Styles of Thought
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Styles Styles of ofThought Thought Interpretation, Inquiry, a...
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Styles of Thought
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Styles Styles of ofThought Thought Interpretation, Inquiry, and Imagination
DAVID WEISSMAN
State University of New York Press
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2008 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production by Marilyn P. Semerad Marketing by Fran Keneston Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Weissman, David, 1936– Styles of thought : interpretation, inquiry, and imagination / David Weissman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7261-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Interpretation (Philosophy) 2. Inquiry (Theory of knowledge) 3. Imagination (Philosophy) I. Title. B824.17.W45 2007 121'.68—dc22
2007001917 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
In memory of Paul Weiss
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Contents Introduction Chapter One. Two Styles of Explanation: Interpretation and Inquiry Interpretation / 8 Inquiry / 14 Different Tasks / 19 Perspective / 22 Contrary Responses: An Example / 29 Mixed Modes / 31 Applications / 32 Values / 35 Morality / 36 Politics / 38 Chapter Two. Interpretation: Self and Society Origin and Context / 45 Distortion / 50 Emotion / 51 Assumptions for a Taxonomy / 51 Stories / 52 Socialized Interpretations / 53 Eliding Fact and Value / 56 Magic, Myth, and Metaphor / 57 Faith and Fantasy / 59 Philosophic Rationales / 60 Tolerance / 64
1
7
45
viii
Contents
Chapter Three. Inquiry: Practical Life and Science Context and Objectives / 67 Meaning / 73 Truth / 76 Animadversions / 80 Engaging Other People and Things / 91 Aims / 94 Ideals / 95 A Choice / 96
67
Chapter Four. A Disputed Question Ontological Alternatives / 97 The Dialectic of Untestable Ideas / 107 Reconciliation / 111
97
Chapter Five. Imagination Construction / 115 Construction Rules / 117 Variation / 119 Discipline / 120
115
Chapter Six. Leading Principles Priority / 123 Precedents / 124 Use / 126 An Inventory of Leading Principles / 130 Values / 164 When Practical Life and Science Disagree / 164 Categorial Form / 169
123
Afterword
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Notes
175
Index
183
Introduction Every man and woman is located in two ways. One is stolidly physical: each human body has a unique address and trajectory. Clifford Geertz credits Max Weber with this précis of the alternative: “Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself spun.”1 These are opposed responses to a salvo of questions: Who, what, and where am I? What are my relations to other people and things? Some answers locate us in contexts where pertinent information and practices make us efficient and safe. Others ascribe significance to me, my family, religion, or state; they tell a story that locates me within a world of purpose and value.2 Neighbors feel and valorize their lives as I do, so our story spreads to dominate a people or an era. One procedure favors realitytesting and truth. The other bestows meanings that appease vulnerability or glorify believers. These ways of construing one’s self and circumstances may be distinguished as interpretation and inquiry. Ignoring the precedent of writers who use hypothesis and interpretation interchangeably,3 I use the words to distinguish these different styles of thought. Interpretation construes the world in ways prescribed by the interests and values of the interpreter: we project significance into things thought or perceived. Inquiry is sometimes urgent, but more detached. It formulates and tests hypotheses: are they accurate; do things stand as they say? Construing matters in either way, I know what or where I am. But know is ambiguous: things are known as interpreted, or known as inquiry tests its claims about them. Which has priority? Provoked by danger or need, we look for means to secure or satisfy us. Or interpretation overrides inquiry when a story endows me and my context with overriding significance. Hunger seems less urgent if religious belief prescribes a fast. Both styles of thought resolve uncertainties that are constants of human experience. Inquiry is obligatory, because practical life is unsustainable without encounters that require hypothesis and experiment. Interpretation is pervasive, because interests and values shape the more or less explicit, self-justifying story that each person formulates as he 1
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positions himself within the ambient world. How much to inquiry, how much to interpretation? Are we practical creatures, opportunists who master circumstances as best we can, or interpreters who contrive the stories that invest our private or social “worlds” with meaning? There is another option, too, for inquiry divides: we sometimes address the world with no motive but the desire to understand it. This is science as it exceeds the interests of practical life. This way of distinguishing beliefs clarifies issues that are otherwise obscure. We sometimes say, for example, that all beliefs are hypotheses, and that some are false. Or we treat every belief as an interpretation, and say that truth is relative to the standpoint of the believer: true for you or true for me. But this tolerance is misleading if beliefs vary in the way proposed. For interpretations and inquiries are not appraised in the same ways. We may regard creationism as a hypothesis while disqualifying it on evidentiary or logical grounds, but doing so misconstrues it. Its role—see reality as the work of a beneficent designer—is valorizing: better a life created by a thoughtful God than one that evolves by chance. The many beliefs loosely described as opinions are also clarified. Some differ because there are many perspectives from which any state of affairs may be perceived and described: the glass seen as half full or half empty. These are hypotheses. They compare to differences that express personal or social interests. Those are interpretations: they aren’t true or false. The difference between interpretation and inquiry sometimes hardens into the contrast of idealism and realism: the world as thought contrives it or the world as it is. But their opposition is evidence that philosophical dialectic has made contraries of a simple though easily confused difference. My concern is the softer, pre-dialectical inclination to do two things: secure and satisfy oneself, while making sense of the world in one’s own terms or those of one’s community. How much to inquiry, how much to interpretation? There may be little conflict between them: we happily subordinate animal needs—for food or clothing—to its demands. But sometimes conflict is overt and irreconcilable. That happens whenever interpretation affirms “truths” that no empirical inquiry can certify. Hence these questions: Which procedure supplies reliable answers? Or is truth equivocal: does “true to me or us” have a sense different from “true”? Dewey and Foucault believed that there is no clean break between these notions of truth. Putnam argues that “ ‘Every fact is value loaded and every one of our values loads some fact.’ ”4 There may seem to be little philosophic purchase in the difference between the savvy required to live a busy day and the pleasure of living it when my city’s team
Introduction
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defeats every other. But the difference is significant within the context of philosophical anthropology, the study of what humans do as we make sense of our circumstances and selves. It matters, too, within contemporary American public life: which claims are reliable when both sides—interpretation and inquiry—declare their truths? Writing of values as though there were no significant differences among them, Dewey, Foucault, and Putnam conflate inquiry’s procedural values—economy and consistency, for example—with the needs, interests, or biases that drive interpretation and practical life. Is value an undifferentiated sump, so no pertinent differences remain when all thought’s instruments are suffused with value? Saying that it is promotes confusion, because it elides religion, plumbing, meteorology, and physics. All are value driven, but methodological standards used to appraise the truth claims of the latter three are incidental to the values impelling practical life and interpretation. Testability, hence falsifiability, is another benchmark for distinguishing them. Inquiry is reality-testing; its hypotheses are empirically falsifiable. (Verifiability is critical to this difference. Quine’s strictures against it are considered below.) Interpretations are not falsifiable, whatever the evidence and whatever their inconsistencies. This is not to say that interpretations are tautologies hence necessary truths (those whose negations are contradictions), but instead that evidence is incidental to reasons for believing them. Interpretations are compelling if they satisfy attitudes that motivate, defend, or glorify us: I believe we humans are the apogee and aim of creation, because believing it justifies my self-regard; you believe in fashion or the Red Sox. Everyone’s beliefs about his or her prospects, other people, and things are mediated by attitudes. Some are repressed as need or interest requires; all are hard to discount because every hope and encounter is warped in ways they prescribe. This doesn’t imply that attitudes are an additional kind of mental furniture. Each is a complex of beliefs, habits, and feelings that frighten or appease; its only foundation is a network of neural facilitations and inhibitions. No one inspects his or her attitudes: they are known, even to those having them, by their effects. Interpretation is equilibrating: security seems enhanced if we control a situation by propitiating or reconciling ourselves to it; well-being is intensified if we identify ourselves with a dominant power, whether a state, team, or religion. These are ways of bestowing meaning. Inquiry is often more deliberate. Its expositions—especially those of scientific method—are widely available, but they often suppose that science emerges from the fog of prejudice or the ad hoc hit-and-miss of practical life. I suggest that science is a refinement of practical life. Each is systematic;
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both satisfy conceptual and experimental requirements that are alien to interpretation. The detail is ordinary. Ignoring it explains some wrong turns that often distinguish philosophy’s history since Protagoras and Nietzsche. My account—chapters 1–5—shadows the fourfold bases for belief described by Peirce in 1877.5 It would be unreasonable to hope that science could displace either practical life or interpretation. Many people and cultures thrive without science though none lacks either the finesse of practical life or stories that reconcile its members to nature, one another, or themselves. Yet few of us live without all three,6 because each is useful in its way and because stories expressing interpretations are indistinguishable from inquiry’s hypotheses at their point of origin. This was Kant’s insight: imagination is the effulgent source of art, plans, stories, and hypotheses.7 Each construct is pervaded by rules—of grammar, cause and effect, or symmetry, for example—that differentiate and integrate its content. How do we choose among these constructs—confirming their applicability to actual states of affairs—when “Harry did it” and “God, the creator” have the same form? An answer is implicit in the rules used to differentiate and organize imagination’s constructs. Each rule is also a procedure for testing their truth: using the causal rubric to hypothesize that Sam is the crook, we also use it as a leading principle to search for confirming evidence.8 Inquiry’s hypotheses invite such tests. Interpretation abjures them, because its aim is different. Vulnerable or secure, we tell stories that justify our respective points of view. Reality-testing is incidental or averse; we don’t want our stories disconfirmed. No matter the evidence, they vindicate our attitudes. We may suppose that leading principles are merely procedural rules used to organize thought: like Kant’s categories or empirical schemas, they tell us nothing of reality itself. I demur, because Kant’s idealism can’t survive the discovery that mind is the activity of bodies able to secure and satisfy themselves within the material world.9 This immediately implies a question about inquiry’s leading principles: what is their status? Why is it that hypotheses constructed under the direction of these principles, then used as maps or plans, are often effective guides to action? There are likely to be two reasons: first, that nature has a complex but decided form; second, that rules used to differentiate and organize hypotheses represent nature’s deep—categorial—features. Accustomed to finding things within the clutter of papers on my desk, I look for a missing page, using a hypothesis about spatial relations— here within this area—as my context-setting rule. Practical life doesn’t consolidate its many rubrics (fire burns, batter rises, ice melts), but
Introduction
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reflection integrates them after generalizing each principle from the diversity of its applications. The set of categorial principles thereby refined is a metaphysical framework, a toolbox of rules suitable to finding one’s way in the near world. Science uses many of the same principles, but it modifies some and replaces others. Its reasons for proposing changes are sometimes moot. Is it sure, for example, that anomalies intimated by the experiments of quantum theorists justify replacing principles repeatedly confirmed in practical life and many sciences: no action at a distance, never something from nothing, for example? I suggest a conservation rule: revise rather than replace accepted principles when feasible; affirm that the coherence of principles often confirmed and long applied is a model and norm for any list of principles formulated to replace those we have. The unexplained anomalies discovered by quantum physicists may require the formulation of new leading principles. Though currently we have the anomalies, but no principles that explain them. This ambiguity is congenial to interpretation. Using or extrapolating from leading principles commended by practical life or science, it welcomes scientific conjectures about action at a distance or entities that pop into or out of existence from nothing. They supply a gloss of plausibility to stories that would otherwise be perceived as illogical or fantastic: didn’t God create the world from nothing? There may be no style of theorizing so rigorous that it precludes every whiff of illogic or fantasy: any rule or procedure barring it would likely preclude advances due to novel ideas. The distinction between interpretation and inquiry is, nevertheless, as fundamental as their respective aims: one valorizes our lives, the other ascertains the character of things themselves. One is a topic for psychology, the other for reality-testing and ontology. Chapter 6 is the aim and point of reference for all the preceding argument: it distinguishes empirically justified contentions about reality’s categorial features from speculations that are empirically unverified and conceptually moot. These are principles formulated for the purposes of inquiry, then tested as we engage other things. They are not correctly formulated or appraised until interpretation’s distortions are acknowledged and discounted. These opposing scruples and concerns distinguish interpretation and inquiry from Plato’s Euthyphro and the Enlightenment to our time.10 Little is new, but these ways of settling belief still need disentangling, hence philosophy’s role: it defends public health by distinguishing whatever is separable.
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Chapter One
Two Styles of Explanation Interpretation and Inquiry
W
hat explains the schism that divides the sciences from the humanities? Their tasks are different: one inquires, the other interprets. Truth and significance are different values; interests they serve are sometimes opposed. Explanations vary accordingly. Science explains phenomena by formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses that cite pertinent causes or laws: citing methane explains coal fires; F=ma explains the velocity of falling apples. Humanists explain phenomena by embedding words or ideas in networks of appraising relations: parenthood is honorable, piety is good. The procedural values of scientific method— simplicity and consistency, for example—are regulative principles that restrict the formation of scientific hypotheses without determining their content. Hypotheses are value-free in the respect that causes or laws they specify obtain or not, irrespective of human concerns; interpretations are suffused with values that determine content, some explicit, others disguised. Science’s opposition to the humanities is clarified once and for all if each side is distinguished from the other by reference to these opposed explanatory styles. Thinkers who challenge this program say that facts and values are inextricably entangled. But they conflate interpretation with inquiry.1 Practical life is the middle term that binds these two. Needy and vulnerable, we interpret and inquire. Inquiry starts when need provokes action: What to eat? Where to sleep? Rabbits survive by following a few hardwired clues or by imitating a parent. Humans, too, associate sensory clues, but practical life would be simpler than it is if doctors and 7
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auto mechanics only tallied symptoms. We do better, because we map our circumstances while deliberating about alternate ways to engage them. Maps represent the structures and processes—the densities and responses—of relevant things. Plans sequence imagined engagements with other things: do this, wait for a response, then, given the anticipated effect, do that. Every cook and mechanic knows the means available and ways to exploit them. Interpretation subordinates practical skills and activities by locating them within a network of meanings. Every aspect of life may be construed in ways that give it significance; every act may express a devotion. Why add this layer of thought and value to effective practices? Because interpretation expresses hopes and fears. It appeases us by making circumstances intelligible in terms that are reassuring and safe. It makes them controllable, if only in the respect that they are understood. INTERPRETATION Interpretation categorizes phenomena by situating ideas of them within a conceptual network. I see the world from my point of view, my interests and entitlements confirmed. Or I lie back watching clouds, seeing faces here, animals there. I point them out to you, but you see other things and don’t see mine. People reading books also disagree. Each organizes selected incidents or portions while arguing that his or her reading is the right one, perhaps the only plausible or moral way to construe the text. Every such reading expresses three aspects of interpretation. First is orientation, second is the projection of orientation’s interests and values onto things perceived or encountered, third is the narrative—the story told—when an orientation is formulated in words and justified. Musicians or actors interpreting a score or text acknowledge that many readings are possible. We are less tolerant of people whose orientations differ from our own. Each filters available data or ideas in ways appropriate to his or her valorizing perspective, though many are opaque: one doesn’t know their interests or fears. Actors experiment with new ways to play a character, but each person lives stubbornly within his or her point of view. He or she may describe it as “living within the truth,” but this is an odd sort of truth, one born of the confusion between assertion and evidence. Ask an interpreter how to confirm that his story is true, and he fulminates or fumbles, though an answer is available. Interpretations are orientations. Some, but not all, are expressed by stories that make sense of the world and our place within it. All express the interests and values of the interpreter. None is
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true—as the preference for chocolate or vanilla is a preference, not a truth—because the values that infuse an orientation have no basis but personal history, needs, and the attitudes of one’s community. Hypotheses are formulated so they may be tested, hence falsified or confirmed. Interpretations are not falsifiable, because they resist every surprise; we can reconfigure or reinterpret their claims to accommodate any outcome, including disappointments and disasters. Nothing is settled, everything is adjustable: any apparent fact—favorable or not—can be digested and made to disappear. So, death is unreal if one believes in eternal life. This is interpretation as it expresses thought’s alliance with piety, will, and conscience. A potent story—one that reconciles or vindicates believers—spreads like contagion through a society. I believe it, and tell it to you; you believe it, too, and tell it to others who confirm my belief by repeating it to me. Religion, movies, and advertising are sources for many shared persuasions, some that are open and subject to criticism, others that escape notice because they are disguised and insidious: one thinks of Thrasymachus and Machiavelli and of stories used to regulate and dominate other people.2 Contemporary thinkers in every discipline are happy to tell us that interpretation is all the knowledge we have of nature, culture, or ourselves. Philosophy is party to this consensus: it chronically confuses interpretation with inquiry, telling us that phenomena have no character or autonomy apart from ideas or conceptual systems that differentiate and relate them. Kant is interpretation’s principal sponsor in modern times. Abductions—inferences from phenomena perceived to their conditions (causes or laws)—often exceed the immediate data of experience. They are speculations about things-in-themselves: the hand that conditions the look of a hand, for example.3 Kant argued that interpretations knitting sensory data into networks of coherent experience are all that understanding can achieve. Why schematize sensory data in one way rather than others? Because something valued—a need, interest, desire, or ideal—prompts us to create a satisfying experience. Piety is a sponsoring value of this sort. It operates within interpretations by calibrating and integrating their parts. So, prayer, ritual, and good works are suitable to a religious outlook, because all are expressions of piety. Or the value is patriotism, so loyalty and service—“my country right or wrong”—are its expressions. Hegel socialized this account, saying that the conceptualizations used to create a thinkable world are common to a community’s members. Bound to one another by history and need, they create and communicate about a common world and shared desires.4 Marx emphasized the economic interest that provokes a dominant group to impose its
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story on a society’s other members.5 Foucault argued that various interests—not only economic motives—determine the bias and detail of interpretations that shape social worlds and the conduct of their members.6 Carnap constructed systems that would integrate and explain phenomena of every sort; Quine endorsed his program, but disagreed about the logic of conceptual networks.7 Their guiding intention is fixed and clear: let no thinkable difference or relation elude a system of sentences or ideas. Or, conversely, affirm that no phenomenon is conceivable—hence that none exists—if there is no place for it within a conceptual system. Truth for these thinkers is the relation of sentences within a system, not the relation of a sentence to an extra-systemic truth-maker. Value— utility—is the conceptual driver and integrator. Carnap argued that the use of conceptual systems—pragmatics—is coequal with their syntax and semantics.8 His inspiration was likely Kant’s Critique of Judgment: I have been reproached . . . for defining the power of desire as the power of being the cause, through one’s presentations, of the actuality of the objects of these presentations. The criticism was that, after all, mere wishes are desires too, and yet we all know that they alone do not enable us to produce their object. That, however, proves nothing more than that some of man’s desires involve him in self-contradiction, inasmuch as he uses the presentation by itself to strive to produce the object, while yet he cannot expect success from it.9 “Presentation by itself” is mere appearance, the given. This is the materiel thought forms—schematizes—when perceptual objects are made to satisfy parameters fixed by desire. Interpretation so dominates modern thinking that writers vindicate inquiry in terms appropriate to interpretation. Dewey wrote with conviction about problem-solving and its biological, cultural setting. Yet, he succumbed to the Kantian style when detailing his notion of inquiry. Every system that satisfies his description is an interpretation, not a hypothesis: it lays down—prescribes—the differences and relations that may be ascribed to the phenomena differentiated and organized within it. Inquiry, as Dewey described it, is “the construction of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such that the consequences of directed operation form the objects that have the property of being known.”10 There is less clarity but more detail when Dewey elaborated: Were it not that knowledge is related to inquiry as a product to the operations by which it is produced, no distinctions re-
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quiring special differentiating designation would exist. Material would merely be a matter of knowledge or of ignorance and error; that would be all that could be said. The content of any given proposition would have the values “true” and “false” as final and exclusive attributes. But if knowledge is related to inquiry as its warrantably assertible product, and if inquiry is progressive and temporal, then the material inquired into reveals distinctive properties which need to be designated by distinctive names. As undergoing inquiry, the material has a different logical import from that which it has as the outcome of inquiry. In its first capacity and status, it will be called by the general name subject-matter. When it is necessary to refer to subjectmatter in the context of either observation or ideation, the name content will be used, and particularly on account of its representative character, content of propositions. The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by meanings of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry. The apparent ambiguity of using “objects” for this purpose (since the word is regularly applied to things that are observed or thought of) is only apparent. For things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries. When used in carrying on new inquiries in new problematic situations, they are known as objects in virtue of prior inquiries which warrant their assertibility. In the new situation, they are means of attaining knowledge of something else. In the strict sense, they are part of the contents of inquiry as the word content was defined above. But retrospectively (that is, as products of prior determination in inquiry) they are objects.11 Dewey’s summary is concise: “The idea that the intelligibility effected by scientific or controlled inquiry proves the antecedent existence of an a priori rational world puts the cart before the horse.”12 Inquiry so conceived is very close to the notion described here as interpretation: There is, accordingly, an element of evaluation involved in appreciation. For such objects are not ends in the sense of being merely termini, but in the sense of being fulfillments: satisfactions in the literal sense in which that word means “making suf–ficient” something de-ficient. Consequently, judgments of appreciation are found wherever subject-matter undergoes such development and reconstruction as to result in a satisfying, complete whole.13
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This is interpretation rechristened inquiry. Situations are problematic: they are, in Dewey’s terms, indeterminate. They are made satisfying and determinate by the ways we develop and reconstruct them. Dewey used the language of problem-solving, interaction, and inquiry to produce a distinctly Kantian result: objects are made not discovered.14 The effect is similar when organizing words creates interpretations similar to novels: they tell comprehensive stories where nothing excluded has reality in situations they prefigure. We may suppose that life resists: circumstances and our limited abilities confound the stories we tell of ourselves. But is that so? Quine denied that there are indigestible data. Every interpretation can be revised to integrate or ignore them, because the network of constituent sentences or beliefs is plastic and adaptable: it reconstrues the data or yields just enough to incorporate it. Inquiry is less flexible. Consistent hypotheses represent possible states of affairs. Tested against a reality they do not make, they are falsified or confirmed. This is an odd dilemma for philosophy. Its claim to authority is founded in the belief that truth is unqualified: sentences or beliefs name their truth conditions; they are true if those conditions obtain. Truths of this sort are impersonal. Not your truths or mine, they obtain or not because of circumstances distinct from sentences they confirm. Truth is two things for interpretation: the story expressing an orientation is true, because it satisfies the interests and values of the interpreter, be it a person or society; the story’s sentences or ideas are true because they substantiate—cohere with and support—one another. This second criterion is very loose: incoherence, even contradiction, may seem appropriate to a credible story: the omnipotent God tolerates evil and free will; pantheism is odious, though God is said to be infinite, hence omnipresent. People are reasonably confused: what is philosophy’s vocation? Are philosophers interpreters—storytellers, like novelists and playwrights—or merely their accountants and bookkeepers, their logicians and meta-theorists? Or is philosophy, too, an inquiry? Philosophy is troubled, either way. Novelists are not obliged to tell the same story; their books are more interesting for their differences. But reality, presumably, has one form, however complex. Truth-telling would seem to require that comprehensive hypotheses should converge on a single theory that correctly specifies this form or at worst on a set of theories that are translational equivalents. Yet, nothing oppresses philosophers so much as agreement. Every powerful thinker accepts the responsibility for making sense of reality in his own terms: his account is an expression of intellectual integrity, depth, and vision: it shouldn’t be elided with others. But it should be measured against other accounts, if reality has
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a settled character of its own, one that is accurately, if partially, mapped by several or many others. Philosophers evade this measure because of the peculiar turn that distinguishes Western philosophy from Plato and Descartes to the present, namely, philosophy’s dedication to the formula of Protagoras: man is the measure of all that is that it is, and of all that is not that it is not.15 This is the claim that the character and existence of things is a function of the ways we conceive them: anything that falls outside an interpretive framework is not. Philosophy’s affinity to literature is all but explicit: there are many possible novels, and many ways to conceptualize the world before us, a world that includes us. What comes of truth? Call it his or her truth, then add the social authority that comes with the status of the thinker. Give the thinker high status, and his truth spreads through the ranks of all who defer to him. That it quickly loses persuasive power with his death is evidence that the theory was an interpretation used prescriptively. But what is the alternative? Restrict philosophy to hypotheses, and its claims have no privileged authority: they may be false. Error is an embarrassment to thinkers who want to commend their values, often surreptitiously in the guise of a favored theory. Emphasize testable hypotheses, forgo a valorizing orientation, and philosophy loses its authority. Philosophy’s response is alternately righteous and defensive: Leave us alone, is the gist. Our aims and practices are different from the ones of practical life or science. If that implies a retreat into hermetic, self-justifying interpretations or merely the logic of value-driven conceptual systems, so be it. This choice would be innocuous, but for the identification of philosophy with truth and the popular conflation of ideas, ideals, and ideologies. Peace is an idea. It may be considered by comparing it to war, without an expression of preference. But peace is preferable, hence ideal. More, it may become an ideology, an aim and recipe for transforming circumstances to achieve it. Most philosophic ideas are too fragmentary or abstract to pass into ideals or ideologies, but some do. Those are usually ideas about social or political organization, morality, or ideas that lend themselves to religious practice or belief. Descartes’ dedicatory letter avers that his Meditations will prove the soul’s immortality. This promise, coming from a philosopher who was never slow to affirm the truth of his views, was sure to attract the support of people who also believed that a soul judged and rewarded by its maker is present in each of us. How many pagans were forcibly converted because of an ideology supported by evidence no firmer than Descartes’? This conceit is philosophy’s latent power, and the excuse for its ambiguity: declare that philosophic theses are interpretations, and they— with regimes they inspire—lose authority; require that they be testable
