Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion (Buddhist Tradition)

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BY

.

Contents

Foreword

by

Series Editor

FortWord

11:1

Thomas P. Kmulis

.

.

IX

Acknowledgments

xix 1

Introduction

1

.

2.

The Buddha's Skill-in-Means

Abhidharma

4.

Mahayana Buddhism: The Nagitiuna's MMiddle Way"

5.

Ch'an Buddhism

Conclusion ���au Index

9

Buddhism:

38

The Scholastic Tradition

3.

..

Vlll

VimalalcirtinirdeSa

62 89

121 150 159

167

Foreword (by Series Editor)

This book is an interesting application of Skillful Means, including compassion, to discussions of Buddhism, whether frmayana or Mahayana. Apparently, it was not held as necessary to know the technical meanings of the Buddhist terms; and persons who fmd it appropriate to know such meanings may not be able to apply Skillful Means in the manner employed by Professor john W. Schroeder. So, may I congratulate Schroeder on his discussions using this 'Skillful Means,' and therefore worthy of inclusion in the Buddhist Tradition Series. -ALEx WAYMAN

Foreword

book that chal lenges us to rethink what we already know and understand. This is just such a

Rare is the believe we

book.- On o n e l eve l, John Schroeder is d eve l opi n g a philosophical interpretation of the Buddhist notion of upiiya or "ski llful means," an idea wi t h whi ch any student of Buddhism is probably familiar. Yet, as we read the book, we find that Schroeder has done something more profoun d and less expected-he has led us to a different about Buddhism and us

w h at

way of thinking

it is all about. He has encouraged

to see Buddhism as not primarily involved in explaining

reality and knowledge, b ut instead as teaching the praxes that lead to such goals as mindfulness or compassion . That

is, he argues that what we often take to be Buddhist metaphys ics or epistemology are, instead, reflections on and within prax i s (so-called "metapraxis"). thereby justifying the procedure

of personalizing the teachings for the particular

audience at hand. In this new light, upiiya becomes not so

much a d octri ne that some Buddhists believe, but rat her a name for an enterprise in which all Buddhists are involved in

one

way or

a n ot h er

.

Schroeder's thesis, in short, is that

Buddhists are less interested in teaching about what reality is than they are in teaching about how we are to find awareness and compassion

in our practices, in helping

us

live

our lives skillfully. To many readers, this might seem

not new at all. Even

the early commentators on Buddhism in the West, people like D. T.

Suzuki, tended to

say things like "Buddhism is

not a

it is a way of life." Schroeder's line of argument shows us, however. a better way of putting this. Although

philosophy;

lX

Foreword

X

Buddhism is a praxis and a way of life, such

a way of life

does not exclude philosophy. That is, Budd hism

is not a

contrasted with a way of life. Although Buddhism may not be a philosophy as an independent academic discipline, i t does not follow that there is no philosophy

as

philosophical dimension

within a Buddhist way of life. At the

base of any religion, Buddhism included, is praxis. Typically, there are multiple praxes within any tradition, sometimes emphasized by d ifferent subsects of the same tradition. In explaining and justif ying the praxes, various philosophical claims and arguments may be made. Such statements are

indeed p h i l o s ophy (Suzuki missed that poi nt ) , but they are

a

kind of philosophizing that ca n n ot be sep ara ted from the praxes out of which they arise (the insight behind Suzuki's comment). In my own work, I have labeled this fo rm of philosophizing "metapraxis" to contrast it with theories about

the nature of reality, "metaphysics." Schro eder has, I be lieve

,

used the distinction fruitfully in this book.

We can better

grasp the point of Schroeder's e mpha s is

on Buddhist philosophy as metapraxis by considering an analogy fron1 a mundane kind of human experience. As I was walking through the park the other d ay,

I stopped to watch a

team of nine-year olds having a baseball practice. The coach was working with the youngsters, helping them in their batting. One girl was very aggressive

hard

and

trying

to

hit

a

at the plate, swinging

homerun

every

time.

She

consistently missed or just barely hit the ba ll. The coach told

try to kill the ball; just let the bat meet the ball." On the n ext swing, the girl hit a nice line drive into the her, ''Don't

outfield. "That's it. Now you,re getting it." The next kid boy who was rather timid at the plate, seemingly

was a

afraid of

missing the ball and hesitating to take a full swing. The

Foreword

xi

coach yelled out encouragingly, "Don't worry about hitting

the ball; just swing away." The lad let it rip on the next swing, missing the ball by at least two inches. The coach chimed o u t,

"That's it. Good. Don t worry about missing. Just '

keep on swinging." I suspect we can all think of parallel expres s ions used in various kinds of te aching whether th ey ,

be

fro m sports, music performance, d ance crafts, or the arts. ,

praxis. S u ppose in our little sto ry however, that I were a die­

They are part of everyday

,

hard metaphysician (or epistemologist pe rha ps ) who had just witnessed the coach's instructions and approached him after

the practice to

submit

him

to

some

tough-minded

questioning. We could imagine a dialogue that might have

gone li ke this: Metaphysician:

"I know that these are just kids, but I don t '

see why you have to lie to them." Coach:

"I didn't lie. What do you mean?

"

"Well, you to ld the girl to le.t the bat meet the ball and then you t old the boy to swing without concern for hitt ing

M:

the ball. B o t h teachin gs c a n 't be right because they

contradict each other: one says to foc us on the ball an d

bat and the other says to focus on the s wing itself without regard for the ball and bat. So, which is right? Bec a use either one or both

m us t

be wron g , you're lying to at least

one of them. Why?" C: "I wasn't lyin g. I was just adjusting what I was s aying in re sponse to what I saw in the ir respective swings. Every kid is different-some are con fident, some overconfident, some hesitant, some stickle rs for technique, some high ly intuitive. Right?"

M: "Sure." C: "Well, I try to factor that into what I'm saying. I'm interested in results. One way of putting things may work for one kid, but not for another."

M: "Well, how did you know what was wrong 1n their swings? You must have some idea of a perfect swing that they were not attaining. If so, why don't you just teach them that?" C: "In a way, I am. I mean, if they take to heart my advice and my advice is good , their swings will improve. Eventually, they'll both be swinging the right way. There may be some differences in style between them, but overall, they will have just ab out the same swing." M: "So, what you're saying to them is just an expedience, a means to an end. Along the way, you are fudging the truth to get them to the point where you d on t have to deceive them any more. I understand your motive, but I '

am

unhappy with it. It seems i mm oral .

You see, I don't

telling white lies, however benign the motive. When we start teBing untruths, they may be efficacious in some short-term sense, but in the end, they undermine believe in

in the hon esty of others and, maybe even more dangerously, deny the audience's autonomy. The students can never figure out the truth on their own because t hey trust

depend on the teacher's pedagogical sequence, filled as it

is with expeditious

white lies. That doesn't seem right

to me." C: "Now wait a minute. I never said I'm telling white lies. I'm j ust trying to help them become better batters, to be more skillful in what they're trying to do. I'm not

xiii

Foreword

pretending to start from scratch. I'm just starting with where they are , j u m p ing into the situation

as

it

presents

with what I've got, what they bring to n ot trying to tell them s om e kind of absolute

itself. I'm working

me. I'm

truth about th e universe; I'm just nudging them along path that

a

wil l help them do b e tt e r what the y r e trying '

to do."

M: "Well, maybe. I und e rs t a n d you're trying to hel p them-! don't in any way q uestion your good intentions. But I s t i ll don't see why you just don ' t

teach them the

perfect swing and forget all this intermediary distortion of the final goal."

C: "I'm not su re where you're going with this 'final goal' stuff. M aybe I was misleading you when I let y o u characterize my goal as 'the perfect swing.' There is no 'perfect

swing'

that

can

be

explained

in

some

unambiguous way. Even if there were such a thing as a 'perfect swing,' I couldn't just exp lain it to them. They

have

to feel

how it works, not abstractly understand it,

and that comes from practicing over an d over again with

supervision. I am helping them to swing more p e r fe ctly without having some fixed idea of a some g ood

preconceived ideal. No two 'perfect swings'-as you ca ll

them-are exactly alike. Yet, when I see one, I know it."

M: "Ah, but how do you know it? What's the foundation, the verification, of that purported knowledge?" C: "I just know it. How? Probably because I 'v e played baseball almost all my life and I've watched thousands of bat te rs good and bad,· over the years. I've been c oach e d myself as a batter, and I've coached others. Basically, I ,

learned just the way these kids are learning."

Foreword

xiv

M: "Oh, now I see. You're just passing down

R

kind of

technical know-how. You've got no real knowledge about the way things are; you just have a set

of

acquired skills,

a craft. Truth does n ' t even come into play." C: "If that works for you, I'll accept that.

Now, if

you'll

e xc us e me, I promised Samantha I'd hel p her with her swing after

M:

prac tice and she's waiting for me."

Sorry to have taken up you r time. I'm a philosopher and I j ust can't help b ut ask such questions. "Sure thing.

I'll let you

go. Teach Samantha well..:._be crafty."

That little dia logu e ca n h e lp

us

focus on some key

points in Schroeder's analysis. First , before the intervention

metaphysician, the coach was simply involved in the praxis of teaching baseball skills. To the extent he is doing it well and the players im prove his teachings are expedients or "skillful means." In Buddhist terminology, they are upaya. In of the

,

co a c hi n g the youngsters, the co ach

problems

simply responded to the

each player was having wi th his or her swing. The

situation

changed, however, once the metaphysician

challenged those teaching practices. reflect on what he

w

The coach then began

to

a s doing and how to justify it. The

discussion ch an ged from the practical to the metapractical.

The coach

was

no longer simply practicing coaching, but also

analyzing the rationale in his coaching and why its methods are effective. The metaphysician kept missing the point, however, by seeking strict l ogical coherence in the coach's

praxis.

The metaphysician wanted the co a ch

to have a singl e

set

of instructions or

In

response, the coach tried to explain the fluidity and

a single paradigm for the perfect swing.

apparent incoherence in

his praxis as coach. The Buddhist

Foreword

XV

justification for upaya, Schroeder shows, is similar t o that kind of meta praxis. Furthermore, in our dialogue the coach ends the discussion noting that t he ph ilosopher's interpretation may still not be perfect. Yet, at least now the metaphysician has

a

way of understanding why coaching statements need not have absolute consistency in the strict logical· sense. Nor are they about "truth" as typically defined in metaphysics or epistemology. If ever in t he position of teaching someone to h i t a baseball, that metaphysician would (because of the

interpretat ion devel oped here) be freer to teach without concern for tight logical consistency. In his own terminology, the metaphysician would be teaching the know-how of a craft instead of the knowing-that of metap hysics or episten1ology. In that respect, the coach's metapractical discussion wit h the metaphysician was also upaya: the c oach did not insist on

only, absolute, unqualified metapr actic al theory of how to coach batting. Instead, he let defining

the

one

and

his interlocutor go off with an understanding that "works for

you." By helping the meta physician real ize how metaphysics does not apply in th is case, the coach coached the philosopher as well as Samant ha. In this book, John Schroeder sh ows how muc h of Buddhist philosophizing can be und erstood along similar lines. In doing so, he cuts against the gra in of much common buddhological scholarship. (1) He shows that the general idea of upiiya, though not necessarily the term itself, is found in both the Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Buddhism

as

well

as Mahayana. (2) He s hows that in Mahiyina sutras like the

Vimalakirti the emphasis and use of narrative is given a metapractical justification of sorts as part of its larger acceptance of t he techniques of upaya. (3) He argues that

xvi

Foreword

N agarjuna's philosophy is best understood as metapractic a l rather than me ta phy sical or mystic al. That is, Schroeder's view is that NagArjuna's arguments are always targeted to a particular audience whose praxes are co rrupte d by unskillful phi lo s ophica l theories.

By that a cco u n t , we coul d say

Nagarjuna is philosophizing, but only in the upaya-like

r athe r than the metaphysical or epistemological sense. Just as th e coach used philosophy in metapractical

sense,

talking with a philosopher, Nagirjuna use d philosophical arguments in talking with philosophers, but that in itself does not make either the coach or NAglrjuna a "philosopher" in some definitive sense. For Nagarjuna to make phi losophy itself a path to skillful p rac t i c e would be as silly as the baseball coach

trying to articulate a "perfect swing." (4)

Schroeder articulates a metapractical re ason for why

Ch'an/Zen an d Pure Land B ud dhi s m could be practice d together in some East Asian contexts. If we take the

nothingness and the Pure Larid idea of Amida's saving grace as metaphysical teachings, there is no room for pract icing the two tog e th er However, if we take Ch'an/Zen idea of

.

those teachings to

be more

metaprac ti ca l

than metaphysical,

p r ac t i c a l confluence of the two traditions, just as there is room on a baseball team for different players to follow different instructions in th eir individual practice. there is roon1 for the

In s u mm a tion, through his synoptic vision of the Buddhist tr ad ition Schroeder shifts our understanding of ,

upaya from being

a particul ar doctrine

in certain schools of

Buddhism to being a way of thinking about praxis found in virt u al l y all

schools of Buddhism. For

me

at leas t , this

suggests that there is nothing wrong in studying Buddhist controversies

as

philosophical disagreements as long

as we

xvii

Foreword

remembe r th at they are based in and u lti mate l y about Buddhist praxis. They are a lways used in particular, not universal, contexts. Nor does Schroeder's approach commit

us

to saying th at all Buddhists agree on philosophical matters . They often disagree, just as co a ch e s may dis agree among themsel ves, but the phi losophic a l point of contenti on i s me taprac t ic a l, not metaphysical. philosophical

enterprise,

has

Metapraxis,

restrictions,

a

like a n y need

for

consistency, for instance . For exam p le, our batting coach might have said seemingly inconsi stent things to di fferent players, but his metapractical justification (di fferences are necessary to adapting the me ssage to the te mperament, habits, an d readiness of each player) was itself consistent.

John Schroeder h a s given us a fascinating and provocative st udy. Even for those who might disagree with some deta i l in the a rgument, the overa l l thesis remai ns engaging and leads us to a more fruitful l evel of discussion. Schroeder is urging us to for mula te our buddhological and philosophical questions in

a new

way and in so doing, opens

up new vistas on the tradition . Buddhist scholarship its e lf is, after all, a praxis . Schroeder makes

us

phi losophical ly reflect

on that praxis and thereby makes us more skillful at what we

do. Thomas P. Kasulis

Teacher mutually

a nd

disciple

pr ac t i c i ng

is the twining vines of buddha

ancestors. Twining v i n es of buddha ancestors is the life stream of skin, flesh, bones, and m.arrow. Taking up a flower and winking is twining vines. Break ing into a smile is skin, flesh, bones, and marrow. The seeds of twining vines have the power of dropping away body. Branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit of twining vines do and do not interpenetrate one another. Thus, buddha

ancestors

appear, and the

fundament.al point is actualized. -Dogen

Acknowledgments

It would

be impossible to

give thanks to all the people

who have helped shaped this book. It has taken many twists and turns, and has been guided by the generous criticisms and intellectual support of many people .

My deepest gratitude goes to

my dear friend and men­

Don Levi from t he University of Oregon. Don supported thi s project from its very beginn ings and has read and re­ rea d many versions of the manuscript. His gen u ine concern for my int e l lec tu al development, his warm friendship, and

tor

,

his penetrating in s igh ts have made this project come to frui­

than anyone else, he taught me the beauty of what Dogen means by the "mutual practice of teacher and studen t tion. More

."

My sincerest gratitude also goes to Henry Rosemont, Jr.

C ollege of Maryland. Henry offered detailed suggestions of the manuscript, and helped me

from St. Mary's criticisms and

think of the project in relati on to the Bu ddhist traditions of C h in a and Jap an. As my professional mentor, he has adopted the role of a true Confucian Master, gu id in g my de ve l opment

as a te acher and s chol ar of the "cross-cultural way." Spe cia l thanks also go to Thomas Kasulis from The Ohio State University who p re sse d me to t hi n k hard about

"skillful means . It was during his NEH Semin a r on Zen Buddhism in 1997 that I rethought the entire proj ect along the idea of "metapraxis," and he has since read the manuscript carefully, giving helpful criticisms and c orrec­ tions. I am es pe cially grateful f or his willingness to write the the idea of

"

foreword.

XlX

Aclcnowledgments

XX

�esides this many other people underlie the making of the book. Special thanks to my loving lotus friend Lance ,

"

"

who helped revise the first sections of the book; to Stephen Stern for his deep friendship and for his help with the conclusion; to Michae l Webb for his undivided love and

Popoff

emotional support; to Larry Rich and C e l i a Escudero for their inspiration; to Shane Farrell for years of friendship; to 1\fehmet Gencer for his generosity; to C. T. for he lpi n g me "skillful means" into practice; to A1ichelle Desailly for of­ fering a w arm Australian home to work in; and, of course, to put

my mother and father who gave me the world.

Special thanks also to St. Mary's College of

Maryland

for financial support to do research in India; to professor

Alan Paskow for financial assistance from the D ivis ion of H urnan Development; to my colleagues in the Department of

Religi ous Studies for providi ng me with a productive and supportive workspace; to Devin Polster, Jake

Philosophy· and

Mroczynski who hel p e d format and index the manuscript; and to Keith K. Leber from the Karaczynski, and Richard

University of Hawai'i Press for his patience and editorial guidance.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor Hee-jin Kim from the University of Oregon who first in trod uced me to � udd his t philosophy. Without his init i al inspiration, this book would have never been written. A note about the text. While I

faithful

have

tried to remain

to the Sanskrit transliteration, I have taken some

liberties with a few key words, alte ring their form for the sake of brevity and coh es io n . I have also standardized the text as much as possible, using Sanskrit instead of Pali in most sections.

SKILLFUL MEANS

Introduction

There is a famous story in the Buddhist Pali text, the Mahauagga, about the Buddha's initial hesitation to express his te achings to the world. Arising from five weeks of medi· tation on the nature of suffering and spiri_tual bondage, it suddenly

occurre d

to the

Buddha that his Dharma, which is

"deep, diff icult to see, difficult to

understand,

pe a ceful, ex·

cellent, be yon d dialectic" might get d istorte d by a world "cloaked in the

murk" of attachments. In fact, given the �a·

bitual tendencies" of most people, the Buddha felt his teachings would

only cause more suffering and confusion in

the world, and, rather than

norance

"

tread against the stream" of ig­

an d confusion, he thought it would be better to re·

main silent and not teach about his experiences at all. If the story stopped here th en we would know nothing

of the Buddha's teachings. But the Hind u

go d Brahma sud·

denly appeared to the Buddha, urging him to teach. The god knelt at the Buddha's feet and pleaded, "Lord, let the Lord

teach dhamma, let the Well-farer teach dhamma; there are beings with little dust in their eyes who, not hearing dhamma are decaying, but if they are learners of dhamma, they will grow" (Horner 1962, p. 9). Brahma repeated his plea

three times, and as the Buddha listened he began to see the world in a new light: As the Lord was surveying the world with the eye of

awakened

an

one, he s aw be ings with little dust in their

eyes, with much dust in

t he i r eyes, with a c ute

faculties, with dull fa culties, of good dispos itions, of

Skillful Means

2

bad dispositions, docile, indocile,

few seeing fear in sins

and the worlds beyond (Horner 1962, p. 9). In both the Mahavagga and Majjhima·Nikaya, the Buddha's

is ion is compared to various lotus ponds with dif

v

•

ferent degrees of growth: Even as in a pond of blue lotuses or in a pond of red lo­

tuses or

in a pond of

white lot use s , a few blue or red or

lotuses are born in the water, grow in the water, do not rise above the water but thrive while altogether immersed; a few blue or red or white lotuses are born in

white

in the water and reach the surface of the water; a few blue or red or white lotuses are born in the water, grow in the water, and stand up rising out of the water, undefiled by t he water (Homer 1967, p. 210).

the water, grow

The story then rel ates the Buddha's

vision

to the nature

of humanity: j ust as there are various types of lotuses, so there are v a ri ous stages of human growth, each with differ· ent degrees of "dust" and confusion in their minds. Upon

the B u d dha knew it preach universally or speak as if every­

seeing these "wondrous" differences, would be useless to

one were the same. He knew that he would need to be

if he wanted

to help

others

sensitive to the karmic differences of

human beings and mold his teachings to their level. With this new wisdom, the Buddha decided to "Tum the Wheel of Dharma" to his former ascetic companions. The

Mahayana tradition in Buddhism sees this story as

pivotal because

it expresses an intimate relationship between

wisdom (prajiia) and compassion (karuQii). Rather than say­ ing the

Buddha attains enlightenment before he hesitates

to

Introduction

3

preach Dharma, the MahAyanists say his enlightenment

culminates in the realization that human beings differ and that he must teach depending on the relative emotional, in­

t ellectual, and spiritual dispositions of his audience. They

say this not only connects the Buddha's enlightenment to the "everyday" world but

revea ls the compassionate wisdom of a

great bodhisattva who

res pond s

to the con cre te suffering of

others.

This link between wisdom and compassion, called "skill­

(upiJya-kausalya) in the Mahayana t raditio n , is what this book will explore. Very generally, �J:pdya refers to

in-means"

the different pedagogical styles, meditation techniques, and

religious practices that help people overco me attachments, and

to the ways in which

Bu ddhism is communicated to oth­

ers. Like the example of

the Buddha in the above story,

"skillful means" arises from the idea that w i s do m is

ied in how one responds to others

r a the r

em bod­

than an abstract

conception of the world, and reflects an ongo ing concern with

the soteriological effectiveness of the Buddhist teachings. One goal of this study is to chart this view of "skillful means" throughout i m po rta nt moments in Buddhist history.

It will focus on the different pedagogical styles that are used in Buddhism,

Dharma is Pye

n otes ,

exploring the various ways

in which the

communicated and taught to others. As Michael Western scholars generally neglect this approach

to Buddhism:

It is fair to say that the method of tho ught and practice

summed up by the concept of skilful means is one of the fundamental

principles of Buddhism.

And

yet,

has never been the subject of extended study .'Nirvii)a', 'bodhisattva', 'emptiness',

strangely enough the matter ...

Skillful Means

4

and so on have all been considered in this way and that,

but apart from oc ca sional references an d brief defini­ tions 'skilful means' has scarcely been attended to at

all. A c oncept which has been used to explain the very existence of Buddhism as a functioning religious system

demands closer attention (Pye 1978, p. 1). Pye's e xa m ina tio n of upaya is primarily a textual

analysis of "skilful tion

"

means

in the Lotus Siltra and the Perfec­

of Insight literature, and, while it does offer some

sug­

gestive insights about the philosophical implications of upii.ya, it offers little in the way of a critical approach to

Buddhist philosophy. The focus of this book points to a larger, critical issue in the Buddhist tradition.

Simply put,

there are some Buddhist traditions (such as the Abhidharma)

that say the Buddha established basic meditative practices for all Buddhists to follow, and that some of his teachings

are therefore "absolutely" true; and there are other traditions (such as the early Mahayana) that say all the Buddha's

teachings are none other than "skill-in-means." While the Abhidharma Buddhists say the Buddha sometimes taught (samurtti) or "skillful" doctrines for the igno­ they also say he established a unive rsal path, or miirga,

"conventional"

r an t ,

in his "ultimate" teachings

(paramiirtha). For the Mahiyina,

however, to say the Buddha established a definitive sote­

riological path constricts his teachings into a fixed remedy

and drains them of compassion. The doctrine of upiiya mirrors this debate, and refers to a

critical, self-reflective movement in the -Buddhist tradition.

The bulk of Western Buddhist scholarship ignores this criti­

cs] element by focusing either on the philosophical implica­ tions of certain Buddhist terms like "non-self," ''emptiness,"

5

Introduction

and "buddha-nature," or by focusing excl usively on

Buddhist

re ligio us praxis. This methodological split generally pits phi­ losophers on one side who ex plore the metaphysical, episte­ mological, and logical significance of Buddhist doctrine, and

religious sch olars on the other side who devote their atten­ tion s o lely to religious praxis. Most scholars will agree, how­ ever, that, in Buddhis m (and perhaps in all Asian t raditions ,

is no clear cut distinction between phi­

for that matter) there

-

losophy and religion, and that our tendency to favor on e ap­ proaeh over another reflects the rigid boundaries within our own aca demic

disciplines rather than anything inherent in

the Buddhist tradition. An approach to

Buddhism that go es beyond this disc i­

plinary split is obviously needed, and is what makes the doc­

trine of

upaya both important and timely. It brings together

the philosophical and religious by explori ng the practices, meditation techniques, and religious d iscip l ines in Bud­ dhism, and offers a critical, philosophical analysis of Bud­ dhist soteriology. To understand what

is at stake in this project it is im­

portant to distinguish between two types of philosophical re­ flection. In "Philosophy as. Metapraxis," Tho m as Kasulis de­ scribes a form

of reflection devoted exc lusively to problems

surrounding the nature and efficacy of religious praxis (Ka­

sul is 1992). He calls this "meta praxi s " and argues that we need to distinguish it from other types of philos ophic al re­ ,

flection-such as metaphysics-that problematize what

behind or above religious praxis. Whereas metaphysi­ c al reflection is geared toward very general issues sur­ rounding the nature of be ing, language, consciousness, and

stands

truth, metapractical reflection is geared s pec ifi cal l y toward

Skillful Means

6

the efficacy of re ligious praxis : how

be n e fi c i a l it is , how it

works , and whether it is performing its job adequately: Re ligious p raxi s generally has either a participatory or

It partici pates in , to use Rudolf Otto's term, the "numinous." It is transformative in its improving the person or community in some spiri­ tua l way (purifying, healing, reconci l ing, protecting, in­

transform ative function .

forming, and so on ) . Meta practical reflection inquires into the purpose and efficacy of th e practice in terms of these partic i patory and transfo rmative functions. Something happens, or at least is supposed to happen, in and through religious praxis. Metapraxis analyzes and eval uates that h a p p en ing What does the praxis .

change? Is something remembered? Reenacted? Em­ powered? If so, exactly how does the praxis work? And why should we prefer our traditional praxis as more ef­ fective

than another? (Kasulis 1992, p. 178).

Kasulis' discussion of metapraxis wil l help us under­ stand the sign i ficance of upiiya dhism.

and how it re lates to Bud­

The doctrine of u p ay a w a s deve loped by the

Mahayana

Buddhists to oppose the creation of an orthopraxy

and to resist the tendency to confine the practices into an ab­ so l ute path , or nliirga . Early Mahayana texts such as the

Prajiiiipii ramitii , Lotus Sii.tra, and Vimalaklrtinirdesa state that th e B uddhist teachings are devised with a particular in mind and not abstract formulas to be espoused inde­ pendently of knowing the exact dispositions of those who suf­ fer. These early texts de pict Sakyamuni as a "Great Physi­

goa l

cian" who knows the different ty pes of illnesses of sentient be ings

and who can therefore offer the best "medicine" to suit

7

Introduction

their needs : he knows when to

hold back, when

to remain si­

lent, an d when to prescri be the appropriate a n ti dote . To preach Buddhism without such sensitivity, we are often tol d, is "bad medicine." Because upaya refers to a debate about the purpose and efficacy

of Buddhist practice , it is not concerned with the na­

ture of truth, consciousness, causality, or the se lf, and has no

interest

in solving pressing metaphysical dilemmas. It is thus

different from the way most Western phi losophers conceive

of Buddhism . According to

many scholars (Murti 1 955, Conze

1 97 3 , Suzuki 1 956, Robinson 1 967 , and Stcherbatsky 1 968) , Buddhist liberation has to d o with releasing ourselves from

the grip of grammatical fabrications , ics, reason ,

from logic, metaphys­

c on ce ptua l dualities , and essentialism, and their

texts are general ly devoted to showing

us

how Buddhism de­

constructs a fa l l acious view of personal identity, conscious­ ness, and language. "Ski l l ful means" w i l l counteract this "metaphysical"

approach by arguing that the major debates in Buddhism surround issues of praxis and the problem of fixed practice for a l l people . Th is w i l l

justifying a

be developed in a

loosely chrono logica l fashion , beginning with the historica l Buddha in Chapter 1 , which sets up the practice of "skil l-in­ means" through

an

analysis of the different

pedagogical and

heuristic devices outlined in the early Pili texts , and is fol­ lowed in Chapter 2 by an overview of the Abhidharma tra d i­ tion in B uddhism. This chapter out lines the diffe r e nt

metapractica l theories of two important Abhidharma schools, which is essential to understanding why the d o ct ri n e of updya was developed

in the first place .

c ha pte rs offer different examples dhism.

The remaining three

of "skill-in-means" in Bud­

Chapte r 3 explores the Vimalakirtinirdesa , an early

SkiUful Means

8

M a h ayana text th at condemns the B uddha's disciples for preaching "bad medicine . " Chapter

4 focuses on the impor­

tant M ahayana philosopher Nagarjun a , and Chapter 5

d is ­

upaya in the Ch'an and Pure Land tradi­ tion s . The fina l section wil l c on c l ude with some self-critical remarks regarding the upayic status of this entire study. Hopefully, the reader wil l not walk away from this book with the feeling that Buddhism is simply relativistic, or w ith cusses the role of

the sense that

upiiya restricts the study of Buddhism

to mere

historica l a n a lys i s . On the contrary , it is hoped that the reader w i l l gl impse the peren n i a l value of upaya

and its

re levance to conte mporary life and experience . For,

while it

upaya speaks primarily to Buddhists about their own practices and about how not to become attached to Bud­ dhism , it is fundamentally a teaching of compassion. It seeks to express l ov e and intimacy, and shows how compassion is sti l l possible in a world fi l led with confusion , un b e a ra bl e is true that

s ufferi ng,

and lone l iness . I t is t h is sense of compassion

(karutJ.ii ) that any book on upiiya should try to convey.

Chapter 1

The Buddha's Skill-in-Means

Introduction Al l Buddhists wou l d agree that the m ost importa nt event i n Gautama Buddha's life was his enlightenment expe­ rience . As he sat meditating under the Bodhi Tree through ­ out the night, the B uddha experienced the depth of human

(du}J,kha ) and saw that bondage arises from the cy­ c lical n ature of attachments and desires . Later t h at same suffering

n ight , he pe rceived the law of "dependent co-originat � on"

(pratitya-samutpada) and felt th at if one cou l d break the

cy­

cle at the right point then one could achieve liberation . Just as dawn arriv.e d , he cried , "Birth-and-death are fin i s he d ! I have fulfilled my cherished goa l ! " I t is tempting to think that what the Buddha taught af­ ter his en l ightenment was the "truth" of that experience, and that his goal as a teacher was to h e l p others arrive at the same concl usion . It is also tempting to think that if en l ight­ enment consists in discovering certain truths about the world then we w i l l be en l ightened if we can s i m p ly discover them

as wel l . If we do think this way then we w i l l easi ly n egl ect the rhetorical context of the B uddha's teachings and focus more on

what he taught rather than how he taught. In the

MahAyAn a Buddhist tradition , however, the Buddha's w is­ dom

(prajnii. ) is not contai ned i n a series of propositions or

decl arative statements about the worl d , but is expressed through a

unique sty l e of teaching, communicati ng, and re­

sponding to others . The re is something about the way the

9

Skillful Means

10

Buddha teaches that interests the Mahayana tradition , some­ thing about the way he s peaks an d the way he l is te n s that reveals the depth of his enlightenment. By simply twirl ing

a

flower, touching someone on the sh oulder, smiling, or ges­ turing w i t h his finger he liberates sentient beings . For some, he simply offe rs words of advice an d consolation , for others he gives long philosophical discourses on

the nature

of real­

i ty, and for others still, harsh reprimands . But what inter­ ests the early Mahiyanists is that a l l these forms of com mu­

they a l l lead to en lighten ment even though they differ in so many ways. This i n te re s t in the Buddha's style of teaching n e eds to nication are effective :

be distinguished from an abstract analysis of what the Bud­ dha taught. Western phi l osophers who s tu dy Buddhism tend to examine the content of the Buddha's discourses at the ex­ pense of his pedagogical style, and assume that we can fully understand his message a part from its rhetorical context. Many think we can separate what the Buddha said from how he said it an d to whom. For the early Mahiyinists , however, we wi l l destroy the significance of the Buddha's teachings if we proce e d in this way. Rather than searching for a "truth"

behind

his everyday

use o f words , the early Mahayanists tell

us that in order to fully appreciate the Buddha's philosophy we nee d to listen to how he commun icates , how he teaches, and how he re spo n d s to others . An example of this a pp r o a c h is the "Fi re Sermon , .,

which was given t o a group of ascetic fire-worshippers who ritually burnt their o wn flesh. Because th e s e devotees of

Agni (the god of fire ) engage in extreme self-mortification, the Buddha's way of communicating is to the point: All things, 0 priests, are on fire. And what, 0 priests , are these things which are

on

fire?

The Buddha's Skill-in-Meall$

The eye ,

0 priests ,

11 is on fire ; forms are on fire; eye ­

consciousness is on fire; impressions received by the eye are on fire; and whatever sensation , pleasant, unpleas­ ant, or indifferent, originates in dependence on impres­ s i_on received by the eye, that a l so is on fire . And with

what are these on fire? With the fire of p as si o n say I, with the fi re of hatred, with the fire of infatuation; with birth , o l d age , death , sorrow , lamentation , misery, grief, ,

and despair are they on fire . The ear is on fire . . . the tongue is on

fire; tastes are on fire

. . .

the body is on fire;

things tangible are on fire . . . the mind is on fire; ideas are

on fire . . . mind-consciousness

is on fire; impressions

received by the m ind are on fire; and whatever sensa­ tion ,

p l e as an t , unpleasant, or indifferent, originates in

dependence on impressions received by the mind, that also is on

fire. <Warren

1986, p.

236-- 2 39 )

One could read this passage metaphysica l ly, as

saying

something either about the nature of the world (that it is ful l

of misery and h e l l-like ) or about the nature of perception (that

as lon g as there is "contact" between a sense organ and

its object, there wi l l be pai n , u n p leasantness , and grief). However, to read the "Fire Sermon" in this way would lead

us

to s pecu late on what the Buddha is saying in the abstract and apart from the fire worshi pping p riests who ritu a l l y burnt the i r o w n fle s h . I t would a l so l e a d us t o ponder the

metaphysica l significance

of his words apart from h ow they

were communicated. Given the Buddha's desire to help these

priests , however, he refuses to speak in the abstract. Instead , he

uses

words such as "fire" that d irect l y appeal to their sen­

sibilities and s piritual practices .

If we neglect this rhetorical

context then we w i l l lose the soteriological force of this teaching th a t ,

we

a re

tol d ,

con v i n c e d the chi e f fire-

Skillful Means

12

wors h i ppe r U ruve l a Kas apa a n d his thousand fo l lowers to stop

burning their bodies . Another exa m ple is the

Banaras"

gi ven to the five

Buddha's "First Sermon at

ascetics the Buddha

once lived

with i n the mountain s . AB with the fi re-wors h i pping priests , the B uddha cons iders the i r practices harmfu l and s e l f­ destructive, and he tries to c a t c h the i r atten tion by using words that a ppea l to their own world -view :

How is there laughter, how is there joy, as th is world is a l ways burni ng? Do you not seek a l ight , you who are

surrounded by darkness? Look at th i s dressed-up l u m p , covered with wound s , joined together sick ly, fu l l o f many schemes,

bu t which

has no strength, no hold!

