Subjectification, Intersubjectification and Grammaticalization
Topics in English Linguistics 66
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Subjectification, Intersubjectification and Grammaticalization
Topics in English Linguistics 66
Editors
Elizabeth Closs Traugott Bernd Kortmann
De Gruyter Mouton
Subjectification, Intersubjectification and Grammaticalization Edited by
Kristin Davidse Lieven Vandelanotte Hubert Cuyckens
De Gruyter Mouton
ISBN 978-3-11-020588-6 e-ISBN 978-3-11-022610-2 ISSN 1434-3452 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Subjectification, intersubjectification and grammaticalization / edited by Kristin Davidse, Lieven Vandelanotte, Hubert Cuyckens. p. cm. ⫺ (Topics in English linguistics; 66) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-020588-6 (alk. paper) 1. Subjectivity (Linguistics) 2. Grammar, Comparative and general. I. Davidse, Kristin. II. Vandelanotte, Lieven, 1978⫺ III. Cuyckens, H. P299.S89.S85 2010 4011.43⫺dc22 2010009228
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” 2010 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin/New York Cover image: Brian Stablyk/Photographer’s Choice RF/Getty Images Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ⬁ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com
Acknowledgements
The present volume finds its origin in the conference “From ideational to interpersonal: Perspectives from grammaticalization” (FITIGRA), held at the University of Leuven from 10 to 12 February 2005. This conference was financed through a research community on interpersonal and ideational grammar sponsored by the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (Scientific Research Network WO.018.00N) from 2000 to 2005. The editors would also like to acknowledge the generous support of the Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) – Phase VI, project P6/44 of the Belgian Science Policy Office on ‘Grammaticalization and (Inter)Subjectification’ and that of the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation and the European Regional Development Fund (grant HUM2007-60706/FILO). Bringing this project to fruition would not have been possible without the support and input of the series editor, Elizabeth Traugott. Over and above her ever incisive comments on all the papers included in this volume, we would like to thank her for keeping things moving and spurring us on to completion. To Mouton de Gruyter’s editor Birgit Sievert and its production editor Wolfgang Konwitschny we say thanks for the pleasant exchanges and helpful feedback at different stages of the publication process. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to Lobke Ghesquière and Sigi Vandewinkel, both appointed to the ‘Grammaticalization and (Inter) Subjectification’ IAP-project at different intervals, for their invaluable help in formatting the manuscript. While naturally we accept the final responsibility for the choices made, we were very lucky in being guided by the advice of external referees (listed at the back of the volume) who did a tremendously conscientious and thorough job, benefitting both the papers selected for this volume and those eventually recommended to other publication outlets. For this we are very grateful to them. Finally, kudos are due to the contributors who all agreed to develop, and in some cases re-orient, their original studies with the themes and overall coherence of this volume in mind. For the good spirit in which everything was conducted and, of course, for the stimulating contributions, many thanks. K.D. – L.V. – H.C.
Contents
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................... v Introduction Hubert Cuyckens, Kristin Davidse and Lieven Vandelanotte ...................... 1 Part 1. Theoretical issues (Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment Elizabeth Closs Traugott ............................................................................ 29 Part 2. (Inter)subjectification and grammaticalization involving adverbials Presupposition accommodation and language change Scott A. Schwenter and Richard Waltereit ................................................. 75 How prosody reflects semantic change: A synchronic case study of of course Anne Wichmann, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Karin Aijmer...................................................................................... 103 The semantic-pragmatic development of well from the viewpoint of (inter)subjectification Tine Defour .............................................................................................. 155 Paths in the development of elaborative discourse markers: Evidence from Spanish Teresa Fanego .......................................................................................... 197
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Contents
Part 3. (Inter)subjectification and grammaticalization in the noun phrase The emergence of the definite article: ille in competition with ipse in Late Latin Anne Carlier and Walter De Mulder........................................................ 241 On the subjectification and intersubjectification paths followed by the adjectives of completeness Lobke Ghesquière..................................................................................... 277 On the rise of (inter)subjective meaning in the grammaticalization of kind of/kinda Hélène Margerie ...................................................................................... 315 Part 4. (Inter)subjectification and grammaticalization involving modals Better as a verb David Denison and Alison Cort ............................................................... 349 (Inter)subjectification in the domain of modality and mood – Concepts and cross-linguistic realities Heiko Narrog ........................................................................................... 385 Contributors.............................................................................................. 431 Referees .................................................................................................... 433 Author index............................................................................................. 435 Subject index ............................................................................................ 441
Introduction Hubert Cuyckens, Kristin Davidse and Lieven Vandelanotte This volume sets out to investigate how the concepts of subjectification and intersubjectification can be insightfully employed in grammaticalization research. In exploring this relationship between (inter)subjectification and grammaticalization, it focuses on three distinct areas of the grammar: adverbials, modals, and the noun phrase. Together, these studies represent recent thinking about subjectification and push further the reflection about the less researched notion of intersubjectification: what is involved in indexing speaker attitude and belief, and expressing attention to the hearer’s self in the meaning of adverbials (e.g. discourse markers), NPs (e.g. determiners) and VPs (modality)? As the structure of the volume is in terms of these three domains, it will naturally invite the reader into this systematic exploration. In this introduction we will focus on the key concepts of language change addressed in this book, viz. subjectification and intersubjectification in relation to grammaticalization, and how the main theoretical claims and descriptive findings of the contributions relate to them. 1. Subjectivity in linguistics As subjectification and intersubjectification denote processes whereby a linguistic element acquires increased (inter)subjective meaning, we will set the scene with a general consideration of the key concept of subjectivity. Defining the notion ‘subjectivity’ is not a straightforward matter, as it has several uses and interpretations, some of them connoted negatively. As a non-technical term used in everyday language, it refers to the situation of being influenced by personal opinion, often unfairly so (as in His judgements are far too subjective), or of existing in the mind or imagination. In scientific investigation, subjectivity suggests something not based on empirical fact, “something ‘soft’, unverifiable, even suspicious” (Finegan 1995: 1), and therefore not worthy of scholarly investigation. In linguistic theorizing, it refers, broadly speaking, to the centrality of the speaker in language. While this is in itself a neutral characterization, linguistics – like
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other social sciences – has for a good part of the twentieth century been influenced by objectivist epistemology and metaphysics (cf. Lakoff 1987), so that subjectivity and speaker-reference have until recently not been seen as paramount to linguistic research. For a good part of the twentieth century, subjectivity and speakerreference in language was not a research topic of major concern. While the importance of subjectivity in language was recognized as early as in Bréal’s ([1900] 1964) writings, it is only the last two or three decades that have seen a resurgence of interest, mainly in the cognitive-functional tradition. Of particular importance in this respect is Benveniste, who introduced the notion of ‘sujet d’énonciation’ (speaking subject) (vs. ‘sujet d’énoncé’ or syntactic subject) and who pointed out that “language is so strongly marked by subjectivity that one might wonder whether it could still function as, or be called, language if it was organized differently” (Benveniste 1966: 261; our translation).1 The importance of subjectivity was further underscored by Lyons (1977, 1982), and was subsequently given increasing attention in the cognitive-functional literature, with hallmark publications such as Traugott (1989), Stein and Wright (1995) and Langacker (1990). Recent publications testifying to the importance of subjectivity in linguistics include Nuyts (2001), Traugott and Dasher (2002), Langacker (1999, 2002, 2006), Verhagen (2005), Athanasiadou, Canakis and Cornillie (2006), De Smet and Verstraete (2006). The two main research strains to have developed on subjectivity and subjectification are those referring to the thought of Traugott and Langacker. In Traugott’s approach, (inter)subjectification is a semantic process whereby a linguistic element (morpheme, word, phrase or construction) develops new senses that involve speaker-reference or speaker-perspective. For instance, Traugott (1989) characterizes the development of English sculan from main verb (‘owe’) to its various modal uses as a shift from objective (‘propositional’) to subjective meanings. From its original concrete sense (‘owe financially’) it first acquired internal evaluative, but still propositional meanings (‘owe morally’). These shifted to deontic speechact-like meanings, which in turn led to epistemic meanings primarily focused on speaker’s belief and knowledge states. For Langacker, an expression or its meaning, taken as a whole, is neither subjective nor objective; as such, “a semantic shift does not … result in a global meaning becoming 1. Benveniste’s original (1966: 261) French wording was as follows: Il est marqué si profondément par l’expression de la subjectivité qu’on se demande si, autrement construit, il pourrait encore fonctionner et s’appeler langage.
Introduction
3
more subjective” (Langacker 2006: 18). Instead, in his view, an expression’s meaning always comprises both subjectively and objectively construed elements, and it is individual conceptual elements within an expression’s meaning that, over time, may come to be construed with a greater degree of subjectivity or objectivity (cf. Langacker 2006: 18). As such, the semantic shift in English modals such as may, will and must do not constitute a development from objective to subjective meaning; rather, the development from main verb to modal involves particular elements in the verb’s conceptualization coming to be construed with greater subjectivity. For instance, in its main verb use in Old English, magan involves an objectively construed force (“onstage” as a focused object of conception) emanating from the trajector for carrying out the situation described in the infinitival complement. In its modal verb use in Present Day English, this modal force is now subjectively construed and emanates from the speaker (subject of conception). Narrog (this volume) compares Traugott’s and Langacker’s theoretical approach to subjectification – and descriptive trade-offs of the differences – in the domain of the development of English modals. Thus, in Langacker’s approach, the term ‘subjective’ (as well as ‘objective’) does not pertain to the semantic content of a linguistic expression; rather, it should be understood in terms of the viewing arrangement or perspective assumed to construe a particular conceptual content. The notions subjective and objective are “characterized relative to the asymmetry between the observer in a perceptual situation and the entity that is observed” (1985: 120), whereby maximal subjectivity is characteristic of “the viewer’s role as such” and maximal objectivity characterizes “the onstage focus of attention” (2008: 77) on the object of perception. “For linguistic purposes,” Langacker (2008: 77) holds, “we are interested in the general conceptual analog of this perceptual asymmetry.” Speaker and hearer are construed with maximal subjectivity when they function as a tacit conceptualizing presence that is not itself made explicit. “At the opposite extreme, construed with maximal objectivity, is the focused object of attention: the entity an expression puts onstage and profiles” (2008: 77). Athanasiadou, Canakis and Cornillie’s (2006) volume Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity is devoted mainly to Langacker’s approach, which is shown at work in predominantly synchronic studies of modals, adjectives and syntax. This volume is complementary to it in that the take on subjectification is Traugottian, and that a good number of the studies, distributed over the domains of modals, the NP and discourse markers, are
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diachronic. As well, a concern specific to this volume is the investigation of intersubjectivity and intersubjectification. 2. A form-meaning approach to language change Traugott’s chapter “(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: a reassessment” forms the theoretical cornerstone of the volume. To her, subjectivity “involves the expression of self and the representation of a speaker’s ... perspective or point of view in discourse” (Finegan 1995: 1, quoted in Traugott and Dasher 2002: 20). Subjectification is the semasiological process whereby linguistic expressions acquire subjective meaning. In particular, it refers to the tendency whereby lexical material “tend[s] to become increasingly based in the SP[eaker]/W[riter]’s subjective belief state or attitude to what is being said and how it is being said” (Traugott 2003: 125; see also Traugott 1989: 35, 1995: 47, 1997, 1999). While expressions of subjectivity index speaker attitude or viewpoint, markers of intersubjectivity index the speaker’s “attention to the addressee’s self-image” (Traugott this volume: 29). Intersubjectification is the semasiological process “whereby meanings come over time to encode … SP/W’s attention to the ‘self’ of AD[dressee]/R[eader] in both an epistemic and social sense” (Traugott 2003: 130). Importantly, in Traugott’s view, intersubjectification follows, and arises out of, subjectification. Both these changes crucially involve “the reanalysis as coded meanings of pragmatic meanings arising in the context of speaker-hearer negotiation of meaning” (Traugott this volume: 60). As subjectification and intersubjectification are sometimes invoked as purely semantic notions, elucidation is warranted of how Traugott grounds them in a functional theory of the linguistic sign and its use. It has been a constant of Traugott’s thinking to define subjectification and intersubjectification as semanticization, which requires the new (inter)subjective meanings to be conventionally coded by the forms, with new form-meaning pairs as result.2 At the origin of the change, there is the old form-meaning pair, a specific correlation of a – lexical and/or grammatical – form and the meaning coded by it, for instance, in the case of a bit, a noun with its full lexical weight and the potential for syntactic modification going with it (Traugott this volume: 46–49). 2. As Traugott (this volume: 35) remarks, her views of (inter)subjectification have sometimes been misconstrued as primarily pragmatic, as in Athanasiadou, Canakis and Cornillie (2006).
Introduction
5
This fixed correlation is encountered in specific contexts, which add both pragmatic specifications and formal (e.g. prosodic) differentiations to it. This can be represented as in Figure 1, which is indebted to McGregor (1997: 44). contextual pragmatic specifications
coded meaning ‘biting/bite’ coding form fully lexical noun bit
formal (e.g. phonological) differentiations
Figure 1. Source form-meaning pair: lexical noun bit
Change begins when the original coded meaning is enriched with pragmatic values, the stage Traugott (1989) refers to as “pragmatic strengthening”, as happened with the invited inference of ‘small quantity’ associated with a bit in specific contexts. However, it is only when this meaning comes to be conventionally associated with the form that Traugott speaks of subjectification as a language change. The new form-meaning pairing presupposes reanalysis of the original lexical/grammatical form, which may be accompanied by phonological change. In the case of a bit, the form coding the new quantificational, scalar meaning is the string a bit of (phonologically rendered as abitta), whose quantifier status – as opposed to its original head function in the source construction – can be demonstrated by the fact that it can only be substituted by established quantifiers such as little/few/some, etc. This new form-meaning pairing can be represented as in Figure 2. Intersubjectification likewise starts with shifting pragmatic values in specific contexts, but can only be claimed as full-fledged change with the establishment of a new form-meaning pair. Demonstrating this for languages such as English which do not have elaborate systems of regular intersubjectivity markers providing clear models may not be so straightforward.
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coded meaning ‘little/few/some’ coding form quantifier a bit of
Figure 2. Form-meaning pair resulting from reanalysis: quantifier a bit of
Full-fledged intersubjectification is found more in languages coding honorific meaning, as does e.g. the Japanese pronoun system.3 For English, Traugott (this volume: 37) mentions, among others, hedges arising from subjectified discourse markers such as some uses of well, perhaps and sort of. In any case, consistent with the principled distinction between lexicogrammatically coded and pragmatic meanings, she insists that intersubjectification too is about the semanticization of what were pragmatic implicatures and pragmatic values of the earlier form-meaning pair. This does not render the study of pragmatic intersubjectivity uninteresting. Meanings involving attention to the addressee’s ‘self’ have been relatively understudied and have to be systematically explored and put on the map – both those that are coded and those that are due to inference and contextualization. (Inter)subjectification often involves grammaticalization, but they are different types of changes which may occur independently of each other. Thus, cases of lexical subjectification are not accompanied by grammaticalization, as illustrated by the use of a speaker-evaluation such as pig for an impolite, slobbering eater. The non-subjective and subjective uses of pig are equally lexical. There can also be grammaticalization without subjectification: we can think here of the development of certain prepositions such as to into an infinitive-marker and by into a marker of the passive. However, the general form-meaning approach to language change advocated by Traugott also applies to grammaticalization, requiring clear semantic and formal argumentation showing that reanalysis has taken place and has led to a new form-meaning pair with (more) grammatical semantics.
3. Another example is particles marking the intimacy/distance between speaker and hearer. Korean, for instance, has particles marking six such different levels (Sohn forthcoming).
Introduction
7
In this volume the chapters by Fanego and by Wichmann, SimonVandenbergen and Aijmer focus strongly on the question of the formal coding of new (inter)subjective meanings. Fanego investigates the question of the formal evidence correlating with the semantic-pragmatic changes undergone by the Spanish manner adverbial de hecho (‘in practice, de facto, illegally’). It developed analogously to English adverbials such as in fact and particularly indeed: it first acquired sentence adverbial uses, in which it could be employed either adversatively to reject a prior position or confirmatively to signal agreement. The confirmatory reading of de hecho is the more likely source of its elaborative discourse marker use. When sentence adverbial uses developed from the manner adverbial, this was accompanied by phonological and morphosyntactic reflexes: a special intonation contour was used for the sentence adverbial which appeared in positions not normally occupied by VP-adverbs (e.g. clause initially) and it lost the syntactic behaviour associated with manner adverbs such as the possibility to be the focus of clefts and to be coordinated with another manner adverbial. By contrast, Fanego does not find clear formal reflexes of the shift from sentence adverbial to discourse marker: they are not distinguished by intonation and share the same syntactic positions (initial, medial and final) in the same discourse contexts. She therefore assumes the same position for de hecho as Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) did for in fact. They had questioned Schwenter and Traugott’s (2000: 21) analysis of the adversative adverb and discourse marker uses of in fact as “distinct polysemies” and proposed instead to view them “as pragmatic implicatures which are conventionalised to a greater or lesser extent, as some contextual meanings are more frequent and more conventionalised than others” (Aijmer and SimonVandenbergen 2004: 1788). Fanego likewise concludes that there is no evidence to regard the shift from the sentence adverb to the discourse marker use of de hecho as a further step in the grammaticalization process. Wichmann, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer in their paper begin by noting that the empirical study of phonological form has been neglected in grammaticalization studies. Mechanisms such as reduction have been pointed to as formal reflexes, but intonation patterns are rarely invoked by way of argument, let alone systematically investigated. They want to start remedying this gap by studying the prosody of of course in relation to meaning and structural position. As to the latter, of course occurs in their – synchronic spoken – data in the three positions typically associated with discourse markers: initially, medially and finally in the utterance. Half of them occur in initial position, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
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subjectifying elements tend to migrate to the left periphery in a language such as English (Traugott this volume: 60; see also below). To get a handle on the relation between meaning and prosody, they turn to theories of intonational meaning. Intonation theory claims that prosodic prominence is directly related to semantic weight. Therefore, they predict that grammaticalization will involve a lower frequency of stress than lexical uses. Of the tokens they examined – which are all grammaticalized uses – only a third was clearly stressed, which confirmed their prediction. As another possible corollary of discourse marker status, they consider realization by a separate intonation unit, one of the few hypotheses touching on prosody to have been formulated in the literature on discourse markers (e.g. Altenberg 1990). This hypothesis was not confirmed by the of course data as the majority were intonationally integrated. They explain this by the fact that discourse markers are often unstressed, which renders it unlikely for them to have separate tone units. They also investigate the correlation between prosody and the basic semantic classes of of course, viz. subjective epistemic-evidential versus intersubjective uses invoking shared knowledge. Here their prediction is that prominence will be more common with the epistemic uses, which have more residual lexical meaning, than with the intersubjective uses, which have bleached further. These expectations were confirmed by statistically significant results, showing again the mileage that can be got out of prosody for the study of grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification. 3. Subjectivity and subjectification With the recent surge of interest in subjectivity, there is, as stressed by De Smet and Verstraete (2006), a danger of the notion being invoked indiscriminately, without an eye to basic distinctions such as pragmatic and coded meaning. The term ‘subjectivity’ subsumes various ways in which an expression may involve speaker-reference: for instance, a word may contain a speaker-related, appreciative or pejorative component as part of its semantic content (e.g. snug, idiot); or it may encode nothing but speaker-attitude with respect to a particular entity or state of affairs (e.g. bloody expressing negative stance towards an entity; may expressing epistemic stance with respect to a state of affairs); or different still, it may function as a deictic element with the speaker as the (implicit) reference point (e.g. the determiner the signalling the speaker’s assessment of an entity’s identifiability;
Introduction
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tense markers anchoring a state of affairs to the speaker’s time of utterance). Importantly, in a general sense, subjectivity pervades all linguistic expressions, and all language is thus subjective by definition. Langacker (1991, 2008: 55–89) argues that a linguistic encoding of a scene, and thus an expression’s meaning, is not solely a matter of conceptual content but also evokes how that content is construed (or how that scene is viewed). The various facets of construal include: (i) choice of degree of specificity of linguistic expressions, e.g. rat versus rodent; (ii) focus on particular portions of a scene by foregrounding them and backgrounding others (in information structural terms: given vs. new, or topic vs. focus); (iii) degree of prominence of participants in a scene, resulting in different alignments (e.g. A is above B vs. B is below A); (iv) perspective or viewing arrangement, an important component of which is the vantage point (by default, the actual location of speaker or hearer in the spatial domain, and the time of speaking in the temporal domain). It can readily be seen that in these various construal phenomena, the speaker or conceptualizing subject plays an important role: an expression’s specificity of lexicalization, its information structure, and the relative prominence of its participants are speakerdependent (or even speaker-imposed), and can thus be said to be subjective. A similar view is expressed by Traugott and Dasher (2002: 20): “Synchronically, SP/W [speaker/writer] selects not only the content, but also the expression of that content – which entity is chosen as syntactic subject, whether topicalization is used, present or past tense, etc.” In a general sense, then, language can be said to be strongly marked by subjectivity in that any selection from the lexical and/or grammatical repertoire passes through the speaker. De Smet and Verstraete (2006: 384) also distinguish this general notion of subjectivity “which is inherent in language use and is independent of the semantics of a particular expression”. Verstraete (2007: 10) further explains it as follows: “the choice of specific lexical items or construction types to refer to a particular entity or situation always imposes a specific perspective on that entity or situation, and it is part of the speaker’s role in the utterance that he/she is the one who bears responsibility for choosing that specific perspective.” As this general type of subjectivity is inherent “in the use of any expression” (De Smet and Verstraete 2006: 384), they refer to it as ‘pragmatic subjectivity’. It is, in Traugott’s terms, non-coded subjectivity, or subjectivity not conventionalized as a form-meaning pair.
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In contrast to this general, or ‘pragmatic’, subjectivity, De Smet and Verstraete (2006) distinguish two types of what they call ‘semantic subjectivity’ (cf. Traugott’s ‘semanticized’ subjectivity), in which speakerrelatedness is part “of the expression’s inherent meaning” (2006: 385), viz. ‘ideational’ and ‘interpersonal’ subjectivity. This terminology refers to Halliday’s (1994) distinction between the ideational functional component of language, which is concerned with the representation of our experience of the world, and the interpersonal component, which expresses speakerpositioning and speaker-interlocutor interaction. Ideational subjectivity “involves the description of a content internal to the speaker” (De Smet and Verstraete 2006: 385). Typical examples are evaluative adjectives and nouns such as stupid and pig. Ideational subjectivity in fact corresponds roughly to Traugott’s (1989: 34) ‘internal propositional’ meaning, defined as “meanings based in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) described situation”. Interpersonal subjectivity refers to expressions that enact speaker position with respect to a particular content, such as deontic and epistemic auxiliaries, discourse markers, illocutionary speech acts, modal adverbs, and intensifying uses of adjectives such as bloody, complete. Importantly, De Smet and Verstraete’s division is not just semantic, but the ideational and interpersonal expressions show divergent syntactic behavior. For her definition of subjectivity, Traugott’s (this volume: 33; 2003: 125) starting point is – and always has been – Lyons’s (1982: 102) characterization: “The term subjectivity refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself and his own attitudes and beliefs” (Lyons 1982: 102). This standard definition contains a more general component, “the locutionary agent’s expression of himself”, which is coordinated with a more specific component, “and his own attitudes and beliefs”. This creates a certain vagueness, allowing for a more narrow or a broader definition. The narrow interpretation finds support in the information Lyons provides regarding his characterization of subjectivity: “selfexpression is nothing other than the expression, or externalization, of one’s beliefs, attitudes, etc.” (1982: 103), and it is also reflected in Traugott’s definition of the process of subjectification as a process whereby “meanings become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief state/attitude towards what the speaker is talking about” (1989: 35; repeated in Traugott 1995: 31; our emphasis).
Introduction
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In Traugott’s various case studies of subjectivity and subjectification (e.g., 1989, 1995, 2003), as summarized in Traugott and Dasher 2002, the main grammatical expressions of speaker-stance discussed are the following: – auxiliaries and quasi-auxiliaries expressing deontic and/or epistemic modality, e.g. may, can, will, must, ought to, going to (Traugott 1989; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 105–151, and references therein; Hopper and Traugott 2003; see also Krug 2000); – various discourse particles expressing the speaker’s epistemic attitude; e.g. the epistemic phrases I think and I guess (Thompson and Mulac 1991; Traugott 1995; Vandelanotte 2004), stance adverbs such as actually, strictly, loosely, really, frankly (see also Powell 1992); – discourse markers as explicit markers of speaker attitude towards discourse structure, i.e. towards the relationship between what precedes and what follows, or of the connectivity between propositions (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 23, 153–189); examples are in fact, indeed, besides, actually, well; – hortative let’s, as in Let’s go, which has come to express the speaker’s (condescending) support; – rather than expressing speaker preference, and scalar adverbs such as even reflecting the speaker’s relative ranking of alternatives (Traugott 1995); – subordinating conjunctions such as while expressing the speaker’s attitude of surprise (Traugott and König 1991; Traugott 1995). Examples of lexical coding of speaker attitude and belief (Traugott 2003: 125) are illocutionary speech-act verbs (including performatives), such as the “assertives” observe, insist, state, claim, and hypothesize, whose meaning is similar to that of epistemic modals, and the “directives” (e.g. request, command, insist), functioning similarly to deontic modals (see also Traugott 1989: 43–45; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 190–225). Other lexical expressions with subjective meaning are modal adverbs such as obviously, possibly, probably, evidently, apparently (Traugott 1989: 46–47), which express the speaker’s epistemic attitude with respect to a state of affairs, and nouns and adjectives expressing the speaker’s evaluation; e.g. bloody in This bloody car and complete in He is a complete idiot.
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To this set, Traugott has more recently added linguistic expressions marking spatial, temporal, and person deixis4 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 23, Traugott 2003: 125). This widening of the class can be accommodated by the broader definition invoking the speaker’s expression of self. Given that the basic function of deixis is to relate entities and states of affairs to a spatio-temporal zero-point or deictic centre – typically egocentric or involving the speaker – and that deictic expressions are thus (typically) speaker-based, they can also be viewed as expressions of the speaker’s self, and thus as subjective. Note that Traugott’s inclusion of deictic expressions in the category of subjective expression ties in with Lyons’s view of the interdependence of deixis and subjectivity, and ultimately goes back to Bühler (1934), who “insists explicitly on the expressive and subjective nature of deixis” (Lyons 1982: 106). A cover term that nicely captures the existence of deictic as well as non-deictic subjective expressions, and which is also used by Traugott, is ‘perspective’ or ‘point of view’. As such, subjectivity can be said to explicitly encode “SP[eaker]/W[riter]’s point of view, for example in deixis, modality, and marking of discourse strategies” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 21–22).5 This volume presents new analyses of the development of subjective meanings in almost all of the areas just discussed: – discourse markers de hecho (‘indeed, in fact’) (Fanego), of course (Wichmann, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer), well (Defour) and kind of/kinda (Margerie) – additive versus counterargumentative too (Schwenter and Waltereit) – volitive and non-volitive modals (Narrog), (‘d) better (Denison and Cort) – scalar intensifying uses of kind of/kinda (Margerie) and complete, total, whole (Ghesquière) – ille and the French definite article (Carlier and De Mulder) As they insert themselves in a tradition established over a few decades, it is intriguing to see how the same new accents and nuances of the main 4. Person deixis is not mentioned explicitly, but its subjective status can be inferred from the following quote: “I and you are crucially grounded in the point of view of the speaker, and so they exhibit subjectivity, as do all deictics” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 22). 5. The term is also used, for instance, in Finegan (1995) and De Smet and Verstraete (2006).
Introduction
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hypotheses guiding that research tradition crop up in these studies. One recurring observation is that the source expression of subjectified uses is rarely purely propositional, but may already have subjective elements, at least on the pragmatic level, associated with it (e.g. Defour; Carlier and De Mulder; Schwenter and Waltereit). Another is that the source may be formed not by one but by several expressions, and that it is the complex interaction between them that leads to the new-form meaning pairing with subjective meaning (Denison and Cort; Defour; Margerie). Some studies integrate gradient and indeterminate uses explicitly in their analysis rather than representing change in terms of discrete classifications (e.g. Wichmann et al.; Denison and Cort; Ghesquière). It is also striking that many studies identify the contexts leading to items coding new subjective meanings in terms of lexical collocations and their positive or negative semantic prosody, e.g. Traugott, Ghesquière, Defour and Margerie (see also Lorenz 2000; Brems 2003, 2010). Margerie pays particular attention to the role played by function words, viz. determiners, in kind of’s differentiation into distinct uses.6 All these tendencies converge under the heading of close study of the micro-processes of subjectification and grammaticalization. While they may, at first sight, appear as mere nuances of existing hypotheses, they may in time lead to a refashioning of them. For instance, processes of change may come to be seen as taking place along multiple interlocking paths, rather than along unitary paths (see also Vandewinkel and Davidse 2008). 4. Intersubjectivity and intersubjectification Just as all language use can be said to be subjective in a general sense, it is intersubjective in a general sense, reflecting the impact of the speech situation which not just involves a speaker but a communicative relationship between speaker and hearer. Benveniste (1971 [1958]) saw this speaker– hearer dyad – and in particular the speaking subject’s awareness and attention to another participant as speaking subject – as a fundamental condition 6. Firth (1957), whose pathfinding insights into collocation have been coming to fruition in the last decades, would have spoken of “colligation” in this case, i.e. “groups of words considered as members of word classes relating to each other in syntactic structures” (Robins 1971: 225). However, it may well be that the linguistic community will choose to use the term “collocation” for patterns of co-occurrence with both lexical and grammatical items.
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for linguistic communication (see also Traugott 2003: 128, this volume: 32). In a similar vein, Schiffrin (1990: 142) has characterized intersubjectivity as mutual information management (the “interaction between what an actor does … and an audience’s interpretation of all available information”, Schiffrin 1990: 142). Traugott (2003: 128, this volume: 32) also stresses that intersubjectivity is a general characteristic of all language use: “Of course, in a general sense the very fact of communicating with another person entails general intersubjectivity.”7 As well, it is intersubjective speech situations that provide the crucial context for ‘invited inferences’ (cf. Traugott and König 1991). In this volume the main focus, however, is on the types of linguistic markers that encode intersubjective meaning: “Intersubjectivity is the explicit expression of the SP/W’s attention to the ‘self’ of addressee/reader in both an epistemic sense (paying attention to their presumed attitudes to the content of what is said), and in a more social sense (paying attention to their ‘face’ or ‘image needs’ associated with social stance and identity)” (Traugott 2003: 128). As examples of coded intersubjectification in English, Traugott (this volume: 37) refers to hedging uses of well, perhaps and sort of. Three studies in this volume include discussions of these or related cases, viz. well (Defour), of course (Wichmann et al.), and kind of/kinda (Margerie). Wichmann et al. make a basic distinction between subjective uses of of course that index speaker-judgement and intersubjective ones which draw in the hearer’s expectations and knowledge or take the hearer’s face into account. The subjective uses cluster around epistemic-evidential senses such as ‘as a natural result’ or ‘predictably’, in which the original lexical meaning of course (‘path taken by e.g. a river’) persists. The intersubjective uses include hearer-involving extensions of the evidential senses (‘as you may expect’, ‘as you and I know’) as well as more bleached markers of speech-as-interaction (cf. you know, Holmes 1988: 69) which co-occur with fillers and hedges. Defour shows that the hearer-oriented uses of well had several sources, the main ones being the now obsolete adjectival use expressing acceptance of the previous speaker’s turn and adverbial well in expressions such as 7. On other, general interpretations, intersubjectivity is seen as referring to evaluations/evidence “known to or accessible to a larger group of people who share the same conclusion as the SP[eaker]/W[riter]” (Traugott 2003: 128; see also Nuyts 2005).
Introduction
15
well said, which could serve a similar pragmatic function. To the hearerturn accepting meaning were added disagreeing or concessive comments, e.g. Well … but …, in contexts in which speaker and hearer have diverging views. In a later stage well came to express on its own this combination of acceptance and concession. Continuous pragmatic diversification thus lay at the basis of the semanticization of intersubjective meanings such as facethreat mitigator, qualifier and pause filler (as well as of subjective uses not recapitulated here). In her synchronic study of kind of/kinda, Margerie stresses that the hedging uses are situated on a cline in which the ‘source’ uses, nominal and intensifier, already show a mix of propositional and pragmatic (inter)subjective meanings. Its coded intersubjective uses, whose analogy to (just) like is noted, are further subdivided into approximator, hedge, focus marker and filler. In the light of Traugott’s (this volume: 59) point that imperative utterances are “in themselves initially intersubjective” but “may be subjectified”, it is interesting to consider Denison and Cort’s discussion of the deontic uses of modal auxiliary ‘(d) better. These have invited inferencing of co-opting the hearer into accepting the advice, or of being held responsible and suffering adverse consequences for non-compliance. This “suggest[s] a great degree of intersubjectivity” (379), which is, however, situated on the pragmatic contextual level. They also point out that deontic modality pragmatically requires, besides the speaker, a person on whom the obligation falls. On this count too, their conclusion is that the deontic meanings are only pragmatically intersubjective. Traugott (2003: 129) has further noted that “in so far as subjectification involves the recruitment of meanings not only to encode but also to regulate attitudes and beliefs, it inevitably involves intersubjectivity to a certain degree”. In accordance with this, Denison and Cort (this volume: 379) note that epistemic/deontic uses of ‘(d) better can be seen to have intersubjective inferences, as “speaker/writer projects the hope [of a favourable outcome] onto the addressee as well”. Whereas all the analyses of intersubjectivity/intersubjectification just discussed adhere to Traugott’s definitions, two contributions argue for a revision of these definitions. Both do this with reference to the development of determiner meanings, Carlier and De Mulder in dealing with distal Latin ille as source of the definite article in French and Ghesquière in characterizing the secondary determiner uses of completeness adjectives. They invoke, in this context, Diessel’s (1999, 2006) cognitively-oriented work on
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deictics, pointing out that demonstratives serve to coordinate the speaker and hearer’s joint attention on a particular reference object. Similarly, the hearer’s focus of attention is an integral part of Langacker’s (1991: 91) definition of definite reference: “the speaker (S) and hearer (H) … face the task of coordinating their mental reference to some instance … .” One could add to this the emphasis on the great amount of interactional work done by speaker and hearer to ensure that the hearer focuses on the intended referent in studies of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Enfield and Stivers 2007). The attention given by the speaker to the hearer’s awareness and tracking of referents is, in other words, well-established in various linguistic approaches. Carlier and De Mulder and Ghesquière propose that extending intersubjectivity to the meaning of determiners is coherent with the general approach espoused in this volume. Carlier and De Mulder (this volume: 268) recall Traugott’s (1995: 47) definition of subjectification as “the tendency to recruit lexical material for purposes of creating text and indicating attitudes in discourse situations”, and they subscribe to Breban’s (2010: 111) position that “attitudinal and textual subjectivity are … two different manifestations of the same phenomenon neither of which can be excluded at the expense of the other”. In another wording of Breban (2010: 111), “subjectivity involves text showing the signs of the presence of the speaker. This general definition of subjective meaning covers both attitudinal and textual subjectivity.” Like Breban (2010), Ghesquière treats the meaning of all determining elements as generally intersubjective. According to Carlier and De Mulder, by contrast, some determiners may encode a predominantly speakeroriented meaning and others a more hearer-oriented one. In their account of the transition of Latin ille to the French definite article, they distinguish two stages. In the first stage, ille, which already in Classical Latin could index positive or negative speaker-attitude, came to be used as a marker of discourse prominence, which they treat as subjectification since it involves mainly speaker attitude. In the second stage, ille, in virtue of its deictic force which evokes ‘new’ or ‘renewed’ identification by the hearer, came to be used with first mentions of proper names and with recognitional uses of first mentions followed by relative clauses as well as with associative anaphoric uses. Carlier and De Mulder characterize this stage as intersubjectification, marked by a shift to the perspective of the hearer who shares the knowledge of the whole speech community. Not only is intersubjectivity a general characteristic of all language use, it is also “the ambient context in which linguistic change takes place and to
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17
which linguistic change contributes” (Traugott this volume: 32). As Traugott (ibid.) explains, “it is precisely to emphasize the intersubjectivity of the speech situation that I have referred to ‘invited inferences’ rather than ‘implicatures’ in theorizing semantic change as the semanticization of pragmatics”. In their contribution, Schwenter and Waltereit take this point further and point out that hearers can play an active role by assigning novel interpretations to forms and by using these in their own subsequent turn as speakers. They illustrate this with a type of pragmatic meaning that has received much less attention than conversational implicatures in the study of language change, viz. presupposition: “Hearers unable or unwilling to accommodate presuppositions assume a novel interpretation of the erstwhile presupposition-trigger and eventually pass this new interpretation on to other people, thereby changing the language” (Schwenter and Waltereit this volume: 80). Their study focuses on additive particles, mainly English too. The presuppositional structure of additive too invokes parallelism between the sentence it is used with and a context sentence, which are both answers to an (explicit or implicit) question given in the discourse, i.e. they have shared topicality. In bridging contexts including a third proposition, too acquired, besides its additive value vis-à-vis a parallel sentence, a refutational value vis-à-vis the third proposition. Due to backgrounding of the original additive sense, too was reanalysed as a novel form-meaning pairing, which denies a previous utterance, as in You didn’t do your homework. – I did too. 5. The (uni)directionality of change Entrenched in the diachronic perspective on (inter)subjectification is the issue of the directionality of these changes. Again, theory formation by Traugott serves as a reference point and its developments are revisited by Fanego and Traugott herself in this volume. Traugott’s early theorizing of subjectification drew on Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) proposal that, synchronically, there are three functional domains of language, the ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal. It was Traugott’s (1982) insight that, diachronically, lexical items which originate in the ideational domain tend to acquire textual and interpersonal meanings. Instead of the terms ‘ideational’ and ‘interpersonal’, however, she preferred to use ‘propositional’ and ‘expressive’ respectively. While this cline did not yet include the term ‘subjective’, there is a good deal of overlap between ‘expressiveness’ and
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subjectivity (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 94).8 The semasiological development she proposed, then, was represented by means of the following cline: propositional > (textual >) expressive (Traugott 1982: 257)
Later, she proposed a more complex model, which included several correlated clines and in which intersubjectification appears as a distinct stage presupposing subjectification (see Fanego this volume: 202): Table 1. Correlated paths of directionality in semantic change (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 40) truth-conditional
>
non-truth-conditional
content
> content/procedural
> procedural
scope within proposition
> scope over proposition
> scope over discourse
nonsubjective
> subjective
> intersubjective
The replacement of the propositional > textual > expressive path by the non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective cline has raised questions for some authors, including Carlier and De Mulder and Ghesquière in their studies of determiners. As noted above, both studies insist on keeping the textual as an essential distinction on the cline, and argue that determiners encode textual intersubjective meaning. Ghesquière’s study, which deals with all the various uses developed by completeness adjectives, focuses on the question of how these relate to Traugott’s earlier and more recent hypotheses of unidirectionality, and how textual intersubjectification can be fitted into them. She relates the unidirectionality hypothesis to the leftward hypothesis, which predicts that increasing subjectification goes together with structural movement to increasingly peripheral positions, viz. towards the left periphery in a language such as English (Adamson 2000). Starting from objective descriptive modifier uses, the adjectives complete, total and whole developed subjective descriptive modifier uses, subjective intensifying uses and secondary determiner uses (which she views as textually intersubjective; see above). Complete and total developed their noun-intensifying uses from subjective descriptive uses. Both these adjectives had earlier on derived secondary determiner uses from objective descriptive modifying meanings but the secondary 8. For a detailed comparison of Halliday and Hasan’s and Traugott’s terminology, see Traugott and Dasher (2002: 94).
Introduction
19
determiners played no role in the shift to noun-intensifying uses. With whole, by contrast, objective descriptive modifier uses led to secondary determiner uses, which in turn led to noun-intensifying uses. This chronology, Ghesquière argues, is nicely captured by Traugott’s (1989) subjectification cline, which also accommodates all the relevant meaning shifts, viz. from externally propositional (objective descriptive modifier) to internally propositional (subjective descriptive modifier), textual (secondary determiner) and expressive (noun-intensifier). She proposes one modification in that both the textual and expressive are argued to comprise subjective as well as intersubjective meaning. This gives the following cline (Ghesquière this volume: 309): externally propositional objective
> internally propositional subjective
non-bleached
> textual > expressive subjective and intersubjective bleached
Figure 3. Model of semantic change
As for Adamson’s leftward hypothesis, it is confirmed in a general sense in that all (inter)subjectified uses involve leftward movement in the structure of the NP. However, there is not always consistent progressive leftward movement for the fine-grained subjective functions developed by these adjectives. Whole, for instance, first acquired the more leftward secondary determiner use, which then led to the noun-intensifying use, which occupies a structural position to the right of the former. Another contributor who deals with the question of unidirectionality is Narrog. He too proposes modifications of the Traugottian pathways, in his case on the basis of crosslinguistic study of semantic change within the area of modality and from modality to mood. He starts from the observation that prominent studies of subjectification (e.g. Langacker 1998, 2003; Traugott 1989) have focused on the increased subjectification in changes from deontic to epistemic modality manifested by modal verbs such as English must and ought to, but that this change is not very common crosslinguistically. If this change is viewed as a general part of unidirectionality, the typologically more common changes, e.g. from epistemic possibility to deontic permission (Bybee et al. 1994), are made to appear counter-directional. Narrog therefore advocates an alternative general tendency, viz. to increased speaker-orientation. He relates this to a semantic map of modality which distinguishes between volitive and non-volitive modality and links up mod-
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ality with mood (see also Narrog 2005). In the modal part of this map obligation, permission and volition are volitive, while epistemic modality, ability and evidentiality are non-volitive. Irrespective of the volitive/nonvolitive distinction, modality ranges from event-oriented to speakeroriented. The map also integrates modality with mood, the latter understood functionally as illocutionary force modification, subsuming moods such as imperative and admonitive. The dimension of increased speaker-orientation which applies to this map “refers to the speaker her- or himself and the speech situation, including the hearer, and thus subsumes both subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Traugott’s sense” (this volume: 394). As Narrog has argued elsewhere (2005: 692), “as speaker-orientation means orientation towards the speaker and the speech situation, it potentially also includes an increasing orientation towards the addressee”. According to Narrog, modal meanings always shift in the direction of increased speaker-orientation, independently of the dimensions of volitive/non-volitive, but incorporating mood. This model does capture the shifts that are crosslinguistically most common according to Bybee et al. (1994), viz. (i)
from non-volitive to volitive, including epistemic to deontic, where the shift often incorporates a change from no control to control over the action (ii) within volitive, e.g. from obligation emanating from external circumstances or higher (religious, social) forces to obligation imposed by a person’s will (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 125, 141). To this category also belongs the change from obligation to imperative, in which speaker-assessment of obligation shifts to direct imposition on the hearer, interpreted as a higher degree of orientation on the speech situation and its participants. (iii) within non-volitive, e.g. from ability/root possibility to epistemic possibility and from future prediction to probability – changes in which the elements of speaker inference and expectation increase.
