Seeing the Future Clearly (Studies and Texts)

s TUDIES AND TEXTS

SEEING THE FUTURE CLEARLY Questions n Future Contingents by Robert Holcot Edited by PAUL A. STREVELER and KATHERINE H. TACHAU Co-editors: Hester Goodenough Gelber and William J. Courtenay Robert Holcot, an English Dominican friar who taught theology at Oxford during the years 1331-1334, was among the most renowned scholars of his generation. Because they probably began their study of theology before Ockham had left England for Avignon, Holcot and his fellows once seemed to historians to be the Venerable Inceptor's early followers; to late-medieval authors, however, who took up, studied, and debated their ideas and methods in one university after another on the European continent, Oxford theologians of the 1320s-1330s were known more for their "English subtleties." Among the defining characteristics of the "New English Theology" of Holcot and his contemporaries were the dilemmas that arose from the increasingly analytical use of logic in theology. When Holcot lectured on Peter Lombard's Sentences and participated in Quodlibetal disputations, Oxford theologians struggled especially to understand a wholly contingent created order in relation to an entirely benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient divinity. The apparently conflicting range of omnipotence and omniscience, in particular, were at the core of several controversies brought together in the four Quodlibetal questions and the question from Holcot's Sentences lectures edited here. The controverted issues include: the continuing contingency of what has been revealed; the reconciliation of contingency with the freedom of the divine, angelic, or human will to choose either of two opposites; the status of prepositional claims about past, present, or future contingents; and whether such statements can be known to be true or false by any human or divine intellect. Holcot's treatments of these themes extensively incorporated the contributions of his contemporaries and teachers to ongoing debates and were widely disseminated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; thus, his Sentences lectures and Quodlibetal questions are valuable sources for historians of late-medieval intellectual culture.

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STUDIES

AND TEXTS 119

SEEING THE FUTURE CLEARLY Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot

Edited by PAUL A. STREVELER KATHERINE H. TACHAU Introduction by Katherine H. Tachau Co-editors Hester Goodenough Gelber William J. Courtenay

P O N T I F I C A L I N S T I T U T E OF M E D I A E V A L STUDIES

CANADIAN CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION DATA Holkot, Robertas, d. 1349. Seeing the future clearly : questions on future contingents (Studies and texts, ISSN 0082-5328 ; 119) Text in Latin, with introduction and notes in English. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-88844-119-3 1. Future contingents (Logic) - Early works to 1800. 2. Theology - Middle Ages, 600-1500. 3. Theology - Methodology - Early works to 1800. 4. Holkot, Robertas, d. 1349. I. Streveler, Paul A. (Paul Andrew), 1943- . II Tachau, Katherine H. III. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. IV. Title. V. Series: Studies and texts (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies) ; 119 BX890.H61995

230'.01

C95-930832-6

Printed by Edwards Brothers Incorporated, Michigan, USA

© 1995 Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 59 Queen's Park Crescent East Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Abbreviations

ix Introd

Holcot's Career at Oxford

uct i o n 1 3

The Dates of Holcot's Sentences and Quodlibetal Questions Holcot's Quodlibetal Questions on Future Contingents The Manuscripts The Relationship of the Manuscripts to Holcot's Intended Text Future Contingents in Holcot's Lectures on the Sentences The Manuscripts Disruption and Loss in the Transmission of Holcot's Questions on the Sentences

16 28 28 30 35 35 43

The Parameters of Holcot's Discussion of Contingency

47

Editorial Decisions

56

Robert Holcot: Quaestiones defuturis contingentibus Quodlibet III Q. 1: Utrum clare videns Deum videat omnia futura contingentia.

59

Q. 2: Utrum ista consequentia sit necessaria: "Deus scit a fore ergo a erit." Significet a unum futurum contingens.

73

Q. 3: Utrum, facta revelatione alicuius futuri contingentis, ipsum maneat contingens post revelationem. 75

75

Q. 8: Utrum generalis resurrectio necessario sit futura.

80

VI

CONTENTS

I n Sententias I I Q. 2: Utrum Deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundum. Argumenta principalia Articulus 7 Articulus 8 Articulus 9 Articulus 10

113 146 149 159 161

Appendix 1 Corresponding Passages in Quodlibetal Questions and Quaestio 2 in II Sententiarum

196

Appendix 2 Holcot's Sentences Lectures: Possible Order of Questions

197

Bibliography

200

Index of Manuscripts

209

General Index

211

Acknowledgments The project of editing Robert Holcot's discussions of future contingents began over two decades ago, when Hester Gelber first encouraged our interest in the thought of "our" genial and clever friar. The initial result, a preliminary text of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions, became one of the chief sources for Paul Streveler's 1970 dissertation, "The Problem of Future Contingents from Aristotle through the Fifteenth Century." At William Courtenay's suggestion, the present edition was undertaken, and a few years later, he and Paul invited Katherine Tachau to join them as a research assistant. Since then, the demands of different projects have required that we take up and set aside our "Holcot work," sometimes for extended periods; each time we have returned to the text with more insights to bring to it, and more debts of friendship, encouragement, and advice to repay. We are grateful to the anonymous reader(s) at the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies who, at an early stage of our project, insisted that Holcot's Quodlibetal questions on future contingents could not really be made clear to his modern readers without the more extended treatment of his Sentences question on the same matters; we have come to appreciate the value of this advice. Father Joseph Wey, a longstanding friend of Holcot, has provided us with extremely thoughtful criticism of the text, and our edition has been much improved thereby. An anonymous reader of the manuscript has cleared up further doubtful constructions on our part. We are grateful, too, to the late Julius Weinberg and to William Hay, Marilyn Adams, Calvin Normore, Norman Kretzmann, Chris Martin, and Tamara Rudavsky, who, in discussion and writing, have sharpened the philosophical insights we have brought to these texts. Lynn Courtenay enabled us to gather in Wisconsin for extensive editing sessions; and a particularly productive fortnight in Stanford with Hester Gelber has left its traces throughout the introduction and edition (which have also benefitted from her careful remarks on earlier drafts). Some of Katherine's graduate students have found themselves learning to edit on Holcot texts, and have thus added their improvements, too; we particularly thank Hillary Sherwood, with whom we worked through Holcot's question on book 3 of the Sentences, and Russell Friedman, who proofread the Quodlibetal questions with us. We are also thankful for the care with which Ron B. Thomson and Jean Hoff of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies have patiently transformed our manuscript into a printed book.

VIII

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several institutions have provided office space and other support, tangible and intangible, as we have proceeded: the History Departments of the University of Wisconsin and the University of Iowa; the Philosophy Department of West Chester University. Calvin Normore and the Princeton University Department of Philosophy graciously made possible the computerization of our edition. Jay Semel, Director of the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Iowa, gave us office space for proofreading the edited text against the microfilms. The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton supported the final stages of the editorial revision. The edition has obliged us to examine manuscripts in many libraries, and we have employed microfilms sent to us by others; we have happy memories of the many librarians who have assisted us graciously along the way, and are happy to acknowledge their help behind the many manuscripts we list or cite in the following pages. We gained microfilm access to several through the efforts of Dr. Julian Plante and his colleagues of the Hill Monastic Microfilm Project at St. John's University. Our sources of funding have been various and generous: the University of Wisconsin; a La Fetra Summer Fellowship from Pomona College; a Summer Stipend from the National Endowment of the Humanities; and an Old Gold Summer Fellowship, a University House Interdisciplinary Research Grant, and a Faculty Fellowship from the University of Iowa. As we write these words of public gratitude, we wish to acknowledge our greatest debt, to William Courtenay, from whom we first learned the paleographical and codicological skills to carry on this project, and without whom it would neither have been begun nor could have been completed. Much of the introduction builds upon his earlier work, and we have taken account of many suggestions. We hope that he and Hester, who have helped and advised at so many stages, will feel that we have done justice to Holcot's thought. Finally, we thank an honorary "Holcotista," John Beldon Scott, who joined us for the many "final stages" of the edition, providing encouragement, advice, and assistance great and small.

Abbreviations AHDLMA AL BGPThM

PL

Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age Aristoteles Latinus, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, et al. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters. Corpus Christianorum, series latina Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum Opera philosophica. In Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita, ed. Gedeon Gal, et al. St. Bonaventure NY: Franciscan Institute, 1974-1991. Opera theologica. In Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita, ed. Gedeon Gal, et al. St. Bonaventure NY: Franciscan Institute, 1974-1991. Patrilogiae cursus completus series Latina, ed. J.P. Migne.

a. add. arg. c. cf. corr. d. del. inser. tier. lin. mg. om. om. horn. q. scr. trp. un.

articulus addidit argumentum capitulum confer correxit distinctio delevit inseruit iteravit linea in margine omisit omisit per homoeoteleuton quaestio scripsit transposuit unica

CCL CSEL OP

OT

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Introduction The belated and exceedingly splintered twentieth-century interest in Robert Holcot betrays how far those of us who are concerned with late medieval intellectual culture remain from appreciating the literary renown that he attained among late medieval readers.1 The significance of this English Dominican friar, who died in 1349, is after all everywhere to be found among those who, in his century, valued books. As Judson Allen once remarked, Holcot "even achieved that pinnacle of medieval fame as an author which made him the object of false attributions," such as the one to a section of Pierre Bersuire's Reductorium morale?1 Other scribes thought that he wrote the Philobiblion for one of the fourteenth century's most visible collectors of books and their authors, Richard Aungerville de Bury, bishop of Durham, advisor to England's Edward HI. The attribution of the Philobiblion to Holcot is far from surprising, since he spent part of his career in the bishop's entourage.3 Nor is scribal attribution of Bersuire's work to Holcot puzzling, for it belongs to the same genre of aids to sermon creation as Holcot's own Moralitates. Many years ago, Beryl Smalley pointed to the use late medieval authors made of the numerous available copies of the latter opus, and revealed how enthusiastically Holcot incorporated into his 1

2

3

For works written prior to 1983 concerned with Holcot, see Hester Goodenough Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason. Three Questions on the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, OP, Studies and Texts 62 (Toronto, 1983), whose edition ours is intended to complement. Since her text appeared, Holcot's epistemology has been studied in Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age ofOckham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden, 1988), pp. 243-255. Judson Boyce Allen, "The Library of a Classicizer: The Sources of Robert Holkot's Mythographic Learning," in Arts Liberaux etphilosophic au moyen age (Montreal/ Paris, 1969), pp. 721-722, referring in a note to "the fifteenth book of the Reductorium of Pierre Bersuire, a commentary on the Metamorphoses" of Ovid. On Bersuire, see Friedrich Stegmiiller, Repertorium biblicum medii aevi, 11 vols. (Madrid, 1950-1980), 4: 235-244; Charles Samaran, "Pierre Bersuire, prieur de Saint-Eloi de Paris," Histoire Litteraire de la France 39: 259-450. Beryl Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), pp. 67-68; see also n. 5 below.

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INTRODUCTION

lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences and on the Bible a reading of classical literary works wide enough to rival Petrarch's.4 Holcot's questions on the Sentences, like his Quodlibeta, were composed when he was teaching at Oxford, where his arguments revealed to his contemporaries a theological acuity aided by brilliance as a logician. These characteristics defined an emergent English theology that appeared both novel and important to Bury, to whose attention Holcot's repute eventually brought him. So he entered a circle of scholars at the point of intersection for intellectual currents flowing from Oxford to London and to Avignon, a court which embraced the best of scholastic logicians and "proto"-humanist literati, whose talents Holcot's own oeuvre best epitomized. His presence at London in Bury's palace gained him an audience among courtiers increasingly literate and like him classicizing in taste.5 Thus, a few decades before Englishmen heard Chaucer's "portraits" of his pilgrims, the evocative verbal "pictures" of Holcot's Wisdom commentary brought philosophical issues into court company.6 There, perhaps, Chaucer first encountered Holcot's writings; in the event, the poet drew from Holcot in shaping the Nun's Priest's Tale, relying for "theory after theory, detail after detail, and illustration after illustration ... [upon] Robert Holcot's commentary on the Book of Wisdom."7 A "medieval best-seller," as Joseph Wey has noted, this commentary survives all over Europe in at least 175 fourteenth- and fifteenth-century

4 5

6

7

Smalley, "Robert Holcot O.P.," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 26 (1956), 5-97, especially pp. 25-28. On Bury and his scholarly entourage, see especially: Smalley, English Friars, pp. 66-74; Neal W. Gilbert, "Richard de Bury and the 'Quires of Yesterday's Sophisms,'" in Philosophy and Humanism. Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. by Edward P. Mahoney (New York, 1976), pp. 229-257; William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England (Princeton, 1987), pp. 118-137; and, with caution, Sheridan Martin, "Richard d'Aungerville de Bury, 1287-1345," Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1987. On Holcot's "pictures," see Smalley, "Robert Holcot," pp. 26-28, 54-56, 65-82, who finds the term in Holcot's own statements, as her citations show. See, e.g. (p. 19n): "De sex alis cherubim, patebit in pictura post ea{m) angelorum . . . " when referring to a verbal picture. Robert A. Pratt, "Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Preest on Dreams," Speculum 52 (1977), 538-570, esp. p. 538.

INTRODUCTION

3

manuscripts.8 This number dwarfs the forty-eight known to preserve his questions on Lombard's Sentences; still, for the latter work four more survive than for Gregory of Rimini's Sentences commentary, and a full dozen more than for William of Ockham's.9 Hence, while modern students of late medieval philosophy and theology know the views of Ockham and Rimini better than those of Holcot, this does not mirror his renown relative to theirs in the two centuries after he left Oxford. As long as late medieval works were read in universities and studia, Holcot continued to find scholarly readers who copied and quoted from his questions on the Sentences and Quodlibeta. In those genres — as students of late medieval thought have generally come to recognize — Holcot's were among the most important composed by the seminal generation of Oxford scholars active in the early 1330s. Yet, any determination of Holcot's role in the creation of the "New English Theology" requires as a crucial step that we establish precisely when he taught.10 HOLCOT'S CAREER AT OXFORD Because fourteenth-century Sentences commentaries and — perhaps in some cases — Quodlibetal questions were composed not by masters of Theology but by students attaining their baccalaureate degrees, the stages of baccalaureate teaching must be understood if we are to discover when

8

Joseph Wey, "The Sermo Finalis of Robert Holcot," Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949), 219-224; also Smalley, "Robert Holcot," pp. 10-11. Our count is based on the manuscripts listed by Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 3 vols. (Rome, 1970-1980), 3: 315-318. Holcot's Wisdom commentary was still familiar enough to scholars in 1625 for Gabriel Naude to cite it in his Apologie pour les grands hommes soupgonnes de magie when arguing that Girolamo Cardano's controversial horoscope of Christ had orthodox antecedents in the work of Holcot and Pierre d'Ailly; see: Wayne Shumaker, Renaissance Curiosa: ... Girolamo Cardano 's Horoscope of Christ... , Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 8 (Binghamton NY, 1982), pp. 59-62. 9 For Rimini, see the introductions to the critical edition, in A. Damasus Trapp et al., eds., Gregorii AriminensisLectura in I et II Sententiarum, 1 vols. (Berlin and New York, 1979-1987), 1: xvii-lxxv, 4: xi-xxi; for Ockham, see Gedeon Gal et al., eds., Guillebni de Ockham Opera Theologica, 9 vols. (St. BonaventureNY, 1967-1984), 1: 11*-18*, 5: 7*-14*, 6: 7*-9*, 7: 7*-12*. 10 "New English Theology" is the description W.J. Courtenay proposes in several of his works, most recently in Schools and Scholars, esp. pp. 250-306.

4

INTRODUCTION

any theologian produced works for a university audience. At Oxford, a student of Theology — whether monk, mendicant friar, or secular — was permitted to proceed to degree candidacy only after a set number of years attending and participating in debates (disputations), and following lectures on the Bible and on Lombard's Sentences. Then, according to statute, the candidate might begin a year of "opposing" in debates; two years later, he might switch roles and become the respondent; finally, at the beginning of his eighth year of theological study, a secular candidate was eligible to lecture on ("read") the Sentences as a "bachelor of the Sentences'" (baccalaureussententiarius). Mendicant friars, whose course of theological study was longer than that of seculars, probably learned to "oppose" and "respond" away from Oxford at the studio, of their order, where too they gave preliminary lectures on the Sentences before joining the ranks of the sententiarii at Oxford. After lecturing on the Sentences, the next stage for both mendicants and seculars was to lecture on the Bible as "bachelors of the sacred page" (baccalaurei sacraepaginae), at the end of which theologians were considered fully "formed" bachelors of Theology (theologiae baccalaurei formati). A formed bachelor needed to remain at Oxford participating in disputations for at least another year before being licensed; only then was he eligible to "incept" as a master. Upon inception, he began the two years of lectures on the Bible to which he committed himself on oath, during which time he was "actually regent." As regent, he no longer delivered questions on the Sentences, though he might revise his earlier lectures for publication.11 These, then, were the steps that statutes prescribed for attaining the degree of master of Theology. Statutes, however, never described the curriculum exhaustively, and over time practice evidently changed until it so diverged from statutory requirements as to require the drawing up of new ones. Thus, for example, surviving lectures on the Sentences reveal how extensively theologians studied the works of Augustine and other church fathers, and Nicholas Trevet's commentary on Augustine's De dvitate Dei suggests that it was taught at Oxford in the early fourteenth century; but

11 We sketch stages that are discussed in much more detail in Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 41-43, 58-84. Particularly useful is his explication of the ways in which the educational programs of Oxford (as a studium generate) were interwoven with the studio of religious orders in the fourteenth century.

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Oxford statutes are silent on this score.12 If this suggests greater amplitude in the curriculum than Oxford regulations specify, in other respects it may have narrowed, insofar as the distinction between disputation and lectures on the Sentences began to collapse in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. A scholarly generation before Holcot lectured, Walter Chatton and William of Ockham had already incorporated material from their debates into their Sentences lectures, a practice that became more common at Oxford in the 1330s.13 One result is that the author of lectures on the Sentences may give us enough

12 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 319. Ockham's Logic is perhaps the most notorious example of a text taught before being officially adopted by a faculty, as discussed in William J. Courtenay and Katherine H. Tachau, "Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339-1341," History of Universities 2 (1982), 53-96. For other divergences between statute and practice, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 47, 60. 13 Although the roles played by theological bachelors grew steadily, the extent to which statutes and surviving texts from any given decade of the thirteenth or fourteenth century reflect actual baccalaureate practice in disputing questions, participating in Quodlibetal disputations, and in connecting these disputations to their lectures on the Sentences, are difficult issues, for which see: Bernardo C. Bazan, "Les Questions disputees, principalement dans les facultes de theologie," and John F. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions, Chiefly in Theology Faculties," both in Les Questions Disputees et les questions quodlibetiques dans les facultes de theologie, de droit et de medecine, Typologie des sources du moyen age occidental, fasc. 44-45 (Turnhout, 1985). For Ockham and Chatton, see: Joseph C. Wey, ed., Venerabilis inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Quodlibeta Septem (St. Bonaventure NY, 1980), OT 9: 30*-32*; Stephen F. Brown, "Walter Chatton's Lectura and William of Ockham's Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis," in Essays Honoring Allan B. Walter, ed. by William A. Frank and Girard J. Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure NY, 1985), pp. 81-115; and Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 252, relying on Stephen Brown's discussion of the oeuvre of Ockham and Chatton. The collapse of disputations into Sentences lectures was complete in the work of many of those most influenced by the "New English Theology" at French studia in the second half of the century; see, for example, Paulus de Perugia's incipit to his 1344-1345 Parisian Sentences lectures which describes them as having been "disputed." For other examples and references, see: Katherine H. Tachau, "French Theology in the MidFourteenth Century: Vatican Latin 986 and Wroclaw, Milich F. 64," AHDLMA 51 (1984), 55-57, esp. note 27. In the Sentences commentaries of Holcot and his contemporary, the Franciscan Adam Wodeham, the references to their debates with their socii, or colleagues (as below, pp. 16, 20, 45, 48) support the inference that Oxford practice in their generation was headed in the direction eventually documented explicitly in France.

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INTRODUCTION

information about his debates with his fellow bachelors to allow us to trace the evolution of their arguments. This it is finally possible to do with reasonable exactitude in Holcot's case, and in what follows we aim to reconsider the relative chronologies proposed by Heinrich Schepers and William Courtenay.14 Let us begin by considering Holcot's words at the outset of a discussion hitherto known from its opening words as his "Sex articuli": Here begin six articles on various matters already treated, against which certain colleagues have reasonably raised objections .... Against the first three articles a certain reverend colleague argues in his first biblical lecture, as you have heard .... I have written these [arguments] with weariness and recite them with shame, lest it be said that I do not deign to recite the statements of my colleague against me. Nevertheless, there is nothing in them which ought to move a boy [to anything] except, perhaps, to laughter.15

From this we learn that the first three articles continue a debate with one colleague in particular, who — by the time of Holcot's writing — has

14 Heinrich Schepers, "Holkot contra dicta Crathorn" [part I], Philosophisches Jahrbuch 77 (1970), 320-354; [part II], Philosophisches Jahrbuch 79 (1972), 106136; William J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), esp. pp. 95-106. 15 London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 131va: "Hie incipiunt sex articuli de diversis materiis prius tactis, contra quos quidam socii rationabiliter insteterunt .... (131vb) Contra primes tres arguit quidam socius reverendus in sua prima lectione super Bibliam sicut audistis ... . (132ra) Ista scripsi cum tedio et cum verecundia recito ne diceretur quod non dignarem recitare dicta socii contra me. Nihil tamen in istis quod quemcumque puerum deberet movere nisi fortassis ad risum, tamen propter reverentiam dicentis ista arguo sic." While Holcot mentions here that he has written this response, he also informs us that it was to be delivered orally as well, by his use of the technical term recitare — on which see Jacqueline Hamesse, "Le Vocabulaire de la transmission orale des textes," in Vocabulaire du livre et de I'ecriture au may en age. Actes de la table ronde, Paris 24-26 septembre 1987, ed. by Olga Weijers, Etudes sur le Vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen age (Turnhout, 1989), 1: 168-194, esp. pp. 175, 186. As I indicate below, p. 17, I think it improbable that Holcot intended for the socalled "Sex articuli" (or, as Fritz Hoffmann prefers, confer entiae) to be considered a free-standing work. As such, however, they have recently been edited; see now: Fritz Hoffmann, Die "Conferentiae " des Robert Holcot O. P. und die akademischen Auseinandersetzungen an der Universitdt Oxford, 1330-1332, BGPThM, n.f. 36 (Minister, 1993). Unfortunately, because this work appeared long after our edition was in press, we have not been able to take it into account here.

INTRODUCTION

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already begun to serve as a baccalaureus biblicus, having delivered his initial biblical lecture. Since Holcot expects his own audience to have heard it, he evidently remains in the same milieu as his colleague. When Holcot finally takes up the third article, he summarizes the latter's view: Hence the principal conclusion which this [colleague] has by now attempted for two years to prove is this: that by which a man formally knows intellectually is the man's soul. [My colleague] nevertheless posits species subjectively inhering in [that] soul itself ... [and] concedes that when the soul knows a color, the soul is truly and really colored by that color.16 The views Holcot quotes hi these three articles correspond, as Heinrich Schepers found, to the positions of Holcot's confrere William Crathorn, thus establishing that he is the colleague (socius) who has been defending the position "for two years" at the time of the "Sex articuli."11 With this discovery Schepers showed that a chronology of Holcot's works can be established relative to those of this fellow bachelor at the Dominicans' Oxford convent. Moreover, as Schepers saw, a secure date for Crathorn's

16 London, BL MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 134va: "Unde principalis conclusio quam iste iam per bienniwn nisus est probare est ista: illud quo homo formaliter intelligit est anima hominis. Ponit tamen species subiective inherentes ipsi anime . . . . (134vb) Concedit quod anima est vere colorata et realiter per colorem quando intelligit colorem, et quod aliquando est nigra et aliquando fusca, et sic de singulis coloribus" (our italics). 17 Schepers, "Holkot contra, n," pp. 108-110, 113-115. For Crathorn, see his Sent. 1, q.l in Crathorn, Qudstionen zum Ersten Sentenzenbuch. Einfiihrung und Text, ed. by Fritz Hoffinann, BGPThM, n.f. 29 (Minister, 1988), p. 70, tin. 23-30: "Istud nomen 'cognitio' atiquando supponit in propositione pro ilk re qua cognoscens cognoscit formatiter. ... Cognitio primo modo accepta potest vocari 'cognitio formatis' .... (p. 73, tin. 25-30) Prima (conclusio) est quod omnis cognitio humana primo modo accepta est potentia cognitiva vel cognoscens"; Sent. 1, q.7 (p. 334, tin. 28-29): "Tertia conclusio est quod potentia memorativa, intellectiva, et votitiva est ipsa anima." Crathorn's defense of the understanding of species subjectively existing in the soul is also discussed in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 263-264. Because, for Crathorn, the reader may find it easier to consult Hoffrnann's recent edition rather than the manuscripts from which I amend it, I cite it here and below; punctuation of Crathorn's text is mine. Hoffmann edits from two of the three surviving manuscript copies of Crathom's text, namely Erfurt, Wissenschafttiche Bibliothek MS Ampl. Q. 395a; Basel, Universitatsbibtiothek MS B.V.30. The third, Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibtiothek MS lat. 5460, became available to him too late to be collated; the only discussion of the latter manuscript to date is in Vladimir Richter, "Handschriftliches zu Crathorn," Zeitschrift Jur kathotische Theologie 94 (1972), 445449. In addition, one question survives in Krakow, Bibtioteka Jagielkriska MS 748.

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INTRODUCTION

lectures on Lombard can also be derived. In the first question on the Sentences, Crathorn mentions that "many have experienced a solar eclipse in this year on the 17th kalends of August on St. Alexius' Eve" — a reference to a total eclipse of the sun visible throughout Europe on the 16th of July (= 17 kalendas Augusti) in 1330. On the basis of this date, Schepers suggested the academic term which began in the fall of 1330 as the term in which Crathorn began to lecture on the Sentences.1* Schepers' suggestion seems to us correct. The question containing Crathorn's reference to the solar eclipse concerns the epistemological foundation of human certainty and scientific knowledge, the usual opening topic for Sentences lectures in the first half of the fourteenth century.19 Hence, its presence in surviving manuscripts as Crathorn's initial question presumably reflects its position in his lectures, so that it should be assigned to his early weeks as bachelor of the Sentences?® Such a date has a further significance, for the "principal conclusion" that Holcot, in the third of his "Sex articuli" attributes to his colleague is also

18 Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 340; Crathorn, Sent. 1, q.l, concl. 3 (ed. Hoffmann, p. 100, lin. 1-4): "Quinto sic: Multi expert! sunt isto anno, quando accidit eclypsis soils, scilicet 17. kalendis Augusti in vigilia beati Alexii, quod respicientes solem et postea convertentes se et respicientes herbas virides ... ." The example of a solar afterimage is a common one, cited in numerous thirteenth- and fourteenthcentury discussions of vision; what is unusual here is the reference to a specific event when the standard authority could be confirmed by personal experience. The absence of the italicized words in the Basel manuscript may be evidence that Crathorn's text was partly revised at some point. (The Erfurt manuscript reads "fuit" rather than "accidit.") 19 Significant Sentences prologues which open with similar epistemological questions include those of Peter Aureol, John Reading, William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, Richard FitzRalph, John of Rodington, and Adam Wodeham — all but the last two certainly available to Crathorn. For discussion of such texts, seeTachau, Vision and Certitude. 20 Crathorn's question, titled "Utrum notitia evidens articulorum fidei sit possibilis viatori in virtute luminis naturalis," occurs first in the Basel and Erfurt manuscripts. The Vienna codex contains a number of poorly identified works, including theological questions by other authors preceding Crathorn's questions; but when, on fol. 40rb, we finally reach his work, we again find that this question is first, as it also was in a Munster manuscript that no longer exists.

