4 -
*>Fa
ology and ~ # a n ~ e impact of invention and innovation on merican social and economic development
1 \
4
...
39 downloads
1317 Views
12MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
4 -
*>Fa
ology and ~ # a n ~ e impact of invention and innovation on merican social and economic development
1 \
4
,.-
DONALD A. .SCHON
Tec
Books by Donald A. Schon D I S P L A C E M E N T O F CONCEPTS ( 1963 TECHNOLOGY A N D CHANGE The New Heraclitus ( 1967)
Technology and Change THE
NEW
HERACLITUS
D O N A L D A. S C H O N
A D E L T A BOOK
A DELTA BOOK
Published by Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 750 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017 Copyright 0 1967 by Donald A. Schon All rights reserved Delta @ TM 75118, Dell Publishing Co., Inc. Reprinted by arrangement with Delacorte Press Originally published as a Seymour Lawrence Book-Delacorte Press Second Printing Manufactured in the United States of America
To my wife
CONTENTS
Preface Introduction CHAPTER I. CHAPTER
The Process of Invention
11.
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk Ambivalence Toward Innovation
CHAPTER I I I . CHAPTER
IV.
C H A P T E R V. CHAPTER V I .
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
Models for Change Technological Change in U S . Industry
C H A P T E R VII.
C H A P T E R VIII.
The National Climate for Technological Znnovation An Ethic of Change
Appendix: Examples of Technological Change in the Textile, Machine Tool and Building Industries Notes Bibliography
PREFACE
THISBOOK is the by-product of two different kinds of experience. From 1957 to 1963 I worked at Arthur D. Little, Inc., an industrial research firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I was concerned with specific product-development projects, with the efforts of industrial firms to engage more effectively in technological innovation, and with studies of technological change in Government and industry. From 1963 to 1966 I was with the United States Department of Commerce as director of the Institute for Applied Technology in the National Bureau of Standards. Here we attempted in various ways to encourage the introduction of new technology into Government and civilian industry and to provide a basis for Federal policy favorable to technological innovation. Neither Arthur D. Little, Inc., nor the National Bureau of Standards bears any responsibility for what is said in the following pages, but both have provided vantage points from which to examine the process of technological change, and in both organiix
x
Preface
zations I have learned from certain individuals a great deal which is reflected in this book. I am particularly indebted to John Eberhard and Dr. Herbert Holloman, in the Department of Commerce, and to David Gleicher and Sherman Kingsbury of Arthur D. Little, Inc. My indebtedness to Dr. Raymond Hainer, of Arthur D. Little, Inc., is of a different order. His ideas are so closely woven into the book that specific acknowledgments are impossible. If Dr. Hainer were to write, this indebtedness would be apparent to all. But, with few exceptions, Dr. Hainer is a teacher in the oral, not the written, tradition, to whom St. Thomas's dictum applies.
. . . The more excellent the teacher, the more excellent his manner of teaching ought to be. . . . For which reason even among the pagans, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were most excellent teachers, did not want to write anything. -ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,Summa Theologica, Part I11
INTRODUCTION
. . . what is, is uncreated and unperishable, for it is entire, immovable and without end. It was not in the past nor shall it be, since it is now, all at once, continuous; for what creation wilt thou seek for it? how and whence did it grow? . . . So coming into being is extinguished and perishing unimaginable. -PARMENIDES(347) Upon those that step into the same rivers different and different waters flow. . . . It scatters and . . . gathers . . . it comes together and flows away . . . approaches and departs. All things are in process and nothing stays still. . . . You could not step twice into the same river. -HERACLITUS (217, 218) And you could not step even once into the same river. -CRATYLUS T W OAPPROACHES to stability and change have been dominant in the history of human thought. Their prototypes go back to Greek philosophers who lived before Socrates, Parmenides and Herac1itus.l For Parmenides, stability was the only reality; being was continuous, changeless, one; change, in the form of creation
xii
Introduction
or passing away, was inherently contradictory and therefore illusory. For Heraclitus, change, in the form of the striving of opposites, was the only reality, and stability was illusory; the river image, improved by the later philosopher Cratylus, was the model for existence. Throughout the development of Western society there have been conflict and oscillation between these two world views. Essentially we have wanted to see human action as occurring against a background of stability: stable physical laws, stable institutions, stable values. Over and over again we have struggled to establish, once and for all, how things really are; to create institutions which will endure; to formulate values which will hold not only for us but for all men at all times. But experience keeps imposing on us the pews that what appeared to be stable is actually fleeting. No sooner is anything called changeless than it proceeds to change. The drive to stability forces us to ignore the change that is occurring now and to deny or explain away the change that has occurred. Hence our present attitude toward change is essentially the view of Parmenides. We conceive of our institutions-nations, religions, business organizations, industries-as enduring. Change of values is seen as deviance, undependability, flightiness. Values a r e presumed to be firm and constant. To the extent that we admit historical change, we see it according to the model of progresssteady change occurring within a stable framework of value. Similarly, our concepts of human identity-occupational, regional, professional-rest on the assumption of a continuing stable state. Even character we see as the ability to retain values and norms formed early in life. Yet institutions, laws, actions, occupations, professions and even our concept of character can be seen, after the fact, to have changed; it is only that we are somehow protected from awareness of these changes while they are occurring. And we are all historical revisionists. Magically, we forget the earlier institutions,
Introduction
xiii
laws and values, and the assumptions of stability that surrounded them. Now we see them as precursors of the new stability. The long time spans of fundamental change aid us in this reconstruction. Since the turn of the century, however, it has become increasingly difficult to sustain this form of self-deception. The Parmenidean attitude toward change suffers as the rate of change increases. Too much has happened to laws, views of the world, values and institutions within the span of one man's life. Too much is happening within ten years of his life. The principal source of the difficulty is in the process of technological innovation and in the many forms of social change which have accompanied it and resulted from it and which now, as technological change has become institutionalized, cause it. We in the United States, besieged by the continual introduction of new products and processes into our lives, have been quick to accept technological change as a permanent part of our society and as a form of progress. With technological change, we have grown used to technological innovation as a continuing task of established organizations. We have accepted "research and development" as a budget item, an occupational category, a way of life and an inseparable part of industrial and Government institutions. These ideas are well on their way to becoming part of what John Galbraith has called our conventional wisdom. But we have accepted technological change as though it were not destructive of the Parmenidean view. We accept it as an instrument. It is what established institutions do in order to achieve stable social objectives. We use it to do what we wish to do, and we remain the same throughout. But, as we are learning, technological innovation belongs to us less than we belong to it. It has demands and effects of its own on the nature and structure of corporations, industries, Government-industry relations and the values and norms that make up our idea of ourselves and of progress. We do not remain the same throughout. The awareness
xiv
Introduction
forced on us by the increasing rate of technological and social change pertains not only to our tools but to us. In order to cope with it, we require a new, Heraclitan view which allows us to confront our inability to step into the same river twice-or even once. In working toward such a view, we must begin with the notion of technological innovation itself. According to well-established principle, when we accept an idea which was once controversial, we like to forget its origins. We prefer to think of it as eternal. But the idea of technological innovation as an integral part of corporate activity is only about fifty years old. The concepts of "science" and "invention," as we know them, date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The concept of organized scientific research is derived from the German universities of the nineteenth century. Organized invention seems to have come into being with Edison, around the turn of the century. And fifty years ago the notion that established corporations should hire scientists and engineers and undertake systematic inquiry into their own products, materials and processes, with the aim of improving existing products and processes and developing new ones-the idea of industrial research-was a strange one. It is one thing for a craftsman to improve his craft. It is one thing to establish a business on the basis of an invention made by an independent inventor. It is quite another thing for an organization to undertake regular and systematic investigations which will obsolete its current products and methods of production and cause it to change in ways it is bound to find uncomfortable if not downright disastrous. It is one thing for businessmen to exploit for business the results of scientific research. It is quite another thing for business to establish a permanent living arrangement with science, and for scientists, technologists and businessmen, with their very different value systems, to enter into a kind of symbiosis quite unknown before the twentieth century.
Introduction
xv
A phenomenon as unlikely as this is bound to have a variety of causes, official and unofficial. In fact, technological innovation as organized effort appeals to a variety of interests. From the point of view of the nation as a whole, we have come to regard the development of new weapons and counterweapons as a continuing part of national defense and an organized scientific and technological enterprise of the first magnitude. The Manhattan project stands as the great symbol of this effort, along with radar, the proximity fuze and many other developments of World War 11. As the distinction between war and peace has blurred, we no longer regard weapons development as a wartime activity. Rockets, missiles, satellites and still newer technologies of war must be perfected as counters to the continuing efforts of our enemies. In the current debate over disarmament, hardly anyone questions the need for a continuing effort in military research and development. Technological innovation is essential, as well, to holding up our end in what appears to be a proliferating set of international contests, related to military applications but by no means limited to them. The Space Race, the supersonic transport and even the Olympic games are cases in point. These contests are matters of national prestige. They are National Adventures. Winning them is both a symbol of national strength and pre-eminence and a sign of national readiness for battle. In these contests skill and energy in technological innovation have all but replaced the traditional virtues of personal courage and manliness. On still another level it is part of the new conventional wisdom that technological innovation is essential to economic growth and that economic growth-as expresed by rate of increase in Gross National Product-is a sign of national economic strength and vitality. New products create new markets. New processes reduce the cost of existing products, or permit improved products to be produced without increase in cost, thereby extending markets. When confronted with the economic problems of depressed
mi
Introduction
areas, like Appalachia, our national thoughts turn almost automatically to research as a means to the development of new industries. One of our responses to the problem of the balance-ofpayments is to think of technological innovation as a way of improving our export/import ratio and fighting off the inroads of foreign competition. Whole industries, when threatened by other industries or by their counterparts in foreign countries, turn to technological innovation. Industries like leather, brick and textiles organize promotional campaigns to "Buy American" or "Buy Leather" and to instigate legislation favorable to their interests, but they also form research associations to improve their products, reduce their costs and create new markets. Effort at technological innovation is one of their responses to threat. For individual corporations technological innovation has come increasingly to be recognized as a principal-if not the principal -instrument in intercorporate competition. The corporation is seen as a miniature nation: its weapons are products and processes, its battlefield is the market place, its enemies are the corporations with which it competes. Behind its walls it produces weapons and counterweapons, strategies and counterstrategies. On its own level it recapitulates the national belief that technological innovation is essential to the waging of this war, which is the very lifeblood of the firm. This view, which is by now almost universal in American industry, has swept across industries in waves over, roughly, the last fifty years. What was at first true only of the chemical and petrochemical industries is now accepted doctrine in all but a few industries which have yet to undergo their research cycle. For individuals, at various levels and stations within the corporation, technological innovation has become a major task and a main road to upward movement. Creativity, for the scientist, engineer and marketing man, and generalship in innovation for the
introduction
xvii
manager, now rank with such traditional corporate virtues as loyalty, steadfastness and financial shrewdness. Increasingly, performance in the corporation has to do, in one way or another, with invention and innovation. On all these levels of concern with technological innovation, official interests are by no means identical with practice. The nation, industry, firm or individual is not innovative because it favors innovation. According to Galbraith, official talk about innovation stands in innovation's place. As we will be seeing later on, the sources of resistance to technological innovation, at all levels, are enormous. But, again at all levels, the problems concerning innovation are usually defined in terms of getting on with it. Technological innovation is something we strive toward, stimulate, create a climate for, adapt to. Naturally the problems are formulated differently at each level. At the level of the individual the problem is "how to become more creative" or "how to give inherent creativity more chance to express itself." At the level of the corporation the problem is how to "have more ships at sea," how to "get more out of research," how to "manage innovation" more effectively. For a whole industry the problems have to do with "encouraging innovation in individual firms" or with "becoming more effective in joint technological effort." For the nation as a whole the problems have to do with -creating a climate in which industrial technological innovation will flourish; -encouraging industrial growth, based on innovation, in the regions, particularly the depressed regions, of the country; -finding ways to help industry meet the challenges of foreign competition and markets; -coping more effectively with the consequences of technological innovation-the dislocations produced by it; -increasing national effectiveness in technological innovation essential to defense and other international contests.
xviii
Introduction
In the following chapters we will try to understand something of the process and problems of technological innovation in the industrial corporation, in industries and in American society as a whole. At each level of analysis, we will find, well embedded in the conventional wisdom, a rational Parmenidean view whose function is to place technological change within a stable state: -a -a
rational view of invention as an orderly, plannable process; rational view of innovation as a manageable function of the firm; -a view of technological change as occurring within welldefined industrial boundaries; -a view of technological change in society as part of a Technological Program, extending in orderly progress from the eighteenth century to the present time. But we will also find aspects of the process of technological change which resist these rational models. These include: -the nonrationality of invention; -the nature of innovation as a process of converting uncertainty to risk; -the pattern of interindustry invasion and its consequences; -the undermining of the values of the Technological Program. The analysis will bear on invention and innovation within the corporation, on a national climate for innovation and on our way of confronting the consequences of technological change. Accordingly, this book addresses itself first to the process of invention, then to technical innovation in industrial corporations, to patterns of technological change in industry, and finally to the consequences of technological change for our social objectives and norms. This book is principally about American industry. Insofar as it is concerned with technological innovation, however, it could
Introduction
xix
have focused on other social systems-medicine, for example, or agriculture-whose patterns of innovation have much in common with those of industry. And in its concern with the disruption of the stable state and the need for values for the process of change, it could have centered on other institutions-the family, universities or Government, for example-which share these patterns and
needs with industry. The choice of industry as the central theme reflects my own experience. But my effort will be to present the dynamics of industrial change as a metaphor for change in our society as a whole.
Technology and Change
T h e Process of Invention
WE ARE G O I N G to be talking about invention and ought, by rights, to begin with a definition. But "invention," like "innovation," "research," "development" and "design," is one of a family of terms already well established in the vocabularies of those concerned with technological change. During the last fifty years the waves of new technology produced by our industrial revolutions1 have pushed these words into prominence. Their meanings are vague, ambiguous and conflicting and so full of Tar Baby issues that we cannot define them without getting stuck. I would like to use "invention" to mean the process of bringing new technology into being, or again, the new technology created in the process. "Technology" will mean any tool or technique, any product or process, any physical equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is extended. "Innovation" will mean the process of bringing invention into use, and "diffusion," the spread of its use beyond the first instance. But these familiar usages carry problems with them. "Invention" clings to "inventor." And "inventor" carries with it the pic-
2
Technology and Change
ture of the Lone Inventor, the embattled, lonely pioneer. This image has two faces: the Romantic Hero, like Edison, Goodyear, Morse or Ford; and the Crackpot, producer of Rube Goldberg contraptions. Accordingly, inventors and inventions are things to be honored or scorned. To choose to speak of invention sounds like taking up the cause of inventors. To have used "research and "development"-both respectable corporate terms-would have sounded like championing corporate technology at the expense of individual effort. I want simply to talk about bringing new technology into being, regardless of who does it or how it is done. There are similar traps in choosing to speak of "invention" rather than "discovery." People tend to make a sharp distinction between these terms. A man "discovers" a law of physics as he "discovers" a new continent; the law, like the continent, antedates its discovery. On the other hand, a man "makes," or invents, a new tool; he first conceives of it and then brings it into being. The attempt to distinguish sharply between these terms is part of a long-standing debate between partisans of "invention" and "applied science" over ways of arriving at new technology. "Invention" conveys the image of blind Edisonian trial and error. "Applied science" conveys the image of the methodical application of discovered laws of nature. This apparently simple distinction quickly founders, however. A man makes theories as well as invention^.^ He conceives theories and brings them into being. We no longer think of them as embedded, like continents, in Nature. And invention depends on discovery of laws and effects. An inventor works by searching through experiment for the smallest manifestation of the effect he wants to produce, learning the conditions' of the effect, and then reproducing it on a larger scale. This interaction between making and discovering is one of the principal features of invention. Moreover, invention and innovation shade into one another. It is impossible to specify the point at which a new product or proc-
The Process of Invention
3
ess begins to be put to use. Aspects of what is required to put it to use occur as early as the first breadboard model, and it tends to change throughout the entire process of use. Invention and innovation are best understood as features of a single, continuous process rather than as steps or phases which always precede and follow one another in time. These are only a few of the issues which lie just beneath the surface of these words.3 In the pages that follow, we will establish certain features of invention, understood broadly as the creation of new technology, in order to set the stage for inquiring into the nature and problems of technological innovation.
The Rational View of Invention Phrases in common use like "the management of research and "the organization of invention" suggest the rational model of invention which thrives in the atmosphere of large organizationsthe corporation, the government bureau, the research organization. Under this model, invention is seen as the conversion of knowledge to technology. Within the last half of the present century a "knowledge industry" has developed. Research scientists and engineers are producing knowledge that has resource value for application to industrial and consumer products. Research knowledge is being created in the laboratories and experimental centers of private corporations, universities and government agencies. It seems important to the national interests that there be proper utilization made of the products of science for the benefits of society. Professional managers use industrial organizations as conversion mechanisms; they convert the essential resources of human talents, physical facilities, money and knowledge into marketable goods and services. -JOHN F. MEE, October, 1964; pp. 36-37
4
Technology and Chunge
According to this rational model, the process of invention is like other corporate activities-sales, accounting or production, for example-and like other corporate functions, lends itself to analysis, management and evaluation. Seen in this way, invention has a number of essential properties: 1. It is a goal-directed process in which you know what you are going to do before you begin to do it.
The days of research and development activities operating under ballooning budgets without sound management controls are over . . . greater productivity results when management directs efforts along lines statistically offering best chances of success toward predetermined goals. MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, -SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL November, 1963 The problem is, for example, to develop a wet-strength paper, a long-span beam, a dimensionally stable wood. The task is to achieve these objectives. Success consists in doing so within the appropriate boundaries of time and money. You also know the disciplines and technologies the invention will require. Management must first establish realistic over-all company objectives. . . . It then must select disciplines, staff the program, and develop its organization to best achieve these purposes. -JAMES BRIAN QUINNand ROBERT M. CAVANAUGH, p. 114 If you aim at a wet-strength paper, for example, you can be reasonably sure the answer will lie in chemistry and specifically in technologies associated with cellulose chemistry and resin binders. Your development team should contain these skills. The development of a new long-span beam will require structural engineering and the technology of materials like concrete and steel.
The Process of lnuention
5
The technical objective (it is assumed) determines the technologies required for invention. 2. The process is orderly. It is a series of steps toward a goal, each one paving the way for those to follow. First comes the definition of the problem, then alternative routes to its solution. You choose and test the most promising route. Figure 1 illustrates one proposed schema for the process. When new ideas are required, their generation is made into a separate phase (like "Thinking and Visualization" in Figure 1 ) . A phase of "idea generation" precedes a phase of evaluation or "idea screening," as in the refinement of an ore.' The two stages operate under different sets of rules. The first calls for creativity and imagination; the second, for critical intelligence. 3. Invention is essentially an intellectual process. While it is not cerebral, in the sense of requiring nothing but thought, paper and pencil ("dirty hands" are considered important), invention is essentially a matter of applying intelligence to the solution of problems. Intellectual resources determine the success of the project. Invention (it is assumed) differs from human relations or poetry, in which emotion and intuition play a part. The scientist or engineer is a man of practical and theoretical intelligence whose work demands the exercise of his dominant faculty. According to the picture painted here, invention is: -goal-oriented; -orderly; -a process in which it is clear, ahead of time, in which discipline or technology the answer falls; -primarily a matter of applying conscious intelligence to the solution of problems. We have presented the rational view in its pure state, unmuddied by qualifying attitudes. But it is surprising how fre-
r---------- +--------I
. OPERATING SPECIFICATIONS (Customer's Requirements)
----------,-----+ -----, I I
I
THINKING AND VISUALIZATION Engineers think about the design requirements, possible approaches, and visualize or imagine what the final
DEVELOPMENT O F ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL DESIGNS (Feasibility Studies) s~ecifications.
I
ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATIONS -------*----------4
A
I
SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT TESTING, CONSTRUCTION AND TESTS O F MATERIALS, C O M P O N ~ N T S ,BREADBOARDS
--+---------A
I
A N D MnPKllPP
4 DRAWINGS AND INITIAL ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS
-------,---------,
!
DRAWINGS, AND SPECIFICATIONS O F PROTOTYPES AND ULTIMATELY OF THE FIELD TEST MODEL
4
FINAL PRODUCTION DESIGN, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS
!---------- +----
I
+
PRODUCTION Problems arising from pilot production, regular roduct~onand use of the product g a d to redes~gnand Improvements.
I
I
----+
fi
Solid lines indicate main flow of work and information
.- - - - -- -- Broken lines indicate feedback of information for corrective purposes
FIGURE1 Graphic portrayal of the system and product design process
The P~ocessof Invention
7
quently the rational view can be found in its pure state. It is an official public view. As such, it plays an important part in the organizational handling of invention and innovation, in spite of private and unofficial opinion. Those engaged in large-scale research and development efforts, such as the military and space programs of the United States Government, often hold a more extreme version of the rational view under the name of the Weapons Systems Approach. Burton Klein has described this version as follows: To ensure that no time, money, or effort will be wasted on blind alleys, almost all of the planning is done in terms of the end products that are supposed to emerge from the program-the weapon systems. Before any major project is begun, the planners painstakingly figure out what performance characteristics the weapon system is supposed to have and the technical innovations it will contain. The development program is spelled out stage by stage and then reviewed by numerous agencies within the armed services, by special committees and by the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. After the program is under way, progress is monitored at every step. -BURTON KLEIN, May, 1958, p. 112 Here men try to predict and then to set up in orderly fashion the sequence of development, the inventions required and the rate at which the whole process is to occur. They prepare schedules of these steps, like the PERT diagrams designed for the Polaris missile program, in order to spell out the beginning and end of each phase of development and the areas of overlap. According to this model of the process, the planning function becomes critical; inventions simply fill the gaps in the plan. Although the Weapons Systems Approach originated among military planners, it shows signs of spreading to civilian efforts and to projects smaller in scale than the development of a missile. The rational view of invention, in mild or extreme form, must appeal to anyone confronted with the complicated task of developing new technology in an organizational setting, within severe
8
Technology and Change
boundaries of time and resources. In some circumstances it may even appear to be a necessary view. But it conflicts, in many ways, with experience.
Invention as Process To begin with, we need to recognize that invention is itself a process and a part of other processes. We say "making an invention," like "making a pie" or "making a shoe," suggesting that invention is a form of production. We do so because we take an after-the-fact view of invention, reading back onto the beginning of the process the simple goals apparent only at the end.6 So we say "Carothers invented nylon," conveying the impression that he first had it in mind to do and then did it in a fairly straightforward way. In fact, bringing new technology into being is a complex process in which goals are discovered, determined and modified along the way. Invention builds on previous invention and is always part of a larger current of technology. It takes time and requires more than one kind of technical effort. It is made up of many different subinventions. Each separate turning of a technical tick, however small, has its own process. And the process of invention continues throughout the life of any new technology. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962), Richard Nelson makes the following analysis of the development of the transistor: The transistor is a semiconductor device. The research at Bell which resulted in the invention took off from a base of knowledge about semiconductors built by several generations of scientists. . . . The element germanium is a semiconductor. So are several other elements, including silicon, and a number of compounds, such as
9
The Process of Invention
copper oxide and zinc oxide. By 1900 many scientists and experimenters with electricity knew that these metals had quite unusual properties. In particular, it was known that these materials conducted electricity although, as the name implies, not as well as conductors like metal. It also was known that the electrical resistance of these materials decreased with temperature. . . Also, it was known that these materials sometimes passed current more [p. 5541. easily in one direction than in another
.
