Social Theory, Power and Practice Jerry Tew
Social Theory, Power and Practice
Social Theory, Power and Practice Jerr...
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Social Theory, Power and Practice Jerry Tew
Social Theory, Power and Practice
Social Theory, Power and Practice Jerry Tew Senior Lecturer School of Social Work University of Central England
© Jerry Tew 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–80306–X This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tew, Jerry, 1955– Social theory, power and practice / Jerry Tew. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0–333–80306–X 1. Power (Social sciences) 2. Social change. 3. Social sciences– –Philosophy. I. Title. HN49.P6 T49 2002 303.3—dc21 2002025243 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
To Stella, James and Alasdair
v
Contents List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgements
x
1
Introduction
1
2
Everything in its Proper Place? Modernism and Postmodernism Modernism and modernity Critical theory Postmodernism Modernist practice Postmodern practice
3
4
Exposing Conflict: Structural Approaches to Power and Inequality Objective, material and real: unpicking ontologies Structural theory Theories of class and capital Theories of gender, age, sexuality and (dis)ability: extending concepts of patriarchy Theories of imperialism, colonialism and racism Integrating structural theories Structural theory and social activism What’s the Story? Poststructuralism, Discourse and Narrative Ideology and culture Discourse and narrative Poststructuralism and language Approaches to deconstruction Psychoanalysis and language Foucault and the archaeology of the modern The politics of knowledge: social constructionism and standpoint epistemologies Poststructural practice: working with language and narrative
vii
10 10 17 19 24 29 33 33 37 39 45 53 58 60 65 65 68 71 75 80 82 85 88
viii Contents
5
Hidden Depths: Reclaiming Emotionality Emotionality under modernism Shifts within modernism: emotion in psychology and sociology The question of desire Critical perspectives: power relations and emotionality Theorising emotionality as a distinct level of social experience Witnessing and mobilising emotions: issues for practice
114 116
6
Stepping out: (De)constructing Identities Decentring the subject Performing identities Opening up the psyche The art of projection Conscripting ‘the body’ Reflexive identities ‘Cutting up and remoulding’: working with identities
121 122 126 129 138 140 143 146
7
Relations of Power Power and modernism Theories of oppression and discrimination Foucault and the dispersal of power Reclaiming productive aspects of power A matrix of power relations Reconceptualising empowerment Power in practice
152 152 156 159 162 165 167 170
8
Systems, Instabilities and Change Systems, harmony and change Agency and subjectivity Generative tensions: power and contradiction Power relations and the dynamics of change Crisis and resolution Strategies for emancipatory change: towards a critical practice
177 177 180 182 184 186
Conclusions for Theory and Practice
203
9
97 98 104 108 110
194
Bibliography
207
Index
227
List of Figures 7.1 Matrix of power relations
166
8.1 Schematic history of crisis formation from a systems perspective
187
8.2 Schematic history of crisis formation from a psychodynamic perspective
189
8.3 Schematic history of crisis formation from a power relations perspective
191
ix
Acknowledgements I would like to thank those whose research supervision, feedback and support have been influential in the genesis and writing of this book – particularly Peter Leonard and Marian Barnes. I have also derived inspiration and ideas from a wide range of current and former colleagues, students and service users with whom I have had the privilege to work. Finally, I would like to acknowledge a particular debt of gratitude to Jo Campling for her wisdom and guidance in the execution of this project.
x
1 Introduction
The aim of this book is to integrate various strands of contemporary social theory in order to develop a critical framework for analysing social relations and the operation of power. Elements of this framework are then applied to examine specific aspects of practice within the human services and, in particular, to questions of how to bring about change in ways that empower those who experience distress, abuse or social exclusion. By bridging theory and practice, I seek to avoid the potential abstraction of ‘pure’ theorising, and the potential ineffectiveness of a practice that is unaware of the importance of power in influencing how human difficulties may arise and be resolved. Drawing on both the structural analyses of Marxism, feminism and anti-racism, and more recent poststructuralist understandings of the operation of power and subjectivity, I aim to bring together those concepts that may be most incisive in exposing inequalities in social relations and indicating potentiality for empowering change. While being cautious of re-creating ‘grand theory’, I will argue for the importance of establishing frameworks to analyse how power is structured, contested and renegotiated, and the interplay between the various ‘levels’ at which social relations take place – including hitherto neglected aspects of social experience such as emotionality. Such concepts and frameworks are crucial if we are to be able to identify both the potential commonality and the particularity of people’s social experience – whether of oppression or exclusion, or of solidarity and social influence. They may be deployed to review and relocate current notions of anti-oppressive and empowering models of practice within a more comprehensive analysis of power relations, social structuring and personal identity. In exploring the application of these frameworks to particular aspects of practice, the book aims to 1
2 Social Theory, Power and Practice
provide a sounder basis for identifying strategies for bringing about emancipatory change within the work of the human services. This book is driven explicitly by notions of theory having a part to play in social change, in moving, however slowly and inconsistently, towards goals of ‘social justice’. It seeks to drive a practice that is emancipatory in that it is ‘concerned above all with liberating individuals and groups from constraints which adversely affect their life chances’ (Giddens 1991: p. 210). It is difficult to be precise or definite about what exactly these concepts may mean: they serve more as indicators of a direction than any specification of some final destination. Thus an emancipatory politics may best be understood as aiming ‘towards the creation of conditions for ongoing dialogue and contestation’ rather than any once-and-for-all overcoming of domination (Healy 2000: p. 6). As Ernesto Laclau (1988) argues, it is important not to abandon any notion of emancipatory ‘meta-narratives’, but to be cautious about letting them take on some fixed or pre-ordained status. They imply challenging processes of social exclusion, oppression and restriction of opportunity – but they do not prescribe some simple notion of equality, liberation or social participation as an all-encompassing end-point which, once reached, constitutes a utopian vision of untroubled happiness for all. Perhaps, most fundamentally, they may be understood as the principles of an ‘ethical’ relationship or respect towards those who, by whatever myriad of social, cultural and inter-personal processes, come to be defined as ‘other’, ‘inferior’ or ‘outside’ (see Derrida 1994). I will use the term ‘critical’ to denote theory that has such an emancipatory intent. Its value relates to its ability to inform social practice in its many forms: the everyday actions and strategies of people in positions of relative power and powerlessness, political activity in its broadest sense, and – the particular focus of this book – the professional practice of those working in the field of human services. It is not any claim to intellectual superiority that marks out this territory of critical theory; its legitimacy stands or falls by its unmasking of the oppressive operation of power and its ability to open up opportunities for those currently experiencing themselves in positions of distress and powerlessness. In this way, critical theory and critical practice may be seen to be inextricably interconnected: neither has meaning or significance without its relation to the other. As will be explored in more depth in later chapters, the very process of writing may be seen to be charged with political significance: it is not some neutral act of representing something already ‘out there’, but a process whereby certain meanings and connections are constructed
Introduction 3
and, to some extent, fixed. In taking on the position of a critical theorist, I place myself at the margins of the modernist project: a subversive position that seeks to open up and challenge some of the oppressive and marginalising processes that may lie at the heart of modernity, while at the same time remaining in dialogue with those elements of modernist thinking and practice that may have potential value for an emancipatory project. Within the text of this book, I will be seeking to fix the meanings of sets of terms and concepts in relation to one another, fixing them in ways that may sometimes differ subtly, or radically, from how they may be fixed in other texts. Such a fixing provides for a degree of coherence and narrative flow within the text. However, it is a process of ‘making sense’ that is necessarily temporary and somewhat uneasy: conflicts and contradictions may remain within the text – and particular chains of meaning and relationships to other terms may only be partially explored. I hope that this process remains reasonably transparent, allowing the possibility for others to react to dissonant elements within the text and hence take forward the process of exploration and enquiry. As Derrida has argued, any process of taking a position for ‘justice’ paradoxically involves some of the same processes of violence and violation that characterise the ‘power play’ of modernist discourse. In covering a broad scope of inherently complex theories, ideas and arguments, it is my intention to pull out themes that connect across and help to build up an overall framework for analysis, to cut across much of the compartmentalisation of ‘knowledge’ that has characterised modernism and, as will be discussed later, served to underpin a social order characterised by inequality and oppression. This project is both integrative and disruptive – introducing some new intellectual discourses and seeking to break up some existing ways of thinking and experiencing. I am aware that, through my particular ‘take’ on certain approaches, I may do some violence to the integrity of particular perspectives: they may not be described in their entirety, and some discussion of their inner subtleties and complexities may be sacrificed. Instead, my work may highlight elements that may not conventionally be foregrounded in order to make connections with ideas external to particular bodies of thought. If one is seeking to achieve any form of break with modernism, conventional notions of logic and order may become inappropriate as they may serve to bind the text to particular ways of compartmentalising and separating out theory and ‘knowledge’. There is no natural logic or
4 Social Theory, Power and Practice
order to this text. Each section grapples with some aspect of the power relations of modernity, but as these may be inextricably interrelated, the full meaning or significance of any part of the text can only become apparent through its connection with what appears both before and after. For the purposes of narrative, I have tended, somewhat arbitrarily, to place theory before practice, and general conceptions before particularisations. This may imply false dichotomies and an illusory linearity of argument. This would be a misrepresentation of more complex processes that may be both simultaneous and recursive: developments in theory and practice, and explorations of the general and the specific, may arise out of and inform one another. The recent history of developments within the field of human services shows how practice may be both behind and ahead of innovations in theory. Within the British context, much practical work has been done in challenging racism and sexism embedded in personal attitudes and institutional and professional practices. While such work may have been inspired by somewhat sketchy notions of structural oppression, the pushing forward of practice has often been driven much more by intuitive or ‘gut’ feelings of outrage at manifestations of unfairness, and a sensitivity to the complex damage that may be done to people, individually and collectively, when they are subject to discrimination or social exclusion. Similarly there have been very significant moves in deconstructing notions of professional or expert power, and in striving towards creating relationships of ‘partnership’ between workers and service users. At a policy level, these developments have become linked to new discourses around social inclusion. Such approaches have been influential in the development of ‘antioppressive’ or ‘values-based’ practice across various professional groups involved in health and social care. To some extent, there is a need for theory to catch up with practice, and learn from the emotional as well as the rational understandings of power relations as they operate in practice. At the same time, developments in poststructural understandings of power relations – with potentially great significance – have so far had relatively little impact on practice in the human services, partly due to the inaccessibility of some of the language and conceptual structures in which they have been articulated. In particular, this body of theory may be very helpful in unpicking some of the complexities as to why ‘the revolution’ has not taken place, and why some people have felt oppressed by aspects of what has been done in the name of ‘antidiscriminatory practice’. It is therefore the intention of this book to
Introduction 5
build new bridges between progressive and emancipatory developments in both theory and practice. This book is written out of my (gendered, classed, racialised) experience of theory and practice within a British context, although it draws on ideas and orientations that have emerged in other formations of modernity, principally Europe, North America and Australasia, and also from locations colonised by the West, but seeking to overthrow elements of this legacy. It reflects the different voices of those who have sought to make sense of, and transform, their experiences of oppression. This sampling is clearly partial and selective, and the juxtaposing of approaches from different geographical and other contexts may not do justice to the diversity of theory and practice traditions that exist internationally, despite (or in resistance to) the homogenising tendencies of globalisation. Nevertheless, ideas may have the potential to speak to more than one context and, by putting together perspectives with different points of origin, it may be possible to generate new and creative forms of common ground. In seeking to define concepts of modernity, I will start to unpick some of the contradictions between its claims towards enhancing social justice and opportunity, and some of the realities of entrenched privilege and inequality that would seem to have lain at its heart. In Chapter 2, the emergence of social theory is contextualised in relation to the dominant strands of modernist thought and their relationships with the various shifts in class, gender and ‘race’ relations that have emerged since the Enlightenment. I will argue that modernist thought has tended to hide or diffuse awareness of social tensions by privileging certain strategies for ‘knowing’ over others. In particular, it has devised conceptual structures that, by separating out raw and discordant experiences into apparently neat and inoffensive categories, have made it harder for people to make sense of their distresses and discontents, and to join with others in bringing about change. It is important not to characterise the social relations of modernity – or the products of modernist thought – as entirely smooth or untroubled. There may be found to be tensions between emancipatory intentions and discriminatory practices. Underlying social and economic contradictions may fuel instabilities and transformations, while out of modernist social theory may emerge disruptive elements that may threaten previous strategies for managing and controlling social relations. Instances of this, such as psychoanalysis and systems theory, are discussed in more detail in later chapters. Following on from this analysis of modernism, there is a brief excursion into postmodernism: a set of perspectives that, on the one hand,
6 Social Theory, Power and Practice
seek to expose and overturn some of the tenets and certainties of modernism, while, on the other hand, may prove somewhat ambiguous in terms of any ability to penetrate the workings of relations of social power and inequality. Again there may be possibilities for a selective and critical appropriation of such perspectives within an emancipatory project. However, in order to maintain clarity within the discussion, I seek to retain a distinction between postmodernism and the more specific developments of poststructuralist theory that are explored in Chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 2 closes with an exploration of how modernism has been highly influential in human services practice, providing some apparently secure foundations in terms of knowledge, understanding and technique – but ones which tend to exclude any engagement with issues of power and oppression. While postmodern perspectives may provide valuable elements of critique in relation to such approaches and the premises upon which they are founded, they may also be found lacking when it comes to any clear strategies for identifying or addressing questions of power. As well as disrupting the certainties and generalisations of modernist social theory, postmodernism also sought to discredit, as part and parcel of outdated ‘meta-narratives’, structural analyses, such as those of capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism, that have explicitly sought to expose and question the operations of power within modernity. In Chapter 3, I seek to reclaim this ground and revisit the critical potential of traditions that have sought to identify how social oppression might be patterned in relatively consistent ways, and how these might give rise to certain commonalities of experience on the basis of class, gender, ‘race’ or other social categorisations. The value and potential limitations of these approaches are then explored in terms of how they may promote forms of practice that may be empowering for service users. Whereas structural theories have tended to emphasise the material and the generalised aspects of experience, poststructural approaches have opened up an analysis of the more local operations of power that may be embedded within relations of discourse and language. These are discussed in Chapter 4, which starts with their origins in the analyses of the operation of ideology of Althusser and Gramsci, and in the development of French linguistic structuralism and deconstruction from Saussure to Derrida. In turn, this may be seen to link with the highly influential approach to history and discourse developed by Foucault.
Introduction 7
These themes may be seen to be reflected in a developing arena of therapeutic practice in which strategies of deconstruction and reconstruction are used in working with people’s narratives – the ways in which people may situate themselves in the stories they tell about themselves and their lives, or how they may be situated in the stories of powerful others. This may offer more subtle and less confrontational modes of bringing about emancipatory change. Having opened up an understanding of how power may be embedded in material and discursive levels of social relations, Chapter 5 extends this to an analysis of the operation of power within emotional relations and interactions. This has tended to be a somewhat hidden area within modernist thought, as it has been seen as threatening to notions of rational order. However, particularly through psychoanalysis and developments in feminist sociology, the radical importance of emotion has emerged – as a carrier of messages about injustice and solidarity, and as an arena in which inequalities in human relationships may be acted out. While the reclaiming of emotion for emancipatory theory can appear a relatively new project, working with the power of emotion is not new to therapeutic practice. Where elements of psychodynamic or humanistic approaches may be harnessed to anti-oppressive perspectives, it may be possible to develop more effective ways of hearing or receiving emotion as a witness of past and present instances of abuse or discrimination, and channelling the energy or outrage and hurt towards bringing about emancipatory change. Much of modernist theory and much of current human services practice may be seen to rest on the notion of ‘the individual’: an essentially consistent and intentional subject who may be held accountable for their actions and who is seen to be defined very much in isolation from others. In Chapter 6, I deploy the tools of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism in exploring how personalities and identities may be socially constructed within the context of potentially unequal power relations. In this way, subjectivity may be seen to be an ongoing performance, a holding together of a fractured and conflicting amalgam of identities that have been brought to life through people’s insertion into, and interaction with, a particular array of discursive, emotional and material relations. Viewed in this way, the individual subject may no longer be seen as a source of power and agency, but as a location through which power flows and is enacted. This poses difficult questions for traditions of practice that have worked towards the restoration of personal
8 Social Theory, Power and Practice
autonomy, coherence and integrity as a basis for re-establishing social inclusion. Instead, it raises the possibility of an emancipatory practice that might deconstruct modernist notions of unitary identity, and open up opportunities for living more fluid forms of subjectivity. Relations of power may be seen to have been a theme running through each chapter. In Chapter 7, I attempt to grasp and define concepts of power in more explicit ways, reviewing diverse understandings of power, discrimination and oppression from mainstream sociology, structural theory and poststructural approaches, before converging on more specific definitions of power and conceptualising a matrix of the different ways in which power may operate: as productive or oppressive and as hierarchical or cooperative. This links into a review of how an explicit focus on power differentials has impacted on human services practice, particularly in terms of anti-discriminatory or anti-oppressive practice, and in moves towards breaking down hierarchical relations between workers and service users. As well as challenging oppressive manifestations of power, practice has sought to develop notions of ‘empowerment’, denoting the productive deployment of power, although the usage of this term has been somewhat confusing and contested. I seek to define a critical concept of empowerment that reclaims it from the territory of the New Right and liberal humanism. Critical theory would be ineffective as a basis of emancipatory practice if it were not able to supplement its analysis of power relations with some theoretical understanding of how processes of change may be enabled and supported. This provides the theme for Chapter 8. Different models of social transformation are considered in relation to the understandings of power derived in the previous chapter. While systems theory has provided concepts of conservative regulation, it may also offer a model of transformation in which existing rule structures may break down under certain circumstances. Dialectical materialism focuses on an historical dynamic of inherent conflict and contradiction, and this is contrasted with an exploration of how change may come about in less confrontational ways within the context of cooperative power relations. Out of this emerge theoretical ‘maps’ both for free-flowing, incremental forms of transformation, and for processes in which underlying tension and contradiction may build up to a point of crisis or rupture, a point which may offer significant possibilities for some form of emancipatory transformation. It is argued that many of the scenarios in which human services practitioners may become involved may be
Introduction 9
understood using one or other model. Empowerment may potentially be brought about through preventative, developmental or capacitybuilding strategies, and through models of crisis resolution that support the emergence of previously suppressed issues, and the consequent renegotiation of structures and relationships. In the final chapter, I seek to draw together some of the themes that have been developed throughout the book, not in the sense of some final and definitive conclusion, but as a point of departure for further work.
2 Everything in its Proper Place? Modernism and Postmodernism
Major strands of social theory have arisen out of, and in relation to, their historical and social context. Ideas and formulations may be seen to be of their time and not some form of neutral and disconnected process of ‘knowledge’ production. In this chapter, I will discuss how the split and separate traditions of positivism and humanism may relate to the emergence of modernity as a social formation. This leads in to a consideration of how modernism has been contested – from both the perspective of postmodernism and that of critical theory – and an evaluation of the ways in which both modernism and postmodernism have influenced human services practice.
Modernism and modernity From the seventeenth century onwards, Europe witnessed a massive transition in terms of dominant forms of social and economic organisation, culture and thought. Through the processes of the Enlightenment, traditional or feudal forms of society were replaced by a social formation that has subsequently come to be known as ‘modernity’, and the emergent ideas, cultural forms and intellectual understandings associated with this have formed the basis of what has been termed ‘modernism’. Although the notion of a ‘modern’ era in history is not new, conceptualisations of modernity as a particular social order emerged only when attention became focused on its possible demise – as part of a new historical break or ‘turn’ in the late twentieth century. Concepts of modernity drew together aspects of a social order that could not all be subsumed within more particular notions, such as capitalism, industrialisation, scientific progress or secularisation. Whereas some commentators focused more on the technical aspects of 10
Modernism and Postmodernism 11
economic, scientific and industrial transformation, others have emphasised the political and cultural aspects of shifts within the social order, regarding modernity as ‘a structure of historical consciousness’ (Osborne 1992: p. 84). Within certain conventional historical and sociological accounts, modernity can be seen as some natural consequence of industrialisation, economic advancement and the (early) globalisation of trade. However, from a more critical perspective, it may be argued that the particular forms taken by western modernity were by no means inevitable and arose out of specific processes of struggle, in which newly emergent groups forged new forms of power base through the systematic subordination and exclusion of other social groups. One crucial shift that occurred was the transition from feudal to capitalist economic relations, moving from localised economies based primarily around formal and hierarchical obligations, to larger-scale – and apparently open and fair – markets for goods, labour and capital. With this came new configurations of social classes and the social relations between them: the landed aristocracy became superseded as the dominant class by industrial capitalists (the ‘bourgeoisie’), and rural peasants became incorporated within the growing ranks of the ‘working classes’. In parallel with these developments, the dominant mode of imperialist struggle may be seen to have shifted from in-fighting between the feudal fiefdoms within Europe to the racialisation and subordination of non-European cultures (Van Loon 1997). New modes of European domination of ‘black’ people emerged, moving through institutionalised slavery to more subtle forms of colonial rule and exploitation (Hall and Gieben 1992; Said 1978; 1993). Within the new ‘social contract’ of the Enlightenment, feudal relations of patronage, duty and obligation, were superseded by more universalist – and apparently egalitarian – notions of citizenship, with its particular balance of individual liberty and responsibility. In one sense, this transition may be seen as liberatory, offering unprecedented opportunities for social mobility and a gradual unfolding of representative democracy and other apparently inclusive social arrangements. However, it may also be argued that the success of modernity for some might, to a large degree, be dependent on the oppression and subordination of a variety of ‘others’ who were effectively denied full membership of the modernist ‘club’ – such as women, working-class people, colonised peoples, and so on. Thus, it may be seen to mark the substitution of a rigid and overt system of inequalities with one that could be more subtle, but which nevertheless tended to privilege the interests of certain groups and marginalise or subordinate others.