INTRODUCTION

9

to be found in this same opening question of Crathorn's.21 This indicates that Holcot composed his response two academic years after his confrere's first lectures on the Sentences, that is, in the summer or early fall of 1332. By the early weeks of the 1332 autumn term, Crathorn would have had time to complete two academic years as bachelor of the Sentences, namely 1330-1331 and 1331-1332, and to have begun the biblical lectures required of bachelors in the summer of 1332.22 In favor of this chronology are two further considerations. First, among the most prominent contemporary foci of Crathorn's attention is Richard FitzRalph, a secular trained at Oxford in the 1320s where he eventually became regent master. When he became master had been the subject of conjecture until Katherine Walsh established that FitzRalph's inception as master of Theology occurred in the summer of 1331. This is evident from the change in the titles accorded FitzRalph — from baccalaureus sacrae theologiae on 24 May 1331 to in sacra pagina doctor on 27 September 1331.23 At different points in the Sentences questions Crathorn refers to FitzRalph as iste doctor and as magister. If the second of these titles might refer to his status in Arts rather than Theology, the first is unambiguous, and is one to which FitzRalph was entitled by the opening of the 1331-1332 academic year.24

21 In addition to the passages quoted in n. 17 above, see Crathorn, Sent. 1, q.l (ed. Hoffinann, p. 83): "Dico igitur generaliter quod cognitio non est aliud quam potentia cognitiva, et hoc vocando cognitionem id, quo cognoscens cognoscit formaliter, quod propriissime vocatur cognitio. Et quia potentiae cognitivae nostrae non sunt distinctae res superadditae animabus nostris ... concede quod anima hominis cognoscentis est cognitio, anima videntis est visio." 22 As Schepers proposed, "Holkot contra, I," p. 344. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 99, considered it possible that Crathorn lectured on the Bible either in an autumn term or during the summer; see also Schools and Scholars, p. 42. That either a single term of lectures or summer reading was usual at Oxford as early as 1330 was first suggested as a way of understanding the chronology of the Holcot-Crathorn debates. One consequence of the rereading of that evidence which we propose below (especially on pp. 11, 14-16) is that we need not so assume. 23 Katherine Walsh, "The Later Medieval Schoolman in Theory and Practice," Innsbrucker historische Studien 2 (1979), 174; on FitzRalph's Sentences commentary, see Tachau, "Richard FitzRalph's Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences," forthcoming. 24 Schepers, "Holkot contra, n," p. 11 In. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 76n, found that Crathorn refers in Sent. 1, q.7 (ed. Hoffmann, p. 340) to "Magister Ricardus filius Radulphi" as he also does in q.l (ed. Hoffmann, pp. 146-147) where, however, Crathorn also says (partly relegated in Hoffmann's ed. to the variants, p. 147,

10

INTRODUCTION

Second, at Oxford a biennial reading of the Sentences was still the norm for mendicant bachelors awaiting promotion to lecturing on the Bible in the early 1330s, and at least two of Crathorn's fellow bachelors, the Franciscan Adam Wodeham and Holcot himself, read the Sentences over the course of two academic years.25 For the evidence that Holcot did so we again have his own words, from his Sermo finalis,26 On its witness, however, Schepers (and, following him, Courtenay) suggested that Crathorn read the Sentences for only one year, interpreting Holcot as indicating that "Crathorn [had] received a university dispensation to shorten his reading." Further characterizing Holcot's observation as "invidious and somewhat gratuitous," Courtenay noted the brevity of Crathorn's surviving lectures on the Sentences?1 Yet, if Crathorn's text is compared to those of such contemporaries as FitzRalph, Kilvington,

lin. 21) "Sed contra istum modum ponendi.... Igitur secundum istum doctorem ... cuius contrarium ponit iste doctor." See also n. 18, above, for evidence that Crathorn's lectures show signs of revision. 25 For Wodeham, see Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 171-180. 26 See below, p. 12. The Sermo finalis is edited by Wey, "Sermo finalis"; in quoting from it, however, we revise Wey's text by referring to the two manuscripts in which the sermo survives: London BL MS Royal lO.C.vi, fols. 137r-138v, and Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, fols. 204v-205r. (We also repunctuate slightly to help the reader follow Holcot's bilingual puns.) 27 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 98. In a note, Courtenay also infers, on the basis of a rebuttal to one of Crathorn's arguments found in Holcot's Quodlibeta, that Crathorn did not lecture on book 2 of the Sentences: "Igitur si socius iste numquam in aliquo doctore legit de gratia animam informante, sequitur quod numquam legit secundum librum sententiarum, quod absit, quia tune est periurus" (Cambridge, Pembroke MS 236, fol. 182va). Still, the dual use of the verb legere in Holcot's time also permits us to understand this remark as a reference to reading rather than lecturing, so we may agree with Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 352, who takes it as a humorous reductio ad absurdum. In other words, as Holcot's audience would have recognized, no bachelor of the Sentences could have arrived at that rank without having perused (or heard read) all four books of Lombard's Sentences, including the second which contains discussions of grace informing the soul. Hence, no baccalaureus sententiarius could reasonably sustain the claim Holcot attests that his colleague has made. This understanding of Holcot's attack is supported by such replacements of "read" with "heard" in Pembroke, as when attacking the corollary claim (fol. 182ra): "Asseruit enim ibi tria: primo quod Magister Sententiarum tantum loquitur de gratia increata et nusquam ponit gratiam animam informantem ... tertio quod ipsemet numquam legit in aliquo doctore ante editionem Decretalis predicte de gratia animam informante. Quantum ad primum de intentione Magistri planum est omnibus qui audierunt secundum librum Sententiarum."

INTRODUCTION

11

Rosetus, Halifax, and even Holcot himself, its length is far from unusual. None proceeds distinction by distinction in the manner of commentaries; all seem, rather, simply to be selections of questions from a greater number actually argued before students.28 Moreover, as we shall see, it is not as obvious as Schepers believed that, when speaking of a university dispensation, Holcot's reference to a scholar whose name the scribes of his Sermofinalis abbreviated as "G~,"or "Gra" ("Grau/Gran"), is in fact to Crathorn.29 Nor i

s

it

obvious

that

the Sermofinalis is a solemn sermon, for many difficulties in our understanding vanish once we recognize it as a festive speech celebrating the end of Holcot's responsibilities as cursor at the Oxford Dominican house and introducing his successor. This casts such references as those to this colleague "Gra" in a new light. Hardly invidious, gratuitous, or motivated by irritation,30 they are instead as jocular as the ribald theme of the speech

28 For FitzRalph, a principial lecture and 26 questions survive; for Richard Kilvington and Roger Rosetus, OFM, 4 each have been securely identified; for Halifax, 9 questions are known; for Holcot, 20 are extant (in addition to four Principia, discussed below, pp. 2022). By comparison, the Basel manuscript of Crathom contains 27 or 20 questions (depending on how one counts several concerning the categories); Vienna records 11 of these, and Erfurt, 19 (see Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 327, and, with caution, Richter, "Handschriftlich.es," p. 446). Lecturing in the same years, Adam Wodeham produced an ordinatio (i.e., a written revision of his lectures) that, in length and in number of questions, far exceeds the surviving works of Holcot, Kilvington, and Crathom (see p. 22 below); this disparity suggests that their surviving works do not reflect the entire course of lectures as actually delivered, since we have no grounds for assuming that their lectures were less extensive than Wodeham's. Thanks in part to Friederich Stegmuller, modem scholars have generally designated all of these lectures on the Sentences as "commentaries"; but it now appears more accurate to distinguish between the genres of commentaries and of questions on the Sentences. 29 See below, at pp. 15-16. 30 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 65. Like Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 346, Courtenay shared Wey's ("Sermofinalis," p. 220n) reading of the Sermo as reflecting the strife between Northerners and Southerners, usually alleged as the cause of Oxford's "Stamford Schism" in the early 1330s. As Katherine Walsh, Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, Avignon, and Armagh: A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate (Oxford, 1981), pp. 72-73, has pointed out, the causes of the schism are hardly uncontroversial, but North-South disputes probably were not significant among them. The controversy continues in The Early Oxford Schools, ed. by Jeremy I. Catto, The History of the University of Oxford 1, ed. by T.H. Aston (Oxford, 1984), whose authors mention three different dates (pp. 131, 186, 391) for the withdrawal of scholars to Stamford.

12

INTRODUCTION

itself, an extended play on the notion of pursuing and attaining theological wisdom as a two-year courtship and marriage, leading eventually to sexual satisfaction. Thus, Holcot pretends to gloss Ovid's account of the virgin Atalanta's decision upon Phoebus' advice to choose as husband only the victor in a race against herself: In this way, dearest ones, in the church militant at the revelation of Phoebus — that is, God — there seems to be a statute concerning this noble girl [Atalanta] — namely theological wisdom — and those who desire to couple with her in marriage, to wit: that no one, no matter how studious he be, may contract for the nuptials of Inception with her unless he has pledged his faith that he will race with her and read fully the four books of

the Sentences in cursory lectures.

This, Holcot tells us, he has done: Therefore, dearest ones, let me speak of myself: although [I am] weaker than others, I was moved by the love of sacred theology — partly compelled by the orders of my superiors, partly attracted by consideration of this virgin — [so that] last year I swore to run a race in the [afore] said contest with her, saying to her what [is said] in the Song of Songs.32

Despite this purported tension, Schepers described the Sermo finalis in the following terms: "wir es hier mil einer geistvollen, witzpriihenden Ansprache zu tun haben, die der ubermutige Absolvent beim Festschmaus gehalten hat." In fact, Holcot's speech belongs to a more widespread genre, as our discovery of the coUatio finalis of his contemporary, Ralph Friseby, shows; see Katherine H. Tachau, "Looking Gravely at Dominican Puns: The 'Sermons' of Robert Holcot and Ralph Friseby," Traditio 46 (1991), 337-345. 31 Wey, ed. "Sermo finalis," p. 220: "Quamdam historiam breviter recitabo quam refert Ovidius, Metamorphoses libro 10 ... . Fuit enim ... virgo quaedam forma corporis pulcerrima ... velocissima, nomine Atalanta. ... Isto modo, carissimi, in ecclesia militante de hac nobili puella, sapientia videlicet theologica, et his qui cum ea coniugium copulare desiderant, Phoebo, i.e., deo, revelante, statutum esse videtur, videlicet, quod nullus, quantumcumquestudiosus existat, inceptionis nuptias contrahat cum eadem nisi fide data quod cum ea currat et quattuor libros sententiarum lectione cursoria plene legal." 32 Ibid.: "Ut ergo, carissimi, de me loquar, licet inter ceteros debilior, sacrae theologiae dilectione commotus, partim superiorum ordinatione compulsus, partim huius virginis consideratione contractus, anno praeterito fidem dedi de faciendo cursus in dicto certamine cum eadem, dicens ei illud Cant. 2, trahe me post te; curremus simul in odore unguentorum tuorum."

INTRODUCTION

13

As we might expect, Holcot's speech is as laden with innuendo as with puns, including several that exploit his colleagues' and his own status as celibate Dominicanes with a talent for racing as "the Lord's hounds."33 So, for example, with an obvious double entendre, Holcot introduces the bachelor who will succeed himself as cursor: Because ... every man, when he comes to consummation, thinks about his own heir, so let me specially recommend the reverend bachelor and future racer (cursor) who ... will succeed me.34

That this bachelor, whose name is Roger Gosford, has a natural aptitude for the duties of cursor in the race, Holcot continues, is clear from "the exposition of his name and the disposition of his body."35 After all, Holcot quips, the English word "Roger" not only contains within it the name of an animal (roe) known for its running ability, but is itself a name commonly bestowed upon dogs.36 Holcot is inspired to find a third

33 I.e., domini canes, perhaps the only pun from medieval sources still well-known. On our reading, of course, Holcot intended that laughter provoked by play upon the name of his order also revert upon himself; this in turn suggests that there could have been little sting in his reference (below, n. 36) to Roger Gosford as a dog, one who runs the pride of Durham, as Holcot, too, as a member of Bishop Richard de Bury's retinue, did either then or later. In the absence of such barbs, it seems to us that the Stamford Schism is not obvious as a motive for Holcot's humor, and so cannot be used to date the sermo (see above, n. 30). 34 Wey, ed., "Sermo finalis," p. 222: "Sed quia cursus rebus inditus illud habet quod omnis natura sollicitatur de fine, et omnis homo cum ad consummationem pervenerit de suo recogitat successore, ideo baccalarium reverendum et cursorem futurum, qui mihi non in tenementis quae quasi ad firmam tenui, sed in scolis Praedicatorum, quae mihi hereditarie debebantur, succedet, specialiter recommendarem, ut tarn de eo quam de me illud exponatur quod dicitur, Act. 13, Cum autem implevit loannes cursum suum." 35 Ibid.: "Et certe quod actus et officium cursoris huic baccalario debeat congrue convenire potestis convincere specialiter ex duobus, viz., ex nominis expositione, et ex corporis dispositione." In reverting to an expositio nominis, Holcot alludes to the heuristic technique employed more seriously, e.g., in the Sentences question we edit here (our lines 852, 936-976). 36 Ibid.: "Nomen enim suum in vulgari estRoger. In quo quidem nomine duae bestiae designantur quae inter animalia communia inveniuntur cursui magis apta, viz., caprea et canis. Ro enim anglice, latine dicitur 'caprea', et ipsum totum vocabulum quod est 'Roger' canibus convenit per appelationem. ... (p. 223) Sed certe cursor iste futurus est fortis canis et pinguis, in tantum quod si homines de Derham eum pridie ... habuissent."

14

INTRODUCTION

species of runners in Roger's cognomen, Gosford, construed as a ford (vadurri) for a goose (aucae}. Given such an understanding of the name, Holcot proposes, "this racer will swim in the depths of theology without peril and run in the plains without stumbling."3" If Holcot tells us that his successor is likely to be successful in the race for Theology's favors, he also employs a gospel verse from John to insinuate that another Dominican and fellow cursor has already bedded her: And although this year two from the house of the [Friars] Preachers raced together in reading the Sentences, nevertheless the other disciple — who is named Gra. — enjoyed her favor, because he had the university's grace for terminating his lectures quickly, so that he raced ahead, in accord with what [we read in] John 20, "two ran together, and the other disciple ran ahead more quickly than Peter, and /^arrived earlier at the monument," that is, to o the time and place of resting.

37 Ibid., p. 223: "Ita iste cursor in profundis theologiae natabit sine periculo et in planis curret sine offendiculo. Et hoc in suo cognomine denotatur. Dicitur enim de Gosford, hoc est, de 'vado aucae'. Sic ergo patet quod tarn ex nomine (i.e. Roger) quam ex cognomine, inventus est idoneus ad currendum." The latinization of Gosford establishes that Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 96, and Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 350, were correct in preferring it to A.B. Emden's reading of the name as "Gofford," A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-1959), 2: 794, which will not yield a goose. Smalley, "Robert Holcot," p. 10, noticed (and repeated in English Friars, p. 135) that Holcot managed in his Wisdom commentary to explain his own name by punning on two biblical texts, "Dominus petra mea et robur meum (n Reg. xxii, 2)," which opens his commentary, and "Columba mea in foraminibus petrae (Cant, ii, 14)." So, Holcot explains, "Hec sunt autem foramina domuncule sive case, in quibus iuxta cognominis mei sensum debeo conversari; ita cognomen habeo a 'foramine case' datum. Et ideo sicut nomen meum in robore, ita cognomen meum intueor in foramine petre; igitur sacre scripture foramen ingressus rogabo." This text allows Holcot to suggest a petrine power to his theological talent, for "Robert," taken as a form of the Latin robur, alludes to the strength of stone (petra), and "Holcot" translates as a hole (or window) in a cottage (casa, domuncula). We have emended the text Smalley quotes by Cambridge, Trinity College MS B.2.25, fol. 2ra (mg: attribution to Holcot); Paris, Bibliotheque nationale lat. 15885, fol. 2ra, and lat. 16792, fol. Ivb. 38 Wey, ed., "Sermo finalis," p. 221: "Et licet de domo Praedicatorum isto anno in lectura Sententiarum cucurrerunt duo simul, ille tamen alius discipulus, qui Gra. nominatur, usus favore, quia gratiam Universitatis de cito terminandis lectionibus habuit, citius praecucurrit iuxta illud lo. 20, currebant duo simul, et ille alius discipulus praecucurrit citius Petro, et venitprior ad monumentum, i.e., ad quiescendi tempus et locum. Ego autem communi potitus iustitia, laboribus non peperci, statum tempus implevi, et multiplicem cursum feci inter omnes, ut aestimo, qui hie vel alibi cursu consimili cucurrerunt." (Underlining marks our emendation of Wey's text.)

INTRODUCTION

15

Holcot presumably intended that his readers recognize a quotation from John as particularly appropriate for referring to a confrere so named. That Holcot indeed had such a Dominican colleague named John whose cognomen could be abbreviated as "Gra/Cra" is suggested by a recently discovered scribal ascription of questions to "John called Crafton of the English Order of Preachers."39 This John Crafton would also seem to be the Grafton whom Adam Wodeham names as one of three colleagues who have attacked the views on the soul's capacity for grace

advanced in his own initial lecture on the first book of the Sentences.

Philological considerations render unlikely the hypothesis of earlier scholars that the name "Crafton" or "Grafton" was a scribal variant for Crathorn (or, on some spellings, Crawthorn). In the first place, the fact that the first syllable is spelled Craf-, Gra-, and Graph-, indicates that its pronunciation follows that of the English word spelled "draft." Thus, fourteenth-century natives of England, as the scribes who copied Hoicot's Sermo finalis clearly were, would not readily have confused this syllable with either "Cra-" or "Craw-" since neither ends with a sound

39 Wien, ONE MS lat. 5460, has two rubrics in different hands on fol. 32ra: one, deleted, reading "incipit quodlibet fratris lohannis dicti Crafton Anglici ordinis fratrum predicatorum"; the other: "quodlibet lohannis Crafton ordinis fratrum predicatorum anglici." Of the subsequent questions, only the first ("Utrum expuris naturalibus homo possit habere certam cognitionem de aliqua veritate") and the second ("Utrum Deus cognoscat distincte omnia quae potest producere"), which has an internal cross-reference (fol. 33vb) back to the first, can be securely attributed to Crafton until further evidence emerges as to the author(s) of the eight questions intervening between this and Crathorn's Sentences questions on fol. 40rb (see above, n. 20). It is also possible that Grafton is the "Grantion" cited by the anonymous author of the first commentary in Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 986, for which see Tachau, "French Theology." 40 Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis, 2, q.5 (Paris, Bibliotheque Mazarine MS 915, fol. 145ra); see below, p. 20. Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," pp. 341, 346, was evidently influenced by Michalski and Wey when he decided that the name "Grauton" (or, as Wey read the text, "Granton") was a scribal rendering of Crathorn's name. Schepers further suggested Edmund de Grafton, and rejected the possibility that Holcot and Wodeham referred to the same socius. In returning to the problem, Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 106-109, successfully ruled out Edmund and reopened the possibility that Grafton was socius to both Holcot and Wodeham.

16

INTRODUCTION

that they could have spoken as an "f."41 Even more unlikely for such an Englishman was confusion between the common toponyms -ton and -thorn (-J)orn). For fourteenth-century German speakers, however, spelling would not have guided pronunciation in the same way, and confusion not only could have arisen, but it apparently did.42 As further grounds for rejecting the supposition that Grafton and Crathorn refer to the same man, we note that those of Grafton's arguments which Adam Wodeham reproduces do not appear in Crathorn's work (nor, in fact, does Crathorn seem anywhere to know Wodeham's views).43 The Dates ofHolcot's Sentences and Quodlibetal Questions With the clue that like Wodeham, Holcot refers here to John Grafton rather than to William Crathorn,44 we are now in a position to use the information from the Sermofinalis for the reconstruction of an absolute

41 Of the two copies (neither the exemplar) of the Sermofinalis, Oxford, Oriel College MS 15 reads (fol. 204va) Ga; London, BL MS Royal lO.C.vi (fol. 137va) reads Gra. In addition to the reference to "Grafton" (written Grafton and, fol. 169va, G~fton) in the Wodeham MS cited in the preceding note, the name "Graphton" appears fully written out in the margin of Wodeham's Reportatio Oxoniensis 2, q.5 (Vaticano, BAY MS Vat lat. 1110, fol. 21r). Few references to Crathorn in these particular manuscripts are any more complete; thus, e.g. in the "Sex articuli" Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138 reports in its margins (fols. 95v, 97r-v, 99r) Craw. (Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 69rb and 70rb mg. does report Crathon). These manuscripts were all written by Englishmen (as we judge from the hands). 42 The scribe who copied Grafton's and Crathorn's questions into Wien, ONB MS lat. 5460 was not a native of England, and may have been German; hence, we should read the attribution (fol. 54rb) of the Sentences questions of Crathorn to "Cracon vel Chrastharn," as a scribal confusion. 43 As Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 101, first pointed out; see also Katherine H. Tachau, "Wodeham, Crathorn, and Holcot: The Development of the complexe significabile," in Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchebnans, ed. by L.M. de Rijk and H.A.G. Braakhuis (Nijmegen, 1987), p. 172. 44 The identification of Crathorn and Grafton is further ruled out by the fact that different first names are attributed to them. Zofia Wlodek, "Hermann d'Augsbourg et ses 'Quaestiones de quodlibet' dans le ms BJ 748" Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 6 (1960), 13-14, first discovered in Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska MS 748, col. 194 mg., that Crathorn's forename was William (and not John); Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 352, found confirming references in Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236.

INTRODUCTION

17

chronology of Sentences lectures at Oxford in the early 1330s. Holcot tells us explicitly that (a) bachelors are required to lecture on the Sentences for two years, and that (b) in the academic year in which he had finished his own two-year course of lectures, the Dominicans had two lecturers. We have further inferred that the second lecturer was not Crathorn when Holcot delivered this speech. The Dominicans seem, then, to have supported two Oxford lecturers on the Sentences, their terms staggered as follows: 1330-1331, Crathorn (first of two years) and an unknown bachelor (second of two years); 1331-1332, Holcot (first of two years) and Crathorn (second of two years); 1332-1333, Grafton (first and only year) and Holcot (second of two years); 1333-1334, Gosford (first of two years), possibly alone rather than with an unknown bachelor to replace the departing Grafton. On this chronology, Holcot's "Sex articuli" were written in the summer before or at the beginning of his second year as sententiarius. Such timing may seem worrisome if we suppose that these articles were intended as a work altogether separate from the questions on the Sentences; it is more likely, however, that when composing these articles Holcot expected to append them to some question. After all, at least once in a question belonging indisputably to book 3 of the Sentences, "Utrum films Dei potuit incarnari," Holcot offers an explanation of the origin of its articles similar to the opening words of the "to articuli": Thus it has been argued regarding this question. Now are introduced articles on the basis of which a certain colleague subtly replies against some [of my] statements; hence there are eight articles which we have discussed back and forth between us.45

The Franciscan, William Chitterne, whose arguments Holcot here incorporated, was also the disputant to whom Holcot responded in the fifth of his "Sex articuli." Whatever their origin, Holcot surely wrote these "Sex articuir in stages, as differences between those manuscripts

45 Holcot, Sent. 3 q.l (Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138, fol. 70v): "Ad istam questionem sic est argutum. Nunc articuli introducentur super quos socius quidam subtiliter replicat contra quedam dicta (mea), unde 8 sunt articuli quos replicando discutimus inter nos." That this is the first question on book 3 is clear from the marginal note which Schepers discovered in Paris, BN MS lat. 3115. Four manuscripts of Holcot's Sentences credit the socius' arguments to the Franciscan, William Chitterne; see Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," p. 342; see also below, at pp. 50-53. There is no known copy of Chitterne's Sentences lectures.

18

INTRODUCTION

recording four articles and those reporting six (but containing fewer) reveal. Such disparity between articles announced when a question is outlined and those actually extant is not limited to this text, but may also be found in other Sentences questions, indicating that Holcot never completely shaped his Sentences lectures into an ordinatio, that is, a thoroughly revised written "edition."47 His intentions were not always clear to his medieval scribes; moreover, Dominican works such as Holcot's were often distributed in unbound quires for copying, thus guaranteeing their rapid diffusion.48 As a result, a manuscript tradition was generated which disordered his Sentences questions, but the interruption of the sequence of questions on books 3 and 4 by the "Sex articuli" nevertheless suggests that these articles were initially part of the Sentences questions.49

46 As examples of the varying number of articuli in the "Sex articuli" to be found among codices of Holcot's Sentences listed below on pp. 36-38: Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236 (fol. 107rb) states "quattuor sunt articuli"; San Marino, Huntington Library HM 27187 (fol. 77ra) begins "quinque sunt articuli"; Oxford, Merton College MS 113 (fol. 69vb) shares Corpus Christi's reading (fol. 95v) "sex sunt articuli"; Paris, BN MS lat. 3115 states "sex sunt articuli," but omits the fourth and sixth of the announced articles. 47 So, for example, Holcot sets forth the following outline at the divisio quaestionis of Sent. 1, q.3, "Utrum viator teneatur frui solo Deo" (Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138, fol. 21r): "Circa istam questionem sic est procedendum: primo (articulo) inquiram quedam circa actum utendi; secundo inquiram quosdam articulos circa fruitionem vie; et tertio quedam circa fruitionem patrie ; quarto solvam quasdam dubitationes et quinto dicam ad rationes principales. Circa primam (partem) de actu utendi erunt tres breves articuli." When, however, Holcot arrives at the end of his discussion of fruition in this life, the text reads (fol. 26r): "Tertius articulus iuxta ordinem premissum in principio responsionis deberet esse de fruitione patrie, quern articulum differo usque ad finem quarti (libri)." This deferral of an announced article indicates that Holcot had sufficiently begun revising as to determine which materials to shift from their position as delivered, but had not proceeded far enough to eradicate such traces of the original location as we find here. For further discussion of the revision of the Sentences questions, as exemplified in the text we have edited, see below, pp. 45-46. 48 For a discussion of methods of text dissemination, see below, pp. 30, 33-35. 49 Thus, e.g., the "Sex articuli" occur at the end of book 4, and immediately precede the question "Utrum finale premium" in Pembroke; within book 4, just before the question "Utrum quilibet sacerdos" in Huntington Library, Merton, and Munchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 27033; at the end of the entire Sentences questions in Munchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 4400; and after an index completing all four books, but before the question "Utrum angeli confirmati" in Praha, Narodni knihovna CR (Universitni knihovna) MS XIII.F. 19. (For the full titles of these questions, see our Appendix 2, below.)

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19

In any event, after Holcot finished lecturing on the Sentences he was required to lecture on the Bible and, in the capacity of bacccdaureus biblicus, produced questions on Matthew, as Courtenay has shown.50 These Holcot structured on lines similar to both his Quodlibetal and his Sentences questions, among which the biblical questions eventually became interspersed as the manuscript tradition evolved. In addition to those Courtenay and Gelber disentangled from the surrounding Quodlibetal questions,51 a further question (sometimes labelled "Determinatio 2"), "Utrum viae vivendae quas Christus docuit sint meritoriae," appears to have been inspired by Matthew 5-6.52 Concerned with the possibility of living a completely meritorious life, this question quotes verbatim from the Sentences lectures given at Oxford by Adam Wodeham, the prologue to which (preserved as an ordinatid) contains a controversial analogy comparing the human soul's capacity to a vase miraculously filled. Our reading of Holcot's Sentences questions confirms Courtenay's judgment that, when discussing the same problem of the soul's capacity, no earlier awareness of Wodeham's example is evident, so that the question

50 William J. Courtenay, "The Lost Matthew Commentary of Robert Holcot O.P.," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 50 (1980), 103-112. Smalley, English Friars, pp. 135, 139-143, incorrectly assumed that Holcot's Sentences lectures and those on the biblical books of Wisdom, Prophets, and Matthew all were produced by Holcot while he served as regent master. 51 In addition to Courtenay, "Matthew Commentary," see Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 17-22. 52 Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fols. 160vb-165va; Oxford, Balliol College MS 246, fols. 219va-225rb. Except for the first two questions of the first Quodlibet (as numbered by Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, p. 117), few share the unusual length of this one. Several occupy no more than three or four manuscript columns, even if a few extend to two folios. Gelber (pp. 18-22) suggested that this "Determinatio" belonged to Holcot's first Quodlibet, but an argument can be made that it belongs among his biblical questions, even though the question title lacks an explicit reference to the book of Matthew. Some questions which Courtenay identified as part of Holcot's lectures on Matthew name the evangelist in the title, as e.g. "Utrum doctrina evangelica beati Matthaei de Christo sit generaliter tota vera"; most, however, contain no such explicit reference (whether by name or by chapter) even though their contents would readily be provoked by the specific verses of Matthew to which Courtenay points. Since, as Courtenay suggests, "Matthew Commentary," Holcot devoted several questions to chapters 1-3 and 6, it would be surprising not to find discussion of the "Sermon on the Mount" recorded in chapters 5-6.

20

INTRODUCTION

"Utrum viae vivendae" constitutes the earliest mention in Holcot's work of his debate with his Franciscan colleague.53 On the other hand, by the time Wodeham lectured on book 2 of the Sentences, he had already disputed related issues with Holcot, and there recorded the debate.54 Elsewhere in book 2, Wodeham cites Grafton, mentioning that he had begun to lecture on the Bible.55 Taken together, these citations from Holcot and Wodeham are consistent with the following relative chronology: Holcot's second year of lecturing on the Sentences, which was Grafton's only year, was also Wodeham's first year. Thus, even in his first lecture, Wodeham could have known and attacked Holcot's views, but not vice versa. Moreover, if Wodeham's questions on book 2 date from his second year as sententiarius, by then both Grafton and Holcot would have had time to take up their duties as baccalaureus biblicus;56 they would also have had time to develop responses to Wodeham's lectures on book 1, such as are reflected in Holcot's second and fourth "Determinations." This relative chronology involves three problems: (1) the description of certain questions as "Determinations" in the Lyon edition of 1497; (2) the

53 Courtenay,/4c?am Wodeham, pp. 103n-104n, provides a transcription of Wodeham's analogy and Holcot's citation of it. The copyist of Pembroke MS 236 noted (fol. 162rb, margin) that the arguments come from "Wodham." 54 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 102n-103n, for Wodeham's verbatim citation in Ord. Oxon. 2, q.6, of Holcot's "Determinate 4." Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 19-23, tentatively assigns this "Determination" to Holcot's first Quodlibet. 55 Wodeham, Ord. Oxon. 2, q.5 (Paris, Bibl. Mazarine MS 915, fol. 145ra): "In ista questione primo repetam positionem et positionis meae prime lectionis primi libri rationes cum 9 argumentis trium sociorum in contrarium, scilicet Carmelite, Skeltonis, et Graftonis; secundo reducam rationem positionis meae contra duos primos socios et incidenter contra quartum dicentem quod nullus auget meritum vel gratiam nisi per opera supererogationis et supermuneratis ... (fol. 145vb) Item, alius socius in principio lectionis sue Biblie arguit contra me, primo contra illud quod dixeram, quod anima repleta cognitione ... ." These passages from the ordinatio of Wodeham's Oxford lectures are already found in his Reportatio Oxon. 2, q.5 (Vaticano, BAV MS Vat. lat. 1110, fols. 20r, 21r) where the second (attributed in the margin to "Graphton") reads: "Item, alius socius arguit contra illud quod dixi, quod anima repleta cognitione ... ." For these and other references to Grafton, see Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 106-107. 56 Above, pp. 15-16; this corrects the assumption in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, p. 275, that Wodeham began his Oxford Sentences lectures in Holcot's first year as baccalaureus sententiarius.