This body is wasted , fu l l of sickness , and

frail; thi s

heap o f corruption breaks to pieces , l ife indeed ends in death . (Warren 1 986, p. 236-239) The univers a lity of

du!Jkha (suffering)

is expressed i n

B uddha's " F i rst Sermon," a n d is considered o n e of the ·�th ree marks" (lak$aT,Ul ) of existence. If we read the sermon the

in its rhetorica l context , however, it is doubtfu l we w i l l de­ rive a metaphysic a l conclus ion . As in the "Fire Sermon ," the

Buddha is not re fer ri n g category. He is

to misery as an abstract speaking to a sc et ics who a l re ad y have a pes­

simistic view of life , and he agrees with them . I n fact, he em­ phasizes j ust

how

miserable and sick l i fe rea l ly i s . After get­

ting their attention , he te l l s them that their extreme way

of

l i fe on ly causes more self-injury and pai n , and that it is not possible to a c h i e v e l iberation

th ro u gh such extreme meas­ ures : "The emaciated devotee produces confusion and sickly

The Buddha 's Skill- i11 -Means

13

thoughts in h i s min d . Mortification i s not conducive even to wor l d l y

know ledge . " The Buddh a then teaches the m the

"M iddle

Way , "

wh ich

avoids

mortification and in du lgence .

the

e x t re m e s

of

s e l f­

If the Buddha had s poken

metaphysical ly or ignored their emotiona l and i nte l lectual context, it is doubtful the ascetics would have ever listened . The point about keeping the rhetorical context of the Buddha's teachings in mind is that it draws our attention how compassion mon weakness in

is expressed through the teachi n gs . a

to

A com­

is that it p rivi le ges

metaphysical reading

what the Buddha said over how he said it, and gives the im­ pression that he s poke with no particular person in m i n d . This n o t o n l y effaces the B uddha's o w n sty l e of re l i gious prax is-his manner of teachi n g and respondi n g to oth­ e rs-but , from a skillfu l means pers pective , ki l ls what is most distinctive about the Buddha's teachings: his compassion.

Skillful Teachings Given the Buddha's realization that he needs to respond to the world in different ways , a number of M ahayana

texts

say the Buddha teaches a variety of philosophical and rel ig­ ious

v

iews that suit the contextua l dispositions

ence. The Did

of his audi­

Lotus Satra says : I not say before that the buddhas , the w o r l d­

honored ones, proc laim the Dharma by various karmic re aso nings , parables , forms of w o rds means ,

and s k i l lfu l

all for the sake o f sup reme perfect en lighten ­

ment? (Kern 1 989, p.

,

103)

. Skillful Means

14

The fa m ou s Madhyamika phi losopher Nagarj una re­ peats this view when he says :

The teachings of the protectors of the world accord with

the

( varying) r e s o l v e of living be i n gs . The Buddhas e m ­

p l oy a wea l th of ski l lfu l mean s , which take many worldly forms. (Lindtner 1986, p.

65)

Even the idea of nirva1;1a , a c co r d i n g to many Mahayana texts ,

is simply another "skillful means" of the Buddha:

For this reason , S ariputra , I set up a s k i l l fu l means for them, Expounding the w ay to end all sufferings , And show ing it by nirvii:ta. (Kern 1 989, p. 54) The Mahayana sfltras are fu l l of stories that express

go aga i n s t orthodox Buddhist doctri ne . The Upayakausalya

th e Buddha's compassionate activities, some of which even

Siltra tel ls of

with the the Buddha

a young woman who was so in love

B ud d h a that she was prepared to ki l l herse lf if

refused her. Out of compassion , the Buddha broke his vow of

celibacy and had a sexual affair with the woman (Tatz 1994, p . 34 ) . Another story from the same text tel ls how the Bud­ dha in a fo rm e r l i fe actua l ly murdered a man . His re a s o n was

to

prevent the man from ki l l i ng 500 others , and the only

him. The Buddh a's act was motivated solely from compassion-both for those who were · about to be murdered as we l l as for the murderer-and the Buddha went against his own mora l princi ples and was way

to preven t this

was to ki l l

willing to suffer in hel l because of it. (Tatz 1 994 , p. 73-77) The most significant feature of upiiya is that liberation does not stem from a metaphysical vision of humanity or a

15

The Buddha 's Skill-in-Means

"mystical" union with truth . The Lotus Sutra te l ls the story

of a rich man

by

promising

who lures

his chi ldren

o ut of a burning house

them beautiful gifts (Kern 198 9 , p. 94). Tradi­

tional ly, t h e house represents the rea l m of d e l u s ion and ig­ n o ran c e , the "imaginary" gifts are the

Buddha's tea ch i n g

styles , and the "bare ground" o u ts i d e the house represents the realm of e n l ightenment. The mora l of the story is that

enlightenment does not depend on any particular m e ta ph ys i

­

ca l view s in ce the chi ldren are l i be ra te d though an imaginary ·•device ."

What is puz z l i ng a b o u t s u ch

s t o r i es is that they not on ly go against orthodox Buddhist d oc tr ine t hey seem phi­ -

loso p hical ly inconsiste n t . That the Buddha can kill , lie, or cheat to h e l p othe rs atta i n l i be ration , a n d that he can s ay d i ffe re nt things to different people-and yet sti l l achieve the same end-seems l ike sophistry. A good exa m p l e of th is problem is found in the Brahma Vihara wh ere the B u d d h a instructs two y o u ng brahmins on how to attain union with the _ Hindu god B ra h m i . The puzzling a s pect of this story is that we not only fin d the Buddha teach i n g ideas that seem but that he seems to contradict the doctri n e of "non-sel f" (a tt ii t m a n ) , wh i ch m a ny scho l a rs more Hindu than Buddhist,

see as

the Buddha's real phi losophica l position. According to

t h i s doctrine , a l l t h i ngs are "se l fless" a n d non-s ubsta n ti a l ,

and

the enti re universe l acks

an

underlying fo rc e o r meta­

phy s i c a l being, l ike B rahm a . Neve rthe les s , when the Buddha

en c o u n ters two young brahmins

who are

co n f us e d

about their o w n H i n d u teach ings , he ins truct s them i n the fo l l o w i n g way:

And he l ets

his min d

pe rvade one quarte r of the world

with thoughts of love, and so the secon d , and

so

the

th ird, and so forth . And thus the whole wide wor l d ,

SkiU{ul Means

16

above, be l o w ,

around and everywhere , does he continue to pervade with heart of love , far reaching, grown great, measure. Just as a mighty trumpeter makes h i ms e l f heard-a nd that without difficulty-in all the and b ey o n d

four d i rections ; even so

of all things

that have shape

life, there is not one that he passes by or

or

leaves aside,

but regards them a l l w ith mind set free , and deep felt love . Veri ly this . . . i s the way to a state of union with Bra h m a
1 899,

p. 3 10)

Rather than tel l i ng the brahmins that there i s no "self,"

Brahms, and no metaphysica l basis to life, he of­ them advice on the best way to attain union with a god . Such i ncon sistencies are found throughout the Pili dis­

no God , no fe rs

In the fol lowing s e c t io n from the Sa111yutta-Nikiiya , for example, the B u d d h a te l l s his di s c i p l e s that they should

courses .

not s e a rc h fo r any t h i n g transce n d e n t a l or beyond sense

e x pe r t e nce : Monks ,

I w i l l teach ·you "everything." Liste n to it. What,

"everything"? Eye and material form , ear and sound, n o s e and odor, tongue and taste , body and tangi­ ble o bje c t s mind and m e n ta l objects. These are cal led "eve ryt h i n g . " Monks , he who w o u l d say : "I reject this monks , is

,

eve rything and ce rtai n ly have

proclaim another everything," he may a theory [ of h i s own ) . But when ques ­

t i oned , he woul d not be able to answer a n d would , moreover, be subject to vexation . Why? Because it would be within the range of sen se-experience. (Saqlyutta ­ Nikaya , quoted in Ka l u pahana 1 976, p . 158) not

The Buddha 's Skill- in -Means

17

But i n other passages the Buddha seems to describe u l ­ timate reality a s transcendental and beyond the senses : The stopping of becoming is N i rvaJ.la . ( Sa f!lyutta -Nikaya 11, 1 1 7 )

N i rvaJ.la do I ca l l it-the utter extinction of aging and dying.

<Sa f!lyutta-Nikaya I, 39)

There is, monks, that p l ane where there is neither ex­ tension nor . . . motion n or the plane of infinite ether . . . nor that of neither-pe rception-nor-non-perce ption , nei­ ther this worl d nor another,

neither the moon nor the

sun . Here , monks , I say that there is no com i ng or going or remaining or deceas ing or upris ing, for this is itself without su pport, without contin uance , without menta l object-this is i ts e l f the end of suffering. There is , mon ks ,

an un born , not become , not made , uncom­

poun ded, and were it not , monks , for this unborn , not become , not made , uncom pounded, n o escape cou l d be shown here for what is born , has become , is made ,

is

com pounded . But because there is, monks , an un born , n ot become, not made , un compounded , therefore an es­ ca pe can be shown for what i s born , has become , is made , is compounded .

( Udii n a 80-8 1 )

How s h o u l d we unders t a n d these obvious i ncon s iste n­ Cies i n the Buddha's teac h i n gs? The M a h aya n a tradition struggled w ith this and came up w ith various ways to reso lve it. One way was to say the Buddha never i n tended a l l of his t e a c h i n gs

to

be

Satrzdh in irmoca na

taken

l i tera l l y .

T e x ts

l i ke

the

Sutra say the Buddha s poke some doc­

trines "conve n t i o n a l ly" a n d othe rs " u l t i mate ly"-mean i n g

Skillful Means

18

s ome of his sayi n gs were m e re l y for the ignorant while others w e re withhe ld for the more advanced-while other

that

te x t s l ike the Lotus

Sutra make no distinction between the

skil lful and non-ski l lfu l teaching: "Apart from the skil lful means of the Buddh a , " says t h e

Lotus Siltra , "there is no

other veh icle to be found."

From a traditional Western phi losophical s t a n ce ; the ski l l fu l means a pproach m akes the Buddha either logica lly incom pe tent or

a

s o ph i st who

is more interested in playing

games w i th people than te l l ing the truth . The phi losopher Rich ard Garner takes th i s app ro a c h and

wonders why the Buddha l ies to p e o ple . He sees this as a major flaw in the B uddh a's phi losophy, an d says it would have been be tter had he s i m p l y s poke n the truth ( Garn e r , 1 993 ) . H o w e v e r, to frame the issue of u ptiya in terms of "truth " may be mis­ leading here . That th e Buddha may have l i ed or taught in­ com pati b l e pos i tions i s , from a pure l y l ogical perspective , a sign of poor judgement or irration al thinking. But from a s ki l lful m e a n s perspective it expresses an a bility to respon d "

"

suffering the Buddha en cou ntere d on a dai ly bas i s . The po int of al l those stories in which the Bud­ d h a suppose d ly lies or contradicts h i m se l f is not to c ond o ne those activ i ties , any m or e than a story abo ut the B uddha ki l l i n g someone is meant to justify murde r. Rather, the point is to show that suffering is a deeply personal experience that is i rred ucible to an abstract category or ge n e ra l rul e . No two

to the various forms of

p e o p l e s u ffe r in the s a m e way, a n d when the B uddha

changes his "v iew" he is s i m ply res ponding to the un ique karn1ic formations of human beings. This does not m e a n , as Peter Hershock says :

[That] there is a level of generality where we can s peak and reason i n t e l l i gibly about suffering . What is be .

.

.

The Buddha's Skill-in-Means

19

ing denied i s that whatever is so discussed h a s ever bee n actual ly experienced by any living c reature and

that such discussions have any rea l bearing

on

resolving

the a l w ays un ique s uf fe ri n g s and hunge rs

by wh ich s e n t i e n t beings are often bound . ( Hershock 1996, p. 9) Thus , the issue in the Buddha's supposed "inconsisten­ cies" is not about truth in the abstract but about how to re­ spond to the c o nc r e t e manifestations of du�kha. From the

perspective of "skil l ful means," his ability to shift viewpoints s hows that wisdom (prajiifi. ) is not bound by any s ingle doc­ trine, practice , or metaphysical view , and exhibits t h e trans­ formative intimacy of a Bodhisattva's love.

Did the Buddha Have a Philosophical Position? While ski l l ful means d raws our attention to the peda­ gogica l style of the B uddha, Buddhist scho l ars in the West sti l l disagree ove r the Buddha's rea l phi l osoph i c a l posit i o n Does he offer

a

.

coherent and systematic view of the world?

Does he teach any metaphysical doctrines he thinks are true? Does he th i n k that fi n a l l i be ration depe nds on knowing something about the nature of rea l ity? To answer these ques­

tions we s hou l d exa m i n e an i m p o rt a n t passage from the

Brahnrajiila-suttanta in which the Buddha re s po n d s to "sixty­ two" phi losophica l views

(dr�!iJ that prev ailed in I n d i a dur­

ing his time . "In this way and that ," says the B uddha refer­ ring to the proponents of these "sixty-two" views : they p lunge about in the net of these s ixty-two modes , but they are in it; th i s way and that they flounder, but

Skillful Means

20

they a re incl uded i n i t , caught i n it . su tta n ta, trans . by Rhys-Davids 1 899, p.

'rhe

"

n e t"

these vi e w s share is a form of

(B ra h m ajii la ­ 54) "

extre mis m the "

B u d d h a cons i ders harmfu l , and he red u c es them to one of

two

p o s i t i o n s : existence

or non-existence. The B rahman ic,

Sankhya , and Jain traditions exemplify the extreme of "exis­ tence " since they ground their views in an etern a l substance ,

be it

Bra h ma n , Puru$a, or the jivas , and the Carvaka tradi­

tion

is an ex a m p l e of "non-existence" since it reduces all

ex­

perience to mate ri a l s ubstances . Even though each tradition has r a di c ally

different views on the nature of l ife , they a l so share a form of "extremism" which the B uddha saw as a ma­ jor source of suffe ring and confl ict i n l ife . Dissatisfied with each of the "sixty-two" phi losophical

views, he forge d a dif­

ferent path : �'W ithout approaching either extreme , the Tathi­ gata teaches you the Doctrine of the Middle."

What d o e s the Buddha

me an

by ca l l ing these views ex­

t reme , and what is the "Doctrine of the Midd le"? To answer this we need to rem e m ber th at the Buddha is trying to solve a

c r i s i s among

the I nd i a n phi loso p h i c a l tradi tion s . The

Jain , C arvaka , and ot h e r ascetic tradition s are a l l e n gaged in an inte l lectual and spiritua l batt le, and the B uddha is trying to resolve their differences by pointing to the source of t h e i r confl ict. What is it that a l l these "sixty­ two" views share? Bra h m anic ,

A n umber of Western schol ars see the conflict between t he " s i xty- two" views as a metaphysi c a l prob l e m . That i s ,

they see t h e problem aris i ng b ec a u s e each of the views h as

incoherent view of the worl d . According to T. R. V. M urti , for examp l e , the problem lies in the fact that all these vari­ ous traditions are trying to conceptua l ize t h e n ature of real an

21

The Buddha's Skill-in-Means

ity, and the Buddha's way o f resolving the issue is t o reject al l forms of conceptualization :

The rejection of theories [dr�ti ] is itself the

mea n s

by

which Buddha is led to the non-conceptual know ledge of

the absolute , and not vice versa. It is

no

accident then

that Buddha concerns himself with an analysis of the various theories of reality and rejects them a l l . Buddha ascends from the conflict of Reason to the inexpressi­ bi lity of the absolute. (Murti 1 955, p. 4 7) Murti sees the problem between the ''sixty-two" views as a metaphysical problem : they all have incorrect views of the

worl d and think that ultimate rea l ity can be rationa l ly and conceptually expl ained . Because the con fl ict for Murti is rooted in conceptual ization , he sees the Buddha resol ving it by rej ecting all phi l osoph ical ( i . e . , conce ptua l ) positions . Gadj in Nagao echoes this sentiment when he says, "Ultimate Truth is beyond the reach of verbal designation (prapanca ) or thought-construct ( vikalpa)" (Nagao 1 99 1 , p. 40 ) , as does David Loy who sees the Buddha deconstructing false views of language and conceptualization (Loy 1987 ). David Ka l upahana sees the conflict between the "sixty­ two" views differently. I n his vie w , the problem with the "sixty-two" v iews is that they a l l go beyond e m p i rical verifi­ cation . What makes the "sixty-two" false is not that they uti l ize words an d conce pts , as M urti and others thi n k , but that they fai l to confine themse lves "to what is given , that is , to the causal dependence of phenome n a , without searching for someth ing mysterious" ( Ka lupahana 1986, p. 1 3 ). Because Ka l u pa h a n a

sees

the

confl ict

betw e e n

the

"sixty -two"

stem ming from a desire for someth ing non -empirica l , he sees

Skillful Means

22

the Buddha rejecting a l l forms of transcendenta l i s m and

teaching a "sixty-third" view: the doctrine of "dependent arising," which, as he says , is empirica l ly verifi a b l e : "It is, indeed, t h e truth about t h e w o rl d which t h e Buddha claimed he discovered and which became the 'centra l ' doctrine of Buddhism" ( Kalupahana 1976, p. 29 ). Although Ka l u pahana sees the issue in a d i ffe re nt l ight, he shares wi t h M urti , Loy, and Nagao th e . be l ief that the Buddha is engaged in a metaphysical batt l e with the "sixty-two" views. That is, they a l l see the conflict between the "sixty-two" views as being caused by fa lse metaphysics , and they a l l see the Buddha resolving the conflict by showing what is rea l ly "true." However, these ways of resolving t he prob lem are ques­ tionable because they a l l assume that the ph il osophical tra­ ditions a re fighting beca u se they have fa lse meta physical views. According to Buddhis m , however, "views" < dr�� i s ) in themse lves do not cause conflicts. Rathe r, it is our a t tach ­

men ts to "views" that causes so many prob lems in l ife . By it­ se lf, a "view" is re latively innocuous , and there is nothing in­ consistent in adhering to any number of "fa lse" or "extreme" views without engaging i n any confl i cts . It is what l ies be­

h i n d our "views" that is the re a l issue for Buddhists . Ac­ cording to the "Second Nob le Truth," suffering, conflict, and strife (du!l k h a J are caused by "blind grasping" a n d attach­ men t . This attachment causes suffe ring and conflict in the worl d , and not , as some scho l a rs think, by simply having a fa l se view of the wor l d . Even the idea that "thi ngs" have pe rmanence , a he resy in many Buddhist quarte rs , is not in­ herently tainted or incorrect so long a s we are un attached to i t . I n the fo l lowing d i a l ogue between the Buddha a n d a

The Buddha 's Skill-in-Means

23

brahmi n , for exam p l e , the Buddha expresses his real prob­ lem with certain philosophical positions:

"Venerable Gautama , there are the ancient holy scrip­ tures of the Brahmins handed down a l ong the line by unbroken ora l tradition of texts . With rega rd to them , Brahmins come to the absol ute concl usion : 'This a lone is Truth , and everything e lse is false . ' Now , what does the Venerable Gautama say about this?" The Buddha inquired: "Among Brahmins is there any one s i n g l e Brahmin who c l ai m s that he person a l ly knows and sees that 'Th is a lone is Truth , a n d every­ thing e lse is fa lse'?" "No. " "Then, is there a n y o n e single teacher, or a teacht!r of teachers of Brahmins back to the seventh generation, or even any of the original authors of those scri ptures , who c l aims that he knows and he sees : 'This a lone is Truth, and everything else is false'?" "No. " "Then , it is like a l i n e of b l i n d men , each holding on to the preceding one; the first one does not see , the middle one a l so does not see, the last one also does not see. Thus , it seems to me that the state of the Brahmins is l ike that of a l ine of blind men . " (Majjhima -Nikaya , quoted in Rahula 1974, p. 1 0 ) Then the Buddha gave his advice : "It is not proper for a wise man who maintains truth to come to the conc l us i o n : 'This a l o n e is Truth, and everything e l se is false.' . . . A m a n has a faith. I f he says, 'This is m y faith ,' so f a r he maintains

Skillful Mea ns

24

truth . B ut b y that he cannot proceed to the abso l u te conc l u ­ sion : 'This alone is Truth a n d everyth ing e l s e i s fa lse . "'

The Buddha's prob lem with these brahmins has little to do with the i r metaphys ica l pre s u ppos i t i o n s . I n fac t , it ap­ pears he cou ld care less whether their views are transcenden ­ ta l , n i h i l istic, athe istic, o r empi rica l . Rather than attacking their phi l osophical assumption s , he questions the i r attach­ ments . Why are they so attached to the i r own views , and why do they think their own views are the on ly acceptable ones? I n asking t h i s , the Buddha i s address i n g what l ies behind their views rather than the views themse lves . It i s i m portant to re member that the "sixty-two" views are all paths to l i beration ( m a rga s ) . They are all trying to liberate human beings in the i r own way, and they offe r vari ­ ous meditation techn iques and re l i gious disci p l i nes to achieve this e n d . The prob lem for the Buddha is that the peop le who espouse these "views" are attached to the m , and therefore as­ sume that there is on ly one path to l i be ration . While they think they are hel ping others, they actua l ly cause more s u f­ fering and strife in the wor l d . The B u d d h a ' s own position i s diffe re n t . R a t h e r t h a n proposing another "view" o v e r and above t h e "sixty t w o , " h e teaches non- attach ment t o any partic u l a r view or spiritual praxis. I n a famous section from the Majjhima -Nilliiya called " C ros s i n g over by Raft , " for exam p l e , the Buddha c learly states t h a t h i s te a c h i ngs s h o u l d not be c o m e obj e c t s of attachment. Monks , I w i l l teach you Dhamma-the Parab l e o f the Raft-for cross ing over, not for re ta i n i n g . Listen to it, attend carefu l ly, and I w i l l speak. A man going along a h igh-road might see a great stretch of water, the h ither

The Buddha 's Skill- i11 -Mea lls

25

bank frightening. But if there were no boat for c rossing by or a bridge across for going from the not-beyond to the beyon d , he m ight think: 'If I were to co l l ect sticks , gras s , branches fo l i age and to tie a raft , then , depend­ ing on the raft and striving with my hands and feet, I might cross over safe ly to the beyond . ' If he carried out his pu rpos e , the n , crossed ove r, gone beyon d , it might occur to him: 'Now , this raft has been very useful to me. Depending on it and striving with my hands and feet, I have crossed over safe l y to the beyon d . S u ppose now , having put this raft on my head or l i fted it on to my shoulder, I should proceed as I des i re?' Now , monks , in doing this is that man doing what should be done with that raft? < C onze 1 954 , p. 87-88 ) As the Buddha explains in this passage , the Dharma is a "raft," and si nce the Dharma incl udes the ideas of niruiir:ta , dependent arising, non-se l f (aniitman ), i m permanence , and "emptiness , " they too are nothing more than provisional de­ vices used to he l p others . As " rafts ," it wou l d be absurd to think of them in propos itional term s , or as applying to a l l situations and contexts . This would be to accept the Dharma as more than a "raft," as something we should carry around after reaching the other "shore . " The Buddha makes a s i m i ­ lar remark regarding "dependent arising": 0 , B h ikkus , even this view, which is so pure a n d so

clear, if you c l ing to it, if you fondle it, if you treasure it, if you are attached to it, then you do not understand that the teaching is s i m i l a r to a raft , w h i ch i s fo r crossing over, and not for getting hold of. ( Ra h u l a 1 9 7 4 , p. 1 1 )

Skillful Means

26

The teaching of "dependent arising" is central to a l l Buddhist traditions, and yet the Buddha warns against be­ com ing attached to it. To "fondle" pratuya -samutpiida , to treasure it, is to treat it in a non -upayic way-as something more than a provisional "raft" used to help others . This may lead one to say, "This a lone is truth , and everything e lse is fa lse . " The Western phi l osopher Ludwig Wittgenstein makes a similar point regarding his own teachings : My propos itions serve as e l ucidations i n t h e fol lowing way: anyone who understands me eventual ly recognizes them a s nonsensica l , when he has used them-as steps-to c l imb up beyond the m . ( He must, so to speak, throw away the l a dder after he has c l i m be d up i t . ) (Wittgenstein 1 953, p. 74 ) Whi le the Buddha would not subscribe to much of what Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, the metaphor of an aban­ doned ladder fits the Buddha's teachings we l l . One should not become attached to the teachings since they a re , ulti­ mately, teachings of non-attachment. The Buddha's view of non- attachment is a l so simi lar to Wi l l iam James' phi l osophy, which bracketed questions con­ cerning the "truth val ue" of re l igious state ments . I n The Va­ rieties of Religious Experience , James exp lores the va rious ways i n which peopl e are transformed through re l igious ex­ periences , and says , "Not by its origin , but the way in which it works on the whole ," expressing his unw i l l ingness to judge a re l igious experience apart from how it "works" as a l ived event (James 1 936, p. 2 1 ). James' depiction of the "sick soul " versus the "healthy-minded" soul shows how the same meta-

The Buddha 's Skill-in -Means

27

phy sic a l or rel igious view can i mpact people's lives in fun ­ da m enta l ly different ways . Whereas an experience o f God ca n make one person emotion a l ly dark and depressed, for a noth er it can inspire peace and tranqui l l ity. Pye remarks on a sim i l ar idea when he says that, according to Buddhis m , "the same item o f doctri ne may b e both a barrier a n d a door depending on how it is used" ( Pye 1 9 7 8 , p. 1 3 4 ) . The Buddha would agree with James' approach in that it refuses to reduce the truth of a re ligious experience to mere factua l coherence or "meaningful statements ." The value of any particular phi­ losophical or re l igious view lies in its effectiveness that can­ not be determined apart from the way it plays itse l f out in people's lives . Fol lowing James' approach to re l igion , we should now see why a metaphysical understanding of Buddhism fa l l s short. It not only assumes that the problems of existence a re caused by incorrect views of the world , but that liberation en­ tails the recogn ition of what i s rea l ly rea l . This approach p rivi leges theory over praxis , and metaphysics over ethics , and assumes that a Buddhist response to the world-to other

human beings and their real e m bodied s ufferi ng-me ans going beyond their concrete differences t o an underlying, sin­ gle cause . I n this way, we lose sight of an entire h istory of Buddhism that has a l ways privi leged re li gious praxis, disci­ pline, and s p i ritual methodology over abstract theory and speculation . As Robert Buswe l l says : [The ] Buddha is said to have identified himself as "ana­ lyzer" rather than as

a

"dogm atist" or someone who

makes categorical assertions . This reasoning seems also to j ustify the characteristica l ly Buddhist i nvocation of pragmatic criteria for the evaluation of doctrines and

Skillful Mea ns

28

practices . . . . It is not unexpected , therefore , that Bud ­ dhists shou ld regu larly choose d i sc i p l i ned experience ( e .g. , meditation ) over reason , reve lation , and authority as the fi n a l arbiter of re l igious truth or e fficacy . < Buswe l l 1992, p. 4 ) When w e think o f the Buddha's critique o f the "s ixty­ two" views in the context of skil l fu l mean s , we do not see h i m asking what t h e world is l i ke b u t h o w t o achieve l i beration and how to be compassionate. The phi losophic a l prob lem in this a pproach rests on how one negotiates this soteriological terra i n . W h ich methodology should I use? What is the best way to overcome suffering and help others? How do I achieve l iberation and h e l p others do so as we l l? The "sixty-two" views answer these questions by offe ring different spiritua l practices and meditation techniques to achieve this end, but each one assumes the re is only one methodological path for everyone-their own . The Buddha rejects this as dogmatic , and says that we shou l d refrain from being attached to any single teaching, discipline, or re l i gious method , including his own .

The Buddha's Noble Silence

We are now in a position to appreciate one of the most puz z l ing issues in early Buddh i s m : the Buddha's "Noble Si­ lence . " His response to what is tradition a l ly cal led the "four­ teen unanswered questions," or a vyiikrta , is by no means easy to decipher, especially since si lence can be interpreted in any number of ways . Neverthe less , if we keep i n mind the Bud­ dha's desire to he l p others overcome attachment and suffer-

The Buddha 's Skill - i n - Mea ns

29

in g, then h i s reason for re m a i n i n g s i l e n t s h o u l d become

cl ea r. The most famous exa m p l e of the "unanswere d ques­

" tions occurs i n the Ma.ifhima -Nikaya where a disciple of the

Bud dha, M a l unkyaputta , demands to know why the Buddha refuses to answer certain q uestions: Thus h ave I heard . On a certa i n occasion The B lessed One was dwe l l ing at Sarvatthi i n Jetavana monastery in Anathapind ika's Park. Now it happened to the vener­ able Malunkyaputta , being in seclusion an d plunged in meditatio n , that a consideration presented itse l f to his mind as fo l lows : "These theories which the B lessed One has left unelu�idated, has set aside and rejected-that the world is eterna l , that the world i s not etern a l , that the world is finite , that the worl d is infinite, that the sou l and the body are identica l , that the soul is one thing and the body another, that the saint exists after death , that the saint does not exist after death, that the saint both exists and does not exist after death , that the saint

neither

exists

nor

does

not

exist

after

death,-these The Blessed O n e does n o t el ucidate t o me. And the fact the Blessed One does not e l ucidate them to me does not please me nor suit m e . There fore I w i l l draw near t o The B lessed One a n d inquire of h i m con­ cerning this matter. (Ma.ifh ima -Nikaya , tra n s . by War­ ren 1 986, p. 1 1 7 ) M a l un kyaputta then goes t o the Buddha a n d adds that if he fai l s to solve these probl e m s then he w i l l not practice

. B ud dhism and w i l l return to a regul a r l ife . By j o i n i ng the

"Skillful Means

30

pairs , etern a l - non-etern a l and infinite-finite , there are four­

teen questions the Buddha refused to answer:

1.

I s the Universe eternal?

2.

Is the U niverse non-eternal?

3.

I s the Un iverse at one and the same time eternal and non-eterna l?

4.

I s the universe neither etern a l nor non-eternal?

5.

Is the universe infinite?

6.

Is the universe fin ite?

7.

I s the universe at one and the same time infinite and finite?

8.

Is the universe neither infinite nor finite?

9.

I s t h e soul identical to the body?

10.

Is t h e soul different from t h e body?

11.

Does the Tathagata survive death?

12.

Does the Tathagata not survive death?

13.

Does the Tathagata both survive death and not survive death?

14.

Does the Tathagata neither survive death nor not sur­ vive death? The above questions refer in one way or another back to

the "sixty-two" views the Buddha refused to accept. The first eight refer to the extent and duration of the wor l d , the next two to the nature of persona l identity, and the last four to the status of the dead saint, or, more specifica l ly , to l ife after death . We have a l ready seen that the Buddha dismissed a l l o f t h e "sixty-two" views because each dogmatic a l ly asserts , "This a lone is Truth , and everything e lse is fa l se . " I n regards to the specific questions l isted above , however, the Buddha was u n wi l l i n g to offe r any positive critique w h atsoeve r ,

The Buddha's Skill- in-Means

31

which has puzzled Buddhist scholars for centuries . B e fo re we

exam ine some Western solutions to this puzz l e , it m ight be he lpful to listen to what the Buddha has to s ay regarding his s ilen ce. Mter M a l un kyaputta asks the Buddha why he re­

fus e s to answer the questions , the Buddha res ponds w ith the foll owing remark: The re l igious l ife , M a lunkyaputta , does not depend on the view that the world is etern a l ; nor does the re l igious l ife , M a l unkyaputt a , depend on the dogma that the w o r l d i s n ot e t e rn a l . W h e t h e r the v i e w o b t a i n s , M a lunkya putta , that the world i s etern a l , o r that the world i s not etern a l , there sti l l remain birth , old age , death , sorro w , l a mentation , m i s e ry , grief, a n d de­ spair . . . . W h y

M a l u n ky a putta , have I not e x p l a i n e d

this? Because , M a l unkyaputta , t h i s profits n o t , nor has to do with the fundamenta ls of re l igion , nor tends to aversion , absence of passion , cessation , quiescence, su­ preme wisdom, and N i rvar:ta; therefore , have I not ex­ plained it? ( Warren 1986, p. 1 1 9 ) T h e Buddha also te l ls M a l unkyaputta that his demand for an answer is like a man who has been shot by a poison ar­ row, but who demands to know who shot the a rrow , what it is

made of, what tree it came from , and so on , a l l before the ar­ row is pul led (Warren 1 986, p. 1 22 ) . In other words , the Bud­

dha chides M a lunkya putta for demanding answers to ques­ tions that have noth ing to do with his abi l ity to overcome ha­ tre d , greed , and b l i n d attac h m e n t . Because the B u d d ha know s M a l unkyaputta's past as a Hindu practitioner, and be­ ca use he knows that M al unkyaputta w i l l not be satisfied due to his desperation to have an answer, the Buddha refuses to

Skillful Means

32

respond , knowing that any answer wi l l on ly cause more suf­ fering on M a lunkyaputta's part. The issue for the Buddha i s not whether the questions ca n b e answered , o r whether they reflect propos ition a l ly true or false statements regarding ex­ istence , but whether these questions are soteriologica l ly re le­ vant for M a l u n kya putta . He there fo re advises M a l u n ­ kyaputta not t o worry about questions regarding the origin of the universe , the sou l , or l ife after death , and te-l ls him that his s i lence regarding such questions is itse l f the answer: ''Therefore , have I not explained it?" meaning that such ques­ tions are irrelevant to his own situation and context. This ski l l ful means approach to the Buddha's si lence is found in another story where the Buddha refused to answer questions that on other occasions he did answer. The story occurs when a certain wandering monk named Vacchagotta asks the Buddha whether there is an atman : "Venerable Gautama, is there an atman?" The Buddha is silent. ''Then Venerable Gautama, is there no iitman ?" Agai n the Buddha is silent. Vacchagotta gets up and goes away. Mter the Parivrajaka (Wanderer) had left , Ananda asks the Buddha why he did not answer Vacchagota's ques­ tion . The Buddha explains his position : " Ananda, when asked by Vacchagotta the Wanderer: 'Is there a self?', if I had answered : 'there is a self,' the n , An anda, that wou ld b e siding w i t h those rec l uses a n d brahmins w h o h o l d the eternalist theory. "An d , An a nda, when asked by the Wanderer: 'Is there n o s e l f?', if I had answere d : 'There is no s e l f , ' then

f'he Buddha 's Ski/l- in-Means

33

that wou ld be siding with those rec l uses a n d brah­ mins who hold the annihilationist theory. "Aga in , An anda, when asked by Vacchagotta: 'Is there a s e l f?', if I had answered: 'The re is

a

sel f,' wou l d that

be in accordance with my know ledge that a l l dham ­ mas are without se lf?" "Sure ly not, Si r . " "An d again , An anda, w he n asked by t he Wan derer: ' I s there no s e l f?', if I h a d answere d : 'The re is no s e l f , ' then that would have been a greater confusion t o the a l ready confused Vacchagott a . For he wou l d have thought: Formerly indee d I had a se l f , but now I haven't go t one . " < Q uoted in Rah u l a 1 9 7 4 , p. 62-63 ) I n this story, the Buddha explains why he re mains s i ­ lent: it h a s t o do w i t h t h e s pecific needs and problems o f a

particular person . Whether he thinks there rea l ly is a "se l f" is irre l evant in this case since he is interested i n h e l ping Vacchagotta overcome his confusions . I f the Buddha bel ieved that truth is the best "medicine" and something to be s poken in every context , then he would have answered Vacchagotta.

