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Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions Series Editor: Professor Philip Molyneux The Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions are international in orientation and include studies of banking within particular countries or regions, and studies of particular themes such as Corporate Banking, Risk Management, Mergers and Acquisitions, etc. The books’ focus is on research and practice, and they include up-to-date and innovative studies on contemporary topics in banking that will have global impact and influence. Titles include: Steffen E. Andersen THE EVOLUTION OF NORDIC FINANCE Seth Apati THE NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR REFORMS Power and Politics Vittorio Boscia, Alessandro Carretta and Paola Schwizer COOPERATIVE BANKING IN EUROPE Case Studies Roberto Bottiglia, Elisabetta Gualandri and Gian Nereo Mazzocco (editors) CONSOLIDATION IN THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INDUSTRY Dimitris N. Chorafas SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS The New Normal and the Newly Poor Dimitris N. Chorafas CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITAL Dimitris N. Chorafas FINANCIAL BOOM AND GLOOM The Credit and Banking Crisis of 2007–2009 and Beyond Violaine Cousin BANKING IN CHINA Vincenzo D’Apice and Giovanni Ferri FINANCIAL INSTABILITY Toolkit for Interpreting Boom and Bust Cycles Peter Falush and Robert L. Carter OBE THE BRITISH INSURANCE INDUSTRY SINCE 1900 The Era of Transformation Franco Fiordelisi MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN EUROPEAN BANKING Franco Fiordelisi, Philip Molyneux and Daniele Previati (editors) NEW ISSUES IN FINANCIAL AND CREDIT MARKETS Franco Fiordelisi, Philip Molyneux and Daniele Previati (editors) NEW ISSUES IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT Kim Hawtrey AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE Jill M. Hendrickson REGULATION AND INSTABILITY IN US COMMERCIAL BANKING A History of Crises
Otto Hieronymi (editor) GLOBALIZATION AND THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND MONETARY SYSTEM Sven Janssen BRITISH AND GERMAN BANKING STRATEGIES Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis (editor) FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES System Architectures, Practices and Risks in the Era of Deregulation Caterina Lucarelli and Gianni Brighetti (editors) RISK TOLERANCE IN FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Roman Matousek (editor) MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 20 Years of Transition Imad A. Moosa THE MYTH OF TOO BIG TO FAIL Simon Mouatt and Carl Adams (editors) CORPORATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF MONEY AND BANKING Breaking the Serfdom Anders Ögren (editor) THE SWEDISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION Özlem Olgu EUROPEAN BANKING Enlargement, Structural Changes and Recent Developments Ramkishen S. Rajan EMERGING ASIA Essays on Crises, Capital Flows, FDI and Exchange Rate Yasushi Suzuki JAPAN’S FINANCIAL SLUMP Collapse of the Monitoring System under Institutional and Transition Failures Ruth Wandhöfer EU PAYMENTS INTEGRATION The Tale of SEPA, PSD and Other Milestones Along the Road The full list of titles available is on the website: www.palgrave.com/finance/sbfi.asp
Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–4872–4 You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England, UK
Sovereign Debt Crisis The New Normal and the Newly Poor Dimitris N. Chorafas
© Dimitris N. Chorafas 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–29840–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
A slave is he who cannot speak his thought. Euripides
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Contents List of Tables and Figures
x
Preface
xi
PART I FINANCIAL RISKS WHICH KEPT PILING UP 1
The World’s New Normal Economic System Five forces promoting the next economic landscape Cause and effect The new normal defined A historical precedent: the new normal at the end of World War I Living at the edge of chaos The importance of knowing the ‘normal’ conditions
3 3 6 9 12 14 17
2 The Newly Poor Poor people’s recipe: falling deeper into debt Property-owning democracies versus debt-laden democracies Debt operates like a tax ‘I will be gone/you will be gone’ Runaway public liabilities and the day of reckoning Nobody is in charge of debt policy Wealth in western nations dropped like a bribed boxer
22 22 24 27 29 32 35 38
3 The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities The many heads of a debt hydra What is meant by rights without responsibilities? Entitlements Pensions and the new normal The middle classes’ broken dreams What may follow the debt hydra?
41 41 44 46 50 53 56
PART II
LOOSE MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF WEALTH
4 Japanification Japanification defined Japanification’s after-effect: precarious public finances Money thrown at the problem brings nearer the next big crisis Financial discipline requires more than leadership Governments, central banks and the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium Correlation risk: Greece/Bear Stearns and X/Lehman vii
61 61 64 67 70 72 75
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Contents
Conventional and Unconventional Weapons in a Central Bank’s Arsenal Souk means both market and chaos Black swans and the need for a new economic theory Price stability and the central bank The wall of liquidity Quantitative easing QE and competitive currency devaluations ‘Bad banks’, the Volcker rule and living wills
79 79 82 84 87 90 92 94
6
Fiscal Policies, Spending Policies and Conflicting Aims The government takes its money out of its citizens’ pockets The best solution is fiscal consolidation Impact of fiscal policies on the financial system Current account deficits Sovereign debt and its consequences for the banking industry Financial stability is one of democracy’s pillars
99 99 102 105 108 111 114
7
Restructuring Sovereign Balance Sheets Deleveraging Deflationary or inflationary risk? Putting the carriage before the horses Austerity is not that bad, after all Budget cuts and B/S restructuring ‘Long-haired’ ‘solutions’ and monetary illusions
117 117 120 122 125 128 131
PART III
EUROLAND’S FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND SOVEREIGN RISK
8
Woes of Euroland’s Financial Integration Strong core and a weak periphery Financial stability and economic integration One-size-fits-all monetary policies are a dangerous game The aftermath of asymmetries on the euro Is a weak euro or a strong euro the better choice? The message by credit default swaps should not be ignored
137 137 139 142 145 148 151
9
Sovereign Risk: Case Study on Greece The Greek crisis is just the first episode Wall Street helped the big spenders to hide debt Textbook economics have no prescription for the current crisis Events which led to the rescue Going on strike against one’s own interest As with swallows, EU money alone will not bring spring
154 154 157 160 162 165 168
10 Germany, France, Britain, Ireland and ‘Club Med’ The German economy The French economy
171 171 175
Contents ix
The British economy The Irish economy Ireland, Iceland, Portugal and the uncle of Dubai Down the Club Med way: Italy and Spain PART IV
177 180 183 187
THE NEW NORMAL’S EFFECT ON THE WESTERN ECONOMY
11 The North Atlantic Similarities are Greater than you Think Tales of the unexpected Big deficits resemble a classic tragedy QE2: poison or cure? What went wrong with monetary policy and the bank rescues? American middle class and missing employment opportunities The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
193 193 196 199
12 The EU’s Banking Industry and its Stress Testing Profile of large and complex banking groups Ultimately economies advance because their institutions are strong Banks do not know the risks they take with derivatives and their IT is unhelpful Stress tests permit crossing the river while feeling the stones How different experts evaluated the stress tests by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors November 2010: four months after the test results have been released
212 212
13 The Global Systemic Risk has been Programmed for 2014 Not only the economy, but also democracy is at a crossroads The way to global financial stability is uncharted Sovereign risks and contagion effects European banks, American banks and the fight for long-term funding The former ‘poor’ are better off than the former ‘rich’ Financial seismology and the slow-motion train wreck
232 232 234 237
Epilog
252
Notes
255
Index
269
201 205 208
214 217 221 225 228
241 245 248
List of Tables and Figures Tables 8.1 Cost of social contribution to social security as a percentage of salary
145
Figures 1.1 Expected events and unexpected events are characterized by two different distributions
18
10.1 German industrial output rebounded leaving other western countries in the dust
172
12.1 The unbearable truth of a thermonuclear option with derivative financial instruments
220
12.2
The normal distribution is a proxy valid only in connection with low-impact events – the distribution of high-impact events is not normal
x
223
Preface The history of economics and finance is littered with the debris of oncesacred theories. The ‘new economy’, whose promise of wealth and prosperity was supposed to be the only possible course, is now in shambles. The belief that theoreticians know so well how to manage the economy that crises are banned forever is another fallen idol. And the hypothesis that leveraging rescues people, companies and states from an existence of limited dimensions proved to be an unmitigated disaster: This book is about sovereign debt, fiscal deficits, the newly poor and the deceit of the ‘State Supermarket’, with its endowments and cradle-to-grave care. The issues confronting the global economy – and most particularly America, Europe and Japan – are inseparable from the current lack of social and political leadership as well as of a credible plan to deal with the mountains of debt amassed by sovereigns, households and companies, particularly banks. The text is written for people who need to know what the problem is with the mountains of public debt, families’ deep indebtedness and financial institutions superleverage. It is not written for economists, analysts and other technicians of the ‘dismal science’, to use John Maynard Keynes’ words. The many practical examples which it includes expose the situation by which western society has cornered itself. Its constructive criticism gives advice on how to come up from under, even if this means slaughtering: • unaffordable endowments, • unwarranted government rescues, and • other proliferating but unsustainable big-spending projects. Largely due to weak governance, the United States and European Union fell on parlous days. Public confidence is lost. Breaking trust can be done very quickly; re-establishing it can take a long time. The aim of this book is to provide an adult conversation on the risks of losing sight of past failures and our society’s ability to solve its problems, with debt heading the list. Nowadays, with all liabilities taken into account, for every $1 of assets there is $4 of debt. It is pure folly to think that such a huge amount of debt will disappear on its own, or even be partially repaid if current policies continue to prevail. Liabilities have the nasty habit of increasing with time, particularly when people and companies have lost their individual initiative and put all their hopes for the future in rescues by leviathan sovereigns. xi
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Western sovereigns are struggling with colossal debt. Peacetime precedents are lacking, the difficulties are so great and the debt hydra so fertile that those supposed to know better are approaching the most vital issues in ignorance. Certainty about the right thing to do in this most challenging economic and financial situation is only expressed by people who either dwell in a world of fantasy or do anything that hits their fancy, while the economy around them falls apart. ‘We are living with an unsustainable hangout between our commitments and our resources,’ said Timothy Geithner, US Treasury secretary on October 13, 2010 in a Charlie Rose interview broadcast by Bloomberg News. Geithner evidently knows what he is talking about because, together with the Federal Reserve, the Treasury has become the big banks’ safety net and universal fire brigade. This is by no means a US phenomenon. Signs of distress are easily seen all over the global economic landscape, but most particularly in the western countries. From entitlements to the salvage of bankrupt institutions, the State Supermarket – a creation of infantile leftism – has taken on responsibilities which are unaffordable. Critics are right when they say that the biggest deficit the West has is in the fact that there is not enough leadership around, and also those who govern either don’t know how or don’t care to help the common citizen understand what the issues are. Yet, in a democracy the people have the right to know why the economic and financial conditions are so grim, what has engineered the most recent deterioration and what kind of measures are needed to prune the system and put it on a growth course; also, why the sovereign debt is on an explosive path and what the next act of the drama will be if nothing radical is done to bend the curve. Which leads to three other questions: what lies behind the evolving economic environment known as the ‘new normal’ (Chapter 1) and who are the ‘new poor’ (Chapter 2), and how can this trend be stopped before it becomes irresponsible? The book the reader has to hand examines these issues and explains why nothing has changed so far – in spite of the deep economic and financial crisis created by big banks through gambling with novel (and little understood) novel financial instruments. The gamblers continue their good work; the regulators are timid; and this means that conflicts of interest have not stopped running down the state’s finances. On June 25, 2010 CNBC, the financial network, revealed that derivatives trades by American banks alone stood at 90 times the level of US gross domestic product (GDP). This was no number picked out of a hat. A couple of weeks earlier, a combined estimate of exposure by the US Senate and House of Representatives had put the market valuation of existing derivatives contracts at $1.2 quadrillion. ***
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Unprecedented sovereign debt in peacetime and a quadrillion in derivatives is bad news for the economy of the USA, the EU and the global economy as well. Ultimately economies advance because their institutions are strong. Today they are on the sick list while governments are running after the facts, doing what Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England in the 1920s and 1930s said about the central bank action which preceded the First Great Depression: ‘We collected money from a lot of poor devils and gave it to the four winds.’ As the case of Ireland and of its ‘Anglo-Toxic’ Bank (Anglo-Irish) documents, the mismanagement of credit institutions and poor governance of sovereigns strongly correlate. High risk, descent into the abyss and a fire brigade approach is the course typically taken by the ‘unable’, who have been asked by other incapables to do the unnecessary. Like the First Great Depression, the economic and financial crisis in which we are living – probably on our way to the Second Great Depression – has not been an act of God. It is the direct outcome of dismal governance by chiefs of state, monetary policy-makers, investment bankers and the common man in the street. In terms of cause and effect, some of the worst decisions date back to the 1990s, while others saw the light in the first decade of this century. The people who took these decisions: • were singularly unqualified to be at the helm of great nations and of their central banks, • could not decide by themselves on what to do and therefore consulted others who had conflicts of interest, and • giving in to social pressure, they crash-landed the western economies through high leverage and unpayable debt. Against all logic, large and complex banking groups (LCBGs) have been offered, since late 2008, an unlimited line of credit by sovereigns, at taxpayers’ expense. But the LCBGs’ wounds, due to their high gearing and misdirected decisions, have been so deep that their financial performance did not strengthen. Whatever money they got from central banks they used to bolster their capital rather than lend. In spite of trillions thrown at the problem, the American, British, euroland and Japanese economies remained anemic. The result of throwing trillions to the four winds was a disaster. Credit is the oxygen of business activity, but sovereigns did not oblige banks that benefited from public money to extend credit. Without credit companies cannot function, and this has become also true of households. If banks cannot or will not lend, then the economy is falling off a cliff. It is wrong to believe that central banks can continue forever accumulating useless collateral while printing money non-stop. The Federal Reserve, Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB) have been doing
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so for more than a couple of years, but it cannot become permanent. MidNovember 2010 the ECB indicated that there were limits to the short-term assistance it could give to Ireland’s banks, which account for around a quarter of the total liquidity offered by the ECB to all eurozone banks. The same applies to Portuguese, Spanish and other banks. Things got out of hand because there is a symbiosis in debt characterizing relations between big banks and sovereigns. This is creating serious risks for the longer-term sustainability of public finances. Together with entitlements, it sees to it that efforts associated to the reduction of government debt are half-baked. Tightening the belt has been always unpopular, and politicians think of their re-election when deciding about measures that need to be taken, forgetting that when the crisis becomes longer term toughness is required as well as competence, and that the party that deserves to win must craft a narrative and policy that creates opportunity out of disappointment and chaos. *** The book divides into four parts. Part I brings to the reader’s attention the financial risks which have been piling up for nearly 30 years, as well as their aftermath. It outlines the succession of errors which has lead to a situation known as the new normal, the economic, financial and social conditions which (by all likelihood) will characterize the next two decades. The text brings the reader’s attention to the fact that western societies are no more the globe’s wealthy inhabitants. Their overleveraging and poor growth prospects have turned them into new poor, while less developing economies are moving up the ladder at a fast pace – aiming to be the new rich. Part II provides documentation on the loose monetary and fiscal policies in the West, those followed over too many years on both sides of the North Atlantic. In recent times, such misdirected decisions were first made by Japan in the early 1990s, and they brought the former industrial dynamo to a state of coma. Hence, the term ‘Japanification’, describing where America, Britain and continental Europe are heading. This thesis is supported by both qualitative and quantitative evidence. It is proper to inform the reader that in using statistics to document statements being made emphasis has been placed on accuracy and not on precision. It has been a deliberate choice to employ only the two or three most significant digits of numbers and ratios (depending on the issue) with emphasis placed on trend and on order of magnitude. The theme of Part III is case studies in economic failure, starting with euroland’s lack of success in financial integration, as well as its reasons. This is followed by a discussion on what went wrong in the case of Greece. Germany, France, Britain, Ireland and the so-called ‘Club Med’ provide
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some other interesting examples on how economies are being managed by sovereigns. By way of conclusion, Part IV brings to the reader’s attention the new normal’s effect on the western economies – including the one which used to be the most vibrant: the United States. Several financial analysts said that Greece is like Bear Stearns, the investment bank whose failure preceded Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. By late November 2010 Ireland became Bear Stearns ‘bis’. In search of a candidate for the Lehman role, some experts mentioned America, while others said Britain. *** What we forget today is to learn lessons from history – economic, financial, political and social. If we don’t understand what has been behind the successes and failures of our predecessors, then we condemn ourselves to repeat the same mistakes. Decisions leading to misdirected risks are often taken as a result of misquoting and misinterpreting what people of better knowledge have said or done. John Maynard Keynes, for example, is often used by leftist economists as the patriarch of big-spending policies by the State Supermarket. Apart from the fact that this is less than half true, Keynes had the power to express his opinions without compromises, and he is quoted as having said: ‘When the capital development of a country becomes the byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.’ *** I am indebted to a long list of knowledgeable people, and of organizations, for their contribution to the research which made this book feasible; also to several senior executives and experts for constructive criticism during the preparation of the manuscript. Dr Heinrich Steinmann and Dr Nelson Mohler have been among the most important contributors. Let me take this opportunity to thank Lisa von Fircks, for suggesting this project, Renee Takken, for seeing it all the way to publication, and Keith Povey and Joy Tucker for editing the manuscript. To Eva-Maria Binder goes the credit for compiling the research results, typing the text, compiling the index and making valuable suggestions. DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS Valmer and Entlebuch
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Part I Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
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1 The World’s New Normal Economic System
Five forces promoting the next economic landscape In the ‘go-go’ years which followed the 1994 crisis of debt instruments, Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, coined the term ‘New Economy’. This he defined as defying the laws of gravity by producing more and more wealth, practically forever. We now know that such talk was a chimera, while the tandem of bubbles it produced in 2000 and 2007 were real. Their origin was not difficult to detect: • a highly accommodating monetary policy, • free reign to leverage and other excesses, and • scant attention by supervisory authorities paid to watch over systemic risk. These causes of economic and financial troubles tend to correlate among themselves, amplifying their impact. Therefore, the disaster which followed was not totally unexpected. One of the outstanding consequences of the major global downturn, which started in 2007 and whose effects are still widely seen, has been the enormous increase in government debt in western countries. Spending by sovereigns rose very rapidly to both keep alive big banks and other ‘strategic’ companies, some of which were zombies, and offset the contraction in private sector spending, as millions of households confronted unemployment as well as uncertainty about the future.1 In the USA the public deficit jumped from 2.8 per cent in 2007, first year of the most recent economic and banking crisis, to 11.2 per cent in 2009. In the EU government deficits varied widely: from over 14 per cent in Greece to a little less than that in Ireland, 11 per cent in Britain, 9 per cent in France and 6 per cent in Germany. The big spenders at the governments’ ivory towers have had a ball – and that’s anathema to public confidence. 3
4 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
As Demosthenes, the ancient Greek orator, said: Business is built on confidence. Any waning of it, particularly at the time economic fortunes seem to start timidly rising, is counterproductive. Consumer confidence is crucial to western economies as it represents up to 70 per cent of spending; a figure amplified by industrial production which nearly always cruises along. ‘The real devils today are the states not the bankers,’ says Dr Heinrich Steinmann, a former vice chairman of UBS. Scared of the long-lasting effect on the economy of these deep red numbers, by the second quarter of 2010 several western governments – including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece but not the USA – announced rather significant austerity measures to reign in their deteriorating fiscal situation. This led some economists to express concern that an austerity policy amid an ongoing recession will make matters worse, warning how fragile the early signs of an upturn still are (see also Chapters 5 and 7). Other economists, however, have taken precisely the opposite stand, pointing out that the unprecedented 2008–11 economic easing – which went in full swing with the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and near bankruptcies of AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac – has turned western economic history on its head by creating an unsustainable flood of money (see Chapter 4 on the many heads of the debt hydra). These economists also emphasized that business confidence will wane if the market sees no signs of restraint in keeping the printing presses busy. While the two aforementioned economic theories are diametrically opposed to one another, they also share the same basic weakness. No economist, on either side of this gulf of opinions, has come up with a clear and welldocumented definition of the cause and effect that characterized the ongoing crisis (see the next section). Which is the primary cause? Is the salient issue: 1. the accumulated huge amount of debt per se? 2. or, is debt the consequence of the current structure of world finance and its institutions? 3. or, is the structure of world finance the consequence of entitlements and globalization, and therefore of unsustainable policies? 4. or, is it the classically poor regulation at government levels, which allows greed and irrationality to carry the day? 5. or, are these reasons closely intertwined, and therefore acting on one of them affects all the others with dismal results? In my opinion, the most likely fundamental reason for the current malaise is the fifth alternative which integrates all others, making both the problem and any serious approach to its solution tremendously complex. Yet, our efforts must be focused. Searching for a holistic approach which simultaneously attacks every cause will be like trying to unscramble scrambled eggs.
The World’s New Normal Economic System
5
We might, but only might, have a better chance by establishing priorities and subsequently attacking these causes indidually – provided we don’t lose sight of the total picture, or forget the underlying interdependencies among the causes of the current state of world affairs and their effects (see below). In addition, to untie the threads of this knot we would need to use practicable rules like those we employ to organize our lives, promote our businesses and confront our obligations. Talking of priorities, the overriding obligation at this moment is to control the exploding debt at all levels of society. And because it is famously hard to govern debt, this is going to be the issue to which the present book addresses itself. It is not normal that every $1 in production corresponds to $4 in debt. Such an ‘unstoppable’ debt inflation has to stop before it becomes irreversible. But the other causes should not be forgotten. Looking at them in reverse order to that presented in the preceding list, there has been, indeed, a huge amount of greed which amplified the economic and financial debacle of 2007 and the ensuing years significantly. In a Charlie Rose interview broadcast by Bloomberg News on April 26, 2010, Michael Lewis, the author, put the blame on both the market players and the instruments they have been using, stating that: • Real corruption is behind new financial instrument design. • This problem is widespread; Goldman Sachs cannot be the only bank which designs debt-based securities aimed to fail. • All sorts of tricks embedded in instruments have been accompanied by misrepresentation to clients – which under current laws is illegal. Regarding the structure of international finance and its contribution to the crisis we have been going through, its reorganization and control was thought to be the mission of the G-20 heads of state. But international tourism aside, the G-20 meetings have so far been met with no real success and it is a deliberate decision not to dwell on their remit in this book. Allow me also to add that, as if to make matters worse, within each jurisdiction the prospects for a significant and deep-rooted regulatory initiative are not good. The slimmed-down Dodd-Frank Act in the USA is a lightweight (see Chapter 12). In his deposition to Congress, Paul Volcker, the respected former chairman of the Federal Reserve, insisted that the essential flaw in regulatory proposals and measures being adopted is that they leave the structure of banking unchanged. This is a pity, because if culture and structure remain the same, then so does the ultimate systemic risk. Risk-taking is a basic ingredient of progress but it must be matched by risk control. Watching one’s exposure is not an option; it is a requirement of sound governance of a person’s, company’s or state’s fortunes – while
6 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
paternalism towards the homegrown banking industry is a most serious error.
Cause and effect Virgil, the Roman poet, said: ‘You must know the causes, to draw the right conclusions.’ What are the causes of the crisis we are going through in 2007–11? The answers most often heard in my research have been lax lending practices, the real estate bubble and subprime mortgages. While these have been, indeed, important factors, they were the triggers of the debacle rather than fundamental reasons. The real causes are: • massive increase in debt, at all levels of society, • excessive risk appetite, amplified by exposures risk-takers don’t understand, • a shadow banking system, with its dubious debt instruments, still funding risks, • limitations of financial engineering and serious mistakes in model-based estimates, and • totally substandard risk management at all levels, totally inappropriate in a world where derivatives are the most popular and lucrative trading instrument.2 Largely engineered through leverage, and therefore by ‘funny money’, this massive increase in debt has become a western culture. By no means a random event, it is the culture of ‘borrow now, pay later (maybe)’ which pervades all levels of western society – and which must now change to: save now, so as not to starve later on, for an improvement in fortunes of peoples and states. There have been many false prophets who prompted public spending through misplaced statements, and helped in creating this attitude to spending. ‘The future appears brilliant,’ wrote Thomas Lamont of JPMorgan a short while prior to the ‘Black Tuesday’ of late October 1929, moreover assuring that ‘air holes’ due to a ‘technical condition’ had developed in the market but that the situation was ‘susceptible to betterment’.3 With hindsight we do know what followed in the decade after the First Great Depression. Clear minds expressed the opposite opinion. ‘We have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand,’ John Maynard Keynes wrote in December 1930 in his article ‘The Great Slump of 1930’. The same words can be used today without changing a syllable in regard to what the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and (to a slightly lesser extent) European Central Bank have done to the western economies in the 2008–11 timeframe.
The World’s New Normal Economic System
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Other warnings, too, were unheeded and relegated to the wastebasket of economic history, even if they came from people who could see further than most. Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) – whose work and foresight extended beyond economics – identified in the mid-nineteenth century certain social happenings that lead to a dismal future: • people tending to live beyond their means,4 • rapid urbanization under stressful conditions, and • short-term policies of governments, adopted because of their lack of courage to lead in shaping society’s future. Engels wrote, in 1844, that the centralization of the population in great cities (the cause) exercises of itself an unfavorable influence (the effect): ‘All putrefying vegetable and animal substances give off gases decidedly injurious to health, and if these gases have no free way of escape, they inevitably poison the atmosphere.’5 Urban dwellings in crowded cities, which are rapidly replacing rural life for large chunks of the world’s population, may range from palaces to shanty towns, but what they have in common is the strained way of life – full of uncertainty and anguish. This is the new normal, in social terms, and Engels described it in a prophetic way nearly 17 decades ago. (The definition of the new normal in terms of the economy is given in the next section.) In cause and effect, there are similarities between the social and economic definitions. The way people live and work (the cause) has a great deal to do with economic after-effects because – from autos and house appliances to exotic vacations – the twenty-first century’s proletarians have been enjoying an increasing standard of living paid through debt. The mountains of leverage were supposed to be taken care of by the ‘future generations’ but, as the deep crisis of 2007–11 has shown, they have already become unsupportable and unsustainable by this generation. The easy way for politicians is to promise what they know they cannot deliver and make the people pay for it. George W. Bush came to office in 2001 and engineered the largest ever US peacetime deficit (the cause) – promising security and plenty of other goodies in exchange. In terms of security the effect has been practically nil. Instead, what the American people got is another layer of bureaucracy in Washington and an explosion of public deficit. Barack Obama compounded all of the Bush mistakes. Among them, the two conceivably worst presidents in the history of the American Republic brought another calamity which will haunt the USA in the coming decades: the new poor (Chapter 2). For reasons quite similar to one another, two megarisk events are likely to compete with one another during the coming years. One is that the economy implodes as sovereigns, companies and families restructure their
8 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
balance sheets. The other megarisk is that the economy explodes as debt reaches for the stars. (Both the reasons and the consequences will be brought into perspective in the last chapter of this book.) A preview of events to come would see the specter of horribly indebted countries which scare the hell out of their partners. For all the brave talk about solidarity among euroland’s member states, their taxpayers don’t wish to put on the table the money which might keep their badly behaved and undisciplined neighbors afloat. Not without reason, they believe that this is not their cause and that the nations which misbehaved should pay for the effects by themselves. This has been behind an overwhelming 69 to two vote by the Slovakian parliament, in the week of August 8, 2010. A crashing majority of Slovak deputies rejected taking part in a European Union aid package for the troubled Greek economy (Chapter 9) – and they had good reasons not to care if both the Brussels-based European Commission and the German government criticized the Slovak parliament’s decision. ‘All member states committed themselves politically to assistance for Greece,’ said a spokesman for Chancellor Angela Merkel. ‘Every member relies on solidarity; solidarity is no one-way street.’6 That’s true, but the prerequisite to solidarity is self-discipline. The Slovaks, who said they would not pay for other peoples’ ‘twentyfirst-century lifestyle’, know that their country has a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $21,200 at purchasing power parity (PPP), while Greece has a per capita GDP of $32,000 – nearly one and a half times greater. Slovak taxpayers have been asked to put a4.4 billion on the table ($5.9 billion) for something they say was not their fault. Moreover: • Slovakia embarked on a bout of painful economic reforms in 1998, that transformed it into one of the EU’s top economic performers. • By contrast, Greece, Spain, Portugal and other EU countries piled new debt over old debt, rather than taking the tough decisions necessary to restructure their economy and labor market. This cause and effect, the most significant cross-border difference in economic management, is another way of showing that the accumulated huge amount of debt is, per se, a real and present danger. The recent crisis made it highly visible, and one cannot blame those people who don’t wish to pay for other peoples’ mistakes, even if they belong to the same community. The bigger countries in euroland had additional reasons for those of Slovakia, when they decided to salvage Greece.7 In fact, for these reasons, in June 2010 they put together a war chest of a750 billion (about $1 trillion), enhanced by a unique supply of liquidity from the ECB and aimed at arresting the Damoclean sword of a reignited financial crisis.
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But, in the EU and the USA, the issue of too many entitlements having been granted without proper study of their effects is still dominant (Chapter 3). What speculators now do is to accumulate liquidity and bide their time. With Greece’s financial crisis, they shook the euro and were ready to attack, first, euroland’s financial system and, next, that of the global economy – if Greece had gone broke. While they are waiting, powerful forces are shaping the economy’s new normal.
The new normal defined Two people are at the origin of the term ‘new normal’: Mohamed El-Erian, Pimco’s8 CEO, and Bill Gross, its chief investment officer (CIO). According to their judgment, while the markets may rise from their current depth, the next five years will not resemble those preceding the crisis. Some of the changes brought by the financial earthquake we have been through may be reversed, but not all. For the world economy, the ‘normal’ situation will be different than that we knew prior to this crisis. In the way El-Erian defines the future landscape, growth will be subdued, unemployment will remain high and the banking system will be a shadow of its former self (more on this later). As for securitization markets, which buy and sell marketable bundles of debt, they will most likely be the shadow of a shadow – while the stock of physical capital will erode. Another of the worries associated with the new business landscape (according to this brief definition) is that state capitalism may become the name of the game, with free enterprise in the decline. In addition, as the financial system remains weak, its role of intermediation will wane, while the cost of capital will rise. Consequently, companies will use less of it per unit of output (the cause), resulting in a lower ceiling on production, as well as lower expected returns and higher implied volatility. Pimco is by no means alone in this projection on the after-effects of the deep economic and financial crisis which, in a way, resembles the First Great Depression of 1929–33. Plenty of other experts say that, in their opinion, we are set for a long period of slow growth, as a number of global imbalances are worked through. That process will take time. Higher taxation will, in all likelihood, be the rule as governments (rather unsuccessfully) try to restructure their balance sheets. But taxation will also have an alter ego: austerity measures (Chapter 7), accompanied by an increasingly deeper re-evaluation and downsizing of all sorts of entitlements (Chapter 3). Business will be confronted by loss of power because its classical recovery drivers will no longer function the way they previously have. As for the helping hand of central banks and governments, they will lack money for extravagances like quantitative easing (Chapter 5) and stimuluses. Equities will suffer because they are prospering in risk-on events, and (save for speculators)
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the new economic climate will be largely risk-off. To confront this novel set of challenges, investors will, most likely, place a much greater emphasis on: • diversification of assets, in the real sense of the term, • directed cash flows, cross-border and within markets, and • shifts in credit risks expressed by spread positions in corporate and sovereign debt, with the latter weaker than the former. According to expert opinion, another characteristic of the new normal will be that sovereign risk will attract as much attention as that of banks, which have been known for decades to overleverage themselves and gamble with derivative financial instruments. The way a news item on CNBC had it on July 23, 2010, a strong correlation exists between credit default swaps (CDSs) of banks and sovereigns. To be taken seriously in their effort to change course from high leverage to dependable balance sheets, sovereigns will have to come up with firm plans for a turnaround, not just with words and intentions. Their quality of governance will be judged by whether the action being taken is convincing, and by how effective it proves to be in reducing the country’s huge public debt and current account deficits (Chapter 6). These are, indeed, tall orders, and success is by no means a foregone conclusion since precise longer-term plans are missing. For instance, in the opinion of British political analysts the ‘fiscal responsibility bill’ in the 2010 Queen’s Speech was a headline, not a plan. Yet, with the new normal it matters greatly that governments set clear, more longer-term objectives, have financial credibility and have the know-how to implement the plans they make. The same is true of central banks, which, by and large, are lacking a longer-term monetary and interest rates policy, which (in the majority of cases) is part of their charter. Nearly zero interest rates have been a shortterm game plan, before becoming a long-term drift (Chapter 5). Made to serve the self-harmed big banks, they penalized the common citizen. For the weaker members of society this has been a triple whammy: • the interest households get for their savings is below inflation; hence their capital wanes, small as it might be, • their private pension plans find near zero interest rates as an excuse to speculate, since they earn nothing from money in the bank, and • the way to bet is that taxpayers, the common people, will eventually be asked to foot another king-size bill, while near zero interest rates feed the next bubble. As we will see in greater detail in Part II, the hidden costs of very low interest rates may well be greater than their visible benefits. Authorities with a long
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tradition of speaking their minds say so. In its 2009 Annual Report, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, the central bank for central banks) brings to attention plenty of ills connected with the too-low interest rates prevailing in western countries: • • • • •
excessive risk taking, lop-sided balance sheets, creation of delays in cleaning out bad debts, surges in global cash flows which are destabilizing, and distorted allocation of capital, as well as of the labor force.
These are among the reasons propelling the new normal. The question is: When will its day really come? Current thought is that with the forthcoming new big bubble (Chapter 13), which for any practical purpose has been already programmed, the post-World War II party of greater and greater leverage will be over. As for the new economic situation, it will be characterized by what Ben Bernanke called an ‘unusually uncertain’ economy.9 There is no point in denying that the western economy is weak and its players are uncertain about the future, because the measures taken so far have been poorly studied in terms of after-effects and the jury is still out on whether they made economic sense, even if unexpected consequences are not accounted for. What is more or less sure is the stress these measures inflicted on the economy, and the hits suffered by common people and businesses alike. We all know that unstoppable leverage and speculation cannot last forever, but the medicine of trying to lower the huge indebtedness of the banking industry by creating mountains of debt at sovereign level may be worse than the disease. In the eye of the storm are the very expensive but ineffective stimuli and quantitative easing gimmicks (Chapter 5), respectively engineered by governments and central banks. Some economists involve Ricardian10 equivalence in trying to explain why the US economy does not take off in spite of the stimuluses. This arises when: • consumers are forward-looking and save the proceeds from a debtfinanced fiscal stimulus, and • they are doing so in anticipation of future tax increases needed to repay the extra government debt. Plenty of factors impact on how the economy and its players react to measures taken by governments and central banks. Costs head the list. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook counted the cost of 88 banking crises over the past 40 years. On average, seven years after a bust, an economy’s level of output has been almost 10 per cent lower than the level it would have attained without the crisis; that’s a big gap. If replicated in the years to come, this 10 per cent difference would: make the public debt harder to sustain, offer little hope for
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higher unemployment, diminish the fortunes of those in work and create conditions leading to further financial breakdown. Even when the economy begins to expand, it may not regain the same pace as before, therefore eroding national income. In conclusion, the new normal shapes up as the antimatter of the go-go environment of the 1990s and earlier years of this century. Apart from the astronomical leverage found at all levels of western society, the wounds created by huge financial losses require a relatively long period in which to heal; healing is not doable at short notice.
A historical precedent: the new normal at the end of World War I Mayer Amschel Rothschild (1744–1812) is rumored to have said: ‘Let me issue and control a nation’s money and I care not who writes the laws.’ The dictum fits hand in glove with the statutes and policies of central banks. By keeping the printing presses busy and spending money in quite inordinate amounts as compared with a nation’s productive capacity, they can destabilize the currency, penalize businesses and households and, eventually, lead to the collapse of both the currency and the banking system. The creation of the Federal Reserve at end of the first decade of the twentieth century and the subsequent independence given to many central banks after World War II (the Bank of England got its independence under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) were heralded as the start of a new epoch. Developing countries were advised by westerners to do the same – but this ‘independence’ proved to be fata morgana, as subsequent events demonstrated. Near zero interest rates and quantitative easing were moves by politicallyminded people, in step with their governments. They were not acts by independent central bankers, whose No. 1 mission is monetary policy sustaining financial stability. This has been a very dangerous deviation from primary duties, and there is no better example of cause and effect than the collapse of the British, French and German economies after World War I. (This also applied following World War II, but the former example is the better.) The World War I lesson sets the precedent for what currently happens with the mismanagement of monetary policy as well as currencies, and it is also very instructive because, among other events, it includes the run on the French franc and hyperinflation in Germany. Another interesting incident of that epoch was the rift between the United States and Britain, due to the controversy over repayment of wartime loans. One of the outstanding similarities between 1918–23 and 2007–11 is that both politicians and monetary policy leaders were running out of ideas on what to do with a mammoth debt; and they were in total disagreement about who, in the last analysis, should pay what to whom.11 They were also in a bind because they could understand that unsolved debt problems would destabilize currencies, lead to bank panics and create other serious financial problems.
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‘Victory’ at the end of World War I was an illusion, since millions of soldiers and civilians had died for nothing, while economic disaster spread all over Europe. As for the international financial system – which, prior to 1914, had brought prosperity to all the combatant nations, it was in a shambles. The unraveling had started with the panic liquidation of securities in London, on July 30, 1914, while stock exchanges in Berlin, Vienna and St Petersburg were closed by the authorities. The first days after the Great War saw the first glimpses of what was then a new normal. Another similarity between ‘then’ and ‘now’ is that chiefs of state, including the central European royals, who in the early part of the twentieth century ran the political show, had shown a curious incapacity to distinguish between what they called a punitive action (against Serbia for the Sarajevo murders) and setting the world on fire. Subsequently, historians found it difficult to understand what World War I was all about and who really pushed whom into that gigantic hecatomb. By the end of World War I, the spotlight fell on economists, bankers and other financial experts who proved unable to put straight the ‘IOUs’ signed by the British, French and Imperial Russian governments among themselves and (in the case of Britain and France), with the United States. Both prior to America’s entry into the war and during its intervention, the USA had acted as banker and armaments factory for the Allies. During World War I, the British government spent the equivalent of $43 billion, including $11 billion, in loans principally to France and Russia (but also to 15 other countries). In counterpart, it owed the United States $5 billion, which took a long time to negotiate and settle after the war ended. The deal was struck in 1923 by the then British finance minister, against the advice of John Maynard Keynes – who said it was better to hold out for better terms since time worked in the debtor’s favor. London paid Washington 80 cents to the dollar. For their part, the French chose to wait and by so doing they proved Keynes was right. In 1926, they settled their American loans at 40 cents to the dollar.12 Three years later, the Italians settled their war loans by paying a mere 24 cents to the dollar, a better term than Argentina imposed on its debtors with its December 2001 (unjustified) bankruptcy. Of course, it is not only the loans which generated the condition for the economic and financial new normal in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The money the Bank of England and Banque de France printed during the war overwhelmed the markets, distorted financial stability and had a strong negative effect on prices. • In Britain the currency in circulation doubled, and prices made the same jump. • In France it tripled, and prices also increased by 300 per cent. • In Germany it quadrupled, and so did the prices initially,13 thereafter leading to hyperinflation.