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21

distribution of Wodeham's lectures between his first and second years as baccalaureus sententiarius; and (3) the dating of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions. The label "Determination" can designate either an entire Quodlibetal disputation, that is, both the first day's debate and the subsequent magisterial resolution, or the latter alone.57 Whichever was intended by the redactors of the Lyon edition, the accuracy of their label "Determination," unsubstantiated by any ascription in surviving manuscripts, is in every case open to doubt as a late, unreliable guess. The redactors were indubitably mistaken in the case of the question they published as the "eleventh Determination," which is found among Holcot's Quodlibetal questions in Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236. There, however, as Wey noticed, a marginal notation identifies it as a "question concerning the second book" of the Sentences.5* Like the question "de obiecto actus credendi," which modern scholars have generally deemed to belong to Holcot's prologue to the Sentences, the eleventh "Determination" is instead that part of a "Principial" exercise (Principium) known as a quaestio collativa.59

57 For recent discussion and guides to earlier literature, see: Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, p. 8; Zenon Kaluza, "La Nature des ecrits de Jean de Ripa," Traditio 43 (1987), 257-298, esp. pp. 291-292; and the Bazan and Wippel articles cited in n. 13, above. 58 Joseph Wey, private correspondence to Gelber, December 6, 1982. See Pembroke College MS 236, fol. 215rb, mg: "questio de 2o libra." Fritz Hoffmann, Die Theologische Methode des Oxforder DominikanerlehrersRobert Holcot, BGPThM, n.f. 5 (1972), p. 401, quotes the beginning of the question from the Lyon text: "Circa principium secundi libri, in quo arguitur de causalitate dei respectu creaturae, quaero istam quaestionem: Utrum deus est causa effectiva omnium aliorum a se"; in Pembroke, the first word is "Utrum." In addition to the Lyon editors' mistaken inclusion of the quaestio collativa on book 2 of the Sentences, there is equally incontrovertible evidence of untrustworthiness in their inclusion (as the first "Determinatio") of a question by Roger Rosetus; cf. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 18-19, and Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 120-121. If Courtenay, "Matthew Commentary," p. 109, is correct, then the thirteenth and fifteenth "Determinations" are also mislabelled, belonging instead to Holcot's biblical lectures. In short, for at least four of the fifteen questions, we have reason to reject the Lyon editors' label. 59 For the full title of "de obiecto actus credendi," see Appendix 2, below. On Principia (and their division into a collatio and quaestio collativa) at Paris in the mid-fourteenth century, see Kaluza, "Jean de Ripa," p. 260; on "principial lectures" at Oxford, see Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 172-177.

22

INTRODUCTION

To modern scholars, such Principia are of great importance not only fo conveying their authors' thought, but for the light they cast upon the debates of an entire academic generation. After all, bachelors were expected to debate their fellows during the cycle of quaestiones collativae they produced over the course of the four Principia which opened the lectures on each book of the Sentences. Yet, the very focus upon the arguments of fellow bachelors rather than upon more generally established and venerable authorities may have made this particular scholarly exercise too topical for most potential medieval readers. For whatever reason, Principia tended to be copied more rarely than the rest of a scholar's lectures on the Sentences; so, for example, only one of FitzRalph's survives, and then in only one of the codices preserving his opus correctum.60 Hence, the paucity of extant copies of Holcot's Principia relative to the rest of his questions on the Sentences provides no grounds for dismissing the possibility that the second and fourth "Determinations" are the missing Principia to the third and fourth books of the Sentences; it is also possible that the second is a question from Holcot's Matthew commentary. On all the available evidence, however, it is unlikely that either "Determination" actually derives from his Quodlibetal disputations. If we should reject the first assumption about the appropriateness of the label "Determinatio" given in the Lyon edition, several factors support the second hypothesis, namely, that Wodeham lectured at Oxford on the Sentences during the two academic years 1332-1333 and 13331334, and that he devoted his initial year entirely to questions on the first book. Not least of these is the fact that its thirty-six questions equal the combined number of those on books 2-4.61 Second, Wodeham's stint

60 FitzRalph's "Fluminis impetus laetificat civitatem Dei (Ps. 45: 5). Postquam primus parens noster" is preserved in Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, fol. Ira-va — one of the few manuscripts to give us Holcot's Principia (see Tachau, "FitzRalph's Commentary," forthcoming). New research promises to expand our knowledge of surviving Principia, as have, for example, Michael Shank, "Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand. " Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, 1988), esp. pp. 204219; Kahiza, "Jean de Ripa"; Tachau, "Looking Gravely." 61 See the lists of questions in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 187-198, which include twelve questions each for books 2-4 of the Sentences. In not assigning Wodeham's lectures on books 1 and 2 to the same academic year, we hereby modify the arguments offered by Courtenay (p. 169). While we do not here propose to recalculate Wodeham's curriculum vitae entirely, nevertheless some expknation is due for revising the decisions of Courtenay, who concluded with considerable misgiving (pp. 166-171) that Wodeham's lectures at Oxford were interrupted by a year at London.

INTRODUCTION

23

as a bachelor must have included at least some part of the year 1332,

Courtenay's hypothesis faces several difficulties. The first, as he appreciated (p. 170), is the lack of evidence that other mendicant scholars were similarly deflected by their superiors from orderly completion of their biennium as baccalaureus sententiarius at a stadium generate to lecture at one of the order's lesser stadia. Second, such an interruption would have placed a bachelor at a distinct disadvantage in the ongoing debates with his colleagues. His absence would have rendered him ill informed and, hence, less able to respond well to any arguments his socii had advanced against him in the intervening year. We wonder how this prospect could be appealing either to Wodeham — whose debates with Chatton, FitzRalph, Grafton, and Skelton continue through all four books — or to his order. Third, it is as hard to reconcile with the statutory requirement that a sententiarius read all four books during his bachelor lectures (above, p. 12), as with the evidence that there was competition within the Franciscan order for the opportunity to read at Oxford. If, however, as Courtenay worried (p. 170), Wodeham did not at Oxford refer to his London lectures before book 3, we note the equally remarkable absence of references to Oxford debates of the early 1330s in those questions of the Lectura secunda which reproduce his London lectures. Does this not imply that these preceded Wodeham's Oxford teaching? Surely, the Franciscan order's educational purposes would not have been well served by a scholar who, fresh from the stadium generale, informed his students of none of the current debates there. Against the expectation that Wodeham's lectures at Oxford were uninterrupted, Courtenay noticed (pp. 168, 171n) Wodeham's explanation for beginning his Oxford lectures on book 3 at distinction 14: "circa istum librum tertium, quia alias Londoniae toto anno pertractavi quaestiones 13 primarum distinctionum, ideo nunc incipio a distinctione 14" (Cf. Paris, Bibl. Mazarine MS 915, fol. 169rb). Perhaps Wodeham hoped that his Oxford audience would accept his omission of lectures on thirteen distinctions; perhaps he knew that a copy of his London lectures was available to opponents preparing their counterarguments; perhaps he merely stated why he proposed to cite earlier lectures without troubling (or paying) to recopy them into the Ordinatio. None of these readings requires any assumptions as to when the questions on dd. 1-13 were actually composed or delivered, nor does Wodeham explicitly state or even imply that the year at London was (as Courtenay thought, p. 168) immediately prior to the year in which he "began on distinction 14." Moreover, against Courtenay's interpretation is the further information Wodeham supplies one folio later in the same question, Ord. Oxon. 3, d.14, q.l (Mazarine MS 915, fol. 170va): "Item 16 potest sic argui, sicut fecit anno praeterito quidam baccalarius, in hiis mediis fundans se(ntentiam), quae hie sequitur: essentia divina sufficientissime repraesentat omnia cognoscibilia et ipsa est ita intima ... et ita praesens intellectui create sicut alia similitude aliqua. Igitur ipsa poterit esse similitude qua creatura formaliter cognoscit" (our italics). As Courtenay discovered (p. 20, n. 37; p. 91, n. 188), the arguments that Wodeham's colleague had made correspond to those of his unnamed Benedictine colleague as recorded in Wodeham's Ord. Oxon. prologue, q.2 (Mazarine MS 915, fol. 8rb-va; Vaticano, BAY MS Vat. lat. 955, fol. 13r-v) and Ord. Oxon. 2, q.8 (Mazarine MS 915, fol. 159va-vb). For the present, then, our redating may offer the virtue of relative simplicity.

24

INTRODUCTION

according to the date given in the sole manuscript witness to the reportatio of Wodeham's Oxford lectures: And thus is finished the fourth book of brother Adam Wodeham, doctor in Theology, who read at Oxford in AD 1332.62

This explicit does not state which book(s) Wodeham read in 1332 and so is consistent with our dating. Moreover, it permits Wodeham to have engaged in renewed debate with Walter Chatton, even if it requires that we grant Wodeham the last word after his senior confrere had £*1 departed for Avignon. On this dating, too, Wodeham's discussion of FitzRalph's views — including reference to his biblical question64 — is far from undermined. Rather, FitzRalph's views on divine reward and punishment for meritorious and sinful action can be seen not only as the spark which ignited Wodeham's and Holcot's debates, but the stance which brought prominence sufficient to assist his own election as chancellor in

62 Vaticano, BAV MS Vat. lat. 1110, fol. 135v: "Et sic finitur quartus liber fratris Adae Wodeham, doctoris in theologia, qui legit Oxoniae anno Domini MCCCXXXH," quoted and discussed in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 14-15. We also note that our dating satisfies the further requirement that Wodeham have completed his lectures before the end of 1334, given his references to Pope John xxn as living (idem, pp. 15-17, 172). 63 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 167n, cites arguments against Chatton from Wodeham, Ord. Oxon. 4, q.5, including: "Tamen nota quod ipse post, (i.e.) tempore magisterii sui, posuit in Determinatione quam et ego ipse tune, sicut et priora alias audivi dum legit Sententias ..." (our corrections, from Mazarine MS 915, fol. 216ra). Thus, Wodeham's ordinatio version of this question was composed after Chatton had ceased to be regent master; moreover, this Determination is evidently the one to which Wodeham refers at Ord. Oxon. 3, d. 14, q. 11 as occurring after he had propounded his own views at London (Courtenay, pp. 72n, 167n). Yet, Wodeham's remarks (p. 73) inform us neither as to how much time separated his from Chatton's arguments, nor how many stages their debate on the continuum involved. Hence, even if Wodeham's rebuttal of Chatton does not require Courtenay's inference (p. 73) "that Chatton was present in Oxford while Wodeham was lecturing on book HI of the Sentences," our chronology nevertheless does not conflict with it. After all, on Courtenay's calculation (pp. 67, 70), Chatton was probably at Oxford from the 1329-1330 academic year through 1331-1332. He had arrived in Avignon by January 1333 — when, on our reckoning, Wodeham was beginning to lecture on book 3. 64 FitzRalph's biblical question was discovered by Jean-Francois Genest, and has been edited by him in the work cited below, n. 118.

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1332.65 Finally, if we recall that Wodeham was not the only Franciscan bachelor with whom Holcot debated, then, in the absence of other evidence that (in the manner of the Dominicans) the Franciscans supported two sententiarii at Oxford in each academic year, we should infer that one succeeded the other. When, in the "Sex articuli" and the questions on the third book of the Sentences, Holcot answered the objections posed to his own earlier claims by the Franciscan, William Chitterne, he gave no sign of knowing Wodeham's views. Hence, we may conclude that Chitterne lectured on the Sentences before Wodeham and at the same time as Holcot; only after the latter's first year of lectures did Wodeham begin.66 The third assumption needing support is the assignment of Holcot's (and Crathorn's) Quodlibetal disputes to the year 1333-1334 — that is, as soon as Holcot, at least, had barely discharged his duties as a bachelor of the Bible. Such a speedy advance to the magisterium has seemed improbably rapid to some scholars, among them Courtenay, who has proposed instead that at Oxford bachelors as well as masters of Theology determined Quodlibetal disputations. The strongest evidence that this was so is to be found in Holcot's own words, at the outset of his second Quodlibef. In [our] disputation de quolibet ten questions were proposed by colleagues (socii) in addition to the two that I proposed.67

As historians have often noted, the term "socius" (colleague) was one a bachelor might apply to another bachelor. Even so, the possibility that Holcot's and Crathorn's Quodlibetal questions were presented by newly promoted masters of Theology cannot be excluded on the basis of the term socius, since the precision it offers for establishing chronology is not in fact absolute. While mere are as yet no known instances in which a master of Theology referred to another master in such terms, we do know that a reference to a fellow scholar as socius insufficiently establishes that both namer and named are at precisely the same stage of their careers. After all, as 65 Perhaps the patronage of John Grandisson, bishop of Exeter, was sufficent to secure FitzRalph's election (see Walsh, Richard FitzRalph, pp. 64-70). Nevertheless, one consequence of our redating is that FitzRalph becomes the earliest of the disputants whose views on these issues have been preserved. 66 On the stages of the debate with Chitterne, see pp. 49-53 below. 67 London, BL MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 152rb: "In disputatione de quolibet proponebantur a sociis 10 quaestiones praeter duas quas proposui ego ipse," discussed in Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 3-4; Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 99nlOOn; Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 45.

26

INTRODUCTION

Courtenay has pointed out, a baccalaureus sententiarius in the first term of his Sentences lectures could consider a bachelor who had begun a year earlier as much a socius as one who had already been promoted to lecture on the Bible. In this way, Crathorn, Grafton, and Wodeham could all be colleagues in Holcot's eyes. Thus, we cannot be certain that the scholarly cohort who began to debate each other in the opening years of the decade inevitably ceased to refer to one of their number as socius upon his promotion beyond their ranks to the magisterium.68 Still, we can read Holcot's references to his socii in another light, by recalling that, as a "formed bachelor," Holcot had a statutory obligation to take part in theological disputations — including Quodlibetal debates — both as opponent and respondent.69 Thus, he need not have been a master of Theology at the time of participating in the debates recorded as "his" Quodlibetal questions. However unusual it may have been for a bachelor to have preserved and edited (for his own purposes) the reportatio of the debate as it was argued before the magisterial determination, the evidence suggests that such efforts on Holcot's part lie behind the present questions. From their structure and content, at any rate, it is not clear that any of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions edited here or elsewhere either constitutes or includes a magisterial determination, nor does any of the three manuscript witnesses so instruct us.70 True, a few questions also appear in the Lyon edition as "Determinations," but as we have seen, there are no grounds for supposing that this otherwise unreliable rubric is in these instances to be trusted.'* If instead we recognize that these Quodlibetal questions are not magisterial 68 On the term "socius," see e.g., Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," pp. 342-343; Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 89-90. Our chronology is also compatible with the hints as to the date of composition that Smalley, "Robert Holcot," pp. 18-23, and English Friars, pp. 138-142, perceived in Holcot's lectures on the books of Prophets and Wisdom. 69 Holcot himself refers to this requirement in his Scriptwn in Sapientiam, lectio 33/32 (Paris, BN MSS lat. 15885, fol. 44vb; lat. 16792, fol. 29ra; Vaticano, BAV MSS Ottob. lat. 357, fol. 28ra; Ottob. lat. 215, fol. 38va): "Tertio examinatur electus sicut bachelarius ad magistrationem; iste enim antequam incipiat probatur in tribus modis: in legendo, opponendo, et respondendo. Habent enim necessitate legere cursorie unum volumen sue facultatis ad minus, et nos certe legere debemus per confessionem volumen conscientie nostre. Stolidus clericus est qui nescit legere scripturam suam .... Secundo habemus opponere, hoc est, arguere per iustam correctionem proximorum, et hoc principaliter pertinet ad prelates ... . Tertio habemus respondere per gratiarum actionem ... et qui hec compleverit dignus est gradu magistral!." 70 See below, p. 28. 71 See above, pp. 21-22.

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"Determinations," then we also eliminate the grounds for worrying that they could not have occurred as early as 1333-1334. The above chronology, however, may face a further challenge, namely Schepers' decision that Holcot's Quodlibetal disputations occurred during the year 1332, a date garbled in the Lyon edition of Holcot's eleventh "Determination," where Michalski discovered it, but clear enough in the Pembroke manuscript.72 Schepers wrote, however, before this question had been recognized as the principial question for book 2.73 Hence, we instead gain further evidence that the academic years in which Holcot read the Sentences included 1332. If the above suggestions are correct, then we arrive at the following chronology: 1330-1331 1331-1332

1332-1333

1333-1334

Crathorn, first of two years as bachelor on the Sentences. FitzRalph, first year as regent master; Chitterne, Franciscan bachelor on the Sentences; Crathorn, second year as bachelor on the Sentences; Holcot, first of two years as bachelor on the Sentences. FitzRalph, second year as regent master and first as chancellor of the university; Crathorn, lectures on the Bible; Holcot, second year as bachelor on the Sentences (including ""Sex articuli"); Grafton, only year as bachelor on the Sentences; Wodeham, first year as bachelor on the Sentences, lecturing on book I.74 FitzRalph's third year as regent master and final year as chancellor; Holcot, Bible lectures and Quodlibetal disputes; Crathorn, Quodlibetal disputes with Holcot; Grafton, Bible lectures; Wodeham, second year as bachelor on the Sentences, lecturing on books 2-4.

72 Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," pp. 351-352; but see the discussion in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 99n. 73 See above, p. 21. 74 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 75. Walsh, Richard FitzRalph, p. 70, remarks that Bishop Burghersh of Lincoln, confirming FitzRalph's election as chancellor of the university, referred to him on 30 May 1332 as "actualiter nunc regenti." Thanks to legislation enacted at Oxford in 1322 after John LutterelTs disastrous chancellorship, FitzRalph's term was limited to two years, during which statutes also required that he remain a master actually regent. Our redating of Wodeham's lectures vis-a-vis FitzRalph's period as chancellor requires that we farther weaken the arguments from silence noted in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 77.

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INTRODUCTION HOLCOT'S QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS ON FUTURE CONTINGENTS

The Manuscripts The principal task of the present volume is to make available a critical text of the four questions concerning future contingents from Holcot's third Quodlibetal disputation. His Quodlibetal questions survive in three manuscripts, all written in English hands of the fourteenth century: B = Oxford, Balliol College MS 246 P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236 R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi The Balliol manuscript has been described by Mynors, who notes that it entered that college's library in the fifteenth century as the gift of Richard Rotherham, master of Balliol College in 1429 and chancellor of Oxford a decade later. This parchment manuscript of 271 folios measuring 10% x 8 J 4 inches, with two columns of 35-60 lines per page, was written by several "current English hands," in Mynors' terms. In addition to Holcot's Quodlibetal disputations (quires xvi-xxii, generally 60 lines to the column), the codex also contains Henry Totting of Oyta's questions on the Sentences (4 folios + quires i-xiv) and a commentary on Aristotle's parva naturalia (quire xv).75 Because each work commences a new gathering of quires, the presence of the latest work (evidently Oyta's) under the same covers as Holcot's cannot be used to date the copying of the latter work. The Pembroke manuscript has been catalogued by James, who, however, neglects to note that the "small close hand" of his description was an English one. Nor is it apparent to us why James has ascribed the hand to the fifteenth, rather than fourteenth century. The scribe wrote in a cursive book hand (littera textualis) on 181/2 vellum quires of 12 folios each, producing 221 + 3 folios of 1014 x 6% inches, in double columns of 62 lines each.76 75 R.A.B. Mynors, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College, Oxford (Oxford, 1963), pp. 267-268. 76 Montague Rhodes James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Pembroke College, Cambridge (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 212-213. The dating of this manuscript has also been queried by Richard E. Gillespie, "Robert Holcot's Quodlibeta," Traditio 27 (1971), 480-490. We have examined the manuscript, which has both medieval and modern enumeration of the folios (we follow the latter), and determined the following division of quires: i-xviii12, xix5. Some of the quires are labelled: xiii (fols. 145-156) = a; xiv (fols. 157-168) = c; xv (fols. 169-180) = d; xvi (fols. 181-192) = e; xvii (fols. 193-204) = f; xviii (fols. 205-216) = g; xix (fols. 217-221) = h.

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The British Library manuscript, described by Warner and Gilson, was written by more than one scribe in double columns of 66 lines each on 175 vellum folios of 13Vi x 914 inches, using quires of 12 leaves each. At the outset, a separate quire contains a logical treatise (also present in Oxford, Magdalen College MS 99) and a fragment from Nicole Oresme's De communicatione idiomatum77 There follow Holcot's works: his questions on the Sentences (fols. 7ra-136) including the principial exercise on book 1 (fols. 130va-131va) and "Sex articuli" (fols. 131va-136ra); his opening lecture on Matthew, "Jerusalem evangelistam dabo" (fols. 136ra-137ra); the Sermofinalis (fols. 137-138ra); a subject index to and a list of the questions on the Sentences (fols. 138rb-141vb); his Quodlibetal questions (fols. 141vb-172). The final two folios, in another hand, contain an extract from a larger work and another list of Holcot's questions.78 The manuscript's scribal hands, like its early owners and the reader who noted in the margins "lok her," were English and resemble others from the third quarter of the fourteenth century; the quires containing Holcot's texts were acquired by a Benedictine doctor of Theology, William Bourne, for his abbey at Gloucester.79

77 George F. Wamer and Julius P. Gilson, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections in the British Museum (London, 1921), 1: 327. We have examined the manuscript and confirmed the collation of quires: i6, ii-xv12, xvi1. See also: Neil Ripley Ker, Medieval Libraries of Great Britain. A List of Surviving Books, 2d. ed. (London, 1964), p. 92. Neither Gillespie, "Holcot's Quodlibeta," p. 484, nor Hoffmann, Theologische Methode, p. 409, correctly repeats Warner and Gilson's description of the contents of the first quire of this manuscript. 78 The numeration is modern, although several quires have folios numbered and quires labelled by the scribe, who also supplied catch words. The manuscript was carefully rebound in 1971, and our examination reveals that, after the initially separate first quire of six folios, none of the transitions from one work to the next corresponds to a change from one quire to another. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, p. 14, plausibly suggests that the extract on the final folios is also one of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions, but until its contents have been studied, such an identification must remain provisional. 79 The manuscript contains two inscriptions, one in the first quire, the other heading the first folio containing Holcot's Sentences questions (fol. 7r): "Liber monasterii S. Petri Glouc. ex adquisitionedom. Willelmi Boure eiusdem monasterii confratris cuius animam librum inspicientes deo specialius recommendent." For marginal notes in middle English, see, e.g., "lok her" (fol. 49rb), "lok" (fol. 50ra); for a similar English hand, dated to 1369, cf. plate 101 in S. Harrison Thompson, Latin Bookhands of the Later Middle Ages, 1100-1500 (Cambridge, 1969).

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The Relationship of the Manuscripts to Holcot's Intended Text Hester Gelber analyses the relationship of these three manuscripts in the introduction to her edition of three questions from Holcot's first Quodlibetal disputation.80 We follow her numeration of the questions we edit, and need not repeat her discussion at length, beyond remarking that the sequence and selection of questions differs from codex to codex, in part because each represents a distinct manuscript tradition. These almost certainly developed because the copies were made from unbound quires or peciae.^ From Royal we are able to derive some idea of Holcot' intended order for his record of the third Quodlibetal disputation: In the [third] Quodlibetal disputation, twenty-two questions were proposed, of which some concerned God, some concerned man, and some were [common] to both .... And so we considered] in God: [His] cognition of the divine essence within [Himself] and [His] revelation [of it] beyond [Himself], the operation of the divine power, [His] assumption of a human nature, and the manifestation of the divine Will through precepts and prohibitions. And, in keeping with these [topics], six questions, namely [concerning] the divine majesty, were asked. The first was whether one clearly seeing God sees all future contingents. The second was whether this inference is a necessary [one]: "God knows that A will be, therefore A will be" (letting A be a future contingent). The third was whether when some future contingent has been revealed it remains contingent after the revelation.82

80 Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 3-23, 113-117. 81 This is so regardless of how strictly scholarly communities in England adhered to the model described for Paris and Bologna by Jean Destrez, La "Pecia " dans les manuscrits universitaires du Xllle etdu XTVe siecle (Paris, 1935). In other words, that Holcot's texts circulated in unbound quires, and that Holcot prepared a text intended to make possible the production of an exemplar from which other copies would derive, are both consistent with prevailing practice in fourteenth-century England and with the internal evidence of the surviving codices, as we explain below, pp. 33-35, 41-46. 82 London, BL MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 157va (discussed in Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 6-7): "In disputatione (tertia) de quolibet proponebantur 22 quaestiones quarum quaedam erant de Deo, quaedam de homine, quaedam com{munes) ad utrumque .... In Deo namque considera(vi)mus divinae essentiae cognitionem ad intra et revelationem ad extra, divinae potentiae operationem, naturae humanae assumptionem et divinae voluntatis notificationem per praecepta et prohibitiones, et secundum ista, sex quaerebant(ur), scilicet quaestiones divinam maiestatem concement{es). Prima fuit ista: 'Utrum clare videns Deum videat omnia futura contingentia.' Secunda fuit: 'Utrum ista consequentia sit necessaria: Deus scit A fore, ergo A erit, et sit A unum futurum contingens.' Tertia fuit ista: 'Utrum facta revelatione alicuius futuri contingentis ipsum maneat contingens post revelationem.'"

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After these first three questions, however, none of the manuscripts preserves the sequence of questions that, on the witness of these introductory remarks, Holcot must have devised. Even in Royal, as Gelber has indicated, the fourth, fifth, and sixth questions of the third disputation are out of order, and the one we edit as the eighth, "Utrum generalis resurrectio necessario sit futura," appears in Royal as the seventh.83 Thus, although its organization supports the inference that, of the three known copies, Royal is generally closest to Holcot's own manuscript, divergences of this magnitude rule out the possibility that Royal is itself that autograph.84 Moreover, within the four questions we edit, Royal is not invariably the best guide to Holcot's editorial intentions. In the eighth question, Balliol and Royal share many misreadings and omissions, but so too do Balliol and Pembroke. Rarely, however, are Royal and Pembroke together wrong, and the latter is the most reliable (but not infallible) witness. Royal alone frequently provides a truncated rendering of an argument (as, e.g., at Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 434^38 or 525-542), drops an explanation (as at lines 444^56), omits words that only Royal's scribe finds illegible (as at lines 39, 191), or transposes part of a response to an argument (as at line 564, transposing from 477-521). And, in the rare case when Royal and Pembroke share a difficulty, the former is less reliable than the latter, as at line 22 of our text, where a reading is nearly omitted in Pembroke, but becomes a marginal correction, while Royal forgets it altogether. Nor is there any point hi question eight where the reverse relationship can be established — i.e., where Royal manages to retain by correction what Pembroke loses — as one might expect to find were Royal closer to Holcot's autograph. On occasion, Royal hypercorrects (as at line 425) where Balliol and Pembroke provide an unproblematic text. Where the eighth question is concerned, Pembroke's authority can also be established against Balliol (as at lines 335 and 380381). Still, Balliol, which omits premises by homoeoteleuton (at lines

83 For question 8, see Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, pp. 13-15. The connection between this question and the others of the third Quodlibetal disputation is also suggested by Holcot's decision in the third question (Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 67-68, below) to omit arguments treated "diffuse in quaestione: 'Utrum resurrectio generalis necessario sit futura,'" thereby referring his reader to the eighth question (esp. Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 253-400). 84 Michalski, "La physique nouvelle et les differents courants philosophiques au xrve siecle," Bulletin international de I'Academie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres, Classe d'histoire et de philosophic (Krakow, 1928), pp. 106-110, first argued that Royal preserved an ordinatio of Holcot's works; but see below, at nn. 86, 88, 95, 106.

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445-446 and 121-722), once does so together with Pembroke (at lines 72-73); moreover, they share a common contusion, substituting variously "Antichristum" and "ante Christum" where the example requires Royal's "Christum" (at line 345). At least one divergence of Royal from Balliol and Pembroke (at lines 612-617) can best be explained as representing two distinct stages in Holcot's thinking. On the basis of the third Quodlibetal disputation's second question, short as it is, one would reach quite different conclusions about the relationships of the manuscript witnesses to Holcot's original. Pembroke is most truncated and least reliable, and one could hardly derive a clear notion of the problems at issue by reading it alone. Balliol and Royal, though generally better, share common errors, as in the very title of the question (Quodl. 3, q.2, lin. 3), and each introduces an occasional error of its own (as Royal does at line 10 or Balliol, by omission, at lines 13-14). If we turn to the third question, we again find that Royal is generally more dependable than either Balliol or Pembroke. None of the manuscripts presents a complete text, at least as projected in the divisio quaestionis (Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 47-50). Both Balliol (at line 22) and Pembroke (at line 20) share omissions with Royal, which might imply that the latter was their common source; but if this were so, one could not readily explain the divergences at lines 26-29. Here Pembroke, as elsewhere in the question, omits several lines, including one clause, "supponit illud idem quod quaerit," present only in Balliol. Because this supplies the point that the subsequent argument endeavors to make, Royal's reading appears to be an omission by homoeoteleuton, indicating that the original source of the difficulty in these lines was a text that resembled Balliol more nearly than Royal. Yet Balliol, too, has several idiosyncratic readings and at least one omission by homoeoteleuton (lines 16-17); nevertheless, its solitary divergences are fewer and less radical than those of Pembroke. The latter truncates arguments presented in greater detail by Balliol and Royal (as at lines 26-32). Indeed, Pembroke offers a text sufficiently different from theirs (at lines 47-50) as to suggest again that two stages of Holcot's revision have been transmitted by these codices — a suggestion reinforced when Pembroke's text supplies an explanation entirely different from that in Balliol and Royal (at lines 72-77). This impression is even more pronounced in the first question, where Pembroke again supplies the greatest number of idiosyncratic errors. If Balliol and Royal each joins it on occasion in diverging from the text, Royal does so rarely, and of the three, proves the most reliable. Pembroke, by contrast, truncates ihedivisio quaestionis (Quodl. 3, q.l, lin. 15-17), omits

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qualifications (lines 35-36), condenses a reference to Aristotle (lines 37-40), or provides a more contusing formulation of an argument (lines 86-87). Stylistically, too, Pembroke's version of the first three questions of this disputation remains suggestive of a reportatio. Presumably, the first written record of Holcot's participation in these oral Quodlibetal disputations was such a reportatio. If these questions were to be disseminated as Holcot's own, the text would not only have required his reorganization but also his indication of how arguments rapidly noted by the reportator should be expanded for clarity, completeness, or congruence with opinions Holcot had elaborated elsewhere. So, for instance, in the first question of the third disputation, Holcot's plans are preserved where his reminder to himself — or, perhaps, to his amanuensis — has been copied into the text: Add here the thirteen arguments which are put [forth] in the lectures on the Sentences, and then put the opinion which [these arguments] support. And then [set forth] the ten arguments against that [opinion], and hold [i.e., as your own view] the second [opinion].86

Inasmuch as the note rather than the cited arguments appears at this point in all three manuscripts, we have at least prima facie evidence that none of them transmits a completed ordinafio. This fact may also enable us to explain the manner in which they differ among themselves, if we allow three assumptions, all consonant with what is known about scholarly book production hi the fourteenth century. Let us suppose first that the quires on

85 Even had statutes permitted that the several participants in debates bring notes with them, not all interventions from members of the audience qualified to raise queries, "doubts," and objections, could be anticipated. Hence, there could be no text reflecting the orally created argument and counterargument of a Quodlibetal debat prior to its occurrence; cf. Hamesse, "La transmission orale," p. 179. On reportationes more generally, see idem, "'Reportatio' et transmission de textes," in The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, ed. by Monika Asztalos, Acta universitatis stockholmiensis — Studia latina stockholmiensia, 30: 11-34 (Stockholm, 1986); idem, "'Collatio' et 'reportatio': deux vocable specifiques de la vie intellectuelle au moyen age," in Actes du colloque Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au moyen age. Leyde, La Haye 20-21 septembre 1985, ed. by Olga Weijers, Etudes sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen age (Turnhout, 1988), 1: 78-87. 86 Below, pp. 65-66 at lines 151-153. Although these commands might be construed as directed by Holcot at an amanuensis rather than at himself, the instruction to hold a particular opinion seems to the present writer to preclude the former construction.