But he knew that any answer-even a true one-would make matte rs wors e . Rahu la comments on this story in the fol ­ low ing way: There are many references in the Pa li texts to this same Vacchagotta the Wanderer, his going round quite often to see the Buddha and h i s disciples a nd putting the same kind of question again and aga i n , evidently very much worried , a l most obsessed by these problems. The Buddha's si lence seems to have had much more effect

Skillful Means

34

on Vacchagotta than any e loquent answer or discussion . ( Rahula 1974, p. 64 ) Most Western scholars think of the Buddha's silence as pointing to something more mysterious and metaphysica l ly deep than a simple heuristic device . T. R . V. M urti says that the "true n ature" of the Buddha's si lence "can on ly be inter­ preted as meaning the consciousness of the indescribable na­ ture of the Unconditioned Rea l ity" ( Murti 1 9 5 5 , p . 4 8 ) ; and Gadjin N agao says that "the inadequacy of language must be regarded as an important key in understanding the prob lem of the fourteen unanswered question s , " s ince , for the Bud­ dha, " Ultimate Truth is beyond the reach of verba l designa­ tion or thought construct" (Nagao 1 99 1 , p. 40). For M urti and Nagao , as we l l as m an y other Buddhist writers , s i l ence w as t h e on ly legitimate response t he Buddha coul d h ave offe red since there is no other way to reveal what exists beyond lan­ guage and concepts except by showing it through the gesture of a "noble si lence . " Ka l u pahana opposes t h i s "transcendenta l " reading of the B u d d ha's s i len c e because a n on - l i n gu i s t i c or n o n ­ conceptua l experience is n o t empirica l ly acceptabl e . F o r h i m , the Buddha's silence i s an attem pt t o stop people from asking "metaphysical" questions : S i n c e no answer based on experience i s pos s i b l e , the Buddha remained si lent when pressed for an answer and maintained that the questions as to whether the

tathagata exists (hoti ) or arises (uppajjat i ) , does not ex­ ist or does not arise , both or neither, do not fit the case

(na upeti ) . I t is l ike asking whether unicorns exist or not . . . . As the Logical Positivists themse l ves maintain ,

\

\ The Buddha 's Skill-in-Means

\

35

( s u c h ) metaphysic a l statements a re meaningless be­ cause they are not verified in experience. ( Ka lupahana 1 976, p. 157) Troy Organ is one of the few Buddhist scholars to expli­

ca te the idea that the Buddha's respon se shou l d be seen pragmatically: The picture we get of the Buddha is that of a remarka­ bly single-minded m a n . Specul ation was not o n l y use­ less but harm fu l , for it wou l d sidet rack him from his main goa l . He had no disinterested love fo r truth . He admitted that he had more truths which he might dis­ c lose , but he refrained and l i mited himself to the reve­ l ation of only those truths which he considered to be re­ l igious ly significant. Truth was a v a l ue for him o n l y w h e n it w a s a m e a n s t o man's re lease from s uffering. For Gautam a, all know ledge was ideology , that i s , a l l know ledge was held a n d expressed for certain reasons . H i s dharma w a s revealed o n l y because i t contributed to man's sa lvation . (Organ 1 954 , p. 1 3 0 ) From a ski l lfu l means perspective , Organ's approach i s more in accord with the Buddha's phi losophy. I n t h e two sto­ ries cited above, the Buddha states his reasons for remaining silent , a n d they have noth ing to do with the idea that l a n ­ guage is either a barrier t o ultimate truth o r a s e t of proposi­ tions that shou l d be verified on empirical grounds. I n stead, the Buddha te l l s M a l unkyaputta that s uch questions "tend not to edification ," in other words , that they are irre l evant to M a l un kyaputta's own prob l e m of overcom in g attach ment. Likew ise, when he te l l s An a n d a why he refuses to answer

Skillful Means

36

Vacchagotta's question about the existence of iitma n , there is no evidence to s uggest that what he really meant was that such questions are beyond the scope of language . He simply says that he does not want to confuse Vacchagotta any fur­ ther. Rather than pointing to anything metaphysica l , either the extra - l inguistic or Logical Positivist type , the Buddha's si lence appears more upiiyistic , signifying nothing more than a simple desire to he l p others . While it is certainly difficult to arrive at any definitive conclusion about the Buddha's Noble Si lence , a metaphysical reading misses the mark because it severs the Buddha's si­ lence from its rhetorical and pedagogic a l context where it was expressed as a compassionate res ponse. To think of it as pointing to a deeper rea l ity untouched by words or concep­ tual frameworks destroys the sote riologi c a l encounter in which silence is simply one of the various ways a Buddha re­ s ponds to others .

Summary This chapter in trod uced the idea that the B u d dha's teachings are best understood as re l igious tools and methodo­ logical devices for he l ping others rathe r than meta phys ical or epistemo logica l truths. I f we take the Buddha's i n i t i a l hesitation t o teach serious ly, and if we accept his decision to teach on ly in re l ation to the context ual needs and d i s posi­ tions of his audience , then it is a mistake to focus on the doc­ trinal aspects of the Buddha's teachings apart from how they were commun icated. The Buddha's first sermons were given to his former companions, severe ascetics who were trying to di scover the "Se l f" through se l f-mort ification . It is thus no wonder why he te l ls them to avoid extremes by staying in the

The Buddha 's Ski/l-in -Means

37

"midd l e , " and even less confusing why he s ays there is no atma n .

Both teachi ngs make obvious sense when taking his

audience and rhetorical context into account. The fol l owing section w i l l continue the theme of skil lful means by looking at how the early Buddhists became at­ tached to the Dharma. I t was not long after the Buddh a's death that a highly sectarian form of schol asticism developed in I n d i a , and Buddhists began debating among themse lves over the status of the Buddha's teachings. There soon devel ­ oped organized sects o r school s, each with its o w n body o f lit­ erature and phi losophical texts known as the abhidharm a . I n itself, t h e a bdhidharma provides a fascinating g l i m pse into early Buddhist meditation and practice in which every aspect of experience is microscopica l ly ana lyzed and reflected upon . But the ph ilosophers of these texts went further by trying to phi losophica l ly j ustify a normative view of praxis and saying that one had to meditate on the abhidharma in order to at­ tain l i beration . The Mahayana tradition, which is the focus of Chapters

3 and 4, scolds the Abhidharma phi losophers for becom ing attached to the Dharma and for reducing Buddhism to an ab­ stract system of rules and re l igious discip l i n e s . N agarjuna even develops a sophisticated dia lectica l method to attack the Abhidharma . His phi losophy of su nyatii , or "empti ness," is a conti n uation of the Buddha's s i l ence on a higher ph i l osophi­ cal leve l : whereas the Buddha refus ed to a n s w e r certain question s , N agarj u n a provides a whole series of reductios that attempt to uproot , through deconstructive logic, the de­ s i re to fixate on methodologi c al views (d!'$!is ) and re l igious practice s . The whole process of his dia lectic, as we w i l l see, is a ski l l fu l means, and what Nagarjuna ca l l s "the emptiness of e mptiness" is the em bodiment of the Buddha's e ntire ap­ proach to phi losophy as upiiya .

Chapter 2 Abhidharma Buddhism: The Scholastic Tradition

Introduction

In some of the Buddha's most i m portant teachings , he rejects the idea of an etern a l , independe n t , or substa ntial "self," and deve lops the idea that a person is com posed of a com plex inter- re l ation between the five aggregates (ska n dha ) such as form ( rupa ), feelings < veda n a ) , perception s ( sa M ia ), v o l i t i o n s ( s a riz s k a ra ) , a n d consciousness ( v ij n a n a ) . Like Nagasena's a n alysis of the chariot , the ska ndha theory im­ pl ies that a person cannot be reduced to any s i ngle part, nor is it something diffe rent from a l l parts put together. Rather, a person is an interre l ated who l e , a dynamic inte rchange be­ tween the ska n dhas in which each part is necessary and i n which no pa rt c a n b e extracted wi thout losing t h e whole person . The Buddha proposed the slw n dh a s against the H i ndu view of a n etern a l Se lf beh i n d o u r d a i ly expe ri e n ce , and aga i n s t the Ca rvaka view that rejects everything but our ma­ terial ex istence . Argu ing against both position s , the B uddha proposed a re lat ion a l view of experience i n which the con ­ crete wholeness of a person is neither lost by searching for an unchanging self ( eternalism ) nor denied by reducing the self to its mere materia l parts ( n i h i l i s m ) . I n arguing for a re la­ tio n a l view of s lw n d h a s , however, the B u d d h a w a rn e d aga i n s t s e e i n g t h e m as s t a t i c categories of expe rience : they too are "empty" ( su nya ) and w ithout s u bstance ( a n ci t m a n ) ,

38

Abhidharma Buddhism

39

and therefore ful l y conditioned and inter-re l ated aspects of experience . Thus , a person is not re l ational as a univers a l category b u t i n t h e concrete : h e r experiences depend o n where s h e is in life , how s h e interprets t h e world, a n d what her overal l dispositional character is like. The abhidharma li te rature is a s ignificant step in this way of thinking due to its sophisticated discip l ines that al low a person to exp lore the relation a l n ature of experience . I t provides step-by-step procedures for experiencing the world as inter-re l ated and con dition e d , and for los i n g a sense of "se l f" that c l i ngs to things as static and independent. The

abhidharma texts ana lyze skandhas into finer experiential units (dharmas) and show how particular moments of pain , suffering, j oy, l ust, greed , anxiety, and so on are a l l depen­ dently originated and conditioned, and how a l l experience is deeply inte rtwined within a vast causal nexus . W h i l e the abhidharma l i te rature offers us a gli mpse into early Buddhist meditation and praxis , however, the later Abhidharma phi losophers developed sophisticated metaprac­ tical arguments to justify the type of praxis e m bodied in the

abhidharma texts . That is, they tried to phi losophic a l l y j us­ tify the a bhidharma as the "highest" form of Buddhist praxis (Ka lupahana 1 986; Jayati l leke 1 963). The Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schoo l s , for examp l e , e levated the abhidharma to the " l i tera l" teachi ngs of the Buddha, saying that it con­ tained the " re a l " sote rio l ogic a l gui d e l ines for e v e ryone . Whether one wanted to attain l i beration , he l p others over­ come suffering, or live a compassionate l i fe , one needed to meditate by fo l lowing the particul a r steps outlined i n the

abhidharma texts . As w i l l be shown i n C h a pter 3 , M a h ayana B u d d h i s m or igin a t e d as an a t t a c k aga i n s t this way of j u s t i fying t h e

· Skillful Means

40

abhidharma texts . The deve lopment of "ski l l ful means" is a

critical weapon against what the Mahayan a Buddhists see as attachment to Buddhist praxis : in privileging one set of texts and one type of meditation, the Abhidharma Buddhists have neglected the complexity of human deve lopment and reduced Buddhism to a static doctri n e . The Dharma, however, must remain open , according to the M ahayana Buddhists , and i s w h y t h e y e m phasize the " e m p t i n e s s " of a l l the B uddha's teachings . Before we examine this M ahayana res ponse to the Abhidharma tradition , a clear unde rstanding of Abhidharma phi l osophy is necessary. The fol lowing sections of this chap­ t e r o ut l i n e

two

i m po r t a n t Abh i d h a r m a

schoo l s ,

the

Sarvastivada and Sa utrantika, paying spec i a l attention t o t h e issue of caus a l i ty that i s centra l t o t h i s tradition as a whole.

Early Buddhist Schisms

The previous chapter noted the Buddha's warning to not reduce a l l re l igious practice to a fixed m o l d . H i s disciples were never f u l l y content with this , howeve r . Prior to h i s death . the Buddha's fo l l owers w e re c o n f u s e d a b o u t h i s teachings and upset over n o t having a spiritual leader for the Sa�gha. When his favorite disciple A nanda re l ayed these fears to the Buddha, he res ponded by saying: An anda , what does the order of the Sa�gha expect from me? I have ta ught the Dhamma without making any distinction as exoteric and esoteric. With regard to the truth , the Tathagata has nothing like the c losed fist of a teacher. Surely, Ananda , if there is anyone who thinks

Abhidharma Buddhism

41

that h e w i l l lead the Sa1.1gh a , a n d that the Sa1.1gha shou l d depend on him, let him set down his instruc­ tions . But the Tathagata has no such idea. Why shou l d h e t h e n l e a v e i n s t ructions concern i n g the Sa1.1gha? Therefore , A n a n d a , dwe l l making yourselves your is­ land ! support ! , making yourse l v e s , not a n yone e l s e , your refuge . < Rahula 1 974, p. 6 1 ) T h e B uddha's parting advice t o h i s disciples suggests his disappointment with the m : they are sti l l waiting for him to esta b l ish normative guide lines and say how the Sa1.1gha shou l d be run . The Buddha's frustration is evident and un­ derstandable: he says he has not held anyth ing back , that he has no absol ute guide l i nes for his fo l lowers , and that he has no teachings about how everyone should practice. I t seems as if his dif.ciples have not l istened to him at a l l , and he ex­ presses his disappointment by saying, "What do they expect from me?" Neverthe less, the disciples organ ized themse lves into a commun ity and quickly assembled the "First Counci l " to re­ cite and organize the Buddha's teachings . To h e l p memorize the teach i ngs , the monks separated those dea l i n g with im­ portant doctri nes and expressed i n story or discourse form , ca l led s ii t ra s , from those dea l i ng with precepts a n d rules of the · monastic l i fe , cal led vinaya . Given the stress on l i v i n g within t h e monastic commun ity d u r i n g this tim e, it i s n o t surprising that t h e Vi n aya -pitalw , or "Basket of Rules , " was examined with precise care . Living according to the precepts of the vinaya distinguished a monk from a l ayperson , a n d hel ped t h e monks l ive a pure Buddhist l i fe . I t w a s t h u s nec­ essary to u n d e rs t a n d the v i naya and act acc o rd i ng to its pri n c ip l es . A hundred years after the Buddha's deat h , howeve r, a

Skillful Means

42

schism arose over the v i n aya. Some monks were found vio­ lating certai n ru les, such as drinking intoxicating beverages , accepting gol d and s i lver, taking food at the wrong time of day, and saying that an arhat may have sexual temptations . The "Secon d Counci l " was organized t o debate these matters , but instead of resolving it the schism deepened, leading to two distinct orders or sects : the M ahasaq�ghika (or "Great Assembly") who argued for the libera lization of the Buddhist precepts , and the Sthaviravada (or "the monks of the Great Counci l " ) who advocated a strict adherence to the rules and precepts of the vinaya . The l ibera l Mahas aq�ghika schoo l later underwent nine more schisms, and eventual ly led to the deve lopment of the Mahayana tradition , while the conserva­ tive Sthaviravada l i n eage divided into e l e ve n d i ffe rent schoo l s , col lectively refe rred to as Nikaya, or "mon astic" Buddhism ( H i rakawa 1 990).

N i k ay a B u d d h i s m a n d the Deve l o p m e n t of the Ab h i d h a r m a Nikaya Buddhism refers t o t h e scho larly and monastic form of Buddhism that developed after the initial schism of the Second Counci l . Nikaya Buddhism was ge n e ra l ly se­ c l uded within monasteries, and ta ught that one needed to live a mon astic life in order to fu l ly obse rve the precepts of the vinaya . Because there was a sharp divis ion between mo­ nastic and l ay life during this period , liberation was often de­ fi ned in exclusive term s: an arhat's job was not to he l p others but to strive for individual perfection and to e l i minate his o w n defi l e m e n t s . T h i s l a ck of soci a l concern led the

Abhidharma Buddhism

43

Mahayana Buddhists to degrade l arge segments of N ikaya Buddhism as an inferior, or "Hinayana" teaching. Neverthe l e s s , an iso lated and c l oistered l ife has its benefits , as it gave the Nikaya Buddhists the freedom to en­ gage in an intensive phi losophical ana lysis of Buddhist phi­ losophy . As the M adhyamika schol a r Kenneth l n a d a says , this period represents one of the most important moments in Buddhist history. It was, he says : the most active, highly vibrant and competitive age i n Buddhist history . . . . I f there are high watermarks to be considered in Buddhist history, this period certain ly rates a very high leve l , a level of great fermentation and f l o u ri s h i n g of B u d d h i s t though t . I deo logi ca l ly speaking, no other period i n Buddhist history . . . could ever matc h , or come up to the leve l of activity as re­ corded during this period . Onada 1970, p . 6) The l i terature that deve loped from this period of Bud­ dhism is cal led the abhidharma . While organizing the Bud­ dha's discourses into the Su tra -p itaka , and the monastic rules into the Vi naya -pitaka , the N ikaya scholars a lso devel ­ oped

a

deta ile d c l assification o f a l l the basic doctrines scat­

tered throughout the discourses. This process of c l assifying and listing the main "topics" ( m a trka) of the Buddha's dis­ courses soon became an obj ect of commentaria l and scho las­ tic study itse lf, and was eventua l ly compiled into a col l ection called the abhidharma -pitaka , making up the "Three Bas­ kets" (Tripitaka ) of the early Buddhist canon . Even though the a b h i d h a r m a text& are conceptua l l y dense a n d difficult t o fol low , it is c lear that, l i ke every major Budd h i s t t ra d i t i o n , the c e n t r a l issue i s m e d i t a t i on and

44

Skillful Means

re l igious praxis. The detailed l ists or "matrixes , " the analy­ sis of experience into dharmas , the examination of causa l con ditioning, and the e m phasis on "discern ing" and "watch­ ing" the flow of impermanent phenomena is a reflection on the nature of meditative practice and how it re l ates to libera­ tion . The body of l iterature ca l led abhidharma was deve l ­ oped f o r me d itative prax i s , a n d t h e d i ffe re nt "sects" o r school s t h a t arose from t h i s lite rature a re different reflec­ tions on the proper ways to achieve n irva 1J a . The debates be­ tween the different school s a re the refore less about doctrinal issues than about re l igious methodo l ogy and discipline. How many dharmas does one need to "discern" in meditative prac­ tice? How should one view the flow of phenomena within the stream of consciousness? The issue

m

these questions is sote­

riologica l and metapractica l , and arises out of concern about the efficacy of the practices presented in the a bhidha rma l ite rature . Central to a l l the m aj o r Abhidharma traditions is a c l ass ification of dharmas into " l ists" or "matrixes" (miitrllii ) for the purpose of meditation . Whi l e the traditions diffe red over the number of miitrkii and number of d h a r m a s , a com­ mon system was to divide the dh armas into three major cate­ gori es : the five aggregates (s/w n d h a s ) , the twe lve bases of cogn ition (iiyatana ) , and the e ighteen e lements (dhiit u ) . This system a l l owed for quick recognition of the major categories of experience that cou l d then be sub-divided for c loser analy­ sis . The aggregate form (rupa ) , for instance-which incl udes the five sense organs and five sense obj ects-is divided into different types of sensual experience, such as colors , sounds , tastes, sme l l s and so on , each of which is further subdivi ded in t o the types of co l o rs , soun d s , t a s t e s , sme l l s , that one experience s . I n this way, the Ab hi d ha r m a schoo l s hoped

Abhidharma

Bu ddh ism

45

to cl a s s i fy a l l experience i n to its e l emental parts , a l lowing fo r a precise analytic meditation . Wh i l e the Abhidharma traditions differed over the ex­ ac t stages one had to fo l low to e l i m in ate the "defi l e m e n ts" (klesa ) , they genera l ly accepted a series of stages in which one ascends from the meditative an alysis of dharmas to a higher wisdom (prajfl1z ) based on the "cessation" of dharmas . I n the Sarvastivadin traditio n , the stages of the "path" are divided into three leve l s . First, there are the "pre l i m i n ary practices" that deal with physi c a l a n d menta l purification ; second, the "seven stages of the wise" that consist pri marily of meditations on the Four Noble Truth s ; and th i rd , the "seven degrees of the sage" i n which a practitioner "cuts off the defi l e m e n ts" and rea l i z e s t h e i r "ce s s a t io n . " In the Theravada tradition , the leve l s of practice a re divided into seven stages of "purification . " One moves progressively from the purification of morals, m i n d , views, doubts , know l edge of the correct path , knowledge of the correct method, a n d , fi­ nal ly", to the "three gates" of l iberation ( H i rakawa 1990). As wi th most Abhidharma traditions, the basis of this "correct path" is the dharmic ana lysis of experience which, as Vasubandhu said, must be " i nvestigated" i n order to "pacify the passion s . " Because the dharmas are "defi led" by desire, lust, anger, greed, ignorance, and so forth, they must be puri­ fied and e l i minate d . Thus , as practitioners progress through the differen t stages of meditation , they cultivate the insight

(uipasyan a ) that e l i m inates the "defi lements" and, once this is completed, attai n complete emancipation . The type of reflection we find i n the Abhidharma tradi­ tion i s what Kas u l i s calls "metapraxis" ( Kaus l i s 1 9 9 2 ) . I t is specifica l ly concerned with how a meditation on the nature of

dharmas w i l l l e a d to l i b e r a t i o n . "What h a p p e n s a ft e r

46

Skillful Means

att a i n i n g the

l e v e l of 'cessation' in which d h a r m a s n o

longer arise?" "How is the stream of mental events brought to a halt through meditative practice?" "What is the re l ation be­ tween the 'pacification' of dh a rm a s and l iberation?" These questions are quite different from the types of metaphysica l issues that we find in traditiona l Western phi l osophy , and should therefore make us skeptical about the claim put forth by many Western scholars that the Abhidharma is doing metaphysics , or that it is offering

a

theory of l i n guistic refer­

ence, l ogica l ato mis m , or rea l i s m . It shou l d make us even more skeptica l ( as we will see in Chapter 4) that Nagarjuna i s attacking the Abh idharma Buddhists on metaphys ic al grounds as we l l . What does make the Abhidharma problematic, however, and is why the Mahayana tradition deve loped the doctrine of upiiya in the first place, is its view t h at liberation entails fol ­ lowing a fixed meditative routine . Without understanding how dharmas arise and cease , how they condition other things , and how they are rel ated th rough subtle rel ays of causes and effects , one cannot attain liberation . Vasubandhu reflects this opin ion in his Abh idharmalwsa when he says : Because there is no means of pacifying the passions w i thout c l ose i nvestigation of existents , and because it is the passions that cause the world to wander in this great ocean of transmigration , therefore they say that the teacher-which means the Buddha-spoke this sys­ tem aimed at the c l ose exam i n ation of existents . For a student is not able to c lose ly investigate existents with­ out teaching in true doctrine . ( Pruden 1988, p. 5 7 )

Abh idharma Buddhism

47

The "close investigation" that Vas ubandhu mentions refers to a particular meditation on the nature of dharmas, a reflection th:1.t is aware of their impermanent, caus a l , a n d selfless status . He is a l s o saying that without meditating i n a particu la r way-i . e . , without "reviewing" the Sarvastivadin analysis of dharmas-it is impossible to attain l iberation . In this sense , Vasubandhu is establ ishing the necess ary condi­ tions for practice , and, in line with many of the Abhidharm a thinkers, creating an orthopraxis for a l l Buddhists to fo l low .

The

Abhidharma Analysis of Dharmas Although the Abh i d h a rma schoo l s s ay the J3 u d d h a

taught t h e Abh idharma ana lysis of experience , i t is more likely a contin uation and deve lopment of i m portant teach­ ings from the early discourse s . I n reaction to the Hindu no­ tion of an in destructible and etern a l soul ( ii tma n ) , for exam­ ple, the Buddha taught his doct rine of aniitma n , or non-self, which was meant to counteract the incessant quest for a mys­ terious ly hidden "se l f . " According to the doctrine of aniitma n , there is no hidden or unchanging "se l f" that l ies be h i n d our experience . Rathe r , our experiences a re composed of ever­ changing a n d interdependent psychophysic a l fo rces , or ag­ gregates (ska n dh a s ) , with no underlying substance W i m a n ) or unifying essence . The reason for li miting the slw n d h a s to five is explai ned by the Vi s u dd h i - Magga i n the fo l l o w i n g way: Why did The B lessed One say there were five groups , no less and no more? Because these sum up and c l assify , according to the i r

Skillful Mea ns

48

affi n ities , a l l the constituents of being; because it is only these that can afford a basis for the figment of a Se l f or of anything re lated to a Self: and because these incl ude a l l other classifications. For i n c l as s i fying, accord ing to the i r affi n iti e s , the many d ifferent constituents of bei ng, form constitutes one group, and comprises everything that has any af­ fin ity to form ; sensation constitutes another group, and comprises everything that has any affin ity to sensation . S i m i l arly with respect to pe rception and the rest. Ac­ cord ingly he laid down only five groups , because these sum up and cl assify , according to thei r affinities, a l l the constituents of being. < Visuddh i - Magga , tra n s . by War­ ren 1 9 7 4 , p. 1 56- 1 5 7 ) According to the Abhidharma view of a na t m a n , the idea of an unchanging substance or "se l r is nothing but a projec­ tion onto an interdependent fl ux of experience . The ska n d ­

has , o n the other h a n d , are impermanent features of experi­ ence, and any attempt to grasp some part of it, such as con­ sciousness , or search for someth ing independent of it, such as

a soul , was said to be the main cause of suffering in l ife ( du b k h a ) . It was thus vita l in early Buddhism to uproot a fic­

titious sense of self, and is why early Buddhist texts are fu l l o f statements such a s : " A particular thing is not one's Se lf ( w hen i t can be said that ) this thing is not mine (mama ), I am not this thing, or this thing i s not my s e l f" ( C onze 1 967 , p. 4 3 l . A Budd hist practitioner is

t h us

asked to be forever vigi­

lant against attributing a s e l f " to any aspect of experience , "

a l ways mindful of the s i m p l e flow of phenomena that rise and fa ll like an "em pty" stream.

The

a bh idha rm a

l i terature was created to a i d thi s

Abhidharma Buddhism

49

meditative proce ss . It a n a l y z e d the ska ndh a s i n t o fin e r e l e m e n t s , creating ever more subtle distinctions for the pur­ pose of sorting out, and being able to quickly recognize, the complex phenomen a l threads invo lved in any experience . For example , the five skandhas can easily be broken down a n d divided i n t o a more accurate account o f t h e different types o f feelings that accompany a sensation, o r t h e different types o f colors or sounds i n vo lved i n a particular perceptual eve n t , o r t h e different kinds of ideas t h a t take p l ace i n a n a c t o f con­ scious awareness . These diffe re n t types of experience were labeled dharmas, or e lements of experience, a n d constitute the phenome n a l worl d . As H i rakawa explains it: The five aggregates of which a pers o n is composed ( form , s e n s ation , perception , m e n t a l formations , and consciousness) are considere d to be dharmas . However, the aggregates of form (rilpa ) and mental pl:.enomena

(saf?lskara ) can be further cl assified and subdivided into additi o n a l dharmas . Rilpa refers to both the body a n d materia l obj ects . F o r t h e body, f i v e dharmas referrin g to t h e five senses a r e l isted : eye , e a r , n o s e , tongue , a n d body . . . . T h e m ateri al of t h e external world is a l s o d i ­ vided i n t o five categories that are the objects of sense perception : form s , sounds, sme l l s , taste s , a n d tangible obj ects . H e re , rilpa refers to visual objects, things with form and color. Such objects of vision are further di­ vided into categories of color such as blue, ye l low, red , and white . Each of these e l e ments exists a s a d h a rma . Sounds , sme l l s , taste s , and tangi b l e obj ects are a l s o analyzed furthe r into basic units. ( Hirakawa 1 9 9 0 , p. 4 7 )

Skillful Means

50

The dharmas , however, are not unchanging or etern a l : they are impermanent, a n d rise a n d fal l through the process of "dependent origination . " This practice of dividing and ana­ lyzing experience into a fin e l y knit grid of dharmas is sup­ posed to h e l p a practitioner reflect on the caus a l flow of ex­ perience . For someone struck by emotiona l pain , for example, the dharma theory can act as a medicin a l aid. By l abeling that emotion as a dharma of "pain" one can rea l ize that, l ike all dharmas of this type , it is conditioned by other dharmas , s uch as those dealing with memorie s , mental formations , physiological sensation s , and s o forth , and that because i t is impermanent there is no need to fixate on it. Seeing it as "conditioned" and "impermanent" resu l ts from labeling it a

dharma , and is supposed to act as a barrier against positing it in a fixed o r substantial way. One can simply "watch" it rise and fa l l without being attached to it in a consuming manner. Al l m e n t a l a n d phys i c a l experiences a re to be viewed i n this manner, and any reification of a fa lse sense of "self" disso lves away into currents of sensation s , i m pres­ sions, fee l ings , and ideas-with no underlying substrate and, hence , no "thing" to become attached to. As a meditation device , it is clear how m uch the a b h id ­

harma l iterature resembles t h e B uddha's counsel to think o f h i s teachings as "rafts . " T h e ana lytical technique o f this tra­ dition can h e l p one experience life as deeply inte r-connected, fu l ly condition e d , a n d imperman e n t . As He rbe rt Guenther says : The abhidharma , however d ry its pre s e n tation in a highly tech n i c a l l a n gu age may appear to us at first s ight, aims at nothing less than to open man's eyes to

Abhidharma Buddhism

51

that which i s n o t speculative ly arrived at b y the l ogical method of hypothesis a n d deductive verification , but which

can

be immediately apprehended and is applicable

to ourse lves. ( Guenther 1 97 6, p . 3 ) The Tibetan Buddhist Chogyam Trungpa makes a simi­ lar observation i n his Glimpses of the Abhidharma : It is he l pfu l n ot on ly for pure meditation but a lso medi­ tation i n action . The whole approach of Buddhism is orie n te d towards dealing with everyday l i fe situatio n s . . . [ it is l concerned with h o w t o step o u t of our usua l s le e pw a l ki n g a n d d e a l rea l ly with actual situatio n s . T h e abhidharma i s a very i m portant part of that gen ­ eral instruction . (Trungpa 1 9 7 8 , p . 3 ) T h e dominant tren d i n Abhidharma Buddhism s a w i t ·

differently, however. Even though the abhidharma l i terature was first construed as another ski l lful means to aid medita­ tive practice , it soon overcame this " l ower" status a n d was transformed i n to the Buddha's " u l t i m ate" or " l itera l " dis­ courses. As Paul Griffiths puts it: The resu l t of a consistent a n d determined effort to i n ­ terna l ize the categories o f Buddhist thought b y w a y of the practice of ana lytic meditation is, it is said, identical with the re m o v a l of i g n o r a n c e , the a tt a i n m e n t of know l edge , and the deve lopment of the abi l ity to per­ ceive t h i ngs as they rea l ly are . When this accurate k n o w l e dge and clear perception i s cont i n uous l y pos-

Skillful Means

52

sessed by the practitioner, the root cause of bondage is removed and salvation attained. < Griffiths 1 986, p. 1 4 ) Mindfu l ness, or smrt i , consists i n "getting dharmas into view" for the Abhidharma Buddhists , in isolating the m , re­ flecting on them , and "burn ing" them up. While this process requires great meditative ski l l , the Abhidharma philosophers struggled to articul ate what actu a l ly happens dur ing the higher forms of meditation . Given their claim that everyon e needs to meditate o n impermanence, for i n stance , it became difficult for them to map out the precise manner i n which

dharmas actua l ly change . Stcherbatsky hints at the problem in his description of dharmas : The e lements of existence are momentary appearance s , momentary flashings i n t o t he phenome n a l w orld out of an unknown source . . . . They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be fo l l owed i n the next moment by another momentary existence . Thus a moment becomes a synonym of a n element (dharma ) , two moments are two different e l ements . An element becomes something l ike a point in time-space . . . . C onsequently, the e l e ­ ments do not change , b u t disappear, t h e w o r l d becomes a c i n e m a . Disappearance is the essence of existence ; what does not disappear does not exist. (Stcherbatsky 196 1 , p. 32 ) While Stcherbatsky sees the prob lem of dharmas as a metaphysical proble m , h i s comments h igh l ight a centra l is­ sue i n the Abhidharma tradition . If all dlzarmas are "momen­ tary" u n its of experience, as everyone i n this tradition holds, then how a re we supposed to exp l a i n the re l ationship be-

Abhidharma Buddhism

53

twe en one dharmic moment and the next? Even the Vedanta phi losopher S ankara saw this problem when he examined the is s ue of causality in relation to "momentary" existence : Those who maintain that everyth ing has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing i n the second moment enters i n to being, the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be . On this admission , it is i mpossible to establish between the two things the rel a ­ t i o n of cause and effect, s ince t h e former momentary existence ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence , and cannot be the cause of the l ater m o m e n tary e x i stence . ( Ra d h a k r i s h n a n 1 9 7 3 , p . 235) The Abh i d h a rm a Buddhists were a l so a w a re of this problem , and tried to fix it by coming up with different theo­ ries

to

explain

how dharmas i n teract c a u s a l l y .

The

Sarvastivad ins tried t o distinguish between t h e substance of a dharma (sva bhii va ) and its causal properti e s , saying that even though a dharma 's properties change , its s ubstance re­ mains the same, while the Sautrantika and Theravada trad i ­ tions deve loped theories t h a t Kal upahana c a l l s " i m mediate contiguity," in other word s , theories that locate causa lity in some form of i m mediate connection . While this prob lem of caus a l i ty may seem excessively abstract and obscure , it has serious sote riologi c a l i m p l ic a ­ tions f o r t h e Abh i dharma t h i nkers . T h e y a re not s i m p ly quenching the ir metaphys ica l thirst or s pe c u l a t i n g on the caus a l structu re of the unive rse . Rather, they are seeking liberation from a dharmic wor l d . Given thei r view that con d i -

Skillful Means

54

tioned dharmas a re "defi led" by l ust, anger, and ignorance , the problem is how to escape this worl d and enter into some­ thing unconditioned and undefi led: in other words, n i ruii r:Ja . The fol lowing two sections w i l l explore this problem i n more deta i l , focusing on the issue of caus a l ity in two of the most i m portant Ab h i d h a rma schoo l s , the Sarvas t i v a d i n a n d Sautrantika.