...
Returning to our story, though by 1900 many scientists knew that the materials we now call semiconductors had interesting properties, they knew little about why. The birth of the radio industry created a practical demand for good rectifiers; [semiconductors] became widely used. But, in large part because the vacuum tube rectifier was better understood and hence the direction of possible improvement more clearly indicated, the semiconductor rectifier declined in importance relative to the vacuum tube during the twenties and early thirties. . .
.
During the thirties research workers in the field of radio waves and communications turned their interest to higher frequencies. The ordinary vacuum tube performed poorly at these higher frequencies and attention returned to crystal detectors and hence to research on semiconductors . . . [p. 5561. Nelson goes on to describe improvements in semiconductor production and in semiconductor science. He calls attention to the discovery of positive and negative semiconductors, and notices the prewar interest in semiconductor amplifiers and the gradual building of semiconductor theory. To one who is not a physical scientist, it is interesting that by the mid-1930's a well-known article, Wilson's [A. H. Wilson], contained most of the essential ingredients for a rather complete understanding of semiconductors, but that almost all scientists missed some of the essential points . . . [p. 5571. The effect of the background Nelson sketches here is to make the invention of the transistor appear as one in a long series of inventions and related discoveries, a capping invention that took
10
Technology and Change
up and united threads of technology and theory which had long been present. The story of the transistor is similar, in these respects, to the stories of other less celebrated inventions. Corfam, for example, Du Pont's synthetic leather, burst on the consuming public a few years ago as a sudden new product but represented more than ten years of Du Pont research and many more years of analogous effort by other companies, all aimed at producing fiber-reinforced plastic films with the critical properties of leather. Corfam's genealogy would show a relation to synthetic rubber films, to clothbacked vinyl sheets, to perforated plastics designed to "breathe," and to many other similar products. In fact, it came out of Du Pont's Fabrics and Finishes Division, which had invented and used many of these related materials. No process of invention has a clear beginning. Every invention clings tightly to the threads of work preceding it. After the fact, we wonder, as Nelson did, why the invention was not made long before; it seems to have been so obviously implicit in its antecedents. Neither does invention have a clear ending: a new product, for example, is never "done" when it enters the market; it undergoes continuing change until its death. We need not see these processes as a series of discrete inventions, each associated with a man. We could see them as continuous open-ended processes of development in which individuals play interconnecting roles6 None of this is to contradict, however, the room available for individual contribution and creativity. There is an "inside" and an "outside" view of invention. From the outside and after the fact, invention can be seen as the work of many interrelated contributors in which the later contributions build on past results. From the inside and before the fact-that is, for the man who is confronted with an unsolved problem of technology or with a technical situation full of some dim promise of novelty-it is by no means obvious how the past contains the solution to his problem or the invention which would draw novelty out of his situation,
The Process of lnvention
11
even though in most cases he is aware of earlier work and knows that it is in some way relevant. His new ideas then seem as new to him as those of Archimedes. His "Eureka" is as heartfelt. But his contribution is not any the less part of a long and complex social process. Moreover, each stage in the process-an individual corporate contribution like Du Pont's development of Corfam or the Bell Laboratories' development of the transistor-is itself a complex process, a series of related inventions rather than a single act. Even subinventions, like the making of the first prototype of a semiconductive amplifier, are complex. They are problem-solving processes which do not happen all at once but in characteristic patterns. Invention is, then, a continuous social process without clear beginning or end. The development of a new product or process is a series of inventions, each of which responds to the problems of earlier efforts and creates new problems requiring solution. Each subinvention has its characteristic pattern of development.
Invention as Nonrationul Process The fact that invention is a process does not in itself contradict the rational view. But attention to the processes involved in invention reveal its nonrational side. To begin with, invention often works backward. It often moves not from a clearly defined goal to the discovery of technical means but from observation of a phenomenon to exploration of a use for it. Often, invention consists in exploiting a phenomenon that pops up while someone is trying to do something else. There are a number of classic stories along this line-Becquerel's discovery of some of the uses of radiation from observation of the fogging of a photographic plate; Fleming's noticing how a bit of penicillin mold, blown in through his laboratory window, killed
Technology and Change
12
some bacterial cultures he was growing; Goodyear's discovery of the vulcanization of rubber when some rubber he was heating boiled over on the stove. These stories are legendary, and as with most stories about the origins of great inventions, their factual and mythical components have merged. But their pattern holds also for many lesser inventions: -A
new approach to reconstituted leather grew out of consideration of biochemical experiments with the swim bladders of carp. -An electrostatic recorder came from observation of the effect of electrostatic charge on water droplets. -A method for encapsulating resin catalyst suggested itself when a chemist idly mixed components used in the resin treatment of wool.
There is nothing special about these examples. Everyone who has worked directly with materials in order to develop new products or processes can supply similar examples of his own. There is a sense in which invention of this kind is accidental. Fleming could not have anticipated that the mold would fly through his window and land on a culture, killing some of it. He could not have predicted this phenomenon. But he could expect that while he was engaged in other work, some interesting phenomena would occur. And he could deliberately exploit them when they did occur. The point is not that invention is accidental but that it builds on unexpected p h e n ~ m e n a . ~ Once a process of technical development has begun, it does not usually moue in a straight line, according to plan, but takes unexpected twists and turns. The investigator must continually replot his course and set off on new tacks as his first ideas about the problem turn out to be wrong or as he encounters new phenomena which either impede
The Process of lnuention
13
or facilitate his progress. In a development task of any size, this happens not once but many times. When the investigator looks back at the end of his journey, he sees no straight line but a jagged path in which each deviation from plan represents the discovery of a new relevant variable or the addition of an important new requirement. -A
product development group undertook the development of a new fastening tool.8 The tool was to feed fine wire from a spool, cut it to size and push it flush with the surface of a wood panel, leaving little or no sign of entry. It was intended originally to fasten prefinished panels to studs, in order to eliminate the work of nail setting, hole filling, sanding and refinishing, which accounts for much of the labor cost of panel installation. The group built a preliminary model which fed fine wire into a die, cut it and forced it through a hole into the surface of the wood. The tool held the wire in its hole throughout, without allowing it to buckle. The diameter of the wire determined both the holding strength of the fastening and the difficulty of operation of the tool. In order to increase the holding strength of the wire, the surface was etched and coated. But the best coating contained fine particles of grit which abraded the edges of the holes through which the wire passed. It was necessary, then, to redesign the tool. Carbide bits and rings were inserted. In order to insure reliable operation a major simplification of design was required. There had to be fewer parts and fewer places where metal rubbed against metal. The resulting tool operated with greater reliability than the first one and grasped its wire more firmly. Because of the greater force exerted on the wire, the wire cartridge that fed wire into the tool had to be redesigned.
Technology and Change This continual shift of direction in response to new problems is a process of design. Each intervention aims at solving a problem; it aims at meeting requirements of the situation which were apparent from the beginning (fasten without a visible trace, in the example above) or which were learned along the way (resist abrasion of the tool). But nothing can be done which has only the result intended for it. Side effects are the rule. The pieces of the problem hang together, and it is usually impossible to affect one without affecting the others as well. Some designs get simpler as the process goes on, whereas others get more complicated. In the case of a mechanical invention, the invention may actually get bigger, heavier and more complicated until, in effect, it falls of its own weight. When this happens, the designer must retrace his steps. His process can be seen, after the fact, as a series of decision points, all of which taken together represent a tree of decision. The trunk of this tree is the path that led to the finally adopted solution; the branches are dead ends from which the designer had to retreat. The path that will lead to greater simplicity, as opposed to greater complication, is always clear after the fact and always obscure beforehand. For a given strategy of design there is often a central weakness, an Achilles' heel, to overcome. It is what finally reveals itself as the basic problem of the system. The designer commits himself to an approach, discovers its weakness and tries to compensate for it. Products and processes, seen from this point of view, reveal what the designer did to control what he could not eliminate. In razor blades there is an Achilles' heel in the problem of maintaining uniform sharpness and preventing corrosion. In nonwoven fabrics it is the ~roblemof obtaining in one fabric the necessary strength and drape. In thermoelectric couplings it is the quality of the solder-its reliability and resistance to breakdown. Such problems set limits to the products application and become the traditional 14
The Process of Invention
15
product-improvement problems, the well-defined problems on which everybody works. But during the process of invention itself, the inventor-designer must travel many routes and retrace his steps many times before he finally commits himself to a path and finds ways either to eliminate or to live with its weaknesses. Invention does not move in a straight line. Neither does it simply consist in defining a need and seeking means to fill it or in defining a technique and finding uses for it. In the process of invention need and technique determine one another. At the beginning, as in geometry, there is a certain "given." The given may be a need ('We must develop a cheap wet-strength paper"), or it may be a technique or phenomenon for which a commercial use is sought ("What can we do with interfacial polymerization?"). The point about the given need or phenomenon is that, because of the limits and opportunities discovered in the process of invention, it changes. -In the development of a new nonwoven fabric, the critical element turns out to be cost: the throw-away fabric must cost less than the price of a single laundering of a more permanent fabric. Economy requires the machine that produces nonwoven fabric to operate at high speeds. And the need to operate at high speed rules out certain fabric constructions. Therefore, we must find acceptable fabric constructions that lend themselves to high-speed production. -A new appliance, designed originally for a mass market, encounters problems of reliability. In order to solve them, we introduce more expensive materials. The more reliable machine, in spite of the best efforts of the engineering group, costs more than the mass market can afford. Now the machine has become a higher-priced, luxury item. It captures a smaller market but gives the company a higher margin of profit. If
16
Technology and Change it is to be a luxury machine, however, it must have certain features beyond those originally conceived for it and at very little extra cost.
In these examples, we encounter unexpected boundaries of need and technology. Neither is fully defined at the outset. Technological boundaries have market implications, and new definitions of need have implications for technology. This oscillation between need and technology characterizes the process of invention. Over time, each determines the other? According to the rational view of invention, we can identify relevant technical disciplines with certainty ahead of time. If we don't know the answer to a problem, we know at least the fields in which it will lie. But answers frequently turn up in surprising places. It is irnpressive how often, in the history of technology, invention consists in carrying techniques, in modified form, from one field to another. -The Polymer Development Corporation made its first commercial success out of a means of extruding nylon rod, a process most of the plastics industry, at the time, thought unfeasible. Their method drew on techniques for extruding metal rod which the president of the company had learned in the metals industry. Later, the company developed a sintered nylon material, using techniques similar to metal sintering. Their way of marketing these products had more in common with practices in the specialty metals industry than with plastics marketing practices of the time. -A process for drawing brass rod came out of an adaptation of candle-making technology. It consisted in drawing a brass wire first through molten brass and then through a die. -The Pillsbury Company developed its line of refrigerated cookies and rolls by adapting sausage-making techniques and machinery.
The Process of Invention
17
-An American Viscose Company chemist invented the celebrated nonnutritive food, Avicel, in the course of attempting to produce stronger rayon tire cord. -Electrical milling of steel uses a phenomenon seen as a nuisance in another industry: electric-arc pitting of metal contacts. -During World War I the Krupp Works in Germany made carbide cutting tools out of a material developed for antitank projectiles. -Guidance systems for today's missiles and rockets build on inertial guidance techniques originally invented for aircraft and shipboard gunsights. Such inventions consist in exploiting technological analogies. The pattern holds true not only for individual products and processes but for whole fields of technology. -Nonwoven fabrics carried paper chemistry and technology into textile applications. -The building industries borrowed modularity, prefabrication and on-site mass production from other industrialized production technologies. -Numerically controlled machine tools (the use of numbers on paper or magnetic tape to program and control the operation of machine tools) grew out of the aerospace industry. Throughout the history of technology, devices, like the wheel, lever, screw and balance, found their way from one field of technology to another, transforming themselves and introducing novelty as they moved. This pattern of invention by technological displacementlo is by no means eccentric. It is characteristic both of recent industrial technology and of the whole history of technolOgY.
This does not mean, of course, that it is entirely a matter of chance from which disciplines or technologies answers come, but
18
Technology and Change
that we cannot expect answers only from technologies traditionally associated with a problem. To do so would be to eliminate an important source of novelty. All of these comments have so far gone to show that: -Invention often works backward from intriguing phenomena rather than forward from well-defined objectives. -Invention is full of unanticipated twists and turns. It is a juggling of variables in response to problems and opportunities discovered along the way. -Need and technique determine one another in the course of development; neither is fully determined at the outset. -It is not always apparent ahead of time from what disciplines or technologies answers will come. In short, a great deal in the process of invention defies definition in advance. Invention, often pictured as a race, is more like exploring an unfamiliar coastline in a fog. There is nothing in this to cause surprise. If invention were wholly determinable before the fact, it would be nothing more than routine application of known techniques to familiar problems. Only the rational myth of invention makes these features of invention seem surprising.
I
I
7 -
C H A P T E R I1
1
Innovation, Uncertainty
I
and Risk
The Rational View of Innovation THERE IS
A RATIONAL view of innovation which builds on the rational view of invention spelled out in the previous chapter. According to this view, innovation is essentially similar to other major functions of a firm.It can be managed. It must be analyzed into its component parts and made subject to rational control. I t is a series of orderly steps, each of which serves to relate special efforts to corporate objectives, and each of which lends itself to effective management practice, along familiar corporate lines.
Competitive success depends to a great extent upon the fundamental company approach to new-product development and product modification. An effective new product program generally involves the following basic steps: Determine over-all company objectives and goals. Integrate all product research and marketing activity into management plans. Organize a system to facilitate getting ideas for products. Obtain, evaluate and select useful ideas and information. Design, build and test the product.
20
Technology and Change
Produce and market the product. Evaluate the product continuously. -GORDON H. WEHRLY,1958 Implicit in this approach is the notion that skilled men can anticipate and control the risks of innovation. Phrases like "the management of innovation" suggest that we can foresee and quantify the likely dangers and rewards of a technical project and weigh them against the likely risks and rewards of alternative efforts. By selecting only those projects whose benefits justify their anticipated costs, by playing risks off against one another-in short, by the whole process of justification, decision and optimization suggested above, we can (it is assumed) keep the risk of innovation within bounds. The process of decision-making associated with innovation is a process of risk-reduction. According to extreme versions of the rational view, it is a process of risk elimination. In order to reduce the risks of innovation, justification of technical effort must precede the effort itself: you do things only when you have shown them worth doing. Hence, a corporation, a government agency or a university may require lengthy proposals, subject to extensive review, before technical work can begin. A technical man may spend a great deal of time justifying his program. He does so in order to get the money to sponsor his work. Money comes when he makes the proper justification. In terms of the organizational hierarchy someone "below" makes the justification and someone "above" rejects or accepts it. Funds flow from above, ideas from below. Those below propose, those above dispose. The rational view of innovation assumes that invention is a series of orderly steps intelligently directed toward an objective spelled out in advance. It regards innovation, then, as a manageable process, like other functions of the firm, in which risks are controlled by the mechanisms of justification and review. But again, the rational view of innovation ignores or violates actual corporate experience. In the light of that experience, the
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
21
notion of innovation as an orderly, goal-directed, risk-reducing process must appear as a myth. The present chapter will explore some of the ways in which it is a myth, beginning with introduction of the critical notion of uncertainty.
Uncertainty and Risk Risk has its place in a calculus of probabilities. It applies to a specific course of action. The risk of an action is the likelihood that it will produce an unwanted result. Risk lends itself to quantitative expression, as when we say that the chances of failing to strike oil in a field are better than fifty-fifty or that the chances of finding a defective part in a batch are two out of a hundred.l In the framework of benefit-cost analysis, the risk of an innovation is how much we stand to lose if we fail, multiplied by the probability of failure. Uncertainty is quite another matter. A situation is uncertain when it requires action but resists analysis of risks. A gambler takes a risk in an honest game of blackjack when, knowing the odds, he calls for another card. The same gambler, unsure of the odds and of the honesty of the game, is in a situation of uncertainty. He can act, but he cannot estimate the risks or rewards of his action. Even so, he operates in a risklike situation because, at any rate, he has two well-defined alternatives-to call for another card or not to call for it. But an explorer lost in the woods, short of food and water, confronts even greater uncertainty: he must act even though relevant alternatives are undefined. He must invent what to do. He has no way of calculating with any precision the risks of action. He has only rough guidelines of skill and experience to help him. A usual model of uncertainty is this: two alternatives are presented-which shall I take? But this model presupposes a great deal of structuring, of work on the situation. A more relevant
22
Technology and Change
model consists of a man in a situation which is both unfamiliar and problematic. Action is required. But it is unclear not only whether to do this or that but what there is that might be done. The situation is like a game of chance in which not only the odds but the moves themselves are undefined. The situation can be described as one in which there is either too little information (not enough to permit decision) or too much. On the second model of uncertainty above, "too much" is more appropriate. There is more information than our theory of the situation can handle. A perceptual analogue may help (Figure 2 ) .
Here there is too much information to permit identification of the object. Elimination of a good deal of it (Figure 3) permits identification. But the knowledge of what to eliminate presupposes a theory of what there is. The formation of Gestalts or forms for the situation resolves uncertainty by wholesale elimination of certain information clues as irrelevant, and by organization of others.
Innouation, Uncertainty and Risk
23
Seen from this point of view, the function of the perceptual Gestalt or the theory is to reduce the situation to one we can handle-that is, take account of, explain and predict. All theories, according to William James, contain a penumbra of uncertainty, error and ambiguity which are irrelevant from the theory's point of view but become the basis for the next theoretical advance in the field. The great field for new discoveries is always the unclassified residuum. Round about the accredited and orderly facts of every science there ever floats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences minute and irregular and seldom met with, which it always proves more easy to ignore than to attend to. . . . Any one will renovate his science who will steadily look after the irregular phenomena. -WILLIAM JAMES,pp. 197-98 Uncertain, unformed situations are a pervasive aspect of individual lives to which we pay understandably little conscious attention. Our entire frame of discourse is designed for formed situ-
24 Technology and Change ations-emerges, in fact, out of the forming of situations. The unformed is put aside, consciously or preconsciously, as a source of anxiety and pain.
. . . in many cases, there is an unfortunate use of selective inattention, in which one ignores things that do matter; since one has found no way of being secure about them, one excludes them from awareness as long as possible. In any case, the self-system controls, from well on in the juvenile era, the content of consciousness, as we ordinarily call it-that is, what we know we're thinking about-to a very striking extent. -HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, 1953, PP. 233-34 There are, in effect, whole repertories of devices and stratagems through which we avoid contact with uncertainty, of which some of the more obvious are: denial ("I am clear about everything!"), forgetfulness ("I cannot remember things that make me anxious"), avoidance ("I stay away from painful situations"), taboos ("Don't talk about it!"), and selective inattention ("I carefully avoid noticing what might make me uncertain"). We shall have occasion to discuss some of these in later chapters. For the moment, it is important to notice that organizations as well as individuals confront uncertain situations. The corporation, for example, may suddenly find itself with a declining market or with a new and unexpected kind of competition. It is then confronted, at least for a time, with more information than it can handle. Its experience of uncertainty is a concomitant and sign of its contact with something new. And of the various sources of novelty capable of throwing an organization into a state of uncertainty, none is more effective than technical innovation.
Uncertainty Is Inherent in Technical Innovation Men involved in technical innovation in a corporation confront a situation in which the need for action is clear, but there is both danger and opportunity, and it is by no means clear what to do.
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
25
This situation is painful and anxious for individuals and, in a sense, for the corporation as a whole. To be a member of a corporation in a time of corporate uncertainty is to be engulfed in waves of uncertainty and anxiety. As long as this situation obtains, the corporation cannot function effectively. The corporation is not designed for uncertainty, where there are no clear objectives to reach and no measures of accomplishment, and where it is not clear what to try to control. A corporation cannot operate in uncertainty, but it is beautifully equipped to handle risk. It is, from at least one point of view, precisely an organization designed to uncover, analyze, evaluate and operate on risks. Accordingly, the innovative work of a corporation consists in converting uncertainty to risk. This work begins with more information than can be handled and operates on this information, at lower levels of the corporation, until clear alternatives of action, together with their probable benefits and their risks, can be defined. At this point, management can play the investment game-that is, the game of deciding where to put one's bets. The game requires analysis of investment alternatives, estimating markets, costs and technical feasibility, and making investment decisions. The game is played with competitive corporations as opponents. The rewards and punishments of the game can be measured in dollars. In the process of innovation everything is done to permit decision on the basis of probable dollar costs and dollar benefits. In the process, the corporation converts the language of invention to the language of investment. Instead of talking about materials, properties, performances, experiences, experiments and phenomena, the corporation begins to talk of costs, shares of market, investment, cash flow, and dollar return. The language change accompanies a.shift upward in the level of corporate involvement. The conversion of uncertainty to risk takes varying forms depending on the kind of uncertainty to be dealt with. Technical innovation involves many different kinds of uncertainty. Some of
26
Technology and Change
these spring directly from the nonrational character of the process of invention. Others are only indirectly related to that process. We will be concerned here with uncertainties springing from determination of technical feasibility, novelty and market. One focus of uncertainty is in the question, Can it be done? Is it technically feasible? In the process of invention, as we have seen, the requirements to be met change continually in response to unexpected findings. These may at any time turn a good risk into a poor one or an indifferent idea into an idea of great promise. We can describe these changes in terms of a curve of technical difficulty. As an investigator works he may first encounter the most difficult problem and later only minor ones whose solution he knows he can attain if he works long enough. If we plot his progress in time against "difficulty" or "demands of the solution with respect to the state of the art," the picture looks like this:
The dotted line at Dl represents the state of the art. The investigator has to surpass it at B (for example, by developing a wire coating with much improved holding strength), whereas his subsequent tasks are well within the state of the art. On the other hand, there may be a number of separate peaks. In considering the development of new semiconductor materials, we would
Innomtion, Uncertainty and Risk
27
have to identify separate peaks for the development of highpurity materials and for the development of high-yield production techniques. Such curves would not be a source of major uncertainty if it were possible always to identify ahead of time the problems and their degree of difficulty. For example, small improvements in the properties of materials-raising by a few degrees the melting point of an alloy or increasing slightly the abrasion resistance of a plastic coating-may require no more than the continued application of known methods. On the other hand, achieving these small improvements may be like approaching absolute zero. The investigator may be fighting the equivalent of the basic laws of thermodynamics. For example, a group working on the development of a new type of transformer, using piezoelectric principles, worked for weeks on what it thought was a materials problem, until it was able to make the calculations necessary to show that the performance requirements for which it was striving pressed to the limits both the energy capacity of the material and its ability to accept mechanical stress. It is not always apparent, even to a skilled investigator, whether he is working on a minor problem of adjustment or a major problem of principle. He cannot place himself on the curve of technical difficulty. He may think he is here:
Technology and Change
28
when, in fact, he is here: D
Technical feasibility, therefore, often resists the kind of definition required by the investment game. It may evade definition, like a will o' the wisp, throughout the entire process of innovation. Another focus of uncertainty concerns the question of novelty: Who has done it before? or, Who is doing it now? Although the patent literature offers a great deal of information about prior invention, a search may not uncover all relevant art. Even a thorough and concentrated search may not turn up a relevant configuration which had been invented earlier for quite a different function. An apparently novel screw thread may have been used in a machine tool to fasten work to a chuck. A method for encapsulating adhesive may have been used for encapsulating solid rocket propellant. Such facts may come to light, in spite of the best efforts of the searchers, only when the patent application is processed or later when a counterclaim is filed. If someone con-
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
29
tests a patent, the courts often find against the alleged inventor. The attitude of the courts toward patents, the skill of the attorneys and the credibility of the witnesses may count for as much as the apparent novelty of the invention. The novelty of an invention is uncertain, both because of lack of information, in spite of best efforts, and because of the uncertainties of the judicial process. If a company undertakes a development, it can have no guarantee that its competitors are not doing similar things. Even if it knows that others are working in the same field, it cannot be sure how far they have gone. Invention is like an arms race between warring countries: The leaders ask: Do they already have it? Are they working on it? How soon will they get it? Can we afford not to have it? Should we wait until they have it and then copy it? What do we lose by being second? How much would we gain by being first? In corporate competition the same questions are relevant. There are the same difficulties in getting answers, the same temptations to espionage, the same strategies for playing out a hand in spite of uncertainties. A company may be well advised to continue its development, even with the knowledge that a competitor is working on the same problem: it may get there fist and the other may not get there at all. There are even cases on record-the development of the automatic light meter for cameras is one-where a company, spurred on by the belief that a competitor had the product, finished first and achieved a commercial success-and discovered that its competitor did not have the product after all. Who will buy the product? How large will its market be? How much of a share will it get? How long will the market last? The marketing questions have become the subject matter of a new profession and of what aspires to be a science. Without attacking the question of whether or not a marketing science is now possible-whether there are inherent uncertainties about marketing which no amount of information, ahead of time, will resolve
30 Technology and Change -we can notice that the process of answering marketing questions occurs in time and that, as in the process of invention, there are bound to be stretches of uncertainty which can only be resolved by the expenditure of time and money-if then. -Scotch tape was originally introduced for mending books. Before its actual introduction, its makers had no inkling of the huge market potential it offered. -Vinyl resins were first developed and marketed as adhesives. Their use as structural plastics was only dimly foreseen. These success stories suggest that products are vehicles for projection: what they are depends on how you see them. It is possible to see in them more or less than their makers intended. In the examples above, buyers saw in the products more than the makers had originally perceived. There is no lack of examples in which they saw less. The uncertainties of marketing are particularly apparent in the case of consumer products. A whole industry-the garment industry-rests on the concept of fashion and yearly fashion change. The process of taking orders, establishing inventories and making production schedules depends on anticipation of what the trade will want-within the lead times required for the production process. And even the most skilled practitioners regard the anticipation of fashion trends as an art, an intuitive skill, which can best be done by the seat of the pants. In many industries market trends remain obscure until the yearly trade show, and then, of course, there is no guarantee that wholesale buyers' judgments will be reflected in consumer behavior. The number of industries subject to fashions of their own goes far beyond the few-garments, cosmetics, jewelry, footwear, etc.-which are clearly seen as a fashion business. Marketing is, more than any other, the process in which there is more information than you can handle. Although you may be able to predict, in principle, the effects of single-variable changes-
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
price, for example,
or color-these
31
variables never act alone.