12 Social Theory, Power and Practice
To some degree, members of the newly emergent dominant groupings would seem to have forged their identities through devaluing the identities of others (and suppressing those parts of their own experience that did not fit their assumed self-image): The idea of the ‘West’ as white, Christian, rational, civilised, modern, sexually disciplined and indeed masculine was put into place in a protracted process in which the colonised others were defined in opposition to these virtues. It was in constructing the ‘natives’ as black, pagan, irrational, uncivilised, pre-modern, libidinous, effeminate and child-like that the self-conception of the European as superior, and as not only fit to govern but as having the positive duty to govern and ‘civilise’ came into being… . The processes which led to the formation of Western modernity also involved an inferiorisation and government or regulation and disciplining of internal Others such as women, children and the rapidly growing urban working class. (Rattansi 1997: p. 482) These changes in social relations were paralleled by changes in thought – as the newly emergent social groups were involved in struggles to gain and hold on to their power positions at the level of discursive as well as economic relations. Whereas the previous social order had been legitimated through relationships of duty and obligation to unquestionable sources of authority (God, king, lord and father), this authority had been challenged by new ruling groups such as the bourgeoisie. In unseating the traditional ruling aristocracy, they had also unseated the authority of traditional forms of thought and ‘knowledge’ – for example, the world could no longer be seen as flat simply because the Church (or the king) ruled that this was the case. Appeal could no longer be to traditional modes of authority, but was replaced by an appeal to ‘reason’ as the source of all legitimacy. Instead of social organisation being seen as determined by (and reducible to) some wider teleological purpose, the new social order was made to appear as if it were natural and based on the principles of rationality. It is important not to underestimate the influence of a commitment to reason in achieving certain principles of justice and social emancipation unheard of within feudal societies – and it may be seen to serve as an effective antidote to the authoritarian tendencies that have reemerged within modernity at various points (Habermas 1984; 1987). However, alongside this, differentials, in terms of who may have access to and be able to deploy reason, may also be seen to have served as a
Modernism and Postmodernism 13
sophisticated legitimation of social divisions between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’: The possession of reason determines the possession of other things; property can then appear as the metonym of reason, the natural result of its proper exercise… . It is difficult to see the join since the differential distribution of power and of property appears to correspond neatly to the (assumed to be natural) distribution of rationality; each instance validates the ‘truth’ of the other… . It naturalises inequality and difference without having to refer to divine providence… . Reason is made to support all forms of oppressive relations and exploitation – colonial, ‘patriarchal’, class. (Venn 1997: pp. 14–15) Within the intellectual project of modernism, social and economic changes were located within discourses of ‘progress’, in which the direction of change was seen as inevitable, and as desirable in terms of providing unprecedented possibilities of freedom, justice and prosperity for all citizens. The guarantor of such progress was the new discourse of ‘reason’ which opened up social relations to scientific and philosophical enquiry – but only within particular and circumscribed ways of understanding. Crucially, intellectual enquiry was compartmentalised around a dualistic ontology: paired categories that are kept separate and not allowed to influence or transform one another. Characterising the complexities of human experiences as belonging within the opposed categories of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ may be seen as the foundation of this project – a schema that was first elaborated by Immanuel Kant. This gave rise to the two key intellectual traditions of modernist thought, positivism and humanism, which, in their separation, rendered the ‘objective’ social world an unchanging given, and the ‘subjective’ world as private and ineffectual in terms of bringing about any generalised form of social transformation. In turn, this core dualism may be seen to be paralleled by a set of other key analytical dualisms that have been central to modernist thought, such as the polarised categories of society and the individual, public and private, culture and nature, and rationality and emotion. Such a ‘carving up’ of human experience and social relations may be seen to preclude certain matters from analysis – those issues whose scope transcends the limitations of such arbitrary categories: Many of the most pressing problems we face, both practically and intellectually, require us to investigate connections, intersections,
14 Social Theory, Power and Practice
interpenetrations between domains which are treated as separate and incommensurable by the dualist traditions. (Benton 1997: pp. 87–8) In particular, that which is excluded from analysis – or is conveniently sectioned off and separated from its context – may be seen to comprise issues such as the operation of power and experiences of oppression. In constructing the concept of an ‘objective’ social world, lay the possibility of recasting social reality as if it mirrored the natural world, so that it could be precisely described, measured and (potentially) controlled. Although technically distinct, the overlapping traditions of positivism and empiricism served to construct a discourse of ‘social science’ that saw the social world as one that was essentially stable and potentially governed by social laws and regularities. ‘Knowledge’ was to be based on a process of classification or compartmentalisation of social phenomena, so that each entity could then be understood in its proper relation to others – all presumed to be part of a ‘natural’ and functional social order. In general, the properties of any entity were to be seen as internally determined and fixed – as a ‘thing-in-itself’. Economics was to be understood on the basis of the actions of Rational Economic Man [sic] who had a pre-given and ‘natural’ propensity to maximise his financial advantage. Such entities would then be seen to interact with other entities in consistent and predictable ways – constituting a distinct domain of analysis. A dualistic separation could therefore be maintained within the analysis between the inherently predictable categories of entities-in-themselves and relations-between-entities, with no confusing possibilities allowed of mutual interpenetration or reciprocal determination between the categories. Thus, Economic Man would be assumed to remain just as rational irrespective of the relational context into which he was inserted, so any analysis of economic interaction could take this for granted. It may be helpful to examine how such a methodology could be applied in practice to social phenomena. One such project was the ‘scientific’ study of ‘race’, in which a racist social order was taken as pre-given, and then people were to be divided into a hierarchy of racial groups, each with their own ‘natural’ characteristics: [This project] set up whites as absolute and distinct, and considered all non-white races only in terms of how much they deviated from the illustrious Caucasian standard. (Young 1994: p. 160)
Modernism and Postmodernism 15
‘White’ Europeans were located at the top of the hierarchy, with ascribed attributes of rationality, intelligence, morality and ‘civilisation’. ‘Black’ people of African origin were located at the base as (at best) ‘noble savages’ with primarily animal characteristics of physical strength and sensuality. People of intermediate skin coloration originating from South Asia or the Far East were placed somewhere in between in the hierarchy of ‘civilised’ attributes. Once these categories had been established, it was then up to social science to devise the instruments whereby to produce the ‘facts’ that supported this system of classification and the hierarchical relations within this – such as tests of ‘intelligence’ that took the attributes of ‘white’ culture as normative. Thus a particular historically occurring form of oppressive social organisation and relationships was to be fixed as ‘natural’, ‘scientific’ and unchangeable. And, as a consequence of the dualistic separation of entities-in-themselves from relations-between-entities, there was no possibility of rereading the scenario in terms of social relations of racism having a determining effect on how these characteristics could be projected on to and constructed around particular peoples. By developing an all-encompassing range of such positivist ‘knowledges’, many forms of social injustice could be justified as somehow ‘natural’, inevitable and necessary for the healthy functioning of the social whole. Human actions were to be seen as governed by ‘scientific’ rules and regularities which both described and prescribed people’s social roles and responsibilities. Such a worldview would allow no place for dissidence, resistance or social transformation – for the breaking or renegotiation of rules or regularities by those who might feel oppressed or disadvantaged by them. While positivism sought to produce knowledges and techniques by which to manage the objective aspect of social existence, the different traditions of humanism have offered a variety of strategies whereby to render the subjective aspect less threatening or potentially out of control. Despite their apparent differences, the constituent strands of the humanist project, such as rationalism, idealism, hermeneutics, interpretavism and existentialism all serve to construct a person as ‘subject’ in a particular way: Traditional humanism … is in effect part of patriarchal ideology. At its centre is the seamlessly unified self – either individual or collective – which is commonly called ‘Man’… . Gloriously autonomous, it banishes from itself all conflict, contradiction and
16 Social Theory, Power and Practice
ambiguity. In the humanist ideology, the self is the sole author of history. (Moi 1985: p. 8) In parallel with its construction of ‘pure’ subjectivity, humanism also provided strategies whereby the functioning and expression of the subject could be constrained by disciplines of logic and rationality, or by canons of aesthetics. The breaching of such codes could lead to intellectual banishment, social exclusion or charges of madness, thereby regulating the irruption into discourse of ‘difficult’ issues – such as experiences of oppression, vulnerability or unpredictability – which might be destabilising for the modernist project. Instead, living by the codes could provide an unproblematic basis for intersubjective understandings and consensus viewpoints that were politically safe (and academically respectable). Thus the subjective, too, could be rendered predictable and non-threatening to the existing social order, with only those accepting such self-disciplines being allowed to take on roles of active citizenship, as the ‘movers and shapers’ of the modern world: ‘the “Man of Reason” is installed [as] the free, autonomous agent of History’ (Venn 1997: p. 15). Despite the apparent coherence and consistency of modernity, there have always been undercurrents of dissent and revolt, and issues of economic, social or political conflict. The edifice has not remained entirely stable, as different imperatives have had to be accommodated. Through processes of struggle and social reconfiguration, the delineation of the boundaries of civil and political citizenship became extended during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – slavery was abolished, and women and working-class people gained the vote (Turner 1986; Mann 1987). However, more apparently inclusive definitions of citizenship did not, in any sense, mark an end to the social divisions within modernity. For many working-class people, such citizenship remained illusory in any real sense, since they lacked the economic and educational means whereby to exercise it (see Barbalet 1988). Similar arguments apply to the position of women, ‘black’ people and other subordinated groups, whose experiences of subordination and exclusion have continued in less stark and easy-tochallenge ways (Lister 1997). Just as such social groups could be marginalised in the discourse of ‘citizenship’, so they have often been excluded from the active production of modernist knowledge. They have tended to be defined as ‘other’, with no right to make sense of their experience in their own terms. Often, their life experience could be overlooked and subsumed
Modernism and Postmodernism 17
within the worldview of the dominant group: within much of social science, visions of ‘normality’ have often been based on the social life and self-definition of middle/upper-class ‘white’ men. Where the discourses of ‘other’ groups could be more overtly challenging to the social order, they may have been more actively denied and suppressed, perhaps being trivialised as minority viewpoints or constructed as irrational or child-like. Alternatively, members of such groups could be captured as passive objects of study within disciplines such as anthropology, in which their practices and forms of expression could potentially be romanticised as strange or exotic. It is against this backdrop of the dominant themes of modernism that there have emerged certain dissident ideas and various possibilities for evolutionary and (perhaps) revolutionary shifts in ideas. Such challenges to dominant understandings may be seen to have been fuelled by the inherent tensions and instabilities within modernity. Both on a theoretical level, and in terms of lived experience, everything could not be maintained within its ‘proper place’ without a degree of ongoing violence, which could become unsustainable as the forces of resistance and discontent built up. As they probed deeper into pressing issues, some modernist social theorists have thrown up ideas and concepts that have been troubling and potentially provocative to previously maintained orthodoxies – and some of these will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. In parallel with this, there have been approaches that have sought explicitly to dismantle consistencies and open up possibilities for more radical change: From the very beginning, the belief in science and reason has been accompanied by critical theories … which … emphasise cultural differences and historical discontinuities. (Larrain 1994: p. 6)
Critical theory The term ‘critical theory’ has been used in a variety of contexts with different meanings, but always indicating an approach which seeks not to take things at face value, but to probe beneath the surface in order to find what may lie hidden there. It has been used to denote a mode of enquiry into literary texts that employs theories of aesthetics, culture and history in order to access deeper levels of meaning, understanding and appreciation. Within the context of social theory, it has been used to describe approaches that ‘attempt to grapple seriously with the historical embeddedness of all theory’, where a full under-
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standing demands an appreciation of the ‘historical and cultural conditions … on which the theorist’s own intellectual activity depends’ (Calhoun 2000: p. 537). In a very specific sense, it has been used to describe the work of the Frankfurt School of social theorists who were the first to attempt a radical synthesis of Marxian and Freudian ideas. The founders of the School, including Adorno and Horkheimer, sought to develop a theoretical basis whereby to understand the contemporary rise of fascism in Europe in the 1930s, and to inform an alternative political and cultural practice whose goal was emancipatory, rather than authoritarian. I will employ the term ‘critical theory’ in a broader (but still political) sense, encompassing all approaches to social theory that seek to penetrate beneath appearances of fairness, naturalness and consistency and explore underlying relations of power, conflict, connection and exclusion. These may include both ‘macro’ analyses of social relations at a societal level and examinations of the ‘micro’ operation of power within particular settings or in particular forms of representation – approaches that will be discussed in greater depth in subsequent chapters. As will be discussed in the next chapter, such a critical approach is predicated on the ontological assumption that the reality of much of social relations is not self-evident, and that making sense of human experience involves probing more deeply into what actually may be going on. This implies a caution towards the categories and explanatory models upon which modernist ‘knowledges’ have been constructed – although not a dismissal of all the perspectives and understandings that have been generated within these traditions. There are many instances in which modernist theory has, intentionally or otherwise, provided material that may be employed to reveal rather than obfuscate relations of dominance and subordination (Fraser 1987). In order to deconstruct the world of appearances and representations, critical theory has, in some way or another, to challenge and transcend the limitations of the various dualisms of modernist thought: each and every ‘thing’ must be taken out of its ‘proper place’ and re-viewed as an entity in dynamic and potentially conflictual relationship to other entities, and whose supposedly essential qualities may, in fact, be seen to be constructed out of these very interrelationships. Key modernist concepts, such as ‘man’, ‘society’ or ‘civilisation’, may no longer be taken at face-value, secure and unassailable as poles of fixed dualities. Most fundamentally, critical theory cannot accept the division of social experience into a predictable world of people as ‘objects’, and a separate world of people as pure, autonomous and
Modernism and Postmodernism 19
unitary ‘subjects’ with inner-driven volitions and propensities for action. Instead, it seeks to grapple with a fluid and ever-changing world of interpenetrating social relations, potentially characterised by conflicts and inequalities: Critical theory … requires a dialectical perspective which suggests that it is from the tensions between these apparent contradictions that creative change can emerge. (Ife 1999: p. 221) The final defining characteristic of critical theory is that it should be able to contribute, in however small a way, to processes of social emancipation and transformation. The fundamental purpose of a critical approach is not only to challenge positivism and humanism by bringing injustice and oppression into visibility (Parker 1992), but also to do so in such a way as to open up possibilities for social action to address these issues: The link between social theory and political practice is perhaps the defining characteristic of critical theory. (Leonard 1990: p. 3) By rejecting the fixities of modernism, critical theory has the potential to examine the dynamics of social change at both ‘grand’ and ‘local’ scales. It is a project that is inherently political, in the sense of starting to provide the tools whereby those who experience injustice or oppression within current forms of social organisation may seek to challenge and renegotiate aspects of the dominant social order: the basis of any form of emancipatory practice (see Giddens 1991; Spears 1997).
Postmodernism Postmodernism represents itself as a decisive break with modernist thought, but in some senses may be seen as an extension or re-presentation of some of its fundamental tenets. Similarly, it may be seen to have an ambivalent relationship with critical theory: on the one hand, it draws on certain developments of structuralist ideas, while, on the other hand, it seeks to reject any form of generalised theory or perspective, adopting a position of ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’, whether emancipatory or otherwise (Lyotard 1994: p. 27), and regarding them all as part of the redundant baggage of modernism. Central to postmodernist thought is the assertion that, in the late twentieth century, there has occurred a radical shift in the constitution of the social order, paralleling the significance of the
20 Social Theory, Power and Practice
Enlightenment and the birth of modernity. This new socio-cultural formation has been termed ‘postmodernity’ and is seen to be characterised by increasing diversity and the loosening or collapse of any coherent organising principles. Dominant cultural forms, all-embracing moralities, the means of economic regulation and even the nature of the nation-state were all seen as under threat from wider trends of liberalisation and globalisation, and new opportunities emerging through the use of the media and information technology (see Boyne and Rattansi 1990; Hall et al. 1992; Thompson 1995; Albrow 1996). Within the economic sphere, it is suggested that the centralisation of economic activity into mass industrial production (‘Fordism’) had become superseded by dispersion and specialisation in response to more sophisticated and diverse consumer tastes (‘Post-Fordism’). There is seen to be a transition from an economy structured around material goods, and the exercise of power through capital accumulation, to one where services and conspicuous consumption predominate. This implies a radical shift in emphasis from the material value of consumer goods (for example, clothes as functional artefacts) to a system of value based on representation (clothes as cultural signifiers – as in the cult of ‘designer labels’). Through revolutions in areas such as advertising, information technology, media and retailing, the focus is seen increasingly to be on goods whose only value is as cultural objects located within a ‘hyper-reality’ of systems of representation, such as videos or computer games (see Baudrillard 1988). Within this ‘virtual’ world, power may be exercised via a ‘regime of signification’, in which style and presentation become all-important. Nevertheless, despite the excited claims of pioneers such as Baudrillard, it is not yet clear that these trends mark anything other than an evolutionary process within modernity – a phase that has been termed ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernity (see Giddens 1990; Fornas 1995). A capitalism centred on the production and consumption of representations may not be fundamentally different from one based on the production and consumption of material goods: it may still reproduce similar patterns of exploitation and inequality, although there may be a slight shift in the composition and orientation of dominant groups with the ascendance of a ‘new, “Yuppified”, post-industrial bourgeoisie’ (Lash 1990: p. 21). Indeed, the idea that society was dominated by the power of images and representations may be seen to have been as much a feature of evolving forms of modernity as anything specifically postmodern. It was Ludwig Feuerbach who argued in the
Modernism and Postmodernism 21
nineteenth century that ‘the present age prefers the image to the thing, the copy to the original’ (quoted in Debord 1977: p. 1). As the ‘postmodernity’ thesis remains questionable, it may be necessary to separate this out from the other strands of ‘postmodernism’. As Terry Lovell argues, it is also important for ‘the postmodernist/ poststructuralist couplet [to] be deconstructed, since it contains a very diverse set of intellectual positions’ (1996: p. 331) – although in practice the two have tended to become conflated, as postmodernism has sought to absorb poststructuralism within its wider project. Whereas poststructuralism was essentially a development of (and break with) the ideas of structural versions of critical theory – particularly Marxism and feminism – postmodernism may be seen primarily as a revolt against the certainties, rigidities and limitations of the positivist strand of modernism within social theory. However, particularly through its appropriation of poststructural ideas, its implications go far wider: [It] is characterised by a loss of certainty and a ‘God’s eye view’ in the sphere of knowledge, a loss of a central, organising principle governing society and a unitary standard of cultural excellence or morality, and a decline in the belief in a unitary, coherent self. (Seidman 1994: p. 5) In many ways, this revolt has been remarkably successful: positivism no longer holds the position of hegemonic dominance that it once held (see Bryant 1995). No longer must human experience and social relations always be shoehorned into the ‘objective’ entities and alien categories that formed the basis of the project of modernist social science. A greater methodological pluralism has replaced the insistence on the discovery of law-like regularities in social life. The narrow obsession with measurable ‘things-in-themselves’ has been superseded by a greater acknowledgement of the fluidity and interpenetration of the various domains of social existence, and a recognition of the importance of complex processes of representation. All forms of meaning and ‘knowledge’ are rendered problematic and no longer to be taken for granted, as the myth of scientific objectivity is debunked. There also emerges a significant blurring of some of the core modernist dualisms. Issues of diversity are to be embraced and celebrated, and no longer to be located within implicit or explicit binaries of superiority/inferiority. Instead, this is to be replaced by a more fluid and respectful curiosity, taking nothing for granted in terms of the constructions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, and conceptualising both according to a
22 Social Theory, Power and Practice
‘non-hierarchical principle of “difference”’ (Lash 1990: p. 37). In this way, both the categories of ‘society’ and ‘the individual’ are rendered less certain or bounded, and the researcher (‘subject’) and researched (‘object’) are no longer so clearly separated into different analytical compartments. However, rather than see critical theory as a natural ally in overturning (elements of) modernism – and specifically its avoidance of issues of power and oppression – postmodernism casts both into the same mould, characterising structural theories of oppression as claiming exactly the same forms of certainty, universalism and rigidity that were seen as the deficiencies of positivism. Their emphasis on the importance of material aspects of social relations and inequalities has been conflated with the positivist obsession with an objective social world that was to be scientifically knowable. Although the political bases of these two traditions were diametrically opposed, they are treated as one. Postmodernism’s break with modernism starts to look somewhat less decisive, when we compare some of its positions with the humanist tradition of enquiry. The shift from an examination of ‘things’, to an exploration of the fluidity of meanings and how these are ‘presented’, may be seen, not so much as an overthrow of modernism, but more as a shift from positivist objectification to humanist ideation within modernism – a switch from the ‘objective’ to the ‘subjective’ pole within the core dualism of modernist thought. An emphasis on the importance of the diversity of meaning is no stranger to humanist traditions such as existentialism or ethnography. Postmodernism may be seen only to constitute a break with humanism in the sense of a reversal of the conventional notion of human subjects creating representations, to a more radical notion of representations constructing the possibilities for human subjects (a notion that is, in fact, borrowed from structural and poststructural theorists, such as Althusser and Derrida). However, questions of power may tend to be removed from the analysis – as with the conventional understandings of humanism. As there is deemed to be no underlying reality, all representations are to be seen as equally valid, whatever their implications to the life experience of particular social groups. In fact, it may be argued that there is a remarkable degree of congruence between the ideas and ideologies of postmodernism and those of neo-liberalism. Both thrive on principles of decentring and deregulation, on the dispersal and individualisation of power and initiative. Thus, in certain respects, postmodernism rep-
Modernism and Postmodernism 23
resents a new body of ideas that actually fit rather well with the interests of modernity’s currently dominant social groups: Ultimately, postmodernist conceptions … help to mask the real contradictions … and … seek to deflect people’s attention away from them into the rarified world of simulacra and hyper-reality… . Postmodernism … becomes a convenient ideology of the status quo. (Larrain 1994: p. 118) To the extent that it throws out the (critical) baby with the (modernist) bathwater, postmodernism may be seen to constitute a shift that leaves crucial elements of the modernist edifice (and power relations) still intact. While dissident viewpoints and experiences may be opened up for expression, they are simultaneously undermined and depoliticised as being only one of a potentially infinite range of possible positions that are all of potentially equal ‘truth’ or significance. Even its insistence on a non-hierarchical approach to ‘difference’ cannot, of itself, shift the reality of, say, racist oppression in any decisive way – although it may nevertheless offer some significant positions and opportunities within the process of struggle. Similarly a politics of feminisms may, in some ways, be more empowering for many women than a monolithic feminism, but there still remains a crucial need for a feminist ‘meta-narrative’: Whilst feminism has to guard against the dangers of generalisation, it nevertheless rests on the fundamental assumption that the inequality between the sexes is indefensible and unjust. Such an assumption informs feminist analysis of the position of women in society. (McNay 1992: p. 197) In seeking to throw off the intellectual straitjacket of (mainly positivist) modernist thought, with its emphasis on social laws, predictability and objectification of social experience, postmodernism went somewhat overboard on fluidity, diversity and the study of the particular rather than the general. It became obsessed with appearances and representations at the expense of theorising the social relations and power relations that may underlie and influence these. In doing so, it lost the overarching models and frameworks that may be necessary in order to put the particular into a wider context of social action and social change. Postmodernism (inadvertently?) threw away the tools by which to conduct a critical analysis of the reality of social oppression –
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and the potential commonality between groups of people in terms of their experiences of oppression.
Modernist practice Following on from the work of Foucault (1967; 1977; 1981), Donzelot (1980) and others, it may be seen that integral to the modernist project has been the role of professional practices and discourses (medical, legal, educational, social, and so on) in maintaining and inserting people into their appropriate slots in the social order, in repairing or concealing the human ‘casualties’ of modernity, and in suppressing or channelling dissidence. This was a crucial element in the regulation of a civil society in which conformity was not generally to be enforced with overtly coercive measures – although the fall-back position of naked force or compulsion was always retained. Instead, most ‘disciplinary’ processes – the inducing of conformity – were to be much less transparent: the interests of ruling groups were to be served, not so much by ‘imposing constraints on citizens as of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose and Miller 1992: p. 174). Modernity required a new discourse of ‘governmentality’ which comprised the ‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and the tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ (Foucault 1989: p. 20). Central to the social contract of modernity was the ‘con’ of fairness in exchange and competition, under which it had to be made to appear, as far as possible, that individuals were selecting, seemingly of their own volition, the very options that fitted with the interests of dominant groups; in effect, people ‘choosing’ to discipline themselves. Thus the precondition for the flourishing of modernity had to be the production and reproduction ‘of regimented, isolated and self-policing subjects’ (Sarup 1989: p. 92). Where such self-discipline was not forthcoming, professional practice was located in the space between the dissident individual and the social order: as far as possible, concealing the reality of conflicting interests by simultaneously appearing to be acting in the best interests both of service recipients and of the community as a whole. From a historical perspective, this may be seen as effectively providing a substitute for the much more overt ties of duty and obligation which had effectively bound the members of subordinated groups within the social fabric of feudal or traditional societies.
Modernism and Postmodernism 25
There has existed an implicit professional contract under modernity in which dominant groups delegated power to professionals, on condition that they did not use it ‘dangerously’ and put this in the hands of service recipients – those at the margins of respectable citizenship. The power was made available to construct or reconstruct conformity, not to give weight to expressions of dissidence or unrest arising from those in positions of social exclusion (see Philp 1979). Practice discourses situated the professional as the ‘expert’ – the active, rational subject – whose job it was to ‘do unto’ the patient/criminal/client/service user, who, to a greater or lesser degree, was invited to take on the role of the passive recipient – the object of the professional intervention. In this way, any possibility for opening up some form of dialogue with dissident experiences is necessarily excluded. Such practice discourses tend to be founded on some process of assessment or diagnosis, as in Foucault’s notion of ‘the examination’ that is carried out by professionals in positions of hierarchical power over the person: ‘It is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify’ (Foucault 1977: p. 184). Although modernist professional practice has typically started with the objectification of the recipient, the most prized outcome would be for the recipient so effectively to internalise the disciplinary process that they slot in, apparently of their own accord, as a ‘ruly’ – rather than an ‘unruly’ – subject within modernity; as a ‘competent’ member of society (see Rose 1990). These principles may be seen to underlie a subtler version of modernist practice: the grooming of particular modes of subjectivity. Integral to this is to privilege particular ways of seeing over others (see Berger 1972) and, in particular, to situate the current social order as natural, necessary and inevitable. Once inducted into particular systems of perception and understanding, service recipients could be permitted to move beyond their object status, and reintegrate within the mainstream – where they could be relied on to take on as subjects that which would be expected of them within the social order. In this way, processes of assessment could either lead on to such ‘rehabilitative’ discourses, within which subjectivity may be restored, or, where this is deemed too difficult to achieve, strategies may be put in place to suppress dissident subjectivities in the longer term, perhaps through incarceration or longer-term medical treatment. However, there may be seen to be inherent tensions between the terms of these two strands of discourse, as may be seen within the sphere of criminal justice. On the one hand, certain practices may be designed to remould deviant impulses and restore a ‘ruly’ subjectivity,
26 Social Theory, Power and Practice
‘to deliver a person who does not offend and who is contributing positively to the community’, as part of discourses of ‘correction’ (Chapman and Hough 1998: p. 5; see also Harland 1996). However, these may sit uneasily with other practices that seek to suppress, marginalise or control subjectivity, as part of discourses of ‘punishment’ and ‘supervision’, through processes of segregating, degrading, or monitoring the criminal. In parallel with the criminal justice discourse of ‘correction’, modernist social and psychological practice had tended to be undertaken under the dominant image of the medical discourse of ‘treatment’. Typically, this had involved a process of diagnosis or assessment, followed by the selection and application of technical interventions – on the person or their situation – that would tend not to be sensitive to the complex meanings and power relations of particular contexts (McBeath and Webb 1991). However, within childcare services, there has been a tendency for medico-therapeutic discourses around the causes and treatment of ‘child abuse’ to be superseded by socio-legal ‘child protection’ discourses predicated upon the assessment and prediction of ‘risk’. Such assessments may then be used to justify legally enforceable interventions, either in terms of level and duration of surveillance, or in terms of forcibly breaking up ‘dangerous’ family units (see Parton 1991). Similar professional practices centring on risk assessment have become increasingly influential in the arenas of criminal justice and mental health, particularly in relation to questions of discharge or release into the community, and setting up procedures for surveillance. Parallel discourses have also been established around the assessment of health and social ‘needs’. Within the British context, there has been a shift in much social and health practice from discourses around diagnostic assessment (where is the fault to be remedied?) to ones seeking simply to quantify observable deficits in performance as a basis of planning schemes of professional ‘care’ (what input is required in order for a person to be maintained in an acceptable role within the ‘community’?). The outcome of such a process is a ‘care plan’ by which to organise the provision of care and support services (Department of Health 1991). Such discourses fit more with neo-liberal discourses of welfare entitlement: what may be seen to be the minimum requirements for ‘civilised’ living; how can the modernist social order maintain people within positions of citizenship at minimum cost to the state? Within this, it becomes the professional role to ‘allocate scarce resources in an individualised way, particularly with the dangerous, isolated and neglected’ (Parton 1994: p. 25).