Causality in the Sarvastivadin Tradition

In attempting to reconcile the theory of dharmas with the doctrines of i m permanence , the Sarvastivadin phi loso­ phe rs borrowed the idea of caus a l identity from the Hindu San khya tradition . Accord ing to the Sankhya p h i l osopher l shvaraknn:t a , causes and effects are identical because both are united by the same primord i a l "stuff" or substance,

prakrt i . The changes we see in the world are nothing but the unfolding of this se l f-same substance , and even though the characteristics of prakrti undergo change , prakrti in itse l f re mains the same . As l shvarakr�r:ta says , The qua l ities of Nature h ave an unmanifested entity for their cause [ i . e . , they have a cause in wh ich they ex­ ist in their unmanifested state )-because they are fi­ nite- l i ke the jar and otht!r things-the jar and othe r thi ngs a re found to have , for their cause, c l ay and other things , in which inhere the unmanifested state of the effects . ( Sa n k hya - karika , quoted i n Radhakris h n a n 1 97 3 , p . 426)

Abhidharma Buddhism

55

The Sarvastivadin phi losophers made a similar distinc­ tion between the substance of a thing and its characteristics , and said that even though a dharma 's characteristics change , its intrinsic nature (svabhava ) remains unaltere d . Similar to l shvarakr�r:t a , they proposed a view of causa l identity, and said that a dh a r m a 's "own n a t u re " ( svabhava ) re m a i n s through t h e three t i m e periods . Stcherbatsky tries t o explain this in the fol lowing way: All elements exist on two different planes, the rea l es­ sence of the e l ement (sva b h a va -dharm a ) and its mo­ mentary man ifestation . The first exists a lways , in past, present, and future ; . . . it represents the potenti a l a p­ pearances of the element into phenomena l existence , and

its

pa s t

appearances

as

we l l .

(Stcherbatsky

1 9 6 1 , p. 3 5 ) According t o the Sarvastivadins, o n e only recogn izes

a

dharma in its pre s e n t m a n i fe s t form by its " m a rk" or lak �a�J.a . Its rea l existence , however, is something that l asts through time, and even though its manifest "mark" changes accord ing to the l aw's i m permanence , its essence e nd ures throughout a particular moment in which a dharma arises , abides , and then decays . The Ablz idh arma kosa refers to four causal theories of the Sarvastivadin tradition . The philosopher Dharmatrata argued that a dharma , while existing th roughout the th ree time periods of past, present, and future , changes its state (bhava ) but not its underlying s ubstance ; Gho�aka argued that on ly the characteristics of a thing are subject to change , and that it "retains" its aspects from every tim e period;

56

Skillful Means

Vasumitra said that as an e lement passes th rough the three time periods it changes its conditions ; and Buddhadeva said that a th ing changes only in re l ation to things past, present, and future . Vasubandhu notes that only the third v iew-arguing for a change in condition but not in substance-was widely ac­ ce pted in Sarvastivadin circles . Neverthe l e s s , a l l four theo­ ries share the s a me basic assu m p t ion that a dharma can be divided i n to "two s phere s , " one part exists in time and con ­ nects with other manifested dharmas , and the other part i s substanti a l ly distinct. Unde rlying t h e c a u s a l process, which is but a "conven tion a l " designation for fleeting appearances , is the se lf-same substance that resides "over" time . W h i l e it m ay appear that the Sarvastivadins a re e n ­ gaged in metaphys ics , they are actua l ly struggl ing with a metapract ical prob l e m . T h e i r "subs t a n t i a l istic" account of

dharmas is a n atte m pt to account for the continuity of "de­ filed" dharmas . Even tho ugh d h a r m a s are s u pposedly im­ permanent, it was obvious to the Sarvastivadin phi l osophers that "past" d h a r m a s infl uence or "contaminate" present ex­ pe rience , such that past anger, lust, and ignorance condition what happens now as we l l as in the fut ure . In other words , "defi led" dharm as set the stage for action (/wrm a ), and these actions are then repeated-or "reborn "-throughout the three time periods .

Dharmas are therefore a highly comp licated and dan­ gerous affai r for the Sarvastivadin thinkers : compl icated be­ cause they go through change and yet endure , and dangerous because

their

substantive

e l e m e n t-t h e i r

"se l f­

nature"-co nti n ues through experience , m a k i n g them ex­ tremely difficul t to "burn up " and destroy . I n fact, "defi led"

dharmas are so substantial for the Sarvastivadins that l ib-

57

Abhidharma Buddh ism

e rat ion is a l most impossible to atta i n , for once the stream of expe rience is "defi led" it continues without stopping. Because of the precarious nature of "defi led" dharmas , th e Sarvastivadins said that one had to meditate on the un­ conditioned ( n i r va n a ) i n order to attain re l e a s e . Since the "defi led" dharm as a r e so "substan tial" there is no w ay to halt their activity except by submitting onese l f to a "correct" form of meditation that wi l l ''i nte rrupt" the caus a l proce s s , a l low­ ing for the pos s i b i l ity of an unco n d i tioned experi ence . A "pure" d h a r m u s uch as n irvd l) a , for examp l e , is uncondi­ tioned , it is n ot caused or produced, and i t exists independ­ ently from the caus a l activity of our "everyday" worl d . But i n order t o experience t h i s o n e must dis rupt t h e causal process so that "defi led" dh a rm a s are destroyed. Person a l identity is then com p letely "inte rrupte d , " and one w o u l d be released from a con ditioned world in which "defiled" dharmas repeat themselves indefi n ite ly. As we w i l l see in C h a pter 3, this metapractical j u stification for a particul ar form of medita­ tion fo u n d i n the a b h i d h a r m a Sarvas t i v a d i n s

aga i n s t

a

ne w l y

literature

p i tted the

e m e rg i n g

M a h ay a n a

tra d i t i o n .

Causality i n the Sautrantika Tradition The

Sautrantika

phi losophers

r ej e c t e d

the

Sarvastivadin conception o f sva b h a va because i t contradicts the doctrine of a n a t m a n by positing abiding substance s . They also found the division of dha rmas into substance and prop­ erties an absurd distinction that only confuses our abil ity to explain impermanence :

Skillful Means

58

They cannot explain the origination and decay [which a re going on in the process of life ) . An e lement, accord­ ing to this view , i s permanent and i m permanent at the s a m e t i m e . This i n d e e d , i s someth i n g q u i te n e w ! (Stcherbatsky 1973, p . 7 2 ) The Sautrantika c r i t i c i s m of the S a rv as tivadin w a s re l ative ly straightforward . T o say that t h e past, present, a n d future endure over t i m e or exist in some substantial manner not only confuses the re l ationship between these three peri­ ods , but makes our everyday understanding of these terms im possible: If they a re a l w ays existent, how i s the [ remarkable re­ s u l t ) brought a bout that they a re cal led past or future? Therefore , the words of our Sublime Lord , "there is a past, there is a future ," must be understood i n another s e n s e . H e proffe red them when d i scussing with the Aj i v i k a s [who denied moral res pon s i b i l i ty for p a s t deeds ). He strongly opposed their doctrine, which denied the connexion between a past cause and a future resu l t . In order to make it known that a former cause and a fu­ ture are something which happened formerly and w i l l happen i n the future , h e categorica l ly dec lare d : "there is a past, there is a future . " For the word "is" acts as a

particle [which may refer to something existent and to non-existent as wel l ) . As, for examp l e , people w i l l say: "there i s absence of l ight [ before i t has been kin d l ed ) , "there i s absence o f l ight [ i t h a s been put out ) ," o r the " l ight is put out, but I did not put i t out . " When Buddha dec l a red that there "is" a past and there "is" a future , he

Abhidharma Buddh ism

59

used the word "is" in that sense. H ad it been otherwise , it wou ld be absolutely impossible to account for [the no­ tions of] a past and a future . ( Stche rbatsky 1 97 3 , p. 7 3 ) E v e n though the Sau t ra n t i k a d e n i e d the i d e a of

suabhiiua as simply another form of

iit m a n

, they neverthe­

less acce pted the theo ry of "moments" com m o n to a l l the Abh idharma traditions , and were thus faced with the same dilemma of exp l a ining the continuity between two dharm ic moments . They confronted this dilemma in two ways : first, by saying that only the present moment exists , thus denying any substantial rea l ity to the past and future ; and second, by saying that the present "moment" is nothing e lse but the "coming into" and "going out of" existence. In other words, a l l thi ngs are characterized by birth a n d death such that what is born comes out of noth ing and what dies goes into nothing. Rather than seeing dharmas deve lop from their "own n a ­ ture ," as in t h e Sarvastivadin tradition , the Sautrantikas ar­ gue that a dharma is simply a "contin uous flow" in a whole series of successive moments . Thus , what appears static, or w h a t seems l i ke a change of a si n g l e substance , is just the con t i n u a l creation -an d i m me d i ate destruction-of n e w

dharmas . As Vasubandhu explains it: When the organ of vision ! eye ) is produced , it does not come from some other p lace; when it disappears it is not going to be stored up in another place . ! Consequently ) a thing becomes , having not been before ; having become , it ceases to be. < Pruden p. 2 1 9 ) Kal u pahana explains t h i s b y saying that bi rth is the beginning of a d h a r m i c serie s , decay the transition into a

60

Skillful Means

new dharma within the series , and destruction the fin a l end of the series a l together. The causation of each individual moment, he says, is therefore red uced to "invariable antece­ dence" ( Ka l upahana 1 9 7 5 , p. 1 5 1 ) . It is not clear exactly what this mean s , and Mookerjee is probably right when he says , "From the e l a borate exposition of the theory of causation with its con fused tangle of criticism and counter criticism . . . one cannot resist the im pression that the Sautrantika has fai led, in spite of his logica l acumen and wealth of dialectic, to carry any conviction" (quoted in Kalupahana 1975, p. 152).

Summary It is important to pause and refl ect on why the Abhid­ harma traditions are debating over causal ity. To say they are concerned with the metaphysics of causa l i ty--as if they sim­ ply want a c l earer picture of the universe-w o u l d distort their project by framing the issue i n terms of what we can and cannot know about the worl d . But the issue for the Ab­ hidharma is not an issue of know ledge , and is not about ob­ jective ly describing what happe n s "out there" in the wor l d . Rather, li ke most Buddhist tradition s, the fundamental issue is l i beration and the proper ways to meditate . By deve loping syste matic accounts of d h a r m a s a n d d i v i d i n g them into "martixes" of experiences , the Abhidharma is engaged in a metapractical reflection on the nature of Buddhist practice , and is trying to phil osophical ly j ustify how one should medi­ tate in order to attain l iberation . The issue is not on ly what constitutes orthopraxis in the B uddhist tradition , but which practice works and why . Given that causa l i ty is a central mediation practice in each of these traditions , it should be obvious why the philosophers of this tradition devote so much

61

Abhidharma Buddhism

in te l lectua l e n e rgy t o how dh armas rise a n d cease , a n d it sh o u l d be obvious that what disti nguishes these tradition s has little t o do with theories of causation apart from Bud­

dh ist meditatio n . However, even though t h e Abh idharma trad itions offe r differe n t meta practical theories on how to meditate on the

Abh idha rm a texts , they come together by insisting that one must meditate i n a particular way to attain liberation . Such orthopraxic measures s purred the creation of the Mahayana tradition i n Buddh i s m , which res po n ded with a mass ive ar­ ray of phi l osophical texts and scri ptures directly chal lengi n g

Abhidharma Buddh i s m . As we wi l l s e e i n t h e fol lowing chap­ ter,

Ma haya n a

texts

s uch

as

the

Lot u s

S u t ra ,

Prajnapciram ita , and Vimala kirtinirdesa criticize the Abhid­ harma fo r restricting Buddhism to a fixed pat h , and argue that a l l of the Buddha's teachings-in c l uding n i r va r.z a , "de­ penden t arising," and "emptiness" -are nothing more t h a n "ski l l-in-mean s . "

Chapter 3 Mahayana Buddhism: The Vimalakirtin irdesa

Introduction The term Mahayana or "Great Vehicle" was coined in reaction to the Scho lastic Buddhist tradition , which was la­ beled a Hinayana or " Lesser Ve hic l e . " Although we are not exact ly sure when the Mahayana first deve loped , a new style of writing emerged sometime during the first century B.C . E . that differed dramatica l ly from t h e a bh idlz a rma l iterature . Whereas the abhidha rma is famous for its prosaic sty l e , l ogi­ ca l precision , and detailed ana lysis, the new Mahayana tradi­ tion deve loped a li te rary style that is rich in the use of meta­ phor, re l igious symbo l i s m , and magical events. Even a cur­ sory gl ance at any of the early M ahayana texts shows that a major literary shift has taken place . The Lot u s Stilra , for example, begins with a mythologi­ cal story of the Buddha sitting in meditation surrounded by monks , bodh isattvas , Nagas , anima l s , and thousands of di­ vine and semidivine beings , a l l participating in a miraculous event: And as the Lord had entered upon his meditation , there fe l l a great rain of divine flowers covering the Lord and the four cl asses of hearers , w h i l e the whole Buddha fie ld shook in six ways; it move d , removed , tremb l e d , trembled from o n e e n d to t h e other, tossed a long.

62

Mah ayana Buddhism

63

Then did those who were assembled and sitting together in that congregation , monks , nuns, male and female lay devotees , gods , Nagas , goblins, demons , great serpents, men , and beings not human , as we l l as rulers of a rmies and ru lers of four continents , all of them with their fol­ lowers , gaze on the Lord in astonishment, in amaze­ ment, in ecstasy . And at that moment there issued a ray from within the circle of hair between the eyebrows of the Lord . I t ex­ tended over eighteen hundred thousand Buddha fie lds in the eastern quarter, so that all those Buddha fie lds appeared who l ly i l l um inated by its rad iance, down to the great he l l and up to the limit of existence . And the beings in any of the six states of existence became visi­ ble, a l l without exception . < Kern 1 989, p . 4-6) This mythological vision of the Buddha is preva lent in most Mahayana sutras from this time o n , and i s a c le ar break from th e analytic prose of t he a bh idlz a rma texts . This shift in e m phasis is more than a mere li te ra ry tran s i t ion , howev e r , a n d points to a c r i t i c a l debate between the M ahayana and Abh idharma tradition s . As d iscussed in the previous chapter, the Abhidharma schoo l s e l evated the a b ­

hidharma texts t o the "highest" teachi ngs o f Buddhism and reduced the notion of "ski l lful means" to a single meditation praxis . The M a hayana tradition reversed this tre nd by l a ­ be ling t h e Abhidharma philosophy a Hi nayana or "inferior" teach ing, and pl aced "ski l lful means" on the forefront by making it the highest sp i ritual practice of a bodhis attva's life . The Perfection of Wisdom C Prajiiiipiira m itii ) siltras place it a l o n gs i d e p r aj iz ii , o r " w i s dom , " a n d t h e f a m o u s M adhyamika phi losopher Nagarjuna sees it as t h e "father" o f

64

Skillful Means

bodhisattvic activity: "Praj fl a paramita is the mother of Bodhisattvas, ski l l-in-means is the i r father, and compassion is their da ughter" ( Lindtner 1 986, p. 1 28 > . Likewise, in place of the a rh a t who supposedly strives for his own l i be ration , the Mahayana promotes the bodhisattv a , the "enl ightened being" who rejects the "selfish" individua l i s m of the a rhats and devotes h i mse lf to helping others . What distinguishes the bodhisattvas perhaps more than anything is their abil ity to use an end less number of ski l l ful means to h e l p human beings cross the turbulent waters of sa msii.ra . Moreover, the Lotus Siitra te l ls us that everything con ­ tained in its pages is nothing more than an upaya : I have attained the Buddha-way, and making use of skil lful means I proc laim this s f1tra so that they ( sen­ tient beings ) may abide in it. ( Kern 1 989, p. 285 ) The doctrine of upaya thus signifies much more than a l i terary transition for the Mahayana tradition , and refers to a reinterpretation of a l l the major phi losophical and re li gious t e rms used by the early Buddhists . Even the most cherished idea of n i rva �z a -which the Abh idharma Buddhists s pent so m uch time " rev i ewing"-is now just one of the many peda­ gogical "devices" used in Budd hi s m . As it says i n the Lotus

Su tra : To those [ who a re suffering) I show a device ( upaya I and say : put an end to your troub l e . When I perceive creat ures vexed with mishap I make them see N irval)a . ( Kern 1 989,

p.

46)

65

Mahaya 11a Buddh ism

To e x p l a i n the i m portance of sk i l l ful m e a n s in the Mahayana tradition , this chapter will focus primarily on one te x t , the Vi m a la /( i rt i n i rdesa . This i m portant text covers a l l t he major phi losophica l concepts used i n Buddhist p h i l oso­ phy, such as "emptin ess , " the doct rine of "two-truths , " the "three marks" of existence , and the doctrine of upiiya . How­ ever, what separates it from other Mahayana texts is the way it attacks the Abh idharma tradition . Al ready fam i l i a r with the e a r l y

B u d d h i s t m e t a p h o r of t h e " r a ft , "

the

Vi ­

malakirtinirdesa refers to the Dharma as a great n arrative the B u d d h a recounts to peo p l e . Acco rd i n g to the Vi ­

malakirtinirdesa , the B uddha is a gre at storyte l l e r , and he weaves his med icinal rafts through fiction al devices that cap­ tivate his audience . I n fact , everything the Buddha teaches is a story, according to this sutra , and we are advised to pay at­ tention to both the storyte l ler and the audience to fu l ly ap­ preciate what is being said.

The Vimalakirtinirdesa

Siitra

As with most early s utras , nothing defi n i te is known about who wrote the Vimalakirtinirdesa or when it was com­ posed , a l though it c l a ims to record events s u rrounding the life of the historical Buddha. Most scho l ars p lace it after the

Perfection of Wisdom
a

layman who

e njoys the p l e a s ures of d a i l y life . He has a w i fe and so n ,

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66

engage s in busines s , and spends his time with ordinary peo­ p l e such as gamb lers, warriors , govern ment officia l s , busi­ nesspeople, prostitutes , and so forth . Neverthe less , he excel s in a l l the Buddhist virtues : Having served the ancient Buddhas , he had generated the roots of virtue by honoring them and making offer­ ings to the m . He had attained tolerance as we l l as e lo­ quence . He p l ayed with the great superknowledge s . He had attained the power of incantations and the fear­ lessnesses . He had conquered a l l demons and oppo­ nents . H e h a d penetrated the profoun d way of the Dharma. He was liberated th rough the transcendence of wisdom . Having integrated his rea l i z ation with ski l l in l i be rative techn ique , he was expert i n know ing the thoughts and actions of l i v i n g beings . Knowing the strength or weakness of their faculties , and being gifted with unriva led e loquence , he taught the Dharma appro­ priately to each . . . . He l ived with the deportment of a Budd h a , and his supe rior inte l l igence was as wide as the ocean. ( Vimalakirtinirdesa tran s . by Thurman 1 986, p . 20) Vimalakirti's abi l i ty to experience the depths of Bud­ dhist wisdom without retreating into otherworldly conte m­ pl ation expresses th e engaged, "worldly" ethics of Mahayana Budd h i s m , and is an exa m p l e of how to integrate wisdom

(prajna ) with "ski l l- in.means . " I n fact, as Vi malaki rti says, wisdom without "ski l l - in-means" is bondage: W i s d o m n ot i n tegrated w i t h l i berative technique is bond age ,

but

wisdom

integrated

with

technique is l iberation .
li berative

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What does Vi m a l a kirti mean by saying that wisdom with out "ski l l ful means" is bon dage? I t m e a n s that even though a practitioner has mastered the techniques that lead to wisdom, he neverth e l ess remains attached to those very practices , and is therefore stuck in samsara . As Vim a l akirti says : I t means that a bodhisattva disci p l ines himse l f i n the teachings of emptiness . . . . and brings on the deve lop­ ment of l iving beings , but a l l the time has a mind fu l l o f c l inging views . This i s cal led the bondage o f ins ight without ski l lful means. (Thurman 1 986, p. 4 7 ) As M ichae l Pye notes, the "cl inging views" Vimalaki rti mentions here are not as d e p l orab l e as they m ight see m , since they a r e , after a l l , those very meditative disc i p l ines that lead to l ove and compassion ( Pye 1978, p . 9 8 ) . However, despite the bodhisattva's noble intention to l iberate human beings , he is neverthe less attached to those very practices that are su pposed to help him . Even though he is disciplined in the "teachings of emptiness ," for exampl e , he is unable to h e l p others due to his clinging, and his wisdom is therefore l imited . As Vi m a l akirti note s , without integrating "ski l l - i n ­ means" the bodhis attva w i l l n e v e r experience the type o f "emptiness" that leads t o compassion . Vimal akirti's demand to in tegrate "ski l l -i n - means" with wisdom is

a

direct criticism of the Abh idharma Buddhists .

Even though they have "mastered" a l l the re l igious disci­ p l i nes and meditation practices , and even though they are

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"experts" in Buddhist logic and analys is, they mi stake medi­ tation for ritu a l i zed behavior, and wisdom for rote doctri n e . Vim a l a klrti singles o u t S ari putra a s a re presentative of this "Hinayana" problem when he te l l s h i m : Reverend S ariputra, he w h o is interested in t h e Dharma has no interest in matter, sensation , i n te l lect, motiva­ tion , or consciousness . He has no interest i n these ag­ gregates , or in the e lements , or in the sense-me d i a . I n ­ terested in the Dharma, h e h a s no interest in t h e rea l m o f desi re , the rea l m o f matter, o r the i mmaterial re a l m . I n terested in t h e Dharma, he is n o t i n terested in at­ tachment to the Buddha, attachment to the D h a r m a , or a t t a c h m e n t to the SaQ.gha . ( T h u r m a n 1 9 8 6 , p. 5 0 ) The aggregates, e l e ments and sense-media Vima l aklrti mentions refer to the Abhi dharma analysis of experience and the specific "path" one needs to fo l low for l iberation . Whi l e these i d e as were origi n a l ly devised t o he l p Buddhists attain wisdom and compass ion , they have nevertheless become a source of bondage because they lack the assistance of upaya . In Chapters 3 and 4, Vimalaklrti chastises the Buddha's immedi ate disciples and bodhisattvas for becoming attached to B u d d h i s t doctri n e . They preach B u d d h i s m i n d i scri m i ­ n ate ly, a n d speak t o others without taking into account the i r spiritua l , emotional , a n d inte l lectual leve l s . B u t t h e Dharma "is not a secure refuge , " says Vi malaklrti , and "without ex­ a m i n i n g the s p i ritual facu lties o f l iv i n g be i n gs one can wound those who are w i thout wounds" (Thurman 1 9 8 6 , p . 2 8 ) . I n these and l ater ch apters , Vimalaklrti interrupts the s peeches of the disciples and scolds them for being discon -

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nected from their audience . When the Buddha asks h i s disci­ ple Piirl)a to go visit Vi m al akirti and inquire about his i l l ­ ness , for example, Piirl) a responds with the fol lowing story : Lord , I am indeed rel uctant to g o to t h i s good m a n to in­ quire about his i l lness . Why? Lord , I remember one day, when I was teaching the Dharma to some young monks i n the great fore s t , the Licrhaavi Vi m a l akirti came there and said to m e , "Reverend Piirl) a , first conce n ­ trate yourse lf, regard the minds of these young bhik�us, and then teach them the Dharma! Do not put rotten food i nto a j ewe led bow l ! F i rst understand the inclina­ tions of these monks , and do not confuse price less sap­ phires with glass beads ! " (Thurman 1 986, p. 28) Vim a l a ki rti repeats these harsh words to all the other disciples and bod h i s attv a s , con d e m n i n g them for their at­ tach ments to Buddhism, the i r a rrogance , and their dis pas­ sion ate re lationship with others . U n derstandably, the disci­ ples and bodhisattvas are re l uctant to see Vimal akirti ever again on account of his harsh tone with those who preach without i ntegrating "ski l lful means . " As Piirl)a s ays , "It oc­ curred to me the n , 'The d i s c i p l e s , who d o not know the thoughfs or the i n c l i nations of others , are not a b le to teach the Dharma to anyon e . ' " (Thurman 1 986, p. 29) Vi mal akirti's criticism of this type of attachment has

a

long history in Buddhism , and is continued in C h in a by the Ch'an master Lin-chi : Fol lowers o f the Way, here and the re you hear i t i s said that t h e re i s a Way to be pra c t i c e d , a D h a r m a to

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b e c o m e e n l ightened to . Wi l l you te l l me then j ust what Dharma there is to become e n l ightened to , what Way there is to practice? . . . There are a bunch of b a l d ­ headed monks w h o te l l students o f t h e W a y t h a t t h e W a y represents t h e ulti mate goa l , and t h a t one m ust s pend three asamkhya kalpas carrying out and ful fi l l ­ i n g a l l t h e re l igious practices before one c a n gain com­ plete understanding of the Way . . . [ but ] don't take the Buddha to be some sort of ultimate goa l . I n my view he's more l i ke the hole in a privy . Bodhis attvas and arhats are a l l so many cangues and chain s , things for fettering people . . . . Fol lowers of the Way, there is no Buddha to be gained, and the Th ree Ve hic l e s , the five n atures , the teach ings of perfect and immediate e n ­ lighte n ment are a l l simply medicines t o cure diseases of the moment. ( Watson 1 993, p. 48-76) Similar to Li n-chi's attack on those who c.l ing to B ud­ dhism, Vi malakirti warns the disciples and bodhisattvas that attachment to Buddhism stands in the way of compass i o n . When Pliri:t a says that those "who do not know the thoughts or the i n c l i n ations of others are not able to teach the Dharma to anyo n e , " he learns that Buddhist wisdom involves a deep inti macy with others , and that there is more to be ing a bodhi­ sattva than simply knowing the ba re "truths " of suffering, " n o n - s e lf," and i m permanence. I n short, he learns that one must know others before engagi ng i n any Dharma discourse.

The ''Three Marks" of Existence When we first meet Vimal akirt i , he is giving a s peech about suffering to a group of v i l l agers who live in his area :

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Friends , this body i s s o i m permanent, fragil e , unworthy of confidence, and feeble. I t is so insubstanti a l , perish­ able, short- lived, painfu l , fi l led with diseases, and sub­ ject to changes . . . . I t is like a m agical i l lus ion , con ­ sisting of fa lsification s . I t is like a dream , being an un ­ rea l vision. I t is l ike a reflection , being the i m age of former action s . I t is li ke an echo, being dependent on con ditions . . . . Therefore , you shou ld be re pul sed by such a body .
duiJ,kha , and seems to be s poken in a very literal sense . The body , which includes al most every aspect of experiential life , i s inherently contaminated and should b e seen a s repuls ive . It is du11 kha . "What terrors are we not exposed to by the mere fact of having a body ! " says Conze, commenting on the doc­ trine of d u 1t k h a . "M uch pleasure is fol l owed by bad karmic consequences ( punis hment ) , and by fresh craving which ties us to this world" ( Conze 1 96 7 , p . 74). The body is "short lived" and i m permanent, it is an "echo" without substance , and an "image" that bears the fruit of a l l past conditioning. There­ fore , says Vi malakirti , we should be repulsed by it. This is the Buddha's First Noble Trut h , that says a l l conditioned phenomena share th ree " m arks" o r characte ris­ tics
(anatman ) . The thre e lak$a 1J a a re so b a s i c to B u d d h i s t thought that every introductory Buddhist text refers t o them in one way or another, and Vim a l akirti's treatment of them

a ppears , at least on a supe rficial leve l , very tradition a l . He simply recounts what the Buddha a l re a dy s a i d , and what every Buddhist practitioner a l ready knows. However, there is

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a l s o s o m e t h i n g d i s t i n c t l y " u n o rthodox" i n V i rn a l a ki r t i's treatment of the lall f?a !J a, som e t h i ng that reve a l s jus t how non-doctrin a l h i s position rea l ly i s. Before exa m i n i n g w hat this i s , howeve r, we need a c l e a r view of how the "three marks" are understood in Buddhism . The first "mark" o f existence i s i m permanence ( a n i tya ) , and expresses the ba si c Buddhist world-view . When we ana­ ly z e our experience we s u pposedly ne v e r find anything t hat is u n a l te red f ro m one moment to the next. A s the Abh id­ harma tradition held, a l l d h a r m a s a re born , re m a i n for an i n sta n t , and then die a l most as soon as they arise, leaving noth i n g but a contin uous flow of experiential events that rise and cease at every instance. And yet, l ike V i m a l akirt i , the B u d d h a says that whatever is i m pe r m a n e n t s h o u l d be t reated as i l l and the refore rejected : "What is i m permanent, that is not worth delight ing i n , not worth being i m pressed by, not worth c l i nging to . " One sh oul d n·ot even try to c l ing to i m perm a n e n t phenomena because they are associated w it h suffering, du �l ldw , th e second "mark . " As t h e Buddha says : Now t h i s , 0 monks , is the noble truth of du�1 1l h a : birth i s pai n fu l , old age is painfu l , s ickness is painfu l , death i s painfu l , sorrow , lamen tation , dej ection , and despair are painfu l . Con tact with the unpleasant is painfu l , not getting what one w i s hes i s painfu l . I n short, the five skandhas of grasping are painfu l . (Warren 1 986, p. 4 7 )

Because ordinary experience is "marked" by the process of b i rt h , decay , a n d death-i . e . , i m permanence-it i s con­ nected to pain a n d sho u l d be rej ected . Long befo re V i ­ m a l akirt i , t h e Buddha taught t h a t we shou l d cu l t i v a te a sense of disgust with i m permanence because it is ful l of pain

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a nd sufferi ng. "In short," s ays the Buddha, "the five skand­ has of gra s p i n g are painfu l , " and h e recommends that we cultivate a sense of aversion for the eye and the impressions it receive s , the ear and sounds , the nose and odors , the body

and tangible things , and so o n . "This body ," says Vimalakirt i , echoing the Buddha, " i s filthy, being an agglomeration of pus and excrement. Therefore , you should be repu lsed by s uch a body. " (Thurman 1 986, p. 22) T h e t h i rd ·• mark" of existence is "non-self" or a natman . Al l of l i fe , says Vima l akirt i , is "insubstan tial . . . l ike a w ater bubb le . . . se lfless , l i ke water . . . and nons ubstanti a l , l i ke space" (Thurman 1 986, p. 2 2 ) . There is noth i ng fixed or per­ manent i n our experiences , and it is i m possible to discover a substa n ti a l "se lf" in the worl d . I n stead, a l l things are depe n ­ d e n t l y re lated th rough a process of c o n d i t i on i n g , a l w ays "turb u l e n t " a n d changing. Because of t h i s , B u d d h i sts say that l i fe is " n o n - s ubstant i a l " or a n at m a rz . As the B uddha says i n the Sa myutta -Nillaya : The body, monks , is s e l fl e s s . I f the body , mon k s , were the self, this body wou ld not be subject to s ickne s s , and it would be possible i n the case of the body to say, "Let my body be thus , let my body not be thus . " Now , be­ cause the body is sou l le s s , monks , therefore the body is s ubj ect to s ickn e s s , and it is not possible in the case of the body to say " Let my body be thus , let my body be thus . " Consc iousness is sou l less. For if consciousness were the so u l , this co n s ci ousness wo u l d not be subject to sick­ ness , a n d i t would not be pos si bl e in the case of con ­ sciousness to say, "Let my con sciousness be thus , let my consciousness not be thus ."

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Therefore in truth , monks , whatever body, past, future , or present, internal or extern a l , gross or subt l e , low or eminent, near or far, is to be looked on by him who duly and rightly understands , a s, "all this body is not m ine , not t h i s a m I, no t mine is t h e so u l . " ( W a rren 1 9 8 6 , p. 182). The B uddha's argument for the "third mark" is voiced primari ly against the Hindu notion of an unchanging iitman . I f there is a "self," he says , it wou ld have to be permanent, eterna l , and "uncontamin ated" by conditioned phenomena . However, neither the body nor consciousness < o r any othe r aspect of experience ) is immune from diseases , which means they are conditioned and , hence , "selfless . " H o w is Vimal akirti's d iscussion of the three " m arks" any diffe re n t from the Abh idharma discussion? I s his ap­ proacll any less dogmatic than their approach to the subject? The main d i ffe rence between Vim a l a k i rti and the Abhid­ harma phi losophers is that Vimalakirti refuses to see the three lak$arJ.a as the absolutely true d iscourses of the Bud­ dha . In his view , they are simply fictiona l "devices" rather than univers a l truths, and exem pl ify just one fo rm of Bud­ dhist communication . We learn a bout this "fictional" status of the lak$arJ.a not on ly in what Vimalakirti says about the m , but in the very structure of the text itse lf. I n the "Ski l lful Means" chapter, for instance , we are told that Vima lakirti fakes an i l lness . He pretends to manifest himse l f as du!J.kha so the v i l l agers ( a n d l ater in the text , the disciples and bodhisattvas ) w i l l visit him:

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At that t i m e , out of this very ski l l i n l i be rative tech­ nique l upaya l , Vi m a l a k i rt i man i fested h i ms e l f as i f sick. T o inquire after h i s health, the king, the officia l s , t h e lord s , the youths , t h e aristocrats , t h e householders , the bus inessmen , the townsfo l k , the country fol k , and thousands of other living bei ngs came forth from the great c i ty of Vaisa l i and cal led on the i n va l i d . When they a rrive d , V i m a l akirti ta ught them the D h a rm a . ( Thurman 1 986, p . 2 1 -22) What he goes on to teach was a l ready quoted above : the "truth" of du �ddw . But this teaching is confounded beca use Vim a l akirti is not being com pletely "truthfu l . " He " l ies" to the v i l l agers about his sickness , and then teaches them about the nature of s ickness (du }J. k h a ) . The connection here should

be obvious . Vimal akirti's own s ickness is "fictitious": i t is a ruse he employs to get the v i l l agers to come see h i m . But the conte n t of his teachi ngs-that which refers to the t h ree

"marks" of existence-is no doubt "fictitious" i n the s a m e sense. H i s o w n s ickness and his teaching about sickness turn out to be identica l : both are "fictional" devices, and therefore

neither i s rea l ly "true . " Vimal akirti's d iscourse about the na­ ture of s uffering, i m permanence , a n d nonsubsta n t i a l i t y , while appearing t o b e spoken i n a l itera l or truthful sense , i s really an upayic story that m akes sense o n l y i n t h e context of helping this particular audience . The s utra makes this c lear t o us by con necting V i m a lakirti's fe igned i l l ness with his teaching on d u �z k h a , and by i n c l u d i ng t his e n t i re e ve nt within a chapter ca l led "Skil lful Means ."