There are always many relevant variables, with multiple, interacting effects.
-A
company tried to market in California a food product which had sold well in Detroit. The result was disastrous. Why? Detroit was familiar with opaque packaging, California with clear film. In Detroit the idea of dietary snack foods was apparently acceptable; in California, it was not. Or had the product been acceptable in Detroit in spite of its dietary connotations? In Detroit the product had enjoyed decades of use; its trade-mark was well known. In California, it was relatively unknown, but the company spent hundreds of thousands of dollars promoting it. Billboards and television "spots" were used in California. Was the failure due to the inappropriateness of these media? Were there quality problems in the California plant? In theory the company could identify and test each of the variables possibly responsible for failure. In this way they might unravel and solve the problem. But there was not sufficient time. Each day, tens of thousands of dollars were slipping away. Something had to be done quickly without a clear definition of the problem.
Companies make marketing decisions under pressures of money and time, confronted with more information than they can handle. There is no sure way of learning from past experience. The situations are never identical-California is never quite Detroitand apparently trivial differences may turn out to be critical. Moreover, it costs money to find out. The introduction of a consumer product on a nationwide scale is a major enterprise. A single regional market test, with appropriate preparation and followup, may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, and its results may not permit formulation of the national picture. Although uncertainties may be resolvable in principle, the cost of their resolution
32
Technology and Change
is high. The very process of resolving them may cost more than can be justified. To this we must add the fact, outlined above, that in the process of development, need and technology do interact. The market originally conceived for the product may be ruled out by technical limitations discovered in the process of invention. A more limited, a broader or a different market may suggest itself. In short, the product for which a market must be anticipated is not an "it" that remains constant throughout the process of development. The product changes and its possible market changes with it.2
The Cost of Innovation Throughout the process of technical innovation decisions about technical feasibility, novelty and markets, among many other factors, must be made on insufficient evidence, by individuals faced with more information than they can handle. The resolution of these uncertainties-the conversion of uncertainty to risk, which is the corporate work of innovation-takes time and money and requires justification in its own right.3 Its benefits must be balanced against its costs. The process of innovation has a cost curve, as well as a curve of difficulty, which exhibits characteristic patterns. Let us consider the development of a new metal-to-metal adhesive. It begins in the laboratory, when a chemist, working on another problem, notices an adhesive effect and reproduces it. The cost, in man hours and materials, up to this point may be in the order of $5,000 to $io,ooo. The chemist shows the adhesive to the research director, who finds it intriguing and authorizes a search of the report and patent literature, some further experimentation and a first examination of markets. This may go on for a month or two and bring the total cost to $40,000.
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
33
At this point, the research director feels he has something worth presenting to management. He makes the presentation and impresses management, which launches a full-scale development project. The adhesive formulation has certain disadvantages, of course. The development team makes efforts to improve it, as well as to explore variations of the chemistry involved in order to cover "all the ground." A detailed analysis of the market-in the automotive, aircraft and appliance industries-gets under way. It reveals the need for improved handling properties. At the same time, the company undertakes a thorough patent search which suggests that, although the formulation may be novel, the company must try certain formulations as well in order to cut off the possibility of later competition from an equally effective product. At the end of six months the total cost for this effort has risen to $200,000. Now the company draws up patent applications and files them. It sets up a pilot production line, which turns out to have a number of bugs in it. There are many more problems in producing large quantities of adhesive of reliable composition than in making small samples. Because of the scale of effort, modifications in the process become far more expensive than they were before. Quality control becomes a problem. Shelf life has to be examined. Use tests, which had already been conducted on a small scale, are now undertaken on a large-scale, long-term basis. Word of the development has gotten around, and it is decided to undertake a crash program in order to market the product before fall. A year and $6oo,ooo have gone by. By the time the first fuel production line has been set up, the marketing strategy has been settled, the sales force has been educated to the product, the use tests have been completed and evaluated, quality control techniques have been established, two years have elapsed and $i,2oo,ooo has been spent. Now the company can market the product even though bugs in production, reliabil-
34 Technology and Change ity and quality still crop up. The product may or may not achieve the volume anticipated for it. The company may or may not make a profit. The process described above is no longer and no more expensive than average for product and process development as they occur in medium to large firms. Some new products ( a new acoustic amplifier, for example) have been invented, developed and brought to the point of marketing for as little as $5,000. Other products-a new washing machine, a new electronic component, a color television process-may take over ten years and require between $10 and $20 millions before they are marketable. The figure of "seven years from conception to market" is frequently cited. Regardless of scale, however, the shape of the development cost curve remains relatively constant:
Time -+
Often, the first invention-the first demonstration of an effectrequires no more than a month or two and a few thousand dollars. As the company takes its first exploratory steps, the rise in the rate of expenditure is slow. As the company passes further checkpoints, the rate of expenditure increases. The total commitment grows in logarithmic fashion. Each new major commitment requires complementary commitments. Only when the product or process reaches commercialization does the curve begin to level off. Then, in many businesses (consumer cleaning products, for ex-
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
35
ample, or appliances), after a brief leveling o%, as the company makes major commitments to advertising, marketing and productive capacity, a step up to a new level of expenditure occurs. All of this precedes any real return to the company. The S-curve for the cost of development takes on meaning when it is put in the context of the corporate investment game and the conversion of uncertainty to risk. Despite careful efforts to establish checkpoints beyond which development will not go without adequate justification, many companies find themselves having to make investment decisions on insufficient evidence in a general climate of uncertainty. As they begin to climb the slope of the S they rather quickly reach what appears to be a point of no return: the fat is in the fire. At this point, the executive vice president can say to the president, "We have put in so much, we may as well put in a little more in order to find out whether our investment is worth while" (to which the president can always reply, "Don't throw good money after b a d ) . Occasionally, after the point of no return there comes a point where the mistake-if it is a mistake-is too big to admit. Largescale developments of the kind undertaken by supercorporations or the military may proceed for months or years beyond the point where they should have stopped because of massive comrnitments to errors too frightening to reveal. Every corporate manager has experienced the difficulties of stopping questionable development projects once they are under way. They have their own momentum. In these cases the personal commitment of the people involved in the development, the apparent logic of investment and the fear of admitting failure all combine to keep the project in motion until it falls of its own weight. These features of innovation derive greater force from our empirical knowledge that most new products and processes fail. Efforts have been made to determine rate of failure. It has been estimated variously at between 7 to 1 and 20 to I and 40 to 1, depending largely on definitions. The farther back in the process
36 Technology and Change of invention we go, the more overwhelming the rate of failure. In the absence of clear criteria of success or failure and of adequate statistics, it is not very useful to attempt a quantitative analysis. It is, at any rate, more accurate to say "Almost nothing new works," than to say "Most new developments succeed." It must be added, moreover, that a general knowledge of the tendency of new products and processes to fail is present, to varying degrees, in the minds of those who undertake their development in corporations. What we have been saying can be summarized as follows:
-The process of innovation is one of converting uncertainty to risk. Corporate work goes into tailoring the messy process of invention to a form suitable for management's investment game. Questions concerning technical feasibility, markets and novelty, among others, must be answered on insufficient evidence, by individuals confronted with more information than they can handle. The inherent uncertainty of innovation rests in no small measure on the nonrational characteristics of invention. -The process takes time and costs money. The rate at which costs pile up makes small beginnings rapidly grow to major financial commitments, all before the uncertainties of development can be resolved. The company incurs the growing danger of yielding to the momentum of its own commitment. From the point of view of corporate decision the process of innovation is essentially one of grappling with uncertainty, a process made more dangerous by growing pressures of time and money. The very resolution of uncertainties establishes commitments which make turning back more difficult, regardless of what future evidence may show. The problem of innovation within the corporation is therefore a problem of decision in the face of continuing uncertainty. A man must take leaps-not once at the beginning but many times throughout the process-in the face of uncertainty and on the
Infiouation, Uncertainty and Risk
37
of imdequate evidence. The need for such leaps of decision grows out of the uncertainty inherent in the process. A company cannot escape it by careful planning or by gathering exhaustive data. The uncertainties resist resolution ahead of time. And the process of attempting to resolve them is itself a form of commitment, which plays its role in the cost curve and has its own momentum.
Why the Rational View? In view of what has been said, we must ask why so many in industry have believed the rational myths of invention and innovation. There is more than one answer. One key to the question lies in the very nonrationality and uncertainty of invention and innovation. A man may state the rational view when he is describing a process in which he has no part, or when he is trying to tell others how to do it, or to exhort others to do it, or, again, when he is reassuring himself about it. It may function, in short, as a device. It is then an idealized, after-the-fact view of invention and innovation-invention and innovation as we would like them to be so that they can be controlled, managed, justified-rather than invention and innovation as they are. It is a view designed to calm fears, gain support or give an illusion of wisdom. This attraction of the rational view is easy to understand. Uncertainty is frightening. If the development of new products and processes is unavoidable-as it is coming to seem in a growing number of corporations-it is cold comfort that most new products fail, that invention is full of unanticipated events, that innovation is inherently uncertain and subject to a treacherous cost curve. It is far more cheering, even apparently necessary, to believe that invention and innovation are essentially rational, deliberate processes in which success is assured by intelligent effort. As
38
Technology and Change
a result, uncertainty becomes taboo, unmentionable, especially in the context of important corporate decisions. It may seem necessary then to have a clear and rational view of where we have been and where we are going and to believe that the future is essentially predictable and controllable, if only we gather the right facts and draw the right inferences from them. We suppress the surprising, uncertain, fuzzy, treacherous aspects of invention and innovation in the interest of this therapeutic view of them as clear, rational and orderly. Armed with this myth,4managers make decisions and mobilize resources. They and their subordinates must then live out the actual uncertainty of the process. But there is another answer to the question, Why the rational view?, which focuses on its partial truth and on its utility. For one thing, the rational view of invention and innovation is more nearly correct for more nearly marginal inventions. The less significant the invention, the more the process tends to be orderly and predictable. The more radical the invention, the less rationality and predictability. We can represent the universe of new products and processes by a target-like diagram (Figure 4). In the outer rings are those inventions whose acceptance requires least change. They are hardly inventions at all, in the usual sense of the term: a new cakemix flavor, a new package design, a slightly different fabric weave. These inventions require little or no change in the technology. They do not significantly advance the state of the art. They require no modification of scientific theory. production equipment can be made to handle them with only minor change. Little or no rethinking of the corporate organization or approach is required. As we move toward the center of the diagram, however, we encounter inventions like synthetic fibers, transistors, freezedrying, television. These carry with them major changes in technology; their introduction goes hand in hand with change in scientific theory. They command new concepts in marketing and new marketing organization, as well as radically different produc-
Innovation, Uncertainty and Risk
39
Tail fins for cars
tion equipment and major new investments. They force corporate organization itself to undergo major change. Between these extremes are inventions like powder metallurgy, stretch fabrics, polyethylene-coated paper and fiberglas boats. Needless to say, these assignments within the diagram are only approximate. The question of degree of novelty is complex. A technically insignificant invention, like individually packaged food products, may require major changes in marketing. A major technological invention, nylon, required surprisingly little change in textile machinery. A corporation's decision to market a product,
40
Technology and Change
new for it but old for the industry, may require major corporate reorganization. Radical novelty in any of these senses may be fraught wtih uncertainties and surprise. There is also an unusual optical effect: what looks like trivial change from afar may appear monumental close-up and from within. The decision to go national with a regional product or to market a "king-size package" may require considerable change in several corporate domains. Degree of novelty should not be confused with magnitude of effort. A relatively small development-for example, a new electronic component-may require for its acceptance major change in technology and in corporate structure. A large-scale effort, such as a new missile system, may require little more than a scaling up of proved engineering devices and principles, entailing little disruption of the technology and little organizational change. In any case, the more peripheral the development, the less change required for acceptance, the more the development tends to conform to the rational view of invention. It is also true that relatively unlimited dollars available for development tend to blur the nonrational character of invention and innovation. When, for all practical purposes, money doesn't matter-as in the case of the development of a crucial weapon in time of war-an objective can be stated at the outset and many parallel paths to its attainment undertaken. Unexpected failures, unexpected twists in the development process, can be put aside or exploited. After success has been achieved, the history of the development may be rewritten to display the straight line connecting means and end, familiar in the historical revisionism common to the field of innovation. Surprises and uncertainties may be drowned in a sea of dollars. It is, of course, disappointing when such developments are taken as models for more normal, limited industrial efforts. The Manhattan Project, which exercised such an influence on industrial research after World War 11, makes a poor model for technical innovation in industry.
Inmuation, Uncertainty and Risk But there is another sense in which belief in the rational view may be justsed. There may be utility in acting as if it were true. The process of planning, which assumes the rational view, may be useful even though plans are bound to be inadequate. The formulation of objectives for technical effort provides direction for the effort and a stimulus for action, even though the objectives will have to be modified in light of discoveries made in the process. There is utility in the formulation of such objectives, provided this flexibility is allowed and expected; otherwise, they strangle invention. There is utility in mapping out stages in the development process and identifying checkpoints along the way, even though the development plan will require radical revision. Provided that such revision is not required as a confession of failure, plans of this sort may give discipline for evaluation and direction of effort; otherwise, such plans stand in the way of invention. Planning the process of invention and innovation, which assumes the goal-directed, orderly structure of the rational view, has utility as a programing device. It is useful when treated as something from which to deviate. It is false and harmful when treated as a hard-and-fast methodology or an accurate description of the process of innovation. We must add that so strong is the attraction of the rational view, plans that begin as flexible programing devices frequently congeal as master plans or myths about the process. Planning in the flexible sense, and with it, assumption of the rational view for planning purposes, does not change the nonrational character of invention or the character of innovation as a confrontation with uncertainty requiring leaps of decision. It is, rather, a way of living with those very characteristics.
II
CHAPTER
I11
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
1.
Ambivalence
ATTITUDEST O W A R D technological innovation in American industry today are contradictory and complicated. Established firms are of two minds about it. There is, on the one hand, a conventional wisdom. The following passage, drawn from an American Management Association report, expresses an idea found in literally thousands of articles, papers and speeches delivered by American businessmen during the last fifteen or twenty years. Under the pressure of today's powerful competition, many companies will be in danger of losing their market positions almost overnight-unless they have definite, formalized programs for keeping acutely sensitive to customers' product needs; unless they have the clearly defined investment and well-organized planning required to perform product development and improvement that will satisfy all the demands of their customers. The billions of dollars industry is spending in developing new and improved products clearly indicate the need for every company to re-evaluate its present product program-to measure its progress in terms of
Ambivalence Toward lnnovation
43
what industry leaders are doing today, and what they are planning for tomorrow. . . . -COLEMAN LEE FINKEL,1958 And again,
New products, new industries and markets, new methods of making current products . . . new is a way of life with us today. Take the chemical field, for instance. In any given year, 30 to 40 per cent of sales are of products that didn't exist ten years ago. Bell and Howell estimates that more than 80 per cent of its current sales are from products that were not in existence even five years ago. And Du Pont estimates that more than half its current sales are from products developed during the past 20 years or so. -RICHARD S. REYNOLDS, JR., 1964; pp. 29-30 With their slightly hysterical tone, these passages say that American industry must engage in product innovation simply in order to keep u p with its competition. As the White Queen says in
Alice Through the Looking-Glass,
. . . here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that1 There is, on the other hand, quite a different attitude toward innovation, which cannot be inferred from what people say but from what they do. If it received expression, it would go something like this: Technical innovation is dangerous, disruptive and uncertain. It is the enemy of orderly, planned activity. It changes everything about the business we are in. It hurts. Let us talk about it, study it, praise it, espouse it-anything but do it! This may be called the unofficial view, or better still, the underground view.'
44
Technology and Change
The official attitude towed technical innovation is made up of a number of tenets: Technical innovation is essential to corporate growth and is the principle means of corporate competition. Companies must innovate at an increasing rate. New products and processes have progressively shorter life cycles. Whereas in the twenties, thirties, and forties a company could count on a product to keep its share of the market for ten to twenty years or more, a product in the fifties was and in the sixties is lucky to last five years, and in the case of some consumer product fields, six months. For these reasons a progressively larger share of corporate income comes from products introduced within the last ten years. Within the corporation the broad official approval of technical innovation extends to research as a means to innovation, to science in the service of the corporation, to personal technical creativity, to imagination in marketing advertising and sales and to creativity wherever it appears. Consumers-corporate and individual buyers of the company's product-have a dual role with respect to technical innovation. The new products must "meet their needs," as indicated in the Finkel passage quoted above. On the other hand, consumers have a responsibility to accept novelty at the rate corporations produce it, in order to satisfy corporate demands for growth and market expansion. The stake of consumers in the nation's economy demands their co-operation in this process. Technical innovation is essential to the nation as it is to the company. The nation is, in fact, a kind of supercorporation engaged in competition with other supercorporations in such fields as defense, the Space Race, the balance of payments, the Olympic games and the like. Moreover, technical innovation leads to economic g r ~ w t h . ~ The negative, underground attitude toward technical innovation has no such explicit form. Its very existence has to be inferred
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
45
from what companies do rather than from what they say. But every man engaged in technical innovation within a corporation can produce his own examples of the negative side. The following examples come from my own consulting experience: A major chemical company appointed a man to take charge of the company's efforts to develop new products away from the then-current line of business, to diversify into new areas and markets. He was a man in his fifties who had an excellent record in product development work related to the company's business. In an interview with this man I asked whether the company had ever succeeded in diversifying into a new business. Fifteen years earlier, he said, they had developed a new chemical additive. It had been a product the company used itself, so that the company was in part its own customer. We went on to discuss the product areas of interest to him now; none resembled the chemical additive he described. I asked if he was planning to go into the laboratory, find ideas, carry them out and push them forward. He said he was not. It developed, then, that this man did not have the fainest notion of doing the job he had been assigned. He felt the company was not about to let him do it; it was too risky. It was his notion that the company knew this when they put him into this role and that they did not really want the job done. Here was a mission with considerable organization around it to perform no function at all. A small company had been making foundry products since the turn of the century. It had established a reputation for high quality, built for the most part on old technology. Now, however, it was being beleaguered by competition-larger companies, foreign companies, plastics. For two years the company's managers had been exploring possible new products. What should they make in order to diversify? I talked to their new-product director, who pulled out a file drawer containing twenty-five instances of new products he had
46
Technology and Change
been working on for two years. When I asked what had happened to them, the new-product man said, "See this sheet of paper? Here are the criteria for the new products in the company. A product has to promise a gross of $~,OOO,OOO within five years, has to have a profit margin of so much, and it cannot be the sort of business where you need a line of products to get in. It can't be too far away from our present line of business. We want to use present production facilities, and it's to be sold through our present sales force." Not one of the ideas in the last two years had passed these tests. It was the product idea, and not the criteria, which was forced to give. I worked some years ago for a major producer of a natural product whose people were beginning to be concerned with the threat of synthetics. The task was to find new markets and uses for the natural product, and we discovered clues to an interesting process in which the natural product was reconstituted and adapted to a number of new uses. We found, moreover, a local company also interested in the process from the point of view of process machinery rather than that of raw material. We went back to the company producing the raw material, told them about it and found that they were excited by the possibility. The two companies got together in a joint venture. In the course of this work, the research director of the first company mentioned one day that there was someone in the laboratory, a chemist, who had been working on the material and who might know something about the process. When we went to talk to him, we discovered that he was as familiar with the literature as we, that he had had this same process idea and that he had made a number of highly promising prototype products. In short, then, if the company in question had searched the whole country, they could not have found anyone more appropriate to carry the project forward-but they hadn't known that they
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
47
had him. What we had done was to reinvent something already potentially available to the company. In the first example, the new-product man believed that his company would go through the motions of search for new products without any real intention of following through. In the second, criteria had been set up which made product innovation impossible, yet under these circumstances the company president was perfectly willing to continue the new-product effort. In the third, the company recognized potential for innovation only when it came from the outside. Clearly, in these cases, forces were operating against innovation. The spoken, official pressures for innovation as a means to growth, diversification or survival called up unspoken forces of resistance. This interaction of positive and negative forces is by no means peculiar to the few examples cited above. It is characteristic of all established corporations. There is an ambivalence toward innovation which makes all corporations, to varying degrees and in varying ways, swing back and forth between positive and negative attitudes toward change. We can understand this ambivalence in its current industrial form by examining some of the trends of the last fifty years.
2.