Narrog further reflects about the cultural embeddedness of notions such as (personal) imposition of obligation. Strong obligation markers are crosslinguistically not very common and even if available in a language, often not commonly used. Narrog ascribes this to the fact that obligations are impositions on the hearer; they are potentially face-threatening and their direct expression might therefore be avoided. Moreover, the very notion of requiring, on personal authority, another person to carry out an action is not congenital to many cultures, and was not either to older speech communities of languages such as English and German. An important cultural historical
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alternative is that of necessities/possibilities being determined by natural and religious laws, morals, shared values, etc. Narrog therefore ends on the salutory plea to include sociocultural conditions into the pragmatic contexts in which to study semantic change. In this introduction we have surveyed the main questions relating to grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification tackled by the contributions. As we have seen, they raise issues (such as the question of textual intersubjectivity) which form a higher-level ‘intersubjective’ dialogue inspiring further theoretical probing. By the same token, it has been impossible to do justice to the descriptive thorougness and insightful analyses of the changes and/or layering of uses of the linguistic expressions studied. It is our hope that both in terms of theoretical reflection and descriptive technique, this volume will prove an important stepping stone towards greater insight into processes and tendencies of language change and in their relevance to understanding language generally. References Adamson, Sylvia 2000 A lovely little example: Word order options and category shift in the premodifying string. In Pathways of Change: Grammaticalization in English, Olga Fischer, Anette Rosenbach, and Dieter Stein (eds.), 39–66. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Aijmer, Karin and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen 2004 A model and a methodology for the study of pragmatic markers: The semantic field of expectation. Journal of Pragmatics 36: 1781–1805. Altenberg, Bengt 1990 Automatic text segmentation into tone units. In The London–Lund Corpus of Spoken English: Description and Research, Jan Svartvik (ed.), 287–323. Lund: Lund University Press. Athanasiadou, Angeliki, Costas Canakis, and Bert Cornillie (eds.) 2006 Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Athanasiadou, Angeliki, Costas Canakis, and Bert Cornillie 2006 Introduction. In Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie (eds.), 1–13. Benveniste, Emile 1966 De la subjectivité dans le langage. In Problèmes de Linguistique Générale, Emile Benveniste, 258–266. Paris: Gallimard.
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Benveniste, Emile 1971 Subjectivity in language. In Problems in General Linguistics, 223– 230. Trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Gables: FL: University of Miami Press. Original French publication, 1958. Bréal, Michel 1964 Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning. Trans. by Mrs. Henry Cust. New York: Dover. Original publication, 1900. Breban, Tine 2010 English Adjectives of Comparison: Lexical and Grammaticalized Uses. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Brems, Lieselotte 2003 Measure noun constructions: An instance of semantically-driven grammaticalization. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 8: 283–312. Brems, Lieselotte 2010 Size noun constructions as collocationally constrained constructions: Lexical and grammaticalized uses. English Language and Linguistics 14: 83–109. Bühler, Karl 1934 Sprachtheorie. Jena: Fischer. Bybee, Joan, Revere Perkins and William Pagliuca 1994 The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and Modality in the Languages of the World. Chicago: Chicago University Press. De Smet, Hendrik and Jean-Christophe Verstraete 2006 Coming to terms with subjectivity. Cognitive Linguistics 17: 365– 392. Diessel, Holger 1999 Demonstratives. Form, Function, and Grammaticalization. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Diessel, Holger 2006 Demonstratives, joint attention and the emergence of grammar. Cognitive Linguistics 17: 463–489. Enfield, Nicholas J. and Tanya Stivers (eds.) 2007 Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finegan, Edward 1995 Subjectivity and subjectivisation: An introduction. In Subjectivity and Subjectivisation, Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), 1–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Firth, John Rupert 1957 A synopsis of linguistic theory, 1930–1955. In Studies in Linguistic Analysis (Special volume of the Philological Society), John R. Firth et al. (eds.), 1–32. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Halliday, M. A. K. 1994 An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 2nd ed. London: Arnold. Halliday, M. A. K. and Ruqaiya Hasan 1976 Cohesion in English. London: Longman. Holmes, Janet 1988 Of course: a pragmatic particle in New Zealand women’s and men’s speech. Australian Journal of Linguistics 2: 49–74. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 2003 Grammaticalization. 2nd rev. ed. [1st ed., 1993.] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krug, Manfred 2000 Emerging English Modals: A Corpus-Based Study of Grammaticalization. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Lakoff, George 1987 Woman, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1985 Observations and speculations on subjectivity. In Iconicity in Syntax, John Haiman (ed.), 109–150. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Langacker, Ronald W. 1990 Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 5–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991 Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1998 On subjectification and grammaticalization. In Discourse and Cognition: Bridging the Gap, Jean-Pierre Koenig (ed.), 71–89. Stanford: CSLI. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999 Losing control: grammaticization, subjectification, and transparency. In Historical Semantics and Cognition, Andreas Blank and Peter Koch (eds.), 147–175. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002 Deixis and subjectivity. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, Frank Brisard (ed.), 1–28. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2003 Extreme subjectification: English tense and modals. In Motivation in Language: Studies in Honor of Günter Radden, Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas Berg, René Dirven and Klaus-Uwe Panther (eds.), 3–26. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
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Langacker, Ronald W. 2006 Subjectification, grammaticization, and conceptual archetypes. In Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie (eds.), 17–40. Langacker, Ronald W. 2008 Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lorenz, Gunter 2002 Really worthwhile or not really significant? A corpus–based approach to delexicalization and grammaticalization of intensifiers in Modern English. In New Reflections on Grammaticalization, Ilse Wischer and Gabriele Diewald (eds.), 143–161. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Lyons, John 1977 Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lyons, John 1982 Deixis and subjectivity: Loquor, ergo sum? In Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics, Robert J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (eds.), 101–124. New York: Wiley. McGregor, William B. 1997 Semiotic Grammar. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Narrog, Heiko 2005 Modality, mood, and change of modal meanings – a new perspective. Cognitive Linguistics 16: 677–731. Nuyts, Jan 2001 Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan 2005 Modality: Overview and linguistic issues. In The Expression of Modality, William Frawley (ed.), 1–26. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Powell, Mava J. 1992 The systematic development of correlated interpersonal and metalinguistic uses in stance adverbs. Cognitive Linguistics 3: 75–110. Robins, Robert H. 1971 General Linguistics: An Introductory Survey. 2nd ed. London: Longman. Schiffrin, Deborah 1990 The principle of intersubjectivity in communication and conversation. Semiotica 80: 121–151. Schwenter, Scott A. and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 2000 Invoking scalarity: The development of in fact. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 1: 7–25.
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Sohn, Sung-Ock Forthc. The role of frequency and prosody in the grammaticalization of Korean -canh-. In Formal Evidence in Grammaticalization Research, An Van linden, Jean-Christophe Verstraete and Kristin Davidse (eds.). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Stein, Dieter and Susan Wright 1995 Subjectivity and Subjectivisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, Sandra A. and Anthony Mulac 1991 A quantitative perspective on the grammaticization of epistemic parentheticals in English. In Approaches to Grammaticalization. Volume II: Focus on Types of Grammatical Markers, Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine (eds.), 313–329. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1982 From propositional to textual and expressive meanings: Some semantic-pragmatic aspects of grammaticalization. In Perspectives on Historical Linguistics, Winfred P. Lehmann and Yakov Malkiel (eds.), 245–271. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1989 On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of subjectification in semantic change. Language 57: 33–65. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1995 Subjectification in grammaticalisation. In Subjectivity and Subjectivisation, Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), 31–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1997 Subjectification and the development of epistemic meaning: The case of promise and threaten. In Modality in Germanic languages, Toril Swan and Olaf Jansen Westvik (eds.), 185–210. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 2003 From subjectification to intersubjectification. In Motives for Language Change, Raymond Hickey (ed.), 124–139. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Richard B. Dasher 2002 Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Ekkehard König 1991 The semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization revisited. In Approaches to Grammaticalization. Volume I: Focus on Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine (eds), 189–218. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
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Vandelanotte, Lieven 2004 From representational to scopal ‘distancing indirect speech or thought’: A cline of subjectification. Text 24: 547–585. Vandewinkel, Sigi and Kristin Davidse 2008 The interlocking paths of development to emphasizer adjective pure. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 9: 255–287. Verhagen, Arie 2005 Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax, and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verstraete, Jean-Christophe 2007 Rethinking the Coordinate-Subordinate Dichotomy: Interpersonal Grammar and the Analysis of Adverbial Clauses in English. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Part 1 Theoretical issues
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment Elizabeth Closs Traugott Abstract This paper reviews and updates my work on subjectification and intersubjectification over twenty-five years. Distinctions are made between subjectivity and intersubjectivity as the ambient context in which change takes place, most especially the development of expressions the prime semantic or pragmatic meaning of which is to index the speaker’s viewpoint on what she or he is saying or speaking about (subjectivity). In some cases expressions also develop marking attention to the addressee’s self-image (intersubjectivity). The hypothesis is that subjectification and intersubjectification involve the reanalysis of pragmatic meanings as coded semantic meanings in the context of speaker-hearer negotiation of meaning. Subjectification and intersubjectification are shown to be independent of processes of grammaticalization, but linked to them for reasons relating to the various functions of grammar. The paper ends with discussion of some studies suggesting the types of linguistic context in which one might expect to find evidence for subjectification.
1. Introduction1 The topic of subjectivity has been discussed in semantics at least since Bréal ([1900] 1964). Benveniste’s ([1958] 1971) landmark paper distinguished subjectivity and intersubjectivity. These are synchronic notions, and can be theorized in many ways, from cognitive construal (Langacker, e.g. 1990, 2003 and references therein) to the basis of human interaction and the procedures for producing and understanding talk (Schiffrin 1990). One branch of my own work over the twenty-five years since the publication of Traugott (1982) has been to study the semanticization over time of 1. Many thanks to Brian D. Joseph and to an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors or failures to solve the intersubjective problem of being clear and informative are of course my own responsibility.
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subjectivity, understood as relationship to the speaker and the speaker’s beliefs and attitudes,2 and of intersubjectivity, understood as relationship to the addressee and addressee’s face. I have called the diachronic process of semanticization “(inter)subjectification”, assuming that an important (though not rigid) distinction is to be made between -ity (synchronic state) and -ation (diachronic process) (see also De Smet and Verstraete 2006). I have also attempted to understand what the relationship between subjectification and intersubjectification is. In this research endeavor I have drawn extensively on neoGricean pragmatics (see e.g. Horn 1984; Levinson 2000) and on discourse analysis (see e.g. Schiffrin 1987; Prince 1988). Another branch of my work has been grammaticalization (e.g. Traugott and Heine (eds.) 1991; Hopper and Traugott [1993] 2003). In the (1982) paper, and in others since then, I have sought to see where and why (inter)subjectification and grammaticalization intersect. The work has been based in historical texts and the evidence we can draw from them, assuming that language change is change in use (see Croft 2000), and that there is a distinction between semantics and pragmatics.3 My purpose in the present paper is to outline my current thinking on the relationship between (inter)subjectivity, (inter)subjectification, and grammaticalization (see also Traugott 2007 on the first two topics). I start with discussion of (inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification (Section 2), and then of grammaticality and grammaticalization (Section 3). After three brief case studies (a piece of, a bit of, a shred of) (Section 4),4 I provide some thoughts about the mechanisms and motivations for grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification (Section 5). The paper ends with some consideration of suggestions about how one might go about operationalizing subjectification in historical corpus studies (Section 6), and Section 7 sums up.
2. De Smet and Verstraete (2006: 369) usefully contrast Langacker’s perspective on subjectification: “In Langacker’s terms, the difference is not whether something is speaker-related or not, but how explicitly reference to the speaker figures in the form of the utterance”. 3. Because I make this distinction between pragmatics and semantics, my purposes do not and have not coincided with those of cognitive grammar, although there are obvious points of contact (see discussion in Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie 2006, and Brisard 2006). 4. For studies of these and other binominal NP of NP phrases in the context of grammaticalization theory and construction grammar, see also Traugott 2007, 2008b, c).
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2. (Inter)subjectivity, (inter)subjectification In Traugott (1982) I drew in part on Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) distinction between “ideational”, “textual” and “interpersonal” components of the linguistic system, but used the terms “propositional”, “textual”, and “expressive”. Theirs was a synchronic analysis, but the insight I had was that historically in many cases a lexical item that originated in the ideational component later developed polysemies in what Halliday and Hasan called the textual and interpersonal domains. Subsequent work has shown that both of these terms encompass two different types of structure. “Textual”, as understood then, included various connectives such as and and therefore, as well as anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns, topicalizers, relativizers, complementizers, etc. In the nineteen-eighties it became clear that while all are essential ingredients of grammar, some of these serve more contentful (and sometimes truth-conditional) purposes of local connectivity (e.g. relativizers, complementizers), whereas others serve the procedural purposes of expressing speaker’s attitude to the text under production (topicalizers, discourse markers). Indeed, many connectives have dual functions, e.g. and, then, in fact. Halliday and Hasan’s term “interpersonal” likewise covered a broad spectrum of phenomena, such as expressions of speech function, exchange structures, and attitude. In a more recent discussion, Halliday has proposed that, most simply put, “interpersonal” concerns “clause as exchange” (Halliday 1994: 179), and includes both subjective and intersubjective elements, e.g. modal, and mood-marking elements, vocative, interactive acts of speaking including illocutionary acts, deictic person pronouns, attitudinal lexical items like splendid, and prosodic voice features. In Traugott (1982) I preferred the term “expressive” to “interpersonal” since it was unclear to me where the “inter-” fit in chronologically. Later, following Benveniste (1971) I came to distinguish “subjective” and “intersubjective” (Traugott and Dasher 2002; Traugott 2003a), and I will make this distinction here. Historically, and, I would argue, synchronically, there is a difference with respect to what has to be learned, and therefore specified in the inventory,5 between subjective possibly, even (markers of speaker assessment) and intersubjective please (a marker of speaker’s acknowledgment of and attention to the addressee). 5. I use the term “inventory” in preference to “lexicon”, since the latter invokes only lexical items, while “inventory” is a neutral term covering lexical and grammatical items (Brinton and Traugott 2005: 90).
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Of course, in a general sense the very fact of communicating with another person entails general intersubjectivity. The “I” is constituted in part by conceptualizing the other member of the communicative dyad “you” (Benveniste 1971; Lyons 1994) and discourse is communicatively successful only if speakers pay attention to audience needs, and if “mutual manifestness” or “mutual management” is worked on (Schiffrin 1990; Nuyts 2001; Verhagen 2005). Indeed, it is precisely to emphasize the intersubjectivity of the speech situation that I have referred to “invited inferences” rather than “implicatures” in theorizing semantic change as the semanticization of pragmatics. The term “invited inferences” was chosen “to elide the complexities of communication in which the speaker/writer evokes implicatures and invites the addressee/reader to infer them”6 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 5). Intersubjectivity is the ambient context in which linguistic change takes place and to which linguistic change contributes. My main concern is not with this context, but with linguistic MARKERS and EXPRESSIONS that index subjectivity and intersubjectivity and how they arise. These expressions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity are expressions the prime semantic or pragmatic meaning of which is to index speaker attitude or viewpoint (subjectivity) and speaker’s attention to addressee selfimage (intersubjectivity). At issue is the development of semantic (coded) polysemies that have to be learned with subjective or intersubjective meanings, and how these come into being. These polysemies may later be reinterpreted as homonymies (e.g. fairly ‘in a fair manner’ and ‘somewhat’), or one or more of the polysemies may cease to be used (e.g. villain ‘peasant’ and ‘evil person’), but by hypothesis most new semantic developments emerge as polysemies, pragmatic to begin with, then semantic. Subjectified polysemies may index evaluation of others (silly ‘blessed, innocent’ > ‘stupid’), of relative position on a scale (adverbs like pretty ‘cleverly’ > ‘attractively’ > ‘rather’), of attitude toward the truth of a proposition (epistemics like probably ‘provably’ > ‘in all likelihood’); they may index information structure (e.g. the topicalizer as far as), connectivity of clauses to each other (anyway), the speech act being undertaken (promise in its illocutionary uses), or the relationship of chunks/episodes of speech to each other (then in its discourse marker use). Intersubjectified polysemies may index euphemisms (the Lord ‘god’, pass ‘die’, etc., see Allen and Burridge 1991), politeness (please < formulae like If you please, where the surrounding 6. Speakers/writers may of course evoke unintentionally (Keller 1994), and addressees/readers may fail to make the inference (or the appropriate inference).
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context has been absorbed into the meaning of please). While I have not been concerned with culturally driven shifts in stylistic preferences, genre preferences (Fitzmaurice 2000), honorification preferences (cf. Japanese vs. Dutch or English), rhetorical play whereby speakers attempt to position interlocutors (Fitzmaurice 2004), or shifts in “habits of mind” (Wierzbicka 2006), these are all important areas of research that, among other things, require detailed knowledge of attested linguistic changes, and how to analyse them. I take my work as potentially providing the linguistic underpinnings for such larger-scale studies of the relationship between language, culture and cognition. My starting point for thinking about subjectivity is and has been Lyons’s characterization of subjectivity: The term subjectivity refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself and his own attitudes and beliefs. (Lyons 1982: 102)
Examples include such subjective expressions as: (1)
–
– –
raising constructions, in which the “speaking subject” differs from the syntactic subject (Benveniste’s “sujet d’énonciation” vs. “sujet d’enoncé”) (She’s going to give a lecture vs. There’s going to be an earthquake) illocutionary uses of speech act and mental verbs (I recognize the Senator from California) epistemic modals (That must be wrong), concessives (while), focus particles (even), discourse markers (besides).
To adapt Lyons’s words about subjectivity, intersubjectivity in my view refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of his or her awareness of the addressee’s attitudes and beliefs, most especially their “face” or “self-image” (Traugott 2003a). Such intersubjective expressions include expletives (“in your face” expressions such as insults; within groups some can signal solidarity, but to or from outsiders can signal aggression, e.g. “N-words”). It should be noted that this is a somewhat different view of intersubjectivity from that of Verhagen (2005), which is based in argumentation theory, and focuses on coordination between speaker’s and addressee’s cognitive systems, rather than on differences in linguistic coding. It is an entirely different view of subjectivity and inter-
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subjectivity from that of Nuyts (2001, 2005) and Cornillie (2004), and indeed orthogonal to theirs. Nuyts defines subjectivity and intersubjectivity as follows (with reference to modality, but in ways generalizable beyond this domain): [A]n evaluation is subjective if the issuer presents it as being strictly his/her own responsibility; it is intersubjective if (s)he indicates that (s)he shares it with a wider group of people, possibly including the hearer. (Nuyts 2005: 14)
This is a view of intersubjectivity that intersects with objectivity, although it is not identified with it: [I]t is often essential to be able to make it clear whether one is alone in one’s views, has backing for them (subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity), is neutral, or is subjectively biased in one’s assessment (subjectivity vs. objectivity). (Nuyts 2005: 18)
If this view of intersubjectivity were dynamicized and taken as the basis of intersubjectification one would have to argue that intersubjectification precedes subjectification historically, since generalized epistemic meanings of the type All men must die (= ‘It is necessarily true that all men must die’) precede inferential ones of the type The fruit must be delicious (= ‘I infer that the fruit is delicious’). However, on the view that intersubjectification involves coding of greater attention to the addressee, the earlier modal meaning is a minimally subjective epistemic generalization, and does not enter into discussion of intersubjectification in my sense. On my view, one may organize expressions along a cline of (inter)subjectivity as in (2). On the second line I suggest approximate matches between my terminology and that of Halliday and Hasan. (2)
non-/less subjective ideational
– –
subjective – interpersonal
intersubjective
Like all synchronic clines, this is simply a way of organizing data on a continuum. It is based on a historical cline that has emerged because diachronic work has shown repeatedly that for some lexical item or construction X,7 subjectified polysemies of that item or construction arise later than ideational ones (subjectification), and for some lexical item or construction X,
7. Here “construction” is to be understood as “syntactic string”.
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment
35
intersubjectified polysemies of that item or construction arise later than subjectified ones (intersubjectification). In my view, subjectification and intersubjectification are the mechanisms by which: (3)
a. b.
meanings are recruited by the speaker to encode and regulate attitudes and beliefs (subjectification), and, once subjectified, may be recruited to encode meanings centred on the addressee (intersubjectification).
This is schematized in (4) (see e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 225): (4)
non-/less subjective > subjective > intersubjective
One issue that needs to be flagged here is that the formulation in (4) obscures the fact that “(inter)subjective” does not mean ‘has pragmatic (inter)subjective meanings in relevant contexts’ but rather ‘has a newly coded (inter)subjective meaning’.8 We need to distinguish between the intersubjectivity that may pragmatically accompany the use of a form from its development into a coded meaning (see also De Smet and Verstraete 2006). For example, in her discussion of the development in the later fourteenth century of the parenthetical reformulation marker I mean Brinton (2007) shows it was a subjectified form of the literal by X I mean (= ‘intend’). By virtue of the fact that it is a marker used by speakers and writers to negotiate meaning “by presenting more explicit phrasing of the preceding NP, phrasing they believe will make their meaning clearer to readers” (Brinton 2007: 48), parenthetical I mean has always been pragmatically intersubjective. Over time it has been used more intersubjectively to express emphasis and assertion of the veracity of an utterance (Brinton 2007) but it has not been intersubjectified, except in fixed phrases like You know what I mean? Heuristically, therefore, it may be better to think of (4) as (4ƍ), although from a theoretical point of view this is not a viable formulation, since language-users do not have direct access to history and may therefore be un-
8. Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie (2006) construe my view of subjectification as primarily pragmatic; while pragmatic strengthening of subjective meanings is without question a pre-condition for subjectification, subjectification itself is not pragmaticalization, but semanticization (on the assumption that there is a difference between pragmatics and semantics).
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aware of what is subjectivized (though they often have indirect evidence of history from awareness of age-graded practices): (4ƍ)
(Heuristic for linguistic analysis) non-/less subjectivized > subjectivized > intersubjectivized
Another issue is that Fitzmaurice (2004) suggests that there is a further step from intersubjective to “interactive”, especially in the case of discourse markers like you know, you see, you say, from the eighteenth century on. Her hypothesis is that this is a shift away from attention to the addressee to simply “keep[ing] things going in a conversation” (Fitzmaurice 2004: 438) and grabbing the interlocutor’s attention (Fitzmaurice 2004: 439). The examples cited suggest that there is probably not a newly coded meaning, but rather a pragmatic one arising in less clearly intersubjective contexts. Indeed, Fitzmaurice ends the article with “A question for further investigation is whether the interactive discourse marker function of an expression is strongest only where no implication [of speaker meanings, ECT] may be drawn from the use of the expression” (Fitzmaurice 2004: 446). Examples of subjectification include the following, the first two of which are dynamicized versions of (1): (5)
–
raising constructions arise from non-raising ones (Langacker 1990, 1995); in the case of be going to, we find expressions of motion with intent to act in the sixteenth century (5a), intentional non-motion expressions in the seventeenth century (5b), and finally raising ones in the nineteenth (5c), which express speaker assessment of the future:9 a. I am going to visit the prisoner. Fare you well. (Exit) (1604 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure III.iii.273 [LION; Oxford Shakespeare])10 b. I ha’ forgot what I was going to say to you. (1663 Cowley, Cutter of Coleman Street V.ii [LION; English Prose Drama]) c. I am afraid there is going to be such a calm among us, that we must be forced to invent some mock Quarrels (1725
9. For a modified hypothesis about this change, see Garrett (Forthcoming). Thanks to Brian D. Joseph for this reference. 10. This example, like many others of the time, is potentially ambiguous, but the “exit” context suggests it is intended as a motion verb.
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment
–
–
37
Odingsells, The Bath Unmask’d V.iii. [LION; English Prose Drama]) epistemic modals may arise from verbs of desire or volition (will), concessives from temporals (Early Middle English while ‘during’ > Early Modern English ‘although’), focus markers from manner adverbials (Old English anlice ‘simply, especially’ > only), illocutionary from non-illocutionary uses of speech act verbs (promise originates in the Latin past participle of promittere ‘send forth’) (Traugott and Dasher 2002) referent (“T/V”) honorifics may arise from non-honorifics (e.g., cooption in the Late Middle English period of plural second person ye for polite address to a singular second person) (Traugott and Dasher 2002).
Examples of intersubjectification that I have cited in the past include the co-option of subjectified meanings specifically to signal addresseeorientation and interpersonal meanings. For example, I have used intersubjectified hedges arising from subjectified discourse markers as examples of intersubjectified meanings (e.g., some uses of well (Jucker 1997), perhaps, and hedged uses of sort of) (see Traugott and Dasher 2002). But, as indicated above, what may look like it is a case of intersubjectification actually may not be. If it is derivable from the context, it is only a case of increased pragmatic intersubjectivity. In other words, there may be more addresseeoriented uses, but unless a form–meaning pair has come to code intersubjectivity, we are not seeing intersubjectification (-ation being the important item here). This makes the formulation in (4) difficult to work with, hence the heuristic usefulness of (4ƍ). Where a “dedicated” (coded) intersubjective meaning arises, however, it does by hypothesis arise from a previously subjectified meaning. An example is provided by the rise of addressee honorifics in Japanese from referent honorifics. To simplify, a referent honorific in Japanese points either respectfully or humiliatively to the subject referent.11 The construal of relationships is subjective, although since the referent is the addressee, intersubjectivity is inevitably involved. An addressee honorific, by contrast, indexes politeness or intimacy with respect to the addressee, and is part of a more general speech style or register, in which lexical items for eating or food may also be indexes; here attention is
11. Note interlocutors have an argument structure role in referent honorific (T/V) systems, including European ones.
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explicitly paid to the addressee, whether or not that individual is referred to. (6) summarizes the changes undergone by one example, saburahu:
(6)
Old Japanese saburahu ‘wait (for an occasion or order) in a specific location’ (non-honorific) > Late Old Japanese ‘Humble Subject be in the vicinity of Respected Referent’ (referent honorific; subjectified) > Early Middle Japanese -saburau/-soorau ‘be-Polite’ (addressee-honorific style; intersubjectified). (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 263–276)
As is true of all diachronic clines, the cline of (inter)subjectification in (4) is a testable schema summarizing tendencies for change observed over long periods of time and over several languages (Andersen 2001: 241–245). Once started down it does not have to be gone down all the way. It is “layered” (Hopper 1991) in the sense that earlier and later forms coexist and are in variation. Neither subjectification nor intersubjectification entails grammaticalization. Evidence in the domain of subjectification comes from the development of speech act verbs and especially of their illocutionary uses. In the domain of intersubjectification it comes from the development in Japanese of polite uses of lexical items from earlier humiliative ones (e.g. moosu ‘say’, Traugott and Dasher 2002: 261). Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between grammaticalization and subjectification, and a weaker one between grammaticalization and intersubjectification. In order to understand this we need to consider the distinction between grammaticality and grammaticalization. 3. Grammaticality and grammaticalization Just as we need to distinguish the synchronic cline of (inter)subjectivity from the diachronic cline of (inter)subjectification, so we need to distinguish the synchronic cline of grammaticality (a way of organizing data) from the diachronic cline of grammaticalization (a schema of attested tendencies over time). Synchronic clines of grammaticality can be established with varying degrees of granularity. Typically this is done with reference to degrees of fusion. A highly schematic example appears in (7) (based on Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 40):
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment
(7)
39
phrase or word – non-bound gram – bound gram
A more articulated cline, also based on degrees of fusion, is proposed in Brinton and Traugott (2005: 93). Here a distinction is made between periphrases that are relatively free, but have considerable internal fusion, e.g. be going to, as far as; semi-bound function words and clitics like of, ‘ll, possessive clitic -’s; semi-productive affixes like grammatical derivational -er; and productive affixes like inflectional plural -s. While degree of fusion is synchronically an independently valid measure of form–meaning pairs, interest in it derives from the fact that it is seen at the outcome of diachronic changes known as grammaticalization: [T]he change whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions. (Hopper and Traugott 2003: 18)12
The synchronic cline in (7) therefore derives its theoretical interest from diachronic ones such as those in (8): (8)
a. b.
phrase or word > non-bound gram > bound gram lexical/constructional item > grammatical item > more grammatical item
Again for heuristic purposes, it may be useful to think of (8b) in terms of (8bƍ), although, like (4ƍ), this has no theoretical validity: (8bƍ)
(Heuristic of linguistic analysis) lexical/constructional item > grammaticalized item > more grammaticalized item
While not restricted to grammaticalization, subjectification is more likely to occur in grammaticalization than in lexicalization or in semantic change in general,13 presumably because grammaticalization by definition 12. For discussion of how to assess “less” and “more” grammatical, see Brinton and Traugott (2005: 93, 147–150). 13. For the distinctions see Brinton and Traugott (2005: 144–145). Briefly, grammaticalization involves the development of items expressing grammatical function, whereas lexicalization involves the development of items with contentful meaning.
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involves recruitment of items to mark the speaker’s perspective on factors such as: (9)
– – – – – – –
who does what to whom (argument structure) how the proposition (ideational expression) is related to speech time or to the temporality of another proposition (tense) whether the situation is perspectivized as continuing or not (aspect) whether the situation is relativized to the speaker’s beliefs (modality, mood) whether entities referred to are construed as same or different (pronouns, indexicals) which part of a clause is viewed as topic or focus how utterances are connected to each other (connectives, discourse markers)
However, not all grammaticalization is equally likely to involve equal degrees of subjectification,14 and some may involve little or no subjectification.15 For example, case markers are often derived from terms for relational space or body parts (Heine and Kuteva 2002), e.g. Old Hungarian vilag ‘world’ + béle ‘world + guts:into’ > Modern Hungarian világba ‘world:into’ (Anttila [1972] 1989: 149). Subjectification is minimally involved here, since the basic function of argument structure is ideational: to express events or situations and the participants in them. However, ideational case may be used pragmatically for non-ideational purposes, see e.g. the choice of accusative or dative case in German as “a function of the degree to which the person is affected, as well as the speaker’s subjective assessment of this effect” (Zubin 1975: 186). Subjectification is more likely to occur in primary grammaticalization (the shift from lexical/constructional to grammatical) than in secondary 14. De Smet and Verstraete (2006) seeks to distinguish degrees of subjectivity using syntactic criteria; to what extent these criteria can be identified with grammaticalization remains to be investigated. 15. Cornillie’s statement that “The combined process of grammaticalization and pragmatic strengthening crucially involves a shift toward linguistic expressions that carry a more speaker-based view. More particularly it entails subjectification” (Cornillie 2004: 52) is too strong. There is a correlation, not an entailment relationship.
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment
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grammaticalization (the development of already grammatical material into more grammatical material). This is because primary grammaticalization often requires prior strengthening of pragmatic inferences that arise in very specific linguistic contexts prior to their semanticization and reanalysis as grammatical elements. Further grammaticalization, however, often involves development into automatized structures (especially in the case of inflections). The fewer the options become, the less likely subjectification will be. This can be regarded as part of the larger constraint, noted in Dahl (2004: 84), that none of “the usual Gricean principles” are operative if a morpheme is truly obligatory. As will be discussed in more detail at the end of Section 6, subjectified elements tend to be positioned at the periphery of a constituent or clause (see Bybee 1985 on the shifting of epistemic modals to the periphery of a complex verbal construction; Suzuki 1998 on the development of the Japanese noun wake ‘reason’ into an utterance-final ‘explanatory discoursemarker’ translatable as ‘no wonder’ or ‘you see’). The migration of subjectified elements to the periphery of the phrase, clause, or sentence would not be considered a case of grammaticalization by those who take structural scope-reduction and condensation to be criterial to grammaticalization (Lehmann [1982] 1995: 144).16 Limiting grammaticalization to reduction and condensation appears to be too restrictive, however. They pertain to certain domains of grammaticalization such as the development of case and tense, but not to other domains such as epistemic modality, connectives, discourse markers, etc., where scope increase is typical of grammaticalization (Tabor and Traugott 1998; Traugott 2003b). Intersubjectification intersects less extensively with grammaticalization. In most languages it is grammaticalized only into some discourse markers and interjections. It is strongly grammaticalized, in the sense of being expressed morphologically, in only a few languages, e.g., Japanese, where verbal endings may index politeness (see 6 above).17
16. For example, Aijmer (1997) argues for the term “pragmaticalization” rather than “grammaticalization” for items that expand their scope such as discourse markers. 17. Given the example in (6), the anonymous reviewer raised the question whether intersubjectification may not correlate with secondary grammaticalization. This is a research question that needs further study.
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4. Three brief case studies In this section I provide brief sketches of the history of three NP of NP patterns: a piece of, a bit of and a shred of. They reveal sufficient similarities and yet differences that they illustrate well what has become a truism in work on grammaticalization: each construction has its own history, but conforms to general schematic change-types in ways that are partly constrained by the particularities of the original meaning–form relationship. In Present Day English at least a bit of and a shred of are polysemous, with Partitive (‘unit of’), Quantifier (‘some, many’) and Degree Modifier (‘rather’) functions, but in earlier English only the Partitive use is found. The development of the Quantifier and later Degree Modifier uses illustrates grammaticalization, and, in two of the cases discussed here, further partial restriction to a semantically negative polarity context. It also illustrates subjectification, and, in the case of a bit of, pragmatic intersubjectification. The three constructions are part of a larger set of Partitive > Quantifier > Degree Modifier changes that occurred mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (for historical studies of kind of, sort of see e.g., Denison 2002 and references therein; of a bunch of, lots of Brems 2003; and of a kind of, a sort of, a bit of, a lot of, a shred of Traugott 2008a, b, c). Partitive constructions in Present Day English have rather idiosyncratic characteristics with respect to presence or absence of the indefinite article a in either NP and the extent to which they allow an unbounded (non-mass) complement in NP2 (see a piece/?shred of an apple vs. a piece/shred of apple), but an idealized, prototypical schema for Partitives is: (9)
[NP1 [of NP2]] Head + Modifier/Complement Unit + Unbounded N (not) a shred of apple
The Partitive construction came into being in the Middle English period when the -’s genitive inflection as in an bite brædess ‘a bit bread:GEN’, was replaced by the prepositional phrase with of (which meant ‘out of’ in Old English). The NP1 of Partitives can usually be substituted by a piece/portion/unit of. By contrast, binominal Quantifier constructions typically have the schema in (10), and NP1 can usually be substituted by a quantifier like some/much (negative no/not any/not much):
(Inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification: A reassessment
(10)
43
[[NP1 of] NP2] Modifier + Head Quant + Unbounded N (not) a shred of beauty
There are several criteria for distinguishing Quantifier constructions with NP heads from Partitive constructions (see Denison 2002).18 These include: (11)
a.
b. c. d.
e.
agreement patterns: in the Partitive the initial determiner agrees in number with N1 (these kinds of mouse), but in the Quantifier construction it can agree with N2 (these kind of mice), at least in colloquial use in the Partitive NP2 may be preposed (of an apple a bit), but not in the Quantifier construction (*of a fraud a bit) in the Quantifier but not the Partitive construction, a N1 of can be replaced by one word (a bit of a beauty = rather/quite a beauty) only the Quantifier may develop into a Degree Modifier Adverb form that collocates with Adjectives (a bit/*piece squeamish) or Verbs (I sort of/*unit of regretted it) (although not all do so) some Partitives do not have or have only marginal Quantifier construction polysemies (a piece/unit/portion of)
4.1. A sketch of the history of a piece of Piece was borrowed from French in Early Middle English in the meaning ‘fragment, scrap, slice, portion’. Initially it is found in a binominal Partitive construction with a concrete complement (food, garment, building, precious metal, etc). In later uses, it can be found with negative evaluations implying ‘too small, inadequate’ (12c).
18. Denison (2002) calls Degree Modifiers with the first three properties PreDeterminers; Aarts (2001) calls them Complex Specifiers.
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Stage I: Partitive a. In þe assaut some … breke a pece of þe wal ‘In the assault some … broke a piece of the wall’ (c1325 Glo. Chron.A 11590 [MED pece 2a]) b. Gave them a piece of a honeycomb to eat (1713 Henry, Catech. Youth in Wks. (1853) II. 169/1 [OED piece 2a]) c. The spirit which animated her father when he went to housekeeping in a piece of a house without any front window (1884 Harper’s New Monthly Mag. 69 303 [OED piece 6d, “US regional”])
By the end of the fourteenth century the complement had been generalized to animate and also abstract NP2 contexts. A piece of is still Partitive, but had been enriched with the quantifier meaning. It could now imply ‘a small amount’. In (13b) we find peece used either meaning ‘exemplar’ or (an early usage) ‘person’.19 (13)
Stage II: Extended Partitive a. Dorus, whilom king of Grece ... hadde of infortune a piece ‘Dorus, once king of Greece … had of misfortunate a piece’ (a1393 Gower, Confessio Amantis (Fairf.) V. 1338 [OED piece, 5a]; note pre-posed of infortune) b. O Pretious peece of villany! are you vnchang’d? (1615 Tomkis, Albumazar V. ix. sig. I2v [OED piece, 5c])
Toward the end of the sixteenth century we find examples in which a human subject is characterized as a ‘piece’ of a profession (logician/doctor/poet). There is some indeterminacy between the Partitive reading (a small part/exemplar of a poet/logician) and a Quantifier reading (a poet/logician to a certain degree, ‘somewhat of a poet’). This appears to be the only context in which a Quantifier use developed robustly, and here it borders on a Degree Modifier in meaning. (14)
Stage III: Quantifier a. If I had not beene a peece of a Logician before I came to him. (1586 Sidney, Apol. Poetrie (1595) sig. B1v [OED piece, 6d])
19. This was used of men and women, presumably somewhat derogatorily.
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methinkes I am a piece of a Poet already, there’s such a whistling in my pate. (1640 Anon, The Knave in Graine I.i (LION; English Prose Drama])
A diary entry shows that at least one writer analogized the Quantifier with Adverbs like greatly that do not require a following NP: (15)
A mayd ... dyd cutt her thrott a-pesse, and after she lepyd in-to a welle and drownyd yr seyllff ‘A maid … did cut her throat a bit, and afterwards she lept into a well and drowned her self’ (1559 Machyn, Diary July (1848) 205 [OED piece, 10b])
(15) is the only example of its kind in my data base. Although indicative of an innovation by a speaker, it does not represent a change, as far as the data base allows us to identify one. From the perspective taken here, change requires both innovation and shared (replicated) adoption by a community of speakers (Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968). A piece of underwent grammaticalization to the extent that it was generalized to non-breakable (house) and mass noun (villany) complements (“host-class” expansion; see Himmelmann 2004) at Stage II; in this context there was pragmatic expansion in so far as ‘unit of mass noun’ came to imply scalar quantification. At Stage III there was syntactic expansion in that the NP of NP string now had two potential syntactic analyses, and also semantic/pragmatic expansion in that in the new polysemy NP1 (a piece) was reanalysed as ‘to some extent’ and bleached of partitive meaning (but only in restricted contexts). Himmelmann (2004) considers host-class, syntactic, and semantic/pragmatic expansion as criterial for grammaticalization.20 Another way to think of this is that, as a new polysemy arises that is an instance of primary grammaticalization, all three aspects of form– meaning pairings (lexical collocation, syntactic structure, and semantics– pragmatics) change (but not necessarily at the same time). 20. While the extensions Himmelmann identifies may be true of primary grammaticalization, there is often later restriction syntactically: a grammaticalized element may become fixed to just one context; or lose most meaning (typical of inflections); or, as a grammaticalized item comes to be obsolescent, it may become more and more frozen, as in the now long non-productive Demonstrative + Instrumental case þy which is restricted to the X-er the Y-er constructions such as The more the merrier.
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4.2. A sketch of the history of a bit of It seems that a piece of is primarily a Partitive in Modern English, despite some marginal Quantifier developments. In this respect it contrasts sharply with a bit of. The history of a bit of appears to start with a nominalized expression meaning ‘biting’ (OED). We may call this Stage 0 (PrePartitive): (16)
Stage 0: Pre-Partitive a. In to the pyne of helle .. for the bytt of an Appel ‘Into the suffering of Hell…for the biting of an apple’ (c.1400 Ancr. Recl. 22/25 [MED bite 3.b.]) b. this appyl…a bete therof thou take ‘This apple, a bite of it take’ (c.1475 Ludus C. 23/220 [Ibid.]; note the preposing of a bete)
Recall that Old English of meant ‘out of’ before it came to be the default Preposition. Metonymic transfer from biting out of something to the result of the biting was semanticized, and bite came to mean ‘piece bitten out, morsel’ (i.e. a unit of a size that could be bitten out). Indeed, bete in (16b) could be interpreted not as ‘a bite’ but as ‘a mouthful’. This is a semantic/pragmatic “bridging” context (see Heine 2002: 84; Enfield 2003: 28). We may call this ‘mouthful’ polysemy Stage I: Partitive. An early example is (17), still with the genitive case: (17)
Stage I: Partitive ‘morsel, unit bitten out’ He badd tatt gho shollde himm ec / An bite brædess brinngenn ‘He commanded that she should him also a bite/bit of bread bring’ (c.1200 Orm 8640 [MED bite 3.a.])
By the earlier part of the seventeenth century the complement had been generalized to non-food, often with a contextual implicature that the unit was a small, insufficient, or inadequate part of the pragmatic Focus (NP2). This is still Partitive, but importantly for later reinterpretation as a Quantifier, the unit (NP1) has been bleached of the literal meaning ‘mouthful’, and NP2 (the complement) can be abstract (18a).
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Stage II: Extended Partitive a. The fragments, scraps, the bits, and greazie reliques of her ore-eaten faith (1606 Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, V.ii.159 [OED bit 2, 3.a.]; note the metaphorical context of ore-eaten faith here) b. If so be as ow you ’ont blab, I’ll tell you a bit of a secret ‘If it be as how you won’t blab, ….’ (1833 Clifford, The Highwayman of 1770, I.ii. [LION; English Prose Drama])
By the eighteenth century we begin to find a bit of meaning ‘somewhat of/rather/quite’, typically before a head with an indefinite article, and an evaluative behavioral term (jilt, bastard, hypocrite, fool). In other words, it is a Quantifier, scaling NP2 (the head) down (19a, b), or approximating it (19c). This is Stage III. Some examples are (from our modern perspective at least) ambiguous bridging examples: does (19b) refer to a small amount of bastard business, or to somewhat bastard(ly) business, does (19d) refer to a small secret or (more probably in the context) something somewhat secret? It is instructive to compare (18b) with (19d). In (18b) a bit of a secret appears to mean ‘a small confidence, a small piece of information that is meant to be kept secret’, given the context in which the speaker allegedly knows something and is willing to impart it if it won’t be blabbed. But in (19d) the secret is not known, indeed, the speaker does not even know if there is a secret; what remains to be found out is whether there is a secret and how big it is. (19)
Stage III: Quantifier a. Your beauty is a little bit of a jilt (1771 S. Foote, Maid of Bath [OED bit 2, 4.b.]) b. If you be a lord, it must be a bit of bastard business (1810 W. Hickey, Mem [OED bit 2, 4.h.]) c. Wal. A sword–have I– (confused) –Why yes, it is a bit of a kind of a sword, as you say, to be sure– (1794 Morton, The Children in the Wood I.iii. [LION; English Prose Drama]; not a piece of a sword, but like one) d. (Aside) Oh, ho! There’s a bit of a secret, and I must be master of it (1769 Morton, Way to Get Married I.ii. [LION; English Prose Drama])
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e.
