Social Rage: Emotion and Cultural Conflict (Garland Reference Library of Social Science)

SOCIAL RAGE

SOCIAL RAGE EMOTION AND CULTURAL CONFLICT

B O N N I E B E R RY

GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC. A MEMBER OF THE

TAY L O R & F R A N C I S G R O U P

N E W Y O R K & L O N D O N / 1999

Published in 1999 by Garland Publishing, Inc. A Member of the Taylor & Francis Group 19 Union Square West New York, NY 10003 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. Copyright ©1999 by Bonnie Berry All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Berry, Bonnie. Social rage : emotion and cultural conflict / by Bonnie Berry. p. cm. — (Garland reference library of social science ; v. 1187.) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8153-3089-8 (alk. paper) 1. Polarization (Social sciences)—United States. 2. Social conflict—United States. 3. Anger—Social aspects—United States. 4. Alienation (Social psychology)—United States. 5. United States—Social conditions—1980– I. Title. Series. HN90.P57B47 1999 303.6'0973—dc21 99-15566 CIP ISBN 0-203-90325-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-90329-3 (Glassbook Format)

To the memory of Edwin M. Lemert, a great sociologist and mentor

Contents

Foreword Acknowledgments Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9

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Introduction to Social Rage The Measures and Meanings of Social Rage: Reality versus Perceptions Social Rage and the Survivalist Right Social Rage against Crime, Criminals, and Crime Control Social Rage and Minority Relations Social Rage and the Religious Fringe Social Rage and Politics Social Rage and the Media Social Rage: Summary, Final Thoughts, and Recommendations

1 29 53 89 119 149 185 213 233

Appendix A Field Notes, Tokyo Metropolitan University Appendix B Bumper Sticker and Radio Talk-Show Surveys by Pacific Lutheran University Students

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Author Index

275

Subject Index

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269

Foreword

Scholars have written recently of societal-level “meanness,” the “culture of argument,” “righteous rage,” and other topics relevant to what I have elected to term “social rage.” These recent discussions suggest that social rage is more prominent now than in the past, although this is not necessarily true. While these timely analyses focus on, among other things, the temporal nature of social rage, pointing out that the 1980s and 1990s are a time of prominent social rage, we find that we have experienced such times before, interspersed with times of decreased social rage. Using examples of political behavior, media behavior, behavior of the religious fringe, crime and crime-control policies, anti-minority actions, and the survivalist right movement, this study attends to the measures and meanings of social rage. In an attempt to understand whether social rage is indeed a broad-scale social phenomenon, or merely seems to be wide-ranging, I have cast about for measurements of social rage, obtrusive though they may be. Interpreting the signs of social rage assists in a query of how we know social rage when we see it and the degree to which social rage fluctuates. We can consider the meanings of social rage in light of relevant emotions and behaviors, causality, and outcomes. One of my hoped-for contributions has been a discussion of what constitutes social rage, for example, what behaviors and emotions are included in social rage. Applying the sociological imagination to what is known empirically, and through the insight of my students and colleagues, I have arrived at a definition of social rage as well as the notion that social rage encompasses

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not just violence, but selfishness, rudeness, short-sightedness, aggression, intolerance, and narrow-mindedness. This analysis examines the behavior of social rage by explaining social rage expression, the conduit of social rage. Social rage expression can be overt and obvious or covert and subtle. Expressions of social rage are also fraught with distortions and distractions, which are highly important to the phenomenon of social rage. Distortions can take the form of just plain lies or rageful messages that are, at best, skewed, emotional, and not wholly truthful. More disconcerting are distractions, which take our attention away from serious social problems requiring useful and well-thought-out responses, and instead focus our attention on something that is emotionally grabbing but irrelevant to improving social conditions such as health care, employment, safety and freedom, and the pursuit of happiness. On the whole, social rage seems, by its expression, to be bigger and more intimidating than it truly is. But, as the student of sociology knows, reality is relative and perception can be reality. Regarding causality, social conditions create social rage. Among the social conditions that create social rage is a poor economy. Related to poor economic times in the United States, we find that the demise of the “American Dream” has lent a feeling of frustration and anger, especially among the traditionally enfranchised who never suspected that their chances at the Dream would be forfeited. These disenchanted people usually place the source of blame inaccurately, not on the ultrapowerful who make the decisions affecting their lives, but on historical scapegoats. A strong causal feature of current social rage in the United States is a perception of violated expectations. Some segments of the U.S. population are in stark disagreement with social changes (for example, the moves toward alternative moral stances, equalized educational opportunities, and the like) and are exhibiting rather negative reactions to those social changes. Such changes upset the “way things have always been” and the way the social order was expected to proceed in perpetuity. Moreover, in understanding the relationship between social conditions and social rage, we must bear in mind that, at times, rageful behavior is collectively encouraged and rewarded. As to consequences of social rage, it impacts our individual daily lives, for instance, how we vote, the consumer choices we make, how we respond to social occurrences, how we feel about and behave in personal interactions, and so on. On a grander scale, social rage affects mass phenomena, such as formation of and membership in social movements, as commonly illustrated by hate groups. At this juncture, I apply the “con-

Foreword

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struction of the enemy.” Sociologists describe social construction of the enemy, often in the context of minority studies, as an artificial labeling process with punitive effects. We find that enemies can be artificially constructed out of any category of people, based on nationality, race or ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, mental or physical differences, criminal conviction, socioeconomic status, or whatever. (Sociallycreated enemies can also be deconstructed.) Even more broadly, social rage influences societal evolution; or perhaps I should say “devolution” since social rage inhibits social progress and often has destructive consequences for a society and its place in the global community. Let us explore the interaction between emotions, cultural conflicts, and the forces of social rage. By understanding such forces, we can further the science of social and human behavior and, more saliently, remove obstacles to peace and equity.

Acknowledgments

First of all, I am indebted to my former students at Pacific Lutheran University, who, diligently and with much enthusiasm, collected measures of social rage presented herein. I am also grateful for the questions raised and interpretations offered by the 1995 graduate methodology class at Tokyo Metropolitan University, and for Professor Keiko Nakao, who organized the discussions. The TMU students lent great insight into the comparison between the Tokyo subway gassing event and the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing, as well as the cross-cultural meaning of social rage. I have been further enlightened by the University of Washington graduate deviance seminar, April 1998, and by the faculty who organize the program, Professors George Bridges and Bob Crutchfield. Second, I wish to acknowledge my editors at Garland Publishing, Kristi Long, Maria Zamora, Linda Henry, Alexis Skinner, and (especially) David Estin, for their painstaking assistance and comments. Through their patience and expertise, I have been encouraged to do my best. Third, I can not express enough my respect and gratitude to all my friends. I admire them more than they know. As to friends, I am especially indebted to my nonhuman companions, Skipper, Blue, and Misery, for the sincere comfort they have provided me. Finally, I am immensely grateful for the kindness, support, and dedication of my technical advisor and best buddy, Pete Lara.

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NOTE ON LANGUAGE In an attempt to write in as nonbiased a manner as possible, I have avoided use of the term “America” and “American” to refer to the United States and members of the U.S. society. Also, for reasons of readability, I was advised to substitute “disabled” and “disability” for my preferred terms “differently-abled” and “differently-abledness.” Finally, I do not use sexist language.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to Social Rage

Countries go insane like people go insane. . . . America had had her neuroses before, like when she tried to give up drink, like when she started finding enemies within, like when she thought she could rule the world. . . . In her way she was never like anywhere else. Most places just are something, but America had to mean something too, hence her vulnerability—to make believe, to false memory, false destiny. (Martin Amis 1989: 366) When I began my research on social rage a few years ago and people asked me what I was studying, a common response was, “Do you mean like in the O.J. Simpson case?” Their question assumes that O.J. Simpson killed his ex-wife and her friend and that Mr. Simpson committed these murders in a state of rage. I then clarify that I am studying social rage, rather than individual or personal rage. In a sense, their question is not very far off the mark, since public reaction to Mr. Simpson’s acquittal in criminal court certainly contained elements of social rage, as will be shown in the chapter on social rage and crime (Chapter 4). Indeed, there is some overlap between personal (or individual) and social rage, which I will detail throughout this book. As we will see, feelings of personal rage can be justified by social forces, and acts of social rage are often displayed by people who are experiencing personal rage. 1

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Social Rage

For example, after many years of abuse, Lorena Bobbitt cut off her husband’s penis. For this, she was acquitted; but more importantly, she received public support for her act of rageful retaliation (Mills 1997). The “angry white guy,” so prominent in journalistic accounts, is angry about social changes not to his liking. He would like for society to return to a time when he enjoyed social and economic privileges over minorities, when he could exercise greater unquestioned autonomy. He is probably experiencing personal and social rage because of his economic frustration and his sense of vulnerability to forces beyond his control. He engages in social rage when he, for instance, states openly his anti-minority feelings. Personal rage can be related to social rage, but is distinguishable from it. In his book, Seductions of Crime, Jack Katz (1988) describes personal rage as leading to acts of violence. More pointedly, Katz describes the place of righteousness in personal rage, the justified need to right wrongs done to a person. Katz gives examples of the murderer being driven (in the murderer’s opinion) to murder due to insults, feelings of vulnerability, and experiences of humiliation. Some of the same processes at work in personal rage, such as humiliation, are also at work in social rage. Rage, social and personal, can be an attempt to right wrongs, to correct an insulted self-image. For example, the angry white man who feels humiliated because he can not get a job, may believe that he can not get a job because all the jobs are going to women, racial minorities, foreigners, or others who are not white, U.S.born men. Angry white men seem to believe that it is their right to possess more social and economic privileges than others, partly out of tradition, and they feel humiliated under these changing social conditions. They feel, in short, that their life expectations have been violated. People, not just white men, may respond to violations of expectations, to social change, with righteous indignation and acts of social rage. So, we find that social rage is different from, although not necessarily exclusive of, personal rage. Individual acts of rage, such as homicides and aggressive traffic disputes, can have social components to them. Social rage may provide the catalyst for singular acts of personal repression as in cases of skinheads killing an African-American because the victim is African-American, an irate driver punching out a non-English-speaking driver, or homophobes gay-bashing a gay individual. Hate crimes, also called bias crimes, are criminal acts carried out by individuals against individuals, but are driven by (nonpersonal) hatred of a class of people (Hamm 1994a; 1993; Klein 1992; 1993; Berk 1990; Ehrlich 1990).

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3

To state the obvious, society is made up of individuals and some of these individuals are rageful. Individuals involved in violent verbal and physical altercations may be viewed as uncivil jerks or as dangerous, evil people. They may be bad for reasons better left to clinical explanations, not for social reasons. Alternatively, they may be behaving poorly because they are dissatisfied with economic and other social conditions; they may feel at the whim of social forces beyond their individual control (DeMott 1996). There are also the rageful individuals who claim to have social motives and may even portray themselves as a one-person social movement. One who comes to mind is Ted Kaczynski, the convicted Unabomber, who engaged in rageful behavior (murder) as a way of making a point about society’s unhealthy reliance upon technology (Lamy 1996). I have been examining social rage mostly as a phenomenon that occurs on a large scale, as would be found in mass movements. Such movements are comprised of massive-scale collective behavior, enacted by members of society whose purpose is to achieve social change to their liking. The expression of social rage to achieve social change may also be a rebellion against a social change already in place. Mass movements can be left-wing, such as the civil-rights movement, most strongly evidenced in the 1960s, and the continuing women’s movement. Mass movements can be right-wing, such as the current religious-right movement to control education and birth control, the movement to reverse affirmative-action policies, and anti-immigration movements. While both left and right movements can be considered rageful, there are some important differences in movement goals and behaviors. I will address these differences later, but for the most part I will concentrate on the rightist social movements as put forth by individuals, groups, or masses, which apparently involve intense negative emotion and repression of human rights (Smith 1994; Applebome 1995; Bennett 1995). SOCIAL CHANGE, VIOLATIONS OF EXPECTATIONS, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST EQUALITY Social change can be a very positive evolutionary process, benefiting large portions of society. As suggested, these same social changes can be viewed as harmful by others, causing rage when social change violates a group’s expectations. Social change means a disruption of stability, a change in “the way things have always been.” Some social groups may be unwilling to accept change if it means a leveling of social power, and par-

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Social Rage

ticularly if it means a decline in social power for them. Their resistance may coincide with a reassertion of their traditionally-held privileges. Acts of social rage can include behavior such as church burnings, sexual harassment, open expression of prejudice against minorities, homicide, and voting against affirmative action. Voting against affirmative action, for example, may express the view that women, racial minorities, homosexuals, immigrants, and other “protected classes” are not really as capable or as deserving as white, straight, Christian, U.S.-born men. Voting against affirmative action may express a feeling of being threatened and may be an attempt to return things to their “rightful” order.1 Knowing this, the reader has a sense that social rage is on a firstname basis with another emotion that can be both personal and social: intolerance. There are a number of emotions and social behaviors associated with social rage; including intolerance, incivility, selfishness, and just plain “meanness” (Mills 1997). Angry white men are only one illustration of socially rageful persons. Many people of all races, nationalities, genders, ages, and social classes are rageful. These rageful individuals, collectivities, and behaviors will be described in some detail as we progress in our discussions of social rage. At the present time—but seeming to grow less significant in social influence—angry white men feel cheated out of what is to them a rightful heritage as white men; their expected superordinate position over women and minorities, particularly in employment opportunities (Barbalet 1992a; 1992b; Coreno 1992; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Fineman 1995).2 Angry white men’s rage is demonstrated collectively in voting patterns, membership in all-male religious organizations, and in their disproportionate representation in male-oriented, militaristic organizations (Chapter 3). These paramilitary organizations, for example, have strong overtones of sexism, racism, violence, resistance to social and governmental authority, and survivalist-right beliefs (Lamy 1996).3 Overall, rather than aim their rage at the unfair economic system, disenchanted white males aim their rage at the new populations with which they must compete for jobs: “protected” classes of workers. These men find a champion in the likes of Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth of Idaho, who refers to white men as an “endangered species” and promises to right the perceived wrongs. The American Dream and Expectations. In the United States presently, there is confusion about the possibilities of the American Dream. Many are now assuming that, if the Dream ever were a viable concept, it no longer applies to all. The American Dream was never relevant for many U.S. citizens (minorities, women, the poor) and nonciti-

Introduction to Social Rage

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zens. Now, those who thought the Dream would and should apply to them feel that they have been short-changed. They have been shortchanged, albeit to a far lesser extent than has been and remains true for the historically socially disenfranchised. While this may be a new experience for some, many others have been barred from the American Dream for a very long time, by an economic system that allows extremely limited access (Rosenthal 1994). A discussion of the American Dream and its demise is not complete without mention of the emotional content of the Dream. Particularly during the 1940s and 1950s, U.S. residents believed and had every reason to believe that if they worked hard, nothing could get in the way of material and nonmaterial success. If one worked hard, one could expect to have a home, a car, appliances, health care, social security, retirement, and so on. By the 1980s, it became clear that the Dream was not achievable by all who worked hard. Through no fault of their own, people raised to believe in the Dream as well as those born and raised after the Dream had begun to disintegrate were forced to accept the false promises of the Dream. For young people in the 1980s and 1990s, there seemed to be less hope that hard work would be rewarded with economic security, hard work guarantees nothing. The social and political ideologies of the Reagan era have produced extreme alienation among the young, especially among white, workingclass youth in the United States (Hamm 1994b). To further distance the Dream from reality, by 1984 “Reaganism had made conditions worse for the dispossessed and disenfranchised, and exceedingly better for the wealthy” (Hamm 1994b: 48). Hamm attends to the alienating conditions for the working classes, but his contentions increasingly apply to the middle classes and to the not-so-young. Hershey (1991) also finds that, after 1988, economic prosperity among the working class had become a thing of the distant past; by 1991, the national rate of unemployment stood at 6.8 percent. The unemployment rate has declined since the mid1990s, but the decline is somewhat illusory because many of the jobs are part-time and temporary, benefits remain low or nonexistent, and the thin sliver of the very wealthy continues to control the vast majority of U.S. wealth (Mills 1997; Dionne 1998). TOLERANCE OF INTOLERANCE Describing the downfalls of intolerance, Lewin (1997) points to the nation’s top bureaucrats “solving” our social problems by declaring a zerotolerance policy on a multitude of social ills. For example, drunk driving,

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drugs and weapons in school, illegal fireworks, dishonest police officers, sexual misconduct in the military, Medicare fraud, unruly airline passengers, FBI employees who leak information, international drug smuggling, and terrorism have all been met with zero tolerance. The problem with “zero tolerance” is that it “has been invoked so often lately that it’s beginning to serve as a tacit marker of problems that have been around forever—and will be around forevermore” (p. 2). As an indicator of popular culture, its widespread nature suggests that zero intolerance is an acceptable and constructive response to social problems. Intolerance may be rampant but there is no evidence that it alleviates social problems and some evidence that it exacerbates social problems. Social rage has elements of intolerance, and the rageful exhibit a great deal of intolerance. It can also be said that the non-rageful are intolerant of intolerance. The calmest, gentlest, most socially progressive person on the planet can be intolerant of, say, the religious right’s stances on abortion, homosexuality, and education. Intolerance is not necessarily bad, at least when aimed at appropriate targets, such as repression, inequality, et cetera, and when kept within reasonable limits. But what are appropriate targets and reasonable limits? A legalistic answer might be the guidelines provided by the U.S. Constitution and its Amendments. Using this logic, any violation of the Constitution and its Amendments may be taking intolerance too far. Suggested changes to this revered document, the Constitution, may be viewed as intolerable to some. Yet consider examples from yesteryear of suffragettes’ demand to change the Constitution so that women could vote. Consider that an Amendment was necessary to free African-American slaves. Now consider the current right-wing segment, the gun lobbyists, anti-environmentalists, and Christian Coalition, who might not agree that the Constitution is a good judge of reasonable levels of acceptance. They may feel that (1) the Constitution is being misread or misinterpreted, (2) the Constitution is in danger of being violated or is currently being violated, or (3) the Constitution goes against moralistic standards and therefore needs to be changed (for example, Roe v. Wade, the guarantor of abortion rights, must be repealed). This is not to imply that the right-wing do not support the U.S. Constitution. Many of the right strongly believe in the Constitution; some believe that the Constitution is divinely inspired (see Chapter 3). There is, understandably, disagreement among the right, the left, and those in between about the meaning and utility of the Constitution. Acceptable levels of intolerance and acceptable targets of intolerance are a matter of opinion.

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Intolerance is expressed toward lesser documents and policies, such as affirmative action. Those opposed to affirmative action suggest that there is some misinterpretation of the policy’s purpose, practice, and longevity. Affirmative action was not meant to apply forever, its opponents may say, but only until we achieved a level playing field, which (we are told) we now have. Since we have a level playing field, the fallacious thinking goes, we should get rid of affirmative-action policies. At the same time, those who support affirmative action grow weary, angry, and maybe even intolerant at efforts to revoke it. Imbedded in the question of just how tolerant we should be of intolerance are questions about civil liberties. In his book about hate crimes, Hamm (1994a) discusses hate speech as a force in encouraging hate crime and wonders to what extent hate speech should be controlled. The conclusion reached is that repression of inflammatory speech would drive hate groups underground, solidify their alienation, and confirm what they say about the overabundance of government control. To put it another way, it is contradictory to clamp down on behavior, including speech, in the name of freedom for all. Aho (1994) reports a similar dilemma in which an organization of open-minded nonracists, ordinarily adhering to notions of inclusion of all people and perspectives, felt compelled to exclude a local National Socialist leader from their open meetings. After puzzling over this contradiction, the ultimate decision in this case was that nobody should be excluded from an open forum on the basis of an opposing perspective. On a broader level, the American Civil Liberties Union does its best to protect individuals’ freedom of expression regardless of how repulsive those expressions may be to many of us. The question of just how tolerant we should be of intolerance remains unresolvable. Social rage generally and hate speech specifically are both repressive and stultifying; therefore, one might suggest, they should be controlled. But to impose control is to repress. Moreover, as an example of the positive functions of social rage, hate speech can serve as a rallying point for those opposed to hate (Schauer 1992). Hate speech can create cohesion among the liberal, progressive non-ragers.4 As repellant as rageful speech can be, freedom of speech (all speech), must be protected if societies are to progress, at least according to the thinking of the non-rageful. The rageful, those narrow-minded, intolerant, and repressive members of a society, may not share this point of view, but rather hope to stifle opposing social messages.

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Social Rage

THE DEFINITION AND MEANING OF SOCIAL RAGE A Definition of Social Rage Social rage can be an emotion, a cognition, or behavior; the source or manifestation of which is social. We usually think of rage as an emotion, as a personal emotion, as in an individual’s rage due to personal experiences. Social rage is also an emotion; its genesis being a social occurrence or wider-spread social phenomena and its display being socially directed and socially experienced. In other words, what makes social rage “social” is its genesis (it is caused by social forces) and its expression (it is expressed through social action). As for cognition, social rage can be a manner of thinking, something that is thought out, even though irrationally and based on beliefs rather than empirical observations. Social rage involves mental processes. Social rage can be behavior, as in hate speech, bombings, voting, and so on. The expression of social rage does not necessarily mean wailing, gnashing-of-teeth, tearing-out-of-hair kinds of expression. It can be as subtle, as private, as hidden as voting or failing to hire. Socially rageful behavior can be, depending on the motives for engaging in it, evoked from actual, experienced rageful feelings or merely an expression without actual, experienced rageful feelings. Politicians and media figures, for example, express social rage without necessarily feeling rage when it is advantageous for them in terms of getting votes and increasing ratings. A Set of Observations. The following is a description of social rage, stated as a set of observations. These observations will receive greater elaboration throughout the remaining chapters. • Social rage is an intense emotion, one that is often destructive to the individual and society. Rage can cause individual and mass death (assassinations, bombings), denial of well-being and human rights (health care, education), and deeply felt economic deprivations (for instance, enormous taxes for ineffective, vengeful crime policies). Rage can be exhausting for the audience, if not for the messenger. At the same time, rage can be a rewarding and positive experience for some. That is, while it can be depressing, horrifying, and embarrassing to observe; it can also be exhilarating for those in sympathy with rage, since it sometimes provides immediate but temporary catharsis. Personal and social rage can make people feel physically and mentally empowered; it is seductive because it can feel good (Ostrom and Moriwaki 1995).

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• Social rage can have elements of incivility, hatred, narrow-mindedness, and intolerance (Johnson 1995b; Ivins 1995).5 The relationship between social rage and related emotions such as intolerance, is one of coverage. That is, social rage, as will become clearer as this analysis progresses, encompasses incivility, intolerance, hatred, and so on. “Incivility,” as a term, sounds qualitatively and quantitatively different from rage, although rageful people are uncivil as well as rageful (DeMott 1996). DeMott suggests that incivility, as we find it presently in the United States, results from the populace finally reckoning with its vulnerability to economic and governmental powers. Incivility can be demonstrated in traffic misbehavior, but, according to DeMott, not a bombing. Hatred seems a little closer to rage than does incivility, since hatred can easily jump the behavioral gap to rage and be expressed aggressively, actively, dramatically. Hatred, as with rage, can be and often is irrational. All emotions, including hatred, rage, intolerance, incivility, as well as positive emotions, may be suppressed. • Social rage is, at best, partially and temporarily effective in its outcome. It is ineffective in achieving lasting social change over the long term. Witness the highly emotional and mean-spirited “Republican Revolution” of 1994 and its demise beginning roughly around 1996. Social rage fluctuates, partly due to its ineffectiveness in social evolution. • Social rage is often misattributed. Social rage is frequently falsely attributed to inappropriate, blameless social targets; such as women, immigrants, differently-abled, racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and others. Social rage might be more effective if it were aimed at the true source of the rager’s problems, such as blocked economic opportunity. • We all experience social rage, some more directly than others. Social rage can be experienced as an observer, as an innocent bystander, or as a specific target of rage. Observers can be TV viewers of rageful programs (see Chapter 8) or passers-by on a college campus where a hate speech is taking place. Innocent bystanders can include people at work on a weekday morning in the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building. Individuals, groups, very large organizations, or entire categories of people can be the targets of social rage. Examples of targets include

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First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, environmentalists, the federal government, Mexicans, homosexuals, and Jews (on the whole or as targeted by particular pockets of anti-Semites, such as Louis Farrakhan and his followers). Individuals are attacked, as symbols of targeted categories of people, as though these individuals represent the hated opposition. These individuals are sacrificed by the rageful in an attempt to threaten the opposition and to deter retaliation. Hillary Rodham Clinton, for example, is attacked by many rageful people, notably Newt Gingrich, Pat Robertson, Rush Limbaugh, sexists of both genders, militias, and healthinsurance providers who feel threatened by widely-available inexpensive health care. Half a century ago, Eleanor Roosevelt was reviled in much the same way. Mostly, the social rage that surrounds Mrs. Clinton erupts from her unintended intimidation of some men and women. As Michael Moore (1996) points out, Mrs. Clinton is very intelligent, independent, and successful, but “the proud owner of two ovaries” (p. 154). She has been given a poor showing in the media, Moore writes, because she is “smarter than most of the men she encounters, and when that’s the case, the woman who’s showing off all the brains might as well write her own ticket out of town” (p. 154). Sexist men hope to put Mrs. Clinton “in her place,” via verbally assaulting her if necessary, and thereby regain their own sense of superiority. (However, it must be pointed out that in 1998 through 1999, Mrs. Clinton has been viewed more sympathetically, as exhibiting remarkable “grace under fire.”) The social rage that Hillary Rodham Clinton inspires grew so severe that, at the 1996 Republican National Convention, vendors sold Hillary Clinton dismemberment dolls, rag dolls with arms and legs that can be torn off (Mills 1997). As commonly understood in the sociology of gender and as suggested popularly by Mills (1997), Moore (1996), and others, sexist men and women are afraid of strong women. • Social rage is a distraction from what non-ragers might see as the real issues, such as poverty and inequality. Throughout this work, we will see examples of distractions (such as the drug war, welfare, and graffiti as the root of social problems) when, in fact, they are signs of social problems (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Jencks 1992; Kaminer 1995).6 Distractions, as the reader will see, are a significant part of the rage phenomenon. If social rage is largely a product of economic disparity, those responsible for the disparity and resulting misery would prefer that

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the public in the United States place the blame elsewhere, however misplaced the blame might be. Hence, distractions are generated to deflect blame. These distractions are transmitted to the public by political and media messages, as well as by grassroots organizations. Sources of distraction include: social institutions (such as religion), policies (such as welfare, affirmative action), and mass behavior and collective movements (such as the Million Man March, the Promise Keepers movement and rallies). Consider the Promise Keepers as an example of a movement whose official statement is a desire for men to take greater responsibility, while the movement actually serves to repress women and represents a larger anti-women feeling (see Chapter 6). • Social rage is learned. It is learned through socialization, interaction, observation, and media. As to the latter, rageful doctrine and instruction come from the mainstream media, as well as fringe and non-fringe messages in talk shows, mail-order videotapes and literature, and the Internet. Vicarious or secondhand learning is reinforced by social experience, as might take place at formal and informal gatherings (such as rallies) and more direct participation in social rage activities (such as cross-burnings and marches). • Social rage is rooted socially, in social conditions that are unsatisfactory to the rager. As suggested, individuals may be rageful because they do not approve of the state of society, because social changes are not to their liking, or because they feel mistreated at the hands of corporate and political figures (DeMott 1996). Such rageful individuals may not be able to connect the source of the rage (vulnerability to social forces) with their rageful behavior (assault, murder, verbal abuse, repressive voting patterns). • Social rage can be experienced socially and personally. Social rage is personally and directly experienced by ragers who engage in it and who comprise an appreciative audience. Social rage is personally experienced by those non-ragers who are the targets of rage, who may be denied equal opportunities and may be killed (Dees and Fiffer 1993).7 As to expressers of social rage, social rage can be experienced and expressed by an individual (such as Timothy McVeigh, Newt Gingrich, and Rush Limbaugh) or a group of individuals (such as the Militia of Montana, Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, the radical right). It helps to have a collectivity behind the feelings and actions of social rage. For example, white supremacists may feel vindicated and justified in their

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racism through interaction with Aryan Nations members at Aryan Nations rallies. Homophobes may feel justified in their homophobia via Christian-right membership and exposure to Christian-right dogma. These groups and collective activities reaffirm the righteousness and correctness of social rage. • Social rage may be expressed verbally or behaviorally; or it may be unexpressed, suppressed, and unmeasurable. In this analysis, I will be dealing primarily with expressed rage. • Some engage in social rage for commercial reasons and for the amassment of power, as I mentioned earlier. Their purpose for expressing social rage can be mercenary or ego-enhancing. The purpose of social rage, from the perspective of true believers, is more likely to be “righting” the “wrongs” (Katz 1988; Aho 1994; Kaminer 1995).8 Self-righteousness is strongly evident in the expression of rage by both true believers and faux believers. • Social ragers have no strong allegiance to the truth. Perhaps “disdain” might be a more accurate word to describe how rageful people feel about scientifically supported facts (Anderson 1995; Lamy 1996).9 In this sense, social rage has irrational and anti-intellectual qualities. Rageful attitudes and behaviors rely heavily upon belief systems. Belief systems may be paradoxical, internally contradictory, and full of faulty reasoning, but they are not arguable (Vest 1995).10 For example, white supremacist survivalists believe, based on the “White Man’s Bible,” that the supremacy of the white race is a provable, historical fact. State executions of people who kill people are supported in the emotional name of retribution, which is probably not achieved, regardless of the cost and lack of deterrent effect afforded by capital punishment (Kaminer 1995; see also Chapter 4).11 Similarly, members of Operation Rescue may feel that it is terribly wrong for a woman to exercise her Constitutional right to have an abortion (or, “kill a baby,” in their terms), but it is appropriate to murder the physicians who administer abortion procedures, since abortion providers are, in Operation Rescue terms, “murderers.”12 • Due to its faulty reasoning, intensity of emotion, and baseless “facts,” the expression of rage is often erratic, ineffective, and pointless. Considered in this light, rage can be “blind rage.” On the other hand and as mentioned, the expression of rage can be calculated and

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clear-sighted, as we find in rageful political messages that appear logical and sensible on the surface. • The reasoning and expression of social rage is replete with absolutisms and over-simplification. Survivalist-right messages read and sound like senseless dictates to those not in sympathy with the movement. Rageful groups, such as certain militia groups, offer highly complex explanations for the poor state of the world, and come to simplistic conclusions (for instance, the Jews are responsible). Simplistic solutions to complex problems have also been offered by mainstream forces, such as the administrations of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and former U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. As evidence, recall that Prime Minister Thatcher’s response to “fear that the British culture may be swamped by an alien one” (Bowling 1990: 2) was to implement harsh immigration policies. These policies then allowed for a “commonsense form of racist logic” to be inserted into mainstream political thought (Hamm 1994b: 31). With no more defensible logic, Reaganomics was “premised on a micro-economic theory predicting that low taxes for the wealthiest members of society should fuel major economic expansion” (Hamm 1994b: 47). One of the hallmarks of the Reagan administration and one of the elements that made President Reagan so popular was the nostalgia and lack of complexity brought to social policies. The Reagan administration had its nostalgic side, a yearning for easier, less complicated times and a return to a period when America reigned supreme. But fundamentally it symbolized the country’s willingness to strike out [at] new problems—even if some of them sounded dangerously simplistic. (Duke 1986: 13)

Addressing the simplicity-complexity and superficial sensibility of political messages, Paul Fussell (1991), cultural anthropologist, states that Reagan left behind a U.S. culture that was “inflated by hyperbole and gilded with a fine coat of fraud” (p. 16). During the Reagan era, like no other time before in U.S. history, the quest for social, cultural, and political significance came through a language aimed to “elevate the worthless to the wonderful via extraordinary verbal pomposity.” (p. 71) • The larger-than-life quality of rageful expression distorts the size and power of social rage as a part of our culture. In other words, the

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By this, I mean two things. First, social rage seems “bigger” than it truly is. Because the rageful are expressive and intense in their expression, they and their messages seem to be more numerous and more representative than they truly are. Second, the non-rageful may respond to the expression of social rage with fear, paralysis, defensiveness, but nearly always on the assumption that the rageful are more numerous and more powerful than they are. Through its vociferousness, exaggeration, loudness, and vivid imagery, the expression of social rage makes social rage seem pervasive and powerful. The presence and meaning of social rage is a matter of impression management. The rageful are often in the minority. Moreover, they do not always retain the power that they accrue; they not infrequently lose power that they once possessed (Schlesinger 1986; Aho 1994). Recall that the “Moral Majority” of decades ago, a religiousright mini movement; did not represent a majority of U.S. culture. The reader has probably been in any number of social situations (at a party, in a classroom, for instance) in which one strongly opinionated loudmouth can make the rest of the gathering feel stifled and intimidated. In the classroom, a particularly vehement student who states her or his opinion venomously may cause the other students, who are in the numerical majority, to not speak. The quieter students may feel overwhelmed and “outnumbered.” If the audience does not challenge the rageful person, the rageful person may feel that her or his point is proven and inarguable, while the quieter members may feel impotent. I became so intrigued by the distortion-versus-reality question that I asked my students at Pacific Lutheran University to gain empirical measures of social rage. I will elaborate on their findings in Chapter 2, but suffice it to say here that their examinations of automobile bumper stickers and radio talk-show discussions, some of which are highly emotional and attention-getting, do not reflect the majority’s opinions. As we will see in the chapters that follow, if one wanted to influence a social agenda in the past two decades, the watchwords seemed to be: the louder, the better; the more outrageous, the better; or, simply, the more voiced, the better. The expression of rage lends superficial credibility to the rageful person and message. As far as impact, rageful expression has more immediate effect than does logic. More to the point, rageful expression can, temporarily at least, influence social feeling and behavior. As we know from behavioral and cognitive psychology, expression can determine, enhance, and confirm feelings.

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THE ORDINARINESS OF RAGE Social rage is not unusual. Individuals of any nationality, gender, race, and socioeconomic status can become unhappy with social forces and therefore ripe for social messengers to direct their feelings and actions in a socially rageful way. Regardless of their demographic features and the fortunate or unfortunate state of their being, the already-primed-for-rage individuals model attitudes and behaviors of rageful politicians, talkshow hosts, discussants on the Internet, and others. Realizing this raises the questions of not only who belongs to rageful groups, but how we determine what is rageful. One might wonder, for example, how a survivalist millennial group is determined to be rageful. They are not necessarily rageful all the time. They do, however, stockpile weapons and plan for some apocalyptic date involving worldwide destruction, in which the members of these groups plan to survive. Assuming that such a time comes, the members of these groups are prepared to use their weaponry to survive; ergo, we have competitive behavior in the extreme, killing others in order to survive and ultimately taking over as the new rulers. In addition to these rather serious survivalist-right adherents, and probably in greater numbers, are the survivalist-right sympathizers who do not belong to a formally organized group, do not believe all of the survivalist-right dogma, and who are not seriously focused on doomsday. Social rage is not unusual in that many people, even though they are not ready to throw a bomb, shoot a federal agent, kill a doctor, collect an arsenal, or throw the switch at an execution, will express rage about gun control, taxes, the federal government, crime, and affirmative action. These lighter-weight ragers will exhibit their rage at town meetings, Soldier of Fortune conventions, and in the voting booths (Johnson 1995a).13 There are little pockets of rage that have always existed and always will, in the United States as well as in other cultures. As I will describe in a moment, the United States was founded on such organizations, tax protesters, and the like. We have seen them gain and lose power over many years. CULTURE AND RAGE Cross-Cultural Comparisons and Cultural Transmission Social rage occurs in all societies, is aimed at various targets at various times, and is expressed in varying ways. It is more prominent and obvi-

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ous in some cultures than in others. The United States, for example, is an “argument culture” where hyperbole, irrationality, and disdain for empiricism are practiced in so-called debates (Tannen 1998). However, we are not the only obviously rageful society. The Middle East, and their seemingly endless wars over territory and religion, experiences and expresses a great deal of social rage. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is an obvious exercise in social rage. Afghanistan is another prime example, as will be described in the chapter on religion. From another age, consider Nazi Germany, as a society rife with social rage. These are cultures in which social rage is expressed openly and violently. Other societies may be just as rageful in their violence and repression, but their social rage is less popularly known. For example, China, Malaysia, Brazil, and other societies engage in repression, exploitation, severe and ineffective punishment, and so on; but their rage may be intentionally hidden from other cultures. Moreover, we may not pay attention to social rage occurring in some cultures, because their social rage is irrelevant to us; that is, their social rage may not be newsworthy compared to that put forth by a society that is threatening us at the moment, such as Iraq. Still other societies, such as Japan, experience and express their social rage very subtly. The Japanese internalize much of their social rage and they respond to unsatisfactory social conditions with quietude. They may respond with generally non-negative reactions such as taking elaborate baths, or with self-destruction (gambling, drinking, and suicide). While social rage exists in all cultures to some degree and in varying manifestations, each culture has unique social-rage traits. That is, social rage in the United States is different from social rage elsewhere. This is also true for rage in Indo-China, South America, Europe, and any other culture. In other words, to the extent that religion, politics, economics, and history vary across cultures, each culture’s social rage has unique qualities. At the same time, social rage shares similarities across cultures, such as some of the general principles listed earlier: high emotion, absolutisms, irrationality, and so on. The foci of each culture’s rage and its intensity vary over time. For example, after 40 years, Germany is once again evidencing a popular sentiment for Nazism among some segments. Neo-Nazis are gaining ground politically, as evidenced by public rallies and election outcomes. Since World War II, Germany on the whole has made intense, heavily apologetic efforts to remove itself from its Nazi past (usually considered 1933–1945). Although some scholars may disagree with me, this revival

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of Nazism does not have to do with any national trait on the part of Germans; many cultures have Nazis or the equivalent of Nazis. Cultures can transmit their rage. The skinhead movement in Britain preceded the skinhead movement in the United States, where the skinhead activities, beliefs, music, dress, and grooming were transferred. Skinheads and Neo-Nazis are notable throughout the United States and the world, mostly European countries (Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Britain, and France; see New York Times 1995). Cultures can react to their social rage in varying ways. The Japanese rarely exhibit social rage, as witnessed by its startling subway gassing incident. The Japanese exhibited puzzlement and a genuine desire to understand how such a thing can happen. The Tokyo subway gassing and the Oklahoma City bombing occurred in very close temporal proximity, March 20, 1995, and April 19, 1995, respectively. Soon after both events, on June 1, 1995, I conducted an in-depth conversation with graduate students at Tokyo Metropolitan University (see Appendix A). I asked this unrepresentative sample of Tokyo residents about their views of the gassing event, how they felt about the people responsible, what they thought the purpose was, and what would be an effective social-control response. The Japanese interpretation of the gassing is different from the popular interpretation of the Oklahoma City bombing in the United States. Moreover, Japanese suggestions for appropriate reaction are entirely different from the policies immediately enacted in the United States. The Japanese with whom I spoke suggested that the motivation for the gassing may have been blocked aspirations and a sense of alienation among the Japanese overall and the persons directly responsible for the gassing. (I will suggest, especially in Chapter 2, that these are prime sources for social rage in the United States as well.) The United States and Japan may also be alike in terms of popular fascination with, yet abhorrence of, the media coverage of the events: both cultures admitted to growing weary of such coverage. Japan and the United States differ markedly in their suggested remedies to social disruption of any kind (crime, social protest, etc.). When asked for preventive strategies to deal with the gassing event in particular, the Japanese students suggested that informal remedies are better than formal ones. Specifically, I was told that education, an informal remedy among the Japanese (but not in the United States), is the key, not increased law enforcement. I also learned that Japanese society remained very puzzled about and very attentive to any interpretations of the gassing. Even months

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after the gassing, the Japanese still had the gassing event at the forefront of their minds, it was still front-page news, it was still the topic of formal and informal conversations. By contrast, the Oklahoma City bombing, quite horrendous by any quantitative or qualitative measure, killing a far greater number of people than the Tokyo gassing (168 compared to a dozen), ceased to be front-page news two weeks after the bombing.14 What is interesting in distinguishing cultures and their social-rage movements and organizations is the question: Why do some cultures contain, allow, or encourage successful social-rage groups and their collective behavior? More broadly, why are some social-rage movements more successful or influential than others? I will deal with these questions in terms of the United States, for the most part. We will see how the history, social institutions (education, religion, family, government, etc.) and the diverse composition of our population allow for deeply imbedded social-rage movements and organizations, with long-term but not permanent consequences. We will also see that the United States fluctuates mightily in its social-rage movements and organizations. THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL BRAND OF RAGE I will focus mainly on social rage in the United States. Social rage in the United States stems from several unique forces: our diversity, our stated interest in freedom and equality, our history, and our supposed rugged individualism. The U.S. culture is partly defined by its white European ancestry (specifically, its takeover of the continent from the indigenous peoples) and partly by its latter-day diversity. Centuries ago, Anglo-Saxons came to the colonies to escape religious persecution and, just as likely, to avoid debtors’ prison. Some came here strictly for exploitative reasons: the economic opportunities were more promising here than in Europe by virtue of abundant space, plentiful natural resources, and lack of legal strictures. By the 1600s and 1700s, importantly to this analysis, these “American” immigrants revolted against the royalty of England.15 As a tax protest, they threw tea into a harbor and thought very well of themselves for it, as witnessed by the yearly celebration of independence from a “repressive” government. This independence was fought for by “patriots” and citizen “militias,” with names like The Minutemen. The point is that two hundred years ago, the United States had Patriots, Minutemen, tax protestors, Constitutionalists, gun advocates, and

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the like, and we still do. The issues across the centuries have not changed that much, with a preeminent focus on freedom: freedom of speech, to bear arms, to not pay taxes, to exploit the environment, to express religious beliefs, and so on (Coates 1995; Ross 1995).16 Many in U.S. society continue to pride themselves on “American” traits. They are proud to be rugged individualists, the kind of people who “stick to their guns,” people who value their individualism and their refusal to be pushed around by any government. Once upon a time, patriots fought against England as the intrusive, repressive government. The government that currently concerns U.S. citizens of the far right is the replacement government, the U.S. federal government itself. SOCIAL RAGE ACROSS TIME Social rage, like all social phenomena, varies over time. As the reader will discover from the chapters that follow, rage targets and rage activities change to some degree. Yet, social rage retains some of its important elements; for example, social-rage targets are not generally in positions of power (minorities, immigrants, the poor). Putnam (1995) finds a trend in the declining social capital in the United States, with “social capital” referring to social organizational features such as “networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (pp. 66–67). We have less of the civic engagement that fosters sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and that would encourage the emergence of social trust. In common language, this means that as members of the U.S. culture, we participate less in the Parent Teacher Association, bowling teams, and other civic and social groups. Therefore, we have less social coordination, less cooperation, less communication, and less social trust. In Chapter 2, I will discuss this declining social capital as expressed in socially hostile behavior and attitudes. According to the Anti-Defamation League (1994), in the past decade, extreme right organizations in the United States and Europe have become more expressive and more attractive to many ordinary citizens.17 As noted, militia organizations have surfaced recurrently and have emphasized the same themes over the past two centuries, with the current militia movement in the United States being only the latest resurgence of a long-term movement. Moreover, the angry white men of whom I have written in this chapter are not newcomers to our culture. Stock (1996) writes of angry white

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men over the centuries in the United States, as exemplified by early rebellious white men of the 1740s and the “rural Sons of Liberty” prominent in the 1760s. In the mid-eighteenth century, “rebels still wondered if they should trust the federal government” (p. 32). All of these insurgents were concerned about the federal government attempting to control their lives and property, like the anti-government people today. When a society is ripe for rage, a rageful voice will be heard. According to Aho (1994) and Schlesinger (1986), the United States as a society fluctuates between right-wing agendas and more left-leaning liberal ones. These fluctuations occur in a fairly regular pattern, roughly every 30 years. The groups representing the movement and the policies that they put forth match the period (right wing or left wing), according to Aho, such that during the liberal time of the New Deal, there was also unionization and passage of the Social Security Act. Conversely, during our intolerant period of Normalcy, a rightist movement, we had strong representation of the KKK, passage of an anti-immigration act, and the Prohibition Amendment. We also see evolutions in specific rageful organizations: Toy (1989) has found that the KKK’s popularity, influence, funds, and membership fluctuate over time, depending upon social conditions. Barbalet (1992a) and Scheff and Retzinger (1991) also describe cycles of social rage. Some social rages are temporary while some are more constant over time, although even the latter may decline in importance. My own thoughts on social-rage cycles are that social rage is tiring and dysfunctional; hence, it abates. Not that personal rage is an accurate representative of social rage, but we know that personal rage is usually (not always) difficult to sustain. Feelings change and people’s agendas change. People, over time, cease to be concerned about the events that have enraged them. Social movements and other collective-rage phenomena have lives, complete with life courses (beginnings, fervor, doldrums, “mood swings,” and deaths). As I write this, I hearken back to when I began my research on the rage project in 1993. On the whole and in this short time, social rage in the United States seems to be lessening. We find lately that the public does not respond so positively to hateful messages leveled by politicians against other politicians, as was popular in 1994 (Kaminer 1995). Consider also Ralph Reed’s resignation as head of the Christian Coalition in May 1997: apparently, Reed hoped to distance himself from the religious hard right because close attachment to the hard right would inhibit his success as a

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political consultant. Once rageful messages worked; now they work less well or not at all (Bellant 1991; Bennett 1995; Kaminer 1995).18 TOPICS AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK In sum, social-rage beliefs and activities are fueled by various social forces, notably economics. They are incited by many social messengers, such as the media, political figures, and religious organizations. Individual or collective ragers may exercise their rage in legitimate and criminal ways, such as, talking, voting, holding beliefs, and killing. The rage topics presented in this analysis are intermeshed. For example, the media are adept at sending rageful messages about crime, abortion, affirmative action, immigration, and so on. The content for media messages comes from citizens groups, political figures, religious coalitions, or anyone with a sensational point of view. Since the media determine what we hear, see, and read about social occurrences and patterns, they influence what many of us think and do about social issues. There are at least two sides to every issue but one side may receive far greater attention and instill greater emotion. My job, as chronicler of social rage, has been to consolidate and make sense of what we already know about social rage and to add new observations, some empirical and some interpretative. As we explore various topics of rage, we will better understand the social institutions and social forces that contain and express rage, evolutions of rage, and, in essence, the meaning of rage. NOTES 1

Opposition to affirmative action is not exclusive to white men, of course; there is also opposition to this policy and practice forthcoming from women and people of color. Disadvantaged people sometimes support the forces that make and keep them disadvantaged. Applying an identification-with-the-enemy explanation, it is not unusual to find that minorities side with nonminorities in their oppression of minorities (see Chapter 5). Opposition to affirmative action is also not necessarily evidence of racism and sexism; in other words, there is not a complete overlap between racism, sexism, and opposition to affirmative action. However, social rage is related to affirmative-action opposition through the violations-of-expectations theme, which will be pursued throughout this study. Specifically, some members of society (any society) oppose social change not to their liking, especially when they believe that this change affects them person-

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ally. Dionne (1998) reports that there are presently few incentives to work hard in the United States. He writes, “At the bottom of the American economy, the incentives to work have been weakening as the pay and benefits for low-skilled jobs have stagnated” (p. 27). This pattern is especially true for men, Dionne states that the income of men in the middle and bottom thirds have stagnated or declined, and the bottom third have been losing benefits as well. Opposition to affirmative action may be equally or have more to do with violated expectations than racism and sexism. 2 Note also the terminology “temper tantrum of white, Christian males,” in The Progressive, editorial comments, 1995, vol. 59, no. 6: 8–10. 3 White supremacists and other extremists are mainly comprised of white men (some women are extremists), but not all extremists are full-fledged survivalists. They may be discontented with diversity, the government, and the global economy, which have cost them their jobs. But in their collective informal activity of griping together as angry white men, many may do so while, for example, drinking in a bar with other “angry white guys,” cleaning their guns, hunting, participating in a church picnic, or attending a night class at a junior college at age 50 so that they can get a job. It is well to bear in mind, however, that many do not own rocket launchers, build nuclear-safe bunkers, plan race wars, or believe that the end is near. 4 Schauer (1992) writes that harmful speech has the indirect effect of increasing public awareness and ultimately providing an organizing force for the anti-hate-speech movement. 5 Johnson (1995b) and Ivins (1995), among others, also write of paranoia, cynicism, and a “meanness of spirit” as descriptors of what we may conceptualize as social rage. 6 Kaminer (1995) describes the focus on media depictions of violence as a distraction from real brutality, lack of education, lack of role models in the lives of low-income inner-city children. She also cites the example of single parenthood as a distracting social problem, which is not the cause of crime and additional pregnancies. See also Jencks (1992) on blaming the poor. See also the distracting “broken windows” examination by Wilson and Kelling (1982), in which broken windows, graffiti, and (in general) poor physical environment in the neighborhood are blamed for crime. 7 Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center demanded and obtained convictions and compensation for the wrongful death of an African immigrant student, murdered by skinheads, under the guidance of Tom Metzger, head of the White Aryan Resistance (see Dees 1993). 8 Katz (1988) and Kaminer (1995) describe the manner in which rageful people feel entitled to rageful behavior. Rage is a sensible response to perceived

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injustices (Kaminer, pp. 261–262). Katz describes homicides in terms of “righteous slaughter” involving good triumphing over evil. He also differentiates between shame, humiliation, and rage, all of which are relevant to righteous retaliation against perceived evil. According to Aho (1994), Nazis were adept at portraying themselves as victims, and therefore, rightful ragers. 9 Anderson’s (1995) book describes the somewhat violent reaction that crime victims (and victims’ rights groups) have to the use of crime statistics to explain policy decisions (see Chapter 4). The survivalist right and other millennialists believe in what Lamy calls “myths.” They support their beliefs with a maze of numerous convoluted stories, none of which can be documented to the satisfaction of the nonsurvivalist right. Among these beliefs are: there is such as thing as ZOG (Zionist Occupied Government), the upcoming millennium will bring worldwide destruction, there are concentration camps in the United States, black helicopters are sinister, some people have been implanted with computer chips, and Jewish bankers control the world (Lamy 1996; Hamm 1997; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998). 10 Reason will not work to untangle militia beliefs. Militia beliefs are “articles of faith” with no foundation, no logic, no reality. 11 As pointed out by Kaminer (1995) and several U.S. Supreme Court justices (notably Thurgood Marshall), the polls suggesting that most U.S. citizens are in favor of the death penalty are not valid. 12 This is not to imply that Operation Rescue, as a formal organization, openly and officially sanctions the murder of physicians. The membership and leadership of Operation Rescue may approve unofficially, but the difference between official and unofficial sanctioning policies is an important distinction to bear in mind. 13 Johnson (1995a), citing interviews with U.S. citizens after the Oklahoma City bombing, finds the perception that survivalist-right members are part of the mainstream culture. 14 Since that time, the convictions and sentencing of the two primary participants in the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, have made front-page news. 15 My apologies are extended to Canadian, Mexican, Central American, and South American neighbors. I distinguish between the U.S. and the rest of the Americas. “American,” surrounded by quote marks, refers to the distinctly U.S. traits of, for example, believing we (U.S. citizens) are “American” while other residents of North, Central, and South America are not Americans. 16 Ross (1995) writes that the white-supremacist militias have been with us since the Civil War in the form of the Ku Klux Klan; and that only the current

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popularity is a new phenomenon. Coates (1995) states that today’s survivalistright movement is tied to early American movements, as I am suggesting. 17 Survivalist-right groups have stated, with little documentation, that their ranks have greatly increased since the Oklahoma City bombing. 18 The reader might recall hyperbolic speeches by Newt Gingrich and members of the 1994 Republican Congress. Gingrich’s “Contract with America” did not materialize and many of the 1994 freshmen have been replaced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Amis, Martin. 1989. London Fields. New York: Harmony Books. Anderson, David C. 1995. Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice. New York: Times Books (Random). Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith. 1994. Fact Finding Report. Armed and Dangerous: Militias Take Aim at the Federal Government. Washington, DC: The Anti-Defamation League. Applebome, Peter. 1995. “An Unlikely Legacy of the 60s: The Violent Right.” New York Times, May 7, pp. A1, A8. Barbalet, J. M. 1992a. “A Macro-Sociology of Emotion: Class Resentment.” Sociological Theory 10: 15–163. Barbalet, J. M. 1992b. “Emotional Climate and Social Change.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 20–24, Pittsburgh, PA. Bellant, Russ. 1991. Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party. Boston, MA: South End Press. Bennett, David H. 1995. The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement. New York: Vintage Books. Berk, Richard A. 1990. “Thinking about Hate-Motivated Crimes.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5: 334–349. Berlet, Chip, and Matthew N. Lyons. 1995. “Militia Nation.” The Progressive 59: 22–25. Bowling, Benjamin. 1990. “Racist Harassment and the Process of Victimization: Conceptual and Methodological Implications for Crime Surveys.” Presented at the Realist Criminology Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia.

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Bushart, Howard L, John R. Craig, and Myra Barnes. 1998. Soldiers of God: White Supremacists and Their Holy War for America. New York: Kensington Publishing. Coates, James. 1995. Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right. New York: Hill and Wang. Coreno, Thaddeus. 1992. “The Impact of Low Status on Emotional Response.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 18: 25–44. Dees, Morris, and Steve Fiffer. 1993. Hate on Trial: The Case against America’s Most Dangerous Neo-Nazi. New York: Villard Books (Random). DeMott, Benjamin. 1996. “Seduced by Civility: Political Manners and the Crisis of Democratic Values.” The Nation December: 11–19. Dionne, E. J. 1998. “Up from the Bottom.” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, August 3, p. 27. Duke, Paul, ed. 1986. Beyond Reagan: The Politics of Upheaval. New York: Warner Books. Ehrlich, Howard J. 1990. “The Ecology of Anti-Gay Violence.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5: 359–365. Fineman, Howard. 1995. “Race and Rage.” Newsweek, April 3: 23–34. Fussell, Paul. 1991. Bad: Or, The Dumbing of America. New York: Summit Books. Hamm, Mark S. 1993. “Conceptualizing Hate Crime in a Global Context.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 11–13, Miami, FL. Hamm, Mark S., ed. 1994a. Hate Crime: International Perspectives in Causes and Control. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing. Hamm, Mark S. 1994b. American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Hershey, Robert D. 1991. “Jobless Rate 6.8%, Reflecting Stalled Rebound.” New York Times, November 2, p. A1. Ivins, Molly. 1995. “Fertilizers of Hate.” The Progressive 59: 46. Jencks, Chris. 1992. Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnson, Dirk. 1995a. “Americans See Strangers in Their Midst.” New York Times, May 14, pp. A1, A15. Johnson, George. 1995b. “The Conspiracy That Never Ends.” New York Times, April 30, p. 5. Kaminer, Wendy. 1995. It’s All the Rage. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime. New York: Basic Books.

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Klein, Lloyd. 1992. “The Hating Game: Racial Tensions and Criminal Justice Reaction.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 18–20, Pittsburgh, PA. Klein, Lloyd. 1993. “The Politics of Hate Crime: Crown Heights and the Crisis of Government Confidence.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 11–13, Miami, FL. Lamy, Philip. 1996. Millennium Rage: Survivalists, White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. New York: Plenum. Lewin, Tamar. 1997. “Yes, We Have No Tolerance.” New York Times, March 16, p. E2. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Moore, Michael. 1996. Downsize This: Random Threats from an Unarmed American. New York: Crown Books. New York Times. 1995. “Some Music, It Turns Out, Inflames the Savage Breast.” New York Times, July 2, p. E7 Ostrom, Carol M., and Lee Moriwaki. 1995. “Anger: Living on the Edge.” The Seattle Times, April 2, pp. A1, A10–11. Putnam, Robert D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6: 65–78. Rosenthal, A.M. 1994. “Lean and Very Mean.” New York Times, December 16, A15. Ross, Loretta J. 1995. “Saying It with a Gun.” The Progressive 59: 26–27. Schauer, Frederick. 1992. “The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate.” Villanova Law Review 37: 805–819. Scheff, Thomas J., and Suzanne M. Retzinger. 1991. Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1986. The Cycles of American History. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Smith, Brent L. 1994. Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Tannen, Deborah. 1998. The Argument Culture: Moving From Debate to Dialogue. New York: Random House. Toy, Eckard V. 1989. “Right-Wing Extremism from the Ku Klux Klan to the Order, 1915–1988.” Pp. 131–152 in Violence in America, Vol. II: Protest, Rebellion, and Reform, edited by Ted Robert Gurr. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

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Vest, Jason. 1995. “Leader of the Fringe.” The Progressive 59: 28–29. Wilson, James Q., and George Kelling. 1982. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” Atlantic Monthly 249: 29–38.

CHAPTER 2

The Measures and Meanings of Social Rage: Reality versus Perceptions

If one listened [to the radio] for long in eastern Washington, one could easily become convinced that one had entered the national capital of religious bigotry, where soi-disant Christians were getting up a jihad to cleanse the earth of their enemies (Jonathan Raban 1996: 308). As suggested in the introductory chapter, social rage is a complex emotion arising from social conditions. I will discuss this more in the sections below on related feelings, such as shame, humiliation, and impotence. Social rage and related emotions are expressed symbolically through actions, conversations, consumer choices, and poignant messages appearing on T-shirts and bumper stickers. Due to their frequency and harshness of presentation, social rage seems more pervasive than it may actually be. The distorted representation of social rage brings forth the question of the purpose of expressing rage. In this chapter, the extent to which social rage is irrational will be examined. Some argue that destructive and self-destructive emotional expressions are reasoned, have a purpose, and that there is such a thing as emotional intelligence. The question of whether social rage, on a macro scale, is a factor in social change and social movements will also be considered. It is my contention that social rage is an outcome of social change and movements. Rageful reactions to change and movements, however, can provide catalysts for an upcoming change and movement. 29

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The independent variable to social rage seems to be social conditions. Conditions leading to rage often have to do with perceived and real inequities; hence we find that economic disparity plays a large role in social rage. The sources of rage, economic and other, help to explain the inception of social rage and the direction that social rage takes as a socially destructive force. Finally, to come full circle back to the issue of reality versus perceptions of social rage, I will offer several obtrusive measures of social rage, as identified by the content and frequency of bumper stickers, T-shirt messages, and radio talk-show conversations. These measures help to identify where incivility ends and social rage begins, and clarify the extent to which the representation of social rage matches its true existence. SOCIAL RAGE AND RELATED FEELINGS Wines (1995) discusses the pervasiveness of cynicism as a U.S. attitude. Especially relevant for the political realms, the Democrats say that the Republicans are cynical, the Republicans say that the Democrats are cynical, and everyone says that the press is cynical. President Clinton mourned “a country encrusted with cynicism” and Wines concludes that “American cynicism is truly destroying democracy as we know it.” Stivers (1994), in his analysis of the “culture of cynicism” as it exists in the United States, finds that cynical people have little trust in others, little faith in social institutions, and often believe that extreme measures are necessary to cure what they see as social problems. Rageful people have some of these same qualities; one might suggest that they are cynical to the extreme. In a commentary on anger, Ostrom and Moriwaki (1995) write that the threat of violence seems to be everywhere: in our homes, at work, and on the road. The forms that violence and anger take are many, ranging from rampant lawsuits, talk-show rage, traffic rage, and mundane events resulting in shooting deaths. Ostrom and Moriwaki differentiate among anger, rage, and hostility. They report that anger closely resembles rage and can be expressed in various ways, not necessarily through active violence and aggression (although those are possible expressions), but also by more passive or less outward expressions, such as a look on someone’s face. Rage, they say, is directed broadly at vague social conditions, not at a specific problem. They further point out that while hostility is an attitude, a cynical mis-

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trust of people, anger is an emotion, which can range from rage to minor annoyance or pique. Katz (1988), in his insightful descriptions of “righteous rage,” suggests that personal rage (and I would add, social rage) can come about through the experience of humiliation. He writes that “In both humiliation and rage, the individual experiences himself as an object compelled by forces beyond his control. . .. Humiliation always embodies an awareness of impotence” (p. 24). The sense of vulnerability Katz discovered through his examination of murder is not remarkably different from the sense of vulnerability individuals and large collections of people feel and translate into social rage. Recall the angry white male discussed in Chapter 1, and his sense of violated expectations, more particularly his rage against social and economic forces beyond his control. Katz writes of a similar process and outcome in a section called “Respectability’s Last Stand”: The impassioned killers described here were upholding the respected social statuses of husband, mother, wife, father, property owner, virile male, deserving poor-self-improving welfare mother, and responsible debtor. These killers were defending both the morality of the social system and a personal claim of moral worth. (p. 19, emphasis mine)

Katz specifies that humiliation is closer to rage than is shame, since shame acknowledges a personal failing or incompetence; whereas humiliation has an essence of innocence (see also Cogan [1994] on the importance of pride and shame in human conduct). If one is humiliated, this experience comes about from something beyond the individual’s control. Shame can be blamed more on oneself and therefore outwardly-directed rage is not warranted. However, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) predict that “an individual in a state of chronic shame is very likely to perceive the source of this feeling as an attack by another, generating rage toward that other” (p. 156). This would suggest that chronic internalized (personal) shame can erupt into externally-directed (social) rage. Not everyone in the same circumstances, such as humiliation, responds in the same way. According to Katz, not all who experience humiliation become enraged; a feeling of righteousness is necessary as an intervening variable between humiliation and rage. He finds that righteousness is “the essential stepping stone from humiliation to rage” (p. 23). From my analysis of social rage, righteousness seems to be an important element. To believe that one is correct in one’s assessment of social conditions and that those social conditions are deliberately harmful can cause social rage.

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REINFORCEMENT, FUNCTIONALITY, AND THE PURPOSE OF RAGE Anger can make people feel physically and mentally empowered; therefore, it is reinforcing. Intense, reinforcing emotions of many varieties, as well as their emotional displays, are contagious. Ostrom and Moriwaki (1995) comment that “everyone around the angry person either leaves or becomes angry. . . . [It] seems to the angry person that the whole world is angry. Which makes him even more angry” (p. 11). People are shouting too much, according to DeMott (1996), “as on Geraldo and talk-radio.” The popularity of TV talk shows and radio talk in the United States seems to be due to their capacity to elicit strong emotions. In short, to vent and to observe strong visceral, negative emotions is cathartic for many people, and catharsis is generally a rewarding experience. The expression of anger can be quite functional, as well as emotionally cathartic. Ariss (1993) describes the strategic use of anger to achieve political objectives. In an ethnographical analysis of ACT UP (the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), he finds that AIDS activists successfully used anger against the Australian government’s refusal to approve early use of AZT, a treatment for AIDS. In response, the government pleaded for rationality, but anger won the day. Ariss concludes that emotional expression can play a large role in changing government policy.1 Also speaking to the purpose of rageful expression, Elshtain (1992) describes the 1988 and 1992 U.S. presidential elections and the importance of symbolism, images, and emotional appeals to the candidates’ campaigns. It is not possible to separate real and symbolic issues in U.S. politics. Nor is it desirable for the politicians involved, given that the goal is to win the campaign. Recall, in the 1988 presidential campaign, George Bush won the election on a tough-on-crime platform. His campaign successfully used symbols of African-American males’ sexual violence to increase fear and anger among voters (Berry 1996). EMOTION AND LOGIC, RATIONALITY, REASONING Rage is sometimes referred to as “blind rage.” Katz states that rage is more like a sophisticated incompetence. It is deaf in the sense of being indifferent to reasoned argument and dumb in the narrow sense of being inarticulate. . . . Rage is also blind, but it is not stupid. . . . Rage is often coherent, disciplined action. . . . (p. 30)

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To assume that emotion precludes logic, rationality, reason, and intelligence is not necessarily true, according to Durig (1994). He confronts the contemporary confusion over the relationship between logic and emotions, and states, more specifically, that logic can exist on a nondiscursive (nonanalytical) level of emotions. Reason and emotion are also co-involved when we engage in “situational calculus.” Situational calculus takes place when people use commonsense psychological theories as a way of inferring or understanding emotional states in others, as a method of explaining the interaction among emotions, cognition, and action in others (O’Rorke and Ortony 1994: 283). Similarly, we learn from Mayer and Salovey (1993) that emotions do not necessarily preclude intelligence; nor does intelligence necessarily preclude emotion. Instead, emotional intelligence can be a type of social intelligence. Mayer and Salovey define social intelligence as the “ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (p. 433). Addressing the duality of reason and passion, Miller (1993) finds that we become passionate about objects and verbal abstractions through our learning experiences, these learning experiences being a form of reasoning. She recognizes that reasoning is essentially scientific, yet we combine passionate motivations with our capacity for reasoning, coming up with quasi-rational behavior. Elster (1994) compares three human motivations—rationality, emotions, and social norms. While emotions “are generally not rational,” emotions may be rationalized or viewed as reasonable reactions to a frustrated or satisfied desire (p. 21). Evaluations of people and events are subjective rather than objective, and these evaluations involve emotion. One might assume that subjectivity disallows rationality, but such is not necessarily the case. Subjectivity does not preclude rationality in the evaluation process, since cognition can be antecedent to and can thereby affect the emotional experience (Frijda 1993). In other words, reasoning can precede emotion and even determine how we experience emotion. In summary, despite research to the contrary, there persists “the deeply entrenched view that emotions necessarily interfere with reason” (Berenson 1991: 33). It seems that there is a fine line between rationality and emotionality. Rationality is not entirely objective or without emotional components. Rational behavior is by nature subjective, since it is based on an individual’s subjective consideration of information. Emotions do not necessarily and always interfere with reason. The expression

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of rage can, conditionally, be said to be functional. We can react rationally, based on social intelligence, to the display of rage and we can express rage to further our own ends. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE To connect the emotionality, rationality, and functionality of social rage, let us consider the relationship between social rage and social change. It has been suggested that rage is cathartic, its emotional display serves a function, it is purposeful, and it is not necessarily irrational. If the expression of social rage is purposeful and rational, it may then operate as an intentional catalyst for social change. That is, socially rageful groups and their activities may desire to catapult their world views and instructions for proper living into “social movement” status. Rageful groups may hope to constitute a movement, to amass enough power and attract resources (members, funding, substantial lobbying clout) to change society to their point of view. While rageful groups, ideologies, and activities may indeed constitute a movement, it is my contention throughout this book that rage is difficult to sustain over time. Humanitarian, socially progressive organizations and activities, such as the civil-rights movement, strive for social change and, intermittently, lose social power as do the more socially destructive organizations. The demise of these more “positive” movements may be due more to the opposition that they attract than to an inability to sustain energy and internal interest among their membership.2 Social change and movements can cause strong emotions, such as social rage. In this manner, social rage can be a reaction to change, a strong dislike for the change plus an attempt to return conditions to their previous state. Negative emotions such as rage, but also fear and depression, come about from disagreement with the direction of social change. It is doubtful that social rage, in and of itself, constitutes a social movement. It can be widespread, as in a “culture” of social rage. Social rage can be pervasive enough that it permeates social institutions (for example, politics), distracts our attention from other social events (for example, inequality and poverty), and makes us pay attention to it (social rage) rather than to other social events. Barbalet (1992a) offers “emotional climate” as an explanation for mass social behavior. Emotional climate refers to “an enduring set of emotional precepts that tends to structure social and political relationships and expectations” (p. 150). As such, emotional climates determine the nature, speed, and direction of social

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change. It is perfectly reasonable that a pervasive emotional climate affects and is affected by social rage, as social rage influences political, media, religious, and other social behavior. But the “fringe-y” qualities of much of rageful organizations, beliefs, and behaviors are so extreme, so uncommon, and so irrelevant for a majority of U.S. citizens, that we are unmoved by them, even though we are distracted by them. Consider some of the hard-core survivalist-right beliefs; such as, the need for building personal bomb shelters, the belief that the government is trying to kill us or put us in concentration camps, and that a race war to end all race wars is coming soon. Although the survivalist right might deny this, most people find ideas like these farfetched. Less “fringe-y” far-right beliefs may address more commonplace concerns, such as taxation. But even these more broadly-accepted groups and ideas do not have the support that their loud voices proclaim. As an example, while many U.S. taxpayers complain about paying taxes, the populist tax party did not win the U.S. presidency in 1996; they did not even come close. Barkan and Cohn (1994) agree that social change evokes emotion. They find that the dominant theory in the study of social movements, resource-mobilization theory, is rooted in rational-choice theory. It makes superficial sense that rational choice would have little relevance to explanations of emotion-laden social movements. Yet the stronger argument is that a rationality-emotionality explanation of social movements is not so “either/or” as it appears, as suggested above by other scholars. That is, within individuals and collections of individuals (for example, movements, societies, subcultures), there may be mixtures of rationality and emotionality. Barkan and Cohn do not discount the role of strong emotion in social movements; indeed, rational-choice explanations allow that social movements may be sites of “powerful emotional experiences.” They further state that a theory of emotions may explain the dynamics of social movements in a way that resource-mobilization theory cannot. There does not seem to be any question that social and cultural variables are central to the study of emotions (Manstead 1991), and the reverse is also true. The connection, intense and intricate, between emotions and social life involves emotional influences on social attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Furthermore, not only does the social context affect individuals’ emotions, but emotions affect the social context, through social relationships and interactions. The go-between is communication, interpersonal communication as well as television and other media, which expresses emotions and thereby affects social phenomena.