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empirically, and we reduce them to the (disreputable) contingency of hypotheses common to practical life and science. But this is not the zero-sum game of mutually annihilating choices. Philosophic inquiry is impelled by vital questions: What are we (who am I)? What is the world about us? What is our place there? These are empirical questions, questions about actual states of affairs known by the empirical differences they make. Interpretation—storytelling—is the poor substitute when we can’t determine or don’t like the factual answers. INQUIRY The character of inquiry is long obscured by two biases that dominate modern philosophy. One is the intuitionist, Humean claim that reality extends no farther than the phenomena—sensory data, ideas, words, sentences, or conceptual systems—set before inspecting minds. The other is the apriorist, Kantian persuasion that reality is identical with the inspectable content mind creates by using rules to differentiate and organize sensory data. These two perspectives—data versus the rules for differentiating and organizing it—share an implication. For inquiry is precluded, if, as Hume and Kant agreed, no legitimate inference exceeds the domain of actual or possible data. The tension between their skepticism and the demands of practical life are apparent in the ambiguity of the word hypothesis. It suggests that inference is tentative, though there are different reasons for caution. Evidence of sparrows reduces to data that have the look of sparrows, with only this possible addition: we extend the domain of our judgments by introducing inductive hypotheses. Seeing one thing or a few, we generalize, fallibly, to some or all. Or—curve-fitting—we formulate equations that track previous observations while entailing others that test and confirm the equations when data predicted are observed. So, Newton and Einstein generalized from a small sample of observations to law statements that represent the dynamical relations of all phenomena. But inferences of both sorts could be mistaken, and are often revised or replaced: black swans, chicken-sized sparrows. It may seem that nothing we might want to know requires an alternative explanatory method: why try to do more when the laws of motion have no other basis? We want and have a different method because we often use sensory data as evidence of their conditions: causes, constituents, or laws. Seeing an effect, we infer—abductively—to one of them. There may be ample data justifying an abduction (the apple one sees, holds, and tastes), or scant data garnered from instruments (canaries) that register the effects of their causes (methane). Either way, we
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mitigate philosophy’s skeptical instincts and speculate that features of a face cause (hence explain) the look of the face. And sometimes, we infer from observed effects to their unobservable conditions: from falling apples to F=ma. Abduction has four steps. Provoked by data, one infers its condition or conditions. This is the abductive hypothesis. Next, one deduces the prediction that specific consequences do obtain or could be provoked if the hypothesis is correct. Such consequences—regularities conditioned by laws, for example—are ideally observable, for there is no way to test the hypothesis if they are not. The third step is inductive, though now induction is the activity of looking for or experimenting to produce the effect predicted. Induction of the other, generalizing kind does not occur, until, fourth, we find the data anticipated. We then infer that all or most data of this sort have the condition specified by the hypothesis in the circumstances tested. This last step is a mix of positive or negative feedback. Hypothesize correctly, and nature yields to our expectations; we get what we look for, perhaps again and again. Hypothesize incorrectly, and the evidence is a reproach: do it again, differently. We use the word hypothesis to signify abductions, inductive generalizations, and curve-fitting, though this critical difference is plain if we compare their utility as explanations. Inductive generalizations often make accurate predictions, but their explanatory power is weak: we explain an event merely by citing the law that covers it. This explanatory style is circular, because the law statement has been generalized from just such events as those it explains: we speculate that this bluebird will be blue, because we generalize after seeing several that all are blue. Such explanations succeed, because they rely on a condition they ignore or deny: namely, the natural kinds they specify. Abductive explanations affirm rather than suppress their material assumptions, and they are not circular. We infer from regularities observed to their constraining constituents, causes, or laws. Curve-fitting hypotheses fall between these stools: they explain adjacent phenomena by representing them as contiguous points on the curve traced by a covering equation. Predictions derived from such equations may be all but infallible, yet the equations are deficient explanations. Like music lovers who sing along without knowing how to play the song, they escape the circularity of inductive generalizations but fail to specify the material conditions for their success. Induction and curve-fitting skim the surface of phenomena, emphasizing similarity or correlation. Abductions identify a phenomenon’s generating conditions; they express the assumption that phenomena have depth, that data affecting us are the leading edge—the effects—of states
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of affairs whose bulk and efficacy are independent of mind and its empirical sensibility. The differences among these kinds of inference are consequential ontologically across the range of situations to which they apply. Laws are an example, because their status is ambiguous: are they sentences reporting correlations or constraints operating upon or within material processes? Inherent constraints seem disreputable, given our reluctance to speculate about extra-mental states of affairs or their conditions, and the prejudice that strips nature of its modalities, be they parochial necessities specific to particular worlds because they satisfy its laws of motion or universal necessities applicable within all possible worlds because they satisfy the principle of noncontradiction.16 Suspend these dogmas, and we are free to consider the possibility that laws are more than generalizations: we infer from a particular event or effect to the intrinsically constraining relationship it embodies. Consider, for example, the surmise that every right triangle embodies the Pythagorean theorem, and that each represents its kind.17 We confirm this by substituting values for the theorem’s variables while observing the result: does the sum of the squares of the sides equal the square of the hypotenuse for each particular right triangle? Granting that the effect may be accidental in any single case, we substitute other values for the variables. Repeated successes are evidence that the theorem applies to all right triangles. Still, the point of reference is every single right triangle. Each exhibits the constraining effects signified by the theorem. They inhere within all the individuals of a domain because they inhere within each: cosmic laws in a falling apple. Newton specified these laws as best he could, given the scales of space and velocity known to him. Einstein did it again, more accurately. This account of physical laws seems carelessly speculative to those who prefer the notion that laws are phenomenological, meaning that law statements signify the observable, functional relations one sees and tests by altering values for their variables. We test an inverse square law for magnetism by moving the iron filings farther and farther from a stable magnet. There is no need to infer a cause or condition that exceeds the observables: they behave as the law reports. But here as above, something is wanting. An event is explained by citing a law that generalizes or abstracts from just such cases: we explain the cycle of night and day by observing that one always succeeds the other. Abduction promises more. It specifies conditions for the effects observed: namely, Earth rotating while turning about the Sun. This complex state of affairs is a condition for the effects observed. Citing it explains them. Phenomenological laws, like inductive generalizations of all sorts, are
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much less ambitious: they are verbal or conceptual generalizations— strings of words or mathematical symbols—that extrapolate from observed regularities to all instances of a kind. Researchers of every sort construe the laws they formulate in these phenomenological terms, because this is a way of discovering laws and because Humean skeptics have convinced them that anything additional— abductive inferences to causes, constituents, or laws—is uselessly excessive. Abduction obliges theorists to formulate models of factors that may condition data mapped by their equations, though it is the equations—we are to believe—not such models, that carry all the force of scientific explanation, prediction, and control. Worse, abduction is profligate: it may generate any number of models that support the same equation. We could choose among them—discounting some, promoting others—if there were testable differences among them. But some or many may not be empirically distinguishable. Why not agree that curvefitting—formulating equations that generate the values observed—is a sufficient explanation for phenomena that concern us? This question encapsulates an agenda framed by Cartesian skepticism, Humean empiricism, and the operationalism learned from Kant: garner what you can from the data, organize and use it, but don’t speculate. This project is often successful, because there is significant information in the data and because we organize it in ways that provoke additional, useful data. But this result is less than knowledge can be. For the project satisfied has limited itself to the effects of things on our instruments or sensory organs. It ignores the natural processes and structures that cause the data. The language used to differentiate and organize sensory data may be replete with theoretical terms—words that apparently signify those causes—but we are cautioned repeatedly that the word flute, for example, is shorthand for a rule that organizes data; it doesn’t signify the source of the notes. Abduction annoys skeptics, because saying that we may identify the extra-mental conditions for sensory effects violates their warnings not to speculate. Skepticism has become so routine that we hardly notice the difference between caution—always or often appropriate— and dogmatic doubt: assume that we never know, because we are never certain we know. This is the ancient Platonic prejudice: distinguish knowledge from opinion in the manner of Descartes’ first Meditation, then discount opinion. Make sure that every candidate for knowledge—be it sensory data or scientific theory—stands directly before the mind’s eye. Practical life and many sciences know better: many abductions are justified by myriad data collected in various ways (wet clothes, wet feet), no disconfirming evidence, and no plausible alternative hypothesis.18
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Explanation is empowered by cycles of advance and consolidation. Sometimes, we know a structure—the vermiform appendix, for example—but not its function. Other times, we observe pertinent behavior, but not the structures or laws engaged. Respiration was familiar, but its conditions were a mystery until the relation of heart and lungs was discovered. Imagine observant people in a culture ignorant of physiology. They explain breath by reducing it to the data observed, then by generalizing: breathing repeatedly is good evidence that we shall breathe many times more. This works for a time, though no explanation is forthcoming when breathing stops. Physics, too, is incomplete until it specifies the entities, processes, and laws that condition matters observed. This is ideal. Pertinent factors elude us, because of their scale (large or small) or because they are unobserved and perhaps unobservable given their nature and our sensory powers. Still, the errors of previous formulations don’t obviate the intention or diminish the partial success of previous abductions. Experimental and mathematical techniques evolve; theorists learn to exploit them. Differences among the several kinds of hypotheses entail different accounts of theoretical terms. Induction generalizes from observables. It sometimes introduces theoretical terms, but they are analyzable—reducible—to terms that cite the observables: electron is said to be an economic way of signifying pointer readings and other data pertinent to the generalizations—the theory—where electron appears. Theoretical terms introduced by curve-fitting equations are justified in the same way. Theoretical terms introduced by abductive inferences are not reducible to the data from which we infer. Electron, on this telling, signifies negatively charged particles. Gravity, too, is introduced by an abductive inference, not by generalizing from the observation of falling apples. Specifying this notion functionally, we speculate about its material basis. Is it a particle with a field force, or the effect of motion in a curved space? Either way, inference exceeds the observables explained. Having a testable answer would enable us to mount experiments, and ultimately a technology. One would confirm the abduction; the other would exploit it. Social scientists, too, think abductively. Sometimes, the conditions to which they infer are observable indirectly (as faces are), other times the conditions inferred are not observable. Market forces—competition, scarcity, and demand—are observable, though repression was unobservable when Freud inferred it. That is changed: neural inhibition— repression’s cash value—makes it observable in our time. Still, repression would not be the mystery alleged by Freud’s critics if its mechanics were unknown. For explanation is partly successful when it identifies a function, but fails to specify its generating mechanism. Aristotle used this
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inferential style when he ascribed dispositions or potentialities to things whose behaviors were observed, though their mechanical properties were unknown. Having more information about such things, we use abduction to identify the structures and processes responsible for such effects. Notice that abductive explanations are not essentially value laden. Interests or needs motivate them; procedural values—simplicity, consistency, and fruitfulness—regulate their formulation. But there is no residue of motivating values in the inferences from phenomena to their conditions or in the empirical tests that falsify or confirm them. Alchemists hoped that turning brass to gold would make them rich, but they didn’t succeed and knew they hadn’t. DIFFERENT TASKS Practical life is inquiry that seeks well-being and safety for partners and oneself. Imagining what to do and how to do it, we test our ideas in the ambient world or revise them to do it better. Interpretations satisfy values rooted in the likes, fears, or aversions of attitudes. Confused interpretations express conflicted attitudes, hence schizoid values. Some such conflicts are never resolved, though stable, coherent attitudes dominate in people whose orientations are focused and viable. Interpretation’s task is plain from infancy. Every newborn is distinctively active, reactive, or inert. All are raw, unformed, and vulnerable. One imagines that babies experience their vulnerability as hunger, discomfort, or uncertainty. Many caretakers do their best to reduce all three, so their babies feel and are secure; rarely frustrated because their expectations are satisfied, they are confident, curious, and playful. Others don’t fare as well. Sick and apprehensive because their bodily rhythms haven’t stabilized, these babies are scared. Early orientations stabilize, because one or another style of human caretaking is dominant and because infants have primitive but quickly evolving cognitive and affective systems. First reactions are automatic, because visceral and innate: the baby is quiescent and responsive, or edgy and anxious. These responses are qualified when caretakers and circumstances are construed as favorable or adverse. For a query is all but explicit in a baby’s eyes, posture, and gestures: “What goes on?” The question is urgent in situations gone awry where fear and vulnerability are consuming. But one infers it, too, in the eyes of intense but contented babies: they want to understand. Their curiosity is a precursor to inquiry, though this other motive is also impelling: distinguish people or events that effect security or vulnerability from those indifferent to both. The child construes his or her circumstances, fixing attitudes—anxious or confident—that form
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as he or she responds. These core attitudes are known by the behavior or intrapsychic feelings they provoke, and later by way of a justifying story that explains one’s attitudes. Interpretation’s task—its regulative aim—is the equilibrium achieved when circumstances are construed in ways that satisfy attitudes. Achieving and sustaining this equilibrium—by appreciating, propitiating, or reconciling ourselves to the ambient world—we control anxiety by construing circumstances and ourselves in ways that seem to reduce the exposure that makes us vulnerable. This is a posture, an orientation, that enhances self-perceived mastery and well-being. It expresses itself in defenses and entitlements that are decisive for personal identity and safety: loyalty and status, for example. Endowing life with significance, it defines a circle—a private space—of valorizing light. The aim is satisfied trivially by everyone having an established orientation, an effect consolidated in childhood when each person construes his or her circumstances as attitudes prescribe. Rodgers and Hammerstein’s The King and I expressed this achievement in song: “Whenever I feel afraid, I hold my head erect and whistle a happy tune so no one will suspect, I’m afraid. . . . The results of this deception are very plain to tell. For when I fool the people I fear, I fool myself as well.” Vulnerability makes us anxious. Interpretation reduces anxiety by construing situations that are dangerous or uncertain in ways that make them seem viable. Salving worry and pain, it makes life supportable. Imagine the alternative: circumstances are so adverse that they defeat every attempt to construe them in a reconciling or propitiating way. Equilibration fails. Numbing oneself to insensibility is the principal alternative. Speculations about early childhood may seem too shallow a basis for claims about interpretation. But adult experience adds nothing but complexity, detail, and more elaborate stories to this simpler rubric. Consider the opposing sides posited by Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals: the self-directed artist versus the herd. Members of the herd loathe the artist’s vanity and bohemian ways. They believe that differentiating himself from them is his principal aim. They would destroy him— Socrates, for example—merely for not wanting their approval. But the artist is mostly oblivious to them and their values. Comfortable in himself or fiercely uncomfortable because he cannot succeed in his own terms, he reworks some part of the world—its notes, paint and canvass, other people, words, gestures, or stone—in ways fixed by his will, skills, and imagination. The artist may be a painter or musician but also a rock-climber, carpenter, statesman, athlete, or cook. Other people suppose that climbers are foolish or crazy, but self-perception requires that they test themselves against sheer walls. There is equilibrium—elation
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and contented exhaustion—when a climb satisfies attitude’s expectations or demands. Artists and writers are also stubborn. Infirm or close to death, they struggle to finish a task because attitudes that fix selfperception won’t let them stop. Members of the herd don’t understand the artist’s persistence, but their behavior is similar. They won’t violate social norms, because core attitudes are a principal point of self-identity and a bulwark against vulnerability: think of believers who risk death by refusing a forced conversion. Why refuse? Because losing—rejecting—a defining portion of oneself is alienating and shameful. Like Socrates, they face extinction in either way: self-betrayal or bodily death. Is this gravity excessive in a culture where identity is worn lightly by people who assume and relinquish roles and styles with every year’s fashion in cars, clothes, or ideas? No, this is evidence that certain bases for identity—religious beliefs, for example—are less compelling than before. The implication for core attitudes is unclear: are we more confident, hence willing to change the trappings of life at will, or is the pleasure and relief of change evidence that we are less secure, more vulnerable, as we sort frantically through successive ways to interpret our selves and circumstances? Nietzsche didn’t know people of this chameleon sort, or he didn’t mention them: no one in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals—no artist or member of the herd—changes his or her orientation: attitudes make them belligerently autonomous and selfsecuring, or socialized because dependent on the recognition of others. What explains the herd’s immobility? What binds its members? The temperaments and developmental histories of individual members are surely different. Why do they adopt routinizing laws, rituals, and a common story? One reason is complexity, and the need for coordination. But that interest is satisfied without a tribal story: by traffic laws, for example. What additional need explains their uniformity? Principal factors are vulnerabilities they share, plus dominating social pressure and the availability of a homogenizing story. The story valorizes, justifies, protects, and intimidates. Who could oppose it, given its many believers, without making him or herself more vulnerable? The story’s credibility is variable: passionate believers read it literally, others give it lip service while grateful for the cover it supplies. Believers root their security in a glorious narrative lovingly told, but they could have been equally defended by any tale learned early and believed. This is the odd contingency of one’s commitment to a tribal story; allegiance is a historical accident. Born and raised in Cleveland, Boston, Los Angeles, or New York, one identifies osmotically with a local team: its successes and failures are one’s own. Believers address one another within the circle of their “truths.” But truth is equivocal.
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Does it signify a belief passionately held, or one whose material truth conditions are satisfied: ‘There are birds on the roof’ is true, if there are such; “true believers” are distinguished by the intensity of their commitment, not by the truth of their beliefs. No one likes being told that his “truths” aren’t true or false, though interpretation’s claims are affirmed for various reasons—affiliation and loyalty, for example—not because of their truth. Hence the implication that any story may satisfy us if it gratifies or reconciles us to our circumstances. Is it a fantastic story replete with contradictions? Do we avow it in the absence of confirming evidence, or despite evidence that the story is false? No matter: we are motivated by needs, fear and attitudes, not by truth. The issue would be less confused if we didn’t err by thinking that beliefs of every sort are truth-claims. For beliefs are commitments of various sorts: truth is one interest among others. We believe in someone despite having no evidence for our confidence: we believe that loyalty is its own reward while knowing that often it isn’t. Divers occasions promote belief—including affiliation, social suasion or status, culture, convenience, and fear—though we wrongly suppose that belief’s causes are incidental when every belief should also be justifiable as a truth-claim. There is confirming evidence for some beliefs sponsored by attitudes: we rightly believe in the uses of learning and health. But truth is often incidental both to belief and to the reason or reasons for it: many beliefs expressing attitudes (including affiliative expressions and directives: “Believe in yourself”) have no other basis. They are not candidates for truth however closely they resemble the propositional forms of truth-claims. Interpretation resists this view of its conflict with inquiry, because truth is an honorific: surrendering claims to truth invites the judgment that interpretations are false. But this is the implication scouted above: interpretation doesn’t challenge inquiry as the source of truths, if we distinguish truth-claims from beliefs that satisfy attitudes. Conflating beliefs of these two sorts is, nevertheless, an all but inextinguishable imperative. No fervent ideologist, religious or political, agrees that his beliefs aren’t true. None is appeased by the news that beliefs sponsored by interpretation serve a different interest. PERSPECTIVE Perspective is often situational: here or there, myself or others, rich or poor. These are complementary matters of fact, though difference sometimes hardens into contrariety: male if not female, here if not there. Contrariety is mutual exclusion. It pervades thought and provokes
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hostility when one side is favored, the other deplored. What explains the transition from an easy tolerance for situational differences to the intolerance of contrariety? A principal reason is the fact that perspective is often evaluative, not situational: we disagree because of our values, not because we see things from different angles. Conflating perspectives of these two kinds subverts the distinction between interpretation and inquiry. For we may infer that every situational difference is also an evaluative difference. I see things as I do because my perspective expresses my values: my entitlements versus your obligations. Does inquiry resolve such differences in ways that identify things as they are, or is inquiry irrelevant because competing values declare congenial “facts” in the absence of an objective standard? Physicists have equations for translating measurements of motion made in one frame of reference into measurements made in frames moving uniformly or at rest relative to the first: a body moving ten miles an hour in your frame of reference has the same measured velocity in mine. But there are no comparable equations when differences of perspective express different interests. A stock market crash is good for those who short the market, bad for those invested in shares. The values are opposed, though this example leaves a space for inquiry because these responses didn’t create the state of affairs that gratifies some and disappoints others. There are, however, many occasions when inquiry has no comparable leverage. There may be no neutral facts relevant to the quarrels of spouses or friends: each alleges the indifference of the other, and both deny the charge. Their conflict is evaluative, not situational: inquiry—fact-finding—can’t settle the dispute because each insists that the other’s attitudes—hence values—are intolerable. Inquiry is forever distinguished from interpretation because of this difference: belief is dominated by facts on the ground or by values that organize perception and behavior. One inquires because of wanting to understand a quarrel better, or one insists on the legitimacy and superiority of his or her attitudes. The second is often more significant for human concerns than the first: something that comforts you, threatens me. Shall I see the world as it is—to the degree I can—or do I see it in ways congenial to my attitudes? The paths are distinct; the means are different. People lean one way or the other: they are secured and satisfied by information about their circumstances or by stories that construe a situation in ways favored by their values. This is a delicate issue for inquiry, because the preference for interpretation or inquiry is itself an intention: attitude is favorable to one or the other. This preference affects every subsidiary determination with the effect that disputes are barren among those who choose differently. People
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oriented by beliefs that sustain hope or reduce fear are not cordial to those who believe that gratifying stories are trumped by sober truths. Most every smoker in the West reads and ignores the block letter warnings on cigarette packages. Addiction explains some. But a value— raffishly attractive me—motivates others. These are alternative ways to be: interpret or inquire. They don’t coalesce at the extremes. But very few people can ignore every relevant fact; few or none are self-effacing to the degree that they never subordinate facts to attitudes. Everyone in the middle does both. Interpreting and inquiring, sometimes at once, we express our ambiguity: I rightly perceive the organization within which I work: knowing its inequities, feeling aggrieved, I want satisfaction. Does this muddle imply that inquiry is compromised by its sanctioning values: does it follow that its claims, too, are appeasing stories? This is not implied, because the discipline of inquiry precludes it. Inquiry is provoked by needs or interests and the values they express, but intention alone cannot formulate or test, let alone confirm, its hypotheses: wanting something, I do what I can to have it, knowing all the while that desire is no guarantee of success. Inquiry is exploration: we hypothesize and experiment. Interpretation won’t save us from a dog that bites. The distinction between interpretation and inquiry nevertheless risks collapse. Everyone gathers and uses information about himself and his circumstances many times in the course of every day, because effectively engaging other people and things is a condition for safety and well-being. Yet, these discrete encounters are jejune: they lack integration and in most lives significance: nothing in them bestows meaning and worth. Understanding wants more. Interpretations provide it by locating us within the integrated, valorized worlds they prefigure, usually on terms that comfort and secure us. The political party I favor tells a story that justifies my interests; a different story reconciles me to my sex or describes my relation to the god who looks after me and my interests: I live as it prescribes. Interpretation fills every problematic space with a conceptualization that propitiates, rectifies, justifies, or explains. Whether my circumstances are treacherous or benign, I know where I am. Probably everyone has a story that reconciles the ragged parts of his or her life, a story that excuses, extenuates, or affirms yesterday’s memories, today’s conduct. Novelists make art of these reflections; not content to make sense of their own lives, they knit invented lives into a coherent story. Daydreams and fantasies do as much for us. Nor is this something we could easily stop doing. Unlike creatures that merely react, we justify and anticipate. Moving back and forth between action
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and reflection, we want the coherence and significance interpretations supply. We barely notice the contrary implications of practical life where maps, plans, and hypotheses direct our engagements with other people and things. This is reality testing, not interpretation. Hume and Kant acknowledged the inclination to distinguish them, but dismissed it as unjustifiable. Conceptual relativists agree. Believing that scientific explanations are interpretations, not hypotheses, they tell us that every differentiation, relation, and state of affairs is posited by the conceptual system used to think it. Doing Kant’s work in our time—rejecting hypotheses that infer from data to their extra-mental conditions—they say that everything is text and that texts have no integrity—no fixed sense—apart from the readings made of them. Foucault is emblematic: There is no difference between marks and words in the sense that there is between observation and accepted authority, or between verifiable fact and tradition. The process is everywhere the same: that of the sign and its likeness, and this is why nature and the word can intertwine with one another to infinity, forming, for those who can read it, one vast single text. 19 But though language no longer bears an immediate resemblance to the things it names, this does not mean that it is separate from the world; it still continues, in another form, to be the locus of revelations and to be included in the area where truth is both manifested and expressed.20 What shapes a reading? Just our way of construing phenomena of any sort, including words, sensory data, or marks of any sort. Textual critics displace authors; scientists displace nature. For nature, like a book, has no essential character of its own. All its differences and relations derive from the theories—the interpretations—used to think it. No matter that this denigrates reality, frustrates practice, and stunts thought. Is it true, nevertheless, that the realist assumptions of naïve practice are correct, implying that the idealism bred of skepticism or caution is wrong? Suppose that engineers or neurologists dispute the belief that conscious mind is a distinct substance. Saying that mind is the activity of a material system, the brain especially, they build mechanical models that duplicate mental functions. But they are challenged: materiality is a concept or notion, one that has a succession of different meanings through the course of scientific reflection. It has no application apart
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from interpretations that use it to organize and construe sensory data. For we have the dicta of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant that nothing known exceeds mind’s power to differentiate and organize the data inspected as they stand before it. Materiality, no less than talk of the gods, is the projection of a value-satisfying conceptual system. This notion of mind’s power is a weapon. Anyone who supposes that thought reaches beyond itself—fallibly but responsibly, in practical life or science—is shamed into silence by the simple remark that nothing can be known of extra-mental things. But is that so? Meeting someone new, I am better able to anticipate her responses with every subsequent encounter. Sometimes mistaken, I correct my assumptions. But what of this acquaintance: is she the creature of my thinking or its measure? And if the latter, why isn’t materiality, too, a control on what we say of it? Interpretation spreads a conceptual net, one that distinguishes and valorizes disparate things for the mind that thinks them as one. But this is not mind’s only activity. We also infer from data to their extra-mental conditions, then experiment to justify hypotheses that specify them: smoke because fire. We are prudent in many ways, because wellinformed about the material effects of many things: no one swallows thumbtacks because of having an interpretation that construes them as a delicacy. Every such thing is known as we infer from its effects to its extra-mental properties. Hypotheses are necessarily speculative, because we never have direct—unmediated—access to things inferred, though we test our speculations by constructing correctible maps or models while searching for collateral evidence that they are as we describe them. Suspecting mice, we lay traps. Fearing coal gas, we expose canaries. One is observable, the other is not. Both are inferred. Inquiry is selfcorrecting: large mice require bigger traps. Inquiry’s methodological values are subject to criticism and revision if there is evidence that reality is more complicated than was thought. Compare interpretations that rationalize our conduct by way of stories infused with value: all our projects are blessed, because we are a virtuous people. No confirming experiment is required. Practical life also idealizes its objectives, but it depends on ventures directed by hypotheses. Science embellishes practical ideas, generalizing, extrapolating, and analogizing to formulations that simplify and extend that understanding. In one as in the other, values—needs or interests—provoke actions (experiments, for example), though the existence and character of things engaged are independent of our values. Water slakes thirst, but wanting it, searching for it, is incidental to this effect: thirst motivates; testability is a procedural value.