“I’ve got something to tell you, my dear,” said Caleb in his hesitating way… “You see, I’ve been a bit of a fool again, and put my name to a bill” (1871 Eliott, Middlemarch [UVa]).
A bit of was reduced and extended to syntactic contexts prototypical for members of the Degree Modifier class, specifically pre-Adjectival position, where a bit functions as an Adverb. This may well have been by direct analogy with other Degree Modifiers like quite and very. (20)
Stage IV: Adverb Degree Modifier I would not be a bit wiser, a bit richer, a bit taller, a bit shorter, than I am at this Instant (1723 Steele, The Conscious Lovers III.i [LION; English Prose Drama])
This Adverb Degree Modifier use has been available since the seventeenth century but is considered “more or less vulgar” by Stoffel (1901) and “slang” by the OED. In the eighteenth century it developed further into an Adverb that can be used without a complement (21a), and even as a free adjunct in responses (21b). The latter usually occurs in the context of a negative, or of negative-conveying intonation. (21)
Stage V: Adjunct a. I tell ye, I zee’d un gi’ Susan a letter, an’ I dan’t like it a bit. (1800 Morton, Speed the Plough II.iii. [LION; English Prose Drama]) b. A. Hear me. B. Not a bit (1739 Baker, The Cit Turn’d Gentleman [LION; English Prose Drama])
A bit of has undergone grammaticalization to the extent that it was generalized to non-edible and abstract noun complements (host-class expansion) at Stage II; in this context there was pragmatic expansion in so far as ‘unit of mass noun’ came to imply negatively evaluated scalar quantification (the bits of her ore-eaten faith are small parts of faith, implying ‘too small’, in this context, even ‘left-over’). At Stage III there was syntactic expansion in that the NP of NP string now had two syntactic analyses, and also semantic/pragmatic expansion in that in the new polysemy NP1 (a bit) was enriched as a quantifier and bleached of partitive meaning. At Stages IV and V there was further syntactic expansion to Adverb and free adjunct use.
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With respect to subjectification, a bit of was subjectified at Stage III (endowed with quantificational scalar meaning ‘somewhat’, a “downtoning” or understating meaning like that of a little). In contexts where the head is lexically negative or can be expected to be negatively interpreted, but not in negative syntax, a bit (of) is used intersubjectively as a hedge (see 19a, b). We may say it has been pragmatically intersubjectified, but not semantically so because it does not code semantic intersubjectivity. Note that in (19e) the speaker is attempting to save his own face, but clearly in the context of paying attention to the addressee: I’ve got something to tell you … You see). Being a downtoner, a bit of is favored with negatively evaluated heads as in (19a, b, e), or with neutral ones (19c, d), but it is not likely to be used, except in special circumstances, such as irony, with positive heads, especially of people: (22)
Your friend is a bit of a beauty.
4.3. A sketch of the history of a shred of In Old English a shred of meant ‘a fragment cut or broken off from fruit, vegetable, textile, coin, vessel’. In Middle English it was generalized to bodies (physical bodies and the symbolic Host) but it still meant ‘unit of X’. (23)
Stage I: Partitive With strengthe of his blast / The white [dragon] brent than rede, / That of him nas founden a schrede / Bot dust ‘With the strength of his blast, the white dragon burned the red, so that of him (the red) not a shred was found, only dust’ (c1300 Arth & M 1540 [MED shrede a)]; note the preposing)
In the sixteenth century it was generalized to further contexts including language, mankind and nature. The effect of a shred of was that the pragmatic focus (NP2) was often evaluated as small, insufficient, inadequate, but the construction is still Partitive; NP1 may still be modified by an Adjective.
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Stage II: Extended Partitive a. Suche shredis of sentence strowed in the shop of ancient Aritippus ‘Such scraps of wisdom strewn in ancient Aritippus’ shop’ (1529 Skelton Sp. Parrot 94 [OED shred 6]) b. A despis’d Shred of mankind (1645 G. Daniel, Poems [OED shred 6])
This extension appears to have been an essential step in the development of the Quantifier use. In the nineteenth century a polysemy arose from reanalysis of NP1 as a Quantifier (not ‘(smallest) part of’ but ‘some/any’) with NP2 as head only when NP2 was a mass noun (e.g. mankind). As a Quantifier, a shred of requires an abstract mass noun (typically evidence, character, hope, reputation, credibility) that is normally neutrally or positively evaluated. By the twentieth century this Quantifier was largely, but not obligatorily, restricted to negative polarity syntax (negation, interrogative, conditional, comparative, etc., see Israel 1996, 2004). (25)
Stage III: Quantifier a. Loto has not a shred of beauty. She is a big, angular, rawboned Normande, with a rough voice, and a villainous patois (1867 Ouida, Under Two Flags [LION: 19thC Fiction]) b. You’re so worthless, you can’t even recognize the shred of petty virtues in others, some of which I still have (1965 Osborne, A Patriot for Me, III. v. [LION; 20thC drama]; note singular shred with plural head, not shreds of petty virtue)
A shred of has undergone grammaticalization to the extent that it was generalized to abstract Ns (host-class expansion) at Stage II; in this context there was pragmatic expansion in so far as ‘unit of mass noun’ came to imply negatively evaluated scalar quantification (shredis of sentence are small parts of wisdom, implying ‘too small’). At Stage III there was syntactic expansion in that the NP of NP string now had two syntactic analyses, and also semantic/pragmatic expansion in that in the new polysemy NP1 (a shred) was enriched as a quantifier and bleached of partitive meaning. To date a shred of has not undergone further, secondary grammaticalization, for example, expansion to pre-Adjectival position (*a shred nice) or to
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adjunct status (*I opened it a shred; Q. Did you like the movie? A. *A shred), in contrast with e.g. a bit/sort of (see 21).21 With respect to subjectification, the semanticization of quantifier meaning is a type of subjectification (to scalar meaning). But there has been no pragmatic, let alone, coded intersubjectification: a shred of is not used as a hedge (*Your beauty is a shred of a jilt). This appears to be related to the fact that a shred of as a Quantifier is restricted to positively evaluated heads (honesty, evidence, decency, reputation). 4.4. Summary and some comments By hypothesis, a shift to meanings that are used evaluatively to assess not just more or less quantity, but also more or less quality, as in the case of Quantifiers or Focus Particles (see König 1991), always involves subjectification: the evaluative invited inferences are semanticized as part of the meaning of the item that comes to index scalarity. Those lexical items that initially refer to small quantities, and, by extension, low quality, tend to become negative polarity items. This involves both further grammaticalization (restriction in terms of syntactic contexts, see ft. 20) and further subjectification in that the speaker evaluates not only elements on a scale, but the scale itself. One feature of negative polarity is that meanings that would normally be understating in positive contexts (a bit (of), a shred of) are reversed and in this context are emphatic (Israel 1996). While a bit means ‘to some extent’, not a bit means ‘to no extent, not at all’. In discussing the development of the complex negative phrase in French ne … pas ‘not’, Eckardt (2006: 169, drawing on Krifka 1995) hypothesizes that negative polarity sensitivity is “the result of emphatic focusing and a specific kind of focus alternatives”. In other words, speakers assessing alternatives on a scale of probability or saliency, may use a quantifier such as bit, shred, Fr. pas (‘step’), once it has lost its original literal meaning, as an emphatic focus marker to signal that the following NP is the least probable or salient among a set of alternatives. The discourse reasons for such assessments 21. Further evidence for the low degree of grammaticalization of a shred of is its low frequency: 4 hits in LION, English Prose Drama, 32 in UVa, as opposed to 623 and 1702 respectively for a bit of (in all its uses). The numbers no doubt in part reflect the fact that the Degree Modifier use of a shred developed a hundred years later than that of a bit, but this alone hardly accounts for the dramatic differences in numbers between a shred of and a bit of.
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include the intention “to contravene scalar expectations among interlocutors, whether explicit or implicit” (Gutiérrez-Rexach and Schwenter 2002). Most emphatics are speaker-oriented claims about extreme ends of scales. But some may be used intersubjectively in certain contexts for aggression (being “in” rather than “saving” Addressee’s face), e.g., Du. kanker ‘cancer’, pest ‘plague’, pokken ‘smallpox’ (Hoeksema 2001: 178) (all “positive” polarity items, i.e. they do not require negative polarity contexts). Some negative polarity items may eventually come to be negation markers in a process usually referred to as the Jespersen Cycle (Jespersen 1917), whereby a negation marker such as French ne comes to be associated in a complex negative phrase with a term referring to a small unit, in this case pas ‘step’, and eventually pas comes to be used alone as the marker of negation (see Eckardt 2006 on the history of French; Schwenter 2006 on cognates in contemporary Catalan, Italian, and Brazilian Portuguese). It appears that at least subjectification and perhaps pragmatic intersubjectification are involved in the early development of the Jespersen Cycle. However, they cease to operate once the subjectivized element comes to be the stand-alone grammatical marker (at which point it has been bleached not only of its original ‘unit’ meaning, but also of its subjective emphatic meaning). 5. Mechanisms of and motivations for change in grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification Mechanisms of change have to do with the ‘how’ of change in the mind of speaker and hearer. Harris and Campbell (1995) have claimed that there are only two basic internal mechanisms for syntactic change: reanalysis and extension.22 Recently, other possible mechanisms have been explored, such as priming, routinization, and other production/parsing processes (see Garrod n.d.). As Campbell and Harris see it, while reanalysis involves changes in the underlying structure, extension (which, in their view, overlaps with analogy) involves changes in the surface manifestation of a pattern (Harris and Campbell 1995: 50–53). This distinction is problematic in some of its details, since any extension that becomes institutionalized and acquires the status of a change rather than merely an innovation, entails at least some 22. They also cite an external mechanism, borrowing, but that does not concern us here.
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minimal reanalysis of the underlying specification. For example, analogical extension of Partitives to non-countable hosts (e.g. a bit of to faith) entails a reanalysis of the restriction that the complement (NP2) is countable. Nevertheless, the distinction between changes that concern constituency, hierarchical structure, category, grammatical relations, or boundary types, and similar primarily “covert” aspects of syntagmatic linguistic structure on the one hand (reanalysis), and changes based on overt patterns and templates that serve as exemplars on the other (analogy), is a useful one (Hopper and Traugott 2003). Famously, Meillet initially conceived of grammaticalization as reanalysis (Meillet ([1912] 1958), and much has since been written about the extent to which grammaticalization and reanalysis are independent of each other (see Dahl 2004: 170–178 for a summary of arguments). It seems safe to say that grammaticalization requires structural reanalysis, but that not all reanalysis, e.g. word order change, is necessarily grammaticalization. The more work has been done on the contexts for grammaticalization, the more it has become clear that it is a reanalysis that occurs very locally and involves fine-grained changes that are not necessarily totally new in the language in the way Meillet appears to have envisioned when he said that grammaticalization “introduit des catégories qui n’avaient pas d’expression linguistique, transforme l’ensemble du système”23 (Meillet 1958: 133). For example, addressing the issue from radically different perspectives, Bybee (2006: 727) has recently suggested that “new constructions are created out of specific instances of old general constructions”, while Kiparsky (Forthcoming) has argued that much of grammaticalization arises out of optimization (generalization) of structures in a restrictive theory of analogy.24 The development of the Partitives into Quanitifiers, and, in the case of a bit of, into Degree Modifier Adverb and Adjunct illustrate well the interdependence of reanalysis and extension. The head-modifier shift is clearly reanalysis, the other changes are largely analogies of various kinds. For the constructions in question, each change was new for the string. Quantifiers and Degree Modifiers had existed since earliest times in English (e.g. manig ‘many’, swiðe ‘very’). The rise of a whole class of binominal Quantifiers in the eighteenth century (a bit of, lot of, (a) sort/kind of, etc.) was new. So was the rise of binominal Degree Modifiers, since until then they had been monomorphemic or derived Adverbs. 23. “Introduces categories which previously had no linguistic expression, transforms the totality of the system”. 24. See also e.g. Himmelmann (2004), Fischer (2007).
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Just as two internal mechanisms have been proposed for syntactic change, so two have been proposed for semantic change: conceptual metonymy and metaphor (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 27–34). The first mechanism, conceptual metonymy, is analogous to reanalysis, and the second, metaphor, is analogous to analogy or generalization based on pattern match (Anttila 1992). Conceptual metonymic shift in the sense intended here involves a covert shift, e.g. the semanticization of an earlier pragmatic implicature or invited inference; in the case of Quantifiers, the semanticization of the implicature of quantity from units and portions, in certain contexts. Metaphorical change is, by contrast, based on analogical similarities. Just as reanalysis and analogy are interdependent, so are conceptual metonymy and metaphor. Much of what looks like metaphorical change can actually be seen to be the result of metonymic change when contexts for the change are taken into account. Presumably, in terms of usage, Shakespeare’s ‘The fragments, scraps, the bits, and greazie reliques of her ore-eaten faith’ cited in (18a) is an instance of metaphor. Shattered by Cressida’s unfaithfulness to him when she leaves him for Diomedes, Troilus disgustedly conceptualizes her new promises to Diomedes in terms of nasty morsels of food left over from others. Because such metaphors have mass and abstract heads, they enabled the reanalysis as Quantifier, but the semantic change Partitive > Quantifier is not a case of metaphorization: it is subjectification, the reanalysis of the pragmatically inferrable scalar evaluations arising by conceptual metonymy in the context of utterances like (17) and (18) as semantically coded scalar, quantitative meanings. Subjectification is therefore a subtype of semantic reanalysis, a mechanism. Likewise, when intersubjectification occurs, pragmatic intersubjective meanings that are pragmatically inferrable from the context (or, as in the case of If you please, syntactic contexts) come to be coded as part of the semantics of an item. Genuine cases of intersubjectification as opposed to intersubjective uses of items are hard to identify outside of languages like Japanese. But where it occurs, like subjectification it is a semantic reanalysis, and a mechanism. What might motivate grammaticalization, in other words, what might be the reason for the change? As we have seen, in many cases, primary grammaticalization follows pragmatic changes and changes in distribution. In the case of a bit of and a shred of, it followed the pragmatic strengthening of the literal Partitives as quantificational (pragmatic subjectification), and host-class expansion to more nominal complements, especially mass com-
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plements. But we cannot say it was caused by these changes.25 Although Partitive a piece of underwent several of the same types of changes as a bit of and a shred of, it did not become as productive as they in the Quantifier function, nor did it participate in negative polarity (perhaps because piece was conceptualized as larger than bit or shred?).26 Haspelmath (1999: 1054–1055) has provided a fairly detailed account of how grammaticalization might be motivated. He invokes a number of “ecological” factors, among them unconscious processing, routinization, maxims of action and invisible hand processes whereby unintended results arise from action (see Keller 1994). Haspelmath suggests that grammaticalization arises out of speakers’ desire to “be extravagant”, i.e. “Talk in such as way that you are noticed” (1999: 1055). The term “extravagant” is, as he admits, unfortunate, since most grammaticalization involves fairly general meanings to start with. Furthermore, “Talk in such a way that you are noticed” implies a degree of consciousness that is inconsistent with the concept of unconscious acts leading to change. However, the examples discussed here do suggest that some combination of maxims must be at work, such as “Talk like the others talk” (with pragmatic invited inferences of quantification) and “Try something very similar that will not be incomprehensible” (and therefore does not violate the maxim “Talk in such a way that you are understood”). What might motivate subjectification? By hypothesis it is online production in the flow of speech (in certain cases, writing may be involved too, as in the case of the development of discourse connectives such as in fact, concerning). In other words, it is the subjectivity of the speech event. This hypothesis is in direct opposition to the many models of language change that are based on the assumption that language change is triggered by child language acquisition, and are therefore hearer models (e.g. Lightfoot 1999). A hearer/perception model explains little or nothing about why subjectification occurs at all. As speakers, we tend to understand in terms of our own schemas, so why would we constantly try to process from the perspective of the interlocutor, enrich the interlocutor’s subjective perspective, and semanticize it? Furthermore, it explains nothing about why subjectification would precede intersubjectification. 25. Similarly, although frequency is often construed as a factor contributing to “the mechanisms of change associated with grammaticalization” (Bybee 2003: 602), it is not a cause. 26. How the relative sizes of bit, piece, iota, shred, bunch, lot, etc. can be established is hard to determine in historical data.
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Grammaticalization and especially (inter)subjectification suggest that a passive view of change is not sufficient. The fine-grainedness of the collocations and the social implications of the changes suggest not only children but also teens and adults play a role in change (see Bergs 2005 on evidence for change as communally as well as generationally motivated; also Croft 2000; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Milroy 2007). Recent work on frequency as a contributing factor in grammaticalization (e.g. Bybee and Hopper 2001; Bybee 2003, 2006) further shows that a production model is needed, and recent processing studies have suggested that production factors may override consideration of hearers’ likely ease of perception (Wasow 1997). Because of the deictic shifts of Speaker and Addressee in the speaking dyad, we need a model of change that accounts for how members of the dyad interact, and above all a production model of how speakers construct “arguments about propositions, and [assign] degrees or statements of confidence to those propositions” (Moxey and Sanford 1997: 229). 6. Operationalizing subjectification Recently there have been some interesting attempts to operationalize subjectification. The aim is to move from the admittedly rather vague notion of ambient subjectivity and interlocutor interaction as a motivating force in subjectification, toward identifying the types of linguistic context in which one might expect to find evidence for subjectification. This work draws on quantitative analysis of variation involving subjectivity in contemporary corpora (cf. Scheibman 2002). Investigating “the increasingly speaker-based construal of (counter-) expectation” as represented by middle-marked salirse ‘leave (despite obstacles/surreptitiously)’ from Old Spanish to present-day Mexico City Spanish, Aaron and Torres Cacoullous (2005: 609) suggest the following as structural correlates of subjectivity which can be considered likely contexts in which the subjectification of salirse occurred: (26)
a. b. c.
1st or 3rd person singular referents close to the speaker positive polarity past tenses
The first factor, person, can be understood as reflecting the hypothesis that 1st persons and 3rd persons with a close relationship to the speaker (e.g.
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family membership), are emotionally salient, in contrast to casual acquaintances (Aaron and Torres Cacoullous 2005: 616). Likewise the temporal factor reflects emotional engagement in past narrative. The positive polarity factor (understood as affirmative contexts) reflects the fact that expression of counter-expectation would be incongruous with negation (Aaron and Torres Cacoullous 2005: 618). The study shows that, even though salirse has counter-expectation meanings from the time of the earliest documents (twelfth century), there has been a dramatic increase in the use of 1st person subjects, and there is robust evidence of the kind of change that is often mentioned in grammaticalization studies: the gradual loss of the preposition de ‘from’ and its absorption of its contextual meaning “into the salirse form itself” (Aaron and Torres Cacoullous 2005: 621). Overall there has been “increasingly speaker-based construal of (counter-) expectation, as the use of the form extends to situations involving non-physical abstract, even social, force dynamics” (Aaron and Torres Cacoullos 2005: 629). In a complementary paper Torres Cacoullos and Schwenter (2006) explore ways to operationalize degrees of subjectification as exemplified by the development of Old Spanish pesar de ‘regret of’ into the concessive connectives a pesar de (que) ‘in spite of (that)’. They construe subjectification in this case as “the evolution of the opposition by an outside force into the superimposition of the speaker’s viewpoint onto the viewpoint of another” (Torres Cacoullos and Schwenter 2006: 352). Like Aaron and Torres Cacoullos they seek to identify subjectification in the expansion of certain types of functional range. The key factors in their study are: (27)
a. b. c.
shift from non-coreferentiality to co-referentiality of the subject of the main verb and the adnominal genitive extension to subjunctive verb forms preposing of a pesar de, i.e. increase in syntactic scope
Without seeking to operationalize subjectification, but nevertheless to identify likely linguistic contexts for subjectification, Horie and Kondo (2004) show that, in the Kansai Dialect of Japanese, what they consider to be the subjectivized negative appears predominantly in: (28)
a. b.
first person contexts with verbs of evaluative attitude and cognition.
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These are important studies that seek to find structural groundings for the admittedly rather imprecise notion of subjectification. However, because the relevant factors are so different, these variation- and multivariate analysis-based studies raise the question whether it is possible to identify factors of subjectification that are replicable across languages and construction-types, independently of those that might be particular to a construction. By hypothesis, it seems likely that shifts in the referent of the subject would generally be relevant to the development of subjective meanings. Shifts toward first person subjects are not necessary correlates of or indicators of subjectivity since subjectification may be most apparent precisely where there is no overt subject, first person or otherwise (Scheibman 2002: 167 herself cautions that “the presence of I does not necessarily subjectify on its own”). Obvious examples include the case of raising constructions (There’s going to be an earthquake), and discourse markers like y’know, God wot, etc. (Brinton 1996). It seems likely that when the subjectification is orientation toward a negative evaluation, the locus of change will be comments about non-first persons, especially third persons (“They” are negatively evaluated in some way), see Kranich (2007) on the development of progressives with always, as in Paul is always writing me letters (ĺ ‘and I find this aggravating’) as opposed to non-evaluative Paul always writes me letters. Another likely locus for subjectification is transitivity. In an early study, Zubin (1975: 19–20) suggested that in German when there is case alternation between dative and accusative, the speaker subjectively perspectivizes the situation, and assesses a participant’s contribution (including his or her own) as less vivid, relatively static (accusative) or more vivid, affected (dative). Thompson and Hopper (2001) suggested that a correlation between low transitivity and subjectivity in conversation is a function of the fact that “our talk is mostly about ‘how things are from our perspective’ … these are reflections of subjectivity in our everyday use of language” (Thompson and Hopper 2001: 53; italics original). The extent to which changes in transitivity relates to subjectification remains to be determined, except in the domain of the development of raising constructions (Langacker 1995). Yet another likely locus is semantic polarity sensitivity. However, the particular change in question may show different specific correlations. While the counter-expectation of salirse may be unlikely to arise in negative environments, expressions that evaluate small degree as below the norm or less than adequate may favor negative polarity (a bit, a shred of).
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Relevant polarity sensitivity is not only clause- but also phrase-internal. As we have seen, in the case of (not) a shred of the head is almost exclusively positively evaluated (honor, dignity, evidence) (phrase-internal polarity). Hoeksema (1996–1997) has shown that during the twentieth century a division of labor has developed between two Dutch Degree Adverbs, bar and bijster, both meaning ‘very, all that’. Bar has come to be favored in positive clauses but with negative members of an antonym pair (e.g. ‘bad’), while bijster has come to be favored in negative clauses with positive members of an antonym pair (e.g. ‘good, uninspired’): (29)
a. b.
Real Madrid was niet bijster geïnspireerd tegen Albacete. ‘Real Madrid was not terribly inspired against Albacete’ Werpers zijn hard nodig bij de bar slecht spelende Giants. ‘Pitchers are badly needed with the very badly playing Giants’
The evaluations emerging from such distributional shifts strongly point to the importance of investigating polarity as a context for subjectification, but do not seem to be generalizable beyond the particular examples. To my knowledge, there have not been attempts to operationalize intersubjectification. Here again there is a need to distinguish the context of 2nd person subjects (addressees) from intersubjectivity that is relevant to intersubjectification. While you see and y’know, with their routinized 2nd person subjects, might appear to be markers of intersubjectivity (example 19e is a case in point), they are actually often used for subjective purposes, to negotiate speaker meaning, as in the case of subjectified a bit of. Even imperative utterances, which are clearly in themselves initially intersubjective, may be subjectified. Examples include the development of hortative let’s (as in Let’s go, shall we?) from (you) let us X, (as in Let us go, will you?) (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 176–178), and of discourse marker say in many of its meanings (‘assume, about, for example, tell me’). Say derives from an intersubjective, imperative use, but is subjectified over time, e.g. the ‘about’ use is a type of topicalizer, and the ‘tell me’ use expresses speaker’s impatience (Brinton 2005). One context that is useful to track in the search for structural correlates of (inter)subjectification is changing position in the phrase or clause. In her study of tense, aspect and mood, Bybee (1985) showed that mood (defined as epistemic modality) typically occurs on the periphery of the verbal complex (Bybee 1985: 34–35, 196–200). She correlated this position with degree of relevance to the verb (mood has sentential scope, and therefore is
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less relevant to the verb than tense and aspect). Mood is typically grammaticalized from a variety of sources (see Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 240–241 for one proposal), and subjectified. A growing number of studies have suggested that as they are subjectified linguistic elements are used in increasingly peripheral positions. Typically the shift is leftward in VO languages, and rightward in OV languages. In English many discourse markers are associated with left (sometimes right) periphery, and their use in this position can be correlated with subjectification of their meaning (see e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002 on indeed, in fact, actually; Brinton 2007 on I mean). It has further been suggested that subjectified meanings of adjectives are to be found in the left periphery of the NP, see e.g. Adamson (2000) on the development from descriptive to affective meanings of lovely as in a lovely little example, and Breban (2008) on the word order correlations of subjectification and grammaticalization in the development of adjectives like different, distinct.27 Likewise, in Japanese many items that are subjectified or intersubjectified come be used on the periphery of the clause (see e.g. Onodera 2005; Onodera and Suzuki 2007). To what extent there are cross-constructional and cross-linguistic constraints on the leftward (or rightward) shift over time of expressions that undergo (inter)subjectification remains to be determined (Traugott 2007). 7. Conclusion I have hypothesized that subjectification and intersubjectification involve the reanalysis as coded meanings of pragmatic meanings arising in the context of speaker-hearer negotiation of meaning. Subjectification is the development of meanings that express speaker attitude or viewpoint, while intersubjectification is the development of the speaker’s attention to addressee self-image. This requires rethinking Halliday and Hasan’s “interpersonal” meanings as having dual functions: subjective and oriented toward the speaker, and intersubjective, oriented toward the addressee. It also requires more careful distinction than I have previously made between increases in
27. Breban (2008) relates the leftward shift of evaluating adjectives to the intersection of three things: i) the constructional properties of NPs in English, in which the rightward elements have descriptively specific semantics, while the leftward ones denote quantity and grounding (Langacker 1991), ii) grammaticalization, iii) subjectification.
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pragmatic (inter)subjective invited inferences in specific contexts and the semanticization of these invited inferences. I have argued that subjectification and intersubjectification are independent of grammaticalization. However, since grammaticalization involves the development of markers of speaker attitude toward the ideational component and toward textual connectivity (among many other things), there is inevitably a close interaction between grammaticalization and subjectification. The intersection of grammaticalization and intersubjectification is less common, since the latter largely involves expressions of politeness, and cross-linguistically these tend to be associated with lexical choices rather than with grammatical ones. Attempts to identify evidence for the structural contexts of subjectification have confirmed how extensive its reach can be. However, it appears that each construction needs to be studied in its own terms before any cross-constructional let alone cross-linguistic predictions can be made about which contexts are the most likely to enable subjectification to occur. A fuller understanding of contexts for subjectification will presumably arise eventually from studies of the collocations not only within local constructions (“collostructions”, see Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004), but also across a large number of distributional contexts in a large number of languages over time (see Hilpert 2008).28 Sources of data LION MED OED UVa
Chadwyck Healey website. http://lion.chadwyck.com The Middle English Dictionary. 1956–2001. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (see also http://www.hti.umich.edu/dict/med/) Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (in progress). http://dictionary.oed.com/ University of Virginia, Electronic Text Center, Modern English Collection. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/modeng/modeng0.browse.html
28. Such studies will presumably also test to what extent the Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (Traugott and Dasher 2002) is correct that utterance-token meanings (particularized implicatures or IIN’s) precede the general acceptance of utterance-type meanings that develop out of them (generalized implicatures or GIIN’s). In their critique of this hypothesis, Hansen and Waltereit (2006) focus not so much on the token (IIN) vs. type (GIIN) distinction, but on a distinction between foregrounding (PCI) vs. backgrounding (GCI).
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Bybee, Joan L. and Paul Hopper (eds.) 2001 Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Bybee, Joan L., Revere Perkins, and William Pagliuca 1994 The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and Modality in the Languages of the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cornillie, Bert 2004 Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Spanish (Semi-) Auxiliaries: A Functional-pragmatic and Cognitive-linguistic Account. PhD. dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Croft, William 2000 Explaining Language Change: An Evolutionary Approach. Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. Dahl, Östen 2004 The Growth and Maintenance of Linguistic Complexity. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. De Smet, Hendrik and Jean-Christophe Verstraete 2006 Coming to terms with subjectivity. Cognitive Linguistics 17: 365– 392. Denison, David 2002 Semantic pathways with sort of, kind of, type of, and their relation to grammatical gradience. Paper presented at Stanford University, May 2002 (see also History of the sort of construction family, ICCG2, Helsinki (http://lings.ln.man.ac.uk/info/staff/dd/default.html). Eckardt, Regine 2006 Meaning Change in Grammaticalization: An Enquiry into Semantic Reanalysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Enfield, Nicholas J. 2003 Linguistic Epidemiology: Semantics and Grammar of Language Contact in Mainland Southeast Asia. London/New York: Routledge. Fischer, Olga 2007 Morphosyntactic Change: Functional and Formal Perspectives. Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press. Fitzmaurice, Susan 2000 Coalitions and the investigation of social influence in linguistic history. European Journal of English Studies 4: 265–276. Fitzmaurice, Susan 2004 Subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the historical construction of interlocutor stance: From stance markers to discourse markers. Discourse Studies 6: 427–448. Garrett, Andrew Forthc. The historical syntax problem: Reanalysis and directionality. In Grammatical Change: Origins, Nature, Outcomes, Dianne Jonas,
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Hoeksema, Jack 1996–97 Corpus study of negative polarity items. IV–V Jornades de corpus linguistics 1996–1997. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabre. http://odur.let.rug.nl/~hoeksema/docs/barcelona.html Hoeksema, Jack 2001 Change among expletive polarity items. In Historical Linguistics 1999: Selected Papers from the 14th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, Vancouver, 9–13 August 1999, Laurel J. Brinton (ed.), 175–186. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Benjamins. Hopper, Paul J. 1991 On some principles of grammaticization. In Traugott and Heine (eds.), Vol. I, 17–35. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 2003 Grammaticalization. 2nd rev. ed. [1st ed., 1993.] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horie, Karuo and Emi Kondo 2004 Subjectification and synchronic variation: Two negation forms in Kansai Dialect of Japanese. In Achard and Kemmer (eds.), 445–459. Horn, Laurence R. 1984 Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and Rbased implicature. In Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications; Georgetown University Round Table ’84, Deborah Schiffrin (ed.), 11–42. Georgetown University Press, Washington D. C. Israel, Michael 1996 Polarity sensitivity as lexical semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 19: 619–666. Israel, Michael 2004 The pragmatics of polarity. In The Handbook of Pragmatics, Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward (eds.), 701–723. Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell. Jespersen, Otto 1917 Negation in English and other Languages. Copenhagen: A. Høst. Joseph, Brian D. and Richard D. Janda (eds.) 2003 The Handbook of Historical Linguistics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Jucker, Andreas H. 1997 The discourse marker well in the history of English. English Language and Linguistics 1: 91–110. Keller, Rudi 1994 On Language Change: The Invisible Hand in Language. Trans. by Brigitte Nerlich. London: Routledge.
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Kiparsky, Paul Forthc. Grammaticalization as optimization. In Grammatical Change: Origins, Nature, Outcomes, Dianne Jonas, John Whitman and Andrew Garrett (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://www.stanford.edu/~kiparsky/ König, Ekkehard 1991 The Meaning of Focus Particles: A Comparative Perspective. London/New York: Routledge. Kranich, Svenja 2007 Subjectification and the English progressive: The history of ALWAYS + progressive constructions. York Papers in Linguistics 2: 120–137. Krifka, Manfred 1995 The semantics and pragmatics of polarity expressions. Linguistic Analysis 25: 209–257. Langacker, Ronald W. 1990 Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 5–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991 Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1995 Raising and transparency. Language 71: 1–62. Langacker, Ronald W. 2003 Extreme subjectification: English tense and modals. In Motivation in Language: Studies in Honor of Günther Radden, Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas Berg, René Dirven, and Klaus-Uwe Panther (eds.), 3–26. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Lehmann, Christian 1995 Thoughts on Grammaticalization. Munich/Newcastle: LINCOM EUROPA. Original publication in Arbeiten der Kölner UniversalienProjektes 48, University of Cologne, 1982. Levinson, Stephen C. 2000 Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, A Bradford Book. Lightfoot, David 1999 The Development of Language: Acquisition, Change, and Evolution. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Lyons, John 1982 Deixis and subjectivity: Loquor, ergo sum? In Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics, Robert J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (eds.), 101–124. New York: Wiley.
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Lyons, John 1994 Subjecthood and subjectivity. In Subjecthood and Subjectivity: The Status of the Subject in Linguistic Theory, Marina Yaguello (ed.), 9– 17. Paris: Ophrys/London: Institut Français du Royaume-Uni. Meillet, Antoine 1958 Reprint. L’évolution des formes grammaticales. In Linguistique historique et linguistique générale, Antoine Meillet, 130–148. Paris: Champion. Original publication in Scientia (Rivista di Scienza) 12, 1912. Milroy, Lesley 2007 Off the shelf or under the counter? On the social dynamics of sound change. In Studies in the History of the English Language III: Managing Chaos: Strategies for Identifying Change in English, Christopher M. Cain and Geoffrey Russom (eds.), 149–172. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Moxey, Linda M. and Anthony J. Sanford 1997 Choosing the right quantifier: Usage in the context of communication. In Conversation: Cognitive, Communicative and Social Perspectives, Talmy Givón (ed.), 207–231. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan 2001 Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan 2005 Modality: Overview and linguistic issues. In The Expression of Modality, William Frawley (ed.), 1–26. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Onodera, Noriko O. 2004 Japanese Discourse Markers: Synchronic and Diachronic Discourse Analysis. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Onodera, Noriko O. and Ryoko Suzuki (eds.) 2007 Journal of Historical Pragmatics 8; special issue on subjectivity, intersubjectivity and historical changes in Japanese. Prince, Ellen 1988 Discourse analysis: A part of the study of linguistic competence. In Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Vol. II Linguistic Theory: Extensions and Applications, Frederick J. Newmeyer (ed.), 164–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scheibman, Joanne 2002 Point of View and Grammar: Structural Patterns of Subjectivity in American English Conversation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
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Part 2 (Inter)subjectification and grammaticalization involving adverbials
Presupposition accommodation and language change Scott A. Schwenter and Richard Waltereit Abstract Innovations leading to language change are often routinely taken as speaker-based. In this article, we look at how hearers can create new meaning in the case of presupposition triggers. Hearers unable or unwilling to accommodate presuppositions assume a novel interpretation of the erstwhile presupposition-trigger and eventually pass this new interpretation on to other people, thereby changing the language. We discuss one particular lexeme, namely the additive particle too and some of its counterparts in Spanish and German (and to a lesser extent in a range of other languages). We find that this particle provides particularly fertile ground for what we consider to be hearer-initiated changes motivated by too-costly presupposition accommodation. We argue that adversative properties of the dialogual discourse context – prototypically in the form of an argument between two interlocutors – appear to have led hearers to reanalyse too as expressing a new, rhetoricallystrategic meaning with strong counter-argumentative force. The trajectory of change thereby produces a clear path from the ideational/textual meaning of additive too to the more clearly interactionally-bound interpersonal meanings associated with non-additive too.
1. Introduction: Presupposition accommodation as a possible motivation for semantic change 1.1. Hearer-induced semantic change Recent research on language change, and especially on semantic change, has focused on the ways speakers and hearers use language innovatively and create new uses of existing words or constructions in the process (Traugott and Dasher 2002). By “innovative” we mean that the relation between form and meaning is novel, rather than given by the conventions
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of the language or other conventions.1 If the innovative language use by speakers “catches on” and hearers in turn make use of it in their own speech, then gradually that particular form–meaning pairing may enter the inventory of the language and a change will have occurred. One kind of language use which is creative by definition are conversational implicatures. Consider, for example, the following dialogue: (1)
A: Do you want to go to a pub after the film? B: I have to get up early tomorrow morning.
Assuming that B wants to decline A’s offer with this answer, B will have conversationally implicated that content. The very fact of it being conversationally implicated means that the speaker has expressed that content by a form or expression that does not carry it by convention; rather, they rely on the hearer associating that specific interpretational content to the form used solely by contextual inferences. In other words, the speaker “invites” the inference that I have to get up early tomorrow morning means (among other things) ‘no’ in that particular context of utterance. We will refer to nonconventionalized ways of associating form and content such as the preceding as pragmatic meaning. Such a novel use may set off semantic change, and the conversational implicature may eventually conventionalize, i.e. become the coded semantic content of the forms in question. Traugott and Dasher (2002), and Traugott in many other places, have most prominently and fruitfully articulated this view in their Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change. The assumption that at least a salient subset of instances of semantic change consists of the conventionalization of conversational implicatures has become commonplace in the historical linguistics literature. Many researchers in historical linguistics tend to place the burden of the labour necessary to set off any change in the language on the speaker’s creativity. For example, Haspelmath (1999) and Keller (1994) invoke speaker’s maxims such as “speak like others” or “speak extravagantly” as responsible for language change, where the former maxim disfavours language change and the latter favours it. If people just speak like other speakers do, then their behaviour will not lead to language change. If some speakers however succeed in speaking extravagantly, that may lead to others imitating them (in line with “speak like others”) and the language 1. See Morgan’s (1978) distinction of conventions of language and of conventions of language use.
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changing in the process. Rarely has the function of hearers been discussed. However it is easy to see that they have an equally important role, since “speakers may innovate as much as they please, but if hearers do not perceive those innovations, they obviously will not take hold” (Hansen 2008: 100). It is not straightforward to predict the relation between the extent of the difference between what is said and what is meant, inherent in any innovation, on the one hand and the likelihood of that innovation catching on in subsequent speakers’ discourse on the other hand. Clearly, the difference between what is said and what is meant must be big enough to be noted in the first place; but at the same time that difference must not be so big as to make it too difficult or even impossible for the hearer to figure out what is really meant. Certainly it may be argued that the greater the mismatch between what is said and what is meant the less easily perceptible will that mismatch be for hearers, and consequently less likely for them to employ it in their role as speakers. However very light and subtle mismatches may not take hold either, because the very complexity of verbal communication implies that any participant in the communication will necessarily have to allow for some mismatch between what is said and what they want to convey (Croft 2000). Hence hearers have a clear “regulatory” role in innovations, as their ability, or willingness, to follow speakers’ innovations places a cap on an innovation’s likelihood to be propagated in the linguistic community. However, the contribution that hearers make to semantic change is not limited to constraining speakers’ creativity. Hearers can indeed have a very active role in that process, namely by assigning novel interpretations to forms, constructions, or utterances they hear and by using these interpretations in their own subsequent use as speakers. A type of pragmatic meaning that we believe illustrates the potentially active role of hearers and that has received much less, if any, attention than conversational implicatures in the overall realm of historical linguistics, are presuppositions. To take a simple example of the phenomenon, the utterance in (2), (2)
I have to take my sister to the station.
presupposes that the proposition ‘the speaker has a sister’ forms part of the speaker and hearer’s Common Ground. However, as is well known, utterances like (2) are very common and actually perfectly felicitous even if the hearer did not know previously that the speaker had a sister. The hearer in such a case accommodates this presupposition (cf. Lewis 1979; von Fintel
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2000; Lambrecht 1994; Beaver and Zeevat 2004; among many others): under the assumption that the speaker is communicating cooperatively, the hearer will accept this accommodated presupposition into the Common Ground. Presupposition accommodation is a pragmatic operation that falls genuinely within the remit of the hearer. Only if the Common Ground, as the set of mutually projected assumptions about each discourse participant’s knowledge, does not contain that proposition will the hearer have to accommodate it in the first place. In the case of an utterance like (2) the hearer may perform this operation noticeably, but smoothly, and will maybe not assume that any deliberate action by the speaker was involved. The speaker could certainly have avoided this operation and have introduced the proposition into the Common Ground as an independent assertion: (2ƍ)
I have a sister. I have to take her to the station.
In the case of (2ƍ), no presupposition accommodation would be involved. However this might be considered a rather cumbersome way of speaking, and intuitively (2) seems to be the more natural and indeed more common variant. Presupposition accommodation, in examples like (2), is economybased: if a speaker, for whatever reason, does not anticipate objections, comment etc. for a proposition, she may as well bring it into the common ground as a presupposition (cf. Givón 1995). Crucial here to the process of accommodation is the “non-controversiality” of the accommodated material (whether a discourse referent or a proposition), oft-cited in the literature (Grice 1981; Atlas and Levinson 1981; Heim 1992). People are typically interested in the course of the conversation rather than in the Common Ground as such, and they will normally be happy to make a reasonable effort to update the Common Ground, as required by an utterance like (2), if this enables them to follow and to successfully contribute to the conversation. The Common Ground is normally in the background of the speakers’ attention, and by the same token, it has a secondary role for the conversation or indeed for the hearer. The accommodated material should therefore be not only non-controversial but also deemed unworthy of being the current focus of attention. Presupposition accommodation may however be used in a “strategic” way, namely in order to avoid any subsequent discussion of the proposition, i.e. to keep it in the background. Imagine a speaker announcing to her father,
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O Dad, I forgot to tell you that my fiancée and I are moving to Seattle next week. (von Fintel 2000)
without telling him beforehand that she got engaged. The proposition that the hearer will have to accommodate is so remarkable (at least in our cultures) that it would certainly have merited introduction into the Common Ground as a full assertion, and thereby to have become a topic of conversation. The ultimately extra-linguistic (cultural) difference between (2) and (3) is that a casual acquaintance having a sister is for many a rather anodyne and insignificant piece of information whereas one’s daughter having a fiancée is normally considered to be highly relevant and significant. Packing this information into a proposition that the hearer has to accommodate, rather than expressing it in a full assertion that the hearer can elaborate on or even challenge, is a way of communicating something without talking about it. It is of course up to the hearer whether he accepts such a move and simply accommodates that probably very important piece of information or whether he challenges it. A hearer who is confronted with an utterance and assigns an interpretation to it that deviates from that utterance’s literal meaning has, in principle, two options: (i)
They can assume that regular pragmatic operations, such as conversational inference and the accommodation of presuppositions, mediate between the literal meaning and the chosen non-literal interpretation. (ii) They can assume a novel conventional meaning for some element of that utterance. In that case, fewer pragmatic computations, and/or less costly ones, may be required, since there is no need anymore for them to mediate between the chosen interpretation and the traditional (previous) conventional meaning.