But why does Vima l akirti do this? Why does he "fic­ tion alize" an i l lness and offer "fa l se" teachings? This P.xact

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question is raised by the Bodhisattva Mailj us ri in C hapter 5 , and Vim a lakirti responds by saying: You ask me, Mailj usri, whence comes my sickness; the sicknesses of the bodhisattvas arise from great compas­ sion . (Thurman 1 986, p. 43) Vi m a l a k i rti m a n i fests h i m s e l f a s i l l a n d teaches d u h ldw out of compassion . He s e e s others s uffering in life

and, "out of this very ski l l in l i berative technique," strives to help them . He does this in two ways : first, by "fiction a l iz ing" his own sickness to bring the v i l l age rs ( and then the disci ples and bodhisattv a s ) to visit him , a n d then by te l l i n g a story about d u fz ll h a because he thinks this partic u l a r story w i l l he l p these particular people overcome their attachments. The point is that Vimalakirti's compassion determines what he is going to say; it molds the style and content of his teaching, and not, as the Abhidharma Buddhists would ha ve i t , the other way around. One m ust "first know the thoughts and in­ c l i nations of others , " says Vi m a l a kirt i , be fore e n gaging in any Dharma discourse. Because Vi malakirti resists be ing attached to any single re l igious method or pedagogical practice , he is open to using any number of heuristic device s. "For this re ason , " says the Buddha in the Lot u s S ii t ra , "I use hundred thousands of various ski l lful means , such as different inte rpretations , i n ­ d i c a t i o n s , e x p l a n a tion s , i l l u s t r a t i o n s . " V i m a l a ki rti a l s o preaches t h e "Dharma appropriate to each , " and promotes

a

variety of l ifesty l e s , many of which go against "orthodox" Buddhist doctri n e . I n C h apter 8 , h e shocks the Buddha's dis­ ciples by proc la iming that even the most "evi l" actions can be part of a bodhisattva's path:

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He may fo l l ow the ways of avarice , yet he gives away all intern al and external things without regard even for his own l i fe . He may fol low the ways of wickedness a n d anger, yet h e re mains utterly free of mal ice and l ives by love . He may fo l l ow the ways of lazines s , yet his efforts are u n i n te rrupted as he strives in the c u l tivation of roots of virtue. He may fol low the ways of s ens uous dis­ traction , yet, natura l ly concentrated, his contemplation is not dissipated. He may fo l l ow the ways of fa lse wis­ dom , yet, having reached the tran scendence of w i s dom , he is expert in all mundane and transcendenta l sciences. (Thurman 1 986, p. 64 ) As noted in C h apter 1 , the Buddha is portrayed i n the Upiiya lw u sa lya S ii t ra as pract i c i n g some of the act i v i t i e s

suggested by Vimal ak irti . He b r o k e h i s monastic vows to have sex w ith a young woman who was about to k i l l hers el f, and he k i l led a man t o preve n t hi m from murde ri n g 5 0 0

other peop l e . S u c h practices g o against "orthodox" doc trin e , yet suggest t h a t Buddhist moral i ty is itse l f an upiiya . When

guided by compa s s i o n , the B uddha a n d B o d h i s attvas do whatever is necessary to he l p h u man beings . I n Vimalak irti's hands, the three lak$a rJa are recovered fro m an Abh idharma fixation on orthodoxy and tra n s formed

into soteriological too l s that suit the particular l eve l s of hu­ man be ings . Rather than te l l i ng us how a l l things m ust be

"se lfles s , " i m pe rma n e n t , and n o n - s ubstanti a l , and rather than sayin g that everyone must meditate on these "truths" in

order to achieve l i beration , Vimal akirt i uses the la k $ a rJ a to i n st i l l a sense of detachment in his l isteners . Given a differ­

en t au d i e n c e , however, and he may reject the lak$a rJ a ; i n

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fact . with a different audience Vi mal akii rti may even teach views that "contradict" the o rthodox Buddhist pos ition re­ garding the "selfless" and impermanent nature of experience. Nagarj un a makes a s i m i l ar point i n his Ma dhya m i ka lltz ri k a when h e says the fol lowing: Sometimes the Buddha teaches self Sometimes no self Sometimes both , And sometimes neither. ( Garfie l d 1 995, p. 62) S uch pedagogical versatil ity is what Vi m a l akirti means by integrating "ski l l - i n - mean s . " This a l lows the bodhisattvas to ·· review" the dlw rm a s without becoming attached to the m , t o uti lize the Abh idharma ana iysis o f experience without any c o m m i t m e n t to their truth - v a l ue , to teach about the three "marks" of existence w i thout treati n g them un iversa l ly , and to preach "emptiness" while knowing fu l l we l l that "it" too is "empty . "

The Teaching o f ''Two Truths" The Buddhist doctrine of "two truths" was deve l oped in early Buddhism to disti n guish between the " u l t imate" (pa ­

ra miirtlz a ) and "convention a l " (sa m urtt i ) d i scourses o f the Buddha . Origi n a l ly , the distinction was used to help organize the exte n s i ve vol umes of Buddhist l i terature that acc u m u ­ l ated after t h e Buddha's death . T h e "two truths" were used to distinguish the analytic a blz idh a rma texts fro m the d i scur­ sive s il t ra s , and was simply a "conve n ient designation" that referred

to

the different ways of speaking and communicating

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th e Dharma. Sometimes the Buddha gave precise , a n alytic tea chings , and sometimes he tol d stories or offered parables. Som etimes he spoke " l i teral ly" ( or "u ltimate ly" ) to his disci­ ples, and sometimes he s poke metaphorica l l y ( o r "conve n ­ tional ly" ) . A s the Buddhist scho lar Jayat i l leke ( 1 963 ) note s , the difference between t h e "two truths" w a s n o t u s e d episte­ mological ly in early Buddhism, but was simply a method for understan ding the v arious rhetorical patterns in Buddhist literature . I n the l ater Abhidharma tradition , however, the distinction took on more weight. Instead of using it to distin­ guish between d iffe rent ways of speaking, teaching, and communicating, the Abhidharma ph i l osophers used it to es­ tabl ish normative guide lines for meditation praxi s . I n the i r vie w , even tho ugh t h e Buddha m ay have expressed certain "lowe r" or "convention a l " truths to the s i m p l e - m i n d e d , he never thought these teachings had any rea l sote rio l ogical im­ portance . On ly those teachings con tained i n the a blz idharm a texts were considered "ulti mate ly" true a n d , there fore , t h e only teachings worthy o f true enl ightenment. A central aim of the Vi m a la ll l rt i n i rdesa is to attack the Abhidharma des i re to privilege one form of religious com m u ­ nication above t h e othe r . I n the "Ski l l fu l M e a n s '' c h a p t e r , Vima l a k i rti r a i s e s the " t w o t r u t h s " when he t e a c h e s h i s neighbors about impermanence a n d non-self. im ploring them to strive for a "higher" or "ulti mate" rea lity:

Friends , the body of a Tathagata is the body of Dharma , born o f gnos is . The body o f a Tathagata is born o f t h e stores o f merit a n d wisdo m . It i s born o f mora l ity , o f meditation , o f wisdom , o f the liberat i o n s , a n d o f t h e know ledge a n d vision of libe ration . . . . I t is born o f the concentrations, the liberations, the meditation s , and the absorptions . . . . It is born of all the t ranscendences . . . .

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It is born of t ruth . It is born of rea lity. It is born of con ­ scious awareness .
a

common distinction within the Mahayana traditio n . I t is a l so a disti nction used by many Western schol ars who say that B u d d h i s m i s co m m i tted to discovering a truth about exis­ tence , or that truth is necessa ry for l iberation . One popu l a r w a y i s to s t" e "convent i on a l " t ruth as dea ling with l a n guage

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81

and conceptua l ana lysis . The "conventiona l " i s the rea l m of the everyday, of s uffering, of causal re l ation s , of s pace and time, and of anything that we cou ld possibly i magine through the use of thoughts and word s . "Ulti mate" truth , on the other hand, is the fi n a l goa l of Buddh ist ins ight, meditation , and practice . I t transcends s peech and the "mundane" wor l d , is pure , unal loyed b l i s s , non-conceptua l and non -dua l , and be­ yond a l l categories and thought constructions . Another com­ mon way of interpreting the "two truths" i s to say that the difference between the two is

a

matter of how we interpret

the phen o m e n a l wor l d . The gist of the argument runs as such: what Buddhis m means by "ultimate truth" is that there is no U l ti m ate Truth . The problems in l i fe stem from not un­ derstanding this i n s ight , and from taking what i s merely "convention a l " for something " u l t i mate . " Th is i s a problem because when we take thi ngs as "objective" we become at­ tached to the m , and then suffer as a res ult. Thus , the way to overcome this probl e m is to real ize that what we think is u l ­ timate ly "true" is i n fact conditioned b y c u l t u r e , l a nguage , the m i n d , and so on . We w i l l return to these i n te rpreta t i o n s of the "two

truths" in the fo l lowin g chapter. The reason for citing them

now is that both share an a p proach to Buddhist ph i l osophy that i s rejected by the Vi m a la ll i rt i n i rdesa . The first c l a i m s that Buddh i s m i s striving f o r an ultimate truth beyond con­ vention s , while the second c l a i ms j ust the oppos ite. However, both share the assumption that Buddhism i s com m i tted to a fixed metaphysical syste m . Vi m a l a k i rti does n o t use t h e " t w o trut hs " i n e ither o f these ways , however. H i s d i scuss ion of t h e "two truths" is not on ly conta i n e d i n an e n t i re c h a pter devoted to " s k i l l - i n ­ mea n s , " b u t t h e n a rra t i v e m o ve m e n t o f Vi m a l a k i rt i 's

82

Skillful Means

d iscourse from a "conven tion a l " doctrin e regarding du1Lkhcz to an "ultimate truth" never veers from that topic : it is sti l l as an upiiya that t h e disti nction is m a d e . A s Vi m a l akirti says , the distinction between the mundane and transcendent is simply one of the "varied expl anations" the Buddha uses . When the �od h i s attvas a s k Vi m a l a ki rt i how the Buddha teaches , for example, he responds in the fol lowing way: Good s i rs , these l iving beings here are h ard to disci­ p l i n e . Therefore , he teaches them with discourses ap­ propriate fo r the disciplining of the wild a n d uncivi­ l ized . How does he disc i p l ine the wild and uncivil ized? What discourses are appropriate? Here they are : "This i s he l l . This is the animal wor l d . This is the world of the l o rd of the death . These a re the a d versities . These are the rebirth with crippled facu lties . These are physical m i s deeds , and these a re the retributions for physical misdeeds . . . . This is fa lse wisdom and this is the fruit of false wisdom . . . . This is the path and that is the wrong path . This is v i rtue and that is evi l . This is blameworthy and that i s blameless. This is defi led and that is immacu late . This i s mundane and that is tran­ sce n d e n t a l . This is compounded and that is uncom­ pounded. This is passion and that is purification . This is life and that is liberation . " Thus , b y means o f these v a ried e x p l a n ations o f the Dharma, the Buddha trains the minds of those l iving beings who are j ust l ike wild horse s . Just as w il d horses or w i l d e l e phants w i l l not be tamed un less the goad pierces them to the marrow , so l iving beings who a re wild and hard

to

civilize

are

disciplined only by means of dis­

courses about all kmds of miseries. (Thurman 1986, p. 82 )

Mahayana BIJ.ddhism

83

B rief as this passage i s , it expresses i m portant ideas foun d throughout most B uddhist texts . I t refers to the idea that l i fe is sam saric and fu l l of pai n , that there are karmic retributions for cert a i n act s , that there are compounded and uncompounded rea l m s , and that there is such a thing cal led l i beration . Rather than descri b i n g a true state of n a t u re , however, Vi m a l akirti says that the Buddha's re as o n for stating such views is to discip l i n e unruly minds . H e n otes that the teaching of "two truths" is specific, directed toward the concrete prob lems of individua l s . I t i s t h us not meta­ phys i c a l s p e c u l ation-but pract i c a l advice . To teach the Dharma otherwise, as Piirna learns from Vim a l akirti , w i l l "wound those who are without wounds . " T h e above pass age a l so i m p l ies somethi n g about the abil ity to overcome attachment. I n atte mpting to "train the minds of those living be i n gs who are just l ike wild horses , " the B uddha is trying to get them t o b e l e s s attached to their "wi l d " side and more focused on disci p l i n e . H i s way of going about this , as Vimal akirti notes, is to teach them discourses appropriate to their needs and d i s pos i t io n s . The Buddha gives stories about he l l rea l ms and rei ncarnation , about how a l l things are i m pe rm a n e n t and "empty ," and stories about how "this is mundane and that is transcendenta l . " It is obvi­ ous that they are stories and not "truths" because the siitra t e l ls us that they are none other than "various explanation s . " l n C h a pter 1 1 , it is t h e Buddha who says that h i s dis­ courses vary depending on the audience : There are l d i scourses ] that acco m p l ish the buddha­ w o rk by me ans of bo dhis attvas ; those that do so by means of lights; those that do so by means of the tree

Skillful Mea n s

84

of e n l ighte nment . . . those that do

so

by means of rel ig­

ious robes . . . those that do so by means of magical in­ carnations; those that do so by means of e m pty s pace ; and those that do so by means of lights in the s ky . Why is it so, Ananda? Because by these various mean s , living bei ngs become disciplined. S i m i l arly, An anda, there are ! discourses ) that accomplish the buddha-work by means of teach ing l iving beings words, defi n ition s , exam ples, such as 'dreams,' 'images ,' . . . 'echoes ,' 'i l l us i on s , ' and ' mirages'; and those that accom p l ish the buddha-work by making words un derstandable . Also An a n d a , there are ! discourses ! t hat accom plish the buddha-work for living be ings without speech, by si lence , i nexpressibi l ­ i t y , and unteachabi l ity . An anda, among a l l t h e activi­ ties , enj oyments , and practices of the Buddhas , there are none that do not accomplish the buddha-work, be­ cause all discipline living beings .
riologica l ly re levant. They embody transformative potentia l , and can have efficacious results i f gi ven a t the right time . H oweve r, to become attached to any s i ngle s tory as abso­ l utely "true" is rejected not only because it denies the con­ crete dispositions of individua l s , but fa lsely assumes there is on ly one "correct" path ( miirga ) that suits everyone . Vi m a l akirti's com p l a i n t aga i n st those who i n te rpret Buddhism as non -fictiona l "truths" is echoed i n N ietzsche's complaint against those who cling to Western science as a factual system. "It is perhaps dawning on five or six minds," says Nietzsche , "that physics , too, i s only an interpretation and exegesis of the world ( to suit us, if I may say so! ) and not

Mahii.yii.na Buddh ism

85

a worl d-explan ation . " According to Nietzsche, the e rror of

science is that it mistakes narrative tales for "facts ," and er­ roneou s l y m i stakes its own n arrative for something objec­ tively "true . " In his view, science is simply one story among many possible stories, and he therefore wants us to eva l uate it heuristica l ly; that is, to ask whether it paints a good narra­ tive picture of l ife . I n his view, science paints a loathsome view of the world, and, to counter it, N ietzsche gives an a lto­ gether different story, called the "etern a l return": What, if some day or n ight a demon were to ste a l after you into your lonel iest loneliness and say to you : "Th is l i fe as you now live it and have l ived it, you w i l l have to l ive once more , and inn umerable times more; and there wi l l be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every s igh and everything unut­ terably s m a l l or great in your l ife w i l l have to return to you , a l l in the same s uccession and seque nce-even this spider and this moon l ight between the trees , and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of ex­ istence is turned upside down aga i n and aga i n , and you with it, s peck of dus t ! " ( Gay Scien ce , trans . by Kauf­ mann 1 9 7 4 , p. 273 > In commenting on this passage , Alexander Nehamas ob­ serves that Ni etzsche is not thinking of the "etern a l return" as ar. objective "truth" about the universe . Rather, he is i n ­ terested in "the attitude o n e must h a v e toward onese l f in or­ de r to react with joy and despair to the possibi l i ty the demon raises'' ( N e h a m as 1 98 5 , p . 1 5 1 ) . In other word s , N i etzsche u ses the idea of the eternal return as a narrative device that he thinks wi l l transform a l i fe based i n fear and resentment

86

Skillful Means

to one of joy a n d c r e a t i v i t y . He us e s it as a cat a l y s t . To a s k whe t h e r the ete r n a l re t u r n is true or fa l s e , or w h e t h e r it d e p i c t s a n accurate onto l ogica l picture of t h e w o r l d , not o n l y m i s s e s the po i n t of the s t o r y , b u t t u r n s a s i m p l e n a r r a t i v e ta l e into a m e t a phys i c a l pro b l e m .

T h e Vi m a la k i rt i n i rdesa a d o p t s a s i m i l a r m e t h o d for de a l i ng w i t h t h e Bud d h i s t t e a c h i ngs . I t te l l s us t h a t "emptiness," the

"two

s t ra t e g i e s

n i r v li f.l a ,

trut h s " us e d

i m pe r m a n e n c e ,

are within

not h i n g a

mo re

p a rt i c u l a r

"non-self," than

and

rhe t o r ic a l

discours e ,

and

w a rn s aga i n s t t h e d a nge rs of beco m i n g a t t a c h e d to these

t e a c h i ngs . The characte r Vi m a l a k i rt i

embodies

t h i s no n - a t t ach ed a t t i t u d e b y e m p h a s i z i n g pe d agogi c a l

v e rs a t i l i t y , aud i e n ce a w a r e n e s s

,

a n ci a s p i r i t ua l res o l v e

t o h e l p ot h e rs , a n d b y cha s t i s i n g t h o s e w h o fo rget the upay i c

status o f the Bud d h a ' s d i s co u r s e s . Acco r d i n g to

M i chae l Pye : V i rn a l a k i rt i is i n d e e d hard to p i n dow n . Th i s i s be ­ c a u s e e v e ry fo rm of re l ig i o u s l a nguage , whe n co n ­ c e i v e d i n te r m s of s k i l fu l m e a n s , i s fi rst a l l us i v e a n d the n d i s po s a b l e . Th i s a p p l i e s to 't e a c h i n g B u d ­ d h i s m , ' t h a t is 't u r n i n g t h e w h e e l o f D h a rm a , ' a n d i t e v e n a p p l i e s to 'e n t e r i n g ni rva n a ' as o b s e rv e d b e fo re in

Th e Lot u s Su t ra . I n s h o rt

it a p p l i e s n o t

m e re l y to the pre l i m i n a ry sugge s t i o n s of t h e re ­ l i g i o u s sys t e m , but above a l l t o i t s fu n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n s and fi n a l t e r m s . ( Pye 1 9 7 8 , p . 1 0 1 )

Mahiiyiina Buddh ism

87

Summary

It is tempting to think that M ahayana Buddhism sign i ­ fies a complete break w i t h early Buddhism, and that t h e d e ­ ve lopment of "emptiness , " t h e "two truths," t h e bodhisattva idea l , and u p ay a is an e ntire ly new syste m of Buddhist though t . I t is also t e m p t i n g to t h i n k that the attack on Abh i d h a r m a Buddhism entai ls the rejection of all the medi­ tation p ractices and re l i g i o us disci p l i nes that are fou n d throughout t h e abhidharma texts . A s we s a w w i t h V i ­ mal aki:rt i , howeve r , t h e i s s u e i s less about the creation of new phi losophical doctrines or world-views than an attempt to restate the basic message of non-attachment. When Vi­ m a l aki:rti condemns S ari putra (a "Hi:nayana" Buddhist) for misinterpreting Buddhism, for example, he is not saying that S ari putra has a metaphysically incorrect view of the world or that Abhidharma praxis is somehow w rong in itse lf. The his­ tory of Abhidharma Buddhism in Southeast As ia would cer­ tai n } � prove him wrong on this point. Rather, he is attacking S ari putra on metapractical grounds , argu i n g that his at­ tach ment to Buddhist doctrine contradicts the mess age of compassion that was inaugurated by the Buddha. Th us , the issue between the Mahayana and the Abh idharma is not about whether the a b h i d h a r m a texts a re efficac i o u s , or whether this or that type of meditation works , but about the ph i l osophical j ustification for how one should meditate . I n this regard , the M ahayan ists argue from the perspective of upaya , saying there is no fixed methodology or doctrine to ar­

gue about., and that any attempt to i nsti tute a monol ithic form of praxis not only violates the teachings of the Buddha, but destroys the abi l i ty to respond compassionately. I n thei r view , t h e idea t h a t one can metapractica l ly j ustify a single

88

Skillful Means

practice for a l l people in a l l circumstances i s not j ust anti­ Buddhist and unorthodox. It i s counterproductive , harmfu l , and ineffective. Vimal aklrti symbol izes the opposite of the Abhidharma view because he refuses to teach others according to a fixed doctri n e . W h e r e a s s o m e o n e l i ke S ari p u t r a - a n e x p e rt "Hinayana" philosopher-can recite a l l the categories, princi­ ples, a n d doctrines of Buddhist thought at w i l l , he also as­ sumes that the mere recitation of these "truths" will faci l i ­ tate l iberation . His attachment t o doctrin e , therefore , severs him from his audience , a n d he preaches without knowing anyth ing about the thoughts a n d i n c l i n ations of others . Vi­ m a l a kl rti , on the other hand, emphasizes intimacy a n d a keen awareness of the d i ffe re n t levels of human beings . Rather than begi n n ing with an abstract conception o f B u d ­ d h i s t "truth" which he then teaches indiscri m inate ly to eve­ ryone, he first begi ns with the concrete dispositions of others a n d then "teaches the D h a r m a a p p r o p r i a t e l y to each " < Thurman

1 986 ,

p.

20).

H i s e m p h a s i s on the " n u m e rous

teachings" and "varied expl anations" underlines the fact that there a re d i ffe ren t prob lems depending on the i n dividua l , a n d makes the point that a p l u r a l ity of ap proaches , doc­ trines, and teachings are necessary to address the different types of suffering that exist i n the wor l d . For this reason, says the Vi malallirtin irdesa , Vimalaklrti has fu l ly integrated his wisdom with "ski l l - in-means . "

Chapter 4 Nagarjuna's Middle Way In troduction

Nagarjuna is widely recognized as one of the most i m ­ portant t h i n kers i n t h e Buddhist phi losoph i c a l tradition . Born in South India sometime during the second century

C.E.,

Nagarjuna deve loped a style o f thinking that cha l l e nged a l l the major ph i l osophica l systems in I n d i a . H e debated ortho­ dox Buddh ists and H i n dus al ike, estab l i s he d the " M i d d l e Way" ( M adhyamika ) schoo l of phi l osophy, and refined a dia­ lectical method (su nya ta or "emptiness") that gave b i rth to Buddhist traditions th roughout India, China, Tibet, and Ja­ pan . I n m any Buddhist circles, Nagarjuna is regarded as the Second Buddha, a bodh isattva who clearly expressed the fundamentals of the "Way." Nagarjuna has recently become im portant for Western phi losophers as wel l . Because many of his texts re ly on

re ­

ductio ad a bs u rdu m logic, and because he is seen as criticiz­ ing prob lems surrounding caus al ity , subjectivity, s pace , and

timl::' , he is thought to be a phi l osopher of stature . I ndeed, he is often compared to such i m portant Western thinkers as Kant, Hege l , Hume, Wittgenstein , and Derrida, and is often

situated within the same intel lectual discourse as the West­ e rn tradition . According to m any schol ars , N agarj u n a not only does metaphysics but also actually thinks l iberation re­ quires it. Whether he is depicted as a mystic, convention a l ist, ni h i l i s t ,

or deconstructionist , and w hether or not his dia lectic

of "emptiness" (sunyata ) undermines al l positive philosophical 89

Skillful Means

90

positions , it is common l y assumed that his ph i l osophy ad ­ dresses metaphysica l problems , and that he thinks Buddhist praxis is somehow incomplete without it. If we read Nagarj un a as operating within a n upiiyic context , however, then this way of framing his proj ect is mis­ leading. The poi nt to remember is that upiiya has little in common with traditiona l Western metaphysics: it is not con­ cerned with the n ature of space and time, caus al ity, persona l identity, o r consciousness , and i t resists the tendency t o con ­ ceptua l i z e l i be ration a part from Buddhist praxis . To think otherwise assumes that the Dharma can be abstracted from its soteriological and rhetorical context, and that Buddhism can be preached w i thout any particular audience in m i n d . Given the Buddhist i ns istence o n the i n dispensable nature of practice , however, and given Nagarjuna's own position withi n the Mahayana tradition, i t is high ly unl ikely that he is rais­ ing traditiona l metaphysical question s , and even more un­ l ikely that he thinks Buddhist soteriology depends on it. The purpose of this chapte r is to offer a d i ffe ren t ac­ count of Nagarjuna than i s found i n contemporary Western schol a r s h i p . I t w i l l not ask what i t means for caus a l i ty , truth , the self, o r consciousness t o b e "empty" in a very gen ­ e r a l sense, b u t h o w "emptiness" re l ates t o t h e soteriologica l practices of Buddhism and what it means for those practices to be "empty" of in herent nature . Before exa m i n i n g key pass ages from N a g a rj u n a ' s

Miidhya m i k a kii rikii that criticize Abhidharma praxi s , i t is important to situate Nagarjuna within the M ahayana tradi ­ tion . W h i l e m ost Buddhist scholars acknowledge Nagarj un a's pl ace within the Mahayana, many of them negl ect the "ski l l -

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

91

in-mean s " di mension o f this tradition . The next section w i l l therefore situate N agarjuna within the Mahayana genera l ly, and will be fo l lowed by a "ski l l - i n - m e ans" readi n g of his Miidhyamilwlliirikii.

Nagarjuna and Mahayana Buddhism The fact that N a g a rj u n a even operated w i t h i n a Mahayana context is not obvious to some scholars . For exam ­ p l e , A. K. Warder argues that there i s very l ittle Mahayana influence in Nagarjuna's writings : Modern s tudents have sometimes s upposed t h a t he i s criticizing ea rly Buddhism, or t he e arl y schoo l s , in order to set up Mahayana i nstead . Is there any truth i n this s upposition? We have a l ready poi nted out that there i s n ot hin g overt ly M a haya n i s t i n h i s though t . (W ar de r

1 973, p. 13) T h e prob lem with Warder's v i e w i s that i t can e a s i ly mis lead us when it comes to understanding N agarj u n a's phi­ losophy. I n the Twelve Gate Treatise N agarj una s ays that his project is based on c l a ri fying the principles of Mahayana Buddhism : I want to reveal and make clear the su}>re m e l y gre at teach ings of the Tathagata. Therefore , I will explain the teachings of M a h ay a n a . ( C heng 1 9 8 2 , p . 53-54 )

Skillf'ul Means

92

And i n the Bodhisarrzbhara (ka) , or "The Accumulations for E n lightenment," N agarjuna expresses views that c learly originated in the Prajniipiiramita texts : Praj flapararnita is the mother of Bodhisattvas, s ki l l-in­ means is their father, and compassion is their daughter. Attracting with gifts , teaching the Dharm a , l istening to the teaching of the Dharm a , and also practicing acts of benefit to others-these are the skil lful means for at­ tracting l others I . While benefiting l iving beings without t i ring and with­ out care l essness, [a bodhisattva) expresses his aspira­ tion for e n l ightenment: To benefit others i s to benefit oneself! Let us not desert living beings ! I n order to benefit living beings , first generate thi s attitude and then come to possess the practice of the doors to l iberatio n . ( Lindtner 1 986, p. 1 2 7 ) M o s t W e s t e r n accounts foc us exc l u s i v e l y o n t h e Madhya m i k a ka ri k a a n d the Vigra h a vy av a rta n t , h i s most

famous texts . However, N agarjuna's writings extend beyond these two books . He wrote for Buddhist monks, l ay peo p l e , orthodox Hindus, and kings , w i t h varying themes and ph i ­ l osophical motives. H i s writing style ranges from the simple to the complex, spanning personal devotional hymns, such as found in the Ca tu�zsta va , to the more phi losophica l ly ab­ stract, such as found in the Ka r i k a s . The d iversity of ap­ proaches Nagarj una adopts in commun icating with different audiences s ituates him within a "ski l l ful means" tradition that runs from the Buddha and through the Mahayana.

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

93

C h ristian Lindtner is one of the few scholars to recog­ nize N agarjuna's diverse l iterary talents , and attributes this to the notion of upaya : I n my v i e w , the decisive reasons for the variety of Nagarj una's writings is to be sought in the author's de­ s i re , as a Buddhist, to address himself to various audi­ ences at various leve l s and from various perspecti ves. This motive w o u l d of course be consistent with

the

M ahayana ideal of upaya k a u sa ly a ( s k i l l f u l m e a n s ) . Thus, the Mulamadhyamakakarika , the S unyatasaptati, and Vigra h a uya vartal we rt! intended to be studied by phi losophica lly minded monks . The Vaida lyaprakara lJ-a was written as a cha l l enge to N aiyayikas . The Yu k ­ ti�a�tillti , the Nya v a h a ra s i ddi , and the Pratltyasa m u t ­ padahrdayalltirillti as we l l are contributions to Buddhist

exegesis . The Ca t u 1zstava is a document confessing its author's person a l faith i n the Buddha's doctri ne, w h i l e texts

l i ke

the

Sutra -samuccaya , t he B o d h i c i t t a ­

vivaralJ-a , the Bodh i - sa f?l b h ara(ka ) , the S u h rllek h a , and

the Ratnavall on the whole a d d ress themselves

to

a

wider Buddhist a udience , monks as we l l as l ayme n . ( Lindtner

1 98 6 ,

p.

33 1 l

L i n d tner groups a l l of N agarj un a's texts u n d e r the h eading "ski l lful mean s . " It is not j ust his supposed "minor" works that are geared toward a particular audience , but even th ose that deal with d ifficu l t conce pts in Buddhist phi loso­ phy, such as the Madhya mikallarika and the Vigrahavya. var­ ta nt . Whi le no one can be s ure Nagarj una wrote a l l the texts

as crib ed to h i m , i t is understandab l e why L i n d t n e r sees N agarjuna as a "ski l l - i n-means" thinker, and why he views

Skillful Mea ns

94

the high ly logica l teaching of "emptiness" on the same foot­ ing as those given to kings , lay people, and disciples. As a M a hayana B u d d h i s t , N agarj u n a re a l i zes t h a t n o s i ngle teach ing is sufficient to cover the various " i l lnesses" of sen ­ t i en t beings , and because t he world manifests itsel f i n differ­ e n t degrees of karmic growth , d i ffere n t d iscourses a re needed . As he says in the Exposition of Bodhicitta : The teachi ngs of the protectors of the world accord with the ! varying] reso lve of l iving bei ngs . The Buddhas em­ p l oy a w e a l th of s k i l lful me a n s , which take many worldly forms. ( Lindtner 1986, p. 65 ) Nagarjuna is saying nothing new here . I t was e mpha­ s i zed by the Buddha, the L o t u s Sutra , and the Prajnapara · m i l a , a l l of which emphasize the need to be sensitive to the

rhetorica l context of sentient bei ngs . W h i le N agarjuna rare ly re fers to any of these texts s peci fica l ly, his devotion to this tradition is expressed th rough his diverse literary talents and his use of skil lful means. In the Ma dlz y a m i lw ll a r i ll a , N agarj u n a further a l igns himse lf with this tradition when he says : That there is a self has been taught, And the doctrine of no-self, By the Buddhas, as we l l as the Doctrine of neither self nor nonse lf. ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 49 1. This pass age suggests that the Buddh a's teachi ngs

a re

s ituated within a rhetorica l context, and that he re l ies on various teachings to l i berate se nt i e nt be ings . Some of the s e teac h i ngs i n c l ude t h e i d e a t h a t there i s

a

s e l f , t h a t there i ,;

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

95

n o- se lf, and the rejection of both alternatives. N agarj un a ex­ presses a similar view when he says : Everything is real and is not rea l , Both rea l a n d not rea l , Neither rea l nor not rea l , This i s the Lord Buddha's teaching. (Garfield 1995, p. 49) Nagarjuna's student Aryadeva was infl uenced by this way of t h i n k i n g , a s we can see from h i s root text , t h e

Catu�, ..�ata lw : A student e m e rges for a certai n l teacher l , a teach e r emerges for a certain l student l . A person who knows the methods l upayavid l instructs ignorant living bei ngs by various methods . Just as it is rare for a ski l led physician not to cure pa­ tients, it is very rare for a bodh isattva who has acquired the ! t ra in in g ! not to have l students l to be trai ned. ( Lang 1 986, p. 57 ) In C hapter 6 of the same text, Aryadeva gives an exam­ ple of how ski l l - i n-means is practiced in Buddhis m :

l A s t u d e n t unde r t h e i nfl uence ofl d e s i re shou l d be treated l i ke a servant, s i nce harshness i s its ant idote . l A s t u d e n t u n d e r the i n fl u e n ce o fl h a t red s h o u l d be treated l i ke a king, s i nce ki ndness is its antidote . ( Lang 1 986, p. 65 J A ry ad e v a ' s co m me n t s e x press h i s co m m i t m e n t to N aga rj una's style of teach ing, and gi v e v o i c e to an e n t i re

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skillful-means tradition that runs from S akyamuni Buddh a through the M ahayana tradition . As a Mahayana Buddhist en gaged i n a debate with the Abh i d harma Buddhists , Nagarjuna is surely concerned with praxis and with how to co mmunicate Buddhism to others . But what s pecifica l l y divides h i m from the Abh i d h a rm a thinkers, an d w h y does he t h i n k they a re w rong? D o they have a fa lse conception of rea l ity? Are they givin g a fa l la­ cious metaphysics? Most Western scholars see the Abhid­ harma Buddhists as concerned with traditiona l metaphysical i s s ue s , and see N agarj u n a a s a ttac k i n g them on these groun ds . According to Gudmunsen , for exa m p l e , the Abhid­ harmists are Russ e l lian phil osophers concerned with i s o l at­ ing sense data and wondering how words refer to logica l bits of experience ( Gudmunsen 1 9 7 7 ) ; for Si derits they are "epis­ te mologi c a l rea l ists" forging a correspondence theory of truth ( S iderits 1 988); for Katz they are "denotation theorists" ( Katz

1 98 1 ); for Garfie ld they are "esse n t i a l ists" unwi l l ing to ac­ cept the convention a l n ature of phenomena ( G arfie l d 1 99 5 ) ; and for Loy and Coward t h e Abh i d h armists a r e proposing a meta phys ical view of language ( Loy 1 9 8 7 ; Coward 1 990). When we f r a m e N agarj un a's audience as concerned with these issues, however, then it means he must be dea l i ng with them as wel l . That i s , if the Abhidharmists are s i m i l a r t o t h e Logical Atomists , epistemological rea l ists, metaphysi ­ c i a n s , or p h i l osophers of language the n , s ince N agarj u n a i s attacking t h e i r v i e w s , he m u s t b e part icipating in this meta­ phys ical disco urse . But to see why this is mistaken we need to re member that the Abhidharma thi nkers a re specifica l ly concerned with metapraxis, and that the ge neral Mahayana critique is leveled at comments such as Vas ubhandu's , when he s ays :

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Because there i s no means of pacifying the passions without close i nvestigation of existents, and because it is the passions that cause the world to wander i n this great ocean of transmigration , there fore they say that the teacher-which means the Buddha-spoke this sys­ tem a i med at the c l ose examination of exi stents . For a student is not able to c losely i nvestigate existents with­ out teaching in true doctrine. ( Pruden 1 9 8 8 , p . 5 7 ) T h e "close investigation" that Vasuban d h u mentions i s a precise meditation o n the nature o f dharmas, a meditation that is mindful of the i m perm anent, caus a l , and s e l fless n a ­ ture of experience . He a l s o i m p l ies t h a t without meditating i n a particul a r way ( i . e . , without "reviewing" the S a r va s t i ­ uadin analysis of dharmas ) then it is i m possible t o attain lib­

eration . I n saying this , Vas ubandhu is estab l ishing t.he nec­ essary conditions for practice , a n d , in l i n e with tradition a l Abhidharma B uddhist though t, justifyi ng a single praxi s for a l l people. Nagarj u na's philosophy needs to be seen as a d i rect at­ tack on this way of thinking. Like the Buddha's critique of the "s ixty-two" views a n d Vim a l akirti's condemnation of the disciples and bodhisattvas , N agarj un a is trying to undermine the idea that liberation is attainable only upon a "close inves­ tigation" of dha rmas . His way of doing this is to examine the meditative "matrixes" of the Abh i d h a r m a tradition--fro m causal ity and the five aggregates to impermanence, nirvar:w, an d the Four Noble Truths-arguing that each is "empty" of i n h e re nt n a t u re . W h i l e i t may a p p e a r t h a t N agarj u n a' s method i s excessively logical and a na lytic i n the fo l lowing discussion , we must remember that he is addressing a scho­ lastic tradition that favors l ogical precision and analysis, and

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that he is therefore using their own way of communicating and their phi l osophical discourse to achieve the best rhetori­ c a l effect. The next few sections of this chapter-dea l i ng with N agarj u n a's critique of caus a l ity, the aggregates , suf­ fering, and the Four Noble Truths-wi l l strive to i l l umin ate this rhetorical style, e m phasizing its upayic ro le against the Abhidharma Buddhists.