Modernism and Postmodernism 27
What these various discursive contexts for assessment, intervention, surveillance and care all tend to have in common is that they place the recipient in the position of a passive object – someone to be questioned, planned for, worked on, monitored, or administered to. This form of professional discourse involves: The introduction of two poles… . The first is implicitly passive, the second active; the first known, the second a knower; the first incapable, the second capable… The client is controlled by the imperial values and acts of the provider, the professional. (Kirkwood 1990: pp. 160–1) Given the nature of this working relationship, such discourses may preclude the possibility of any real dialogue or exchange: the agenda would tend to be one-sided and deriving from the priorities of the dominant social order. However, as an alternative strand of the modernist project has been to restore ‘appropriate’ subjectivity, practice may also involve encouraging people to ‘choose’ to work towards the very outcomes that would enable them to fit back as active subjects within the prevailing social order. Thus, within the more sophisticated versions of modernist practice, an apparent ‘partnership’ between professional and recipient may be established in which deviant thoughts and behaviours may be reviewed and reconstructed within the context of the dominant discourses of rationality and normality, thereby forging ‘alignments between the personal projects of citizens and the images of the social order’ (Miller and Rose 1988: p. 172). This process may effectively ‘dress up’ corrective or self-disciplinary processes as solutions to personal or social difficulties that the service recipient may embrace as their own. However, behind this apparently benign and philanthropic assistance have lain more powerful medical or legal discourses that could be employed either to invalidate or regulate dissidence. Failure to opt in to the terms of the particular ‘rehabilitative’ discourses on offer could lead to the application of sanctions designed to suppress continued expression of dissidence. Unconventional thoughts or behaviours could be invalidated and treated as symptoms of ‘mental illnesses’. Unacceptable acts or standards of conduct could be controlled and monitored through legally sanctioned processes of ‘care’ or ‘supervision’ – for example, in relation to issues around parenting standards or children’s behaviour.
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The most explicitly modernist forms of practice have been either those which closely allied themselves with the positivist project of an ‘objective social science’ (Bakan 1976), or those that have grown out of the humanist tradition (Sollod 1982). The former have explicitly used ‘science’ to break down the totality of experience into supposedly ‘objective’ entities, which – it is proposed – may be described, measured and controlled (Allyon and Azrin 1965; Hudson 1982). Psychiatry and behavioural psychology have been at the forefront of such approaches, and they share a common thread in terms of taking issues of distress or dissidence out of any personal or social context, and recategorising them as constellations of behaviours or ‘symptoms’. Equally part of modernist practice may be seen to be the humanist tradition that has been influential in much of conventional counselling and psychotherapy. Drawing upon academic approaches such as phenomenology and existentialism, person-centred practice emphasises a purely subjective encounter between professional and recipient (Lietaer et al. 1990; Scott 1989). The solution to difficulties is seen to lie in actualising the ‘human potential’ inherent within each individual, thereby effectively bracketing out issues of power and social connection (Pilgrim 1992). The social order is seen as essentially unproblematic, with professional practice resting on a ‘commitment to humanist endeavour and [an] emphasis on the idea of respect for the client, optimism for the future, and faith in the essential … unity of society’ (Davies 1985: p. 4). Thus, although employing a completely different methodology, such approaches can also have the effect of decontextualising distress or dissidence and thus effectively viewing a situation purely in terms of ‘managing people in positions of severe weakness, stress or vulnerability’ (ibid.; my emphasis). However, just as pressure for social change has emerged from within modernism in the form of critical theory, so it has also surfaced in some of the tensions and contentions within modernist practice. Inherent in the core of the modernist project – the grooming of the ‘right’ sort of active participatory citizens – are potentially contradictory processes of simultaneously closing down and opening up opportunities for subjectivity and expression. Thus, however well they may be steeped in the modernist world-view, professionals may become influenced by and take on some aspects of the challenging and destabilising issues that may be raised by service recipients. Relationships of apparent ‘partnership’ – however unequally they may be constituted – may nevertheless open up subject positions from which recipients may start to articulate some part of their own agendas.
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Given the inherent contradictions within modernist practice, particular approaches and techniques may be deployed (intentionally or otherwise) to achieve emancipatory outcomes. Within the field of research, positivist methods may be used to measure issues of discrimination and inequality of opportunity (Oakley 2000). Although grounded on a somewhat naïve understanding of social power relations, a humanist approach that seeks to mobilise untapped ‘potential’ within people may have the effect of enhancing their ability to develop and express dissident positions: ‘These new persons have a trust in their own experience and a profound distrust of all external authority’ (Rogers 1978: p. 274). Of even greater significance are the various strands of psychoanalysis, whose relationship with modernism is particularly complex. Although initially flirting with appeals to scientific respectability, Freud’s legacy fits more with humanist ideas of personal encounter and search for meaning: Freud … invoked a totally new principle of explanation. This principle of explanation, which ran counter to the tenor of thought prevalent in medicine … was that the symptom could have meaning. (Home 1966: p. 42) While, ostensibly, psychoanalysis accepted a repressive social order as given, it also provided some of the critical tools whereby to deconstruct its impact upon the structures of personality and social interaction. Freud himself agonised over both what he saw as the inevitability of modernity (‘civilisation’), and the degree of psychic repression and human unhappiness that it entailed. And, in the theorisation of the unconscious, he took a radical and subversive step in decentring the rational subject of modernist social contract.
Postmodern practice In terms of approach and technique, it has been poststructuralism, rather than postmodernism, that may be seen to have had the most significant impact on much of the arena of social practice, particularly in relation to the understanding of narrative; this will be discussed in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, postmodernism’s overturning of positivist certainties, and its emphasis on diversity and plurality of meaning, has been influential in starting to deconstruct monolithic notions of ‘normality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ – although the potential implications of this may be seen to be somewhat double-edged.
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On the one hand, postmodernism may be seen to have emancipatory potential in disturbing the narrow focus of positivist practice and replacing it with a more ‘critical, self-reflexive and deconstructive state of mind’ (Howe 1994: p. 523; see also Pease and Fook 1999). It may start to move beyond the deceits, vested interests and implicit oppressions that may have been central to much of modernist practice: The views, experiences and interests of white, middle class, able bodied males have invariably been embedded in ideas, theories and approaches, but presented as if they were universal, objective and neutral. (Parton and O’Byrne 2000: p. 21) Instead of working according to the straitjacket of such ‘received wisdom’, postmodern practice may employ a multiplicity of unconventional perspectives in teasing out new ways of constructing meaning in particular situations. This may be of particular significance in opening up areas of practice that have been closed to new perspectives, such as the domination of the ‘scientific’ medical model in psychiatric and general medical practice. Even within the modernist paradigm, conventional medical practices have come under greater scrutiny: all interventions may be called to account in terms of their ‘evidence base’, although what counts as evidence may be defined narrowly in terms of ‘scientifically valid’ randomised controlled trials (Trinder 2000). However, postmodern critiques are beginning to chip away at how the terms of this discourse are defined, opening up the possibility of privileging new evidences based on how people perceive their own ‘recovery’ and how medical interventions may or may not have changed their lives (Gray 1999). It involves a shift from a focus on external ‘knowledges’ that may be imposed on people, to a valuing of people’s own particular ‘knowhow’: expertise based on their unique life experiences. Such approaches move beyond the confines of traditional therapeutic dialogues, in which any user contribution is located within a discourse whose terms are already fixed by the dominant ‘professional’ way of seeing. Instead, they seek to enable users of services to construct their own narratives and meanings around their experiences. Once it is taken out from dominant medical discourses, ‘recovery’ may be viewed not just in terms of being ‘able-bodied’ or ‘symptom-free’, but as feeling empowered to start living again and enabled to take
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control over the impact of any ‘symptoms’ or ‘impairments’ (see Corker and French 1999b; Coleman 1999). Similarly, in promoting a plurality of perspectives, postmodernism offers a basis for validating cultural diversity and lifestyle choices that might have been treated as deviant or abnormal under a more traditional modernist perspective. It may significantly undermine both the hierarchical superiority and the ‘normalising gaze’ of the modernist process of professional ‘examination’, as identified by Foucault, thereby starting to problematise the professional role: The growing emphasis on the participation of clients in matters which fundamentally affect their lives … de-centres the locus of power and disperses the site of exclusive control traditionally held by the practitioner. (Howe 1994: p. 525; see also Dominelli 1996) Within such an approach, service users may not just be consulted within a professionally defined framework of understanding and options, but be invited to develop their own interpretive frameworks, which may lead to a very different identification of strategies and definition of desired outcomes (Pardeck et al. 1994). On the other hand, postmodernism may also serve to mask, beneath its celebration of diversity, the importance of issues of social inequality, poverty and discrimination, and the ‘extent to which power is still controlled and administered by specific and identifiable agents in positions of economic and political power’ (Best and Kellner 1991: p. 70). It may be seen that postmodern ideas fit well with the neo-liberal critique of ‘welfarism’ – both undermine universalism as a principle of social provision (see Parton 1994). In this way, postmodern practice may well – intentionally or unintentionally – ‘serve the interest of powerful forces and result in further marginalisation and fragmentation of the interests of the powerless’ (Peile and McCouat 1997: p. 354; see also Taylor-Gooby 1994). Just as postmodern theory sets itself against both positivism and any attempt to build a coherent edifice of critical or emancipatory theory, so postmodern practice may be equally undermining of any commitment to anti-oppressive or empowering practice: A postmodern analysis is more than analytically flawed, it is ethically problematic… . The often grim, lived realities of oppressed groups may be reduced to ‘difference’ and, in the process, pressing (emancipatory) social imperatives may become obscured. (Smith and White 1997: pp. 293–4)
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Of particular concern is that postmodernism may fuel an ethical and theoretical relativism in which any mode of practice or understanding is seen as equally valid – which may be particularly damaging to those seeking to promote and establish the criteria for emancipatory practice, ‘as ultimately nothing can be considered more worthy than anything else’ (Peile and McCouat 1997: p. 355).
3 Exposing Conflict: Structural Approaches to Power and Inequality
In exploring critical theory and its potential application to emancipatory practice, one starting point is with the structural approaches of Marxism, feminism and anti-colonialism/anti-racism, together with a consideration of their interconnection with understandings of other equally important dimensions of oppression, such as ageism, disablism and heterosexism. It is these approaches that have provided the first set of tools whereby to unpick patterns of discrimination and inequality within the social organisation of modernity. Before examining these bodies of work in detail, I will locate them within the broader context of structuralist thought. However, I start with a consideration of some fundamental questions of ontology: what is it within human experience and social relations that we may be seeking to understand? The chapter ends with an overview of how structural theory has informed practice traditions.
Objective, material and real: unpicking ontologies Within the various intellectual traditions of modernism, postmodernism and critical theory, many different concepts have been deployed to denote that which is there – the potential raw material for enquiry and theorisation. Within modernism, there has sometimes been a tendency to study surfaces or appearances: pure empiricism does not delve beyond a search for regularities between phenomena that can be directly observed and measured. In a very different sense, postmodernism also becomes fixed at the level of appearances: it settles for representations as the ‘be all and end all’ of study. However, within critical – and many modernist – approaches to theory, there has been a dissatisfaction with appearances, leading to a search for underlying 33
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logics, meanings, connections or contradictions. What distinguishes critical from modernist analyses are particular perspectives on the nature of what may lie beneath surface appearances. Different approaches may seek to define this, using concepts such as ‘objective’, ‘material’ or ‘real’ – often in ways that can be overlapping and confusing. It may therefore be helpful to start by disentangling these terms. The term ‘objective’ implies a social world akin to the scientifically defined understanding of the natural world – a world of things-inthemselves that may be defined in terms of their essential qualities. These qualities may be directly or indirectly measurable, and may relate to each other in consistent law-like ways. This is the positivist world of ‘facts’ that, once discovered, can be trusted to remain ‘true’. It is a world that lends itself to human mastery and control – or, more precisely, control by the social groupings (male, bourgeois, ‘white’) that possess the means to exert that control. As a corollary of this, members of other less powerful social groupings may then be relegated to the world of things-to-be-controlled – the world of supposedly predictable social objects. The tradition of (historical) materialism shifts the focus from essential qualities of social entities to the changing and contradictory relations within and between them – the forces, pressures and dynamics that may structure social life. With Marx, this specifically emerged as a revolt against Hegelian humanism – the notion that historical development could be driven by a struggle of ideas. Instead, Marx proposed that it was issues relating to the basic conditions of existence – such as the inequality of the wage-labour contract and differential access to and control over resources – that provided the underlying dynamic for social change. Thus, the concept of ‘material’ emerges in distinction to both ‘essential’ and ‘ideological’: the legacies of positivism and humanism respectively. In this context, ‘material’ suggests not only some connection with entities that are, in some sense, physical and tangible – ‘matter’ in a static sense – but also that these entities are constituted in particular ways that ‘matter’ (make a difference) within the context of social relations. The concept of materiality implies a social process of coming-to-be, rather than some pre-given form – an embodiment of specific operations of power: ‘matter itself is founded through a set of violations’ (Butler 1993: p. 29). It may be helpful to ground these distinctions in relation to Marx’s theory of capital. Money – in the sense of a collection of coins and banknotes that may be hidden away somewhere – may be seen to be ‘objective’, in that it can be counted and measured, but may have little social
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significance as long as it remains a private hoard. However, when put to dynamic use as industrial capital in order to secure ownership of the means of production, it takes on a particular meaning as part of specific social relations: it becomes a bargaining counter in potentially very unequal negotiations between individuals, and between collectivities of individuals (Marx 1970). Money thus becomes constituted as part of a set of material relations between social classes, which can both have a highly determining effect on people’s lives, and also stoke up conflicts and collective resentments which may ultimately have a determining effect on oppressed people’s propensity for emancipatory or transformative action. In this way, material relations may be seen as integrating what had been separated under modernism: the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects of a social formation. It opens up the interrelationship between, on the one hand, the specific location and deployment of money and, on the other, how ordinary working-class people may see themselves and their future. Thus, in seeing contradictions within social relations as irrevocably intertwined with people’s dissatisfactions and aspirations (thereby providing a motive force for historical change and transformation), the concept of ‘material’ may be seen to transcend the subject/object dualism. Feminism has argued that definitions of what may constitute the material aspects of social relations may usefully be extended beyond the ‘public’ economic sphere to include the exploitation of domestic labour and reproductive capacities, and other physical or embodied aspects of social interaction such as violence and sexual behaviour. Here may also be found evidence of systematic enactment of inequalities between individuals and social groups. However, notions of the ‘material’ have sometimes been stretched further to include processes of discursive production (representations and signifying practices), in order to stress their real impact on people’s lives and the structuring of power relations within a social order. However, I would suggest that it is unhelpful and confusing to conflate ‘material’ with ‘real’, since this then blurs potentially useful analytic distinctions. Instead, both the ‘material’ and the ‘discursive’ spheres may be seen as distinct, but as potentially important in their own right. Thus, if ‘material’ refers to physical and economic aspects, and ‘discourse’ refers to those aspects of experience that are primarily constructed through language or systems of representation (such as thought, knowledge, text, ‘common sense’ and ideas), then there is the potential for complementary and intersecting analyses.
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Having clarified the terms ‘objective’ and ‘material’, it becomes easier to derive a definition of ‘real’. Although the term ‘critical realism’ has sometimes been used in a very specific sense to denote a focus on issues of ecology and the precarious interconnections between the categories of the social and the natural, I will be using it in a much more general ontological sense to denote the possibility that ‘what is’ may extend further and deeper than what may be directly observed or experienced (see Keat and Urry 1975). Theories and models may be seen as better or worse metaphors – as partial guides ‘to the structures of the real’ (Lovell 1980: p. 22). They may seek to provide ways of opening up a fuller appreciation of ‘what is’ without ever being able to claim an exact or total understanding. Following Rorty (1989), it is important to distinguish a realist ontology from the notion that some metaphysical concept of self-evident ‘truth’ is also out there waiting to be discovered. ‘Truths’ may be understood as strategies to give some particular set of meanings and explanations an air of universality or naturalness – a tactic that may be seen to be integral to modernism. While the ‘real’ may be seen to exist independently of any attempts to make sense of it, ‘truths’ may be seen to be narratives, constructed and reconstructed to serve particular interests. Unlike those who tend to subsume any notion of the ‘real’ within the category of an objective world of things-to-be-discovered (see Sayers 1985; Bhaskar 1989), I would argue for a more critical reading of ‘real’ that would see subjective experience as just as much part of social reality as objective indices such as income or occupation. Neither the objective nor subjective surfaces of experience may be seen to make (complete) sense in their own terms, but each may be interpreted and understood as reflections of (or defences against) some deeper sets of relations, connections or contradictions. Politically, this opens up the possibility of appreciating that personal experiences of oppression – which may be suppressed, concealed or internalised within a given social order – may nevertheless be acknowledged as real. Following on from the materialist critique of an objective world of things-in-themselves, a critical realist ontology can privilege systems of interconnecting relationships as the fundamental building blocks of social life and human identity. It is essentially at odds with a modernism in which ‘it is much easier to see and think in terms of objects than in terms of relations’, leading to a ‘tendency to constitute entities which can only exist … as independent ontological categories and to represent ourselves in the form of objects when, in reality, we are a framework of relations’ (Ibanez 1997: p. 33; my emphasis).
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Through its fascination with the surfaces of representation, postmodernist thought has come (almost) to deny the possibility of any underlying ‘real’ – as this becomes conflated with its revolt against any notion of ‘objectivity’. Although debunking the possibility of valuefree scientific knowledge, it thus can offer no criteria whereby to unpick the competing claims of a multiplicity of value systems: issues of oppression may be presented, but only in a way that denies them any underlying substance: It’s very important to say the Holocaust happened … the slave trade happened, and an incestuous act happened. And it wasn’t just someone’s interpretation… . I think it’s extremely dangerous when women are talking about what happened – ‘He hit me’; ‘He beat me up’; ‘He raped me’ … to say … ‘There’s only stories, nothing really happens’. (Gilligan 1994: p. 412) It is then for critical theory to probe beneath the surfaces of the experiences being represented: to analyse the real social relations, conflicts and connections that might start to make sense of how such horror and suffering could come about, of people’s capacities for survival and resistance, and of how such experiences may intertwine with and become embedded within the organisation of people’s personal subjectivity.
Structural theory The first wave of critical perspectives that started to examine issues of power and inequality undertook structural analyses of collective issues faced by specific social groups within the modernist social order. It is important to see these as separate from other traditions of structural theory. From the functionalist perspective of Talcott Parsons, the structuring of the modernist social order was seen as not only inevitable, but also acting to the collective advantage of all participants, in terms of the functional efficiency of the social order as a whole. In his vision of ‘structure’, he acted as an unashamed apologist for the American Dream of the 1950s – constructing this particular phase and location of modernity as ‘the best of all possible worlds’. He proposed that there was a ‘consensus of values relating to the societal importance of particular functions’ which justified the basis of social divisions, so that differentials in prestige and reward were seen just to reflect people’s intrinsic merit (Crompton 1993: p. 7). For example, he was able to characterise the different ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ positions occupied by women and men within this social order as complemen-
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tary, building on the ‘natural’ propensities of each – not as evidencing any profound inequality in opportunity between gender groups. A very different application of structural concepts may be seen in the analyses of cultural and linguistic practices undertaken by Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss, and in the models of unconscious psychic functioning proposed by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. While these did not seek to provide a critical analysis of modern (or pre-modern) social orders, they nevertheless established a set of ideas whereby to start to deconstruct modernist notions of personality, text and communication. These structural concepts provided some of the foundations which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, have been most influential in the formation of poststructuralism. Within critical structuralist analyses, differences in (collective) experiences may be examined in terms of people’s access to the resources that are necessary for survival, prosperity and fulfilment. In any historically occurring social formation, certain social groups may be identified as being in a position to have influence over the way resources and responsibilities are distributed. In this way, the opportunities open to people, in terms of the way they live, work and make intimate relationships, may depend on membership or non-membership of categories such as ‘race’, gender or social class. While, under modernism, these categories, and their hierarchical arrangement, have often been constructed so as to appear to reflect the innate characteristics of those occupying superior or inferior positions, they may actually be seen to connote who does and does not have power within a particular social formation. In each case, social relations may be understood in terms of how a dominant group is able to exploit or oppress the daily life of subordinate groups by a variety of economic, ideological, political and emotional means. Iris Young identifies five key forms of oppression resulting in the ‘systematic and unreciprocated transfer of powers’ between social groupings (1990: p. 30). These comprise: exploitation of labour, nurturing or sexuality; marginalisation; cultural imperialism (the systematic ‘othering’ and inferiorising of difference); powerlessness in relation to ‘experts’ and institutions; and outright violence or the threatened use of force. In turn, oppressed groups may, over time, organise to mount more or less successful resistance against their subordination or exclusion. To use Antonio Gramsci’s phrase (1971), this constant ‘war of position’ between forces of oppression and of resistance may be seen as providing a motive force for historical change.
