sole responsibility would be to ensure protection of police posts and Salwa Judum camps. Meanwhile the State Government has now appointed a 3member committee' comprising the following, to recommend ways and means to deal with the Naxal violence: 1.
A: retired DG, CRPF.
2. Brig BK Pawar; Commandant, Jungle Warfare College. 3. Girdhari Nayak, IGP, Anti-Naxalite operations.
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KPS Gill Interview: Mid-May 2007 To get other side of the story, or to get facts as seen by the no-nonsense KPS Gill, a weakly interviewed 19 him and published the text in its issue dated 19 May 2007. Excerpts follow. Q. What is wrong with national strategy on Naxalism? A. You don't tackle a problem like this by having meetings. Ever since the PM said so, there has been a succession of very diffused meetings that lack a focus. The' other things is that these states have governments run by different parties and they have different strategies. Q. So parties should have a consensus? A. Even in Punjab the consensus lasted a short while, and then we got Beant Singh as CM who had a focus. In Chhattisgarh, the DGP can't transfer a c{lnstable. Q. Is .not Naxalism different from terrorism you tackled in Punjab? A. There is no difference. No state learns from the experience of others. Now Chhattisgarh officials have made some visits to Andhra and are trying to learn from them. , Q. Do we need a joint Special Task Force (STF) for this? A. I do not support STFs. The thana is the' basic unit of police. West Bengal overcame the Naxalites by strengthening the thanas. So it was in Punjab. The police strength of Bastar is abysmal. Q. Has the Salma Judum been successful considering the Rani Bodli massacre that killed 65 policemen? A. The Salwa Judum has shaken up the Naxalites but now there is a ,stalemate. The two major massacres by the Naxalites were actuallY,!iefeats for them. This is a foolish movements where the Naxalites kill tribals, who are their very own support group.
Q. After the Rani Bodli massacre, there were reports in Raipur that the state's top police brass does not know what exactly has been your contribution.
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A. If I am there and they do not take may advice, whose loss is it? I don't lose anything. The loss is of the State, of the people.
Q. The Home Minister said that Naxalite violence has declined in all (other) states but increased in Chhattisgarh. A. Depends on how you use figures. In Chhattisgarh, they are in an aggressive mode. We die, they die.
Q. SO it is a civil war we are up for? A. There is no civil war, it is a creation of journalists. Political parties tie up with the Naxalites before elections. Look at Nandigram. It is totally supported by N axalites. Advani supports it because he wants to score points against the CPM.
Q. You have said that corruption in the police has hurt in the anti-Naxal efforts. A. You don't find corruption in the police?
Q. Why-does Naxalism thrive? A. Like the mafia in Bombay, N axalism in Chhattisgarh is an extortion operation. It runs between the beedi manufactures, the Naxalites and the government.
Q. Will the Army have to step in? A. I don't agree that the situation is that serious. When I studied the police deaths in Chhattisgarh for a few months, only three or four policemen died. The rest were all CRPF or the N aga battalion and the Special Police Officers. So what is the contribution of the Chhattisgarh police? Policemen do not want to be posted in Bastar. They bribe and get a transfer. I submitted a proposal: give out-of-turn promotions and provide the leaders. Insurgencies 'are small (junior) Comm~nders) wars. They are not Generals' wars.
Q: Is the CM an effective leader? A; How can I comment on the leadership qualities of a CM?
But I told you that the type of administrative support
922
Terrorism in India the police is getting is not adequate. I am sorry to say that. Q: Don't you think fake encounters are the last thing the government needs to win the trust of tribals?
A: Bastar tribals are to be won over in 101 different ways. It starts with what tribals think is development and what we think is development. The tribal says leave leave me alone and stop my exploitation by middlemen. The state makes crores of the tribal produce and is unable to give it back to the tribals. Improve their villages. Give them land rights. The problem in Chhattisgarh is not Naxalism. It is the administration. Q: You wanted dogs sent for training at the cost of few crore rupees. A: The police dogs were totally incapable of detecting bombs. I sent a proposal to the Chhattisgarh government but they did not accept it. The loss is theirs. Similarly, I asked them to set up a control room. They are still doing that.
Q: There were reports that money from the police welfare fund was spent on your helicopter rides and R!s"".20 lakh was spent for your house in Jagdalpur. A: The helicopters belong to the state. I used it twice: once with the Home Minister and once with the Chief Secretary. There was one room of a Mess that they built in Jagdalpur. They took a long time, otherwise I would have gone and stayed there.
Some comments are called for on this interview. Last one is the motivated question actuated by frivolous and asinine gossip to smear a reputation for benefit of certain individuals. As to his answer about his proposal for dogs being sent to the US at a cost of a few crore rupees being turned down by the state government' an intelligent and well-informed interviewer should have been ready with a simple follow-up question: There are facilities for training such dogs within the country with the Army and the BSF, to name just two. Were they considered by you?
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NAXALITE INCIDENTS AND EVENTS
Killings, Abductions and Economic Blockade by Naxals : June 2006 Naxalites on 14 June 2006 killed two villagers, including a surrendered comrade and looted their belongings in the Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh. These attacks came a day after the abduction of seven villagers, including six women, by the rebels in Dantewada district on the 13th . Both the persons killed in two separate incidents in Tumnar village of Bijapur police station are named Kowaram Telam. Surrendered Naxalite Kowaram, 57, was picked up from his village past midnight and axed to death by a group ofNaxalites. In a separate incident, the ultras killed the village head (Patel) of Tumnar, Kowaram, 55, and looted his properties worth Rs 48,000. Meanwhile, the economic blockade call given by CPI (Maoist) to protest the Salma Judum in Datemada district of Chhattisgarh on 14 Mar 2006 passed off peacefully but its impact was witnessed in the tribal belts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. In Chhattisgarh, majority of markets in Dantemada, Kanker, Bastar and Sarguja districts remained closed and vehicles kept off the road. The worst-affected areas were Geedam, Bhairamgarh, Bhopal patanam, Bhanupratappur, Pakhanjore, Kisnar, Konde-a,on, N arayanpur and Ambagarh chowki as Maoists blocked roads. In several parts of Orissa, life came to a near standstill, and buses and trucks went off the roads. All state transport buses had been advised to avoid Maoist-hit areas. Overnight journeys were discouraged both by government and private vehicle owners. The impact of blockade was mostly felt in the southern districts of Malkangiri, Gajapati and Rayagada. Prior to the commencement of the blockade, Tumnar village, 10 km from Bijapur police district headquarters in Chhattisgarh, suffered a depredation late on 12 June night at the hands of the
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Terrorism in India
N axalites. More than 1,000 armed rebels attacked the villagers, who are seen as Salma Judum sympathizers. Two villagers were killed in the attack. 20
"Naxalit it for Islamic tat": Thackeray: June 2006 One can count on Shiv Sena Chief Bal Thackeray to come, up with weird theories and postulations. Let us see what he said Qn 19 Jun 2006 at a public meeting in Mumbai convened to mark the 40 th anniversary of the Shiv Sena: "I am ready to seek cooperation of. the Naxalites to fight Islamic terrorism in the country. They are Hindus. They have some social-economic issues for which they have taken to arms. When separatists are invited for talks in Delhi, why do the government ignore Naxalites? The country faced bigger threat from Islamic separatist not only in Jammu and Kashmir what elsewhere in India (also)"21 In his 10-minute speech, he also addressed his other pet aversions/issues: the UPA government taking diktat from Sonia Gandhi, political parties' double-speak on reservations, his inability to check his age which is catching on with him inspite of his famed remote control, etc. But these subjects do not concern us as far as the issue dealt with in this book. A politician like Th~ckeray could not be unaware of the preposterous nature of the comments he has made which are briefly noted above. In fact his postulations are more than weird. Some comments are necessary for information of the Sena Chief and persons of limited vision like him: 1. It must be clearly understood that the aim of the Islamist
terrorist outfits and the CPI (Maoist) is exactly the same: destabilizations, destruction/disintegration of India as we know it today. 2. Both practice extremist, fundamen~alist ideology-one in the religious and th~ other in the political fields. 3. The government and political leaders have often talked of their willingness to talk to the Naxals if they abjure violence. New Delhi cannot talk to those who have never
Naxalism : Present Situation shown any interest in the negotiated solution to tIlt:' socio-economic of the underdeveloped regions a. Hl their inhabitants. .'
ills
4. Forget about their Central .leadership, why does not tht', 'great' Hindu leader contact the State Commith~(' leaders/members of his own state who are spreadins death and destruction in its eastern areas like Gadchi roli district?
8 Oct 06: Dreaded Sobha's arrest brings relief The arrest of Sobha, a dreaded Maoist a"rea commander, hcu; brought a sigh of relief from the police administrations of fo!, r states Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Orissa. Sobh:l. arrested along with two others from Lathikata market 1·\ Sundargarh district on the 7th , is said to be a member of tl~.: Central Committee of the Maoist organization. The two othf" .; arrested with her-Rajan Munda and Bijoy Munda-a l " members of the No. 39· platoon of the Maoists. Along with her husband, Prasant Bose, a West Bengal-baf'('f I active Maoist leader, Sobha was instrumental in planni 1. ~ attacks in these four states, said SP Sundargarh Dhirendra ,..;. Kutte.
8.10.06 (C4atra dist:ti~t, Jharkhand) Three persons were killed late last night by the Maoists Cl r Barkha village. They were abducted, accused of being informer" and shot dead. 8.10.06 (Chhattisgarh) Maoists removed sections of rail track in two places near Kirandul station in Dantemala district, causing derailment of an empty goods train and disruption of traffic along the routes between Chhattisgarh and neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, mainly used for transporting rich quality of iron ire. The Naxalites removed the tracks after the land mine they had planted on the Visakhapatnam-Kirandul railway route failed to go off. 10 Oct 06. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil said at Hyderabad that the CISF was deployed extensively in 12 States
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of the Union which was seriously affected by left wing extremism-NaxalitelMaoist.
Chhattisgarh takes t!te lead among Naxal-hit states: March 2007 Chhattisgarh has surpassed Andhra Pradesh in terms of the number of Naxalite-related incidents and casualties, a daily 22 reported on 17 Mar 2007. "Over the last two years, while Chhattisgarh registered a sharp increase with over 757 incidents that left 551 dead, Andhra Pradesh had 192 fatalities from as many incidents". A further break down of the figures provides a rather grim picture. In case of.Chhattisgarh, security forces are at the receiving end, in contrast to the southern State where most fatalities belong to the rebel camp. The following statistic make the point. 1. In Chhattisgarh, 147 security personnel and 316 civilians have been killed by Naxalites in the last two years, against 88 Naxalite fatalities.
.
2. In sharp contrast is-the figure of Naxalite fatalities in Andhra Pradesh during the same period: of the 192 killed, 141 are Naxalites . '
The Naxalites are equipped with modern arms and ammunition, said Union MOS, Home Sriprakash Jaiswal. In response to a parliamentary question, he said on 16 Mar 2007 security forces had recovered 584 weapons such as SLR and .303 rifles, stenguns and DBBL gp.ns besides grenades, landmines and detonators from Naxal outfits during 2006.
"The Naxalites: through the eyes of the police": Mar 2007 This is the title of a book, edited by Ashok Kumar Mukhopadhyay and published recently: A reviewer of this book starts with a reference to Kurosawa master piece Rashomon, and how historians smile each time they see it. It show how historiography works. The films unusual narrative structure, with its conflicting witness accounts, points to the impossibility of obtaining the truth about a single event:
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in the case of Rashomon, a rape and murder. Shifting our gaze to a more recent 'event' like the N axalite violence that engulfed rural and urban West Bengal in the 1970s' the conflict of perspectives has not lost its sharp edges. Even when the intervening time has afforded us some distance, the peasant uprising of 1967 in a North Bengal village called Naxalbari has its various narratives and, versions-and, therefore, interpretations and inferences. In this valuable collection edited by Mukhopadhya, one sees the swirling violence that descended on the landscape of early mid-1970, Calcutta . through the eyes ofthe police. 23 The Calcutta Police Gazette (CPG), published daily as a tool for internal communication among police personnel at all levels, is not a "secret document". But the extracts in this book, from Jan 1967-four months prior to the first violent confrontations that took place between the state police and organized peasants in Naxalbari on 24 May-to Dec 1975, give us a valuable narrative to how the State, in the form of the police, decided to view and tackle the Naxal menace. To begin with, the approach was largely defensive. Read the entry dated 3 Oct 1970 in the CPG: "The Durga Puja starts from the 7th instant. In this national festival of the Bengalees, it is very natural that our officers and men on duty and their families will be eager to enjoy the festival..But unfortunately, the life of a policemen (sic) today in view of the activities of certain groups and anti-social in the city, particularly the Naxalites, need specially be looked after". By 1971, the CPG is giving policemelt advice on how to open fire on a riotous mob (" one shall aim low at the time offiring . .':) as well as hinting at retribution ("our officers and men shall not forget that the loss of life of any individual officer and man is not only a very big loss to himself, to his family and the coworkers they leave behind but also a very great loss in many ways to the police force as such"). Understandably, a lot of what makes up the internal communication of the CPG is sheer propaganda. The statement of arrested Naxal leader Charu Mazumdar (reprinted as an appendix in this book), for instance, mentions how he became
Terrorism in India "addicted to wine" during his college days and later to "ganja, lehang, opium, charas and siddhi". Why would he want to talk about substance abuse to his jailers at a time when even the writing of such a statement is doubtful, considering the state of his' health? Also, the facts gleaned from Mozumdar's "confessions" and revelations regarding N axal strategy and methods of carrying out the "annihilation of the class evemy" prior to his death in police custody seem suspiciously like material that the police had already gathered and had put it all in the mouth of the N axalleader. In another appendix, fellow Naxal and editor of the Naxal , publications, Liberation, carefully"points out the many discrepancies between facts they would have been known to Mazumdar and what is made evident in Mazumdar's 'unsigned' statement. I
. But the CPG notifications were not only about demonizing the Naxal leaders but also about presenting police brutalities as acts of exemplary courage. To wit, here is a notification from 29 Nov 1973 issue of the CPG: "On 9 Sep 1971, Shri Ranajit Guha Niyogi arranged a predawn raid on the hideouts of extremists of Muraripukur in Eastern Calcutta. As the police. party surrounded the bastee the extremists opened fire on the police. He then opened fire and hit two of the extremists and killed one of them. He also captured some arms and ammunition". Mukhopadhyay points out that this version ("straight out of a Hollywood action movie") sounds dodgy. He goes on to point out that as per eye witnesses, the armed police would raid Naxalite hideouts, select some' young boys suspected to be Naxalites, "make them stand in a single file and then riddle them with bullets." One thing even the Editor of the book does not explain is as to why an incident/police action of Sep 1971 should be notified . as late as in Nov 1973. What was the reason, occasion, and even provocation behind recording the incident more than two years after it took place. More probably, '1973' is a typo for '1971'. It may be that the incident of Sep 1971 has been notified in the
Naxalism : Present Situation
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CPG in Nov 1971. If both the dates as published are correct, only explanation can be that Niyogi was retiring around Nov 1973, and the notifications was a kind of eulogy for him, a parting gift so to say. (. There are CPG entries pertaining to m~asures and methods advised to the policemen to the able to confront the extremists. "The Commissioner of police commends to all ranks the following excerpts from the book on Communist Insurgency by Robert Thompson [British counter-insurgency expert]" goes a 3 Dec 1970 entry, while some others restrict and prohibit the import of 'seditious' publications like Mao Tse Tung: Taveal Jang ke Barre Mein (Urdu), Columbus Plastic Globes, and the magazine, China Pictorial. Notices announcing the "brave acts" of constables are regular features. The CGO may not be a literary master piece, but this genre of books should be welcome to the general public, as a source of information-even if occasionally it reads like a self-serving treatise. This important collection, at the very least, brings a new Kaleidoscope-tivirl to the story of the urban battle raging in a 1970s metropolis. One should not miss humour even if it is in Kafkaesque lines like, "Avoidable places are to be avoided." One entry reads: "This attack will increase in intensity". So the police were there when Naxals waged war in 1960s-1970s Calcutta. This book shows us how they saw them. The narrative is a contemporary account of those times. It is obviously written by junior-level officials, and is often self-serving. Not_withstanding all this, is valuable as a source of information. It gives us a historical perspective of events of those two decades. Nepal Maoist want money from Indian School: Apr 2007 A day after the Maoist joined the interim government, some of their local cadres allegedly issued an extortion notice t? the management of a higher secondary school in southern Nepal, which was constructed with the Indian assistance. It was on 2 Apr 2007 that the Khajuri Higher Secondary School of Dhanusha district received the extortion notice for Rs 4 lakh from the Maoists, failing which the rebels warned they would explode a bomb at the newly-built school building.
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Terrorism in India
A Mo U was signed between the school management and the Indian Embassy in Nov 2004 for the project. India had provided Rs 15 lakh for its construction. The Management informed the Embassy about the incident, and the latter in turn asked the Nepalese Government to provide ~ecurity to the school. Kathmandu gave the necessary assurance. In 2006, the Maoists had extorted Rs 2.5 lakh from the contractor who built the school, "which is scheduled to be inaugurated next month (May 2007)".
Maoist Crimes: will they be ever punished? May 2007 Chhattisgarh's reputation as the State worst hit by 'Left' extremism has found grisly reconfirmation in the killing of 9 policemen on 28 May in the Bastar region. The policemen who were on an anti-Naxalite in a remote area, were killed in a series of explosions and an unremitting volley of gunfire. The modus operandi reflects the growing capacity of Maoist extremists in Chhattisgarh to carry out coordinated operations. The ambush is one of a string of deadly Maoist attacks this year; the most lethal was in Bijapur in March (2007) on a police camp in which 55 security ·men were slaughtered. Data compiled by the Institute of Conflict Management reveal that in 2005, 2006 and 2007 Maoists have killed more security personnel in Chhattisgarh than in other help spots such as Bihar and Jharkhand. 24 In all, the year 2006 saw over 500 people killed in Chhattisgarh as a result of Maoist depredations. Most of the victims are civilians, with Maoists also involved in what are plain criminal activities, such as abductions, hostage-taking and gruesome violence like beheadings. 25 Chhattisgarh having emerged as the worst-affected State, the Maoists are also on the rampage in several other states. Consequently, the daily lives of citizens in large swathes of the country are severely disrupted. The rapidity with which Maoist crimes are escalating and increasing scale of their activities can only suggest that they are possibly gaining the upper hand. Security establishment has'
Naxalism : Present Situation
, 931
reasons to be concerned if the internal security situation is spinning out of control. It.is not without-significance that the situation on the Maoist violence front has begun to invite reference/mention in the international media, which is happening not because ofIndia's sudden and extraordinary news worthiness but since the massacres symbolise Indian State's soft underbelly: its unraveling internal security situation. Yet somehow, the gravity of situations in Chhattisgarh (and neighbouring states) does not seen to have caught the attention of policy-makers in a meaningful degree. If the Centre has a proclivity to grudgingly acknowledge the seriousness of the problem, it haleitually passes the la~ andorder luck to the States-ritually but meaninglessly offering all help to the latter as and when requested. In turn States like Chhattisgarh, which adopt quick fix methods, ad hoc in nature, to deal with this security threat, are extremely sensitive to anything that can be remotely perceived as criticism of their handling of the situation. To cite one example of adhocism, services of the renowned antiterrorism expert, KPS Gill, were requisitioned for one year but not renewed in early 2007. This approach of the Centre and the concerned states does not help in controlling the menace, not to speak of eliminating it. This is not only unfortunate but also dangerous, because this lackadaisical approach will only worsen the enormity of the crisis that is already looming large. Analysts ascribe the marked increase in Naxalite violence in Chhattisgarh over the past three years to the merger and consequent consolidation of the two major extremist formations, the PWG (People's War Group) and the MCC (Maoist Communist Centre of India). "The most significant expansion of their destructive capacities came during the 2004-2005 Ceasefire in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh between the Congress government and the Maoists. The AP ceasefire, supported by the Centre, was worth trying under the circumstances but failed in its objec~ive of de-escalation. Intelligence officials believe it actually led to an expansion of the theatre of extremist operations."
I
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Terrorism in India
Unfortunately, Moist violence-terrorism, in fact, should be its proper appellation-has become a subject of political rhetoric in India, particularly in the' hands of elitist libertine like the Arundhati Roys. Obviously, there are more than are opinions on the subject. First, the ground realities. The situation in central India is essentially that of asymmetrical warfare. On the one hand, there are the ideologically fired and politically motivated Maoist forces that have international links and use the terror tactics in an attempt to undermine, and finally destabilize, the Indian state. They have increasingly indulged in politico-criminal activities. Ultimate aim: Overthrowing of the Indian State, a la in the neighbouring Nepal. The activists and their leadership are well aware of the vastly different objective situation in Nepal and India, but aspiring high is a tactic of the revolutionaries the world over. Ranged against the determined desperados, on the other hand, are the creaking security machinery and the calcified, soporific responses of the Indian state. This mismatch of a feeble response to what is emerging as the most insidious threat to the Republic is omenous, to say the least. It is easy to ,underestimate the strength of the faceless guerrilla force and distance from New Delhi makes it easier for the policy makers - functioning from there to make unrealistic and some time even facile assumptions and analysis of the sitlJ.ation in the Maoist terrorism-affected States. \ Some analysts are warning the security establishment to realize what can happen, citing the example of neighbouring Nepal, if anti-national forces are not handled seriously, and put down ruthlessly. It is no longer a secret that Maoists are running parallel 'administrations' in many deceptively peaceful districts of the country. That is the reason serious enough for the Indian state to cease to be in a denial mode about the dimensions of the N axalite problem. This, in fact, has to be the first step in crafting an effective policy framework to first contain and then eliminate the Maoists. What is required utmost is the political will. If
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Andhra Pradesh has been able to put the Maoists on the run, there should be no reason why others can not do the same. But then there others, mainly liberal and elitist critics who fault the government on different grounds. They assert that the worsening situation can be blamed, as the BJP state governments tend to do, on the neighbours and the Central Government. They assert there is a nexus between the deepening crisis and the State government's policies in tackling the N axalite challenge. "This is highlighted by the notorious Salma Judum (= Purification Hunt) campaign. This officially sanctioned effort to mobilize tribal people against Maoists has caused enormous social damage. It has pitted tribal against the tribal, village against village, and resulted in the death and displacement of huge numbers of innocent people". Then it is alleged the state government has failed to distinguish between the perpetrators of the violence and the voices of legitimate dissent and democratic protest. Some dismiss this criticism as motivated for the simple reason that the state police had the gumption of arresting a wellknown civil rights activist Binayak Sen. ~ Be that as it may, the fact remains that Naxals are serious threat in Chhattisgarh and they need to be handled more effectively than hithertofore. Kid gloves treatment would not do. The menace must be stopped in its tracks-ruthlessly, if necessary.
Horrors of fighting Naxalite terror: 37 years after: June 2007 This is a sad story of ghosts of N axalite terrorism hunting a retired DGP of a State, 37 years after he fought it. "The CBI court will read out the Chargesheet to a former Kerala DGP and IGP for killing a Naxalite leader in a contrived encounter 37 years ago." This is the news story datelined Kochi: 15 June 2007. In the dock are former DGP P. Vijayan and IGP G. Lakshmana, who have been ordered to appear before the court for killing Varghese. .
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Terrorism in India
Varghese led the Spring Thunder campaign of Kerala's fledgling N ~xalite movement in the 1970s, when K. Karunakaran was the State's Home Minister. Varghese and his followers mostly operated in the Wayanad belt of the North Malabar, annihilating "class enemies" and were alleged to have killed a couple of local landlords accused of oppressing workers. 26 The special team of Kerala police stalking Varghese announced his death on 18 Feb 1970. Claiming that he was killed in an armed encounter in the Tirunelli forest of Wayanad, the police got photograph of the slain rebel, with a country rifle near his body, printed in the newspapers. Though N axalites and other activist organisalions in the State raised· a din and moved court alleging it was a staged killing, the case and its investigation dragged on for several years, until the 1990s. That was when Ramachandran Nair, a former head constable, declared that he had shot Varghese point blank on the orders of his superiors after the police had nabbed and tortured him in custody. Nair, who died in 2006, had confessed that he was making the revelation only clear his own conscience, and was willing to take any 'punishment the court deemed fit for his crime. He said it was Lakshmana, then a DIG, who ordered him to shot, threatening to kill him (Nair) if he did not oblige/obey. The CBI, which took over the investigations in the wake of Nair's revelation, had filed the charge sheet with Nair as the first accused. Vijayan, Lakshmana and a couple of other policemen, who are no more, were made the co-accused, but they managed to get a.stay on the proceedings. The case received a fillip after the High Court recently pulled up the accused for trying to delay the case and scrapped the stay.
Maoists call two-day blockade in 4 States: 26-27 Jun~ 2007 Security forces were put on alert, 2, June 2007, in several States following a 2-day economic blockade announced by the CPI (Maoist) from 26 June 2007.
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Intelligence agencies suspect that Maoist guerrillas, numbering more than 20,000, could target industries and. railways in a bid to bring mining activities in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Jharkhand to a standstilL The blockade seems inspired by several "Chakka jams" organized by the Maoist Party in Nepal, which wrecked the economy of the Himalayan Kingdom. The latest move comes in the backdrop of the CPI (Maoist) Polit Bureau to step up attacks to destroy infrastructure.
Protest against SEZs The blockade was planned to appose the formation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the policies of Central and State Government "which are playing into the hands of multi-national companies", a Maoist statement issued in Orissa on 19 June said. Interestingly, the Central Committee of the Party has not issued a statement announcing the blockade; the statements were issued by the State Committee Gauri Shankar Rath, Additional DGP, Jharkhand, told a daily27 on the phone, 21 June: ''We have noticed many posters announcing the blockade on the borders of Jharkhand with Orissa and West BengaL We suspect that Naxals could indulge in violence because they have been getting hit in Jharkhand and Bihar." In Chhattisgarh, the authorities are busy mobilizing troops in the strife-torn forest areas of Bastar. "We are concentrating on Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur and Jagdalpur districts, which have a strong presence of Maoists", Giridhari Nayak, IGP, overseeing the anti-extremist operations, told the daily from Raipur.
Mining operations hit That the latest strategy of Maoists is to target the economic infrastructure of the country is clear. When on 31 May and 2 June, six districts went without power for the next 11 days affecting mining operations and the movement of ore from Bailadilla mines. The national Mineral Development Corporation is reported to have incurred a loss of Rs 9 crore a
Terrorism in India
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day. Days after the 'Bastar black out, Maoists blew up th~ control station of a mini-hyd~ power generating unit at Sileru in the Donkarai area of East Godavari. Later, they blew up hightension transmission lines too. A similar blockade in June 2006 in Chhahisgarh had a devastating impact. With the National Highway 16, which passes through Bastar, being blocked, the Dantewada, Kanket and Surguja districts remained cut off. Power supply restored After 12 days of darkness, the power supply to Bastar, Narayanpur, Dantewada and Bijapur districts was partially restored on 12 June 2007. "It could take a few days (more) to complete the work as currently there is heavy rainfall in Narayanpur", an official spokesman for the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (CSEB) said. As said above, normal life in the Bastar region was thrown into disarray after Maoist blew up the Bhilai-Barsur high tension transmission structures near Narayanpur on 31 May. The restoration of power supply was adversely affected Naxalites blew up a truck on 5 June, killing three CSEB workers and injuring five security men. i
Women in the Naxal Movement .
I
If Ajitha was the female icon in the Naxalite movement of the 1960s, Nirmala akka is the current persona doing the honours. Women were always there in the Naxallandscape, but today they have a 'Battalion' exclusively for themselves. Th~ story of Munni Devi is as good as any other to tell the circumstances that propelled the women into tough, man's world of guerrilla warfare-though, of course, no longer so! It was essentially callous society denying them social justice that brought about the drastic metamorphosis in their ordinary, penury-ridden lives.
Munni Devi 26, wife of a soldier guarding India's precious borders in Jammu and Kashmir, is presently serving a life sentence in the Ranchi jail after she was convicted of killing three policemen at the Chiro valley in her village Latehaar in
Naxalism : Present Situation
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Bihar. Her 'crime'? She sQught to release Latehaar from the agonizing clutches of 'oppressors'. Regret, of course, she does not know. "No jail on earth can keep me for 2Q years," she is sure. Introduced to Naxalism five years ago (2001), Munni with six cases against her, is an archetype of hundreds of women who have joined their male compatriots in the CPI (M) (formed in 2004 when the MCC merged with PWG) to become an inseparable part of the attack squads which signify terror to some state governments. Munni and other women of her ilk are precisely doing what the party's manifesto emphasizes: Women asserting their power in the organization and fighting genderbased discrimination. Chhattisgarh is one of the states having sizeable women cadres in the Naxal ranks-700 in all. The Naxal movement considered d8ad in Tamil Nadu is still· active in Dharmapuri, once the cradle of Naxalism. The Farmers Liberation Front claims the Naxals here are more concerned with social and economic issues of the people. Reena, one of the I women arrested under POTA for "undertaking arms traiQ.ing" near Dharmapuri in 2002, says: "We believe in Naxalbari ideology, though we are not that". She took to 'alternative politics' because of her mother's plight, "I was disgusted by the· way society treated my mother after she became a widow .... only social ohange can put an end to such inequalities". Mter a long fight, Reena and the other women were released on bail. IGP Bastar (Chhattisgarh) Mohd Wazir Ansari says, "women N axalites are more ruthless than their male comrades. Each lal Dasta (= Red Squad) has at least three women adept in guerrilla warfare." ADGP Sant Kumar Paswan (Madhya Pradesh) gives more information on Naxal women: "In Dandakaranya, 30 per cent of the 70 guerrilla outfits and 30 military dalams (= squads) have women commanders". Paswan is in charge of controlling Maoist operations in his State. The women, between the ages of 16 and 35, are enro;led through special recruitment drives and are subsequently trained at camps in West Champaran, Bokaro, Chatra and Hazaribagh,
938
Terrorism in India
and in other parts of the country. Many are tribal and lower castes. Yet, they are well-educated and some even speak English. And aim of these women: ,To wipe out economic disparity and social injustice with ,.the Utpidan Mukti Vahini (= antiexploitation force). Paswan has more details: "A special battalion, National Park Dalam, exclusively for women Maoists, has been raised in Narayanpur. Nirmala akka, a doctor, heads it. Sujata, wife of Politburo member M. Koteshwar Rao, and Nirmalahead (their respective) outfits in South Bastar. Nirmala is also a member of the Central Committee of the Maoists",. The women Naxalites of Jharkhandfirst grabbed the head lines on 31 Oct 2001, after-they attacked the Topchanchi police station, Dhanbad, killing 13 policemen. Decamping with 18 SLRs, they set the station on fire. Here follow some other incidents involving women Naxals: • 3 March 2006, dressed up as marriage revellers, they opened fire'at the Central Industrial Security Force men at Chandrapura, Bokaro, Five of them and a women Naxalite were killed. • A month earlier, Maoists had decamped with explosives and weapons after blowing up a depot at National Mineral Development Corporation in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, killing eight Jaw:ans and injuring nine. • Police also blame them for the 16 Apr (2006) killing of 11 policemen in Bastar, • These women also played a decisive role in coercing over 160 sarpanches, secretaries and janpad chairmen to resign in Dandakaranya. To step up Maoist campaigns against the government's Jan Rapat and Gaon-shahar-Chalo schemes, the male commanders of the Kondagaon, Kochalibada and Maad dalams have been replaced by the women Naxals. They fight their ideological battles at several planes. Working zealously to create a classless society, they masquerade
Naxalism : Present Situation
939
as vegetable vendors, mix with village folk and sing songs in praise of Naxalism and its struggle for an egalitarian society. These revolutionaries are often seen exhorting villagers to fight untouchability and encouraging them for inter caste marriages. The villagers are urged to fight the higher castes and the police-seen as oppressors and committing atrocities on them. The hapless, abused women are pressed/compelled to fight their tormentors. The police does not seem to be knowing much about these N axals women and their activities. Obviously, the later are wellversed in the art of hiding their tracks. The police, as of now have only a few ofthem on their hit-list. Barke, 19, tops the list. Hailing from West Bengal, she is involved in Maoist attacks in Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and Chhattisgarh-besides of course in her own state-over the past two years. The analysts rue the fact that police efforts to stem the Maoist depredations and nab the perpetrators have been lamentable. "In Bihar, hardly a dozen women Maoists have been arrested, Veenita, accused of murdering Rohtas forest officer Sanjay Singh, in Feb 2002, being the most prominent. She carries a reward of Rs 50,000 on her head. Perhaps, the only solace the police can have is that some of the arrested members turn informers. Perhaps as a clever move to create a chasm between male and female Maoist cadres, the Jharkhand police screened a . documentary Badrang Hota Lal Salaam (=:: the fading red salute) showing women Naxalite being sexually exploited by their male colleagues. (If we are to believe their personal histories, the women Maoists claim to be too imbued with Chairman Mao's philosophy to fall for physical temptations. Of course, these 'puritans' would the benumbed into deep silence if they are told about their icon's weakness for the young, nubil~ girls right into his old age!) The State also announced the 'Kanyadaan scheme' for women Maoists-a grant for marriage and subsequent rehabilitation. A journalist poses a pertinent question: Will marriage take them away from the armed revolution aimed at
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Terrorism in India
creation of a classless society? May be, he should contact Munni Devi in a Ranchi jail for the answer. Here is a news flash from their counterparts in Kathmandu. Guerrillas are demanding at least 40 per cent reservation for women in the interim government to ensure gender equality in the Himalayan nation. The members of the All Nepal Women's Organization (Revolutionary) ANWO (R), a sister organization of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) "are getting ready for a brainstorming storming session on Friday (1 Dec 2006), focus of which is gender equality in Nepal's future political scenario. Jaypuri Gharti Magar, Chief of the ANWO (R) was quite emphatic: "Having played a decisive role during the decade-old war, women cannot be marginalized when it comes to a role in " nation-building.. _We want them to be ministers as well." Coming from Magar, a senior leader;in Nepal's Maoist hierarchy, this should be an inviting morsel for her Indian acolytes to chew upon! Personal Histories What follows are biographical sketches of four Naxalite cadres, belonging to diffuroent .periods, hailing from different backgrounds, and have different presents . . K. Ajitha : Early woman Naxalite She had made the headlines in the 1960s. 56 today, she was jailed for nine years from 1968 for a Naxalite attack on a police station, and is President of the. voluntary organization Anweshi. She married Yakub, a colleague. They have a daughter, Gargi, who is in college. Her story of youthful idealism and N axalite life of that long past is told mostly in the fi·rst person. "I was not adventurous by nature, but circumstances made me take a risky path to fight for the ideals that I developed faith in Rebellion and revolution were blQwing all over the world in the sixties. My pare:nts, ,Kunnickal N arayanan and .Mandakini being firm believers ofMal?'ism and later in doctrines of Chinese statesman Mao Tse-tung., iny attraction to revolution was only natural.
Naxalism : Present Situation
941
Used to reading Mao literature regularly and listing to Radio Peking (now China Radio International), "I became aware that every one has a duty to perform for the progress of mankind and that each person should contribute in all possible ways to fight oppressive and capitalist forces. "Mao's teachings inspired me and instilled a sense of courage to face any difficulty in the path of revolution. When 1 quit studies during Pre-degree, 1 was fully fired up by the Communist ideals Mao had been preaching-permanent revolution and importance of the peasantry, of small-scale industry, and of agricultural collectivization. 1 became a committed Naxalite through Mao. "Kerala those days was witnessing immense social inequities ...poor farmers and tribals of Wayaned district in North Kerala faced a lot of oppression from feudal lords and the police. ' "As revolutionary movements sprang up at Naxalbari in DaIjeeling (in May 1967) and Sreekakulam, we.were encouraged to take up arms against the oppressors. Though my dedication to the cause of revolution was total, many fellow Naxalites were apprehensive about a teenager taking part in an armed struggle from inaccessible jungles of Wayanad. My determination soon over come their apprehensions. "Being the only women III the group, I did face discrimination from male colleagues when they excluded me from major meeting. The revolutionary fervour enabled me to hang on. "The high level thinking among Naxalites prevented the occurrence of physical temptations which could develop in a girl during teenage. "Always guided by Mao's teachings, I never veered from the revolutionary path all through the long stays in the forest, the bloody attack on the Malabar Special Police Camp in Pulpaly (Wayanad) in 1968 and later one in the jail since 1968 ~w..:l" ~R
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Nirmala akka, MBBS Born into a family of farmers in Sreekalkulam, Andhra Pradesh, Nirmala akka has been associated with the Naxal movement since childhood. It was her brother's association with the movement that drew into its fold. She fully devoted herself to the movement after completing her medical degree from Hyderabad in 1988. Her identification with it was sealed when she married a CPI(M) activist Mukiri Somaiya. The couple decided against having children as "they" do not have the time to look after anything other than the Naxalite movement."29 Being a qualified doctor, Nirmala has trained several teams to administer preliminary medical treatment to injured comrades. Intelligence sources say one team has an ambulance to carry the injured to Dr. Naxalite. A senior Bihar Naxalleader informs Nirmala has visited his State and Jharkhand a dozen times in the past ten years to train women Naxalite in first aid. She vyas in Nepal in Mar 2004 "to impart training to women Maoist." This leader continues: Before she returned to Chhattisgarh, "Nirmala spent three nights at a village in East Champaran, a border district of India." He claimed she was a great fighter, who has carried out 17 daring actions against the police and other 'enemies'. Nirmala now heads the National Park Dalam, exclusively raised for the women Naxalites. On joining the Naxals, she was made a member of the Bhavanasi Dalam, and the Tiger Reserve Dalam, and stayed with it till 1996, when she took over as its commander.. She has also commanded Palauanka Dalam in Prakasam district. She was reportedly involved in the murder of P. Srinivasacharya in Jan 2000, and led the armed squad that killed Paturu Ramaswamy at Narmalapadu village, Piduguralla.
Sabita Kumari: "I have killed five ..•will kill 100."60 Naxalleader Sabita Kumari, 22, displays no remorse about
Naxalism : Present Situation
943
the five murders she has committed. She promises to "murder at least a 100 if I am alive for another 10 years."
As with most of her Naxal comrades, Sabita was forced to take up arms after her "oppressors"-money-Ienders from her native village Paleira in Jharkhand-murdered her two younger sisters and then seized their ancestral land with police help. Worst, when she sought justice from the officer-in-charge police station, he demanded sex in return. "so I decided to seek justice on my own", she recalls. A hard-core Naxal, she has hand in some well-known cases: (1) hacking to death 13 policemen at the Topchanchi station,Dhanbad, on 13 Oct 2001. (2) In 2005, she was part of the large squad that broke into the Jehanabad jail, killing 12, to free 340 comrades. A member of 12-member armed squad commanded by a oneeyed man, Sabita is a graduate from a college in Daltanganj and speaks a bit of English. Sabita is not her real name; it is party name. "There are three women in our squad. We eat together, move together, and sleep together. We do not have physical relations because we have no time to think about that," says she. Sabita's parents wanted her to be a teacher but fate decided otherwise. Questioned about her marriage, she says: "Why would I marry? My mission is to establish the rule of people in India."
Comrade V. Bharati: The Sarpanch Today, Bharati is the Sarpanch of her village, Gummalakshmipuram. 'Comrade Bharati' was a teenager when Naxalism took roots in Andhra Pradesh in the late 1960s. "We learnt to make country-made bombs and carried pistols for personal safety," recalls Bharati, who had gone underground back then. The Srikakulam-Vizianagaram forest was abuzz with extremist activity then as it is now. Bharati, who has a case pending against her, speaks nostalgically about those (her N axal) days: "People were attracted by anti-government songs. We understood the cause a lot better. Today, there is not much idealism left. Government schemes have diverted the peoples' minds, but I will not say that Naxalism is dead."3o
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Some select incidents of Maoist Violence Date
Killed/ Injured
17 June 2006
2INil
20-21 June
7/3
2006
8 Feb 2007
5/12
Details
Two Naxalites killed in Chhattisgarh Two Naxalites were killed in Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh in a joint operation mounted by its police and Andhra Pradesh's. The ultras had fired at the police party and in the ensuing shoot out two of them were killed, the police told the PT!. Naxals kidnap 25, kill 7 in Chhattisgrah Some 300 armed Maoists raided Dantewada district and took hostage 25 villagers. Subsequently, they shot, beat and stabbed to death seven of them and injured three other on 20 June 2006 night. They also burnt down number of houses in the village. The police recovered the bodies on the 2pt morning. Chief Minister Raman Singh said condemning the killings: "Massacre has ashamed humanity ... CPI (Maoist) has become desperate ever since the Bastar tribals had launched the Salwa Judum campaign. With the campaign reaching Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites were becoming more and more insecure. As the N axalites are losing grounds, they are targeting innocent villagers." 5 killed 12 hurt in Naxal violence in Chhattisgarh In a major strike, Naxalites on 8 Feb killed a civilian and four security personnel and injured 12 others by triggering on lED in Chhattisgarh's Bijapur district.
Naxalism : Present Situation Date
Killed/ Injured
945
Details The blast took place between Bodli and Bhairamgarh villages on the National Highway 16, that connects Bastar region with Nizamabad of Andhra Pradesh. Bhairamgarh police station sources gave details of the fatalities: 1. An officer and a jawan of the Nagaland Armed Force. 2. An Assistant Sub Inspector (AS!) of Chhattisgarh police. 3. A Special Police Officer (SPO). 4. A civilian.
26 Mar 2007
NillNil
Maoists attack police station in Chhattisgarh Maoists once again attacked the Maraiagudem police outpost in the 26 May 2007 night. Some 300 Naxalites and Sangham members surrounded the outpost, hurled grenades at it and then opened fire. There was heavy firing from both sides. The Konta Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Prafulla Kumar Thakur, said the firing went on for about an hour. There were no casualties.
19 May 2007
10/1
Maoists kill 10 policemen in Bastar Maoists violence claimed the lives of 10 police]llen in the Bastar forests of Chhattisgarh on 19 May. This blow in Bastar comes shortly after blowing-up of the railway track at two places at Bhansi and Bacheli villages effectively cutting off transport of iron ore from the Bailadilla mines in Chhattisgarh.
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Killed / Injure d
Detail s
On the 19 May, police men riding motorc ycles becam e sitting ducks for the terrorI sts, who lay in wait near Kudur villag e and blaste d 20 mines while simul, taneou sly openi ng fire. Nine of them, .includ ing a sub-in specto r and two havild ars, were killed in the operat ion that lasted an hour. The other memb er of the police patrol , escape d -and reache d the nearb y police station sqme 20 km away. The police team had rushed to a locatio n on receiv ing the inform ation. About the movem ent of the ultras, IG of SIB, Chhat tisgarh , Giridh ari Nayak , told the press. Possib ly, the inform ation was plante d to lure the police men to the heavil y-mine d area. The same day, some 30 civilia ns had a mirac ulous escap e in a landm ine explos ion trigge red by the milita nts in Malka ngiri distric t of Orissa abutti ng the strife- form Basta r area. A CRPF jawan lost his life in anoth er excha nge of fire in Gang alur police station area falling in the neighb ouring Bijapu r distric t.
Notes 1. Asian Age, 4 April, 2007.
2. Vivek Deshpa nde, Indian Express, 8 June, 2007. 3. Venkat Parsa, "Maois ts met in forests despite cops", Asian Age, 26 Feb., 2007. 4. Shafi Rehma n, Indian Express, 22 Feb., 2007. 5. K. Sriniva s Reddy, Hindu, 21 Feb., 2007.
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947
6. Mohua Chatterjee, Times of India, 15 May, 2007. 7. Lalita Iyer, Week, 11 June, 2006. 8. Vivek Deshpande, Indian Express, 18 Dec., 2006. 9. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 26 March, 2007. 10. Vishwa Mohan, Times of India, 16 March, 2007. 11. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 20 April, 2007. 12. Vijay Thakur, Statesman, 28 April, 2007. 13. Akhilesh Suman, Pioneer, 27 April, 2007. 14. Manoj Prasad, Indian Express, 16 June, 2007.