If a hearer chooses (ii) and uses the novel form–meaning pairing in their own discourse, the language will have changed. But when will a hearer prefer (ii) over (i)? Probably in a situation where the regular pragmatic operations required for (i) are considered too costly, or if s/he is unable to make them in the first place. Eckardt (forthcoming) has suggested the principle “Avoid pragmatic overload” in semantic change: Assume that u [=an utterance] in the old sense Iold requires unbacked presuppositions. The speaker makes his utterance under the assumption that the interpreter will accommodate them. The interpreter may see this possibility but finds the required accommodations implausible. As an interpretive al-
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This principle predicts that if the pragmatic operations required for option (i) are implausible the hearer will choose option (ii). The principle is adumbrated in Detges and Waltereit’s (2002) “Principle of reference” in reanalysis, which assumes that reanalyses may be guided by an assumption on the part of the hearer that the relation between what is said and what is meant should be maximally simple. In this article, we want to investigate how the strategy (ii) may lead to language change in the case of presupposition triggers.2 Hearers unable or unwilling to accommodate presuppositions assume a novel interpretation of the erstwhile presupposition-trigger and eventually pass this new interpretation on to other people, thereby changing the language. We choose to discuss one particular lexeme, namely the additive particle too and some of its counterparts in Spanish and German (and to a lesser extent in a range of other languages). We found that this particle proved particularly fertile and versatile, as it were, for what we consider hearer-initiated changes motivated by too-costly presupposition accommodation in the sense of “Avoid pragmatic overload”. We will use the upper-case word TOO as a shorthand for the English particle too and its congeners in Spanish (también), German (auch) and in other languages, as well as its respective negative polarity counterparts English either and Spanish tampoco. 1.2. The additive particle too: a presupposition trigger (usually) unable to be accommodated The additive particle too and its cross-linguistic congeners are oft-cited examples of a presupposition trigger that will not permit accommodation of 2. Our study may therefore be considered a contribution to Lambrecht’s (1994: 65–73) work on conventionalization of accommodation. Lambrecht looks at the use of English it-clefts without the clefted proposition being presupposed and of the emphatic do-construction (as in “I did pay the money back!”) without explicit activation of the proposition in question in discourse. Whereas Lambrecht focuses on cases where “the presuppositional structure of a frequently used construction is exploited so regularly that it loses some of its force, sometimes resulting in a new meaning for the construction” (1994: 70), we are studying strictly hearer-led changes with no implication regarding the frequency of the construction.
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the presupposed first conjunct, i.e. the corresponding “additive” proposition (Kripke 1990; Beaver and Zeevat 2004): (4)
(#)John had dinner in New York, too.
Simply adding to the Common Ground that someone else (e.g. some unspecified diner) has had dinner in New York does not make too felicitous in this example, even though it would seem to make sense to do so, given the trivial assumption that at least one person besides John had dinner in New York. An utterance like (4) is likely to provoke the question “Who else had dinner in New York?”, reflecting the improbability of the hearer simply assuming (and thereby adding to the Common Ground) that someone else had dinner in New York, without asking who that may be. However, additive too (or TOO) without a first conjunct does seem to be possible in certain contexts: (5) (6) (7)
You too can haiku [http://artsedge.kennedy-center.org/content/2246/] (title of an introduction to haiku poem writing) Prova anche te il nuovo gusto del cafè XXX [brand name] ‘Try you, too, the new flavor of XXX coffee’ (advertisement read in a bar in Loano, Italy) Hey, {men, fish, we} have feelings, too! (Beaver and Zeevat 2004: 32)
It seems that the TOOs in (5–7) appear in a type of context such that the hearer can readily construe a suitable parallelism between the first and the second conjunct, necessary for the felicitous use of TOO (cf. Schwenter and Zulaica-Hernández 2003), to which we will return in Section 3.1 below. In example (7), this parallelism is afforded by semantic contrast evoked by a salient set of entities: men – women, fish – other animals / humans, we – other people etc. (Beaver and Zeevat 2004: 32). The first conjunct that is required to be accommodated is simply the second conjunct’s contrasting complement, so that the hearer can easily assume what the first conjunct would be. Furthermore, the semantic inference from ‘men’ to ‘women’ or from ‘we’ to ‘the others [of a given set]’ or from ‘fish’ to ‘other animals’ provides information of the same degree of specificity about the two conjuncts.
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Examples (5) and (6) are not from conversation, but from written communication targeted at an anonymous readership. Anyone reading them is aware that many other people whom neither the current reader nor the author know personally will have read them as well, so the current reader cannot reasonably assume that any information about who else can write haiku poems or who else has tried or may try a particular coffee specialty is deliberately being withheld from them. The underspecified pragmatic parallelism proposed in Schwenter and Zulaica-Hernández (2003) as the principal meaning component of TOO sheds more light on the difficulty to accommodate the first conjunct in utterances such as (4). What is really disruptive in (4) is not the fact that the first conjunct has been omitted as such. The hearer can in fact easily accommodate that “someone else” besides John had dinner in New York. However the underspecified pragmatic parallelism of TOO implies that if the speaker gives a specific name in the second conjunct then s/he could do the same in the first conjunct, so that saying (4) means that the speaker is withholding the identity of the first diner. In other words, uses of TOO like in (4) are unacceptable not because the hearer is unable to accommodate that someone else has had dinner, but because the pragmatic parallelism of the two conjuncts suggests that the speaker is not giving information they could reasonably be expected to give, hence violating Grice’s Quantity maxim. 2. Non-presupposition-triggering TOO / EITHER Despite the generalization about TOO and accommodation just detailed, in many languages there exist non-presupposition-triggering uses of additive markers all of which, albeit in rather different fashion, have specific, highly constrained discourse-structure- and speech-act-related functions. It appears, in every case, that these uses appear diachronically later than the respective canonical additive use. Besides the very ancient additive meaning of English too, there is a more recent use especially common in American English, where too is not additive and does not imply the topical parallelism between propositions noted above. Rather, the function of too in this use is to deny the truth validity of the propositional content of a previous speaker’s utterance:
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A: You didn’t/won’t do your homework! B: I did/will too!
Spanish tampoco ‘either’ has a “canonical” additive reading, like in the following example: (9)
Pablo no vino a la fiesta, y Maria tampoco. ‘P. did not come to the party, and Maria [did not come] either.’
However, tampoco also has an independent reading (Schwenter 2003), wherein its main discourse function is to attenuate or “de-realize” (Ducrot 1995) an inference issuing from a previous speaker’s utterance. These independent uses appear to exist since the 17th century (we will return to the issue of dating the examples later): (10)
A: Pablo está borracho. ‘P. is drunk.’ (ĺ He cannot drive) B: Sí, pero tampoco ha bebido tanto. ‘Yes, but he hasn’t drunk that much’ (ĺ He’s OK to drive)
Similar non-additive uses of additive markers are found in other languages as well. The German particle auch ‘too’ also displays independent readings attested since the 15th century: (11)
A: Das IST auch ein Problem! ‘Hey, that’s a real problem!’
The French additive particle encore ‘more’ has a non-additive reading as in (12): (12)
Elle m’a engueulé – et devant mon copain encore! (Hansen 2002: 163) ‘She told me off – and in front of my friend, too!’
Likewise, in Danish, the additive particle også ‘too’ and its negative polarity counterpart heller ikke ‘either’ each have non-additive readings when in combination with the modal particle (MP) da (this observation and the following examples are from Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen, p.c.):
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a. b.
A: Du skulle ikke have skældt Jette ud. B: Det har jeg (da) [heller ikke] gjort. ‘A. You shouldn’t have told Jette off. B. I didn’t (MP), either.’ A: Hvorfor har du ikke ringet til Ole? B: Det har jeg (da) [også] gjort. ‘A. Why haven’t you called Ole? B. I have (MP), too.’
Similar non-additive uses of additive particles exist in European and Brazilian Portuguese (Patrícia Matos Amaral and Gláucia Silva, p.c.). Crucially, in all these examples the erstwhile presupposition trigger (TOO) does not force the hearer to accommodate an “additive” presupposition. Indeed, no such proposition is even potentially available to the hearer in the discourse record. Summarizing so far, the examples adduced up till now suggest that there is a cross-linguistic pathway recruiting additive particles to non-additive uses. This pathway seems to confirm Traugott’s subjectification hypothesis: the additive function is clearly an ideational one, as its most fundamental conventional element of meaning is the truth-functional conjunction of two propositions p and q. The requirement of shared topicality that we assumed constrains the conjunction of p and q belongs, again with respect to Traugott’s hypothesis, to the textual realm as it makes reference to textual organization and discourse structure. In other words, the additive particle already contains a non-ideational element of meaning as part of its conventional semantics. Finally, the non-additive uses of the particles, as the diachronic outcome of the process of change, may be characterized as interpersonal (intersubjective), again with respect to Traugott’s subjectification tendencies, to the extent that they imply a dialogual situation where a speaker directly refers to an addressee’s utterance (most typically one that is maximally salient in the ongoing discourse context). 3. Pathways from additive (ideational) to independent (interpersonal) uses Having mentioned a number of independent uses of TOO all of which arose later than the canonical additive meaning of TOO, we will now tackle the question as to how these independent uses may have arisen. First however we will have to provide a clear idea of the structure of additive TOO in
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order to be able hypothesize how the independent uses may have arisen from it. 3.1. The structure of additive TOO Additive TOO links two propositions p and q. Many researchers have struggled with the question as to what exactly the terminology “additive” means. Under what conditions can two sentences or utterances p and q be linked by TOO? The simplest instances of additive constructions seem to be those with q involving a syntactic ellipsis of p, such as (14): (14)
John had ice cream, and Mary had ice cream too.
Here there is an obvious syntactic parallelism between p and q. However, as (15) from Spanish shows, there need not be any syntactic or presuppositional parallelism between the two propositions: (15)
La biblioteca de OSU no tiene muchas computadoras y tampoco tiene buen ambiente para estudiar. ‘The OSU library doesn’t have many computers and it doesn’t have a good studying environment either.’
This suggests that constraints on TOO are pragmatic, rather than syntactic, in nature. Rejecting previous analyses that claim that q is either implicated or even entailed by p, Schwenter and Zulaica-Hernández (2003) suggest that “the relationship between the text sentences (marked by tampoco) and the context sentence is that they must display the property of shared topicality. ... we claim that the parallelism between the text and context sentences results from their shared status as parallel, but at the same time independent, answers to the same explicit or implicit question induced in the discourse.” In other words, the two propositions p and q contribute to the same point in discourse, and TOO is signalling precisely that. In (14), the two propositions jointly answer the question “who had ice cream?”, and in (15) they jointly answer the question “what is the OSU library like?” The condition of shared topicality is a conventional one. Only if the two propositions actually make the same point, i.e. if the hearer can construct the conjunction of two propositions as answering the same underlying ques-
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tion, is the use of TOO acceptable (cf. Schwenter and Zulaica-Hernández 2003). Now, shared topicality makes additive TOO suitable for argumentative contexts. Argumentation theory (cf. Anscombre and Ducrot 1980 for an overview) assumes that speakers provide arguments in conversation to support or reject (explicit or implicit) contextual conclusions. These arguments may be of varying strength. Arguments that support the identical conclusion are called co-oriented arguments. The fact that TOO marks shared topicality means that two propositions used as arguments p and q conjoined by TOO are typically co-oriented arguments. Furthermore, two co-oriented arguments p and q implicate greater argumentative strength for the speaker’s desired conclusion than p alone, or even than the simple conjunction of p^q, whose topical parallelism must be inferred. Consider the following utterances: (16)
a. That car is affordable. (ĺ that’s why I want to buy it) b. That car has a nice color. (ĺ that’s why I want to buy it) c. That car is affordable, and it’s a nice color. (ĺ that’s why I want to buy it) d. That car is affordable, and it’s a nice color too. (ĺ that’s why I want to buy it)
(16a) and (16b) present That car is affordable and That car has a nice color, respectively, as an argument for the conclusion I want to buy this car. The two conjoined arguments That car is affordable and it has a nice color in (16c) support the same conclusion. They are co-oriented arguments. However this is not explicitly marked, their co-orientation and their topical parallelism must be inferred. (16d) contains the same two conjoined arguments as (16c), and they are linked by TOO. Their topical parallelism is explicitly coded by the additive particle. While two co-oriented arguments do not necessarily provide greater argumentative strength for a given conclusion than any other single argument (one could perhaps imagine a single stronger argument for the purchase of the car than the two conjoined arguments in 16c), they do provide at least the same (and normally a greater) strength than any one of their two conjuncts alone. So, (16c) provides greater strength for the same conclusion than each of (16a) or (16b) alone would. Moreover, the very fact of two arguments being co-oriented implicates that the speaker requires addi-
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tonal argumentative strength for the conclusion than offered by one of the arguments alone. Still, the co-orientation of the two arguments in (16c) is not overtly marked. The hearer will have to infer that the two propositions share topicality, and that they are being used to make the same point. In (16d) however, shared topicality is overtly marked by TOO. The hearer/reader can easily infer that the two conjoined propositions p and q are being used to make the same point, and that they are co-oriented arguments, which together provide greater argumentative strength than one of the two arguments on its own. While argumentative co-orientation is a typical property of TOO, it is not a conventional one. In fact, additive TOO is compatible with counterargumentation conveyed by but: (17)
Our new job candidate knows a lot, but he’s pretty young, too.
The q proposition (he’s pretty young) is argumentatively countering the p proposition (our new job candidate knows a lot), with the argumentative force of q superseding that of p. The utterance (17) would be interpreted as an argument against hiring the candidate in question. It seems that even though TOO implicates ‘high argumentative strength’, it does not necessarily indicate high argumentative strength of the proposition q it is attached to. It may indeed very well be that q as the second argument in the pair of arguments is the weaker one. This in turn suggests that the use of TOO conversationally implicates “high argumentative strength”. The three languages we are considering make use of this particular structure in different ways, as we will show in the following sections. Note further that the two propositions p and q need not necessarily be adjacent. There may be material separating them, as in the following example: (18)
Admits Juliette Binoche, “I wanted the English bed badly – and I asked for it first. Ralph and I had a big chat about it, and he wanted it too.” [http://www.petey.com/kk/docs/binousa.txt]
Hence, TOO has an anaphoric structure – the particle, attached to q (he wanted it too), refers back to a previous proposition p (I wanted the English bed badly) which, in this case, does not immediately precede q. It is this
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structure that has led scholars working on presupposition to classify TOO as one of the most typical members of the class of “anaphoric presupposition triggers” (Roberts to appear). Summarizing so far, the pragmatic condition of shared topicality of propositions p and q makes TOO particularly suitable for argumentative contexts. In fact, if TOO is used in argumentative contexts, it typically indicates argumentative co-orientation and implicates high argumentative strength. However it seems that only shared topicality, not co-orientation or strength, is part of TOO’s conventional meaning. 3.2. English: refutational too While the English additive too is very ancient and, according to the OED, attested since the 9th century, the independent use mentioned in (8) above is a much more recent use especially in American English, where too is not additive and does not imply the topical parallelism discussed earlier. Rather, its function is to deny the veracity of the propositional content of a previous speaker’s utterance: (19)
(=8) A: You didn’t do your homework! B: I did too!
B denies the propositional content of A’s foregoing utterance (that the addressee, i.e. B, did not do their homework) and asserts, by implication, that B in fact did their homework. The earliest mention of this use of too in the OED is from 1914. Just like the additive too, this use makes reference in discourse to a contextually-salient proposition, most often one derivable from a previous utterance, namely the syntactically negative proposition it denies. However it is obvious that this way of referring back to a previous utterance is completely different from the way the additive too operates. In order to distinguish the two “foregoing utterances” implied by the additive and the refutational too, respectively, we will refer to them with the letters p (for the additive interpretation) and r (for the refutational interpretation). The refutational use of too is at first sight quite puzzling, as one struggles to see the semantic/pragmatic connection with the additive too. Now, in order to find out how the independent use may have arisen from the additive one, it is useful to look for bridging contexts (Heine 2002). Bridging
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contexts are contexts that, from today’s perspective, are compatible with both the old and the new meaning of the item or the construction in question. In other words, there is at least some ambiguity as to whether the speaker actually wanted to convey the old or the new interpretation. Such contexts are methodologically important in at least two respects. From a genuinely semantic point of view, they may enable us to see the connection between the old and the new – i.e. what led from the old to the new meaning. Secondly, in a diachronic corpus they may serve as a guidepost directing us to when in history the new meaning arose. The first potential bridging context we found where both the additive and refutational interpretations of too appear to be accessible comes from the novel The American Baron, by James de Mille (1871): (20)
“Oh yes; I did get acquainted with some in–in Canada.” “Oh; and is this man a Canadian?” “No, Dowdy darling; only an American.” “Well, if he’s a friend of yours, I suppose you know something about him. But how singular it is that you have so completely forgotten his name. Atramonte? Why, I’m sure it’s a very singular name for an American gentleman–at least it seems so to me–but I don’t know much about them, you know. Tell me, darling, who is he?” “He–he saved my life.” “What! saved your life? Why, my precious child, what are you talking about? It was the Italian that saved your life, you know, not this one.” “Oh, but he did too,” said Minnie, despairingly. “I couldn’t help it. He would do it. Papa was washed away. I wish they all wouldn’t be so horrid.” Lady Dalrymple looked in an equally despairing manner at Mrs. Willoughby. “What is it, Kitty dear? Is the child insane, or what does she mean? How could this person have saved her life?” “That’s just what distracts me,” said Minnie. “They all do it. Every single person comes and saves my life. And now I suppose I must go down and see this person.”
It seems possible to read the utterance q Oh but he did too with either the additive or the refutational use, although most of the English speakers
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we asked preferred the additive one. Under the additive interpretation, q is parallel to the utterance p The Italian saved your life, assuming that he in q is co-referential with the American: (21)
Additive interpretation: p: The Italiani saved your life. q: But hej [the American] did too. … Every single person comes and saves my life.
However it is also possible to read q as a denial of the foregoing It was the Italian that saved your life, not this one [the American.], more precisely of the Quantity-implicature ‘no one else other than the Italian’ arising from the it-cleft: (22)
Refutational interpretation: p: the Americanj saved my life. r: It was the Italiani that saved your life, you know, not this onej. q: But hej did too.
Note that the refutational interpretation is still additive as well, i.e. even under the refutational reading, the proposition q is topically parallel with the proposition p The Italian saved your life. This example makes it clear what the link between the additive and the refutational too may be. In particular, the particle too may be attached to an utterance q which is parallel with p (i.e. additive) but denies some third proposition r. Another quite nice example showing the same kind of ambiguity, though much later chronologically, can be found in the following extract from the novel Gone with the Wind: (23)
From Gone with the Wind, by Margaret Mitchell (1936) “Because your own dear mother is dead and Miss Pitty, not being a matron, is not qualified to–er, well, to talk to you upon such a subject, I feel that I must warn you, Scarlett, Captain Butler is not the kind of a man for any woman of good family to marry. He is a–” “He managed to save Grandpa Merriwether’s neck and your nephew’s, too.” Mrs. Merriwether swelled. Hardly an hour before she had had an irritating talk with Grandpa. The old man had remarked that she
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must not value his hide very much if she did not feel some gratitude to Rhett Butler, even if the man was a Scallawag and a scoundrel. “He only did that as a dirty trick on us all, Scarlett, to embarrass us in front of the Yankees,” Mrs. Merriwether continued. “You know as well as I do that the man is a rogue. He always has been and now he’s unspeakable. He is simply not the kind of man decent people receive.” “No? That’s strange, Mrs. Merriwether. He was in your parlor often enough during the war. And he gave Maybelle her white satin wedding dress, didn’t he? Or is my memory wrong?” “Things are so different during the war and nice people associated with many men who were not quite–It was all for the Cause and very proper, too. Surely you can’t be thinking of marrying a man who wasn’t in the army, who jeered at men who did enlist?” “He was, too, in the army. He was in the army eight months. He was in the last campaign and fought at Franklin and was with General Johnston when he surrendered.” The too in the last utterance He was, too, in the army is additive – it binds together a battery of arguments Scarlett O’Hara is offering for the conclusion ‘I want to marry Rhett Butler’, namely ‘He managed to save Grandpa Merriwether’s neck’, ‘He was in your parlor often enough during the war’ and finally ‘he was in the army’, each of which is countered by an argument brought forward by Mrs. Merriwether militating against that same conclusion. At the same time, that too in Scarlett’s utterance denies the presupposition of Mrs Merriwether’s immediately preceding turn ‘Rhett Butler was not in the Army’. The too in Scarlett’s last turn can be read as additive or as refutational. We have an interdigitating series of arguments for and against one conclusion, the last one being the direct denial of the second last one. Schematically, the relevant parts of the exchange can be distilled as in (24): (24)
r1: Captain Butleri is not the kind of a man for any woman of good family to marry. p1: Hei managed to save Grandpa Merriwether’s neck and your nephew’s, too. r2: Hei is simply not the kind of man decent people receive. p2: Hei was in your parlor often enough during the war.
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r3: Surely you can’t be thinking of marrying a man who wasn’t in the army? q: Hei was, too, in the army. In this and the preceding example, the presuppositional structure of additive TOO is still satisfied, but backgrounded by a series of other phenomena: for one, the proposition q, while still topically parallel with its conjuncts p1 – p3, is acting counter-argumentatively mainly upon the immediately preceding r. Furthermore, and in fact a direct consequence of the first observation, the proposition p is not immediately preceding q in discourse; rather, there is a certain textual distance between p and TOO q. Finally, the presupposition-triggering quality of TOO q is functionally subordinated to its counter-argumentative discourse function. In other words, the presupposition, while still present, becomes unimportant in the light of the more salient counter-argumentative function in dialogue. This may lead hearers to reanalyse the item with its new meaning, along the lines of the principle “Avoid pragmatic overload”, discussed in Section 1. Generalizing from these examples, the link between additive and refutational too becomes readily apparent – and even quite natural: it is not really surprising that constructions conveying high argumentative strength, like additive too, occur in dialogual contexts where speakers are arguing against an interlocutor’s opposing viewpoint. The very use of high argumentative strength requires a context of utterance where one speaker is arguing against the other. At the same time, those contexts are not unlikely to contain denials of the type associated with refutational too. Challenging the truthfulness of the interlocutor’s utterance in such a blunt way as that particle does might be more likely to occur in contexts where interlocutors are arguing anyway than in other ones, not only because of the relative rudeness of the situation but also because contradictory viewpoints often differ not only with respect to the conclusions they favour but also with respect to how they judge the truth of a given proposition. An unambiguous example which does not support an additive reading, providing evidence that the additive particle has been reanalysed as having a new polysemy involving refutational meaning/function, is (25):
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From Penrod and Sam, by Booth Tarkington (1916) “My uncle don’t PLAY on it!” Roddy shrieked. “It’s an ole wore– out horn nobody wants, and it’s mine, I tell you! I can blow on it, or bust it, or kick it out in the alley and leave it there, if I want to!” “No, you can’t!” “I can, too!” “No, you can’t. You can’t PROVE you can, and unless you prove it, I got a perf—” Roddy stamped his foot. “I can, too!” he shrieked. “You ole durn jackass, I can, too! I can, can, can, can—”
The two interlocutors are arguing about whether Roddy is able to play the horn, with Roddy finally denying his interlocutor’s claim to the contrary. Schematically: (26)
r: You can’t [play on the horn]! q: I can, too!
Summarizing so far, the early examples of English refutational too in bridging contexts suggest that the argumentative strength implicated by TOO q is taken advantage of in order to deny an interlocutor’s proposition r. TOO in these cases is a means for lending one’s utterance more rhetorical strength than it would have otherwise, which is an especially important discourse function in the face of a contradictory viewpoint. Note as well that too with refutational meaning receives the primary prosodic focus of the utterance in which it appears, thereby acoustically highlighting its role as a marker of greater rhetorical strength. The change just discussed illustrates the complex dialogue-related structure of TOO. Additive TOO links two propositions p and q that share topicality. This feature makes it likely for additive particles to be assigned to the same speaker in dialogue, as in the examples discussed, though it is of course possible for one speaker to complement another one’s argument by a “q TOO” utterance: (27)
A: Emma has a lot of teaching experience. B: And she has a good publication record, too. (ĺ so we should hire her)
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Contrariwise, the refutational too must refer dialogually to a different speaker. In fact, this constraint seems to be even stronger than the converse constraint on additive too being used by the same speaker. While it is possible to share an additive too-structure between two speakers (see 26), it would be the very idea of obvious and pragmatically unacceptable selfcontradiction to refute one’s own assertions within the same turn. Indeed, refutational too in a monologue would be tantamount to immediately denying one’s own prior assertion: (28)
A: ?Emma doesn’t have a lot of teaching experience. She has, too!
Interacting with these dialogual constraints, an additional feature is important for the rise of refutational too: there may be material intervening between the two conjuncts p and q of additive too. If an utterance r, said by the interlocutor, inserted between p and q is the negation of q, as in (20) and (23), then we have a configuration compatible both with the additive and the refutational reading – a bridging context. The argumentative properties of additive too in dialogue make such a configuration in fact quite natural. 3.3. Spanish: Independent tampoco We now turn to the Spanish additive particle tampoco. Just as with English too, the additive meaning of this particle is much older than the independent one. However it is much less clear when the independent reading arose, partly because of the lack of studies on the subject and the relative neglect of that latter variant by dictionaries and lexicographers. The additive meaning has been attested since the 14th century (Espinosa Elorza 1989), as in the following example found in the Corpus del espaĖol: (29)
Libro de las maravillas del mundo. AUTHOR: Juan de Mandevilla; Anónimo tr. DATE: [__] SOURCE: [ADMYTE] Valencia 1524– 10–13. ... mas no puede esser porque assi como nosotros no caemos agora contra el cielo. assi tampoco caen los que estan dela otra parte. ‘That is not possible because just as we do not fall against the sky those on the other side do not fall either.’
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In order to find out how the independent use may have arisen from the additive-presuppositional one, we proceed in the same way as with English too, namely by looking for suitable bridging contexts. Such examples seem to be offered by adversative contexts, where the additive interpretation of tampoco, often preceded by pero ‘but’, is employed in order to limit the inferential conclusions derivable from an immediately preceding proposition; similar to a concessive. One of the earliest examples we have found of this configuration is the following: (30)
From: Tablas poéticas, Francisco Cascales (Spain), 1603. También el poema brevíssimo no es agradable ni gallardo; porque en él la especulación se acaba en breve espacio. Y por ser las partes tan pequeñas, se confunde en ellas el entendimiento, y apenas puede distinguir unas de otras. Por tanto, es conveniente que el poema tenga un cuerpo grande, cuyas partes sean conocidas y distinctas; de manera que halle la vista dónde reparar y hazer su especulación. Pero tampoco a de ser sobre modo y excessivamente grande. ‘As well the very short poem is neither pleasant nor elegant; because in it the speculation ends in a short space. And because the parts are so small, understanding them becomes confusing, and one can barely distinguish the parts among themselves. Therefore, it is advisable that the poem have a large body, whose parts are known and distinct; so that [the reader’s] sight can find where to observe and make its speculation. But it should not (tampoco) be overblown or excessively long.’
In this context tampoco has a particular argumentative function. The author offers advice to poets regarding the suitable length of poems. He advises to avoid extremes in length – the poem should be neither too short nor too long. He does so in a particular way, namely not by saying “Avoid extremes” but by discussing disadvantages of the too short poem, praising the qualities of the longer poem, and then however arguing against the possible inference from that praise that the poem should be as long as possible. This is why tampoco has a three-way anaphoric structure in example (30) – it links three propositions p, r, and q: p: r:
the very short poem is neither pleasant nor elegant it is advisable that the poem have a large body, whose parts are known and distinct
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But it should not (tampoco) be overblown or excessively long.
On the one hand, the link between p and q is the traditional presuppositional connection between a TOO and its first conjunct. Tampoco takes up anaphorically the negative proposition no es agradable ni gallardo ‘[the very short poem] is neither pleasant nor elegant’, adding a third negative proposition. All three propositions share parallel topicality – they count as answers to the discourse-salient question under discussion ‘what is the appropriate size of a poem?’ On the other hand, the proposition tampoco q apparently argues against the inference ‘the bigger the poem is, the better’ arising from the proposition r: es conveniente que el poema tenga un cuerpo grande, cuyas partes sean conocidas y distinctas ‘it is advisable that the poem have a large body, whose parts are known and distinct’. This proposition is not part of the traditional presuppositional structure of tampoco as a TOO element. It could be left out without making the discourse deviant or unacceptable. However canceling the inference to the effect of ‘the bigger, the better’ seems to be the main point of that part of the utterance, to the point of the anaphoric link between p and q being barely recognizable in contemporary Spanish. In fact, the combination of tampoco with the connective pero ‘but’ makes it clear that the proposition is argumentatively related (anti-oriented) to the immediately preceding proposition (cf. Anscombre and Ducrot 1977). Again, the presupposition of an additive TOO (tampoco) requiring a first conjunct is present, but this constraint is backgrounded to the benefit of the argumentative effect of the second conjunct acting upon a third proposition r intervening between p and q. This is why context (30) is compatible with both the additive and the independent readings of tampoco. And just as with the English too, the argumentative strength associated with the second conjunct seems to have transferred, as it were, to a different proposition. A context like (30) may have led hearers to reanalyse additive tampoco as having a separate, non-additive polysemy, in line with the “Avoid pragmatic overload” principle cited earlier. The additive particle tampoco, requiring a first conjunct, is reanalysed as a concessive particle. The following example is even closer to the contemporary use of independent tampoco, since it lacks a first (additive) conjunct that can be interpreted as argumentatively co-oriented with the one signalled by tampoco:
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From: Viaje al reino del Perú, Antonio de Ulloa (Peru) (1748) Assimismo, se hacen allí algunas minas de esta piedra pero tampoco se labra nada con ella ni se aprecia… ‘Likewise, they do some mining there of this stone, but they do not carve anything out of it or hold it in esteem.’
Here tampoco has apparently already been reanalysed, in combination with the adversative sentence conjunction pero, as an inference-denying connective. From the assertion that the people in question do some mining of the stone in question the reader might infer that they also have the habit of doing some carving out of it. That anticipated inference (on the part of the reader) is canceled in the following proposition, in a similar way to how proposition q acts upon proposition r in example (30): r: q:
they do some mining there of this stone they do not carve anything out of it or hold it in esteem
A slightly different use of independent tampoco is the following one, where it does not cancel an inference but rather denies the entailed content of a proposition directly derivable from the prior speaker’s utterance: (32)
From http://www.el-mundo.es/encuentros/invitados/2003/11/883/ (Interview with José Apezarena, expert on the Spanish Royal Family, about the royal wedding in 2003.) – No entiendo las tremendas críticas realizadas contra Letizia Ortiz por su agitada vida sentimental e íntima ¿No cree usted que está a la altura de la vida sentimental e íntima de la familia Borbón? ‘I don’t understand the strong criticism leveled against Letizia Ortiz because of her rocky private and lovelife. Don’t you think that it’s on a par with the private and lovelife of the Borbón family?’ – Tampoco he escuchado críticas tan tremendas, la verdad. ‘I haven’t heard such strong criticisms, truthfully.’
Summarizing, the pathway yielding independent tampoco appears to be as follows: the argumentative strength implicated by ~TOO q is reinterpreted so as to de-realize an inference arising from an immediately preceding proposition r. Continued evolution via understatement produces a marker of attenuated denials, as in (32).
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3.4. German: Independent auch As our last example, we would like to sketch a discussion of the German modal particle auch, which emerged from the additive auch ‘too’. Again, we see how the rich anaphoric and argumentative structure of TOO is used to create a new kind of interpersonal use. The additive auch is attested from very early on, since the 800s. We may assume that in German as well, the anaphoric and thematic structure of TOO confers higher argumentative strength to the second conjunct: (33)
Ich mag dieses Haus, und Erna gefällt es auch. ‘I like this house, and Erna likes it as well.’ (ĺ that’s why I want to live in it)
Independent auch is attested since much later, namely since the late 1400s according to the DWN. Independent auch is a modal particle, i.e. a particle that has a particular function within a speech act. Specifically, it appears in rhetorical questions with the function of implicating a rejection of the propositional content: (34)
Warum auch hatte sie mein wichtigstes Wort nicht akzeptiert? (DWN) ‘Why only didn’t she accept my most important word?’
Another function of the modal particle auch is its independent use in exclamations since the late 1800s (still according to DWN): (35)
Was der Kerl auch für Einfälle hat! (DWN) ‘Hell, what sort of ideas does this guy have!’
Now, both independent uses in (34) and (35) convey that the state of affairs in question is an “extreme” one. In (34), the superlative ‘my most important word’ implies an extreme position on a pragmatic scale. The exclamative in (35) implies that the ideas in question are either very brilliant or very far-fetched or aberrant, at any rate uncommon. This can be linked to the higher argumentative strength associated with the second conjunct of the additive use in (33). In the appropriate context of utterance, an uncommon state of affairs may be associated with higher argumentative strength. For example, a particularly low price of a certain good provides
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higher argumentative strength for the conclusion of buying it than a higher price does. Ducrot and his associates have highlighted in their work (e.g. Anscombre and Ducrot 1980; Carel and Ducrot 1999) how argumentative force may be linked to the coded content of lexical expressions. One can therefore gather the way the high argumentative strength conversationally implicated by additive auch may have been reinterpreted as being conventionally associated with pragmatically extreme states of affairs. 4. Conclusion The data presented in this paper illustrate how rather similar counterargumentative uses of cross-linguistic additive particles with the meaning TOO, when used in novel discourse contexts, can override the old presuppositional constraint associated with such particles. This novel meaning/function of TOO liberates it of the requirement of a parallel first conjunct that is (typically, but not always) argumentatively co-oriented with the conjunct containing TOO. As we have noted above, TOO (and especially English too) is without a doubt the most famous example of a presupposition-triggering expression that typically does not permit accommodation of the presupposed proposition. Both speakers and hearers presumably have recognized this fact, thereby leading to innovative uses in non-presuppositional contexts—or at least, not in the same kind of presuppositional contexts as before, as we have illustrated above. Accommodating the additive presupposition associated with TOO becomes too costly and leads to reanalysing the TOO element as a new form–function pairing. This particular case of semantic change, then, provides clear evidence for hearer-based change. The initial diachronic examples in bridging contexts are plausibly interpretable as conveying the additive meaning of TOO, but the adversative properties of the dialogual discourse context— prototypically in the form of an argument between two interlocutors— appear to have led hearers to reanalyse TOO as expressing a new, rhetorically-strategic meaning with strong counter-argumentative force. The trajectory of change thereby produces a clear path from the ideational/textual meaning of additive TOO to the more clearly interactionally-bound interpersonal meanings associated with non-additive TOO.
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References Anscombre, Jean-Claude and Oswald Ducrot 1977 Deux mais en français? Lingua 43: 23–40. Anscombre, Jean-Claude and Oswald Ducrot 1980 L’Argumentation dans la langue. Brussels: Mardaga. Atlas, Jay and Stephen C. Levinson 1981 It-clefts, informativeness, and logical form: radical pragmatics (revised standard version). In Radical Pragmatics, Peter Cole (ed.), 1– 6. New York: Academic Press. Beaver, David and Henk Zeevat 2004 Accommodation. In Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Interfaces, Gillian Ramchand and Charles Reiss (eds.), 503–539. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carel, Marion and Oswald Ducrot 1999 Le Problème du paradoxe dans une sémantique argumentative. Langue française: 6–26. Croft, William 2000 Explaining Language Change: An Evolutionary Approch. London: Longman. Detges, Ulrich and Richard Waltereit 2002 Grammaticalization vs. Reanalysis: A semantic-pragmatic account of functional change in grammar. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft 21: 151–195. Ducrot, Oswald 1995 Les modificateurs déréalisants. Journal of Pragmatics 24: 145–165. DWN = Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm 1983 Deutsches Wörterbuch. Neubearbeitung. Leipzig: Hirzel. Eckardt, Regine to appear Grammaticalization and semantic reanalysis. In Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner (eds.). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Espinosa Elorza, Rosa María 1989 También y tampoco: origen y evolución. Anuario de estudios filológicos 12: 67–79. Givón, Talmy 1995 Functionalism and Grammar. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Grice, Paul 1981 Presupposition and conversational implicature. In Radical Pragmatics, Peter Cole (ed.), 183–198. New York: Academic Press.
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Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard 2002 La polysémie de l’adverbe ‘encore’. Travaux de linguistique 44: 143–166. Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard 2008 Particles at the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface: Synchronic and Diachronic Issues. A Study with Special Reference to the French Phasal Adverbs. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Haspelmath, Martin 1999 Why is grammaticalization irreversible? Linguistics 37: 1043–68. Heim, Irene 1992 Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs. Journal of Semantics 9: 183–221. Heine, Bernd 2002 On the role of context in grammaticalization. In New Reflections on Grammaticalization, Ilse Wischer and Gabriele Diewald (eds.), 83– 101. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Keller, Rudi 1994 On Language Change. The Invisible Hand in Language. Trans. by Brigitte Nerlich. London: Routledge. Kripke, Saul 1990 Presupposition and Anaphora: Remarks on the Formulation of the Projection Problem. Ms., Princeton University. Lambrecht, Knud 1994 Information Structure and Sentence Form: Topic, Focus, and the Mental Representation of Discourse Referents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, David 1979 Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 339–359. Morgan, Jerry L. 1978 Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In Syntax and Semantics (vol. 9), Peter Cole (ed.), 261–280. New York: Academic Press. Roberts, Craige to appear Only, presupposition and implicature. Journal of Semantics. Schwenter, Scott A. 2003 No and tampoco: a pragmatic distinction in Spanish negation. Journal of Pragmatics 35: 999–1030. Schwenter, Scott A. 2005 The pragmatics of negation in Brazilian Portuguese. Lingua 115: 1427–1456.
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Schwenter, Scott A. 2006 Fine-tuning Jespersen’s Cycle. In Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Semantics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn, Betty J. Birner and Gregory Ward (eds.), 327– 344. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Schwenter, Scott and Iker Zulaica-Hernández 2003 On the contextual licensing of tampoco. In Linguistic Theory and Language Development in Hispanic Languages: Papers from the 5th Hispanic Linguistics Symposium and the 4th Conference on the Acquisition of Spanish and Portuguese, Silvina Montrul and Francisco Ordóñez (eds.), 62–80. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Richard B. Dasher 2002 Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. von Fintel, Kai 2000 What is presupposition accommodation? Ms. MIT. Waltereit, Richard 2001 Modal particles and their functional equivalents: A speech-act theoretic approach. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 1391–1417. Zeevat, Henk 2004 Particles: Presupposition triggers, context markers or speech act markers. In Optimality theory and pragmatics, R. Blutner and H. Zeevat (eds), 163–199. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
How prosody reflects semantic change: A synchronic case study of of course Anne Wichmann, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Karin Aijmer Abstract Although discourse markers have recently received a fair amount of linguistic attention their prosodic realization has been relatively neglected. Since discourse markers have been found to be more typical of spoken than of written language, the scarcity of prosodic studies is regrettable. This article has two aims: firstly, to provide a detailed description of the functions and prosodic realizations of of course in present-day spoken British English, on the basis of corpus data. The study seeks to answer the question to what extent of course fulfils the criteria for discourse marker status. Secondly, on a more general level, the article contributes to the discussion on the relation between grammaticalization and prosody. The findings relate to three main areas of inquiry: structure, meaning and use, and prosody. In structural terms the data showed a clear preference for of course to occur in initial position as part of the thematic material. In terms of meaning, strong evidence was found of grammaticalization, with more literal meanings occurring alongside subjective and intersubjective developments. In a number of cases, the tokens have acquired a routinized pragmatic function. From a rhetorical perspective, the subjective and intersubjective meanings of of course are exploited dialogically. Finally, on the basis of theories of intonational meaning, it was predicted that semantic change involving a loss of semantic weight in favour of pragmatic meaning will also involve a loss of prosodic prominence. This is borne out by the data, which shows a statistically significant association between prosodic prominence and meaning. This study also has broader implications for the study of grammaticalization. These implications are discussed in the article.
1. Introduction Discourse markers (DMs) have recently received a fair amount of linguistic attention, both from synchronic and diachronic perspectives, in a range of
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languages as well as across languages in contrastive studies (see e.g. two recently published edited volumes, Fischer 2006 and Aijmer and SimonVandenbergen 2006). However, one aspect which has received little attention in this area is the prosodic realization of discourse markers. Since they are generally accepted to be more typical of spoken than of written language (Brinton 1996), the neglect of this aspect is regrettable. In this article we have two aims. One is to provide a detailed description of the functions and prosodic realizations of of course in present-day spoken British English (PDE), on the basis of corpus data. How of course functions in spoken language is an interesting question in itself, since it appears to be an extremely frequent phrase (see Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2002/2003, Note 1). With the analysis we want to answer the question to what extent of course fulfils the criteria for discourse marker status. On a more general level, however, we aim to contribute to the discussion on the relation between grammaticalization and prosody. 2. Discourse markers 2.1. Discourse markers and grammaticalization Before we can begin to examine the question of the status of of course in PDE it is necessary to take a position with regard to the status of the historical changes which generally lead to the emergence of the class of discourse markers. Even though we do not engage in a diachronic study, we will show that the various uses of of course in PDE reflect varying degrees of closeness to and distance from its earlier meaning as a fully lexical item and that these degrees can be related to a decrease of semantic weight and a correlated increase of pragmatic functions. This means that the variation we find in PDE partly reflects past and perhaps ongoing change which must be accounted for by reference to what we know about similar changes in other adverbs. The question of the status of the development into DMs has been answered in four different ways. The four ways are extensively discussed by Traugott ([1995] 1997) and we shall not repeat the arguments for and against the positions here. Suffice it to say that the positions are lexicalization, pragmaticalization, grammaticalization and post-grammaticalization. The reason why there is disagreement over how to label these developments is that there is disagreement over the necessary conditions for talking about grammaticalization. As Traugott explains, those who want to exclude
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DMs from grammaticalization argue that they are not grammatical items, and that they do not fulfil what are seen as certain essential criteria such as reduction in scope and fixation, criteria given by Lehmann (1995: 164). In fact, DMs show the opposite tendency, namely an increase in scope and a looser syntactic connection to the rest of the sentence. So, as Traugott points out, if we want to claim that DMs are the result of processes of grammaticalization we have to rethink the criteria of grammaticalization as well as the nature of the grammar (Traugott 1997: 5). Traugott argues that of the four solutions proposed in the literature, grammaticalization is the most appealing one. Pragmaticalization, which has been proposed by Erman and Kotsinas (1993) for cases such as you know, captures the increase in pragmatic functions which such items have gained in the course of their development but the concept does not satisfactorily account for formal and structural changes. ‘Pragmatic strengthening’ (Traugott 1989) is a concomitant feature of grammaticalization but it does not explain the whole process. We follow Traugott in opting for the term ‘grammaticalization’ in spite of the need to relax some of the criteria. The reasons are briefly summed up below (for a more extensive account, see Traugott 1997). DMs typically develop from lexical material into items which serve grammatical functions and which occur in well-defined syntactic slots. The development entails desemanticization and increasing pragmaticalization. Typically DMs move to the left periphery of the sentence and acquire new meanings, new syntactic constraints and new prosodic characteristics. The typical diachronic path is described by Traugott (1997: 13) as follows: verbal adverb > sentential adverb > discourse marker
The development into a DM is, as pointed out by Traugott, accompanied by a number of shifts “normally associated with grammaticalisation” (1997: 13–14). Traugott mentions six shifts and shows how these have taken place in the instances under consideration, indeed, in fact and besides. These shifts are (i) decategorialization (the lexical nouns deed, fact, side become fixed in prepositional phrases), (ii) bonding within the phrase (bonding with the prepositions in and by), (iii) phonological reduction (which is possible though not always realized), (iv) generalization of meaning (increase of polysemies), (v) increase in pragmatic function (concrete > epistemic > metatextual elaborator), (vi) subjectification (increasing association with speaker attitude). The problem areas for the grammaticalization stance are scope and disjunction. In contrast with ‘typical’ cases of grammaticalization (e.g. Lehmann 1995: 143), DMs do not have a reduced but an in-
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creased scope, and they do not come to occupy fixed syntactic slots in the sense that, say, clitics do. Traugott’s arguments are that “syntactic scope increases must be allowed for in a theory of grammaticalisation” and that the disjunct slot occupied by DMs can be considered as “the typical syntactic site” to which items move in the process in languages such as English. Other languages such as German reserve the middle field for discourse particles with similar functions to DMs (Traugott 1997: 14; see also Diewald 2006, discussed below). If we accept – as we do – that from a formal and structural point of view DMs are instances of grammaticalization, this still leaves us with the question of whether they indeed fulfil ‘grammatical’ functions. Traugott’s position is the following: The view of grammar adopted here is that it structures cognitive and communicative aspects of language. It encompasses not only phonology, morphosyntax and semantics but also inferences that arise out of linguistic form, in other words, linguistic pragmatics such as topicalisation, deixis. (Traugott 1997: 5)
In the same vein, Diewald (2006: 405) writes that the pragmatic functions that DMs1 have are “genuine grammatical functions which are indispensable for the organisation and structuring of spoken dialogic discourse.” She, too, rejects the distinction ‘pragmaticalization vs. grammaticalization’ in favour of a view of grammar which includes discourse structuring elements. Diewald refers to various arguments given in the literature to support the ‘DMs as grammaticalization view’, including Günthner (1999), Barth and Couper-Kuhlen (2002), Lima (2002). Diewald (2006: 408) also sees DMs as syntactically non-integrated. This syntactic non-integration, in the sense that DMs have no syntactically fixed position, distinguishes them from modal particles, which appear in the middle field. In Diewald’s view, the functional criteria are primary and are valid cross-linguistically, while the formal and structural ones may well be language specific (2006: 408). With regard to the question whether DMs have an inherent semantic meaning which plays a role in the pragmatics, Diewald’s answer is ‘yes’. She postulates a ‘core meaning’ which is present in all the uses of the DM and the “synchronic polyfunctionality of the particle [including DM] lexemes is 1. Diewald (2006) actually uses the term discourse particles instead of discourse markers and distinguishes them from modal particles. In the discussion of Diewald’s position we shall, however, keep using the term discourse marker for the sake of consistency.
