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SECOND EDITIOP.;
Stephen Eric Bronner
'\---V
" A Menlber of the Perseus Books G...
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SECOND EDITIOP.;
Stephen Eric Bronner
'\---V
" A Menlber of the Perseus Books Group
A11 rights reserved, Printed in the Unitcd Statcs of America. No part of this publicatiotl may be in any form or by any meaxls, etecrronic or mechanical, including reproduced or tra~~srnttted lhhotocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval sysecm, without permissiotl in writing from &c publishcl: Copyright 43 2001 by Westview Press, A :Member of the Perseus Books Group Published in 2(301 in the United States of America by westview Press, 5500 C:cntral Avex~ue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, <:urnnor Hill, C)xfturd OX2 9jJ
Find us on the World Wide Web a t tvw\ltitvestviewpress.com library of Cnrlgress Caratoging-in-Publicatior~Data t2ronner, Stcphen Eric, 2 949Socialism urlbound i by Stephen Eric 12ronner.----2nJ ed. p, C171, Includes bibliographical references and index, ISRN 0-8133-6776-X 1. Socialism. 2, Cornt-x~unism. 3, Sociajism---Histor-y, 4. Communism-History. Title.
X.
The paper used in this pt~blicationi-x~eets the requirements of the American National Standard for E)ermancnce of Paper for Printed 1,ibral-y Materials 239.48-3 984,
To my parents,
Harry and Edith Bronner
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Contents Acknrrwledgments Preface to the S e c o ~ dEdition Preface $0 zhe First Editiour 1 The Democratic Legacy of Karl ~Marxand Frederick Engels
2 Kart Kautsky: 'The Rise and Fail of Orthodox Marxism
3 Eduard Bernsgin and the Logic of Revlsit~nisrn 4 Leninism and Beyoild
5 A Bridge to the Present: Rosa Luxemburg and the Underground Tradition 6 Recasting rbe Project: Prologue for a Critical Theory of Socialism
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There are many to whom X owe a debt of gratitude, faxnuef Assefa and Joel Rogers o h r e d extensive comments on the original manuscript. 1 also received waiuable insights from Rosalyn Baxandall, Stewe Best, judith Grant, Larry Hartenian, Bertell Qllman, Charles Noble, jarnes Brsini, Diana Owen, Robert Rocklein, Ann Sweeny, Peter Wagner, and Linda Zerilli. Douglas Kellner often caused me to rethink my positions and this was also the case with Michaef Forman, Micheline Ishay, and Manfred Sr-eger.John Ehrenberg, Christian Fenner, Carola Frege, Kurt Jacobsen, and Ul rike Knotz offered some mluabte insights for this second edition, I also owe a gelirline debt to my German translator, Eva Guenstein-Neu~nann.The Rutgers Research Council offered its support for the project. Without 'Victc>riafrmiere, Karen Sulfivan, and my editor at Routledge, IWaureen MacGrogan, this book would probably riot have seen the light of day, As for Leo Wiegrnan and David McBride of Westview Press, let me just say how much 1 appreciated their enthusiasm for bringing out this new edition, Finally, I would like to offer a special thanks to my wife, Anne Burns,
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ce to the Second Edition Soczi3.lism Unboztnd first aypeared in 1990, The Berlin Wall had just fallen and the Soviet Union was in a crisis that scmn would turn into its death throes* IVikhail Corbachev was still in power and, incredibly, it seemed as if his sclerotic communist state might yet make way for a new form of sociaiisxn with dexnocratic political foundations. Movements committed to liberal constitutionalism, whose dyllamics still remain theoretidly undeveloped, were taking to the streets almost everywhere in Eastern Europe. Hopes on the left were high. In the popular imagination, however, the final collapse of the Soviet Union in I991 seemed to vindicate the policies of Ronald Reagan an3 Margaret Thatcher. 1,aissez-hire became the rallyingcry for most farmer dissiderlcs m d the new party professionals in Eastern Europe, Meanwhile, in the R s t , attempts to temper market excesses were c o n d e ~ ~ n easd anachronistic. Left politics suddenly stood discredited, Indeed, soon enough, the attack on ""socialism" would turn into an attack on welfare liberalism and the values assc~ciatedwith the 1960s. Socialisnz U~boundoffered a new libertarian socialist perspective amid tlze erosion of cornrnunism in the East and the effects of a conservative counterrevr~ltltionin the West. It introduced new ethical principles, new categories, and a new appr~aCh.Mainrstream critics corzdemned the work for chainplaning class politics just when the seeming alternative to capitalism had lost its validity. Meanwhile certain left-wing intellectuals castigated its critique of teleolt~gicaloytimis~rtand populist assumptions. But ten years make a difference, Academic studies in industrial relations now often call upan the labor movement to reassert its ""ciass" character, though they often have little sense of what this might ideologically imply, and most progressives are searching for answers beyond those offered by identity politics. The debilitating effects of the transition to capitalism in the East, and the economic dislocations attendant upon the shift from an industrial to an information society in the \Vest, have given, socialist thinking a new role to play, No remedies seemed available when the dissidents of Eastern Europe were driven to the political margins in hvor of party professionals and the initial outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm gave way before the economic inequities, corruption, and material insecurity associated with attempts to inrtrodnce a market econoiRy. Unemployment and the accumulated costs of
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conservative rule began growing in Western Europe wllile, in tl-re United States, an ongoing economic boom accompanied increasing inequality, Transnational institutions like the International Monetary Fund started exercising greater arbitrary power than ever before wl-riie fragmentation among workers intensified. Dealing with such changes demands more than has previously been offered by the establishmentc?rimLeft, Traditional wisdom now rests on what was obviously the focal point for the attack on the conservative policies of the 1980s: the election of President Bill Glintor1 in 1992. Over the next few years, social democratic parties and ""progressive" phticians would be swept into power in any llumher of cc.,untries. Mixing old-fashioned social democratic promises with an almost unmitigated admiration fc~rthe Clinton electoral strategy of bringing "m~derate"voters into the progressive fold, new leaders like Tony Blair and Gerl-rard Sckroeder galvanized the electorate in England and Germany Soon enough, however, both leaders began speaking of 'Tiscal discipline," "personal initiative," and a "'lean" "state. Each ~1ltirnatc;Iyrefused to address a growing inequality of wealth and already unequal systems of taxation skewed in favr~rof the wealthy They instead decided to roll back welfare policies, throttle the left wing within their own parties, lessen dze social responsibilities of big business and-perhaps for want of gertuinely new ideas of their own-embrace many premises of "'trickle down" ecor1omics. Gtobaliza tion seemed to ~ustifysuch policies, The new constraints on state action, the new mobility of capital, and the rise of new financial institutions had supposedly created new h m s of systemic stabitit). reinfcjrced by tl-re lack of genuine alternatives or movements, But globalization is not a llatural process. Current trends toward deregulation can he co~ltestedboth nationalfy and especially through internatio~~al cooperation, Xt is a matter of political will, But that is clearly lacking. The R~issianCommunist Party now blends nostalgia for the economic benefits provided by the former Soviet state with cowardly expressions of anti-Semitism and demagogic nationalism wllile, elsewilere in the East, some ex-communists are transforming themselves into social democrats and others have begun trumpeting the need for neoliberal policies. In a sense, however, the refusal to engage glc~halization in a critical manner has been even more striking in tl-re West. The search for a '"third way" 'or a "'new middte,'" or what has most recently been termed ""progressivegovernance," has clearIy devolved into a general accommodation of capitalism and its values*Most R s t e r n socialist parties have lost their nerve and, in the Ullited States, the Democrats have increasingly begun to resemble what had been the Iiberal wing of the Republican Party in the years before the Reagan revolution. Given its skepticism ~ g a r d i n gmore-. compliant views of class action, with its new internationalist commitment to liberal democracy and econt~micjustice, SocZdtESm Unhound might actually retain a greater salience today than
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when the book first appeared. The current disjunction between progeessive ideals and ct>nserwatiwepractice is particularly grave. It is threatening to parafyze the purwit of wrkersktllxcerns by socializing the costs and privatizing the berlefics of public policy. A chasm is ever inore surely separating the interests of mainstream social democratic and progressive parties from those of their swn mass base whose members are ever more surely being faced with voting for the ever more indiscernible "ksser of the two evils." Sociaiism Linhot%~;ld sought to highlight the importance of political action inside and outside the erectoral arena. Its claim that socialism is not equivalent with any institutional arrangement speaks directly to the current situation. It suggests that, Ieft to their own devices, established progressive organizations succumb to a pc-~liticsof bureaucratic self-interest. Neither the party nor the trade union can any longer be considered the incarnation of hope in the manner of times past. The need exists lctr a political project capable of articulating the common interests of working people and new k ~ m of s solidarity appropriate for the new miHennium. The attempt to develop such a project, to recast sociaiism as an ethical tlteory with a practical intent, was the original political purpose behind the writing of this book, Unbridled opportunism by existing organizatio~is,combined with a certain support for socialist positions among tl-reir constituencies, is precisely what has put the ethical question back on the historical agenda. Revived attempts to conflate politics with administration by the professionals, combined with the growing manipulation of political symbols for mass consumption, have undermined the ability to think &out new organizational forms, radical. demands, and the ideological. requiremerits for unified forms of class action, A different and more critical approach has become necessary. But it is no longer enough to reject reality and insist upon rehahilitating the "true"" alternative, an ontr~odednotion of workers councils, an atavistic belief in "national self-determination," or the libertarian pall1 not taken by the Russian Revolution. Critique needs a positive rekrent. A new critical standpoint m s t prove capable of contesting the mistakes and appropriating the contributions of the socialist past. Socialism Unboz-tndtried to show what the traditioil generated by the la~ ~practice, ft illur~inatedthe dybor movement has to offer in t h e and naxnics informing that intellecttial tradition, its limits no less than its contributions, under circumstances in which radicals were already becoming inrzreasingly Lznaware of their own past. New corzditions warrant a new edition, This new edition offers stylistic alterations, corrects mistakes, revises certain arguments, and highlights relevant insights that were previously underplayed. All tile chapters have also been reworked in light s f new developments especially tlzose concerning the logic of reformism and the Qynarnics of communism, But the most important revisions occur in the last chapter, These shift the discourse.. Having explicated socialism as a regulative idea, with the purpose of transfc~rmingcapitalist reality, I have taken
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the step tl-rat should have been taken earlier: identify ""scialism" with the institutional empowerment of working people and treat socialist theory as a h r m of critical theor)i informed by the transformative purposes of the class ideal ratl-rer than as a political theory in tl-re traditional sense. Even radical political theory has mt~stfylost its critical edge in the aftermath of 6991: its partisans generally ignore movements, history, and the institutional workings of power, Analclgies with the past are not particularly far-fetched. Just as existentialism and positivism became tame substitutes for the revolutionary philosophy of the bourgeoisie bllowing the hiled revolutions of 1848 so, 150 years later, pastmodernism and rational choice along with liberal universalism and communitarianism have supplanted the radical ideas of the 1960s. Both historical situations were marked by the emergence of fundamentally opposed forms of pl-riIosoyhy in which either bkubject'%was severed from ""object," heedom from necessity, or the particular from the uiliversal, The situation is x~odifferent with the inore do~nesticatedforms of critical theory, It is now usually identified either with a $ilosophic-aesthetic assertion of subjectivity against all structural h r m s or a new discourse ethics removed from the real problems of life in advanced industrial society. Neither can articulate the contradictor)r character of social reality or the preconditions for political solidarity among working people. The older concern with the struggles and longings of the downtrodden has been neglected in hvor of metaphysical musings and acadexnic pedantry, The current trends in political theory and critical theory, in short, simply assume the collapse of a radical political project and the victory of establishmentarian forces. This new edirion of Socialism Unhozfnd builds on my original arcempt to resist such thinking. Its prime purpose remains the rehabilitation of political thought in what has often enougt~been called an antipolitical age. Fasl-rionahle atternyts to deny the validiq of terrrls like ""left"and ""right" make no sense under circumstances in which advocates of a newly pernicious form of free-market ideology are setting the agenda. And there is no need to relreaF into the dogmacisrn of times past, This new edition of Socialism Unbound offers a critical engagement with the idea of socialism by highlighting the betrayal of its regulative ""class ideal,'Tefl~sillgto identify this ideal with either a fixed inscicutional arrangement, or an absolute utopian alternative tc-I the existent, socialism is considered here as a "project'3intent ~zyorrmitigatirtg the worst effects of narke et discipline, rendering existing institwions accountable, fiostering civic resyansi"oilt)i, exposiw prejudice, contesting proprincialism, and empowering the disenfranchised. Collcerzled with actualizir~gthe ever-shifting interests ctjmmon to working people within each of the new social movements, hawever* its class ideal stands in asymptotic relation tc-Ithe real, Indeed, if socialism is i n h e ~ n t t ya practical, enterprise, it is also informed by utopian norms.
Marxism is dead as a political worldview capable of gripping the masses. There is no longer a single serious party or orgallization willing to stake its practice on its assumption. Whatever the intellectual power of its method, and the obvious ways in which it has inforxned the present study, the historical preconditions fc~rits practical validity no ionger exist. Its ability to provide a politicaf alten~ativehas been irretrievably compromised and its teleological guarantees concerning the unfolding of history have Iost their material foundations, Sctcidtisn Unbctund called upon socialists and progressive~to rethink their ~zndertakingwithout forgetting their past. Talk about socialism as the absolute otl~erto capitalism has only blinded the left to the actual csntrih~~tions of the labor movement: its legislative victmies, which culminated in the modern welfare state and mitigated the whip of the market, were not simply the product of technocrats. They were instead forged by the actions of mass movernents inspired by norxnative ideals, Tlzese legislative achievemellts may have required compromise, but these compromises were made with a view to implementing a radical agenda rather than sacrificing it, The comproxnises involved in brillging the welfare state into existence were less simply concessictns to the existitlg order than part of an overridiilg attempt to clzange it, Socialism linbocr~zdwas never ctmcerned with providing a critique of comproxnise in tlze abstract. The prablexn with contemporary social democracy lies nut in its preoccupatir>n with refurnrs, but rather in its blatant disregard for its original reformist commitments. This indeed is what ~ris~ifies bstering a "creative Criccion" ktween any given sc~cialistor progressive organization and its base. Organizational engagement remains as importalit as ever, but it is now less a rnatter of wllich party or interest group an individual ~oinsthan the values he or she seeks to inject into practical action. More important is the attelBpt to specify issues of concern to working people in all of the new social movexnents rather than any group in particular, Especially in tlze United States, with its institutional privileging of interest g o u p s and populist traditions, blacks, woinen, and minorities must now foster class uxiity in their own particular organizations. The burden upon them becomes all the greater, and this, in turn, only heightens the contingent aspect of anticapitalist action infvrmed by the class ideal. Reawakening the sense of urgency in transforxning a world in. which increasing inequalities are emerging in and between nations, coordixlating tile efforts of those already committed to this kind of tmdertaking, is the principal political task facing sociaiists and their allies. International organizations will ever more surely constitute the arena far challenging an increasillgly intermtional capitalist class, The question is whether the Left will choose to work within. thexn and wliether it will seek to render tlzern stronger and yet more accountabIe to popular cmstituencies. Confronting the new system of globalization p~liticaIlycalk for a new h r m of solidarity in which. a class
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ideal coordinates othemise diverse interests, The Qernonstrations in f eattle in I999 and in Washingtoil, D,C,, during the year 2000 might well provide an anticipatory sense of new alliances amorrg a wide array of previously contentious progressive interests, including environmentalists and unions, Their members have become aware of the need to render intertlational institzttioils more democratic and highlight the need for new international policies and labor standards in the face of a new capitalism. Socialism Unhound assumed the need for a crystallization of interests in this spirit. It assumed that the degree of arbitrary power exercised by big business ultimately rests on the degree of ideological and organizational disunir). existing among working people, But it refused simply to presuppose an awareness regarding the need far class unity. It instead presented solidarity as an ethical and political choice rather than the product of ecsnaxnic necessity or teleology. Developing a plausible connection between the ends and means of progressive social change, in the same vein, remains as pressi~rgas ever. Progressive political theory must again start speaking to practical concerns of this sort. But there is no assurance that it will. The guarmtees have all been lost. Socialism is 110 longer justified by the prospect of success in the future, but rather by the need for digi~ityin the present. It is not much, but it is all we have. The challenge lies in making that suffice.
Stephen Eric Bron~er Hew York City, 2000
ce to the First Edition Historic nzny bc verpitie d c j ~ e das n nmightic war dgdi~-tt1211212,fnr sndlzhingfiunz h2 hgnds the ymrs cnzpri~o~ed nny alreddj s/ain 1,i~1, she cdfierth theznz back unto I@, pdssetilr them in review &and~dngetf~ them OECC" more ;Mb d ~ arrnp L -Ahssadr~ Manmai
What is socialism? The question marks the crisis. Throughout the fast half of tl-re nineteenth centtary and well into the first decade of the twentieth the answer was self-evident. Socialism was a movement of the masses, of the dispossessed and the exploiwd, led by a working class that seemed to hold the future in its hands. Its most radical definition projected a 'btransitional'a order capable of finally ending the irrationality of "'p~history"'and creatt y equals wherein each ing the conditions for a communist c o ~ ~ m u n i of might fttlfill his or her potential. Socialisrn also provided the working-class movement with a sense of ideological identity in a quite practical way, Committed to enlightenment values and the heritage of the great bourgeois revolutions, it took tl-re belief in political Qexnocracy, econoxnic equality, and inrernationalism for granted. These principles informed its guiding up the ilnage of a just "class ideal,'Thus, the term "socialism'k~~njured world with wllich to contest tl-re injustice of the present. But this once firm notion of political purpose is n w in doubt. Ripped from its origir~alpurposive context, associated with any number of organizational rnodels and canonical dogmas, the term has been used to fegitimate everything from thetlcracp and nationalism to technocratic economisrn and the w s t forms of a~zthoritarianrepressiijn. Thus, ambivalence and axnbiguity have come to mark the heritage. Of course, the initial steps toward socialism were undertaken in a world of exploitation and often bloodshed, a world controlled by mighty capitalist enemies with a material interest in the failure of such exyerimcms, The deformation of socialism was tied to the pracrices of its enemies. Following the revolutions of f 848, in fact, even the bourgeoisie fost interest in the
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radicai egaiitarian, democratic, and internationalist l-reritage it had previously espoused. As a consequence, almost horn the begi~ming,it became obligatory for socialist pofitics to hifill the unfrtlfitled pofitical promises of the once revolutionary bourgeoisie and simultaneously establish a distinct identity h r the claims of the working class, This d ~ a burden l created enormous difficulties for the working class that carry over into the present. As never before, socialism stands on the defensive, and asserting its salience: involves bursting kom withif$the bonds of authoritarianism and opp o r t u n i s ~ ~dogma , and instrumentalism, that are part of its history. Undertaking such a task initially assurnes a view of socialism as an ongoing "'project" in which freedom is not equated with any particular political arrangemeilt or ecailomic model. Socialism, no less than concepts like democracy and internationalism, must therefore become open to new determimtions of meaning. This involves moving beyond the truisxn that the definition of socialism is historically specific for specific periods, A genuine crlriqzre is always predicated on positim foundations. Developing a new interpretation of socialism depends upon linking an immanent critique of socialism's historical development with a transce-ldelzt perspective horn which to judge it. Only when that co~~nectic~n is made will it become possible to evaluate both the degeneration of the once emancipatory movement of the working class and the contemporary role that sociafist theory might piay. Socialism Unbound addresses this complex of problems. Envisioned as a set of interconnected essays, wl-rich nevertheless retain their individual integrity, it attempts to reconstruct the original spirit of the working-class movement, provide a critique of its development, and employ a new unclerstanding of the class ideal in order to both coniront and illuminate contemporary coildititlils, Initialiy, this calls far giving a strwture to the socialist experierrce and putting it on par with liberalism or conservatism as worthy of theoretical attention, This book wilt subsequently engage in a critical analysis of the relation between theory and practice as evinced by the most important political representatives of tlte socialist tradition: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, V. I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. These thinkers have had the most direct and serious political impact on the labor movexnent, They are the ones wllose naxnes many recognize, but whose works few actually know. They shaped the dominant political. beliefs of the Western working class and determined the basic parameters of its vision. An evaluation of their legacy is intrinsically worthwliile fnr hiscoricai reasons. Again, hr>wever, the poiitical validity of the critique ultimately depends the articulation of the positive political perspective from which it is launched. The long concluding section rnakes this perspective clear. It develops the class ideal and, in the process, places primacy on an ethical perspecdve in favor of a moribund teleology intent on ~znderstandingsocialism
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as the necessary outcome of capitalist devefopment. It also begins the process of reformulating the relation between theory and practice in order to make explicit the premises and goals underpinning a political theory sf socialisxn for the xnodern age. Suciialkrua Utzbnund advmces a "project" committed to iilternationalism, democracy3and ecor~ofrticjustice, These values retain their reievance. Their potential was not exhausted by the misguided l-ristoricai practices of the past. Now that is usually taken for granted when dealing with most other intellectual tetidencies. Who would seriously argue that the liberai. tradition is invalidated by Hobbesk authoritarianism, Locke's willingness to deny civil liberties to Catholics and atheists, or Elerbert Speilcer" ""social darwinism" Wew would suggest that liberalism is reducible to the horl.ihle costs exacted by the rise sf capitalism, the olxgoing economic exploi~ation,or the countless genocidal and imperiafist practices of putatively "liberal" regimes? But, especially on the part of those who have shaped political theoq in the United States, that same tolerance has not been extended eitl~erto Marx or ocl-rer representarive thinkers of the socialist tradition. This tradition is rarely eveEl seen as such by mainstream political scientists. Neither Leo Strauss, Karf Popper, nor Sheldon WoIin have confronted its actual historicai or political dynamics, The relation between its theory and its practice still hangs in the ahstract. There is still little understanding of the reasons for the astounding successes and terrible failures of the working-class movement, Ignored are the qualitatively different tendencies and personalities to which the socialist tradition has given rise, Lost is its spirit, its philosophical csnnection to the radicd heritage of the bourgeois ctass eriemb as well as the criticai and emancipatory elements it retains. IVost in the mainstream have remained contetlt to make ahstract claims about humall rlatwe and ""re text,'" subordinate; historical reality to some anachronistic neo-Aristotelian idea of true ""plitics," or epistexnologically decide that the intellectual perspective of 121arx necessarily leads t o a "closed society'Yn fact, these putatively different philosophical stances share a common desire to dissociate socialist theory from its political enterprise and render a judgment in terms of what is nothing more than an ahistorical and philosophically prefabricated outlook. Thus, socialism has been denied its intellectuat lineage and any serious recognidon within the field of political theory. That is essentially where matters still stand. Eveii with respect to Marx, many continue to hazard tl-re claim that his theory is "antipoliticalm-although even the most orthodox "econt~micdeterminist" version of his thought inspired the democratic practice of countless trtillions long before: Stalin, or even Lenin, entered the scene, Others maintain tl-rat Marx and the socialist tradition are simply irrelevant since the proletariat has not fulfilled its r d e as the "reevolutio~~ary agent" of history-as if that were the only
concern worthy of discussion. Still others argue that we have entered a "pstcapitalist"" phase-as if: the existiilg accumulation process, along with its basic contradictions, had somehow vax~ished.Indeed, many still inaintain that IVarxiscn inl-rerentty leads to ""ttalitarianis~n." Of course, contemporary socialists must bear responsibility for explaining the aberratiorzs and atrocities of the past, But, although the new is not signply sundered frorn the old like dates on a calendar; neither is the present a mere uninterrupted extension of the past. History is defined neither by an exclusive emphasis on continuity nor discontinuir)r, And so, a colzcept of tradition becomes necessary to mediate diverse ernpiricai developments and provide them with coherence as well as a distimtive meaning. A fruitful use of the concept, however, also demands an interdisciplinary standpint that rejects the autono~nyoften ascribed to any given branch of inquiry Such a standyoir~rasserts the iink between tlzeory and practice, It calls for analyzing the philosophical potentiat within socialism by relating it to a chmging historical context which itself demands ever new political responses, SockEisnz Unhound seeks to expose tlze diverse dynamics and self-criticai possibilities of socialist thought. It does not treat tradition as an inherently conservative concept predicated on what Michael Qakeshott termed a ""moraiity of seccled l~abits."A tradition can, after all, retain elernents of the conservative and the explosive. It can even forge an experimental commitmerit to the future through criticism of the inissed opporturlities of the past. This insight, in fact, initially Led socialists to define their thinking in coherent relation to the most radical phiIosophical achievements of tbe bourgeoisie. The ability of the wc~rkingclass to appropriate and transform the radical heritage of liberalism shows tlzat tradition is not simply a xnatter of prescribed practices inherited from the past. It always demands a subjective intervention in the present: traditior~receives a political purpose in its very constitutian, The real question is whether the appropriation ol a tradition takes place in a critical manner and whether political assumptions are expticitly stated. Knowledge of the past is the precondition for knowledge of the present. Unexamined assumptions of a former time, unwittingly carried over from one period ingo the next, can produce the mtrst devastating consequences. Populism, anarchism, and a particular variant of classical liberalism perhaps played a greater role in shaping the American Left than socialism, But, even if these other traditions are better known, they exhibit a decided lack of awareness regarding the existing logic of accurnulatian, the prerequisites for class mobilization, and the structural constraints on political change, They also rest upon provincial notions of community and r-~bstractclaims about the individual, Charges that socialisxn is sornelzow ""foreign" to the United States subsequently miss the point. Indeed, particularly in the h e r i c a n colztext, the princigal theoretical issue for the contemporary Left
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is wlzetl-rer it can become aware of a broader socialist inheritance and appropriate it for the future, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels are clearly the most crucial figures within the tradition and the first chapter of this volume demonstrates that their theory initially generated neither a "totalitarian'het of values nor an ""antipolitical" attitude, As the title inrdicates, "The Democratic Legacy of Karl ~ V a r xand Frederick Engeis" kghlights their attempt t a tie the achievement of social equality b r workers to the unrealized democratic an3 internationalist prorrtises of the EnIightenment and the French Revolution. Tlzese goals gave purpose and meaning to the struggles in which they were engaged: their participation in the revolutions of 2848, their battles with the anarchists in the First International, and their tempered hopes for the new rBass parties that would comprise the Second International, Indeed, it will becorne evident that all attempts to view the work of iIMarx and Engels outside this normative framework violate its political integrity. Democracy, social equality, and internationalism fuse to form a speculative componetnt-a type of class ct>nsciousness or class ideal-in the and Ellgels that is irreducible to any particular form s f thought of ~MXX l-ristorical practice. These norrnative concerns becoxne particularly clear in the writings of the ""young Marx," But they also influence the historical and political pieces no Iess than the more scholariy and ""scientific" inquiries that culminated in Das Kapitcnll. Inl-rerently linked tr) the idea of institutional accauntabilitl; these values prc~videda basic coherence and sense of purpose for the general theory of historical materialism, S o r ~ construe e the work of Marx and Engels as a ""system." h~tzttheir refusal to simply identirfy the interests of workers with any particular organizational form would also enable it to take the form of a critical method. This illdeed made it possible even lor Marxists to confront both the existing order and the socialist practice within it from the perspective of an unfulfilled notion of freedom embedded in its class ideal. The appropriation of Marxk iegacy cannot rest on some academic determination of what be "really" said. Crucial is rather the relevailce of what was said for a theoretical project with an ""cancipattrry interest'" (Habermas) in creating rnore equitable, just, and cosmopolitan institutions. No particular claim of IUarx and Engels, from this perspective, remains sacrosanct, The point is rather the normative spirit of their enterprise. Socialkm Unbound begins witl-r tl-re assumption that it is not the socialist project that must conform t o the dictates of ~Marx,hut rather ~Marx's thought that must show its relevmce for an unrealized socialist project. The abiliv to make the theory relevant is what defined the ""success" of all the major protagonists discussed in this volrrrne. Whether one agrees . prowith their particufar positions and arguments is not the p ~ i n t They
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vided real insights into the political problems of their times as well as positive strategies with which to confrc->ntthem, Their ability to deal with contingent circumstances, in fact, produced the later atternpts to extrapofate their contributions and render tl-rem absolute. So it was that theories, wl-rich flexibly responded to new historical conditions, ultimately turned into rigid ideologies predicated on transhistorical claims, Unfurtnnately, these are what the present remembers even while the mornents of historical bbtrutl-r" provided by these thirrkers are forgotten. In this vein, it is only proper t o introduce the next chapter, "Karl Kautsky: Tl1e Rise and Fall of Orthodoxy," T l ~ egreatest of Marx3 popularizers, Kautsky philosophically dominated the early years of the Second International. Reality itself seemed t o be confirming the prophecies of Marx arid Engels, wlzich, in turn, appeared to legitimate Kautskp" attexnpt to produce a finished syscexn from their theoretical endeavors. Writing in a period marked by the explosion of capitalism, and the astounding growth of an industrial proletariat coinmiteed tct what were hecoming mass political parties, Kautsky's version of orthodox Marxism predicted an ""inevitable" "victory and expressed the optimism of a movement on the rise, Few l-rave been mistreated as badly by l-ristory, Especially following the disaster of 1914 when European social demwracy chose to support the war effort of its respective nation-states, only abuse was heaped upon Kautsti-)r In retrospect, it seemed that he had fashioned ~Varxisxninto a system precisely in order to subvert its real revoIutionary pwposes. Gommi~edto a ""science" of histor)., it now appeared that he had always beer1 wary about those forxns of mass action that alone might actttally have proven or disproven its predictions, It became a commonplace to suggest that he had ignored culture and consciousness, and that he had employed the certainty of an '5nevitableWproletarian victory in the hrure to denigrate the need for direct political actiocl in the present. That is how Karrtsky is remembered. Brtt, in fact, he was neither a ""taitor'' to socialism nor an "imperialist." What" more, his view was not reducible to some instrumental policy of nationalization that simply precluded questions of ethical solidarity and crrlrural renewal. Nor did he ever simply ignore ""politics" in the name of an "econornic determinism" designed to make the masses complacent, Quite the contrary. Kautsky placed a fundamntal primacy on the role of the political party a d it was his brand of teleological ~Marxismthat energized the rnasses with the belief that their participation would help bring about the ""day"" of revolution that much sooner, The truth is that Kautsky's teleological economism was a spur for action. Its collapse severed tl-re connection between theory and practice, reform and revolution, political democracy and socialist transformation. Indeed, the collapse of his teleological vision ultimately initiated
that loss of ideologicai certainty and political direction that l-ras plagued the Left dowil tc-,the present. As orthodox Marxism faltered, the theories of Eduard Berr-rstein and VI LT. Lenin took center stage. Building on Kautsky, botl-r standpoints equated the interests of the workers with those of an organization. Yet, neither was actustlty able to shoulder the dual burden of the working class. Tensions ernerged between realizing the unl'utfiited radicai legacy of the bourgeoisie and establishing a distinct identity for working-class politics. What were once two moments of the same project rlow appeared as mutuclIly exclusive, Revolution would subsequently stand opposed to reform, politicat work to econc~micconcerns, sociafism to democracy, proletarian internationalism to national interests.. Two new competing worldviws would now define working-class politics in tl-re popular imagination. Employing the critical and I-ristorical elements of ~Marxism,while intzt>vativelyresponding to new conditions, the contending standpoints of Eduard Bernstein arld,enin soon enough assumed the stattis of orthodoxies in their own right. Identified with a particular form of politicd practice, an unrelenting instrumentalism transformed each into a rigid and self-legitimatir-rgworldview that truncated the class ideal, Eduard Bernstein attacked orthodox Marxism by attempting to divorce the transformation of the capitalist economy from a political assault upon the state, Ready to assume that the industrial working class was not growing, and that a democratic proletarian revolution was no lr~ngerinevitable, he believed that a '?revision" of the old theory was necessary. Only in this way would it prove possible not to offe~idgroups that r ~ i g hotherwise t support tl-re sole tactic available for a socialist movement opposed to the violent political seizure of power by a minority; incremental economic reform. Eduard Bernstein indeed initiated an "'economism" far more pervasive and reductionist tl-ran orthodox Marxism ever was in theory or practice, Eduard Bernstein's "revisionism'hwas predicated on his rejection of Marxist teleology Just as the belief in the "irnevitable'\ictory of the proletariat had ttirned into a new b n n of faith, howevef; his insissence upon the need for compromise soon became an ideologicd dogma in its own right, The theory had repercussiol~sfor practice. It fostered the liquidatioll of a distinct identity or sense of purpose for the labor movexnent. With l-ris belief in the linear development of: reforms, whereby one would necessarily build on another, Berrrstein also assumed that sociaIEsm would "evolve" gradually within capitalisxn. Indeed, blind to the structural dependency of workers on capitalist investment and the need to maintain an adequate rate of profit, his revisionism appeared based on ""common sense'\and it became the ersatz for the old teleology. The economic achievements of ""evolutionary socialism" are ir-rdisputable, But, politically, it is another story, The greatest successes of this
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tendency occurred precisely in those advanced industrial states where democracy was already constituted, or would become constituted without the need for political radical action by the refc~rmiststhemselves, ft is notewortlzy that social democratic reforrnisrn had Xittle appeal for the struggtes of colonized peoples against imperialism. It has also proven incapabie of confronting the growth of cynicism and apathy among the very groups to which it should appeal, Thintgs have grown even worse for revisionism with the rise of the '"third wab" or a neorevisionism, intent upon rolling back many of its origitlal successes. Reformists have generally been unwilling to admit the structural dependency of their undertakings on the whims of capital. They have been unable to conceive of a political response to reaction, let alone the possibility of counterrevolution, and they have been insistent on suhodina ting inrternational commitments to national exigencies and long-term to short-term issues, The original revisionist attack on "metaphysics" made it ever more difficult to forward any speculative criteria for ethical judgment and this, in turn, l-retped transfonr.1 a coherent social democratic worldview into a potitics of drift. Ali of this demands a critique of the unexamined epistemologic : this tendency, Thus, cal premises as weli as the underlying d y n a ~ ~ iof ""Euard Bernstein and the Logic of Revisionism" confronts the institutiunai and philosophicat limits o f an instrumental politics that threatens both the meaning and identity of the socialist proiect, h somewhat different ayproach is necessary, however, when dealing with Leninism. Its totalitarian impulse has been duly recognized, Especially give11 the prejudices of a "pstcoi~munist"world, however, illuminating the integrity of the original theory has become a matter of some importance, Leninism was a worldview with implications for political organization and the state, nationalism and internationalism, as well as i~nperiafism and a revolutionary ethic. ""Lninisxn and Beyand" explores the dynamics of the theory, the alternatives it might have generated, and how political choices made within a changing historical complex influenced the character of its assau 'ft on tlze internationalist, republican, and egalitarian principles inhrming the class ideal. Initially concerned with bringing &out a bourgeois revolution where capitalism was weak and the proletariat small, no less than Bernstein, Lenin too was wiliing to reach out to g o u p s other than the working class. But, according to Lenin, this required making the political organization independent of its empirical base and substituting it for the proletariat as the revolutionary agent of socialist transformation, Incarnating the possibility of concerted revolutionay action by the oppressed, the p a r y became the repository of ""true consciousness," wl~ich,in turn, enabled it to treat all adversaries-includiq those with actual support from the profetariatpurely as conditions warra~~ted.
An etl-ricai or speculative component, predicated on revolutionary cornmitment, was nevertheless evident in the thought of this great ""Machiavellian'9from the beginning. This alone enabled Lenin to cmceive of the party as tl-re bearer of ""true consciousness" a d ~ustifiedtactical changes as well as compromises with other classes. It also allowed him to disregard all charges of opportunism artcl engage in the anti-imperialist: quest lor ""rational selt--determination" without fear of liquidating inrernationafist proletarian principles. Lenin" conception of the party was predicated on a vobuntaristic reinterpretatiori of Marxism that would highlight its revolgtionrlry implications for econamicaily underdeveloped societies without liberal traditioils or a mass labor movement. Indeed, its usuccess" was inversely related to the existence of democratic institutions and economic advancement in any given nation. An etl-ric built on revolutionary commitment demands revision, however, once powu has been seized in a national context and the possibilities for inrternatioxzal revolutiori have waned, Yet, that is precisely what did not OCcur even as history seerned to abandon the nascent regime, Faced with the failure of the pmletarian uprisings in the West following Wc~rtdWar I, the Bolshevik state found itself znorally rudderless. Forgetting that a movemerit in power differs from one on the rise, and implicitly assuming tile revolutionary commitment of his vanguard, Lenin refused to accept the need for countervailing organizations to institutionally check what would become an arbitrary exercise of power by the party, Thus, revolutionary socialist identity was cc~nsolidatedat the expense of those radical democratic values that Marx and Engeis no less than Matltsky and Bernstein had called upon the politicai organizations of the working class to realize, In this way? Lenin helped set the stage for his successor. Whatever the continuity between 1,eninisrr-r and Stalinism, however, elements of discontinuity also existed in marters ranging from tile character of tl-re party to the use of terror, from its organizational style to the cult of the personality, from domestic policy to the role of cultrrre and fc~reignpolicy. In fact, the coherence of Lenin's original theory was destroyed by Stalin, whose ad hoc pronouncements resuited in little more than an arbitrary dogma designed to meet the immediate instrurnerital exigencies of party practice. Miflions were sacrificed as one compromise followed another and '"proletarian internationalism"" became a mere veil for the pursuit of the Soviet Union" national interest, But the terror and the lies ultimately took their toll. Especially following Stalin's deatl-t, the USSR lost the aura and ""rvolutionary privilege" it bad once possessed among the exploited and the dippossessed. Gradually it became apparent that the only ""scialist'\tate, even if it had emergcd from the depti-rs of superstition and underdevelopment to become a superpower, was n w a state like any other. And so, even before the events of 19139, the former communist parties found themselves
bereft of ideulr~gyand politicai purpose. Soxne turned to nationalism, and even anti-Semitism, while others sought to reinvent themselves in the guise of traditit)nal social democracy P;;o less than with the Western reformist parties, howevel; a sense of drift would infect tile once proud Western cornmunlst movement. A standpoint for criticism and a positive afternative can be found within the '"underground" tradition of socialist theory m d praccice inauguritled by Rosa Luxemburg, Emphasizing the critical elements within :Warxian theor?; seeking to actualize the ~zntappedpotential of the class ideal, she rutl~lesslycriticized tile instrumentaiism of both umritical reformers and Bolsheviks by refusing to accept any mechanical unification of "socialist" interests between party and base. This immediately put her at a disadvantage inside the party burea~zcracy and among party professionals. Luxexnburg believed the party should attempt to raise tl-re self-administrative capacities of the base and, perhaps ultimately, create the conditions for its own disappearance. Breaking dowz-~the identification of freedom with any set of institutions, she implicirIy saw socialism as a process
rninirnizing the political difficulties or hiding the existential price, "'Recasting the Project: Prologue for a Critical Theory of Socialism'' attempts to confront this situation. New conditions demand a new perspective, It may not be possible to develop a prtgram in the abstract, hut it is possible to talk &out the principles that should inform one. Whatever one may think about Marx and Engels, Kautsky, Bernsceirz, Lenin, and Luxernburg, each afrer his or her fashion coupled a fundamentally critical attitude towards dominant assurllgtions with a positive perspective predicated on a particular understanding of theory and practice. Unfortunately$ such positive concerns lor practice are precisely what have been missillg from many of the current theoretical debates, Admittedly, most have rect~gnizedthe need to dispense with the teleological pretensions of the past, But recent theoretical undertakings l-rave sought to compensate for the erosion of historical certainty by seeking either to make Marxism fit the requirements of a contemporary social ""science,'" provide it with an ontologicat foundation, or develop an ethic centered on fundamentally ""democratic" concerns. None of: them speaks to the central issues involved in developing a public philosophy for the presexit, A new theory of socialism sl-rould not begin by attexnpting to determine yes another set of ""iron laws,"" Equally misguided, however, is the uncritical acceptance of philosophical perspectives incapable of confronting existing institutional structures of class constraint or the exploitation deriving from the production process, Indeed, if the dual burden of the working class has not been iifted, neither has it beer1 thernatized in a fruitful fashion to meet the concerns of the present, New social movements have leapt into the breach caused by the integation of the revolutionar)i-proletariat and the ~znfrtlfaliedprosrtises of liberal society, These new social Enovernents l-rave expanded the realm of freedarn by raising new issues and exposing new domains of repression in terms of ecology3 abuse within the family, and other matters, They have brought about a profound transformarion of everyday life, B~ittheir cult~tralsuccesses have been accompanied by a growing maldistribution of wealth and a shift towards pr>liricalconservatism. Fragmentation is now the hallmark of tl-re Left and it makes ritrle sense sirnyiy to suppiexnenc "cclass" with '*racep and ""sex." Attempts tc-, forge a sustainable unity on this basis ignores the bureaucratic preoccupation with autonomy by interest groups and the often mutualIy exclusive character of their epistemological assuxnptions. A new perspective has become necessary, Insofar as the current dynaii~icsof fragmentation remain uncontested, moreover, it becsmes ever more difficult to envision the prerequisite political conditions for unity along with the basic values tc-,which the Left should stand zknambiguousty co~nmitted,
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Neither postmodern nor analytic philosophy ofkrs much for any movement tbat mEst set priorities and establish categories for making political judgments. The 1980s have shown how particularist and instrumeritd ideologies, buttressed by political organizations witit a vested interest in autont>my, serve to uildermine the commitment to universal values, Without such values, it is impossibk to formulate the csnditions for class tzniq necessary to contest the power of capitaf or creaee the institutions that might fwther economic ey uality and democratic accountability. Indeed, while rejecting the belief that this situation n l l ~ s tchange, Socialism Urthouvtd attempts to resist the present inceilectual state of affairs. Rehsing to define itself by the thinking of either 1848 or 1968, rejecting the ""politics of experience" no less than an academic philosophy blind to its practical implications, it seeks to reassert the critical tnoiBent within a virtually forgotten tradition. Attempting to recast the dltal burden of working-class politics, which invt~ivescons~ectinguniversal political principles with particrxlar economic interests, it asstimes r~eitherthat various forms of particularism of ""necessity" heed political cosmopolitanism nor that it is sufficient mechanically to link the "'working class" with women, minorities, and other such constittiencies.. Cornpetition over scarce resources, and the need to rebuild with each new issue, rnakes it irnperative to formulate a standpoint capable of speaking to the concerns of workers in every oppressed group while privifeging none. Single issue coalitions are still necessary in practice, but the power of capital is also still dependent on the degree of unity among working people, Indeed, that is the reason for inrtroducing the class ideal, This category equitably embraces the egalitarian concerns of the new social movements even as it mair-rtains a distinct class standpoint committed to transiorming the existing logic of accumulation, It is predicated on those values of democrac)r, econornic justice, and internationdim that continue to define the most emancipatory possibilities of the socialist project, Cor~mitmentto the class ideal calls for contesting the privilege currently accorded autonorny with civic responsibility, local participation with the accountability of alE institutioils, national sovereignty with internationalism, provincia! sentimerits with cosmopolitan values, There is no possibili~ of evasion, Particularism and identity politics perhaps provide an option. But, if unity is the goal in practice, principles capable of fostering this unity must be chosen in theory. That choice lacks all teleologicai guarantees. It is based a n purely speculative consideratioils and, to this extent, a trailsfarmatioil of the traditioilal tlnderstanding of the relation betweeri theory and practice is required. In the past, teleological beliefs made it possible to assume that the insights of theory would necessarily be trailslated into practice, That assumption has lost its validity Socialist poiitical theory can no longer guarantee the real-
I>re@ceto the First Eda'rion *
mix
ization of its concerns any rnore than the popular acceptance of the fogicai prerequisites for an emancipated order, Practice is no longer, then, the ulrimate arbiter of theoretical ""truth,'Y~oialistpolitical theory can forward positive proposals and illuminate opportunities for political practice. It can unearth the exploitative implications of the existing system of production and it can highligi~tthe critical inornent within the socialist project, Nevertheless, its reassertion of the link between theory and practice can occur only from the standpoint of theory itself. That is not very cssrtforting. A starrce of this sort offers no certainty that sacrifice in the present will ever be redeemed througli a more humane future, Nor is any organization seen as holding the key to uftimate success. A sc~cialismuilbound rests on little more than an ethical commitmeilt to a set of ux~realizedideals, But, then, no serious ethic has ever been constructed on tl-re guarantee of success or reward. As Brecht put the matter: "kcan go one way, and ailother tc-,oW-and the alternatives are far more nuanced than the old choice between sociaiisrn and barbarism, Freedom continrxes to contest the darkness, But it can wither, Witcllout a reinvigorated cornmitment to the goals of internationalism, political democracy, and economic justice, history will be made in the breach. And that humanity simply can no longer afford. S.E,B.