Research and Growth
There is scarcely a corporate report to the stockholders or a major speech by a corporation executive which does not make favorable reference to the twin ideas of research and growth. Human progress reflects directly the contributions of science and management to society. Science created the knowledge and made it available for human progress. Scientific management generated
48
Technology and Change
the management movement in the United States early in the present century. Management developed to utilize effectively the products of science for economic growth and social progress. -JOHN F. MEE, op. cit. The theories associated with these concepts have become second nature to American industry. Nevertheless, in the form in which we know them they are less than fifty years old. The concept of industrial research emerged at the turn of the century. It is only since World War I1 that we have seen the full flowering of technical innovation as a major and contributing function of the firm, on a par with other functions such as marketing, production and financial control. Similarly, growth as a major corporate goal in American industry seems to have come into existence well after 1900. The acceptance of the idea of technical innovation as essential to corporate growth is a post-World War I1 phenomenon. The two ideas have developed in concert. It is instructive to look at the curve of the U.S. Gross National Product since 1900 (Figure 5). What is apparent here is a long period of relative inactivity from about 1900 through the 1930's. During the forties and fifties a steep rise began which has continued through the present despite brief plateaus. Along with the sharp increase in growth of the GNP in the forties and fifties there was a spurt in the growth of large corporations. These were years of corporate concentration and expansion. And along with actual national and corporate growth there emerged an ideology of g r ~ w t h On . ~ both a national and a corporate level, growth has become the principal sign of success. As a sign of success, growth has a number of things to recommend it. It fits with our general admiration of bigness and power. It is measurable. Amid the many indeterminate, intangible accomplishments of life in corporate and national organizations, economic growth stands out as a concrete accomplishment that can be pointed to in no uncertain terms. Moreover, it lies within the time scale of a given administration. Within a period of a few
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
49
Billions of dollars Current prices 600
500
400
300
200
loa
years it is possible to affect the growth rate of a company or a nation. A corporate president can show, conclusively, that within his tenure sales have doubled, so many companies have been acquired, production has boomed. For the more sophisticated, growth in rate of profit or return on capital can be shown as well. But the concept of growth-a rise in the c u r v e i s central. Lacking growth, complicated explanations are necessary. With it, almost nothing need be said. It has already been remarked that corporate and national growth in our time are rate phenomena. In the forties and fifties
50
Technology and Change
our economy underwent what Rostov refers to as a "take-off'-a steep rise from a relative plateau. And with the change in rate came a change in ideas. A combany that grew only with the population came to be regarded as stagnant. It was no longer sufficient in management to provide reliable stewardship. Growth and, even more so, growth in the rate of growth became necessary conditions for success. In order to permit scope for these ambitions, and in order to allow corporations and their leaders room to prove themselves by the accepted criteria, the economy had to be regarded as indefinitely expandable. The concept of industrial research appeared as a new and strange idea in the early years of this century. By and large, companies became involved in industrial research in three sequential stages, which we will call the Research Cycle. In the first, or craft, stage, technology is regarded as the private property of a few individuals. It is empirical and intuitive. It comes only through lifelong experience. The sign that a man has it is his membership in the guild or its equivalent. The technology is secret and proprietary-secret, not only from company to company but from individual to individual. In the early years of the century individuals responsible for wire drawing would carry their own lubricant home with them in a bucket lest its secret be discovered by the other workers. Machinists cherished their private cutting compounds. In the craft stage, technology is, above all, nonrational. There are no general principles, no explanations of phenomena; only observation of what happens when you do this or that. Today there are still islands of craft in papermaking, textiles, leather, graphic arts, ceramics; whole companies are dependent on the real or imagined skill of a few men. Craft has not disappeared with the introduction of new technology and the scientific method. In the field of plastics, for example, there are men who know how to mix catalyst and resin and time the mixture for best results, although they cannot fully explain what they are doing. Even jet engines are tended by men
Ambioalence Toward Innovation
51
who often regard them as having personalities of their own, requiring special attention for best performance, in ways they cannot explain. New technologies are apt, in fact, to generate a fringe of craft, and with it the anthropomorphic, loving view of materials and processes characteristic of craftsmen. In the second stage, scientific analysis of production begins to replace craft. Engineering begins to replace mechanical ingenuity. Chemistry begins to replace kitchen formulations. The new scientific grasp of production pays off in increased productivity, reduced cost and better control of quality. Technical service to sales begins. But technology is still fighting its battle against craft and is still very much of a subordinate function-a service to production or a service to sales. In the third stage, technology comes into its own. The company has extended and consolidated its scientific grasp of production and quality control. It begins to undertake research into the materials and processes related to its field without being sure where that research will lead. Work is done toward the development of new products and processes to replace those in existence. Research and development is no longer a service to production or to sales. It has its own independent organizational status, symbolized by a corporate vice president for R & D. Its results may threaten, rather than support, current sales and production practice. The company becomes accustomed to investing a certain percentage of its sales in research, which is accepted as a major corporate function. The research cycle outlines simplified steps in a complicated process-the growth and acceptance of the research idea in industry. The cycle did not move uniformly through all of American industry at once. It moved, in waves, through one area of industry and then through another. The chemical and petrochemical industries began their cycle in the early years of the century. The chemical industry was then a new industry, built in large measure on the chemistry-particu-
52
Technology and Change
lady the German chemistry-of the middle and late nineteenth century. The research idea began about the same time in the growing electrical industry. It spread, then, to other fields. At any given time in the last fifty years it has been possible to identify those industries in the third stage, those in the second and those still in the first. In our own time, the chemical and petrochemical industries, and those (like pharmaceuticals) closely related to chemistry; the electronic industry; the aerospace and nuclear industries; and to some extent the primary metals industries-can be located in the third stage. Others, like the automotive industry, are still for the most part in the second. And still others, like the building, textile and leather industries, are in process of transition from the craft stage. Of course, even within industry categories, progress through the research cycle is uneven. Ten per cent of an industry may be much more advanced than the rest. The research idea was becoming well established in American industry by World War 11. But World War I1 gave it new impetus and new models of operation. It provided clearly defined technical goals, imbued with life-and-death urgency. It created new demands for productive capacity, giving incentive to the development of new equipment and the replacement of old. In radar, in the proximity fuze, in the V-2's and, above all, in the atomic bomb, it gave examples of unprecedented technological accomplishment. And in organizations like the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Manhattan Project, it gave models of large-scale, deliberate, organized research and development. Following World War 11, in the period of apparently unlimited demand of the late forties and early fifties, American industry-in a few ~rivilegedsectors-took up the model of large-scale science. It accepted in principle, even where it did not in practice, the idea of the practical utility of scientific work undertaken at first without clear immediate profit-oriented objectives, and the idea of
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
53
massive, organized
technological programs on the model of the Manhattan Project. In the fifties, with Sputnik-a large-scale demonstration that "the competitor had the product"-the research idea, in industry and more particularly this time in Government, went through another period of "take-off." The American reaction to Sputnik raised to a high point acceptance of the idea that scientific activity undertaken on a large scale will produce useful results, that research and development must become permanent independent functions of Government and corporations and that essentially any technological goal can be achieved with sufficient organized effort and investment. Sputnik also heightened American concern with technical manpower and technical information. Along with these beliefs came a set of values for the new problem of handling or managing scientific and technical activity within the corporation. The fifties saw a proliferation of articles, books and speeches about this topic and a diversity of corporate styles for solving the problem. In essence, this diversity of views and practices centered around two dominant models. According to the first, Hire a good man and leave him alone. The scientific function is sui generis. Good men, under first-rate technical guidance, will uncover new knowledge from which corporate profit can later be made. In the interim, corporate peering over the shoulder will simply retard progress. In the fifties this view was popular with scientists and with corporate executives influenced by after-the-fact accounts of the scientific exploits of World War 11. It led to the establishment of central corporate research laboratories headed by Great Men of science who were left, essentially, to their own devices. It is, in effect, a theory of scientific laissez-faire coupled with a theory of the Great Man.
Technology and Change
54
The second model dealt with the process of technical innovation as a whole and saw it as essentially similar in character to other major functions of the firm and, like them, subject to rational management. It was, in effect, the rational view of innovation outlined in Chapter 11. The two antithetical models vied for popularity and influence during the flowering of the idea of industrial research. They were alternate means of linking research to growth. The patterns and ideologies of corporate growth and industrial research have complemented one another. The concept of industrial research rose with our swelling economy. Research came to be seen as the instrument of growth, and growth as the occasion for and object of research. The two ideas have become, in effect, the twin pillars of a new corporate faith. Corporate executives who used to say that corporations must achieve soundness through probity, conscientiousness and hardheadedness now state routinely that corporations must grow through research. But in the late fifties and early sixties there were signs of change. American companies well advanced in their own research cycles have undergone what may be called a wave of scepticism, disillusionment or realism about the research function. Whereas many of them began the decade building on the models of World War 11, determined to "get research and set up central research divisions headed by outstanding scientists, by 1960 most such companies were in the midst of reactions which can be described as follows: -It
is not enough simply to hire good men and leave them alone. The product of a laboratory handled in this way is apt to consist primarily of scientificpapers. -Effective technical research makes demands on the corporation, and on corporate management, which had not been foreseen.
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
55
-The job of finding ways to put research and new technology in the service of corporate goals is a serious and difficult one. It may require modification of corporate goals, and of the very style of the corporation, to enable it to make effective use of the results of research. In reaction, some companies have eliminated their central research divisions. Others have reduced their research budgets - and concentrated on technical targets close to the day-to-day operations of the business. Still others have set about examining the problem of the relation between corporate and technical activities and goals, with the aim of developing new models of corporate effort. The wave of reaction is not merely against certain models of corporate research. Part of the reaction is due to a new understanding of the demands and uncertainties produced by the need to exploit the results of research. In extreme cases, as we will be seeing, research-which had been idealized at the outset-ends up as the scapegoat. These symptoms can be observed in the Federal Government, as well, but at a lag. After the headlong plunge into Governmentsupported research which followed Sputnik, the Congress has begun to ask questions about the use of research results and the problem of getting economic benefit from investment in re~ e a r c h Its . ~ questions are similar to those asked by advanced industry over the last decade. American industry's attitudes toward growth and research are changing slowly. As domestic markets have become saturated, as foreign industrial concerns have begun to provide more vigorous competition for foreign markets, and as large, established companies have become more sophisticated in the experience of investment in research and development, there has been some shift away from the conventional wisdom with respect to growth and research. Of course, the shift has not been complete. It would still
56
Technology and Change
be unhealthy for the president of a large corporation to come out against technical innovation as a means to corporate growth. It must also be added that many segments of industry are only now beginning their move into the third stage of the research cycle. For many companies, the shift has been not away from commitment to technical innovation but away from an uncritical acceptance of research as a means to growth, and toward a more serious concern with the problems of adapting technical effort to corporate objectives. But these preliminary shifts in the conventional wisdom have made it more nearly possible within companies to speak of the forces of resistance to technical innovation which, in the early and middle fifties, had gone underground.
3. Resistance t o Innovation For the forces that resist technical innovation we have such designations as "obstacles," "inertia," "foot-dragging" and "resistance to change." These designations succeed in conveying the impression that resistance to innovation is entirely negative. The talk about resistance to innovation tends to come from within the framework of official approval of innovation. It suggests, moreover, that the resistance is somehow mechanical (inertia, footdragging, sand-in-the-gears) and can be removed by mechanical means (motivation, lubrication). But resistance to innovation is central to the working of the corporation. And it is by no means an externally imposed obstacle to the good and natural processes of the firm. Because of the strength of the official approval of innovation, disapproval of it tends to be inadequately expressed. It is usually presented as the bad thing that others do. As a result, it tends to go underground, where it is safer and more effective, more fatal to efforts at change and more resistant to attack.
Ambivalence Toward lnnovation
57
The corporate society. In order to begin to understand resistance to innovation in the corporation, we need to look at the corporation as a society, analogous to other societies in churches, governments, communities, armies, hospitals, camps and countries. Then, given the nature of invention and innovation, resistance seems natural. To say that a company is a society is to say, first, that it is not simply a place to work and earn a living but a setting in which people live, fully as important for the quality of their lives as the home to which they return at the end of the working day. It provides objectives, formal and informal rules, values, punishments and rewards, styles of personal behavior and a language of its own and manages to maintain these characteristics in something like a stable state, even though its members may frequently change. Like other societies a corporation has certain objectives that are open and explicit ("to make money!," "to grow!," "to return a profit to the shareholders!") and others, nonetheless real, which may remain unstated ("to provide a safe birth for loyal employees," "to dominate the town," "to keep the family name clean," "to humble our principal competitor"). It provides values for its members and even an approximate rank ordering of values. In certain corporate societies the highly valued characteristics may be loyalty to the corporation, moral dependability, conscientiousness. In other corporations these characteristics may be of low value; importance may be attached instead to aggressiveness, manipulative ability, shrewdness, willingness to encounter and overcome the extracorporate world. Corporate rules may be formal and explicit ("Working hours are from 8:30 to s:oo," "Each employee must be responsible for his defined accountability," "Corporate secrets are to be strictly kept") or they may be powerful but unstated ("Top management's commands are to be obeyed without question," "It is permissible to take liberties with formal rules if you have made a
58
Technology and Change
recognized contribution to the firm," "Special deference is to be paid to members of the owning family"). The rules of the corporation gain their force from formal and informal punishments and rewards, which vary in kind from society to society. For recognized contribution there are promotions, advancements in salary, freedom to do interesting work; and there are also freer and more intimate contacts with management, respect of one's peers, greater license in imposing commands on others. For violation of the rules there are obstacles to promotion, demotions in grade and title; and there may also be refusals of privileges (travel, attendance at meetings, use of corporate facilities) and the disapproval or contempt of superiors, peers or subordinates. The corporation attracts, teaches, and propagates certain formal and informal patterns of behavior, often in such a way as to establish recognizable corporate personality types. The management group of one large corporation is called informally "the deacons of the church." A large midwestern concern consists almost entirely of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men of rural midwestern background, who are frank, conscientious, churchgoing and strong in their identification as "country boys." The corporation develops a language for the peculiarities of its own business (the production materials may consist of "slubs," "nibs," "pickers"; the major customer may be "our friends across the water"), for relations between people and for behavior shared with other societies (working toward an objective may be "working against a goal"; sales may be "launching a barrage"). The corporation, like other ~ocieties,~ makes demands on its members, but it also provides them with a great deal in return. In addition to formal and informal rewards for work and contribution, it gives its members a sense of self, an identity. It does this not only by making it possible for them to say "I am a Ford man" or "I am a General Electric engineer," but by establishing certain
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
59
corporate roles, sets of expectations for the kinds of people who will fill those roles and means by which the roles can be learned.
. . . expected activity in the organization implies a conception of the actor and an organization can therefore be viewed as a place for generating assumptions about identity. In crossing the threshold of the establishment, the individual takes on the obligation to be alive to the situation, to be properly oriented and aligned in it. In participating in an activity in the establishment, he takes on the obligation to involve himself at the moment in the activity. Through this orientation and engagement of attention and effort, he visibly establishes his attitude to the establishment and to its implied conceptions of himself. To engage in a particular activity in the prescribed spirit is to accept being a particular kind of person who dwells in a particular kind of world. -ERVING GOFFMAN, 1961, p. 186 To help in the establishment of identities for corporate members, the corporation provides role models, individuals whose behavior stands as an ideal for a certain kind of corporate role, complete with patterns of behavior toward outsiders and insiders, superiors and subordinates, near and distant colleagues. To a far greater extent than is generally realized, the corporate society, as it shapes the identities of its members, draws on resources of emotional energy. It provides a setting for emotional involvement by constructing an organizational stage on which individuals can play out their own life dramas, brought by them to the corporation from their previous lives in work, school and family. This repertory of dramas includes the dramas of Revolt Against Injustice, Loyalty Under Fire, Sacrifice, Redemption, Comradeship and, most significantly, Making Good. The drama of Making Good is central to the broader society of which the corporate society is a part, and through it the corporation achieves much of its hold on the emotional lives of its members. The props of the drama may be soap, cigarettes, drugs, potato chips, lubricants, fasteners, product campaigns or cost-reduction programs,
60
Technology and Change
and all are invested with the emotional capital brought to them by the participants. The small significance of these vehicles to outsiders is totally disproportionate to their meaning in the dramas of success and failure within the corporation. In many respects, the corporate society shares functions with the noncorporate societies of church, army or family. But it has other attributes derived specifically from the fact that it is a society designed to accomplish work (as opposed, for example, to hospitals, monasteries, prisons or families). It is a working society which provides a setting for individual career dramas, tied to performance in work, and a political hierarchy designed for control. Tom Burns has described the operation of these three contextswork, career, politics-as aspects of the corporate society. Business enterprises are co-operative systems assembled out of the usable attributes of people. They are also places in which people compete for advancement. Similarly, members of a business concern are at one and the same time co-operators in a common enterprise and rival for the material and intangible rewards of successful competition with each other. The hierarchic order of rank and power, realized in the organization chart that prevails in all organizations, is both a control system and a career ladder. -TOM BURNS,1965, P. 5 Still further, the corporate society takes a special form because of its linkage to industrial work. The corporation is a society which accomplishes work through division of labor-a proposition now so much taken for granted that it is surprising to think it once represented a discovery. In the modern industrial corporation, division of labor has been carried to great lengths. Not only are there broadly separate functions tied to classes of individuals-marketing, production, finance, law, accounting, technology, management-but within each of these there are many subdivisions, any one of which may constitute a career. This functionalism rests on the clear description of the varied, interrelated tasks that make up the corporation's work.
Ambivalence Toward lnnouation
61
The "job description" is a statement of task meant to be independent of the individual who fills the job. Individuals become "personnel" or "manpower" in relation to such job descriptions. The stability and discreteness of these tasks, which are seen as essential to the corporation's efficiency, give rise to the formation of many subsocieties, each made up of individuals concentrated on a set of shared tasks and each, increasingly, tied to a specialized kind of training and professional status. Thus, there are within the large modern corporation little societies of marketing men, production men, quality control men, comptrollers, organization specialists and, of course, the elite society of top management. Each, as we will be seeing, tends to develop its own view of the corporation, its own values and objectives, its own language and its own jealous sense of its prerogatives. In the twentieth century we have become increasingly aware of the tendency of this industrial functionalism to take on the characteristics of the production process itself. Not only is the complex work of the corporation divided into many discrete tasks performed by discrete individuals, but there has been a strong tendency to make these tasks consist of simple, uniform, repeatable elements capable of at least partial mechanization. Marshall McLuhan finds the roots of this tendency, and of the mass production process which fathered it, in the uniform, repeatable characteristics of the printed word: Repeatability is the core of the mechanical principle that has dominated our world, especially since the Gutenberg technology. The message of the print and of typography is primarily that of repeatability. With typography, the principle of movable type introduced the means of mechanizing any handicraft by the process of segmenting and fragmenting an integral action. -MCLUHAN, 1964 But long ago Thorstein Veblen pointed out the growing power of the production model, and specifically of the machine, for the
62
Technology and Change
organization of all industrial work and for the structure of the corporate organization itself.
. . . the modern industrial system at large bears the character of a comprehensive, balanced, mechanical process. In order for an efficient working of this industrial process at large, the various constituent sub-processes must work in due coordination throughout the whole. . . . -VEBLEN, 1958, P. 14
Veblen would have been interested in the recent proliferation of mechanical metaphors for industrial work, in phrases like "big wheel," "spark plugs," "making the wheels go round," "putting on the brakes," "cranking up the machine" and "sitting in the driver's seat." Seen from this point of view, the current interest in the programing and computerization of industrial functions previously performed by human beings appears as the extension of a much older tendency to form industrial work on the model of machine work. The process as a whole depends on the reduction of industrial tasks, insofar as possible, to series of simple, uniform, repeatable and predictable steps. Seen from still a different point of view-the view from the top--the corporate society is designed to allow management to play the investment game described in Chapter 11. From this point of view, all subordinate corporate functions serve either to present top management with investment opportunities for analysis or to carry out the investment decisions top management has made. Corporate success and failure are defined in terms of the outcomes of the investment game, and the individual career ladder gets its meaning from its relation to the game. The game, in turn, is played with other corporations in a context that is often more warlike than gamelike. The corporate society sets itself toward other corporations much as a nation sets itself toward other nations. We have already seen how much a company in competition with other companies is like a nation at
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
63
war with other nations, with new products, sales strategies and the like playing the role of weapons. The process and problems of technical innovation in a corporate society are, in this sense, directly analogous to the process and problems of technical innovation toward the military functions of a nation. Being a member of a corporate society is therefore like being in a country in a state of war. There are those in the front lines and those in the rear, there is generalship, there are casualties, and there are communiqu4s from the field of battle. Threats to the corporate society. The corporate society, like all societies, is in a state of dynamic conservatism. It strives for survival, stability and continuity. It is active in its efforts to achieve its objectives and to maintain its society-its structure, functions, values, language and style of operation. "Inertia" is wholly inadequate as a way of describing this dynamism, for inertia suggests passive resistance to change whereas, in reality, the corporate society-like all societies and like biological organisms-is actively striving to maintain itself. Its life is a constant response to threats either to its survival or to its identity. In this it is like homeostatic systems, as described by Walter Cannon, and like the self-system as described by Harry Stack Sullivan : In an open system, such as our bodies represent, compounded of unstable material and subjected continually to disturbing conditions, constancy is in itself evidence that agencies are acting, or ready to act, to maintain this constancy. If a state remains steady it does so because any tendency towards change is automatically met by increased effectiveness of the factor or factors which resist the change. The regulating system which determines a homeostatic state may comprise a number of cooperating factors brought into action at the same time or successively.