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SOURCES OF RAGE Economics as a Determinant of Rage. In the chapters that follow, I will cover the relationship between social rage and the survivalist right, crime, minority issues, religion, politics, and the media. Underlying the analyses of these topics, we will see that an economic factor figures strongly in the development and demise of social rage. One way in which economic factors can encourage social rage is through capitalist pursuits and ordinary greed. For instance, if the media are rewarded for over-reporting crime, survivalist-right activity, et cetera, they will be over-reported and the result is a distorted perception and reaction. More directly on the topic of corporate greed, Mills (1997) and Moore (1996) address the corporate focus on the bottom line, profit margins, and stakeholder shares—all to the detriment of labor. The financial rewards forthcoming to chief executive officers (CEOs) who significantly downsize labor are unimaginable in their grandness. In the corporate culture of the 1990s, . . . it was perfectly all right for a thriving company to shed thousands of workers, watch its stock prices shoot up as a consequence, and then reward its CEOs and top executives with stock options that were even more valuable than before. (Mills, p. 64)

There has been a growing disparity between the incomes of CEOs and everyone elses’ pay, assuming that the “everyone elses” have not been fired: in the 1990s, the typical CEO in the United States made 150 times the average worker’s pay. CEOs tell laborers that they should not feel “entitled” to their jobs, that all employees should now consider themselves “temporary,” and that “the responsibility of the CEO is to deliver shareholder value. Period.” (Mills, p. 24). Corporations preparing to lay off workers or reduce their pay and benefits often tell the workers that these belt-tightening measures are necessary for corporate survival. Recently, workers have become aware that their being laid off is absolutely unnecessary for the health and well-being of the company. This awareness is especially startling when it becomes known that profits remain intact or have grown, to be shared among the very few. Ignoring the laborer’s needs for a living wage or even a job instills depression, anxiety, and rage. Economic forces, when they are manifested as differential opportunities and relative deprivation, encourage social rage. Strain theory observes that inequalities among people can lead to feelings of alienation,

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resentment, and injustice (Merton 1938; 1968). Understandably, those who are treated unequally can feel rage. But so can those who traditionally have been socially and economically powerful, who have had the bargaining chips in their favor, who are fearful of losing power, and who may hope for a system of continued inequality. No matter who you are in terms of race, gender, or socioeconomic status, to not be able to get a job or to earn a living wage is, to say the least, frustrating. To say the most, economic “failure” can lead to depression, rage, and other strong negative feelings. Failure is relative, and that is what sociologists mean when they talk about relative deprivation. To compare one’s own job, income, and possessions to others’ and find one’s own to be less than others’ can lead to bad feelings about oneself. Relativity can also speak to the economic situation one currently finds oneself in, relative to what one expected or to the situation a person once was in. Differential opportunity speaks to relativity, as the term “differential” implies. Inequality visits itself on us as unequal income opportunities and hard-to-break-into class structures (Barbalet 1992b). Class inequality and class resentment strongly affect the emotional patterns of human interaction and thereby the structure of social relationships. Equal opportunity does not exist in this or any country. The United States is somewhat unusual in the strain that so many of us experience, since we have long touted equal rights, the “American Dream,” and the myth that individual effort and hard work will guarantee achievement of the Dream. According to Merton (1938; 1968), strain can cause any one of several nonproductive responses as a way of circumventing the usual methods of attaining the Dream: we may cease to care about achieving the Dream and mindlessly continue our work tasks, we may strive for the Dream through alternate routes (crime, for instance), we may give up on the Dream and the means to achieve it (through drug use, a skid-row existence, etc.), we may substitute an alternative Dream, and so on. In a discussion of economic sources of rage, we can not leave unattended the interaction between the aforementioned emotion of shame combined with the perception of socioeconomic class inequity. As Katz (1988) has intimated, the feeling of being cheated, humiliated, vulnerable, or impotent against forces beyond one’s control can eventually lead to rage, personal or social, violent or not. Regardless of the fact that low status occurs within a system of inequality, the emotional impact of being low status is often one of shame (Coreno 1992). In other words, it does not seem to help much to know that the entire economic system is rife with unequal opportunity; one

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may still feel like a “loser” if one is not economically successful. Whether or not an individual has access to economic opportunity has always been beside the point in the spirit of capitalism so heavily pronounced and so much advocated in the United States. Adolf Hitler and his public were wrapped up in a cycle of shame, humiliation, rage, and vengeful aggression that had very much to do with the economic crisis in Germany. Recall that Hitler’s appeal was imbedded in his “continuous humiliated fury,” which he channeled into a sense of community and pride for his German public, rather than alienation and shame (Scheff and Retzinger 1991). Shame theory, according to Scheff and Retzinger, suggests that, protracted and destructive anger is always generated by unacknowledged shame. . . . Long chains of alternating shame and anger . . . are experienced as blind rage, hatred, or resentment if the shame component is completely repressed. (p. 152, emphasis mine)

Scheff and Retzinger also explain that Hitler’s intense rage was projected onto Jews, the scapegoats for Germany’s economic condition, as we are painfully aware through history. We find a similar situation in the United States today with prejudice and discrimination visited upon Mexican and other minority laborers. A. M. Rosenthal (1994) examines “lean and very mean” employment practices, concluding that, although unemployment has declined (except for the traditionally disadvantaged such as young African-American men), U.S. workers remain edgy and continue to look for targets. Living under lean and mean circumstances, not surprisingly, leaves many of us scared and angry. Hamm (1994) describes the relationship between economics, governmental administrations, anger, despair, and destructive behavior such as hate crime. In his research on skinhead movements in England and the U.S., he proposes that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did for the British what President Ronald Reagan did for the U.S. populace; they both blocked the aspirations of the majority (particularly the young) and instilled a mental and social vacuity. Hamm writes that, Reaganomics created the decade of greed in which tens of millions of American white youth became so culturally, intellectually, and spiritually vacant that their main way of defining themselves and achieving self-respect was to “go to the mall.” (p. 213)

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He adds that, college education, especially in business, has trained U.S. students to fit . . . uncritically into the ready-made niches of American middle-class society where money, sports, entertainment, and fashion are valued over human compassion, service, and love—where the outside of a person is valued over the inside; the appearance over actuality. (p. 214)

Moreover, according to Hamm, while Reagan was adept at simplistic homilies, his emphasis on grand theories of social and political affairs had no relation to reality whatsoever, and only increased the confusion and despair. Relevant to the American Dream, the result is that those who played by the rules of Reaganomics have not been rewarded as they expected to be. Not surprisingly, some feel rage and express rage at inappropriate targets (minority and foreign labor), as Scheff and Retzinger (1991) suggested. The skinheads, an especially destructive and racist group of angry whites, “are both a product of and an understandable reaction to, the national emptiness, dullness, self-deceit, and fraud of Reaganomics” (Hamm 1994: 215). Many skinheads come from the working class and their bitterness over the economy made conditions ripe for them, as well as non-skinhead youth, to embrace extreme social and political beliefs. Of course, not all economically devalued people become racist skinheads. Some, probably many, suffer in silence. Shweder (1997) writes of the direct correlation between socioeconomic status and health. He reports, as medical sociologists have long known, that: people with high social status are more healthy and less crazy. . . . With each step down the educational, occupational and income ladders comes an increased risk of headaches, varicose veins, hypertension, sleepless nights, emotional distress, heart disease, schizophrenia and an early visit to the grave. . . . Western men and women of higher status have lived longer and have been healthier and saner than the people they outclass. (p. 5)

Perhaps the illnesses, distress, and early deaths of poorer people lead to feelings of rage on the part of some sympathetic observers. Perhaps poor health is a sign of internal, impotent rage.3 Less-Economic Explanations. Perhaps economic conditions explain a great deal of social rage, but other factors also play a role in the creation of the “American” brand of rage. In addition to the society’s

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economic condition, we have the insidious “me-first” attitude that can lead to rageful expression. Much has been written and discussed about the me-first attitude, greediness, and selfishness of U.S. citizens in the 1980s and 1990s, as found in mass phenomena (see Mills 1997 on collective “meanness”). Recent phenomena that range from incivility to rage include aggressive driving, selfish consumer purchasing, and apathy toward environmental damage. “Road rage” is touted as causing a great deal of damage and to be on the rise. Wald (1997) reports that aggressive behavior like tailgating, weaving through busy lanes, honking or screaming at other drivers, exchanges of insults and even gunfire is a factor in 28,000 highway deaths a year. The blame is placed, says the head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, on an increase in a “me-first” philosophy and the preceding decade in which society as a whole had grown less deferential. He went on to state that rage was present in two-thirds of the deaths and injuries last year: “The more serious the crash, the more likely that aggressive driving was involved.” We find that from 1990 to 1996, there has been a 7 percent increase in “violent aggressive driving,” according to American Automobile Association; and that half of New York’s traffic fatalities are caused in part by aggressive driving. A psychologist who studies driving patterns found that 53 percent of drivers had “road rage disorder.”4 However, as a counterpoint to the road-rage discussion, we might more usefully consider road rage as a symbol of popular culture. By this I mean not only that the behavior of road rage, to the extent that it exists, is influenced by a larger social forces (selfishness or a jadedness to violence, for example). I also mean that it is a popular creation, or, as Fumento (1998) refers to road rage, a “media creation” (p. 17). Fumento questions the presumed rise in road rage and discounts the use of words like “epidemic” as false labeling to describe aggressive driving in the United States.5 Fumento also addresses the make of the vehicle as relevant to road rage. He cited a discussion put forth in the House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, suggesting that aggressive drivers react to the “personality” associated with a particular make and model of vehicle. It was contended that the make of the vehicle encourage road rage, as we find among drivers of sport utility vehicles who feel insulated and powerful (see below). The upsurge of sport utility vehicles (SUV) on U.S. roads is directly correlated with an increase in serious injuries and deaths. More telling in terms of social rage, are the explanations for purchasing and driving them.

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Selfishness and the use of SUVs as weapons are related to social rage. The reaction to SUVs and SUV drivers has not been without rage, also. Sport utility vehicles, also known as “command vehicles” or “suburban assault vehicles,” are extraordinarily large and heavy vehicles that can seat up to eight adults comfortably plus carry their accoutrements. Very few people need such a large-capacity vehicle with rugged mountain-climbing features. (Ads for these vehicles show them clambering up mountains and fording streams, both activities quite destructive to the environment.) Nor does the society need to waste fuel; these vehicles get about 14 miles to the gallon. The auto industry, however, may feel the need to make approximately $10,000 to $14,000 profit on each vehicle sold (Ford 1997; Bradsher 1997). A selling point of the SUV is that the driver and occupants can literally look down on occupants in normal-sized vehicles, according to some advertisements. Just as tellingly, the ads and buyers remind us that occupants of the SUVs are less likely to get seriously injured or killed in an auto accident, compared to people in normal-sized vehicles, who are more likely to be seriously injured or killed. Ford (1997) and Bradsher (1997) report that crashes between sport utility vehicles (including pickup trucks) against small, fuel-efficient cars are especially deadly for the occupants of the latter. At its very basis, the increased-safety reason for owning SUVs indicates that the owners believe that their lives or the lives of their occupants are worth more than the lives of the people injured and killed by these vehicles.6 In Bradsher’s (1997) article, a professional accident investigator quips, “Sport utility vehicles are great . . . for the guy that owns them.” Purchasing and driving SUVs may be a measure of selfishness but the presence of SUVs can also create a great deal of anger on the part of people who do not own them. In Russell Baker’s (1998) editorial on the rage he feels about sport utility vehicles, he points out, for example, that drivers of ordinary vehicles can not see to back up out of parking spaces when walled in by two SUVs. He (and the insurance industry) also realizes the danger of driving a regular-sized vehicle at night, followed by an SUV: the SUV, which is not only wide but tall, blinds the driver in the normal-sized car with its headlights. Baker, in his usual humorous fashion, schemes what to do about the SUVs, these “colossal machines,” this “odious produce” of the “colossus industry,” these “land-bound Titanics.” Recognizing that he is indulging in revenge fantasies and that his hatred is irrational, he jokingly dreams of slashing SUV tires in parking lots. He may not be too far off the mark when he asks, “What is this ab-

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surd boom in sport-utility vehicles if not a plot to make me miserable, possibly even a plot to destroy me if I refuse to join the crowd and buy an immense trucklike machine?” (p. 23). Also in terms of selfishness, we find some U.S. citizens voicing their apathy, impatience, and sometimes downright hostility about environmental issues. A comment not infrequently expressed among the environmentally apathetic is that the environment will hold up until they die. That is, the state of the environment does not affect the individual personally so there is no need to be concerned about it. It is as yet unresolved whether aggressive behavior, heartless attitudes, and apathy constitute social rage or incivility. Among the primary traits of social rage and incivility are self-centeredness and thoughtlessness. Social rage and incivility both involve an assumption on the part of the rageful and uncivil that they have the right idea and the rest of us ought to go along with their views or be damned. DeMott (1996) hints that the rageful and the uncivil are on the same continuum. In his description of “representative villains, characters with jumbo negatives [it is] not just the uncivil prick in the pickup who gives you the finger as he cuts you off but rabble-rousing Buchanan [and] Farrakhan with his demon whites. . .” (p. 12). I would not say that either one, rage or incivility, is more obvious than the other or more extreme than the other. Rage and incivility, for example, can both be subtle. I would not say that there is necessarily a progression from one to the other, such that a person starts out being uncivil and progresses to rageful. The rageful person is often uncivil and the uncivil person is often rageful. Sources of Rage and Types of Rage. Typologies of social rage can not be neatly explained by sources of social rage. Take, for instance, an economic source of rage like blocked aspirations. Many of us experience unfair economic conditions; some of us rage, some of us do not. Some social rage is expressed legally, some is not. Legal demonstrations of social rage include Congressional budget wars; illegal ones include the murder of Planned Parenthood clinic workers in Brookline, Massachusetts and the Oklahoma City bombing (DeMott 1996). As I proceed through this book, I will elaborate on the many types of ragers present in the United States: the survivalist right, the religious fringe, the political far right, and others. As with all categories of people, there is diversity in terms of level of commitment and activity. Some people, as we will see, express but do not feel rage whereas others feel but do not express rage. Some seethe inwardly and never express their rage to others. As expressions of social rage, some (Rush Limbaugh,

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Newt Gingrich, G. Gordon Liddy, for example) shout and curse. Some, notably Timothy McVeigh, kill. Some do both. Some participate in social rage on a peripheral, sporadic, and conditional basis while others are consumed by social rage as though social rage is their life. Indeed, for some ragers, social rage constitutes their livelihood, their occupation, and the totality of their social interactions. Within an individual rager, rage can vary over time and across topics. That is, the degree of rage can fluctuate over time and experience. And individual ragers may be rageful about some things but not other things. Some of the socially rageful progress toward increasingly rageful acts, moving from shouting and screaming to physical violence (Katz 1988). The progression to more active rage may be a form of modeling, as we would find with rageful talk shows increasing the expressed anger on the part of callers and listeners. Interaction with militia groups increases the likelihood of active rebellion on the part of the participants. Aho (1990) describes cases in which there was movement farther to the right or toward more actively rageful behavior, due mostly to interaction with rageful others in the militia. However, there is progression in the opposite direction as well, from the extremely rageful to the more moderate and less actively rageful end of the spectrum. The latter effect is due more to maturation and involvement with the nonrageful (Aho 1994; Ezekiel 1995). So exposure to rageful people and their messages does seem to provide a key to understanding the spread of social rage. Exposure to non-rageful people and messages seems to decrease social rage. FORMS IN WHICH SOCIAL RAGE EXHIBITS ITSELF AND OUR MEASUREMENTS OF IT I do not have, nor does anyone to my knowledge have, sophisticated, quantifiable measures of social rage. There are, however, some rather intriguing obtrusive measures of social rage. Obtrusive measures are more indirect and inferred, but no less valid as measures of social reality (see, for example, Babbie 1992). All measures are approximate and representative, even though they may have numerical values assigned to them. This is true of all sciences, the so-called hard as well as soft sciences (Smith and Berry 1996; Faia 1993). As scientists, we attempt to apply values that represent as accurately as possible the phenomena we are describing; sometimes, the best measure is one that is an indirect one. We might assume, for example, that a T-shirt message represents the atti-

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tudes of the wearer. We may be in error some of the time, but, for the most part, our assumption would be valid. What can be seen “on the surface,” such as bumper stickers messages and T-shirt messages, may provide some clue as to the beliefs of those exhibiting such messages. Obtrusive measures such as these do not measure what all of us believe, but that is important in and of itself since we can compare messages—their presence and absence, their content. If it can be assumed that expressions of social rage (T-shirt messages, talkshow conversations, et cetera) are signs of the expressers’ true feelings, then we have some idea of the social conditions that are of concern to these message-senders. The absence of messages and presence of contradicting ones likewise speak to social feelings. The comparison here is more numerical, allowing for an understanding of how many people express social rage (“Feed Jane Fonda to the Whales”) versus those who express more progressive ideas (“Celebrate Diversity”). Some people, rageful and nonrageful, are reticent to express their feelings about social conditions publicly, for reasons having nothing to do with the intensity or direction of their feelings. However, as I have mentioned in Chapter 1, on the whole, the socially rageful may be more inclined to express themselves than the non-rageful, thereby making themselves and their attitudes seem more prevalent than they are. Socially rageful messages, I have suggested, are more expressive, more extreme than less rageful reactions to social phenomena. While many of the non-rageful may wear T-shirts with messages and may have bumper stickers on their cars (for instance, “Mean People Suck”), the frequency and (obviously) the content of the messages are different than rageful messages. While driving across Montana, Idaho, and Washington, Jonathan Raban (1996) listened to the radio and observed bumper stickers as indicators of public feeling. Near Sandpoint, Idaho, Raban read the bumper stickers on motor vehicles and discovered the same mix that my students did (see below). Among those stickers he saw representing conservative and far-right sentiments were: “Gun control means using both hands,” “Rush is right,” “Bo Gritz [a publicly-known militia figure] for Prez,” “Don’t steal—the government hates competition,” and “Impeach Clinton and her husband.” Countering the conservative viewpoint, he finds: “Rush is reich.” Among those stickers that are intended to draw attention to oneself, Raban found: “I’d rather be quilting” and “Preacher ran off with my wife and my dog—I sure miss that dog.”

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Discussing T-shirts and their message qualities, David Foster Wallace (1997) writes, A lot [of T-shirts and messages] serve to I.D. the wearer as part of a certain group and then congratulate that group for its . . . dynamism. . . . Some presume a weird kind of aggressive relation between the shirt’s wearer and it reader. . . . There’s something complex and compelling about the fact that these messages are not just uttered but worn, like they’re a badge or credential. The message compliments the wearer somehow, and the wearer in turn endorses the message by spreading it across his chest, which fact is then in further turn supposed to endorse the wearer as a person of plucky or risque wit. (p. 121)

Bumper stickers on motor vehicles serve the same purpose as T-shirt messages, to send a message about oneself and one’s view of society. In the spring semester of 1995, students in my Social Problems class at Pacific Lutheran University collected data, taking measures of radio talk shows and bumper stickers as indices of social rage. Bumper stickers and talk-show behavior do not necessarily reflect societal beliefs, which is precisely my point. We will come back to that point after I relate the students’ discoveries. My students surveyed 4,425 motor vehicles in the state of Washington (mostly the western region of Washington) and found that 87.21 percent of the vehicles do not have bumper stickers, compared to 12.79 percent that do. While that is revealing by itself, so is the content or message of the stickers. The greatest percentage of vehicle stickers are neutral: 40.14 percent of the stickers advertise a university, a place to shop, a consumerist service, or an activity that presumably the driver engages in, such as, “I brake for latte.” The next greatest category is self-congratulatory stickers: 21.54 percent of the stickers point to the self, usually in a flattering way. For example, “My child is an honor student at ___ school,” “Never underestimate the power of a redhead,” “Always late but worth the wait,” and “It’s hard to be humble when you’re Norwegian.” Only 6.71 percent of the stickers were blatantly rageful; for instance, “Feed Jane Fonda to the whales.” An equal number (6.71 perent) were religious, usually remarking on anti-choice. Patriotic bumper stickers (“We support our troops”) make up 3.08 percent. Pro-gun and pro-military stickers account for 2.09 percent and 1.26 percent respectively. And, just as interestingly, 13.43 percent of the observed stickers indicated positive messages, such as those advising us to engage in random acts of kindness, those extolling that “hatred is not a family value,” and those

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supportive of diversity (“Celebrate Diversity”) and environmental causes (see Appendix B). Not unexpectedly, the settings where vehicles were observed varied with the content of the stickers. For example, vehicles parked at military bases had more pro-gun and pro-military stickers; whereas college campuses had more neutral and positive ones.7 My students also listened to many hours of talk radio, and using a coding sheet supplied by me, wrote detailed narratives of what took place during those shows. Some of the not-so-surprising findings were that the moderators vary in terms of their attempts to engage in conflict, their rudeness, their impatience, the interruptions, and their tone of voice (yelling versus talking in a moderate tone). Variation was also found among the callers. However, my students found that most callers called in to make a point, often vehemently, about what is wrong with the government and how much they hate the current governmental administration. More than half of the callers were men. There were instances of combative and aggressive behavior on the part of the talk-show hosts, but overall, my students found the moderators to be rather polite (see Appendix B). There are some indications that social rage, while it is not insubstantial, is not so rampant as it appears. That is, there may seem to be more rage than actually occurs in the population. Rageful messages may seem quantitatively greater than they are because of the quality of their expression. Ragers are expressive, whereas non-ragers are quieter and less likely to express attitudes, especially hateful attitudes. CONCLUSION In response to abortion-clinic bombings and killings, a pro-choice organization placed ads in major newspapers reminding readers that most U.S. voters are pro-choice. Given all the rage about abortion rights from those who oppose choice, we might find ourselves assuming that there is an immense controversy in the United States over abortion rights. Upon reflection, it is known that, statistically, a majority agree on abortion rights, and that there is no problem with the Constitutionality of abortion or popular support for it. What we have are a minority of people who are very expressive and anti-choice. Within this minority is an even smaller minority, willing to commit even more drastic behavior (assaults, arson, bombing, and murder) based on their beliefs. Distortions of social feelings come from the socially rageful themselves as well as from secondary feeders of social rage, such as the media, politicians, and religious groups.8 My students discovered that

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signs of social rage, as emitted by the rageful, are in the minority of social messages. As we will see in the remaining chapters, the more institutionalized sources of social rage, political rage and the like, are just as unrepresentative of society. NOTES 1

ACT UP may be an example of a limited social-rage movement. If so, it lends credence to the notion that social rage can be justified and righteous. ACT UP hopes to achieve the righting of wrongs, such as the inattention to AIDS victims and their health-care needs. 2 The civil-rights movement was not without violence and, depending upon one’s point of view, was destructive of (for example) segregation, obstacles to voting, and unfair employment practices. Throughout this analysis, we must bear in mind that the righteousness of social rage is a matter of perspective. The Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan both have engaged in civic-minded as well as violent acts. A criminologist friend of mine, Bob Bohm, defends a school of thought that there actually are “good” and “right” perspectives, which are obviously in contrast to “bad” and “wrong” perspectives. As social scientists, we are usually very careful to always view things (such as individuals, traits of individuals, ideologies, and worldviews) as relative. Bohm believes that some political and social ideologies and what I would call “personal theories” are truly better than others and that we all fundamentally agree with these theories, even if we do not adhere to them through our actions. There is some unidentifiable but inherent quality that is “good” and “right.” For example, to be thoughtful of other people is “good.” 3 John Steinbeck writes about internalized rage in his novel Sweet Thursday (1954, p. 179). The voice of rage is speaking to the protagonist and saying: “Let me out . . . or I’ll set my claws in you and I’ll tear at you for all your life! Let me out, I say! Feel this, this red burning? That’s rage. Will you let it out or will it fester here until it makes you sick and crazy?” 4 In September 1997, Princess Diana was killed in an automobile accident in Paris. There were accusations that the paparazzi were chasing the vehicle in which she was riding, and that they were intent on photographing her and her boyfriend. A colleague asked me if this event constituted social rage. There was temporary rage involved in the reaction of the public to the paparazzi; many were desperately angry with them for chasing Princess Diana and indirectly causing her death. The paparazzi behavior was motivated by greed, but does not constitute “road rage” as commonly understood.

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The term “road rage” was coined in 1988, and by 1997 there were 4,000 mentions in the Nexis media database, appearing in three stories per year from 1988 to 1994 and increasing sharply to 500 mentions in 1995, over 1,800 mentions in 1996, to 4,000 in 1997 (Fumento 1998). “Headlines notwithstanding, there was not—there is not—the least statistical or other scientific evidence of more-aggressive driving on our nation’s roads. . . . There is no evidence that ‘road rage’ or an aggressive-driving ‘epidemic’ is anything but a media invention, inspired primarily by something as simple as a powerful alliteration: road rage” (p. 12). Citing David Murray of the Statistical Assessment Service, he explains that “Once a phenomenon picks up a label . . ., the label tends to be applied to more and more things” (p. 14). 6 An ad in the National Geographic (Vol. 192, 1997) advertised the Lincoln Continental version of the popular “command vehicle.” The boldest caption was “Ditch the Joneses.” 7 Of the 4,425 vehicles observed, 566 had stickers but some had more than one; therefore there were 715 observed and countable stickers. Of the numbers and types of stickers, we found: neutral (n = 287, 40.14 percent), self-focused (n = 154, 21.54 percent), positive (n = 96, 13.43 percent), rageful (n = 48, 6.71 percent), religious (n = 48, 6.71 percent), patriotic (n = 22, 3.08 percent), unknown meaning (n = 19, 2.66 percent), political (n = 17, 2.38 percent), pro-gun (n = 15, 2.09 percent), and pro-military (n = 9, 1.26 percent). 8 Even academic scholars are somewhat to blame. Sociologists, for example, do examine topics that are not necessarily “sexy,” such as birth rates in China in the 1800s. But much of our field of study is inundated with research on social problems. This is especially true for problems of social interest at the moment; such as domestic assault, violence in the schools, the militia movement, fear of crime and victimization, spree killing, child sexual abuse, etc. While it is true that these are all important issues warranting extensive research, it is also true that as academics we are rewarded with external funding, publications, and media interviews for our work on “hot” topics; therefore we may be prone to studying them. Inadvertently and to save our academic lives, we may do our part to substantiate the notion that these problems are bigger than they are or that they have recently expanded. The less scrupulous among us, few though they may be, seek empirical support for a current political or otherwise nonacademic agenda. Prostituted science, especially in the conclusions reached and recommendations offered, may artificially increase panics, fear, and social rage (Berry 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Smith and Berry 1996).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Aho, James A. 1990. The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Ariss, Robert. 1993. “Emotion in Strategic Responses to AIDS.” The Australian Journal of Anthropology 4: 18-30. Babbie, Earl. 1992. The Practice of Social Research. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Baker, Russell. 1998. “Encased in Black, Sees Red.” New York Times, April 24, p. A23. Barbalet, J.M. 1992a. “Emotional Climate and Social Change.” Presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 20–24, Pittsburgh, PA. Barbalet, J.M. 1992b. “A Macro Sociology of Emotion: Class Resentment.” Sociological Theory 10: 150–163. Barkan, Steven, and Steven F. Cohn. 1994. “Emotional and Cognitive Resources in the Development of Social Movements: Supplementing Resource Mobilization Theory.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 5–9, Los Angeles, CA. Berenson, F.M. 1991. “Emotions and Rationality.” International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 6: 33–46. Berry, Bonnie. 1991. “An Account of a Professional Ethics Violation in Sociology.” The American Sociologist 22: 101–106. Berry, Bonnie. 1994a. “Artificiality in the Construction of Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 22: 33–43. Berry, Bonnie. 1994b. “The Relationship between Infringements on the Freedom to Research and Teach and Poor Sociological Practice.” The American Sociologist 25: 53–64. Berry, Bonnie. 1996. Book review of David C. Anderson’s Crime and the Politics of Hysteria. (New York: Times Books, 1995). Justice Quarterly 13: 339–344. Bradsher, Keith. 1997. “A Deadly Highway Mismatch Ignored.” New York Times, September 24, pp. A1 and C6. Cogan, John M. 1994. “A Place for Emotion in Critical Study.” Human Studies 17: 277–284. Coreno, Thaddeus. 1992. “The Impact of Low Status on Emotional Response.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 18: 25–44. DeMott, Benjamin. 1996. “Seduced by Civility: Political Manners and the Crisis of Democratic Values.” The Nation December 9: 11–19.

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Durig, Alexander. 1994. “What Did Susanne Langer Really Mean?” Sociological Theory 12: 254–265. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1992. “Scenes from 1992.” The Responsive Community 2: 20–30. Elster, Jon. 1994. “Rationality, Emotions, and Social Norms.” Synthese 98: 21–49. Ezekiel, Raphael S. 1995. The Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen. New York: Penguin. Faia, Michael A. 1993. What’s Wrong with the Social Sciences? The Perils of the Postmodern. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. Ford, Richard. 1997. “Behemoths on Wheels.” New York Times, August 20, p. A21. Frijda, Nico H. 1993. “The Place of Appraisal in Emotion.” Cognition and Emotion 7: 357–387. Fumento, Michael. 1998. “’Road Rage’ versus Reality.” Atlantic Monthly. 282: 12–17. Hamm, Mark S. 1994. American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime. New York: Basic Books. Manstead, Antony S.R. 1991. “Emotion in Social Life.” Cognition and Emotions 5: 353–362. Mayer, John D., and Peter Salovey. 1993. “The Intelligence of Emotional Intelligence.” Intelligence 17: 433–442. Merton, Robert K. 1938. “Social Structure and Anomie.” American Sociological Review 3: 672–682. Merton, Robert K. 1957, 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. Miller, Trudi C. 1993. “The Duality of Human Nature.” Politics and the Life Sciences 12: 221–241. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Moore, Michael. 1996. Downsize This: Random Threats from an Unarmed American. New York: Crown. O’Rorke, Paul, and Andrew Ortony. 1994. “Explaining Emotions.” Cognitive Science 18: 283–323. Ostrom, Carol M., and Lee Moriwaki. 1995. “Anger: Living on the Edge.” The Seattle Times, April 2, pp. A10–A11. Raban, Jonathan. 1996. Bad Land: An American Romance. New York: Pantheon Books.

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Rosenthal, A.M. 1994. “Lean and Very Mean.” New York Times, December 16, p. A15. Scheff, Thomas J., and Suzanne M. Retzinger. 1991. Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Shweder, Richard A. 1997. “It’s Called Poor Health for a Reason.” New York Times, March 9, p. E5. Smith, Earl, and Bonnie Berry. 1996. “Problems Real and Imposed in the Discipline of Sociology.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 24: 77–84. Steinbeck, John. 1954. Sweet Thursday. London: Pan Books. Stivers, Richard. 1994. The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wald, Matthew L. 1997. “Anger Cited in 28,000 Road Deaths a Year.” New York Times, July 18, p. A10. Wallace, David Foster. 1997. A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again. Boston: Little, Brown. Wines, Michael. 1995. “It’s a Despicable Attitude. Good Thing It’s All Around.” New York Times, April 16, p. E3.

CHAPTER 3

Social Rage and the Survivalist Right

God Damn your Government, Laws, King, Council, & Assembly (Ethan Allen, 1700s, summing up his and other New Hampshiremen’s feelings). There’s some things they want changed and some things they want to stay the same (Roy, speaking of the militia, in the play Sweet Ike by Frederick Gaines, 1996). The term “survivalist right,” preferred by James Coates in his (1995) book Armed and Dangerous, covers a lot of ground. The term is preferable to many others, such as “militia,” because it concisely addresses two important characteristics of the people about whom I will be discussing: their right-wing perspective and their determination to survive, by violent means if necessary. First, I will distinguish between the radical right and the radical left. Then I will define the place of survivalism among the far right. From this point, I describe the various organizational qualities of the survivalist right, their memberships, their history, belief systems, and survivalist-right foci (gender, race, government, environment, religion, military, weaponry, and use of media). Finally, I will address effective and ineffective responses to the destructiveness of the survivalist right.

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THE RADICAL RIGHT AND THE RADICAL LEFT Schlesinger (1986) has documented fluctuations in right and left social movements in the United States. Proponents of right and left politics prevail over each other from time to time, roughly every thirty years. Today’s radical right is quite distinguishable from the radical left of the 1960s in that the former has a greater involvement in verbal and physical violence, greater destructive capacity and purpose, and a greater investment in conspiracy theories. While the left of the 1960s did engage in disruptive activities and violence, it was basically rooted in nonviolence, in an attempt to influence the government toward ending the war in Vietnam and to advance civil rights. Today’s extreme right is opposed to all government involvement in civil rights or governmental activism of any kind, and is weapons- and violence-oriented (Applebome 1995a). Hamm (1994) distinguished the fundamental differences in values between the radical right (exemplified by skinheads and neo-Nazis) and radical left (illustrated by the Weathermen and the Black Panthers). The radical right want to topple the government and have a takeover by FirstWorld neo-Nazism and, decades ago, the radical left wanted to topple the government in favor of Third-World neo-Communism. Right and left techniques and targets also vary. The radical left fought American ingroups, such as the establishment and the social-control agencies. They damaged ROTC buildings, courthouses, police statues, and a restroom in the U.S. Capitol Building. The skinheads and neo-Nazis target outgroups, such as African-Americans (in the United States) and Pakistanis (in Britain). While they sought to bring down the fictitious Zionist Occupied Government, in reality, they committed innumerable killings, stabbings, clubbings, knifings, and stompings of disenfranchised individuals.1 Rather than focusing on distinctions, Stock’s (1996) analysis of rural radicals throughout history points to the similarities between the rural radicalism of the 1990s and the counterculture rhetoric of the far left in the 1960s. She writes, “were we to travel back in time to determine once and for all whether rural radicalism has been progressive or regressive, liberal or conservative, a force from the left or the right in American society, we would return as confused as ever” (p. 5). But she seems to lean toward the view that rural radicals are more right-leaning in the intense racial hatred that frontiersman felt for Native Americans and in their successful introduction of slave labor. Early U.S. residents, such as elite planters, “realized how powerful a social glue such hatred could be” (p. 5). Probably the most detailed treatment of the differences between the radical right and radical left is Smith’s (1994) book on terrorism in the

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United States. Smith describes the differences between the members’ demographic traits and between their ideologies. Compared to the radical left, the radical right are older, more often male (93 percent), white (97 percent), less educated (33 percent have a GED or less), more often unemployed or impoverished, fundamentalist Christian, and rural. Smith compares the left-wing groups (animal-rights activists, environmentalists, Students for a Democratic Society, Weathermen, Black Panther Party, Black Liberation Army, et al.) with the right extremists, and finds that they differ markedly on their “special interests.” The far left are characterized by extreme egalitarianism, hatred of racism and capitalism, and an overt opposition to militarism. The extreme right, on the other hand, have “a belief in the intrinsic superiority of their own race or national group and . . . a belief in the necessity and desirability of war as a means of realizing national or racial destiny” (p. 35) SURVIVALISM Survival, in the face of race wars, government takeover, nuclear war, or environmental disaster, is crucial to the survivalist-right dogma. In these beliefs, we find a mixture of destruction and salvation in the use of intriguing phraseology (such as the “end times”) and wondrous imagery (such as ghostly “horsemen of the apocalypse” riding down to Earth from the heavens). A lot of militia organizations believe the message (from Christian Identity, Aryan Nations, etc.) that the white race is special and doomed to extinction due to evil forces, largely Jewish and governmental (Aho 1995; Coates 1995; Lamy 1996; Stern 1997; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998). They are encouraged in this belief by their complex and unprovable belief systems (see below) and by more “legitimate” sources such as Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth of Idaho, who describes white men as “endangered.” As we come to understand the survivalist right in its various forms, we find people who truly do expect some apocalyptic event to happen soon and who really do believe in a constellation of millennial events, none of which are mythical to them. Alternatively, we find less strict adherents to survivalism who worry about destruction of their place in society and their traditional ways of life, but do not anticipate cataclysmic worldwide destruction. The survivalist right offer elaborate, “historically-based” explanations for why they believe what they believe. As is typical of beliefs, rea-

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son will not undo them. The believers would counter that reasoners or questioners are merely naïve. The world as we know it is going to end soon because of external destruction (one-world takeovers, globalization, nuclear war); because the survivalist right (particularly the militia and racialists) start it; because a numbered year is reached; or for religious reasons (it is God’s will). It is impossible to say what is right or wrong, when it comes to beliefs. What makes survivalist beliefs and corresponding survivalist actions socially rageful is the encouragement of doomsday (for example, forcing a race war) and the preparation for it (the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition). Survivalist-right beliefs support a thriving survivalist industry. The survivalist right buy the literature, the how-to manuals, the storage units, things to store (nonperishable food, bandages and medicines, ammunition), and weapons. They build bunkers and buy “survival condos.” They attend survival classes. They give up everything and move to a safe survival place. Lamy (1996) provides particularly good descriptions of the extent to which people will change their lives because of survivalist-right beliefs, including leaving jobs and selling property. The less-dedicated survivalists buy camping equipment, store ammunition and other survival needs, and make declarations about their capacity to live “off the grid” (without public utilities or governmental assistance). SURVIVALIST-RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS In addition to formalized survivalist-right units, there are lone survivalist-right individuals and there are informal collections of survivalistright-minded people. I am addressing, for the most part, formalized survivalist-right organizations, complete with memberships and organizational roles. Among the types of rageful groups that can be categorized as survivalist right are: the (now defunct) Minutemen, various Patriots (Christian Patriots, Arizona Patriots), the CSA (Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord), the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nation, Posse Comitatus, WAR (White Aryan Resistance), skinheads, John Birch Society, National Alliance, Blue Ridge Duck Club, state militias (such as the Militia of Montana, Michigan Militia), and many others. Of these groups, there may be region-specific subgroups, such as the Texas Hammerskins (a Texas skinhead club) and East Side White Pride (a Portland, Oregon, skinhead club). These organizations have, as will be presented below, varying foci, varying memberships, and varying rageful attitudes and actions. For instance,

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some are directly and extremely violent, advocating revolution (to their “correct” views and behavior) through mass killing. WAR, for instance, is openly and rabidly racist and has been known to murder minorities. By contrast, some groups and some members of some groups are less violent, less dedicated to overthrowing society as we know it. As an example, the John Birch Society basically wants the United States out of the United Nations, is wary of globalization, is anti-federalist, and, like all survivalist-right groups, generally intolerant of people unlike them. Survivalist-right groups vary in their attention to religiosity, tax resistance, literal constitutionalism (taking the U.S. Constitution at its word), anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, nationalism, hatred of the federal government, weapons and gun ownership, survival of nuclear war, takeover by the New World Order, and the millennium in its many facets. These groups compete among themselves and there is little love lost among the factions. Rage on a social (in other words, widespread, prevalent) level and as encouraged by mainstream social institutions (politics, media, and religion) creates fertile ground for survivalist activity and ideology. Moreover, the “militia movement” is often represented as a social movement, and militia activities can be understood in terms of collective behavior. HISTORY Ross (1995) reminds us that although militias have been around since the Civil War in the form of the Ku Klux Klan, the militia’s current popularity is a new phenomenon. She further points out that although the present-day militias would hope to portray themselves as upstanding individuals exercising their rights to be left alone, very much like early pioneers and colonists; in fact, they engage in activities that are criminally treasonous. (While it may be technically true that they advocate and engage in treason, from the militia perspective, treason may be necessary and just.) Rural radicalism is older than the nation itself, writes Stock (1996). As early as 1676, settlers committed to economic independence and representative government protested against taxes and land laws. Stock also notes that present-day radicalism is not a new idea nor a fly-by-night phenomenon. Rather, it follows an “all-American heritage.” Smith (1994) provides further historical-to-modern linkages in his history of the Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, a current extremist militia-type group. In 1878, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, an act that, perhaps un-

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intentionally, disdained state authority. Presently, Posse members refuse to obey any state or federal laws, such as payment of federal taxes, renewal of drivers’ licenses, or purchase of automobile license tags. There is no authority except at the county level, in the Posse’s perspective. A poignant example of the link, in the militia’s minds, between early-American extreme-right ideals and today’s extreme-right ideals is visibly illustrated by Timothy McVeigh’s T-shirt, worn on the day of the Oklahoma City bombing. At the time of his arrest, he was wearing a Tshirt showing the tree of liberty, dripping with bright-red blood instead of bearing fruit. Under the tree was the slogan “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants” (Thomas 1997). The quotation is from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson in 1787 to William Stevens Smith. The front of McVeigh’s T-shirt had a picture of Abraham Lincoln, the president credited with ending slavery and enacting the Thirteenth Amendment. With Lincoln’s picture is the slogan “Sic Semper Tyrannis,” meaning “Thus always to tyrants,” shouted by Lincoln’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth. Much has been made of the fact that militia-like organizations and anti-government factions have been around since the beginning of the formalized United States. But Stern (1997) disagrees that today’s far right are rooted in the early-American movements and groups. He aptly refutes the notion that today’s militias are simply carrying forth old-fashioned values and behaviors. His treatment of the gun-control issue, for example, is an account of how the Second Amendment does not state that we all have a right to bear arms. By contrast, the militias and others in the survivalist right rally a staunch defense of the Second Amendment, proclaiming that we do indeed have the right to bear arms. Stern concludes that the early-American patriot symbolism is just that—symbolism. What does seem to be irrefutable is the evolution of survivalist-right groups. The militia movement of today has grown and developed out of a number of previous movements, many in existence since the Civil War. The likes of the Silver Shirts (an early Nazi-esque group), the KKK, the John Birch Society, tax protestors, and Constitutionalists have given us skinheads, the Aryan Nations, White Aryan Resistance, the Militia of Montana, and others (see Ezekiel 1995). BELIEF SYSTEMS Entire volumes have been devoted to the belief systems of the survivalist right (for instance, Lamy 1996) and I will only offer a brief overview of

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the emotion-laden aspects of the survivalist-right belief systems. Included in their belief systems are assumptions not readily acceptable to the nonsurvivalist-right majority, who would view their “reasoning” as preposterous. The simplistic and absolutist qualities of their beliefs are in contrast to, but not contradictory to, the convoluted complexities of their explanations for their beliefs. To nonsurvivalist-right ears, some of these beliefs have a ring of hysteria to them; they seem disingenuous and melodramatic, and just plain false. The unpopularity of the survivalist-right belief systems for the rest of society has to do, partly at least, with beliefs about race and attitudes toward women. These beliefs are translated into suppressive, sometimes rageful, actions toward minorities and women. Racial minorities should be eliminated, according to the white supremacists. Women should be relegated to subservient roles (as childbearers and home-schoolers, with no financial independence) and have no voice (for instance, women should not be allowed to vote). The Emotional Content of Beliefs. The extreme rightist worldview is imbedded in “a climate of hate” and “a meanness of spirit” (Ivins 1995). Hate indoctrination comes from a variety of sources, such as the armed forces, right-wing political figures, and the media (Ballard and McDowell 1991; Nichols 1995; Vest 1995). Besides “hate,” a word that one repeatedly comes across in reading about the survivalist right is “paranoia” (see, for example, Kelly 1996). Closely akin to the paranoia found in the survivalist-right speech, literature, and Internet postings is conspiracy. Most of us realize that the government may not have our best interests at heart, but we also realize that we are not so important to warrant conspiracy. We might logically assume that the government, the banking industry, and other powerful entities do not actively conspire against us to the point of enslaving or eliminating us, since we are, in many ways, useful to them.2 As a mass, we may be targets for exploitation, and therefore, not targets for destruction. Since cynicism is also a strong emotion among the survivalist right, assessments such as the above would be dismissed as naïve. The militia, according to Stern (1997), consider themselves to be among the privileged few who know the “suppressed truth,” for example, that the government has been taken over by secret evil forces. Egan (1995a) reports that the literature of self-styled patriots has grown from an old root of paranoia, that has since sprouted rage and conspiracy. Egan reminds us that, throughout the history of the United States, there have always been paranoics with weapons. But the differ-

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ence with today’s paranoics is that, while once dismissed as crackpots and wackos, they are now able to spread their conspiracy theories via new technology, primarily the Internet. From the survivalist-right perspective, the conspirators (the source of threat, the reason for paranoia) are comprised of a variety of enemies. In the long list of enemies, we find ZOG (Zionist Occupied Government), the Jews, “mud people” (nonwhites), career women, the banking concerns, and the government. We should also feel threatened by the Vatican, the United Nations, the Trilateral Commission, Interpol, the Red Cross, Council on Foreign Relations, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), and the EPA (the Environmental Protection Agency).3 Enemy conspirators might also be composed of those who are not viewed as actively conspiratorial so much as leading to the ruination of society by their mere existence and participation in society. Included in this category are “inferiors,” such as non-Christians, gays and lesbians, intellectuals, and racial and ethnic minorities.4 In Chapters 1 and 2, I alluded to the need for an enemy and will present a more detailed treatment of this phenomenon in the chapter on social rage and crime (Chapter 4), and the chapter on social rage and minority relations (Chapter 5). Through his study of the Idaho Christian Patriots, Aho (1994; 1995) explains how the enemy is socially constructed and deconstructed or transcended. Lamy (1996) and others note that the demise of the Cold War deprived U.S citizens of a significant enemy, the Communists. The militias have substituted a new enemy, an internal one, the U.S. government.5 Along these lines, Stern (1997) discovers what he terms “a new brand of bigotry.” With the help of some public officials, political figures mostly, bigotry was reinvented by the militias. The new victim group is federal employees. The government and its employees have become acceptable targets of directed hatred, particularly since it has became socially inappropriate to express prejudice against women and minorities (Berry 1996). An enemy government has greater meaning to the survivalist right than to the rest of us, as we find in the nebulous, much-encompassing ZOG and New World Order. Zionist Occupied Government and the New World Order are, in many ways, the ultimate enemies to the homegrown militias.6 Many survivalist right believe that, unless armed, we (the “sheeple”) will be rounded up and placed in concentration camps, there to be enslaved or killed. The captors will be guided to these concentra-

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tion camps by manufacturers’ labels on the backs of road signs. Another ZOG-related belief of some members of the survivalist right is that government authorities can and do drive by citizens’ residences with a device that detects how much money one has. Hence the belief that we should barter or only use precious metals (gold, silver) instead of bills. For that matter, all bar code labels are suspect as “marks of the beast.” And some, notably Timothy McVeigh, believe that through vaccinations, computer chips have been implanted in their buttocks for identifying and monitoring purposes (Hamm 1997). Beliefs that are based on undocumented assertions and shrill invective (Berlet and Lyons 1995) have little meaning to the nonbelievers. Importantly though, these beliefs are “articles of faith” (Vest 1995: 28). They require no foundation, no logic, and no reality. The lack of empirical support is unimportant because the beliefs are articles of faith. The literature is replete with examples of religious explanations for why the survivalists feel the way that they do. Religiously-based survivalist-right explanations are very complicated, but have to do mostly with the presumably massive faults of the Jews throughout history. Biblical interpretations, moreover, provide “proof” of the superiority of the white race, as well as reasons why whites are destined to survive the end times and rule the world. Survivalist-right beliefs may confirm or deny any number of social issues. Holocaust denial is espoused by the Liberty Lobby, Aryan Nations, and other survivalist-right groups. Racism as an ideology and the resulting racist deeds are based on “pseudo-scientific theories” (Hamm 1994, citing Hannah Arendt, p. 137). Hamm further describes racism as a “faith” and a “permanent belief system” (p. 153). Racism has a component of irrationality to it, and “extreme racism breeds distortion in reality” (p. 182). Citing political historian Richard Hofstadter, Hamm (1997) writes, The distinguishing thing about the paranoid style . . . is not that its exponents see conspiracies or plots here and there in history, but that they regard the “vast” or “gigantic” conspiracy as the motive force in historical events. . . . The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms. (pp. 152–153)

A much-read and oft-quoted conspiracy piece is William Pierce’s (1978) The Turner Diaries. The Diaries provide a fictional account of a futuristic world in which there is a race war to end all race wars, and where the survivalist right triumph over all other beings on the planet. All the con-

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spiracies, such as gun control via the “Cohen Act” (Jewish in origin, naturally), are dealt with successfully, in survivalist-right terms. This book is essentially a recipe book, detailing how to start a revolution, how to make bombs, how to assassinate people, how to form small organizations of revolutionaries (“cells”), and so on. It has inspired many of the survivalist right. One person heavily influenced by the book is Timothy McVeigh. The horror committed by survivalist-right terrorists, combined with the absence of rationality in their belief systems, is unnerving. In The Turner Diaries, we find “a world of paranoid conspiracies that by their very nature deny empirical testing. They are locked and loaded mental constructs about the human struggle that outface all contradictory evidence.” The more connections can be made between historical events, albeit false events, “the greater the proof that there is a diabolical enemy to be annihilated” (Hamm 1997:199, emphasis added). Similarly, Stern (1997) demonstrates the reasoning problems of the survivalist-right belief system: Any doubt about the need for guerilla warfare was, of course, the result of “enemy propaganda” . . . If you bought the premise—say, that gun control was not really to control guns, but for “people control” by an evil government—everything fell into place. Events were not to be analyzed; rather they were to be scrutinized for “proof” that confirmed the theory. (pp. 48, 72)

Regarding uncommon beliefs and writing of Idaho Christian Patriots, Aho (1994) finds that they believe themselves to be innocent of wrongdoing, even if their acts were to result in the murder of millions. Sacrifices must be made in order to preserve values. The Patriots are innocent, since they are themselves victims of the enemy government. The survivalist right know that their values “are better than others” (p. 13). On a more indirect level, Stout (1995) reports that the far right broadcasters as a group have shown no remorse, no guilt, no concern for the public in the wake of the OK City bombing. Since the survivalist right have a belief system to support what they say and do, they can and do engage in destructive but, to them, necessary acts. The Emphasis on Simplicity. For all the complexity in the survivalist-right belief systems, there is also oversimplification. According to a spokesperson for the Jewish human-rights group of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the militia are seeking a simple understanding of the world (Johnson 1995b). According to John Trochman, the leader of the Militia of Montana, “Where we come from is very simple. There are good guys and

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bad guys out there. The bad guys have to be stopped.” On survivalist-right beliefs, we also read, “It’s all spelled out in the Bible,” as though this font of “truth” is the font of truth for us all (cited in Johnson 1995b: 5). We find in the survivalist-right belief system a mind-boggling mixture of simplistic and complicated explanations. Having tried to follow the logic of the survivalist right’s arguments, explanations, and “historical” accounts, my interpretations are that (a) their lives are full of symbolism and symbols and (b) the contortions of their belief systems are a substitute for logic, empiricism, and rationality. There can be no argument with them (or anybody) about their (or anybody’s) beliefs. Facts and counterarguments do nothing to pierce an armor of beliefs. There is a great deal of faith involved in their (and all) belief systems. After all, religion plays a large role in probably all survivalist-right groups, along with their own special brand of patriotism, which also constitutes belief and relies much on faith.7 SURVIVALIST RIGHT FOCI Foci of the survivalist right overlap with the more mainstream right-wing foci. An obvious illustration is the overlap between survivalist-right political views and conservative politics on their anti-federal-government stances. At the local level, there are a number of causes that blur the distinction between moderate conservatives and extreme rightists. One common cause is the anti-gun-control movement, led by the National Rifle Association; another is the anti-environmental Wise Use movement; and another is the anti-choice movement. There is also a key point of contact between the militia movement and the Christian Coalition, which has wielded influence over the Republican Party. Fueled by former Christian Coalition leader Pat Robertson’s theories of a New World Order headed by Jewish financiers, anti-choice battles, anti-gay and antilesbian movements, enforced prayer in schools, and other intolerant views and actions, the Christian Coalition is working to transform the country into a straight-jacketed theocracy (Worcester 1995). Not surprisingly, we find overlapping themes across the many survivalist-right groups. As will be demonstrated below, these far-right groups display varying emphases on sexism and gender relations, racism, anti-taxation, anti-environmentalism, military involvement, progun views, and a developing interest in media. Gender Roles and the Radical Right. Berlet and Lyons (1995) remind us that the growth of the militias in the 1990s is a social by-product

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of economic hardship as well as the “erosion of traditional structures of white male heterosexual privilege” (p. 25). Stock’s (1996) superb treatment of the subject, rural radicals, offers a detailed history of the privileged place that white men have held and continue to hold in the United States, but also their anger at any opposition to their privileged place. She finds that white men of the 1700s did not tolerate well any sort of unequal status applied to them by other white men, by those who held economic and political power over them. From a racist and sexist point of view, things have not improved, with non-whites and women gaining a modicum of power. It is not unexpected that people in danger of losing their privileges (white men in this case) would attempt to regain their previous status and the corresponding benefits. As one example among many, the White Patriot Party is heavily represented by angry white men and enshrouds its white-supremacy issues with “white discontent” (Smith 1994: 84). This white discontent easily drew massive numbers to the Party in economic hard times. As Smith states, “The recession of the late 1970s fueled new, broad opposition to affirmative action, busing, and welfare [and the White Patriot Party] reaped the benefits of white frustration in the early 1980s” (p. 85). The overlap between survivalist extremists and angry white men is not total commonality. Not all angry white men are full-fledged survivalists or rightists. They may be discontented with diversity, the government, and a global economy that has cost them their jobs. Their discontent may be expressed only in griping to other angry white guys about these issues. Most do not own rocket launchers, build nuclear-safe bunkers, plan race wars, or believe that the end is near. It is safe to say, however, based on studies of the topic, that the majority of the survivalist right are angry white men. Stock (1996) aptly describes the role of women and men in rural radical life as holding fast to traditional patriarchal relationships and having taken up arms to protect those relationships. Threats to American “womanhood” made by racial and religious minorities (Native Americans, African-Americans, Mormons, or Jews) were met with deadly force. Women who did not behave in a manner becoming to virtue in a rural community were not tolerated.8 The rural “warriors” of present day have taken hypermasculinity to its extreme. Some “militia men and survivalists have procured mail-order brides from Asia, engaged in polygamous marriages for quick and efficient spreading of their Aryan seed, and even taken female captives” (p. 12). The literature on the survivalist right is full of examples of strongly

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sexist attitudes and repressive behaviors toward women. Aho (1995) describes gender relations among the Idaho Christian Patriots in much the same terms as do other scholars on the topic. For example, wives of the Idaho Christian Patriots are expected to be “silently dutiful,” as depicted in movement literature (p. 32). The female partner in patriot marriages “knows her proper place” (p. 153). And, feminine power must be subjected to men’s conscious control, for God’s sake and the (Aryan) Nation’s sake. The world of the “contented Aryan woman,” according to Richard Butler, leader of the Idaho Aryan Nation, is made up of family, husband, children, and home (Aho, p. 172). Aryan girls are taught at an early age that their primary responsibility is to further the Aryan race, by having children and caring for them as well as caring for their “Aryan warrior” husbands. Aryan girls should school themselves in wifely and motherly chores, and devote years to making themselves pure, because it is in the purity of her blood that Aryan culture reposes. Such preparation as an Aryan wife and mother demonstrates “far greater love” than preparing herself to be a “clever woman lawyer” (p. 172). Although Aryan women and girls are revered for their birth-giving capacities and family roles, they are also subjects of repulsion and distrust. Leaning heavily on Biblical interpretations of gender roles and the origin of sin, Aho (1995) describes the assumed relationship between Woman and “all her attendant corruptions: pornography, sodomy, ‘whorishness,’ and abortion,” in contrast to masculine virtue (p. 86). We also find that patriot “loathing of the material world by fundamentalist Christians” often takes misogynic (woman-hating) forms. This loathing is not necessarily disgust at particular women, but horror at the feminine principle, of “what the image mother-seductress-siren-shrew-daughter-witch represents” (p. 172). Bushart, Craig, and Barnes (1998) also note the reliance on the Bible for explanations of woman’s essential weakness and tendencies to sin. In general, according to survivalist-right principles, women should not work outside the home, and definitely should not be career-oriented. One wonders how they could possibly work outside the home, given that their roles include bearing as many children as possible, home schooling, as well as all of the domestic chores (food gathering and preparation, house cleaning, primary medical care, clothes making and mending, etc.). Career women realize that they are financially self-sufficient and therefore not without social power; and this self-sufficiency is intimidating to rightist men. Women should be silent: women should not even vote according to some survivalist right (Blee 1991; Hamm 1994; Aho 1995; Stock 1996; Hamm 1997).

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Kathleen Blee (1991) has written about women’s roles in radicalright organizations, particularly in the Ku Klux Klan. Women formed their own Klan, the WKKK (Women of the Ku Klux Klan), originally to gain protection from abusive and neglectful husbands and as a bargaining chip with the KKK to gain male votes for women’s suffrage. Klee depicts women members of the Klan and the Aryan Nation as playing mainly supportive roles. She writes, women’s rights are antithetical to the agenda of the modern Klan, which affirms traditional gender roles as the only correct ones for Godfearing Christians and denounces affirmative action programs on the grounds that these curb the rights of white men. (p. 176)

The WKKK were expected to be subservient and cooperative; their appropriate roles were determined by men of the Klan, not women. The WKKK in the 1920s were supposed to and did do “women’s work,” that work being boycotting non-Klan business establishments and spending money at Klan businesses (consumer activities), charity work (rather than for-pay work), and gossiping (as a form of social control). In today’s world, women of the Klan support openly anti-feminist causes, such as anti-choice and anti-Equal Rights Amendment agendas. Stern (1997) describes the not-surprising opposition to the Brady Bill by the Militia of Montana. The Brady Bill was designed to restrict handgun purchases. What is interesting about Stern’s analysis is the manner in which the Militia of Montana opposed the bill by going after Sarah Brady. Mrs. Brady, as the initiator and crusader for the bill (recall that her husband is not able to actively crusade since he was shot in the head), created quite a fuss among pro-gun militias because of her involvement in this bill. It is as though, as a woman, she has no business being actively involved in politics, let alone in the area of gun control. On a broader level, Stern describes the sexist abuse leveled at women by the militia. Militia books include one entitled Big Sister Is Watching You, which discusses “Hillary’s Hellcats” and “Gore’s Whores.” The book presents strong women as “lesbians, sex perverts, child molester advocates, Christian haters, and the doctrinaire of Communists, whose goal is to end American sovereignty and bring about a global Marxist paradise” (p. 78). Beliefs About Race. The “white right” of South Africa looks very much like and, indeed, borrows from the U.S. white right. They believe in white supremacy, are convinced that God is on their side, and share among themselves an apocalyptic vision of the future. Their rhetoric is

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“don’t tread on me,” their members dress up in camouflage, stage guerilla maneuvers, gripe about the government, stockpile weapons and ammunition for the day of reckoning, and harbor muddled conspiracy theories. They read the U.S. magazine Soldier of Fortune, exchange information on the Internet, and have ties with the U.S.-based violent, white-supremacist Church of the Creator. They couch their grievances in the language of “rights,” such as the right to form a “white people’s state.” They also share the U.S. far right’s distrust of the Trilateral Commission, Jewish bankers, and bar-code labels. They refer to non-whites as “mud people” as does the far right in the United States. One of the most important elements that the South African white right have in common with white supremacists in the United States is that they are men who have been marginalized by economic and social change. These blue-collar workers and farmers fear that the black democratic majority will seize their jobs (Stengel 1995). Tom Metzger of the White Aryan Resistance has pronounced the Oklahoma City bombing as “payback” (The Progressive 1995a: 8). He further advised, “White man, you have the greatest reason in history to kill.” This racist appeal goes to the heart of economic worries of the survivalist right in the twentieth-century United States. Goldhagen (1996) lends the very uncomfortable feeling that the racism of the far right may be different only in degree from racism on a broad cultural level. On a society wide level, he suggests, we justify genocide of the powerless (urban unemployed African-American males, Mexican immigrants, for instance), as did the Germans during the Holocaust in the mass killing of Jews, as “necessary and just” (p. 37). Racism runs deep in survivalist-right thinking. Bushart, Craig, and Barnes (1998) interviewed and attended meetings with the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan Nation, and other survivalist-right organizations. It is very clear that racism is not an arguable issue with them; non-whites are seen as inferior, useful only for certain kinds of work (not white people’s work), and deserve destruction. Survivalist-right beliefs are largely supported by their own brand of religious reasoning. Politics and Anti-Government Sentiments. The extreme right today and early in the formalization of the United States has always been anti-government. This sentiment coincides with an anti-government sentiment on the part of recent (1980 to date) Republican politics. At this point, I must distinguish between most Republicans and the more “revolutionary” and rageful Republicans (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed treatment of the subject). We can probably assume that the latter are a

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minority and temporary. Some of the hard-core rightist Republicans elected to the Congress in 1994 are now in disfavor or have been dismissed from their posts. However, by their vociferousness, the more farright Republicans have made a noticeable ripple in U.S. politics for a short time and have somewhat legitimated the survivalist right. In the 1996 Republican presidential race, extremism was the norm and the contenders were “spewing vitriol so poisonous [that they seemed] to know no limit to their rightwing rhetoric” (Nichols 1995: 30). George Johnson (1995b), composing a list of organizations involved in the militia mindset, included the military, the religious right, racist hate groups, and the conservative, Republican politicians. Dirk Johnson (1995a) described ordinary right-wing citizens as deploring the militias while, at the same time, speaking up for the militias “as a bulwark against gun control, restrictive land-use policies and a general intensifying of power in Washington” (p. 1). A few of the ordinary citizens interviewed for his article said that they wondered whether the Republican campaign against federal government was sowing seeds of malice toward legislators and law enforcement, those who enact and carry out the nation’s laws. Similarly, Weiner (1995) reports that, in the eyes of thousands of right-wing Americans, the assault on Waco symbolizes the violent eradication of the right to bear arms and the right to privacy by an authoritarian federal government. And Egan (1995b) writes that, “Even as a Republican ascendancy has shifted political discourse rightward, the militias accept as an article of faith that the Government has betrayed the people, that its leaders are corrupt and that the Constitution has been subverted. Ross Perot has said some of the same things” (p. 1). Applebome (1995b) states that obsessions of the extremist radical right have overlapped with elements of the nation’s mainstream political culture. The far-right sources with whom he spoke indicated that hatred is widespread. The radical right have been heartened by the degree to which mainstream citizens and conservative politicians are expressing anger at attempts at gun control, taxation, affirmative-action policies, and so on. In fact, the borders between conservative-but-rageful politics and the radical right are so porous that, after the Oklahoma City bombing, the blame was placed squarely on the Republicans and their catering to rightist perspectives. To this, “Speaker Newt Gingrich . . . angrily denied that the Republican attacks on government . . . could in any way be tied to terrorist acts” (Applebome 1995b, p. 13, emphasis mine). The editors of Time Magazine noted the connections between the Oklahoma City bombing and mainstream conservative politics (Time

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Magazine 1995). Kramer (1995), writing for Time, points the finger at politicians as culprits of the bombing. He writes, If the perpetrators of the OK City bombing really view the government as the people’s enemy, the burden of fostering that delusion is borne not just by the nut cases who preach conspiracy but also to some extent by those who erode faith in our governance in the pursuit of their own ambitions. (p. 66)

Worcester (1995) writes specifically of the “politics of rage,” placing the blame for the Oklahoma City City bombing on the country’s march to the right, particularly the building of a hard-right Republican majority in Congress. The linkages between the Oklahoma City bombing and “the putschist fantasies of a radical, sometimes ‘revolutionary’ right have come into sharper focus” and raised questions about the dividing line between mainstream conservatives and the radical fringe (p. 5). The Anti-Defamation League (1994) has found that some militias, such as Missouri’s, have become so disgruntled with established politicians that they run their own candidates for local office. In such cases, we have militia members with political aspirations who are organizing for political action. In addition, we have elected officials who unabashedly cater to the militias: Representatives Steve Stockman, Robert Dornan (both now deposed), Helen Chenoweth, Karen Thurman, Mac Collins, James Hansen, Irene Hadly; and Senators Larry Craig, Lauch Faircloth, Charles Duke, and Pam Glanton (Vest 1995; Ross 1995). In the history of vigilantism and the politics of radical patriotism, the United States has fluctuated over time on issues of loyalty to the government (Stock 1996). For example, the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s were, as self-described, “100% American” and 100 percent loyal to the government and its policies. Rural radicals of the 1930s were not, but rather resemble some of the radical organizations today in their targeting of individual members of the federal government, such as President Frankin and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt in earlier times and President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton today. One of the points that I will make throughout this analysis of social rage is that social rage fluctuates. It is always present, but becomes more prominent and influential at times. This is true with the survivalist right, with politics, with crime, with religion, and other correlates of social rage. Verhovek (1997) suggests that the mood appears to be changing with respect to politics and rage, due partly to the Oklahoma City disaster and partly to the public’s growing disenchantment with the rage of politicians

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and militias alike. Similar to many of those listed above, he points to “guilt by rhetorical association” between hard-right conservative movements (such as Gingrich’s promise of a “revolution”) and terrorism. However, recent history illustrates the connection between the survivalist right and conservative politics as beginning in earnest in the 1980s. Coates (1995) offers some rather startling quotes from Ronald Reagan, about Armageddon for example, that are strongly related to survivalist-right doctrine. Likewise, Aho (1994) and Hamm (1994; 1997) have defined the link between Reagan’s administration and the upsurge of the various patriot and militia ideologies. While the “revolutionary” political movement does seem to be losing momentum, it has affected and continues to affect U.S. social rage. Environmental Issues. Essentially, the extreme right’s concern with environmental issues is twofold. They see themselves as rugged individualists, permitted to engage in what some would call exploitation of the environment but what they might call manifest destiny. Moreover, they want no one, especially the federal government, telling them what to do with the environment available to them. Some of the extreme right have the notion that federal lands are their lands to use and mistreat as they see fit; these lands are in fact public lands. In Raban’s (1996) book on rural radicals in Montana, he writes of anti-environmentalism and anti-federalism: Ranchers and farmers, with their wheat subsidies and grazing rights, had more tax dollars in their pockets than any other single group of Americans . . . but if they were grateful for this public largesse, they kept their feelings well concealed. . . . the federal agents of the 1990s were seen as a bunch of officious snoops, full of misbegotten ideas, whose mission it was to destroy the farmers’ and ranchers’ traditional way of life. (p. 252)

Raban’s recognition of Montana rightists’ hatred of federal agencies (Bureau of Land Management, Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Forest Service, etc.) is also reflected by Stern (1997), who has much the same impression of the survivalist right and their perspectives on environmental concerns. He writes: As with gun control, the issues around land use were made for militias: Not only did they involve strongly felt concerns, but also the question of who was “in control” was meat and drink to conspiracy theorists.