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The Democratic Legacy o Karl Marx and Frederick Enge
As Karl Marx ancl Frederick Engels were finishing The Communist Martifesto, a specter was hauntix~gEurope, Heine knew it. T(3cquevilte knew it, Mazzini and Wauxnier, Lassalle and Merternich knew it as well. Across the political spectrum, everyone with eyes to see knew it. How could they not? The upheavals of 1848 occurred because the October Revolution of l917 was not the only one that history would betray. The great French Revolution hacl produced an emperor who fell before an epoch of '"restorationm-a "swamp" ((Stendbal) wherein the l-ropes of Dantan, Marat, and Robespierre drowned as surely as the dreams of Beethoven and Schiller,. Ruled by a decayed aristocracy, this restoratiol~was dorninated by ideolr~gicaicornxnitments to irrationalism, elitism, provincialism, chauvinism, mysticism, racism, and ailti-Semitism, The remaining liberals bided their time, With hearts still o n the barricades, they were thrilled at the Kevuf wian af 1W, which deposed Charles X, finalfy ended the threat of a return to feudal absolutism, and ushered in King Louis-Phillippe who dressed in suits and knew the vaiue of cornInerce, Nevertheless, those same liberais m u g have experienced a twinge of discomfort when they read tlze closing lines of G e t h e " F ~ a u sor~ first looked at Defacrr>ix\ LLiberty Lecadi~zgthe People. The ""bourgeois king" was nor one of their own, but his regime changed them, A slow, though irreversible, process began that ultimately turned this previously revolutionary class into the complacent inheritor of what would becoxne an increasingly dangerous heritage. Far all tl-re tensions between liberal and popular conceptions of democracy, the bourgeoisie once felt that its interests were identifiable with those of " h e Peoplem-by which
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was meant nut sixnply those of coxnman birth, but the lowly and the insulted, the excluded and the disil-rherited. Now, however, the existence of the masses was fast becoming foreign to the class that had formerly claimed to speak in its name. And yet, as unemployed artisans and hungry workers seethed with anger over the economic crisis of 1847 as well as the corrupt regime of Louis XVJTJ, the bt~urgeoisiedecided to stand up for its old ideals one last time. Thus, in 1848, this class confronted its traditional aristocratic enemy with the republican demand h r sufiage, Wfjrkers everywhere rejoiced and initially supported the call for a ripubligue d&mocrat.igue,But disquiet spread, and, soon enough, tlze buurgeoisie was appalled by what it had uilleashed, Feeling the emptiness in their stomachs, working people recalled 1830, when the great capitalist TAafficteproudly proclaimed ""From now on the bartkers will rule,'"& when the saying went around, ""The 13eople has wan a victory; the genttemen share the spoils.'TTfiis time it would be difkrent, and, as action from below complemented the bourgeois attack from above, the revolutionary gaal chaaged. By demandixlg a r k p ~ b l i q ~dkmocratique e el sock& that would reorganize labor, institutionalize the right to work, redistribute wealth, and erid the inequiries of tlze market, the Parisim workers went beyond their comrades elsewhere. They recogtlized that, without meaningful social and material equalit)., the root ideal of democracy would be seriously corrtpromised, The 13arisian workers thus saw their demand for socioeconomic equalitj~as an extensroil, or radicalization, of the c~riginalbourgeois democratic impulse. So it was that the most radical ~zndertakirrgsof 1848 sougl-rt to link political democracy, predicated on free elections and civil liberties according to the rule of law, with the creation of egalitarian material conditions, or social democracy, From that tixne, the f~~ndamental practical question for the socialist movement has been whether the one form of democracy might he extended inta the other peacefully through reforms or whether such an extension would demand a revolutionary transfarrnation of the entire systexn. The historical convergence of formal democratic and substantive egalitarian aspirations in 1848, however; also had a profound theoretical corzsequence: socialism ernerged as a public ideal tlsat, unlike otlzer radical egalitarian ic of materdc~ctrinesrooted in religious values, offered a d e ~ ~ o c r a tdefense ial and social equaiity
In Quest of Equality The demands raised during the revolutions of 1848 produced a critical mtjmerit in socialist theory with which to confrt'ront the authoritarian deforma-
226 Dc~~ucr~t-ic l l g d q uf Karl Mdrx nnd Frederick EngeL * 3
tions of the future, At the same time, however, they left the bourgeoisie in a terrible dilemma,' Clearly, it feared that attempts to link political democracy with In q ~ e s t i c msocialct would threaten private property, Nevertheless, it also dreaded the possible poIicicai consequences of embarking upon an unqualified defense of its wealth and privileges, Conditions differed from couritry to country;' some situations saw greater success for the bourgeoisie or the workers than others; in some instances a new governmental form was generated, in others not; in some cases the bourgeoisie was actually challenged by the wc~rkers,in others not, Especially in France, wl~erethe dynamic bellind the international events exhibited its starkest features, previously antagonistic classes like the aristocracy and bourgeoisie formed a tacit alliance that crushed the insurgent workers. But, throughout Europe, it soon became apparent that the failure of the revolutions had resulted in an order doxninated politically by the aristocracy and ecoilc~micalfyby the bourgeoisie," Thus, the bourgeoisie learned the difference between the trappings and the content of power: Every revolution bequeaths its Legacy, and 1848 was no exception, The reactionary Metternich felt and the meteoric Garibaldi rose, whife, for a few years, France experienced republicanism. But the new dawn turned to dusk quickly enough. As the E-iapbsburgs attempted to turn back the cIock, and Napoleon JII forged a csalition to support his new form of Caesarism, the faiture of republican aspirations in Germany paved the way for Bismarck and stunted the development of liberalism well into the twentieth century, The once unified bourgeoisie split over these events. Some recsiled in disgust, others played their roles behind the scenes. It: didn't matter, AI1 over the continent, it had become clear that the bourgeoisie was 110 Longer cap&l"le of leading a revolution. Its time for utopian dreams and radical democratic values had passed: Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel made way for Gomte, Spencer, and Schopenhauer, The most radical ideals of the revolutionary bourgeoisie now came to inspire the partisans of yet another class: the workers. For close to a century, the practical choices and ideological self-identification of working-class movemerits would remain interwoven with attempts to appropriate that betrayed revolutionary inheritance of 17'889 and t 848, As a consequence, every spokesperson for the working class was fc~rcedto address bn& the ~lnfulrilledpcjlitical promises of the bourgeoisie and the construction of a unique socialist vision. Among those leaders were bohernians, committed workers, disillusioned bourgeois, fatlen aristocrats, intellectuals, and artists, Ail suffered under severe economic hardships. Most were outcasts, hunted by tl-re police, and shunted from one country to anotl-rer, The risks were real, and the danger for Louis Blanc in demanding the ""right to work" was no less than for the anarchist Pierre Proudhon in calling for
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workerskooperatives or for Marx and Engels in portraying the working class as the key to the riddle of capitalist production, As for that working class, it was surely not a unified and hosrtogeneous industrial ""poletariat." Workers wl-ro received wages mixed with petty artisans of various stripes to form an inchoate urban mass of highly disparate skills and status, If at all, they were org~nizedinto secret societies. Isolated and mostly illiterate, impoverished and robbed of their dignity, they were despised by ""society." h a l l relative to the peasantry, surrounded by an increasingly complacent bourgeoisie and an anachronistic set of precapitalist classes, this bbworkingclass" stood alone. The Iast might yet become first, But, ideofc~gically,ttha would demand employing the unfwlfified promises of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution against the very class that had once made them. In keeping with their coxnmirrnent to Reason and the "'rule of law,"'" the great philosophers of the revolutionary bourgeoisie had sought to curb the aristocraq" arbitrav use of political power."n arguably its xnosc radical iormulation, that undertaking was predicated on a utopian canceyciun of the "c>bject9' or society. uility between the individual ""sbject" "and Inherently democratic, incarnating a notion of equality under the rule sf law, the vision of ""subject-object unity" povided a rational standpoint for confronting feudal. institutions that arbitrarily oppressed the mass of individuals and hindered their potentia t for self-realization. This dream of expanding the yararnerers of democritric action far all individuals in a community led Rousseau to place primacy on the "general will" over the particularistic interests that ruled feudal society. It l SO enabled Kant to understand "enlightenment," not merely as material or ""sientific" progress, but as a moral development predicated on the gadlml emergence of the intellect from the shackles of: arhitrarity imposed dogma," The historical progress of "Reason" was seen as ushering in a Rechlssti-sat; or state under the rule of Iaw, to supplant an old feudal order built on the arbitrary dictates of an a11-yowerfrri king and the special privileges of an aristocracy, Of course, the substantive exploitation of Iabor in civil society underpinned the formally democratic system that the bourgeoisie wished to institute. Even Hegel could envision t l ~ econstriction of arbitrary autlzority only in the realm of the state and, given the historical moment, it made sense for the representatives of the bourgeoisie to preoccupy themselves with law, constitutians, and the "'palitical."T Stilf, it is foolish to indthge in a dry reductionism that obscures the ideological sources of action, tocke was quite sincere ifl assuming that accumulation was firlite and property infinite; Adarn Srnitlz honestly thought that an "invisible hand" "guided tlze market; and Rousseau was not merely avoiding the basic issue by separating the quesrion of private property from that of democracy. Many of the great C aI
226 Dc~~ucr~t-ic l l g d q uf Karl Mdrx nnd Frederick EngeL * 5
bourgeois thinkers genuinely believed that econoxnic justice would take care of itself, It was with a clear conscience that this rising class either irnpticitly or explicitly identified its quest for formal democracy with the substantive interests of humanity as such, But there is a difference between a class on the rise and a class in powcc That difl.'ere~iceappears in how it philosophically sees itself and history as well. The philosophers of the revolutionary bourgeoisie still l-rad worlds to conquel; and their various speculative conceptions of the ""good life3" whether in the explicit form of a subject-object urlity or not, gave meaning to that enterprise. By 1848, however, those worlds had disappeared as '*suhject9'was sundered from ""object." Thus, the most radical, critical, and utc-,pian moment of bowgeois thought vanished from the initiators of what would become the two dominant currents of nod ern philosophy August Cornte" work of the 1840s inaugurated a "positivism" that sought to prcjvide '"scientific" foundations h r the unlolding of a new and finai stage of humas existence, Relinquishing the critical ele~nentof idealist philosophy, he sought to extend the "psitive" trut1-r criteria of' the nat~tral sciences into the realm c>f society. His new approach coilsciously attempted to exclude the normative coxlcerns of the subject from the "objective7' world and its analysis. Around the same time, beginning from a fundmentally different perspective, Saren Kierkegaard set the stage for nod ern ""eistentiafism" even as he divorced the obective world of "necessity" from the subjective concern with ""authenticiry." In seeking to overcome historicism, Kierkegaard rendered solidarity impossible by emphasizing the primacy of experiential truth and an inner subjectivity, All that remained for the individual was to dwell a n the unalterable conditions of his or her own is~latioil, With the retreat from the atternpt to relate subject and object, the new phitofophies of yusitivisrn and existentiaiism began to shift bourgeois philosophy away horn its earlier concerns, And this only makes sense if philosophy exhibits a connection with history and class inerest. Indeed, under the circumstances, the philosophical retreat by the bourgeoisie left the xnost radical implications of its once radical vision for realization by a new revulutionary class. That vision would prove crucial to the political worldview of :rsXarx and Engels, Whatever the problems with their analysis, or their criticism of 1845, the experience fundamentally affected them.8 Along with various other radical nineteenth-century thinkers, tl-rey recognized both tl-rat the bourgeoisie had betrayed its democratic values and that not only state power, but the power of capital was arbitrary if those who decided on its use were not held accountable to citizens and workers. h4arx and Engels, in short, did nt>tconsider political democracy irrelevant. Instead, from the beginning they wished to attack the way its most radical. substantive implica-
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tions were stunted by the bourgeaisie.9 Indeed, it is a great lr~ssthat Marx never systematized llis views on the French Revolutir>n or wrr>te his ptanried history of the Convention in 1793.10 As for Engels, he faced the limits of tl-re new order concretely, Before meeting i2rlarx, he had published The Condition of the W o r k t ~ gCkzss in E ~ z g h ~ This d . work graphically portrayed the nightmare of proletaria13existence. Robbed of maeerial rights, working people found their political Liberties violated ever more openly Things seemed only to get worse. As one economic crisis followed anothef; without reference to the exploitation in civil society, even democracy in tl-re realm of the state gradually began to appear as an '*ahstra~lion, A basic transformation in the meaning of "'democracy" "began to take ptace, Where the bourgeoisie had traditiorzally viewed it as formal, politicai, and ~uridicai,the representatives of the workers now wished to rnake the concept substas~tive,economic, and practical." Where Marx subsequently defined pot itical democracy as "'the: final h r m of emancipation within the prevailing order of tl-rings" in in@the Jewish Questz'tzn, he never considered it commensurate with the concept of democracy as such or its ~lnrealizedpotentiavz Support for a given republic was contingent on the degree to wbicl-r it allowed iar the practice of democracy and the ability of the working class to effectively organize its interests, These interests, in turn, were tied to the extension of democracy into civil society, The situation was radically different with the bourgeoisie. Its material interests in preserving control over capital prevented any assumption that such a development would (jccur peacefully. This was the csntc;xt in which Marx and Engels discovered a ""proletariat" "generated by the capitalist production process, whose interests were both fovmrkll'y and s~bstapztiz~ety democratic-and so identifiable with the interests of humanity as such, Socialism was, from tl-re first, predicated on a democratic political project whose potential fur realization was interconnected with the dynamics of capitalist production. As a consequence, it makes little sense to reducr: the entire enterprise to some preordained "antipaXitical9' econamism. iliIarx and Engels always emphasized the need for programmatic initiatives and organisation. They supported the English Chartists, tried to make contact with progressive movements on the continent, and founded clre Neue Rhei~hcheZeitza~g,which they called ""TheOrgan of Democracy""; in facb Marx even served as the vice president of the Belgian Society of Fraternal Democrats. The real point for Marx and Engcls was always political. And, in keeping with the prevailing wisdom of other nineteenthcentury radicals, t h y believed that control over the wealth of bourgeois society was not an end in itself. Instead, na less than the anarchists or most social reformers, they maintained that the real end was a stateless and
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classless order that would finally accuaiiae and give substantive meaning to the great slogan of "'liberty, eyualith and fraternity."= "deed, for this very reason, Marx could maintain that "the proletariat has no goals of its own to actt1aiize~"l4 The socialist movement saw material inequality as only the most visible sign of:that utopian promise betrayed by the bourgeoisie. The promise itself would utrimatdy be rehshioned, and not forgatten. The fight for democracy would now he undertaken in the name of a classless and universal "communist" order for which ""sciaIismm would serve as the "trransitior~,'" Communism would fulfill all democratic and egalitarian aspirations and ahoiish the alienatiq institutional forms inherited from the past, Indeed, a radical understanding of democracy would initially provide the concept of co~nrnrmismwith its emiancq~torycontent. This commitment to democracy contests the notion that an unbridgeable chasm sumehr>wseparates the "'young Marx," the ""radical democrat9balld tltopian humanist, from the ""jacobirt" Marx of 1848 or the later dogmatist who sougl-tt to provide a ""scientific" eeiaboration of history's ""ion laws." Marx changed over the years, and the concept of democracy was emp1o)ied in mally ways. But it makes little sexise, ever more pedantically, to difirentiate periods within his thought so dramatically that any attempt to form a general impression of his undertaking becomes impossih1e.l Such an interpretation, not 0n1y lifts Marx's work h m a polifi~ialas wer) as a historical contexr: that manifests fundamental moments of continuity, but also ohscures the fact that-even as categories were dropped and others discovered-hasic themes rernained constax~t,lG Democracy was one of them. Though lt/(farxand Engeis did make certain scattered undemocratic statements at various times in roughly forty volu~nesof work, their identificatior~with the heritage of the revoIutionary bourgeoisie is evident thraugl-rout, It: appears as clearly in the earliest essays on "wood theft" as in the attempt to overcome a iragmented and alienated world in the cmcept of "ispecies being," as surely in T h e Ezghteenth Brumuire or T h e Civil War ~ P ZFrance as in the discussion of the "inverted world" in Capital, The theoretical work of lt/(farx and Engels, inoreover, stood in direct relation to their practical activities. Beyond changing historical conditions, or the tactical priority given to one form organization over another, their democratic commitment appears in the revolutions of 1848 as manifestly as in their work with the First Internationat, as obviausly in the support they extended to the Paris Commune as in that given to the creation of the first modern mass socialist parties. Xndeed, the attempt to provide form a1-d content to democracy provides the point of entry into tl-re political theory of Marx and Engels Manzfesto. and The Com~~unzs;k
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The Manifesto A politizcll polemic s f roughly thirty pages, The Copflraunist Munzfsto has been treated by scholars like the Stlrnma T'heologica. Every phrase and sentence has been carefully scrutinized; the work has been attacked for this mistalien prediction and criticized k>r t h t empirical error, for this statement and that assumption,l7 There is probtlbly no coxnparable work, other than the Bible, that has ever been put under the microscope in quite the same way. And still the forest is ~zsuallyfost for the trees. It took cetituries for cite bourgeoisie to justify its revolr against leudalism by positing capitalism as an economic aitertlative to the manor, liberalism as a political alternative to the "&vine right of kings," and Protestantism as an ideological alterrtative to Catholicism. Even the greatest polemicists of the revolutionq bourgeoisie like Sieyks and Paine could not pull these various moments of struggle together into a coherent whole, Nevertheless, that is precisely what defi~lesthe great success of The Communzst Manzfesto, Beyond its flaws, this work provided a totally unsopl~isricacedaudience with an immanellt analysis of the capitalist system along with the most rudi~uentaryoutlines for a socialist alternative. It forwaded a positive set of bbtran~itional'a programmatic dexnands for the present along with a utc-,pian vision for the future, It propounded a theory that gave meaning to the suffering workers experienced an3 supplanted the need for otherworldly religion with a secular faith in thexnseives and their cause. This little pamphlet did nothing less than place the workiw class on the side of political democracy9~ustice,and the future. The Gommzlni,ct Mnn$estu was an anticipatory work. Even though peasants constitmed the overwhelming majority of society, and the aristocracy was politicalty dominant at the time, it envisioned the future as defined by workers and capitalists, Even without considering the revolutions of 1848, it foresaw the betrayals of the bourgeoisie and called upon the working class to lead the ""battle for democracy,'YIl,ongbefore the prerequisite co11Qitions had tltemselves come to pass, it called upon workers to establish political organizations, a democratic state, and a viable internationalism, Indeed, the whole becomes more than the sutrl of its parts-and the result is a remarkable intellectual achievement, This achievement would ultirnately become defined as a creative synthesis of French rltctpian thought, German idealism, and English political ecorrorny.'Wwen, Fourieg and Saint-Simon bad pointed to a new set of values as well as the pssibility of developing an alternative to the existing system of capitalist exploitation." Marx and Engels fused this notion of an ernmcipatary alternative with the metl-rodalogicalinsight, culled froxn the young Wegel,"btha afl institutions are transient and that history is driven by a conflict whose determinations depend upon the given structure or "total-
226 Dc~~ucr~t-ic l l g d q uf Karl Mdrx nnd Frederick EngeL * 9
ity" dmt defines them.21 The source h r this confilicc they h u n d in English politic4 economy, whose most important representatives, in spite of their ahistrlrical framework, illurni~~ated the workings of the capitalist production process and how it defines the exisring totality, The Commu~isrManiJ~stodiscussed capitalist production in terms of contradictions-rnc~st notably between the social production and private appropriation of wealth-whose resolution would ""inevitably" result from the triumph of the w o r k i ~ ~class g and the introduction of socialism, Building on Hegel, Marx and Engels saw the future as derivative of a ""s~agetheory" in which differem classes defined different historical epochs, Capitalism, as the Erzglish political economists showed, was based on an unending quest for profits. This led Marx to identify capitalism with a new "commodity form" "that would reduce ail relatit>rlsto what Thornas Carlyle origillally termed the "cash nexus" and tend to force precapitdist classes-like the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry-to become either capitalists or workers. Most would obviously become workers. Capitalists, however, would also coxnpete, and many of the Least successlui would then fall into the ranks of the proletariat as capital itself became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. At the saiine time, market competition would engender constant tecl-rnolagical innovation even as it rnade "'living labor" expendable-theret.>y swelling the ranks of the "idustrial reserve army of the ~znemyloyed."Productivity would increase, but buying power would not, and, as a consequence, the "rate of profit" would tend t o fall so that recurrent crises would result with ever greater farce. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie's own cornmitmellt to scierlce and reason would lead to the demystification of the universe and the growing insight among workers that a new and more rational system was necessary. Thus, Marx and Engels could write that in the new period ""all that is solid melts into air, all tl-rat is holy becomes profane, and man is at fast compelled to face with sober seilses, his reat conditions of life, and his relations with his kind,"zl Marx and Engels assumed that the proletariat was capable of breaking the p o w u {of the reigning ideology, comprehending its position within capitalist socief-);and seizing control of those enormous productive fc~rcesthat the bourgeoisie had unieashed," Through their "scientific" analysis, they conduded that the working class would come to understand its own power and create a new order that would realize in practice the humanistic values articujated in the theory of tl-re revolutionary bourgeoisie and the utopian sc~ciatists,Indeed, where the previous commitme.tlts to ""radical demc~cracy" irrspired by the French Revolution helped shape the idea of socialism as a b"ransition," h e utopian ideas of the Econornzc and Philosophic Manzascril;lfs of l844 provided the normative content for the new ""communist" society that would brir-rg ""prehistory" to an end,
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Tlze "scientific" hfabors of Marx and Engels were anything but valuefree." They were informed, from the first, by a positive concern with an emancipatory alternative, and critique of the existing order was harnessed to a utopian understanding of democracy, Marx and Engels sought to reveal those economic tendencies, which the proletariat would act upon politicalt3/, in order to abolish the existing forms of repression from the perspective of an unrealized freedom.25 This is the real meaning behind what would become the famous phrase from the last of the Theses 0%Fegerbach: ""philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it." A speculative moment thus existed in the desire of the two friends to further the transformation of capitalism as well as in their famous claim that "history is the history of class struggle."Zb That speculative moment had nothing to do with abstract theorizing or tl-re formation of purely metaphysical assertions, It was rather part and parcel of a transformativo project that class action wouId reatize. Neverthefess, this only begs the question surrounding the definition of the "working class" and what xniglzt be termed irs class ideal. Contrary to pc~pularopinion, Marx and Engels did not begin their analysis in The Commuest Manifesto horn an ""empirical" perspective, That is not merely a philosopl_lical claim, but a historical one. At the time, an empirical point of investigative departure would obviously have fed them to champion romantic and anarchist proponents of " h e poor," "like Heine or Proudhon, and give center stage to the then huge peasailtry rather than a tiny proletariat. Instead, their argrlment derived from an exposition of the logic of capitalist accumulation, Essentially9 by questioning how production and distributioil are constituted, IVarx and Engels derived a structural detinitisn of ""cfass."2' As the century wore on, that structural analysis received ever greater empirical vaiidation. Even so, from the first, an ideal in search of realization was intrinsic to the ""objective" inquiry into capitalist society. The founciers of "'scientific socialism" were always concerned with questions pertaining to the political constitution of tl-re class, Indeed, speaking "'dialectically," the "&terminism"' of the historical process only makes serise when referex~ceis made to the morBerit of ""f-reedom" in which the working class-tl-rraugh organized political action-will bring capitalism to ail end, As students of Megel, Marx and Ellgels believed that "^objective" truths cannot exist without their "'subjective'kcamprehension-4 that, by definition, a contriddiction can only be formulated from the standpoint of its future resolution. ""Every class struggle is a politicai struggle'"% they could write and, if only for this reason, they assumed a speculative principle of organizational and ideological unity beyond the empirical conditions in which the proletariat might find itself. An implicit class ideal, which inctlr-
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porates the radicai dexnocratic ideais of bourgeois philosophy, was thus an element in the notion of class developed by Marx and Engels. But why should this speculative csncept have remained implicit? 'The, answer derives, not merely from tl-re attempt by Marx and Engels to distinguish their ""scientific"' enterprise f%c-~m a soft moral concern for the poot; but from another philosophical assumption that they inherited from Hegel: everything in the "essence" of a phenomenon will become evident in the historical series of its "appearances," With this insight the ideal and the real, the metaphysical, and the empirical, the present and the future cease to exist as mutually excltlsive terms, The proletarian ""agent" cccrulri! only realize the goal of revolutionary transhmation by consciously acting a n the possibilities that were empirically unfolding through capitalism9$structural contradictions. Thus, the authors of The Commutzis"sta~ifestowere able to synthesize three divergent notions of class: tl-re structural, the empirical, and the speculative,
Class Action Deriving their structurtrt concept of a working class from the logic of the accumuiation process, believing that the intensification of capitalism's contradictions would becsme empirically apparent, Marx and Engels had little doubt about their speculal~zveclaim regarding the proletariat and its revolutionary role, Recognizing the objective ""necessity" br institutionalizing a new econoinic order, it only made sense that the proletariat should make use of its 'Treedom" to engage in the decisive subjective act of political transformation, The dream of bourgeois philosophers for a utopian '"subject-abject" ~znis)rwould subsequently become transvnlz-led in Marx and Engels" new conception of the proletariat and its "communist" mission+29 There should, however, be 110 inisunderstanding, Xt was x1ot some metaphysical desire to make History conscious of itself, or further the march of Reason in suxne abstract sense, that inspired tl-re commitment of Marx and Engels to the working class. They were not simply spin~lingout the implications of Hegelian philosophy for politics. Marx and Engels wished to corrfront the terrible reality before their eyes, and the burgeoning industrial revolution seemed to justif.y their belief that most prc~letarlanswould hecome factory workers, But they also knew that the majority was not yet composed of indrtstrial laborers and that, for both political and philosophical reasons, a historically contingent and empirical description should not exhaust the csttegov of class." That is why they provided a structural definition of tl-re proletariat as the class that sells its ""labor power" or time on the market, rather than merely its "blabor" or empirical skills," Thus, even while bound to a specific historical. phasel the theory of Marx and Engels
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remained open to capitalist conditions in wllich the ernpiricai composition of the working class might change.?" Once again, however, the normative purpose of the inquiry plays a crucial role in the choice of definition. Clearly, empirical differences within the working class-such as skill or status-were precisely what a unified movemerit would have to surmount in political terms. But this could only occur by projecting an idea of unity predicated on those uniuersill prolrtariiz~in~erczststhat a political movement would have to highlight.3TThe speculative mofnerit of indeterminate uriity thus received an ~bfectivereferent in the empiricaljy indeterminate concept of ""Iabor power." Only from such a standpoint could the 'c~bjective"social or economic concept of class fit with the '"subjective" political enterprise of the Communist League fur which Marx and Engels wrote The Commu~zzstMufzifestc:, in the first place.34 Agai% inore than metaphysics plays a role in determining the importance of this speculative moment in the wndersta~idingof class. The proletariat may have logically presented itself as the revolutionary ""agent" h e to its particular position within the production process, But it also stood alone in its commitment to the legacy of what the American historian R. R. Palmer called the ""age of democratic revolution." Though intellectuals and bohemian~certainly mounted the barricades in 1846, einpirical events would verify the claim of The Cornmu~istMrznz'festo that the working class alone could ensure its own emancipation m d the incroduccion of a new democratic order.33 After all, on what other class could the workers l-rave relied? The aristocracy opposed all revolutionary experiments and all notions of dexnocracy. At best, the bourgeoisie supported only formal demcxracy. The peasants, the class that would prove most irnporta~itin bringing Napoleon XI1 to power, were shifting their hatred from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie and the prcjletarians who defined the production process of modern Iii"e.3" Tlze ""Xrrmpenproletariatlacomprised tlre Mobile Ct~urds,which crushed the workers' uprising oljune 1848 with horrible brutality,'Wiverl all this, it only made sense for ~Marxand EngeIs to believe that the industrial proletariat would have to lead any popular movement for democratic change. The unique aspect of the socialist project, its need to fulfil1 the radical political promises of the revolutionary bowgeoisie and still fight h r its own concerns, thus becomes apparent where the c o m b i ~ e di~terest.in substantive and formal democracy is seen as class specific. Still, the bourgeaisie condemned the new movement of the prc~letariatas antidemocratic. From its class standpoint, this was totally logical. The proletariat alone seriously threatened the new capitalist order. In fact, seeking a solution to /a question socia/e and disgusted with the authoritarian direction that ""democratic" politics was taking, the French workers in W
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June 1848 actualty turned their guns on tl-re Second Republic for which they had fought in February." Nevertheless, a certain ideological conviction also allowed bourgeois liberals to oppose the workers with a clear conscience. Traditioilally, liberalism had associated the commitment to democracy with respect for the minrority and the sanctity of private propery+-3% palitical commitment to democracy was not seen as necessarily demanding its extension into the economic realm, lMost did not even recognize the problem. With a few exceptions, like John Stuart Mill, bourgeois liberals believed that the very concern with substantive democracy constiru ted a breach of democratic principles. Thus, ~Uarxand Engels cc~uldargue that the real emancipatory moment of 1848 involved the yuest not merely Eor a republic, but for that so~jcl.liStrepublic whose realization would occupy them throughout tl-reir lives. Indeed, this is what lies behind Marx's claim that "the real birthplace of the bourgeois repubtic was not the Februdry victory; it was the Jurte No less than many of their sc~cialistand anarchist comrades, IVarx and Engels wished to break the connectioil between property and democracy, It strtx~tedthe implications of a radical idea and it enabled a small and econaxnically ernpowered minority to paralyze the will of tl-re majority, The bourget>isie,of course, was appalled by the socialist attempt to extend democratic principles and only fdt its positio~ljustified by Marx and Engels's caXI for a "dictatorship of the proletaria," Given the later misuse of the term, their fears can be seen as prophetic. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the issue these tl-rinkerssought to address: the problem of power in a revol ~ltionarycontext, None of the great bourget~isphilosophers had ever seriously confronted the question of counterrevalution. Marx and Engels looked back to the Jacobins whom tl-rey saw as the democratic defenders of the First Republic and the architects of The f)ecliZmtio;t.t of the Righb of M i r ~srad Citixen. They aiso saw the ways in which the French Revolution was undermined by the Vendke and its reactionary allies abroad. Indeed, seeking to learn from that historical experience, the): were the first to suggest that force might be necessary to delcnd the next revolution, With this in mind, ~ V a r xand Engels introduced the idea of a ""dctatarship of the proletariat."'"l Though predicated s n a "dialectical'7nversion of the bourgeoisie's use of political democracy to justify economic dictatorship, the '"dicratorship of the proletariat" would prove an unfortunate term, The two friends and most of their followers believed that this dictatorship would prove of brief duration. Its purpose was to ensure the creation of conditions wilerein tl-re vast working-class majority might successfully press its interests against the antidemocratic intentions of a small capitalist andlor aristocratic minority4""X"hs, Marx and Engels could
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stress that '?he first step in tl-re revolution by tl-re working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of dem~uacy. Only because the dictatorsl-ripof the proletariat was understood as an inherently democratic phenomenon could the ""transitional" state of socialism stand in soiBe plausible relatio11 to the future " c o i ~ m u ~ ~ isociety. st" With real wealth in the hands of a new class-wl-rose own interests lay in developing a new classless society predicated on a new logic of accumulation-----thetraditional state necessary to repress the exploited classes would supposedly become irrelevant. An "administration of things"hou1d take precedence over ""the administration of people." h fact, precisely because the '"eommunist" 'order was predicated on a radical extension of the socialist transition" democratic aspects, quantitative develt~pmentsin the one could be seen as ultimately producing a qualitatively different order of existence in the other, Indeed, fclr this very reason, it became unnecessary for Marx and Engels to posit an abrrrgt ruptwre beween the two phases of development, The "withering away of the state'" was tc-o mark the creation of a "free association of producers" and the end of "'prehistory'The ina~zgurationof real X-ristary under "caxnmunism" would become dependent upon the realization of democracy" most radical implications. For "prehistory" was seer1 as being made behind the backs of people-whether t h r ~ ~ u gthe h "marchy of the marketplace" or institutions lacking in dexnocratic accountability, And s<>,it only makes sense that the ability to ""make" "story should ultimately depend upon the creation of: democratic institutions that would fir-rallyenable humanity to arrive at its decisions without regard lor economically exploitative class interests.44 Again, this formulation stands in accord with a partic~xiarappropriation of the mast radical elements within bourgeois idealism. Having abolished class distinctioils and surmounted scarcity, or the conditioils in which the political ability to shape events no longer relies on unequal control over society's snaterial resources, the ""cunning of history" megel) could then become subjugated to the conscious control of: the "universal class.'' Attempting to surmount the "ialienatcd" "separation benitreerr the state and civil societit; the cornrnunity and the individual, the purpose and legitimation of this new ""c>mmunistWorder would rest upon abolishing the arbitrary exercise of power. Jt is in principle the opposite of any totalitarian regime: The Creedom of the coilectivity would be defined in relation to the freedom accorded the individual, Thus, reformulating the traditional notion of a ""sbMarx and Engels could insist that "the free development ject-object" ~l~~iity, of each serve as the condition far the free development of alI,"4-" Their perspective, of cowse, presupposes that the expansion of capitalism would turn the vast nrlmber of peasants and artisans into workers and "
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so produce an ever-expanding proletariat. It was for this reason, against the explicitly antipolitical pcrsitions taken by anarchists and '"topian" socialists alike, that Marx and Engels argued so vehemently for general suffrage and emphasized tl-reir political cornxnitxnent to develop the unzversal interests of working people." h the same vein, it was because they considered capitalism an international p h e n s m e n o ~that ~ they called for an international perspective and opposed tl~oselike Fichte who had previously argued for a "national" economic form of socialism (or t-fa~delss~anr), They were clear enough in stating their belief that the Communist League to which they belongcd sl-rould "labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties crf all countries,"'37
Internationalisxn was anotl-rer one of those cherished socialist ideals that the working class inherited froxn the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The idea has its crwn history.4X After Grotius laid down the modern hundatior~sfor international law, Kant called for the development of a new "'universal history with a cosmopolitan intent" and claimed that ""prpetual peace" could exist only under a federated republican world order. The logic of capitalist production never had anything to do with nationalism, But Thomas Baine was probably the first to make workers truly aware of their common explcritation in The Rights oo(Marz.49 The notion of "rights" is indeed an inherently internationalist concept grounded in detrtocracy artd it onfy hllows that the Jacobins should have sought to spread them beyond their national borders. The attack on internationalism, by the same token, becatrte part m ~ dparcel of a generalized assault on enlightenment values. It combined a respect for prejudice, racism, and the organic community with contempt for critical reason, democratic institutions, and the masses. Such reactionary values mixed with marters of national interest as Prussia, Austria, and England waged war against a desperate France, which, in the years following Thermidor, ultimately turned to Napoleon." RReing from its defeats, resendul at the victorious counrerrevolution, it was only in 1830 that the capitalist class finally made peace with the nation-state. Even so, Mazzini and others immediately began the attempt tct create an international fc~rm of organization. That attempt failed, but it provided an inspirarion, Thus, the attempt to realize internationalism fell into the hands of the working class. The internationalism of The Communist Manifesto stands within this tradition. Marx and E~zgelsknew that the class struggle would initially break out within specific nations,$l and recognized that revoLutions im-
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pelled by tl-re structural dynamics of capitalisrn would vary in character, But they also saw the need fc~ran international organization to cwrdinate the discrete struggles of workers. The extension of international revolutionq solidarity, the tacticai attexnpt to subvert the stability of reactionary states like czarist Russia, became the criteria that Marx and Engels used to judge various national movements, Their judgxnents in foreign policy, however, were generalty made on a case-by-case basis, And this often led to confusion, They usually apposed imperiatist policies in practice and thus often supported movements frir ""national self-determinatian"" in Ireiand and Poiand. At tl-re sane time, in theorb they maintained that nationalism served the interests of the capitalist class and that imperialism served to batter down the '"Chinese walls" of tradition in uderdeveloped countries like India. The fact is that they never really articulated a general theory of imperialism or nationalism and what would become known as the right to national self-determination, Instead, Marx and Engels subordinated 60th to the development of capitalism as a world system and an independent analysis of ixnperiafism to contingent interpretations of its effects. Their principle concern was the victory of the bourgeoisie over the remnants of fet~dalisxnin order to prepare the patl-r for a proletarian future.52 Jn this vein, they promulgated the need for oppressed nations to define their own fate even as they inaintained that a simple commitment to nationalisrn otlscured the international characler of the capitalist system. ~ V a r xand Engels knew that natioilalism tetlded to interfere with the creation of class consfiousness and artificially divide workers through the provincialism it fostered. They also deplored the way in which it sanctified the given political order as well as a particular fc~rmof bureaucratic organization. Perhaps most importantly, however, they believed that natio~lalism served to buttress imperialist adventures and a militarist mentality, Xn this sense, they thought that it helped produce and justify wars-whose victims would become the workers themselves. Marx and Engeis retained a lifelong commitment to internationalism, The revalutions of 1848 were internatiotlal in character, and their failure did not deter them. Still, following the defeat s f those undertakings, Marx and Engels brake with rnany of their former friends who believed that the working-class movement should coiltinue as though nothing bad happened, Cut off from, practical activiit): the founders of ""scientificsocialism" experienced tl-re 1850s as a difficult decade. It was also a time of econornic prosperity during which the legislation Eor a ten-hour day was finally put into practice in England while a workerskcooperative movement began in France. But it was lrorn the standpoint of political rather than economic progress that i2/larx and Engels judged the most important perions of their lives, Whatever the internationalist stirrings among English trade unions,
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and revolutionary exile organizations, the decade was rnarked by intense counterrevolutionary repression.f' Thus, the two friends withdrew from practical, poritics and concentrated on political ccjmmentar). and scholarly work. The 1840s offered new hope. An imprtant development had taken place in Germany. There the charismatic labor leader, Ferdinand Lassalfe, had founded that country3 first working-class party-the Allgemtri;r.ceWeubcher Artleitertrerezn (General German WorkersY~ociety1.54 Calling fc~runiversal sufirage and the assumption of political power by the proletariat, workers' cooperatives and various economic reforms, Lassalle secretly sough a tactical aliiance with Bismarck to bring about changes from above, He considered such a stance ~ustifiedprecisely because the weak and ideologically backward bourgeoisie appeared little better than the aristocrats or the cconservative peasantry, It was Lasalle, ratl-rer than Marx, who actually developed the notion that all nonproletarian classes and strata constituted "one reactionary mass." ft vvas also his desire to employ an aristocratic state tc) bring about reforms that cast Marx in the Light of appearing '"antipolitical'" and opposing state action to redress grievances. Interestingly, though Lassalle'?; tactics were arguably quite justifiable and even prophetic,Fj ~Marxand Engels opposed them on principle. They disageed sharpjy with his emphasis on cooperatives, as they bad years before with Z,ouis Blanc's ideas on the safBe subject. Brtt the reali conflict between these giants of the nascent German fabor movarlenc involved their dilfserent perceptions about the fundamental purpose of the socialist project. Tt~roughouttheir lives, Marx and Engeis saw strcialism as the fulfiilment of bourgeois liberalism3 revolutionary prornise-and so as an attack on alt vestiges of feudal powcc Consequently, where a tactical alliance with the bourgeoisie or even the vast peasantry always remained a possibility to further the struggle for dexnocracy, an alliance with tl-re reactionary aristocracy was out o f the question. A point of principte was at stake that had nothing to do with the theoretical issues of whether; in tl-re abstract, state action could improve the plight of the proletariat or ecnnomics should take absolute precedence over pnlitics, It was rather a matter of whether to engage in political compromise at any price. Marx and Engels were certain that Bismarck wished merely to exchange economic reforms for an ahandonment of the proletarian movement's pofitical purpose: it was a profound insight since this m precisely what would happen in tlze Prussian dictator" attempt to provide a new set of weifare refc~rmsto compensate for the antistxialist laws of 1878-1 890. Marx and Engels also believed that casting one's lot with the Prussian state would strengthen the class enemy, further nationalist identifications on the part of the proletariat, and so hinder the development of internationalism, Tt~us,throughout the years of corztroversy with Lassalte, Marx and Engels