64
Technology and Change
When a factor is known which can shift a homeostatic state in one direction it is reasonable to look for automatic control of that factor or factors having an opposing effect. -CANNON, 1963, pp. 299-300
. . . the anti-anxiety system which is called the self-system-the system involved in the maintenance of felt interpersonal security . . . (p. 1089) The self-system thus is an organization of educative experience called into being by the necessity to omit or to minimize incidents of anxiety. -SULLIVAN,1953, p. 165 Threats to the corporate society may be external or internal. External threats come from competitors (who cut prices, improve product or service quality, reduce costs or introduce new products), from Government (which imposes unfavorable regulations) or from customers (who change preferences, tire of products or make excessive demands). Corporations tend to be well armed to cope with such threats; it is precisely their business to cope with them. Internal threats come from staff who revolt against management directives, who fight with one another rather than with the competitive firms or who seek to displace those in power. While these threats may be serious and occasionally fatal, it is again part of the business of management to cope with them, and the business is one that management tends to understand. The deepest internal threats, however, affect the central operations, structure and identity of the firm. And nothing is better equipped to do this than the process of technological innovation. Technological innovation attacks the corporate society at all levels. The corporate society is built to function on the model of the production process-that is to say, in a manner that is rational, orderly, uniform and predictable. But invention and innovation
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
65
are nonrational processes that resist control. They are precisely what cannot be managed, and in spite of the best efforts of the proponents of the rational view to harness them with mechanisms and to marshal1 them in orderly array, they keep popping out of the mold, dismaying those who attempt to control them, even when they succeed. -Unexpected success is no less destructive of the rational view of corporate activity than is unexpected failure. When the addition of carbon black turns out to increase the strength of rubber; when the book-mending tape turns out to have a multiplicity of unexpected consumer uses; when the new plastic, designed for a cheaper molding process, turns out to perform well in a completely different application-the corporate manager can only react with a wry smile. In ways he did not understand, and was unable to state before the fact, things have gone well; but what has he learned that will prepare him to cope with the next time? Corporate behavior is based on regular, orderly, linear, predictable processes-the extension of the industrial manufacturing process itself. How is it to absorb invention? If invention can appear to the manager as a random process, innovation can appear to him as a kind of con game. Caught in the peculiar cost curve of innovation, he may become committed to a mistake which resists detection before the fact and refuses to lend itself to a straightforward playing of the investment game. The corporate society is built on the principle of functionalism which requires, for effective operation, that each separate corporate function remain relatively constant over time. Accordingly, each subsociety arrayed around a function strives to maintain a constant framework for operation. It wants to do predictable jobs under predictable circumstances. But technological innovation requires change-and often unpredictable change-in virtually
66
Technology and Change
every major corporate function. The more radical the innovation (in the sense of the target diagram in Chapter 11), the more functional change it threatens. In most consumer companies the dominant function is marketing. The company is tied to its sales force, its distribution channels, its brand names, its consumer franchise. When technological innovation threatens these resources, the company resists it with the full force of present success: -The research department of an appliance company developed a new means of preserving foods. It would have replaced conventional refrigerators. The sales department laughed the idea out of court. They already had 30 per cent of the refrigerator market: how could this new principle do anything but hurt their position? Their distributors were sold on the current line, understood the product, knew how to sell it. Why upset them? Millions had been invested in establishing the firm name in refrigerators: why undercut that investment? In industries like paper, chemicals, lumber, metals and automobiles, production is King. The whole company revolves around the manufacturing process. Success is measured in terms of percentage of utilized production capacity: at 75 per cent of capacity the company is at a normal state; at 80 per cent, good times; at 70 per cent, disaster. The problem in such companies is to keep the machines busy. -In every manufacturing company there is a thick-set, crewcut, grey-haired, bespectacled, lantern-jawed guy who says, Nol He looks at a new idea and asks, Will it use more of our phthalic anhydride? Will it keep the bag machine busy? Will it take up our surplus caustic? If it will do none of these things, it is impractical and dangerous. If, far from employing the excess capacity of machines, the new idea would cause those machines to be replaced, then it is subver-
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
67
sive and essentially unthinkable. It is simply "not our business." In the case of inventions near the center of the target diagram, the disruptions threatened affect several levels of the company at once. Consider the replacement of a natural material by a synthetic:
-The established technology will be rendered obsolete. Men who have built up craft skills over decades will suddenly find their skills irrelevant to the new problems. Production will change from batch processing of materials to a continuous chemical process. New means of controlling product quality, production scheduling and inventory will have to be devised. The far greater productive capacity of the new machines will require new marketing concepts: the old volumes will no longer be adequate. l;may binecessary to double or triple the volume of sales, at lower prices, in order to keep the company's net profit constant. New accounting methods will be required. The very strategy of sales will have to change. Product quality will no longer have the same meaning. New salesmen, and new forms of technical service to sales, will be required. The business, and hence the nature of the corporation, will no longer be the same. Not the least of the effects of technological innovation is on top management itself. For top management the cumulative effects of all these changes may be overwhelming. If the president came up through the business and draws his confidence from his intimate knowledge of the details of the present operation, technological innovation may throw him onto completely unfamiliar ground. He understood the old business; he does not understand the new one. How can he manage if he does not understand the business he is in? Where is he to draw the resources of experience he needs in order to trust his own judgments? Is he to become completely
68
Technology and Change
dependent on the proponents of the new product or process? He is faced with a crisis of both self-confidence and trust in others. Innovation threatens also the hierarchy of power and prestige on which the corporation's system of control is built, for its political structure is tied to an established technology. Radical shift in technology disrupts the structure. Elting Morison, in an elegant study, examines this process as it occurred in the U.S. Navy. He studies the Navy's resistance to the introduction of continuous-aim firing. In Theodore Roosevelt's time, this new way of keeping guns trained on an enemy ship, even when both ships were in motion, had been combat-tested with spectacular results. Nevertheless, the Navy Department rejected the new technology. Morison's analysis of this rejection is as follows: The Navy is not only an armed force-it is a society. In the forty years following the Civil War, this society had been forced to accommodate itself to a series of technological changes. . . . These changes wrought extraordinary changes in ship design, and therefore in the concepts of how ships were to be used; that is, in fleet tactics and even in naval strategy. . . . To these numerous innovations, producing as they did a spreading disorder throughout a service with heavy commitments to formal organization, the Navy responded with grudging pain. It is wrong to assume, as civilians frequently do, that this blind reaction to technological change springs exclusively from some causeless Bourbon distemper that invades the military mind. There is a sounder and more attractive base. The opposition, where it occurs, of the soldier and sailor to such change springs from the normal human instinct to protect oneself and more especially one's way of life. Military organizations are societies built around and upon the prevailing weapons systems. Intuitively and quite correctly the military man feels that a change in weapons portends a change in the arrangements of his society. The point holds good for industrial technology and industrial organization, as well. -The shift to individualized machine drives, to standard lubricants, and to engineered materials, has all but eliminated the role of the
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
69
traditional machinist and changed the character of the machine tool industry. -The introduction of on-site mass production techniques and prefabricated components has begun to take the craft out of building technology and to replace the small-time contractor with the entrepreneur of the building industry. -The new mechanical-chemical technology of agriculture has replaced the family farm by the large industrialized farm, and created a national problem of agricultural adjustment which has lasted for well over thirty years. Morison goes on to summarize his case history as follows: I. The essential idea for change occurred in part by chance, but in an environment that contained all the essential elements for change, and to a mind prepared to recognize the possibility of change. 2. The basic elements-the gun, gear and sight-were put in the environment by other men-men interested in designing machinery to serve different purposes or simply interested in the instrument themselves. 3. These elements were brought into successful combination by minds not interested in the instruments themselves, but in what they could do with them. . . . They may also, not so consciously, have been interested in the implied revolt that is present in the support of all change. . . . 4. He [Sims] and his colleagues were opposed on this occasion by men who were apparently moved by three considerations: honest disbelief in the dramatic but substantiated claims of the new process, protection of the existing devices and instruments with which they identified themselves, and maintenance of the existing society with which they were identified. 5. The deadlock between those who sought change and those who sought to retain things as they were was broken only by an appeal to superior force--a force removed from and unidentified with the mores, conventions, devices of the society.
Morison concludes: We are not yet emotionally an adaptive society, though we try systematically to develop forces that tend to make us one. We en-
70
Technology and Change courage the search for new inventions; we keep the mind stimulated, bright, and free to seek out fresh means of transport, communication, and energy; yet we remain, in part, appalled by the consequences of our ingenuity and, too frequently, try to find security through the shoring-up of ancient and irrelevant conventions; the extension of purely physical safeguards, or the delivery of decisions we ourselves should make into the keeping of superior authority like the state. -MORISON, 1950
Underlying all these threats is the threat innovation imposes on corporate society by forcing confrontation with uncertainty. We have seen in the previous chapter the primary uncertainties inherent in the process of innovation itself. We have seen in this chapter how innovation threatens change in the functions and political structure of the firm, creating a kind of secondary uncertainty by undermining the bases on which the corporate society is prepared to respond. In situations of uncertainty the traditional responses of the corporate society are inappropriate. Increase in sales effort, reduction in prices, economy moves, crackdown on staff, change of management-none of these makes sense (although many may be tried) if the company's situation contains more information than it can handle. In brief, technological innovation disrupts the stable state of corporate society. It affronts, on every level, that society's vigorous and continuing efforts to stay as it is. In Marshall McLuhan's words : That each new method of transporting commodity or information should have come into existence in a bitter competitive battle against previously existing devices is not surprising. Each innovation is not only commercially disrupting, but socially and psychologically corroding, as well. -MCLUHAN, 1964, p. 250
Response to threat. To this onslaught, the corporate society responds in a variety of ways. Some of the more evident are these: I t rejects the effort at innovation. It puts down the idea, fires or
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
71
demotes the men associated with it and makes its further discussion taboo. Many corporate pasts are littered with discarded efforts of this sort; begun, then stopped and relegated to corporate limbo, they come to light only inadvertently or with patient digging. It allows the effort to continue but isolates it from the rest of the corporation. In this way, research projects or whole research departments may function in a vacuum, cut off from the contacts with the corporation essential to their coming to reality. It contains the threat, allowing it to proceed but on a level so much reduced that the innovation is always far short of critical mass. It seeks to convert the threat to an activity acceptable within the corporate society. Efforts at radical innovation become product improvements or service to production or sales, which can be carried on without disrupting effect. These are straightforwardly negative responses. But the corporation cannot respond to innovation in an exclusively negative way. As we have seen, the corporation believes itself committed to technological innovation as an instrument for achieving corporate objectives. Innovation is something the corporate society must both espouse and resist. It may succeed in this by following a variety of strategies proper to those in conflict: It may compartmentalize innovation, permitting it to occur in one part of its business while preventing it from occurring in others. It may oscillate between support and resistance, confusing corporate members by an on-again, off-again approach to change. It may resist innovation while not appearing to do so, while in fact proclaiming the official doctrine of innovation. As in the three examples cited earlier, the corporation may encourage the development of new product ideas only to find consistently that none of them meets the stringent criteria laid down in advance (just as a
72
Technology and Change
mother may want her son to get married but never approves of the girls he brings home); or it may foster a research effort, only to reject or ignore its results. To the extent that the corporation engages in the enterprise of technological innovation, it must somehow cope with the uncertainty inherent in the process. It must foster the process while resisting, or protecting itself from, elements essential to the process. The company's way of protecting itself against uncertainty may be by selective inattention, in which uncertainty is selectively screened from perception; by making uncertainty taboo; or by the creation of corporate mythology. Myths are ways of simplifying and structuring situations more complicated than we can handle. They tend to cluster around events of great significance or danger-birth and death, for example. Corporate myths, like the myths of other cultures, are highly selective views of life, taken to be true without question and held as projective models for life in the culture. They relieve anxiety. They permit action where decisive action seems to be required. From the inside they appear as powerful, condensed truths, reflecting unspoken feelings about matters of great moment. Characteristically, no one feels the need to verify them. A company, like other societies, produces myths of origin, of the "early days" and of the Founder. It produces "life myths" such as the myths of corporate war, complete with images of the enemy, the moral basis of the struggle and the rewards of victory. And it produces myths designed to cope with the uncertainty, ambiguity and danger of technological innovation. Myths which have grown up to serve this need are the rational myth of innovation and the related myth of the Great Man. The rational myth, as we have seen, restructures processes of invention and innovation, presenting them as though seen after the fact in the spirit of the production process itself. Out of disorderly, uncertain, random processes, it makes something orderly and sequential, subject to familiar techniques of management. The myth of
Ambivalence Toward Innovation
73
the Great Man shifts the burden of uncertainty to a single individual-the Boss, conceived as omniscient-who disposes of the ideas proposed from below. In a sense, these myths reimpose one another. The emphasis of the rational myth on antecedent justification and review presupposes a being at the top capable of evaluating proposed innovations. When the corporate society lives by these myths, innovation is impossible. The myths serve both to appear to free the process of innovation from the uncertainty inherent in it and to provide effective, though unspoken, resistance in the very act of granting official approval. These strategies do not usually represent a conscious pose or a management deception. They are responses of corporate society as a whole to two requirements which are equally legitimate, even necessary, but unfortunately in conflict with one another. The society of a corporation attempts to maintain a stable state. This effort is not inertia but conservative dynamism. The various forms of corporate resistance to change which reflect themselves as obstacles to technological innovation are processes of conservation essential to the survival of any social or biological organism. Active conservatism is the natural state of organisms. It is nonsense to require companirs to throw off this old-fashioned habit. But it is the crisis of modern industrial corporations that they are also required to undertake technical change destructive of their stable states in order to survive. It is this paradox which makes them vulnerable, accounts for their ambivalence to innovation and forces them to adopt new forms and styles of change. It must be apparent that these statements about industrial corporations hold, in only slightly altered form, for other societies of our time and, indeed, for our society as a whole. We have already had occasion to notice the analogy between the corporation and the nation: they are both political organizations confronted with the dilemmas of technical change. We might have spoken, as well, about the Church, the university and the scientific community.
Technology and Change Each feels the requirements for an increasing rate of innovation which, in turn, affronts its conservative dynamism. This ambivalence, shared by the corporation with other changing societies, provides the stage for the drama of corporate innovation. 74
I/
The Drama of Corporate
/I
Innovation
1.
An Allegory of the Corporation
ONCE,T H I R T Y T O a hundred years ago, there was a little man. He had an idea, or he became the champion and supporter of someone with an idea. Perhaps the idea had to do with a new way to produce saccharine, or with air brakes or safety fasteners or a new way of forming metal. He was determined to build a business around the idea. He became the idea's entrepreneur. If he did not already have money, he had to get money. He borrowed it. He found supporters. And he worried about meeting installments on the loan. He had to learn about finance. He had to figure out how the product was to be sold, and, probably, he had to sell it himself. He had to solve the problems of making the product for a price. Sometimes he solved these problems in his own basement. He became acquainted, intimately and at first hand, with finance, sales, technology and production. He held these things in his head and worked them out. And he began to make and sell his product. People bought it. He was able to expand, hire more people and move to a new building to accommodate the staff and equip-
76
Technology and Change
ment he needed. He added to his line of products and formed divisions around these products. He began to buy up his competitors. He participated in the upward movement of the economy. He brought forth further new divisions and hired more people. His divisions brought forth divisions. He was now a national company; his salesmen spanned the continent. And two things had happened to him: -He could no longer do everything or keep everything in his head. -He could no longer serve as the entrepreneur of each new idea. He had his hands full. The business had become very big and very complicated. It threatened to get out of hand. It needed management, co-ordination, administration, at the very top. The little man had to hold the reins while others pulled the load, for there was more to do than he could handle. He became an administrator. The responsibilities and information he used to hold in his hands and his head were parceled out among other men. There was a division of the work, and the new men became specialists in finance, who worried about the handling of the money and paying off the loans; specialists in marketing, who worried about selling the products and finding out who would buy them; specialists in production, who worried about making the products economically and reliably; and specialists in technology, who did something the little man had probably never done-they worried about the new role of science in the business and the application of science and technology to its operations. Each of these specialists soon found that one man was not enough. The job was too big, the success was too great. New tasks were required in keeping with the new scale of effort. And so there were departments of finance, production, marketing and re-
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
77
search. As these functions came to be recognized as separate jobs, they were elevated to the status of professions. Schools now prepared men as specialists in one of these functions. The marketing man had a degree (perhaps a Ph.D.) in marketing, the production man a degree in production, the technologist a degree in technology. At about the same time (it was now from 1950 to 1960), it became apparent that the corporation could not live forever on its original line of products. The lifetime of the products which had carried the corporation to its success and through the great rise in the economy had a foreseeable end. There were pressures to do something new. The little man at the top could feel them. Everything was different now from what he remembered. He had built the company on an idea. First the idea, then the company. Now there was a company, a huge organization, in full swing. There were people to be kept busy, equipment to be used, stockholders to be satisfied. And the new ideas had to come from within the organization while it was in full swing. The old game could not be stopped while the new one was planned. There were now two great problems: -The success of the company, and the shift of the founding entrepreneur to the role of administrator, had created a race of entrepreneurs without authority. Those to whom the entrepreneurial task had been delegated confronted the new problem of innovation from within the corporation. They had no authority to take leaps of decision on insufficient information which are essential to innovation. Instead, they could only propose upward to the boss, who disposed. -The division of labor between functional units in the corporation, and specifically the division between marketing and technology, fragmented the innovative process. Technology and need could no longer determine one another in easy interaction. Instead, the technology department and the need
Technology and Change
78
department (marketing) divided the job, each proposing for the other's disposition, each levying requirements on the other. What the founding entrepreneur had unified in his own person, the new articulated corporation broke apart. The Little Man had taken the burden of uncertainty on his own shoulders. The new corporation attempted to banish uncertainty by organizing work in lines, vertical and horizontal, across which the uncertain was not allowed to pass.
2.
Boss and Subordinate
The stress of technical innovation tests the relationship between boss and subordinate, throwing into sharp relief all the weaknesses of the propose-dispose system. The large corporation had created a race of "entrepreneurs without authority." l The entrepreneurial task had been delegated to those below but not the independence to carry it out. The Little Man at the top still kept the power of final decision (it was still his company), and he passed it on to his successor. Those below proposed; those above disposed. The process of innovation still had in it all the randomness and uncertainty described in earlier chapters. Before the fact, a man still could not give complete justification. The "leaps" were still required. But in the new articulated corporation no one had both the intimate knowledge of new projects necessary for conviction and the power to take the leaps. The knowledge and conviction were below; the power, above. From the point of view of the subordinate faced with the entrepreneurial task, he was continually floating balloons to the top of the company. He would find the balloons, inflate them, let them go and wait to see whether they were shot down. Usually, as in
The D r a m of Corporate Innovation
79
the case of the small foundry cited at the beginning of Chapter 111, they were. He would then have to infer, from inspection of balloons shot down and those allowed to go up unimpeded, just what would make a new development "go" in his company. In this effort at understanding he could not take at face value what management said. Management, as we have seen, is for good reason of two minds about innovation. He might hear, "We welcome radically new ideas" and discover from his balloon-watching experience that nothing very much different from the current line would be allowed to pass. From the point of view of the boss-the Little Man faced with the new problem of judging the ideas of others-the situation was equally frustrating. When the new ideas had been his own, he had been able to develop the conviction to go forward on inadequate evidence. Now he was confronted with strange ideas, developed through processes in which he did not participate and with which, because of limitations on his time, he could not become thoroughly familiar. There were enormous pressures against going forward-the priority of what exists (which, incidentally, he had built), the fear of uncertainty, the disruptions of change, the distrust of a new generation. Because the new ideas were, after a certain point, impenetrable, the boss had to find a way of challenging and coming to trust the men who proposed them. In the last analysis, going ahead required an act of faith. All of this can be described as the propose-dispose dynamism. It characterizes not just a few "sick" companies but, to one degree or another, all established corporations. In each corporation it takes a different form, still retaining its essential characteristics. The following case histories present the dynamism in three varied forms. They are fictionalized composites of corporations encountered in consulting experience. The Gordon Company, one of the largest paint companies in firm, the country, is now three generations old, a $~OO,OOO,OOO publicly owned. A Gordon is chairman of the board, but the oper-
80
Technology and Change
ating management is free of family ties. The company has a national name and a national market. Its product line was formed, basically, twenty years ago. Its most recent new product is a line of latex-based paints specially designed for do-it-yourself use. This product did not originate in the sizable Gordon research department, however, but was purchased from a small independent firm. Mr. Robbins, the president, sees the problem in the following way: The company is highly successful now. But its success is based on innovations over ten years old. Its market is becoming more competitive. Recently, a new chemical company entered the field in a big way. In order to retain its share of market, the Gordon Company is being forced to make a greater and greater investment in merchandising and advertising. Its profit margin is dropping. What is most distressing is that there are no ships at sea-no new ideas which will be the paints of tomorrow. This should be the responsibility of the research department. But the research department has not produced. It has done an adequate job of technical service to production and sales. It has initiated an effective program of quality control. But it has not come up with new products that offer promise of being the new businesses of tomorrow. Clearly, there is a lack of creativity in research. Its men seem to be more interested in turning out technical papers than in contributing to the growth of the corporation. Somehow, it is impossible to get them seriously committed to the new-~roductjob. This is the fault of the research director. It is also, secondarily, the fault of the uncreative people on his staff. Among the research people themselves, the problem appears quite different. It is by no means clear, for example, that top management is able to recognize a new product when it sees one. The story ib told of a new line of industrial paints which had been
The Drama of Corporate lnnouation
81
developed in research. From a technical and marketing point of
view, the concept of the line was radically different from the company's present line. Samples were taken to the president, to acquaint him with the new concept. His response was to study one of the samples intently, then to remark that "it had too much white." The research people say that top management can't generalize, they can't see any farther than the model in front of their nose. How can they expect research to present them with concepts for new businesses when they don't have the vision to understand them? But from the president's point of view, the same story was seen in a different light. Mr. Robbins admits to knowing nothing about technology. He came up through sales. He knows about the paint business. Specifically, he knows how to market paint. He built his own reputation on the marketing of the latex-based product. How is he to judge what the research people bring him? He can't be expected to form a valid technical judgment. Basically, he must depend on them for that. But he can challenge the research men themselves. He can test their confidence and firmness in their own technical decisions. He admits to having said, "Too much white." But when he did, research took the sample back and removed some of the white. How is he to build confidence in his people when they go soft and retreat in the face of his challenges? How can he be expected to trust their judgments when they won't stand firm. But to the research people, all of this appears still different. The company is noted for strong management; it still bears the paternalistic stamp of family control. It has a style in which it is not good form to fight with the boss. You do your job, listen to the criticisms and carry out management's orders. If the boss says there is to much white, you take some out-regardless of what your own opinions may be.
82
Technology and Change
The boss and his subordinates in research were caught in a vicious circle in which the boss's challenges-issued in order to test men, as a substitute for technical understanding-were taken to indicate narrow vision. The yielding response to those challenges, made because of what was regarded as proper behavior in the company, convinced the boss of the softness of the research position. On that basis, he could not give his commitment to the new paints. In the absence of that commitment, and of apparent understanding of new ideas, the research people felt they had no audience for their views. The resulting lack of performance convinced the boss that research needed more creativity.
The Straightway Company is a large, successful producer of machine tools. The company has spent eight years and as many millions of dollars in the development of a new transfer machine. Now, after all this effort, it is still very much in doubt whether the concept of the machine is valid, whether the machine can gain the market that had been anticipated for it, whether it is reliable and technically sound. A number of market studies have been conducted, but the results of the earlier studies have been ignored by the key men involved-Herb (the manager of the transfer machine division), Paul (the technical vice president), the head of sales, and the others. Instead, these men talk about their own reactions and those of their employees who have used the machine. A consultant proposes that the need is not for more information but for work on the conflicts among management that are holding up decision on the machine. In the course of the group work that follows, the following points emerge: -Of all the men involved only Herb has a commitment to the machine. It is his baby and he is determined to see it work. -The others see the machine as a failure, with Herb holding the bag. The work now going on is a salvage operation.
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
83
-The machine cannot be abandoned. Too much money has been spent on it, and the company's reputation is too much involved. In sessions with the others, Herb fights for the machine. He paints a picture of the market that will make the machine feasible and delays certain decision points (like cost estimates) as long as he can. In all of this the president of the corporation remains in the background. He does not participate in the meetings. He has little direct involvement with the program. But there are indications that his influence is powerful, nonetheless. Gradually, over several months, the nature of this influence is revealed. The president had taken a fancy to the notion of this new machine. His enthusiasm has brought it into the company. But he needed someone to take responsibility for the machine, and the someone turned out to be Herb. Herb became the president's 'boy." The machine was handed to him-not for evaluation but to make it work. It is assumed that technical feasibility, market and the like had been intuitively established at the beginning. In this transaction the president had not been coercive. He is generally regarded as a fine, fatherly man. But he is someone you could not let down. The president's style is, as General Georges Doriot once put it, "to take someone I trust, someone who likes me, and to tell him I am up against it." It turns out, moreover, that the transfer machine is not an isolated case. There have been half a dozen others, most of which have ended as expensive failures. The president gets enthusiastic about an idea; he induces a key man to make the idea his own and take full responsibility for it, on the basis of personal loyalty and the hope of heroic success. The commitment to the new development is very great, as is the money spent on it, because failure is
84
Technology and Change
unthinkable. Several men have been martyrs to such developments and, as a result, have either left the company or retired to a sort of company limbo. In the case of the transfer machine, it is possible to define a limited market for the machine as a high-priced item at the top of the line. Understood in this way, the machine justifies the dollars that have to be spent to make it reliable. It can be seen as a prestige product that adds to the company's reputation and position. But it is definitely not the new machine tool which would revolutionize the business and make a hero of its proponent. It is possible to observe here how an entire company adapts to the style of behavior of one man at the top. The president of the company is wealthy in his own right and has taken over a business which already holds a large share of the market in its field. It is not enough for him to run the company well and to effect modest growth. The president's success, as he sees it, is to make a radical change in the business. He wants to be responsible for new and exciting innovations in his field. It is said of him, "Some presidents keep horses; others keep women; ours has research." The president's style is to seize on ideas and then to establish relationships of personal loyalty in which individuals, lower down, become committed to these ideas which they will not let fail because they will not let him down. The company could be divided into those who are willing to be selected for sbch a role and those who are not. Each proponent, within his own suborganization, adopts a similar style. He puts great pressure on his subordinates to realize the idea at all costs. He asks total commitment. Others, in other parts of the company, will go through the motions of support while trying to avoid being tarred by ideas they regard as doomed to failure. Most of the energy available in the company for innovationmost of the "free energy"-is taken up in this way. In research it is generally felt that an idea has little chance of success unless it catches the president's fancy. But it is not clear what the basis of
The Drama of Corporate innovation
85
this attachment is, except that it involves a difference from the current product. This makes for a lack of available ideas and a general sense of lack of direction in research.