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It is important to recognise that, unlike in other structuralist traditions, these forms of social structuring are seen as fluid, conflictual and subject to continual historical change. In order to emphasise this point, Harriet Bradley has proposed that the term ‘structure’ be replaced by the term ‘dynamic’ so as to convey the sense that social relationships are constantly evolving and subject to transformation (1996: p. 7). Not only may there be struggles over power and resources between dominant and subordinate social groups, but there may also be conflicts between different elements within the dominant groups, and their composition may be seen to have changed over time: The ruling elite, while it does often have some interests in common with all of its members, does not have all interests in common with all of its members. In other words, the ruling elite – or, more correctly, ruling elites – is not monolithic. Indeed the battles among them are often vicious. (Hodge et al. 1975: p. 34) Postmodernism criticises structural theories for subsuming the particularity of experience within grandiose categories such as ‘class’, ‘gender’ or ‘race’. However, postmodernism may equally be criticised for covering up deep-rooted and systematic inequalities in its overemphasis on diversity and superficial representation. Both positions may be seen to have some validity, but it may be seen as important to revisit and reclaim those structural perspectives that were effectively washed away in the first wave of postmodernist fervour: While the social relations involved in gender, ‘race’ and class have indeed changed, and while the notion of ‘new times’ does have some purchase on the world and the concept of ‘flexibility’ does have some uses, the postmodernist argument has been taken too far in the attempt to disintegrate the concepts of gender and ‘race’ and to see capitalism as disorganised… . Patriarchy and racism remain potent social forces, and capitalism has not withered away despite its new form. (Walby 1992: pp. 32–3)
Theories of class and capital The concept of social class has been used very differently within modernist and critical approaches. Within the former – the ‘orthodox’ consensus of post-war sociology (Giddens 1982) – class is used as a descriptor of measurable social position within a system of hierarchical classification, generally related to occupational status. Such
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systems of social differentiation may be seen as fitting well with meritocratic notions of the social order, and not implying any form of structured oppression or unfairness. Although the categories remain static, individuals are permitted a degree of social mobility between them – reflecting their personal endeavour and worth. Such individualist perspectives tend to overlook the possibility of various forms of ‘glass ceiling’ and other generalised barriers to opportunity and advancement – or see these as incidental, rather than fundamental, to class structuring. By contrast, Marx’s examination of some of the fundamental inequalities and conflicts between social classes within modernity may be seen as a ground-breaking critical analysis of social structure. Instead of simply describing differences in wealth, earning power or status, he sought to situate social groups in dynamic relationships to one another, developing the concept of ‘capital’ to denote the mobilisation and organisation of resources by one social group in order to systematically oppress other groups. He was most rigorous in his analysis of the economic exploitation of the ‘working class’, showing how the ‘ruling class’ had gained monopoly control over the material resources necessary for industrial production (factories and machinery), so that working people had typically no independent means of support – and were thereby forced to survive by selling their labour power on an individual basis at well below its use-value to the capitalist. This mode of organisation was in contrast to the earlier feudal social formation in which the former ruling class, the aristocracy, was in a position to expropriate the labour power of the peasant class through their monopoly ownership of land. Whereas ‘orthodox’ sociology may treat class as an objective category, the Marxist notion of class, as an underlying real relationship between social groups, sought to transcend the modernist dualism and embrace the possibility of a class having an identity not just ‘of itself’, but also ‘for itself’ – as a collective subject of history which may potentially act, self-consciously or otherwise, on the basis of the material interests of its members. Over recent years there has been much debate as to the continued relevance of a Marxian concept of ‘class’ within social analysis. Even within economic and materialist analyses, traditional Marxist perspectives have been criticised for overemphasising relations of production, at the expense of analysing inequalities and power relations within the sphere of consumption, in an era in which ‘lifestyle’ is seen as having greater prominence in identifying social difference – whether these
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‘New Times’ are understood as high- or postmodernity (see Hall and Jacques 1989). As Marx had predicted, the progress of capitalism and industrialisation has not been entirely stable and the constitution of the class structure would appear to be shifting – however, not generally in the specific directions that he anticipated. A simplistic picture of a cohesive and self-conscious working class in struggle with a similarly organised capitalist class does not seem helpful in unpicking the very significant changes in class configuration that may be seen to have taken place in Europe over recent decades, such as the fall in membership of the unionised manual working class (the most obvious manifestation of an organised and politicised class ‘of itself’), and the apparently increasing separation of an underclass whose exclusion from social and economic participation may appear more total than ever before (see Therborn 1989; Wilson 1991; Roberts 1997). Such shifts have not, in any sense, marked the end of issues of collective inequalities of opportunity, of economic exploitation, and of raw poverty – or excessive riches (Rentoul 1987; Oppenheim and Harker 1996). Nor has there been evidence of any threat to the level of economic control vested in the hands of a relatively small dominant group – and their potential for accumulation of wealth: Britain is ruled by a capitalist class whose economic dominance is sustained by the operations of the state and whose members are disproportionately represented in the power elite which rules the state apparatus. That is to say, Britain does have a ruling class. (Scott 1991: p. 151) Despite this, even within the more radical political discourses of the 1990s, traditional notions of ‘class’ disappeared behind the new agenda of identifying and seeking to combat ‘social exclusion’. The emphasis shifted from how a small and powerful minority might be in a position to exploit the majority, to how minority groups may be excluded from mainstream economic participation. This can be seen as marking a resurgence of the modernist notion of citizenship to denote a supposedly ‘level playing field’ in which the majority of the economically active population may interact with equality of opportunity – leaving, as the only outstanding political issue, how to incorporate those currently excluded within the ranks of such a citizenship (see Andrews 1991). Such notions of inclusivity have been shown to mask the
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operation of structural factors which prevent whole sections of the population, who are supposedly included, exercising their notional rights of citizenship (Lister 1997). The debates around concepts of ‘social exclusion’ may be seen to originate from more of a Weberian than a Marxist notion of class. While Weber sought to distance himself from the more deterministic notions of historical materialism, he also located people within class or status groupings characterised by similar ‘economic interests’ or ‘life chances’, in terms of ‘the possession of goods and the opportunities for income’ and hence their positioning within a capitalist market economy, in relation to both production and consumption (Gerth and Mills 1948: p. 181). Although Weber’s notion of class was primarily descriptive and located within the humanist tradition of modernism, it may nevertheless be seen as having critical possibilities in terms of exposing the distribution of power within a community, and how class position may underpin ‘possible forms of class action’ (ibid.: p. 184). The question of a majority closing ranks against an underclass may be just one instance of more pervasive processes of ‘social closure’ in which certain social groups may seek to keep hold of specific social resources by processes that limit access, while excluded groups may discover a solidarity of purpose in struggling to usurp such privileges (see Parkin 1974). Within such an analysis, many middle-class groups may be seen to occupy ‘contradictory class locations’ (Wright 1985), in that they may be simultaneously engaging in processes of exclusion in order to protect their somewhat elevated position, and in forms of struggle to break through the various ‘glass ceilings’ above them. What would seem to be required is a more sophisticated analysis of social structuring, using concepts such as that of ‘class fraction’ (Gramsci 1971) to describe the matrix of power and alliance that may define the shifting positions of the various elements of the middle classes, the working and non-working poor, and so on. In the late twentieth century, it has been the various middle-class fractions that have been most obviously successful in advancing their structural positions economically – and also politically and culturally. Although the apparently straightforward Marxist linkage between collective material interests, class consciousness and political action has shown itself to be seriously flawed, it may make sense to see the solidarity and common purpose of particular middle-class fractions as constituting them as the most effective collective subjects of recent history. The apparently fractured and diverse single-issue politics that
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has been identified as an indicator of postmodernity (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985) may instead be seen as the complex articulation of a variety of aspirations of those groups in intermediate positions within the overall class structure. In addition to an overemphasis on the social relations of production rather than consumption, traditional Marxist approaches have been seen as overly focusing on the role of the economic per se, in relation to cultural and ideological factors, in the constitution of class and class relations. Whereas Weber provided a basis for analysing some of the power implications of class cultures – in understanding processes of ‘social closure’ – it was Marx, despite his emphasis on material relations, who more clearly set out the foundations for a critical analysis of class-based struggle at the level of ideological or political activity: The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas… . The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production… . They … regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age… . The dominant idea … is expressed as an eternal law. (Marx 1965: p. 65) Later Marxist theorists took this analysis further in terms of the connections between ideology and material relations. Gramsci proposed that ruling groups could maintain their domination only by promulgating certain sets of ideas, ‘knowledges’, world-views and institutionalised practices that made an unequal social order appear fair, natural or inevitable. Louis Althusser makes a complex but fundamental point about the ‘dual’ character of ideology: it may be seen as being simultaneously both ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’. It may be imaginary in the sense that sets of ‘received ideas’ and ‘common-sense’ understandings may distort and misrepresent the real relationship of individuals to the material relations of their existence. Workers, who have no control over the means of production, may, in reality, be forced to accept a job on the terms that they will be paid a wage that does not reflect the true value of the work done (and hence provide profit for the capitalist). However, in capitalist-dominated ideologies, this unfair transaction may be constructed as a free exchange between individuals of ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’. This ‘imaginary’ vision of the relationship becomes real in the sense that it is lived as if it were real by the participants. When going after work, workers are situated, and must actively situate themselves, as free subjects who actually want to work,
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and who can therefore be held individually responsible for the quality and execution of that work. Ideology thus becomes enshrined in real customs, institutions and practices – and the possibilities for change become less straightforward, requiring no longer just an unveiling of people’s ‘true’ material interests, but a strategic ‘war of position’ in order to open up and secure alternative perspectives. Gramsci proposed that in order to achieve their ideological domination, or ‘hegemony’, ruling groups had to secure alliances with key class fractions, such as professional groups and those working in the media, in order to ‘win the active consensus of those over whom it rules’ (1971: p. 244). Conversely, effective struggle to enhance the position of those subject to economic domination and exploitation could involve complex alliances between the working class and allied class fractions to achieve an alternative hegemony – a radical consensus for social change. Combining elements of both Marxian and Weberian notions of class, Pierre Bourdieu (1987; 1989) proposes a model of the unequal distribution, movement and availability of different forms of social ‘capital’, leading to differential access to positions of power over others. He views class as being embedded in the micro-scale interactions and ‘trajectories’ of everyday life, and as being continually subject to constant small-scale shifts and realignments. While incorporating a Marxian view of economic capital, he develops a broader understanding of the constitution of various other forms of ‘capital’. Social capital is seen as deriving from being connected and identified with groups, collectivities or other allies. Cultural capital may become embodied in the form of acquired identities, orientations or ‘dispositions’ of the mind and body. Alternatively, it may exist as cultural ‘goods’ that may be possessed or accessed, or in institutionalised forms such as educational qualifications. His separate concept of symbolic capital connects with previous notions of ideology, and concerns access to systems of representation and legitimation, which may be seen as essential in mobilising and reproducing other forms of capital in order to achieve and maintain power. The coming together of these various ‘capitals’ may be seen in the operation of notions, such as ‘respectability’, in dividing the ‘haves’ from the ‘have-nots’, and delineating gradations in between (Skeggs 1997). Respectability may be seen to depend on the possession of economic capital (income, consumption goods, property), cultural capital (taste, manners, clothes, cultural objects, qualifications), social capital (connections in ‘the right places’) and, perhaps most crucially, sym-
Structural Approaches to Power and Inequality 45
bolic capital. It is this that may be seen to legitimate the bracketing together of wealth and status, to establish the hierarchical signification of dress codes and etiquette, and to distinguish ‘high’ from ‘low’ forms of culture. Such more sophisticated understandings of forms of capital have been helpful in establishing that, theoretically as well as empirically, class is still an issue. At a local level, it may be acted out in differential abilities to mobilise personal dispositions, networks of support and validation, and systems of symbolic or institutional legitimation. However, the underpinning of these inequalities may be seen to depend on structural codes that delineate wider class positionings.
Theories of gender, age, sexuality and (dis)ability: extending concepts of patriarchy A second body of structural theory has developed, initially examining issues of gender inequality, whose primary concepts may also have the potential to open up perspectives on a range of other discriminations. It could be argued that each basis for discrimination requires to be theorised in its own right – and ultimately this may be the most appropriate way forward (see, for example, Jeffreys 1990; Bytheway 1995). However, there is a danger that this may lead to a multiplicity of disconnected analyses that may tend to confuse, rather than elucidate, the dynamics of power within the current social order. As Connel warns: ‘Any number of dimensions can be added… . Yet the more sophisticated the cross-classification becomes, the more firmly is the analysis embedded in a static logic of categories’ (1987: p. 59). Therefore, given the potential degree of interconnection, I have chosen to deal with sexism, heterosexism, ageism and disablism together, in order to explore the degree of linkage at a theoretical level. Feminist and gender studies have identified possible terms to describe the structural relations that may be seen to define categories such as ‘masculinity’, ‘femininity’, ‘heterosexuality’, and so on. Most straightforward in its definition is the term ‘androcracy’, or Rule-byMen (see Eisler 1987; Remy 1990). However, such a concept, describing a simple binary relation of male domination over women, has been little used in practice. Instead, the relations that define ‘male’ and ‘female’ have generally been seen to be more complex, with not all men, or all women, being situated in quite the same ways in relation to each category. More specific terms, such as patriarchy and fratriarchy, interconnected with notions of institutionalised heterosexuality, have been deployed to denote how certain male collectivities, organised in
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particular ways, may be seen to have achieved historical positions of domination over subordinated ‘other’ categories. By invoking notions of age, status and sexual orientation as part of the overall picture, the metaphor of patriarchy, or Rule-of-the-Father, suggests a more complex set of social relations that have wider ramifications than just a binary analysis of all men subjugating all women (see Hearn 1987). Instead, it suggests power being vested in certain positions of ‘seniority’, which may be signified by attributes such as physical strength, potency, heterosexual orientation or position within a generational hierarchy. In this way, certain men as well as women may be located as subject to ‘the power of the father’ (Barrett 1980: p. 250) – those ‘whose situations are related in different ways to the overall logic of the subordination of women to men’, such as children, gay or disabled men (Carrigan et al. 1987: p. 86). Indeed, ‘any kind of powerlessness, or refusal to compete’ may tend to be defined in terms of effeminacy or ‘the imagery of homosexuality’ (ibid.). Alternatively, turning this around, it may be argued that it is the reiterative practice and privileging of heterosexual relations that continues to define hegemonic constructions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ (Butler 1990; Wittig 1992). Further complexity may arise where, in circumscribed instances, individual women may take on positions of patriarchal power as if they were men – whether as heads of households, business leaders, monarchs or prime ministers – without fundamentally challenging patriarchal power relations. Within the feudal organisation of many monarchies, a woman has been able to ‘slot in’ to a position of full authority and status while she reigns as queen, while still presiding over a system in which sons would take precedence over daughters in determining inheritance. Similarly, within different political systems, women such as Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi have become prime minister without fundamentally challenging the patriarchal organisation within their respective countries or opening the doors for women in general to have access to membership of the ruling elite. It is a matter of some debate as to what extent modernity has been marked by a perpetuation of neo-feudalistic forms of patriarchal relations. Within the public sphere, as part of the ‘social contract’ of the Enlightenment, it is suggested that the mode of organisation among men may be seen to have shifted more radically towards a ‘fratriarchy’ that gave more power and opportunity to younger men, as the capitalist class superseded the aristocracy as the ruling group in class terms. Notions of some ‘natural’ authority, giving a special status of seniority
Structural Approaches to Power and Inequality 47
to men ‘of a certain age’, may be seen to have fitted well with the wider social structures and ideologies of feudalism. However, as more wealth was created through industrial expansion than was to be acquired through inheritance, the relative economic power base of older people declined. A parallel shift may be seen in the decline in respect for notions of wisdom and judgement associated with older age (Bytheway 1995). Thus, a transition in patriarchal relations may be seen to mark the birth of ageist discrimination against older people within modern societies – and one way of understanding ‘modernity’ would be to see it as representing ‘a change from a traditional (paternal) form of patriarchy to a new specifically modern (or fraternal) form: patriarchal civil society’ (Pateman 1989: p. 35). Such ‘modern’ patriarchy in the public sphere may be seen to have coexisted with continued variations of the Rule-of-the-Father within the domestic sphere. Sylvia Walby (1990) suggests that, in the early phases of modernity, ‘private patriarchy’ was the dominant mode of oppression, as women were effectively excluded from public life. However, later modernity saw some loosening of such barriers, accompanied by a simultaneous emergence of ‘public patriarchy’ under which women faced forms of segregation and subordination within economic and political life (for example, relegation to low-paid and part-time work). Thus, despite the apparent legislative enfranchisement of women in the West, ‘women’s formal admission to citizenship has been on different terms to those enjoyed by men’, due to factors such as unequal expectations in the domestic sphere, resulting in ‘at best partial and precarious inclusion into substantive citizenship’ (Lister 1997: pp. 71–2). The starting point of the ‘second wave’ of feminism, was a focus on the generalities of women’s experience of inequality and oppression. Although, initially, the concept of ‘patriarchy’ was seen, in somewhat monolithic terms, as a single, overarching structure of oppression, more sophisticated structural analyses sought to break this down into ‘a system of social structures and practices’, each of which may be seen to operate and change to some degree autonomously from one another (Walby 1990: p. 20). These comprised the different processes whereby women may be systematically disadvantaged in the public sphere of wage labour and political participation, and exploited, both economically and sexually, within the private sphere of domestic relations. These processes may comprise both material aspects, in terms of access to resources and victimisation within patterns of violence, and cultural aspects in terms of how gender may be represented. Although analyti-
48 Social Theory, Power and Practice
cally separate, each of these processes of structuring social relations could be seen as interpenetrating and interdetermining of one another. Initial attempts to examine the economic operation of patriarchy involved developing a historical materialist analysis separate from, but potentially interlinking with, analyses of class: Patriarchy … is a structure … whereby property, the means of production and exchange values, is appropriated by men, and whereby this property relation informs household and family relations in such a way that men may appropriate the labour and the actual persons of women. (Kuhn and Wolpe 1978: p. 65) Defined in this way, patriarchy was seen to operate within a separate economic base, that of the ‘domestic’ mode of production. Women (and sometimes children or other household members) may be required to undertake whatever ‘housework’ or physical caring is needed within the family, without any right to material or other recognition for the services they provide (Finch and Groves 1983; Delphy 1984). Due to their continued involvement in the domestic mode of production, women may not find liberation from oppression within familial organisation just through their participation in the capitalist wage labour process. Instead, they may typically have to ‘juggle’ employment with their domestic ‘responsibilities’. Thus, not only may women face systematic discrimination in the wage labour market, but, on top of this, their work opportunities may be defined by what they can fit around their ‘obligations’ to husband and children (see Close and Collins 1985). Although, as Oakley (1974) showed, women have tended to work for longer hours overall than men (paid employment and housework), their disposable wealth or rights of consumption tend not to reflect this. While it has often been considered legitimate for men to retain a part of their wages for personal consumption, a woman’s earnings have often been considered as part of the ‘housekeeping’, to be spent on herself only when (or if) the rest of the family is properly provided for (see Barrett and McIntosh 1982; Land 1983). Within working-class families, there may often be differential rights in terms of the consumption of food, depending on gender and age, that are continually reproduced in day-to-day family rituals and are underpinned by an elaborate system of beliefs and sanctions (Charles and Kerr 1987). Much research on family poverty has shown how it is women who consistently go without, in order that men and children (usually in
Structural Approaches to Power and Inequality 49
that order) can have the greater share of whatever resources are to be distributed (Pahl 1983; Graham 1984; Brannen and Wilson 1987). For the wealthier social classes, it is argued that forms of patriarchal domestic organisation have tended to be governed by the rules of inheritance, ‘patrimonial transmission’, which ‘creates possessors and non-possessors within each family’ (Delphy 1984: p. 19). Thus, in addition to exploiting their domestic labour, patriarchy may also exercise ‘control of women’s fertility and sexuality in monogamous marriage’ as a means of guaranteeing the path of inheritance (McDonough and Harrison 1978: p. 40). In both feudal and modern societies, the ‘family’ has typically been organised around a set of ideological concepts, such as legitimacy, lineage and racial ‘purity’, that have enabled wealth and power to be passed from one generation of ‘white’ bourgeois men to another. Feminist and gender analyses have generated a wider perspective on what may constitute the material aspects of oppression – starting to theorise the structural domination of women also on the basis of relations of physical force and coercion. As with other aspects of modern ‘civil society’, this may be somewhat concealed and ‘behind the scenes’: We are not accustomed to associate patriarchy with force… . Customarily, we view its brutalities … as the product of individual deviance, confined to pathological or exceptional behaviour, and without general import. And yet … control in patriarchal society would be imperfect, even inoperable, unless it has the rule of force to rely upon, both in emergencies and as an ever-present instrument of intimidation. (Millett 1977: p. 43; see also Dobash and Dobash 1977) Thus, from a materialist perspective, patriarchy may be seen, not just as a mode of economic exploitation, but also as a systematic organisation of social relations on the basis of the potential for violence – both between men and women and between dominant and subordinated groups of men (Connel 1987). Such an approach links in with other perspectives within social theory which have identified the importance of physical coercion as a basis for social structuring: ‘The monopolisation of violence … plays no less a part as a source of power than the monopolisation of the means of production’ (Elias 1987: p. 230). Historical analysis reveals that men have achieved positions of domination through the organisation of military action or policing, and also through the oppressive use of physical strength in domestic or street violence. In many contexts, men’s competitive relations with
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other men may be mediated by the potential for systematic violence (as in school bullying, or in the role of the police and armed forces). This may also be seen to underpin their structural domination of women and children (although, in these instances, such violence may more frequently be sexualised). Furthermore, men who suffer abuse and domination at the hands of other men may displace their aggression on to ‘softer’ targets such as female partners or children: Violent actions may be available as part of men’s repertoire at all times, but are most used at times of particular threat… . Frustration and anger at possible or potential loss of power in one sphere may be acted upon in another sphere of relationship, where there may be less resistance. (Hearn 1990: p. 70) Feminism was probably rather quicker than Marxism to appreciate the relative importance of discursive and ideological structures in terms of developing a fuller understanding of the operation of oppression. Patriarchal discourses may serve to legitimate (and make appear ‘natural’) the exploitation and intimidation of women. However, they may also be seen to contain points of tension and contradiction, giving space for continual possibilities of instability or resistance. Assumptions about the ‘natural-and-proper organisation’ of gendered social relations may be seen to be ‘subject to constant renegotiation’ (Harris 1985: p. 122). Women can be subjected to representations of their domestic roles and responsibilities: as caring, hard-working and loyal. Simultaneously, within patriarchal relations, women may also be defined, particularly through discourses such as pornography, as the objects of male sexual desire: as sensual, spontaneous, exciting and longing for ‘it’ (where ‘it’ is the satisfaction of a masculine rather than any feminine mode of sexuality). This results in the split and conflicting construction of ‘femininity’ in relation to the twin images of women as, on the one hand, the sexual property of men and, on the other, the chaste mothers of their children. The madonna/whore dichotomy runs through western patriarchal culture as the means whereby men have sought to ensure both the sanctity and inheritance of their families and their extra-familial sexual pleasure. (Barrett 1980: p. 45) However, it is not just the more extreme forms of representation that may be seen as crucial in the subordination of women. Everyday media images may be shown to support and reproduce
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codes of representation of how women should see themselves and be seen by men as ‘feminine’ – in terms of the significations of dress (dressing for, and in relation to, a masculine ‘gaze’), location (representing women within the confines of conventional zones such as the ‘ideal home’), activity (privileging the representation of women undertaking conventionally female tasks), and so on (see, for example, Coward 1978). There is a danger that some of the clarity (and outrage) to be found in these feminist analyses has been lost in subsequent more complex formulations. Poststructuralists have criticised such theories as being too deterministic, casting women in the role of perpetual victims, helpless to negotiate and achieve power for themselves – and also for masking the degree to which women may act oppressively towards other women (Aziz 1993). There has been a rejection of the unitary category ‘women’ as reinforcing aspects of the same biological essentialism that has been used to justify women’s subordination over the years. Through its dominant articulation by relatively privileged groups of women living in the Western world, feminism has been seen as repressive of the diversity of ‘minority’ experiences: ‘The description of what we have in common “as women” has almost always been a description of white, middle-class women’ (Spelman 1988: p. 4; see also Bhavani 1993; Lovell 1996). Subsequent feminisms have sought to emphasise a more complex and fractured picture of women’s experience across class, culture and geography, sexual orientation, age and (dis)ability. Nevertheless, there is a feeling that this process of reaction may have gone too far: ‘It is not necessary to abandon categories such as women … in order to recognise that they are internally differentiated’ (Maynard 1994: p. 22). Within modernism, notions of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’, whether as part of ‘common sense’ or within the academic literature, have tended to take for granted certain assumptions about the appropriateness, inevitability and biological basis for differentiating social roles. A major achievement of second-wave feminism was to decouple social constructions of gender from biological notions of sex. Following on from this, once the supposedly ‘natural’ basis for defining ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ started to become deconstructed, the way was opened for other sets of stereotypes to be deconstructed as oppressive and anything but inevitable. Through the developing genre of Queer Studies, gay and lesbian people have started to probe beneath the discriminatory attitudes and practices that privileged heterosexual over homosexual relationships,
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characterising the former as ‘normal’ and the latter as a ‘sin against nature’. Women who choose not to make themselves sexually available to men may face particular experiences of oppression. By patriarchal definition, women must always be ready to subject themselves as sexual objects for men (inside or outside marriage), so the very possibility of lesbian orientation may be denied, or it may be constructed as ‘deviant’, a joke or as a subject for male sexual gratification (Barrett 1980). Male homosexuality would seem to have posed a more direct threat to many modern forms of patriarchy – as something that could not just be ignored or marginalised – and became subject to medical regimes of definition and ‘treatment’, and legal proscription (Foucault 1981; Weeks 1990; 1991). Perhaps the most bizarre extension of the dualistic separation of ‘normal’ and ‘against nature’ may be seen in the systematic social degradation of people with physical impairments or learning difficulties; in their construction as a category of difference that is somehow painful or disturbing to behold, and one that requires subordination within the dominant order of patriarchal relations. It is seen as profoundly disruptive to dominant constructions of both ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ (Campling 1981; Meekosha 1998), and to the modernist ‘valorisation of the notion of autonomy from others in Western society’ (Corker and French 1999a: p. 5). It is no coincidence that, in order to occupy the patriarchal position of authority as US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a wheelchair user, had to be ‘packaged’ as if he were able bodied, and was only to be photographed and presented to the public at large from the waist up, often seated behind the grandeur of the presidential desk. Through the articulation of the social model by disability movements, people have argued that their greatest experiences of restriction and distress are not due to anything inherent in their biology, but to the stigmatising and exclusionary practices that determine how they are treated by dominant able-bodied groups within the current social order (Oliver 1996). The attitudes and practices both of the community in general and of professional services have tended to promote systematic social exclusion through the establishment of segregated services and by failing to open access to mainstream facilities. People may be dehumanised as a problem or a ‘burden’ on those who are more able, or as a ‘tragedy’ requiring endless sympathy, or they may be patronised by able-bodied people talking over them and treating them as if they were children unable to indicate preferences or make decisions (Corker and French 1999b).
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Just as forms of sexist, disablist and heterosexist oppression have been legitimated by spurious recourse to biology, so too have systematic forms of discrimination against children and older people. In this way, it may come to be seen as ‘natural’ for people of certain chronological ages to be constructed as inherently ‘stupid’, incapable and of lesser importance (Bytheway 1995). It may also be seen as ‘natural’ to accord children an almost pre-human or animal-like status, legitimating systematic forms of physical or verbal assault as part of their disciplining or ‘training’ (Miller 1983). Research evidence suggests that forms of physical punishment are in most widespread use in relation to young and very young children – those who are least able to defend themselves or articulate any effective form of protest (see Hotaling et al. 1988). Just as nineteenth-century English law used the commonsense ‘rule of thumb’ to judge as excessive only those wife-beatings where the husband used a stick of a greater diameter than his thumb, so the current English legal system maintains an arbitrary distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abusive’ use of force against children – thereby sanctioning the continued subordination of younger people by means of the systematic deployment of physical violence.