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essentially remained true to tl-reir democratic, socialist, and internationalist beliefs of 1848, But, still, they were delighted when, in 8 6 6 , their devoted follt~wers, Willielm Liebknecl-rt and August Bebel, founded the Sozzi;rldemokria~ische Arbez'terpartcrz' (Social Democratic Lahor Party), which, in 18'75 at Gotha, ~lnitedwith Lassalle" sorgarzizatio~ito fonn the Socialist Workers Party of Germany; later, in 1890 following the lifting of the antisocialist laws, this party would reconstitute itself as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The future brightened as events kept pace elsewhere, i n Italy, Garibafdi once again attacked the rnonarchy and the power of tl-re Cf-rurcl-r. In France, the elections of 1863 shook Napoleon III. In that same year, the Poles rose for the third time since 1830 agaiilst their Russian masters and a t t e ~ ~ p t etod create a provisional goverment, In Russia itself, the Czar abolished serfdom and the ernperor of Austria grudgngly accepted a relatively progressive constitution. Then, too, the fragmented English union movemerit began to amalgamate while, ofren against its owzi e c o n o ~ ~inic terests, t l ~ a country" t working class chose to support tl-re North during the American Civit War in a remarkable display of socialist and democratic principle.5" Progress of this sort, however, was met by yet another international capitalist of-lensive that sought to crush burgeoning strike movements through the use of fttreign scab workers. Everything seemed to make the need for international proletarian cooperation ixnperative. Building on tl-re links between French and British workers, a set of orgailizational meetings took ptace that resulted in the creatioli of a First Irztematiorial-wirt7 Marx ptaying a preeminent organizational and inteltectt~alraile'f7 This povertystricken organization, whose influence far omweighed its actual membership, fasted as a serious entiv only from 8 6 4 to 1872, But its importarxcr: was not defined by its duration. The First International showed that internationalism, meful national reform work, an emphasis on class consciousness and a commitment to democracy could coexist, Indeed, along with his formulation of its ""GeneralRules,'Warxrx"s'"naugural Address" is oone of his most significant pieces and indicative of his enduring concerns. Despite the earlier jacobin ir~flnexzceand the previous call for direct revolutionary action, a fundamental connection still exists between the practical project of The Cvmmun&g Mnnz'fc?sto and the political positions taken by Marx and Engels in the First: International, Here, again, capitalism is understood as an international systern in which the workers must seek to secure their own emancipation. Here again, it is not a matter of struggling for "class privileges" bm fur ""equal rights and duties, and the e~bolitionof all class rule," Here again, there is the ethical imperative to develr~puniversal interests a m o q workers and constrain the arbitrary use of: power that appears in the f a ~ ~ o line: u s ""no rights without duties, no duties without rights,"-5"
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In keeping with The Gommurzkt Manifesto, tl-re ""Xaugural Address" also calls Eor an extension of political democracy to destroy the ""economical subjection of the man of labor to the monopoliser of the trteans of labor," Q~~eseions of political organization and the importance of building consciousness recur. Even as lt/(farx%prediction that the working class would become the great majority m starting to gair~empirical validity in the 1 8 5 0 ~ ~ he continued to maintain that ""numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combinatioil and led by knowledge."* Once again implicitly positing a speculative ideal of irttraclass equality and unity, Marx"s ""fauguraI Address" calIed upon workers to overcorne thezr prejtxdices with regard to "color; creed, and natiuilalitp.'9t reiterated his coilvictioil that a political organization was necessary to articulate "'the common aspirations of the working class'5n order to ftlrther the coxlquest of state power. The First hternational was that organization, Abiding by democratic procedures, it was essentially structured along federalist lines with a strong General Council-which would give rise to mch corztroversy, The Geiieral Council enabled the First International to settle squabbles among member parties, serve as a clearing house, initiate proposals, and coordinate strategy, Aware that unique prolslems existed in particular nations, committed to aid in the creation of new democrapic working-class movements, the First International never had a dogmatic position on what political form these new trtovements should take. Revolutionary in aim, "Marxists'>nd socialists within the First International still found it quite logical to support the struggles of members to achieve particular reforms s w h as a shomr work week. Marx was somewhat cox~cernedthat the lack of coercive meaxls to enforce decrees would make the power of both the International and the General Council purely moral in character. But he also recogilized the lxed to work with people who did not share his views. His followers never had a real majority, and the fact that his ideas defined the general prograrn was probably due more to the lack of a coherent alternative than anyching else.6o Anarchists still look to tl-re First International as a prime example of Marxist authoritarianism But the reality is somewhat different. Marx and Engels consistently took the most democratic pr>sitioil possible given immediate exigencies and the tendencies toward sectarian frag~rtentation within the organization, The First International was wracked by Qissension from the start, But, in contrast to popular opinion, the mast crucial conflicts had little to d o with economics or teleological determinism, Actually, Marx was willing to compromise on most economic issues. The "'Inaugural Address" wen gave a nod of approval to cr~operativeassociations in order to assuage socialist refomers, and nothing was said about nationalizing private property to avoid offending tl-re anarchists. Ir was also not Marxists alone who were willing to employ the belief that a new ~ltopiztnorder lay on the horizm. The real debates in the First Xnternational
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took place over the primacy of organizational politics.61 These essentially centered on whether to organize politically from a class standpoint, further the quest for reforms, and use the state as a lever of chmlge, The deknse of these positions pitted Marxists and socialists against a diverse opposition that actually had more in common than uize would care to thii1k.62 The conflict betweex? Marx arid Pierre Prorrdhon stretched back to before the revolutions of 1848," Against Marx" emphasis upon industrial, production, control of private property by the state, and poIitical action, Proudhon's supporters wished to divide ali property evenly. Their goal was to create workerskooperatives, which, through the instit~~tion of "'free credit" or a ""Bank of Exchange," wtvouid allow lor control of production and consumption in terms of '"mutuat aid3"a term that would later receive popular currency in the writings of Peter Kropotkin. In seeking t a create this new form of econornic organization by educational means, however, the Broudllonists opposed the formation of a poIiticai party, electoral, activity, or a seizure of powef; They rejected any restriction on ""freedornm-including ""heedom of contractw-wl~iclk. put them in the somew hat embarrassing position of arguing against the eight-hour day. Anarckisrn was also promulgated by tl-re followers of Mikl-rail Bakunin and Louis-Auguste Blanqui, Whatever the differences between them, in contrast to the Proudhonists, both groups placed their hopes upon either a sponrmeous uprising of the populace or an assault on the state by a conspiratorial vanguard. Rejecting all political actiotz that did not directly further either the direct seizure of power W a revolt frr~mbelow however, the objective result of their argurnents mirrored tl-rose of Broudhon and his fo1lowers. Indeed, according to Bianqui, nothing could come of reform while Bakunin's funda~entalcriticism of Marx rested on his unswerving belief that a socialist ""transitionm-even in tlze forrn of a republic-would result in only another ""prisonfor the prc>letariat+" In the tradition of Godwin and Rousseau, these anarchists within the International saw people as inl-rerently good. It was the state that bad corrupted them, and SO it was the state that would have to be destroyed. Iiz his own way3 each of the major anarchists believed that the people could be trusted absolutely, They would recognize their enemy once a small vanguard provided them with a symbol of revolt, The people would then rise spontaneously through a general strike and introduce direct particigatctv democracy, All this made the need for polirical organization and tlze quest for legislative reform irrelevant. ignoring all thoughts of potential strwtural conflict among the oppressed, the anarchists found it unnecessary to forward either a political prograrn or a distinctly class perspective, Building working-class unity through an organization that could sustain itself over time was, in their opinion, lot the real issue, Spontaneiq was what the all-
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archists cherisl-red. Consequently they concerned themselves with instigating ""direct action" "(BLanqui), promulgating the call for an ""armed riot" (Bakunin), and providing revolutionary symbols for the masses through what Nechayev would later term ""the propaganda of the deed." Tile ailarchists generally organized themselves in conspiratorial groups and, it became almost natural for them to believe that conspiracies shaped events. This &ten led them to embrace other paranoid beliefs like antiSemitism. As the ailarchists tmsted one another, so did they deeply distrust all centralized authority and formal structures. Thus, against Marx, Bakunin essentially proposed a termination of the General Council's authority in hvor of a torally decentralized approach to the International that would leave each member party autonomtlus, Committed to realizing refc~rmsalong the revolutionary path, and developing the organization4 preconditions b r class unit5 Marx saw the anarchist proposals as catastropl-tic, His dismay only increased when they created an organization within the organisation to further their aims. Attempting to bring the anarchists under control, he sought-perhaps somewhat undiptomaticaliy and with a certain ruthlessrress-to impose the General Council's powers over the various national sectiorzs.6Vn turn, that policy was condexnned as ""autfioritarian" and, as ~ V a r xsought to expel. the anarchist opposition, the First International stood on the verge of collapse. His tactic was successful, but it was a hollow victory. Disgusted with the endless squabbling, the Chartists threatened to secede, the Lassalfeans voiced their displeasure, Blanqui" fcollowers openly talked of seizinf, the General Cc~uncit,and the class enemy reveled in the confusion. It was as a consequence of all this that Marx decided to effectively liquidate the First International by shifting its headquarters to New York. Xn corltrast to his future ft~llowers in the Second and the Third Internationals, Marx never mechanically identified any particular political organization with the ultimate interests of the working class. Having served its historical purposes, any organization could be abandoned witbout regret, It is tfserefore a mistake to believe that Marx was obsessively concerned with bureaucratic organization or with the centralization of power, Under the circur~stances,he was simply correct in attacking his opponentshncrirical calls for decentralization. In fact, the chaos foreseen by :Varx became evident in 1873, when the anarchists created their own rurr.lp ""antiauthoritarian'" international organization. The new movement accomplished notl-ring beyond passing a variety of resolutions, one of which recommended that all members learn chemistry in order to make bombs. Indeed, the new Internaticcr-zalAlliance was str confrtsed tlaat, soon enough, xnany mernbers were openly calling for the reconstitution of the c>riginal organization whose operating structure they bad previously helped to destroy65
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Given the controversy between socialists and anarchists, along with the vicious infighting between personalities as powerful as Marx and Bakunin, it is amazing that the First International acco~nplishedanything at all. Nonetheless, its acl-rievemetlcswere quite significant, The First Xrlrernational helped the English city workers acquire suffrage. It aided in the struggle to oppose the Europearr ruling classes who, almost uniformly, supported the Soutl-r in tl-re American Civil War." It raised xnoney for numerous strikes on the Continent. Its actions prevented the use of ft~reignscabs to undermine the Engtish wsrkers9battie for the nim-hour day. Perhaps inost importantly, however, the organization created a climate of trust among European workers that helped pave the way for the creation of a Second International h o m the rubble of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Com~nune. Tlze First International combined pacifism in terms of national wars with revolutionary militailcy in terms of class coilflict. Faced with an impending war between Germany and France, the member parties of the First Enternationat acted honorably. Manifestoes calling for peace were issued, and some strikes were even attempted. Such actions were made all the more difficult since informatit>r~was scarce and confused. At the time, it appeared-falsely"-that Napoleon I11 had instigated the conflict and that Bismarck was acting in a purely '"defensive" manner. German workers were therefore divided in their attitudes. Followers of Ferdinaind Z,assalle, who would later prove crucial to the development of Gerxnan social democracy's "right-wing," generally supported the war against France. Most Marxists, however, refused either to condone the aggression of Napoleon I X X or place their confidence in Bismarck, They initially abstained from voting, later argued against annexations fallowing the Cermarl victory, and ultimately fouild the~nselvesaccused of treasorl. Thus, the two men who would lead the German Social Democratic Party in the coming decades became heroes to the European working class: h g u s t Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht.
The Commune Marx had anticipated that war with Bismarck would sourld ""the deathknell of the Second Empire," though he thought this might usher in a revolution, what he envisioned was very different from the event that shook the foundations of Eumpean society and created perhaps the most vibrant expression of working-class rule down to the present: the Paris Comxnune." NCIless than the October Revt~lution,the Paris Commune was born of national defeat and abdication of responsibility by the central government. No iess than the Russian Revolution, bourgeois regimes
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conspired to destroy it. Nevertheless, wl-rere in Moscow the revolution survived and gave birth to an authoritarian state, the fsilcd uprising in Paris continues to symbolize the most radical possibility of proletarian rule-a " "dicca torship of the yrof etariat " 'defined by parciciyatory democracy,G9 Ernile Zola's The Delmcle: beautifully tells the story of how Paris rose after tl-re Second Ernpire l-rad collapsed at Sedan, and how the new French government, headed by Adulphe Thiers, shamefwlly withdrew to Versailles, As Marx feared, the working class and the eritire Left was carried away by dreams of 17993, Beset by thoughts al treason, even after the peace treaty was signed, they sought to continue the struggle as a patriotic revt~lutionary war, Under conditions defined by what Rotsky would later describe as ""dual p~wer,"in which a republican government formally proclaimed its sovereignty even as it lacked substantive authority, the workers created a new form of political organization to abolish all institmional checks on the democratic power of the masses, But 18"7 was not 1793 or 1 848. In contrast to the events of bygone days, the revolutionary workers received no support from either the peasantry or the bcturgeoisie, What is inore, seeing the ckance to combine ideology with national purpose, Bismarck put 10,000 Frencl-r prisoners of war at the disposal of Thiers to quell the revolt, destroy the International, and further reduce any future threat frorn Germany" seighhor. Iscrlated, surrounded, and outmanned, witl-rout l-rope of supplies or relief, the starving workers of Paris valiantly defended their Commuile. Its heroes were people like Gustave Courtlet, I,ouise Michel, and Jules Vallks, while its values became explicit in Eugkne 130ttier's The I~ternntiu~nEe. The Paris Commune instituted free, eyuat, and universal stiffrage for the first time and radicalized the traditional commitment of the working class to democracy, A11 public positions were decided by elections, instant recall was instituted, all officials received wr>rkers9wages, and many believed that the Com~nunewouid realize the "economic emaricipation" "of the workers, But that was not tl-re primary goal, Instead, the Carnmune sought to create a free federation of autonomous local communities, Its strrtctrrre had much in cofnmoxi with the democratic palzs, the medieval free cities, and the rest of those experiments that together form the political tissue for what Ernst Bloch called ""the underground history of the revolwtion,'" Interestingly enougl-r, the First International had little to do with the Paris Cr>mmune and ~ V a r x even less, The Paris section of the Internatiorial was not dominated by Marxists, and Marx himself was l-righly pessirnistic about the uprising horn the start, The political leadership of the Commune was instead composed of Prtrudbonists, old-style Jacobins, and foIIowers of Blanqui.7" Whatever the proletarian support
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far this experiment, Marx was correct in claiming that its vanguard had proposed a confused economic policy, Even the anarchists refused to demand the abolition of private property or the seizure of the Bank of France. Tl-re apparatus by whicl-r parisl-r councils, directly accountable to their constituencies, formed commissions to conduct the everyday affairs of governace was also curn hersoine and inefficient, But tile Paris; Cornmune was a daring attempt to supplant the previous commitment to bourgeois republicanism with a qualitatively digttrent farm of democracy Perhaps its Parisian central conlmittee should have attempted to centralize autkority.71 Probably it should l-rave sued for peace or repressed the saboteurs and enemies from within, ~211;arxand Engels certainly thought so. In fact, the two friends had criticisms of every movement with which they ever associated themselves. But, in ct>rltrast to their future followers Marx and Engels supported every genuinely revolutionary experirneilt uildertakeil by workers and ilumerous refc~rmistmovements as welf, The co~nfnitmentto revolutionary tolerance and the rejection of suicidal sectarianism were constants of their politics, IVarx publidy eildorsed the Gornmunards with his pamphlet The Civil War irr. Frafice. Such an endorsement was also necessary for purely practical reasons, He was probably the dominmt figure in the International and, for right or wrong, the establishment press had identified that organization with the eveiits of 1871, Under the circumstances, anything other than a statement of solidarity would have been irresponsible, Besides, Marx believed that the end of the Commune would spell the destruction of the most militant segment of the French proletariat and the hopes for a revolutionary transformation in that country for quite some time, Thus, he was concerned with its legacy for the future, In this vein, Marx's support cannot be divorced from his critique of the Paris Cornmune, It may have shown the importance of civic commitment by the masses for any revolutionary experiment. It may have evidenced the theoretical point Marx woutd later elaborate in Capital: that it was not what was produced that would defille a new socialist order, but rather how that production would take place. Still, where the anarchists essentially believed that this spontaneous explosion of political com~nitmentwould simply sustain itself, Marx remained skeptical.72 That is probably why he did not see tbe Paris Commune as a fixed and finished goal far the futum, but rather as a symbol for the ""transitional'"itictatorship of the proletariat. Indeed, perhaps somewhat disingenuously, Marx claimed that the Coinmuilek actual goal lay in its ""vague aspiratians" tctward a "republic" that would fi~lally""abolish ail cfass rule.""' That ~Marxcould support both the Paris Commune and the vision of a republic has ~ v e rise n to much confusion, The theoretical problem stems from the seeming co~~tradiction between his understanding of the state in
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The Communb~Manifesto, and the Inazilgural Address, and The Gi-vzl War in Frrrlnce.7"arkining back t o the revolutionary democracy of Rohespierre,75 the Maaitfesto had called upon the wc~rkersof 1848 to organize, seize control of the existing state apparatus, ernplay it: in the naxne of the great majority to crush tile counterrevolution and then, only later, institute a qualitatively new society. Marx and Engeis would soon return to that stance. Nevertheless, the pressure of events in 18"7 led them to demand that the proletariat smash the existing state apparatus and, abruptlyy institute a new order. Insight into the political context of tl-re Paris Carnxnune, rather than abstract textual ailaiysis, alone provides a resolution to this problem, The Third Republic was being formed just as the Parisian workers were beginning to rise.7"These two forms of institutional organization were indeed mtr~l.ciall?, ezlusive and Marx" criticisms of the ""democrats'balld ""republicans" makes sense in the historical context. Whatever his sympathies far al supporting Thiers would have republicanism in the I ~ a ~ g u r Address, meant accepting a ""~epubfic'9hat would not only clearly act against tl-re revolutionary interests of workers, hm possibly even degenerate into a new Caesarist form of dictatorship, Reactionary monarchists dominated the original constitutional proceedings far a third republic and, even after a settlement between ruling classes was fitlally achieved in 18'75, the aristocracy refused tc_t reconcile itself to democracy while the bourgeoisie railed against anything tl-rat might rexnotely threaten existing property relations. At the same time, whatever the prt.>hlemswith the Third Republic, the radically decentralized Paris Commune lacked its reproductive institutions: even a "free association of producers" would need to sustain its future existence, There was only one way out h r Marx and Engels: view the Cornmune as the ""transition" to a socialist republic that, witl-r a proletarian majority and appropriate institutions, might create the conditions far suhstantivc equality and an ongoing democratic order. This would perhaps mean piaying fast and loose with the idea of a "transition." h~tltMarx and Engels could thereby keep their commitment to previously defined ends, differentiate themselves from bourgeois democrats as well as anarchists, and still remain flexible with regard to the marter of means. lntergreting the Commune in this way would furthermore provide evidence fc~rtheir claim that the manner in which the working class subjectively organized itself during the ttransition would depend upon empirically specific conditions tl-rat no theory could articulate a priori, The heedom of the working class could thus not be identified with any particular institutional form. Interpreting the Paris Coxnmune in this way would ultimately make it possiHe to contest tl-re repressive policies of any particular organization claiming to incarnate the interests of the w r k i n g class from within iVarxism itserf," The experience of
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the Paris Comxnune once again exexnplifies the crucial theoretical point: the critical momellt of lt/(farxismties in its reflexive character and its commitmerit to the unfinished character of democrac)i Perhaps more than any other single event in tl-re socialist tradition, tl-re Paris Commune called into question the values of capitalist production and the structure of the bourgeois state. ft made also made clear how Marx and Engels understood the ""dictatorship of the proletariat." "'2"h e3aris Commune shr>wedthat the truly socialist character of such a regime is defined neither by who rules it, nor what purely econoinic reforms it brings about, but rather by what it does to foster democracy and dexnocratic dccisionmaking. Even though the Commune" t~rganizationaifom is no longer relevant to the needs of an advanced indtistrial society, it nevertheless crystallizes the real purpose of the socialist project: the attempt to expand the setfadministrative possibilities of working people (Selbst~dtigkeit). The repression fc~Ilt>wing the Commune" defeat was borrible.78 More died in the first ""bloody week" than in the French Revolution% eerltire "reign of terror." h the wake of tl-re Commune, the First InternationaX was popularized as a huge conspiracy directed against the foundations of civilization. There were numerous calls for its suppression and the arrest of its members by the concerfed acrion of European states. Indeed, were it not for Engiand's rdiusal. to participate, asylum would have been denied to all progressive political refugees, civil fiberties might essentially have been suspended througl-raut Europe, and a powerful. international police force constructed, The destructiox~of the Commune marked the end of revolutiox~ary Jacobinisxn in Western Europe. Conservative forces took control everywhere on the Continent and during tbese years the image of Robespierre a funda~nentaitrax~sfurmation-frofn heroic revolutionary de~lx~dervvent mocrat to bloodthirsty dicrator.79 General suft-rage now became undermined through government frauds and the suppression of radical movements, A resurgence of a~~archism, only this time in the Form of individual acts of terrorism, reflected the deca)l,"%r/larxism provided an alternative, and, to paraphrase the young il/larx, it finally seemed that reality had risen to the idea,
Marxism and Democracy The Paris Com~nunemade Marx-the ""Red Doctor of Terror'Linto a world figure. His importance for the fahor movement, howeve5 was ultimately determined by the relevance of his theories for understanding the development of capitalism during this last quarter of the nineteenth century. Previously his writirtgs had achieved a certain inteflectuai. renown, and
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l-re l-rad gained scattered followers tl-rrougl-routEurope. But, though it was possible to speak of '\VarxistsW before this time, '\lularxism" was really a product of the years following the C o ~ ~ m u n e . The last quarter of the nineteenth centtary witnessed a trexnendous expansion of Europe's productive capacities. Along with this technological tralxsforntation, an explosion in the s i x artd militancy of the industrial working class took place. Unernplr~ymentincreased and, if tl-ris contributed to the substitutic.,n of: trade unions far the old workershssocia tions and guilds, it also created recurring crises of overproduction, thereby fostesir-rg doubts about the intrinsic balance betvveen supply and demand that Adarn Smith" '"invisible hand" was meailt to ensure, The economic, political, and even idealogical conditians fclr a response to capitalism were thus different from either I848 or 1 8"7 . Real develr~pmentsseexned in accord with tl-re predictions of a Marxian "'science" that had always sought to distinguish itself from ""bourgeois metayhysics3\and justify its ""revolutionary'kconclusions in objective terms.81 Given his belief- in the revolutionary character of capitalism, and the way in which it generated its ""own gravediggers," Marx" analyses also made it easy to assume that ""progress" was ideiitifiable with the extension of capitalism's producrive farces, which the political representative of an expanding proletariat would soon inherit, Thus, it became llatural far social democrats to identify ""progress'kith economic growth and the poliricaX interests of their own organizatian.82 Between the rapid growth in numbers, and the rapid development of technologl;, however, increasing competition for jobs posed a threat to the potential unity of the working class and the econamic security of its mernhers. Wtjrkers had only their numbers with which to confront the ecc-~nomic might of capital and the political power enjoyed by the aristocracy, Resistance demanded unity from tl-rose seexningly countless workers, which obviously implied the need for a political party to articulate their interests, New conditions enabled the new Xabor parties to take on a mass character. The new ideology of 'Warxisrn" could only prove useful in determining the interests of- their members, defining their relatioil to the rest of sc~ciety, and forwarding the twin goal of f a m a l '>olitical" and substantive ""scial" "dernracy, Ideology, however9is not quite the correct word. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Marxism took on an ever more ""objective'\and "clr~sed-I'character precisely because it seexned to comprehend act~~ally existing trends, Engels, with the approval of ~lularx,may have contributed to the transformation of the original approach into a fixed systeEn with The Diabetics of fitare (l876) and the Anti-DfihrSng. (1878). This atrexnyt to introduce dialectics into the natural sciences and so invent a philosophy of nature, however, had nothing to do with authoritarianism; that would
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await its later sophistic political perversion under very different conditions. The point was rather to prt.>videa new fcjundation, at once speculative and scientific, for the theory and its teleological projections. Attempting to build on the most progressive ttlinkers of tl-re time, these imxnensely popular works provided the masses with a camprehellshle secular worldview to conlront religion and a rational, teleological, basis for political c o i ~ m i t ment, Indeed, such intellecc~ialcornerstones of Marxism served to build political ct>nsciousnesseven as they "'scientifically" g~~aranteed the realization of a refurbished democratic vt sion, Marxism was built through the efforts of Engels,g3 who survived l-ris friend, as well as younger thinkers like Karl Kautsky in Cermanh Ceorgi Plekhanov in Rttssia, Marx9s son-in-law Paul L a h g u e in France, and a host of other activists in other nations. Once again the ruling classes trembled. The social revol~tz'on,wllose development ltratrx l-rad already prophesized in 1848, seemed now to be taking shape befc~retheir eyes, VVasnk it obvious that the politiccl/ revolutiofz would "kevitably"?folir)w? Affer all, from the standpoim of Marx's contemporaries, what else were the ewetlcs following the Commune other than a confirmation of the master9s prediction that the economic workings of capitalism would prodrzce its own "gravedigger." Perhaps social democrats no longer mounted the barricades like the communards.84 But repression remained severe and, throughout Europe, the organizational activities of social democracy led to constant harassment and sometimes even exile for many in the leadership, As for the masses, accarding tc) the strictures of marxian orthodoxy, sacrifice in the present would he rewarded and justified by the collapse of capitalism and the consrruccion of a humane socialist order in the future. Untold thousands died in strikes or demonstrations while befieving themselves part of a historical process that would ultimately produce a ""tap into the realm of freedom" "ngels) wherein nr>subject would be treated instrumentally as an object. Marx himself may have favored speaking of a dictatorship of the proletariat along mare radical lines. But most believed that a republican farxn of democracy would prove sufticient for the proletariat to organize itself, resofve class csnflict, and ultimately usher in the long-awaited stage of "communism." Perl-raps they ignored the immanent dynamics of bureaucracy, the constraints that capitalist democraq can place on tile working class, along with a host of other hctors that would inhibit such a development. Yet everyone knew that social dexnocracyk calls for a republic, civil liberties, and unhindered universal sufti-age constituted a directly political threat to the status q~zo.So why shouldn't these "'scientiSir'>partis;lns of the proleuriat have considered themselves the new revolutionary heirs of 1789 and its democratic legacy!g"
7 %LlfYmocrrk~ic ~ Lcgdq of KarL Mgrx and &redcrick Engch
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An integrative process was taking place, and a measure of bureaucracy was already emerging within the party. But the increasing size of the movemerit only intensified the faith of the working class in an ultimately successful revolutionary outcome as well as its commitment to republicanisxn. The achievement of reforms would pave the way for a relatively quick and bloolltess democratic seizure of pc~wm.The only question was whether the bourgeoisie could be trusted to respect the results of its owr-r legal and political order,%" Traditional socialist wisdom held that the extent of revolutionary violence fundamentally depended on the accions of the ruling classes rather than the proletariat.87 The stronger tbe democratic institutions in which the proletariat could g r a y the greater the democratic expe"ience of its membership, the more peaceful and rapid the inevitable revolution, From such a perspective, three possible strategies for proletarian action emerged-all of which could find justification in the writings of 1Marx.M Where economic development and democratic institutions coexistec"[, as in EngIand or the United States, a strategy of gradualist reforxn seemed only logical; this stance would later receive a general theoreticai articulation from Eduard Bernstein. Under conditions of ecorlomic backwardness and authoritarian repression, by contrast, such reformist tactics were impractical; it was either wait for the "hws" of capitalist development to assert themselves ot; in the mancler of Lenin, attempt a direct seimre of politics! power. Germany and most European nations, l-rowever, were experiencing an intense form of capitalist development under imperial regimes whose authoritariarlism was at [east partially mitigated by certain representative institutions. Tizis led Karl Kautsky and his faltawers to exnphasize the way in which capitalism would create an ever-expanding constituency for mass socialist parties whose success would ultimately generate a demt~craticpoliticai revolution with a rninirnum of violence, Everywhere mass proletarian parties were rendering politically irrelevant the old theories of Marx's enemies: Proudhon, Bakunin, and Bianqui. in the face of this burgeoning sociaiist rnovemetlc, the old anarchist calls for "direct actioil" or an "armed cr>upmxsouilded childish. Syildicalism maintained a certain influence in France, which only makes sense give11 the romantic legacy of the Commune, but more generally anarchism became confined to the most industrially underdeveloped areas such as Italy, Rmsia, and Spain, or where ~zniquecorrditions applied as in Switzerland. As fllr as Austria, England, Germany, and Scandinavia were concerned, anarchism was already an anachrc~nismbefore the twentieth century had even begun. In these nations, Marxis~nemerged as a finished system of philosophy and, in concert with an expanding industrial proletariat, it helped in the construction of the first truly mass democratic politicai parties on the Continent.
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Dexnocratcy became the process and the purpose for a world socialist movement inspired by the teleological guarantees of ~Marxism.Against those who would simply stress the connection between orthodox Marxism and tlze authoritarianism of Lenin and Stalin, Ceorge Lichtheim was quite correct when he termed the IVarx of C=agital""the theorist of the democratic labor movernent.'The millions of workers, who braved such extreme risks in joining the parties of what in 1589 would become the Second Inter~~ational, and who fought b r economic equality and democratic institutions," would surely have beer1 appalted to hear that they were "mtipolitical" or that marxism was a ""ttalitarian" "ilosophy inl-rerentty bent on establishing a "closed st>ciety."'""iVarxists everywhere understood that an arduous agenda of political work and a common set of obviously democratic goals informed their enterprise, There was simply n o qriestio~lof the to be free, and they saw the party forcing workers to be Gee, They wn~z~ed vehicle of their freedom in those democratic mass parties that mplicitly ptaced themselves under the ban~lerof Marxism, Marx and Engels may have miscalculated regarding tlze ""inevitable" collapse of capitalism and the cc~mingof socialism, They were surely irresponsible in their use sf terms like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and their view of political institutions, not just their vision of a communist utopia, often seems grossly indeterminate. But they saw the connection between economic and political democracy* They were also the first to understand capitalism as a world system and highlight the need for an internationalist politics of resistance, The point is worth considering, since, for all the talk of gloltafization, there has been little wjllingness to articulate a radical response to the xnost debilitating effects of a globally restructured capitalist economy The insights of Marx and Engels into the commodity form, the trend toward corrcentratioll of wealtlz, and the technological proclivities sf capita lism are as trencl-rant as ever, They understood the structural antagonisms between capital and la bor along with the importance of a class perspective for defining the poiitical possihilbties of the exploited and disempowered. Their ""scientific socia"tism'krystallized the real trends of their time. Unbridled optimism infused the will to resist in the years i~nmediatelyfollowing the master" deatlz in 1883. The allure of Marxism did not derive from an empq determinism or a passive belief in the coming revolution, It made the sources of oppression visible and it extracted political commitment from countless impoverished and disconsolate workers. The power of ~Marxisrnwas not an iliusion, Its ability to link theory with practice, republicainisrn with socialism, would decline only after its most Irrr~damentalassuxnption was called into question by Eduard Bernstein and Lenin: namely, that capitalist development would engender an ever-expanding working class intent on its prescribed revolutionary mission.
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Telealogical certainty regarding the triumph of socialism is a thing af the past, along with the unity that once existed between the structural, the empirical, and the speculative notions of class. Highlighting the speculative moment, the class ideal, at least makes possible an imcnanellt confrontation with tile ways in which sc~ciafismbas been perverted. Only once that takes place can theory, again, help forge the new vision of a world in which progress ceases "m resemble that hideous pagan idol, w l ~ awould not drink the nectar but fr'rom the skulls of the slain."91
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Kautsky: The Rise and Orthodox Marxism
For over a quarter of a ceiitury? Karl, Kautsky was the preeminerit theoretician of social de~nocracpand the authentic interpreter of the Marxian legacyWe was a friend of iVarx and Ellgels as well as a prolific scholar whose valuable historical works include The Oriyins of Christi-anity and Preczdrsors to Scrci~lism.He was the founder of Die ncrucr Zeit, which, under his editorial reign, became the major intellectual Marxist publication of tlze era. Along with Eduard Bernstein, he coauthi>red the E@rr Program that served as the guiding docu~neritof the German Social Democratic Party and the inspiration for virtually every other European socialist organization, He intervened in the major political events of his time and he was an important figure at countless poiitical meetings who forwarded numerous resolutions. Indeed, Karl Kautsky was an intellectual activist wlzo brought Marx's thought to the attention of millions and whose political influence proformdly stamped the nascent: social de~nocraticmovement. But today his achievements are hrgotten.Wnly the demstating criticisms, begun during Kautsky" lifetime and rehabilitated during the 1960s, are rernembered.3 The reasons transcend the qudity of his writings. His life lacks the drama of Rosa Luxemburg's or Lenin's and he is identified with an unyielding orthodoxy, Ultra-leftists castigate his preoccupation with organization and reyubiicanism. Those with nostalgia for the communist cause still consider him the ""renegade" who sold out the European working class and opposed Lenin's revolution. Modern social democrats, for their part, view birn as the defencier of an sutworn ideology against the new pragmatism developed by refarrnists like Eduard Bernstein. There is a certain truth to these criticisms. Still, they do not exhaust either the importance or the relevance of Karl Kautsky's contribution,
Especialiy in the present context, it is useful to remember that he considered republicanism the precondition for socialism, Kautsky was a principled d e ~ ~ o c rand a t his historical determinism enabIed him to contest the terrorism and authoritarianism of the Russian Revolution. He was clear about the dangers attendant upon attempting to skip phases of historical development and he was always skeptical of voluntarism. His interpretation may, for better or worse, stilt define the mainstream economistic Ltnderstanding of: Marxism, But, if his thinking was deterministic, it was not frztalistic. Xt spurred activism. Kautsky was opposed to nationalization totlt cuztrt, he recognized the dangers of bureaucracy, and his '"rnunicipalism" hghlighted the need far participation and the reinvigoration of civil society, Kamsky also considered it imprudent to assume power at any cost and, given the o p p o r t u n i s ~of~ contemporary lefr-wing parties, examining his original view of social dernocracy as a movernent of protest and opposition is well worth the effort. Understanding the changes social democracy has undergone is, in any eventl impossihfe without a sense of the original movement and tl-re ideology that originally inspired it,
Marxism for the Masses Kari Kautsky rdected the values and presuppositions of social dernocracy during its most vibrant period. He responded to events in his own way, Btrt his thinking was fc~rmedthrough a certain rigid understanding o f Marx, He was always a popularizer. And he was proud of it, After all, it was r i o t the varied m d complex, philosophically rich and self-refiexive, dimensions of i2narx's massive output that ""gripped the masses," "stead it was Kautsk* simpfified version of the theory that vaiidated the famous link between '"heory 'band "practice." His '\orthodox" "interpretation of iMarx mirrored a unique historical situation in which the working class was indeed leading "the people" in its strt~gglefor republics n democracy and econornic justice. Workers were committed to a party with an il~ternationalorganization that manifestly seemed tct represent their inwrests and there seemed ntr need to distinguish between the historical rnethod of Marx and the system of Marxism or between its potetintially critical character and its instrumental usage as an ideology* Marxism, from Kautskyk standpoint, was a unified scl-rema that explained the totality of existence, Throughout his life" work he maintained that both the natural and the social w r l d could be encompassed within a single overriding theory, Always closer to positivism than idealist dialectics, in keeping with EngeIs" A~nli-DGhring and lrhe DiaEectics cif Nat~dre, Kautsky i n s l s ~ dthat Marxian inyuiy deyerids upon the truth criteria of
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the natural sciences, such as the validity of universal Iaws, causality, and a value-free standpoint. He believed that the "scientific" character of Marxism alone differentiated it from ""bourgeois'Vorms of social theory even as it gave the working class its sense of destiny and theoresical privilege, Indeed, mirroring what were certainly iIMarx% ambitions, Kautsky produced a seamless theoretical whole." His popularization of tl-ze first volume of Das Kapital, entitled The Econ01.7.iricDoctrine o(KarE Marx, was enormously successhl, and the argument was quite clear. Given that capitalism is predicrtted upcm calculr-lble units of production m d consumption, profit and loss, it stands open to causal and, in principle, mathematical investigation. Its causal effects, ht>wever, are uilfy activated in terms of its fundame.tltal "laws." "These economic laws, in turn, become open to objective analysis and determine both the ideological and political developments within the particular society. Kawsky sought to oppose the seemingly mystifying metaphysics of ideafists of Richard Wagner and like Hegel along with the romantic irratio~~alisnt the nationalistic ilrlperialism advocated by Heinrich von Treitschke, both of whom were also staunch anti-Semites. 111 this reactioilary German inteltectuai climate, ""am?ost by default Kari Kautsky had few challenges to his intellectual ascendancy at the turn of the 1890s.""' He saw capitalism as driven by the fundat~entalcontradiction between social production and private appropriation of weatth. This still relativeIy new economic systexn would bring all precapitalist classes into its orbit. Due to the more efficient character of capitalist production with its cornmodit). farm, emphasis on investment, and quantifiable market criteria, atavistic classes like tl-re aristocracy or the petty bourgeoisie would either adapt or die. The market system would ultimately make them fall into either the bourgeoisie or, inost tikely, the proletariat. Under this market system, the working class would be forced to sell its time or "labor power" while the total revenue of the firms that hire these workers, minus wages and depreciation, would define the s ~ r p l u sthat capitalists appropriated. Izt contrast to previous stages of development, reinvestment of capital in technology was required in order to supplant living labor, reduce costs, produce more efficiently, and compete with other firms. Technology heightens the contradictions sternming froxn the capitalist production process, It can be employed to shorten the work week and produce goods better, cheaper, and h t e r . But it also tends to throw people out of work, intensify the need for further reinvestmem, and supposedly create a "falling rate of prc~fit,"Mare is produced even as fewer and fewer are able to buy the goods in question. Technology helps generate the "inevitable" crisis of overproduction by ruining smaller enterprises, depressing wages, and swelling the ranks of the unemployed "industrial serve army.'" S~lcfia crisis always benefits the larger firms able to weather the storm by
concentrating capital in fewer l-rands. Accumulation tl-ren begins once again on a higher plane. Nevertheless, the endless quest to generate profits will produce another and still another crisis of ever-increasing severity resultir-rg in war and other forms of social cl~aas. Kautsky retained a structural view of capitalism. But be never denied that ideas matter and that certain prophetic individuds could anticigatc; future developments.6 He also maintained that ideologies and political occurrences emerge in objectively discernible, direct responses to the accumulation process and the concrete economic class interests that derive frorn it,T The contribution of Marx was seen in terms of penetrating tl-re ""laws" of capitalist accumulation and opening them to empirical verificatictn, It is true that Kautsky could provide only an inadequate sc3lution to the "transfornation problem"-or how values are translated into prices. But, like Bernstein, he leIt that the empirical verification l o r Marx" theory rested upon the tendency of monopoiics to shrink the number of capitalists and expand the size of the working class. Kautsky's views s n the concentration of capital, the blling rate of profit and the quesrion of "immkeracion," hdeed provided an explanation for the rapid political development of European social democracy during the last quarter of the riineteenrh cent Llry* The political moment was often hidden in Kautsky" thought, but it never disappeared entirely, Despite his commitment to the "inevitable" col lapse of capitalism, he knew that Engeis had posited a choice for the f~xturebetween sc~cialismand barbarism, Confidellt about the outcome of historical developrrtent, however, he rejected speculative concerrts s r any other fc~rm of ""prescientific" or '"re-Marxist" ""ufoyianism." Until the end of his fife, he maintained that the ""objective" "development of capitalism would, throt~gh"nat~zralnecessit)iWcul~ninatein crisis a i d nttirnately a situation wherein tl-re proletariat could rnake a democratic revoltltion. He always placed primacy on the teileological aspect of Marxism and thereby suspended the need for an independent ethic or the formulation of a class idea!, But, still, class consciousness and organization in preparation of the coming revolution became matters of crucial concern. Thus, even if Kautsky's thinkilag may not have generated revolutionary action, it undoubtedly inspired activism and confidence in the party, Herein lies the principal confusion pertaining to orthodox Marxism, If activism is defined in terms of fostering a sense of what Georg I,ukcics terxned " h e actt~alityof the revolution," h e n it is legitimate to condemn the thought of Kautsky for its quietism,"nt if activism implies a commitmerit to furthering the political work of the labor movement, and deeyening class consciousness, then it rnakes fittie sense to criticize his materialism for inducing passivity. Just as predestination generated a desire to know whether one is a meml?er of the elect,hnd thereby inspired believers to ac-
Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 37
cumulate wealtl-r in order t a gain a hint of God" jjudgxnent, orthodox ~Marxismcreated a desire in workers to bring the "inevitable" ~rerv.olution about that much sooxler. Thus, they joined the labor movement and worked for its triumph. It was not for inhibiting pojjcical engagement that b u t s k y gained the adulation of the masses during a period of capitalist expansion and revolutionary stagnation.