The McKinrwy Company began when its president, Oliver, as a young man, peddled cosmetics from store to store. Oliver did well at selling, bought out his supplier and went into business for himself. He surrounded himself with a small, competent staff. He expanded his territory and began buying out his competitors. He took over poorly managed plants and put his own stamp of efficiency on them. In fifteen years he built his business into a $20million operation. At that point, Oliver came to the end of possible acquisitions in his field. He still felt the need to grow, however. It is his ambition to become a major national company, to "go national" in a big way. He feels the only way left to do this is through the development of new products. But new products means conceiving new ideas, developing them, finding ways to merchandise them and risking substantial sums of money on new pilot plants and eventually on new production lines. This is all new to Oliver, who has made his mark with essentially one product, one way of manufacturing, one way of selling, and who has become master of this process. Confronted with novelty, he seeks outside help. In the first consulting session with the McKinney Company, the consultant meets three members of Oliver's management teamhis sales manager, production manager and technical director. The sales and production men are old-timers who came into the business at the beginning with Oliver. The technical director is a man in his early forties who joined the company ten years ago as a technician. The consultant joins the McKinney company in a program of day-long new-product sessions, to be held about once a month, in which product ideas are to be gathered and evaluated and devel-
86
Technology and Change
opment programs are to be plotted and checked. The consultant, Oliver and his management team sit in on these sessions. One of the first issues has to do with a new product currently being market-tested. It appeared promising at first but is disappointing now. Oliver is angry about it. He says that he recommended against it but "let the boys have their fling." Their failure provokes him to utter a phrase we will hear often in subsequent meetings: "Good ideas come from the top." After the first session, a definite pattern begins to come clear. An idea is at issue. Sometimes it is brought in by Oliver, sometimes by the consultant, sometimes by Woody, the technical director. Oliver explains it, or asks for an explanation, and waits for comment. Harold, the production man, keeps silent. He offers a comment only if the subject is close to production; then he sometimes offers a rapid-fire calculation of production costs or an analysis of special problems of production. He keeps clear of giving commitment to an idea. Ed, the sales manager, is voluble and enthusiastic. But in the clutch he is all but impossible to pin down. Oliver pushes for him in one place, and he turns up somewhere else. If he is forced to produce an opinion, that opinion is highly conservative. Ordinarily, his volubility yields no opinion at all. Woody is another story. He is willing to commit himself and often finds himself identified with product ideas which he proposes or presents to the group. It soon becomes apparent, moreover, that he is held responsible for a number of past new-product failures. He had failed technically, or had been slow or had been deficient in judgment. Woody's position in the group is special; he is clearly a boy among men. But he has made useful contributions, so he is kept on, in spite of his product failures. Typically a meeting will end when Oliver, after eliciting opinions, makes a firm decision of his own-one which frequently involves, in the development stages, further work for Woody.
The Drama of Corporate innovation
87
By and large, this process is not effective. In spite of the company's over-all success, its new product activity is slow and indecisive, marred by repeated failures and cautious, often halfhearted new attempts. Oliver is eager for procedures, rules and mechanisms for resolving these problems and is somewhat disappointed when his consultants refuse to provide them. In the McKinney company, each success or failure is attributed to an individual. It is, in the final analysis, one man's work. A success demands a hero. A failure demands a scapegoat. Naturally, everyone wishes to become a hero and, even more strongly, to avoid becoming a scapegoat. The president cannot be wrong. He is regarded, essentially, as omniscient. After the fact, it is always recognized that he correctly calls the turn-no matter which way the turn goes. This is Oliver's position, but his staff maintains it, as well. In the light of these two axioms, the happenings of the new product meetings make sense. Because a new product effort is, on several fronts, a plunge into the unknown, every new product effort means a possible failure. Every possible failure requires a scapegoat. The scapegoat has to be someone other than Oliver, and for the most part, Oliver's staff tries, in their various ways, to make sure the load will not fall on them. Ed is fleet-footed and hard to find. Harold is taciturn and narrowly expert. Only Woody is regularly vulnerable. He has the scapegoat's role thrust upon him and in some ways seems to collaborate by taking it on. He can be counted on to express a sheepish opinion, to undertake the work and eventually to admit to the blame. Once the scapegoat's role is established, the group can proceed with the project. It is clear who will be blamed. Assuming the scapegoat's role does not mean Woody will be fired. On the contrary, the role is a necessary one. The slowness between meetings, the diffidence during meetings, are attempts by the others to make sure responsibility for possible failure is
88
Technology and Change
clearly located. Then, if the product fails, Woody is there. If the product succeeds, Oliver's judgment is justified. Each new case adds evidence to the claim that "good ideas come from the top." Each of these case histories emphasizes different features of the underlying theme and helps make that theme explicit. The demand for technical innovation stresses the relationship between boss (in these examples, the president) and subordinate. The boss drives toward technical innovation. He sees it as required for growth (the McKinney Company), safety (the Gordon Company) or personal success (the Straightway Company). But he does not engage in the process himself. He delegates it to others. In a general way, his role is to set the process in motion and then to serve as judge of success or failure and to exercise ultimate authority. He may play that role in different ways, however. He may hold himself aloof from the process, acting only as a judge at the end (the Gordon Company). He may insist that "good ideas come from the top," though he takes no responsibility for failure (the McKinney Company). Or he may espouse an idea, fully formed, and assign responsibility for it to a subordinate (the Straightway Company). In all these examples, even that of the Straightway Company, the process of innovation is one in which subordinates propose, upward, to the boss. (In the Straightway example, the boss "plants" an idea below, which comes back to him later for disposition. ) These propose-dispose examples have a number of features in common: 1. As pointed out in Chapter 11, the situation itself is inherently uncertain. The process of development has a good deal of randomness in it. There is more information than can be handled. Some factors essential to intelligent decision remain unknowable within the limits of time and money. The probabilities are on the side of failure. 2. There is a division of labor with respect to failure. The boss
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
89
participates in the Myth of Omniscience. Within the company (though, perhaps, not in the board of directors, the stockholders or the business community) he is free from blame. But he is judge of the success or failure of subordinates and assigns praise or blame to them. 3. In case of failure someone is to blame. It is never that the situation is inherently uncertain or that events beyond control occurred, but that someone has failed. This has the quality of an axiom. It derives its strength from the Myth of Rationality: if the process of innovation is essentially rational, with the information necessary for decision available, personal culpability becomes the only explanation for failure. 4. Technical innovation within the company, then, becomes a drama of Success and Failure for those below. The drama is a sort of contest, with the boss as judge. Out of the drama come heroes and scapegoats. The whole dynamism works only because the drive for success and the terror of failure are so deeply embedded in the company. Each man, on entering the company, becomes a participant in a drama of Success and Failure. 5. The dynamism creates isolation. In his role of omniscient judge, the boss becomes isolated from his subordinates. He cannot get close to them if he is required to sit in judgment on them. The subordinates, in turn, becomt: isolated from one another in their efforts to make sure that "the blame doesn't fall on me." 6. The net effect of the dynamism is to protect the company from uncertainty. It converts a situation inherently uncertain for the company as a whole into a situation, taken as though it were determinate, in which men wrestle with the problem in hope of success and in terror of failure. If the effort fails, that failure does not mean that the company is at sea. It signifies the guilt or incompetence of one man who can be eliminated (leaving the company competent and free of guilt) or, by an act of clemency, given another chance. As the corporation converts uncertainty to risk, it converts dread of uncertainty to dread of failure.
90 Technology and Change The dynamism, begun at the top, propagates to all levels of the company, in all subsequent boss-subordinate relationships. The president's relation to his lieutenants serves as a model for the company. From one point of view, this pattern converts the company's free uncertainty into useful work. From another point of view, it indicates a preference for determinacy, rationality and personal guilt, as against confrontation with the uncertainty facing the corporate society as a whole. We would rather suffer and compete under the injustice of our bosses than expose ourselves to bossless uncertainty. All of this undercuts the company's ability to innovate. The propose-dispose relation between boss and subordinate creates entrepreneurs without authority-men who have the task of bringing new developments into being but not the authority to take the necessary early leaps on insufficient evidence. In order to justify investment, the subordinate must bring his ideas before the boss before they have proved themselves, and at that early stage he can never adequately defend them. The isolation created by the propose-dispose dynamism deprives the men in the company of a basis for going ahead. Faced with uncertainty, danger and the need to perform, a man seeks and gains strength from others. He needs the security of strong relationships with others in order to face the insecurity of risking his neck while confronted with more information than he can handle. Success and failure in the company appear as matters of life and death. The subordinate may know that, if he fails, he can find another job. But once in the thick of the struggle, he cannot really believe in a life outside the corporation. His dependence on others, as a source of interpersonal security, is not unlike the feelings of a man in a combat bomber crew or an infantry squad. The isolation induced by the propose-dispose dynamism cuts him off from this resource. Similarly, the dynamism does not, at the early stages, permit a corporate commitment to product innovation. The subordinate,
The Drama of Corporate innovation
when he has taken on the job, performs under the eyes of
'
91
the others. He is engaged in the enterprise; they are not. If he represents technology in the company, the idea in question is the technical department's idea. The others observe and offer their services. Their resources are not fully available. The same is true, to an even greater extent, of the boss. Although he may be the company's most skillful entrepreneur, he is not engaged in the crucial first stages of the game. Instead, he is limited to the role of spectator and judge. The boss and subordinate see the dynamism in different ways. The boss has the problem of getting things going without being able to do them himself. He suffers from his isolation in that he cannot really be sure what is going on in the corporation. Most often, he is unable to judge the technical quality of what is presented to him. He must find ways to test the soundness of the proposer rather than the validity of his ideas. He must find a basis for trusting him. Like the president of the McKinney Company, he may take refuge in the notion that "good ideas come from the top." Like the president of the Gordon Company, he may see the problem as one of lack of creativity in research. Like the president of the Straightway Company, he may attach himself to specific ideas and find individuals within the firm, on the basis of personal loyalty, to take on commitment to the entrepreneurial job. From the point of view of the subordinate-particularly the subordinate in research-the situation appears quite different. It may seem to him that he receives inadequate co-operation from others in the company and insufficient support from the top. He may find that top management does not really understand what it wants when it asks for innovation, or that it does not have enough imagination to see the potential in new ideas. He may believe that he has been unfairly charged with full responsibility for an idea he did not originate. Both parties tend to look for individuals on whom to lay the blame. Both tend to look for mechanisms to correct the situation.
92
Technology and Change
Both accept the rationality of the process, the pattern of success and failure with omniscience at the top and personal culpability below, and the propose-dispose relationship between boss and subordinate.
3. Marketing and Technology The process of invention requires mutual determination of need and technology. But in the large, articulated corporation, the job of determining technology has been separated, by specialization of function, from the job of determining need. There are now departments of marketing and technology. Each specializes in its job. Each has developed a profession around its job. Each tends to be willing to answer only the questions that fall within its professional specialty: to do otherwise would be nonprofessional. As a result, it is difficult to locate commitment to innovation. Each department says to the other, "Give me what you have done and I'll tell you whether or not it is feasible from the point of view of my specialty." Professionalism serves as a barrier to co-operative inquiry and as a defense against blame from the top for failure. But since questions of need cannot be answered without assumptions about technology, and vice-versa, each department finds itself performing as an amateur in the professional specialty of the other.
Marketing. Unlike science and technology, marketing is a corporate function aspiring toward a profession. Its professional status is incomplete. What is now generally called "marketing" grew out of sales and is in some firms still called sales. But in the fifties there was superimposed on sales the concept of market research. Selling the product came to include the effort to find out, ahead of time, who would buy it. This began to happen as, in some product areas,
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
93
demand for the obvious needs became saturated. Only for a short while, after World War 11, was it sufficient to say, "Here's what they need; how can we make it?'It became important to ask, 'What do they need?" and then, "What will they buy?" Out of the saturated market came the concept of market research, in the sense of market "science," in imitation of physical science. The market researcher, by his own lights, develops theories of what people will buy, by the use of statistical techniques and the techniques of "social science"; the salesman then "applies" his findings, as the engineer is supposed to "apply" the ideas of the physicist. But from the point of view of the salesman of a generation ago, many of whom continue as vice presidents for sales, the picture is quite different. Their attitude toward market research is rather like the attitude of production toward central research: it's all right if we can afford it, but it is, essentially, a frill. There is a rational model of marketing as there is a rational model of the whole process of technical innovation. According to this model, it is the function of the marketing department to provide information about markets for management decision. Technology provides the relevant technical information. Marketing, using similar techniques of inquiry, provides information about likely future sales. With these inputs, among others, management decides. It is implicit in this model that the role of marketing is the professional role of providing evaluated information. Unfortunately, much to the chagrin of marketing men, this information is often not believed. As in the case of the Straightway* Company, market research is apt to receive no attention at all. Instead, managers persist in giving credence to the opinions of their wives and friends, or in listening to the indications of their "gut." "Mother-in-law research" is more than a phrase. In spite of the availability of new techniques of market analysis and of the efforts of marketing to establish itself as a science, top management continues to a surprising extent to trust its own direct
94
Technology and Change
human contacts and to distrust the carefully displayed and statistically analyzed numbers provided by market research. The "why" of this throws light on the nature of market analysis and on the role of marketing within a corporation. Product innovation, according to one very common version of the rational model, occurs when established human needs are filled in new ways or when new human needs are discovered. One function of market research, according to the model, is to discover these new needs. But there is something peculiar about the idea of identifying new, unfilled needs. Consider the problem of identifying new transportation needs in the days of the horse and buggy and suppose a market-research group to be confronted with the task. Through interviews and questionnaires they might discover a variety of irritations and dissatisfactions shared by users of horses and buggies. People might express the need for longerwearing horseshoes, for horses that ran longer on a given ration of feed, for more comfortable buggies or saddles, and the like. But they would hardly express the need for automobiles. This is not to say that someone might not invent the idea of a horseless carriage in the course of thinking about transportation-only that the idea, if it occurred, would be an invention. It would have to be invented, through the exercise of ingenuity, not revealed as matter of fact. And similarly, the "need for the object of the idea could not be said to pre-exist the manufacture of automobiles. Before the actual presence of automobiles on the market, people could not be expected to indicate a need for them. It would be more accurate to say that the introduction of automobiles created that need. Confronted with a ~erceiveddifference between what they had and what they might have, people could express a "need" for what they might have. Without that contrast, they could only express dissatisfaction with what they had. As a result, "market research," if it sticks to the facts of expressed attitudes and preferences, reveals "needs" for relatively minor improvements of what is available-a soft detergent, a rust-
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
95
free car, and the like. To the extent that more than minor improvement is desired, invention is required. And invention foregoes the apparent certainty or even the objectivity claimed by market research. From this point of view, "the discovery of unfilled needs" is a deception. It falsely offers the promise of novelty, somehow objectively attained, without invention. There are "objective" surveys of customer attitudes and preferences, but they do not provide a basis for significant product innovation. There are marketing inventions, but they cannot lay claim to a basis in "objectively discovered customer response." The marketing man must choose between his professionally objective role and his ability to come up with something new. The situation of a company that has developed something new and untried before that something has had an opportunity to "create a need" is one of great complexity in which the company is confronted by more information than it can handle. Suppose the product in question is a new kind of snack food. Its marketing success will depend on a variety of factors that include its flavor; its freshness; its packaging; the rigor with which product quality is maintained over time and from region to region; the status of the trade name under which it is marketed; its shape; the state of the market for snack foods at the time it is introduced; the merchandising devices used to get it into supermarkets; the appeal of the advertising campaign that accompanies it; its price; the raw materials that go into it; its product name, the shelf-position it gets in the market; the ability of the company to fill orders fully and quickly. This is a very incomplete list. It covers only some of the factors that have turned out to be important in many cases. New instances have a habit of turning up new relevant factors. Moreover, each variable is questionable. There are always limits to the company's ability to infer customer response to a value of the variable on the basis of past experience. Past experience is never applicable. If "miniatures" were popular a year or two ago,
96
Technology and Change
they may have lived out their cycle of popularity by the time the new product is introduced. If clear packaging was effective with the last new product introduced, it may be ineffective with the shape of the next one. An appeal to "diet" products or to 'low fat" in one region of the country may fall completely flat in another. A combination of flavors that has great appeal to a low-price market in the Southwest may seem strange and unpleasant in the Northeast. There are more relevant variables than can be taken into account. They act in a changing market situation. It is never possible to be sure whether a given market effect is due to one variable or to that one in special combination with others. Market tests, which attempt to experiment with consumer response to various configurations of variables, are always different in critical ways from the real market experience. They are small in comparison to the real thing. They are special because of regional variables, because of lack of variability in production lots, because of unfamiliarity, etc. They are bound to be incomplete. If completeness were theoretically possible, it would be economically unfeasible. Failure in a market test is often indicative. Success is always inconclusive. For all these reasons there is bound to be a gap between what market research can objectively state about a new product, or even a minor variation on an old one, and an assertion about the product's future success or failure. It is not that some useful observations and predictions cannot be made, but that they are always short of what is required for action. In order to act, management must assume more than can be said with objectivity and with reasonable certainty by market research. To the extent, then, that market research is intent on sustaining its professional status, in imitation of the apparent professional objectivity of technology, it can neither invent nor make the required assertions about the future success or failure of products. It
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
97
can only say, in effect, "This is what, with our best techniques, we were able to discover." The rest is left to management. And the rest is often a great deal. Management's response is often to press marketing for a commitment which can only be made by shifting from professional certainty to something approaching the intuitive wisdom of experience. If, in the interest of its professional safety and status, marketing fails to make the leap, it often pays the price of nonbelief or, even worse, of being ignored. For the company in which this happens, reliance may come to be played on the rather private intuitions of management. In the end, the marketing reports are left in a corner of the desk, and the decision to "go" or not is made on quite a different basis. To the extent that it does not use the findings of its market research, the company may make its decisions in relative isolation from the market. Science and technology. Scientists and technologists in industry are members of two cultures but not in the sense recently used by C. P. Snow.2 When, at a cocktail party, a technical man in industry is asked, "What do you do?" he may answer in terms of his company or his profession. He may say, "I work for the General Electric Company" or, "I am a physical chemist." The nature of his answer will say a great deal about the man. Scientists and engineers in industry are always members of a culture within a culture. Although a man lives in the General Electric Company, he also lives in the cross-cutting community of his technical specialty and in the still broader community of science or engineering. As a member of the technical community he shares school ties, participates in meetings, reads shared literature and, most importantly, shares a system of values. This system of values relates to a methodology which has become a way of life. Central to it is the paramount importance of discovering the truth about the way things work and, coupled
Technology and Change with this, faith that this discovery can be made. Each technical man is a member of a team, continuous through time and overlapping among generations, charged with this discovery. Each man makes his own contribution to it and is judged, after the fact, by its importance to the developing theory. What is accepted as a contribution depends on many criteria, one of the most important of which is "objectivity." Objectivity here means at least two things-first, reproducibility from investigator to investigator (any other competent investigator, if he performs your experiment, should be able to obtain your results); and second, the idea that "a negative result is as good as a positive one" (since the aim of inquiry is to discover the truth, an experiment may be as valuable for destroying a hypothesis as for confirming it). So much is shared by the entire technical community. These values are learned along with the laws of mechanics and the critical tables. But the community is far from homogeneous. Within it are many important social divisions which are reflected in values as well as methodology. One of the most important of these is the division between scientists and technologists. This division is represented, at the extremes, by two types of models of behavior. The types are seldom perfectly realized, but there is no question of their existence as norms. The scientist identifies himself with the pursuit of knowledge, the development of true theory. As a scientist he has little or no concern for what the theory is good for. Its applications are important only insofar as they lead to further theory. Solution of practical problems by the application of theory, where the process does not lead to further theory, is at best an intriguing diversion or a necessary evil. Results are judged by the beauty of the inquiry, their precision, their generality and their importance to the body of theory in which they fit. At the other pole, there is the model of the good engineer. He is the practical man who does things, makes things work. He uses skills and knowledge of the mechanisms of things in order to 98
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
99
build, to put together, to solve problems. He is apt to mistrust theory per se. He asks what things are good for. He judges his colleagues by their accomplishments, the concrete things-buildings, machines, systems-they have made. Each of these models has its own social system. Each has its hierarchy of status which, by and large, excludes the other. Men like Von Neuman, who moved back and forth across the borders, tend to be dismissed as exceptions even though the history of science is full of such exceptions. While the difference in type described above are facts, as are the competition as well as co-operation between scientists and technologists, it is also a fact that scientific theory and technology have interacted historically and continue to interact so closely that they must be regarded as parts of the same current of change. Theories of the solid state and the development of solid state devices, theories of protein structure and the development of new medical practice, are as closely linked as Greek science and craft or as seventeenth-century machines and seventeenth-century physics. When the young scientist or engineer leaves school and enters industry, he is in fact entering a foreign culture. It is in terms of this problem that the situation of the technical man in industry should be considered. Whether he has been trained as scientist or engineer, but more particularly if he has been trained as a scientist, he leaves a stronghold of the scientific value system to enter a fortress of the business culture engaged in a war that has meaning primarily in that culture. His contact in graduate school is for the most part with professors who are themselves carriers of scientific culture and with students who share, at least for a time, in that culture. He becomes attracted to a specific line of technical work, acquires a long discipline to enable him to undertake it, undergoes an initiation into the scientific community through which he wins his wings on scientific grounds and by scientific standards--only to
loo
Technology and Change
find himself a member of a scientific colony in an essentially alien culture. He has learned to value what he does by its contribution to scientific theory. Now he must get used to the idea that it must contribute to something which, sooner or later, is to show a profit. He has learned to consider a negative result as good as a positive one and must now face business management's attitude toward project failures. He has learned that technical results stand on their own feet, buttressed only by the evidence of experiment and theory, and he must now live in a society in which financial considerations and the politics of the corporation make a major difference to action. Faced with these facts, he may respond in a number of ways. He may retreat from the threats of the industrial world and seek protection in a scientific shell which becomes, in effect, a replica of his graduate school environment. He moves only within his scientific subgroup. He accepts work only within his narrow specialty. His output is scientific papers. He feels no responsibility for the application of his results; that is the company's problem. At the extreme, he may insist on continuing the line of research he began in his graduate work and feel that the company has an obligation to make that possible. At the other extreme, he may attempt to adapt to the new culture. In this case, he becomes as much as possible like the businessmen with whom he works. He justifies his work on the basis of its contribution to profit. He may outdo the comptroller in his use of charts and graphs to show how investment in research will be turned into financial benefit. He sees research as an instrument of corporate activity and has no difficulty in accepting the fact that "the corporation is in business to make money." Ultimately, he may withdraw from research altogether and turn to marketing, production or the administration of technical activity. Or, as he becomes aware of the value system of his new environment and its conflict with his view of the world and of himself,
The Drama of Corporate innovation
101
he may try to find some middle way. He will look for projects technically interesting and within his capability which, on some basis, make sense for the corporation as well. He confronts the possible irrelevance of his hard-learned specialty and seeks ways of branching out to areas of importance from the corporate view. He becomes acquainted with concepts of cost and investment without abandoning the values of science. He foresees the possible obsolescence of his skills and looks for ways of retooling to meet new challenges. But this adaptation is made more difficult for him by the fact that the scientific culture is what David Gleicher calls "a culture with a hook." In graduate school the young scientist learns that real scientific achievement is the province of a very small elite. Of hundreds who compete, only one or two may contribute to "the important breakthrough and find reward in admission to the inner circles of the scientific community, the respect of his peers, an important university teaching post. The others are doomed to be second-rate. This is not an accident but is inherent in the very nature of the scientific community and of the long process of admission to it. There is room at the top for a very few who are able to be seen as the top just because there are others below them. Moreover, placement in the pyramid is usually determined very early in a young man's scientific career, frequently in graduate school. To the elite go the best teaching and research positions. To the others, go the less important teaching positions and positions in industry and Government. This, at any rate, is the way it tends to be seen from within the scientific community. For these reasons, a young scientist in industry is apt to regard himself as, at best, a competent second-rater. While he is imbued with scientific values, he cannot regard himself as a first-rate scientist. The effect on him, paradoxically, may be to make him even more insistent on the prerogatives of science: freedom to undertake "pure research," judgment only on the basis of scientific ac-
102
Technology and Change
complishment as understood by his peers, continuity of inquiry uninterrupted by corporate needs. Or it may induce him, convinced of his own second-rateness, to limit himself to technical work of routine competence. He may say to himself, in effect, "If I am a second-rater, I will stick to second-rate work." For all these reasons, the position of the young scientist in industry is apt to be difficult. If he does not find himself in one of the few companies which have, over the last decade or so, allowed young men essentially to continue their graduate research work, he will be forced to make some transitional adaptation to the business values of the corporation. This adaptation will, in one of the ways mentioned above, challenge the scientific identity he has so far constructed for himself. In his anxiety over this period of transition, the young scientist will cling very tenaciously to the idea of himself as a professional. As a professional, he is a member of a society that cuts across the corporation, and his status within the professional society is not dependent on his status within the corporation. It is another string to his bow. His professionalism also gives him a special status within the corporation, a shield from the direct threats of the bosssubordinate relation, a special claim to be believed and respected, and a claim to an "objectivity" that lets him deliver opinions and findings regardless of their impact on the corporation. "I have made my analysis and this is what I find." The signs of professional status-the degree, the language and manners of science, contacts with the professional peer group-assume great importance and become the core of the young scientist's response to his newly discovered conflict with business values. In this conflict the corporate research director is the man in the middle. From the point of view of management he is the man responsible for putting technology to corporate use. From the point of view of his scientists he is the champion of the scientific value system in the corporation. Somehow he must negotiate both
The Drama of Corporate lnnouation
103
hurdles without becoming ineffectual in the eyes of management
or a traitor in the eyes of the scientists. He may attempt to play this role in the diplomatic style, as a Talleyrand of the research laboratory; he may identify himself squarely with management or squarely with his scientists; he may for the sake of a safer and more clearly defined position accept a second-rate corporate status which requires him to do simply what he is told; or, like some of the research directors who are perceived after the fact to have been Great Men-Whitney at G.E. comes to mind-he may find ways of motivating his technical men to address themselves to a practical objective, usually through personal appeal, and shield those men from the demands of management.