15. Week, 11 June, 2006. 16. Other affected states are Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. 17. Vishwa Mohan, Times of India, 2 April, 2007. 18. Vijay Jha, Indian Express, 1 June, 2007. 19. Shivam Vij, Tehelka, 19 May, 2007. 20. Shivam Vij interviewed KPS Gill, Tehelka, 19 May, 2007. 21. Times of India, 15 June, 2006.
22. Statesman, 21 June, 2006. 23. Pradeep Thakur, Times of India, 17 March, 2007.
24. Hindustan Times, 4 March, 2007. 25. Cited, editorial, Hindu, 30 May, 2007. 26. Cited, editorial, Pioneer, 30 May, 2007. 27. Rajeev PI, Indian Express, 16 June, 2007. 28. K. Srinivas Reddy, Hindu, 22 June, 2007. 29. As told to Vinu Abraham, Week, 11 June, 2006. 30. A more celebrated example of such a vow is the CPI(M) couple of Prakash and Brinda Karat. 31. This is the title of the story on Sabita Kumari in Week, 11 June, 2006 32. Cited, Lalita Iyer, Week, 11 June, 2006.
"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
18 Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh Chhattisgarh is one of the worst-affected states of the Union. The Naxalites dominate 9 of the 16 districts of the State? And are rapidly spreading their influence in four districts, says an intelligence report. It makes a dark prediction: "The Maoists . could capture 60 per cent of the land in these areas by 2010.~'1 In the State's Bastar division, the Naxals have forcibly occupied 20,000 hectares of forest land and are running a parallel government. As many as 175 incidents were reported in the state during January-April 2006. On 29 April 200'6, the Maoists killed 15 members of Salwa Judam (anti-Naxal campaign in Bastar) and earlier on 25 April, they had kidnapped 52 villagers from'Bastar. Between Nov 2005 and 30 Apr 2006, they have killed at least 90 people, including 50 security personnel. In what can classify as a huge exaggeration, a journalist wrote, "in fact, almost all of Chhattisgarh's 16 districts are Naxalite-infested,2 with over 700 women in the guerrilla squads. SALWA JUDUM: BOON OR A CURSE? Salwa Judum: Success or Failure: An Analysis: Mar 2007 Salwa Judum (SJ) was formally initiated by the Chhattisgarh Government in June 2005 as a people's movement against Naxalite violence (and terrorism, what the Naxal extremism actually is). Salwa Judum (mobilization for peace) was deemed as a part of the government's counter-insurgency strategy. Object of Criticism Of late, the SJ has been coming under criticism for a variety of reasons. Some NGOs and liberals have accused the government of pitting tribals against the armed Naxalites. Some even took recourse to the modern IT jargon, accusing the state
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Terrorism in India
of outsourcing anti-Naxalite fighting to the tribals under the SJ campaign. It was also asserted that the so-called volunteers joining the SJ were in fact forced to do so. With 15 March 2007 attack on Rani Bodli SJ camp, some analysts are inclined to believe that the Naxalites are gunning for the SJ activists. Because 34 of the 55 police personnel killed there were Special Police Officers (SPOs), the fact gave rise to the speculations that the Naxalites might have been implementing their recent resolve to stamp out peoples' movements directed against them. This major attack came eight months after 25 SJ activists were killed by the Naxalites at an Errabore relief camp in Dantewada district. The first indication of the Naxals being back with a renewed vigour was the killing on 4 March 2007 of the JMM MP Sunil Mahato, an opponent of the Naxalite violence and an active member, rather leader, of the NSS who was often vocal in condemning the Naxalism in his state, Jharkhand. However, it was not if all the (34) SPOs killed and/or injured on 15 March were officially part of the SJ project. They were drawn from among the local population and possibly part of a temporary police camp set up to control/counter Naxalite activities in' Bhairamgarh Block of Bijapur district. The group also included a read opening party (=ROP. It is a routine practice in Jammu and Kashmir for the units to send the ROPs in their areas along the highway to ensure that land mines if any laid out by the terrorists are removed or defused) since there were instances of roads in the area being mined or blocked. If the Chhattisgarh government decided to deploy all means at its disposal in its anti-Naxal armoury, including the SJ, it certainly has its reasons. It is a known fact that the State accounts for a majority of incidents and casualties when it comes to N axalite violence. The following needs to be highlighted: 1. In 2006, the state witnessed 7/5 incidents of Naxal depredations, that caused large number of fatalities (462)-304 civilians, 84 security personnel and 74 Naxalites.
2. 13 battalions of central paramilitary forces, including CRPF and CISF, are already deployed in the state to assist its police in anti-N axal tasks. It is obvious, seeing
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
951
the ability of the Naxals to choose their targets at will and cause mindless death and destruction, that the center will have to allot additional security forces and intelligence resources to Chhattisgarh to improve its counter-Naxalite performance. The above facts have been adduced to show the grim situation created by the Naxals for the state and its requirement and determination to adopt all available resources and means, including the SJ campaign, to counter the evil.
Salwa Judum Criticized A report, 'Salwa Judum and Violence on Women in Dantewada' was released on 18 Jan 2007 by glamorous writeractivist Arundhati Roy at New Delhi. A group called the Committee Against Violence on Women (CAVOW) got this report prepared by a team "which visited the area between 30 Sep 18 Nov 2006 to investigate the condition of safety, security, life and livelihood of tribal women" Convenor of CAVOW Shoma Sen gave this information. Attributing the significant increase in incidence of violence against women in Dantewada to Salwa Judum, the CAVOW has called for a review of the Government's counter-insurgency strategy. Some of the accusation/points made by the Report and . Roy are mentioned here. 1. The Report submitted to the National Commission for Women (NCW), highlights the atrocities perpetrated by the SJ activists. 2. Releasing the Report, Roy said: "This is a disturbing document and the business of setting up vigilante groups is infusing the country with violence." 3. Roy further said, criticizing the Government's the Government's policies, "We are entering an era where we have to become a police or an army state and they will become the implementers of the great Indian growth rate dream." 4. The Report lwint& out the absence of health and education facilities in the district. 5. CAVOW member and researcher Ilina Sen said: "SJ, which was built for restoring peace in the area has
Terrorism in India
952
instead proved to be a violent institution. Women havebeen raped and molested, dole being given out to people is insufficient, ration does not last for the whole week." 6 The Chairman of the NCW, Prof. Malini Bhattacharya, also echoes some points from the Report: "In the wake of SJ, villagers are deserted and whatever little civic amenities are available are in the relief camps. Though we have no direct evidence of violence against women, our team met women lodged in prisons who have been abused. Those village women claimed they have been accused of having links with Naxals." Comments on the Report A word on the NGOs Recent inquiries the world over have shown that most NGOs are not credible, and some are outright frauds, whose sole aim is to gain publicity and occasionally even hog the newspaper headlines. It is no one's case that all the NGOs have dubious reputation . . The one in question, CAVOW, seems to be not so well known, and it chose to call itself merely a 'Committee'. That perhaps explains ~ts 'renting' the service of a Roy to release its Report. Roy incidentally has assumed the role of a glamorous activist who is ever ready to associate herself with any anti-Government often even anti-India activities. Being a Booker Prize author, she has certain reputation. Is she going to be a one-book author, no one can tell. But in post-Booker years, some critics feel she has reduced herself to a worthy tract-writer. Interestingly, having won' a literary prize, she has convinced herself of being wellqualified to comment on any issue under the sun-be it India's nuclear explosion, economic policies, major hydro-power projects like N arbada or India emerging as a superpower. If the criticism does not include alternative solutions to the plans/projects/ decisions done down/ridiculed, it loses its very credibility. If she goes as far as to say-as she indeed has done in the recent years-that Naxalites are justified to inflict mindless bruatalities on the innocents in the name of righting socioeconomic disparities and getting justice for the under-privileged! disadvantaged sections of society, one need not take her seriously. In her own lights, she may be right in thinking that the Naxalite ideology of violpncp lmlimited is the only solution
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
953
to India's ills and democratic imperfections, she has no reason to expect others to imbibe this wisdom. Here are offered some comments on and critique of certain accusations/statements made in the Report: 1. The Report highlights the atrocities perpetrated by the SJ activists, without giving any specificities and details. It is, of course, obvious that the CAVOW team that visited Dantewada for seven weeks never heard of NaXal atrocities. 2. Roy is disturbed by setting up of the vigilante groups because they are "infusing the country with violence" she is obviously convinced that the N axalites are running a peaceful campaign and government violence against them is unjust and uncalled for. Such a blinkered vision which sees only government's violence can be ignored, even if it comes from Roy. 3. Roy is concerned about "India becoming a police or an army state and they will become the implementers of the great Indian growth rate dream". One wishes she had given example of a nation which has neutralized/ defeated insurgency/terrorismlNaxalism with Gandhian ways. The entire postulation can be dismissed as 'ideological rhetoric? 4. About the absence of health and education, it should be known that no one denies the shortcoming not only in Dantewada but also in the rest of Chhattisgarh. But Roy and the activists must know that the state endeavour in development field are thwarted by the Naxals with lethal violence. Development projects undertaken by the state goyernment will be mentioned later. 5. SJ will help restore peace if it is allowed to function sans rhetoric and motivated criticism and exaggerated accusations. Yet again, why use the term 'dole' for rations? They have been dubbed insufficient without telling us the quantitative information. 6. Chairman, NCW repeats some of the accusations made in the Report. "These village women claimed they have
Terrorism in India
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been accused of having links with Naxals." Is it being conveyed that these women-all of them-are innocent? Roy and CAVOW are not perhaps aware that the Naxals have sizeable number of female cadres. 7. The best part comes now. After laying all kinds of accusations including rape and molestation, the NCW Chairperson say: "Though we have no direct evidence of violence against women our team met women lodged in prisons who have been abused .. _" Imagine, this is the Qhairperson of a National Commission speaking!
~
It cannot be denied that Roy and this Chairperson are honourable persons having earned certain place in the pantheon of eminent Indians in a variety of fields. Their only fault is that they are innocent of complexity of security threats impinging upon this nation's integrity and sovereignty. Even this exculpation seams uncalled for when one is aware that, to repeat something already mentioned above, one of these two eminences, Roy-to be exact, has pl,lblicly declared that she is waiting for the time when the Left-wing extremists will take over India and de,liver justice to the much-oppressed people! Is any further comment necessary?
Why Salwa Judum? Part of criticism might spring out of 'bleeding heart liberalism' so fashionable and popular in India. In any case, severe condemnation of the government and its policies as well as of 'excesses, rape, molestation' committed by security forces come at no cost to the critics concerned. Not only no action can be taken against them as dissent is part of highly-valued democratic freedoms but also it gets newspaper space without much effort. On the other, adverse comments on the Naxalite violence can get serious threats by its perpetrators. After all, its serious opponents have even invited death on themselves. Secondly, this verbose criticism springs out of ignorance. Salma Judum is not the first organized opposition by a civil society to violent activities of outlaws of any description. Certain inconvenience caused to the villagers vacating their homes and hearth voluntarily or under orders by the counter-insurgency movement leaders is nothing new or unprecedented. It happened
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
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in then Malaya in 1940s, and in Nagaland and Mizoram post1947. Let it be understood that SJ was a voluntary opposition to mindless violence perpetrated by the lawless Naxals. Subsequen.tly, government chose to join it to save innocent lives. Perhaps its 'eminent' critics do not know it that there was civil society resistance organized even before the SJ. Just one instance follows. On 9 Aug 2003, when cadres of the PWG raided Lango (Jharkhand), its residents led by Bhado Bandra, battling Naxalites under the banner of Nagrik Raksha Dal (NRD), fought back and lynched 9 PWG cadres. The very next day, Sunil Mahato, the former All Jharkhand Students' Union activist and by then General Secretary JMM, arrived and congratulated the brave tribals. (Later he paid for it with his life on 4 Mar 2007). Let it be put on record that like NRD in Jharkhand, Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS) had been fighting Naxalism in Chhattisgarh. Later, a political leader, Mahendra Karma, decided to extend support to it and re-Christened it Salwa Judum. His interview appears later. Forget about NRD, NSS and the SJ. These are instances of Kashmiri Gujjar women in some remote villages to take to rifles to defend their homes and their honour against the Islamist jihadis. Some cases of such bravery have been profiled elsewhere in this book. I
The choice before these men and women is simple and straightforward. To defend themselves against the outlaws and -4je fighting if necessary than or spend a life of cowardlinessfrightened, crouched and perpetuelly awaiting death at the hands of these dehumanized killing machines called Naxalite extremists/cadres. Here is the latest instance of self-help.
Jammu Women to Face Infiltrating Islamic Terrorists Terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan from now on will not only face bullets of Indian troops on the LOC but also equally armed women of the border villages who have been trained as sharp shooter to prevent ultras from entering these areas. So informs a daily dated 12 Aug 2007.
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As many as 27 women from the border villages of Nausheni tehsilon 11 Aug 2007 completed their training in the handling of AK-47th, INSAS, and .303 rifles to match the arms carried by terrorists. "These women will now be part of the Village Defence Committees (VDCs) of their respective villages. The training was imparted by the 'Dah' Infantry Division of the Indian Army. Three sisters, Sunita (20), Sonia (16) and Monica (18), who belong to Sariya village, were thrilled to carry AK-47 rifles about which they had only read in newspaper reports. The three demonstrated their shooting skills that matched any trained army rifleman. Satbir Kaur and Simrit Kaur of Tiper village said arms training was useful to them particularly at times when the menfolk were away to work. This would help the women not only protect themselves, but also target the ultras who stray into their villages. "90 women of the area have so far been trained in handling sophisticated arms and ammunition." Maj Gen Rajinder Singh, GOC, Dah Division, identified medicare and women empowerment as the key areas for the general uplift. Dashmesh Battalion was tasked to explore ,r avenues and opportunities to meet the target. Villages near the LOC were surveyed and Sariya village on the border was selected for training women VDC. Young women volunteered for the arms training and a systematic <:apsule was conducted in which 27 of them participated. These women were trained in observing unusual and suspicious persons and movements.
Interview with the Founder of the Salwa Judum: Mar 2007 To put the whole issue in perspective, here follows the interview excerpts by a weekly with the founder of the SJ and Congress leader Mahendra Karma. U nfazed by the criticism of his baby, the SJ, Karma tells the interviewer that he is in the, thick of the war. 3
Q. How has Naxalism affected you?
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A. I have lost two brothers to it and escaped attacks several times. Whenever I go to Dantewada, especiaHyon padyatras to spread to message of SJ, there is the risk. My family and sons still live in my native village. This is not the bogus fight politicians are used to. In this fight, we will have to be prepared for anything. I am not new to it. I have been fighting the Naxals since 1989 when we started a Jan Jagran Abhyan among villagers and Naxalites had left, but they returned. Q. SO what has this experience of working on the issue of N axalism has taught you?
A. The single greatest lesson I have learnt is never to compromise with the N axals. Q. What do you thing of the way Maoists have joined democracy in Nepal?
A. That is what they will have to ultimately do in India. Q. But Naxalites say Indian democracy has been a farce because benefits have not reached the people.
A. Wh;;tt have the Naxals done for the people? Have they empowered common people in any way? Has the standard of living in villages controlled by them improved? Why don't you understand that Naxals want 'revolution', they want to change the system, and the tribals are the best fodder. But we who are fighting against the Naxals are also tribals. We have the same blood in us. Q. SO what is the status of Naxalism in Chhattisgarh now according to you? A. There is a big dent in it after a people's movement against it in the most affected district of Dantewada. But Dantewada is still the center of Naxal activity, but not, just in Chhattisgarh but the entire country. This is where the root is. This is where I suspect the central leadership of the CPI (Maoist) resides. If we can wipe off Naxalism from Dante wada, we will have wiped it out from the rest of country. And there is only one thing that can defeat Naxalism. It is called Salwa Judum. For the first time,
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a people's movement is taking place. The very existence of N axals is being challenged.
Q. Is it true that you are the initiator of SJ? A. I only gave it this name after I saw it come up on its own. Seeing a village rebel against Naxalites gave me the inspiration to lead them. They needed a political voice, which is what I gave them. I gave tern leadership. Q. Some say SJ was your creation with police help.
A. This is mere propaganda. After a month-and-a-half of the movement, the state government made the wise decision to support it. Given how alarming the problem of N axalism is, why should the state not support it? Q. But if it is really a spontaneous movement against Naxalite oppression, why has it appeared only in Dantewada and not the rest of South.Chhattisgarh and undeed the Red Corridore? A. Just because others have not risen up does not mean Dantewada's tribals are fools. It is not Dantewada's fault if others do not have the courage to stand up against Naxalism.
Q. SO why don't you take the SJ movement to other areas?
A. Whereever we go, people stand up and join us. We have made a beginning with Dantewada. Until we become a Naxalism-free state, we will not stop. If there are places where there is local leadership willing to stand up against the Naxals, we are ready to support it. Q. But is n't it unfair for the state to arm tribals and pit them against Naxals? It is widely alleged that many are forced to join the SJ and relocate to camps. A. The people of Dantewada want to fight. Hundreds have died at the hands of the Naxalites, but they still want to fight. They want to kill Naxalites. The state cannot fool lakhs of people. You go to SJ camps and ask them. The people of Dantewada are not like the Kashmiri Pandits who left their homes when forced by the gun. We are ftghters.
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Q. The N axalites are known for violence against those who represent the State. SJ camps are sitting ducks for Naxals. A. On the contrary, wherever there are SJ camps, Naxals violence and oppression of villagers have come to an end. Q. Many allege that these camps are there for officials to make money. A. As you know the N axals can succeed in killing me any day. Do you think a man who has given his life would care for money. But I would not be surprised if there has been corruption by officials. Q. What do you think have been the three biggest successes ofSJ? A. Firstly, Villagers' support for the Naxalites has been undermined. Secondly, 5,000 Naxalites have surrendered and joined the SJ. Thirdly, politicians are no longer afraid to speak against N axalism. Q. In May 2006, you told Tehelka that SJ would be able to finish the Naxals by June 2006. A. We give such slogans to inspire our masses. But you will appreciate that the SJ has spread to all of Dantewada by now. Q. Rights groups have found large-scale human rights viola.'tions by SJ. A. I don't care for so called intellectuals who can't what a jan andolan is. Q. has there been a single mistake committed by the SJ? A. When such a jan andolan takes place there are always some wrongs, but exceptions should not be represented as rule. Q. KPS Gill said the SJ was a Gandhian movement . . A No doubt. It is a public movement for freedom just like the one Gandhi led. Q. But Gandhi's was non-violent ... A. But do you know how many people Gandhi's non\Violence killed? 22,000 killed for following Gandhi's path.
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Q. Is n't the Rani Bodli massacre proof that the SJ campaign failed? A. This massacre was going to happen. It was decided in the 9th Congress of the CPI (Maoist). Government should take the Naxalite decisions more seriously than they do. The Naxals do what they say. Q. Naxal-related incidents dipped by 6.5 per cent in 2006, but in Chhattisgarh they increased by 57 per cent. You still think SJ has not back fired? A. Do the other states have a public movement against Naxalism? Obviously, Naxals are killing more in Dantewada because they are frustrated at tribals being wooed away from them.
Q. SO deaths are collateral damage? A. Well, when there is a problem in front of you, will you bravely face it or turn away? If we have to fight N axalism, we will have to pay a price. We Indians leave things to God. That is not how you fight a war. Q. Is this the only way of fighting Naxals? A. If any learned person has another solution to offer, he is most welcome to try it.
Q. Is n't more security a solution? A. Yes, as the SJ spreads, there will be more need for security.
Government Keen on Development But ..• "Travelling through Dantewada, there are several things that stand out", says a reporter in a weekly dated 31 March 2007. 4 The roads: the Border Roads organisation (BRO) has been building some of the best roads here. The state is seriously attempting multi-faceted attempt at development to dispel the cause behind the wide-spread discontent among the Adivasis (= tribals), which in turn is exploited by the Left-wing extremists for their anti-State propaganda blasts to spread disaffection among tl).e tribals. But it must be stated right here that the Naxals would not let the government ensure a fart-paced development for this
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very propag and reason s: such a develo pment would snatch from their hand the very weapo ns they emplo y agains t the state about talk the cause of the tribal discon tent. So while they loudly the socio-economic backw ardnes s and under develo pment of the tribal areas, they will go out of the way to thwar t any govern ment endeav our to undert ake any develo pment projec tsattack ing the labour engag ed in buildin g new bridge s, roads and! or rail tracks , and destro ying/s etting afire the mater ials gather ed at the sites for the purpos e. Beside s the roads being laid, one sees the schools every few kilome ters along the highw ay. These are mostly run under the Sarva Shiksh a Abhya n, the Centre 's schem e to increa se literacy. Adivas is are known to be among the most resista nt to educat ion. To wear this resista nce down, the Abhya n has built 'Ashra m' (= small boardi ng school s) than has facilit y to house studen ts/ childr en from remote village s. Every SJ camp too has a school. Althou gh resista nt to moder n educat ion, tribals increa singly see the benefi t of it thank s to reserv ed jobs. The village of Rani Bodli has one such girls' school, separa ted from the SJ camps by half a foot ball field. Most of the girl studen ts had been moved to a neighb ourhoo d school and the buildi ng of this school was occup ied by an operat ions unit compr ising the person nel of the Chhat tisgar h armed police and the Salwa Judum SPOs. Two bunke rs on the roof this buildi ng and two atop the verand ah at its back, with the words "Basta r Tigers " writte n on these four in bold, had night -duty sentri es posted on them when "the 500 N axals attack ed the camp after surrou nding it at 8 am on 15 March 2007." The details of this attack and its after- math have alread y been discus sed in an earlier part but is briefly touche d upon again to empha sise, how a report er who visited the camp subseq uently , pieced the accoun t in his news story: "At 2 am on 15 march , about 500 men surrou nded the buildi ng and an exchan ge of fire followed until the sentrie s ran out of ammu nition. The Naxals then hurled patrol bombs in the room where the police were sleepin g. Those who came out were behea ded with a Phars i (=axe). Other units in the area were alerte d but they arrive d two hours after the Basta r guerri llas had killed the Bastar Tigers ." .
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others, particularly the reinforcements who were expected to rush to the site within a short time after the incident, about the beastiliaty and ferocious nature of their CNaxal's) revenge. It is a pity that the Roys and her ilk of human rights enthusiasts keep condemning the socalled 'atrocities' of the security forces without a saying a word about the gruesome brutalities of their heroesthe Naxals, fighting to bring justice to the down trodden of the society. 3. To write that "the reinforcements did not deliberately arrive" at Rani Bodli to avoid being martyrs is avoidable journalistic flourish-at once cynical and flippant. It is known that police posts and camps are located at long distances from one another. The reporter would have gained some credibility had he said "so and so post was 10 minutes, or even half an away, in terms of walking distance from Rani Bodli and they came three hours after the incident." In the absence of any such hard facts, this reporter can be dismissed as being just 'clever' or 'smart' who does not mind embellishing his news stories with such avoidable nonsense! 4. Just because the reinforcement of police or CRPF was not stationed at Rani Bodli when the reporter reached there, makes him write that " .... this was an attempt to explain away the massacre ..... .': This is being facetious. 5. Another comment on "Naxals throwing petrol bombs into the rooms" to flush out the defenders is necessary. It has already been clarified for information of this 'clever' reporter and his readers whosoever they may be, that after initial few minutes no defender will be sleeping or sitting in his 'room' until he is injured or dead. Yet again, to say that these bombs were fired into the rooms is erroneous. These petrol bombs will be fired/dropped over the camp arealbarracks located inside it to put it on fire, especially the foliage and undergrowth, and subsequently the fire would certainly engulf all the barracks. This is the way these bombs will be made use of. That some odd bomb may 'enter' a room if reaching a barrack at a certain angle is merely incidental.
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Salwa Judum as Seen by the Public and the Press It seems obvious that majority of tribals in Dantewada are with the SJ, as the Karma interview is suggesting. One reason of its success here could the political leadership provided by Mahendra Karma and others like him. Expectedly, there are bound to be the dissenting voices. Both sides find expression in the succeeding paragraphs.
It bears repitition to state that the criticism by the intellectuals like Roy and run-of-the-mill human rights NGOs like the one discussed above, CAVOW, can be dismissed-or, nearly-out of hand as being ideologically motivated or impelled by an urge of self-publicity. At the same time, no movement can be faultless sans any shortcomings. This veritable truth applies to the SJ as well. What follows is a brief critique on its functioning as seen by different group. In all anti-insurgency battle, intelligence is the battlewinning factor. Actionable, and real-time intelligence in-puts can save many lives and incur defeat on the rebels. On the other hand, its absence can prove costly to the security personnel, as it indeed did in Rani Bodli and some earlier grim incidents of that nature in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. The presence of local villagers as SPOs in the SJ is important from this angle. These SPOs' help identify the 'sangham' members-their fellow villagers who are part of the lower sung of the Naxal military cadre. In a manner of speaking, they are part-time 'fighters' and over-ground arm of the Naxalite sympathizers. As a press report says: "They bring some of them from the interiors and make them surrender, while others are just killed."
It is widely believed by the observers that the areas where the SJ campaign has been organized witness far less Naxal activity, indicative of the fact that the SJ has been fairly successful there to frustrate the Naxalites into a certain degree of inactivity. The fact may be exaggerated by the proponents of the SJ, but its basic truth cannot be denied. Intelligence aspect of the SPOs operational functioning undoubtedly is important, but there is more to their contribution to the success of the SJ. They augment the anti-Naxal strength of the state police. This can be appreciated better if it is
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mentioned that the ratio of the police to the population of Chhattisgarh is lower than other so many states of the Union which are not facing the Naxal violence. There is obviously an urgent need to increase the total strength of the state policeboth regular cadre and the Chhattisgarh Armed Police. It is no one's case that the SPOs are as well trained as the state police, which leads the NGOs and CAVOW to turn the SPO ranks exaggeratively into cannon-fodder for the Naxalites. The fact is that the SPOs have been imparted basic training on the weapons they are expected to wield. Given certain leadership by the police personnel, they can acquit themselves creditably while fighting the N axals. What is required is their additional training in jungle and guerrilla warfare at professional schools like the ones run by the Jharkhand Government and the Indian Army at different locations. Physically fighting the Naxal ultras is only' part of the antiNaxal--or any anti-insurgency-strategy. The battle has to be won on the 'hearts and minds' front also. The N axals certainly win on this front initially, winning the common tribals on to their sides pointing to them the fact of the government purposely keeping their areas underdeveloped/undeveloped. The state has to undo the damage by not only a deliberate, well thoughtthrough and relevant projects to usher in the socio-economic development of their areas but also by spreading information about the real, diabolic designs of the N axals to methodically over throw the present government democratically run by their (tribals') own representatives. There is little doubt that the 'jan andolan' must strengthen its fighting arm not only by recruiting more SPOs in its ranks but more importantly, by augmenting the anti-Naxal forces of the state by additional recruitment to its police force and by obtaining more CRPF and other paramilitary forces units to help the state security forces to control and defeat the maniac Naxalism. There is no doubt that majority of the local inhabitants join as SPOs as they feel strongly about driving the Naxals away. It is also not ruled out that some may be coerced into joining the SJ, something which is made much of by the CAVOW and other human right NGOs, neglecting the positive features of the SJ movement.
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There have been complaints that after every major strike by the N axals, state security officers mount combing operation against the perpetrators. Mter the Rani Bodli massacre, the State Home Minister told the press that the massacre, would be 'avenged'. Intense 'combing operations' by eight battalions of police were launched in a radius of 50 km around the village. There was an unofficial report of an exchange of fire between the police and the N axals near Shangri village. Five Maoists were said to have died, a .303 stolen rifle recovered, but no casualties on the side of the police. Read what a reporter says after visiting Rani Bod1i: "It is in such 'Combing operations' that the SJ is said to commit atrocities: they are accused of burning and indiscriminately killing people in entire villages seen to be with the Naxals. There are even accusations of rape." It is deemed necessary to introduce a note of caution here. It is not uncommon for security forces to face such 'accusations' when they are deployed in anti-insurgency/terrorism duties. To be fair an odd such charge cannot always be denied. But to go to the extent of writing that the security personnel "are accused of burning and indiscriminately killing people in entire villages . .': for whatsoever reasons, is obviously being facetious, losing right of the need to be fair and balanced while reporting on such sensitive issues. Be that as it may, the last two paragraphs from this reporter's news report after visiting Rani Bodli post-15 March incident/massacre, are reproduced below: Two years ago Gidam police station was looted and a similar combing operation had taken place. The N axals had just walked in, started firing and looting. The New Station House Officer (SHO) RL Senger learnt the security lesson: a zigzag of barbed wire is most common strategy to delay the entry of attackers into a building, giving the sentry enough time to fire and flash the message on the wireless. The Rani Bodli school even did not have this. But Senger did another smart thing: He even managed to find a few Naxals in a village nearby (during the combing operations mentioned above) and shot them. They were harvesting the field-pretending to do so, claims Senger-and he shot them just after they had perpetrated a bomb blasts. "There may be
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somemistakes", says Senger, "just as the media may make some mistakes in reporting about the Salwa Judum". The local papers had reported the controversy over the 'fake encounter'. Instead of an inquiry, Senger got a President's medal. Senger says, "People are the biggest weapon". Local journalists have been muzzled into ignoring the Salwa Judum's excesses and journalists reporting Naxal atrocities have paid their price: One was even shot dead. There is pro/ anti Salwa Judum divide among the journalists, most of whom do not even know the Gondi language and do not hire translators to get the Adivasis' version. Local journalists may never know what happened in the 'combing operations' after the Rani Bodli blood bath and those who may know about it may not be able to write on it. The tribals of Dantewada, then, are only the second biggest casualty of the strife. The biggest casualty is truth.
Is the Politics Blocking an Effective Anti-Naxal Policy? If some intellectuals and Hum an Rights NGOs are opposed to Salwa Judum for ideological reasons, there are others who' are convinced SJ is the only answer to Naxalite violence. Obviously the Congress politician of Chhattisgarh is not the only , one to think so. He obviously has the backing of intellectuals and analysts beyond the borders of his state. Some analysts certainly are of the view that SJ is more than a popular tribal movement against Maoist repression and depredations against common man in the tribal regions of Chhattisgarh "It is a bulwark of civil society and strategic resistance to Maoist designs of forging a Red Corridore from Andhra Pradesh to Nepal." Every shade of opinion in the country, barring, of course, the "bleeding heart" liberals and sections of Leftist and Communist parties, are concerned with the serious threat these Naxalite cadres/militants are posing to India's security and integrity. Of the two major all-India parties, the BJP is in determined opposition to the N axals and is an outright supporter of the SJP. Incidentally, the party is in power in Chhattisgarh. 5 But the Congress is in a bit of a spot over the issue. It is " yet to come out openly either is support or opposition to the
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Salwa Judum movement. In fact "the Congress is waiting for the Harkesh Bahadur panel's report to clarify its stand on the SJ", wrote an analyst in Sep. 2006. Its approach to the issue is marred by its obsession with the BJP and its policies. It is worth recalling how the Congress erred on the nature of the Maoist menace. An All India Congress Committee (AICC) Task Force had concluded that the proliferation of Naxalism-read, Naxal violence and insurgency-was owing to socio-economic factors. I had no ideological content. The AICC at New Delhi might have its motivations or compulsion to conclude that the Naxalism in India has no ideological content, but its state unit in Chhattisgarh, one of the worst sufferers of the Naxal violence, knows better than to agree with its apex body. The SJ was founded by its state Congress leader Mahendra Kumar Karma in June 2005. He is presently the leader ofthe opposition in the State Legislative Assembly and continues to lead it from the front. The brave man told the analyst mentioned above during his visit to the state: "It is a battle for the tribes men's livelihood and self-identity and the society has left their leaders behind in this fight." The Congress dilemma does not end here, with dichotomy at the Central and state levels. It has tied itself in knots at policy level also. Consider what Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, while addressing the second meeting of the Chief Ministers of " NaxalismlMaoism is the single largest insurgency faced by it." In fact, he went further, describing the Maoist threat to India's internal security as bigger than even the one posed by the terrorists of various hues. Having said this, how does his government act to counter this threat? The draft tribal policy (of his Government) views the Maoist war against Indian state as nothing more serious than a ''Violent manifestation of tribal unrest." Here is delicious irony. While extending UPA government's implicit support to the SJ movement, its own draft tribal policy recommends its termination. It is time to analyse the contradictions in the Congress stance on SJ. It is important to make a political postulation: The BJP is the main rival and a political threat to the Congress, but to the Communists-especially the CPI (M), the important and th .. 111ajor party that leads Left Front of four parties-it is an
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anathema. If it is supporting the UPA government at the Centre, it is not because it has any ideological affinity with it, but essentially to keep the BJP out of power. Now how the BJP colours the vision of the two parti.es-Congress and Communists. Incidentally, most of the Naxal-affected states are not governed by the Congress, barring some like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. The BJP is in power in majority of such states. This raises many questions. Is this the reason the UPA coalition is not adopting though anti-Naxal policy in states? Is the Centre under UPA niggardly in extending necessary help to Chhattisgarh? Things become worse when it comes to Left influence at the Centre, which creates an opinion divide. A bunch of Leftliberals who toured Dantewada district mid-2006. branded SJ as a civil war within tribal society fomented by the government. They went to the extent of recommending the disbandment of the SJ. Curiously, and surprisingly, there was no such strong doze recommended for the blood thirsty Maoists. In fact, they advised the government to 'talk' to ~he bandits/murderers to strike some compromise with them. It bears repetition to remind that delegation Lhat BJP may be ruling party there, the SJ in Chhattisgarh is led by a brave Congress leader Karma, and the BJP Government has extended support to the movement. A brief history of the movement should be of interest, and even useful for most people outside Chhattisgarh. To start at the beginning, Salwa Judum (mobilization for peace) originated amongst the tribes men of Dantewada in June 2005. The opposition Congress and the Ruling BJP today, it is not merely because of the periodic violence perpetrated by the Maoists but more because the tribal (civil) society has dared to stand up to them. It needs to be recorded that Dantewada is the most unlikely/ uncharacteristic place to become a Marxist laboratory. It has been an aboriginal, egalitarian and exploitation-free society since time immemorial. Even more importantly, incidents of murder, limb amputation, rape and extortion were unheard of before the advent of the Maoists. "Dantewada showcases a unique tribal way of life. Its extensive landmass of 10,239 sq km. has a
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population of just over six lakhs. One of the most sparselypopulated districts of India, it is full of forests, hills and inhospitable terrain sans roads." The last one makes it ideal for the guerrella warfare. The institution of state, much maligned in Marxist parlance and literature, hardly ever exised here. With such low population numbers here, there was hardly anything at stake for governance. Consequently they were left free to practise their perennial tribal way of life, with nary any intervention by the state. On the flip side, this situation left the area underdeveloped, more accurately undeveloped. In the modern parlance, there was no political authority, worth the name. In the given situation, the Maoists saw an opportunity and rushed in to fill the vacuum. To reemphasis, there was neither oppressive state nor any exploiting classes in the Dante- wada society-the traditional reasons offered for entry of Maoism and its subsequent spread in an area. How do the socio-economicunderdevelopment/exploitation theorists justify the rise of Maoism in Dantewada? As stated earlier, the reason of underdevelop is a fig leaf for their nefarious designs. If that indeed were so, why will they thwart tooth and nail all the government's attempts at developing the area economically. Thus, the issue of development is a subterfuge. The Maoists resent any development in the regions they control-dubbing it as an aggression by the state. They extort a heavy cut from the contractors of the highways, bridges and levy taxes from tendu leaf traders, and transporters. Maoism in Dantewada, or anywhere else in India or even beyond, is organised banditry. People are mostly lured into it by the lucre ofloot, and not by much-louted ideological reasons. It is no surprise that the living standard of an average guerrilla 'warrior' is far superior to that of a policeman. This is the money or lucre side of the enterprise called Maoism, its brutal or violent side is far worse-generally dreaded by its victims. The spectre of violence unleashed by the Maoists has threatened the physical security and economic freedom in the tribal society. It has also outraged its religious and cultural ethos. If ~he village folks do not carry out the diktats of the Maoists, brutalities are let loose on them, including gory murderslbeheadings and amputation of limbs. _ Many tribeswomen were 'subjected to rape and molestation.
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Such atrocities and excesses generated a sens.e of revulsion. in tribal minds. Consequently, on iO June 2005, some 10,000 tribesmen to a field off Karkoli village, in Kutru are~ of Dantewada, to contemplate a public action. But while retur~ing, they were confronted by volleys of Maoists bullets-drawing t~e blood of innocent tribesmen. Consequently, there numerous fatalities besides missing person. Salwa Judum was thus born in amidst blood and fire. Is the centre, impelled by the Left, justified in calling Maoist terror a mere 'violent manifestation of tribal unrest'? Does Maoism express itself in indigenous idiom? "Is it restricting itself to tribal territory?, asks the analyst. It speaks in the lingo of a foreign trio: Marx-Lenin-Mao. There is nothing Indian about it. Its aim is not to ameliorate the socio-economic situation of the disadvantaged tribals. But sporting that beneficial pro-poor garb, its aim is nothing short of overthrow of the Indian state with 92 per cent non-tribal population. The denouement is eagerly awaited and will be publicly welcomed by the Left-liberal lobby and intellectuals of the Roy variety. It is time the Indians understand the sinister designs of not only of the Maoists but also <;>ftheir public face, their overground sympathizers. It is these overground sympathizers who are accm,mg Salwa Judum being a violent campaign, ironically against the tribals, and not against the Maoists-which it actually is! It needs to be clearly understood that the tribesmen of Salwa Judum have little stake in violence per se. They would be happy to return to their carefree tribal life. Opposed to this all, Maoism is a militant doctrine that abhors pluralism, reject democracy and negates cultural traditions. (All this was aptly illustrated by the "Cultural Revolution" personally unleashed and sustained for a decade by Mao himself, with a heavy human cost). So, Salwa Judum is the indigenous answer to this imported, intolerant creed of Maism.
End Salwa Judum: Kids to Tell President Here is a daily of 7 Nov 20066 writing frivolously on a serious national security issue, just for the sake of some catchy headlines:
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Terrorism in India "Raipur, 6 Nov, 2006 'Please stop Salwa Judum' is the plea made by 12-year-old Soyam Sandhvi, a resident of Errabore Salva Judum Camp. She wants to tell President APJ Abdul Kalam that N axal violence should end and blames the government-initiated movement for driving her family out of their village. "While Chhattisgarh is celebrating the sixth anniversary of its creation (next week, a group of 50 children from various Salwa Judum camps, who are in Raipur to participate in the celebrations, hope that the President will listen to their woes."
It is not clear what purpose such stories serve? Having children mouth such anti-Salwa Judum sentiments cannot be understood. Did the children come out with such views without any promptings? Were the words put in their mouths. Should not they be explained that the Salwa Judum was devised to counter and control the mindless N axal violence? Are such stories in nation's interests or merely a journalistic flourish, ask some ar\alysts.
SOME RECENT INCIDENTS AND EVENTS Training Police to Face the Naxalites: Apr 2006 Chhattisgarh is among the worst-hit states on the Naxals violence charts. It, of course, suffered because of certain flaws inherent in the situation. As one drives through states' Maoist-dominated districts, the virtual absence of state police personnel is a stark reality. 7 One of the major contributory reasons can be the low ratio of policemen to civilian population in the state. In fact this ratio is one of the lowest in the country: 17 to 1,000. At the places where they can be seen by the public, at police stations and check posts where they are on duty, "a majority will be seen lounging around, unshaven, unarmed, out of shape and deliberately sloppily attired in dirty banians and lungis." Former Chief Minster Ajit Jogi explains, perhapsy a little uncharitable: "The policemen here want to be indistinguishable from the local population. They do not carry guns because they don't want to fight anyone." (But whether a politician, and a former Chief Minister at that, should be speaking so disparagingly about his state!.s policeJUeR, can be a matter of two opinions). But the change-and for the better-is In the air. As a weekly; puts it:
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"Now meet Sub-Inspector Praveen Purseth, ofthe Chhattisgarh Armed Police (CAP), but now an instructor at the Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare School (CTJWS) in Kanker. Fit and alert, he carries his AK-47 like a third arm and is a product of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Warfare School (CIWS) in Mizoram". Presently, Purseth is one of the instructors at the CTJWS, engaged in training state's policemen to acquit themselves better in counter-Naxalite battles. A school for training policemen for this task was urgently needed and it is a happy sign that it is already functioning under IGP BK Ponwar, a retired Brigadier from Infantry. What is Ponwar's mandate? To put it briefly: To transform the police not just in Chhattisgarh, but from neighbouring Maoist-affected states such as Orissa and Jharkhand, }into a fighting force. Ponwar has several instructors like Purseth under him to achieve this transformation. Says Brig Ponwar, a counter-insurgency expert: "The Maoists are not just well-trained but their ability to merge with the crowds introduces the surprise element. The goal is to train. the police l in guerrilla tactics and establish a counter-insurgency grid so that we can dominate ~reas where the strong arm of the_ state is ~issing today." But along with physical fitness and psychological preparedness, the Brigadier stresses the men are being taught to make friends with the villagers and be sensitive. ~'Without local intelligence, everything could fail," he says. The Brigadier is quite clear in asserting that the pQlicemen trained by him will find it easier to worst the Naxalite if they can befriend the local population. Hence the. cliche that the real war is to win the heads and hearts of the civilians caught between the guns of the ultras and security forces.
Left's stance on Salwa Judum Irks BJP: June 2006 The BJP on 19 June 2006 condemned the stand of Left parties against Salwa Judum they took at the recent UPA-Left Coordination Committee meeting. The BJP also decreed the Left demand for withdrawing the Naga and Mizo battalions fighting
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Terrorism in India
the N axalites in Chhattisgarh and elsewhere (Incidentally, there is no Mizo battalion in the Indian Army!). BJP spokesman Prakash Ja~adekar said: "The r~cent meeting of the UPA-Left Coordination Committee has exposed the Leftists to the hilt and has also ~xposed their hidden agenda to support various insurgent groups. The BJP demands that the Central Government should deploy more forces to fight the rising menace of Naxalism in more than eight states." The note circulated by the Left on the eve of the recent meetings had voiced criticism of the Government's economic and foreign policies, in the main. But press reports suggested these issues were not discussed at all, or perhaps too briefly if at all. The meeting Jammu and Kashmir, North-East and Naxal violence. In the last two years, Naxalites have killed 379 civilians and 95 police and military personnel. 8 Tribals in the Bastar legion, fed up with continuous Naxal attacks, organised a people's movement called 'Salwa Judum', in which people joined hands irrespective of their political affili,ations. ,!,he Judum is supported by the State Government as it has proved a very effective mechanism to fight the Naxals. Javadekar further added: "We demand that the Central Government should abandon its policy to treat N axalite threat as a state subject and a mere law and order problem, and devise and adopt a comprehensive policy to contain and eliminate Naxalism.
13 Maoists Killed, and 13 held: Chhattisgarh: Dee 2006 The anti-Maoist campaign in the state received a major success with arrest of 13 Maoists from the Koeelibara area of Kanker district on 5 Dec 2005. Acting on a tip-off that the rebels were planting landmines in the area, the police rushed there and arrested the ultras. The arrested rebels were wanted in several criminal cases including murder daoity and explosions. In a separate incident the same day, police killed two Maoists in an encouhter in Abujmad area of worst affected Bastar district of Chhattisgarh.