The Golden Age Italian socialists affectionately called Karl Kautsky ""the pope of i2narxism.'" The label was warranted. Kamsky provided an entire generation of European workers with a particular form of: socialist identity. No longer was it necessaq far them to invoke the spirit of Blanqui; no longer would they have to mount the barricades like the Communards; no longer was it importax~tto deal with muddieheaded ax~archists.Democratic mass orgmizations of the proletariat were on the rise and they offered the working class a new world of possibilities. EspeciaHiy in Germany and Austria: The Social Democratic party was far rnorc than an organization for conducrir~gelections, %.inning votes, or inflcrencjng legislation. Xt embraced the whoIe life of its 111embers; it had a women" snovelnent . . . it was soon to have a youth mt>vernenr;its C:ongresses tlehated at length the question whether workers should drink spirits or-with a foretaste of 'socialist realismLthc piacc of sex in 111odern art. Socialist colnposers wrote socialist songs which were sung with enthusiasm by socialist cl~oralsocieties, A whoie range of pubticadc~ns, daily, weekly, monthly, annually, aII over Germany providect instructtorl and entertainil~entfor each section of the working c-lass-fro111 the high theoretical Neue Zeit in wl~ichMarxist first principles were tliscussed, to the satirical Wahre Jakob, or the Ruch der Jzrgend for proletarian clzildren prod~rccdby Victor Adler's wife Emma. hiore and snore the Social Delnoc-ratic Party forrnecf a world t>f its t>wn, a society within the state, which ahsorbecf the interests, energies and tmagir~atiorlof its members, while its leaders acquired a 111ythological status usually reserved, in England at least, for the royal fat11ily.lo
Everywhere a coxnmitment was growing to tl-re new Second International that proudly considered itself ready to inherit the revoIutionary mantle of ~Varx's cold organization. And those workers who flocked to it were not fools. They knew that only the labor movement stood for both political democracy and substantive equality, In lukewarm fashion, the bourgeoisie supported one and not the other. The aristocrats, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie sttppc~rtedneither, Social democrats could legitimately claim that no
other party l-rad ever created sirnitar conditions for participation a n the part of its membership or expanded the range of free public debate and diversity of opinion in like mamer. The ""self-isolatiorr"of the working class in nations like Germany was, moreover, not self-chasen.12 IVost workers correctly considered the German Reich as an authoritarian and militaristic state that structurally reinforced the alliax~cebetween Junker aristocrats and great industrialists against the proletariat, These classes were obsessed by counterrevolutionary fears of political democracy, And these fears, in turn, 0n1y intensified the hopes of the ruled. Thns, where in the 1870s the members of this ragtag organization nurnbered in the thousands, in 1887, ""Social Democracy polled 1 0 3 % of the votes in the Reichstag elections; in 1890, 19.7%; in 1893,23.3%; in f898,27.2%); and in 1903,3 X .7%."'2 Given these numbers, most workers and party reg~llarscould believe that the claims of orthodox Marxism were being validated by empirical reality. Who could deny that social democracy was the wave of the future, that the consciousness of the workers was maturing in a steady and regulated hshion, tbat the social revolution was being achieved, and that a political shift of power loorned on the htzizon? Other socialists from Erlrope to the Orient Looked at German events as prefigurations for the development of their otvn labor parties, Kautskyss "'scientific socialism," in short, expressed a real trend. It evidenced what Hegel would have called the pkilosophicai "truth" of the epoch, The lahor movement was seemingly unfolding in conjunction with the "hws" 'of cllpitaiism itself. Kautsky believed that these laws were specific to capitalism and tbat they involved people in a particular mode af class interaction. He understood, of course, that capitalism could nt>t he abstractly divorced from preceding epochs and that the new system must: be conceived within ttle continuum of history, His Erhik would indeed argue that the basis of all human activity is already apparent in the animal kingdom. This work presents one of the first and most important attempts at developing a Marxian antl-rropology. The use of language, the development of technology with its concomitant division of labox, and ttle subsequent ability of humanity to tra~~sforn? itself and its world are seen as deriving from a process af adaptation. The same holds for morals, Through natural selection, those that help the grimp survive and cooperate become ingrained and hallowed. Those that have a difkrent effect become vilified, Darwin" theory of evolution was pervasive in the bourgeois culture af the late nineteellth century and also within the socialist intellectual milieu." Its interpreters included lesser figures Like Herbert S y e n c e ~But Marx" admiration h r the author of 8 r i g k ofthe Species was well known, and so there was really nothing strange in Kmtsky turtling to the great scientist for ttzeoretical guidance.1Vn fact, he first became interested in
Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 39
Darwin wllile still a student at the University of Vienna and Kautsky initially envisioned Die ueue Zeit as a journal committed to popularizing the thought of bath Darwh and Marx, After all, both pfovided an attack upon religion, metaphysics, and philosophical obscurantism, Unfortunately, however, Kautsky made an epistemological erroc Ulllike Darwin, but in a manner much like Spencer, he simply a s s u ~ ~ ethat d evolution involved "pogeess." Xt was on this assumption that Kautsky based his belief that evolution provided the link betweerr the llattlral world and humail history as well as the natural and the social sciex~ces.There is even a sense in which Kautsky built his Marxist materialism on the evolutionary foundations provided by Darwin. Civilization becomes part of a continuum that stretches back to the nat~lralworld. But this continu~zrn.is considered subject to decisive ruptures and history is seen as developing through social contradictions. The division of fabot; for example, is understood as being profoundly affected by the particular natural environment in which certain groLips find themselves. A certain form of cooperation between them is subseqmcnrly necessary even when one group is pitted against others for control over the given econrlmic surplus. According to Kautsky, the critical ethical question is whelher the doxninant group recognizes the norms of cooperation it espouses in terms of its actual practice. If it does not, then new norms must be developed by the oypressed group to help overturn the ""decadent" "stern. Ideas and values becoxne ""weapons" h the social struggle. Thus, Kautsky could write: Not only the worker, but the scientist as wet1 needs mc~ratincentives, New sciet~tificinsigbcs always violate traditional, ingrained t>pinions, In societies that ir~elltdcciasscs, a new scientific insight tends to irnpingc on class interests, To find and spread scientific truths incompatible with vested interests ~l-teansto ask for warJ5
IVost orthodox i2/iarxists9including Kautsky, did not believe that the collapse (Zswammenbrrrch)of capitalism would simp.ly usher in socialism-as many interpreters would care to think. They instead maintained that the proletariat must first recog-nize the morally bankrupt character of the existing order and the way it breeds economic crises, undemocratic uses of political power, and egoistic values, These Marxists considered moral coi~mirment crucial Eor the success ol the socialist undertaking. Xt is indeed a gross historical misreprrselltation to GIniin that consciousness was somehow "the forgotten dimension of the class strrrggle""jBourdieuj, Building class consciousness went on twenty-lour hows a day in the labor movement. It was moreover the stalwarts of ilJlarxian ""orthodoxy" "like Kautskp who gave priority to the party rather than the trade uniuns.l6 They
could downplay the role of consciousness in tl-reory only because they took idet>logicalwork far granted in practice. It is also a mistake to claim that Kautsky simply trtisunderstood Kant and the character of: "fithics'3ecause l-re refused to consider it an independent discipline.1' It seerned that history was justifyiq his teleologicai beliefs and, if only for this reason, Kautsky had no need to ccjncern himself with the qrlestioris Kant posed, The issue for him was not, as for Kant, how universal hurnanist values and ends are derived from an epistemological standpoint, Kautsky started from the assumptioll that history must realize precisely those ethical concerns to which Kant was committed. Kautskyk interest was therefore l-ristoricalrather than epistemological, He did not wish to explore the capacities far moral judgment or Inquire into which realm of philosophical analysis they might belong. Instead, he wanted to ~znderstandhow values change in differefit eras for different classes and what would foster democratic rationalist ideals among workers. This concern was intimately connected with Kautsky" bbelief that the bourgeoisie of the late nineteemk century had surrendered the radical democratic ideals and internationalist values that its revolutionary proponents had once espoused." Only the proletariat is now in the "objective" pyositiorl to end the exploitation and oppression of ""prehistory." Its morality should thus preserve and extend humanitfs unreafized yearnings far freedom that reached their apex in the democratic, egalitarian, and humanistic values forwarded in the great bourgeois revol utions. Kautsky understood socialism as the extension of democracy into civil swiety and he considered the future proletarian revolution as the inheritor of 1688 and 1789.1" While inspired by the past, however, the proletarian revolution must still prove different from its predecessors. Where the earlier revolutions had only been the work of a mix~ority,nlxow the vast trtajoritj~of society would abolish botl-r the political artd the economic hundations of arbitrary power, A qualitative change fi-om the past would take place. Thus, in one o f his most important essays, Kautsky fc~lioweclHegel and Marx by drawing an analvgy between revolution and human birth." That image indeed incarnates the self-perception of the young social democratic movement and it becomes crucial for any assessmerit of orthodox Marxism.
Parry and State Despised by the bourgeoisie, branded as "irabble without a fatherland" by the kaiser and the Junker aristocrat); the early social democrats csnsidered themselves l-rarbingers of a new world, Prior to World War X, only France and Switzerland were republics, and tbere was hardly a state that adhered to the principle of one person, one vote. The Cerman state fashioned by
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Bismarck was particularly cuxnbersoxne and autocratic. 13russia ruled tl-re principalities of the Reich like satellites, and a political structure arose wherein social demt~cracycould run its candidates fc~rparliament without real hope of ministries since the kaiser alone was in the position to choose the chailcelior and his most important cabinet members. This created a sit~lationin which the proletariat could grow along the parliamentary course even though there was nu chance whatsoever of is assuming power. Thus, according to orthodox ~MarxistsIikc Kautsky, the need for a democratic revoXution.21 The issue was not that social dexnocracy ignored the tension between the bureaucratic character of the longed-for republican state and the stateless communist society of the future, Subordinating the direct fight for communism to the struggle for a republic seemed legitimate. Democracy was a revolutionary demand at the time and it also appeared as the necessary soc26ZEisd prerequisite fur introducing a new stage of more radical political development in the future. The real problem was not the ideological cornrnitrnent to a republic, but the inability to press for its realization in a conseq uent manner. This failing derived less frc~mhypocrisy than the political position of the SPD within imperial Germany. Ostracized within a deeply reactionary milieu, with Iittle influence on decisionmaking, social democracy held to the . " movement also conposicion ""rrot a man or a penny for this s y s r e ~ ~ The stituted what was often called a ""state within a state," Its Leadership served as a virtual shadow government, and Kautsky became the principai theoretical exponent of "'opposititrtn" as a political tactic.22 The strength of his policy derived from its ~ a l i s m there ; was a lack of potential partners for a coalition due to the stubbornness of the ruling elites and their contempt for social democracy. it also kept the party from losing its radical kIan a r engaging in voluntaristic attexnpts to take power under conditions in which compromise of its democratic commitments would prove necessary. Kautsky placed teleological certainty regarding the socialist future over the contingency of a purely etllical comxnitnlent to achieve it. By the same token, however, his stance left the party in a quandary about how to use the power deriving from its growing electoral constituency. Indeed, ""since, according to Mautsky, the revolution could not be arbitrarily brr~ughtabout, and since nothing could be said about when and uilder what conditions it would occur, no ideas existed about the corlcrete way to power: organization became a substitute for political action.'?x3 Kautsky's concerrl with organization in the present was ideologically justified by the need to prepare for the syskmic "breakdowrx'9that loomed in the f~tture.But he never established a plausible connection between xneans and ends: an electoral was not the same as a revolutionary movement and, arguablb the tactics necessary for the one precluded the other. Thus, under
the circumstances, it was less a rnatter of orthodox Marxists neglecting "'politics" per se than using the '?inevitable" collapse as a type of compensatorq" myth for the political impasse in which they found themselves. Not every activist bought into this myth. The impact of Karl :rsTarx upon the young social democratic movement has always been somewhat exaggerated, whereas the importance of Ferdinand Lassaille has been undervalued. Aict~~ally, the Lassalfean General German Workersyociety, which merged with its ~Varxianrivals to form the German Socialist Workers" Party (SAPD) in 1875, did not have to change either its political tactics or empl-rasis on state-directed econornisrn when it entered the new organization. The trade unionists and politicians influenced by Lassalfe would constitute a pc>werful trend within the labor movement and, following the nearly twelve years of intense repression beginning in 1878 urlder Bismarck" antisocialist laws, they accepted ~Warxisnnas a unifying ideology for the newly titled German Social Democratic Party only insofar as it met their particular concerns. The ideological result was a conglttmeration of very different standpoints that, ironicaily, came to be known as ""orthodox :Marxism. Of course, Kautsky-and even Berrrstein prior tct 18982"sougllt to appose those tenets of Lassalle" theory that its supporters wished to impart into Marxism. They inveighed against the "hirnseration" tthesis, the belief that nonproletarian strata inherently constituted "one reactionary mass,'" and the idea that the existing autocratic state could serve as the Lever for social transformation, But, here, the "'pope of Marxism" was unslrccessful, Heresy mixed with canonical dogma. It wasn't his fa~zlt.When theory "grips the masses," when the goal is unity, and when certain texts can lend credence to an opponent's interpretation, di&rences and nuances are often lost, In the very act of responding to such ideas, and attempting to balance practical interests, the positions of Marx and Lassalle blended in the rnind of the average prcdietaean, Both of the original factions understood that only a new party with a new class base could possibly realize the democratic values betrayed in the bourget>isrevolutions of the past, The importance of these values and their revolutionary character were only reinforced bp the introduction of the antisocialist laws." Therere was general agreement about this, The question was whether, lacking a genuirrely revolutionary situation, the nonrevc>lutionary commitment to pariiamer~taryactivity in an imperial regime and the preoccupation with economic relowlx.1 should serve as ends unto tl~emselves.26 Judgments regarding the "inxnkently" ~ d u t i o n a r yor reformist character of tl-re SPD only make sense when the context in which the xnovement has been placed is takell into account. Thus, concerns with maintaining even the most minimal conditions for efectoral activity had radical republi"
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can ixnplicatians in the 1880s tl-rat tl-rey would not l-rave a decade later, After 190.5, these same concerns tended to inhibit revolutionary republicanism and new offensive f a r m of proletarian organization such as the mass strike and the soviets.27 This transformation of the r n e a n e behind p a a i c ~ ~ ldear mands helps explain many of the political and theoretical differences within a unified parry with a hegemonic worldview Few in the leadership of the SPD were concerned witl-r the basic criticisms Marx had raised against the Cotha Program when his internal memorandum was published posthumousfy by Engels in 1890. By that tilne, the SPD's commitment to creating a republic was widely recognized and, given the domestic repression in Germany, it wc.,ufd liave been fc~olhardyfor the party to highlight the need for a dictatorsllip of the proletariat, With the creation of a Second International, inoretlver, the concern Marx expressed fifteeri years earlier regarding the neglect of internationalisxn no Longer seerned relevant. Finally, with respect to separating issues of distribution from issues of production, it was clear that inost party meinhers were primarily concerned with econamic inequality, Control over the production process assumed importance only with regard to the question of political power. This is where the basic differences arose betweeri the three theorists with whorn the three factions of the SPD would ultimately identify themselves. Their positions were not mutually exclusive in every detail, which often allowed for collaboration between them, but the differexices were still real,. Eduard Bernstein was content to accept a constitutional monarchy and maintain the structure of the existing production process while Rosa 1,uxemhurg dreamed of proletarian administration over the production process through the rnass strike. As for Kari Kautsky, along with the party majorir)i,B he remained committed to parliamentary rule and the electoral path while emphasizing issues of distribution in the preserit and a transformation of the production process in tl-re futtlre.29
Programs and Practice In 1891, Kautsky wrote his commentary on the Erfurl Programnz. It would serve as a guiding document lor both the SX3Dand the entire Second International. Fashioned loosely after The Commzkrzisi:Manifesto, the prog r m was split irt two parts. The second part, originally drafted by Bernstein, emphasized the need for particular reforms ranging from zmiversa/ suifrage to a graduated incc~metax, nationaiization of major industries, the eight-hour Jay? and the right to a free burial. The first part, written by Kautsky, was a model of Marxian orthodoxy tl-rat empl-rasized t l ~ e need to gain state power and faretold the '"inevitable" collapse of capitalism through ""natural,necessity,"30
Despite tl-re temptation, it would be a mistake to read the respective positions of Kautsky and Bernstein in their debate over "revisionism" in 1898 back into their respective iabors on the socialist platform of 1890. TE would also be a mistake to believe that the emphasis on "natural necessity" "aduced an antipolitical passivism or rendered class conscic->usnessir~levant. Indeed, this becomes evident frorn a fllrntrus paragraph in the progracn: We tlo n ~wish t to say that the abolition t>f private property or the exploitation of the means of production will t>cscur by itself, that the irresistible development through natural ncccssity will take placc urittzout human action. Nor do we wish to say that all soc~alrelorll-ts are useless or that those who suffer the ccjnsecluences of the ccjntratliction between prcjductive forces and the existing relations of production haw rlorhirlg to do other than srarld idly by with ttlicir hands in their pockets waiting for this contradiction to be avercome.31
Tlzough Lassalle originally coined the phrase ""sknce behind the masses," it holds equally well for Kautsky" view. No less than the partisans of the First and the Third Internationals, members of the Second International did not believe that the revolution would simply occur of its own accord through the ""objective" "economic warkings af capitalism. Quite the contrary, The teleological system Kautsky Eashioned from Marxss work did not make the workers antipolitical. Indeed with its claims regarding the "inevitable" "revolution, orthodox Marxism actually spurred political activity by intensifying the desire of workers to bring socialism into existence more quickly. In revolution as in birth, obstacles can accur." Thase German social democrats who had so vc->cifemuslyfought for the legalization of their p a r v from 1878 to 1890 were now forced to garner votes in hostile surroundings and maintain a belief that the potemid for garnering inore wouid be assured. Such hopes were supported by the theory of the '"inevitable" "collapse of capitalism and the ever-expanding proletariat, Illiterate artd degraded, constantly threatened with reprisals, the warking class understood that this theory called upon them to join the social democratic parties that incarx~atedtheir future, The problem with the E r f ~ r tProgrcam~nhad nothing to da with either fostering the passivity of the workers or embracing the ""immiseration thesis."33 ?"he real problem was of a different sort. Though the pamphlet xnde clear tl-rat no series of reforms could substitute for a political act af transformation, its teleological perspective presupposed what was only a contingent link between the growth of the SPB and the strengthening of its radical commitments to reform and revolution, irnmediate needs and trailsitional dernands, nationat forms of electr>ralactivity and internatioilal
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solidarity." There was no discussion of tl-re means necessary for transforming the sc~cialsystem or dciending the new regime. But theorists often forget the difference between a political manifesto and a philosophical treatise. The one must respond to sociopolitical exigencies and prospects while the other need not. Regarding issues such as these, the Erfu~t:Program vvas corzstrained by the inrterrtsts of those divergerit factions with which the SPD had to contend, Indeed, Kautsky would c o n h m t some of these neglected concerns in The Social Revo!zafz'on, This remarkable little political pamphlet has been unjustly forgotten and helps explain Kautsky" influence upon Lenin, Luxemburg and the entire left wing of the Secc-~ndInternational before 1910, It predicted the gr~jwth of monopoly capitalism and the dangers of a '"reactionary democracy'" with unaccountable institutions that might csnstrict civil liberties as welt as socialist activity, it emphasized that the SPD should remain a b'class,'a rather than a multiclass party of democratic reform if only to deal with the likelihood of "co~znterrevolution,'TThe pamphlet also makes clear that, contrary to popular opinion, Kautsky did not demand tl-re nationalization of all businesses, but only the larger and failing firms. Eie was quite flexible and he never identified socialism with an uriyielding national plan. The Social Revolution recogllized the need for a socialist ethos of solidarity and it envisaged a new intellectual and cultural life under socialism. Indeed, while refusing to provide a blueprint, Kautsky tried to confront: real obstacles inhibiting the creation of a new society and call fortlt a new spirit of civic responsibility in its citizenry. The Social Reuolzartz"oncreated a new fascination with the ""Euture state" (ZukunJtsstaatf that socialism would instit~tte,and xnuch l-ras been said about the semirefigious character of orthodox ~Warxism,But this ideology did not constitute religion in the usual meaning of the term. Its questions were not existetlciai and its proponents believed they had empirical proof for their beliefs. They looked to this world rather than the aherlife for their of salvation. In the German Empire, where religion really was an gi~~piLIm the masses," Marxism called upon the oppressed and exploited to take control of their lives and to stand up for themsetves In a political rnailner.35 Indeed, if Marxism must be understood in religious terms, tl-ren it should be at least be considered a form of ""secular faith*"
The Road to Power This faith ultimately focused on ""tie day" of proletarian triumph. Kautsky l-rad drawn the crucial distinction between the "social" and the "'poIiticalm revolution. The assumption behind his understanding of so-
cialist politics, l-rowever, was the existence af a link between them. Tl1e social revolmion was what Marx had in mind when he wrote that the capitalist systeEB would create its own gravediggers by generating a12 everexpanding proletarian consrrluency far the SPB,36 Witli workers entering the political arena, the party could thus ever more vociferously demand various economic reforms, which, in turn, would haste12 the dissolution of the system. Indeed, corresponding to the insights of ""Marxian science," the social revoitrtion was predicated on the "'necessary" implications of capitalist development. Kautsky rejected tl-re idea that economic reforms waufd enable capitalism tc-, "evrotve" into socialism, A ""political revc.>1utioi19'was necessary in order to rectify the injustices of the e x i s t i e electoral system in Germany and thereby prepare the way for the next phase of "'socialist" ddevelopment, Undertaken once the party had secured the support of tl-re great proletarian majoriry, most likely occurring during a moment of crisis, this quick and relatively bloodless act would involve the final conquest of state power, Though the social revolution woufd create its structural preconditions, tl-ris political rewlution would depend on contingent historical factors for which it was impossible to predict m y particular tactic inr advance, Mautsky" interpretation of orthodox Marxism was never based a n the eradication of freedom and contingency in the name of necessity and determinism. Me inrstead Iiked to speak of "'determinate volition'Qor a freedom conditioned by circurnstances,i7 The refusal to fashion a concrete strategy for the seizure of state power, however, left Kautsky and his fc~iluwersin the position of emphasizing the ""necessary'2evelopments occurring in the present aver those contingent and unpredictable circumstances af the future, It became, far him, a matter of maintaining the cc~nnectionbetween the social and the political revofution. fn his mind, this meant expanding the membership of the SPD wllile keeping its revcliutionary identity intact. Buttressed by his belief in historical teleology, yuestioning the constant calls for c o i ~ p r o i ~ i by s e the right wing of the SPD, tile result was a politics af ""apposition," Kautsky correctly believed tl-rat, under the monarchy9 the SPD had no real possibility of exercising power or any serious chance of participating in the hrrnation of national policy. His politics of opposition also furthered a sense of internal cohesion, class solidarity, and a commitment t o republican values within the movement. Neverthekss, this starlce also helped ~ustifythe charge that his "'economic determinism" was devoid of ""pulitics" a r an explicitly narrnative coxnmitmeilt to a class ideal. Again, the context is crucial. Errtergng from the underfhround in 1890, a qualitative political revolution had already taken place. The infant SPD had been born and a steady regulated course was beginning to unfold as the child grew into a responsible adult, According to Kautsky, that course
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would continue so fang as the party retained its class identity, revolutionary vision, and political harmony His view of revolution was predicated on ~ztilizingand extending those organizing possibilities that had emerged with the rexnoval of the antisocialist laws. These laws l-rad proven traumatic fur all social democrats of Kautsky's generation. In fact, their implementatiorz was so drastic that: Ger~rgvon Vollmal; a respected party activist, caused a sensation by claiming that only through an irnrnediate revolution could these repressive laws be lifted, When such an action proved unnecessary, he became the first major proponent of reformism within the SPB, Few social democrats, in any event, could have found fault with Bebet's dramatic recollections in a speech to the Dresden Pafty Congress of 1903: Blows simply rained tlown t>nus and everything was broken up. One city after anotl~er,including the surrc>unding tlistricts, was put into a state of siege, Hundreds and hurldreds of our cotnrades became unexnploycd and we uwrc drtvcn froin our homes like rmangy dogs, . . . W11en I recall fiow we were made to report at the potice station, had our measurements taken and were treated generally like criminals, photographed and then givcn three days to clear out-this was an cxperienc-e X shall relnember as tong as I live.38
Fear af ever l-raving to ga thraugh such regression again combined with a recognition tl-rat the Prussian state" attempt to destroy social democracy had faiied, The party had broken the pc-~werof Bismarck and probably played the crucial role in his fall. The popularity of Kautsky's thought, in this vein, reflected the political breakthrough that had occurred at the moment of the SPB's legalization. Its success in the struggle against the authoritarian excesses of the Bismarckiax~state would illdeed endow it with a revohtionary aura." But, particularly as the trade unions grew stronger and the party bureaucracy Larger,"Qtl~e "revolutionary" iimgact of the old teIcofogical vision fell away trtore and trtore. It became ever clearer that an etl~icaland practical choice was necessary between the commitment to revolution and the reformist demand that the party make greater efforts to integrate itself into the given order and shoulder ministerial responsibility. Kautsky's politics of opposition was a way of stalfing that decision, Standing outside the corridors of power, while continuing to work for the immediate tasks at hand, l-re sougl-rt to maintain the party's unique identity by pushing the socialist revolution ever further into the future, Past sttccess was used to ~ u s t i kthe prospect of an emancipated future. Kautsky and his followers were unwilling to entertain new strategies af either the reformist c>r revolutionary sort, This indeed helps explain their vacillation especialiy following the final sptit in the SPD's left-wing faction in 191Q,
Tensions had already arisen foilowing the first electoral setback ever suffered by the SPD in 1905. Even though the p a q would regain its momentum, its leaders now began to feel themselves on the defensive.. By 1909, a staunchly reactionary coalition had assurned power in Cerrnany wllile imperialist ambitions and chauvinism were also on the rise. The original coalition of factions within the SPD now divided over yuestic~nsof political and ideological strategy. Indeed, marked by strikes from below and new expressions of proletarian militancy, 1910 was a year of polarization within the party. Old Lassalleans, trade unionists, and party bureaucrats sought to dispense with tl-re radical ideolr~gy,forward a policy of class compromise with regard to social programs, and often provide support br what was hecoming a blatantly imperialist foreign policy, Meanwhile, on the "'Ieft," Rosa and her followers were calling upon the SPD to e~rttrlatethe TA~zxe~rtburg Rkissian mass strike of 190.5, Faced with the cl-range in political climate, the danger posed to traditional party tactics by the Left and the original ortbodox theory by the Right, Kautsky took a different stance, He justified it by providing a self-criticism of his own former optimism regarding the mass strike.4 Since the revolution had failed where the rulit utopian to expect its sucing class was the weakest, he now co~~sidered cess where tl-re ruling class retained support from the strongest army in tl-re world, 3% be sure, Kamsky was willing to entertain the use c>f a "&fensive'\nlass strike as a last resort tct protect democratic gains under exceptionai circumstances. Given the recent electoral defeat and tl-re tl-rreat of repression, however, he considered it suicidal t o maintain his prior c~mmitmenttc) an ""offensive'hse of the mass strike. And so, rejecting the revisionists no less than l-ris former radical allies, Kautsky proposed a variation on his politics of opposition, His new ""strategy of attrition"' would be predicated o n maintaining a traditional farrrt of class politics while waiting for tl-re laws of capitalist deveiopxnent to reassert tl-remselves and reverse the reactionary trend. Thus, in ail article on the Prussian elections, Kautsky could write the line that would become famous for its future implications: ""X is not coxnpromise in action tl-rat is dangerous, but compromise in prc~gram." Kautsky and his supporters found themselves occupying the center between the two tactions. Willing to consider a defensive mass strike in order to preserve previous demooratic gains, but not an offensive mass strike intent m introducing a new form of workerskcsntrol, Kautsky opposed the economism and political al,portunism of the reformists even wl~ilewishing to woid the "adventurism'" 05 the radicals, Questions regarding the pc>litical passivity of orthodox Marxism now t c t ~ kon. new meaning while the argurnent about constituting an opposition last its radical flavor. Indeed, 1909 was the year in which Kautsky provided the virtual credo for his party faction and gave literal meaning to what he had stated in aesopian
Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 49
language for the benefit of the censors in 1 893; The SPD is a '"revolutionary party that does not make revolution."'""
Many would recall that phrase in 193 4, Coxnmitted to the traditional pacifism of prewar social democracy, Kautsky had been critical of the burgeoning militarism in imperial Germany since the beginning of his career. He was particularly fearful of the army being set loose upon the "internal enemy,"4-' But, like all progressives, he hated and feared the tzar," R m o r s of mobilization by Russia, cynically promulgated by the kaiser, coupled with the sudden iltflation of chauvirtist sentiments amtrng the working. class." To be sure, he was l-resitantin assenting to a "class truce" fiat would liquidate the plitical independence of the party and foreclose any chance to contact pacifist forces in other larlds in order to terminate the conflict. Me was also suspicious of tl-re kaiser" imperialis axnbitions in asking far war credits. Newrtheless, with respect to the historical judgment of his role in the events feadin~to World War X, it didn" tmateer, N o less than tl-re other leading representatives of his generation, tl-re irnperialist war that Kautsky had beell expectiilg now took him by surprise," hacking any plan for concerted action, or the institutional ability to demand coxnyliallce from i t s members, the Second International helplessly watched its own diss~Iutioi~ as one member party after another succumbed to domestic threats froin the doininant classes as well as the war l-rysteria of their own constituencies.47 Two years of the most debilitating compromises folfowed and, by 1916, European social demc-~cracyin general-and German social democracy in particular-----wassplit: where one bkajority'9action sought to conquer at all costs and annex new territories, the other essentially called for peace and a return to the status quo ante, Kautsky belonged to the second group. He was neither an imperialist lackey nor a ""social chauvinist.'We and his supporters had traditionally been the great critics of Germany's imperialist ambitions. Their pacifism l-rad placed them directly at odds with the politicians who brought about the catastrc~phicconflict. Kautsky adamantly maintained that linguistically distinct groups had a claim on nationality, thereby atlticipating the position usually associated with. Lenin, and that each nation had the right to defend itself if attacked, In fact, personally, he wished to grant war credits only if the kaiser would explicitly state that Germany was engafSlng in a purely ""dknsive" war without territorial ambitions. Unfortunately, however, the government was unwilling to make such a statement, And so, Kautsky was fc>rcedto choose beween hreaking the tra-
dition of party discipline and voting against his beliefs, He chose the latter, Kautsky submitted to the authcrrity of the party and his faction lost its independence. No longer would it prove possible far him to mediate between the far Left of the SPD led by Rosa Luxernburg and the "revisioni~ts'~ whose theoretical-if not practical-spokesperson was Eduard Bertlstein, The center had made its decision, Ignored by the Right, Kautsky and his followers soon enough found themselves despised by the Left, Chauvinist sentiments among the "ma jar it-y sociaiists" hrdetled as the war dragged on, Ever more disgusted, hamstrung by the dictates of party discipline, Kautsky along with Bernstein and others from their generation made the painful decision to break from the party they bad helped form and constitme the Independent Social Demc~craticParty (USPD)in 1916.JThey would only rejoin the parent organization at the beginning of the 1920s when electoral losses and internal ideological scrife forced the new movement to choose between the SPD and the German Commuilist Party (KPD) that had been founded in 1231 9, Nevertheless, by then, it was already too late. Even as the USPD sought to resurrect the SPD of old, the Russian Revolution was ushering in a new epoch. The working class had split, and no longer was it possibte autoinatically to identify its interests with those of any single organization. The old certainty was gone, and identity now became an issue that turned comrade against comrade. IVilitants quickly shifted their allegiance and vented their anger on the leaders of the Second International, wllo had led the working class into the abyss. Even wl-riie the majority of workers in the Western nations vehemently rejected the Bolsheviks, radicals ernbraced Lenin" followers, who had remained true to their revolutionary principles and steadfast in their desire to turn the international war into ail itlternational class war= Rcvoiutionary sentiments spread through a devastated Europe. With the collapse of tile Western Front, and the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm XI in 1; 918, Germally experienced mass uprisings amoilg workers calling either for soviets along Russian Iirtes OF; at the very least, purging the monarchist bureaucracy and tile military as well as curtaiiing the power of capital and partitioning the aristocratic estates. The revolntisaaries sought, in short, to abolish the old order or sulx~dinateit to the new republic in which the "majority" faction of the SPD, led by Friedrich Eberc and Phillip Scheidemann, reluctantly found itself at the forefratlt.49 The \Veimar Republic was the product of an aborted revolution. An opportunity existed, if not to bring about a new democratic form of bbsoviet" regime, then, at a minimum, to introduce a democracy grounded in a democratic civil society. Wc3rkers recsgnized their enemies and their interests. They basically acted in accordance with the political values and traditions of the SPD, But the party ruthlessly suppressed its own constituency. It chose to csmpro~nisewith Germany9s moft reactionary forces and thereby
Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 5 1
forestall the ernergence of a more radical regime, Or, putting it in terms Kautsky would have understood, in November 1918, the SPD employed the ""political" revolution to stymie its "social " c(~u~iterpart.~@ No less than Marx and Engels, he believed tl-rat the ""beakdown" of the [>Id order woutd be precipitated through an extertlal event like w a The ~ events of November, however, threw him into a typical quandaty, A supporter of tl-re new parliaxnent, he remained open to cooperation with the workers' councils that had spontaneously risen throughout much of Germany Appalled at the thought of repressing a wc~rkers'movemerit like the Spartacus Group, which was led by Rosa Luxexnburg and Karl Liebknect, Kautskp nonetheless shied away from cdling fc~rsocializing the great industrial firms and aristocratic estates or demanding a purge of the counterrevolutic~narybureaucracy and military, He could not envision a policy that might provide a ""social" foundation Zbr the "pajitical" revohtion. His politics, however, stood in accord with his derrtocratic commitments. The new republic fed by tl-re fPB could be seen as invalidating the need for further qualitative change or a prc~letarianseizure of power. Democracy seemed its own reward. AII the more ironic then that so marry should later have identified not simply Marxism-leninim, but Marxism itself: with totalitarianisrrr,CI The decisiczri by Kautsky and his associates to uncor~ditionally s u p p ~ rthe t new V(ieimar regime solidified the theoretical connection of orthodox Marxism and repubtican dexnocracy. The strategic situation did not necessarily favor a more radical course, The Soviet Union could have offered little in the way of tangible support and, aside from the dire prospecrs for the Left should events have led to an open civil war, it is highly doubtful whether the victorious allies would have tolerated the prociamatiol~of a soviet regime in Germany. But, for Kautsky, it was not enough to accept the political situation in strategic terms. Kautsky also sought to explain it in theoretical terms and, here, he was ultitllately unsuccessful. His revolutionary theory was incapable of anchoring the nascent regime. Asked to provide a new party program for the I925 party congress in Ijeideiberg, and help confront a growing political identity deficit in the SPD, Karrtskg could produce only a stale remake of the E r f g r ~Program. There was surely sorrtething like historical lustice in the emotional reconciliation that took place between Karl Ka~ztskyand Edtlard Bernstein in the year before this party congress,"3 The clock seemed to have been set back. Kawsky had anticipated what would become uncritical support from the S P n for the V(ieimar Republic and Bernstein had anticipated the economic policies it would pursue. The SPD seemed unified once again. It seemed again ready to fuse the theory at-orthodox ~Marxismwith the practice of reform, But times bad changed, Kautsky's brand of Marxism had become an
anachronism. The real revolution had been made by tlze Bolsheviks wllorn Kautsky condemned for their ""bonapartism" and their commitment to what in his view, given the ""pematnre'\haracter of the entire enterprise, could only result in a form of ""hrracks socialism.""" The Western labor movement, by the same token, c o d d no longer simply stand in opposition, Jf it was easy for Kautsky to castigate the Bolsheviks for their corznterrevslucionary perversion of the socialist idea,'"t was more difficult to oppose the call fc>r workerskcouncils in favor of what was clearly a bourgeois republic, Unlike his fc~rmerprottgci., Rosa Luxemhurg, his attack on Lenin's authoritarianism lacked any reference to an actual revolutionary experiment in progress. At the same time, his criticism of refr~rmismas a simple extension of liberalism lacked an alternative set of political ambitions to justi.fy his more radical theory. His Marxism could now neither inspire a politics of reform nor specify a revolutionary go, l to serve. The publication of The Materiakf Cozceptioz of Nistov (1927) didn't heip matters, This was not merely due to the mistaken belief he expressed that fascism, because its base of support supposedly came atmost exclusively from the lumpenproletariat, had no chance of success in Germany It was rather that this final grandiose attempt to spsterrlatize his views on the dialectics of nature and history, society and plzilosoplzy, left him in a state of political paralysis, Other thinkers had, of course, previousfy pointed tct the existence of historical stages and, even earlier, the manner in which successful forms of government rest on certain ecoilomic presuppositions, M a r s and Ellgels had secured the co~1nectionbetween these two insights. But Kautskg now stressed thexn in a way that his mentors did not and he denied the voluntarist and activist elements in their thought genuine importance, Stage theory became the tctol with which to contest the Bolshevik ateemyt to shortcircuit the movement of I-ristory, But historical materialim couid no longer guarantee what it had guaranteed in times past. Democracy and socialism, reform and revolution, ecsnoxnics and politics, nationalisxn and internationalism, now increasingly appeared mutuafly exclusive. The connection that Kautsky sought to create betweeri them had fallen asunder. Xt was as if Edrrard Bernstein had appropriated one part of Kautsky's worldview for his theory of social reform while Lenin had embraced the other for his drxtrine of political revolution, Orthodox Marxism lost its cohere~ice.It could no longer corzfront the practicai issues facing the fabor movement, Indeed, when Kautsky died in I938 at the age of eighty-hw; the optimistic assumptions of his theory had already been invalidated bp the Nazi triuxnph. There is something poignant in recalling what he wrote to Eduard Bernstein during their debate: "If the materialist conception of history and the conception of the proletariat as the driving force of the coming social
Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 53
revolution should ever be overcome, then I must indeed confess, then I would be finished. Then my life would nt> Ionger have any content.'""Ut the time of Kautskp% death he was left with nothing to fight the heretics. Unable to contest the political practice of social democratic reformism, or confront the rigid communist dogma with an alternative revolutionary vision, Kautsky csuld neither question his original assutrtptions nor corrfrctrrt the new conditions of a new era, Thus, orthodox Marxism passed from history. Against his opponents, however, Kautsk y understood that a social derntrcratic parw without a sense of socialism would soon degeneraee into just another parry and that the communist attempt to construct socialism without republican commitments would result only in an amhoritarian perversion of the idea. There is also a sense in which his politics of: opposition can serve as a corrective bath to the anti-institutional voluntarisrn reminiscent c>f the 1960s and the bureaucratic opportunism of the present. In this vein, perhaps, Xiautsky still has something to teach: N~tfiiit~g could be rnore urrong than the view that in politics only the inrcrcsrs of the rnoment arc decisive, that distant ideals have no practical i~lpartancc, that we wiII obtain all tlie better results in our electioneering, say, the mare p~acticatly~ that is the more soberly and pettily we comport ourselves, the more we speak ordy of taxes and customs d~rties,uf poIicc chicanery and health insurance and the like, and the more we treat aLtr great future goals like a past love sl our youtl~,on whom we still glatlty tt>ok back in our l~earts,but with whom we prefer no longer tu have any connection it1 publiceF7
Perhaps because he served as a reminder of an exhilarating time when the l a b ~ movement r still took its theory and values seriously3Xiautskg became an ernbarritssmenc to b o t l ~major paticical organizations of the working class in the postwar period. As the social democrats ever more surely distanced themselves from the thought of their ""nogmatic" hfonner prophet, the coxnxnunists sougl-rt only to condexnn the 'Straitor" to tile working class. Thus, neither rnovemellt was willing to pay its debt to the man who had so clearly influenced them both-a man who, whatever his failings, cs~rtmitted his life to tl-re workiw class and tile democratic character of tl-te socialist project.