Theories of imperialism, colonialism and racism A third body of structural theory has addressed how, as part of the modernist project, ‘white’ westerners have systematically secured their domination over other peoples, both those denied equality within the West because of their ‘race’ or ethnicity, and those living elsewhere who, under the social relations of colonialism, have been subjected within unequal economic, social and cultural relationships. As was discussed earlier, the transition to modernity involved fundamental shifts in the ways in which the principal western powers secured and organised their domination over other peoples. This coincided with new conceptions of nationhood. For the first time, concepts of ‘race’ (defined in terms of ethnic descent) emerged as a crucial component of the reciprocal definitions of ‘us’ – who were to belong to and constitute the nation-state – and ‘them’ – who were to be excluded and potentially exploited as ‘other’. Rather than see racist exclusion as some incidental ‘blip’ that was ‘antithetical to the universalist aspirations inherent in modernity’ (Van Loon 1997: p. 158), such patterns of exclusion and exploitation may be seen as central to the construction of modern prosperity and the establishment of social privilege within this new order of society (Miles 1989).
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Just as women were excluded from entry into the Enlightenment social contract because they were deemed incapable of full rationality, so too were non-Europeans and colonised European peoples, such as the Irish. This exclusion was organised on the basis of unexamined constructions of ‘race’ and ancestry that were produced and reproduced as ‘common sense’ in everyday discourse, and underpinned by the writings of modernist intellectuals. For example, Kant was able to propose that ‘the reason for assuming the Negroes and the Whites to be fundamental races is self-evident’ (1950: p. 19), without even having to provide any evidence or argument in support of such a proposition. Similarly, for Hegel, the supposed ‘irrationality’ of the ‘African character’ placed African people beyond the pale of modernist citizenship: The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it, we must give up the principle that naturally accompanies all our ideas – the category of universality. (1900: p. 93) Although such differences were constructed as ‘natural’, ‘the otherness of colonised persons was neither inherent nor stable; his or her difference had to be defined and maintained’ (Stoler and Cooper 1997: p. 7). Furthermore, concepts of ‘difference’ were to be inextricably linked with an understanding that difference denoted ‘inferiority’. Thus, despite the universalist rhetoric of modernity, its ‘new political codes’ may be seen to have been ‘endowed … with a deadly exclusionary force’ (Gilroy 1999: p. 187). As with patriarchy, ideological assumptions around ‘difference’ and ‘inferiority’ were also underpinned by an appeal to a spuriously scientific biological essentialism that claimed to render the difference ‘natural’ and inevitable. Difference could be specified in terms of geography, culture, ethnicity or ‘race’ – but each of these modernist categories requires to be deconstructed to reveal their ongoing social constitution through processes of oppression and resistance. As part of the project of biological taxonomy undertaken by Linnaeus, Cuvier and others, a hierarchical system of ‘racial’ classification was established which offered a gradation from animallike ‘savages’ (African peoples) to superior White/Aryan racial types who alone were seen as capable of the sophisticated sensibilities that characterised ‘civilised’ Europeans. Although the basis for the scientific categorisation of ‘race’ has been systematically discredited (see Banton and Harwood 1975), it still leaves a legacy which underpins notions of essential superiority within the everyday discourses of ‘white’ people – and occasionally resurfaces
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in more academic texts, such as The Bell-Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). However, while ‘race’ as a biological construct has a dubious reality, ‘race’ as an ideological concept, and racism as an oppressive and exclusionary practice, may be seen to be all too real (Husband 1986). Thus, as Tariq Modood (1992) argues, it is much more helpful to redefine the term ‘race’ as a political category that signifies a ‘mode of oppression’, in a similar way as does the concept of ‘class’. Within modernity, imperialist domination has comprised various modes of economic exploitation, both internally through structures of discrimination, and also externally through the colonial and postcolonial domination of Third World economies by the West. Materialist perspectives have opened up an analysis of issues such as the exploitation of the labour of subordinated ‘races’ through practices such as slavery, in which ‘the slave system defined Black people as chattel’ (Davis 1982: p. 5). Not only was the value of their labour power appropriated, but their very persons were subject to being bought and sold in the marketplace. Legal and military means were employed to underpin the slavemasters’ domination. However, at a more local level, power was exercised through the systematic use of violence, through routine physical abuse and ‘the virtual institutionalisation of rape’ (ibid.: p. 175). Intersecting with forms of material oppression were structures of ideological domination, legitimation and resistance. Within classical civilisations, slavery had never been linked to any ‘racial’ identification – only the misfortune to be conquered by a militarily superior power (Miles 1989). However, early modern slavery, which was driven by opportunities for rapid economic expansion in the New World, required legitimation of its dehumanising practices through a new and ‘distinct regime of truths’ which presented ‘race’ ‘as a permanent, inevitable and extra-historical principle of differentiation’ (Gilroy 1999: p. 185). Slavery fitted uneasily with the overall ethos of modernity: its stark use of brute force and coercion undermined the appearances of fairness and consent which characterised its preferred forms of oppression and exploitation. Only an extreme distortion of biological ‘science’ could hope to provide a sufficient legitimation for such an inherently barbaric (but economically lucrative) practice as slavery – one that would effectively separate off this reality from corrupting the belief in a rational social order that underpinned other aspects of the new social order of the Enlightenment (see Young 1994). As living with such contradiction threatened to undermine the project of modernity, the dominant mode of imperialism switched to more subtle forms of material exploitation: colonialism, postcolonialism and
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racism. Colonialism involved the systematic exploitation of the material and human resources of non-western peoples as a subjugated nation under the direct political administration of a western power (but often coopting a local administrative class to undertake much of the work required in maintaining this control). Postcolonialism (or postcoloniality) involves nominal political independence, but within a global economy that dictates a continuation of unequal terms of trade, underpinned by a variety of mechanisms of western control from bank lending to military ‘protection’. (For a discussion of the various meanings of the term ‘postcolonialism’, see Dirlik 1994; Rattansi 1997). Racism within the West subjects ‘black’ or ethnic minority peoples to systematic forms of economic exclusion and exploitation through discrimination in access to employment, housing, education and other forms of opportunity. Intersecting with these new economic and political forms came new variants of racial and cultural ideologies that constructed ‘an irrevocable otherness’ for non-western peoples (Gilroy 1999: p. 185). There was a significant shift from a sole reliance on ‘scientific’ racism, to the promulgation of new and more subtle discourses of cultural superiority. For example, faced with the reality of complex and sophisticated eastern civilisations, imperialist discourses sought to redefine these as of unequal status: Oriental cultures were compartmentalised as ‘exotic’ and strange (although dangerously seductive), and eastern people became seen as wily and untrustworthy (Said 1978). Western imperialist rulers were able to justify their presence on the basis that even ‘civilised’ non-Europeans were incapable of modernist rationality and hence had to be subordinated and excluded from entry into the post-Enlightenment social contract: The mind of the Oriental … like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description … and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times before he has finished his story. (Lord Cromer 1908, cited in Said 1978: p. 38) Thus empire was represented as being to the benefit of those colonised, who were defined as being inherently morally, culturally and intellectually backward or ‘primitive’, and who would therefore be in perpetual need of western leadership in maintaining at least a superficial veneer of ‘civilisation’ and economic prosperity: That the people of a culture should view themselves as culturally superior is certainly common… . But not so common is the feature contained in Western cultural thinking, that the superior should
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control the inferior. It is this kind of thinking, which emphasises the value placed on control, that produces a missionary imperialism… . Western control over non-Western peoples is therefore considered morally defensible (Hodge et al. 1975: p. 3) Racism, as a structure for the subordination of ethnic minorities within the West, may be seen to be linked to further revisions and shifts in ideologies. More recently, overt expressions of ‘white’ supremacy or superiority have become displaced by what Barker (1981) has termed ‘the new racism’, which emphasises racial difference and the psychological and social stresses wrought upon the ‘host’ (‘white’) community, in terms of identity and culture, by the entry of ‘black’ outsiders into their midst. Implicit within this discourse is the notion that ‘white’ society is ‘normal’ and non-‘white’ cultures are ‘different’ and therefore problematic – thereby legitimating a variety of more subtle modes of oppression and exclusion: Ethnic hegemony involves … a distinct set of strategies whereby a particular power elite lays claim to represent an ethnic majority in such a way as to impose their own norms of language and culture on the rest of society as ideals or models to which all should aspire. (Cohen and Bains 1988: p. 26) To those on the receiving end of these colonial, postcolonial and racist discourses, the implications may be devastating. Not only are they placed in the position of an inferior ‘other’, but the discourses, and the colonial or racist languages within which they are inscribed, may be so pervasive that they may find themselves with little possibility for articulating their experience of oppression or assert any different identities (hooks 1992). Perhaps even more insidiously, codes of looking and seeing are also unequally structured, so that the ‘white gaze’ subjects ‘black’ people to an unremitting interrogation, while ‘black’ people have no reciprocal right to interrogate ‘whiteness’, since this is to be seen as ‘normal’ and unproblematic: In white supremacist society, white people can ‘safely’ imagine that they are invisible to black people since the power they have historically asserted, and even now collectively assert over black people, accorded them the right to control the black gaze. (hooks 1992: p. 168) ‘Black’ people may be placed in situations where they either have continually to deny their difference in order to fit in with the ‘white’ way
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of seeing things, or have justify every detail of difference in the face of hostile and uncomprehending ‘white’ perspectives that often seem to lack any potential or willingness to empathise with the position of the ‘other’. Thus, through developing an analysis of the structures of western materialist and ideological domination over other peoples, it becomes possible to disconnect the concept of ‘race’ from any biologically based notions of difference or inferiority, and to see it instead as a category that signifies a mode of oppression. Just as class analyses have moved on from a simplistic binary opposition of ‘ruling’ and ‘working’ classes to explore the complex politics involving ‘class fractions’, so too there has emerged a need to move beyond the simplicity of the categories ‘white’ and ‘black’ to more sophisticated notions of ‘ethnicities’. An ethnicity may be understood as how people choose to identify themselves in terms of history, tradition, values, community and culture (Modood 1992). However, just as with the concept of ‘race’, ethnicity may used to signify some form of ‘essential’ difference that then may be used to legitimate processes of exclusion or inferiorisation of the ‘other’. Thus, any definition of an ethnicity may also be seen to be an intrinsically political category, historically constructed out of power struggles and alliances, and the ongoing division of ‘the world into “us” and “them”’ (Yuval-Davis 1994: p. 182). More recently there has been a tendency to subsume and secrete issues of ‘race’ and racism within postmodern discourses of ‘ethnic diversity’ and ‘multi-culturalism’, leading to the substitution of analyses of difference rather than inequality. This has rendered more problematic the political use of the term ‘black’ by groups subjected to experiences of racism, in the face of an emphasis on the particularities of ‘ethnic’ identity, culture and economic or educational opportunity – and perhaps suggests the need for new signifiers that can embrace political commonalities in experience, while no longer playing to imperialist discourses that may continue to merge and stereotype the different identities and experiences of those oppressed. ‘White’ people, perhaps somewhat threatened by owning up to the complicity in racist oppression that would be the focus of any analysis of ‘white’ identity or experience, may have too eagerly sought refuge in the complexity and dispersal of ‘white ethnicities’.
Integrating structural theories It has been a matter of some debate how the three sets of oppressive structures discussed above may constitute ‘interlocking categories of experience’ (Andersen and Hill Collins 1992: p. xii). Each experience of
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oppression may suggest different definitions of who constitutes a ruling group and an oppressed group. In each case, a ruling group may seek to incorporate a different set of ‘allies’ in securing the oppression of subordinated groups. While it seems highly significant that most capitalists are ‘white’ and male (although not exclusively so), nevertheless working-class men may also be seen to act oppressively to women, and ‘white’ women may be in an oppressive position with respect to ‘black’ women. Such contradictions have led to fruitless debates among the theorists of different oppressed groups as to whether one mode of oppression is, in some way, more fundamental than any other (see, for example, Sargent 1981; Meulenbelt et al. 1984; Chow et al. 1996). I would see it as more productive to pursue (and, if necessary, extend) a ‘triple jeopardy’ analysis, in which the power relations of the social formation are understood in terms of ‘the simultaneous oppression of patriarchy, class and race’ (Carby 1982). The specific dynamics of each set of struggles may be seen to be, to some extent, autonomous from one another – but many people may find themselves subject to more than one mode of oppression. The impact is not simply additive. Sometimes the operation of different modes of oppression may act in contradictory ways, opening up unexpected possibilities for manoeuvrability and effective resistance. Alternatively, the impact of different aspects of oppression may compound one another, creating more extreme forms of social exclusion (see West and Fenstermaker 1996). It may be seen that, at various historical instances, changes in the forms of patriarchal and class oppression have given rise to particular contradictions. For example, in the early stages of the industrial revolution, the opportunities for women and children to sell their labour power individually to the factory owners, while satisfying the capitalists’ desire for plentiful cheap labour, undermined traditional aspects of patriarchal organisation in which the ‘man of the house’ had directly controlled the labour of his whole family unit. In the event, this tendency was countered, and patriarchy reasserted, through a variety of means, such as protective legislation regulating the employment of women and children, and the discourse of the ‘family wage’ which constituted the man as the principal ‘breadwinner’ (see Barrett 1980). Such moves, however, effectively reduced the possibilities for the capitalist exploitation of a larger workforce. Some theoretical work on imperialism and racism has interlinked this with an understanding of class or gender oppression (for example, Alexander 1987; Miles 1989). Sometimes these separate modes of oppression acted so as to reinforce one another, but at other times they
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produced contradictions, as between the logic of global capitalism and particular modes of colonialist domination, when ‘the attempt to rule on the basis of native custom clashed with the process of domination that sought to incorporate the other into the same socio-economic sphere’ (Chan 2000: p. 381). Similarly, contradictions between the interests of racism and of patriarchy may be seen to have arisen in relation to the organisation of slavery: Since women, no less than men, were viewed as profitable labourunits, they might as well be genderless as far as the slave-holders were concerned… . Judged by the evolving nineteenth century ideology of femininity, which emphasised women’s roles as nurturing mothers and gentle companions and housekeepers for their husbands, Black women were practical anomalies. (Davis 1982: p. 5) Thus the material exploitation of ‘black’ women as slave labour prevented their being subjugated as women to ‘black’ men in terms of any ideology of femininity (and this potentially threatened to undermine the subjugation of all women in this way).
Structural theory and social activism Structural theories of social divisions have informed many aspects of practice, both political and social. Broadly speaking, the dominant modes of radical politics in the 1960s were informed by analyses based on class and a focus on mobilising groups of working-class people – workforces or local communities – in forms of mass action: strikes, protests, single-issue campaigns, and so on. However, following a number of significant ‘watershed’ defeats, such as the failure of the Paris uprisings of 1968 and the collapse of the British miners’ strike in 1984, the traditional left-wing radical consensus began to dissolve. In parallel with this, new radical political alignments began to emerge, representing the interests of those who had found that their particular experiences of structural discrimination and oppression were not being addressed, or being given sufficient significance in their own right, within the dominant socialist agenda. Women, black people, disabled people, lesbians, gay men and other subordinated groups began to articulate their own particular ‘identity’ politics, not only raising and prioritising different issues, but also pioneering new forms of organisation and action. The Women’s Movement shifted the focus from large-scale mass action to more intimate spheres, under its historic slogan that ‘the per-
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sonal is political’. Women sought to disentangle their experiences of oppression within the context of small-scale consciousness-raising or support groups, and to use this as a basis for renegotiating attitudes and practices, and their roles and relationships, within domestic, workplace and other settings. ‘Black’ and ‘white’ activists formed alliances to fight together against racism. Alongside this, a political focus for many ‘black’ groups was struggles around redefining and reasserting aspects of cultural and ethnic identity. Pride in asserting alternative identities and cultures also formed a major part in the political activities of lesbian and gay people – particularly through festivals and cultural events. For disabled people, struggles have involved reclaiming their bodies and minds from medical control and definition – and hence from all of the various processes of social inferiorisation and social exclusion, of being constructed as a ‘problem’ or a ‘tragedy’, that follow on from being classified as somehow less than ‘normal’ (Oliver 1996). Shifts in the dominant directions of political action, and also in the theoretical sophistication of structural analyses, may be seen as setting the contexts for the various forms of professional practice that have been influenced by structural perspectives. Structural theory has been influential in the development of various strands of ‘radical’ professional practice in which workers have sought to use a professional role (social work, community work, nursing) in order to address collective issues of inequality, disadvantage and social exclusion. Such practice may be seen to have close links with other traditions of political and economic activism, such as working within pressure groups, political parties or trade unions (see, for example, Joyce et al. 1988). Informed by analyses of class, ‘race’ or gender relations – or, more recently, by attempts to integrate analyses of multiple dimensions of oppression – structural practice targets power structures external to the person: Since a power relations perspective assumes conflict in social relations based on inequality, then this framework proposes a mode of intervention to work with power, conflict and change, the overall objective of which is to transform power relations (McNay 1992: p. 58; see also Mullaly 1993) While some approaches have focused more on ideological issues, others have been underpinned by a predominantly materialist analysis, involving ‘an examination of the way in which power and economic resources are distributed, the characteristics of that distribution, the
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interests it serves and the part played by welfare services in the processes of distribution’ (Davis 1991: p. 67). Particularly in the 1970s, a key location for structural practice was in community activism which sought to address powerlessness experienced by working-class and other disadvantaged sections of society (Curno 1978). This approach encouraged people to make links with others and collectively take action to address the oppressions or exclusions that they experienced in common (Craig et al. 1982; Taylor and Roberts 1985; Popple 1995). It could entail identifying local or sectional interests, and pursuing ‘single-issue campaigns’, around which participants may unite in common purpose, such as better housing or environmental conditions. However, such approaches were criticised for failing to engage specifically with race or gender issues (Hanmer and Rose 1980; Thorpe and Petruchenia 1985). Responding to such critiques, the principles of community activism were extended to working with women (Dominelli 1990; 1995), and people from black and minority ethnic communities (Ohri et al. 1982). In this way, the agenda widened to include issues such as more appropriate healthcare choices for women, or more effective protection against sexual or racial violence. In such activist approaches, the concept of community was developed within an adversarial frame of reference: geographical communities and social divisions were used as a basis for organising campaigning units against the state, the local authority, capitalist, patriarchal or racist interests. This radical discourse has stood in contradiction to the more liberal discourses of ‘community development’, in which goals have been specified in terms of social inclusion or economic and social regeneration – and where intervention has involved forming working alliances with a range of potential ‘stakeholders’ including statutory services and business interests. Sharing many of the same values and orientations, are structural approaches to working with individuals, families and groups, building on the tradition of ‘radical’ social work (Bailey and Brake 1975; Langan and Lee 1989; Moreau 1990). As with community work, there has been a gradual shift from an initial emphasis on class (Corrigan and Leonard 1978), to separate considerations of gender (Brook and Davis 1985; Dominelli and McLeod 1989) and ‘race’ (Dominelli 1988), and finally to more integrated perspectives addressing multiple and interlocking systems of oppression. Individually and collectively, people may be enabled to see their difficulties, not as due to some individual fault or pathology, but as located within local or structural dynamics of dis-
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crimination or exploitation (Coates and McKay 1995). A structural approach offers an alternative to forms of modernist practice that work towards restoring social conformity and participation. Instead, it seeks to make connection between the personal and the political: Rather than looking within the individual or within one’s family, or within one’s subculture for the source of distress, the way in which the larger social order perpetrates and perpetuates people’s problems would be identified and communicated to the person or group experiencing the distress… . [This would] put their situation into its proper perspective (i.e. normalisation) thus reducing some of the internalised guilt and blame (i.e. internalised oppression) that many people experience as part of their troubled situations. (Mullaly 1993: pp. 141, 155) Such approaches have been influential in establishing mental health and therapy services for women or ‘black’ people that are explicitly informed by feminist or anti-racist perspectives (Kareem 1988; Francis et al. 1989; Fedele and Harrington 1990; Mills 1996). Different approaches to practice may focus on professionals intervening directly on behalf of oppressed groups with State or other bodies (for example, in advocacy and welfare rights work), or on developing the capacity of people from marginalised groups to undertake their struggles more effectively on their own behalf. The latter approach may be characterised by an understanding of social structures and an emphasis on networking, collaboration and solidarity among those who are disadvantaged (Griffin 1995; Arshad 1996). Enabling people to come together around shared experiences of oppression or powerlessness may involve the use of groupwork skills in the facilitation of support, ‘self-help’ or action groups (Mullender and Ward 1991; Adams 1996). Common to these various strategies for intervention tends to be ‘an adversarial view of practice which simultaneously seeks to alleviate and transform the conditions in which oppressed clients find themselves’ (Davis 1991: p. 71). Many structural approaches have tended to be limited by their focus on adversarial activities in relation to particular binaries of struggle, such as class or gender. These have tended to become less influential and be replaced by critical approaches informed by poststructuralist ideas of much more complex forms of political struggle and resistance against domination – where social change may be seen to come about through a myriad of intersecting small-scale campaigns and renegotiation of practices, discourses and personal relationships (Healy 2000).
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Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following chapters, poststructural ideas around the construction of personal identity have profoundly influenced understandings of processes of, and resistance to, the transformation of social structures at a ‘micro’ as well as a ‘macro’ level. While it is perhaps easy to criticise some structural approaches for their lack of sophistication, and their failure to recognise the importance of difference within as well as between social groupings, it is also important not to lose the power and dynamism of their straightforward outrage at collective inequalities and injustices: an awareness of structural issues must remain a vital component of any truly emancipatory social practice.
4 What’s the Story? Poststructuralism, Discourse and Narrative
Partly as a reaction against an overemphasis on economic relations, and partly out of a desire to deconstruct monolithic categories, such as class, ‘race’ or gender, in order to understand the specificity of people’s experience, a new body of critical theory arose from the 1970s onwards which moved increasingly away from the structural approaches discussed in the previous chapter. Building on the work of later critical structuralists, and on the very different traditions of psychoanalysis and linguistic structuralism, it started to explore the operation and contestation of power within the realms of ideology, culture, discourse and language. It was argued that this was a level of social relations that needed to be theorised in its own right – not just as a reflection of processes of material exploitation. This chapter charts these developments, which have come to define the terrain of poststructuralism, with its particular focus on questions of representation. Just as structural approaches set out to expose macro-scale conflicts and inequalities beneath the surfaces of modernity, theorists such as Derrida and Foucault have sought to deconstruct the more local power relations that may be enacted within everyday discourses and narratives. These perspectives may be useful in deconstructing how bodies of ‘knowledge’ may interlink with the operation of power. They may also provide a basis for a practice that uses the principles of deconstruction to work with power relations embedded within particular narratives that may be influential in defining people’s situations.
Ideology and culture Within modernism, the concept of ideology has conventionally been understood ‘as the opposite of science or reason’ (Larrain 1994: p. 10). A similar dichotomy between ideology and reason – with the former 65
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being seen as backward-looking and regressive, and the latter as forward-looking and emancipatory – may be seen to be mirrored in early Marxist tendencies to conflate ideology with the notion of ‘false consciousness’. Here, ideology appears as an organised ‘smokescreen’ that can effectively blind people to the material realities of their situation. It was seen that such a dishonest system of representation could potentially be swept away by historical materialist academic practice which would expose the realities of people’s economic exploitation and hence pave the way for a ‘true’ and potentially revolutionary class consciousness. This somewhat superficial vision of the processes of ideology presumed that the ‘truth’ (about material realities) would somehow, of itself, have the power to outwit and supplant the ‘false’ – and the real struggle would then be waged for control over the means of production. Subsequent theorists, building on the work of Gramsci and Althusser, moved the discussion beyond such a naïve acceptance of the emancipatory potential of rationalism and science. Constructions of rationality and knowledge were seen to have been embedded within modernist social relations, not as somehow separate from it. This suggests a conceptual shift from a political struggle against ideology to one conducted within ideology. In this way, ideology becomes characterised in a wider and more neutral sense – as the ‘level’ of social relations that comprises particular forms of knowledge, thought and ‘common-sense’ understandings. However, as with material relations, it may be far from a ‘level playing field’, containing its own mechanisms for domination and subordination: Conceiving of ideology as a level of struggle rather than an imposed ‘false consciousness’ does not imply that all ideas or representations are equally possible. Just as material relations may contain profound structural inequalities based on class position – as in the ‘bargaining’ around wage labour – so too may the field of ideology be similarly structured. (Poulantzas 1973: p. 223) Dominance at the level of ideology may be achieved through the control of strategic ‘sites’ of representation, thereby securing an internally consistent and self-reinforcing ‘spin’ on how social relations may be viewed. This control of ideological relations is termed ‘hegemony’, a form of organisation which ‘welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: p. 67). However, such control may never be complete: subordinated
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ideas and representations may, at times, come together to constitute a political force, and exploit contradictions or weaknesses in the dominant ideological ‘line’. In this way, it may be seen that elements of ideology may be used either ‘to legitimate or oppose power and dominance’ (Van Dijk 1998: p. 5). This understanding of ideology may be seen to grant it a degree of independence from material relations – what goes on at this level is not simply determined by the structural patterning of material relations, although, potentially, positions reached in struggles at one level may have an impact on what may be going on at another. From the discussions in the previous chapter, it may be seen how the field of ideology may be seen to be structured not just around economic but also cultural forms of capital accumulation, and also around systems of patriarchal and imperialist domination. Such structures singly and in combination may be riven with contradiction and offering particular opportunities for counter-strategies of resistance and assertion. A growing interest in the specificities of struggle at this level of social relations led to a final break with Althusser’s notion of the material being determinant ‘in the last instance’, and a relocation of analysis within wider discussion of the role of culture as an arena in which power relations could be enacted (CCCS 1978). Whereas the term ideology may denote a relatively narrow arena of systems of ideas and modes of representation, the term culture may be used to include wider ensembles of social relations, practices and identities, each with their own histories, ‘articulating principles’, dynamics of dissent and transformation, and interactions with other cultural formations. At a ‘macro’ scale, cultures may be structured around class, ‘race’ or ethnicities, gender, sexual orientation, age group and so on. Alongside this, and to some extent mediated by such wider structuring principles, distinctive cultures may emerge at much more local scales – within families, streets, peer-groups and communities. In this way, it is probably most helpful to see ideology as one aspect of a cultural level of social relations. The emergence of ‘post-’ theories has been characterised as a ‘cultural turn’ – a fundamental shift of emphasis to the processes and products of signification. In one sense, culture encompasses the range of representations between high art and vernacular or popular idioms. In another it comprises ‘bundles’ of everyday practices, narratives, symbolic connections and representational cues which provide the reference points for lived experience within particular ethnic, religious, local, class, sexual or other identifications – cultures which may reflect
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elements both of colonisation by dominant groups and of collective resistance and self-identification (see, for example, Singh 1992). In order to construct an analysis, cultural theorists have sought to focus down on various ‘building blocks’, such as discourses, narratives, languages and practices, out of which a particular cultural edifice may be constructed. As structural accounts were seen as presenting too simplistic an image of consistency and internal coherence, with the emergence of ideas neatly fitting in with the overall dynamics of capitalism, imperialism or patriarchy, poststructural accounts have tended to shift the analysis to more local elements of culture operating, to some degree, independently of one another. These smaller ‘units’ of culture have been conceptualised as discourses. Just as there have been somewhat fruitless battles to argue for the primacy of one mode of oppression over another, there have been similar factional disagreements as to whether the cultural should take priority over the material, or the local over the structural. Ultimately, as long as issues of power and inequality remain central to the analysis, I would see no fundamental problems pursuing a ‘both/and’ rather than an ‘either/or’ approach. However, for analyses to mesh, there needs to be a degree of ontological consistency between them. Analyses must not be allowed to collapse into either polarity of the objective/subjective dualism. This is essential if oppression and other operations of power are to be understood as real – whether at cultural or material levels of social relations, or at personal, local or structural scales. In any critical approach, there would need to be a focus on the dynamics of social relations and an ongoing distrust of any suppositions about ‘natural’ or ‘essential’ human qualities. However, on this basis of these caveats, it may be possible to move towards integrating understandings of how more overarching structures of ideas and practices may interpenetrate with analyses of more local and particular instances. Larger-scale patterns may potentially be understood as aggregations and contingencies between processes operating at more local scales; and the local operation of power may be seen as taking place only within wider contexts of power relations.