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due to the reinterpretation of the basic semantic template” (Diewald 2006: 405). We share this view, as shown in Section 6 (see 6.1 and 6.2). The semantic development traceable for DMs follows the tendencies generally attested as typical of grammaticalization. These tendencies have been described as metaphorization from concrete to more abstract (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991), for example typically along the following path: local > temporal > abstract (e.g. causal; adversative; copulative) (Diewald 2006: 410)
In addition, Traugott distinguishes three recurrent diachronic stages (1989: 34–35) typical of the development of DMs, which are well-known and need not be further discussed: the functional development from meanings based in the external situation to meanings based in the textual situation to meanings increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief. This scheme was later refined (e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002) to include the further step from subjectification to intersubjectification, to account for social deixis (e.g. for such functions as the expression of politeness or solidarity). DMs have by definition a discourse function, which entails indexing the utterances to the surrounding discourse, both in terms of structuring the ongoing discourse and in terms of signalling to the addressee how he/she should interpret the speaker’s stance. Aijmer, Foolen and SimonVandenbergen (2006) mention three functions as important in this respect: reflexivity (metacommunicative function), indexicality (pointing to the speaker’s position with regard to persons and situations) and heteroglossia (positioning the speaker’s voice within a context of other voices, see e.g. White 2003 for an account). These functions are all non-propositional and abstract. Summing up, there are cogent reasons for considering the development of DMs as one of grammaticalization, and it is the purpose of this article to examine the extent to which of course in PDE is a DM according to the generally accepted criteria prosody, discourse function and semantic change.
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2.2. The prosody of discourse markers 2.2.1. Previous studies: inconclusive results Despite numerous claims in the literature that prosodic features contribute to the identity of discourse markers, there is to date no comprehensive overview of what these features are and how they operate. Early quantitative studies based on corpus data (Meyer 1986; Altenberg, 1987, 1990; Stenström 1990) are inconclusive. They are in fact studies of the prosodic behaviour of the broad class of ‘adverbials’, but the definition of adverbials follows the categories of Quirk et al. (1985), which include ‘disjuncts’, and ‘conjuncts’, both of which categories contain items that we would now refer to as discourse markers. Stenström points out, rightly, that adverbials are distinguished prosodically not only by segmentation (presence or absence of a boundary) but also by tonicity (presence or absence of nuclear tone) and by tonality (choice of tone). Nonetheless, the generalizations offered are more a matter of expedience for text-to-speech systems than linguistically revealing. Altenberg concludes that prediction rules (i.e. for text-to-speech synthesis) for adverbials are complicated by “their formal and functional diversity” (1990: 283). The reason for variable prosodic patterning may in part be morphological. There seems to be some agreement, for example, that the longer and more complex the adverbial, the more likely it is to be punctuated (and prosodically separate). According to Altenberg, “initial adverbials, which generally have a grounding, connective or attitudinal function (as adjuncts, conjuncts or disjuncts), are normally set off in a separate tone unit if they are polysyllabic” (1990: 283–284). Speed of delivery also plays a part – the slower the delivery, the more likely a tone unit boundary. This of course is in part determined by the context of situation, which constrains speech style (e.g. formal–informal, dialogue–monologue, prepared–spontaneous), and in turn constrains aspects of articulation, e.g. tempo, degrees of reduction and other connected speech processes. More recently there have been studies of the prosody of individual discourse markers, e.g. in English you know (Holmes 1986), well (Bolinger 1989), now (Hirschberg and Litman 1993), anyway (Ferrara 1997, see also Wennerstrom 2001); in Swedish men (Horne et al. 2001). The results have identified more nuances than in earlier studies, but there is still no clearer view of the extent to which discourse markers exhibit unique sets of prosodic patterns. We are left with an incomplete picture of what to expect
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prosodically of discourse markers, making it difficult in turn to use prosodic features to identify function in cases of ambiguity. We believe nonetheless that it is possible to identify a number of patterns that systematically co-occur with discourse markers, and we will argue that these are underpinned by the processes of lexical change. This argument is based firstly on the fact that discourse markers share functions with other grammatical classes, and secondly on a theory of intonational meaning that relates propositional content to prosodic prominence. 2.2.2. Prosody and discourse function The extreme variability reported by e.g. Stenström is the result of generalization on the basis of lexical items (which a speech synthesizer can identify) rather than on the basis of discourse functions (which it cannot). If we re-analyse Stenström’s findings according to individual subcategories of adverb in the London–Lund Corpus (1990: 261), we find greater systematicity. All ‘disjuncts’ (they include epistemic stance adverbs, e.g. apparently, of course, clearly, fortunately) are prosodically separate in her data, with either a falling tone or a fall–rise. The distribution of these tones is not given, but may be consistent with Cruttenden’s observation that “adverbials which limit the main clause take a rise, while those that reinforce take a fall” (1997: 95). ‘Conjuncts’ (adverbials with a connective function2), on the other hand, are either separate with a falling tone, or unstressed and integrated. The distribution is not given. Thus we would predict (invented examples): Disjuncts / stance adverbials (1) A\/pparently | he’s not coming after \all ||3
2. It is therefore not surprising that the same prosodic patterns can be found on ‘normal’ conjunctions (co-ordinating, subordinating). The idea that discourse particles can have uses in common with other grammatical categories has been noted by Aijmer (2002: 27). 3. The prosodic symbols throughout are based on those used in the British system of intonation. The \ indicates a falling pitch contour, associated with an accented syllable and any unstressed material up to the next accent or a boundary. The / indicates a rising contour, and the \/ indicates a falling–rising contour. This is marked before the accented syllable on which the contour begins, but the rising part of the contour may occur on subsequent unstressed ma-
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Or \Certainly| we’re going to have to \deal with this || Conjuncts/ discourse markers (2) Now `let’s give a round of a/pplause | to …. Or \Now | `let’s give a round of a/pplause | to … ‘fact is he’s not \coming The fact \is | I’ve been having some \trouble recently | and .. Well we \/might go | but we’re `not \sure || Or \Well || it’s a `long \story || In their unstressed form, these conjuncts behave just like other grammatical conjunctions (because, and, etc.). In their stressed form, however, they behave as other grammatical elements do, whether NP, adverbial or main clause, when a new topic or title is being announced – namely by treating the item as a complete utterance (cf. Wichmann 1998). The effect is to widen the scope of the conjunct to relate to larger domains. This increased scope of conjuncts is a possibility that has already been noted by Quirk et al.: …conjuncts can relate units much larger than sentences: nonetheless at the beginning of a paragraph or section of a text will indicate a conjoining contrast with the whole preceding paragraph or section. (Quirk et al. 1985: 632n)
In speech, this phenomenon of linking across larger or smaller domains is signalled by prosody. By assigning stress to a conjunctive DM, the size of the shift is exaggerated. The same effect is created by stressing a conjunction.
terial. The symbols | and || represent minor and major tone group boundaries. The symbol ` indicates the first accent in a tone group (normally the ‘onset’).
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2.2.3. How does this relate to semantic change and intonation theory? Because it is non-propositional, intonational meaning is elusive. Most accounts suggest very broad abstract meanings associated with pitch movements, such as ‘finality’ or ‘non-finality’, ‘closed’ or ‘open’ (Cruttenden 1997; Wichmann 2000). Because the meanings are so abstract, there is no one-to-one relationship between prosody and lexical item, or between prosody and word class. If a discourse marker is realized in a way typical of major shifts in the discourse, this is not the prosody of the discourse marker, it is the prosody of a major structural shift. If there is a tendency for certain co-occurrences, this is because there is a tendency for certain words to be used for a particular discourse function, not because the prosody is the property of the word itself. The theory of intonational meaning in English proposed by Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) tries to account not only for pitch movement (tone choice) but also for the effect of intonational prominence (presence or absence of an accented syllable). They claim that the degree of prosodic prominence is directly related to the informativeness or propositionality of the associated word or phrase. This accounts for the fact that in speech, lexical words have much greater potential for prominence (stress) than grammatical or function words. The theory of semantic change (see Section 2.1 above) proposes that, over time, certain high frequency items are subject to a gradual loss of semantic weight, a process of ‘bleaching’ through habituation, and acquire a grammatical or pragmatic role. Discourse markers often derive, via this process, from verbal adverbs (see Section 3.2). In line with the theory of intonational meaning, we can predict that this process of semantic change will go hand in hand with a loss of potential for prosodic prominence. Those items that have a purely interpersonal function, highly routinized and with very little residual core meaning, we would expect to be least prominent, while those that still express some propositional meaning, e.g. epistemic or evidential stance towards a proposition, might have greater prominence. If it is possible to consider the distinction made by some grammarians between disjunct and conjunct (see also Section 3.1.1 below) to be a distinction between (subjectified) propositional meaning and discourse meaning, then we can predict that elements used as expressions of stance towards the proposition are more likely to be stressed than those used in a routinized way for cohesive or interpersonal purposes. This would account for the variability reported in earlier studies, given that they tried to gener-
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alize over a much broader category of adverbials. It would also account for the systematic realization of subcategories of adverbials: Stenstrom’s disjuncts are typical examples of elements which express stance towards the proposition and have obvious residual propositional meaning themselves. The conjuncts, however, behave frequently like other grammatical conjunctions – unstressed and integrated into a larger tone group. Confusion arises only when one of these conjuncts is stressed. While we do not confuse a stressed conjunction (\And |, \But |) with any other word class, but simply understand it as a ‘bigger’ and or but, a stressed conjunct (actually just a ‘bigger’ well, now or anyway, indicating a greater scope) is prosodically identical to a stressed stance adverbial, and if the same word functions as both, the prosody may introduce ambiguity. For this reason, it is not possible to use prominence alone to disambiguate the time adverb now from the conjunct now. The unstressed version – behaving normally as a grammatical word – is indeed more common, but an emphatic \Now || is not a time adverb but a conjunct with wider scope. 3. Of course: previous work 3.1. Of course in present-day English 3.1.1. The grammatical status of of course Of course is classified as an adverb in Quirk et al. (1985: § 9.5), where it is to be found in the sections on subjuncts, disjuncts and conjuncts. As a subjunct, it is relatively integrated into the clause, occurring next to the clausal element it emphasizes. Quirk et al. also make a comment on the prosodic features of subjuncts, saying that they are not separated intonationally (1985: 584). However, the group of so-called ‘emphasizers’ to which of course as a subjunct belongs, “mainly consists of items that can also function as disjuncts expressing the comment that what is being said is true” (1985: § 8.100). As a disjunct, of course occurs in the periphery of the clause, usually initially. Thirdly, Quirk et al. recognize a conjunct use of of course. Conjuncts, like disjuncts, have a “superordinate” role in the clause (i.e. they have wider scope), and are syntactically peripheral. In contrast with disjuncts, they have a linking function. Quirk et al. distinguish two conjunctive uses, or semantic subtypes, viz. as a ‘resultative’ and ‘concessive’ conjunct. These are illustrated by examples (3) and (4) respectively:
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She arrived late, gave answers in an offhand manner and of course displeased the interviewing panel. (Quirk et al. 1985: § 8.140) Of course he’s a bit lazy; all the same I’d like to give him the job. (Quirk et al. 1985: § 8.141)
Summing up, Quirk et al. correlate different functions of of course with the different syntactic options (degrees of clausal integration), as well as with contextual factors which distinguish between disjunctive and conjunctive uses. Prosody is mentioned in passing, where it is claimed that subjuncts are not separated by intonation or punctuation. The fact that disjuncts are often followed by commas would seem to suggest that they are separated intonationally as well, though in the conjunctive uses illustrated by examples (3) and (4) above there is no comma and no comment on the prosody is made. In other words, prosodic realization is not linked explicitly to syntactic status or semantic type. Quirk et al.’s classification is primarily based on position in the clause, disjuncts and conjuncts being mostly initial. Holmes (1988) uses the term pragmatic particle to characterize all uses of of course, regardless of the syntactic slot it occupies and in all contextual functions. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2002/2003) take the same position and refer to of course as a pragmatic marker “in all its occurrences, regardless of its position, syntactic integration, prosody and realisation as a full or reduced form” (2002/2003: 20). Holmes does not mention the concept of grammaticalization but states that “of course is a discourse particle or verbal filler like you know and I think” (1988: 49). She also mentions the phonologically reduced form of of course “in rapid or casual speech”. Phonological reduction is, as pointed out (Section 3 above), a feature associated with grammaticalization. In sum, the grammatical status of of course has been given little attention in the literature. While Quirk et al. (1985) distinguish three grammatical types, the assignment of of course to one of these types is based on a mixture of positional and contextual criteria. Holmes (1988) and SimonVandenbergen and Aijmer (2002/2003) classify of course as a pragmatic particle/marker but base this classification purely on functional criteria. What is lacking at the moment is an account which brings together formal, structural and functional features. In Section 3.1.2 we give a brief survey of the functions as discussed in the literature, in Section 3.1.3 the scanty information on prosodic forms of of course is summarized.
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3.1.2. The meaning, functions and prosody of of course Both Holmes (1988) and Simon-Vandenbergen (1992) recognize a core meaning of of course which remains invariant in the different contextual functions. In her assessment of the core meaning of of course, Holmes proposes that it “acts as an overt signal that the speaker is assuming that the hearer accepts or is already familiar with the propositional content of her or his utterance, and functions to emphasise the validity of that content” (1988: 53). The definition in Simon-Vandenbergen (1992: 215) is very similar: “…of course combines the meanings of certainly (‘there is no doubt that…’), which expresses a probability judgement, and naturally (‘it was to be expected that’), which conveys a judgement on the extent to which something was expected”. In other words, both studies see the meanings of certainty and expectation as part of the core. In addition to that core meaning, of course has various contextually determined pragmatic functions. Holmes (1988) distinguishes two main functions which she labels “impersonal” and “confidential”. These tend to occur in different registers, the former in formal and public discourse, the latter in casual and intimate discourse. The difference has to do with the nature of the content which is presented as shared and the reasons for presenting it as such. In the impersonal use, of course marks generally shared knowledge, while in the confidential use it marks knowledge shared by intimates. Both types of of course can also have politeness functions and can be used manipulatively. Basically, the impersonal type is authoritative and potentially patronising, while the confidential type signals solidarity and can act as a positive politeness device. Simon-Vandenbergen (1992) also links types of functions with types of contexts. The study compares uses of of course in casual conversation and in political interviews, and the conclusions are comparable to Holmes’s. While in both registers speakers use of course to mark shared knowledge, the interactional aims differ. The meanings may be ‘everybody knows that…’, ‘we both know that…’, ‘I know what you are telling me’, ‘you know what I’m telling you’, ‘you should know what I’m telling you’ (Simon-Vandenbergen 1992: 215). Politeness is also said to operate differently in different genres. The manipulative uses of of course in political colloquy are the focus of attention in Simon-Vandenbergen, White and Aijmer (2007). From a heteroglossic perspective, of course is seen as a strategy which is dialogic but
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at the same time restricts the possibility for disagreement by expressing consensus or “concurrence” (White 2003: 269). In political discourse it is further frequently used as a rhetorical ‘put-down’, signalling that the opponents’ arguments are not impressive. The distinctive pragmatic functions as discussed in the literature provide a basis for the functional classification of the data in this study. There is little specific reference in the literature to the prosody of of course. We are aware of only two main sources of comments, the first a passing mention by Halliday and Hasan (1976) in relation to cohesion, and the second in a detailed analysis of the meanings and uses of of course in New Zealand speech (Holmes 1988). In their very brief account of of course, Halliday and Hasan identify two prosodic realizations, stressed (in their terms ‘tonic’) or unstressed (in their terms ‘reduced’). In each case, the meaning ascribed is related to shared knowledge (‘you should have known that already’), rather than any epistemic meaning such as ‘naturally’, ‘predictably’. We may therefore infer that Halliday and Hasan classify of course as a grammatical item (discourse marker), and not as a stance adverbial. In her detailed corpus-based analysis, Holmes takes more parameters into account than stress alone, describing the prosody of of course in terms of position in tone group, stress, and choice of pitch contours. She envisages both integrated and prosodically separate versions – a separate tone-unit containing a stressed syllable (rising or falling), or, in initial position, as an unstressed pre-head. Despite the claims made above, our own data suggests that, just as the degree of syntactic integration is probably a matter of degree, there are also degrees of prosodic integration that make such categorical observations problematic: It is uncertain whether we should regard discourse markers as part of the clause or as extra-clausal units (as applies also to parentheticals in writing). It is probably correct to say that there are degrees of integration, as expressed by prosody and the type of orthographic marker. When there is clear prosodic or orthographic separation, they are best treated as independent nonclausal units. (Biber et al. 1999: 140)
3.2. The history of of course An account by Lewis (2003) of the historical development of of course shows that its meaning derives from a structure containing the noun
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‘course’ (French/Middle English cours) meaning ‘the path taken e.g. by a river’, which coalesced with of and came to mean ‘in the natural order of things’, ‘predictable’ or ‘to be expected’ (OED). Early use shows that it functioned both as an adjective and as an adverb. Adjectival use was predicative and postmodifying, the latter persisting into the 19th century, e.g.: (5)
1580 1813 1862
The friendship between man and man as it is common so it is of course (OED) You must give me leave to flatter myself, my dear cousin, that your refusal of my addresses is merely words of course. (Jane Austen: Pride and Prejudice) … a matter of course (OED)
In PDE this usage remains only in the fixed expression a matter of course. Until the 19th century, of course was also used as an adverb, e.g.: (6)
1548 1813
A thing which is graunted [=granted] of course. (OED) Mr Collins had only to change from Jane to Elizabeth – and it was soon done – done while Mrs Bennett was stirring the fire. Elizabeth, equally next to Jane in birth and beauty, succeeded her of course. (Jane Austen: Pride and Prejudice)
As a sentence-internal adverbial, of course appeared in the 17th century meaning ‘as usual’ and underwent a further development in the 18th century to a sentence adverbial (‘in accordance with the natural ways of the world’): (7)
1752
…if a poor child is to be whipped equally for telling a lie, or for a snotty nose, he must of course think them equally criminal. (cited in Lewis 2003)
By the end of the 19th century of course had acquired a meta-textual, discourse-oriented function, pointing to a ‘dispreferred argument, contrasting it with a preferred argument’ (concession): (8)
1885
Of course, I am naturally a partial judge of my father’s character; but this I may say, that during my experience of over seventy years I have never known a more incessantly
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industrious man. (Nasymygh, Autobiography, quoted from Lewis 2003) To sum up, the historical data show that the function of of course has changed over time, some usage now being obsolete, except in fixed expressions. The development is one from more lexical to more grammatical meaning, from more objective to more subjective, which are the characteristics associated with grammaticalization. The parallel with words such as in fact (Traugott 1997, discussed in Section 2.1 above) is obvious: it, too, started as a noun, became a fixed collocation with a preposition (coalescence), developed into a verbal adverb, and then acquired more subjective and discursive meanings. 4. Data and methodological considerations 4.1. The data This study of of course is based on naturally-occurring data taken from the International Corpus of English, British English (ICE-GB) compiled at the Survey of English Usage at University College London (Nelson, Wallis and Aarts 2002). The value of this particular corpus is that the sound files are linked to the text, and can be accessed directly, meaning that sections of text, resulting from an automatic search and displayed on screen, can be listened to individually. The corpus contains 1 million words in all, of which 600,000 words are (transcribed) speech. This study is based on 200 examples of of course taken from a total of 552 occurrences in the spoken section of the corpus. As the corpus contains a variety of speech genres, the examples are taken to represent both dialogue and monologue, and different degrees of formality across those two broad dimensions. The dialogue examples (102) thus include both informal conversation (52) and dialogue in a public setting (50) (e.g. broadcast interviews), while the monologue section includes highly prepared or scripted speech (41) (e.g. broadcast talks) and more informal spontaneous speech (57) (e.g. spontaneous commentary). The tokens in dialogue were selected to represent as many text types as possible, and in cases where there were more tokens than needed, starting at the beginning of the group of texts, excluding inaudible examples, until an appropriate number had been collected. There was no selection other than for quality.
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4.2. Analysis The sound files were analysed auditorily by the first author4 and the text samples were prosodically annotated. For each token the accentual status (stressed, unstressed or indeterminate) was noted. The tokens were also categorized according to their position in a tone group, and then according to the pitch contours associated with stressed tokens (fall, fall–rise, rise, etc.). Each token was then categorized as being prosodically integrated or separate, with indeterminate cases marked as such in a third category. All examples were examined in context for their semantic content (see Section 6.2). We assume that of course retains in all cases some core meaning, but that each example will be at a different point on a transparency scale. We found examples with a clear meaning of ‘naturally’ or ‘the natural course of things’ at one end of the scale, and at the other end we found examples signalling shared knowledge (‘you/we know this’) where little of the core meaning remained. Inevitably there were many where both meanings co-existed or that were difficult to determine, and these were categorized separately. We thus had three broad levels of meaning: (1) epistemic/ evidential – glossed as ‘naturally’, (2) interpersonal – glossed as ‘shared knowledge’, and (3) indeterminate. In addition to the semantic and prosodic analysis, the tokens were annotated for their syntactic position, initial, medial or final, and for common collocates (e.g. but + of course, and + of course; see Section 5). 5. Structural patterning of of course 5.1. Utterance positions Of course occurs in various positions in the utterance, which can be roughly described as initial, medial and final. Table 1 gives an overview of the frequency of each of these positions in the data.
4. Instrumental analysis is not possible for all of the tokens, given the noisiness of much speech collected in natural surroundings. In any case, extracted pitch contours (more properly F0 contours) cannot replace an auditory analysis of this kind, since speech software is unable to identify phonological categories such as pitch accents (AM system) or falls, rises, etc. (British system).
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Table 1. Utterance positions of of course initial 101 (50.5%)
medial 72 (36%)
final 27 (13.5%)
total 200
Table 1 shows that initial position occurs in just over half the cases. It should be noted that cases where of course follows a conjunction (such as but of course, and of course) or a discourse marker (such as well of course, further of course) are also counted as initial because such conjunctions and discourse markers take obligatory initial position and thus force of course into second position in the utterance. Both elements must be considered as part of the thematic material (see Section 5.4 for a definition of Theme) in such cases (Thompson [1996] 2004: 157). A comparison with the results reported by Holmes (1988: 51) shows that the general trends are the same: initial position is by far the most frequent one, followed by medial position, and then final position. The difference is that Holmes found an even higher percentage of initial instances (60% in her New Zealand speech data, 86% in the British data). This difference may be due to the composition of the corpora. For instance, Holmes did not have any monologic data and the ICE-GB covers a wider range of genres. Holmes found a very different trend in written data, where medial position is most frequent. The sample examined in this study further shows that in initial as well as in medial positions, of course recurs in a number of identifiable structural and pragmatic environments. In the following sections we take a closer look at the recurrent structural environments. 5.2. Conjunction followed by of course Of course is frequently preceded by a conjunction, as Table 2 shows. The percentages are calculated on the total number of instances of initial of course (see Table 1): Table 2. Frequency of of course in initial position preceded by and, but or a subordinating conjunction and of course
but of course
35 (34.5%)
15 (15%)
subordinating conjunction + of course 13 (13%)
total 63 (62.5%)
The figures show that in initial position of course occurs in combination with a conjunction in over 60% of the cases. In the total of 200 instances
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the combination accounts for nearly one in three cases. If such combinations are frequent they tell us something about the profile of of course. The combination but of course and the subordinating conjunctions (which are mostly contrastive/concessive) show the adversative functioning of of course (see Section 6.4 below). The combination with and, which is even more frequent, can have different functions. One is to flag that a piece of information which is self-evident is to follow, after the production of some not so evident information. Example (9) illustrates this. (9)
F: Well I have decided for a long time uh and the answer is I am very keen indeed to see Douglas Hurd as the next leader of the Conservative Party and the next Prime Minister E: Why F: Uh because he has had a considerable experience the most experience of any of the candidates in very high office I saw him at work when I was in the Cabinet both in Northern Ireland where I had been before and of course at the Home Office where I had also been [broadcast news]
5.3. Relative pronoun followed by of course Like conjunctions, relative pronouns take up obligatory first position in the clause, so that of course following a relative pronoun can also be classified as thematic. There are seven instances. Example (10) illustrates this position. (10)
They suddenly see it as a run up to another nineteen sixty-seven which of course was the great big set-back in modern Arab history when Israel emerged as a sort of imperial power and occupied large tracts of Arab territory which it s of course it still is it still holds [broadcast news]
The occurrence of of course in a relative clause enhances the backgrounding of the information: not only is it put in a syntactically subordinate clause but it is also presented as self-evident.
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5.4. Of course in post-thematic position One important medial position of of course is post-thematic. We are using the term Theme in the Hallidayan sense (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 64ff.) to refer to the first ideational element in the clause, possibly preceded by textual and interpersonal elements. It appears that of course occurs in post-thematic position in 29 instances, which accounts for 34.5% of all medial cases (14.5% of all 200 instances in the database). Most frequent as themes are subjects and adverbials, which are unmarked and fairly unmarked themes respectively (Thompson 2004: 144–145). A special type of subject preceding of course is the demonstrative pronoun, with an anaphoric function. The effect of of course in this position is that it highlights the theme, thus making it more prominent. Marking the thematic structure is one of the discourse functions that discourse markers typically fulfil (Diewald 2006: 406). Examples (11) and (12) illustrate of course following the thematic subject:5 (11)
(12)
Sadly Old Hushwing is no longer part of the great meadows of our countryside <,> One of the problems of course is that the new agricultural methods have decreased grassland areas which were the birds’ feeding grounds <,> and removed the old barns and hollow trees in which they could roost and nest <,> [broadcast talks] Now <,> the law <,> Members of jury the first point is this <,> This of course as you know is a civil case it’s not a criminal case [legal presentations]
Of course also follows special thematic subjects which are attitudinal or metadiscursive comments such as it’s very important of course…, the question of course….Thompson (2004: 152) refers to them as ‘thematized comments’. They, too, receive extra focus in this way. Another favoured position of of course (11 instances) is after the subject and the finite verb, or, in Hallidayan terms, after the Mood element 5. In the transcription of the ICE-GB the symbols < , > and <, , > stand for a short and a long pause respectively. A long pause is a substantive break rather than a gap equivalent to a few syllables.
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(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 111 ff.). This is also a typical position of sentence adverbs and it has the same effect of highlighting as the postthematic one. Example (13) illustrates this. (13)
And Dick basically said he didn’t like it because it was there were questions like were you given enough guidance and were your personal tutors good enough And these are of course the the sort of questions that Dick doesn’t really want answered because if someone says no the guidance wasn’t good enough and our personal tutors weren’t good enough then Neil’s going to say to Dick [direct conversations]
5.5. Of course in parenthetical remarks In parenthetical remarks of course enhances the backgrounding of the information because it presents it as ‘known’. Examples are (14) and (15). (14) (15)
And the government thanks to the tax payers it represents of course coughs up a lot for various imperial ceremonies and functions <,> [broadcast talks] Her father is a man of incredible moral principle who will never do any work on a Sunday because it’s forbidden as he sees it in the Bible etc uhm Exactly the sort of person that Rockefeller who also by the way of course is very religious but who he is going to trample underfoot and push out of the way [classroom lessons]
In (14) the parenthetical remark is thanks to the tax payers it represents of course, in which of course has final position. In (15), the parenthetical comment is who also by the way of course is very religious, in which of course occurs after the obligatorily initial relative pronoun and after the adverbial also and the discourse marker by the way. These examples show that of course can occupy different positions in parenthetical remarks.
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5.6. Responses In responses of course is the new element which is given as a confirmatory answer to a polar question. In such contexts it is emphatic in comparison with a simple affirmative yes. Example (16) illustrates this use.
(16)
R: Do you want him to become Prime Minister S: Of course I do I think it would be wonderful <,> Yes I’d be terribly proud of him Wouldn’t anybody <,,> [broadcast news]
The reply Of course I do has only one element which is ‘new’ information, viz. the positive response to the polar question, signalled by of course. 6. The semantics and pragmatics of of course 6.1. Introduction The multifunctionality of of course in PDE is the result of its development from a full lexical item (prepositional phrase) into a sentence internal adverb, into a sentence adverb and finally into a discourse marker. Not only is it a characteristic of discourse markers that they are polysemous and multifunctional (see e.g. Aijmer 2002: 19 ff.), but it is also a characteristic of grammaticalized items that they exhibit what Hopper and Traugott ([1993] 2003: 49) refer to as ‘layering’ – the presence of different layers of meaning at the same time. This means that some of the former propositional meaning is still retained as a relic, while newly acquired meanings, some conventionalized, some as pragmatic inferences, are overlaid on the underlying meaning. The results are that the item occurs in different functions in different context, and that the different meanings of the polysemous item cannot always be sharply delineated. In some of its uses the item in question will have a meaning which is close to its propositional one, in other uses its meaning will be far removed from it, with a grey area in the middle, giving a cline of more lexical to more grammatical meanings, or more propositional to more textual or interpersonal ones.
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In trying to grasp the multifunctionality of of course it has become clear to us that several factors play a role and that it is the interplay of all these factors that accounts for the complexity of its workings. The reason why of course is apparently, judging by its frequency, so useful, especially in speech, is precisely that it does very different things in different contexts, and its description must therefore be based on contextualized data. In the following sections we discuss the parameters which play a role in the semantic-pragmatic profile of of course. Four parameters are crucial for its description: its semantic meaning, its discourse status, its heteroglossic functioning, and the pragmatic stance it expresses. 6.2. Semantic meaning The lexical meaning of of course ‘as a natural consequence’ (as in as a matter of course) is present in some of its occurrences. This sense is the epistemic-evidential sense, in which the speaker’s assessment of the truth of the proposition is based on the fact that it follows as a natural result, and hence becomes inevitable. In this sense then of course has still a clear residue of lexical meaning. Here are some examples which illustrate this use. (17)
D: The effects of nerve gas would be even worse E: Well the nerve agents act basically by blocking the message from the nerves to the muscles so the muscles go into spasm and of course the muscles that control your breathing are in spasm and people asphyxiate and that can happen very quickly <,> [broadcast news]
In example (17) the propositions in the scope of of course are presented as the natural result of the preceding proposition that ‘the muscles go into spasm’. A paraphrase ‘as a result’ would be possible in this case. (18)
A: You always read poetry presumably B: Yes always I lectured in English at Durham University and uh <,> Well I studied English all my life so of course <,> I love poetry Poetry’s lovely to read in bed at night I think it uhm <,> it quietens your mind and <,> flattens your spirit out [broadcast interviews]
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In (18) also the proposition ‘I love poetry’ is presented as following naturally from the proposition ‘I studied English all my life’. If an event is presented as following naturally from some other event or state-of-affairs, the mental step to the meaning that the event was or is predictable is a small one. In many contexts the paraphrase for of course is ‘predictably’. The development is one from more objective to more subjective meaning, since it is people who make predictions and voice these. Example (19) illustrates this sense: (19)
Inside the medieval church is a sacred statue of the Marys sailing in a little wooden boat how they came to be here <,> The legend tells us that after the crucifixion the two saints and their Egyptian servant Sarah were set adrift by the Jews of Jerusalem in a boat with no sails no oars and no food But with the divine protection of the Lord the boat was guided ashore to the foot of the church walls <,> Of course over the years the pilgrims have improved this story so that the boat contained Mary Magdalene Lazarus and his sister Martha and various other saints and the whole lot were greeted by Saint Trophemus <,,> The reason that this is such a sacred place is because the two Marys remained in the Camargue with Sarah the servant and it is she who has become the most important person for the gypsies <,,> After her miraculous escape from the sea she wandered throughout the Mediterranean region and the gypsies identify with her nomadic existence and her life as an oppressed servant <,> [broadcast talks]
In (19) the proposition which is the ‘cause’ of the event modified by of course is not expressed, as was the case in (17) and (18) above. The proposition that ‘over the years the pilgrims have improved this story’ is nevertheless presented as somehow referring to something which ‘took place in the natural course of events’, which was predictable. The causing factor is left implicit because it is assumed to be known: the prediction is based on the speaker’s knowledge of the world, which tells him that improving stories is something pilgrims tend to do. Hence past facts lead to present predictions. A further step in the meaning development is that towards a more intersubjective meaning involving the hearer and ‘predictably’ becomes ‘as
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you may expect/may have expected’. Example (16) given above and repeated here with more context illustrates this sense: (16)
R: Do you want him to become Prime Minister S. Of course I do I think it would be wonderful <,> Yes I’d be terribly proud of him Wouldn’t anybody <,,> [broadcast news]
Example (16) is an extract from an interview with Mrs Heseltine about her husband, Michael Heseltine. She uses of course to present her positive reply to the question as ‘to be expected’. This is made explicit in her following utterance ‘wouldn’t anybody’. In this way the speaker positions herself in a shared world of common values. This sense can be taken one step further into ‘as everybody knows’, and from there to the more intimate world of the interactants (‘as you and I know’). In this sense of course acquires a predominantly interpersonal meaning. Example (20) illustrates ‘as everyone knows’, while (21) illustrates ‘as you and I know’. (20)
The British obsession with class is quite remarkable We persuade ourselves quite against all the available evidence that it perverts our social political and economic life Foreigners believe this too Here for example is Helmut Schmidt’s famous quote of nineteen seventy-five He said as long as you maintain this damn class-ridden society of yours you will never get out of your mess But Britain is more or less the same class structure as most advanced industrial societies a declining working class an expanding middle class although we display more social mobility than most others if the leading sociologists not usually Conservatives are to be believed Now in spite of this the British class system is regarded as peculiar And it certainly would be peculiar if all the myths about it were actually true but of course they’re not For example in nineteen eighty-four according to a Gallup poll seventy per cent of the British population claimed to be working class
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claimed not only that they were working class but their parents were working class According to sociologists the percentage was at least twenty per cent less [broadcast talks] In (20) the speaker presents the proposition that the myths about the British class society are untrue as shared knowledge. (21)
B: And and somebody else said well maybe that was a bit of a mouthful and you know try just an evening on your own together A: Like skiing or something Or a day trip B: Yeah Or something like that uhm <,> so you know so far none of those suggestions A: The other thing is uhm <,,> do you confide in her <,> Does she feel excluded because you don’t exactly confide in her B: Well <,,> I don’t But then <,> uh I haven’t I mean I never have <,> and I’m I’m rather scared that you know that would seem rather artificial to her and as an attempt to win her over and of course <,> you know she’s terribly alive to things like that <,,> uhm [direct conversations]
In this casual conversation (21), the knowledge that ‘she’s terribly alive to things like that’ is not generally known but belongs to the world of intimates. The meaning has evolved into ‘as you and I know’. As a further step this intersubjective meaning gets further eroded into a marker of speech as interaction, where of course functions like you know (see Holmes 1988: 69). It seems to be developing this function in contexts where it co-occurs with other discourse markers and with disfluency markers. Example (22) illustrates this use: (22)
C: They th think different things are important <,> and at the end of the day that makes the atmosphere of the very different <,> to a boys’ school <,>
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D: Yes But I mean C: They’re they’re very upper class I mean some of the things that get lost in boys’ schools are are highlighted in a girls’ school B: Uhm D: Like B: Uhm C: Uhm <,> B: Pit bulls and anthems I mean yeah C: Oh yeah I mean it’s probably cos I mean you know they don’t advocate the fact of course that you’re actually dealing with at the end of the day young girls or young boys And they’ve got different aspirations on what’s important as well B: Uhm uhm [direct conversations] Without wanting to claim that of course has become eroded and merely functions as a filler, we feel that it is important that it can occur in a context of hesitation markers and interpersonal hedges such as oh, yeah, I mean, probably, cos, you know, actually. What we see then is that the polysemy of PDE of course reflects a range of senses which can be put on a cline from more to less propositional, or from more to less objective. The comparative terms ‘more to less’ indicate that no instances are purely propositional or purely intersubjective: they are all layered. But some instances can be classified as predominantly one or the other, ‘epistemic/evidential’ or ‘intersubjective’. Other instances are somewhere in between and indeterminate. Example (23) illustrates what we mean by ‘indeterminate’: (23)
I come back to uh Dumas every so often and read The Count of Monte Cristo or The Three Musketeers Things like that Things that have been with me I suppose since I was in my teens <,> And and every so often I come back to them and uh and of course they get dog-eared and so on
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so then then I scour the secondhand bookshops looking for decent copies of them <,> to uh bring my uh collection back to uh some decent state [direct conversations] In (23) there is a clear sense of resultative of course: if one handles books very often they get dog-eared. A paraphrase with ‘as a natural consequence’ is possible here. On the other hand there is also a very clear interpersonal element, an appeal to the hearer to recognize the type of situation, to place it in what she knows about the world. The sense of inevitability is used to draw the hearer into a world of shared expectations, ‘as you may expect’, ‘you know what I’m talking about’. We would therefore classify such instances as indeterminate. A special type of usage which also combines the meanings ‘inevitably’ and ‘shared expectations’ is illustrated in (24) below. (24)
And literally she followed him down to and the romance blossomed somehow And another fellow who we cruelly nicknamed uh foetus <,> Foetus that’s a very dreadful word When he went over on a month’s trip to the Soviet Union He was at Liverpool Poly to begin with but he was far too intelligent Apart from that he tried to smuggle this girl back Vera you know in the train com compartment where you’re supposed to shove the luggage And of course Leda came up This ha happened when my friend was with him on a Sept September trip And of course Leda came in and said have you seen Richard And she said these two little heads were pro peeping down from the top of the carriage [direct conversations]
The fact that ‘Leda came in’ is presented as an inevitability because of what ‘we know of the world’: when things can go wrong they do go wrong. The sense of inevitability is not the result of some objective causal factor but is
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based on a subjective assessment of how things happen in this world. The tone of irony is the same as in the predictability sense which the modal would has developed in expressions such as Well he would say that, wouldn’t he? In both cases a modal item has acquired a tone of irony to signal inevitability as a shared world-view.6 6.3. Discourse status A second parameter which leads to two types of usage is ‘discourse status’. This distinguishes between cases where of course confirms a previously brought up proposition (typically as a response marker) and where it modifies new information. Example (16) above is an instance of a response: the only new element in the speaker’s utterance Of course I do is the confirmation of course, given in answer to a polar question. The ‘given’ information need not be present in a question but may also be in a previous statement, as in (25): (25)
B: Now I think that over the years a breadth of experience outside politics and inside politics has equipped me to understand many of those concerns so I believe I can do it But my colleagues will decide I’m not going to breast beat about it They will make a decision and I will abide by that decision A: Of course But of But of course of course of course they will and of course you will too it’s self-evident [broadcast interviews]
In most cases, however, the speaker uses of course in an utterance which conveys new information. For example in (24) above the fact that ‘Leda came in’ has not been mentioned before in the conversation and is introduced by the speaker as new information.
6. The same development seems to have taken place in the case of no doubt in some contexts, where the speaker uses it as an ironic afterthought or response commenting on a proposition which s/he presents as to be expected (see Simon-Vandenbergen 2007).
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6.4. Heteroglossic functioning The term ‘heteroglossia’ has been borrowed from White (e.g. 2003), who uses the Bakhtinian term to refer to the view that all utterances take place in a context of other utterances, and that speakers in using language inevitably take a stance towards other viewpoints. White (2003) classifies semantic resources according to the type of positioning they convey. The function of the word of course is classified as ‘concurrence’, in that it represents “the textual voice as taking up some generally held position and thereby as concurring with the reader”. The rhetorical function can also be termed “dialogical alignment” (White 2003: 269). A first basic distinction we noted in the data from this perspective is that between what we would call ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ dialogue. In the former type the speaker is as it were weighing arguments for him/herself, and using of course to self-correct, to modify, to add another aspect, generally to signal a ‘dip’ in the argument. Again, there are various possibilities, which the following examples illustrate. Example (26) is a clear instance of engagement with an exterior voice: (26)
B: I am making the point that the Conservative Party in my judgement has three excellently qualified candidates and they will make a judgement as to which of those candidates most suit their preferences to be leader of their party A: Sure but the reason why I invited you is because I thought you wanted to be at Morden and felt that the party ought to have you rather than them but uh of course it’s up to them [broadcast interviews]
In (26) speaker A expresses agreement with a viewpoint (‘they will make a judgement’) voiced by speaker B. Example (27) illustrates of course in a counter-argument against a viewpoint which the speaker does not share but which she herself voices in her discourse: (27)
A: The other thing is I suppose uhm <,> uh that we this extraordinary notion <,,> that adolescents <,> should have their family unit as their centre of their life which of course children who go to boarding school don’t have but of course <,> presumably if she is saying no I don’t want to go to boarding school
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and yet you see she’d have such a lot of fun there because she wouldn’t have to think about you and Gavin and Bernard which is actually rather boring for her She would have all her friends Couldn’t you send her uhm <,,> to a mixed school at sixteen like King’s Canterbury where Fran’s going or weekly B: uhm uhm Oh I see that yes uhm uhm uhm uhm uhm [conversations] Speaker A is here weighing pros and cons of sending B’s daughter to boarding school as a solution for a problem B has brought up. The argument introduced by but of course is a counter-argument against the viewpoint expressed in A’s own preceding utterance. The speaker thus positions herself against an alternative viewpoint which she introduces first to then argue against it. In example (28) there is no alternative voice which the speaker engages with except his/her own preceding statement. In such cases of course may announce a major or minor shift of topic. (28)
B: I’ve never had one D: Who you Nor’ve I B: No you wouldn’t Stuart because you don’t pay tax <,> But of course now they’re going to send everyone one aren’t they regardless of whether you <,,> pay tax or not E: Uh I don’t know [direct conversations]
One heteroglossic function which is frequently fulfilled by of course is ‘countering’. ‘Countering’ is a general cover term for contexts in which speakers put propositions against other propositions. Arguments given by others or foreseen as possible arguments are ‘disclaimed’ (White’s term 2003: 271) in various ways. White subsumes the strategy of disclamation and its subtype countering under the resources which contract the dialogue. His definition is the following: They [i.e. proclamations] stand beside a second grouping of resources which are even more contractive in that they entail the direct rejection or
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countering of a dialogically contrary position. They are the resources which I group under the general heading of DISCLAMATION which operate either as DENIAL (negation in the broadest sense) or as COUNTERING (various types of concessives, adversatives, and counter-expectancy). (White 2003: 271)
The occurrences of of course in structural environments which express countering have been grouped into the following types: (i) the collocation but of course: this is an instance of initial of course preceded by a coordinating conjunction; (ii) but … of course: the occurrence of of course in a clause introduced by but where but and of course are separated by intervening constituents; (iii) whereas/although/while/without … of course: the occurrence of of course in a subordinate clause of contrast or concession; (iv) of course … but: the occurrence of of course in a clause which is followed by another clause introduced by but.