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Eduard Bernstein and the Revisionism
Eduard Bernstein had been a friend and collaborator of Katrl Katutskyk for close to twenty years. Born in 1850, the son of Jewish working-class parents, be worked at a hank in his younger years, and participated in the Gotha Congress of 2 875, which gave birth to what would ultimately become the SPD. An early admirer of Eugen Dhhring, like so many others, he k c m e a Marxist after reading Etlgels9sattack on the anti-Semitic philosopher of violence, An editor of the influential The Social Democwt, exiled to England during the period of the antisocialist laws, Bernstein was a socialist of impeccable credentials who originally saw his '?revision" "of Marxism f master's critical enterprise. as entirely within the spirit t ~ the By the time of his death in 1932, he had served as a deputy in the Reichstag h r close to a quarter of a century, What9$more, he was a scholar of the British and Ger~naniabor movements as well as the editor of Lassalle" writings and the letters of Marx and Engels. No Less than tl-rey, he believed that Marxism must comprehend reality and so respoild to Ilew conditions. It was to prevent the degeneration of theory into ideology that Bernstein launched his assault upon orthodox Marxism,l Even his staunchest critics agreed that his undertaking was motivated by the best intentions and inany actually praised him for daring to express the reality of the social democratic movexnent in theoretical terms.2 Edttard Bernstein was not a theorist on the Xevei of Marx, ZAnxen?burg,or even Lenin. He was concerned with ideas and, like inany of his comrades, he wrote on a wide variety of topics ranging from foreign affairs to taxation to the impact of ideas. Part of his influence, bowever, derived from a certain utilitariax~readiness to reject theory. Bernstein's revisionism gener-
56
* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
ated a lr~gicwhose instrumental character ultimately turned against his own ideals, His more opportunistic hllowers would indeed simply justify themselves in terms of political exigencies. There is something ironic about this since, fullowing his early fiing with orthodox ilifarxism, Bernstein became deeply influenced by Kant, E-ie also learned much from members of the famt~usFabian Society and English socialists like Rarnsay MacDonald, It rnakes sense that he should have sought tc-,conilect his revisionism with English liberal philcrsophy.T"fh two converged in a f c ~ mOf e ~ i r i c i s mwith strong skepticist and utilitarian irnplications, Bernstein initially wisl-red, following Engels, to distinguisla between the scientific and the utopian forms of socialism with an eye on eliminating the latter'wis concern was that the older theory now lacked empirical verification for its claims and, as he stated in the preface to the French translation of E u ~ I ~ t i o ~ Sa~r cyk l i S mhis , was basically norhing inore than "m attempt at =vision, vision, and clarification of marxist socialism."""gainst his intentior~s,however, his new "evolutionary socialism" "shattered the ass m y t i u n s of tl-re old theory and became an alternative to revofurionary iMarxism. Certain critics have argued that Eduard Bernstein's revision of Marxian ortl-rodoxy bears little relevance to the contemporary practice of mainstream stxial democracy.6 He was nt:, party hack, he had his problems with the trade ~znions,and he was genuinely preoccupied with the sppression s f working people. Bernstein was also acutely concerned with political etl-rics. He was sympathetic to Kantss idea of the moral politician and he was insistent upon connecting means and ends,' But his preoccupation with sl~urtterm calcttlable gains, his utilitarian understanding of socialist politics, made his general approach appealing to those with whom be actually had Indeed, especially given recelit developments, it is imgorlittle in COT~~EROXZ.. rant to consider just how far tl-re logic of revisionism has taken its supporters from the original enterprise of Eduard Bernstein, The success of his revisionist ~zndertakirrgis so obvious that his foillowers have virtually identified it with the very movement whose official dogma he originally sought to transform. Their political record is mixed, They have squandered numerous opportunities to enact radical chmge. But they rarely succumbed to authoritarian temptations and their policies dearly irnproved the lives of working people. Genuine reformers played a significant role in introducing the modern welfare state. There are reasons why Eduard Bernstein and his hilowers can be deeply proud of their tradition. Xt makes little sense to condemn revisionism by insisting upon the misreading of Marx by its founder.Vts political allure, after all, has been real: Marx himself liked to say that a good piece of iactory legislation is worth a dozen revolutionary manifestos. The refc~mrenvisioned by Bernstein and his successors hebed bring about the passing of laissez-faire capitalism, and he
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 57
was surely correct in maintaining that the outstanding contributions of social democracy involved its commitment t~ raising wages, shortrlling labor time, an3 improving working conditions,Y facial dernocratic reformisxn has constrained tlze wllip of tlze market and generally expmded democratic participation in the process. It has provided the goods, or at least some of them, and its Iogic appears based on common sense, Its justification seexns somehow self-evident. Precisely for this reason, however, its assumptiolls bave remained unexamined along with its blindness to the contradictio~lsgenerated by the capitalist prduction process. Revisionisxn exaggerated the importance of economic self-interest and thereby neglected the role of ider>logicaifactors. The ethic introduced by Bernstein is, perhaps for this reason, radically underdeveloped, It offers Little with which to c m b a t wllat has become a self-serving politics of compromise by contexnporary social democratic organizations and fragmenting forms of self-interested particularism at the base, Thus, the need to expose the ideulugiclal elements of this supposediy anti-idectlogical theory. Especially during the 1960s, and then again in the 1 9 9 0 many ~ ~ people began to question the pc-~litics of reformism and the complacency of the social detrlocratic movement. There is stiH discontent concerr~ingthe extent of its integration into the status quo, its bureaucratic professionalism, the Qebilitating identity crisis it has generated, and its diminishing commitment to its working-class constituency, Confronting reformism in theory and practice, however, is no easy task, It initially calls far illttminating the material and organizational interests that an ideology of compromise tends to hide, Jt atso involves k i n g the structural constraints on policy that reformist epistemology refuses to articulate, It means questioning reformisxn" style and ethical foundations. In short, it requires dealing critically with Eduard Bernstein's revisionism not merely i r ~terms of its ability to confront new material conditions, but also in terxns of how its Iogic has been turned against the refcjrmist ends it clriginally sc~ughtto serve.
The Genesis of Revisionism Revisionism was the product of a context in which orthodox IVarxism dc~minatedthe workersbc->veme.tlt.A symbiotic relation existed between them an3 it is important to urlderstand that the revisionim debate took place within a shared universe of thought.lWeither Eduard Bernsteit~nor Karl Kautsky had a positive view of the Hegelian impact on ~Varx,Nor was either able to confront the capitalist totality in the manEler of Rosa Luxemburg,fj Both believed in the objectivity of natural science and the validity of its methods for social scientific analysis. Both also retained a firm trust in the enlightenment notiorl of linear progress along with a fundamen-
5 8 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
tally positivistic conception of materialism.12 Theoretical differences were therefore derived from similar p~mises.. But there were also ininor differences and misundersta~ldingsbetween Kautsky and Bernstein that would have prohund implications. Bernstein3 notion of evolution was obviously influenced by Darwin, as surely as was the dialectic of Kautsky, hut the revisionist theory of social develaprrtent was not tied to a broader antl-rropological conception.13 Bernstein no less than his friend sought to defend science and materialism from idealism and metaphysics, But Bernstein saw the threat emanating frt~rnthe apocalyptic visions and utopian goals of orthodox Marxism. He felt that proletarian irzterests could not be left to teleological guarantees. They must instead be understood as desired aims for which struggle was necessary14 Kautsky hixnself would prabably not have disagreed with the substance of this idea, of course, only with its formulalion. In contrast to Kautsky, however, Bernstein refused to accept the proposition that necessity required conscious will or action. This erlabled I-rirn to heco~nethe first within the Marxist tradition to divorce society from n a t ~ ~ rlaws, a l But, in so doing, he actually drew on a h r more traditional and po6tivistic understanding of materialism than Kautsky Bernstein"s thinking was also more grounded in ""econoxnism," The ""vulgar" econornisrn for which Marxism has been so soundly criticized-though never by Bernstein himself-would prove far more important lor the development of revisionism and contemporary social democracy tl-ran for Marxism itself. Bernstein wanted a republic as surely as Karl Kautsky and, just as surely, the means for achieving it eluded him. Against Kautskb however, he was willing to table talk about its creation and privilege tl-re quest for economic over political demands in the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm,is But this issue is salielzt only within a revolutionary discourse.. Bernstein was as outspoken in his condemnation of Bolshevism as Kautsky,f"he political confiict between Kautsky and Bernstein indeed became irrelevant with the creation of the Weirnar Republic. Bernstein was intent upon displacing a tl-reory predicated on an impending catastrophe with a new form of gradualism. But he basically stood in broad tactical agreement with the political leaders of the older social democratic generation like Viktor Adler, Ignaz Auer, August Bebel, and Karf Kautsky." No less than they, he was aware that orthodox Marxism had contributed to the success of the SPD, It had helped in ~ustifyinga parliamentary course, generating a coxnmitrnent to dexnocratic trade unionism, gaining votes lor the party, and attempting to realize those refc~rmselahorated in the Ellfurl Pvogriam, In his retrospective analysis horn Sect to f i r 9 ( l 91. l),however, Bernstein noted the very success of the SPD l-rad helped create new conditions to which the old theory could no Longer respondthus inaking it ail obstacle to future progress.
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 59
Two paths seemed to present themselves: reform and revolution, And, here, the issue was never Bernstein" lack of dialectical sophistication. His argumentation was completely in Iine with the thinking of Masx, Historical conditions had seemingly invalidated many of the claims made by orthodox Marxism and thereby shattered the unification of theory and practice it propounded. New conditions precipitated a moment of decision,lVernstein Izad only scorn for those who would complacently accept the dualism between '"evolutionary phraseology" and urefc>rmist9' practice. Thus, in keeping with Marx, he insisted upun the need to "'forward a unity between tl-reory and reality, between tl-re phrase and the action. lFor though] in the normal course of events this dualism can be bridged by demag0guer-y . , . in every crucial situation it wiH become a severe Believing that the SPD was pursuing a fundamentally reformist practice anywab Bernstein demailded that the party appear as what it actually was and drop the revolutionary Jargc~n.This made it necessav to confront the presuppositions of Marxist ""science" horn a critical standpoint.Z" According to Bernsrein, economic indicators no Ionger Justified the assumption that capitalism would coltapse, As far as he was concerned, and there is some truth to the claicn, credit had solved the crisis character of capitalism. Capital was not becoming concentrated in fewer hands and the working class was not growing into the emajoritg of society. Instead, he argued that the peasantry was remaining stable wlliie the middle strata and a class of smaller entrepreneurs was on the rise. Clearly, all this would have both theoretical and practical implicatiotls, The refusal to deaf with these changed circuxnstances would, in his opinion, result only in political miscalculation. Thus, he could write that: I regard it as my duty tc) stand up for the right of a socialist revisionism based on sclet~ceand the demands of practical struggle. Arrogance has always been thc defining trait of any orthodoxy, By "orthodoxy" do nor mcan the adhrrence to specific convictions ar views, but the process af strangting wide-ranging theories, tl~erehyturning tl~eminto rigid formulas and unassailable dog117as.ll
Bcmstc;k"s analysis corrtradicted the airon iaws'\of Marxian srthodoxv, The ""social" no longer underpkned the ""political" wrevolrttion: history had sundered tlle connection between thern. Under the circumstances, Bernstein framed the alternatives in terms of maintaining the traditional socialist co~~rnitment to democratic principles and pursuing a politics of reform or abandoning tl-rose principles and calling far the revolutionary seizure of power by a minority in the manner of Blanqui.22 Justification for both positions can be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. In the view of
60 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
Bernstein, l-rowever, the choice was self-evident: tl-re SPW would l-rave to begin the arduous process of ""persuading" nonproletarian classes and groups about the value of socialism.2" The existing political consteilatian, he believed, also made this possible. England had its constitutional monarchy a i d France its Third Republic while the United States appeared as a beacon of democracy. Even in Germanh a degree of civil liberties had resulted from lifting the antisocialist laws, It seemed that the development of capitalism was iiltrinsically tied to the extension of democratic forms, Thus, Bernstein could ignore the revolutionary concern with overthrowing the autl-zoritarian political systern in Germany and develop his standpoint without reference to any particular governmental farm. His aim was to secure the co~iditionsnecessary for pursuinrg ecorzomic reforms that rnost like15 in turn, would dernand a politics of compromise. Because the working class was no longer expailding, Bernstein believed that sociatists wo~ildhave to gain support from the peasantry as we!! as the petty bourgeoisie and parts of tl-re ""pogressive" burgeoisie, Such an undertaking would prove possible, however, on0; if social democracy surrendered its traditional revolutionary or politicnl standpoint, with its unique class goals like the "dictatorship of the proletariat,"" and its incernar-ionaiist rhetoric, which frightened away more moderate voters. Indeed, according to Bernstein, furthering the proletarian interest in the new corrtext would mean transhnning a revolutionary party of workers into a populist, multiclass party ""of tbe people" "i~l,kspiart.cgi) capable of reflecting the sum of their divergent interests. Eduard Bernstein was intent on ideologically reorienting the SPW because, from his perspective, advancing the real economic interests of workers was more important than trtaintaining the prescribed teleotogical end that their party originally sought to serve. He may have retained a notion of the classtess society in Evolutionary Soeiillisnz, But it was a thin ideal predicated on the inability of any class to define state policy and it thereby fit perfectly with his norions of partnership and compromise. His p a l of the classless society was left without content, without epistemological justification, without scieritific grounding, without political purpose, and witlzout any way of linking theory and practice, Indeed, as he succinctly put the matter in his famous formulation, ""Iopenly admit it, I have very little interest or feeling for what is commtrnly understsoci as the "final goathof: socialism. This goal, wllatever it rnay be, is nothing at all to me, the movement is everything."2*l Ortl-rodox Marxisxn had already been criticized by various ""socialists frorn tl-re lecturn" ~athedersoxz'alisten),including Wrner Sombart, and by others on the right of the SPD like Gomad Schmidt and Georg von Voilmar,
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 61
A radical faction known as "the youngsters" " i e Jungen) had also been ruthlessly suppressed for its attack on the party leadership from the "Le.'" Edrrard Bernstein, however, was the first to inaugurate a thorough critique of orthodox Marxism from inside the social dexnocratic mainstream. It is surely the case that he identified &Marxiantheory with what Kautsky and others of: his gerieration understood by it,.'-V~cmstc;jn'sconcern w a w i t h the Marxism of his time, This was no rnere acadernic or "marxolc~gical" controversy. It was at great political cost that Bernstein made his arguments, Indeed, supported by those with h r more opportunistic views than his own, he lost the support of genuine comrades Like K ~ u t s k y . ~ ~ Revisionism chalfenged the privileged status of both the working class and the socialist goali, Were it proven correct, not only would ~Marxismlose it would also becoi~eimpossible for its its stiperiority as a '"science,'"hrrt partisans to claim "'objectively" that socialism stood on the side of history But there were also practical matters. The labor nnovennellt was undergoing a profound transf(>rmation. Truly9a sect had turned into a party. Not only was it becoming inextricably linked to a burgeoning trade union movement, the SPD was also generating an internal bureaucracy to ftzcilitate organizational activities and create jobs for its partisans.2' Bernstein" aapproach perfectly suited tl-ris growing constituency within the SPD. Indeed, the ultimate success of revisionism derived Less frtjm the fact that it better ascertained the ""real '"interests of workers than that it anticipated those that were becoming daminant within their political party, Influenced by the Fabians, who combined trade unioslist coslvictions with the sensibility of committed civil servants, Bernstein's thinking justified both the economic and antipolitical preoccupations of tl-re party bureauof the movement cracy and union officials, These included f u t ~ ~ leaders re like Friedrich Ebert, Karl Legien, and Gustav Nsske. They were m(>stlycareerists unconcerned with ideas and ideals, Even before World War X, which they enthusiastically supported, their views ohen conflicted with those of Bernstein. Nevertheless, the original revisio~list"doctrine soon Iost ali distinctness at the bands of his followers and was melted down with reactionary attitudes of all sc~rts."Zg Major figures like Viktor Adler, Heinrich Cunow, Parvus (Alexander Helphand), Georgi Plekhanav, Kautsky, and-a bove all-Rosa Luxexnburg attacked Bernsteil~during the revisionism debate. It is, however, partieularly useful to corzsider the arguments of August Bebel, He was an orthoQax Marxist and a bureaucrat who fed German social democracy for over a quarter of a century Behel was also essentially uninterested in theory. He was certainly utilitarian hi~nselfbut he sensed the practical das~gerposed by revisionism to the identity of the SPD and the coherence of its palkics. Thus, he could write:
62
* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
Tactics il't~istfit the conditions under which we live and struggle. That is generally recognized as a matter of course by t l ~ eparty as a whole . . . I can only remind you t>f Will~elrnLiebknecbt" drastic words: if necessary, change the tactics 24 times in 24 hours, Rut the eorlflict really lies over wl~cthcrin the given il-tonnent a different or changed tactic i s necessary, and ~tltimatelyhow far such a change should take hold, For there is something that should exist under any circumstances. The tactics must continually he directed towarcis a view of the basic assumptians (Crf.z~z~ris2txe) and goal of the party. . . . Far, if this is not done tlxn we must cease calling ourselves social democrats because we mzest thcn call oursclvcs social Liberals frorn that point or1.29
The self-evident superiorit). accorded Eduard Bernsteids positiorl today was not quite so self-evident when the Hannover Congress csnvened in 1899. Revisionisrn was formally condemned. Few believed that the proposed shift in ideology would actually benefit the party, The controversy over "immiseration," for example, appeared as intellectual hairsplitting given the poverty of the proletariat. As far as the growth of that class was concerned, moreover, the real issue far most party members was whether support for the SPD was increasing-and it was. Also, even if Bernstein were correct about tl-re role of credit in curbing crises, Marx and his foflowers had always said that breakdown would result frorn a worldwide conflagration caused bp imperialist policies and war rather than simply through an economic collapse.3@ Even inore importantl Bernstein" call for class compromise probably seemed more utopian than the future possibilit). of a proletarian revolution, His warnings against antagonizing the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie (lllit;eelszand) must have sounded strmge indeed give11 the iron support those classes extended to a regime that had no intention whatsoever of itlstit~~ting a real parliamentary democracy." No less than Kaiser Wilhelm, who maintained his belief in the "divine right of kings" a d would not step foot in the Reichst~g,everyone knew that-----withouta profound transfc~rm a t i o n t h e f13D would continue to exist as a state within the state, Consequently, whatever the problems with IVarxian theory, the vast majority of the SPD thought it absurd to abandon a standpoint that had inspired the entire European working class for over a generation.32 Despite the formal defeat, however, substantive victory loo~nedon the horizc-m. ft is douhtt;ll wlaether Eduard Bernsteill would have enjoyed his triuxnph. He may have disagreed with his ortl-rodox friends about the impending revolution. He may have assumed that a linear development of socioeconomic reforms had already supplanted the need for contesting the barriers of capitalist society, He may have sought to identify socialism with the liberal welfare state and the yuest fi>r reforms with a technocratic populisrn. But, he was still part of a mtlvernent in which, following 1848, the
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 63
belief in democracy had been fused with a socialist vision of capitalist transformation, fndeed, until the end, Bernstein would support '"the general social development and a specific movement of the working class."j"
Ethics and Compromise Eduard Bernstein was persotlally committed to placing primacy on improving the economic interests of workers, But the truth is that his theory Lzndermined the notion of class and, perl-raps more important, provided nothing that could seriously substitute for class consciousness. His ethical undertaking combined a vague humanism with democratic and egalitarian sentiments, Bernstein rlever forwarded anything iike a cfass ideal capable s f articulating the coxnmon interests of working people, rendering all social institutions accountable, and resisting the increasingly instrumental logic of the party apparatus. fndeed, he was rlever concerned with the problems ideological disillusionmetlr might pose for tl-re movement or the role internationalism might play in the struggle against capitalism, TTelec,lcjgical grlarantees had previoustp rendered such matters more or less irrelevant." "~1st activists believed that the Longed for socialist "'futwe was appearing as prewnt," employing the phrase of Wilheim Liebknecht, and that there was no need for an independent ethic, Austro-Marxists would later highlight its importance." In 1898, however, ethics was stilt essentially the preserve of a neo-Kantian intelligentsia with mots in buhemia and the acaidet~y." krnstein introdt~cedthe theme into Marxism and thereby raised a host of normative questions for socialist tl~eoryto answer, BLlt he never developed the epistemological foundations of his ethic any more than the logic informing it or the different purposes it might serve. Eduard Bernstein expressed tl-re philosoghicai predilections of most revisionists by calling upon socialists to ""give up cant and return to Ka~1t.''-~7 His intent was obviously to preserve the critical, rationalistic, and liberal heritage of this enlightenment tl-rinker. In a deeper sense, however, his understanding of Kant has usually been misconstrued. Against other Kantian socialists of his generation like Max Adler, or Kurt Eisner, or Gustav Landauer, Bernstein demanded that socialists embrace tl-reskeptical-rather than the radical ideal&$-strain within the great phiIosopherSs thought. Only fater in fife, when his influence had waned, would Bernsteir~beco~ne interested in a transcendent standpoint to guide the individual subject in making political chc~ices. Bernstein's immediate aim was to invoke, using the terms of Kant, "pure" rather than "practical" mason. Only the empirical realm comprehended by the natural sciences, according to Kant, defines what can be known with any degree of certainty, And so, especially give11 the !lack of
64 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
empirical verification far rnany of Marx3 most important claims, Berllsteill called upon genuil-re materialists to reject all structural postulates that, like the labor theory of value, seemed entar~gledin the "tripwires of Qialectics.""3 Or, putting it another way, Bernstein sought t a maintain the integrity c>f empirical knowledge-if not empiricism proper since he always accepted causality-by preventing the intrusion of what he considered "metaphysics" into the realm of ""skence." His confrontation with orthodox ~Marxismwas, precisely in this sense, an example of critical phiiosophy, Thus, in keeping with the positivistic assumptiorzs of his time, he could write: '" propose a fundamental division between science and assumption, knowledge and inclil-ration (volition), and immanent and televlogical necessity-terms that are continw,usiy being cc~nfusedin socialist literature."40 Bernstein" ethics was derivative from the beginning. He justified a politics of partnership because "an econt->micas welt as a moral (rechtll'ches)relationship is thereby expressed,'"""~ he said little about which "partner" has the ability to define what gaals. Socialism became one political project among many Eliminating not only teleology but, in principle, all speculative categories from the investigate inquiry made it impossible for him to ernploy any structural referent for claims regarding exploitation or disenfrar1chisement.42 bb(3Lass"thereby lr~stits normative connotation; it became stripped of any connection with class consciousness, Bernstein was quite clear when he lloted that class is "a socio-economic concept based solely upon objective economic and bdicial characteristics,"""" Fragmentarion of the class into its constituent strata pursuing their own economic interests and legal remedies, while searching for other forms of subjective identification, lies at the heart of his de5nitiorz.M The way in which the class conflicts informint5 a structure of production helps constitute the workings of society is simply ignored. He offered no way of speaking about hc~wclass relations are created, manipulated, or reproduced; the totality disappears."" But the skeptic still had his illusions, Bernstein eqtrated the discrete economic reforms achieved under capitajism not merely with mitigating the of a whip of the market, hut with the ""organic growrth'~iliri;r?einwachse socialis alternative," It was the same with dem~xracy:he did not simply call far a republic, but klleved that the reprtblic would ultimately lead to a decelitraiization of power and a new form of: democracy.47 The connection between ends and rneans upon which Bernstein insisted was, in his own case, much less tight than he wished to believe. The gap between them was overcsme by surreptitious!y introducing a notion of progress that, while standing beyond empirical verification, remained as optimistic and linear as that of any orthodox Marxist." KO Joess than the deacons of orthodox)r, but without the power of their teleology, Bernstein essentially maintainecl that
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 65
one reform would generate another, tl-rereby gradually bringing about the sc~cialistsociety, Socialism would be introduced piecemeal into a capitalist society through the legislative redistribution of wealth. This goaX, in his view, made it incumbent upon the SPD to compromise with other organizations representing other nonproletarian classes and strata. The point for Bernstein was to garner support from as xnany quarters of society as possible far as many legislative reforms as possible. Thus, the empirical. understanding of class engendered a politics of "'partnership'3redicated on the achievement of incremental reforms througl-r calculable cornpro~nises with the party as baker, Compromise takes priority over a n y ideological sense of class interest and, if only for this reason, the party trtust transform political into economic, ideological into bureaucratic, and structtirat or long-term into contingent short-term concerns, The political role of the masses becomes ever smaller, ""Experts'Yncreasingly make the complex decisions fc3r an organization that attempts to unite divergent interests on instrumental or utifitrtrian grounds. The revisionist theory renders all interests reconcilaHe, in principle, and therefore strips them of any ideological attachirtents. This general way of thinking would indeed inform the u a n s f r m i o n of mainstream social demc~cracy:its abandonment of the symbols traditionally connected with the lahor movement and its concern with balancing the needs of workers with those of capital or the nation. Reformism shields itself from criticism by those concerned with the implications of ""rrade-oifs,"4' the loss of a xnoral high ground, and the manner in which sl-rort-term gains can produce Long-term tosses. Such issues simply cannot he raised from within the logic of revisionism. Its philosophical skepticism, its assault on sgecufatiorl and structure, provides the activist with a self-serving dogma. Since ultimate goais cannot be employed to evaluate instrumental means, a tautology results in which compromise assumes a transcendent value in its own right, Heirnut Schmidt put the matter bluntly: "each citizen must he capable of consenting to an orderly procedure of conflict settlement by compromise. We must be prepared to accept the loss of stringency a n 3 consistency which goes with that. For: no peace without comproxnise."j0 There is nothing wrong with this statement by the hrmer chancellor of Gemany: it would be absurd simply to reject any form of co~rtpromiseon any isstie. The problem lies only in what Schmidt neglected to say and what is hardly ever addressed: perhaps the individual must be prepared not just to accept compromise but, under certain conditions, also prove capable of raising principled objections to comproxnise. Condexnning radicals fur their idealism, or their lack of pragmatism, has always been easy. It is more difficult for utilitarian reformers to provide a normative justification fclr what is often
66 * Edaard ljer~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
cowardice and sheer opportunism. These words should not imply a rejection c>f that commitment to "activity in the present" (Cegenwar~arbez't)upon which Bernstein and his fc~llwersprided themselves, Without the irttroduction of the ends compromise should serve, however, political decisiomaking becomes defined arbitrarily. It secures those who actual!y make the decisions from anything other thari the instrumental criticism embraced by the unreflective reformer in the first place. It is legitimate, however, for socialists to consider whether any particular co~rtpromiseaids in achieving further gains in the futwe.q"They have the obligation of raising questions regarding whether tl-re cornpromise in question will build rather than impede future forms of class solidarity. Current events have not preserved them irom deciding whether any given policy might strengthen, using the told forlnulatiori of Marx, the ""political econorny of capital" or the "political economy of labor." In judging a compomise, moreover, socialists cannot simply refuse to ask whether other courses of action were possible at the time. That Iiving standards of the working class have risen does nor eradicate this type of concern. Xt does not prove that more radical alternatives were unavailable any more than that movemerits of the frrture must follow the opportunistic tactics of the present.5" An ideology of comprorrtise results from the unwillhgness to deal with concerns of this sort, This ideology is predicated on an unexairtined origigal compromise illto which the instruxnenral reformer has entered even before any particular grievance has been opened to adjudication. The original co~rtprornisestands beyond any give11tactic, Jt defines both an attitude and a style: the attitude of a Lobbyist and the style of a tecl-rnocrat. Contemporary social democrats are popuiarly seen as retaining this attitude and elllbodying this style, T t is thus unsurprisirtg that they shouId inspire so little trust. Kurt hcholsky beautifully satirized their ideology in the German context in his ""Songof Compromise": Let U S strike a Izttle comprt~mise It wozald be so very var3~nice On the (me hatzd-and the other. . . This kztz~iof tb71';1~zg /?as its appeal In CGarman34 for szdre, s&icces?ssLies itl the dad Let gas strike a ligrle coq2romise.
Eduard Bernstein's ethic would have profound implications for how he and his successors viewed the relatioll between party and base, Its inadequacies
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 67
opened the way for subverting what was still a tl-reory of socialist development into a self-serviq ideology far party regulars, Lacking practical criteria of ethical ~udgment,and a stance capable of takillg ideology and structure into account, reforms undertaken in the name of orgatlizational expediency would gradually assume the status of ends unto themselves. The orenization would now justify itself to itself: working people would ever more surely be ignored as a referent in decisionmaking. Increased participation harbored a threat not merely to the bureaucracy and its professionals, but also to the increasingly symbiotic connection between the reformist organization and the regirne &rough whicl-r reforms would be implemented. The virtual etimi~~atiun of the old socialist puhiic sphere in the years following World War II, when the new tendency truly began to dominate the movement, was only logical. Bernstein was candid in stating tl-rat: "only with a quite srnalt number can one propose or expect serious inclination far, and understanding of, endeavors which go beyond the inere amelioration of lahor.'"4 Revisionist politics denigrated ideological commitments in favt~rof utilitarian rationaliv from the start, Bernstein can even he seen as criticizing Marx and Engets not for being too materialistic or too economistic, but for not being materialistic or econornistic enough. He surely viewed the old boys as being still far too pretjccupied with issues of class consciousness and political revolution, Judging the utilitarian assumptions of Betnstc;in and his followers, if only for tl-ris reason, remains a matter of some importance, Their thinking had little to say about the aljure of nationalism though it took the nation-state fOr granted as the site for political activity The self-styled pragrnatisrn of Bernsteink followers, in the same vein, prevented them from understandinf, the Nazis and too often, in a difl'erent way, the various revoiutionar). or anti-imperialist movements of the Third World. Revisionism was the product of: a working class located in advanced nation-states that often harbored imperialist interests or designsers Certain of its advocates-if not usually Bernstein himself-dreamed of the short-term gains that would accrue to the industrial proletariat from supporting the imperialist foreign policies of their respective mtionstates." Such benefits were often justified by making reference to the "national interest" a r spoutil~gnonsense similar to Kipling's thoughts cm the "white man's burden," Many revisionists objected.. But utilitarian lt~gic makes it difficult to counter the prospect of economic benefits with normative claims, Neither the original revisionists nor their followers have ever beer1 able to understand the strivings - for national self-determinatiw or gain adherents among tl-re masses wllo languished under the colonial yoke. Even with the rise of: globalization during the last quarter of the twentieth century> and the growth of trmsnational organizations, they
68
* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
l-rave contributed virtually nothing to developing a new and appropriate notictn of internationalism or deepenkg the ideologicai commitment to these new institutior~s, Perhaps it is true that people will struggle for noneconomic gains only under exceptioilal circumstances; it would be absurd to discount the importance of ecsnrrmic motivations it? analyzing events. But these exceptional circumstances seem to present thexnselves again and again, It is not merely a matter of pointing to the idealism behind the mass strike of 1905 in Russia or the aaltruis~rt,of those who fought in the Spallish Civil %r. More is involved than insisting upon the selflessness of many who journeyed south during the Civil Rights movement in ""freedom summer" (or who demonstrated in rfianallmen Square and Eastern Europe during 1989, There is something basic at stake, It is a matter of recsgniaing ilz princzpk the limits of economic calculation and tl-re role of ideology and normarive commitment in shaping political action, History is richer than the one-sided utilitarian assumptions of revisicrnists and tl-reir xnodern followers, Because tl-re ""fdamental tendency of all htxreaucratic thc~ughtis to turn all problems of politics into problems of administrati0n,"57 however, the appropriate sense of richness dissolves into an instruxnental cynicism." Truly9 the absence is the presence in an argument that amounts to little more than a self-fulfilling pmphecy. Any ideological activity thereby becomes ""irrationaf" and a closed systeErt, results from wllat was originally construed as an exercise in critical pl-rilosophy:sq the attack upon ideology itself becsmes ideologicaf. Eduard Bernsteill was right, SociaIism is in desperate need s f an ethic, Precisely because the utilitarian elements of his Irrgic contest tl-re use of specuiative judgment, however, he was ultimately never able to provide one, great phrase that the workUndoubtedly, he sincerely believed in IAassalle3s ing class is ""re rock on which the church of the present should be built." Nevertheless, Bernstein's conception of ""ethicai socialism left a legacy of ~lncertaintyabout which faith the priests should embrace and whose god they should serve.
An Excursus: Ministerialism, Participation, and Opposition That uncertainty would only increase as the socialist movement became ever more directly confronted with the qriestion of pawer. Its growth, both organizationally and nuxnericall3.; xnade such a confrctncarion inevitableand raised a new set of issues, Out of powet; and without serious legislative or bureaucratic influence, party activists initially found it easy to inaintain
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 63
that the interests of the organization were identicai with those of its disenfranchised base and that the rights for which the proIetariat was fighting nationally were reaily urliversal in character, Nevertheless, the prospect of actually participating in a governmental cabinet-not to speak of ruling a nation-called all this into questioi~, Participaticrn at any price remailts the rallying cry of the political hack white stubborn preoccupation with doctrinal purity excuses the refusal to take ~sponsibilityfor actualizing a program, ir becomes a matter of balancing different commitments and developkg criteria reffarding the legitimacy of participation at any particular time, There is subsequently surnething useful about considering a crucial event in the history of the Second Inter~~ational. Indeed, the "i211iflerand Affair" provides a compressed exampie of a cruder farm of revisionism and its implications for the socialist movement, During the Dreyfus Affair, against the traditional appositional and antibourgeois sentiments crf orthodctx Mafxists like Jules Guesde,"hhe wellknown socialist politician Alexandre Millerand was asked to join a guvernmental coalition beaded by Renk Waldeck-Rousseau.. Justihing his actions by a generally perceived atrthcrritarian threat to the Third Republic, Millerand entered the Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet in 1899 without a mandate and without permission from his party. His political fears fc~rFrench democracy were surely legitimate and he probably felt that joitling the government would give him the chance to implement certain labor-protection laws-which it did, General Gaston de Gallifet, however, also received a post in that s m e cabinet, Simply sitting across the table from the ""butcher" of the Parisian Gommunards was insulting to the memc-~ryof these revolutionary martyrs, That insult was only compounded when the VValdeck-Rousseau government chose to conclude an alliance with an arch-reactionary R~issiawhose czar, in an ironic twist, wound up decorating the embarrassed socialist Millerand, while workers de~nonstratedoutside. The governEnent of Waldeck-Roussea u was indeed marked by bloody strikes and dernonstrations: there was even one to commemorate the rising of the Communards in which a number of workers were killed. Millerand was, naturally, forced to share responsibility for the actions of his government, As even moderate socialists protested, the Wa]i&ckRousseau cabinet fell and the next regime began to undermine Millerand3 legislative achievements. Wacked by bitter dissension, the unity of the French socialist movement, laboriously achieved in 1904, w ~ ~ u be l d based on a f<>r~nal rejection of ""ministeriatisrn.'~~ for the inarl whose name would become sy nonymous with "oppartunism," he moved ever mare surely to the Right and, following World War I, became a founder of the reactionary "natio~talb k ~ c . ' ' ~ ~
TO
* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
Of course, it is impossiMe to predict the consequences of such a politicai tactic in advance, But the response of the Second International t o the Millerand Affair was quite interesting, Fofl~wingthe decisiorz of a French party congress, it condemned him while simultaneously passing a motionargued by Kautsky-that justified socialist participation in bourgeclis p v ernrnents under tznspecified exceptional circumstances. Bernstein's own position was not very different." It was only sensible. The door t a participatioil had been opened even if it could be shut at ally moment. But this said little about the ethical principle involved. The idea of Jemtrcratic socialism speaks to the connection between accountability and class sc~lidarityThese two values, of course, can conflict. But, usually, the concern for class solidarity stands in coherent relation with the commitmeilts to those democratic hrms that grtjtect workers and offer the powibility for organizing tl-rexn. Jean Jaurks employed tl-ris kind of thinking to link the cause of socialism with a defense of republican institutions in the Dreyfus Aifair.63 But the opposite holds just as well: Kautsky maintained that Miilerand was being ""used" by the class enemy because his actions unduly cornprornised the workershc~vements,The ambition and intransigence of Millerand not only tzndercut the discipline and identisrr of his party, but also served to furtlzer dissension and fragmentation within tlze international movement as a whole. Afexandre Mlterarxd tried pointing to historical csnditions and defending his actions in terms of orthodox Marxism. But the opportt~nistoutsmarted himself. This tactic prt>bahIy cost him the chance to serve as the most eminent symbol for international revisionism during his lifetime, But there is a sense in wtsich he ultimately trit~xnphedover Bernstein, Tlze Millerand Affair showed the strength of those among the revisionists who were willillg simply to seek power at any cost. It expressed the growing power of the political hack in social democracy tong before the outbreak of the First World War, As far as Rosa Luxemburg was csncerned, in fact, the Millerand Affair crystallized the confiict between those committed to the radical spirit of social democracy and the opportunist crtrrellt seekillg to conquer it, The Affair trtade ctear to her the difkrence between those intent tzyorr making "the independent political struggle of the socialist Party the permgent, f ~ n d a r n e ~ t aelement l and unity with b~urgeaisradicals the varyimg and incz'desztclll elernent'hax~dthose for whom "the alliance with the bourgeois democrats became the cclnstanz; and the independent political struggles the accidental elemeilt."64 Bernstein was mildly critical of the decision made by Millerand. But his irritation derived primarily from the unfortunate consequences of the affair, It was, fc~rhim, simply a "bad experience" frc,m~which it was dangerous to draw general conclusions."' Bernstein never actually dealt with the princi-
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 7 1
ples involved. The Millerand Affair indeed provides an insight into the weakness of his ethical perspective when obliged to deal with the temptations of instrumental action, Disregarding poiitical consistency and wltimate aims in the naxne of organizational exigencies can weaken the resolve of the movement and narrow the range of its future-. alternatives. The failed legacy of Lenin made this cleac In a very different way, however, social democracy would becoxne plagued by ttte same tendency, There is Little sense in contemporary sociaiists defining themselves by what they oppose, Simply ignoring existing social democratic or progressive parties will not rnake them go away. Those coxnxnitted to radical change cannot accept the alternatives of remaining inside or outside existing institutions and organizations, Better to begin thinking about new organizational possibilities and new sites fclr political action: the "mass association,""" in this vein, is neither a party in the traditional sense nor a mere coaiition reducible to the sum of interests composing it. Something like the "'Poor People's Movement32ounded by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., or the civic groups that were so important in the East European revolts of 1989, offer models a n which contemporary socialists can build. The organizational question is a trtatter not merely of techtlique, hut imagination. Ideas maccrr: the refusal to take principles seriously leads not only to the sunender of ultimate goals, but the progressive agenda as well, This development indeed marks the new sociaX democratic trends that have transbrmed the old revisionism into sornething alrnost unrecognizable.
hesent and Past Advocates of new social democratic trends like the ""tird way" or the "new middle" or what is now called ""pogressive governance," who took power dwing the 2990s in England and Germany, have turned what revisionists originaIly regarded as a necessity into a virtue. They view their enterprise as innovative atld offer a tlew point of departure for social dernucracy:h7 they wish to trtove "beyond left and right," They are tegitimately concerned with environmental devastation on the global plane. But they l-rigl-rligltt the pressures of glr~balizationand call for curtailing state intervention in the economy, rolling back public services, and reinvigorating "civil society'"% The end of the cold war, they believe, has put a new premiuxn on introducing bbefficiertcy"into the welfare state. This makes necessary a perspective bent upoil st>cializingthe costs and privatizing the benefits of public policy, Thus, the new social de~rtocratsseek to lessen their reliance upon the industrial working class and attract new support from the new social movements whose members are supposedly concerned less with economic issues than "lifestyle."