Discourse and narrative Although employed somewhat differently by particular theorists, the term discourse is generally used to denote not just a specific speech act or text, but systems of cultural practices, symbolic representations, knowledges and ‘common-sense’ that may structure what can be said (or done) and by whom, within specific contexts of social interaction.
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Discourses may construct certain ways of thinking or seeing as right and others as wrong, vest authority in the hands of ‘experts’, or force certain groups to take on specific positions of subordination if they are to participate at all in social interaction. Discourses may be seen to locate the potential identities and speaking positions of subjects, ‘form the objects of which they speak, and conceal their role in doing so’ (Lowe 1999: p. 78). A discourse may comprise a body of related writings or conversations that construct a particular mode of understanding – for example, the strictures around correct discipline to be found in late nineteenthcentury childcare manuals (see Miller 1983). It may comprise non-linguistic forms, such as the representation of women in Pre-Raphaelite art, or the symbolisation of the state and the party within Soviet architecture. It may also comprise sets of practices that signify certain meanings, for example, the rituals around medical consultations which construct doctor as expert and patient as passive recipient. All such discourses have the potential to situate people in particular (power) relationships to one another, or to specific social institutions or apparatuses. The capacity of a discourse to influence and determine social relationships is seen to reside within the very structuring of the languages or symbol-systems in which it is inscribed. By focusing on the internal operation of linguistic structures, discourse theory may be seen to provide the basis for a critical theory of the processes of ideology and culture. In turn, one of the building blocks of discourse may be seen to be the various narratives, the ‘stories’ by which individual or collective experience may be organised in specific ways. A narrative can ascribe certain meanings to present experience or events, either ‘laterally’, connecting with (or differentiating from) other contemporary happenings, or ‘temporally’, perhaps connecting with a specific reading of past events or charting a direction for the future (if the story leads to an ‘ending’). Meanings are not seen as being fixed by any intrinsic essence, but only emerge when they are ‘storied’, and placed within specific contexts. Narratives may be seen to be constitutive of experience – both opening up and closing down certain possibilities for perception, action and making ‘sense’ – although any process of suppression or exclusion may be an uneasy and fragile one: Narrative structures organise and give meaning to experience, but there are always feelings and lived experience not fully encompassed by the dominant story. (Bruner 1986: p. 143)
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At a collective level, modernity has been underpinned by a multiplicity of narratives, located in science, literature and popular culture, which have constructed western bourgeois society as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ and contrasted this both, temporally, to the ‘Dark Ages’ of the European past and, laterally, to the alleged primitiveness or deviousness of non-western ‘others’. An even more prosperous future was to be guaranteed by strict adherence to the principles of instrumental rationality. However, particular narratives may both support and contest the terms of such a dominant discourse. The horror of events such as world wars and the Holocaust, and the ongoing threat of nuclear war, may be seen to have led to the emergence of much more pessimistic counter-narratives in the twentieth century, giving a very different ‘take’ on modernity as, variously, an inevitable but flawed form of social organisation, or an unstable edifice that could be transformed into a less oppressive social order. Adapting, transforming and bringing together narratives that encapsulate some elements of previously excluded experience may be crucial in establishing counter-discourses of resistance and liberation. For example, in parallel with the shift from ‘certainty’ to ‘uncertainty’ narratives around western modernity, there emerged significant shifts in the ways that certain colonised and subjugated peoples have perceived and given meaning to their situations. Earlier, dominant ways of storying may have constructed their past as glorious and their current experiences of exploitation, discrimination and social breakdown as an unfortunate transitional point on the road to assimilation within the prosperity of the ‘Western Dream’. Where this dream was seen to falter, opportunities arose for the emergence of more radical narratives in which the past was constructed as exploitation and the current situation as one of active resistance, the start of a process of struggle against western hegemony (Bruner 1986). An interesting instance of the operation of ideological struggle at a larger scale has been the recent displacement of ‘class’ as a concept from popular, political and academic narratives. Although, as has been argued earlier, the realities of collective exploitation and systematic inequalities have not disappeared, the notion of ‘class’ has been almost entirely eradicated from the debate as a means of comprehending – and acting to redress – such issues. The erasure of ‘class’ may be seen to have occurred within a number of individualising and fragmenting discourses that came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly those of postmodernism and neo-liberalism. Within the British context, these discourses were not just driven by the ruling elite in iso-
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lation, but through the hegemonic incorporation of discourses arising from fractional interests – from disaffected radical academics and activists, to culturally mobile sections of the ‘respectable’ working class.
Poststructuralism and language Poststructural theory may be seen to have developed out of (and in reaction to) two quite distinct bodies of structuralist work: critical theories of social structures and structural understandings of how meanings may be constructed through the operation of language and the performance of social practices (see Delanty 2000). Through the work of Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (1971), critical theorists had begun to appreciate the importance of ideology – the operation of class or other struggles ‘in words’. With poststructuralism, the focus shifted away from social structures to an analysis of how meanings may be constituted in language, and how these may, in turn, structure power relations between social participants. A basis for doing this was to be found in the work of French linguistic structuralists, principally Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. Ferdinand de Saussure (1974) proposed that language can be seen as a code in which meanings are constructed in relation to systems of other already existing meanings and associations. He opened up a crucial distinction between signifiers (sounds, images, written words, symbols) and that which is signified – entities existing outside language to which particular signifiers are deemed to refer. He suggested that the precise meaning of a particular signifier may be constructed in terms of how it differs from all other potential signifiers within a specific linguistic code or ‘chain’ of signifiers, rather than be read off from its relation to an entity external to linguistic structures. This suggests that a particular nuanced meaning may primarily be constituted within language – or other signifying systems – and may have no prior existence outside language. For example, the signifier ‘whore’ may be seen as deriving its meaning, not from some natural or self-evident reality ‘out there’, but through its specific connections to, and differences from, other gendered and potentially ideologically loaded signifiers, such as ‘virgin’ and ‘madonna’ on the one hand, and ‘stud’ and ‘lad’ on the other (see Weedon 1997: p. 23). The radical implication of this perspective is that it provides the basis for overturning modernist assumptions around the transparency and neutrality of language, in which signifiers (linguistic or cultural
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symbols) are taken to have a straightforward and linear relationship with that which is signified. Within modernist thought, it is supposed that the signified already exists and has meaning independently of the process of representation, and the word/symbol/metaphor used by the author or speaker simply seeks to convey the signified as accurately as possible, given the available range of language and symbol systems. Such an ‘innocent’ language could, in itself, have no part to play in processes of oppression and subordination. However, once it is seen that meaning may be constituted within languages and symbolic systems, this opens up the possibility that language and other systems of representation may be potential sites for political struggle in their own right. This insight was developed by Roland Barthes, who called for a ‘political theory of language’ that would ‘study the “ownership” of the means of enunciation’ (1971: p. 25). He saw language as a sign system through which powerful groups could potentially label, define and rank others. If particular dominant groups were to be in a position to fix certain points of reference of current linguistic and other discursive structures, they would then be in a position to dictate that certain things can be spoken and others not, and to impose particular slants and meanings on to perceived reality. Especially through their control over the artefacts and representations of media such as advertising and popular culture, ruling groups could be able to lead (or seduce) members of other groups into identifying themselves and their place in the world in particular ways. If language can represent a potential site for domination, then it can also be a crucial site for resistance and struggle, although ‘oppressed groups may have to live even their revolt against the domination of the system within the framework of the dominant ideology’ (Poulantzas 1973: p. 223). Deprived of the possibility of constructing language in their terms, all that may be open to oppressed groups is to seek to empower themselves through changing the meanings of the key signifiers that secured their subordination. From the 1960s onwards, there have been a number of instances where issues of language, meaning and terminology have emerged as central to the struggles and self-assertion of many oppressed groups. Examples of such shifts are the redeployment of the abusive term ‘queer’ as the positively valued signifier of a branch of academic study and the inversion of morally inferiorising terms such as ‘bad’ and ‘wicked’ to denote ‘cool’ and ‘street-credible’ by African-American and African-Caribbean communities. Some disabled people have taken over and deployed the
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word ‘cripple’ as a self-description to shock able-bodied liberals into some realisation of the pain and abuse that has been part of disablism (see Byrom 1999). It has been important for oppressed groups to find signifiers to represent their collectivity in a positive and assertive sense. The privileging of the signifier ‘woman’ over ‘lady’ or ‘girl’ by feminists sought to promote a term that was inclusive in terms of age and class and did not link directly into systems of signifiers and meanings associated with male patronage. By contrast, ‘working-class’ people have struggled to articulate any positive signifier of collective identity in recent decades, and this lack may be significant in the apparent rolling back of their opportunities to redress inequalities of opportunity and status. Instead, they face either their existence being erased from popular discourse, or being defined and subordinated on the basis of a concept of ‘working class’ that is imposed upon them via the discourses of ruling groups and other class fractions (Walkerdine 1995). It is particularly illuminating to examine how the term ‘black’ has represented a site of struggle in its own right. Initially constructed as an oppressive term, it stood as a racist signification of inferior ‘otherness’ that was crucial to the project of western hegemony. It represented the ultimate degradation, located even below ‘coloureds’ in its hierarchical distance below the summit of ‘whiteness’. To shift its meaning would destabilise the entire linguistic rhetoric of racism – the whole chain of interrelated signifiers. From the late 1960s onwards, the term became the focus of two separate struggles. First, it became adopted by the majority of all people subject to the experience of racism as the political term that united them in their resistance to white supremacy – to take on the signifier ‘black’ connoted a positive move to subvert the divide-and-rule hierarchy of colour, and its associations with biologically based racism, that had underpinned colonialism. Thus, ‘political blackness’ became a marker for raised consciousness and activism. In parallel with this, peoples of African descent, who had been inferiorised as ‘black’ within the discourses of western racism, engaged in a struggle to reclaim their skin colour from representing an embodiment of inferiority – an ‘ugliness’ by definition in comparison with the western notion of ideal ‘beauty’. Stuart Hall has analysed the resistance mounted by ‘black’ people against this hegemony, identifying the specific struggle over the meanings and connotations of the very word ‘black’: ‘Black’ could not be converted into ‘black = beautiful’ simply by wishing it were so. It had to become part of an organised practice of
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struggles requiring the building up of collective forms of black resistance as well as the development of new forms of black consciousness. (1985: p. 48) The reclaiming of the term ‘black’ and the coining of new collective identities such as ‘African-American’ and ‘African-Caribbean’ may be seen as part of a wider struggle to ‘erase the marks of dispossession inflicted by colonialism and imperialism’ (Venn 1993: p. 2). However, the two parallel struggles around the re-signification of the term ‘black’ created their own contradictions, particularly for those groups who were ‘politically black’ in terms of some shared experience of racism and colonialism, but whose ethnic or cultural identities – Indian, Jewish, Arab, and so on – were not connected with any pride in ‘African blackness’, or the recovery of identities erased through slavery (see Werbner and Modood 1997). Nevertheless, the very real successes of radical moves to subvert and destabilise conventional and oppressive forms of language led to a major backlash from a hegemonic alliance between various dominant groups – particularly men and ‘white’ people. Through their control or influence within the media, these groups were able to establish an alternative discourse within which oppressed peoples’ disquiet with, and struggles over, meaning were situated as irritating and irrelevant instances of ‘political correctness’. While, in one sense, it may be constructive to point out that language is not the only issue and its relative importance may have become exaggerated (a legitimate element within the critique), it is nevertheless interesting to note how dominant groups themselves deployed language (as in coining the term ‘political correctness’) as a highly effective strategy in suppressing dissidence. In a much more subtle way, ruling groups have been able to exploit oppressed people’s discomfort at being crudely inserted within categories such as ‘women’ or ‘black people’ within the structural discourses of resistance that were supposed to bring about their liberation as a collectivity. As we have seen, working-class and ‘black’ women did not always recognise themselves within the constructions of ‘woman’ deployed by the feminist movement, and many non-‘white’ people found that their particular ethnic identity and experience of oppression could become lost within the political category of black. Drawing upon postmodernist themes of diversity, new discourses have been promulgated, such as ‘post-feminism’ and ‘multi-culturalism’, in which some of the force of earlier collective struggles may become dissipated. While it may be crucial to open up questions of difference within the
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apparently homogeneous categories proposed by earlier activists, this does not need to be at the expense of any analysis of how each ‘micro’ category of ‘difference’ may relate, in their particular ways, to wider contexts of racism, sexism, homophobia, and so on. Taken outside such contexts, any celebration of ethnic or gender diversity implicitly assumes a social order in which we can all be ‘equal-but-different’, thereby erasing any debate on widespread and shared experiences of inequality: The whole debate on multiculturalism stumbles on the fact that the boundaries of difference, as well as the boundaries of social rights, are determined by specific hegemonic … discourses. (Yuval-Davis 1997: p. 199) This vision that language and systems of representation could, in themselves, be potentially constitutive of human experience, both oppressive or liberatory, offered a basis for moving beyond a previous overemphasis on material relations within structural theories of power inequalities. However, just as Marx could be criticised for his narrow ‘economism’, discourse theory has, in turn, tended to over-emphasise social relations at the level of ideology with respect to other levels of the social formation. At its most extreme it has produced the position that material aspects of social relations may be seen to have no existence except in as much as they are represented in language (see, for example, Hindess and Hirst 1975). Meanings are seen as only having meaning in relation to, and difference from, other meanings. Such a position harks back to the one-sided abstraction of the humanist conception of ‘pure thought’ and runs counter to any formulation which seeks to integrate analyses of material and discursive relations (see Werbner 1997).
Approaches to deconstruction A fundamental tenet of all forms of structuralism is that meaning is not self-evident – it cannot be read off in terms of the stable and essential character of whatever is being studied. Meaning associated with particular elements may only be uncovered by an analysis of their underlying relationships to other elements: ‘The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to consider the terms, and not the relation between the terms’ (Lévi-Strauss 1972: p. 46).
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This shift from an analysis of things-in-themselves to a study of things-in-relation-to-other-things may be seen to underpin both critical theories of social divisions and structuralist approaches to text, language, myth, custom and cultural practice. Just as Saussure derived the meanings of signifiers from their connections with, and differences from, other signifiers, so Lévi-Strauss (1972) applied similar principles to anthropological study. He looked at cultural phenomena, such as myths, rituals, kinship arrangements and cooking practices, to examine how elements and terms within these were situated and counterposed in relation to one another – and, in turn, how these sets of meanings placed the people of a culture in particular forms of connection to one another. For example, he saw within cooking and eating a series of rituals and practices in which the elements ‘raw’ and ‘cooked’ were brought into particular relationships to one another, signifying both a closeness to, and a radical separation from, the realm of nature – thereby defining people’s relationship both to nature and to one another. Such a structuralist approach was radical in the sense of creating a break with humanism: many of the meanings that situate people in relation to one another are to be seen as created outside the consciousness or intentionality of individuals, and the human subject ‘is to be understood as constructed by the symbol and not as the point of origin of symbolism’ (Coward and Ellis 1977: p. 3). However, despite this, Lévi-Strauss’s work remained substantially within the modernist tradition, since his focus remained on identifying functional relationships of cohesion and continuity, not on exploring issues of power inequalities or social tensions. By contrast, Jacques Derrida’s work on deconstructing text was much more destabilising for the modernist project (1976; 1981). Developing the linguistic analysis of Saussure, he examined the meanings inherent in texts, not in terms of their supposed relationships to entities outside the texts (representations of objective or subjective phenomena), but by an internal analysis of the text itself: how meanings were constructed out of the interplay of differences within the structures of the text. This approach brought into focus the way in which modernist thought rests on interrelated sets of hierarchically ordered binary oppositions: the dualisms of public/private, reason/emotion, fact/value, culture/nature, male/female, ‘white’/‘black’, and so on. He questioned the modernist presupposition that such words ‘centre’ meaning (‘logocentrism’). Instead, he argued that the meaning and significance of each of these terms was inherently unstable. Each term
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had no meaning of itself, only in terms of its difference from an opposite term, and, in turn, the meaning of these terms could not be seen as fixed, but as deferring indefinitely to a chain of other related terms. Thus ‘female’ has no meaning of itself, only in the ways that it is constructed as different from ‘male’, and in the ways that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ may be constructed in relation to (and defer to) other terms such as ‘public’ and ‘private’ or ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. In turn, these terms have no more claim to fixed meanings – the chain of deferral to other terms is infinite and unending. Similarly, more sophisticated understandings of the multiple and contested meanings of ‘blackness’ lead on to moves to deconstruct its opposite and previously unassailable term ‘whiteness’, and how their meanings defer to a ‘whole cascade’ of other related signifiers located in historically specific texts and practices (Malik 1996: p. 249). Such a project of deconstruction and contextualisation would seek to open up how ‘whiteness has developed over the past two hundred years into a taken-for-granted experience structured upon a varying set of supremacist assumptions (sometimes cultural, sometimes biological, sometimes moral, sometimes all three)’ (Bonnett 1997: p. 188). Such deconstructions of modernist discourse are potentially iconoclastic: the whole edifice is revealed as shaky and contingent, every term needing to be ‘shored up’ by other, equally unstable terms, and nothing remaining as natural or inevitable about the configuration of the current social order at the level of discourse or language. Similarly, the conscious intention of the author of a text cannot be assumed to centre or guarantee its unique and canonical meaning. The humanist focus on the individual author is superseded by an examination of the process of writing, thereby substituting ‘language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner’ (Barthes 1977: p. 143). Final subtleties of meaning do not exist prior to the writing: they arise within it from the specific ways in which terms are connected and counterposed. Once analysed within its particular historical and discursive context, a text may be seen to generate a multiplicity of meanings – meanings which may or may not have been part of the consciousness (or unconsciousness) of the author. Any discursive practice, text or representation has the possibility of temporarily fixing the meaning of certain signifiers in relation to one another. Such a practice may be seen as inherently political, in that it ‘is never a neutral act [as] it involves both interests and questions of power’ (Weedon 1997: p. 171). However, any attempt to fix meaning, and the power positions that this may reflect, may be seen as somewhat tenuous. Given that any text (utterance or image) is produced out
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of a range of already existing discursive structures, each with their own tensions and instabilities, contradictory and dissonant elements are likely to creep in to even the most assiduously constructed writing. The process of deconstructing aims to look behind surface consistencies in order to reveal whatever jangling bundle of potentially conflicting elements may lurk behind: To ‘deconstruct’ … is, so to speak, to reverse the imposing tapestry in order to expose in all its unglamorously dishevelled tangle the threads constituting the well-heeled image it presents to the world. (Eagleton 1986: p. 80) However, practices of deconstruction may not always be ‘critical’ in the sense of seeking to unearth hidden relations of power and hence (potentially) form part of an emancipatory project. Within the wider postmodern agenda, multiple readings of meaning may be used to disrupt conventional ‘certainties’, without according any particular significance to issues of oppression. As Chris Weedon argues, Deconstruction is useful … in so far as it offers a method of decentring the hierarchical oppositions which underpin gender, race and class oppression and of instigating new, more progressive theories… . However, much deconstructive analysis … fails to attend to question of social context, particular interests and power. While its stress on the plurality and non-fixity of meaning is a helpful move … the implicit assumption that there is a free play of meaning not already located in a hierarchical network of discursive relations denies social power by rendering it invisible and in doing so reaffirms the status quo. (1997: p. 160) Such issues became an explicit concern for Derrida (1994), who sought to rescue a deconstructive approach from the endless possiblities for ‘play’ – and ethical nihilism – that characterised some developments of postmodernist textual practice. Somewhat uneasily, he proposed a non-relativist position on social or interpersonal justice: a defined non-violative ‘ethical’ relation to the other, which is both respectful of the difference of the other, and is always attentive to the potential for positional power play (however unintentional) to fix meanings for the other in ways that may be oppressive or devaluing. This stance would provide a fixed position from which to undertake deconstructive practice. However, paradoxically, fixing such a position of justice
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entails some of the same force and violence that characterise modernist or structural attempts to secure particular readings or meanings as hegemonic. Therefore, this position must be constructed as a ‘power without a power’, in the sense that, while it does not set out to violate, it must nevertheless be a site of power, since ‘a powerless justice is not justice’ (Derrida 1992: p. 11). Thus it may be seen that poststructuralism can provide rich and valuable insights into the degree to which modernity depends on particular fixed or ‘logocentric’ modes of language, where the emphasis is always on the determinate character of a social world of things-inthemselves whose intrinsic meanings can be captured and given to us transparently through the use of the corresponding linguistic term. Such systems of language may be seen to depend on a hierarchically ordered framework of binary opposites, reflecting the fundamental dualisms at the centre of modernist thought. Deconstruction can offer a means whereby to disrupt and decentre this, opening up the politics of how meaning (and the subordination of those constructed as ‘other’) may have been fixed through the operation of particular modes of signification. Derrida’s move towards fixing a basis for emancipatory theory and practice also provides a direction which may be fruitful in achieving some degree of rapprochement between structuralist and poststructuralist critical perspectives. While both provide conceptual armouries for penetrating beneath the surfaces of modernism, there has remained considerable space for acrimonious debates between the two. While poststructuralists have seen a tendency for essentialism in concepts of capital or patriarchy, structuralists have argued that an endless focus on indeterminacy provides an unfortunate ‘smokescreen’ over issues of systematic oppression and inequality. A way forward would seem to be to reconceptualise larger-scale as well as local struggles as an ongoing contestation of alternative fixings of discursive and material relations. It may not, for example, be helpful to see patriarchy as some monolithic and unchanging structure. It may be seen, more dynamically, as sets of systematically interconnected relationships of difference, both within and between masculinities and femininities, that must be continually re-enacted and re-performed in particular ways in order to secure and maintain positions of dominance. Subtle alterations to the terms by which these differences are performed may (perhaps temporarily) restructure power relations. Nevertheless, given the degree of interlocking between these practices, the underlying power inequalities can only be contested by picking away at each and every weak point
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within chains of deferral and legitimation, opening up ambivalences and contradictions within how the terms of relationships may currently be fixed. And this unpicking and refixing can only proceed in a systematic and emancipatory manner if it is underpinned, however tenuously, by an ethical commitment to social justice.