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That’s a lesson central bankers (particularly Bernanke and King) have forgotten. While the currency in circulation in all European countries rose by leaps and bounds during the fights, the end of the war changed none of the politicians’ bad habits. No government altered the wrong policy of throwing money at the problem. Instead, that unwise practice accelerated. In Germany, throughout 1919, the monetary base rose by 50 per cent, and in 1920 by another 60 per cent. The Reichsbank warned that the volume of short-term debt was a dangerous threat, but it still kept the presses running. Germany faced, among other financial challenges, the huge and illogical reparations demanded by World War I victors, which were way beyond the ability of its ruined economy to pay, even if stretched over many years. In 1921, the German government made the first reparations payment by selling marks for dollars, and this transaction contributed to a sharp decline in the mark’s value, while at home social unrest and strikes worsened. Politicians, economists and central bankers are often fooled by the fact that the debt hydra takes some time to raise its heads. In 1921, money in circulation in the German republic rose by the ‘usual’ 50 per cent to 120 billion marks, but in 1922 the situation significantly worsened. With paper money being printed round the clock, inflation ran at 1300 per cent. The following year, 1923, was one of despair with newly minted Reichsmark flooding the market, as well as the mark’s decline against the dollar continuing relentlessly. By mid-1923, the Reichsbank was throwing cash at the market at the rate of 60 trillion marks per day, much of it in big denominations. By November 1923, the currency in circulation was heading for an astronomical 400,000,000 trillion. Something significant had, however, changed. The Reichsbank had a new boss, Hjalmar Schacht, who was a no-nonsense banker. With hyperinflation still carrying the day, on November 20, 1923 a new currency was introduced, the Rentenmark, to replace the old imperial Reichsmark. The conversion rate to the new currency was set at one trillionth of a mark;14 at that time the exchange rate of the old currency to the dollar had hit 4.2 trillion, which made the rate of the Rentenmark to the dollar 4.2. This was the ratio prevailing before World War I between the German and American currencies.15 This 4.2 exchange rate was fine-tuned to affect the market’s psychology, but in itself the change of currency would have been pure cosmetics without fiscal discipline. Schacht, the Reichsbank’s new president, insisted that the only way to financial salvation was through balanced budgets. It was true then; it is true now.
Living at the edge of chaos The new normal which characterized post-World War I Europe did not affect only economics and finance. It also meant the disappearance of the
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old social order, a fact which preceded the major upheaval of populations and economies because, for any practical purpose, a new normal constitutes a major inflection point. This change started during the World War I years and continued unabated.16 Then, as now, governments were not really in charge; they just drifted. Or, alternatively, the challenges they were confronted with overwhelmed the second raters who were in charge. Yet, everyone knew that it would not be possible to turn back the clock. People and organizations, including government bureaucracies, had to adapt to the new conditions. Not the least among them was the need to gain citizens’ confidence by bringing all economic and financial excesses under control. They failed in that mission then, as they fail in that mission now. What happened in 1923 in economic, financial and social terms is so interesting because of its striking similarities to what has taken place in recent years. In the early 1920s in Germany, tax revenues accounted for no more than 10 per cent of government expenditure. The difference was covered by deficit financing. As far as western sovereigns are concerned, this 90 per cent deficit is not the case today,17 but even persistent deficits of 10 per cent or more can reek havoc. Interviewed on August 18, 2010 by Bloomberg News, an American economist said that much when he commented that a US Treasury bubble is building up rapidly. One of the examples he gave was that the Obama Administration’s $1.4 trillion deficit in 2010, which is over 10 per cent of US GDP (see also Chapter 12), may be the last drop which makes the glass overflow. Western economists must also cope with the continuing high leveraging of the banking industry. Unprecedented increases in the use of structured instruments and securitizations, across the globe but most particularly in the USA, have been a seemingly unstoppable trend, with the trading of credit risk at its core. The tool is credit derivatives, which initially supplemented then overtook traditional forms of transferring credit risk, like syndication of loans. Lust and greed aside, factors which contributed to this development include the globalization of financial markets and information technology, especially networks and pricing models. These developments produced significant changes in the financial structure of western countries and in the role of banks therein, but they also had a major effect on sovereign debt. The changed role of banks developed from originating and holding to originating, repackaging and selling, thereby altering loan dynamics. The impact on sovereigns can be briefly described as the alchemy of their budgets, enacted by hiding the effect of ever-greater public deficits. As the ‘help’ Goldman Sachs gave to different governments (the Greek among them) demonstrates, the use of novel derivative instruments produced a
16 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
mystical transformation of state debt, much of it highly shaky, yet good enough for a prolonged denial of a red ink torrent. The 80th Annual Report by the Bank for International Settlements put this issue from a different perspective when it stated that: ‘By the end of 2011, public debt/GDP ratios in industrial countries are projected to be on average about 30 percentage points higher than in 2007 – a rise of about two fifths. But the increase for countries that have been hit particularly hard by the crisis will be even greater.’ The United States, Britain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain are evident examples. Worst of all is the fact that the rapid increase in public debt in the wake of the 2007–11 economic and banking crisis is unlikely to be halted within the near future. As was the case after World War I (as well as after World War II), sharp declines in tax revenues will be used as an excuse for more deficit financing. In addition, nowadays sovereigns cover their lack of financial discipline behind expenditures such as income support and other entitlements (Chapter 3). It is most instructive to note that, with the possible exception of the United States, fairly similar conditions of lack of fiscal discipline prevailed in the early 1920s for all former belligerents. If anyone thinks that hyperinflation befell Germany because it had lost the war, then he or she is fairly misguided. Neighboring France won the war but, in the early to mid-1920s, its currency was just as much the plaything of speculators and its recovery of economic wellbeing was just as tedious as Germany’s. As 1923 was coming to a close, a very short time after the German mark had turned to dust, the value of the French franc fell by about 50 per cent against the dollar. In January 1924, the French Ministry of Finance asked for expert advice on how to redress the situation and salvage the franc. Frank Altschul, the principal of Lazard Brothers New York office, came to Paris at the French government’s request. One of Altschul’s strengths was thinking out of the box. He proposed to the French government what he called an ‘experiment,’18 which essentially was a way of teaching speculators a lesson – something missing today from the toolkit of sovereigns and central bankers. ‘This would involve arranging credits for the government in the United States and perhaps England, in round amounts,’ he told the French.19 The new loan of $100 million (big money at the time) was provided by the Morgan Bank, which evidently required appropriate guarantees. (At that point the French had not yet repaid their World War I loans to the USA.) Morgan was going to lend money to a government which, five years after World War I had ended was still borrowing $1 billion a year to close its budgetary holes. The conditions for the loan included: • reduction of expenditures, • abstaining from asking for new loans,
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• concrete steps to balance the budget of the republic, and • a rumored secret clause that the French government bound itself to accepting whatever plan the Dawes Commission came up with.20 The members of the Dawes Commission were no novices.21 They were well aware that a large part of the projected fiscal deficit in the 1924–5 timeframe was likely to persist even in the event of recovery in output. The financial crisis had permanently reduced the level of future potential output for Britain, France, Germany, Italy and other countries, and therefore the tax base. Sound familiar? In spite of these negatives, Altschul’s trick worked. By taking on the speculators with the $100 million war chest, the French government bid the franc from nearly 30 to 18 to the dollar in a couple of weeks. (The salvage of the French franc was, however, temporary. Three years later, in 1926, the franc fell to a new low, then fluctuated while the Banque de France intervened to hold it at 25 to the dollar; an exchange rate which favored French industry.) Up to a point, but only up to a point, this was the road taken in 2010 by euroland and the IMF to salvage Greece from bankruptcy. If Greece had had the drachma and not the euro as a currency, it is quite likely that its value would have been halved against the dollar (Markezinis, the then finance minister, did just that in 1953). But with the euro, the country could not devalue. In other words, its financial problems significantly weakened the euro against the dollar, and it had to pay over 9 per cent for short-term loans, 600 base points more than loans by Germany. Greece does not seem to have comprehended that, in the decision-making process of nations, forthcoming ‘battles’ will not be fought by tanks and supersonic jets but by financial instruments. This will be a permanent feature – the outcome being decided by financial staying power. Overindebted nations, and this reference includes the United States and Britain, would do well to notice that there is nothing new in the message conveyed by the preceding sentences. (In the early eighteenth century, Louis XIV had said that the last Louis (the golden sovereign) wins the war – in other words, he who has the financial staying power.) In conclusion, massively printed money represents unsupportable government leverage, and therefore debt, which unsettles investors and makes them run for their money. It was not for nothing that, in the 1920s, Hjalmar Schacht believed the real problem in post-World War I Europe (not just in Germany) was the prevalence of government debt – and this was bound to lead to a general European bankruptcy. It was true in 1920s and it is true today, with the difference that, in the coming years, general bankruptcy might be truly global.
The importance of knowing the ‘normal’ conditions Let’s start with statisticians. They love the normal curve of events and measurements because it reflects the degree of calculability of an event occurring.
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Besides that, there exist excellent statistical tests and tables based on normal distribution. The nasty fact is that many distributions of real-life events are not normal. Some are skew, others have long legs – and the further a measurement falls from the bell-shaped curve, the higher is the degree of complexity of the problem, its interconnections and its aftermath. The so-called ‘normal’ situation is easily calculable and presents a simple structure. But, as Figure 1.1 shows, outliers alter these conditions and harbor great challenges, not the least being that they involve too many unknowns. As far as the ‘not normal’ distribution of events is concerned, a major contribution has been made by Benoit Mandelbrot, a mathematician, who developed the fractals theory – which has interesting applications in economics. Mandelbrot believed that the market behavior of financial movements has fractal forms.22 It does not follow the familiar bell shape of the normal distribution. Therefore, trading practices and financial models based on the assumption of a normal distribution are fundamentally wrong. The 2007–11 economic and financial earthquake proved that Mandelbrot was right. Plenty of models were written by people who were good at mathematics but knew little or nothing about finance, and the economy was turned on its head. Banks using these models paid dearly for this error. The misconception derives from the fact that typically, though by no means always, the distribution of measurements associated with events which are ‘normal’ and understood tends to approximate the bell-shaped curve. By contrast, with skew, leptokyrtotic, long-legged, fractal and other Unexpected events involving too many unknowns
A distribution approximating the normal curve
Long leg of distribution
Frequency
Expected events based on known conditions
Figure 1.1 Expected events and unexpected events are characterized by two different distributions
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distributions the area under the curve is never stable, and what are thought to be outliers may become frequent daily occurrences. Therefore, extreme events and their likelihood must always be taken into account and, while their cause is far from being clear, their effect may be significant. As different occurrences outside the bell-shaped curve multiply, the area under it changes its shape, or it translates itself to the left (or to the right). As the frequency of what used to be extreme events increases, they become a part of a new normal. It needs no explaining that this is not only relevant today. It has been occurring all the time in both natural and man-made systems – as they move from stability to chaos and back to stability following an inflection point. During the last quarter of a century there has been: the 1987 stock market crash (a 14.5 standard deviations event); descent to the abyss by Japanese banks and breaking of the British pound by Soros and Steinhart, both in early 1990s; the 1994 hecatomb of debt instruments; the 1997 East Asia crisis; the 1998 Russian bankruptcy and near bankruptcy of LTCM; the 2000 stock market crash (with dotcoms at the epicenter); and the 2007–11 deep economic crisis – which included the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, as well as near-bankruptcy of AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Royal Bank of Scotland and plenty of other mismanaged mammoth institutions. The fact that these have been (unwisely) saved, through torrents of red ink, by central banks and governments has ushered in the new normal. It is in this sense that El-Erian/Gross’s insight about coming events in finance and the economy, as well as their aftermath, should be interpreted. Crises which used to be outliers are now becoming mainstream, and their impact weighs heavily on the daily lives of people, business activities and the global economy as a whole. For instance, according to Goldman Sachs, in just two years, from early 2008 to early 2010, the economic and financial crisis knocked $30 trillion off the value of global shares (owned by people and companies) and another $11 trillion off the value of homes. Another statistic to remember is that these losses amounted to over 0.75 per cent of the world’s GDP. Notice that this cumulative $41 trillion represents an amount of money in fairly popular markets – exchanges and housing – where players can win and lose all at the same time. If there is even a mild turnaround, as the new normal theory suggests, some (though probably not much) of this lost money will be recovered and will help to start redressing balance sheets. What will not be recovered, at least by many of the players, is money lost with games involving derivative financial instruments. To appreciate this statement, the reader should know that over 95 per cent of derivatives trading is proprietary between financial institutions, particularly the big ones. Trading transactions undertaken for clients represents a meager part of the total. To understand what this means in terms of ‘silly business’, it is as if General Motors were to sell 95 per cent of its auto production to Ford, and
20 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
Ford were to return the compliment by selling 95 per cent of the motor vehicles it manufactures to GM. In addition, the large majority of these derivatives transactions contribute nothing to the national economy and involve ‘imaginary’ money, such as 30-year interest rate swaps. How a banker or trader can know what the interest rates will be three decades down the line mystifies me, and also those people to whom I posed that question. To the contrary, what is not appreciated enough (by the gamblers) is that one party is bound to lose and it will not recover its money, even if the economy returns to stellar performance. The only way the loser can try to get his money back is to get even deeper involved in gambling, going further into the red. In a way, it is worse than in a casino, because the players gamble against each other to total destruction and they can all go bust because of their superleveraging. Look at the fall not only of Lehman Brothers, but also of Citigroup, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and plenty of others. While in the short term superleveraging might deliver fat profits, in the medium term it leads straight to the precipice. A message the new normal gives to those who care to listen regards what happens after the day of financial reckoning has arrived. When the gambling casino goes bust, people and companies discover that the so-called ‘assets’ (of most doubtful value) are accompanied by vast debts, which are due with interest. In a crisis, these ‘assets’ are shattered, but, short of outright bankruptcy, the liabilities always stand. As in the case of Japan and its ‘two lost decades’, from 1992 to 2011, western financial institutions and households confront a balance sheet recession. And, because this is happening on a massive scale, nobody really has a clue about how to handle it, let alone how to get the economy out of the long tunnel which it has entered. The curious medicine of throwing massive amounts of money at the problem, first practised by the Japanese government and then followed blindly by the American, British and continental European governments, is a medicine whose longer-term effects are anybody’s guess. All sorts of portfolios have been left with liabilities that far exceed their assets. Some economists believe that the world’s economy will be pulled up from its crisis by the developing nations – which, relatively speaking, are in better shape, while demand in developed countries remains weak. But other economists question the thesis that the emerging nations will be able to compensate. There is an even more basic bifurcation in expert opinions: • Some economists say that many governments will have to keep their stimulus packages going for longer than expected, or face entrenched unemployment. • To the contrary, others believe that public debt cannot rise any more without disastrous after-effects for everybody, common citizens companies and the state itself included.
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21
Last but not least, opinions are divided as to whether the current system of global currencies can continue functioning under the preposterous weight of debt and liabilities on some countries and their currencies. As it stands, the situation is attracting cruising sharks whose business is the blood of the mighty. There is, indeed, a currency puzzle which has found its way into the new normal but which is still (by all likelihood) living on borrowed time. International transactions and central bank reserves are being denominated mainly by three currencies: the dollar, the euro and the yen, which is rather funny because none is supported by first-class fundamentals. The Japanese economy has been in a coma for 20 years. The finances of euroland resemble those of a traveling provincial circus. And as for the US dollar, its investment bankers, mortgage ‘bodybuilders on steroids’,23 credit-rating agencies and big spenders at sovereign level have killed the goose that laid the golden egg.
2 The Newly Poor
Poor people’s recipe: falling deeper into debt In 1966, the Daily Express ran a competition in which one should select, in order of importance, what one considered to be the essential attributes to become a self-made millionaire. Plenty of people participated in it. According to Robina Lund, Paul Getty, one of the oil industry’s pioneers, assessed his own most important attributes as: • • • • • • •
single-mindedness ability to work long hours1 elastic use of time2 attention to detail knowledge of a particular business unpredictability3 ability to make good use of professional advice4
What Getty chose as the seven top characteristics of success are the personality traits of men who make history in any profession – from politics to business and science. These qualities are rare, possessed by exceptional people, most of whom are self-made. What the large majority of men and women choose as their guiding light in planning their life (if they plan it at all) is the exact antithesis of Paul Getty’s guidelines. Quite surprisingly, this antithesis prevails even among so-called ‘experts’. The basic qualities characterizing the doers of society are not limited to the seven just discussed. An eighth all-important characteristic of success, which Getty did not spell out explicitly but implicitly used throughout his life, is thriftiness and the avoidance of debt. Costs matter. Wealth provides economic freedom, gained by living within one’s assets, acquired through hard work, rather than amassing liabilities and becoming slave to them, and to the creditor(s). 22
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The ninth principle guiding the life and work of people who are in charge of their destiny is their aversion to the welfare state – today’s State Supermarket. Getty’s thesis was that those who deserve social support don’t get it. By contrast, the lazy good-for-nothing scroungers who live on rent are encouraged in their idleness. His motto was: ‘People only appreciate what they pay for. If it’s free, they waste it.’ Look at the State Supermarket’s free medical care ‘for all’ to find the evidence. The tenth principle (which really belongs at the top of the list) is personal responsibility. Everybody has his or her duties and dues to society. Forgetting about them, or having them waived due to the pressure of the masses and being led by a lightheaded leadership, is the worst that can be done in terms of building up character. ‘In a profession, waiving your dues may be a question of conscience; in a businessman it’s proof of weakness,’ Paul Getty pointed out.5 The disregard of personal responsibilities, so well described by these ten principles of behavior, has brought our society to the edge of social, ethical and economic bankruptcy.6 In the course of the last 50 years, whether we talk of Europe or of America, the absence of personal responsibilities has become proof of social organization’s weakness. This is true all the way from the sovereign state to the smallest social unit. It is also the most fundamental reason for déclinisme of the West.7 As we will see in the next section, the western countries that wrongly think themselves as ‘the rich world’ are becoming poorer and poorer – and this is a self-inflicted wound. Their sovereigns, their companies (particularly their banks) and their citizens are living on debt and, therefore, on borrowed time. The newly rich are the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the bigger countries of the developing world. How far apart the newly rich and the newly poor are in terms of policy is dramatized by the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, held in Washington, on October 8 to 10, 2010 – which was dominated by the Damocles sword of global currency wars hanging over the global monetary system. The newly poor countries, especially America, focused on China’s unwillingness to allow the yuan to rise. In response to this, China’s officials argued that the biggest distortion came from the (formerly) rich world’s extra-loose economic policies, particularly the expectation that the Federal Reserve would soon reactivate its deplorable strategy of massively printing money to buy government bonds and to devalue the dollar (see Chapters 5 and 12 on quantitative easing (QE)). Steady current account and fiscal deficits reveal a roadmap to financial catastrophe. Even worse than the doctrine is the thoughtless way in which it was deployed. The force behind the creation of newly poor nations, precisely those who in the nineteenth century were the mighty world powers, have been the twentieth century’s devastating European wars.
24 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
We have reached the end of an epoch in terms of democracy, wellbeing and trust. Few people really appreciate that breaking trust can be done very quickly, while re-establishing it takes a long time and a huge amount of effort. By lowering its ethical values, ignoring the fact that liabilities lead to poverty, forgetting about each person’s responsibilities and falling deeper into debt, our society no longer trusts itself.
Property-owning democracies versus debt-laden democracies The most stark contrast between ancient times, when democracy saw the light under the sky of Athens, and the twenty-first century is that the base of people who have the privilege of voting has radically changed. ‘A people that values the privileges above its principles, soon loses both,’ said Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953. It is difficult to find a dozen words which encapsulated better the current status of our society. The citizens of ancient Athens who exercised the right to vote were owners of something – even if this was only the (far from being widely available) privilege8 of being the city’s citizen. Such an ownership principle also prevailed in nineteenth-century England at the time modern parliamentary democracy was born. It makes a great deal of difference whether we talk of an electorate belonging to a property-owning democracy or to a debt-laden democracy, subservient to the power of those controlling its liabilities. Human nature being what it is, even the more ethical voters will also think of their own interests in casting their votes. But when the majority (indeed, the large majority) of voters are debt-laden, the way to bet is that people will vote for politicians and governments who enhance and perpetuate their way of dealing: debt is enshrined in the system, till the day of reckoning. Falling deeper into debt is toxic for democracy and its citizens because it becomes a vicious cycle; one in which society finds itself cast with cement around its feet. There exists a great deal of difference between the state having a beneficial role to the citizenry and having as its raison d’ètre the survival of the State Supermarket. Democracy pays the greater price, as the state becomes too dominant and intrudes too far into its citizens’ privacy. Both personal freedom and efficiency are at stake. Basic human liberties are abandoned as the State Supermarket not only buys and distributes goods and services it cannot afford, but also looks over the shoulders of every citizen. Furthermore, the goods and services a debt-laden ‘democracy’ provides are mediocre. By contrast, the iron-clad police state that accompanies a debt-laden society is effective. All this is bad news for the West, where the State Supermarket has chosen its domicile. Paraphrasing Albert Einstein, the significant problems we face cannot be solved by the same way of thinking we followed when we created
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them. Not many western leaders have read Einstein’s words on the need for cultural change, or, if they read them, they did not appreciate them. Yet, the great physicist was right. The problems of a debt-laden society will not disappear by ignoring them. Time is of essence as the West finds itself at an inflection point, with past wealth in rapid decline, while new wealth is created by the major developing nations which work to become property-owning. According to current projections, by 2012 the G-79 countries will account for less than 50 per cent of the world’s GDP. This sharp drop in the share of wealth is the result of déclinisme, which started in the post-World War II years, and which accelerated during the last couple of decades. In a way that is absolutely disastrous for its economic and financial health, the West continues printing a great deal of ‘funny money,’ while the more prosperous developing countries are in the process of accumulating potentially useless paper. In 2002, developing countries’ currency reserves were just over $1 trillion, of which China’s coffers held about 20 per cent and the other developing countries shared the balance. In 2011, this hoard of western currencies, particularly dollars, is expected to be about $7 trillion, up by nearly 700 per cent. China will probably have $3 trillion (up from $2.6 trillion in 2010), with the remaining $4 trillion shared by the other BRICs and other formerly poor countries which are now the world’s newly rich. This raises some soul-searching questions on: • the fate to which the newly poor have condemned themselves, • ways and means to stop competitive devaluations leading to capital controls and trade wars, and • the necessary rebalancing of the global monetary system to save it from collapse. There is no better example of the tragedy in store for the newly poor than the noisy strikes which shook France in September, October and early November 2010. They were supposedly motivated by the government’s decision to increase the retirement age from 60 to 62 – a rather trivial change. In reality, they were a noisy attempt to avoid redimensioning of entitlements in a lastditch effort to salvage a bankrupt State Supermarket from going bust.10 On repeated occasions, an estimated 3.5 million people took to the streets,11 with banners and loudspeakers. This was a record turnout of teenagers (many half a century away from their pension), railway men, bus drivers, postmen, dockers and teachers, joined by housewives on one side and by hoodlums on the other. Young people from over 300 lycées (pupils and students have their own labor unions) participated in this carnival. Pupils and students added their voices to the cacophony raised by people who marched through the streets of French cities with slogans protesting against their own future. In reality, these demonstrators were not afraid of two more years of working till they get their
26 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
pension; they were afraid of losing some of the unaffordable and unsustainable privileges the bankrupt State Supermarket had thrust upon them. Behind such a savage showcase of a spoiled mass society lay the toughest test of French labor unions’ ability to force the government to back down. Useful as they might have been in the nineteenth century, in the twenty-first century featherbedded labor unions have become the front window of chaos and disorder; the No. 1 agent of disruption, regression and déclinisme – a state within the state. The most depressing statistic about this circus of the State Supermarket’s spoiled young and old is that in French opinion polls some 70 per cent of respondents said that they backed the strikes. This was far more than the 54–62 per cent in favor of social strikes against government measures, in late 1995, which forced the then French government to back down and lick its wounds. As if to document how destabilized the State Supermarket’s spoiled masses have become, their answers to the pollsters’ queries were inconsistent. Because, finally, they began to understand that the newly poor western nations will eventually have to waive many current social privileges, in the same poll which backed the strikers, 70 per cent said that raising the retirement age was ‘responsible towards future generations’. Hence, taken individually, the people know that tightening the belt is inevitable; however, in the most undemocratic way, they still go down the street to topple the government which tries to keep the boat afloat. In contrast to this behavior of men and women against themselves, several developing countries are improving their prosperity because they hit the nail on the head, in terms of mindset, and are working hard to come up from under. They keep clear of the strange political netherworld of the newly poor, its coterie of nineteenth-century socialists, corrupt labor unions and tunnel-vision ideologies of guilt which the dysfunctional system entails. The questions to answer to turn the situation around, Dr Nelson Mohler commented during a personal meeting with the author, are: • What must we do today to properly shape tomorrow? • What kinds of challenges are already visible in our society, our politics and our economy? • How different is the society we now live in from that ahead, which we perceive somewhat unclearly but don’t seem to accept? Mohler adds that a crucial question sovereigns and common citizens should ask themselves (and provide the answers for) is whether the new normal economic system works in synergy with the forces that are creating tomorrow’s society. Are these forces promoting discontinuity in our social, political and economic landscape? If yes, are we able to position ourselves against them, or are we overrun by them by default?
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Debt operates like a tax The more extraordinary the event, the greater the need of it being supported by strong proofs, according to Pierre Simon de Laplace, the late eighteenthcentury French physicist, mathematician and astronomer. To obtain strong proof, we must strip away the surface of events and phenomena to reveal, examine and test their deeper realities, as well as their connections. This is the basis of the scientific method, which applies, though only up to a point, to economics and finance. The limitation comes from the fact that, unlike the laws of nature, the laws of man, his tools and the rules he uses are subjective. In consequence, to gain a level of objectiveness, good practice in economic analysis is to study and scrutinize past events, and to listen to the advice of learned people who have delivered results in their lives, and also to avoid engaging in a voyage of fantasy, following different monetary theories and macroeconomic or microeconomic models. The rapid multiplication in models and simulators12 without an accompanying increase in skills, which take years to develop, has resulted in dismal accuracy in their projections (evidently including VaR). Furthermore, some mathematical models seem to be written just to prove a theory, gain status, or justify high fees. The result is that, quite often, following a model is no different than chasing a myth. Errors in monetary and fiscal policies, on one hand and in algorithmic artifacts, on the other, correlate, if for no other reason than because they both use one or more false assumptions regarding the behavior of the economy, the market, or financial instruments – including the limited appreciation of the after-effects of policy decisions. Nowadays, frequent examples of the latter are: • zero interest rates, • endless increase of the monetary base, and • interminable leveraging, in disregard of the fact that debt is toxic. One of the persons judging, in an able manner, the risks of the third bullet point is Andrew Haldane, head of Financial Stability at the Bank of England. In 2010, he pointed out that debt operates like a tax, with higher servicing charges on it reducing disposable income. Not all policy-makers appreciate the impact of this reference. Yet, they should understand that liabilities become a triple whammy, damaging the capacity of the economy, negatively affecting its subsequent growth rate and inducing creditors to run after the money owed to them by their debtors when an economic financial and/or banking crisis hits. Like all liabilities, sovereign debt must be serviced and repaid, raising the question of where to find the money. The ill-advised massive bail-out, in 2008–10, of self-harmed big banks and accompanying sharp recession, which led to collapse in tax revenues, have pushed several western countries into budgetary deficits of more than 10 per cent of GDP.
28 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
Among industrial nations such massive deficits, unprecedented in peace time, have become a mill-stone as far as budgetary discipline is concerned. Current figures suggest that, in debt-to-GDP ratio, the leading 20 developed nations are already twice as exposed as the top 20 emerging nations;13 by 2014 the ratio will be three times as high, putting the developed nations at a huge disadvantage in the global market.14 As these references document, there are good reasons why the executive director of Financial Stability at the Bank of England made reference to a disaster myopia. Even speculators are known to exercise greater caution after a disaster, but among politicians it does not seem to happen that way. Admittedly, it does not take long for speculators to once again become reckless, piling up ever riskier securities and creating asset bubbles – but should the people leading western countries behave in the same way? Haldane knows full well what he is talking about. As we have seen in Chapter 1 with the case study on the post-World War I years, debt is no manna from heaven. It represents an obligation for the debtor to pay a sum of money at a given currency and at some fixed future time and place. Typically that money has been taken as a loan, or is an obligation derived from a bond15 being issued, at a rate of interest which is also due. Theoretically, loans are given to, and bonds are bought, from entities with no or very low moral risk. Practically, the scrutiny of creditworthiness is not always what it should be, particularly when a banker or investor is trying to maintain yield at a time of low interest rates. Both at sovereign and corporate level, creditworthiness means that the attitude towards previous obligations reflects willingness as well as ability to repay debt. Beyond the financial underpinnings, the moral risk is measured by character; character is an important factor in determining a debtor’s ability to obtain credit. But, here again, practice does not always conform to underlying theory. Typically, overleveraged entities – families, companies, sovereigns – do not lack character; but they overplay their hand. As debt enthusiasts, they don’t take notice of Haldane’s attention to the negative effects of debt. Therefore, time and again, they repeat the same mistakes of high leveraging. This might even work, up to a point but, eventually, the evidence is that an economic policy based on growing sovereign debt leads to serious comparative disadvantages and eventually to a downfall. In peacetime, such situations are often created by hopeless social-policy entanglements, and they result in an acute, long-term threat to the country’s economic wellbeing. In the aftermath, there is, first, an inevitable relative loss of prosperity, though people and those who govern them are slow to look at this side of the facts; then, an absolute loss of prosperity becomes unavoidable, as there are no more funds for productive investments – the only ones able to lift the standard of living. In addition, when debt exceeds assets, an entity – be it a household, company or the state – is insolvent. It is unable to meet its obligations such as
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interest cost for its loans, repayment schedules, purchasing or trading commitments, guarantees, salaries, pensions and other assumed engagements in the present and in the longer term. Getting out of debt is not at all easy because, financial reasons aside, debt becomes a culture. In 2008, the American consumer debt reached a massive $12.6 trillion. The crisis led to belt tightening and economists spoke of households rebuilding their balance sheets. American consumer debt dropped over seven quarters, reaching $11.7 trillion at end of September 2010. But, of this $900 billion difference, $812 billion were due to bank write-downs of mortgages and other personal debt.16 ‘Debt capital’, a term often used by entities nearing the edge of bankruptcy to crow about their ‘resources’, gives a false message. It does not mean capital but liabilities, which come due. The entity is leveraged, and it may even be highly so. Inability or unwillingness to meet requirements associated with assumed liabilities leads creditors to take legal action; and the next step is default. It follows logically that the more debt there is, the more problems there are; such problems grow exponentially as debt soars, whether the victims are countries, businesses or common people. Most recent deep economic crises find their origins in the use of indebtedness for fat profits. An example from this century has been the use of subprimes.17 By all evidence, this massive policy started in the 1970s, when global banks recycled the vast amounts of petrodollars. Eventually, this led to convulsions like those the Greek economy went through (Chapter 9). No matter what the theorists of leverage (and some socialists whose mind is stuck in the nineteenth century) say, nobody has yet produced a body of theory to explain the social benefits of extreme indebtedness (if any). Yet, practically every politician, so-called Keynesian economist18 or ‘social scientist’ preaches the merits of debt and, through them, he or she promises Eden. Instead, what the public gets is Hell.
‘I will be gone/you will be gone’ In June 2010, Didier Migaud, the president of the French Cour des Comptes, the government auditor roughly equivalent to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), said that his country’s public debt was reaching unprecedented levels. He also pointed out that the bigger part of the government deficit was not due to the recent economic and financial crisis. Two-thirds of it was structural.19 There seems to be a competition to use the most red ink. The French deficit for 2010 was projected to be 9 per cent, under best conditions. A similar forecast was made across the Atlantic for the US economy, while a comparable figure for Britain has been over 10 per cent. Then it was learned that, by August 2010, the US budget would also have a deficit in excess of 10 per cent.
30 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
Even before the latter forecast was made, in July 2010 Allstate’s CEO stated that US government borrowing was out of control.20 A week prior to this statement, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had produced a gloomy long-term outlook for America’s budget, projecting that, under current law, publicly held federal debt would rise from an estimated 62 per cent of GDP in 2010 and keep on rising. Under the CBO’s alternative fiscal scenario, US public debt could reach 185 per cent of GDP in 2035.21 The CBO stated that the government should account for costs that are expected to accrue but are not presently considered, such as increases in Medicare payments to doctors. One might think what happens in 2035 is of no interest to those who govern because they will be long gone. That’s true. But the American public will still be there, and it will suffer. In addition, some American economists believe that the aforementioned figures will be reached well before 2035, using as evidence that in 2010 the US budget deficit exceeded $1.4 trillion rather than staying below the $1 trillion originally projected. They suggest that the Congressional Budget Office had exercised restraint, even if its deficit projections were worse than the government’s. Sovereigns’ attitudes towards debt at the beginning of this second decade of the twenty-first century has a disquieting similitude to the early eighteenth century and the early 1920s (Chapter 1), because it shows some common trends with those troubled periods. Personal responsibility has taken leave, and good governance went along. Whether in Europe or in America today, the prevailing principle is: ‘I will be gone, you will be gone’ (IBG/YBG).22 Those making the wrong decisions will not be here when their consequences hit hard. Therefore, they feel free to say anything they please, collect the votes and political contributions, as well as other goodies, upfront. They don’t worry if heaven breaks loose thereafter. Louis XIV of France had the motto: ‘Après moi le deluge.’23 His grandson, Louis XVI, paid for it with his head. A more recent example is that of France, after World War I, which could not control its finances; for eight years, from 1918 till 1926, it ran a budget deficit equivalent to $1 billion per year (big money at that time). Today’s America has copied that (almost) century-old French policy by running a budget deficit of over $1 trillion for several years which, everything counted, is not that different from the aforementioned case of the 1920s. Several American economists have not made a secret of their disdain for this way of doing things, but both Republican (Bush Administration) and Democratic (Obama Administration) politicians have a deaf ear. If the runaway public debt continues along that road, the day will come when America, France and all the members of the so-called ‘Club Med’24 (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) will be espousing Argentina’s scenario. Chapter 1 brought to the reader’s attention to the fact that, for an economy where everything is interlinked, there appears to be no clear distinction
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between cause and effects. The interplay among the main players and interconnection between different instruments sees to it that cause may become effect and effect cause. Even so, something is the origin, and something else follows as a result. What the aforementioned countries, plus Britain and Ireland, have in common with Argentina is not only that they have been spending well beyond their means, hoping that somebody else will pick up the bill. They are also (like Argentina) characterized by: • exceptionally weak growth prospects, • erosion of global competitiveness, • high unemployment rates, and more. Worse still, by using the IBG/YBG principle they share virtually no financial discipline with Argentina and, as justification, they present arguments whose particular feature is to weaken investors’ confidence in the government’s creditworthiness. The erosion of confidence is accelerated when it becomes clear that heads of state don’t have the courage to implement radical measures able to consolidate public finances and improve the prospects for economic growth in the years ahead. This leads to adverse debt dynamics taking hold in countries whose economy, till a few years ago, was sound, but which have been hit by persistent budget deficits, negative current accounts, low savings relative to investment and other ills. The result is that non-residents hold a substantial part of the public debt not just in the Club Med, but also in the United States. At no other time than in the two major wars of the twentieth century was the American government so overindebted. Prior to World War I, the public debt was less than 10 per cent of GDP; it tripled during the years of that war, rose again with the New Deal (but still kept below 50 per cent of GDP), then soared during World War II to nearly 130 per cent of GDP. But this unaffordable government deficit was sharply cut in the following decades to around 30 per cent of GDP. It is, therefore, a pity that prudence took leave and, since the 1970s, the big spenders have run the show. Over the course of the twenty-first century, the reasons for overindebtedness on both sides of the North Atlantic have not been the same. In America, the IBG/YBG background developed hand-in-hand with crazy budget deficits and widening negative current account balances (see Chapter 11) under the watch of George W. Bush. This was followed by the Fed’s printing presses working overtime to: • salvage self-harmed big banks and mortgage companies,25 • launch the dubious policy of quantitative easing (Chapter 5), and • finance the Obama Administration’s stimulus, which aimed to jump-start the economy but failed to do so.
32 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
One of the ironies has been that state governments in America are, in their way, to become much more serious debtors than the Federal administration. With only one exception (Vermont), legislation in all US states now requires that annual operating budgets are balanced. This limits the racking up of debt over time. Moreover, many state constitutions also enforce repayment of debt. In euroland, only Germany has had the courage to pass such legislation. By contrast, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have persistently failed to enact structural reforms leading to balanced budgets, higher growth and employment, improved competitiveness, and the policy of allowing wages to adjust appropriately to the unemployment situation. Another ‘must’ is to stop making matters worse through the increases in entitlements. In addition, in spite of talk to the contrary, all western sovereigns have failed to proceed with the appropriate restructuring of the banking industry, including much more effective supervision.26
Runaway public liabilities and the day of reckoning According to the 80th Annual Report by the Bank for International Settlements, the continued deterioration of fiscal balances and rapidly mounting sovereign debt ‘heightens the temptation to tolerate an unexpected rise in inflation to reduce the real value of the debt, particularly when a large part of the outstanding domestic currency debt is long-term and a large share is foreign-owned’. In other words, inflation will be the name of the game on the day of reckoning and governments will be better off if inflation wipes out the wealth of their citizens. The BIS 80th Annual Report adds that another reason why ‘high and rising debts may lead to higher inflation is that the public, confronted with the continued failure of government to close the fiscal gap, may eventually become unwilling to hold government bonds’. Hence, the sovereigns will retaliate. This said, governments and, evidently, voters have two options in dealing with the toxic debt that has invaded the economy: pay what it costs now, or pay a higher price later. The first option is the best, and it can be enacted by letting the economy settle down, stopping feeding it with debt and allowing it to find its course. Propelling the second option is the current policy of supposedly helping banks and people by throwing big money at the problem. This greatly delays the required restructuring of balance sheets of governments, banks and other companies, as well as of households. It looks as if the idol and guiding light of Ben Bernanke has been von Havenstein. Rudolf von Havenstein was the (in)famous president of the imperial Reichsbank, who stayed at this job after the war ended and under whose watch, in late 1923, Germany’s mark turned to ashes in a wave of hyperinflation. Eight and a half decades later, in 2008 (little over a year after the 2007–11 crisis started), Bernanke started hyperleveraging the American economy. This was a total miscalculation in the early 1920s, as it is now.
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Von Havenstein I and von Havenstein II failed to recognize that inflationary experiments with the currency can be explosive and end by setting the country’s economy on fire. Martin Feldstein, of Harvard University, was much more serious when, offered the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve by Ronald Reagan, he said he would accept it on condition there was a balanced budget. This did not please the politicians, who chose ‘double bubble’ Alan Greenspan27 instead. After him came Bernanke who, like von Havenstein, has not learned that: • even a moderate degree of inflation can turn into a nightmare if it continues being fed by the printing press, and • at some point down the line, the market and the public lose confidence in the central bank’s and the government’s will, let alone power, to maintain money’s value. This is precisely the time when the descent to the abyss starts. The deeper this descent gets, the more governments try to micromanage the economy, typically making the wrong decisions. In his 1944 classic, The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek argued that markets were the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources – but he also outlined certain conditions for this to be true. In Hayek’s opinion, a free market (a rare species these days) represented the individual decisions of consumers and producers – millions of them – rather than the decisions of a few politicians and bureaucrats. This does not mean that there should be no regulation. Nowadays, the free market has been killed by the State Supermarket, which started life in the late nineteenth century and has become an elephant in the glass house through: • • • • • •
government health care, government pensions,28 free university education, government car companies, government banks, and government ‘this’ and ‘that.’