:\
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Jhst a day before, on 4 December, police killed' 13 Maoists in a fierce encounter in Dantewada district, at Cherpal, more than 450 km. from the state capital of Raipur. The encounter took place after armed rebels at'tacked a CRPF outpost at Cherpal, which was repulsed by the local police and the CRPF personnel jointly, having fired 1100 rounds of bullets. Four Maoists were killed by police on 3 December. More than 50,000 people in Maoist-affected area in Bastar region have left their villages and taken shelter with the State Government run 27 relief camps. Some 350 people, including the police personnel and civilians, have been killed this year, 2006, at various places in the N axal violence in Chhattisgarh. 79 Maoists Surrender: 3 Jan 2007 Cllhattisgarh police achieved a major success in the ongoing , anti-Maoist operation when 79 Left guerrillas surrendered before Chief Minister Raman Singh at the Police Headquarters in Raipur. Of these 79 Maoists, 29 carried rewards on their heads, ranging from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 20,000; 32 others were wanted in several cases while twelve were members of Sangham, an '. anciUiary body of the rebels. Four other N axals also laid down their arms on the occasion. The surrendered took oath expressing faith in country's constitution and resolved to return to the social mainstream. Those who surrendered belonged to the following Dalams: Keshkal
Barda
Gurghat
Kiskodo
These Dalams are active in Bastar region of the state. A Dalam, it needs to be noted, is the basic operational unit of the Maoist outfit, which can roughly be equated to the term 'squad'. Welcoming the Maoists, the Chief Minister said his government "has announced a "surrender policy" and also a - package for rehabilitation ofthe Naxals who shun violence and join the national mainstream.
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Terrorism in India
The Ma6ists who had surrendered last month (Dec 2006) were also brought to Raipur for the occasion from the worstaffected Bastar region. . DGP OP Rathor told the press: "Surrender was the result of 'community policing' and other welfare measures started by the police to motiv~te the misguided youth to return to main social stream..Effo~ts are on to instill confidence among the rural masses. Such large surrenders would help create an atmosphere to free tribals of Naxal problem." More than 365 people including security personnel, common people and 66 Maoists have been killed in the Maoist-related incidents during 2006 in Chhattisgarh where 8 of 16 districts are affected by Maoist violence. Fearing Naxal attacks, more than 50,000 peopl~ from hundreds of villages of Dantewada have left their honi.es and taken shelter in the 27 camps set up .... _.
UAV Deployed for Anti-Naxal Operations: Jan 2007 1:he center has long last deployed one UAV (Unarmed Aerial Vehicle) in Chhattisgarh for mapping of the dense forests in the Bastar region of the State that are heavily infested by the Naxalites. Dense Sal forests in Bastar region continue to remain a sanctuary of the Naxalites. The outlaws also operate an illiegal arms factory in the deep jungles of the State affected by the Leftwing extremism. The demand for an UAV, which has now materialized, seems to have a long history. The Chhattisgarh government had requested the Centre in 2004 that the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) be approached to have the area mapped by its satellites. But the matter still hangs in the air. But the State had also a long-pending demand on the Centre to have the said area mapped by the UAVs to enable the former to effectively combat the Naxal violence in the State. The State was given a UAV in 2006.
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"The use ofthe UAV in anti-Naxal operations has helped the security forces in containing the menace to a large extent", said the Union Home Ministry sources. 9 The growing sophistication of the insurgent and N axal outfits continues to remain a matter of serious concern for the security agencies. The Naxalites in various states as will as the insurgents outfits in Jammu and Kashmir have moved beyond the use of mobile phones in detonating IEDs and are now using multiple detonators against the security agencies. Explosion of IEDs with multiple detonators have, of late, been reported in Kashmir and Chhattisgarh, a cause of major worry for the security establishment. DG, National Security Guards and CRPF, JK Dutt, acknowledging the increasing sophistication of the insurgent outfit, added: "The security forces need to be extra cautious while defusing IEDs as there is no way to detect multiple detonators in a bomb. Technology for jamming such devices are being indigenously developed and imported to counter the new threat." He further, added, speaking at a function last week, "Threats posed by the insurgents and terrorists continue to increase with more and more use of technology for carrying out subversive activities and therefore the training aspects of the security forces need constant upgradation to face newer Challenges. The above narrative informs us how the Naxals extremists are making use of latest technology in their war against the nation and its security forces, and the urgent need for the security forces to develop and use counter measures to defeat the ultras in their own game. More interestingly, the Union Home Ministry sources have misled the daily in saying that "the use of the UAV in anti-Naxal operations has helped the security forces in containing the menace to a large extent". Even more interestingly, these Home Ministry 'sources', obviously its senior officials, not only misled this daily but even-handedly, also misled the poor Home Minister himself, who as told by these officials, misinformed the Parliament (Lok Sabha) on 16 March 2007, as the following news story in a paper dated 17 March shows, about use of the UAVs by the Chhattisgarh government.
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Terrorism in India
Made Available, but Never Used The Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil on 16 Mar 2007 told the Lok Sabha that UAVs were made available to Chhattisgarh "but he seemed to have forgotten", write a daily dated 17 March 2007,10 tongue firmly in che'ek, "to tell the members that the sophisticated aerial equipment was not used even once to track the N axal's hideouts in the pas~ couple of months." Patil really cannot be hauled over the coals for simple reason that he read the answer as prepared by his:Ministry officials. Again, the answer as far as it goes, is factually correct. Yes, he can be faulted for not supplying the full:land complete information to the House. Here again there ar' two possibilities. One, the officials of the Ministry did not in~ed know that the UAV has not been actually used even once. :t;rhis was possibly only and certainly known to the State officiaf~ at Raipur. Two, the Home Ministry officials knew the facts but purposely left them out to ensure that their Minister does' not face embarrassing supplementaries like "why were the UAVs not used for the. purpose they had been so urgently demanded years back?:~ "this is criminal act of negligence .... ", wh'Q is responsible for this reprehensible omission and derilection~f duty", etc, etc. Now to the other end of the story-Raipur. The revelations made by the state security officials there can be an eye-opener. It only shows how poorly the Centre and states coordinaterather do not coordinate-in utilizing available resources to fight the Red ultras. It may be a sad reflection on the serious ness with which we in II)dia deal with such life and death problems, but this is not the whole story. Faultlines may be somewhere else, too. Some critics assert that had the UAVs provided by the IAF been used by the state to gather information about Naxals' hideouts, it may have been possible to fai1 the Maoists' attack on Rani Bodli camp in Bijapur district. In a manner of speaking, it may be ovel'Stating the ca ss. The lack of coordination between New Delhi and Raipur may not be the only cause for the failure here to use the UAV for the urgent purpose they were requisitione'd for. The cause £ould also be lack of coordination between Raipur and IAF authorities, and as also between the latter and the IAF.
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The daily quote a senior Official, obviously of the Union Home Ministry, saying: "using this technology requires a lot of . coordination on the ground. There has been no operation (al) problem at all with the UAVs but the state police has not been able to coordinate properly with the IAF in utilizing the service." Without any further nitpicking, let it be said that none of the three entities involved in the {auxpau (New Delhi, Raipur and the IAF) has covered itself in gloris.
lED kills 7 in Bastar, Chhattisgarh: Jan 2007 Seven security personnel were killed in an lED blast near Jharia village, 30 km. from Kanker city in Bastar district of Chhattisgarh and some 350 km. from Raipur. IG Bastar RK Vij told a daily that explosion occurred when a 30-member patrol-composed of personnel from CRPF, Chhattisgarh police and Chhattisgarh Security Force-was trying to cross a small bridge over a rivulet at 5 pm, 16 Jan 2007. N axal cadres, waiting in an ambush near this bridge, set off the lED which killed seven security men on the spot. The impact of the explosion was so devastating that it created a huge crater in the ground-there was a brief exchange of firing. The seven killed are: an Assistant Commandant of CRPF, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (AS!) of Police, and five constables. The injured men were moved to District Hospitals in Jagdalpur and Raipur. Naxals stepped up violence in Bastar after the launch of 'Salwa Judum' in South Bastar in June 2005, or at least so believe some Human Rights NGOsJactivists. These NGOs believe the Government is endangering the lives of the civilians by sponsoring the Salwa Judum and putting young men in the firing line. Among the 13 states facing the N axal threat, Chhattisgarh is one of the worst affected. Nearly 50,000 tribals have deserted their villages in forests of Chhittisgarh after the government launched the Salwa Judum. At least 500 people, including over .350 civilians, were killed in Naxal-related violence in the state in 2006, the highest casualty figure for any Naxal-affected state.
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Terrorism in India
Appointment of a Governor is Welcome It is not often that state governments take kindly t
The state's Home Minister, Ravivichar N etam believes that N arasimhan can be of tremendous assistance in tackling the decade old menace of Maoism. He observed that his state would definitely seek N arasimhan's guidance and suggestions on the Issue. The Minister's views ai'''' understandable, knowing as we do '. that in 2006 alone, Maoist violence had claimed nearly 400 lives, including 320 civilians, in the State.
55 killed in Rani Bodli, Bastar: Detailed Analysis: Mar 2007 . Maoist rebels, numbering sorne 400 armed ultras, carried out a massacre ,early morning 15 March 2007, killing in Dantewada district in "Chhattisgarh-a region where the writ of the gq.vernment barely runs, a situation that had earlier prompted Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh to characterize Red threat worSe than the Islamist terrorism. Mter a" year long relative lull, the Maoists rendered a grim twist to the ongoing battle between the rebels and security forces helped by a local tribal militia called Salwa Judum, by executing the cold blooded mass murder with 'military' precision. They arrived arxhed with grenades, petrol bombs, guns and even generator sets to light up the area to carry out the grisly operation-'-a.nd also to ensure that no one escapes the death trap: Around 2 am, some 400 armed outlaws raided the wellfortified police camp in Ram Burgi in Bijapur, South Bastar)' catching 78 police personnel-23 jawans of Chhattisgarh armed Force and 55 Salwa Judum cadres-unawares. The guerrillas lit the periphery of the security camp with portable gensets, lobbed grenades and set the place ablaze with petrol bombs leaving 55 dead and 10 others wounded after a 3-hour battlemostly one-sided as it seemed; of the dead, about half are
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security personnel and the other half Salwa Judum activists who have now been inducted as Special Police Officers (SPOs) for' a monthly salary of Rs 1,500. By the times, reinforcement arrived, the rebels had melted into the deep jungles of Andhra Pradesh and Chhatisgarh, taking with them the camp's armoury. Inside the camp, the surviving policemen hid themselves amidst strewn bodies of their comrades. Before fleeing, the raiders laid rings of landmines around the camp, not only to block the reinforcements but also to thwart their hunt for them. It is a sad commentary on the anti-Naxal strategy of the state and functioning of its intelligence apparatus that Maoists can mount a huge operation and' mobilize hundreds-in the instant case, 400-of their armed cadres and achieve a" clean break after 3-hour mayhem at a supposedly well-fortified police/ Salwa Judum camp. The failure of the state administration is all the more reprehensible knowing as it did that Salwa Judum camps/SOPs were the targets of the Maoists, The Maoist guns have increasingly turned from the police to those civilianslPSOs seen to' be collaboratorslhelpers of the state, The best efforts of the State and Union governments have come to a nought in Chhattisgarh, which had requisitioned the services of KPS Gill, the Punjab supercop known for his antiterror skills and reputation. The situation is believed to be so bad in these areas that the police official are shy of traveling in their official/government vehicles for fear of inviting Naxal attacks. Even the most heavily-armed policemen hunker down in barricaded compounds after dusk.l1 Some analysts have a different take on GiH's one-year stint with the State as its Security Adviser. They argue Gill's presence may have had a salutary influence. The last major attack, after all, was in Jul2006 when Maoists attacked a Salwa Judum (antiMaoist campaign by the local tribals) camp in Dantewada district killing 32 people. Since then, barring a few minor incidents, Maoists had maintained a silent stance in the Naxal- infested state.
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Though the police claimed 15 Maoists had also been killed, but none of the bodies were found. Such claims are generally highly exaggerated or imaginary, based as they are on some erroneous or doubtful basis or observations. Most of the victims were stabbed or axed to death. Injured policemen said they were unable to react as they were h~avily outnumbered. State Home Minister Ratnvichar Netam and DGP OR Rathor reached the camp soon after the raid, as did Leader of Opposition Mahendra Karma, who also leads the Salwa Judum movement. Netam and Karma were gheraoed by the angry villagers. Following Chief Minister Raman Singh's request for helicopters for evacuation of the casualties, one machine was rushed to the State.
Is the Salwa Judum key to Naxal rage? N axal violence is not new to Chhattisgarh but its stridence is. In the recent years, the state has emerged as hardest hit among the 13 Naxalite-z:avaged states of the country: Even Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil admitted in Rajya Sabha that the Naxalite violence in Chhattisgarh increased by 47-38 per cent and killings (in the state) by 57 per cent in the year 2006. The important question in the pretext of this increase in Naxalife violence is: Is it the success of resistance movement, popularly known as Salwa Judum, which is posing a threat to the N~xal movement in tribal Chhattisgarh, that is behind the spurt in Naxal violence? The success, even limited in nature, is causing certain sense of insecurity among the rebel ranks. Hence this violent response. Alternative, the causative factor could be poor governance that invites daring, brazen raids like the Rani Bodla. Leader of the Opposition and senior Congress leader of Chhattisgarh Mahendra Karma, who is leading Salwa Judum, thinks it is the threat factor. He adds: "The most obrious reason is the danger perceived by the increasing popularity ofthe Salwa Judum." Editor Diwaker Muktibodh explains: "The Maoists will not tolerate losing hold or identity in strongholds that they have nurtured for the last two decades. Salwa Judum has weakened their position."
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This became a strong defence for the police as well. DGP OP Rathor said Maoists resorted to more violence to terrorise police and people in their bastions. 12 Intellectuals cite other reasons. A retired professor of sociology Kumar Sen said: "It is the predominant scheduled Tribe (ST) and Scheduled Caste (SC) population in the backward regions of Chhattisgarh and its status on poor development indicators that spurred the attacks". Naxalites in Chhattisgarh claim they stand for justice to the deprived tribals and vow to fight for their rights. It is also known that N axals had received covert support from political parties earlier, strengthening their base. The state rich in mineral and forest resources is inhabited by 34 per cent of tribals and 15 per cent of SCs, who are poor, backward and impoverished, has always been a fertile breeding ground for Maoist insurgency. Diwaker adds: "The Maoists share rapport with the local inhabitants in the remote villages by ensuring speedy justice to deprived population and shielding them from unscrupulous traders." Since the inception of Salwa Judum, the Naxals have been at war with the villagers, warning them to desist being a part of it. Chief Minister Raman Singh, however, calls Salwa Jud~m a self-motivated movement of tribals who wish to see development in neglected areas.
Blame Game and Reason: Justified or Imaginary As it is the most blatant act of dastardly violence and repulsive carnage, certain degree of 'blame game' is only to be expected. Then various reasons have been offered by the press after some kind of "investigation" as also degree of negligence on the part of official agencies and individuals. Some of these are discussed below.
"Policemen Were Drunk" A daily13 dated 22 Mar 2007 made some disconcerting disclosures which are briefly mentioned below: )
• all of 74 personnel of the Chhattisgarh Armed Police (CAP)-55 of whom were killed on the 15th-were drunk. All but six were fast asleep inside their barracks on the fateful day.
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Terrorism in India • Only six sentries of the 9th Battalion of CAP wer~ on duty and even they were not, because of which they could not notice the movement of the militants in large numbers around the camp site. • The members of the police post were in the habit of taking liquor everyday, according to the informed sources in the Union Home Ministry. • The location of the police post at Rani Bodli is considered important as the anti-Naxalite Salwa Judum Movement was born here in June 2003. • The sentries on duty did not have full supply of magazines for their light machines guns, and so could barely confront the ultras fire for more than two-to-three. min.utes. The post personnel did not conduct night patrolling around the camp site, a necessary routine. They 'also completely ignored intelligence inputs. • The N axal outlaws killed almost all of the 55 policemen with knives aQd axes and took away 37 rifles from them.
It is obvious that this daily has accessed the report of preliminary departmental inquiry into the ghastly incident, and dressed it up as its "investigations". It is also clear its reporter had access to "sources" in the Union Home Ministry.
Similarities between Attacks on Rani Bodli and Jhumra Pahari The state police and CRPF, towards the end of 2006, had secured the general are in Chhattisgarh which was attacked by the Naxals on 15 March. Having 'secured' it, the sources said, the CRPF had moved on to the neighbouring areas where the Maoists were still present in good numbers, leaving the 'secured' area under the control of the ChhattisgarhArmed Police (CAP). "The Rani Bodli attack seems to have had twin objectives: the reminder that the N axalites were still active here and could strike at will, and a warning to the civilians to stay away from the anti-Naxal operations mounted by the security forces, and particularly Salwa Judum campaign", an official said. 14 Over half ofthe 55 killed on the 15th were the Special Police Officers. (SPOs), local tribals part of the civilian movement'
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
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against the Naxalites (Salwa Judum) who had been given basic training and armed with .303 rifles. Meanwhile, there is some concern over similarities between the 15 March attack in Chhattisgarh and the one on a CRPF camp in Jhumra Pahari in Jharkhand's Bokaro district in June 2006. Then also some 400 armed N axals had attempted to overrun the CRPF camp but the men at post held fast. The ultras had kept the post under sustained firing throughout the night in an attempt to capture it. They fled at day-break as the defenders managed to hold out. Obviously, CRPF proved to be better trained, and displayed greater vigour and grit. But like they did at Rani Bodli, the fleeing Naxals laid mines on all roads connecting Jhumra Pahari to thwart a chase. Incidentally, at Rani Bodli, they planted mines under the bodies of the slain policemen to cause casualties among the reinforcements which would arrive sometime following the raid. Like the number of raiders in either case was some 400. There have been three major attacks by Naxals in the last three months to wrest back the Jhumra Pahari area. "Whenever security forces have driven them out of their 'strategic' areas, _ they have made repeated attempts to regain the control", an officer said. Security agencies at New Delhi feel it is time forces like the CRPF (and CISF) were involved more actively in counterinsurgency duties. What, however, is left unsaid is that the state police is not equal to the task! Perhaps to counter the suggestion, DG, CISF SIS Ahmed maintained that the force functioned as part of a "joint strategy": "We keep modifying the strategy based requirements at the ground level." Blame game is obviously on! The (paramilitary) force tried to ward off criticism that its personnel stationed in the region did not respond in timeeafter the attack on Rani Bodli, with its top officers denying the charge that the casualty could have been much lower had reinforcements reached earlier than they did. Questions Raised on Police Postings The 15 March attack and consequent massacre have focused on several irregularities regarding postings of its officers by Chhattisgarh police in the N axal-infested areas of the state.
l
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. The foremost name that emerges is that of Mohd Hussainwhat at 55 was in command of Rani Bodli police outpost in Dantewada. Ironically, after being suspended by the state government after the attack, he has been given command of two posts that are some 725 km apart. The suspended officer has his own grievances and explanations: "I have been made a scapegoat, and made to serve in Naxal-infested area despite state government order that officer above 54 should not be posted in these areas. I was present in Polikhand, and the fact was known to my seniors and juniors when the attack came." The allegation comes as ChhatHsgarh police is busy' explaining irregularities in these postings. "These posted in Naxalite-affected areas have been burdened with many responsibilities."
,
Chhattisgarh, which has the worst record in fighting Naxals, , has lost over 150 security men to the Naxalite violence in the past three year. Moreover, the state does not have a full-fledged! independent IG (Naxalite Intelligence). This is an additional charge held by the IG (CAP). What is worse, state's Intelligence Unit is also operating without any DIG and SP rank officers. Only, two Additional SPs have been posted to this important unit, required to function as the eyes and ears of the State police in its anti-Maoist war. As a measure to fight to N axals effectively, the state government has created ranges for selected Naxal-affected areas like Surguja, Rajandgaon, Raigarh, Dantewada and Kanker and two posts of DIGs in CAP. But the government seems to have forgotten to post officers to these sensitive posts, especially created to counter the Naxal threat. Or, as an alternative explanation, worse than the first one, officers are shying away from shouldering such responsibilities for obvious reasons, and the government/ the DGP are unable to force the issue. Either way, it is a sad reflection on the administration of the state facing the most serious threat from the Maoists and their marauding militants. As if all this was not enough, as many as three SPs-of Sarguja, Korea and Jashpurnagar-and eight commanding.
,
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
987
officers of the CAP battalions are non-cadre officers. They seem to have been posted flouting the cadre rules. What seems to be an apparent attempt to explain away this criticism, DGP OP Rathore claims that there is shortage of IPS officers in the state, a claim that is immediately rubbished by the state police officers who are in the know.
"
To paraphrase the poet, the things are not okay in the State of Chhattisgarh!
Did Andhra Maoists train Chhattisgarh Maoists? The upswing in Naxal attacks on police camps and outpost~ in Chhattisgarh is being ascribed, in some knowledgeable circles, to the training being imparted to them by the fugitive Maoists from Andhra Pradesh. This is perfectly sustainable proposition knowing as we do the kind of pressure and unceasing antiMaoist operation~ mounted by Andhra Pradesh authorities during 2006. But the Chhattisgarh intelligence admits and security experts agree that lack of proper training of the State police officers in anti-N axal operations is also adding to difficulties of the State in countering the extremists' activities. Hi Chhattisgarh is the only Naxal-infested state in. the country with an DAV to survey Maoist camps and movements. But is does not seem to have helped the state tackle the menace. There are reasons for it, even if some analysts and Andhra Pradesh police officer tend to blame Chhattisgarh police for it. Even conceding that the state police is not trained well enough to take advantage of the DAV in its couner-Naxal battle, one cannot ignore the fact that state police is not l;ldequately equipped to mount a quick response even if a Naxal hidout is reported by the DAV in a distant jungle/area. It simply lack the requisite mobility to reach the spot, unless it is a short distance away from a police camp/outpost. There is war of words between the two neighbouring states. A senior Chhattisgarh police officer said Andhra Maoists had been part of the group which attacked Rani,Bodli. It was denied by his counterpart: "Thi~ is not true. My information is the Naxals were local people. It may be that they got some training from Andhra Naxalleaders who have fled to Chhattisgarh."
988
Terrorism in India Meanwhile, the 15 March incident has persuaded Andhra Pradesh to re launch combing operations in the difficult terrain on the Andhra-Orissa border: Home Minister K. Jana Reddy said: "Though the other areas in the state including the Nallamalla forest belt, are almost free of Naxals, we are not complacent. He further added a helpful note:
"The Andhra government is ready to give adequate training to cops in the neighbouring state. Andhra Greyhounds have already given training to police personnel from other states. I have reviewed the situation with senior police officers and have asked them to be on the alert in police stations near the Chhattisgarh border. In Andhra Pradesh, the government and the police had succeeded in distancing people from the Maoists in rural areas. Our success has been because of this."
Comments, Solutions Suggested and Flaws Therein The enormity of the Maoist act of ghastly, gruesome criminality has attracted wide variety of comments, suggestions, solutions and critical analysis from the academia, scholarly analysts, press and even politicians. Some of these are examined and dissected in the following paragraphs for their balance and cogent reasoning. To one analyst, the massacre of 55 'policemen' is a gruesome reminder of the imperfections of the Indian polity. Such generalities leads us nowhere. For that matter, any such ghastly depravity--:-be it Nine-Eleven, London underground bombings, Madrid train bombing, 1993 Mumbai multiple blasts et aI-will be a gruesome reminder of imperfections of some polity or other. ADy human creations, including polities the world over, are imperfect. Is killing of the innocent, helpless civilians or policemen and soldiers, for that matter, the only way these mindless marauders can think of to correct such imperfections? Then the state is berated, for using counter force against these lawless marauders, instead of trying political solution. The ultimate wisdom: "The solutions in neither to abandon the development project nor .crush dissent, but to recognize and negotiate with dissonance". I say, who has abandoned development? In fact, Inqia is proceeding with the development of backward/tribal areas, inspite of Naxalites doing the worst
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
989
to thwart the development works-killing the innocent workers and company/contractors' managers and burning and/or destroying the material gathered at a spot, say, for building a bridge or railway track. They are mustering the underprivileged! poor in the name of government's neglecting the development of their areas. If they let the development projects,proceed to their conclusion/completion, they risk losing the raison of their murderous activities. Negotiation with dissidents/dissonance is a fine idea, but they have spurned any offer of negotiations. They want to bend India with the bullet. This analyst must know that no Naxal/terrorist/insurgent outfit will come for negotiations unless state forces it to abandon its violent ways by using even greater force. Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Lutherking could bend government by their leaderships and non-violence. But they could not force violence mongers to become law abiding citizens. These are realities of life today. Empty but Verbose rhetorical flourishes do not a solution offer for these situations created by blood-thirsty ghouls. The second analyst is neither so '~pontificatory nor so idealistically inclined, nor given to verbosity or fluffy prose. The comments offered and lessons suggested to be learnt are down to earth and on practical lines. It "is one of the most audatious single assault ever on the diminishing might of the state in the far-flung regions of the country. They turned the outpost into a grisly graveyard. These are mundane facts. Now the analyst comes to truthful postulations: The success of the attack "must be viewed against the abject failure of intelligence vigilanc'e as well as the retaliatory powers of the security agencies in viole~ce-prone Chhattisgarh, while proving yet again that the Maoists are militarily capable of inflicting maximum, possible damage at a place and time of their choice."
The.a~a~yst goes further to regret that these are not the only hardj:unpalatable messages that the horrendous orgy of violence in Bastar sends down, for it also reveals the severe limitations '~f the sphere of even basic comprehension of the Maoist problem. FQI' the bare fact is that such wanton blood letting-that reveals the mounting capabilities to inflicting damage of the guerrillasis perhaps taking place at the fag end of mass mobilization by
990
Terrorism in India
the Maoists, which the state has be~n helpless to contain. It also exposes the effeteness of the state, faces as it does the problem of its own acute inability to use overwhelming force to neut:ralize the treat. Consider, for example, the nadir to which even routine policing all across the country has sunk. The States in the worst grip of Maoist violence, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgar~ have an average of 57,85,90 and 103 policemen per 100,000 people. 16 The Maoists, on the other hand, have built strong militia in nearly all the villages in the guerrilla zones, even as their true strength and number remains a matter of contention and argumentation ~ithin the establishment. Thus, while the Maoists are consolidating and enlarging their militaristic programme, the police-the first line of defence against the Left-wing terror--continues to function in squalid conditions. What is the way out? A radical improvement in th~ grasp and understanding of the security and political establishment in the country of the nature of problem to thwart the further Maoist consolidation. The success of the Maoists is a result of their working to a plan; success against them will require even more elaborate and organized effort by the state. One of the ways to begin could be to start a slow but sure crackdown on the various front organizations of the Maoists that exploit the vulnerabilities of constitutional governance and its liberal freedoms to expand their activities. The second would be to bolster recruitment in the security agencies and equipping them with the most sophisticated intelligence and weaponry to take the war into the Maoist training camp. The third essay on the subject also points out the state failure in tackling the Maoist violence and find faults with the intelligence not be able to warn when rebels in such large numbers mount a well-planned attack, with such disastrous result. I_
It shows clearly that the Centre and the states have not measured up to the task even though reports suggest that the Naxalite-affected Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh taken together witnessed more bomb blasts in 2006 than terror-hit Jammu and Kashmir. It sums up cogently: Increasing emphasis on development is as important as strengthening intelligence
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
991
through people's support and modernizing police force to combat the N axals effectively. The fourth analyst, also from the press, notes that the Rani Bodli comes barely 10 days after an outrage in Jharkhand; together they point to an increasing virulence in extremist operations in two fledgling states with an inadequately experienced administrations. It further makes some apt observations on the issue.
It notices a cijstinct shift in the strategy, with the target focused on particular individuals or group. If it was a JMM MP in Jharkhand (4 March) it was a police outputlcampt which was stormed by some 400 outlaws (15 March). And both the onslaughts left the respective state administrations floundering in search of solutions. If Jharkhand is hobbled by political uncertainty, Rani Bodli exposed the faultlines of Chhattisgarh's security apparatus, which was clearly over powered at an inhospitable hours. The failure to retaliate effectively was compounded by the fact that after a point the camp ran out of ammunition. This is inexcusable as the camp was set up priml!rily to counter the extremists. Obviously, counter-strategies have not worked, not even the inter-state coordination exercises worked out by various mechanisms at New Delhi. As the area attacked borders Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, the misgivings of the state administration that the extremists may have crossed are not entirely unfounded. At the end, it makes some debatable observations on Salwa Judum: "In the case of Chhattisgarh, the' formation of citizens' resistance groups carried within it the seeds of its own destruction. It was a suicidal move from the start as it envisaged the pitting of the ordinary folk against the Maoists. This has only steeled the determination of the latter. For every extremist killed, two are born." The larger issue of contentious Salwa Judum Campaign will be discussed in a separate section in the later pages but the last assertion needs immediate rebuttal. If this argument is accepted, the battle against the Naxal ultras stands lost even before it starts. It boils down to a ridiculous situation: the extremists can kill the innocents and the soldiers at will without any fear of retaliation/reprisals, whatsoever.
992
Terrorism in India
The fifth comment comes from a daily. It does not get with mundane things: nitty gritty of the attack and various other such details which of course have been mentioned , by other analysts and already discussed above. This daily looks , at the original sin. Its editorial is headed: i~volved
"Started with Reddy"
Country continues to pay the price of Congress confusing romantacism as policy on N axals It starts with saying that it is not known exactly how many of the 55 security personnel killed in the 15 March Naxal strike were Salw~ Judum activists. But the ferocity of the operation, coming as it does just 11 days after the murder of a Member of Parliament in Jharkhand, once again call into question the UPA government's longstanding strategy of pretending that only states have to find devices in dealing with Maoist extremism. It has also come as reb}1ttal to a certain narrative gaining credence in civil society that N axalism is a socio-economic issue. In this incident in Chhattisgarh's Bastar area, for instance, Naxal operations are specifically oriented toward clearing areas from the presence of state machinery. One has to go back many decades to find even the pretence of a desire for equity in the Naxals' programme, no matter how much their apologists may allude to it.
Then, attention is invited to a more serious aspect of ~he UPA government's counter-Naxal policy, rather absence of it. It says "a perception is getting consolidated that Congress government-at the Centre and in Andhra Pradesh area reluctant to take decisive action for fear of losing electoral support in Naxal strongholds. The YSR Reddy government, within months of coming to power in the state in 2004, called N axal leaders 'for talks. The state announced a ceasefire, and acceded to the absurd demand that N axalleaders be allowed to come over- ground fully armed. "In those months, as this newspaper warned in October of that year, the state government did more to dignify Naxals than all of Gadar's ballads put together. The talks predictably collapsed,
993 Naxal Movement in Chhatt isgarh but the top Naxal leader ship flaunte d its clout by having a police cordon ordere d away. Union Home Minis ter Shivra j Patil has done away with his earlie r insiste nce that Naxal ism is a social proble m. But he is yet to take a decisiv e action to overtu rn the impres sion given by his excuse that since the law and order is a state issue, the Centre canno t lead. The scope and geogra phical spread of Naxal violen ce puts effecti ve strateg y beyon d the reach of individ ual state govern ments . It needs to be noted that a variet y of mecha nism has been create d not only for inter-s tate cooper ation like the Joint Task Force ofthe 13 Naxal- affecte d states consis ting of state minist ers and Natio nal Coord inatio n Centr e on Naxal ism (NCC N) presid ed over by the Union Home Secre tary, but also Empo wered Group of Minis ters (EGOM ) at the Centr e for superv ision and guidan ce of the concer ned states. The Home Minis try must give credib le streng th to the forme r two mecha nism and the EGoM must act like a centra l think tank for all the states facing N axal threat , instea d of being merely a monito ring body. It is time the Centre took the N axalite insurg ency a little more seriou sly than it has done so far. Maois ts Vacat e Andh ra F~rest: March , 2007 The Maois t 15 March , 2007 attack in Chhat tisgar h must have come as a surpri se for Andhr a Prade sh (AP), though the ambus h was not totally unexp ected. The source s disclos ed thGlt in the 2nd week March , 2007 some 200 Maois t cadres had :migra ted' from the fores,ts of Nallam alla and. North Telang ana to the Andhr a-Oris sa border and the Danda karany a forest. So ' said a daily dated 16 March , 2007. Repor ts on the subjec t sugges t that over 40 senior leader s/ cadres ofthe CPI (Maois t) were also in the group. Police officers claim ed that most of the Maois ts had been vacate d from Nallam alla forest by mid-M arch, 2007. But senior Andh ra police officia l said the 'exodu s' had nothin g to do with 15 March Rani Bodli attack , as the Naxal s from Andhr a (areas who vacate d Nallam allah) do not know much about the terrai n in those (Rani Bodli) areas. The
994
Terrorism in India
Dandakaranya forest touches Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra. Police presen~e in the area is limited due to the difficult terrain and dense for€st cover. Meanwhile, the AP Police have put all police station on the Andhra-Orissa and Khammam district-Chhattisgarh borders on high alert following this attack. Anti-Naxal forces have also stepped up combing, as they expect weapons stolen from the 15 March attack will be used to equip other Maoist groups. Tabulated/Statistical Information 1. Fatalities: Home Ministry figures show that 551 people have been killed in Maoist attacks in the Chhattisgarh State since 1 Jan 2006. Their break down:
• Civilians
316
• Maoists
88
• Security personnel
147
2. 3-Stage mayhem: 15 March 2007 • 2 AM. Heavily-armed 400 Naxal militants raid the security forces' camp and block all exits by surrounding it. • Hurls grenades and petrol bombs inside. Ensure no one escapes by lighting up the area with portable gensets. • Taken by surprise, there is hardly any counter action by the inmates. The Reds set the camp afire after 3-hour 'battle', before making away with the security forces' weapons. 3. Distances. The Rani Bodli site is 525 km south-west of Raipur, and 50 km from Bijapur district headquarters. 4. Fatalities in action. Of the 55 killed in the attack, 38 were Salwa Judum PSOs and 17 from the Chhattisgarh Armed Police (CAP). 5. Strength. Collector KR Pisda said 60 SPOs and 23 from the CAP were stationed at the Rani Bodli camp/post in the Maoist-infested area. 6. 676 killed. A daily says 676 people have been killed in . Maoist violence over the last two years.
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh:
995
7. Why Dantewada? • Government-sponsored 8~wa Judum Movemer.t, an anti-Naxal campaign by th'e local tribals~ is based in this district. . ,• Dantewada has a huge forest cover: Dandakaranya forests. • It borders Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra. Easy for rebels to escape after attacks.
• Its extensive landmass of 10,239 sq km has a population of just over six lakhs. Its abundant forest cover coupled with hills and inhospitable terrain sans any roads made it ideal to the Ml;l.oists to spread their ideological tentacles. Their task proved even easier as there was h~rdly any institution of governance worth the name in the District.
8. Major Naxal strikes • Nov 2004. Killed 17 policemen in an attack i:t:l Chandaulu district of Andhra Pradesh. • 3 Sep 2005. 20 policemen in Bilaspur district of Chhattisgarh by a landmine. • Nov 2005. Raided Jehanabad jail in Bihar killed 12 policemen and freed 305 inmates. • Nov 2005. Looted 207 rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition from the Guard Training Center at Giridih, Jharkhand. • 28 Feb 2006. 25 civilians killed in landmine blast at Errabore in Datewada district Chhattisgarh. • 25 Mar 2006. 13 civilians killed in landmine blast in Kanker district, Chhattisgarh. • 16 Apr 2006. 10 policemen killed in an attack on a police outpost in Datewada district, Chhattisgarh. • 28 Apr 2006. 13 of 50 hostages executed in Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh. • 16 July 2006. 32 tribal inmates killed by Naxal rebels when they attacked Salwa Judum Relief Camp at Errabor in Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh. Some
996
Terrorism in India
sources said "32 tribal participants in a Salwa Judum camp at Errabor killed in a N axal attack. Difference in categorization of victims in the same incident is too glaring to be missed: First source describes them as innocent civilians, to the other they are participants/members of the anti-Naxal Salwa Judum campaign. • 2 Dec., 2006. 13 policemen killed in landmine blast in Jharkhand. • 4 March, 2007. JMM MP Sunil Mahato who was watching a football match at a village near Jamshedpur, Jharkhand is shot dead. • 15 March, 2007. 55 police personnel killed at Rani Bodli camp, Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh in attack by 400-strong Naxal militant squad. 9. Maoist arm dump busted: 15 March, 2007-In an uncanny coincidence, on the day of the Rani Bodli massacre, Andhra Pradesh police unearthed a huge cache of rockets, rocket launchers, landmines and ammunition during a raid on a Maoist hideout in N allamalla forests near Pullela Cheruvu in Prakasam district on 15 March, 2007. The details of the seizure are given hereafter: • 272 fully-assembled rockets. • 7 rocket launcher. • 47 anti-personnel pressure mines. • 1 SBBL gun. • 112 tocket pipes; 111 rocket heads; 360 rocket propellant nuts; 30 rocket launcher stands; 271 propeller caps and 22,00 propeller blades-all raw materials to manufacture rockets. • 104 pressure mine springs and 360 detonator caps. • 380 grenade springs. • 360 rounds of .303 rifle ammunition. The police said the dump was part of rocket launcher, rockets and other materials manufactured by Maoist Tech
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
997
Madhu last year (2006) to target police station and other security installations across the state-Andhra Pradesh. 10. The fatality figure subsequently rose to 68.
CRPF Averts Naxalite Attack: March, 2007 An alert squad of the CRPF and Chhattisgarh Police's Special Police Officers (SPas) repulsed a major attack by 400strong Naxalite ultras at a Salwa Judum camp at Marriguda in Dantewara district early on 25 March, 2007. The exchange of fire lasted three hours on the 24/25 March night. The militants escaped the scene taking ~dvantage of the dense forest cover. A senior CRPF official said on 26 March that the Naxalites opened fire at the camp covered by the CRPF personnel, where reinforcements were rushed to the spot and the said fire fight took place. This official further added: "During the search operations after the encounter, the 'troops' noticed fresh blood stains which indicate that 10 to 15 Naxalites were either seriously injured or killed." "One Naxal commander, Attu, is also believed to be either seriously injured or killed by the forces. No casualty of the security forces has been reported in the incident". [Without commenting too harshly on the 'casualties' suffered by the N axals, as estimated by concerned officials or the police/paramilitary forces after such clashes, the best that can be said is that the estimates may bear no relationship with the realities and actualities of these situations. Most of the times, these estimates could be highly exaggeratedif not imagined. Some analysts would assert all such telltale estimates are self-serving. It, of course, is a fact of life that it is not often that the state police or the para-military forces recover the body of a dead rebel. Let us rest the case here for the present.] The arms and ammunition recovered during the combing operations include a gun, 15 bombs and five detonators, besides 17 rounds of ammunition of 7.62 mm SLRs and 100 mtr of dectric wire. The bombs recovered from the site include countrymade varieties, petrol bombs and tiffin bombs.
998
Terrorism in India
Other recoveries included two camera flashes, 16 plastic water cans, three diaries, three search lights, 40 batteries of 1.5 volt, and Rs. 27, 500 in cash. The recoveries were handed over the state police and a FIR has been lodged in this connection. 17
Chief Minister Demands Unified Action The man most concerned with the 4 March, 2007 assassination of JMM MP Sunil Mahato in the neighbouring Jharkhand is Raman Singh, Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh. A red alert was sounded all over the state after the killing. He demanded constitution of a separate Central Para Military Force to tackle Maoist meance in the 155 affected districts of the country. He said the Central Para Military Force could be deployed in Maoist effected states and the personnel from this force should be trained and extended facilities at par with Army. Maoism was a threat for tHe democracy, he said. In fact, Chhattisgarh, where more than 400 people have fallen to Maoist violence in the last one year, has again called for a unified action against the rebels. The State has all along been demanding a unified command from the Centre and stressed the need for a joint action for all the effected States to fight Left rebels. Chhattisgarh shares border with other effected States like Jharkhand, AP, Orissa and Maharashtra. Eight of the 16 districts of the State are seriously affected by the Left extremism.
Maoists Kill two in Chhattisgarh: April, 2007 Tension gripped the site of Essar Steel's upcoming plant in Chhattisgarh after Maoist ultras on 1 Apr 2007 killed two farmers for having agreed to hand over their land to the company. Some 40 armed outlaws swooped on Bhansi village (some 400 km south of Raipur) in Dantewada, district, among country's districts worst hit by Maoist violence, and killed Amit,- 26, and Hungaram, 50, as they had agreed to surrender for the steel plant. District SP OP Pal describes the village atmosphere: "The situation is tense and villagers, mostly tribals of Bhansi and neighbouring Dhurli village, are highly frightened by the killings
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
999.
by these Maoists ..Rebels have warned villagers not to hand over their ancestral farmland to Essar Steel, otherwise they would . also meet the same fate." Extra forces were deployed at the project site. Essar Steel, one of India's leading steel makers, signed an agreement with the Chhattisgarh government.
Can the Maoists Influence the Elections? Chhattisgarh: April,2007 Pro. or anti-Naxal stance of candidates and their parties seem to be finding a mention among the reasons for their victory or defeat in the electoral battles, of late. Justified or misplaced, such a thing indeed came to happen about the Rajnandgaon Lok Sabha by election held in March, 2007. When BJP lost the Rajnandgaon byelection, its leaders and even its Chief Minister Raman Singh (ofChhattisgarh) initially attributed the defeat to the wrongs done by Pradeep Gandhi, the BJP MP from this seat who was disqualified from Lok Sabha after the 'cash for question' scam.
B~t the very next day after the results were '~nnounced, . there were se.cond thoughts' about the cause of BJP's discomfiture. The party insiders said there were oth~ factors that led to the defeat of the BJP candidate. The reasoning goes somewhat along the lines traced here. The BJP leaders of the State pointed that their candidate trailed by some 44,000 votes in the areas bordering Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, the region heavily infested with the Maoist cadres. It needs or mention that the Maoists initially had given a boycott call to the elections. Now comes the twist: In view of this boycott call by the Naxals, what explains the more than 60 percent turnout of the voters in this Maoist-infested region? BJP acolytes are ready with the answer: As the State Government was waging a war against the N axals, they did not enforce their dictat, allowing the people to cast their votes, which apparently went in favour of the Congress. So the BJP reasoning is that the Naxals knew that BJP was unpopular because of its tough anti-Naxal policy. But "'the conundrum does not end here. More is yet to come.
1000
Terrorism in India
If the BJP lost because of its tough stance against Naxalites, how does one explain the victory of the Congress candidate whose state leader Mahendra Karma is best-known hero of the anti-Maoist campaign? Karma is, in fact, the progenitor of the much-criticised Salwa Judum. BJP has answer for that also: Congress kept Karma under wraps, not allowing him to attend any meeting or canvas support for party candidate! If there is any convoluted reasoning at all, this line of BJP leaders explaining their candidate's defeat, indeed, is an ideal example! Politics is not a straight game, nor is it played straight any way-not "in India at least. It could be looked in another way also. It is the line pursued by the state leadership of the BJP for the consumption of its central leaders. The logic is simple even disingenuous: "If the BJP lost Rajnandgaon, is not because of any inherent weakness the functioning of the State unit, but because of tough anti-N axal policies pursued by it! So Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh had to"pay a heavy price for fighting against Maoists. If this" tough stance proved a proverbial last nail for the BJP which was defeated by the clever Congress, it must cheerfully suffer for ifs principles. Has not the BJP continuously pilloried Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh for his being soft on the terrorism? So, fighting for one's' principles does not come cheap! At the end, one may say that the BJPs central leadership possibly has, already seen through the game. In any case, such clever if convoluted reasoning would not wash for long anywhere, with anyone.
