SECRECY IN US FOREIGN POLICY
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SECRECY IN US FOREIGN POLICY
For my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiko Komine
Secrecy in US Foreign Policy Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China
YUKINORI KOMINE Miyazaki International College, Japan
© Yukinori Komine 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Yukinori Komine has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England
Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Komine, Yukinori Secrecy in US foreign policy : Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China 1. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994 2. Kissinger, Henry, 1923- 3. United States - Foreign relations - China 4. China - Foreign relations - United States 5. United States - Foreign relations - 1969-1974 6. China - Foreign relations - 1949-1976 I. Title 327.7'3'051'09047 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Komine, Yukinori. Secrecy in US foreign policy : Nixon, Kissinger, and the rapprochement with China / by Yukinori Komine. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States--Foreign relations--China. 2. China--Foreign relations--United States. 3. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994. 4. Kissinger, Henry, 1923- 5. United States--Foreign relations--1969-1974. 6. United States--Foreign relations--Decision making. 7. Executive privilege (Government information)--United States. 8. Official secrets--United States. I. Title. E183.8.C5K64 2008 327.73051--dc22 2007041407 ISBN 978-0-7546-7272-2
Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.
Contents Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations A Note on Transliteration of Chinese Terms Introduction
vii ix xi 1
PART I THE FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING 1
The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership for a New China Initiative
15
2
Foreign Policy Decision-Making Machinery for the US Rapprochement with China
41
PART II THE EVOLUTION OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT POLICY 3
The Development of Policy Options from January to July 1969
71
4
The Reassessment of the China Policy from July to November 1969
91
5
6
The Resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks from December 1969 to May 1970
115
The Development of Backchannel Communications from June 1970 to July 1971
135
PART III
DIRECT TALKS
7
Kissinger’s Trips to Beijing in July and October 1971
159
8
Nixon’s Trip to China in February 1972
197
Epilogue Conclusion
229 241
Appendix Bibliography Index
251 255 279
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Acknowledgements During the research for and writing of this book for almost a decade, I have benefited from assistance and generosity of a number of people in America, Britain, and Japan. I would like to express my appreciation to the former and present members of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, Britain. I am indebted to Professor Ian Bellany, Mr. Gordon Hands, Professor Gerd Nonneman, and Dr. Peter Wilkin for their comments on the manuscripts. I would like to record my gratitude to Miss Becky Richards for proof-reading the manuscripts and for offering me invaluable suggestions. I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Paul Stares, then the Director of Research and Studies Program, the United States Institute of Peace, who provided me a crucial opportunity of consultation which materialized a series of interviews with former US officials. I am indebted to Dr. Gareth Davies, St Anne’s College, Oxford University, who has given me a number of advices for archival research in Washington DC. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following academic experts and former US officials for their cooperation for interviews and correspondences: Professor Saki Dockrill, Professor Rosemary Foot, Dr. Evelyn Goh, Dr. Morton Halperin, Mr. Charles Kennedy, Ambassador Winton Lord, Mr. Peter Rodman, Professor David Shambaugh, Ambassador Richard Solomon, Professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Professor Allen Whiting. I would like to express my thanks to the support of a number of archivists and librarians in the following institutes: The National Archives, Archives II, Maryland; The Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress, Washington DC; The Special Collection Division, The Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington DC; and The inter-library loans, Lancaster University Library. My editors at Ashgate Publishing Limited have provided an excellent assistance and continuing encouragement throughout the review and editing of this book. My gratitude goes to: Ms. Carolyn Court, Nikki Dines, Aimée Feenan, Kirstin Howgate, and Margaret Younger. I am grateful to my colleagues and friends in Miyazaki International College, Japan. I have received useful comments, help and encouragement from Professors Bern Mulvey, Mundoli Narayanan, Edward Rummel, and Amy Szarkowski. Amy generously read the entire manuscript and offered a number of significant suggestions. I have benefited from the support and encouragement given by my old friends and colleagues. My thanks go to: Cem Birsay, John Boyle, Jim Bowey, Estevao Cabral, Tom Colombino, John Elder, Stewart Fraser, Ozge Girit, Juan Hall, Radhika
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Kanchana, Githadethevi Kanisin, Philipe Larcher, Al Lawson, Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Vince Miller, Rob Moore, Beth Rempe, Athanasia Rodaki, Tracy Sartin, Graham Smith, Chris Shelhorse, Lee Smith, Ghulam Yar. Finally, a special word of thanks must be reserved for my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiko Komine, for their support over the last twelve years in America, Britain, China, and Japan. Yukinori Komine Washignton DC August 2007
List of Abbreviations ADST CF CIA Chicom CWIHP
Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training Country Files US Central Intelligence Agency Chinese Communists Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
DOD
US Department of Defense
FAOHC FPF FPF/Lord FRUS
Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection For the President’s Files For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) Foreign Relations of the United States
Haig-File HAK HAK-ASF HAKOF
Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Special File Henry A. Kissinger Henry A. Kissinger Administrative and Staff Files Henry A. Kissinger Office Files
INR
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State
Memcon MemforP
Memorandum of Conversation Memoranda for the President
NA
US National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park, Maryland Name Files Nixon Presidential Materials Staff National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC US National Security Council National Security Council Files National Security Council Institutional Files The National Security Council Project, Oral History Roundtables, The Brookings Institute and Center for International and Security Studies, Maryland, Virginia National Security Decision Memorandum National Security Study Memorandum
NF NPMS NSA NSC NSCF NSCIF NSCP-OHR
NSDM NSSM
x
P/HAK Memcons POF PPF PPS PRC PSF PTF RG 59
Secrecy in US Foreign Policy
Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger Memorandum of Conversations President’s Office Files President’s Personal Files Policy Planning Staff People’s Republic of China President’s Speech Files President’s Trip Files
RN ROC ROM
Record Group 59, General Records of the US Department of State Richard M. Nixon Republic of China Records of Meetings
SALT SF SNF STATE
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Subject Files Subject-Numeric Files US Department of State
Telcon
Telephone Conversation
WHCF WHSF WSAG
White House Central Files White House Special Files Washington Special Action Group
A Note on Transliteration of Chinese Terms In general, this book has used the Pinyin system of transliteration of most Chinese names and places. It uses the original forms regarding Wade-Giles spelling in direct quotations from primary documents. For example, the declassified transcripts and policy analysis papers wrote “Peking,” “Mao Tse-tung,” and “Chou En-lai,” which the Pinyin transliteration system has rendered as “Beijing,” “Mao Zedong,” and “Zhou Enlai,” respectively.
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Introduction [A general] must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War Secrecy is the very soul of diplomacy.
François de Callières, 1716 1. Setting the Scene: Secrecy and the Nixon-Kissinger Diplomatic Coup On July 15, 1971, US President Richard M. Nixon announced his decision to accept the invitation from the Chinese leaders to visit the People’s Republic of China at appropriate time before May 1972, resulting from the confidential talks between Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing to open the door for more normalized relations between the United States and China. His briefly televised announcement astonished and delighted a large number of the American and international audiences. The diplomatic breakthrough in US-China relations also shocked America’s allies as well as its adversaries in the world. In short, the NixonKissinger diplomacy of surprise dramatically ended the two decades of mutual hostilities between Washington and Beijing since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, which caused the “Loss of China” to the Communists and the development of SinoSoviet alliance. Nixon’s historic journey to a newly-emerging but still mysterious Middle Kingdom and the spectacle of his meeting with the prominent revolutionary leader, Chairman Mao Zedong, also formed romanticism in the American public symbolizing the entry of the world into the era of negotiations. In particular, the US rapprochement with China transformed the structure of the international system from US-Soviet bipolar military rivalry to US-Soviet-China diplomatic triangle, in which the US played the pivotal role of being a balancer in the deepening SinoSoviet rift. Simultaneously, by opening to China, which US officials once viewed as an expansive threat causing America’s prolonged involvement into the Vietnam War, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to put pressure and isolate North Vietnam. Prior to the Nixon announcement, there had been Washington’s public and private communications with Beijing over a two-and-half year period, based on a highly
2
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complex bureaucratic maneuvering between the Nixon-Kissinger White House and the State Department. This book examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by President Richard M. Nixon and the National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger in foreign policy decisionmaking as a principal characteristic in the US rapprochement with China in the early 1970s.1 It was Nixon’s presidential leadership that drove the new China initiative, along with Kissinger’s contributions as a skilful negotiator and strategic thinker. Together, Nixon and Kissinger re-activated the National Security Council as the President’s principal forum for foreign policy decision-making, namely a multi-level system with the Council at the highest, the Kissinger-led Review and Operational Groups in the middle and the Interdepartmental Groups at the bottom. Nixon wanted a formal and systematic NSC, which moved authority from the departments to the White House; Kissinger designed the systematic control of policy study papers within the NSC that enabled the development of a full range of policy options for presidential consideration and decision. In a broader sense, therefore, this study perceives the centralization of power in the White House and the exclusion of the State Department from the direct decisionmaking process as a “diplomatic coup” by Nixon and Kissinger. While the so-called “rational actor model” perceives the government as a unitary actor with agreedupon goals to be attained, the alternative “bureaucratic politics model” emphasizes government as the representative of diverse interests to be bargained.2 On the basis of the rational actor model or the so-called realist model, the conventional interpretation of the US rapprochement with China emphasizes the importance of 1 “Rapprochement” is a term of French origin, which implies: a coming together again in friendship of former enemies; and the reconciliation, restoration, and renewal of relations, especially between states. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, New edition. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2003). In particular, the term “rapprochement” is often used to describe the US opening to China, namely the development of US initial diplomatic contact with China from January 1969 to June 1971, which resulted in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. “Normalization” implies a much longer political process toward the establishment of US official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in January 1979. 2 Allison examines the decision-making process of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study in crisis management. He suggests three models for the analysis of foreign and defense policy decision-making analysis: 1) the rational actor model – an examination of purposive and reasonable actions by a unified national government; 2) the organizational model – an exploration of the pattern and operating procedure of organizational behavior; and 3) the bureaucratic politics model – an analysis of a resultant of various bargaining process among players within national government. See Graham Allison and Philipe Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second edition. (New York: Longman, 1999). Halperin and Clapp, with Kanter, analyze the roles played by government departments, agencies and individual officials with a set of interests to preserve and promote. Those priorities and their occasional conflicts influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. See Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp with Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second edition. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007). Chapter 2 of this book examines the bureaucratic politics model within the context of the revitalization of the National Security Council system by Nixon and Kissinger.
Introduction
3
the strategic and geopolitical calculations for the US’s leverage in the Sino-Soviet rift and the subsequent development of the triangular balance of power between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.3 On the other hand, adhering most closely to the bureaucratic politics model, this book examines how the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger affected the interactions between the White House and the State Department over the devising and implementing of the new China initiative; and how Nixon and Kissinger personalized diplomacy and held secret talks with the Chinese leaders regarding the reduction of direct threat from the respective sides.4 The present introduction briefly outlines the following: 1) the evolution of the conception of rapprochement; 2) the aspects of the search for secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger in the implementation of rapprochement; and 3) the major security issues which Nixon and Kissinger sought to discuss with the Chinese leaders during their highly confidential talks. At the same time, it also demonstrates how this book seeks to fill the gaps in focus and coverage left by the existing accounts of the NixonKissinger diplomacy toward a new China policy. Despite the respective claims by Nixon and Kissinger for the historical breakthrough which shifted the balance of power in the international system from military bipolarity to political multipolarity, the US rapprochement with China was not necessarily an original political notion of the two decision-makers. In reality, beneath the Nixon-Kissinger initiative, there was a long-term development of a variety of concepts for US reconciliation with China during the pre-Nixon-Kissinger era, such as American domestic debate on China during the mid-1960s, Sino-US ambassadorial talks from 1955 to 1968, and the middle-rank level bureaucratic policy studies during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.5 From the mid 1960s, 3 See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, Revised edition. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994); James H. Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999); and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). As for the main arguments in the existing literature on the Kissinger years, see, for example, Jussii M. Hanhimaki, “‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerrogy, Thirty Years and Coming,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 5 (November 2003). 4 Secrecy in politics and diplomacy can be defined as the practice of sharing information only among a group of key officials, as small as one individual, while concealing it from others, such as other members of governments, leaders of political parties, foreign governments, journalists and the public. Secrecy is considered to be “necessary to enable governments that have taken extreme positions in public to compromise in private and to be protected against the consequences of disclosure until the terms of agreement are final and can be defended successfully against domestic critics.” See Charles W. Freeman Jr., The Diplomat’s Dictionary, Revised edition. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 264. 5 See, for example, Rosemary Foot, “Redefinition: The Domestic Context of America’s China Policy in the 1960s,” and Steven M. Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf: The SinoAmerican Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955–1970” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds), Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Evelyn Goh, Constructing the Rapprochement with