Table 3 gives the frequency of these patterns in the total sample of 200 instances. Table 3. Frequency of occurrence of (i) but of course; (ii) but … of course; (iii) whereas/although/while/without … of course; (iv) of course … but type (i)
type (ii)
type (iii)
type (iv)
total
15
4
6
5
30
% in the sample 15%
Table 3 shows that 15% of all instances of of course occur in adversative or countering contexts.7 The likelihood of certainty markers in such contexts has been noted in various studies (Holmes 1988; Downing 2001; SimonVandenbergen and Aijmer 2002/2003), and can be explained in terms of flouting of the Gricean maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975): since one is supposed to say only what one has evidence for, the addition of certainty markers is superfluous under ‘normal’ circumstances. If they are added they often signal the need for the speaker to persuade, to counter, to chal7. In fact this is an underestimation of the real frequency because type (iv) is here limited to instances where the contrastive but-clause follows the of courseclause immediately, but such contrastive clauses may also be separated from the of course-clause by intervening clauses or the contrastive clause may not be introduced by an explicit but but nevertheless express a counter-argument. Such instances have, however, not been counted.
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lenge, to dismiss. Certainty markers in general, then, are likely to be frequent in argumentative contexts where consensus cannot be taken for granted. Of course has the additional meaning of expressing shared knowledge, on top of its modal meaning of certainty, and this adds the ‘complication’ that we need to explain why and in what contexts speakers want to convey information which is already known and mark that information as such by the use of of course. Here are some examples of types (i) to (iv) in that order: (29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
George Bush in his inauguration speech said A president is neither prince nor Pope <,> It was his way of saying that his approach to the job was not going to be grandiose or imperious But of course the American people who love British Royals perhaps more than the Britons do <,> rather want that kind of figure and in the main they don’t mind paying for it <,> At least they get to see some of what their money buys <,> [broadcast talks] And it’s an example of the uh hopelessness of the Europeans when faced with a crisis which is nothing to do with Europe but is outside the area of Europe because of course traditionally they have always been concerned with what happens within the Continent and left what happens outside the Continent to others including ourselves But it’s of course one which doesn’t alter the fundamental objections to political and economic and monetary union which uh have always been there [broadcast news] And again my honourable friend doesn’t understand the meaning of morality Last week on a visit to Israel I found that the Israeli government was well aware of the dangers of her becoming militarily involved in the Gulf crisis Uh while she does of course have every right to defend herself will my honourable and learned friend urge the government of Israel to continue to show the considerable constraint which she has so far shown [parliamentary debates] Royalists say that the country makes a profit out of the monarchy Andrew Morton explains how this idea is mistaken <,,> <,> <,>
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Those people were interviewed outside Buckingham Palace Like many others they believe that having a Royal Family is good for Britain’s tourist industry <,> I couldn’t find any real evidence that it is Anyway other countries in Europe such as Austria and Switzerland make far more money out of tourism than we do and they are republics <,> Of course republicanism isn’t about the Royal Family failing as a tourist attraction but even so it is interesting to discover that it isn’t a very great attraction <,> The British Tourist Authority’s own figures show that the main tourist attractions have very little to do with living royalty [broadcast talks] It can be seen that there are two main types of immediate contexts here, viz. contrastive and concessive. In both cases some proposition which is presented as shared knowledge is juxtaposed to another one. The types are repeated here for convenience: (i) the collocation but of course: this is an instance of initial of course preceded by a coordinating conjunction. This type is illustrated in example (29). (ii) but … of course: the occurrence of of course in a clause introduced by but where but and of course are separated by intervening constituents. This type is illustrated in example (30). (iii) whereas/although/while/without … of course: the occurrence of of course in a subordinate clause of contrast or concession. This type is illustrated in example (31). (iv) of course … but: the occurrence of of course in a clause which is followed by another clause introduced by but. This type is illustrated in example (32).
In types (i) and (ii) the speaker contrasts his/her statement, which is presented as shared knowledge, with a preceding one. In types (iii) and (iv) he/she backgrounds as self-evident an argument which is contrasted with his/her main argument. While the specific functions of of course may contextually vary (from authority to solidarity and from ‘predictably’ to ‘as we all know’), the overall rhetorical function of of course is to express a consensual knowledge of some things in order to strengthen one’s position in the dialogue. The meaning is very often a concessive one, with the speaker dismissing a proposition as ‘true but irrelevant’ or ‘true but not the main point’. This is especially the case in type (iv), but the other types can also
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have the function of focusing on the ‘main issue’, as is very clearly and explicitly the case in example (30) (with reference to the fact that it does not ‘alter the fundamental objections’). One important difference between the examples is the degree of foregrounding of the of course utterance. In some instances it is foregrounded (as in 29 and 30), in others it is backgrounded (as in 31 and 32). In types (i) and (ii) it is necessarily foregrounded because the but-clause follows the one it contrasts with; in type (iv) it is necessarily backgrounded because it precedes the but-clause. 6.5. Pragmatic stance As pointed out by Holmes (1988), referred to in Section 2.1.2 above, of course may signal both authority and solidarity. By presenting a viewpoint as ‘generally known’ or ‘self-evident’ one may project an image of superiority as well as create an egalitarian relationship, depending on the heteroglossic function of the utterance and on contextual factors such as relationship between speakers and genre. In casual conversation the stance is generally one of solidarity and intimacy, with of course signalling a shared world, while in political colloquy the stance is generally authoritarian, with of course signalling superior knowledge. Example (21) above (from a conversation) illustrates the solidarity stance. Example (20) (from a broadcast talk) illustrates how of course projects authority. These examples are repeated here for convenience’ sake. (20)
The British obsession with class is quite remarkable We persuade ourselves quite against all the available evidence that it perverts our social political and economic life Foreigners believe this too Here for example is Helmut Schmidt’s famous quote of nineteen seventy-five He said as long as you maintain this damn class-ridden society of yours you will never get out of your mess But Britain is more or less the same class structure as most advanced industrial societies a declining working class an expanding middle class although we display more social mobility than most others if the leading sociologists not usually Conservatives are to be believed
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(21)
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Now in spite of this the British class system is regarded as peculiar And it certainly would be peculiar if all the myths about it were actually true but of course they’re not For example in nineteen eighty-four according to a Gallup poll seventy per cent of the British population claimed to be working class claimed not only that they were working class but their parents were working class According to sociologists the percentage was at least twenty per cent less [broadcast talks] B: And and somebody else said well maybe that was a bit of a mouthful and you know try just an evening on your own together A: Like skiing or something Or a day trip B: Yeah Or something like that uhm <,> so you know so far none of those suggestions A: The other thing is uhm <,,> do you confide in her <,> Does she feel excluded because you don’t exactly confide in her B: Well <,,> I don’t But then <,> uh I haven’t I mean I never have <,> and I’m I’m rather scared that you know that would seem rather artificial to her and as an attempt to win her over and of course <,> you know she’s terribly alive to things like that <,,> uhm [conversations]
7. Prosodic analysis 7.1. Prosodic prominence and separation If, as intonation theory claims, prosodic prominence is directly related to semantic weight, we would expect grammaticalized items to be infrequently stressed, just as function words are usually unstressed in English. Where layering occurs, i.e. where the grammaticalized form and the lexical form of a word or phrase co-exist in PDE, we would expect the latter to be more frequently stressed than the former. If our assumption is correct, namely
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that of course has gone further in the process of grammaticalization, and now has discourse functions in which the lexical content has bleached further in comparison with its epistemic/evidential function, we would expect stressed tokens to be less frequent than unstressed tokens (other factors being equal). The distribution (Table 4) shows that this is indeed the case.8 Table 4. Distribution of of course tokens that are stressed, unstressed or indeterminate in status indeterminate 16 (8%)
stressed 63 (31.5%)
unstressed 121 (60.5%)
total 200 (100%)
On this evidence, then, we have prosodic grounds for considering of course to have undergone a process of semantic weakening, and to be functioning at least in many cases as a discourse marker. Secondly, we consider the prosodic separateness or integration of of course. There are claims in the literature that discourse markers have a tendency to prosodic separation, reflecting their decreased syntactic integration in the utterance, but empirical studies show great variability. Our overview of the literature (2.2) shows that these opposing views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but that the picture is more complex than would appear. In our data we find, predictably, both separation and integration. There are, however, far more cases of integration than separation (79.5% of all tokens) (see Table 5). This is, of course, consistent with the strong tendency for tokens to be unstressed, since separate tone units are assumed to contain at least one stressed syllable. It is not, however, consistent with the view that discourse markers tend towards increased prosodic separation. Table 5. Distribution of of course tokens that are prosodically integrated, separate, or where this is indeterminate integrated 159 (79.5%)
separate 35 (17.5%)
indeterminate 6 (3%)
total 200
8. While stress is a binary feature in theory, the phonetic cues in naturallyoccurring speech are not always clear-cut. Research has shown (Rietveld and Gussenhoven 2003) that a high utterance-initial item can be perceived either as having a high pitch accent (H*) or a high boundary tone (%H) (the former is maximally prominent and the latter minimally prominent). In the British system of intonation this distinction would be between a high pre-head syllable and a high onset. In some utterances in our data it was not possible to decide.
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Theoretically (i.e. according to most models of intonational phonology) only the stressed tokens have the potential to have their own tone unit, and we would for the same reason expect all unstressed tokens to be integrated into a larger tone unit. The stressed tokens in this data are evenly divided between integration and separation. It must be remembered that there is potential for indeterminacy in identifying both prominence and boundaries, the choice of one often determining the choice of the other. If we examine the co-occurrence patterns of the two parameters stress and separation (Table 6), we can say that more than half (56%) of the tokens in the data are both unstressed and integrated. This contradicts suggestions that discourse markers tend to be prosodically separate, but supports the view that of course has a grammatical function rather than a lexical one. We will examine these patterns again below in relation to the various discourse functions described in Section 6. Table 6. Distribution of of course tokens according to the parameters stress and integration integrated % of integrated % of all tokens separate % of separate % of all tokens indeterminate total
stressed 33 (21%) (16.5%) 26 (74%) (13%) 4 63
unstressed 112 (70%) (56%) 8 (23%) (1%) 1 121
indeterminate 14
total 159
1
35
1 16
6 200
To summarize, these overall results are consistent first with the notion that of course has undergone semantic bleaching and acquired a grammatical function (as reflected in the tendency to be prosodically non-prominent), and secondly with earlier observations that discourse markers can be both prosodically separate and prosodically integrated. In the following we illustrate from the corpus how the parameters of stress and separation interact, dealing in turn with the four main cooccurrences: unstressed and integrated, stressed and integrated, unstressed and separate, stressed and separate. Over half of the tokens (56%) are unstressed and prosodically integrated, including initial, medial and final positions (33a–c).
140 (33)
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Unstressed and integrated: a. How you \/fashion them of course | is the big big problem <S1A-089 #23:1:A> b. And of course \nobody will own \/up <,> <S1A-059 #125:1:B> c. a::::nd uh \they’re very exciting of course <S1A-088 #68:1:A>
Those tokens that are stressed and integrated (34a–c) tend to have a falling tone.9 (34)
Stressed and integrated: a. Uhm a::nd of \course the \other part of the joke is that there is a sort of uhm <,> suggestion that the unity of the two is a mask as well <,> a doubtful unity <S2A-057 #81:2:A> b. And what \/I would do | would `not10 be of \course| at the same level in any sense at all <S1A-024 #131:1:B> c. In the \nicest possible \way of \course <S1A-085 #217:1:B>
Stressed and separate tokens in initial position (35) are typical of the prosodic separation frequently observed with other discourse markers. In initial position (35a–e) they are followed, in most cases, by a pause (including uh). The tone choice is typical of reinforcing adverbials (e.g. obviously, clearly, definitely, certainly, without a doubt) – the sense of ‘finality’ or ‘closure’ being consistent with the exclusion of other possibilities entailed in the expression of certainty or reinforcement. (35)
Stressed and separate: (initial) a. Of \course <>| republicanism isn’t about the Royal Family failing as a tourist attraction <S2B-032 #39:1:A> b. But of \course | Alexander came along after classical ballet <S1A-045 #38:1:B> c. But of \course uh | `foreign \/governments uh | warning their citizens have to take wider things into ac into account <S2B012 #136:1:G>
9. Only 7 of a total of 63 stressed tokens have non-falling tones: 4 rise, 2 fall–rise and 1 low level. 10. The ` symbol indicates here a high onset that displays little pitch movement.
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d.
Of \course | <,> you are entitled to draw conclusions <,> from the <,> uh <,> evidence <,,> <S2A-061 #17:1:A> e. Now uh <,> of \course <,> uh `you’ve \heard <,> uh these uh <,> uh words read out <,> al already <,> uh more than once <,> <S2A-061 #88:1:A> (final) f. Well we’re /\not going to force them to /take it | of \course <S2B-035 #45:1:A> g. No not a \word| of \course <S1A-069 #104:1:B> (medial) h. As soon as it is possible to say something more concrete about that | then of \/course | we will do so <S2B-014 #42:1:B> i. The buildings as we have them | of \course | \/are later <S2A060 #17:1:A> Unstressed and separate tokens are anomalous: according to the rules of prosodic phonology, unstressed tokens could not be other than prosodically integrated, given that the presence of a tone (pitch accent) is a defining characteristic of a tone unit.11 However, a number of initial unstressed tokens in our data are separated by a pause from the rest of the utterance (36a–c). (36)
Unstressed and separate: a. And of course <>| a late date is suggested by the fact that Malachi is the last of the prophets <S1B-001 #146:1:A> b. but of course <,> pr\/esumably | if she is saying <S1A-054 #65:1:A> c. Of `course <>it’s it’s en\tirely possible to waste your ent en\tire working \/day on it <S1A-015 #19:1:A> d. and of course <,> you know | she’s \terribly \/alive to things like that <,,> uhm <S1A-031 #187:1:B>
This anomaly is already well documented in the intonation literature (e.g. Cruttenden 1997). A pause is assumed to be a strong indication of a prosodic boundary, and by this definition these tokens are clearly separate, but a separate tone unit is required to contain an accented syllable, which is not present here. The conflict thus lies between external (boundaries) and inter11. Variously called tone groups, tone units, intonation units, intonation phrases etc.
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nal (accented syllables) definitions of tone units. If this is a problem, however, it is more a problem for generative phonology than for the study of discourse.12 Such pauses are quite systematic in some contexts, even in formal read-aloud prose.13 It is entirely consistent with observations of other discourse markers (well, now, so) that they can be followed by a pause despite being short and unstressed. From a Conversation Analysis perspective (see Sacks et al. 1974: 719–720) these can be seen as projecting a turn and claiming the floor while allowing time to formulate an utterance.14 This phenomenon does highlight, however, the lack of specificity in some comments on prosody in the discourse literature. The binary distinction between integration and separation does not take into account indeterminacy nor the fact that temporal and melodic separation/integration have to be specified separately. In other words, when a discourse marker is referred to as ‘prosodically separate’, we do not know whether it is unstressed followed by a pause, or stressed and carrying a tonal contour followed by a boundary (optionally including a pause). Formal intonational phonology can account for the latter but not for the former. 7.2. Prosodic realization and semantic meaning In this section we consider the extent to which prosodic realization correlates with meaning. We have already suggested that the high frequency of unstressed tokens suggests a high degree of grammaticalization. Here we attempt to relate the accentual status of tokens to an independently judged degree of semantic weight. Despite retaining a consistent underlying core meaning, of course can convey anything from this is a natural consequence to you/we know this (Section 6.2). In other words, some uses are clearly epistemic in that they express the speaker’s stance towards the truth of the proposition, while in others the meaning has become more opaque15 to con12. An unaccented discourse marker followed by a pause was observed often enough by Chafe (1994) for him to see this as what he calls a ‘regulatory’ tone unit. By distinguishing between different kinds of unit he dispenses with the anomalies arising from more formal intonational phonology. 13. We refer e.g. to the pause that often precedes a final reporting clause (…<> he said) even though it contains no accented material. 14. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this. 15. House (1989: 104) uses ‘opaque’ to mean ‘non-transparent and having highly negotiable illocutionary force’.
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vey little more than ‘shared knowledge’. In some cases of course seems to perform some “routine (organizational) task in interaction” which discourse markers such as I think, I mean, and you know also perform in some contexts (Kärkkäinen 2003: 172). In between these two extremes there are many shades and gradations, and these will be discussed later, but for practical purposes we have divided this continuum into three broad categories: epistemic, shared knowledge and indeterminate. Intonation theory, as discussed above, would predict that those items at the transparent end of the spectrum, and therefore having greater residual semantic weight, are more likely to be stressed than those at the other extreme. The data confirms this prediction (see Table 7). A chi-squared test was carried out to ascertain whether there was an association between meaning and accentual status. The tokens whose accentual status could not be decided (first column) were omitted from the analysis. The test showed a very strong association between meaning and accentual status (chi-squared = 22.3, df=2, p<0.001). There is a clear trend showing that on the continuum from interpersonal meaning to literal meaning (‘shared knowledge’ > ‘indeterminate’ > ‘epistemic’) the probability increases that the token will be stressed, and conversely, as the literal meaning fades, the probability increases that the token will be unstressed. Table 7. Distribution of of course tokens according to accentual status and meaning stress
indeterminate
unstressed observed/expected 47 38.3
total
3
stressed observed/expected 11 19.7
shared knowledge indeterminate epistemic total
9 5 17
10 41 62
38 36 121
57 82 200
16.3 26.1
31.7 50.9
61
These broad overviews of the data do not take into account utterance position, nor do they distinguish between the various discourse functions of of course. We also acknowledge the inevitable difficulty of forcing gradient data into fixed categories, but by basing our interpretations on the written transcripts alone we have at least endeavoured to avoid circularity. The results support claims that of course has undergone grammaticalization, functioning chiefly as a discourse marker (with both textual and interpersonal functions), while still having the potential to express more transparent, epistemic meaning, closer to the original core meaning. However,
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despite the evidence for a relationship between stress and semantic weight, we will see from the examples below that there are other parameters, e.g. information status and pragmatic function, that make it impossible to expect a one-to-one relationship between prosodic realization and any one parameter. 7.3. Prosody and discourse status The status of the information modified by of course, as set out in Section 6.3, can be either given or new in conjunction with previously given (or otherwise readily accessible) information and the of course serves to emphasize its certainty or self-evident truth. In these cases the of course carries by default nuclear tone, since the given information is either omitted or de-accented, and there is no other material available to carry the nucleus (37a–c). (37)
a. b. c.
\/win | of /\course I’m running to win <S1B-043 #21:1:B> Of \course I need a longer break from Darryl <S1A-011 #153:2:A> Well of \course it is | [but uh] <S1A-023 #41:1:A>
To treat the given proposition as ‘natural’ or ‘predictable’ in this way undermines to some extent the previous speaker’s justification in making it in the first place, having the sense of ‘you should know that’. It is therefore not simply a function of information structure, but has a marked attitudinal meaning, the nuances of which will depend on other contextual parameters. 7.4. Prosody and heteroglossia The attitudinal effect ascribed to the above examples also reflects their dialogic function (heteroglossia). In the simplest cases, the of course utterance is a response to an actual previous question or statement. Sometimes, however, the exterior ‘voice’ being responded to is hypothetical, allowing the speaker to pre-empt and dismiss an unspoken objection. In this case the hypothetical objection must be introduced to the discourse by the (real) speaker, but at the same time treated as ‘given’ (and thus already dismissed). This occurs in the following example:
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A: Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown says that civilian deaths are regrettable but he says it would be wrong to condemn the U S military commanders for what appears to have been an error B: It is not as some of us have perhaps more comfortably believed a transcontinental video game in which nobody gets hurt This was clearly a mistake It’s not part of the policy And these mistakes happen in war Of course if there are lessons to be learnt we should be learning them But it would be wrong for politicians to second-guess the military who are taking the tough decisions to win this war from four thousand miles away [broadcast news]
In extract (38) the speaker is countering the condemnation of the US military commanders for civilian deaths, by first of all stating that these deaths were not “part of the policy” and that such mistakes are inevitable (these mistakes happen in war). The hypothetical objection that ‘there are lessons to be learnt’ is then treated as leading to a self-evident conclusion (Of course … we should be learning them). By presenting the conclusion as self-evident, it is backgrounded as ‘non-new’. The main point of the speaker’s answer is in the following clause, introduced by but, which denies that the military should be condemned. The prosodic challenge here is to simultaneously introduce a new proposition ‘learning lessons’ and treat it as given (a mutual belief). The speaker realizes the utterance as follows: (38ƍ)
Of \course if there are lessons to be /learnt | we should be \learning them
The absence of any accent on lessons suggests that the notion is already accessible. The high terminal on learnt is consistent with grammatical subordination of an if-clause, but of possible choices (level, fall–rise, high rise, low rise) at this point, the low rise is psychologically the least salient (Cruttenden 1997: 43), adding to the impression of ‘given information’.16 Such 16. An anonymous reviewer points out, rightly, that a rise on a subordinate clause in this position is predictable. However, this subordinate clause does not have its own tone group, as one would expect, but is integrated prosodically with the
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countering appears more effective and authoritative when of course is stressed, as if responding energetically to a real dissenting voice, and thus has a stronger dialogic effect. This is a feature of a persuasive rhetorical style, typical of political debate, and sets up an asymmetrical power relationship between speaker and hearers (or silent interlocutors). The third type of heteroglossic response is ratiocinative, in other words it is part of the process of developing one’s own argument in real time, and the ‘voices’ reflect different aspects of one’s own reasoning. This kind of thinking aloud is common in unplanned discourse, reflected in a number of connective strategies (but on the other hand, but then again, mind you, on balance though). The prosodic strategy is different from the cases described earlier, because the function is contrastive rather than countering, and may simply signal a shift in the discourse. We therefore find a number of cases where the of course is unstressed (39a–b). (39)
a. b.
But of course \/now | they’re going to send everyone one aren’t they regardless of whether you <,,> pay tax or not <S1A-007 #272:1:B> but of course <,> pr\/esumably | if she is saying <S1A-054 #65:1:A>
If a stressed token occurs in this context it suggests less an emphatic countering of an objection (as in the previous example) and more a strong shift in the discourse – either a temporary digression, in other words a move to a different level in the hierarchical structure of the discourse, or a linear move from one (sub)topic to another. Example (23), repeated in part as (40), is an instance of this: so of course they get dog-eared on the one hand simply expresses the natural consequence of frequent reading, but at the same time it creates a link to a new part of the narrative (so then I scour the second-hand bookshops). The and uh and sequence is symptomatic of a hesitant planning phase, and is typical of topic transitions in spontaneous narrative where a slowing down is followed by an acceleration into the next section – a change in tempo reflected in the reduced form of of course (‘course). This further supports our assumption that the stress on of course signals a shift rather than emphasizing the fact that books get dog-eared if read frequently.
preceding of course. This enhances the impression that it is being treated as given information.
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And and every so often I come back to them and uh and (of?) \course | they get \/dog-eared and so on so then then I scour the secondhand bookshops looking for decent copies of them <,> to uh bring my uh collection back to uh some decent state [direct conversations] <S1A-013 #74:1:E>
7.5. Pragmatic stance We have shown that a common function of of course is to express shared knowledge, either with the purpose of exerting power or in order to express solidarity. Where an authoritative tone is intended, we often find emphatic use of of course. Where symmetry and closeness are the goal, however, there appears to be little need to focus on the of course since there is no argument to be countered and no dissenting voice to be answered. Thus we find tokens used in this way are usually minimally prominent, reflecting also the fact that the core meaning is only minimally present. The expression of solidarity has different functions in different contexts, depending on such factors as the roles of the interactants and the aims they want to achieve in the interaction. In a teaching situation the word can function as a way of including the learners and their knowledge. In example (41) this attempt at inclusion is conveyed both by of course and by the tag question doesn’t he. (41)
And O\thello of course | calls on uh Desdemona’s \father doesn’t he | and then he tells her the story of his life [direct conversations] <S1A-020 #211:1:B>
In a football commentary, example (42), the of course serves to suggest to a radio audience that they are experts, sharing detailed knowledge with the commentator, who is filling in with what ‘everyone knows’: (42)
United on a \/good run at the moment | whereas \/Rangers of course | have been \struggling in the First Di/vision [spontaneous commentaries] <S2A-003 #56:1:A>
In the special context of a radio interview, the interviewee is often obliged to ‘tell’ the interviewer what they already know, because the interview has been prepared in advance. What is new to the radio audience is shared
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knowledge between the interlocutors. The dilemma for the speaker can be reflected in the use of of course, signalling complicity with the interviewer while performing the information as if new for the audience. In example (43) the late Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, talks about his mother, and the fact that she had been a hairdresser. There is little residual meaning here of ‘a natural course of events’, since our knowledge of the world around us, or at least that part of the world that contains Anglican archbishops, does not normally permit us to predict the occupation of their mothers: (43)
Uh but uh she \had been of course uhm <,> a a \hairdresser on an ocean liner <S1B-041#147>
A similar interview situation elicited examples (44a–b), in which the information is in no way predictable but is marked as knowledge shared by the interlocutors: (44)
a. b.
hhh of course I’ve /\been a congregational /rabbi <S1B047#028> but \then of course | I \went into <>secular phi /losophy <S1B-047#056>
In this special situation, where a speech situation involves multiple addressees, the use of of course is a way of providing information that is new to one part of the audience and known to the other. 8. Conclusion Our findings relate to three main areas of inquiry: structure, meaning and use, and prosody. In structural terms our data showed a clear preference for of course to occur in initial position as part of the thematic material, followed by medial position, where of course is post-thematic and serves to highlight the theme. In terms of meaning, we found strong evidence of grammaticalization with more literal meanings (‘as a natural consequence’) occurring alongside subjective (‘predictably’) and intersubjective developments (‘as you may expect’ or ‘as you and I know’). In a number of cases, the tokens have acquired a routinized pragmatic function and operate as an interactive marker. From a rhetorical perspective, the subjective and intersubjective meanings of of course are exploited dialogically, including con-
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ceding or countering other points of view. Depending on context, this function can reinforce solidarity, as for example in casual conversation, but also express power, as for example in political debate, where dissenting voices are dismissed in favour of one’s own argument. Finally, on the basis of theories of intonational meaning, we predicted that semantic change involving a loss of semantic weight in favour of pragmatic meaning will also involve a loss of prosodic prominence. This is borne out by the data, which shows a statistically significant association between prosodic prominence and meaning. Of course as a grammaticalized/pragmaticalized item may be said to be unstressed in its unmarked realization, although the constraints of information structure, text structure or dialogic demands can require it to be brought into focus. In this respect the prosodic patterns found in our data, though diverse, are all consistent with a polysemous pragmatic marker. This study also has broader implications for the study of grammaticalization. A usage-based model of language (e.g. Bybee 2001) argues that patterns of change are affected by frequency of use: high frequency items can be vulnerable to phonological change involving attenuation of form, and frequency-induced habituation can lead to a loss of semantic meaning. Our corpus-based approach, therefore, acknowledges the importance of quantitative (frequency) information to complement more qualitative analyses. Secondly, since the processes associated with grammaticalization are in part phonological, it makes sense to focus on speech rather than writing. Phonological reduction typical of grammaticalization has so far only been described in segmental terms, and prosodic phenomena ignored, but the reduction of articulatory gestures is clearly a function of the prosodic realization of the word or phrase in question: a word that is unstressed has shorter duration than its stressed counterpart, leaving less time for careful articulation. Thus articulatory gestures may overlap or fail to meet targets. There are obvious problems associated with studying prosody from a historical perspective, but we believe that synchronically co-occurring prosodic patterns may reflect different stages in the grammaticalization process. If semantic change and phonological change are related, our view of such processes can only be enhanced by the study of contemporary speech and its prosodic characteristics. As we reported, there has been little systematic study of the prosody of discourse markers in general. While we, too, have focused on a single specific marker, we believe that our study has broader implications for the study of discourse markers in general. Most importantly, it is clear that there can be no single prosodic pattern that is ‘the prosody of discourse
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markers’. We know, for example, that tone choice is determined inter alia by position in an utterance and by meaning. Thus, falling tones conveying ‘finality or closure’ are not surprisingly more commonly associated with initial adverbials that reinforce rather than limit a proposition (compare certainly, of course with possibly, apparently), thus overriding another constraint, namely to use a non-final, or ‘open’ tone (e.g. a rise) to indicate that the utterance is incomplete. Accent status is also constrained partly by context, partly by morphology, partly by information structure (given–new) and by text structure. Finally, phrasing (status in a tone group) may depend on speech style, situation, or on the role of the speaker in terms of power, knowledge or rhetorical goals. In sum, prosodic choices – segmentation, accent placement and tone choice – convey abstract meanings that can be related only indirectly to lexical items, and are motivated in part by convention, but largely by the often conflicting demands and constraints of the semantic, pragmatic and discoursal functions that discourse markers fulfil. References Aijmer, Karin 2002 English Discourse Particles: Evidence from a Corpus. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Benjamins. Aijmer, Karin and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen (eds.) 2006 Pragmatic Markers in Contrast. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Aijmer, Karin, Ad Foolen and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen 2006 Pragmatic markers in translation: a methodological proposal. In Approaches to Discourse Particles, Kerstin Fischer (ed.), 101–114. Amsterdam: Elsevier, Altenberg, Bengt 1987 Predicting text segmentation into tone units. In Corpus Linguistics and Beyond, Willem Meijs (ed.), 49–60. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Altenberg, Bengt 1990 Automatic text segmentation into tone units. In The London–Lund Corpus of Spoken English: Description and Research, Jan Svartvik (ed.), 287–323. Lund: Lund University Press. Anon 1989 Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barth, Dagmar and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen 2002 On the development of final though: a case of grammaticalization? In New Reflections on Grammaticalization, Ilse Wischer and
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Günthner, Susanne 1999 Entwickelt sich der Konzessivkonnektor obwohl zum Diskursmarker? Grammatikalisierungstendenzen im gesprochenen Deutsch. Linguistische Berichte 180: 409–446. Halliday, M. A. K. and Ruqaiya Hasan 1976 Cohesion in English. London: Longman. Halliday, M. A. K. and Christian Matthiessen 2004 An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 3rd ed. London: Arnold. Heine, Bernd, Ulrike Claudi and Friederike Hünnemeyer 1991 Grammaticalization: A Conceptual Framework. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hirschberg Julia and Diane Litman 1993 Empirical studies on disambiguation of cue phrases. Computational Linguistics 19: 501–530. Holmes, Janet 1986 Functions of you know in women’s and men’s speech. Language in Society 15: 1–22. Holmes, Janet 1988 Of course: a pragmatic particle in New Zealand women’s and men’s speech. Australian Journal of Linguistics 2: 49–74. Hopper, Paul J. and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 2003 Grammaticalization. 2nd rev. ed. [1st ed., 1993.] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horne, Merle, Petra Hansson, Gösta Bruce, Johan Frid and Marcus Filipsson 2001 Cue words and the topic structure of spoken discourse: the case of Swedish men. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 1061–1081. House, Juliane 1989 Politeness in English and German: The functions of please and bitte. In Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies, Shoshana Blum-Kulka, Juliane House, and Gabriele Kasper (eds.), 96–119. Norwood NJ: Ablex. Kärkkäinen, Elise 2003 Epistemic Stance in English Conversation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Lehmann, Christian 1995 Thoughts on Grammaticalization. Munich/Newcastle: LINCOM EUROPA. Original publication in Arbeiten der Kölner UniversalienProjektes 48, University of Cologne, 1982. Lewis, Diana M. 2003 Rhetorical motivations for the emergence of discourse particles, with special reference to English of course. In Particles, Ton van der Wouden, Ad Foolen and Piet Van de Craen (eds.), 79–91. Belgian Journal of Linguistics vol. 16. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
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The semantic-pragmatic development of well from the viewpoint of (inter)subjectification Tine Defour Abstract Previous research on the semantic-pragmatic evolution of well has mainly focused on the functional development of manner adverbs towards pragmatic markers placed in utterance-initial position (Finell 1989; Jucker 1997). The complex relationship between well as a pragmatic marker and its propositional source has been subject to a gradual non-straightforward diversification (e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002). According to Traugott’s hypotheses (1999), adverbial well could be expected to have followed a historical development from propositional, over textual, to interpersonal meanings – with an increase in subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In order to gain a more complete understanding of how the functional development of well has occurred, and how various propositional uses have influenced the development of subjective meanings, this paper aims to examine the semanticpragmatic uses of well in the historical data from the Helsinki Corpus of English texts (HC) and the Corpus of Early English Correspondence (Sampler) (CEECS). More specifically, different shades of meaning of propositional well will be considered – as a source for historical speaker-based and hearer-oriented pragmatic development. Secondly, two frequently occurring collocations of well will be examined against the background of increasing subjectivity and epistemicity.
1. Introduction 1.1. Aims and research material The historical development of propositional adverbs into pragmatic markers has received a fair amount of attention in recent years (see Schiffrin 1992 on then; Powell 1992 on stance adverbs; Aijmer 2002; and Traugott and Dasher 2002 among others). Diachronic hypotheses state that pragmatic markers which have evolved out of adverbials, such as well and now, are still coloured by their original propositional meanings. According to various hypotheses, manner adverbs are predicted to undergo an evolution from
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propositional meanings to more expressive and subjective meanings, i.e. from referential meanings to abstract discourse meanings with a wider scope (see Traugott 1995b) and a greater speaker-oriented perspective. It has been shown, however, that there is no such thing as a straightforward development from adverb to pragmatic marker (Schourup 2001; Traugott and Dasher 2002 among others). Jucker (1997 – see also Schourup 2001; Traugott and Dasher 2002) has attested that adverbial well has undergone a gradual functional diversification, and that the many pragmatic meanings of the present-day marker still show ties with adjectival and adverbial meanings of well. On the basis of a historical corpus study, this paper examines to what extent the pragmatic diversification of well can be explained against the background of hypotheses of grammaticalization, subjectification and intersubjectification, and whether we can trace diverging developments in the marker’s semantic-pragmatic history. My aim is to look at the historical development which well has undergone, and to examine to what extent the marker’s syntactic position has had an influence on the semantic-pragmatic meanings of well. A second focus will be on the pragmatic influence which well fulfils in two frequently occurring collocations, viz. with cognitive verbs (e.g. you know well that…) and with modal auxiliaries (e.g. you may well see that…). Various contextual factors will be taken into account, such as sentence position, relative frequencies and the relationship between speaker and addressee. We will see that the additional use of well can serve a subjective function in contexts where speaker and addressee have diverging opinions, and that the adverbial use of well can be used pragmatically to fulfil intensified and modal meanings. The data will attest to what extent well presents a valuable element in the positioning of the speaker and the acknowledgement of the addressee. For each example dated before 1500 used in this paper, a translation of the entire utterance or of relevant parts is given. The findings discussed in this paper result from research on two historical corpora, namely the diachronic part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (HC) and the Corpus of Early English Correspondence (Sampler) (CEECS). The HC consists of a collection of extracts of continuous text, taken from a wide range of different genres and covering the period between Old English (c. 850) and c. 1710. The corpus contains approximately 1.6 million words. The CEECS is a letter corpus which runs from 1417 to 1681. The corpus contains 23 letter collections and a total of 450,000
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words.1 The HC and CEECS are important methodologically because they contain “speech-related” genres. The HC for instance includes a certain percentage of dramatic constructions of speech (e.g. plays or sermons) or reconstructed recordings of speech (e.g. trial proceedings or witness accounts) – balanced by less speechlike, written genres (e.g. law documents). As a letter corpus, the CEECS also offers a valuable source of genre data. Letters, particularly private letters “contain many interactional features such as address terms, directives, politeness markers, apologies, and so on” (Jacobs and Jucker 1995: 8). Because pragmatic markers are more frequent in oral discourse and it has only recently been made possible to record spoken data (see Culpeper and Kytö 1997, 2000), the text types in these historical corpora come as close as possible to “natural” spoken interaction of previous centuries. Although synchronic and diachronic corpora are “assumed to be representative” of a certain language or language period (Francis 1982: 7), the linguistic domain they cover remains limited in the sense that it is hardly possible to achieve a complete level of equal distribution with regard to time periods, dialect, or text type. If this is difficult for synchronic data, it poses even more difficulties for historical periods. The compilers of the HC and CEECS have aimed to achieve different kinds of representativeness – “chronological, regional, sociolinguistic and generic”, with an emphasis on sociolinguistic coverage for the CEECS. We need to take into account that frequencies of pragmatic markers will be influenced by differences in genre representation. Palander-Collin (1999) points out, for example, that the phrase I think has a speech-based nature and was found to be much more frequent in private letters than in non-private letters. Inevitable differences in representativeness should therefore be kept in mind when considering quantitative or qualitative corpus results. Genre-related differences are not the main focus in this paper – the examples that are selected belong to a variety of (speech-related) genres, and only when relevant will the genre of the illustration be discussed. Apart from a reference to the corpus, the date and abbreviated file name, the genre of the excerpt is added between brackets after each example from the Helsinki Corpus. Examples from the CEECS all belong to the genre of (private) letters. The influence of genre 1. Both historical corpora are taken from the ICAME cd-rom (the International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English). Further information on the HC and the CEECS can be found on (last accessed on 1/04/2009). For the CEECS: also see Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg 1996.
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differences on semantic-pragmatic meanings of well will be discussed more extensively in future publications. 1.2. Terminology Many different terms have been used to refer to the elements of speech known as pragmatic markers (Brinton 1996), discourse markers (Jucker 1997; Fraser 1999), discourse particles (Aijmer 2002) or discourse operators (Schourup 1999). In this paper I will use the term pragmatic marker (see Brinton 1996 for a list of defining features) as a general, encompassing term for those items which do not contribute to the propositional contents of an utterance, and which predominantly occur utterance-initially, more particularly in the “pre-front” field (Auer 1996). Subclassifications can be made on the basis of formal or functional criteria, which can clarify the differences between for instance (modal) adverbs (e.g. certainly, surely), pragmatic expressions or particles (Hoye 1997: 212; Aijmer, Foolen and Simon-Vandenbergen 2006). A general denotation with subdivisions allows for a more specific delineation of various forms and uses. Discourse markers, for instance, are considered to be a specific subclassification focusing on text-structuring functions, i.e. on how interactants structure discourse. In this article, the term particle is reserved for reference to modal particles. 2. Synchronic functions of well The discourse functions of well in present-day English have been the subject of a number of studies (Lakoff 1973; Svartvik 1980; Watts 1986; Schiffrin 1987; Schourup 2001 among others). Research on the semanticpragmatic uses of well shows that the marker is often used in the context of a confrontation between speaker and addressee and that well can be applied to create or restore coherence. According to Jucker’s division (1997), synchronic well can be classified according to four main pragmatic uses (table 1).
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Table 1. Functional classification of well (Jucker 1997: 92) function adverb, adjective discourse marker discourse marker discourse marker discourse marker
level propositional textual interpersonal interpersonal interpersonal
label – frame marker face-threat mitigator qualifier pause filler
The main textual function of well as a frame-marker allows the speaker to create textual coherence by indicating topic changes or by introducing direct reported speech (see examples 1 and 2). In example (1), well forms a frame between two subtopics, uttered by the same speaker (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2003: 1142). (1) (2)
“Well, where’d you sleep last night?” the woman said softly. “You get kicked out?” (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2003: 1142) And he said well tell me something about rickets. (Jucker 1997: 93)
On an interpersonal level, well expresses attitudes or creates common ground between speaker and addressee. Jucker distinguishes three interpersonal meanings for well. As a face-threat mitigator, the marker can be used in situations where the addressee’s face (or that of the speaker) is threatened. In this case, well serves as a means to prevent face loss. (3)
A: I didn’t know there was such a job going B: [mhm] well there was about a year ago now they had a first batch… – and then a second batch … (Jucker 1997: 93)
Secondly, well can be used as a qualifier when a respondent is unable to give a reply which is – in the speaker’s or the addressee’s eyes – “sufficient” or when he or she cannot seem to give an answer which is “optimally coherent with the preceding question” because the respondent cannot supply the requested information (Schiffrin in Jucker 1997: 94).