Super Cop Gill's Services may not be Renewed: April, 2007 The Raman Singh government in Chhattisgarh may not renew the contract of KPS Gill, brought into the State to plan, implement, and operationalise the anti-Maoist strategy, a daily18 . reported on 17 April, 2007. The recent Rani Bodla attack in Dantewara, in which 55 sceurity men were killed, might have persuaded the State government to close the door on the Supercop, "whose contract ended today (16 Apr 2007)". Incidentally, Gill is credited to have controlled, and finally ",eliminated" the Khalistan insurgency in Punjab. Knowing hiS' w
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
1001
ways, the journalists would say the Supercop himself would prefer the term "crushed" in liu of "eliminated" Raman Singh, electioneering in UP for assembly polls, told the daily on 16 April: "I am busy here till 23 April. A decisin on renewing Gill's contract will be taken after consulting (my) cabinet colleagues once I return." Meanwhile, official sources said the Government had decided not to renew the security Adviser's contract, as it felt "there has been no positive impact of Gill's stint in the State. Ironically, the number of casualties had risen in comparison to the previous year. A shift from defence to offence, a strategy devised by Gill, has been blamed for the higher number of security force and civilian casualties in the State. Sources said some 400 civilians and policemen were killed in rebel attacks since Gill's appointment, while the figure was less than half during the corresponding period the year before. His opponents in the officialdom assert: "Though Gill has vast experience in tackling extremism, taking on as he has separatists (first) in Assam and (then in) Punjab, he has been unable to show any tangible resq.1ts in our State." Surprisingly, the Security Adviser is alsQ being blamed for high number of civilian casualties: "As our,forc6s are taking on Naxal cadres, they are retaliating by ki!ling civilians. Such arguments are rather inane! Are his critics suggesting that the forces should stop attacking N axals to avoid civilian casualties? But security analysts hold that Gill could not be criticized for the Police's inability to show results. "One should understand that Gill is a security adviser and the implementation is the responsibility of the police. Moreover, how could he be expected to provide miraculous results in a year's time when the State police have been unable to tackle the problem for decades?", a senior officer asked. Some other related details and Gill's side of the case is given in the accompanying write up.
Chhattisgarh: 6 mote Districts to get Anti-Naxal Cells: June, ~007 Conceding tl),at fh~ Naxalite menace has spread to almost the entire State; ,the Chhattisgarh Government has decided, State Home Minister Ram Vichar Netam disclosed on 12 June,
Terrorism in India
1002
2007, to establish Anti-Naxalit~ (Operations) Cells in six more districts, which were till now free from the Left wing extremism. These six districts are: Raipur, Kawardha, Rajnandgaon, Dhamtari, Durg and Mahasamund. With the setting up of these six special units, of the State's _ 20 police districts only four will remain classified as non-Maoist affected district. These are: Bilaspur, Korba, Raigarh and Janjgir. The following ten districts already have Anti-Naxal cells functioning in their jurisdiction: Bastar
Sarguja
Kanker
Korea
Bijapur
Jashpur
Dantewara
Balrampur
Narayanpur
Surajpur
The decision (to set up 6 more cells) comes after intelligence inputs and interrogation of top arrested Naxalites revealed that after strengthening their base in tribal areas, the Maoists were now planning to further spread their activities in the plains of Chhattisgarh. Explaining the decision, Home Minister Netam disclosed that the proposal was forwarded to the Government during the tenure of the late DGP OP Rathore, who had feared that the N axalites had started to spread their base to non-tribal areas of the State as well "It has now been approved by the Gov~rnment, as we want to be prepared to deal with the - extremists", Netam said. 19 Reinforcing the Minister's averments, Acting DGP SK Paswam added: "The Government took the decision after receiving intelligence inputs that Maoists were planning to spread to new areas of the State. These (6) districts are next on target. The interrogation of Dandakaranya Divisional Committee Chief Satyam Reddy, alias Gopanna, who was arrested in May 2007, also revealed and confirmed that the extremists are now planning to spread their roots in these districts." The State police had arrested Gopanna, along with his two accomplices Surendra and Suresh, from Gariyaband area of Raipur district. Gopanna had a Rs. 5 lakh reward on his head. -
Naxal Muvement in Chhattisgarh
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Sources disclosed N axalite cadres had been visiting these areas regularly and also attempting to woo the locals with· Maoist literature and tracts. "Naxal literature seized by the police also points towards the direction that the Maoist are planning to head to," the sources said.
It is learnt that once these Anti-Naxal (Operations) Cells are in place, additional police personnel will be allotted to the districts. The police in these districts will also be provided with specialized training to confront the Maoist cadres. These Anti-Naxal Cells will be directly responsible to the SSPs and SPs of the respective districts.
Delay in finding a new DGP: Chhattisgarh: June 2007 Even in normal times, the States must ensure that a new incumbent is positined to take up his job the day after a DGP retires. It should not be a problem, even fully knowing that these will be pulls and pressures by the likely candidates themselves in the race and their political backers above them, because the date of retirement of the serving DGP is known months in advance. This is necessary not only because the new incumbent would have been chosen after due consideration of his merits/ demerits and fitness and otherwise for the job but also because an important post, responsible for maintaining law and or~er in the state should not be allowed to remain vacant for weeks and months. The above observations apply to a situation where law a~1d order are in reasonably good shape, and given the fact that this could not said for most of States in India, the issue assumes . urgency. But keeping such a post vacant for even a short time, in the States suffering the Maoist depredations is a veritable act of political irresponsibility-if not delinquency! These thoughts come to mind when a daily20 reports that Jharkhand has been without a DGP for a month. The post fell vacant on 21 May, 2007 following the death of OP Rathore, who suffered a massive cardiac arrest while, ironically, delivering a lecture on tackling Naxalite menace in the State. That it should remain vacant for a month, as reporL~d by the press on 19 June, in a State like Jharkhand which is
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facing the very worst of a poor law and order -situation, aggravated by the Maoist murderous violence, is not only an unhappy event but also suggestive of administration being amiss. Accepting that it was not a case of normal retirement of a current incumbent, even then the Chief and Home Ministers should have acted with certain despatch to find a replacement. It is certain that the Chhattisgarh police, battling the mounting extremist violence, must be facing problems operating without a leader. Though the state police "has been under an acting DGP, SK Paswan since Rathore's demise", sources said the del:;(Y by the Government in appointing a full-time DGP was preventing several critical policy decisions from being taken by the police. A senior source explained the problems: "This is also creating a command and control problem. Transfers up to the level of Dy SP can't be made as the DGP is the one who heads the establishment board and needs to forward the proposal. An additional problem also arises as only a DGP is authorized to write the confidential report of senior officers."
However, Chief Minister Raman Singh assured that the process of appointing a new DGP was underway: "We are at present talking with the Union Home Ministry regarding relieving Vishwa Ranjan, now on deputation as Additional Director, lB, for the position." Four senior IPS officers were stated to be in the running for the top job. Ranjan and Praveen Mahendru are the senior-most officers from the Chhattisgarh Cadre. Then there are Rajeev Mathur (Director Prosecution) and Anil Nawani (DG Prisons). It also needs to be added that the Union Home Ministry should have shown some urgency in relieving Ranjan as it is the nodal institution in the country charged with dealing with problems of internal security, including the ones of terrorism and insurgency, and therefore is well aware that Chhattisgarn and Jharkhand are two states in the country that are worst suffer~rs among a total of ni.ne of the Maoist extremism.
Senior Maoist Leader Arrested in Chhattisgarh: June, 2007 The Chhattisgarh police claimed 3 June, 2007 to have arrested a senior Naxal commander Subhash alias Aitu Rurs~
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
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alias Vijay from Maoist-infested Rajnandgaon district. Aitu is the commander of Darrekasa Dalam, operating in Rajnandgaon district of Chhattisgarh and Gondia district of Maharashtra. Police sources disclosed the arrest was made from Dongagarh on the 2nd evening, and Aitu was shifted to Rajnandgaon for interrogation. SP, Rajnandgaon district Amit Kumar said: "Aitu was involved in several offences, which includes an attack on a police party in 2006 in which several policemen, including a DSP, were injured and another attack in which a train engine was set on fire at the Darrekasa station." Aitu had sneaked into Dongagarh town for some medical treatment. On a tip-off, Aitu was arrested when police laid a trap. The 27-year old Aitu hails from Naxal-infested Bastar area, and was heading the Darrekasa Dalam operating across the said inter-state border since 2005. Though he was recruited. only in 2003, he was moved to this border as Dalam commander in 2005. After interrogation, the extremist led the police to a N axalite ammunition dump which yielded following items: • AK-47 rifles
2
• Self'-Roading rifles
2
• .12 bore rifles
3
• Gelatin sticks
150 4
• Wireless !:'('ts • Photography flashes
10
• Bundles of wire
10
Chhattisgarh: Prisoners Shifted to Safer Jails: June, 2007 After intelligence warned thaLNaxalites might attack prisons and attempt to free their emnrades, the Chhattisgarh Government has shifted 60 hardcore Leftwing extremists to more secure areas ofthe State, a·daily reported on 8 June, 2007. f.
SOurces said the Maoists wer~ shifted' from Dantewara subjail to Jagadalpur Central Jail: "Th"e- operation was conducted discreetly, amidst tight security, as the extremists could have attacked the con~oy"', DG (Prisons)AniI M Nawani confirmed. 21
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.
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The step to shift these high-risk inmates came after specific inputs from Central intelligence agencies that prison in Chhattisgarh were particularly vulnereable to N axal attacks. "The Central agencies cited the 14 Nov 2005 incident in Bihar, when Naxalites stormed Jehanabad district jail, 45 km from Patna, killing at least 12 people", sources said. The incident was aimed at 'rescuing' the Maoists lodged in the jail, and led to the escape of half of the jail's 650-odd inmates. Intelligence agencies feel the threat had also increased after the N axalites blew up several high tension power transmission towers on 31 May (2007), causing a blackout in many Naxaliteaffected areas.
Chhattisgarh Seeks Young IPS Officers to Tame Maoists: , June, 2007 Chhattisgarh on 14 June, 2007 requested Centre to post young IPS officers to State to effectively deal with the Maoistrelated violence. The demand was made by the State officials during their discussions with the senior Union Home Ministry officials in the State capital Raipur. Presently, the State does not have even the sanctioned - strength of 81 IPS officers-shy of it by 11. A senior official who attended these discussions told a daily: "We have requested for'·, posting of more young IPS officers even if it called for an out of way arrangement." He further added: "Given the gravity of the sit~ation and the fact that the State Government has taken the Maoist problem as a challenge, we have requested the Centre to post more and young IPS officers so that the State can fight Maoists with more efficacy. In fact, the State needs more IPS officers than the sanctioned strength. But for now, the ... Government demanded to fill at least the vacant posts."22 '.
The meeting also discussed the development works in the Maoist-infested areas of the State, as the development in itself is considered an anti-dote to the spread and propaganda of the 11' \ Mabi~t" philosophy. The State representatives also informed the - \(,~sitmg team, that included Additional Secretary, Union Home Mii1:istr:y, Vijay Kumar, and the head of the Anti-Maoist Cell, Union Hbme.'Min.istry, GK Sinha, about the various measures taken up i~1 the-affected areas.
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After the launch of the Salwa Judum anti-Maoist campaign, the Maoists have become more aggressive and have been targeting both civilians and security forces. IG (Bastar) RK Vij gave details of security personnel who were despatched on search operation in the forests: 155 security personnel, comprising 28 CRPF personnel, 84 SPOs, and three personnel from Chhattisgarh police, posted at Errabore camp. Vij also added that 44 personnel had gone missing after the attack. State Home Minister Ram Vichar Netam claimed at least two dozen Maoists were also killed in the fire-fight, but no Maoist body was recovered from the site. This averment obviously lacks credibility. The Maoists also took away over two dozen weapons, including AK-47s, SLRs and 303 rifles. From the above account and facts narrated there in, those who know what an ambush means, its mechanics, and loss of large number of weapons by the search party, can make the following conclusions: / 1. Netam's statement about deaths in the Maoist ranks is based on self-serving briefing by the state police to hide all relevant/true facts.
2. There was no fire fight whatsoever.
Maoists Kill 23 Police in Ambush in Chhattisgarh: July, 2007 Carrying out another big strike in Chhattisgarh, Maoist cadres killed 23 security men and a civilian in the forests near Errabore in Dantewada district, some 550 km from Raipur. The security men, who numbered 155, were ambushed on the 9 July 2007 evening by some 300 Maoists between Regergetta and Uppelxnetta villages near Errabore. Of the 24 bodies recovered, the break down is : CRPF-15
State police-2
.SPOs-6
Civilian-1
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Terrorism in India
The attack took place after security personnel, on being alerted about the presence of the Maoists in the area, headed for a hilltop at Uppelmetta, 6 km from Gaganpalli. "Reports reaching Raipur said 60 SPOs, 10 CRPF men, and one from the State police had managed to reached the Errabore police post." The ambush is the first major strike after the 15 March incident (it was the worst Maoist outrage in the state) in which 55 security personnel were killed at the Rani Bodli outpost in Bijapur district. Constables to SHOs in one Step: Bastar: Aug. 2007 Faced with a serious shortage of officers in N axal-affected Bastar region, the Chhattisgarh police has decided to deploy lower ranking personnel from other districts and post them as Station House officers (SHO) in hyper-sensitive police stations. , In fact, "ten police constables have been selected as part of this process from Durg district. All of them wil~ be post~d as Sub- , Inspectors in charge of the police stations in Bastar, Dantewada, . Kanker, Narayanpur and Bijapur districts of Bastar and will have t9- serve a tenure of five years in the region." This was reported by a daily dated 8 Aug., 2007. 23 They will be required to undergo a physical test and clear a written examination. Chhattisgarh DGP Vishwaranjan said decision to promote existing senior constables was part of government policy to provide manpower to the Naxal-affected police stations. "If we go in for fresh recruitment, the process could take up to two years. But existing employees do not need to be given much training and can be deployed almost immediately," the DGP explained. Constables seeking the "promotion" will need to be graduated and below 48 years of age. The candidates selected will have to go in for a two-month training in jungle warfare and also learn about the basic responsibilities of a SHOo "As most of the selected candidates are expected to be familiar with the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) and Indian Penal Code (lPC), we don't think there should be any problem in their handling of the higher responsibility," the DGP added.
Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh
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While the process has been initiated in the Durg district, the special promotion drive will be started in some other districts too where the Naxalite pressure is comparatively less. Official sources indicated that the State Government is aming to appoint some 100 SHOs through this process.
Chhattisgarh to have its own "Grey Hounds:" Sep., 2007 Frustrated by repeated attacks on an ill-trained and illequipped police force, Chhattisgarh is set to roll out the 'heavy artillery' against Naxals, reported a daily of 6 Sep 2007 24 . Task Force (STF), one the lines of Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds, under the command of a Colonel from the Army. DGP Chhattisgarh Vishwaranjan said some 4,000 crack personnel will be deployed with the STF. They would be provided with commando training and advanced weaponry, enabling them to mount an offensive against the Maoists inside the dense jungles. Col Rajnish Sharma, selected to lead the STF, would shortly resign from the Indian Army and join the Chhattisgarh police in the rank of a DIG. The STF personnel will be picked from the existing police f Jrce and trained at the State's Jungle Warfare School at I{anker. 1300 officers and men in the age groups 18-25 have aiready been selected. The decision to constitute the STF is the latest measure by the Raman Singh government to deal with the Left rebels who have, of late, been hitting the police and the rag-tag "civil defence unit" called Salwa Judum almost at will.
References 1. The deadline coincides with the Commonwealth games period. Does it have a hidden, sinister implication.
2. Kanhaiah Bhelari, Week, 11 June 2006. 3. Shivam Vij, Tehelka, 31 Mar 2007. 4. Ibid.
5. Balbir K Punj, Outlook, 11 Sep., 2006. 6. Nitin Mahajan, Indian Express, 7 Nov., 2006. 7. Smita Gupta, Outlook, 15 May, 2006.
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8. Asian Age, 20 June, 2006 . 9. Asian Age, 29 Jan., 2007. 10. Vishwa Mohan, Times of India, 17 March, 2007. 11. Times of India, 16 March, 2007. 12. Ejaz Kaiser, Hindustan Times, 16 March, 2007. 13. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 22 March, 2007. 14. Vinay Jha, Indian Express, 19 March, 2007. 15. Ch VM Krishna Rao, Asian Age, 16 March, 2007. 16. Editorial, Pioneer, 16 March, 2007. 17. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 27 March, 2007. 18. Nitin Mahajan, Indian Express, 17 April, 2007. 19. Nitin Mahajan, Indian Express, 16 June, 2007.
20. Ibid., 19 June, 2007. 21. Ibid., 8 June, 2007. 22. Shivanand Shukla, Pioneer, 15 June, 2007. 23. Nitin Mahajan, Indian Express, 8 Aug., 2007. 24. Amitabh Tiwari, Times of India, 6 Sep., 2007.
19 Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, and Jharkhand This chapter covers all the N axalite-affected States of lndia, barring Chhattisgarh, which has been discussed in the preceding chapter. The States have been dealt with in alphabetic orderstarting with Andhra Pradesh and ending up with West Bengal.
ANDHRA PRADESH All 23 districts of Andhra Pradesh are affected by the N axalite menace. The State can possibly be categorized as the worst-affected State in the Indian Union, if for no other reason than the fact that the N axals 'almost' claimed the life of a ruling ChiefMinister-Chandra Babu Naidu of the Telgu Desam Party (TDP)-not very long ago. The State police admitted that "in the manner of Assam's ULFA" , the Naxals utilized the ceasefire there to augment its strength and enhance its fighting capability. After the ceasefire, the number of Maoist fighters grew from 700 to 1200. During the peace, the Naxalites succeeded in reclaiming their domination and evolved a comprehensive plan to make Telangana the beacon of the revolutionary movement again. If a date is to be fixed for start of Naxalism in Andhra Pradesh, it has to be 31 October 1967. That was the day when a huge m,~eting organized by the J-atapu and the Savara tribes in Srikakulam was disrup~_..;d by Medi Satyam of the Congress. In the violence that ensued, Satyam and two tribals were killed. That was the day it all began in Andhra Pradesh. Incidentally, the revolutionary movement sprang up at Naxalbari in Darjeeling in May 1967.
Terrorism in India
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Has Andhra Police Evolved a Model on Tackling Naxalism? Andhra Pradesh (AP) has had decades-long experience of dealing with the Naxalite violence. The state is reputed to have launched various initiatives to counter and defeat the CPI (Maoist) war machine, including the much analysed October 2004-January 2005 peace talks. In fact, it is widely believed, that over the years an 'Andhra Pradesh model' has evolved which combines welfare activities for the people in the areas where Naxal rebels operate violently as well as cracking down on them with all the might at the disposal of the state. If some analysts conclude Andhra's has been a success story in tackling the N axalism, others assert it is a flawed model. Both the Maoists and state police agree that the peace talks are history now. Even writer and activisit-poet P Varavara Rao, member of the three-strong Naxal delegation that participated in the talks, admits as much. In fact, top police officials in the State Intelligence Branch (SIB) and the special Greyhounds force involved in anti-Naxal operations say recruitment drive by the--Naxalites went up during the talks as did militant activity. In fact, it is a matter of record that Chief Minister YSR Reddy was severely criticized for inviting the Ultra-Left extremists to talks soon after wining the 2004 polls without thinking through the issues involved. His hasty step bestowed greater credibility and respectability on the Maoist leadership than had been done by the years of work of the ballade er Ghadar. And in the process, as mentioned above, the outfit regrouped and augmented its combat capability. The state police explains the present "focused" five-pronged strategy followed by the Government. • Establishing special forces like the Grey hounds, and for improved intelligence functioning the SIB and the Intelligence Security Wing. • Rehabilitating surrendered Naxals. • Reassurance and protection to potential victims. • Mass contact programmes.
Noxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
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Improving socio-economic condition of people in Maoist-run territories. DGP Swaranjit Sen seems to be quite clear what police should do and how it should conduct itself: "Police offensive must continue to neutralize the Maoist threat. As many as 167 rebels were killed last year (2005) in encounters. At the same time, the police cannot oppress villagers in the name of getting information. The Government has strongly emphasized that the police should not oppress villagers or colour them as sympathizers. "1 Police activity has ensured that Maoist's traditional stronghold in AP-the North Telangana Zonal Committee (NTZC)- has weakened. Even earlier nucleus of the Naxal movement, Warangal is no more its stronghold. Warangal's Additional SP (operations) Rajesh Kumar Confirms the postulation: "Maoists have suffered severe losses in North Telangana. Our information network is much superior, it is now apparent that several NTZC members have retreated into Chhattisgarh. » The 'limited' success achieved by Andhra State should not lull it into complacency. It is yet far from winning the 'war' against' Naxalism. But neue potential signs of danger are surfacing. First such threat Comes from CPI (Maoist)'s AP State Committee, based in the Nallawalla and Rayalaseema areas. The second one is the Maoist division of Andhra-Orissa Border Committee. In both these areas, forest cover is dense and the terrain difficult, and to make the matters worse for the state administration and welcome for the rebels, the police information network weak and sparse. Consequently, it should have come as a no surprise to the state authorities and observers alike that the Maoists' "month-long 9th Congress" was convened at the Andhra-Orissa border at a 'secured' enclave in early 2007. Since socio-economic disparities in undeveloped or underdeveloped areas exploited by the Maoists to persuade the youth to join their protest movement, Andhra Pradesh government pressed a remote and interior areas development department into service in Naxalism-affected villages. Its head, Principal Secretary JC Mohanty expands the motivation: "The idea is to empower tribals and SC/STs. Potential N axal recruits
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Terrorism in India
are also provided employment. This leads to several potential and surrendered Naxals to join the mainstream." Unfortunately and inevitably, all such well-planned and noble-intentioned schemes at a certain stage fall prey to the bonalty of the officials involved and the apathy of the grass root staff. The entire scheme, well-conceiyed, to begin with, starts gathering disrepute. No wonder, if Varavara Rao scoffs at it all. The ineffective gesture of government schemes was exposed when the Economic Support Scheme scam broke. Under it, BPL' tribals of Eturunagaram, Warangal district, were supposed to be given livestock. Instead, photos of cattle were super imposed with pictures of tribals, and submitted to the Integrated Tribal Development Authority as evidence of the scheme's implementation. A poet and good author that he is, Varavara Rao puts i~ well, justifying the revolutionary Zeal of his compatriots with stock terminologies: "Such injustices, besides feudalism-imperialism, give rise to revolutionary parties. As long as there is a need, there will be movemrults." The day the state starts functioning with a modicum of honesty and consequently establishes an efficient delivery paradigm, India would have taken the first step towards eliminating' the evil of ultra-Left violence. As for the Andhra model tackling the N axalism successfully or otherwise, the best that can be said on the issue is: The jury is still out.
Evaluating Andhra's anti-Naxal 'Success': 2007 Chief Minister YSR Reddy was severely criticized for ordering a ceasefire against Naxalites and inviting them for negotiations after coming to power in early 2004, in keeping with his pre-poll promises. The criticism was essentially based on the postulation that the 'peace pause' was utilized by the Naxals to re-group and improve their operational capacity and though they came to the negotiation table, they never had their heart into it. They agreed to the cease fire only because they had been pushed into a corner by the Chandrababu Naidu government, went one analysis, and needed a ceasefire urgently,
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, GUjarat & Jharkhand
1015
which was gifted to them thoughtlessly by Reddy. But all that is history now and the issue has been discussed earlier in these pages. It is worth recording that after completing a full circle, Reddy Government itselflaunched the Naidu-like offensive against the Naxalite in 2006, having realized the futility of the 2004 negotiations. Having completed three years in office in early 2007, the Reddy Government claims to have 'won' the war against N axals and a good number of analysts seem to accept the tunability of this claim. What follows is an evaluation of this claim. After the 2004 futile talks and then pussyfooting on the issue for nearly two years, the Congress government led by YSR Reddy launched the anti-Naxalite operation in 2006. What follows is a dominant opinion on this operation: "The Year-long exercise turned the tide completely in the battle against the Left-wing extremism in Andhra Pradesh. Mter spectacular successes by the police in targeting and eliminating key functionaries of the outlawed CPI (Maoists), the year ended with the Naxalite Army in a shambles." "In the course of 2006, the killing of 42 senior leaders -including Andhra Pradesh Committee Chief Burra Chinnaiah alias Madhav and at least one Central Committee member Wadkapur Chandramoulidelivered such a blow to the organization that it has been forced to suspend its activities in the State. At a recent plenum held in the sanctuary of forests of neighbouring Chhattisgarh, the party leadership decided to halt operations for sometime, assess the situation and regroup."2
Reactions in the aftermath of the 'Success' As far as the Maoist propaganda machine and over ground supporters and sympathizers of the movement are concerned, they insist the pause is only a tactical manoeuvre. The celebrated folk-singer Gaddar explains it better, and Knowledgeably: "The have gone into a defensive mode because
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of so many reasons. It is not an about turn. In the military, . there is either advance or retreat. These is no suspension. This is a strategic retreat." It seems the Andhra Police does not want to be complacent, neither willing to take a benign view of "moratorium". Refusing to let its guard down, it not only continues to be alert "but is also extending logistical support to neighbouring states." The state government sees the rebels on the run. What is this logistical support the Andhra 'Pradesh police is claiming to be extending to the neighbouring state: Its response is too brief to give any detail: "In the form of infrastructure developed by its anti-Maoist Greyhounds unit."
The new DGP Mohd Abdul Basit who took over on 1 January 2007, promised to persist with the policy of past 12-18 month and go after the Maoists. On their supposed suspension of operations, he sounded rather skeptical: " If it is true, it is well and good. It is very difficult to comment on a hypoth.esis. Obviously, it shows that the police pressure is working. We would like to continue in the same way." Analysts believe DGP Basit has a hard act to follow. His predecessor SW:K'anjit Sen, who relinquished office on the last day of 2006, had led an overwhelmingly successful counteroffensive against the Maoists in 2005-06. Pointing out one indication of the Change that has come from the public reaction on police campaign, he said: "People are sighing in relief. Many people told us that for the first time in several years they have been able to visit their fields an work there without any fear of Naxalites."
Speaking Through Figures In such situations, the figures should tell the story. In the 1990s and early 2005s, Maoist triggered violence killed, on an overage, 300 people a year in Andhra. In 2003, if the police killed 175 rebels, 151 people, including 15 policemen, fell to their bullets. The decline reached a new low in 2006 when there was a 65 per cent drop iiJ. casualties compared to the previous year. In 2006, the Maoist could kill 52 people, 11 of them policemen. On the other hand, the police liquidated 134 extremists and gained dominance of the terrain-for the first
, Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1017
time. The toll for the N axalite side detailed below is for the year 2006: 1. State Committee Chief and at least one Central Committee member, as already mentioned above.
2. Three State Committee members. 3. Four State Committee Secretaries. 4. 12 District Committee members. 5. 20 Squad Commanders. 6. 320 Maoists surrendered and 717 others were arrested. 7. Mter 1999 when the police killed three senior Central Committee members(Nalla Adi Reddy, Seelam Naresh and Santosh Reddy) in a single incident, this (2006) was the most successful year for the anti-Maoist· operations. To demonstrate the supremacy the police had established, Sen personally visited and marched through the thick forest N allahmallah, once the impregnaable fortress of Maoists, and the Dandakarnya forest on the Andhra-Orissa border. These were the places the policemen would tremble even mentioning them.
Strategy and Tactics behind the Happy Results How did the reversal of fortunes came about? Sen, like a good senior police officer, gives the credit to policemen on the ground, and a carefully-built intelligence network that sought to win over the fence-sitters. The just-retired DGP explains: We had adopted the strategy of not touching any villager who was not a hard-core Maoist, bent upon violence and killing. This helped us in getting 'more information from the lower cadre. That is how we could come to know who was where. After getting pinpoint information, we undertook combing in that area." The strategy was to target the top State and District leadership of the Maoists. The calculation was that once the pillars fell, the rest of the edifice-would collapse in a confused heap.
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Built into this approach was hard sleuthing, the nonglamorous, nuts-and-bolts work of rural policing. It required reaching out to villages in difficult areas, hamlets policemen had avoided for years, and winning the trust of locals. A carrot-and stick-policy worked here. The villagers had to be convinced that the police would stand by them, and also to be warned that it would not help to provide support to the Maoists-under pressure or otherwise. The dual message had to go though. "Once that happened, information started flking in thick and fast", an emphatic Sen concluded. Gaddar, the part poet and part ideologue, sees it differently: "This is not an adept internal security (management) but a 'betrayal.' We have lost so many top leaders because of tactical mistakes and our failure to understand the enemy. The government talked of peace but pursued violent methods. Police agents infiltrated the Maoist camp and the insurgents failed to identify them in -time. Tech Madhu, one of the Maoists, experts on munitions, is a good example of it. He had been 'won over' by the government during the peace talks, when he was arrested and released by the (government)/police. He provided information the police about many leaders." He also charges that many of the deaths were not in battle but in "false encounters", insisting that each death has motivated cadres even more, and the revolution is not far away. All this big talk by the balladeer Ghaddar can be dismissed a pretence, a bravado. The obvious fact is that the Maoists nave been left crippled. Many arms dumps and weapon-making units have been destroyed. The most significant operation was the one that led to the recovery of 875 rockets and 27 rocket launchers supplied to the Maoists from the neighbouring Tamil Nadu. Similarly, the flow of funds had also been curtailed; the police seized Rs 1.38 crore from the N axalites in different incidents in 2006. Extending help to Other States Emboldened by its success on the home turf, the Andhra police is extending its anti-Naxal campaign beyond its_borders. The busting of Maoist weapon factories in Rourkela (Orissa) and Bhopal (MP) in the second week of January 2007 was the result of intelligence inputs provided by the Andhra Pradesh Special ,~s
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Invesligation Bureau. When asked to confirm, DGP Basit merely said," Yes, we are cooperating with the police ofthe other States." The Rourkela operation was particularly significant. Top Maoist leader Ganapathy-who was in hiding in the steel Cityescaped narrowly when the police arrived. Background Landscape and the Change The Change, indeed, is dramatic. In the early 1990s, the N axalites reputedly were running a parallel administration in the State. In 2003, they nearly killed the then Chief Minister N Chandrababu Naidu. Each new attack was turning out to be more audacious than the previous one. Maoist firepower had been augmented with the add-ons like the Ak-47 and IED. The extortion of Rs 50-60 crore per annum from Contractors, businessmen, officials and local politicians had converted the pro-poor "prolitarian Army" into a resource-rich enemy. In 2002 came the first glimmer of hope for the hapless citizenry. The Chandrababu Naidu regime and the People's War (PW)-now past of CPI (Maoist)-agreed to hold talks. The PW nominated poet Varavara Rao and Balladeer Ghaddar to represent it at the talks. But the negotiations soon collapsed, leaving the two sides blaming each other. A year later, Naidu escaped an assassination attempt atop the Tirumala Hill near, Tirupati. This marked the start of an intense confrontation. The second dramatic change came when YSR Reddy assumed power, in May 2004, invited the Maoists to talks in October. To facilitate the emergence of Maoist leadership from jungle hideouts, the government allowed the 12-year-Iong ban on the PW to lapse. So the rebel leaders-including the State Committee Chief, Ramakrishna-travelled to Hyderabad for 'peace talks' in October 2004. Ramakrishna was even allowed to address a public meeting in Guntur. What vitiated the air just a day before the formal talks was the announcement of the CPI (Marxist-Leninist)- PW combine that it was merging with the Bihar-based Maoist communist Center of India (MCCl) to form the CPI (Maoist). The PW Chief, Muppal Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathi, was to lead the new supra-Ma{)~ organization, spread across 13 states. Ifthls raised suspicions, the Maoist demand-that, despite the
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peace talks, they be permitted to carry their arms and reserve their right to armed struggle did not help. By January 2005, talks had broken down. The sound of gunfire was heard in the forests once again. When Congress leader C N arsi Reddy and 10 others were killed in Mahbubnagar district, it forced the government to reimpose the ban on the CPI (Moist) and its front organizations.
Effusive Self-congratulations Uncalled for For Chief Minister Rajasekhara Reddy, the wheel has come full circle. Having been severely castigated for holding futile round of peace talks" and offering them ceasefire which they used to regroup and strengthen their armed 'army' "he has now emerged as a model of success against an internal insurgency." The Centr is believed to have asked other States to follow the Andhra Pradesh templete-Iearning from its grassroots intelligence gathering as much as from its special forces, the Greyhounds. A critique is offered to the excessive clebratory tone of the . above complimentary comment: • Andhra Pradesh has just won a battle. A long haul is required to win the 'War'. The N axals may be out temporarily, they are certainly not down-not as yet, at least. ', • As to the Center asking other states to emulate Andhra, there is some politics involved in the charade. It is the Centre led by Congress heaping praise on a state government led by Congress. The same Centre took years to allot one UAV to Chhattisgarh to excute some anti-Naxal responsibilities. • It is unfair to 'compare Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the two worst-affected states on the Naxal states, with Andhra Pradesh. The two are newly-created small states, which suffer from shortage of resources and experience, unlike Andhra. Jharkhand is additionally weighed down by politically instability. What ever other reasons, the Centre must bear some responsibility far the two states not being able to have their police
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forces for below their anthorised strengths. • Jharkhand, in particular, is simply unable to carry out any development projects since its security forces cannot provide security to the workers and professional at the site. In additional, the Maoist rebels swoop on the site and destroy/put to torch the material assembled for construction work. • It way be fair, over some critics, that YSR Reddy can be held responsible for retardubg the victory by two years of futile talks and subsequent dilly-dallying. On his anti-Naxal policy. Had he only continued police action against the N axali tes on the lines of his precessor's N aidu, what was achieved by the end of 2006 could have possibly been achieved by the end of 2004, without as much loss of lives.
Development Route to Undo Alienation There is another aspect to the Reddy government success. It has worked hard to address causes of economic alienation in· the rural hinterland-the hunting ground of the Naxalites to swell their ranks. Initiatives such as the distribution of about 300,000 acres of land among the landless peasants, special development schemes for remote areas and augmentation of employment opportunities for rural youth are three areas that will deny the Maoists the favourite issues they exploite to entice the poor youth, into their parlour. The youths will cease being their willing recruits. An intelligence officer says: " Recruitment of youth into the Maoist ranks has touched an all time low. It has not been so low in four decades."
'War' is yet to be Won A battle has been won but war is yet to won. So, much remains to be done-by political leaders and security forces. It should not be forgotten that the top leadership of the Maoists, headed by Ganapathy, is still intact and safely ensconced in the safe zones/forests of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Senior military commanders like Shakhamuri Appa Rao in Nallawalla and Ramakrishna and Sudhakar on the Andhra-Orissa border are still very much active. All this Weans a clear possibility of the Red terrorists staging a comeback after studying and
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addressing the deficiencies and losses of the 2006 setback. So task for the new police Chief and his men is clear cut. Not only should they not lower their guard, they should continue the anti-Naxal operations in the areas across their borders, but, of course, in coordination with the security forces of the neigh bouring states concerned. This is in their own interest also, because the N axalites in these areas after some training and reorganization, will retrace their steps to Andhra Pradesh to start afresh after their 2006 disconfiture. In the political field, the State Government must continue their current policy of addressing economic disparities, in rural Andhra Pradesh particularly. An optimum deployment and determined effort on these twin tracks tha~ complement each other could defeat and climinale, hopefully for ever, the ultra-Red change to the state, and ultimately complement the effort of other affected states to achieve the same.
Andhra Pradesh : Senior Leader Killed A top Maoist leader, Mattam Ravikumar alias Sridhar alias Anil was killed on 16 June 2006 in an encounter with the police in the interior Nallamalla forest area. '!\vo other ultras escaped. Subsequently, the police recovered one Ak-47 rifle, one 303 rifle, four kitbags and some literature from the spot. Police says Ravikumar was a member of State and Central Committees of the CPI (Maoist). Considered an intellectual, he was actively involved in policy-making and issuing directives and guidelines for the extremist movement. Some of the details about this Maoist leader are noted here: 1. He drafted the documents for the State and Central Committees. 2. Technology savvy, he was the first among Maoists to use palm top commuter. 3. He was also a member of the Propaganda Committee. 4. He belonged to Tandur in Ranga Reddy district and was an engineering graduate. 5. He joined the extremist party in 1986.
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6. Wrote several articles under the pen name of Manjeera. 7. Being a Central Committee member, he carried a rewards of Rs 15 lakh on his head. On a tip-off that Ravikumar has come to Nallamalla forest, the police began combing the forest area and spotted him along with two others at Pitchirajuthanda, 25 km from Yerragondapalem. Seeing the police, Maoists opened fire and a fire fight ensued. After the shootout, the police party reached the area and found Ravikumar lying dead in a pool of blood. The other two outlaws made good their escape. CPI (Maoist) State Secretary Madhav called some select newspapers to condemn the killing. Paying glowing tributes to Ravikumar, he mentioned his 30 years of service in the cause of the extremist movement and termed his death as an irreparable loss to the Maoist movement. He squarely blamed. Chief Minister YS Rajasekhar Reddy and DGP Swaranjit Sen for continuing repression on the movement and encounter killings. He vowed that Maoists would take revenge. 6.10.06 Three Naxalites, including a top Naxalite leader, Sudarshan alias Slityam, Secretary, N allamala forest Division Committee of the outlawed CPI (Maoist), were killed in an encounter with the Grey Hound commandos in Anantapur district, when they were carrying out combing operations in Goonepalli forest area near Bulakpatnam village. Rayalaseema Regional Committee member Obuyleshu was also killed in the fierce gunbattle while the third Naxalite is yet to be identified. A wanted Naxlite, Sudarshan carried a reward ofRs 3lakh on his head and was also involved in 20 criminal cases in Prakasam district alone. A native of Warangal district, he was one of four N axalites involved in a daring attack on Prakasam District Superintendent of Police Mahesh Kumar Ladda early this year. He had also worked as Nalgonda District Committee Secretary. Sudarshan was responsible for killing of 8 villagers at Vempenta village of Kurnool District in 2005 and was involved
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in as many as a total of 103 criminal cases including 30 murders. The State DGP Swaranjit Sen remarked the killing of Sudarshan signified an end to the Maoist hold on the N allamara forest area, and it was a blow to the CPI (Maoists).
7.10.06 A Deputy Commander of Gurtedu Squad was killed during combing operations launched by the Greyhound commandos in GK Veedhi mandal forest area in Visahkapatnam district, a day after a police constable was injured in a landmine blast at Palkajeedi village in Koyyur mandal. During the search operations, the police encountered the members of Gurtedu Dalam when exchange of fire took place. The incident comes a day after the police had garnered a major success, killing Sudarshan, a senior Maoist-details in the preceding entry.
Likely NaxaIite Attacks in Andhra Pradesh Worry CRPF: October 2006 The CRPF on 34 October 2006 expressed fears of possible intensification of attacks by Naxals in Andhra Pradesh and its adjoiqg areas consequent to the reports that some rocket shells seized by security forces there might have already found their way to Left-wing extremist groups. In a joint operation, the Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh police forces had recently seized 875 rockets and other ammunitions from different places in Mehboobnagar and Prakasam districts. Expressing his concern, DG CRPF JK Sinha told reporters on the 24th, ahead of the 67th Raising Day function of his force on 28 October (2006): "Though a husbandwife duo has been arrested, there is information that several rocket shells have already been smuggled to Naxals. Hence his worry." "The Naxals have only to fill in explosive material in these shells and use them against the security forces, "he said, adding that precautionary measure have already been taken and various state governments ablerted. Dismissing criticism against the anti-Naxal Salwa Judum movement in Chhattisgarh, Sinha said such movements needed
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support from the government as it was people's voice against the Maoist depredations. "One should not even think of scrapping the movement. "If it was scrapped, people will never come forward and extend such whole-hearted support. For the tribals involved in the Salwa Judum, it would be either a meek surrender before the N axal groups or fall prey to their bullets if the Government decides to withdraw support to the movement." The DG was responding to a question about the recommendations wmde by the Union Tribal Welfare Ministry to scrap the movement. "In turn, we should be at the forefront of the movement which has seen large number of tribals, coming together on one platform against Naxals, especially in the worst-hit Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh", said. Success on 25 January 2007 In its continuing operations against the Naxalites the Warrangal district police has achieved another breakthrough by arresting four persons with a cache of weapons (two rifles and a large stock of ammunition) and Rs 1 lakh in 'Cash from a vehiGle (lndica car) during a search operation at Mulug in Warrangal district, on 25 January 2007. The arrested persons (Merugu Devender, Badithela Mahender, Kaka Lingaiah and car driver N allabelli Chaitanyya) were carrying the cash and arms to be handed over to an important ledader of CPI (ML) Pratighatna group. 26 January 2007 Arrest A suspected Naxal was arrested on 26 January 2007 from a bus near Gonibeedu in Moodigere taluk of Chikwagalur district. Identified as GM Krishna, he confessed to being involved in attacks including the one on the forest department office in Thanikodu in 2005, and the Attikudi blast near Balchonnur. AP police hit on a Goldmine of Information on Naxals: Jaunary 2007 Two raids by Andhra Pradesh police on the key hideouts of the CPI Maoists in the latter half of January 2007 in Bhopal and Rourkela led not only to the arrest of some senior cadres
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and recovery of arms and ammunition but more significantly : to the seizure of a gold mine of information about the Naxalite outfit in the form of CDs, DVDs and hard discs. Sources in the State police involved with the operation undertaken in Bhopal and Rourkela aver that the CDs, DVDs, and computer hard dises seized in the raids "contain so much information that it will take several months to analyse it all". The information concerns the details of the Maoist network in different States as also their own analysis of the past failures and future strategies and plans. The importance of the treasure trove could be measured from the fact that it also includes animation films on the assaults and counter-assaults against the police forces and other targets. Similarly, there is also technological information on the arms manufacturing and presentations for the training camps of the Maoists. It is obvious that this seizure and the information it amn'ds to the security and the intelligence agencies will havl' Sl'J'ious and far reaching implications for the organizational functioning and operating capabilities of the Maoists throughout the country.
The information yielded by the technical gadgetry has fully given out the present strength and its location of the Maoist cadres in various pasts of the country.:l Besides the police officers from different States, the IB officials are also involved in analyzing the information contained in these CDs etc. Some analysts assert that the CPI (Maoist) has suffered this debilitating blow at a time when it is already on the run in Andhra Pradesh where several of its top leaders were killed by the police during the year 2006, curtailing the level of violence perpetrated by it. In a related report, it has been confirmed that the Maoist leadership has been sending its cadres to new bases, yet to be consolidated, in the Western Ghats, Karnataka and Goa. Meanwhile, the State DGP MA Basit said that the coordination with the other States against the Maoists has yielded good results, and that the recent encounters were the result of this strategy. On his first visit to the Maoist-affected district of Prakasham after taking over as the DGP, Basit said
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it "cannot be claimed that the Maoist problem has been complexly contained, even if we have achieved conspicuous duccess."
Andhra Naxals find Shelter in Western Ghats: February 2007 Coming under relentless pressure due to combing operations by Andhra Pradesh Police, the Maoist extremists in the lush Nallamalla and Bhadra Chalam forests of Dandakaranya are moving to the harsh and rocky terrain of the Western Ghats. This was reported by a daily on 3 February 2007. It was only recently that the State Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB) learnt that the Western Ghats had become the new refuge of the CPI (Maoist) of Andhra Pradesh. The police authorities had calculated that their operations would drive the Maoists to the neighbouring Chhattisgarh and MP. Instead, they have preferred Karnataka and parts of Western Ghats, including Goa. It is believed they would try to regroupifrom these areas.
"We have learnt that the Maoists are conducting special . training camps to help their cadres survive in the terrain ofthese Ghats," said a senior police officer. 4 It is natural consequence of this movement that Naxal activity in Kerala, Karnataka and parts of Maharashtra will witness a spurt. These states are believed to be keeping a tab on the Naxal movement on their territories. The Karnataka police has intensified combing operations in Chikmaglur, Raichur and Malnad.