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There was a tradition to be built upon: In the 1970s and 1980s the Posse Comitatus had organized farmers who, like loggers, miners, and ranchers today, saw economic hardship or government regulation affecting their ability to make money (p. 119).

The same “twisted history and legal theories” used by the militia were also used by ranchers, loggers, and miners. They believed, or stated that they believed, that their jobs and way of life were being threatened. They had grown dependent on public land for trees to cut, minerals to mine, and grazing lands for their cattle. If legislators for the federal government passed any regulation that restricted their access to these resources, “the regulation must be, by definition, unjust, and those who promoted it must be, by definition, the enemy” (Stern 1997: 124). Religion. On the overlapping issues of militia ideals and repressive, intolerant religious ideals, Egan (1995b) equates “anti-abortion militants” to “the new face of domestic terrorism, not unlike some members of the far-right paramilitary movement” (p. 1). Elsewhere, Egan (1995a) writes that some self-proclaimed Christian leaders have gravitated to the militias. Consider the armed “Christian Patriots” community in Idaho, founded by James (Bo) Gritz, a former Army Special Forces Green Beret, which regularly espouses a mix of Christianity and weaponry talk. In the name of religion, much violence has been wrought, on a worldwide and historical basis. Religion, as a significant element to the survivalist-right movement, is difficult to confront because (a) religious beliefs are taken on faith and cannot be disproved satisfactorily to the believers, and (b) the United States at least gives lip service to protecting religious freedoms. Nevertheless, there seems to be a cycle in which rageful religious groups influence rageful politicians, who in turn are influenced by the militia movement (Nichols 1995). Coates (1995) and others present a great deal of evidence to the effect that the religious component of the survivalist right is to be taken very seriously: some people, in preparation for the end, are willing to die and kill for their beliefs. Witness the death toll at the Branch Davidians compound in Waco, Texas. Consider more broadly that, according to some survivalists, the essentials of survival are “beans, bullets, bandages, and the Bible” (see Lamy 1996 on Christian survivalism). Here we find that survival needs are not only nutritional, medical, and death-dealing, but also spiritual. Hamm (1994; 1997) substantiates the link between religion and rageful violence in his books on skinheads and the Oklahoma City bombing. He writes in 1994: “Throughout the American twentieth century, white extremists have used bizarre forms of Christian fundamental-

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ism as moral justification for their political violence” (p. 198). And, “there is an empirical link between a religious belief and terrorism. And this link is defined by an individual’s capacity for vengeance” (p. 202). The Church of the Creator and the White Man’s Bible, both significant parts of the survivalist right, offer a reinterpretation of Creation. The White Man’s Bible, for instance, states that non-whites were created earlier than whites, God became unhappy and disappointed with the nonwhites, and as a result, created whites. Hamm explains that evidence from other versions of the Bible, such as the King James Version, mean nothing to the devotee of “Creativity” since the devotee “lives in a separate reality. He believes with all his heart that Aryan supremacy is an eternal law of nature” (1994: 204, emphasis mine). The Church of the Creator (COTC) redefines the meaning of sin as it relates to violence: violence is not a sin, indeed, it is an exalted virtue. Members of the COTC have a host of enemies, including African-Americans, race-mixers, Jews, gays and lesbians, and the Zionist Occupied Government. In Hamm’s 1997 book, he focuses on Christian Identity, a significant religion among the survivalist right. He defines Christian Identity as “a theology that gives the blessing of God to the racist cause” (p. 2). Christian Identity is very much concerned with the “Jewish Conspiracy” as found among the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord faction of the survivalist right. At CSA religious services, there were “vibrant celebrations of Nazi occultism [complete with] Third Reich regalia, and typically ended . . . with a Sieg Heil and a tribute to the memory of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi reign of terror” (p. 2). Stern (1997) attends to the religious influences of the survivalist right on Constitutionalism. Constitutionalists, people who believe that the U.S. Constitution is divinely inspired and should be taken literally, are also known as Christian Patriots. In essence, from the Christian Patriot’s point of view: The Constitution and the Bill of Rights were meant to empower white men; any government that wanted to uphold the rest of the Constitution, that is, the amendments that followed the first ten—establishing income taxes, forbidding racial discrimination, enfranchising women—violated the “organic” Constitution and the “common law,” and was, accordingly, illegal and worthy of armed opposition. (p. 69)

Christian Patriots and Christian Identity adherents see white citizens of the United States as “chosen.” Moreover, white men are “state citizens” meaning that they received nothing from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

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amendments (the Thirteenth freed the slaves and the Fourteenth provides equal protection and due process). Since white men do not need any of these amendments, they have no duties under them. As “non-resident aliens” of the United States, whites have no obligation to pay income tax, for example, whereas minorities must pay taxes. The Military. Aho (1994) describes the downsizing of the military as a problem for the rightists, since the pro-military right believe that the United States needs a credible military power. Lamy (1996) concentrates on the Soldiers of Fortune and other paramilitarists, founded by and largely made up of Vietnam veterans, bitter over (in their perspective) betrayal by the government. Aho and Lamy describe the explosion of peoples’ militias and right-wing extremist vigilante groups after the Vietnam War, in the decade after 1975. Besides the embittered Soldiers of Fortune subscribers, there developed the Christian Patriots Defense League, the Posse Comitatus, the Aryan Nations Church (the political-military arm of the Church of Jesus Christ Christians), the White Aryan Resistance (WAR), and the now-defunct Bruders Schweigen, or Order. In support, Stock (1996) emphasizes the sense of betrayal felt by the Vietnam-era veterans and their turn to hate groups, militias, and various survivalist-right organizations. With the end of the Vietnam War, hate groups expanded in size, number, and diversity of beliefs. Nearly all of these hate groups have adopted the paramilitary and survivalist style. The Vietnam War was a devastating experience for all U.S. residents but “most of all to working- and middle-class white men who had believed in the righteousness of the military’s anti-Communist ideology” (p. 170). The Vietnam War, to them, was politically alienating as well as emotionally and psychologically debilitating. The end of the Cold War also enhanced a sort of anomie among the white working class and middle class who may have been predisposed to a military outlook. In short, the conclusions of the Vietnam and Cold Wars deprived rightists of needed enemies and coincidentally strengthened their paramilitary focus (Bellant 1991; Bennett 1995; Coates 1995; Lamy 1996). Regarding the overlap between the militia and the military, Stern (1997) finds that many in and around the militia movement have military experience and currently serve as active-duty service members. Furthermore, militias go out of their way to recruit those with military backgrounds. Through such members, the militia gain legitimacy, weapons experience, and leadership qualities. A significant advantage of military

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members is their capacity to provide weapons. Stern writes that, “Weaponry has been leaking like a sieve from U.S. armories” (p. 156).9 On that very topic, accusations have been leveled at U.S. Marines for weapons trafficking to paramilitary outfits (Johnston 1997). At the Marine base in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Marines have been arrested for stealing weapons (including machine guns, anti-personnel mines, rocket grenades, plastic explosives, detonating cord, hand grenades, Claymore mines, anti-tank weapons, and mortars) and selling them to gun dealers. Law-enforcement officials now have evidence for a decade-long suspicion that militant political groups at Camp Lejeune are supplying paramilitary organizations with stolen weaponry. According to Red Beckman, a leader of a paramilitary group in Montana, “We have a tremendous number of people inside the National Guard, Navy, Army, Marines who would turn on the government if they started something” (cited in Applebome 1995c: 19). Guns and Weaponry. The interest in weaponry, especially as seen in the right to own guns and lightly veiled as Second Amendment rights, makes sense given that (a) many in the survivalist right have prior experience in the military, and therefore, with guns and (b) survivalists see guns as important to survival. There are, of course, many former military people who have no interest in guns, and survivalists who do not see guns as pertinent to survival. But in general, there does seem to be an overlap (see Lamy 1996). Applebome (1995c) finds that extremism is, increasingly, heavily armed. He interviewed Danny Welch (director of Klanwatch, Southern Poverty Law Center), who said that there has been an “arms race” within the white-supremacy movement. There have been for some time substantial caches of weapons and explosives, usually used for less ambitious projects than the Oklahoma City bombing. The extreme right have many weapons and explosives arsenals; the contents are used for exploding churches and synagogues, diversity-related museums, public housing projects, as well as for assassinating individual enemies. When police stopped members of the “security team” for Mark Koernke (the radio talk-show host and organizer of the Michigan Militia) on a routine traffic violation, they found three military assault rifles, semiautomatic pistols, a revolver, 700 rounds of armor-piercing ammunition, 21 magazines, knives, bayonets, and other weaponry supplies (Applebome 1995c). There are many incidents like this, so numerous that I fear I will overwhelm the reader, involving groups as diverse as the Texas Emergency Reserve, The Order, Order II, Aryan Nations, Blue Ridge Hunt

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Club, Citizens for Christ, the Minnesota Patriots Council (all paramilitary groups), and a variety of individual citizens seeming to act on their own. Some get their weapons from the military, as stated above. But most weapons are freely and legally available at gun shops, gun shows, and through publications. Worcester (1995) blames the mainstream conservative political figures and parties for encouraging the survivalist-right attachment to guns. Spokespersons for Gun Owners of America and the Committee to Protect Family Foundation (a fund-raising front for Operation Rescue) speak alongside militia figures and funnel money into the coffers of sympathetic political figures. Recall that the founder of Gun Owners of America, Larry Pratt, was, until he resigned, co-chair of Patrick Buchanan’s 1996 U.S. presidential campaign. Pratt had urged the formation of armed militias. After the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents in 1992 and 1993 respectively, right-wing politics marched in lockstep with the radical right on matters of gun control (Hamm 1997). (Recall that both events had largely to do with the right to own weaponry, on a small scale with Randy Weaver of Ruby Ridge and on a large scale with the Branch Davidians of Waco.) The spokesperson for the National Rifle Association staged a media blitz that found a “receptive audience among the newly elected Republican leaders in the U.S. Senate and Congress” (p. 117). NRA membership dues edged toward an all-time high following Waco, and the NRA became one of the nation’s largest and wealthiest political action committees, contributing $1.5 million to Republican candidates in the 1994 elections. Use of The Media. The focus on the media and its relationship to the survivalist right is two-pronged. The publicly utilized mass media play a large role in enhancing the image of the survivalist right. In addition, the survivalist right have become quite adept at using computer bulletin boards and web sites, public-access television, telephone hotlines, shortwave radio, and printed materials as more covert forms of communication. As to mass media, radio talk-shows and TV have been quick to jump on the bandwagon of presenting, for example, the militia’s side of the story. The mainstream media are focusing on the survivalist right for opportunistic reasons: It sells. The survivalist right are likewise using the mainstream media to their own ends.10 John Tierney’s (1995) New York Times article has a misleading title: “How Talk Radio Gets at What’s Real.” As I have treated the subject in Chapter 2, we find that rageful expressions are not representative of U.S.

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reality, not generalizable to the population at all.11 However, as Mark Hamm (1997) has described it, “perceptions are everything” in the media (p. 228). Perhaps that is what Mr. Tierney is saying as well. He wrote of the Oklahoma City bombing and its aftermath as provoking “angry diatribes, biased rants, arcane conspiracy theories —precisely the kind of unfiltered, untempered speech that gives radio its coarse authenticity” (p. 1). Talk-radio devotees believe that “callers on talk radio have their finger on the pulse of society and that they represent the public” but another explanation is that “regular listeners to talk radio [are] all too familiar with the mentality of paranoid extremists” (p. 1). At any rate, radio talk shows have repeatedly been blamed as fomenters of right-wing hatred. Tierney finds that radio talk-show hosts and listeners have a decidedly right-wing bias and are disproportionately conservative. Exit polls in the November 1994 election showed that frequent talk-show listeners voted Republican by a 3 to 1 margin. Compared to liberals, conservatives are not only more likely to listen to talk radio, they are more likely to call in when they listen, and more likely to get on the air when they do call. Tierney also makes a useful distinction between the standards of the more widely respected press compared to those of talk radio. The former is presumed to be a voice of reason and filter for truth. Injudicious statements or factual errors require a correction or an apology. By such standards, G. Gordon Liddy is clearly guilty of irresponsibility for his advice to those who believe themselves to be victims of government persecution. The reader will recall that G. Gordon Liddy, a rabid radio talk-show host, advised his listeners to shoot Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents in the head or groin area. The reader may also recall that, after giving this controversial advice, Mr. Liddy was named winner of the 1995 Freedom of Speech Award by the National Association of Radio Talk Show Hosts (New York Times 1995). When a San Bernadino radio station dropped Liddy’s show in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing and Liddy’s remarks about shooting federal agents, the station was targeted with bomb and death threats. One caller called in to the station saying, “You are all going to die” (The Progressive 1995b). Besides advising his listeners to shoot federal agents, Liddy has been quite personal in his targets. He has recommended that listeners use “stick figures named Bill and Hillary for riflery practice” (Hamm 1997: 213). Johnson (1995b) writes that if terrorists attend militia meetings or tune in occasionally to World Wide Christian Radio, they are exposed to simplistic, hate-filled thinking. Talk radio is a “medium suited to strong

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opinion strongly stated” (Stern 1997). There is no pretense of fairness but only entertainment. Unfortunately, this “entertainment” can be taken seriously as we find when G. Gordon Liddy is quoted by militia leaders at militia meetings. In addition to talk radio, there are the more modern approaches to spreading the survivalist-right message. New technologies have made communications quicker, easier, and cheaper; thereby enhancing rapid formation and growth of the militia movement. Fax networks play a role; shortwave radio is a key organizing tool of militias around the country; but most important is the Internet. The Internet has the advantage of being interactive. Like-minded people around the globe can communicate through computer bulletin boards and newsgroups on the Internet (Stern 1997). In addition, “The anonymity of the Internet was also the perfect culture in which to grow the virus of conspiracy theory. Messages appeared on the screen with no easy way to separate junk from the credible” (p. 228). Through far-right newspapers (such as the Liberty Lobby’s Spotlight) and other media (telephone hotlines, fax, Internet, shortwave radio), radical rightists have become cohesive. The information age has facilitated international outreach (Worcester 1995). We find, as reported by the Anti-Defamation League in 1997, a rise in the use of computer bulletin boards. There are dozens of sites in cyberspace celebrating white supremacy, anti-Semitism, anti-government fervor, and denial of the Holocaust. In recent years, the number of such sites has doubled, to 250 or more (Janofsky 1997). MEMBERSHIP OF THE SURVIVALIST RIGHT In some ways, the survivalist right seem composed of ordinary people. As bombings in the United States occurred more frequently, terrorism went “homespun” (Egan 1996). Egan depicts paramilitary bombers as regular folks, as family men and women who, at potluck dinners, discuss how to build bombs. Aho (1994) seems to agree with Egan. Of the neoNazis whom Aho has met in Idaho, he describes them as married churchgoers, as “indistinguishable intellectually and educationally from their more conventional peers” (p. 68). However, there is quite a bit of evidence to the contrary based on broader samplings. To the extent that they are ordinary, the people who comprise the membership of survivalist-right groups are rural, white, un-

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employed or under-employed, working-class, not well-educated men (Smith 1994). In answering the question of who joins the skinheads and like groups, Hamm (1994) answers that they are hard-working, industrious white people, with a commitment to working-class living standards. Most far-right terrorists, he says, come from blue-collar backgrounds and hold down blue-collar jobs themselves. They are blue-collar in family backgrounds, blue-collar in their aspirations, and blue-collar in their consciousness. Many of them are emotional cripples regarding their tolerance for minorities, Jews, and homosexuals. Many members of the public who are sympathetic to the survivalistright cause may not be actual members of a survivalist-right group. They may complain about the unfairness of taxes and their distrust of the government, but they do not participate in any survivalist-right activity. Kaplan (1997), discussing the Church of the Creator, applies the nomenclature “righteous remnant” and “part-time revolutionaries” to describe the less-committed far right. He finds that the adherents of the COTC “are highly idiosyncratic,” professing fealty to no one. The COTC membership “is diffuse and no more substantial than a name on an application form and sufficient funds to pay dues and buy literature” (pp. 37–38). Addressing the remnant qualities of the COTC, Kaplan writes: Adopting the life of the full-time revolutionary is extremely rare in the world of the radical right. Radical right violence is primarily an impulsive act, carried out by part-time revolutionaries against convenient targets of opportunity or symbols of some change in the status quo. (p. 65)

Organizationally, the leaders are much different from the followers. The leaders understand, as do all successful leaders of organizations (corporations, political units, social groups, etc.) how to get things accomplished. The successful survivalist-right leaders are cool-headed entrepreneurs, in private if not on stage. They express themselves and their ideologies very strongly because the members need them to. Their strong expressions fire enthusiasm and get the point across to the already-convinced and to the unconvinced. The leaders and members of the survivalist right hope their organizations will be dynamic and will grow via increasing memberships. There is an important distinction between doers and talkers. According to Hamm (1997), a transforming set of events for the survivalist right was Ruby Ridge and Waco.

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The resulting sense of betrayal . . . transformed a group of law-abiding dissidents into a social movement increasingly disrespectful of legal norms and less resistant to the rhetoric of violence. This left allies with only two options: to withdraw into the milieu of the radical right or to resort to the “propaganda of the deed.” The majority took the first option, finding solace in the strident rhetoric of the nascent militia movement, the religious right, radio talk shows, and the Internet. The Oklahoma City bombers took the second option. (p. 117)

Terrorism would not be possible without direct and indirect support from others. Hamm delineates the sources of direct and indirect support for the doers. Direct support can come from other members of the aggrieved population [for example, allies of the Waco cause], other terrorist groups, philanthropists, or even other states and their national security organizations. Sources of indirect support may be unlimited . . . writers, poets, politicians, government agents, university professors, lawyers, and media figures ranging from journalists and broadcasters to rock musicians and movie stars. Indirect support can also come from those closer to the terrorist: family members, friends, and lovers. These actors play a vital role in the conspiracy because they provide not only ideological justification for terrorism but also money, information, training, safe housing, and recruits. (pp. 118–119)

Related to the doers-and-talkers dichotomy, some skinheads have committed acts of terrorism and others have not (Hamm 1994). Both terrorists and nonterrorists have strong feelings of alienation regarding matters of politics and economics, suggesting that alienation may be present in many, but does not necessarily lead to terrorist acts. However, reading terrorist and racist literature inclines one toward action; it “provides the necessary stimulus for terrorism” (p. 141). In short, there are many members of militias and other survivalistright groups who would not engage in bombing, for example, but do share the same belief systems as their more actively involved fellow members. Are they as rageful as the militia members who espouse extreme behaviors, such as violence, and who act on their beliefs? Perhaps, but they may be more interested in staying out of legal trouble and, therefore, will not violate the law in order to prove a point. Growth in Membership. I have wondered since the beginning of my research on this topic whether we can obtain accurate measures of survivalist-right membership. Estimates range from 10,000 to 40,000

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militia members in the United States (Stern 1997). But we are, after all, dealing with a social group known for exaggeration. Moreover, the militia seem to be very interested in giving forth an image of grand size and strength. Stern (1997) wisely points out that “today’s militias confuse the idea of ‘membership in’ with that of ‘definition of’ the militia” (p. 114). For this reason, we must be very cautious in taking their membership estimates as valid. Janofsky (1995) reports that the Oklahoma City bombing itself, enacted by paramilitary forces, has attracted membership to these organizations rather than discouraged it. A report by the Anti-Defamation League, cited by Janofsky, suggests that while some paramilitary groups have lost membership, others have gained, the end result being that the “gains plainly appear to outweigh losses.” Rosenthal (1997) states that, since the Oklahoma City bombing until 1996, there has been a 6 percent increase in the militia membership. From this we may presume that militia memberships had been invigorated by the bombing. The editors for the New York Times (1997) describe roughly the same pattern. State officials report that some moderates in the militia movement have left the movement, being repulsed by the actions at the Oklahoma City bombing. However, Timothy McVeigh has become a martyr for the hard-core militia and Terry Nichols’ (who had closer militia connections) trial “may provide the faithful with an even more inspiring cause” (p. 18). In addition to the 10,000 and 40,000 militia members in Stern’s (1997) estimates, there may be hundreds of thousands, or millions, of sympathizers. Citing Ken Toole of the Montana Human Rights Network, we come to understand the funnel concept of militia membership. People are attracted to the militia on the basis of a funnel moving through space. At the front end, it’s picking up lots and lots of people by hitting on issues that have wide appeal, like gun control and environmental restrictions. . . . Then you go a little bit further into the funnel, and it’s about ideology, about the oppressiveness of the federal government. Then, further in, you get into the belief systems. . .. Then, it’s about the antiSemitic conspiracy. Finally, at the narrowest end of the funnel, you’ve drawn in the hard core. . . . The bigger the front end of the funnel . . ., the bigger the number that get into the core. (p. 107)

Smith (1994) finds that right wingers who remain right wingers move in a more radical direction. Generally, these individuals became involved with smaller, more radical groups as an outgrowth of their rightist

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affiliations. A beginning Klan membership is “merely a first stop on the long road to extremism” (p. 55). Hamm (1994) documents the fluctuations in far-right memberships in the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi Party, and other rightists over the years. He has found the same pattern as Smith, that those rightists who do not leave the far right become more extreme. That is, those who remain loyal drift toward extreme forms of activism. Movement across Groups and Themes. To make the measurement of membership and growth in membership more confusing, we find that within the survivalist right, individuals may move from one group to another and may belong to more than one group. This is not too astonishing since most people belong to a number of formal or informal associations, all with some continuous themes.12 For example, it is not unlikely that a person who is sympathetic to the Klan is also sympathetic to the Aryan Nation, Christian Identity, and so on. We have already seen that as rightists stay with the far-right cause, compared to those who drop out, they grow more and more extreme in their views, their affiliations, and their commitments. There is not much evidence of single-issue constituencies, but rather, for most adherents we find an interlocking composite of beliefs about taxes, gun control, and so on. The rightists are aware of these overlapping themes and may see them as advantageous. Christian Identity minister Pete Peters sees a beneficial outcome to the convergence of “men . . . who in the past would normally not be caught together under the same roof, “ such as neoNazis, Christian Identity adherents, anti-choice activists, tax protestors, and the KKK. These various groups may view each other as ideological and organizational adversaries, but, importantly, the additional numbers add strength to the whole (Stern 1997: 35–36). CONCLUSION: WHAT TO DO? The militia movement has not only its “military arm” but also a “legal arm,” a very disturbing development, according to Stern (1997). At least one hundred vigilante “common-law courts” have been established around the country in recent times (p. 7). He adds that whenever the far right talk of “states’ rights” or “county supremacy,” it is a cover for bigotry. When a political movement rejects the idea of common values, this movement hopes to do things that are objectionable, and hopes to do them undisturbed and unnoticed. Moreover, the militias want to “remake America into a weak whole comprising fifty herculean states that can do as they

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wish, without any guarantee that the rights of all Americans will be protected no matter in what part of the country they live” (pp. 219-220). Perspectives on what to do about the survivalist right range from clamping down on them legally to informal sanctioning. The danger of clamping down on them legally is that it might substantiate the survivalist right’s point, that they are being suppressed. Clamping down also has the potential disadvantage of making the violent more secretively violent. Finally, and as paradoxical as it may seem, formal and forceful sanctioning measures are often ineffective. Among those who propose doing something legal is Morris Dees. His approach is to bankrupt the organizations and individuals involved, which has worked remarkably well in undoing the Klan and the White Aryan Resistance (Dees and Fiffer 1993; Dees and Corcoran 1996). Dees and Zelikow (1995) provide a history of how militias and racist groups have been controlled in the United States in various time periods (1886, 1944, etc.). They put forth in no uncertain terms that “Congress should enact a law that bans militias that operate as private military organizations and are not authorized by state law” (p. 15). We already have similar state laws against domestic terrorism, which have been successful in lawsuits. There is probably a limit, though, to what laws can do. While Dees and Zekilow’s ideas about banning private militias are probably correct, President Clinton’s response to the Oklahoma City bombing has not been without controversy. He expanded the powers of the FBI and stepped up efforts to pass his Omnibus Counter-terrorism Act, complete with items like tagging bomb-making materials. Actions like this only feed the paranoia, already rampant in right-wing groups. Worse yet, comprehensive surveillance diminishes the freedom of all members of the society (The Progressive 1995a). Hamm (1997) also seems to think that federal intervention only makes things worse. At the same time, he believes that federal law enforcement should have intervened more in the McVeigh case, to interrupt the course of action eventually taken in the Oklahoma City bombing. Aho (1994) suggests more of an individualist approach such that, on an individual basis, members of the far right can establish ties with nonmembers who display the rewards, such as enhanced self-esteem, available to those who renounce hate. This strategy assumes that (a) members of the far right have poor self-esteem and (b) they are willing to even consider defection from the far right. A more likely approach that Aho suggests is grassroots demonstrations that run counter to the far right,

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and he gives examples as they occurred in Idaho. Grassroots activities on the part of non-rightists show the rightists that they are not all-powerful and that they are not the only game in town. Rosenthal (1997) levels the blame at many groups for not responding vigorously to the militia movement: governors, state attorneys, Congress, the Republican and Democratic Parties, the President, the press, and the public. As to the public, the best approach might be for the public to marginalize the militia, as Stern (1997) suggests. As it stands, many are intimidated by the militia. The public standing together against the far right would reduce the far right’s feeling of freedom to engage in their special brands of terrorism. NOTES 1

There is a great deal of literature on the skinhead movement, activities, and membership in the U.S. and elsewhere (see, for example, Hamm 1994; Ezekiel 1995; Dees and Fiffer 1993). We must bear in mind that skinheads vary as much as any organization of people. Although they tend to be homogenous in race and socioeconomic status, they vary in terms of their belief systems and their willingness to engage in violence. Almost all have a strong sense of race, specifically that the Aryan race is superior to all others and that Jews and AfricanAmericans are inferior in particular. However, some (some would argue, many) skinheads have almost no ideology, no political or social understanding of the purpose for their organization and actions. On the other hand, skinheads vary in their belief in the existence of ZOG (Zionist Occupied Government) and their religious beliefs (some are deeply and fundamentally Christian). 2 In a way, the paranoia and conspiracy theories speak to a group of people who believe that they are personally important to powerful entities. 3 Kelly (1996) finds that the radical fringes of the left and the right, both believing that the government conspires against them, have formed an alliance. He calls it “fusion paranoia” and states that it is reaching millions of disaffected U.S. citizens. 4 The Order, a white-supremacist militia organization in Washington State, was guided in its origination by William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries, and much influenced by Louis Beam (previously of the Klan and now of the Aryan Nations). Members of the Order were to try to gain “points” to stay in good standing within the group. Points could be accumulated through violent acts and, preferably, through assassinations of targeted minorities or ZOG. The points were based on a decimal system, with the goal being to reach a score of 1, to earn the status of “Aryan warrior.” Killing a liberal sociologist only gains the

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warrior 1/500 of a point, an obvious measure if our “worth.” The president of the United States is worth one whole point (Aho 1994;Coates 1995). 5 Of course, the survivalist right are not the only people who have a “need” for an enemy. Various cultures throughout time have constructed enemies, purely out of need, these enemies being very helpful to the cause promoted by the constructors. During wars, cultures are adept at creating enemies, often out of people who may have been allies and friends previously. Cultural messages, such as propaganda during wartime, point to histories of enemy cultures as proof of their treachery and general inferiority. Cultural messages attached to the enemy’s traits indicate why they should be considered the enemy; for example, their dishonesty, their untrustworthiness, their thieving ways, their poor manners, their sexual misconduct, and so on. In addition to entire cultures, segments of cultures engage in this same kind of process on a smaller scale, not necessarily during “special” periods such as war, but on a more constant basis. We find this more continuous construction of enemies among those who hold prejudicial attitudes and engage in discrimination against any number of human categories. They create and “substantiate” their enemy categories with empirically unfounded belief systems. 6 There is a great deal written about the New World Order. Little makes sense to one who is disinclined to believe in it. In a nutshell, the NWO was a term used by former President George Bush. The term and its relevance to globalization unintentionally dredged up grand conspiracy theories in the minds of the survivalist right. According to the survivalist right, the New World Order is comprised of Jews and elites who plan to take over the lives of ordinary U.S. citizens. 7 And then there is the survivalist right’s lack of humor. Several writers have noticed this. Militia members, for example, are not just serious, they are often grim and cantankerous. A sense of humor may be a sign that the person who possesses one can see things from more than one perspective, is able to understand (and accept) that absurdities are absurdities, and that world events are not necessarily personal or meant to destroy them. Perhaps the survivalist right do not think things are funny because what we would call absurdities to them are not absurdities. Anecdotally, rageful people in the mainstream and outside the mainstream also do not seem to have much of a sense of humor. 8 I am reminded of the discoveries made over 20 years ago by feminist writers on various gender topics, but particularly rape. “Protective” or “chivalrous” men were determined to be protective of “their own” women, from abuse by other men, but there is an element of extortion to this “protection.” The “protected” woman has to be subservient to her protector. 9 Note especially the Special Forces influence in the military and the survivalist-right movement. The special forces are trained killers who, except under

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unusual circumstances (like war), are denied their chance to kill. Denied of a foreign enemy, they may substitute a domestic enemy, in the form of the federal government and U.S. minorities. There is also an overlap between the survivalist right and law enforcement. Stern (1997) and Bushart, Craig, and Barnes (1998) finds that local law-enforcement officers are represented among the militia in greater numbers than would be expected by chance. The militias actively recruit local law-enforcement officers and some-law enforcement officers seem drawn to the militias. Interestingly, Randy Weaver (the key figure in the survivalist-right event at Ruby Ridge) wanted to become an FBI agent; the FBI later became his enemy (Stern). 10 In a conversation with Raphael Ezekiel, a psychologist at Harvard University and scholar on the Klan and skinhead movements, he and I agreed on the foolhardiness of appearing at media events with the survivalist right. I had just been asked to debate John Trochman, leader of the Militia of Montana, on a Seattle TV news show, and had declined. The feelings that Rafe and I share on this matter and our consequent refusal to debate the survivalist right is that there really can be no argument with people who base their argument on belief systems. Moreover, our “opponents” are verbose, expressive, and emotional, which, strange as it may seem, make their “arguments” seem more legitimate to the uninformed, to the less than thoughtful, to the uninitiated. 11 In interviewing residents of Kingman, Arizona (a stronghold of the survivalist right), Roane (1995) cites one as saying, “People are going to rise up. There’s going to be a war [against the government]. You can hear it on A.M. radio.” This suggests that radio talk shows are definers of “truth.” 12 That is the key to clever marketing schemes, as the reader may be painfully aware. If one or more bits of information are known about an individual, then many more bits of information may be conjectured; thereby allowing for a targeting of that individual for additional solicitations. Likewise, it can be assumed that a Klan member may also be suitable for Aryan Nations, Christian Identity, and other relevant memberships.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Aho, James A. 1995. The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith. 1994. Fact-Finding Report. Armed and Dangerous: Militias Take Aim at the Federal Government. Washington, DC: The Anti-Defamation League Printing Office.

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Applebome, Peter. 1995a. “An Unlikely Legacy of the 60s: The Violent Right.” New York Times, May 7, pp. A1, A18. Applebome, Peter. 1995b. “Radical Right’s Fury Boiling Over.” New York Times, April 23, p. A13. Applebome, Peter. 1995c. “Increasingly, Extremism Is Heavily Armed.” New York Times, April 30, p. A19. Ballard, John A., and Aliecia J. McDowell. 1991. “Hate and Combat Behavior.” Armed Forces and Society 17:229–241. Bellant, Russ. 1991. Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party. Boston, MA: South End Press. Bennett, David H. 1995. The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement. New York,NY: Vintage Books. Berlet, Chip, and Matthew N. Lyons. 1995. “Militia Nation.” The Progressive 59:22–25. Berry, Bonnie. 1996. “The Vandalism and Violent Demise of Political Correctness.” Quarterly Journal of Ideology 19: 23–33. Blee, Kathleen M. 1991. Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bushart, Howard L., John R. Craig, and Myra Barnes. 1998. Soldiers of God: White Supremacists and Their Holy War for America. New York,NY: Kensington Publishing. Coates, James. 1995. Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right. New York,NY: Hill and Wang. Dees, Morris, with James Corcoran. 1996. Gathering Storm: America’s Militia Threat. New York,NY: Harper Collins Publishers. Dees, Morris, and Steve Fiffer. 1993. Hate on Trial: The Case against America’s Most Dangerous Neo-Nazi. New York,NY: Villard Books. Dees, Morris, and Philip Zekilow. 1995. “Ban Private Military Groups.” New York Times, May 7, p. E15. Egan, Timothy. 1995a. “Inside the World of the Paranoid.” New York Times, April 30, pp. D1, D5. Egan, Timothy. 1995b. “Conspiracy Is an Elusive Target in Prosecuting Foes of Abortion.” New York Times, June 18, pp. A1, A9. Egan, Timothy. 1996. “Terrorism Now Going Homespun as Bombings in the U.S. Spread.” New York Times, August 25, pp. A1, A10. Ezekiel, Raphael S. 1995. The Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen. New York,NY: Penguin Books. Gaines, Frederick. 1996. Sweet Ike. A play, performed at George Mason University Theatre.

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Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 1996. Rebuttal to Criticisms of his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners. The New Republic 4275:37–45 Hamm, Mark S. 1994. American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. Ivins, Molly. 1995. “Fertilizers of Hate.” The Progressive 59: 46. Janofsky, Michael. 1995. “Paramilitary Groups Gain New Members Since Oklahoma City Bombing, Study Says.” New York Times, June 18, p. A12. Janofsky, Michael. 1997. “Anti-Defamation League Tells of Rise in Web Hate Sites.” New York Times, October 22, p. A17. Johnson, Dirk. 1995a. “Americans See Strangers in Their Midst.” New York Times, May 14, pp.A1, A15. Johnson, George. 1995b. “The Conspiracy That Never Ends.” New York Times, April 30, p. A5. Johnston, David. 1997. “Marines Accused of Weapons Trafficking.” New York Times, October 17, p. A14. Kaplan, Jeffrey. 1997. Radical Religion in America: Millenarian Movements from the Far Right to the Children of Noah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Kelly, Michael. 1996. “The Road to Paranoia.” The New Yorker June 19:60–75. Kramer, Michael. 1995. “Time to Stop Shouting.” Time Magazine 145:66. Lamy, Philip. 1996. Millennium Rage: Survivalists, White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. New York: Plenum Press. New York Times. 1995. “Talk-Show Group Honors Liddy.” New York Times, May 18, p. A8. New York Times. 1997. “The Militia Threat.” New York Times, June 14, p. A18. Nichols, John. 1995. “Righter Than Thou.” The Progressive 59:30–33. Pierce, William L. (Andrew MacDonald). 1978. The Turner Diaries. Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books. The Progressive. 1995a. “The Far Right Is Upon Us.” The Progressive 59:8–10. The Progressive. 1995b. “No Comment.” The Progressive 59: 11. Raban, Jonathan. 1996. Bad Land: An American Romance. New York: Pantheon Books. Roane, Kit R. 1995. “In Arizona Desert Town, Suspicion Walks Streets.” New York Times, June 18, p. A8. Rosenthal, A.M. 1997. “The Traitor Movement.” New York Times, June 20, p. A15. Ross, Loretta J. 1995. “Saying It with a Gun.” The Progressive 59:26–27.

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Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1986. The Cycles of American History. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Smith, Brent L. 1994. Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Stengel, Richard. 1995. “White Right.” The New Republic 4193:14, 16. Stern, Kenneth S. 1997. A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Stout, David. 1995. “Broadcast Suspensions Raise Free-Speech Issues.” New York Times, April 30, p. A18. Thomas, Jo. 1997. “Trial Begins in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case.” New York Times, April 25, pp. A1, A14. Tierney, John. 1995. “How Talk Radio Gets at What’s Real.” New York Times, April 30, E1, E3. Time Magazine. 1995. “The Terror From Within.” Time Magazine 145:43. Verhovek, Sam Howe. 1997. “The Emotional Politics of a Political Trial.” New York Times, April 27, pp. E1, E6. Vest Jason. 1995. “Leader of the Fringe.” The Progressive 59: 8–29. Weiner, Tim. 1995. “F.B.I. Hunts 2d Suspect and Seeks Far-Right Ties.” New York Times, April 23, pp. A1, A2. Worcester, Kent. 1995. “The Right and the Politics of Rage.” New Politics 5:5–7.

CHAPTER 4

Social Rage against Crime, Criminals, and Crime Control

The term “expressive justice” refers to laws, policies, and practices that are designed more to vent communal outrage than to reduce crime. (David C. Anderson 1995b: 14) Criminology, the study of criminal behavior, is part of the social and behavioral sciences. As such, it is subject to interpretation by non-scientists, who base their opinions regarding matters criminological upon personal experience and feelings. People untrained in social and behavioral sciences believe that what is known through our research is just “common sense”; and that social and behavioral sciences, sociology and psychology particularly, are non-sciences. The result is that social and behavioral scientists, as well as the public, are fair game for “expert” advice received from people untrained in the social and behavioral sciences. Part of the disrespect for social and behavioral sciences comes from a misconceived and unfavorable comparison to the “hard” sciences. Hard sciences, to the uninitiated, are thought to be objective, valid, reliable, and trustworthy; whereas “soft” sciences are viewed as subjective and the findings, ambiguous. What many people, including some scientists, do not realize is that all sciences are subjective (Faia 1993; Smith and Berry 1996). Moreover, some people set themselves up as experts on crime control and criminology because they apply their own experiences and feelings to all people. Because they are human beings, they believe that they know all there is to know about other human behavior and motives. They 89

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interpret other peoples’ behaviors and motives in light of their own, generalizing to others what they themselves have experienced. The selfnamed experts are puzzled when confronted with the reality that what would deter them from criminal behavior does not deter others. At the risk of waxing elementary, peoples’ lives vary on important dimensions. A person’s race, gender, nationality, socioeconomic status, (dis)abilities, and other basic characteristics affect how that person is perceived and treated on a daily and lifelong basis. Societal reactions to these basic characteristics affect how people feel about themselves, and what they see as their capabilities and their life chances. The fact that people live within a set of social conditions (poverty, wealth, etc.) and that these social conditions influence how they feel and behave can be immensely confusing to those untrained in social and behavioral sciences. One might call it narrow-mindedness. I would call it a lack of awareness. As a university professor of many years, I have grappled with students resistance—and that of the public in general—to understand the perspective of “the other.” Many people seem to believe that, even though important life circumstances vary across people, all people can be expected to conduct their lives as if they have experienced the same circumstances. Take one social characteristic, socioeconomic status, and its relationship to criminal behavior. Alfred Blumstein finds that people who are in economically-advantaged positions do not see that their experience, expectations, and so on are not relevant for others. The middle class “recognize that the threat of imprisonment keeps them from committing crimes, and so it should work comparably with others who commit crimes. They then seem to take the position that, if current sanctions are not working, they should be increased in order to cross a response threshold” (1995: 267). But for them to fully understand the class and crime interaction, it would be helpful for the middle class to realize that they have something to lose; they have had a lifetime of knowing that they have something to lose. As laid out in the introductory chapter, the United States has been in a phase of simplistic thinking, poor education, fierce internal economic competition, and intense negative emotion. Broad social features, such as economics, education, politics, and so on affect how a society, on the whole, views crime and responses to crime. Speaking especially to correctional strategies as social control, Thomas Blomberg and Stanely Cohen (1995) write that forms of punishment are closely related to social trends, such as free-market ideology. The correctional system, specifi-

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cally, “both reflects and creates these wider social trends” rather than being driven by utilitarian concerns of “what works” (1995: 8).1 Nils Christie (1993) describes succinctly the U.S. view that our crimecontrol industry is infinitely expandable. Furthermore, we seem to believe that an expanded crime-control system (more prisons, more prisoners) is a good thing. Such a point of view represents an irrational reaction to crime, since it is known scientifically that increased criminal-justice intervention, rather than reducing crime, is more likely to increase measured crime (Berry 1985; 1986; 1994; 1997; forthcoming; Hagan 1994; Irwin and Austin 1994; Roberts 1994; Elikann 1996). Much of my earlier work in the study of corrections finds that the law of the instrument operates in the practice of criminal justice. This means that new technologies and developments in social control (such as electronic monitoring) are applied even if there is no reason to expect them to control criminal behavior. Upon discovery that the new techniques do not work, they are continually applied regardless of economic cost or human-rights violations. Irwin and Austin researched “America’s imprisonment binge,” as they refer to our massive prison construction and expansion program. Quantitative evidence documents that increased incarceration does not seem to reduce societal-level crime. Of a related nature, Hagan compares U.S. crime rates with other societies and discovers that we have more of particular kinds of crime, specifically violent, and that our increased incarceration rates have done nothing to abate any kinds of crime as perpetrated in our society. Finally, Elikann focuses on our almost surreal incarceration rates, especially in response to drug offenses. He finds that incarceration does not reduce drug offenses and the crimes associated with drug offenses; and that the money spent on incarceration could be better spent on social needs such as drug treatment, as well as more general needs of the populace, such as education and health care. In essence, our correctional system is imposed on more people without a corresponding abatement of crime. Moreover, our crime-control system reflects the rage we are encouraged to feel from the mass media, political figures, and grassroots organizations. Our reactions in the past couple of decades particularly have been dysfunctional insofar as controlling crime. FACTS: WHAT IS KNOWN EMPIRICALLY What is known scientifically is that public perception of crime, criminals, and crime control is much different than the reality of crime, crimi-

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nals, and crime control. Yet, strange as it may sound, if the public knew the truth, their attitudes about what to do with criminals may not change. For instance, we know that, based on official FBI statistics, violent crime is not higher now than it was in the 1970s but that violent crime has dropped impressively (Butterfield 1997). Yet the public continues to be very much afraid of crime. We also know that the success rate for prison furlough program is 99.5 percent, but victims’ testimonies provide heavy emotional, non-numerical counterweight against furlough programs. Indeed, victims become enraged that they and their particular victimizations account for a very small percentage of crimes (Anderson 1995a; 1995b). Crime scholars know that many of the tough-on-crime policies of the 1980s and 1990s have been tried before, with no greater success then versus now (Friedman 1993). One would think that inattention to history would not apply to a problem so seemingly widespread and so troublesome as crime. Imagine that, instead of crime, we are talking about a medical disease and further imagine that medical researchers are not taking notice of previously-tried procedures (medications, surgeries, vaccines). Now imagine that the public is demanding that the medical community apply techniques that are known to not only be ineffective, but to worsen the problem.2 Politicians, notably, behave as though they are not interested in the facts about crime and crime control; they are interested in being elected or re-elected. Similarly, the media are interested in high ratings, guaranteed by “true-crime” stories. Hatred of Numbers. Some people, such as victims’ groups, find statistics abhorrent and irrelevant. Social statistics are not considered accurate representations of reality, as though they are intentionally misleading and contrived by scientists. For victims and victims’ groups, statistics are seen as part of the problem. Unfortunately, “‘statistics’ became a code word for softness on crime and callousness toward its victims” (Anderson 1995b: 201); this hatred of numbers has made a “casualty of the truth” (Anderson 1995a: 36). David Rothman reminds us that, “Opinion and data . . . need not jibe. . . . Public responses appear to be framed not by overall crime statistics as by events in people’s own neighborhoods or by what they read or hear about through the media” (1995: 36). The fearful public becomes very upset, even rageful, when confronted with statistics about how tough-on-crime measures have not worked. I am not the only social scientist to state that the facts do not matter, especially when it comes to crime (Loeb 1994; Berry 1994; 1996a). It is

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well-documented by now that foundationless, harsh responses to crime, even if they “make sense,” do not reduce crime but often increase crime and certainly increase cost. Part of the reason for ineffective crime control is the aforementioned inattention to history and the abhorrence of statistics. Lawrence Friedman (1993) has written a comprehensive history of criminal punishment in the United States. He describes in detail many punishments that have been tried repeatedly, while the failure rates do not seem to vary. Consider one example, the three-strikes-you’re-out law, passed recently at the behest of a citizens’ group. The three-strikes law has had several precursors in many states over the past century; for example, a nearly identical law was passed in Ohio in 1885. The threestrikes type of laws have had different names, such as the “habitual offender” statutes, but the purpose, application, and outcome have remained the same. Knowing that one may spend the rest of one’s life in prison does not significantly reduce recidivism. It would be unrealistic to expect that the public, political figures, and the media would be aware of the history of punishment. One might retort that people —political people in particular, but generally anybody calling for changes in punishment policy—should make it their business to know the history and evolutions of crime-control strategies. Clines (1995) describes ignorance of history as strongly relevant to a thirst for vengeance. The thirst for vengeance allows a dismissal of history and thereby guarantees ineffectiveness. It does not matter, for example, that the death penalty has never deterred crime, and the weight of the evidence to this effect is staggering (see, for instance, Bedau 1997). What matters is that we satisfy our blood lust. It does not even matter, according to Verhovek (1995), that we execute innocent people. When confronted with the ex post facto reality that an executed person was innocent of the crime for which he was executed, some say, “Well, he probably did something.” True enough. Many of us have done something, but to punish a person wrongfully does not constitute justice; nor does it deter crime. On a less tragic scale, but still an absurd practice regarding the connection between harshness and effective crime control, Thomas Blomberg (1994) notes that prison boot camps are a result of public outcry. (Let me add here that boot camps and other alternatives to sentences are considered harsh in comparison to community corrections. That is, they are harsh punishments in that they are applied, not in lieu of incarceration, but in lieu of probation and less onerous punishments. This is

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also true of electronic monitoring and other punishments that are additional to and beyond that which would be applied in ordinary community corrections, without the strictures of extra conditions, such as electronic monitoring; see Berry 1985; 1986.) Boot camps, Blomberg observes, have achieved higher taxes but no reduction in recidivism. Harsh punishments in the form of mandatory minimum sentences, under which those sentenced serve longer terms than they would otherwise serve, are self-defeating in that they actually increase crime. We know that mandatory minimums mean that violent and dangerous offenders are freed from prison to make room for nonviolent and nondangerous ones sentenced under mandatory minimum statutes (Elikann 1996; Schlosser 1997). Caning, while it appeals to many Americans, would not reduce crime if practiced in the United States. Even though the United States does not have much to fear from vandals (such as the young Ohio man who was caned in Singapore) and U.S. residents would have little tolerance for the repressiveness of Singaporean social rules applied to our own society, we “heartily approved the idea of flogging” and “consider Singapore’s justice a praiseworthy model” (Anderson 1995b: 19; see also Kaminer 1995). Elikann’s (1996) analysis of Singaporean punishment suggests that there is no evidence that torture for Asian, American, or any convicts would lower the crime rate. Indeed, Elikann offers that many Asian countries have crime rates as low as Singapore’s without resorting to beatings or harsh laws (p. 43). Chemical and surgical castration, tried decades before, is once again gaining support across the United States. Few advocates of castration seem to wonder about a well-known social fact: sexual offenses are not about sex, they are about power. As a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union has pointed out: “It’s a simplistic, feel-good piece of legislation that doesn’t get at the root of the problem” (New York Times 1997a). According to Franklin Zimring (cited in Kolata 1996), it is a “folk belief” that castration cuts down on sex offenses. Moreover, Professor Zimring calls the new castration legislation “don’t bother me with the facts” legislation. Still on the topic of sex offenders, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 1997 that violent sex offenders can be confined indefinitely in mental hospitals after their prison term has been served. Here we find two very familiar controversies that philosophers and practitioners have encountered in previous times: whether we can predict human behavior and whether treatment constitutes punishment. Decision-makers in criminal

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justice and mental health constantly commit false-positive and false-negative errors. (False-positive errors refer to mistakenly predicting dangerous behavior and keeping the patient or prisoner confined unnecessarily. A false-negative error refers to falsely predicting that the patient or prisoner is safe for release and she or he subsequently engages in dangerous conduct.) It is not decision-makers’ fault necessarily that they make such errors; it is just that human behavior is extraordinarily complex. Generally, criminal-justice and mental-health decision-makers prefer to err on the side of public safety, retaining the prisoner or patient whom they assume would do harm if left unsupervised. As for treatment versus punishment, long ago, when we at least made a pretense of rehabilitative motives to incarceration, we found that the incarceration experience was quite punishing even though treatment was involved. Confinement in a mental hospital, while the purpose may be benign, is experienced as punitive. Community release of sex offenders has its own hazards. When the community takes matters into its own hands against offenders, we find a semblance of vigilantism in which community residents picket the offender’s home, verbally abuse the offender and his family, and sometimes destroy property (McQuiston 1997). Purdum (1998) reports that a paroled sex offender, released into a California community after serving 13 years in prison, felt threatened by the community to the point of suicide. Under California’s law (a version of Megan’s Law), the police distributed public notices door-to-door in the form of a stark flier about the ex-offender’s former sexual assaults. Five days after the dissemination of the fliers, the ex-offender, who held a job and lived a life without incident, committed suicide. Megan’s Law came about as a result of the rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a twice-convicted child sex offender, and requires that convicted sex offenders register their addresses with the police upon release from prison. The laws also provide for notification of community groups, schools, and (in some cases) immediate neighbors. The released offender is subjected to embarrassment, public humiliation, as well as severe harassment in the form of threatened assaults, property damage, and job loss. Even if one is unsympathetic to the plight of ex-offenders, community responses of this kind constitute another level of punishment beyond the court-ordered sentence already served. There seems to be a collision between competing values: the rights of sex offenders to resume normal lives and the rights of parents to protect their children.

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EMOTION AND CRIME People have feelings, often strong feelings, about crime, criminals, and crime control. I had discussed in an earlier chapter that social rage can come about from violations of expectations, or more broadly, violations of one’s world views. In the case of crime, rageful feelings may be inseparable from puzzlement, fear, anger, and frustration that we experience when confronted with violations of the social contract. The social contract is an unspoken guideline, akin to the golden rule, that most of us use to get along in life. We would like to go on the assumption that other people will not hurt us (steal from us, assault us, and so on), especially if we are doing our part to not hurt anyone else. When this implicit rule is violated, as in explicit violations of the law, we may become rageful that people engage in socially and personally harmful behavior and wonder how we can prevent them from doing so. Emotional reactions to crime are very likely derived from feelings about unfairness: Those of us who play by the rules may be angered by those who do not and who believe that they are above the law. David Garland’s thoughts on the symbolic nature of punishment are relevant here. Punishment is intended to be a method of communication to the criminal offender. Punishment is a system of signs and images, a semiotic conductor, and a way of “saying things with walls.” It is a means of sending a message that the social contract has been violated and that society strongly disapproves (1995: 196). Crime can be defined, at its most basic and most universal level, as an act that is harmful to individuals or to society as a whole. On a slightly more sophisticated level, crime is defined in a legally codified way. The legal code tells us, for instance, what armed robbery is and is not. Legal codification specifies not only the act itself but also the punishment forthcoming with conviction. This legally clear-cut way of defining or describing crime does not seem to make it any easier for societal members to grasp the nature of crime, however. With this legal specification comes strong emotional appeals for greater implementation of the laws, for widening the definition of criminal violations, and for hardening the punishment. Appeals to lessen or to not implement laws are not so successful, given that decriminalization has been suppressed and decriminalizers have been viewed as “soft” on crime—not a socially popular or politically advantageous stance. Ignorance and the Thirst for Vengeance. The criminal justice system is made up of law enforcement, the courts, and corrections. All three criminal-justice components inspire social rage by their attempts and

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perceived failures at controlling crime. I will focus on the correctional component of crime control. There are basically four goals to corrections: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. “Incapacitation” refers to keeping a person contained in such a way that she or he can not pose a menace to society. Prisons serve this purpose: while a person is incarcerated, she or he can only prey on other prisoners or correctional staff. Community corrections such as electronic monitoring, drug testing, and so on are also attempts to keep people’s behavior contained to some degree. “Deterrence” refers to the hope that we can prevent crime through threatened punishment (general deterrence) or prevent further crime through applied punishment (specific deterrence). While deterrence as a correctional goal is rife with logic, its effects have not panned out empirically. General deterrence assumes that, through the threat of punishment, people will be prevented from committing crime. That is, if a person is aware of the existence of onerous punishments (for example, a life sentence or execution), learns by example of other peoples’ punishments, and as a result, elects not to engage in crime, she or he is generally deterred. If a person has already personally experienced punishment for a crime, and elects to not commit another crime because of this punishment experience, she or he has been specifically deterred. One of the reasons that deterrence, a perfectly sensible notion, does not operate as expected is that many offenders and would-be offenders assume (often correctly) that they will not get caught. “Rehabilitation” refers to a practice much in disfavor presently in the United States. It attempts to make the convicted criminal “better” in some way, less prone to crime. Examples of rehabilitation are numerous, including work programs, drug and alcohol treatment, education, recreation, counseling, and so on. Some say that rehabilitation does not work (for example, Martinson 1974). Some say that it has never been tried or measured properly (for example, Palmer 1975; 1978). “Retribution” is a desire for vengeance. When we exact retribution, we intend for the offender to feel the pain of punishment. Supposedly, people (the public, not the convicted) feel vindicated by harsh punishment. In fact, as will be explained below, retribution does not ordinarily provide the cathartic experience expected by victims or the general public. Current writers on this theme recognize that retribution currently comprises the bulk of punishment functions in the United States (Johnson and Toch 1982; Johnson 1987; Friedman 1993; Kaminer 1994; 1995; Elikann 1996).

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To make matters confusing, calls for retribution are often couched in crime-control terms rather than strictly emotional terms. Mixing retribution with crime-reduction goals distorts the meaning of both, since retribution has nothing to do with effective crime control and everything to do with expressing rage at crime, criminals, and (“soft”) crime control. These goals may be confused, one might suspect, when players in contemporary crime control (politicians, the public, victims groups, grassroots organizations) present their arguments for greater severity in functional terms, rather than in purely emotional terms. Emotional appeals for severe punishment for the purpose of inflicting pain, while appealing to some, smack of impracticality. EXPRESSIVE JUSTICE One of the most impressive concepts in the study of crime to come around in the past few years is that of “expressive justice.” David C. Anderson (1995a; 1995b) surprises us with the notion that crime control is not the name of the game after all, not even for the public. No longer is there concern over utilitarian goals of crime control: the public and legislators do not seem aware of or attentive to the ineffectiveness of severe punishments to control crime. Deterrence of crime has become secondary to retribution. Anderson writes that, “Promoters of expressiveness pay lip service to crime control [and to] common sense . . . Yet in fact expressiveness and crime control aren’t compatible” (1995b: 268). Similarly, Brent Staples writes that road gangs of prisoners doing meaningless labor provide a “show” and a “spectacle” for the public, a “pure photo opportunity” and “public entertainment” (1995: 62–63). Moreover, the sight of road gangs offers a “visible symbol” of criminal justice might. Examining expressive justice more closely, we are forced to consider the purpose of expression and who is involved in the expression activity. According to Anderson, the purpose of expressive justice is to make the expresser feel good; expressive justice is supposed to (but fails to) work as “mass therapy,” to provide a catharsis for the rage and confusion that people feel about crime. Even when revenge is achieved, it may not help. O.J. Simpson was tried for the murders of his ex-wife and her friend, Ronald Goldman. Mr. Simpson was acquitted of the murders, but was found liable in a wrongful death (civil) suit and forced to pay a large settlement to the families of both victims. Ronald Goldman’s father displayed a great deal of emotion, mostly anger, during and after O.J. Simp-

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son’s criminal trial. On the absence of the therapeutic effect, we find that Mr. Goldman does not feel any better as a result of his awarded settlement. On February 26, 1997, the headline of a Seattle paper blared that Mr. Goldman was still dissatisfied, even with the finding of liability. Mr. Goldman was continuing to experience the “nightmare” of his son’s death, which is certainly understandable, and achieving revenge has not met with a feeling of resolution. Nevertheless, according to Anderson (1995b), the public use and are used by the media and political figures to manage fear, to ventilate outrage, to exact revenge, to express anger. Grassroots and victims’ organizations, with the help of politicians and the media, have been very successful in toughening crime laws.3 When the public develops attention-grabbing anger about a crime issue (child abuse, habitual offenses, etc.), talk shows and other media outlets encourage and legitimate this anger. Politicians and legislators are then called upon to “do something” about the crime problem, to respond to public demands, petitions, and campaigns regardless of how little thought has gone into those demands (Anderson 1995b; Elikann 1996). In turn, there is political profit to be made by satisfying a public desire (Staples 1995). I have already mentioned that, strange as it may seem, the death penalty does not deter homicides. What is even stranger and less known is the lack of therapeutic effect forthcoming from death sentences and executions. We repeatedly find the lack of effect, but I will offer a couple of examples. A victim’s family member observed the execution of her sister’s murderer in Texas (one of 122 executions in Texas, as of May 1997) and cried, “this is so uncalled for” (Verhovek 1997). Casual observation and perusal of newspaper articles on the topic of Texas executions reveal, on the whole, a sort of ambiguous lament experienced by the victims’ surviving family members. In a state with far fewer executions, I heard the interview with the father whose son was raped and murdered by Wesley Alan Dodd, immediately after Dodd was hanged in Washington. The father said that he felt as empty and sad as he did before the execution, but by no means better. Finally, on a grand scale, Timothy McVeigh was sentenced to death for bombing the Oklahoma City Federal Building, killing 168 people and injuring 850. Of the victims and victims’ family members, some are gratified with the death sentence. Others feel that there has been punishment, that “justice” has been served, but there is no peace (Bragg 1997).