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which Holcot made his corrections ("autograph") were copied by an amanuensis in an effort to produce a fair copy for circulation (the "apograph"). Let us assume further that the scribe who produced the apograph had difficulty following the author's intended revisions, so that they were not invariably incorporated into the text. Finally, let us suppose that both the autograph and apograph were simultaneously available unbound for copying, thus functioning as two exemplars.87

87 Because we here posit a text initially written by a reportator and not by Holcot himself, one might be justified in referring to a "first apograph" rather than to an autograph; but this would require us to term the fair copy a "second apograph" and might obscure the fact of Holcot's autographic revisions. In principle, the point of producing an apograph was to provide a model from which an exemplator could prepare an official and (again in principle) correct exemplar for a stationarius, who would rent it one quire or pecia at a time for copying. The number of unachieved revisions retained in the three manuscripts suggests that no such exemplar was produced (or at least, that no known manuscripts were copied from it), and that the text began to circulate one stage earlier. Our hypotheses do not require that we resolve the current debate among codicologists as to whether Oxford university book production involved official exemplatores and stationarii in precisely the manner of Paris, but only that we recognize that however unofficial the system may have been, the initial stages by which an author's text was prepared for dissemination were not entirely dissimilar. Certainly Holcot was familiar with such a system; see his Scriptum in Sapientiam, lectio 3 (Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 357, fol. 4ra): "Item, a capite corpus capit regimen, rivulus a fonte capit aquam, et ab exemplari scriptor accipit hoc quod scribit; unde, si exemplar sit incorrectum et falsum, scriptor sufficienter excusatur, licet scripsit librum falsum ... et stationarii solent esse soliciti quod exemplaria sint correcta de quibus scriptoribus copia ministrantur." For this nomenclature, see Graham Pollard, "The Pecia System in the Medieval Universities," in Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts & Libraries: Essays Presented to N.R. Ker, ed. by M.B. Parkes and Andrew G. Watson (London, 1978), pp. 145161, esp. pp. 151-152. (Note incidently that on p. 149 Pollard adduces a manuscript of Holcot's Wisdom commentary as the "latest manuscript from Paris with pecia notes so far discovered.") On late medieval university book production, see now La Production du livre universitaire au moyen age. Exemplar et pecia, ed. by Louis J. Bataillon, Bertrand G. Guyot, and Richard H. Rouse (Paris, 1988); Louis J. Bataillon, "Exemplar, Pecia, Quaternus," in Vocabulaire du livre, Etudes sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen age, 2: 206-219. For English studio, in addition to Pollard, see: Hamesse, "La transmission orale," esp. pp. 178-181, 188; Jeremy I. Catto, "Some English Manuscripts of Wyclifs Latin Works," in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks. Studies in Church History, Subsidia 5: 353-359 (Oxford, 1987); Malcom Beckwith Parkes, English Cursive Book Hands, 1250-1500 (Oxford, 1969); Alan Piper and Meryl Foster, "Evidence of the Oxford Booktrade, About 1300," Viator 20 (1989), 155-160.

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The last of these circumstances would explain the trading of roles, from the first three questions of the disputation (in which Pembroke seems more nearly than Balliol and Royal to have preserved an earlier reportatio rather than subsequent revisions) to the eighth question (in which Royal retains more features of an unrevised text). Such a reversal is a familiar result of the availability of two exemplars directly or indirectly behind the extant copies.88 The shifting pattern of omissions by homoeoteleuton usually indicates contamination of traditions, but on the basis of the second and third hypotheses taken together, such shared features could instead be taken as having resulted from Holcot's process of editing. But however we understand the origins of the three surviving witnesses to Holcot's debates, it is clear that none faithfully maintains his editorial intentions. Hence, our edition gives weight to each manuscript, treating none as a base.

FUTURE CONTINGENTS IN HOLCOT'S LECTURES ON THE SENTENCES The Manuscripts Perhaps the greatest difficulty the modern student of Holcot's thought faces hi evaluating the present Quodlibetal questions results from their preservation in relatively abbreviated — even truncated — form. Fortunately, portions of Holcot's second question on book 2 of the Sentences, "Utrum Deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundum," directly treat or amplify the arguments of the Quodlibetal texts that are our primary concern. In this century, scholars have usually acquired their familiarity with Holcot's questions on the Sentences from the text printed at Lyon in 1497 (and again in 1518); but as its editors already saw, the manuscripts available to them did not yield a reliable text.89 If readers of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions are to benefit from a companion text of his Sentences discussion, they require

88 See, e.g., Henrici de Gandavo, Quodlibet V7, ed. by G.A. Wilson, in Henrici de Gandavo, Opera Omnia, ed. by Raymond Macken, et al. (Leuven, 1987) 10: xxiixxxiv, lii-lxvii; and the classic discovery that there had been two exemplars for Aquinas' commentary on the Liber de causis in the introduction by H.D. Saffrey, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super librum De causis expositio (Fribourg-Louvain, 1954), pp. xl-lxxiii. 89 Scholarly attention has been drawn to these difficulties at least since Konstanty Michalski sought to determine the reliability of Holcot texts. For a survey of the scholarship, see Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries, p. 3.

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one that is based on better manuscript witnesses than the Lyon edition presents. So far as we know, however, the preparation of a truly critical edition of Holcot's Sentences lectures is nowhere underway. The development of such an edition of Holcot's second question on book 2 presents a labor beyond our purposes or resources as editors of Holcot's Quodlibetal questions, but it has seemed incumbent upon us to improve upon the Lyon edition. We therefore offer a careful edition which takes into account the Lyon incunable, but which we base upon manuscripts representing major traditions into which the surviving manuscripts fall (as we explain in what follows). Because several were not known to earlier scholars,90 it may be useful to list the codices containing all or part of Holcot's Sentences commentary: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Assisi, Biblioteca del convento di S. Francesco MS 198, fols. 1-lOv, 13-196v (incomplete). Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek MS Q. 31, fols. 226-236 (book 1 fragment). Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College MS 290 (682), fols. 49a-58a, 65b-68b, 78a-84b (book 1 fragment). Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fols. 1-132 (books 1-4). Douai, Bibliotheque municipale MS 436, fols. 1-73. Diisseldorf, Landes- und Stadtbibliothek MS F 5 (books 1-4). Eichstatt, Universitatsbibliothek (formerly Staats- und Seminarbibliothek) MS 713 (books 1-4; written Florence 1387). Engelberg, Benediktiner-Stiftsbibliothek MS 29, fol. 1-90. Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek MS Ampl. F. 105, fols. 1-110 (books 1-4). Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek MS Ampl. F. 127, fols. 9ra-12vb, 56-107 (books 4, 1-3, incomplete). Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek MS Ampl. Q. 112, fols. 1-126 (books 1-4). Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek MS Ampl. Q. 349, fols. 75-79 (book 1, fragment). Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS conv. soppr. B.iii.173, fols. 50r-54v (fragment; olim Petrus de Strozzi, O.P., saec. xiv).

90 Copies of Holcot's Sentences questions were listed by Friedrich Stegmuller, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Wurzburg, 1947); revised by Schepers, "Holkot contra, I," pp. 331-335. Our list also corrects theirs where we have been able to consult the manuscripts themselves. Foliation in our lists includes (as parts of the Sentences lectures) the "Sex articuli," "Principia," and the question known to historians of science as "De stellis," as explained above, pp. 17-18, 21-22, and below, p. 39.

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14. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS conv. soppr. G.i.813, fols. l-102r (olim S. Croce 394). 15. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS conv. soppr. J.vi.20, fols. l-60v, 68r (olim S. Marco 445). 16. Heiligenkreuz, Stiftsarchiv des Cisterzienserstiftes MS 185, fols. 1-84 (books 1-4). 17. Koln, Historisches Archiv der Stadt Koln MS GB 4o 186, fols. lr-130r. 18. Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellofiska MS 1374, fols. lr-96 (saec. xiv). 19. Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska MS 1378, fols. lra-163rb (books 1-4). 20. London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi., fols. 7-137 (books 1-4; saec. xiv). 21. Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek MS Clm 4400, fols. 1-174 (books 1-4; olim Augsburg, S. Ulrich MS 100). 22. Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek MS Clm 4401, fols. 103-145 (abbrev. books 1-4, 1396-1397; olim Augsburg, S. Ulrich 101). 23. Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek MS Clm 27033, fols. 1-142 (books 1-5; saec. xiv). 24. Oxford, Balliol College MS 71, fols. 1-156 (books 1-4). 25. Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138, fols. l-122r, (books 1-4, saec. xiv). 26. Oxford, Merton College MS 113, fols. l-106v (books 1-4; saec. xiv). 27. Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, fols. 114-210 (books 1-4; 1389). 28. Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria MS 1925, fols. 1-54 (books 1-2, abbrev.). 29. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana MS 226, fols. 13r-85r (books 1-2). 30. Paris, Bibliotheque Mazarine MS 905, fols. 1-101 (saec. xiv). 31. Paris, Bibliotheque Mazarine MS 906, fols. 1-116 (olim Paris, O.P. Sancti Jacobi). 32. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 3087, fols. 1-107 (books 1-4). 33. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 3115, fols. 3-55ra, 69r-74. 34. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 14576, fols. 1-115 (books 1-4; 1389; olim S. Victor). 35. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 15884, fols. 3-94 (books 1-4; saec. xiv; olim Sorbonne). 36. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 16228, fols. 249v-250v (fragment). 37. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 16399, fols. 1-118 (olim Sorbonne; 1374 "emptus ... a Henrico anglico stacionario"). 38. Praha, Narodnf knihovna CR (Universitm knihovna) MS III.B. 10, fols. 213-329 (books 1-4; 1360). 39. Praha, Narodni knihovna CR (Universitm knihovna) MS XIII.F. 19, fols. 1-127 (books 1-4; 1393). 40. San Marino, California, Henry E. Huntington Library MS HM 27187, fols. 1-117r, 118-119v (books 1-4; olim St. Albans; saec. xiv). 41. Tortosa, Archivo de la Catedral MS 172, fols. 1-114 (books 1-4).

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42. Troyes, Bibliotheque municipale MS 634, fols. 4-94 (books 1-4; olim Clairvaux K 72; saec. xiv). 43. Valencia, Biblioteca de la Catedral MS 226, fols. 1-155 (books 1-4). 44. Vaticano, Citta del, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Ottob. lat. 591, fols. l-75v. 45. Vaticano, Citta del, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Vat. lat. 703, fol. 2v-3 (fragment). 46. Vaticano, Citta del, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Vat. lat. 111, fol. 89r-106r (fragment). 47. Vaticano, Citta del, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Vat. lat. 4353, fol. 61-72v (book 4). 48. Wroclaw, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka MS 221 (formerly I.F.194), fols. 101r-103v (fragment).

For our text of the principal arguments and articles 7-10 of Holcot's question, "Utrum Deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundum," we have relied upon the following manuscripts: P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236 R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi C = Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138 O = Oxford, Oriel College MS 15 Pa = Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 15884

Two of these manuscripts (Pembroke and Royal) contain Holcot's Quodlibetal questions, and so have been discussed above.91 Of our manuscripts, Paris represents the shape in which the text was transmitted to scholarly readers in the university where that copy was probably produced and has surely remained since the fourteenth century. The stamp of the Sorbonne on the third folio establishes this manuscript's eventual provenance, but there is otherwise no evidence as to when it was copied or purchased for the benefit of that college's theologians. The codex itself contains only 94 folios + 4 parchment endpapers (two each at the beginning and end, written in French, in notarial hands; the former are also signed at Paris), all numbered consecutively. Holcot's Sentences questions thus begin on fol. 3ra, with the question "Utrum quilibet viator existens in gratia," and the work is ascribed to

91 See pp. 28-29. Our MSS numbers 4, 9, 11, 20, 24, 25, 27, are discussed by Hoffmann, Theologische Methode, pp. 401-414; number 36 is the discovery of Venicio Marcolino, "Die Quastionensammlung im ms. Paris Nat. Lat. 16228," AHDLMA 54 (1987), 279-288.

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Holcot on fol. 88vb, where the scribe writes: "Explicit lectura fratris roberti alchot anglici ordinis fratrum predicatorum deo gracias." There follows a table of questions, which in turn ends with the words (fol. 89va): "Et sic finitur tabula questionum deo gracias. H. Anglici scripsit istam tabulam, etc." The final folios (fols. 89va-94vb) are devoted to the question "Utrum finale praemium boni viatoris sit beatitude," which has been separated from the other questions.92 Like Pembroke and Royal, the Corpus Christi College manuscript is written in English hands of the fourteenth century. Coxe describes this codex of 126 folios (each containing one column per side) as containing Holcot's questions on the Sentences in the first 118 leaves, followed by "ejusdem forsan liber astronomicus de stellarum" (fols. 118v-122r). The latter, however, proves to be the question titled "Utrum stellae sint creatae," which ought to be assigned to the questions on book 2 of the Sentences. The last four folios contain indices to the questions.93

92 This description is based on our examination of the manuscript. Holcot seems to have been known to Paris scribes as Olchot or Alchot, so he probably is not the "H. Anglici" to whom this table is credited. Perhaps we should attribute it to the Henricus Anglicus from whom the Sorbonne purchased another copy of Holcot's Sentences questions (our number 37), according to the possessor's note on the latter's fol. 118v: "iste liber est domus magistrorum et scolarium de Sorbona emptus parisiis ... a Henrico anglico stacionario anno 1374." There are two men known by this name and associated with the booktrade in mid-fourteenth-century Paris; see Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, "The Book Trade at the University of Paris ca. 1250-ca. 1350," in Production du livre universitaire, pp. 41-114. 93 The contents of the Corpus Christi College manuscript are listed in H.O. Coxe, Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Oxford Colleges (Oxford, 1852; reprint ed. Wakefield, 1972), 2: 53. Because Thorndike believed he had discovered a separate treatise by Holcot in the "Utrum stellae sint creatae," subsequent scholars have hesitated to assign this lengthy, discursive question to Holcot's Sentences lectures; cf. Lynn Thorndike, "A New Work by Robert Holkot (Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 138)," Archives international d'histoire des sciences 10 (1957), 227235. Nevertheless, several extant manuscripts treat the question as a part of Holcot's Sentences; the subject is consonant with the discussion of creation that occupies the initial distinctions of book 2 of the Sentences; and, while relatively lengthy, the question is not appreciably longer than the one we edit below. Most important, the Pembroke manuscript tells us (fol. 117ra): "Distinctione 15 secundi libri Sententiarum agit Magister de opere quartae diei creationis mundi... ideo circa istam distinctionem quaero istam pro materia praetacta quaestionem: utrum stellae sint creatae ut per motum et lumen sint in signa et tempora." Hence, the grounds appear insufficient for doubting its place among Holcot's Sentences questions.

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INTRODUCTION

Two of our manuscripts, Oriel and Royal, are closely related, as their common variants in our text of Holcot's Sentences question and the presence in both of Oresme's treatise De communicatione idiomatum reveal. Written in apparently coeval cursive English bookhands, these codices provide the only known copies of Holcot's Sermo finalis, and join a minority in preserving the principial exercise on book 1 and the question "Utrum stellae sint creatae."94 Moreover, a comparison of these two manuscripts further undermines earlier scholars' claims for the authority of Royal, for if it were either Holcot's autograph or closer to it than Oriel, the latter should not convey a text more complete than Royal's. This, however, is precisely what we do find in the question "Utrum stellae sint creatae" — a text which depends for comprehension on geometrical figures. Although the scribe of Royal left room for them, the diagrams were never supplied, as they are in Oriel. Thus, at least for this question, Oriel must be closer than Royal to a correct original.95 Oriel is the most studied of the manuscripts written in English hands. Purchased by Oriel College in 1454 for 42s., the volume contains Richard FitzRalph's Lectura super Sententias (fols. lra-112v); Sentences questions by Nicholas Aston (fols. 210v-222r) and Roger Rosetus (fols. 243r-287v); Wyclif s Tractatus de incarnatione Verbi (fols. 225r-243r) and, probably the only work not composed in England, Nicholas Oresme's Tractatus de communicatione idiomatum (fols. 222v-224v). Holcot's Sentences questions (fols. 114r-210r) occupy slightly fewer folios than do FitzRalph's.96 The manuscript has been effectively dated by the discovery under ultraviolet light of a colophon: "this book was written by the industry of brother Nicholas Fawkes, monk of Glastonbury, in the year of the Lord 1389, at which time it was hard to find

94 For the dating of Royal, see above n. 79. 95 Thus, compare Royal, fol. 74va, where a space is left for a figure showing planetary motion, to Oriel, fol. 170vb. (The question occupies fols. 164ra-171vb in Oriel.) It may also be worth noting that Royal, unlike Oriel, transmits only a fragment of Oresme's treatise De communicatione idiomatum. 96 Oriel College's purchase of this codex is noted in the Bodleian Library's copy of Coxe, Catalogue of the Manuscripts, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1852). See also Catto, "Manuscripts of Wyclif s Works"; L. Minio-Paluello, "Two Erasures in MS. Oriel College 15," Bodleian Library Record 4 (1953), 205-207; and Stephen Forte, "A Study of Some Oxford Schoolmen of the Middle of the Fourteenth Century with Special Reference to Worcester Cathedral MS F. 65," B.Litt. thesis, Oxford University, 1947. For a more complete discussion, see also, Tachau, "FitzRalph's Commentary."

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Q*7

many questions of Holcot's work." The bound volume now owne by Oriel does not contain some quires Fawkes copied, for Rosetus' work ends in mid-sentence on the verso of the last folio of the quire, just above the tag indicating the opening words of the one which should follow. The 279 remaining parchment folios that Fawkes produced so industriously (and that a later hand misnumbered) present a regular cursive bookhand, in two columns of 72 lines each. Beyond providing a date for the Oriel codex, Fawkes' remark that he had difficulty finding part of Holcot's work suggests that it was still circulating and being copied from unbound quires as late as the last decades of the fourteenth century. Indeed, for Holcot's Sentences questions even more than for his Quodlibetal questions, the evidence is strong that the pecia system was the basis for their dissemination. Thus the fourteenth-century scribe who (perhaps at Paris?) copied Miinchen, Staatsbibliothek MS Clm 27033 left implicit traces of the transition from one pecia or quire to another by expanding words to fill a line neatly or (as in fols. 58r-59r) by crowding the margins with text for which he had not left sufficient room when copying peciae out of order, as they became available. His signals are explicit, too, as when (fol. 135vb) he announces in the margin his reason for abruptly terminating the "Sex articuli": "there [was] nothing more in the exemplar."98 The question which we edit provided this scribe with particular difficulties, but for some of them, such as the two columns of text "which ought to be in another place,"99 we cannot be sure (without collating all the known

97 Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, fol. 210rb: "Scriptus fuit iste liber de industria fratris Nicolai Fawkes, monachi Glastoniae, anno domini millesimo trecentesimo octogesimo no no, quo tempore plures quaestiones de opera Holkoth grave fuerat invenire" (as discovered and transcribed by Forte, "Oxford Schoolmen," p. 18). 98 Munchen, Staatsbibliothek MS Clm 27033, fol. 135vb: "Nihil plus in exemplari." Our comments are based on our examination of this parchment manuscript of 9Vi x 6l/t inches, which comprises 142 folios, with two columns per side, in quires as follows: i-v12, vi14, vii-xi12, xii7. Such implicit evidence of peciae copying as we mention are also found on fols. 67r-68r. The use of the term "exemplar" can be ambiguous in this context; see: Bataillon, "Exemplar, Pecia," pp. 214-219. 99 Munchen, Staatsbibliothek Clm. 27033, fol. 75ra: "nota hoc quod est hie in istis duabus columpnis debet esse in alia parte." Among other manuscripts that appear to have been copied from a Paris exemplar that had already distorted the intended text, we include Paris, Bibl. Mazarine MSS 905 and 906. In both, the order of questions is the same, and each adds the "Sex arlicuW onto the eighth question of the fourth book without so much as a paragraph mark to suggest that the articles are distinct from that question (which we number in Appendix 2, below).

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INTRODUCTION

manuscripts) whether the scribe's difficulties resulted from the order in which he copied the peciae of the exemplar, or whether the latter had itself been produced from disordered folios (and contained directions for transposition which the scribe noticed too late and simply copied). The inference that such problems were indeed already present in a copy of Holcot's text which functioned at Paris as an exemplar is strengthened by indications to that effect in the Huntington Library's volume containing Holcot's Sentences questions. Although it passed in the early fifteenth century through the hands of Robert Reed, bishop of Chichester, and eventually ended up in the English monastery of St. Alban's, where it was reserved to the abbot's study and bound together with one of William Woodford's treatises against Wyclif, this copy was written not in an English hand, but in a bookhand typical of Paris.100 This scribe, too, breaks off in the middle of the "Sex articuli" (which he knows as the "quinque articuli") with the words, "there [was] nothing more in the exemplar."101

100 San Marino, Henry E. Huntington Library MS HM 27187. Again, we here record observations from our examination of the composite manuscript, to the existence of which we were guided by Ker, Medieval Libraries, p. 168. Holcot's work, including (on fols. 117va-118rb) the question "Utrum beata virgo iuerit concepta cum peccato originali," which is either from Holcot's Quodlibetal disputations or his Matthew commentary, occupies the first 119 folios. These are written in two columns and numbered in the same ink as the marginal corrections on ten quires, as follows: i12 (missing the first fol.), ii-vii12, viii12 (missing one fol.), ix-x12. On the first endpaper, we find: "Liber magistri Roberti Reede episcopi Cicestrensis in quo continentur lectura Holcote super iiii libros sententiarum in parte cum tabula eiusdem, cum tractatu valde bono magistri W. Whydeford edito contra hereticas opiniones et erroneas positas per magistrum J. Wyclyff." The next folio contains the annotation "De studio abbatis." The treatise by the Franciscan William Woodford, written in a later hand continuing across the page rather than in columns, begins a new quire (at which the volume falls open naturally) and occupies fols. 120-182. Robert Reed (bishop of Chichester, 1396-1415) is evidently the donor whom Ker, Medieval Libraries, p. 105, identifies as having given several books to the Dominican convent at Kings Langley in 1415. Since our examination, this manuscript has been more fully described in C.W. Dutschke, Guide to Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the Huntington Library (San Marino, 1989), 2: 670-673. 101 San Marino, Huntington Library MS HM 27187, fol. 82va: "nihilplus in exemplari." On fol. 77ra, he writes: "Quinque sunt articuli quos in diversis materiis dixi (contra) quos socii reverendi rationabiliter institerunt. Primus articulus fuit quod obiectum scientiae et opinionis et universaliter omnis notitiae assentivae est complexum."

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Disruption and Loss in the Transmission of Holcot's Questions on the Sentences If we can trace a family of manuscripts to a Parisian "exemplar," behind it lay an English tradition of copying Holcot's Sentences from unbound quires, as is most obvious, perhaps, in Oxford, Merton College MS 113, codex number 26 in our list of Sentences manuscripts given above. At least once, the scribe found that he had not left himself enough space for a quire copied out of order, as is apparent (fols. 60-61) from the erasures, deletion by vacat^ change of ink, diminution of the size of his letters, and the crowding of ever more words into extra lines and margins.102 Such a procedure of copying from unbound sections of text must be inferred as the source of several disruptions that occurred early in the transmission of Holcot's Sentences questions, probably at the point where one quire was succeeded by another.103 One which our edition reveals was in the tenth article at the words "concede quod angeli sunt confirmati. Potest tamen esse quod numquam fuerunt confirmati" (Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 1370-1371). At this juncture, the scribe of Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 4400, notes "here I could find no more, nor did Holcot leave the rest behind him."104 As the scribe recognized, there should be responses to the fourteen remaining arguments from the twenty-two which made up the question's opening "eighth principal argument."105 He was, however, too confident in assuming that these arguments did not exist. If no known manuscript preserves all of the

102 Similar implicit indications of copying by peciae or unbound quires can be found in Royal, as at folios 63va-64r, where the insertion in the margins of nearly a column of omitted material suggests a pecia or quire change, as do the shrinking of letters on fol. 46r. 103 See, for example, Corpus Christi's interpolation (equivalent to about a column of text) in the exposition of the principal arguments at the words "ergo, si aliquid est prophetatum esse futurum, illud immobiliter erit futurum, et ultra ergo necessario erit futurum" (Sent.2, q.2, lin. 498-500). Here Corpus Christi inserts arguments 9.1 and 9.2 (our lines 673-703) before returning to 8.10 (our line 501). 104 Miinchen, Staatsbibliothek Clm 4400, fol. 92v: "Ad octavum concede quod angeli sunt confirmati et potest esse quod numquam fuerunt confirmati. Plus non inveni nee reliquit post se Olchet." 105 This may be inferred from Holcot's statement at the outset of the tenth article (our lines 1022-1023) that it will consist of responses to the seventh and eighth principal arguments which opened the question (our lines 296-672). For the broad lines of Holcot's answer to argument 8.20, cf. Quodl. 3, q.3, below, at lines 98-109.

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missing counterarguments, several are extant in the closely related Royal and Oriel manuscripts (our lines 1372-1816). Even in the Royal and Oriel codices, however, the equivalent of several columns of text must be missing both before and after the counterarguments to 8.12-8.15, which they alone report. Thus, not only are the responses to 8.9-8.11 absent, but most of the answer to 8.8 is evidently lost, since what remains (our lines 1370-1371) does not address either of its subarguments (lines 487-492). In their stead, the scribes of Royal and Oriel copied an extraneous passage (beginning "Sciendum quod Daniel existens in Chaldea") concerning angelic delay in conveying to Daniel God's revealed will, and human delays in conforming their actions to it (as Holcot's medieval sources interpreted the biblical account).106 Although largely taken from Peter Comestor's Historia scholastica, this interpolated discussion is almost indubitably Holcot's, and the issue that it treats, the ability of human and angelic agents to impede the divine will, is germane to the missing arguments 8.9-8.11 as well as to 8.18. Holcot also drew upon this passage elsewhere in his Sentences questions, as in the "seventh principal argument" of "Utrum angelo confirmato conveniat deputari ad custodiendum," the question which in both Royal and Oriel immediately follows the one we edit.107 It is significant that in three further codices (Oxford, Merton College MS 113, Paris, BN MS lat. 3087, and Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 591), which are the only other known witnesses to the "Sciendum quod Daniel" passage, the latter appears immediately before the same question

106 Variant readings for line 1371. 107 Cf. Vaticano, BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 51ra, "Septimo sic: angel(i) boni volun opponere et resistunt, impedientes se mutuo, sed nullus bonus angelus agit contra conscientiam ... . Totum antecedens patet de facto Danielis 10. Ibi legimus quod angelus venit ad Danielem et dixit preces eius esse exauditas et quod citius venisset, sed princeps Persarum restitit ei 21 diebus. Et subdit: 'nunc revertar ut proelier adversus principem Persarum.' Et secundum Gregorium, ambo fuerunt boni angeli, tarn princeps Persarum quam Graecorum; igitur angeli boni volunt opposita et resistunt impedientes se invicem, quod est propositum .... (fol. 53rb) Ad septimum, de illis angelis qui voluerunt oppositum, dicit Hieronimus quod sunt mali angeli, quorum unus, scilicet angelus Persarum, laborabat ne ludaei liberarentur a dominio Persarum, quia delectabatur in eorum afflictionibus turn quia Persae diutius affligentes eos gravius peccabant; angelus vero Graecorum laborabat ut tarn Persae quam captivi transirent in dominium Graecorum. Contra: si mali angeli possunt delectari, igitur et boni tristari."

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45

on guardian angels.108 This means that the intervening counterarguments to 8.12-8.15, preserved in Royal and Oriel, dropped out at some stage in the transmission of Holcot's questions — almost certainly by the loss of a folio from an unbound quire. Moreover, we are justified in inferring that they were still present in a lost manuscript anterior to Royal and Oriel; neither, after all, is among the earliest manuscripts, nor is either copied from the other.109 If the tenth article of the question we edit is most obviously truncated, the ninth article also promises more than it delivers. At the divisio quaestionis, Holcot announces that the ninth article concerns whether what God has revealed remains contingent after His revelation — the subject (but not the exact title) of the third question of his third Quodlibetal disputation.110 The extant article itself never undertakes this discussion, but consists of a summary of rules of obligatio, perhaps pertinent to the announced issue if these rules were preliminary to it; but in the event, the article breaks off abruptly with the words "no more concerning these."111 Other discrepancies in the question we edit are more readily explicable as evidence that Holcot failed to complete his envisioned revisions of his lectures. Thus, the eighth article, according to the divisio quaestionis (lines 739-740), treats the question whether God, by revealing future contingents to a creature, can cause an awareness of them

108 Oxford, Merton College MS 113, fol. 93ra-rb; Paris, BN MS lat. 3087, fol. 75va-vb; Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 50va-vb. 109 Among manuscripts which reflect other stages of the transmission of the tenth article and which surely existed before Oriel was written are Merton's codex, already in that college's library in 1377; Paris, BN MS lat. 16399, purchased in 1374; Praha, Narodm knihovna IH.B.10, dated in its colophon to 1360. In addition to the reason adduced on p. 40, above, for believing that Oriel cannot have been copied from Royal, note (from our edition of the Sentences question below): at line 1095 Royal (with Corpus Christi and Paris) omits "instans" required for sense against Oriel (in margin); at lines 10411042 Oriel does not share Royal's omission per homoeotekuton. Similarly, in the counterarguments to 8.12-8.15, Oriel retains the words "sequente ... uno" at lines 14551456, as well as (in margin) "casum suum" at line 1470, both omitted by Royal. Nevertheless, at lines 1580-1581 and 1729, Royal does not share Oriel's omissions; again, at line 953, Oriel (and Pembroke) omit "scienter" which Royal retains (in margin). Hence, the scribe of Royal cannot have copied from Oriel. 110 Our line 741; cf. also below, at n. 112. 111 Our lines 1000-1020; we are indebted to Professor Christopher J. Martin for calling our attention to the significance of the discussion of obligatio at this juncture.