The Maoist presence in the Western Ghats was first noticed in 2001 when a tribal woman, Cheramma, suffered a bullet injury when she fired a gun accidentally at village Menasena hadya in Chikmaglur in Karnataka. Since then, Maoists have been trying to establish a hold over the Western Ghats. But their plans were spoilt by the activities of Sandalwood smuggler Veerappan and the special task force hunting him. Things have quietened down after the death of Veerappan and the Maoists, who are on the run in the State, nOw consider Western Ghats their best refuge.
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Corridor: Ghats to Ghats The Maoists are believed to be creating a corridor from Seshachalam hills of Eastern Ghats to the Western Ghats via Jawadi hills, Bennari and Satya mangalam. The Maoists are also trying to expand their activities in coffee plantations in Ooty and adjoining districts of Karnataka. They have been intervening in local labour disputes in these places. To resist the growing Maoist influence, coffee growers in Malnad region formed an organization, Grameena Jagruti Sena, in end-January 2007.
AP Police Unearth Naxal Arms Dump: March 2007 Close on the heels of the Naxal's major success in killing 55 police during their attack on Rani Bodla police camp in Chhattisgarh on 15 March 2007, the Andhra Pradesh police found a large arms dump of the_same outfit in Nallamalla forest. Significantly, it contained long-range explosives which could be used to target police stations and camps. The dump was also discovered on 15 March 2007, only hours after the Rani Bodla massacre. Arms and explosives seized from the dump are mentioned below with some relevant details. 1. More than 270 rockets and launchers, with adequate materials to assemble another 100 rockets. The rockets were similar to those discovered by the police in Mehboobnagar in 2006, which first led the police to ,_ believe that the extremists had this type of firepower. SP Guntur district B. Shivadhar Reddy explained: "It appears as though this batch of rockets too was made in the same factory as the earlier one. The two are identical in nature."
2. These rockets were found at the Guntur-Prakasam border near Pullala Churuvu, and DGP MA Basith said that the shoulder-fired rockets had a range of about five kilometers. 3. Now the materials for making rockets. The arms dump had 112 rocket pipes, which are basic components of rockets, and 101 empty warheads. The dump also had a large number of smaller parts like rocket propeller
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nuts, propeller caps and fins. 4. Police also retrieved 47 anti-personnel Claymore mines, mine springs and spare parts used in pressure mines. 5. There were one double barrel gun, a country made pistol and 0.30 rifle ammunittion . 6. Some grenades, 380 grenade strikers, 360 detonator caps, etc. 7. Some walkie-talkies and camera flashes. In September 2006, the Andhra Pradesh police found 875 rockets meant to be transported into Nallamalla forests for Naxalites. The rockets were believed to have been manufactured in factories near Chennai, and these were raided by the Tamil Nadu police. Andhra police, later arrested the 'designer' of the rockets, Tech Madhu and his wife, who turned approv~rs.
Naxals high on marijuana in Andhra Pradesh : March 2007 ; Arrests by the Andhra Pradesh police show that the state's 'ganj,' far~s are now bei~g ~sed to fund Naxalite weapons. "Recently In Warrangal dIstrIct, 12 people were arrested on charge of selling 'ganja' grown in the state, and using the procedes to buy weapons that were, in turn, sold to Naxal groups here". This was reported by a 5 March 2007 story in a daily. 5 It is an interesting inter-states operations, involving as many as three states. The extent of network operating to achieve the end results can well be imagined. The gang led by Mekapothula Venugopal, alias Goutham, sourced the marijuana locally (in Andhra Pradesh), and sold it to drug peddlers, mostly in Madhya Pradesh (MP). The money was used to buy the countrymade weapons from Munger in Bihar, which were sub-isequently transported to Andhra Pradesh (AP) where it all started in the first instance.
Warrangal SP, Sowmya Mishra, said they believe the gang, its members between 30 and 35 years, used to procure weapons from two persons: Shahad Bhai of Bokarpur in Munger district and Anand of Satna in MP. So far, they have supplied 39 countrymade pistols and two carbines to N axal groups operating
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"In their latest run last week, the gang had gone to Jabalpur in MP with eight quintals of 'ganja' and sold it for Rs 7 lakh." The money was used to buy five 9 mm pistols, four 7.62 mmcalibre pistols and extra magazines from Bihar for Rs 1.22 lakh. The gang members then took the train back to Jabalpur, and returned in modified vehicles. On a tip-off, the police intercepted them at Annasagar crossroads on the outskirts ofWarrangal city. Besides the weapons, eleven bags of Marijuz.na were also recovered from their houses. Police believe this may not be the only gang practicing this modus operandi in the State. K . Narayan, DSP, added that while these smugglers may not be directly associated with the extremist groups, they had 'close relations' with many top commanders. Besides Goutham, police also arrested Sasarla Ramana Reddy, Kothapally Darshan, Naini Naveen, Reddy, and eight others from Warrangal. Two transporters, whose Tata Sumo and DCM vans were reportedly modified. To hide and transport the contraband under crates of fruit were also arrested. Naik said marijuana was grown in Sileru, near Vishakhapatnam, in Warrangal, near Karimnagar and Adilabad borders, and in Medak district. The police disclosed the weapons procured in this manner were being sold at a premium to Naxal groups listed below (and possibly some others): 1. CPI (ML}-Prathighatana 2. CPI (ML)-Praja Prathighatana 3. Communits Party of United States ofIndia (CPUSl).
Andhra Pradesh: Top Naxal Leaders Surrender: 25 March 2007 Two top Naxal leaders, Durgam Ramanaiah alias Ravi and Merugu Sambaiah alias Ganesh Ueike, surrendered before the Andhra Pradesh police in Warrangal on 25 March 2007. While the former surrendered reportedly due to ill health, 55-Year-old Sambaiah gave up because he was "disillusioned with the group's ideology." Incidentally, Sambaiah is a contemporary of party founder Kondapalli Seetaramaiah. 6
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Sambaiah's wife Ballamkonda Sarakka, who had been under-ground for the past few years, has also surrendered. While he was involved in cases like the Koraput jail break of 2004 and attacks on police stations in Koraput and Etunagaram, his wife headed the Chaitanva , Natya Manch in Dandakaranya, the police said. Explaining his surrender, Sambaiah said the group has "failed to involve the masses, and the leadership was not ready to change with the times." There was a stark difference between the Maoists of Nepal and those in II?-dia, he added. He was amongst the pioneers of the movement in the region. Ramanaiah was involved in a number of cases, including the murder of Yellandu Market Committee chairman and an attack on Kothagudem Therwal Power Station. Ramanaiah joined the party in 1993 and was part of the Radical Students Union, said SP, Warangal Saumya Mishra. He was also a member of the North Tekngana Special Committee, the DK (Dandakarnya) zone and the Central Military Commission. He had been conducting military training camps till Ja~uary 2007 for the state Committee members and the divisional committee secretaries of the group. These camps were organized in West Bastar and the Andhra-Orissa border areas of Gaikonda, Gangaloru, Bairangadh and Made. 24-year-old Sarakka had joined the group in 1997.
Andhra to set up 13,OOO-strong Anti-terror Force The Andhra Pradesh Government has decided to form an Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) of police comprising 13,000 members to deal terrorist activities. State Home Minister K. Jana Reddy announced this on 6 September 2007. "Efficient personnel with good performance record presently working in different police wings would be inducted into the proposed ATS." "The constitution of the ATS will be completed in one and a half months," the Minister said. The plan for the creation of the ATS was prepared by a committee comprising senior State police officials and headed by
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Chief Secretary J. Harinarayana. Its members included DGP MA Basit, AD GP (lntellegence) K Arvinda Rao, and the Hyderabad Police Commissioner Balwinder Singh. The Committee is tasked to submit a comprehensive report after studying the functioning of counter-intelligence wings of different countries and make recommendations. Chief Minister YSR Reddy has already said that the proposed ATS will be on the lines of highly successfully anti-Maoist Greyhound force with very high standards of fitness and efficiency for its men.
Anti-Terrorist outfit named OCTOPUS The elite intelligence-cum-combat outfit, contemplated by the Government to fight terrorism, has been named OCTOPUSOrganization to Counter Terrorist Operations. OCTOPUS will be headed by an Additional DGP and will have various wings, including Special (Intelligence) Branches at city, district and state levels. According to a press release issued by Chief Minister YSR Reddy's office after he reviewed the law and order situation in the state in Hyderabad on 7 September 2007, the OCTOPUS will have basically three wings, mentioned here: 1. Jntelligence and Analysis Wing. Would collect intelligence inputs at sub-divisional, district, city and state levels.
2. Technical Intelligence wing. Would monitor communication, forensic and cyber-related activities. 3. Research and Analysis Wing. Would undertake data interpretation, analysis, inter-agency coordination and planning. The OCTOPUS would undertake surveillance operations by way of shadowing, recording, interpretations; field operations through assault teams and bomb disposal squads and rescue operations equipped with ambulances and para medical teams.
BlHAR In Bihar, the Naxalites have spread to 32 of its 38 districts.
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Major responsibility for it must rest with Lalu Prasad Yadav and his consort Rabri Devi who between them ruled the State for 15 years till 2005, even if it was not among the most-advanced of Indian States before they took over. During the 15-year-Iong Lalu-Rabri rule, the Maoists won the hearts of people by constructing small-scale irrigation projects in Gaya, Nawada and Kaimur districts. Maoist Leader Dies in Custody: 8 March 2007 A zonal commander of the banned CPI (M), Bhala Kahar, died in police custody at Gaya (Bihar) on 8 March 2007. Confirming the death of Kahar, arrested from Konch police station area of Gaya on the 6th, DIG Police, Magadh Range, U med Singh said he died of asthama. Locals, however, alleged that Kahar died of police torture. The insurgent was being held at the police station for interrogation. Maoists Attack Bihar Station to Enforce Bandh Call: 21 April 2007 In 'yet another 'dare-devil' operation in Bihar, around 100 armed Maoists raided Narganjo railway station in Asansol . Division of Eastern Railway around 1 am on 21 April 2007 to enforce a bandh call "to protest the death of one of their leaders, Balgovind Yadav, in Jamui jail recently." Consequently, movement of trains remained suspended for seven hours. Maoists locked the station entrance and took cabin master M Riwani and a porter hostage for five hours, after which the both were set free. The ultras also claimed to have planted landmines on tracks. Eastern Railway CPRO, S Mazumdar, informed the press that soon after the station was raided, an SOS was sent to the Asansol control room whence after movement of trains was suspended. Swinging into action at day break, the Railw~ys despatched a strong contingent of RPSF from Jhajha at 6.30 am. The RPSF men checked the up and down tracks 'and found them safe. So,
Terrorism in India
1034 the tracks were cleared for traffic at 7.50 am.
DRM Asansol, AK Rawal said the Railways "have asked the DM Jamui and the Superintendent, Railway police to step up security measures". DG, RPF MK Sinha-said Eastern Railway's Chief Security Commissioner had been told to coordinate with the state police, including the GRP, to check such incidents. This was the second time that the N axals targeted N arganjo station in less than two weeks. On 8 April, they had gunned down two RPF constables in a running train and looted one SLR and two pistols from them near this very railway station.
Arms, Equipment: Fighting Capability The Maoists in Bihar have 200 police rifles, over, 100 selfloading rifles, 130 carbines, dozens of AK-47s, 8 rifles of .315 bore, 5 -light machine guns (LMGs) and 4 semi-automatic rifles in their possession.
Maoists beheads 2 in Bihar : 30 May 2007 Throwing a virtual challenge to the claim by the Nitish Government to have contained the N axal violence in Bihar to a great extent, over 100 armed Maoists on 30 May 2007 swooped O!l the Satgharwa village in Munger district and dragged two JDU activists from their homes. They slashed their throats, killing them on the spots. The victims were allegedly acting as police informers. The Maoist guerrillas, including women, wore army fatigues as they stormed the village, dragging out Ramchandra Yadav, Anil Yadav, Sambhu Yadav and Ranjan Kumar of the same family from their home. Later, the beheaded bodies of Ramchandra and Anil were found at an isolated place near the village. Incidentally, Munger is among the 23 Maoist violenceaffected district in Bihar of the total 38.
Bihar Government Receives Bizarre Criticism : March 2007 India is presently in the midst of serious crisis created
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by mindless, violent terrorism perpetrated by the CPI (Maoists) guerrillas, it calls its cadres, in a large swathe of its territory. It bears repitition that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh not too long ago termed Naxalite extremist threat as biggest danger to India's integrity and sovereignty. Given this reality, the extremismaffected states are adopting all kinds of strategies and means to defeat/control this violence. Being a country of free expression, it is no surprise that occasionally the State governments come under criticism for designing/adopting a particular anti-Naxalite strategy to deter the violent ultras. The most well-known instance of this is the passionate, vigorous criticism the Salwa Judum campaign evolved by the Chhattisgarh Government has attracted from the Human Rights 'busy bodies' and 'elitist' campaigners like Arundhati Roy'. Of late, Bihar Government's policy of deploying dogs in the police stations to alert the police peI\Sonnel about the imminent. danger from the presence/arrival of the ultras has come,under adverse comments from the analysts. It is also obvious that Bihar is possibly emulating the fledgling state of Jharkhand carved o,ut of it only in 2000. The 'innovation', if we are allowed to call it so, has been dismissed as "an awfully disingenuous method to cope with the Maoist challenge. /
A daily newspaper? of standing and reputation has thought it worth its while to offer caustic comments editorially on the issue. This daily dated 27 March 2007 says sneeringly in its editorial suggestively titled, "Bihar gets bizarre; A dogged determination against Maoists": "As exposed by this newspaper, street dogs are to be sheltered in police stations for (an) instant alert against ultras. It is an oblique admission of intelligence failure to come to grips with a daunting challenge. Dogs are expected to be more effective where the state endeavour has failed." To be rather kind to this daily, the entire editorial seemsrather, reads-funny. Still, as a national daily has thought it fit to elevate such an issue into eminence and respectability demanding an editorial scrutiny, the arguments offered by it themselves are being subjected to a balanced and critical
1036
Terrorism in India
analysis: 1. "Of course, they (the dogs) can supplement the efforts
of detectives on the trail of criminals. And the fundamental premise being followed in Bihar as much as Jharkhand can be faulted for the simple reason that Left radicals, like the terrorists, are not to be confused • with criminals per se." • The daily has used the right term "supplement" but allowed it only to supplement the efforts of detectives on the trail of the criminals. Any supplemental effort in the field of anti-terroristlNaxalite strategy/plan should be welcomed, and complimented rather than derided. Even if it adds an iota to the totality of counter-N axalite endeavour of a State, the 'supplement' should be welcome. • It is surprising to know that this daily faults the State . for confusing Naxalities (and terrorists) with criminals. It way be blasphemic to hold the daily ignorant of the facts in such cases, but truth be told, it is close to being so. The Naxalite Cadres (like the terrorists-jihadi variety or some others) may well be idealists when they join the extremist ranks. Ideological consideration! consciousness, generated by self-study or instilled externally by Left ideologues (and by maulvis and mullahs in case of the jihadis) have a role to lead the recruits to the altar. But soon after joining the ranks, realities of situation confront them. Wayward tendencies, including certain criminal trait, start appearing on the mental landscape of these recruits, nay cadres as Left would like them to be known. A stage comes when they become worse than the ordinary criminals. They are now goaded and led by the greed, glamour and even gore-an unsatiable urge for blood letting ostensibly, of course, by ideological reasons viz class interests, punishing the dirty rich, 'avenge' the cruelties perpetrated on the landless and poor by killing the landlords, and ultimate in sophistry, killing and looting the villagers and their hamlets for I
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1037
siding with the police and the 'hated' government. Why are the Naxalites worse than the criminals-and can even be cowards? They have for superior means to inflict cruelties on the unwary, innocent women and children among their victims, which the criminals lack. This daily would like its readers to believe that all these dastardly and ghastly inhumanity is impelled by idealism. • Besides the reasons adduced above, can there be any other reasons or differences that distinguish a Naxalite from a criminal? The daily has not told us if the common cri!llinals have a particularly obnoxious body odour that helps the sniffer dogs on their trail, which the N axals are clean of. • It is by now.no secret that the Naxalite cadres, most of them anyway, now indulge in common criminal acts like loot, atson, rape, kidnapping for ransom, extcTtion et aI-like their terrorist fraternity. Of late, they have been found h~nd and glove with the timber mafia. • L-ast word on their ideology-driven action: They berate the government for keeping certain areas, especially the ones inhabited by the tribals, under developed or undeveloped. And they, pray, what do they do to undo this government failure? They go around the 'under developed' areas destroying whatever has come up already/recently like bridges, rail tracks and small scale cottage/local self-help units. More on it: Naxalites in recent months have set afire the equipment and materials gathered at the sites by the contractors and government agencies like PWD for building bridges or community projects in backward areas like Ghatsila sub-division of Jharkhand. • The daily could not be unaware that the jihadis and others of their ilk are running the 'terrorism industry' largely with the narco-trade money. Some ideology indeed, this! 2. '''Having failed along with the neigh bouring states to devise a well thought-through strategy to counter the
1038
Terrorism in India extremists, the latest official order which has been communicated even to the IGs is as bizarre as it is ridiculous. As a case study, the police Headquarters in Patna has high lighted a Gaya police station, now home to no fewer than 36 street dogs. Dog squads are deployed to help detectives to get to the root of a crime. If they are now used against a political group, whose violent methods are embedded in socio-economic reality, a charitable construct can be that it is a desperate act of a beleaguered administration." • There is no denying the fact that most states have failed to successfully fight the Naxalite menace. Still, we have the example of Andhra Pradesh achieving a measure to success against the Naxals and others are doing as lest as they can. It should also be accepted that such socio-political battles take long to be won. India has been fighting various insurgencies in the North-East since 1947 and in Kashmir since 1989. • Not to discuss the issue in too much detail, let it be<'said that India has come to have a image of a soft state for a variety of terrorist. The states facing Left terrorism is part of the same Indian Union. But this is not written to condone the waywardness or inefficies of the counter-terroristINaxalite policies of the Central or state b"overnments. Equally well, there is nothing to despair. We shall overcome in our own ways. India is too great a nation to go under, all the Cassandras not with standing. • As to the orders about 'dogs in police stations' policy going even to the IGs, the daily's point or complaint not undE!rstood. This is the normal channel of police communications to his next lower channel of command, which is a police range under an IGs. Or, is it the daily's contention that DGP should keep the entire plan in his own office, like some TOP SECRET. plan, not to shared even with his IGs.! • The point that dog squads are deployed to help detectives trace the criminals, is a repition as the
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1039
editorial has mentioned it in its opening paragraph, and has been commented upon as well. • Is the daily unaware of the fact that the Indian Army is using dogs in Kashmir in its anti-terrorist operations. Or is it its care that the high-minded Naxalites do not use high explosives in killing the innocent? In fact most armies are deploying dogs-Labradors and German Shepherds in case of the American Army in Iraq. • Or is the daily objecting to the Gaya Police Station sheltering 36 stray dogs in its premesis? Lightheartedly, do we take it the daily will be satisfied if the SHO there manages to replace them with some variety of pedigree dogs? At a more mundane level, it is better to shetler the stray dogs in the police stations than to have thousands of them culled as some states are already doing! • Yes, the police way not need the services, pedigree or stray, if the Left extremists were to run their ideological campaign peacefully through powers of debate, discussions and discourses to convince the target people of th~ correctness of their ideology. • As/ to the argument that Naxalitse's violent methods are embedded in socio-economic reality, it begs a question. Why should they try to solve Indian problems with an imported ideology? It is a bankruptey of thought to shun Indian approach in such situations. Why should the mindless violence preached by the socalled Oarsman be practiced in India. We should be proud of our democratic traditions. What huge price China has paid to reach its present level of economic and political stage? Death and destruction of millions and millions of Chinese. And we shall be a world power, like China around 2050 AD. Our way may be slow, but it is enduring and superior to China's. As to the socioeconomic realities, is every body in China equal? Certainly: not. Why are n't some 'Maoists' running their campaign there? We all know the reasons. They will
1040
Terrorism in India always be executed without remorse-or even record thought. The people and press are not serving cause of Indian society by finding foolish justification for Maoist perpetrated violence on the innocent Indian citizens-even we accept their attacks on symbols of Indian state. • As to the charitable construct of this measure being a "desperate act of a beleaguered administration" , well any act, including a desperate one, is better than no act. Inaction will be worst of the options. 3. " The Bihar government, whch on occasions appears crudely outlandish and often as much encounters a ghost at every turn, should rather focus on the core issues, notably the factors at the root of extremism, the interstate movement of extremists, surrender of arms and the scope for negotiations." • The first part of this para of editorial is rather an attempt at rhetorical flourish. Just because it is planning to deploy dogs in anti-Naxal campaign even though in a limited role, it is seen as "crudely outlandish" and "encountering ghost at every turn." The whole argument-if it can called so-itself is outlandish, and even jejune. The daily seems to be carrying an anti-Nitish Kumar chip on it shouldersborygelting that he is administering a near bankrupt state after 10 years of Lalu-Rabri ruinous rule. Why personalize issues by starting the editorial with "Nitish Kumar dispensation?" As to the advice that government should "rather focus on core issues", there is nothing extraordinary or revolutionary or original in the suggestions offered for action. Is there any evidence that Bihar, or, for that matter, any other Naxal-afficted states, is not already doing all that is suggested by the editorial. One is not sure if the right to free expression should also embrace offensive demagoguery and inane pontification. • One does not talk to murderers unless they are ready to give up arms. or at the very least, agree to come to
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, GUjarat & Jharkh and
1041
the table willin g to talk sincer ely on the issues involv ed. Surely , the daily does not mean that Bihar should approa ch the murde rous Maois ts on bent knees! 4. "It will be wholly prepos terous to expect dogs tobe effecti ve where human effort has come a croppe r. The challe nge is daunti ng with no ernest respon se on part of the Nitish Kuma r admin istrati on to cope with it. Across attemp t at cuttin g corner s could be an insult to human dignity , indeed a grotes que violati on of human rights. " • The daily asserts it "will be prepos terous to expect dogs to be effecti ve where human effort has" failed. A more prepos terous and sillier argum ent is difficu lt to come by. The daily is negati ng the practic e of emplo ying dogs by armies of the world on anti-te rrorist chores or any other aspect of the job which the human s can't do themse lves. • The daily sees no ernest respon se from the Nitish Kuma r admin istrati on to the daunti ng challen ge. The Chief Minist er's name is dragge d in second time. The genera lities like "no respon se . .': are meani ngless . In any case what is the reason behind this bilious tempe r? The State police decidi ng to deploy stray dogs in its police station s as an anti-N axalite measu re! • The last senten ce takes the cake in the entire inanit y reflect ed in this 'prepo sterou s' editori al. "This crass attemp t at cuttin g corner s could be an insult to the huma n dignity ." The daily does not specif y whose dignity is insulte d? Is it policemen's? Or, of th~ Maois ts' ? or that of the editori al staff of the daily? Before the daily answe rs the questi on, let us add the real injure d party totally ignore d by the daily. The entire conten ts of the editor ial, and the tenor of its argum ents has surely insulte d the most loyal friend s of the man! The dignity of the stray dogs, indeed ! • Again , the assert ion about "grote sque violat ion of huma n rights " begs a questi on. Violat ion of whose huma n rights ? Obvio usly, of the daily',s , belove d
1042
Terrorism in India
N axalite extrem ists. It is a laugha ble sugges tion, to put it mildly . Do the marau ders indee d deserv e any huma n rights ? Just becau se they are likely to be chased by mere stray dogs under the planne d policy of the DGP Bihar. One suppo ses the daily will be mollifi ed if the pedigr ee dogs are set on the Naxal ites. At the end of this rather extens ive and harsh critiqu e on the editori al of a daily, the autho r deems it necess ary to add a word of explan ation. This work on terror ism in India and the wider world has made libera l use of mater ial availa ble on the subjec t in the , newsp apers, magaz ines and the Intern et. It is indeed admitt ed witho ut any compu nction that maxim um mater ial has been obtain ed from the forme r source of the three obtain ed from the former source of the three mentio ned above. The reason is simple Day to day incide nts of terrori sm are obviou sly report ed by the nation al dailies , in great deal and often with analyt ical article s and editor ial comm ents, which again have been widely used in this works. Editor ials are quenc tesent ial wisdom on an incide nt and an issue. Libera l use of the editori als, includ ing the ones in the daily whose one editor ial has been roundl y criticiz ed here, have been made in this work. In all honest y, it must also be admitt ed that this is the only editor ial which is obvio usly inane , jejune and almos t meani ngless . One can't under stand how such a "prepo sterou s"to borrow a term from the editor ial under adver se focus editori al could find a place on the pages of this nation al daily, which was only one of the two dailies (other being the fearles s Indian Expre ss) which brave ly defied the Indira Gandh i Emerg ency.
They Blow up Bridg e in Bihar : March 2007 A group of 500 heavil y armed Maois t rebels on 31 March 2007, using dynam ite, blew up a bridge near Dheng , snapp ing road links to Riga, and then attack ed a Block Develo pment Office (BDO) and a police station at Riga in Bihar' s Sitam arhi distric t. But no casual ties were report ed.
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1043
The Maoists stormed the Central Bank of India branch at. _ Raja and injured its manager a Home guard while attempting to loot cash from the chest. But they failed to break it open. Thereafter, they laid virtual siege to the police station in Riga at 6.15 pm and exploded several bombs before exchanging fire with the personnel of the Bihar Military Police (BMP) and Special Anxiliary Police (SAP) for over 45 minutes. This was detailed by the SP, MRP Nair, to the journalists, adding they looted several shops in Riga Bazaar. The Maoists fled when the reinforcement arrived from the district headquarters. The ultras failed in their attempt to loot/snatch weapons from the policemen posted in Riga. The authorities on night 31 March sealed the Indo-Nepal border in Sitamarhi district and SSB jawans conducted combing' operations.
GUJARAT Gujarat has been lucky to have been saved the ravages of the Left-wing Extremism. But of late, some evidence is turning up to show that the Naxalites are attempting to spread their tentacles in this State also. One instance is cited below.
Naxals Claim to have a Cell in Surat City: January 2007 The Madhya Pradesh (MP) police informed the press on 19 January 2007 that five hardcore Naxalites "arrested last week after a weapons workshop was busted in Bhopal's Satnami Nagar area have told their interrogators that they have an active Dalam (= an operational Unit of Naxalites) in Surat the textile city of as it has a large migrant population, including large chunk from Andhra Pradesh working in its processing units." But the police refused to disclose the part of Surat which the arrested Naxalites had visited recently. It is, thus, obvious that the Left-wing extremists could be spreading their wings to Gujarat. As a police officer said "it was much easier for Telugu-speaking Naxalites to operate there as thousands of workers from Andhra Pradesh are employed in the textile industry. A Gujarat Police team was among the first to interrogate the
1044
Terrorism in India
arrested five along with the teams from six other Naxal-affected states, the BSF and Military Intelligence Directorate. It must· be noted that Gujarat has been considered relatively insulated from Left-wing extremism though presence of activists in its southern parts has always been expected and talked about. 8 The idea of setting up a base in Surat is yet another indication that the extremists are choosing urban places/cities where they are least likely to arouse suspicion (But the idea itself goes against Mao's teaching of overpowering/taking over the rural areas completely before turning to the urban areas. This Mao-speak is the reason behind the split in the ranks of Maoist unit in Karnataka). But significantly, and as a matter of policy and practical wisdom, they do not strike where they are operating in such urban centres. Instead, they use such centers for manufacturing parts of weapons or assembling them. By now the police know of two such towns at least - Surat and Bhopal. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the IB has already told states to keep an eye on those workers/joints who are operating lathe machines in their towns. The five arrested in Bhopal (in January 2007) operated in Jabalpur for two years 1996 onwards, and thence shifted their base to Indore for nearly four years before moving to the State capital Bhopal in 2001. Thus, they have been working for some six years in Bhopal before being delected/arrested. These details were furnished by DIG Anuradha Shankar. SP Bhopal Anant Kumar Singh explained the smooth operations at their 'lathe units' in such urban centers. The Naxalites operating in cities always have a female member, which enable them to rent houses with any undue difficulty. They hardly mix with the locals but pay their bills on time. The units are set up with lathe machines as a front and the location is always closer to Industrial units from they can easily source raw material for their 'manufactures.' The Bhopal 'units' yielded arms, components, literature and a huge stock of books on weaponry. The police claimed it was the biggest N axal library so far discovered. Shankar said the Naxasl, from making crude weapons, have come close to making rocket launchers like the RPG 7. Even more worrying is the fact
Naxal Thrror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1045
of the Military Intelligence informing the MP Police that "even the Indian Army has not as yet acquired plastic grenades of the type rec~ntly confiscated from the Naxalites." Initially, as it turned out later, these five misled their local interrogators by faking their identities and addresses. But then the MP Police sought help of their Andhra counterparts to establish their real, identities and to ascertain their place/status in the N axal hierarchy. The five were apparently in touch with the central leadership and the arms assembled or manufactured at Bhopal 'unit' were being sent to Jharkhand Chhattisgarh.
The Big Five The five arrested from Bihar were obviously among the top leadership bracket of the CPI (Maoist). Their life sketches follow. ,
Chakkakrushna,47 A resident of Kajipetha mandal in Guntur, he is member of the Central Technical Committee (CTC) of the CPI (Maoist) and also a member of the (Andhra Pradesh) State Committee. He is believed to be the Chief of the Rand D Wing of the party. Reward on his head Rs 10 lakh.
Yalwarthy Lilakrishna, 35 Resident of Kothluru, Swaliyapuram in Guntur district, he . is a District Committee Secretary, CPI (Maoist). Reward on his head Rs 5 lakh.
Ramesh Siddhi, 40 Resident of Brahman Kodru, Punni mandal in Guntur district, he is a District Committee member of the CPI (Maoist). Reward on his head Rs 3 lakh.
Gandrakota Pentaiyya, 57 Resident of Intikanne, Keshmudram in Warangal district, he is a member of the Area Committee. Reward on his head Rs 2 lakh.
Lanjupalli Rani, 25 Hailing from Julapalli Piduguralla, she is a member of the Area Committee. Reward on her head Rs 2 lakh.
Terrorism in India
1046
JHARKHAND The Jharkhand government is honest enough to admit that the N axal have consolidated "their hold in 18 of the State's 22 districts."9 Naxal violence in Jharkhand has claimed 800 lives by 30 April 2006. More than 200 of them were policemen.
15 October 06 (Giridhi diotict, Jharkhand) Suspected Maoist rebels blew up the railway track, 1 mtr long, between Chandero and Chaudhary Bandh stations early around 3 am. The site is 230 km from Ranchi. The Maoists had called a 24-hour strike in three eastern Indian States-Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh- on 1415 October to protest against the arrest last week of "three top Maoist leaders" including a woman.
Jharkhand : Rebel groups Rattle for supremacy: October 2006 The clash between the cadres of the Revofutionary Communist Centre (Third Conference) and the CPI (Maoists) on the night 22/23 October 2006 brought to light a singular fact , that the two outfits are locked in a serious-often lethal-war of suprem~cy in Jharkhand. Already, the cadres of the Third Conference, a breakaway faction the CPI (Maoist), are known to have made their presence felt in Latehar Palamu and Chatra districts. Chatra SP Subodh Prasad admits as much: "They are still spreading their tentacles despite our efforts to contain them."
of
After years of animosity, the MCC and PWG had merged to form CPI (Maoist) in 2003. The formation of the Third Conference, rather its splitting away from the CPI (Maoist), was attributed to two main factors: 1. Desire of the cadres at the ground zero to make use of the levy money collected by them at their level rather than share it with the distant top brass living elsewhere. 2. Caste conflict among the cadres. A senior police officer, preferring anonymity, told this daily: "Most of those who have parted ways with the yadavdominated CPI (Maoist) are Dalits". DGP JB
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1047
Mahapatra was outrightly blunt and uncommunicative: "we do not want to share with the media any information gathered by the intelligence."lO The daily, however, has learnt that at least 20 Naxalites belonging to the two warring outfits -CPI (Maoist) and RCC (Third conference) were killed in half dozen clashes of attrition between the two sides since 1 August 2006 till date (24 October). Consequently, there was no major incident of attack on the police during this period. Prasad added: "But to establish and carve out its own area of influence, the rival groups have planted a number oflandmines for inflicting damage on each other." Recovery of landmines in Chatra district last month (September 2006) only confirms this postulation.
Red Flags mean Fallow land: October 2006 More than 2,000 cultivable acres in Jharkhand's Palamu district lie fallow for fear of Maoist terrorism. Intelligence reports ascribe this to the extremists high-handed treatment of land- owners. "Red flags were planted in the fields ahead of monsoons, prohibiting agricultural activity:' A source said: " Drought-affected Palamu counted upon as good harvest this year as a lot of rain fell there after three dry years. But due to Naxal fear; the cultivation came to be halted and daily-wage labourers were badly hit-surely not the aim or desire of the Leftist N axals." But then, Ramgarh village in Chainpur has not had more than 800 acres of its land worked on for the last nine years as some land owners refused to pay the extremists in cash or kind. Uldanda, Nenuarakhura, Karso, Hutar, Bedma, Panchlewa, and some other villages too have shared the same fate over the past two years. Police is not of much help either, as the land owners and villagers are too scared to come to police. "We have visited villages and deployed our personnel there but that did not serve to eliminate the fear factor", district Superintendent of Police U dayan Singh told a daily. 11
Maoists' Fears: Marriages are Blessed in the Temple Hari Shankar Prasad got married on a November 2006 in Harihardhan temple at Bagodhar of Giridih district as he did
1048 I
Terrorism in India
not want to take his baraat deep into the jungle for fear of Maoist rebels. Like him, scores of families solemnize the marriage of their children in this temple to avoid the wrath of Maoist guerrillas. The temple is located on the Ranchi-Giridih National Highway, 190 km from Ranchi. During the marriage season, people have to book in advance the time and hour as the priests have to manage a crowded schedule. Nobody wants to go into the deep jungle which is a den of the Maoist guerrillas. ~No wonder, this year (January-October 2006) 1369 couples tied their knots in Harihardhan temple, which has a 65-foot high Shiva lingam. Most of the people belong to the Maoistinfested villages wt 3re the families of brides and grooms equally fear the ultras. So no one musters the courage to venture into the jungle with baraatis. "Maoists simply kill the baraatis."
Giridih is one of the worst Maoist infested districts. Here people fear to go into the jungle even during daylight hours. "Here the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) runs a ,jmrallel government. The J an Adalat of the Maoist t~kes place ~?ere and people are executed in the court."12 , Giridih is, to repeat, one of the worst Maoist infested districts ,of the state. This is the same district• Where Maoists butchered 15 villagers in Beluwaghati village in 2005, just because they were opposing their activities. • Where the Maoist rebels attacked a Home Guard Training Centre in 2005 and killed six security personnel. • Where the lone CPI-ML legislator Mahendra Singh was murdered by the Maoists in the jungle.
Andhra Police Adopts Maoist's Daughter What is seen as the latest in its psychological, offensives, the police in Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh has adopted the duaghter of an important Maoist leader, Lanka Papi Reddy alias Ranganna alias Latchanna, as par\ of their efforts to win the hearts and minds of people in the Naxalite affected areas. Lanka Tejasri, the ll-year-old daughter of CPI (M) Central
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1049
committee member Papi Reddy, was adopted by District· Superintendent of Police Soumya Mishra in the presence of DIG Warangal Range Ravi Gupta and other officials. The announcement was made at a function on the occasion of Children's Day on 14 November 2006 at the Kakatiya University police station. Mishra announced that all the expenses of her education would be borne by the police and a cheque for Rs 40,000 has already been handed over to the Vidyaniketan School towards her school and hostel fees. The police has reached out to Tejasri just in time as her poor paternal grandmother Shantamma had decided to discontinue her schooling because of financial problem. Papi Reddy had sent her to his mother about 10 years ago. Papi Reddy is a native of Takkellapadu village of Atmakur mandal in Warangal district and has been underground for more than two decades. Earlier he worked as secretary of Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee of CPI (M) and worked in various capacities in the same Committee. The move should assure the families of the underground Maoists that police was not their enemy was making sincere efforts to bring back their children into the social main stream.
Maoist Recruitment forms Seized in Jharkhand : December 2006 Jharkhand police seized some recruitment forms from different parts of the State from the arrested Maoist cadres. 17point form also includes the endorsement of the members of the outfit. CPI (Maoist), formed after the merger of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People's War Groups, seems to have adopted the new method of recruitment to avoid entry of informers into the organization as also to keep the family profile of the members. Among the 17 points are: (1) Educational qualifications. (2) Annual income. (3) Nationality. (4) Conjugal status. (5) Address (6) Reason for wanting to join the Maoist organization. (7) Oath of loyalty through filling a column to remain faithful to the outfit
1050
Terrorism in India
and spread its ideology (8) Ever sent to jail? If so, the reasons thereof. The applicant's form will be accepted only when there is signature of one member of the outfit who will endorse the form. Police say the Maoist organization also makes monthly payments to the members depending on the post they hold. A police official involved in the anti-extremist operations, told a daily:13
"It seems the Maoist leaders are concerned about the new entrants. Some of their cadres were involved in activities like loot and rape which brought bad name for the outfit." "Such forms have been seized from the arrested Maoist rebels. They distribute such forms in the rural areas among its cadre and ask them to ensure entry of people into organization by filling these forms."
Maoists torch Bridge Construction Material : December 2006 Maoists set afire equipment andmakeshift camp of a construction company, engaged in bridge construction at Shyamsunderpur in Jharkhand's East Singhbhum district on 16/17 December 2006 night. Some 30 armed rebels beat up some labourers of the Chaibasa-based construction company engaged in building of a road bridge over the Suvarnarekha river which linked Shyamsunderpur and Ghatsila in the interiors of Jharkhand. They also set on fire a motorcycle, the makeshift camp 'and a g$erator set. They also looted Rs 1.25 lakh before decamping, the sources in state police said. The incident comes three weeks after the militants torched valuable equipment of another construction company engaged in laying of road under the Central Government scheme in Patamda block of Ghatsila sub-division on 29 November. Officials led by DSP (Ghatsila) SP Burnwal reached Shyamsunderpur sometime after the Maoist depredation. While blaming the government for keeping the tribal areas
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1051
und~veloped,
they go about meticulously destroying the bridges and hi.il tracks already' built in there "underdeveloped" areas. Their thoroughness also demand that the development schemes under execution are also thwarted. This they do by killing the labourers and destroying/burning the materials gathered at sites for construction of bridges, community projects in these areas. All this is necessary to ensure that the N axalites can play their trade of murderous violence and destruction-all in the name of protest against the denial of development to the tribal areas, their favourite constituency. Ironically, one does not find Human Rights organizations and en.tightened Left-Libber sections raising their voice even feebly against such murderous and destructive activities of the Left extremists! "
Jharkhand : More Securitymen Than Maoists Killed in 2006 Some analysts assert that security agencies of Jharkhand are not getting the logistical and weapons support from the State Government which they need to combat and control the Maoist rebels. This should be an obvious inference from the fact that during the last six years (2001 to 2006) the security forces -.mffered more fatalities than the rebel ranks. Fatality figures for these six years are given below. 14 1. Security personnel (State police and para military forces, put together)
262
2. Maoist rebels
256
3. Innocent civilians killed by Maoists
323
The figure of 256 for Maoists killed by security forces may even be over-stated, if not willfully exaggerated, as the police have hardly managed to recover 50 bodIes of the rebels. The police officers are wont to explain this way with a usual reply: the rebels used to escape with the bodies of their activitists killed in encounters. But this explanation cannot wash cognescenti. Mter an ambush or encounter, the rebels will disengage and flee the site as the security forces are bound to pursue them after the initial surprise and shock are over. The only situation where the rebels will 'carry away their fatalities is when they ambush! encounter a small party of security personnel and all ofthe latter are killed in the firefight.
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Terrorism in India
Till date, the State has spent Rs 144 crore on police . modernisation. What has this amount meant for the police? • Of the total of 323 police stations, more than half are in a dilapidated condition. • 20 per cent of its police station are running from rented premises. • Of the rented variety, "25 per cent of the buildings can collapse any time". It is obvious from the fatality figures cited above that the rebels have upper hand when confronted by the security squads. The following are the natural consequences of this unequal fight. 1. When Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar in November 2000, Maoist rebel were active in only eight of its districts. In the six years since, it has doubled the number.
2. Due to fear of the rebels, security personnel do not go for patrolling during the night to avoid ambush and landmines. It is not that remedial measures are not known to the senior police officers and their political superiors. Somehow, things are not moving. Is it any surprise that a senior police officer is ready to pour out his frustrations to a journalist, unmindful of all the restraints imposed by his service regulations. 1. One example should suffice to indicate the plight of the State police in its fight against the Maoist rebels. Over the last six years, two helicopters repeatedly promised by the State Government for anti-extremist operations, have ,not materialized as of date.
2. Yet again, "our wireless system and landmine dclecting machinery are still the old ones ... We continue to fight the rebels with traditional weapons and technologies. Given improved weaponry, at least to mtch the one with the rebels, and better technology for its counter-Naxal operations, the State police will surely redeem itself.
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
Jharkhand : Fund Crunch Operations February 2007
1053.
Derails Anti-Naxal
Here is the news story broken by the press on 23 February 2007 which is a sad reflection on the ways Jharkhand Government, and its nodal agency responsible for combating Naxal terrorism, perform the assigned task. The State police could not launch and sustain counter-Naxalite operations for the first two months of the year 2007 as it had run out of the funds for buying petrol and diesel for its· vehicles required for the purpose. And to know that Jharkhand, with Chhattisgarh, is one ofthe two worst-affected states in Naxal violence. The funds were finally released only on 22 February 2007 by diverting money from the police modernization account. The Police Headquarters had no money in the relevant account as the am()~nt allotted in the budget 2006-07 to purchase petrol and diesel for this purpose had already been spent "as far back . as six months back and the Home Department had been approached to arrange this money through the first supplementary budget." This was disclosed to a daily15 by a senior police officer, who further added: "But the Department slept over the file, causing security of fuel. The first supplementary budget was passed in .. the Monsbon session in September 2006, and the second was passed during the Winter session in December. And the Home Department never bothered to push the file to the Finance Department." This officer added more grim colours to the picture: "We had sought Rs 10 crore for petrol, food articles and other things for the personnel on patrol duty. But the Home Department did not feel prudent (enough) to move the file. We are not able to send money to Maoist-infested districts in absence of budgetary provisions." Even DGP Jharkhand JB Mahapatra admitted that the money meant for (the purchase oD patrol and diesel had already been spent. To wit, 16 of the State's 22 districts are infested by Maoist v.i~lence. And "the district police chief's have to find sources of funds to meet the requirement of fuel (to combat Naxalites}."
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Terrorism in India
Certainly, an extremely unfortunate situation. Talking to the said daily, another senior police official _- engaged in the anti-extremist operations, mentioned his difficult position: "According to one estimate, a sum of Rs 3 crore is due to different patrol pump owners but we are unable to pay them."
Maoists Kill Second Leader in a Week: 8 March 2007 Close on the heels of the killing of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) MP, Sunil Kumar Mahato, the son of another JMM leader, Sukhdeo Hembrom, was shot dead on 8 Mar(~h 2007 in Chakradharpur locality of Jamshedpur in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. Sukhdeo had gone to drop his son, Lakshman, in a bus where he spotted Ratan Tiu who was traveling in the same bus. Ratan snatched the rifle from the -, security guard of Sukhdeo and shot dead Lakshman. Ratan had tried to kill Sukhdeo, when he hadi'fought unsuccessfully the 2005 Assembly polls against the former. Now he kils his son. Ratan was later arrested by the police.