72 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
Proponents of tl-re tl-rird way, or what might better be terxned ;r.teoreul'sionism, embrace a mixed market-although less mixed and more market than in times past, They justify abandoning Iegislative attempts to constrairl multinational corporations. They also tend to overestimate the gains rnade by working people over the last decades, the ability of the market tu deal with environmental devastation, and the power of what Ult-ich Beck initially termed the ""suboalitics" "pursued by tl-re new social xnovements," The assault on designations like "left and right'" and the new preoccupation with eff-lciency legitimates the pursuit of new c s ~ ~ p r o m i s eand s a policics primarily directed towards ""yung upwardly mobile intetlectuals'kr ""yppies," This new trend indeed ignores the way in which the end of the cold war has enabled people to see the problems produced by the glolsal market and the need for new global remedies. Most striking is the lack of anything realty new in the new vision: the only difference between this neorevisic-lnism and its predecessor is the lack of emphasis upon the ecorromic interests of workers and the lack of corrcern with socialist goals, It should be clear by now that Bernstein was already intent a n transfoming a proletarian into a ""people" party" capable of representing a multitude of interests and, in principle, lifestyfes, He believed in the use of expertise and the need Ear ""eenter-lefi" alliances. The logic of his enterprise was, moreover, directed against ideology from the very beginning. The notion of a mixed economy in which priorities r-2nd interests were constantly shifiing was also apparent in Bernstein's thinking from the start, Indeed, ~ u s as t revisionists sought tc-,divorce the distribution n so they tried process fro^^ the prerequisites of the a c c u ~ ~ d a t i oprocess,70 to preserve the state from the pressures of class conflict. The state is the political arena in which conflict resolution over the distributiorz of public goods takes place. But the objective reality of capitalism does not vanish quite so easily, An imbalance of class power remains to which reformers would increasingly acquiesce in the process of fc~rmulating and then pressing their grievances. Such a course would be justified by eradicating a class perspective in favor of a liberal political framework, The liberal understanding, after all, views society as composed of abstract citizens with individual rights; T. H. Marshall could, in this respect, view the welfare state as tile most complete substantive expression of these rights. Bernstein would surely have agreed. The differences between liberal and socialist politics indeed became increasingly unimportant to him, Bernstein saw control over distri h~ztionas dependent upon the ability to wield legislative power. He also saw the achievement of such power as the product of eiectoral successes that are, in turn, determined bp the simple aggregation of individual voters and interests. This view assumes that voters drive the electoral prwess and that links between the state and capitalist elites are purely contingent in nature.71 In spite of the pressure empiri-
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 73
caj interests may exert," therefore, tl-re state is accorded a "neutral"\haracter, This makes it possible to assume that the capitalist state will allow for a sustained policy of socialist reform and the gradual "abolition of class contradictions. "73 Eduard Bernstein never explored the systemic limits to instrumental reform under capitalist democracy. Believirrg that the achievement of discrete economic reforms wifl h i l d the constituency of the social dexnocratic movement, and diminish the power of capital, he never considered what subvertirtg the political independence of the workers tnovement might imply far the future of social democracy, Unconcerned with the geowing fragmentation of workers brought about by changes in capitalism, and thc: rise of the acfrninistrativc state, it never occurred to him that the "'partners" c o d fzot have equal power due to a disparity of organizational resources and the structural imperatives of the existing production process, Indeed, whatever his genuil~edemocratic commitme.tlts, Bernstein never even assumed that &!l parliamentary democracy was riecessary for the introduction of socialisrn in the first place, Bernstein was correct in suggesting that the republican state is not simply subordinate to the empirical interests of capitalist elites. Only with a measure of neutrality, or ""relative autonaxny," can a state punish particular malkasants, protect civil liberties, and settle dispmes between classes or given sectors within any given class.% But he radically underestimated the dependence of the state upon its elites. Because capitalists retain private control over investment, on which employment is dependent, "the satisfaction of the interests of capitalists is a necessary condition for the satisfaction s f all other interests within the systexn."7Thus, though the state will not only serve the interests of capitalists in every instance, it will generally identify its irrterest wit h what may be deemed the collective capitalist interest, The revisionist logic cannoc call any of this into question and, especially in periods of economic downturn, workers pay the price. h r i n g these times the benefits of the welfare state are trtost necessary and relevant. Brtt it is precisely at tl-rese times that capital is most unwilliw to pay lor them. And this creates a terribie quandary. If the state is used to coerce capitai then the cry of totalimrianism arises; if it is not then the party must dasrtpen the radicalism ot its base m d higbligl-rt the needs of capital, Vacillation is the usual response, Employment depends upon the ability of capital to secure a steady rate of profit on investmerit and, without ir-rvestment, there will be no employment. Thus, the search lor policies capable of balancing the economic interests of workers with the need tt-, secure possibEe investmerit by capitalists-possible since, according to the logic of revisionism, capitai cannot be coerced, only cajoled. Capital usually has the final word-and this fundamentally influences what especially the mtlre timid reformers can derrtand. Even bolder reform-
74 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
ers will find it difficult to cut sharply into capitalist profirs on pain of capital flight: it was a lesscm learned L7itterty by Franqois Mitterrand when, following his electoral victory in 1980, he was forced to retract his promises of radical socialist refurrn in the face of capitalis disinvesrrnent. Short-term profits for capital. must be secured as the precondition for long-term growth-from which ""ctizens3kill hopefully benefit.7WChoosing not to seek control: over the business cycle or socialize investment, once the fongterm bill comes due in the form of a new ecoilomic downturn, the more instrumentaf rehrmers will most likely acquiesce when capital catls for the retraction of previous programs. The logic of revisionism anticipated the tactical acceptance of "'austerity'" or "fiscal responsibility" lung hefclre the introduction of the "third way." It envisiorled not onty a cessation of new demands, but possibly the rollback of old reforms as well. Neorevisionisrs have only radicalized this possibility in frxshioning a response to the pressures of globalization, the decline of the inrdustrial proletariat, and the new need for efficiency, They have narrowed the range of utility for state intervention and, in place of the division between left and right, they have turned the desire for a ""center-left" coalition nt illto a matter of principle. Anthony Giddens, the most i ~ n p ~ r t a theoretician of the ""tl-rird way," puts the matter succinctly wllen l-re writes: The egalitarianism of the aid left was noble in intent, but as its rightist critics say has soxlletirnes led to perverse consecjuences. . . . "Fhe welfare state, seen by mast as the core t>f social tlernocsratic politics, today creates almost as many problcxns as it re~olves.~7
But problems for whom? It has now becsme abundantly clear: progressive resistance agaix~stneorevisionism rests upon the commitment not merely to establish new reforms, bur also to reaffirm prior gains. Rosa Luxemburg was prescient in claiming that utilitarian reformers arc inherently engaged in a ""tabour of Sisyphs." Present exigencies can always require abandoning past gains and beginning the entire process of reform anew There is indeed something ironic that a thinker so influenced by teleological hopes of: her own should have been so poix~tedin seeing the teleological fallacy in the theory of her oppone11~. Little remains today from Bernstein's original belief in a steady growth of reforms whose cumulative impact will produce a socialist transformation of capitalism, Criticism of his thought does not rest, however, upon the simple rejection of reforms or refarmism, h depends instead upon contesting the refusal of neorevisionists to press the reformist agenda in a consistent fashion especially under conditions when workers must bear the brunt of economic downturn, Or, putting it another way, ironically, the critique
Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 75
of the revisionist lr~gicis ultimately directed against the Iaxity of its etl-ricai commitment to meaningful reform,
The End of Crisis Eduard Bernstein predicated his theory of evolutionary socialism on the assumption that capitalism had c>vercomeits crisis character?K In this be was obviously incorrect, Even ignrtring cataclysmic evelits like the great depression of 1929, or periods ol capitalis reorganization like the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ~ ~ smaiier recessions have continued to take place at an alarming rate since 1898. It is one thing to reject clairns that capitaiisrn is inevitably heading towards a breakdown and quite another to maintail? that fluctuations of the business cycle-or periodic crises-are inere aberrations of an essentially sound system. There is, however, some question about whether Bernstein caricatured the concept of ""crisis'"~?iy viewing it in terms of a preordained ecmoxnic breakdown," Thus, the importance of examining his views on the rnatter more closely, Xt should be stated from the outset: there is a certain naivete in believing that crises are necessarily unwelcome occurrences for the capitalist systexn. During such times, of course, the majority of the population suffers-and the weak suffer the most. But this does not imply that all segments of capital, or even the collective capitalist interest, will suffer either at all or in the same way. Periods of economic downturn can open new possibilities for clearing the market, reducing wages, rationalizing competition between firms, realizing xnergers, and so on. In fact-, using the terminology of Hegel, a periodic crisis can appear as the momentary self-negation of the capitalist system that allows accumulation to recommence on a new plane. It is also mistaken to believe that growtil always allies the interests of capitalists and workers. modern global expansioil has rendered big business increasingly mobile and, under the threat of capital flight, workers have been called upon to hear reductions in benefits offered by the welfare state. It is today a yuestion of whether an ethics intent upon resisting increasing economic inequalit). m d growing fragme~itationaEBong the exploited will make reference to structural confiiccs of interest and employ a revamped notion of class+jr a class ideal-in its philosophical framework. Neorevisiollism employs the instrumental, logic of times past, but directs it against the slogans and concerns of a reformism committed to furthering the interests of worker-s. Its proponents understand that the national paradigm of their predecessors has beer1 supplanted and many of thern support the transnatianal institutions emerging in Europe and elsewllere as well as the United Nations, But their instrumental logic prevents thern from fc~ster-
76 * Edaard ljer~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism
ing tl-re development of an internationalism capable of contesting glr~balization. Echoing the global needs of capitai, supporting only the creation of yet another alienating hweaucracy, neorevisionists find themselves countenancing precisely those periodic crises whose effects their particular constituency fears the mt~st. Utilitarian reformers have always beer1 willing to exchange social stability for any form of utoyim experimentation and future gains for immediate concessions, Conservative social democrats took part in crushing workingclass movements horn belr>w like the Spartacus Rebetlion of 191 9 and, on occasion, even chase to abandon their decnucratic principles entirely as in the case at- Paul Faure and the majority of French socialists who accepted the Vichy regime of 1940. But the logic t.f revisionism does ntjt necessarily h v o r one x~otionof refc)rm over another. It instead seeks to understand every decision simply as an ad hoc response to a given situation. Just like any other fmm of organized practice, however, even the revisionist logic surreptitiously retains a guiding principle. This princigfe ultimately has Xittie to do with extending political democracy or even insuring the best possible deal for any set of constituents. It is defined by something else: a dogmatic csncern with achievirlg the best possible conditions for furthering tl-re instrumental practice of tl-re particular organization in question. Such indeed is the hidden interest within what appears as a purely pragmatic form ~f anti-ideological politics, Eduard Bernstein initially contributed to dispelling the illusions of a Marxian teleology that hindered reformist politics even as it iacked any revolutionar)i role to play. While rejecting its "fixed and finished" 'system, however, he ~znwittinglycreated a new one that-in its own terms-became just as fixed and just as finished, This system eliminates the structural contradictions throrigh which capitalist society sustains itself and thereby leaves them as they are. It ultirntltely renders issues of class power irrelevant and, even more importantly$ absolves the organization from any responsibility regardTTh sptem permits 0nly irlstruing the g ' c t ~ n s ~ i ~ ~Of~ sitsn ct~nstituency, e~~" mental criticism of instrurnental concerns and thereby, perhaps unwittingly, fosters the political identity crisis that has plagued the labor movement throughorit the last half of the ~ e n t i e t hcentury. -Indeed, if only for these reasons, contemporary socialists must confront not only the old dogmas, but the new ones as well.
Leninism and Beyond
Leninisrn has surrendered: its supporters l-rave been dispersed and its victims curse them from their graves. Its integrity has been withdrawn and its q p e a l has been destroyed. The abject failure of the communist experiment makes it itiffic~lltto imagine the rBasses it inspired, the sacrifices it received, the moral capital it once possessed, the reverence accorded its leaders, and the utopian hopes it inflamed, Wc~rldhistory has reildered its judgment: T&eninismis a thing of the past, Especially in the postcornmunist climate, however, it is important to bring balance and a sense of historical perspective into our view of events, Questions regarding the connection between Lenin and his heirs, and whether the entire undertliking could have t~trrtedout differently, are still worth asking, The difficult transition of communist into parliamentary states is aiso better understood when the mariner in which the Soviet &ion was transformed from an authoritarian into a totalitarian, and then back into an authoritarian, state are taken into account, The implications deriving from the disintegratiol~of the communist experiment, its ethical and practical costs, l-rave still not been fully grasped by many on the Left. Leninism was as much a product of the collapse of orthodox Marxism as revisionism. But it privileged the political over the social revolution, the party over the trade unions, and the ""mission" over the empirical character of the proletariat, Leninism was the mirror image of revisionism. Two organizational views squared off against one another, A ""dictatorshipof the proletariat" confronted tl-re bourgeois republic, Communist revolution contested a politics of socialist refc~rmwith little to offer those languishing in the colonial territories. Mc>ral relativism opposed a vague universafism. Indeed, nu less than revisionisxn, Leninism expressed more than the rnere quest for power and more-. than a set of contingent responses to unique historical circumstances.
Leninisrn confronted tl-re old-fashioned ""sage theory" of history with a new voluntarism, It projected a politics of will powered by an ethical commitment to the basic elemerits of the class ideal: radical democracy, social justice, and internationalism. Equating tl-rese values with their own interests and ignoring the need lor institutional accountabifitb howevet; the communists squandered the colisiderable moral capital they inherited from their role in bringing about the Russian Revolutian, Understanding this development calls for moving beyond what Simone de Beauvoir termed '"he force of circumsrance," reconsidering forgotten alternatives, and reconstructing the bond between tl-reory and practice, This begins with the vanguard party whose embodiment of ""rue" rrevulutionary consciousness turned it into the substitute for the proletariat as the agerit of history. The new party was organized to assure discipline, secrec)i and flexibility in the b c e of economic backwardness and severe political repression, h t its "dem~craticcentralist" form of decisionmaking, which called for public ~znanimityon the part of all members on all matters, harbored a presentiment of what was to corne, Lenin felt himself justified in treating all opponents-whether socialist or not-in a totally instrumental and expedititxts manner and this same Iogic would later be ernployed against critics of the new regirne and rivals of its leader witli far more drastic consequences. Indeed, the same Iogic initially used to make and then preserve the Russian Revolution annihilated the possihilir). of realizing its goals. Dictatorship was introduced in the hope of instituting a more radical form of democracy, Ecoxiomic justice was undertakexi on the basis of ""pimitive socialist accuxnulation," but with an eye on the robust rnodern society of: the future, Even "'socialism in one country" initially reflected more despair over the failure of revulutiorzary hopes in the afrermath of the first world war tl-ran an abandonment of revolutionary aspirations, But the means abolished the ends: the internatic>naistruggle against capitalism was co~~promised and '"socialist'kconstruction became identified with the most barbaric forrns of modernization. The cornrnunists were ultimately left without any purpose other than the perpetuation of their owil dictatc3rs h i p a n d so, were ethically rudderless, Different policy cl-roices made during the 1920s could l-rave prodtlced something other than a '"totalitarian" regime in the 1930s, just as diCferent policy choices in the 1980s could have prevented the disintegration of tfze USSR in the 1 9 9 0 ~Only ~ the party, L~owever,was in the position to make those choices; the victorious Bolsheviks crushed all movements and institutions capable of contesting their understanding of socialism or providing institutional checks upon thern. With the party in the saddle, once tl-re irrtplications of ""democratic centralism" had been radicalized, the organiza-
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tional theory invented by Lenin could be used against all attempts to limit the power of Stalin, This indeed would produce a qualitative rupture in what otherwise seems a logical develop~nent:life within the party, its more eqerirnental policies, its use of terror, its propaganda, and its aims were all trailsformed. There was illdeed a shift from Lenitlism to Stalinism. Just as Stalin liquidated the racjical meaning of Leliinisrn while still ernploying it for legitimacy, however, his successors sougle to distance tl-remselves from him without fully breaking with the system be had. dominated. The militant style, the turgid propaganda, and even the fear deriving from the uninhibited exercise of arbitrary power all began becoxning increasingly obsolete following the death of Stalin, In seeking merely to reform all this, however, the communist regime Lost its original ""revolutionary privilege>" which Stalin desperately sought to retaitl, and opened itself to comparison with other socialist nations. A spirit of malaise and corruption increasingly took hold. This spirit would indeed hasten the collapse of the USSR and, with the riew iniflenniurn, aiso leave its mark on the new Russia,
Underdevelopment and Revolution Despite its glittering literary tradition, turn-of-the-centw Russia was a provincial backwater, shrouded in religious mysticism and illiteracy*Its secret police was notorious throughout the civilized world and, as various works like the Autobiography of Maxim Gorky so graphically portra yed, the most terrible misery burdened the vast majority. The peasantry had only been freed from seddom in 1863 and, though foreign investment was spurring industrialization in isolated cities, imperial Russia still Iagged behind the West politically artd economically The country lacked a proletariat and a trade union movexnent along with a bourgeoisie informed by the democratic values of the Enlightenme~ltclr the French Revt~lution,And so, while Wstern social demtrcracy was predicated on the existe~iceof a gen$$il.telabor rnovement inhrrned by the liberai legacy of the bourgeoisie, communism was not, Therein lies perhaps the most prt>fc~undreason for the tragic defc2rmation of the Russian Revolution,l Revtllution was, in Dct, a mere speculative possibility when the Russian Social Demc-~craticParty (RSDP) was formed in 1898, Recognizing they were stuck within a sernikudal context, most inernhers of the RSDP attempted to draw the practical consequences of ortl~odoxMarxism and its stage theory of history. This view essentially claimed that capitalism must reach its productive limit befcjre the proletariat can bring about a revolution. The majority of the RSDP tl~usconcluded that the party should foster bc~urget-,isdevelopment and, in order to mitigate its worst effects, trade
union activity axnong the proletariat, Inspired by a specuiative befief in " h e actuality of revof utioil," "2hile also embracing the theory of orthodc~x Marxism, Lenin headed the opposition. Barn into a middfe class family in 1870, Lenin was sixteen when his brother Alexander was hanged for his participation in a plot tu assassinate the czar-. Admitted to Kazan Universit?; where he planned to study law, he was expelled for taking part in a student demonstration, This led him into revolutionary circles and he began the systematic study of Marxism. E-fe t in radical circles when he published a was already ;l. p r o ~ ~ i n e nfigure Marxist attack on anarchism, "What the Triends of the 13eoplehre . . . 'a (1894) and, by 1895, he had been arrested for organizing workers in St. Petershurg, While in Siberian exile, Lenin wrote The Deuelopment of Capitalism irr Russia ( f 8991, which claimed only a bourgeois and demc~cratic revolution would prove possiHe in the near future given the econamic backwardrless of Russia. Economic determinism marked Lenin's early studies on Russian economic development and the diminishing role of the peasantry, His Materz'alhm and Empiria-Criticism ( 2 908), written in order to combat an empiricism and an irrational b r m of idealism enjoying brief popularity in the Iabor movement, exl~ibitedeven stronger traits of ""vulgar1Varxism.""' But his tt~inkingalways sought to link the real with the ideal: the tactical response to existillg conditions was always strategically formulated with a specific revot utionary purpose in mind. After ernbarking upon a study of Hegel while living as an exile in Zurich, in fact, he expticitly stated that ""ltelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialisxn,""4ntiII 1917, hc~wever,most considered Lenin little more than a particularly crude and sectarian adherent of orthodox Marxism. E-fe was late in recognizing that what r~atteredwas ultimately Iess the level of economic development in a nation than its revolutionary potential. Only in 1917 would Lenin embrace the idea of a "'permanent revolution," which had been developed in 1905 by Trotsky 61116 Akxander Helphand (who was known as Yarvus),s and insist that the proletariat must seize pc-~wer* Lenin held Kautsky in high esteem until 1914. He praised him in various works including What Is 7% Be Do~ze.5Lenin learned from Kautsky that no intrinsic connection exists between fostering bourgeois economic conditions, or furthering trade union activity, and creating the prerequisite political consciousness frw overtllrowing the r~onarchyand ushering in a republic. He, too, reached the conclusion that ignoring the qualitative difference between economic gains and political power would inevitably result in reformism. Lenin never simply rejeaed the use of parfiar~entary tactics and he usually supported dernands for higller wages, shorter hours, and improved workillg conditions. He knew that a revolutionary movement could not grow simply by feeding the masses dreams of uttrpia. In
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keeping with Kautsky, he ernphasized that such tactics and dexnands are not ends unto themselves, With even more certitude than the radicals in Western Europe, moreover, Lenin believed that the prospects for meaningful reform were no greater than the possibilities for revolution in the Russia of 1902. Marx and Engeis had already stated in The Comml~utzstManifesto that, before any revolution could take place, a part of the ruling class must "'break off"" and lain the oppressed. Lenin appropriated their insight and highlighted the need for radical action even in the face of objective constraints. He knew that the authors of the Matzifesto had kept tl-reir eyes cast upon the French Revolution while writing it. Marx and Er-tgels were aware that 1789 did not take place in the nation with the strongest bourgeoisie of the timel It was subsequently logical for Lenin tct interpret the importarxcr: of revolutionary acrion in tile face of objective constraims, employing a group of disaffecred inrellecruals to instill the requisite consciousness into the masses, and perhaps even establish a proletarian version s f an 'kedncational dictatorship,'" Lenin would indeed place his own revolutionary aspiratioils in coherent relation with those of the French Revolution and, in this vein, he csuld even view his communists as "Jacobins inseparably finked to the proletariat.'' Lenin was convinced that the weak bourgeoisie of: imperial Russia, whose m m b e r s were mostly supportive of the imperial r e g h e , would prove unwilling and unable to carry through the revolution by itself, A revofutiorlary undertaking in an econt>micalllybackward natioil would invt>lve not merely the bourgeois and proletarian classes, according to Lenin, but also the peasants and even elements of the antisocialist middle strata. Or putting it another way, following the basic idea of Marx and Engels in 1848, Lenin essentially sought a bourgeois revolution that would lay the groundwork for an attack upon the bourgeoisie.7 Solidibing a revolutionary alliance of ctasses with sbviousl y confticting concerns while still giving primacy to proIetarian interests, in his view, required a ""party of a new type.'?erhaps it would prove possible for such a party, after shifting class alliances from thtjse employed during the first bourgeois phase of the revolution,bo lead the proletariat into the second socialist phase. In any event, however, Lenin considered the European model of an open demc-~craticlabor party with loose rules h r admission si172pIy i n a p p r o p r i ~ efor coordinating underground resistartce in a huge ernyire with a ferocious secret police. Only a centralized a d disciplined vanguard of '"rc~fessional revolutionary intellectuals" could prove capalzle of securing secrecy in a far-flung orgmization, maintairting lines of cornmunication, coordinating political activity, distributing illegal propaganda, and preservi~~g the revolutic,nary goal during nonrevolutionary periods,
Lenin" '""arty of a new type" was not merely a product of Rkissian conditions. His innovation reflected what was becoming a more general European preoccupation: the turn of the century was marked by ii~odernist avant-garde groups like the fauves, the expressionists, and the lutkirists no less than the explosion of "elite theory" "generated by thinkers like Rvberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto. The organizational theory of Lenin was also influenced by controversies taking place within the Second International, The criticisms leveled at Eduard Bernstein and his followers during the revisionism debate were directly relevant to Lenin's own orthodox criticisms of the Mensheviks in the organizational controversy of li902,9 This was the context in which Lenin formulated his most radical claim. Consciousrzess must be brought to workers from the outside: "The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness.""'" Kautsky wouid surely have endorsed the idea and perhaps even Eduard Berr~stein.In colltrast to them, however, Lenin was willing to draw the conclusions from his insight for a revolutionary politics. The party must not only inject the requisite consciousness into the proletariat from ""outside" kits ranlks,l1 but serve as the only agent of the revolutionary enterprise, It must link "empirical" with "'utopian" interests, and shoulder the responsibiIity for ""imputing" the level of revolutionary conscit>usness among workers in any historical circumstance in the hrmation of yolicy.12 Lenin wanted as centralized and disciplined an organization as possibte, His ~znderstandingof class struggle was in terms (of an almost military notion of class war. Party members should be ahfe to fight for their positions within the organization, at least in principle, hut they would have to support the "party line" in public. He erivisioned the party as a pyralllid composed of cells organized in a hierarchical manner: crucial decisions would be made at the top and advice would rise up from the bottom, The very reasons that led him to invent his particular organizational mt~delalso fed him to subordinate tl-re individual to the party and ignore democratic procedures, Lenin meant to "revise" 'Marxism in order to deal with the political underdevelop~~e~lr rather than employ it as a problems raised by eco~~omic fixed and finished system, He must surely have believed, no less than Bernstein, that his critics were the dogmatists. It was with a certain prophetic quality, however, that Trstsky criticized his future comrade's bcst~bstitutioniscn"": ""Lenin" methods lead to this: the party organization (the caucus) at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself far the (organization; and finally a single Qicta torhsubstitutes l-rirnsellfor the Central Committee. 3 Lenin believed he couId substitute the vmguard for the working class as the agent of revolution because he believed that their interests were identi"
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cai, Identifying agency and "true" consciousness with the party, however, renders the base indeterminate and turns it into little more than a ""vac~lurn."" Since any class or combination of classes can ultimately serve as the foundation for the new organizalional agmt of revoluti~n,the vanguard can be used far an); end, There is ultimately nothing "'Marxist" about it, Qne revolutionq goal can easily be substituted for another given a shifc in the balance of class forces and party needs. Fascists and religious zealots along with representatives from any number of other viewpoints s to employ the notion of a ""vanwould incieed all find t h e ~ ~ s e l v eable guard"' with xnuch prof"it. Lenin may have sought to make the party responsive to the masses: he even opened it to new members in moments of crisis like 1 f l 7 and 1921.15 The proletariat was also originally used as its point of reference, But the party always had the final word. Qcrescions of institutional accountlzbilicy and the dangers of democratic centralism were never given their due, The ""rvolutionary privilege" 'of the party was seen as resting on its embodiment of b'tr~ef'consciousness, Any coxnpeting political organization or institmion was always considered an expression of ""false consciousness" by definition-no matter what its function or empirical support from the working class. Indeed, from the first, tire Bolsheviks felt themselves entitled to deal with their oppnents In terms of plitical expediency rather than fro117 the standpoint of what was then known as ""revolutionarytolerance.'" Leninisxn never had any room for reciprocity or universal tlnderstandings of ethics. Ethical commitment to a "categorical imperative of revolution" may have infc~rmedLenin's notion of the vanguard party.16 But issues of fegality or illegaiicy,f7 truthfullless 0r lying, violence or nonviolence, were rendered contingent from the start, A difference In style, or what Leon Blrrrn would later call ""an incompatibility of feeling and morality," sseyarated the Balsheviks from all otl-ter socialist movements. Their tone, their arrogance, and their invective were fmeign to European socialists. They developed a distillct idetitity that had a profound effect on the meaning they would ascribe to socialism. TI-reir befief in tl-re party was exaggerated and unquestioning. The subservience of the individual to the party was based on trust in its missi~~n, and trust was seemingly enrjugh. Lenin was a student of the French Revolution, the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune. He must surely have seen how the politics of the bo~zrgetrisieand its philosophy changed once it had gained power. But Lenin was unable to apply this insight from tl-re past to his own situation: he saw no need for institutional checks a n the party, He simply assumed it would be diflferent with his communists because they were communists, They would nut allow self-interest to undermine solidarity or bureaucracy to extinguish the prospect of utopia, Lenin could indeed have benefited horn the insight of MYlilovan Djilas, once a comrnrmist and later a prisoner
for many years under Tito, who wrote: ""Ipolitics, inore than in anything else, the beginning of everything lies in moral indignation and in doubt of the good intentions of others."I"
The Transition md the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Tl1e Russian Revolution struck the world like a thunderbolt, Lenin's Bolsheviks were instantly transfc~rmedfrom a little-know11 sect into worldhistorical actors. Euphoria gripped the masses, Betrayed by the social democrats, weary after four pears of death notices and rationing, they saw the October Revolution as opening a period in wlphich everything seemed possible, Not force alone, hut the utopian dream of an egalitarian and democratic communist society inspired the masses tct those incredible sacrifices they would make in tlphe coxning years.19 As much as any other single pamphlet, Lenin's The Sgate arzd Reuolzrtion inflamed those early hopes for an end to "prehistory'hnd the creation of an emancipatory alternative to capitaiisxn. Xn fact, this work still provides an inspiration for many "'ultra-leftists" and 'kcouncilists." At the same time, however, Lenin's most ~ztopianwork provides a fundamental insight into the authoritarian character of his vision. Written during the crucial period between Russia" bbowgeois and communist revolutions, its arguments did not embody the practical experience of the October Revolution, but rather presented Lenin's general ideas on the state, beyond any immediate concert1 with Russian conditions.zVt forwarded the ~ztopianmoment of workers' democraq Nevertheless, its irnnlediate political purpose was different, Lenin9$pamphlet was intended as an attack upon both his social democratic and anarchist critics, Xt served to distinguish the communist position and provide his followers with an explicit revolutionary standpoint, Social democrats had always maintained that the state could be used to transfc~rm a capitalist into a socialist society, Since the state can only serve the interests of the ruling class, however, Lenin argued tl-rat the atsexnpt to ernploy the capitalist state to transform capitalism must prove illusory. The old state apparatus must be mashed along with the class enemy. But this should not be seen as justifping anarchism. Demanding rlphe imrnediare abolition of the ss such ieads anarchists to evade crucial questions cclncerning how to dei-end the revolutioll against its enemies and how to establish conditions for the tratnsition to a ""higher" "phase of comxnunisrn and a "free association of producers," TTheir refusal to ccjnfront the reality of cclunterrev-
olutionary as well as revolutionary power turns anarchists into tl-re worst kind of utopians. Thus, whatever their differences with the social democrats, anarchist views on the "withering away of the state'hsupposedly left them just as politically rnisguided.21 The histc3rical coiltext in which the pamphlet was written is crucial. Lenin was, at the time, departing from the legal path to power urlder Kerensky" provisional government and beginning the illegal struggle to make the revolution '"ermanent."2"t was already clear that the seizure of power would demand a military defensc of the revolution against its enemies. This alone seemed to iustify the need for a highly discipiir-red and centralized workers\tatc. EIardly anyone: before had seriously dealt with the problems of the transition, however, or been willing to consider whether the traditional form of state was adequate for the inevitable struggte against the equally inevitable reacrion. Lenin was tl-re first to link the question of the transition with an organizational response to the prospect of courlterrevolu tion. The S ~ a t eand Revolzstion breathed new file into the idea of the 13aris Commune, which, essentially from its collapse to the events of October 191 7, existed merely as a symbol without any real referent in the theoreticaX or practical debates arnong socialists, Lenin" call fur a direct attack on the state, nt->less than discussroil about its "withering away," "existed only at the boundaries of socialist discourse in the Second International. There was both drama and daring in Lenin" contention that tl-re socialist revolution will consist "not in the new class commanding, gover~lingwith the aid of the 01d state machine, but in this class sm~shingthis machine and commanding, governing with tl-re aid of a new rnachine."23 Marx origirxally envisioned the transition as taking place under conditions of abundance, The new proletarian regime would extend democracy and, in so doing, attack the privileged classes. It would also institute a new set of humanized production relations, no longer constrained by the imperatives of capimt accumulation, and create the foundations for a "'leap into the realm of freedom.'" centralized socialist state would thus simultaneously defend the revolution and facilitate the emergence (11a communist society in fclr the free developwhich ""the free developmerit of each is the co~lditit~n ment of al." Lenin's ideas were the same in the abstract. But the attempt to realize them without a mass-based Iabor mt>vementand under conditiails of economic ~znderdevelopmentwould give them a very different suhsk~ntive meaning, Russian bt~c kwardness rnade it incuxnbent upon the ""new" "state machine to accumulate capital under numerous constraints imposed by the counterrevolution even as it simultaneously sought to introduce a new set of production relations. Thus, from the very start, a set of rnutually excl~tsive undertakings defined the Bolshevik project.
The need for accumulation would supplant tl-re hope of utopia. Justifying this demanded the redefinition of both the transition and the '"leap into the realm of freedom," The frlrmer would involve substituting rule by the vanguard for the extension of democratcy,24 while the latter would involve equating modernization with socialism," Understanding the communist experiment is illdeed impossible without a sense of the political meaning behind this redefinition. In virtual despair, while preoccupied with securing an improvement in agriculture and mising productivity, Lenin spoke about the need to ~nairrtain an apparatus s f compulsion and identified ""Communism as Soviet power pl~rsthe electrification of the whole countryW2"rfhe Soviet Union would have to employ the same values of production as its capitalist adversary and, without the constraints imposed by institutional: accountabilith reduce individuals to a "factor of production" in a xnore radical iashion, Bolshevik control over tl-re "commanding heigllts" of the economy appeared necessary to ensure what Preobrazhensky first termed "primitive socialist accumulation." Indeed, before long, the revolrttionary vanguard would find itself transhnned into tl-re custodian of a rigid bureaucratic order fearful of libertarian innr>vations,27 The Russian Revolution was noc the outcorne of a fully develoycd capitalisxn, It lacked nut merely a proletariat, but also an indigenous bourgeoisie, The Bolsheviks were left shouldering the burden of modernization, This was the precisely why orthodox 1Warxists believed that the communist seizure of power was premature and why they dzougl-rt that it would result. in the sacrifice of democracy. Gramsci indeed admitted what everyone knew when he, a supporter of Lenin, stated that the events of October 1917 constituted a ""revolution against Mar! Marxk C~pztal~"28 But the critics evaded the question of "'what is to be done2'7t becanle a matter of embracing the activist o r the structurai. strain witllin Marxism. Lenin's voluntairisrn xnay have reflected the underdevelopment of ixnperial Russia, But there was little with wilich to cr>nfrr>nt"objective" cconditioils other than the commnist vanguard. The "'dictatorship of the proletariat'" l-rad, in this vein, always been considered an unfortunate necessity, The State and R ~ " z ~ o / %turned ~ ~ o Eit into a virtue: belief in the '"dictatorship of the proIetariat'%ould now define the ""true" Marxist, But, ux~derthe commux~ist state, perhaps there was stilt a cha~zceto modernize the country and also create the conditions for its own disaipyearance,xY Thus, Lenin could write that it is ozly: from the rnoXnerlt aII mcxnbcrs of society, or at least thc vast majority t~ave learned to actminister tllc state thcmsclvcs, havc takcn this ururk into their owrl hands, have organized cantraf over the insignificant capitalist il-tinarir~aver the gentry who wish to preserve tlzeir capitalist habits and over workers who t~avebccn thoroughly corruptcct by capitaiistn-fro this rnorncnt the need for
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government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the detl-tocrac-y,the nearer the moment when it bec-oil-tesLtnnecessary. The more demc~craticthe "staeebhicb consists c>f the armed workers, and wl~ichis %no longcr a stare in the proper sense of the word', the rnorc rapidly euery f o m of state begins to wither away.""
The call for a state ""which is no Ir~ngera state in the proper sense of the word" raised the image of the Paris Commune. But, in contrast to Marx, Lenin did not see this experimental order as the transition to one that would institutionalize democratic procedures. That would have meant returning to republican institutions and, obviously, subverting the primacy of the party, Lenin was left with a yawning chasm separating the ideal of a authoritarian and new coERmune fro^^ the reality of an increasi~~gly poverty-stricken nation. He recognized the problexn and so refused to provide an ironclad prcjmise fc~rthe realization of the future communist society in his most utopian work." Neither in theory nor praxis was he able to bridge the chasm. Wl-zere implementing the ideal wauld have meant destroying the revolutionary state, crushiilg the counterrevolutian and sirnply transforming underdeveloped material conditions meant deferring the dream. The S a t e and Rrvot~riont l ~ u sprovides an excellent example of how the limits within even the most utr>pian theory are conditioned by the constraints on political action in a specific historical c011text. Mitigating the ever-deepening contradiction between ideal and reality would have demailded an event whose realization stor>doutside the control of Lenin and the Bolsheviks: revolutiox~in the West. Successfrtl revolutions in the economically advanced nations would have curtailed the intervention c>f those previously warring allies in support of the " m i t e " counterrevolution. They would also have provided military and technr~logicalsupport lrjr the devastated USSR and lessened the burden of underdevelopment. Bailking oil the possibility of international revolution was not outlandish, Disgrlst with W11rld War I had, since 9 1 6, syarked working-class revolts in much of Europe. Everywilere it was possible to hear the call ior bbsoviets'a or '"councils" tthat would aholish the need for a state "in the proper sense of the word." Many social democrats and even anarchists initially aligned themselves wit11 Lenin. The principled Mensl-revik leader, jfulius Martov, recognized that the revolution was "'sick," But he also recognized that the Bolsheviks had significant support among the pprletariat and that the alternative to them rnigbt prove even more distasteiul.3WPlis position was indeed not very different from the u n h i r k forgotten anarchist poet, Erich MGhsam, who grasped the spirit of the times wl~c;rrhe wrote: The revtllutic->naryactivists of the urhole world placed themselves on the side of thc Russian Revolcrtion, In Russia itself, the divisiorls bctwecn the various rev-
olutionary tendencies had not yet reached fruitian, A coalition of Bofsfieviks and Social Revolutionaries ruled from jat~uaryuntil Alarcll 1919, The anarcllists fouglit under Makhno in common with the Red Army against the white gcrlcrals of the courlterrcvolution. Especially abroad, it1 fact, the unity of all revol~ltionariesand the defense of the revolution assumed a near tloty status, Only after the Bolsheviks succeeded in assuming power for themselves, after they began to persecute their prcviacrs allies, did it hccornc possible ever1 abroad to differentiate between the Revojution and the Bolshevik-Communist X3arty.33
The State and Revolutior.t provided the regime with a symbol of radicai democracy and, even under Stalin, the suviets were never formally abolished. Trotsky had argued that the soviets provided a practical. revolutionary function insofar as they would "'give unity to the revolutionary struggle."" But there was a sense in which Lenin always distrusted these organs of democratic rule, Me did not, for example, understand their importance i r ~1905, But it was also reasonable for him to admire the idea that political representatives be paid the same as workers, that instant recall should reign, that "the coak'bhoufd have a chance at running the state, and that a new fc~rmof goverriance shoulit combine legislative, executive, and ~udicial functions. He also Learned from experience, Lenin quickly grasped the role soviets might play in undermining the provisional government of Mexander Kerensky,"" This self-appointed regirne lacked the conlidace of the workers and the peasants, remained coxnrnirted to continuing tl-re war, and accepted support from what would become important elements of the counterrevolution. Its overthrow appeared ever rBore rlecessary as Russia moved closer to chaos.36 Thus, Lenin afiied himself with the insurgent revuIutionary masses under the general slogan, All Power to the Sc~viets! The alliance was purely tactical, But, then, things were less clear during the revolutionary upsurge that swept imperial Russia than they rnay now appear, The strength and even the political complexion of the usoviets' movemerit was open to debate." The supaorc given by urbm soviets to the Bolslleviks and otl-rer socialist parties did not extend to the countryside, It was also highly questionable whether the soviets bad the mity, the resolve, or the administrative capacity to carry through a civil war fet alone forward a viable program for tl-re transition, This may provide the historim1 reason for a crucial omission in The State and Ravol~tion,Lenin never did provide an analysis of the structural role of the soviet either in terxns of its relation to the party or l-row it might adjudicate conflicting interests within a fragmented society, As surely as he divorced the vanguard party from the proletariat it claimed to represent, so did he separate the soviet from its function in the political order, This type of institutiotlal indeterminacy, however, marks Lenin's entire theory of the
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state. It always ignored fundaxnental difkrences in governance in favor of formal class definitir~ilsof the state. Thus, he could write: The dictatorship aE a sz'tzgle class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat wfiich lias averthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for t l ~ eentire historic;rrt period which separates capitalism from the "lassless society" frorn communism, Bourgeois states arc most varied in form, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their farm, in the final analysis are inevitably tlze dictatrlrshq of the bozdrgeokie, Tile transition from capitalism to cornmrtnisxn is ccrtatnly hound to yicijd a tremendous abundance and variety af political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorshif~of the profetarkt,38
Lenin seemed unaware that the fmm of government possesses its otvn dynamic. Ese was crlntent to equate ""governmeilt" with " s t a t e S b d , as a consequence, this most "'political'Warxist had virtually nothing to say cf. bOut institutional politics. The reason is clear: the only way of privileging his authoritarian dictatorship of the proletariat was by arguing that in essence, whether democratic or authoritarian, every bourgeois state is the same "dictarorship of the bourgeoisie," His shift of slogans horn ""AllPower to the Soviets" "to ""The Bc-,lsheviks IVust Assume Power" was thus consistent.-39 The difference between a decentralized democratic and a centralized aurhoritarian regime i s merely a matter of expediency: the only salient cluestion is which can best repress the fcrrces of rmction and express the "true" needs of the working class."J And, horn Lenin3 perspective, that is something only the vanguard can decide. The ""newmachine'bill be socialise only insofar as it supports interests favorable to the most advanced sector of the pmletariar~movement: the Bolshevik Party. a
The Wretched of the Earth T&eninismriever had much appeal for workers in advanced industrial societies. But that was not the case for the oppressed living under colonial rule. The great transformation of the twenties11 centtary was undoubtedly the liberation of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Though some movemeilts of national self-determination were inspired by religion, and others by charismatic personalities, most were profoundly influenced by Leninisrn in the theory they employed no less than the practice in which they engaged. Its countless believers were not mere dupes any more than their movemerits were simply pawns far tlze USSR, There were indeed legitimate reasons for the appeal of Leninism among the most wretched of the earrh,
Perhaps the Russian Revolution did not bring about the victory of international socialism, hut it was stiU the first nationalj revolutioil of the modern age, Xt had taken place in an economically backward nation and its vanguard provided an illustration of l-raw to sustain an insurgent movement under harsh political conditions. Leninism offered the prospect of a national front composed of various classes and dominated by the revolutionary organization. Its wiftingness to place ""politics in com~nand" aiso obviwsly had trernendws appeal in areas lncking an indigenous bourgeoisie and where national land reform wouicl prove necessary The modernizing success of tl-re USSR-if not the bloodshed-would serve as ail ir-rspiration, But there was something else: imperialism and the plight of the colonized had been relatively neglected." Lenin brought both into the suciafist limelight in fmperiirlism: The Highest Stilge of Gup2~lzfn.t.The pamphlet filled a vacuum. ~Marxhad subordinated the nt-jtion to capitalism and he was un~~ down the ""Chinese sentimerltal ahc~utthe way in which it V I P C I L ~ break walls of tradition" and transform precapita list na tions, Revisionists were often supporters of imperialism while the analytic skills of Kautsky and Rosa I,uxemburg did not compensate for their inability to provide political advice to those fighting colonial rule. Lenin's brocl-rure may have been marred by various empirical errors, and it never envisioned the possibili~ of what might he termed ""socialist irnperialism.'Wevertheless, it provided what other works lacked: a political understanding of imperialism and a practical respoilse to its continuation. fmpericzlism is Lenin's finest theoretical effort. Written durirtg Wc3rld War I, its explanatory power reaches beyond tl-rat event. It ties together his ideas on revolution, the party, nationalism, and internationafism, It also marks his most original contribution and his break with orthodoxy. The pamphlet draws on the work of John A. t i d s o n , Rudolf Hilferding, and Wikofai h k h a r i n . In fusing their insights with his own, however, Lenin created sorrtething genuinely new. With this work, indeed, it became possibk to speak a bout " Marxism-Leninism."" EIobson was a liberal and a socialist, and also the teacher of John Maynard Keynes. He had argued in his influential study of 1902 that the ""econornic taproot" of irnyerialjsm derived from those ""seifish" sectors of capital that greedily sought to export their surplus-no matter what the consequences f'or the nation as a wi~ole." 'Tarasitical" in character, tl-rese interesis threatened the "common good" through the militarist and ultrachauvinist tendencies they strengthened as welt as through the negligible bellefits that would accrue to the natic~nfrorn, pursuing an imperialist course. Nevertheless, tl-rrough state action, electoral activity, and heightened awareness, liobson believed that such parasitical interests could be controlted.