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in that creature. The article itself, however, is couched as an inquiry into whether God can reveal future contingents (lines 806-807) — or, in Hoicot's restatement, into God's scientific knowledge (scientid) of future contingents; into whether He can reveal these to a rational creature; and, once again, into whether what has been revealed remains contingent after His revelation (lines 812-815).112 To this end, Holcot announces (lines 815-819), the article will have four parts: after setting out the authoritative statements of "the saints" (here Augustine and Anselm), Holcot proposes to put forth some "distinctions and expositions of terms," then "some suppositions," and finally, "by means of these" to address issues raised "in the seventh principal argument of this question." The fact that the only treatment of the question's seventh principal argument is instead to be found in the tenth article (lines 1024-1110) is the clearest divergence in the eighth article from the description of its contents. The second section comprises Holcot's (a) distinction (lines 852-935) among the different understandings that attach to the terms scire, certiftcare, and revelare, and (b) his explication or "exposition (lines 936-976) of three propositions at issue, namely, "Christus asseruit" "Deus promisit," and " Christus iuravit." Numbered consecutively to these are what appear to be two of the announced "[pre]suppositions" (lines 978-998), with the result that the second and third sections of the article collapse into each other.

112 At our line 811, Holcot mentions that he has already argued against Ockham the related issue whether God can know more than He knows. An early copy of Hoicot's Sentences question (perhaps the apograph?) contained a marginal indication informing the scribe or reader on what folio the mentioned Quodlibetal question began; thereafter a scribe copied this reference into the text, where versions of it persisted. Thus, Corpus Christi reads "quere 171b"; Oxford, Merton College MS 113, Paris, BN MS lat. 15884, Paris, BN MS lat. 16399, Troyes Bibliotheque Municipale MS 634, and Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 591, are among those retaining "quere 171"; and Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Ampl. F. 127, Miinchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 27033, Paris, BN MS lat. 14576, and Praha, Narodni knihovna III.B. 10 reduce the folio to "17." Cambridge, Pembroke MS 236 contains a marginal "quere" at this point, but correctly substitutes the folio (210) where the question occurs within the same codex.

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THE PARAMETERS OF HOLCOT'S DISCUSSION OF CONTINGENCY Whether these discrepancies between Holcot's announced plans and the extant text of the second question from book 2 of the Sentences reflect an editorial revision he never completed, or losses that occurred in its transmission, is in many cases difficult to say definitively in the absence of a complete collation of all surviving manuscripts.113 Nevertheless, we may conclude that none conveys a completed ordinatio, a fact which complicates any effort to discover and analyze Holcot's thought. So, for instance, on what is perhaps the most controverted theme that Holcot takes up in the questions we have edited — the continuing contingency of what has been revealed — his surviving discussions show considerable indecision as to the most appropriate context for its treatment in extenso.n4 These scattered treatments are, moreover, deeply enmeshed in (largely unpublished) Oxford debates: obiter dicta attributed to Richard Campsall, Ockham's worries over the logical limits of divine omniscience, and the views of FitzRalph, Crathorn, and Chitterne, like those of the aliqui or the una via modernorum whom Holcot answers, all contribute to shaping his principal concerns.115

113 In advance of such an effort, we observe that, as the indications of copying from unbound quires and the evidence of the Quodlibetal questions suggest, the relationships among the manuscripts we have used (and the Lyon edition, itself based on an unknown codex) change even within the question we have edited. Thus, for example, ORP are usually closely related, as at lines 953-954, 1071, or at lines 888-889, which reveal ORP against C and PaL; but at lines 1115-1116 LP share an omission per homoeoteleuton, and at 1117-1119, concede an argument against all other manuscripts. At 1127, LPPa omit per homoeoteleuton; then at 1130-1131, LRO oppose PaC as well as P. At line 426, PaC share a variant; at line 1095, CPaR omit "instans," which O retains only in the margin; and at line 892, PaORC diverge once from LP together, and once oppose the separate readings of L and P. 114 See above, at nn. 110-112. Holcot's indecision as to where to insert an extensive delineation of his own view is also reflected in his Quodlibetal questions; thus in Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 47-50, Holcot promises to set forth his own position on the matter, but the promised article is absent. 115 For Richard Campsall, see: Katherine H. Tachau, "The Influence of Richard Campsall on Fourteenth-Century Oxford Thought," in From Ockham to Wyclif, pp. 109-123; idem, "Richard Campsall as a Theologian: New Evidence," in Historia Phihsophiae Medii Aevi, Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, ed. by Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991) 2: 979-1002. For Holcot's references to anonymous contemporaries, cf. e.g., Sent., 2, q.2, a.10, lin. 1146-1151,

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INTRODUCTION

One who had done so is the unnamed Oxford colleague (perhaps the scholar to whom Wodeham refers) who had insisted that, once revealed, the future will come about of necessity. *16 Arguing against the coherence of this claim,117 and persuaded that, if true, there could be no free

1536-1538, 1559-1562; Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 52-54. We do not propose here to explicate Holcot's entire discussion, nor to defend his positions; this would require us to cover matters treated more folly in Hester Gelber's study, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310-1340 (Princeton), forthcoming. Readers of Holcot's questions will also find extremely useful the study of Jean-Fran<jois Genest, "Le Defiituris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine," Recherches Augustiniennes 14 (1979), 249-336, which includes an edition of Bradwardine's earliest surviving discussion of future contingents. 116 Holcot, Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 52-66; again, at q.8, lin. 253-273, where Holcot refers to this stance as that of "cuiusdam valentis," thus informing us that its proponent is a contemporary, probably a colleague recently promoted to the magisterium. (Thus, e.g., at Holcot's Sent. 1, d.l, q.l in Troyes, Bibliotheque municipale MS 634, fol. 19rb: "Sed contra istam responsionem quam facit iste valens potest argui ... ," where the marginal note reads "contra responsionem istius doctoris"). Wodeham, Ord. Oxon. 3, d.14, q.4, Paris, Bibliotheque Mazarine MS 915, fol 180va, adduces the view of someone named Walter: "Hie respondet magister quidam modernus (mg. opinio Gualteri), gratia tamen exercitii sine assertione, et nonnulli alii de Villa minus bene ut estimo, quod facta revelatione absoluta, qualis est de resurrectione mortuorum et aliis articulis fidei de future, quod non potest evenire oppositum, nee impediri, quia posse contra veritatem non esset possibile." That Holcot here alludes to the same opinion is Courtenay's suggestion; cf. his Schools and Scholars, pp. 281, 322-324, and his "Augustinianism at Oxford in the Fourteenth Century," Augustiniana 30 (1980), 67. Genest, "Le De fiituris," p. 265n, argues that the author of this opinion is not Thomas Bradwardine, as Hoffmann had suggested, Theologische Methode, p. 328. We note that one consequence of our redating of those works composed when Holcot was a bachelor is that his second year of Sentences lectures (1332-1333) is the same year Genest proposed as the probable date of Thomas Bradwardine's De Juturis contingentibus, which, Genest (p. 253) suggests, was part of Bradwardine's lectures at Oxford on the Sentences. The discovery of a third witness to Bradwardine's question among anonymous Sentences questions demonstrated to be Bradwardine's established how sound was Genest's hypothesis; see Jean-Francois Genest and Katherine H. Tachau, "La Lecture de Thomas Bradwardine sur les Sentences," AHDLMA 57 (1990), 301-306. 117 As, e.g., at Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 26-32, where Holcot implies that, strictly speaking, it is incoherent to speak of a necessary future contingent; hence, Holcot says, as formulated, the question "whether a future contingent remains contingent after [its] revelation" answers itself.

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will, human or divine, Holcot — like FitzRalph before him — defends instead the conclusion that the future must be contingent even after its revelation.118 Holcot thinks that the point can be put more precisely: there is a class of statements (hi late medieval terms, "propositions") about the future such that the truth of any statement which is a member of the class remains contingent even after the statement's revelation.119 Yet if we accept this conclusion, Holcot believes, then we must admit as a corollary that divine deception is logically possible where this particular class of propositions is concerned.120 Nor is divine deception limited to

118 That there could be no free will Holcot draws as a consequence at, e.g., Quodl. 3 q.3, lin. 25, 43-46. Cf. also Sent. 1, d.l, q.l, "Utrum voluntas creata in utendo et fruendo sit libera libertate contradictionis," arg. 1 princ. (Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. lat. 591, fols. 7va-vb, 14ra-rb). For Holcot's assertion that God's power (including, inter alia, the absolute liberty of his will) would be derogated if the revelation of a future state of affairs entailed the inevitability of its coming into being, see: Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 40-43, 74-77; q.8, lin. 231-243, 679-694, 712-714. For FitzRalph's view, see his Sentences question, "Utrum Deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia," Paris, BN MS lat. 15853, fol. 92va (also quoted in Genest, "Le Defuturis," p. 260n): "Dico ... quod facta revelatione, hec est contingens: 'iste credidit ilia fore,' quia contingens est quod ilia sunt revelata; nisi enim sint futura, non sunt revelata proprie ... . Et concede ulterius quod hec (est) contingens: 'Deus fecit ipsum credere aliter quam erat ex parte rei,' et hec similiter: 'Deus decipit ipsum.'" FitzRalph's other important discussion, in his Quaestio biblica "Utrum creatura racionalis possit prescire in Verbo divino aliquod futurum contingens," is now available in Jean-Fran§ois Genest, "Contingence et revelation des futurs: La quaestio biblica de Richard FitzRalph," in Lectionum Varietates: Hommage a Paul Vignaux (1904-1987), ed. by J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera, pp. 199-246 (Paris, 1991). 119 Holcot, Quodl. 3, q.l, lin. 70-75; q.8, lin. 402-409; Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 795-799. Among the important sources for this shift to discussion of future contingent propositions (rather than events or states of affairs) was the Mertonian scholar, Richard Campsall, whom Holcot implicitly cites in Sent. 2, q.2, a.7. 120 Holcot, Quodl. 3, q.3, lin. 36-40; Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 907-914, 930-935, 1251-1264. Cf. FitzRalph (Paris, BN MS lat. 15853, fol. 92va; in Genest, "Le De futuris," p. 260n): "Non enim videtur (mihi) impossibile Deum aliquem decipere; sed tamen numquam decepit aliquem sicut nos pie credimus. Unde Augustinus vult concludere tanquam unum inconveniens secundum legem ordinatam quod Deus aliquem decepit, non tanquam aliquod impossibile"; again (fol. 93va; Genest, p. 260n): "Ideo concede quod postquam Christus predixit futura contingentia discipulis suis, fuit hec propositio contingens: 'Christus asseruit falsum,' et nego consequentiam, 'ergo hec fuit contingens: tune Christus mentitus est, vel dixit mendacium,' quia non sufficit ad mendacium sola assertio, sed requiritur intentio fallendi."

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the realm of possibility (however construed); for Holcot, the Bible provides ample instances of historical deceptions by divine agency, direct and indirect.121 The further conclusion, that, being deceived, a creature could merit on the basis of false belief, Holcot also accepts as following from the contingency even of revealed states of future affairs.122 To these concessions, some of them advanced in Holcot's opening questions on the first book of the Sentences, William Chitterne had objected.123 One phase of their debate over the possibility of deliberate

121 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 955-976; see also n. 126, below. On this point Holcot evidently disagrees with FitzRalph's claim in the preceding note that, on God's ordained power, He "numquam decepit aliquem sicut nos pie credimus." 122 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 404-407, 1120-1125; Quodl. 3, q.8 lin. 457-463. 123 In Sent. 1, q.3, "Utrum viator teneatur frui solo Deo," Holcot argued that a person could merit by committing otherwise sinful acts if he did so under invincible error, which divine deception would cause (Oxford, Oriel MS 15, fol. 137rb; Vaticano, BAY MS Ottob. kt. 591, fols. 22vb-23ra): "Secunda conclusio est ista: homo potest licite et meritorie frui quacumque creatura. Hec probatur sic: videat Petrus Christum et lacobum, et estimet lacobum esse Christum, et stante illo errore invincibili in Petro, volo quod Petrus velit lacobum esse Deum et diligat eum super omnia. Iste fruitur creatura, et tamen meritorie, quia ignorantia sua est invincibilis .... Eodem modo causetur (error) [opinio] invincibilis in aliquo quod dkbolus est Deus si (in) creaturam transfiguret se; et sic de quacumque creatura argui potest." This example gave rise to the fifth article of Sent. 3, q.l, "an adorans diabolum transfiguratum in effigiem Christi per errorem invincibilem delusus excusetur per ignorantiam talem ab idolatria" (Oriel MS 15, fol. 175va; BAY MS Ottob. kt. 591, fol. 45va-vb): "In hoc articulo dixi quod non solum excusatur a peccato, ymmo tantum meretur quantum mereretur si Christum adoraret, si tamen fecerit quod in eo est ad discernendum an Christus fuerit an non. Et ad hoc adduce rationes, quarum una est talis: ostendat Christus Petro se in certa effigie, et credat Petrus eum esse Christum, et adoret eum adoratione ktrie; ostendat similiter dkbolus omnino in consimili effigie lohanni et sub eisdem signis, et adoret eum lohannes. Tune quero an lohannes peccat aut non? Si sic, igitur Petrus peccat; patet consequents, quk non maiorem certitudinem habet Petrus quam lohannes. ... Secunda ratio in hac materia fuit talis contra hoc quod dicitur (a socio isto, scilicet) quod homo in tali casu debuit adorare sub conditone." These two stages of the debate with Chitterne apparently bracket the third, which is reported as either the fourth article (Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fol. 107rb) or the fifth article (Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138, fol. 95v; Oriel MS 15, fol. 199rb) in the floating section of Holcot's Sentences lectures known as the "Sex articuli" (above, pp. 17-18): "articulus fuit dictus in materia de fruitione vie, questione 3 super primum (librum), et fuit talis casu possibili posito, potest homo licite et meritorie frui creatura." The opening lines of the actual article restate the casus and provide Chitteme's response that one should adore conditionally (Corpus Christi MS 138, fol. 99v;

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divine deception, with its consequences for human certitude and soteriology, resulted in the eight articles which Holcot decided to incorporate into his first question on the third book, as has been noted above.124 There, in taking up the eighth article, Holcot recalled the earlier discussion (in the question on the second book edited here): The eighth article is whether God can lead someone to error? In this article I have said elsewhere, when touching on future contingents, that God is able to lead someone to error and to deceive [him], although He cannot deceive unjustly, viciously, or inordinately.125

Oriel MS 15, fol. 201rb; BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 71rb-va): "Casus ftiit tails: ponatur quod aliquis, puta lohannes, erraret discemendo inter Christum et lacobum, et credat lacobum esse Christum ... tune arguitur sic: lohannes diligit lacobum super omnia, igitur fruitur eo; antecedens patet, quia vult lacobum esse Deum ... . Item, istum adorat adoratione latrie .... Quod autem illud totum facial meritorie et ordinate probatur, quia error suus est invincibilis; igitur sibi excusat. Quod error suus sit invincibilis patet ex casu, et sic consequenter dicebatur quod si diabolus transfiguraret se in effegiem Christi — et Deo permittente — causaret firmam adhesionem in anima alicuius simplicis quod esset Christus. ... Istud dictum non placet cuidam alteri socio reverendo fratri minori. Immo dicit quod includit contradictionem quod aliquis fruatur dkbolo et mereatur eodem actu ... propter ista tenet socius iste quod nullo errore nee quacumque ignorantk existente in creatura potest homo meritorie frui creature. Et ad casum respondet quod lohannes in casu tali non deberet diligere lacobum super omnia absolute, sed sub conditione" (our italics). 124 See p. 17. In Sent. 3, q.l, the connection of divine deception to soteriology is made explicit in the titles of the articles. Thus, the sixth (Oriel MS 15, fol. 176va; BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 46va), "an aliquis possit mereri per fidem falsam," is immediately succeeded (Oriel MS 15, fol. 176vb; BAV MS Ottob. lat. fol. 46vb) by an article devoted to Abraham's belief that God required the sacrifice of Isaac — that is, to a biblical case of meritorious action performed under mistaken belief brought about by revelation. These two articles are in turn followed by one investigating "an Deus possit aliquem fallere" (n. 125, below). We have benefitted from the preliminary transcription of this question prepared by Ms. Hillary Sherwood from Oriel MS 15. This connection between divine deception and soteriology is also explicit in the opening arguments of Quodl. 3, q.8, and (linked to the problem of certitude) Sent. 2, q.2, arg. 8.1, 8.7, 8.9, 8.11 edited below. 125 Holcot, Sent. 3, q.l, a.8 (Munchen, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek CLM 4400, fol. 134r; Oriel MS 15, fol. 177ra; BAV MS Ottob. kt. 591, fol. 47ra): "Octavus articulus est an Deus possit aliquem fallere. In isto articulo quando tangebatur alias de futuris contingentibus, dixi quod Deus potest fallere et decipere, licet non possit iniuste vel viciose vel deordinate fallere. Contra istud arguit socius frater Wllebnus de Chitterne" (Oriel and Ottob. lat. omit the italicized words). See Holcot, Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 945-955; Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 562-566.

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If, as Holcot insists against Chitterne, both biblical authority and Augustine's arguments confirm this conclusion, they do so only under a specific "proper" understanding.126 We must recognize, Holcot stresses, that there are senses of the terms "to deceive" (decipere) and "to lead someone to error" (fallere) which do not involve malice (and, thereby, "vicious" intent). Properly speaking, Holcot says, "to deceive" carries the import of voluntarily causing in someone an error whereby he will affirm that what is false is true;128 in this way God

126 Sent. 3, q.l (Oriel MS 15, fol. 177ra-va; BAV MS Ottob. lat.591, fol. 47rb-vb): "Circa istum articulum sic procedam: primo, quia istum articulum pertractat Augustinus in multis locis, ideo super hoc ponam sententiam Augustini; secundo, ostendam per rationes quod Deo non repugnat decipere aut fallere, et potest hoc (facere) si vellit ... tertio adduco Sacram Scripturam, que hoc satis innuit, videlicet quod de facto Deus decepit, hoc est, causat errorem non solum per malos sed etiam per bonos, et immediate per seipsum .... Lucae ii habetur quod beata Virgo erronie estimavit ... sed certum est quod erroris causa partialis fuit ipsemet Christus ... . Preterea, Deus iussit Abraham immolare filium suum, sicut superiori articulo tractatum est; sed per illud preceptum causavit in eo errorem .... Preterea, exempla multa sunt in vetere testamento, (e.g.) de Rebecca et lacob de familiari consilio spiritus sancti excusantur a mendacio quando deceperunt Isaac ... . Item, ludith Holofernem. ... Ad secundum, quando arguitur {Chitterne} et respondetur de ista auctoritate leremiah 20, 'seduxisti me domine, etc.,' dicitur quod ilia verba non fuerunt verba leremiae, sed verba Phasur, qui fuit falsus propheta, et sic non sunt ad propositum. Salva pace cuiuscumque dicentis, aliter exponit Scripturam quam deberet, et contra Glossam Communem ... ecce plane quod verba predicta fuerunt verba leremiae et non Phasur." 127 Sent. 3 q.l (Oriel MS 15, fol. 177va; BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 47vb): "Quarto restat solvere que videntur esse contra viam istam. Ad quorum evidentiam sciendum est quod isti termini 'fallere,' 'decipere,' 'mittere in errorem,' vel 'facere hominem errare' vel 'causare errorem' et huiusmodi possunt dupliciter accipi: uno modo communiter et tamen proprie, alio modo stricte et improprie . . . . Secundo modo accipiuntur tales termini stricte et improprie ... et sic 'fallere' importat 'causare iniuste vel deordinate errorem,' et sic loquuntur sancti de 'decipere' et 'fallere' quando talem actum negant a Deo, per quod patet ad dicta Augustini." See also: Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 432-437, 439-442, 552-561. 128 Sent. 3, q.l (Oriel MS 15, fol. 177va; BAV MS Ottob. kt. 591, fol. 47vb): "Communiter et tamen proprie loquendo, 'decipere' vel 'fallere' non est aliud quam esse causa actus erroris alicuius; et sic capio 'fallere' et 'decipere' in articulo pretacto." See also Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 930-935, 1199-1201; Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 437-438.

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deceives when he pronounces a verbal proposition which He knows to be false, but intends that the hearer believe to be true.129 For Holcot, what is at issue is not so much erroneous perception or apprehension — "incomplex cognition" (cognitio or notitia incomplexd) in late medieval terms — as errors in the complex, adjudicative cognitive acts of opinion, scientific knowledge, or doubt which depend upon apprehension but regard mental propositions.130 Thus, Holcot tells us, there are different ways to construe the term "to know scientifically" (scire), the loosest of which, as a synonym for "to cognize" or "to perceive," is not of interest here. More strictly, scientific knowledge (scientid) can be taken as "an assenting awareness of some true [statement] by which one assents without hesitation that reality is as that true [statement] designates."131 According to Holcot, this is the sense in which we hold that God knows future contingents.132 Yet, when scientific knowledge is so defined, the same proposition can be known, or merely believed, or doubted, depending upon whether the intellect is certain that extramental reality is as the proposition signifies; for when this is not evident to the intellect, its assent will not be unhesitating.133 Moreover, in human minds, any given cognition over

129 Sent. 3, q.l (Oriel MS 15, fol. 177va; BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 47vb): "Et ad primum argumentum (Chitternis) quando arguitur quod tune Deus posset facere et dicere contra conscientiam suam et mentiri, et facere Sacram Scripturam falsam, respondeo quod si isti termini 'dicere contra conscientiam' vel iste terminus 'mentin' non significant aliud, nisi quod Deus causet propositionem vocalem quam scit esse falsam et intentione tali quod audiens credat earn esse veram, dico quod conclusio non est inconveniens. Si vero tales termini important quod hoc fiat deordinate, tune dico quod hoc non sequitur, sicut alias dictum est diffusius in questioneubi tangebatur de futuris contingentibus." See Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 950-955, 1179-1264; Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 442-443. 130 For further discussion and supporting texts, see Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 246-251. 131 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 853-858; Quodl. 3, q.l, lin. 46-59; q.2, lin. 13-14; q.8, lin. 99105. See also Quodl. 1, q.l, ed. J.T. Muckle, "Utrum Theologia sit scientia, A Quodlibet Question of Robert Holcot, O.P.," Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 129. 132 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 870-872. 133 Quodl.l, q.6, "Utrum Deus possit scire plura quam scit," lin. 40-46, 346-362, ed. William J. Courtenay, "A Revised Text of Robert Holcot's Quodlibetal Dispute on Whether God Is Able to Know More Than He Knows," Archivfiir Geschichte der Philosophic 53 (1971), 1-21. This is the question to which Holcot refers the reader at Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 810-811 (see n. 112, above).

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time can be either knowledge or false opinion (error), depending upon changes in extramental reality. After all, Holcot proposes, if I see that Socrates runs, then the assent on which I believe that Socrates runs is called 'scientific knowledge' .... If, however, God should maintain that assent in my mind and the species [i.e., visible image of Socrates running] in my sense as before; and if he should annihilate Socrates, the same assent will be error and false opinion. [This is] because we do not speak of 'scientific knowledge' as an absolute name for assent; rather, at the same time that it stands for assent, it connotes that reality is as the assent designates.134

On this understanding, Holcot finds neither contradiction nor malice in God's asserting to someone (thus revealing to him) that it is the case that some future event will occur when (a) it remains possible that the event not occur, with the result (b) that the state of affairs will not be as the asserted proposition signifies.135 But if for Holcot one horn of the dilemma presented by the future is how human and divine liberty could be preserved in the face of divine omniscience, the other is the problem of avoiding the conclusion that the contingency of our voluntary choices entails our power to affect God's immutability by affecting His knowledge.136 Here, Holcot takes the relevant and strictest sense of "know" (scire) as being an unhestating assent that a state of affairs is (a) as it is designated to be by a true proposition (complexion), and (b) that it cannot be otherwise. If we no consider a given statement about the future such that the state of affairs which it signifies remains contingent (i.e., is able to be otherwise), then,

134 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 874-882 (see also lin. 984-990). Again, Sent. 3, q.l (Oriel MS 1, fol. 177rb; BAV MS Ottob. lat. 591, fol. 47rb): "Deus potest immediate causare in homine notitiam veram de aliquo complexo contingente; igitur et errorem. Antecedens est manifestum; consequentia patet, quia ista res — demonstrata notitia vera que nunc est assensus veridicus — per permutationem rei potest fieri error; sicut si Deus revelaret mihi modo 'papa sedet' et causaret in me assensum istius sicut causa partialis ... si postea Deus continuaret ilium assensum in me, papa surgente, assensus qui primo fuit veridicus deveniret error. Et Deus esset causa efficientia et conservativa istius erroris, sicut notum est." 135 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 907-955, 984-998, 1249-1253. If, as Holcot holds, God is omnipotent such that His will cannot be constrained by any creature, then of course the latter will not be able to overcome any error He causes (i.e., the error will be invincible). But, Holcot believes, inasmuch as God excuses any otherwise sinful acts committed because of such error (n. 123 above), then His causing such errors cannot be construed as malicious. 136 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 408-421, 596-603, 773-779; cf. also Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 275-323.

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Holcot reasons, strictly speaking this future contingent proposition cannot be known scientifically, for this would be to know the contingent under the aspect of necessity. As this involves a contradiction, no restriction of divine omniscience is entailed by the recognition that such a proposition is not knowable in this sense even by God.137 To the consideration of these issues, Holcot and his contemporaries introduce a further level of complexity by their recognition that the test for any claims to be sustained with respect to either human or divine natures must be that they succeed without contradiction with respect to Christ, who possesses both. Hence, for example, Holcot inquires whether the immutability of the divine will in Christ removes the contingency of His sacrifice, foreknown by His uncreated intellect and revealed to his created intellect.138 Whether Holcot ever worked out a complete defense of the views propounded in the questions we edit, or came eventually to modify them, is not clear. What is evident, however, is that these positions remained the nexus of the relatively few and deeply interwoven problems, such as the calculus of merit vis-a-vis human and divine liberty and knowledge, that constitute nearly the entire surviving body of his Sentences and Quodlibetal questions. Thus, behind virtually every argument in the texts we edit can be found extended debates with his colleagues, sometimes re-elaborated into entire articles or questions within his oeuvre.139 We therefore expect that each new edition of portions of his work will make more intelligible what has already been made available; we are also convinced that any appreciation of his manifestly incomplete texts will require concurrent exploration into his scholastic sources and opponents; and we hope that the present selection will encourage others to the investigation that Holcot's discussions reward so richly.

137 Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 858-864, 872-874; see also Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 618-650. With this claim, Holcot disputes the conclusions held by his fellow Dominican, Crathorn, Sent. 1, q.19, "Utrum deus cognoscat necessario futura contingentia," ed. Hoffmann, Crathorn, Qudstionen, pp. 483-498 (especially, p. 490, lin. 1-21). 138 Quodl. 3, q.8, lin. 219-220, 730-737. Cf. also Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 1111-1264 for the crucial discussion of whether "ter me negabis" remained contingent after Christ's assertion to Peter, such that his deception was possible. (For Crathorn's different resolution of the problem, see his Sent. 1, q.19, ed. Hoffmann, Crathorn, Qudstionen, p. 490, lin. 34-p. 491, lin. 12). 139 So, for example, two questions on the second book, "Utrum angelo confirmato conveniat deputari ad custodiendum hominem viatorem" and "Utrum demones libere peccaverunt" deal at length with issues raised in Sent. 2, q.2, lin. 396-421, 535-540, 546-553.

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EDITORIAL DECISIONS We have hoped to establish a text that is as close as possible to the text Holcot envisioned and to make it accessible to the modern reader. To that end, we have adopted modern Latin orthography and followed the rules of punctuation observed by American writers of English (rather than adhering to the punctuation practices employed by the scribes of the manuscripts from which we edit). We have also imposed our own orthography and punctuation upon texts quoted in the notes, no matter whether we cite manuscript or printed sources. We expand all abbreviations. In providing the variant readings of the collated manuscripts, we have aimed at completeness except that we have neither indicated orthographical differences nor generally noted the interchanging of ille and iste (in any of their forms); nee and neque; vel, seu, and aut; videlicet and scilicet; ergo and igitur. We have taken the titles of the questions from the manuscripts, but we have added or signalled such subtitles and sections of questions and articles as marginal indications or Holcot's explicit statements (in, for example, the divisio quaestionis) warranted. We have identified citations as far as possible. We indicate emendations as follows: (} []

The addition of words or letters which, according to the editors, would have been wanted by the author. The deletion of words or letters which, according to the editors, the author wished removed.