With all these goodies supposedly for free at the State Supermarket, private initiative does not feature. Everybody learns that he or she does not have to work or get tired. The State Supermarket will take care of all personal needs. What members of society need to do to get ‘more’ from the sovereign is to demonstrate in the streets – or simply go on strike.29 This means that the government has to pay for everything the State Supermarket has put on display. But the government (any government) does not have money. The assets in its treasury come from its citizens’ pockets through taxes and inflation (precisely from the very same people protesting in the streets).
34 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
For starters, the government’s financial assets mainly include currency, loans granted, securities like bonds, shares and other equity, gold reserves, technical reserves and accounts receivable. The government’s liabilities are its debts (to other governments, banks and bondholders), as well as its commitments – many of them in the form of entitlements. In mismanaged countries (and there are plenty), the market value of government financial liabilities is more than twice as large as that of its financial assets.30 Therefore, the concept is loading with debt, also known as high leveraging, and is against the common citizen’s best interests. In the mind of the public, the national debt – which represents an accumulation of budget deficits, entitlements, war bonds, salvage of big banks or other entities, and all of the more mundane State Supermarket goodies – is not supposed to be repaid, at least not wholly. This is a misunderstanding because, on the contrary, short of bankruptcy, the loans taken and bonds issued by the state to finance deficits have to be repaid, a fact which also brings the need for rollovers, new loans and bonds issues to pay past debts. Also, the interest on the whole budget deficit has to be regularly budgeted for, thereby adding to the budget deficit and absorbing financial resources that might have gone to infrastructural, educational and other projects. In France, for example, the cost of servicing the public debt is roughly equal to all the money taken by the state through personal taxation. As for Greece, according to an article in The Economist: ‘[the country] would not have had such a problem with higher bond yields if it had not borrowed so much money in the first place’.31 For a relatively small economy like that of Greece, a sovereign debt of a300 billion ($400 billion) was simply unaffordable and unsustainable. But it was not unusual for euroland’s Club Med: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy (with Ireland a northern member). Neither was it in total contradiction of conditions prevailing in Britain and the United States, which feature the higher debt mountains of the West financed by, and putting in peril, their own commercial banks and their own central banks (as well as the wealthier emerging markets). An example of how fast a capital error by the sovereign can have unimaginable consequences is provided by Ireland (see also, in Chapter 10, a more detailed description of the cause and effect of events in Ireland). The Irish government erred in providing blanket coverage for the country’s overleveraged main banks; no matter what the official communiqués say, this brought the country near to bankruptcy. Prior to the events of 2008/09, Ireland had a prosperous economy. But lingering concerns about the health of the banking sector and its potential impact on the public finances kept Ireland in the spotlight, as one of euroland’s major financial and economic problems. Given the size of Ireland’s economy, the estimated bailout of its failed banking industry corresponds to a staggering $4.3 trillion in the US
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economy. That is far more than American taxpayers have been obliged to contribute to the salvage of US financial institutions by the Bush and Obama administrations. As 2010 approached its end, the news was that Ireland was hovering on the edge of a double-dip recession, with an unsupportable public debt, GDP having shrunk in the second quarter and the market having been confronted with heightened fears that the government’s fiscal policy may also tip Britain into one.32 The multiple effects of an original error can best be appreciated by returning to the time just before the crisis. In 2006 and the first half of 2007, Ireland’s public debt stood at 23 per cent of GDP – one of the best in Europe. This, however, rose to 42 per cent in 2008; 62 per cent in 2009; and an estimated 78 per cent or more in 2010. In fact, if the current prognosis of an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010 materialized (Chapter 10), Ireland would have closed the year with more than a 350 per cent rise in public indebtedness between 2006 and 2010. Not even Japan, whose economy has been in a bad way for two decades, has had such a score.
Nobody is in charge of debt policy The deep economic crisis of 2007–11, which started with subprimes and the banking industry’s illiquidity, turned into a crisis of sovereigns. Its course and its amplitude have much to do with spreading indebtedness at all levels of society, all the way to sovereign risk. To deal effectively with it and come out ahead of the curve requires a different policy than the parochial ‘fire brigade’ approach, the results of which have proven to be both very costly and highly ineffective. ‘Regulating monetary policy and regulating debt is not the same thing,’ said George Soros, on January 28, 2010, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. ‘If you allow debt to accumulate in the economy you sink the economy.’33 That is precisely what has taken place under the watch of Bush, Greenspan and Bernanke in America; Blair, Brown and King in Britain; and many other chiefs of state not only in Europe, but also in Japan. It is bad enough that the regulation of debt has been absent from the list of critical government activities. This is made worse by the fact that monetary policy and fiscal policy are not working in unison – which is an error shared by developed and developing countries. First, monetary policy involves the control of short-term interest rates and the supply of money – including the irrational extension of this to include a ‘printing press exercise’ without limits through quantitative easing (Chapter 5). Second, the realm of fiscal policy is the balance between government spending and tax revenue. Sovereigns try to hide their trickery but, in the end, this becomes visible through budgetary deficits (and, in rare cases, surpluses).
36 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
With the main western central banks – the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and European Central Bank (ECB) – theoretically independent but practically ready to print tons of money, the regulation of debt has been the least of sovereigns’ worries, as exemplified by von Havenstein, as detailed above. Then, as now, the money supply ballooned under the leadership of the ‘money generals’: chiefs of state, ministers of finance and central bank governors. While the reasons for high inflation lay in the lack of a debt policy, not only in financial but also in social terms, nobody really bothered about after-effects. Starting with Greece, the sovereign crisis hit governments and central banks, and many common citizens suddenly woke up to something they had chosen not to talk about. In the aftermath, authorities have to control, contemporaneously: • family overindebtedness, • banks still haunted by bankruptcy risk, • major currencies (first the dollar, then the euro) on the verge of crumbling, and • western sovereign countries close to the precipice and wondering what comes next. Not only investors, but also all those who can read statistics and bear the bad news are increasingly nervous about public sector debt levels in the United States, Europe and Japan. Combined, these are in excess of $30 trillion. Big but empty words aside, there is not even a hint about when these might be siphoned out of the system, how this will be done, at what cost and who will pay the price. One reason why a debt policy has not been undertaken is that it will impede the governments’ spending habits through guidelines and a roadmap. Another is that sovereigns don’t want one, simply because it is bound to be unpopular. Without a debt policy limiting big spending, sovereigns continue claiming that their superleveraged balance sheets (B/S) will relaunch the economy. This is utterly untrue because stimuli have failed in the past, they fail today and nothing is going to change in the future – except that debt, both absolutely and relatively, becomes even greater and more unaffordable. When Didier Migaud, the president of the French Cour des Comptes, said that two-thirds of his country’s budget is structural (see above), what he meant is that all sorts of entitlements – state pensions, universal health care, higher education for all and an ever-widening range of other social services – are state commitments met through debt financing. Deficits widen because there is volatility in the state’s income from taxes, there are too many structural requests for ‘more money,’ and fewer and fewer projects of a productive nature to create new wealth.
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Time, however, is pressing. Not only is it important to balance the budget, but also there should be a surplus to serve in progressively retiring the mountains of debt. The only way this can be done is by means of a debt policy which politicians have the courage to explain to the public, explaining its urgency and rationale. Integral to such explanation is the fact that enormous cuts to services provided by the State Supermarket – or, alternatively, massive tax rises – are needed to save western sovereigns from bankruptcy. Leaders should not be too scared to say so publicly, for fear of losing the ‘next election’, because this is what brought us to the current mess. The common man needs to be told the truth and then prepare for the new normal. Political parties should be able and willing to set out the precise cuts, even if their opponents attack them for bringing an ‘age of austerity’ (see also Chapter 7). Failure to do so is tantamount to lying to the public because not one but all political parties have been responsible for the ‘age of profligacy and waste’, which lasted for several decades but could not continue forever. This is precisely what led to the age of austerity which is now upon us. The people responsible at sovereign level, should, at long last, take charge of regulating debt and shrinking the vast leverage ratio which weighs upon and distorts the economic system. No matter what its origin, and how many layers it is crystallized in, debt is toxic for the economy. True enough, deleveraging and debt regulation are not going to be an easy business; though necessary, they will not be popular because people like to spend more than they have. There are also technical difficulties, in an economic and financial sense; according to some analysts, even if the authorities want to pull part of the large amount of printed money out of the financial system, there would be difficulties in doing so due to the complex means by which it was injected. For instance, in the USA this has included buying asset-backed securities (ABSs), which have been largely designed as complex and opaque derivative instruments. Structured instruments would be hard to sell if deleveraging was put in motion. Sovereigns (and central bankers) also have to decide to raise interest rates, in spite of the widely spread misconception that near-zero interest rates help the economy. In fact, they do so only for some sectors of the economy at the expense of others, stealing money out of the pockets of savers and providing excuses for pension funds to take unwarranted risks. There are also conflicts of interest and collusion between sovereigns and monetary policy-makers because nearly zero interest rates help the former to finance their mountains of debt, pushing the bankruptcy date a little further away. At the same time, however, with the passage of time the complexity of what can be found in this mountain of debt (and, by extension, in the vaults of central banks and treasuries) keeps on increasing. Nowadays, trading with subprime securities (which brought the unmitigated disaster of 2007) has been replaced by proprietary trading, which also
38 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
involves unknowns and major risks – and, moreover, is largely done with taxpayers’ money. This does not really make things better. Last, but not least, when, in 2008, Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, decided single-handed to become the Robin Hood of self-harmed big banks, and found imitators in Britain and continental Europe, he utterly forgot to establish an exit strategy. This proved to be a grave mistake, because an exit strategy has to be carefully worked out a priori; improvisation after the event, when the wealth of citizens is being looted and most exit doors are shut, makes no sense whatsoever. Many governments are reluctant to allow their economic, monetary and fiscal policies to be characterized by an exit strategy, seeing it as not in their interests. Yet, ‘the way out’ is more important than ‘the way in’ – and it is integral to requirements posed by the new normal, just like stock market crashes and banking panics were integral to the old normal. It is high time to appreciate that a debt policy and its exit clauses are a ‘must’ and not an option in the economic system in which we live.
Wealth in western nations dropped like a bribed boxer The final section of Chapter 1 underlined the importance of knowing ‘normal’ conditions in order to make factual decisions, starting with the concept of the normal distribution of events. Another reason why it is important to know ‘normal’ conditions is to be able to make financial projections capitalizing on the fact that democracies are not proactive. Their political system works backwards, trying to capitalize on what has been done already. There is, however, an old saying that in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king. Being reactive to events is an asset, and most particularly amid financial turbulence. To be able to sustain, let alone grow, the economy, and therefore the standard of living, governments should look forward to anything that might happen and take a priori rather than a posteriori decisions, albeit at a certain level of risk. Evidently this is not happening on any appreciable scale. The measures taken during this crisis by sovereigns and their central banks call forth a sense of déjà vu. But the shortfall is somewhat eased when the new normal conditions are properly understood – and the measures adapted to take advantage of them. The old normal has been: tax, print money and throw that money at the problem no matter what the result may be. Since the end of World War I, which means for nearly a century, governments have been profligate in their spending, with no questions asked about what the effect will be on the economy, whether big spending is affordable, or if the expected results can be sustainable. Indeed, this sums up the love of debt discussed in this chapter. It was doable with the old normal because reactive policies took some time to destabilize the system. But it can lead to a catastrophe with the new normal, given
The Newly Poor
39
that debt is already overflowing, and in many countries taxation has hit the limits – while, day to day, the idea that western countries are ‘rich nations’ looks highly misplaced. Western countries are getting poorer and, by consequence, financial and monetary policy have to be fine-tuned. If they aren’t, the gap between the public and the politicians will widen, with the former losing faith in the latter. In America, opinion polls suggest that 75 per cent of the electorate thinks the stimulus, which cost billions, was mismanaged. The country’s working people and their children are being strung with debt. Add to this torrent of red ink the huge cost of health care reform, and what you get is evidence that politicians have no clear policy of what to do next. While they were dysfunctional in regard to the old normal, they are agnostic about the new normal. As a result, they don’t even have a rudimentary roadmap; neither can they perceive the boundaries between conflicting economic aims, even if these are as important as the goals themselves. The wealth of western nations has been described by a critic of the taxand-spend policies of sovereigns on both sides of the North Atlantic as dropping ‘like a bribed boxer’. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and first seven years of the twenty-first century, the rise in debt levels was almost unstoppable, while economic growth was subdued. Debt increased on every side of the economic equation, from households to companies to banks to whole countries. According to statistics from the European Central Bank, the debt ratio of non-financial companies to GDP, in Europe, went from 53 per cent in January 1999 to 83 per cent in January 200934 – an increase of more than 57 per cent in just ten years. A survey by the McKinsey Global Institute found that, on average, the debt of private and public sectors in ten mature economies rose from 200 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 300 per cent in 2008. There have been even more startling rises in Iceland and Ireland (Chapter 10), where debt-to-GDP ratios reached 1,200 per cent and 700 per cent, respectively.35 That’s not the work of the rogue traders or speculators. It is the dismal result of sovereign policies which relied on superleverage without a thought to the fact that all this debt had to be serviced and repaid. Sovereigns do this through taxation – but this, too, reaches its limits. Still, in spite of so much money being taken out of taxpayers’ pockets and thrown to the wind, government balance sheets in the USA, Japan, Britain and continental Europe have been deteriorating as liabilities rise rapidly in response to ill-studied measures and inability to comprehend factors underpinning the economic and financial crisis. Ill-studied measures included a great deal of money being spread around, either going down the drain or to serve special interests. It is no accident that, in the first quarter of 2010, the American financial services, insurance and property industries spent nearly $125 million on lobbying, up by over
40 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
11 per cent from 2009. The Center of Public Integrity36 says the financial industry alone hired more than 3,000 lobbyists to impact upon the financial reform bill (Dodd-Frank) before Congress (Chapter 11). Influence peddling has been doing its best to water down the new regulations, even if senators and congressmen knew that taxpayers, who are repeatedly put to the task, wanted to see some house cleaning. On June 14, 2010 it was announced that the Office of Congressional Ethics launched a probe into the fund-raising activities of eight lawmakers. All of them sit on the House Financial Services or Ways and Means committees.37 The wealth of western nations has not been helped by the fact that money in politics has become pervasive. In an article in the International Herald Tribune, Thomas L. Friedman was to comment that while political instability was a phrase normally reserved for developing countries, now people ask him about political instability in America. ‘Banks, multinationals and hedge funds,’ Friedman wrote, ‘often hire policy experts to do “political risk analysis” before they invest in places like, say, Kazakhstan or Argentina … [but] they may soon have to add the United States to their watch lists’.38 Thomas Friedman did not say in his article whether all this is part of the new normal theory, or of the last and dying convulsions of the old normal. One can only hope that, in the evolving economic and financial landscape, it will be possible to distinguish between private interest and public responsibilities, doing so in a better-documented and more consistent way than has been possible so far. On the contrary, a reversal of the factors negatively affecting the wealth of western nations seems less likely, because sovereigns and their people are far from eager to fulfill the preconditions.
3 The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities
The many heads of a debt hydra ‘One day suffices to rise or dampen all human fortunes,’ said Athena, goddess of wisdom, in Sophocles’ Ajax. The message conveyed by these ten words by the Goddess of Wisdom could not be stated in clearer terms, and it gets to the real root of the evil that has plagued the American and European economies for the last two and a half decades. This is the avenue leading to oblivion, and the only way out is to do what Heracles (Hercules) did in Greek mythology. He cut the Hydra’s heads and burned their throats so that they did not rise again. In restructuring our economy, the aim should be to get rid of structures that have proved to be dangerous and assumptions that are plainly illusory – if not outright destructive. In democracies the need for this, and for a radical change in course, must be explained to the public in the clearest terms. When light falls suddenly on a subject which has been, for a long time, wrapped up in an envelope of obscurity, its effect is comparable to that of a revolution. And a revolution in thinking and in culture (see the following section) is necessary to ensure that the debt habit is kicked and the road is opened up in a new direction, based on ownership of real assets. Indebtedness as a way of life did not start suddenly. For private citizens, the era of personal debt by means of loans peddled by banks to households began in May 1928, in New York, when City Bank accepted 500 applications. The next three days brought 2,500 more applicants, and the following years brought millions.1 Sovereigns have had a longer and more checkered history in leveraging and defaults. Bardi, the great Florentine banking house, went bust because of its loans to England’s Henry VIII. The reason, in the late nineteenth century, that Barings Bank brought itself to the edge of bankruptcy (but was saved by the Bank of England at the 11th hour) was its loans to LatinAmerican states and US municipalities. 41
42 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
Precisely because banks speculate with other people’s money, in the wake of the First Great Depression, which started in 1929, when it came to power the Roosevelt Administration instituted the Glass–Steagall Act which divided commercial from investment banking. But, in 1999, the big banks convinced Bill Clinton to scrap the Glass–Steagall Act2 – thereby preparing their descent to the abyss in 2007–8. Having stated that, between 2000 and 2007, Wall Street created $1.8 trillion of subprime mortgages (within a grand total of $13.4 trillion of mortgagebacked securities sold by Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and the rest), Lawrence G. McDonald, a former trader of Lehman Brothers, looked at this issue of abuse of public confidence and depositors money: ‘The repeal of Glass–Steagall had heralded a devastating new era, where the huge deposits in the commercial banks had enabled them to get into our game simply by buying and owing an investment bank.’3 With the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, the debt hydra’s heads multiplied. With minimal supervision and free reign granted by the Bush Administration, US commercial and investment banks expanded their activities to include all sorts of gambling, with special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and a horde of structural products of dubious creditworthiness.4 Combined with very low premiums for refinancing, engineered by Greenspan’s Fed, this made it feasible to decrease the transparency of proprietary trading banks’ activities radically and to chart a road whereby the banking industry has been steaming full speed ahead towards the icebergs. The banks were not alone in this rush to disaster. Common citizens also took a similar road through overindebtedness, while at the same time they used all available political levers to get more and more entitlements. We will look into this issue in subsequent sections, but, first, let’s complete the picture on how hard the banking industry labored against the economy, against itself and against financial stability. The debt hydra got the elixir of life because of the close connections prevailing between the big banks and supervisory authorities. With Basel II,5 capital rules were constructed so that supposedly low-risk business could be loaded onto the balance sheet in virtually unrestricted amounts without triggering capital requirements. This became a huge loophole nearly all banks were quick to exploit. Step by step, the debt hydra got from governments, central banks and regulatory authorities the right to raise ever more ugly heads. They have been called special investment vehicles (SIVs) and were fed by selling off securitized tranches of the balance sheet – such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and asset-backed securities (ABSs) – to all sorts of financial market players, but mainly to other banks. Debt piled upon debt in the books of the banking system at highly inflated prices. The fact that the man at the helm of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, and his team kept interest rates rock bottom emboldened the speculators.6
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 43
Rather than being too lenient, Greenspan at the Fed, Cox at the SEC and other regulators should have followed the advice of an Athenian senator in Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens: ‘Nothing emboldens sin so much as mercy.’ Instead, they did everything in their power to ensure that the catastrophe waiting to happen would be delayed. With the blessing of the central bank and of the supervisory authorities, the debt hydra had a ball. Events followed rapidly, one after another, as Athena had predicted in Sophocles’ Ajax. • • • •
2007 2008 2009 2010
was the year of the financial earthquake, the year of the banking meltdown, the year of the impotent stimulus package, the year when the sovereign crises in the West began.
One catastrophe led to another, the only constant being continuing and massive waste of money by governments and monetary authorities. Yet, for central bankers and administrations, systemic collapse resulting from insolvencies is a vision of horror. Some experts suggest that all this was assisted by derivative financial instruments which blurred the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency due to overindebtedness. As the debt hydra’s heads clamored for more and more money, whether real or fake, ‘too big to fail’ companies – from banks to insurance and mortgage companies – were not allowed to go bust. On both sides of the North Atlantic, they were provided with an unlimited blanket of protection by already bankrupt sovereigns who acted as lenders of last resort. In America, this became known as the ‘Greenspan put’,7 which set the stage for a very curious and highly expensive zero-accident policy. Little attention was paid to the fact that this was practically bankrupting the nation. It did not matter either, since the debt hydra liked it and gave birth to even more heads, fed by very cheap taxpayers’ money handed over by the state. Big financial conglomerates rapidly expanded their off-balance sheet business, and deficits in most western countries increased so much that governments did not even dare to tackle them. Today, judging from the after-effects, many economists say that the medicine which was applied was worse than the illness. It is also more or less generally agreed that deficits of 10 per cent or more of GDP exhibited by the USA, Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and other sovereigns, cannot be sustained over several years. If they are, they will poison the economy and push nervous markets to drive up the cost of servicing the growing debt, till it reaches stratospheric levels. It does not take a genius to understand that such a simultaneous mismanagement of monetary policy, sovereign debt and the economy leads investors to question even the major countries’ ability to roll over their debt. Prior to the recent deep crisis, there was a sort of consensus that rich
44 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
countries could safely have public debts worth 60 per cent of GDP. Optimists put this percentage much higher, citing as an example that Japan’s debt has exceeded 200 per cent of its GDP. But this argument forgets that, as Japan’s economic crisis lingers on, the debt hydra has turned the country into a hall of mirrors. Even in the world’s largest economy, the United States, public debt is too high relative to the economy’s size and year-on-year increase in GDP. In the meantime, with the exception of Bernie Madoff, who supposedly swindled $65 billion in a giga-Ponzi game, none of the wrongdoers have been brought to court. Most were allowed to keep running the institutions they ruined, and those who were retired did so in great comfort, having amassed enough millions through fat salaries and bonuses for a comfortable life. In the total absence of any responsibility, there have been golden parachutes instead of punishment.
What is meant by rights without responsibilities? As far as life in a modern economy is concerned, these are truly changing times. Although it would be presumptuous to say that ours is a new condition in the flow of human affairs, the definition of the new normal in Chapter 1 brought to the reader’s attention that, because of government actions and inactions, business opportunities and a swarm of unexpected risks, we are at crossroads. History will record the first decades of this century – and most likely a longer time period – as living on debt rather than living on assets. The present and the next generation will find it difficult to kick the deep debt habit, but there is no alternative. The inherent weakness of this system of enjoying more and more for less and less work is the hypothesis that there exists a bottomless pit from which to pull out riches. This is an illusion partly created by the fact that the danger of public finances drying up, with the next stop being bankruptcy, does not show up immediately; instead, it hits hardest at the most inopportune moment. Debt, debt and more debt unraveled what historians consider to be the golden age of Pericles in ancient Athens. It lasted a mere 30 years – more or less the same time as the ‘more and more’ current prosperity. In old times, like now, with spending for welfare far exceeding the state’s income, the advantages of economic prosperity waned at the same time that profits from far away expeditions ebbed. Pericles’ Athens was living on borrowed time, at the expense of those it professed to protect; almost by necessity, Pericles’ democracy turned to imperialism, which led to the 30-year Peloponnesian War that devastated ancient Greece. In modern times, the love of debt started to gain supremacy in the 1970s, becoming even more popular in the 1980s partly, though not wholly, because the mantra of every pressure group became its call for its ‘rights’. Theoretically, a higher standard of living in the West has been promoted by a revolution
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 45
in technology and applied science: space research, computers, robotics, communications, networks and biotechnology. This theory, however, is highly simplistic. Science is amoral,8 and has no interest, let alone objective, in guaranteeing ‘a better life for all’. Indeed, it is not science per se but the profound change in society which accompanied the deification of debt from sovereigns to families that radically changed the way our generation behaves. As the first two chapters have explained, piling up and consolidating debt is, in reality, a curse – even if, curiously enough, it is being looked upon as the solution. It is a ‘solution’ for people ready to discard their responsibilities because they think that they only have rights fulfilled by amassing more debt – since it is so much more difficult to amass assets. ‘[Modern] Greece seems to be a typical example for the degeneration of the modern social state. A state, in which life shall be better year on year. In which less and less work will be done, but social protection constantly improves and privileges as well as benefits are extended,’ according to an article ‘Patient Greece’ in Rzeczpospolita, the Polish newspaper.9 As that same article points out, our disdain for assuming responsibilities has gone so far that ‘risk is eliminated, and the next generation believes they have a right to a comfortable and sorrow-less life’. Part of the blame, of course, falls on the previous generations. We should not forget that, since the end of World War II, the ‘next generation’ has been featherbedded by its parents and by society to the point of believing that one does not need to take care of oneself. Deus ex machina will do what it takes.10 Over the years, this disastrous philosophy has become typical of Europe, and it has now invaded America. Personal irresponsibility, associated with passivity or plain absence of hard work (the best way to come up from under), has sapped energy out of people who have been brought up to believe that they can have whatever takes their fancy, and they will fight anyone who tries to take that non-existent ‘right’ away from them. As the Rzeczpospolita article aptly pointed out: ‘The furious demonstrations in Athens were not for fear of hunger or endangerment of health and life. The Greeks protested, because they thought they have a right to prosperity’ – and no politician of the left, center or right wing had the wisdom and courage to stand up and explain that the ‘right to prosperity’ – indeed, the right to anything else – are myths and that they are a fata morgana which no sensible people would take for real. This is by no means singling out the Greeks for criticism. What Rzeczpospolita has written applies to all western nations without exception. The article under discussion has correctly characterized this philosophy of ‘rights without responsibilities’ as alarming, disquieting and troublesome. It is precisely the sort of personal and social attitude which identifies societies in decline, and it is propagated through the biased mentality that wealth is not a consequence of one’s own effort and work, but should be guaranteed through the state to everybody – and forever.11
46 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
As in the years of the decline of ancient Greece and of Rome, work starts being seen as something ‘good for slaves’; the moral code itself also changes for the worse. In America, bankruptcy has become one of these ‘rights’. People who persistently spend beyond their means go bankrupt, and this unethical behavior is no longer stigmatized but simply regarded as ‘bad luck’. When consumers borrow or go on shopping safaris with their credit cards, the blame is laid on lax lending practices; in reality, however, the wrong is 50:50, the other 50 per cent being irresponsible borrowing and spending. Governments have contributed to this drift in society’s values. For instance, they have encouraged more and more people to become homeowners when they can hardly afford the mortgage payments. Taking on more debt is now seen as a ‘right’, without any responsibilities attached to it. In being so lenient in awarding entitlements which are unaffordable and unsustainable, the politicians have, most evidently, a conflict of interest. Money makes the world go round and, up to a point, debt is seen as real money – though in a society that allows unlimited leverage that ‘privilege’ turns to dust. Debt is the instrument par excellence of the virtual economy and of run-away finance, propelled by greed, lust and fake social models. The 2007–11 economic, financial and banking crisis has demonstrated that, unlike the real economy which we know how to manage at a certain level of depth (albeit not very profound), the virtual economy is an unknown entity with opaque deals. It involves gearing, unprecedented risks and requirements for human expertise well beyond what is generally available. This new and little-understood debt-ridden financial environment has survived through a stream of: • new financial products, difficult to price and untangle, • novel processes of financial alchemy created by means of derivatives, and • globalized markets whose whims are poorly understood and which are regulated by nobody. Taken together, the notions of unlimited debt, deregulation, technology and globalization have created limitless opportunities for misbehavior. Control requires the highest caliber of management experience and skill – which, we should admit, is very tough to find. As for the loudly heralded ‘age of democracy’ that the West wants to export to developing countries, its critics say that it has turned into an age of cleptocracy – and this not only by politicians, speculators and smart bankers. The whole population participates in it through its entitlements and by living beyond its means by getting into debt.
Entitlements Starting in the years after the First Great Depression, and after World War II, proceeding at an accelerated pace, society assumed obligations way beyond
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 47
those it had the means to fulfill. In the West, an aging population has made this policy of paying by debt – and therefore by mortgaging the new generation’s future – much worse than it might otherwise have been. Both socially and economically, what now happens is destabilizing. In France, entitlements are called ‘les acquis sociaux’ (acquired social benefits); they have been lavishly given by successive governments and greatly contributed to the fact that sovereign debt is overflowing from all sides. Entitlements range from state pensions and health care for all, to a long roster of goodies the State Supermarket delivers. Among the most worrying issues are the massive demands all this makes on the common purse. From cradle to grave, people are entitled to ‘something’, while social pressures and weak sovereigns see to it that this ‘something’ balloons. All this did not happen by accident. It is a consequence of the fact that people have learned how to use the levers of democracy. They exercise political pressure, which allows them to get what they want. They vote for politicians ready to satisfy citizens’ wishes with something out of dreamland. By exploiting the politicians’ fear that they might lose the next election, citizens have obtained concessions from the government on an unprecedented scale. • Everybody is entitled to health coverage, which teaches people not to care for their health (widespread obesity being an example). • Mothers and fathers get subsidies for their newborn, allowing them to substitute income from work by income from procreation. • Youths get more benefits from being unemployed than they would if they worked, hence it is better for them not to look for a job. • Those who have a job are entitled to all kinds of protection through structural barriers, essentially taking as hostage those who have no job. • Bus drivers, railroad personnel and plenty of others are entitled to retire at age 55, because they are doing a tough job putting their health in peril.12 • Every person has the right to three, four or five weeks of vacations; and foreign travel to exotic places, once a rare privilege, has become commonplace. • Big banks, whose managers have been inept or self-gratifying, are entitled to a rescue, by massively throwing good public money after bad. • Lawyers are enjoying good business, as the expanding wave of consumer protection has led to class actions against a number of companies for reasons ranging from real to imaginary. One of the most ‘silly’ entitlements is the so-called ‘13th and 14th month’. Under public pressure, and for the purely populist reason of being re-elected, weak governments first legislated for the payment to employees of an additional month’s wage for Christmas. Then, they added a further month’s wage in
48 Financial Risks Which Kept Piling Up
cash payments – half for Easter and the other half for vacation.13 The calendar year still has 12 months, but, in the process of leading the sovereign to bankruptcy, the State Supermarket invented a 13th and 14th. While many of the goodies in the list of entitlements were irrational to start with, an extra problem that arises with the new normal is that nobody knows for certain, ahead of time, what current solutions will be worth some years down the line – or what kind of social costs might be needed in exchange for future benefits associated with entitlements. One way to find out is to play the devil’s advocate: • How far will the wealth remaining in western nations guarantee even a slimmed-down version of entitlements? • What will be the impact of conservation measures – taking into account high volatility in financial markets and greater appreciation of risk – on pension and health care systems – and their financial staying power? • Will families have to retrench their spending attitudes? In which area of the economy will this be mostly felt? Will it take the form of less reliance rather than of entitlements? • How will sovereigns and central banks deal with the long-term consequences of their policy of rescuing every self-harmed big bank with zillions thrown to the four winds? Answers to these and similar questions are non-linear, because there are no reliable means of predicting economic growth after the years of superleveraging and subsequent upheaval we have gone through. It is possible that, when it comes, recovery will lead to rapid increase in tax revenues and the deficit will be reduced without great pain. This, however, is not likely. On the other hand, it is possible that a loss of business confidence will oblige sovereigns to proceed with deep cuts in public expenditure as well as much higher taxes – a painful way of gaining control over current deficits. ‘Anyone confident in predicting either outcome is a fool,’ wrote John Kay in a feature article in the Financial Times, adding that ‘The basic issue is the need to restore confidence in what government tells us.’14 The deep economic and financial crisis of 2007–11 has posed tough questions that self-respecting politicians will not be able to avoid answering forever. But to do so in an able manner they should involve all citizens, because in the end they will be asked to pay the bill. Even if the twenty-first century’s problems are complex, the co-involvement of common citizens can be beneficial in finding suitable solutions to problems such as: • How should government debts be reduced without overly impacting on economic development? • What’s the risk on continuing with loose monetary policies? At what point will these create runaway inflation?
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 49
• How can we find more efficient ways to allocate capital commensurate with the risks embedded in financial investments and trades? • How should the clean-up costs of the recent crisis be distributed between current and future generations, and how should that solution be sold to the public? A major gain from co-involving the common citizen in the search for a soft landing is the better understanding they gain that the current system of entitlements is falling apart. Precisely because of lavish and growing entitlements, as well as of their own softness, western societies face serious challenges: • • • • • •
high percentage of unemployed or underemployed, falling educational standards, disintegrating families, major income inequalities, lack of trust in public institutions, and failure to deal fully with social change.
The reason for this sharp contradiction between the ‘you never had it so good’ promised by entitlements and the negatives summed up in the preceding bullet points is human nature and the distortion of handouts (even of their meaning) by the mass effect. Many problems have become too big to manage and their complexities are way beyond the abilities of those people in charge. In addition, some chapters of social expenditure can be effectively tackled only through open, well-informed public debate, which does not happen. Instead, opacity promotes all sorts of fraud as people try to take advantage of the system. Governments are not vigilant in tackling fraud, an example being healthrelated cases. ‘The largest federal health-care fraud takedown in our nation’s history,’ was how Eric Holder, the US Attorney General, described a recent case. On July 16, 2010 authorities in five American cities charged 94 people with a $25 million plot to defraud the federal agency that manages health care programs for the poor and elderly.15 In France, about 50 million people have the right to health insurance supported by the State Supermarket. But, according to wide reports, there are 60 million individual chip-in-card health IDs in circulation, giving a right to doctors’ visits, medicines and hospital care. Worse yet, because government support is graduated; the most widely copied IDs are the sort providing full protection. Contrary to this policy of State Supermarket health coverage, which more or less prevails in all western states (with the exception of Switzerland which has made private health insurance mandatory for all residents), everybody
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should be responsible for his/her health. The best contribution by the state is one akin to the role played by an insurance company.
Pensions and the new normal16 Entitlements are not just granted by politicians at times of prosperity. Back in 1921, at the depth of its bleak economic problems right after World War I, while a bankrupt Germany was trying to negotiate relief from the huge weight of reparations and was unable to control its finances, the government took upon itself enormous new social obligations: • • • •
eight-hour workdays, health and welfare payments for the poor, insurance for the unemployed, and other goodies, over and above pensions to veterans and widows.
These became entitlements and, because they are largely paid through debt contracted by the state, they raise the question of who will finally foot the bill. Classical measures of public debt only record the legacy of past commitments and associated past borrowing. By contrast, a new approach, known as generational accounting, looks far into the future and may well become part of the new normal. The concept underpinning this approach is that of quantifying how much a government can expect to spend on its citizens now and in the future, and how much it can expect to collect from present and future generations, through all sorts of taxes. The financial deficit between these two estimates expresses the amount a sovereign would have to set aside today to fill future holes in the state budget. This is an eye-opening paradigm because, in many countries, such a gap is a millstone around the government’s neck, doing away with any hope that income could exceed expenditure. While education and the defense budget are huge expense items, those of particular concern to generational accounting are pensions and the ever-rising amount of money thrown into health care.17 Proponents of generational accounting suggest that its results help to identify the fact that the way entitlements are currently structured allows all members of society, and most particularly the elderly, to make outsize claims on the young, which may include their own children and grandchildren. This statement has far-reaching consequences because it is shows entitlements not as an instrument of social cohesion, but one of abuse. Pensions are a case in point. In 1889, when state pensions were introduced by Otto von Bismarck, the German chancellor, life expectancy was 45. Bismarck’s concept was to provide an income for those who simply could not work any longer. In France today, people typically live 26 years after retirement.18
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Allow me to repeat the references I have made, to impress their message on the reader’s mind. Debt and entitlement policies see to it that the greatest cultural challenge for this and the coming generations is to change the mentality of common citizens and political leaders alike from borrow now, pay later to save now, rather than starve and be hopelessly ill later. The mention of starving is no exaggeration because a surprising majority of people are unprepared for retirement. According to available information, an estimated 47 per cent of British women of working age do not have a pension plan, and this is also true for 22 per cent of all adults aged between 55 and 64. The nasty surprise awaiting them is that the state’s pension system is already nearly bankrupt and may well be unable to honor its past promises in the not too distant future. Self-reliance is the only way to avoid the whims (and eventual bankruptcy) of the State Supermarket, as well as those of different company pension plans. Millions of workers could be poorer when they retire because of a government plan that would allow the terms of their pension schemes to be rewritten, according to a news item in The Times. Behind it was the fact that the British Pensions minister confirmed he is considering legislation that would make it easier for the trustees of private sector-defined benefit schemes to water down crucial member safeguards.19 Aging being a rather widespread practice, one of the challenges for the new normal is thoroughly to rethink the whole issue of pensions. In addition, while the currently prevailing system of public pensions (which largely rests on ideas of the mid-1930s) is bankrupt, and gets deeper in debt every year, private pensions schemes are quite frequently mismanaged. Indeed, not only are private pension funds far from being well-run, but also western central banks have added to their mismanagement woes by keeping interest rates at 1 per cent or less. In the aftermath, pension funds, which earn nothing through bank deposits, put much of their pensioners’ money in equities – and, even worse, in alternative investments.20 The company favored by British pension funds has been BP, because of its high dividend and supposedly solid business. But following the well-known accident in the Gulf of Mexico early in 2010 and the unprecedented cost of environmental salvage, in mid-2010 BP did not pay a dividend and the British pension funds have been in a bind: BP’s dividend represented one sixth of their revenue21 and, as an equity investment, BP shares lost more than 50 per cent of their value, reducing pension funds’ assets considerably. Not all private pension funds are properly provisioned. In mid-March 2010, in connection with a three-day strike by its cabin crew, British Airways announced that it had reached agreement with unions to tackle its £3.7 billion ($5.7 billion) pension deficit. Companies are also changing the basis of pensions they sponsor from defined-benefit to defined-contribution schemes, with uncertain benefits. The difference in cost may be as much as 30 per cent of the payroll.
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This swarm of uncertainties is part of established pensions schemes’ new normal. On September 22, 2010 the Financial Times commented on a study which had documented that people employed across the European Union need to save a1.9 trillion ($2.5 trillion) more each year to retire with pensions that can maintain their standard of living. (The pensions gap is worst in Britain and in Germany, where total additional savings required each year are at the level of a380 billion and a470 billion, respectively.)22 Individual savings are the answer and should be part of the new normal, though it is unlikely that an electorate accustomed to 65 years of unlimited handouts by the State Supermarket will relish following that course. (When I suggested to a cousin of mine that this is a ‘must’, she answered: ‘I don’t earn enough; how can I afford to set money aside?’). Compounding this social and political adversity are the possibility that any individual investment’s returns are not those expected, as the likelihood of a shortfall is always present, and also the existence of so-called pure longevity risk, which cannot be discounted. Therefore, the possibility of outliving resources must be faced ex-ante.23 Stoics could say that as long as individuals are healthy enough to pursue remunerated activities they are less affected by the aforementioned risks, because they have a fall-back option to deal with any shortcomings in public social security and in their savings. This is only half true and, moreover, does not include sudden devastation of their portfolio through a deep financial crisis. But the big if is whether they can find jobs as 60-year-olds, and it is likely that, at some point, this might no longer be the case. To make matters worse: • the legislation may change, • health costs might significantly rise, and • longer-term care solutions might become too expensive, defying the idea of any old-age security system. In conclusion, entitlements might be dying of natural causes. With public sector deficits reaching for the stars, the usual game of the State Supermarket to be everything to everybody is no longer viable. Therefore, under the new normal there will be a rigorous need for household-based mechanisms to cover pensions and health care – and the aforementioned figures from Britain and Germany show how much these will probably cost each citizen for pensions alone. To avoid being trapped in another high debt crisis they can hardly afford, sovereigns should promote pensions and health care individual savings targets, in a way similar to their approach to carbon emissions, for example. It needs no explaining that this requires a well-studied long-term policy to avoid dismal failure – the result of, Tony Blair’s (and others’) idea of taxing carbon emissions, which was politically untenable.