Anti-Naxal MP Killed on Holi : March 2007 MP from Jamshedpur Sunil Kumar Mahato, who was the Chief Guest at the function to celebrate Holi on 4 March 2007, was killed at the N axalite-infested village of Bakuria 16 in Ghatshila block of East Singhbhum district, while attending a foot ball watch by unidentified gunmen. The reports said he wanted to leave after watching the women's foot ball match, as he had some other engagements. He was requested to stay a little longer to watch the boy's football match also and organizers promised they would cut it short-to be played in two halves of 10 minutes each. It was during this period that Mahato, the first MP killed by Naxalites, was gunned down by 15-20 armed assailants who came from behind the dias, and let loose a volley of shots on him at point blank range. Two of his body guards and a JMM activist was also killed. It is surprising how even the name of place where Mahato was gunned down is mentioned differently. If one daily names it Barkuria village, as mentioned above, another says "the incident took place at Galudih, 28 km from Jamshedpur."17
Naxal 'Ierror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1055
Conspiracy Theory . Was it a conspiracy? Soon. after Mahato was gunned down on 4 March, Jharkhand government blamed the assassination on the Maoists. But on the very next day, the 5th, Nalini Dean, sister-in-law of the slain MP said, "we are suspicious whether the assailants were actually Maoists. Deputy Chief Minister and senior JMM leader Sudhir Mahato also indicated at the conspiracy angle, saying : "We are probing the matter to find the reason-political or personal. . Chief Minister Madh,u Koda cited revenge by Maoists as a possible reason for assassination of Mahato : "we cannot deny it. N axals normally target MPs, MUs and government officials. This is a pre-plannel attack." A.day after the killing, MOS Home Sriprakash Jaiswal blamed the killing on the Maoists, but left roo~ for a theory that it could be a revenge killing. 18 Central' agencies suspect the killing of the MP to be a handiwork of Naxalites/ who had , reasons to be sore with the leader due to his role in mobilizing . his constituents against the Red ultras, Though the Union Home Secretary VK Duggal on 5 March stopped short of making a categorical assertion about Naxals behind the killing which can' create ~r~uble for the Madhu Koda government 19 , the C~ntral agencies and the state police have little doubt that th~ MP fell prey to the extremists. It is indeed a sad commentary on the resolve of political parties to fight anti-Naxal battle purposefully-or the antiterrorism battle for that matter-that such a serious issue, like assassination of a serving ruling party MP, is seen through the prism of vested interests of various categorigs and at various stages. The ramshackle Koda government was installed after dislodging a reasonably stable BJP-Ied government. The Congress right upto the Centre will not like to accept that the MP was done down brutally by the Naxal ultras. It will be an adverse reflection of their anti-Naxal strategy. So even the Central MQS Home and his Home Secretary is hedging their bits. In the given situation, it is no surprise that the police hierarchy too has joined the fung game! Minor incidents or events/decisions related to the assassination are magllified to
I
1056
Terrorism in India
give credence to the imaginary--or motivated-conspiracy theory (It is interesting to note that no such foolish conspiracy theory was floated for the massacre of 55 police personnel at Rani Bodli that came less than a fortnight after the Mahato assassination). Just read what the DGP and his minions are saying about the assassination: 1. DGP JB Mahapatra accepted that there was some controversy and that a football can never be over in 10 minutes. "The attempt was to make him stay back for a longer time".
2. A police source chips in: "The organizers of the football tournament will soon be questioned. It is also amazing that the driver of the MP's Car, who never used to leave Mahato alone, had miraculous escape, as he had left the dias a few second before the gunsho~s were fired at the senior leader." / 3. The police, which suspects that the killing could be the outcome of a feud between the local mafia and the slain MP, also said the assailants had kicked the body of Mahato after he fell on the ground. Chief Minister Koda sought a CBI inquiry into the killing 'to,determine whether there was any conspiraey angle to it. He said the assailants might have sneaked into Purulia district of West Bengal, which shares a border with East Singhbhum, after killing the MP. He added the areas bordering Orissa, Bihar and Chhattisgarh have' also been sealed. The killing points to a level of sophistication as well as motivation which only the cadre-driven Naxalites possess. The dawn-to-dusk state-wide bandh called by the JMM supporters on 5 March was also near total and largely peaceful. The last rites of Mahato were performed at his native village in Saraikela-Kharsawan district on 8 March.
Mahato Fought the Naxalites Bravely Even when Hoem Secretary Duggal baulked from making a categorical assertion about N axals being behind his killing for fear ot political fallout, still he made certain significant remarks
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1057
concerning his death. His assertions indicated how the leader might have been killed in a "retaliatory action." He also mentioned that Mahato, being on MP, was part of the Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS), a civilian body which has been active in mobilizing people against the Maoists. He also indicated the JMM leader's direct involvement in raising a strong protestmovement against the N axals. Sunil Mahato plunged into politics when the movement for the separate Jharkhand state was at its peak in 1986. Born into a family of farmers, Mahato hogged the limelight as one off the founder members of the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU), spearheading the separate statehood agitation in Saraikela, Kharsawan and East Singhbhum region. He was the first treasuresr of the AJSU when it converted itself into a political party. He even unsuccessfully contested the Bihar Assembly elections as an AJSU candidate. Internal bickerings compelled him to quit the AJSU to join the JMM in the early 1990s. Soon the Kurmi leader rose in the JMM ranks, helped by his mass base and close proximity to Shibu Soren, the JMM supremo and much respected separate state agitation leader. Known to have considerable influence among Santhals, he emerged as one of the popular faces in the JMM. He was elected to the 14th Lok Sabha from Jamshedpur in 2004 became General Secretary of the Party. Born on 11 January 1966 at Cho~a Gamharia village in Saraikela-Kharsawan district, he graduated from the Cooperative College in Jamshedpur. 2o If analysts believe Mahato's exertions against N axals may have brought his end, they way not be far off the mark. In fact he started this battle some years back and possibely paid for his convictions and actions. An instance or two should be in order. On 9 August 2003, when cadres of the PWG raided Lango village, its residents led by Bhado Bandra, battling Naxalites under the banner of Nagrik Raksha Dal (NRD), fought back and lynched nine PWG raiders. The very next day, Sunil
1058
Terrorism in India
Mahato, the former AJSU activist who had by then become JMM General Secretary, showed up at Lango, praised the villagers and distributed sweets. He was later elected MP in 2004. He always backed the NRD and was extremely critical of the Naxals and their murderous ways. His assassination on 4 March 2007 brought his supporters to the streets, pelting stones and setting up road blocks to demand a high-level probe into the killing, which brought J amshedpur and neighbouring towns to a complete halt today. But Lango's Bandra talks about Sunil Mahato and discloses certain facets of his life as he observed them personally: "Mahato, unlike others in the party, had taken on Naxalites. Whenever any body contacted him and sought help against the Naxals. He would respond."
~
"He would even show up alone on a motorcycle." "In December 2006, when CPI (Maoist) cadres set off a landmine and killed 25 policemen at Kangiro in Bokaro, Mahato was among the first to issue a statement, slamming the Naxalites. This may have PWG target him, echoing what many in the area believe to be the reason for the killing." But Jamshedpur SSP Pankaj Darad, who took charge last month, was not so sure, as was Bandra : "There is no doubt he was against the Naxalites. But the evidence gathered so far is npt sufficient to conclude that this was the motive." This is in line with other police officers' take on the murder. Surprisingly, some in the JMM too think it was not the Naxalites, basing their argument on the fact that no outfit has claimed responsibility for the killing. JMM's Jamshedpur-based spokesman Ashok Mahato was rather direct : "It was a preplanned murder. The plan was hatched by some of his rivals who laid a trap by organizing a football match on Holi, inviting him as the Chief Guest."
Murder Leaves Uneasy Posers for Local Administration The killing of the JMM MP may have thrown up some uncomfortable questions for the State administration.
Naxal 'Ierror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1059
"Mahato was a key functionary of the N agrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS), a civil society movement against Naxalism. We are looking at the security provided to him during the sports function and the standard operating procedures." This was Home Secretary Duggal posing some such questions at New Delhi. Security arrangements for him become an even more important issue when his death is seen as retaliation for his active anti-Naxal stance throughout his political career. The MHA has also noted with concern that the incident occurred in the same belt where the Outlawed CPI (Maoist) had held the month-long 9th Congress last month (February 2007). Taking the cue from the fatal incident, the Ministry has outlined the need for identifying sensitive areas as well as leaders who had taken a long stand against N axals. Jharkhand's inability to contain Naxal violence has made it an area of concern for the Centre. There is a general feeling.that the State has not done enough. Two points in this connection have been repeatedly brought to the Centre's attention: / 1. The high number of vacancies in the state police force. (Part of blame for this lacuna must lie with the Centre/ MHA). 2. Improper use of funds allotted to the State, especially for anti-Naxal tasks/purposes.
Naxals Threaten Jharkhand Dy CM: April 2007 More than a month after its cadres gunned down JMM MP Sunil Mahato in East Singhbhum district, CPI (Maoist) has come out with a letter dated 8 April 2007, threatening Deputy Chief Minister Sudhir Mahato of dire consequences if he does not stop speaking against the N axals. The letter reads as follow: "You have been issuing false statements from time to time. Your aim and motive is clear to the people. However, we feel it right to challenge your statements and warn you against letting loose a barrage of lies." "To come to your false propaganda about your espousing the cause of the Jharkhandis, we make it loud and clear that you have betrayed them in every conceivable way. ;You and your party's corrupt leaders have proved traitors to the long
1060
Terrorism in India
cherished dream of a democratic Jharkhand. If you continue to support the anti-Naxalite Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS), . you will meet Sunil's fate."21 Sudhir's answer to this threat was brief, to the point and sans any flourish and bravado: " We have discussed the matter with the top brass in New Delhi, and sought 30 companies of para-military forces." The JMM cadres are up in arms against the Maoists. Under the Deputy CM's patronage 200 Adivasis belonging to the NSS had recently gathered at the Bagudia football ground in East Singhbhum district and paid tributes to Sunil Mahato. NSS Chief Shanker Chandra Hembrom, who was close to the slain leader, declared on the occasion that the Adivasis instead of bowing before the Naxals would carry out a drive against them. "It is a matter of shame that a 3000-0dd Naxalites have begun to dominate over 2.69 crore people of the State," said-Hembrom. Chief Miniter Madhu Koda has said his government will not enter into a dialogue with the Naxalites till they give up arms. How one wishes activists led by the likes of Arundhati Roy I and sitting in Delhi visit Jharkhand and meet people like Sudhir Mahato and Shanker Hembrom who are putting up a brave fight against the Maoist marauder, instead of issuing anti-Salva Judum statements from New Delhi.
Jharkhand Plans Jungle Training for Its Cops: April 2007 It is learnt that the Madhu Koda-led UPA Government has decided to set up a special school to train its police personnel in jungle warfare to effectively fight the Maoist rebels in this insurgency-infested State .
. The Government seems to have finally realized the threat of growing Maoist violence to the State, sources said on 16 April 2007. The envisaged school is expected to give extra teeth to the police and security forces against the Maoists. Nearly 550 people, including 245 security personnel, have been killed in the past five years in Jharkhand alone. One indicator of fast . spreading N axal menace is the fact that when Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar in November 2000, Maoist rebels were active only in 8 of its 22 districts and presently the number of its
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1061
affected district stand at 16. It is, thus; obvious that the decision to set up the Jungle Warfare School is not a day too early. The proposed school, to be set up in Hazaribagh district during the fiscal 2007-08, will be the first of its kind in the State. The School is mooted to provide training to policemen to combat Maoists in all possible scenarios, including and particularly jungle areas where they are often ambushed by the rebels. After initial basic police training, policemen will be inducted into the (planned) School. Once the specialized training is over, they will be deployed in the Maoist dominated district and on security duty for the VIPs (Ambarish Dutta, Tribune, 17 April 2007). Help from the Army and BSF will be requisitioned for training of the policemen in the School, certainly for some initial years, at least. Jharkhand is covered with forests and hills and the Maoist use the avenues provide by the two to harass, &ttack and ambush the security forces. It is widely believed the police are unable to carry out night patrolling for fear of getting blown up in the minefields prepared by the ultras andlor getting caught in the ambushes sprung by them. Nearly 1200 of the 4564 panchayats (over 25 per cent of the total) in the State are stated to be under the influence of the Maoist cadres, where they now virtually run a parallel government: collecting taxes, holding courts and deliverirrg onthe-spot Naxal justice, and at grass-root level, adjudicating in social/personnel disputes. Besides these measures, an elaborate machinery for "levy and tax collection" from government contractors and industrial/commercial establishments is in place. The Maoists have made full use of State's rich forest and hill cover to establish camps and training schools for their cadres in several areas. Some of these locations are mentioned below: 1. Jhumra Hills of Bokaro. 2. Saranda forest in West Singhbhum district. 3. Border region of Hazaribagh and Chatra districts. 4. Baruhatu and Shilaghati Hills of Ranchi. 5. Madhuban Hills of Giridih. 6. Some places in the Latehar and Garhwa districts.
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Terrorism in India
Muktanchal (= Liberated belt) on Jharkhand W. Bengal Border: April 2007 This is 'liberated' territory in the lexicon of Maoists. "Law does not live in N axal land", as an analyst puts it rather unfelicitously. The reference is to the Muklanchal (= liberated or free belt). ' Muktanchal, along the Jharkhand - West Bengal border, is a verdant hilly t~rrain dott~_d with springs and natural forests. It is the bombed forest rest house and guest house in the are a that indicate that Naxalites run a parallel government here. Where exactly is this 'free' land? It has some 200 villages of the two states spread across the three border police station areas: One-Ghatsila-in Jharkhand and two-Belpahari and Bandw'an-in West Bengal. This is the Maoist-proclaimed Muktanchal. Whose writ runs here? No prizes for the answer. If there is any lingering doubt still, the following two horrific incidents should clear it. • Former MP late Sunil Mahato visited Huludboni, the remotest village of Ghatsila, in February 2007. A fortnight later, Naxals killed him in Baguria, one of their strongholds. Eversince, no politician has dared to travel to Haludboni. Given the Maoist terror in the region, chances of a Jharkhand politician visiting Haludboni soon are reare. • Anil Mahto, Belpahari Cricle Secretary of ruling CPM in West Bengal, spoke against the Maoists at a couple of public meetings/gatherings. Some 50 armed Naxalites raided his house in 2006 and killed him and his wife while they were asleep. Most of the CPM leaders under Belpahari police station are have fled, abandoning their homes, pledging never to return. 22 Now the larger picture. 19 politicians ,belonging to this region astride the West Bengal - Jharkhand border and hailing from these two states have been killed here in the last four years. Most of them were from the JMM and CPM. The killings have virtually driven the legislation (read politicians) out of the region. Political activity is at low ebb. Even party),fJags are hardly visible here. '. ::,.
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1063
The two branches of administration are only slightly better. The State police personnel seldom venture into the region without the company of the CRPF or BSF. When security forces do visit, it is during the day, either on foot or on motorcycles and anti-landmine vehicles. "The judiciary exists, but again it does not function on the lines it does in the rest of the country." 'Jan Adalats' are dispensing justice here. Justice is delivered rough and ready through JanAdalatsthe proverbial Kangaroo courts. The Maoist writ is sacrosanct. People in Muktanchal have no option but to approach these courts, where the N axalites , dispense the justice as they see it. In any case, the people dare not go any where else for getting justice. NSS President and JMM leader Shankar Hembrom is on record telling us what happens if ;fhey do. A couple of Kesarpur panchayat vihagers were punished brutally for approaching the police for justice in , a criminal case. ' Unfortunately, and this is the worst aspect of the Naxal rule . in Muktanchal: The people may forget, or even reject under compulsion, the democratic tradition of this country. A press party visited Dwarsini, a border village of West Bengal, to cover a rally taken out by the Border Jungle Mahal Jan Jagran Samity (BJM JJS), allegedly a Maoist-sponsored outfit, to protest police atrocities. Samity President, Panchanan Singh, had a word of 'caution' for the press party : " Please do not write any thing detrimental, to the villagers' interest." So, even reporting the proceedings of a rally can harm the people's interest! Ghatsila DSP Shailendra Burnwal rightly attributed the Maoists' dominance in the area to the sluggish development, and then honestly spoke the facts of life in the region: "Except police, nobody visits these villages. CommiSSIoned to maintain law and order, we are also fighting Naxalites, besides carrying out small welfare work for the villagers. You will seldom see doctors, teachers or BDOs discharging their duties in dIe area. This has given the edge to Naxalites, who are growing in power."
Terrorism in India
1064
" Fight back": Sibu Soren JMM chief Sibu Soren, presently in prison, has asked his party cadres to ''be prepared to take the Naxalites head-on." He sent his message through his lieutenants. JMM Central Committee member Suprio Bhattacharya told the press : "Guruji has given a call for a direct confrontation with Naxalites. He had not anticipated that Naxalites would kill Jamshedpur MP Sunil Mahto". But Soren's call has alarmed the State police, which it could lead to a blood bath between the die-hard JMM cadres and the N axalites, killing many innocents in the crossfire.
Police vs Naxalites : Is it an Unequal Battle? Some of the indicators are adumberated here: • Jharkhand police have a clear brief these days: to locate and defus~ the lethal land-mines that Maoists had planted across their strongholds in the/State during the monsoons. The problem: they do not sufficient metal detectors. • Police estimate there are more than 4,000 Maoists in Jharkhand. Almost 500 of them, including 150 women,·· are hardcore elements. • 18 of the 22 Jharkhand districts are Naxalite-infested. 21 of these share borders with nighbouring states. Po~r coordination among them helps Maoists to shift bases and avoid capture. • Almost 250 police men have been killed by Maoists in Jharkhand till date. • The extremists use modern weapons, including INSAS rifles, SLRs, Ak series rines (most of them looted from' police) and even rocket launchers from Andhra Pradesh. • Police estimate that the Naxalites in Jharkhand gather nearly Rs 100 crore as levy each year.
Maoists can Display Compassion Also: April 2007 Naxalites killed six men, including two CISF personnel in Bermo near Ranchi, Jharkhand on 7 April 2007. But six other'
Naxal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat & Jharkhand
1065
Cl SF men survived the attack--courtsy a trait not commonly found among the gun-toting Naxals, compassion. The six survivors owed their lives to a young woman Maoist, who pleaded and finally persuaded her comrades to let the injured CISF men live. ADGP (Special Branch) Gauri Shankar Rath said: "When the Maoists barged into the CISF barracks after hours of gunfire, the security personnel had no ammunition left. They were injured and expected to be killed.. But the woman saved them." The CISF survivors told the pressman the Naxalites had raised their guns to shoot them dead, and had the woman not intervened, they would have indeed been killed. A police officer said in Bokaro, 'lIt seems women extremists, despite donning extremistiMaoist uniform, still have some compassion." But recent Maoist attacks, both in Bihar and Jharkhand, show a dangerous trend of women tp-.King the lead in launching attacks on security forces. The Maoist that attacked Bermo had many womE1n leading the groups. Rath has the last word: "The women are dangerous and more trustworthy." ,
Minors working for Naxals in Jharkhand: June 2007 It is known for long that minors are working for the Naxals in Jharkhand. Periodic incidents of this phenomen keep coming to public notice. Here follows a news story from a daily datelined Ranchi, 18 June 2007:
"Recently a high-speed chase down the dirt tracts of". Nadwelva village in Laterhar district resulted in the arrest of two motorcycle-borne Maoists. They were later identified as CPI (Maoist) Sub Zonal Commander Visheshwar Yadav and its child wing (= Bal Dasta) member Vimal, who was' the pillion rider." "Whep asked why he had joined the Maoists, 9-year-old Vimal said he was playing cricket outside his house a year ago, when he was picked up by Naxals. 'Lokeshji (a Maoist, still at large) caught me and forced me to go with him at gun points,' the Class III student told the police."
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Terrorism in India
Vimal, obviously, was not the first minor to be arrested for Maoists links. On 15 June 2006, 15-year-old Vipul Kumar was nabbed after a night-long encounter Maoists and security forces in Domuhan forest. In another case of this nature, a teenager was arrested on 17 May 2006 after an encounter near Simaria police station in Chatra district. Earlier, two Kherwar tribal boys were booked under POTA. 23 Police records show that Maoists have been abducting minors from their areas and training them to work as spies and cQoks. Others are being trained to provide logistical support like carrying arms and ammunition during operations in remote areas. Latehar district SP Diwakar Dhan told the daily that with th~ information provided by Vunal, the police were able to arrest two wanted Maoists including a Zonal Commander on 16 June 2007.
Notes l\fadhavi Tata, Outlook, 15 May, 2006. Omer Farooq, Pioneer, 28 Jan., 2007. Ibid., 4 Feb., 2007. SA. Ishaqui, Asian Age, 3 Feb., 2007 Karn Kowshik, "From Marijuana to Mines: another Naxal story in Andhra Pradesh," Indian Express, 6 March, 2007. 6. Karn Kowshik, Indian Express, 27 March, 2007. 7. Statesman, 27 March, 2007. 8. Milind Ghatwai, Indian Express, 20 Jan., 2007. 9. Kanhai Bhaleri, Week, 11 June, 2006. 10. Manoj Prasad, Indian Express, 25 Oct., 2006. 11. Dipankar Bose, Statesmen, 27 Oct., 2006. 12. Nityanand Shukla, Pioneer, 15 Nov., 2006. 13. Ibid., 5 Dec., 2006. 14. Ibid., 8 Ja"ne, 2007. 15. Ibid., 23 Feb., 2007. 16. Kumar Uttam, Asian Age, 6 March, 2007. 17. Manoj Prasad, Indian, Express, 6 March, 2007. 18. Sonali Das, Times of India, 6 March, 2007. 19. Ibid. 20. Jaidecp Deogharia, Times of India, 6 March, 2007. 21. Manoj Prasad, Indian Express, 10 April, 2007. 22. Vijay Murti, Hindustan Times, 12 Apr'u, 2007. 23. Manoj Prasad, Indian Express, 19 June, 2607. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1'- •
;
20 Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some other States KARNATAKA ,The next N axalite-affected state to be discussed is Karnataka,
Maoists Getting Active in Karnataka: Early 2007 At the Chief Minister's conference on internal security in New Delhi in Sep 2006, Karnataka Chief Minister H.D Kumar a-swami haG admitted that 13 districts in his state were affected by ultra-Left extremism. There were about 200 Maoist cadres active in the state, of which as many as 60 were operating in two to three armed groups each in the Malnad and Western Ghats :regions alone. in the recent months (Jan-Jun 2007), these two regions, comprising Karnataka's districts of Shimoga, Chikmagalur, Dakshina Kannada and Udupi, has witnessed what the state police described as "heightened Naxal activity." The region has been witness to a series of police encounters and counter-offensives that has claimed the lives of at least eight alleged Naxalites or sympathisers and four policemen or police informers. They were rendered leaderless following the death of Saketh Rajan in 6 Feb 2005 ~ncounter with police. He was a postgraduate in mass communications. In the recent months, after regrouping and mobilization, the Naxals began being assirtivedictating terms especially over the of the forest economy in the said region. Police has disclosed that after Rajan's death, the Naxalite movement in Karnataka was revived with the leadership outsourced from Andhl ':1 Pradesh.
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Reacting to the increased N axalite violence in Malnad, Chief Minister Kumaraswamy expressed his readiness to talk to the Naxals. In response, the Naxals asked the government to with(:lraw the anti-Naxal force (ANF) from the area as a precondition. The Naxals had gained popularity and following in this region because of the state government's policy of forcibly shifting out of the tribesmen from the Malnad forest areas. The victims of this policy were found to be easy converts to their movement by the Naxal cadres. Presently, the government is no more evicting the tribals from the forest areas. As a result, the locnls are no more falling easy prey to the N axal propaganda.
Karnataka Naxal Movement Splits: Feb 2007 Sharp differences over ~la()ist strate~ of area-wise seizure of power~"intensifying the revolution in rural areas first and then spreading it to urban centers" ~led to a split in the Naxal organization leading the movement in Karnataka, a daily reported on 14 Feb 2007. Tile ideologues who disagreed with the Maoist strategy' tl }c1tpd n ne\\' party named l\Iaoist Coordination Committee (MCC).
The split has obviously turned out as a set back to the central' leadership as it comes in the back drop of intensified efforts to unite smaller Naxalite parties in the country. It is even a bigger "hock to the control leaders that majority of the cadres in Karnataka quit the parent party to join the MCC. )
The name of the leader who engineered the split has not been made public. He is reported io be busy contacting leaders in other states and mass organizations to woo them back into t hp \iCC fold. Alarmed over the development, the CPI (Maoist) Polit Bureau has recently written to all party members in the country to expose the opportunistic and disruptionist activities of the dissenting / splitting leaders and ideologues. The split is belie" L/recent
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Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
1069
meeting attended by central committee secretary Ganapathi decided to step up efforts to convince their cadres on the futility ofthe-'new line'. It was, however, felt that the central committee had failed to initiate steps to stem the dissent and ideological disagreements had accentuated after the killing of Saketh Rajan (6 Feb 2005).1 Maoist activity in various intensities is witnessed in the state in Bidar, Gulbarga, Bellary, Raichur, Shimoga, Chikmagalur, U dupi, Dakshina Kannada, Hassan, Kodague, Tumkur and Kolar. The split is bound to affect its further spread in the State. MADHYA PRADESB
MP Worried: Naxals Reach Bhopal: Jan 2007 It was a shock and surprise for Madhya Pradesh Government when Its police discovered &. Naxal arms factory right in its capital town of Bhopal.
Five suspected Naxalites for Madhya Pradesh Government mere arrested from Satnami Nagar, a residential locality adjacent to an industrial area of Bhopal. Parts of weapons and ideological literature were seized from the premises on 11 and 12 Jan 2007. Th~ presence of Left-wing extremists and that too running
an arms-manufacturing factory, in Bhopal must make the MP Government sit up and take note of the growing threat. \Vhile all this while, the State Government had been demanding (for long) that the Sidhi district, sharing borders with LJttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, be declared Naxal-hit, it was caught unawares_about this factory in it's over capitai-its front yard so to say. Balaghat, Mandla and Dindori districts of MP have already been declared N axal-affected. It is worth a note that since the year 1990, the State has recorded 360 offences, most of them minor, of course. much less than the stateshke Cl,hattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. 2 ( .J.iscoyel~:,T ~ \: ~
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The State's inexperience to deal with the fall-out of such stunning seizures admitted rather honestly: "we are not even sure if the names given by the Five suspects are true". So, it was only on the 12th that the MP police got in touch with their counter-parts in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Karnataka, the states the suspects disclosed they came from. He further added: "All of them speak good Hindi but are not divulging anything. The teams from other states will help the MP police in establishing the identity of the five, which include a women. It is possible that they may turn out to be some senior leaders, but at the moment there is confusion about their identity. We are finding it difficult to crack them". This officer is speaking on the 12th to the journalists. This is where his 'inesperience' indeed shows. The initial arrests were made on the 11th , and some seizures made on the 12th. Where is the tearing hurry for this officer to share all this sensitive information with the press - so early in the day? M,ay be, he was carried away by the circumstance and the occasion. Maybe, 'smart' journalists coaxed or provoked him into such unnecessary and avoidable speak. May be, the police officer was too young, too in experienced to be allowed to speak to the press. May be, he was overwhelmed by the occasion, as suggested earlier! / One of the suspects displayed an aggressive stance, an apparent bravado, daring the interrogator to kill him: "I know you will kill us. Do it now!" At the unit, their arms factory, they maintained a low profile. Neighbours thought they ran a lathe machine behind the closed shutters and since they were from South India, did not know Hindi. They worked for fixed hours, leaving the unit of 5 P.M. They either walked to the unit, or used bicycles. The police were surprised to find posters of Hindu gods and. goddesses at the unit. ADGP (Intelligence) S.K. Rout has the explanation: "They did so to mislead others." A team of AP police was on the 12th on its way to Bhopal to interrogate Madhukumar, who claimed to be a resident of Guntur. His wife Rajlaxmi alias Sonam, Ashok alias Rajsh~khar, Srinivas alias Anna alias Balamurli, were among those arrested. The name of the 5 th was not disclosed.
_Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
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The 11th raid in Satnami N agar was followed by searches in Siddharth Enclave, Bijli ~gar, and J{alpana N.agar: - all neighborlng areas ~ suspects li~ed. No futher arrests were made from these locations, but the searches there did yield another cache of weapons and literature. So Madhya Pradesh too is in it, well and proper this time. All this as consequence of discovery of a functional N axal arms factory.
Naxal Arms Factory Unearthed in Bhopal: Jan 2007 The unearthing of an illegal Naxal arms factory, which is supplying clanders tine weapons to their forces in states like Gujarat, Karnataka, Chhattisgarh etc, in the heart of the state capital, seems to have made the Madhya Pradesh police extremely wary and cautious. "Never famed for their valour or daredevilry like their brethren in Punjab or J am mu and Kashmir, officers of the rank of SP and above have promptly had their nameplates removed from their staff cars, and a few - even from their bungalows. Public appearance in uniform too are being curtailed".3 ,I
The factory, which had been functioning for nearly three years, Was a key point in the Naxal weapons trail. The interrogation onll-13 Jan 2007 of the six inmates arrested earlier revealed: "Their job was to train new recruits in the neighboring states, especially Gujarat where an arms-making factory had been planned. None of the six arrested were common criminals. "They are intelligent and well-educated, and speak English, Hindi, and -- Telugu fluently. That the Naxilites might have been planning something big was evident from the sizeable quantity of gunpowder seized. What is publicly known seems to be only the tip of the iceberg, IB sources told the press. The ground reality obviously was much worse. "But their (IB's) hands were tied due to the system-built restrictions". The bust-up in Bhopal, in fact, had already resulted in unearthing of another Naxal arms workshop in what was a joint operations of the Andhra Pradesh and Orissa police.
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When asked if the powers that be were aware of the magnitude of threat the N axalites posed to the Nation's security and the crisis it could be plunged into by their fanatical creed, Naxalism, the source said with an air of finality and certitude: "Everything was known, even the finer details. But the political will to tackle the N axalism was lacking. Much of it has to do with the disproportionate influence wielded by the Communists in the current disposition at the centre. But the things were neither vastly better under previous regimes." It is time that the nation, its leaders and intelligentsia realized that the danger posed to the nation's unity was in no way less than from terrorists. The two, Naxalities and terrorists, had ~ommonality of interest which was being over looked even ignored. This internal threat, gnawing at the vitals of the nation, should be taken seriously before it is too late.
MAHARASHTRA In Maharashtra, the Naxals dominate the forest and mountainous tracts of Gadhchhiroli and Gonda districts, and have extended their influence to Chandrapur and Yavatmal districts. Compared to 2003, Naxal violence in the State in creased by 15 percent in 2004. The Maharashtra government, which has ckalkad mout a Rs. 733 crore anti-N axal programme for two districts of Gadhchhiroli and Chandrapur, has urged the Centre to set up a helicopter base in Nagpur, with medical support time, and station CRPF men there. Besides the four mentioned above, two other districts of the State-Bhandara and Nanded-have also been characterized as 'Naxalite-prone'. These six districts of Maharashtra, significantly, border the Naxal-affected districts of three neighbouring States: • Districts of Adilabad, Karimnagar and N azamabad of Andhra Pradesh. • Rajnandgaon, Bastar, Kanker and Dantewara of: Chhattisgarh. • Balaghat of Madhya Pradesh.
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Naxal-timber Mafia Link: Maharashtra: Jan 2007 The arrest on 14 J an 2007 of [,even Naxals of the Pratighatana faction and 16 timber smugglers by the Gadchiroli (Maharashtra) Police in the area beyond Asarali, in the southern part of Gadchiroli district on the Andhra Pradesh border has for the first time established a Naxal-timber mafia link. Special rGP (Anti-Naxalite operations) Pankaj Gurta told a daily that seven Naxalites were Rrrested after an E'LCounter. Gupta gave futher details: "They were in the process of transporting wooden 10gb, 150 of which have been seized from them. We have made smaller seizures earlier and knew there was a link. But this is the first time that we have caught the smugglers along with the Naxals. This clearly establishes an organized N axal-timber mafia link .. -Rs. 50,000 were also recovered from them". The pre8S was told "the police link produce the arrested before a magistrate in Karimnagar district, where the arrests were technically affected after a hot pursuit, and seek their transfer to Gadchiroli."4
NaxaIites target the Vehicles during Local Polls: Mar , 2007 Naxalities set ablaze two vehicles on 8 March in Gadchiroli districts and one on the 7th at Kondamahi, belonging to an NCP candidate. In another incident, 25-30 l\axalites from the Tipagarh Dalam capture a vehicle at Karwafa and later' set it afire. "These incidents were during the Zila Parishad poll, dLe on 11 Mar 2007".
Naxals Face Cadre Crunch in Eastern Maharashtra Police sources said 3 Jul 2007 that the Naxalite movement in the most affected Gadchiroli and Gondia distric'"s in Eastern Maharashtra "has weakened with some of the 'delrtms' operating in the area virtually winding up following a cadre crunch. The shrinking number of cadres has forced Naxal leaders in Vidharbha region ofthe state to wind up four of their dalams: Gamini, Kotagaon, Dhanora and Jimmalghatta.' {The Naxal quartet, led by Murli alias Mahesh Reddy, arrested by Nagpur police on 8 May, have also confirmed the intelligence inputs of the poiice' confessing tha't there has been
Terrorism in India
1074 no fresh recruitment for quite a long time.
Additional DGP (anti-Naxal operations) Pankaj Gupta, confirming the depletion in the Naxal cadre, said: "In a desperate mov€, Naxals are shifting some of their cadres from the adjoining Chhattisgarh". Citing reasons behind weakening of Naxal movement in Vidharbha, Gupta said the 'gaonbandi' (= barring entry into the villages) scheme of the Maharashtra Government proved very effective as villages are putting up a stiff resistance to their movement. Besides, a number of Naxals and their supporters have already surrendered to avail certain benefits, including cash, while some of them are on their way to abandon N axalism.
ORISSA The Maoists have been consolidating their base in CJrissa too. Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik has admitted that 10 of his states 30 districts were affected by Naxal violence. The Maoist are employing well - known and tested methods, to draw the youth into their fold. They are mobilizing I unemployed youngmen for Rs. 2000 a month. The Maoists have launched some major attacks in the state successfully. In 2002, the attacked Golpadar police station in . Rayagada district. In 2005, the Kalimela police station in ¥alkangiri district was target. It was a planned escalation of violence, with over 200 armed CPI (M) cadres attacking the Ramagiri V dayagiri sub-jail in Gajapati district and freeing 40 prisoners, including Ghirsinga Majhi, a senior Maoist leader. They also attacked the police station, the camp of 3rd Battalion, Orissa State Armed Police, and treasury. The analysts feel these are "blooding" operations where cadres are exposed to military operations to prepare them to undertake a wider mobilization across the entire Maoist corridor along India's eastern board.
Orissa Outlaws Maoists and Announces Surrender Package June 2006 : In a significant decision, the Naveen Patnaik Government has outlawed the CPI (Maoist) and its seven front organizations
Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
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State Chief Secretary Subas Pani said: "The organizations were banned under Section 16 of the CLA. The front organizations have been providing a platform to the Naxalites to propagate their ideology. Theior activities have been affecting administration and law and order. The government gave the Naxalites an opportunity to reform and provided maximum support to bring them back to the mainstream. But they did not heed the government's proposals and continued with violence. '. Finally there was no other way and we were forced to declare them unlawful. The state government has promised rehabilitation packages to militants who surrender to help them join the mainstream." Home Secretary, Santosh Kumar explains: "unlike in other states, no special law has been enacted in Orissa. There is a . technical difference between imposing a ban on organizations and declaring them unlawful. A ban would empower the police to arrest the office-bearers, whereas declaring them unlawful would mean that they would be liable for punishment if they continued with their activities. But the state government has maintained that it is open to negotiations with the Maoists without any pre-conditions." Daman Pratirodh Manch (DPM), one of the seven front organizations, challenged the ban in the Orissa High Court. Its convenor Dandapani Mohanti said: "DPM is a democratic organizations and the ban on it is an undemocratic move. We - have no links with the Maoists and DPM is tackling grassroot problems concerning the downtrodden and the tribals of the state. This ban would be a stumbling block in the path of any possibility of talks among the Naxals, the pro-people leaders and the government." Some parties have also opposed the ban on Maoists. According to Orissa Gana Parishad leaders, banning the Naxalites would create more problems. CPI leader Judhistir Rout said the ban had come at an "inopportune" time. Besides outlawing the CPI (Maoist), the state government
•
Terrorism in India'
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has also come up with a 'relief package'5 for surrendering Maoists. The main points of the relief package are summed up hereafter: 1. The goodies on surrender. • Immediate payment of up to Rs. 10,000. • Allotment of a plot for a house. • Housing grant up to Rs. 25,000. • Bank loans up to Rs. 200,000, with a subsidy. component of Rs. 50,000 after repayment of 75 percent of the loan. 2. The state cabinet decided to give surrendered Maoists Rs. 15,000 if they marry. 3. Free treatment in a government hospital. 4. Withdrawal of minor cases against them. 5. The reward money if he had a bounty on his head. 6. They would be paid for each weapon they surrender. The amounts to be paid for viarious weapons detailed here. • Rocket launcher
Rs 15,000
• AK -471Assault rifle
Rs 10,000
• .303 rifle 1 pistol
Rs 5,000
It is an attractive 'surrender package'. How many Maoists will be induced by these liberal terms will be known only after a while.
Orissa: Is it Ready to Counter Naxalism? Oct 2006 Orissa may not be one of the worst-hit states on the Naxal stakes, as are Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, but it certainly should never be seen as complacent in its fight against the Naxal violence. It is time that the Maoist-inflicted violence is brought under critical focus as also its preparedness to face the menace. The recent killing of its DIG, Jaswinder Singh, (23 Oct 2006), is not the only reason for this critical review. Ever since the Naxalite infiltration began in the state in the early 1990s' the system of policing to counter their presence and activities has not been found to be effective. Some analysts feel
Naxal Terror in Ori'Ssa and Some Other States
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"it has been a big mess". In statistical terms, it is in an extremely worrying situation. As many as 20 of the State's 30 districts are presently (Oct 2006) plagued by the presence of the NaKals. The recent killing of its DIG by the Naxals brought the state's unpreparedness to face the Maoist extremism, under sharp focus (That his gunning down was later attributed to his own security guard raised facile question about managing information). But the real question for the state government and for Orissa is this: How capable are the arm~ed rebels to strike at its security apparatus and how well-prepared is the police to counter it? It needs to be understood that southern Orissa is particularly vulnerable to N axal depredations. Broad areas of concern in-the counter-Naxalite campaign are mentioned here:
1. The gulf between the field commanders and their seniors sitting in the headquarters. 2. Inadequate training in anti-Naxal operations. 3. Poor equipment, even weaponry, held by: the police compared to that held by Naxal outlaws. 4. Equally important, failure of the state to counter Maoist propaganda among the tribals. The administrative machinery is reported to be ineffective. Even worse, a sense of insecurity is evident among the police personnal posted for duty in the Southern districts of the State, and consequently, many-right from top level officers to the constables down the line-deem a posting in these districts on anti-Naxal duties as a punishment rather than a challenge. They may have reasons for such sinking feeling but situation is certainly unfortunate. The attributing factors for such a mindset are: difficult terrain; lack of essential equipment; and an indifferent top administration. Because of these factors, the security personnel assigned to fight the Naxals are neither motivated enough nor in the best of their morale. In fact, some of them may be highly demoralized. Reasons for this state of affairs are not far to see. Often their essential requirements are not met. The Armed Police Reserve
Terrorism in India
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Force, assigned the combing operation task in the deep forests, to search and arrest thtf~~ .. a~e ~UlAtiz~d jungle boots lit .~Bt.lt -they ar-e.. giv"._-l'l8~8Ac:)Qs-inStead, which do not work even in the plains. :Yet again, instead of getting a lightweight rain coat, they are often walking in the rains in heavy tarpaulin over coats. Now comes most disconcerting of the factors that adds to the confusion : the disconnect between the top officers "who do not have much experience of anti-Naxal operations" and those actually working at the ground level, complaining the former keep issuing orders "without caring to know the ground realities." This mutual 'grouse' between the headquarters and the 'field' is not unknown in such situations but it seems to be more pronounced in Orissa
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Given the factors enumerated above, which are bound to create difficulties in the efficient performance of State's counterNaxal capability, if not make it dysfunctional, it should come as no surprise that the ultras carried out violent attack, at ti~es with worrying regularity, in the past few years. Only some major ones are mentioned here. I 1. The Left extremists targeted the police at will in Malkangiri, Koraput, and Gajapati districts.
2. They laid siege to Koraput district headquarters town '- and no less-in 2004 and looted arms.
3. In 2002, more than half a dozen police personel were blown up in.a landmine blasts. 4. Then there was R Udayagiri jail break in mid-2006. This was an example of clear dereliction of duty as the security in the prison located in a highly vulnerable are had not been reinforced as it should have been since it had been similarly raided by Naxals and tribals in 1998 as well. The above makes it reasonably clear that the state has not been able to put in place an effective anti-Naxal strategy to face the present serious situation. There is no doubt that political leadership is doing commendable job in executing development project in the backward areas of State, is a long-term anti-dote too the spread of the Naxalism. But it is equally essential that it does not ignore the need to defeat the Naxalite violence in its
Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
1079
present strongholds. It is political leadership that guides the top police brass in this situation. In fact the two must get their "act together and draw up an anti-Naxal strategy. Analysts say merely asking for financial help and some additional paramilitary companies every time there is a Naxal strike can at best be the news for the media, but certainly not a substitute for an effective counter-Naxal action plan. An urgent action is called for from the state on this issue in view of the fact that the Centre has made it clear that fighting Naxal violence is the responsibility of the individual states even though it will provide all necessary help to them in this fight. The Centre has also advised the affected states to work out plans for inter-state cooperation to mutually defeat the terror outfit. The states can expect from the Centre financial packages, additional security forces, intelligence inputs and over-all guidance as and when required. For the last mentioned, the Centre has set u.p various mechanisms, mentioned below: 1. Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) to inull over the policy issues concerning the Naxalite terrorism.
2. Anti-Naxal Task Force, set up by the Centre composed of Ministers / Senior Civil and police officials from the Naxal-affected states and concerned Ministers at the Centre, which discusses periodically issues of mutual interest on anti-Naxal plans formulated by various states. 3.
National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) composed of the home secretaries and DGPs of the states affected by the Naxalite terrorism and presided over by the Union Home Secretary, is charged with the task of coordination of counter-Naxalite strategies of various states at the level of officials.
But the primary task that must be taken in hand urgently shoring up Ori~~'s anti-Naxal fighting security force. It needs to build up a co~mitted cadre of trained officers and men that is equipped in all aspects to take up the Naxalite militant's under extremely harsh and hostile conditions. They should not only be provided with requisite weaponry, technologically sound " communication equipment and intelligence back-up but also -
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Terrorism in India
imbued with self-confidence which comes only with the full knowledge that the political and police leadership will back them' to the hilt. This is an extremely essential requirement in the'! existing political milieu. The security personal are not unaware of the fact the after an anti-terroristlNaxalite action, the ruling party in the state come under pressure to institute inquiries against them for either killing the 'innocents' or 'ex'.!essive' use of force. And not unoften, the Chief Ministers end up conceding such inquiries, or at the very least, sacking senior/police officers in the chain. Some may say, the most important task for administration is the training of police personnel for anti-Naxal operations, including guerrilla and jungle warfare training. A beginning has been made by Jharkhand setting up a Jungle Warfare School at Hazaribagh for anti-Naxal training courses for its police. It is not suggested here that each Naxalite-affected state should start similar schools. That may neither he necessary nor costeffective But what is feasible is that states like Orissa could benefit through inter-state agreements to have their select officers and men trained at Jharkhand's school, or even at such schools run by the Army. Murder of Jaswinder Singh under what-so-ever circumstances would not have gOGe in vain if it has persuaded Orissa Government and its Police Headquarters to put in place an effective and coherent counter-Naxalite strategy.