Marketing and technology. So far, we have been looking at marketing and technology as independent functions and units within the firm. But, in fact, they interact, or fail to interact, in a way essential to technical innovation. The nature of this interaction when it occurs can best be made clear through examples. -A
large, well-established firm in the consumer products field has been for years among the top two or three in the business. But its success has been based not on leading the field but on effective counterpunching. When a competitor brings out a new product, this company is able to move in quickly with another like it. Because of its assured distribution, its name, advertising, and merchandising ability, it is usually able to capture a good share of the market. It maintains a sizable research department and spends at least as much in technology as its nearest competitors. Nevertheless, its technical efforts somehow fail to lead to commercial products. A recent case in point had to do with the development of a new cleaning powder. The idea for the product had originated with the marketing
104
Technology and Change
department. They wanted a powder that would be good for a wider range of stains, including cigarette and rust. Otherwise, the powder was to cost no more than the then-present entry and be at least as efficient in other respects. All of this was spelled out in a product meeting, attended by the brand manager and members of the market research and technology departments. These product requirements were reduced to writing, and technology was given the ball. In the development department a project team was formed. A series of new formulations was identified with the aim of effectiveness against cigarette stains and rust. The formulations were tested against standard stain samples. Typically, the process of development was devious rather than straightforward. Among the first ten formulations tested, one was found to be relatively effective against the new stains.
But there were problems about the new agents added to gain this effectiveness. They tended to oxidize. Antioxidants were added.
These tended to reduce somewhat the effectiveness of the agents. Moreover, there were concerns about odor. Stronger abrasives were added to complement the chemical effectiveness of the new agents, and new odorants were added as well. At this point, for some reason, it was discovered that the formulation's effectiveness against rust stains disappeared about a week after the formulation was first prepared. An
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
105
unexpected reaction was found to be going on. It could be prevented by substitution of two of the components.
Now the formulation was felt to be ready for consun: test. It was effective against rust and cigarette stains as well as against all stains affected by the firm's existing entry. Its odor was acceptable and its shelflife was good. Six months had elapsed. The product was given over to market research for test. In its consumer test, market research gave the new powder to forty women and let them use it over a two-week period. At the end of that time, they interviewed the women and asked them to fill out questionnaires about the product. At the next product meeting, the market research representative said, "Research has done it again. Nobody's willing to accept a purple cleaning powder!" Color had not been identified initially as a relevant product variable. Research had not been sensitive to color as a problem. They had had their hands full trying to juggle other variables they knew to be relevant. And market research did not reveal the problem until after six months of development work had elapsed. Market research functioned here as gatekeeper. After the initial identification of the objective, and after technology had produced a candidate, they served to keep it back or let it go. After the first statement of objectives they did not contribute to the product. They had put in their order. But, where the product in question is of any complexity at all, the first statement of objectives is bound to fall short of a complete description of relevant product variables. You cannot, at the
106
Technology and Change
beginning, say everything about a product that will be relevant to its success or failure from the point of view of consumer response. In fact, many relevant variables do not appear to be relevant until the product violates them. The point is both logical and psychological: -In the real world, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive description of the characteristics of a thing which determine its success or failure, its approval or disapproval, its popularity or unpopularity. -Often we do not become aware of a feature of something essential to our approval of or preference for it until that feature changes or disappears.
As a consequence, as long as market research keeps to stating product objectives and then playing gatekeeper, technology is left to make decisions which will be bound to have an effect on consumer response without the benefit of market research. A second case illustrates a variant of the problem.
-A
large industrial chemical company has both a sizable research and development department and a sizable marketing section. The relationship between these two departments, as far as product development is concerned, suggests a kind of seesaw. During and just after World War 11, research and development brought more new chemicals into being than they knew what to do with. These came as by-products of war research and as an outgrowth of major new developments in chemistry which had been made not long before. In those days new chemicals were given to marketing people, who were instructed to sell them. The technology came first. The technical people could then, more or less, wash their hands of the product. The marketing people faced the uncertainty of the commercial new-product effort. Could they find adequate
The D r a m of Corporate lnnovation
107
TECHNOLOGY FIRST! Technology
uses for it? Would the market be large enough, given the cost picture? It was their problem. In the middle and late 1950's the situation changed. New chemicals were no longer coming in such profusion from the research and development department. The company no longer assumed it was the duty of the marketing department to sell what technology came up with. Instead, the company had begun to operate on the assumption that technical resources should be addressed to needs uncovered through market research. The marketing department examined various businesses related to the company's product line-catalysts, fertilizers, plastics, food-and identified "needs" for product or process improvements which required new chemicals. These needs were spelled out as completely as possible and passed on to the research and development department. It was their problem, then, to come up with new chemicals that met the needs. The second state of the seesaw is more nearly like the situation of the consumer products company described in case (1). The second state-in which technology performs to requirements generated out of Marketing-is characteristic of many companies. In both states, however, the relationship between marketing and technology is unfortunate. Either marketing produces require-
108
Technology and Change
NEED FIRST: Marketing
Uncertainty ments, fully formed, for new technology and leaves the "technical problem" to the professional in that field, without taking into account how many covert marketing inventions and decisions will have to be made in that process; or technology gives marketing a new product, developed without reference to customer response, and marketing is required to find ways to sell it. In this attempt, marketing uncovers problems that could be treated as technicalinadequacies in the product, changes which might endure capture a new market-but it cannot get work done on these problems if it has been handed the task of finding markets for what has been given. In each case, there is a "given" from one department which is made the basis of the task of the other. Each is held to its professional territory. Each sets requirements for the other. Or again, each disposes of what the other proposes. As in the case of the boss-subordinate relationship, proposedispose is a wasteful process. In fact, technical work cannot be done without marketing consequences and marketing assumptions. And marketing work raises problems that may fruitfully be treated as technical ones. As a result, marketing men engage in amateur technology, and technologists, in amateur market research. Neither can use the resources of the other for invention before professional critique is applied. This is particularly the
The Drama of Corporate Innovation
109
case since each party has a tendency-understandable in view of the distortions of the boss-subordinate relation-to push uncertainty off onto the other and lay him open to blame for failure. As we have seen earlier, technical innovation requires both marketing and technological invention as well as marketing and technological critique. The two are so closely related that there cannot be work in one area without assumptions and consequences that bear on the other. Product characteristics and market characteristics mutually determine one another. After the fact, marketing failure can be read as technical failure. Technical failure can be read as marketing failure. The division of labor between marketing and technology, and especially the professionalization of that division, attempts to create a work situation in which each group makes true, safe statements within its professional territory. But since uncertainty is inherent in technical innovation, the result is that marketing and technology attempt to put themselves in the role of providing "givens" for the other, judging the output of the other by their own professional criteria and leaving the other with the major burden of uncertainty. As a result the first forces the second into doing, in an amateur way, what the first could and should be doing. Each is deprived of the resources of the other where he needs them. All of this precludes the collaborative marketing-technical invention required in technological innovation-the kind of invention the old-time entrepreneur often performed himself.
4. A Summary of the Problems The poblerns of technological innovation so far discussed come out of a view of the corporation as a society and of technological innovation as a process. Technological innovation is inherently uncertain and treacher-
110
Technology and Change
ous. It demands invention with respect to human need as well as technology. The corporate work of invention attempts to convert certainty to risk. But a proposed innovation can never be satisfactorily justified before the fact, and requires leaps of decision. The corporation is a society, composed of many subcultures, which seeks to hold itself together. It is a vehicle for work as well as for the exercise of power and subordination. Its survival depends on its ability to protect the individuals within it from uncertainty. The current problems of technological innovation within the established firm come primarily from two causes: -Technological innovation has come to be a regular, necessary function of the firm. -The firm has outgrown the structure of its rise to maturity. It is no longer centered around an individual entrepreneur who undertakes innovation, shoulders uncertainties, and cuts Instead, it is a large, across all major functions of the h. complicated structure in which: -The entrepreneurial function has been delegated to lowerlevel entrepreneurs without authority who must propose new ideas for disposition by the boss. -There is a rigid division of labor between those concerned with need (marketing) and those concerned with technique ( technology ). -Uncertainty, which is at the heart of technical innovation, is taboo. To protect itself from uncertainty, the corporation has constructed a family of myths of innovation, of which the most important is the myth of rationality. As a result the process of innovation becomes a series of propose-dispose relationships across vertical and horizontal barriers within the corporation. Entrepreneurs without authority cannot take the necessary
The Drama of Corporate Innooation
111
leaps; their justifications before the fact always turn out to be in-
adequate. Both boss and subordinate operate in ignorance--one, in ignorance of the facts, opportunities, and problems of the innovative process; the other, in ignorance of the considerations which will be governing in making decisions. The two have little basis for establishing relations of trust on which, alone, forward movement could occur. The artificial division between marketing and technology prevents the real work of invention. Fear of failure and professionalism isolate the two functions from each other. Each proposes ideas for the other's disposition or seeks to leave the other with full burden of uncertainty. In this environment the corporation minimizes innovation. The strategies it has developed to control uncertainty increase the probability of failure.
Models for Change
WE H A V E L O O K E D at the process of technological innovation in companies and have noticed a series of problems depending on the social system of the company and on the process of innovation itself. The form in which these problems appear is a function of the times-of the state of evolution of companies and industries and of the concept of industrial research. For some time now, it has been possible to observe companies struggling with these problems and seeking new ways of producing technological innovation regularly and deliberately from within the firm. Industrial experience since 1945 presents a range of experimental answers. These take the form of: -shifts in corporate assumptions about innovation; -the emergence of new roles and new forms of activity within the corporation; -shifts in what it means to be a company; -a shift in the ability of a company to examine its own processes, to confront its taboos, and to undertake deliberate change in its social system. 112
Models for Change
113
We are in a time of transition. Out of it there seems to be emerging a new ideology of innovation, a set of new corporate forms, and new styles of corporate behavior.
Assumptions about Innovation From the turn of the century until about 1 ~ 8 the , concept of industrial research, and with it the concept of technological innovation as a means to growth, were seeking to establish themselves. After World War I1 they succeeded in doing so. It became fashionable and, indeed, essential for the leader of a large corporation to proclaim his allegiance to research and innovation. As we have seen, this official view often carried with it official attitudes of a quite contradictory kind. As we have seen, too, the company's inability to express and work openly on its resistance to innovation was itself an impediment to innovation. Between 1950 and 1960 this new conventional wisdom began to be challenged. There is now, in many research-oriented firms, a growing sophistication about technological innovation. It says, in effect: -Corporate growth is not the only relevant sign of corporate success. This has been recognized particularly in corporations which exist in very nearly saturated markets. -Technological innovation is only one route to growth. It may not be the most effective. It is no longer possible to avoid noticing "counterpunching" firms who wait until a new process or product has been developed or marketed and then move in either through purchase or through a closely competitive development. These firms often make up in fleet-footedness and marketing skill what they lack in invention.
114
Technology and Change
-Scientific research is only one route to technological innovation. Invention or engineering, without a base in science or, at any rate, without a corporate base in science, can be as effective. Na'ive faith in corporate growth and research as a means to growth may be wearing out. Among the drug companies, for example, there are a number whose research departments are devoted primarily to technological intelligence and then to imitating and improving what others have developed. The profit margins and growth rates of these firms do not suffer in comparison to others. In the consumer products field, most technical effort is devoted to minor product change or to quick imitation of live items developed by competitors. The profitability of those firms seems to vary more with the effectiveness of their marketing and market research than with their technology. Among the automotive firms there has been very little utilized research-in the sense in which Bell Labs or Du Pont understands research. Most of the auto maker's effort has gone into styling change, engineering improvement, increased productivity, and again, marketing. Their ability to grow and to maintain a respectable rate of profit does not seem to have suffered. For many firms who have over the last decade halfheartedly, and therefore unsuccessfully, supported a technical effort aimed at innovation, a new scepticism about innovation may represent a step in the right direction. It brings official company policy into line with the realities of company behavior. They can now say "We do what we say we do." Nevertheless, pressures for innovation continue. These pressures come from the competitive innovations of other firms and other industries-innovations which do not easily lend themselves to imitation. They come from the ambitions of a powerful corporate leader committed to innovation. Or they come, in more than
Models for Change
115
a few companies, from an unwillingness always to enter the market on a me-too basis.
New Corporate Roles
The problems of innovation experienced by the established firm, and especially the problems of boss and subordinate, have created their own antidote. In answer to "entrepreneurs without authority," the corporation has invented the product champion. The product champion identifies himself with a new development and pushes it upward and outward, using all the weapons a t his command, against the funded resistance of the organization. He functions as an entrepreneur within the organization, and since he does not have official authority to take unnecessary risks, he usurps that authority. He may or may not have made the original invention, but in either case he identifies himself with it and pre-empts it. Its success or failure becomes his responsibility and his preoccupation. Since the risks he takes are great, he puts his job in the organization (and often his standing in the social system of which the organization is a part) on the line. Here, as in many other areas, the military serves as a large mirror for industry. Despite the enormous legitimate and illegitimate sources of resistance to change in the military, occasional radical inventions do find acceptance and come into being. Developments like McLean's Sidewinder missile and Rickover's atomic submarine do not fit the rational pattern of an orderly presentation of promising technical ideas to official judges, favorable objective evaluation and then orderly marshaling of technical resources for development. These histories look more like crusades or military campaigns, with overtones of fifth-column activity and guerrilla warfare. They present clear illustrations of four major themes. I. At the outset, the idea encounters sharper resistance.
116
Technology and Change
Like Goddard's work on rockets, Whittle's work on the jet engine, and virtually every other significant military technical development, the Sidewinder and the atomic submarine at first met indifference and in some cases active resistance from military officials. These innovations appeared to run counter to the most sensible and established technical commitments. They looked expensive and unfeasible. They were, therefore, considered through established channels and rejected. 2. The idea requires active and vigorous promotion. In spite of the myth that valid technical ideas do not need internal sales, it is characteristic of successful technical innovation within the military that a new idea requires and receives active promotion. Often, as in Morison's description of the introduction of continuous-aim firing, there is a division of labor into invention and promotion. In that instance, the inventor was not equa1Iy talented as a promoter, and so a second figure emerged who was able to carry the fight for its introduction and development into the highest Navy circles. In our own time, Admiral Rickover's skill in defending and promoting his ideas is legendary. Techniques for promoting new technical ideas are a matter of serious concern, even at the highest military levels, as shown by the use of outside publication and appeal to Congress. 3. For the introduction, promotion and development of these ideas, their proponents make use of the informal, rather than the official, military system. In the early stages of development, when the idea was still in its infancy, the Sidewinder was funded not through official contracts from any of the Navy bureaus but from the small sums detoured from official programs. Only when enough work had been done to show the strength of the idea did it fall into official contract channels. The use of such "bootlegged research funds is only one example of the use of the informal military network. In many instances ideas now under development or test were submitted originally through personal contacts; in the matter of technical
Models for Change
117
development, particularly across departmental lines, a network of
good
personal contacts is a cherished resource. The buffering function of the official screening offices virtually forces such a network into existence. 4. Typically, one man emerges as champion of the idea. Many people do know of Goddard, Whittle, Rickover and McLean. But in the case of less-famous developments-for example, the Navy's "Ribbon in the Sky" and the introduction of frangible bullet-firing as a training method in World War 11-individuals also emerged as champions. There is nothing incidental or exceptional about this. Where radical innovation is concerned, the emergence of a champion is required. Given the underground resistance to change described earlier, the new idea either finds a champion or dies. Essentially, the champion must be a man willing to put himself on the line for an idea of doubtful success. He is willing to fail. But he is capable of using any and every means of informal sales and pressure in order to succeed. No ordinary involvement with a new idea provides the energy required to cope with the indifference and resistance that major technical change provokes. It is characteristic of champions of new developments that they identify with the idea as their own, and with its promotion as a cause, to a degree that goes far beyond the requirements of their job. In fact, many display heroic persistence and courage. For a number of them the price of failure is professional suicide, and a few become martyrs to the championed idea. All these themes are to be found in commercial organizations as well as in the military. At IBM, according to Arthur K. Watson: The disk memory unit, the heart of today's random access computer, is not the logical outcome of a decision made by IBM management. It was developed in one of our laboratories as a bootleg project---over the stem warning from management that the project had to be dropped because of budget difficulties. A handful of men
118
Technology and Change ignored the warning. They broke the rules. They risked their jobs to work on a project they believed in. -Address to the EIGHTHINTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ACCOUNTANTS, New York City, September 24, 1962
Similarly, Avicel-the cellulose-based nonnutritive food-was championed within the American Viscose Company by Dr. Andrew Battista. K-Cel, Kimberly-Clark's most successful nonwoven product, was championed over a ten-year period by Harlan Hershey. Sometimes, paradoxically, the champion is to be found at the top of the organization. For over a decade, against the resistance of those below and those above, David Sarnoff at RCA championed color television. It must be added, of course, that the product champion is sometimes, perhaps often, wrong. Companies other than RCA had competitive color television systems and their own champions -and failed. A large petrochemical company, spurred from within by one man, brought a radically new chemical process plant into being and failed resoundingly. But such failures do not negate the validity and importance of the product champion or of the pattern of innovation through product champions. The principal point is that there is in American industry and in the military a pattern of innovation through the product champion, and that this pattern has come into being because of the problems we have discussed under the heading of entrepreneurs without authority. -Technological innovation requires leaps that cannot be justified before the fact by those charged with the task. So, there comes into being a man who takes the burden of risk on his shoulders without formal justification. -The formal chain of command, with its screening mechanisms for evaluating ideas and allocating resources, is wedded to the major commitments of the firm and treats radical innova-
Models for Change
119
tion as a threat. The product champion ignores the formal organizational system and goes underground, bootlegging his project and often keeping it secret until its performance appears undeniable. -The split between marketing and technology sets up potential innovations for failure. The product champion builds marketing, or technology, informally into his team-or substitutes his own intuitions for the missing component. -The rational myth denies the need for internal sales and promotion. The product champion turns publicist and promoter on the Q.T. The product champion is a creation of the age of large organizations and of the special problems of innovation which have become so noticeable in the last decade or two. He is a man of strong will, attracted to risk, set against the established order, with great energy and capacity to invite and withstand disapproval. Fifty years ago he would have started his own firm. He may still do so. But in a mature economy, full of large and powerful firms, he is more likely to find himself in a position where he can and must work from within. In many, if not most, instances of radical technological change, he is to be found at the heart of things. Still, his emergence is a very infrequent event. The mere existence of product champions in corporations is not an adequate solution to the problems of technical innovation in corporations.
New Corporate Forms The most significant recent change in corporate structure, from the point of view of technological innovation, is in effect an institutionalizatisn of the role of the product champion. It is an effort on the part of a growing number of corporations to provide a
120
Technology and Change
corporate umbrella for the formation of new small firms based on new technology. The larger firm attempts to identify ideas which promise new businesses where these are apart from the main business of the firm. It seeks men who are willing to be identified with such ideas to carry them forward, with relative autonomy, as new businesses. These will operate as independent profit centers within the larger firm. The men are product champions made legitimate and nurtured by the firm as a deliberate means to diversification and growth. This pattern is an outgrowth, as well, of what might be called the R 81 D-based company. As, replacing craft, the research idea entered the industrial scene as service to production, the company's first effort was to understand and regularize its production process. Gradually, after World War 11, research gained the status of an independent entity within many firms. There came into being research departments, research directors and, with them, the problems of research policy. It became necessary to spell out the boundaries of the research task and to point out the ways in which research effort was to be made consistent with corporate goals. Characteristically, however, research has tended to yield unexpected results. Companies in the food business find themselves in possession of new devices for extruding plastics. Paper companies develop new textile fibers. Electrical firms give birth to new techniques of powder metallurgy. And in these cases, thinking in terms of existing marketing and production facilities and of the '%usiness we're in," companies often find no way to capitalize on their unexpected results. On the other hand, results from projects within the business of the firm may never materialize at all. Firms which have profited most from research have tended to be flexible and adaptive in their ability to commercialize unexpected technical blessings. A firm like QM is perhaps the most famous example. It began with sandpaper, moved into commercial coatings, marketed Scotch Tape and then moved in rapid suc-
Models for Change
121
cession to magnetic tape, cleaning products and games, among many other products. Nearly all its new businesses have built on the output of its central development program. But in each case, a new management group has been formed (often from the technical and marketing people first associated with the development) and a new business launched as a division of the company, with great autonomy. As a result, the corporate structure looks less like this :
and more like this :
122
Technology and Change
3M is a group of relatively independent small firms surrounding a central bank and development facility. The histories of AMF, Brunswick and Borg Warner represent variations on this theme. Companies like Carborundum, Whirlpool and Union Carbide, among others, are experimenting with this approach to utilization of their own research results. The advantage of this approach is that it permits commercial exploitation of developments which do not fall within the existing corporate scheme or which threaten established departments. The resulting corporate form-a loose confederation of businesses only peripherally related to one another in their technology and linked to a central bank and development facility-is the form of the R & D-based company. It is the form corporations assume when their research policy becomes: "Make money from the promising results of R & D." This pattern of entrepreneurship is closely tied to the projectteam approach. The new business matures in most instances out of a technical-marketing-business group which has, for some months or years, been pursuing a line of development. It permits the members of this group to move forward with their productcapitalizing on their store of energy and commitment. It subjects them, then, to the discipline of performance as a profit center. It rewards product champions with a business of their own. In a sense, it represents an effort on the part of the established firm to re-establish within the large corporate framework the verve and style of the little man who founded the company.