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Procedural values discipline the formation of hypotheses by focusing attention on the states of affairs used to test them. Every procedural value is subsidiary to this overriding question: which empirical effects need obtain if hypotheses (including those implicit in maps and plans) are true? Truth is the principal value because practical life is distorted by fantasy. Many hypotheses may be true—they are possible because consistent—but the only ones reasonably affirmed are those supported by empirical data. Compare interpretations. They are organized to express the concerns of those who promote them. Truth is truth-for-me or truth-for-us. Contrary interpretations oppose one another, though neither is tested against reality, itself. Two examples illustrate these opposed interests. Consider several parents: each looks at photographs, most of them pictures of unknown children. All respond in two ways when told that one is the photograph of his or her child. Each looks through the pictures searching for the beloved face. This is inquiry: there is a hypothesis—one of these photos is important to me—and a search for the data predicted, my child. There is also interpretation: all seek the vital picture, and each enfolds it in a web of valorizing thoughts, memories, and feelings. This is interpretation as it satisfies attitude: the valorized world as it looks to me. Now this other example. Citizens answer the question: What does America mean to me? There are many answers, some mention important dates, great achievements or occasions to which inquiry could testify. Many others are effusions of gratitude, pride, pleasure, or disappointment; they dispense with supporting references, or any reference is subsumed by valorizing thoughts and feelings. This America has no ascertainable properties apart from the character ascribed it by interpretations. For America so described is not like the photographs considered above: it has only the character assigned it by valorizing attitudes. There may be predictable uniformity to some answers—because of patriotism, for example—but the America they signify is an effusion, the creature of an interpretation, not a thing disclosed by inquiry. Answers of a different sort require an inquiry: cite the actual nation, its history and people. One may join the two perspectives by using inquiry to supply backing for an interpretation, explaining an evaluative response by citing conditions that provoke it. But circumstances are typically unspecified—they may be unknown—when feelings are expressed. For this is interpretation—the affective expression of valorizing attitudes— not inquiry. These examples illustrate interpretation’s power across the range of human pursuits and commitments. Inquiry is fully appropriate to the
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intrinsic properties of texts, music, and art, though interpretation often dominates our reactions to them because such things are known principally by way of responses they evoke, not for technical details known only or best to specialist critics. Philosophers sometimes emphasize these valorizing responses when they argue that all thought is interpretation: they would have us believe that attitudes subordinate every state of affairs by fixing its ascribable properties in ways prescribed by one’s values. So, a poem or text acquires meaning within the network of discriminations and referents sanctioned by a reader’s attitudes. America is construed—“constructed”—by affective reactions to questions about its meaning: it acquires identity, hence history, character, and moral standing by way of distinctions and relations sanctioned by each person’s valorizing responses to it. Things engaged, things that provoke our attitudes, all but disappear in the tide of our projections, whether conceptual or affective. Reality then seems to be our product, not something encountered and known. History, too, is a preferred venue for those who argue that reality is constructed in ways prescribed by attitudes. For claims about it are a litmus test of ones’ overriding bias: to inquiry or interpretation. That is so, because history is inferred from residues, never by engaging it directly. Those who favor interpretation say that history lived is always subordinate to history written: its character and complexity—even the events ascribed to it—are prescribed by the sense we make of it, hence by the interests—the values and attitudes—of the historian. But this is implausibly grandiose if it implies that single authors, all of them ephemeral and narrowly constrained by their information and interests, are empowered to “construct” the past. For the perspective appropriate to history is situational, not evaluative. Available information is often meager. This occluded window may be further restricted by a historian’s scholastic emphasis (political or economic, for example) or by his theoretic bias (great men or the tempo and detail of everyday life). But only Berkeley and his phenomenalist heirs suppose that the Statue of Liberty reduces to the impression of people moving about New York Harbor. Grant the obstacles to determining the actual shape of events long past (even recent), then consider that history too has an integrity undiminished by our difficulty ascertaining it. Situational perspectives are not reduced to valorizing perspectives for want of information: think of past events as bridges obscured in darkness or fog. This opposition—interpretation or inquiry—is an abiding tension in human thought. Experience is ambiguous in a way that expresses their difference: it signifies data (percepts, thoughts, words, sentences, and theories) organized “before the mind’s eye” while infused with
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value. Or it denotes explorations in the ambient world. Interpretation is expansive, value-laden, and unfalsifiable. Inquiry requires that motives and interests be left at the door: its claims are falsifiable; its method is a discipline for exposing error. Thought is comfortable with both— we ignore their incompatibility—because each is gratifying in its way. Inquiry is exigent, because practical life demands it. But interpretation is likely to be as ancient as the evolutionary changes that enabled humans to reflect on questions that dominate our quest for personal and social meaning: what and where am I, what do I like or fear, what can I hope? Modernity—the early sixteenth century (Copernicus) to the present—recalibrates the balance. Before, interpretation dominated practical life in the respect that its conduct and meaning were subordinated to an interpreting story: church and state imposed their views without risking challenge from superior explanations. They are superseded, because science, technology, popular sovereignty, and a market economy require that we find our way in a world that resists us. Interpretation is still the way of self-understanding, social identity, fiction, and daydreams, but stories embroidered with fantasy and myth are poor directives apart from sects where belief is a condition for participation. Hypothesis and experiment is the method preferred as we move through strange rooms at night. There will never be a time when sobriety reduces interpretation to nil, though frustration and error intimate that reconciling interpretations have their limits. Adherents can whistle Berkeley’s tune—nothing is like an idea but another idea—but they, too, trip in the dark. CONTRARY RESPONSES: AN EXAMPLE Imagine a seminar where each of ten people reviews the same novel. The author is allusive, the story line is complicated, there are many characters. Five of the reviewers are inquirers. The book has a form, however imperfect: they will find it. The other five are interpreters: each sees the book as an opportunity to tell his or her story. How does discussion go? The inquirers make hypotheses and marshal supporting evidence. Fellow inquirers criticize them in two ways: they say the evidence is equivocal or that their hypotheses explain it better. These disputes puzzle the interpreters. Postmodernism has taught them that texts have no settled form; the inquirers are looking hard for something that isn’t there. Interpreters construe the book on analogy to a Rorschach test: make what you can of it. Disputes are much less heated, because each
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sees another’s reading as an expression of his interests and perspective. Alternative interpretations are generously received: why resist them if none is true or false? Everyone goes to dinner after the seminar, but only the interpreters are amiable and pleased. Each embroiders his or her story and listens to the other four with the bemused tolerance of people exchanging pictures of their pets or children. The inquirers aren’t speaking. Each is annoyed by the rejection of his hypothesis. All are distressed by the show they have made of themselves: what could inquiry be worth if no hypothesis is better than another? But then, the interpreters, too, are suddenly quiet. Each has realized that his account reveals biases he would rather not expose. No one is happy when dinner is over, and the bill is called. This isn’t the end of the matter, because literature is puzzling in ways that nature is not. There is much to know of my cat, but every hypothesis concerning it is decidable. Authorial meaning isn’t as sure. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., hopes to minimize the difference by citing “authorial intent” or “will”:21 “The aim of my exposition will be to confirm that the author’s meaning, as represented by his text, is unchanging and reproducible.”22 Authors typically believe that this is so: they would have readers hypothesize, in ways Hirsch describes, to determine a book’s “whole meaning.”23 But does this obviate the plain difficulty of agreeing about a text’s meaning? Is a diversity of readings merely an expression of partial or shallow readings or the conceit of readers who prefer their interpretations to the text? Hirsch knows the ambiguity of texts; the difficulty is elsewhere. Three considerations are decisive: i. States of affairs and all their relations are determinate in every detail. (Quantum theory denies this of phenomena at the scale of electrons. This view is contested in chapter 6. Just now, I assume the truth of this surmise.) Books, too, are determinate in every detail: there are so many pages and so many words. But characters in a novel are sometimes barely sketched. Premises in the arguments of philosophers are often merely intimated: there may be many ways to justify conclusions that are affirmed or implied rather than argued. ii. Many poems, novels, and plays are read for the feelings they evoke. An author’s choice of words is easily settled; one may also discern his or her intent. Mood’s relation to words is nevertheless uncertain: it depends very much on the author’s choice of words, the reader’s situation, and his or her state of mind. Readers can’t be faulted for responding to provocative words in whatever ways they do. iii. The whole of a text is known to its author in the way a complex city is known to its residents. Each knows streets regularly traveled, but not
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the routes of other people. For there are many routes, so many that no one could know all of them. Routes are analogues for the “implications” of which Hirsch writes.24 It’s surely true that readers may want to know the implications drawn or assumed by the author. Yet, why foreclose the possibility that a reader may concern himself with inferences prefigured but otherwise ignored in the text? These considerations have varying implications for the difference between interpretation and inquiry. The first—the indeterminacy of texts—is an open door to interpretation: make of the text what you can. One might think it sufficient to note a text’s ambiguities. But why shouldn’t an imaginative reader supply details, motives, or arguments ignored by an author, but appropriate to the reader’s inclinations? The second point—the affect provoked by texts—also speaks for the prerogatives of the interpreter. An author may have expected readers to laugh, but his intention is irrelevant if one, several, or many feel irony or pain as they read him. It is incidental to the third point—alternate routes through a test—that the author was oblivious to implications important to a reader who cites textual evidence sufficient to justify them. But this, too, is easily turned to the purposes of interpretation. Readers may aim to do no more than report the ambiguous implications of Hegel’s Phenomenology, but that is work for a book report. Inventive readers elaborate his themes in ways suitable to themselves, only incidentally to him. Hence this slippery slope: inquiries—finding implications the author ignored—culminate as interpretations if, for example, Marxists or theists appropriate Hegel for their purposes. It would be useful to reconvene the seminar, listening again as participants justify their responses: Does the book describe characters or incidents that invite completing detail because they are merely sketched by the author? Do words or sentences rouse feelings that vary with readers and their circumstances? Does the text prefigure implications that are otherwise ignored? Life, itself, provokes these alternate responses— interpretation or inquiry. It isn’t surprising that books do it, too. MIXED MODES Science is replete with experiments calculated to falsify or confirm a surmise. Personal or social interests may motivate either hypotheses or the experiments they promote—blind tests of a promising drug, for example—but those concerns are incidental to the outcome. Practical life is less sanitized: needs and interests direct every intervention; reality-testing is everywhere buffered in ways congenial to attitudes. The will to believe is nevertheless constrained. The woman who rejects a suitor may
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refuse every inducement: she’s not interested, and no act or attitude of his changes her mind. But this can’t happen if Kant is right, because such women have no being apart from the experiences schematized by their suitors. Still, these experiences are puzzling: why these men populate their worlds with women who reject them is a mystery Kant doesn’t and can’t explain. For his idealist view is everywhere confounded by the errors and frustrations of everyday life. Is the dog that bites me the figment of my schematizing imagination and its directing attitudes? A rich enough story implies moral judgments, and the promise that breaches will be punished. Construe the bite as a judgment, and the story seems confirmed. The dog is the instrument of a story that vests it with moral purpose: deserving punishment, I accept it. But I didn’t create the dog, and I might have noticed, before reaching thoughtlessly to pet him that he wasn’t friendly. Fact-finding—inquiry—could have warned me, as usually it does. For sobriety, too, is an expression of attitude, one learned as we seek information while controlling impulses. Practical life is often disappointing, partly because of circumstances, partly because attitudes have these contrary vectors: some calibrate needs to circumstances, others satisfy attitudes with fantasy. Making attitudes pertinent to our circumstances is a discipline we never quite master, though there is often a rough but reconciling balance. Needing traffic laws, we regulate after gathering information— inquiring—about road use. Attitude—the aesthetics of road design—may prescribe a favored solution, but it is more likely that the choice of laws will be justified by information about the likely effects of regulation. The result is different if we consider beliefs fixed by attitudes that are incidental to their circumstances. Many people pray sincerely when buying lottery tickets or batting with the bases loaded. Attitudes valorize the act, but they can’t vindicate losing tickets or strikeouts. APPLICATIONS Participants in my imaginary seminar easily distinguish interpretations from inquiries, though the difference isn’t always clear because some of the language used is ambiguous. Critical theory is a principal example, because it signifies both interpretation and inquiry: theorists analyze and construe the meaning of novels, plays, or poems, or they distinguish what is from what ought to be in social or political contexts.25 The ought expresses a reader’s value-bestowing interpretation or it signifies the finding that a system diverges from its internal norms: a state and its constitution, for ex-
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ample. The postmodernist literary critic tells what he would have intended had he written the book; the critic of social organizations diagnoses their structures or practices, and tells how and why they should be altered given some generic conditions—private and social—for human well-being. These versions of critical theory have different origins. The style appropriate to literature derives from the hermeneutics of biblical exegesis.26 This is interpretation: we read texts in ways fixed by attitudes. The style for curing social ills or for remaking them to realize an ideal derives from Plato, Marx, and Freud: distinguish what is from what ought to be given some assumptions about the conditions for human flourishing, then specify a procedure for repairing the harm or realizing the good. Or the motive is pedestrian but commonplace and urgent: pollution threatens public health, so we establish procedures and laws to control it. This is planning, the version of inquiry that joins realitytesting to a program for altering a situation to create a desired outcome. Many laws have no other basis. Strategies are mixed if we investigate to secure a personal aim, because attitudes and preferences are no less critical than information. But pure cases—those in which either side excludes the other—are also familiar: ideologies versus weather reports. This is contentious given the preference for sunshine, but one can determine what is or is likely to obtain without an encumbering bias. Nutritionists specify the least requirements for healthy diets; physiologists say as much about exercise. Both name deficiencies in personal and social practices. Nothing in this comparison implies that inquiry eliminates every interpretive bias as it solves practical or theoretical problems: there is always a perspective and interest that directs our engagements with other things, though usually we do or can appraise our circumstances without regard for this distortion: wanting a suit or tie, I like the one I see, but see, too, that it doesn’t look good on me. Nietzsche averred, to the contrary, that pure inquiry—untainted by motivating biases—is a delusion. History was his preferred example, because of its elusiveness: having no way to engage it directly, we infer from its effects to their conditions. Interpretation is constructive and value laden, hence Nietzsche’s claim that historical events are indeterminate until interpreted: they acquire specificity and valence from the interpretations used to construe them.27 But is this so: is the character of the past decidable by something we do when thinking it? This might be an evidentiary question: do we have enough information to know what happened days or centuries ago? But that is not Nietzsche’s question.
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He supposed that events are indeterminate as they occur, and that none has a settled form until and unless it is thought and reported. We provide for the first consideration—Is there evidence of things past?—and avert the second—Are events formless in themselves?—by specifying one determinate event for which there is evidence. Suspend Cartesian doubt and acknowledge that there are people additional to oneself, or apply it and acknowledge that there is at least one person, oneself. When and how the many or one were created is a separate issue. We need only a single, determinate historical event to refute the claim that everything past is determinable: the coming to be of one or many persons is that fact. But you say, Nietzsche wasn’t proposing miracles. It isn’t the reality of the past, only its details—how, what, and when—that are in question. Alleging many comings-to-be doesn’t entail that they were determinate in any of these respects; their determinability is an invitation to historical imagination: let historians tell us—let them imagine—what happened. But we do have detailed information—private memories and public records—of many births. Their dates, times, and sites are not uncertain or determinable to any significant degree. Many events are known with the same degree of confidence. Nietzsche ignored the evidence for a moralizing reason. Concerned that freedom is impaired by the weight of the past, he proposed to liberate us: supersede your past by interpreting it in ways congenial to your aims; don’t be sabotaged by inquiries—cold and detached—that discover your fate in a trajectory no one could alter. But Nietzsche understood that freedom is always constrained by character and circumstances, and reduced by will-full ignorance of both.28 Excuse his romantic excess, then consider that illiteracy, poverty, and sickness are impediments to freedom. Inquiries that identify these factors are a condition for liberating people they disable. Aesthetics, too, is clarified by distinguishing interpretation from inquiry. Imagine an erotic film, beautifully crafted and emotionally provocative, then compare it to hearing one of Bach’s sonatas for violin or cello. The music, too, is affecting, but the response is cognitive: what am I hearing; let me hear it again to perceive it better. Music stirs us, but the tension resolved is sometimes an expression of intellectual appetite: we are drawn to hear things as they are. This is inquiry, not interpretation. Nothing is lost if aesthetic experience has these two expressions, but practical life and science are sabotaged by their confusion. Need and interest guarantee their survival, though metaphysics is more vulnerable because practitioners and critics alike often believe that fantasy is its only sponsor. Distinguishing interpretation from inquiry (chapter 6) is its principal defense.