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THE CRIMINAL AS ENEMY In the United States, we frequently apply individualistic explanations to social ills, claiming that poverty, joblessness and (especially) crime, are the individual’s own fault. As part of our heritage perhaps, many of the U.S. public believe that people choose their own destiny. The U.S. public, which may not be unique in desiring simple, individualistic explanations, often places blame squarely and entirely on the individual. Concomitantly, this individualism implies the comfortable notion that the system works, otherwise we would all be subject to systemic whims and unfairness. The “collective,” collective responsibility as a concept and practice, has little meaning for us. In the same way and for the same reasons that we blame immigrant labor for our economic problems and respond to their presence with refusal to provide health care and education, we view “criminals” as despicable and expendable, responsive only to force, and deserving of punishing life conditions. It is easier to make criminals into enemies and to do horrific things to them if they can be viewed as “not us” or as socially marginalized in some important way.4 Criminal offenders are marginalized anyway because of their status as criminals. They are even more marginalized if they are minorities or possess additional deviance traits that set them apart from “us.” Racial minorities, non-native born, women (in a complicated way), the mentally ill, and drug users are easily set apart from society even if they are not criminal offenders, but are especially stigmatized if they are also offenders. As Andrew von Hirsch points out, law and order policies “exploit popular resentment of crime and criminals” (1995: 131). I have stated elsewhere (Berry 1996a) that there is no political disadvantage to marginalizing criminals. Many U.S. inhabitants worry about saying something sexist or racist because our society frowns on sexist and racist remarks, even though we may engage in sexism and racism. Gender, race, and other ascribed statuses refer to a state of being, beyond the control of the person inhabiting that role. But “criminal” is an achieved status that we can really sink our teeth into as far as guilt-free marginalizing. It is assumed that criminals choose to engage in crime, therefore their criminal status is their own fault. Begging the question of choice, I would point out that individuals apprehended by the criminal justice system are more likely to be nonwhite, poor, uneducated, and mentally ill. Being of lower socioeconomic status is the strongest explanation, the key, to understanding who gets arrested, diagnosed, convicted, incarcerated, and executed. It is well

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known that the police, courts, and corrections perceive and treat the socially disadvantaged differently than they do middle- and upper-class white people. For a full explanation of this phenomenon, see Jeffrey Reiman’s (1997) classic, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison. There is an extensive literature on the association between demographic traits and crime, for example, crime and race, crime and gender, crime and socioeconomic status, crime and age, crime and nationality, etc. Given the scope of this book, I can address only a few associations between demographic traits and crime in terms of their meaning within the social-rage schema. The “Race Card.” Think of the O.J. Simpson case from a social point of view. As we know, many people (in particular, many white people), believe that O.J. Simpson killed Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman. Many were shocked at his criminal court acquittal and many still believe that O.J. Simpson is guilty of the homicides. Long after the acquittal, the front pages of the grocery-store tabloids, such as the National Inquirer, still carried “news” and “evidence” of Mr. Simpson’s guilt. As for Mr. Simpson’s being found liable in civil court, many think that finally he got what was coming to him (Hoffman 1997). The reasons that many people believe Mr. Simpson to be guilty is related to racism in the media, racism already well-entrenched in the public mind, and racism well-established in criminal justice. It is depressingly well-documented that African-Americans, along with other racial minorities (notably Spanish-Americans), are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and to receive harsher sentences including the death penalty. African-Americans accused of killing whites are more likely to receive the death penalty than African-Americans who kill African-Americans, whites who kill whites, and whites who kill African-Americans. The studies showing the disparity in criminal-justice treatment statistically control for all the necessary variables: prior offenses, aggravated circumstances, and so on (Hagan 1994; Kaminer 1995; Bedau 1997). Worse yet for Mr. Simpson, his murdered ex-wife was a white woman and mother of their two biracial children. Traditionally, AfricanAmerican men who have had sexual or romantic relationships with white women fare particularly badly in the U.S. criminal justice system. To put it another way, if Mr. Simpson had not been wealthy, he likely would be sitting on death row right now. This is not to say that Mr. Simpson bought his innocence. He may in fact be innocent. In short, the U.S. criminal justice system behaves in a racist manner,

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which coincides with a large part of the public, which tends to be racist. To the extent that there is rage over the Simpson case, it may be felt and expressed by the public due to this violation of their expectations. In a perfect racist world, Mr. Simpson would have been found guilty, perhaps regardless of the facts. The reader may recall that after O.J. Simpson was acquitted of murder charges, legal and other commentators brought up the “race card” as the explanation for the acquittal. By this, they meant that he was acquitted by African-American jurors (who comprised part of the jury) because he is African-American. It takes quite a stretch of imagination to see AfricanAmericanism as an advantage in the United States, particularly within the criminal justice system. More pointedly, one does not hear of the “race card” being brought up when white jurors acquit a white defendant. Another racially-intense case in Los Angeles having to do with social rage is the Rodney King incident. The acquittal of the white police officers who beat Rodney King (an African-American) mercilessly led to community rage, as witnessed by the Los Angeles rebellion of 1992. What the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King events have in common is a desire on the part of a segment of the public and social-control systems to retain unequal treatment of African-Americans in the criminal justice system, from the police, courts, and corrections. Much of the U.S. public expects criminals to be African-American and for African-Americans to be criminals. Even African-Americans feel this way (Jackson 1994). Anderson (1995b) writes that: As the drug and gun subculture metastasized in urban communities, it contributed to a new racism: Crime news . . . portrayed an apparently endless parade of young black men under arrest, on trial, or headed for prison; it did not take long for the automatic, barely conscious association of blacks with crime to become an assumption of urban life. (p. 52)

Much of the paired associations regarding race and crime involve African-Americans being associated with the crack trade. William Adler (1995), in his book, Land of Opportunity, describes very well the reason why economically depressed African-Americans may be involved in this type of offense: They need or want the money. It would be unrealistic to expect disadvantaged African-Americans, subject to the same social messages as the rest of society, to not engage in capitalistic pursuits. However, their punishment for using a criminal method to gain funds is unequal to the punishment dealt to whites for the same offenses. Note the

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discrepancy between sentences for cocaine offenses and crack offenses (Wren 1997). Cocaine possession and sales, more often involving whites, results in lesser sentences than crack possession and sales, which more often involve African-Americans (Elikann 1996). Nationality and Crime. Bob Dornan, the deposed representive from California, was and is well known for rageful attacks on homosexuals, women, Mexicans, and liberals. During his time as representative, he supported a program whereby the Immigration and Naturalization Service placed agents at the city jail to spot illegal aliens, detain them in jail, or turn them over to the INS. He spoke, as the crime-control rageful often do, in economic terms, of the “outrageous costs of jailing criminal aliens” (1996). Of course, not everyone is pleased with the manner in which the United States treats the foreign-born. The Mexican government is unhappy with the June 1997 execution of a Mexican citizen by the state of Texas. The prisoner had signed a confession written in English, not his first language. It is often assumed that there is a strong overlap between being foreign-born and being criminal. Recall that in the hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, the presumption was that the perpetrators must have been foreigners, probably Middle Easterners. It came as quite a shock to learn that the two primary suspects (now convicted) are white, native-born, one a Gulf War veteran and the other a farmer (Hamm 1997). Gender and Crime. Many writers have focused on the increase in women’s involvement in the criminal justice system. Social-science studies of women and crime are relatively recent, the first classics on women and crime appearing in 1975 (Adler 1975; Simon 1975). Presumably, once upon a time, women were treated to the “chivalry factor,” meaning that they were, mostly, exempt from the harsh treatment accorded men by the criminal justice system. That is, women were less likely to be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated, not only because they engaged in less criminal activity than men, but, even when they were discovered to be criminally involved, police and judges were reticent to inflict embarrassment and punishment upon them. At this juncture, let us revisit the violations-of-expectations theme. Traditionally, girls and women have been assumed to be incapable or not culpable of criminality. And when they were discovered to be engaged in crime, especially behavior that violates female role expectations (talking back to parents, sexual promiscuity, violence), they received much harsher treatment than boys and men (Chesney-Lind 1982). Women

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were treated more leniently in the criminal justice system unless they behaved “unladylike.” Women still make up a fraction of the criminal justice system. They comprise between 7 and 10 percent currently, compared to a steady 5 percent historically. They are, however, one of the fastest growing subpopulations in prison. There has been an increase in violent crimes by women, largely accounted for by a new pattern of women fighting back in domestic assaults. Traditionally, women victimized by domestic violence were continually battered; some, until they died. Now battered women are in prison because they retaliate with violence. Mostly though, imprisoned women are drug offenders with no on to rat on (Elikann 1996). Elikann explains the increasing number of women in prison as coconspirators, accomplices, and victims of their drug-dealing male partners and of the system. Women who are arrested for drug offenses along with their male counterparts are more likely to get prison sentences and to receive longer prison sentences than their male codefendants because the women are not so well connected among the criminal subculture. Because they are not so well connected, they cannot reap the benefits of turning state’s evidence. Unequal sexual opportunity does not end here. Women’s prisons are fewer in number than men’s prisons, providing a “rationale” for not offering equal treatment. Women’s prisons, on the whole, have fewer programs, less equipment and less up-to-date equipment, fewer educational programs, fewer employment opportunities, and worse medical and dental care. Women make less money than men on their prison jobs. Despite what the public may think, nobody does well in prison and women do less well than men in prison (see Faith 1993; Fletcher, Shaver, and Moon 1993; Watterson 1996). As part of our general intolerance for crime, women are by no means getting a break. Social Class and Crime. As for social class, recall the effect of lower socioeconomic status on criminal justice involvement as delineated by Blumstein (1995) and Reiman (1997). Socioeconomic status is strongly related to race, gender, and nationality, in directions that one would expect: Non-whites, women, and foreign-born have unequal economic opportunity. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) describe the relationship very well in their book aptly entitled, Crime and the American Dream. One might say that being poor is the catalyst for criminal-justice intervention, one that takes precedence over all other traits. Being poor is causally related to surveillance, arrest, conviction, and sentencing. However, we can not say with assuredness that being poor causes one to en-

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gage in crime more than being middle class or being wealthy. Self-report studies show that the middle class and upper class engage in as much, or more, crime than do poor people. SOURCES OF RAGE AGAINST CRIME, CRIMINALS, AND CRIME CONTROL The sources of social rage against crime, criminals, and crime control include mass media, the victims’ movement, politics, religion, and moral panics. Media Effects. When we think of media, mostly we think of TV. TV is the primary source of news for the U.S. public; TV determines our views on the world and on crime in particular (Anderson 1995b). We not only have TV news, we have docudramas and TV crime shows, none of which gets into the complexities of crime and criminal justice. Gray Cavendar and Lisa Bond-Maupin (1993) examined the effects on viewers of two TV crime shows, America’s Most Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries. They find that viewers of these shows feel that they are far more vulnerable to violent crime than they really are. In support, Susan Douglas (1997) adds that, “Simply put, the more TV you watch, the more inclined you are to exaggerate the level of crime in society, and to exaggerate your own vulnerability to crime” (p. 19). Furthermore, Scott Stossel (1997) finds that TV viewers become fearful and anxious. TV viewing encourages the perception of the “mean-world syndrome” and the reaction of severe (albeit ineffective) crime measures. He states that “heavy viewers tend to favor more law-and-order measures: capital punishment, three-strikes prison sentencing, the building of new prisons, and so forth” (p. 91). The mass media, especially TV, are very much responsible for public views on minority involvement in crime. Kurtz (1997) reports on experimental subjects’ reactions to TV news shows. It is clearly shown that TV news presents an overrepresentation of African-American criminal suspects (conversely, underrepresenting white suspects), to the point that even when a photo is not shown, people “recall” seeing a black perpetrator. And, when photos of black men were digitally changed to white men, study participants still recall black men as the perpetrators. Ninety percent of false recalls are of African-Americans and Hispanics. In other words, in 90 percent of the false judgements made by viewers, the error was made in the direction of assuming that they saw a black or Hispanic, when in fact the suspect shown was white. Kurtz specifies the research

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by Douglas (1997) and Stossel (1997), reporting that “support for punitive law-enforcement policies was highest when the stories featured minority suspects or provided no information about race, and was lowest when the suspects were white” (p. 39). Fear and the (Pre)Victims’ Movement. As I discussed earlier about the meaning of rage, social rage is an intense emotion, often irrational in thought and behavior; and while social rage is a rewarding experience for some, its consequences for society as a whole are destructive. We are a nation of victims and “pre-victims.” Pre-victims are members of the public who expect to be crime victims, again or for the first time. Pre-victims are waiting to be and fearful of being victims of crime. With the aid of political and media activity, formal and informal victims’ organizations have generated heightened fear of crime and immense anger at criminals. The strong feelings and messages emoted by these organizations encourage many of us, regardless of our lifestyles, to be fearful. We are in a state of perceived vulnerability and siege mentality. It is not possible to deny the loss, anguish, and pain of crime victims and that of their families. Nor is it possible to alleviate the fear that previctims experience, unfounded as those fears might be. Nor is it politically advantageous to be less than supportive of the victims’ movements. While it is true that the United States outranks other societies on the amount of crime we have (Hagan 1994), it is simply not true that we are all highly likely or equally likely (across the population) to be victims. Those advantaged enough to live in nice parts of town, safely ensconced in gated communities, and who do not have to travel through high-crime areas at the peak crime times, are unlikely to be victims. People who are advantaged in their lifestyles and material circumstances live in conditions that drastically reduce if not virtually preclude victimization by street criminals. Nevertheless, these people are very afraid (Mills 1997). One practical point I would make here is that if we are a society of victims and pre-victims, it would be helpful to do something about economic inequality. To be distracted by a fear of crime is merely that: a distraction. Some people in our society have much to be afraid of, crime-wise. They are poor, living in poor neighborhoods, and are victimized by the poor. Politics. Examining the intersection between politics and the victims’ movement, we find that politicians are adept at translating the victims’ and pre-victims’ messages to their own ends. Speaking on victims’ behalf, politicians can make their proposals seem compassionate to victims and tough on crime simultaneously. Politicians, pressured by vic-

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tims, victims’ families, and pre-victims, in turn pressure legislators to pass harsher and unwittingly ineffective crime controls. I have already said all I need to about political influences on crime policies (see also Berry 1996b). At this juncture, I would only drive home the point that politicians and political parties engage in absurd, ineffective but vote-getting practices to prove to the public that they are tougher on crime than their opponents. They cannot go wrong in doing so: they get votes, and siding with the deeply emotional victims’ movements makes them seem as though they have their finger on the pulse of the public, that they understand, and that they care. Political intervention on crime policies, without debate on the wisdom of those policies and without regard to the consequences, is quite expensive and socially destructive, given the more productive uses to which “crime-fighting” funds could be put. Religion. Besides the effects of media and politics on rageful reactions to crime, there are also religious influences on this form of rage that can be more subtle than media and politics. Many people point to their religious dogmas and doctrine as justifications for a strong reaction to crime. For example, the Old Testament advises an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; thereby rationalizing revenge, retribution, and what is popularly known as “justice.” Moral Panics and “Wars”: Historical and Hysterical Cycles. Throughout U.S. history, we have experienced a number of moral panics or “wars” on crime and deviance. Witness the Prohibition (1920–1933), sexual-psychopath statutes, castration laws, and our numerous drug wars.5 Craig Reinarman (1996) and Troy Duster (1970) have offered histories of U.S. drug wars, starting with the first documented one immediately after the Civil War. We find that there are a couple of commonalities to these repetitive drug wars: (1) they do not reduce drug use or drug offenses. Matza and Morgan (1995) have shown that, after almost 100 years of governmental effort to prevent drug use, the goal remains unachieved. (2) Drug wars target the socially disenfranchised, such as the poor, Chinese, African-Americans, Mexicans, Bolsheviks and labor organizers. The history of drug wars clearly illustrates the sociology-of-theenemy argument. In the United States (and elsewhere), people have long used drugs recreationally or otherwise. Yet not all people are subjected to criminal sanctions for their drug use. Instead, it is well documented that those who use drugs and are considered not a social or economic threat

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(historically, white middle-class women) are not targeted for law-enforcement action (see, for example, Reinarman 1996). However, when moral entrepreneurs instituting a moral panic set out to deal, legally, with “undesirables” (Communists, minorities, foreigners), they target these undesirables as drug users, manufacturers, and sellers. In other words, when a society or a segment of a society wants to control a category of people, laws are developed to target them and controls are implemented to exclude or nullify them. Another interesting trait of drug wars is that they are self-sustaining. Like the U.S. military and bureaucracies on the whole, the purpose of the organization and its activities seem to be to continue their existence. Exorbitant amounts of money have been and still are being spent on the current drug war. The people who benefit from the drug war, law enforcement primarily, by no means want the drug war to end. After The New Republic published an article showing that the D.A.R.E. (Drug Awareness Resistance Education) program is ineffective and expensive, a reader wrote a letter to the editor explaining that she had given a copy of the article to the head sheriff in her town. The sheriff’s response was that he did not know or care that D.A.R.E. does not work. He was getting lots of tax money and so, “every year, at budget time, he would continue to flood the media with scary ‘facts’” (Calhoun 1997). In June 1998, critics of the U.S. zero-tolerance drug laws made known through an open letter to the United Nations Secretary General that they believe our society should rethink the drug war. This coalition of advocacy groups has argued that the global war on drugs has cost society more than drug abuse itself. They further argued that by focusing on punishing drug users, the United States as well as other societies has “helped create a world-wide criminal black market that wrecked national economies and democratic governments” (Wren 1998: 22). The president of Common Sense for Drug Policy, a group that wants drug laws changed, stated specifically that the upsurge of public advocacy for druglaw reform is due to the growing knowledge that our current drug policies are not making society safer or healthier. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey, director of the national drug policy task force, retorted that those calling for reform are in truth pursuing an agenda to legalize drugs from marijuana to heroin and cocaine. Labeling the reformers a “carefully camouflaged, exorbitantly funded, well-heeled elitist group,” McCaffrey accused them of engaging in a “slick misinformation campaign” and used words like “fraud” and “falsehoods” to describe their position on drug laws. General McCaffrey referred to the advocacy

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group’s call for a change in drug laws as, “a hijacked concept that has become a euphemism for drug legalization” (Wren, p. 22). I offer this debate as an example of unwillingness on the part of drug warriors, heavily involved in enforcement rather than treatment and education, to hear the facts about a social problem, drug abuse in this case. Moreover, the heatedness of the debate, complete with its accusations of fraud, falsehoods, and misinformation, is an example of distractions from the reality of the problem as well as from appropriate, beneficial solutions for drug use. The drug war of the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s is, in essence, the perfect depiction of crime rage and contains all the elements of an emotion-driven, media-driven political movement. The current drug war has been translated into overkill crime-control practices, such as lengthy mandatory minimum sentences and death-penalty eligibility for some drug offenders. The drug war has caused incredible harm to our society, economically and otherwise. It has expanded our punishment system in such a way that the dangerous are released from prison and the nondangerous are incarcerated, on tax-payer dollars, for very long periods, sometimes for life. Schlosser (1997) points to the paradox of sentencing the possessor of a single marijuana cigarette to life imprisonment without parole and allowing a murderer to go free after about six years. There are many myths about drug users. For example, as reported by Butterfield (1995), “contrary to popular belief,” drug users do not carry guns and do not commit violent offenses. This fact alone raises a question about the war on drugs as a war upon dangerous individuals. But I suppose that dangerousness is in the eye of the beholder. Schlosser (1997) reminds us that during the Reagan Revolution, a link was made between marijuana use and “the weakness and permissiveness of a liberal society . . . marijuana use was inextricably linked to ‘the present young adult generation’s involvement in anti-military, anti-nuclear power, anti-big business, anti-authority demonstrations.’” (p. 94). The dangerous commies of yesterday are the dangerous liberals of today. Equally importantly, cross-cultural studies, such as in the Netherlands, show that where drugs are not so criminalized as they are in the U.S., there is no drug problem to speak of. Indeed, cross-cultural studies illustrate that decriminalization leads to lower usage. Not surprisingly, harsh penalties do not deter: in the United States, teenage marijuana use continues to grow even though we have many people in prison on marijuana charges (Schlosser 1997: 90; New York Times 1998).

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THE WAGES OF RAGE The results of social rage against crime, criminals, and crime control include economic cost, human cost, and confusion about what works to reduce crime. The Economic Cost. For a nation that gripes as much as we do about taxes and about crime, we spend a lot of money foolishly. Moreover, the money that we spend on crime without effect is money channeled away from other social needs. Jerome Skolnick (1995) reminds us that, To pay for a [multifold] increase in the corrections budget since 1980, [the public] have had to sacrifice other services. . . . it is a moment of dangerous anxiety and thoughtless intuition that is driving the nation toward desperate and ineffective measures. . . . divert[ing] tax dollars for other vital purposes, and leav[ing] the public as insecure and dissatisfied as ever. (p. 23)

Elikann (1996) states roughly the same. The money that we spend on ineffective crime-control practices could be used much more effectively for education, health care, housing, nutrition, the basics of healthy and successful living. The Human Cost. Our use of revisited and ineffective punishments does a great deal of damage to families, detracts from the needs of the much-beleaguered U.S. worker, and in general reduces our dignity, in our own eyes and in the eyes of the world. Consider the loss in health and human services to family members of the convicted. Those convicted of a marijuana felony in the United States, even if they are disabled, may no longer receive federal welfare or food stamps. On the other hand, and pointing to a strong discrepancy across offense types, convicted murderers, rapists, and child molesters do continue to receive these benefits (Schlosser 1997). Moreover, the increased imprisonment rate for women means that many children are raised in foster care, are placed for adoption, or are raised by already overburdened family members. Most women in prison have children and no life partner (such as a husband) to help. Confusion. Another indication of irrational responses to crime rage is the public reaction of buying guns for self-protection. According to Ayres (1993), an increase in gun sales, to the point that manufacturers could not keep up with the requests, was spurred largely by the very idiosyncratic Long Island Railroad killings. The killer, Colin Ferguson, pur-

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chased his gun and ammunition legally, which allowed him to kill a large number of people whom he did not even know. As a result, people in other parts of the country went on a buying spree to protect themselves from such a killer coming to their neighborhood and killing them at random. Carrying weapons may reduce fear, but purchasing, possessing, and carrying guns does not reduce crime. It increases the availability of guns and therefore gun-related crimes. If purchasing and carrying guns reduces fear, and some people say that they buy guns because they are afraid and want to be able to defend themselves, the reasoning is a bit mysterious. In general, we have a corrosion of faith— in truth, in the legal system, in government, in people. We also have a distraction from the problem of gun availability. We respond to our fear of crime by buying guns, the instruments of crime. We find social rage in the gun lobby’s strident defense of gun ownership, when it is known that guns are the instruments of crime. We find social rage being enacted in the recent (1997–1998) rash of school killings when young school boys, with ready access to arsenals, gun down (mostly) women and girls, in what some may see as the ultimate sexist expression of rage. THE REAL REASONS FOR RAGE ABOUT CRIME The media profit from crime. Most of the media are privately owned and therefore profit-motivated. Politicians and political parties profit from crime. Crime sells votes and crime agendas transcend into other popular repressive social policies. Rothman (1995) writes that there was a . . . changed political environment of the 1980s. [Former U.S. Presidents] Reagan and Bush were able to make crime and sentencing procedures a rallying point around which middle-class Americans could express their frustration not only with unsafe streets but with affirmative action and welfare costs. (p. 34)

So, frustration over crime is not separable from other social concerns as employment. Rothman goes on to state that job seekers and bondholders view prison construction and maintenance as an employment source and a sound investment. Rich (1998), in an editorial entitled “Just Say $1 Billion,” describes the one-billion-dollar government ad campaign to keep children off of drugs. In what he calls, “Madison Avenue creativity,” he spells out the new anti-drug campaign as a merchandising effort that the government,

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media, and advertisers will capitalize on. Apparently, according to Rich, Washington believes that advertising is the “instant remedy to fool voters into believing that it is addressing intractable problems” (p. 19). As I mentioned above, some of our law-enforcement organizations are greedy. Schlosser (1997) has described very well the profit made from the drug war, but consider asset forfeitures on drug cases as one part of incoming “drug money.” Former Justice Department officials have admitted that many forfeitures are driven by the need to meet budget projections, according to Schlosser. He reports that, “The guilt or innocence of a defendant has at times been less important than the availability of his or her assets” (p. 95). Hidden behind these more obvious sources of crime rage are corporate interests in keeping labor costs down, employment and underemployment high, and attention diverted from economic exploitation. We have a dangerous combination of greedy corporations and excess labor. Since criminals are expendable and we have a surplus of (free citizen) labor, we can afford to lock up criminals and use them as cheap prison labor. Indeed, we must lock them up and take them out of circulation and out of the labor pool that might make unseemly demands, such as a living wage, health insurance, and retirement. With the advent of privatization of prison labor and prison management, near-slave labor is allowable and immensely profitable. Moreover, we are in a period of anti-government sentiment, facilitating privatization of many social services. Private companies not only contract with private and government-run prisons for prison labor, they also build prisons and staff them with private employees. Finally, as one of the real reasons for irrational reactions to crime, and an explanation most difficult to accept, is the assertion that our crime-control industry is a selective genocide program. Devalued people are being used up, their lives wasted and sometimes extinguished (Leighton 1995; Johnson and Leighton 1995).6 The criminal is the “other,” the enemy, and this is especially true for minority offenders. Even though the enemy is representing more and more of “us,” we believe that we are immune from the ravages of a crime-control system gone awry. In conclusion, the public is baffled by crime, puzzled and deeply troubled by the lack of effect that punishments seem to have on crime. Part of the misunderstanding that we, as a society, have about crime and crime responses stems from our failure to designate the true cause of most lower-status crime: class inequality. The other part of our misun-

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derstanding stems from an unwillingness to become educated about crime, criminals, and crime control. Additionally, institutionalized social rage about crime may stem from corporate (including media) greediness and political self-interestedness. As I have suggested, the public may indeed be uninformed and emotional, but the people who truly call the shots, private interests, are more intentional in their institutionalization of rageful criminal-justice practices. NOTES 1

See also Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon (1992) on “new penology” and David Garland (1990) on sociology of punishment. 2 Elikann (1996) compares medical disease and treatment to crime and crime control. Relatedly, the medical model is applied to crime as found in remarks by the Montana State Representative, Deb Kottel, sponsor of two bills proposing chemical castration for sex offenders. She has likened chemical castration to nicotine patches: “It takes the edge off and allows people to quit.” This assumes that rapists are addicts of some sort. 3 Throughout U.S. history, there have been uprisings by the citizenry that express rage about certain crimes, criminals, and (what they see as) lenient crime control. These uprisings are often followed by stricter laws and punishments. When the correctional pendulum swings back to harshness, we find grassroots organizations that hope to change criminal-justice responses to something less hysterical, something more reasonable; for example, Families Against Mandatory Minimums. Presently, these latter grassroots organizations are less successful, perhaps less frequently occurring, and certainly have less popular appeal. Much more popular and successful are grassroots calls for greater punishment, calls that are taken up by talk-show hosts such as Oprah Winfrey. Winfrey, on her popular TV talk show, proposed a background-check provision for child-care workers. Based on this, a national registry and national background check were created and federally funded (Kaminer 1995). My point is not that background checks of child-care workers is a bad idea or an example of greater punishment. My point is that greater surveillance can come about by someone who is not an expert in crime control, to wit, a talk-show host. 4 “Not us” is peculiar and misleading terminology. Many of us have family and friends who have been and are clients of the criminal justice system. Regarding crime, “not us” is comprising an increasingly smaller part of our society. The latest Bureau of Justice Statistics figures show that at the end of 1996, the nation’s prison population reached 1.2 million (New York Times 1997b). That means that roughly one in 200 U.S. inhabitants is in prison. Add to that the num-

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ber of people in jails and we have about one out of every 100 people incarcerated, either in jails or prisons. What this means in real-life terms is not that 1/100th of just anybody’s friends, acquaintances, family are incarcerated. Some people may personally know no one who is incarcerated, whereas others may know many people incarcerated. Of the latter, out of 100 friends, acquaintances, or family, there may be 10, 20, 50 people who are incarcerated. The point is that we incarcerate a lot of people in the United States and incarceration rates are not random. 5 Castration laws, as alluded to earlier, refer to surgical or chemical castration of sex offenders, legally allowable and enforced. Castration of sex offenders is not a new practice in the U.S. (or in other societies, see Friedman 1993), and has variously been considered a treatment and a punishment. Surgical castration occurs as removal of the testicles; chemical castration is applied in the form of injections or chemical implants imbedded under the skin with a slow release of chemicals that inhibit sex drives. The assumption is that castration, surgical or chemical, will reduce sex offenses by reducing the capacity to engage in sex since a penile erection is inhibited. Castration has not worked as well as expected, since sex offenses do not require an erect penis. Sex offenses are acts of violence and power, rather than sex acts. 6 In Leighton’s (1995) and Johnson and Leighton’s (1995) articles, selective genocide is discussed as a practice, aimed specifically at African-American men to reduce their numbers (and social power) in U.S. society. African-American men, to many white people, Leighton argues are “scary people” because of their association with crime. While there is evidence that African-American men are disproportionately arrested and convicted for crimes, it is also true that they are disproportionately crime victims, often at the hands of other African-American men. In Johnson and Leighton, they offer mortality data and other social indicators to support their contention that African-American men are the victims of genocide. That is, African-American men are systematically and systemically being destroyed through conditions of life, such as social deprivation, imprisonment, and murder.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adler, Freda. 1975. Sisters in Crime: The Rise of the New Female Criminal. New York: McGraw-Hill. Adler, William M. 1995. Land of Opportunity: One Family’s Quest for the American Dream in the Age of Crack. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Anderson, David C. 1995a. “Expressive Justice Is All the Rage.” The New York Times Magazine January 15: 36–37.

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Anderson, David C. 1995b. Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice. New York: Times Books (Random House). Ayres, B. Drummond, Jr. 1993. “Fear Makes Powerful Sales Pitch in Gun Shops Around the Nation.” New York Times, December 19, pp. A1, A17. Bedau, Hugo Adam, ed. 1997. The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies. New York: Oxford University Press. Berry, Bonnie. 1985. “Electronic Jails: A New Criminal Justice Concern.” Justice Quarterly 2: 1–22. Berry, Bonnie. 1986. “More Questions and More Ideas on Electronic Monitoring.” Justice Quarterly 3: 363–370. Berry, Bonnie. 1994. “Artificiality in the Construction of Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 22: 33–43. Berry, Bonnie. 1996a. “Resisting Rage, Feigned and Real.” Presented at the Western Association of Sociology and Anthropology, May, Kelowna, British Columbia. Berry, Bonnie. 1996b. Review of David C. Anderson’s Crime and the Politics of Hysteria for Justice Quarterly 13: 339–344. Berry, Bonnie. 1997. “Scholarly and Nonscholarly Constructions of Crime: A Search for Meaningful Measurements and Explanations.” Quarterly Journal of Ideology 20: 23–40. Berry, Bonnie. Forthcoming. “Technological and Other Changes: A Commentary on Boundary Crossings in the Control of Crime and Other Deviance.” Advances in Criminological Theory 8. Blomberg, Thomas G. 1994. “Boot Camps and Other Myths.” Tallahassee Democrat, January 9, pp. 1F, 7F. Blomberg, Thomas G., and Stanley Cohen, eds. 1995. Punishment and Social Control. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Blumstein, Alfred. 1995. “Stability of Punishment: What Happened and What Next?” Pp. 259–274 in Punishment and Social Control , edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Bragg, Rick. 1997. “Many Find Satisfaction, But Few Find Any Joy.” New York Times, June 14, p. A8. Butterfield, Fox. 1995. “Study Finds Drug Users’ Role in Gun Crimes Is Exaggerated.” New York Times, October 8, p. 14. Butterfield, Fox. 1997. “The Wisdom of Children Who Have Known Too Much.” New York Times, June 8, pp. E1 and E4. Calhoun, Ann. 1997. Letter to the Editor, Response to Stephen Glass article on D.A.R.E. The New Republic 4290: 7.

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Cavender, Gray, and Lisa Bond-Maupin. 1993. “Fear and Loathing on Reality Television: An Analysis of America’s Most Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries. “ Sociological Inquiry 63: 305–317. Clines, Francis X. 1995. “ ‘Old Sparky’: Not Just a Punch Line.” New York Times, November 27. Chesney-Lind, Meda. 1982. “Guilty by Reason of Sex: Young Women and the Juvenile Justice System.” Pp. 77–105 in The Criminal Justice System and Women, edited by B. Price and N. Sokoloff. New York: Clark Boardman. Christie, Nils. 1993. Crime Control as Industry. London: Routledge. Dornan, Robert. 1996. “Dornan Joins Orange County Delegation in Demanding the INS Remain at Anaheim Jail.” Hyper-text document on www. house.gov, July 26. Douglas, Susan. 1997. “Body-Bag Journalism.” The Progressive 61: 19. Duster, Troy. 1970. The Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs, and Moral Judgement. New York: Free Press. Elikann, Peter T. 1996. The Tough-on-Crime Myth: Real Solutions to Cut Crime. New York: Insight Books (Plenum Press). Faia, Michael A. 1993. What’s Wrong with the Social Sciences? The Perils of the Postmodern. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Faith, Karlene. 1993. Unruly Women: The Politics of Confinement and Resistance. Vancouver, British Columbia: Press Gang Publishers. Feeley, Malcolm, and Jonathan Simon. 1992. “Reflections on the New Penology.” Criminology 30: 449–474. Fletcher, Beverly R., Lynda Dixon Shaver, and Dreama G. Moon, eds. 1993. Women Prisoners: A Forgotten Population. Westport, CT: Praeger. Friedman, Lawrence M. 1993. Crime and Punishment in American History. New York: Basic Books. Garland, David. 1990. Punishment and Modern Society. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Garland, David. 1995. “Penal Modernism and Postmodernism.” Pp. 181–209 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Greenhouse, Linda. 1997. “Likely Repeaters May Stay Confined.” New York Times, June 24, p. A12. Hagan, John. 1994. Crime and Disrepute. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklohoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Hoffman, Jan. 1997. “Tried and Tried Again, With a Vengeance.” New York Times, February 9, pp. D1, D6. Irwin, John, and James Austin. 1994. It’s about Time: America’s Imprisonment Binge. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

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Jackson, Jesse. 1994. As cited in Paul Glastris and Jeannye Thornton, “A New Civil Rights Frontier,” U.S. News and World Report, January 17, p. 38. Johnson, Robert. 1987. Hard Time: Understanding and Reforming the Prison. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing. Johnson, Robert, and Paul Leighton. 1995. “Black Genocide? Preliminary Thoughts on the Plight of America’s Poor Black Men.” Journal of African American Men 1: 3–21. Johnson, Robert, and Hans Toch, eds. 1982. The Pains of Imprisonment. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Kaminer, Wendy. 1994. “Federal Offense.” Atlantic Monthly 273: 102–114. Kaminer, Wendy. 1995. It’s All the Rage: Crime and Culture. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Kolata, Gina. 1996. “The Many Myths about Sex Offenders.” New York Times, September 1, p. E10. Kurtz, Howard. 1997. “A Guilty Verdict on Crime and Race Bias.” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, May 12, p. 39. Leighton, Paul. 1995. “Industrialized Social Control.” Peace Review 7: 387–392. Loeb, John. 1994. Cited in Wendy Kaminer “Federal Offense.” Atlantic Monthly 273: 102–114. See esp. p. 114. Martinson, Robert. 1974. “What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform.” The Public Interest 35: 22–54. Matza, David, and Patricia Morgan. 1995. “Controlling Drug Use: The Great Prohibition.” Pp. 229–241 in Punishment and Social Control , edited by T. G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. McQuiston, John T. 1997. “Sex Offender Sues Neighbors Over Protests.” New York Times, June 20, p. A16. Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 1994. Crime and the American Dream. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. New York Times. 1997a. “Montana Law to Allow Use of Injections for Rapists.” New York Times, April 27, p. A17. New York Times. 1997b. (National News Briefs.) New York Times, June 23, p. A15. New York Times. 1998. “Teen-age Drug Use on the Rise, New Government Survey Reports.” New York Times, August 22, p. A11. Palmer, Ted. 1975. “Martinson Revisited.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 12: 133–152. Palmer, Ted. 1978. Correctional Intervention and Research: Current Issues and Future Prospects. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Purdum, Todd S. 1998. “Death of Sex Offender Is Tied to Megan’s Law.” New York Times, July 9, p. A13.

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Reiman, Jeffrey H. 1997. The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Social Justice, 5th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Reinarman, Craig. 1996. “The Social Construction of Drug Scares.” Pp. 77–86 in Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective, edited by E. Rubington and M. S. Weinberg. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Rich, Frank. 1998. “Just Say $1 Billion.” New York Times, July 15, p. A19. Roberts, John W., ed. 1994. Escaping Prison Myths: Selected Topics in the History of Federal Corrections. Lanham, MD: The American University Press. Rothman, David J. 1995. “More of the Same: American Criminal Justice Policies in the 1990s.” Pp. 29–44 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Schlosser, Eric. 1997. “More Reefer Madness.” Atlantic Monthly 279: 90–102. Simon, Rita James. 1975. The Contemporary Woman and Crime. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency. Skolnick, Jerome H. 1995. “Sheldon Messinger: The Man, His Work, and the Carceral Society.” Pp. 15–25 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T. G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Smith, Earl, and Bonnie Berry. 1996. “Problems Real and Imposed in the Discipline of Sociology.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 24: 77–84. Staples, Brent. 1995. “The Chain Gang Show: Humiliating Prisoners, for Political Profit.” The New York Times Magazine, September 17, pp. 62–63. Stossel, Scott. 1997. “The Man Who Counts the Killings.” The Atlantic Monthly 279: 86–104. Verhovek, Sam Howe. 1995. “When Justice Shows Its Darker Side.” New York Times, January 8, p. E6. Verhovek, Sam Howe. 1997. “As Texas Executions Mount, They Grow Routine.” New York Times, May 25, pp. A1, A6. von Hirsch, Andrew. 1995. “The Future of the Proportionate Sentence.” Pp. 123–143 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T. G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Watterson, Kathryn. 1996. Women in Prison: Inside the Concrete Womb. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Wren, Christopher S. 1997. “Reno and Top Drug Official Urge Smaller Gap in Cocaine Sentences.” New York Times, July 22, pp. A1, A14. Wren, Christopher S. 1998. “Drug Official Warns Panel of Effort to Legalize Drugs.” New York Times, June 18, p. A22.

CHAPTER 5

Social Rage and Minority Relations

The United States “. . . is the land of opportunity—a place where anybody can rise as high as his intelligence and hard work will take him (Robert Dornan, 1996, in support of House Bill 2128, emphasis mine) It is important to bear in mind in any discussion about minorities that “minority” does not refer to a numerical minority so much as it refers to a category of people with less social power, relative to those with greater social power. Some groups are in the numerical majority, such as women, but have less social power compared to men. Most minority categories are in the numerical minority and have less social power than those in the numerical majority.1 Key among the contributors to social power is economic power. Economic power can refer to one’s economic worth (usually measured as capital), the amount of influence one can wield with one’s economic power, and what one can demand on the labor market. Economically based social power brings with it subtle but important role expectations, assumptions about capabilities, and so on. For example, African-Americans on the whole earn less money and have less influence on society than do whites. Racism against African-Americans also dictates that they deserve less power because they are lazy, are less intelligent than whites, have inappropriate value systems, and are prone to deviant behavior. Relative social powerlessness is found among minorities, notably women, racial and ethnic minority groups, those without U.S. citizen119

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ship, those with mental and physical disabilities, gays and lesbians, and the poor. Minority status is assigned by those with the social power to assign such statuses. This assignation is artificial in that without the official designation of “minority,” those so designated would not be seen as inferior to the majority and treated accordingly.2 Prejudice is the negative attitude applied to minorities, permitting the perception that minorities are less capable (less intelligent, for example) than non-minorities. Discrimination is the behavior that often follows prejudice, disallowing minorities to participate fully in society’s economic structure or, more broadly, to enjoy the same privileges that the majority enjoys. Hence, minority status is applied by those with the social power to apply such assignations, the status implies that minorities are inferior and deserving of less social power. The assignment of minority status originates in power. Specifically, those with economic power are legally enabled to enforce definitions of minority status and to encourage prejudiced perceptions and discriminatory practices. Non-minorities hope to retain their advantaged status and their corresponding privileges by the informal reviling of minorities as well as by engaging in formalized discriminatory practices (such as failure to hire). Not all people who are prejudiced and who discriminate are members of the majority, however. Some are minority members themselves who, experiencing the vulnerability of minority status, transfer prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory practices from the powerful to the powerless. Members of a society who have less social power are also the targets of social rage; thus minority traits are related to social rage. At the same time, minorities, experiencing prejudice and discrimination, may express social rage against a society that perpetrates prejudice and discrimination (Mills 1997). THE MINORITY AS ENEMY I have already presented the notion of “the enemy” and described how important enemies are to social rage. In personal and in social rage, it helps to have an enemy—somebody, some group, or some “thing” (for example, the “Jewish conspiracy,” the “new world order”) to whom or at which the rage is directed. James Aho (1994) describes in his analysis of the sociology of the enemy how the enemy is socially constructed. There is nothing inherent to the constructed enemy that qualifies them as necessarily bad, to the naked and objective eye. Individual capabilities, past

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and present conduct, and any number of other traits are irrelevant to those intolerant of minorities; regardless of individual traits, minorities are viewed and treated as deserving enemy classification. Because of the arbitrary nature of the social-enemy construction, the classification of enemy can also be destroyed, deconstructed, or transcended socially. Among the many examples of deconstruction, consider that wars create enemies and the end of wars deconstruct enemies. Griessman (1993) distinguishes between “they” and “we,” driving home the notion of artificial but important boundaries between groups of people. He expands on the idea of transferring “they” into “we” in his general suggestions toward cultural diversity. Ehrlich (1990) prefers the term “other,” and discusses “ethnoviolence” against the other (specifically anti-gay and anti-lesbian prejudice). He defines ethnoviolence as “violence motivated by a desire to do harm to an ‘other’ who represents a group against which the attacker is prejudiced” (p. 359). As I have mentioned in earlier chapters, social rage has elements of absolutism, oversimplification, either-or qualities, and “a self-defeating dualistic logic” (Aho 1994: 180). Rageful views and behaviors toward minorities are no exception. From the rageful perspective, important viewpoints are “us versus them” or “enemies against enemies.” Recall Charles Horton Cooley’s (1962; 1964) and George Herbert Mead’s (1934) notions of the “looking-glass self” and the self as a product of social interaction. Sociologists tell us that we can only know ourselves inferentially, indirectly, through other peoples’ responses to us. We know ourselves through the “social mirror,” with other members of society serving as mirrors. In their reflections, we gain some idea of our place in society. The person who is disabled has her or his difference brought home when confronted with an “abled” person who feels nervous and unsure in the disabled person’s presence and when confronted with a structure that allows access for the abled but not for the disabled. The ghetto dweller experiences something called “relative deprivation” when confronted with evidence that others are comfortably well-off. Not all of us consider these reflectors (social members who are different from us) as enemies, but some people do. Some people feel disdainful, cheated, or rageful in comparing themselves to minority or majority members. As we will see throughout this book, reasoning and emotion may coincide, but not necessarily. Each can override the other; that is, emotion can override reasoning (causing people to be enraged for no supportable, rational reason) and vice versa (the feeling of rage can be dissipated

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through rational discussion and discovery). Attribution theory tells us that our hatreds need make no sense. We dislike people because of attributes we assign them, regardless of how fictitious those assignations are. Sokolowski (1992) found that experimentally induced emotional states influence trait attribution, by research subjects onto unknown others. Research subjects experiencing hate, for instance, were more likely to assign certain negative attributes to others. Sokolowski found that the emotional group (the subject group with emotion induced through experimental conditions) exhibited not only attributional biases but also increased “action readiness.” From this we might infer that the socially rageful may be primed to attribute negative traits to targeted groups, and to take action against them since they are already emotional and hate-filled. The more distinguishable the enemy, the easier they are to identify as the enemy. Strong, clear distinction allow for simplicity in the construction of enemies, as we find with enemies such as African-Americans (as compared to whites), women (compared to men), the disabled (compared to the abled), and criminals (compared to the unconvicted). Ivan Light (1972) has written that the more obviously distinct the racial minority (for instance, African-Americans versus Jews or Hispanics), the easier it is to make them enemies. Women are physically different from men. “Criminals” are commonly defined as those people who have been convicted of crime, as distinct from those who have not been convicted. The fact that the enemy has a distinguishable trait (physical features, conviction, confinement to wheelchair, one or more mental hospitalizations, absence of U.S. citizenship) is wrongly associated with a number of other traits (lack of intelligence, untrustworthiness, laziness, unpredictability, and so on). Here we have attribution theory at its most destructive—attributing negative traits to minorities based upon their minority status. In cases like this, the minority status becomes a master status, the most salient social characteristic of all the characteristics that one person possesses, with the master status being associated with a number of other negative traits. Mark Hamm (1994) expands the number of distinct enemy entities from the usual dichotomy of “us and them,” in his analysis of hate crimes. There may be first, second, and third parties of enemies, not unlike what one would find in conflict-ridden legal proceedings; to wit, “the party of the first part accuses the party of the second part.” Hate crime can be viewed as an attempt by the first party (for example, neo-Nazis) to threaten a third party (for example, minorities) in order to influence policies of a second party (for example, governmental factions). Richard

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Berk (1990) has carried this notion a bit further with his address of hatecrime victims as enemies. The victims of hate crimes are, obviously, enemies of the hate criminals. Moreover, Berk explains, hate crime is intended to be both expressive and instrumental. Expression, I have suggested, is a large component of social rage and sometimes it is the only motive to rage. But to say that hate crime also features instrumentality suggests more of a practical purpose; for instance, a desired return to “normal” or unequal conditions. Hamm and Berk both contend that enemy construction serves such a function for the hate-filled. Also on the function of enemies, Godwin (1994) describes the positive and negative psychological function of the enemy as it relates to group mentality. The creation of strong in-group and out-group feelings, via the construction of enemies, reduces anxieties but simultaneously prevents emotional growth by confusing the world of feelings and the world of facts. The sociology of the enemy addresses “the deep emotional structure animating the debates on crime, family values, poverty, homosexuality, welfare, morality . . . with the goal of identifying the ‘bad other’ that shadows human history” (p. 79). The constructors of enemies may victimize their enemies and, at the same time, feel victimized. In this way, the victimization of a constructed enemy is presented as righteous retaliation. A typical example of constructed enemies would be Jews as Holocaust victims. Jews were constructed as enemies by the Nazis and, as such, Jews were tortured, humiliated, robbed, killed, and otherwise badly mistreated. Yet, as Aho (1994) describes the prototypical Nazis, they perceived themselves as victims of persecution, their world overrun by Jews. Today in the United States, immigration policies (and immigrants as constructed enemies), affirmative action (and minorities as constructed enemies), environmental policies (and EPA agents and, believe it or not, free-roaming animals as constructed enemies), and other targets are victimizers from this point of view.3 The far right currently see the federal government, independent women, African-Americans, foreigners, environmentalists, and others as enemies, as pushing them too far, as trying to take their rights away from them. The far right may feel that, as victims, they must regain their rights, violently if necessary or through repressive counterpolicies and initiatives at least. In the introduction to this book, I wrote of the popularly termed “angry white guys.” White men who feel that their hold on social power may be slipping, may desire a category of people to blame for their troubles. Women, racial minorities, immigrants, and others serve this scape-

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goat role very well since this unrepresentative collection of white men believe minorities to be getting preferential treatment. Unemployed or underemployed angry white men may see their employment status as a false reflection of their worth, they may feel mortified, or they may feel that policies enacted to correct past discrimination are unfair “reverse discrimination.” Jesse Helms, senator from North Carolina, successfully used an advertisement during his reelection campaign depicting a white man being denied a job because the job was given to an African-American. Individual enemies in the form of select persons can be members of minority groups. And their membership in a minority is good material with which to revile them, from the perspective of their revilers. By contrast, less distinguishable, larger-category enemies also provide fodder for the intolerant. Large-category enemies can be quite nebulous and can include groups of people (liberals, Jews, bankers, Freemasons), large and rather vague organizations (the federal government, the United Nations, the Trilateral Commission), and ideas, movements, and programs (gun control, the women’s movement, and affirmative action). One of the advantages that these broadly encompassing enemies offer to their enemy creators is that, because they cover so much ideological ground, they can be blamed for a great deal of social ills. Liberals, Jews, and the government are to blame for removal of constitutional rights, the dearth of jobs, the moral downfalls in present-day society, and destruction of family values. Broader still, we have “progress” or “social change” as the enemy. Progress and social change represent violations of the way things used to be or “ought to be.” MINORITIES AND POWER: DAMNED EITHER WAY As minorities gain power through increased numbers (immigration, birth rates) or the gaining of constitutionally mandated rights and equal-opportunity policies, they violate the expectations of the traditionally powerful to retain their traditionally powerful statuses. Minorities once “knew their place,” but now many expect to be treated as equals. This is upsetting to those who want to continue to see themselves as or be treated as “more than equal,” deserving of superior life benefits. Minorities can be unintentionally intimidating to the usual holders of power, in essence, because they represent competition. Hence, a bill was proposed to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1996 (HR 2128) that “would prohibit the federal government from requiring or encouraging racial or gender preference, such as quotas, set-asides, numerical

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goals, timetables or other numerical objectives based in whole or in part on race, color, national origin or gender” (see Dornan 1996). As a result of this kind of policy, we have already experienced a dramatic drop in African-American law-school admissions. Affirmative-action opponents might say that this decrease is correct and fair and that the AfricanAmericans previously admitted were not really qualified. But as social scientists have long known and as University of Pennsylvania Professor Lani Guanier stated recently, university admissions in general but especially law-school, medical-school, and graduate-school admissions, have more to do with the socioeconomic status of one’s family than innate ability.4 Affirmative action has helped to level the playing field, but the field remains quite uneven. Human-rights movements have rageful consequences even though their intentions were and are not rageful or destructive. The reaction to women’s-rights, civil-rights, and gay-rights movements has been repressive on some fronts, as we have seen in personal violence enacted against the movements’ representatives and in anti-affirmative-action initiatives (notably in California and Washington). These movements had and have as their purpose merely the gaining of rights, not a removal of rights from others. Yet the rageful reaction to human-rights movements has been couched in terms of the powerless gaining privileges at the expense of straight, native-born, Christian, white males. Rather than solidarity among minorities, often there is conflict (Berry 1996a; forthcoming). Sometimes the disenfranchised go after each others’ jugulars instead of going after the true source of their suppression. For instance, Louis Farrakhan has helped escalate the strife between African-Americans and Jews. The Million Man March, which he promoted, was notable for its exclusion of women, whites, gays, and Jews (in other words, anyone who is not a straight African-American man). Even without his intervention, there have been bloody rebellions between these two minority groups, African-Americans and Jews, over perceived and real injustices (Klein 1992; 1993). ASCRIBED VERSUS ACHIEVED MINORITY STATUSES Whether a person is born socially disadvantaged (for instance, a woman) or becomes socially disadvantaged (for instance, an illegal alien) is a point of argument and has much bearing on how society views minorities. Obviously, some minority statuses are ascribed: people are born belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group, born male or female, and born in a

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particular society. Other minority statuses are achieved through experience, choice, or accident, such as, immigration or criminal conviction. Ascribed statuses, as our introductory sociology textbooks tell us, are those statuses that we are born into and that we can do little about. Once born in the United States, we will always be U.S.-born even if we decide to change our citizenship. We can change gender but at some surgical, psychological, social, and financial cost. We cannot truly change our race, although some can “pass” as members of another race. (There is the extremely rare case of the entertainer Michael Jackson and perhaps others less popularly acclaimed who have gone to great physiologically-altering lengths to resemble persons from another race.) But by and large, ascribed statuses are unchangeable or changeable only at great cost. Achieved statuses are those statuses, complete with corresponding roles and expectations, that we are not born with but gain through life experience. Achieved statuses may be chosen of our own free will or assigned to us against our will. Examples of achieved statuses are marital status, parenthood, occupation, education, and religion. But keep in mind that achieved statuses (occupation and education, for instance) are heavily influenced by a trait that we are born into, family socioeconomic status. To further complicate matters, race, an ascribed status, is heavily correlated with socioeconomic status, making race and socioeconomic status determinants of education and occupation. It is questionable in popular opinion whether some minorities (the disabled, the mentally ill, homosexuals) are the result of nurture or nature, whether and to what extent a person chooses to be mentally or physically disabled or a homosexual. That is, there is a variance of opinion on the degree to which one has control over one’s minority status. Regarding homosexuality, for example, some members of the public as well as some scholars say that homosexuals are “born that way,” that homosexuality is a matter of realization that one is homosexual. Others say that homosexuality is a matter of choice over which one has control (Clinard and Meier 1995). This controversy, while intriguing, may become less important with greater acceptance of homosexuality (see, for instance, Mohr 1994); yet acceptance is partly dependent upon whether the status is considered achieved or ascribed. In short, it is a matter of debate whether minority statuses are ascribed or achieved. The construction of enemies hinges upon many issues, including whether someone chooses (or is perceived as choosing) to be homosexual, prisoner, mentally ill, or physically different. Social rage is attached to ascribed and achieved minority statuses, whether they

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are innate or presumed to be voluntary, but greater rage may be reserved for the presumed voluntary minority. In a way, a biological basis for minority status is worse for the minority because it implies that there is an ingrained incapacity inherent to those minorities (women are too emotional to engage in certain kinds of work, Mexicans are lazy, etc.). On the other hand, it is worse to be considered a minority by volition. If a minority is viewed as having made a choice to be socially disadvantaged, then their disadvantages are their own fault: if people do not want to be poor, they should work; many of the mentally and physically ill are putting on an act in order to shed their responsibilities; and people should not come to the United States illegally regardless of how poor they are. Randall Kennedy (1997) writes of racial pride, racial solidarity, and racial loyalty in terms of ascribed versus achieved statuses. Obviously, race is something that one is born into and not an achievement. Kennedy states that he, an African-American, eschews racial pride because the object of pride for an individual should be “something that he or she has accomplished” (p. 56). Moreover, he writes: It is understandable why people have often made inherited group status an honorific credential. Personal achievement is difficult to attain, and the lack of it often leaves a vacuum that racial pride can easily fill. Thus, even if a person has little to show for himself, racial pride gives him status. (p. 56)

Here, Kennedy is writing about racial pride among African-Americans, but I would point out that this strong desire for racial pride, pride in an ascribed status, is also displayed among white people who perceive themselves as social losers. To wit, white pride takes on immense and frightening dimensions among lower-socioeconomic-status white people in prison, among neo-Nazis skinheads, the Ku Klux Klan, and other white-supremacy groups. This discussion begs the question of why people would feel pride or shame about an ascribed status. Minority statuses such as mental illness or physical disability, whether they are achieved or ascribed, do not get a lot of social empathy and support (Goffman 1959; Anspach 1979; Schneider and Conrad 1980; Herman 1993). There is great uncertainty about how much blame to place on the mentally ill, the disabled, the homosexual, and other socially constructed minorities. The unsympathetic seem to assume that these questionable categories of minorities choose to be different and that they have greater control over their disabled status than they may in

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fact possess. As with other minorities, the intolerant may see these minorities’ quest for equality as a demand for “special privileges.” Social rage against the mentally and physically disabled speaks to our lack of tolerance for a difference that is not well understood; social rage against them seems to suggest that people can or ought to control their mental retardation, mental or physical illness, et cetera, without special considerations from the non-different. Hostility against the blind, deaf, less-than-independently mobile, chronically mentally ill, and others have become more rampant with the increase in societywide economic troubles. The evidence is found in (a) reduced funding for disability services and (b) hateful activities on the part of the community (refusal to have a group home in the neighborhood, verbal and physical abuse of the disabled). According to intolerant thinking, the mentally and physically different should be less of a social “burden.” They should not demand jobs, handicap access, disability insurance, dignity, credibility, parenthood, an equal chance, or even life. It is well established that some forms of mental illness are organic (the result of physiological trauma, chemical imbalance, and the like), whereas other forms are functional (not physically based but rather the result of social and personal experience). In either case, and regardless of popular opinion to the contrary, the mentally ill probably cannot help being mentally ill. There are no advantages to being mentally ill or to pretending to be mentally ill, except to avoid criminal responsibility, which is, contrary to popular opinion, quite rare. The vast majority of criminal defendants do not use insanity or incompetence to stand trial as a defense. Nevertheless, some believe that the mentally ill are just pretending to be mentally ill; and the exceptions prove the rule to those prone to this belief. (The case that comes to mind is the 1997 Vincent Gigante case. Gigante was accused of organized crime activities, specifically murder and racketeering. He presented himself as mentally disoriented, constantly wearing a bathrobe in public, and so on. He was convicted of racketeering.) Nor has post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—a disorder coming about from traumatic experience beyond one’s control, as encountered in war—paid off well as a criminal defense; that is, it does not always provide legal justification for criminal behavior. For that matter, even mental retardation has not operated as a mitigating circumstance in this age of “tough-on-crime” policies, as we see in cases of the mentally retarded being executed. At this juncture, I will address specific minority relations and the social rage that they incur. I will discuss gender, citizenship, race and eth-

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nicity, religion, homosexuality, and socioeconomic status as minority issues related to social rage. GENDER Women have gained social power in the past century and some people (men and women) find that fact rather disturbing. Forces against women’s rights, often from the religious and political right, attempt to reverse the progress so recently made. Women are in the same situation as other minorities as far as gaining rights: damned if they do and damned if they don’t. To not have gained rights, awareness, and recognition would have been worse than gaining them, of course. Yet, the women’s movement and feminist progress pose a grave threat to non-feminist worldviews, causing an anti-feminist reaction that sometimes borders on social rage. Anti-feminist reaction to the women’s movement comes from nonfeminist women as well as non-feminist men. Non-feminist women probably have not been socialized to accept their own equality; moreover, they may hope to align themselves with non-feminist men as a way of absorbing as much “protection” as possible. That is, they may believe that it behooves them to align themselves with their oppressors, by supporting a system (complete with practices and policies) that hurts them, if this system protects them from greater abuse by anti-feminist forces. This has always been true of minorities, that some align themselves with their oppressors. At the risk of oversimplifying, it is not unlike a protection racket in which one buys protection from severe harm by agreeing to go along with those who threaten to impose that harm. The reasoning for the powerless joining forces with the powerful has long been understood through Bruno Bettelheim’s (1960) study of concentration-camp prisoners. Some of the prisoners, to the extent possible, altered their uniforms to look like the camp guards’ uniforms and aided in the abuse of other prisoners. We find a similar practice in U.S. prisons. Trustees in U.S. prisons (prisoners entrusted with correctional officers’ duties) have been among the most abusive of other prisoners (Ruiz v. Estelle 1980; Snarr 1992). Both kinds of prisoners were willing to identify with, and uphold the controlling behaviors of, their captors against their fellow captives. I am reminded here of a somewhat complex relationship between men and women in the Ku Klux Klan. In Kathleen Blee’s (1991) history of women’s role in the Klan during the 1920s, we find that women joined

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the WKKK (Women of the Ku Klux Klan) for two reasons. First, they wanted protection from abusive and nonsupportive husbands. Second, they wanted to amass KKK support for passage of gender-relevant constitutional amendments, temperance and suffrage. As to the latter, like many women of their day, the WKKK were strongly represented in the temperance and suffrage movements. They wanted prohibition of alcohol sales, manufacturing, and drinking; and they wanted the right to vote.5 Yet, to gain such rights and protections, they joined forces with men of the KKK, who fail to treat women as equals. Ironically, although Klanswomen wanted protection from abusive men, they were and are openly anti-feminist, anti-abortion, and anti-ERA. Men can be, and some are, feminists. On the surface, it seems paradoxical, counterintuitive, or dysfunctional for men to not support women’s rights. In the United States, the common pattern has been antifeminism, though. Catherine McNicol Stock (1996), in her book about rural radicals, describes the “contradictory experiences relating to gender.” She writes: Much of the economic independence and “republican manhood’’ so ardently sought by rural men was made possible by their dependence on women. . . . [Although farm women’s labor was] economically invaluable . . . for centuries . . . rarely if ever were they considered to be full and equal partners in the farming enterprise. (p. 11)

Well, that was then and this is now, right? Stock goes on to inform us that, compared to decades and centuries ago, although today’s farm women have many more legal rights, their domestic circumstances are similar, for although their domestic production is less prevalent, they take off-farm jobs to supplement farm income. (p. 11)

Anti-feminists express their fear of feminism in social-rage policies and practices that are illegal, harmful, and personally taxing. Women still are overworked and underpaid. Women are paid less than what men are paid, for the same job (Lopez 1992; National Committee on Pay Equality 1995). Women still are overmedicated, and forced to undergo unnecessary surgeries, more than men. Some women are still so concerned about their appearance that they undergo elective, often dangerous cosmetic surgeries (Nygaard 1994). Women starve themselves and die (Chernin 1981; McLorg and Taub 1992). Women still do not have unconditional

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control over their bodies; witness the push to make abortions illegal. Women who are sexually harassed are still disbelieved and are punished for complaining about it, as seen in the criminal justice system and in the U.S. military lately; not to mention the double standards for engaging in consensual sex between military women and men.6 In sum, women are often assumed to be less capable in all realms of life except domestic chores. It remains a constant struggle for women to maintain integrity and to command simple respect (Anderson and Collins 1995; Rothenberg 1995; Schuman and Olufs 1995). “Endangered White Males.” Helen Chenoweth, representative of Idaho, who courts the militia, anti-environmentalist, and anti-feminist vote, uses the adjective “endangered” to describe white men. To use such terminology is ironic, since white men are by no means an endangered species. The term is also ironic in that it does not indicate concern about environmental issues but suggests that liberals care about every other species except white males.7 As I have explained elsewhere, “politically correct” terminology and political correctness on the whole was vandalized from the liberal perspective (Berry 1996b). Politically-correct terminology and concepts have been used as a means to attack liberal policies, such as environmentalism and affirmative action, without pinpointing the destructive qualities of non-politically-correct (sexist, racist, anti-environmental, etc.) perspectives. To describe a perspective as “pc” is to dismiss that perspective as invalid and not valuable. Dismissal of politically-correct perspectives, policies, and practices is not based on rational argument, but is based on personal opinion, superficiality, and emotionality. To apply the “endangered white male” terminology is to borrow a progressive, politically-correct, and popular term addressing species endangerment in a pointless and enraging fashion. Applying the issue of endangerment to a non-endangered and relatively powerful social group, white men, speaks to political opportunism but not to reason. Religion and Gender. Some religions, as social forces, have severely restricted women’s rights. It would be inaccurate to say that all religions condone abuse of powerless, select categories of people (minorities). Mormonism, for example, which accounts for a small proportion of the U.S. religious, exercises some gender repression (for instance, women can not serve as church deacons). Within the Mormon religion, there are some, but by no means a majority of, members who practice polygamy. Within the group that practices polygamy, we find rather extreme sexism in the form of forced marriages and physical abuse

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(Brooke 1998). My point is not that the Mormons engage in abuse against women; my point is that a small, unrepresentative subgroup of Mormons (a minority within a minority religion) engage in abuse against women. However, some religions provide the framework in which social rage is leveled at minorities. In the name of religion, women have not only been denied rights but have been mutilated, killed, neglected, and tortured. In the Middle East, women are stoned to death for violating religious customs. Furthermore, genital mutilations continue, largely in African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries, without letup. The Egyptian court, in a decision celebrated by Islamic leaders and outraging human-rights advocates, has overturned a year-long ban on genital mutilations. The practice is most prevalent among Muslims, but is also performed by Christians and followers of other traditional religions (Jehl 1997). Court rulings on female genital-mutilation practices have fluctuated over the past few years (bans, overturned bans). But one thing is certain: the mutilations continue. Diversity-minded persons puzzle over how to guarantee religious freedom (a good thing from a tolerance point of view) while at the same time allowing sexism, racism, and other minority oppression in the name of religion. In other words, torture of women is abhorrent; to protest practices such as genital mutilation is humanitarian and a step toward granting women’s rights. Yet to prohibit a religious practice can also be considered oppressive. We have a similar issue in the United States regarding abortion rights. As the reader is well aware, there are strong disagreements in the United States over the right of women to gain access to a medical procedure (abortion). The pro-life advocates believe that life is sacred, including that of unborn fetuses. The pro-choice advocates remind us that women are constitutionally guaranteed the right to abort fetuses from their bodies. There are many complicated concerns surrounding the abortion issue (religion, health risks, et cetera) that cannot be resolved here. What can be usefully addressed in an analysis of social rage, however, is the strong negative emotions swirling around the issue of abortion, not to mention the very violent activities taking place at abortion clinics (assaults, assassinations, bombings, gassings).8 In the crusade to prevent women from exercising their constitutionally guaranteed right to a medical procedure, “anti-abortion militants” (a fringe collection of pro-life adherents) engage in (what is to them) justified violence (Egan 1995). In an ethnography of pro-choice client escorts during anti-abortion

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protest activity, DiIorio and Nusbaumer (1993) examine collective anger-management strategies. While not resolving the question of who is right and who is wrong, DiIorio and Nusbaumer find that collective strategies of anger management can serve as a basis for pro-choice group solidarity.9 Moreover, anger is defined as a rational response, as morally appropriate for the pro-choice escorts, affording them a position of moral supremacy. On the other hand, the pro-life segment, relying primarily on religious grounds for their beliefs and behaviors, also command a morally superior position, in their own opinion. Finally, on the association between religion and suppression of women, we have the Promise Keepers. The Promise Keepers, founded in 1990, are a male-only religious and politically conservative organization, dedicated to the proposition that women must submit to men (Ross and Cokorinos 1997). Women do participate in the Promise Keepers movement through their support of the Promise Keepers’ activities and ideologies (New York Times 1997a). The female supporters of the Promise Keepers movement speak of submission being “a place of honor” (p. 15) in the same breath as stating a need for empowerment (through a commitment to the Christian god). It may be argued that such phraseology as “empowering” women through submission illustrates a distraction from real social problems (such as inequality) away from useful solutions (such as the gaining of rights). FOREIGN-BORN Social rage can be indicated by exploitation of immigrants, by the callousness and greed to which immigrants are subject. The United States has not been kind to Mexicans, Vietnamese, and other immigrant populations.10 Mexicans especially, and especially recently, have been assumed to be illegal aliens, criminals, and perhaps worst of all, cheap labor. In response, California Governor Pete Wilson campaigned in 1994 for Proposition 187, a measure that would cut off public services to illegal immigrants. By illegal immigrants, he meant Mexicans. It is hard to imagine Californians getting upset about French, British, Canadian, or other immigrants coming to and working in California. Proposition 187 passed, and conservatives have since been on an anti-immigration bandwagon. In addition to Proposition 187, fear among California Hispanics was further generated by a new welfare-reform bill. This bill threatened to cut off federal benefits to legal immigrants. Soon it was pay-back time. Hispanic voters, legal immigrants and

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those U.S.-born, grew into a mighty force. Bob Dornan, a radical-right California representative, lost his 1996 re-election to the House of Representatives to an Hispanic woman, due to a heavy Hispanic and Democratic vote. Dornan’s explanation: the Hispanic voter turnout was too heavy, implying that the voters were illegal aliens. He demanded a check on the voters’ alien status and was proved wrong. In July 1997, there was exposed the practice of bringing deaf Mexicans into New York City and North Carolina, to work in virtual servitude. In describing their plight and by way of advising the United States what to do, Alan Wolfe (1997) compared the Mexican influx to the illegal Chinese exodus from China to New York on the ship Golden Venture four years previous. The Mexicans and Chinese who came to the United States were experiencing extremely poor economic and human-rights conditions in their own nations and thus felt forced to come to the land of opportunity, even though their coming here was illegal and under terrifying conditions. However, the United States was reluctant to keep these immigrants, regardless of the harshness of conditions they were escaping. Wolfe lists desired characteristics for U.S. immigrants: they should speak English, work hard, and believe in the Christian god. The deaf Mexicans do not communicate in any language except sign language, but they worked like slaves (literally), and generally are god-fearing. The hopeful aliens on the Golden Venture were also escaping poor cultural and economic conditions, and had their reputation for strong work ethics to offer the U.S. labor market. Moreover, they wanted to escape birth restrictions in China, limitations on the number of children a couple could have. Their work ethic and desire for freedom against birth restrictions would seem to strike a positive chord with the United States. But, as Wolfe writes, even though our stated creed is acceptance of the downtrodden huddled masses, the precarious economic situation cannot support “our own” needy legal residents. One wonders, then, where the line should be drawn—who, ethically, can be turned away and who served. Immigration restrictions, to the point of turning away the needy and returning them to unimaginably harsh conditions, may be viewed as necessary. An alternative or additional explanation, though, is that those not accepted are those untrained in marketable skills. Among those who are accepted are foreign-born and -trained computer scientists who will work for less than is demanded by U.S.-born and -trained computer scientists. Social rage is evident not only in the poor treatment afforded would-be immigrants at the hands of

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the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but more so in the public support for unfair immigration policies, as found in Proposition 187. RACE AND ETHNICITY The survivalist right, as was addressed in Chapter 3, contain a strong element of white supremacy and often take their rage against racial minorities to an extreme; for example, murder and genocide. More commonly, we find social rage in the United States exercised in denial of access to economic opportunity (employment and admission to educational institutions), in denial of housing, and in other everyday aspects of social life. Howard Fineman (1995) describes the disagreement over affirmative action as a . . . most profound fight . . . one tapping deepest into the emotions of everyday American life . . . setting the lights blinking on studio consoles, igniting angry rhetoric in state legislatures . . . (p. 24)

Racial prejudice and discrimination are mighty forces in the United States, as they are in other, especially heterogeneous and inequality-ridden societies (Pincus and Ehrlich 1994; Aguirre and Turner 1995). Most people in the United States do not want to admit that they are racist. Racism goes against the grain of our historical view of ourselves as welcomers of the poor, tired, hungry, persecuted masses. The United States was founded on principles such as equal rights and the supposition that all “men” are created equally. A more recent trend is the aversion toward open expressions of racism, even though racist feelings may be harbored unwittingly. Our general aversion toward obvious racism may be related to our quickness to judge other cultures that engage in racism. For instance, in Goldhagen’s (1996a) book on “willing executioners,” he describes the willingness of the German citizenry to participate in the murder of Jews. In a rebuttal to criticisms of his book (1996b), Goldhagen writes that the world, including the United States, is very harsh in its judgement of the German culture that, in his opinion, encouraged the holocaust. Goldhagen has been criticized for suggesting that German anti-Semitism (an attitude) is causal to Jewish persecution (a behavior) when in fact, the critics argue, anti-Semitism has little to do with the willing executioners’ actions. This line of reasoning would be tantamount to saying, Goldhagen contends, that “The official public racism of the American South was not shared by most whites and . . . had little or no influence upon the atti-

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tude of whites or even slave masters toward blacks . . .” (1996b: 45). In agreement, Catherine McNicol Stock (1996) reminds us that U.S. communities not only condoned lynchings, communities (including sheriffs, jurors, women, and children) actively participated in them. The point is that all societies exhibit racism even though some, like the United States, downplay it. The U.S. opposition to affirmative action, a rejection of equal opportunity, is an indication of racism. Jesse Jackson understands the furor over racism and affirmative action very well. In a speech cited by Nichols (1996), Reverend Jackson explained to U.S. laborers (farmers, factory workers, et al.) that “There is an awful lot of race-baiting laced into the welfare focus and the affirmative-action focus.” The actual source of this race-baiting is corporate downsizing and outsourcing. Greedy U.S. corporations want laborers to be in conflict with one another, distracted from discussions about the dysfunctions of corporate welfare, distracted from the absence of health care for all (cited in Nichols 1996: 27). Stock (1996) agrees with Reverend Jackson’s intimations that the politics of class are closely related to the politics of race. White people in the United States, particularly those financially precarious, have long sought to place the blame for modern societal ills on racial and ethnic minorities. Chinese and Mexicans, since the 1800s, have posed a problem for white laborers because Chinese and Mexicans would work longer hours for less pay than whites; racist white laborers never thinking that if all were paid fairly, there would be no such competition across races. Racial conflicts over labor have resulted in legislative and informal community actions (like vigilantism) for centuries. While racism occurs in all cultures, it does take on distinctive features in specific cultures, partly because of the mixture of races within a culture and partly because of economic conditions of a culture. Stock explains that white frontier people pitted themselves against non-whites (Native Americans, African-Americans, and others) because of the former’s “Americanism” and European roots. Europeans are ethnocentric, Stock writes (I would ask, as opposed to the Japanese? Chinese? Middle Easterners?). U.S. peoples from a European background expected newcomers to abandon their beliefs immediately upon arrival and accept European beliefs. Failure to internalize European ways of looking at things provoked “impatience, contempt, and even murderous rage” (pp. 110–111). The United States is in a unique position though, as demonstrated by the following paradox: we inhibit free speech and free assembly when its

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purpose is racist (New York Times 1998; Herbert 1998). When our loyalty to free speech allows for the spread of the “hate virus” (Herbert, p. 19), we are in a quandary. Khalid Abdul Muhammed, an anti-Semitic, antiCatholic homophobe, is planning (as I write this) a “Million Youth March” to take place in September 1998. Mr. Muhammed has as his worthy goals the empowerment of minority youth; the bringing together of African-American and Latino youth to protest job discrimination, police brutality, and substandard education (Herbert). The problem faced by the City of New York, where the March was scheduled to (and did) take place, was how to constitutionally deny the right to free speech and free assembly when Mr. Muhammed’s “rhetoric seems likely to attract those so alienated as to pose the prospect of violence” (New York Times p. 18). In the present-day United States, the racial situation remains quite poor, from affirmative-action disputes to riots and hate killings. Metropolitan areas especially have encountered increased cross-racial assaults, as in the Crown Heights, New York, incident involving violence between African-Americans and Jews (Klein 1992). Race-inspired hate crimes occur outside cities also, as witnessed during a June 1998 weekend in rural Texas, in which three white men with Klan ties tortured and murdered an African-American man. Urban or rural, Klein blames the generally heightened tension on, among other factors, the white-supremacist message and the economic difficulties faced by whites and minority groups alike. RELIGION Religion, and its relationship to social rage, has already been mentioned in this chapter in terms of its interaction with gender, specifically the religious rationale for suppression of women. I will offer only a limited discussion here of prejudice against religions and by religions. The interaction between fringe religion and social rage will receive fuller treatment in Chapter 6. Religion serves many societal functions. It serves as an opiate of the masses, to borrow Karl Marx’s phrase. What sometimes appears on the surface to be a positive function, like providing comfort, can instead be quite negative, in terms of continuing oppression. In this sense, religion can serve as a distraction from one’s problems (such as, poverty) and from the source of one’s problems (unequal opportunities). Christianity among U.S. slaves quelled much questioning of the institution of slavery. African-American slaves believing in Christianity accepted their lot as

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“God’s will.” Their belief provided a means of instilling patience, waiting for heavenly rewards after death. Besides religious beliefs and practices as corollaries, precursors, or derivatives of social rage, there is the social rage that is leveled against specific religions and their members. As is true for all targets of social rage, prejudice can be imposed on individual members such as the individual Amish man whose buggy was destroyed in a hate crime (New York Times 1997c) and on whole societies of people, such as the Jews, who have been subject to severe anti-Semitism historically and to date (Wald 1997). At times, prejudice against a religious group is carried out by specific rageful groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan against Catholics (Blee 1991). At other times, anti-religious sentiment is more widespread across a population. Religion plays a role in violent and wide-scale social rage in many cultures, including Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and the Middle East. The more intolerant religions can serve as non-arguable “explanations” for social rage leveled at specific groups of people. As I stated in the beginning of this analysis, social rage, its messages, its messengers, and its practices do not have to be rational, logical, or empirically provable. People who disagree with religiously-based social rage get nowhere with people who hold these attitudes, since those rageful attitudes are based on a belief system. ANTI-HOMOSEXUALITY The United States has always displayed little tolerance for homosexuality. Our intolerance of an alternative (non-heterosexual) sexual orientation can take the forms of assaults and murders as well as more insidious and formalized policies that disallow same-sex marriages, deny parental rights to gay and lesbian parents, deny employment opportunities, revoke military standing and benefits, and so on. The reasoning behind homophobia is as contentious and empirically ungrounded as prejudicial feelings and practices against women, racial and ethnic minorities, foreigners, religious groups, the poor, and disabled. For instance, those intolerant of homosexuality say that it is “unnatural,” against God’s will, sinful, sick, and so on—all indefensible but inarguable reasons for homophobia. A bill sponsored by Florida Republican state representatives Johnnie Byrd and John Grant was proposed to prevent state recognition of same-sex marriages. As cited in the Gainesville Sun,

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Byrd admits that same-sex marriage legislation seems like a “wildeyed, vengeful, gay-bashing sort of thing.” But he contends that both he and Grant favor protecting individual freedoms. “It just has to be within certain fundamental structures found in the Bible,” Byrd says. (The Progressive 1997b: 11)

This line of argument presupposes that the Old Testament is a font of truth and standard bearer for all of us. Beyond the false assumption of widespread Christian agreement, this line of reasoning assumes that social and legislative power can be wielded and imposed without argument—that those who believe they are right can dictate the attitudes and behaviors of others. Anti-homosexual prejudice, like all prejudice, is learned (Ehrlich 1990). Some would say, so is violence. Joshua Dressler (1995) writes that violence against gays and lesbians, as bias-related crime, communicates “the false message that homosexuals do not deserve to be treated with dignity and respect” (p. 727). Dressler then goes into a detailed legal analysis of the “reasonable man” standard for provocation in cases of murdered homosexuals. It seems that in the eyes of some defendants who kill homosexuals, homosexuality by itself is a sufficiently culpable behavior and state of being. Furthermore, from an anti-homosexual perspective, gays and lesbians do not deserve the respect and protection of the criminal justice system. A study released by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, an advocacy group based in Washington, has found that gay men and lesbians remain one of the least-liked groups in the country (Goldberg 1998). And recently, there has been some movement toward removing civil rights of homosexuals, as found in state initiatives sponsored by the religious right to deny homosexuals employment. Society wide, however, there is a growing acceptance of homosexuality. The report, using data drawn from polling organizations such as Gallup and the National Opinion Research Center, focused on steep rises over the last 20 years in support for equal rights in housing, employment and the military. In a more limited fashion, the report found that disapproval of homosexuality had dropped by nearly 20 percentage points since its peak in the late 1980s. While acceptance of gay men and lesbians has swelled substantially in recent years, as has support for their civil rights, a majority of the U.S. population still disapproves of homosexuality. For all the signs of increased tolerance, homosexuality was still disapproved of by the 56 percent of the U.S. population in 1996 (Goldberg 1998).