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A: Are you from Philadelphia? B: Well I grew up uh out in the suburbs. And then I lived for about seven years up in upstate New York. And then I came back here t’go to college. (Schiffrin 1987: 106)
A third interpersonal function according to Jucker’s research is the use of well as a pause filler, which enables a speaker to ‘bridge interactional silence’ in situations where he or she wants to keep the floor. (5)
yes … quite … well there you are … you see … em – it’s an obvious – x application (Jucker 1997: 95) [adapted]
3. Historical development of the pragmatic marker 3.1. Grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification Previous studies have shown that the present-day multifunctionality of well can be traced back to propositional (adverbial or adjectival) functions with the meaning “in a good way or manner, according to a certain standard” (Finell 1989; Jucker 1997; Schourup 2001 among others). However, Schourup stresses that the “marker well has […] properties that cannot be predicted on the view that the marker is simply an adverb called into illocutionary service” (2001: 1038). The relationship between adverbial well – as in “He plays the guitar well” – and a pragmatic use of well – e.g. “Well, let me see” – is “far more tenuous” (Schourup 2001: 1038). An explanation for the present-day relationship between form and functions, and between original propositional meanings and present-day pragmatic functions of well may be found in the historical process of grammaticalization. Traugott (1995a: 15) defines grammaticalization as “the process whereby lexical material in highly constrained pragmatic and morphosyntactic contexts becomes grammatical, and already grammatical material become[s] more grammatical” (see also Traugott 1995b, 1997). Grammaticalization involves changes through which an element can gain increased scope or increased syntactic freedom, while at the same time the element’s position becomes more restricted in the sense that its position becomes “more clearly defined in its syntagmatic relation to other sentence elements” (Palander-Collin 1999: 50). Apart from grammatical or syntactic
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changes, grammaticalization can also cause linguistic elements to lose semantic meaning and to gain pragmatic strength – evolving from propositional meanings, over text-structuring to increasingly interpersonal functions according to a unidirectional cline. In recent studies (Traugott 1999), more emphasis has been placed on an increase in expressiveness and subjectivity. According to these hypotheses, a propositional manner adverb such as well can develop abstract pragmatic meanings which are increasingly grounded in the speaker’s perspective. Grammaticalization can be motivated by the speaker’s need to communicate attitudes and personal opinions. The processes that support this need are called subjectification and intersubjectification and entail the recruitment of propositional material for subjective and intersubjective purposes. Subjectification (Traugott 1995b, 1997) causes meanings to “shift toward greater subjectivity [and] become increasingly associated with speaker attitude” (Traugott 1995a: 2) and can be defined more specifically as “the process whereby meanings come over time to index, encode, and externalize the speaker/writer’s perspectives and attitudes” (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 10). Intersubjectification, which is generally preceded by subjectification and cannot occur without it (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 97), highlights the other end of the speech event and is “a mechanism whereby meanings become more centered on the addressee” (Traugott 1999: 3). As such, intersubjectification is described as “the explicit expression of SP/W’s attention to the ‘self’ of AD/R in both an epistemic sense, paying attention to their (likely) attitudes to the content of what is said, and in a more social sense (paying attention to ‘face’ or ‘image needs’)” (Traugott 1999: 2). Traugott (this volume) stresses that both subjectification and intersubjectification are processes that are independent of the process of grammaticalization, but that there is definitely a close interaction between subjectification and grammaticalization because the latter involves the development of (pragmatic) markers towards the ideational component of discourse structuring and/or towards text-structuring functions. An example of pragmatically motivated change is the evolution of indeed (Traugott 1995a: 7–9; Aijmer 2002: 16f.). In origin a prepositional phrase, indeed (‘in deed’) moved away from a clause-internal adverbial form towards a (modal) sentence adverbial – with the epistemic (modal) meaning “certainly” (Traugott 1995a: 8). Through further development on the adverbial cline, indeed shifted to clause-initial position and acquired meanings expressing “elaboration and clarification of the [the speaker’s] discourse intent” (Traugott 1995b: 11).
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Semantic-pragmatic change and (inter)subjectification are dynamic processes. As historical phenomena, these processes nevertheless result in synchronic layers of functional split for one particular item. The coexistence of different variants [A > A ~ B > B], which may or may not replace older meanings, is called “layering” (Hopper 1991). By tracing different steps in the semantic-pragmatic evolution of well we are able to gain a clearer picture of how different layers of functional split can be compared, and how propositional meanings have evolved towards a diversity of pragmatic and (inter)subjective uses. 3.2. The historical evolution: Previous research Although previous studies by Finell (1989), Jucker (1997), Schourup (2001) and Traugott and Dasher (2002) have established a connection between the semantic-pragmatic development of well and a propositional source, the marker’s evolution is not transparent. According to Finell (1989), who studied well in responses, early propositional uses of well as a predicative adjective can be seen as precursors for later interpersonal functions. She considers the following use of adjectival well to be the earliest context for the marker’s further pragmatic evolution. (6)
And where as they saye that the Gospell must be taught after the interpretations approued by the churche (that is very well) but all the stryfe is, which is the trewe church. (OED, well – 1560. taken from Finell 1989: 655).
In the following example, well can be seen as an abbreviated form of the phrase that is very well. (7)
Cloten: Nay, come, let’s go together. Second Lord: Well, my lord. (Shakespeare, Cymbeline, qtd. Schourup 2001: 1049)
Schourup (2001: 1049) states that these meanings are now obsolete but that their use expressed consent or agreement, and that they illustrated a particularly strong semantic connection between propositional and pragmatic functions. Placed in utterance-initial position, adjectival well allows the speaker to express “acceptance of a situation” or acceptance of a pre-
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vious speaker turn. As in example (7), the central positive meaning of propositional well can then be used as a starting point for additional disagreeing or concessive comments (that is very well, but…). It is this combination of acceptance and concession which recurs in present-day interpersonal uses of well, as in example (8). (8)
Are you coming to the lecture? – Well, I’d like to, but I’m afraid I can’t today. (Finell 1989: 655)
In conformity with Traugott’s hypotheses on shifts of meaning and subjectification, Finell finds that well evolved from a predicative adjective to an expressive, independent part of the sentence. Jucker expands this point of view by stating that propositional (adjectival or adverbial) uses are not “sufficiently transparent as being the origins of the discourse meanings of well” (1997: 107). Finell’s study does not take into consideration the possibility that interpersonal pragmatic uses in present-day English may have a more textual function as a precursor. All Jucker’s early examples from Middle English place well in a context of direct reported speech, accompanied by a verb of speaking (see examples 9 and 10). (9)
(10)
“Ye sey well,” seyde the kynge. “Aske what ye woll and ye shall have hit and hit lye in my power to gyff hit.” “Well,” seyde thys lady, “than I aske the hede of thys knyght that hath wonne the swerde,…” (HC Cmmalory 1470 [Romances] – Jucker 1997: 99). ‘… “Ask what you will and you shall have it if it lies in my power to give it.” “Well”, said this lady, “then I ask the head of this knight who has taken the sword,…”’ “Howe say you, mistris Alice,” quoth he, “is itt not so?” “Bone deus, bone deus, man, will this geare neuer be lefte?” quoth shee. “Well then, mistris Ales, if it be so,” quoth he, “it is very well…”. (HC, Cebio1 [Biography]: 1500–1570)
Jucker’s historical data illustrate a “continuous [pragmatic] diversification” from the Middle English period onwards, starting with this predominantly textual function. This frame-marker use becomes more versatile in later periods, occurring also without communicative verbs. In late Early Modern English, pragmatic well is then seen to adopt new meanings – e.g. as an interpersonal face-threat mitigator. The functions of qualifier and pause
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filler were unattested in Jucker’s data and are therefore likely to have originated in later, post-Shakespearean periods.2 Although Jucker’s and Finell’s data validate Traugott’s evolution from propositional – via textual – to interpersonal functions, the Old English form wella suggests that an interpersonal element may lie at the basis of further developments of well. Research by Van Herreweghe (2003) states that the development of well as a discourse marker can to a certain extent be related to Old English wella or wel la. Wella is an Old English discourse marker which mainly served as an indicator of positive appraisal or as an attention-getting device, i.e. an interpersonal function. Although wella did not continue to exist in this particular form, Van Herreweghe suggests that a possible blending of forms may connect adverbial or adjectival meanings of well with Old English wella, as well as with other forms such as Old English weg la or wa la (“alas”).3 This possible connection again draws attention to the fact that already in its earliest developments, well essentially had an interpersonal element in its core meaning. Secondly, in considering the early textual functions of well – in the context of a quotation – we need to keep in mind that calling something well, i.e. good, in a good manner, is in itself already a subjective, evaluative act because it entails that the speaker is matching the situation against a certain norm or standard. It is clear that [w]ell functions as a frame marker and text-sequencing device, but in many cases it may also indicate an acceptance of a situation that has been expressed or indicated, and thus it may already have some interpersonal significance besides its mainly textual function. (Jucker 1997: 99)
Initially captured in a textual frame (quotation), well signals that the speaker finds that “the interlocutor has got a point” (Finell 1989: 655).
2. As pointed out by one of the anonymous referees, the absence of the function of pause filler might partly be attributed to the fact that spoken language is often rendered into written language in an idealized way. 3. Jucker (1997) and Van Herreweghe (2003) found that certain uses of wella have been translated as ‘alas’, which may seem at odds with the generally positive semantics of well(a). Jucker suggests that translators perhaps did not have an appropriate word for the translation of wella, while Van Herreweghe mentions a possible connection with Latin (e)heu, which is an interjection of pain or grief. A related expression of sorrow still exists today – though obsolete – in the form of wellaway (i.e. originally a combination of wel(l) and away).
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A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the diachronic data from the HC and CEECS indicates that the historical evolution of well largely follows Jucker’s findings in the sense that most of the corpus tokens before 1500 (9 out of 10) are found in a textual frame of direct reported speech. After further examination of all utterance-initial tokens of well in the historical corpora, paying specific attention to the ways in which well interacts with the speaker’s need to express personal stance and create interpersonal ties with the interlocutor, we can see that the sense of acceptance signalled by well is increasingly followed by a personal – concessive or diverging – point of view, indicating that the speaker “is not prepared to completely comply with the interlocutor” (Finell 1989: 655) (examples 11 and 12). (11)
(12)
Miss.: That’s my best Nurse, do as you wou’d be done by; trust us together this once… Nurse: Well, this once I’ll venture you; but if you disparage me… (HC, Ceplay3a [Drama, Comedies]; 1640–1710) Leaue her company ketha? Alas poore soule, this reward she hath for her good will. I wis I wis, she is more your friend, then you are your owne. Well let her be what she will sayd her husband: but if shee come any more in my house, shee were as good no. And therefore take this for a warning I would aduise you: and so away he went. (HC, Cefict 2b [Fiction]: 1570–1640)
The data from the HC and CEECS attest that well is increasingly used in contexts where speaker and addressee have diverging views or need to reach a source of common ground – as in the examples above. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2003) underline the fact that the central positive sense of well makes it a valuable element in interaction and “interactively useful in cases where speakers are aware of possibly divergent interpretations” (2003: 1129). Whereas early examples of well mainly indicated the acceptance of a situation (as an indication of a “positive judgement”), it seems that most tokens of well in corpus examples before ca. 1500 are increasingly followed by a personal elaboration, thought or modification (often differing from the point of view of the addressee). The sense of “acceptance” expressed in earlier, more transparent and propositional uses of well now seems to become oriented towards acknowledging a previous speaker turn for the benefit of the addressee, as in (13) and (14). These examples show
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that acceptance not necessarily implies actual belief of what is said. Both examples are excerpts from trial proceedings, in which the speaker’s consideration of preceding information is central, and forms the basis for a continuation of the dialogue. The interrogees’ answers are acknowledged, but not recognized as indisputable. (13)
(14)
L. C. J.: Did you lie with them? Dunne: No, my Lord, I did not. L. C. J.: Well, I see thou wilt answer nothing ingenuously, therefore I will trouble my self no more with thee: Go on with your Evidence, Gentlemen. (HC, Cetri3b [Proceedings, trials]; 1640–1710) A: Nay (quoth [the earl]) it is now not tyme to answere vppon thinkinge, did you indeede so counsell me? (B:) he answered: “I did”. A: The E. pausing as it were in a wonder replyed thus. Well, let his lyfe and my death witnes howe truely he speakes. Then was agayne vrged the Consultation at Drewery house,…. (HC, Cetri2a [Proceedings, trials]; 1570–1640)
The positive adverbial sense is thus used strategically as a defence against possible face loss, and allows the speaker to develop a possible divergent argument. Schourup (2001) has called the present-day use of well “epistemic” in the sense that the marker indicates that the speaker looks back and expresses consideration of a previous utterance – “actively taking into account what is already known or assumed” (2001: 1043) and “[granting] what is (though not necessarily approving of it)” (Schourup 2001: 1049). To some extent, this is already noticeable in example (13), where well results from speaker A’s evaluation of the previous speaker turn. The historical corpus data illustrate an evolution where well initially has a propositional significance (that is well; If this is so, then…). This layer of meaning continues to be used in later data, but well also evolves towards a semantically weakened use which can serve to acknowledge the addressee and which is increasingly positioned in the speaker’s subjective perspective and in a personal discourse dialectic.
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4. Adverbial well: Increase in speaker-perspective 4.1. Layers of adverbial meaning Jucker (1997: 99) notes that several senses of the adverb well were already firmly established in Middle English. Although these cannot be called direct, transparent origins of present-day interpersonal functions, they may have served as precursors for later – textual – functions. Jucker lists three meanings (1997: 99–100): (i) in a way appropriate to the facts and circumstances; fittingly, properly (OED2, well adv., 5) (ii) with good reason; naturally; as a natural result or consequence (OED2, well adv., 8a) (iii) clearly, definitely, without any doubt or uncertainty (OED2, well adv., 14a)
Interestingly, as Jucker points out, meaning (i) occurs mainly with verbs of saying or speaking, as in (15)
Ĉæt is wel cweden swa gewritu secqað, þæt… (a900 Cynewulf Christ 547 – Jucker 1997: 99). ‘That is well said, as the book says, that…’
The importance of this co-occurrence lies in the fact that the early textual functions of well – for which these adverbial meanings can be seen as predecessors – were all accompanied by a communicative verb (e.g. “‘Well,’ seyde thys lady, ‘than I aske the hede of…’”), as attested in Jucker’s data and confirmed in the historical material from the HC and CEECS. We can relate this to the fact that the utterance-initial use of “Well,…” can in some cases be paraphrased as “that is well” or “that is well said”, and in that sense functions as an acceptance of the previous speaker turn. It appears that the interpretation of the semantic-pragmatic value of well depends at least partly on the marker’s verbal collocates and on the positional relationship between verb and adverb. Before considering the idea that there may be a correlation between grammatical context (position, verb type) and level of (inter)subjectivity, we need to take into account the fact that adverbial well in itself displays a wide range of meanings – clearly propositional, but also more subjective and even epistemic meanings. The following examples (taken from the Middle English Dictionary Online [MED]) define well as a manner adverb indicating that when some-
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thing is “done well”, it is “done in accordance with a good or high standard of conduct or morality” (MED wel, adv. 1.a; example 16 below), “in a way appropriate to the facts or circumstances” (e.g. with verbs of speaking; example 17 below), or in accordance with the standards of an art, a craft or a profession (MED wel, adv. 5a; example 18 below). These propositional meanings are largely contextual. (16)
(17) (18)
Do(n) well, live(n) well (Act/live virtuously, in accordance to God’s will): E.g. For when they doe well or ill the praise or blame will be laid there. (HC, Ceeduc3a, 1640–1710) Speak well (= speak eloquently) Make…well (Make…in accordance with the standards of a craft): E.g. Now also I schall speke of…the Gerneres Joseph that he leet make for to kepe the greynes for the perile of the dere yeres. And thei ben made of ston, full wel made of Masounes craft. (HC, Cmmandev, 1350–1420) ‘…And they are made of stone, full wel made through the skills of a mason.’
Apart from the “standard” manner meaning, i.e. “in a good manner, according to a standard”, propositional well can be used in a more emphatic or intensified use, indicating degree (rather than manner). (19) (20) (21)
So wel she loved clennesse and eke trouthe. (MED wel, adv. 14a – c 1430) (= greatly, devotedly) ‘So greatly she loved cleanliness and also faithfulness.’ Wite thou wel that in the last dayes schal come perilous tymes. (MED wel, adv. 14a – c ?1387) (= assuredly) ‘Be assured that in the last days perilous times shall come.’ Knowen well (= in depth, with great familiarity): E.g. I wot wel thi werkes. (MED wel, adv. 11a – 1400) ‘I know your doings well.’
A third type of meaning for well was already mentioned as one of the established meanings of well in Middle English (Jucker 1997 – see above: meaning iii). This use of well, i.e. “clearly, definitely, without any doubt or uncertainty” (OED2, well adv., 14a) represents a more subjective, epistemic use of the adverb – as illustrated in the following examples (22–24).
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(23)
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He seeþ turmentoures on euery syde bisette to do hym woo, as he haþ wel deserued. (MED wel, adv. 14a (d) – a1450) (with verbs denoting obligation, deserving: duly, indeed) ‘He sees torturers [placed] on every side to do him harm, as he has well deserved.’ Swich a noble theatre as it was I dar wel seyn in this world ther nas. (MED wel, adv. 14a – c1385) ‘Such a noble theatre as it was, I dare well say there was none (i.e. not a similar one) in this world.’ Well may he be a kyngys son, for he hath many good tacchis. (MED wel, adv. 15a – a1470) (= possibly, likely – intensified sense of likelihood) ‘He may well be a king’s son, for he has many good characteristics.’
The notion of epistemicity is “concerned with knowledge and belief (as opposed to fact)” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 106). More specifically, epistemic expressions illustrate the speaker’s point of view with regard to the truth of a proposition. Epistemicity can be expressed by means of pragmatic markers (e.g. in fact), adverbs of modality (probably) or modal verbs (You must be tired.). If we consider these three levels of meaning, we see that the degree of speaker-intrusion or subjectivity remains fairly limited in the “clear” propositional uses. In epistemic uses of the adverb however, a greater level of speaker-attitude or interpersonal expression becomes visible. The dividing line between “clear” propositional uses, intensifying forms, and epistemic meanings of well is fairly thin and seems to depend mainly on the accompanying verbs. In order to attest whether there is a correlation between different forms of adverbial well and an increase in (inter)subjectivity, the next sections will discuss two of the most frequently occurring correlations in the historical corpus data, namely the co-occurrence of well with mental verbs and with epistemic modals. 4.2. Semantic field types: Mental verbs As will be shown in this section, adverbial well illustrates a high level of co-occurrence with verbs of cognition in particular. In order to attest to what extent this collocation influences a possible evolution towards in-
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creased subjectivity, the correlation between contextual factors (e.g. semantic verb fields; subject forms; positional differences) and levels of (inter)subjectivity in the historical corpus data is discussed here. 4.2.1. Classification Lexical verbs can be categorized according to a number of different semantic fields. In order to establish quantitative and qualitative distinctions between different semantic patterns, all verbs co-occurring with adverbial well in the historical corpus data were classified accordingly. A quantitative and qualitative study of typical – verbal – patterns in which well is used in the corpus data points out that adverbial well (modifying a verb) accounts for up to 60% of all tokens of well in the HC and CEECS. Well appears 602 times as a Verbal Adverb (VAdv) in the CEECS (on a total of 1064 welltokens, i.e. 56.6%) and 1909 times in the HC (on a total of 3088, i.e. 61.8%). The verbs in this category were divided according to the semantic verb field they belong to based on a classification into seven categories taken from Biber et al. (1999: Section 5.1.).4 Illustrations of each category are given below: (i)
Activity:5 e.g. make, buy, work, carry, wear, open. E.g. … he shall now pay your mastership well and suffisauntly (CEECS, Stonor; 1424–1483) ‘… he shall now pay your mastership well and sufficiently’
4. Many lexical verbs can be called ambiguous in the sense that they can be placed into more than one semantic verb category. Verbs such as resist, obey or follow (a command or law), for instance, seemed to fit both into the cognitive and activity verb categories. Moreover, it is possible for one single verb to display different meanings, consequently fitting into different categories (e.g. deserve can be categorized as either cognitive or existential, depending on context; see Biber et al. 1999: 367–371). In order to create a consistent categorisation, all entries were classified on the basis of their individual contexts. 5. Activity verbs are verbs which “primarily denote actions and events that could be associated with choice”, e.g. come, bring, leave, run, take, work (Biber et al. 1999: 361).
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Mental:6 e.g. think, love, know, want, believe, read. E.g. Whan Melibee hadde herd the wordes of his wyf Prudence, he seyde thus:“I se wel that the word of Salomon is sooth.” … (HC, Cmctpros; 1350–1420) ‘When Melibee had heard the words of his wife Prudence, he spoke thus: “I see well that the word of Salomon is true.”’
(iii)
Communication: e.g. say, tell, shout, suggest, thank, write. E.g. Yif me gold and oþer fe, þat Y mowe riche be, … for þu ful wel bihetet me þanne I last spak with þe! (HC, Cmhavelo; 1250–1350) ‘Give me gold and other (lit.) property, (so) that I may be rich, … for you full well promised me when I last spoke with you.’
(iv)
Existence: e.g. represent, include, involve, indicate, seem, live. E.g. … and very true it was they did all acknowledge, that her highnes had shewed herself a most loving princesse and neighbour to them, as did well appeer to their embassadors in England … (CEECS, Leycester; 1585–1586)
(v)
Occurrence: e.g. change, grow, develop, occur, become, happen. E.g. … þei takeþ cold water & salt to-geder & waschuþ ouer-al & froteþ him wel. … & so wol þe swellynge aswage wel [enough]. (HC, Cmhorses; 1350–1420) ‘… they take cold water and salt together and wash (him) all over and rub him well … and so the swelling will be well [enough] reduced.’
6. Mental verbs “denote a wide range of activities and states experienced by humans; they do not involve physical action and no not necessarily entail volition. … They include both cognitive meanings (e.g. think or know) and emotional meanings expressing various attitudes or desires (e.g. love, want), together with perception (e.g. see, taste) and receipt of communication (e.g. read, hear)” (Biber et al. 1999: 362–363). Mental verbs include dynamic verbs (examine, discover) but also verbs that are more stative in meaning (e.g. believe, know, remember, understand).
172 (vi)
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Causative: e.g. allow, cause, enable, help, require, let. E.g. His Highnes also well allowed that your Grace noteth not onely remisse dealing, but also some suspitione in that the Lord Dacre so litle estemede the mynde and opinion of the Kings sister … (HC, Ceoffic1; 1500–1570)
(vii)
Aspectual: e.g. start, keep, begin, continue, stop, finish. E.g. … I blles the Lord, that He has ouer-ruled the harts of men, and I hope they goo now on well, to doo that greate worke they haue in hand. (CEECS, Harley; 1625–1666)
According to Scheibman (2002), studying the conventionalization of different patterns and of subjective forms requires us to look at “a range of combinations of grammatical and discursive elements and constructions that appear frequently in conversation” (Scheibman 2002: 60). The historical data from the HC and CEECS (see table 2 – raw figures are added in brackets) show that well is most likely to occur with the semantic field category of cognitive verbs. The HC and CEECS show a correlation with mental verbs amounting to 41.3 and 39.8 % respectively, compared to smaller percentages of correlation with activity verbs (36.4 and 31.4%).7 An additional comparison with present-day data (of verbs collocating with adverbial well) from the British National Corpus (BNC), however, presents a stronger correlation with activity verbs (56.1%) than with mental verbs (21.2).
7. The separate category of Verbal Adjectives (VAdj), although not included in the discussion, can be mentioned as a complementary set of data. VAdjs (e.g. a well-ground powder; They are well pleased with their bishop; …of those wellaffected people) can be considered as Predicative Adjectives, with verbal elements however. As such, they can also be categorized according to verb type. For the HC and CEECS respectively, VAdjs take up 36.5 % (72/197) and 72 % (90/125) of mental verbs – compared to 34 % (67/197) and 21.6 % (27/125) of activity verbs.
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Table 2. Verbs modified by well: Semantic Field distribution in the HC, CEECS and BNC Semantic Field Activity Mental Communication Existence Occurrence Causative Aspectual Indefinite/Implicit Total
HC % 36.4 (695) 41.3 (789) 11.3 (215) 7.1 (135) 3.3 (64) 0.3 (6) 0.1 (2) 0.2 (3) 100 (1909)
CEECS % 31.4 (189) 39.8 (239) 13.5 (81) 9.1 (55) 5.1 (31) 0.2 (1) 0.5 (3) 0.3 (2) 100 (601)
BNC % 56.1 (37) 21.2 (14) 9.1 (6) 7.6 (5) 3 (2) – – 3 (2) 100 (66)
In table 3, a second comparison is presented with more general presentday data (i.e. figures of verb types without well-collocates) from Biber et al. (1999: 365). As in the BNC data, these percentages display the strongest correlation with activity verbs (also see Defour 2005 for a comparison between synchronic and diachronic corpus data). Table 3. General semantic field distribution of verbs in synchronic data (Biber et al. 1999: 365) Semantic Field Activity Mental Communication Existence Occurrence Causative Aspectual Indefinite/Implicit Total
Biber et al. % 49 19 13 8 5 4 3 1018
The fact that historical uses of adverbial well collocate with mental verbs in such high percentages may be connected with the nature of the corpus texts. It is assumed that a higher level of interaction (for one particular genre) will result in a higher use of “subjective” linguistic items. Scheibman states that 8. No raw figures were given in Biber et al. (1999). In total, the percentages do not add up to an even hundred.
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“language – in particular, spontaneous conversation – is subjective in that it is fundamentally used by speakers to express their perceptions, feelings, and opinions …” (2002: 61). She establishes a connection between the communication of subjective attitudes and verb types by referring to the fact that, in her conversational data, verbs of cognition are the most frequently occurring verb class, in combination with first person singular subjects. This ties in with a general hypothesis saying that linguistic elements that commonly appear in conversation should be those that participate in subjective expression …. There should also be greater cooccurrence of items whose combinations lend themselves to conveying speaker point of view than those whose combinations do not (e.g. after Benveniste 1971, verbs of cognition would more frequently appear with a first person singular subject than with a third person singular). In other words … there should be associations between commonly occurring conversational material and semantic and pragmatic expression of subjectivity. (Scheibman 2002: 61)
Mental verbs, expressing “opinions, wants, and feelings, and [those] of other people” (Biber et al. 1999: 365), are a suitable medium for communicating perception and cognitive processes and may therefore serve a relevant function in the interactional frame. Biber et al. state that “mental verbs, especially know, think, see, want, and mean, are particularly common in conversation” (Biber et al. 1999: 378), and confirm that mental verbs seem to have a natural correlation with first and second person subject forms. Finally, Fitzmaurice (2004) also stresses that mental and modal verbs in particular are common grammatical resources for the expression of speaker self-expression – as in e.g. you see, you know, or I believe. It should be noted that, although the use of first person subject forms can be relevant for the development of subjective meanings, this does not necessarily indicate an evolution towards increasing subjectivity (cp. Scheibman 2002: 167; Traugott, this volume). The historical corpus data confirm that the mental verbs with the highest frequency, i.e. know, understand and remember,9 occur most frequently
9. In both historical corpora, know has the highest frequency, followed by do. Apart from know, understand and remember, mental verbs like, love and see also appear in the list of most frequent verbs. However, these are verbs of emotion and perception, and the three cognitive verbs with the highest frequency were chosen because they are more likely to reflect the speaker’s cognitive activities.
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with I and you in collocation with well, as can be seen in table 4 below. Raw figures are added in brackets.10 Table 4. Percentages per corpus: Subjects of mental verbs modified by well: a) Know b) Understand c) Remember KNOW CEECS
(73)
HC
(280)
UNDERSTAND CEECS
(20)
HC
(53)
REMEMBER CEECS
(15)
HC
(15)
I % 35.6 (26) 33.9 (95)
You % 32.9 (24) 25.4 (71)
They % 8.2 (6) 8.2 (23)
He % 11 (8) 18.6 (52)
She % 4.1 (3) 2.5 (7)
It % –
We % –
0.7 (2)
2.5 (7)
I % 55 (11) 11.3 (6)
You % 35 (7) 35.8 (19)
They % –
He % –
She % –
7.5 (4)
24.5 (13)
–
I % 46.7 (7) 66.7 (10)
You % 40 (6) 20 (3)
They % –
He % 13.3 (2) 13.3 (3)
–
Rest % 8.2 (6) 8.2 (23)
We % 5 (1) 9.4 (5)
Rest % 5 (1) 11.3 (6)
She % –
We % –
Rest % –
–
–
–
In contrast to cognitive verbs, activity verbs and communicative verbs from the HC and CEECS – such as do (table 5) or greet – present a more varied picture with regard to subject forms. Apart from these quantitative results, which show that historical uses of adverbial well mainly occur with cognitive verbs and first and second person subject forms, a qualitative study of the contexts in which this collocation occurs may attest whether well provides an additional pragmatic value in its co-occurrence with mental verbs and “interactive” subject forms. 10. The large differences between masculine and feminine third person singular forms may be context-dependent or depending on genre differences. Because of the small numbers of occurrence, more contexts would need to be examined in order to make further generalisations.
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Table 5. Percentages per corpus: Subjects of activity verbs modified by well: Do DO CEECS
(61)
HC
(102)
I % 8.2 (5) 2.9 (3)
You % 54.1 (33) 29.4 (30)
They % 3.3 (2) 15.7 (16)
He % 18 (11) 22.5 (23)
She % 3.3 (2) 4.9 (5)
It % -
We % -
3.9 (4)
6.9 (7)
Rest % 13.1 (8) 13.7 (14)
4.2.2. Mental collocations Although the meaning of well in phrases such as as you well know or you well know that… is mainly referential, Quirk et al. (1985) state that this type of formula (e.g. as you (well) know; as you may know) does not function as a mere reference to the hearer’s cognition or to his or her knowledge of a fact or event, but rather serves as an appeal to the addressee, indicating that “he or she is not being underestimated” and that it is probable that he or she already knows the facts that are referred to. In that sense, a phrase such as as you know can serve as a help to acknowledge the hearer. Its use can prevent face loss and can keep the argumentational flow of a conversation going by integrating the addressee in the discourse frame. The collocation is not limited to second person subject forms. Examples in which a first person subject is combined with well and a verb of cognition (e.g. I understand well that…) can equally help to stress the speaker’s assertion. The following examples may help to attest what exactly the added interactional value of adverbial well is in a collocation of first or second person subject forms with mental verbs. Examples with a first person subject form will be discussed first (examples 25 and 26). (25)
A: I have norysshed in thys place a grete whyle a serpente whych pleased me much…. And yestirday ye slew hym as he gate hys pray. Sey me for what cause ye slew hym, for the lyon was nat youres. B: Madam, I know well the lyon was nat myne, but for the lyon ys more of jantiller nature than the serpente, therefore I slew hym … (HC, Cmmalory [Romances]; 1420–1500) [adapted] A: ‘For a long time I have nourished a serpent in this place, which pleased me much…. And yesterday you killed it as it was trying
The semantic-pragmatic development of well
(26)
177
to catch its prey. Tell me for what cause you slew it, for the lion was not yours.’ B: ‘Madam, I know well the lion was not mine, but because the lion is of a more noble nature than the serpent, therefore I slew it …’ Her majestie I do remember well indeade, and so may you, howe before all my lords she seamed to mislyke that I should take any other charge then as her generall…. (CEECS, Leycester; 1585– 1586)
It appears that the contexts in which these formulas are used can all be explained in the larger frame of an argumentation. In example (25), for instance, the second speaker has to justify himself for killing a snake – which belonged to the first speaker. The situation poses a possible risk of face loss for speaker A. What we can see is that speaker B therefore starts by acknowledging his interlocutor and her claim (I know well the lyon was nat myne) before putting forward his own point of view. The reflection of the accusation diminishes a possible face-threat and allows the speaker to develop his line of reasoning. The additional use of well may play a role in this, in the sense that well presents an intensification of the speaker’s assertion and seems to express a personal viewpoint of the speaker on the truthvalue of his or her claim. Well as it appears in I know well that… can still be seen as a propositional adverb, modifying a lexical verb (as “in a good manner”), but the adverb seems to come close to a more intensified, epistemic meaning, signifying indeed or certainly. This meaning is even explicitly added in example (26) (I do remember well indeade), indicating the speaker’s judgement on the truth-value of the utterance. In examples (27), (28) and (29), the use of a second person subject form explicitly acknowledges the addressee and similarly occurs in contexts where speaker and addressee have divergent views or where the speaker attempts to bring across his or her personal perspective. At the same time, these examples illustrate that the speaker wants to express a form of politeness. In each of the three excerpts, the writer addresses someone who can be considered socially high-ranked (cp. “your maystership”, i.e. Thomas Stonor; “your Ladyship”, i.e. Lady Jane Cornwallis; “Madam”, i.e. Lady Bacon). The relationship between speaker and addressee will necessarily be affected by this. Positive attention is therefore given to the addressee’s face, by presenting the given information as something that is shared already at the start of the utterance.
178 (27)
(28)
(29)
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…, which as your maystership knoweth well was right shorte warnyng, remembring þat þe more parte of my lordes servauntes were sente into Suffolk … (CEECS, Stonor; 1424–1483) ‘… which, as your mastership knows well, was right short notice, bearing in mind that the majority of my lord’s servants were sent to Suffolk …’ I confesse I am not without some regrette that, eyther by [your Ladyship’s] election or my misfortune, it falls out at such a time when I am not soe much at liberty, as [your Ladyship] well knows, nor soe much master of myself, … (CEECS, Cornwall; 1613–1644) Surely, Madam, there is great reason, you very well know, that you should strayne yourself for the effecting of this mach; for, as I have often expressed… (CEECS; Cornwall; 1613–1644)
A phrase such as as your Ladyship well knows… (28), for instance, urges the addressee to consider the validity of the speaker’s utterance. This ties in with Östman’s suggestions on the use of you know, saying that the speaker “does not indicate by you know that he wants the addressee to accept the truth of his proposition, but he wants the addressee to PRESUPPOSE the tenability of what he is saying” (Östman 1981: 18). While you know well can be used by a speaker to emphasize and attain a sense of common ground, certain examples seem to add a more critical sense to the proposition. In a context where speaker and addressee appear to have diverging expectations or points of view, the difference between I/you know that… and I/you very well know that… can illustrate an underlying implication (made by the speaker) which can be paraphrased as “I am not trying to pretend that I don’t know this” or “don’t (you) try to pretend that you don’t know this”. We can compare this with two phrases in Dutch in which a hearer is addressed, namely the neutral phrase “Je weet dat hij in Gent woont” (“You know he lives in Ghent”) versus “Je weet goed genoeg dat hij in Gent woont” (“You know well (enough) he lives in Ghent” – said when the addressee denies). The latter use of you know allows a speaker to express (presumed) certainty (“as you know”): the speaker invokes a prior agreement as the source for the trustworthiness of what he is saying; and the addressee might be expected to believe the speaker. This use of you know is primarily a speaker-oriented, Face-Saving you know: by using the declarative you know, the speaker does not want to be argued against. (Östman 1981: 18)
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The intensified positive meaning of adverbial well can in this sense be used to anticipate possible diverging opinions – which could undermine the truth-content of the utterance, to validate the utterance of the speaker, and to serve as a basis on which the speaker can tackle diverging opinions without creating face loss for the addressee (“I see what you’re saying. However…”). More so, the speaker creates an assumption of shared knowledge (or at least expresses the hope that the hearer will be brought to the same level of understanding). Although well is not an indispensable element in this mental collocation, the use of the adverb does provide an additional intensifying factor, and seems to play an important role in the positioning of the speaker, as well as in establishing common ground. 4.2.3. Positional shift: You know well that… ~ as you well know The historical corpus data illustrate that the relationship between well and collocating verbs (e.g. with to know) is also subject to differences in position. The positional division used in this paper is taken from Quirk et al. (1985: § 8.15–8.23) and can be summarized as follows. An Initial position (I) places the adverbial before all other clause elements (e.g. “Suddenly, the driver started the engine”). In contrast, an adverbial can follow all other obligatory elements in End Position (E); e.g. “The light was fading rapidly”), or can be placed after Subject and Verb but still followed by an obligatory element, i.e. Initial End position – as in “She kept writing in feverish rage long, violent letters of complaint”. Medial position (M) (Quirk et al. 1985: 492) places the adverb between Subject and (finite lexical) verb (“The driver suddenly started the engine”) or after the first auxiliary or the verb to be (“She hadn’t really delighted her audience”). Two variants of M are the Initial Medial position (iM; “She really hadn’t delighted her audience”) and End Medial (eM; “The room must have been quite carefully searched”). The variation between you understand well, with well in Final position, and you well understand, with well in Medial position, may lead us to wonder whether this difference has a correlated influence on the meaning of the collocation, and whether the position which well has in relation to the main verb can serve as a syntactic criterion for determining pragmatic meaning. Tables 6 and 7 below indicate the historical evolution of the position of well in the HC and CEECS – as a verbal modifier of mental verbs, categorized according to three main time periods.
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Table 6. CEECS: know + well: percentages (and raw figures) of the position of well CEECS Initial Medial Final Initial End Total
1400–1500 2.1 (1) 16.7 (8) 39.6 (19) 41.7 (20) 100.1 (48)
1500–1600 – 60 (6) 30 (3) 10 (1) 100 (10)
1600–1680 – 43.75 (7) 25 (4) 31.25 (5) 100 (16)
Table 7. HC: know + well: percentages (and raw figures) of the position of well HC Initial Medial
850 – 950 100 (1) –
950 – 1050 –
End Medial Final
–
100 (1) –
–
–
Initial End Rest
–
–
–
–
100 (1)
100 (1)
Total
1150 – 1250 22.7 (5) 9.1 (2) –
1250 – 1350 29.2 (7) 8.3 (2) –
1420 – 1500 9.6 (8) 8.4 (7) 1.2 (1) 16.9 (14) 63.9 (53) –
1500 – 1570 2.8 (1) 38.9 (14) –
1570 – 1640 –
1640 – 1710 –
42.9 (6) –
21.1 (4) –
29.2 (7) 33.3 (8) –
1350 – 1420 18.75 (15) 11.25 (9) 1.25 (1) 15 (12) 53.75 (43) –
27.3 (6) 36.4 (8) 4.5 (1) 100 (22)
38.9 (14) 19.4 (7) –
28.6 (4) 28.6 (4) –
52.6 (10) 26.3 (5) –
100 (24)
100 (80)
100 (83)
100 (36)
100 (14)
100 (19)
Hoye (1997: 149) noted that Medial position is more usually associated with modality and degree – but whereas we can observe a tentative shift from Final (you know well) towards “intensified” Medial position (you well know) in the CEECS, the HC presents more varied results (table 7) and shows an increase for both Medial and Final position. The distinction between activity verbs and mental verbs, collocating with well in the historical data, made no relevant difference in terms of positional restrictions or evolutions. A comparison with present-day data from the BNC shows that, while the co-occurrence of pragmatic well with know does not undergo a strict positional shift from Final to Medial position, the combination as a whole
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181
becomes subject to a structural change which can be situated on a broader syntactic level. A data sample from the BNC illustrates that well in collocation with know frequently (43%) and increasingly occurs as a parenthetical remark, introduced by as (e.g. as you well know; as you know right well). The development of such parenthetical remarks has been dealt with quite extensively in the literature. Three hypotheses have been suggested for the grammaticalization of epistemic parentheticals such as I mean, you know, I think or I guess. For the evolution of I think/methinks, for instance, Palander-Collin suggests a development from a following that-clause (I think that he will win) to a that-less clause (I think he will win) and finally to a structure where I think can be postponed as an epistemic parenthetical, after the proposition (He will win, I think) (Palander-Collin 1999: in Brinton 2003: 9). An alternative development has been suggested for I think and I guess and related parentheticals (Brinton 1996), starting from a relative structure (e.g. as/so/which I mean) and evolving towards deletion of the relative pronoun and to “a change in status…from adjunct to disjunct” (Brinton 2003: 10). A third hypothesized evolution – suggested for the development of I mean (Brinton 2003) – entails that I mean initially “governs a phrasal element {NP, VP, AP, PP, AdvP}” (2003: 12). The connection with this element is gradually loosened, and allows for I mean to be postponed and reanalysed as an independent element. For the development of you know well, our historical data show that the combination of you and know is initially followed by a noun phrase (with pronoun: example 30), a that-clause (example 31), or a subordinated interrogative clause (example 32). (30)
(31)
þurrh þatt Godd wass wurrþenn mann forr ure miccle nede, þurrh þatt wass he, þatt witt tu wel, all wiþþ hiss lefe wille niþþredd & wannsedd wunnderrlig … (HC, Cmorm [Homilies]; 1150–1250) [adapted] ‘because God had become man for our great need, through that he was, you know [that] well, humbled and greatly diminished al through his will …’ Þou wost ful wel, yif þu wilt wite, þat Ætelwold þe dide site on knes and sweren on messe-bok … þat þou hise douhter sholdest yelde … (HC, Cmhavelo [Romances]; 1250–1350) ‘You know full well, if you want to know, that Ætelwold made you sit on your knees and swear on the missal … that you would (lit. should) hand over his daughter…’
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“Guode womman,” seide þe holie man: “þou wost wel hou it is, þat þat chief louerd habbe þe beste aygte: …”. (HC, Cmseleg [Biographies, saint’s lives]; 1250–1350) ‘“Good woman”, said the holy man: “you know well how it is, that the highest ruler has the most valuable possession: …”.’
In these early sentences, know well has a concrete referential meaning, and appears to have limited scope. In later periods, we can see an increase in the use of you know well as a parenthetical construction, which may or may not be introduced by as (examples 33–36).11 (33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
… ant sire Iohan Abel, mo y mihte telle by tale, boþe of grete ant of smale, ye knowen suyþe wel. (HC, Cmpoemh [History]; 1250– 1350) ‘… and sir Iohan Abel, I might tell more through story, both of great and of small, you know very well.’ Þu hast a garnement wel iweue adoun to þi foot, in whiche þyn husbounde Crist wil haue gret lykyngge to fynde þe icloþed in. An hemme, as þu wost wel, is þe laste ende of a cloþ … (HC, Cmaelr3 [Rules]; 1350–1420) ‘You have a garment well woven down to your foot, in which your husband Christ will be pleased to see you dressed. A hem, as you know well, is the last end of a piece of cloth …’ It is well done ye remembre hym off them ffor dyverse consederacions, as ye know bothe right well. (HC, Cmpriv [Private letters]; 1420–1500) ‘It is well done (if) you remind him of them for diverse reasons, as you both know right well.’ He that doth procure another Man to commit a Felonie or a Murther, I am sure you know well ynough, the Law doth adjudge the Procurer there, a Felon or a Murtherer. (HC, Cetri1 [Proceedings, trials]; 1500–1570)
These examples illustrate the fact that the combination of a mental verb with well and a first or second person subject form appears to become in11. As can be seen in examples (33) to (36) among others, the combination of know and well is frequently complemented by a premodifying or postmodifying element which lends added strength to the assertion. Examples are you know very well, you know right well, or I know well enough.
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creasingly detached from the internal clause structure, and gradually becomes more fixed as a parenthetical collocation with greater positional freedom. A preliminary comparison with contemporary material from the BNC shows that this construction has become even more fixed in presentday use. However, more research is necessary in order to be able to map exact figures and possible evolutions. The combination of well with mental verbs and with what can be called “interactional” subject forms diachronically forms a variety of different layers of meaning – which range from propositional uses to more intensifying meanings that can be applied when speaker and addressee have diverging points of view and want to find a source of shared understanding. In addition, this is structurally reflected in the co-existence of parenthetical uses with sentence-integrated structures. 4.3. Modal collocations 4.3.1. Well with epistemic modals A second collocation occurring frequently in the historical data from the HC and CEECS is the combination of well with modal auxiliaries, as illustrated in the examples below. (37) (38)
(39) (40)
Mr. Coosin, you may well thinke that I wonder at these proceedings in the College. (CEECS, Cosin, 1617–1669) I cannot but bee extremly troubbled at my one misfortune, in that it appears to you (and I confesse it may verie well appeare so) that I am the worst of children to the best of mothers. (CEECS, Cornwall, 1613–1644) My wit is short, ye may wel understonde. (HC, Cmctvers [Fiction], 1350–1420) ‘My wit is short, you may well understand.’ I fere me he cannot well shew them to your mastership. (CEECS, Stonor, 1424–1483) ‘I fear (that) he cannot well show them to your mastership.’