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VALUES Values are intrinsic to interpretation in the respect that they motivate and integrate the stories we tell. They warp every situation experienced through interpretive lenses. But truth, too, is a value, one that interpretation values highly. We know it does, because no one gladly concedes that views strongly held are false. The vigor of this response compares to the flexibility required of interpretations: organize an orienting story in any way that satisfies your values and—if this concerns you—the credibility of your story to favored people. My team always loses, but nothing convinces me that it is less than best. I extenuate its failure by describing games it would have won but for bad luck to other members of our fan club; all agree. This is value’s role as it insulates us from frustration, and failure: interpretation says that we are safer and better than we seem. Inquiry’s discipline is more severe. Values that motivate it—a need or aim—are incidental to results, though procedural values—consistency, economy, and testability—are critical to success: the maps and plans of practical life are worthless if they misdirect us; no hypothesis is verifiable if inconsistent and untestable. Leading principles—rules regularly tested and confirmed—are also procedural values: they direct formulation of individual plans and hypotheses. But their value, too, is extraneous to interests that motivate their use. There is evidence that buildings have architects—cause and effect—but none for the inference that nature is designed. Augustine and Descartes agreed that a different value—self-love— is especially prominent: self-affirmation—I am, I exist—expresses it. Valuing myself, I tell a story that accords with my sense of identity, worth, grievance, or entitlement. Interpretation ascribes intrinsic value to the self and, by extension, to systems with which it identifies. “A man’s home is his castle” is a précis of this view. For a proper castle has a moat that defends it from intruders. Other people—retainers of every sort—have instrumental value only. They, too, may have castles, but every such dwelling has walls that make residents opaque to neighbors. Each person and every established system—team, sect, business, or state—has a more or less explicit self-justifying story. Why did you do it, we ask; how could you do such a thing? There is usually an answer that seems rational and plausible within the context of the respondent’s interpretation. This difference between private and public—each person or system’s rationale versus the judgments of others—is vigorously defended by a fortuitous accident: idiosyncrasy is invisible. Impenetrable others have interpretations that dovetail with ours at the margins, but commonalities
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explained by socialization obscure differences that abide. Idiopathic tastes are disguised; we establish a community of shared values by defending practices that are publicly approved. The Internet is useful evidence that much of the private survives: there is profitable trade in ideas and things that others regard as perverse. Interests that few would acknowledge are openly expressed when anonymity is assumed. Science as we know it was impossible until people could differentiate values motivated by self-love and tribal loyalty—values that distort hypotheses or experiments to favor an interest or need—from inquiry’s procedural values. Economy and consistency are internal to the maps and plans of practical life and the hypotheses of science, but inquiry isn’t compromised by them. A scientist obsessed by the issues he investigates knows that his passion has no place in his hypotheses. No interpreter feels this constraint: it is my god, team, or state I celebrate; mine is better than yours. One might see this difference in evolutionary terms: reality is conflated with our aims before we learn to distinguish them from circumstances that alternately satisfy or frustrate them. The inference is reasonable, because science and effective practice are unachievable until we distinguish what we want, including what we want to know, from circumstances for getting it. But it isn’t true that interpretation is always superseded by inquiry. For there are some domains of belief—the demand that life have purpose—from which interpretation is never displaced. MORALITY Interpretation shares several of its moral assumptions and virtues with inquiry—honesty and loyalty, for example—but each construes them differently and embeds them in assumptions that are alien to the other. Honesty in inquiry is truthfulness about relevant facts and straight dealing with one’s partners. People can’t do their work with faithless— unreliable—partners, or without the accurate information partners supply. Interpretation construes honesty as forthrightness; loyalty is fidelity to a belief or to a community of believers. Consistency—stubborn belief—is a virtue, because we are disoriented rather than located if the beliefs endowing life with significance are threatened or altered. Fidelity to a belief is a condition for one’s psychic stability, but also a condition for the ease of fellow believers. Their affiliation is a strength, but also a vulnerability, for there is the perpetual risk of conflict, betrayal, or a change of heart. Unable to sustain beliefs that make me a trusted communicant, I have this choice: remain intelligible to them at cost to being unintelligible to myself. Endorse a life that is significant in their terms or significant in mine; be loyal to them or loyal to oneself. Babe Ruth
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and Johnny Damon could move from Boston to New York faster than any Red Sox fan could root for the Yankees. A salary is a contractual obligation; loyalty—self-identity—isn’t for sale. These different ways of construing moral virtues are symptomatic of structural social differences. Interpretation favors affiliation; inquiry is appropriate to the differentiated but complementary tasks of organizations. Friendship is affiliative; schools, businesses, and teams are organizations; families are both. Affiliation requires mirroring, because bonding is intensified among an ideology’s partisans or a team’s fans when each believes, feels, and responds as other members do. Organizations are cooler. Having a complex task, they divide it among their reciprocally related members; each receives the information and resources required to do his or her part. Styles of cooperation and the norms appropriate to systems of these two kinds—churches or teams—vary accordingly. One prizes solidarity in belief and feeling. The other wants efficacy, though cooperation is sabotaged in organizations—broken marriages, businesses, and teams are the effect—when partners who share an aim are unable to collaborate because their interpretations diverge. Suppressing these differences while agreeing about pertinent facts is a condition for working effectively together, though incompatible attitudes sometimes preclude it. We acknowledge this obstacle to cooperation in our personal lives, but fail to realize that it also stymies political, social, and economic organization. Autocratic interpretations were a potent obstacle to social cooperation, until modern societies pushed sectarian ideologies to the margin. Separating church and state—by declaring that there shall be no established religion—enables a state’s citizens to create a viable public space for cooperation across chasms of ethnicity, race, religion, and gender. Cooperation to achieve shared or complementary aims generalizes when religious views become incidental to business, education, and all the other domains where inquiry dominates interpretation. But there is no simple, definitive solution; countervailing influences are discouraged rather than eliminated, so nations struggle recurrently to purge sectarianism from public life. Differences once eliminated or suppressed reemerge when special interests militate for laws that would enshrine sectarian values in marriage, abortion, education, taxation, or immigration. This is a critical issue in every European nation where immigrant communities challenge the secular mores and views of longtime residents. They are less urgent in America where disparate attitudes and worldviews are softened, because a vigorous economy and Constitutional defenses promise private spaces and well-being to most citizens. We cooperate, usually, despite schismatic differences, because practical
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good sense identifies objectives we organize to achieve. The result is affiliating, because health and safety, living together wisely and well are aims that supersede divisive interpretations. Or cooperation breaks down, because sects respond to secular demands by recoiling from practices that are abhorrent to them. Tribal identities are emphasized: remember who you are; don’t betray us or yourselves; salvation in our terms is worth many times more than any secular advantage. These are disputes about norms that regulate belief and behavior. Should a society commend or command particular social or spiritual values, or is it sufficient that it favor norms appropriate to inquiry and the reciprocities that promote individual and public welfare? The status of norms—whatever their content and role—is controversial since Hume and Kant taught that all are stipulated, none is discovered. Attitudes more than efficacy were to determine the choice of norms: sacralized marriage or the Ten Commandments, for example. Yet many norms— logical and natural laws, health, and parameters for the proper maintenance and functioning of any machine—are natural, not conventional or divine. Inquiry, not interpretation discovers and specifies them. Distinguishing these origins—norms stipulated when we interpret our circumstances versus norms inquiry discovers and applies—is critical when a norm is disputed. For attitudes and conventions change, but natural norms are hard to displace. This difference is obscured when interpretations cite divine origins for norms that naturalists describe as conventional: norms regulating sexual relations, for example. These disputes are clarified if conditions for the cogency of interpretations and the validity of inquiries are firmly stated: claims about natural norms, like all hypotheses about matters of fact, are empirically testable; interpretation’s norms—no divorce, no sex until marriage—satisfy no condition but the attitudes of people who affirm them.29 POLITICS Politics is a competition for the control and management of social life. Interpretation and inquiry are alternative bases for disputing or exercising control. Each interpretation justifies its author’s claim to govern in the name of values he or she commends by describing the world valorized in its terms: sanctity, justice, or the proletariat, terror, or the general will. Inquiry agrees that values direct our engagements with other people and things, but these are practical interests satisfied by work, health, study, family, and governance. Religious scruples may restrict one’s diet, but then inquiry inherits the task of determining how to satisfy nutritional standards in ways consistent with that regime.
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Political deliberations may be focused by the demand that they be satisfied in the style favored by one or another interpretation or by a material interest susceptible to practical solutions. Interpretations intimate or formulate systems of rules for managing every such interest. Inquiry agrees that there are a hundred ways to skin a cat, but ever pragmatic, it wants evidence that any particular way serves individual or public welfare by solving specific problems. Given the many languages, we restrict ourselves to one or a few for the practical motive of wanting a society’s members to be mutually intelligible, not because interpretation alleges that one or another is the language of God. The cleavage that sets domineering ideologists or tyrants against the public of responsible, deliberating citizens is always cogent, though it is superseded in our time by another idea of democracy. Our tolerant culture supposes that democracy is better expressed by slogans: let a thousand flowers bloom, don’t make judgments, let each person or community live within his, her, or its truths. This is democracy tailored to three concerns: first, interpretation’s demand that no one external to a circle of interpreters should appraise its truths and values; second, the principle that every interpretation is tolerated if organizing in its terms is not inimical to a civil society’s other members; third, the demand that each interpretation’s values be respected in the arena of public policy. The last requirement is unrealizable given the first and second. For if abortion is favored by some but detested by others, we cannot require that every person be made responsible for both, though we can allow each person, family, school, or sect to decide among practices that do not violate generally accepted norms. This conflict is the energy that translates the tolerant democracy of difference into a struggle for domination: let our interpretation—our values—dictate practices to all. Inquiry resists this political outcome for several reasons. We may not believe the stories interpreters tell because they aren’t falsifiable and because they are, so often, transparent ways of controlling vulnerable people. Interpretation’s rules—do it this way or that—are unnecessarily dogmatic. For there are many ways to satisfy life-securing interests. Some are invisible when interpretations foreclose our options, though many are viable and consistent with the interests of people served. Think of traffic laws: people go their separate ways with private aims and chosen companions while observing laws that facilitate movement and prevent harm. An ideology insisting that driving on one side or the other should be favored for ethical or divine reasons would be silly, given inquiry’s confirmation that we get both effects from either. Democracy puts its faith in inquiry: we experiment to know the effects of alternative policies, then toss a coin or choose.
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Democracy requires a public, one created when citizens accept responsibility for the task of corporate self-regulation. They or their representatives establish the constitutional, institutional structure that makes laws, administers public policy, and adjudicates conflicts. But critically, it is the public—not only government—that deliberates. For government is ineffective if citizens fail to understand or respect the conditions for an open playing field, meaning freedom of action, mutual respect, and defense against harm. It is democracy’s citizens, not only their representatives, who do or should dispute and articulate shared values, tasks, and priorities: they, too, know the obstacles and challenges to public and private welfare. The alternative is a bureaucratized state, one that goes its way for reasons of habit or ideology without regard for the interests and circumstances of its people. We often suppose that democracy is an ideology, so a preference for it is an interpretation expressing an attitude. But this is moot, if government by the people is predicated on these salient facts. First is Descartes’ “I am, I exist,” and the fact that this is everyone’s perception. Second is each person’s affirmation that his or her life is valuable to him or her and that his or her well-being is, for him or her, a good in itself. Third is the fact that no one is self-sufficient so we need and desire to cooperate with others if we are to achieve personal and collective well-being. Fourth is each person’s ability to make rational calculations that enhance the wellbeing of him or herself and partners. Only the third point—a desire for cooperation—may seem moot, but that is so only if we imagine that it requires cooperation everywhere and always with everyone. Start, instead, from the standpoint of small groups—families, friends, neighbors, or a tribe. Cooperation is a commonplace within them. The public is a larger tribe, one requiring an act of imagination from all its members. For we wear two hats, one private, the other public. It is usually the private hat that shows, though we wear the public hat when deliberating about impediments, aims, and policies vital to all citizens. Imagine a Vermont town meeting, then consider that the properly informed, effectively joined citizens of every community must deliberate lest they be diverted by interests that oppose communal self-regulation. The alternative is the sclerosis of the public, its manipulation, and death, then the tyranny that justifies itself with a reconciling interpretation. Individuals may resist the task of public deliberation; each may be oblivious to others because he or she is self-concerned, but this is a correctible failure. For every person is, to some degree, self-responsible. All can realize that regulations distorted by the interests of other people or their sects are inimical to them, and that there are common interests, hence choices that affect the well-being of all. Shall we favor individual
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wellfare or the interests of the community, this generation or its heirs? These options can be discussed without the distortions introduced when deliberation is only an exchange of ideological verities. For the prime interest—a shared interest—is the well-being of the citizenry, individually, in their core systems, and together. Democracy as described here is both an expression of corporate inquiry and a condition for individual inquiry. It is corporate inquiry, because citizens join to consider alternate policies, then to test the alternatives. Conceding failure—Prohibition, for example—the public alters course. Laws are replaced; judges apply old laws to altered circumstances by reconstruing them in terms that are apposite. The corporate public adapts: it alters the terms of self-regulation to make itself viable in altered circumstances. It has, however, this enduring aim: defend the open playing field in which citizens make their private choices and lives. Let them take charge of their lives while making the families, businesses, and schools that give substance and meaning to their lives. This is democracy as the enabling condition for the experiments of private citizens and the systems they form. For joining other people in a shared project is an inquiry of a practical sort: we undertake to work together for benefits and costs that are only partly foreseen. The work may continue well past the time when it is reasonably described as an experiment—in marriage, for example— but this impression confuses habit or familiarity with commitment: it ignores the ineliminable contingency that qualifies every relationship. We engage old clients or companions in new ways or—given means and opportunity—they find other partners. Suppose it true that democracy is an expression of corporate inquiry and a condition for the inquiries of private life and its affiliations. For this blurs the distinction between reality testing inquiry and significance bestowing interpretation. Life is valorized in both ways: we construe it in terms prescribed by an interpretation, projecting significance into the ambient world, or we discover significance as we accommodate our circumstances or affiliate ourselves to valued others. So, children learn moral virtues—honesty, loyalty, reliability—in the context of their families, friendships, schools, and neighborhoods. It is these engagements—the trial and error of relating to other people—that teach moral lessons, irrespective of the interpretations invoked to justify moral virtues. Think of early friendships, and the experimental attitudes they require: what does this new friend need and want, what do I want, how I can be sure of his or her attention? The process is an inquiry; stabilizing intimacy is the result. Interpretations crystallize and rationalize these values, but it is inquiry rather than those stories that achieves viable relations to other people.
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There is a contrary view. It avers that political affairs are morally neutered until interpretation projects animating values and aims into them. But this is a deception: interpretation is frosting on the cake, not the reason or impetus that motivates every political dispute: many are factual, empirical, and practical, not ideological. The issue is confused, but an example is clarifying. Political parties are the epicenter of ideology, hence interpretation. Suppose we limit attention to those right or left of center. They disagree, currently, about the degree to which social interests—health and education, for example—should have market-based solutions. These disagreements are often expressed without regard for the evidence that comes with pursuing one policy or another. But sometimes when policies are tried experimentally, debate turns on questions of evidence, efficacy, and the trade-offs that go with one or another policy. Is fungible labor—few restrictions on hiring or firing workers— a condition for a dynamic economy, or is worker insecurity an unacceptable personal and social cost? One may see these alternatives in the light of ideology, hence interpretation, but this other emphasis is more elusive but appropriate: there are alternate perspectives on the complexity of modern economies; one may emphasize the effects on individual workers, the costs or benefits to business, or the long-term conditions for growth. These are distinct practical concerns, each justified by the actual features of markets. People who study or legislate for them may start with an allegiance: workers, businessmen, or a viable economy. But this is partiality—loyalty to and support for one of the participants in a complex process—not interpretation. Politicians who take one perspective or another properly defend themselves by saying that the side they favor deserves their concern. All concerns are justified, because there is no business without workers, no workers without business, and neither without an economy that sustains both. Why say that each of these perspectives is more congenial to inquiry than interpretation? Because inquiry considers the effects suffered and caused by market participants. Each has value for the others so that significance emerges as they engage one another in the process of making the food, clothing, or shelter all require, but also the pollution that makes them sick. Partisan politicians emphasize effects that disadvantage one side or the other, but their charge is testable: does the market have these effects. Evidence for or against their claim doesn’t end discussion, because the next question—are these effects a worthwhile tradeoff for its benefits?— invokes the loyalties of the contesting sides. But here too, the solution is inquiry, not interpretation. Interpretation would impose a solution: favor this side or the other for reasons it affirms. Inquiry asks this other question: how can circumstances be adjusted so that benefits are en-
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hanced or costs diminished on both sides. Democratic governments study and compromise, tinker and accommodate on most issues that engage them. Democracy is remarkable among political systems, because it tolerates different perspectives on complex phenomena then sanctions the many perspectives by giving each person a voice in policies that affect his or her topics of concern. This was Dewey’s emphasis: policies are tested by their effects; none is reaffirmed merely because an ideology commends it.30 Even the worth of democracy needs occasional reconsideration and vindication. For its value is never uncontested. Inquiry— including historical studies and thought experiments that inform us of alternatives and their effects—supplies the evidence confirming its value, not least for the permission to inquire. This tolerance for experiment and diversity seems laborious and time consuming: trying alternative policies to see and appraise their effects—think of the FDA testing candidate drugs—requires patience and mutual forbearance. Interpretation aborts this process in the name of values, rules, or a story appropriate to us and our circumstances. It feigns an urgency that rarely obtains. There may be no situationally appropriate practices that cannot be tried and justified by the combination of experiment and a universal respect for the welfare of individual persons and their communities: someone restricted to a vegetarian diet because of allergies quickly learns to cope. This doesn’t preclude interpretations: most vegetarians choose their diet because of attitude, not allergy. It does suggest that experiment promotes viable alternative solutions to pressing issues, be they personal or social. Politics is an argument about authority: who should determine the policies that organize and regulate a community? There may be several or many disagreements about every policy considered. But democracy is unique among forms of governance, because it is an expression of selfregulating inquiry and a condition for the personal inquiries of its members. Democracy can tolerate sects that construe themselves in the terms of a favored story, if the sects are privatized because denied access to governmental authority. Interpretation, less tolerant, declares its truths, then closes the door on further information and experiment. We have these choices: legislate regulation, dogmatically affirming one or another set of rules and meanings—“truths”—or acknowledge that circumstances and our self-understanding may evolve and that we may learn new ways to accommodate our circumstances while improving ourselves. Public discourse is often a competition between these two kinds of power. One is ambitious, but fallible and sober. The other is expansive, romantic, dogmatic, and irresponsible; its claims are untestable,
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so inquiry is its enemy. Their merger is nevertheless possible. Credulity dominated experiment for centuries, though it wanes wherever science, technology, and abduction are ascendant. But this is a two-edged sword, because successful inquiry is instrumental to effective control. We risk trading fantasy and mythology for greater manipulation and less freedom. This is the likely effect when a successful technology intrudes on personal life. Imagine biomolecular engineering joined to a cult of discipline and efficiency, and to drugs that “correct” rogue interpretations. That is too much sobriety.
Chapter Two
Interpretation Self and Society
I
nterpretation embeds us in webs of meaning: hero of the revolution, beloved by God, or dear to me. Meanings that depend on the attitudes of individuals have little currency, until their influence is regularized within a neighborhood, society, or culture. Yet socialization is polarizing: we resist it, because interpretation is essentially private. Like a fingerprint, it is yours or mine. Think of merchandise arrayed in store windows to seduce passersby. There is a fact of the matter—things of a kind recognizable to all who see them—but passersby respond differently; one is attracted by everything, something, or nothing because of his or her interests. Cognition is biased by values; interpretation is the medium that joins them. ORIGIN AND CONTEXT Imagine arriving, for the first time, in a foreign place. Disoriented because local practices and beliefs make no sense, we perceive the gap between things seen raw and the significance bestowed by interpretation. The difference is intolerable, because the uninterpreted world seems alien and dangerous. Local residents are oblivious to having this orientation, but they recognize its absence in visitors obliged to choose: learn the local ways or leave. For here, in this strange place, the accepted interpretation is one of the facts to learn. This imperative is a commonplace of religious practice, but it obtains as well for the members of every community: all use a valorizing conceptual framework to perceive 45
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the world and themselves. The framework is normative: it tells us what we ought to be and how to be it: think of a bride finding her way in a new family or children adjusting to a new school. I once met two neighbors on the street shortly after returning from a country where men shake hands all around when meeting others. Both stepped back when I extended my hand. They eyed it and paused, until one reluctantly offered his hand saying, “OK, if you want to.” My neighbors weren’t callous or hostile, but they didn’t recognize this gesture as the expression of an emotional and civic bond. Both are New Yorkers. The density and scale of the city, the need for distance and autonomy make residents less open and available than people from towns where life is less fraught. One allows others to enter one’s space: they don’t assume a right to cross that barrier unless invited. This is interpretation as it penetrates and shapes the simplest gestures and responses. Hopeful, cautious or afraid, we interpret events in ways that make life seem coherent and safe, though doing this distorts understanding. For nothing is quite as it seems when everything is construed from a valorizing perspective. Compare the mindless cows described in Nietzsche’s On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life: lacking a conscious past or future, they chew thoughtlessly through sun or rain, making no sense of themselves or their situation. We can’t do as little short of anesthesia or brain death. For each person anticipates obstacles and integrates anomalies, all the while construing his or her circumstances and self in ways prescribed by an evolving interpretation. Sometimes consciously, more often not, each contrives a network that valorizes and integrates the separate bits and pieces of life. The logic of the network is loosely associational, not axiomatic, because there are always new interests or data to integrate; incorporating them would be clumsy if the network were too rigorously organized. Terrible events sometimes exceed our ability to comprehend them in its terms, but we try. Interpretation evolves: socialized later, its beginnings are resolutely singular, because of the distinctive way that people resolve two contrary urgencies: we are vulnerable and afraid because needy and dependent, but also resilient, hopeful, easily excited, and pleased. A third factor mediates, but complicates these two: requiring the goodwill and help of others, wanting companions, reconciling hope and fear, we embed ourselves in relationships (families, friendships, religious communities, and states) that confirm our well-being or expose our vulnerabilities. Pleasure and pain are often described as the primary axis of human struggle, but they are place-markers—symptoms— for well-being and excitement or vulnerability and fear. This alternation is primitive and abiding: other variables—relations to other people,
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gender identity, and status, for example—are contexts where the tension between them is resolved. Both factors are decisive for attitude formation, and each is apparent in the responses of infants. I infer (there is no testimony) that babies are alternately anxious and uncomfortable or quiescent and satisfied, and that they begin to correlate these feelings with the responses of their caretakers: are they engaged and reliable, or is the baby desperate because they are not? The child responds with confidence or fear. (Mixed cases—caretakers who are mostly but not always good or bad—are more common, but I ignore them because they complicate description.) Learned expectations crystallize as core attitudes. Embodying cognition and feeling, favoring some outcomes, dreading others, they establish the parameters for belief, choice, and action. Having an attitude, one sees things of a kind as threatening or securing, and one fears or welcomes the experience. These first, orienting attitudes are hard to change once formed. Other needs emerge, but children retain the expectations chiseled into memory by early experiences of deprivation and vulnerability or security and well-being. The effect is apparent at twelve months when an infant’s style of attachment to primary caretakers has formed: the baby is confident and secure, firmly attached to one or a few caretakers, or disoriented and so lacking in affect that he or she responds listlessly to everyone encountered.1 Some contented adults were content already as babies. Others construe things as malign and out of control, or believe that one can pacify uncertainty with power, understanding, or prayer. All use interpretation to convert alien facts into comprehensible situations. These accommodations are fragile, but never passive. For interpretation is the cognitive power that locates us within the ambient world on our terms: knowing where we are—or imagining we do—makes being there more tolerable. Joyous praying surged among people marooned in the Louisiana Superdome after Hurricane Katrina. Homes, jobs, and lives were lost, but believers could steady themselves by exalting their God. There is no disaster, no vulnerability or failure that cannot be construed passably if facts are discerned in ways congenial to one’s attitudes. Interpretation progresses with the learned repertoire of practical skills and with enhanced facility for conceptual housekeeping: introduced to new tasks and situations, gratified or embarrassed, we instill these circumstances and our responses with significance: more than practical, they are meaningful. Every such interpretation is evidence that attitudes have formed, and that they mediate between stimulus and response. Ephemeral attitudes are superseded; core attitudes stabilize. The overall effect is an orientation—a perspective—that construes the world in ways
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that justify and explain whatever practices secure and satisfy us. We are serene and passive (because circumstances are mostly gratifying) or anxious and active (because they are inimical if undefended). Ask a person to describe his or her values, and the answer is fragmentary and uncertain. He tries to present and explain himself with economy and coherence, but there is more complexity and conflict than self-inspection can reveal. He cites things valued, but this is reflected light, choices that survived when filtered through his attitudes. There may be no other, more direct way of addressing conflicted attitudes, because we see and feel their effects, but not those drivers themselves. Preferring cigars to cigarettes or a pipe, I may abstain from tobacco of every sort for the sake of health. Prizing health, but committed to my habit, I sacrifice one for the other. Priorities are ranked, but the order is more plastic than fixed: a dominant aim today was subsidiary before and will be again. Core attitudes fix the parameters for attitudes acquired later, those tied more closely to shifting circumstances and opportunities. But all this is backstage, and all is inferred from the choices made: no meat for vegetarians, no pork for Muslims and Jews. Attitudes focus and direct these expressions of value, but they in turn are a function of these two more fundamental motives: wanting excitement and well-being expresses the positive, hopeful side of us; vulnerability is the fragile, fearful side. Control of our circumstances and selves mitigates fear while empowering us to do or be as we choose. Pleasure or pain, relations to other people, gender identity, health, status, and religion are six domains (there are many others) where interpretation is an expression of control. i. Relief from discomfort or pain, promoting pleasure and excitement are two effects of having control. Despair is evidence that we fear having no control. ii. Relations to other people are chronically vexed because of this ambiguity: which has priority, their interests or mine? Most needs cannot be satisfied without the fellowship and support of partners who ask the same question. But who controls me—myself or others—when I need them to secure or satisfy me? iii. Gender identity, learned in the first year or two of life, is an early step in the self-perception consolidated by socialization: one is confirmed by seeing him or herself as others do. Yet gender identity is also a point of vulnerability: Am I sufficiently manly or feminine? How do I control my responses to people of the other sex or theirs to me? iv. Impaired health entails a lack of control; good health is a power to exploit. v. Status is an early discovery: the beloved child thinks better of himself, and controls others’ responses to him or her. Compare the morale of resentful conscripts: no status and no control. vi. Religions speak to the meaning of life. They focus its enthusiasms and defend its
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vulnerabilities. Skeptics are solitary and exposed, but faith is strength: there is optimal control in precarious circumstances, because belief dissipates the illusions of status and appetite or because life has a design and aim defended by its maker. Attitudes express each person’s ways of negotiating contrary impulses across these many variables. For vulnerability and fear, selfassertion and excitement are global conditions that achieve resolution as attitudes in all the domains where people are exposed or empowered. Interpretation assembles these interests and establishes an orientation that expresses one’s hierarchically organized attitudes: safety is more urgent than status and significance, or one ignores risks and disappointments that would be paralyzing if God’s love were not the guarantee of his care. Anxieties and enthusiasms pervade every domain of thought, feeling, and activity, but they are not all of life. Engaging other things— because we want to or must—we acquire information or cultivate talents that are narrowly attuned to practical, intellectual, athletic, or aesthetic interests. Yet these are the occasions where interpretations, hence attitudes, are decisive. How does an athlete construe the games or teams in which he participates? Does he play to enjoy the company of others or test himself against the best of his competitors; does he see fellow players as hostile or benign? Skill and appearances may differ, but the dynamic is similar when an otherwise placid accountant uses games to express frustrations he barely acknowledges. Even specialized attitudes remote from the opposition of fear and pleasurable excitement may express this opposition. Think of debates between philosophic idealists and realists. One side is content to describe the world as it appears; truth is coherence or the certainty that things are as perceived. The other prizes resistance and affirms that truth is correspondence: things we engage have an existence and identity we alter but do not make. No empirical evidence falsifies one view while confirming the other: all the data may be construed either way. Their ontological assumptions are radically different: one favors Protagoras, Berkeley, or Hume; the other prefers Aristotle or Peirce. But this is incidental, for each interpretation is congenial to those who defend it. Should we explain this difference as an expression of the refined taste appropriate to an arcane intellectual dispute? Or is it another expression of the primitive opposition considered above: fear of vulnerability versus an exuberant welcome to a reality we don’t make but can enjoy? My realist view opines that idealism short-circuits vulnerability by denying its existential conditions: idealism strangles fear—we control ourselves—by crafting an experience that eliminates its extra-mental causes.