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CLASSISM Classism usually refers to prejudice and discrimination against the poor. Although the non-rich do have negative attitudes toward the rich, usually those attitudes smack of resentment and jealousy. More importantly, those who are not rich cannot discriminate against the rich. No matter how much the rich may be hated or envied, the non-rich can inflict no social harm upon them. Classism can be exhibited through a denial of access. Access can refer to opportunities and to more physical objects, including places. Note the term “exclusive” in describing clubs and organizations: the term means that some people are excluded. Physical barriers are strong symbols of rejection. Social rage may result from instances in which trespassers violate class-defined barriers. It was reported that nonresidents of Greenwich, Connecticut, are prevented by residents from setting foot on “their” beach, unless accompanied by a Greenwich resident (New York Times 1997c). The legal argument—being brought by an attorney who, as a nonresident was prevented from jogging on the beach—is that (1) the beach is a federal shoreline and, as such, is not owned by Greenwich residents and (2) the prohibition is unconstitutional, elitist, and “un-American.” Grave disrespect is reserved for people so poor that they are on public assistance (Wilson 1990; Piven and Cloward 1993; Jencks 1994). Many false assumptions are attributed to the poor on a wholesale basis, such as that they are lazy, unmotivated, and happy to be poor. Being poor is not an enjoyable lifestyle, not only because of the material things one lacks but also because of the alienation one feels. As sociologists have long known, and this is especially true of the United States, we are all bombarded with the message that if we only worked hard enough, we would be economically successful (recall Robert Merton’s anomie theory). This message causes great feelings of alienation for those who work hard and are nevertheless financially defeated. Classism is ordinarily deflected downward. The rich may be contemptuous of all of us. The middle class may be contemptuous of the working class and lower class. The working class may be contemptuous of the lower class. The poor often self-loathe. It is ironic in the same way that racial and ethnic minorities are in conflict with each other and that women are unsupportive of each other that the non-rich (middle, working, and lower classes) fight among themselves. The fact is, only the very wealthy control the lives of the rest of us (the jobs that are available, what we see on TV, our health care, our health, our political choices, etc.).

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This very thin stratum controls the wealth, the opportunities, the economy, legislation, politics, and what we “know” through the media. Through privately owned media, for example, we come to understand that the poor deserve to be poor. Harsh economic conditions such as those experienced in the United States since the early 1980s to date seem to increase classism to a rageful pitch. In hard economic times, people see how fine the line is that separates prosperity from poverty. It frightens them. Their sense of vulnerability makes the not-so-desperately-poor want to separate themselves from the poor and, better yet, be able to blame the poor for their own plight. The non-poor want to blame the poor for their poverty because to do so means (they assume) that the non-poor will never get in such dire straits, since they do what is necessary (work) in order to escape the ravages of poverty.11 Adolph Reed (1996) writes of disrespecting the underclass. He recites criticisms leveled by Joe Klein (a political pundit and author of Primary Colors) at William Julius Wilson, a sociologist and widely respected expert on race and poverty. Klein says that Wilson does not grasp the African-American inner-city poor peoples’ problems. The problem, Klein says, is not a lack of jobs but a lack of restraint on the part of lower-income African-Americans. Klein states that ghetto-dwelling African-Americans are poor because they exhibit bad behavior and harbor bad attitudes. They have problematic values and they are steeped in social pathology of their own doing. In short, Klein blames the victim instead of social injustice and unequal opportunity. Reed concludes that “focusing on the behavior of the poor makes is possible to sidestep . . . reality” (p. 21). Again, we see illogical distractions instilling and “explaining” social rage, in this case blaming the poor for their poverty. CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have described the sociology of the enemy as it is relevant to perceptions and treatment of minorities in the United States. Minorities, those with relatively less social and economic power than majority members of a society, are constructed enemies. They are also the targets of social rage, especially as they have gained economic power over recent decades. Construction of the enemy suggests that the creation of the enemy category and placement of people in that enemy category are artificial. There is nothing inherently inferior about women, Mexicans, homosexu-

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als, the poor, and other minorities. There are only the inferior traits assigned to them that guarantees, regardless of their accomplishments, that they are viewed and treated less equally than majority members of a society. It hardly matters that minorities have no empirically provable faults (stupidity, laziness, etc.) compared to majority members: attribution of minority traits, falsely assigning traits to minorities, “confirms” their lower status as deserved. What matters is that those in power use these enemy traits, conferred on minorities, as justification for unequal treatment. Making minorities into social enemies is more complex than arbitrarily making dualistic categories of “us and them.” Construction of minority enemies has to do with social forces and social fears currently operating at a given time. In poor economic times, for instance, those accustomed to being economically comfortable (well employed) may become and behave in a more prejudicial and discriminatory manner. I briefly presented a number of minority categories (gender, country of origin, race and ethnicity, religion, sexual preference, and socioeconomic status) as they are associated with social rage. Throughout the discussion, several themes were discovered. One theme is the distractions from the real problems (unequal treatment) and real solutions (equality) through, for example, politically-correct language. The examples I offered were phraseology such as “endangered white men” and “empowerment” of women through submission. Another theme is that inequality leads to competition and conflict among the masses (the masses being everybody who is not in the very top stratum of super wealthy), which ensures that the unequal social order remains intact. Finally, unintentional intimidation by minorities through the gaining of power enrages the non-diversity-minded members of a society, who then urge greater repression of minorities. Gaining human rights is essential for the wellbeing of minorities, yet such equalization creates a backlash on the part of nonegalitarian members of society. NOTES 1

Some minorities are assigned more than one minority status and are referred to as, for example, “double minorities” (for example, an African-American woman), “triple minorities” (a physically disabled, Hispanic woman), et cetera, depending upon the number of minority statuses they possess. These combination minorities receive exponentially poor treatment because they presumably possess and display a multitude of minority traits according to the intolerant; that is, they have multiple negative traits of their multiple minority

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categories heaped upon them. They are (according to racists, sexists, etc.) assumed to be unintelligent, lazy, overly emotional, helpless, and so on. 2 This definition is not unlike Howard Becker’s (1963) symbolic interactionist definition of “deviants” in its emphasis on artificiality. Becker wrote: “The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is the behavior that people so label” (p. 9). 3 Spotted owls, for example, are the constructed enemies of the timber industry. I have written elsewhere that humans vary in their prejudices and discrimination of certain non-human animals (Berry 1996a; forthcoming). Humans reserve special prejudice and discrimination for wolves, spiders, bats, snakes, and mountain lions compared to other non-human animals, such as dogs, horses, and domestic cats. These analyses also describe the manner in which human minorities are rank-ordered and the manner in which minority humans (for example, prisoners and women) are often more sympathetic to non-human animals. 4 Mayer (1991) and, more generally, Jencks and Peterson (1991) address the manner in which socioeconomic status determines the future opportunities of the inhabitants of those statuses. Specific to this discussion, being of a workingclass and lower-class background heavily influences whether one will go to college and the type of college one will attend, if any. Moreover, family socioeconomic status also affects more personal-social variables, such as teen pregnancy, marriage, and so on. As to affirmative action and its effects, I am reminded of an incident at home, in which a friend and I were listening to classical music compact discs. The one we were listening to ended and we had to decide which one to hear next. He suggested one, “you know, the one with the woman conductor.” The fact that a cd can be described in such a way, among a huge collection of classical cd’s, is a strong statement that women are underrepresented in classical and other music industries. Qualifications have nothing to do with it. Women, African-American, gay and lesbian, and disabled would-be conductors face seemingly insurmountable obstacles to traditional channels of success, especially in some occupations. 5 Much of the impetus for the temperance movement (heavily influenced by the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement) was women’s experience of being beaten by drunken husbands. The hope was that if men could not have access to alcoholic beverages, drunken assaults on women would decline. The WKKK also wanted the right to vote, but had no qualms about denying voting access and other civil rights to Catholics, immigrants, Jews, and African-Americans. 6 This litany of bad news applies to the United States. The situation for women in other cultures, as I will describe in Chapter 6, can be much worse. 7 Anti-choice people do the same with bumper stickers like “save the unborn humans” and another sticker with something about endangered species hav-

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ing more rights and protection than human fetuses. Such statements suggest that pro-choice liberals care more about whales and other animal species than babies. 8 A bit farther removed from assassinations and other direct violence is the political behavior of pro-life and pro-choice segments (see Chapter 7). In political behavior, we find illustrated quite volatile, destructive, and distracting arguments, presumably over abortion, but frequently having more to do with unrelated issues. 9 This is not unlike Mark Hamm’s conclusion cited in Chapter 1 regarding opponents of hate speech. While not reconciling the right to (free) hate speech, opponents of hate speech bond over their opposition and at least provide a counterpoint to hate speakers. I would add in both cases, management of hate speech and anti-choice activities, that those engaging in them also feel that they occupy positions of moral supremacy. Hate speakers point to their constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech. Anti-choice assassins of abortion-clinic workers feel that they are on morally appropriate ground by stopping further murders (of fetuses) by murdering the murderers (abortion doctors). 10 The United States, over its lifespan as the formalized United States, has expressed prejudice and discrimination against most incoming groups: the Irish, Italians, Germans, Chinese, Japanese, and so on. This pattern is ironic given three facts: the United States badly mistreats its one indigenous population, the United States is a nation founded by foreigners (European, mostly the English), and the United States is composed almost entirely of descendants of foreigners. 11 Economic good times do not seem to make things any better for the poor. Johnston (1997) reports that as state sales taxes and income taxes go up or down, one thing stays constant: the affluent usually come out on top. The booming economy has benefited the wealthy and hurt the poor.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aguirre, Adalberto, and Jonathan H. Turner. 1995. American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequences of Discrimination. New York: McGraw-Hill. Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Anderson, Margaret L., and Patricia Hill Collins, eds. 1995. Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. (See especially Chapter 5, “Oppression,” by Marilyn Frye.) Anspach, Renee R. 1979. “From Stigma to Identity Politics: Political Activism among the Physically Disabled and Former Mental Patients.” Social Science and Medicine 13A:765–773.

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Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders. New York: Free Press. Berk, Richard A. 1990. “Thinking about Hate-Motivated Crimes.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 5: 334–349. Berry, Bonnie. 1996a. “Solidarity among the Oppressed.” The Prism 9: 23–25. Berry, Bonnie. 1996b. “The Vandalism and Violent Demise of Political Correctness.” Quarterly Journal of Ideology 19: 23–33. Berry, Bonnie. Forthcoming. “Human and Non-Human Animal Rights and Oppression: An Evolution toward Equality.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology. Bettelheim, Bruno. 1960. The Informed Heart. New York: Free Press. Blee , Kathleen M. 1991. Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Brooke, James. 1998. “Utah Struggles with a Revival of Polygamy.” New York Times, August 23, p. A12. Chernin, Kim. 1981. The Obsession: Reflections on the Tyranny of Slenderness. New York: Harper Collins. Clinard, Marshall B., and Robert F. Meier. 1995. Sociology of Deviant Behavior. Fort. Worth, TX: Harcourt, Brace. Cooley, Charles Horton. 1962. Social Organization. New York: Schocken. Cooley, Charles Horton. 1964. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken. DiIorio, Judith A., and Nusbaumer, Michael R. 1993. “Securing Our Sanity: Anger Management among Abortion Escorts.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 21: 411–438. Dornan, Robert. 1996. Discussion on Affirmative Action. Hyper-text document on www.house.gov, November 23. Dressler, Joshua. 1995. “When ‘Heterosexual’ Men Kill ‘Homosexual’ Men: Reflections of Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the ‘Reasonable Man’ Standard.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 85: 726–763. Egan, Timothy. 1995. “Conspiracy Is an Elusive Target in Prosecuting Foes of Abortion.” New York Times, June 18, pp. A1, A9. Ehrlich, Howard J. 1990. “The Ecology of Anti-Gay Violence.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5: 359–365. Fineman, Howard. 1995. “Race and Rage.” Newsweek, April 3: 23–34. Godwin, Robert W. 1994. “On the Function of Enemies: The Articulation and Containment of the Unthought Self.” The Journal of Psychohistory 22: 79–102. Goffman, Erving. 1959. “The Moral Career of the Mental Patient.” Psychiatry 22: 123–142.

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Goldberg, Carey. 1998. “Acceptance of Gay Men and Lesbians Is Growing, Study Says.” New York Times, May 31, p. A15. Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 1996a. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Knopf. Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 1996b. Rebuttal to Criticisms. The New Republic, 4275: 37–45. Griessman, B. Eugene. 1993. Diversity: Challenges and Opportunities. (See especially Chapter Five: “Transforming ‘They’ Into ‘We.’”) New York: Harper Collins. Hamm, Mark S., ed. 1994. Hate Crime: International Perspectives in Causes and Control. Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company. Herbert, Bob. 1998. “The Hate Virus.” New York Times, August 10, p. A19. Herman, Nancy J. 1993. “Return to Sender: Reintegrative Stigma-Management Strategies of Ex-Psychiatric Patients.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 22: 295–330. Jehl, Douglas. 1997. “Egyptian Court Overturns Ban on Cutting Girls’ Genitals: Another Victory Claimed by Islamic Forces.” New York Times, June 26, p. A9. Jencks, Christopher, and Paul E. Peterson. 1991. The Urban Underclass. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute. Jencks, Christopher. 1994. The Homeless. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnston, David Cay. 1997. “Taxes are Cut, and the Rich Get Richer.” New York Times, October 5, p. A16. Kennedy, Randall. 1997. “My Race Problem – And Ours.” The Atlantic Monthly 279: 55–66. Klein, Lloyd. 1992. “The Hating Game: Racial Tension and Criminal Justice Reaction.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 18–20, Pittsburgh, PA. Klein, Lloyd. 1993. “The Politics of Hate Crime: Crown Heights and the Crisis of Government Confidence.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 11–13, Miami, Florida. Light, Ivan. 1972. Ethnic Enterprise in America: Business and Welfare among Chinese, Japanese, and Blacks. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lopez, Julie Amparano. 1992. “Women Face Glass Walls as Well as Ceilings.” Wall Street Journal, March 3. Mayer, Susan E. 1991. “How Much Does a High School’s Racial and Socioeconomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?” Pp. 321–341 in The Urban Underclass. Washington, DC.:. The Brookings Institute.

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McLorg, Penelope A., and Diane E. Taub. 1992. “Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia: The Development of Deviant Identities.” Deviant Behavior 13: 291–311. Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Mohr, Richard D. 1994. A More Perfect Union: Why Straight America Must Stand up for Gay Rights. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. National Committee on Pay Equity. 1995. Pp. 144–151 in Race, Class, and Gender in the United States, edited by Paula S. Rothenberg. New York: St. Martin’s Press. New York Times. 1997a. “The Promise Keepettes.” New York Times Magazine April 27: 15. New York Times. 1997b. “Four Charged in Burning of Amish Man’s Buggy.” New York Times, November 12, p. A17. New York Times. 1997c. “Lawsuit Challenges Restriction of Beaches.” New York Times, July 21, p. A11. New York Times. 1998. “Free Speech and Public Safety.” New York Times, August 11, p. A18. Nichols, John. 1996. “Over the Rainbow.” The Progressive 60: 27–29. Nygaard, Christine E., M.D. 1994. Personal Communication, September. Pincus, Fred L., and Howard J. Ehrlich, eds. 1994. Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination, and Ethnoviolence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1993. Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Vintage Books. The Progressive. 1997. “No Comment” Section. The Progressive 61: 11. Reed, Adolph. 1996. “Dissing the Underclass.” The Progressive 60: 20–21. Ross, Alfred, and Lee Cokorinos. 1997. “Promise Keepers: A Real Challenge from the Right.” National NOW Times 19: 1 and 6. Rothenberg, Paula S., ed. 1995. Race, Class, and Gender in the United States. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ruiz v. Estelle. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Texas 1980). Cert. Denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438. Schneider, Joseph W., and Peter Conrad. 1980. “In the Closet with Illness: Epilepsy, Stigma Potential and Information Control.” Social Problems 22: 32–44. Schuman, David, and Dick Olufs. 1995. Diversity on Campus. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

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Snarr, Richard W. 1992. Introduction to Corrections. 2d. ed. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown Publishers. Sokolowski, Kurt. 1992. “Emotional Influence on the Attribution Process: Does Love or Hate Make Blind?” (in German). Zeitschrift fur Sozial Psychologie 23: 245–256. Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wald, Matthew L. 1997. “Suspicious Package Prompts 8-Hour Vigil at B’nai B’rith.” New York Times, April 25, p. A12. Wilson, William Julius. 1990. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Wolfe, Alan. 1997. “Immigration Angst.” New York Times, July 23, p. A19.

CHAPTER 6

Social Rage and the Religious Fringe

I’m a student of Bible Prophecy . . . also a Vietnam veteran who fought Communism. Partly because of that I was determined from the start to fit Communism into Bible Prophecy, if at all possible. I looked for evidence that the Antichrist . . . was a Soviet leader. I found it. I looked for evidence that the Endtime dictatorship in Western Europe would be due to Soviet conquest of Europe. I found it. I looked for evidence there would be a nuclear war (Soviet attack upon America). I found it.(Joseph Grace, in a letter to Jeffrey Kaplan 1997: 172) Dictionaries define religion as “an objective pursued with zeal or conscientious devotion” and as “a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith.”1 In these relatively objective dictionary definitions, we find strong emotional components to religion, as indicated by the words “zeal,” “devotion,” “ardor,” and “faith.” The emotional content of religion does not mean that religion is necessarily dysfunctional for society. Although religion has been said to be the opiate of the masses, and it does function in that manner for some, it is more than this.2 I have referred to the religious fringe in the title to this chapter because there is only an imperfect overlap between religion and social rage. Even Christian Identity, the religion associated with the Aryan Nation and white supremacists in general, has militant and nonmilitant follow149

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ers. Members of a variation of Christian Identity, known as “Seedline,” believe that they (being white) are a race born of God, whereas Jews are a race born of Satan. The eventual outcome of the conflict between Aryans and Jews, according to Seedline, is that one side (presumably the Jews) will be utterly destroyed (Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998). But not all Christian Identity members belong to Seedline and not all Seedline adherents are willing to engage in armed conflict with Jews. Some religions, some factions of religions, and some members of some religions engage in social rage; and they do so in the name of religion. Some religious beliefs justify socially rageful attitudes and behavior, as we find in religion-based notions that women should be subservient to men, that homosexuals are sinners, and that blacks are inferior to whites. The more accurate representation of the relationship between religion and social rage is a narrowly constrained one, since many religious people disagree with intolerant, repressive, rageful points of view. It is impossible to state definitively that any one religion is more ragefully involved than another. To state otherwise suggests bias against some religions compared to others. We need also to understand that any religion, regardless of its prosocial messages and beliefs, can contain a portion of adherents who act and think ragefully and do so in the exculpatory context of their religion. As with other social institutions such as politics or economics, religion can provide the backdrop for feelings and actions of social rage, should one be inclined toward social rage in the first place. That is, some individuals, notwithstanding their religion or lack of religion, engage in socially rageful activities (arson, murder, and other violence) and adhere to very ungenerous perspectives of others. Many others, belonging to organized religions or not, do not engage in rageful behavior or hold rageful perspectives. Most Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland certainly do not throw bombs and most would probably rather have a peaceful co-existence. Not all Islamics think and act toward women in the manner prescribed by the Taliban, a segment of the Islamic religion. In fact, most religions, at least superficially, teach doctrines that oppose socially rageful attitudes and behaviors. THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS Thus far in this analysis of social rage, we have learned that beliefs, rather than empirically observable phenomena, are an important element to the creation and sustenance of social rage. Beliefs require no logic, no

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rationality, no reasoning that we can all agree upon. Sociologists define beliefs as: systems of symbols or ideas that . . . apply to particular aspects of social life, such as work, family, school, recreation, and other concrete spheres of activity. Some beliefs say what should exist in a situation, expressing people’s specific expectations or sentiments. (Turner 1985: 66)

Religious beliefs are often viewed as concrete, inarguable, and infallibly supported by a religious document, such as the Christian Bible. If it is the case that religious beliefs are inarguable, then there is created quite a bit of leeway for intolerant attitudes toward categories of people (feminists, homosexuals, racial minorities, and others) as specified by one’s beliefs and as documented by religious teachings. This is tautological reasoning, and that is my point. More generally though, there is room for doubt in religion, according to Miles (1997). In his research, he had many conversations with people in the United States about their religions and found a note of defiance, a “defiant rejection of the widespread assumption that doubt and religion are incompatible” (p. 58). Doubt is allowable according to his interview subjects; religious belief is a not take-it-or-leave-it sort of thing. Fundamentalist interpretations, which are not representative of all religious interpretations by any means, leave little room for deliberation, as when a strict, literal reading of a religious document provides the one and only way to derive religious meaning from that religious document. We find that the no-room-for-argument stance is not limited to fundamentalist Protestantism. Recently, the Roman Catholic pope, John Paul II, has vowed to “stamp out liberal debate” and has backed his promises with predictions of “just punishment” for those who question Roman Catholic teachings. Dissension from “definitive” articles of faith is not allowed (Stanley 1998). As is true for politics and other emotionally intense social forces, religion is not always truth-friendly. Bruni (1997) reports that the “truth suffers” in the religiously-based abortion debate. Neither the pro-life or pro-choice side offers the whole truth in putting forth their points of view.3 No amount of legal and medical argument, that abortion is a constitutionally-guaranteed right and without it women will increasingly be mutilated and killed, can effectively counter a religious basis for the prolife stance. Likewise, no amount of religious argument can counter the pro-choice stance.

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Kaplan’s (1997) book on radical religions in the United States lends some understanding toward “truth” and the place of “proof” in religion. In the letter written to Kaplan by Joseph Grace, quoted above, we discover that because religious documents (the Bible in this case) are subject to interpretation, almost any point of view can be confirmed or refuted. For instance, Mr. Grace searched for evidence that the antichrist is a Soviet leader and such was revealed to him. Members of the 1998 Southern Baptist Convention point to Scriptures stating clearly that women should “submit gracefully” to their husbands, while other students of the Bible have found that women have a more equal place to men (Niebuhr 1998; Wilson 1998). Stephen Jay Gould, a paleontologist, describes the use of religious argument to support one’s own political attachments and deflate one’s political opponents. To make matters really confusing, the religious argument in this case stems from a scientific proposition, Darwinism. Gould has become a bit chagrined that the theory of evolution is (mis)applied as a weapon in political conflicts. Forcing a scientific theory into religious, moral, and political arguments is “the current fad in conservative intellectual circles,” invoking Charles Darwin “as either a scourge or an ally in support of cherished doctrines” (p. 19). The theory of natural selection and the fact of evolution in general cannot legitimately buttress any particular moral or social philosophy, writes Gould. Yet, Darwinism has animated a religious faction that views an old-style Christian revival as central to a stable and well-ordered polity. In Slouching toward Gomorrah, for example, Robert Bork [1996] writes, “The major obstacle to a religious renewal is the intellectual classes,” who “believe that science has left atheism as the only respectable intellectual stance.” (p. 19 of Gould)

Mr. Bork’s statement, writes Gould, is in itself anti-intellectual, unfounded, and exaggerated. Mr. Bork, not a paleontologist, is unmoved by the abundant evidence . . . of intermediary fossils in major evolutionary transitions — mammals from reptiles, whales from terrestrial forebears, humans from apelike ancestors. (p. 19 of Gould)

Recently, Darwinism has been taken over by the conservative cause as validation for their views. More specifically, Gould finds, Darwinism has been used to enshrine conservative political dogmas as the dictates of

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nature. Clues that conservative politics are Darwinian politics are evidenced by, according to their proponents, human self-interestedness (selfishness) and “natural inequality.” Right-wing explanations of selfinterestedness and inequality as normal and successfully evolved human behaviors and attitudes are proposed to rest on the foundations of evolutionary theory. Gould reminds us that applying Darwinism to a particular moral or political line is a misuse of science, specifically evolutionary biology. He concludes that science can never decide the morality of morals. Suppose we discovered that aggression, xenophobia, selective infanticide and the subjugation of women offered Darwinian advantages to our hunter-gatherer ancestors a million years ago on the African savannahs. Such a conclusion could not validate the moral worth of these or any behaviors, either then or now. (p. 19)

Standards Set by the Supernatural. Besides defining the nature of the world and the place of people in it, religions ordinarily contain a belief in a supreme being(s), a set of ethical principles for behavior, and belief in the perfectibility of the human soul. Religions serve the useful function of setting guidelines that are akin to the social contract or, in laypersons’ terms, the “golden rule”: we should not go out of our way to harm others and we should live our lives in such a way to enhance others’ well-being. If people did not believe in the perfectibility of the human soul, a belief provided by religion, then they perhaps would not see the utility in teaching others good conduct. Closely related to behavioral guidelines and perfectibility, a belief in a supreme being leads us to avoid dreaded consequences for poor behavior (such as being sent to hell, accumulating bad karma) but also provides a model for good behavior (steering us, for example, toward “Christlike” behavior). Contained within a general set of religious beliefs and values are ideas about the sacred and supernatural. Besides determining what is true or false, religions provide basic cultural values designating what is appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong. Sanctions forthcoming from supernatural forces for not adhering to religious values and standards make the values and standards all the more significant (Turner 1985). In June 1998, Pat Robertson, former chair of the Christian Coalition, predicted supernatural punishment for gay-pride celebrations in Orlando, Florida. Supernatural forces would visit themselves in the form of a hurricane (it was hurricane season in a hurricane-prone state), punishing the city and its inhabitants for their sins (Berke 1998). Admittedly, Mr.

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Robertson is closer to the religious fringe than to the religious mainstream. More mainstream religions might predict an accumulation of sins leading to purgatory, using a Catholic example. Crime, sin, and moral transgressions are often interchangeable in religious messages, with supernatural sanctions for wrongdoing involving capriciousness and not uncommonly, punishment. Forgiveness by supernatural forces and by mortals also figures strongly in many religions. Even more positively, most religions promise rewards for good conduct. Social rage overlaps with religion more on the negative end of it, though, when extremist religious leaders and spokespersons strike fear into and level condemnation at nonbelievers and other social enemies. Hence, religion can be identified as a system of shared beliefs and standardized practices, implying that dissension from the beliefs and violations of shared practices are frowned upon by members of the religious community and by supernatural beings. Irrationality rears its confusing head when we understand that supernatural forces cannot be explained rationally but nevertheless give meaning to life by “illuminating complex human questions” (Inciardi and Rothman 1990: 364). Here I would remind the reader of the simplicity of social-rage phenomena, as I have earlier described it, coexisting with convoluted beliefs and explanations. Importantly, beliefs pertain not only to “shoulds,” but also to reality. That is, beliefs not only guide our behavior but interpret what truly is. From Inciardi and Rothman (1990), we learn that, “Beliefs refer to what people have learned to be real whether or not it can be verified” (p. 76). Interpretation of the universe often relies upon religious beliefs. The intersection between social rage and religion provokes questions on the relationship between values and beliefs (what should be), on the one hand, and knowledge and rationality (what is), on the other. Religion and its relationship to social rage is also much influenced by the social conditions in which they exist. In other words, social rage in the context of religion is affected by social forces, such as economics, politics, and the media. Poor economic times create greater competition for jobs and greater resistance to equal employment opportunities, as we might find in religious organizations that want women to be subservient and economically dependent. The dominance of a political party by fundamentalist religious groups, as we have experienced in the United States since the early 1980s, can affect political behavior on issues of tolerance for diversity and human rights. Media treatment of religion can overfocus on fringe and fundamentalist religious practices and occur-

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rences, to the exclusion of more mainstream religious practices and occurrences, thereby instilling in the public a distorted sense of fringe and fundamentalist religious influence. CULTURAL VARIATIONS AND THE CONTINUITY OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT Jack Miles (1997) has determined that, cross-culturally, the relationship between religion and nationality varies in meaning. In the United States, for instance, “an American may be of any religion or none and still be fully an American” (p. 56). This is not so in other countries such as Bosnia. In Bosnia, if you are a Catholic, you are a Croat, and vice versa, to the point that if you change your religion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy or Islam, you will feel as if you have also changed your nationality to Serb or “Turk.” In this country [the United States], by sharp contrast, your American identity remains unchanged when you change your religion. (p. 56)

Cultures vary in terms of their predominant religions and mixtures of religions represented in those cultures. The United States is predominantly a Protestant culture, but with many types of other religions representing smaller numbers of adherents and having less cultural impact via education, politics, and so on. Cultures vary in the degree of violence provoked by the interface between and among religions. Strife between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland continues on an extreme scale, as illustrated by the burning of ten Roman Catholic churches in Belfast; the arsonists are believed to be members of a dissident Protestant group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (Clarity 1998). Religious conflict, however, is a constant. The juxtaposition of unlike religions provoke conflict, sometimes as violent as we find in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, sometimes less perceptible. Religious conflict can take place within a single society or across societies and nations, the latter being represented by long-standing wars in the Middle East. Religious conflict can be massive in scale as seen in religious wars, entire societies engaging in war largely if not entirely based on religious conflict. By contrast, religious conflict can be pinpointed, as we find in assassinations of religious leaders, or in assassinations of political leaders (such as Itzhak Rabin) by religious zealots. Often, rage expressed toward a particular religion, toward members

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of a religion, or toward a religious symbol are not about religious issues but are about racism and intolerance of specific ethnic identities. Church burnings in the U.S. South are aimed not at the religions associated with those churches so much as at the race of people who attend those churches: African-Americans. The war in Bosnia is partly over religion and partly over ethnicity. Anti-Semitism continues as a worldwide tradition and may have more to do with hatred of the Jewish people than hatred of Judaism (Wald 1997). Religions on the whole do not serve a rageful purpose, but some (notably fringe) religions do display obvious and active social rage. “Cosmotheism,” developed by William Pierce of the National Alliance, a neo-Nazi group, offers a particularly intolerant religious worldview. William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries (the violent, futuristic guidebook for Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building), has created an apocalyptic theology with a millenarian message. Cosmotheism combines racism with evolutionary principles to “prove” that Aryans are superior to other ethnicities (especially Jews) and races (especially African-Americans). Moreover, Cosmotheism mandates the destruction of the present order of earthly existence, and specifically dictates that whites have a duty to control and destroy nonwhites (Whitsel 1995; 1997). An example of a relatively fringe segment of a larger religion that advocates intolerance and repression is the Taliban movement of the Islamic religion. I will describe the Taliban movement in terms of presentday repression of women in the section on religion and gender inequality below. The Taliban has also dictated strictures against technology. The people of Afghanistan will have their televisions and other media devices destroyed by the religious police if they refuse to part with them; effectively ending communication with urban centers (Crossette 1998).4 More commonly, and to the extent that religions engage in subtler repression, they can adopt a general and outwardly directed repressive attitude and behavior toward nonadherents, minorities, and social outcasts. This is not to say that all adherents to these more subtly repressive religions engage in social rage; it is only to say that their religion may allow for generally repressive attitudes. By greater contrast to Cosmotheism and the Taliban movement, some religions, notably Eastern ones, encourage adherents to internalize their troubles instead of externalizing them in socially rageful expressions. Japanese Buddhists and Shintoists try to alleviate personal and social rage through ritualized interaction, massages, hot baths, gambling, meditation and introspection (Lemert

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1995). However, adherents to these rather passive religions may internalize their rage and may be repressed by their religions; and some followers of these more passive-seeming religions may engage in social repression against religious advice. RELIGIOUS VARIATION AND CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES “Cults” and New Religions. “Cults” is a word much avoided in the sociology of religion because its meaning is unclear and distorted by popular myth. Moreover, cults are “by definition a transitory phenomenon, the cultic milieu is, by contrast, a permanent feature of society” (Campbell 1972). The Moonies, followers of Sun Myung Moon, certainly have cult qualities (see, for example, Lamy 1996). Other religious organizations that are termed cults, such as the Heaven’s Gate community, may not be cults. To gain a useful understanding of religions and its relationship to social forces, it is essential to avoid use of alarming and ambiguous terminology. The Heaven’s Gate community did provide an intriguing case for religious discussion, however. One question that was raised was the question of whether the Heaven’s Gate community were forcefully subjected to the will of a religious leader (Marshall Applewhite, known as “Do”). The community did apparently view the leader’s perspectives on life, death, and intergalactic interaction as valid. The reader may recall that 39 members of the community, under the guidance of a charismatic leader, committed suicide in the third week of March 1997. They believed that they could shed their “containers” (physical bodies) and be transported by alien (not earthly) means to a better world. Their course would be guided by the comet Hale Bop, prominent in the heavens at the time. Once at their new destination, they would continue to live, albeit in a different form than they did in their earth-bound containers. In Purdum’s (1997) terms, they took a “millennial flight to the heavenly ‘level Above Human’” (p. 1). Heaven’s Gate members believed that civilization was doomed and that salvation awaited a few who could escape by flying saucers (Niebuhr 1997a). Such beliefs are not terribly unusual in the United States. There are approximately 2,000 distinct religious groups in the United States, and there are over 100 relatively new religious groups whose spiritual interest focuses on flying saucers. While the United States is basically a Christian nation, where religious freedom is guaranteed and belief in

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God remains vastly popular, the United States is simultaneously becoming “a spiritual marketplace” and a “hothouse for new movements” (Niebuhr 1997a:1). Currently, the situation in the United States. (and elsewhere to a lesser degree) is a great number of major faiths, such as the various Christian denominations, and countless minor ones competing with each other for followers and influence. Moreover, there are a growing number of people embarked on personal religious quests, and therefore comprise a willing audience to an aspiring spiritual leader who offers “a new pathway to ultimate meaning” (Niebuhr 1997a: 1). Change and Stability. The United States has traditionally been and remains a fairly religious society despite impressions to the contrary. Fifty years ago, 95 percent of the population stated that they believed in God; 96 percent do today. We have changed in some ways, however. For instance, although 87 percent of our society consider themselves to be Christian, we are becoming increasingly evangelical (fundamentalist, Christian Right) in our religious attachments while mainline Protestant churches are losing membership. Even so, the Christian Right is not a monolith but instead harbors greater diversity in beliefs than is generally supposed. To illustrate, 38 percent of evangelical Christians support conservative political organizations, but 49 percent believe that religious leaders should not dictate how people vote. At the same time, the Christian Right have a strong consensus on some social issues; for example, 79 percent of evangelicals think that homosexuals are too influential in U.S. society (Shorto 1997). The United States has also changed in terms of consumer activities and media attention relevant to religion. The sale of “Christ-honoring products”—books, bumper stickers, CD’s, etc.—have soared, from $1 billion in 1980 to $4 billion in 1996. We have more religious programming on television. There were nine religious TV stations in the United States in 1974 versus 257 religious TV stations in 1996 (Shorto 1997). Problematic Intersections across Religions. Clashes occur between religions and between the religious and the non-religious. These clashes can be intensified by social forces, such as politics, economics, and the media, and by social movements, such as the survivalist right (discussed in Chapter 3). Issues of overlapping importance to the religious right and the survivalist right include abortion, homosexuality, property rights, taxation, gun control, home schooling, and devolution of government power (Novosad 1996). Relatedly, “Focus on the Family,” a fundamentalist organization in Colorado, speaks a militia-like message when it

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insists that “the government has to make second-class citizens out of everybody else who is not their brand of Christian . . .” Man’s sinful nature must be controlled and “so you have to have a repressive society.” (Novosad 1996: 26, quoting Focus on the Family pamplet)

Harsh, intolerant religious messages can provide the reason and the directive for destructive behaviors and repressive attitudes (see also Chapter 5 on religious beliefs and bias). An important issue regarding social rage and religion in the United States is the opposition to abortion. Select representatives of the religious right hope to suppress women’s choices through reversal of the U.S. Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade, by engaging in clinic disruption activities and occasionally murdering doctors, other clinic workers, and clinic escorts. The more extreme forms of religion in the United States are focusing on other salient social issues besides abortion, such as education (advocacy of mandatory prayer, home schooling, private [religious] school vouchers, and refusal to teach evolution); religion-endorsed suppression of racial minorities, women, and homosexuals; and continual intimidation of some religious groups by other religious groups. As for interreligious intimidation, there are and will continue to be instances of conflict between religious groups. A minute example of intolerance leveled at a religious minority is hate crimes against the Amish. Recently, four men were charged with setting an Amish man’s horsedrawn buggy afire, because he is Amish (New York Times 1997). Kephart and Zellner’s (1994) book on “extraordinary” religious groups provides a rather helpful analysis on the perceptions and treatment by the more “ordinary” religious groups toward the outliers. Kephart and Zellner explain and describe the views of the “extraordinary” groups (Amish, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Father Divine Movement, the Hasidim, Gypsies, the Oneida Community, and Church of Christ Scientist) and how they may experience “neighboring” problems. Such problems can be exacerbated by urban squeeze, as we have seen with the Hasidim in the Crown Heights section of New York City. Goldberg (1997) questions the degree to which mainstream Christians suffer persecution in the present-day world. Using a teaser headline, “The Rage over Christian Persecution,” we are drawn to an examination of whether more Christians have suffered persecution in this century than in all previous centuries combined. A critic of this declaration states, “It’s a great one-liner, but I’m not sure it’s true.”

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AMBIGUITY ON THE RAGE CONTINUUM There are cases of ambiguity, in which it is uncertain where a religion fits on the spectrum of socially rageful behavior. Scientology, for example, is not ordinarily known for rageful qualities but has some repressive traits. Scientology has begun to establish a reputation for fraudulent dealings with its membership, for attempted takeovers of economic and civic matters in entire towns, and for its heavy-handed tactics to silence its critics through intimidation (Frantz 1997a). Scientology, perhaps like many organizations (occupational, educational, etc.), stifles criticism from internal and outside sources. More than stifling criticism though, Scientology engages in internal repression of its membership to the point of resembling a total institution (see Erving Goffman 1958; 1961).5 Belonging to a total institution (a monastery, a prison, a military body, a mental hospital, an orphanage, and so on) can be appealing to those who do not wish to or feel unable to make life decisions. This unwillingness or inability to cope with the mundane aspects of life can come from prior experience with institutional living. Being “institutionalized” (by living in orphanages, hospitals, reform schools, etc.) can leave the individual feeling vulnerable to outside forces, unable to make choices, and with a loss of identity. Those who feel unable to deal with the basics of employment, housing, and everyday life tasks may be attracted to religions that control every aspect of one’s life. Jim Jones’ church, the Peoples’ Temple, took care of every element of its members’ lives. All that was required of the members was that they follow Reverend Jones’ directives. Unfortunately, they did so to their deaths: Hundreds committed suicide along with Reverend Jones in their isolated religious community in Guyana, South America. Similarly, David Koresh’s following lived rather controlled lives in their Waco, Texas, compound. Breeding, childcare, housing, and all routine and mundane aspects of living were controlled. Many (approximately 80) Davidians followed their leader, presumably unquestioningly, unto death. Similarly, the Church of Scientology seems to encourage dependent relationships between their members and the Church, resulting in death in at least one case. Scientologist church members have been accused of committing non-negligent manslaughter in the 1995 death of their fellow scientologist, Lisa McPherson. Ms. McPherson died mysteriously under Scientologists’ care, following a traffic accident in which she was not injured. She died, the coroner’s report states, from a blood clot due to dehydration. It appears as though she would have responded successfully to medical treatment had such treatment been administered. Instead, the

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Scientologists attending her hindered proper medical care that would have saved her life (Frantz 1997b). (The Scientologists have no strictures against medical treatment, as do the Christian Scientists; although they do prohibit psychiatric care.) One supposition is that she may have been allowed to die rather than expose the practices of Scientology. Frantz (1997b) reports that, an examination of Scientologist Ms. McPherson’s life and death, including a review of church records and other documents . . . offers an unusually rich look into the world of one Scientologist. It shows how virtually every aspect of her life—work, friendships, relationships with family members, even choices of vacation spots—was influenced by the church. (p. 14)

In some ways, her relationship to the church looked like an addictive one: she paid a great deal of money for Scientology classes, $97,000, or 40 percent of her (church-provided job) earnings. She paid so much money that she had to borrow from the church to pay for the classes, thereby making her more indebted to the church. Stephen Kent, a professor of religion who studies Scientology, is quoted as saying: “For members who are deeply involved, Scientology becomes a totalistic institution. It provides them with everything from occupation, pseudomedical treatments, entertainment and a justice system to an overarching purpose for their lives” (p. 14 of Frantz 1997b). Even if the relationship is entered into voluntarily, total control unquestionably represses selfidentity and self-determination, and can have violent qualities to it, particularly when adherents question the validity of that total control. RELIGION AND INTOLERANCE One of the points that I am making is that one does not have to be an extremist, in religious or any beliefs, to be intolerant and narrow-minded. Intolerance and narrow-mindedness can be translated, sometimes unintentionally, into social rage as described in Chapter 1. In terms of religion, intolerance speaks to a dislike of what the intolerant see, experience, and know about religions other than their own. The intolerant have constrained views of religion, not necessarily due to inexperience or unfamiliarity with other religions. Even if the intolerant view of the world were expanded through education, experience, or vision, the intolerant might remain so. Therefore, intolerance refers to an unwillingness, a contrariness, to see things like religion from a perspective other

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than the one already adopted. A socially rageful reaction can come about when the intolerant feel forced to consider that other religions or that a non-religious perspective is equally valid to their own. This resistance is not unlike the reaction to diversity and (more broadly) social change. The intolerant, probably less so than the more tolerant, do not respond positively to being coerced into accepting that which seems unacceptable to them; religion is no exception. As an example of religious intolerance, Dirk Johnson (1997) cites the trouble between the Nation of Islam, under the guidance of Louis Farrakhan, and the Jewish community in U.S. cities.6 More to the point, there has been a great deal of abuse leveled against the Jews by Mr. Farrakhan’s followers. The mayor of Chicago, Richard Daley, met with Mr. Farrakhan recently and told him “to establish better relations with Jewish leaders and hinted that if he did not, he could expect rough sledding at City Hall.” Mr. Farrakhan has called Judaism a “gutter religion” and has said very unkind things about Jews. Moreover, Jews, along with women, homosexuals, and others, were not permitted to participate in the Million Man March promoted by Mr. Farrakhan as a show of African-American male unity. Mr. Farrakhan and his followers, unrepresentative of Muslims, are intolerant of all who are unlike them. Yet, within the Nation of Islam, we face the dilemma of how to balance the good intentions and achievements of religion with the bad. Mr. Farrakhan and his followers want the cooperation of Chicago’s City Hall to gain building permits for developing bakeries, a printing press, and other shops under the auspices of the Nation of Islam. Development of businesses in seriously dilapidated sections of Chicago seems a very positive step. But the anti-Semitic qualities of Farrakhan’s following is proving to be an obstacle to public and political acceptance. For their part, Jewish leaders and rabbis have, over the years, met with Mr. Farrakhan to build better working relationships, but to no avail. Of course, Mr. Farrakhan is not the only member of his church who is anti-Semitic, he is only the spokesperson and leader of the Nation of Islam. It really does seem as though there is no possibility of reaching any form of consensus between the two, largely because Mr. Farrakhan and his followers are unwilling to forego use of anti-Semitic rhetoric and, more generally, to not be anti-Semitic. The midwest director for the American Jewish Committee, cited in Johnson, said there is “no point in Jewish leaders meeting with Mr. Farrakhan ‘unless and until the anti-Semitic rhetoric stops,’ because it [is] absurd to discuss outrageously bigoted charges seriously.” From this, we may interpret a sense of

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hopelessness about crossing the conflictual barrier because of the extreme views of the Nation of Islam on the issue of anti-Semitism. Of course, this irresolvable conflict between these two religious groups is not specific to religious groups. Other large-scale organizations, such as political parties, are constantly at loggerheads; as are smaller-scale organizations, such as university departments. RELIGION, POLITICS AND LAW-MAKING Novosad (1996) writes of political activity of the radical religious right, especially surrounding their views on family values.7 Specifically, she writes of James Dobson, or as she refers to him, “the Right’s new messiah.” He has mobilized other religious rightists to pressure legislators and the president to adhere to the religious right’s “family values” suggestions on abortion, same-sex marriage, tax cuts, school prayer, and so on. The religious right exercise “switchboard madness” to influence political decisions by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of phone calls to jam the switchboards of the White House and Congress. The religious right have had a more receptive audience among the Republicans than among the Democrats. In the 1994 election, for example, 43 percent of the total votes putting Republicans in power came from evangelical Christians and pro-life voters, indicating that conservative Christian voters more often identify their cause with the Republican Party. In a show of religious intolerance of diversity, an Alabama judge refused to remove a Ten Commandments plaque from his courtroom (Nossiter 1997). A crowd assembled to show their support for the judge and held up banners denouncing the American Civil Liberties Union. (The ACLU, recall, is an organization that protects everybody’s civil liberties, no matter whether they are left, right, neutral, religious, non-religious, etc.) Besides intolerance and denouncement of liberty, we find a substitution of religious rhetoric for law. The Ten Commandments, participants at the rally suggested, should take precedence over U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Supported by members of the rally, the state governor said, Lawmaking by the U.S. Supreme Court is wrong, illegal, and chaotic . . . The Ten Commandments is God’s law. That’s where we need to start. (p. 10 of Nossiter)

Other speakers at the rally also warned against the imminent creation of a “mongrel race” and multiracialism. Furthermore, rally speakers ap-

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provingly cited biblical and historical examples of the execution of homosexuals. I mentioned gay bashing in Chapter 5, and pointed to a proposed bill that would, in the name of religion, prevent legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Defending himself against charges of gay-bashing, an originator of the bill, Florida State Representative Johnnie Byrd, stated that individual freedoms are indeed protected, so long as they are “within certain fundamental structures found in the Bible” (The Progressive 1997). His reasoning proposes that legal parameters be determined by a religious document. In a 1998 television interview, Trent Lott, Republican senate majority leader, likened homosexuality to alcoholism, kleptomania and “sex addiction” (Mitchell 1998). He also said that homosexuality is a sin. Not surprisingly, gay-rights groups condemned Mr. Lott’s remarks, but Mr. Lott was defended by Dick Armey, Republican representative of Texas, citing scripture. The House majority leader, Mr. Armey, pointed to biblical passages (I Corinthians Chapter 6, Verses 9, 11, 18, and 20) to support his and Mr. Lott’s views on homosexuality: “The Bible is very clear on this,” said Mr. Armey (cited in Mitchell, p. 23). The political dispute set off by Senator Lott comes at a time of intense debate in religious circles, especially within Protestant churches, over whether certain verses of the Bible can be interpreted as condemning homosexuality. Several recent events have fueled that controversy, including the decision by Southern Baptists to continue their boycott of the Walt Disney Company, which the Southern Baptists accuse of condoning homosexuality. Mitchell describes the growing influence of social conservatives and the religious right in the Republican Party, and finds that Republican leaders are being drawn toward an “extreme point of view in American political life” (Mitchell, quoting Mike McCurry, the White House Press Secretary, p. 23). In support of Mitchell’s report, we find Pat Robertson (former chair of the Christian Coalition and 1988 Republican presidential candidate) making dire predictions, in the form of natural disasters, to be visited upon our society for not condemning homosexuality more stringently. I would warn Orlando that you’re right in the way of some serious hurricane, and I don’t think I’d be waving those flags in God’s face if I were you. (cited in Berke 1998: 19)

This statement, made in June 1998, refers to the Orlando, Florida, City Council’s decision to permit rainbow banners to hang from city light

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poles during gay-pride celebrations. The previous week, Mr. Robertson pointed to the fires devouring Florida at that time as an illustration of the punishment being exacted on Florida for open-minded attitudes regarding homosexuality. Prophecies of this kind, based on religious beliefs, predicts in no uncertain terms that severe punishment from a deity will be forthcoming to those not adhering to Christian-Right beliefs. It is well known that the Christian Coalition hopes to influence politics, as do many lobbying groups (Berke 1997). It may be less well known that it is illegal for a religious group to try to influence politics in the way that the Christian Coalition does, by supplying large quantities of campaign funds, a practice uncovered by the Federal Elections Commission. In a tape-recorded speech made by Mr. Robertson and released by the liberal watchdog group, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, we hear Mr. Robertson jokingly addressing his audience as “fellow radicals . . . dangerously seeking to overturn the established order.” Ridiculing the Internal Revenue Service for investigating the Coalition, he said that the IRS “sent to do the audit a big Valkyrie-like woman” wearing a “great big National Organizations of Women belt buckle.” His statement may be an attempt to deflect blame from the Christian Coalition’s illegal campaign activities by pairing two enemy organizations, the IRS and NOW. Mean-spirited comments aside, the Coalition’s unabashedly political activities have caused the election commission to sue the Coalition in 1996, contending that the Coalition acted illegally to promote Republican candidates. Religious-right influence on conservative mainstream politics may be lessening (Rich 1997). According to Rich, the Republican donors are rebelling against the religious right’s heavy-handed manner and the assumption that politicians have no choice but to do as the religious right dictate. He writes that “behind-closed-door revolts against the religious right are gathering speed—and cash—at lofty levels of the Republican Party” (p. 15). Rich points out that the religious right do not represent the U.S. public but rather represent only themselves. The religious right, Republican leaders fear, drive away women and moderates. Indeed, Christian Coalition support of a candidate makes voters dramatically less likely to vote for the religious-right-endorsed candidate. Republican candidates are now courting monied donors unaffiliated with a religious organization to guarantee a more moderate party. This strategy may pay off: “Main Street and Wall Street Republicans alike are finally willing to challenge the far right” (Rich, p. 15). In summary, my earlier comments on distorted representation and

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fluctuation of social rage are supported (see Chapters 1 and 2). Rageful elements in society, due to their expressiveness, seem more influential than they are; and social rage fluctuates in its prominence and power to influence society. RELIGION AND ANTI-FEMINISM The men-only Promise Keeper movement has, as one of its stated goals, that “married men fulfill their obligations to their wives and children” (Ross and Cokorinos 1997). The intention, to instill greater familial responsibility, is a good idea. Whether this pro-social purpose can be achieved is called into question by the Promise Keepers’ social and political agenda. There is a rather confusing juxtaposition in men taking greater familial responsibility by retaining and strengthening male privilege already enjoyed in our society. A simple question that leaps to mind is why suppression of one group (women) is necessary in order to make another group more responsible. The movement was founded in 1990 by the former University of Colorado football coach Bill McCartney, who is also anti-choice and has served on the board of the anti-homosexual Colorado for Family Values. The Promise Keepers movement is the third wave of the religious right’s political development since the Second World War. The first wave was the Moral Majority, a fundamentalist movement led by Jerry Falwell. The second wave was the Christian Coalition, led by Pat Robertson (later Ralph Reed), noted for its grassroots structure and success with local school boards and other grassroots organizations. The Promise Keepers are different from the first two waves in that it “wants comprehensively to restructure this country’s social order” (Ross and Cokorinos 1997: 6). Among their promises is the segregation of U.S. politics along gender lines and the idea of setting “things right” through male Christian leadership (p. 6). The Promise Keepers do not represent all Christians by any means, but they and the ideals they represent are a force to be reckoned with in the present-day United States. To the equality-minded, the Promise Keepers espouse an oppressive-to-minorities message, if the following quotes are any judge. These quotes are from prominent Promise Keeper leaders and speakers, and indicate homophobia, racism, and sexism (NOW 1997). The first three pertain to homophobia, the next three to racism, and the last seven to sexism. The last three of the seven sexist quotes suggest that the Promise

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Keepers believe the women’s movement to be making men into homosexuals. It’s been too long that 3 percent of homosexuals control our moral majority (Tony Evans). The nation is plagued with “wrong conduct.” Prisoners believed they could get away with it. Homosexuals believed they were born that way . . . (Ed Cole). Arrogantly demanding their rights, activist gays and lesbians have become a militant voice in American politics, influencing elections and affecting the policies of high government leaders. Their public demonstrations and political lobbying have fooled many in our country into believing that they deserve special status (Bill Bright). I believe that slavery, and the understanding of it when you see it God’s way, was redemptive (Wellington Boone). I want to boldly affirm Uncle Tom. The black community must stop criticizing Uncle Tom. He is a role model, who, when he was stepped on like a worm, at a point of crisis, evidenced the nature of the classic, model worm, Jesus (Wellington Boone). Blacks have had more than two centuries of training in being a slave of man. It can be added as a long-term qualification to prepare them to be a fine slave of God or to rule as a king (Wellington Boone). . . . sit down with your wife and say something like this, “Honey, I’ve made a terrible mistake. . . . I gave up leading this family. . . . Now I must reclaim that role” (Tony Evans). Treat the lady [sic] gently and lovingly. But lead ! (Tony Evans). . . . I believe that feminists of the more aggressive persuasion are frustrated women unable to find the proper male leadership. If a woman were receiving the right kind of love and attention and leadership, she would not want to be liberated from that (Tony Evans). Don’t you understand, mister, you are royalty and God has chosen you to be priest of your home? (Tony Evans). The demise of our community and culture is the fault of sissified men who have been overly influenced by women (Tony Evans). The primary cause of this national crisis is the feminization of men (Tony Evans).

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Within these quotes, we find diversity intolerance supported by fundamentalist ideals. One explanation for these strong feelings on the part of the Promise Keepers is that they feel threatened by the economic and social inroads made by gays, lesbians, racial minorities, and women. By engaging in homophobia, racism, and sexism, Promise Keepers may be hoping to turn back the clock to a time when minorities had no power, as detailed in the section (below) on violated expectations. For their part, the Promise Keepers have repeatedly denied that they are fostering “a belief that women should be subservient to men” (Niebuhr 1997b:5). Yet egalitarian organizations indicate that they do indeed pose a threat to women’s equality. Equal Partners in Faith, an interfaith coalition of religious liberals, are opposed to the Promise Keepers, because, as they state, not only do the Promise Keepers have at their top leadership members of the religious right, but also the Promise Keepers movement hopes to undermine the equality of women in family, church, and society. In defense of themselves, a Promise Keeper spokesman offered proof that “many women support the Promise Keepers.” The proof is that women are present at the rallies where “often the wives and relatives of men there, serve as volunteers.” Unnoticed by the spokesman, the key word is “volunteers.” The Keepettes. The editors of the New York Times Magazine (1997c) describe the female supporters of the Promise Keepers as “Promise Keepettes” and as a “female back-up” group. Women can join a number of categories of auxiliary Promise Keepers, such as the Heritage Keepers, who teach women to “let go of the reins” of family matters and to view submission as an honorable social position. There are also the Suitable Helpers, who must learn to accept their Promise Keeper husbands’ new agenda, even if it means going into counseling. Their credo, according to what God told one of the founders, is: “He [God] was raising this powerful army of Christian men and needed WAC’s.” In addition, there are the Promise Reapers, another “rah-rah auxiliary, born from the side of the Promise Keepers, as Eve from Adam’s side” (p. 15). There are the “Chosen Women” who awaken to their roles as “daughters of the King.” (The “King” may be God or the Promise

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Keeper man of the house, as suggested by Tony Evans’ remarks about Promise Keeper men being royalty in their homes.) There are also Women of Promise, whose credo proposes that women walk in obedience to God’s word. The Women of Promise, interestingly, were “created to give women a powerful voice that non-Christian women have long enjoyed.” It seems that the Women of Promise want to emulate non-Christian women, whom they recognize as possessing more equal-to-men perspectives and roles than they. At the same time, they must be obedient to their fundamentalist faith and to their husbands. Finally, there are the Women of Faith. Joining this latter category is supposed to “empower women through a commitment to God.” As with the need for a voice in the Women of Promise, the need for empowerment suggests that the Women of Faith recognize their suppression and hope to shed it.8 If it is true that Women of Promise and Women of Faith recognize their unequal status while hoping for equality and simultaneously hoping to keep intact their marriages to Promise Keepers, they are in an unenviable bind. The Promise Keepers Rally. Laurie Goodstein (1997a; 1997b; 1997c) has written of the Promise Keepers rally in Washington, D.C., which took place on October 4, 1997. She points to the similarities between the Promise Keepers rally and the Million Man March in that both were men-only. Both also claimed that their purpose was to make men more responsible to their families.9 The Promise Keepers were proud to have non-white men among them at the rally but there was a dearth of male-female unity. Indeed, as Goodstein writes, the racial unity of Promise Keeper men may be another example of distractions from a true anti-diversity purpose: “the presence of thousands of black men at the rally will . . . divert criticism by those who say Promise Keepers merely furthers the goals of the conservative white evangelical movement” (1997a: 10, emphasis mine). We find additional diversion in the Promise Keepers’ avoidance of stands on traditional civil-rights issues as affirmative action, voting rights, and discrimination in the workplace. Goodstein (1997b) describes the wide-sweeping promises of the Promise Keepers. At the Washington, D.C. rally, a Promise Keeper said, “If everybody got back to God, I’m sure crime would fall, racial prejudice would cease, the conflict between the sexes would cease, abortion would be done away with, just name it” (p. 1). These unrealistic promises are not unlike one I will cite below, promised by an Islamic leader.