Psychoanalysis and language A focus on the construction and deconstruction of meaning in narrative is not unique to structurally informed linguistics: it has formed an integral part of psychoanalytic practice. Freud proposed a focus, not on the surface veneer of acceptable speech, but on where this apparent consistency and ‘sense’ breaks down – the mis-takes that reveal another register of discordant experience which he termed the ‘unconscious’. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1977) linked this to the work of Saussure and Derrida to propose that the psychic ‘unconscious’ is structured like a language, but a language that only just about manages to suppress the fluidities of desire, yearning and melancholia that may be associated with current and past experiences of connection and disconnection. Within the current linguistic order, certain key symbols are seen to secure this repression, such as the signification of patriarchal prohibition ‘Le Nom’/‘Le Non’ (‘The-Name-of-the-Father’/‘The No’), and the excluded possibility of joyful ‘feminine’ desire-in-connection: ‘jouissance’. However, ultimately this symbolic order is seen to be anchored by the male-centred signifier of power: ‘the phallus’. Interestingly, this is seen to double not as some symbol of male ‘potency’ in terms of a capacity to make connections with others, but as a signification of yearning and unattainable desire. Such an account opens up the possibility of links being made between social and intrapsychic modes of oppression through a deconstruction of the power relations that may be embedded within language – thereby starting to transcend the individual/society dualism. Whereas Lacan characterised ‘the feminine’ as inevitably subordinated and excluded, as representing a ‘lack’ rather than a ‘presence’, post-Lacanian feminists, such as Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous, have sought to turn this around and see in ‘the feminine’ the seeds and possibilities of resistance and assertion of difference against a creaking, unstable and historically specific patriarchal sociosymbolic order. Following on from Derrida, Cixous proposed that
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female sexual difference no longer be understood as the inferiorised or silenced term in a binary opposition of male:female, but as a position of ‘otherness’ from which to deconstruct the discourses of patriarchal domination (Cixous 1976; Cixous and Clement 1986). Modernist discourse is seen not just to be structured around an illusory fixedness of each word-in-itself (logocentrism), but that this fixedness is inextricably linked to a ‘masculine’ domination of the possibilities of desire and connection – not only among women and children, but also among men themselves. In this way, people may be seen to be located and constrained in specific ways within a system of ‘phallocentric’ (or ‘phallogocentric’) language. Although deconstruction may offer a critique of phallocentric language and discourse, it begs the question of how to transcend this and construct an alternative praxis of communication – a move that could be crucial to emancipatory political or social action. The post-Lacanian feminists started to explore the possibilities of alternative modes of ‘feminine’ representation that may engage with people’s experiences of connection, relatedness, oppression and violation: languages that are fluent rather than fixed, modes of expression that do not force the complexities and diversities of experience into distorting and hierarchical ‘black and white’ dichotomies. Kristeva (1989) theorised a structure of expression, ‘the semiotic’, that lies beneath, and is normally repressed by, the terms of the prevailing ‘symbolic’ (phallocentric) order. This is seen as the ‘feminine’ language of the unconscious and is characterised by expressions of fluidity, connection and diversity. She looked at how that which is typically repressed as unconscious may emerge, for example, in less conventional poetry or texts, such as those of Mallarmé or Joyce. (Interestingly, she tended to search for the emergence of the hidden ‘feminine’ in the writing of male authors, rather than in the work of women.) Irigaray proposed a concept of ‘woman-speak’: language that no longer reconstitutes and lives out the binary oppositions of the modernist/patriarchal social order (see Belsey and Moore 1989). Similarly, Cixous (1976) looked at the possibility of developing an ‘écriture feminine’, a way of writing which could embrace diversity in that it did not depend on terms that could only represent difference as a hierarchical ordering and an implicit inferiorisation. Although these theorists propose only very tentative possibilities for such modes of communication creeping in at the margins of modernist discourse, it may be seen that forms of expression which at least start to disrupt or avoid the fixed terms of ‘phallocentric’ language may
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already be providing ‘a different voice’ – whether located in certain forms of theoretical writing or, just as importantly, in the ordinary and everyday discourses of women and other subordinated social groups. For example, whereas the moral thinking and explanation of western men tends to be characterised by the rigidities of ‘phallocentric’ codes and rules, that of subordinated groups may be expressed through a more fluid emphasis on the importance of maintaining relationship and connectedness (Gilligan 1982). Similarly, much of the writing that has underpinned the development of critical theory, from Marx to Lacan and Foucault, may be seen to have broken with the static precision of conventional academic codes, allowing terms to flow and acquire meaning from their interrelationships with other terms. Thus, whereas the language of modernist discourse may be characterised as ‘elemental’, as comprising a sequence of terms-in-themselves with fixed meanings and essential qualities, the languages of critical theory and practice may necessarily develop a more ‘relational’ emphasis. Instead of an ordered speaking of the words that places everything ‘in its proper place’, it may be important to experiment with a speaking between the words: linguistic and discursive practices that flow in among terms that no longer pretend to be solid and stable, speaking the horror of violation, or embracing connection and difference – practices that do not split off the emotional from the rational, the private from the public, and so on.
Foucault and the archaeology of the modern Developed in parallel with these analyses of language, the work of Foucault employs a radically deconstructive approach to dig, in a very detailed and painstaking way, beneath the surfaces and layers of particular modernist discourses and practices, examining particularly the histories (genealogies) of techniques of social regulation operating within, and at the boundaries of, modernist civil society. Motivated by ‘a certain restlessness to break up our familiarities’ (1989: p. 198), he allows nothing in the historical archive to remain as it seems: modernity’s self-representations are overturned to reveal inconsistencies, tensions and instabilities in the social fabric. Everywhere is unearthed the ‘micro’ operation of power, the deployment of knowledges and ‘expertise’, the constitution of resistance, and the shifting and contradictory nature of the discursive structures in which all of this may be situated – all to be analysed in their historical specificity.
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He focused on the historical shift, with the onset of the Enlightenment, from the naked use of military might and monarchical, religious or legal authority in order to control the populace, to the more hidden, subtle and internalised forms of domination that may be seen to characterise modernity. In particular, he examined the modernist passion to regulate, using the power of rational or scientific discourses to specify and define, to categorise and to pigeon-hole experiences and behaviours which might otherwise be seen as disturbing or subversive to the established social order – as in the case of mental distress: Mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own. (1972: p. 32) His examinations of institutionalised discourses and practices relating to the treatment of the ‘mad’ (1967) and the ‘bad’ (1977), are angled so that they reveal more about the precariousness of a modernist project based on reason and conformity – and the instability of the practices and knowledges designed to map out the boundaries of acceptability. Post-Enlightenment ‘freedoms’ are opened up to reveal their underside: the threats, coercions and prescriptions for insidious self-disciplining and compliance. Conversely, he demonstrates how nineteenth-century prohibitions on sexuality actually served to sexualise much of the social fabric, through its introduction into a wide range of medical, legal and other discourses. The charting and labelling of sexual expression, carried out in the name of suppression, is shown to have actually introduced the very vocabulary whereby those outside the dominant and permitted modes of sexual expression could identify and organise themselves. Thus, while, on the one hand, lesbian and gay people were repressed by being placed into various categories of ‘perversity’, this ‘also made possible the formation of a “reverse” discourse: homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or “naturality” be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified’ (1981: p. 101). Foucault’s work arose out of the philosophical melting-pot in which the products of language and culture were being taken apart, on the one hand, by Marxist and, on the other, by linguistic structuralists. At various points, he was closely connected with both Althusser and Barthes. While he saw structuralist methods as providing a basis for overturning the conventional humanist histories that failed to probe beneath
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the surfaces of modernity, he utilised such ideas only as a point of departure for his own historical and philosophical analyses (see Foucault 1986). Following Derrida, he sought to open up and scrutinise sets of related discourses ‘composed of endlessly proliferating meanings, none of which are stable’ (Bevir 1999: p. 348). However, instead of the chains of meanings defering ‘laterally’ within a linguistic structure, the focus was on ‘temporal’ or historical genealogies in which meanings could only temporarily be fixed within an ever-shifting discursive ‘archive’. Foucault effectively resisted any simplistic dichotomous notions around the operation of power within modernity: he saw no easy way of locating the source of the power that may be oppressing ‘us’ with a separate and identifiable ‘them’. Instead, he proposed that modernity depended on the decentring of power through a multiplicity of discourses and practices running through the entire fabric of civil society in which everyone (unwittingly) participates. People may be seduced into ‘playing the game’, paradoxically because these very discourses and practices may offer people certain possibilities of accessing circumscribed forms of productive power. In this sense, productive power is to be understood, not as being necessarily desirable or beneficial, but as being creative in shaping and driving certain opportunities for people. In some of his work, he focused on relatively enduring discursive ‘regimes’ that embodied their own logics and disciplines in order to maintain particular configurations of power and social order – structures that could nevertheless undergo relatively rapid ruptures and shifts, such as the transitions between ‘classical’, ‘sovereign’ and ‘modern’ social formations. However, in some of his later work, he makes more of a break with such structuralist perspectives, decentring any logic of the social, and seeing any historical configuration as arising out of ‘the more or less random interaction of numerous micropractices’ (Bevir 1999: p. 352). Throughout his work, Foucault refuses to locate his analysis within any formal contexts of structural inequality – simply allowing for the possibility that aggregations of power operating at local scales might cohere to bring about wider social movements. Similarly, in distancing himself from Marxism, he makes no mention of any material aspects to any of the sets of power relations that he studies. In his studious resistance to contextualising his analyses in relation to such approaches, he stands firm against any possibility of some reductionist ‘reading off’ of the particular and the local from ‘grand’ narratives purporting to describe the social whole. However, by not accepting any such contextual grounding, he is constantly on the verge of falling
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back into some of the very humanist positions that he is seeking to deconstruct. The lack of a theory of the constitution of the social whole leaves an implicit picture of an invasive and immanent source of disciplinary power – which might reflect the activity of some nebulous ruling elite, but might equally well represent the compulsive meddling of a ‘nanny state’, as constructed within neo-liberalism (see Burchell et al. 1991; Barry et al. 1996). Reflecting the same ambivalences, his vision of power sways uneasily between notions of oppression and resistance, which would be compatible with those of structural theorists, and an equation of power with the assertion of individual ‘will’ – a notion of productive power that harks back to Nietzsche’s romantic notion of an immanent force that impels the individual towards their destiny. Overall, his work would seem to be committed to a project of emancipation and empowerment, but it is not entirely clear what this might mean in terms of forms of politics or practice (see Fraser 1989). Like Derrida, he found the need in his later work to address questions of ethics (1994). However, he did not allow himself to declare any fixed ‘ethical’ relation to the other that would situate his deconstructive project in relation to any notion of social justice. Instead he sought to correct the implications of personal passivity, and lack of ethical responsibility, inherent in his conception of the subject as a ‘docile body’ upon which external power relations could be inscribed. He broadened his description of the possibilities by which people might resist the imposition of power, to embrace an active ‘ethics of self’ in which people might, to some extent consciously, pursue goals of emancipation. However, such ideas come perilously close to re-creating the humanist notion of the individual subject, one that he continually sought to deconstruct.
The politics of knowledge: social constructionism and standpoint epistemologies A variety of critical perspectives have sought to explore how modernist knowledges may not be neutral or value-free, but may instead reflect the sectional interests of particular groups and embody relations of unequal power (Habermas 1968; Althusser 1971). Instead of knowledge being guaranteed by principles of scientific objectivity or rational enquiry, such principles may themselves be seen as part of the very ideological structures that may underpin the position of elites, or function as mechanisms of social control. The canons of academic research
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may become subject to the same scrutiny as other forms of discourse, leading to a growing awareness of how ‘descriptions and explanations … are shaped by … the interests, desires and values’ of researchers and the research process as a whole (Harding 1991: p. 15). There may be circular and self-reinforcing processes whereby knowledges may legitimate the positions of those already in power, and those in power may have leverage over the means to accredit (or discredit) knowledges, depending on whether they suit their interests. In this way, knowledge may be seen to be constructed in particular social conditions, and may be linked, overtly or covertly, to specific political purposes. Just as deconstructive approaches explored how language itself did not function as a neutral medium, faithfully reflecting what was already ‘out there’, so they have started to destabilise the claims of both positivist and humanist knowledges to relay any self-evident forms of ‘truth’. Instead, it has been argued that ‘any interpretation of reality is itself a manifestation of power’ (Yeatman 1997: p. 137). Foucault (1972) highlighted the indivisibility of knowledge and power within the social organisation of modernity, and analysed the circumstances in which certain bodies of modernist knowledge emerged, how they could be deployed by ‘experts’ and professionals over particular groups of people, and how they may have been internalised, resisted or reinterpreted by those people constructed as ‘objects’ of such knowledge. However, under the influence and diffusion of postmodernist perspectives, there has been some tendency to confuse and conflate the projects of ‘radical’ deconstruction, such as those arising out of the work of Derrida and Foucault, with the humanist tradition of social constructionism (or constructivism). While both seek to debunk universalist claims to the objectivity and permanency of knowledge, social constructionism tends to bracket out questions of power in the construction of knowledge, in that it assumes an intersubjective consensus in which people can come together to define notions of ‘reality’ within a particular social context (Berger and Luckman 1967). Furthermore, in opposing notions of positivist ‘objectivity’, it also rejects any concept of underlying reality within social relations: social phenomena are seen to exist only in as much as they emerge as consensual meanings. Thus, for example, from a social constructionist viewpoint, rape within marriage cannot be accorded any existence, as long as an intersubjective consensus remains (however arrived at) in which it is not considered a possibility. Thus, in settling for the established consensus, rather than delving for suppressed or dissident meanings beneath the surface, a social con-
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structionist perspective may tend to reify taken-for-granted notions of common sense and custom-and-practice – and thereby become complicit in upholding the impressions of fairness and consent by which modernity has sought to present itself. While it may offer multiple possibilities for social groups to determine knowledge derived from their intersubjective experiences, its disregard of questions of power gives no basis for arbitrating between any competing truth claims that may emerge, or any way of supporting the voices of those who may face systematic forms of exclusion. Whereas social constructionism may tend, in practice, to give ontological priority to a dominant consensus in defining any knowledge about social relations, standpoint epistemologies seek to stand this on its head. It is argued that, by their very experience at the receiving end of relations of discrimination or exploitation, certain groups of people may achieve a privileged insight into the realities of power, giving rise to a narrative and conceptual resource that may be hidden from, or denied by, those in positions of domination. While such situated knowledge may be subordinated and marginalised within conventional modernist approaches, it may be seen to be crucial to any democratically driven emancipatory project: versions of the ‘truth’ may be wrested away from the elite or those that have secured the dominant consensus, and may be rewritten by those whose outcast position gives them a very different ‘take’ on the social relations of modernity. Rather than accept marginalisation within academic discourse, feminist and anti-colonialist standpoint epistemologists have claimed a particular authority for those ‘subaltern’ knowledges that may emerge from people’s experiences of oppression (Harstock 1983; Guha 1984; Hill Collins 1991; Harraway 1999). For social groups that have been refused the right to speak in their own terms, and whose perspectives have been systematically discredited, just the faltering process of starting to ‘tell it as it is’, to compose a narrative, begins to construct new knowledges of social meanings and relationships. It is clearly no coincidence that, for example, much of gender and anti-racist theory has been developed by those experiencing these particular aspects of oppression – and this may be seen to have given them a particular intellectual authority vis-à-vis the modernist knowledges that they set out to challenge. More recently, other subordinated social groups have become involved in commissioning and undertaking research and knowledge production. Within the field of human service practice, a particular resource is the ‘situated’ or ‘positional’ knowledges of recipients of services – the perceptions and meanings by which people have come to
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make sense of their particular experiences. In the construction of relevant knowledges for practice, an emancipatory approach requires not just appropriating the existing but unarticulated knowledges of service users, but their direct involvement in the processes of knowledge production (Beresford 2000). It is out of disabled people’s direct experience, and their political struggles for recognition, that the social model of disability has been constructed and refined (Oliver 1996). Similarly, people with lived experience of mental distress have been involved in constructing a very different set of knowledges around issues such as compulsion and recovery than those knowledges that have hitherto informed professional discourses around service delivery (Deegan 1997; Coleman 1999; Tew et al. 2000). However, there is a danger that standpoint epistemologies may serve to re-create the very categories of essentialism, for example, in terms of Afrocentric, women’s or disabled people’s consciousness, that poststructuralism set out to deconstruct. Just by experiencing social reality from the situation of a particular subordinate group, no one may be afforded the right to speak for all those with whose experience they may identify, although, at times, this may constitute an expedient political strategy (Chakravorty Spivak 1987; Gilroy 1993). Just as situated knowledges may serve to break down the monopolies on knowledge secured by a dominant consensus, so they too may need to be contested from within, in order to tease out diversities as well as commonalities. Such processes of challenge and (sympathetic) deconstruction may also be valuable in identifying those elements of incorporated knowledge and internalised oppression that may inadvertently be reproduced in articulations of alternative knowledge discourses.
Poststructural practice: working with language and narrative As Christopher Hall (1997) has demonstrated, much of the field of social practice is constituted in and through language: the language of interviews and assessments; the language of reports and decision making; the language of therapy and personal meanings; the language of policy and procedural texts. Each of these languages is performed within specific discursive contexts, contexts that are laden with relationships of potentially unequal power: those between service user and worker, worker and agency, and between workers located in interprofessional hierarchies. A service user may present a narrative that weaves a particular context around an incident, problem or difficulty. A pro-
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fessional, such as a social worker or nurse, may reconstruct this narrative and re-present it to someone in a more senior power position, such as a manager, judge or doctor. In this process, a fear may become recontextualised as a ‘delusion’ or a ‘symptom’, or an injury may be reconstrued as ‘non-accidental’, on the basis of professional ‘expertise’ and judgement. Each level of text or narrative carries with it its own persuasive politics of meaning – meanings that are nuanced with the potential to be empowering or oppressive. For example, for a particular practice of chastisement to be defined in professional discourses as ‘excessive’, may have a significant impact in redefining the power relations between a parent and a child and securing more effective protection against abuse. By contrast, having deeply personal or spiritual experiences dismissed as auditory hallucinations, within a discourse of ‘mental illness’, may be felt to be profoundly alienating and disempowering. A focus on the constitutive power of language, narrative or discourse is not, of itself, the basis of critical practice. What is crucial is how these various levels of ‘text’ are listened to, deconstructed and worked with – is the outcome of involvement to open up dominant stories to new performances that shift the power relations that are embedded within them? Many narratives may be presented with an overall ‘gloss’ that does not take the risk to open up the full extent of distress, oppression and conflict that is being experienced. It is therefore important for the practitioner to develop skills in recognising elements of discontinuity or dissonance that may serve as ‘clues’ to internalised oppression: In a politics of listening, one is searching for the form of colonising discourses hidden in the apparent transparency of personal accounts within. (Byrne and McCarthy 1999: p. 96) Without such a politically aware process of listening, practice may serve to shore up oppressive texts that may be beginning to fall apart due to the weight of their internal contradictions. For example, workers may inadvertently collude with the reiteration of discourses in which victims may blame themselves (as others have done to them) and hold themselves responsible for their distress or disablement. A social constructionist approach may be helpful in opening up the possibility of negotiating new meanings and perceptual ‘lenses’ by which to view what has seemed to be problematic, and this may in
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turn lead to new patterns of behaviour and interaction (see, for example, Hoffman 1990; Parton and O’Byrne 2000). However, if this process is conducted in isolation from any grounding in the realities of power inequalities which may constrain or determine the particular shifts in ‘the story’ that may emerge, then it may represent little more than a renaming of situations of subordination or marginalisation that may render them slightly more palatable to those on the receiving end. Similarly, postmodern approaches can open up a ‘play’ of different readings and inflections that, while disrupting dominant or totalising discourses, may also discount the reality of experiences of oppression or abuse as presented in the narratives of those who may be currently victimised. Whereas social constructionism and postmodernism fail to address issues of power, through assuming either a modernist consensus around meaning, or a postmodern conceptual anarchy, poststructuralism opens up possibilities for a politically oriented practice of ‘deconstructing dominant cultural stories, particularly those which marginalize and oppress service users’ (Milner 2001: p. 2). Here, there comes the opportunity to work with the subtleties and contradictions in the operation of power at local levels, instead of becoming caught up in the polemical ‘us/them’ approach of structural activism which can construct ‘the other as an enemy … against whom one must fight until the moment that the enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears’ (Foucault 1991: pp. 382–3; see also Healy 1999). As has been suggested, pre-existing narratives may not be complete and neatly polished, all ready for an exact re-enactment. Instead, they may be, to some extent, fractured due to conflicts and contradictions arising either internally within a discourse, or externally between coexisting discursive regimes: Stories are full of gaps which persons must fill in order for the story to be performed. These gaps recruit the lived experience and the imagination of persons. (White and Epston 1990: p. 13) Narrative construction may therefore involve an active process of filling the gaps, either by drawing upon available devices that serve to ‘paper over the cracks’, or by allowing in potentially discordant or subversive material. In practice, such choices around how narratives are reperformed may not be made entirely intentionally or self-consciously – elements may creep in both within and outside awareness. It is in engaging with the uncertainties and ambiguities of ‘re-storying’ that professional practice may have its greatest influence.