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This claim about motives is, of course, incidental to the dialectical question of truth: coherence, correspondence, identity, or disquotation? Can we decide among these alternatives? We can, because realism cites data—cooperation, efficacy, error, frustration, and death—that idealism ignores, and because it alone explains the character and relations of data idealism favors—colors and shapes, ideas, and conceptual systems—by citing their extra-mental, sometimes intrapsychic, neural conditions. DISTORTION Every interpretation is paradoxical: each is a way of construing reality, yet reality itself is incidental to the orientation adopted. For interpretations aren’t tested against reality: that would be inquiry. Why interpret situations when inquiry would be less distorting, more straightforward? Because interpretation enables us to control ourselves by construing the world in ways that console or justify us. It would be good if reality, itself, were safe and congenial, but often it isn’t, so we contrive and project a complementary or substitute world onto the facts known to practical life. Sharing this orientation with other people, convincing ourselves that the world is structured as construed, we are reassured. Gaps between circumstances themselves and circumstances construed are the spaces obscured by, power, propaganda, or merely discretion. Someone living comfortably within a socialized interpretation may not wish to know the gaps, but interpretations used ideologically deserve the skepticism deconstructionists encourage.2 What would we expect to see if people were deprived of their interpretations? More anxiety, less confidence that all is or will be well. Circumstances may be hard to distinguish from properties ascribed to them by an interpretation, though we need disinterested inquiry to specify those properties if we are to perceive the distortions thereby created. One imagines epistemological arguments that deny the possibility of knowing states of affairs in themselves once their features have been obscured by interpretive fog. But this isn’t always the barrier to a clearer view. Imagine two people jostling for space and advantage. Each wants something only one can have, and each rationalizes his claim by citing considerations that justify it (inheritance, desert, or the divine right of kings), though neither claim has standing apart from desire, power, and will because inquiry reveals that none of the alleged facts obtains. Or we promote the idea that Earth is the center of the universe and that we are its raison d’être, but then concede—despite the implications for self-importance—that neither is true.
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EMOTION Someone annoyed or frustrated when a plan misfires is humiliated and angry when others question his religious beliefs. Emotions may be keen in either case, but their focus is different: everyone knows situations he can’t control, but no one enjoys being told that his way of construing himself and others is silly. Emotion’s pitch and intensity are likely signs that an interpretation is insulted or affirmed. A subtle phenomenology would distinguish these contexts and their ways of shading anger and pleasure. It would distinguish humiliation from the anger of frustration or intimidation, the pleasure of effective accommodation and initiative from smug conviction. The emotional life of inquiry rises and falls with success and failure; we expect both. The emotional life of interpretation is steadier, because more cocooned and because one believes unless challenged. Skeptics are ignored or flattered, until they threaten self-respect and well-being. Suppressing the challenge is urgent, so we reply with aggressive anger. Or others indulge us: seeing the world as we do, they confirm the impression that everything worth notice is as we perceive it. ASSUMPTIONS FOR A TAXONOMY It may seem that interpretations vary unsystematically: one can plot the different attitudes and habits they express and their different uses of information, but there is no explanation for their distinguishing patterns. That isn’t so: interpretation is disciplined; its formations have predictable effects. Start with a specific psychic constitution—a more or less quiescent baby—and situations to which it responds. The developmental result is a set of core attitudes weighted toward confidence and pleasure, or fear and aversion. This is character: the intrapsychic condition for initiatives and reactions. We are altered by contingencies of all sorts, but inferences that track the evolution of this early formation are a sound basis for estimating a person’s likely responses to situations that frustrate or satisfy this acquired psychic structure. These five considerations are its principal determinants. i. What is the infant’s dominant somatic tone (is he or she colicky and anxious or sunny and contented)? ii. How does the child control anxiety in order to enhance perceived security; is he quick or slow to panic when feeling vulnerable? iii. What makes the child feel good or bad? iv. Which situations enhance or diminish self-esteem? v. Which attitudes form as the tensions between vulnerability and security, distress and pleasure are tested and resolved by experience? Values
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for these factors are responsible for effects we observe: treat an anxious child capriciously and you create a sullen, fearful, and suspicious adult; always gratify a contented baby and you are more likely to have an entitled adult. These are probabilities, not necessities: other factors— intrapsychic or social—will intervene to confirm or divert the outcome. Interpretation reliably accommodates either situation. It justifies the convergence of circumstances and expectations (we deserve what we have), or it compensates—with propitiating ritual and prayer—when circumstances frustrate the desire for safety and well-being. STORIES Stories—orientations made articulate and expressed—are the betterknown aspect of interpretations. They are told as we explain ourselves or declare our political or religious beliefs. Unformulated orientations are global—they warp every perception, idea, and encounter—but categories and valorizations they prescribe are determinable and loosely organized. Every such interpretation is a set of templates for evaluating the individuals and situations encountered. Their behavioral expressions are often inconsistent (repressive sexual morals with a taste for prurient films), but variability is tolerable until one is asked to articulate his or her interpretation. Then, order, simplicity, and consistency become priorities. Satisfying this format is complicated by the need to identify attitudes that organize an interpretation, though core attitudes are elusive. Acquired during childhood, they never appear fully formed in conscious awareness: one is vulnerable or secure for developmental reasons that were beyond our control and mostly unknown. Take care not to formulate your way of construing things, and you may never be asked to justify it: you have the comfort of your attitudes; others notice and take pleasure in biases they share or they work around them.3 Someone asked to explain himself typically expresses his beliefs by emphasizing a small array of more or less integrated factual claims congenial to his attitudes. These are beliefs expressing attitudes that direct practice and justify the storyteller’s orientation. They are a broad brush rendering of the world in which he or she lives, though live—like location—is ambiguous. It signifies the world in which we suppose ourselves to be—the world to which we are reconciled—however much or little it overlaps the physical, biological, and social domains of the natural world. Narrating an interpretation is, therefore, an adaptation to two exigencies: the world as I perceive it, and myself as I struggle to understand, valorize, and control my circumstances. My story comforts
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me by supplying the context in which I rationalize and extenuate my failures while pursuing my desires. There are many variations. Feeling diminished, I tell an aggrandizing story or one that explains my bad luck. Or luck is good, and my story emphasizes the virtue that justifies it. A story that provides for all the domains of human experience would be unusual. More often, stories are partial. Each begins as the rationale for an individual life: my way of construing who and where I am. Then, as people share a perspective, their interpretations have a common emphasis, one focused by class, religion, race, ethnicity, history, politics or authority, economics, gender, or vocation. So, intelligent design satisfies the idea of a first cause and the hope for generous oversight—a benign presiding creator—while responding to the fear that nature would be insecure—an unstable house of cards—if complexity had emerged randomly from mixtures of simpler components. A smart, munificent designer assures that nature will not come unstuck; he wouldn’t let that happen given his special affection for us humans. We are invited to live in this circle of interpretive light. SOCIALIZED INTERPRETATIONS The need to tell one’s story implicates people to whom one answers. They want an explanation for one’s attitudes or behavior; the speaker wants vindication. Telling one’s story is awkward; we hardly know where to begin. Or we start with a feature that seems important as we try to assemble and formulate a rendering of the whole. But much of the story has never been expressed in words, partly because much of it expresses attitudes and feelings for which there are no words. Socializing our separate stories is always problematic, because each is different, and because we don’t welcome people who challenge our idiosyncrasies. Less comfortable with one another when differences are explicit, we suppress them by tacit accord. Wanting confirmation—in talk and action—that much of one’s story squares with others, we choose friends who can (usually) be counted on to reveal only those parts that cohere with ours. Telling one’s personal story seems precious or portentous, however bold the person struggling to reveal it. Stories are halting and oddly neutered, ironic, incomplete, or dishonest as interpreters discover interests or biases that are better suppressed. For there is always a discrepancy between the orientation recounted and factors passed over in silence. We tolerate this difference in the self-presentation of others, because we are shamed by some of our biases and skeptical that others would candidly expose all theirs. But a consensual story does emerge, and it
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becomes a mantle and shield, a point of reference that is simultaneously personal and objective for a family, tribe, or nation. Many people are uncomfortable if others fail to endorse their stories, if only by repeating them. This is sometimes the gentle demand that an interpretation be shared with partners in valued systems: friends or teachers, for example. Such relationships may be as intimate as marriage or as vast as a religion or state, with adjustments appropriate to the difference. Spouses in viable marriages agree about many things. Citizens need only agree about basic rules and practices. Governments and cultures are less permissive: they often require allegiance to a dominant, homogenizing narrative, one that reconciles people to a regime of beliefs and practices that satisfies the interests or desires of a powerful despot or despotic bureaucracy. Heresy is the sin of rejecting this persuasion: the dissenter should bend; others should tremble. But heresy is problematic: Who is betrayed if I refuse an alien story? Are others shaken and sabotaged if I fail to see the world as they do? Or is heresy the greater sin of repudiating the interpretation that makes sense of me and my circumstances? This opposition is never resolved, though individual orientations are subordinated to interpretations that are socialized, announced, and more or less subtly prescribed. Every society or culture has its storytellers or ritual occasions when someone is elected to recount the tribal epic. Expressing shared hopes, anxieties, and loyalties in ways that resonate with other members, they are its public poets, conscience, or enforcers. Their interpretations are often expressed in the style of someone dressed for dinner, but their aim is practical: the tribal myth infiltrates every personal story to the degree that telling it is a way of reaffirming a shared identity; or we tell it to enforce identity when we fear diversity. Why are we so easily captured? Four reasons are decisive. i. Idiosyncrasy makes us vulnerable: we fear being unintelligible and alien to people on whom we depend for support and recognition. ii. Attitudes are paradoxical: seemingly rooted and uncompromising, they may be defenseless against influence because of being unconscious, hence beyond the reach of critical scrutiny. Not knowing one’s self-generated attitudes, unable to justify or defend them against the weight of social pressure, we quickly surrender. Not everyone capitulates, but the tolerance for isolation is rare. iii. We need to coordinate personal views with partners in core and other systems. Each of us participates in many systems; changing worldviews from system to system would be clumsy and unconvincing. An ample view with enough ambiguity for individual preferences is a more efficient solution. iv. Fearing difference because
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other worldviews are reproof to one’s own, we offer a carrot and a stick: join us in the circle of true believers, or suffer ridicule, exile, or worse. This is socializing interpretation as an expression of control: each of the many controls his or her anxiety by obliging others to construe the world in terms congenial to him or her. These socializing motives are a tidal wave; those who resist usually drown. Conscientious objectors are the survivors. Their stubbornness is heroic, whether or not one thinks them misled. One reason for the dread aroused by Orwell’s 1984 was its implication that personal interpretations would be unsustainable because tyranny joined to technology would preclude the ruminations where private interpretations are codified and affirmed. This account of socialization—each person coerced by the monolithic, generalized other—is too oppositional, because consensus is not always monolithic or stable. There may be no consensus, because contending centers of power dispute the right to establish a dominant story. Altered circumstances—climate change, war, or a discovery such as evolution—fracture and re-center the accepted story, or all follow when influential people revise it. Edicts are sometimes pronounced by authorities to whom everyone defers, but more often, each person’s interpretation is inflected, not superseded, by the consensual view. A people’s interpretations do, nevertheless, converge on a mean. Each man and woman opens his or her front door onto a square where biases and practices are shared by all the residents. Interpretation takes this neighborhood into itself: it prescribes what is passable or profane, what is or is not to be said, believed, or done. Persuasions overlap, because all have learned and each is affiliated to others by way of attitudes that are standard among them. There is a common narrative, but variations are tolerated because the story is secondary when people construe their circumstances in similar ways. These considerations emphasize the opposition between vulnerable privacy and secure sociality. But there is also a different basis for socialization, one that engages people without oblating their individuality. Socialization of this other sort is local. Attitudes are socialized, isolation is mitigated, when private fears and aspirations are focused and intensified by successes and failures in core systems: family, friendship, work, or school. Here, socialization is the effect of attachment, cooperation, shared hopes, ideas, and ideals, not, as above, the effect of an orientation and story everyone learns. Why say that this, too, is a kind of interpretation? Because each person’s orientation is manifest in affiliations that are voluntary or inherited and affirmed. Every such system is construed by members as an appropriate context and focus for themselves. Each reminds us that practical life and inquiry compete with
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interpretation as generators of purpose and meaning. For orientations— attitudes—forged in core systems are life-sustaining: we are reliable members of vital systems—we identify with their aims and other members—because they secure and satisfy us. These two modes of socialization are contraries. One homogenizes, the other particularizes: I see myself in terms of the story prescribed by church or state, or my aims and attitudes express my loyalties and perspectives: this family, that team. Interpretations of the first sort are regimented and generalized; one or a few orient believers. Interpretations of the other kind are particular and distinctive, because each is generated in a valued social system; there are several or many, because every man or woman participates in several or many systems. Responsibilities sanctioned by these two perspectives sometimes conflict: personal conviction or God and country. There may be nothing but coercion to reconcile the opposed interpretations of, say, conscientious objectors and their government. ELIDING FACT AND VALUE Interpretation elides facts with values when facts are warped to satisfy values. Inquiry elides them, too, when maps and plans are designed to satisfy interests or needs. But the two elisions have different conditions and implications. Facts and values relevant to inquiry are complementary: facts are represented by maps and the causal relations signified by plans; values are fixed by the needs or interests plans may satisfy. They merge in the respect that facts are valuable because instrumental to our aims. Making and using many plans in the course of any day, we come to believe that integrating facts (or the words signifying them) under the aegis of value—utility or aim—expresses their essential bond: food, clothing, and shelter fuse with the merit of having them. This is the instrumentalism that reduces other things (including other people) to utilities: meaning, values or disvalues for us. We thoughtlessly generalize from this practical fusion to interpretations that construe facts as having no identity apart from their value. There are, for example, the many people who see their political or religious beliefs as the essential context for personal identity and significance. But fusions of these two sorts are different. Goods that supply warmth and nourishment are life-sustaining, but their value for us typically exploits properties we don’t create: sunlight, for example. Other things are made to a standard that serves our purposes, but they don’t lose those properties because—like blankets in the tropics—their use has lapsed. People, too, have identities indepen-
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dent of interpretations; those assigned by our valorizing stories may have little or no bearing on who and what we are. MAGIC, MYTH, AND METAPHOR Myths in Plato’s hands were inspired riffs of speculative thinking. The figure of the divided line, the allegory of the cave, the myth of Er: each is the graphic representation of a complex possibility, one that is easily lost in the verbiage of philosophic argument. Plato’s myths succeed because they use the conceptual rubrics of practical thought (levels, passage, or transformation) to illustrate supersensible claims. Dispensing with “proofs,” they startle us with metaphor and economy. Yet Plato’s literary gift is easily abused. For there is no limit to the structural analogies invented by fertile minds. The cycle of the seasons suggests the birth, death, and rebirth of souls; describing order as design implies all the assumptions required for a “theory” that postulates a designer. Myth and magic are especially challenging to thinkers who contrive experiences or theories of things “re-presented” while dispensing with their extra-mental referents. Mythical Thought, volume 2 of Ernst Cassirer’s The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, addresses the issue without acknowledging that he, like every Kantian, is vulnerable to the charge that no objective test distinguishes “veridical” thought and experience from competitors sponsored by myth and magic.4 How should we choose between them if neither experience nor theory can be tested against a reality that is independent of both? Cassirer responds by discounting the belief that myth and magic are pathologies cured by logic and experiment; there is, he argues, a natural evolution to our thinking. Certain rubrics persist throughout its course, though their specific form and implications evolve. Myth construes cause, for example, as a holistic influence or effusion, not as an action having a specific effect: God’s benign influence versus a bullet. We outgrow our mythic thinking when its holism is superseded by scientific analysis, but why is one version better than another when neither can be tested against extra-mental states of affairs? Cassirer ignores his Kantian dilemma: he doesn’t try to convince us that values motivating scientific theories—universality and necessity (on his telling)—are superior to the imagined virtues of mythic stories: significance, understanding, salvation, or control. We are to see the difference and benefits because they are apparent and incontrovertible, though the Kantian predicament is confounding if reality has no character apart from schematizations that satisfy a system’s motivating values. Choose your values—if birth and culture haven’t already decided them—then live within the reality they conjure. Mythology or science: discount Cassirer’s developmental story,
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and you are free to choose. Disputes are referred to the court of attitudes. Or authority makes it choice, and we live and believe as it prescribes. Construing myths as hypotheses shifts the burden from allusive figures of speech to empirical tests: is there evidence of the states of affairs myths postulate? But this is tricky, because the allegory of the cave and figure of the line imply the reality of entities—Forms—that are not empirical. Wanting to explain how they might be known, we ask these additional questions: is there evidence of Forms independent of Plato’s myths; are there alternative, testable hypotheses that explain thought and its content without reference to Forms?5 All the plausibility of most myths derives from the myths alone: there is no additional evidence to justify them. Hence this conclusion: untestable myths are usually fiction. Magical thinking is fiction that ignores natural processes or violates natural laws: cycles of death and rebirth, for example. Many or all interpretations are infused with magic, myth, or the metaphoric use of leading principles. The sober physicist is a Cubs’ fan; every disaster is “divine justice.” Telling a piecemeal story about ourselves, the world, and our place there, we fill gaps with magic, myth, and analogy. No one purges every excess: Fantasy is, in general, the medium of infinitization. It is not a faculty like other faculties—if one wishes to speak in this way, it is the faculty instar omnium [faculty of faculties]. What feelings, understanding and will a person has depends in the last resort upon what imagination he has—how he represents himself to himself, that is, upon imagination.6 This is Kierkegaard’s gloss of Kant’s idea that atomic sensory data acquire character and relations by virtue of the conceptual system used to think them. There are two ways to construe this effect: an interpretation may be an associative network where fragments of experience acquire sense and significance, or a rule or rules that bind the fragments. An interpretation’s truth claims may express either standpoint: they affirm that data are related coherently within a conceptual network, or they affirm the network, hence the logic of its construction. Both readings tolerate myth and magic, because there is no restriction on the choice of construction rules and networks. Even consistency is dispensable if myth and magic are approved: terrible things happen but God, the creator, is benign; he is all-powerful, but we humans have free will. Such beliefs are passionately held, but all are mythic because inconsistent or because they are untestable stipulations: there is no evidence to support them and no thinkable way to create an experiment that would produce it.