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Another Promise Keeper and his pre-recorded message appeared on a giant video screen at the rally, proclaiming that he was “a man asking for forgiveness for allowing his wife to have an abortion” (p. 1). The Promise Keepers avoid stating outright that they do want to remove women’s rights, yet this Promise Keeper spoke of allowing his wife to participate in a constitutionally guaranteed right. Equal Partners in Faith, the religious organization that opposes the Promise Keeper movement, has stated that by excluding women and female clergy from Promise Keepers events, “the message is that women belong behind men, not in equal partnerships, and that this is God’s will for men and women” (Goodstein 1997b, p. 14). Goodstein (1997c) reminds us that the Promise Keepers regard the Bible as the infallible word of God, and the Bible teaches that homosexuality and abortion are “sins on a par with adultery” (p. 4). The Promise Keepers say that they have no political ambitions, that it is not their goal to influence politicians and political activity. But they are heartily endorsed by conservative Christian political leaders, including the founders of the Moral Majority (Jerry Falwell), the Christian Coalition (Pat Robertson), and Focus on the Family (James Dobson), ministries that actively engage in political lobbying. Promise Keepers and Violated Expectations. Martin Marty, professor of American history, points out that the Promise Keepers are symbolic of a continuing pattern of a portion of white men in the United States who want to reestablish their manliness, via religion (1997). He writes, “They are not the first Protestants to organize in an effort to advance some version of the male cause. A century ago, their ancestors invented ‘muscular Christianity,’ a set of initiatives intended to fight cultural de-generation” (p. 11). There have been, according to Professor Marty, numerous other male-oriented religious movements in the United States. Social change, as I mention throughout this book, can serve as a catalyst for social rage when that change is not to the liking of a segment of society. Social change constitutes a violation of expectations for some, a change from what was expected to be true and valid for all time. Professor Marty suggests that the men and women who support these “masculine” religious organizations may be intimidated by movement toward gender equality. He suggests, what bothers evangelical women is that so many men have had so much trouble adjusting to the new world around them, a world that differs from that of their mothers and grandmothers. (p. 11)

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Many evangelical women, as is true for many women in the United States, work outside the home and, while they may find their work satisfying, are also experiencing greater stress because of limitations on time. They, like many women, are expected to work outside the home and to perform their domestic chores. They need more help from their husbands with the housework, child care, and so on. Many husbands, but especially evangelical ones, are knocked off balance by this change, Professor Marty remarks. He seems to believe that Promise Keepers are sincere in their quest for taking a leading role in family matters as a means of “helping.” A counterargument would be that the stated Promise Keeper desire to regain control is exactly that. GENDER INEQUALITY, “TRUTH,” AND THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION Family values, gender relations, inequality, and validation of religious truth by the Bible were discussed at the June 9, 1998, Southern Baptist Convention. Among other occurrences at this convention, an amendment was passed stating that women should submit to their husbands, as based on biblical teachings (Niebuhr 1998; Wilson 1998). The rationale for this amendment, as stated by the conventioneers, is “family life.” Specifically, Paige Patterson, the elected Southern Baptists’ president, described the amendment as a response to “a time of growing crisis in the family.” The Southern Baptist Convention’s response to this “crisis” is, intentionally or not, the requirement that women be submissive, be less than equal, to men. (The amendment, by the way, also implicitly rejects divorce, homosexual unions, and abortion.) The Southern Baptist Convention is the nation’s largest Protestant denomination, claiming nearly 16 million members, and an increasingly conservative force among religious organizations in the United States. The Convention voted overwhelmingly favorably on the declaration that a woman should “submit herself graciously” to her husband’s leadership and that a husband should “provide for, protect and lead his family.” The wife, the amendment says, “has the God-given responsibility to respect her husband and to serve as his helper in managing their household and nurturing the next generation” (Niebuhr, p. 20). An effort to soften the language was soundly turned back (Niebuhr, p. 1). The amendment relies on biblical passages, notably Ephesians 5:2233, which compares the husband-wife relationship to that of Christ ruling the church. R. Albert Mohler, president of Southern Baptist

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Theological Seminary, reminds us that Southern Baptists believe in the literal interpretation of Scripture, and that “The submission of wives to their husbands is ‘not a modern idea’ but ‘is clearly revealed in Scripture’” (cited in Niebuhr, p. 1). Robert Parham, executive director of the independent Baptist Center for Ethics, has criticized the amendment. He contends that the Convention and the amendment “hope to make June Cleaver the biblical model for motherhood, despite numerous biblical references to women who worked outside the home” (Niebuhr, p. 20). Thus, further evidence of a reaction to violated expectations is provided, in this case in the matter of gender roles, and an attempted reversion to a time when women played a different role with less social power. Writing of the Southern Baptist declaration, the author A. N. Wilson (1998) discussed the intention to reinforce traditional Christian family values based on the Epistle to the Ephesians. This Epistle “asserts that ‘a wife is to submit graciously to the servant leadership of her husband even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ’” (p. 31). Spokespersons for the Southern Baptists who state that the submission of wives to husbands is “clearly revealed in Scripture” must assume that there can be no further question about the rightness or wrongness of the proposed practice of forced submission. In other words, the amendment states that women must submit to men as men (and all the church) must submit to Christ. Note that while all mortals are directed to submit to Christ, intramortal submission is directed to be females to males. St. Paul is seen as an infallible source of truth and is quite prominent in Baptist teachings. However, St. Paul’s teachings in the New Testament hardly support the fundamentalist template of sexual morality and politics. Several of St. Paul’s female friends “clearly ran their own businesses and were heads of the respective churches in their localities. The text in which Paul tells the Corinthians that ‘women should keep silent in church’ is obviously an interpolation by a later, misogynist Christian scribe, since earlier in the same letter Paul has spoken of women prophesying” (Wilson, p. 31). We find once again the hope for a return to the past along with an unwillingness to allow for diversity. Wilson writes, Far from having a cozy 1950’s-style ideal of family life, [Paul] advised his followers not to marry at all. The early church was consistently hostile to family life, and held up as role models ascetics, celibates, self-mutilators and desert dropouts. It is safe to say that none of the

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saints or heroes of the early church would have been welcome at a Southern Baptist Convention. Cross-question conservative evangelicals closely and you will virtually always find that their religion consists in deifying a mid-twentieth-century, middle-class, Western way of life. A few stray texts chosen at random from the confusing and multifarious pages of the Bible serve as useful bats with which to hammer the heads of homosexuals, divorced women, Jews and more or less anyone who is not a conservative evangelical (p. 31).

Wilson goes on to state that the declaration has been received with some dismay by women’s groups, by liberal Christians, and by those “who have noticed that social and familial conditions in modern America differ somewhat from those of first-century Asia Minor” (p. 31). In a society where many families depend on both parents’ jobs, and where women are just as likely to earn a salary as men, it seems, to those who are not conservative evangelicals, as impractical as it is undesirable to try to re-create the ethics and behavioral patterns of a vanished age. One is tempted to wonder how many of the 16 million members of the Southern Baptist Convention . . . really try to impose “servant leadership” over their wives and, if they do, whether the wives “submit graciously.” (p. 31, emphasis added)

It seems that the Southern Baptists do not stick to all biblical dictates as firmly as they do to the one regarding submission by wives, according to Wilson. For example, the Bible also condones slavery. The Bible instructs us that everything must be held in common and to pool all our property. The Bible tells us that usury is wrong and therefore fundamentalist Christians must not invest in the stock market, must not put savings into pensions or even have a bank account; indeed, Christ taught that we should not lay up treasure at all. And the Bible tells us, through the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, that we should bless our enemies and not resist evil, yet the Southern Baptist Convention does not embrace pacifism. In short, even “the most fervent fundamentalists have to be highly selective in their fundamentals” (p. 31). In an exercise to explain selective fundamentalism rather than to merely point out hypocrisy, Wilson describes the dilemma for the Southern Baptists. They want to believe that “every word of Scripture is God’s word, and therefore infallible.” But the paradoxes in what the Southern Baptists (or Christian fundamentalists on the whole) are willing to accept

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and reject are revealed by their ignoring some parts of the Bible, while stating that all parts of the Bible are true and infallible. Rather than chastising them, Wilson seems to pity the Southern Baptists. He concludes that they “have seen a terrible problem, but they have found a solution that is not just terrible in itself, it is a nonsolution. . . . A true biblical faith recognizes that the Bible is not a book of answers. It’s the story of the human race getting it wrong, over and over and over again” (p. 31). The Southern Baptist Convention’s amendment has not gone unchallenged by Southern Baptists. Some members of the Southern Baptist Church, in protest of the June 1998 amendment, are considering a break from the Southern Baptist Convention (Bragg 1998). Men and women among the Raleigh, North Carolina, First Baptist Church, for example, are unhappy about the Convention’s suggestion that women should submit graciously to their husbands. More broadly, they see the amendment as “the last straw” and as a congregation are weary of an organization (the Southern Baptist Convention) that has become “increasingly rigid and right wing” (Bragg, p. 10). In support of Miles’ (1997) surveys of U.S. residents and their views on religion, the Baptists disagreeing with the Convention believe that there is room for doubt in any religion, and followers of any religion have a basic freedom to interpret one’s faith and the Bible. GENDER GENOCIDE IN THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT AND IN OTHER RELIGIONS Lest we think that religion plays a role in gender inequality only in the United States, consider the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Bearing in mind, and as suggested throughout this chapter, not all adherents to fundamentalism, in any culture or within any religion, are oppressive individuals representing a social-rage movement. Burns (1997) describes Islamic Taliban treatment of women as a “straitjacket.” In Kabul, Afghanistan, under the rule of Alhaj Maulavi Qalamuddin, Muslim men terrorize women who do not adhere to mendetermined rules of dress and conduct. Thousands of young men, known as “inquisitors,” roam the countryside looking for infringements of the Taliban’s taboos. They arrest some offenders and beat and flog others. The inquisitors’ role is to ensure conformity with the ancient Islamic penal and social code. Taliban rule has come to mean:

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. . . floggings of women who allow faces or ankles to show beneath the head-to-toe shrouds . . . that the Taliban have made mandatory. Other Taliban taboos include bans on women talking to men who are not blood relatives, making themselves visible to passers-by through the windows of their homes, or traveling in cars, buses or trucks alongside men who are not from their family. (p. 4)

If women wear white socks or plastic sandals (that squeak), they are beaten by the inquisitors for provoking impure thoughts in men. Women are to walk calmly, quietly, and avoid creating noise by their footsteps. In short, if anything about their feet or legs arouses suspicion among the inquisitors, the offending women are flogged. Moreover, women in this religious system are banned by Taliban rule from working, getting an education, and are restricted to domestic seclusion past puberty. Shawcross (1997) finds much the same thing about women’s role in Kabul, under the Taliban rule. He adds that because of the rules about dress, few women appear in the streets for fear of being beaten. He also points out that the prohibition against gender integration mean that few boys can go to school, since many teachers are women. Segregation of the sexes has other prices to pay, by women anyway. “The Taliban has decreed that no women could be treated in any hospital where men were present, either as patients or staff. Female patients were being moved to a facility where there was inadequate water, electricity and equipment” (p. 22). All these kinds of practices amount to what Emma Bonino, a fellow reporter with Shawcross, calls “gender genocide.” In Chapter 5, I had written about female genital mutilations and abortion opposition as repressive practices against women. I had cited Jehl (1997) as describing the overturning of a ban on genital mutilations in an Egyptian court. Islamic forces were generally very pleased about this, being one of the chief religions that condone genital mutilations of young girls. I would point out though, that while genital mutilation is conducted in dozens of African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries and is most “prevalent among Muslims, the practice is also followed by Christians and followers of traditional religions” (Jehl, p. 9). My point is that this horrifying practice is not just condoned in some dreaded, exotic, ill-understood religion not among mainstream U.S. religions. Moreover, in the United States, as advocated by the Christian Right, we find opposition to abortion to the extent that the anti-abortion movement sometimes resemble violent, irrational paramilitary activities (Egan 1995). This opposition is bound up in politics and in family and morality issues. Eager to placate supporters from the Christian Right,

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some Republican leaders in Congress are promoting “cruel and constitutionally suspect legislation that would jeopardize the lives of frightened young women seeking abortions” (New York Times 1998: 18). In a distracting turn of phrase, the Republicans promoting this new measure apply language that plays cleverly on the issue of parental consent, the “Child Custody Protection Act.” It might more realistically be called “the Teen Endangerment Act” (p. 18). At this point, 22 states have enacted laws requiring teenagers to notify or consult their parents before getting an abortion or to seek a judge’s permission, which does not seem unduly onerous. However, under this new measure, anyone (including grandparents, religious advisers, and, in some instances, even single parents) who accompanies a minor across state lines for an abortion would be at risk of federal criminal prosecution and imprisonment “if that minor failed to meet the requirements for parental consent in her home state” (p. 18). The new measure would likely reduce the willingness of adults to accompany minors to abortion services; therefore increasing risks to pregnant minors who may revert to illegal, unsafe abortions or cross state lines unaccompanied. The political leaders supporting this measure call it “family friendly,” but this distracting terminology ignores the real-world consequences. Often the closest abortion clinic is not in the state where the woman needing an abortion resides. Desperate young women, fearing perhaps a violent reaction from their parents if they were told, will continue to cross state lines to obtain an abortion. There is nothing “friendly” about isolating scared youngsters from the trusted adults in their lives. Their fear only increases the chance that they will resort to illegal or self-induced abortions or delay the procedure, making it more dangerous. It is indisputable that young women should be encouraged to talk to their parents about the difficult decision of abortion. More than 75 percent of minors under 16 do consult one or both parents; but no law can foster communication between a parent and a child where none exists (New York Times 1998). Without legal abortions, as we know from U.S. history, we would have a tremendous increase in mutilated female bodies due to botched, illegal abortions. Abortion and mutilations are forms of repression; they are condoned and sanctioned in the name of far-right religion.

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CONCLUSION The aforementioned Mr. Qalamuddin encourages stoning of adulterers in his society. He has stated that the 1996 stoning of two adulterers was one of the Taliban’s most successful demonstrations. He stated, specifically: “Just two people, that’s all, and we ended adultery in Kandahar forever. . . . Even 100,000 police could not have the effect that we achieved with one punishment of this kind” (Burns 1997: 4). It is unknown if he truly believes that adultery has been ended forever. However, it is extremely unlikely that his assumption is true. I began this chapter with a quote from a man stating that he could find confirmation for his beliefs, no matter how unacceptable those beliefs might be to the mainstream, through perusal of the Bible. I then described the nature of beliefs and how beliefs do not require validation through logic, empirical observations, or even social consensus. In the section on anti-feminism and religion, I offered a quote from a Promise Keeper stating that, if we all got back to God, all of our problems, such as crime, prejudice, abortion, gender conflict, “just name it,” would be solved. To the reasoning mind, strong, all-encompassing statements such as those quoted herein, suggest irrationality and social regression. The problem of social rage and religion is not just a difference of opinion or empirically unsupported, strongly-held beliefs. The problem arises when strongly-held beliefs are imposed on those who disagree with them. Social progress is likely to be inhibited when diverse opinions are disallowed, when we are all subject to any one group’s dictates for behavior and attitude. This would seem to be true regardless of who comprises the group or what they stand for. Religious fanaticism, qualitatively different from fundamentalism, continues to exist and is not to be taken lightly. Miles (1997) writes that religious fanaticism is “armed and dangerous” and “deserves to be quarantined.” As I wrote in Chapter 3, and as others have written, we as a society must take peoples’ religious beliefs seriously and consider them with great deliberation, no matter how fantastic they might seem; else we will experience more tragedies as occurred among the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, in 1993 (Lamy 1996; Hamm 1997). In Kaplan’s (1997) book, we find that radical religions can create social unrest through intolerance and violence. While this may be the case, perhaps it is no more so than the accepted, non-radical, mainstream, or traditionally accepted religions. Kaplan writes that revolutionary millenarianism (also known as apocalyptic millenarianism) can refer to either a nonviolent quest to revolutionize an existing religious tradition or a

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violent movement that propels the upset of the sociopolitical status quo, and thus, forces “the End.” By so saying, Kaplan describes for us a very important point about social rage and religion; that is, even radical religions occur on a continuum of violence.10 One of the most important points I have striven to make in this chapter is that religion, because it can instill strong emotion without necessarily an eye toward what is best for social health, can provide the rationale for socially harmful attitudes and behaviors. This is not just true for radical religions; it can be true for mainstream ones. At the same time, religions, radical or mainstream, are not unconditionally dysfunctional for society. On the contrary, religions can offer stabilizing effects; which some might argue is a negative force if it encourages passivity when social change is called for. Within any religion, there is a portion of followers who engage in and hope to spread social rage. Much of this interaction between social rage and religion, as it occurs in the United States, has to do with (a) disgruntlement with social change (for example, toward gender equality) and (b) other social forces, political and economic primarily, making circumstances right for a ragefully religious voice to be heard. NOTES 1

These definitions come from the American Heritage Dictionary and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, respectively. 2 I have suggested that social forces other than religion can serve as opiates. Crime control, via severe punishment, reduction of constitutional rights, and increased law enforcement also are intended to assuage public fear, even though they may not achieve their purpose of reducing crime risk (Berry 1997). Crime control may make people feel better about class inequalities and any number of other societal dysfunctions. 3 I can not say that I agree with his equating “political ambiguity” of the pro-choice side with untruthfulness. He also states that women have often applied a feminist explanation for anti-choice feelings. For example, the early and continuing explanation for the illegality of abortion is that it forces women to bear children, thereby suppressing their economic independence. Bruni counters with the fact that some men plead with women to have abortions because these men do not want the responsibility of children. While it is probably true that some men want to avoid the responsibility of children, I do not see this fact as relevant to political ambiguity and pro-choice truthfulness.

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Much of what I will describe below in terms of the Islamic Taliban movement’s intolerance is related to sexist practices. Intolerance is wider than sexism though. Crossette (1998) reports that the movement, which rules most of Afghanistan, “has given the people 15 days to get rid of their television sets or see them smashed by the religious police” (p. 7). VCRs (videocassette recorders), satellite dishes, and videotapes are also ordered to be removed or destroyed by the Afghanistan Minister for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue, who reports to the Ministry of Religion. According to Crossette, this new rule seems to be an attempt to isolate the population. Cited in Crossette, Leonard Sussman, senior scholar in international communications at Freedom House, this new rule is “killing urban communication.” His organization conducts an annual study of press freedom worldwide, and reports on repressive control of information. He says that the Taliban’s new rule is the harshest anywhere, since other countries may demand absolute control of the content of broadcasting, but no other country “wipes out the delivery system” (p. 7 of Crossette). 5 Total institutions include military establishments, monasteries, mental hospitals, and prisons. Gresham Sykes (1958) wrote in The Society of Captives a detailed account of the manner in which imprisonment affects ones life. Institutionalization provides for all of the individual’s basic needs, such as food, clothing, housing, and so on. But institutionalization deprives the individual of choice and freedom. In essence, living in an institution, voluntarily or not, takes over one’s life to the point that the individual loses her or his identity. Upon release from prison, for example, the former inmate continues to experience great difficulty conducting ordinary tasks, such as buying clothes or food (having not been allowed to handle money), applying for jobs, using city transit, interacting with the opposite sex or with children. 6 The reader must bear in mind that not every Muslim is a member of the Nation of Islam or the Taliban movement. Many, probably most, Muslims have no sympathy for Louis Farrakhan’s hate-mongering notions or for the abysmal treatment of women per the Taliban. 7 Dobson’s book Dare to Discipline, advises corporal punishment as the biblically correct way to handle one’s children. Dobson writes that corporal punishment is of “vital importance to Christian parents who wish to transmit their love for Jesus Christ to their sons and daughters. . .. Because young children typically identify their parents . . . and especially their fathers . . . with God” (cited in Novosad 1996). 8 Use of the word “empowerment” in this context suggests that these women actually would like some “empowerment” but hesitate to use words like “equality” or “power” for fear of disapproval from their Promise Keeper hus-

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bands. As I mentioned in Chapters 3 and 5, use of “pc” words like “empowerment” and “endangered” (the latter to describe white men) can be ironic or factitious. 9 The question of “What’s wrong with asking men to be more responsible?” is one that has been brought up with the Million Man March and with the Promise Keepers rally. There is nothing wrong with asking men (and women) to be more responsible. But there is something wrong with repressing women (“leading her gently but leading her,” according to Tony Evans), and overall subjugating women to an unequal position because of a biological fact. 10 He also finds that adherents of radical religions constitute a kind of pariah class in contemporary culture and are “banished to the farthest reaches of the cultural cosmos” (p. xv). With the intersection of radical religions and social rage, perhaps there is less banishment than Kaplan supposes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Berke, Richard L. 1997. “Taped Speech Discloses Robertson’s Goals.” New York Times, September 18, p. A15. Berke, Richard L. 1998. “Flurry of Anti-Gay Remarks Has G.O.P. Fearing Backlash.” New York Times, June 30, pp. A1, A19. Berry, Bonnie. 1997. “The Future (and Past and Present) of Critical Theory in Criminology.” The Critical Criminologist 7: 14-17. Bork, Robert. 1996. Slouching Toward Gomorrah. New York: Harper Collins. Bragg, Rick. 1998. “Old Baptist Church, Women and All, Is Set to Leave Fold.” New York Times, July 25, pp. A1, A10. Bruni, Frank.1997. “The Partial Truth Abortion Fight.” New York Times, March 9, p. E3. Burns, John F. 1997. “Sex and the Afghan Woman: Islam’s Straitjacket.” New York Times, August 29, p. A4. Bushart, Howard L., John R. Craig, and Myra Barnes. 1998. Soldiers of God: White Supremacists and Their Holy War for America. New York: Kensington Books. Campbell, Colin. 1972. “The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization.” Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain 5: 119-136. Clarity, James F. 1998. “Arsonists Burn 10 Catholic Churches in Ulster.” New York Times, July 3, pp. A1, A4. Crossette, Barbara. 1998. “Afghan Rulers Planning to Smash TV Sets.” New York Times, July 10, p. A7. Egan, Timothy. 1995. “Conspiracy Is an Elusive Target in Prosecuting Foes of Abortion.” New York Times, June 18, pp. A1, A9.

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Frantz, Douglas. 1997a. “Boston Man in Costly Fight with Scientology.” New York Times, December 21, p. A12. Frantz, Douglas. 1997b. “Death of a Scientologist Heightens Suspicion in a Florida Town:” New York Times, December 1, pp, A1, A14. Goffman, Erving. 1958. “Characteristics of Total Institutions.” Pp. 43-84 in Proceedings of the Symposium of Preventive and Social Psychiatry. Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums. Garden City, NY: Anchor. Goldberg, Jeffrey. 1997. “Washington Discovers Christian Persecution.” New York Times Magazine, December 21, pp. 46–52, 60, 64–65. Goodstein, Laurie. 1997a. “For Christian Men’s Group, Racial Harmony Starts at the Local Level.” New York Times, September 29, p. A10. Goodstein, Laurie. 1997b. “Hundreds of Thousands Gather on the Mall in a Day of Prayers.” New York Times, October 5, pp. A1, A14. Goodstein, Laurie. 1997c. “Good for the Gander, but the Goose Isn’t So Sure.” New York Times, October 5, p. D4. Gould, Stephen Jay. 1998. “Let’s Leave Darwin out of It.” New York Times, May 29, p. A19. Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Inciardi, James A., and Robert A Rothman. 1990. Sociology: Principles and Applications. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Jehl, Douglas. 1997. “Egyptian Court Overturns Ban on Cutting Girls’ Genitals: Another Victory Claimed by Islamic Forces.” New York Times, June 26, p. A9. Johnson, Dirk. 1997. “Chicago Mayor Meets Nation of Islam Leader, to Chagrin of Some.” New York Times, November 28, p. A14. Kaplan, Jeffrey. 1997. Radical Religion in America: Millenarian Movements from the Far Right to the Children of Noah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Kephart, William M., and William W. Zellner. 1994. Extraordinary Groups: An Examination of Unconventional Life-Styles. 5th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Lamy, Philip. 1996. Millennium Rage: Survivalists, White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. New York: Plenum Press. Lemert, Edwin M. May 18, 1995. Personal communication. Marty, Martin. E. 1997. “The Promise Keepers, in Perspective.” New York Times, October 3, p. A11. Miles, Jack. 1997. “Religion Makes a Comeback. (Belief to Follow.)” New York Times Magazine, December 7, pp. 56–59.

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Mitchell, Alison. 1998. “Controversy over Lott’s Views of Homosexuals.” New York Times, June 17, p. A23. National Organization of Women. 1997. Letter soliciting funds for “Promise Keepers Mobilization Project.” Received September 9. New York Times. 1997. “4 Charged in Burning of Amish Man’s Buggy.” New York Times, November 12, p. A17. New York Times. 1998. [no title] New York Times, May 29, p. A18. New York Times Magazine. 1997. “The Promise Keepettes.” New York Times Magazine, April 27, p. 15. Niebuhr, Gustav. 1997a. “Land of Religious Freedom Has Universe of Spirituality.” New York Times, March 30, pp. A1, A14. Niebuhr, Gustav. 1997b. “Converts and Critics for a Men’s Group.” New York Times, August 2, p. A5. Niebuhr, Gustav. 1998. “Southern Baptists Declare Wife Should ‘Submit’ to Her Husband.” New York Times, June 10, pp. A1, A20. Nossiter, Adam. 1997. “Throngs Rally to Aid Judge in Displaying Biblical Code.” New York Times, April 13, p. A10. Novosad, Nancy. 1996. “The Right’s New Messiah.” The Progressive 60: 22-26. The Progressive. 1997. No Comment Section. The Progressive 61: 11. Purdum, Todd S. 1997. “In Serene Setting in California, Eerie Scene out of Hollywood.” New York Times, March 30, pp. A1, A15. Rich, Frank. 1997. “Power of the Purse.” New York Times, March 2, p. E15. Ross, Alfred, and Lee Cokorinos. 1997. “Promise Keepers: A Real Challenge from the Right.” National NOW Times 19: 1, 6. Shawcross, William. 1997. “In Kabul, Life — Such as It Is — Under the Taliban.” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, December 1, p. 22. Shorto, Russell. 1997. “Belief by the Numbers.” New York Times Magazine, December 7, pp. 60–61. Stanley, Alessandra. 1998. “The Pope Moves to Stamp out Liberal Debate on Heated Issues: A Warning of ‘Just Punishment’ for Dissenters.” New York Times, July 1, pp. A1, A8. Sykes, Gresham. 1958. The Society of Captives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Turner, Jonathan H. 1985. Sociology: The Science of Human Organization. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. Wald, Matthew L. 1997. “Suspicious Package Prompts 8-Hour Vigil at B’nai B’rith.” New York Times, April 25, p. A12. Wilson, A.N. 1998. “The Good Book of Few Answers.” New York Times, June 16, p. A31.

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Whitsel, Brad. 1995. “Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains. Terrorism and Political Violence 7: 117–139. Whitsel, Brad. 1997. “The Turner Diaries and Cosmotheism: William Pierce’s Theology of Revolution.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, November 21, San Diego, CA.

CHAPTER 7

Social Rage and Politics

[O]ld resentments and angers are stirred up in an effort to get voters to cast yet one more ballot of angry protest. Political consultants have been truly ingenious in figuring out endless creative ways of tapping into popular anger. (E. J. Dionne 1991: 16) I’ve tried to bring the American people together. I’ve tried to depersonalize politics and take the venom out of it. And the harder I’ve tried to do it, the harder others have pulled in the other direction. (President Bill Clinton, February 6, 1998)1 Several rage-related books have “politics” in their titles; for example, Aho’s (1995) The Politics of Righteousness, Stern’s (1997) subtitle The Politics of Hate, and Anderson’s (1995) Crime and the Politics of Hysteria. In addition, some books that are about politics address strong negative emotions; such as, Bennett’s (1995) The Party of Fear, Dionne’s (1991) Why Americans Hate Politics, Hofstadter’s (1965) The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Lipset and Raab’s (1970) The Politics of Unreason. Political behavior is highly competitive. At its basest level, it is about beating one’s opponents and winning elections. One strategy for winning elections involves being everything to all people, which sometimes involves dishonesty. 185

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But political behavior is also about getting legislation passed or prohibiting legislation from being passed. Politics is the process that determines who gets what. Political behavior comprises a complex set of variables, including but not limited to traits of the political actors themselves—their ideologies (including ethical principles, political opinions, religious beliefs), their views on economics, their demographic characteristics (race, gender, age), and their degree of self-interest. The interaction between political actors who are at odds with each other, can create conflict and rage. The juxtaposition of political actors (their characteristics and their desires) with public needs is the point at which conflict and, sometimes, rageful behavior comes about. Political behavior is not necessarily rageful and, by no means, are political actors necessarily greedy, selfish, hateful, mean-spirited, hellbent-on-destruction people. Some political behavior is rageful; some political actors are rageful. My purpose in writing this chapter is to describe the fluctuation in influence that rageful politics has enjoyed in recent decades. As I have repeated throughout, there are always socially rageful events and rageful people. At times, rageful events and rageful people are more predominant and influential. Because political behavior involves competition and influences social issues, it can involve social rage. Some political figures think it necessary to instill or heighten social rage among the voting public. Political figures such as these often express a great deal of social rage and engage in socially destructive behavior, behavior that distracts the public from war, poverty, and other real social problems. An example of distracting and destructive political behavior would be politicians expressing rage over a timely issue like crime, passing a bill that dictates ineffective and expensive punishment, but never addressing social inequality as the precursor to crime and punishment. Political figures and parties sometimes operate as the enactors, enablers, and messengers of social rage. Religion and the media also sometimes operate in this same fashion. That is, politics, like religion and media, provide the backdrop for social rage. Bearing in mind that not all political behavior and messengers, religious behavior and messengers, and media behavior and messengers are rageful, we must recognize that politics, religion, and media are the frameworks that allow messages and actions of social rage, at times, to take precedence.

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THE IMBALANCE OF POWER In the United States, we have essentially two political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. We actually have many other, smaller and less influential parties (populist, independent, reform, green, libertarian, socialist, communist, etc.). But basically we have two serious contenders for political power. This two-party structure is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. From the perspective of social rage, the divisiveness between these two parties simulates downright “meanness” at times. For instance, consider “the criminalization of politics” (Grann 1998).2 It seems that, particularly since 1992 when the U.S. presidency became Democratic, criminal charges directed at Democrats by Republicans have been rampant. In Bellant’s (1991) book on the Republican Party, which I will discuss in some detail, he focuses on the rage of the Republican Party. He recognizes that Democrats also do destructive things. Although the two parties vary in their degrees of exhibited rageful behavior, the bulk of the rage appears to be carried out by the political figures on the right end of the spectrum, according to Bellant and many others cited herein.3 At least one Democrat has recently engaged in personal verbal assaults against his opponent; and it has not paid off for him but rather has come back to haunt him (New York Times 1998). Geoffrey Fieger won the Democratic nomination for the Michigan governor’s race but now trails the Republican incumbent by a 2-to-1 margin. Mr. Fieger is a “roguemouthed” lawyer who, by his “stick-in the-eye campaign rhetoric,” has damaged not only his own chances at the governorship but perhaps the entire Democratic ticket (p. 10). Other Democratic Party members are backing away from him, putting him at arm’s length, viewing him as (not just an albatross but as) an anchor that could bring other Democrats down with him, and have called upon him to be less personal in his verbal attacks. Mr. Fieger has referred to the incumbent governor as a “racist,” “fat,” and a “moron.” An interesting comparison to this case is the right-wing candidate for the governorship of Alabama, who also insulted his opponent by calling him, among other severe insults, “fat.” In the latter case, though, the insulting candidate has won the primary election and continues to make a good showing. Christopher Caldwell (1998), senior writer for Weekly Standard, a conservative magazine, describes the difficulties facing the Republican Party as it currently operates in the United States. Related to their search for scandal with which to harm their opponents, and related to their vehement expressions of intolerance on social issues, is their lack of ideology.

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They have substituted their lack of ideology, their “standing for nothing,” with a reliance on scandal to bring down the Democrats, specifically President Bill Clinton. Coinciding with their absence of ideology, Caldwell states, is the lack of trust that the party instills from the U.S. citizenry. Caldwell cites a 1997 ABC/Washington Post poll, which asked voters whom they trusted more to improve education, help the middle class, handle the economy, hold down taxes, balance the budget, handle crime, and reform campaign finance. The responses showed that voters trust Democrats, on all these issues, more than the Republicans, even on such “Republican staples as taxes, crime, and budget balancing” (p. 55). The Republicans seem to have lost public trust because of their strong rhetoric combined with their lack of workable solutions to social problems. In other words, because the party is directionless, they are the party with “a stake in institutional disruption and bad news” (p. 72). The political right, by most analytical accounts, have made great use of social rage to beat their opponents. As Nichols (1995) has written, “National politics may be going the route of the Republican contest, where extremism is not a vice or virtue; it’s a requirement (p. 33). As I will illustrate, the political right’s rage has begun to turn against them as they become victims of their own rageful expressions and behaviors. Social rage dissipates over time, as it behooves the rageful less and less to engage in it. POLITICAL BELIEFS As we have seen in the previous chapters and will see in the remaining chapters, there are intense overlaps across social institutions, social phenomena, and social rage. This chapter addresses social rage and politics, and here we see politics influenced by and influencing religion, media, crime, the survivalist-right movement, and economics. Politicians, as is true for all humans, vary in their willingness to express and behave in socially progressive and destructive ways. Some are selfishly motivated. Even those who are more altruistically inclined may be influenced to some extent by monied lobbyists and special interests. The public, in varying degrees, is motivated by personal needs and personal beliefs. We may assume that a person votes in a particular way and endorses or protests particular policies depending on the person’s “politics.” A person’s “politics” is influenced by that person’s religious background, gender, race, education, socioeconomic status, perceptions,

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experiences, and so on. A person’s political decisions are based on what politicians and legislation can do for them as individuals. Not uncommonly, the emotions that make up and are affected by political beliefs are strong ones. Political beliefs are expressed in behaviors varying along a range of their emotional commitment and strength of personal conviction; such as the willingness to vote, to participate in informal discussions, to provide funds, to campaign, and to engage in organized protests and marches. Belief systems are far more important than facts to a rageful outlook and rageful behavior. Stated alternatively, emotions are salient to beliefs in that beliefs are evaluations that something is true or false, even though these beliefs are not based on facts or empirically grounded reasoning. For example, the belief that anyone can succeed, regardless of opportunity structures, is often presented as inarguable in political discussions of the “American Dream.” A person’s beliefs are constructed from the roles and statuses that the person inhabits and from the socialization process, as we find in families and peers who pass along their own beliefs to others in a sort of informal training. The emotions involved in politics can be quite extreme. The destructive behaviors resulting from these emotions are also quite extreme and their effects are more widespread than may be intended. The destruction resulting from political rage is not just personally experienced by the targeted politician and individual citizens peripherally involved with politics (spouses, confidants, et al.); political rage affects entire societies and can affect global interactions as well. Personal attacks on President Bill Clinton by Clinton-haters is personally and socially rageful. Without passing judgement on his personal integrity, we can safely say that the activities of his enemies have jeopardized the capabilities of the office of the presidency (no matter who holds the office henceforth), caused social trust to suffer overall, and weakened our and the government’s attention to public and international affairs.4 Religion, Politics, and Constitutional Rights. The historical significance of the passage of Roe v. Wade can not be dismissed as a political struggle, and it continues to pose perpetual tugs-of-war over moral, legal, and health issues. There is plenty of physical violence and destruction manifested in the abortion controversy, given the harassment of abortion providers and women requiring abortions, the bombings, and the assassinations. But social rage is more than physical violence and destruction. It includes intolerance, repression, and other less obvious signs of rage.

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Rich (1998) argues that we have amnesia about abortion rights. Before Roe v. Wade, pregnant women who did not want to bear children were butchered by unqualified abortion providers or turned to (often suicidal) self-surgery. When abortion was legalized, maternal mortality rates rapidly fell 45 percent. As long as the amnesia continues, insidious threats to the constitutional rights guaranteed by Roe are quite real. Among the common themes discussed in this examination of social rage is that beliefs and behavior are not as logically related as one might think. One of the points of illogic in the enormous controversy about abortion is the juxtaposition of belief contrasted to behavior about abortion. I am thinking of the paradoxical phenomenon of pro-life women getting abortions. Rich (1998), in pointing out the irony of pro-life women having abortions, cites one case in particular, Susan Carpenter-McMillan. Before Ms. Carpenter-McMillan became Paula Jones’ “front woman,” she was a strong crusader for the anti-choice movement. She described abortion as “America’s Holocaust” and her position was an absolutist one: she opposed abortion as a legal choice, even for victims of rape and incest. She had been an anti-choice crusader for over a decade when she was forced to confirm rumors in 1990 that she had undergone two abortions. When she was asked by a Los Angeles Times newspaper reporter to justify her hypocrisy, she said, “It was my own private life, and I don’t consider myself a public figure” (Rich, p. 21). She could hardly have stated the pro-choice position more articulately. The pro-choice position is that a woman’s intimate decisions about childbearing are beyond government reach. This is the privacy that the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, protects. Many women who undergo abortions “sincerely consider themselves pro-life right up to the moment that life intervenes” (Rich, p. 21). It has been observed by the Planned Parenthood counseling network that right-to-lifers demand an abortion and then immediately return to the clinic picket line. Their statistics show that this phenomenon is not uncommon. The pro-life versus pro-choice controversy is not new, but at the twenty-fifth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, the discussion has become even more heated. The 1973 U.S. Supreme Court ruling permits women to legally obtain abortions, although the religious right has never let up in their struggle to revoke abortion rights. At times the religious right are violent, even murderous in their efforts to deny women’s right to choose.5 These violent activities of the religious right have taken their

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toll on physicians’ willingness to offer abortions and women’s freedom to exercise their constitutional rights. One significant question is, “Can people be said to possess a right if they’re too afraid to exercise it?” (Hitt 1998: 55). Because of the controversy, medical students are not required to learn abortion procedures, fewer doctors are learning abortion procedures, almost no medical schools now teach abortion procedures, and abortions are provided by fewer numbers of doctors, hospitals, and clinics (Hitt 1998). Consequently, abortion doctors are, as a population, growing older and are retiring: at present, almost two-thirds of abortion doctors are beyond retirement age. Understandably, a great number of doctors refuse to serve as abortionists because they are threatened (and they or their staff are occasionally murdered) by “pro-life” zealots for engaging in this medical practice. In the United States, we face a political conundrum, one we have not grappled with in a long time. As Hitt observes, the right to abortion may not be enough. Besides direct violence, the anti-choice movement is attempting to reverse Roe v. Wade through more legitimate means, the political process. A “litmus test” was proposed in late 1997 by a faction of Republicans to separate the solidly anti-choice candidates from other political candidates. If it had been supported, the litmus test would have disallowed campaign funding for 1998 congressional candidates who are not anti-choice. Former Republican President Gerald Ford, in response to the proposed litmus test, condemned what he views as Republicans’ preoccupation with abortion. He warned that this “ultra-conservative” faction threatens to divide the party (Berke 1998: 15). Furthermore, he stated that the abortion issue is inappropriate as a partisan political issue. Unfortunately for the Republicans, the issue has created significant turmoil in the party. Mr. Ford laments that “zealots who are determined” continue to influence the party and will not allow extraction of the abortion issue from the political arena (p. 15). In summary, the job of politics is very much influenced by personal agendas and by social rage. Because politicians want to amass political power, some will cater to what they assume to be a significant voting public. Some will do this by engaging in disruptive, rageful, and destructive political behavior, behavior that forces unrepresentative and inappropriate policies upon the public. The current political culture that we have in the United States is heavily influenced by a minority of religious rightists. These rightists hope to dictate educational, social, and eco-

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nomic policies for the entire nation, regardless of our diverse opinions and needs. EMOTIONS AND POLITICS In his work on emotions and politics, Marcus (1991) offers psychological studies demonstrating that emotional response to politics is two-dimensional. Two responses, affect and cognition, are present in political behavior. Moreover, affect (or expression) and cognition (or thinking) are complementary systems; they are not antagonistic systems and can be mutually engaged. However, while expression and reasoning may not necessarily be at odds, it seems that expression takes precedence over reasoning in political rage. Scheff and Retzinger (1991), in describing Hitler’s influence over the German public, provide a link to the furious political behavior in the United States today. Like the right-wing political figures who play on the public’s sense of vulnerability, Hitler and his public were united by their individual and joint states of emotion, a triple spiral of shame-rage. They were ashamed, angry that they were ashamed, ashamed that they were angry, and so on, without limit. Hitler’s hold on the masses: instead of ignoring or condemning their humiliated fury. . ., he displayed it himself. . . . he sanctioned their fury. (p. 159)

Sanctioning the fury of the masses, by engaging in it oneself as a political figure, can make a politician popular, as we have seen with highly expressive and rageful politicians. In the United States, we are told by political figures that we are vulnerable to crime (in earlier decades, communism was the threat). The more vehement the message of public vulnerability, the more desperate the public feel and the more they will vote to gain protection from crime. Writing of a particular type of rageful politician, Richard Hofstadter (1965) describes the paranoid political spokesperson as “overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic.” The paranoid politician makes curious leaps in imagination and abandons “sensible judgement.” Lipset and Raab (1970) call a similar phenomenon “the politics of unreason” and describe paranoic reactions in politics as caused by a feeling of impotence. Feelings of impotence can be experienced by politicians and the public, and can be reflected, for example, as a feeling of having no decision-making power.6

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Some political figures are remarkably aggressive. Anderson (1995), in his study of crime and the politics of hysteria, describes Lee Atwater, the manager of Republican George Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign, as an aggressive “field commander of a deadly earnest struggle to protect America from liberal Democrats.” Atwater approached politics as “only a slightly politer [sic] form of ground battle” and viewed political figures as “hired guns.” Atwater focused on finding his “opponent’s weak point, striking there and striking hard’” (p. 208). Besides a violent, warlike analogy to political behavior, we also find a reliance on lowly reflexive thinking and actions. Describing Bush’s media campaign for the presidency, we are told that “the American people react instinctively to issues like the flag, not technically. . . . the issues had to be simple to state, simple to understand” (Anderson 1995: 212). Note the use of the words “instinctively” and “simple.” Simplicity, absolutism, and distortion are strongly interrelated and are among the hallmarks of social-rage expression, as I have noted throughout this book. Anderson reminds us that the political behavior in the 1988 Republican presidential campaign, particularly the furor over the tough-oncrime contest, illustrates amply and alarmingly the power of expressed fear to distort the truth. The “politics of fear” make a casualty of truth, in the same way as wartime passions nurture propaganda. On the politics of fear, Rothman (1995) suggests that the U.S. public may have selfish motives for voting Republican. Writing on criminaljustice policies of the 1990s and the failures of the reform programs, he hearkens back to the changed political atmosphere of the 1980s. Reagan and Bush were able to make crime and sentencing procedures a rallying point around which middle-class Americans could express their frustration not only with unsafe streets but with affirmative action and welfare costs. . . . many bondholders and job seekers see prison maintenance and construction not as a drain upon public resources but as a sound investment and source of employment. (p. 34)

Emotions run high in political debates at all levels of government. The aforementioned former President Gerald Ford is “troubled by the lack of civility” in the U.S. Congress. He said he is startled to see Congress “filled with bitterness and acrimony” (Berke 1998: 15). Similarly, Johnson (1997) describes the “fiery debates” among people at local political meetings. In a disagreement over financing education, a schoolboard president grabbed a fellow board member by the throat. Behavior

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at town councils, county assemblies, and school boards have become increasingly boorish, menacing, and violent. Although elected officials have set embarrassing examples, disruptions are most often caused by angry constituents. Disagreements over town-council decisions have resulted in smashed mailboxes and obscene telephone calls. Johnson concludes that political life mirrors a society that has gone from mannerliness to very threatening behavior, such as road rage, athletes spitting on and assaulting umpires and coaches, and parents suing Little League teams over playing time given to their children. POLITICS AND SYMBOLISM Edelman (1967; 1977) discusses words (as symbols) versus policies. Words can succeed where policies fail. That is, images generated by public policies create a sense of confidence that social problems are being attended to while, in actuality, little or no concrete progress is being made. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, criminal punishment is a symbol and has no measurable effect on crime reduction. On the politicization of crime policies, Garland (1985) writes that politicians, more than actually doing something about the social problem of crime, do more to portray their policies in acceptable terms to the public. In 1995, Garland writes that crime control and punishment have become more explicitly politicized. Issues that were once a matter for expert discretion, sentencing decisions for instance, are no longer left to the professionals; rather, they have become the subject of political debate and public controversy. The widespread and intense fear of crime has cued politicians to reclaim crime issues and to make crime a core symbol in debates about social order and political authority. The public discourse on crime is definitely about fear, a feeling that political figures hope to enhance in the electorate (Simon and Feeley 1995). Unfortunately, the U.S. public is no more confident in the criminal-justice system’s ability to reduce crime, despite the “tough-oncrime” policies, than they were 30 years ago. The public is still pessimistic and afraid. Yet, according to Simon and Feeley, the public continues to vote for politicians who have promised and delivered a massive expansion of expensive and ineffective criminal-justice strategies. Any hint of being “soft on crime” can cost a candidate an election. Republicans were traditionally considered to be harder on crime than Democrats. Such is no longer the case. As Caldwell writes (1998), one of “the single most destructive interest group[s] on the right is the NRA” (p.

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66). The National Rifle Association, the reader may recall, attacked the federal agency that monitors firearms (the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) as “jackbooted thugs.” Rabid pro-gun rhetoric has put the Democrats on the side of law enforcement and crime control, while conservative Republicans have been placed on the side of criminals and crime, not only for assailing the Federal Bureau of Investigation but also for opposing increased ranks of law enforcement. Away from crime and more generally on the politics of symbolism, Hamm (1997) writes that symbolic political acts call forth a larger and usually more complex set of ideas, rather than the basic meanings of political action. In other words, the symbol of the act is primarily a vehicle for conveying a message. For Reagan conservatives of the 1990s, the federal government continued to symbolize the problem, not the solution, for U.S. ills. More pointedly and concomitant with the drift toward anti-federalism, there was “a winding down of militarized masculinity that had been idealized during the Reagan-Bush era—the idea that a man’s worth elevates in proportion to his prowess as a paramilitary warrior” (p. 227, emphasis added). THE FAR RIGHT AND THE MAINSTREAM RIGHT Caldwell, a conservative writer, has recently described the Republican Party as “the party more congenial to haters of America” and as replacing Democrats as the “To-Hell-in-a-Handbasket Party” (1998: 66). More pointedly, he states that the Republicans have become associated with terrorism, particularly since the Oklahoma City bombing and more generally since the Reagan Administration. Today, he writes, “it is the right, not the left, on which suspicion falls first when a bomb goes off” (p. 66). I would add the cautionary note that members of the Right occur on a continuum; for example, the majority of Republicans are distinct from the more “revolutionary” and rageful Republicans. The interaction between the Republican Party and right-wing terrorism is also central to the former losing power, Caldwell predicts. He compares two signal events of the 104th Congress (of the 1994 election): the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 and the government shut down of 1995–96. Both events advanced “a belligerent rhetoric of ‘revolution’ that . . . Americans mistrusted” (p. 64). Overlap between the Republicans and a force that the public considers a genuine menace, anti-government revolutionary terrorists, will prove to be the Republicans’ downfall, Caldwell suggests. Historically, Democrats, especially those of the more

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liberal and progressive persuasion, were punished for their seeming relationship with Communism during the Cold War. In Chapter 3, the chapter on social rage and the survivalist right, I offer a discussion on the overlaps between the mainstream political right and the survivalist right, principally the militia movement. Reiteration will be kept to a minimum here, but a reconsideration of commonalties across the basic themes and actors involved is warranted. Regarding themes, both the mainstream right and the far right condone (a) fighting for specific freedoms, such as the right to bear arms; (b) tax resistance (denial of tax-paying responsibilities); (c) hatred and suspicion of the federal and (less so) state governments; (d) fundamentalist religion; and (e) nostalgia for times past. As for overlaps across people representing far-right and mainstream-right movements, we find state and local elected officials who espouse militia ideals and support militia behaviors.7 Bennett (1995) points to basic traits shared by members of the right in his perusal of right-wing writings as a lack of a sense of humor, an incapacity to make distinctions, intolerance, a hint of violence, and overt anti-intellectualism. The rightists, Bennett finds, “are not people who will receive a warm response from intellectuals” (p. 5), in others words, from people who reason. The Anti-Government Theme. The U.S. society fluctuates in its anti-government ideology. Anti-government feelings and behaviors are not new (Stock 1996). The U.S. has, since colonial times, displayed a definite strain of anti-government sentiment. Until the 1930s, rural American vigilantes attacked enemies who were also enemies of the federal government, such as socialists and anarchists. Enemies targeted by a legitimated government were “safe” targets for the vigilantes; simultaneous targeting by the vigilantes in combination with the government afforded the vigilantes general immunity from prosecution. Then, in the 1930s, “rural Americans began to wonder whether the government itself had not become the enemy, an un-American agent in their midst,” which hearkened back to the days of colonial radicals and their uprisings (p. 134). The American fascist movement of the 1930s is similar to some radical movements today in that individual members of the federal government —Jewish members in particular— were targeted for “murderous rage” (p. 139). By the 1970s, Stock goes on to say, there were a growing number of white men in the rural United States who had come to believe that liberalism had little to offer them. These men had been raised in an environment of traditional gender and racial divisions. They were conservative

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about many social issues, such as religion, abortion, homosexuality, and gun ownership. Stock finds that, increasingly in the 1970s and 1980s, residents of the rural United States were politically alienated; they found no more room for themselves in the middle class, and few politicians willing to listen to their point of view. Putnam (1995) also finds a growing lack of trust in government among U.S. citizens, not necessarily of right-wing citizens, over the last decade or so. The U.S. public has become psychologically disengaged from politics and government. Of those who reply to surveys the proportion who say that they trust the government in Washington only “some of the time” or “almost never” has risen steadily (p. 68). Besides the anti-government sentiments, the Republican Party in the United States expresses the same concerns as the radical-right militias, such as gun ownership and anti-environment policies. And, like the intolerant mainstream right, the militia are prone to express racism, homophobia, anti-immigrantism, and sexism (Berlet and Lyons 1995). Extremism and “Revolution.” Political power and influence fluctuate in the U.S. and elsewhere (Schlesinger 1986). While the United States has never been without proponents of either rightist or leftist politics, there are moments in U.S. history when one or the other of these ideological orientations prevails and dominates political discourse (Aho 1994). Beginning around 1980, Aho writes, the United States experienced a resurgence of right-wing extremism. Ronald Reagan was elected president along with a slate of senators anxious to reverse various civil-rights programs, to restrict rights of sexual and religious privacy, and to “modernize” the United States’ allegedly faltering military defenses. Presumably our domestic and foreign policies were part of a larger struggle against “atheistic communism.” (I will say more on communism as a diversion in a moment.) Less commonly known about the rightist resurgence was the establishment of what some have called a “secret government” in the White House whose operations were coordinated with the World Anti-Communist League. Furthermore, as part of the rightist resurgence, we had a proliferation of paramilitary political-religious organizations formed throughout the western United States, such as the Aryan Nation, the Posse Comitatus, the Aryan Youth Movement (“skinheads”), and the Christian Patriots Defense League (Aho 1994). Egan (1995), explaining the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, places part of the blame on Republicans for creating a “world of hate and fear.” Stern (1997) says much the

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same; that is, the “Republican victories in 1994 brought with them people who were able to stake out the fringes of their party. . . . When the center shifts, the margins move too” (p. 217). At the same time, the militias accept almost as an article of faith that the government has betrayed the public, that government leaders are corrupt, and that the Constitution has been subverted (Egan 1995). Johnson (1995), in his examination of anti-government views put forth by the U.S. public, discovered some saying that “they could not help but wonder whether the Republican campaign against government was sowing some seeds of malice toward those who carry out the nation’s laws” (p. 18). The editors of Time Magazine (1995) saw a similar connection between mainstream conservative politics and the Oklahoma City bombing and termed the bombing a political event. Writing of the intersection between the radical right and the mainstream politics, Hamm (1997) explains that: The radical right [of the 1980s] rallied against such things as Reaganomics, corporate America, and the elaborate, multibillion-dollar defense project known as Star Wars. At the same time, they remained deeply committed to the core values of mainstream conservatism at the height of the Reagan era: fundamentalist Christianity, love of family, hyperactive militarism, just saying “no” to drugs, and—most importantly—the idea that the federal government was the problem, not the solution. (pp. 11–12)

Part of the problem with rage as expressed in politics is the recent need to be extreme, to be “revolutionary,” to participate in a one-up-manship game of who can be farther to the right than the next person. In Nichols’ (1995) article “Righter than Thou,” he demonstrates that rageful talk shows, a rageful public, as well as rageful religious groups encourage conservative politicians to be rageful. He finds that this is especially true for the Republicans and contends, “In the Republican presidential race, extremism is the norm” (p. 31). He describes a poisonous, vitriolic rhetoric employed by Republican candidates for the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, a rightwing rhetoric that knew no bounds. According to the Fund for New Priorities in America, a New York-based group that closely monitors the tenor of the national discourse, the Republican candidates are “stylistic extremists” who “go beyond the ideological fringe” (Nichols, p. 32). The Fund’s executive director is quoted as saying, “This is the most outrageously rightwing field of candidates ever in the history of the U.S. They will say and do almost anything. . . . In the past, there

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may have been outrageous candidates, but there have never been this many outrageous candidates” (p. 32). In essence, the candidates appear to be captive to the demands of the intolerant right. Overlaps among Revolutionary Actors. There is an unmistakable connection between the militias, such as those who came to our attention with the Oklahoma City bombing, and elected government officials. Indeed, some elected officials have openly aided the militias’ cause (Ross 1995). Vest (1995) reports that “the margins of radical rightwing politics are wide enough to include thousands of people—including members of state government” (p. 29). Specifically, he cites Irene Hadley, representative of Indiana, as addressing an audience of the Sovereign Patriots (an Indiana militia group extremely hostile to the federal government), as saying, “My ideas aren’t any different from your ideas.” Vest concludes that the extremists are not entirely separable from mainstream-right politics. Placing the blame for the Oklahoma City bombing unequivocally on rightist politicians, Kramer (1995), suggests that it is time to stop shouting, and specifically designates Newt Gingrich (former Republican Speaker of the House) as one such shouter. Incendiary language, name-calling, and damning opponents as the embodiment of evil prohibit honest debate. Mr. Gingrich has praised incendiary language as a key to winning elections. He advises his colleagues to use words like “liar” and “traitor.” On the eve of the 1994 elections, Congressman Gingrich charged the Democratic Party with being the “enemy of the people.” He also directly targeted First Lady Hillary Clinton, calling her a “bitch,” thereby ushering in “a climate of stereotyping, race and gender-baiting, and hateful language that came to characterize the Republican Revolution” (Hamm 1997: 212). The angry electorate of the 1994 general election was much influenced by the bilious Newt Gingrich, who graced one magazine cover with the headline “Mad as Hell” (Ostrom and Moriwaki 1995). Did the extreme terrorism of the Oklahoma City bombing make a difference in conservative-right political behavior? Stern (1997) states that politicians’ reaction to the militias, pre- and post-bombing, was stark. Some were repulsed by the image of armed groups expressing hate. Others, state governors for example, saw a constituency with which they felt at home. Still others, including local leaders (including county commissioners, state representatives, and sheriffs), remained very connected to the militias. Even after the Oklahoma City bombing, some state and local officials continued to promote hatred of government and support for the militias’ ideology, speaking to overtly white-supremacist audiences. The

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greatest threat posed by county and state officials lay in the courage and legitimacy they gave to the militia agenda (Stern 1997). Religion and “Revolutionary” Political Rage. Nichols (1995) observes that the extremism sweepstakes is sponsored by religious conservatives, who use their influence to push the center of political gravity to the right. Ralph Reed, formerly of the Christian Coalition, had ordered operatives in key states to withhold their support from any of the candidates until they obtained ironclad assurances that they will follow the group’s anti-abortion, anti-gay rights, and anti-public-education agendas. Novosad (1996), in describing the religious right’s influence on right-wing politics, offers James Dobson as the “right’s new messiah.” Dobson, a fringe, far-right religious spokesperson, addressed the concerns of millions of conservative Christian voters who identified their cause with the Republican Party in 1994. Forty-three percent of the total votes that put hard-line right Republicans in power in the 1994 elections came from evangelical Christians and pro-lifers. In this election, the infrastructure of the Republican Party was greatly radicalized. During the 1980s and 1990s, it has become increasingly difficult to separate Republicanism from the Christian Coalition (Bennett 1995). As far as the rageful expressiveness of the Christian Right, Christian Coalition leaders were discovering by mid-1995 that toning down their rhetoric was not necessary for political success; nor was it acceptable to the growing number of activists who had been recruited to their cause (Bennett 1995). The Christian Right’s vision of the moral superiority of “Christian values” and its concern about abortion rights, gay rights, pornography, and other threatening violations of “Christian morality” sustain it as the party of fear (Bennett, p. 421). Overall, the combined Republican-right and religious-right movements have set the parameters of political discussion further and further from accurate cultural representation. Religion, obviously, has played a very significant role in the rightist political activities. While only a minority of U.S residents accepts the values and attitudes of the Christian Right, the born-again movement had been tied to the particular wave of nostalgic politics embodied in Ronald Reagan’s terms in office. The evangelical influence on politics could never have had the influence it enjoyed without Ronald Reagan’s vociferous support (Bruce 1988; Tamney and Burton 1989; Jelen 1991). Nostalgia. Nostalgia has been a running theme throughout this analysis of social rage. And it has had a special place in the Republican Party during and since Ronald Reagan’s two terms as president. Nostal-

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gia is a longing for times past that cannot be recovered. It is, moreover, a rebellion against social change, for example, in the form of a widened distribution of equality. In the mid-1990s, the focus was not only on economic and political issues; there was also a strong “social agenda” at work. The 1994 congressional majority of Republicans insisted that they would be satisfied with “nothing less than a major assault on those policies, programs, and attitudes viewed as threatening ‘traditional family values’ in America” (Bennett 1995: 412–413). The development of social enemies, by the mainstream or the far right, speaks to a strong dislike of people not like them. We saw it in the 1920s with the Ku Klux Klan in their heyday of terrorism. We saw it in the 1930s with the anti-alien movements. We saw it in the Cold War with the anti-Communist eruption. We see it now with myriad acts of intolerance against women, immigrants, non-Christians, non-whites, and homosexuals. Bennett (1995) explains that much political extremism of the Right and the need to combat alien people and ideas have come about because they were seen as threats to a “cherished but embattled American way of life.” For adherents to the “party of fear,” then, the United States is a “dream from the past imperiled” (p. 3). RAGE, THE CONSERVATIVE RIGHT, AND NAZISM Bellant (1991) presents a detailed account of Nazi involvement in the U.S. Republican Party. According to Bellant, there is certainly a great deal of common understanding between Nazism and U.S. Republicanism, not the least of which is anti-Communist sentiments. Besides this startling line of reasoning, Bellant backs his analysis with indisputable evidence such as membership rolls. As an indication of Republican sympathy toward Nazism, Ronald Reagan has characterized the Nazi Waffen SS as “victims” (Bellant, p. xvii). Essentially, Nazis have been networked into the Republican Party, Bellant explains, via an Eastern European émigré fascist network with direct ties to former Nazi collaborators. The Nazis have penetrated the Republican Party through an “ethnic outreach” program. The precise manner in which the Republican Heritage Groups Council has included Nazi collaborators, racists, anti-Semites, and fascists has been to legitimize them as ethnic leaders in U.S. communities. This practice of reformulating fascists as “ethnic leaders” (a phrase connoting diversity- and tolerance-mindedness) has ultimately provided a vehicle for expanding

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fascist influence in the executive branch and in Congress, where they have played a role in shaping United States foreign policy since World War II. The link between Nazism and Republicanism is strongly related to the fear of communism. (Recall that the European Nazi party of the 1930s and 1940s loathed communism as a political ideology.) One wonders whether the intense U.S. fear of communism is due to the Republican Party having been infiltrated with Nazis or whether the Nazis were welcomed into the Republican Party because of their anti-Communist feelings. Bellant concludes that, regardless of causality, the Republican National Committee, the American Security Council, and World AntiCommunist League may forgive fascist collaborators so long as they are active anti-Communists pursuing extremist right-wing politics. Christopher Simpson (1988) writes that while by far most Republicans have no Nazi ties or interests, it is nonetheless true that the Republican Nationalities Council has become fertile grounds for political organizing by former Nazi collaborators still active in immigrant communities in this country. It cannot be said that the Republican Party did not or does not know of their Nazi involvement. According to Bellant, it has become clear that people with Nazi associations were in the Republican Heritage Groups Council, and that the Republican National Committee knows with whom they are dealing. The Republican Heritage Groups Council, for example, has consciously recruited some of its members and leaders from “sympathizers and collaborators of Hitler’s Third Reich, former Nazis, and even possible war criminals” (Bellant, pp. xvii–xviii). Where we tread on familiar ground is the evidence that the Republican Heritage Groups Council contains anti-democratic and racialist components, who use anti-Communist sentiments as a cover for their views while they operate as a de facto émigré fascist network within the Republican Party. Some of these anti-democratic personalities were part of the 1987 Republican Heritage Groups Council meetings as well as the 1988 Republican presidential election campaign. It may be that a “combination of ignorance, amnesia, and in some cases political sympathy have allowed both American and European abetters of the Third Reich to play a prominent and respectable role inside the Republican Party” (Bellant, p. 89). In providing a socially rageful reason for the association between Nazism and Republicanism, Bellant suggests that support for fascism as an ideology mostly come from desperate, anxious, and angry people.