Nigirjuna's Critique of Causality

I n the Madhya mikakarika,

N agarjuna

attacks

the

Abhidharma view of praxis by uti l izing a system of logic that offers negative res ponses to fo ur poss i b l e a l ternative s . C a l led t h e catu$ko,i , it is often depicted in t h e fo l lowing form :

1 . It is not the case that x is y. 2 . It is not the case that x is not-y. 3 . I t is not the case that x is both y and not-y. 4. It is not the case that x is neither y nor not-y. Nagarjuna uses these four state ments against a variety of arguments ranging from caus a l ity and the se lf to imper­ manence, space , time, and motion . Against a particu lar view of causation , for exa m p l e , N agarj u n a ap p l ies the calu$ko'i and conc ludes that dharmas (x) are not produced (y), not non­ produce d , neither bot h , nor neither. Or, against a particular view of motion he appl ies the dia lectic and concl udes that motion ( x ) is not moving ( y ) , not non- moving, neither bot h , n o r neither.

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In Chapter 1 of the Karika s , Nagarjuna uses this l ine of re asoning against the Abhidharma views of causation : Neither from itse lf nor from another, Nor from both , Nor without a cause , Does anything whatever, anywhere a rise. (Garfie ld 1 995 , p. 3 ) T h i s is t h e begi n ning of Nagarj un a's attack on caus a l ­ ity . Thi ngs a re either caused from themse lves , from some­ t h i n g e l s e , from both , o r from no cause w h atsoeve r . Nagarj un a denies a l l four a lternative s , trying t o show that each view of causation is absurd . He does this by saying that any understanding of cause and effect presupposes our ability to either affirm or deny caus a l identity. I n other words , a cause is either identical to its effect , different from its effect, both , or neither. Saying they are identical is absurd s ince this destroys the language of cause and effect that te l ls us something h a s ch anged or has become d i fferent from what it was . I f cause and effect are identica l , then there is no change from the cause to the effect, which means that nothing was ever rea l ly "caused" at a l l . N agarj u n a denies this a l ternative , saying that thi n gs cannot arise from themselves . Does this mean that cause and effect is a re lation be­ tw e e n

two

d i f fe r e n t

t h i ngs

( arising

from

another)?

Nagarj una denies this a l ternative a s we l l , a rguing that it i s logica l ly i m possible f o r two separate entities t o b e caus a l ly re l a te d . If two t h i ngs are fu ndam e nta l l y d i ffe re n t , then th ere is no connection between them whatsoeve r , which de­ stroys their ability

to

interact causally. Just

as

causal identity

Skillful Means

1 00

denies the necessary re l ationship that must exist betwee n causes and e ffects , so the idea of absol ute difference rup ­ tures any caus a l connection between two things that are sup­ posedly re l ated . According to Nagarjuna, this idea must be rejected because it denies our abi l ity to speak cohere n t l y about causation . " Perfect otherness ( o r di ffe rence ) , " says C a n d ra k i r t i , " a m ounts to no cause at a l l " (Sprung 1 9 7 9 , p. 42).

This leaves the last two alternatives , wh ich are a lso de­ nied by N agarj un a , the first for being contradictory, and the second for being i l l ogica l . Saying that cause and effect are both identical and non-identical is a basic contradiction : x and not (x

=

=

y

y ) ; and saying that a cause arises from nowhere

is not only logical ly impossible ( how can a non -cause bring something into existence? ) , but implies that things can arise from any source whatsoever. N:. Buddhapal ita says: Th i n gs cannot arise w i thout a caus e , because that wou l d e n t a i l that anything cou l d arise a t any time , anywhere . (Sprung 1979, p. 4 3 ) T h e result o f Nagarjuna's dialectic is t o say that causa­ tion is "empty ," without essence , i n herent nature, or sub­ stance . But what does Nagarj una mean by saying that causa­ tion is "empty," and why is he attacking these theories in this way? Most Western accounts say that Nagarjuna is dea l i n g w i t h metaphys ical prob lems. According t o M urti ( 1 9 5 5 ) a n d Loy ( 1 98 7 ) , f o r exa m p l e , Nagarj u n a is argu ing for a tran­ scendental expe rience beyond l anguage and conceptua l i z a­ tion ; for Siderits ( 1 988 ), he is argui ng against the prob lem of "rea lism"; for Ka lupahana ( 1 986) Nagarjuna is similar to the

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Logi c a l Positivists w h o a rgue against non-empirical meta­ physical views; and for Garfield ( 1995 ) N agarj una is arguing for the "conventiona l " nature of rea l ity . These schol ars a lso see N agarjuna as saying that we cannot attain l i beration un­ t i l we fu l l y deconstruct our metaphys i c a l attac h m e n t s . Garfiel d makes this clear when he writes: I t cannot be overemphasized that as far as N agar­ jun a-or any other M ahayana Buddhist philosopher, for that matter-is concerned , the view that the things we perce ive and of which we conceive , to the extent that they exist at a l l , do so inherently, originates as an in­ n ate misapprehension and is not the product of sophis­ ticated phi losophica l theory. That is, we n a i ve ly and pretheoretica l l y t ake things as substantia l . This, as N agarj un a wi l l argue , and as t he Bu d dha h i m s e l f ar ­ gued, is th e root de l usion that l ies at the bas is of a l l human suffering. ( Ga rfie ld 1 995, p . 88) Garfield's genera l ization about all Mahayana Buddhist phi losophers is puzz l i ng, especi a l l y since, at least from the M a h ayana perspective, the prob lem with the Abh idharma Buddhists ig not thei r supposed metaphysica l views but their attempt to justify one soteriological praxis a bove all others . That a l l Mahayana philosophers a re conce rned with meta­ phys ics is certainly not obvious ; nor it is obvious that all hu­ man suffering is ca used by taking thi ngs as "substantia l . " Such

a

sweeping genera l ization presents a biased account of

Buddh ist phi losophy and assumes that human suffering can be exp lained i n a tota lizing way. I f Nagarjuna is saying this , then he is gui lty of offering the type of "poison ous remedies" that was rejected b y t h e Buddha and Vimalakirt i .

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If we read Niigiirj una as a "ski l l - i n-means" thinker,

however, then we wi l l not arrive at this concl us ion . To do so, we need to remember that, l ike the Buddha's criticism of the "sixty two" views, Niigiirjuna is trying to resol ve a major con ­ fl ict in the Buddhist community over "correct" soteriological praxis . For most Abhidharma traditions, for instance , libera­ tion depends on a "correct" meditation of dharmas: how they arise and cease , how they are conditione d , and how they cause suffering. While they a l l agreed on the need to medi­ tate on dharmas , they fought over the "correct" way of going about this. The Sarviistiviidin held that underlying the "moments" of meditation there are unchanging substances (suablzauaJ that adhere throughout ti me . These underlying substances were termed a dha rm a 's "se l f nature," and were seen as piv­ ota l in meditative practice . To meditate on a dharma 's "se l f nature" m e a n t t h a t o n e wou ld no longer b e captivated by fleeting appearances or attached to "turbulent" phenomen a . One c o u l d t h e n s e e t h e causes o f suffering a n d mental anxi­ ety, and rest peaceful l y in the "calm" of n iruti !J. a . The abi l ity to discern the substance of dlz a rm a s was the refore tanta­ mount to liberation . Niigiirj una's prob lem with this is that it contradicts the view that one must meditate on caus a l ity in order

to

attain

liheration . I f d lz a rm a s stay the same then they are not caused at a l l because they never change ; and if they a re "se lf-caused" then they are identical to themse lve s , which d e n ies t h e doctri n e of " d e p e n d e n t a r i s i ng . " Thus , for Niigiirj u n a , the Sarviistiviidin view of dharmas is absurd within the con text of a Budd hist meditation , since the idea of

dlwrmas contradicts t h e Buddhist doct rin e of "dependent arising."

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T h e Sautrantikas a l so rejected t he Sarvastivadin posi­ tion but proposed the idea that meditation is com posed of contin uous " f l a s h i n gs " of " m o m e n ts " i n to consciousn e s s :

dharmas arise and cease each moment, they come from no­ where , "flash" for an instant, and then vanish . To see this process-to "review" it-was the goa l of meditative practice that supposedly ends in liberation . For Nagarj un a, this j ustification of praxis suffers from s i m i l a r i n consistencies as the Sarvastivadin vie w . If one must meditate on dharmas as point-in stants that h ave n o con tinuity between o n e moment and t h e n e x t , t h e n w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h e caus a l process t h a t is vita l to Buddhist praxis? If dharmas are nothing more than distinct "moments" in meditative equi l i brium, then what is the connection be­ tween one dharma and the next? Since there seems to be no connection whatsoever, then how can we make sense of "de­ pe n d e n t a r i s i n g"? N agarj un a ' s point i s t h a t , l i ke the Sarvastivadin view, the Sautrantikas are proposing inconsis­ tent views of praxis: they say one must meditate on causal ity in order to be l i be rated , but then deny caus a l i ty b) saying that one must meditate on certai n moments (dharmas ) that are non-caus a l . W h a t is t h e significance of t h i s criticism? I s N agarjun a saying th at we sh oul d never meditate on caus a l i ty , or that any meditation on dharmas is a l w ays w rong? I s he saying that the Abhidharma views of causation are useless because they are contradictory? It is doubtful Nagarj u n a wants us to come to t h i s con c l usion . Not only wou ld this contradict the Budd ha's own teachings about causation , it wou l d mean that N agarj u na is trying to re s o l ve the co n f l ict be t w e e n the Ab h i d h a rma trad itions by re nouncing Abhidharma pra c t i c e al toge t h e r . However. N iiga rj u n a knows that con flicts are

not

Skillful Means

1 04

caused by "views ," even i f they a re metaphysica l ly or logi ­ ca l ly fa l s e . T h e probl e m l i es m uch deeper t h a n this for Nagarj u n a , and he knows that i t has nothing to do with the Abhidharma view of dharmas or causation i n itse lf. Like the Buddha who criticized the "s ixty two" views because the phi­ losophers who proposed them were "ca ught i n the net" of b l i n d grasping, Nagarj u n a cou l d care less about the meta­ phys ical status of d h a r m a s . Hi s concern is why the Abh i ­ dharma philosophers t h i n k there i s o n l y o n e type o f causal meditatio n , and why they think there i s on ly one way to at­ tain l i beration . By arguing for the "emptiness" of causation , he is reminding the Abhidharma Buddhists that causation , i n t h e form of "dependent arising," i s s i m ply o n e of the ma ny med itative practices taugh t . by the Buddha, and that it is t h erefore noth i n g more than a ski l l f u l "device'' used to counter certai n forms of attachment . Rather than argu i n g against

a

metaphysical v i e w of causat ion , h e i s s i mply re­

c a l l i ng the Buddha's own words on the subject: "If you c l ing to it, if you fon dle it, if you treasure it, if you are attached to it, then you do not understand that the teaching is s i mi l ar to a raft , which is for crossing over , and not for getting hold of" ( Rahula 1 9 7 4 , p. 1 1 ) .

The Five Aggregates In C hapter 4 of the Ka r i k a s , Nagarj un a continues h i s criticism o f t h e Abhidharma trad1tion b y examining t h e "five aggregates" (or ska ndhas ) , which, l ike caus a l ity , is central to Buddhist m e d i tation . Begin ning with the first aggrega te , form ( rilpa ) , N agarjuna applies h i s reductios against the idea that either form or the cause of form must exist i n a substan­ tial way:

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

1 05

Apart from the cause of form, Form cannot be conceived. Apart from form, The cause of form is not seen. I f apart from the cause of form , there were form , Form would be without cause. But nowhere is there an effect Without a cause. If apart from form, There were a cause of form , I t would be a cause without an effect. But there are no causes without effects . ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 48) I n these lines, Nagarjuna argues against the idea that the rupa aggregate exists essentia l ly or contain s a sva b h iiva ("sel f nature"). I f we keep in mind the Abhidharma view that a dharma 's "se l f nature" is wound up with an explanation of caus a l ity , we w i l l un derstand what Nagarj u n a is u p to in these passage s . The Abhidharma pos itions res t on the idea that a dharma is either diffe rent from or identical to its causa l properties , and Nagarjuna is trying to show how both views lead to absurd conclusions. I f the Sautrantikas are right in saying that a thing is essenti a l l y different from its cause , then we shou ld be able to s peak of cause and effect as two separate things . On the other h a n d , if the Sarvastivadin a re right in saying that a

dharma is identical to its caus a l re lation s , then we should not be able to distinguish a cause from its effect since they are numerica l ly the same. What N agarj una s ays about both

106

Skillful Mea ns

positions is contained in the above verses . It makes no sense , h e says , t o se parate the aggregate rilpa from its cause be­ cause we then have the concl usion that riipa can exist with­ out any caus a l rel ations whatsoever, i . e . , that cause and ef­ fect a re two separate "things . " This means that an effect can exist without a cause, and that a cause can exist without an effect. But this conc l usion is absurd, says Nagarjuna, s ince nowhere do we find causes without effects , or effects without causes . The two terms stand in a re l ation , thus making it logically impossible to assert their independence . I n the next th ree verses, Nagarjuna con tinues his cri­ tique by saying that i f riipa has a n identifi a b l e essence , something that cou l d be c l a s s i fied as svabhiiva , the n i t makes no s e n s e t o speak of something e l se "caus ing" it to a rise since it a l ready exists as an independent entity. Simi­ larly, a non -existent cause for riipa is logica l ly incohere n t , since if it is non-existent then it makes no sense t o claim that it could cause other things to arise : When form exists , A cause of the arising of form is not tenable. When form is non-existent, A cause of the arising of form is not tenable. Form itse lf without a cause I s not possible or tenable. Therefore , think about form , but Do not construct theories about form . The assertion that the effect and cause I s not acceptabl e .

a re

similar

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

107

The assertion that they are not similar I s a lso not acceptable. (Garfield 1 995 , p. 49) The Sarvastivadin position was a l ready shown to lead to absurdity, and is therefore quickly dismissed in the above sections. If cause and effect are identic a l then it makes no sense to speak about causation since causation i m p l ies that there is some amount of change that occurs between things . The conclusion , as N agarjuna asserts in verse six, is that an essential effect is neither different from nor similar to an es­ sential cause , s ince the whole idea of someth ing having a n essence, either a "se l f nature" o r a n "other nature," i s absurd: The assertion that the effect and cause are similar Is not acceptable. The assertion that they are not similar I s a lso not acceptable. (Garfie l d 1 995 , p. 49) Note that Nagarjuna does not propose another correct view of "form" over and above the Abhidharma traditions. He simply a rgues against their views by showing how their dis­ cussion is incoherent, and rather than propose another view he simply says to "think about form" but not to get attached to it:

Therefore, think about form , but Do not construct theories about form. (Garfield 1995, p. 50)

In other words , meditate on the body, the sense organs, and experiences of taste, sme l l s , sensations, and sounds, but do not construct metapractica l justifications for these medi-

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108

tative experiences. This conclus ion is then extended to a l l the other aggregates as wel l : Fee lings , discrimination and dispositions And consciousness and a l l such things Should be thought of In the same way as material form. ( Garfield 1 995, p. 50) The majority of arguments in the Karikas proceed al ong these lines. The idea of svabhiiva , essence, s ubstance , or in­ here n t n ature is attacked for being inconsistent, which makes the Abhidharma insistence on needing to meditate in a particular way utterly foolish. From an ana lysis of caus al ­ ity and th e aggregates , Nagarjuna moves o n to the other ma­ j o r factors i n Abh idharma ana lysis of expe rience, performing the same task in each cas e : decon structing the view of

svabhiiva without putting another definitive view of praxis in its place.

Suffering, Attachment, and Bondage

In the chapter "Exam i nation of Suffering," N aga rjuna argues against the view that suffe ring can be explained in an essenti a l istic way. T h i s i s an i m po rta nt c h a pter of the

Karikas because it goes against the prevai l ing view in Indian ph i l osophy that suffering needs to be an object of meditative prax i !' , i .e . , that we must meditate on the nature of s uffering and how it arises in order to achieve l i be ration . Nagarjun a hegins by laying out four popu l ar theories on how suffering arises:

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

1 09

Some say suffering is sel f-produced, Or produced from another or from both . Or that it arises without a cause . It is not the kind of thing to be produced . ( Garfield 1 995, p. 33) N agarj u n a ends the verse by stating the concl usion : Suffe ring is not the kind of thing that can be exp lained by appe a l i ng to some form of inherent production . He then goes on to explain that suffering is not se lf- produced because that wou l d entai l s peaking of production in isol ation from caus a l condition s , i . e . , production without a n y rea l cause and effect . It cannot come from someth ing who l ly other because t h e idea of essentia l diffe rence precl udes the necessary re lationship that must adhere between conditioned things . The fina l two alternatives are rej ected for leading to s i m i l a r conclusions : T o s ay that s ufferi n g i s both s e l f- p roduced a n d other­ produced is a basic contradiction , and saying that it arises without any cause whatsoever implies that things can arise from nowhere , which make l ittle sense . Nagarjuna concludes the chapter by criticizing an essentialistic view of suffering: Not only does suffering not exist In any of the fourfold ways : No external entity exists In any of the fourfold ways . ( Garfiel d 1 995, p. 34) Nowhere in this chapter does Nagarjuna say what s uf­ fering is in itse lf. He offe rs no new theory on how it comes about, what its na ture is, or what we need to know in order to ach ieve l iberation . His goal is simply to refute those theories th at re ly on an essenti alistic understanding of s uffering. Not

Skillful Mea ns

1 10

only does suffering l ack an essence ( at least in the way the Abhidharma thinkers think of it), but it is absurd to speak

of

"externa l entities" as existing in this way as we l l . By attack­ ing the idea that suffering has an essence, he is trying to un­ dermine the view that suffering must be an object of medita­ tive praxis . Nagarj una's critique of essentia l ism in regards to su f­ fering is also appl ied to the causes of s uffering. According

to

a n umbe r of Indian ph i l osophie s , one needs to meditate on the causes of suffering in order to overcome it, and most tra­ ditions agreed that suffering, sa rizsara , bon dage , and disease are caused by attach ment, either to the fruits of action , the gu �ws,

Prallrt i , an em pirical "se l f," friends, rel atives, o r ma­

teri a l things . N agarjuna a l so shares this view , but ascribes no sign ificance to the idea that attachment must be an object of med itative praxis . Just as causal ity, rupa , and suffering are "empty , " then so too is attachment-without essence , substance, or inherent nature . T h i s idea is deve loped in t h e "Examination o f Bondage" chapter, in which Nagarjuna argues against the idea that the essence of sa 1il sa ra can be l ocated i n the act of "gras ping." The gist of the argument is that if grasping ( attachment) has an inherent nat ure then we shou l d be able to identify the subject of attachment, the "grasper." I n other words , if there is "grasping" then there must be some essential subject that actually does the grasping. But since no essential subject can be found, according to Nagarjuna, it fo l lows that the idea of an essential "grasping" is impossible. I f grasping were bondage, Then the one who is grasping would not be bound .

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But one who is not grasping is not bound . I n wh a t circumstances w i l l o n e be bound? If prior to binding There is a bound one, There woul d be bondage, but there isn't. The rest has been explained by the gon e , the not-gone, and the goer. ( Garfiel d 1 995, p .4 1 ) Nagarj una's goa l here i s t o drive a we dge between bondage and the person bound . I f bondage does have an es­ sence , then, like all essences, it must exist as an independent phenomenon , separate from and prior to the person becoming bound . S i m i l a r l y , if a person has an essence , a svabhiiva , then it too must be separate from the act of grasping that is identified as bondage . What Nagarjuna says above, however, is that this creates a n untenable dua l i s m . I f the person "grasping" has an inherent nature independent from that act, then it is obvious ly not bound, and if it is not bound , then the whole idea of needing to get out of bondage makes no sense. The separation between the s ubject which grasps, the act of grasping, and the experience of being bound--al l th ree of w hich are needed to iden tify an essential "graspi ng" -is a separation that exc l udes the n ecess a ry re l ation s h i p t h a t must adhere between these activities . I t is l ike severing the rela tion between motion and moving, which , as N agarj u n a expl a i n s in C h a pter 2 o f t h e Karikas , l e a d s to t h e absurd conclusion that there is no movement. The reification of s uffering, attach ment, a n d bondage that N agarjuna criticizes here goes hand in hand with a reifi­ cation of non-attachment, or n irvar.ta, as wel l . When samsara is es sential ized into a fixed principle with its own "inherent

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nature"-then nirviifJa is separated off, distinguished from a l l other thi ngs , and reified into a rea l m of independence . Such a radica l separation severs any possible re l ationsh i p be­ tween bei ng bound and achieving l iberation , and leads to the conc lusion that whatever is bound must necessarily re main boun d , and w h atever is re leased must stay re l ease d . As Nagarjuna puts it: Whoever is bound is not re leased . Whoever is not bound does not get re lease d . ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 4 2 ) T h i s is an un.a cceptable .concl usion for Nagarj u n a-or any other Indian phi losopher who values l iberation-and is why N agarj una ends the chapter with the fol lowing question : When you can't bring about nirvaQa , Nor the purification o f cyclic existence , What is cyclic existence , And what is the n i rvaQa you examine? ( Garfie l d 1 995, p. 4 2) Nagarj una's point here is t o say t hat l i beration is im­ poss ible if sa ritsara and n i rvfzfJa are substantia l ly existent thi ngs . To think of gras ping, bondage , suffering, and l ibera­ tion as distinct obj ects of meditative praxis treats them as fixed and static entities, which severs any possible re l ation ­ s h i p between the m . I f this ha ppen s , then someth ing boun d can never become unboun d , and someone who suffers can never hope for re lease. Since this is an unacceptabl e con c l u­ s ion for any Buddhist, then the prob lem lies in the way l i b ­ eration is being conceived.

Niigiirju na 's Middle Way

1 13

I n moving from caus a l ity, the aggregates , and the e l e ­ ments of existence to suffering, attachment, sa m s a ra , a n d nirvtiT,la , Nagarj un a h a s covered t h e major areas of Buddhist

p ra c t i c e .

In

each

case

he

undermines

the

idea

of

suabhaua-th u s underm i n i n g the a s s u m ption that these

terms, categories, and experiences are necessary for l ibera­ tion . I f there is no essence to caus a lity, to s uffering, to at­ tachment, or to n irutirz a , then they are , as Nagarj u n a says , "empty" of inherent n ature; and if they are "empty ," then the Abh idharma view that one m u st med itate on them is unwar­ ranted . This does not mean that one should never meditate on causal ity, the dharm as, ska ndhas , or samsara as e lements of experience , or that there is anything inherently w rong with the abh idharma texts themse l ves . Nagarj u n a is not a rguing against the meditative practices of these texts , but against the phi losophical j ustifications of the Abhidharma ph i l oso­ phers who a re justifying these texts as the only soteriological "rafts" in Buddhism. I n this sense, Nagarj u n a , a long with the Lot u s S u tra, the Prajnaparamita , and Vi mala k i rt i n i rdesa , takes a strong ph i l os o p h ic a l s t a n c e :

t h e r e a re no fixed o r a b s o l ute

metapractical criteria i n Buddhism, and the attem pt to j us ­ tify a n y single practice for a l l people under a ll circumstances not only contradicts Buddhist doctrine , but goes against the spi rit of compassion that meditative praxis is trying to faci l i ­ tate . W h i l e thi:; m a y look l ike simply o n e more "view" among a l l the others , it i s not a meta practica l-or metaphysi­ cal-"view" that seeks to tota lize Buddhist praxis under a single heading. In this respect, N agarjuna has no "view ."

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Nagarjuna's Critique of the Four Noble Truths

Chapter 24 of the Kiirikiis contains some of the most important sections of the entire text, and begins with an ob­ vious rejoinder to everything N agilrjuna has argued against up to this point . If it is true , as Nagarj una says, that caus a l ­ ity , i m permanence, suffering, bondage , and so on a re a l l "empty," then what i s left of Buddhism? I n other words, if it is true that the Abhidharma justifications of practice a re "empty," and if it is true that their views of praxis are centra l to Buddhist meditation and doct rine, then Nagarjuna seems to be undermin ing everything that is vita l to Buddhism. He begins C hapter 24 by expressing this com p l a i n t i n the fol ­ lowing way: I f a l l of this is empty , Neither arising nor ceasing, Then for you, it fol lows that The Four Noble Truths do not exist. If the Four Noble Truths do not exist, Then know ledge , abandonment, Meditation and manifestation Wil l be completely impossible. I f these things do not exist, The four fruits wil l not arise . Without the four fruits , there wil l be no attainers of the fruits. Nor will there be the faithful .

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115

I f so, the s piritual community w i l l not exist. Nor w i l l the eight kinds of person . I f the Four Noble Truths do not exist, There w i l l be no true Dharma . I f there is no doctrine and spiritua l community, How can there be a Buddha? If emptiness is conceived in this way, The three jewels are contradicted. (Garfiel d 1 995, p. 6 7 ) I n the above passage s , t he Abh idharma oppone nt a r­ gues that if Nagarj un a is right about ''emptiness ," then the very practices that make Buddhism soteriologica l l y effica­ cious will be destroyed. That is, if it is true that the Four No­ ble Truths are "empty," then there is no such thing as the Buddha , the Dharm a , and the Sangha, no such thing as im­ permanence, "non-self," and nirvalJ.a , and the practices that supposed ly lead to l iberation will be destroye d . N agarj una responds to this complaint by saying it re lies on a misinter­ pretation of siinyata : We say that this u nderstanding of yours Of emptiness and the purpose of emptiness And of the sign ificance of emptiness is incorrect. As a consequence you are harmed by it.

( Garfield 1 995, p . 68) Because the Abhidharma opponent takes "emptiness" to mean the non-existence of the Four Noble Trut h s , h e is "harmed by it," in other words , he sees "emptiness" as de­ s troy i n g Buddhist praxis a l together. But his reason for

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thinking l ike this is because he thinks that practice requires fixed metapractical criteria. Nagarjuna responds to this assumpt i on by reversing the tables, saying that what destroys practice is not "emptiness," but rather the idea that there must be an essentia l practice

(svabhiiva) that appl ies to everyone univers a l ly : If you perceive the existence o f a l l things In terms of [svabhii va}, Then this perception of a l l things Wi l l be without the perception of causes and condition s . Effects and causes An� agent and action And conditions and arising and ceasing And effects wil l be rendered impossible . Garfiel d 1 995, p. 69) N agarj u n a goes on to say that the reason svabhiiva mil itates against causal condition s , arising, ceasing, agency, and so forth, is because svabhiiva enta i l s independence, and if things are independent then it is impossible for them to in­ teract caus a l l y . I f this is true then there is no "dependent arising," a n d without "dependent arising" it is i m possibl e to make sense of the abi lity to cultivate a virtuous l ife . I n other words , without the process of change the whole idea of c u l ti· vating t h e "fruits" of a Buddhist l ife is rendered nonsensica l . I n short , h e says that Buddhist praxis must b e "empty" i f are t o make a n y sense o f the Four Noble Truth s : I f dependent arising is denied, Emptiness itsel f is rejected.

we

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

117

This would contradict Al l of the worldly conventions. I f emptiness is rejected, No action wil l be appropriate . There wou ld be action which did not begi n , And there would b e agent without action . If there is [svabhava ] , the whole world W i l l be unarising, unceasing, And static. The entire phenomenal worl d Wou ld b e immutable. I f it ( the world) were not empty , Then action would be without profit. The act of ending suffering and Abandoning misery a n d defi lement w ou l d not exist. ( Ga rfie ld 1 995, p. 7 2 ) Nagarj u na has t h u s shifted t h e debate . Whereas the Abhidharma thinker began with the assumption that fixed meta pract ical

criteria

a re

n e c e s s a ry

for

l i be ra t i o n ,

. N agarjuna counte rs by saying that Buddhist pract ice-an d hence liberation-is undermined by treating it as a fixed sys­ tem . Like the first chapter on causation , N agarj u n a is at­ tacking the Abhidharma Buddhists for the i r attachment to meditation and for thinking that one can reduce Buddh ism to an abso lute soteriol ogica l guide. The Four Noble Truths are supposed to be medicinal "rafts" that h e l p particu l ar human beings overcome attach ment, but if one becomes attached to those practices of non-attachment then the entire thrust of Buddhism

is

lost .

Thus ,

N a g a rj u n a

s ays

that

the

Skillful Means

118

Dharma-which incl udes causation , i mpermanence , suffer­ ing, bondage, and liberation-must remain "empty."

Summary

During Nagarj u n a's time there were prol ific debates over issues such as the nature of personal identity, the mind, consciousness, the status of know ledge , caus a l ity, and the structure of experience. While it is possible to discuss these debates in pure ly metaphysical terms and apart from their South Asian milieu, we need to remember that these debates take pl ace within a sote riological context and are l i n ked to issues of praxis . The deb a tes over caus a l ity in the Buddhist tradition , for example, are not about knowing how the world is structured or getting an obj ective view on causation , but about how a meditation on dharmas a l lows us to overcome the causes of suffering, attachment, and bondage . Likewise, the debates over the " m eans of know ledge" (prama!J-a ) be­ tween the Nyaya and Buddhist phi losophers has l ittle to do with the epistemo logica l prob lem of how we know, or how we know that we know , but is abou t the ro le of know ledge and cogn ition in meditative praxis . Thus, while it might be inte r­ esting to examine these issues apart from how they operate in a metapractica l discourse , and whi le we cou l d discuss them in rel ation to genera l metaphysical , onto logica l , or epis­ te mologica l problems, we end up distorting the issue if we frame these debates apart from their metapractica l context and a part from how they re l ate to issues of mediation , prac­ tice, and soteriology . I t is neverth e l ess common to confuse N agarj un a's meta practical critique-deal ing with attachment to Buddhist

Nagiirjuna 's Middle Way

1 19

praxis-with metaphysics because it appears that the Ahhid­ harma phi losophers are giving a metaphys i c a l j ustification for their views . As was discussed in C hapter 2, however, i t is doubtful that the conflict between the Abhidharma traditions can be framed i n this way s ince their views are inseparably linked to praxis : they are not offering theories of causality i n t h e abstract-but metapract i c a l j ustifications of h o w o n e should meditate. N agarj un a 's phi l osophy c h a l l e n ges s u c h

justifications , arguing f o r t h e ' emptiness" of caus a l i ty , the dharmas , s k a n d h a s , the Four Noble Truth s , and suffering.

And instead of justifying "em ptiness" as a new fixed medita­ tive standard for all Buddhists, Nagarj un a argues that even "emptiness" is "empty . " I n saying this , he not only under­ m i n e s the Abh i d h a r m a fixation with a s pecific fo rm of praxis-those fou n d i n the a b h idharma texts-but tries to undermine o ur own desire to become attached to "emptiness . " W h i l e t h i s m ay presuppose certain assumptions about the nature of the world and human beings , i t does not enta i l a metapractical j ustification for any single meditative practice . And it is i n this sense that we shou l d understand N agar­ juna's claim that he has no fixed "view" (dr�ti ) . The divisions between the t w o M a d hy a m i k a schoo l s t h a t fol lowed N agarj u n a , the Prasailgika and Svatantri k a , a r e separated b y s i m i l a r issues of praxi s, and therefore i m ­ mersed i n a skil l ful - means debate . T h e i s s u e t h a t separates them is about the best way to communicate "emptiness" to oth e r B uddhist a n d non - B ud d hi st schoo l s in I n d i a . The Svatantrika phi losopher Bhavaviveka, fo r exa m p l e , thought the best way to express "emptiness" is to use arguments that conform to accepted modes of argumentation . By re lying on an independent syllogis m (svatantra -anumana ) , he fe l t that the M adhyamikan philosopher wou l d be more effective i n in­ · ducing an understand ing of "emptiness" to others because he

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would then use inferential norms accepted by both partie s . According t o Candrakirti, however, t h e Madhyamika system begi ns only with views and assertions of other people and does not rely on an i ndependent inference. It admits o n l y provisiona l ly t h e argument o f t h e opponent and then shows , through reductio ad a bs u rd u m (p ra sa liga ) arguments , the unten abil ity of the position being advanced. As Peter De l l a Santina notes , the issue for the Prasanghika i s n o t whether an argument is true inferentia l ly but whether it w i l l work soteriological ly : They have as the i r paradigm the conduct o f the En­ lightened Ones who by means of appropri ate arguments edify the ignorant. In such a context, the val idity of

an

a rgument i s measured by its efficacy , not b y its confor­ mity to the principles of forma l logic and epistemology . < De l l a Santina 1 986, p. 69 ) From a metapractica l perspective , the debate between the two Madhyamika schools is a debate about the n ature aud efficacy of the Buddhist system, and has l ittle to do with strictly metaphysical or l ogic a l issue s . N agarjuna's debate with the Abhidharma ph ilosophers should be seen in a simi­ lar light: he is not asking how causation is possible at a l l , or which phil osophical theo ry is most fe asib l e , but why the Abhi dharma thinkers are justifying this particu lar view of praxi s , and why they think it represents the highest sote­ riological wisdom of the Buddha .