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This harsh judgment is consequential, because interpretations affect the self-understanding and the morale of believers, teams, schools, religions, and states. Imagine people dedicated to a team and its fan club. Each member’s self-perception is intensified by loyalty to the club, its rituals, and other members; principal offices go to passionate devotees. Relations are familial; members excite or console one another when their team wins or loses. Their ecstatic loyalty evokes the magical powers of a self-exalting tribe. Should we sabotage them by insisting that their interpretation is empty posturing; must they justify themselves by satisfying inquiry’s empirical truth tests? Why lay down a standard that self-valorizing people and groups cannot satisfy when so much they do satisfies them while harming no one? There would be no reason to object if there were no alternate basis for self-valorization, and if these passions were always or usually innocuous. Many systems—friendships, families, and businesses—are valuable because of fellowship they promote, talents they educate, and work they do, not because of selfexalting myths. But no conflicts are more inimical than those that pillory detested others while glorifying the interpreters. How shall we detoxify pernicious interpretations without discrediting every other? Education and sobriety sometimes mitigate, but never quash every pernicious interpretation, because myth and magic supply power, virtue, or access to entities and events that violate nature’s cloying restraints. Conversation with the gods, our pride, their shame: there is no tinge of vulnerability in us, if contingency and doubt are vanquished by a story firmly believed. Interpretation is reckless. It liberates imagination while implying that consistency and testability are the self-imposed restraints of trivial minds or feeble wills. We resist, because imagination is untrustworthy. Testability and consistency are its essential controls. Many hypotheses may be true—many things are possible—but there is no way to sort plausible candidates for truth without evidence that matters obtain as described. Yet repeating this anodyne formula never slows the tide of fantasy. People relish the stories it promotes and resent killjoys who insist that belief be sober. Remember James’s “Will to Believe”: a belief may be considered true if it provokes good feelings and conduct that generates desired effects. FAITH AND FANTASY Everyone has beliefs infused with positive or negative feelings and the attitudes they express. All of us want them vindicated by reality. Should we believe an appeasing story because it encourages hope or reduces fear? Is it contemptible that attitudes set parameters for the equilibrium
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of feeling, belief, and desire? Many people emphasize the intensity of their belief, speak of faith, and want it respected. Everyone responds— skeptics too—by stepping lightly. But respect for people of faith doesn’t entail believing that their interpretations are true. Hypotheses are testable. Faith is a determination to believe irrespective of evidence. Interpretations are validated to the degree that needs—for security, pleasure, significance, gender identity, and control—are appeased by affirmations they express. Believers call them true, but this is an honorific use of a word whose core sense requires the consistency and testability that are incidental or alien to interpretations. Their aim is different: reconcile us to events we cannot otherwise understand or control, justify our deeds or inclinations. Exemption from the standards of inquiry is often innocuous: faith in the Red or White Sox was mythic but not magical. No laws of nature were suspended so they might win a World Series. Interpretations laced with magic cross that threshold. Socrates died for implying that there is myth and magic in religious and political thinking. We are indebted to Marx and Freud for saying that both are pervasive in the habits and postures of secular society. Advertising succeeds, because it stirs attitudes felt as needs in target audiences: repair your deficiencies, realize your better self. But fast cars and shaving lotion don’t turn old men into boys. Thinking otherwise is fanciful, but useful: our consumer economy would shrivel were everyone sober. This advantage doesn’t expunge the difference between what I am or suspect myself to be and the myth of what I might be. Interpretation is magical wherever fantasy closes this gap by imagining that natural laws are violated. PHILOSOPHIC RATIONALES Many stories that express and justify interpretations use myth and magic to make difficult transitions (from death to eternal life), integrate anomalies (punishment with forgiveness), or violate natural laws (miracles). Philosophers are more careful. Prizing clarity and rigor, we say that no belief is compelling if there are no systematic arguments to justify it. Many such arguments propose to transform the mythology of interpretation into the currency of sober discourse: philosophers “prove” the reality of God, unconditional freedom, or innate human rights. Their a priori arguments are apologies for beliefs already held: they rarely culminate in testable hypotheses or in truths whose necessity is more than the validity of conclusions derived from stipulated premises. This a priori style characterizes philosophic conclusions since Plato. It became the only legitimate style when Kant scotched inquiry by arguing (in the style of Berkeley’s “nothing is like an idea but another
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idea”) that human understanding cannot exceed the domain of schematized sensory data. Nothing beyond experience is thinkable, if experience is a barrier to the extra-mental world, for then nothing of its character can be inferred from the data mind differentiates and organizes. This first claim obscures another, more often implied than expressed: mind and matter are categorially different so properties known by way of experience cannot be identical or like the properties of material things. Mind’s qualifications—sensory properties constitutive of experience—are, therefore, no basis for inferences concerning the character of extra-mental things. We should infer that inquiry has no extra-mental referent: there is nothing the other side of experience, or nothing we can think or know. Kant’s heirs amend the details of his argument, but not its point. Cassirer argued that conceptual systems are forever revised as science progresses, but that empirical objects are never more than phenomenal posits of the conceptual system used to think them. Empirical data are not a check of hypotheses, because the character of the data alters with the depth, integration, and range of the theory used to generate hypotheses. The trajectory of conceptual revision probably has no end—though its trace may be asymptotic—because there may never be a time when every contingent datum is locatable within a system whose applications are universal and necessary. Carnap had little patience for Cassirer’s historicism, but he agreed that questions about objectivity are “internal” to the conceptual system used to think them. “External” questions are unthinkable, because meaningless. Every such claim uses different words to repeat with Kant that objects lying the other side of sensory data are unthinkable “negative noumena.”7 Quine added decisive final touches: “Theory as a whole . . . is a fabric of sentences variously associated to one another and to nonverbal stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response.”8 “Conditioned response” seems to presuppose things that provoke responses. Yet the character of such things is unknowable because unthinkable when every property that might be ascribed to them acquires character and relations from the theory used to think it. This raises a first ambiguity: What is a hypothesis tested against: an extra-conceptual, extralinguistic phenomenon, or observation sentences that re-present that alleged state of affairs? Quine’s account of objectivity—objects are schematized by theories whose quantified sentences ascribe properties to things9—rejects the first and affirms the second: a sentence is true or false because of its relations to a theory’s other sentences. Quine argued that theories should be construed holistically for the purposes of meaning and truth: each was said to be a system of interanimating sentences:10 “The problem of relating theory to sensory
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stimulation may now be put less forbiddingly as that of relating theory formulations to observation sentences. . . . What this means is that terms embedded in observation sentences recur in the theory formulations.”11 Alleging error in any of a theory’s sentences is, therefore, significant for the theory as a whole. It is defended—error is eliminated—by rejiggering several, many, or all its constituent sentences: the sentences or their relations are altered. Inferential relations are revised, for example, so one sentence is weakly implied by another, not, as before, strongly implied: “We will prefer the possibility of correction which ‘disturbs the total system as little as possible.’ ”12 The possibility of a definitive—up or down—empirical test is vastly reduced, because we are barred from testing sentences one at a time, eliminating those falsified. For suppose an experiment seems to threaten a hypothesis. We respond by altering that sentence or its relations to others in ways that reduce the pressure of this apparently disconfirming experiment, or we distrust the experiment and ignore observation sentences that report it. Quine’s holism is consequential, because the freedom it promotes— tinker until you have eliminated any empirical challenge—implies that no consistent property ascription is falsifiable. Hence the conclusion that no consistent theory is falsifiable: none addresses data it cannot make or remake to suit itself. Inquiry loses its essential leverage, because confounding data are no longer evidence that a characterization needs revision or a substitute. And there is more: consistent thought— imagination—has carte blanche: The truths that can be said even in common-sense terms about ordinary things are themselves, in turn, far in excess of any available data.13 To call a posit a post is not to patronize it. A posit can be unavoidable except at the cost of other no less artificial expedients. Everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built. Nor let us look down on the standpoint of the theory as make-believe; for we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the best we can muster at the time.14 The passage following this one invokes the discipline of scientific theory: What reality is like is the business of scientists, in the broadest sense, painstakingly to surmise; and what there is, what is real,
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is part of that question. The question how we know what there is is simply part of the question, so briefly contemplated . . . of the evidence for truth about the world. The last arbiter is socalled scientific method, however amorphous.15 This appeal to scientific method is quixotic and lame, because Quine has deprived it of the indispensable condition for confirming or disqualifying hypotheses: namely, the data used to test them. Indeed, Quine dissolves the tension between interpretation and inquiry by reducing the second to the first, though he denies that this is reckless: Have we now so far lowered our sights as to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth—rating the statements of each theory as true for that theory, and brooking no higher criticism? Not so. The saving consideration is that we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular world-theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be. Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs of the moment, even in the midst of philosophizing, until by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them here and there for the better. Within our own total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but that goes without saying.16 Quine is permissive, indeed: “Our own particular world-theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories” is his imprimatur for any and every consistent conceptual system. Interpretation has all the sanction required, for Quine has said that any system is satisfactory if it enables one to differentiate and organize sensory data—stimulations—in ways appropriate to a conceptual system that is consistent, fruitful, and economical in its use of theoretical terms.17 This, the Duhem-Quine thesis, is defended by many thinkers who recoil at the idea of defending interpretations laced with myth or magic. Quine the “naturalist” (hard to square with his ontological relativism18) would be equally adverse, though his formulation scuppers empirical inquiry for the benefit of storytelling. One of Quine’s last books acknowledges that his thesis obscures a theory’s relation to confirming or falsifying evidence: “My concern has been with the central logical structure of evidence. . . . Science does stay responsive somehow to sensory stimulation both early and late, but its mode of response . . . eludes my schematism.”19 Quine never revised his account of theory formation and confirmation to tell how science might use sensory data in ways that eluded him. Yet, this admission is gravely
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compromising, because the untestability of science’s “central logical structure” is a fault it shares with every consistent but empirically unfalsifiable interpretation, be it a religious story or political ideology. Why choose one conceptual system rather than others? Quine cites scientific method, implying that it can choose among them. But he was also dubious of its rigor, and sure that several theories, each capable of embedding all possible data, would survive its application. It is relevant, too, that Quine’s ontological relativity should have obliged him to acknowledge methods other than that of science: it has no sanction, he implied, apart from the claims of enlightened habit. Why choose one method or theory from the array of alternatives absent that habit? Quine doesn’t say, though emotivism has a plausible answer he might not have scorned. Is chocolate better than vanilla? People who say it is voice a preference, not a truth, hence the link to interpretation. People willingly hear that their choices express preferences, not truths, but they are scandalized if told that their interpretations—religious beliefs, for example—are not true or false, because untestable. Positivists often say that empirically untestable beliefs are meaningless, but we needn’t offend believers by requiring that thought submit to that higher standard of rigor. It isn’t too great an extrapolation to imagine gods on Mount Olympus or a forest alive with spirits. More disturbing because it compromises every claim to material truth is the fact that interpretations are not falsifiable: one may persist in believing them whatever the evidence. Interpreters may suppose that this is a great strength. But which is more plausible: beliefs are irrefutable or reality (including evidence of reality) is irrelevant to belief? A posture that defends fantasy against evidence that would confirm or refute it is odd. What motive commends it? Emotivists have told us: the choice of interpretations is a preference. Each person construes life in a way that satisfies his or her attitudes. Saying this doesn’t imply that preferences are capricious, that one could have chosen otherwise. The implication is narrower: each person construes his or her circumstances in one of many ways that are possible. Preference signifies something preferred, not freedom to choose. One prefers to make sense of oneself and others things in terms of a religion one has learned, not chosen. Why call it a preference? Because one resists other ways to construe them. These are some reasons for saying that Quine’s formulation, true to the tradition that passes from Kant through Cassirer to Carnap and Quine, eliminates the difference between interpretation and inquiry. TOLERANCE Could we avert conflict among people espousing contrary interpretations in the way we discount differences of taste? Treat them generously
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as preferences, and concede that they aren’t disputable. We are often comfortable with people whose tastes differ from our own: why not regard differences of interpretation in this tolerant way? One reason is the partisan conviction that one’s interpretation is true. But this is problematic when everyone makes this claim of contraries, all supported with the same passion though all or all but one are false. One might tell believers that contrariety is a distraction, because interpretations are not true, false, or falsifiable, but that would surely be a waste of time. Why would they resist this simple point? Because it is insulting. Each person’s values—and psychic identity—are sanctioned by an interpretation. Descartes’ formula, I am, I exist, each time I think or perceive it, would be more accurate if “think or perceive” were replaced by “value or appraise.” Vulnerability and fear, pleasure and excitement are the two axes of experience and the point of inception for one’s attitudes. These sensibilities and expectations define me. Perceiving other people and things through the scrim of my attitudes, I see comfort and risk, sectors or shades of good and bad, right and wrong. Partners endorse some of my appraisals, but none has an orientation that maps perfectly onto mine; some offend me, many are unintelligible. I acknowledge that others are free to interpret their circumstances in ways appropriate to themselves. But respecting their choices doesn’t imply that my interpretation is a taste that might have been different: this interpretation defines me; its values express my attitudes, the world and myself as I know them. More than a preference, this is my psychic posture, the outcome of my developmental history, my beliefs, hopes, and fears: simply me. And often, it is enforced—secured—by a tide of social thought, preference, and feeling. Truth is cogency, the sanction and permission, for all I value and believe, the final honorific. Strip interpretation of its truth and self-esteem deflates like a punctured tire. Tolerance is respect or patience for difference, or difference is tolerated because we turn away and ignore it. There is no tolerance for interpretations different from one’s own without recognition that interpretations are developmentally rooted orientations, not truths. Nor can we save the dignity of interpretations by calling them preferences. No one prefers to see things as he or she does; nothing but reeducation— intimate contact with people having other orientations, psychoanalysis, or a crisis—enables one to see them otherwise.
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Chapter Three
Inquiry Practical Life and Science
A
n interpretation is validated by construing the ambient world in ways that satisfy motivating attitudes. Friends and associates substantiate its claims by construing other things and themselves in similar ways. Or we contrive an ever richer story by adding dollops of fantasy. Nothing but the hard edge of practical life—the disaster no prayer averts—obliges us to moderate beliefs the story sponsors. Unable to reconcile ourselves to harsh circumstances, having no way to propitiate them, we surrender to panic or depression. Anxiety is evidence that an interpretation fails to appease the need provoking it or that attitudes are charged with dread. Plato advised us to turn away from fantasy and seek reality,1 but this existential dilemma is all but unresolvable if we are restricted to interpretation alone. It valorizes core systems and oneself, but distorts self-perception and plans that engage us with other things. Inquiry is the necessary cure. Quine and Putnam have made inquiry problematic: Quine because he eliminated falsifiability as a test of truth; Putnam because he describes fact as a function of value. Joining their claims entails that interpretation is the only style of systematic thought. Establishing their error is a necessary condition for reaffirming the difference between interpretation and inquiry. CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES Imagine descending unfamiliar stairs in the dark. Uncertain about the width and depth of each stair, the height of the staircase, or the angle 67
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of descent, one grasps the railing and guesses that the reach of every next step will be no more than the last. But this is a staircase built to confuse: steps are often narrow, their heights unequal, the angle of descent is variable, stairs go on forever. There is sometimes a run of steps, each like the one before; but expectation is frustrated—one falls— when a step is larger or smaller, deeper or closer than the one before. We could sit down refusing to go forward, but few of us do. Flooded with anxiety or coolly deliberate, we gingerly reach below in ways that extrapolate from the feel of steps above. Every such hypothesis would be useless in a world of random conjunctions, but not in our world where there are runs of order and chunks of stability. We speculate about the conditions for these effects, test our speculations, then use the surmise to leverage our initiatives. For there is no alternative, no viable way to estimate the shape and scale of things by ruminating perpetually on our ideas of them. Protons could withdraw into reverie, because they embody energy sufficient to sustain them indefinitely. We who lack that advantage find companions and resources by exploring our circumstances. Descartes’ first two Meditations—a narrative of doubt, withdrawal, and self-discovery— face the other way, but they are a conceit. Philosophers often ignore situations where action is exigent but circumstances are known imperfectly, because his account of mind’s isolation and autonomy is their point of reference. But we are neither alone, nor self-sufficient. Think of a master pianist in the first moments of a recital. Something is awry: unable to play as he practiced because the piano wasn’t voiced, he plays speculatively, listening to the music as he produces it, moderating what he does to achieve effects he wants. He plays as the rest of us act, with competence tempered by uncertainty. For there is an abiding contingency to our interventions: How will things respond? What changes need be made to produce an effect closer to the one desired? Plans and hypotheses direct what we do, as scores direct musicians. But scores are implacable—finished and fixed. Plans and hypotheses are always revisable; frustration and error guarantee that they are often revised. Planning and theorizing are evolutionary afterthoughts, the fortuitous effect of brains that have grown beyond the challenge of enabling bodies to find their way in a world that mixes stability with uncertainty. It is often said that inquiry begins when belief is problematic. An opinion is disputed, or an action it directs doesn’t work: uncertainty provokes reflection. But belief is also tested when someone tired of hearsay—all the banalities of everyday life—wants to know the truths it carries or obscures. This was Descartes’ motive in the first Meditation, and sometimes, as when Einstein considered conventional beliefs about perspective and simultaneity, it is still entrée to unknown terrain.
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Exploiting information for practical aims requires hypotheses of three sorts: perceptual judgments, maps, and plans. Looking for a friend in a crowd, I make a number of mistaken judgments—similar gait, hat, or face—before finding him. Maps and plans are mutually implicative. A plan is tailored to its circumstances, but, reciprocally, the emphases and scale of a map imply the plan to be enacted. Emphasis is limited by our aims and circumstances: drivers map a terrain by exaggerating the prominence of roads; pedestrians emphasize sidewalks, paths, or trails. The accuracy of perceptual judgments is assumed when maps and plans are made and used, though mistaken judgments are a principal reason that maps are inaccurate and plans misfire. Maps are typically accurate to the degree appropriate to plans. But “appropriate” is the slippery slope that carries hypothesis into interpretation. Suppose one dresses for an occasion where the style isn’t prescribed: how shall I present myself? The circumstances tolerate many variations, but the event has certain features—of place and time, scale and purpose—that are not in dispute: call these the facts of the matter. Individuals acknowledge the same facts, but construe the complex—meon-this-occasion—differently and dress accordingly. What shall I wear? The decision turns on one’s sense of self. The answer is an interpretation, one that locates me in the situation for which I prepare. Some have nothing to decide: they always dress the same way. Others believe that every occasion requires a new decision, because each is different. The easy comfort of the first compares to the nervous vanity of the second; but this difference is incidental to a point they share: each construes— interprets—the meaning of the occasion for him or herself. Idealists and romantics see their advantage and pounce: maps are formulated in ways appropriate to plans; plans always express the peculiar bent and interest of the planner. Neither is testable independently when interpretation has spread the net of purpose and value over all it surveys. But this reading wrongly conflates two things. Agents of the American Automobile Association help members plan trips. Members choose their destinations; the AAA supplies maps and information about possible routes. The difference is secure and plain. Surveyors don’t prescribe the sorts of roads or houses to build; they do inform us about the circumstances to which plans will be adapted. Someone who stubbornly builds on quicksand can’t say he wasn’t warned. The exigencies of practical life make it plausible that perceptual judgments, maps, and plans were the principal or only expressions of hypothesis in the early history of mankind. Its extended applications were perhaps delayed until leisure and language enabled our ancestors to speculate about themselves and their circumstances. We have a rightly exalted idea of science, one justified by its explanatory and predictive
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power. But science was already only a step beyond the hunters, smelters, and farmers of those bygone times. They, too, generalized, predicted, and explained. But there was much they didn’t know, so interpretation was their principal device for integrating bits and pieces of practical information. What concerned them more: practical success and the information it supplied, or interpretation’s stories? We don’t know, and shouldn’t pretend we do. Reconstructions—fables—that emphasize the irrationality of ancient peoples don’t square with the evidence of their art, agriculture, and astronomical tables. Cities constructed on plans dictated by religious beliefs don’t obscure the genius of their architects and builders. They exploited hypotheses (additional to perceptual judgments, maps, and plans) that were speculations of the three kinds mentioned in chapter 1: inductive generalizations (to all crows from a few), curvefitting (testing a formula or equation against an array of data), and inferences from effects to their conditions (whether constituents, causes, or laws). Pre-Socratic philosophers—probably their ancestors, too—did all three. They generalized, predicting that seed of a kind would produce the same grain that flowered in previous years; they applied a formula—the cycle of seasons—to the evidence of shorter and cooler, then longer and hotter days; they inferred from the properties and behaviors of things that all were made of earth, water, fire, or air or that all could be explained as expressions of attraction and resistance— love and strife. We, too, make hypotheses of these three kinds despite skeptics who object that the third is gratuitous and dogmatic. They say, rightly, that the best possible abductions—they would accurately predict every sensory datum—could be mistaken: they might correctly specify every perceived effect while mistakenly identifying its conditions. This proviso precludes discovery that such a hypothesis is mistaken. Grant this outcome is not a contradiction, then consider that an abduction capable of explaining every empirical difference, whatever its complexity, would need to be a very competent surmise. Is it more than vanishingly likely that predictions derived from such abductions are repeatedly confirmed, though the abductions themselves are mistaken? Critics respond that Newton’s laws fit the example perfectly—they are maximally confirmed though false—but his equations do not predict every possible effect; their error is their partiality, the restricted domain to which they apply. Improving an abduction, locating a partial truth within one more ample is evidence of a more powerful successor, not evidence of failure in the hypothesis subsumed.