The frequent appearance of the combination of well with modal auxiliary verbs in the historical data is reminiscent of an Old English example mentioned by Traugott and Dasher (2002), in which the use of well is shown to illustrate the subjectification of adverbial well.
184 (41)
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Cwæð he: Wel þæt swa mæg, forþon hi englice ansyne habbað. ‘He said: Well that may (be) so, because they have angelic faces.’ (?900 Bede, ii.i. [Schipper] 110 [Jucker 1997: 100], in Traugott and Dasher 2002: 175)
Example (41) portrays well as an element which can hardly be seen as a propositional modifier but rather as an element which has evolved towards a more epistemic meaning – which can be paraphrased as ‘indeed’ or ‘certainly’. Placed in utterance-initial position, and as early as the Old English period, well can be attributed with an increased level of epistemic modality,12 which is, according to Hoye’s definition (1997: 42–43), concerned with matters of knowledge or belief on which basis speakers express their judgements about states of affairs, events or actions. [The speaker is] not making statements of fact or categorical assertions but conveying his subjective view of the world.
The combination of well with epistemic may is by far the most frequent modal collocation in the historical material from the HC and CEECS, taking up more than 75% (HC) and 60% (CEECS) respectively. Table 8 presents an overview of the epistemic modals collocating with well in the respective corpora. Table 8. Most frequent modals in collocation with well: percentages per corpus Modals May Might Can Shall Ought (to) Would Birde (= ought to) Total
CEECS 61.1 (22) 22.2 (8) 13.9 (5) 2.8 (1) – – – 100 (36)
HC 75.3 13.4 1 6.2 2.1 1 1 100
(73) (13) (1) (6) (2) (1) (1) (97)
12. Both Goossens (1982) and Bybee (1988) state that “clear epistemic meanings are hard to find out in Middle English” (Goossens 1982: 78). In many cases, the interpretation depends on semantic context – mark, for instance, the ambiguity in “…he must extraordinarily well know paintings”. Because of the ambiguity with regard to modals in historical data, all entries were classified on a case-by-case basis in order to distinguish between tokens illustrating deontic and epistemic modality.
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May well has turned into a fixed idiom in present-day English. Shibasaki states that it is “the most frequently used expression in the modal verb– adverb construction, synchronically and diachronically” (2003: 400). The collocation is invariable and an example of “semantic harmonization”, which entails that may and well are semantically within the same scope of modality, and that their co-occurrence creates a stronger level of epistemicity than the sum of the two individual elements. Hoye (1997: 240) indicates that the combination of well and may not only creates an intensification of the modal, but a transformation of its meaning. Whereas the unmodified modal signifies possibility (example 42), the combination with well conveys probability (43). (42) (43)
it may / might / can / could be true that he beat her it may / might / can / could well be true that he beat her (Quirk et al. 1985: 588)
The value of well in this type of restricted modal environment (may well) lies in the fact that well signifies a transformation in the epistemic value of the auxiliary, which … alters the status of the speaker’s attitude and commitment towards the ‘known facts’. (Hoye 1997: 210)
Whereas the use of may represents the speaker’s subjective view on the probability or truth-value of a propositional fact or an utterance, the supplementary use of well “additionally lends weight to the force of the speaker’s argument” (Hoye 1997: 144), creating an environment in which not only the contents of the utterance are given a greater truth-value but also the subjective view of the speaker is credited with additional authority. 4.3.2. Position The Old English example mentioned by Traugott and Dasher (example 41) places well in utterance-initial position (Well that may be so). Although this use needs to be distinguished from pragmatic marker-uses in which well is also placed utterance-initially (as in Well, that may be so…), the fact that well has initial position in this example may tell us something about the historical evolution and positional value of well in this modal collocation. Well may…(Initial; e.g. example 44) needs to be differentiated from the related collocational string may well (Medial; e.g. 45).
186 (44)
(45)
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For out of a mans hert es broght al-kins euil, als idell thoght of man-slaghter and avowtri, fornicaciowns and felony …. Wele ge may vmthink gow þan þat þise er þai þat files a man. (HC, Cmnorhom [Homilies]; 1350–1420) ‘For out of a man’s heart is brought all kinds of evil, such as vain thoughts of manslaughter and adultery, fornications and treachery, …. Well you may consider then that these are the things that render a man morally corrupt.’ … layeth a very great obligation upon me to returne you my most thankfull acknowledgment of your speciall kindnes …. It may well be that I am in this particular likewise beholden to Mr. Gayers, of whose generous freedome and bonte I have had divers testimonies heretofore. (CEECS, Cosin; 1617–1669)
Hoye stresses that, in present-day English, the former (with well preceding the modal auxiliary) breaks the unity of meaning that may well has, and “more clearly carries the independent meanings of its constituent items and denotes ‘indeed possible’” (1997: 233). This kind of correlation between syntax and meaning can also be seen in can’t possibly versus possibly…can’t. Both may well and can’t possibly respectively indicate probability and impossibility (negative certainty) and form a collocational unit where the adverb strengthens the sense of (un)certainty expressed by the modal auxiliary. In the case of possibly can’t (as with well may), the adverb adds propositional meaning and changes the content of the collocational string. The positive sense of adverbial well seems intensified when placed in initial position, and in the Old English example (example 41), the position of well provides additional strength to the speaker’s personal assertion and [renders] the speaker’s assertion all the more forceful and … can be used in a manipulative sense ‘to seduce the addressee into believing the content of the proposition’ (Hoye 1997: 213).
Historically, the position of well with regard to the collocating modal auxiliary undergoes an evolution towards an increased use of Medial position. In the material from the CEECS, all 22 tokens of well (in collocation with may) are placed in Medial position (including one eM token in the period 1566–1638). The HC-data (table 9 and figure 1) show a more varied picture.
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The semantic-pragmatic development of well Table 9. HC: Well + may: positions of well (per period) Period 850–950 950–1050 1150–1250 1250–1350 1350–1420 1420–1500 1500–1570 1570–1640 1640–1710 Total
Total/ period 3 2 9 2 17 19 9 9 3 73
I
M
iM
eM
iE
33.3 (1) – 33.3 (3) 50 (1) 11.8 (2) 10.5 (2) – – – (9)
66.7 (2) 50 (1) 44.4 (4) 50 (1) 82.3 (14) 89.5 (17) 88.9 (8) 100 (9) 100 (3) (59)
– 50 (1) 22.2 (2) – – – – – – (3)
– – – – 5.9 (1) – – – – (1)
– – – – – – 11.1 (1) – – (1)
120 100
I
80
M
60
iM
40
eM
20
iE
85 09 95 50 01 11 050 50 -1 12 250 50 -1 13 350 50 -1 14 420 20 -1 15 500 00 -1 15 570 70 -1 16 640 40 -1 71 0
0
Figure 1. HC: Well + may: positions of well (per period)
We can see that there is a general – although not absolute – tendency for well to occur in Medial position (88.8% of all historical tokens), and that there are increasingly fewer collocations in which well appears utteranceinitially. It must be kept in mind that these tendencies are based on a relatively small number of occurrences, and that percentages therefore indicate general directions rather than straightforward theoretical evolutions. The graph illustrates that well and may evolve towards an increasingly fixed collocation, in which well follows and specifies the modal verb head. The use of adverbial well as it appears in this modal collocation (e.g. as you may well know) shows an evolution towards semantic reduction, a high
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level of dependency on the modal verb head – strengthening the epistemic character of well – and a high degree of integration in the clause – which indicates an advanced progression in the process of grammaticalization. These factors are indications that well could be treated as a modal particle (see Hoye 1997: 209). Modal particles (MP) are related to pragmatic markers and work on similar levels. Modal particles and pragmatic markers both have an evaluative and interpersonal significance (e.g. Weydt 1969; Hansen 1998). Although there is no clear consensus about their exact definitions, we can say that modal particles focus more on the speaker’s stance, the speaker’s relationship with the addressee, pragmatic politeness strategies (see Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2003), background assumptions and the concern of creating shared knowledge in conversation. MPs can be seen as a subset of pragmatic markers and are said to “‘sit in between’ propositional content and interaction-related functions of language” (Waltereit 2005). Hoye states that modal particles help to “characterize and promote the speaker’s version of the world which is then offered to or imposed on others” (1997: 67). In English, modal particles are uncommon and according to most researchers even non-existent. However, in other languages we can find modal particles which behave similarly to well (at least in particular restricted contexts), for instance the German MPs ja and dann (Abraham 1984), the Swedish väl (‘surely’) or ju (‘as you know’) – also see Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2003 – and vel in Norwegian13 (see Johansson 2006). Johansson refers to examples where well is translated by vel in its function as modal particle and has the meaning of ‘I suppose’. In contrastive research, ju, for instance, is found as a translation of well in the context of an ongoing argumentation. Ja…ju not only lexically shares the positive meaning of well, but is also considered to be an “obviousness particle (‘as you know’) with a rhetorical, argumentative character” (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2003: 1140) – which can be compared with our findings that, in certain restricted contexts, well can be used by the speaker to defend a particular viewpoint and at the same time to acknowledge a possible “conflict of interests”. In this historical collocation of well and may it becomes apparent that the propositional adverb well (in a good manner) has evolved to a meaning that is weakened semantically but strengthened pragmatically and epistemically. The use of well as the “satellite” of 13. In initial position, Norwegian vel and English well can both express agreement, disagreement or qualified agreement. Both can be found in dialogues as well as in monologues – representing a person’s thought. Vel, however, covers a more restricted area of use than well (Johansson 2006: 118–121).
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a modal auxiliary such as may allows the speaker to give additional strength to a subjective evaluation and supports the speaker’s authority to claim that something may or may not be the case. 5. Conclusion From a historical perspective, various propositional uses of well can be seen as a source for further semantic-pragmatic development. Placed in utterance-initial position, the inherent positive meaning of well can indicate the acceptance of a situation – and thus serves as a starting-point for the historical development of increasingly pragmatic and (inter)subjective meanings. Diachronic material from the HC and CEECS illustrates that non-initial uses of well can similarly display different levels of delexicalization or intensification, depending on collocating subjects and/or verbs. In collocation with cognitive verbs and a first or second person subject (e.g. as you well know), adverbial well can serve as a means to strengthen the positioning of the speaker and to establish a source of common ground with the addressee in contexts where both interactants have diverging opinions. Syntactically, the combination of well with mental verbs seems to have evolved towards an independent parenthetical structure, with a broader scope (as/which you know well). Well displays an advanced level of delexicalization and syntactic dependency in collocation with modal auxiliaries. In combination with epistemic may in particular, well conveys an increased level of modality and subjectivity, allowing the speaker to give additional strength to his or her opinion on the truth of an utterance (as you may well know). Propositional meanings of well remain visible in later pragmatic and epistemic uses of the marker, even in advanced stages of grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification. Although we cannot establish a straightforward connection between intensified collocations in which well plays a defining role and utterance-initial pragmatic uses of well, we can, however, consider the possibility that these various uses – with different levels of epistemic or subjective strength – are the result of diverging developments. As such, different polysemous uses of well co-exist, but each has a specific semantic-pragmatic context in which they can be applied. As a common denominator, the element of acceptance inherent in adverbial well can be seen to be increasingly “recruited” in contexts where speaker and addressee need a
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means to express speaker attitude, and to establish a greater interactional understanding between different interactants. Acknowledgements The research reported on in this article was carried out in the framework of the Project “Grammaticalization and (Inter)Subjectification” (Project Number P6/44 Interuniversity Attraction Poles), funded by the Belgian Science Policy Office. Sources of data BNC CEECS
CED
HC
MED
OED
The British National Corpus. (last acessed 01/04/2009) The Corpus of Early English Correspondence (Sampler) (on cdrom). 1998. International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English (ICAME). Compiled by Terttu Nevalainen and Helena Raumolin-Brunberg. Department of English, University of Helsinki. (last accessed 01/04/2009) A Corpus of English Dialogues 1560–1760. 2006. Compiled under the supervision of Merja Kytö (Uppsala University) and Jonathan Culpeper (Lancaster University). (last accessed 01/04/2009) The Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, Third Edition (1996) on cd-rom (International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English [ICAME]). Matti Rissanen. Compiled by Merja Kytö. Department of English, University of Helsinki. (last accessed 01/04/2009) The Middle English Dictionary. Hans Kurath, Sherman Kuhn et al. (eds.). 1952–. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan University Press. The Middle English Dictionary Online: (last accessed 01/04/2009) The Oxford English Dictionary. James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley, William A. Craigie and Charles T. Onions (eds.) 1989 [1961]. Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Oxford English Dictionary Online: (last accessed 01/04/2009)
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References Abraham, Werner 1984 De betekenis en de functie van het Nederlandse wel – een vergelijking met het Duits [The meaning and the function of Dutch wel – a comparison with German]. In Studies over Nederlandse Partikels [Studies on Dutch particles]. Antwerp Papers in Linguistics 35, Johan van der Auwera and Willy Vandeweghe (eds.), 17–46. Antwerp: University of Antwerp. Aijmer, Karin 2002 English Discourse Particles: Evidence From a Corpus. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Aijmer, Karin and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen 2003 The discourse particle well and its equivalents in Swedish and Dutch. Linguistics 41: 1123–1161. Aijmer, Karin, Ad Foolen and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen 2006 Pragmatic markers in translation: a methodological proposal. In Approaches to Discourse Particles, Kerstin Fischer (ed.), 101–114. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Auer, Peter 1996 The pre-front field in spoken German and its relevance as a grammaticalization position. Pragmatics 6: 295–322. Benveniste, Emile 1971 Problems in General Linguistics. Trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Cables, FL: University of Miami Press. Original French publication, 1958. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad and Edward Finegan 1999 The Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. London: Longman. Brinton, Laurel J. 1996 Pragmatic Markers in English: Grammaticalization and Discourse Functions. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Brinton, Laurel J. 2003 I mean: the rise of a pragmatic marker. Paper presented at the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (GURT), Georgetown, Washington, DC, February 15–17 2003. Bybee, Joan L. 1988 Semantic substance vs. contrast in the development of grammatical meaning. In Proceedings of the fourteenth annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, Shelley Axmaker, Annie Jaisser and Helen Singmaster (eds.), 247–264. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistics Society.
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Culpeper, Jonathan and Merja Kytö 1997 Towards a Corpus of Dialogues, 1550–1750. In Language in Time and Space. Studies in Honour of Wolfgang Viereck on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday (Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik – Beihefte 97), Heinrich Ramisch and Kenneth Wynne (eds.), 60–73. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Culpeper, Jonathan and Merja Kytö 2000 Data in historical pragmatics. Spoken interaction (re)cast as writing. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 1: 175–199. Defour, Tine 2005 (Inter)subjectification and pragmatic change in the development of well: A corpus-based comparison. Phrasis 46: 37–61. Finell, Anne 1989 Well now and then. (squib) Journal of Pragmatics 13: 653–656. Fitzmaurice, Susan 2004 Subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the historical construction of interlocutor stance: from stance markers to discourse markers. Discourse Studies 6: 427–448. Francis, W. Nelson 1982 Problems of assembling and computerizing large corpora. In Computer Corpora in English Language Research, Stig Johansson (ed.), 7–24. Bergen: Norwegian Computing Centre for the Humanities. Fraser, Bruce 1999 What are discourse markers? Journal of Pragmatics 31: 931–952. Goossens, Louis 1982 On the development of the modals and of the epistemic function in English. In Papers from the fifth ICHL, Ander Ahlqvist (ed.), 74–84. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard 1998 The Function of Discourse Particles. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Hopper, Paul J. 1991 On some principles of grammaticization. In Approaches to Grammaticalization, Vol. I, Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine (eds.), 17–35. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Hoye, Leo 1997 Adverbs and Modality in English. London/NY: Longman Jacobs, Andreas and Andreas H. Jucker 1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In Historical Pragmatics, Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Johansson, Stig 2006 How well can well be translated? On the English discourse particle well and its correspondences in Norwegian and German. In
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Watts, Richard J. 1986 Relevance in conversational moves: a reappraisal of ‘well’. Studia Anglica Posnaniensia 19: 37–59. Weydt, Harald 1969 Abtönungspartikel: Die deutschen Modalwörter und ihre französischen Entsprechungen. Bad Homburg: Gehlen.
Paths in the development of elaborative discourse markers: Evidence from Spanish Teresa Fanego Abstract This chapter examines the development of the Spanish manner adverbial de hecho ‘in practice’ into a DM roughly synonymous with English in fact and indeed, and addresses two main research questions, namely: a) whether the history of Spanish de hecho can help to confirm some of the hypotheses put forward by Traugott regarding the trajectories followed by DMs cross-linguistically (cf., among others, Traugott 1982, 1995, 2003; Traugott and Dasher 2002); and b) whether there is any morphosyntactic evidence correlating with the semantic-pragmatic changes undergone by de hecho which might justify an analysis in terms of grammaticalization. The analysis shows that, as expected, the historical development of de hecho is analogous to that of DMs like in fact, indeed, or actually, all of which started as VPAdvs and evolved into DMs via a sentence adverbial stage. With respect to the second research question, the evidence from two large corpora of historical and contemporary Spanish indicates that, when de hecho evolves from a VPAdv into a SAdv, the shift has both semantic and morphosyntactic consequences, such as desemanticization, context generalization (use in new contexts) and decategorialization (loss in the morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the source forms), all of which are indeed indicative of increased grammaticalization. By contrast, there are no grounds to consider the further development of the SAdv de hecho into a DM as also falling within the field of grammaticalization, since there is no evidence of the structural and morphosyntactic changes which are criterial for the definition of that process, as this is understood in Traugott’s work generally.
1. Introduction Since the 1980s, grammaticalization has taken up an important place in linguistic research, and the term grammaticalization has come to be applied to a very large number of linguistic changes which include, apart from prototypical instances of grammaticalization such as the development of function words from content words, other more peripheral or even controversial
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cases, such as changes in word order (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991: 25; Haspelmath 2004: 26, 38), the development of discourse markers (DMs), or categorial changes like those undergone by the English toinfinitive (Los 2004, 2005) and gerund (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 240– 244; Fanego 2004: 45–49), two forms which started as verbal nouns of action and evolved into parts of the verb system. The focus of this paper1 is on the development of the Spanish manner adverbial de hecho ‘in practice’ into a DM roughly synonymous with English in fact and indeed. The view that the historical development of DMs has similarities with the developments taking place within the domain of grammaticalization was first put forward by Elizabeth Traugott in her ground-breaking article on the regularity of semantic change (1982) and was explored in greater detail in Traugott (1995, 2003), Tabor and Traugott (1998), Schwenter and Traugott (2000) and Traugott and Dasher (2002). In the two decades since Traugott’s initial work, research on DMs from the perspective of grammaticalization has multiplied; witness Jucker (1995), Brinton (1996), Onodera (2004), and Hansen and Rossari (2005), among many others. Yet with exceptions such as Garachana Camarero (1998), Pons Bordería and Ruiz Gurillo (2001) or Company Company (2004, 2006, 2008), the diachrony of Spanish DMs has attracted very little attention to date. One of the aims of this paper, therefore, is to examine the history of a Spanish DM whose English cognate, in fact, has been studied from both the synchronic (Oh 2000; Smith and Jucker 2000; Aijmer and SimonVandenbergen 2004) and diachronic (Schwenter and Traugott 2000) perspectives; synchronic descriptions of French en fait/de fait and Italian infatti are also available (cf. Danjou-Flax 1980; Roulet 1987; Rossari 1992; Iordanskaja and Mel’þuk 1995; Brutti 1999). A second aim is to check wheth1. Some of the material in this paper was originally prepared for a plenary lecture presented at the International Conference From ideational to interpersonal: Perspectives from grammaticalization (FITIGRA), held at the University of Leuven in February 2005; I would like to thank the participants in the conference for helpful discussion and the conference organizers for kindly inviting me to speak at such an intellectually rewarding event. Thanks are also due to Carla Dechant, Bruce Fraser, Tomás Jiménez Juliá, Salvador Pons Bordería, Elena Rivas, María José Rodríguez Espiñeira, Scott Schwenter, Victoria Vázquez Rozas, and the editors and anonymous reviewers for this volume. Last but not least, I am grateful for generous financial support to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and the European Regional Development Fund (grant HUM2007–60706/FILO), and the Autonomus Government of Galicia (INCITE grant 08PXIB204016PR).
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er the history of Spanish de hecho can help to confirm some of the hypotheses put forward by Traugott and her associates regarding the trajectories followed by DMs cross-linguistically. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines DMs; Sections 3 and 4 give an overview of research on DMs from the point of view of semantic change and grammaticalization respectively; Section 5 introduces the research questions that this study intends to answer and examines the functions and development of Spanish de hecho; Section 6 closes the paper. 2. Discourse markers defined It is notorious that DMs constitute a very heterogeneous group rather than a well defined word class, as is clear from the great number of different definitions and descriptive terms found in the literature, such as discourse particles (Schourup [1982] 1985; Zwicky 1985; Fischer 2000, 2006; Aijmer 2002), discourse markers (Schiffrin 1987; Blakemore 2002), discourse connectives (Blakemore 1987: 104ff) or pragmatic markers (Brinton 1996). In this paper the label discourse marker will be understood in the restrictive sense it has in authors such as Fraser and Malamud-Makowski (1996), Traugott (1995, 2002: 154ff) or Fleischman and Yaguello (2004: 143), rather than in the broader sense initially proposed by Schiffrin (1987); in this restrictive use the term DM refers to a subset of a far larger set of pragmatic markers2 and comprises expressions whose function necessarily involves a relationship between two segments of discourse: [DMs] are usually in initial position, although medial and final position are possible for many of them, and they signal how the utterance following (U2) is to be interpreted, given the first utterance (U1). … The meaning of a discourse marker is procedural rather than representational, which means that it provides instructions to the hearer about how to interpret U2 rather than designating a specific concept. (Fraser and Malamud-Makowski 1996: 864– 865)
As Traugott and Dasher (2002: 152) put it, DMs are subjectified expressions
2. Among Hispanic linguists, a similar distinction between pragmatic markers in general and a smaller subset of DMs or conectores (‘connectives’) has been made most explicitly by Fuentes Rodríguez (1994, 2001, 2003).
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signal[ling] an aspect of the speaker’s rhetorical stance toward what he or she is saying, or toward the addressee’s role in the discourse situation. They have little conceptual semantics, and do not contribute significantly to the truth-conditional meaning of propositions … they mark the speaker’s view of the sequential relationship between units of discourse, that is, they serve as connectives between utterances.
Some examples of DMs, all taken from Traugott’s work, include so in some of its meanings (e.g. “So, what’s for lunch?”); anyway as used in “anyway, probably the enemy is surviving on birds and squirrels”, where it is used to signal a return to a prior topic (cf. Tabor and Traugott 1998: 255; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 95); or indeed as used in (1), where it signals that what follows “is not only in agreement with what precedes, but is additional evidence being brought to bear on the argument” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 164): (1)
1630 Taylor, Penniless Pilgrimage, 131.C1 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165): any a one that is not well, comes farre and neere in hope to be made well: indeed I did heare that it had done much good, and that it hath a rare operation to expel or kill diuers maladies.
The essential property of DMs, as defined above, is therefore that they have primarily procedural meanings (cf. Blakemore 1987, 2002).3 In this respect, they are to be distinguished from sentence adverbials (SAdvs), which include, among others, modality or epistemic adverbials (probably, certainly), evaluatives (fortunately, regrettably), and speech act adverbials (frankly, briefly). Unlike DMs, sentence adverbials have conceptual meaning, in the sense of Blakemore (1987, 2002); witness (2): (2)
A: Sinceramente, es una buena película. B: Eso no lo dices sinceramente, lo dices porque sabes que a mí me gusta. A: ‘Sincerely, that’s a good movie.’
3. An anonymous reviewer wonders whether I hold “that DMs have purely procedural meaning and absolutely no conceptual meaning”. It is apparent throughout this chapter, however, that I adhere to the view that grammaticalized items, whether DMs, SAdvs or other, exhibit what Hopper and Traugott ([1993] 2003: 49) refer to as layering, i.e. the presence of different layers of meaning at the same time.
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B: ‘You are not saying that sincerely, you are saying it because you know that I like it.’ The Spanish speech act adverb sinceramente does not impose additional truth conditions on its own clause, but its meaning is conceptual, rather than procedural, as shown by the fact that it is possible to negate that one is speaking “sincerely” (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1993; Martín Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro 1999: 4058–4059).4 Apart from the semantic difference just mentioned, two additional differences between DMs and sentence adverbials have sometimes been pointed out in the relevant literature, one pertaining to morphosyntax, the other to intonation; they will be discussed in Section 4 below. 3. Cross-linguistic regularities in the semantic development of DMs In her seminal paper on the regularity of semantic change, Traugott (1982) put forward the hypothesis that there is a strong cross-linguistic tendency for semantic-pragmatic change to proceed along the path in (3), but not in the reverse direction: (3)
propositional > (textual >) expressive
This cline, which was based on Halliday and Hasan’s (1976: 26ff) proposal that there are three functional-semantic components or dimensions of language, namely the ideational, textual and interpersonal (= Traugott’s expressive) dimensions, has given way in Traugott’s more recent work to a more complex model of semantic change, labelled the Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC; see in particular Traugott and Dasher 2002: 34ff, also Traugott this volume: 54ff). This assumes several corre-
4. The contrast between conceptual and procedural meanings is analogous to the distinction established by Sweetser (1990) between interpretation in the content domain and interpretation in the speech-act domain, as illustrated in the following examples of causal constructions: (i) Since John wasn’t there, we decided to leave a note for him. (His absence caused our decision in the real world.) (ii) Since we’re on the subject, when was George Washington born? (The fact that we’re on the subject enables my act of asking the question.)
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lated paths of unidirectionality (see Table 1) and views pragmatic implicatures as playing a crucial bridging role in semantic change. Table 1. Correlated paths of directionality in semantic change (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 40) truth-conditional 5
>
non-truth-conditional
content
> content/procedural
> procedural
scope within proposition
> scope over proposition
> scope over discourse
nonsubjective
> subjective
> intersubjective
Traugott and Dasher illustrate these recurring patterns of change by examining changes in four different semantic domains, namely modal verbs, DMs, performative verbs, and social deictics. It is hypothesized that the regularities observed in these four domains “are major tendencies … available for any kind of change that involves semantic development of at least those lexemes that are recruited to the target domains” (2002: 282) in question. With regard to DMs in particular, Traugott and Dasher (see also Traugott 1995, 2003; Tabor and Traugott 1998: 254ff; Schwenter and Traugott 2000) note that many of them have their source in VP adverbials which evolve into DMs, often via a sentence adverbial stage in which the adverbial has an adversative meaning or function. More specifically, based on the analysis of Japanese sate ‘so, well’ and of the English markers indeed, in fact, actually and well, Traugott and Dasher (2002: 187, 281) propose that the development of DMs takes place along the various stages of development reflected in Table 2, each stage involving increased subjectivity and, ultimately, intersubjectivity, in the sense that the expressions in question gradually develop a semantic or pragmatic meaning primarily indexing speaker attittude or viewpoint (subjectivity) and speaker’s attention to addressee self-image (intersubjectivity).
5. Following Sweetser (1990), Traugott and Dasher (2002: 10) use the labels “content meaning” and “contentful meaning” for Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) “conceptual meaning”, as defined in Section 2 above.
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Table 2. Correlated paths of directionality in the development of DMs (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 187) ADVmanner
> ADVadversative
content
> content/procedural
scope within proposition
> scope over proposition
nonsubjective
> subjective
> ADVelaboration
> ADVhedge6 > procedural
> scope over discourse > intersubjective
Thus, in the case of English indeed, in fact and actually, three elaborative7 DMs closely related to the Spanish adverbial which is the concern of this paper, Traugott and Dasher (2002: 157–175) show that all three items started as clause-internal adverbials, came then to function as epistemic sentence adverbials, and ended up as DMs, though indeed (< Middle English in dede ‘in action, in practice’) developed DM uses around 1600, some two hundred years earlier than the other two items (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171). These various stages are outlined in the following paragraphs. A) Stage I: indeed1 / in fact1 / actually1 = VP adverbials of respect or manner meaning ‘in action, in practice’. Certain discourse contexts could invite the inference that the event was observable, and the fallacy “seeing is believing”, which draws on the view that what is physically/empirically accessible is true, allowed the adverbials to be endowed with evidential (epistemic) modal meanings: ‘in action/practice’ > ‘in actuality, certainly’ (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 160). E.g.:
6. An anonymous reviewer enquires about the term “adverbial hedge” used by Traugott and Dasher and how it differs from the term DM. Though the distinction is by no means clear-cut, hedges are used to convey imprecision or approximation; they encode the speaker/writer’s anticipation of the hearer/reader’s expectations and are aimed at reducing the hearer’s belief in what has just been said. In this sense, they are markers of intersubjectivity. An example would be the use of well in the sentence Yeah, we allow dogs in here; well you’ve managed to get one in anyway. For discussion of hedges see for instance Fleischman and Yaguello (2004: 134) and Lewis (2006: 46), from whom the example is taken. 7. The terms “elaboration” and “elaborative” go back to Halliday ([1985] 1994: 324). In fact and related DMs are members of the semantic field of expectation, and the label “DMs of expectation” is also often applied to them.
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c. 1300 Fox and Wolf, p. 34 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 159): “Vuolf,” quod þe vox him þo, “All þat þou hauest her before I-do, In þohut, in speche, and in dede, In euche oþeres kunnes quede, Ich þe forвeue.” ‘“Wolf,” said Fox to him then, “All that you have done before this, in thought, in speech, and in action, in evil of every other kind, I forgive you for it.”’ 1690 Locke, Ess. Hum. Und., Bk. 2, Ch. 21, Sec. 36 (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 15): If we enquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact, and examine why …
B) Stage II: indeed2 / in fact2 / actually2 = epistemic adverbials with sentential scope often “serving a polyphonic adversative function” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171) and expressing commitment to the truth of the proposition (i.e. “It is true that…”, “the truth is that…”). E.g.: (6)
(7)
1531 Elyot, The boke named the gouernour, p. 21 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 163): [teachers] somtyme purposely suffring [‘allowing’] the more noble children to vainquysshe [‘succeed, get the prizes’], and, as it were, gyuyng to them place and soueraintie, thoughe in dede the inferiour chyldren haue more lernyng. 1739–40 Hume, Treat. Hum. Und. Foot. 75, p. 510 (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 18): since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one, and should connect them together in the closest manner. But in fact the case in always found to be otherwise.
C) Stage III: indeed3 / in fact3 / actually3 = DMs with an elaborative function. At this stage the prime function of the adverbials is to signal additivity: what follows is not only in agreement with what precedes, but is additional evidence being brought to bear on the argument. (8)
1630 Taylor Penniless Pilgrimage, p. 131.C1 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165): any a one that is not well, comes farre and neere in hope to be made well: indeed I did heare that it had done much good, and that it hath a rare operation to expel or kill diuers maladies.
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1886 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, chapter 1, p. 5 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 168): Thus in various ways ethical questions lead inevitably to psychological discussions; in fact, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological.
We can conclude this brief outline of Traugott’s approach to semantic change by drawing attention to its implications for current hypotheses about language change in general. Unlike generative models, which view language change as triggered by child language acquisition (see e.g. Lightfoot 1991), Traugott’s model assumes that many linguistic changes are not initiated by children, but rather by teens and adults, because of the complex inferences involved and the discourse functions in structuring text: the model of acquisition assumed is one that does not privilege young children, but rather young adults … and, especially in earlier times, those carrying the authority of education, law, or political or ecclesiastical and educational power. However, they may well be spread by children and younger adults, who pick up and extend innovations. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 41–42; see also Traugott this volume: 55–56) To have a full understanding of the changes discussed here and their impact on language-users, it will be important to know, among other things, in which text types particular changes are favored, and among which groups of people. For example, it has been suggested (Macaulay 1995) that English speakers in authoritative position, or those who position themselves as having authority, may favor stronger epistemic adverbials (e.g. in fact, surely) than others in less authoritative position. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 283– 284)
4. The development of DMs in relation to grammaticalization In addition to the attention she has given to DMs within her IITSC model, Traugott has also looked at DMs from the point of view of grammaticalization studies. In her (1995) address to the 12th International Conference on Historical Linguistics (Manchester), as also in several later publications (Tabor and Traugott 1998; Traugott 2003; Brinton and Traugott 2005: 136– 140), she has put forward the question of whether the development of DMs could or could not be included within the domain of grammaticalization. She aptly notes that SAdvs and DMs appear to undergo several of the morphosyntactic and semantic changes associated with grammaticalization (as outlined, for instance, in Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991 or Lehmann
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[1982] 2002: 108ff), such as decategorialization (loss in morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the source forms) or shift from more to less referential meanings. They do not, however, exhibit one of the syntactic parameters identified by Lehmann as also criterial for grammaticalization, namely condensation in structural scope, that is condensation in the extent of the construction which they enter or help to form, since both SAdvs and DMs have wider scope and relate to larger stretches of discourse than the VP internal adverbials which often are their sources, as becomes evident if one compares the VP adverbial in fact with the adversative SAdv (cf. 11) and the elaborative DM (cf. 12) that have evolved from it: (10) (11)
(12)
United Airlines Magazine, May 1997 (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 11): Humanity is absent in fact but everywhere present in feeling. 1739–40 Hume, Treat. Hum. Und. Foot. 75, p. 510 (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 18): since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one, and should connect them together in the closest manner. But in fact the case in always found to be otherwise. 1886 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, chapter 1, p. 5 (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 168): Thus in various ways ethical questions lead inevitably to psychological discussions; in fact, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological.
Tabor and Traugott (1998) and Traugott (2003; also this volume: 41) therefore challenge Lehmann’s notion of decrease in structural scope as criterial for grammaticalization, and propose instead that in some change episodes, such as those involving the development of SAdvs and DMs from earlier VP adverbs, grammaticalization may involve increase in structural scope, rather than decrease.8 From this perspective, therefore, it is appropriate to consider the development of DMs and SAdvs from other parts of speech as
8. Since my concern in this paper is with the question of whether there exist structural differences between SAdvs and DMs, as claimed by Traugott in many places and as more fully discussed in the next paragraphs, I will not go here into the problems posed by Tabor and Traugott’s definition of scope, which they characterize in terms of the generative notion of C-command. As Fischer (2007: 313) aptly notes, a definition of scope in such formal terms is “bound up with all kinds of theory-internal motivations”, and may therefore not be the best tool to measure scope by in research on grammaticalization.
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“the legitimate object of study in terms of grammaticalization” (Traugott 2003: 643). A different issue is how exactly SAdvs and DMs differ from each other. As noted above, both SAdvs and DMs exhibit increase in structural scope; they differ semantically, however, in that the former encode primarily conceptual meanings and the latter procedural meanings (see Section 2 above), but this criterion alone does not seem to be enough to argue that they involve different degrees of grammaticalization, since grammaticalization is a process generally understood to imply not just semantic/pragmatic changes but also structural and morphosyntactic ones.9 Witness in this respect various definitions of grammaticalization by Traugott and her colleagues: In sum, we take the limits of the field of inquiry [of grammaticalization] to be gradual morphosyntactic and semantic change which results in grammatical reanalysis. (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 236; emphasis added) Grammaticalization is in essence a morphosyntactic phenomenon, most crucially the development of functional categories (auxiliary, case, preposition, subordinator, etc.) out of constructions including lexical categories (main verb, nominal in adposition, etc.); it also involves intraconstructional fusion. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 283; emphasis added)
In order for SAdvs and DMs to be recognized as separate formations, each worthy of consideration from the grammaticalization perspective, it should be possible, therefore, to identify in them distinctive structural properties. That such properties can be found has been claimed by Traugott: most analyses of adverbials and pragmatic markers conflate the IPAdv [= SAdv] and DM functions. For example, Biber and Finegan in their seminal (1988) paper on “stance adverbs” conflate them as IPAdvs, Fraser (1988, 1990) conflates them as DMs. However, they are different syntactically, semantically, pragmatically, and intonationally. (Traugott 1995: 6)
Statements to the same effect can be read in Tabor and Traugott (1998: 253–257), Schwenter and Traugott (2000: 13, 21), Traugott and Dasher (2002: 158–159) and Traugott (2003: 639–640). More specifically, Traugott notes two main structural differences between SAdvs and DMs, one 9. An apparent exception to this prevailing view is Himmelmann (2004: 33). In a rather confused account of the differences between lexicalization and grammaticalization, he argues that semantic/pragmatic changes are “the core defining feature of grammaticization processes” and that “often, but not necessarily” it will be possible to show that they are accompanied by syntactic changes.
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having to do with morphosyntax, the other with intonation. From the point of view of morphosyntax, based on work by Kiparsky (1995) on ProtoGermanic and Aissen (1992) on Mayan, Traugott claims that in generative terms SAdvs like perhaps or adversative in fact and indeed are sisters of IP (Inflection Phrase), whereas DMs occupy an outer position and “have syntactic properties in common with the left-most ‘E-node’ posited for … external topics in Mayan”10 (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 256): (13)
E PP
CP IP AdvP
In fact3
IP
perhaps
To illustrate these differences, Traugott draws attention to examples like (14), where the SAdv indeed “is found in clause-initial postComplementizer position as a contrastive adverb”, and (15), where the elaborative DM indeed occurs “in clause-initial, pre-Complementizer position” (Traugott 2003: 640): (14)
(15)
1531 Elyot, The boke named the gouernour, p. 21: [teachers] somtyme purposely suffring [‘allowing’] the more noble children to vainquysshe [‘succeed, get the prizes’], and, as it were, gyuyng to them place and soueraintie, thoughe in dede the inferiour chyldren haue more lernyng. 1665 Hooke, Micrographia, 135: thereby [the flea] is inabled to walk very securely both on the skin and hair; and indeed this contrivance of the feet is very curious, for performing both these requisite motions.
10. Aissen’s E-node stands for “Expression-node”, following Banfield (1973).
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As is clear from (15), Traugott adopts the X-bar analysis of phrase structure which assumes that main, non-dependent clauses contain an empty Complementizer constituent. Examples which reflected more clearly the different structural positions occupied by SAdvs and DMs would have been desirable, and the fact that Traugott does not adduce them, neither for indeed itself nor for its close synonym in fact, suggests that none could be found in her corpus material. On the other hand, she has acknowledged in other places that “the syntactic positions of in fact2 and in fact3 overlap” (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 13), and recent analyses of in fact in Present-day English (Oh 2000; Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004) show its great positional mobility as both a SAdv and a DM, and also its very frequent occurrence in medial position when used in DM function. More specifically, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen raise doubts concerning Schwenter and Traugott’s analysis of in fact2 (the adversative adverb) and in fact3 (the DM) as “distinct polysemies, rather than contextuallybound uses of a monosemous lexical item” (2000: 21); they argue instead that from a synchronic point of view in fact2 and in fact3 can best be seen “as pragmatic implicatures which are conventionalised to a greater or lesser extent, as some contextual meanings are more frequent and more conventionalised than others” (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004: 1788). All this suggests, I believe, that unless there exists clear supporting evidence, one should be wary of claiming that all SAdvs and DMs differ in terms of syntactic scope and distribution, though it is true that in the case of some DMs deriving from earlier SAdvs this claim appears to be justified, as happens with the topic-resuming DM anyway versus the concessive SAdv anyway ‘nonetheless’. These two uses can be kept apart not only semantically and pragmatically but also positionally (see Ferrara 1997): the DM is always sentence-initial, whereas the SAdv appears to be restricted to the right periphery of the VP; witness (16–17): (16) (17)
They got up early. That’s rare for them. Anyway, they left at noon. It was ugly but he wanted to buy the dog anyway.
The fact that anyway, in fact or indeed do not behave alike syntactically need not be considered surprising if we recall that, as was pointed out in the opening lines of Section 2, DMs constitute a very heterogeneous class, not only in terms of their sources – many English DMs, such as yes, oh, ok, as you know, I mean, hark ye, etc., do not originate in other adverbials – but also in terms of their functional properties.
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Turning now to the question of whether there exist prosodic differences between DMs and the corresponding SAdvs, Traugott (1995: 6) and Tabor and Traugott (1998: 255) rely on Ferrara’s above-mentioned analysis of anyway (1997: 356), which shows that in Texas English this adverb carries a special intonation contour when used as a DM, to argue that SAdvs and DMs differ intonationally; see in this connection the quotation from Traugott (1995: 6) cited earlier in this section. In more recent work, however, Traugott appears to have changed her views, to judge at least from the following observation: Out of context, the written form In fact, humanity is usually absent is ambiguous: it could evoke either adversativity to or an elaboration of something that preceded. In speech, in fact in both meanings [i.e. SAdv and DM] may have a typical disjunct intonation with a sharp rise and fall (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 158).
In addition, it should be pointed out that Wichmann, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (this volume) have reached inconclusive results regarding the extent to which the different prosodic realizations of English of course correlate with its uses as epistemic adverbial and DM. Thus they note (p. 144) that “despite the evidence for a relationship between stress and semantic weight, … there are other parameters, e.g. information status and pragmatic function, that make it impossible to expect a one-to-one relationship between prosodic realization and any one parameter”. 5. Spanish de hecho: historical development and present-day usage 5.1. Research questions Bearing in mind the various issues mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 with regard to the cross-linguistic development of DMs and their relation to grammaticalization, the present study attempts to answer the following research questions: (i)
Is the development of de hecho ‘in fact, indeed, actually’ analogous to that of English in fact and other related DMs? Which functions, if any, do they have in common? (ii) Is there any morphosyntactic evidence correlating with the semanticpragmatic changes undergone by de hecho which might justify an analysis in terms of grammaticalization?
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(iii) What kinds of text-types favour the use of de hecho? What is the role of generic conventions in change? Recall in connection with this Traugott and Dasher’s observations (2002: 41–42), quoted at the end of Section 3 above, on the role played in language change not only by children but also by teens and adults.
5.2. The corpus The diachronic analysis of de hecho is based on data from the Real Academia Española’s CORDE (“Corpus Diacrónico del Español” [‘Diachronic Corpus of Spanish’]). This database is accessible at http://www.rae.es and consists of approximately 196 million words of European Spanish covering from c. 1200 till 1975; eighty-five per cent of this material is prose and the rest verse. The synchronic data were retrieved from CREA (“Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual” [‘Reference Corpus of Present-day Spanish]’); this too is accessible at http://www.rae.es and comprises both written (85 million words) and spoken (4.5 million words) European Spanish dating from the period 1975–2000. Varieties of Spanish used outside Spain are also extensively represented in both CORDE and CREA, but have not been included in the analysis. Throughout the rest of the discussion the ascription of linguistic examples to a given text type is based on the classifications provided by CORDE and CREA. 5.3. De hecho in Present-day Spanish11 Though synchronic approaches to Spanish pragmatic markers are very numerous, not much has been written on de hecho, apart from a few passing comments in Martín Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro (1999: 4141–4142) 11. Though there is no complete agreement among scholars as to when exactly one period in the history of Spanish ends and another begins, I will here adopt the more or less traditional divisions of Medieval Spanish (up to 1492, coinciding with the publication of Antonio de Nebrija’s Gramática castellana, the earliest vernacular grammar in Europe), Classical Spanish (1492–1726, where the year 1726 m