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The middle classes’ broken dreams One of the reasons for overdependence on the State Supermarket is that, in the minds of most people – including those who govern – there is much confusion about the nature of wealth. Theoretically, wealth consists of goods people use or consume, as well as more permanent assets: land, factories, machinery – which provide the ability to produce goods and earn an income from them. Services could be seen as part of goods, and therefore of wealth, insofar as they help in its production, distribution and sales. By this definition, financial assets are not wealth in the established sense. This is particularly true when these ‘assets’ are based on debt, hence on someone else’s obligations. By contrast, financial services could fall under the definition of wealth production, as long as they assist in the creation of real wealth through loans financing the companies’ investments and operating expenses. Financial assets can, however, be a claim on real wealth even if their existence per se neither increases nor decreases the level of wealth. For instance, the lack of a mechanism for recycling money can handicap the production and distribution process by making capital a scarce commodity. Leverage used to increase one’s impact and expected profits beyond that which one’s current wealth permits is not wealth – and the preservation of wealth is not promoted through leverage. The banking industry, as well as governments and households who inflate the value of their financial assets relative to their real wealth, are doing a great disservice to themselves and to the economy. The gearing of debt sees to it that real wealth takes a hit and eventually everyone suffers. This also holds true for ill-conceived geared investments. People who buy overvalued and/or speculative assets with borrowed money do not make themselves richer but poorer – particularly when adversity hits, as it does from time to time. Similar principles prevail with oversized (and often ill-studied) salvage operations and rescue packages. Economists challenging the ‘greater leveraging’ concept ask: • Is a policy of gearing financial assets boosting the amount of goods the economy produces in the long run? • Or, is it having consequences that eventually restrict economic activity because of loss of business confidence? Though different experts tend to respond to these queries in diametrically opposing ways, experience teaches that the second alternative is likely to happen more frequently than the first. This is important inasmuch as governments and central banks have been repeatedly intervening to rescue financial institutions (and the markets) by keeping the printing presses busy without thoroughly examining the downside.
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At the end of the day, those who foot the bill are the common citizens, through unemployment, higher prices, more taxes and diminution of their investment wealth. All this is poison for the middle class, and it is absurd to promote such practices because, however it may be counted, the middle class is the pillar of the modern state. In addition, households are leveraged twice, though it is difficult to appreciate this issue by looking at it superficially. They are leveraged both through their own debt habits and because of unaffordable entitlements which see to it that a big chunk of public debt burden is eventually falling in their back yard to be paid through higher taxes and inflation; these ‘claims on the collective’ are ever rising and nobody bothers to ask the all-important question about how they will be financed. To make matters worse, society now tends to penalize the very concept of enterprise which has been fundamental to the rise of the middle class; the people widely considered as the bedrock of modern western society. This is true even if the exact definition of the term ‘middle class’ is far from being clear. In Britain, it means better-off people; by contrast, the meaning in America is that of rather less well-off.24 Under either definition, as with all other parts of society, the population characterized as middle class has handsomely benefited from the generous welfare state, whose credo is ‘wellbeing for all’. In the longer run, however, this ‘wellbeing for all’ is financed through higher taxation of those working, while at the same time personal initiative – which has created the wealth – is regarded with suspicion. As a thought-provoking commentary by Wegelin, a private bank based in St Gallen, Switzerland, pointed out, ‘wellbeing for all’ has become so embedded in western citizens’ thinking that the modern economy’s zeitgeist is unwilling to recognize misfortune and strokes of fate; while hard work, good fortune and success are regarded as a sort of evil (although also a source of tax income): The industrious and productive are met with envy. The Greek past is forgotten, in whose mythology the Orestaea spelled out the inevitability of misfortune; forgotten too, the Old Testament story of Job, in which misfortune afflicts the innocent and the guilty triumph. Europe has lost the roots of its cultural history.25 This is true not only in Europe, of course, but also in America and Japan. Rightly or wrongly, plenty of nations collectively known as ‘the West’ are poorly equipped for global competition, particularly when confronted by emerging countries which don’t ‘take it easy’, don’t have an elaborate (and costly) ‘social net’ and are relatively unfamiliar with the entitlement mentality and all sorts of ‘guarantees’ lavishly provided by the State Supermarket.
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 55
Traveling with light luggage and working hard to come up from under, China, India, Brazil and a few other nations have been outperforming the West’s tired approach. They do not face this never-ending spiral of debt burden, which has a distorting effect on economic policy and is still being practiced on a large scale. The way western governments are currently operating in monetary and fiscal matters far from constitutes sound management of the economy and, without doubt, has nothing to do with fiscal discipline. They are just kicking the can down the road, and through the G-20 meetings they invite the big emerging economies to join them in this self-destructive pastime. The leaders of developing countries – who find no reason not to take part in these high-profile G-20 events (organized and paid for by the West) – are, however, careful. They don’t see the attraction in bringing their nascent middle class a boulevard of broken dreams, as the West has done with its own middle class. Rather, they use the Socratic method – the art of asking: • What exactly are they (the western leaders and hosts) trying to do? • Are the West’s goals colliding with the developing countries’ own? • Or are they allowing them to fill the vacuum left by the retreating West? It is as if western leaders are not in their right minds any more. By ‘right’ I mean the way Sam Walton, one of the most successful businessmen of the post-World War II years, described the way his mind worked: ‘When I decide that I am wrong, I am ready to move to something else.’ A project or process may prove unable to deliver what was promised, or the man in charge may be unable to get results. As Walton aptly remarked on such an occasion: ‘One should never underwrite somebody else’s inefficiencies.’26 Efficiency and effectiveness correlate. ‘Effectiveness is a habit,’ Peter Drucker once said, but people today are not being taught how to be efficient and effective – let alone how to get that habit. They don’t even know how to plan, or if they make a plan they keep it static even if the world around has changed. One does not plan and then try to make the circumstances fit those plans, according to General George Patton. One tries to make plans fit the circumstances; the difference between success and failure in high command depends on the ability, or lack of it, to do just that. Flexibility, however, takes leave when people have ‘rights’ but no responsibilities. Remember this when, in Chapter 4, we speak of Japanification. Remember, also, what Lord Melbourne, a former British prime minister, said when Queen Victoria came to the throne: ‘What all the wise men said would happen, has not happened. And what all the damned fools predicted has come to pass.’27
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What may follow the debt hydra? In mid-August 2010, the Federal Reserve said that America’s economic recovery was ‘more modest’ than had been anticipated. Therefore it maintained its policy of quantitative easing (Chapter 5). The debt hydra responded to the Fed’s statement with a ‘Thank you’, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 2.5 per cent the next day.28 The economy does not want to move because business confidence is lacking. After the Fed, the Bank of England lowered its growth forecasts. The given reasons were tight credit conditions, government spending cuts and the projection that inflation would probably remain above target in 2011. The reference to the debt hydra was forgotten. The subtle admission that the largest economy in the world, and one of the largest in Europe, were unwell confirmed that the debt hydra did not achieve the miracle expected of her. Instead, the economic troubles created have been visible – a combination of shocks from the cocktail of new and risky financial instruments, fake credit ratings, plenty of greed, weak risk management and lax supervision. It did not help that central banks bent backwards to permit commercial and investment banks to survive by decreeing bottom-rate interest rates and engaging in novel and untested monetary policy exercises. The early blossoms Ben Bernanke, the chairman of Federal Reserve, was dreaming of had a short season in late 2009. In the week of July 19, 2010, he told Congress that the US outlook was ‘unusually uncertain’. According to critics these two words – ‘unusually uncertain’ – threw oil on the fire. Around the western countries, different government initiatives to stimulate the economy by keeping the printing presses running had the same effect. Consumers, and to a certain extent the financial industry, tried to rebuild their balance sheets, but still remained overleveraged. With official unemployment figures just shy of 10 per cent, American consumers have emerged from the whirlwind of ‘buy now pay later’, which characterized many of Alan Greenspan’s years at the Fed. As for talk about another stimulus, on July 28, 2010, Bill Gross, the chief investment officer of Pimco, equated spending to boost production to flushing money down the toilet. No wonder that Nouriel Roubini, the New York University economist, argued that ‘avoiding double-dip recession will be difficult’.29 For his part, Lawrence Summers, (then) chief economic advisor to President Barack Obama, described the world’s leading economies as ‘in or near liquidity trap conditions’,30 which is practically implying that they are so weak that lower interest rates and other monetary policy tools are ineffective stimulants. Economists, however, disagreed on whether the disaster scenario of sovereign defaults was a real and present challenge or only a tail risk. The difference is significant because a tail risk can bring totally unexpected
The Salient Problem is Rights Without Responsibilities 57
conditions, including a slide to the edge of the abyss. By contrast, viewing the debt hydra’s presence as a challenge means finding the money to pay for increasing debt in timely fashion. If creditors lose faith in their borrowers, they will significantly increase the interest rate they demand, call for repayment of existing debt or refuse to roll over old loans. The same principle exists in business. When debt is secured against assets, then the borrower is often forced to sell; a number of forced sales causes asset prices to fall, making creditors much less willing to extend loans, let alone offer new ones. Many bank industry executives may look kindly on the debt hydra, since it means business; but alert ones will do so only up to a point. They will not wait for the house to burn till they call in their money. Jamie Dimon, Morgan Chase’s CEO, is said to have called a senior manager of his bank in the middle of the Rwanda jungle, ordering him to get the institution out of subprime mortgages – having sensed the upcoming disaster. Made in October 2006, nine months before hell broke loose, Dimon’s prognostication proved right. That was not the case of Richard Fuld, Lehman’s CEO, who continued taking misdirected risks with all sorts of rotten mortgages till he loaded his bank with $660 billion in highly doubtful ‘assets’ in commercial and residential real estate, subprime and other mortgages, leveraged buyout debt, commercial paper and credit default swaps. As the bank was sinking in a sea of red ink, its employees posted a giant photo of Fuld and Gregory (the bank’s president, who was fired at the 11th hour) in the offices, arm in arm in tuxedos with the caption ‘Dumb and Dumber’.31 By contrast, creditors become willing to accept risk for their capital if they sense that personal, corporate or government financial policies are sound. This means that, at sovereign level, fiscal as well as monetary discipline has become an established practice. Creditors are keen to check if such a sound financial policy is well-established because, time and again, all sorts of developments, including political, reveal weaknesses in prevailing rules. All sorts of lenders, except those employing usury, will dump unsafe borrowers – for instance, when crucial aspects of the fiscal framework are far from being retightened, or incentives for encouraging a general responsibility to safeguard sound finances are non-existent. As far as sovereign debt is concerned, it is no secret that the large majority of politicians don’t have the stomach for tough decisions regarding a comprehensive consolidation of public finances. Yet, to get out of economic troubles, a country has no option other than to downplay debt and return to a sound budgetary position. To put it bluntly, confidence in stable and reliable underlying conditions is fundamental to the recovery of the economy, particularly in countries where the debt hydra had free reign. The best policy in a globalized economy is concerted common action but, G-20 or no G-20, this is not in the works, as governments which should have been coordinating their policies are
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heading in different directions in an attempt to keep their country’s voters ‘satisfied’. If the chief executive of an organization and his financial officer are upset when analysts raise valid questions (to which the CEO and FO don’t have answers), then the crisis climate does not lift. This is one of the criteria analysts (and some economists) use to make up their mind about future prospects. The US economy faces a painful period through 2015, an executive of Berkshire said on August 16, 2000.32 Just imagine … more of the 2007–11 economic and financial crisis for another four years and, even then, who can guarantee that, in the meantime, a second dip does not send ‘recovery day’ to 2020 or beyond? There are very difficult choices ahead and a consensus is difficult to find, even if everyone recognized that all sorts of benefits, from health care to pensions and other entitlements, are unaffordable and unsustainable; therefore, they have to be trimmed for spending in order for governments to be in control. What has ruined the western economies is the State Supermarket, which is running on deficits – while no government is keen to apply fiscal and economic discipline.
Part II Loose Monetary and Fiscal Policies Lead to the Destruction of Wealth
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4 Japanification
Japanification defined As a term of economic plight which is neither outright bankruptcy nor much better than a hall of mirrors, ‘Japanification’ is derived from the events which led to, as well as resulted from, the two lost decades of Japan’s economy. This unraveling process has involved a terrible destruction of wealth. It defied a horde of stimuli, which cost more than 150 per cent of the country’s GDP but delivered no results; led to a deflationary environment and a moribund stock market; and crystallized business activity, leaving it unable to lift itself from the hecatomb into which it was thrown by the crisis. Given the dreadful after-effects of these misdirected policies followed by the Japanese government, it is quite evident that America and western Europe did not need to copy that bad example. Yet, that’s where their policies seem to be leading. By mid-2010, financial analysts in New York were saying that Japanification has the following in store for the US investor: • a Fed funds rate below 0.5 per cent until at least 2020, • average annual real GDP growth of roughly 1 per cent over the next 20 years, • a Dow Jones Industrial Average below 4000, and • a drop in average US house prices to around $100,000 (from $184,000 today) before 2030.’1 Such a grim assessment (hopefully) might not be highly probable, but neither is it impossible that things will turn out that way. Action in the right direction is the only means to avoid the economic and financial environment described by the above four bullet points, which will be worst than the stagflation of the 1970s.2 So far, however, US, UK and continental European policies – including the salvaging of big ‘zombie’ banks – point towards Japanification. But what is the right direction? 61
62 Loose Monetary and Fiscal Policies
If this is the wrong way, then what is the right direction? American economic history provides an excellent example, albeit eight decades old. Shaken by the First Great Depression (which was already old news), in 1931 and 1932 the US banking industry stonewalled. It was not lending to enterprises or to the public, even if the government and Federal Reserve of New York provided abundant available liquidity. Instead, banks used the federal money to add to their own reserves.3 In this environment: • • • •
about one quarter of the working population was unemployed, roughly one quarter of US banks had collapsed, ‘bank holidays’ were common currency, and the credit engine of the nation was no longer functioning.
Then, as now, inside and outside the government the luminaries were short of ideas about what to do next. But in early March 1933, right after he took command, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors (the so-called Brains Trust) thought out of the box and the measures they adopted turned the situation around. William Woodin, FDR’s secretary of the Treasury, recognized he did not have the experience to revive America’s economic power single-handed. The president’s weight was indispensable; Roosevelt and his economic advisors (George Warren and Henry Morgenthau) were ready to act. The (then) new president’s personality tipped the balance because he knew how to make tough decisions against all odds – decisions on which he staked his authority and his prestige – and how to communicate with the American public to gain its understanding and support during a difficult period. On Sunday evening, March 12, 1933 FDR started his ‘fireside chats’ over the radio (which as a communications medium is more effective than the ‘one-eyed cyclops’ [known as television] because the listener’s attention is not distracted by images). Neither George W. Bush, the father of the Second Great Depression, nor Barack Obama, who inherited it (and failed to keep his promises about righting the balances), know how to reach the hearts and minds of people – and this counts a great deal. Roosevelt’s fireside chats, and his way of addressing the problems of the common citizen, acted like magic. Instead of the (by then) customary run on the banks, on Monday, March 13, 1933, the queues of people outside branch offices were there to deposit money rather than asking for their savings back. A week later, prodded by FDR, Congress passed the Economy Act, followed by other important legislation and, in June 1933, by the Glass–Steagall Act.4 The answer to critical problems demanding immediate and forceful action cannot be given by economic theories because they are abstract, often detached from reality. Even theories which have found more general acceptance, like so-called Keynesianism, were made for different economic
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conditions than those we are confronting. The past is of course a good teacher, but decisions are made for the future, not for the past. This is not written as the critique of just one theory, but of economic and social theories at large. Contrary to the laws of physics, economic and social theories have so many subjective biases in them that the word ‘theory’ is simply a misnomer. The free market theory, too, is suspect because in the middle of this century’s first decade the markets have failed in some important ways. One of the reasons has been over-reliance on the ‘efficient market hypothesis’; another is that the financial system has both grown exponentially and become more complex. A third is that derivative financial instruments, over-the-counter deals and shadow banking have killed the free market hypothesis. A fourth, even more critical, is that the ‘efficient market’ theory does not account for human lust and greed. Regarding economic theories and their after-effects, Larry McDonald quotes Mike Gelbank, saying: ‘Many US economists are completely out of touch. They don’t understand derivatives in the property business and how these derivatives provide a huge and totally unacceptable stimulus to the economy. Unacceptable because they are demonstrably false.’5 According to expert opinion, if derivatives are regulated and over-thecounter trades channeled through exchanges, investment bankers and traders will find other (non-regulated) ways to make fast profits. Therefore, the ability to apply discipline based on financial laws and regulations is most crucial. Regulators must do so steadily. It should not be forgotten that those who govern are under steady pressure from special interests to turn a blind eye. Japanification is an example of unwanted consequences as Japanese politicians and the Liberal Democratic Party tried to be all things to all people and therefore took plenty of illadvised decisions. Looking back to the Roosevelt years, the fact that, in the 1930s, there were no lobbyists with huge budgets to put the government under pressure was an evident advantage to decision-makers which is currently unavailable. Today, lobbyists have so much elbowroom that they can turn not only economic theories but even the toughest regulations on their head. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act is an example, because over the George W. Bush years it was not really applied. By contrast, there is no evidence that Franklin Roosevelt was burdened by the lobbyists when he decided on the abandonment of the gold standard (essentially largely devaluing the dollar against gold), even if the USA had the largest gold reserves in the world. ‘Congratulate me. We are off the gold standard,’ Roosevelt said to his economic advisors6 on April 18, 1933. That was his decision. He took the initiative rather than waiting to see infighting and hear a cacophony from his economic advisors – as Obama did in 2010 when Larry Summers and Christina Romer allegedly clashed and the latter quit as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisors.7
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FDR’s way was leadership, and that’s the right way, though inevitably it involves risks. When crisis is the keyword of the day, the man in charge has to be bold. He cannot succeed by making compromises. When, at the beginning of World War I, the German army was approaching Paris, Ferdinand Foch, the French commander at the front, reportedly said: ‘My left wing lost contact with the enemy, my right wing is in retreat, my center hardly holds. The situation is excellent. I attack.’ This was at the famous Battle of the Marne. Foch’s decision took the Germans by surprise and changed the fortunes of World War I. But bold decisions are not what the Japanese government took in the early 1990s, or that the American and European governments are taking today. Instead, the policy is one of compromises and half-baked plans leading nowhere other than to Japanification.
Japanification’s after-effect: precarious public finances One of the lessons taught by Japanification is that the worse can continue to worsen, and it can do so fairly fast, with after-effects spanning a long period of time. Two decades after the crash of its banking industry and accompanying evaporation of public confidence, Japan continues to have precarious public finances. Every so often an uplift looks to be on the horizon. Economists ask: Can the recovery be sustained? The answer is that many things may look like being good news but they do not last very long. Cyclical upturns are unlikely to be sustainable when there exist deep-seated economic problems – such as Japan’s huge public debt, poor demographics and a vital lack of decisiveness among policy-makers about how to deal with the ‘next challenge’. Economic and social problems have a nasty habit of not going away when leadership is at its lowest. Precisely for this reason, Japan has been experiencing sapping growth for 20 years and most likely will continue doing so for years to come – with disastrous consequences. The country is in a dire fiscal situation: as a percentage of GDP, the budget deficit is over 10 per cent; and gross debt has passed the 220 per cent of GDP mark. The real and present danger is that the negatives reach a tipping point as the government escalates its issuance of bonds to finance ambitious new spending policies; meanwhile, like the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan inflates away debt. ‘Misfortunes’, as such, don’t just come along. The government is unable to take bold action, leading many analysts to the forecast of a ‘triple-sell’ –the Nikkei, the Japanese bond market and the yen – all starting to decline together.8 One of the visible after-effects of Japanification is that the country’s main stock market index is a shadow of its former self. As for government bonds, for years the state relied on domestic savers to buy them. This policy,
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however, unraveled: first, because an aging population no longer has a high savings ratio and, second, because of the mass effect – Japan’s public debt may exceed gross household assets by 2015 and Japan might have to rely on foreigners to finance its debt, except that foreign investors seem to be positioning themselves for a meltdown rather than being ready to assume ‘Japan risk’. A triple whammy of the Nikkei caving in, coupled with investors going on strike in the Japanese bond market and the yen declining – all at the same time – would be a nightmare scenario, making Japan the Lehman Brothers of the global economy (see the final section of this chapter). But such an eventuality should not be totally unexpected. For years the Japanese economy gave warning that the combination of economic stagnation and rising public debt was explosive, though this warning fell on deaf ears. The country which, in the 1970s and 1980s, was on its way to conquer the world financially through superleverage, slipped down the global league and amassed the largest gross public debt-to-GDP ratio ever recorded in peace-time. The puzzle (as far as economic theories are concerned) is that this has happened while government-bond yields have remained unreasonably low – as if kept so deliberately to feed speculation and promote the carry trade. The passive attitude Japan adopted in regard to its future is a far cry from the policies it followed in the second half of the twentieth century. The 1970s, and most particularly the 1980s have been a time of ascendancy. In the latter decade, the country’s industrial production rose by nearly 50 per cent. The problem was that such a rapid growth was driven by unprecedented financial leverage and overinvestment, both at home and abroad. This led to a real estate and stock market bubble, with equity prices rising as much as 600 per cent. The bubble’s collapse started in December 1989 and, a little over a year later, in 1991, it was followed by the aforementioned two decades of economic contraction. Today, Japan’s economy continues operating way below capacity. The output gap is estimated at about 7 per cent, three times bigger than it has been in the interval since Japan’s asset-price bubble burst two decades ago.9 Economists think consumer prices have further to fall, while at the same time fiscal problems are also pressing. In an effort to explain Japanification, economists say that cracks appear when the rate of interest paid on government debt is higher than the economy’s growth rate – not only in the event of public revenues being insufficient to cover the government’s financing charges. When this happens, the fiscal position becomes unstable and the debt spirals upwards. The deeper challenge confronting America and Europe at the present time is that their woes are not so different to those of Japan. While the recovery is theoretically continuing, practically its pace is moderating as the support from the global inventory cycle and fiscal policy stimuli wanes. Moreover,
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different surveys suggest that global growth might weaken, as, in the third quarter of 2010, international trade started to slow down from rather buoyant rates recorded in the first quarter of 2010. This is highly relevant to our discussion because, as far as America and Europe are concerned, a bad situation is made worse by a global financial crisis which inter alia obliges governments to borrow at ever-shorter maturities while their obligations are longer-term. This has been one of the key reasons that led to the Russian bankruptcy of August 1998 (as well as to the banking crisis in America, in 2007, because of structured investment vehicles and subprimes). Japan’s persistent deflation is not a good omen for the future. (In financial circles, it is said that the Japanese government is unable to understand it.) Unlike Roosevelt’s forceful action in March 1933, which led to dollar devaluation (against gold, see above) and a rise in prices, leaving deflation behind, no Japanese chief of state has had the courage to take a bold step and reverse a situation which continues to be out of control. Economic theories on what ‘should’ or ‘should not’ be done abound – but none presents much by way of a realistic course of action. Some economists, for instance, suggest decisive action before deflation and negative psychology become deeply embedded. They do so, however, without explaining how can this materialize under prevailing twenty-first-century circumstances. Another piece of economic advice making the rounds is to use capital injections (read: another discredited stimulus) and then ‘ensure’ the economy is on a sustained healing path before exiting the stimulus (which may mean never exit). This runs contrary to yet more advice from a different group of economists: that it is time to exit the stimulus once and for all. No economic creed takes, or even tries to take, a well-rounded approach. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in Japan – as well as in America and in Britain – economic policies are drifting along by default. That’s another characteristic of Japanification which also illustrates that keeping interest rates near zero, à la Bank of Japan, is far from being a brilliant idea (see also Chapter 5). It is suggested that Japan’s scarcity of yield translated into scarcity of growth, a pattern often repeated in the USA and Britain – and it may last for years. Some economists believe that, should this happen, it will cause secular bull markets in investment grade bonds (which, in a way is already taking place) and also promote the so-called Venti stocks (the term ‘Venti’ means global firms with capitalization of at least $20 billion – vingt in French). According to opinions which, a couple of years ago, were few but now reflect the majority, the risk of Japanification will end the day the Federal Reserve hikes. When this happens bond prices bend and the clouds will be lifted from what Bank of America Merrill Lynch financial analysts call the ‘three Ds’: debt, deflation and deleveraging. For some time, however, there is no indication that monetary policy authorities intend to move in that direction. Therefore, doing away with
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the ‘three Ds’ is not yet around the corner. Even if the cloud of debt lifts, if that of deflation remains, the economy will be in the doldrums. In addition, deleveraging means catharsis – and both policy-makers and common citizens have to accept that, because after so many excesses catharsis is inescapable. In conclusion, the Damoclean sword of Japanification still hangs over our heads. What is rather astonishing is that western politicians don’t position their countries’ economies against the forces of the new normal, which misdirected government policies and the big banks created, by learning critical lessons about the ways and means through which Japanification creeps in and then finds a home.
Money thrown at the problem brings the next big crisis nearer Japan has two decades of experience of throwing money at the problem and getting deeper in debt. In spite of this waste, if not because of it, year-in and year-out prospects for stronger economic growth are being overshadowed by a market which simply refuses to get into higher gear. In the USA, the experience with massive quantitative easing is no better (though there may be political reasons behind it, as we will see in Chapter 13). Another similitude between Japan and western countries is that politicians and central bankers are split on the nature of mechanisms, and timing, of an exit from the exceptional economic and financial measures taken at the peak of the crisis. That exit should lead to a more normal monetary policy framework – which is a natural aim. It would have been a grave mistake, and admission of Japanification, if the measures which were adopted, particularly those that were non-standard, were not designed with their phasing-out in mind. According to learned opinions, such an exit strategy has not been one of Ben Bernanke’s and Mervyn King’s worries. Instead, the spirit was that most of the measures unwind naturally in the absence of an explicit decision to prolong them (which is absurd). Some experts add that, anyway, central banks have the ability to act whenever this is deemed necessary because of their institutional independence. It does not need explaining that in times of crisis institutional independence is a fiction. The mammoth bureaucracy of an administration leaves a large footprint on central bank decisions, and politicians know full well which levers to pull to steer monetary policy their way. Central bankers appreciate that in a clash with the government, when push comes to shove, they have three options: • follow the political winds, • openly express the deeper reasons for their opposition, or • simply quit.
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That is precisely what Hjalmar Schacht did in March 1930 after confronting a hostile reaction by the Brüning government because of his publicly declared opposition to a punitive clause of the Young Plan (which substituted the better Dawes Plan of 1926, weeding out its escape clause regarding reparations). There is little doubt that documented improvements in financial conditions allow central banks to begin performing part of their ‘normal’ role in the market. But what exactly is meant by ‘documented improvements’? The answer is more subjective than objective. Central banks do appreciate that keeping all or most of the non-standard monetary measures in place for a long time induces distortions such as: • excessive reliance on exceptional central bank liquidity, • the belief by market players there will always be a deus ex machina, • weak financial incentives to restructure banks’ balance sheets and other delays in necessary adjustments, and • the inescapable moral hazard associated with enhanced support for credit institutions. Central bankers also know that the market’s trust in their steering of the economy may bend. Breaking trust is usually done very quickly, while gaining it and re-establishing it (if at all doable) take a long time. On the other hand, uncertainty in regard to government policies propagates the message that a sovereign has adopted Japanification by default. The fact that major nations continue along a one-way road, and the decisions they are taking are not far-sighted, leads many observers into thinking that, even if the more recent chapter of the crisis revolved around Greece, this may probably be just a starting point. Everybody knows that the United States is heavily indebted. It is essentially euroland’s sovereign troubles which enhanced the allure of US government bonds, deemed comparably safer. Still, despite short-term benefits to the USA from the debacle or near-debacle of Club Med’s sovereigns, investors have reason to be worried. A renewed credit crunch could set off a chain reaction, undoing much of what has been achieved through emergency lending by central banks around the world. There are visible strains in money markets, where inter-bank lending has become costlier, as the market players are still fearful about sovereigns resolving to solve their debt crisis. Something similar happened with Japan in the 1990s which led global lenders to demand higher interest when lending to Japanese institutions – a policy which became known as the Japan premium. Investors and lenders have not forgotten that the inter-bank market, which is an important source of funding for nearly all financial institutions, froze in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. Alarm bells ring
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because the inter-bank market makes banks highly interconnected, facilitating the spread of crises from one credit institution to the next and creating conditions whereby the insolvency of one institution can materially harm others. Against the backdrop of non-ebbing market turbulence, uncertainty about the sustainability of the global economic recovery could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy of a double dip, while overindebted sovereigns are no longer left with a margin of error. Investors cannot fail to be aware of the number of economic errors in the past – such as injecting massive liquidity into the market and taking over, or otherwise rescuing, self-harmed big firms. In fact, global banks, insurance companies and car manufacturers were by no means the only parties to benefit from plenty of money being thrown at the problem. In Britain, the Labour government embarked on a parallel (and irrational) spending binge, increasing funding of the (already overburdened and inefficient) National Health Service (NHS) by 6 per cent per year in real terms, and boosting spending on education. This misdirected policy was not only motivated by the desire to overcome the economic and banking crisis. During Labour’s 13 years in power (up to the 2010 elections), two thirds of all the new jobs created were driven by the public sector. As if this we not enough, pay has grown faster there than in the private sector. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, British government expenditure soared from about 40 per cent of GDP to 54 per cent – a whisker below 55 per cent in France but still high compared to 41 per cent in the US, 43 per cent in Canada and 47 per cent in Germany. Just like Japanification, when the sovereign’s spending spree gets out of control the situation is dangerous and contagious. Not to be left behind, in America, George W. Bush adopted a ‘guns-and-butter’ strategy whose after-effect became the biggest expansion in the US budget since Lyndon Johnson’s in the mid-1960s. Bush: • created the biggest new bureaucracy since World War II – the Department of Homeland Security, • added a huge new drug entitlement for Medicare, and • expanded federal government control over the states and over education. Instead of focusing on the reduction of public debt, it kept on rising as Barack Obama also expanded government-sponsored and -financed health care, without first cleaning up the system and cutting costs. According to critics, this has ominous implications for the future, as the demand for social services soars because of an aging population. The reader should notice that this is a global problem, as well as one of the pillars of Japanification. According to a United Nations study, the proportion of the world’s population that is over 60 will rise from 11 per cent today
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to 22 per cent in 2050. Much worse off will be western countries where, if no radical changes in pension schemes are made, by 2050, one in three people will be pensioners and one in ten will be over 80, fully eligible not only for pension but also for full medical care every day and every hour.10 Let me conclude with this thought. There is cause and effect in Japanification. While the foregoing projections talk of events which are some years away, across western countries today’s budget deficits have already ballooned to almost 10 per cent of GDP. The more governments bolster their health care schemes, their pensions and their damaged banks – as well as the more they provide fiscal stimulus – the worse becomes the prognostication in terms of the next big crisis.
Financial discipline requires more than leadership Japanification is not an act of God; it is an act of man. Whether we talk of entitlements, stimuluses or other big money obligations assumed by the State Supermarket, spending more money than the sovereign gets in taxes cannot go on indefinitely; it is high time to apply financial discipline. Working against discipline is the fact that political leadership nowadays is weak and it does not have the force required for change in economic and social priorities. Instead of positioning themselves and their economies against the forces of the new normal, politicians have adopted an attitude of self-defense, delaying the tougher decisions associated with longer-term fiscal steps – as well as the all-important re-evaluation of commitments. For instance, adopting policies leading to reduction of entitlement spending, which most economists now see as a necessity in order to rein in public sector expenditures. This attitude engenders significant risks. Mike Mullen, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is America’s most senior officer, said publicly that the US national debt posed the biggest threat to the country’s national security – bigger even than that presented by al-Qaeda or weapons of mass destruction.11 This is another example of failed leadership in western countries. Thomas L. Friedman, the political analyst, put the issue of what is wrong with ‘things as usual’ in proper focus: The standard answer is that we need better leaders. The real answer is that we need better citizens. We need citizens who will convey to their leaders that they are ready to sacrifice, even pay, yes, higher taxes, and will not punish politicians who ask them to do the hard things. Otherwise, folks, we’re in trouble.12 If there is a prescription for Japanification – with all this means in déclinisme and decadence – then this is the citizens’ policy to take more out of the state than they contribute to it. In present-day western society, such a widespread
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pressure to grab the most out of the common purse is pure greed. It is also coupled with the incorrect belief that the state and its institutions are responsible for bringing ‘prosperity’ to everyone. The policy is that, to get the most out of the government, one has to intimidate its agents and constantly put them under pressure through demonstrations and by any other means. Such an undemocratic attitude counts on the fact that the second-raters who are in charge of public affairs will get scared and bend, doing what the street demonstrators ask them to do. Fear of losing the next election is democracy’s soft spot – and such a fear is enough to scare those who govern into submission to the will of the masses. De Gaulle once said about Pétain,13 to paraphrase, that he thought too much of the voters and not enough of the country. Lack of financial discipline at every level – most particularly government – is the root of the crisis which started in 2009 in the aftermath of the economic and financial hecatomb opened by the crisis in self-harmed banks in 2007. As was the case in Japan in 1991, to avert the likelihood of systemic risk created by extravaganzas like speculative trading, high leverage and irresponsible lending, governments took it upon themselves to right the balances, forgetting that: • the governments themselves are markedly overleveraged, • they have assumed obligations well beyond their income, and • their agencies are far from being characterized by the fiscal discipline so necessary in tough times. As central banks injected a lot of newly minted money into the economy, credit markets and stock markets rebounded from their March 2009 lows. Optimists saw this as evidence that central banks and fiscal authorities were taking decisive measures to stabilize the markets and the real economy. Because of this, they thought that a recovery was taking hold, allowing companies to raise additional capital. Ben Bernanke spoke about having seen ‘green shoots’. The old normal was supposed to be back, albeit at great cost to the economy. This optimism was misguided. Some countries resumed growth not because of improved prospects but as a result of the government’s being maladroit with taxpayers’ money, essentially showing that fiscal discipline was still on leave. All but forgotten has been the principle, brought to the reader’s attention in the preceding chapters, that fiscal discipline requires both leadership and a change in culture. People have to take responsibility for it, as well as accept the credits and debits which will be necessarily created by major financial adjustments in income and in spending policy. Avoidance of Japanification requires restructuring, and the act of restructuring calls for deleveraging. From this, there is no escape. Because nearly all western economies have been in such a derelict state, monetary and fiscal
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adjustment are bound to be painful. Whoever takes responsibility for them will be exposed to plenty of criticism from people who fail to appreciate that: • entitlements have to be cut, • all sorts of expenses need to be revisited, and • whole chapters of the sovereign budget have to be axed, especially those adopted because of populist policies. In addition, if a recovery to sound economic conditions is to be sustained and the challenges presented by the new normal faced in an able manner, monetary and fiscal discipline should become the order of the day. There is no evidence that this is understood, because political leaders don’t have the stomach for difficult choices. Rather than keeping some powder dry for action in the future, they do what central banks have done, slashing interest rates to almost zero and dramatically expanding balance sheets. The pros say that this unprecedented activism: • injected new life to the financial system, • countered the collapse in private demand, and • heralded the message that governments and central banks are ready to take action. Critics answer that this high-handed interference with the markets is simply repeating Japan’s mistakes over the last two decades on a grand scale. The risk of Japanification has been brought so much closer, and the result has been that, already, the finances of highly indebted sovereigns are cracking under the weight of new debt. But, all the while, the economy is worryingly fragile, as demand is still dependent on government support; property prices are still falling in more places than they are rising; and public largesse, papering over old problems, is creating new sources of worries and volatility. As long as the rebound in demand is due to the public purse in the form of stimulus spending and other tricks, any celebration of coming out of the tunnel is premature. Not without reason, economic forecasts press the point that demand in the western world will remain weak, especially in countries with broken banking systems and with over-indebted households.14
Governments, central banks and the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium Many economists and nearly all investors are fretting that another crisis is coming because the sovereigns’ profligacy cannot last forever and debts will have to be paid. The IMF reckons the gross government debt of the western world’s big economies will reach an average of 115 per cent of GDP by 2014
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and continue to rise thereafter, particularly so in America and in Europe’s Club Med: • • • •
pushing up interest rates, crowding out private investment, sapping economic growth, and leading to outright default of some sovereigns (see below).
Transforming current social norms which characterize the State Supermarket, the politicians’ and, increasingly, the common peoples’ sense of responsibilities are key to fighting the notion of living on debt. Asking the state to provide all sorts of goodies and, over and above that, abusing the system, as happens universally with health care, is worse than cheating. It is covert corruption. Covert corruption is difficult to uproot because it has taken hold. On the other hand, plenty of evidence demonstrates that as long as it is around there is no way to diminish the mountain of public debt. Added to this is the fact that economic and financial crises leave plenty of muddle behind them, making corruption and overspending of public money symptoms of an increasingly profound Japanification. Sovereigns and central banks are, in fact, running out of options. The more they try to stimulate the economy and salvage damaged entities through debt financing, the less they get in return. According to an article in the Financial Times: ‘To the fearful crowd, potentially overvalued debt sits on the world’s balance sheet like a flammable compound in a creaky old tank. A spark is a spark, wherever it comes from.’15 As the previous chapters brought to the reader’s attention, the current weaknesses of the economy will not be resolved as long as total debt levels are high and interest rates are near zero, which practically means that central banks must stop taking more risks with the economy and that government budgetary deficits, as well as current account deficits, must be put under lock and key. What is now happening is dynamite. One can hope the powder will not ignite while the room is full of TNT. Jean-Claude Trichet, the European Central Bank’s president, had very good reasons when he warned at the Jackson Hole Symposium – the central banks’ top annual event organized by the Kansas City Fed16 – that postponing cuts in public and private sector debts would be very dangerous and risk a Japanese-style lost decade. In his opinion, dealing with economic imbalances was not simply a duty to be completed after an economic recovery, it was, and still is, an important precondition for sustaining a durable recovery. Trichet also pressed the point that economic growth could be threatened by high public indebtedness, stating that as long as it is unclear when the adjustment will occur and who will bear what fraction of the adjustment’s costs, firms and households may delay their investment and consumption decisions. This will slow down the economic recovery.