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A more qualified skepticism emphasizes that the conditions specified by an abduction express the limited information and historical perspective of the hypothesizer.2 Even successful predictions can’t overcome these limitations on one’s ability to conceive the processes and structures specified by hypotheses, then engaged experimentally. But notice that this response expresses the practical caution appropriate to knowing things remote or complex, not skepticism. One quickly identifies shoes too large or small by wearing them. Electromagnetic fields are less accessible. We can’t try them on; they are harder to model. Many intermediate examples confirm that we do know the structures of things, absolutely (in a sense), not perspectivally. Architects design and build very complex buildings. Seeing a finished structure, they can say, accurately, that it does or does not embody its model. Physicists don’t have the architects’ advantage—confirm a model’s applicability by using it to build the structure studied—but experiments confirm, after successive tests and revisions, that abductions converge or not on matters they specify. Why else say that abductions including Newtonian space and the Bohr atom are superseded? The principal motives for arguments disputing the cogency of abduction are philosophic, not practical or scientific. One fulcrum is the persistent assumption that well-substantiated belief is deficient because it falls short of certainty. Insist on this distinction, as do Plato, Descartes, and their successors,3 and we disqualify every belief that speculates about the conditions for sensory effects: none is certain. Another motive is dialectical: what can we know of an extra-mental reality, one whose existence and character are independent of the ways we perceive, think, engage, or talk about it? Berkeley’s dictum, esse est percipi, converts Descartes’ method of universal doubt into a dogma: there is nothing apart from mind and the contents of awareness.4 These two points converge: the direct presentation of content—its presence before an inspecting mind—is the only guarantee of knowledge. Anything less is opinion: it could be mistaken. Every claim about the extra-mental world is unreliable in this way. All are subject to Cartesian discipline: unable to know things as they are in themselves, we renounce every reference to them. Knowledge shrinks to the circle of directly inspectable phenomena, including sensory data, words, ideas, and theories. Skeptics demand rigor, but fail to do what their argument requires: explain in detail the presentation or generation of the systematically related data that naïve common sense ascribes to our interactions with other people and things. Hume cites the data, but never tries to explain their origin. Kant tried to explain the differentiated qualities
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and relations of experience, its unity and stability, but who believes that the content of experience is the product of transcendental synthesis rather than the effect of data generated by our interactions with other people and things, then processed by our sensory organs and brain? Experience might be synthesized by the mind that thinks them—as dreams are—but it seems odd indeed that I am the inventor of the speech or sonata to which I listen or that my thinking stabilizes the Manhattan skyline. There is a clock on my desk: the case and face are stable, but the hands move; how do I manage both effects at once? Should I marvel at the subtlety of my transcendental self or concede that minds cloistered in skulls accurately register and report their experiences of the ambient world. Though notice the habit learned from Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant: they encourage the impression that mind is passive to data received and inspected. This misconstrues most experience, because it emphasizes one side, but ignores the other half: we perceive other things in the course of engaging them. “A dollar,” says the clerk; you pay it, and take your newspaper: there is perpetual reciprocity in our relations to other people and things. Why deny that the extramental world is often understood and controlled? How do we plausibly deny it, given cooperation, conflict, and the technological culture that proves its skill every time one flicks a light switch? There would be less argument if this were not the bone skeptics love to chew.5 Deny that true belief requires certainty, locate adaptable, smart animals (human beings) in the cities, swamps, and savannahs of the physical world, then consider likely conditions for the efficacy of practical experience: do all this, and you remove the bone. Skeptics refuse to yield, but they are obliged to explain that esse est percipi—that all reality is in us—and that, miraculously, separate minds coordinate their experiences. Leibniz’s Monadology—each mind a shard bound harmoniously (without mutual access) by divine apperception—should be everyone’s preferred explanation. It isn’t, because there is no evidence of the entities and relations cited by this cosmic abduction, apart from claims it makes. We choose between a simple hypothesis that explains everything—God does it—and the many inferences that explain particular practical effects by citing extra-mental causes. Science adds explanations that are more generic, but it never displaces reciprocities it explains: people answer voices they hear, because they rightly believe that others are speaking to them. Proud of modern science, thinking that this is abduction’s principal achievement, we ask why there was no science in the early history of cultures. But this question is better rephrased: why wasn’t there better science in cultures that successfully used abduction to master
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various practical techniques? Preliminary answers are apparent: partial information and no theory to integrate it, no consistent or sufficiently subtle standards of measurement, primitive mathematics, poor technology (no microscopes, thermometers, or telescopes), misleading or mistaken metaphysical assumptions (distinct qualitative natures—Aristotle’s quiddities—rather than discrete or continuous values for a few variable types or qualities). These were severe impediments to systematic knowledge. There was little chance of displacing them in the West as long as inquiry was suppressed by the dominant interpretation of a church convinced that it and Aristotle knew everything worth knowing. MEANING One may think of empirical meaning in the terms of ostensive definition—say or think “red” when seeing red—but this is too simple for most cases. A more ample account proposes that thoughts or sentences are meaningful if they signify possible states of affairs and true if those states of affairs are instantiated: the state of affairs prefigured is actual; it has a determinate location in spacetime. Meaning has three conditions: the thought or sentence satisfies logical laws (it is consistent), it has subjectpredicate form or a permitted relational form (its syntax), and its individual words (other than logical constants and rhetorical uses of words such as By golly) signify properties, processes, relations, people or things, relationships, or events. The third of these considerations—semantics—has three constituents: words or phrases that signify properties, entities, processes, or relations; rules that bar solecisms (“round-square”); and organizational rubrics (cause and effect) that signify structures or relationships. The semantics of these rubrics (explicit in the role Kant ascribed to empirical schemas6) is distinct from the syntax of grammatical form, though the two elide when a sentence’s subject-predicate form expresses an organizational form: ‘Fire burns.’ Empirical meaning is problematic in this respect: does an empirically meaningful sentence signify all the observable effects that could be educed if it were true though most such effects are unconsidered or unknown when the sentence is affirmed? It is a contingency, for example, that dogs are known by their shapes, noses, and barks, not their DNA. Should we count all these features as properties signified by dog? Saying no raises questions about the cogency of evidence: can properties not implied by dog count as evidence of a dog or dogs? No one could have known before the discovery of canine DNA that its structure is one of the features signified by dog. Nor would anyone have said that evidence of it was evidence of dogs. But this restriction is problematic:
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reject extended semantic coverage and we hobble thought and language by implying that dog as currently used signifies all the properties dogs may someday be shown to have. The alternate, extended notion of meaning regards sense as a target: the target is a complex of properties (existing perhaps as a logical—eternal—possiblity7). Some of its constituent properties are known or conceived, others not. It may be incidental that the speaker knows less of dogs than he or she realizes, but it is not incidental that this extended notion of meaning—call it implicit or Platonic meaning—is psychologically and morally false: a speaker’s responsibility extends to the consciously acknowledged sense of his or her words, not to the denumerably infinite set of features that a word may come to signify. These opposed interests require two notions of meaning: one appropriate to the extended sense, another that limits semantic meaning to the set of features currently associated with the thing signified. This difference is significant in practical life, because of our inclination to restrict semantic meaning to properties directly perceived (colors and sounds), rather than relationships discerned or inferred. This is satisfactory when words are defined ostensively: red signifies the color seen. It fails when words, phrases, or sentences signify complex structures or relationships that are not or cannot be observed directly or altogether. Imagine that a consumer calls customer service with a complaint. Speaking to the first person to answer the phone, she expresses her concern and waits for help. Getting none, she speaks to successive superiors until (perhaps) the issue is settled. The caller infers, without directly seeing it, that authority in this company is organized hierarchically. Or, a simpler case, magnetism signifies a field-effect, not merely the behavior of polarized nails. These examples illustrate the philosophically problematic difference between observables and their sometimes unobservable but inferred conditions: perceived radiation emitted from otherwise unperceived black holes, sound waves heard as different notes. This difference— between sensory data and their conditions or ground—is the focus of an interminable debate among empiricists: is there more to reality than the data by which it is known? We assume that the ambient world reduces to sensory data if we agree with Berkeley that reality comprises mind— the Cartesian cogito—and these data, its qualifications. But this is the lingering shadow of a skeptical ontology: it affirms that there is no extra-mental world or no way to know it. The more likely alternative avers that mind is the activity of a material agent, one embedded within and perpetually engaged by other material systems. Every such agent has multiple properties, usually—in our experience—some that are
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observable, and others (their energy, for example) that are not. Saying, “Careful, red light,” we signify that things have properties of both sorts. Joining these considerations, we say that meaning has a double thrust: surface and depth. Some words and phrases signify properties perceived; others signify properties, things, or relationships inferred. Some of those inferred—DNA or the shapes of large irregular structures, partially seen—are properties inaccessible to direct observation. The referents for other words, phrases, or sentences are discovered when thought uses its leading principles (listed and elaborated in chapter 6) to organize hypotheses, maps, or plans. Applying the rule that effects have causes, we see bites and look for mosquitoes. Both terms of a relationship—bugs and bites—may be observable, but science has learned to exploit the looser requirement that we be able to confirm one or more of a relationship’s terms by way of its other terms: heat and molecular motion, for example. Or we make a relationship accessible by way of theories that generalize, extrapolate, or analogize from things better known. Observables are still critical if a hypothesis is to be confirmed. But access to them may be steeply mediated by a lengthy string of intermediaries: the radiation of black holes and the Big Bang are intelligible because ideas credited by studying the Sun are applied to them, and because of evidence that would be inaccessible without theory and instruments more subtle than the eye. The liberties taken are, however, problematic. Interpretation, too, can analogize and extrapolate in circumstances where no direct observation is possible. Radiation is perceived; the black holes from which it allegedly emanates are not: cosmic design is perceived (or conceived), the cosmic designer is not. The extended, implicit meaning of black hole signifies (among other things) its radiation; the extended, implicit meaning of cosmic intelligence signifies (among other things) effects intrinsic to its nature, including the cosmic design. Our inability to perceive the designer is a minor disability if natural order presupposes a divine intelligence. Why demur; why flatter inquiry at cost to interpretation? Because the creationist inference is a step too far: thinking beyond the possibility of direct confirmation doesn’t excuse us the requirement that a claim have empirical meaning. Creationism applies the principle that effects have causes, but this is only a first step: it remains to establish the link between effects and their alleged causes. For it needs to be shown that the effects of a process are continuous with the mechanics of the process. It makes little sense (no sense if we discount familiarity) to say that an immaterial process—unextended Cartesian thinking—can generate the experience of extension. The mechanisms responsible for radiation are specifiable; the process of divine creation is not: we speak
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of God’s “thinking” with a familiarity that betrays our entire ignorance of his existence or activity. Creationist stories are empty rhetoric without that further specificity. Chapter 5 argues that both imagination and inquiry use leading principles—rubrics such as cause and effect—to create phrases or sentences that represent inferred states of affairs. These structural affinities are nevertheless superficial if they extend no deeper than thoughts or sentences that express them. For using the rubrics to couple thoughts or words is easier than justifying inferences they promote. A dimensionless mind thinking space, a thinking God creating an orderly, material universe: these mysteries are not self-authenticating. The phrases or sentences expressing them are provocative, but not more meaningful than recommending that someone take an umbrella, because: “It’s raining ghosts and numbers.” We don’t know what this means or how to make it meaningful. TRUTH Hypothesis is sometimes hard to distinguish from interpretation if truth is honorific. True grit is real grit; true friends are reliable. But we are encouraged to believe that the doctrines of a “true” religion are correct, not that they are resolute or reliable. Maps are accurate or not, so sentences reporting the relative placement of features represented on a map are true or false; it is also true or false that the instrumental— causal—relations invoked by a plan do obtain. But practices—driving on the right, shaving one’s head, or worshiping in a favored way—are not true or false in the respect that hypotheses are one or the other. Nor is a doctrine true merely because believers affirm it. Distinguishing inquiry from interpretation requires a firm notion of truth. But what is truth: identity, coherence, disquotation, or correspondence? What are its terms and what should count as evidence of truth? Are there degrees of truth and, if so, how much of it need there be to justify saying that a thought or sentence is true? Truth of the sort appropriate to interpretation is always and only a combination of coherence and identity: a network of thoughts or sentences is true because it satisfies the attitude or attitudes—hence values—that promote it. The story believed may be inconsistent, its contradictions may be glaring, but it is true to the believers whose values it affirms. Coherence is a weak requirement (logic may be incidental), because any jumble of beliefs may seem coherent when attitudes are its measure. Truth as identity is founded in self-perception. I know triangularity as it is, because a determinate figure (or the generic idea of closed three-sided figures) is inscribed in my awareness and
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inspected. There is no gap between awareness and its object, hence no distance or intervening medium to distort my view of it. Affirming such truths is also a way of affirming myself. For every thing qualifying my awareness is known directly as a qualification of myself. (Recall Plato’s theory of Forms. Each Form stands plainly before the mind’s eye, and is seen as it is; a mind inscribed with the Forms sees them as qualifications of itself.) This is my special—unmediated—connection to a team, tribe, or any other thing or event known to interpretation. I am one with it either because I think or imagine it or because I identify with it, thereby affirming myself. 8 These convictions, elaborated in the context of self-inspection, are intensified when socialized. For loyalty and conviction are greater when others validate my interpretations by affirming them. Think of the intensified conviction aroused in comrades who cheer as one: your affirmation coheres with mine and confirms it. Now add that mind is “in the truth” or “true to itself” when its way of construing the world satisfies its attitudes, hence its moral and emotional imperatives: I know who I am, and know that this posture—these beliefs and feelings—satisfy my needs and pacify my fears. These concerns are alien to inquiry. Phone calls are everywhere familiar; some are generated by machine, but put them aside to consider the others. Does anyone believe that coherent messages from a spouse, child, or creditor reduce callers to the voices heard? There is better evidence that there are various modalities of transmission, each reliable in itself though information distorted by one may be corrected by information from another. We listen carefully, or, seeing poorly, we wear glasses or turn up the light. We want information about things as they are, to the extent they are accessible. Inquiry doesn’t identify such things with the act of thought (except for the rare case of thinking about one’s own brain states), nor does it represent them in ways that appease us. Which theory of truth is appropriate to inquiry? Philosophers distrust correspondence for a reason that commends identity: the gap between knower and known breeds error. Never grasping and inspecting the thing known, we rely on surrogates: the thoughts, sensory data, or sentences that represent it. Kantians suppose that experience is an impenetrable barrier to the extra-mental world: we can’t see beyond percepts and ideas in order to compare them to the matters allegedly represented. Generations of thinkers have responded by telling us that a surrogate world—the one presented in sensory data, theory, or language—satisfies every description otherwise reserved to things-inthemselves: it, too, is differentiated, organized, and transparent, hence intelligible. Coherence binds the thoughts or sentences that express or exhibit this world: each is true in the respect that it couples to others
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within the narrative mind tells of the world and itself. Now add coherence to identity in recognition that the experience and world presented by way of the narrative is mine. We say, indifferently, that I am in the truth, or truth is in me. Interpretation would have us believe that mind is the measure, though each thinker construes reality in a way peculiar to itself. But is this plausible? Is reality nothing but mind’s qualification or construction? Is experience a barrier to knowledge of the external world, or a source of filtered but reliable information? Is the prospect of error so intimidating that we retreat into the double relation of identity and coherence? Are we made secure merely by creating a surrogate world, one that uses fantasy to disguise error and disappointment? These are philosophic postures; discount the skeptical arguments and they seem a mix of grandiosity and fear. The retreat to identity—each thinker’s selfaffirmed view of the world—is the weakest sort of truth: universal selfpleading promotes universal distortion. Add that coherence is a test of truth, not truth itself; a coherent, repeatedly tested and well-confirmed theory is likely to be a good representation of relevant states of affairs. Contradiction make us question an interpretation, but coherence isn’t sufficient: we don’t achieve truth by telling any consistent story. Truth as correspondence is the only alternative standing if we deny that mind conjures all reality to suit or spite itself. Correspondence is the relation of a thought or sentence—meaningful because of the possible state of affairs it signifies—to the actual state of affairs that instantiates the possibility. Truth requires that my reading of another’s speech should accurately represent it. You speak, wait for my rendering, and hear it as irrelevant or wrong before replying that I have misunderstood you. “It’s raining” is false on a clear, dry day, but meaningful because of signifying a possibility. We say that thoughts are meaningful and sometimes true, but we translate this into a claim about sentences, because thoughts lack perspicuous structure. Sentences are meaningful (as above) when they satisfy syntactic and semantical rules. Syntax is a constraint on word order: s is p, for example, or a gives b to c. Logic, too, is syntax, so no sentence violating its rules—no contradiction, for example—is meaningful. Semantics correlates substantive words—nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs—to the extra-linguistic phenomena they signify: cat to cats. There are also semantic rules for combining words: these are the rubrics that create organizational form: cause and effect, here and there, before and after, for example. Two additional conditions for correspondence are the speaker or writer’s intention, and the context of thought or communication. Think-
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ing of my father, my intention and lineage secure reference. Speaking of our agreement, I invoke you and an accord to which you too may testify. “Pass the butter” implies three: you see it, I see it, and you see that I can’t easily reach it. The list of sentential types that are or may be true by correspondence is contestable. Does it include counterfactuals and complex sentences using and, or, or if-then? I suggest it does,9 though the evidence for truth as correspondence requires no examples additional to thoughts, sentences, or theories that signify individuals, their existence, properties, and relations. I say truly that roses are red when they are. You tell me rightly that I have ignored the thorns. We agree that material truths are partial: there is usually or always more to say. It sometimes happens that the same data—indeed all the available data—justify two or more abductive hypotheses. Detective stories thrive on this ambiguity when any of five suspects could have murdered the victim. Philosophy hesitates, because the same evidence justifies physicalism and its phenomenalist contrary: one enlarges the domain of sensory experience by citing its extra-mental conditions; the other contracts reality to mind and its sensory qualifications. Science, too, is sometimes confounded, as happened when the same evidence justified Ptolemaic and Copernican descriptions of celestial motion. How do we decide when empirical data fail to disqualify one or more contending hypotheses? Looking for evidence that confirms or disqualifies standing candidates, we extend the domain of relevant data and their conditions. Murder mysteries progress when suspects are successively discarded; science extends the domain of relevant evidence, from Sun, Earth, and moon to other planets and the fixed stars. Philosophy looks for evidence that mind is not self-sufficient: inferring error or death from the sensory data, it asks if a self-sufficient mind could commit one or suffer the other. Alternative explanations complicate inquiry without altering the conditions for presumptive truth: we consider predictions that would distinguish competitors, then look for evidence of the effects predicted. Inquiry advances as contenders fall away; it stalls if there is no evidence that confirms one while disqualifying every other. Truths tested and affirmed are often partial, hence the belief that there is more or less truth by correspondence. Saying correctly that something is a tree is less specific than calling it an oak of a certain height, location, and age. The latter formulation is more detailed, but not more true than the first. Both are more accurate than saying that this is a dead oak, because the conjunction, oak and dead, is false. But this, too, is closer to the truth than calling it a dead frog. Degrees of truth is a puzzle we avoid by listing the alleged properties of things, one at time in the style of Russell’s theory of descriptions.10 Such thoughts
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or sentences are true, unqualifiedly, if things signified have all the properties ascribed. They are partial truths if two conditions are satisfied: the nonexclusive or is substituted for the and of Russell’s theory, and one or more but not all property ascriptions are correct. A sentence is false, categorically, if the item signified has none of the properties ascribed. No thought or sentence is false in this categorical respect, because we can add a universally ascribable property to the list of disjuncts: thinkable without contradiction, for example. But this trivializes an otherwise viable criterion: we do not include or imply one or an indefinite laundry list of contrived properties when signifying this dog, that fireplug. Things have some, all, or none of the properties ascribed to them. ANIMADVERSIONS How do we confirm that a hypothesis is true? Or, rephrasing the previous sentence to cover several contested points, how is it confirmed that the possible state of affairs signified by a syntactically and semantically correct hypothesis does obtain? One expects that the perceptual stimuli provoking thought stand against it as a control on thought’s response. Seeing chocolate, I’m wrong to describe it as vanilla. Yet Quine has argued that all the characteristics ascribable to these provocations originate in the system of thoughts or sentences—the theory— used to differentiate and organize them. Stimulations provoke observation sentences,11 but this is not the simple relation of a datum to the sentence that correctly reports its character. For the direct link between them is buffered and diffused when observation sentences are integrated into the tissue of interanimating sentences. They have no thinkable character apart from the properties and relations it prescribes. This has the perverse consequence that no datum can falsify any hypothesis. Every test is compromised, because adjusting the relations of a system’s thoughts or sentence is sufficient to save every consistent hypothesis from empirical disconfirmation. You bought an orange shirt having asked for blue? No problem: every datum acquires its identity from the theory or hypothesis it tests. Adjust the relations of sentences within the conceptual network that differentiates your perceptions and you’ll say that what you see is blue, or more radically it will look blue. This formulation deprives theory of an external, empirical control on thought’s claims about extra-mental states of affairs. One thinks of Protagoras: man is the measure of all that is that it is, and of all that is not that it is not. Quine’s account is vulnerable in two respects. The first—no external, empirical control on thought—is falsified many times a day. Traffic
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lights turn red, drivers stop: the effect is imposed and recognized whether or not it was anticipated. Many data are perceived in ways determined by context and expectation—pleasure or pain, for example—but many others—noise and sunlight—are not. The second—thought’s determining effect on data perceived—overstates mind’s role. For thought and theory are often neutral regarding the character of effects perceived, even when they rightly anticipate the range of possible effects. So, litmus turns red or blue, but only the solution tested—not anything in our structuring theory—prescribes that a test result be one or the other. There are many such experiments. All confirm that ensembles of theoretical assumptions—distinguishable conceptual precincts or Quine’s holist network—mediate and focus experiments without determining or extenuating effects perceived. It’s also relevant that either of two postures is appropriate when testing theories or hypotheses, and that Quine ignored one while emphasizing the other. He supposed that a theory’s posture is defensive, and that empirical tests are challenges theories resist. Thinking defensively, we incorporate, redescribe, or ignore the evidence. This attitude, prevailing when a theory is well established, suits the many times when its encounters with the ambient world are routine exchanges, not experiments. The other posture regards a theory’s every encounter with things appropriate to it as a test. For tests imply vulnerability and a question: do things have the character a theory signifies? Quine’s emphasis is odd, because disabling. We often make theories vulnerable, because error provokes better theories. Specifying a range of confirming values is an invitation to experimental failure, theory revision, and progress. Peirce emphasized error’s importance to self-correcting inquiry.12 Quine scorned it.13 I suppose that a true theory specifies its truth conditions: ‘The cat on the mat’ is true, if there is a cat on the mat. But why neglect a viable alternative: why not say with those who favor disquotation that truth is an excrescence, one that adds nothing germane to the assertion that roses are red? I ignore disquotation, because this is a rhetorical version of Kant’s notion that a transcendental judgment has complementary effects: synthesis creates both an object—red roses—and an empirical judgment expressed as a thought or sentence affirming that the roses experienced are red. Kant eliminates thought’s representational character by dispensing with the extra-mental or -linguistic state of affairs represented; the thing-in-itself. Yet he preserves the appearance of representation by pairing the object schematized to an empirical judgment—typically expressed as a sentence—that reports this product of transcendental synthesis. Notice, however, that the schematized state
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of affairs is not the truth-maker of the sentence, for this is the magic of transcendental synthesis. These are judgment’s correlated products: creating one, it also creates the other. The disquotational argument takes a further turn. For why do we need both of judgment’s effects? Kant assumed we do, because he argued from the appearances—the experienced object and our judgment that it is as it appears—to its transcendental conditions. Disquotationalists are more economical: they dispense with the state of affairs while emphasizing that “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. Naïve readers believe that the second iteration of snow is white signifies white, fluffy crystals of ice. But that reading misconstrues the sentence in which the phrase twice appears, the first in the meta-language, the second in the object language (English). That complex sentence affirms, from the standpoint of the meta-language, that the sentence in the object language is true. Three questions arise: First, why say that the sentence in the object language is true? Because it coheres—deductively or inductively—with other sentences of an established theory. Second, what has happened to the object schematized as the complement to the sentence in the object language? It has been eliminated in favor of the sentence that reports it. (The elimination of phenomenal objects, and inversely the emphasis on language and judgments, is characteristic of Marburg Kantians in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.14) Third, what is signified by saying that the theory used to derive the sentence in the object language is “established”? Is this a disguised way of saying that the theory is true of a subject matter distinct from itself? Is it tacit recognition that the theory is or could be used to direct behavior that successfully engages this extra-theoretic state of affairs? Neither is correct, because either would imply the existence of things whose character and existence are independent of the conceptualization that makes them intelligible. Kant tells us that such things are “negative noumena,” unthinkable things-inthemselves. Disquotation makes them eliminable. This is the radical—eliminative—disquotational posture. Truth is a function of identity and coherence. It is truth as identity, because sentences derived from established theories are qualifications of the thinker who uses them to make experience thinkable. It is truth as coherence, because the object sentence is described as true in the metalanguage if it coheres with the other sentences of an object language, more specifically, an established theory. This confabulation might be criticized at several points, but one is sufficient. Affirming that something has or lacks properties it lacks or has, we err. But no object falsifying such ascriptions is paired with a false
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thought or sentence, because Kant’s transcendental theory of judgment is tailored to explain the synthesis of objects and, concurrently, the generation of sentences that accurately affirm them. Kant did not provide a complementary theory of error, one that describes the generation of false empirical judgments, those having no paired object. Disquotationalist versions of truth are equally impaired. They think it pleonastic to add “is true” when one says “Roses are red.” They don’t tell us how or why to resist saying “is false” after “Roses have teeth.” We require both locutions—“is true” and “is false”—if thoughts or sentences signify or represent states of affairs that are not created by our affirmations or denials. My account of meaning and truth is deemed speculative and naïve by every thinker indebted to Kant. All agree that mind constructs the only reality we can think or experience, and that inquiry—reality-testing— is a delusion. But there is considerable diversity in the emphases and history of that tradition’s several strands: hermeneuticists differ from scientifically oriented thinkers of the Marburg school—including Cassirer, Carnap, and Quine—because of their distinct history and emphases. First devoted to texts, hermeneutics affirms that it best describes the character and conditions for knowledge in all its domains. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore elaborate its claims in their jointly edited issue of Metaphilosophy, entitled “The Philosophy of Interpretation.” Interpretation, they say, is conceptual and “constructive” (after Kant’s talk of schematization and synthesis), not attitudinal. Rockmore declares that Any theory of interpretation needs to take into account the lessons of Kant’s much-neglected Copernican revolution. . . . Kant makes two points that should structure all discussions of knowledge, hence our understanding of interpretation. On the one hand, as Kant points out, we do not know that we know the way the independent world is, since there is no way to know that we know independent objects. . . . On the other hand, the condition of knowledge is not that we discover what is already there, but rather that we in some way “produce” or, perhaps better, “construct” what we know.15 The nerve of Rockmore’s argument is his claim that “there is no way to know that we know independent objects.” We could know them were we to step outside ourselves, seeing things as they are before comparing them to our representations, but no one argues we do this. Intuitionists have supposed that things—including states of affairs, sensory data, ideas, or