4
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China experts in academia held a series of public debates on US China policy in order to raise awareness among the American public of the importance of reversing a rigid policy of containment and isolation and reducing tensions with China, which formulated a firm political and social foundation for the new China initiative by Nixon and Kissinger. The Warsaw ambassadorial talks played a vital role as a crisis management channel between the US and China in order to prevent miscalculation of the respective intentions during the escalation of the Vietnam War. In the 1960s, State Department officials at mid-level ranks continuously assessed China’s military, political, economic and ideological power resources; they came to conclude that the threat from Beijing was not as serious as it had previously been estimated within the US government since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the outburst of the Korean War in June 1950.6 Within the historical context of those long-term bureaucratic assessments and public debates, this book compares the development of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conceptions on US policy toward China, viz. the evolution of Nixon’s personal interest in China as Vice President in the Eisenhower administration during the 1950s and as a private citizen during the 1960s; and Kissinger’s views on China prior to 1969 as well as the possible influence of bureaucratic and academic expertise on Kissinger’s interpretations of the Sino-Soviet differences.7 While maintaining his long-term public reputation as an anti-Communist cold warrior toward the threat from Communist China, Nixon privately assessed China’s short-term weakness in the Sino-Soviet rift as well as its long-term potential strength as a nuclear-armed state being outside the regular diplomatic interactions of the international community. On the other hand, Kissinger originally perceived China as a revolutionary power which was much more aggressive than the Soviet Union and thus was skeptical about any quick opening to China in the earlier period of the Nixon administration. When, why and how did Nixon and Kissinger come to convince themselves of the necessity and possibility of the rapprochement with China? What differences and similarities were there between their respective views on US China policy? While the existing accounts examine the breadth of US-China relations (from the late 1940s to the early 1970s), this book takes a deeper look into the most dynamic stage of the NixonKissinger initiative (January 1969–February 1972).
China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 6 Foot emphasizes the importance of a much wider conceptual framework in the US attempt to integrate China into the international community through the practice of “structural power” – the establishment of multiple international interactions with China strategically, commercially, intellectually, and militarily. Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995). 7 In his memoirs, Kissinger creates the impression that he independently came to realize the necessity and possibility of the opening to China during the early period from 1968 to 1969. See Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Little Brown, 1979), pp. 163–167. Yet, it seems likely that because of his original specialization in European power politics, Kissinger’s interest, knowledge, and experience regarding China were still limited in early 1969. This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 2 (pp. 30–37) of this book.
Introduction
5
Upon assuming the office, Nixon and Kissinger centralized power and operated foreign policy from the White House, because of their personal distrust of the Washington bureaucracy and their excessive sensitivity to the danger of leakages (especially by the State Department and also by US allies), which might undermine a new China initiative. They were also afraid of the conservative backlash by the pro-Chinese Nationalist lobby in Congress against any new initiative toward the Communist regime in Beijing. Following the two decades of mutual hostility, the only formal communication between the United States and China was via the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Thus, in parallel to the sending of a number of public signals (official statements which expressed the US’s willingness to resume a diplomatic dialogue with China as well as the lifting of trade and travel restrictions), Nixon and Kissinger privately explored and utilized the so-called “back-channel” – “a direct negotiation through White House communications, bypassing regular diplomatic channels and forums” – through third parties, such as Pakistan and Romania, to communicate with the Chinese leaders.8 In essence, Nixon and Kissinger valued the speed of these back-channel communications for the transformation of US policy toward China from containment and isolation to engagement and coexistence. This book examines the political-diplomatic process of the US’s opening to China, namely how Nixon and Kissinger designed and sent public signals to the Chinese leaders and simultaneously sought to install and develop backchannels, while the State Department, without knowing the real intensions of the White House, continued to seek the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Nixon and Kissinger operated within a certain time frame; they wanted to see the realization of rapprochement with China before the presidential election in November 1972.9 They sought to obtain credit for an historic breakthrough, dramatically ending prolonged hostility with Beijing. Nixon envisioned that the presidential trip to China in February 1972, which he described as a “journey for peace,” would earn him international credit as a peace-maker, and thus significantly enhance his domestic political support for re-election.10 At the same time, after his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, Kissinger attempted to establish international prestige as a great diplomat and statesman in an era of negotiation.11 Together, Nixon and Kissinger wanted 8 Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (Boston: Little Brown, 1999), p. 79. In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger presents his latest reflections on the Nixon presidency, including the development of the National Security Council system and the China initiative. See ibid., chapters 2 and 5. 