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By contrast, in the course of the same event Ben Bernanke said that he stood ready to administer more of the same medicine – namely to boost the flagging American economy through unconventional means – adding that he had the tools to do so.17 The only issue, Bernanke added, was whether the benefits of each tool, in terms of additional stimulus, outweighed the associated costs or risks of using it. (But he did not elaborate on ‘pluses’ and minuses’.) This did not go down well with the audience. To Bernanke’s statement that the Fed would do ‘all it can to stimulate the US economy’ (albeit without providing any specifics), Nouriel Roubini answered that, as far as stimulating the economy was concerned, the Federal Reserve was running out of bullets.18 Roubini is right. By overreacting in the wake of the September 2008 banking crisis, the central bank has not kept any dry powder. At the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium, Bernanke went through some of the advantages and disadvantages of the Fed’s remaining policy options. He thought that the policy of asset purchases had worked by reducing the amount of Treasury- and mortgage-backed securities available to investors (though no mention was made of the fact this also raised bond prices, pushing them into other assets such as commercial bonds). The Fed chairman, however, acknowledged there are two risks with asset purchases: first, finding it hard to judge how much to buy and, second, that the sight of the Fed creating money to buy assets may unnerve the public and cause them to expect more inflation in the future. Of course, not only the public, but also the whole financial market will be unnerved. Economists, financial experts and investors question the Bernanke Fed’s judgment of superleveraging the central bank’s balance sheet – and most particularly the fact of continuing doing so for what the market perceives as uncertain benefits. Boosting from $2 trillion to $4 trillion to $6 trillion, with whatever ‘benefits’, is outweighed by the costs and risks of doing so, commented an article in the Financial Times.19 To his critics, Bernanke lost the Fed’s independence by having the central banks policies follow politics – which should have never been the case. Critics moreover suggest that Bernanke will not be remembered as a great chairman if he rescues the economy from a financial crisis, only for it to suffer lost decades due to Japanification. A senior executive’s legacy is, indeed, the quality and endurance of the structures he leaves behind. The pros say that Ben Bernanke was obliged to do what he did because he did not want to be the Fed chairman who let the economy deteriorate – and, in addition, his options have been very limited. He could promise to keep rates close to zero for longer than the market expects; but then his hands would be tied if he wanted to raise rates within that period if inflation suddenly rose. Alternatively, always according to the pros, he could raise the Fed’s longterm goal for inflation above levels consistent with price stability. But this
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could make sense only if a prolonged period of deflation greatly weakened public confidence in the ability of the central bank to achieve price stability. Another course might have been to cut the interest the Fed pays on reserves deposited with it by commercial banks towards zero (from 0.25 per cent), in order to encourage them to lend more. In regard to this option, the pros say the effects would be small while what is really needed is central bank action capable of calming the market’s concerns over both the likelihood of deflation and sovereign debt, as well as market uncertainty (caused first, by banking, then by the sovereign debt crisis, which is far from over). These twin problems are as challenging as squaring the circle, but the argument they make works both ways. Until an effective and convincing policy is found, the central bank’s independence is compromised by the politicians’ relentless push to continue flooding the market with liquidity. At the same time, however, it is an illusion to think that a monetary authority would continue to be independent when public trust in it has been lost.
Correlation risk: Greece/Bear Stearns and X/Lehman An unavoidable presence in the mind of central bankers, government officials and economists at the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium has been the wall of credibility sovereigns have to climb to avoid repeating the Greek scenario of earlier that same year. Or, more precisely, the possible correlation between Bear Stearns, the American investment bank, and sovereign Greece. History knows that economic and financial weakness is provocative; as exposure to amassed liabilities gets bigger and bigger, there comes a time when debt is no longer sustainable. The exceptional measures taken by the Greek government in the second quarter of 2010 to redress a situation which had gotten out of control are discussed in (Chapter 9). In retrospect, there are two ways of looking at them and their consequences: first, that the sovereign acted under pressure, and as a condition for the multibillion dollar loan; second, that the was actions were most courageous, presenting the only way left to save the country from Japanification. When the Greek crisis broke, in January 2010, an opinion often heard among economists and financial analysts was that Greece was like the Bear Stearns of sovereigns. So far, there has been no evidence to refute such hypothesis. To the contrary, several knowledgeable people now think that, over the next few years, the world could see another country or two, much bigger than Greece, going the same way (Chapter 13). That will evidently cause significant concerns and a massive flight to financial safety. Even the likelihood of a Greek bankruptcy has caused a minor earthquake in euroland, with the euro sinking against the dollar, although the country’s economy is just a small part of the European Union. What is disquieting is the potential parallel to Bear Stearns. Analysts noted that, when the
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American investment bank imploded in the spring of 2008, it also represented a small part of the US financial system as a whole. But, its impact went well beyond its size; with Lehman’s bankruptcy immediately followed by the fall of AIG,20 Bear’s downfall reached potentially global dimensions. The root of this knock-on effect lay in the fact that Bear Stearns was linked with a web of other financial entities, through a complex network of dealings and interdependences. Therefore, the ripple effect from Bear’s implosion was significant, scaring regulators and investors – with investors rushing through the exit door. The fear that a Greek bankruptcy might lead to that of a sovereign the size of Lehman Brothers in investment banking became pervasive. There has been speculation that a Greek bankruptcy may take along with it euroland’s Club Med or one of the world’s larger economies. ‘Club Med Plus’ is the more likely emulation of Lehman Brothers. If all of them fall down the precipice at once – Portugal, Spain, Italy and (why not) Finland – this will be the proverbial sword of Damocles for the global economy. Like Ireland, Finland has been seen as one of euroland’s go-go economies, but what is often forgotten is that it has gone through a severe economic winter after the fall of the Soviet Union. Much of Finland’s resurgence was due to the strength of a couple of its global companies, foremost among them Nokia. But on February 9, 2011, a leaked memo by Nokia’s chief executive delivered a blunt assessment of its predicament, likening it to a man standing on a platform on fire, torn between burning alive and jumping into icy waters.21 The nightmare scenario of sovereigns at the edge is magnified by the big global banks’ continuing misfortunes. French and German banks (among others) will be badly damaged by a Greek, Irish or other bankruptcy, which explains why euroland’s governments thought that a huge package to shore up Greek and Irish financial defenses was urgently needed to reassure the markets. A political commentator in France put it in this way: ‘Sarkozy has two options: put up billions to shore up Greece, and never see them again. Or do nothing, and come up with billions to save from bankruptcy the big French banks22 – money he will not see again either.’23 Merkel was confronted with the same predicament. In addition, euroland’s governments had good reason to be afraid of psychological effects. By an interesting coincidence, in early May 2010, Jimmy Cayne, the former chief executive of Bear Stearns, told a US financial crisis inquiry commission that the blame for his bank’s bankruptcy lay with the market’s loss of confidence. Cayne blamed market rumors for the demise of his investment bank in 200824 – the event which started the dramatic phase in the deep financial and economic crisis. Several companies who had made investments in Greece, particularly those who gave loans to the government and its agencies, started counting their beans. At end of July 2010, Munich Re, the giant German reinsurer,
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said that it held a2.1 billion ($2.8 billion) of Greek debt, but that was only 1 per cent of its asset portfolio; hence such a loss was affordable. That sort of counting makes sense. An exposure at 1 per cent of assets is, indeed, an affordable level, provided that one has made a good return on it and that similar conditions don’t prevail with chunks of the other 99 per cent of the investor’s or entity’s portfolio. (Warren Buffet practiced this 1 per cent exposure rule when, with American Re, he reinsured policies protecting against earthquakes in California. In his words, if worst comes to worst, Berkshire could easily afford 1 per cent damage, profiting in the meantime from a hefty income from reinsurance.) Other financial services companies, however, had not done their homework as Munich Re had and, therefore, their exposure to a Greek bankruptcy was substantial. Boardrooms were shaken because they knew full well that euroland’s billion, matched by IMF funds (Chapter 9), might prove inadequate. They were not the ‘nuclear option’ – the last big weapon in the armory of euroland’s sovereigns – though they proved good enough to keep the markets quiet. George Soros, Paolo Pellegrini and John Paulson, the three hedge fund managers who hoped to become trillionaires by shorting Greece, thought it safer not to challenged the package – at least for the time being. Instead, they probably lost money, as evidenced by the fact that, in late August 2010, Pellegrini closed down his fund, returning investors’ money. Having said this, however, both euroland’s sovereigns and the European Central Bank continue to be concerned about a rekindling of the debt figures as well as the contagion of the banking sector, carefully watching spreads in credit default swaps (CDSs). The CDS spreads of the eight banks with the most exposure to Greece – BNP Paribas, Barclays, Crédit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Fortis, ING and Société Générale – rose to year highs at the peak of the Greek crisis. The likelihood of a Greece/Bear Stearns correlation in financial woes should always be seen in the context of globalization. While the aforementioned banks could still access inter-bank markets, the fact that CDS spreads widened alarmed investors and made them sell more peripheral euroland government bonds. Concomitant to this, financial analysts reminded their audience that, while Bear Stearns heralded the descent of investment banks into the abyss, the big drama came with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,25 and that’s why the spread of sovereign risk after Greece is a matter to watch most carefully. Surprisingly enough, Lehman and many of the sovereigns who are thought to be on the sick list share another curious distinction. Their accounts are in a state of disorder and it is difficult to get a reliable picture of assets and liabilities. ‘Lehman’s derivatives records were a mess,’ Barclays Bank’s representative said on August 30, 2010 in an ongoing US trial.26 At the time these words were spoken, nobody was really certain which one of the big economies might be cast into the role of Lehman Brothers.
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But several hypotheses were heard and, if this happens, the bigger sovereign’s insolvency will severely aggravate the global economic picture – well beyond tensions in the money market and the inter-bank market. Uncertainty about the extent of sovereign liquidity and capital shortages greatly amplifies the importance being attached to credit risk in the international financial market. In Lehman’s case, commercial banks and other financial institutions responded by clearly reducing longer-term lending in the inter-bank market in a wave of risk aversion, which meant that: • maturing loans were not easily rolled over, • there were new interest rate highs for unsecured longer-term money market transactions, and • the impairing of the inter-bank money market redistribution mechanism for funds obliged governments to act as lenders of last resort by getting deeper in debt. Though the name of ‘X’, the country which might play Lehman Brothers’ role in an emulation of the Greece/Bear Stearns sequel, is not exactly known, guesses about ‘X’ abound. The same is true of hypotheses regarding the trigger for such a mega-event. The editorial to the October issue of Research Monthly, by Crédit Suisse, put it in these terms: Today, the nuclear weapon of the United States is protectionism, and China’s equivalent is the ability to sell its vast holdings of US government debt. Large-scale use of these weapons would trigger a global depression in which both sides would be major losers, so they don’t get used … But … markets may suffer a bout of panic over the seemingly inexorable expansion of US public debt.27 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, at G-20 gatherings of ministers of finance and central bankers, the prevailing psychology resembles that of boardrooms of financial institutions – particularly those uncertain about their own liquidity requirements and concerned that they will not receive sufficient liquidity from central banks, or from the market, at affordable rates. The nervousness prevailing among debtors – whether sovereigns or credit institutions – significantly increases the spread between the bid rate on main refinancing operations and the marginal allotment rate. With sovereigns, the market differentiates between creditors and debtors. Those with ambitious funding schedules, as well as those that have to make significant improvement in their balance sheet but fail to do so, are penalized. There is a parallel in what happens today with well-known entities, and it does not matter if they are banks or sovereigns.
5 Conventional and Unconventional Weapons in a Central Bank’s Arsenal
Souk means both market and chaos Souk is an Arab word with a double meaning: it means market; but also confusion, chaos, instability. Inherent to this second definition are a significant number of unknown factors and doubtful outcomes – which evidently represent risk; and they can reach critical proportions when market confidence wanes which, quite evidently, does not happen just by accident. Like any other scientific discipline based on or reflecting scientific principles, chaos theory1 teaches that there is always cause and effect (Chapter 1). The cause might be much smaller than the effect, and we can usually (but not always) identify the cause. A frequent reason for souk in the market is the blowing up of a bubble. Financial bubbles build up when prices get way above the fair value of assets and, typically, this happens because of exuberance, greed and the rush for quick profits. The American subprime bubble was, in large measure, due to interest rates being kept too low for too long by the Fed, supposedly to aid recovery from the dotcom crash of year 2000. Cheap money awakened the never-sleeping lust of big business dealers and their accompanying ultra-sized bonuses. Greed and low interest rates were also the cause of the dotcom bubble. Excessive interest rate cuts between 1997 and 1999 to counter the Asian crisis of 1997, as well as the Russian crisis and LTCM meltdown of August/ September 1998, were the causes of a rush by speculators and investors to the new Eldorado – and we know the results: a bubble based on debt which wrecked the stock market. This is exactly the kind of thing no economy needs, and it is most surprising that sovereigns changed clothes – from regulators to speculators – condoning (and even creating) situations which they knew were wrong. Here is another example. In its late 2010 ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, the IMF notes that some 24 per cent of Japanese banks’ assets consist of government bonds. In addition, Japan borrows inordinately through shortterm debt. If creditors suddenly lose confidence in government debt, the 79
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result could be a global systemic banking crisis, as well as a deep funding crisis for the Japanese government, ravaging the country’s economy. This is souk at its best. While, in the last analysis, even the most careful debt management cannot stop a country’s solvency coming into question if its deficits keep rising, as Ireland has been recently finding with investors deserting its bonds, conveying the message that going downhill is not an option can have invaluable results. Too much debt and frequent bubbles are the right recipe for sorrows. Economists who care for the proper functioning of the economy and of the financial system maintain that central banks and governments must intervene to prick asset-price bubbles. Bubbles are easy to pinpoint in hindsight, but highly-paid individuals who have the responsibility of watching over the health of the economy are expected both to exercise foresight and have the courage to identify them as they arise, then taking action to deflate them when they are still of manageable proportions. There is no excuse for the fact that the chairman of the Fed, or governor of any other central bank, is not more knowledgeable and better informed than the speculators and any other market player. Short of having foresight and decision-making expertise, central bank governors are part of the souk. It would be most interesting to know how Ben Bernanke, who missed the housing bubble of 2004–07, or his predecessor, who perhaps inadvertently created the stock market bubble of 2000, feel about their inability to bend the curve of such economically destructive events which have taken place under their watch. Critics say that Greenspan and Bernanke not only failed as guardians, they were also at the origin of both big bubbles. Having made the same mistake twice in a row within less than a decade (the first being the 2004 debt instruments bubble), Alan Greenspan and his monetary policy advisors created the souk. Then Bernanke repeated the same mistake. Since late 2007, interest rates have been kept ultra-low, supposedly to counter the aftermath of the credit crisis – without studying the negative effects. It is no wonder, therefore, that another bubble is brewing up, even if it is the remit of monetary policy-makers to try to avoid the causes creating bubbles and it is the mission of regulators to take timely action to stop bankers, investors and speculators from exploiting (and inflating) a nascent bubble. In an interview he gave to CNN on April 9, 2010, George Soros said: ‘When I see a bubble I join it, because that’s how I make my money.’ But then he added that regulators should act in exactly the opposite way – deflating the bubble before it booms and busts. Otherwise, they are not performing their duties. Soros rejected the usual excuse by Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and the US regulators that they did not see the bubbles coming. Instead, he pointed out that if he could see the bubble then they, too, could see the bubble. (Notice also that Dr Paul Volcker, the respected former chairman of the Fed,
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saw the coming bubble, but Greenspan and Bernanke, who were in charge, didn’t.) A similar argument is valid for commercial and investment bankers. Why did the West’s top bankers, considered to be masters of such an astute industry, not see the bubble created by their wheeling/dealing and their trades? Particularly in the United States such questions are daunting, because there is the added fact that, even after the economic and financial cataclysm, existing laws have not been applied. Most precisely, the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, enacted in the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scams, was mothballed by the Bush Administration and its regulators. Reportedly, the top brass of Lehman Brothers misrepresented the sum of $50 billion in the bank’s annual financial accounts. According to SOX provisions, Lehman’s CEO and CFO were first in line of responsibility, but the fact is that none of them was brought to justice. It does not need explaining that, both for reasons of effectiveness and of moral hazard, timely and decisive action by regulatory authorities is at a premium. Bursting bubbles presents a major risk to the economy. It is no secret that all asset-price bubbles are inflated with easy credit, and when that happens souk is the next stop. Every major market collapse, like that of 2007–11, poses a serious systemic risk. It also brings the economy into a perilous state, which further discourages central bankers from exercising control. The cost of a souk is high. Beyond the waste of public money, bursting bubbles damage the balance sheets of states, companies and households, creating plenty of victims. Because sovereigns and their regulators don’t do their job, taxpayers are asked to underwrite the speculators’ excesses. At the same time, these same taxpayers face foreclosure on their houses, lose their jobs, suffer a depletion of their savings and often see their pensions evaporate. The problem for economists who know enough to worry, is that, simultaneously, asset valuations are too high by historic standards and a combination of high asset prices, low interest rates and massive fiscal deficits is a prescription for trouble. As if to support the thesis that central banks lack political independence, in recent years few monetary policy executives have given proof that they know how to be ahead of brewing trouble. South Korean central bankers, for example, have been too slow to grapple with the need to act in a timely manner against excessive asset-price movements. (The problem originated in Seoul, where, in some districts, house prices have been near or at record highs.) Sound management would do what it takes to change this unacceptable state of affairs. In late 2009, Lee Seong-tae, the governor of the Bank of Korea, said that the central bank would have to be increasingly alert to
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the risk of speculative bubbles. At a conference in late 2009, he expressed his thoughts thus: ‘We must exercise greater vigilance over asset-price movements than we did in the past.’ But then he added: ‘I don’t think the central bank can accomplish price stability by itself.’2 In a way this is true. The whole government machinery must work in synergy.
Black swans and the need for a new economic theory The essence of what is called a ‘black swan’ is that its occurrence calls everything else into question. This is generally considered to be an extraordinary outlier; an ‘unknown unknown’, to use Donald Rumsfeld’s definition. Examples include the crises which demolished several of the better-known big banks and other financial conglomerates – events that shook the global financial system, as well as the slide towards bankruptcy of Greece, which hit the euro, and the subprime crisis, which unraveled the trust placed on securitization as well as on the dependability of independent rating agencies. Theoretically at least, one of the characteristics of financial markets over recent years is that of starting to accommodate extreme events. The practical challenge is that events which, in earlier times, were considered as rare outliers are now occurring much more frequently, beyond the margins of probability models. This leads to the assumption that finance is becoming more fragile. Markets and their complex instruments are prone to an unpredictable randomness and black swans are showing up in the economic landscape with much greater likelihood than originally suggested. This change in the frequency of causes, as well as amplitude of effects, is very important because, nowadays, finance is leveraged and major upsets, even rare ones, are more significant than the sum of several smaller and better understood ‘classical meltdowns’. Examples of such higher-magnitude events include the stock market crash of 1987; Japan’s descent into the abyss of 1990–01; the interest-rate turmoil of 1994; the East Asian economic earthquake of 1997; Russia’s bankruptcy and LTCM near-bankruptcy of 1998; the stock market crash of 2000; the 2007–11 deep economic and banking crisis. In the short time of slightly over two decades there have been eight spikes in the long leg of the risk distribution – black swans. By all evidence, the old economic theories, with which we are still living, no longer hold water. Newly established extreme conditions may not be ‘extreme’ after all but part of the new normal – turning on their heads many of the principles of traditional economic thinking. A new, up-to-date economic theory is needed to incorporate and reflect on risks associated with domesticated black swans, including the risks and opportunities they may bring to financial markets. Most definitely, this should also incorporate the after-effects of globalization and the rapid financial instruments innovation promoted by high technology. According
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to a growing body of opinion, both the souk of globalization and the novelty, as well as opaqueness, of new financial tools contributed most significantly to the magnitude of the 2007–11 crisis. Working in unison, these three forces – domesticated swans, globalization and novelty of financials – had an unprecedented impact. While the bubble was punctured by the US subprime crisis, casino capitalism and the internationalization of interdependent financial services spread the souk worldwide, and this fed back into real economies which, geographically, are far away from one another. In the aftermath, the rules of the game have changed. As an example of what used to be regarded as ‘normal’, diversification across multiple asset classes is today of little help. One has to be prepared for the worst all the way, including having financial staying power (own capital and liquidity) and a holistic, knowledge engineering-enriched and fine-tuned risk control system, with no sacred cows in its way. Put differently the socialization of black swans is changing the patterns of risks. Therefore, the way financial entities manage exposure should also change.3 Before the 2007–11 crisis, bankers, investors and regulators looked at exposure as a rather exogenous factor to be tackled case by case. The events which followed have shown that they now have to turn their attention to risks originating from within the enterprise and the system, being, to a significant extent, amplified by correlations which, in the past, were largely unexpected. According to expert opinion, beyond leverage, novelty and complexity, the homogeneity of formerly diverse instruments and markets has created new financial dynamics. Banks, insurance firms, hedge funds, pension funds, endowments and other financial entities, as well as individual investors, have been structuring their portfolios in a way that promotes concentration, not diversification. Therefore, risk, too, gets concentrated. Individually and in unison, a bewildering array of entities, supposedly with diverse objectives, bought a befuddled array of structured debt securities. They did so hoping to kill two birds with one well-placed stone: fat profits (hence, bonuses) and diversification. The ingredients, however, were very similar – leveraged loans as well as subprimes and other mortgages: from each individual firm’s perspective this looked smart, but for the system as a whole it put everyone’s eggs in practically the same basket – and the eggs became scrambled. Poor governance at sovereign and corporate levels further contributed to the frequency of black swans’ appearance, and to deepening of the crisis. Both during the inflation of the bubble and after it burst, risk management was reliant on poor models, together with lack of due diligence by bank supervisors, the banks themselves and investors. Also, there has been astonishing ignorance of the fundamentals, greed for money and poor incentivizing of remuneration. Greater exposure ruled the day, leaving the common citizen’s finances in poor shape. In the United States, for example, private sector debt alone
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rose from 50 per cent of GDP in 1950 to nearly 300 per cent at its 2008–09 peak, accounting for huge changes in family attitudes and in society at large. A century ago in America, defaulting borrowers were sent to prison and the generation that lived through the First Great Depression learned to save. However, the wide diffusion of credit cards in the 1960s and 1970s created a spending society; default became a lifestyle choice rather than shame, with a culture of reckless lenders and imprudent debtors. This is another reason why a new economic theory is necessary at all levels of society: private, corporate and sovereign. Its goal should not only be positioning risk and opportunity against unexpected consequences of leveraging, globalization and novelty in financial instruments; it should tackle also the avoidance of moral risk – which evidently requires an upgrade of ethics. The aftermath of obsolete, worn-out economic theories and methods has been the unprecedented indebtedness of western sovereigns and their economies. According to conservative estimates, overall write-downs in the US alone amounted to $1.5 trillion, or 11 per cent of GDP – much of it covered by taxpayers’ money. In 2008 (latest available statistics) the cost in euroland was about 18 per cent of GDP. Continuing on the same path is the worst possible solution. The new economic theory should: • internalize systemic risk, • provide the basis for contingency planning, and • guarantee a framework for solvent asset transfers from wrongdoers to the lender(s) of last resort.4 Anything short of this promotes moral hazard. Crisis resolution, too, should be revamped to include mechanisms for loss absorption like shareholder dilution, as well as ways and means for taking hold of cross-border challenges.5 Given its novelty and the fact it can lead to cross-border controversies, such a plan should be tested with set-out actions aimed at guaranteeing that it can handle even the most complex financial groups, their global operations and disposition of their assets – anywhere, at any time.
Price stability and the central bank The charter of the European Central Bank specifies that its first and foremost mission is price stability. In America, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the central bank a dual objective: price stability and high employment. These two goals are evidently contradictory to one another. Inflation of credit is a frequently used but uncertain way to promote employment, but it is the opposite of what is needed for economic and financial stability, eventually landing on the shores of greater trouble.
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An orderly credit system helps households, companies and the economy at large.6 It also implies that, in the longer run, people, businesses and governments have to live within their means, rather than being continuously strapped for cash. To fulfill its mission of price stability, the central bank must be able to control inflation in parallel with its efforts to avoid financial booms and busts. The Monthly Bulletin of the European Central Bank explained the monetary policy decisions reached by its governing body in connection to the 2007–11 deep economic crisis: Empirical evidence clearly suggests that monetary policy regimes oriented towards the maintenance of price stability contribute to stable macroeconomic environments. By firmly anchoring inflation expectations … [they] help to reduce both inflation volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty, thus improving the resilience of the economy to adverse shocks … [This] is clearly demonstrated through a comparison of the macroeconomic performance of most advanced countries during the Great Inflation of the 1970s and that of recent years.7 Economies which wrongly label themselves as ‘Keynesian’ argue that exactly the opposite policy is the best way for getting out of the current mess. They justify their position as being singularly able to avoid deflation. Other economists, however, maintain that the determination by some central banks to avoid deflation could result in galloping inflation (Chapter 7). The Fed’s pledge to keep interest rates low for ‘an extended period’ suggests that it thinks the US economy will remain underemployed for that extended period. This is simply pessimism and, if it spreads, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is exactly the policy which led to Japanification (Chapter 4). The Bank of Japan, over the last 20 years, and the Fed, in last three years, could cut rates to practically zero, and did not raise them because inflation was rather low. Just like the Bank of Japan, however, the Federal Reserve prolonged the slump, sowing the seeds of the next crisis at the same time. Theoretically, low interest rates are helping the economy mobilize its resources; practically, they are misallocating them by generating excessive growth in sectors that rely on either fixed-asset investment or credit. There is plenty of evidence that years of loose monetary policy have unwelcome side effects and critics suggest that policy-makers should look for antidotes to stagnation beyond macroeconomics. The Bank for International Settlements and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have warned that a prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates risks, resurgent risk-taking and inflation is the worst scenario possible. Having unwisely misused the monetary policy tools at their disposal by keeping no dry powder, central bankers in the
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West now see themselves as committed to significantly extending their easy monetary policy and expanding their balance sheet, which is already overblown. Interest rate decisions are at the core of monetary policy-makers’ responsibilities – particularly short-term rates. The interest rates reflected by the yield curve8 for a period ranging from five to ten and up to 30 years down the line are practically set by the market. The central bank decides the current interest rates, which gives it the ability to regulate the process of credit and the means for determining the velocity of circulation of money, hence how much flows through the economy.9 Other things being equal, when the quantity of money circulating doubles, the result will be that of doubling prices. Admittedly, ‘other things’ may not be equal because; for instance, financial conditions may be awful and the economy subdued. But when this veil lifts, inflation comes at its heels. Excess liquidity strikes back (see below). At end of the first quarter of 2010, a Merrill Lynch report put it in these terms: ‘Central bankers cannot be generous forever.’ Investors know this and they carefully watch for signs of a policy change, as well as the behavior of the yield curve implied by the market, which tends to be quite a good economic indicator. Investors also demand a higher yield on longer-dated bonds, to compensate them for tying up their money for longer. This is inverted in the case of ‘backwardization’, but it does not often happen that there are periods when the yield curve is inverted with short rates above long ones. Backwardization often occurs when the central bank raises short rates to slow the economy and head off inflation. Hence, it is an early warning of the probability of a recession. Plenty of evidence suggests that central banks are not so successful in fighting inflation, partly because of political pressures and partly because their tools are imperfect. This sees to it that inflation has persistence, defined as its tendency to deviate from a long-term equilibrium in prices rather than quickly reverting to it. The fight against inflation is at its worse when the policy of the central bank is adjusted to head off a recession. When a loose monetary policy is in place for a long period, such as the latter half of the twentieth century and nowadays, price stability takes leave while inflation emerges and re-emerges as a threat scenario. Ultra-low interest rates kept over a longer term and other sorts of monetary stimulus engineered by sovereigns by no means offer a free lunch. On September 29, 2010 rising expectations that at least some western central banks would step up monetary stimulus to support fragile economies drove the dollar to a five-month low against the euro. Mounting speculation suggests that the Federal Reserve will engage in another round of quantitative easing (QE, see below) by buying up bonds
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and other assets to throw new cash into the economy. ‘The dollar currently is in a lose–lose situation, where if US data is disappointing it increases the prospects of Fed easing and that weighs on US rates and the dollar,’ said Brian Dolan of Forew.com10 Opponents of the need for maintenance of price stability say that a tightening of monetary policy would result in higher lending rates, reducing the demand for loans from firms and households and leading to lower aggregate demand. This is not a monetary policy but a political argument – and the risk to the economy because of brewing inflation lies precisely in this conflict of interest. The ability of, and incentives for, commercial and retail banks to supply loans through the credit channel is composed of two parts: bank lending, with monetary policy rates affecting the liability side of credit institutions’ balance sheets; and monetary policy transmission, which essentially affects changes to the quality of borrowers, principally in terms of their creditworthiness. Interest rates aside, other monetary policy instruments used by central banks include main refinancing operations, longer-term financing, deposit facilities, marginal lending facilities, discounting of commercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps, absorbing operations and more. Through an array of tools, a sane monetary policy aims to do all that is needed to maintain financial and price stability over the medium to longer term. This is not to deny that, in the shorter term, certain non-standard measures need to be taken during a period of acute financial market tensions (see below). Referred to as ‘enhanced credit support’, these ensure that monetary policy accommodates an overall provision of liquidity – which, if extended over longer time, might become a liquidity wall (see below). Therefore, central bankers who want to be ahead of the curve try to forecast inflation, which should be done in a pragmatic way, free of bias. It is utterly wrong to take inflationary effects lightly.11 This is the wrong approach and it is illustrated by the fact that, over the twentieth century, the US dollar lost about 95 per cent of its spending power as a result of inflation. In fact, there is no better answer to the different ‘inflation is good for you’ arguments than the one John Maynard Keynes (then at the British Treasury) gave to David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of finance) and shortly thereafter prime minister: ‘With the utmost respect, I must, if asked my opinion, tell you that I regard your account as rubbish.’12
The wall of liquidity In the opinion of economist Nouriel Roubini, a new financial crisis is brewing because of persistent excessive liquidity. This has taken its strength from the 2008–09 anti-crisis measures by western central banks and governments, which put huge amounts of newly minted money into the market – though
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without reaping the beneficial effects they expected from having the printing presses work overtime. That money was supposed to pull the big banks out of the abyss and, at the same time, relaunch the western economies. But the appropriate homework was not done and the necessary rules were not put in place, which allowed bankers and speculators to take on crazy risks. The result should not have been unexpected. It came in the form of a new financial bubble-in-the-making which will not take long to explode. The wall of liquidity did not solve the market’s confidence problem. If anything, it made it worse because: • banks have over a trillion dollars in excess reserves, • companies have plenty of cash and easy access to capital markets, and • interest rates are extremely low for most borrowers. Still, there is a notable lack of confidence (not a lack of liquidity), which seems to be the main problem holding back the western economies – and most particularly that of the USA. It looks as if there is a bad set of policy options for the Fed. According to a growing body of economists, current Fed policy may cause a bubble in the credit markets. The market is hot, with bond, equity and gold prices rising at the same time. This flooding of the market with newly minted money through quantitative easing has come over and above the policy of very low interest rates, a more classical way of central bank intervention. Critics press the point that the real costs of overswamping interest rates – at the zero to 1 per cent range – are overlooked, and the same is true of the wall of a vast liquidity’s after-effects. Those economists who believe that western monetary policy is misguided, challenge the view of Ben Bernanke, Mervyn King and other central bankers that nobody gets hurt by a runaway monetary policy. Among other authorities who think that enough is enough is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In its 80th Annual Report, it asks whether the hidden costs of low interest rates might be greater than the visible benefits, and identifies several dangers from too low interest rates, including excessive risk-taking by market participants. BIS says that keeping interest rates low comes at a cost that is growing with time, and it gives as an example lopsided balance sheets, distorted allocation of labor and capital, as well as destabilizing surges in capital flows. It also suggests that pumping more money into the economy increases inflation expectations. For instance, in Britain inflation has been above the government’s 2 per cent target for most of the past four years. Injecting a great deal of liquidity for liquidity’s sake is also counterproductive for another reason: social commitments. It is projected that by 2050 several western countries will be devoting more than 30 per cent of their GDP to agerelated spending (the median western country will be spending 27 per cent of GDP), while state expenditures altogether will absorb around 70 per cent
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of GDP. That’s very bad news. To avoid an era of ‘new communism’, western countries will have to choose between two forms of default: breaking their promises to their creditors by default, or breaking their promises to their pensioners and the growing army of citizens benefiting from free health care. Theoretically, bankers might come to the rescue by inventing new and unconventional financial instruments, just as Goldman Sachs allegedly used to help Greece (over several years) to hide its galloping budget deficits. Practically, the events of the first decade of this century make it highly questionable whether this is a welcome strategy. Finding buyers for ‘novel’ and tricky financial products is not that difficult: what is difficult is being able to pay for their disastrous effects in the longer run. In monetary and fiscal policy, longer-term sustainability is much more important than short-term effects. It should not be forgotten that, in the period 2002–04 which followed the great stock market bubble of 2000, low short-term interest rates were instrumental in boosting house prices, diverting capital and workers to house construction – as well as common citizens into property gambles, all the way into the subprimes and Alt-As folly.13 But the cocktail of subprimes, Alt-As, fake credit rating, loose lending standards and huge bonuses brought about the 2007–11 economic hecatomb. As long as people and companies can gamble on easy credit, ample liquidity and low servicing costs, they will gamble in a big way. As long as banks can pretend that the principal and interest might one day be repaid, their balance sheet will remain muddy – the sort of thing found at the origin of Japanification (Chapter 4). High liquidity and low rates keep zombie companies, mismanaged banks and other bankrupt entities alive at great expense to taxpayers and to the more efficient competitors. The damage can be global because, all things considered, the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and European Central Bank determine the world’s short-term interest rates and (particularly so the Fed) they flood the global market with money – while emerging countries’ central banks find themselves obliged to raise rates and try to cool their economies. Raising rates encourages more speculative inflows of short-term money, creating a crazy financial merry-go-round in which industrial economies send capital elsewhere in search of higher yields. Critics of this state of affairs say that, when monetary conditions in the western countries are loose, the price is paid by the emerging countries, which become prone to asset bubbles. Liquidity and leverage correlate with negative effects, and the same is true about credit quality and leverage. In the 1980s, according to Henry Kaufman, the corporate leveraging explosion was accompanied by a severe drop in corporate credit quality: ‘Among other things I believe that highly leveraged firms ran a good chance of reporting higher-than-normal losses during the cyclical downturn in the economy.’14 It is essentially against this background that current and potential misdirected monetary policies should be judged. To make matters worse,
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central banks are by no means the only providers of excessive liquidity. The problem of too much money in search of speculative profits is compounded by the proliferation of short-term debt to support illiquid long-term assets. Much of it is issued by the highly-leveraged shadow banking system, an example being structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and, when markets freeze, the SIVs’ sponsoring entities, typically banks, find it difficult if not outright impossible to absorb their losses.15 Through their daily activities the commercial banks, too, contribute to the expansion of money supply: ‘There is no limit to the amount of money that can be created by the banking system,’ warned Marrinner Eccles, the Federal Reserve chairman in the Franklin Roosevelt years, ‘but there are limits to our productive facilities and our labor supply, which can only slowly be increased.’16
Quantitative easing A jurisdiction’s money supply is affected in a most significant way by quantitative easing (QE), originally invented by a desperate Bank of Japan, which became the West’s misdirected risk and great novelty of the 2007–10 economic and financial crisis. QE became a policy the Federal Reserve and Bank of England chose as a way to make monetary policy effective after interest rates were already (unwisely) close to zero. Put simply, the central bank uses its prerogatives of money creation, as a monetary institution, and it floods the market with it, in the (often vain) hope that excess liquidity will make the economy move again, bankruptcies will be avoided and there will be manna from heaven. It needs no explaining that these are hypotheses bordering on wild dreams. Moreover, QE is done without establishing a priori an exit strategy. Critics say that it is characterized by lack of confidence in one’s wisdom brought on by too much improvisation. Policy-makers enter a tunnel without ensuring the exit is clear – yet, how to get away from a beaten path is a basic principle in sound management. In technical terms, with QE the central bank uses newly created money to purchase assets, such as government bonds, and this new money makes a full circle, ending up as bank reserves at the central bank. To appreciate the smoke and mirrors behind QE, let’s start with its invention. While it is generally believed that the Federal Reserve and Bank of England have been the first to implement QE aggressively, in reality they did not discover it. Historically, QE was invented by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and 2006, when it massively boosted the reserves that commercial banks held in their vaults. The results have been negligible, making many economists skeptical that the benefits Japan derived from QE offer a useful yardstick. Other economists, however, tend to like this policy of monetary merry-go-round
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because of its effects on the money supply, which they consider to be beneficial at practically no cost – a misconception. Excess liquidity from the Fed may lighten asset prices, but it will also increase market volatility, and have other unexpected consequences. Therefore, economists who carefully examined cause and effect are of the opinion that QE is a double-edged knife. It impacts on asset prices – government bonds, corporate bonds and municipals bought by the Fed – as well as on liquidity.17 But it also creates significant worries about inflationary money printing and the fact that too little attention is paid to the flow of credit – while not dealing with structural problems. Critics say that, while QE policies might have propped up creaking banking systems in Japan, America, Britain and euroland, they did not really improve the economy of these countries; neither did they change the prevailing mindset. They also add that, inflation expectation aside, QE does not reach the most damaged parts of the credit system. For instance, in the year to January 2010 lending to the private non-financial sector in Britain shrank by 2.7 per cent. The pros answer that QE is a beautiful, flexible policy adaptable to the prevailing circumstances, therefore standing a good chance of being beneficial. Without much conviction, they give as examples Japan’s form of QE and the credit easing the Fed is engaged in, but more than anything else what they do is to quote other pros who have a conflict of interest: in January 2010, Ben Bernanke said that the Fed’s approach was focused on buying up loans and securities – hence on the asset side of its balance sheet.18 This fired up QE proponents, who looked at QE as a great innovation recommended by the high priest. Critics however point out that, to the contrary, Japan’s approach looked backwards, focused on the quantity of commercial and other banks reserves held at the central bank – therefore the liability side of its balance sheet. The latter was the opinion of none other than Masaaki Shiratsuka, the governor of the Bank of Japan, who also sees striking similarities between these US and Japanese QE approaches, because the asset and liability sides of the central banks’ balance sheets interact so closely.19 QE is not the only financial tool to support this instant metamorphosis. Derivatives have the same effect on every bank’s and every other company’s balance sheet. A middle ground between the critics and the pros is that the use of a central bank’s balance sheet to restore liquidity to financial markets simply buys time until banks restructure their own balance sheets (if they are able to do so). In a way, this is another form of bailout through public money – and the evidence available from Ireland, Britain, the USA and Japan is not very positive in terms of the outcome.20 In spite of central banks’ zero interest rates and QEs, western economies are hardly in good health. While sovereigns are overindebted, growth is still
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heavily dependent on government stimulants. In addition, the experienced massive intervention in private markets by America’s and Britain’s central banks distorts those same markets and, the longer QE persists, the more such distortions become apparent. That may explain why, in the early days of February 2010, the Bank of England decided to halt its program of QE; though by October 2010 it changed heart and said it would repeat it. But even with that February restraint, since March 2009 it had injected £200 billion ($320 billion) of newly minted money into the British economy by buying assets, mainly government bonds (gilts). As for the exit strategy, if there is one, it is wrapped in a thick veil which can be lifted only by answering four critical questions: • When should monetary and fiscal tightening begin? • Is it more important to raise interest rates or to cut budget deficits? • How will the bloated balance sheets of central banks return to normal conditions? • Will a serious effort at cutting deficits boost business confidence? While answers to these questions are pending, there is little doubt that central banks will have to re-establish their name in the market, and governments will have to practice real fiscal restraint. It is important to avoid QE’s negative effects – which were not properly studied when QE policies were adopted. This means that QE’s future path runs into dilemmas, some of which are akin to those associated with fiscal stimulus. Governments inject large amounts of money into the economy by increasing the public debt by a certain amount. Central banks inject funds into the monetary system by purchasing assets such as mortgages and government bonds. As far as future inflation pressures are concerned, the risk is high that the two processes may work in unison.