Maoist Deputy Area Commander Killed in Orissa: Feb 2007
On the eve of the state panchayat polls (scheduled for 13 Feb 2007), SOG of the state Police and the CRPF personnel on 12 Feburuary gunned down two Maoist ultras including a Deputy Area Commander, and injured two others after a gun battle in the southern district of Malkangiri. The incident took place around 9.30 AM when a police party was heading for thE Radigata polling booth under Kalimela police station, while thE polling party was expected to follow the police team later. 'hen the extremists (.' 'fUP forests, tl.
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Naxal Terror ill Ori8sa and Some Other States
1081
mentioned above occurred as a result of the half-an-hour fire fight that ensued. Police recovered grenades, explosives, kit bags, some literature/pamphlets and polythene sheets from the spot. Later, a detailed search of their jungle hideout yielded a solar phone, electronic detonators and some fuse wire. It is to be noted that the Maoists had earlier warned the people and wanted them to boycott these Panchayat polls in the area of South-West P()lice Range. The incident created a certain panic among the polling parties charged with responsibility of conducting polls at different polling booths in the insurgent affected areas on 13 Feb 2007. The rebels had earlier killed a Havilder of the CRPF on 26 January in this very area. This incident had resulted in the intensified combing operatio!'s and arrest of several suspects by the police. On 30 January, the security forces had arrested three Maoist cadres following a gun battle between the two sides in the forests near Karamguda village under Chitrakonda police station area of Malkangiri. Orissa: Fire Fight in Sambalpur Forests: Mar 2007 There was heavy exchange of fire on the 26 Mar 2007 evening between the Special Operations Group (SOG) and CRPF personnel and the Maoist rebels in the Kutab forests area between Gariakhaman and Budhikhaman villages under the Kisinda police station in the northern district of Sambalpur. The firefighting took place when security men came across some rebels during a combing operation of the forest areas mentioned above. If the former fired some 95 rounds, the rebels replied with about 50 before escaping from the scene. SP, Sambalpur S. Debadutta Singh told the press: "We have alerted all the entry points bordering Andhra Pradesh and Chhattishgarh and intensive combing operations have also been carried out to nab the rebels." "Security forces suspected that some 30 ultras are active in Kisinda area. The Maoists are painting development ",' .:':' le Goyernnler:+ :1.~ ,,-; 'l'l'(JT)h· and we
1082
Terrorism in India
Earlier, on 13 March district police had arrested an employee of the Oris sa Forest Development Corporation (OFDC) for his'· alleged role in providing arms and ammunition to the Maoist organization. Police had then recovered three rifles and some bullets on the spot. To trace the ultras who had disappeared into the jungle on 26 March, Kisinda and Jujumara police stations have been alerted and police parties are out on massive combing operations.
Maoists Protest Nandigram Deaths: Orissa Response: Mar 2007 Maoist rebels called for a bandh (= strike) across four eastern states-Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal - to protest the police shooting 15 villagers in N andigram in West Bengal. Barring a few stray incidents in the South-Western Police Range of Orissa, the bandh called on 20 Mar 2007 by the CP (Maoist) evoked a mixed response. DGP Amarananda Pattanayak said: "We have reports of violence in Malkangiri while the bandh was partial and there was no report of any major untoward incident during the bandh." On the other hand, the rebels in a statement issued in the name of Sunil said: "The people must come to terms with the fact that the governments in these States are agents of imperialist forces and should rise to fight their anti-people agenda." The ultras have been opposing the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and tribal displacement. Meanwhile, the Special Operations Groups and CRPF arrested a Maoist leader near Orkelguda village under Malkangiri Police Station close to Chhattisgarh border. He was identified as Laxaman, an expert in laying landmines. His arrest followed a heavy exchange of fire between the security forces and the rebels near Kalimela. "No bodies have been recovered while police claim the death of three Maoists". However, the bandh affected normal life in Malkangiri. Gajapati, Rayagada, and Koraput while Sambalpur, Angul, J ajpur, Dhenkanal, and Rourkela, were among those Maoist. dominated regions not affected by the bandh, policE' sources said.
Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
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Thus, the bandh call by the Left-wing extremists evoked a partial response in Orissa.
Orissa: 7 Southern Towns Under Maoist Threat: Jun 2007 At least seven major towns under the southern police range have come under serious Maoist threat while more than 500 Maoist cadres have been coming along the Orissa-Andhra Pradesh border in the Southern and South-Western police , Ranges of Orissa. This was reported by a daily in a news story datelined Parla Khemundi (Orissa): 11 Jun 2007. : Latest intelligence reports suggest the rebels have been camping in the districts of Gajapati, Ganjam, Rayagada, Koraput, Nawarangpur, Malkangiri and several other places, with a view to implementing the decisions taken during the 9th annu,aCmeeting of the CPI (Moaists). Meanwhile, Maoists have also been conducting camps in which they are attempting to convince the people against the development schemes of the state. Sources say ultras are conducting camps in the dense forest areas of South Orissa, where the security forces often failed to locate the Maoists base in the forests. Security forces are suspecting that the top CPI (Maoist) . 'leader, "Sudhakar, is camping here to work out the future plans and pr{)grammes for South Orissa. The ultras are also believed to be moving along the Orissa-Chhattisgarh border. 6 Considering these developments and movement of the ,Maoist cadres mentioned above, Special Operations Groups of the State Police and the CRPF have intensified their combing operations along the areas of the state bordering Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Along with this, a high alert has been put in place at all the sensitive junctions under the Southern Police Range.
Orissa: Road Re-routed to Bring Naxal Heartland on Map: Jun 2007 Orissa Government has long dreamt of a road through its 12 insurgency\ - affected districts, bringing these tribal areas doser to the rest of the State and, hopefully, to the development. It sees a solution for its Maoist violence in this dream road.
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A daily reported from New Delhi, 5 Jun 2007 that at a recent chaired by Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways was asked to expedite the finalizations of the Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the Vijayawada (Andhra Pradesh)-Ranchi (Jharkhand) corridor cutting through Orissa, and take it up on a priority basis. The two-lane road demanded by Orissa will be part of this corridor. The alignment of this road follows: Vijyawada (Andhra Pradesh)Malkangiri-Koraput-llayagada-Gajapati-Ganjam-KandhamalAnugal-Sambalpur-Deogarh-Keonjhar-Mayurbhanj-Ranchi (Jharkhand)31 Bolangir (Boudh). Of the 1,729 km long corridor, 2-lane 1219 km portion will be in Orissa, linking its 12 district towns named above. The state has requested the Centre that its state highways, district and rural roads running along the alignment be incorporated in the corridor and special assistance be given to it for the purpose. This way, 235.8 km of national highway section~, 878 km of state highways, and 104.5 km of rural roads will be part of the corridor. The road from Vijaywada enters Orissa at Motu in Malkangiri district and leaves it at Tiring in Mayurbhanj district on the north. Orissa has long sought a security corridor through the 'red' tribal belts. The state, in fact, wanted that the entire stretch through its territory be declared a national highways (NH) or at least be developed on a par with national highways. While the Ministry may not call the stretch NH as yet, with the Prime Minister taking a keen interest, it is set to be developed as per national highway standards. What it means is that tribal area of the 12 districts named above- Koraput, Malkangiri, Rayagada, Gajapati, Ganjam, Kandhamal, Anugul, Sambalpur, Deogarh, Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj and Boudh, currently insurgency hot beds, may emerge out of the hinterlands. Confirming that the project has been put on fast track, a senior official of the Ministry said: "The DPR of the corridor is underway and should be ready in six-seven months". Orissa: Joint Command Achieves a Success: Jun 2007 The Joint Command set up by the State Government to track down and chase the Maoists in the industrial hubs on 10
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Jun 2007 achieved a success when the security forces, after 5.day-Iong combing-operations in the dense forests of Kankadahada Forest Beat area under the North-Central Police Range in Dhenkanal district, gunned down two Maoists, demolished a camp and recovered a heavy cache of arms and ammunition. Informing a daily about the first success of the Joint Command, North-Central Range DIG Arun Sarangi said: 7 "The security forces have managed to bring the whole area under their control, while the combing operation has been further intensified to crack down on more rebels. "We are suspecting that two are dead, though their bodies are yet. to be recovered. The amount of arms and ammunition seized pointed to a major future plan of the rebels in the Kankadahad Forest. "In all, 75 rounds of live ammunition, a self-loading rifle, a revolver, a landmine, five detonators, six gelatin sticks, and a large quantity of personnel belongings from the camp were recovered, after the Maoists retreated into the jungle. "The 17-member Joint Command led by Dhenkanal SP Sanjay Kousal strongly fought against the rebels for four hours. The encounter took place in the Kanarapatharakata jungle close to the area where the Maoists had abducted and killed three forest department employees inCluding a forester and two forest guards recently. The killing was indicative of the fact that ultras have recently penetrated into the area." Sarangi, who heads the Joint Command, further added. "Every precaution has been taken to negate possible Maoist strikes and security forces have been working over time in close coordination with the security system put in place by different industrial houses in four districts: Jaipur, Dhenkanal, Anugul and Keonjhar." Alerts have also been sounded to intelligence network in the wake of the incident and the Maoist movement, which was so i
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far confined to most of the southern districts, was recently noticed in Anugul and Dhenkanal districts. The Jharkhand-bordering Keorjhar district, the mining belt of the state, is on top of the agenda of the ultras. Admitting that the Leftwing extremists belonging to the CPI (Janashakti) group have strengthened their base in the three district of Jaipur, Dhenkanal and Keonjhar, the State Home Department inducted four Special Operations Groups (SOG): two in Dhenkanal district and one each in J aipur and Keonjhar districts. However, sources claimed that mainline ultras h&ve already made a corridor from Sundargarh to Ravagada via Sambalpur, Deogarh and Phulbani, from where they are slated to carry out their depredations. The area from where the new outfit is operating is about 10,000 sq km, covering these three districts. The problems confronting the police in combating and rooting out the ultras from this large area are both logistic and administrative in nature. Though for the Maoists the area constitute a single operational unit, on which they can manage to bear all theirfighting cadres and support resources, for the police it falls in the jurisdictions of three districts and making it even worse, coming under the three different police ranges. Yet again, while the ultras are well-conversant with the roads and passes, the police from three districts are just picking up the pieces, being unfamiliar with the road communications and Maoist hideouts to begin with, any way. Meanwhile, in the wake of the poster campaign carried out by the Leftwing rebels in Sambalpur and Deogarh districts under the Northern Police Range, secUrity forces have intensified their combing operation while an alert has also been sounded at all the sensitive points. "A close watch has been maintained on the national highways and railway lines passing through the Sambalpur and Deogarh areas", said the police sources. . Moist hideout in Malkangiri destroyed: Aug 2007 The Special Operations Group (SOG) and District Volunteers Force on 14 Aug 2007 jointly destroyed a Maoist hideout in Prajaguda and Kurup villages near Rajurkonta area of Kalemela block of southern district of Malkangiri under the
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South-Western Police Range in Orissa. The incident assumes significance as the Left-wing guerrillas had called for a Black Day on the Independence Day, Wednesday 15 August. Speaking on phone, Malkangiri SP Satish Gajbhiye told a daily: "The combing operations team raided a Maoist hideout at Rajurkonta and Kurup areas where 12 rebels including some female cadres had gathered for a meeting ahead of the Independence Day. We recovered one landmine, a detonator, huge quantity of explosives and large quantity of medicines, which was suposed to be used by the injured Maoist cadres were also recovered after an hour-long exchange of fire." Security forces destroyed the Shahid Pillar (= Martyrs Column) recently erected by the Maoists and "search operation has been intensified at Kalimela." Posters and banners were put up in Kurmanur, Papulur, Vejangiwada Panchayat areas on Andhra-Orissa border. Maoist cadres were on a whirlwind tour of Chitrakonda, Kalimela, '. Motu and MV-79 villages, urging their inhabitants to boycott Independence Day celebrations. The ultras had decided to hoist • black flags on the office and school buildings protesting against the Government, which they allege has done nothing for the tribals in/last 60 years. Schools in the interior villages were reported to have been closed since the afternoon of 14 August. Meanwhile, the cadres in Rayagada, Gajapati, Koraput and several other insurgent-affected districts had geared up to observe Independence Day as 'Black Day'. The police said: "The security has been tightened while combing operations have also been intensified," ,said SK Nath, DIG, Sodh-Western Police Range. Gajapati district SP, A N Singh, spoke of elaborate security arrangerr1~nts in his district also. ' In order to check cross-border infiltration, a red alert had been sounded aJgng the State's borders with neighboring Chhattisgarh, i\r:ldhra Pradesh and Jharkhand. To be sure that the state was ready to face any situation, the security fot~ under the South-Western, North-Central, Southern, Northwn, and Western Police Ranges were put on high alert for t ..:e Independence Day celebrations.
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A senior Home Department official said: "we have also made elaborate security arrangements in all Maoist infected districts, where some ministers are slated to hoist ~he tricolor." But there were rumors that the Maoists had launched an effort to capture Barpahar forest region skirting the Hirakud Dam reservoir, covering both Sambalpur and Bargarh districts. This would be helpful for them to establish a corridor to Koraput and Kalahandi. When contacted about this potential threat, Bargarh SP Sanjiv Panda ruled any possibility of Maoist fears in his district and assured that ample security measures had been taken for 15 Aug 2007.
TAMIL NADU Tamil N adu was one of the states that had N axal presence, but today movement is claimed to Qe dead. But it is still active in its Dhermapuri area, once the cradle' of N axalism. But Venkatesan, leader of Farmers Liberation Front, constituents rather a front-of CPI (ML), says the Naxalites here are more concerned with solving the problems of the people, settling communal disputes and encouraging inter'-caste marriages. Special Staff to Monitor Naxal Movement: Tamil Nadu: Feb 2007 "Police men in the rank of head constable will be deployed at nine police stations along the Tamil Nadu-Andhra Pradesh border to track / elicit information about the activities or presence ofthose attracted by the Nacalite movement." This was disclosed by the DIG of Police, Kancheepuram Range, Mohd Shakeel Akhter on 20 Feb 2007. These head constables, assigned with the special duty, w,ill also be interacting with their counter parts attached to the Andhra Pradesh police stations along the border and exchllnging information or data with regards to suspected movements to of N axalities. The nine police station.s of Tamil Nadu in question are: Arambakkam
Tirutani
Pathiri Vedu
Pothatturpet
Uthukottai Kannurpet KKChatram
Pallipattu R.K. Pet
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Besides this, there is a plan to revaJIlp and infuse fresh blood into the village defense committees to deploy them in law and order maintenance, night patrolling and traffic management, whereever required.
Three Nabbed in Tamil Nadu: Naxals Advancing South? Jun 2007
It has been widely believed since the 2002 Uthangarai operation in Tamil Nadu that Naxal presence in the state was negligible. But that perception changed on 26 Jun 2007 when residents of a backward village in Theni district in south Tamil Nadu helped nab three youths, said to be members of the CPI (Maoist), with a pile of arms and ammunition. Seven others, most of them important activists, are believed to have succeed in escaping the scene. 8 The three nabbed by the villagers were found with a significant quantity of arms and ammunition leading police to believe they were in the process of recruiting sympathizers and ., building a Maoist base in the state. The incident has spurred the state government to launch a drive to flush out Naxals from the forest ranges. The responsibility for this operations is being entrusted to ADGPK Vijaya Kumar- the police officer who led Operations Cocoon in which the outlawed brigand - and much-wanted smuggler of the teak wood-was killed. A senior Q branch official not wanting to be seen alarmed at the incident, said confidently: "We are sure that there are only a handful of activitsts in Tamil Nadu." The police seem certain that the incident was only a N axal 'spurt' and not a revival, or even an attempt at it. Fairly worried and unwilling to take any chances, the state government ordered the police to mount a major Combing operations in the forest ranges of caimbatore, Teni, Periya Kulam, Salem, Dharmapuri, and Krishnagiri. It was only to be expected that the state government was cautious, consequent to the said incident. It could not have been unware of the 9 th congress meeting of the CPI (Maoist) held earlier in 2007 on the Jharkhand-Orissa border. One of the decisions there was to extend the presence of the Naxalism
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across the borders of Tamil N adu and Karnataka. The cadres - involved in the incident were probably tasked to make the fresh recruitment for the outfit, and then initiate the novices into basic arms training and guerrilla tactics. So, the Maoists have already started the recruitment drivefirst step to concretise the expansion plans decided upon by their leadership at the 9 th congress.
Tamil Nadu: Will it Relapse into Naxalism? July 2007 It is-rather, was - widely believed that Tamil Nadu had successfully quelled Naxalite moveme;nt by the end of 2002. There was a reason for the belief. After all, the last Naxal-related incident in the state had taken place way back in Nov 2002. What was that incident all about?
Following a tip-off from villagers, the 'Q' branch swooped down on a group of some 35 youths, including six women, ' claiming to be members of the Radical Youth League, being trained in guerrilla warfare in the dense mangroves of J alajothipatty, some 30 km from Dharmapuri. Operation Uthangarai (a village close to Jalajothipatty lasted a ~eek, resulting in the police nabbing 28 of the youths. One pei-son, Parthipan alias Shiva, was killed in the operation. If the last N axalite incident was the result of a tip-off from villagers, a village couple's chance 'discovery' on 26 June 2007 is suggestive of Naxalite attempts to revive the 'almost' defunct Naxalism in Tamil Nadu. Here follows some details about the chance discovery. On the morning of that fateful 26 June, Subramani and his wife Pushpa went on their usual trek up Murugamalai, a bald hillock just outside their village in Kakkanji Nagar, close'to Theni, to collect firewood-a daily chore. They saw a bundle covered with plastic and dhoti on the slope, and raised an alarm fearing it to be a dead body. By evening, a group of men armed with sickles and wood~n clubs arrived at the hill, they found three persons guarding the bundle, claiming to be students on a hike. The said the bundle contained ration for their trek. But when the suspicious villagers uncovered it, they discovered to their shock a neat pile of gu~s, grenades and cartridges. 9
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The villagers tied up the three, one of whom hailed from nearby E. Pudukkottai village, and informed the Theni police. The men confessed they were members of the CPI (Maoist) and pleaded with the villagers to either kill them or let them escape. Villagers also learnt that seven others, including V. Sundaramurthy, who was later nabbed, and Kalidas, key Maoist leaders, attempting to revive Maoism in Tamil Nadu, had escaped. This incident sent panic waves across the state administration, which until this incident had believed that any significant Naxalite movement in Tamil Nadu had been quelled. A deeply concerned Government pulled out ADGPK. Vijaya. kumar, the former STF chief popular for heading the operation that killed Veerappan, from an inconsequential post, and handed him the brief to flush out the Maoists hiding inside the state's forests. Six special police teams were formed to comb the forest ranges in Chennai, Madurai, Salem, Coimbatore, Dharmapuri and Krishnagiri where Maoists were believed to be heading. Q. branch sources said: "Seven people are still absconding. We believe there is only a handful of these men, who now call themselves CPI (Mapists), fashioning themselves after the Naxalites of Andhra Pradesh." Theni SP R. Sudhakar pointed out: "If you take a look at the guns, you can see that many of them are rusted and not in operational condition. The arms were meant only for imparting training and not for operations." 'Q' branch sources dismissed reports that arms were being sources from Karnataka to Tamil Nadu by Andhra Pradesh Maoists. "The group involved in reviving the movement is so small. Moreover, they are far from even recruiting to start any major operation", said an officer.
Meanwhile, police intensified their hunt for Kalidas, said to be the key person behind the renewed attempt to recruit villagers and impart training. He has been on'the run since the Nov 2002 Uthangarai operation described above, and-has seven cases against him including a case under TADA and two attempt to murder cases. Police are also on the look out for Chandra,
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wife of Sundaramurthy, who was nabbed in a house in Tiruppur near Coimbatore on 13 July. A senior police officer, a part of the present anti-Naxal operations, explains: "The modus operandi of the Maoists is simple. Villagers gullible enough to join the group are made accomplices in incidents of dacoity and murder. They then go underground and have little option but to join the Maoists. We believe the handful of active Maoists were in the process of recruiting villagers and have not been very successful." But back in E Pudukkottai, it is a different story. S Bhaskaran, a senior DMK functionary in the village, whose wife Latha is a Panchayat President, pointed out that Velmurugan, a law student, and one of those nabbed by the villagers in Murugamalai and hailing from E Pudukkottai, had successfully formed a committee and roped in some 50 village youths as members. But before the could initiate them into the movement, Velmurugan was caught. There seems to be a certain sense of complacency about the success or otherwise ofNaxal attempt to revive their movement in Tamil Nadu. That could mean a serious error of judgment on part of all concerned, especially the state police. While dealing with the Naxalites, it is better to be prepared than to be surprised. They will always be looking for new avenues to spread their movement and its ideology. They have been surreptitiously spreading their movement in Madhya Pradesh, why should Tamil Nadu be an exception?
VTTAR PRADESH V.P. Claims Success Against Naxals: June 20Q6 The Uttar Pradesh Government on 22 June 2006 claimed that the two-pronged strategy to counter Naxalite activities had paid off as this year (till mid-June 2006) there had been no incidents in theBtate. State Home Secretary R.M. Srivastava told the press that the success of the Government's strategy was evident from intelligence reports that most of the Naxalite leaders in the three worst-affected districts of Chandauli, Sonebhadra, and Mirzapur had moved over to neighboring Bihar, MP, Jharkhand, and
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Chhattisgarh. Some of the ringleaders also migrated to Andhra Pradesh. According to the survey by the State Home Department and' police, 680 villages in eight districts of Mirzapur, Chandauli, Sonebhadra, Ghazipur,· Ballia, Mau, Deoria and· Kushinagar were identified as centers of Naxalite presence in the State, with the problem being more acute in 23 police stations of Chandauli, Sonebhadra and Mirzapur districts. The official explained the two-pronged strategy involved economic development of the identified areas under the 'Samagar Gram Vikas Yojana' and strict surveillance of the unlawful activities. He said the Union Government also wanted that the State Government focus more on development of the backward regions in a bid to find a permanent solution to the problem and root out the menace. The Chief Minister had constituted a high-powered panel headed by Agriculture Minister Ashok Bajpai. It met on 20 June 2006 and decided to formulate a long-term plan for integrated development of those 680 villages under the Samagar Gram Vikas Yojana. Disclosing that Rs. 114 crore was spent during the 2005-06 financial year under the scheme, the Home Secretary said Rs. 1~0 crore was planned to be spent during 2006-07 on education, health facilities, rural roads and power generation. Major Arms Haul in Varanasi: 20 April 2007 The police on 20 Apr 2007 seized 6,000 detonators and 400 highly-explosive gelatin rods from the Ramnagar area of Varanasi, suspected to have been transported there by Naxalities to disrupt the ongoing Assembly polls in Uttar Pradesh. Ramnagar police station incharge KD Tripathi told the journalists a police team on patrolling duty near the Vishwasundari bridge on the border of Varanasi-Chandauli districts found the explosive materials lying ab~ndoned in a jungle area late on 20/21 (Apr 2007) night. !J'he seizure in the area, prone to Naxalite activities, pointed to the possibility of the consignment having been brought from
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carrying out subversive acts to vitiate the electoral process in the region. Another reason could be the plans of the MCC to avenge the killing of its self-styled Zonal Commander Sanjay Kol in Chandauli district earlier in the week in a gunbattle. Luckily, the consignment did not reach the insurgents.
WEST BENGAL
It may seem ironic, but the Naxals have not spared the state long ruled by their fraternity-the 4-member Left Combine of CP CM), CPI, RSB and FB. They have made inroads into a of West Bengal's 19 districts. The worst-affect districts are Purulia, West Midnapur and Bankura, followed by N adia, Hoogly and 24 Parganas. Active in Jadavpur, Behala and Bagmari of Kolkata, the Naxalites have infiltrated the two universities of Kolkata and Jadavpur. The West Bengal government of Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee honestly admits it has failed to provide basic facilities to the people. CRPF-Maoist Clash: 15 Dee 2006 "After hailing the Bagduli Talab area encounter as a major boost to the::morale of men in uniform, the Bankura police failed to locate any rebel despite intensive combing operations in boarder are~s of west Midnapur, Bankura and Purulia". The reference is ·to the clash in Bagduli Talab area under Barikul police station in Bankura district, West Bengal on the 15 Dec 2006 night between the CRPF and Maoist. Two Maoists and a CRPF jawan were killed in the encounter. Two jawans from CRPF were injured who were admitted into -SSKM hospital, Kolkata. The slain Maoists remained unidentified. Bankura SP, Rajegh Singh, said combing operations are also on in the West Beonal-Jharkhand border areas along with Jh!lrkhand police. On the 17th , the police stated "it is highly probable that the.two women squad members who fought with
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CRPF 171 Battalion personnel are J agori Baski and 'Sulekha Mahato, the two much-sought after guerrillas from the outlawed outfit. The CRPF "hailing" a clash where it lost one of its own against two rebels killed is rather unnecessary, and misplaced hype, which is avoidable, to say the least . .
Naxals Made a Comeback in Bengal in 2006: 20 Dec 2006 Naxals made a come back in West Bengal in 2006 after a lull in 2005 their activities have spread at least to four districts: West Midenapur, Jalpaiguri, Purulia and Bankura. The subversive activities carried out during the year (2006) include explosion of lED at a camp of the CRPF in January, and another in a general compartment of Halidibari-New Delhi passenger train in November. Besides these, the Naxalities hp.d also burnt down eight vehicles and planted TifEn-box bombs in support 9f a bandh call by the CPl (M) on 13 Dec and tried to abduct a local leader of the CPl from Bagduli Talab in Bankura district on 15 December. The Moist movement in State stated in 1988 and continued till 1994, following a complete lull in 1995. However, sporadic incidents started in 1996 and continued ti112000. The year 2001 did not witness any untoward incident, but Maoil>ts activities renewed in 2002 and continued till 2004, followed by a peaceful 2005, said the Union Home Ministry sources. ID This 2006 come-back may pose a threat in the coming years, with the net-working of the militants with the lSl-backed terrorist outfits, operating from Bangladesh and Nepal. At the lB-organized conference in Nov 200~ in Delhi, DGP West Bengal had expressed concern regarding, iHegal migration from Bangladesh. He also expressed reluctancelinability of the state police to take illegal.'Banglll(ieshis, into-:custody due to shortage of space, in ~ils tb'a't' rem'ai~ .crowded with such migrants. One MHA official sou:Q~~d a warn~: "
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Terrorism in India "Indo-Bangladesh border currently poses the great difficulty due to the high level of infiltration and illegal immigration. India's economic progress vis-a.-vis other nations in the Sub-Continent made it an attractive destination' for migrants, which was affecting the territorial and physical integrity of the nation." .
.
Are the Maoists behind' Nandigrani? Jan 2007 The meticulously planned resistance "being put up by N andigram farmers and the violence that has ensued have surprised the people and analysts alike. Consequently, the question everyone is asking us: who is actually leading the movement? Ostensibly, the Bhumi Uchhed Protirodh Committee, a platform of seve!al organizations, is running the show as champion of the farmer's caues. It has the active support of Trinamool Congress and Congress. But a dailyll claims investigations have revealed that Maoists are playing a key role by training the people' on how to fight the police and armed CPI (M) cadres. Cutting off approach roads and destroYing bridges are well-known guerrilla tactics Maoists have often employed to great effect. The Maoists first entered Nandigram in Oct 2006, a time when Singur was coming to a boil. They sent a 7-members team to find out the people's opinion on state government's proposed . land acqui.ition for Salim group's SEZ project. "We hoped that at best a few people would agree to speak with us. To our surprise, whereever we wevt, hundreds gathered to say they were not willing to give up their land. It was an eye-opener", said Chhoton Das of the Gana U nnayan J ana Adhikar Samity (GUJAS), an umbrella group of 22 parties, including Maoists and Jamayat Ulema-e-Hind which began the struggle in N andigram. GUJAS decided to conduct a more detailed survey and ,sent another team to Nandigram between 22 and 25 Nov 2006. Last is yet to be heard of N an~igram and issues thrown up by it. At one time Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee did
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feel uncomfortable, but later was able to get over the difficult situation. At the end, suffice it to say that there is Maoist stamp on N andigram siege.
Role Reversed: "West Bengal CPM are Oppressors": Naxals: Jun 2007 It is succinct case of ironic role reversal: The CPM which ascended to power 30 years ago mouthing Marxist slogans of the then ruling Congress being oppressors of poor farmers is at the receiving end of exactly same charges by CPI (Maoist) - the present salf-proclaimed champions of the farmers, landless/ unorganized worker labourers, tribals et al.
The obvious question then is: Are the CPI (Maoists) biggest threat to West Bengal's ruling CPI (M)? Are the Naxals chief Minister Buddhadeb BhattachaIjee's enemy No. 1? Considering the goings-on at and around Nandigram today in West Bengal and beyond it in the Red Corridor post Jan 2007 Ninth (Unity) Congress of the CPI (Maoist) that indeed seems to be the case. The issue deserver a critical analysis. The Maoists/ N axals seem to be all over in anti - CPI (M) agitation in West Bangal. They played a leading role in protests against violence erupted on 3 January (2007) at Nandigram in protest against and-fencing at SUngur. They were present wher land acquisition for a Special Economic Zon~ (SEZ). They are at the forefront of organizing the abandoned Labour in West Bengal's closed tea gardens, and even more portentously, they - not the mainstream union - are mobilising workers in Hindustan Motor's Uttarpara factory. Naxalites have emerged as Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee's strongest threat, working among the dispossessed, the landless labour and marginal farmers to spread their message: BhattachaIjee and the CPI (M) are the enemies of the poor. It bears repetition: This is the very charge the CPI (M) constantly laid at the door of the Congress till they supplanted it in 1977! Will the history repeat itself? A book in the recent past is useful to understand the present stand-off. Even before the police firing on 14 March (2007) at
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Nandigram leading to the death of 14 villagers, the state police had warned the authorities that Naxalites had set up bases in the area with arms and ammunition. In fact, during the raids following the first outbreak of violence in January, the police had arrested three 'Naxalites, all students of Jadavpur University, equipped with a laptop from a remote village in Nandigram. 12 Earlier, in Dec 2006, the CPI-ML(Liberation) sent two state committee members with 22 students from Jadavpur University and other institutions to resist the fencing of the land meant for the Tata small car project in Singur. Police arrested all of them. Here is one more ironic event. At Hind Motor, the CITU, the CPI (M)'s labour wing, found its union at the back-foot when a breakaway faction led by the Naxals forced the management to declare a suspension of work. The CITU, known as/the source/ root of all strikes, found itself criticizing the breakaway faction's tactics and, horror of it all, supporting the management! Can one imagine a bigger irony? Surrealist indeed, all this! Even more interesting things have been happening in the land of Marx in India: West Bengal. The solidarity of the Left Front seems to have been- breached. The Naxals were able to subvert the loyalty of some partners of the CPI (M) in the Left Front at all these trouble spots at different times, of course. So, at Nandigram, the Naxals were able to initially muster the support of the local leaders of the CPI for their cause. At the North Bengal's tea gardens, the Naxals got the support of the local leaders of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). At Hind Motor, Naxalleader Amitava Bhattacharya got the support of CPI leader and Member of Parliament Gurudas Dasgupta. Chief Minister Bhattacharjee and the ruling CPI (M) would be making a serious mistake if they think that Nandigram and Singur are its success stories for their plans for industrialisation of West Bengal. Dipankar Bhattacharya' All-India General Secretary of the CPI-ML (Liberation) warns the CPI (M): "If they think their actions represent the Red flag, they are making a mistake and we will give a befitting reply". Bhattacharya says his party has already developed extensive conta~ts ,with the people at the lowest level, and it is trying to explaIn to them
Naxal Terror in Orissa and Some Other States
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that the Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee government's actions are anti-poor, especially against small and marginal farmers, and the landless labour. There is obvious truth in these assertions because the CPI (M) district level leaders themselves have confirmed so. CPI (M) sources say their district reports have indeed confirmed that the Naxalities are spreading a campaign against the government among the people and also among the CPI (M)'s lower levels. At Dhaniakhali in Hooghly district, the Naxalites have been using a former rYI (M) leader, Mahadeb Murmu, to campaign against the CPI (M). Sometime back, the tension reached a flashpoint and the local CPI (M) cadres attacked Murmur's people, leaving si{( per~ms seriously injured. Kartick Pal, state secretary, CPI-f\fL (Liberation), claims that a larger number of CPI (M) cadre~ are contacting them to voice their protest against Bud?hadeb Bhattacharjee's policies. The assertions/claims, like the one just made above, of the CPI-ML (Liberation) or ePI (Maoist) leaders may have certain element of exaggeration, but their essential truth cannot be denied or faulted. If these two parties are attacking the ruling CPI(M) on the ideological front, the Trinamool Congress party and the Congress are doing so even more passionately at the political front. No one can be envious of CPI (M) in its given predicament. What is even worse for Chief Minister Bhattacharjee is the innuendo among some senior leaders of his own party: Is he and will he prove the Gorbachev of India-with all its sinister, unmentioned implications! One more thought could be even more dangerous for the CPI (M): Islam and Communism are two fundamentalist ideologies, and in the former, empirical evidence shows the hard liners always supplant the moderates! Notes 1. K. Srinivas Reddy, Hindu, 14 Feb., 2007. 2. Milind Ghatwai, Indian Express, 13 Jane, 2007. 3. Sudhir K. Singh, Asian Age, 16 Jane, 2007. 4. Vivek Despande, Indian Express, 17 Jane, 2007. 5. Bibhuti Pati, Tehelka, 24 June, 2006.
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6. Siba Mahanty, Indian Express, 26 Oct., 2006. 7. Tarini Prasad Panda, Pioneer, 11 June, 2006. 8. Anubhuti Vishnoi, Indian Express, 6 June, 2007.
9. Pioneer, 11 June, 2007. 10. Jaya Menon, Indian Express, 22 July, 2007.
11. Ibid., 18 July, 2007. 12. Rakesh K Singh, Asian Age, 21 Dec., 2006. 13. Aloke Banerjee, Hindustan Times, 11 Jan, 2007. 14. Bidyut Roy, Indian Express, 12 June, 2007.
Glossary Aung
An autocratic chief among the Konyaks, as also in the hierarchy of the N aga Federal Government.
Bakerwals
Cowherds owning and tending grazing cattle-more commonly the goats.
Chapori
Sand bank; small island in the rivers.
Char
River island; a highland formed in the river by deposits of silt.
Damdami Taksal
The Sikh seminary once headed by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
Dhok
Summer huts built by cowherds on the hill tops.
Fatwa
A religious decree by Muslim clerics.
Hadith
A nine-volume compilation of the words and deeds of Prophet Mohammad, authored by Imam Mohd al-Bukhari.
Hafiz
Individual who knows the Quran by memory.
HatlHaat
A market, where shops are usually in sheds or temporary shelters. In the NorthEast the haats spring along the roadsl main approach of the villages and towns on a fixed day on weekly basis where the .villagers from the neighbourhood flock with their wares and do frisk business either on the barter basis or in cash.
Jhum
Land cultivated by 'Jhumming', in which a given area is cleared of jungle, which is then burnt and the resultant ashes are then dug into the soil. The land is then
Terrorism in India
1102
sown for a cycle of 3 to 4 years, depending upon the fertility of the soil, after which the land is allowed to remain fallow for 4 to 7 years. Thus each area comes under the cultivation in a cyclic rotation. popularly known as slash-and-burn type of cultivation and being wasteful, it has been discouraged as a policy by the concerned state governments and replaced by permanent or wet riceterrace-cultivation where ever feasible. Considerable areas still remain under jhum. Jihad
Holy war.
Lingdow or Lyngdoh A Garo piest; head of an administrative unit. In the later period, Lyngdohs came to be identified with the ruling classes. Madaris
Plural term for Madrassa.
Madrassa
Islamic seminary.
Mujahid
Holy warrior.
. M,ujahideen
Plural term for Mujahid.
, Nazrana
A tribute, an offering, or gifts paid by the native rulers to the visiting British dignitaries like the viceroys, governors etc. It could be in cash or kind. The term comes from the Mughal period when the local chieftains paid nazrana to the king or the subedar of the province.
Paiks
Foot soldiers armed with swords an shields who were provided with land in return for military service in the Ahom rule in Assam. During the peace time, the were mandated to render service to the state for a given period (3 months initially, 4 in the later days) in a year for construction of the roads, tanks, other public works etc.
Glossary
1103 Each member of the roalty and rich classes like the land lords was allotted a given number of paiks to cultivate their lands and render other services. When the British after taking over Assam in 1826, abolished the paik system, the roalty and the landed gentry were set on the road to ruin.
Qari
Individual skilled in the rules that govern the recitation of Quran.
Siropa
Robe of honour presented to prominent personalities at a Sikh temple (Gurudwara).
Syiem or Siem
Syiem is the vernacular for chief (king) of a Khasi state in Khasi Hills, presently in Meghalaya.
"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
Index A AAPSU (All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union), 674 AASU (All Asom Students Union), 668, 669, 674, 675, 676,677 Abdel Raouf Hawas, 57 Abdul Nasser Mahadani, PDP Leader, 503, 595 Abu Ammar, Operative Chief of LeT,774 Abu Faris, LeT Commander, 777
Border, 770 War, 37 Afghanistan, 15, 337, 338, 347, 731, 732, 741, 770, 783-786 Jihad Veterans, 443 Narco Trade in-, 714 Terrorism in-, 37 Aftab Ansari Alias Farhan Malik,59 Dawood Linked, 635 Afzal Guru, 306, 339, 566, 894 Afzal's Hanging, 729
Abu Huzaifa (Huzefa), 537, 733
AGP (Assam Gana Parishad), 664,676,677
Abul Kalam, APJ, Pres. India, 514, 518, 521, 524, 533
AHAB,672
Abu-ul-Kama, 774
Aircraft Bombing Plan, 405
ACHR (Asian Centre for Human Rights), 399, 400
AISSF (All India Sikh Students Federation), 299
Act Now for Harmony and Democracy, 400
Ajai Sahni, 318
Adivasis, 827 Administrative Reforms Commission, 326 ADS (Air Defence Ship), 375 Advani, LK, Former HM, BJP, 46, 60, 502, 504, 514, 525, 527, 733, 788 Conspiracy to Kill, 503 Afghan
Ahle-e-Hadees, 640
AJSU, 1057 Akal Federation, 427 Thakth,427 Akali Party, 336, 337 Akif Biyabani Zaby, 871 Akshardham Temple Attack, 610, 726 Al Akhtar Trust, Terrorist Support Organization, 406
1106 Al Badr, 443, 444, 445, 604, 606, 608, 699 Militan ts, 421 Al Quada , 41, 46, 58, 339, 380, 397,39 8,404, 429,43 0,449, 485,55 5,614, 682,68 3,710, 713, 716, 725, 735, 750; 760, 769, 770, 785, 787, 872 Leader s, 41 Netwo rk, 783 Plans, 741 Terror ist Netwo rk, 785 Al Rashid Trust, 406 Al Umma , 502, 504 Aligarh Muslim Univer sity, 440, 454 Alipore Jail, 514 All India Congre ss Comm ittee, 968 M aj 1 i s - e - I t t e had u 1Muslim een, (AIMI M), 329 Muslim Person al Law Board (AIMP LB), 459 All Jharkh and Studen ts Union, 955 All Tripur a Tigers Froce (ATTF), 49 Amban is and Singha nias, 485 Americ an Centre , 59 Amrin der Singh, forme r CM Punjab , 336, 337 Andhr a Maoist s, 987 Model ,846 Prades h, 52, 54 Ceasef ire, 931
Terrorism in India Naxal Terror ism in-, 1011-166 Terror Force, 11031 Andh ra-Or issa Border , 988, 1013 Anti Naxal Cells, 1001, 1002 Drive, 816 Force (ANF), 1068 Operat ion, 854, 976, 1053 Plan, 848 Policy, 967, 873, 1021 Trainin g Course s, 1080 War, 847 Anti-In dia Jihad, 34 Anti-M aoist Policy, 845 Anti-M uslim- Gujara t Riots, 541 Anti-N axalite Campa igns, 311 Strateg y, 864 Anti-T error Laws, 326 Measu res, 319 Anti-T erroris m, 780 Learni ng from India, 781 Anti-T erroris t Policy, 304, 352 Squad, (ATS), 394, 435, 544, 547, 548, 554, 557-55 9, 568, 569, 575, 583-58 6, 601,60 5,606, 1031 Antony , AK, Defenc e Minist er, 374, 378, 587, 592, 594, 595 Arbind a Raj Khowa , 461 Arif Sheikh Khalil, 288
1107
Index Arjun Munda, CM Jharkhand, 434 Arjun Singh, 534
Azam Cheema, LeT India Commander, 571, 579, 580
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 321, 912
Babri Masjid, 541, 542, 694, 731 Backward Regions Grand Fund (BRGF),908
Arms Act, 509 Bazar on India's Eastern Border, 349 Arms Haul
B
BaiIalilla Mines, 935 Baitha, Kameshwar, Maoist Leader, 898 Bajrang Dal, 532, 598, 641, 643
in Kochi, 398
Communalist, 31
in N asik, 392
Bakht Zamin Khan, 444 Balwant Singh, 425
in Varansi, 1093 Army Dogs, 878 Arthur, Sir Michael, UK High Commissioner to India, 778 Arunachal Pradesh, 51, 372 Asaf Khan, 583 Ashgar Mukadam, 494 Ashok Chakra, 525 Asian Kashmere, 446 Assam, 372, 600, 664 Accord,677 Bengal Border, 369 Hill Districts, 431 Assam-Naxalite Belt, 327 Assam-Tripura, 349 Ateeq Khan, POK PM, 711 Aurangabad Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Cell, 447 Avantipura (J&K), 395 Ayodhya, 541, 610 Ayodhya Mastermind, 428 Ayub Memon, 694, Azad, Ghulam Nabi, 525, 529531
Bangladesh, 15,48,49,349,418, 541,559,572,600,657,673, 777 And China, 361 And Myanmar International Border, 349 And Myanmar, 408 And Nepal, 700 Army and NLFT, 50 Border, 315 Migrants, 32 Nationalist Party (NBP), 48, 50 Bangladesh's, 337, 338 Immigrants, 31 Military, 632 Infiltrators, 674, 675, 677 Migrants, 676 Bara Kabarastan, 583 BARC Connection, 906 Baruah, Paresh, ULFA Leader, 461 Bashir Ahmad Bhat, HUJI Terrorist, 450
Terrorism in India
1108 Bastar Forest of Chhatisgarh, 824 Tigers, 961 Basu, Jyoti, CM West Bengal, 32
Black Friday, 499 Tigers, 377, 772
Bay of Bengal, 382 Beant Singh, Punjab,425
Bitta, MS, All India A,ntiTerrorist Front, 427, 511, 514, 525
Former
CM
Blackwell, Robert, 784, 785, 787 Blasts at-, 560
Belaruse, 680
Bandra, 560
Below Poverty Line, 303
Borivili, 560
Belt Bomb, 401
Jogeshwari, 560
Bengali Terrorism, 794
Matunga, 560
Bhabha Atomic Centre, 379
Mera Road, 560
Research
Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), 291, 311, 324, 339, 348, 362, 404,525,643,664,677,716, 717,752,967,969,973,974, 999, 1000 led National Democratic Alliance, (NDS), 31., 346
Blasts in Assam, 9 BNLF (Boru National Liberation Front), 50 Bodo People's Progress Front (BPPF-H), 676, 677 Bodoland
State Governments, 932
Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), Council, 677
Bharatiya Janta Yuva Mortha (BJYM),675
Territorial Council (BTC), 676
Bhattacharya, Budhadev, CM WB, 32,1098 Bhilai-Barsur-Transmission Structure, 935
Bomb Blasts in Delhi, 537 Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS), 574
Bhopal and Rourkela, 1025
Bombay Blasts Criminals, 32
Bhumihars, 815
Bombing,
Bhutt, Maqbool, 516
Bali,322
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 600, 753
London, 322, 779
Bihar,52
Madrid,322
Bilal Ansari. 290, 447, 632, 667, 711
Booker Prize, 952
Pakistan Trained Terrorist, 290.