Chapter 5 Ch'an Buddhism Introduction

The C h'an (Jaj)anese Zen ) Buddhist tradition offers some of the most exciting and interesting uses of upiiya . Al­ though developed fi rst in China and then l ater i n Japan , Ch'an has its roots in India, and claims to preserve the peda­ gogical styles and teachings of the Buddha . Two obvious ex­ amples of "ski l l-in-means" in Ch'an include the use of k u ng­ a n (Japanese koa n ) , that are used to initi ate a s piritual

awake n i n g i n a student, and Ch'an meditation (Japanese zazen ) , that resembles the traditional Buddhist practice of

"mindfulness . " In many Ch'an schoo l s , the doctrine of upiiya is extended to include the devotion a l e lements of Pure Land Buddhism such that faith in Amida Buddha wil l itse l f lead one to the Pure Lan d . This re liance on "other power" ( Chi­ nese t 'o-li; Japanese tariki) in which a practitioner can simply invoke the name of Amida Buddha ( n i e n -fo ) to attain en­ lightenment is con sidered

a

valid path in some Ch'an tradi­

tions , and is said to have originally been taught by the B ud­ dha himself. The Ch'an use of upiiya is particu larly interesting be­ cause it highlights the critical e lement of non-attachment. As we have seen , upaya counteracts the tendency to reify any one teaching, doctrine, or practice by saying that all the B ud­ dha's teachings are rhetorica l ly efficacious : they s uit the dif­ ferent leve ls and karmic dispositior.,; of an audience . Hence , the use of paradoxical k u ng-a n s , ch 'a n meditation (dhyiina ) ,

121

Skillful Mear.. s

1 22

and "ot her power" devotion are fu l ly compat i b l e and sy n ­ cretic doctrines , and make perfect sense within t h e pedagogi ­ cal context of skil lfu l mean s . However, Ch'an is also s e n s i ­ tive t o t h e long-standing prob lem o f essenti a l i z ing Buddhis t practice and the prob lem of saying that only one of these practices w i l l lead to l i bera t ion . While this struggle aga i n s t Buddhist attach ment is by no means unique to t h e C h ' a n tra ­ dition , it did deve lop an iconoc l astic resistance to attachment by exc l a i m ing, as Lin-chi did, that there is no Buddhist doc­ trine whatsoever, no such thing as e n l ightenment, and that the scriptures are nothing more than "old toilet paper to w i pe away excrement . " Such extre me statements -which can a l s o incl ude a s l a p , kick , or punch b y a Ch'an master-take p l ace within a l a rger debate about Buddhist practice and need to be seen as strategic maneuvers within the context of upaya . This chapter is therefore not about the Ch'an tradi tion per se, a lthough it will obviously be the main focus of the fo l ­ lowing discussion . Rat her, this chapter, like a l l the preceding cha pters , i s about exploring· an on-going critica l d i a logue within the Buddhist trad ition , a dialogue that began with the B u d d h a's c r i t i c a l stance toward his o w n t e a c h i n gs ,

re­

emerged i n the Prajiiaparamita texts , the Vi m a la k l. rt i , a n d Nagarj u n a , and is s e e n aga in i n t h e Ch 'an tradition . I t is the refore not a bout Ch'an metaphysics , n o n - d u a l ity, l a n ­ guage , e n l ighte n m e n t , o r the doctrine of "No- M i n d , " but about a l a rger debate over Buddhist praxis. As the Japanese Ch'an master Dogen says :

You should know that in the buddha's house we do not discuss superiority or inferiority of the teaching; nor do we concern ourse lves with the depth or shal lowness of

Ch 'an Buddh ism

1 23

the dharma, but on ly with the gen uineness or fa l seness of practice . (Tanahashi 1 985, p. 149) The fo l l owing section will examine this issue of practice by looking briefly at key representatives of the Ch'an tradi­

tion , such as Hui-neng, Lin-chi , and Dogen . I t wil l end with some concl uding remarks about the harmonious re lationship between Ch'an and Pure Land.

Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng

The prob lem of Buddhist praxis is contained in a fa­ mous struggle between Shen-hsiu and H u i -neng over who w i l l become the Sixth Patriarch of C h 'an Buddh i s m . The Fifth patriarc h , H ung-j e n . had grown old and needed to choose a successor to pass the "robe" of patriarcha l authority , an estab l i shed tradition in C h ' a n s i n c e the B u d d h a first passed it to Maha kashyap a . One day the Fifth Patriarch gathered his disciples before him �.nd said that the monk who writes the best poem (giithii) will receive the robe . The next day, a monk named Shen-hsiu, famous for his inte l lect and unwavering commitment to practice , offered the fo l lowing

giithii to the Fifth Patriarch : The body is the Bodhi tree, The mind is l ike a clear mirror. At a l l times we must strive to polish it, And must not let the dust col lect. Shen -hsiu's gii thii expresses a fund amental point in Buddhis m : the importance of practice . The first l ine compares

Skillful Mean s

1 24

t h e body to th e tree of wisdom u nd e r w hi ch the Buddha sat, and i m p l ies that it is a vita l i n gredient i n a l l meditation praxis , a n d , hence, e n l ighte nment itse l f . The second l i ne compares the mind to a mirror that, when clear, can reflect a l l things as they truly a re . However, the mind of ordinary people is not like this , and they must continua l l y "po l ish" it i n order to reach enlightenment. As Shen -hsiu implies in the third and fourth lines, the way to clear the mind of dust is by contin u a l , vigi lan t practice . Through meditation , the mind will purify itse l f of attach m e nts a n d reve a l the reflective bri l l iance of e n lightenment. Accordi n g to the Platform Siitra , however, Shen-hsiu did not receive the robe from the Fifth Patriarch . Rathe r, it was given to a n uneducated kitchen-hand n a med Hui-neng, who composed his own gathii for the Patriarch: Origina l ly there is no tree of e n l ightenment, Nor is there a stand with a clear mi rror. From the beginning not one thing exists; Where, then, is a grain of dust to cling? Hui-neng's gii thii is d i a metri c a l l y opposed to She n ­ hsiu's . I t rej ects the idea that the body is a "tree" of wisdo m , that the mind i s like a mirror, a n d that there i s any p l ace for dust to col lect. Where Shen -hsiu affirms the body as the ba­ sis of meditation practice , H ui - neng says there is no body , and where Shen-hsiu expresses the i m portance of purifying one's mind, Hui-neng rej ects the mind. Given that Hui-neng seems to be rejecting the very basis of en l ightenment and practice , why did he receive the robe? To understand the issue that Hui-neng's gii t h ii raises we need to see it i n rel ation to a long critica l tradition of

Ch 'an Buddhism

1 25

Buddhism . Like Nagarj una's attack against the Abh idharma tra dition and Vimal akirti's anger at the Buddha's immediate disciples, H ui-neng is trying to undermine Shen-hsiu's tradi­ tiona l stance that e n l ightenment only comes about by fol ­ lowing a s pecific practice o f meditation . He rejects the bodi ly postures and "polishing" mind that was a l so standard prac­ tice i n Abhidharma B uddhi s m , and tries to undermine the essentialist attitude toward practice that Shen-hsiu's "dust­ ing" metaphor impl ies . A similar point is made by Ma-tsu when he observes an­ other Ch'an master in meditation : He I M a-ts u ] was residing in the monastery of Dembo­ in where he sat cons tantly in meditation . The master, aware that he was a vesse l of the Dharm a , went to him and aske d , "Virtuous one , for what purpose are you sit­ ting in meditation?" Tao-1 answered, "I wish to become a Buddha . " Thereupon t h e master picked up a t i l e a n d started rubbing it on a stone in front of the hermitage . Tao- 1 asked, "What is the Master doing?" The master re plied, " I am pol ishing ! this tile ] to make . a mirror. " "How can you make a mi rror by · pol ishing a ti le?" ex­ c laimed Tao-i. "An d how c a n y o u m a ke a B u d d h a by practicing

ch 'an?" countered the master. ( Dumou lin 1 988, p . l 63 ) I t is tempting t o think that Ma-tsu a n d Hui-neng are at­ tacking the epistemological assumptions of these other Bud­ dh ists . Both Shen-shui and Tao-1 compare the mind to a mir­ ror, and say that through continua l practice one can attain

Skillful Means

1 26

en l igh tenmen t. By speaking of the mind as something dis­ tinct from its experiences (or the mirror from its dust) they seem to be e recting fa l l acious epistemo logic a l and meta­ phys ical distinctions . A number of Ch'an schol ars tend to frame the problem in this manner, seeing the problem as a dualistic view of the mind. As Steven Laycock put it: O n l y by overcoming the conflictual dual ity of medita­ tion a l practice and the profound "seeing" that is "the­ ory" (theoria ) in a sense akin to that which this term held for the Greeks, cou l d the transaction of ordinary l ife (sa m s a ra ) be rendered consistent with the attain ­ ment of supreme insight (nirviir:ta ) . ( Laycock 1 994, p. 5 ) Laycock sees the issue between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu as an epistemologica l problem re lated to the idea of a mind that mi rrors the wor l d . Like Richard Rorty's criticism of Western philosophy ( Rorty 1 980), he sees Hui-neng trying to overcome a subject/object dua lism in Shen-hsiu's view of the mind, and says that only by overcoming this "confl ictua l du­ al ity" can liberation be achieved . While there is nothing w rong in viewing Ch'an as a critic a l response to epistemological prob lems , it departs from the issue of practice that is central to Hui-neng and Shen ­ hsiu. The issue that divides them is whether there is any sin­ gle practice that leads to e n l ightenment, and whether the Buddha origin a l l y taught this practice . Shen - h s i u t h i n k s t h e re i s , a n d assumes that e n l ighte n m e n t c o m e s about th rough a cont i n u a l "polishing" of the mind. H e not o n ly separates meditation from e n l i ghtenment but thinks that it is impossible to attain enlightenment without "pol ishing" in a particular way. Hui-neng attacks this view of meditation and

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127

promotes a " s u d d e n " a w a k e n i n g that re l ies o n n o pre­ established methodologica l procedure or fixed practice . In his vi ew , there is no caus a l relationship between meditating and attaining e n l ightenment s ince l iberation i s a direct and un­ mediated encounter, or, in the words of Bodhidharm a , "a di­ rect pointing to the mind of man . " Thus , th e differences between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu are not so much metaphysica l or epistemologica l as they are methodologic a l . That is, Hui-neng is not criticizing Shen-hsiu because Shen-hsiu has a dua l istic view of conscious ness , or because his gatha im p l ies an e rroneous view of the mind, or even because Shen-hsiu tends to substantialize the n ature of "dus t . " Rather, Hui-neng's criticism is leveled at the meth­ odologica l prescriptions involved in Shen-hsiu's account of Buddhist praxis. Shen-hsi u's approach to praxis-which can be found in any n u mber of B u d d h i s t texts from the B u d d h a 's Sa ·

tipaNhana Sutta to Buddhaghosa's Vi s u dd h i

-

m agga -fo c uses

a l most excl usive ly on meditation tech nique s ; on bod i l y pos­ ture , breathing, conce ntratio n , awareness of phys iologic a l sensatio n s , observation , a n d s o fo rt h , a n d emphasizes the need to cultivate insight ( vipasya n a ) i nto our emotion a l and mental l ives. Dogen's advice to his monks on how to practice "just sitting" < J a panese zazen) brings out the flavor in this approach: Loosen your robes and arrange them in an orderly

way.

Pl ace the right hand on the left foot and the left hand on the right h a n d , l igh tly touc h i n g the ends of the thumbs together. With the hands in this position , p l ace them next to the body so that the joined thumb-tips are at the nave l .

Skillful Mea ns

1 28

Straighten your body and sit erect . Do not lean to the left or right; do not bend forward or backward. You r ears shoul d be in l ine with your shou lders , and your nose in l ine with your nave l . Rest your tongue against the roof o f your mouth , an d breathe through your nose . Lips and teeth shou l d be closed. Eyes shou l d be open , ne ither too wide , nor too narrow . H aving adjusted body and mind in this manner, take a b reath and exhale fu l ly . S i t s o l i d l y in sa m a d h i a n d t h i n k not-thinking. H o w do you think not thinking? Nonth inking. This is the a rt of zazen .

< Tanahashi 1 985 , p. 3 0)

B y focusing on meditation practice , t he "gradua l " ap­ proach high l ights th e Buddhist concern for "cul tivating the path ," achieving mindfu lness, and the appropriate methods for overcoming menta l angu ish , suffering, and s pi ritua l dis­ tress , i . e . , sa ri1 sa ra . I n this sense , Shen-hsiu expresses what Conze ca l l s "the very core of the Buddhist approach to life" ( Conze 1 956, p. 1 1 ) , and si tuates himse l f within a med itative trad ition that dates back to S akyamuni Buddha. As Peter G regory notes, the "Sixth Patriarch's criticism of t he form a l . pract ice of m editation in the Pla tform Sii t ra on ly makes sense within the context of the daily regi men of the Ch'an or Zen monk, where seated meditation is an inte­ gra l part of h i s pract ice , if not the major focus of his l i fe" ( G regory 1 986, p . 3 ) . It is the refore doubtfu l that Hu i-ncng has a problem with medi tation itse lf, or thinks that "po l i s h ­ ing" is com p letely ineffectua l . On t h e other hand, w h a t d is­ t u rbs H u i-n eng is that Shen -hsiu seems to focus exc lusivel y o n h o u · to attain e n l ighten ment rather than e n l ightenme n t i t s e l f. a n d t h e re fore red u ces a l l of Bucidh is m to

a

fix e d

Ch 'a11 Buddh ism

1 29

methodo logy . The s e v e n t e e n t h -century J a p a n e s e m as t e r Bankei expresses

a

s i m i l a r point when he says :

Zen maste rs of today ge n e ra l ly use " o l d too l s " w h e n they d e a l w i t h pupi l s , apparently thinking t h e y cannot ra ise the barriers I to e n l ighten m e n t ! w i thout t he m . They d o not teach by thrusting themse lves di rect ly for­ ward and confronting their students without their too l s . These m e n who teach w i t h too ls and cannot d o without them are b l ind men of Zen . < Wadde l l 1973, p, 147 ) Like Vi m a lakirti who scolds S ari putra for his dogm atic attachment to a particular form of meditation , Hui-neng is attacking Shen-hsiu for mistaking "meditation" for ritua lized behavior, and for restricting e nl ightenment to a se l ect few , in oth e r words , to those who can engage i n l e n gthy years of pract ice. Hui-neng's teachings , on the other h an d , a re s u p­ posed ly open to everyone such that even " i l l i te rate barbari­ ans" < l ike Hui-neng) can attain enl ightenment. While the d ifferences between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu later divided into the Southern and Northern schoo l s , each vying for orthodoxy and cl ai m ing to be in possession of "true" Buddh ist praxis, many C h'an masters see no confl ict whatso­ ever between the m . The J a pane s e C h ' a n m a s t e r Doge n makes this point in h i s discussion of Bodhidharma's tran s ­ mission t o Hui-k'o ( "Huike"): The Twenty-e ighth Ancestor I Bodhidharma l once said to his studen ts , "The time has com e . C a n you express your understanding?" Then one of the students , Daofu , s a i d , "My present view is that we should neither be attached to lette rs nor

1 30

Skillful Mea11s

be a part from letters, and a l low the way to function freely." The ancestor said, "You have attained my skin." The n un Zongchi said, "My view i s that it is like the joy of seeing Akshobhya Buddha's land just once and not again . " T h e ancestor said, "You have attained m y flesh." Daoyu sa i d , "The four great e lements are origi na l ly empty and the five skandhas do not exist. Therefore I see nothing to be attained." The ancestor said, "You have attained my bones . " Fin a l ly H uike answered b y bowing three times, s tood up, and returned to where he was. The Ancestor said, "You have attained my m arrow . " Thus he confirmed Huike as t h e Secon d Ancestor and transmitted to him dharma and robe .
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131

They think that the Second Ancestor w a s acknow l edged as attaining the marrow because his view was better than those of the others . I But l you shoul d know that the ancestor's words "skin, flesh , bones, and marrow" do not mean that one understanding is c loser than another . . . . I t means that neither the phrase "You h ave attained my m arrow" nor the phrase "You have attained my bones" is more essential than the other for guiding a person in holding up gras s , d ropping grass . I t is l ike holding up a flower, or it is l ike transmitting a robe . From the begin­ ning, Bod hidharma's co n firmation of each was equa l . (Tanahashi 1 985, p . 1 7 0 ) T h e phrase "ho l ding up grass, dropping grass , " and the ph rase "holding up a flower" are metaphors for e n l ighten­ ment. When S akya m u n i Buddha h e l d u p an u d u m b a ra flower and winked in the midst of a vast assembly, there was on ly one disciple ( Mahakashyapa ) who fu l ly unders tood its sign ificance . However, this does not mean that "holding up a flower" is the o n ly way to express e nl ightenment or guide a person in "holding up grass, dropping gras s . " As Dogen says , Bodhidharma is not privilegi ng one view above a l l the others , and is not saying that "attaining the marrow" is more essen­ tial than "atta ining the flesh ." While the views obviously dif­ fer-i . e . , the view of non-attachment ( "atta ining the skin") is not the same as Hu i - k'o's s i lent bow ( " attaining the mar­ row " }--they are nonethe less equa l since they a l l express a so­ teriologica l experience between Bodhidharma and his stu­ dents . I f Bodhidharma had hundreds or thousands of stu­ dents , says Dogen , "he would have spoken h undreds or thou­ sands of word s . There shou l d be no l i m i t . Because he had only four students he spoke of 'skin, flesh, bones, and marrow.'

Skillful Mea n s

132

But the words n ot s poke n , and yet to be s poken , should b e many" < Tanahashi 1 986, p. 1 70 ) . Fo l lowing Dogen's analysis , w e c a n say t h a t Shen-hsiu's problem has nothing to do with metaphysics or epistemology si nce his view is just as "true" as Hui-neng's in "holding up grass, d ropping grass." The seated "mind-polishing" medita­ tion of Shen-shiu is no less essential than Hui-neng's "sud­ den" approach , just as Nagarjuna's "emptiness" is no "truer" than the Abhidharma phi losophy of svabh a va . The problem is in thinking that only one of these practices wi l l lead to lib­ eration . As Hui-neng says: Wf! shou ld practice straightforwardness and should not attach ourse lves to anyth ing. People under delusion be­ l ieve obstinate ly i n Dharma laksana ! th in gs and form ! and so they are stubborn in having thei r own way of i n ­ terpreting t h e "sa madhi o f S pecific Mode , " w h i c h they define as "sitting quietly and continuous ly without let­ ting any idea a rise in the mind." Such an interpretation would ra n k us with inani mate objects , and is a stum­ b l ing b l ock to the right Path which must be kept open . < Price 1 969, p. 4 3 ) Hui-neng's point is that Buddhist practice may actua l ly stand in the way of l i beration if it is defined too n a rrow ly as "seated meditation . " He suggests that it is better to keep the Buddhist "Path" open , and is why he reinterprets ch 'an medi­ t a t i o n in fo r m l e s s terms such as " n o n - a b i d i n g , " " n o n ­ thinking," a n d "non -action , " which , as Pete r Gregory notes , "l eaves open the question of what one actua l ly does when one meditates" < Gregory 1 986 , p. 3). Even the disti nction between "gradu a l " and "sudden" awake n ing, says H u i -neng, shou l d

Ch 'an Buddh ism

1 33

n ot be reified since they only refer to two types of practices set up for different sentient beings : What is meant by "gradual" and "sudden?" The Dharma itse l f is the same, but in seeing it there is a s low way and a fast way. Seen s lowly, it is the gradual ; seen fast it is the sudden ! teaching ! . Dharma is without sudden or gradua l , but some people are keen and others d u l l ; hence the names "sudden" and "gradua l . " ( Yampolsky 1 96 7 , p. 163) W h i l e it is true that Hui-neng favors the "sudden" ap­ proach and disparages the "grad u a l " as "du l l -witte d , " it is clear from what he says above that there rea l ly is no "grad­ ual" or "sudden" approach since both depend on the karmic leve ls of sentient beings .

Th e C h'an Master Lin-chi

A similar issue of the dangers involved in becoming at­ tached to Buddhist praxis i s expressed i n the L i n -ch i lu , a sma l l volume of "co l lected s ayings" of the n i nth-century C h i ­ n e s e C h 'an master L i n - c h i 1 - hsuan ( J apanese Rinza i ) . Like most Ch'an texts , it purports to contain the basic philosoph i ­ cal a nd rel igious mess age of Buddh i s m . Howeve r , n o n e o f this i s given t o u s th rough a n y lengthy discussions on t h e n a ­ ture of "em ptiness ," e n l ighte n m e n t , dependent a r i s i n g , o r causal con ditioning. I n s tead , t h e text repeats t h e s e points th rough the dynamic encounters between Master Lin-chi and his students .

Skillful Mean s

1 34

A few i mportan t themes re l ated to Lin-chi's sty l e of teaching deserve spec i a l attention . First, Lin-chi ope n l y re ­ jects the importance of studying Buddhist doctrine by te l l i ng his students that nothing can be gained by reflecting on th e Buddha, the nature of e n l ightenment, or anything e lse hav ­ ing to do with Buddhist i nstruction . I n fact, Lin-chi tel l s his students that, quite simply, Buddhist doctrine is a "sham": Fol lowers of the Way, there is no Buddha to be gained, and the Three Vehicles, the five natures, the teachings of the perfect a n d i m m e d i ate e n l ighte n m e n t are a l l simply medicines t o cure diseases o f the moment. None have any true rea lity. Even if they had , they woul d sti l l a l l be mere s h a m s , p lacards proc l a i m i n g superfi c i a l matte rs , so m a n y words l i ned up, pronouncements o f such k i n d . (Watson 1 993, p. 7 6 ) L i n - c h i r e p e a t s these s e n t i m e n ts to h i s stude n ts th roughout the text, te l l ing them that the teachi n gs of the Buddha and Patriarchs "have n o s pec i a l m e a n i n g , " that "there are no great number of principles to be gras ped," that the teachings contained in the siitras are mere ly "expositions of surface matters ," and that even if one could discover some "special meaning" in a l l the Buddhist teachings put together, "it would a l l. be names , words , phrases, medicine to apply to the i l l s of l ittle chi ldren to pl acate the m , words dealing w ith mere surface matters" ( Watson 1 99 3 , p. 7 2 ) . Although it may appear that L i n -chi is discarding tradit ional Buddhist doc­ trine to establ ish his own phi losoph ica l position , this is not the case , for he te l ls us that he does not have "a particle of Dharma to give to anyone" ( Watson 1993, p. 53).

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135

T o take these com ments serious ly m e a n s t h a t we shoul d b e cautious about i n terpreting Lin -chi's project metaphysi­ ca l l y : that is, he l itera l ly has no Dharm a , no phi l osophical doctrine, and no metaphysical teachings to offer his students. "Everyth ing I a m s aying to you" he te l l s the m , "is for the moment on l y , medicine to cure the disease" (Watson 1 9 9 3 , p. 34 ) . Given that Lin-chi i s a respected Ch'an master, how­ ever, then what, specifica l ly , does he teach? I n t rying to an­ swer this question we find ourse lves embroiled in a contro­ versy i n Ch'an schol arship that wil l not be settled here. But a few things need to be said. Lin-chi tel l s his students that his teachings are not doctrinal because what he has to teach has nothing to do w i th "words and phrases" and i s performed "outside the scripture s . " For many schol ars this i s because Lin-chi's teachings are esoteric, non-discurs i ve , and beyond the ken of logi c . That is , Lin-chi does not teach i n "words and phrases" because he recognizes the inherent l i m itations of lingu istic and conceptua l use, and his job as a teacher is to shock his students out of their "dua l i s tic" thinking by using non-conceptua l , i rration a l , and paradoxica l mean s . W h i l e this i s o n e popu lar interpretation o f the text , i t i s a l so leads us away from the d i rect form of pedagogy that Lin-chi em­ bodies . To understand th i s poi n t i t m ight be h e l pful to imagine the example of a phi losophy p rofessor who walks into c l ass one day w i thout any i n tention of saying a word about the history of phi losophy, metaphysics , epistemo logy , o r logic, a n d who te l l s h i s students t o put away thei r note­ books because he is not going to say anything about "ph i l oso­ phy . " Thus, there w i l l be no discussion on Kant, Plato, Hume, proposition a l logic, or the nature of consciousness because, he says , their education a l deve lopment has nothi n g to do with

Skillful Mea n s

1 36

such topic s . Obvious ly confus e d , the st u d e nts a s k , "Th e n what are we going to do?" W h e re a s the ave rage teacher w o u l d become h i gh l y anxious i n t h i s situation , i t is exactly this type o f en vi ron­

ment that Lin-c � i thrives in, and is what makes his pedagogy so exciting. He refuses to preach any "doctrine" because spiri­ tua l transformation takes place th rough a d irect confronta­ tion between master and disci p l e . "Doctrine" and what some­ body else proc laims are mere ly "coatings ," "placards ," and "so many words l ined up" that mediate the direct form of peda­ gogy that Lin-chi sees as vital to transformation . Lin-chi's students are obvious ly diffe rent from the av­ e rage col lege studen t , and so what arises in his context with­ out "words an d ph rases" is probably not an issue i n a phi­ losophy c l a s s . U n l ike most co l l ege students, Li n -chi's d isci­ ples are l iving within a monastic community and striving for spiritual e n lightenment. Lin-chi's manner of addressing their concerns is to respond to their concrete situation , to who they are as individua l s , and to their upbringing and environment . "When someone comes to me," says Lin-chi , "I can tel l exactly what he is like. Whatever circumstances he may have come from": I sit ca l m ly in my seat, and when fol lowers of the Way come for an interview, I see through them a l l . How do I do this? Because my way of looking at them is different. I don't worry whether on the outside they are common morta ls or sage s, or get bogged down in the kind of ba ­ sic n ature they have i n s i d e . I j u s t see a l l the w ay th rough them and never m ake an e rror. (Watson 1 993 , p. 30)

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137

A s Lin-chi notes , his abil ity t o perceive t h e various d i s ­ positions of h is students does n o t re ly o n anything s pecial : he anything metaphysical and is not concerned is not pe rce iving ·' with thei r inner nature. He sim ply examines who they are , what they s a y , and h o w they question h i m ; a n d then re­ sponds in the most appropriate way : I f a student of less than midd ling ability comes to me, I s n atch away the environment but leave h i m his exis­ tence . If

a

student of better than middling ability comes

to me, I snatch away both environment and existence . If a student of truly superior abi lity comes to me, I do not s n atch away anything, neither environ ment, nor exis­ tence , nor person . I f a student appears whose under­ standing s urpasses a l l these categories, then I deal with h i m with my whole body and take no account of h i s abi l ity. ( Watson

1 99 3 ,

p . 58)

What Lin-chi teaches therefore depends on what he thinks his students suffer from. It is their "disease" that di­ rects his res ponse. His pedagogical sty le changes in re lation to the student, and he is therefore free to teach a variety of philosophica l and re l igious standpoints or, as Lin-chi puts it, a variety of "robes" : "There is a clean pure robe , there is a no­

birth robe , a bodh i robe , a nirvaJ.la robe , a patriarch robe , a B uddha robe . " But a l l of these , he says , are mere ly "sounds, name s , words , ph rases . . . . nothing but changes of robe" (Watson 1 9 9 3 , p. 6 0 ) . Rather than teach ing formal doct rines t h at have l ittle to do with his students' concrete experiences , L in-chi molds h i s pedagogical style into a powe rfu l .;ote­ rl ological tool by confronting his students directly.

Skillful Mea ns

1 38

There is of course one particular "disease" that Lin-chi is t rying to cure in his students , and is why he emphasizes that there is no such thing as the Dharma, the Buddha, en­ l ightenment, n irviir:za, practice , and so fort h . This "disease" has to with his students taking the sayings and doctrines of previous C h'an maste rs as sign i fying more than provisional devices . That is, they have become attached to the Dharma as having some special "dark mean ing" and, hence, suffer be­ cause they cannot discover what it means . They thus ask the tradition a l questions such as , "What is the meaning of Bud­ dhism?" "Why did Bodhidharma came from the West?" "What is the nature of wisdom?" and think that their l i beration de­ pends on discovering the answers to these questions : The trouble with students these days is that they seize on words and form their un derstanding on that basis. In a big n otebook they copy down the saying of some worth less old fe l low, wrapping it up in three l ayers , five l ayers of carrying c loth , not letting anyone e lse see i t , ca l ling it t h e "Dark Meaning" a n d guarding it as some­ thing precious. What a mista ke! B l ind fool s , what sort of j uice do they expect to get out of old d ried bones? Fe l ­ l o w bel ievers , you rush around frantica l ly o n e p l ace and another-what a re you looking for , tramping ti l l the soles of your feet are squashed flat? There is no Buddha to be sought, no Way to be carried out, no Dharma to be gained. (Watson 1 993, p. 6 1 ) T o cure this disease , Lin-chi resorts t o a l l those "ex­ treme" measures that are characteristic of the Lin-chi/Rinz ai traditio n : H e gives them s l aps , kicks , punches , " irrationa l" screams , and paradoxical responses . I n the Lin -chi Lu such

Ch 'an Buddhism

1 39

harsh measures have positive results because the student of­ ten "gets it" and no longer searches for mysterious sol utions to Buddhist doctrine. Lin-chi's abi l i ty to provoke an "aware­

n ess " in his students does not depend on a metaphysica l de­ sc ription of the worl d , however . He s i mply res ponds to his "environment" in an immediate way. Lin-chi's performative style is a l so found i n Dagen's idea of "the mutua l practice of teacher and stude n t . " For Dage n , the transformative and soteriological di mension of Buddhism is a "face-to-face transmission ," an intimate rel a ­ tionship between t h e master and student t h a t is direct an d unmediated, and the refore not reducible t o phi losophical o r rel igious doctrine: The authentic ancestors of all generations have contin­ ued face-to-face transmission , disciple seeing teacher . and teacher seeing disciple . . . . I t is transmitted from vine to vine w ithout being cut. It is transmitted from eye to eye , with the eye open. It is transmitted from face to face , w ith the face revealed . . . . It is l ike pouring wa­ ter into the ocean and spreading it endl ess l y , or l ike trans mitting the lamp and al l o w i ng it to shine for­ ever . . . . Thus , [ a student of the Buddha ) bowed for­ mal l y to the Buddha's face . S akyamuni Buddha's eyes were reflected in his eyes, and his eyes were reflected in Shakyamu n i Buddha's eyes. This is the buddha eye; this is the buddha face. It has been transmitted face to face without a generation's gap. (Tanahashi 1 985 , p. 1 7 7 ) Dagen's comments express a fascination with a style of Buddhist pedagogical praxis : a style that i� direct and unme­ dia ted , a "face-to-face" encounter where com passion and

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140

l ibe ration are dynamic and situated firm ly in the present. It i s , in the words of Hui-neng, "a s pecial trans mission outside the scri ptures ," where spiritual transformation occurs in a re lation a l ly liberated "space" i n -between the Buddh a , the "authentic ancestors ," the teacher, and the disciple.

Nagarjuna and Lin-chi It is important to pause for a moment and reflect on the s i m i l ari ties between Lin-chi and Nagarj u n a . First, Lin -chi's remarks that there is "no Buddh a , no Dharma, no N i rviii:la, and no E n l ighten ment" are foresh adowed in Chapter XXV: 24 of Nagatjuna's Madhya mikakarika when he says: No Dharma was taught by the Buddha At any t i m e , i n any p l a c e , to any pers o n . ( G ar f i e l d 1 995, p. 76) The s i m i l ariti es between L i n - c h i a n d Nagarj u n a a re more apparent when we remember that the Ma dhya m i lw ­ karika i s a n attack o n trad ition a l Buddhi s m . As was dis­

cussed in the previous chapter, Nagarjuna covers all the ma­ jor topics i n Buddhist philosophy-caus a l ity, the skandhas , suffering, the Four Noble Truth s , a n d

n i r v a � a -and

con­

cludes that all of them are "empty," l ike "dreams" and " i l l u­ s ions, l i ke a city of Gandharvas . " One who grasps the view that the Ta t h aga ta exists , he says, "having seized the Bud­ dha, constructs conceptual fabrications . " Such comments are remarkably similar to Lin-chi's views, as when he says :

141

Ch 'an Buddhism

I te l l you , there i s n o Buddha, n o Dharm a , n o practice , no e n l ightenment . You go off l ike this on side roads , t ry i n g

to

fi nd

something.

Blind

Foo l s !

(Watson

1 9 9 3 , p . 53 ) Secon d , Lin -chi's assertion that even he does not have "a p a r t i c l e of D h a r m a to give a n y o n e " i s a n a l ogous to Nigirj una's famous phrase i n the Vigrahauyii.uarta nl where he states that he has n o phi l osophical propositions whatso­ ever. Arguing mainly against the Nyaya position , that s ays that because N agarj u n a is asserting the "emptiness" of a l l things then this must apply t o his own assertion a s wel l , he says : "If I had a proposition, this defect wou ld attach to me. But I have no proposition . Therefore I am not at fau lt" ( Bhat­ tacharya 1 9 7 8 , p . 23 ) . While the meaning of this passage is disputed among Madhyamika scholars, let it s u ffice for the moment to say that, l i ke Lin-chi , Nagarjuna is not advancing any metaphysical view or theory.

And third, j ust as Lin-chi's pedagogical method depends on "contradictory" teach ings , so Nagarj u n a often uses what

seem l ike paradoxical statements to get his points across . In his Mii.dhya mikakii.rikii. ( 1 8 : 6 and 1 8 : 8 ) , for example, he s ays the fol lowing: The Buddhas have made know n the conception of s e l f a n d ta ught t h e doctrine o f no-se lf. A t t h e same time, they have not spoken of something as the self or as the non-self. ( Ka lupahana 1 986, p. 267 ) Everything is such , not such , both such and not such , and neither s uch and not such : this is the Buddha's ad­ monition. ( Ka lupahana 1 986, p. 269)

·skillful Mea ns

1 42

Such "contradictory" teachings are not un l ike Lin-chi's sty l e which , depending on the stude n t , wi l l either s natch away the "pe rson ," the "environ ment," both, or neither, an d wh ich free ly uti lizes a variety of phi losophical and re l i gious "robe s . " U n l ike Nagarj u n a , however, Lin -chi often resorts to more "extreme" measures . I f they come with

a

raised h and, I hit the raised hand; if

they come mouth ing someth i n g , I hit them in the mouth ; if they come making motions with their eye s , I hit them in the eye . (Watson 1 993, p. 53) Now it should be recal led that Lin-chi has a reason for reveal ing th is aspect of this pedagogical "robe . " That i s , when he is making these comments he is doing something quite different than s lapping someone in the face. His comments a re more refl ective than pe rformative because he is te l l ing his disciples about his method of teaching. But his reason for doing this is because his students have taken the method for something deeper, something more mysterious and meta­ physica l ly rea l than it actual ly i s. Thus , he seems to be te l l ­ i n g them outright in these passages that Buddhist methodol­ ogy is just this, i . e . , no more mysterious than the s l apping of a face or the teaching of "contradictory" views . And his rea­ son for practicing such "harsh" measures, he tel ls them , is to "snatch" something away from the m , to confront their "envi­ ronment" and , like a thief, steal it away. Nagarj una's complaint with the Abh idharma traditions shou l d be seen in a s i m i l a r l igh t . Like Lin -chi's "thief," Nagarj u n a is trying to "ste a l " something from the Abhi ­ dharma phi losophers . In their desire for l i beration they have become attached to the teachings , and h ave therefore missed

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the most significant teaching i n Buddhism : non-attachment. To confront this "i l l ness , " Nagarj u n a resorts to "ski l l - i n ­ means" a n d uses their own way of speaking a n d their own views aga i n s t them . W h i l e i t i s true that L i n - c h i a n d Nagarjuna are separated b y wide cultura l , religious , a n d phi­ losophica l differences , they are both attacking a similar issue of attachment and highl ighting the problem-which is long­

standing i n B uddhist history-of becoming attached to th e p ractices of non-attachment. And it is to counter this problem that N agarjuna says-along with the entire Mahayana tradi­ tion-that "emptiness is t h e unsurpassed medicine" of non­ attachment ( Lindtner 1 9 86, p. 29 ) , and t hat e ve n this very "emptiness" is "empty."