Deliberate Change from Within The pattern of the R & D-based company is a way of circumventing the problems of innovation in an established firm. It does not solve them. It outflanks them. By a loosening of the concept of "the business we're in," the management allows itself to form new
Models for Change
123
business entities and spares itself the task of making the existing organization more nearly capable of technological innovation. But it is not always possible in this way to start fresh. Often, for a variety of reasons-competitive threat is perhaps the major one -the old business must change. But how is it possible deliberately, from within, to change in
the direction of innovation? The conventional wisdom provides two clear, although contradictory, answers. The first depends on the assumption that People Cannot Change. Since people cannot change, an organization, left to its own resources, cannot change either. Change is possible only when agents of change are brought in from the outside. Moreover, since "an organization reflects the competence of its leader," a new man must be brought in at the top. The recipe for innovation then becomes, Bring in a new leader! In companies where the task of innovation has been delegated to research, the receipt is, Bring in a new research director! Something very much like this line of thinking helps to account for the high rate of turnover among research directors in many large U.S. companies between 1950 and 1960. The second answer is mechanistic. It assumes that lack of technique is all that stands between an organization and greater capacity for innovation. A reorganization, the introduction of a new idea-screening system, a new "mechanism" for producing ideas (brainstorming, for example), a new "co-ordinator" for product innovation-any of these might do the trick. None of them threatens fundamental change. The organization can adopt them as it might adopt a new accounting system or PERT or a new sampling scheme for quality control. Even though these answers contradict one another, they rest on a common view of an organization's resistance to innovation. They treat resistance to innovation as "inertia." If an organization's resistance to change is in the nature of iner-
124
Technology and Change
tia, it can be overcome by the exercise of force-a new "engine" at the top or a new mechanism which allows internal forces to act more effectively. A new man can "get things moving'; a new mechanism can "take the bugs out." But if there is one thing that comes out of our discussions to date, it is that resistance to innovation is not merely inertial. Resistance to innovation is in the nature of an active, complex dynamism which strives to keep things as they are. We saw in the McKinney Company, for example, how top management, sales, production, and research-as-scapegoat combined to maintain the fiction that good ideas only come from the top. We saw in Morison's example of the introduction of continuous-aim firing how technology and social systems are intertwined in such a way that a threatened change in technology will bring retaliation by the social system. In a more generalized form, the existence in established firms of entrepreneurs without authority and the current state of relations between boss and subordinate over issues of innovation tend actively to keep innovation from happening. This active, dynamic character of resistance to innovation is by no means limited to companies. In the next chapter, we will be seeing similar patterns in whole industries. Psychiatrists find similar dynamisms in resistance to change in individual personalities. Economists find them in the problems of "underdeveloped regions : These barriers [that bar the way to development] . . . are a series of "vicious circles within vicious circles and of interlocking vicious circles": Poor people have poor health and low energy; low energy results in low productivity: which keeps people poor. Absentee and large-scale ownership patterns demand single-crop farming, which is dependent on unstable markets, which dictate credit systems that perpetuate undesirable land-tenure patterns. . . .
Models for Change
125
The Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal has described these circles as a downward-spiralling cumulative process of circular causation. It can be summed up by saying: "Poverty is its own cause." . . .
vicious
Social systems strive actively to remain as they are. "Stability is a state for which a high price in energy and effort is paid. Resistance to change is not a matter of inertia but of dynamism. Given this dynamism, no mere shift in organization, no mechanism, no simple infusion of a new leader, no one-shot venture in education, is likely to produce a significant effect. The mechanism will be ignored, circumvented or put to use in maintaining the status quo ( I am reminded of a company in which a new-project accounting system, designed to force research projects to become compatible with company goals, found its actual use in masking a greater movement toward undirected research). The new leader, unless he displays unusual skills, will be swamped by the dynamism or become its instrument. Nevertheless, deliberate change from within in the direction of innovation is possible. There is no one route. On the contrary, a variety of styles are possible. But on empirical grounds-not out of a theory of what makes change possible but out of observations of the situations in which it has and has not occurred-some of the conditions of change can be stated. -Leverage
at the
top. Without commitment to change at the
top, the organization as a whole cannot move in the direction of innovation even though there may be islands of innovation, subunits of the organization, moving toward innovation to the extent that they can. In one instance, foremen in a plant were trained in human relations skills. They returned to the plant, prepared to practice their newly acquired skills. What they found was the same uncomprehending management they had found before, and they were unable to deliver on implicit promises of fair
126
Technology and Change
treatment made to the workers. The foremen's training had put them in the middle. Similarly, the managers of the division of a company may make determined steps toward innovation, bringing their own research and marketing people into a close-knit team committed to new -products, which comes to nothing when proposals are brought to a top management which does not share the same attitudes toward risk or the same style of working. In order for deliberate change toward innovation to occur, management must be reallynot only officially-committed to it. This implies, among other things, that top management recognizes its own need to change. In most organizations, problems of innovation tend to become polarized: they tend to be seen as the fault either of those on top or of those below. In fact, as we have been seeing, they are nearly always problems of a social system of which top and bottom are parts. But change in management is both necessary and catalytic. For one thing, constructive change is unlikely so long as management continues to believe the various myths which place responsibility for failure entirely elsewhere: "We need more creative men" or "Good ideas come from the top." Moreover, radical innovation is generally more threatening to top management than to anyone else: it forces them to leap into unfamiliar business situations and to abandon what seems to be safe ground. Finally, as we have noticed before, the personality of the man at the top and his way of doing business are likely to have a profound effect on the character of leadership throughout his organization. The style he adopts is apt to become the style of his submanagers and of their subordinates. In all these senses, change toward innovation requires that top management accept its own need to change. Without this leverage and support, efforts at deliberate change from within are apt to come to nothing.
Models for Change
127
-Perception of a crisis. In individuals and organizations it is easy to underestimate the strength of the dynamisms that tend to keep things as they are. Only the strongest incentives can lead an organization to effective deliberate change. For an organization to increase significantly its capacity for innovation, it is not enough that a man or a few men-even at the top-understand that it would be advantageous for the organization to change. Something like a state of crisis must arise. The organization must come to feel that its survival, or at any rate, its survival as it has been, is threatened. Characteristically, this perception of threat comes from the outside. It may. come from the realization that foreign competition is producing better, cheaper products which are destroying markets, from the knowledge that a new, powerful company has moved into the market with a superior line or from the feeling that the corporation has no ships at sea. Once it perceives the threat, the organization must immediately interpret it as requiring a shift toward innovation. One of the characteristics of managers capable of inducing deliberate internal change toward innovation is the ability to create a sense of crisis around events that need not be interpreted in this way. Such crises have been generated, for example, around the perception that "without new products, we cannot grow further" or that "while we have a large share of the market, we have not contributed to the field in twenty years." Leverage at the top and the perception of crisis are starting conditions for change toward innovation. There are, in addition, conditions which must be met along the way. -Conflict. A state of crisis, which puts a whole organization into stress, is likely to create internal conflict. This is particularly the case when it becomes clear, to some at least, that the organization's traditional or usual response to the crisis is inadequate.
Technology and Change
128
-A
company built on a traditional line of products is declining. New products have failed to fill the gap. A conflict breaks out between the partisans of research, who see the company's lack of research-mindedness as the problem, and the old guard, who claim that research has let the company down and that what is required is a return to customeroriented development. -A strong top manager has created a crisis around the need to develop more ships at sea. An atmosphere arises in which there is sharp competition for leadership in the drive for new products: two men emerge as principal candidates and fight for the new position. -An old-line agency of Government is under attack. Members of Congress criticize it for surviving the accomplishment of its mission, for having too many employees, for being irrelevant to modern times. Within the agency, conflict breaks out between those committed to the original agency mission and those who want to see the old mission modified to suit the times; between a new management eager for change and lower ranks committed to old skills and activities. Internal conflict is the organization's response to external threat which demands change. It corresponds to deliberation and self-doubt in an individual. It lets come into play the organization's resources for coping with threat. It lets new views of the situation emerge. I cannot identify a finite number of types of conflict which organizations experience in this way. Characteristically, the establishment fights against proponents of the new way; the old guard fights the young Turks; central fights operations; those above fight those below; divisions, such as marketing and technology, fight one another, as do contestants for power. The point about such conflicts is that they are a construc-
Models for Change
129
tive condition for change. The manner of their resolution determines the form of deliberate change. --Suficient time. Change toward innovation, like any fundamental change in people, demands sufficient time. It takes time for a perception of crisis to turn into a sense of the need for innovation. It takes time for the conflicts, stimulated by external threat, to be resolved. Moreover, time ( T ) is required for what can be called a whole cycle of change ( C ) to occur. A graph of change in an organization tends not to look like this:
Change tends not to proceed in steady increments, cumulatively. It is more apt to look like this:
130
Technology and Change
What Rostow says (in the Stages of Economic Growth) about economic growth, seems to apply to change toward innovation. There is at first a "steady state," maintained through the expenditure of energy in the form of more or less hidden dynamisms. There is a take-off point ( A ) when the process of change begins. Change proceeds, gathering strength and at an increasing rate, in a period of "take-off'' (A-B) during which it becomes self-sustaining. At a later time, ( B ) , a new steady state is reached. Such a process is usually one of a series
T
complicated by perturbations within individual change cycles.
Time is required for the take-off. If the organization's situation does not afford time for reaching a new steady state,
Models for Change
131
the gains made may be lost. An earlier steady state will reoc-
cur. A company's cycle of change toward innovation seldom requires less than a year and usually more than two or three. Often the perception of the meaning of a crisis, or the decision to act on it, will come too late. The cycle of decline will have gone too far, markets will have been too far eroded, competition will have gained too much. The company's situation must permit it to live through the full cycle of change required. -A vision and a model. "What would we be, if we were not what we are?" When it perceives the need for an organization to become more innovative, top management is apt to experience a curious feeling of helplessness. What can it say and do to cause the change to occur? Several answers to this question come easily: -It can issue a "call to arms," exhorting the organization to strain its efforts toward innovation. It can issue policy statements to this effect. -It can set organizational goals. But these are apt to be put in the language of after-the-fact assessment of the effects of innovation: "We must double our gross sales. We must bring five new ~roductsto market. We must increase our margin of profit." -It can allocate resources to the task, by increasing research and development expenditures, for example, or by naming more new product managers. But the exhortations are apt to have a hollow ring: "The boss wants us to get more 'creative,' but what does he want us to be more creative about?" It does not help to speak of "doubling sales in five years," which says what things are to be like after the job has been done rather than how to do it. And an increase in research dollars merely shifts the burden
132
Technology and Change
to the man who has to decide how to invest them. Moreover, all these indications compete for attention with the history of the organization's actions, as perceived by those charged with the task. Corporate actions, as seen (and distorted) from below, speak louder than management's words. Management is apt to complain, at such times, that it cannot get the organization to take management seriously! And the usual exercise of punishments and rewards may simply add to the frustration of those below. Pressure to move, in the absence of a sense of direction, may send them around in circles. In order to move deliberately toward innovation, the organization must have a vision, vividly and broadly perceived, of what it can come to be. That vision is often associated with an individual, the leader. Providing that vision, in a state of need for change, may be the leader's major job. The man who develops the vision may come to fruition as leader regardless of his actual formal position in the organization. It is easier to see this in the case of nations than in the case of companies. Inspirational leaders, like Ghandi, Nehru, Wilson, De Gaulle, Kennedy and Roosevelt, are perhaps best remembered for their visions. Among industrial leaders, the best-known visionaries are of the last generation: men like Henry Ford, Westinghouse, Edison. They had visions of beginnings. It is, in some ways, more difficult to generate visions of radical change from within. When the leader is unable to generate a vision that provides a direction for change, his task is to create a situation in which such a vision can be developed-to identify the building of such a vision as a task for the organization and to get people to work on it. For a vision to become reality, models are required. It is not enough to paint a picture of what might be. There must be an instance, a concrete happening, which can be pointed
Models for Change
133
to, afterward, as "the kind of thing we are trying to do." For the organization, it becomes "another": for 3M, "another Scotch tape," for the Department of Defense, "another Polaris." In most companies the models are far less dramatic and need not be overwhelming successes in order to serve the purpose of making the direction of change concrete for those involved.
Styles of Change Leverage at the top, a perception of crisis, sufficient time for the change cycle to occur, a concrete vision of the direction of change -these are minimal conditions for change toward innovation. Within this framework, change may proceed in a variety of styles. The initiative for change may come from below in the organization or from the outside, but in order to be effective, it must eventually engage the top. We will consider two of many possible styles of change from the top. These two differ principally in that, in the first, the leader holds a more or less detailed vision of the direction of change and attempts to impose it, powerfully, from above; while, in the second, he attempts to create the conditions for the emergence of initiative for change throughout the organization. -In the first instance the leader is characteristically a new man at the job. He may be a son who takes the business over when his father retires, a new appointee, an outsider brought in or a new man from the ranks. Rarely, he is an old leader with a new sense of mission. He has, or quickly develops, a vision of what it means for the organization to move toward innovation. He has, or proin lieutenants who share his vision and his style of operation. He tests the limits of his power and of his dependence down-
Technology and Change ward. Those he regards as educable, he teaches. Those he regards as intractable, he attempts to remove from power. He sets new activities in motion, suitable to his vision of the organization's future. In old activities, he plants individuals who represent the style of behavior he wishes to encourage. He pulls the reins in tight and exacts performance. He reorganizes, partly to accomplish new objectives, partly to shake things up. He is attempting, as nearly as possible, to make the organization an extention of his own personality and an instrument of his own vision. He creates great dependency. He becomes a kind of product champion at the top. Through his pressures for performance and the real risks he undertakes on behalf of the organization, he is able to generate a continuing sense of crisis. He does not permit uncertainty within the organization. He resolves conflicts by fiat. Disengaged or hesitant resources are quickly pulled into his field of force. He takes on himself the burden of converting uncertainty to risk. He must, of necessity, trust his own vision of the way things should go, since any uncertainty on his part creates chaos below. He tends to make more and more of the decisions himself. The size of the organization and the extent to which innovation is required in the situation tend to set limits to his effectiveness: if innovation is required in parts of the organization that lie beyond his direct control, beyond his ability to impose his vision directly in the detail required by the situation (without arbitrariness or ineffectiveness) , he must induce innovation indirectly through his relation to his subordinates. He is given, then, to a stringent requirement for innovative performance, ruthlessly enforced from above. His is the method of power, control, competition, anxiety, survival, performance. He becomes the Great Man of the organization. He galvanizes others into activity either through hate or love or, more frequently, through both.
134
Models for Change
135
He solves the organization's problems of innovation by
substituting his own personality for the organization's. He generates the ideas and champions them. To the extent that his vision is effective and changes with the changing situation; to the extent that his energy and ability are equal to the scope of innovation required-he is effective. He may cause the organization to take off and break through to a new level of stability. The great problem of the style is in the dependency it creates. The Great Man is apt not to be able to tolerate men of his ability around him. He is not indestructible. If he fails, dies or for some reason leaves the organization, he creates an enormous problem of succession. He has not groomed his successors. The organization has not learned to innovate except in the sense of implementing his orders. The organization, through him, has learned only to respond dependently to a Great Man. At his demise, the organization is ready only for another Great Man. -In the second style, the leader works to enable people within the organization to learn to innovate. His vision is of change, learning, innovation from within. He does not attempt to shoulder the burden of converting uncertainty to risk; he attempts to help others learn to do this. He does not impose his ideas about substantive projects; he does not regard himself as the principal source of ideas. Instead, he attempts to build resources for innovation. To the extent that he is manipulative, he manipulates the process by which ideas come into being and turn into reality. He attempts to teach and to create models but on the level of process rather than specific accomplishment. His assumption is that it is possible, without relaxing standards of performance or deflecting attention from the work at hand, to enable people in the organization to use their own potential for innovation and to set a style in the organization for doing this.
136
Technology and Change
The style is one of: -emphasis on the interpersonal problems that stand in the way of innovation; ---challenge to the rational myths about work and organization; insistence on the relevance of feelings to the work at hand; -openness in dealing with the organization's taboos; -participation of subordinates in setting targets for accomplishment; toughness in determining whether targets have been reached. The ways in which interpersonal issues enter into problems of innovation in the established corporation need to be reintroduced here : -When the boss-subordinate problem arises in the context of new technology, it forces the question of trust, The boss, who must evaluate and decide, cannot hope to be competent about every question of new technology that is brought to his attention. He must at some point make judgments based on inadequate information, out of confidence in the man who stands up for the idea. He must therefore find a basis for establishing trust. Similarly, the subordinate who proposes must have a basis for feeling that the disposition made of his idea will not be arbitrary, that the boss's demand for innovation is real and that the risk he is asked to take will be shared. If this set of problems is not to be resolved by the exercise of power by the Great Man above or the product champion below, or dissolved by a re-evaluation of the need for innovation, it demands that boss and subordinate come together on another level, as men. This can happen only through a process of challenge, test and performance, undertaken in both directions. This is not to be confused with their getting to like each other, although that may happen as a conse-
Models for Change
137
quence. Nor is it a matter of setting aside the obligations of their respective roles. It is a matter of establishing, within the framework of corporate obligations, emphasis on work and its requirements, and respect and demand for performance, a basis for mutual trust which will enable them to run risks with one another and jointly to run risks for the organization. -The prospect of innovation carries with it the possibility, even the likelihood, of failure. It entails uncertainty. Where both failure and uncertainty are taboo-where it is felt necessary to pretend that they do not exist-they will be avoided. The overwhelming tendency will be to push them underground and to stick as far as possible to the well-understood, the likely-to-succeed; that is to say, to the tried-andtrue. Where it is impossible to avoid uncertainty and the prospect of failure, the tendency will be to shunt them off onto somebody else. The consequences of these tendencies have been spelled out in our discussion of companies like the McKinney Company: divisions within the company will tend to draw boundaries between each other, to dispose of what others propose and to seek scapegoats. Dealing with these problems other than by the power routes requires introducing the notion of "failure through competence." It means abandoning the notion of omniscience at the top and the certainty of success if you are competent. It requires that the organization tolerate both failure and uncertainty, without becoming softheaded toward incompetence or relaxing demands for performance. Tolerance for uncertainty carries with it tolerance for experiment, which in uncertain situations is the only productive response. The leader, in this style, must help the organization acquire the concept of shared responsibility for the risk of innovation; must remove the dread of failure by recognizing,
138
Technology and Change
openly, its association with the demand for innovation; and must, in his own behavior, model tolerance of uncertainty and of willingness to change and experiment in the face of that uncertainty. The leader who wishes to confront these problems is dependent on sustained contact with the people who experience them. Where the size and complexity of the organization makes such contact impossible, he is compelled to decide who the key people are and to work on these problems with them. He must help them, then, to work similarly with their subordinates and peers. He must present this policy and, more importantly, exemplify it. The two styles we have just discussed have been presented in their pure or extreme form. In reality, they rarely appear in this form. Most leaders of organizations who undertake to resolve problems of innovation strike some compromise between the posture of the Great Man at the top and the role of the resourcebuilding educator. Still, these two styles represent major alternatives open to the leader. They are poles with respect to which his own position is defined. The first approach looks at the problem of change toward innovation as a problem in the exercise of power by a man at the top who knows where he wants to go and has a vision of what must be done. The second looks at the same problem as one of identifying and resolving the interpersonal obstacles to innovation. It focuses on the process of change rather than on implementing an established vision. The first approach moves toward the organization as an extension of the personality of a Great Man, on whom all others are dependent. The second moves toward a community of innovators, within the framework of corporate goals and requirements.
1
Technological Change in U.S. Industry
1)
WE H A V E CONSIDERED, up to this point, invention and innovation within the corporation. What we have learned through this analysis--characteristic patterns and problems of innovation within the firm, and some of the approaches to change-should have implications for technological change within a larger industrial framework. It would be surprising if patterns of innovation within the firm did not reflect themselves in broad patterns of technological change within and across large segments of industry. In spite of its problems innovation does occur and at a rate to cause widespread interest and concern. What are its sources? Where does it come from, and what are its patterns? Do the patterns and problems of technological innovation differ significantly from one industry to another? Is it as useful to speak of models for change on the level of industry as it is on the corporate level? In the studies1 from which this chapter was drawn, three industrial areas-textiles, machine tools and building-were chosen to 139
140 Technology and Change represent industries that are traditional and mature (stable in comparison to change in Gross National Product). In each industry we tried to identify technological developments of major significance which had been brought into commercial use between about 1930 and 1960. Through this analysis, answers were generated to some questions concerning source, pattern and problems of technological change. Because of the limits of the study-major industries such as chemicals, petrochemicals and primary metals were not considered, for example-these answers are very much in the nature of hypotheses. Enough material was assembled, however, to throw doubt on at least one common-sense view of technological change in industry, a view which runs as follows: -Within any given industry new technology comes primarily from the research and development efforts of firms established in the industry. The rate of technological change in the industry is therefore primarily a function of research and development investment by those firms and their skill in commercializing research results.
An "Industry" At the outset it became apparent that one of the central problems of the study would have to do with the question, "What is an industry?" We are accustomed to speak of the textile and machine tool industries, for example, as though they were fairly welldefined areas which remain substantially the same from year to year-so many companies which share a common set of functions and at least an overlapping family of products and processes. They are defined in this fashion by the Standard Industrial Classification manual and by the industrial associations themselves. Nevertheless, each of the industries studied turned out to be complex, ill-
Technological Change in US. Industry
141
defined and shifting. It is not even clear that textiles, building and construction, and machine tools are industries in the same sense. In textiles, for example, several different kinds of companiesmills, fiber producers, machinery producers, garment manufacturers-are all more or less associated with the industry. But many companies traditionally associated with the industry have been moving out of it, and other companies (notably from the chemical industry) have been moving in. Identifying the industry as a set of companies, becomes difficult, since many traditionally nontextile companies have been establishing textile divisions and traditionally textile companies have been establishing nontedile divisions. The "industry" appears to be quite a different set of companies if companies filling textile functions (even though the products are paper- or plastic-based) are included. The boundaries and the nature of the industry have been in process of change. This change, moreover, turns out to be essential to innovation in the industry.
Significant Innovation A second major question was what would be meant by a significant technological innovation. Its significance would seem to depend on three criteria: I. Economic importance-the