Border District of Rajouri and Poonch,408
1109
Index Fencing, 668
Chauhan, Jagjit Singh, 298
Jungle-jag Jagran Samiti, 1063
Chauhan, Shiv Raj, CM MP, 1069
Road Organization, (BRO), 869, 960
Cheema, Azam, 555, 558
Security Forces (BSF), 698, 1044,1061 Bordoloi, Gopinath, 410
Chenna Reddy, M, former CM, 863 Chhatisgarh Model, 846
Boru Tribals, 50 BPL Tribals, 1014
Naxalite Movement in-, 949-1009
Brahmanical Ideology, 896
Worst Affected State, 949
Brar, BS, Police Chief, 421
Chicken Neck, 15
Buddhists, 485
• China, 34, 362, 857,864
Bush, George, Former US Pres, 30,32,345,685,785 Administration, 761 C
China's People's Liberation Army, 360 Surge, 360
Caste System, 895
Chittagong Hill Tracts, 349
CBI, 314-316, 329, 499, 584, 585, 587,588,590,595,632,634, 933
CIA,731 Clinton, Bill, former US PRES, 713
Court, 933 Inquiry, 596, 597
CMC (Central Militant Commission), 861, 862, 903
Investigations, 593 Ceasefire, 424 Central Industrial Security Force, CISF, 683, 855, 887, 937, 1065 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), 55, 419, 525, 852, 853,887,888,910,962,963, 965,975,977,979,985,997, 1024, 1081, 1094, 1095
CMP (Common Minimum Program), 389, 390 Coast Guards, 402, 772, 774 Coastal Police Stations, 776 Dhanushkoti, 776 Keelakarai, 776 Rameshwar, 776 Thondi,776
Battalions, 350
Coastal Terrorism, 373
Chalia, Anup, 461 Chargaon and Raoghat Chhatisgarh, 892
CITU, 1098
in
Coimbatore Blasts, 518
Terrorism in India
1110 Blasts Case, 509 Serial Blasts, 502, 504 Combating Naxalism, 847 Commando Operations, 854 Committee against Violence Women (CAVOW), 951-954, 964, 965 Committee of Maoist-in South Asia, (CCOMPOSA), 53 Communal Riots, 297 Communist Party .of India (M), 56
Coun ter-Terroris mIni tia ti ves, 748 CPI (M), 588, 589, 594, 596, 829, 830, 831, 835, 891, 968 CPI (Maoist), 789, 811, 814, 817, 825,826,857,858,861,862, 874,893,894,896,901,903, 906 911, 913, 934, 993, 1013, 1015, 1019, 1020, 1022, 1023, 1027, 1045, 1046, 1047-1049, 1058, 1066, 1068, 1074, 1075, 1083, 1089, 1091, 1097
Comprehensive Convention o,n International Terrorism, 771
CPI (ML), 827, 828, 829, 836, 891,911
Conference On Security Policy in Munich, 403
Criminal
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), 35, 337-339, 690, 716, 743, 686, 794, 851,
CPM and BJP, 587 Conspiracy, 493 Law Amendment Act, 1075 Cross Border
Container'Initiative Security, (CIS),789
Infiltration, 42, 44
Counter
Terrorism, 41, 43, 307, 552, 701, 734, 761, 786
Interference, 35
Guerrilla Tactics, 854 Insurgency, 790 Insurgency Jungle Warfare School, (CIJWS), 680, 782, 862, 912, 862
CRZ (Compact Revolutionary Zone), 861 D
Dal
Insurgency Operations, 854
Khalsa,427
Naxalism Measures, 862
Lake, 303
Naxalite Campaigns, 1077
Dalal Street, 343
Naxalite Strategies, 880, 886
Dalit Movement, 846
Terrorism Measures, 30
Daman Pratirodh (DPM), 1075
Manch
Terrorism Policy, 85, 350, 362, 336-395, 663
Dandakaranya Forest, 899
Counter-Insurgency School, 854
Darsgah Jihad-e-Shahadat, 638
Dar, Ghulam Ahmad, 537
1111
Index Dar-ul-Banat Madarsas, 449
Kondarma, 55
Dar-ul-Uloom
Nasik,597
Islamia Arabiya, 445, 448, 450 Seminary, 635 Dar-ul-Uloom-Inwar-e-Raza, 450 Dawood Ibrahim (DI), 484, 690, 686, 695-697, 707, 709, 71~ 718,753 Bio-Sketch, 690-682 India-Pak Crimes, 690 Mastermind Bombay Serial Bombing, 690 Pakistan Address, 709
Pulwama, 603 Sibsagar, 289 Tirap and Changlang, 51 Divali Blast, 774 Dravidian Parties in Tamil Nadu,35 Drug Trafficking, 61 . 'Du tt, Sanjay, Bollywood Actor, 325, 509 E East Godavari, 935
Deendar-e-Anjuman, 38
East Pakistan, 669
Delhi
Economic Infrastructure, 935
Blasts, 14
Economy, 299
High Court, 482
Elections, 999
Delhi-Maharashtra, 438
Eshimala Naval Academy, 375
Deli's Jama Masjid, 453
Esssa Memon, 497
Deshmukh, Vilasrao, CM Maharashtra, 544, 555, 565, 567, 575, 780
European Union, 663, 680, 681
DGFI (Director General Forces Intelligence), Bangladesh, 15, 369, 370, 372, 373, 657, 671, 673, 700
Explosives Substances Act, 492, 509
European Union-Anti-Terror Czar, 680
Extradition Treaty, 679, 686
'F
Digvijay Singh, 531 Dilawar Singh, Human Bomb, 424, 426
Facts about India, 29
District
Fake
Fahad, ·422
Baska, 412
Currency, 413-415, 417, 418
Doda of J &K, 774
Passport Case, 607
Gumla, 55
Farooq Abmad Battoo, 537
Jaisalmer, 59
Farooq, Abdullah, 515, 516, 526
Karbi Anglong, 461,
Farooq, Mirwaiz Umar, 429
Terrorism in India
1112 FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area- Of Pakistan), 428, 752 Fayyas Kagdi, 565 Feroz Abdul Rashid Khan, 290 F JCI (Federation of Jharkhand Chamber of Commerce of India),434
Anti-Terrorist Expert, 931 Interview, 919-921 Scapegoat, 918 Services, 1000 GLO (Gorkha Liberation Organization), 58 Global
Food Security, 846
Terrorism, 786, 787
Foreign
War against Terrorism, 37
Jihadi in Iraq, 792
War on Terror, 788
Terrorist Organization, 406
Globalization, 896
Tourists, 421
Goa Terror Alert, 399
Foreigners (Tribunal for Assam) Order, 664
Gogoi, Tarun, CM Assam, 392, 408
Forensic Controversy, 563
Golden Temple, 297
Forward Observation Post, (FOP),776
Goswami, Indira, 372
Funding Pattern of Outfits, 884 G
Government-NSCN Ceasefire, 423
(IK)
Greater Nagaland, 425
Ganapati, (MLRao), 894, 896
Gujarat, 1043
Foundation's Gandhi International Peace Award, 459
Gujarat Killings, 540
Gandhi, Mahatma, 989
Gujral, IK, former PM India, 516
Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, former PM India, 292, 297, 482, 753 Gandhi, Raj iv, former PM India, 298, 364, 773
Gujarat Madrasas, 449, 452 GUJAS, 1096
Gulf Countries, 725 Gurmeet Kamal, Brig., 754 Gutti Koya Tribe, 837
Gandhi, Sonia, 340, 397, 424 Ganja Farms, 1029 Geelani, Syed Ali Shah, (SASG), 429,510,519,526,531,532 Ghazi Baba, 522 Ghulam Ahmad Khan, 537 Gill, KPS, 674, 738, 812, 853, 867,870,918,919,931,981
H
Hafiz Mohd Saeed, JUD Chief, 614 Hafiz Saeed, LeT Chief, 398 Hamas, 350 Hamas in Israel, 364 Hamid Karzai Govtnment, 741
1113
Index I
Hamidya Masjid, 583 Hanslot, 446 Harihardhar Temple, 1048 Harkat-ul-Ansar, 657
IDP (Internally Displaced Persons), 399, 400 In India, 401
Ultras, 285
Illegal
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami- Based Bangladesh (HUJI), 14,286, 287,439,454,585,586,539, 632, 635, 648, 636, 654-660, 667,700,701,872
Bangladeshi Migrants, 667, 670
Bangladesh Based, 636 Militants, 632
I
Operative, 636
Terror, 450 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, (HUM), 46,428,640 Havana Accord, 759 Hawala Funding, 444 Payments, 573 Routes, 444 Transfers, 560 Hazratbal Mosque, 419
Hindi Speaking Biharis, 430 ~ Hindu Terrorist, 453 Hitler, Adolf, 449
Immigrants (Bangladeshis), 664 Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act (lMDTA), 664,665 Migrants from Bangladesh, 392 Migration, 601 Immigrants Problem, 392 Important Terrorist Attacks, (ITA), 334, 335 Akshardham, 334 Bomb Blasts Coimbatore, 334 Indian Parliament, 334 Seriall Bomb Mumbai,334
Blasts
Shramjeevi Express, 334 Zaveri Bazar, 334
Hizbul Mujahideen, 48, 430, 441, 699, 744 HNLC (Hynniewtrip National Liberation Council), 51, 415, 416,417 Holy Places Attacked, 644
Improved Explosive Devices (lEDs), 350, 351, 419, 560, 598,628,651,807,871,885, 977, 979, 1019
HU Jintao, 361
Imtiaz Ghavte, 492
Human Rights, 324, 369, 370, 510 Hyderabad-Calcutta, 701
India and
Hyderabd Blasts, 649
And Mines, 837 Blast, 979
Bangladesh, 350, 664 Brazil,680 Pakistan Border, 59
Terrorism in India
1114 Pakistan Relations, 752
Saudi Arabia, 399
Pakistan, 35, 306, 685, 688, 689,715,783,791,870
Yemen, 399 Mujahideen,15
Pakistan, 552
Muslim Organizations, 704
S~C
Leaders, 771
Sri Lanka, 772
Muslims, 455, 725 Navy and Coastal Guards, 374
US, 35 778, 790 India Bangladesh Border, 563 India's
Police and Judicial System, 522
Border with Myanmar, 350
Security Agencies, 378
Borders with PakistanMyanmar,43
Society, 1040 Terrorist Outfits, 408
Civil Society, 452
Troops in Iraq, 788
Criminal 509
Just~ce
System,
Disintegration: 600 North East, 361, 362, 601, 738 Population, 865
Union Muslim (lUML),31
League
India-Pak Joint Anti-Terrorist Measures, 742, 746, 759 India-US
'Security, 806
Counter Terrorism Exercises, 793
Indian
Talks, 381
Air Force, 978 Army, 404, 654, 742, 869, 956,1039 Coastline Security, 354 Economy, 402 Embassy in London, 298 Human Rights NGO, 522 Institute of Science (lSS), 538 Institute of Science, 726 Institute of Technology, 538 Judiciary, 532 Missions in-, 399 Algeria, 39!1·
Indo-Bangla Border, 400, 456, 706 Indo-Bangladesh Border, 667, 668 Indo-Nepal Border, 58, 456 Indo-Pakistan Cricket Matches, 338 Joint War on Terrorism, 735 Peace Process, 719 Indo-Russian Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism, 771 In-do-UK Pact to Protect Infrastructure, 779
1115
Index Indo-US Cooperation-Operations, 790 Diplomatic Mission, 429 Military Engagements, 782 Military Ties, 791 Relationship, 787, 788 Infiltration (tors), 354, 338, 769 From Bangladesh, 671 Influx from Bangladesh, 666
287, 837, 360-362, 369, 415, 453,550,551,553,554,559, 561, 565, 567, 571, 585, 603, 608,626,654,655,671,673, 688, 694, 696, 699, 700, 703, 708,713,730,717,721,725, 732, 733, 735, 737, 749, 763, 854, 870, 871, 872 Activities, 712 And Bangladesh, 710 Cells in UP, 705 In North East India, 710
Institute for Conflict Management, 318, 812
Infiltration, 306
Insurgency, 813
Terrorist, 31
Integrated Tribal Development Authority, 1014
Islamic Extremist, 540
Intelligence Failure, 543, 546
Militancy, 48
International
Militants, 9, 541
Atomic Energy Agency, 740
Military Group, 399
Cooperation in the Fight Against TerrorismOrg Crimes, 769
Research Foundation, 562
Trade Fair, 395 Interpol, 708 Iran and Pakistan, 360
Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, 9 Terrorism, 15, 344, 442 Terrorist Groups, 58 Terrorist Network, 45 Terrorist, 9, 455
Afghanistan, 9, 366, 367, 761
Islamic-Jamiat-e-Tulba, 443
Israel, 351
Islamist
Iraq, 326, 331, 481
Military Group, 710
Iraq War, 793
Terrorism, 37
Ireland and Pakistan, 336 Irish, 9 Irshad AIi and Mohd Qamar, AI Badr Operatives, 444, 445 ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence), 14, 15, 38, 41 56, 57. 59,
Israel, 682 Indonesia, Egypt, Russia, 365 Tourists, 685 ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization i, 970
Terrorism in India
1116 ISS (Islamic Sevak Sangh), 505, 506 IT Sector, 341
Jessica Lal Murder Case, 528 Jharkhand, 52 Armed Police, 55
IUML, 587, 588
J
Liberation Tigers, (JLT), 910,911
J agtar Singh, 425
Orissa Border, 817, 1089
Jains, 485
Jihad,38
Jaish-e-Mohammad, (JeM), 45, 46, 367, 379, 395, 428, 439, 485,539,606,628,631,632, 635,651,656,657,698,700, 714, 741, 744, 761
in Kashmir, 37
Terrorists, 522 Jalapu and Savara Tribes, 1011 Jama Masjid, 727 Jamaat-e-Ahle-Hadin, 872 Jamaat-ud-Dawa, (JUD), 562, 614 J a m a a t - u 1- M uj a hid e e n Bangladesh (JMB), 872 Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 12, 14,35,37,40,41,43,44,46, ;)6, 303, 305, 306, 317-321, 326, 333, 337, 348, 355, 395, 398, 408, 419, 421, 422, 428, 431,444,446,448,450,481, 529,531,604,607,617,667, 682,689,685,707,710,718, 731, 733, 782, 784, 785, 788, 813, 820, 977 Fatalities, 319
Jihadi Groups, 46, 445 Outfits, 15 Terrorism, 348, 725 Terrorists, 322, 323 Jihadist Islam, 481 Jihaids Attack, 419 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 485 JKIF (J&K Islamic Front), 693, 516, 685, 693, 722 JMM (Jharkhand Mukti Mortha), 434, 955, 998 Control Committee, 1064 Joint Mechanism, 762, 763 Joseph Commission, 587-588 Findings, 589 Julius K Dorphang, 415 Jungle Training, 1060 Jungle Warfare School Kankar, 912, 913, 1080
K
Insurgency, 46
Kafeel Ahmad, 779
Tourism, 421
Kaiga Plants, (Karnataka), 358, 542
Terrorists Incidents, 365 J an Adalats, 889 Jaswant Singh, former External Affairs Minister, 367, 783 Jehanabad Jail Break, 916
Kaluchak, Fidayeen Attack on-, 45 Kamal Ahmad Ansari, 571, 572, 575, 577
Inde:t
1117
Lashkar Operative, 562
Kasilnnri Pandits, 400, 726
Kamatapur Libera lIOn Organization (KLO). 58
Kasuri, Khurshid Mehmood, PK Minister, 610
Militants, 371
Kemal Ataturk Turkey, 744
Kandhar, 366, 688
Khalistan, 298, 307, 336, 337
Kanglei Yawel Kunna (KYKL),49
Lup
Homeland Insurgency, 867 Insurgency, 299
Kani Kazsal Missiles, 378
Terrorism, 336, 794
Kappad, 603, 604
Khan, AQ, 697, 712, 740, 741
Karaj Singh and Terrorist, 300
Amrjit,
Khaplang Faction, 424, 459 Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 416
Karbi Anglong, 431
Khonglam, FA, CM, 51
Kargil, 40, 41, 305
Kill Ratio, 42
Attack, 754
King Faisal Award, 449
Conflict, 711
King Zahir Shah, 784
Reviw Committee. 37
KL-NLF (Kabi Longri National Liberation Front), 430, 461
War, 34, 729 Karnataka New Tenants, 60G
Law
for
Koirala, GP, Nepalese PM, 915 Koran and Hadis, 459
Karunanidhi. K, CM Tamil Nadu, 514, 773, 9X3
Kumar, HD, CM Karnataka, lOG7
Karzai, 769, 770
Kumaraswamy, CM Karnataka, 1068
Kashmir, 10, 302, 344. 429, 430. 446,537,600, (-i04, 617. Gm), 706,715,717,719,744.749, 755, 756, 783, 806, 820, 1039 Centric Terrorism, 699 Formula, 722 Insurgency, 722 Issue, 40, 46, 398, 614
l(lITnbh Mela, 440
L Ladakh Borders, 34 Lal Masjid Pakistn, 312, 313 Lapang, DD, CM Meghalaya, 415 Lashkar, 731, 732 see Lashar-eTayyaba
J ama Masjid Democratic Muslim Associtiion, 872
Jihad in India, 734
Problem, 553, 894
Military Resources, 733
Related Terrorist Outfits, 786
Operatives, 446
Militant Outfit, 775
Terrorism in India
1118
M
Terrorist, 359 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Toiba), (LeT), 46, 60, 287, 290, 358, 367, 379, 383-385, 398, 404, 438,439,445,447,448,454, 485, 537, 538-540, 548, 550, 551,555,568,569,600,606, 613, 614, 632, 634-636, 638, 640,656,657,686,693,699, 700, 701, 703, 711, 717, 718, 725, 737, 741, 744, 749, 763, 776,778,789,870,872 And JeM, 713 Cadres, 774, 775 In India's North East, 776 In J&K, 870
Madani, Abdul Naser, 518 Madhu Koda, CM Jharkhand, 433,1055 Madrasas, 58, 445, 450,456 In Gujarat, 435 Training Ideologies, 448 Madrid Train Bombings, 988 Mahanta, PrafulIa, 676 Mahapatra, JB, DGP, 910, 1047, 1053 Mahato, SuniI, JMM MP, 846, 881, 896, 897, 950, 1054, 1056-1058, 1060, 1062 Killing of-, 313, 846
Militants, 498, 576, 778
Majid Memon, 499
Operatives, 553, 573, 575, 579
Major Naxal
Plan, 704 Training Camps, 571 SIMI Trail, 548 Law Enforcement Agencies, 530 Lenin, Stalin and Mao, 830 Line of Control, (LOC), 287, 408, 409,456,711,752,753,783, 955 Local Guerrilla Squads, (LGS), 56 Low Intensity Conflict, (LIC), 9 LTTE, 9, 364, 377, 527,599, 772, 773, 776, 883 In Sri Lanka, 710 Infiltration, 378 Insurgency in Sri Lanka, 35 Threat, 776
Activities, 823-824 Strikes, 995 Majumdar, Charu, 826-832, 857, 896 Malayasia, 418 Maldives, 781, 782 Malegaon Blasts, 9, 389,583,610,613, 693 Mosque, 453 Mallangirimdaigiri Jail Attacks, 916 Mallik, SK Brigadier, 15 Malnad Forests, 1068 Manipur,49 Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), 49 Manmohan Singh, Indian Prime Minister, 35, 41, 329, 339,
1119
Index 351,396,525,563,608,619, 663,697,699,715,719,726, 727, 735, 746, 748, 752, 756, 759,780,810,813,867,912, 980, 1035, 1084 Havana Diplomacy, 764 Musharraf Interactions, 757
Terrorism, 1047 Training School Locations, 1061, 1062 Violence, 980, 990 MaoistlNaxal Movement, 824 Maoists from India, Nepal and Bangladesh, 806
Maoism, 846
Marad, 586-592
Maoist Army, 903
Marad Massacre (Kerala), 586, 587
Behind Nandigram, 1096
Marine Jihadis, 354
Blockade, 934
Markaz-ud-Dawa, 600
Campaign against Government, 938
Marxist-Leninist Parties, 829
Communists Centre, (MCC), 53, 56, 857, 891, 893, 898, 901, 911, 931, 93~ 1068, 1019, 1046, 1049 Connections, 891 Crimes, 930 Group, "l73 Guerrillas, 1048 Hideouts, 1086 Hit States, 886
Masood Azhar, (Mohd), 38, 285, 366,528,530,531,533,741, 760 MCOCA (Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act), 554, 556, 558, 568, 576, 58:3 Mecca Masjid Blast, 314, 641, 643, 651, 652, 660 Bombing, 638 Hyderabad, 310, 315, :323, 335, 628-632, 634, 667, 727
Insurgencies in Nepal, 52 Insurgenc~
35, 344, 868
Killed-details, 1051 Mobile Warfare, 906 Movement, 869 Plans, 856
Meghalaya, 51, 415 Mehbooba Mufti, PDP Leader, 527 Mercy Petitions, Pro And Against, 515 MHA
Problem, 807
Anti-Naxal Cell, 847, 850
Rebels, 980
Report on Naxals Spread in South,888
Recruitment Forms, 1049 Select Incidents, 943
Militants, 399
Strategy and Plans, 889
Algerians, 399
Terror, 852
Yemenese, 399
Terrorism in India
1120 Mumbai
Militia Strengths, 859 MIM (MajEs-Ittehad Muslimeen), 628, 630, 633, 634, 642, 643, 655
Blasts, 439, 516, 547, 584, 714, 715, 748, 763
Mining and Dam Projects, 892
Film on-, 499
Case, 509, 528
Bauxite Mines in Orissa, 892
Financial Capital of India, 485
Kalinganagar, 892
Multiple Blasts, 988
POSCO,892
Rail Attacks, 728
Mizoram,50 Modi, Narendra, CM Gujarat, 541, 555
Serial Blasts, 1993, 486-494, 542 Accused Sentenced, 492 List of Guilty Men, 489492
MohdMzal (Guru), 510-514, 518, 519, 521-523, 525, 526-534
Terror Attacks, 715
Hanging, 526, 527 Mercy Plea, fil L
!)1~,
fi?4
Mohd Ali Hussain, Pakistan Nationalist, 422, 607 Mohd AIi Shaikh, SIMI, 583 Mohd Azam Cheema, 737, 731 Mohd Fahad, AI Badr Militant, 603-605,607 Mohd Hussain Fazli, 537 Mohd Naiyeem, 415, 418
Train Blasts, 584 Mumta Bancrjee's TMC, Mundas,827 Musharraf Pervez, Gen and Pres Pakistan, 37, 41, 44, 47, 307, 312, 314, 347, 398, 565,619,639,715,718,719, 737, 742, 744, 745, 747, 748, 749-751, 753, 756, 759-761, 770, 785-787 Army General, 744
Mohd Rafiq Shah, 537
Commitments, 751
Mohd Umar Dossa, 694
Jihad,37
Mohd Zia-ul-Haq, Gen., 730
Policies, 614, 750
Mongolia, 781
Postures, 746
Mosques in Ayodhya, 702
Regime, 718
Muktanchal, 1062, 1063 Mulayam Singh, Former CM UP, 438
:~:w
Muslim Communal Riots, 503
Mulla Latif, Militant, 687
Community, 346, 556, 591, 641, 726
Mulund Train Blast, 535
League, 592, 593
Index
1121
Population, 346 Rohingya Refugees Myanmar, 657
NAM Conference, 758 Summit, 699
Separatist in India, 784
Napalm like Bombs, 613
United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), 48 United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), 48
Narayanan, MK, National Security Advisor, 305, 306, 401,403,405,455,546,736. 742, 747,
Women, 459
Narbada, 952
Composition, 485
Narcotics Industry, 770
Muslims Composition. Agakhani, 485 Ahmedia, 485
Nasim Barmere, 493, 495 N asrallah, Hezbollah Leader, 898 National Commission
Bora, 485
for Minorities, 400
Khoja, 485
for Women, 951-954
Shia, 485
National
Sunni, 485 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), 686, 765, 772 Muzaffarabad Camp in POK, 774 Myanmar, 673 Myanmar and Bangladesh, 360 N
Naga Ceasefire, 51 Nagaland, 50, 425 Nagrik Raksha Dal (NRD), 955, 1057 Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS), 1059, 1060, 1063 Nahida Altaf, Terror Girl, 431433 Naidu, Chandra Babu, former CM, Andhra Pradesh, 863, 1011, 1014, 1019 Nallamala Forest, 988
Coordination Centre (NCC), 846 Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN), 809, 820, 849, 887, 908, 909. 993, 1079 Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC),788 Defence Alliance, (NDA), 387, 388, 528, 728, 808 Government, 342, 382 Democratic Front (NDF), 587, 588, 592, 593 Front of Bodoland (NDFB), 48, 51 Human Rights Commissions (NHRC), 400 Industrial Security Academy (NISA),855
1122
Terrorism in India
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT),49
Maharashtra, 42
Police Academy, 351
Plans, 916
Police Academy University, 877, 878 Rural He9.lth Mission, 846 Security Advisor, 37, 403, 404, 547, 737 Board,808 Security Guards, 977 Training Centre, Manesar, 854 Nationalist Socialists Council of Nagaland (NSCN), 49, 361, 459 (IM), 40, 50-52, 368, 416, 423-425, 459, 873, 877 (K),51 Naxalite
Orissa, 42 Violence, 313, 317, 319, 351, 811, 816, 860, 880, 885, 941, 1074 Naxalites in Jharkhand, 354 Women, 937 Naveen Patnaik Govt., 1074 Naxal Mfected States, 809, 823 Arms Dump, 1025 Arms Factory (Bhopal), 1071 Atrocities, 967 Counter Terror Measures, 837
Ammunition Dump, 1005
Leaders Surrender, 1030
Brutalities, 856
Leaders, 825
Cadre, Biographical Sketches, (NCBS), 939
Ganapathy-N Rao, 825
Keshava
K Ajitha, 939-941
Menace, 810
Nirmala Akka, 941
Money Sources, 884
Sabita Kumari, 942
Movement, 885, 936
V Bharati, 942
Movement in Chhatisgarh, 949-1009
Incidents/Events, 922 Left-Wing Extremism, 481 Movement, 42, 808, 861 Andhra Pradesh, 42
Outfits, 885 Violence (NV), 799, 800, 806, 807, 850, 852, 853
Bihar, 42
Chhatisgarh Worst Affected State, 850
Chhatisgarh, 42
Strategy to Control, 852
Jharkhand, 42 Karnataka, 1067, 1068 Madhya Pradesh, 42
Naxalbari, 826-828, 830, 835, 936,1011 Region, 829
112_3
Index Naxalilte Affected States, (NAS), 802-803,852,85~ 1011 Andhra Pradesh, 802 Bihar, 802
North Bihar-Keshulek, 861 North East, 15, 37, 320, 321, 333,354,355,410,481,664, 782, 806, 813, 820, 1038
Chhatisgarh, 802
Border Madrasas, 456
Jharkhand, 802
India, 702
Madhya Pradesh, 802
Militant Outfits, 710
Maharashtra, 802
States, 349, 350, 355, 408, 380, 456, 777
Orissa, 802 Uttar Pradesh, 802 West Bengal, 802 Naxalism, 32, 316, 352, 799, 806, 808,851,855,864,866,873, 889-945, 1012, 1013, 1089, 190
North Telengana Zonal Committee (NTZC), 1013 Northern Alliance, 784 NREGP (National Rural Employment Guarantee Program), 908
o
In India, 799 And R -D Cells, 905
OCTOPUS, Anti-Terrorist Outfit, 1032
As Internet Warrior, 908
Old Bailey Criminal Court, 298
Naxals
Naxal-Timber Mafia Link, 1072
Omar Abdullah, 719
Nehru, Jawahar Lal, former PM India, 295
Omar Rasheed Sheikh, 667
Nepal, 418, 572
Open Societies, 348
Border, 312 Bhutan and Bangladesh, 369 Islamic Yuva Sangh, 872 World Islamic Council, 872 Nepali and Bihar Maoists, 900 Nepal-India Border, 572
Omar Sheikh, 740, 741 Operation Alla-u-Akbar, 503 Blue Star, 297, 298, 299, 336 Flush Out, 370, 372 Oraons and Santhals, 827 Orissa
Nitish Kumar, CM Bihar, 1040
Gana Parishad, 1075
Administrationo, 1041
Outlaws Maoist, 1074
Nizam-e-Mustafa, 15 Non-Aligned Conference, 746 Noorani Masjid, 454
State Armed Police, 900 Osama bin Laden, 38, 57, 347, 444,449,693,709,718,723, 770
Terrorism in India
1124 p
Padmanabhiah, K, 423
Journalists, 625 Militants, 739
Pak, 769
Nationals, 398
Pakistan, 15, 31, 33-35, 37, 4045, 47, 299, 306, 307, 347, 351,362,395,403,413,430, 445,499,510,519,541,552, 553,572,608,614,615,625, 626, 686, 689, 696
Terrorists, 599
Afghanistan Bortfer, 722 And Bangladesh, 369 And India, 605, 608, 610 Anti-India Action, 712 Army, 34, 711 Chief Investigator, 707-764 Civil Society in-, 624
Palk Bay, 378 Strait, 375, 776 Panchayat Act, 908 Polls, 1081 Pandya, Hiran, BJP Leader, 632 Pan-Islamic Terrorism, 727 Para Military Forces, 854, 879, 888
Double Standards, 739
Paris Based Financial Action Task Force, (PATF), 681
Leaders, 42
Parsis, 405
Occupied Kashmir, (POK), 409, 428, 439, 698, 713, 732, 761, 785
Pasang Lama, Nepalese Gun Dealer, 870, 871
Policies on Kashmir, 697 Pragmatic Policy, 35 Role in Terrorism and Jihad Warriors, 720 Terror Network, 605 Pakistan's Cross Border Terrorism, 40 ISI, 373, 685, 687, 710, 744, 759, 761, 763, 785
Pati!, Shivraj, Union Home Minister, 308, 316, 331, 340, 354,373,679,814,850,881, 882, 925, 982, 993 Pawan's Lok Jan Shakti, 329 PDP (People's Democratic Party), 502, 505, 595, 718 Pearl, Daniel, 740 Pencil Detonators, 550 People's
Pakistani, 337, 338
Democratic Front of India (PDFI),889
Army, 305, 749
Liberation Army, 361
Diplomacy, 625
Republic of China, 360
Game Plan, 722
Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), 49
.Jihad in Kashmir, 725
Infiltrators, 749
Index
1125
R
Pir Panjal Range, 446 PLA (People's Liberation Army), 49, 862, 895 PLGA (People's Liberation Guerrilla Army), 858, 862, 895, 904, 915 Police Modernization, 841 POTA (Prevention of Terrorist Acts), 49, 53, 62, 318-320, 324-326, 339, 346, 355, 358, 387-391, 396, 405, 406, 439, 531,567,618,619,788,808, 894, 936, 1066 Policies, Ugly Face, 390 Powell, Colin, Gen, 782, 783
Rabri Devi, 1033 Radoo, Parvez Ahmed, (Raju), 395 Raghuvamshi, KP, Special IG Police, 544, 547, 574, 584, 601, 780 ATS Chief, 557, 558, 563, 570 Rahil Sheikh, 565 Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case, 513 Rajnath Singh, Pres. BJP, 511, 525, 527
Prachanda, Maoist Chief, 872
Rameshwar-Tuticorin-Cuddalore Stretch, 772
Problems of Naxalism, 815
Rani Bodla Massacre, 1028
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),791
Ranvir Sena, 815
Pro-Pak Hizbul Mujahideen, 722
Rashtriya Slim Vikas Yojana Funds, 805
Proxy War, 721
RAW, 381, 546, 553, 570, 670, 747, 749
Punjab,481
RCMP, 298
Accord, 336 State Human Rights Commission, 406, 407 Putin, Vladimir, Russian Pres, 769, 785, 786
RDX, 394, 395, 484, 492, 494, 498,500,537,543,548,549, 556,557, 559, 561, 568-574, 576,583,584,598,648,667, 684, 695, 739, 775, 776 Bombs, 359
Putin's Emissary, 770 PWG (People's War Group), 5356, 857, 874, 893, 898, 901, 911, 931, 936, 955, 1019, 1046,1049 Raiders, 1057
Q Qasim Rizwi, Islamic Guerrila Leader, 637 Quraish, Meccan Tribe, 443
Red Army, 811 Cadre, 908 Corridor, (Andhra Pradesh to Nepal), 812, 860-862, 963 Quadrangle, 312 Reddy, YSR. 310, 1014, 1015, 1019, 1021, 1032
1126
Terrorism in India
REGS (Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), 865
Samagar Gram Vikas Yojana, 1093
Relief Package for Surrendering Maoist, 1076
Samajwadi Party, 438
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policies, 809, 908 Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF),889
Express, 335, 728, 764 Blasts, 609, 613, 620, 623, 626 Terror, 623
River Mechi, 827 Rocket Propelled (RPG),349
Samjhauta
Grenade
Sankat Mochan Temple, 751 Santhal Jangal, 857
Roy, AN, Mumbai Police Commissioner, 561, 567, 574
Sanyal, Karu, 832
Roy, Arundhati, 1035
Sarath, Fonseka, Lt. Gen., Sri Lanka, 363
Royal Thailand Army, 782
Sardar Sarovar Dam, 532
Royelaseema and Nallamala Forest, 825
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, 846, 961
RSS,288,439,500,532,539,587
Satnami N agar Raid, 1071
Rubin Memon, 498
Scheduled Caste/Tribe, 983, 1013
Russia, 769, 770 Russia, UK, China, 781
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Act, 909
S
Scotland Yard, 556
SAARC
Sea Tigers, 377, 772
Leaders, 771 Regional and Convention Suppression Terrorism, 771
Addl on of
Sector, Rajouri and Poonch, 409 Security Council, 366
Saddam's Iraq, 365
Forces, 302, 802, 875
Saifullah Qari, 428, 429
On Trains, 614
Salma Judum Movement, 837, 838, 837, 838, 949-952, 954, 961,964,967,971,973,982, 985, 991, 995,
Personnel, 50, 51
1035 Interview with Head, 956960
Review, 456 Serial Blasts, 285, 481, 484 In 2008,10 New Delhi, 334 Serial Bombings, 14
1127
Index Seriously Affected States, (SAS), 813
Siachen, 753, 755, 756 Sibu Soren, 1064
Bihar, 813
Sikhs, 485
Chhatisgarh, 813
SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India), 57, 58, 437-442, 447, 453, 454, 485, 548-551,562, 568, 575, 577, 600,601,613,639,640,657, 684, 701, 703, 713, 725, 733, 872
Jharkhand, 813 Maharashtra, 813 Nepal,813 Seven Party Alliance (SPA), 914 SEZ, (Special Economic Zones) 817,832,835,866,892,894896, 897, 916, 1082 Maoist Protest Against-, 934 Projects, 1096
Activities, 583-586 Singh, JJ, Army Chief Gen" 879 Singh, VP, former PM India, 516
Shabbir Abmad, 583, 586
Sinha, Jaswant, BJP MP, 882
Shabbir Batterywala, 584
Sir Creek, 755, 756
Shabnam Hashmi, 400
Socio-Economic
Shah Ali Banda, 628
And Political System, 518
Shahi Rafsan Jani, Bangladesh's Women, 653
Backwardness, 961
Shahnawaz Qureshi, 494 Shahzad Khan, 711 Shamim Ahmad, LeT Terrorist, 684
Disparities, 352, 875, 1013 Sofonov, Anatoly, E, 769, 770 Sopore, (District Baramula), 395 , Soviet
Shamim Sarwar, 57
Forces in Afghanistan, 443
Shaukat Hussain Guru, 510, 519, 534, 535
Presence in Afghanistan, 712
Shergill, JeM Avantipura Commander, 395
Gnion, 867
Shia-Sunni
Investigation Team (SIT), 607, 616, 633
Clashes in Iraq, 643 Muslim Front, 455 Shikaras, 303 Shimoga-Udupi, 1067 Shoaib Ghansar, 495 Shramjeevi Express, 438, 632
Special
Operation Group (SaG), 1081, 1082, 1086 Task FOl':-e (STF), 585, 632, 636, 654, 657, 1009 Spring Thunder Campaigns, Kerala, 933
Terrorism in India
1128 Sri Lanka, 375, 418, 771, 772, 776
Sushma Swaraj, BJP, 521, 908 Swu, Isaak Chishu, 424
And Thrkey, 365
Syed Abmad Basha, 503, 504
Navy, 773
Syed Ahmad Shah Bukhari, Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, 455
Tamils, 402 Srikakulam to Nellore, 373
T
SSFI (Sikh Students Federation of Indi;:t), 336
Tabhgh Jamaat, 449
State-wise Terrorist Figs, 332
Tabligh-e-Jamaat, 640
Stockpiling of Weapons, 590
(Terrorism TADA and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 31, H2, 319,322,492,500,501,1091
Straits of Malacca, 360 Strategic Plans and Policy, 790 Strategy and Tactics, 901 Structural Reforms, 509 Subhash alias Aitu KUfsa, Naxam Commander, 1004 Subsidiary Alliance Bureau (SAB),585 Sudan--Egypt, 444 Suicide
Court, 486, 488, 492, 493, 496-500 Convicted Policemen. 488 Taj Mahal Hotel, 694 Taliban, 46, 347, 657, G87, 713, 769, 7/0, 784 Bases in Pakistan, 792
Attacks, 363, 364
Gangster, 688
Terrorism, 363
in Afghnnistan, 626
Terrorism Acts, 367
Leaders, 41
Terrorist Attack, 453
Movement, 688
Sunni
Rule, 15
Central Waqf Board, 437
Talibanized Forces, 312
Jihadi Movement, 789
Tamil Nadu Properties (Prevention of Damage and Loss), Act, 509
Tehreek, 599 Vohras, 449 Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 60 Surrender Policy, 877 Suryanarayana, K, Indian Engg. Slain in Afghanistan, 344, 347, 687
Talllin Nadu--Kerala, 374 Tarkl'~hwar,
446, 447
Taseem Azim, Pakistani National, 5R5, 586 Tashm:1 Nasreen, 311, 329 Telugll Desam Pa;rty, 1011
1129
Index TerroistlInsurgent Assam, 62-63
Groups,
Mumbai,326 Mumbai Car Bombs, 326
Terror Attacks-2005-2008, 10
Ram Janambhumi, 326
Terror Bases in
Terrorist
Bangladesh, 698
Groups in Manipur, 49
Nepal,698
Organizations, 47
Pakistan, 698
Outfits, 41
Terror Decade, 13
Arunachal Pradesh, 68
Terrorism
J&K,64
Cost to India, 301
Manipur, 65-66
Financing, 405
Meghalaya. 66
In 2006,359
Mizoram,68
In North East, 794
Nagaland, 67
Infrastructure, 42
Punjab,67
International, 37
Tripura, 67-68
Islamization of-, 721
Terrorist Timeline of Events,
Policy, 285
2000-2002,71-77
Worst Affected States, 799
2001,78-101
Terrorists Attacks, 33, 34
2002. 101-130
Terrorist Attacks
2003-2004,131-174
in India, 481-536, 537-581 Terrorist Attacks on-, 453 On Afghanistan, 344 Aksharshadm Ahmedabad, 453
2005-2006, 175-199 2006, 199-232 2007, 233-284 Terrorist, 30
Jama Masjid Delhi, 453
Training Camps Pakistan, 42, 785
Varansi Tern pIe, 453
Violence, :10
Terrorist Attacks, 44, 326
in
Violence in J&K, 46
Coimbatore, 326
Terrorist! Insurgent Groups, (-)2
Delhi Blasts, 326
Terrorist!Naxalite Violence, 42
Indian Parliament, 326
Terrorist-Criminal Network, 57
Jammu Army Camp, 326
Thailand, 360, 418, 781
Mecca Masjid Hyderabad, 326
Thatcher Margaret, Brilish PM,610
Terrorism in India
1130 Thomas P Joseph Commission, 596 Tiger Memon, 493, 694-696, 760 Tilewala Masjid, 459 TNT Explosives, 773 Tolu TV (Kabul), 687 Train Blasts in Mumbai, 334, 543 Transister Bomb Blasts, 481 Tripura, 49 Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC),911 Trombay Peak, 379 Twin Blast Hyderbad, 335 Mumbai,535 U
UAPA (Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 324, 326, 788 UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), 375, 976-979, 987, 1020 Uighur Terrorism, 361 UK and EU, 780
Umar Farooq led APHC, 398 United Democratic Front (UDF), 589, 595, 596 Jihad Council (UJC), 397, 398, 430 National Liberation Front (UNLF),49 People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), 48 United Nations, 61, 318, 327, 346, 348, 356 High Commissioner Refugees, 400
for
Security Council, 60, 680, 707, 708, 709, 691 Unani Doctors, 583 UPA (United Progressive Alliance), 309, 312, 324, 338, 348,389,391,397,404,405, 513,527,618,619,716,728, 729, 808, 969, 973, 992 Government, 313, 323, 387, 550, 968, 969,
304, 307, 312, 337, 339, 382, 567, 664, 727, 992
UK Based South Asia Solidarity Group (SASG), 521
Uprisings in Balochistan and Afghanistan, 717
UK, 445, 778, 779
Uranium Mining in Jharkhand, 892
UK, Canada and US, 794 ULFA (United Liberation of Asom), 14, 40, 48, 51, 52, 58, 291, 354, 355, 357, 359, 370, 372, 373, 407-413, 430, 460, 461,710,788,789,873,1011 Leaders, 678 Militants, 289 Rebels, 349
Uri, Gurez and (Kashmir), 408
Kupwara
US, 38, 41, 345, 348, 367, 382, 396,404,563,564,626,769, 770 And India, 557 And UK, 32
Army, 790
Index
1131
Dept. of Army, 790 Forces , 781 Marine s, 782
Trade Routes , 375
Nuclea r Deal, 531 Nuke, 623
W
Regime , 310 Secret Service , 713 Securi ty Forces , 792 Treasu ry, 406 War on Terror, 750 US, UK, France and India, 365 US-Ind ia Count er Terror ism Partne rship, 780 Terror ism, 785 USS Cole, 378 Utpida n Mukti Vahini , 937 Uttar Prades h-God hra, 297 V
Vaid, SP, IGP Jammu , 433 Vajpay ee, Atal Behari , Indian Prime Minist er, 41, 46, 60, 61,510 ,519,7 82,783 ,785 Varans i Blasts, 541, 610 VDC (Villag e Comm ittee), 956
Oil Assets, 375 Suez Canal, 375
Defenc e
Vidarb ha, 332 Villilan s of Peace, 577-578 Vishwa Hindu Parish ad (VHP), 31 Vote Bank Policies, 31, 438, 864 Vulner able Aspect s, (VA), 375 Defenc e Techno logies, 376 Energy Assets, 375 Nuclea r Plants, 375
Wahab i Indoctr ination , 726 Walliu llah, 287 War on Terror, 32, 333 Terror ism, 639 Waziri stan, 770 West Bengal Board of Madar asa Educat ion, 458 World Confer ence agains t Racism , 449 Trade Centre (WTC) , 30, 533,89 2 War I and Il, 343 War Il, 549 WOTA (War of Terror ism Act), 387, 389, 391 Y
Yadav, Lalu Prasad , 1033 Yahya Ayyasha, Bomb Maker of Hamas , 350, '351 Yasin Malik, JKLF Chairm an, 514, 526, 527 Yoqub Memon, 497, 694 YSR Reddy Govern ment, 992 Yusuf Memon , 497
Z Zahida n Border Pakista n, 448 Zahidu ddin Ansari , 565 Zahira Shaikh , 531 Zoram thanga , CM Nagala nd, 50
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