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systems of sentences (scientific theories, for example)—appear before the mind and are seen as they are. But this claim, too, deserves no credit if mind, the activity of a material system, has no power to inspect matters set before it. I know the time by reading the hands of my watch, but it is light reflected from the watch to my eyes that generates this stable image by affecting my neurons. These are conditions for transmitting information about a distant object. The alternative hypothesis—content set before the mind’s eye and inspected—is a gloss of the apparent experience. It credits minds with powers that no material system can have while ignoring the generating conditions for experiences we do have. Rockmore demurs. There is, he believes, no alternative to construction: unable to know things as they are, we make thinkable surrogates. But there is an alternative Rockmore neglects. It seems strange to him—naïve rather than irrational—that philosophers since Parmenides assume that knowing requires knowing the way the world is: “Foundationalism,” he remarks, “founders on the representationalist reef, or the inability to show that representations really represent.”16 But this is an odd characterization of our practical lives, where we regularly justify beliefs about states of affairs represented by our percepts, maps, plans, and hypotheses. Think of the malpractice suits dentists would face if they couldn’t accurately locate the teeth they extract. The alternative Rockmore ignores is also conspicuously absent from Kant’s analysis: we engage other people and things, then infer their properties from the character of their effects on us. Rockmore supposes that these sensory effects have no identity apart from conceptualizations that prescribe their context, determinate properties, and relations. But is that so? I go to the dentist rather than an accountant to check my teeth. He looks, probes, takes X-rays, and reports his findings. Ah, thinks Rockmore, just one of the many ways to construe a situation: What we mean by “objectivity” can no longer mean the grasp of the independent object. It cannot simply mean the verification of such claims, for instance, by testing them against further experience, construed as providing an empirical restraint, since claims to know can always be verified in at least a minimal manner for the obvious reason that the particular framework invoked also generates evidence for them.17 This suggestion is tantalizing, but incomplete: which of the accountant’s readings generates evidence that competes with data that justify a dentist’s diagnosis? The dentist’s claims are more “fruitful,” but what does this imply, if not the fact that his hypotheses are accurate to the state of
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affairs examined, while the accountant’s response is incidental or incompetent? Nothing Rockmore says or implies concedes that thought directs human engagements with the ambient world. Indeed, his remarks have the contrary sense: they emphasize mind’s passivity to data it construes. This bias is apparent in his emphasis on history: we reconstruct the past, but never encounter it: “What we call knowledge is no more than a reading, construal, or interpretation, in effect, a theory of what is given in experience.”18 This is the aestheticizing, intellectual distance that deprives all Cartesian-Kantian thinkers of the clue they nominally seek: things we engage are the constant control on perception and behavior, hence on every cognitive activity vital to efficacy, cooperation, survival, security, and satisfaction. Rockmore is a Cartesian exiled from the world of other people and things. He reflects and construes. Certain that he exists, he is less sure of other things: “Claims to provide a correct representation of the independent world either rest on a misunderstanding, feature a different understanding of the object of knowledge, or are asserted dogmatically.”19 Dogmatically? The dentist supplies a bill with a code that satisfies my insurance company. Is the insurer foolishly credulous: the dentist didn’t do the specific thing claimed? We do not know that we know the way the independent world is, though we have very good evidence of what it is by way of our focused engagements with it. Cartesians—terrified by skepticism—prefer worlds they construct to a world known fallibly to hypotheses tested in action. The word hypothesis does not appear in Rockmore’s essay, but the complex activity of making and testing hypotheses is the unmentioned solution to his question, how to know that we know the existence and character of the mind-independent world. Sensory data are not content for a daydream or aesthetic reverie. Generated by our engagements with other things, they are explained by hypotheses then tested when predictions about the likely effects of additional, specifiable engagements are predicted and confirmed. We always risk being mistaken, but error is instructive: we revise our hypotheses to make their predictions more accurate. Rockmore defers to Kant’s “Copernican revolution” as though it were the point of reference for all reasonable philosophic thinking. But this begs the question. For there are two choices: we humans live within and engage a world we do not make, or we have isolated lives within single minds or minds socialized by a culture and history. The idea of a world known to testable hypotheses is speculative, but not foolish: each person confirms it all day every day as he or she successfully engages other people and things. Rockmore’s alternative is mysterious: How do self-sufficient minds create thinkable worlds? How do they
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stabilize the experience of those worlds, including all their particularities and details: the lives of other people, for example? How do they generate both sides of a conversation? Rockmore’s argument turns circular: human perspectives are historicized (“there is no escape from relativizing our knowledge claims to the historical moment”20), implying that we are creatures of a history that has no integrity apart from our ways of interpreting it. Rockmore supposes that every vehicle for expressing knowledge and every knowledge claim is a construct. Margolis defends this thesis against its realist critics: Here are six theorems that I claim to draw from post-Kantian first considerations: (1) Intransparency: No realism can escape the inherent paradoxes and contradictions of “Cartesian realism” . . . if it does not reject the a priori standing of a rational account of cognizing subjects and “independent” cognized objects (or intermediary representations of same) intended to ensure an undistorted correspondence between belief and world. Hence (2) Constructivism: Whatever realism we are able to defend (regarding the “independent” world) must be constituted in the logically trivial sense of affirming (1) and must, as a consequence, construe the cognizing relation between subjects and objects (presupposed and entailed in admitting truth-claims) as a critical and revisable artifact internal to the “space” of that construction, precluding thereby all possibility of privileged or apodictic access to the “independent” world or to the conditions for knowing same. (3) Symbiosis: The “independence” or “mind-independence” of physical nature is not compromised by (1) or (2), but the ontic independence of anything said to be real is, on pain of contradiction, epistemically dependent on, or inseparable from, whatever may be affirmed and confirmed “objectively”—which, therefore, must itself be similarly constructed in accord with (2). Hence, also, (4) Holism: There is no principled priority or separability of metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, logical, or psychological (mental or subjective) analyses bearing on realist or legitimative questions; but that is benignly compatible with a constructivist and “internal” account of relationships between subject and objects. But if that is so, then (5) Presuppositionlessness: Whether a bivalent or a relativistic logic (or any other logical provision) suits our realist claims best or adequately in this or that sector of the world depends on what we take to be the actual nature of the phe-
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nomena of that domain. If we assume elementary coherence and consistency, there can then be no a priori disqualification of relativism, incommensurabilism, historicism, or similar doctrines from any vantage that presupposes the falsity of (1). And finally, (6) Constructive realism: The argument that runs from (1) through (5) is not tantamount to idealism (the supposed “mind-dependence” of the “real” world) but only the denial that there is any valid a priori disjunction between the sense of “realism” and the sense of “idealism” that accords with the “Cartesian” tradition.21 This passage uses “Cartesian” in contrary ways: one implies Descartes’ realism (objectionable), the other indicates that he founded the idealist lineage of Kant and Hegel (approved). Other considerations—one for each of the six points—are more telling: i. “Intransparency” is said to foil the a priori claim that there is an undistorted correspondence between belief and world. There are some naïve realists: the world as they describe it is set directly before their inspecting minds. But representational realism needn’t make the assumptions here alleged. The existence of a mind-independent reality is a hypothesis justified by our nearly perpetual encounters with it. Realists attentive to the material conditions for perception—the structure and physiology of brain, eye, and ear, for example—agree that its content is never undistorted. Nor does realism postulate the literal correspondence of belief and world. It does affirm that beliefs are often refined and improved when tested and that many signify their truth conditions: believing that this is a friend’s telephone number, I dial and speak to her. Was I mistaken: was there a mismatch between the belief, the conventional signs and physical processes (complex electrical signals initiated when numbers are dialed), and its object? ii. Margolis would have us believe—his “Constructivism”—that the relation between subjects and objects is internal to the “space” of the construction. Its intrapsychic contents are a mix of the natural (percepts) and the contrived (our styles of reference and grammar). These signs— percepts, thoughts, and words—are the instruments used to discriminate and probe differences and relations encountered in practical life or particle physics. There are a few iconic signs (perceived shapes, principally), but it is rare that like knows like: red-looking roses aren’t red. We make bread, but telephone other people using numbers we haven’t made. Imagine telling one’s number—123–456–7890—to a class of six-year-olds. All thirty (sixty, a thousand) repeat the number when asked. Why this consensus? Why suppose that they construct the number
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rather than hear it? Because Margolis, like every Kantian, regards perception as an impenetrable brick wall, not as the filter of discernible, reliable information: Gibson’s “information in the light”22 has no cogency for him. But how does one select and “construct” a correct number from the myriad possible ten-digit numbers? Margolis doesn’t tell us; he rejects Kant’s transcendental synthesis, but offers no alternative. Using signs to direct action—one right number, many that are wrong—challenges Margolis, because he insists that his relativism sanctions an infinity of accounts—degrees of right, degrees of wrong, neither right nor wrong—each anomalous with some or all others, and no way to choose among them if all are consistent. (Even consistency too narrowly constrains his relativism if, as Margolis hints, we may dispense with the principle of noncontradiction.23) He requires a multivalent logic rather than one that is bivalent (implying right or wrong numbers and statements that are true or false). This consideration may explain his failure to detail the activities signified by “construction”: why bother to describe them if none of the infinite possible formulations can be discounted? This assumption is confounding, because it entails that we have and can have no definitive explanation for any effect: each is multiply explicable, however anomalous the explanations. The same effect can be redescribed and explained in infinite ways. Though “same” splinters: every thing is what it is given its constitution under one or another description. Rockmore also speaks to the claim that there may be multiple interpretations of the “same” state of affairs: It would be a mistake to infer that if different interpretations are possible, none of which is true, all interpretations are on the same level, since none is better than the other. . . . It does not follow . . . that all are equally plausible. To rank interpretations we require criteria allowing us to choose between them, such as explanatory richness, or the capacity to account for more rather than fewer items in a given text or series of events. In principle, the absolutely best, fully adequate interpretation, a regulative idea probably never achieved in practice, would not only be better than its competitors, but would finally, wholly adequately, and fully explain everything to be explained.24 Yet, we have it from Margolis and Rockmore, too, that every referent is constructed by an interpretation, thereby precluding the comparison proposed when Rockmore postulates referents (“items in a given text or series of events”) common to disparate interpretations. How is it possible
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that an interpretation is more or less adequate to its referent if each referent is constructed by its interpretation? Rockmore may reply that some interpretations are not “plausible.” Why not: doesn’t an interpretation lay down the terms for its own plausibility, given that there is no common measure (perhaps including consistency) for appraising it? Margolis and Rockmore may disagree about details (consistency, for example), but their tolerance for diverse, self-serving interpretations makes error impossible and thinking too easy. They frustrate action by generating anomalous directives (one or more for each way of construing a situation), or they guarantee success by “constructing” states of affairs appropriate to every aim and way of achieving it. Why this flux? Because neither Margolis nor Rockmore acknowledges the difference between things and the many constructs—some accurate, many not— used to represent or signify them. Historicism justifies them, for as they see it stability is only the shadow of social prescriptions that narrow and fix the domain of constructions intelligible to thinkers of an era. Things change with a society’s interpretive framework: the world, including Earth and Sun, was different after Copernicus.25 This version of stability is dangerous to thinkers who misconstrue the plasticity of thought and meaning as an escape from circumstances having a decided character: a busy highway doesn’t become a sidewalk because we rethink it. More, their vision imposes an intolerable burden on every thinker: it isn’t enough that we find our way in a world we don’t create; they demand that each thinker construct the complex world to which he or she accommodates. Is this done piecemeal or at once? Margolis and Rockmore don’t tell us. They may prefer a simpler response, saying with Descartes, “I am, I exist.” That would be an authentic response within a tradition that ambiguates everything but minds known to themselves. iii. “Symbiosis” requires that the “ontic independence of anything said to be real” be “epistemically dependent on the linguistic or conceptual vehicles used to affirm or confirm it.” But your telephone number doesn’t depend epistemically or otherwise on my way of thinking about or using it. I don’t construct your number: Verizon or BellSouth does that. Much more compromising is Margolis’s claim that the “ontic independence of anything said to be real is . . . epistemically . . . inseparable” from whatever is affirmed or confirmed. If this means that remembering or repeating the number is my way of knowing it, nothing exceptional is implied. But there is much to object if Margolis supposes that the number exists by virtue of being constructed, hence known, by me who uses it. This is true to the Kantian spirit of his views, but vulnerable to the objection that I repeatedly get a wrong number, because I have
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misdialed. Here, as above, Margolis has no way to distinguish things from our re-presentations (his “constructions”) of them. iv. “Holism” is to be understood as the notion that all relationships between subjects and objects are to be construed by way of Margolis’s constructivism. But this principle is subverted by all the mindindependent items one doesn’t construct: other people, their histories, and circumstances, for example. v. All our thinking, metaphysical or otherwise, is to be “Presuppositionless,” for then we shall have no reason to disqualify the relativism Margolis favors: every consistent story will be as good as any other. But thinking is not presuppositionless for a reason Margolis ignores: people do not merely think and talk about an external world: they perpetually engage it. Formulating maps, plans, and hypotheses that direct and refine our engagements with other people and things, we secure and satisfy ourselves by using these conceptual instruments to control our circumstances. Feral chickens—hardwired to their circumstances—don’t speculate about the conditions for their success. We explain our successful accommodations by formulating and confirming a simple abductive inference: reality has a decided form. vi. Margolis denies that his points i through v are “tantamount to idealism,” for there is no valid distinction between realism and idealism that accords with the “Cartesian” tradition. Read “Cartesian” as one would read “Kantian,” and there is no doubt that Margolis’s idealism is the only sort of realism his tradition acknowledges, but this is not the realism of those who believe that one uses telephone numbers and beliefs of all sorts without constructing their referents. Margolis does acknowledge one external control on our constructs and their truth: namely, the “cultural conditions under which our “data” are (interpretively) constituted.”26 But he does not sufficiently specify those conditions, including the technology that generates telephones and telephone numbers. Margolis might reply that telephones derive their character from ways they are construed by people of the culture in which they are created. This is surely true about the importance of telephones to their users, but not at all true of the fact that telephones are made to send and receive signals carried by electromagnetic fields we exploit but do not make. Wrong numbers are a constructivist’s embarrassment. Why do we err? We need a standard for measuring error, but what could it be when Kantians of every stripe, logical constructivists or hermeneuticists, deny the reality of a world that resists us, one whose character and existence are independent of our ways of representing it? Cultural relativists and historicists may suggest that we err by opposing the standards of our
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people or time, but this limit is flouted by those visionaries and stubborn people whose “errors” are successfully tested against their circumstances. Hermeneuticists want a different solution, one that doesn’t commit them to a stable, extra-mental reality. They find it in the personal or socially sanctioned attitudes—the values—that regulate belief. Margolis and Rockmore don’t mention this control on interpretation: there are, says Margolis, “no large categories of interpretive activity comparable in importance” to the activity of constituting or amplifying sense.27 Kant said otherwise: construction is always motivated by “the power of desire.”28 Desire has various determinants, but attitudes are overriding: one may starve or die of thirst rather than violate them. Ideas enjoy some degree of favor if they satisfy attitudes; those opposed are intolerable and “false.” This would seem to be the only notion of error available to Rockmore and Margolis, but also the closest they come to a notion of truth. True-to-me, true-to-my-tribe, or true-to-my-era: interpretations are true to the degree that they satisfy attitudes.29 ENGAGING OTHER PEOPLE AND THINGS The apparent dialectic of interpretation and inquiry often disguises their complementarity. Marriage is my aim, and I imagine finding someone whose attitudes square with mine: the world as we construe it shouldn’t be so different that we agree about little or nothing. Interpretation determines the range of possible or likely orientations. Yet, inquiry is critical, too, because I need hypotheses appropriate to my circumstances, including a map of situations where I may find a possible mate and a plan for meeting one. A marriage broker never confuses these interests. She doesn’t want to marry my possible partners, but she does need a map and plan of circumstances where she could find partners acceptable to me. The complexity of an inquiry directed by interpretation (mine) reduces for her to inquiry only. Knowing that she will make less money if the people coupled are badly suited, she differentiates her financial interest from the work itself. One is self-concerned, the other more careful, and “scientific”: she takes no payment from clients until bonding is accomplished (they pay-one third after the first year of marriage, two-thirds after five). She is at least as careful as the chemists whose salaries at pharmaceutical firms are calibrated to the success of drugs they invent. Practitioners of both sorts distinguish their motives— money, curiosity, or status—from the work at hand. Inquiry is the practice of formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses. Do matters stand as hypotheses represent them? We consider the effects that would obtain if a hypothesis were true, then look for them.
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A hypothesis and supporting assumptions are confirmed—they are more likely to be true—if the effects are perceived, but disconfirmed if they are not. There is give and take; we engage the extra-mental world on our terms, then appraise the effects produced: do they falsify or confirm the hypothesis that directs us? The procedure may be as simple as looking for evidence of rain or as theoretically complex and mechanically subtle as testing to determine the deviation of light in Mercury’s perihelion. We are often misdirected because hypotheses mislead or because data is misconstrued, but hypotheses are corrected or replaced and experiments repeated, until successful experiments confirm that this part of the world is accurately mapped. Nothing in this account is unfamiliar, but the comfort of knowing it obscures the practical discipline—mapping circumstances, designing experiments—that eludes intellectualizing idealists when they reduce truth to webs of sentences. Interpretation disciplines ideas by requiring that they satisfy attitudes. Inquiry is disciplined in three ways: by procedural values that include consistency, economy, coherence, and fertility; by rubrics (cause and effect, for example) that direct thought and experiments; and by states of affairs that test maps, plans, and hypotheses. Procedural values imply consistent hypotheses tested for differences they entail, then revised or replaced if they fail their tests. Rubrics are leading principles that shape and direct the formation of testable hypotheses: seeing smoke and looking for fire. States of affairs that satisfy or confound hypotheses include every thing or event that stands against thought as a test of its claims. Saying that such things are unknown apart from thought and perception is surely true (and tautological). Saying that every such thing is a function—the construct—of our thinking is offsettingly false, given error, frustration, death, and every other sign of an ambient world we challenge and alter but do not make. Interpretation struggles to digest the everyday obstacles that confound us. Inquiry addresses them, and yields. Unable to prescribe, it acknowledges the unforeseeable, accommodates, and describes. Idealists distrust perception, because it is sometimes misleading. Inquiry prizes this steady, reliable, though mediated contact with other things. Riding a bicycle requires thoughtless sensitivity to changes of surface, direction, wind, or speed: imagine staying upright if there were no perceptual clues. How much efficacy or cooperation could there be without them? Plato and Descartes agreed that sensory experience is vague and unreliable, until differentiated and fixed by ideas. Their heirs agree. Quine’s “stimulus meanings” are quickly subordinated to “occasion” and “observation sentences” in Word and Object, never to reappear as an independent control on inquiry.30 This is a characteristic bias in the
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Marburg tradition. Preferring talk of “observation sentences” entailed by the higher-order sentences of theories, these Kantians say very little about the data with which theories are tested. For the data are plastic; they accept whatever form is received from the concepts, the theories, used to differentiate and organize them. Thought’s principal task is elsewhere: to exhibit the rational structure of the thinkable world to minds that inspect it—as re-presented—within themselves.31 Indeed, the very notion that we encounter extra-mental things is an idea of reason, an intellectual pathology that recurs whenever we stretch imagination to specify conditions for experience,32 hence, the impulse to say, with Cassirer, Carnap, and Quine, that understanding subordinates—absorbs— all of materiality, perception, and existence to itself. Affirming that sensory data have no character or relations but those ascribed them by the conceptual system used to differentiate them, they make existence a function of truth: something perceived is said to have the character assigned it if the thought or sentence affirming it is true. Yet, truth, as they understand it, is the coherence relation binding sentences within a conceptual system. Hamlet and atoms exist if Shakespeare’s play and physical theories say they do. But everyone stumbles in the dark, and no one thinks his tripping is the effect of misconstruing a conceptual system. Yes, one’s map of the terrain was misleading or vague, but, no, we didn’t create the obstacle (Carnap and Quine), and don’t wait for theory’s serial perfection to encounter it (Cassirer). Inquiry is the practice of engaging other things under the joint direction of thought and interest. Imagine bees searching for honey. Cerebration is richer in our case, searches are more subtle and effective, but no beekeeper thinks he makes the honey he gathers. Thinking and willing are the principal activities Kant acknowledged, though thought’s original and still primary role is that of directing our encounters with other people and things. Reflection and deliberation neatly conform to the notion that mind is an illuminated sanctuary and theater beyond which all the rest is terra incognita or nothing at all. But this model cripples thought, because of denying its extra-mental referents. For cognition—understanding—is only a first step in the exchange of energy, materiel, and information with the other people and things that nourish, secure, and inform us. Maps, plans, and theories—all of them hypotheses—are formulated, tested, and revised. When sensory data mediate between hypotheses and the states of affairs they signify. Kant taught us to believe that the decisive cognitive relation has two terms—data and conceptualizations that differentiate and relate them—but there are three terms: sensory data falsify or confirm hypotheses about states of affairs that cause the data in us. Hearing the snatch
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of a tune, I may fill in the gaps by humming all of it to myself. But this is not the standard paradigm for using sensory data. Feeling a bite, I scratch. Dewey’s paper on the reflex arc—published in 1896—is still cogent.33 It describes mind’s intelligent direction of body’s adaptations to other things. This is inquiry, the most cognitively refined of activities that direct our responses to the ambient world. Accommodation is perpetual. Walking down an uneven street, we correct every last step with the next. A sleeping partner pulls the sheet; suddenly cold, we pull it back. Every such action implicates a map of one’s circumstances, and a plan, however primitive. Achieving a proximate aim, one terminates the sequence; failing to achieve it provokes one or more additional acts, until a satisfactory state is achieved. Bodily accommodations are often subtle: think of the inner ear as it controls balance. Maps and plans are subtle, too: evolution empowers us beyond the requirements of our primitive vulnerability; we secure and satisfy ourselves in ways that exceed the least requirements of surviving to breed. Inquiry complicates these responses and initiatives, because thought is overreaching: its maps are extended and detailed; its plans often direct us through foreseeable sequences of action and response, error, surprise, and revision. Recognize thought as a probe— a better white cane—and inquiry seems less abstract. AIMS It may seem that inquiry’s distance from interpretation is compromised by some of its directing aims. The scientific objective—know things as they are—is hard to achieve but straightforward: there is a discernible history of theories tested and reformulated for accuracy and experimental control. Thomas Kuhn emphasized paradigm shifts and incommensurable theories; others see continuity in successful theorizing.34 We bootstrap ourselves to greater insight and generality when crude ideas are refined then tested with experiments that are ever more subtle. A scientist’s motives may be impure: patents or status may be his principal aim. But motives are incidental to the procedures, both logical and social, for making and testing theories. Cheaters ignore the rules, but their exposure doesn’t stop inquiry’s momentum: it shudders, reconsiders its assumptions, then moves on. It is practical life that seems to compromise inquiry. Many plans are impelled by needs—hunger or thirst, for example—but many others have interpretation as their principal or only driver. Their motivating beliefs may be testable hypotheses, but more likely they express atti-
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tudes no test could alter: rain correlates badly with prayer and rain dances, but believers dance anyway. What are the implications for inquiry? Its procedures are uncompromised if the motive is abstracted from the map, plan, or hypothesis tested. For a test’s disinterested appraisal is, in principle, no more difficult for hypotheses motivated by interpretations than for those expressing science’s desire to know. Aims, alone, are innocent (in the respect at issue); it is our inability to discount them that threatens the integrity—the testability and bivalence (true or false)—of practical inquiries. Kantian constructivists say the threat is deeper: the very characterization of maps, plans, hypotheses, and data they predict is warped by values that organize the interpretations directing inquiry: every characterization of any state of affairs projects these values, however surreptitiously. But is this plausible? Having what looks to be water in the basement, I call what seems to be a plumber. He comes, all the while treating me in an equivalent as if manner, and earns his money by fixing the leak. There is no ambiguity separating my aim from the steps required to achieve it. Inquiry isn’t hobbled by its link to interpretation, unless the interest expressed by an interpretation confines inquiry’s initiatives: ailments an interpretation won’t acknowledge won’t be diagnosed or cured. IDEALS It may seem that interpretation, not inquiry, is the natural source of ideals, given that preferences express attitudes. Doesn’t inquiry look the other way, to reality? Disinterested inquiry—science—finds things as they are, without distorting aims or ideals, though science, too, has directing attitudes and an overriding ideal: provide a disciplined rendering of things as they are. Attitudes and ideals are all the more conspicuous in practical life where accurate maps and plans defend us against vulnerability or secure well-being. Isn’t practical life barren if conceived only in terms appropriate to inquiry, for then focus is restricted to needs, means, satisfactions they achieve, or pains they avert? It is not, because this idea of inquiry is a parody of activities that give life its meaning. Freud spoke (allegedly) of love and work appropriate to one’s talents. The cooperation required to satisfy these values creates families, schools, work teams, and states where ideals measure every transaction. Like water quenching thirst, these core systems satisfy needs appropriate to our nature. Creating, sustaining them completes us as we are. Find venues for talent, renew the possibilities for affiliation. Reduce the need, and fantasy may be satisfied with novels and films.
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A CHOICE Inquiry discovers many truths and sometimes formulates hypotheses that subordinate several or many others. Yet its findings are much less integrated than ideologies that indict and explain every social pathology or religions that credit every contingency to divine necessity. There may be no way to integrate every reasonable practice or well-confirmed hypothesis in a way that satisfies the discipline of testable inquiry. Can we tolerate this irresolution? Morris Cohen described the anxiety it provokes: Without philosophic breadth of view, specialization defeats itself, losing sight of the woods for the trees, or developing a world where everyone is a specialist and no one can understand his neighbor. Granted that a perfect synthesis of all the sciences is beyond the power of any individual, yet the ideal of it is indispensable for everyone who wants to live a rational life. As rational beings we must all form some provisional plan or picture of the world in which we live and of the goal of our human effort, and this is precisely where philosophy alone can be of direct help. . . . This argument involves a psychologically true, but logically dangerous, admission, viz.