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Lenin appropriated the notion tbat imperialism rests on tl-re attempt to export an overproduced swplrrs and the ensuing exploitative relation that arises between an ecsnorrtica!ly aclvanced nation and its colonies. In corrtrast to Hobson, however, Lenin rejected tlie idea that this or tbat particular capitalist interest was ""prasitical." Ifnstead, the capitalist system itself was seeri as being defined by seemingly irrational imperialist policies, Lenin considered imperialism a necessary imperative that had arisen as a consequence of changes in the organizational structure of capitalism itself. 1st making this claim, he profited from the work of the great Marxist ecorrornist Rttdolf Hilferding,"' who argued in 19t l tliat tl-re banks and ""finance capital" had gained hegemony over other capitalist sectors of the economy." This had made it possible to regrllate inarkets through stare intervention, secure investment outlets, and the exercise of financial leverage. Hilferding believed, in fact, that the state might mitigate conflicts be~ween capital and Iabor to the point where this new form of '"organized capitalism'kcould conceivably continue forever. Thus, he challeliged the idea of an inevicable capitalist collapse from within the tradition of orthodox iMarxism. Building on Hilkrdtng, while critical of his reformism, Lenin suggested that the predominance of finance capital and its fusion with a new incerventionist state had resulted in a '%&her" and final stage of capitalism. A new linkage is seeri as existir-rg hetween imperialism, Illilitarism, and capitc?lism, Monopolies now increasingly compete over markets and heighten what Lenin termed ""unequal development."@ The result is a twofold contradiction in which the advanced nations compete with one another over colonies even as tensions ernerge between each and its subject peoples. By engaging in imperialist policies and rationalizing exploitation more ef6ciently3however, these ecsnosrticalty advanced nations can y uell donlestic class conflict. Imperiaiism allows them to collect ""spergrofirs" and, with the "crumbs" of these profits, buy off their own proletariat with social programs and vario~zsforms of state assistance, Thus, according to Lenin, imperialism generates a ""labor aristocracy" in tl-re advanced nations whose interests are inimical to those of the masses languishing under colonid exploitation. Tn this vein, according to Brrkharin, it no longer makes sense to speak about international solidarity in traditional terrns. The world is witnessing a split beween the "'haves" and the "havet-nots" along East-West lines46 Organized capitalism has produced a ""fusion" btween the administrative, the economic, and the politicat futlctions of bourgeois society resultin, ~na type of "'national trust." Neither Bukharin nor Lenin ever meant to imply that revofutio11 was impossible or unnecessary in the 7Xiest. But it was a question of where to look m d Lenin believed that the best possibility was a revojution at the point of intersection, so to speak, between the haves and r, using a phrase his pamphlet would make famous, at the Q
'
"weakest link in the chain." His work indeed suggested that revolution would spread from East to West and that is precisely what occurred in the aftermath of the Russian Revolutior~, Imperklism showed why capitalist nations were driven to challenge each other for markets. It exposed the bidden source of the militarism and chauvinism that had set nation against nation. It clarified why Italy3 still economically underdeveloped, should have been fate in entering the war and why a rapidly industrializing Germany should have followed an especially beilicose policy in the years leading up to the war," It ralso provided an explanation in Marxist terms of what at the time seerned almost incomprehensible: the "'great betrayal" of European social democracy and its ~Mairxistleaders. Above all, however, Lenin offered reasons why the revolution did not take place in any of the advanced Western nations as Marx l-rixnself predicted and why it occurred-and could occur again-in the poorest parts of the globe. The problems with fmpevi~lzsmhave beer1 endlessly documented. Its idea of a ""lbor aristocracy" thesis was empirically flawed: crllics argued that workers in imperialist states were not always better off and skilled workers i r ~Germany were, for example, often the most radical in their views,"Vhe pamphlet cannot explain why the bulk of world trade is still carried on among the advanced nations and, in fact, not every economically advanced nation has engaged in imperialist policies. Imperialism is reduced to an ecsnomic reflex of capitalism and the contingent charactw of foreign policy is essentially ignored." Thus, lmpevilalzsm manifests trtany o f the same inadequacies as The Sate artd Remlgtion. But these criticisms had little relevance for what would become the antiimperialist struggles for national self-determination. ~Vustrecognized that the proletariat w a ~still far better off than the colonia;ec"t and enough Western workers now recognized tl-rat they l-rad been misled hy the imperialist ambitions of their governments and that they had received little in exchange For their acceptance of a "class truce." What the concept of a ""bar aristacracy" lacked in tl-reoreticai rigor, in short, it retained in practicai salience, Lenin's ttbe.t>ry seeming1y justified his split with the Second International. It was also evident that the revolutionary winds had changed direction: they were now indeed blowing from East to West. lmperiialism fit perfectly with the views Lenin had already articulated prior to the war on the right to ""national self-determinatio~z." He had always maintained tl-rat revoltttion in an econoxnically bt~ckwardnation required the proletariat to ally itself with the bourgeoisie and other classes. Concerted action demanded a unifying ideology and in this way, according to Lenin, supporting the right to national self-determination was a prerequisite for success in the first, or anti-imperialist phase, of the revolution, it is certainly true that repression of nationalist movements by the czars had
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created enorrnous discontent, and support for the Rkissian Revolution was in large measure dependellt upon them, At the same time, however, Lenin only wished to rerider ""negative support" tto nationalist mtrvements since ""beyond tlzat begins the ~oositivebctivityof tl-re bourgeoisie striving to fortify nationalism,"-SVhus, the need for a vanguard party capable of engaging in coalition politics and shiking its ""line" without ever sacrificing its unique class interests or its commitment to the next socialist stage of the revr~lutioil, Lenin believed in general equality among national cuftwres within a nation-sta te and general equality axnong socialist nation-sta tes within the Cornmuilist International when it was farmed in 1919, But he also assumed that minorities would see their economic interests in amalgamating into larger national units and remaining part of a socialist nation.51 He even suggested that minorities learn the doxninant language of their particular area for the same reason, Lenin could subsequently state that any minority had the political right to secede from a nation even as he maintained that this right would not necessarily be exercised. He always underscored his belief that nationalism is not an end unto itself.51 Proclaiming national self-determination as a transcendent right, however, conflicted witls the impossibility of grmting it once nations made the decision to secede from the nascent Soviet Union." Or, putting it another way3 the USSR fc~unditself in the position of extending this right only to those nations it did not control and only nominally to its own minorities. Taking this logic a step further, the cardinal problem of Lenin" sentire theory emerges: the horribie repression of nationalist aspirations in the Ukraille and Ceorgia,s4 and elsewhere, becomes legitimate in principle because imperialism under socialism is impossible by definition, Lenin still trtain~ainedthat the proletariat should play a leaditlg role in the anti-imperialist struggle and that tlse ultimate liberation of the colr~nies depended upon revolution in the Western nations, This stallce led him to break with his former Indian prottgci. Manabandra Roy who, anticipating Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minhr, wished to highlight tlze independent role of the peasantry rather than simply subordinate its interests to those of other classes.sj Lenin called tapon his vanguard initially to offer support for bbpr~gressi~e'a bourgeois democratic revoi~ttionsin preparation for a cornmunist seizure of power. As against Stalin, who truly had no coherent policy for the underdeveloped world, Lenin sought to link the bourgeois struggle against imperiafism with the proletarian struggle against capitalisxn. He had argued that the Soviet Union should initially present itself as the supportive n i b of all bourgeois-nationaI-democratic revolutions. Only when the vanguard of clze proletariat and peasantry actually seized power should it become the model for rapid idustrial development along a noncapitalist path. r6 Nothing more than trust in the part5 however, prevents
negative from turning into positive support for the national revolution. Then, too, the rise of various neutralist states with very different ideologica l concerns would underlnirte the connection between an ti-imperialism and anticapitaiism-between serving as an alIy and serving as a model-that Lenin had presupposed, The two stages of the same revt->lutionaryprocess would, soon enough, turn into mutually exclusive strategic alternatives.57 Officially, of course, tl-re Soviet Union continued to offer itself as a model f ~ "pogressive" r movements in the colonial world, But its wiiliwness to ally with what were often reactionary military or religious regimes irnpt ied the need for retreat from tl-re revolutionary goals of the past. ""CounterimperiaIism7' rather than "anticapitalism" mscrbsequently became its overriding concern during the cold war. This did not necessarily preclude support b r genrlir~elyprogressive rrtovements and states in the former colonial world. Nevertl-reless, in keeping with changing national interests, the USSR arbitrarily designated as progressive any regime that claimed to oppose the Western b5imperiaIist'kenem~ Historical Qevefopmentswould shatter wl-rat remained of the original theory Globalization has nothing in common with Lenin" understanding of inlyerialisrrt and the explosion of sovereign states in the former colonized territories invalidates his views of the strugde against it, Resistance can no longer rely on ""natioilal self-determination.'' Human rights will instead piay an expanded role in contesting the arbitrary exercise of power. Dealing with transnational issues like immigration and the environxnent no less than poverty and the arrogance of dobal capital requires international parties, ~lnir>ns,and interests working within strengthened international institutions like the United Nations. A new cosmopolitan ideolr~gymight yet retrieve the commitment to social justice and democracy betrayed by so many nationafist movements of the past. In any event, however, the next progressive attexnpts to coordinate the interests of the wretched and exploited will have little in common with Leninism or the interpretive changes it suffered at the hands of its successors.
Guardians of the Revotutisrr Jn 1918, however, things were different. The Bolsheviks could look back proudly at what they had accomplished, All along, they were the ones who had dared, In tile prewar years, they had sugered innumerable hurniliatiuns. Before the war, as a minority, they had split Russian social democracy over the need to organize around a speculative belief in the coming revolution. When Vdcorld War I broke out, again% the tide of popular opinion, tbe Bolsheviks rejected the policies of the Wstern ""tabor aristocracy.'" Lenin stood by his principles and, refusing even to compromise with the
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""sociat pacifists" who now opposed the conilict, he alone called upon the international prt.>Ietariatto turn the war ktweerr ~lationsinto an international class war, Then, in October 191 7 , the Bolsheviks became the driving force for the first prolecarim revolution in world history, The others had talked; they had acted. N a y in 1918, the capitalist powers were ready to wage an ofiensive, and I,enim5s ""csmmunists'"ere faced with pet another challenge: defend the revolution that they had introduced. World War 1 had caused e.tlc>rmousdevastation, and it was still not over when the February Revolution of 1 9 17 brought a democratic provisional government into existence, Its leaders did not wish to offend crucial Western economic interests. They hoped to mailltain political support from reactionary segrnents of Russian society. They worried about the loss of Russian prestige in international affairs and t h y sought to preserve their l-ronor. The new regime led by Alexander Kerensky, for all these reasons, stubbornly committed itself to continuing the war effort even as it lacked solid backing: from its own citizens. As the war took its toll, the imperial army cruxnbled and the national administration fell into disarray. Workers spontaneously began to socialize their factories while, in keeping with Lenin's slogan of "Land, Bread, and Peace!" peasants started to divide the old estates among tbexnselves. Production came to a virtual standstill, anarchy ruled in the countryside, and the rtlbie collapsed. This indeed framed the context in which tlze Bolsheviks took power, They too were split over how to handle the war issue. Some like Bukharin wished t o cr~ntinuethe war in order to foster revolution in the West, whereas others feared the domestic econt~micconsequences of withdrawal. Lenin favored unconditional peace. But the party majority chose to disregard his arguments and instead backed Trotsky" position of '"neither war nor peace*" That polic~,however, turned into a disaster, As negotiations contir-rued at Brest-Litovsk, the German army penetrated ever lurrher into the Soviet Union. There was little time to spare when the Central Committee reversed itself and endmsed Lenin's sine. By then, conditions k r peace had grown stiffer and enorrnous chunks of territuv appeared to have been lost.58 But the Bolsheviks had garnered support from the most active proletarian eienlents of the population and passive support him segmelits of other classes like the peasantry, No other force could possibly have reesca"oiished stability by pulling Russia out of Wortd War I and saving the country from an antidemocratic counterrevolution whose ferocity would becsme so notorious that it actually aided the ""Reds" "ring the Civil War.5Vn 1917, putting the matter bluiztly, the choice was not betweerr a robust republic and the dictatctrship of: the proletariat. ft was rather between an unreyresentarive and ineffectual bourgeois democrat& whicll was clearly leading the country into chaos, or some form of authoritarian order. The question was merely whether that order would be White or Red,
The provisional government was plagued by dissension from the start, heyoild the disruptioils caused by the Bc-,lsheviks, and its other m a ~ o rnatiorlal parties were in disarray, No liberal party had serious support from below and none of eke radical parties would have been willing to cancel the enormous fc~reigndebts the imperial regime bad amassed." But there were other issues as well. The Social Revolutionary Party was paralyzed over continuing the war effort and it quickly split, Its small '"left" faccion rerained a revolutionary democratic program, though it lacked a genuine mass base, while its large ""rght'9faction had a strong base in the peasalltry, but lacked a coherent political prograxn. It was indeed d ~ inability e of the Left Social Revt>lutionaries to harness the discontent of the peasantry that led them into their shc~rt-livedcoalition with the Bolsheviks, As for the Mensheviks, the tradition4 enemies of Lenin, their support for the war and the provisional government left tl-rem with only a narrow base of support among the prcjletariat. The soviets were, moreover, obviously disorgmized and they lacked a plan for either waging the civil war or reconstructing the economy on a national basis. Thus, the Bolsheviks emerged as the only political force on the Ieft capable of linking the interests of workers and peasants arid t'orrrtulating radical policies t'or dealing with a nation still enmeshed in war and threatened with counterrevolution, Lenin's abolition of the provisional government could have been justified either through cfianneling power to trtore radical institutions like the soviets or by calling for new elections to a new and more representative Constituent Assembly. With the soviets generally seen as defir-ting the new regime and a civif war looming 017 the horizon, howevel; he believed there was no going back to a republic. But the soviets would never rule Russia. Though. workers organized from beiow in 1918 to secure contrc~lover the shop floor, and money vvas effectively abolished, this had as much to do with the collapse of the ruble as ideological comxnitxnents. With the onset of the civif war, "'6reen" anarchist bands, under the leadership of Makhno, reigned over parts of Russia and dealt with the Reds and the Whites as circrrrrtsrances dictated. Internal sabotage and assassinations grew more frequent. Administrative and economic disintegration cr~ntinued,The Whites, meanand military support from those previously while, began receiving eco~~u~rtic warring Western states whose elites now realized that they l-rad something in common: a desire to end the communist experiixent.~~ "Those who are not far us are against us" became the rallying cry, It was when the war broke out in 1918 that support for the Bolsl-reviksand support for the Russian Revolution became identical in the eyes of the world.^^ As Trotsky traversed the f oviet Union, irtdefatigably organizing and directing tl-re nascent Red Army, a ferocious civif war raged whose outcome was by no means a Eoregone cc~nclusion,With the country isolated within the inrternatiorzal commnnitr, hcing economic collapse and internal revolts, it
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was no wander that the Bolsheviks should l-rave become obsessed with unity, discipline, economic efficiency, and the administrative centraiiaation of power. Jn this way, revolutionary euphoria at the level of the soviets combined with the party's policy of ""war cornmunisxn" to create the parallel construction of a new society-from the bottom up and from the top down, Amid sabotage and starvation in the cities, armed detacl-rments of Bolsheviks seized food from the peasants and attempts were made to collectivize the cstmtryside. But this only led to a further decline in agricultural production, especially given the allied blockade and the skills of the peasants at woiding requisitioning. Rationing soon became necessary along with the manifest need to rebuild Russia" shattered transportation and co~rtrnrmicatio11 systems. Thus, a centrally controlled ""militarizationof labor" was instituted that conflicted with the suvietsAesire for decentralised democracy, Contradictions between erids and means, which had already been intimated in The S t ~ t eand Revolution, became apparent as the ""heroic period" of the Russian Revolution drew to a close. The years from 1918 to 15321 were marked by experimental social policies. These ir~volvedeverything from introducing abortion rights and divorce to attacking antiSemitism, fostering awnt-garde culture, and transhrming everyday life, Nevertheless, underpinnkg these developments was a draconian economic and political policy that, most agreed, would have to give way before a new approach. The Bolshevik triumph in the civil war seemed to trtitigate the need for "war communisxn" and its l-rarshest authoritarian controls. The trade unioils demanded democracy, an end to the rnifitarizatioil of labor, a i d the protection of workers from further austerity trteasures. As peasant revolts spread throughout the countryside to protest the first experiments with collectivization and hrced requisitions,a Ertoreover, nostalgia arose far the irnmediate aftermath of the revolrrticzn. Opposed to both the Constituent Assembly and tl-re Bolsheviks, harking back to 1905, radical proponents of the soviets sought to extend democracy through a new commitmeilt to decentralized shop-tloor corztrol rather than to a general prograrrt of ""workers' controleWb"he cry grew for ""soviets without Bwlsheviks9?hat w d d culminate in the Krc-~nstadtrising of 1921 and its ruthless suppression under the stewardship of Trotsky." "Indeed, Richard Pipes was basically correct in fabeling this year as the "false Thermid~r,"b~ Just when a decisive reaction against the Bolsheviks vvas taking shape, interestingly enough, Stalin began his rise ttr genuine eminence within the party," The specter of counterrevc>Iuticzn and economic despair still lingered. The communists naturally feared the political demands of the Krol~stadtsailors more than any econmic demands, And so, foliowing the
insurrectian, econornic changes were made to assuage tlze peasants and the workers. Though Lenin and the Bolsheviks surely remembered that the demand for economic capitalist rights had helped undo Robespierre and usher in the Thermidor, war communism was scrapped soon after the Bolshevik victory at Kronstadt in favor of the New Economic Program (NEP) of 1921. This program introduced the "second period" 'of the revolution (l92 1-28), It was time h r a ""breathing spell" 'both at home and abroad. Lenin elaborated this belief in LeRWirtgr Co.n.rmunism:An J~faurti(eDijordel; which called upon the newly bunded Communist International to oppose revohtioilary adventurism and instead crlncentrate upon building unioils and mass parties throughout Europe, He also admitted that the NEP involved a revolutionary retreat, Money was reintroduced and a system for taxing agricutt ~ ~ r production al was instituted. In the countryside, forced requisitioning and collectivizatiolil came to an end as peasants were allowed to sell their surplus olx the open inarket, At the same time, the Bolsheviks took control over the ""cornmanding heigl~ts"of the economy, emasculated tlze soviets, ended the militarization ul labor, and began to industrialize in a slow regulated fashion. Thns, in exchange fc~rpc~iiticalcontrol, the party was willing to risk the return of capitafisrn and, in exchange for future xnodernization that would benefit workers, it granted peasants the right to earn profits from which the state could gamer income through taxes.. NEP was a cornproxnise faslzioned by the party to placate the divergent concerns of classes with conflicting interests. But bureaucracy blossomed as midd!emen (""NEP-~nen'"profited from the market atmosphere while class distinctians grew in the countryside, Even worse, a "price scissors" "med. As increased farm production led to lower prices far agricultural products, minimal gains in manufacturing exacerbated demand and generated high prices for industrial comrnodities. Though the poor crop of 1924 texnporarily solved the crisis, the price scissors foreshadowed futum peasant discontent,bVn that same year, Lenin died at the age of fifty-hr: Wlzile despairing over the Soviet Union's bureaucratic degeneration, and the power Stalill was amassi~~g, a stroke had already left him incapacitated in 1922, By then, all frirces hostile to the Bolsheviks had beer1 vanquished. But the civil war had Left the party decimated and, more oxninously, previously extra-party forms of opposition had begun to express their interests fmm within the party itself. That was why Lenin decided to instifilte a "temporary" h n on factions. The need for discipline had seemingly become more pronounced just as it appeared necessary to open the gates of the party and admit untutored and unskilled "workers from the bench." This situation gave new importance to the position of General Secretary occupied by the still relatively unknown party bureaucrat: josef' Stalin.@
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The Civil War created the foundations for what would follow. Originally, the Bolshevik obsession with poiitical hegemony had derived from an almost frantic attempt to create power out of a vacuum, Lenin and his followers believed that the councry was beset by a host of conflicting interests unable to grasp the general will or establish any revolutionary amhority capable of enft3rcing effective rules for conflict resolution.70 Its quest for order and centralized au~hority~ however, left the communist leadership directly pitted against what would become an array of competing forces: the Kerenky government and those who desired a constituent assembl.): the soviets, other socialist parties, tl-re trade unions, and ultimately even internal party dissidents. But, while the Bolsheviks were shutting down ail the institutional structures wherein such conflicting ""factional'"interests might be expressed, the divergent collcerns and interests of extra-party groups did not just disappear. They simply shifted frorn one political arena to the other: from the provisional government to the soviets, from the soviets to the trade unions and peasant associations, and finall?:,once other cssrtpeting institutions had been eliminated, frorn these organizations to the Comnnui-ristParty itself, Wit11 the failure to realize the promises of a bourgeois revolution, as Rosa Luxernburg anticipated,7ha~horitarianismfed upon itself and the public realm became ever more circumscribed. The responses by the Bolsheviks to these countervailing forces did not merely constitute a set of discrete, instrumental decisions, Revolution and counterrevolution created a situation in which one repressive act quickly became a precedent far the next. A political dynamic took shape, justified by the needs of the part)., that gave credence to Max Weber" famous stateinent that ideolog is not like ''a cab, which one can have stopped at orre" ppleasme: it is ail. or nothir~g.'"L The vanguard party tried to stand above the interests of particular classes and groups. But what was possible for a party leading a revolution became impossible for a party leading a state, ft quickly became apparent that the new order had not solved the problem of class conflict. Lenin even admitted as much when he put forward the polemical question: "'If the ram and the goat Ml out, rBust the lynx of counterrevolution be allowed to devour them both?'' The vanguard identified its interests with those of the proletariat and the socialist state. But, frorn the very first, a qriestion lingered, Was this state really either proletarian or socialist? Lenin himself had admitted that the Soviet Union was a "'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Attempting tct identify socialism with modernization, and the nationalization of industrial concerns, he stared openly that the nascent Soviet Union would be lucky if it entered the stage of '"state capitalism" in the near future," Was the party building capitalism or building socialism?
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The best for which the party and the revolutionary masses could hope was the elimination of precapitalist conditions under a state they believed was ultimately preparing h r a future leap into the socialist realm of freedam. Each step towards modernization would have to be presented as a step tc3wards socialism and any cc~mpetingclaim as a threat to bath the national irrterest and the revolutionary project. Ethics was thereby thrown into the battle and made subservient to the cause. Even before Stalin, morality had been subordinated to the class struggle; moral was seen as what serves the interest of the party a1-d immoral as what hinders it, fn keeping with Trotsky and others, against the eternal and universal catechisrm of morality, Lenin consistently maintained that ""communist morality amounts tc-, the struggle for the confirmation of proletarian dictatorship,"x Teleolog imbued the party and its dictatorship with a historical ""pivilege" over all other parties and states. Allegiance on. the part of tl-re mernhership was unconditional: the party retained the ""truth" 'of the historical process or, as Brecht wrote in The Measures Takert, "the party has a thousand eyes, we have only two." With the legitimacy of tile party resting on faith in the inevitable triumph of socialism in the USSR, a myth of ihllibility was gradually wclvetz around its leadership and the choices it made. 75 'Wecessity" was increasingly used to justiif. every mistake and every retreat, But the refusal of Lenin to countenance checks on the party and its dictatctrship, his support for the invasion of Poland, his overestimation of revolt~tionarysentiment in Europe during the X-reroic years, were not ait matters of histc-,rical.necessity, It was the same with his initial advancement of Stalin and his general faults in matters of persorrnel. Lenin was blind to the institutional consequences of policy choices like his ""remporary" reliance on terror or his ban on factions. Until the very e d , in fact, Ire never realized what Max Weber knew: ever). organization tends to become bureaucratic and every hreaucracy seeks to grow even at the expense of those whose interests it claims to represent, Only through the use of myth was it possible to evade the col-rsequences of these insigkts, Indeed, only through sucl-r a "myth" could Lenin's followers justify their power and present the Soviet Unioi-2 as what it clearly was not: a s~~cialist wr>rkers>tate.
Into the Darkness Lenin had named and criticized, albeit some mtlre forcefully than others, a number of passible successors in his famous "Last rfestament": Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev? Wi kolai Bukharizz, Georgi Pyatakov, Lev Kametlev, and Josef Stalin, The first, the logical candidate to inherit Lenin's mantle, would he tried ir-2 ahsentia and later murdered in IMexico by an agent of the Comintern: the others would ail be judicially liquidated hp the
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last, and least famous, of the group, None of the rivals to Stalin fasl-rioneda program capable of dealing with the new situation fc~llowingthe death of Lenin: the hilure of the international revolution, the changed role of the party, and the requirements of industrialization. Stalin l-rirnself would vacillate on all these issues and this served him well. more was involved, however, than the failure s f the other conte~idersto formulate an insight into bkecessity" or grasp ""objective conditions," 76 Their political miscalculations and inadequate skills at political infighting, no less than their commitmerit to democratic ce~itralism,were just as important in their defeat, ftatin's "revolution from above" z d v e d various issues begged by tl-re Bolshevik conquest of power and the isolation of the Soviet Union following the failed uprisings in the West. It identified internationalism with support for the slogan of ""socialism in one country'Yt ttransbrmed a revolutionary into a bureaucratic party to meet the needs of " s ~ c i a ~ i s t ' ~ construction in a nonrevolutionary age. It confronted the economic backwardness of the USSR by combining rapid industrializatiw with forced collectivization of the peasantry, It, tinally, answered questions regarding the duration of the dictatorship, and justified the reliance on terror, with the self-serving claim that class struggle wouId inevitably sharpen during the construction of socialism. How was all this accompIished?77Stalirr3srise in the party had been Lznspectacular, but steady. Born in the province of Cectrgia in 8 7 9 , he had served as a bank robber, guerilla, functionary, and party leader, Considered an expert on the question o f nationalities,78 he had caught the eye of Lenin who raised him to the Central Committee. There he stayed in the background and built a network af contacts, Using l-ris new position of General Secretary, Stalin slowly began to appoint his prot6gCs to administrative vacancies caused by the civil war. Cautious and duplicitous, he became a power broker par excellence. After building his foundation at tl-re base, Stalin was SOCI~Ienough in the position to seek support from prestigious Bolsheviks like Kameriev and Zinoviev in what would become his momentous battle against Leon Trotsky. Indeed, whatever his enormous visibility, Trotsky had become vultlerable. Though most clearly idetitified as Lenin's partl-rer and heir, he had only joined the Bolsheviks in 191'7, and many stilt rernernbered his bitter conflicts with Lenin from 1902. Party Eunctioilaries and leaders alike feared the former leader of the 1905 Petrograd Soviet, organizer of the assault on the Winter Palace in 1917, architect of the Red Army, and conqueror of Kronstadt, They distrusted this profoundly Western intellectual who was as c o ~ ~ k ~ r t awriting ble literary criticism? or history, o r political theory, as negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, As arrogant as he was brilliant, Trotsky's popular appeal and woridwide v i r t ~ ~ofe his posifame actually worked agairrst him in party circles.T"y
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tion and personality, unlike f ta lin, Trot sky ultimately found himself forced to take a stand on every issue. As time went by, any sense of nuance vanished, and he became identified with an ~znco~~promisingly radical foreign policy along with a rigid antipeasant and proindustrializatim line, It also did not take much, especially with the help of Stalin and his friends, for party officials to think that in Trotsky it detected the specter of ""honapartism." Thus, the myth of "Trotskyism'hmerged.~" Trotsky" aannhitious and is~competei~t c>pponents like Kamenev and Zinoviev lacked any coherer~tvision for the future of the Soviet Unio11. Beyand their personal dislike of him, however, they leared that Trotsky would upset the delicate compromise between classes that had emerged from NER Stalin played on those fears even as he refused to take a definitive stand. And so, while joining the attacks on Trotsky3he shrewdly undermined Kaxnenev and Zinoviev in order to pursue a new alliance with the leading Bolshevik economist and theorist of NEP: Nikolai Bukharin. E-Iis support came horn the peasmtry and, anticipating the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev, Buklzarin wished to continue NE13 in order to steer a course towards market socialism.8We also soug;hr a more moderate foreign policy. These three concerns along with his personal, ambitions led Bukharin to ally himself with Slalin rather tlzan Trotsky. It was already too late when Zinoviev and Kamenev attempted to reconcile with Rotsky in a futile attempt to oppose the general secretary and his new supporter, After the dust lzad settled, tlze "Left Opposition" was squashed. Once Trotsky had been deposed as a potential rival, however, Stalin quickly turned against Brrkharin, The general secretary appropriated Trotsky's earlier calls for rapid industrialization and, assuring himself a built-in scapegoat fc~rthe future, readmitted his @eat enemy's supporters to the part).. Thus, "Stalinism" "began with a dramatic left turn in 1328 that brought the second period of the revolution to an end. Jealousies and intrigues may have marked the struggle to succeed Lenin. But political controversies were carried on within a fr~ndamer1taXfrarnework of political agreement, No major figure questioned the primary of the party and democracy only became an issue when a particular faction found itself out of power, They all identified morality with the interests of the party and thereby, once Stalin took over, lacked any independent moral foundation for further resistance.82 Ait of them aiso wished to avoid a potentially explosive confrontation with the peasantry and all believed that industrialization constituted the prerequisite for socialism. Every claimant to the throne of Lenin understood that the revr>lutions in the West had beer1 lost-at least temporarily-and that the Soviet Union was threatened with encirclement. ~ndeed,whatever their particular disagreements over foreign polich all of them also endorsed the ""reuoiutionary privilege" o' f the USSR.
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All this has fed many commentators to conclude that tlze develr~pmentof the Soviet Glnioil woulid have been fundamentalty the same even if Stajin's enemies had gained corrtrol," "st as the ~zttraleftis unable to distinguish alternatives for capitalisxn, however, its enexnies have ignored the alternative possibilities that existed within communism. IVore was ixlvolved during the second period than simply a choice betweeri the principal actors: Buklzarin, Trotsky, and Stalin, Each brought with l ~ i ma coterie and, wlzen considering the policies of the victc-~r,it is often forgotten that Stalin" lieutenants had as much, if not Inore, to gain from the e h i n a t i o n s f the opposition as he did, Each also had divergent opinions about whether prioriw should be given to the needs of the proletariat, the needs of the peasantry, or a compromise between classes, A genuine choice existed between different stpIes of leadership with different aims and, ultimatel!; different policies.84 The party a h n e was capable of making such a decision and herein lies the prirtciple responsibility of Lenin and the Bolsheviks for what followed, The outcoxne would have been authoritarian even if Stalin had been defeated, All members viewed the party as sovereign. But there were different ~lnderstandingsof what this implied.gVrotsky and Bukharin boch suyparted its early ""txnparary" el.eor of 1919 and the suppression of the Kronstadt sailors, Neither of them ever seriously considered the need far a permanent reghre of fewor, however, let alone one that wouId make the party subordinate to the secret police.86 Their understanding of the party was similar to that of Lenin, Their disputes, no matter how vitriolic, were still carried on along political lines, Under Stalin, however, power would be used to settle grudges." Old mistakes were rehabilitated: other charges aside, for example, Mamenev and Zinoviev would be condemned for breaking party discipline by publicly opposing the seizure of power in 1917 even though Lenin had accepted them back into the party. Party fife changed and party rule would exist in I l m e only: the entire organization became subordinated to the will of Stalin. And so, by the end of elze 15330~~ tlze Communist 13arty had little in common with the old vanguard.g"rotsky and Bukharin were Bofsheviks: Stalin would ultimately ban use of the term. He replaced the "ibolshevih-'" with tlze "apparatchik'bllo was cruder, more subservient, more bureaucratic, and iess trained in the traditions of revolutionary struggle.gVTl~e party of '"professional revolutionary intellectuals" was turned into a party of fawning bureaucrats and thugs. This clzange was connecred to a burgeoning clillrate of paranoia and corruptictn that Stalin consciously fostered.90 The Soviet Union under Stalin was indeed run less by a government in m y ordinary sense of the word than a "miixtttre of conspiracy, Mafia, and court."'" If not riecessariIy in theor5 then certainly in practice, a sharp and decisive break took place beween Leninism and Stalirtism.
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The greater the concentration of power, tl-re more omnipotent the leader, the more importallt become y uestians of: political style. Trotsky and Bukharin were cosmpolitan intellectuals with sophisticated artistic tastes.92 Their interpretations of Marxism were, whatever tl-reir faults, very different than what Stalin uilderstood as ""dialectical materiallism,"~h is hard to believe either would have championed Stalin" sater attacks on natural science or quackery like ""Lysenkaism." There is also little evidence that either would have instituted allything like what Trotsky called the ""Stalin school of falsification" or consented to the rewriting of history and retouching of photographs in order to glorify their own exploits and abolish those of their critics. Trotsky and Bukharin were far more sympathetic tc-,modern art than their rival and neither was ail advocate of "socialist realism."g"ndeed, while both supported nggative censorship over works that were explicitly critical of tl-re revoIution, neither ever demanded that scbolarly or artistic works must positz'ueiy support a particular party standpoint.9" Rotsky" economic program emphasized the need far rapid industrialization, It undc~ubtedlylacked the moderation of the NEP that Bukharin sought to preserve. Neither Trotskp nor Brtkharin, however, envisioned simultaneously industrializing and collectivizing the nation, Terror would probably have been employed. But their supporters were of a different political caliber than Stalin's and, again, whatever their faults, they did not employ power purely for personal advancement or to settle old grudges. Trotsky and Bukhariil were assimilated Jews, but it is unlikely that either would have engaged in the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin" slater years. Both prided thexnselves on their ruthlessness in the name of tl-re cause, But Bukharin was a better administrator than Stalin, Trotsky would undoubtedly have made a better commar~derin chief: Yq-rundreds of tlzousands of lives, perhaps millions, were unnecessarily wasted dttring the early stages of the German invasion of Russia in 1941, Indeed, wbtever the failings of Trotsky and Bukharin, their policies opposed those of Stalin when it came to Nazisxn and a host of otl-rer issues,
Stalinism The triuxnph of Stalin was predicated on his recognition that tl-re failure of the Western revolutions constituted more tl-ran a temporary setback, His provincialism served him well in the llew coi~text,He understood better than his opponents that the time of the ""professional rev~lntionaryinteltect~~al'q-rad passed: a new communist with less exalted attitudes was required for the great task of:socialist construction, This undertaking was, moreovet; heroic and revolutionary in a new way. The goal of Stalin was more con-
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crete than the international revolution identified with Trotsky and more inspiring than the calltiaus reliance on established economic policies exhibited bp Bukharin. More was involved than rnti~lessnessor terror in winning the great struggle for power. There is a sense in whicl-r Stalin was looking to the future while his enemies were anchored in the past, Industrialization of the USSR was the foremost priority when Stalin took power in 1928. Such a policy, however, presupposed greater agricultural productivity and Lower prices for farm goods, Production had increased in the NEP period. But the policy had also resulted in the formation of a wealthy peasant stratum, or kulaks, wl-rich controlled rnuch of the yearly crop and kept it off the market due to lcrw prices. If grain was tight for domestic consumption, mtjreover, it was alscr inadewate for export, This only made things worse since agricnltural profits were seer1 as the source for investment in heavy industry. Such was the context for Stalir-r" '""se-tcond revolution from above" in which he undertook to cdlectivize agriculture and industrialize the country sirnultaneuusly.97 Agricultural profits would now be requisitioned even as industrial development was undertaken without the appropriate degree of investment, Lahor discipline was employed against the proletariat by lengtl-rening the working day, introducing piecework, severely punishing unexcused absence, issuing residence permits, Lowering wages, rationing food stuffs, and exploiting child labor. But the peasantry suffered the most. They died by the rnitlions due to the combination of incompetence by tl-rose charged with collectivization, the unrealistic expectations of Stalin himself, the ambitisns of the secret police, and the artificid famines induced during the 1920s and 1930s. But that wasnk all. The prospects of success for the new policy obviously depended upon eliminating recalcitrant elements in the party OF those identified with the interest of either class. Indeed, if introducing the new industrial plan was possiHle only by empowering the secret police, it simultaneously demanded instituting a new "'cult of the gersonali ty. '' The first five-year plan was greeced with tremendous entl-rusiasm. But the "'plan" ddid not constitute an integrated program for development. Instead, it called for the rapid modernization of key industries without any regard far consumer needs.98 InefGcicncy was built into it, which helped create the basis for a semilegal black market and also was used to justify the coming terror, Structurirtg the plan in that way, no less than enfcjrcing it as Stalin did, was a choice rather t b m a necessity.gVts unreachabfe production goals, and barbaric enforcement, ironically, brought a measure of success in the devehpment of heavy indrtftr)i'"Us one plan iollowed anotl-ref;however, the price of success became ever higher. The myth of infallibility surrounding the party and its Leader thereby took on increasing importance, Evwthing was thrown behind the modernizing effort: constriction of sex-
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ual freedarn occurred in con~unctionwith the increasing regulation of art and the condemnation of free time. Every cost paid by the populace and every step in the creation of a police state was iderrtified with the creation of socialism. The jusrification for all of this was the ideological postulate of Stalin, which ran counter to the thinking of lt/(farxnt>less than the views of Trotsky and Bukharin, that class cor~flictmust intensify the riearer a nation gets to socialism. Terror was used to answer every problem, correct every mistake, meet every criticism, and confmnt every particular interest or co~intervailing force, Conspiracies were uncovered everywilere. 131atswere "exposed" &at sought to overthrow the USSR and its Stalinist leadership, A11 this only intensified the original paranoid fears-thereby drawing ever mare rigid boutldaries between ""us'"and "them" kboth poIitically a i ~ dmt~rally.The terror insured atomization and unity with the figure of Scalin by suttversing all i~~termediate institutions stmding between the individual and the state. Ever). segmerit of the population was affected by the waves of terror. The terror was both more and Iess tlzan an atteinpt to extract the most out of i ""pimitive socialist accumulatioil," It was not merely a matter t ~ attacking the class enemy, but of consolidating Stalin" personal rule and squaring old grudges.1" The terror struck friend and foe alike, and terms like "guilts' ail$ '5nn0cence" became meaningless. Indeed, E-llailnah Arendt was correct in suggesting that the very arbitrariness of the terror was crucial for the success of the new totalitarian regime.102 Attacks on individuals in the part5 mosdy industrial experts, had taken place earlier. But the assault on the party as an irtstitution began in response to the assassination of Sergei Kirov.1" He had been one of Stalin's early sllpporters and, as "the darling of the party," probably his last genuine rival. There remains littie doubt that Sta Xi11 himself orchestrated the assassination. But the most likely culprit took charge ol the investigation. Trotsky was transfigured into Satan and Bukharin was pushed into the background, The first major purge foilowed quickly, Then the Leningrad party organization, which had traditionally served as a base of Zinaviev's support, was liquidated. Soon afterwards, Zinoviev himself and Kamenev were r~urdered,Then came the Moscow Trials, highlighted by the sensational "confession'kf Bukharin-"Wext it was the militarh thereby leaving the Soviet Union unprepared for the Nazi invasion. The armed forces were demoralized, and there was confusio~iover the chain of command following the collapse of tlze Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939.1O5 Stalin reacted by renewing the terror and insisting that soldiers fight to the death. Those captured were deemed traitors and, making good on his word, after the war thousands of repatriated Soviet soldiers were shipped to concentration and labor camps, Suwicion and distrust were not by-prr>ducts of Stalinism, but rather essential to it, The beginning of the cold war brought
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with it new demands for absolute partisansl-rip, which fed ta a new domestic terror in 1946-48 and its extension into Eastern Europe.1"" The results were monstrous, unimaginable: it is estimated that prisoners in a m p s by the late 1940s numbered between twelve and fourteen mittion.107 There had emerged, in short, what Daniel Rvusset would tater call a ""concetltration camp universe." "Necessity" &Q not demand any of tl-ris. It did not dexnand tl-re horrendous inefficiency, the terrible waste in lives, the blunders in military and foreigrl policy, or the corruption and the lying. History did not somehow require the countless individual incidents of bestiality recounted so graphically by the survivors,f" There was no telet-,logical impetus leading from Lenin to Stalin and it makes little setlse blavning the utopia11 element in Marx,lo9 fet alone what was branded in the notorious Black Book of G o ~ ~ u ~ asz s" hI e. left ~ idea," for totalitarianism. It has already been shown how d i f f e ~ n interpretations t of Marx, and the "left idea,'" could produce very different outcomes. Tndeed, precisely for this reason, those seeking a teleological explanation of Scatinism stand in danger of defining their a~lricommunistposition by the very thinking they oppose. Communism and Nazism: a difkrence exists between a philosophy bent on exnancipation, which was eventtaally corrupted by its supporters, and a philosophy that was rotten from the start, Communism envisioned a free and equal ""association of producers,'khereas the Nazis called for the subordination of the world to the "master race." One may not have lived LIPto its claims but tile other was something no decent person could, in principle, accept, Even if Stalin may have sought to achieve somewhat more rational and limited ends than E-Xitler,lfohowever, the structure of their dictatr3rships, the style in which their police operated, the "authoritarian personality'\of their supporters, the propaganda to which they listened, were roughly the sane, It is acadexnic wl~etherf t a l k emerged from witl-rin the prevailing system and Hitler was an outsider. It also matters little to susvivors whether Stalin was eng~gedin a modernizing project and Hitler was not: it is absurd to argue over whether the elimination of classes is somehow less appalling than the extermination of races. Getting drawn into this kind of cold war debate was a mistalee from the beginning. Tr constitutes an insult to those wl-ro sufkred so terribly under both systexns. But few are content with being ideological orpltar-rs and, ~ u s as t John D. Rockefeller gave away dimes to newsboys m d contributed to many charitable causes, comxnunists under f talin were supportive of various progressive struggles. Memories linger, Nostalgia exists for the old sense of revolutionary purpose, Many living in the new Russia look hack to the past and hope for the emergence of a new strongman in the future, Some xnay even recall the Dmous claim of Georg Luktics that the worst form of sociajism is better than the best form of capitalism. But they forget the retort of Ernst Bloch
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that the worst form of socialism is no s~cialismat all. Too much time has indeed been wasted dciending Stalinism against charges that it was worse, or no better, than Nazism, There is no room left b r erreuses or qualification. The malogies falter that once were drawn hetweell Stalin and Cromwell, Napoliei,n, or even Lenin. Each of them also played his part in destroying a generation. But they unleashed the progressive values of an incipient alternative order. Stalin left behind nothing worthy of being called a legacy, He trampled on every value of: the original iabtor movement, His regime led to the association of Marxism with a socialism of gray and communism with terrorpure and simple, hdeed, when the monster finally died in 1953, the profusion of public sorrow hid a sigh of relief.