QE and competitive currency devaluations Up to mid-2010, the pros and cons of QE mainly revolved around its merits and demerits, along the lines discussed in the previous section. Then, suddenly, something significant changed: QE was recast as the modern tool for currency debasing. Using the central banks’ power to devalue currency is a different ballgame, and understanding it requires political skills to appreciate decisions taken at top government level. In a globalized economy, many voices are raised to discourage this type of behavior, which can have the most severe unexpected consequences on world trade. QE is, by all evidence, unable to get the economy moving again. Instead, what is happening is more debasing, followed by devaluing and depreciating the nation’s currency in the vain hope of making ends meet. As critics have
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it: debasing, devaluing and depreciating are the keywords in the mind of central bankers, who are printing money like there is no tomorrow, and call it QE. Debasing a country’s currency is synonymous with undertaking competitive devaluation to stimulate exports; this implies a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, precisely the sort of stuff which led to the First Great Depression (see above). The pros argue that, with taxes at their highest and therefore with fiscal policy practically out of the picture, the entire burden of stimulating demand falls on the central bank and QE is the last weapon in its arsenal. For instance, after lowering short-term interest rates to zero in late 2008, the Fed bought $1.7 trillion-worth of Treasury and mortgage bonds with newly created money to release liquidity and bring down long-term rates (all that in the vain hope of reducing unemployment). Debasing is engineered through competitive QE – a race: ‘I can print more money than you can.’ In all likelihood, what forced the Federal Reserve into another round of QE in November 2010 was not just the ‘growth recession’. GDP growth in the USA, while positive, was not strong enough to sustain jobs growth, which increasingly depends on decreasing exports, while imports continue to soar. There has been plenty of talk of currency war, and this escalated as an IMF meeting of finance ministers and central bankers (partly aimed at soothing currency tensions) failed to deliver a resolution. The gap between the two main protagonists in the dispute, America and China, appeared as intractable as ever. America accused China of an artificially cheap yuan; China accused America of destabilizing developing countries’ economies by running a lax monetary policy. Other countries, too, have been involved in this currency dispute, to the point that, on September 27, 2010, Guido Mantega, Brazil’s Finance Minister, declared that an international currency war had broken out.21 The fuzzy, and ill-documented, rhetoric about cooperation to boost global growth is old news. Nowadays, a more combative tone has taken hold with countries blaming each other for: • distorting global demand, • using QE as a weapon for debasing, and • practicing currency intervention and capital controls. The pros also argue that currency debasing is not a new practice, but an ancient one. It started in days of yore when governments would reduce the precious metal content of coins by shaving or adding cheap alloys. The result was that, like devalued money, the same coin was worth less in exchange for goods and services. This awkward justification of sovereign monetary policy malpractices forgets that after debasing came galloping inflation, often followed by bankruptcy and a wide financial crisis. There is no better example than the
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downfall of the French Banque Royale and the Mississippi Bubble of 1720, engineered by the policies of John Law. Misdirected, short-term measures can have long-term negative results. * * * With the complexity of global as well as national economic and financial challenges continuing to increase, half-baked measures are no solution. The need for overhauling economics as a discipline is becoming increasingly evident. Several people argue, with plenty of reason, that much of the research in macroeconomics and finance has been of little value, and part of it was even counterproductive – essentially limited to stereotypes like ‘Keynes said that …’. John Maynard Keynes was a great mind, and his legacy rests on the fact that he was a challenger of the status quo in the economics of his time. To the contrary, today’s self-named ‘Keynesians’ are the status quo – which, far from being eliminated by the crisis, has spread wider now than prior to 2007. The macroeconomists who dominate leading universities, ministries of finance and central banks are theorists with a troubling lack of real-life experience. This puts them, and their approaches, in stark contrast to industrial economists and investment analysts, who work close to businesses and know what makes them tick. Other theorists, at the height of absurdity, claim that ‘markets are always right,’ or ‘they will automatically correct their own errors’. Stereotypes of many sorts have led to fallacious assumptions about conflicting solutions, such as: • • • •
deficit financing, rational expectations, efficient markets, and misplaced certainties about ‘this’ or ‘that’.
The deep economic and financial crisis we are going through also has proven that the modeling craze must come to an end. Plenty of mathematical models are written either by people who know math but understand nothing about economics and business, or by economists whose mathematical skills are wanting at best. In this misdirected risk lies the fact that, for reasons of modernizing (and of tenure), for over 30 years all serious economic ideas had to be expressed in equations, not by means of well-structured cause-and-effect relationships backed up by real-life events.
‘Bad banks’, the Volcker rule and living wills Bad banks are entities set up and backed by governments to facilitate the removal of ‘bad assets’ from their balance sheets. ‘Bad assets’ are loosely
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defined as those that are at risk of severe impairment; are difficult to value; or, when valued, are worth very little in comparison with their purchase price. Among other reasons, bad banks are created to: • assist in the resolution of a financial crisis, • permit refloating of the damaged bank by relieving it of its worst ‘assets’, including holdings and non-performing loans, and • try to recover the most of what may be seen as lost money, by avoiding a fire sale of those damaged ‘assets’. Whether or not, and how well, these aims will be reached depends a great deal on the nature of these ‘bad assets’ and the quality of management at the bad bank level. Professionalism is a plus. The eldest such entity on record has been Securum,22 engineered by the Swedish government, which put in charge people capable of restructuring loans, and negotiating the sale of holdings and participations. However, though Securum is the first practical example, the concept underpinning a bad bank preceded it by a few years. It first arose in 1988, when the Mellon Bank spun off its energy and property loans, which had turned sour, into Grant Street National Bank, financed with junk bonds and private equity. As the Mellon, Securum and present-day derelict bad banks demonstrate, this whole idea is quite flexible, and it can be given different interpretations at different times by different people. Economist Josef Stiglitz criticizes the ‘bad bank’ idea as ‘swapping cash for trash’, but the pros say such an approach has advantages: first, management can focus on the job of recovering the fair value of damaged assets; and, second, taking toxic assets off the balance sheet of banks teetering on bankruptcy leaves behind a cleaner credit institution, which should find it easier to raise capital or attract a buyer. Finding a buyer at fair value price is a pipe dream, but the real problem with bad banks is that, as usual, the taxpayer will be asked to foot the bill. Someone has to pay for the assets transferred by the damaged bank to a new equity, or to a buyer, at deep discount. Simply stated, the transfer of big chunks of a loan portfolio (specifically non-performing loans and similar ‘assets’) from a credit institution to a specially set up vehicle will take the form of the former selling them to the government, or its agent, at large discount. Superficially, this is similar to a securitization transaction but in reality it is not, as it raises the questions of proper classification, reasonable valuation and treatment of transferred assets. Because write-downs are not considered financial transactions, the result will be a decline in the volume of outstanding loans of the pruned bank which exceeds the recorded flow. At the same time, the impact of the
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write-down will be reflected in a decline in the stock of capital and reserves. Moreover, it may be required, for reasons of financial analysis of assets and liabilities, to treat the impact of such transactions in a way similar to corrections for derecognition of loans. The positive side of this issue is that, with able management, bad banks may present positive surprises. Securum was able to recover over 85 per cent of the value of damaged assets it was entrusted with, doing so within six years. Had these assets been sold at the time of transfer they would have fetched less than 50 per cent of that amount. An example of a bad bank becoming profitable comes from Britain. As will be recalled, Northern Rock was the first European credit institution to be salvaged by taxpayers’ money and to be nationalized in the first year of the 2007–11 severe economic and banking crisis.23 From it was split a bad bank, which, in mid-2010, reported a first semester profit, while its sister ‘good bank’ did not. Nevertheless, not only Northern Rock’s ‘good bank’ and ‘bad bank,’ but also many others, like the Royal Bank of Scotland, are still on the British government’s life support and the next few years will quite likely be tough. This is particularly true as the economic crisis continues unabated and many more loans may go bad in 2011 while banks struggle to raise new finance as their existing inter-bank and other loans fall due (Chapter 13). It follows that, though the bad bank idea may have some merits, if its management is first class, it is far better to take proactive measures which see to it that banks are not being salvaged by public money because they are ‘too big to fail’ (or, for that matter, for any other reason). This has three prerequisites: • a system of merits and demerits, • Volcker’s rule, and • living wills written when the bank is still in good financial health. One of the less frequently discussed issues with the banking debacle of 2007–11 and measures taken to redress the balance, is that the current system’s players have only rights to merits, but no obligation for failures. Bankers get fat bonuses – but they don’t pay for plain mismanagement or even for malfeasance under their watch. Yet, behavior should have consequences. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 says so, but, as the careful reader will recall, politicians have seen to it that it has not been applied, under the reign of George W. Bush or thereafter. Big financial institutions have tremendous power – and, if they misuse it, there must be consequences. A system of demerits should be in place to ensure that personal responsibility does not remain on permanent leave of absence. The second prerequisite is re-establishing the Glass–Steagall Act, or instituting a modern version of it. The Volcker rule, named after Dr Paul
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Vokcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman who proposed it, calls for deposit-taking institutions to be banned from propriety trading24 in capital markets, as well as from investing in hedge funds and private equity. From the moment this was proposed, it was welcomed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a Basel-based entity spearheading the international reform drive. FSB also stressed that such a move would need to be combined with tougher capital and liquidity standards together with other regulatory measures to make it effective. It is, however, important to notice that, unlike Glass–Steagall, the Volcker rule does not seek a full separation of commercial banking and investment banking. Neither is it targeting those banks generally assumed to be ‘too big to fail’. Its goal is to limit further growth of non-deposit liabilities, which become the weakest link in the banking industry’s chain.25 Banks have generally opposed the Volcker rule, which was finally voted by Congress as part of the 2010 financial regulation (FINREG), but with many modifications which weakened its impact. Fat profits are at stake. Goldman Sachs derives 10 per cent or more of its revenues from proprietary trading; Morgan Stanley and Citigroup derive half as much, but these figures say nothing about the magnitude of the risks assumed by banks. A great deal of the objection to banning proprietary trading from the activities of deposit-taking institutions is a reflection of the sacrosanct status of financial innovation. This has become a sacred cow. Yet, in his testimony to Congress on February 2, 2010, Paul Volcker is quoted as having suggested that there is no evidence financial innovation has contributed anything to the wealth of the United States. By contrast, the risks are high, opaque and widespread, and common citizens are being asked to pay for all the damage when the gamblers’ bets turn sour. Interestingly enough, the attitude of investment bankers to the Volcker rule has changed. Morgan Stanley has agreed to jettison its big trading desk, and many of the banks that complained the Volcker rule would harm profits are complying years ahead of the 2014 deadline. It looks as if the banks’ CEOs have decided that proprietary trading is not mission-critical, while the choice to dump it could earn valuable credibility with regulators. Some experts are, however, saying that opposition to the Volcker rule was, in large part, a negotiating tactic and that there exist many other ways to speculate, make profits, distribute fat bonuses or engineer a bank’s demise.26 All sorts of speculators, some masquerading as bankers, are still making wild bets, developing and trading among themselves in new derivatives and piling on debt. With the Fed keeping interest rates at nearly zero, big banks have access to money very cheaply, and bonuses are as generous as ever. On the other side of the equation, millions of people have lost their jobs, homes and savings, and nobody answers their questions about why giant banks are so important to the economy and to the public.
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This raises the issue of living wills. The term stands for a special resolution regime to be established in advance and target the case of a bank’s nearbankruptcy or partial bankruptcy. There has been much talk about such regimes for failing banks: big, medium and small – which could be seen as contingency planning. In short, living wills set up procedures for creditors to unwind a failed bank. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision outlined the need for living wills in the following terms: Although certain large financial institutions provide functions that are systemically relevant … their business continuity and contingency planning arrangements have not typically been required to include resolution contingencies … [hence the need to] address the practical and concrete steps that could be taken in a crisis or wind-down to preserve functional resiliency of essential business operations.27 By drawing up a living will, bank management explains to stakeholders and supervisors how the bank will be unwound in case of bankruptcy. The leading thought is that it should be implemented along the insolvency regime, helping to speed the return of client assets. (Today, to a significant extent, the aim is to address problems uncovered by Lehman’s collapse.) Critics say that giving a resolution authority the right to beat up all creditors would ensure that any credit institution at risk of falling under its auspices would face a run. The pros answer that a living will serves to ringfence the deposit-taking parts of a credit institution and offer its depositors a full guarantee.28 There may also be other benefits. The alternative to a living will is to force banks to issue bonds that would automatically suffer partial losses in the event of a rescue through state intervention. This, too, is contemplated with the objective of guaranteeing sufficient of an institution’s balance sheet to repay depositors, while at the same time leaving a good part of it free of such a guarantee to protect taxpayers from having to foot big bills, as with the events which followed the 2007 debacle. In the last analysis, however, there exists no fail-safe procedure. Much depends on ethics and human behavior; and, because a proactive approach is the better alternative, regulatory authorities should be free to act rather than have to limit their action in the narrow terrain permitted by political will, as happened in the George W. Bush years.
6 Fiscal Policies, Spending Policies and Conflicting Aims
The government takes its money out of its citizens’ pockets Few people really appreciate that the state has no money of its own. The money it has in its Treasury comes from two sources: taxation and the central bank’s printing press – in other words, inflation. The first is the object of the government’s fiscal policies; the second, that of the central bank’s monetary policies, as well as of the politicians’ pressures. The two correlate because the difference between the money the government gets through a reasonable level of citizen taxation and its unwisely assumed huge commitments – from entitlements to foreign aid and military expenditures – is made up by the printing press, as well as by increases in all sorts of taxes. ‘We must tax the poor,’ André Tardieu, a French radical socialist prime minister, said in 1930. ‘They are the most numerous.’ Indeed, so it is. Value added tax (VAT) picks up a hefty share of private money for the government and it is paid by both rich and poor. As Chapter 5 brought to the reader’s attention, inflation’s impact on the value of the money belonging to the citizen is more subtle but just as deadly. To show the American public what inflation means, in a televised address he gave after being elected president, Ronald Reagan held, in one hand, a $10 bill and in the other three dollars, a couple of dimes and a nickel. That’s what is left, he said (in 1981), of what $10 was worth at the end of World War II. That’s the catch. The more money flows into an economy through the central banks’ printing presses, through derelict government budgets, twisted fiscal policies, quantitative easing and other measures to (theoretically) jump-start the economy, the more this policy contributes to the inflation of the sovereigns’ deficit spending. These loans must be serviced. Western governments have printed trillions of dollars to pay off their debts, but with the rising likelihood of sovereign bankruptcies has come the day of truth. One of the most vicious after-effects of having the central banks’ printing presses working overtime since 2008, while interests rates are kept at 99
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rock-bottom, is the emergence of sovereign credit risk among the industrialized economies. This is a great destabilizer because the virus of huge government deficits moves through a number of hazardous contagion channels and adverse feedback loops interlinking financial systems, which negatively affects public and private balance sheets. Steady leverage creates adverse market dynamics. It also reflects conflicts of interest on the part of governments. When an inflation psychology takes hold, the prices of assets become detached from underlying fundamentals and sovereigns can pay back their debts at a fraction of the value of the money for which they contracted them. At the same time, however, there is a pass-through of higher sovereign funding costs, reflecting an inflation psychology’s growing concerns, which sees to it that the functioning of some markets is impaired and also that monetary policy becomes blurred as governments fail to implement fiscal consolidation, ensuring the sustainability of their policies. The situation gets out of hand when governments behave as if they are afraid of taking a firm grip of their public finances. More than anything else, the reason is a lack of backbone in those who govern. There are positive examples of sustainable fiscal and financial policies. In this century, Germany and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat government in Britain have been rewarded for doing so. While the monetary policy of the majority of developed countries is wanting, the greater risks are posed by runaway fiscal policies. In 2010, America provided an example, where anxiety about public debt made businesses and consumers tighten their purse strings, with negative effects on the US economy. Economists who favor sound public finances maintain that being in charge of budget deficits reduces uncertainty and has a liberating effect on private spending. This, however, is not the normal course of events. Many governments responded to the 2007–11 economic crisis by taking the debt burden off the private sector’s balance sheets and putting it on their own. The result has been a huge gap in government finances, as taxes are no longer able to close these ever-greater imbalances. In addition, there are other classical symptoms of souk (Chapter 5), such as rapid growth in private sector debt, particularly the households, and an outbreak of enthusiasm for financial assets, which are not so well understood and harbor major opaque risks. It is an irony of our time that, with a shortfall in taxes and difficulties in making ends meet, many governments, particularly city and county, started investing in derivative financial instruments1 which they don’t understand. Not only have the complexities of derivatives and structured instruments escaped them, but they also introduced new wildcards in their finances. All that leads to skyrocketing debt at all levels of government – city, country, state and federal – along with a legacy of excessive debt contributing to the economy’s mismanagement. Unsupportable gearing aside, an
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after-effect is misallocation of resources which, in turn, acts as a drag on economic growth. Another legacy is asset-price inflation, which redistributes wealth in an arbitrary way between those who ride the bubble (a small minority) and those suffering from it as it inflates and after it bursts (the large majority). Even where there exist plans for fiscal consolidation (and the better example among western nations is Germany), the sizeable near-term funding requirements of the sovereign can crowd the issuance of bonds by companies. The risk that this implies for funding costs also raises the possibility of a setback to the recovery in the private sector’s profitability, while concerns remain about pockets of vulnerability within specific industries such as banking. Adding to the souk is the fact that doubts are raised about the willingness of some featherbedded countries (for instance, like Spain and Portugal) to push through the required austerity measures. As the example of Greece demonstrated, electorates react negatively to the cost of downsizing public deficits.2 In addition, because politicians don’t really explain to the citizen that the money they themselves overspend by abusing health care, pensions and other entitlements is their money, people want to have ‘more and more’ and don’t seem to understand that they will pay for it, in one way or another. In a democracy, the absence of public debate on ‘who pays’ discourages rigorous action at government level, even if those in charge understand that: • the country cannot afford to let debt build up until it reaches stratospheric levels, • rolling over one’s rising debt may be increasingly difficult or outright impossible, short of paying outrageous interest, and • like companies and households, countries have a debt limit that is a function partly of their own history of fiscal consolidation and partly of their conceived ability to repay. Repaying by governments means that, once again, they will take the money out of their citizens’ pockets through taxation and inflation. It is a vicious cycle. A better policy is sovereign budgets for the current year, and budgetary plans for the coming years reflect a strong commitment to implementing credible consolidation policies aimed at restoring fiscal sustainability when it is lost and creating room for budgetary flexibility within the realm of sound finances. This evidently requires that a public administration’s budgetary targets comply with fiscal consolidation requirements, rather than deficit procedures. Ambitious budget control targets are necessary but inapplicable when current plans fall short of meeting the objective of halting and reversing the increase in government debt ratios. Affirmative financial action becomes believable
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only when administrations adopt credible fiscal adjustment measures – and put them into effect.
The best solution is fiscal consolidation A basic economic principle, albeit contested by big spenders, is that, despite any illusions, government deficit cannot boost demand. Consumers, particularly those who pay for public debt, cut their own expenditure in anticipation of higher taxes ahead. Moreover, when governments are heavily geared, fiscal stimulus becomes less effective and the market’s confidence deteriorates. This has been the case in the 2008–11 environment in which western markets have seen public debt rise so fast, skewed so strongly towards ‘spend now pay later’, that it has weighed heavily on market psychology. In developed countries, the average ratio of public debt to GDP has jumped from below 80 per cent to nearly 100 per cent in two years, and the IMF believes it will approach 120 per cent by 2014.3 And yet, governments are still bent on spending huge volumes of public money. Available evidence suggests that countries that live with higher debt burdens grow more slowly than those exercising fiscal discipline. Big spending by governments gives a semblance, but only a semblance, of economic growth; this makes the politicians’ lives much easier because they don’t need to take tough decisions. Economic growth reduces deficits by increasing tax revenues, thereby making debts more sustainable and lightening the adjustment burden. Governments (and more recently even the central banks) should not be as quick as they have become to invent different ways to spend taxpayers’ money. Policy-makers should appreciate that the effect of a monetary stimulus (for instance) lasts only as long as it is ‘on’, and it can become addictive. Living on ‘stimuli’ is like living on steroids. The irony with these different ineffective initiatives is that withdrawal of even small parts of the package can send an economy back into doldrums.4 In December 2009 and January 2010 in America, new home sales slowed sharply after an initial end-ofNovember 2009 deadline for the expiry of a buyers’ tax credit. By September 2010, sales of old and new homes were most disappointing. (Though the credit had been extended until April 2010, December 2009 home sales were just 342,000, compared with 329,000 in January 2009, at the height of the crisis. The pros said that the stimulus might have prevented an even worse real estate market. But this argument is just an ‘if’.) The fact is that economic growth does not happen on command, and the best way to be in charge of deficits is to use a sharp knife to cut government spending by increasing statutory pension ages, cutting the public sector’s fat (such as guaranteed increases in salaries and pensions based on years of service rather than performance). While shrinking the number of bureaucrats
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and rolling back comfortable retirements may be an unpopular medicine, the private sector and households should by no means be the only parties paying for the government’s follies. Other social measures, too, are important, such as reforms that make labor markets more flexible and which, in most western countries, are overdue anyway. The fact that measures necessary to redress the balances skewed by debt are unpopular is not surprising. What is surprising is the western governments’ inertia in reinforcing sustainable growth through job creation – which cannot be done without fiscal and structural reforms – including the promotion of a policy of sound balance sheets. Optimistic GDP forecasts have often been used by governments as a way of avoiding decisive action, but fake good news is unsustainable. In March 2010, economists projected that the American economy would experience growth of 2.8 per cent in 2011. Six months later, in September 2010, this forecast was reduced to 2.3 per cent.5 Governments lie when they say that they are laying the foundations for long-term growth, while they continue loading themselves with debt. There is, therefore, no surprise when the actual GDP figures are a lot feebler than projected. Galloping budgetary deficits by sovereigns and the fallout of the 2007–11 financial crisis weighs heavily on the private sector’s spending and the way the economy tries to recover. ‘In the short term, fiscal consolidation reduces aggregate demand and thus has a negative impact on economic activity,’ states the September 2010 Monthly Bulletin by the European Central Bank. ‘At the same time, credible and ambitious consolidation raises expectations of future economic growth and induces economic reactions, which may offset the demand effect in the short term.’6 Fiscal consolidation is not achieved by wishful thinking, just as damaged balance sheets and stiff labor markets are not repaired by words. Laying the foundations for sustainable financial stability, and acting in this direction, are often regarded as unpopular activities by part of the population – often the sector which benefits from the current casino society and its bonuses; hence it involves conflicts of interest. Governments run ‘by the seat of their pants’ do not really know where all the money is going. In early June 2010, months after the debt earthquake shook the euro, it was announced that Greece would do an inventory of staff on its public sector payroll and establish an agency to monitor public sector pay. The aim of this action, taken in the wake of the economic and financial crisis, was to improve public sector administration and promote a more efficient use of public money.7 That’s good. But the measure also reveals that the government is lacking accurate and readily available data on how many people work for the wider state sector, including local government and state firms – which is evidently bad. This is much more of a reflection on previous governments than on the
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current Greek one; the country’s fortunes have been set without a compass, or a sense of responsibility. In addition, taxpayers should no longer be asked to pay for the misdeeds of bankers and politicians, who have been feeding the debt hydra’s appetite and saddling future generations with a growth-sapping burden of higher taxes. The best way to squeeze the beast is to explain to the common man what the problems are and what is required for sound solutions – including the cost and the risk of leaving the problems unsolved. Governments never really feel the economy is strong enough to stop throwing money at the problem, particularly if an election campaign is about to begin. Very few politicians learn from past mistakes or are ready to admit them. Jim Callaghan, the then British Labour prime minister, did precisely that when he declared to a party conference in the 1970s that: We used to think that you could spend your way out of recession and increase employment, cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists and that in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.8 Not only is it followed by unemployment, but also by higher taxes. ‘Too much tax kills the tax,’ said Jacques Chirac before being elected president of France. After his election, however, he changed his mind. With a mismanaged economy where the large majority of people expect the State Supermarket to take care of all their needs, taxes increased and Chirac simply forgot that taxpayers deserve a break. Germany provides another example of what is meant by this reference. A single person earning an average income pays more of his wages in income tax and social security contributions than in any other country among developed nations, except Sweden. Taxpayers earning just 1.3 times the average income, pay a rate of 42 per cent and there is an even higher rate for top income earners. All this works to discourage rather than encourage people to work harder. That is precisely the sort of policy western citizens do not need. Governments are wrong to take the common man as utterly stupid. According to an article in The Economist, white voters in America have changed their view of Barack Obama; not because of his skin color but because of what he has done – and what he has failed to do – since he took office. White men, The Economist’s article says, are disproportionately skeptical of Obama’s proposed solutions. Seven out of ten prefer small government to big government. ‘I don’t like the way they are giving away all that money,’ suggested Steve Roberts, a welder in Arkansas. ‘I think you should work for your money.’9
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Impact of fiscal policies on the financial system There is both a direct and an indirect interaction between a government, its fiscal policies and the financial system. Indirect channels between fiscal policies and the financial system exist via households and industrial firms. Tension along these channels may have important consequences for financial stability, even more so than direct links, because of potential implications for a government’s balance sheet. Another indirect channel is provided by financial and economic globalization. It makes itself felt through the impact of current account deficits (see the next section), which bring into the picture cross-border contagion effects. Cross-border contagion comes from, or has an impact on, other countries because of spillovers. Spillovers and tensions are particularly dangerous to tightly connected economic systems, like euroland’s, whose members share a monetary union but do not have political union, with a plethora of incompatible, if not outright contradictory, fiscal policies. Small economies like those of Greece or Portugal will not do irreparable damage to euroland if they default. They also gain relatively little from looser fiscal policy, because a lot of its effects spill abroad. However, they will suffer heavily when investors lose confidence. Countries with heavy debt burdens (like Italy) or whose tax base has collapsed (for instance, Spain), would create considerable financial and economic upheaval if they were to collapse. For this reason, they should be greatly concerned about a sudden loss of investors’ confidence – whether this is the result of uncontrollable deficit procedures or other events casting doubt on the government’s ability to be in charge of its fortunes. Sovereigns also interact directly with the financial system. They do so when financing their fiscal deficits and when managing their debts. Important parameters in this direct channel connection are the amount and maturity of public debt held by financial institutions, and shares of intra-bank lending covered by government securities as collateral. Other important factors include the proportion of government debt insured via credit default swaps and downgrades to sovereign credit ratings, which in the globalized economy immediately become public knowledge. Plenty of information on direct channel patterns and behavior can be obtained by assessing relationships between fiscal policies, monetary policies, and financial stability. Furthermore, valuable information is available through the role the government plays as tax authority, affecting the behavior of financial industry participants through tax rates and tax structures. In the best cases, tax rates and tax structures are fine-tuned. This is not universally the case, and they do go wrong. They practically always do so with persistent budget deficits. The wrong interaction between a government and its fiscal policies, on one hand, and the economy and financial system,
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on the other, could lead to ominous consequences. Persistent unemployment is a case in point. The most recent events connected to the 2007–11 deep economic and financial crisis illustrate this statement. In western countries (with the exception of Germany, where employment figures have been improving) unemployment is still widespread, with little hope of a pick-up. Business confidence oscillates. And, in spite of massive stimuli as well as rock-bottom interest rates, the economies of western nations remain under repair, even if some seem to have recovered to some degree. Two of the most important background reasons are: first, that the stock of debt that sovereigns, banks and households carry will take many years to absorb; and, second, that the holes in sovereign and other balance sheets must be repaired before the economy can get moving again. Tibor Vamos of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences commented as follows in recent correspondence with the author: ‘The Ponzi-game of overspending was a crazy cooperation of greedy people, politicians and banks.’ Greed was not the whole reason for the debacle. The financial firms had too much (unjustified) faith in their own foresight, believing themselves capable of modeling and containing the risks they were running. In so doing, they neglected the basic quality of resilience and assumed that, at a pinch, they could always borrow funds or ask for government bailouts. In his book The Creation and Destruction of Value, Harold James argues that the events most closely related to the present crisis may be the huge bank failures in Austria and Germany in 1931.10 Then, as now, uncertainty about asset values in a big bank led to an earthquake throughout the banking sector. In 1931, the German government responded by injecting huge amounts of public money into the banks and creating a separate entity (a forerunner of a bad bank, see Chapter 5) for the assets that could not be priced. Sound familiar? That’s precisely what the American and British governments repeated in the first decade of this century. In 1931, the German authorities also founded a new institution that allowed the Reichsbank to discount bills from those banks that found it difficult or outright impossible to trade then because the inter-bank market had seized up. That’s precisely the policy followed by the Fed, Bank of England and European Central Bank after 2008, except that they did so directly, without a bad bank intermediary, and, by so doing, they filled up the western central banks’ vaults with useless financial and commercial paper. The net result has been more newly minted money and higher sovereign debt. Another curious and ominous similarity is that, in 1931 and these days, the politics of bank bailouts have been both too complex and too controversial. Politicians meddled with economic decisions that had enormous consequences on the economy, but lacked the necessary experience to enlighten their moves. In his book, James shows how seemingly novel crises and debates about ‘the way out’ are variants of past crises; the debates among politicians, economists, bankers and
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whoever else joins them, make no contribution of new ideas on ways and means to come out of the hole we find ourselves in. In reality, when financial crisis struck no one seemed to have a clue about how to react; statistics that have emerged since have been devastating. Following the crash of 1929, for instance, America’s economy shrank by one quarter and the unemployment rate hit 25 per cent – and nobody today can ensure that this will not be repeated, despite all the quantitative earnings. According to some opinions, ‘this time around it is different’ because the Fed and other western central bankers, as well as governments, have not been thrifty (with other people’s money). But this is only a theoretical statement based on an illusion because big banks are wrapped in cotton wool, extremely low interest rates devastate savers and pension funds, and big public spending packages create the impression that economic distress has been much less than it really is. In spite (or because) of this, the deep recession has still been extremely painful and the common man’s perception is that nothing is really different from the events that followed the First Great Depression. Some people may, however, say that there is a difference. In January 1932, Wright Patman, a Congressman, opened impeachment hearings for high crimes and misdemeanors against Andrew Mellon, a former banker and Treasury secretary under three presidents. The investigations that followed did prove a number of misdemeanors by Mellon, including his use of fictitious gifts to avoid taxes, and the employment of Treasury tax experts to trim his personal tax bill.11 The same policy prevailed towards those who ran the banking system into the ground. Because the management of big banks messed up badly, their shareholders have been severely penalized. But only a small minority of credit institutions ejected their CEOs in anything like disgrace, let alone brought them to court. This is even true of cases such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole, whose CEOs left but were not accused of wrongdoing. Boards have been ultra-lenient – and the same is true of public prosecutors, even if the failed CEOs destroyed swathes of property. Instead, western governments and central banks bend over backwards to salvage the self-harmed mammoth financial institutions – through an ill-studied policy of saving banks ‘too big to fail’, at great cost to the economy. In its 2009 Annual Report, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), arguably the central bank of central banks, had some good advice on this matter: Institutions that are too big to fail – those that created intolerable systemic risk by themselves because others are exposed to them – pose a significant challenge … Mergers and acquisitions that have formed a part of the crisis response … may have increased the number of such institutions … [and officials] realize that [this] creates an unsustainable structure.12
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Again and again, the throwing of an inordinate amount of taxpayers’ money at the problem has created the false impression of having escaped the worst. This, however, masks a lack of necessary change in the system of finance itself. With the exception of Lehman’s, no big firms have been allowed to file for bankruptcy, which would have happened without the lavish (and irrational) supply of taxpayers’ money. The law for big firms today is that which the film Wall Street dubbed ‘survival of the unfittest’. Its alter ego is the mountain of debt which turns on its head the western governments’ fiscal policies. Because of widespread debt in America, Britain, France and Spain (to name but a few), consumers cannot start, let alone, lead a sustained recovery. They themselves have to repair their balance sheets. Exports could help, but with the exception of Germany, developed countries find that their peers, as well as emerging countries, are not ready to absorb them.
Current account deficits A country’s current account is a balance of payments (BOP) ledger covering all transactions in goods and services, as well as income and currency transfers between residents and non-residents. The balance of payments bill is a statistical statement which, for a specific period of time, summarizes the financial/economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world. The current account definition presented in the preceding paragraph is that of the European Central Bank. Other central banks define BOP in somewhat different terms. For instance, the Deutsche Bundesbank states that the current account balance corresponds to the difference between aggregate savings, including the balance on the capital account, and overall net investment, equal to gross investment less depreciation, of a given country. If aggregate savings are lower than investment, a current account deficit shows the aggregate savings gap that has to be bridged by lowering balances or by borrowing abroad. At this point of reference, the aforementioned two current account definitions tend to merge into a common concept. Unavoidably, because of international trade, at any given time period (for instance, a year) some countries will have a positive current account and other countries a negative one – which they need to finance by borrowing abroad. This shorter-term measure of ‘⫹’ or ‘⫺’ tells an interesting story. By itself, the one-year reference is neither good nor bad. It becomes bad and perilous if: • the ‘minus’ persists year after year, • foreign debt accumulates, and • the government is unable or unwilling to turn around the situation to the ‘plus’ side.
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Taking a longer-term view, a country’s current account position provides vital information about its economy and its global trade (most particularly in regard to its macroeconomic factors). In terms of the conduct of the economy, it makes a difference whether increasing external debt is driven chiefly by productive investments or whether too little import discipline, too few exports and a declining savings rate propel the current account deficits. It does not need explaining that, in general, surpluses and an improvement in the net external position are welcome – particularly for countries faced with an aging population, because they help to absorb future demographically induced burdens. All else being equal, channeling savings abroad permits domestic savers to diversify the risks of their assets and benefit from higher yields in growing economies having a different demographic profile. Internal government debt and current account deficits do not necessarily need to correlate, though they tend to do so because they both represent imbalances and the fact that those in positions of authority are not really in charge. They are signals of an economic drift, and a similar statement is true about deficits in sectors of the economy that lack competitiveness. For instance, in western countries today both the household and public sectors have become permanent and significant borrowers, but in some countries their deficits are partly offset by surpluses in the corporate sector. In addition, over time there may be significant changes in some sectoral net borrowing/lending positions. If the current account surpluses become yearly affairs, then the reason may be that the government has been able to address some of the legacy imbalances in the economy. An example to the contrary, when the government exacerbates the imbalances, is the merchandise deficit. A widening trade gap is created when imports grow faster than exports. A case in point is America’s economic slowdown in the second quarter of 2010, which saw imports grow three times faster than exports, producing a big drag on the current account. Christina Romer, who was at the time Obama’s chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers, lamented: ‘A bit of you keeps saying that if only those were American products, think of how high GDP growth would have been.’13 The problem confronting the USA and the dollar is not just the current account deficit because of global trade, which acquired its own dynamics, but also that of being policeman of the world – which, in terms of expenditures, makes an already bad situation worse. In the early 1970s, when the gold reserves at Fort Knox were melting away because of the convertibility of dollars into gold as warranted by Bretton Woods, President Nixon realized that the USA did not have the resources to hold the world’s banner of gold standard and this policy ended with the Smithsonian Agreement. The difference between what ‘could be’ and ‘what is’ in global trade and other deals has an unquestionable impact on the country’s current account. When the
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foreign currencies’ deficit continues to grow, its impact on the economy and on foreign debt can be devastating. Sometimes a cumulative presentation of current account figures hides important differences behind the reasons propelling imbalances. These reasons cannot be confronted in summary manner. They should be examined individually – each on its own merits. The often-heard statement that the current account balance of euroland in the aggregate fluctuated only a little between deficits and moderate surpluses since the launch of the euro masks the fact that Germany has had huge surpluses, while France has had mostly deficit figures, and the current accounts of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have regularly been in the red. A more accurate statement about BOP imbalances is to say that, with its high surpluses from trading with non-euroland countries, Germany made a major contribution to the health of the euro by sustaining a largely positive current account position. Had Germany been factored out of the calculations, euroland would have had to bear current account deficits of between a160 billion or 2.6 per cent of GDP (which occurred in 2006) and a320 billion or 4.7 per cent of GDP (observed in 2008).14 If Germany falters as a major exporter, then the euro will face hard times. There is plenty of evidence of unsustainable developments in current account balances in euroland’s peripheral countries. These current account deficits, and their funding, have been accelerated by the disappearance of the exchange rate risk because of monetary union. In addition, country default risk in euroland’s bond markets was rated very low in the years prior to the 2007–11 crisis. Prior to membership of euroland’s monetary union, some countries’ persistent current account deficits led to the market’s dumping of their currencies. Their currencies were devalued and the silver lining was that they were (at least partly) compensated by the resulting difference in foreign exchange rates. The common currency did away with such an adjustment mechanism. With or without the existence of special factors like monetary union, the study of divergences in current account balances provides a good deal of insight on how an economy works. Another basic criterion is that of a country’s inflation rate. Inflation is ravaging euroland’s peripheral countries, mainly driven by sharp rises in unit labor costs. This slows down exports in real terms and boosts growth in imports, by weakening the position of domestic suppliers on their home market. An important input in any model of current account balances, and factors underpinning them, is price competitiveness of industry sectors compared with their peers in other countries. This is usually calculated on the basis of the deflators of total sales. At the core of redressing current account imbalances, however, is always the will of governments, industries and common citizens to turn around an unfavorable situation. A successful effort in this direction includes the proper identification of the origin of trade deficits and of prevailing trends, which may be negative.