Robert Holcot Quaestiones de futuris contingentibus

Sigla

QUODLIBET III, QUAESTIO 1

P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fols. 179rb-180rb R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fols. 157va-158vb B = Oxford, Balliol College MS 246, fols. 263ra-264rb

QUODLIBET in, QUAESTIO 2

P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fol. 180rb R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fols. 158vb-159ra B = Oxford, Balliol College MS 246, fol. 264rb QUODLIBET in, QUAESTIO 3 P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fol. 180rb-vb R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 159ra-va B = Oxford, Balliol College MS 246, fols. 255va-256rb

QUODLIBET in, QUAESTIO 8

P = Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fols. 183vb-188ra R = London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fol. 161vb-163rb B = Oxford, Balliol College MS 246, fols. 245rb-248vb IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM, LIBER II, QUAESTIO 2

C O Pa P R L

= = = = = =

Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 138, fols. 42v-56r Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, fols. 147ra-156rb Paris, Bibliotheque nationale MS lat. 15884, fols. 44va-53v Cambridge, Pembroke College MS 236, fols. 45va-59vb London, British Library MS Royal lO.C.vi, fols. 41va-53va Editio Lugdunensis, 1497 (no foliation)

Quodlibet in, Quaestio 1 UTRUM CLARE VIDENS DEUM VIDEAT OMNIA FUTURA CONTINGENTIA. 5

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Quod sic, quia beatus Gregorius, iv Dialogorum, loquens de beatis qui vident Deum per essentiam, dicit: "quid est quod nesciunt qui scientem omnia sciunt?" Igitur, quilibet clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia, quia videt omnia quae Deus scit. AD OPPOSITUM ARGUITUR: Nullum obiectum finitum potest repraesentare /R 157vb/ infinita, ergo nullus actus finitus, sicut visio, potest repraesentare infinita; sed infinita sunt futura contingentia, ergo nulla creatura clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia. Primum assumptum, videlicet, quod nullum obiectum finitum potest repraesentare infinita, patet; quia aliter tot posset obiectum finitum repraesentare quot obiectum infinitum. In ista quaestione sic procedam: primo, ponam quasdam distinctiones; secundo, formabo iuxta eas quasdam conclusiones; tertio, movebo quasdam dubitationes.

(ARTICULUS PRIMUS) 20

Circa primum: iste terminus 'videre' accipitur stricte vel large loquendo. Stricte, significat operationem potentiae visivae, et sic loquitur Aristote2-4 Utrum ... sic] Ad primam quaestionem arguebatur probando quod clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia R 3 contingentia] et arguitur add. B 4 quia ... Gregorius] seeundum beatum Gregorium P 4-5 loquens ... dicit om. P 5 Deum om. R j per ... dicit] vel essentiam (dei scr. et del.) divinam clare diligit B 6-7 Igitur ... scit om. P 8 arguitur om. PR j obiectum] bonum P 9 ergo] id est R | sicut] cuius est P j visio] videtur B 10 repraesentare] praesentare R | infinita] simul add. BR 10-13 nulla ... infinita] antecedens P 12 videlicet] videt R j finitum corr. ex infinitum B 13 finitum tier. R | repraesentare om. B 14 obiectum om. P 15 sic procedam om. P | ponam] -no R | quasdam om. P 16-17 secundo ... dubitationes om. P 17 quasdam dubitationes] dubia B 19 Circa ... accipitur] quarum una est de isto termino videre qui potest accipi P | vel] et P | loquendo om. PB 20 et sic] qualiter P 4-6 Gregory I, Dialogi, 4.34.5 (Sources chretiennes 265: 116.50-51).

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UTRUM CLARE VIDENS DEUM

les, ii De anima. Large, transumitur ad cognitionem imaginativam et intellectualem, tarn complexam quam incomplexam, et sic loquitur beatus Augustinus de visione, xii Super Genesim, capitulo x et deinceps, ubi distinguit triplicem visionem: corporalem, imaginativam (quam vocat spiritualem) et intellectualem. Rationem huius transumptionis ponit Augustinus, xi De Trinitate, capitulo iii: "visus," inquit, "inter sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior." Secundo, distinguo de isto termino 'futura contingentia,' quia uno modo /P 179va/ futura contingentia dicuntur propositiones de futuro quarum non est veritas determinata vel falsitas, quia, licet sint verae vel falsae, illae tamen quae sunt verae possunt numquam fuisse verae, et illae quae sunt falsae possunt numquam fuisse falsae; sicut haec est modo vera: "Sortes peccabit eras," et tamen in potestate Sortis est facere quod numquam fuit vera. Et isto modo loquendi consueverunt homines communiter dicere quod in futuris contingentibus non est veritas determinata, et sic loquitur Aristoteles, I Perihennenias, ubi dicit quod in singularibus vero et futuris non est simpliciter veritas vel falsitas, sicut in propositionibus de praeterito et de praesenti, ubi vocat futura propositiones de futuro. 21 transumitur] terminus add. BR | imaginativam] -nationem B 22 intellectualem -lectum B; -lectivam P \ complexam] commixtam R | incomplexam] incommixtam R | et sic] qualiter P | beatus om. P 23 et deinceps om. P | ubi] dicit vel add. B 26 XI] secundo P 28 vicinior] visionem B; propinquior P 29 Secundo] Tertio B 29-30 quia ... contingentia om. R; quia uno modo P 30 dicuntur] dicens R 33 sicut] ut B; sic R 34 peccabit] -cavit B \ eras] et potestate quod Sortes peccavit eras add. B j tamen om. P \ facere om. P 35 fiiit om. R | isto modo] per istum modum P | loquendi... homines om. P 36 communiter dicere trp. B; dicitur communiter P 3740 et ... futuro] quod habetur primo Perihermenias ubi vocat Aristoteles futura contingentia propositiones de futuro contingentes P 37 quod om. R 38 vero om. R | simpliciter] similiter R 39 ubi] nisi R 20-21 Aristotle, De anima, 2.11, 424al-32, ed. F. Stuart Crawford, Averrois Codubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de Anima libros (Cambridge MA, 1953), 313-318. 22-25 Augustine, De Genesiad litteram, 12.7, 10-11 (CSEL 28,3.2: 387-389, 392395). 25-28 Augustine, De Trinitate, 11.1 (CCL 50: 334.34-35). 35-40 Aristotle, De interpretatione vel Periermenias, translatio Boethii, 9, 18a34b25 (AL2,l-2: 13-15).

QUODLIBETHI, QUAESTIO 1

45

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55

60

61

Alio modo intell{ecti)o vel significatio istius complex! 'futurum contingens' exponitur sic: quod non est sed erit, possibile est tamen quod numquam sit; et sic loquuntur quidam concedentes talia: "Antichristus est futurum contingens," "Beatitudo Sortis est futurum contingens," et huiusmodi. Tertio, suppono quod iste terminus 'clare videns Deum' convertatur (de facto et ut nunc) cum isto termino 'beatus,' et quod 'videre' utrobique in quaestione accipiatur secundo modo pro cognitione intellectual!. /B 263rb/ Et sic adhuc 'videre intellectualiter' est dupliciter: incomplexe vel complexe. Incomplexe, sicut apprehendere simpliciter; complexe, sicut quando formatur propositio affirmativa vel negativa. Et sic certa cognitio intellectualis complexa potest vocari 'scientia.' Et isto modo intellectus quaestionis est: "utrum clare videns Deum videat, id est, sciat omnia futura contingentia." Sed primo modo intellectus quaestionis est iste: "utrum clare videns Deum videat, id est, apprehendat omnia futura contingentia"; et eodem modo accipitur iste terminus 'videns' cum dicitur "videns Deum," quia Deus apprehenditur a beato notitia incomplexa, licet de eo posset forte formare multa complexa.

(ARTICULUS SECUNDUS} Istis visis, pono quattuor conclusiones. Prima est quod clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia primo modo. Hanc probo sic: Deus videt omnia futura contingentia; Deus est clare videns Deum; ergo 41 intell(ecti)o] intellig[u]o B; intentio R; om. P 41-42 vel ... exponitur] accipitur 'futurum contingens' pro eo P 42 sic om. PB | tamen quod om. B 43 loquuntur ... talia om. P 44 Beatitudo ... contingens om. PR 44-45 et huiusmodi om. P 46 suppono om. P 47 de ... nunc om. P [ beatus] ut nunc add. P 48 in quaestione om. P j accipiatur ... modo] accipit B 49 sic om. B j adhuc ... intellectualiter trp. P 50 incomplexe2 om. R j simpliciter] similiter P 51 complexe om. B j sicut om. P | formatur] -maliter B \ affirmativa] -live BR j vel negativa om. R; vel negative B 52 certa ... complexa] circa cognitione intellectuali incomplexa B 53 modo] dicimus add. B 53-54 id est] et R 54 Sed om. BR j intellectus] -to B 55-56 apprehendat omnia] apprehendit R 57 videns1 cum dicitur om. P J quia] videlicet add. P 58 notitia] non B 58-59 licet ... complexa om. P 58 forte formare trp. B 61 pono ... quod] sit haec prima conclusio P j clare] -rum B 62 primo modo] exponendo complexum 'futura contingentia' primo modo B; exponendo istud complexum 'futura contingentia' secundo modo R j Hanc probo sic] probatur P 63 clare] -rum B | Deum mg. R

62

65

70

75

80

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clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia. /R 158ra/ Maior patet, quia Deus videt omnes propositiones quia videt omnes res; sed omnia futura contingentia sunt propositiones ex secunda distinctione praehabita; patet ergo ista conclusio quod clare videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia, et in isto sensu dicitur affirmative ad quaestionem, quia quaestio est de una indefinita. Secunda conclusio est quod futura contingentia primo modo loquendi sunt contingenter futura, id est, possunt esse in futurum et possunt non esse in futurum; sed sunt res praesentes. Haec patet quia sunt propositiones nunc existentes et in beneplacito Dei est eas adnihilare vel conservare; et ideo possunt esse in futurum et possunt non esse in futurum. Tertia conclusio est ista: nullus videns Deum clare videt omnia futura contingentia secundo modo distinctionis secundae, ut, videlicet, istud complexum 'futura contingentia' exponatur sic: quae non sunt nunc, sed erunt et possunt numquam esse. Haec probatur sic: sua opposita infert contradictoria, ergo haec est vera. Antecedens probo, quia sequitur: aliquis videns Deum videt omnia futura contingentia, ergo videt aliqua futura contingentia; sed nulla futura contingentia sunt, ergo videt aliqua quae non sunt; sed omnia aliqua sunt, ergo videt aliqua quae sunt et non sunt. Item, si videt aliqua quae non sunt, videt aliqua quae non sunt aliqua, quia omnia aliqua sunt. Item, si aliquis videt aliquid quod non est aut illud aliquid est Deus vel aliud a Deo. Si est Deus, Deus est aliquid quod non est; si est aliud a Deo, est creatura; ergo aliqua creatura non est. Item, si Deus videt omnia talia, videt plura talia; ergo videt quod sunt plura nunc; ergo sunt aliqua plura praesentia nunc; ergo futura 64 clare] -rum B; om. P | videns ... contingentia om. P; deus est clare videns add. et del. R \ Maior] minor B 66 secunda] ista B 67 praeh(a)bita patet om. P; praehibita patet R j ista om. P 67-68 quod ... contingentia om. P 67 clare ... Deum] videns Deum clarum B 68 affirmative ad quaestionem trp. P 69 quaestio est de] est P ! una] de add. B J indefinita] definita R 70 est quod om. P | primo] isto BR J loquendi] -do P 71 in om. BR 71-72 et ... futurum om. B 72 sed] quia P 74 et1 om. PB j ideo ... futurum om. P 74-75 et2 ... futurum om. PB 76 Tertia] Secunda R ! est ista om. P | clare] -rum B 77 secundo] tertio B 77-79 ut ... Haec om. P 78 exponatur sic] -nitur B 79 esse] posse R j sic om. P 80 probo] sic P 81 aliquis] a R | omnia ... contingentia] etc. P 83 quae1] sunt et add. B j videt om. B 84 si] sequitur P j sunt2] ergo add. P 85 quia] sed B | sunt] igitur add. B 86 aut] ergo R 86-87 aliquid1 ... aliud] est Deus et tune Deus est aliquid quod non est vel P 87 est3] et sic P \ ergo] et sic P 88 omnia om. PB j quod] non add. R 89 nunc] nee R j plura1] ergo videt quod sunt plura iter. P

QUODLIBET III, QUAESTIO 1

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95

100

105

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contingentia sunt aliqua plura nunc praesentia. Consequens contra descriptionem datam termini, quae est quod futura contingentia dicuntur quae non sunt nunc, sed erunt et possunt numquam esse. Quarta conclusio est quod non omnis videns clare Deum videt omnia futura contingentia /P 179vb/ accipiendo 'futura contingentia' primo modo, videlicet, pro propositionibus de futuro quae sunt verae vel falsae indeterminate, sicut supra exposui; et accipiendo 'videre' pro 'scire' communiter accepto, sicut cum dico "quando sedeo video me sedere." Haec patet, quia non omnis beatus scit tales propositiones: "Sortes dampnabitur," "mundus finietur ad mille annos," quia Deus non revelavit beads /B 263va/ omnia talia, quia infinita talia Christus potest revelare, quia ante incarnationem multi angeli dubitaverunt tales: "Christus redimet genus humanum moriendo tali loco per tales personas." Eodem modo verisimile est quod sunt propositiones multae de futuro vel saltern constat quod Deus potest multas tales formare, quibus factis, ista starent simul: "Linus est beatus," et tamen dubitat hanc propositionem demonstrata una tali.

{ARTICULUS TERTIUS) (Prima dubitatid) 110

Tertio, contra ista movebo dubitationes. Prima est an tales debeant concedi: "Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod modo est," "Deus nullam rem potest producere quam non produxit," "Deus nihil vult umquam fore nisi 90 contingentia] sunt aliqua plura praesentia nunc ergo futura contingentia iter. R 90-92 praesentia ... nunc om. B 91 descriptionem ... termini] descriptionem termino datam R | dicuntur] sunt R 92 nunc om. P 93 est quod om. P \ clare] -rum B 94 futura2 contingentia2] futurum contingens P 95 de futuro] contingenter futurum P 95-96 quae ... exposui om. P 95 sunt om. B 96 indeterminate] sunt add. B | et accipiendo] accipiendo etiam R 97 accepto om. P 98 Haec patet] probatur P j tales propositiones] istam P; tales R 99 mundus ... annos om. P 100 beatis] eis BR | omnia] futura add. B j quia ... Christus] quia in infinitum BR j potest] talia add. B; omnia talia add. R 101 quia] et BR | multi om. P; alii add. R | angeli] baeati add. BR | dubitaverunt tales] dubitabant talem P 102 Christus] nee B | redimet] mundum add. B 102103 genus ... personas] moriendo tali loco per tales personas et genus humanum R; tali loco moriendo vel genus humanum B 103-106 Eodem ... tali om. P 104 potest] posset R 109 contra ista om. P j movebo] moveo PR j dubitationes] et add. R j est om. P 110 rem] creaturam P 111 quam] quod R | vult umquam trp. P; vult numquam R

64

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quod modo actualiter est"; et si concedantur, arguitur sic: Deus nihil vult umquam fore nisi quod modo actualiter est, sed Antichristus non est modo actualiter, ergo Deus non vult Antichristum /R 158rb/ umquam fore.

(Secunda dubitatio)

120

Item, Deus non vult diem iudicii umquam fore, quia dies iudicii non est aliquid, et per conclusionem super quam arguitur Deus nihil vult umquam fore nisi quod modo actualiter est, igitur Deus non vult diem iudicii umquam fore; et si sic, revelavit falsum et prophetae deceperunt homines, quod est inconveniens.

(Tertia dubitatio} 125

Item, si ista concedatur: "Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod modo est," sequitur quod Deus multa tradidit oblivioni, et multa scivit quae modo nescit. Consequentia patet, quia Deus aliquando intellexit Caesarem, ergo si modo non intelligat eum, tradidit eum oblivioni. (Quarta dubitatio}

130

Item, Deus scit quidquid significatur per istam: "Caesar fuit imperator," quia aliter Deus nesciret an foret vera vel falsa; ergo, modo intelligit quid significatur per subiectum et per praedicatum; sed nulla res quae modo est significatur per subiectum etc., quia nulla res est Caesar qui fuit imperator, nee aliquis imperator est imperator qui fuit Caesar.

112-113 et ... est1 om. B 112 concedantur, arguitur] hoc concedetur, potest argui R 113 umquam ... est1] etc. P j sed om. BR 114 Antichristum umquam trp. P; Antichristum numquam R 117 Item] tune add. P j umquam om. PR | dies iudicii om. P 118-120 et ... fore om. P 118 per om. R 120 umquam fore trp. B; numquam fore R j si om. P 120-121 deceperunt homines] bonos deceperunt P 121 quod ... inconveniens om. P 123 ista concedatur om. P 124 sequitur] sequeturR \ Deus om. P j tradidit] tradat B 124-125 et multa ... Consequentia] et multa quae scivit nescit consequentia B; om. P 125 Deus aliquando trp. P 126 intelligat] -git P 128 quidquid] quod R 129 Deus om. P j modo om. P | intelligit] -gitur B 130 per1] suum add. B j per2 om. PB 131 modo] id B j significatur ... etc. om. PR j quia ... qui om. P 132 fuit imperator trp. B j nee ... qui] qui est vel fuit P j Caesar] ergo add. P

QUODLIBET III, QUAESTIO 1

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(Quinta dubitatio) 135

140

Item, secundum istam tertiam conclusionem haec esset neganda: "Deus cognovit vel intellexit mundum antequam esset." Probatio: quia haec fuisset falsa ante mundi constitutionem, si fiiisset formata: "Deus intellexit mundum," quia tune mundus non fuit, et haec fuisset vera: "nihil est mundus," quia nihil est nisi Deus; igitur, Deus nihil aliud a se intellexisset, quia nihil aliud fuisset. (Sexta dubitatio} Item, Ad Romanes iv: "Vocat ea quae non sunt, tamquam ea quae sunt," ergo vult ea quae non sunt reduci ad esse, ergo, cognoscit ea quae non sunt. (Septima dubitatio)

145

Item, Deus praedestinavit Petrum ab aeterno, ergo intellexit Petrum ab aeterno. Confirmatur per illud (Ad) Romanos ix: "Cum nondum nati essent, aut quicquid boni aut mali egissent (ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret), non ex operibus, sed ex (vocante) dictum est: 'lacob dilexi, Essau autem odio habui.'"

150

(Octava dubitatio) [Adde hie xiii argumenta quae ponuntur in lectura super Sententias et postea pone opinionem quam concludunt et postea argumenta decem 134 Item] iterum R | istam ... conclusionem] conclusionem tertiam P | neganda] falsa P 135 antequam] Christus add. R \ Probatio am. P j quia] data quod add. R; dato quod add. B 136 fuisset] fuit B [ falsa om. BR 136-137 ante ... mundum] ante a Deo B 136 si fuisset formata om. R 137 quia ... et om. BR 137-139 et... fuisset om. P 137 vera] quia haec fuisset falsa, mundus est intellectus a Deo, et haec fuisset vera add. R 138 quia] et R | se] intelligit add. et del. B 141-143 Item ... sunt om. B 141 Ad om. P j Vocat] ac add. R [ ea2 om. R 146 per illud om. P 147-148 aut1 ... maneret] etc. 147 quicquid] quicquam B 148 {vocante}] voluntate BR; vocatione P 149 lacob ... habui] etc. B 151 in lectura om. R | super Sententias] Sententiarum B 152 postea1] eis B; post P | postea2 ... decem] post decem argumenta P 141 Rom. 4:17. 146-149 Rom. 9:11-13. 151-153 Holcot, In Sententias, 2.2.3 (C 46v-47v; O 149ra-va; P 49rb-50rb; R 44ra-vb; Pa 47rb^7vb): "Circa tertium articulum restat videre an nulla rosa existente haec sit concedenda: 'rosa concipitur,' vel 'rosa intelligitur,' et huiusmodi.

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contra illam, et tene secundam.] Item, contra praedictam conclusionem arguitur: quia secundum earn homo non posset intelligere nisi ens reale, 153 praedictam] dictam BR

154 posset] -test P

Et hie (l) est unus modus communis dicendi quod sic, quia tales termini 'concipi,' 'intellegi,' 'cognosci' et eis aequivalentes possunt verificari tarn de terminis supponentibus pro nihilo sicut pro re. Potest enim homo intelligere chimeram, quae nihil est, secundum istos. Concedunt enim quod illud quod nihil est, est intelligibile et cognoscibile; ymmo illud cui repugnat esse potest intelligi et a nobis imaginando cognosci, unde intellectus format propositiones de non existentibus et habet de eis conceptus tarn complexos quam incomplexos. Et dicitur praedicatum inesse subiecto, et tamen nee pro se nee pro aliquo existente sed pro illo quod nihil est ac si aliquid esset. Confirmatur istud per Anselmum, De casu diaboti, capitulo ii: 'multa enim,' inquit, 'dicuntur secundum formam loquendi quae non sunt aliquid secundum esse et secundum rem, sicut enim de aliquo dicimus quod habet visum, et visus est in eo' .... {2} Econtrario est opinio aliorum talis: quod posita intellectione rosae in mente Sortis et conservata post adnihilationem vel corruptionem rosae ita quod Sortes nihil intelligat aliud, dicunt quod haec propositio est neganda 'aliquid intelligitur a Sorte,' et haec similiter: 'rosa intelligitur a Sorte.' Et eadem ratione haec est modo neganda: 'Antichristus intelligitur a Deo' et quod ante creationem mundi haec fuisset falsa si fuisset 'Deus intelligit mundum,' et haec similiter: 'aliqua creatura intelligitur a Deo.' Verumtamen pro ista opinione potest argui sic: nam posito casu priori de Sorte et de intellectione rosae, arguitur sic: omnis universalis est vera cuius quaelibet singularis est vera; sed huius universalis, 'nihil intelligitur a Sorte' hoc casu posito quelibet singularis est vera ... . (opinio propria mg. CP) Quantum ergo ad istos varios modes dicendi, magis est difficultas verbalis quam realis, unde tales propositiones 'Antichristus intelligitur,' 'Caesar concipitur,' 'rosa cognoscitur' et huiusmodi sunt distinguenda penes amphiboliam, eo quod possunt accipi proprie et pro seipsis ad virtutem vocabulorum. Et sic sunt falsae, nam ista 'Antichristus intelligitur' convertitur cum ilia 'Antichristus est intellectus,' quae propositio est falsa, cum subiectum supponat respectu verbi de praesenti quod nullo modo ampliat. Alio modo possunt tales propositiones accipi pro aliis secundum voluntatem utentium eis et volentium sic loqui, ut ista propositio, 'Antichristus intelligitur' accipiatur pro ista: 'intellectio quaedam est qua Antichristus, si foret, foret intellectus,' vel 'conceptio quaedam est quae foret conceptio Antichristi si esset' ... . Et sic de consimilibus propositionibus dicendum est. Nee est philosophice vel logice dictum, sed solum ad placitum, quod scilicet, tales termini 'intellectum,' 'cognitum,' 'conceptum,' et huiusmodi ampliant; ideo proprie loquendo videtur quod tales sunt negandae: 'rosa intelligitur' nulla rosa existente; 'Antichristus intelligitur a Deo' ... nam proprie ista est (P 50rb) manifeste falsa." We thank Fr. Joseph Wey for locating Holcot's intended arguments for us. Holcot had already advanced them in his first Principium (O 206va), where he names Chatton (whose name is garbled in O) as holding the first opinion, and Campsall as the proponent of the second.

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et sic non posset aliquis formare propositiones de figmentis, et sic haec non esset intelligibilis: "chimaera est chimaera," "chimaera non est hircocervus," et huiusmodi. Consequens est falsum. Similiter: "nullus posset fingere montem aureum vel hominem cuius dextera foret in oriente et sinistra in occidente," ad modum quo Aristoteles imaginatur, ii De caelo. (Nona dubitatio}

165

Item, nullus posset imaginari corpus moved in vacuo nee aliquis posset cogitare de tempore, quia nee praeteritum est nee futurum est, et tamen dicuntur esse partes temporis; et eadem ratione nee de motu, cum cuiuslibet motus aliqua pars /B 263vb/ sit futura, aliqua praeterita, secundum Aristotelem; nee aliquis posset cogitare de tempore quo vixit. (Dedma dubitatio}

170

Item, haec divisio foret falsa: "ens aliud in anima, aliud extra animam," secundum quod 'ens in anima' solet vocari 'ens rationis.' Et haec divisio similiter nihil valeret: "ens aliud in potentia, aliud in actu," quia omne ens est ens in actu. (Adprimam dubitationem seu dubium) Ad ista dicendum est. Ad primum dico quod haec est concedenda: "Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod modo est," quia convertitur cum hac universal!: 155-156 figmentis ... esset] significatis et sic aliquis dicit haec non est B 156 non2 om. P 157 et... falsum om. P | est om. B 158 foret] esset P 159 et om. P j ad modum] modo P 160 caelo] et mundo add. BR 163 cogitare om. R | et tamen] quae B 164 et om. BP | eadem ratione om. P 164-166 cum ... vixit om. P 164 cum] tamen B 165 praeterita] sed add. R 166 Aristotelem] intentionem Aristotelis B; intensionem Aristotelis R 168 Item] Similiter tune P | foret falsa] non valeret P 169 secundum] sed R \ solet vocari] vocatur P 169-170 Et ... valeret] Similiter nee haec P; Et homo divisio similiter R 170-171 quia ... actu om. P 173 est1 om. BR | primum] dicitur add. et del. B | dico om. R; conceditur P 160 Aristotle, De caelo et mundo, 2, 285b20 seq.; cf. Averroes, In de Caelo 2.13 in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois cordubensis variis in ea opera commentariis (Venice, Juntina, 1562-1574; repr. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962), 5, fol. 102va. 164-166 Cf. Averroes, In Aristotelis Physica, 4.2.3-4, comment. 67-75 (Juntina 4, fols. 156r-165r).

688

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180

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190

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UTRUM CLARE VIDENS DEUM

"nihil est intellectum a Deo nisi quod modo est," cuius quaelibet singularis est vera, sicut patet inductive. Eodem modo haec est concedenda: "Deus nihil potest producere nisi quod produxit," vel ilia: "nullam rem potest Deus /P 180ra/ producere quam non produxit." Et hanc /R 158va/ concede similiter: "nihil vult Deus umquam fore nisi quod modo actualiter est," quia quaelibet eius singularis est vera. Nee valet iste discursus: "Deus nihil vult umquam fore nisi quod modo est actualiter, Antichristus non est modo actualiter, ergo Deus non vult Antichristum umquam fore"; quia non est in modo nee in figura. Nee iste discursus valet isti consimilis de die iudicii, quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa utrobique. Contra: Si Deus vult Antichristum fore, ergo vult aliquam rem fore quae modo non est. Nego consequentiam. Contra arguitur sic: omne volitum a Deo fore est, Antichristus est volitu(s) a Deo fore, ergo Antichristus est. Dico quod maior est vera et minor est falsa, quia haec est falsa: "Antichristus est volitus a Deo fore"; et nego istam consequentiam: "Deus vult Antichristum fore, ergo Antichristus est volitus a Deo fore." Contra: aut Deus, volendo Antichristum fore, vult aliquid fore vel nihil vult fore. Et expono hoc gerundivum 'volendo' per quia. Si aliquid, et nihil nisi Antichristum, ergo Antichristus est aliquid; si nihil, ergo Deus, volendo Antichristum fore, nihil vult fore. Concede conclusionem exponendo ly 'volendo' per quia. (Ad secundum dubium} Ad secundum concedo istam: "Deus vult diem iudicii fore," et tamen nihil vult fore nisi quod modo est. 175 nisi ... est] etc. P | quaelibet] quilibet R; quodlibet B 176 sicut ... inductive om. P 177-179 Et ... concedo om. P 179 similiter] Deus (produxit add. et del.) add. B j Deus om. B | umquam] numquam R 180 actualiter om. PB 180-182 quia ... actualiter1 om. R 180 quaelibet eius] quodlibet B 181 iste om. B 181-182 est actualiter1 tip. B 182 non est modo trp. P 183 umquam om. P | non] nee R j nee1] etBP | Nee2 om. B 184-185 iste ... utrobique] sic de aliis P 184 isti] -te B 186 ergo] Deus P 187 modo] nunc R; om. B j arguitur sic om. P J omne om. B 188 fore1 om. B \ volitu(s)] -turn BR 189 Dico] -citur P j et ... falsa] et non minor P 189-190 quia ... et om. P 190 a Deo fore trp. R 190-191 nego istam consequentiam] nego consequentiam B; Contra P 192 fore1] nego consequentiam add. P; contra autem Deus volendo Antichristum fore, igitur Antichristus est volitus a Deo fore add. B j vult] vel BR 193 nihil vult fore] non P; ftp. B ] Et expono hoc] exponendo P | volendo om. P 198 secundum] patet per idem quia add. BR j istam Deus] quod P; est add. et del. B 199 modo] nunc BR

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(Ad tertium dubium) Ad tertium quando arguitur sic: "Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod modo est, ergo multa tradidit oblivioni," quia intelligit Caesarem, Platonem et Ciceronem, nego primam consequentiam, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, quia nulla multa tradidit oblivioni. Dico tamen quod multa sunt intellecta a Deo quae non semper erunt intellecta a Deo; Deus tamen semper erit intellectio, propter quam haec foret vera: "si talia essent, ista sunt intellecta a Deo," et pro tanto concedunt multi tales propositiones "ista semper erunt intellecta a Deo." (Ad quartum dubium}

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Ad quartum, quando arguitur: "Deus scit quid significatur per istam: 'Caesar fuit imperator,"' dicendum est quod Deus non scit quid significatur per istam, "Caesar fuit," proprie loquendo, quia nihil significatur per illam, sicut patet inductive. Contra: haec "Caesar fuit" est una propositio vera, ergo est significativa, ergo quilibet terminus significat, et si significat ergo aliquid vel aliqua. Dicendum est quod est propositio vera et oratio significativa, et concedendum est quod quilibet terminus illius est significativus vel consignificativus. Unde concede quod iste terminus 'Caesar' est modo vox significativa, sed tamen nihil significat nee alicuius est significativus, sed fuit aliquando institutus ad significandum Caesarem; et si ille esset modo, sine nova institutione ilium significant. Similiter, talis terminus est quod ipso audito multi ex certa institutione formant conceptus qui 201 quando ... sic] nego hanc consequentiam P | modo] nunc BR | est] ad add. et del. R 202 intelligit] -lexit B; om. P 202-203 Caesarem... quia om. P 206 tamen] tantum R j intellectio] intelligibilis ea B; intellecto R 207 ista sunt] essent P 210211 quando ... imperator om. P 210 quid] proprie add. B | istam] Deus fuit add. et del. R 211 dicendum est] dicendum R; dicitur P j Deus om. BR j scit] sit R; om. B 211-212 quid ... istam om. B 212 Caesar fuit om. BR | proprie loquendo om. P 213 sicut ... inductive om. P 214 haec ... fuit] haec B; om. R | una propositio om. P | est om. BR 215 et si significat om. P j ergo om. B 216 vel] vult B | aliqua] alia P 217 Dicendum est] dicendum R; dicitur P \ quod ... et2 om. P 218 concedendum est] conceditur B; om. P 218-219 vel consignificativus om. P; vel significativus R 219220 Unde ... significativa om. P 219 Caesar om. R 220 nihil significat om. B | ne ... significativus om. P 221 ille om. P 222 institutione] impositione P j tab's terminus] isto termino P 223 est ... ipso om. P

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forent /B 264ra/ conceptus Caesaris, si Caesar esset, et pro tanto dicitur apud eos significare Caesarem. Similiter ista consequentia, quae innuitur esse bona in illo argumento, non valet: "nihil significatur per subiectum neque per praedicatum, ergo propositio non est vera, sicut patet de ista: 'Antichristus non est chimaera.'" (Ad quintum dubium}

230

Ad quintum dicendum quod antequam mundus esset, haec fuisset concedenda si fuisset formata: "Deus nihil intelligit nisi se." (Ad sextum dubium}

235

Ad sextum, quando arguitur per Apostolum, (Ad) Romanos iv: "vocat ea quae non sunt tamquam ea quae sunt," sensus (est): facit res esse quae aliquando non fuerunt. (Ad septimum dubium} Ad septimum, concede quod Deus intellexit Petrum ab aeterno, id est, ab aeterno Deus fuit quaedam intellectio qua haec fuisset vera: "si Petrus fuisset, Petrus est intellectus."