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These are people with a perception that their social and economic position is declining and who are frustrated with the constant risk of uncertainty and chaos. The political Right has directed our attention to the “Communist threat” as a major distraction from more realistic threats, such as the absence of jobs, low pay, inadequate housing, health care, and education. THE DEMISE OF RAGEFUL POLITICS It seems that the political radical right may be in a decline (Rich 1997). Republican Party donors are rebelling at being forced by the religious right to follow the dictates of the religious right’s agendas. Rich points out that the religious right are nowhere near representing the public; instead they represent only themselves and threaten the Republican Party as well as the populace. The religious right drive away voters who might otherwise vote Republican, particularly women and moderates. The Christian Coalition and other far-right religious groups, it has come to be recognized, actually put the Republican Party in jeopardy. Another indication of the right’s demise is the fading of Newt Gingrich’s power (Rosin 1997). Once upon a time, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich was riding high, especially in the mid-1990s. Recall his “Contract with America” and his “revolution.” In his heyday, Gingrich was known to be “mad as hell” (Ostrom and Moriwaki 1995), as a ranter and a raver. And that was one of the things that made him so popular. He was angry and vocal, communicating his pettiest bulldog instincts with outbursts of useless anger, which made his rageful expressions seem authentic and action-oriented. In the late summer of 1997, some of the House Republicans staged a “coup” against House Speaker Gingrich, at least partly because of his rageful behavior. In response, Gingrich stated that the rebellion against him had been “blown entirely out of proportion” and he attributed the subsequent uproar to the fact that “we live in an age of television where any three loud people can sound bigger than any 200 quiet people” (Sack 1997: 11). He went on to denigrate life in Washington, in these days of infighting, as replete with “hyperbolic exaggeration” (p. 11). Gingrich’s statements are extraordinarily ironic: well-known for hyperbolic exaggeration and for his own loudness, he complains that others are behaving as he does. But by the late 1990s, even his Republican peers had turned against

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him. By the end of 1998, he had become so unpopular with his colleagues that he resigned as House speaker. Balz and Yang (1997) reported that, in the perspective of many House Republicans, Gingrich’s greatest weakness was his “inability to discipline himself and to see the impact of his words and actions” (pp. 10–11). His rageful behavior seemed to be out of control and seemed to speak to no concern for the future. Said a poller, “people aren’t willing to take much more” of Gingrich’s behavior (p. 11). I would offer this as evidence that people eventually grow weary of social rage. Verhovek (1997) also observes a chink in the political right’s prowess. In early 1995, talk of revolution was in the air, from the mainstream and radical right, culminating in the greatest act of terrorism on U.S. soil, the Oklahoma City bombing. On the whole, the Republicans who had swept to power promised radical change. Rush Limbaugh predicted that the second violent American revolution was very close. In support, Newt Gingrich, the self-described “genuine revolutionary,” promised to slash the size and power of the federal government, in an historically defining way. The Oklahoma City bombing, partly a protest against federal government, fulfilled predictions and promises such as these. The bombing also dealt a political setback to conservatives. One analyst, Robert Holsworth of Virginia Commonwealth University, suggests that there is “guilt by rhetorical association” to explain the relationship between conservative movements and terrorism. He points out that since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the mood has changed drastically in this country, and “Republicans aren’t preaching revolution anymore. . . . Those who had this strident, revolutionary, antigovernment line have lost that debate” (p. 6). Hamm (1997), likewise citing the Oklahoma City bombing as leading to the demise of rageful politics, states that after the bombing, there ensued a search for sanity and a return to normalcy. The downfall is exemplified by the dismantling of the “Republican Revolution,” Gingrich’s approval rating dropping precipitately, and (seven months after the bombing) 75 percent of the American public disapproved of the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress (Hamm). Some politicians never apologize for their loudness and aggressiveness, however, as evidenced by Representative Dan Burton, Republican of Indiana. Burton, even though he has engaged in wrongdoing in his own fund-raising activities, is a “take-no-prisoners politician of the right” and he is “unbowed by his critics and proud of his combativeness” (Sciolino 1997: 1). The question is raised as to whether he is too extreme

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to do a good job. He defends himself and is defended by his fellow churchgoers as “a misunderstood warrior doing the Lord’s work” (p. 17). He is quite belligerent in his unwarranted accusations of others. Friedman (1997), not a liberal writer, illustrates his own growing dissatisfaction with the conservative U.S. Congress. He refers to them as a bunch of “narrow-minded, shortsighted, weak-kneed, navel-gazing characters.” He complains that they are barring President Clinton from conducting essential world business (such as paying United States’ overdue United Nations dues and paying into the International Monetary Fund) because Newt Gingrich and the “anti-abortion fanatics” are demanding that President Clinton do as they say (p. 19). Nevertheless, the right does appear to be losing power. Possibly providing an explanation for the demise of the Republican Revolution, Herbert (1997) claims that, The so-called conservative revolution has more or less exhausted itself. It has left its mark, but it has also left a majority of Americans to face the twenty-first century with the unsettling sense that they are on their own when it comes to such potentially overwhelming matters as earning a living, raising a family, sending their children through college, caring for aging parents, securing adequate health care and providing for their own retirement in an increasingly insensitive and unforgiving global economy. (p. 21)

The conservative philosophy has taught working U.S. residents to not turn to their government for help, since the government cannot or will not help them. Giant corporations, we are told, rule the economic world according to “merciless dictates of a free market.” Such a worldview is cynical, self-serving, inhumane, and increasingly is being perceived as unsatisfactory (Herbert, p. 21). The conservative revolution has not raised the standard of living for most U.S. workers, but has threatened such cherished and hard-won supports as Social Security and Medicare. Our belief in the “American Dream” has dissolved. Polls show that 60 percent of whites, 58 percent of African-Americans, and 55 percent of Latinos believe that they are farther away from attaining the American Dream that they were a decade ago. Thus, politics of the far right may be losing favor because people are suffering from them. On a more progressive note, evidence of the demise of the conservative revolution include (a) strong support for the 1997 United Parcel Service strike, (b) strong support for the increase in mini-

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mum wage, and (c) Republicans turning their backs on the self-described “revolutionary” Newt Gingrich (Herbert 1997).8 CONCLUSION: WHAT GOES AROUND, COMES AROUND All cultures have internal disagreements and disagreements with other cultures about the best approach to view the world and the best way to behave politically. This is the stuff of anthropological and sociological cross-cultural examinations. To give one example of social rage expressed by one culture against another’s policies, consider the death-penalty recommendation for a Pakistani convicted of killing two U.S. Central Intelligence agents. Mir Amal Kansi, the convicted man, was given the death penalty for rageful behavior. A Pakistani immigrant, he believed he had a legitimate purpose for his killings. According to the prosecution, the murders were “set off by Mr. Kansi’s anger at United States policies in the Middle East” (Wayne 1997: 1). The prosecutor said that Mr. Kansi was politically motivated and deliberately chose the Central Intelligence Agency as a symbol of U.S. power against which to protest U.S. policies. The prosecutor went on to say that Mr. Kansi killed the two men “as a political statement because of his animosity to our government and to the C.I.A. . . . Mr. Kansi was said to be especially furious with the United States as a result of the Persian Gulf War” (p. 7). We also have what might be considered a rageful reaction on the part of the United States, that being the application of the death penalty for Mr. Kansi’s crimes. To bring this example around to full circle, the United States is now going to be subject to greater rageful behavior from Pakistan, the U.S. State Department warns, because we have recommended the death penalty.9 Behavior of this sort, internationally and within the bounds of one nation, resembles a cycle of violence. The example above is rageful, pointlessly so, given that the execution of the convicted Pakistani is not going to reduce terrorism against the United States, but will very likely escalate terrorist acts against the United States. The Pakistani’s acts were also pointlessly rageful given that the United States is unimpressed with his act. U.S. involvement in the Gulf War has not been reconsidered as a result of Mr. Kansi’s murder of U.S. C.I.A. agents. Political rage on the home front is also pointless, as we see between the Republicans and the Democrats. The Republicans blame the Democrats for investigating and calling for the impeachment of Richard Nixon

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for the Watergate incident. The reasoning goes: Richard Nixon, a Republican president, was forced to resign under threat of impeachment for the Watergate crimes (high crimes and misdemeanors, specifically). As a result, Bill Clinton, a Democratic president, is being punished with criminal and civil prosecution, by a Republican special prosecutor, for Whitewater (questionable land and banking deals), for Vince Foster’s suicide (which some have argued was a Clinton-inspired murder), campaign finance questions, and sexual-misconduct charges. The Democrats, in response, are trying to defend themselves against the special prosecutor’s multiple accusations. All of this is taking place while many important governmental issues need to be addressed, not the least of which (as I write this) are impending renewed wars. This is but a moment in time. Political scandals come and go and are forgotten. They are not to be trivialized, however, since they impact world events on a grand scale and with historical significance. Thus social rage affects politics and affects the world. NOTES 1

The quote by Bill Clinton is cited in Broder (1998: 6). In an article he wrote about the indictments against Michael Espy, who served as U.S. Secretary of Agriculture from 1993 through 1994, Grann describes the charges that Espy “accepted $35,000 worth of gifts from companies he was regulating.” If validated, Espy could face more than 100 years of imprisonment “for the appearance of impropriety, for simply taking gifts” (p. 19). 3 Bellant (1991) expresses concern about his political biases influencing his analyses and conclusions. As social scientists, we are cautious about being influenced by our own biases. Throughout this analysis, I trust that I have made clear the truism that we all are biased. Surely, it is no secret by this point that I am socially progressive and politically left. 4 I am specifically referring to the early 1998 sexual misconduct charges against Mr. Clinton. Linda Tripp, a Pentagon employee, an appointee of a previous Republican administration, and a strong critic of Bill Clinton, leaked the story of the sexual relationship between a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, and Bill Clinton. Tripp’s story was relayed to independent counsel Kenneth Starr who was also investigating the president on other (unsubstantiated) charges. Thus far, in Bill Clinton’s presidency, he has been accused of many things, such as illegal land deals (the Whitewater investigation) and campaign-finance abuse, but, most tellingly, he has had to defend himself repeatedly against very personal charges of sexual misbehavior. Mr. Clinton has been up against formidable and 2

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well-endowed enemies. For example, Paula Jones’ sexual-misconduct lawsuit against Mr. Clinton is backed financially by the Rutherford Institute, a politically conservative organization, which has poured enormous amounts of money into Jones’ legal team, her Hollywood makeover, and publicity. The result of these scandals and “crises” is a massive diversion away from meaningful social issues and global problems. During the time of the Lewinsky scandal, the United States was embroiled in what looked like an impending and renewed war with Iraq (subsequent to the Gulf War). Global troubles, however, had to share the front page with sex scandals. 5 The “Army of God” has claimed on February 2, 1998, that they bombed the abortion clinic in Birmingham, Alabama. This bombing has left a security guard dead and a nurse badly maimed. The Army of God has also taken credit for other bombings, such as that of a gay and lesbian bar. These activities, murder, assault, and threatening the rights of people through violence, are conducted in the name of religion. 6 Political figures may experience or express rage-related emotions (paranoia, resentment, anger, and frustration) as a result of political competitions. I would venture that paranoia, resentment, anger, and frustration can be likewise experienced by the public due to the social strains that they experience. Some segments of the public may experience a perceived relative loss of social and economic power, as we find in recently marginalized white males. Other segments of the public, such as minorities, have experienced a more constant level of disenfranchisement due to traditionally experienced social strains. 7 It is not just those who preach conspiracy who are responsible for terrorist acts such as the Oklahoma City bombing, but also those who, in the pursuit of their own political ambitions, erode faith in our governance. Referring to terrorists and to hard-right political figures, Kramer (1995) reminds us that, “inflamed passions produce unintended consequences. In the effort to get attention, to startle, to motivate, a crucial self-control is lost” (p. 66). A number of writers make the point that mainstream politics are related to the survivalist right (Coates 1995; Worcester 1995; Hamm 1997; Stern 1997; and others). Worcester (1995), for example, states that the Oklahoma City bombing raises questions about the porous borders dividing mainstream conservatives from the radical fringe. Among the connections that can be made between conservative politicians and the militia are members of Congress, such as Steve Stockman of Texas (who has since lost his seat) and Helen Chenoweth of Idaho, both of whom are aligned with the militia movement. Led by former members of the Aryan Nation, the Militia of Montana merchandise a video in which Representative Chenoweth explains that more than 50 percent of the United States is under “the control of the

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New World Order.” Senators Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina and Larry Craig of Idaho have written militia-inspired letters to Janet Reno prior to the Oklahoma City bombing complaining that nefarious agents of a one-world dictatorship were mobilizing troops and black helicopters against ordinary citizens. Newt Gingrich, Bob Dole, Phil Gramm, and others have been regular guests on G. Gordon Liddy’s talk radio show. Recall that G. Gordon Liddy has offered on-air suggestions about how to inflict maximum damage against federal agents and political targets. As will be discussed in the next chapter, some talk radio hosts regularly incite listeners to engage in acts of violence against liberals and public officials. 8 For a while, it looked as though Janet Reno, the U.S. Attorney General, knew how to handle rageful politicians. The Republicans have been angry with her because she refused to allow them free reign in punishing the Democratic president and vice president for alleged fund-raising violations. (The Republicans accuse President Clinton and Vice President Gore of engaging in campaignfinance misdeeds.) Until lately, Ms. Reno has not cooperated with the Republican calls for punishment because she does not think that punishment is warranted. As a result, the Republicans have acted rather threateningly toward Ms. Reno so that she will be persuaded to “throw the book” at Clinton and Gore. At a meeting on December 9, 1997, the Republicans tried to intimidate her, by glaring at her and sharply criticizing her. She was unmoved (Clines 1997: 18). By September, 1998, having been buffeted by Republicans for 18 months over her refusal to examine Democratic campaign financing, she relented. Johnston (1998) reports that she may have been motivated to shift her position because, as some in Congress suspect, she is trying to “blunt the fierce attacks by the lawmakers on her competence and credibility” (p. 22). 9 As a result of Mr. Kansi’s conviction, four U.S. oil-company auditors working in Pakistan were ambushed and killed in retaliation. We are quite possibly going to experience more violent retaliation on the part of Pakistanis sympathetic to the convicted killer, now that he has received the death penalty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Aho, James A. 1995. The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Anderson, David C. 1995. Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice. New York: Times Books (Random House).

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Balz, Dan, and John E. Yang. 1997. “Newt Gingrich’s Self-Renewal Strategy.” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, February 24, pp. 10–11. Bellant, Russ. 1991. Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party: Domestic Fascist Networks and Their Effect on U.S. Cold War Politics. Boston: South End Press. Bennett, David H. 1995. The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement. New York: Vintage Press. Berke, Richard L. 1998. “Ford Urges G.O.P. to Drop Abortion Issue and Shift Center.” New York Times, January 20, p. A15. Berlet, Chip, and Matthew N. Lyons. 1995. “Militia Nation.” The Progressive 59: 22–25. Broder, John M. 1998. “Clinton Rules out Any Consideration of Stepping Down.” New York Times, February 7, pp. A1, A6. Bruce, Steve. 1988. The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Caldwell, Christopher. 1998. “The Southern Captivity of the G.O.P.” The Atlantic Monthly 281: 55–72. Clines, Francis X. 1997. “Stolid Reno Douses Fire on G.O.P.’s Day of Rage.” New York Times, December 10, p. A18. Coates, James. 1995. Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right. New York: Hill and Wang. Dionne, E.J., Jr. 1991. Why Americans Hate Politics. New York: Touchstone. Edelman, Murray. 1967. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Edelman, Murray. 1977. Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail. New York: Academic Press. Egan, Timothy. 1995. “Inside the World of the Paranoid.” New York Times, April 30, pp. D1, D5. Friedman, Thomas L. 1997. “Tame the Beast.” New York Times, November 17, p. A19. Garland, David. 1985. Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies. Brookfield, VT: Gower. Garland, David. 1995. “Penal Modernism and Postmodernism.” Pp. 181–209 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Grann, David. 1998. “Prosecutorial Indiscretion.” The New Republic, Issue 4333, February 2, pp. 18–23 Hamm, Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

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Herbert, Bob. 1997. “A Revolution Subsides.” New York Times, October 22, p. A21. Hitt, Jack. 1998. “Abortion in Hiding: Who Will Do Abortions Here?” New York Times Magazine, January 18, pp. 20–27, 42, 45, 54–55. Hofstadter, Richard. 1965. The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New York: Knopf. Jelen, Ted G. 1991. The Political Mobilization of Religious Beliefs. New York: Praeger. Johnson, Dirk. 1995. “Americans See Strangers in Their Midst.” New York Times, May 14, pp. A1, A15. Johnson, Dirk. 1997. “Civility in Politics: Going, Going, Gone.” New York Times, December 10, p. A14. Johnston, David. 1998. “Reno’s Sudden Shift.” New York Times, September 3, p. A22. Kramer, Michael. 1995. “Time to Stop Shouting.” Time Magazine 145: 66. Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Earl Raab. 1970. The Politics of Unreason: RightWing Extremism in America, 1790–1970. New York: Harper and Row. Marcus, George E. 1991. “Emotions and Politics: Hot Cognitions and the Rediscovery of Passion.” Social Science Information 30: 195–232. New York Times. 1998. “Losing Ground, Even in His Own Party.” New York Times, August 31, p. A10. Nichols, John. 1995. “Righter than Thou.” The Progressive 59: 30–33. Novosad, Nancy. 1996. “The Right’s New Messiah.” The Progressive. 60: 22–26. Ostrom, Carol M., and Lee Moriwaki. 1995. “Anger: Living on the Edge.” The Seattle Times, April 2, pp. A1, A10–11. Putnam, Robert D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6: 65–78. Rich, Frank. 1997. “Power of the Purse.” New York Times, March 2, p. E15. Rich, Frank. 1998. “Back to the Future.” New York Times, January 21, p. A21. Rosin, Hanna. 1997. “The Madness of Speaker Newt.” The New Republic 4287: 23–26. Ross, Loretta J. 1995. “Saying It with a Gun.” The Progressive 59: 26–27. Rothman, David J. 1995. “More of the Same: American Criminal Justice Policies in the 1990s.” Pp. 29–44 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Sack, Kevin. 1997. “Gingrich Reminds Rebels He’s Head Coach.” New York Times, July 22, pp. A1, A11. Scheff, Thomas J., and Suzanne M. Retzinger. 1991. Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

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Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1986. The Cycles of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Sciolino, Elaine. 1997. “From Chairman of House Inquiry, No Apologies for Aggressive Style.” New York Times, September 24, pp. A1, A17. Simon, Jonathan, and Malcolm M. Feeley. 1995. “True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime.” Pp. 147–180 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T.G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Simpson, Christopher. 1988. Blowback: U.S. Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Stern, Kenneth S. 1997. A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Tamney, Joseph B., and Ronald Burton. 1989. “Pat Robertson: Who Supported His Candidacy for President?” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28: 387–389. Time Magazine. 1995. “The Terror from Within.” Time Magazine 145: 43. Verhovek, Sam Howe. 1997. “The Emotional Politics of a Political Trial.” New York Times, April 27, pp. E1, E6. Vest, Jason. 1995. “Leader of the Fringe.” The Progressive 59: 28–29. Wayne, Leslie. 1997. “Jury Recommends Death Penalty for Pakistani in C.I.A. Slaying.” New York Times, November 15, pp. A1, A7. Worcester, Kent. 1995. “The Right and the Politics of Rage.” New Politics 5: 5–7.

CHAPTER 8

Social Rage and the Media

If you watch television news you know less about the world than if you drank gin out of a bottle. (Garrison Keillor 1997: 95) After bouncing from medium to medium, rumor can become truth. (Janny Scott 1998: 17) I cannot remember a time in American history when so many stories have been aired, printed, and sent out over the Internet with so little in the way of verification. (Fred Moody 1998) All media, but particularly the news media, are salient to social rage as well as other social phenomena, because the media shape our reality. The news media, although it is not objective, is thought to be objective. With the use of words like “crisis” to describe scandal, for example, our views of events are shaped. Moreover, the mere but nontrivial fact that we focus on certain kinds of events (sensational ones like crime, sex, and disasters) makes our view a distortion of reality. As Bob Herbert (1998) wrote, “The press is drawn irresistibly to that which is loud and destructive” (p. 23). Part of the problem is the lack of analysis (the lack of time, attention, and deliberation) afforded an issue or a newsworthy event. Another part of the problem is the emotionality attached to stories; the emotionality influences our interpretations. For example, we feel angry about crime and at criminals. We feel pity and sorrow at human-interest stories. 213

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Our beliefs and behavior are influenced by the media. To the extent that the TV news shows tell us to be afraid of crime, we are. To the extent that we attach credibility to talk-radio discussions about unfair employment practices being the result of affirmative action, we sign anti-affirmative-action ballots. Music and movies indicate what we should be incensed about and how we might interpret social phenomena in general. We are not only influenced by what we hear, see, and read; we are, equally importantly, influenced by what we do not hear, see, and read. If we are not offered the facts about welfare, our prejudices remain intact and human services are removed from children, the physically disabled and mentally ill, the aged, and other “deserving poor.” As members of modern society, we vary in our exposure to media messages and in our choices of media. For the most part, the U.S. public is inundated with media. One illustration is the number of settings where television is unavoidable, such as bars, airports, and so on. Another illustration is the omnipresent billboard with which one is confronted using any mode of transportation: driving, walking, or riding in a bus or train. Our reality is shaped, if not defined, by the media. Mostly we are a society of TV viewers. TV is the most common source of information (news, news shows, talk shows, and docudramas). Most of us tune in and read mainstream (in other words, commonly accessible) TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines. Mainstream, Tabloid, and Fringe Media. As suggested in my parenthetical comment above, “mainstream” means commonly available and frequently used. It has also come to mean “acceptable” and even inarguable. The meaning of mainstream can be in comparison to less competent forms of media, such as tabloid and fringe media. “Tabloid” journalism, as found in grocery-store checkout lines, is frequently derided as less competent and less professional than mainstream journalism. Scott (1998) has pointed out that the boundaries between mainstream and tabloid press have become blurred. She was referring to the President Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal, which broke in January of 1998. Monica Lewinsky, a former White House intern, claimed to a friend that she had had a sexual affair with Bill Clinton, while he was president of the United States. After a week or two, the veracity of Ms. Lewinksy’s stories were suspect, although President Clinton did admit eight months later that he did engage in inappropriate sexual conduct with Ms. Lewinsky. The Clinton-Lewinsky scandal is a “story rife with the sensational elements of tabloid news, based heavily on anonymous sources and colored in many instances by what journalists themselves

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say is speculation and hype” (Scott, p. 1). Among the factors that have allowed this to happen are, according to Scott, a lowering of standards by mainstream news organizations. This lowering of standards has occurred because of the “information free-for-all” resulting from the influx of talk radio, 24-hour cable news, and the Internet. Comparing mainstream news sources to Internet gossip sites, we find overlaps. A mainstream magazine, Newsweek, had delayed its publication of the Clinton-Lewinsky story but the on-line gossip reporter Matt Drudge posted the story on his “Drudge Report.” The story as it appeared on the Drudge Report made its way to various Internet news groups, to the ABC News program “This Week,” to a CNBC talk show, to CBS Radio, and to major newspapers and network news shows. From there, the story received round-the-clock coverage on CNN and MSNBC (Scott 1998). Scott mentions a very important development in media that is further elaborated upon by Moody (1998), and that is the upsurge of the Internet as a source of “news.” Scott tells us that the World Wide Web gave the Clinton-Lewinsky story additional velocity, to be sure. This is partly due to the fact that the Web does not have the “ethics cops” who patrol newspaper and magazines newsrooms. That is, rumors and unsubstantiated stories can be posted to the Web without any such controls. An entire day’s worth of stories can have their origin in a single claim made by a single anonymous source, Moody tells us. In pre-Internet times, a thinly-sourced story would not have seen the light of day; but in these days, the news organizations feel great pressure to “rush into print or pixel” without verification of the story. The problem with the Internet managing news is not only the absence of ethics police, it is also that time is of the essence more than ever. Moody writes, “Where in the past publishers and broadcasters would worry about being scooped that evening or the next morning, now they are constantly terrified about being scooped in the next few minutes.” Likewise but on a different topic, Rich (1998) wrote about false stories in print and TV journalism, especially Cable News Network (CNN). He specifically addressed the false story reported on CNN about nervegas use in Laos in 1970, during the Vietnam War. Rich makes two important points about the distortion allowed in the media. One is that, with mistakes like this one about nerve gas coming to light, the news media put forth a show of installing a “new system of journalistic checks and balances” but the news-media culture of distortion “remains entrenched—and ubiquitous” (p. 21). Rich refers to the news-media culture as an “entertainment culture” with an “insatiable hunger for new stars

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and daily scoops (however tenuous)” with systemic problems, not infrequent mishaps (p. 21). Referring to the news media’s unwillingness to admit its mistakes, he describes it as a “smug industry” whose botches only thicken the “prevailing arrogance” (p. 21). Second, he remarks on the purpose of news (entertainment versus dissemination of news) in terms of the profit motive. He concludes, there’s nothing wrong with high ratings for TV news—or high circulation for newspapers and magazines. If you don’t make a profit, you’re out of business. But which business is it—journalism or show-biz?” (p. 21)

As for fringe media, the mainstream media reaches a greater audience than the fringe media. Public-access TV, short-wave radio, and computer bulletin boards have fewer formalized controls and thereby permit a broader interpretation of “truth.” The term “media” covers a lot of ground and it has extended to include new technologies that allow for a wider reach of messages. Most notable among these is the Internet, which the rageful (such as the survivalist right) use with some frequency.1 These less mainstream forms of media (bulletin boards, etc.) do not necessarily have a fringe message, but fringe messages are more likely to appear on these less controlled media. Although the fringe media may take a more direct or more obvious approach in inciting rage, the line between the mainstream and fringe etiology of social rage is vague. Militia leaders, using fringe media, are relatively blunt in their messages of hate and violence. But the messages put forth within the mainstream can also be quite volatile. Douglas (1996) describes Rush Limbaugh as a “male hysteric [who] expresses outrage not permitted Peter Jennings” (p. 19). In short, the range of media-incited social rage is not narrow. Some media, such as the mainstream, may be more subtle in its rageful messages. Bias. It is a matter of opinion as to what constitutes bias. Those who watch and listen to public TV and National Public Radio may, for instance, think that commercial TV and radio are biased. Most media are privately owned and operated by private corporations that, being profitmotivated, are more likely to cater to public desires for subjective presentation and highly emotional content. Private media also ordinarily put forth a conservative agenda. Scholars of the media tell us that the private mainstream media have become narrower in focus and further to the political right. Moreover, the right seems to want to do away with compet-

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ing public media. Evidence to this effect includes their attempts to do away with public TV, which by most accounts is considered educational and objective (Ledbetter 1997). In this chapter, I will examine several forms of media (radio talk shows, TV, print journalism, movies, and music) for evidence of social rage. One consideration is the superficiality of expressed rage. Another is responsibility of the media for inciting rage. As to the former, recall from Chapter 1 that social rage can be expressed without being experienced. This occurs primarily because the expresser is hoping to achieve some end by means of the expression of rage (votes, attention, money). Individual media figures, not unexpectedly, want to keep their jobs and make money. Commercial media organizations are similarly concerned with marketing, ratings, and sales. Profits seem to result from sensationalism sans accuracy and rationality, and result in public manipulation. Responsibility of the media for encouraging the behavior of social rage is ambiguous. Some journalists and scholars have placed the blame for the Oklahoma City bombing and other militia activities, extremism in crime control, and oppression of minorities squarely on the shoulders of fringe and (less so) mainstream media figures and their behavior. G. Gordon Liddy, Rush Limbaugh, Mark Koernke (“Mark of Michigan,” radio talk-show host and organizer of the Michigan Militia), and other rageful radio hosts directly incite intolerance, irrationality, and occasionally violence. Related to issues of responsibility are issues of free speech. Apparently, G. Gordon Liddy is free to advise shooting federal agents. His and other hate speech is popularly thought of as protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The dilemma is that, while hate speech may not be healthy for a society, neither is repression of speech. Throughout this book, we have considered the media’s influence on social rage and the effect of social rage on the media. As we have seen, the media affect and are affected by politics, religion, minority issues, the survivalist-right movement, crime perceptions, and so on. DISTRACTIONS AND DISTORTIONS Mark Hamm (1997) has referred to the media as the place “where perceptions mean everything” (p. 228). The media offer many fictive distractions in the form of television situation comedies and other shows intended strictly for entertainment. The media also offer questionably “factual” distractions from real issues and real explanations, in the form

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of TV docudramas and TV news (Cavender and Bond-Maupin 1993; Kurtz 1997; Stossel 1997). Stossel (1997) goes so far as to say that television is a modern-day religion for some of us, in that television presents a coherent vision of the world. The vision provided, however, is “violent, mean, repressive, dangerous—and inaccurate” (p. 87). Cultivation analysis, Stossel explains, is a method of understanding how much television contributes to viewers’ conceptions of reality and their understanding of the world. Cultivation analysis reveals the distorted nature of “reality,” as offered by TV. TV viewers absorb, unwittingly sometimes, false messages (such as the relationship between race and welfare) and socially unfriendly attitudes (such as homophobia, sexism, etc.). Stossel finds that the more people watch TV, the more they think that television represents reality. Heavy viewers believe that they learn a lot from television and that television shows “what life is really like” (p. 95). Ewen’s (1996) book on “PR” (public relations) uses the term “spin” to describe the distortion of information, usually as a means to an end. The end is, not uncommonly, an economically advancing end. That is, we speak in the United States of putting a “positive spin” on something as a way of making something seem better than it is. We query each other as to what kind of a “spin” we should apply as a way to reinterpret a phenomenon, as in, “What type of spin shall we put on this?” People who come up with palatable spins for explaining phenomena are called “spin doctors.” Ewen details the rise of the mass media and its role in creating a “virtual public.” The virtual public is created by its vulnerability, its vulnerability having been developed out of mass manipulation, isolation, and spectatorship. The techniques of mass manipulation used today include sentimental appeals through advertising and motion pictures, mass distribution of news releases, targeted recruitment of “experts” and local “opinion leaders,” and corporate-controlled grassroots organizing. Readers of mass-circulation newspapers and magazines, for instance, are witnesses to society but not part of society. In other words, they constitute outsiders to or passive observers of society, but are not active participants in society. Newspapers and magazines have become “modern pipelines of persuasion,” exploited presently by right-wing propagandists (and previously by progressive reformers), with the objective being to manage an increasingly restive public. According to Ewen, the purpose of the PR industry is to construct publicly accepted ideologies. Since this is the case, the industry has de-

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veloped a self-serving rationalization. This rationalization is composed of two mutually contradictory propositions. One is the public rationale, designed for public consumption. The other is the private pitch, for presentation to the industry’s private clients. The former consists of pious sentiments such as “honesty is the best policy” and other calculated lies. The latter, rarely aired in public, suggests that public opinion must be scientifically engineered from above in order to control the rabble. In summary, public opinion can be manufactured, bought and sold like any other commodity. Crime, Politics, and “Spin.” The U.S. public has been subject to PR, spin, and distortion of the facts about crime, criminals, and crime control (see Chapter 4). As Anderson (1995) pointed out, part of the problem is that TV journalism reports crime stories more visually than verbally and must do so in less than a minute. Coverage of this kind not only simplifies all the elements of criminality and the behavior of the criminal justice system, it also “magnifies the emotional force of a victim’s anguish or a neighborhood’s fear” (p. 54). Public education, serious debate, meaningful explanations, and effective responses to crime are very unlikely so long as television is the major source of crime news. Anderson focused on the Willie Horton case and the way in which our attention was riveted to him and his criminal activities while he was on furlough from the Massachusetts prison system. While on furlough, a temporary prison release, Horton committed a rape and robbery. This event became key to political decision-making in the 1988 Presidential campaign. The Republican presidential candidate, George Bush, blamed the Democratic presidential candidate and governor of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis, for being soft on crime. Print, television, and radio media all played a role in this drama. The Massachusetts newspaper, The Eagle-Tribune, won a Pulitzer Prize for the story it carried on Willie Horton, a story that was full of hype and lies. The newspaper’s irresponsibility in reporting falsehoods was noted by critical journalists, who stated that the newspaper “used an old and simple formula . . . Find a crime, recruit a couple of hyperventilating politicians, and it’s simple enough to stir up hysteria, particularly if the objects of the assault are killer convicts and a sensible program [furlough].” Irresponsible journalists see “good journalism” as relying on “hatred polls” (Anderson 1995: 191). The Eagle-Tribune was also criticized for running roughshod over complexities and running in one direction. Furthermore, “the paper had totally abandoned objectivity and often seemed transparently in bed with the politicians pushing the ban on furlough” (p. 191).

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Readers’ Digest was also guilty of manufacturing and spreading falsehoods about the Willie Horton story. In support of the Republican campaign, the Digest published an untrue, emotional, and biased article on the Horton case. Lies reported by the print media do not disappear easily, especially when sex is involved. The story reported by The Eagle Tribune was that Horton not only murdered a man prior to his prison furlough crimes, but also cut off the murdered man’s penis and stuffed it into his (Horton’s) mouth. In fact, there was no sexual mutilation of the murdered man and every evidence that Horton, though involved in robbing the murder victim, did not kill him. However, years later, well-meaning criminal-justice officials in the Massachusetts system repeated the sexual mutilation story as if it were well-established fact. And in 1992, Rush Limbaugh, the popular right-wing commentator, wrote in his best-selling book that “Horton was in prison for murdering a man after castrating him and stuffing his genitals in his mouth” (Anderson 1995: 192). David Rothman (1995), writing in general about crime realities versus the emotional portrayal of crime in the media, states that public responses to crime are not framed by crime statistics, so much as by what people read or hear about through the media (p. 36). More specific to the falsehoods about race and crime, televised reports not only make crime seem larger than reality, crime is, to a highly distorted degree, associated with racial minority suspects (Kurtz 1997). In short, television news encourages prejudicial racial attitudes about minorities and their involvement in crime. Susan Douglas’ (1997) work on “body bag journalism” finds that journalism, particularly TV journalism, is vacuous, distorting, and distracting. TV news carries a lot of stories on murders, robberies, fires, and automobile accidents. In addition, there are the distractions, “the cotton candy: coverage of Elvis look-alikes or a beauty contest for cows” (p. 19). In this way, Douglas points not only to distortions in TV news coverage of crime, but also to distractions from severe social problems. Douglas, a communications professor, finds “zero coverage of poverty, education, race relations, environmental problems, science, or international affairs” (p. 19). The message: let us not know about or understand social problems, such as poverty. Instead, let us focus on distorted images of one problem (crime) and one type of social enemy (criminals). Or failing that, let us be distracted from problems and attend to amusing and superficial phenomena like Elvis look-alikes. Religion, Politics, and the Media. Essentially, the media’s utility with respect to religion and to politics involves its ability to sway the

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public, to force emotions and channel them in a particular direction. Linda Kintz (1997) has written a book about the emotions that matter in right-wing United States, and how those emotions are manipulated by Christian Right books, videos, and conferences. Kintz deconstructs the emotions pertaining to “Jesus and the market” through her descriptions of Concerned Women of America and its leader, Beverly LaHaye. Through television mostly, LaHaye battles against feminism and liberalism by urging women to engage in kitchen-table activism. La Haye expounds upon the notion that “Women can be aggressive only if they have first proved their identity as true women.” True women, she contends, are not assertive in pursuing equal rights. Not surprisingly, La Haye supports the Christian men’s movement, whose leaders, in Kintz’s words, are certifiably macho. Certifiably macho leaders include Bill McCartney, former University of Colorado football coach and founder of the Promise Keepers movement. McCartney and other Christian Right leaders evoke militaristic imagery in their struggle for power, through televised rallies, published literature, and videotapes (see Chapter 6). The scariest aspect of the movement, for Kintz, is its effectiveness in manipulating emotions. Appeals to the heart, a very important achievement of the Christian Right’s culture wars, revise and reconstruct the role of emotions in political life. Of course, appeals to emotion are not new, nor are they the exclusive province of the religious or political right. Progressives and liberals have used emotional appeals too, in their struggles to gain rights and equality for the less advantaged. What is noteworthy and what seems to concern Kintz, is the combination of extremism, false authenticity, popular culture, and the ability to manipulate. On extremism and absolutism, note the key phrases used by Kintz: “absolutist fundamentalists,” “absolutist readings of Scripture,” “absolutist American biblical morality,” and “absolutist Christian political agenda.” Extreme, absolutist qualities are much represented in the Christian Right, political right, and survivalist-right media, as they are in rageful expressions generally. Elsewhere in the present analysis of social rage, we have seen absolutism and extremism often mistaken for authenticity. Kintz writes that Rush Limbaugh’s rhetorical style is a performance of seeming “authenticity.” By his very coarseness and high drama, his message appears to be reality-based, at least to his fans. As to the role of popular culture, Kintz finds that movements of the Right have borrowed from the bag of pop-culture tricks, such as MTVlike fast cuts and winking references to TV shows. All this (the absolutism, alleged authenticity, the borrowings from pop culture) makes it

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more likely that the public can be manipulated. Operating in stealth, Kintz believes, a powerful and wealthy movement is manipulating the public’s beliefs through its media empire.2 Narrowing the focus to politics and the media, Johnson (1997) finds that the use of media, notably the presence of TV cameras at public meetings, has reduced civility in politics. The mere “presence of television cameras often encourages the high drama,” he says (p. 14). It is not just the meanness of modern politics, he suggests, but the high degree of “noise and nonsense” that is so bothersome in today’s debates. The increasing use of television to broadcast local city-council meetings, corresponding with the open-meeting laws prohibiting boards and councils from meeting behind closed doors, has made outbursts visible. In other words, the TV cameras exposes the dirty laundry that was once unexposed to the public eye. Whether there actually is more incivility in modern politics or, whether due to the openness of the meetings and the presence of TV cameras, there appears to be more incivility, is unclear. Johnson seems to be suggesting that the TV camera’s eye is allowing us to see what previously may have been taking place unseen. I would make the argument, as have others cited in Chapter 7, that both are operating: there is indeed more ragefulness, more incivility, in modern politics; and we are more aware of it through media attention. “Learning” from Movies. Movies can serve as a distraction from reality, which is not necessarily bad. Indeed, movies as an escape can prove quite functional. But movies can also serve as massive distortions of fact. One recent and troubling case is the film Amistad. Amistad not only presents an historically false interpretation of slavery and the antislavery movement, but worse, its producers have set forth a scathing attack on historians and have made available “learning kits” to students as a substitution for history. Eric Foner, a history professor, describes the film Amistad as “by no means a work of history, and it is certainly not appropriate for use in the classroom” (1997: 21). A learning kit, based on the film, has been distributed to high school and college teachers, encouraging them to use the kit as part of history lessons. The learning kit’s study guide erases the distinction between fact and fabrication, suggesting that students, for example, study the film’s “composite” characters rather than actual historical African-American figures on whom they are based. The learning kit contains falsehoods about the Supreme Court decisions surrounding the end of slavery. It is claimed that the Supreme Court’s decision to free the Africans aboard the Amistad, a slave ship,

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was a “turning point in the struggle to end slavery in the United States.” In truth, the Amistad case had nothing to with slavery in the United States. Students are further told in the study guide that, in the nineteenth century, one could defend slavery and support the flourishing slave trade in the United States while simultaneously condemning the importation of slaves from Africa. Students are instructed that the Supreme Court, having heard an impassioned plea by John Quincy Adams on behalf of slaves, was moved to a new recognition of human rights. In truth, most of the same justices serving during the Amistad case were still serving in the 1857 court that ruled in the Dred Scott decision. The Dred Scott decision held that African-Americans had “no rights which a white man is bound to respect” (p. 21). As is true with other films, Amistad tells us more about the time in which it was produced than the actual events that it claims to portray. For example, Amistad depicts white abolitionists as self-righteous and hypocritical. In fact, the abolitionists were instrumental in winning freedom for those aboard the Amistad. But by criticizing the abolitionists, the film “reflects today’s cynicism about broad social movements” (Foner, p. 21). “The most galling assumption by the film’s producer,” writes Foner, “is that a subject does not exist until Hollywood discovers it.” One of the producers is quoted at the conclusion of the learning kit as saying that historians have “castrated” the “real history” of African-Americans and slavery. Such a statement turns reality on its head. The film’s producers, says Foner, should direct students to the library, where there are several shelves of books on slavery and slave resistance, if they really want to promote an understanding of slavery. For all their adamant protests to the contrary, it would appear that the producers have less interest in promoting a true understanding of historical phenomena than in promoting their movie. Music and Its Rageful Charms. Music can simply be the expresser for social feelings of any kind or it may provide the impetus for engaging in social behavior, such as rage. Paul Leighton (1997) has written about skinheads and their music, often called “white power” music. “Oi,” the original skinhead music is now only one genre of white-power music. Leighton finds that all white-power music operates within specific constraints because its musicians want to avoid playing derivative “black” music, such as rhythm, blues, and rock and roll. Much of the music has thus tended to resemble heavy metal, but bands like RAHOWA (Racial Holy War) have tried to mix heavy metal with classical

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Wagnerian music. (The reader may know that Richard Wagner was Adolf Hitler’s favorite composer and that Wagner was something of a white supremacist.) RAHOWA boasts a concert-grade violinist and pianist, who contribute to a sound they call “neo-classical gothic fascist metal.” There is an interest in blending white-power lyrics with music of more genres as a way of reaching more people, but this expansion does have limits if “black” music genres are to be avoided (Leighton 1998). As to whether white-power music instills social rage (in this case, skinhead, neo-Nazi, white-supremacist rage) or whether rage results in music as an expression of that rage, Leighton feels that both may be the case. In support of the supposition that white-power music instills rage, we know that skinheads and other white supremacists (especially young ones) do listen to white-power music and do engage in violence (Dees and Fiffer 1993; Hamm 1994; 1997). Hamm states the relationship a bit more causally by saying that, for instance, listening to Skrewdriver audiotapes (white-power music) has helped to ideologize skinheads. In support of the latter supposition, that music is an expression of rage, some of the white-power musicians do use music as the conveyor for their social rage. Much of the original “oi” music came out of the alienated working-class youth in Britain and the United States and was an expression of their rage at the economic system that so oppressed them. (See Hamm 1994, on skinhead music as an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with economic policies of the 1980s.) Some of the musicians, Ian Stewart of Skrewdriver in particular, found their expressions to be very well received. The profit motive in this or any artistic expression cannot be dismissed, but neither can we dismiss the artistic need to express one’s feelings, as the sole purpose for creating music. At least some people realize the potential that music has for recruiting and mobilizing disaffected youth. White-power concerts—described as a “We Are the World” for white people—whip up the crowds through a call for white-supremacy action and end with the crowd doing stiffarmed “Heil Hitler” salutes (Leighton 1998). On January 4, 1998, the Stockholm police arrested 314 youths when violence broke out after a neo-Nazi rock concert in a Stockholm suburb. The police sweep took in Norwegian, Swedish, German, and U.S. attendees. The concert was organized by Nordland, a neo-Nazi organization along with other whitesupremacist groups. The Stockholm police seized T-shirts bearing swastikas and compact discs of rock music “vaunting the supremacy of the white race” (New York Times 1998). Leighton makes a crucial point that, although the music may be rad-

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ical, its producers and musicians, naturally enough, may have an interest in making money.3 He has documented the rise of Resistance Records, a successful recording agency that emphasizes “oi” or white-power music. Yet, Leighton is uncertain about Resistance Records’ profit motive. He agrees that while other rageful media figures, such as Rush Limbaugh, manage to make a great deal of money through rageful expressions, they are mainstream enough to ensure their popularity and therefore wealth. But being labeled as a “white-power” band is still marginalizing. Once a band has appeared on certain labels, such as Resistance Records, they are effectively locked out of a contract with a mainstream record label. Likewise, most promoters will not want to deal with bands who have contracted with white-power labels. Nor does the corporate world want to take a chance on them and the audience remains quite small. By contrast, some of the cop-killer types of “rap” music, usually associated with African-American expressions of social rage, have a large crossover audience in adolescent white suburban-mall-goers (see Mills 1997 on social rage and rap music). Talk Shows: Radio and TV. We often assume that talk radio is almost exclusively a U.S. phenomenon. However, as Perlez (1997) reports, it exists and is a problem in other cultures as well, such as Poland. One of the most politically potent mass-media outlets in Poland is a populist radio station, Radio Maryja, with a Roman Catholic priest as its director. Radio Maryja offers daily outpourings of hate and rage, intermingled with lengthy prayer sessions. The priest-director stirs hostility and foments rage much as do G. Gordon Liddy, Rush Limbaugh, and other radio ragers. He proclaims that pro-choice politicians should have their heads shaved, just as Poles shaved the heads of women who slept with German soldiers during World War II. Expressions of anti-Semitism are regular fare. Radio Maryja is the fourth most popular station in Poland and is quite influential in political election outcomes. It is the impression of at least 18 members of Parliament from the Solidarity group that they won because the radio endorsed them. The Maryja listeners resemble those who listen to U.S. right-wing talk radio in that they are not economically well-off and rather traditional in their views. Radio Maryja is fiercely anti-urban and draws most of its five million listeners from among older and religiously observant women who live on meager pensions. Like heavy viewers of TV, talk-radio listeners seem to feel that they have their fingers on the pulse of society. Talk-radio listeners and hosts view themselves, their perspectives, and their expressions as “authentic”

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because they are coarse and unfiltered. They also may feel, according to the editor of Talkers Magazine (the industry magazine for radio talk shows) that they represent the public (Tierny 1995). Tierny notes that the hosts and listeners are disproportionately conservative, and refers to radio talk shows as the medium repeatedly called “a fomenter of rightwing hatred.” Apparently, a lot of people in the United States, if not a majority, have no problem with the biased rants that one can hear on talk radio. Recall that G. Gordon Liddy, the talk-radio host who advised his listeners to shoot federal agents in the head and groin, was named the winner of the 1995 Freedom of Speech Award by the National Association of Radio Talk Show Hosts (New York Times 1995). But do talk-radio listeners constitute a large bulk of the U.S. public? Probably not, even though they are loud and expressive, and even though they may think that talk radio offers the truth.4 After the Oklahoma City bombing, the town of Kingman, Arizona, was in the public eye because a pocket of militia resides there. (Timothy McVeigh lived there shortly before he bombed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City.) In an interview, a resident of Kingman stated categorically: “People are going to rise up. There’s going to be war. You can hear it on AM radio” (Roane 1995: 8). Perhaps talk-radio listeners would disagree with me, but hosts and callers on AM radio are not accurate predictors of human behavior. It is very unlikely that there will be a war within the United States at any point in the foreseeable future. Stern (1997) finds that talk radio has been helpful to the militias, since some of the issues that drive the United States’ private armies also play well on talk shows. And he reminds us that talk radio is not about fairness or evenhandedness. It is not about accuracy or reasoned thought, but is rather “a medium suited to strong opinion strongly stated” (p. 223). It may be well to consider the personal agendas of the radio talkshow hosts, to the extent that they can be known. Rush Limbaugh may or may not feel the rage that he expresses and evokes from others; as he has admitted, he is in the talk-radio business for the money. Other radio talkshow hosts may have a more personal bone to pick. Initiative 200, the initiative to do away with affirmative action, is strongly affected by the work of a radio talk-show host John Carlson. Carlson is the catalyst and campaign manager for Initiative 200. Initiative 200 deliberately borrows language from the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the landmark anti-discrimination measure, and has paid unsuspecting African-Americans to gather signatures for the initiative.5 Such tactics, Carlson argues, are not misleading. If that were true, and there were no

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distracting hidden agendas, then Carlson needs to explain why the initiative was entitled “the Washington State Civil Rights Act” (as it is called in Washington), and why African-American signature gatherers were not informed as to the purpose of the initiative. Perhaps talk radio is losing influence. The age of “soundbite journalism” is disappearing, according to Susan Douglas (1996). She writes that talk radio, after four years of exerting considerable political pressure, seems to be losing steam. Talk radio played a central role in the 1994 political elections in which a large number of hard-right Republicans took over the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate. Ninety percent of those who listened regularly to Rush Limbaugh voted in 1994. Nevertheless, polls show that regular listenership to political talk radio has declined over the past couple of years. This decline may be a sign that rage is becoming tiring and maybe even boring. The demise of TV talk-show violence may be another indication of reduced tolerance for rage. The producers of the Jerry Springer Show agreed in April 1998 to “eliminate all physical violence from the raucous daytime talk show . . . taking a step toward toning down the very behavior that has made the show notorious and has sent its Nielsen ratings soaring” (Mifflin 1998: 17). The agreement to rid the show of violence stemmed from community protests against violence, nudity, profanity, and the degradation of women. The truly newsworthy part of this story is that the Jerry Springer Show has agreed to reduce its violence. The more insidious part of the story is that violence on talk shows sells. FREE-SPEECH ISSUES The question of the appropriateness of repressing speech is probably unresolvable. When the question arises, one often hears the unhelpful retort of “just don’t listen.” We can, of course, try to avoid coming into contact with hate speech, hate radio, hate TV, hate literature, and so on. Such avoidance begs the question, though, of how wise it is to be uninformed of potentially dangerous activities. Even if we are somewhat successful at avoiding hate communications, we are unlikely to be entirely successful at it, since some hate communications are thrust upon us without our permission, willingness, and ability to shut it out. And then, as Stout (1995) brings up, even if we can avoid hate communications, this says nothing about others who do not avoid hate communications but indeed seek it out. After the Oklahoma City bombing, far-right radio broadcasters were criticized for their role as fomenters

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and advisors to militias who were willing to put their hate into action. The Radio for Peace International station manager recalled that the farright broadcasters had shown no remorse for the public in the wake of the bombing. The question was asked, “Can’t a listener simply turn off the radio?” The reply was, “I may turn it off at my house, but my neighbor may not. The radio may be telling my neighbor to go kill the liberal next door.” So the question really is whether we can prevent the rage-prone neighbor from hearing and being influenced by hate messages. The answer is that we cannot. Larry Flynt, a pornographer and publisher of Hustler Magazine, took his fight for free speech to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court decided that he does have a right to express his views, repulsive (sexist, racist, personal, violent, etc.) though they may be to many people. Flynt said, in response to the Court’s decision: “If the First Amendment will protect a scumbag like me, then it will protect all of you.” Regarding the freedom to spread repulsive and rageful messages, we find that Hungary continues to ban Adolf Hitler’s Main Kampf, the book written during his imprisonment in the 1920s, before he rose to power. In this book, Hitler attacks the Jewish people and suggests that the only way to deal with them is to kill them, like vermin. Jews were not the only target of Hitler’s rage; Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, homosexuals, gypsies, the ill, and others were also targeted. The outcome of Hitler’s rage is well known and Hungary has not forgotten. A question that could be asked in this instance is why Mein Kampf is not banned in the United States as well as other countries. It is not banned because we value the First Amendment right to free speech. At the same time, we are aware of Mein Kampf‘s continuing destructive influence. It is documented that United States and German militias (especially the neo-Nazi branches) to this day view Mein Kampf as a bible. Should we limit free speech (for example, hate speech) in order to reduce social rage? It is unknown whether a limitation of hate speech would reduce social rage, or whether limiting hate speech would cause more social rage. The Anti-Defamation League supplied some insight by reminding us that the First Amendment does guarantee the right to free speech, but with that right comes a responsibility. Specifically, they state, “When hatemongers preach bigotry and spew invective under the guise of free speech, we all have a responsibility to expose and condemn them. We should never give them a welcome mat” (1998: 13). I have addressed free-speech issues elsewhere in this book and have gotten no further than any other scholar. Repression of communication is bad, yet there re-

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mains the concern about the violent and repressive consequences of hate communications. In summary, some kinds of communications are socially harmful, but repression of communication is equally socially harmful. CONCLUSION More disconcerting are the less obviously extreme communications that are, nonetheless, distorting and distracting. TV news focusing on crime instead of poverty, talk radio that derides any politician who is not a rabid right-winger, newspapers that falsify the relationship between race and welfare, and so on, are very troubling. Communications of this kind may be more insidious and dangerous than obvious hate communications. The former are subtler and have a cloak of mainstream legitimacy compared to communications from, say, the survivalist right, the religious fringe, and other rageful individuals and groups. Importantly, issues of free speech matter less among the mainstream media than, for example, survivalist-right computer bulletin boards. TV news may be biased and inaccurate, but is not obviously inciteful of social rage. It may cause the public to engage in socially dysfunctional and rageful acts, such as demanding legislation for expensive and ineffective criminal punishments, legislation that removes health care from children, legislation that revokes equal employment opportunities, and other socially destructive actions. But few see TV, talk radio, or other mainstream media as a point of concern for the First Amendment. NOTES 1

To refresh the reader’s memory, recall that Coates (1995) had quite a bit to say about how the survivalist-right movement and hate are spread through media technology: web sites, computer bulletin boards, videotapes, audiotapes, telephone hotlines and message centers, hate literature, short-wave radio, fax networks, public-access TV, etc. More specifically, Janofsky (1997) has reported a rampant rise in web hate sites or “high-tech hate” as the Anti-Defamation League refers to it. Recently, the number of sites celebrating white supremacy, antiSemitism, anti-government fervor and denial of the Holocaust have doubled to 250 or more. 2 Kintz (1997) also reminds us that progressive thinkers must not resist engaging the Right. If academics, for example, never confront baseless, emotional,

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unscholarly arguments, then they must be avoiding most public discourse altogether. 3 See Lamy (1996) on profit motives of survivalist-right music and other survivalist-right businesses. 4 Even though talk-radio listeners may constitute a small part of the public, they can still pose a social-rage problem to the larger society. First, they support rage-oriented talk radio, which encourages social-rage behavior. Second, some of them do foment trouble on an active and obvious level, as in physical violence and destruction. Certainly some, perhaps many, of those who engage in socialrage types of violence are listeners to talk radio. Being small in number does not mean that a category of people (listeners to rageful radio, in this case) can be trivialized as fomenters of social rage. When asked whether violence-prone white supremacists constituted a significant minority, Howard Bushart replied, “Anyone with guns is a significant minority” (1998: 11). 5 The anti-affirmative-action movements in California and in the state of Washington have intentionally distracted the public with the “civil rights” language of the Initiative and using African-Americans as signature gatherers. In California and Washington, many people who are pro-affirmative action were fooled into signing the ballot, not knowing that the ballot measure would get rid of affirmative action.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, David C. 1995. Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice. New York: Times Books (Random House). Anti-Defamation League. 1998. “Armed. Dangerous. And Filled with Hate.” Advertisement in the New York Times, September 4, p. A13. Bushart, Howard L. 1998. Interview in New York Times Magazine. July 19, p. 11. Cavender, Gray, and Lisa Bond-Maupin. 1993. “Fear and Loathing on Reality Television: An Analysis of America’s Most Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries.” Sociological Inquiry 63: 305–317. Coates, James. 1995. Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right. New York: Hill and Wang. Dees, Morris, and Steve Fiffer. 1993. Hate on Trial: The Case against America’s Most Dangerous Neo-Nazi. New York: Villard Books. Douglas, Susan. 1996. “The Rush Is On.” The Progressive 60:19. Douglas, Susan. 1997. “Body-Bag Journalism.” The Progressive 61: 19. Egan, Timothy. 1997. “Blacks Recruited by ‘Rights’ Drive to End Preference.” New York Times, December 17, p. A12.

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Ewen, Stuart. 1996. PR! A Social History of Spin. New York: Basic Books. Foner, Eric. 1997. “Hollywood Invades the Classroom.” New York Times, December 20, p. A21. Hamm, Mark S. 1994. American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crimes. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hamm. Mark S. 1997. Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Herbert, Bob. 1998. “Don’t Flunk the Future.” New York Times, August 13, p. A23. Janofsky, Michael. 1997. “Anti-Defamation League Tells of Rise in Web Hate Sites.” New York Times, October 22, p. A17. Johnson, Dirk. 1997. “Civility in Politics: Going, Going, Gone.” New York Times, December 10, p. A14. Keillor, Garrison. As quoted on p. 95 of Stossel, Scott. 1997. “The Man Who Counts the Killings.” The Atlantic Monthly 279: 86–104. Kintz, Linda. 1997. Between Jesus and the Market: The Emotions That Matter in Right-Wing America. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kurtz, Howard. 1997. “A Guilty Verdict on Crime and Race Bias.” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, May 12, p. 39. Lamy, Philip. 1996. Millennium Rage: Survivalists, White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. New York: Plenum Press. Ledbetter, James. 1997. Made Possible By . . . The Death of Public Broadcasting in the United States. New York: Verso. Leighton, Paul S. 1997. “Learning from Hate: Visions of Social Control and Dancing in the Revolution.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, November 21, San Diego, CA. Leighton, Paul S. 1998. Personal communication, January 7. Mifflin, Lawrie, 1998. “ ‘Springer’ Producers to Reduce Violence.” New York Times, May 1, p. A17. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Moody, Fred. 1998. “Spinning the Rumor Web.” ABC News.com, January 30. New York Times. 1995. “Talk-Show Group Honors Liddy.” New York Times, May 18, p. A8. New York Times. 1998. “Swedish Police Arrest 314 at Neo-Nazi Concert.” New York Times, January 5, p. A7. Perlez, Jane. 1996. “Hungary Bans Hitler’s Mein Kampf.” New York Times, December 15, p. A6. Perlez, Jane. 1997. “As a Priest Gives Poles Hate Radio, Rome Stirs.” New York Times, December 14, p. A11.

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Rich, Frank. 1998. “Milli Vanilli News.” New York Times, July 8, p. A21. Roane, Kit R. 1995. “In Arizona Desert Town, Suspicion Walks the Streets.” New York Times, June 18, p. A8. Rothman, David J. 1995. “More of the Same: American Criminal Justice Policies of the 1990s.” Pp. 29–44 in Punishment and Social Control, edited by T. G. Blomberg and S. Cohen. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Scott, Janny. 1998. “A Media Race Enters Waters Still Uncharted.” New York Times, February 1, pp. A1, A17. Stern, Kenneth S. 1997. A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Stossel, Scott. 1997. “The Man Who Counts the Killings.” The Atlantic Monthly 279: 86–104. Stout, David. 1995. “Broadcast Suspensions Raise Free-Speech Issues.” New York Times, April 30, p. A18. Tierney, John. 1995. “How Talk Radio Gets at What’s Real.” New York Times, April 30, pp. E1, E3.

CHAPTER 9

Social Rage: Summary, Final Thoughts, and Recommendations

Smashing heads does not open minds. (Deborah Tannen 1998a: 22) GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SOCIAL RAGE In this conclusion to the analysis of social rage, allow me to emphasize the meaning of social rage, the expression of social rage, the relationship between social rage and several related emotions and behaviors, and the consequences of social rage. Social rage, as I have defined it, can be experienced as cognition, emotion, or behavior; the source or manifestation of which is social. Social rage is expressed by individuals or by groups of individuals. Social rage can be experienced by an individual, its genesis implanted by social-rage-related experience. This rage-related experience may be as long term and overarching as familial and peer socialization into hate as a worldview. The rage-related experience may be a singular occurrence, such as being taxed beyond one’s ability to pay. Social rage can be experienced from without as an observer, as an innocent bystander, or as a target of social rage. Socially rageful behavior can be considered in terms of what it hopes to accomplish. Behavior associated with social rage is expression of that rage, whether or not social rage is actually emotionally experienced. That is, social rage can be a method for achieving desired ends, and does not necessarily derive from attitudes, perceptions, or feelings of social rage. Instead, the expression may be a means to an end. 233

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In general, the expression of social rage accomplishes (a) the appearance of authenticity and (b) the appearance of empowerment. Early on, I stated that the extremist qualities of rageful expression is intended to impress the observer with the inarguable nature of rageful expressions. If one states one’s case strongly enough, the thinking goes, the observer will be overwhelmed with the justness of the rage. Moreover, the targets of social rage are supposed to feel threatened and overpowered. Throughout, we have seen that social rage is not necessarily violent and not always obviously or strongly stated. (It can be violent, obvious, and strongly stated.) Social rage encompasses intolerance and narrowmindedness. It can be manifested in covert and quiet behaviors, such as discrimination and voting. This is not to say that social rage is synonymous with discrimination, intolerance, and narrow-mindedness so much as it encompasses them. Social rage is broader than these other feelings, attitudes, and behaviors. Equally importantly, social rage emphasizes the destructive consequences of these negative feelings, attitudes, and behaviors regardless of whether they are experienced and expressed subtly or obviously. Another theme that has cropped up throughout this analysis is the utility of distractions and distortions to social rage. The topics of social rage, the designated targets of social rage, and the behavior of social rage (especially in politics and media) distract us from other, perhaps more reality-based, social problems. For example, to rage against crime and welfare, against criminals and welfare recipients, and against the punishment and welfare systems distracts us from the true source of crime and welfare—economic inequality. Distractions from real problems and real solutions are accomplished through many means, one means being distortion of the facts. In short, distractions and distortions overlap and serve each other. We have also seen, repeatedly, that social rage is not infrequently a reaction to social change. Those members of a society who do not like the change, who feel that their life expectations have been violated, may respond with feelings and expressions of social rage. Using a simple example, consider the civil-rights movement and the manner in which the outcomes of that movement violated the expectations of people who thought that unequal opportunity was not only correct but would remain a societal constant. Those opposed to civil rights reacted with social rage, specifically with increasingly repressive action (including murder), to the proposed changes. Movement toward equal-opportunity employ-

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ment, education, and housing was a positive social change for many, but a severe violation of expectations for others. It is well to bear in mind that there are no clearly delineated categories of people who are social ragers. We commonly think of “angry white males,” for instance, as rageful. And the fact that some white men are angry does speak to rage. I have offered a number of instances and historical accounts of categories of people who do seem drawn toward social rage as a response to social conditions, such as religious factions, political groups, the survivalist right, and others. But even among these categories, their members are not necessarily and always rageful, meanspirited people. Not all people who react to social forces not to their liking with social rage are overall repressive, irrational, destructive people. Some are. Finally, social rage comes and goes; it is cyclical. It becomes more understandable in that light. Social rage is present in all societies all the time. At times, social rage is more prominent and has more impact than at other times. SOCIAL RAGE, GOOD AND BAD Social rage serves a positive function when it functions as social progress. For example, a leader of the civil-rights movement in the 1960s, John Lewis, described the anti-civil-rights movement put forward by George Wallace and his allies as attempting to “stem the tide of progress” (1998: 31). However, we as a society disagree about the meaning of “progress” and the best way to achieve progress. Social rage is good if aimed at, for example, injustice. From the progressive, liberal point of view that would mean treating people fairly, ensuring that all people have equal opportunity to be employed, have adequate housing, have access to health care, and in general are free to engage in the pursuit of happiness. From the non-progressive, non-liberal point of view, rage at injustice may mean rage at the government for taxing them, rage at the “injustice” of affirmative action (“reverse discrimination”), and so on. Social rage, even when it has (ambiguously defined) positive social purposes, can still be a destructive force depending on the methods applied to achieve those noble ends. Early on, in Chapter 1, I cited scholars comparing the Left (progressive) and the Right (repressive) forms of social rage. The consensus among these scholars is that the Left is less physically destructive, usually as measured by property loss and physical violence. From the Right’s perspective, the Left’s social rage may be

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considered massively destructive of well-entrenched cultures, as when the Left engaged in active social protest leading to African-Americans gaining voting rights and destroying segregation. The Left’s activities did change the culture, particularly the Southern culture. In the Left’s opinion, for the better; in the Right’s opinion, maybe not. RAGEFUL EXPRESSIONS The multitudinous and extreme nature of social-rage expression make it seem bigger than it is. My students discovered that rageful bumper stickers are actually in the minority of bumper stickers, yet the ragefulness of the message may make the messages seem pervasive (see Chapter 2). Likewise, Wolfe (1998a) found, based on interviews with 200 mostly conservative middle-class U.S. citizens, that social rage is not as prevalent as its expression (in politics and the media) makes it seem.1 His respondents in the Bible Belt, though deeply religious, were found to embrace religious diversity and are intolerant of religious extremism. More broadly, the notion of a “culture war” as prevalent in the United States is, in fact, a fiction; it was dreamed up and imposed on us by the hard right, Wolfe suggests. Indeed, the ordinary citizens in his sample were found to be much more sympathetic to the poor, to women’s rights, to religious diversity, to homosexuality, and to civil rights than contended by many social commentators. The respondents, Wolfe concludes, practice “capacious individualism.” They stand by their own beliefs and values while they are respectful and nonjudgemental of others’. Mills (1997) also notes the misrepresentation of social rage, and cites bumper stickers such as the one stating, “Where is Lee Harvey Oswald When His Country Needs Him?” This is a startling message in its “meanness,” and it also misrepresents how some U.S. residents feel about President Clinton. (The message suggests to mean that President Clinton should be assassinated, as was President Kennedy, by Lee Harvey Oswald.) Many writers on the topic of rageful media expression describe TV and radio talk shows as not only expressive of rage but encouraging of rage. The content of and participants in many talk shows are specifically selected to elicit strong emotion and strong opinion. The participants, including the hosts, are expected to strongly state their views and get into sharp disagreements. Some shows result in physical violence (see, for example, Tannen 1998a; 1998b). Pursuing the same line of reasoning as I have, Tannen describes calculated rageful expressions. She finds that, in our “argument culture,”

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many of us believe that to engage in verbal violence is a way to make ourselves seem high-minded, intelligent, and dominant. It is a good thing to be aggressive, according to this way of thinking. It also leads to massive oversimplification and distortion, but no matter, as long as one “wins” the argument. Relevant to my notions of the expression of social rage, she distinguishes between “ritual fighting” and “literal fighting,” with the former more closely resembling rageful expression without true rageful feelings. Literal fighting refers to “opposition of the heart,” or, fighting that is truly based in actual and experienced emotions (1998a: 22). Rage is not the only way to communicate in society at present, it is only a more dominant form than it has been in the past. The rageful method of communication that Tannen addresses and that I have discussed herein is not necessarily the “best” way to communicate. While heated arguments may be common, they are not necessarily effective. Because the argument culture, as Tannen describes it, is commonplace, to not be rageful in one’s expressions is to appear weak. That is, if one is willing to consider another point of view besides one’s own, to listen, or to debate rationally, one is assumed to be in a weaker intellectual position, to be less informed than the more adamant debater. There are rather ugly implications for a society embedded in the argument culture. A society that feels and behaves this way is less likely to learn, to understand, the reality of any social conditions (economics, political, etc.); the end result being an inability to resolve unhealthy social conditions. As I have stated throughout, the expression of social rage is sometimes calculated to achieve a particular means. Political figures often utilize strong expressions of social rage to make their cause seem authentic, to enrage voters, and to give the public a sense that they, rageful politicians, understand the problems facing the nation and are angry enough to “not take it anymore.” Rageful politicians also understand that, under specific circumstances, rageful expressions can gain votes. At least this was the case in 1994. I have described a similar pattern with media and its many attention-grabbing, colorful, rageful, and profit-making news stories. Anti-crime grassroots organizations have also been successful in having their voices heard and having ineffective (unbeknownst to them, probably) legislation passed. THINKING AND FEELING SOCIAL RAGE Recall from Chapter 1 that cognition and emotion refer to thinking and feeling, respectively. Thinking and feeling can be but are not necessarily

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related. Emotions do play a role in reasoning, and vice versa. Rageful thoughts and rageful feelings are probably less under one’s conscious control, and therefore less calculated and less ends-motivated, than is rageful behavior. To the truly rageful, not just the rageful expressor, emotions of social rage probably predominate over cognition.2 This analysis has suggested throughout that rageful feelings, cognition, and behavior are absolutist, intense, simplistic, and destructive in long-term outcomes. Rage can be experienced socially and personally, as I have detailed the phenomenon in Chapters 1 and 2. Outside the context of an analysis of social rage, we think of rage as personal—as personally experienced and as directed against others in a personal fashion. Personally, rage can be experienced, for instance, as the reaction to a sense of helplessness. Recall Katz’s (1988) description of humiliation as a precursor to personal rage. Socially, rage can be applied directly and violently to others, as we would find in terrorist acts, brutal assaults, or homicides. Social rage can also be experienced in less dramatic forms, as for instance, incivility or rudeness. Socially, rage may be so indirect that neither the perpetrators nor the targets are fully aware of its occurrence, as evidenced in rageful voting behavior. Personal and social rage can be interactive. A person experiencing personal rage may express it socially. Examples would include a person angry for any number of personal causes (she did not get the expected raise at work, a love affair has ended, et cetera), who, influenced by socially reinforced incivility, engages in road rage. Another example would be the person who, much overwhelmed with distorted media portrayals of crime and who has been robbed recently, signs a petition to increase prison sentences without understanding the consequences, economic and otherwise, of lengthy incarceration. The reverse is also true: a person experiencing social rage may express it personally. An individual may engage in an act of road rage because she is anti-immigrant and, the rager discovers in the ensuing altercation, the person who cut her off in traffic can not speak English. Another case might be the man who, socially instilled with sexism, expresses his rage by personally harassing female co-workers. Yet another example would be the woman who assaults her husband, having been emboldened by the public support for Lorena Bobbitt, who was acquitted for cutting off her husband’s penis (to borrow Mills’ [1997] example). Rage, social and personal, varies in its source and in its expression. Personal and social rage are distinct, often, because of their effects. That

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is, social rage is more far-reaching and wide-ranging, whereas personal rage is specifically directed and therefore experienced more narrowly. SOURCES, TARGETS, AND FORMS OF SOCIAL RAGE Sources of Social Rage. While personal rage can not be dismissed as a factor in social rage, I have made the argument that social rage is created from social forces. At most, personal rage provides a propensity to engage in social rage. Those individuals prone to selfishness or self-interestedness, for example, are more likely to engage in social rage. In this way, social rage may be related to personality or other highly idiosyncratic traits. Social rage is channeled into being by external, social forces, such as economics, politics, religion, the media, social movements (for instance, civil rights), and social change. Rageful personal propensities plus rageful social forces plus the social reinforcement derived from collective support lead to socially rageful behavior. A significant source of social rage is the violation of expectations. One of the greatest social forces relevant to violations of expectations is economics. Traditionally, according to Robert Merton and other scholars in sociology, the inability to achieve economic success, especially in a culture that emphasizes economic success, causes alienation, anomie, unhappiness, and anger. In support, there is some indication that anger on a social scale is lessening, while simultaneously the U.S. economy is improving (Morin and Deane 1998). In contradiction and more specific to a particular kind of rage, experts on hate groups contend that a strong economy typically discourages the proliferation of organized hate groups, that hate groups are nourished by economic hardship. However, the Southern Poverty Law Center reports that, even though the national economy is improving, hate groups are increasing (Sack 1998a). One interpretation I would offer for Sack’s findings is that angry white men may believe that they are not participating in the national economy as much as they should be. In other words, the economy may be improving, but for whom? In substantiation of my violations-of-expectations notion, the Southern Poverty Law Center finds the increase coming mostly from white racist, male-dominated groups. Growth in “the number of chapters of pre-existing groups like the Ku Klux Klan and in the number of churches belonging to the Christian Identity movement, which cites biblical foundations for white supremacy and anti-Semitism” accounts for the rejuvenation of hate organizations (Sack 1998a).

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Another interpretation I would offer for the seeming increase in hate groups is the possible misrepresentation of hate groups’ prominence through media attention and the resulting enlarged scope of a hate-ready audience. There are an increasing number of Internet sites that propound hate. In less than three years, after a Klan member created the first neoNazi site on the World Wide Web, there are now 163 Web sites advocating racial hatred. In addition, it is estimated that racist, white-power, hate-oriented music labels are selling 50,000 copies of recordings each year, recordings that use incendiary lyrics to advocate violence against minorities. A third explanation offered in a Southern Poverty Law Center report is that the passage of time provides a catalyst for social rage. The approach of the millennium is influential in that many of these groups truly do see the year 2000, if not literally as Armageddon, then as “the coming of the end times, and they feel that they must go to war.” (Sack, p. 10). Wolfe (1998a; 1998b) finds, based on his interviews across the United States, that poor economic conditions do not necessarily affect people adversely, as far as socially rageful attitudes and behavior. But he suggests that improving economics may correlate with apathy. On the relevance of economics to public feelings, Wolfe (1998a) states that, “The American political system seems to work best when the American economy is performing at its worst” (p. 17). To demonstrate, he reminds us that during the economic crisis of the Depression in the 1930s, “political passions ran high, innovative policies were fashioned, people listened to their radios and campaigns were intense” (p. 17). By comparison, the prosperous 1950s was a time of bland politics: “Most people preferred the pleasures of private success to the rewards and frustrations of public involvement” (p. 17). The 1990s resemble the 1950s, according to Wolfe: the economy is good, but our involvement in politics is apathetic. In short, my assumption is that disparate economics remain a dominant factor in the instillation of social rage. While it is true that by many indices the national economy has improved, relatively speaking, many of us are still not doing well and we are very much aware of our economic difficulties. Our awareness is especially stark in comparison to the top economic stratum. Mills (1997) reports that the top 1 percent of the nation’s households now control nearly one-third of the nation’s net worth. The next 9 percent control another third. The remaining 90 percent struggle to survive on the remaining one-third of the wealth. Such obvious disparity leads many in the U.S. public to adopt what Mills calls “lifeboat ethics.”