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For instance, America’s bilateral trade deficit with China grew by nearly $4 billion from May to June 2010, while China’s July trade surplus swelled to $28.7 billion (the highest level for one-and-a half years). In a globalized economy, the banking industry is clearly concerned about persistent current account balances in countries where it operates, as well as what underpinning them. Trade is by no means the only issue. International loans is another, and it is fast growing in importance, leading to bad debts in foreign currency loans.15 An example is provided by Hungary, where about 6.5 per cent of household debt is in foreign currencies, particularly in Swiss francs. In mid-2010, the steep rise in the value of the Swiss franc against local currencies (as well as against the euro and the dollar) has significantly increased the burden of debt on Hungarian borrowers; the strains have been made worse by the general economic crisis and collapsing housing markets. Economies hit by the double whammy of persistent current account deficits and credit woes, as banks call in their foreign currency loans, find it tough to recover. The lenders, too, are suffering. Many loans in Eastern Europe have been made by western European banks, which will be paralyzed if lenders are weighed down simultaneously with bad debts. The way Piroska Nagy, of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development sees it: ‘The risk is of a Japanese-type frozen situation.’16
Sovereign debt and its consequences for the banking industry Banks and other financial firms from countries with excessive deficits are typically large holders of government debt securities. One of the results is that a fall in the value of government bonds has an adverse impact on the banks’ securities portfolio. Over and above this exposure, banks also have a sizeable lending activity with governments; therefore, sovereign bankruptcies severely erode their capital buffers. Governments are wrong when they press the country’s banks to lend to them because they may well put their liquidity and solvency in jeopardy. An actual, or even perceived, decline in the quality of government bonds in a financial institution’s portfolio, which is often used as collateral for covered inter-bank loans, has an adverse effect on its access to financial resources and may ultimately reduce the inter-bank market’s liquidity itself. Moreover, as far as the bank’s capital requirements are concerned, downgrades of sovereign ratings may also lead to a potential increase in capital risk weights on the bank’s holdings of government bonds. Inter alia, the interdependency of players in the globalized economy is illustrated. Traditionally, the increase of sovereign risks has been observed in the falling price of government bonds. A more recent, and highly potent, measure is the spike in sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs). Spreads over AAA-rated sovereigns widen most
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in countries where fiscal imbalances are high; investors become proactive by pushing the spreads of damaged sovereign issuers to higher and higher levels. In late October 2010, this happened with Greek and Irish bonds. Critics say that the role of CDSs, and most particularly of sovereign CDSs, as a way of judging the likelihood of an entity’s failure to pay interest and repay the money it has borrowed, is controversial. The pros answer that CDSs represent community intelligence – and, as such, they have shown the market’s ability to judge creditworthiness better and in a more steady manner than credit ratings.17 CDSs did play a role during the Greek crisis of early 2010 by promoting investor vigilance. At the same time, speculation saw to it that liquidity in several sovereign bond markets evaporated. The market doubted that other Club Med (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and eventually France) member states have really decided to put their economic and financial houses in order. The volatility of sovereign bond spreads also focused market attention more generally on interest rate risk – even if, over the months preceding the second quarter of 2010, interest rate volatility had remained relatively low. In the event, a steep yield curve attracted investors into building up sizeable yield curve carry-trade positions which were leveraged and their abrupt unwinding would have disrupted market functioning. One issue on which many experts now seem to agree is that the descent of the banking industry into the abyss, compounded with crushing amounts of sovereign debt, changed the rules of the game. As Chapter 1 explained in connection with the new normal, since the 2007–11 crisis the business model which has been, for over two decades, characterized by: • • • •
zero cash, maximum leverage, large derivatives exposure, and unrealistic return on equity (ROE)
is no longer sustainable. In fact, one of the basic premises underpinning the new normal is that this model has come to an end. Against this position of several economies works the fact that such an outcome implies a radical change in the behavior of politicians, governments, central bankers and regulators. Resistance in changing mental models sees to it that practical evidence of this happening is scant at best. Such evidence would involve: • • • • •
an end to lax monetary policies, regulators taking and maintaining a tough stance, abandonment of policies of easy credit and quantitative easing, break-up of the big, unmanageable financial conglomerates, and appreciation of the fact that financial risks are not isolated, while their severity critically increases when they become correlated.
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In democratic regimes, it is up to the public to elect politicians that will enact radical changes (see the next section). Abandoning past practices requires a great deal of leadership. The hope is that the 2007–11 deep economic and financial crisis has created conditions which may have the momentum to force a change. Precious lessons can be learned from recent events such as the credit crunch, and skyrocketing public debt. The credit crunch has led to an economic slowdown. In economies accustomed to feed on debt, restrictions on the supply of credit created a negative pattern with important consequences for economic activity and employment. For its part, the deterioration of public debt has brought some crucial issues into perspective. Worsening sovereign financial problems had, and continue to have, a large adverse impact on industry a whole, and on the banking sector in particular. Hence, they imply further adverse consequences for the economy. Evidence of this has been that the banking industry’s (almost) unconditional support by euroland governments led to both bank and sovereign CDS spreads becoming increasingly correlated and an accompanying credit rating spillover, as in fiscally troubled countries rising sovereign risk induces rating agencies to review their ratings. These notions correlate. Credit rating agencies are increasingly using CDS patterns to derive marketimplied probabilities of default. In addition, a marked discrepancy between current ratings and market-implied ratings now serves as an early warning for detecting companies that may warrant a critical review. An irony with the destabilization of sovereign debt, as it reaches stratospheric levels, is that corporate bonds and credit default swaps are being priced using a so-called ‘risk-free’ rate as a benchmark. This originally derived from an AAA sovereign debt security with a corresponding maturity. High-rated government bond yields generally set a floor for corporate bond yields in the same country, but the question now becomes: Do sovereign bonds justify the assumption they are credit risk-free? Like big banks, sovereigns have only themselves to blame for this deteriorating situation: the former, because they invented instruments backed by blue sky and took many of households and ordinary investors to the cleaners; the latter, because they turned a blind eye on the banks’ wrongdoing, as the party running the government was ‘pro business’. Here is a short chronological list of major shocks during the last few years: • subprimes, special purpose vehicles (SPVs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs), conduits: February to October 2007 • liquidity crisis: November 2007 to August 2008 • Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Lehman Brothers: September 2008 lasting to February 2009 • zero and near-zero interest rates plus the printing press of quantitative easing: late 2008 to 2011
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• sovereign debt bubble expected during the next three to four years (Chapter 13), with nobody knowing how to stop the clock from ticking. Over and above the economic and business weaknesses promoted by these bullets has been the complete absence of bringing wrongdoers to justice. Politicians and central bankers rushed to spend public money as if they were firefighters, not the persons entrusted with their nation’s wealth. This gave the message to speculators and bankers (running after fat bonuses), that, quite unexpectedly, their wrongdoing has been rewarded by a win–win situation – which is highly undemocratic.
Financial stability is one of democracy’s pillars In the early 1970s, Raymond Aron, a French author, journalist and political analyst, wrote an inspiring article18 in which he stated that the year-on-year 2–3 per cent improvement in the standard of living was a post-World War II pillar of democracy. For all the destruction of World War II, the reconstruction which followed provided plenty of work and a better living standard, fulfilling Aaron’s criterion. This is now a faded memory. Western democracies, and their economies, are no more able to provide a steady increase in standard of living, while their citizens want to experience jumps of 5 per cent or 10 per cent per year – and the gap which followed has been filled by endowments (Chapter 3) and torrents of debt. This has been deadly for financial stability, which is now being also challenged by two other principal factors. First, the American democracy, which after World War I became the financier of the West, is presently borrowing too much abroad for its own good. Second, the progressing destruction of the middle class is making the economy of western nations ungovernable because the gap between rich and poor tends to become an abyss. The huge discrepancy in pay is a dramatic example of this second point. Research investigating pay at Wall Street firms found that bonuses rose by 17 per cent in 2009, amid a deep economic and banking crisis, to $20.3 billion. Compensation at Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase jumped by a whapping 31 per cent;19 at that same time, 10 per cent of the American labor force was unemployed. While big banks were (wrongly) salvaged by lavish amounts of taxpayers’ money, fat cat bonuses bounced back to be higher than ever. In 2009, the average Wall Street employee took home nearly $124,000 on top of his base salary, one quarter more than in 2008, while the American economy was still at the edge of the abyss. There is, indeed, a very good reason why Bair and Shapiro, respectively the chief executives of Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), were quoted by Bloomberg News on January 14, 2010 as having said that the banks’ bonus practices spur the
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economic debacle of America. This is true of every other country – and most particularly of Britain. The destruction of democracy through wage ratios of 400:1 is by no means only a Wall Street phenomenon. At the five biggest British banks, executives’ pay exceeded £50 million ($80 million) over the 2005–09 timeframe, according to a report by the Labor Research Department. Fred Goodwin, the CEO of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) who brought the institution to near bankruptcy under his watch, was paid a basic salary of £3.5 million ($5.6 million, an ultra-big salary in Europe) while RBS was falling apart and being rescued by the government. There seem to be some very curious rules when it comes to determining a ‘disaster-to-pay-out’ ratio: the greater the disaster, the more lavish the CEO’s benefits, all the way to the golden handshake. BP’s CEO Tony Hayward profited handsomely from that. After the huge engineering mistake and ecological catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, which will probably cost BP shareholders upwards of $30 billion, his severance package was (inevitably) outrageous.20 These are not cases reflecting high ethical standards, let alone endearing the leaders of big business to public opinion. Times have changed since the late nineteenth century, when Lord Salisbury, and other conservatives, feared that democracy would lead to the overthrow of private property rights because debtors tend to outnumber creditors and, therefore, can outvote them. Today, debtors and creditors are cut from the same cloth, characterized by the habit of spending way beyond one’s means at state, corporate and family levels. Still, the ultra-high salaries, superbonuses and other extravagant self-awards remind everyone of unjustifiably large inequalities, which, inevitably, are common knowledge. This has disastrous effects on financial discipline, pushing the less well-off segments of society to emulate the richer by loading themselves with liabilities way beyond their means. Democracy is at risk because financial stability and a Republican regime are the two sides of the same coin. Public discontent translated into a debt frenzy becomes self-feeding (and self-defeating). The peril of destabilization is a global problem, to a large measure created by the fact that politicians and governments turn a blind eye to practices which should never have been condoned. As we saw in Chapter 3, to hide the growing discrepancy between rich and poor, successive governments have handed out many entitlements without examining whether the country’s economy can afford them. This ranges from universal health care from cradle to grave, to early retirement with a generous pension and unemployment benefits higher than the salary a person makes when working. The total bill means spending beyond the economy’s means and it results in structural deficits which are unsustainable, while further inciting people to use debt as money of the mind. This issue is hugely topical and important. In part, the educational system itself is to blame because, while the subjects it teaches might have been great
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in the nineteenth century, they fall short of elementary literacy for future citizens of the twenty-first.21 Nowhere is the concept of savings and being in charge of one’s own future being taught. This is a pity because saving for a rainy day is a mindset necessary to ensure a person’s independence. According to Henry Ford, small savings made in big numbers represent a large sum of money. Take care of the smallest penny, Andrew Carnegie, the king of steel, used to say, and the pennies will take care of themselves. For his part, John Rockefeller applied two principles to his success: first, to be ruthlessly competitive with his competitors; and, second, to control the whole chain of production, which further allowed him to compress costs. (Carnegie had done the same.) The principle of being watchful of costs and adherent to a savings policy is applicable not only through the whole chain of industry, but also all the way from household to government expenditure. Low cost, however, should not mean low quality. Ingvar Kamprad, who built Ikea, says that diminishing the quality to cut costs is not a solution; it’s a trap. Another trap is to put assets on the block, in a desperate effort to close the gap between income and expenditures – rather than cutting expenditures to below income level. In 2010, highly-indebted western governments decided to sell some of their remaining (lower-quality) assets, while, in former times, their predecessors had already sold state-owned telecoms, gas and electricity outfits, as well as everything else that mastered a good market price. In Britain, George Osborne, the Chancellor, listed four candidates for privatization, none of them exciting as an investment: • • • •
Tote, a state-owned bookie, the student-loans book, the National Air Traffic Control Service, and High Speed 1, the new name for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which also happens to be the country’s only high-speed rail line.
These are largely fire sales, but the British government does not have much of anything else left that can master a market price. (A 30-year concession to run High Speed 1 was put up for sale on June 21, 2010, and experts reckon the final price will be around £1.5 billion [$2.2 billion] just a quarter of the £6 billion the track cost to build.) With practically every saleable asset gone, at stake is not just the government’s ability to keep expenditures below income, but also to solve the problem of great indebtedness relegated to future generations. Because financial stability is one of democracy’s pillars, taxing future generations with debt for which they are not responsible is sure to have severe political consequences.
7 Restructuring Sovereign Balance Sheets
Deleveraging Japan’s example of an economy which has been, for two long decades, in a coma should give western governments plenty of food for thought. As Chapter 4 on Japanification brought to the reader’s attention, since the early 1990s a prolonged banking crisis, sluggish growth and the failure to prune balance sheets led to deflation, and from there to free fall. Numerous unsuccessful stimulus plans drove up Japan’s debt ratio dramatically, but their effect on the economy has been practically zero; yet, this misdirected policy has found imitators in the USA and Britain. Lack of leadership and the beaten path of easy ‘solutions’ saw to it that the Japanese economy got the worst of two worlds: continuing leveraging and permanent residence in a deflationary status quo. This is, once more, evidence that throwing money at the problem and taking half-way measures don’t work and it is silly to try them all over again in America and in Europe, as certain governments are doing, with stimuli, quantitative easing and other nonsense. If the Japanese economy sank under mountains of debt, then there is no reason to try an unsuccessful formula all over again. Yet, all things considered, on both sides of the North Atlantic the deleveraging that many economists suggested as the best possible course to end the economic crisis has not really begun. Government debt has simply substituted for banking sector and household debt. This makes plenty of western economies very reliant on continuing misdirected action by central banks and governments, while the opinion that these mismanaged economies will slump once that support is taken away is very hard to disprove. It is as if Japanification’s dismal results, documented through statistics, have had no effect on western decision-makers. Lip service is paid to the urgent need for sovereign deleveraging, but there is little evidence that governments properly appreciate their big underlying budget gaps. These, and most particularly the structural gaps, will not be filled by economic recovery. Rising pension and health care spending puts relentless pressure 117
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on government debts and, if western economies return to economic growth, public borrowing will crowd out private investment and harm the prospect of further recovery. Therefore, the time for deleveraging is now – not at some unspecified date in the future. This requires well thought-out exit strategies, a term used to describe the necessary monetary policies to be used by central banks to disengage themselves from their (often unwise) leveraging of the preceding year or years. As has been the case with the Bank of Japan, it will not be easy, let alone painless, for the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and ECB to establish valid exit strategies. Governments object to raising interest rates for fear of weakening the economy, even if ultra-low interest rates and a great deal of newly minted money increase the risk of inflation. In addition, absolutely nobody has had any experience of how to undo the damage created by quantitative easing. Reductions in government debt, particularly a large one,1 require a firm longer-term commitment to fiscal consolidation, along with a strong focus on the reduction of spending and structural reforms. Both are doable, but neither is every jurisdiction’s cup of tea. Among positive examples, Belgium, Finland, Holland and Ireland have, in the past, implemented substantial budgetary adjustments, complemented by structural reforms; their after-effects were instrumental in reducing each country’s government debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal consolidation, however, gives rise to certain negative short-term effects on sharing the weight of the reforms between the different sectors of the economy. Negative reaction to consolidation because of these effects unduly delays fiscal discipline and ultimately results in even greater adjustments. This is not properly explained to the public when it mobilizes against austerity measures (see below). The increase in retirement age, aimed to account for demographics, longevity and a bankrupt government-sponsored social security system, is an example of a domain in which fiscal consolidation is urgently needed. The plan advanced in 2010 by President Sarkozy of France was to raise the legal retirement age from 60 to 62, which is necessary, though far from being adequate. But it met fierce popular opposition promoted by labor unions and the Socialist Party, who wanted to hike taxes on ‘the rich’ – the usual left-wing snake oil. Millions of demonstrators paraded time and again in the streets of Paris and other French cities with whistles and banners (Chapter 8). They showed their anger against a minor deleveraging – only by two additional years – of an entitlement which, because of demographics and mismanagement, has become unaffordable and unsustainable. Increasingly bleak economic figures from the western economies do not help in turning the system around. On the other side of the North Atlantic, at end of August 2010, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a baseline budget forecast based on two hypotheses. The first assumed that tax cuts enacted in 2000 by
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George W. Bush would expire as planned; with this, the deficit could fall from 9.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 3.8 per cent in 2014, but rise to 6 per cent in 2020; clearly, too high a level. The alternative hypothesis of extension of the Bush tax cuts would increase the shortfall in 2014 to over 6 per cent of GDP and to over 11 per cent of GDP in 2020 essentially ruining the American economy. As these references demonstrate, fiscal tightening has many aspects and there is no way of avoiding the pain of budgetary repairs. But it is not easy to explain to the public that this negative attitude damages everybody’s future prospects and standard of living. Yet, in the medium to longer run the benefits of budget pruning and fiscal consolidation become evident. A reduction in government financing needs leads to lower long-term interest rates, due to lower demand and declining risk premia, and frees up revenues to finance productive expenditure as well as growth-enhancing tax cuts. Because of its positive results but negative public response to necessary measures, deleveraging is a fine balancing act. Therefore, it is the art of masters who are in short supply. While, in financial history, severe financial crises are usually followed by long periods of debt reduction, the rapid rise of liabilities in the first decade of this century – family, corporate and sovereign – does not benefit from precedents on how to handle the new normal. This makes more complex the process of reducing leverage by: • convincing the public that deleveraging is a ‘must’, not an option, • finding open-minded, agenda-free economists able to work with diligence, and • making plenty of walkthroughs and post-mortems to fine-tune measures and document progress, because success can only be judged through deliverables. Early signs are important; it is just as critical to see if they are sustained. Judged by ratios of total debt to GDP, in November 2010, at the time of writing, deleveraging has barely started in any western country. Theoretically, consumer credit in the USA has fallen for nearly a year, but not by much in real terms. What is evident is that the composition of debt has shifted as government borrowing has soared and the curve of private debt bent somewhat. This sharp rise in sovereign debt on both sides of North Atlantic (with the possible exception of Canada) lead several economists to the belief that, under current conditions, deleveraging will be more protracted than in previous cases. The scale of indebtedness is higher and the fact that almost all major western countries are simultaneously afflicted by high sovereign debt will have global consequences. Deleveraging is made still more complex by the fact that rising amounts of public debt have
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increased the overall debt reduction that will be needed and a simultaneous private–public sector deleveraging adds to the aftermath of cause and effect. Economists suggest that pivotal to reducing high debt ratios of sovereigns is the creation of significant primary surpluses2 through fiscal consolidation – particularly based on the reform of state expenditure and promotion of output growth. Working against this option is the fact that, where tax burdens are high, a revenue-based consolidation provides rather limited results. Most helpful in creating a deleveraging psychology is the early announcement and implementation of credible ambitions and decisions on consolidation, particularly when they focus on matters of expenditure. Such a strategy can be instrumental in reducing risk premia in interest rates and in providing the market with a message of sustained commitment by the government. In conclusion, the complexity of the deleveraging process and the unknowns it involves see to it that it is not well understood by those who govern, let alone by the public. Doing a neat job requires a great amount of skill, and involves plenty of risks, some of which are cropping up for the first time. While the French and American economies have been taken as an example, several other western countries are currently confronting similar challenges from the perspective of budgetary discipline and need for deleveraging. There are also issues connected to the quality of debt, which call into question the creditworthiness of governments supposed to be riskfree borrowers. What is more, many present risks are of asymmetric nature in the sense that the upside is limited but there is plenty of downside. Inflation and deflation are examples.
Deflationary or inflationary risk? Deflation is a persistent, generalized and self-reinforcing decline in a broad set of prices, usually resulting from a decrease in aggregate demand. At the same time, deflation can turn into a market psychology and become entrenched in expectations. Contrasted to this, disinflation characterizes a process of decelerating inflation that may lead to negative inflation rates (hence deflation) of a temporary nature. The definition of inflation is more twisted, and therefore more ambiguous. Webster’s New Universal Dictionary describes it as an increase in the amount of currency in circulation resulting in price rises, and a relatively sharp and sudden fall in the currency’s value. Webster’s also assigns inflation’s causes to supply of goods failing to meet demand and/or an increase in volume of paper money issued. While this definition looks crisp, economists as well as statisticians of the government and of central banks make it less straightforward by
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distinguishing between ‘headline inflation’, ‘core inflation’, ‘imported inflation’, ‘implicit inflation expectations’ and other terms invented to enrich the technical jargon which, at the end of the day, means different things to different people. To make matters worse, with the exception of Paul Volcker’s successful fight against inflation in the early 1980s in the USA, monetary policy has little to offer by way of proven achievements in swamping inflation – or, for that matter, deflation. To make matters more complex, there exists as well the process of ‘strategic inflation’, used as a tool by governments to avoid paying the full value of their debts. Strategic inflation is heralded as being socially friendly (which is absolutely untrue), and some economists (particularly the pseudoKeynesians) look at it with a sympathetic eye. They are wrong to do so. In the longer run, the net result of inflation hurts people more than a dose of deflation. Economists, contrary to the supposedly liberal thinking about inflation ‘benefits,’ doubt that a period of deflation would be catastrophic, as some of their colleagues have been warning. The non-believers in the destructive power of deflation put their thoughts in this way: ‘Will the sky fall in if deflation happens? The sun still rises over Tokyo.’ By contrast, the school of thought promoting inflationary policies maintains that deflation is more dangerous than most forms of inflation, particularly if it becomes entrenched, as in Japan. This argument is wholly one-sided, forgetting the dramatic after-effects of inflation – and, even worse, of hyperinflation, which devastated Germany in 1923 and Zimbabwe in 2008/10, under the watch of Robert Mugabe’s regime. Theoretically, but only theoretically, one might feel more comfortable with zero inflation and zero deflation. But nothing walks in a straight line, advises the Heisenberg principle. These two zeros are not a realistic target. With zero inflation, part of the time prices will be in deflationary territory. An inflation rate of up to 1 or 1.5 per cent is taken by many economists as acceptable, but it is unrealistic when sovereigns’ huge budget deficits, coupled with a very accommodating policy, flooding the market with money from central banks feed the fires of inflation. Economists who press for more stimulus in spite of the fact that the sovereigns’ debt runs in torrents, do so because they fear a large oversupply in goods, as governments struggle to fund the burgeoning budget deficit. To this, they say, should be added a disappointing consumer attitude (in terms of spending money by falling deeper into debt). The result is an increasing likelihood that the economy relapses, particularly so if credit is still restrained and the residential real estate market looks dead in the water. Under the regime of so-called inflationists, prices rapidly rise, including labor costs, making exports uncompetitive and public confidence in the value of money is lost; therefore, the road to economic recovery becomes even more problematic. In an article he published in the Financial Times, Edward Gottesman took the opposite stance to that of the inflationists: ‘From 1865 to 1895, the US
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had persistent deflation,’ Gottesman wrote, noting that ‘During that period industry flourished … [while] businesses produced real output from innovation, capital investment and human resources, without illusory gains from currency depreciation.’3 He also contrasted this result to four decades of inflation in America and Britain, which led to damaging imbalances. Some of these imbalances were created by the massive and very low-cost central bank financing in 2008–11, which, moreover, proved to be no real cure for illiquidity and decay of bank assets, or for the credit squeeze (an effect partly due to disrupted credit channels and rising defaults in western economies). Five years into the global financial crisis and, in spite of unprecedented public sector support for banks’ capital, the financial industry is still on the sick list, says Gottesman. Deflationary risk, therefore, is far from being the one and only challenge confronting monetary and fiscal policy-makers. There is also a wall of credibility western governments and their ‘too big to fail banks’ have to climb in order to prove that the measures taken by sovereigns have been sound, and the big banks’ recovery has been successful. Still, the risk of embedded deflation should not be taken lightly, as it has the nasty habit of perpetuating itself. By so doing, it condemns the economy to a vicious cycle of weak spending and sliding prices. In short, the elephant in the china shop can be both inflation and deflation. As with all other issues, both costs and deliverables count. The expensive and ill-studied stimulus programs through which western governments substantially increased the sovereign debt are an example of the costs.4 The often-heard argument that ‘the hole was simply deeper than it appeared’ and, therefore, is very difficult to plug, is not acceptable. As for the aftereffects of superleveraging, nobody bothered to explain the negatives to the US or British public, and no political leader asked for sweat and tears5 – as Churchill did in World War II – to prepare the citizen for confronting the challenges lying ahead.
Putting the carriage before the horses One of the paradoxes of the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 was that, while China, India, Brazil and the companies there were vaunting their salesdriven, consumer-centric growth to achieve first-class efficiency, most European countries, as well as the USA, were on the defensive. Their leaders are apologetic, timid and constrained by conflicts of interest, as well as by the sacred cows which put themselves in the way, such as ill-conceived ‘social’ spending, which inhibits bold decisions commanded by a sound economic policy and leads to the oxymoron that sovereigns and their folk want to have their cake and eat it, too. France boasts more Fortune 500 companies than Germany; but the French public behaves as if the country is exploited by the multinationals.
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It also presses for wealth distribution. ‘Elsewhere, material success is readily admired … billionaires are applauded (and envied), bosses are acclaimed, self-made men celebrated,’ writes Alain Duhamel, a French political commentator. ‘In France, not at all. Wealth embodies evil, money the devil.’6 Copains d’abord7 used to be a French slogan, but, as of recently, the United States has fallen into precisely this same trap of putting the cart before the horse. This speaks volumes about cultural reversal. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that society enslaved man to vanity and ambition. By contrast, Adam Smith argued that society’s impact was positive. The US economy was tuned to Adam Smith’s principles, but today it has become an ardent follower of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith turned the tables on Rousseau, but the argument underpinning their cultural difference did not die out with the passage of time. The theory espoused nowadays by many people, that the state should indefinitely continue playing nanny to society by means of a monstrous State Supermarket, has taken root. This turns the principles of able governance on their head. Sound management requires that when a crisis hits an institution, the task of handling that crisis falls mainly to the institution itself, its bosses and its agents. Managers must regroup and restructure the resources. If they do not, then the institution fails and eventually collapses. This is precisely what Latvia did in 2009 and 2010 (to its credit), and by so doing its government defied social gravity. In spite of the severe economic and financial crisis it went through, the country kept its currency pegged to the euro and regained competitiveness through an internal devaluation, with large cuts in wages and public spending, and a fiscal adjustment roughly equivalent to between 14 and 18 per cent of GDP. It is a measure of the Latvian voters’ maturity and understanding that the coalition which saw through such tough measures won the parliamentary election on October 2, 2010 with 58.6 per cent of votes cast. The common citizen did not punish the government; they rewarded it for holding firm. Because the public have been so poorly informed about the need to reverse the profligate policies of the last three decades, in other parts of Europe it has reacted negatively to austerity measures. On September 29, 2010 there was labor unrest in Spain and other EU countries in response to recent rather timid austerity measures taken by their governments. Spanish industry and parts of the country’s transport network were brought to a standstill by a general strike, with thousands taking to the streets to protest against spending cuts and new labor rules that make it easier to fire workers. In Brussels, an estimated 50,000 workers from across the EU converged on the Schuman area, where many European Union institutions are located. They gathered to decry the measures aimed at dealing with the aftermath of the financial crisis and the European Commission’s
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proposal to impose semi-automatic fines on countries that share the euro currency, but fail to improve their finances and balance their budgets. Belgium, France and Spain are not alone in experiencing this ‘antidemocracy’ through street power. In Athens, public transport employees stopped work for several hours to protest about job cuts; the debt-ridden national railroad was hit by a 24-hour strike to protest plans to downsize and privatize the company; and truck drivers were in the third week of a strike because the government (correctly, though belatedly) decided to liberalize the truck drivers’ market. This is, in a few words, the real challenge confronting western society and its sovereigns today many of the other arguments raised are pure theory. Clear decisions have to be made on economic priorities, otherwise overindebted governments, companies and households are heading straight for the wall. If deflation and higher interest rates are the medicine to save society and the economy from a hecatomb, then so be it. The silver lining of having gone to the edge of the abyss is that economic policy is being increasingly constrained by deflationary tendencies as they limit the government’s capacity to inflate debt away. Austerity measures are not the enemy of society, as we will see in the next section. This is by no means a call for deflation Japanese style, but for a policy of austerity aimed at facilitating the long-delayed restructuring of sovereigns’ and households’ balance sheets. Failure to do so is precisely what led to Japanification (Chapter 4). Deflation was a symptom, not the disease in Japan. Internal rigidities and demographic trends were primarily responsible for Japan’s long-term structural damage. But misdirected monetary and fiscal policies, implemented after the bursting of the Japanese economy’s bubble,8 have made a bad situation much worse. Carmen and Vincent Reinhart presented evidence at the Jackson Hole Symposium of late August 2010 for appropriate policies. They have shown that, in the wake of financial crises, deleveraging can be an exit road. The real problem with engineering a recovery after deleveraging is that, in practically all countries, fiscal policy is deeply politicized, characterized by an absence of or only rudimentary, defined goals, as well as haphazard methods, largely due to a lack of precedents. Politicians sometimes use deflationary tendencies as a counterweight to the need for fiscal restraint, following a sharp rise in public debt. Political squabbling and the absence of an exit strategy are key reasons why a deflation which should be short-lived lingers on. As it is prolonged, it turns into outright deflation and can have a severe impact because it raises the real value of outstanding debt, with negative implications for the valuation of liabilities. Summing up the themes above and in the present section, the cornering of monetary and fiscal policies between rationality and the easy way out has led many economists, central bankers, commercial bankers and investors
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to debate whether inflation or deflation is the greater danger for the economy. This issue is still unsettled,9 which matters a great deal because inflation and deflation require almost totally different responses from households, companies, investors and government policy-makers. Inflate, deflate, stagnate, default; all seem equally grim. The better solution for countries is to work off their debts through economic growth – but economic growth has proved to be an elusive concept, particularly for western countries, as, with globalization, jobs moved abroad (and money, too).10 Therefore, it is all the more important for countries to pursue deep structural reforms that will open up new opportunities for market entry, free the labor market and, hopefully, make it vibrant once more.
Austerity is not that bad, after all In March 1933, in the very early months of the Roosevelt Administration, the US Congress passed the Economy Act, which cut the public employees’ salaries by 15 per cent, as well as department budgets by up to nearly one billion dollars in various public expenditures. This was followed by the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps which aimed to provide jobs for young men in areas such as fire prevention, flood control, maintenance of roads, bridges and other constructions. Franklin Roosevelt had a talent for finding solutions to complex and urgent problems; the austerity measures which he took should have been a guiding light to the Bush and Obama administrations. Decisions about austerity policy are tough and can be taken by leaders – not by second-raters in government. More often than not, the choice is that of the lesser evil. When, in 1930, Brüning became chancellor of Germany, he imposed austerity measures aimed to stop the torrent of red ink in the government’s budget: • salaries of all officials11 were cut by 20 per cent, • unemployment benefits were restricted, and • other measures were taken to balance the budget. Memories of Germany’s hyperinflation disaster of 1923 were still fresh, and the government did not want to finance the sovereign deficit through the central bank’s printing presses. Now, as then, the tough decisions on austerity are a test of a statesman’s legacy and of the quality of the economic structure he leaves behind. Austerity measures enacted by the Greek government, in early 2010, in spite of wide public opposition, helped in the improvement of market psychology towards the country’s outstanding debts. It should, however, be remembered that in this, as in all other cases of national overindebtedness and restructuring of the state’s balance sheet, the most important factors
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are the composition of austerity measures and the will to see them through. Persistence will determine whether or not fiscal retrenchment is successful. There exist payoffs: outside infrastructure, spending cuts are effective in stimulating growth by reducing public sector employment and wages, and when the government cuts public spending, households perceive the likelihood of lower future taxation and they increase consumption. Like any other project, an austerity program has to be managed. It would be a mistake to think that EU-IMF loans and associated austerity measures will succeed no matter how the program is run. But they had to be enacted. Failing to try is to miss an opportunity to restructure the Greek economy that might have been. Short of rigorous measures, the effects of a deep economic crisis can be wide. In terms of money alone, the emergency loans exclude neither that Greece might default (at least in an organized, prearranged way), nor that other sovereign defaults will not happen because governments will be in charge of their finances. In the opinion of Wegelin, the oldest and one of the best-managed Swiss private banks: ‘Greece corresponds to the non-bankruptcy of Bear Stearns in spring 2008; we shall be surprised if a Lehman Brothers for the eurozone does not follow relatively rapidly, and put an abrupt end to the midsummer night’s dream.’12 (See also the discussion on this issue in Chapter 4.) This risk looms on the horizon of every indebted nation and makes it absolutely imperative that the sovereign put its financial house in order. The faster this is done, the better is the government’s ability to confront the next shock. As for the argument that austerity measures swamp growth, it stands on thin grounds. Under certain conditions of good governance, austerity can improve growth prospects; this is another example of cause and effect. Looking at 112 cases of serious fiscal retrenchment, the London-based European Economic Research team found that sizeable and swift austerity, delivered primarily through expenditure cuts, was successful in supporting growth as well as (often) reducing the debt to GDP ratio. A most interesting finding has been that, on average, in the year of fiscal tightening and the two following years GDP grew by 2.8 per cent per year.13 While the Merrill Lynch statistics contradict other findings by economists, the opinions they document tend to converge with evidence supporting the fact that tightening and expenditure cuts open up the way to GDP growth. This is also the conclusion of a new analysis by the International Monetary Fund, which suggests that fiscal austerity, coupled with structural reforms, yields far higher growth than austerity alone. Such a synergy should, indeed, be the overriding objective of an economic austerity plan. Neither households nor governments can continue to operate with wide budget gaps without running the risk of funding costs escalating. America’s deep crisis suggests that even the largest economy in the world cannot afford the spend, spend, spend attitude which has prevailed
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since the early George W. Bush years. A similar concept is found in the 80th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements: Financial and economic recovery is under way, but it is both incomplete and fragile, at least in the major advanced economies. Monetary policy is still highly stimulative almost everywhere, despite first steps towards a more neutral policy stance in some economies. Fiscal policy remained expansionary, causing government debt levels to rise at an alarming pace.14 Because every country has idiosyncratic problems, trying to develop one solution which fits them all would be the wrong approach. Instead, the cause and effect method discussed in Chapter 1 should be preferred, assisted by a search to uncover the deeper causes of the imbalances found in domestic economy factors. The aim of such a study should be to unearth the half a dozen deeper causes, then examine how to go from ‘here’ to ‘there’. How can an economy which is skidding to the edge of the abyss get back on a sustainable path? It is enough to proceed by consolidating public budgets? Which structural reforms have priority? Which other adjustments are required – for instance, in areas of the industrial base and wage growth? (More on this later.) It is self-evident that the higher-deficit countries will bear the brunt of the adjustment burden; still, an important question is whether the costs of redressing a bad situation will be distributed symmetrically or asymmetrically between sections of the population. Socialist claims that ‘taxation ought to be based on a person’s ability to pay’ are reminiscent of failed communist doctrines, and therefore unacceptable. Another issue requiring careful study is the case of countries sharing a common currency, like euroland member states. Corrective measures should focus on an extensive reduction of negative current account balances and the control of inflation – since relative prices can no longer be adjusted through exchange rate changes. The way a monthly bulletin of the European Central Bank puts it: Major reforms are particularly needed in those countries that have experienced competitiveness losses in the past or that are suffering from high fiscal and external deficits. Measures should ensure a wage bargaining process that allows wages to adjust flexibility to the unemployment situation and losses in competitiveness.15 Identification of economic sectors which contributed the most to a country’s total debt and leverage is the next most important requirement. Taking as an example the United States, focusing on four main sectors and using order of magnitude figures, in 1970 the largest debtors were non-financial
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companies, followed by households and the government. In comparison, only a tiny amount of debt belonged to financial firms. At that time, total US debt stood at a relatively large, but still manageable, 145 per cent of GDP. In 1980, the same pecking order prevailed, but government debt had shrunk somewhat, while the financial industry’s debt had more than doubled. By then, total US debt approached 160 per cent of GDP; a 10 per cent increase in ten years. In 1990, following the Reagan years, the largest debtor was the government, with the financial industry rapidly catching up as it leveraged itself more than in any previous time. In 1990, the total US debt ratio passed the 230 per cent mark – a destabilizing increase of nearly 44 per cent in a decade. In 2000, the financial industry’s debt alone represented 85 per cent of GDP, making it by far the greatest debtor, while (thanks to the Clinton years of balancing the federal budget) government debt had fallen to fourth position. An austerity program at that time should have been squarely applied to the financial industry, because it was that sector of the economy that brought total US debt to 260 per cent of GDP. Unfortunately, no austerity measures were put in place. Instead, the financial industry was allowed, as an industry sector, to increase its debt figures at will, while the government and supervisory authorities turned a blind eye. A year after the bubble burst, in 2008, the largest US debtor was the financial industry, having reached, all by itself, a debt level of 120 per cent of GDP. Capitalizing on the banking industry’s superleverage and low credit standards, households were not far behind; their debts amounted to another 100 per cent of GDP. By 2008, the cumulative mountain of debt in the US economy had reached 360 per cent of GDP.16 As the above statistics demonstrate, the financial industry should have been the first to be subjected to austerity measures, while there was still time. Instead, the bubble burst and private sector debt was taken over by the government in the most unwarranted manner – suggesting policies established by inflation rather than proponents of financial stability and balanced budgets.
Budget cuts and B/S restructuring One of the first senior executives to quit the Obama Administration, and most particularly its economic policy team, has been Peter Orszag, who headed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).17 The wider opinion has been that he resigned partly in frustration over the absence of a tough plan to address America’s oversize national debt, which continues to soar. Reportedly, Orszag clashed with Larry Summers,18 the head of Obama’s National Economic Council, over when fiscal consolidation should start and how far it should go. Political analysts have suggested that this dispute
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arose after the head of OMB asked government agencies to prepare two budgets: one with a minor spending freeze requested by the Administration; and the other with the aim of cutting spending by 5 per cent, which he saw as a first step towards restructuring of the government’s balance sheet. Another reason for divergence of opinions within Obama’s economic team seems to have been the battle over health reform. Orszag’s thesis was that getting health care under control was essential if America’s large deficits and mountain of debt were ever to be controlled. But the Administration’s bill fell far short of his cost control expectations. Congress balked at measures designed to hold down costs over the longer term, a move which has a great deal to do with the politicians’ fear of a backlash from downsizing entitlements. Both America and the European Union are confronted with public claims and entitlements which have got out of control, but there is no political leadership able to downsize them to make ends meet. The sovereign budget is loaded with unsupportable claims whose financial requests multiply like the heads of the hydra: • • • •
old age pensions, unemployment subsidies, a growing pallet of health care services, social wealth redistribution requirements, and more.