The Communist International Stalin transformed world communism. Its former commitment to international class struggle gave way before an unqualified greoccupation with natiorzal interest, But it was again a sittiation in which Lenin himself laid the groundwork for the perversion of his ideas. Already while in Zurich during the war years he had begun planning for a new form of international organization with the power to enforce its decrees: the Second Interrlational had effecrive'iy declared itself bankrupt when its mcrnber parties chose to support their respective governments in 1914. Over the next few years, Lenin participated with other dissidents in what would becc~methe famous antiwar congresses in Zimmerwald and Kienthal. His stands, however, were certainly not designed to build his shrjrt-term influence within the antiwar opposition, The overwhelming majority opposed his demand for an attack on the ""sacial chauvinists" in their national parties, his slogans for turning the world war into an internatioilat class war and, above all, his calf for a new Third International.1 l l Lenin considered the creatioil of a new inter~lationalurganizatioil even more necessary in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, The proletarian ~lprisingsin Central Europe and the burgeoning tide of anti-Soviet propaganda, no less than the dire straits of the fledgling diccatorsl-rip, made coordination among communists in different nations into a matter of some importance. Stlpport for the new Communist Tnternatiorzal m only logical during the early years of the revolution wllen the Bolsheviks were desperately waiting far salvation from abroad.i'z But, if the spirit of revolution still prevailed in Europe when the Communist International was established in 1919, no Communist Party outside Bulgaria had either taken power or found itself capable of effectively influencing its government by 1922. The contintzed existence of an organization dedicated to interna-
tional revolution certainly did not help matters. The USSR found itself isolated, impoverished, and in need of both allies and foreign investment, Lenin's misguided attempt to carry the revolution into Poland failed miserabl?r,N3and it was the same with other attempts to implernenc m ""offensive" strategy elsewhere."z" European wc->rkersbegan finding their way back to social democracy following these defeats and right-wing authoritarians took power in rnany countries: Hortky in Hungary, Pilsudski in Pc~land,and Mussolini in Italy. A counterrevolution was brewing and fear of communism was gripping the West, Lee- W i ~ gCommzlnkm: An hfanrile Disorder ('1920) antici yated the need for a revolutionary reprieve and it expressed the sentiments in foreign policy of what would become the New Ecoilomic Program. The pamphiet attacked the politics of ultralek revolutionaries in favor of building mass parties through trade union work and electoral activiry.jf5 Continued support for the Comintern, given this shift in line, would have been illogical unless Lenin and his followers were geiiuinelg concerned with preserving the unique identity of tl-reir movement, The Cornintern provided the Soviet Union with a revofutionrlry symbol and, perhaps more important, an organizational capacity to foster international action should more favorable conditions for insurgency arise. Its maintenance enabled the masses to see the shift in Lenin's foreign policy for what it was: the tactical holding action of a revolutionary inovenlent in a time of capitalist stabiiity.116 Lenin had originally designed his orgilnizatiwal theory with an eye on maintaining a revofutioilary commitment during nonrevolutionary periods. The same thinking explains his insistence that the acceptance of the '221 Points" serve as a condition for any party" entry into the Cornintern,"7 It demanded that every member party maintain ail undergrouild organization and, tlzrorzgh acceptance of ""democratic centralism,'\obey the instructions of the Cornintern. Sucl-r requirements, again, may have made sense in 1919, Given the noilrevolutionary context of 1921122, however, they must have appeared foofish in strictly utilitarian terms: these conditions csst the cornmuniscs dearly in Italy and elsewhere. But Lenin undoubtedly leared his Cr~nninternbecoming a new version of the socialist ir-rternatioilal, His inhis transigence regarding the 2 t Points is expiicable only by recog~~izing speculative commitment to international revolution that Qirninislaed during the ""scond period" "of the USSR and that completely eroded uilder Stalin, During the early years of the Comintern, the USSR was merely primus i ~ t e pnres,jfx r Its growing dominance developed due to the failure of the Western revolutions and its being lefr as the only existivlg "'socialiist" state, This context proituced Lenin's scattered references to ""socialism in one country" that Stalin would later turn into the fulcrurn of l-ris worXdview. Belief in this idea increased the sense of revolutionary privilege needed to justify the subordination of ail corn~nunistinterests to those of the USSR.
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Thus, foilowing Lenin" deatlz, what he had introdtlced as a holding action on revolutionary politics became a permanent feature of Soviet foreign policy, As tlze gap widened between the brutal present and tlze utopian f u t ~ ~in re the USSR, the need fcrr discipline and conformity grevv,lfY The 21 Points were used to realize this goal within the world communist mtrvement,l") The understanding of the vanguard and its attendant cornmitment to dexnocratic centralism was changed fram a tactic necessary to confront Russian conditions into a strategic postulate, Member parties of the Comintern became locked into abiding by decisions increasingly made in Moscow. The USSR became the focus of their identity and uilcr>nditional obedience the essence of their military style. Thus, ever more surely, the member parties of the Third International fcjund themselves slaves of the revolutiori that had already been achieved, ratlier than agents generating the transformation of their own nations. Securing such ideological obedience demanded coercion. ASone faction in tlze Soviet Union replaced anottier, and those in positions of autlzority were ousted, the substitution of one ""Line" f i ~ another r and the purge of recalcitrant members followed in the Comintern. This dynarllic becosrtes clearest in tlze case of the large German Communist Party (KPD). It began shortly after the Spartacus Revolt of 1919 with the expulsion of Paul Levi,121 the fc~rmer inrtimate of Rosa Luxemburg and her successor as leader of the party, for criticizing the disastrous ""rvolt~tionary" "strategy imposed upon the German communists by Lenin and Trotsky The next stage was worse: flew preoccupations with discipiille produced the ""bolshevization"' of the KPD in 1925-26 under the direction of Grigori Zinoviev in Moscow and his puppets Ruth Fischer and Arkadij Maslow in Berlin,"The last vestiges of a viable demtrcratic centralism were liquidated in that pwge. The substitution of Fisclzer and Maslow by Stafin's henchman, E r n s ThClmann, can indeed almost he viewed as anticlimactic, The foreign poficy s f Lenin was a radical interlude in the history of Russia:"3 his Br~lsheviksconsidered international class conflict as the strategic premise under1ying even the most conciliatory tactics. The secoild period of tlze revolution ( 1 92 1-28) r~arkeda time in which dissent became more constricted and rnernber parties were unable to develop any constructive policies. Stalin's foreign policy, however, eradicated any internationalist concerns. It sought only to exploit the conflicts between nations and reinstate traditional aims lzarking back to tlze time of Peter the Great: a barrier against invasion from Central Europe; warm water ports to the South; control s f the Balkmis; and security against Asia.lzYT'he result was a foreign policy whose dizzying changes of the '"arty line" ukimateiy dernoraiized and disillusioiled its own surporters
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In 1928, Stalin inaugurated the infaxnous ""t-rird period" with his ""scialfascist" thesis that identified social democrats with Nazis, All critics of co~~rnrmism were now lumped together and the Comintern refllsed to support repubfican regimes against rnounting threats from the Right, This sectarian policy would later be ~ustifiedby the belief that Hitler would only last five years and the seemingly revolutionary slogan ""After Hitler, Us!" lt clearly l-relped bring the Nazis to power, More might have been involved, however, than a simple miscaiculation by Stalin, Give11 his desire to intensify csnflicts among Western natiowstates, which would buy time for the USSR to industrialize, l-ris unprincipled "kle turn" may well have been predicated on a secret wish to have the Nazis in power. The year 1936 would witness a change in "line" when Stalin called upon co~~rnrmists evevwhere to support the ""popular front." C~rrlciailelections pitting the Right against tl-re Left were ready to take place in France, and it had become clear that Elitler would Iast more than five years.125 Dissatisfaction with tl-re social-hscist line had already become evident and, at the saxne tixne, a call far sdidaricy abroad might deflect criticism of the terrible purges taking place at hr>me. But this policy was also provisional in charactes: The communists refused ministries in Leon Bt urn's Popular Front government so that they might rexnain free to criticize it, Ferxnenting ""~volutionary" "discontent over its farmally neutral stance during the Spanish civil war, and its economic policies, they simultaneously opposed direct intervention in parliament and equivocated over the spontaneous strike wave of 2936, From tl-te first, wbatever the excellent organizing efforts of the co~~rnrmists, their support for the popular front was purely provisional. This was made clear in 1939 when Stalin concluded his i n k n o u s pact with Elitier, It sprang more from the perception that the West was Incapable of oyposirtg Nazi expansionism, and that Hitler offered a better deal, than tlre fact that a Sovier agreement with tile Western democracies was unreadable. A pact with Germany would, again, provide Stalin with time to reconsolidate his forces fczllc~wing the purge s f Marshai Tlrkhachevsky and the army Leadersbip,l26 It also promised the chance to extend the borders of the Soviet Zlniczil, remove Poland as a threat, and incorporate Lithuania artd Estonia.'" Stalin was indeed intent on meeting all his obligations to Germany and it is important to remember that participation by the Soviet Union in W r l d War II was occasioned only by the invasion of its terrirory in 1941 .Q% National interest understandably became paramount once the war began: it resulted in the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, This step was taken in order for communist parties to fight against fascism bp using national slogans.'" It also enahled Stalin to deal with their leaders individually a i d thereby divide any potential opposition that might emerge in the afrermath
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of the war. Even more importandy, l-rowever, the liquidation of this ""rvolutionary" [organization appeared as an act of good will intended to convince the Allies that the time had come to open a second front a e i n s t Hitler. It didnk cost Stalin much, The end of the war brought a rapid expansion of communist influence along with a general euphoria that produced new hopes for the cotlli~lgpeace, The posibility seemed to present itself through the introduction of new organizations, like the World Trade Union Federation, intent on unifying social democrats and communists. Unfortunately, however, any prospects for such unity were doomed once the cold war began and social democrats, alxnost unanimousl-~r, sided with the West. The year 1947 saw the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, and Stalin was ready with his response, In that same year, the Cominform (Communist Tnformatiox~Bureau) was secretly convened in Poiand.1-30 Present were only the leaders of nine East Eurc~peannation-states, cantrolled by the Soviet Union; there was no participation by non-European parties, and the communist leaderships of France, Traly, and Greece were not even invited. The birth of the new organization was also imrnedialely greeted by a new set of pwges to insure the existence of reliable cc~mmunist goverr-rmentscm the borders of the USSR, Soon enough, NATO faced the Warsaw Pact and Europe was partitioned into spheres of influence, Since the lines were basicaily drawn where the respecdve armies of East and West had liberated the various subjugated nations from the Nazis, for all tl-re cold war rhetoric, tl-re division was already a virtual fait accompii by the war" end. Stalin essentially respected the lines of demarcation. Far weaker than the W s t both economically and militarily, l-re surely considered the acquisition of Eastern Europe well worth the cynical sellout of those revolutionary movements that existed at the time in JtaIy and Greece, The Soviet Union w u l d engage in only two instances of direct arrned conflict outside Eastern Europe: at the Chinese border, wl~ich points to the traditional fear of Asia by Russia, and in Afghanistan, which was seer1 as lying within its sphere of influence and necessary to secure its soutl-rernflank. From its vicrory in World War 11, the Soviet Union received almost everything that it had traditionally wanted: a barrier against European invasion, control of the Balkans, and warn-water ports to the Soutl-r. Just when Stalin was seeking to reaffirm his totalitarian control, hc~wever, challenges arose to his hegemony over the wt~rldcommunist movement, Tito asserted the independence of Yugoslavia in I948 and, following the triumph of .iMao Tse-tung, conflicts of ideological and practical interest produced the Sino-Soviet split of 1953, Far trtore signiticmt, however, was the success of anti-imperialist struggles and the ernergence of neutral states like India. Certainly by 1968, whatever support the Soviet Unir~nextended to national revolutionary movements, it no longer made sense to speak of a
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unified coxnmunist ""movement,"Ql Neutral nations no less tl-ran cornxnunist parties elsewhere would increasingly give or withhold support Eor the USSR on a case-bp-case basis.l"z The nation had squandered its moral capital. Indeed, long before its final dissoicxtion in 1991, the moral authority of the USSR had become a thing of the past.
Breaking
Chains
A new leadership composed of Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrentii Beria, Georgei Malenkov, and Viacfieslav Molotov appeared ready to begin the postStalinist trmsitioi~,It seemed clear to all i~lvoivedthat the USSR required a different approaci~to power in the 1950s.. ft could no Ionger be ruled on the basis of terror-thus tl-re elimination of Beria, tlte forxner head of the secret police and biographer of Stalin, It would have to distance itself hom the old administration and its inefficiency-thus the elimination of Maienkav. It would need a new and more principled foreign policy-thus the elimination of Molotov, an architect of the pact with Nazi Germany Khrrlshchev was not identified with any of: these insritutians and policies in quite the same way. A rnan who had risen under Stalin, and participated in his crimes, he called for reestablishing the primacy of the party and the power of the Central Committee.fl3" This indeed lay bel-rixld the secret Twentietl-r Party Congress of 1956 in which Stalin" crimes were partially revealed,l"" The congress signaled a more liberal attitude towards cultural expression and placed restrictions on the terror apparatus. Xt conde~nnedthe "cult of the personality'bnd marked an attempt to restore the principles of Ieadership associatd wit11 Lenin. C m p s were dismantled, political prisoners freed, and political officials were given some degree of securicy regardillg their psitions and their lives. The m o rigid ~ forms of conformity and censorship were relaxed. Uncetisored writings of atrociries and blunders associated with tl-re recent past were circulated and Khrusl-rchev personally intervened to assure the publication of: Qne Day i~ the Life of Itlnn De~zzsortich by Alexander Solzheni tsyn. In keeping with f tlkte a d Revolztion, moreover, Khrt~skchevsought to mitigate the alienation of ordinary citizens hy introducing new farms participation associated with what is now understood as civil society135 Leninism would be reinvigarated in order to overcorne the legacy of Stalinism. Reasserting the primacy of the party and the vision of a "full scale construction of cssrtmunism" had Ied Khushchev in 1961, while visiting the United States, to claim "We will bury you!" A bureaucratic party and increased production, however, could not change the meager prospects of international revolrxtion. Leriinisrn was never viable as ail establishmentarian
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doctrine and its priviteging of the party-state was a standing impediment to the liberal rule of law The new freedom was, in a sense, as arbitrary as the old terroc The extexit to which dissidents could dissent was never made explicit and Mhrushchev was in line with Lenin's way of thinking when he sent troops to suppras the anticommunist uprising of 1956 in E-Iungary, TAeninismhad helped pave the way for totalitarianism and, if a critical engagement with its autl-roritarian ixnplications was never undertaken, there were also limits to the constraints that could be imposed on what Sartre bad appropriately termed the "ghost of Stalii-t," The new leadership was itself implicated in the crimes of t1.e old regime. But the limits of reform did not merely derive from their fears. The public sphere of the nation and the myth of the party s t w d in danger of being wrecked through a full disclosure of the past, Aher all, it was Stalin who l-rad incarnated the very idea of sucialisxn for an entire generation. It was Stalin who had laid dr~wnthe industrial infrastructure. It was Stalin who had defined ctlltural life, It was Stalin who appeared to have brought the Soviet Union its victory in World War If. It was Stalin wllo l-rad been deified in every conceivable way. Indeed, it was Stalin who had given pmpose to the indescribable horrors fie had imposed on the Russian people during the 1930s and the war years. This fcrrmer sense of revolutionary purpose was lost after the dictator's death. Despite attempts to refashion party unir)i and perhaps even a cuft of Lenin,13Qthe old myth of historical infallibility surrounding the party was undermined by an explosion of semi-official criticism, With its breign policy defined by a narrow perception of national interest, along with the use of utleqltal trade agreements and ""mixed coxnpanies" to exploit its satellites,'" its own citizens began to doubt its pronouncements against imperialism, Even before the fall of Khrushchev, the nation started experiencing a deep malaise or, better, a keling that Kierkegaard, in a dirferent context, called the ""srckness unto death." k~roilically,by callling for a rejection of Khrushchev% "adventurisr~,"Brezhnev capitalized olx this trend. During his seemingly endless reign, soviet socialism becaxne identified with a joyless authoritarianism that served no revolutionary purpose and fostered n o libertarian goals, The ""fullscale construction of communism'" was abandoned as utopian aild even the trumpeted welfi2re state of the USSR could offer little to recommend it in camparison with Scandinavia, Stalin was partially rehabilitated in his more conservative aspects against: Lenin and, in keeping wit11 this move, the state machine received new fegitimacy. Its il~terestswere self-evictent, however, wile11 Brezhnev ordered the invasion of Czechlosfavakia in 1968. The party may have still been privileged in theory, but its bureaucratic and careerisr elements were given primacy in practice m d the attempt to foster civil society withered. The ~zomezklilrtzdrawas liberated from subservience to the party.138 In this
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vein, moreover, Brezl-rnev completed the transformation of the older Stalinist form of '"rash-planning73into an elaborately controlled and subsidized system wherein the prices of hunclreds and thousands of commodities were fixed by tl-re government amid a growing semilegal black market,flg in the face of the ppostcommunist transition, which has introduced bitter poverty and curtailrnent of state benefits, many now look back fondly on the Brezhnev years. Bm such nostalgia is misguided. Corruption was rampant and the decision to engage in an arms race with the United States l-relped produce the econurnic debacle that would Lead to the dissolution of the USSR, A new fc~rmof ""legitimation crisis," a p l o y i q the phrase of Jhrgen Habermas, began taking hold, Marxist rituals no less than the old Stalinist style had already been rendered obsolete, Mass cofrtmunicatit>r~ was subverting the remaining forms of censorship and turning culture into an international commodity Especially given the rise of Western living standards, it was becoming ever trtore difficult simply to denigrate consuxner goods in favor of military hardware white the bureaucratic elite, or not7.irenklalura9reaped the benefits. The USSR was also losing ecr>nc>mic ground as the Brezhnev years came to a close: most had become willing to admit that replating an economy of more than a billion articles was inefficient and that lack of accountability was creating a situation in which shortages were reinforced by waste. Freezes and thaws continued during the Brezhnev era as various elite coalitions struggled with one anr~therover adrni~listrativedecisions and budgetary priorities. Waiting in the wings stood a younger ruling stratum that included Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Cromybo, Yuri Andropav, Konstailtin Cherneilkceaild, also, ~MikhailGorbachev: The more rigid bureaucrats sought to defend against the future, h bitter conflict arose between the neo-Stalinist followers of Brezl-rnev and Chernenko and the young neo-leninist modernizers, supported by Andropov, who took power and held it briefly until his untirnely death, it was atready clear when the "period of stagnadon'+as finally corning to an end, however, that the old system was breaking dowil and that a radical adjustment to the imperatives of capitaiist accumulation w u l d have to take place.1" Nevertheless, iew expected the impact tl-rat Andropov" pprtkgk, Mikl-rail Corbt~cX-rev,would have on Russia and the world. Gorbaclnev maintained a commitment to the primacy of the part& but he also believed in the need for a dexnocratic rejuvenation (glluamg)of tl-re nation and the introductioil of market initiatives (pemstrol;Gcaf.Already in 1988, which marked the first televised Party Congress, Gorbachev sought to re-empower the soviets as popular electoral organs of day-to-day administrative and legal decisic-~nmaking.He called for five-year terms for elected officials and a new presidetitial system based on multicandidate efections by
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a 1,500-mernber Congress of People" Deputies that would also elect a 400member standing legislature, This radical undertaking did not occur ex nihilo, Indeed, nt:, less than Khrushcheti, Corht~cl-revand his supporters Legitimized themselves by making reference to a certain intmpretation of Leninism, They looked to the period g fight an of NEP and envisioned Lenin heading a party desperately t ~ h to increasingly corrupt bureaucracy and use capitalist tools to improve a fagging economy, Corbacfiev and his supporters wished to curb the bureaucrach roll back centralized planning, and gradually end collectivized agriculture. Their aim was to proxnote democratic management and self-administration in the factories and, by transforming the pricing system, make foreign investment more attractive. Spending on consumer goods was to be increased, aiong with discretionary income, while defense expenditures were to be c~lrtaiied. Control over the Eastern bloc was to be lc~osenedand reiations with tl-re Western democracies improved. New liberal cultural and political policies created a climate of respect abroad and, for a brief period, enthusiasm at l-roxne. Political prisoners were released and the possibilities for exnigration expanded. A reexamination c>f the Soviet past begall, Old Bolsheviks like Bukharin and Karl, Radek were rehabilitated and certain of Trotsky's writings were published for the first time. The specter of fear receded, Corbachev brought the cold war to an end. P3is fareig~rpolicy was bold and decisive, He called for a moratctriutrl on nuclear testing and experiments in cl-rernical warfare, and dramatic cuts in conventional forces, He was intent upon expanding the power of the United Nations and the jurisdiction of the World Court, In conjunction with the withdrawal from Afgilanistan, moreova, Gurbact-rev repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine that justified interference in Eastern Europe to protect against "antisocialist" forces. His policies also provided the moral and practical impetus for the mass strikes that tumbled the old-line coxnmunist gavernrnents in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere: it was Gorbachev whose refusal to support repression of mass demonstrations led to the collapse of the Gerxnan Dexnocratic Republic. His 1989 Address to the Council of Europe illdeed expressed the desire to build a "common house,'bn expression coined by Leon Blum in the aftermath, of W r l d War I, which foreshadowed the integration of R ~ ~ s sinto i a the West. Perestri~ikahstered a set of rising expectations for immediate ecc-~nomic improvement. But the transition to a form of market socialism, perhaps on the model of Scandinavia, was sabotaged by the sheer inertia of entrenched bureaucrats who felt themselves threatened by glasnost. They tried to block the devolution of centralized economic authority At the same time, however, the introduction of 'kommodity money" generlzced new forms of competition for resources among the managers of decentralized units, Mong with new incentives and pricing policies, the emphasis on market
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mechanisms-especiaily in agriculture-produd inflation and other serious economic burdens for the working class, The new climate of freedom also fostered previously repressed nationalist sentiments among states comprising the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev unleashed the forces that would bring &out the disintegration of the UfSR.1" Perestroika and glasnost were not halfhearted measures. The institution of democratic procedures, the new comxnitment to the rule of law, the attack on authoritarian culture and the pestering virus of anti-Semitisrn, went beyond a simple reform of the old regime. They inspired a new fibera! vision of civil society, But tlze unrezllized expectations for immediate economic improvement resulted in mass resentment and disillusionment followed. The ensuing economic degeneration, the loss of interrtational prestige, the corruption of democrach and the seeming decay of moral values, would all he bXarned on Corb.1c-l-rev, The sheer rapidity with which evev-rts c>ccurredonly made things wwse: it would indeed seem that the USSR was ""oneday a 11ligl.L~ empire, the next, rubble, " l a Cmmunists condemned Gorbachev b r betraying the party and anticommunists for refusing to break with it. He found himself a u g h t between his early supporters of reform, now intent: on rstdicalizing the process l-re had begun, and the old guard equally intent on rolling it back, The right criticized him for his utopianism and the left for his conservatism, But they were both wrong, His undertaking remains the single most intelligeiit exyerimem with institutional democracy in tl-re history of Russia,
.
Endgame On August 19, 1991, the rnedia reported that a coup had been attempted in the Soviet Union: its failure led to the dissolution of the communist regime.1"" For more than forty-eight hours, the w r l d heid its breath. The forces of demt~cracywere pitted against those of authoritarimim. Mikhail Gorbachev staod under house arrest, Yanks ruxnbled tl-rrough the streets for the first time since the falf of Khrushchev in 1964, The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were placed ~znderrnilitary rule. Resistance crystaitized around Boris Yeitsin in Moscow. Thousands gatl-rered at tile Winter Palace in Leningrad, perhaps the peatest symbol of 1%7, and elsewhere, Democratic media and newspapers were closed down; curfews were ordered in the cities. Troop movements in Soviet Georgia and elsewhere gave every indication that the coup had been planned Eor some time Glasnost and perestroika seemed ready to ~znraveland the nation stood on the brink of civil war, The seizure of power was attempted under the rubric of the "National State Emergericy Corrtmittee,'Weaided by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov
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and President Cennadi Yanayev, both of whorn had gained their posts only due to the personal intercession of Carbachew, it was composed of representatives fro~nthe defense estabIishinent, the KGB, arid various cornmunist-dominated farmer and worker organizations. The incompetence exhibited by the Committee was remarkable. %Itsin and major figures of the giref~rm'hmovement,no less than other middle and low level opponents, remained free. The plotters overestimated the collesion of the arrny and underestimated the need fhr a recngnizahle leader. Nor were they able to articulate a coherent program to deal with the nation's ills. The undertaking was conceived without a clear dehition of leadership roles, a coherent rnilitary strateg).; or an understanding of the degree to which democratic political hopes had taken root. For all that, however, 250,000 handcufff were ordered and reams of blank arrest orders printed.. This w a ~indeed a ""putsch of f0ols." The plc>tterstried to stuff the genie of rebrm back into the bottle, They sought to reverse the trerid towards the "free market," a pluralistic society, and multiparty elections. Mainraining the unaccounra bilisy of the militaryindustrial complex, and fueling it with scarce resources at the expense of consumer goods, was their primary goal. Former ideological justifications, however, no longer made even superficial sense. Their offer of auuthoritarianism plus a discredited form of economic planning testified to the bankruptcy of com~nunisrn,its supporters did not so much corzfrorzt one view of the future wirh mother as, in the words of Zbigrliew Brzezitlski, attemp to set the future against the past, Structural factors doomed the junta. But they also created the fih-eiihood of a revolt in the first place. More was involved than the axnbitions of a k w power-hungry apparatcbiks or even a communist leadership sta~ldingin the shadows, An imyending unioti treaty i n ~ n on t redresskg the imbaiarrcr: of power among the states of the USSR, a worsening economic crisis buttressed by lack of economic support fi-om the West, the decay of the communist parry, and a political identity deficit, created the context in which contingent decisions were made. On August 17, 1491, just two days before the attempted seizure of power, Aleksander N. Yakolev-the so-called ""gdfather of perestr0ika"predicted a Staiinist coup as he resigned from the coxnmunist party, Months before, Eduard Shewardnaze, who had helped bring the cold war to a close as Gorbachev" foreign minister, stated publicly that dictatorship in tile USSR was irnminent and surrendered his post. Yakovlev was not taken seriously9 and it was originally assumed that the dictatorship of: which Shevardrlaze spoke was to have been led bp Corbachev himself. indeed, enough responsible people believed tl-rat his express request for these feaders to remaisl at his side was a mere ploy,
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Around the beginning of 1991, in between periods rnarked by concern over the disintegration of central authority, the Western press talked incessantly about how Gorbachev was af~assingpower. This was, in turn, used to justify the critical posture of Yeltsin and those ""radicals" wishing to speed up the economic and political changes that the Soviet leader bad initially set in motion. They supported a plan, tabled by Corbachev, to introduce tl-re market in ""S00 days," They called for dismantling the central state and autonomy fc~rthe fifteen republics. They condemned Gorhachev for refusing to challenge the militarh the KGB, and the still powerful communist bureaucracy. With support from the radicals eroding, he and the moderates turned to the "conservatives," Allies were I I C ) ~sought among those who had opposed perestroika and glasnost from the beginning, Jstdeed, often with hyperbolic ftourish, Yeftsin and Shevardnaze accused Gorbachev of poor judgment and perhaps even of having had a hand in the conspiracy.
Confronted by an implacable right wing seeking to ihitzit democratic change, and a radical Left wing seeking a rupture with the past, Gorbachev must have considered his primary aim to avoid civil war, A practitioner of co~~promise, he mistakenly believed that the c(~~nmunist parry could be reforxned. He also rnade serious errors in matters of personnel, trusting and q p ~ i n t i n gfigures who would play important roles in the attempted coup, Gorbachev undoubtedly bears a degree of responsibility fur the events, and he admitted as rnuch. His constant sbifling from one set of allies to another created uncertainty and a self-fulfilling prophecy regarding his own political. weakness. Jf Yakovlev and Shevardnnze were aware of a possible coup, however, it stands to reason that Gorbachev knew of it as well, A "mini-rehellion'' hd,after all, been attempted on June 17, 1991, when Prime Minister Pavlov, with support from the future rebels, asked parliament to enhance his powers at the expense of the president. Gorbachev may have sounded optimistic in public after heating back the attack, but he drew away from the raclicals in the following weeks. Perhaps he overestimated the extent to which cabinet posts would placate the old guard. Nevertheless, the claim that he should simply have dropped any connection to the party stalwarts can only be made otit of context. Sanctimonious comments by f tlevardnaze tl-rat Gorbachev ""skould have "listened to me' and 'quit'" "simply ignored political reality and the responsi~ have intensibilities of leadership, Divisiolls within the Soviet U n i o ~could fied, cornxnunists at the grass roots might have attempted to slow reforms even more, the country could have been thrown into gearer chaos, and the still pr>werful party might well have embarked earfier s n the adventure it undertook in August. 13erl-rapsa coup would have been attempted sooner or later anyway. But it also might have occurred under more propitious cir-
120 *
Lenirzism and Liqond
curnstances, Had it succeeded, surely, Gorbachev would have been condemned by those who later criticized his failure to recognize fully the corruption of the commrmist party, Indeed, whatever the posturing of the rradicals, it only made sense for him to accernyt staving off a coup by seeking to work with conservatives in the communist party, It is a rnistake simply to judge the choices of yesterday by the evelits of today, That is especially the case given that the policies of the radicals helped gush Curbacbev to the right in the first place, They never explained how they wished to bring about a capitalist transformatioli of the USSR in 500 days. S~lbsequentill-conceived attempts would plunge the nation into virtual bankruptcy and there is something pathetic about Yeltsin's later admission; "'it was all more difficult than we first anticipated.'" The: radicals also opposed Gorhachev's sensible and progressive plan for the devolution of centralized autl~orityand tl~eyadamantly criticized his refusal to act sooner in offering autonomy to the republics. This makes it all the more ironic that Ueltsin should have left (office on January 1,2000, enmeshed in a genocidal war aimed at squashing the quest b r national seif-determination by Ghecl-mya. Then too, the radicals castigated Cc>rbachevfor maintaining a co~nmuxiistculture, thereby inhibiting investmerit and economic aid from the Western democracies. Respect for pariiarnentarism and the courts has notably declined under the corrupt regime of Ycltsin, however, and Eoreign inrvestment is still woefrllly inadequate. The radicals never co~isideredthat Western policy might have been predicated less on prudence or a ""capital shortage" than a desire to further weaken a disintegrating superpower. Gorbachev's attempt to affirm the spirit of social detnocracy, inr this vein, went hand in hand with an ever inore obvious internationalist cornmitment. By way of contrast, bowever, the new leaders of Russia have embarked on a riew riationalist course, often with riew expressions of nuclear saber rattling, and its standing among nations is far lower than it was in 1991, The problems of times past have indeed only been rendered more acute with the dissotutiori of the "former Union." f ocialisrn has, of course, been discredited, Identified with communist authoritarianism, rather than the democratic traditions of the Western labor movement, visions of the ""market" continue to irilspire reformers. Privalizing especially srndler firxns was perhaps unavoidable. An errelusive reliance on the market, however, was utopian from the beginning, Evevwhere the trar~sirionhas prove11 severe. Outmoded larger industries have provoked little interest frorn buyers and econornic hardship have forced most ordinary people to sell their publicly distributed shares in what are iargely failing industries, thereby produci27g an "iembourgeoisement"" of the nurnenklatura and strengthening the hand of an emergent Mafia. Representatives of the old bureaucracy and the new IVafia would indeed
Lc~zi~zkmz and Bqond
*
12 1
use their connections, cash, and expertise to dominate the new firms and wield eilormc>uspower in the new order. Distortion of all social institutions at the expelise of working people has been the consequence of an increasingly ineyuitabie and irnaccountable concentration of wealth. Pitting markets against state intervention in dogmatic hshisn is already no longer viable: the real issue is the degree of mix between them. Planning may l-rave proven notoriously weak in specifying consumer deinands, hut it is a mistake tc-,assume that the market will inevitably rebuild the infrasrructure, surmount unempIoyinent, or guarantee decent wages in the near future, Maintaining the welfare state is surely as pressing as the need h r policies devoted to fostering a free market. Economic desperation might lead many states of the former USSR to engage in various forms of economic cooperation among themselves as they look west for investment. But the wave of repressed nationalist passion unleashed in the wake of the c<-~up continues to grip the region. The "'balkanization'9caking place in the region has already created memt~riesof the instability prior to the outbreak af %rid War l, Minorities have engaged in pitched battles in Moidavia, Georgia, m d elsewhere, Tartars have called k ~ succession r from Russia, Savage conflict has broken out once again between Croats and Serbs in Yugoslavia. The Crimea is demanding independence from the Ukraine. Civil war within and between many of the new republics remains a disti~lctpossihili~and might even, one day, be carried on with nuclear weapons. Reaction f o l l ~ w seven those revolutioils that conservatives tend to like, History moves neither forward nor backward in a straight line, But the old dream was sl-rattered long before the rnasses toppled the grotesque statues c>f party beroes iike Lenin, SverdIov, Dzerzhinsky, and Stalin, Democracy was saved in 1991 and it rernainf the slogan of today despite the dangers for tomorrow. These is no sense in looking hack to the communist past. Boris Nicolaevsky, the old ~Vensheuikleader, once told ahcrut meeting Bukharin some years after Lenin's death."' While reminiscing, ayyarendy, l-reasked the old Bolsl-revik why his party l-rad perxnitted those radical experiments from below that bad marked the early days of the revr>lution, Bukharin supposedly responded: '"Because we didn't think we could actually succeed and we wanted to provide a monuxnent, like that of the Paris Commune, to inspire comrades of the future," An obsessic->nwith industrial prr>drrctiurtand authoritarian control unfolded instead. History offers every movement only one cl-ranceat success: the task for the next century involves redefining the nt>tion of success and imagining anew the next mc>numents to freedom,
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A Bridge to the Present: Rosa Luxemburg and the Underground Tradition
Economic refc~rmismand political authoritaria~iismvied for influence over the labor movement for most of the twentieth century But there was always anotl-rer tradition lurking in tl-re background. Its trajectory would extend from the Paris Commune and the Russian mass strike of 190.5 tc-,the European workers' uprisings of 19 18-23 over the Spa~iishCivil War and to the student revolts of 1968. Its partisans were eclectic and bound by a spirit o f revolutionary humanism and libertarian socialism. most of them are regrettably forgotten. The most visible representative of this underground tradition remains Rosa Luxemburg.l Two films have been made about her, she rernains the subject of scholarly work,Z her death is still marked by mass demonstrations, and the German Party of Democratic Socialism has even named a foundation alter her. Luxemburg was one of those genuinely charismatic personalities who extracted intense loyalty horn her hiends and, according to cllose who participated in l-rer classes at the social desnocratic party school, she must also have been an exceptional teacher. Luxemburg had her difficulties as a Pole and a Jew But she made her way, She confronted the sexism of inany in the Second International and she sl-rowed tl-rat a woman could become a major theorist, a superb orator, and a leading revolutionary activist. Her brutal death at the hands of protofascist soldiers during the Spartacus Revolt sf 1919, and the later camrnunist assault on the ""syphilitic bacilllis of ~~ her as a genuine heretic and an Luxemburgism" "ring the 1 9 2 0 certified autl~eriticinartyr.
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* A Bridge to the l3r~seg.2c: Rosa Lzkxenzburg and the Undt~gromndTi.u!dZ'tion
It was understandable that, following her death, friends should have begun publishing works intended to humanize Luxemburg in the public eye.' But the crlrrelit preoccupation with her personal life and her sense of identity, or lack of it,"has resulted in a discussion more inrent on determining what she was, or how she should have "felt," than what she thought and what she did. Luxemburg herself would have had little use for any of this. She scorned all attexnpts to "transform political questions into persona!, sentimental ~ i l e s , "And ~ she was right. Luxemburg was ir-rdeed sensitive and brave and she died tragically. Brtt there were surely trtany men and women-just as sensitive and just as brave-who died just as tragically. The point is to discern her real contributions. Luxemhurg" sensibility and charisma say nothillg about her salience, There is n o use artificially trying to turn her into a forerunner of fe~rtinist theory or practice," It also makes little sense debating her Jewish or Polish "'identity" 'or suggesting that her support far national cultural autonomy somehow mitigates her critique of the right to natisnaf self-determination. Luxemburg was uninterested in tl-re influential Jewish Bund in imperial Russia, she rejected Polish natioilalism, and she vehemently disageed with activists intent on farming a separate women's movement like Lili Braun, Luxemburg deserves to be judged in the terms by wl-rich she defined herself, Her struggles were undertaken in the name of socialism, democrach and internationalisxn, Sl-re was beholden to no dogma. fl-re ernplayed the method of Marx to contest his own predictions and claims.' Consistent in her attacks o n reforrrtism, and clear about the authoritarian dangers of cornxnunisxn, her reflections on the mass strike are remarkably salient in thinking ahrout 1989, Ekr views oil inter~latioilafismand ""self-admiilistration" a k o strike a chord given the need for a progressive response to globalization. There is something invigorating, moreaver, ahout her radical understanding of democracy and its rcde in public life. Indeed, perhaps more than any other thi~tkerof the "'golden age,'"~er ideas speak to the concerns of modern activists intent upon changing the progressive discourse.
Internationalism and Imperialism Born in the fittte city of Zamosc, 13aland, in 18'71, to a middle-class Jewish faxnily, Rosa Luxemburg experienced, firsthand, the terrible Jewish pogrom of 1881 in VVarsaw.8 It left an indelible mark and she would maintain a profound concern with what is today called human rights. tuxernburg never sought to deny what she was, but she refused to make what she was the foundation of her politics, Her position came down to the following:
The duty aE the class party of the proletariat to protest and resist national appression arises not from any special 'right of nations"just as, for example, its striving for the social and political equality of sexes does nor at all resuit from any special 'rights of worncnhhhich the nlovemcnt of bourgeois emancipation refers to.. Tl-tis duty arises solely from the general opposition to every form af social inequality and social domination, in a word, from the basic position t>f socialism.9
Luxem burg first became involved in socialist politics during her high school years wllen she participated in various clandestine and semiclandestine organizations like the radicatly internationalist and partially. terrorist Her activities Ied to her tliglzt shortly after gradc>rgailizationPrOkll~~aridt~lO ~lationfmm Poland to Zurich, where she met her future lover Leo Jogiches who, whatever the personal. and romantic conflicts between t h e ~ n , ~rc-' mained her political collaborator until her death. In Zurich she studied mathematics, natural science, law, and political econoiBy at the rmiversity There she also first systematicaiIy read the works of Marx and Engcls and completed her dissertation The I n d ~ s ~ r i Derrelc~pment al of Poi~nd(1898). Xts conclusions stood in accord with those of her articles for the journal she and Jwiches founded in 1 5133; Sprawa Robofizicxs (The WorkersToice),'" The Jrrdustrz~lDevelopme~tof Potand argr~edthat Polish industrial development was dependent upon that of Russian capitalism. The implications were clear: support for Polish nationalism must prove counterproductive for st>ciafists since its success would hinder the general economic developrrtent of the Russian empire on which the expansion of the proletariat depended, It would also underxnine class solidarity and divert concern from overthrowing the czar. Luxemburg no less than Lenin sought to make a b0urgeois r e v o I u t i ~against ~ ~ the inclinations of an underdeveloped and servile bourgeoisie, But she drew