Pure Land Buddhism

Any discussion of upiiya wou l d be incomplete without some reference to the Pure Land tradition . This m ay seem odd coming within a discussion on Ch'an since the two tradi­

tions seem diametrica l ly opposed . Pure Land Buddhism em­ phasizes the l i m ited inte l lectual and spiritual capacities of human be i n gs , says that e n l ighte n m e n t can be achieved through faith in an "external power" < C h inese t 'o-li; Japanese tariki ) , and c l aims that by reciting the name of Am ida Bud­

dha one w i l l be reborn in the Western Pure Land. Ch'an , on the other hand, affi rms the unique cha racter of the human mind, and is critical of any distinction between the present moment and a future paradise, sentient beings and divin ity, or re l i gious practice and e n l ightenment. Whereas Pure Land

emphasizes faith in an exte rn a l source , Ch'an re l ies on the h uman min d's own abi lity to overcome its inadequacies .

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Wh i le it is true that Ch'an and Pure Land offer diver­ gent re l igious views and practices, however, they also exist side by side. This is especial ly the case in China where Pure Land chanting is bal anced by C h 'an meditatio n , and where one can find a meditation h a l l and a recitation h a l l existing side by side in the same monastery . When John B l ofe l d trav­ e led to the famous Nan Hua Monastery i n C h i n a , fo r in ­ stance , he witnessed Ch'an monks performing rites before an a l tar of Am ida Buddh a . Thinking he was in a "pure" Ch'an monastery that is opposed to theistic be l iefs and devotion al practice s , he asked the abbott of the monaste ry why the monks were worshiping Amida. The abbott's reply was, "Why not? It is l i ke every other Zen monastery in C h i n a . Why should it be different? Hundreds of years ago there were many sects , but the teach i n gs have long been synthe­ sized-which is how it should be" ( B lofeld 1959, p. 88). Chinese historians are now aware that the synthesis be­ tween the two traditions came about mainly from po l itica l pressure and the need to integrate different Buddhist tradi­ tion s . However, Pure Land thinkers faci l i tated the union by criticizing early Ch'an Buddhists for adopting an esoteric and e l itist orthodoxy . W h i l e Hui-neng and Shen - h s i u de bated over methodol ogy , and while Lin-chi severe ly repri manded his students for being attached to Buddhi s m , Pure- Land thinkers attacked C h'an for its own brand of attachment. As Tz'u-min Hui-jih says : Various practices are broadly taught in the scriptures as a cause for becoming a Buddha, not mere ly the Six Per­ fections . How can Ch'an masters be so strongly attach ed to meditative concentration [ch 'a n -ting] as the corr e ct cause of Buddhahood , and not [ real ize the i m porta n ce of ) the remaining perfections? (Gregory 1 986, p. 1 69 )

Ch 'an Buddhism

145

The problem with some of the early C h 'an B uddhists , according to Pure Land thinke rs such as Hui-jih, is that they distort the teachings in the scriptures by saying that Ch'an practice is the only "gate" to e n lightenment, when in fact the

Prajiiiipiiramitii teaches "Six Perfections" and "te n thousand practices" ( C happe l l 1 986, p. 1 73 ). I n doing th i s , they neglect the upiiyic thrust of B uddhism by emphasizing an esoteric, austere , a n d exclusive praxi s . She n - h s i u's polishing is re ­ served for a select few , and one wou ld need to live in a mon­ astery a long time to receive a " l i berating blow" from Lin-chi . Even Hui-neng's "immediate" approach , that is s u pposed ly available to "i l literate barbarians," turns out to be a rigorous , monastic l ife , requiring cel ibacy and dai ly meditation . Pure Land Buddhism, on the other hand, is avai lable to everyone , even those with "dul l capacities" or with l ittle patience for tradition a l meditation . The Vietn amese B u d d h i s t Thao­ Du'o'ng ( e leventh century C . E . ) w ho introduced the u n ion of C h ' a n an d Pure Land in Vietna m , expresses this poi nt b y saying: Though you may practice Buddhism i n many w ays , in summary there are three main methods ; meditati o n , v i s u a l i z a t i o n , a n d B u d d h a 's - n a me r e c i t a t i o n . T h e method of meditation h a s no definite way t o fo l low a n d is therefore a difficult practice . I f you do n o t have an e n l ightened master or a capable mind, you may stop midway in your progress or re main mistaken for your entire li fe . Visua lization is a very subtle method ; with­ out a good teacher or prajna wisdom, compl ete e n l ight­ enment is hard to attain. Buddha's-name recitation is a quick and easy method . I n a l l the ages past both inte l l i-

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gent and dul l , both men and women have been ab l e to practice [ it ] . Nobody makes a mistake with this method . . . . Putting worries aside, you may therefore proceed with a decisive heart. ( Corless 1 995, p. 266) The heart of Pure Land practice rests on the invocation of Amida Buddha's name (nien -fo ) who, upon hearing it, wi l l immediate ly come t o one's aid. The invocation "Nan -mo 0-mi­

t 'o Fo" ( " H a i l ! Amida Buddha ! " ) aw ak e n s Amida Buddha's compassion , and wi l l transform the practitioner from fear and suffering to "immeasurable l ight" and purity. According to the Japanese Pure Land Buddhist Honen , the mere invoca ­ tion of Amida's name, whether w a l king, standing sti l l , sit­ ting, or lying down , is all that is required to attain l iberation: The method of salvation that I have propounded is nei­ ther a sort of meditation , such as been practiced by many scholars in China and Japan , nor is it a repetition of the Buddha's name by those who have studied and understood the deep meaning of it. It is nothing but the mere repetition of the "Namu Amida Butsu , " without a doubt of His mercy, whereby one may be born into the Land of Perfect B l iss . . . . Thus (one) should fervently practice the repetition of the n ame Am ida, and that alone. < De Barry 1 969 p. 33 1 ) Am ida Buddha i s invoked a s "Other Power" {t'o-li} be­ cause Pure Land recogn izes that not everyone i s capable of re lying on themselves for l i beration . Amida is therefore de­ scribed as a deity with an infinite abundance of compassion who extends his ray of l ight upon saints and sin ners a l ike .

Ch'an Buddhism

147

One need only i nvoke his name or contemplate a Pure Land of "infinite bliss" to attain spiritual transformation . Whi l e such theo logical and devotiona l e l e ments m ay sound complete ly non-Buddhist, espec i al ly if one thinks of "pure" Buddhism in terms of "non-se lf," "emptines s , " a n d "one- poi n ted concentration" (samadh i ) , P u r e Land t h i n k e rs see themselves fu l ly within the basic teachings and practices of traditiona l Buddhist thought, and see Nagarjuna as one of

their first Patriarchs . As Nagarjuna says i n the Dasabh u m i ­ kavibha$d Sastra : To discipline onese l f in deeds of austerity is difficult; whereas to proceed by means of faith is easy . . . . Those who wish to reach the stage of non-retrogression quickly should have a mind fi l led w ith reverence and pronounce the Buddha-name , a lways keeping it in mind. < Wi l l iams 1 989, p. 25 7 ) Accord ing to Pure Land thinkers , the Dharma contains "other power" and "self power," and, depend ing on the spiri­ tua l leve l s a n d karmic d i sposition of hu m an beings , both teachi ngs a re effective . The problem is in thinking only one of these teachings is "true" Buddh i s m , or, l i ke Shen -hs i u , that there is only one soteriological guide for everyone. This form of attachment denies l i beration to all those "lower" be­ ings and, more importan tly, destroys the message of compas­ sion that is centra l to all of the Buddha's teachings . Amida's compass ion , on the other hand, extends to everyone . Like S a kya m u n i who saw the world as m u l ti -colored lotuses , Amida experiences the d ifferent karmic leve l s of human be­ ings and understands that no s ingle teaching is sufficient to

148

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encompass th em a l l . His "infinite l ight" s hi ne s on everyon e , i l luminating numerous paths for those who are in most nee d of a compassionate response.

Summary Taken together, the Ch'an and Pure Land traditions re­ v e a l two aspects of u p aya that have been e m p h a s i zed throughout this study. On the hand , there is the iconoc l astic resistance of C h 'an denouncing a l l forms of Buddhist at­ tachment and rei fication by c laiming that there is n o B ud­ d h a , no Dharma, no practice , and no e n l ighte n m e n t . This critica l aspect of upaya repeats itse lf throughout h istory: in Vim a l akirti's condemnation against those who "preach with­ out knowing the thoughts and inc l i n ations of other s ; " i n Nagarjuna's attack on t h e dharmas ; a n d in t h e Buddha's re­ proach to his disciples , "if you cling to it ( the Dharm a ) , if you fondle it, if you treasure it, if you are attached to it, then you do not understand that the teaching is s i m i l a r to a raft . " Ch'an's anti-methodological side-exe m p l ified i n L i n - c h i ' s "shout" and H ui-neng's sudden e n l ightenment-is the con­ tinuation of this critical tradition . But upaya is not on ly negative and critical . It also s i gn i­ fies what Peter Hershock c a l l s " l i berating intimacy," that is , a unique pedagogical encounter that is suffused w ith imme­ diacy, spontaneity, and compass ion . Amida's re l a t i o n s h i p with � h e world brings o ut t h i s positive s i d e t o upaya , an d shows that a bodhisattva's wisdom (prajiia ) is identical to compassion (karu FJii ) . "The actu a l i z a tion of the Buddha's Great Compassion and the witness of faith by sentient be­ ings," says Nishitani Ke ij i , "are seen to be real ly one , a single

Ch 'an Buddhism

149

rea l i z ation " ( N ishitani 1 9 8 2 , p . 2 7 ) . This "rea lization ," in which wisdom and compassion are inseparabl e , is the "twin­ ing vines" of enl ightenment where the Buddha sees disciple, and disciple sees the Buddha. That the Ch'an tradition in C h i n a-so

famous

for

its

antinomianism

and

self­

reliance-claims Pure Land "other-power" enlightenment as its own shows a deep commitment to an upiiy i c phi losophy that began with the Buddha's first "Turning of the Whee l . "

Conclusion

The development of upiiya in the history of Buddhism spans over two m i l lennia and covers many differen t B ud­ dh i st traditions throughout the world. While it originated in the B uddha's e n l ightenment experience and his procl amation to teach Dharm a , it was not until B uddhism crossed over into China and Japan that upiiya ful ly blossomed into a rich phi l ­ osophical syste m . There is therefore sti l l much t o learn from the doctrine of upaya , both from the traditional Sanskrit and Pa l i s o u rce s , a n d from the l i v i ng B u d d h i s t t r a d i t i o n s throughout East a n d Southeast As i a . T h e goa l o f t h i s book is t o show h o w upiiya directs o u r attention t o t h e efficacy o f Buddhist praxis a n d t o t h e prob­ lems associated with justifying a fixed practice for a l l people. The issue is not only whether any particular practice works , but whether it is possibl e-from a Buddhist perspective-to estab l ish norm ative guide l i n e s for a l l practitioners . The early Abhidharma tradition is singled out in Chapter 2 as one example of this prob l e m , not because it e ngaged i n meta· phys ica l reflection , but because it adopted one set of prac­ tices-those found in the abhidharma texts-and tried to es­ tabl ish them as the o n ly "medicinal" guide for all Buddhists .

Upaya was deve loped to counter this approach, and thinkers like N agarj u n a , Lin-chi , and Doge n , and texts such as the Lo­

tus Siitra and Vi ma la k i rt i n i rdesa use the doctrine of upiiya to

a t t a c k th o se B ud d h i s ts who t ry to e s t a b l i s h fixed

metapractical criteria . From the perspective of upiiya , no sin ­ gle teach ing or practice is sufficient to cover the vast range of karmic differences in the worl d , and to think otherwise not

1 50

Conclw1ion

151

on ly goes against B uddhist doctrine, b u t distorts the message of compassion that is central to Buddhism. It is tempting to think that what separates the various Buddhist traditions is conflicting metaphysical position s , or that they are divided over different conceptions of truth , lan­ guage , causality, and consciousnes s , an d that upayic terms like "emptiness," dharmas , the "two truth s , " a n d a n a t m a n are metaphysica l ly charged terms that mirror Western phi­ losophical categories . However, an upayic a n a lysis of Bud­ dhism leads in a diffe rent direction a l together. As a s pecific form of metapraxi s , upiiya is not reflecting on the l i mits of know ledge , the nature of real ity, or metaphysica l assertions , but on th e efficacy a n d j ustifiabi l ity of Buddhist praxi s . Whi le metaphysics asks u s t o reflect on general issues in the philosophy of l anguage , truth , consciousness , and causality, metapraxis asks to l ook at praxis itse lf, how i t works and why. The difference between them i s not "theory" versus "practice ," since metaphysics theorizes about the nature of the world and metapraxis theorizes specifical ly about praxis . Rather, the difference is what we a re asked to reflect upon . Moreover , metapraxis is not opposed to metaphysics , a n d does not d e n y t h e possible benefits of metaphysical reflec­ tion , but simply says that such investigations a re of a differ­ ent order and, in the case of upaya , unre l ated to the issue of praxis that divides the various Buddhist traditions. A number of Western schol a rs lose this critic a l insight when they discuss Buddhism in re l ation to metaphysics . The best example of this problem is found in Western interpreta­ tions of N agarj un a , that see him arguing against epistemo­ logica l rea l i s m , essenti al i sm, causality, l i n guistic structure s , "truth," and rationa lity,_ an d see him saying that enlightenment

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requi res the deconstruction of our most implicit metaphysic al assumptions . According to Murti , for example: The dialectic, then , as the S u nyatii of dr#is , is the ne­ gation of standpoints , which are the initial negation of the rea l that is essentially indeterminate . Correctly un­ derstood , S u nyatii is not annihilation , but the negation of negation ; it is the conscious correction of an initial u n c o n s c i o us fa l s i fi c a t i o n o f the re a l . ( M u rt i 1 9 5 5 , p . 27 1 ) M urti not only sees Nagarjuna diagnosing a fundamen­ t a l pro b l e m i n human existence, but sees his d i a l ectica l method as the "cure" for a l l del usion . Since h u mans suppos­ edly "cover" rea l ity w ith conceptual thought ( which is de l u­ sory), we need to reverse t hi s process , and N agarjuna's dia­ lectic will cure this. Thus , M urti s e e s himself offering an

upiiyic account of Buddhis m : "emptiness" is the "m e ans " for correcting a "falsification of the real . " Frederick Streng a l so tries t o give an upiiyic reading of Nagarj u n a . "E mptiness , " he says , is the "means for q ue l l ing the pain found in existential 'becoming' which res u l ts from longing after a n etern a l undisturbed entity" ( Streng 1 9 6 7 , p . l 4 9 ) . Whereas M urti s ays Nagarjuna helps us achieve l ib­ eration by "demol ishing" what he calls "the conflict i n rea­ son ," Streng s ays N agarj u n a attacks a referentia l view of language that posits objective "things" in the wor l d . By un­ derst a n d i n g a "re l at i o n a l norm of mean ing" we w i l l be "cured" of the longing for an "etern a l , undisturbed entity . " Huntington expresses a similar view when h e says : Recogn ition of the strictly contextual or pragmatic s ig­ n ificance of the thoughts and objects that popul ate our

Conclusion

1 53

mental and materi a l world renders meaningless any search for a transcendenta l ground behind these phe­ nomena . . . . What is immediately given in everyday ex­ perience is indeed all that there i s , for the inherently interdependent nature of the components of this experi­ ence is the t ruth of the highest meaning: both the means to the goa l (marga ; upaya ) and the goa l itsel f

(nirvti!J.a ). ( H untington 1 989, p . 40) For Garfi e l d , the upayic e l ement in Nagarj una's phi­ losophy l ies in showing us the nature of rei ficatio n , or the tendency to take the "convention a l " world for something other than what it is: Reification is the root of gras ping a n d craving a n d hence of a l l suffering. And it is perfectly natura l , de­ spite its incoherence. Nagarj u n a intends one to break this habit and extirpate the root of suffering . . . . Only with the simulta neous rea lization of the emptines s , but conventiona l rea l ity, of phenomena and of the em pti­ ness of emptiness , argues Nagarj u n a , can s uffering be whol ly uprooted. (Garfie ld 1995, p. 3 1 4 ) N agarj una's d i a l ectic uproots t h i s tendency to "reify" the world, according to Garfie l d , and shows that a l l phenom­ ena are "empty," and that this very "emptiness" is itse l f "empty . " Rea l izing both , h e says , i s the "means" t o l i beration . I t could be argued that such readings s u ffe r from a prej udice that is deeply embedded in the Western philosophi­ cal tradition . The fact that "emptiness" refers to metaphysi­ ca l "be l iefs" and propositions , that it s ays something about h ow a l l thi ngs are "convention a l " by nature , l acking i n "es­ sence ," or li nguistic a l ly structure d , and t,hat it s upposedly

Skillful Mea ns

1 54

"cures" everyone (even those who don't practice Bu ddhis m ) of their deepest philosophical i l l s shows that a decontextualiz­ ing process has begun , a process that treats metapractica l is­ sues in propositiona l terms and apart from their cultural and rhetorica l context. When we are further advised that l ibera­ tion is impossible without adopting a certain epistemological framework, or a "bei ief" about the how the mind works , how caus a l ity is l i n guistical ly structure d , or how a l l things are conventiona l ly posited, it seems we have left a strictly Bud­ dhist framework and entered one that is distinctly Western . The prob l e m runs deeper than t h i s , howeve r , since these various metaphysical interpretations see Nagarj un a as estab l i s h i n g a fixed-a l beit metaphysica l-path . Whether the probl e m is "fa l s ifying the rea l , " a " referential view of l a n guage ," "essent i a l i s m , " or "reification ," N agarj u n a is de­ picted as speaking univers a l ly: he not only diagnoses an i n ­ nate "sickness" in h uman nature , but cures it b y prescribing

a

set remedy, i . e . , "emptiness." However, both the probl e m and the cure on these accounts are tota lizing and essenti a l i s t i c . Asserted independently o f a n y rhetorical context and apart from the karmic d i s positions of individua l s , they are ex­ pressed with the assumption that there is a single cause to

all human suffering and a single cure . I t is not s i m p ly that Nagarj una does metaphysics , but that he thinks metaphys i­ cal reflection is necessary for e n l ightenment. While this ap­ proach may appear upayic , it embodies the type of "poison­ ous" remedies that upaya rejects . In other words , it is bad "medicine . " I f we examine N agarjuna's phi losophy w i t h i n t h e con­ text of metapraxi s , however , then we see him operating within a Buddhist tradition that argues against the i m posi­ tion of a ny fixed criteria when it comes to overcoming suf­ fering or achieving e n l ightenment. His upayic d i alectic of

Conclusion

1 55

"emptiness" undercuts the phi losophical j ustifications of the Abhidharma tradition , a n d , rather than asserting "empti­ ness" as a new tota l izing practice , he tel ls us that even "emp­ tiness" is "empty . " Whereas the Abhidharma p h i l osophers sought to impose fixed standards for a l l Buddhist practition­ ers , N agarjuna argues for the "empti ness" of praxis and for the "emptiness of e m ptiness . " I n doing so, he effectively un­ dermines the desire to become attached to "emptiness" or re ify it into a new fixed soteriologic a l path ( miirga ) . The poin t of his upiiyic critique is not to establ ish new absolute metapractic a l criteria, but to question whether any such cri­ teria a re necessary when it comes to achieving e n l ighte n ­ m e n t , responding t o suffering, or c u l tivating com passion . W h i l e this may presuppose certain assumptions about the nature of the wor l d , human beings , and spiritual efficacy, it is doubtful that he is engaged in a metaphysical critique , and even more doubtful that he is trying to establ i s h fixed m e t apractic a l crite r i a . The Western i n t e r p re t a t i o n s of Nagarjuna not only miss this critical insight when they place his ph i l osophy within a metaphysi c a l discourse , but effec­ tive ly undermine the upiiyic nature of his phi losophy by in­ terpreting "emptiness" as a fixed soteriologi c a l guide that appeals to all peopl e under all circumstances. This does not mean that upiiya leads to re l ativism , or that i t adopts a pragmatic criterion of "truth . " Rather, it is critica l of establishing any fixed criteria-be i t rel ativis m , pragmatism , o r otherwise-when it comes t o addressing the concrete , embodied s uffering of others . The bodhisattva ex­ emplifies this non-attached perspective by refusing to "course in" or fixate upon any single praxis, and by resisting a l l sote­ riological "marks ," "signs," and fixed doctrines. He rej ects the i m position of fixed metapractic a l criteria-not because he

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thinks the use of criteria are a lways w rong-but because he is committed to the expression of compassion and to the be­ l ief that attachment to any single practice , teaching, or doc­ trine stands in the way responding to those who suffer. What Dogen ca l l s the "face-to-face transmission ," in which teacher sees disciple , and disciple sees teacher, is a bodh isattvic ex­ change that is direct and unmediated , relying on no fixed cri­ teria and no substantial doctrines, and in which l i beration is revea led as intimacy and l ove of another. Upiiya reflects this un mediated encounter, showing that spiritual transforma­ tion occurs in a l i berated "space" where one's body and mind is ful ly present, and where the sheer "emptiness" of anything fixed or tangible leads to a deep sense of v u l nerabi l ity and intimacy . "A Bodhisattv a , " says the Prajniipiiramitii , "does not review any dharm a . I n consequence he does not tremble, is not frightened , nor terrified. No dharma can cow his m i n d , and he knows no regrets . . . . I t is t h u s t h a t a Bodhisattva , who courses i n perfect wisdom , not having settled down i n a l l-dharmas, grows i n the perfection o f giving" (Conze 1 97 5 a , p. 92-94 ) . That we s h o u l d understand t h i s as a metaphys ical issue leads us away from a soterio logy based on a "face-to­ face" encounter. After having attacked so many others for turning Bud­ dhism i nto "bad medicine," however, and a fter having de­ voted an entire book to explaining how it i s i m pos s i b l e to make sense of s k i l lful means apart from the concrete needs and karmic dispositions of an audience, the position of this study i s obviously problematic. I s this book an upiiya? Is it grounded i n the l ives of others , a practical guide or "raft" to­ ward l iberation? I f it is true that ski l l fu l means is a practical guide, and tha t by thinking of it apart from praxis we lose

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157

sight of wh a t Buddhism is a l l about , t he n hav e I not commit­ ted the "fa l lacy" of offering an abstract view of upii.ya? These questions expose the weakest point in this entire study. This book was not meant to be a "raft" or a path to­ ward l i be ration . It i s not grounded in the l i fe of Buddhist practice; nor is it a meditation too l . Therefore , it too is gui l ty of s peaking about Buddhism apart from practice , and suffers from the problem of explaining its central ideas ( e . g. , upii.ya ) apart from how they function in the l ives of Buddhist practi­ tioners . Moreover, in privileging upii.ya as the central concept in Buddhist though t , I have succumbed to the type of at­ tachment that the Buddha, Vim a lakirti , Nagarjuna, and Lin­ chi all fought against. On the other hand, what distinguishes this book from those criticized is that it was not intended as an upii.ya . The preceding arguments did not determine in advance what any path i s , how l iberation should be achieved, or how to over­ come suffering. Rather, they tried to remain faithful to an

upayic philosophy that undercuts our abi l ity to say in ad­ vance-a n d previous to knowing who one is addressing or what one's " i l l ness" is-how l iberation shoul d be achieve d . T h i s is where t h i s study differs most from those criticized. For most Western scholars, Nagarj una's doctrine of "empti­ ness" is a panacea, a medicine that will cure everyone regard­ less of the disease , and their interpretations are gene ra l ly devoted to tel l ing us what our problem is, and how to cure it. And all of this , odd ly enough, without even knowing who we are. This book argues why this approach "tends not to edifi­ cation , " and tries to express Vim a lakirti's l esson to Purz:1 a : "The disciples who d o n o t know the thoughts o r t h e inclina­ tions of others are not able to teach the Dharma to anyone" (Thurman 1986, p. 29).

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Index

Bankei 1 2 9

Abhidharma xiv, 4 , 7 , 38-40, 42-44 , 1 25 ,

bhiiva 5 5

1 3 2 , 143, 150, 1 5 5 .

Bhavaviveka 1 1 9

See also: Hinayana

B lofe l d , John 144

Buddhism,

Bodhicittavivarana 93

Sarvastivada,

Bodhidharma 1 2 7 , 1 29 , 1 3 1 , 1 38

Sautrantika, Theravada Buddhism

Bodhisaf?l bhiira(ka) 92

Abhidharmakosa 46, 55

Bodhisattva 19, 64 , 70,

Abhidharma -pitaka 43

75 , 7 7 , 92, 1 5 6

Ag ni 1 0

Bondage 1 , 9 , 66--68 , 1 08 , 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 ,

Amida Buddha 1 2 1 ,

1 18 . See also:

1 43- 1 46. See also:

du!J,kha, samsiira

Pure Land Ananda 32-35, 40-4 1 ,

Brahma 1 5- 1 6

Bra h ma Vihiira 1 5- 1 6

84

Brahmajiila -suttanta

a niitf!! a n 1 5 , 25, 38,

1 9-20

46-48, 5 7 , 7 1-73, 1 5 1 .

See also: "three

Brahman 20

marks"

Brahmanism 1 8 , 20, 23

anitya 7 1-72, See also:

Brahmins 1 5- 1 6 , 22-23 , 32

"three marks"

arhat 42, 64 , 70

Buddhadeva 55

Aryadeva 95-96

Buddhaghosa 1 27

iitman 32, 35-36 , 4 7 ,

Buddhapalita 1 00

5 9 , 74 . See also:

Buswe l l , Robert 27

eternalism

a vyiikrta 28-30

Candrakirti 100, 1 20

iiyatana 44

Carvaka 20, 38

167

Index

1 68

CatuiJ,sataka 95

Dogen 1 22- 1 23 , 1 2 7 ,

calu$koti 98-99

1 29- 132, 1 3 9 , 1 5 0 ,

Catustava 92-93

1 56

Causation 7, 2 1-22, 1 5 1 , 1 54 . Nagarjuna's

dr$fi 1 9-20, 22, 3 7 , 152 duhkha 9, 1 2 , 1 9 , 22,

critique of 98- 1 04 ;

4 7 , 1-72, 74-76, 8 1 .

Sarvastivada theory

See also: bondage ,

'54-57 ; Sautrantika

lak$a1Ja

theory 57-59 . See

also: pratuya­ samutpiida Ch'an Buddhism 8 , 69-70, 1 2 1- 1 4 3 , 148-149 Chappe l l , David W . 145 Conze, Edward 7 , 25, 48, 7 1 , 1 28 , 156 Corless, Roger J . 146

Eternalism 38. See also: atman "Fire Sermon" 1 0- 1 2 First Council 4 1 . See

also: Nikaya Four Noble Truths 45, 97-98 , 1 1 4- 1 1 9 , 140

Coward , Harold 96

Garfield, Jay 96, 1 0 1 ,

Dasabhumikavibha$a

Garner, Richard 1 8

Sastra 147 Defi lements 4 2 , 45 . See

also: klesa De l la Santina, Peter 1 20 Derrida 89

Dharmas 39, 4 4-48, 56, 72, 78, 148, 1 5 1 , 156 Dharmatrata 55

dhatu 44 dhyana 1 2 1

153 Gho�aka 55 Gregory, Peter N. 1 28 , 132, 1 4 5 Griffiths , P a u l J . 5 1

gU TJaS 1 10 Gudmunse n , Chris 96 Guenther, Herbert V. 50 Hege l 89 Hershock, Peter D . 1 8 , 148

Index

1 69

Hirakawa, Akira 42-49 Honen 146 Hui-jih 1 44-145 Hui-k'o < H uike ) 1 29- 1 3 1

lak�ar:ta 1 2 , 55, 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 7 . See also: du}J,kha, anitya, anatman Laycock, Stephen 1 26 Lin-chi 69-70, 1 22- 1 2 3 ,

Hui-neng 123- 1 33 , 1 40, 144- 1 4 5 , 1 48 Hume 89, 1 35 H ung-jen 123 Huntington , C. W. Jr.

1 33- 1 50, 1 5 7

Lin -chi lu 1 3 3 Lindtner, Christian 1 4 , 64 , 92-94 , 143 Logical Atomism 46

Lotus Sutra 4 , 6, 14- 1 5 ,

152-153

1 8 , 6 1 , 86, 94 , 1 1 3 , Inada, Kenneth 43 I shvarakpma 54 . See

1 50 Loy, David 22, 96, 1 00

also: San khya Jainism 20 James , Wi l l iam 26-27 Jayati l leke K. N . 39, ,

79 Ka lupahana, David 16, 1 8 , 2 1-24 , 34, 38-39, 53, 59, 1 0 1 , 14 1 , 142 Kant 89, 135

karma 56 llarur:tii 3 , 9, 148 Kasulis, Thomas ix-xvii, 5-6, 45

klesa 45 kung-an (koan) 1 2 1

Madhyamika Buddism 14, 43, 63 , 89, 1 1 9-1 20 , 1 4 1 . Prasangika schoo l 1 1 9- 1 20; See also: Nagarj un a , Candrakirti

Madhyamikakarika 78, 90-94 , 98, 1 4 0- 1 4 1 Mahakashyapa 1 2 3 , 131 M ahasaqtghika 4 2 . See also: N ikaya Buddhism Mahauugga 1 , 2 Majjhima -Nikaya 2, 23-24 , 28-29

Index

1 70 M a l unkyaputta

28-29,

35

23, 38, 89

Ni kaya Buddhism

M aiij usri

42-43. See also:

75

miirga 4 , 6, 24 , 84, 153, 1 55

M ahasarpghahika , Sthaviravada

niruii�Ja 1 4 , 25, 44, 53,

matrka 43-44 Ma-tsu

Nihilism

5 7 , 6 1 , 64 , 86, 97, 102 ,

1 25

metapraxis ix-x, xiv-xix,

5-7 , 39,

1 1 2-1 1 5 , 1 26, 1 37-140, 1 53

44-45 , 56-60, 1 08,

Nishitani, Keiji

1 1 3- 1 20, 150,

Nyaya

148

1 18, 1 4 1

1 54-155 Murt i , T . R. V.

7,

20-22, 33-34 , 1 00,

34-35 Otto , Rudolf 6 Organ, Troy

152 paramiirtha 4 , 78. See Nagao, Gadjin M .

2 1-22, 33-34 Nagarjuna xiv,

also: sariwrtti, "Two Truths"

8, 14,

37' 46, 63 , 70, 78,

Platform Sutra 1 24 , 1 28

1 1 0- 1 20, 1 2 2 , 1 25 ,

prajna 2, 9, 1 9 , 45, 63 ,

132, 140-143,

66, 145, 148 Prajnapiiramitii 6, 6 1 ,

147-157. See also: M adhyamika Nagasena

38

Nehamas , Alexander

85 nien -fo 1 2 1 , 146. See also: Pure Land Buddhism N ietzsche , Frederick

84-85

63 , 65 , 92, 94, 1 1 3, 1 22, 145, 156 prakrti 54 prasanga 1 20. See also: M adhyamika Prasailgika B uddhism

1 19 pratitya-samutpada 9 , 25. See also: caus a lity

171

Index

Pure Land Buddhism

S al)kara 52

xvi, 8 , 1 2 1 , 1 23,

Sankhya 20, 54

143- 149

Sar:tkhya -karika 54

Purl)a 69-70, 83, 157 Puru�a 20 Pye , Michael 3--4 , 26,

67 , 86

sanna 38. See also: skandhas

S ariputra 1 4 , 68, 87-88, 1 29 Sarvastivada 30--40,

Rahu l a , Walpola 23,

45-54 , 97, 1 02-1 07.

25, 33, 4 1 , 1 04 Rea l ism 1 5 1

See also: Abhidharma Buddhism,

Re lativism 155

Sautrantika,

Rinzai < Lin-chi 1 -hsuan )

Vasubandhu

1 33 , 138 Robinson , Richard 7

Satipatthana Sutta 1 27 Sautrantika 39--40,

Rorty, Richard 1 26

53-59, 10 3 , 1 05 . See

rupa 38, 44, 49,

also: Abhidhanna

104-1 06, 1 1 0. See also: skandha

Second Counci l 42. See also: Nikaya Buddhism

Sa f!ldlz i n irmocana Sutra 1 7 samsara 64 , 67 ,

1 1 0-1 1 3 , 1 26, 1 28.

Shen-hsiu 1 23- 1 29,

132, 144-145, 147 Siderits, Mark 96, 1 0 1 "sixty-two" views

See. also: bondage

1 9-22, 24 , 27-28, 30,

sa mskiira 49, 38. See

99, 1 02 , 1 04 . See also:

also: skandhas samu rtti 4, 78. See also: paramiirtha, "Two Truths" Saf!lyutta -Nikaya

1 6- 1 7 , 73 Sal)gha 40--4 1 , 68, 1 15

dr� t i skandhas 38-39, 44,

47--49, 7 2 , 1 04 , 1 13 , 1 19, 13 0 , 140. See also: rupa, sanna, saf!lskiira uedanii, ,

uijnana

Index

172

smrti 5 1 Stcherbatsky, Fyodor 7 , 52, 54-58 Sthaviravada 42. See

also: Nikaya, Mahasaqtghika

"three marks" 1 2 , 65,

70-72, 74-75 , 78. See also: du}Jkha, anatman, anitya Tripitaka 43. See also: Nikaya Buddhism

Streng, Frederick 152

Trungpa, Chogyam 5 1

Sunyata 37, 89, 1 15,

Twelve Gate Treatise 9 1

152

"Two Truths " 78-8 1 ,

Sutra-pitaka 43

83, 86-87. See also:

Suzuki , D. T. ix, 7

paramartha, sam vrtti

svabhava 53-58, 102, 1 05-108, 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 ,

Udana 1 7

1 1 6- 1 1 7 , 132

Upayakausalya Sutru

svatantra-anumana 120. See also: prasanga Svatntrika Buddhism

1 1 9. See also: Madhyamika

1 4 , 7 7 , 93 U ruvel a Kasapa 1 2 Vacchagotta 32-3 3 , 3 5 Vasubandhu 45-4 7 , 55,

59, 97 Vasumitra 55

Tao-1 1 25

tariki (t'o-liJ 1 2 1 , 143. See also: Pure Land Buddhism Tathagata 20, 30,

40-4 1 , 79, 9 1 , 140 Thao-Du'o'ng 145 Theravada Buddhism

49, 53

vedana 38. See also: skandhas Vedanta 52, See also:

S ankara Vigrahauyavarta nz 92-93, 1 4 1 . See also: Madhyamikakari ka vijnana 38. See also: skandha

Index

65-88, 9 7 , 1 02, 125, 1 29, 1 4 8 ,

Vimalakirti

157 Vimalakirtinirdesa 6-1, 6 1 -88, 1 1 3 , 1 22 , 150 Vinaya -pitaka 4 1 , 43 uipasyana 45, 1 27

1 73

Visuddhi -Magga

47-48, 1 27 Warder, A. K.

91

Wittgenstein , Ludwig

26, 89 zazen 1 2 1 , 1 27- 1 28