These go way beyond the demographic problem which has hit the West (particularly western Europe). Politicians seem to be overwhelmed by legislating the proliferating claims and entitlements, and governments are evidently unable to manage them. Both the political leadership and the general public are living in a world of monetary illusions. The public’s adverse reaction to measures aimed at putting the debt-toassets balance right is often promoted by the fact the sovereigns find no difficulty in finding good money to throw after ‘silly money’. In Ireland, the ill-advised decision taken by the government to save the self-harmed banks at any cost saw to it that, by October 2010, the cost of bailing out the Allied Irish and Anglo-Irish banks had soared close to a massive a50 billion ($74 billion) and the Irish budget deficit was revised up to 11.9 per cent of GDP, plus the banks bailout costs, which, when added, raise the sovereign’s deficit for 2010 to an eye-watering 32 per cent of GDP. If one looks for a definition of what is meant by a dramatically unbalanced budget, this is it. No wonder, therefore, that after three years of austerity in which household wealth fell by almost one third, most of the Irish public remain deeply pessimistic. A cool 70 per cent of respondents to an opinion poll said they felt the worst was yet to come for their country’s economy.19 In neighboring Britain, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition led by David Cameron and Nick Clegg, with George Osborne at the Exchequer, is in the middle of an initiative to balance the budget. It enacted the
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industrial world’s biggest collective budget cuts for about four decades. The newly elected government is pushing ahead with plans to overhaul the British state: schools, the police and some forms of welfare all face a sharp knife. This, however, is not true of the National Health Service (NHS), the sacred cow with an insatiable appetite for taxpayers’ money. There is even talk of the Bank of England offsetting the pain of the budgetary cuts by printing more money to buy more government bonds (see Chapter 5 on quantitative easing). On the positive side of the Cameron/Clegg budgetary cuts is the fact that 75 per cent of the savings will come from spending cuts. Many government departments will shrink by 25 per cent. On the negative side is the massive budget deficit of 11 per cent of GDP inherited from the Labour government and the lack of political will to trim the budget of the biggest spender of them all, the NHS, as if it were untouchable. Peter Orszag in the USA and George Osborne in Britain have been absolutely right in their emphasis on taking tough fiscal action. This is an urgent task before, under relentless pressure, the markets force Washington and London to do anything else by default. Governments don’t necessarily appreciate that unplanned or poorly planned deleveraging causes low growth and has other unexpected effects – like scarce investment themes. An example of well-studied, planned action is provided by the restructuring of the Swiss fiscal framework. In the 1990s, after a period of rising budget deficits and growing debt, the Swiss people voted to implement a debt-brake mechanism. Constitutionally inscribed and enforced since 2003, this mechanism aims at achieving a structurally balanced budget, sets annual expenditure ceilings government officials must observe and prevents excessive accumulation of debt via future expenditure corrections. This has had, quite evidently, a positive effect on the Swiss economy and the citizens. To compete internationally, Switzerland must focus on producing high value-added goods and services whose costs are kept in check. Inflation, too, must be low so as not to erode competitiveness. To help in meeting these goals, public expenditure for new social projects has been kept low, as compared with other western countries, at less than 0.5 per cent of GDP. This is a meaningful percentage when inflation is swamped – which, at the end of the day, benefits workers and employees because unemployment, too, is low. In contrast, measures taken by other governments have simply been too weak and too indecisive, while more and more common citizens and business people have a feeling that trouble lies ahead. This negative public feeling is further promoted by the fact that, in spite of the different stimuluses and salvage of self-harmed banks, concerns remain relating to the emergence of renewed tensions in financial markets, increases in commodity prices, growing protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances.20
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Because they are more eager to get re-elected, than to do a neat job, politicians avoid taking radical but necessary measures, including the reorganization of government itself. Peter Drucker argued that if politicians were serious about really reinventing government they would go back to first principles and ask if large parts of government services, and budgets allocated to them, need to be there in the first place. In Drucker’s opinion, in many cases the evident answer is they don’t; but it takes political courage to be an organizer and innovator. Restructuring the government’s balance sheet should make use of the fact that not only have many departments become obsolete, but also public services are characterized by an appalling amount of waste, as successive parliamentary inquiries have revealed.21 Margaret Thatcher first tried to cut dead wood and increase efficiency, but in the end her successive governments built overly elaborate, bureaucratic structures and made it harder for people to do their job or to serve the public. In the USA, Barack Obama created a new bureaucratic structure of ‘chief performance officer’, with no evidence his government’s performance got a boost, especially in terms of spending taxpayers’ money more efficiently. If the health care bill ‘for everybody at any price’ is taken as an example initiative, financial performance was hit by paying no attention to the attainment of greater efficiency in public health. Yet, greater performance is a bonus in the government’s balance sheet restructuring. Therefore, the absence of evidence that governments care about efficiency comes as a surprise.
‘Long-haired’ ‘solutions’ and monetary illusions So-called Keynesian economists (an incorrect label) argue that big budget cuts will fell a fragile recovery and condemn the western countries to deflation. Paul Krugman has stated that this is utter folly of madmen in authority – but he failed to pay due attention to the fact that, with unlimited spending policies, public debt is heading for 120 per cent of GDP and beyond, which is an even greater disaster than two decades of Japanification. Krugman is not alone in his preference for fiscal irresponsibility. J. K. Galbraith also promotes government stimuli without limits, no matter the consequences. One of his famous remarks on spend-and-spend policies was that: ‘there is no operational limit. The federal government can spend what it wants.’22 Really? A government that ‘spends what it wants’ is utterly irresponsible; it is indeed regrettable that some politicians and ‘long-haired’ economists make the mistake of confusing ‘do’ and ‘can afford’. While fiscal responses to the crisis differ notably across countries, the multiplication of the debt hydra’s heads is very bad news for everybody, and most particularly for those nations featuring the larger budget deficits. The need to balance receipts and expenditures is no abstract notion, but one
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targeting the sustainability of public finances, taking care of imbalances and allowing the stabilizers to operate in order to improve economic activity. Measures are needed to: • reduce government expenditure by downsizing administrative costs, • lower public wages and trim the number of public employees, and • rethink entitlements, with the aim of cutting back the unlimited spending of public money. The alternative is the widening of the tax base through both direct and indirect taxation. ‘More taxes’ are anathema to economic activity, but they have come into the picture in a big way as governments have deliberately taken on the debts of the private sector, incorrectly assuming that their capacity to carry such burdens is almost unlimited. In reality, these have been national Ponzi schemes in which governments grant all sorts of benefits and take on spending responsibilities way beyond their tax income. As the evidence presented so far demonstrates, this leveraging of the government’s balance sheet through more and more debt is a dirty trick because everybody knows that somebody will have to pick up the bill – it will be the next generation. Globally, particularly among western nations, the number of deficit countries is growing and their condition has become chronic. Not unexpectedly, this has led to a public debate on the strategies required to achieve a sustainable reduction of macroeconomic imbalances; for instance, in euroland, by using the credit of surplus countries. This argument, which has been joined by Barack Obama with no success whatsoever, is based on a monetary illusion. The recommendation that surplus economies should reduce external discrepancies by increasing domestic demand and by being, in economic terms, irresponsible, falls on deaf ears and for good reason – it leads to fiscal catastrophe. The Obama Administration has been pressing Angela Merkel to increase her country’s imports through higher government expenditure or wage acceleration, and therefore inflation. This poor advice is supposed to lower Germany’s current account surplus and help deficit countries – including the USA – by providing an expansionary stimulus. China is under the same pressure from a so-called symmetrical adjustment scenario where its surplus would work towards reducing the huge trade deficit of America. Critics say that a symmetrical adjustment scenario is based on assumptions which, when analyzed in greater detail, prove to be invalid. A case in point is the theory that surplus countries actually have a notable impact on deficit countries. Statistics show this is not true. If German imports were to rise by 10 per cent, then the first-round effect would be that the current account balances in Spain, Portugal and Greece would improve by only a 0.25 percentage point, while in the case of Ireland the effect would be more pronounced, amounting to 1 percentage point.23
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Proposals for so-called symmetrical adjustments often center on wages, prices and collateral damage to the surplus country’s economy, with a second thought that, after the damage, output will shift to the market(s) benefiting from the deal. That’s plain nonsense. The problem of large, persistent current account deficits can only be solved by the affected countries themselves (Chapter 6). The fact that symmetric adjustments are unsustainable, has also been illustrated by events in America; successive governments have tried it for some time without success. The current account deficit is not the only worry. Any western economy is full of government-sponsored and government-controlled entities, which have been used for decades as garbage bins for nearly worthless loans, particularly mortgages, or, to provide well-paid jobs distributed by political patronage to people who know little or nothing about how to run a company. This being widespread among industrial nations, it is not far-fetched to assume that, even with nominal budget cuts and budget restructuring, the deeper healing of western economies still has a long way to go. Economists who lean towards the side of optimism suggest ‘this’ or ‘that’ course for the recovery, which pays minor attention to market fundamentals, and could produce stronger expectations. Needless to say, these half-baked solutions do not work. Other economists with an optimistic outlook think that inflation will not rise, as spare capacity remains high; and, against a backdrop of a weak recovery and stable or falling inflation, most global central banks will remain on hold. Adherents to that school of thought are usually (but not always) younger people whose experience of inflation is limited to what they read in books. To the contrary, more mature economists who went through the stagflation of the 1970s and galloping inflation of the 1980s do not believe in such fairytales. According to their judgment, the gaping fiscal deficits in western nations cannot be sustained forever. Eventually, the debt bubble will burst. Beyond these differences in the appreciation of the risks present in the current economic situation, and projections made about the future, lies the fact that there are no fundamental studies to document which level of public debt to GDP governments should aim for. We have spoken about this issue. The limit of 60 per cent enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, which governs membership of the euroland,24 was a political decision. It is also one that no member state in euroland cares to observe. What can be stated with assurance is that debt, and therefore leverage, makes the economy fragile, as it does with a company’s or a household’s balance sheet; even if the figure shown as national debt is not to be repaid in its entirety, the part of it in foreign loans will have to be repaid – while the total debt has to be serviced, with new receipts running to cover the damage created by old spending follies.
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In conclusion, governments have the responsibility of ensuring that higher debt does not crowd the economy, resulting in lower future growth. Some economists also reckon that a public debt rising from 60 per cent of GDP to 100 per cent of GDP could increase a country’s borrowing costs by 2 percentage points. Therefore, it is important not only to avoid re-emergence of debt increases and imbalances, but also to ensure a sustainable process of bringing the public debt to GDP ratio below pre-crisis levels.
Part III Euroland’s Financial Integration and Sovereign Risk
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8 Woes of Euroland’s Financial Integration
Strong core and a weak periphery As these lines are written at the end of 2010, Germany is leading euroland’s rebound, helped by the global manufacturing cycle, a restructured economy and (till mid-2010) a less overvalued euro. France and Italy have strengthened, but the financial crisis in euroland’s periphery has been worsening and continues unabated. Ireland ruined its economy by providing unqualified support to its mismanaged banks; Spain and Portugal are falling back into stagnation; and Greece is suffering a recession. The good news is that Greece is staging a fiscal turnaround, while the risk that Spain may soon fall into euroland’s economic safety net has receded. The optimistic view is that euroland can (and probably will) get its internal problems under control, even if the sovereign debt crisis and domestic fiscal responses restrain the pace of growth. Pessimists – and, along with them, speculators – are betting on the opposite outcome. The common currency’s weak periphery and its woes evidently weigh on the euro. A decade after having been born, the monetary union itself is not in the best of health, which is bad news because the euro had been seen as a symbol of successful financial integration. It was originally thought that the challenge of a common currency was to provide stability for all of its members, but economic and financial laxity at government level saw to it that overspending policies and budget deficits undermined both discipline and economic growth. This has evident consequences for the European Union as a whole. Euroland is divided between a group of countries determined to save the currency’s value through budgetary discipline and a bloc that wants to continue feeding the monster of the State Supermarket which devours the economy’s flesh. The latter press for transfers from ‘richer’ to ‘poorer’ (in terms of discipline) members. Mismanagers advocate ‘solidarity’, accusing the more productive and disciplined euroland members of selfishness. By so doing, they even brush 137
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aside one of the pillars of democracy: for voters to consent to a transfer of wealth, they must feel that the recipients are fully responsible and accountable to them – which is far from being the case. The flaws in the agreements which led to establishment of the euro ensure that, so far as action taken by its member states to redress the balances is concerned, alarm bells only ring when danger is imminent. Ireland has made the most serious effort. Greece has been obliged to slash spending and raise taxes significantly. Spain and Portugal have also been tightening their belts somewhat, but one can see no enthusiasm for austerity elsewhere in euroland. An example of a mismanaged economy is provided by Spain, which benefited lavishly (and still does so) from euroland’s and the EU’s financial help, and, on the surface, appeared to be a model of fiscal discipline. Compared with those of the other countries, its public debt was relatively low at 43 per cent of GDP in 2007; it had good bank regulation and it was running budget surpluses. This, however, was only superficial. Fundamentally, the Spanish economy was overleveraged by a huge and poorly controlled housing boom, whose financing mainly came from outside the country. Large and unsustainable inflows of capital from the rest of Europe (Germany in particular) fed rapid growth of the Spanish economy, as well as significant inflation. As a result, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, while it seemed that jobs stayed strong, society was polarized; then the housing bubble burst with the economic crisis. With this, the Spanish economy turned on its head and unemployment soared to over 20 per cent, while the budget went into deep deficit. What the reader should appreciate is that the torrent of red ink which followed was the result – not the cause – of the ‘Spanish miracle’s’ end. After the bubble bursts, it is not easy to recover. Spain is not the only example of lack of economic and financial discipline. In retrospect, Ireland seems to have done almost all it could to become vulnerable. The overexposure of its three main banks (which escaped the attention of its regulators), and the flood of money thrown at them by the government to save them from bankruptcy, make the recovery of the Irish economy quite a worrying prospect. (More on this in Chapter 9.) The old proverb goes, ‘the time to fix your roof is when the sun is shining’: for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, joining the euro was the sunshine – but they failed to take advantage of it and instead increased their sovereign debt. Because economic and financial discipline has been absent, the common currency helped Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece to overleverage themselves. All four have handsomely benefited from the euro, but they were not ready for it. Indeed, well before the single currency came into being, economists warned that many sovereigns who wanted to join had a good deal of homework to do before joining the club. These warnings were ignored and the fact the crisis came is not really a surprise. If euroland’s strains increase past a certain point, there will be two options and neither is easy. One option
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is the break-up of euroland (which is not unthinkable), allowing undisciplined member states to reintroduce their national currency – though they would face a mountain of problems, not least high interest rates and de facto increases in debt repayments.1 The alternative is to make the euro work better through a euroland-wide fiscal policy and near-zero budget deficits to be carefully policed by the ECB or a new transnational authority. This means moving towards political union and tightening belts along the way. Whichever option is chosen, its implementation has to be holistic, not half-baked. Recent talk of ‘coordinating’ fiscal policies among euroland’s members, but without political union, does not make sense. Calculating and coordinating changes in fiscal stance among 17 independent nations would be a tricky business, even if the different chiefs of state could agree on a core fiscal balance to act as baseline. The concept underpinning one of the approaches under discussion is that the actual deficit of a euroland member country may vary, depending on a cyclical component and the change in its interest burden. Only bureaucrats, whose lives revolve around long discussions and zero results, could think of something like that. Somewhat more promising is the fact that on May 9/10, 2010 Ecofin (the EU Council of finance ministers and CEOs of member states) agreed to establish a comprehensive package of measures to preserve financial stability in Europe (including a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism). The fund is subject to strong conditionality; it still constitutes an interesting back-stop financing arrangement which will have up to a500 billion ($615 billion) in funds to be provided by euroland members. The IMF will participate in the financing arrangements and is expected to provide at least half as much as the contributions – hence the talk about a $1 trillion fund. How effective this financial stabilization mechanism will be can only be judged after the next couple of crises of euroland member states have been tackled. Also, all member states, and most particularly the economically weaker, will need to exercise self-discipline in financial matters and implement deep cuts in their expenditures, which has often been required but only partly done. In addition, if the European Union, not just euroland, wants to institute budgetary discipline, it will be well-advised to start doing so with its own bureaucrats in Brussels, who are overpaid. Over 1,000 European Union officials earn more than Britain’s prime minister. The EU is a ‘racket’, thundered one of the members of the European Parliament who sits in for the British Independence Party (UKIP).2
Financial stability and economic integration According to the European Central Bank, financial stability can be defined as a condition in which financial intermediaries, markets and market
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infrastructures (which comprise the financial system) are able to withstand shocks as well as the aggravation of financial imbalances. Implicit in this definition is their ability to sustain the continuing allocation of capital to profitable investment opportunities and mitigate the probability of disruptions in financial intermediation. To fulfill such requirements, it is important to identify (and continue identifying) the main sources of vulnerability, as well as the risks which they pose. Also, to ensure transparency and monitor financial stability in a forward-looking way, evidently the likelihood of imbalances and instability and reasons to worry about their effects should be included, particularly those interfering with the normal behavior of economic processes, or those having a potentially disruptive impact. Theoretically, financial stability should be examined independently of economic integration in a wider area, which includes independent states. Practically this is not so, because it is too optimistic to expect that formerly independent economic entities will effectively merge their financial affairs by adopting a common currency – as the euro’s experience demonstrates. Also, theoretically, this expectation is not unreasonable because an integrated financial market offers economies of scale, potentially greater efficiency and a rather smooth monetary policy. Practically, when such statements are heard you can bet that those making them pay little attention to the fact that there are also drawbacks – such as the easier spread of economic and financial crises occurring in one of the members of the integrated financial market and possible cross-border spillover. This spillover hits both the public and the private sectors. Companies within a monetary union tend to engage more strongly in cross-border investment activities as they continue increasing their foreign investments. They do so because, apart from waiving foreign exchange risk, they expect that the single currency promotes harmonization of the institutional framework, providing additional impetus to financial market integration among the participating countries. Not all of these expectations are, however, fulfilled. While statistics on industrial activity in Germany reflect the strength of its exports and renewed demand for German cars and machine tools, the main drive of German exports is in Asia, while France and Italy have not experienced the same surge and the weaker periphery countries of euroland remain subdued. The Germans have applied a much greater economic discipline than other euroland members. The country’s industrial and economic data reflect the rigorous restructuring the economy has been through, which, practically, means that even with economic integration the results may be asymmetric. Other euroland countries did not benefit much from the rebound in world trade. Such real-life examples provide good reasons to back up the opinion of a number of economists that, as far as economic integration is concerned, the
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experiment of a monetary union without political union has failed. Even the simpler mechanics required by an integrative approach to finance and the economy are not in place; for instance: • euroland-wide control of budgetary deficits damaging the common currency, • a supranational crisis resolution system with authority over all members states, and • policies to reduce intra-euroland current account imbalances through corrective measures. Therefore, both economists and political analysts suggest that not only euroland, but also the EU confronts a historic choice between integration and break-up unless real economic convergence is put in motion. This should include the smoothing of national consumption and spending paths, followed by centralized taxes, as well as a common level of reasonable and sustainable social benefits. It does not need explaining that diverging paths of income, taxation, consumption and social benefits (from health care to pensions and beyond) create conflicts between member countries. A stabilization mechanism on entitlements is most critical in an aging society, where capital for social ends becomes scarce, given so many demands, while the state’s catchment area is shrinking. The ‘sharing of risk’, often considered to be one of the characteristics of an integrated economy, makes no sense at all when some jurisdictions lack discipline while others work hard to improve their standard of living. The market sees that and votes with money. Sovereigns lacking fiscal discipline pay steadily higher yields. During the last couple of decades, investors have set new rules in the flow of funds, as sovereign debt problems have an enormous impact on their decisions. Financial stability has taken a primary role in investment choices, way above that of a theoretical economic integration based on a common currency. When a euroland member country spends in an unsustainable way, the specter of Lehman’s collapse comes to every investor’s or banker’s mind. In terms of risk appetite, 2011 is a world apart from the earlier years of this century, when the wide expansion of securitization and off-balance sheet instruments enhanced the ability of banks to transfer credit risk, and led to an excessive risk-taking behavior. There is an ongoing transformation in the financial system in appreciation of the fact that policies and instruments that leveraged the banking industry and the economy brought them to the edge of chaos. From the perspective of a common currency, matters become more complex by the fact that the government of each individual country is more
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concerned with pleasing its voters than with righting the balances. In turn, this leads investors to the conclusion that cutting the deficit and striving for positive current account balances are not top priorities. The after-effects are seen in bond auctions whose results should be fairly uniform if euroland were characterized by economic integration and financial stability. Governments with outsized borrowing, which offers numerous opportunities for something to go wrong, are penalized by having to pay a high level of interest for their bonds and banking loans. This situation cannot continue unchecked. In mid-December 2009, as the Greek crisis was still brewing, Joaquin Almunia, then the European Union’s economic and monetary affairs commissioner, told Spanish newspaper El Pais that Greece could not rely only on the eurozone to come to its rescue: ‘If Greece does not take the necessary measures to overcome its problems, the eurozone won’t be able to take them in the name of Greece.’3 With political and market warnings becoming common currency, as 2009 came to a close Greece urgently needed to restore its international credibility. This became particularly urgent following a downgrade by Fitch to BBB+ and a warning by Standard & Poor’s of a possible downgrade – while the country’s public debt was set to rise in 2010 to the highest in euroland. A year later, in November 2010, Portugal and Ireland are the sick men of euroland. In a way not dissimilar to that of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, Uncle Sam had taken some hefty risks, with some of its bonds failing to raise as much money as planned, sending shock waves through global financial markets. What will a government do when there is a confidence shock to its name? Will it borrow at astronomical interest rates or finally decide that austerity is the better way to take hold of one’s economic and financial fortunes? Today, America is still the world’s strongest borrower, thanks to two centuries of timely debt repayment,4 plus its size, wealth, legal and political stability. But Britain, too, was in the same position prior to World War I (and somewhat less so between the two world wars). However, in early 2009, in a public auction it failed to raise as much money as the government had planned.
One-size-fits-all monetary policies are a dangerous game Short of political, social, fiscal and economic rules common to all of euroland’s member states, a one-size-fits-all monetary policy creates an unstable system prone to flip over. The idea that a common currency will, all by itself, correct the asymmetries characterizing the different jurisdictions if euroland has been tested and failed. Up to a point, but only up to a point, the common currency benefited countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland in obtaining cheaper
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money. This, however, also led to looser economic policies and greater inflation, making the Club Med countries uncompetitive while the traditional escape route of devaluation was no longer available. Euroland’s peripheral countries have also suffered from another flaw which comes with cheaper money and scant attention paid to credit: a very low national savings rate. Club Med citizens have become big spenders. In turn, negative savings have not permitted governments to emulate Japan, which financed the unprecedented expansion of its public debt over two decades by means of its citizens’ traditionally high savings habits. Furthermore, scant attention has been paid by the governments of peripheral euroland member states to the fact that countries with low savings tend to grow slowly, and their dependence on external sources of funds increases over time. In turn, this negatively affected fiscal sustainability, as the citizen started to believe that someone else would foot the bill. As if the structural deficiencies have not been enough, ‘under the plans being developed by former Internal Market Commissioner, Mario Monti, at the behest of European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, Europe will be saddled with a tax harmonization scheme that will stifle growth and erode global competitiveness’, says Investment Commentary No. 269 by Wegelin, the eldest Swiss private bank.5 The counterparty adds that ‘the European Union in its current form would not survive such restructuring – collapse or compulsion will result’. This is almost always the result of half-baked measures. One of the weaknesses of studies done not only by bureaucrats, but also by economists and central bankers up to the crisis of 2007–11 is that, in their estimates of the amount of fiscal consolidation, they have focused on aggregates. Aggregates lack detail because they abstract from the existing heterogeneity among the different countries sharing the euro. Yet, the asymmetry of this heterogeneity has been most significant and its impact is felt both in inaccuracy of the models and on necessary precision of exit strategies from an economic crisis. Had the common currency been confined to the majority of the original members of the 1957 Common Market – Germany, France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg (Italy was not ready to join the euro6) – the hypothesis of relative homogeneity might have been sustained.7 As it was, both the membership of the common currency and the models used to manage it were poorly chosen. To make matters worse, management control was totally absent. On more than one occasion, the Stability and Growth Pact was watered down and not taken seriously; inspections of fiscal policies and debt strategies by member states, if they were ever exercised, brought up none of the anomalies which prevailed among euroland’s members – which is curious because these anomalies have been legion. To take just one example, between 2006 and 2009 the average increase in Greek sovereign debt was an estimated 40 per cent.
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Other public debts in euroland’s periphery also grew significantly during the same period, as did those of the USA, Britain and Japan, increasing by so much sovereign credit vulnerability. In the past, this was typical of countries with embedded entitlements cultures and oversized governments, but it is now rapidly expanding in western countries. Such a deteriorating fiscal and economic outlook cannot change on a dime or on its own will. It takes a strong will to bend the debt curve, and even the best efforts can be undermined by the negative underlying economic trend. There is also spillover, with the result that a growing number of countries suffer from serious fiscal issues and find it difficult to refinance their debt. Financial analysts have singled out France as the euroland country of greater vulnerability outside the Club Med, as well as Ireland, because the share of public spending in the economy is the highest. Cuts in the state’s bureaucracy and in entitlements, not tax increases, would be the best remedy for balancing the national budget, but under public pressure successive governments have done just the opposite. Public psychology and habits acquired from long-held (albeit wrong) practices are the political reason why one-size-fits-all monetary policies do not work. Another important area where one-size-fits-all hypotheses are extremely wrong is that of labor relations. Generally speaking, individual countries in euroland need radically to revise their labor practices to facilitate flexibility and promote profitability, but some member states have to do a much deeper restructuring than others. Rigid labor laws and practices are seen as a sacred cow; the cost of hiring and firing is so high in continental Europe that it forms substitute capital for labor when expanding production. In all European countries, big labor, big business and big government hold the keys to the future of economic policy. Many sovereigns are run by coalitions of several parties whose goals conflict with one another. Coalitions are too weak to attack the rigidities of the social system.8 Businesses may want to modify labor laws, but they lack the votes. Labor unions launch crippling strikes to preserve the status quo. The result is that reform comes very slowly, or not at all. Even a strong personality like Margaret Thatcher could not accomplish everything she wanted by way of labor restructuring. In Germany, Gerhard Schröder did a good job in restructuring the labor market, but it may take bankruptcy to wake up France and the Club Med to the fact that high unemployment and a still labor market are highly correlated. The frequent ‘easy strikes’ policies followed by labor unions in some euroland countries make matters worse. According to statistics published by The Economist, the annual average number of days lost to strikes per 1,000 workers in the period 2000–08 has been: • 130 in Spain, • 92 in Italy,
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• 62 in Finland, • but only four in Germany.9 Huge discrepancies also exist in social security contributions, which add a great deal to the cost of labor. Table 8.1 compares contributions by workers and employees in three euroland countries to those prevailing in three non-euroland jurisdictions. Notice that, in the sample of France, Italy and Ireland, the contribution by companies varies from maximum to minimum by a factor of more than 440 per cent. Correction of such discrepancies is no matter-of-course issue because most governments follow the path of least political resistance. This means that the wide gap in social cost continues to penalize some economies severely. Even worse, the path of easier resistance means still more spending and widening continuing fiscal deficits – thereby feeding an economy’s vicious cycle.
The aftermath of asymmetries on the euro The euro has been the fourth, not the first monetary union in the old continent. The previous three date back to the nineteenth century, with the first on record being the German Monetary Union (GMU), which lasted for 78 years. The GMU was formed in 1838 when the currencies of the North German Confederation, Kingdom of Bavaria and Austro-Hungarian empire were linked together; and it collapsed in World War I. The second attempt at establishing a common currency among independent states was the so-called Latin Monetary Union (LMU), formed by (in alphabetic order) Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Switzerland in 1865. It lasted for 61 years. It is interesting to notice that the LMU included only gold and silver coins. Each country maintained its own currency but with a fixed 1:1 exchange rate. Discipline, however, was not at its best. Italy issued an excessive amount of paper money, which led to strains, and this increased with World War I. The LMU broke down in 1926. Table 8.1 Cost of social contribution to social security as a percentage of salary By companies France Italy Ireland Britain USA Japan
57 38 13 13 10 16
Source: Statistics based on working meeting of financial and economic analysts.
By workers 19 8 6 11 10 14
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The third attempt was the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), which lasted for 42 years. It was formed in 1872 on the basis of 1:1 exchange rates between the currencies of Denmark, Sweden and Norway – and it collapsed in 1914 at the start of World War I. None of these past events gives a clue as to how long the euro can last. Averages are meaningless; looking at budgetary deficits can be more revealing about a future trend. All 17 members of euroland now breach the 3 per cent deficit threshold of the Stability and Growth Pact; three out of four also violate the 60 per cent debt limit. The fact is that there is an escape clause permitting them to avoid penalties if Europe faces a general shock such as a financial crisis. At the same time, details about how monitoring should take place are, at best, sketchy. All this casts doubt over eurocrats who promote the monitoring of imbalances and exercising of scrutiny by a new financial regulator who could spot the problems. Management control is weakened by the fact that official statistics tend to lie. Hence, imbalances are identified after a bust; practically never during a boom. As for self-discipline, its absence has been noteworthy. Too many governments believe that, once in euroland, they could worry less about balanced budgets, or even creditworthiness or competitiveness. What all this adds up to is that there has been simply no point in establishing a common currency without political union, or, as a bare minimum, common monetary and fiscal policies to be followed without deviations by all member states under the control of a transnational authority. Just the same, there is no benefit from outlining some supposedly common economic rules in a stability pact without real and immediate sanctions. Paper tigers are feared by nobody. Because the necessary preconditions for a successful common currency were not fulfilled, the euro has turned into a dangerous project. Every one of its members has fiscal and spending policies which conflict with those of its neighbors.10 Precisely because of this diversity in fiscal policies, spending policies and debt levels, euroland’s economy is pulled apart by conflicting interests – which make economic integration problematic at best. The worst can worsen because of the expansion of euroland’s membership, while management planning and control is wanting. As an investment letter pointed out: Membership of the eurozone was also sweetened by unrealistic conversion rates; subsequently, the marginal member states enjoyed financing conditions on the capital markets that had previously only been available to the soundest economies, such as Germany or Holland. The absurdity of this implicit solidarity lay (and still lies) in its incentive for the weaker countries to pile on still more debt.11
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Quite to the contrary of what this undesirable policy promoted, profligate governments had to be told to become more prudent. Uncompetitive labor unions had to be shaken up. Countries that were classically running current account deficits had to make far-reaching changes through strategic product and market plans. Instead, incompetence and impotence have been rewarded, as in the case of Spain, and all sorts of problems were allowed to build momentum till they dragged down the economy of euroland. In addition, unwisely, the member states of the common currency lost their chance to profit from it. Their political leadership relied too much on the hope that euro membership alone would generate favorable economic conditions, and did too little to turn this into a reality. Scant attention was paid to macroeconomic imbalances, which were apparent in large current account deficits, persistent fiscal deficits and eroding price competitiveness. Euroland’s chiefs of state could have improved their performance by operating in unison, but, being politicians, this is not what they did. Instead, inflation in the peripheral countries and fiscal irresponsibility destroyed the euro’s two pillars: price stability and financial stability (in terms of market perception). The basic economic principle, which was put on the backburner, was that countries with enormous fiscal deficits, like those of the Club Med, never really had a stable currency. Rather than betting on stability, every member state tried to improve its standard of living by getting deeper into debt. With this economic background, the euro has suffered progressively as the recession has followed its course. For some of euroland’s peripheral countries – Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece – the initial slump in gross domestic product was weak due to lower dependence on exports. But as the crisis developed, it became clear that home-grown problems were being added to global recessionary forces. One of the worst omens for Club Med’s economic future is that, over the years, the countries in question allowed their industrial base to decay. Part of the reason was competition from cheaper Asian products; another reason was that as internal demand for goods increased it exceeded domestic production capacity and created a vicious cycle whereby imported goods displaced those produced at home. Inflation, too, played a negative role. For instance, Portugal was not able to halt the rise in unit labor costs while fiscal policy was charting a course that was unsustainable in the long term. Greece did the same and this ultimately plunged the country into the current crisis created by a mountain of debt. There is an irony in this real-life scenario because the euro was supposed to make the member countries more virtuous. It did not happen that way, because no attention was paid to the fact that there exist centrifugal forces and, under the conditions of a common currency, persistent national
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imbalances generate internal tensions, with rising current account deficits, and contagion effects on other member states, which strain the economic prospects of national economies as well as the stability of the common monetary framework. Under these conditions, draconian measures are needed to establish longterm, not just short-term, stability of the euro. This policy, however, has two enemies: public reaction to austerity measures and forces promoting a scenario of chain reaction, which starts with the deep economic and financial troubles of one of the common currency countries and spills over. As for the option that Greece, Spain, Portugal, and maybe Ireland, leave the euro, this is one of unprecedented dangers and complexity. Such a move would shake the banking system to its roots, or at least a big part of it; the weaker countries themselves would sink further into the red as, short of outright bankruptcy, the obligations they assumed in the euro’s first decade would be payable in euros. All this leads some experts to the belief that – as economist Martin Wolf said in an interview with Charlie Rose12 – it is more likely that Germany might leave the euro. The Germans have had enough of the economic weaknesses of other euroland member states and they will probably decide to establish their own strong currency. If this happens, before too long the euro will turn to ashes.
Is a weak euro or a strong euro the better choice? During most of the first half of 2010, prior to and after the temporary rescue of Greece by euroland’s and the IMF’s intervention, the euro has been buffeted by uncertainty about a resolution to the ongoing crisis and looming bad news in euroland’s weak periphery. Reactions have been uneven: in Germany the majority of people wanted the deutschmark back and, in midFebruary 2010, one poll in France found that 69 per cent regretted losing the franc, up from 39 per cent in 2002.13 Economists and financial analysts came up with plenty of reasons why the destiny of the euro was to continue to weaken. Some foresaw that it would reach parity to the dollar; others said it might even fall below that. Both proved wrong: still in the background of such projections was the opinion that the world’s smartest investors were convinced that, given the debt problems confronting Club Med countries, the euro has only one way to go: down. Proof that the argument was overdone was provided by the market. After breaking 1.20 to the dollar, the euro bounced back to 1.30 and from there to 1.40 (breaking it in early November 2010). Forecasting is by no means an exact science. Financial analysts who still bet on the euro during the crisis pointed out that the Federal Reserve and Bank of England were inflating themselves out of their debt, while the European Central Bank held a firmer stance. They
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did add, however, that investors, and the market at large, were concerned about what would happen to the euroland beyond Greece. Does it risk: • one or more sovereign meltdowns? • private sector depression concentrated heavily on the Mediterranean shore? • leading to euroland’s break-up at some point in time? • the euro taking all the hits and surviving a major devaluation? Because so many factors enter into these what if queries, no a priori answers could or should be given. The speculators are always at play, seeing to it that the exchange rate of a currency and its volatility are in themselves an interesting theme. According to some economists, Germany’s manufacturing industry has suffered in global competition from the strong euro, particularly during the period when the dollar, yen and renminbi were relatively weak. Others, however, and among them many German manufacturers, have been of the opinion that a strong currency has advantages – provided a country puts its house in order. The problem is that, in different euroland countries, politicians interpret this statement in diverse ways. When German politicians talk about euroland’s rigor they mean extending fiscal discipline for all. By contrast, the French want more state intervention and abolition of flexible economic tools in other countries, like weaker labor laws and market liberalization. All of the aforementioned factors see to it that the answer to the question ‘Is a weak euro or a strong euro the better choice?’ is not linear. It is subject to a long list of economic, social and political constraints and also to little expected reaction from labor and business, since the exchange rate of a currency affects competitiveness in the global market and has a significant impact on imports and exports. Dieter Zetsche, chairman of Daimler, told the Financial Times that the strengthening of the dollar against the euro was helping exporters in the short term, adding that ‘in the long term, I always say two things: the strong euro has been a good training ground for companies. It has made the weak weaker. The second thing is that a strong currency is a sign of a strong economy.’14 Furthermore, a strong euro or a weak euro cannot be judged in the abstract. It has to be measured against something else. That ‘something else’ is the dollar, which, since the end of World War II, has been the international currency. It has a status no other currency ever attained in recent times. Dollar denomination is used in:15 • 86 per cent of foreign exchange transactions, • 62 per cent of international reserves,
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• nearly 60 per cent of bank deposits, • 53 per cent of bank loans, • 48 per cent of sales of debt securities. The dollar’s status has persisted over 65 years independently of macroeconomic factors, and often in spite of them. The euro is a currency without a country. In Germany and Holland, taxpayers worry that the corollary of giving weaker euroland governments unqualified support to cut their deficits is a weak euro. They look at the French ‘compassion for the euroland members who find themselves in difficulty’ as an invitation to avoid the hard decisions that lie ahead. In the longer term, collective insurance which includes the profligate is a recipe for collapse. Carte blanche solutions do not promote collective discipline; it would be impossible to stop reserve funds from being abused. The fact that both fiscal/financial discipline and compassion for neighbors were absent at the same time is not surprising. They go together like a horse and carriage. Financial discipline cannot just be enforced when things have already gone wrong, as the Stability and Growth Pact stipulates. The whole logic of the euro’s stability pact was questionable. To threaten a deficit-ridden country at the edge of an economic precipice with huge fines is the worst possible way to make the need for fiscal discipline credible. Aside from that, too many countries, including the euroland’s biggest economies, were repeatedly allowed to break the rules. How are sinners going to bring to reason profligate governments? Where is the Stability and Growth Pact’s mechanism for dealing with impending failure, and an orderly system for sovereign-debt restructuring? Were the clauses of the Stability Pact, invented at Maastricht by François Mitterrand and Guilio Andreotti to kill the Deutschmark, intended from the start to be a paper tiger? Behind these questions lies the hypothesis that the euro might have been invented simply as a currency to emulate the successive devaluations of the French franc and Italian lira, rather than one able to promote financial stability, like the Deutschmark. The Mitterrand/Andreotti coup, which trapped Helmut Kohl at Maastricht, has been continued by Jacques Chirac, by his trimming of the Stability Pact’s clauses during negotiations in Dublin and by pushing the Germans to abandon it altogether through a new version which is a shadow of the original – and is simply meaningless. Things being what they are, the European Central Bank should be given the task of studying each country in euroland – both in the core and in the periphery – to determine what it needs to do to meet its commitments. Consider what would happen if this is not successful in balancing its total fiscal budget and current account16 (in less than three years); and evaluate the fallout if the member country suspends debt payments, offering instead a take-it-or-leave-it deal, as Argentina did. In redressing this bad situation, approaches to be chosen should not just brush aside existing rules, because otherwise the setting of economic
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rules becomes a meaningless exercise. For instance, euroland’s 2010 loan to Greece has violated the no bailout rule in the treaty setting up monetary union. It also contravened a decision by the German Constitutional Court. In a 1993 judgment it was ruled that, once monetary union had come into force, it had continuously to satisfy the full conditions of the Stability and Growth Pact concluded when the single currency was agreed. If it did not, the court ruled that Germany would be obliged to leave euroland, which it did not. Stopping Greece from falling into the abyss was both a political and financial act. The euro would not only have weakened with an inorderly Greek bankruptcy. It would have fallen off the cliff – with trillions of investments wiped out, aside from the major crisis of French, German, British and American big banks, which had given the Green sovereign a windfall of loans. There is a precedent to this from the 1930s, when the British government abandoned the gold standard because gold reserves in the Bank of England had become ultra thin. The Banque de France at that time had $350 million in sterling deposits, as sterling sank when Britain went off-gold, and it ended up losing close to $125 million, a cool 700 per cent of its equity capital.17
The message by credit default swaps should not be ignored ‘Considering the high indebtedness in Europe, I am in favor of a Schuldenbremse,’18 said Josef Pröll, Austria’s finance minister.19 Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, also expressed himself in favor of some form of balanced-budget rule which serves as a roadmap for judging the survivability of indebted sovereigns. Th