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Within emancipatory practice, it is not for the worker to attempt to fill the gaps within the story that a person may be recounting, but to enable the person to access alternative experiences, ways of seeing, knowledges and relationships. In doing so, a person may articulate previously suppressed or marginalised narrative elements – memories, significances, connections – and thereby start to ‘reclaim the unsaid’. It would be unrealistic to expect that a person in a subordinated or excluded position will suddenly be able to ‘re-author’ the story as if they were a free and autonomous actor. However, a person may be able to weave in previously suppressed or separated material in order to represent the narrative in a way that puts them significantly more in control of their situation, and/or more connected by relations of mutual support and recognition to those close to them. The telling and (re)storying of experience has long been at the core of many forms of ‘therapeutic conversation’ that seek to be usercentred, ranging from life-story work with children to help them reclaim personal frameworks of meaning and identity, to the complexities of working through unconscious material in psychoanalysis (see Dwivedi 1997). In between, there is a profusion of approaches that seek to enable individuals or groups to make significant changes in the frameworks of meaning that may have a powerful bearing on how they live their lives. Often, those who may be in need of such help may be seen to have reached a point of conflict ‘when the narratives in which they are “storying” their experience, and/or in which they are having their experience “storied” by others, do not sufficiently represent their lived experience’, leading to a situation in which ‘there will be significant aspects of their lived experience that contradict these dominant narratives’ (White and Epston 1990: pp. 14–15). Echoing a similar perspective to the interpretive sociology of Goffman (1974), the founders of cognitive approaches such as Beck (1976) and Ellis (1970) argued that it is often not any fixed or intrinsic nature of actions or events that can be crucial in determining people’s responses to them, but the framework of meaning through which they are interpreted. In turn, the meanings embodied in specific elements of belief or thought may be seen as ultimately deferring to an anchoring ‘schema’ of core beliefs laid down usually in childhood. Therapy involves strategies to enable the person to review and reconstruct selfdamaging elements within their belief system – not in terms of how they came to their original beliefs, but in terms of whether these still make sense in the present. Change depends on the incorporation of new experience or information, some ‘news of difference’ that adds to
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and destabilises the ‘story so far’ within which particular core beliefs or attitudes may have been justified. Psychodynamic approaches also involve a review of historically embedded schemata of meaning, but from a somewhat different angle (Coren 2001). They seek to give meaning to current expressions of distress by relating them to parts of the story of past traumas which may not have been safe to express at the time and may have been suppressed for many years: ‘Psychotherapy is concerned with a story that is so disturbing that, however painful the telling may be, it must be attempted’ (Cox and Theilgard 1987: p. xxvi). Retelling and witnessing the story may start to shift previously fixed meanings that may have been functional for survival in past contexts of oppression and powerlessness, but now are destructive and limiting of opportunities. For example, stories of abuse may be retold with new meanings, so that victims may no longer shoulder all responsibility for their abuse and may pass this over to perpetrators and those who were in a position to protect but who failed to do so. However, both cognitive and psychodynamic approaches remain embedded within modernist assumptions of an unproblematic social order into which people may be reinserted following an individualised process of therapeutic ‘adjustment’. Typically, they lack any clear analyses of the power relations embodied within the prevailing discourses, knowledges and practices that provide the historical and cultural context within which personal stories must be negotiated. If the goal of intervention is to be some form of empowerment, rather than simply reinserting the person in some more socially acceptable discursive framework, an engagement with such power issues is inevitable. Otherwise, the real agenda of therapeutic conversations may be the reestablishment of subtle and pervasive techniques of regulation and social control, even if this is not overtly intended. In order to see what could be the implications, in terms of power relations, of working to shift sets of interrelated and oppressive meanings, it would be necessary to examine how people may have been influenced to take on certain meanings rather than others (or have meanings enforced upon them), and how they may have been ‘incited to perform operations … on their lives and relationships in order to subject themselves and others to the specifications of personhood and relationship that are carried in [dominant] “truth” discourses’ (White and Epston 1990: p. 28). Emancipatory change may therefore involve addressing complex significations of personal identity, in terms of gender, age, ‘race’, sexuality, and so on, unpicking routes of disciplin-
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ary control, surveillance or self-harm, and identifying new or already existing discursive elements that may ground a sense of self-worth and connection with others. Instances may involve unique and idiosyncratic factors, but also collective or structural inequalities, which may both be revealed through the process of narration, and be implicit in what can be said and not said: ‘The experience of racism is difficult to define without the use of storytelling … . The real story that is told is often between the lines’ (Watt 1999: p. 54). The discursive shift from ‘victim’ to ‘survivor’ cannot be achieved through some linguistic sleight of hand, but by a serious and prolonged engagement with the micropolitics of violation and connection, of how chains of meaning defer to other chains of meaning, each with their own implications in terms of oppression or opportunity. Practical steps towards such a politically aware practice in relation to narrative and meaning may be found in the recent work of the mental health survivor movement, for example, in engaging directly with the speech and symbolisation of the internal ‘voices’ that people may hear (see Coleman and Smith 1997; Coleman 1999). Conventionally, this may be rendered meaningless as ‘symptoms’ of mental illness. However, closer examination may reveal complex and contradictory narrative elements, both re-enacting internalised oppressive, selfpunitive and regulatory discourses, but also comprising elements of parody, resistance and creativity, which may be harnessed in enabling people to restructure both internal and external power relations. Conventionally, people in powerless positions may have come to story their experiences of distress and abuse within a narrative of ‘problems’, in which their personal identity becomes so intertwined with that of ‘the problem’ that they may tend to see themselves (or be defined by powerful others) as ‘the problem’. In turn, such definitions may easily be taken up and magnified within professional discourses that may tend to individualise difficulties (Milner 2001). In order to challenge these interlocking narratives that prevent people having any possibility of power in resolving or acting in relation to ‘the problem’, Michael White and David Epston devised a ‘re-storying’ approach to detach or externalise ‘the problem’ from the problematised person. For example, the difficulties of a young boy leading an overtly antisocial lifestyle may no longer be personalised by defining him as a ‘delinquent’, and instead the sets of problematic attitudes and behaviours may be re-storied as a separate entity, ‘mischief’, which may be seen to have both attractive and destructive aspects, and to have ‘taken over’ much of (but not all of) the boy’s recent life, and significant aspects of
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the lives of those around him. Everyone may be seen to have some power (intentionally or otherwise) in influencing the particular trajectory that ‘mischief’ takes. Such an approach may offer all concerned the opportunity to create new narratives that both describe their particular relationship with ‘the problem’ – how it has impacted upon them – and situate them in positions where they may see themselves as able to act differently in relation to ‘mischief’. In turn, this may open up a space for the person most intimately identified with ‘the problem’ to refuse their objectification and specification within ‘familiar’ narratives, and to start to construct and perform a new identity with the support of key allies. In doing so, they may reclaim elements of other self-stories that may have been suppressed while ‘the problem’ held sway, and also catch hold of externally available narrative elements, either within local ‘micro’ cultures or across wider cultural domains, which offer emancipatory possibilities. For example, a woman seeking to re-author her place within the organisation of domestic life may re-present herself to other family members in narratives that speak of her frustrations and unfulfilled capacities, at the same time connecting these with elements from available ‘women-changing’ stories drawn from friends, neighbours, workplace, media, fiction, and so on. If sustainable change is to be achieved, new narratives must be grounded in, and make sense in terms of, the particular sets of meanings and orientations that already exist within the situation, or may be encountered in the discursive structures that surround it. A narrative that is imposed will carry the taint of oppressive force: it may secure temporary compliance but will not be owned. New stories that are too confrontational and disrespectful of current norms and practices are unlikely to gain a ‘foothold’. It may not be feasible to ‘substitute a dominant discourse with its suppressed other’, but it may be possible to juxtapose elements of each in order to create a more ‘ambivalent structure’ which may offer greater possibilities for change (Byrne and McCarthy 1999: pp. 96–7). In a micro-scale version of Gramsci’s ‘war of position’, opportunity may come through exploiting points of contradiction and dissonant elements within existing narratives, finding the ‘gaps’ that may start to destabilise their hegemony. These gaps may be within the personal stories within which people define themselves and their relationships with others, and within the wider context of the ‘socioculturally constructed discursive complexes by which people are positioned’ (Kaye 1999: p. 35). Unlike the more extreme ambitions
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of structural activists, narrative practitioners may have more modest intentions in terms of changing the terms of the everyday processes of people’s lives: From a critical poststructural perspective, it is not a question of overcoming domination once and for all, but rather the ongoing negotiation of power and identity. (Healy 1999: p. 130) Within a critical approach to deconstructive narrative or therapeutic work, there is a need to recognise a second set of power relations that lie alongside those of the people’s living situations: those that may exist between the worker and the client or user. Just as Derrida explored the power paradoxes implicit in the activity of deconstructing text, so it is important for practitioners to be critically aware of how they may have to take a position of power in order to overturn conventional understandings and thereby expose issues of power and violation. An ‘ethical’ stance on social justice is necessary in order to undertake any deconstructive practice. In practical terms, there may be a need to ‘take control of an interview in order to let the other have a voice, to be empowered’, in order for the process of deconstruction to get under way and the gaps in the surface veneer of narratives to start to emerge. This process is inherently ‘violent’ in the sense of seizing a position of legitimated professional authority, but this violence is necessary ‘in order to deconstruct the violence in people’s lives at the social, political, legal, media-technological, sexual or physical levels’ (Larner 1999: p. 40). Thus it is essential for the worker both to perform the power and simultaneously deconstruct its (institutional) basis; to remain, to some degree, the ‘expert’ on deconstructing and on social justice, while debunking any pretence to be ‘expert’ on the experience of the other, or on how any gaps in narratives might be filled. Maintaining a potentially awkward and painful dialogue around how power may be experienced ‘provides the very context in which deconstructing [practice] can proceed’ (ibid.: p. 41). Viewed in this way, a deconstructive approach to re-storying is not about some humanist dream of ‘the individual’ reclaiming their autonomous life through authoring ‘a unitary, integrated identity or self-story’ (ibid.: p. 31). It is also very different from the structural activist vision of a homogeneous collectivity engaging in an antagonistic struggle with a dominant group. Instead it describes a practice that is a continuum between personal and collective struggle, one that aims to work creatively with the contradictions that inhere within, or emerge from, both personal narratives and the broader discursive
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structures with which they are interconnected. It is a process of simultaneously working with, and subtly transforming, the terms of personal, familial and cultural discourses: one that takes account of unique circumstances and situations, but can nevertheless aggregate to bring about significant shifts within the power relations of wider patterns of social and cultural structuring.
5 Hidden Depths: Reclaiming Emotionality
In the preceding chapters, I have explored both structural and poststructural perspectives and argued that any analysis of power relations would need to take account of dynamics and interactions taking place at both material and discursive levels of social relations. However, even this may be insufficient to capture the breadth of analysis that may be required in order to examine the operation of power in all its manifestations. In this chapter, I will discuss what may constitute a third discrete level of social relations: that of emotionality. This may be seen to be an aspect of social experience that has tended to be marginalised, not only within modernist discourse, but also within many critical approaches to analysis. Perhaps the most important key to opening up this arena to critical interrogation is the various theoretical and practice traditions that have developed out of psychoanalysis. Although these may touch on issues of oppression, they have tended to remain predominantly grounded within modernism, and hence lack any clear framework for analysing the operation of power. In addressing this weakness, there may be useful potential contributions from recent developments, particularly in the sociology of emotions, in terms of exposing some of the wider issues of power that structure, or are structured by, forms of emotional expression. Within this body of work there is much debate as to how to define or conceptualise ‘emotion’, and there have been various strategies whereby to try to collapse emotion into some other category – as an adjunct to rationality, as a form of behaviour or as an aspect of bodily physiology. While some form of conceptualisation is clearly important in order to progress this discussion, there is a danger of falling into the modernist trap of defining it too narrowly and precisely – and thereby 97
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constructing a category of experience that may exclude aspects and connections that could be significant in an analysis of power relations. I will therefore start with a broad definition of the field of emotionality as comprising a range of experiences and expressions that may be internal to the person or emerge as part of social interaction, and which encompass states of feeling, non-rational or intuitive assessments of people or situations, and configurations of energies or drives. Such descriptions start to overlap with some understandings of spirituality, but I would not think it appropriate to subsume all aspects of spiritual experience within any conception of emotionality.
Emotionality under modernism Expressions such as passion, desire and distress mark out a territory that is alien to the ordered surfaces of modernity, and have thereby posed particular difficulties for the modernist project since its inception. Emotions may be seen to be integral to everyday ‘life-politics’, playing a crucial role in ‘communication, commitment and cooperation with others’ (Giddens 1992: p. 202). They may also have the capacity to speak out against conformity, oppression, abuse, to aspire to something better than the status quo, and the potential to rouse a ‘rabble’ of isolated and discontented elements into a fighting force for change. Within many traditional societies, the coding and regulation of powerful or disturbing emotions has been closely linked to systems of spiritual belief and religious practice, or to more secular celebrations and festivals in which some ‘Lord of Misrule’ could preside over a temporary and circumscribed suspension of conventional constraints. In many cultures, heightened emotional states may have been encouraged as part of religious ceremonies or valued as mystical revelations. Alongside this, spiritualised discourses, such as those around witchcraft or demonic possession, could be deployed to separate out the responsibility for any difficult or subversive manifestations of emotionality from the actual people expressing them, and these expressions could then be controlled through culturally and religiously sanctioned rituals. Such forms of ordering and directing emotionality may be seen to have fallen apart with the transition to modernity. As rationality replaced organised spirituality as a guarantor of the social order, emotionality, no longer tied in to social constructions of spirituality, presented itself as a potential ‘loose cannon’, a powerful force that
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threatened to scandalise reason and undermine the smooth running of society. Not only was emotion potentially disruptive to the sway of rationality, it also had a very specific capacity to carry messages about the operation of injustice and oppression: ‘A very large class of human emotions results from real, anticipated, recollected, or imagined outcomes of power and status relations’ (Kemper 1984: p. 371). Emotionality may thus be seen as both a socially structured and a socially structuring force, playing a crucial role in both the maintenance and the transformation of social relations (Barbalet 1998) – particularly through providing ‘the “missing link” between “personal troubles” and broader “public issues” of social structure’ (Williams and Bendelow 1998: p. xvii). The preservation of modernity has depended on the manipulation and subordination of emotion through the deployment of a range of discursive strategies. One approach has been to exclude, trivialise or devalue emotion. Within ‘public’ discourses, it has been denied the words to speak itself, and it has been shut off within the world of the ‘primitive’, the ‘childish’ or the ‘feminine’: In our dominant tradition [emotionality] has not been seen as an aid to understanding and action, but rather as an impediment, even an evil. We have a long tradition of trying to dispense with, or at least to control and neutralise, emotionality. (Baker Miller 1988: p. 39) It has been represented as the inferiorised term of a mental/emotional dualism, and signified as belonging with ‘the body’, ‘nature’ and ‘the feminine’, rather than the higher world of ‘civilisation’, ‘culture’ and (masculine) citizenship. The very right to modernist citizenship has, at various points, depended on the ability both to control emotionally ‘unruly’ others (women, children, colonised peoples, the working classes, and so on), and to achieve ‘mastery’ over passions within (Venn 1997). It has been conventional for members of the aristocratic or bourgeois classes to construct themselves as ‘gentlemen’ and ‘ladies’, expressing emotion only in a ‘correct’ and ritualised manner that avoids disclosure of any real desire or vulnerability. By contrast, in class-based literary and other discourses, members of the peasant and working classes may be situated so that they appear ‘earthy’ and ‘common’, representations of an almost ‘animal’ sensuality. Similarly, racist oppression may be seen to operate through specific discourses that impact on possibilities for emotionality available to ‘black’ people (and, conversely, a reciprocal distortion of that available to ‘white’ people):
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Blacks, like women, have been constructed as possessing the characteristics that are negatively valued in white western culture, for example, emotionality, sexuality and hedonism… . Racism reproduces itself not only … at an economic and social level. (Henriques et al. 1984: p. 89) An alternative approach has been to develop strategies for channelling, sanitising and managing emotion. Within the early modern period, it could be reconstructed in more anodyne form as ‘romance’, ‘sentiment’ or spiritual ‘fervour’. In later modernity, it has tended to become constituted as a commodity that may be consumed, induced or traded within an ‘emotion industry’: From psychiatrists to Agony Aunts, psychotherapists to GPs, social workers to self-help manuals, we are increasingly advised or instructed, encouraged or cajoled on how best to ‘manage’ our emotions, resolve our ‘troubles’ and ‘make the most’ of our lives, thereby achieving our ‘full potential’. (Williams 2001: p. 10) In his critique of current ‘post-emotional’ society, Mestrovic (1997) suggests that emotion has become detached from any connection with the experience or real social relations, and has been ‘McDonaldised’, able to be synthesised within theme parks and heritage centres or, more sinisterly, within media or political constructions of national mourning (as with the orchestration of Princess Diana’s funeral) or ethnic identity (as in the mobilisation of violence within the Balkans). While modernity may be dressed up, at the level of ideology and discourse, to appear fair, open and natural, it may come to feel very different to those subjected within its structures. There may be significant disjunctions and contradictions between how people are supposed to see their situation and their lived experience of it. And modernist strategies for suppressing or subordinating emotion may, at times, appear somewhat ‘leaky’. Just as discursive attempts to prohibit and regulate sexuality served to imbue it with a paradoxical power and a seditious importance (Foucault 1981), so too modernist attempts to repress or manipulate emotionality may be seen to have given it a ‘perverse’ status as a carrier of messages around oppression and resistance: ‘power … can be said to create emotionality’ (Lutz 1996). Julia Kristeva suggests that ‘the movement of material contradictions’ may generate the emotional drives and energies of the ‘semiotic’, which may, in turn, spill out into and disrupt the symbolic order (1984: p. 119). Such ‘gut’ awareness of unfairnesses and oppressions, and outrage against
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assaults and abuses, may potentially provide a motive force for social change and transformation – or may remain internalised and fuel mental or emotional distress. Conversely, for those situated in positions of relative power under modernity, in order to continue to ‘play the game’, it may be necessary to dissociate from any awareness of how it may be experienced by those on the receiving end of exploitation or abuse – and forms of rationalisation may be employed in order to disqualify both their own and others’ feelings. Economically and politically excluded people may be blamed for their misfortune, and any empathy with their distress minimised through constructing them in categories such as ‘bogus asylum seekers’, ‘single parents’ or ‘scroungers’. A righteous sense of indignation may be used to cover up and cut off from more worrying and intuitive concerns of being complicit in the degradation of others. An extreme instance of this may be found in the ways that perpetrators of sexual abuse and rape often have ways of rationalising their behaviour as fair, consensual or even to the benefit of the victim – framed within a discursive structure in which the victim may perhaps be seen as ‘asking for it’ or enjoying it. Not only may a dulling of emotional sensitivities be necessary for the continuance of modernist relations of domination and subordination, but the possibilities of emotional closeness in social relationships may also be politically dangerous to the social order. Despite the various strategies for marginalising emotion that have characterised modernism, in practice, the exclusion of emotionality has never been total. Particularly for many members of subordinated groups, the realities of day-to-day survival may dictate a degree of interdependency grounded in a wider sharing of feelings of vulnerability, with the formation of ‘webs’ of emotional support and connection. These affective bonds may have the potential to develop into a more seditious glue, bonding people together as ‘comrades’, ‘brothers’ or ‘sisters’ in collective struggles against shared disadvantage or oppression. For members of dominant groups, maintaining authority may entail sacrificing the immediacy of desire in order to be able to act autonomously without being constrained by emotional dependencies, or displaying any signs of vulnerability or ‘weakness’. Even within the domestic sphere, men may typically ‘hold back’ their emotionality, so that ‘love’, openness and vulnerability may tend to be differentially located with those in subordinated positions (Duncombe and Marsden 1993). In this way, unsettling desires or personal weaknesses may
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conveniently be associated with – or projected on to – those social groupings that have been deemed unfit to take on full ‘citizenship’ status, such as women and children. Within modernist thought, a fundamental strategy for taking away the potential political force of emotion has been its splitting into ‘objective’ manifestations and ‘subjective’ feelings, within the respective modernist intellectual traditions of positivism and humanism. The marginalisation of emotionality has been particularly evident in relation to the dominant modernist discourses of social ‘science’, which have, until recently, tended to exclude any consideration of emotionality as an aspect of social relations worthy of study. Within a discursive structure defined only by questions of classification and measurement, emotionality has very largely been ignored as a phenomenon – except for its physiological manifestations in terms of particular states of arousal. Here, emotion became redefined (and concealed) as an attribute of ‘the body’, belonging to the world of instinct and nature, of ‘fight’, ‘flight’ and appetite, and divorced from any form of social context or meaning. Emotion has had an uneasy relationship to humanist discourses. Some have maintained a clear subordination of ‘the emotional’ to ‘the rational’, for example in Kantian philosophy. Similarly, within Classical literary and artistic traditions, emotional expression has been regulated by rational canons of aesthetics and literary criticism that stressed the importance of form and order – fitting comfortably with the overall ethos of modernism. However, other humanist discourses may be seen to have permitted some more potentially troubling irruptions of emotionality or distress within subjective experience. Early on within the development of Enlightenment thought, David Hume (1969) struggled with the vexed question of feelings and accorded them an importance in their own right as, in some sense, coming before and not being constituted by rationality. He recognised emotion (or ‘passion’) as a primary source of personal motivation, which then had to be guided and controlled by reason. In the early twentieth century, the writings of another influential modernist, T.S. Eliot, while reflecting a strong commitment to upholding a literary and aesthetic order, nevertheless allowed dangerous and disturbing feelings to break through in some of his poetry. In ‘The Waste Land’ (1963), uncomfortable desires found expression at the margins of the text – located within a split-off persona, or in obscure footnotes quoted only in Latin.
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Set against these predominantly rationalist traditions of humanism, aspects of emotional experience were allowed much greater prominence in the ‘irrationalism’ of romanticism, existentialism and psychoanalysis. While romanticism signalled a revolt against the suppression of feeling under classical discourses, it still served to maintain ‘the underlying assumption of rationalism – that reason and passions are firmly opposed’ (Crawford et al. 1992: p. 17). Furthermore, within the discourses of romanticism, rather than being seen as potentially a response to situations of oppression, emotion, like nature, could be viewed as beautiful and ‘exotic’: as ‘a great keyboard on which our highest sentiments are played out’ (Taylor 1989). Only very particular constructions of feeling could be permitted – perhaps gentle and contemplative, or, alternatively, dramatic and intense, but in a way that was also stylised and somehow divorced from everyday realities of living. The raw and contradictory force of emotion could be carefully filtered out within discourses that substituted ersatz reactions such as ‘sentiments’ in place of any real engagement with social and personal issues. Artistic devices such as ‘pathos’ could be deployed to engender a distancing sympathy, as opposed to any more involving empathetic forms of connection. Emotional awareness of (collective) power inequalities could be concealed behind a ruthless individualism linked with essentialist visions of a personal driving force or ‘Spirit’, or a narrow focus on the existential ‘I–thou’ encounter divorced from any social context (as in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Buber, respectively). The challenge posed to the rational authority of modernism comes through more forcefully within psychoanalytic approaches to emotional experience. The critical edge to this tradition came through both the emphasis of the importance of emotional life in its own right and the theorisation of mechanisms whereby this crucial aspect of social relations could be subject to systematic and potentially damaging forms of repression. However, some of the radical potential of Sigmund Freud’s work was constrained by its insertion within the modernist dualism between nature and culture. In his formulations, he theorised a conflict between the instinctual drives of the Id and the culture-based expectations of the super-ego, presided over by an ego governed by principles of rationality. He saw it as essential for the rational ego to have ultimate control, and for instinctual drives to be subjugated (however painfully) to the necessary values of ‘civilisation’. Thus emotion remained marginalised as a problem area for civil order – as a set of potentially dangerous forces to be contained, rather than an integral element of human social experience.
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Shifts within modernism: emotion in psychology and sociology While psychoanalysis raised the difficult issue of emotionality, the mainstream tradition of psychology was established in a way that tended to exclude emotionality from serious consideration. Set up within the positivist tradition of scientific enquiry, the initial emphasis was on the ‘objective’ manifestations of human experience: only that which could be measured and would appear consistent in repeated experiments was seen as being of importance. Within such discourse, there has been a great reluctance to engage with emotionality in its own right, with it being subsumed either within behaviour (such as facial or bodily expressions) or, more recently, within the cognitive evaluation of situations (see Harré 1986; Crawford et al. 1992). Initially, cognitive theory was located within a rationalist paradigm: feelings were not allowed to intrude into the processes whereby thoughts and beliefs guided actions and the effects and consequences of actions could inform future patterns of thought and belief. However, just as behaviourism, on its own, had come to be seen as an inadequate explanation of the complexity of human transactions, so the limitations of cognitive behavioural approaches started to be recognised within psychology with a rediscovery of the importance of emotion (see Arnold 1960). A sanitised emotionality was allowed a place as long as it was to be seen as a functional part of a process in which people appraised and evaluated the various stimuli of their environment. Subsequently, and more radically, emotion started to be taken seriously, in its own right, as central to how people act in the world (Zajonc 1980). Rather than seeing emotion as just an adjunct to processes of cognitive appraisal, it could be understood as comprising its own condensed and non-verbal form of meaning, both as ‘feeling’ memories and as part of comprehending current situations (Frijda 1986). This work remained situated firmly within a positivist paradigm, with emotions, like cognitions and behaviours, being seen as belonging to an objective world in which human organisms interacted, in potentially predictable ways, with their natural environment. Emotions would be seen, not as disturbing and disruptive passions, but as ‘a motivator of adaptive behaviour’ (Safran and Greenberg 1991c: p. 352). This approach started to converge with how emotion had been construed within the other (and hitherto less influential) pole of modernist psychology: humanistic approaches. This tradition, informed by an uneasy synthesis of American individualism and existentialist and
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Nietzschean ideas, presumed an inherent drive towards a ‘natural’ wholeness and integration of all aspects of personal subjectivity, and an assertive ‘being-in-the-world’ that was nevertheless potentially in harmony with an environment of other human subjects: ‘The innermost core of a man’s nature … is basically socialised, forward moving, rational and realistic’ (Rogers 1961: pp. 90–1). While the process of ongoing ‘self-actualisation’ could (temporarily) be blocked or deflected by external circumstances, it could potentially be overcome by an effective mobilisation of inner ‘organismic’ resources. The possibility of more fundamental contradictions between psychic renewal and social oppression were ruled out within an unswerving belief in the essential harmony of individual and society. Gestalt and other expressive psychotherapies had seen emotion as an essential part of the awareness necessary in order to process experience and promote personal ‘growth’ (Perls 1969; Stevens 1971; Gendlin 1981). Grounded within romanticism and distrusting rationalisation, ‘cathartic’ displays of emotion could be seen as an essential part of rediscovering a ‘true’ sense of self. These could often involve people’s expression of ‘resentment’ at how they felt that they had been treated by others, but responsibility for such feelings, and the onus for change, would remain firmly with the individual. Thus, certain evocations of emotion would be an integral part of an individual rebalancing their subjectivity with the world around them – and hence in bringing about adaptive change. In this way, both objectivist cognitive and subjectivist humanistic perspectives have come to construct an emotionality that may play a significant – and quasi-independent – role in bringing about the positive adaptation of the individual to their circumstances. Such developments may be seen to signal certain important shifts within the dualistic structure of modernist thought: a move to transcend the split between objective and subjective and the associated inferiorisation or suppression of emotionality beneath its opposite term, rationality. In one sense the emotional ‘cat’ is now out of the ‘bag’, but it is still rendered a remarkably well-mannered beast: feelings may now be welcome as long as they lead the person along a path of positive adaptation. What neither psychological tradition allows for is the possibility of painful and discordant feelings or desires that could lead to resistance or revolt against a social order that may be experienced as damaging or oppressive. As will be discussed in more detail later, the third major tradition within psychology, that of psychoanalysis, is the one that has both
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recognised the prevalence of conflictual and disturbing feelings, and, at the same time, sought to construct therapeutic technologies whereby to subordinate them more successfully to the domination of the rational (ego) and the dictates of a potentially oppressive social order. Although acknowledging the pain and distress that may result from internalising and suppressing feelings of outrage, anger and loss, these issues remain carefully separated out as unique experiences of trauma that need to be worked through on an individual basis. The goal remains one of adaptation to the existing social order, rather than focusing or mobilising emotion as a force for social change, leading to an orthodoxy that has doubted that ‘political’ concepts such as ‘power or equality … are appropriate for talking about emotional life’ (Craib 1995: p. 155). Some time after emotionality made its entrance within psychology, it has started to be recognised within sociology and cultural studies – although initially having to struggle against those committed to positivist or rationalist modes of enquiry (Eichler, 1981). As with psychology, there was a resistance against allowing emotions to emerge as ‘a sui generis realm of personal meaning’ (Chodorow 1999: p. 287). Within social constructionist approaches (Harré 1986; Gergen 1994), emotion can come to be conflated with its social articulation, so that it is not possible to conceive of a feeling that cannot be spoken or acted out – perhaps because it may be at odds with social expectation. Instead, codes of emotional exchange are seen as integral to the construction and maintenance o