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Lifeboat ethics may be expressed, for example, in immigration fears: “a sense that the nation isn’t making it economically and that taking in more people will make our problems even worse” (p. 111). The U.S. public believes that the economic pie is shrinking and that each new arrival “not only takes a piece of the pie but takes it from me” (p. 111). Besides disparate economics, the degree of social participation influences societal cohesiveness and can affect social movements, rageful and otherwise. As the reader may recall from the earlier discussion of Putnam’s (1995) work, our declining civic involvement resembles alienation. The lack of civic interaction may encourage social rage in the forms of road rage, anti-immigration feelings, as well as a plethora of other evidences of “meanness” (per Mills 1997). Putnam has described a declining civic involvement in the U.S. insofar as the more direct and personal interactions; at the same time, he presents evidence of a countertrend toward increased “tertiary involvement.” In other words, while there is a decrease in primary and secondary interactions as one would find in, say, bowling leagues, there are booming memberships in what Putnam calls tertiary organizations. National environmental organizations, feminist groups, and retirement groups (such as the Sierra Club, NOW, and the American Association for Retired Persons) are growing, as measured by dues-paying memberships. These new massmembership organizations are of great political importance from a lobbying standpoint; but they do not create the strong social and personal adherence that primary and secondary associations do. For the vast majority of their members, the only act of membership consists of writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter. Few ever attend any meetings of such organizations, and most are unlikely ever (knowingly) to encounter any other member. The bind between any two members [is that] they root for the same team and they share some of the same interests, but they are unaware of each other’s existence. Their ties, in short, are to common symbols, common leaders, and perhaps common ideals, but not to one another. (p. 71)

Importantly, and according to Putnam’s notions of social capital, associational membership should increase social trust. But membership in tertiary associations does not have the same degree of social connectedness at all, as can be found in primary and secondary associations. On the whole, Putnam finds that social capital in the United States has signifi-

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cantly eroded over the last generation. Primary and secondary associations are being replaced by tertiary involvement. However, there is evidence that even at the tertiary level, participation may be declining. Greenpeace is an example of a tertiary-supported civic unit per Putnam’s description of tertiary organizations; it has a civic purpose and, by and large, is composed of a membership who do not know each other and do not interact with each other. At this point, Greenpeace is suffering retrenchment, its workers are being laid off, and several offices are closing, at least partly because of plummeting memberships (Goldberg 1997). Hence, tertiary participation in this organization does not appear to be so widespread as it once was. Similarly, the Promise Keepers are laying off staff because of decreased individual donations (Niebuhr 1998). This evangelical men’s movement reported on February 19, 1998, that it would lay off its entire 345-person staff because of financial problems, primarily resulting from declining membership and membership participation. Randall Balmer, a professor of religion, suggests that donations are down because the robust national economy has “sapped a certain protest element from the movement, which he said had appealed to men who felt marginalized in society” (Niebuhr, p.10). In essence, Balmer is conjecturing that white straight Christian men became involved in Promise Keepers in the first place because they were feeling socially marginalized; they were experiencing a fear that their privileged status is endangered. His explanation for reduced Promise Keeper participation, as related to improved economic times, supports the association between economic fears and social marginalization.3 Targets of Social Rage. The sociology of the enemy provides a helpful framework in analyzing targets of social rage. According to Aho (1994) and others, enemies are socially constructed, they serve a social function, and can be socially deconstructed. In this sense, social enemies seem an artificial entity. The artificiality of their construction does not detract from the very real effects of social rage directed at them, whether the target is an individual, such as Hillary Clinton, or a category, such as welfare recipients. The content of social-rage targets (who they are, what it is about them that makes them a target) is related to sources of social rage. Unemployment causes intolerance for immigrants, tough-on-crime politics causes us to suspend civil liberties and unfairly punish suspected criminals, and so on. Socially constructed enemies often constitute a disadvantaged social

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category, those lacking in social power. In fact, constructed enemies usually are a socially disenfranchised group, who are nevertheless construed to be threatening in some way. Women, gays and lesbians, immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, convicted criminal offenders, and so on are presented as threatening, either economically threatening or threatening to dominant social values. Constructed enemies can be vague, as exemplified by the federal government as an enemy. Vague targets are nebulous, ill-defined, and widely encompassing. Given these traits, vague enemies are easy to target (for example, with a word, “government”) but hard to fight successfully, providing relief from taking direct action. Enemies can be symbolic, as illustrated by a notorious criminal symbolizing all criminals. In the search for enemies, individuals as symbols have the (dis)advantage of being pinpointed as the root of evil. Forms of Social Rage. In this analysis, I have discussed several forms of social rage, as found in the survivalist-right movement, rage against crime, rage surrounding minority issues, as well as rage brought about through politics, media, and religion. I have attempted to point out the overlaps across types of social rage. I have shown how one type of social rage influences and is influenced by another type; for instance, the manner in which politics and media, religion and politics, religion and survivalism, crime and politics, media and crime, and so on feed upon each other. As mentioned, social rage can occur as obvious, blunt, and direct acts of violence, as illustrated by the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building. It can occur more obliquely and indirectly, as encroachment on civil liberties and human rights or as a proliferation of negative perceptions. Social rage can occur as attacks against entire societies, against large categories of people, or against individuals. In differentiating sophisticated and subtle meanness from the more obvious and direct meanness, Mills writes: I am not suggesting that all meanness is the same. A corporation that pays its CEO millions while brutally downsizing is different from a middle-class worker who, feeling pinched, wants to see welfare payments cut. . . . But what all of them help to further is a culture in which cruelty wins out over compassion and “civic empathy.” . . . Meanness in any one area—institutional, social, or personal—makes meanness in every other area easier to achieve. (p. 10)

While we usually think of social rage as direct and violent, it may be

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subtle and sophisticated, as Mills (1997) offers in his account of the effects of “scholarly” works demonstrating “scientifically” that AfricanAmericans are less intelligent than whites. It is not the crudest manifestations [of meanness] that have made the racial meanness of the 1990s so formidable, however, but its respectability, its presence in an intellectual and social culture we take seriously. In this regard the 1994 publication of Charles Murray’s and the late Richard Herrnstein’s The Bell Curve, with its focus on low black IQs as the basic reason for black poverty, was a watershed event. The book gave respectability, in the form of a barely disguised biological determinism, to a notion that for decades had been taboo for anyone to say: blacks are an inferior race. Murray and Herrnstein’s argument allowed middle-class voters and anyone else with an axe to grind to talk and think like a racist without feeling guilty. (p. 90)

Social rage developed and applied in this more sophisticated form allows for an unawareneness of rage. Or perhaps it may be better said that social rage is not identified as social rage but as just another social observation. DISTORTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS Social rage can be a distortion and distraction in itself. For example, the rage exhibited by politicians about each others’ behavior removes our attention from policy issues. The distraction from social problems such as racism, sexism, poverty, and class inequality cause us to focus our energy and attention onto matters like illegal immigration, crime, and welfare cheats. Distortions and distractions support and encourage social rage because they divert attention from real sources of real social problems, disallowing an understanding of the problems as well as a solution to those problems. I will not overload the reader with many examples of distractions, as I have recounted them throughout this analysis. But I can not resist offering one more. Pertinent to societal factors related to crime, let us briefly examine the initial explanations offered for the killings of schoolchildren by schoolchildren. As I write the drafts of this concluding chapter in March 1998, two schoolchildren in Jonesboro, Arkansas, ages 11 and 13, opened fire on their classmates and teachers. Four 11- and 12-year-olds were killed, one teacher was killed, and 10 others were wounded. The two children responsible for the killings had a mind-boggling arsenal

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and countless rounds of ammunition. The most preposterous of the distracting “explanations” is the question of whether the 13-year-old killer is a member of the Bloods, a Los Angeles street gang, as he had claimed to be. He was not a gang member. Gangs are not the issue in this instance. But, while it is repeatedly dismissed by the newspapers as irrelevant to the case, the gang issue is also repeatedly brought up in these same newspapers. It is as though gangs cannot be dismissed because the public has been convinced (largely by the media and politicians) that gangs are a significant part of any youth crime puzzle. The real explanations are far more systemic to our society: the widespread use of guns; sexism and sexual dominance; and distorted perceptions of criminal justice. One obvious explanation for this tragedy is the availability of guns. This is an issue that will probably not be seriously taken to task because many outspoken members of the U.S. public seem to have such a fondness for guns, and because the National Rifle Association is a well-funded and powerful lobbying force. Another explanation has to do with the relationship between the killers and the targets: males against females. One male schoolchild in Jonesboro was wounded, the nine others wounded are female, and all five of those killed were female. The killers are male, one of whom said he wanted revenge on the girls who had rejected him. Similarly, the victims in other recent cases of schoolchildren killing schoolchildren (for example, Pearl, Mississippi, and Paducah, Kentucky) involved male schoolchildren killing women and girls.4 A third explanation for children murdering others in a wholesale manner is that the public, including children, are not familiar with the reality of imprisonment. The children responsible for these killings, like most criminal offenders, probably assumed that they would not get caught. But, besides this often-false optimism, adults and children alike have been told that incarceration is a plush existence with plenty of the amenities of life (food, TV, recreation, etc.). The fact is, contrary to what we are told, incarceration is not an easy life. When the Jonesboro children were taken to jail, they asked if they could have pizza substituted for their jail food. They were told no. ANGRY WHITES AND ANGRY NON-WHITES “Angry white guys” are but one example of social ragers. They are not alone; to suggest otherwise is to fall into a distorted understanding of social rage.

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Some of the socially rageful are angry white women. These women may be coopted by components of rageful social institutions, such as farright Christian or political organizations. White women primed for social rage may gain the perception, through any number of avenues, that other people (immigrants, non-whites, homosexuals, and so on) threaten their own limited economic chances. Some white women feel intimidated by the social changes taking place in a way unique from angry white men: they may feel that they do not measure up to the new social standards of the independent woman, that they can not compete adequately but are expected to compete anyway. Many white and non-white people can and do become angry about being laid off, being unemployed, and unfairly treated in the workplace. Two cases, a Hispanic man and an African-American man, follow. Before being killed by the police, Arturo Reyes Torres, a dismissed Caltrans (California Department of Transportation) employee, killed four of his former co-workers at a maintenance yard outside of Los Angeles. He had been dismissed from his Caltrans job and later dismissed from another job. He was dismissed from the second job because he could not meet the physical requirements due to a back injury sustained while on the first job (New York Times 1997a). In the second case, an African-American postal worker had been reprimanded by his supervisor. He responded by shooting three people before killing himself. According to the president of the local Milwaukee chapter of the NAACP, racial discrimination likely played a part in precipitating the shootings. Four former postal supervisors, all African-American, filed suit in Federal District Court, contending that they had been demoted after writing a letter complaining of racial harassment by a white supervisor. The NAACP president had warned postal officials about the problem of racial discrimination; indeed he had received more than 80 complaints from Milwaukee postal workers over the past eight years (New York Times 1997b). Some minorities are angry at their treatment by society or express their rage at racism, as we find in African-American rap music. Rap music does not just target racism; it encourages violence toward women and authority figures as well (see Mills 1997). Along these same lines, Cose (1993) points to the 1990s as a period in which African-American student groups invite speakers to their university campuses who spew anti-white and anti-Jewish invective in their speeches. Aside from these rather direct confrontations, we also see African-American-imposed segregation on campuses, as in separate dorms, separate graduation ceremonies, and separate dining tables for African-Americans. Cose

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suggests, and Mills concurs, that segregation of this type have become “standard strategies for making racial exclusion routine” (Mills, p. 105). In another example of extreme intolerance by minorities, during the Labor Day weekend of 1998, Khalid Abdul Muhammed sponsored the Million Youth March in Harlem. Mr. Muhammed, an African-American known for his hate-filled rhetoric aimed at whites, Jews, lesbians and gays, and Catholics, planned a rally exclusively for African-American and Latin youth. The motive, superficially, was to bring together AfricanAmerican and Latin straight youths in a show of solidarity against police brutality, for educational improvements, and for equal employment. As with the Million Man March and the Promise Keepers Rally, while some of the stated purposes sound perfectly good (instilling a sense of familial responsibility), there are less obvious socially repressive purposes. (Recall that the Million Man March excluded whites, women, and Jews. The Promise Keepers Rally was designated for men only.) The Anti-Defamation League refers to Mr. Muhammed as “a dangerous man.” They remind us that he is credited with quotes such as: We kill the women, we kill the children, we kill the babies. We kill the blind, we kill the crippled. . . . we kill ‘em all. We kill the faggot, we kill the lesbian, we kill them all. If you say you’re white, goddammit I’m against you. If you’re a Jew, I’m against you. Whatever the hell you want to call yourself, I’m against you. (ADL 1998: 13)

Angry white people’s rage is qualitatively different than the expressions of minorities’ rage. White peoples’ rage, racism in particular, uses more legitimately recognized channels and therefore seems to have some measure of success, as we have seen in the dismantling of affirmative-action policies. Much of the backlash against affirmative action has been quite underhanded, full of distortions, distractions, and dishonesty (Egan 1997). In order to gather enough signatures to pass the state of Washington Initiative 200, an anti-affirmative action referendum, unemployed African-Americans were recruited by a “research firm,” funded by an anti-affirmative action political group. The African-American signature gatherers sent to Washington were never told the true nature of the campaign. They thought they were part of a drive to end discrimination. In the age-old tradition of indentured servitude, the signature gatherers went into debt to come to work in Washington and then had to borrow money from the campaign in order to get back home. Many of those who

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signed assumed that, since the signature gatherers were African-American, the petition was for affirmative action. This was the same strategy used successfully in California. The leaders of the campaign, Washington Initiative 200, say there was no attempt to recruit blacks as a strategic way to counter the perception that the initiative would be a setback for many minorities. Nor were the petitioners misled, they say. . . . “The only way they could be misled is if they can’t read,” said Sherry Bockwinkel, the owner of the firm that pays and recruits signature gatherers, on behalf of the campaign. “Petitioners are motivated by money. They tend to be lazy. If they say they were misled, they are lying.” (Egan, p. 12)

But, says Kathleen Russell, the campaign manager for No! Initiative 200 in Washington, “It’s not accidental that the people who were brought here are African-Americans. They [the campaign group] are playing the race card. And they’re preying on people who are hard up, who are unemployed or homeless.” In summary, many of the rageful have no real need to be rageful or to express rage, but they do anyway, perhaps due to widespread socially condoned rageful feelings and behavior (Tannen 1998a; 1998b). People who are accustomed to being in power and exercising privilege, and who are financially safe, express a great deal of social rage. CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL RAGE As I have noted earlier, social rage seems to have no therapeutic value (see Anderson 1995). The expression of social rage does not provide the catharsis that one might expect from an explosion of strong emotion. When socially rageful actions bring forth the results that the rageful say they want, such as a change in legislation, the rageful remain singularly dissatisfied. Social rage may serve a social function, such as pointing out the destructiveness and futility of social rage. As sociologists have long known, even bad behavior (for example, crime) and bad events (for example, poverty) can sharpen the dividing line between the good and the bad, and thereby force a questioning of that dividing line. Likewise, social construction of the enemy sets boundaries as to who are and who are not the enemy, thereby leading us to question the boundaries and eventually to deconstruct the enemy. In short, examinations of social rage function to

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clarify issues, reveal important aspects of human and social behavior, and move social change in a progressive direction. As will be discussed below, societies undergo rageful and non-rageful periods. After a rageful period, social analysts examine what was accomplished and what were the outcomes of a rageful social mindset and rageful social behavior. We find that social rage does not alleviate social ills, not surprisingly, since irrational and emotion-laden activity does not offer society a realistic picture of social problems nor a solution to them. Rageful organizations that discourage open-mindedness and enhance intolerance perpetuate conflict and repression. Social rage can be temporarily exhilarating for those who condone it, experience it, and are collectively supported for it, as among white supremacists at a Klan rally. Social rage is also tiring, hence its impending demise. It may be tiring for the rage-filled person who feels it and expresses it; and it can certainly be tiring for the audience, to those who witness it and experience it involuntarily. We need not be discouraged by social rage. It will go away, temporarily (see Schlesinger 1986). TIME CYCLES OF SOCIAL RAGE As I have suggested throughout and as others have contended, social feelings and behaviors fluctuate. We will always, in every society, have social rage but its preeminence wanes and waxes. I leave it to other scholars who have already documented the fluctuation of rageful periods (for example, Schlesinger 1986; Aho 1994; Mills 1997). Times that are repressive and mean are overturned by more progressive periods, during which people are more generous in their perceptions and their actions toward others. Then those more progressive times are exchanged once again for mean and repressive times. Meanness is certainly not new in the United States. We have a long history of cruelty that targets the vulnerable, as evidenced by events such as immigration quotas and the relocation of Native Americans, and by people like Father Charles Coughlin during the Great Depression, Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s, and Governor George Wallace in the 1960s. We have also experienced some very progressive and generous times, “eras when we acted as though we were a single people . . . unthreatened by the prospect of sharing” (Mills, p. 9). In these times, we implemented the GI Bill, the Peace Corps, the War on Poverty, Medicare, Medicaid, and so on. The future can be changed, according to Mills, only

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when we come to terms with the no-win position in which the culture of meanness has placed us. It is difficult to account for the exact catalyst of change, the set of circumstances that causes society to change from rageful times to nonrageful times and vice versa. Schlesinger’s (1986) explanation is generational. At the risk of oversimplifying Schlesinger’s proposition, he states that approximately every 30 years there is a rebellion against the way things were viewed and the way life was conducted by the earlier generation. In essence, the upcoming generation becomes dissatisfied with the way society is functioning and then attempts to change it. The current rageful period has regressed our society in such an extreme fashion that the effects have outlasted Schlesinger’s 30-year rule. Mills (1997) reminds us that a decade ago, during President Ronald Reagan’s second term, Schlesinger confidently predicted, “At some point shortly before or after 1990, there should come a sharp change in the national mood and direction” (Mills, p. 38). This change has not come about. Perhaps the damage has been so great that recovery will take longer than the standard 30 years. But, while the change to a less rageful period may take longer than anticipated, it is still likely to happen. Others have offered evidence that our society is changing toward a more progressive time (Dionne 1996; Tomasky 1996). Dionne has written on the expected turnaround of society to a stage when “progressives will dominate the next political era.” This will occur, he says, because voters are tiring of the mean-spirited combat in political arenas, the lack of fairness, the epithets, and the lost distinctions between fact and opinion. Tomasky, similarly, has more guardedly speculated upon a “possible resurrection of progressive politics in America.” Not everyone is so optimistic. Mills addresses the time cycles of meanness in terms of the positive and negative functions served by the culture of meanness. Ordinarily, we assume that if something is functional, it will be unchanging. The negative side of this meanness is easy to see. More prisons. More police. Less welfare. Decaying public schools. But the positive side of the same equation is just as revealing. It is fortress America with gated suburbs and guarded apartment houses and private schools and private security forces. (p. 7)

I disagree, conditionally. It has been my contention that people will get fed up with more prisons, poor education, and gated communities.

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Mills is pessimistic about the future because, as he states, the 1990s are not just another meanness phase. The meanness we are experiencing is cultural and therefore pervasive. Social rage is pervasive and the toll taken by the damage done over the past decades is immense. While I am more optimistic than Mills, I agree that the damage has been extensive and that, as a society, we need to come to some understanding of the futility of social rage. I have kept my eye on signs of a turning point, where our society will begin its new phase and discard the rage, the meanness, the incivility, and the selfishness that I have described herein. These signs will change many times before this book goes into print: I can only chronicle them to date. There are, not unexpectedly, good signs, bad signs, and mixed signals. Good News. In the “things are looking up” category, we find people of both genders serving in the U.S. military charged with sexual harassment. This would have been unheard of not long ago; the harassment would have simply continued and worsened. An ironic case is that of U.S. Army Sergeant Major Gene McKinney, the court-martialed top soldier accused of sexual harassment, who once served on the Army’s sexual harassment board (Lewis 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 4, 1998, that sexual harassment can occur between people of the same sex, heralding a breakthrough in the notion that sexual harassment is only a women’s issue. The plaintiff was repeatedly harassed by male co-workers, who made crude passes at him and threatened to rape him. A recognition that males are also vulnerable may open the doors to greater tolerance across gender lines. Retail stores and corporations are having to pay for discrimination. As we know, employment opportunities, pay, and benefits are not equal across the sexes or races. But now we have legal remedies that are being exacted against retail stores and corporations that do not promote minorities or do not allow equal access to higher-paying jobs (Myerson 1997). Of course, one might wonder why these employment issues even need to come up. If things were right in the world, employers (corporations, universities, etc.) would make work situations equitable without those who are unfairly treated having to seek legal recourse. But, while things are not right in the world, unfair treatment does occasionally come to our collective attention and is remedied, albeit in small increments. In April 1998, in Afghanistan and in Ireland, women’s groups were forcing attention and a change of behavior relative to women’s rights. Afghanistan continues in its repressive policies and practices against

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women, as bolstered by the Islamic religion (see Chapter 6). But now, head of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, has instructed Islamic Afghan leaders that their curbs on women jeopardize their receiving United Nations aid (Crossette 1998). We also learn that the Women’s Coalition in Northern Ireland has resisted being placed, by the male-dominated Northern Ireland peace talks, in a subservient role (Clarity 1998). Kannapell (1997) finds that the United States, for a change, is making progress on a broad scale. The yearly analysis of 16 social indicators produced by the Fordham Institute for Innovation in Social Policy, known as the Index of Social Health, shows the nation’s social health as improving. Six indicators from 1995 show improvement: the percentage of children in poverty, unemployment, poverty among the elderly, homicides, the gap between the rich and poor, and alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Indicators that things are worse include: absent or poor health-insurance coverage, drug abuse, average wages, the percentage of high-school dropouts, and food-stamp coverage. Any improvement is a good sign, the Institute’s director said. However, the social health of the nation has not kept up with the recovery of the economy. Also on the sunny side of the societal street, Morin and Deane (1998) cite a new Washington Post/ABC News national survey finding that the U.S. public is more satisfied now than at any time in recent years. We are more satisfied with the overall direction of the country, our elected leaders in Washington, and with the performance of the federal government. Importantly for social rage, fewer people say they are angry. Even those “angry white males” of elections past seem less dyspeptic today than they were just a few years ago. According to the survey, 44 percent of all working-class white men interviewed said they were at least “satisfied” with the performance of the federal government, more than double the 20 percent who expressed a similar view in January 1995. (Morin and Deane, p. 35)

Corporate cruelty has been signaled to end. Albert J. “Chain Saw Al” Dunlap has been fired. Dunlap, “one of the nation’s most feared corporate executives” who has “downsized with a vengeance,” has been thrown out of a job (Canedy 1998:1). Mr. Dunlap has frequently boasted that he has thrown thousands of people out of work in order to lift a company’s stock price, earning him his nickname. Calling himself “Rambo in pinstripes,” he authored an autobiography entitled Mean Business. His track record included cutting labor forces in at least five companies, needlessly. His pattern was to lay off thousands of employees (hefty pro-

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portions, up to one-third at a time, of the corporate labor forces) and reduce workers’ benefits, from 1980 though 1998. Finally, there is some evidence that the message of hate is not so well-received. The response to the previously-mentioned Million Youth March (a rally of hate speech put forward by Khalid Abdul Muhammed, excluding Jews, whites, homosexuals, and Catholics) was mixed. Only a few thousand people showed up, rather than a million. And of those who did, “Mr. Muhammed’s message of hate was soundly rejected by young black people” (Herbert 1998: 17). Indeed, the “people kept their heads. They never bought into the hateful rhetoric spewed by a succession of clowns from the speakers’ platform” (p. 17). Unfortunately, the mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, attempted to suppress the march through court and police action. This attempted suppression gave Mr. Muhammed an opportunity to complain of racism. The city’s display of force, especially the police presence and action at the March, served to give Mr. Muhammed “a more visible platform” (Sack 1998b: 13). As reported by Sack, the former president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference stated, “I abhor his [Muhammed’s] remarks, but his remarks would fall on deaf ears if Giuliani didn’t magnify them. Giuliani gave him a bullhorn” (p. 13). In sum, depending on the reaction to social rage, social rage may be legitimated or dissipated. Mayor Giuliani’s reaction to the march—setting the police on the march, ostensibly because of Mr. Muhammed’s incitement to riot—strengthened rather than weakened Mr. Muhammed’s message. On a broader level, though, we see that social rage was unsuccessfully brought about by this march. The youth in attendance, at which the march was aimed, were unimpressed with the messages of rage. Bad News. But happy days are not here again according to, for example, Riechmann (1998) and Pace (1998). The former reports that the U.S. racial divide is widening and the latter reports that southerners and the poor are audited disproportionately by the IRS. Riechmann offers the Kerner Commission (a private, urban-policy group) report as evidence that thirty years after the civil-rights movement the nation was and is divided into two societies “one black, one white— separate and unequal.” The new report, called “The Millennium Breach,” finds that the economic and racial divide in the United States is growing. Moreover, the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation issued a report stating that inner-city unemployment is at crisis levels, and that “The rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer, and minorities are suffering disproportionately” (cited in Riechmann). According to Fred Harris, a

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member of the Kerner Commission, people “need to see their own selfinterest in this—that it doesn’t make sense to have these underutilized regions in the country and these underutilized people whose lives are being wasted.” It is unknown whether or not people in general will indeed see how racism and unemployment hurts them. Another example of unfairness and discrimination is that low-income working families are audited by the IRS more than other categories of people. Almost half of randomly audited taxpayers over the past three years live in the southern United States, and more than 85 percent of those audited randomly earned incomes below $25,000. By virtue of their low income and region of residence, they are among the types of citizens about whom the IRS is suspicions (Pace 1998). Yet another indication that society or part of our society has not become more tolerant is the latest finding on homosexuals being discharged from the U.S armed forces for being homosexuals. Recall that soon after Bill Clinton was elected to the presidency, he put into place the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy as it pertains to homosexuals in the armed forces. No one is really sure what this policy means and how it should be implemented, but the most common guess is that fellow enlisted personnel and officers should not ask if their fellow troops are gay or lesbian; nor should gay and lesbian troops admit that they are homosexual. Five years after the policy was put into place, the military is discharging 67 percent more gay and lesbian troops than before the adoption of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. Gay-rights advocates believe that this increase in discharges is due to continued harassment and interrogation by commanding officers. The U.S. Pentagon officials believe that the increase is due to voluntary admissions of homosexuality, which the policy forbids. A final sign that things are not heading in a progressive direction is that the far right remains a political contender not only in the United States but in other cultures as well, notably Germany and France. The political party representing neo-Nazi ideals is winning elections in Germany (New York Times 1998a; Cowell 1998). This neo-Nazi wave is based upon the spoiled hopes of Germany’s unification, drawing on nostalgia for the clear-cut ideals of Nazism; the latter referring to unambiguous nationalism and racial exclusivism of Nazism. This desire for clear-cut ideals and nostalgia sound very much like the popular notions put forward during Ronald Reagan’s terms as president, and, more currently, popular notions among the U.S. survivalist right and Christian Right. Mixed News. Some of the recent events relevant to social rage are

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mixed (good and bad) news. Although the top sergeant of the Army was court-martialed for sexual harassment of his female underlings, he was acquitted of all 18 sex charges on March 14, 1998 (Gross 1998). One interpretation is that while he may have been found innocent of sexual misconduct charges (bad news, if he did engage in sexual misconduct and harassment), he did have to answer to the U.S. Army for his behavior as reported by his alleged victims (good news, as a way of discouraging sexual misconduct). It is mere speculation that those inclined toward sexual misconduct and harassment might be deterred, having heard so much about the McKinney case. However, it is not out of the realm of possibility, especially given that careers are at stake. In the United States, France, and Germany, the political hard right has caused something of a backlash among the more progressive forces of the Left. The pattern is similar across these countries: the conservative-right parties hope to gain the electoral support of the hard right, but end up being coopted to some extent by the hard right, with unexpected consequences. For example, the far right in France have gained some prominence, to the point that they are plaguing the mainstream parties of President Jacques Chirac’s conservative coalition. That is, some of the French conservative leaders have accepted support from the National Front, a far-right organization and, perhaps as a result, are not having much success in elections. The far right are not winning the day. Instead, the Socialists are gaining ground while the conservative party, the Union of French Democracy, may “fly apart” (Whitney 1998: 5). More specifically, we find a French far-right political leader convicted and stripped of his civil rights for assaulting a Socialist politician. He shoved the Socialist candidate during a 1997 campaign, kicked two protesters, and verbally abused another. This rightist had previously remarked that gas chambers in Nazi death camps were nothing but “a detail” of history, for which he was fined (New York Times 1998b). In Germany, while the neo-Nazis may be gaining ground, left-wing opponents of the rightist National Democratic Party of Germany made it quite clear, through physical violence unfortunately, that the skinheads were not the only political group in the country (New York Times 1998c).5 Finally, there is mixed news on another social-rage topic, the treatment of immigrants. Proposition 187, as discussed in Chapter 5, has been basically nullified. Recall that the state of California passed Proposition 187 in 1994 as a means of denying social services to illegal immigrants. Under Proposition 187, illegal immigrants (read: Mexicans) were ineligible for public education, health care, and social services (food stamps,

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etc.). “Only provisions for criminal penalties for the manufacture, sale, and use of false documents to conceal a person’s immigrant status remain in force” (Purdum 1998: 12). What makes this mixed news for social progress is that the overhaul of the federal welfare system signed into law in 1996 already denies welfare benefits to illegal immigrants, making the state of California powerless to enact its own legislative scheme to regulate immigration. WHAT TO DO ABOUT SOCIAL RAGE Before suggesting possible courses of action, it is important to address the probabilities of changing human behavior and human perceptions. Human traits, some of them quite disturbing, are only questionably changeable. Selfish, self-centered, thoughtless, mean people are often unwilling to change, or to even consider the damage resulting from their perspectives and actions. At times, they seem to be in the majority and to overshadow the thoughtful, generous, and those who are oriented toward others. Undeniably, some people do not care about the environment (even though they may live to experience the ill effects of their mistreatment), do not care about people living in poverty, do not care about international troubles, or anything that they believe is irrelevant to them. By the very nature of their thoughtlessness, they are unlikely to change. The world has always been full of people like this, at all times and in all cultures. However, the world has also been inhabited by the more thoughtful, at all times and in all cultures. The latter, their perspectives, their actions, and their social policies have been better represented during periods other than the present rageful one. It is possible that they and their policies will be represented again in the future. Specific to one form of social rage, skinhead thinking and behavior, Mark Hamm (1994) offers five recommendations for how to handle the skinhead problem: boycotting, expanded litigation, gun control, standards for responsible media coverage, and more research. Following these recommendations would go a long way toward reducing skinhead influence and, I would argue, could be applied to managing all social rage. Michael Moore (1996) offers his advice on how to reduce corporate downsizing and the economic rage resulting from it. He suggests that (a) corporations should be fined heavily of they close profitable U.S. factories and move them overseas; (b) companies should be prohibited from pitting one state or city against another (in other words, there should be no competitive bidding among locales for start-up or relocation of businesses); (c)

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a 100-percent tax on profits gained by shareholders when a company’s stock rises due to an announcement of firings should be instituted; (d) executives’ salaries should be prohibited from being more than 30 times the average worker’s pay; and (e) boards of directors of publicly owned corporations should have representation by workers and consumers. These are fine suggestions but they are fraught with “shoulds” and they rely upon the highly unlikely willingness of the powerful to relinquish power. Among my recommendations for reducing the destructiveness of social rage are (a) growth of, support for, and involvement in watchdog organizations and grassroots resistance organizations; (b) greater awareness of rage, its sources and effects, through education; (c) pressure exerted upon media and political behavior, via consumer and voter choices, to reduce social rage; and (d) we need patience, but active patience. I will list only a few of the many organizations that sustain a front against the socially rageful groups proliferating in the United States and elsewhere. These many watchdog organizations or grassroots resistance organizations attempt to counteract rage movements on a grand scale and rageful behavior on an individual level. Included among them are Families Against Mandatory Minimums, a grassroots organization composed of family members of those incarcerated for lengthy periods due to mandatory sentencing laws. The research they have accumulated clearly shows what criminologists have long known, that mandatory minimum sentences are unfairly applied, that mandatory minimums reflect popular political agendas at the moment (such as drug laws), and that lengthy incarceration of specific offender types does not reduce crime overall. Hands-Off Washington is an organization in the state of Washington that monitors racism, sexism, homophobia, religious intolerance, and other forms of social rage. They have formed an effective political front against discrimination of all kinds. On a broader level, the Anti-Defamation League is a large, national and international organization that brings to our attention matters of anti-Semitism mostly, although they also tackle unfair treatment of any number of other social categories. The American Civil Liberties Union is a broad-based organization ensuring that the civil rights of all citizens are protected. As a legal unit primarily, they are in the unenviable position of having to defend social ragers from time to time, just as they would the meeker members of society. Klanwatch, a division of the Southern Poverty Law Center, monitors and seeks legal remedies for Ku Klux Klan activities. They, like the Na-

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tional Organization of Women (NOW), have dealt a serious blow to those who would violate the civil rights of minorities by forcing legal settlements that deplete the financial resources of the offending organizations (the Klan, Operation Rescue, etc.) Equal Partners in Faith, a loose interfaith coalition, is a countermovement to the Christian Right, in particular the Promise Keepers. They, along with other diversity-minded religious organizations, anti-homophobia groups, and women’s rights organizations, prevent further inroads into violations of human rights. Niebuhr (1997) reports that the Promise Keepers are facing opposition from the NOW as well as religious liberals. A spokesperson for Equal Partners states uncategorically that, “The Promise Keepers’ movement undermines the equality of women in family, church, and society” and assert that the top leadership of the Promise Keepers is close to the religious right (Niebuhr, p. 5). Similarly, Berke (1997) describes the Americans United for Separation of Church and State (AUSCS), an opposing watchdog group to the Christian Coalition. The Christian Coalition hopes to influence politics and the AUSCS has evidence to that effect. It is illegal for a religious group to try to influence politics in the way that the Christian Coalition has, for example, via illegal use of funding. The Christian Coalition, through the efforts of the AUSCS, has been exposed for their inappropriate campaign-related activities. Melton and Moore (1982) and Kaplan (1997) introduce us to anticult movements (ACMs) and watchdog groups as they pertain mostly, but not entirely, to religion (see Chapter 6). It is instructive to consider Hands-Off Washington, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, antihomophobic groups, and others as ACMs even if they are not necessarily targeted at religious cults. Kaplan points out that the Anti-Defamation League “stands unchallenged as the most successful model of a philanthropic ACM in the U.S.” (p. 135). He points to the Southern Poverty Law Center as another major political ACM. “Political ACMs differ from denominational and philanthropic subgroups only in that they see their mission as entirely secular: combating racism, or more broadly, ‘hate,’ and (not coincidentally) promoting their own particular political agendas” (Kaplan, p. 136). Melton and Moore (1982) state that the rise of the militant anti-cult movement in the United States marks a new chapter in the history of human bigotry. Resembling my discussions of the sociology of the enemy, he finds that the new bigotry turns both the ideology and new sci-

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entific perspectives of the Enlightenment into the effective tools of modern scapegoating. Sometimes it is difficult to tell who is the targeted enemy, the watchdog groups or the group in need of watching. Watchdog groups, according to Kaplan, are often not content with merely publicizing the iniquities of the movement. These groups may organize to harass, intimidate, or even outlaw the target group. “Paradoxically, the role of the anti-cult movement (ACM) is to bring the message of the target group to the attention of the dominant cultural community—albeit in often grotesquely distorted forms” (Kaplan, p. 128). Rageful groups and movements often gain their first access to the mass media as a by-product of the effort to demonize them. Educational efforts can assist in creating greater awareness of social rage and its effects. By education, I do not mean just formal education, although this is an important venue for understanding social phenomena.6 Public-service announcements in print media, on the radio, on billboards, and on television are equally important and probably reach a larger audience than formal education. On media coverage, Hamm (1994) writes that U.S. neo-Nazism had become respectable through the “media’s confirmation of the skinhead paranoia that working-class whites will have their self-respect, power, and economic well-being usurped by racial and ethnic minorities” (p. 218). Our media have engaged in encouragement of rageful thoughts and behaviors by virtue of offering simplistic non-explanations for serious social problems, such as crime, racism, and poverty. The commercial media encourage distortions, distractions, fiction, and opinion. By contrast, they discourage an examination of facts. The U.S. public would benefit from understanding this and making media choices accordingly. At this point, it is unknown if the public will seek a greater understanding through more thoughtful media examinations and by boycotting vacuous, false, and hateful media messages. Increased awareness, as a society, can cause us to rethink our support of rageful politicians and rageful political agendas. Since 1994, there has been some reduction of political support for the extreme right. We have started to respond unfavorably to hateful campaign tactics. The difficult part for U.S. voters has been to understand that rageful agendas and policies do not help them in their life courses. The uncivil, the self-interested, the mean seem to still believe that the best way for them to get through life is to achieve their own consumerist needs, to focus on their children and not on others’, and not to help those who cannot help themselves.

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Finally, we must be patient, but we must be active in our patience. Howe (1993) has raised the question of how we can move from the selfishness of the 1990s, as symbolized by “fortress worlds,” or gated communities, that bespeak the message “I’ll take care of me and mine. The hell with you.” He advises us to not acquiesce to the given just because it is here. Another strong message for not acquiescing occurred in July of 1998. As 90 white supremacists from the Aryan Nations marched through Coeur D’Alene, Idaho, they were met by hundreds of protestors. The white supremacists, many of them skinheads, marched past chanting counterdemonstrators. The marchers’ leader and leader of the Aryan Nations, Richard Butler, used a microphone but his words were drowned out (New York Times 1998d). Maintaining and escalating social rage, the negative forms of which I have described herein, results in grave societal devolution; reducing social rage allows society to attend to social problems in a constructive manner. Fighting rage with rage will not eliminate rage. To end social rage and its consequences, active patience is the key. NOTES 1

The sample was loaded toward the conservative and religious and away from “godless liberal intellectuals.” 2 One might suppose that rational thinking could control rageful feelings. Rageful emotions may or may not be beyond one’s cognitive control. The matter of what is beyond one’s self-control is beyond the scope of this analysis. 3 See Chapter 6 on Social Rage and the Religious Fringe. Here I present others’ reports on the Promise Keepers as a rageful movement. The Promise Keepers intend to turn back the clock on women’s rights and demonstrate intolerance on a number of other matters. In terms of their exclusion of women, they are comparable to Louis Farrakhan’s Million Man March and movement, with its exclusion of women, Jews, whites, and homosexuals. 4 Since I had originally drafted this final chapter, on May 21, 1998, a 15year-old high school student shot and wounded 23 fellow students (five critically). Among the dead were his parents and two male students. 5 The National Democratic Party disavows neo-Nazi labels and claims democratic credentials, but vendors at the rally sell videotapes depicting neo-Nazi themes, and in which Adolf Hitler is featured prominently. The National Democratic Party claim they are interested in “national resistance.” (New York Times 1998c: 3).

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6

As a university faculty member of 14 years, I, like most of my colleagues, have experienced the pull of students to affirm what they believe. As a sociologist specializing in social problems, deviance, and criminology, I have been especially subjected to resistance on the part of students to hear the latest truth on social issues. University professors, perhaps like all teachers, have been coerced into “artificial” education (with artificial education referring to simplistic and entertaining coursework, with no empirical grounding) in hopes of keeping the students entertained and not confrontational, but not truly educated. Those of us who resist are punished (Berry 1994).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aho, James A. 1994. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Anderson, David C. 1995. Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice. New York: Times Books (Random House). Anti-Defamation League. 1998. “Armed. Dangerous. And Filled with Hate.” Advertisement in the New York Times, September 4, p. A13. Berke, Richard L. 1997. “Taped Speech Discloses Robertson’s Goals.” New York Times, September 18, p. A15. Berry, Bonnie. 1994. “Artificiality in the Construction of Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology.” Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 22: 33–43. Canedy, Dana. 1998. “Sunbeam’s Board, in Revolt, Ousts Job-Cutting Chairman.” New York Times, June 16, pp. A1, C2. Clarity, James F. 1998. “Irishwomen Cry Foul as New Political Rules Leave Them Out.” New York Times, April 2, p. A11. Cose, Ellis. 1993. The Rage of a Privileged Class. New York: Harper Collins. Cowell, Alan. 1998. “Neo-Nazis Carving out Fiefs in Eastern Germany.” New York Times, February 8, p. A3. Crossette, Barbara. 1998. “Afghans Meet with U.N. Official Who Is, er, a Woman.” New York Times, April 2, p. A6. Dionne, E.J. 1996. They Only Look Dead: Why Progressives Will Dominate the Next Political Era. New York: Simon and Schuster. Egan, Timothy. 1997. “Blacks Recruited by ‘Rights’ Drive to End Preferences.” New York Times, December 17, p. A12. Goldberg, Carey. 1997. “Downsizing Activism: Greenpeace Is Cutting Back.” New York Times, September 16, pp. A1, A16. Gross, Jane. 1998. “Former Top Sergeant of Army Is Acquitted of All Sex Charges.” New York Times, March 14, pp. A1, A6.

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Hamm, Mark S. 1994. American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Herbert, Bob. 1998. “An Insult to Harlem.” New York Times, September 7, p. A17. Howe, Irving. 1993. “Two Cheers for Utopia.” Dissent Spring: 131–133. Kannapell, Andrea. 1997. “Society Is Making Progress, For a Change, Report Finds.” New York Times, October 12, p. A12. Kaplan, Jeffrey. 1997. Radical Religion in America: Millenarian Movements from the Far Right to the Children of Noah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime. New York: Basic Books. Lewis, John. 1998. “Forgiving George Wallace.” New York Times, September 16, p. A31. Lewis, Neil A. 1997. “Top Enlisted Soldier Faces Probable Trial in Sex Case.” New York Times, September 20, pp. A1, A9. Melton, J. Gordon, and Robert L. Moore. 1982. The Cult Experience: Responding to the New Religious Pluralism. New York: Pilgrim. Mills, Nicolaus. 1997. The Triumph of Meanness: America’s War against Its Better Self. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Moore, Michael. 1996. Downsize This: Random Threats from an Unarmed American. New York: Crown. Morin, Richard, and Claudia Deane. 1998. “On the Sunny Side of the Street.” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, January 26, p. A35. Myerson, Allen R. 1997. “Home Depot Pays 487.5 Million for Not Promoting More Women.” New York Times, September 20, p. A7. New York Times. 1997a. “Dismissed Worker Kills 4 and Then Is Slain.” New York Times, December 20, p. A7. New York Times. 1997b. “Postal Worker in Milwaukee Shoots 3 and Kills Himself.” New York Times, December 20, p. A7. New York Times. 1998a. Kohl’s Party Defeated in Northern Vote.” New York Times, March 23, p. A8. New York Times. 1998b. “French Rightist Found Guilty of Assault in 1997 Campiagn.” New York Times, April 3, p. A11. New York Times. 1998c. “Leftists Attack at a German Far-Right Rally.” New York Times, February 8, p. A3. New York Times. 1998d. “Supremacists March at Idaho Lake Resort.” New York Times, July 19, p. A18. Niebuhr, Gustav. 1997. “Converts and Critics for a Men’s Group.” New York Times, August 2, p. A5.

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Niebuhr, Gustav. 1998. “Men’s Group to Lay off Entire Staff.” New York Times, February 20, p. A10. Pace, David. 1998. “Study: IRS Audits Southerners, Poor Most.” Washington Post, Internet News, February 28. Purdum, Todd S. 1998. “Judge Nullifies Most of California Immigrant Law.” New York Times, March 19, p. A12. Putnam, Robert D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6: 65–78. Riechmann, Deb. 1998. “Report: U.S. Racial Divide Is Widening.” Washington Post, Internet News, February 28. Sack, Kevin. 1998a. “Hate Groups in U.S. Are Growing, Report Says.” New York Times, March 3, p. A10. Sack, Kevin. 1998b. “Atlanta Rally Unburdened by Ills of Harlem.” New York Times, September 8, p. A13. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1986. The Cycle of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Tannen, Deborah. 1998a. “Taking a ‘War of Words’ Too Literally.” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 23, pp. 21–22. Tannen, Deborah. 1998b. The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue. New York: Random House. Tomasky, Michael. 1996. Left for Dead: The Life, Death, and Possible Resurrection of Progressive Politics in America. New York: Free Press. Weiner, Tim. 1998. “Military Discharges of Homosexuals Soar.” New York Times, April 7, p. A21. Whitney, Craig R. 1998. “Far-Right Furor Has French Conservatives Crumbling.” New York Times, March 30, p. A5. Wolfe, Alan. 1998a. One Nation, After All: What Middle-Class Americans Really Think about: God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left, and Each Other. New York: Viking. Wolfe, Alan. 1998b. “Couch Potato Politics.” New York Times, March 15, p. D17.

APPENDIX A

Field Notes, Tokyo Metropolitan University

On June 1, 1995, I spoke at a graduate methodology seminar at the Tokyo Metropolitan University. To begin my discussion, I introduced the topic of social rage, much as I have described the topic to the reader herein. I gave as one rather obvious example the bombing of Oklahoma City’s Federal Building on April 19, 1995. But also, and just as important, I made sure that the students understood that there was more to “American” social rage than noteworthy events like the bombing. Indeed, I described our rage about crime and criminals as another example of social rage. And I discussed the wholesale, societal-level, and historically-favored social rage in the United States. Having described what I meant by social rage and how it is manifested in the United States, I then asked them about the recent, March 20, 1995, sarin gassing in the Tokyo subway. The following are some of the questions and answers. I asked the students how they felt about the subway gassing. For example, I asked what emotions best described their feelings about it. Several answered that they felt sympathy for the cult who perpetrated the gassing. Other responses were that they felt sad that the cult “had to do it.” One said, for instance, “I felt sympathy for them. I feel like bombing out of boredom.” [Boredom was mentioned more than once as a strong trait of life in Japan.] Rage was mentioned by one person as a possible reason. I asked if they thought that the gassing is representative of a social feeling that may exist across the society. Does this behavior represent just a weird cult or something bigger? Does it represent social discontent? Three students answered that the gassing was a protest against all of 265

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Japanese society. One said that the gassing was a statement against the Japanese government in particular, although Japanese society as a whole was also targeted. One said that it was a protest against big, big things— like life itself. Social structure was also mentioned as the target of rage. Other social causes included anomie and alienation. Another student mentioned that the cult had tried to remedy some social problems, and had openly and constructively debated social issues, such as contaminated drugs given to the public, and the profit motive of corporate greed. Keep in mind that these are smart graduate students, which might explain why they experience, perhaps more than other Japanese, unhappiness about blocked opportunities and intractable social ills. They expressed, a number of times, bad feelings about societal repression. I asked whether the people in the cult have feelings of hatred or rage about Japanese society. If so, is the rage directed at all of Japanese society or just a segment (the government, social class structure, etc.)? In other words, who is the target of rage? The students stated that the cult may have felt that its efforts to change bad social situations were in vain. The blocking of positive social change was described as an experience that made the cult and other Japanese view social structure as an enemy. The cult wanted to do something to change a bad social structure, but their attempts resulted in failure. (At this point, at least one student reminded me that the cult is not homogenous; there may be various reasons for the gassing and various reasons for the behaviors and feelings of the cult.) I then asked the students if their daily routine had been changed because of the gassing, for example, if the ordinary things one does (shopping, etc.) had to be altered. None of the students said that they had altered their usual routines, although the professor said that business had dropped off because the Japanese in Tokyo had reduced their going out to shop. One student mentioned that he used to read the newspapers that other people left on the train. Since the gassing, people cannot leave newspapers on the train, eliminating this form of informal sharing. Some students said that people had become more watchful, more observant since the gassing. I asked if the media (TV, newspapers, magazines) affected their perception of the gassing. If so, in what way? For instance, had the media attention heightened cynicism or fear? One student said, “I’m tired of media coverage of this.” The stu-

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dents also said that mass media decided who is guilty before an investigation (a complaint often voiced in the United States as well). Mass communication gives its own interpretation and many people believe or accept it as fact. I asked whether the students felt that formal social control should be increased and in what way? Should there be more police, police searches, video surveillance, cameras in train stations, and so on? The students stated in no uncertain terms that an increase in formal control was not an appropriate response. The students feel threatened by the police. One mentioned that the children of the cult were taken away by the police; he described this taking away as “they were kidnapped by the police” (and not at all a good idea). Finally, I asked the students what kind of informal social control might be used to control this kind of behavior. At least one person suggested education, which to a U.S. resident, sounds more like formal social control. Other students said that it is hard to say what kinds of informal social control would help because there are so many things that could be done informally to control behavior. This response is in stark contrast to the way the United States government has responded to our Oklahoma City bombing, with changes in law, vast increases in law-enforcement resources made available to fight violent militia activities. We fail to see and fail to use informal means of controlling poor behavior.

APPENDIX B

Bumper Sticker and Radio Talk-Show Surveys by Pacific Lutheran University Students

FINDINGS FROM THE BUMPER STICKER STUDY I had instructed my Social Problems students in the spring of 1995 about my social-rage project. I offered them extra-credit points for collecting data on bumper stickers and radio talk shows. I had outlined the type of information to look for, complete with a form to guide their data collection. For example, on the bumper-sticker study, they were instructed to survey only motor vehicles in the state of Washington. They were to note the date, the time, and location of the surveys. N of student observers = 13 N of vehicles, total = 4,425 N of vehicles with stickers = 566 N of vehicles with more than one sticker = 112 (range of stickers = 0–9) N of vehicles without stickers = 3,859 12.79% of vehicles observed have stickers 87.21% of vehicles do not have stickers. N’s and Types of Bumper Stickers Neutral, n = 287/715 = 40.14% Self, n = 154/715 = 21.54% Positive, n = 96/715 = 13.43% Rage, n = 48/715 = 6.71% Religion, n = 48/715 = 6.71% Patriotism, n = 22/715 = 3.08% 269

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Unknown, n = 19/715 = 2.66% Politics, n = 17/715 = 2.38% Guns, n = 15/715 = 2.09% Military, n = 9/715 = 1.26% (715 observed and countable stickers. Recall that there are 566 vehicles with stickers but some vehicles have more than one sticker.) Combinations of Types of Stickers: Neutral + unknown + politics = 287 + 19 + 17 = 323/715 = 45.17% Positive + neutral = 96 + 287 = 383/715 = 53.57% Rage + religion + guns + military + patriotism = 48 + 48 + 15 + 9 + 22 = 142/715 = 19.86% (But not everyone would agree that patriotism is rage.) Rage + religion + guns + military = 48 + 48 + 15 + 9 = 120/715 = 16.78% The settings, which the students noted, vary accordingly. That is, in some settings there are more rageful bumper stickers (such as military bases), whereas in other settings there are more positive ones (for example, Evergreen State College campus). RADIO TALK-SHOW SURVEY For the radio talk-show surveys, my students took copious notes on the behavior of radio talk-show hosts and callers (interruptions, cutting off of conversations, tone of voice); topic of conversation; and the date, time, and identities of the hosts and the callers. The host’s identity was always known. The students noted as many variables about the callers as they could, such as gender and whether the caller was a “professional” (someone who frequently called in to talk shows) or a “virgin” (a caller who said that this was the first time she or he had called in to a talk show). Survey 1 • Most callers (18 versus 10) were rage-oriented about personal, self-relevant issues. • Host cut off callers if they didn’t agree. • Host was rude, impatient, interruptive.

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• Host tried to get callers to engage in conflict. • Host tried to persuade callers to confirm host’s point of view. Survey 2 • Callers gave their personal opinions about the government—all negative. • Some callers wanted their “point to scream out across the radio.” They were argumentative and refused to see other points of view. • Proposals for cutting welfare to teen mothers because it perpetuates pregnancies. Moderator tried to get callers to see the other side, but callers kept their opinions. • Most callers were “pros” rather than “virgins.” • A lot of finger-pointing at welfare and job-training programs • The government was blamed for “absolutely everything.” • Moderator was calm and collected. Callers were angry. “The moderator was just a tool by which people could express their opinions.” • Student noted an “absence of rage” on the part of the moderator. Survey 3 • Callers did not ask questions, they just made their points. • Callers gripe about the government, especially Clinton. • The host, Mike Reagan, says “liberal press” are the problem. Host also severely criticizes the Clintons (on their “dishonesty”) and all connected to them. Host repeatedly severely criticized Bill and Hillary Clinton. • Host raised his voice to caller and interrupted. • Host strongly stated his anti-affirmative-action views and “family values” views (we should stay in marriages even if they’re terrible, marriage ending is the fault of women who encourage other women to get divorced). Multiple marriages and children born out of wedlock are very bad, according to host. • All the callers agreed with the moderator, so there was no need for him to get abusive. • A lot of finger-pointing by the host and by callers.

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Survey 4 • Host wanted to keep discussion general and to focus on problems with the government. • No rage on the part of callers. The discussion was about civil libertarian party. Callers called in with questions. • Host cut people off sometimes to go to commercial or clarify a point—not because of disagreement. He seemed respectful, not rude, interruptive, impatient. Host tried to resolve conflicts and disagreements. • Callers seemed fed up with the government but there was no rage in this show. Most did blame the Democrats. Survey 5 • • • •

Most callers make points rather than ask questions. Most were male (12/2). Half were virgins, half stated that they had called before. 6/14 callers were “very angry because of personal issues.” All of the angry callers were men. Male enraged callers were “very outraged,” raised their voices, anger was directed at government, blamed everything on the government. • Host (Mike Reagan) did sometimes try to get people to engage in conflict, but was not rude and did not cut people off. Survey 6 • All the callers (n = 12) called to make a point, express their views on the subject. • Most (10/2) were male • Callers were calm until one caller called in and personalized the issue. This caller attacked the host, was very rude and defensive. The caller ripped the host apart. He was the only one pointing fingers and being rageful. • Host was polite, not rude, not impatient, not interruptive, did not try to engage the callers in conflict

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Survey 7 • Most callers had questions (9), one had a point to make (issue = environmentalism). • More males than females (7/3). • More new callers than “pros” (7/3). • Most callers were calm, with unassuming questions. One was angry and had a “bone to pick.” • A lot of agreement, overall, no rage. There was “superficial rage” limited to one caller. Survey 8 • • • • •

6 callers, 4 women, 2 men Half were “pros,” half virgins. Two asked questions, four made points. Callers were angry, frustrated, and disappointed about welfare. Host was polite, did not cut people off when they disagreed with him, was moderate. He interrupted twice. He did try to get callers to agree with him, but not to engage in conflict. • Overall, no rage, but anger, resentment, and frustration. • Blame was placed on the government, Democrats especially. Survey 9 • • • •

15 callers. 6 made a point, 6 made comments, 3 asked questions. 10 callers were women, 5 men (topic = sexism in sports). 8 callers were “pros” and 7 virgins. Host did not cut off those who disagreed with him, was not rude, was interruptive on occasion, did not engage in conflict. • Overall, no rage detected; there was however anger, resentment, and frustration.

Author Index

Elikann, Peter T., 91, 94, 97, 103, 104, 110 Ewen, Stuart, 218–219

Adler, William M., 102 Aho, James A., 7, 12, 14, 20, 43, 55, 60, 62, 65, 70, 73, 77, 82–83, 120–121, 123, 197, 242 Anderson, David C., 12, 92, 94, 98–99, 102, 105, 193, 219–220, 248

Friedman, Lawrence M., 92, 93, 97 Garland, David, 96, 194 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah, 67, 135–136

Bedau, Hugo Adam, 93, 101 Bellant, Russ, 73, 187, 201–202 Bennett, David H., 73, 196, 200–201 Blee, Kathleen M., 65–66, 129–130 Blumstein, Alfred, 90, 104 Bushart, Howard L. John R. Craig, and Myra Barnes, 55, 65, 67

Hagan, John, 91, 101 Hamm, Mark S., 2, 5, 7, 13, 38– 39, 54, 61–62, 65, 70–72, 75, 78–79, 81–82, 122–123, 195, 198, 204, 217, 224, 256, 259 Irwin, John and James Austin, 91 Kaminer, Wendy, 10, 12, 20, 94, 97, 101 Kaplan, Jeffery, 78, 152, 177–178, 258–259 Katz, Jack, 2, 12, 31–32, 37, 43, 238 Kintz, Linda, 221–222

Caldwell, Christopher, 187–188, 195 Christie, Nils, 91 Coates, James, 53, 55, 70, 71, 73 DeMott, Bejamin, 3, 9, 11, 32, 42 Dressler, Joshua, 139

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276 Kurtz, Howard, 105–106, 220 Lamy, Philip, 3–4, 12, 55–56, 60, 71, 73 Merton, Robert K., 37, 140 Mills, Nicolaus, 2, 4–5, 10, 36, 40, 225, 236, 238, 240–241, 243, 246, 249–251 Moore, Michael, 10, 36, 256–257 Pierce, William L. (a.k.a. Andrew MacDonald), 61, 156 Putnam, Robert D., 19, 197, 241–242

Author Index Schlesinger, Arthur M., 14, 20, 54, 197, 249–250 Schlosser, Eric, 109–110, 112 Smith, Brent L., 3, 54–55, 57–58, 64, 77–78, 80–81 Stern, Kenneth S., 55, 58–60, 62, 66, 70–72, 77, 80–83, 198–200, 226 Stivers, Richard, 30 Stock, Catherine McNicol, 19–20, 54, 57–58, 64–65, 73, 130, 136, 196–197 Stossel, Scott, 106, 218 Tannen, Deborah, 16, 236–237, 248

Reiman, Jeffery H., 101, 104 Scheff, Thomas J. and Suzanne M. Retzinger, 31, 38–39, 192

Wilson, William Julius, 140–141 Wolfe, Alan, 134, 236, 240

Subject Index

Bumper stickers, rage messages on, 43–46, 269–270 Bush, George, 13, 32, 193, 219

Abortion issues, 6, 12, 132–133, 159, 175–176, 189–191 Achieved and ascribed minority statuses, 125–128 Affirmative action, opposition to, 4, 7, 125, 226–227, 235, 247–248 American Dream (see also Violations of expectations), 4–5, 37, 39, 205 “Angry white guys,” 2, 4, 19–20, 31, 64, 123–124, 234–235, 239, 252 Angry white women, 245–246 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 19, 69, 77, 80, 228, 247 Anti-government feelings, 57–58, 63, 67–70, 195–200 Aryan Nations, 11–12, 55, 58, 65, 73, 149, 197 Attribution theory, minority statuses and, 122

Chenoweth, Helen, politics and terrorism (see also White men as “endangered species”), 55, 69 Christian Coalition, 20, 63, 153, 165, 200, 203 Christian Identity, 55, 72, 81, 149–150 Christian Patriots, 72, 197 Christian Right, the United States, 158–159, 175–176, 192, 200, 221, 258 Church of the Creator, 72, 78 Classism, social rage and, 140–141, 253–254 Clinton, Bill, as target of social rage, 76, 189, 207, 236 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, as target of social rage, 10, 69, 76, 199, 242 “Common sense” (see also Nostalgia, Ronald Reagan, Simplicity and social rage), 33, 89

Belief systems, social rage and, 12, 150–155, 189–192 Buchanan, Pat, 42, 75

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278 Corporate interest in crime control, 112–113 Crime and racism, 101–103 Crime, perceptions versus reality (see also Media effects on crime), 91–93, 109, 219–220 Criminals as enemies (see also Sociology of the enemy), 100–101, 107, 112 Cross-cultural comparisons and media, 225 and religion, 155–157 of social rage, 15–19, 66–67, 206, 254–255 Distractions, social rage and (see also Media distortions and distractions), 10–11, 34, 176, 186, 203, 234, 244–245 Dornan, Robert, 103, 125, 134 Drug wars (see also Moral panics), 107–110, 112 Economic conditions, effects on social rage, 36–39, 64, 203, 239–242, 246 Expressive justice, 98–99 Farrakhan, Louis, 10, 42, 162 Functions of social rage, 9, 12, 32–34, 217, 233, 235, 237, 248 Gender genocide, 174–176 Gingrich, Newt, 10–11, 43, 68, 70, 199, 203–205 Grassroots victims movements, crime and, 99, 106 Guns (see also Guns and politics, Guns and the survivalist right), 58, 63, 66, 110–111, 245 Guns and politics, 195–196

Subject Index Guns and the survivalist right, 74–75 Hate speech, 7, 217, 227–229 Hate web sites, 239–240 Helms, Jesse, 124 Homophobia, 138–140, 153, 164, 201, 254 Horton, Willie, 219–220 Illogic, social rage and (see also Irrationality versus rationality), 190 Incivility, 4, 9, 42, 238 Intensity of social rage expression, as distortion, 12–14, 44, 46–47, 75–76, 80, 177, 213–214, 219–220, 226, 233–234, 236–237 Irrationality versus rationality, social rage, 12–13, 32–35 Jackson, Jesse, 102, 136 John Birch Society, 57–58 Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 11, 20, 57–58, 69, 81–82, 201, 239 Left versus right social rage, 3, 20, 54–55, 235–236 Liddy, G. Gordon, 43, 76–77, 217, 225–226 Limbaugh, Rush, 10, 11, 42, 204, 216–217, 220–221, 225–227M “Looking-glass self ” (see also “Social mirror”), 121 Master status, minorities and, 122M McVeigh, Timothy, 11, 43, 58, 61–62, 80, 226

Subject Index Media distortions and distractions, 217–227, 229 Media effects on crime control, 105–106, 111, 214–216, 217–219 Media religion and politics and, 220–222 superficiality of, 217 survivalist right and the, 75–77M Military and the survivalist right, 73–74 Million Man March, 11, 162, 247, 252–253 Million Youth March, 247 Moral panics (see also Drug wars), 107–110, 112 National Rifle Association (NRA), 63, 75, 195 Nationality and crime, 103 Nationality and social rage, 133–135, 255–256 Nostalgia (see also “Common sense,” Ronald Reagan, Simplicity and social rage), 200–201, 254 Oklahoma City bombing, 9, 17–18, 42, 58, 62, 68–69, 76, 80, 82, 195, 198, 204, 234 Operation Rescue, 12, 75 Personal rage, social rage and, 2–3, 8, 31, 238 Political intolerance, 201 Politics and survivalist right, 67–70 Promise Keepers, 11, 133, 166–171, 221, 242, 258 Racism, social rage and, 135–137

279 Racism, survivalist right and, 66–67 Rap music, 246 Reagan, Ronald, 13, 38–39, 70, 109, 193, 195, 197, 200–201, 254 Religion and intolerance, 161–163, 177–178, 192 and politics, 163–166, 176, 192, 200 and racism, 156 and sexism, 131–133, 152, 156, 165–166, 176, 251–252 and social rage, 137–138 and survivalist right, 71–73 and total institutions, 160–161 Religious conflict in the United States, 158–159 “Republican Revolution” of 1994, 9, 68, 76, 198, 200–201, 205M “Righteousness” of social rage, 2, 12, 31 Right versus left social rage, 3, 20, 54–55, 235–236 Right-wing politics and nazism, 201–203 Right-wing politics and terrorism (see also Chenoweth, Helen), 199–200 Road rage, 40 Robertson, Pat, 10, 63, 153, 164 School killings, 111, 244–245 Selfishness, social rage, 40–42 Sexism and crime, 103–104 and social rage, 129–133, 251–252 and survivalist right, 63–66 Shame, role in social rage, 31, 37–38, 238

280 Simplicity and social rage (see also “Common sense,” Nostalgia, Ronald Reagan), 13, 39, 62–63, 121 Skinheads, 17, 38–39, 54, 78, 197, 256 Social change (see also Social movements), 3–5, 34–35, 124, 170–171, 234, 245–246 Social movements and social rage (see also Social change), 34–36 “Social mirror,” 121 Social rage across time, fluctuations, 16–17, 19–21, 54, 186, 188, 203–206, 227, 235, 248–251 Socio-economic status and crime, 104–105 Sociology of the enemy, 60, 120–124, 142, 201, 242–243, 248 Southern Baptist Convention, 1998, 171–174 “Spin,” 218–220 Subtle versus obvious social rage, 234, 243–244 Superficiality, social rage (see also Media and superficiality), 39, 195, 217 Survivalist right anti-governmentalism, 70–71 belief systems, 55–56, 58–63 military, 73–74 racism, 66–67 religion, 71–73 sexism, 63–66

Subject Index Taliban movment (see also Gender genocide), 156, 174–176, 177 Talk shows, 32, 43, 46, 76, 225–227, 270–273 Thatcher, Margaret, 13, 38 Tokyo subway gassing, 17–18, 265–267 Tolerance, 234 Tolerance of intolerance, 5–7 Tough-on-crime policies, 92–93 ineffectiveness of, 93–96, 98–99, 109 politics of, 106, 111–112, 194–195 T-shirts, rage messages on, 43–46 U.S., special brand of rage, 18–19, 39–40 Vacuousness, social rage, 39, 195, 217 Vengeance and crime control, 93, 96–98 Violations of expectations (see also American Dream), 3–5, 37, 170–171, 234, 239 Waco, 68, 71, 75 White Aryan Resistance (WAR), 57–58, 67, 73, 82 White power music, 223–225 White men as “endangered species” (see also Chenoweth, Helen) 4, 55, 131 Women of the Ku Klux Klan (WKKK), 66, 130