240

(Ad octavum dubium}

245

Ad octavum, quando arguitur quod homo nihil posset intelligere nisi /R 158vb/ ens reale, concede. Contra: ergo nullus homo potest intelligere figmenta nee formare tales propositiones: "chimaera est chimaera"; nego istam consequentiam, quia habere tales intentiones est satis possibile, sed quia istae intentiones 224 Caesar om. P 225 apud eos om. P | ista] haec P 225-226 quae ... argumeno om. P 225 quae] in add. R | innuitur] innuit B 226 non] nihil BR 227 propositio om. P j de ista] per tales BR 230 dicendum] dicitur P 231 formata om. PR j se] et hanc ista demonstrata Deus nihil intelligit nisi se add. R 233-234 quando ... sensus] Apostolus intelligit quod P 234-235 res ... non] aliquando res esse quae numquam B | esse om. R 237-238 id ... aeterno om. R 238 intellectio] intentio P | Petrus om. P 239 est] fuisset B 241 quando arguitur] quod arguitur B; concedo P j posset] -test P 242-243 concedo. Contra] et nego consequentiam P 243 ergo om. B j homo om. P j potest] -sset R | figmenta] significata B j nee] vel P j formare] fore B 244-250 tales ... imaginatur2] conceptus de eis vel imaginari P 244 chimaera2] nee add. B 245 possibile | impossible B

QUODLIBETIII, QUAESTIO 1

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innuuntur supponere pro rebus extra, et nulla res extra eis correspondet, ideo tales propositiones sunt falsae. Similiter, satis est possibile formare talem imaginationem, quasi sic esset, quod homo extenderet unam manum ad orientem et aliam ad occidentem. Sed dico quod qui sic imaginatur nihil imaginatur. Unde sicut aliquis intelligit et aliquis diligit, et tamen nullam rem tali dilectione diligit, sicut patet si diligam lohannem absentem et stante ista dilectione Johannes corrumpatur, ita est in talibus actibus imaginationis: aliquis imaginatur, sed tamen nullam rem imaginatur.

,55

(Ad nonum dubium} Ad nonum, patet per idem, quia possumus imaginari corpus moveri in vacuo et cogitare de praeteritis et futuris, et tune cogitamus, et de nulla re cogitamus. (Ad decimum dubium)

260

265

Ad decimum, dico quod ilia divisio: "ens aliud in anima, aliud extra animam" debet sic intelligi: quod de numero entium quaedam sunt operationes rationis (sicut propositiones, sillogismi, et discursus), quaedam entia extra /P ISOrb/ animam. Similiter, haec divisio: "ens aliud inpotentia, aliud in actu" debet sic intelligi: de quibusdam terminis significativis rerum formamus propositiones de inesse per hoc verbum 'est' et de quibusdam per hoc verbum 'potest'; sicut dicimus: "rosa est," quando est in effectu, vel "potest esse," antequam sit in effectu, quamvis forte proprie loquendo haec sit falsa, rosa non existente: "rosa potest esse." Sed quando conceditur, accipitur pro ista: "potest esse quod rosa 248 talem] propositionem vel add. B | homo extenderet] homini ostenderet B 249 manum] magnam R 250 imaginatur1] -nantur R | intelligit] et tamen nihil intelligit add. B 250-251 aliquis2 ... tali] et nihil intelligit diligit et nullam rem ilia P 251 tamen om. B | tali ... diligit trp. B | patet om. P j si diligam] diligendo B 252 corrumpatur] moriatur P 252-253 est ... imaginationis om. P 253 sed tamen] et P; et tamen B 254 imaginatur] et terminus significat et nihil significat et ita de aliis P; om. R 256 Ad ... idem] per illud ad nonum B 256-258 quia ... cogitamus om. P 258 re om. R 260 dico om. BR | ilia divisio trp. R 260-261 ens ... animam om. P 261 quod om. P 262 operationes rationis trp. R 263 animam om. PR | haec] alia P ! ens om. BP 264 aliud1 ... actu om. P | quibusdam] -buscumque P 266 dicimus] quod add. P; om. B 267 vel... effectu2 om. B | quamvis] contra non B 268 rosa1] est add. B 269 accipitur] conceditur P j ista iter. R; ita add. P j quod rosa trp. B

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sit," vel pro consimili. Sed in ista materia non est possibile quod evolvamus nos perfecte quin malis gratibus nostris improprie loquamur; sed sufficit habere sanum intellectum et scire quod improprie loquimur. AD ARGUMENTUM IN opposiTUM quod probat quod quilibet videns Deum videt omnia quae Deus scit propter illud verbum Gregorii, iv Dialogorum: "quid est quod nesciunt qui scientem omnia sciunt?" Dicendum quod intentio beati Gregorii potest esse quod beati nihil ignorant spectans ad beatitudinem eorum essentialem. Vel potest intelligi /B 264rb/ de 'scire in habitu,' pro tanto quia sciunt ilium per quern possunt omnia scire si ipse voluerit, sicut auctoritas sonat. Unde licet actu nesciant omnia, quodammodo habitualiter sciunt omnia, quia sciunt ilium qui potest eis quodlibet intelligibile revelare. 270 vel pro om. P 270-272 consimili ... loquimur] etc. P 272 sanum om. B | improprie] proprie B 273-275 quod1 ... sciunt om. P 274 IV om. R 276 beati1'2 om. BR ! Gregorii om. B j potest esse] est P j ignorant] -ret B 277 eorum] illorum P 278 in ... tanto] de habitu P | quia] quod B | per quern] a quo P 279 ipse] ii P | voluerit] -rint P 279-281 Unde ... revelare om. P 280 quia] qui R

Quodlibet III, Quaestio 2 UTRUM ISTA CONSEQUENTS SIT NECESSARIA: "DEUS SCIT A FORE ERGO A ERIT." SlGNIFICET A UNUM FUTURUM CONTINGENS. 5

Quod sic arguitur, quia oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente; ergo consequentia est bona. AD OPPOSITUM: Si ista consequentia sit necessaria et antecedens est necessarium, ergo consequens est necessarium; ergo "a fore" est necessarium; ergo "a fore" non est futurum contingens.

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In ista quaestione suppono quod consequentia necessaria vocetur consequentia bona. Consequentia autem est bona quando non potest sic esse sicut per antecedens denotatur nisi (ita) sit sicut per consequens denotatur. Secundo, suppono quod 'scire' accipitur pro 'assentire evidenter alicui vero.' Hoc supposito, dico ad quaestionem quod sic, quia si Deus scit a fore, verum est quod a erit, et si verum est quod a erit, a erit; ergo, a primo si Deus scit a fore, ergo a erit. Similiter, ista consequentia est bona: "Sortes scit a fore; ergo a erit"; et eadem ratione et alia. Ad rationem in oppositum, quando accipitur /R 159ra/ quod antecedens huius consequentiae est necessarium, ista videlicet: "Deus scit a fore," dicendum quod haec est contingens: "Deus scit a fore," quia sic scit a fore quod potuit numquam scivisse a fore. 2 ista] haec P 3 scit] sit BR 4 A om. B 5 arguitur om. PR 6 ergo ... bona om. P 7 Si] sequitur BR j ista consequentia] ilia P j sit] est BR 8 est necessarium2 om. P 8-9 ergo2 ... necessarium om. P 9 a fore] consequens P j futurum om. P 10 consequentia] non est add. R 11 Consequentia2 ... quando] quae talis est quod P j sic] ita P 12 per antecedens denotatur] significatur per antecedens P 12-13 nisi... denotatur] etc. P 12 {ita}] ista BR 13-14 Secundo ... vero om. B 13 accipitur] -piatur R 15 supposito] -pono R | scit] sit B 16 est1 quod1 om. R j et ... erit2 om. R 17 si om. BP | ergo om. B | ista] haec P 18 bona om. P | et1 ... alia om. P 19-21 quando ... dicendum] dicitur P 20 huius] unius B 21 Deus ... fore2 om. BR 21-22 sic ... fore1] Deus scit (sit R) a fore sic BR 22 potuit] -test PR

74 UTRUM ISTA CONSEQUENTIA SIT NECESSARIA

25

Unde, quandocumque aliqua propositio habet multas exponentes, si una earum sit contingens, ilia tota propositio est contingens. Modo, ista propositio: "Deus scit a fore" aequivalet isti copulativae: "Deus assentit huic complexo: '# erit,' et ita erit quod a erit," cuius secunda pars est contingens per positum.

P

23 quandocumque] quando P 24 earum] illarum P j sit] est B | ilia ... est] tota erit 25 propositio om. P 27 per positum] ergo, etc. P

Quodlibet m ? Quaestio 3 UTRUM, FACTA REVELATIONS ALICUIUS FUTURI CONTINGENTIS, IPSUM MANEAT CONTINGENS POST REVELATIONEM. 5

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Arguebatur /B 255vb/ quod non, quia si sic, sequitur quod aliquis simul posset esse in gratia et in peccato mortali. Consequens falsum. Consequentia probatur sic: pono quod Deus praecipiat Sorti existenti in caritate quod nihil velit nisi quod apparet sibi rationale; et ponatur etiam quod Deus revelet sibi revelatione clara in Verbo unum effectum futurum contingenter, qui sit a; et credat Sortes per rationem propriam quod a non est effectus futurus. Revelatione facta, ponatur quod velit a fore, sicut videt ex sua revelatione, et duret sua volitio per horam. Isto posito, si "a fore" sit adhuc contingens, ergo haec est contingens: "Sortes simul fuit in gratia et in peccato mortali," quia Sortes per totam horam fuit in caritate per casum; ergo haec est modo necessaria: "Sortes per hanc horam fuit in caritate," et haec est contingens: "Sortes in hac hora peccavit mortaliter," quia in fine horae haec est contingens: "a non erit." Et sequitur: a non erit; ergo Verbum numquam repraesentavit a fore; ergo Sortes numquam vidit in Verbo "a fore"; et necessarium est quod Sortes voluit a fore; igitur voluit a fore contra rationem, quia per casum Sortes aestimatione propria credidit a numquam fore; ergo fecit contra praeceptum; ergo fuit in {peccato) mortali, et tamen per totam illam horam fuit in caritate; ergo simul fuit in caritate et in peccato mortali. AD OPPOSITUM: Si (non), liberum arbitrium tolleretur. 5 Arguebatur om. P | quod1 om. R j sequitur] -queretur B 7 sic] quia P 8 apparet] -real B j rationale] -nabile R | et om. PR | etiam] sic B 9 Deus revelet trp. B j revelatione clara trp. B 9-10 futurum contingenter trp. BR 10 sit] scit B 11 ponatur] -nitur P 12 videt om. P j sua1 om. BR | duret... volitio trp. P 13 fore sit] foret sic B j adhuc om. P | est] erit R 16 fuit iter. P 16-17 Sortes ... contingens om. horn. B 16 hac om. R 18 Verbum numquam trp. B j repraesentavit] erit repraesentans B; praesentavit R 20 igitur ... fore2 om. PR 21 Sortes om. BP 22 ergo ... mortali om. BR j tamen om. P j per iter. B 23-24 simul ... mortali] etc. P 25 (non)] sic BPR | tolleretur] -letur B

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Quamvis forma /P 180va/ quaestionis solvat semetipsam, ut necesse sit earn concedi, quia supponit illud idem quod quaerit, quia supponit quod facta sit revelatio de aliquo future contingente, et quaerit an maneat contingens post revelationem, non enim posset esse revelatio facta de future contingente nisi ipsum esset futurum contingens pro mensura revelationis, et pari ratione post revelationem, si propositio revelata maneret. Unde absolute debet quaestio concedi, supposita existentia illius revelati. Pertractando tamen quaestionem ad intentionem quaerentis, ut sit sensus quaestionis talis: "Si fiat revelatio de eo quod nunc est futurum contingens, an ipsum maneat contingens post revelationem," sic est de ista quaestione apud modernos studentes maxima difficultas. Occurrit enim ex una parte, si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati potest contingere, quod Deus potest decipere, mentiri, periurare, non solvere quod promisit, et fieri infidelis, et huiusmodi, quae bonis moribus repugnare videntur. Ex alia parte, si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati, vel promissi, vel asserti seu iurati a Deo non potest evenire, videtur derogare divinae potentiae, quae in nullo minuitur propter revelationem, vel iuramentum, vel promissionem factam creaturae. Item, videtur derogare humanae libertati, quia, facta revelatione, /R 159rb/ de aliquo /B 256ra/ cadente sub libera facultate voluntatis, iam fieret necessarium si eius oppositum evenire non posset. Ut, igitur, videatur quae pars in ista difficultate possit probabilius sustineri, primo recitabo istam viam secundam et arguam contra earn; secundo recitabo (viam) primam et arguam similiter contra earn; tertio praeeligam illam quae mihi pro nunc probabilior apparet. 26 semetipsam] seipsam P 27 earn] illam P 27-29 quia ... revelationem] supposita veritate talis revelati P 27 illud ... supponit2 am. horn. R 28 quod facta sit] ex facto fit B j quaerit] -ritur B 29 non enim] quia non P j posset esse] esset B |revelatiofacta] revelat P; revelationem factam B 30 esset om. P 31-32 et... revelati om. P 32 existentia] ex natura B 34 quaestionis talis om. P | revelatio corr. B 35-36 de ... maxima om. P 36 difficultas] difinitas B 38 periurare] peierare P 39 repugnare] obviare R 40 vel om. P 41 vel asserti] asserti P; om. B j seu iurati om. P J potest] -ssit R; non add. P j videtur] -debuntur P 43 vel1 ... creaturae] etc. P 45 facultate] potestate P 46 si] quod P j evenire] -ret B 47-50 Ut... apparet] In ista quaestione duae viae tenentur P 47 difficultate] diffinitate B | possit] -test B 48 sustineri] -re B | earn] illam B 50 praeeligam illam trp. B 48 49

viam secundam Rather, the first way of reasoning (above, lin. 36-40); see also below, Quaestio 8, lin. 253-273. (viam} primam Rather, the second way of reasoning (above, lin. 40-46); cf. below Quaestio 8, lin. 231-243. Ockham, too, argues for this opinion in Tractatus depraedestinatione etpraescientia Dei respectufaturorum contingentium (OP 2: 505-539).

QUODLIBET III, QUAESTIO 3

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(ARTICULUS PRIMUS)

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Est una via modernorum quae ponit quod omne revelatum, assertum fore, promissum et iuratum a Deo necessario eveniet. Probatur multipliciter. Primo, quia aliter Deus nullum posset certificare de aliquo futuro, quia quantumcumque assereret vel revelaret aliquid fore futurum, semper esset contingenter futurum, sicut prius; quod cum constaret illi cui fit revelatio, nulla fieret in eo certitudo. Item, si facta revelatione de isto: "Antichristus erit," oppositum posset evenire; ergo Deus posset revelare alteri quod oppositum eveniet, et sic posset certificare duos de duobus contradictoriis, quod est impossibile. Item, si dicatur quod Deus potest numquam asseruisse quod asseruit, ergo homo potest magis certificare quam Deus. Item, tune maior foret certitudo fidei quam revelationis, quia cum certitudine revelationis stat haesitatio de opposito, non autem cum certitudine fidei. Contra istam viam arguitur alibi diffuse in quaestione: "Utrum resurrectio generalis necessario sit futura." Ad rationes ergo istas, dicendum ad primam: quando arguitur quod aliter Deus nullum posset certificare de aliquo futuro, nego consequentiam, quia dico quod certitudo quam Deus facit in beatis non est talis quod sic erit et impossibile est quin sic erit. Puta, quod Linus sciat 52 Est om. PR j una] ergo add. R | via modernorum om. P | quae om. PR [ omne om. P 52-53 assertum ... Deo om. P 53 eveniet] erit P 53-54 Probatur ... Primo om. P; modo add. B 54 posset certificare trp. P 55 assereret] assent B | vel ... futurum om. P j revelaret] -laverit B 56 sicut prius om. BP \ quod] et BR | cum] tamen B j constaret] stare possit et debeat R j fit] facta est talis P 57 revelatio] et debeat add. B 58 de ... erit om. P 58-59 oppositum posset1] possit oppositum R; potest oppositum B 59 posset2 revelare] revelare R; revelavit B j alteri om. P; aliter B | quod oppositum] quam B | eveniet] foret P 60 posset] -terit R \ duos om. P 6061 quod ... impossibile om. P 62 dicatur] -citur P | asseruit] contra add. PR 64 foret] esset P | cum] tali B 65 certitudine revelationis] revelatione P j cum] de P 66 fidei] etc. add. R 67 istam viam ... diffuse] ista arguitur P 67-68 in ... futura om. R 69 ergo ... primam] istas BR 69-70 quando ... futuro om. P j quod aliter om. B 70 posset] -test B 70-71 nego consequentiam] negatur consequentia B; nego primam consequentiam P 71 dico quod om. P 72-77 Linus ... produxit] quia Deus ipse non potest talem notitiam habere de futuro contingenti, quia non potest facere de potentia sua absoluta quin ipse potest facere tale contingens datum, nee quin ipse potest non facere P 67-68 quaestione ... futura Below, Quaestio 8, lin. 346-400, 417-746.

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istam: "Linus semper erit beatus et impossibile est quin semper erit beatus," quia talem certitudinem Deus non potest causare, quia impossibile est quod Deus sit talis vel in tali statu in quo non posset destruere omnem creaturam, quia omnem creaturam aeque libere conservat, sicut libere a principio produxit. Sed causat in eis talem certitudinem quod semper erunt beati, et illi adhaerent ita fortiter et tanto assensu, ac si aliter esse non posset. Sciunt tamen quod aliter esse potest, quia aliter lateret eos condicio creaturae semper dependentis a Deo. Ad aliud dicendum quod facta revelatione de ista: "a erit," haec est contingens: "a non erit." Non tamen potest fieri revelatio de ista stante revelatione facta de opposito. Quia tamen haec est contingens: "a fore est revelatum a Deo," concedendum est quod "a fore" potest numquam fuisse revelatum, et eodem modo quod "a non fore" potest esse revelatum. Sed si ponatur quod sit revelatum, concedendum est consequenter quod "a fore" numquam fuit revelatum. Ad tertiam, quando arguitur: si Deus potest numquam asseruisse /B 256rb/ quod asseruit, ergo assertio hominis magis certificat quam assertio Dei, nego consequential^ sed magis potest constare homini quod assertio hominis est assertio hominis quam quod assertio Dei est assertio Dei. Contra: revel et Deus homini quod ipse asserit quod a erit; dico admittendo, sed nihilominus potest numquam asseruisse et numquam revelasse se dixisse assertive. Ad quartam, dico quod nulla haesitatio stat cum revelatione, /P 180vb/ sicut nee cum fide. 73 est] erit B 73-74 erit2 beatus] sit B 75 est om. R j sit] scit R | tali om. R J posset] -ssit R 76 libere om. R 77 a ... produxit trp. B | in om. R 78 illi] certitudinaliter add. B | fortiter] formaliter R 78-79 et2 tanto assensu om. P 79 esse1] -set B 80 quia om. BR \ aliter] alias R 81 dicendum] dicitur P | haec est trp. P 82-83 Non ... opposito] stante tamen revelatione ilia, non potest revelari oppositum P 84 a Deo om. PR | est quod trp. B 85 quod a trp. B 86 Sed] quod P j quod sit revelatum om. P | concedendum est] conceditur P; quod est B 87 consequenter om. P j fore] -ret B 88-90 quando ... Dei om. P 89 certificat] hominem add. R 90 sed ... constare] quod sequitur quod magis P 91 hominis1 om. P 92 Dei om. PR j Deus om. R | asserit] assentit R 93 dico admittendo] ad illud dico B; admittatur P | sed] quod B 93-94 numquam] num R 94 se] sed B 95 dico] -citur P; om. R | stat] existat B

QUODLIBET III, QUAESTIO 3

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(ARTICULUS SECUNDUS)

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Ad rationem in oppositam partem quaestionis, dicitur quod facta tali revelatione et habito tali praecepto ille cui fit praeceptum non debet velle absolute a fore, sed sub condicione tantum. Unde dicitur quod posito isto casu de revelatione in Verbo quod a erit et quod Sortes nullam aliam aestimationem habeat de "# fore" nisi in Verbo, stante similiter isto praecepto quod nihil velit nisi quod apparet sibi rationale, non obligatur ex isto casu, scilicet, ad volendum a fore. Si vero /R 159va/ sponte velit a fore stante isto praecepto, ingerit se discrimini peccati mortalis, quia scit quod "a fore" est sic sibi revelatum quod potest numquam fuisse revelatum. Si vero ponatur in casu quod fiat Sorti existenti in caritate praeceptum quod velit a fore, potest dici quod praeceptum non est rationale, nee dari potest. 98 oppositam partem] oppositum P; oppositum ad B ] quaestionis] cum B 98-99 facta ... praecepto om. P 101-103 de ... rationale om. P 101 aliam om. R 102 fore om. B 103 praecepto quod] praeterito R | nisi om. B 104 ex ... scilicet] adhuc P 105 fore] -ret B { peccati mortalis] in peccato mortali B 106 sic sibi trp. P 107 ponatur] -namus R | fiat om. R J Sorti] sibi B 109 dari] dampnari P

Quodlibet ill, Quaestio 8 UTRUM GENERALIS RESURRECTIO NECESSARIO SIT FUTURA.

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(1) Et videtur quod sic, quia si non (necessario) sed contingenter, sequitur quod Christus potest ftiisse deceptus et homines fefellisse; immo quod haec est possibilis: "Christus modo est deceptus et omnes beati sunt decepti." Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum, Defide et symbolo. Consequentia tamen probatur, et primo quod potest fuisse deceptus, quia haec est modo necessaria: "Christus in a credidit resurrectionem esse futuram" (sit a aliquod tempus vitae Christi); igitur, si ita potest esse quod resurrectio numquam fuit futura, ita potest esse quod Christus in a credidit falsum. Et ultra: ergo ita potest esse quod Christus in a fuit deceptus. Consimili modo probatur quod ista est possibilis stante significatione terminorum: "Christus est modo deceptus et omnes beati sunt decepti"; et per idem patet modo quod haec est modo possibilis: /P 184ra/ "Christus decepit homines praedicando et asserendo resurrectionem esse futuram." Et tune sequitur quod haec est possibilis: "Christus non est veritas," secundum consequentiam beati Augustini, 83 quaestiones, quaestione xiv: "Si Christus," inquit, /R 162ra/ "fefellit, veritas non est." Antecedens est possibile; ergo et consequens. (2) Praeterea, si haec potest esse falsa: "resurrectio fuit /B 245va/ futura," non fuisset vera fides beatae Virginis et aliorum sanctorum de 3 Et ... quia] Quod sic arguitur, quia P; om. R j sed contingenter om. R 4 potest] -tuit P; modo add. R 4-6 immo ... decepti om. BR 6 falsum et om. R 7 tamen om. BP j et ... deceptus om. BR 8 haec ... necessaria om. B j in a] iam R 9 aliquod om. BP j ita] ista B 10-11 resurrectio ... quod om. B 11 credidit] credit R 11-16 Et ... possibilis] Ergo, quod fuit deceptus, et sic decepit alios, et sic R 11 fuit] in a fuit iter. B 14 modo1 om. B 16 quod] quia B 17 secundum ... Augustini] confirmaturper Augustinum R 18 Christus inquit trp. B 19 Antecedens ... consequens om. R j et om. P 20 Praeterea] Item R | potest] -sset R 21-22 et ... futura om. R 4-6

Perhaps Holcot refers to Augustine, De fide et symbolo, 24 (CSEL 41: 30), "Resurget igitur corpus secundum christianam fidem." 17-19 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q.14 (CCL 44A: 20).

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resurrectione futura; et si vera non fuit, nihil prodesse potuit. Hanc condicionalem ponit Anselmus, n Cur Deus homo, capitulo xvi. Igitur, modo est possibile quod beata Virgo numquam meruit per fidem resurrectionis, quod est impossibile, quia haec est absolute necessaria: "beata Virgo meruit credendo resurrectionem futuram." (3) Praeterea, capio aliquem de secta Sadducaeorum, qui praecise est damnatus, quia non credidit resurrectionem mortuorum; et tune arguitur sic: iste est damnatus quia credidit verum; igitur iniuste est damnatus. Consequens impossibile; igitur et antecedens. (4) Praeterea, Christus dixit resurrectionem corporum fore; igitur impossibile est illam non fore. Antecedens est necessarium, et consequentia probatur per Glossam, Matthaei xxviii, super illud: "surrexit, sicut dixit," ubi dicit Glossa, sic: "impossibile est non fieri quod dixit." (5) Praeterea, (i) Corinthios xv, sic arguit Apostolus ad probandum resurrectionem: "si," inquit, "mortui non resurgent, igitur nee Christus resurrexit"; et secundum Augustinum, n De doctrina Christiana, capitulo xxxi: "consequentiae quas facit Apostolus sunt bonae, licet habeant sententias falsas," id est licet antecedens et consequens sint falsa. Si ergo antecedens potest esse verum, ergo et consequens potest esse verum, videlicet illud: Christus non resurrexit. Consequens impossibile. 22 fuit] fuisset B j potuit] ponit R | Hanc om. R; wg. P 23 n ... homo trp. R 25 quod est] consequens R 26 beata Virgo om. R j futuram om. PR 27 Praeterea] Item R 28 credidit] credit R | tune arguitur] arguo BR 29 credidit] credit R \ est2 om. R 30 consequens] est add. B | igitur et antecedens] ergo antecedens P; om. R 31 Praeterea] Item R 32 illam] earn R | est2 necessarium] est notandum B; notum est R 33 per] unam add. R | xxviii] xxiii R j surrexit] resurrexit R 34 ubi ... sic] Glossa sic B; om. R | dixit] -cit P 35 Praeterea] Item ad R | xv] v P 36 inquit om. R j nee mg. R 37 et ... capitulo] De doctrina Christiana libro secundo R 38 habeant] -bent B 39 sententias falsas] (lacuna) R j id] hoc R j Si ergo trp. R 40 ergo et om. BP | potest2 ... verum2 om. R 41 illud] -la R; om. B | Consequens] est add. B; om. R | impossibile om. R 22-23 Anselm, Cur Deus homo, 2.17, ed. Franciscus Schmitt, 5. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera omnia (Edinburgh, 1946), 2: 125.1-2. 33-34 Matt. 28:6; Glossa ordinaria, in BibKa sacra cum Glossa ordinaria, primum quidem a Strabo Fuldensi collecta; ... et Postilla Nicolai Lyrani, Additionibus Pauli Burgensis, ac Matthiae Thoringi replicis ... , 6 vols. (Paris, 1590), 5, interlin. at col. 467-468. 35-37 1 Cor. 15:16. 37-39 Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, 2.31 (CCL 32: 66-67).

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(6) Praeterea, si resurrectio potest non fuisse futura, Christus potest non implere quod promisit, et per consequens potest fieri non-fidelis sive infidelis. Consequens falsum, quia sic posset peccare et peierare, contra Apostolum, Ad Thimotheum ii: "ille fidelis permanet; seipsum negate non potest"; Glossa: "Qui est veritas, 'non potest negare seipsum,' quod faceret si dicta sua non impleret." (7) Praeterea, Christus post resurrectionem suam dixit discipulis suis, Lucae xxiv: "haec sunt verba quae locutus sum ad vos cum adhuc essem vobiscum, quoniam necesse est impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Moysi, et prophetis, et Psalmis de me." Sed constat quod in prophetis scribitur quod resurrectio corporum sit futura; igitur necesse est quod impleatur, et per consequens non contingenter erit. (8) Praeterea, arguo sub hac forma: resurrectio generalis est prophetice praedicta; igitur necessario et immutabiliter ita erit, sicut est prophetatum. Antecedens patet in Daniele, et lob, et Ezechiele, et aliis; et consequentiam probo per definitionem 'prophetiae,' quae est ista, scilicet quod prophetia est divina inspiratio rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Igitur, si aliquid est prophetatum /P 184rb/ fore, illud immobiliter erit; igitur Deus non potest facere quin erit. 42 Praeterea] Item R j resurrectio ... futura] sic R 42-43 potest non trp. B 43 potest... sive] fieri BR 44 falsum ... et om. R | peierare] peiorare B; om. R 44-45 contra ... Ad] Unde B 45 ii] et R; dicit Apostolus add. B | ille] idem B | permanet] per naturam B 46 Qui] que B 47 faceret] fieret R [ dicta sua trp. P 48 Praeterea] Item R | Christus ... suis om. R 49 xxiv] xiv P 49-50 haec ... quoniam om. R 50 necesse] -ssario R [ scripta] dicta BP 51 et1] in add. B | et2 Psalmis] et per Psalmos B; om. R 52 sit] est BP j quod2] ut R 53 et ... erit om. R | non om. B | erit om. B 54 Praeterea ... forma] Item R 55 immutabiliter] immobiliter PR j ita erit trp. B; erit P 56 Daniele et lob] lob, Daniele R; Daniele, Job B 56-57 et3 ... et om. B; et videnda (n) Machabaeum (xii: xliv), de quo dicitur: "nisi enim eos, qui ceciderant, resurrecturos semper, superfluum videretur," etc. R 57 consequentiam probo] consequentia patet R j ista] haec R 58 scilicet ... est om. R; prophetia est B 59 veritate denuntians] veritatem de denuntians B 59-60 Igitur ... erit1 om. R 60 illu om. B 45-47 2 Tim. 13; Glossa ordinaria, 6, interlin. at col. 739-740. 49-51 Luke 24:44. 56-59 The definition of prophecy is from Cassiodorus, Expositio Psalmorum, praefatio, 1 (CCL 97: 7.1-2; PL 70: 12); the biblical passages to which Holcot alludes are probably Daniel 12:1-4, Ezechiel 37:12-14, and Job 14:7-15.

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(9) Praeterea, Anselmus, n Cur Deus homo, capitulo xvii: "si Deus proponat se immutabiliter facturum aliquid, illud non potest non esse futurum, antequam fiat." Sed Deus immutabiliter proposuit se facturum generalem resurrectionem corporum; igitur antequam fiat non potest non esse futura. (10) Praeterea, si revelatum maneret contingens post revelationem, ponamus quod reveletur ecclesiae de aliquo viatore, puta de Sorte, quod damnabitur. Quo posito, quaero: aut licet ecclesiae sperare salutem Sortis fore possibilem, vel non. Si non, contra: haec est contingens: "Sortes damnabitur"; igitur licet sperare quod potest esse falsa; immo scit modo quod potest esse falsa; igitur scit quod Sortes potest salvari; igitur licet sibi sperare salutem Sortis. Ideo, si concedatur consequentia, tune liceret pro tali orare. Contra hoc est beatus Augustinus, xxi De civitate Dei, capitulo xvii, ubi dicit sic: "denique si de aliquibus ita certa esset ecclesia, ut qui sunt illi etiam nosset, qui, licet adhuc in hac vita /B 245vb/ constituti, tamen praedestinati sunt in ignem aeternum ire cum diabolo, tarn pro eis non oraret quam nee pro ipso." Sed si liceret sperare salutem Sortis viatoris, liceret orare pro eo. Igitur, si non plus liceret in casu illo orare pro tali quam pro diabolo, non plus liceret sperare salutem talis quam salutem diaboli. Et manifestum est quod diabolus est iam de facto damnatus, ita quod haec est necessaria: "diabolus est damnatus." Igitur aequaliter est haec necessaria: "Sortes erit damnatus," dicto casu posito. 61 Praeterea] Item R j Anselmus] capitulo add. B; om. R j n om. R j si om. R 62 proponat... facturum] proponens se futurum R | illud] idem R | non2 om. B 63-65 Sed ... futura om. R 63 Sed] se P 65 futura] -rum B 66 Praeterea] Item R 66-67 revelatum ... quod1] si sic R 67 de ... quod2] quod Sortes R; de aliquo viatore praeterea Sortes quod B 68 Quo posito] vel ergo R j quaero aut om. R; aut P | sperare corr. ex superare R 69 possibilem] -bile R j contra] scit quod add. R ] est om. R 70 Sortes om. R j licet] sibi add. R 71 scit] sit R 71-72 igitur ... Sortis om. R 72 Ideo om. BR | si concedatur] si hoc concederetur B 72-73 consequentia ... orare om. horn. BP 73 hoc ... beatus] beatus B; om. R j Augustinus] -tinum R j XXI] xn B 74 Dei om. BR j ubi... sic om. BR j denique om. R | si de] fide B; si inquit de R 74-75 ita ... esset om. R 75-76 ut... constituti] certa quae R 75 etiam nosset] etiam noscet P; et nosceret B | adhuc om. B 76 constituti] contingent! B ] tamen] cum B; om. R ! praedestinati sunt trp. R 76-77 ire cum diabolo om. R 77 non om. B | nee om. BR j ipso] tantum add. R 77-83 Sed ... posito om. R 77 liceret] licet B 61-63 Anselm, Cur Deus homo, 2.17 (Schmitt, 2: 123.9-10). 73-77 Augustine, De civitate Dei, 21.24 (CSEL 40,2: 558.20-24; CCL 48: 789).

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(11) Praeterea, si resurrectio potest numquam fuisse futura, sequitur quod Deus potest decipi secundum notitiam deitatis et non solum per communicationem idiomatum; quia forte sic aliquis concederet quod Deus potest decipi. Consequentiam probo sic: omne reputans fore quod non erit decipitur; Deus potest se fore reputans aliquid fore quod non erit; ergo Deus potest decipi. Maior est necessaria, ut apparet ex i Priorum, quia, si maior sit de inesse et minor de possibili, sequitur conclusio de possibili; sic est in proposito; ergo etc. Minor vero probatur, haec scilicet: "Deus potest esse reputans aliquid fore quod non erit," quia faciat Deus quod resurrectio non erit; et arguitur sic: Deus potest reputare a fore; igitur Deus potest reputare aliquid fore quod numquam erit. Consequentia patet, ab inferior! ad superius. Similiter arguitur sic: Deus credit Antichristum fore, et ita est; et potest credere Antichristum non fore; igitur potest credere aliter quam est. Et sequitur: potest credere aliter quam est; igitur potest decipi. (12) Praeterea, Anselmus, De casu diaboli, capitulo xii, quaerens utrum angelus malus potuit esse praescius sui casus, distinguit de 'scientia,' et dicit /P 184va/ quod si quaestio fiat de ilia scientia "quae non est, nisi cum aliquid certa ratione intelligitur, omnino respondeo non posse sciri quod potest non esse. Quod enim non esse potest, nequaquam 84-95 Praeterea ... superius] Item, si sic, sit a talem quod non erit, et arguo sic: Deus potest a repugnare fore, quia potest facere quod erit; ergo Deus potest repugnare fore quod non erit R 85 per] propter B 86 sic] si B 87 sic] quia add. B 88 se om. P j reputans] repraesentans B | fore om. B 89 Deus om. B | ut] et discursus P | apparet] -rentis B 90 quia om. B 91 sic] sicut R | vero] -ra B 92 scilicet] si B | reputans aliquid] repraesentans B 93 quia ... erit2 om. B 94 reputare1'2] repraesentare B 95 numquam] non B j ad] suu(m) add. B 96 Similiter ... sic] Item R j credit] -didit R 98 Et ... est om. R 99 Praeterea] Item R | capitulo xii om. R 99-100 quaerens utrum] quaerit an R 100 malus om. R | praescius] praescientius B 100-102 de ... respondeo] oportet modo R 102 nisi om. B | aliquid ... ratione] aliqui circa rationem B; corr. ex certa ratione aliquid P 103 potest1 non trp. R 89-91 Aristotle speaks of mixed syllogisms "de necesseet de possibili" inAnafytica priora, translatio Boethii recensiones duae, translatio anonyma ... , 1.16 (AL 3,1-4: 36-39), but this precise rule is not found; nevertheless, it seems to have been commonly accepted. Among Holcot's sources, see, for example: William of Ockham, Summa logicae, 3.1.44 (OP 1: 474.7-9); Thomas Aquinas, Commentwn in iv libros Sententiarum, 1.38.1.5 (Parma, 1856; rpt. Paris, 1929), 1: 316. 99-104 Anselm, De casu diaboli, 21 (Schmitt, 1: 266.17-20).

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esse certa ratione colligi potest." Et ideo cum casus suus non necessario fiiit futurus, tali scientia non potuit angelus casum suum praescire. Et consequenter obicit contra istud, quia secundum hanc rationem nee Deus potest praescire illud quod fiet per liberum arbitrium, quia illud non necessario est futurum. Respondet quod non est simile de praescientia /R 162rb/ Dei et de praescientia creaturae, nee est necesse divinam praescientiam et angelicam in casu quaestionis eandem habere consequentiam. Ubi satis innuit evidenter quod ista consequentia est bona: "angelus praescit casum suum, igitur necesse est eum cadere"; sed ista non valet: "Deus praescit Sortem peccaturum, igitur Sortes necessario peccabit." Ex isto arguitur sic: "anima Christi scivit resurrectionem fore, ergo resurrectio necessario erit"; vel "si angelus beatus scit resurrectionem fore, ergo necessario erit." Antecedens patet, quia nee anima Christi nee aliquis beatus habet fidem de isto articulo, quia fides non fuit in Christo nee est in beatis, secundum Magistrum, Sententiarum libro (in), distinctione xxvi, et certum est quod assentiunt illi articulo, ergo non nisi per scientiam. Similiter, ex prima parte auctoritatis, videtur quod creatura beata non potest habere certain scientiam de resurrectione futura, quia dicit sic: "quod enim non esse potest, nequaquam esse certa ratione colligi potest." Videtur etiam sequi quod beatus creatus non potest habere securitatem de sua beatitudine nee de restauratione numeri beatorum. 104 certa ratione] circa rationem B | casus] angeli add. R 104-105 suus ... fuit] non potest necessario R; intelligitur B 105 tali scientia om. R j Et om. BR 106 obicit] -citur R 106-107 contra ... potest] quod Deus non posset tune R 107-108 illud2 ... futurum] tale non modo erit R 108 Respondet] Vel B; -detur R 108-109 praescientia Dei trp. BP 109 de om. PR | praescientia om. R | creaturae] a tempore add. B 109-111 nee ... evidenter] ubi innuit R 111 consequentia est bona] est consequentia bona P; est bona consequentia B 112 praescit] -scivit R 113 peccaturum] peccare B 114 peccabit] -vit B j Ex ... sic] Ergo nee a simili R | anima Christi] Christus R 115-120 vel... scientiam om. R 115 si] sic B 117 aliquis] -quid B 118 libro om. B ! xxvi] xvi P 119 illi articulo] a libero arbitrio B 121 prima] ilia R [ videtur] dicitur R j beata om. R 123 enim] eum R 124 Videtur ... habere] et eodem modo potest argui quod non habent BP 125 sua beatitudine trp. R j nee ... beatorum] futura R 118-120 Peter Lombard, Sententiae, 3.26.4 (Quaracchi, 1916; re-ed. Grottaferrata, 1971, 1981), 2: 160-161.

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<13> Praeterea, Anselmus, II Cur Deus homo, capitulo v, concludit in fine capituli sic: "Dicamus tamen quod necesse est, ut bonitas Dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod incepit." Et est intentio sua in illo capitulo probare istam conclusionem: quod quamvis necesse sit Deum perficere /B 246ra/ quod incepit, tamen hoc non facit cogente necessitate. Ad cuius evidentiam distinguit Anselmus de duplici necessitate, et dicit quod est necessitas quae benefacienti gratiam aufert aut minuit, et est necessitas qua maior gratia de beneficio debetur. Prima est necessitas coactionis quae facit aliquem involuntarium, et secunda est necessitas fidelis promissionis. Unde dicit, "si quid hodie sponte promittis te eras daturum, eadem eras voluntate das; quamvis necesse sit te reddere debitum promissum, si potes, aut mentiri, non tamen minus tibi debet ille pro impenso beneficio cui das, quam si non promisisses." Et infra dicit quod Deus implet promissionem suam quadam necessitate servandae /P 184vb/ honestatis quae "necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a seipso non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas." Ex isto processu arguitur sic: Deus promisit quod resurrectio corporum erit; igitur necesse est eum hoc facere si potest, vel mentiri si non potest; sed mentiri non potest; igitur et cetera. Secundo sic: Deus statuit hoc fieri, ergo de necessitate immutabilitatis hoc implebit. Tertio sic: si Deus non impleret quod promisit, Deus esset mutabilis; sed hoc est impossibile; igitur et cetera. Et consequentia patet ex intentione Anselmi, quia aliter non foret necessitas immutabilis in Deo ponenda. (14) Praeterea, si debeo credere quod resurrectio erit contingenter, sequitur quod non teneor aequali certitudine credere omnes articulos 126 Praeterea] Item R j Anselmus ... homo] casu debet homo R 126-127 concludit ... tamen om. R 128 immutabilitatem suam trp. R 128-142 Et ... processu] Ubi etiam dividit duplicem necessitatem videlicet coactionis et fidelis promissionis R 132 benefacienti] -facit B 133 gratia de beneficio trp. P 135-36 hodie ... eras1] sponte promittis hodie esse te B 139 Deus om. B | promissionem suam] -nes suas B 141 idcirco] necessitate B 142 arguitur] tune add. R 144 vel] non R j si2 non potest2 om. BR 144-145 sed ... cetera om. R 145 Secundo sic] Item R | statuit] scit R | de om. BP 146 immutabilitatis] in m{ut)abiliter R | hoc] haec R | implebit] -bitur B | Tertio sic] Item R; Tertio quia P 146-147 quod promisit] promisum R 147 esset] foret R 147-149 sed ... ponenda] consequens impossibile R 147-148 et ... Et om. B 150 Praeterea] Item R | credere] creare R | contingenter] consequenter R 151 non om. 126-128 Anselm, Cur Deus homo, 2.5 (Schmitt, 2: 100.26-27). 131-142 Ibid. (Schmitt, 2: 100.5-8, 24-26).

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fidei. Consequent falsum et contra Augustinum, Defide ad Petrum, ubi dicit "firmissime tene vel crede," etc., et contra Richardum, i De Trinitate, capitulo ii, "nihil certius vel constantius quam quod fide apprehendimus." Consequentia probatur, quia impossibile est quod homo ita firmiter credat illud cuius oppositum scit Deum posse facere, sicut illud cuius oppositum scit Deum non posse facere; sed de multis articulis credimus quod Deus non potest facere opposita illorum, sicut est de istis: "Deus est incarnatus," "Christus resurrexit," "Deus est trinus et unus"; igitur, etc. (15) Praeterea, si Deus potest facere futurum non esse futurum, tune eadem ratione potest facere non-futurum esse futurum. Consequens falsum, quia ponatur in esse quod Deus in aliquo instanti faciat b (et significet b quoddam non futurum, puta angelum perfectiorem perfectissimo angelo qui nunc est) esse futurum, et sit illud instans a. Et arguo tune sic: b nunc est futurum, igitur ab aeterno fuit futurum, quia si nunc est verum dicere quod b erit, prius fuit verum dicere quod b est futurum. Sed sequitur: ab aeterno fuit futurum, ergo non fit de novo futurum; et ultra: ergo Deus non facit hodie b de novo esse futurum, ergo non est possibile quod Deus faciat de non-futuro futurum. Item sub hac forma: si Deus potest facere de non-futuro futurum, sequitur quod Deus potest vel potuit fecisse de non-futuro futurum, et tune haec est possibilis: "Deus fecit de non-futuro futurum," vel igitur ab aeterno vel ex tempore. Si ab aeterno, igitur tale futurum fuit futurum ab aeterno; igitur numquam 152 falsum et otn. R 152-53 ubi dicit om. BR 153 firmissime ... etc. om. R; firmissime crede, etc. P | contra om. BR | I om. BP 154-155 nihil... apprehendimus o R 154 fide] tenemus add. et del. P 157 Deum] eum R | facere om. P 158 credimus] scit R j Deus om. R | opposita] -turn R | illorum] eorum B; om. R | est de istis] quod R 159 Christus ... et] et R 160 etc. om. R 161 Praeterea] Item R 161-62 tune eadem ratione] eadem ratione R; sic etiam B 163-170 ponatur ... forma] nihil de novo potest esse futurum quod iam est futurum, quod fuit futurum, et si semper fuit futurum non potest de novo esse futurum. Item R 163 faciat] fiat B 165 esse futurum om. P j illud instans] ille P 166 tune om. B 167 b1 om. B 169 facit con. ex faciat P j hodie b] hoc B j esse om. B 170 non-futuro] novo future R 171 sequitur quod om. BR 171172 vel potuit] non R; om. B 172 haec est tip. P 173 fecit de non-futuro] non-futuro fecit B ! futurum] et tune est haec possibilis: Deus fecit de non-futuro futurum add. R 152-153 Fulgentius Ruspensis, Defide ad Petrum, 35.78 (CCL 9lA: 756.1334-1337). 153-155 Richard of Saint-Victor, De Trinitate, 1.2, ed. Jean Ribaillier, Richard de Saint-Victor, De Trinitate, Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Textes philosophiques du moyen age (Paris, 1958), 6: 88.23-24.

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fuit non-futurum. Si ex tempore, igitur aliquid incepit esse fiiturum. Consequens falsum, sicut patet. Item sub hac forma: Deus potest facere aliquid de novo futurum; faciat igitur (et sit illud a). Et arguo sic: si a est de novo futurum, igitur Deus de novo scit a esse futurum; igitur Deus non prius scivit a esse futurum; igitur aliquid est futurum quod /B 246rb/ Deus /P 185ra/ non praescivit ab aeterno esse futurum, quod est inconveniens. Item sub hac forma: Deus potest facere de non-futuro futurum; igitur aliqua factione hoc faciet, vel igitur subito vel successive; et sive sic sive sic, patet deductio, ut prius argutum est. (16) Praeterea, ad principale arguitur sic: si resurrectio potest non fore, sequitur quod Deus nulla necessitate impleret dictum suum vel promissionem suam, et sic non plus remaneret obligatus ad faciendum a postquam iuravit se facturum a quam ante, et sic non minus inconveniens foret Deo omittere quod promisit quam illud quod numquam proposuit facere. Consequens falsum. Confirmatur ista ratio per hanc formam: aut Deum omittere quod promisit est Deo inconveniens vel non. Si non, contra: igitur Deum esse falsum vel impotentem non est Deo inconveniens. Quia omne promissum in ore fidelis est debitum, sequitur: tune frustra promitteret homini aliquid de future, et vane Deus crearet, et vane prophetae prophetarent. Si sic, cum quantumcumque modicum inconveniens sit Deo impossibile secundum Anselmum, igitur impossibile est Deo omittere aliquid quod promisit; igitur si Deus aliquid promisit, necesse est eum implere illud. (17) Praeterea, ista condicionalis est bona: "si Deus promisit resurrectionem fore, igitur resurrectio erit"; igitur consequentia est 176 sicut patet om R 176-177 sub ... sic om R 177 faciat] -ciant B j si om. BP 179 Deus om. BP 180-183 quod ... est om. R 182 faciet vel] facie B 183 sive2 sic2 om. B j deductio] de necessario B 184 Praeterea] Item R j arguitur sic om. BR j potest] -sset R 186 suam om. BR j plus ... obligatus] post remaneret R 187 postquam] plus quod R j facturum a] futurum R 188 omittere] non facere R | illud] idem R 189 proposuit facere] promisit facere B; facere proponit R | Consequens falsum om. R 189-190 ista ... omittere] ad idem dimittere R 190 vel] aliud R 191 igitur ... impotentem] arguit (lacuna) falsum R 191-192 non ... inconveniens om. BR 192 Quia] quod R | sequitur] similiter BP 193 homini aliquid tip. P | Deus om. P 194 prophetarent] -taverunt R | cum ... modicum] sed quodlibet R; contra quodlibet modicum B 195 inconveniens] in Deo add. B | sit] est BR \ impossibile1] inesse add. R j secundum] per R 195-197 impossibile2 ... illud] etc. R 196 aliquid1 om. B 197 illud] igitur P 198 Praeterea ista] Item haec R | bona] vera P | promisit] -mittit R 199 fore igitur om. R 199-200 igitur2 ... necessaria om. R 195 secundum Anselmum See lin. 135-142, above.

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necessaria; sed antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens. Quod autem antecedens sit necessarium patet, quia est verum de praeterito non dependens a future, licet enim resurrectionem fore sit futurum, tamen Deum promisisse resurrectionem fore /R 162va/ est a multis annis praeteritum. (18) Praeterea, arguitur sic: de necessitate Deus faciet resurrectionem fieri vel Deus erit falsus; sed impossibile est Deum esse falsum; igitur necesse est Deum facere quod resurrectio sit. Confirmatur per illud Apostoli, Ad Hebraeos vi, ubi probans quod spes electorum non potest esse frustra, quia Deus promisit et iuravit quod sic erit sicut sperant, dicit sic: "abundantius Deus volens ostendere pollicitationes heredibus et immobilitatem consilii sui, interposuit iusiurandum, ut per duas res immobiles, quibus impossibile est mentiri Deum, fortissimum solatium habeamus"; per duas, inquam, res immobiles, id est per promissionem et iuramentum. Ex qua auctoritate patet quod consilium Dei circa salutem electorum habet immobilitatem; et similiter quod divina promissio et iuramentum habent immobilitatem; et similiter quod impossibile est Deum mentiri; id est esse falsum. Et sic sequitur quod necesse est Deum implere quae circa salutem electorum promisit. {19} Praeterea, ita necessarium est quod resurrectio erit, sicut necessarium fuit Christum mori antequam moriebatur pro redemptione generis humani. Sed Christum mori fuit necessarium, quia secundum Magistrum, HI Sententiarum, distinctione xvi, "Christus accepit /P 185rb/ necessitatem moriendi"; igitur necesse fuit eum mori antequam moreretur. 200 sed] licet B; et P j necessarium igitur] necessarium est igitur et B 200-201 Quod ... necessarium] Minor R; Quod antecedens est necessarium B 201-202 est ... ftituro om. R 202 enim om. R 203 Deum] eum add. B j promisisse] Deum fore add. et del. B j a ... annis om. R 205 Praeterea] Item R 205-208 arguitur ... Apostoli om. R 208 Ad om. P | ubi] dicit add. et del. B 208-211 ubi ... ut om. R 211 et om. B j iusiurandum ut] vel B | per om. P; iter. B j res om. R 212-213 quibus ... immobiles om. horn. R 213-214 duas ... patet om. B | promissionem et iuramentum trp. R 214-216 Ex ... similiter om. R 215 et om. B 215-216 quod ... similiter om. horn. B 216 quod] quo R 217 Deum mentiri trp. R 217-218 id est... promisit] etc. R 217 Et... quod] igitur B 219 Praeterea ... sicut] Item quam R 220-222 pro ... Sententiarum] tarn necessarium est resurrectionem fore. Sed m libro R 222 xvi] 6 R 223-224 necesse ... moreretur om. R 208-213 Heb. 6:17-18. 222-224 Peter Lombard, Sententiae, 3.16 (2: 103-105).

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(20) Praeterea, si resurrectio corporum est solum contingenter futura, pari ratione quodcumque aliud futurum, quia productio cuiuscumque futuri et continuatio praesentis in ftiturum et pro futuro dependet a libera voluntate Dei; igitur de nullo future habetur certitude, et sic periret potissima pars beatitudinis, quae dicitur securitas futurae beatitudinis secundum Augustinum. AD OPPOSITUM arguitur sic: resurrectio generalis fiet libere a Deo; igitur contingenter fiet a Deo. Ista consequentia patet, quia si deberet fieri necessario a Deo, Deus necessitaretur ad agendum aliquid extra se; sed consequens est falsum; igitur (etc.). Praeterea, Deus potest adnihilare omnes angelos et omne aliud a se secundum Anselmum, De libertate arbitrii, capitulo viii. Sed non necessitate ad ea reparandum plusquam necessitabatur in principio ad ea producendum. Sed sine animabus et corporibus non potest resurrectio fieri; igitur non est absolute necessarium quod fiat resurrectio. Praeterea, Deus non magis necessitate ad causandum resurrectionem quam ad conservandum creaturam productam vel (ad) administrandum universum. Sed ad istud non necessitate, sed contingenter facit; igitur et aliud. IN ISTA QUAESTIONE intendo tria /B 246va/ facere, quia primo tractabitur iste articulus: utrum revelatum a Deo maneat contingens post revelationem, sicut fuit ante — et loquor de aliqua propositione de futuro revelata hominibus, cuiusmodi est ista: "resurrectio corporum erit." 225 Praeterea] Item R j est solum] sit R | contingenter] sit contingenter tier. R 226 aliud am. R 226-228 quia ... Dei] erit contingenter futurum R 228 nullo futuro] novo futurum nee R 229 potissima pars beatitudinis trp. B; beatitude cuius potissima pars R j quae ... beatitudinis] ponitur certitude R 230 Augustinum] Anselmum B 231 arguitur sic] est Magister B; om. R j generalis om. R \ a Deo om. R 232-234 fiet ... igitur] quia ex opposite sequitur oppositum R 233 se om. B 234 sed om. P \ est om. P j igitur om. P 235 Praeterea] Item R | omnes ... se] omne aliud a se, angelos et animas et corpora B; omne aliud a se R 236-239 secundum ... resurrectio] sine eorum recreatione; igitur R 237 reparandum] reprobandum B 237-238 in ... ea trp. B 238-239 resurrectio fieri trp. B 240 Praeterea Deus] Item R | magis] maius R 241 creaturam] causam B; creaturas R 241-242 productam ... necessitatur om. R 242 ad om. B | facit] unum add. R 244 ista] hac R j intendo ... quia] tria fient BR 244-253 primo ... Circa om. R 245 tractabitur] pertractabitur B 245-246 post revelationem] postquam fuit revelatum B 229-230 See below, Holcot, In Sententias, 2.2, at lin. 1528-1529. 235-236 Anselm, De libertate arbitrii, 8 (Schmitt, 1: 220.13).

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Secundo, dicetur ad quaestionem in forma sua. Et tertio ad rationes principal es.

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(ARTICULUS PRIMUS) CIRCA PRIMUM tria fient: primo ponetur una opinio modernorum; et secundo contra earn obiciam; tertio quaedam via alia adiungetur.

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Circa primum est notandum quod est opinio cuiusdam valentis quod facta revelatione absoluta de quocumque articulo de futuro, cuiusmodi est ista: "resurrectio mortuorum erit," non manet ille articulus postea contingens, sed necesse est sic esse sicut per illud revelatum denotatur fore. Nee potest Deus impedire vel omittere ne illud impleat, quia tale posse foret contra Dei voluntatem et veritatem, et ideo non foret posse, sicut posse facere contradictoria esse simul vera non est posse, immo contra potentiam Dei. Quando tamen dicitur quod "Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere oppositum," dicit quod haec propositio potest dupliciter intelligi. Unus (sensus) est secundum communiter intelligentes, quod Deus potest dimittere ordinationem factam et facere oppositum, ita quod haec sit vera simpliciter et absolute: "Deus potest facere oppositurn." Secundus sensus est iste: nisi Deus sic ordinasset, Deus posset facere oppositum, ita quod absolute considerando potentiam Dei ut potentia est sine eius ordinatione, non repugnat potentiae eius oppositum facere, nee in ea est defectus ad hoc. Primus sensus negatur et secundus sensus conceditur. Et ita tenet haec opinio quod propositio de futuro absolute revelata a Deo vel asserta, est simpliciter /P 185va/ necessaria, 248 sua om. B 253 est1 ... opinio] notandum est quod opinio B; est utrum (corr. ex. uterum) revelatum a ponit opinionem R | valentis] est add. B 254-255 facta ... erit om. R 254 de2 om. B 255 ista] et add. B | non] sed add. R 255-256 ille ... denotatur] necessarium R 257 fore om. BR 258 voluntatem et1 om. BP j posse2] possibile P 259 esse om. R | immo om. R 260 Dei] et R; om. B | tamen om. R j quod om. R [ Deus] potest add. R | sua om. BR 261 potest1 om. R | oppositum] obiectum del. et corr. mg. R | haec propositio] hoc R 261-262 potest2 ... intellegi] duplicem potest habere intellectum B; duplicem habet intellectum P 262-263 Unus ... quod] Primus intellectus est R 262 Unus] Uno B 263 factam] futuram R 263-268 ita ... ad hoc om. R 264 haec sit vera] est B j absolute] vera add. B 265 posset] -test B 266 considerando] desiderando B 268 negatur] falsus R j et om. B 269 sensus om. PR ] conceditur] verus R 269-273 Et ... est om. R 253 By using the term valens Holcot cites a more senior colleague, probably the "master Walter" to whom Adam Wodeham refers; see above, "Introduction," n. 108.

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ita quod Deus propter talem assertionem vel revelationem non potest facere oppositum nee impedire quin illud fiet vel eveniet quod revelatum est. (Contra Opinionem) 275

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Sed contra istam opinionem arguitur sic: quaero de ordinatione, vel revelatione, vel assertione divina: aut ordinatio Dei est ipse Deus, vel creatura, vel creaturae, vel Deus et creatura. Si Deus, igitur est natura divina; igitur quod repugnat illi ordinationi repugnat naturae divinae, et per consequens potentiae divinae. Et si Deus propter illam ordinationem necessitaretur ad alterum oppositorum, sequitur quod Deus ex natura sua necessitaretur ad alterum oppositorum, quod tamen non concedit haec opinio. Si ilia ordinatio est creatura vel creaturae, vel Deus et creaturae, Deus potest talem creaturam vel creaturas adnihilare, quia omne aliud a se potest Deus adnihilare secundum Augustinum, iv Super Genesim, capitulo xiv, exponens illud lohannis: "Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor," et quomodo ilia auctoritas concordat cum ilia Genesis i, "requievit Deus die septimo," dicit quod Pater et Filius operantur creaturarum omnium administrationem "alioquin continue dilaberentur. Creatoris namque potentia, et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus, causa subsistendi est omni creaturae, quia virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis, si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim, sicut structor aedium cum 272 illud] ita B | eveniet] -niret B 275 Sed] ad add R 275-276 contra ... ordinatio] ad ordinationem R 276 est ipse mg. B; est R | vel2] ut R; et B 277 creaturae] -tura B 277-278 igitur ... divina om. R 278 igitur quod trp. R | naturae divinae] deo R 278-279 et... divinae om. R 279 Et] I