9 The political time frame started in January 1969. 10 Reeves sought to create a detailed chronological description to “reconstruct the Nixon presidency as it looked from the center.” Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 13. MacMillan describes Nixon’s visit to China as a great ceremonial occasion for the media and public to maximize the dramatic effect of historical opening. Margaret MacMillan, Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao (London: John Murrey, 2006). 11 Hanhimaki conducted a comparative analysis of Kissinger on the one hand as a skilful diplomat and on the other as a bureaucratic manipulator obsessed with secrecy. Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
6
Secrecy in US Foreign Policy
the China breakthrough to come as a “great headline,” calculating that “public excitement would sweep away a lot of the uncertainty, suspicion, hostility, [and] criticism that might otherwise have accrued.”12 Finally, the historical and dramatic opening to China became a highly personal issue of ego and jealousy between Nixon and Kissinger. On the one hand, the new China policy symbolized the height of the Nixon-Kissinger secret diplomacy making the two decision-makers privately compete for credit and publicity. On the other hand, the excessive secrecy itself remained within the Nixon presidency, sowing the seeds of the Watergate scandal.13 While the existing biographical accounts of the Nixon-Kissinger relationship assessed the political careers of the respective leaders in a broad international and domestic political context of the 1960s and 1970s, the present book focuses on the China initiative to re-assess the nature of the Nixon-Kissinger leadership. In his memoirs, Nixon stressed the need for secrecy because “the more we had to put things into words, the less freedom of movement we would have in our dealings with the Chinese.”14 Kissinger also explained that owing to the “delicacy of the event,” the “uniqueness of the opportunity,” and the unforeseeable outcome, it was essential for the United States to be in control of the presentation of the China initiative. “[W]e did not want to risk inflating expectations, generating pressures, and forcing the two sides to take public positions before the results were known.”15 Thus, the pursuit of secrecy for the China initiative was necessary for Nixon and Kissinger and could be justified because of the danger of leaks, possible conservative opposition, and finally bureaucratic pressure to seek concessions.16 In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger, because of their highly personalized use of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, also caused unnecessary confusion and friction within the bureaucracy. At the operational level, the re-vitalized NSC system was “very secretive at the top.”17 Nixon did not share some information even with Kissinger. Together, Nixon and Kissinger did not share their intentions and
12 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department of State, 1965–81), Oral History Interview, p. 11, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University. 13 Dallek examines the Nixon-Kissinger partnership as the two most powerful but compelling and contradictory policy-makers whose complex personal relationship influenced both collaboration and rivalry. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). 14 Richard M. Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 555. 15 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 762–763. 16 See, for example, William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang A Division of Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 1998), p. 233, and pp. 244–245; and Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 342–343, and pp. 347–348. Hanhimaki interprets that secrecy was a “means to a broader bureaucratic end” for Kissinger to secure his “personal reserve” of US China policy. Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, p. xvii, and p. 118. 17 Allen Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003.
Introduction
7 18
agenda with other senior officials within the administration. Kissinger’s NSC staff was “closely held.”19 For example, former NSC staff member, Morton H. Halperin, recalls that Kissinger “manipulated” the NSC staff and “dealt with each one separately and instructed them not to tell anyone else what they were doing. Often he had two people working on the same issue without telling them.”20 Kissinger used the NSC staff for “what he thought they were good at.” The problems arose further as Nixon and Kissinger “wanted to operate without talking to the cabinet members.”21 On the other hand, though he was the dominant intellectual on the NSC staff, Kissinger was less at home as an administrator. Thus, while Nixon preferred to avoid face-toface meetings with other senior officials and used memoranda extensively, Kissinger greatly benefited from his Deputy Alexander M. Haig Jr.’s bureaucratic experience as well as from the White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman’s role as intermediary in dealing with the State Department.22 At policy planning level, despite the deliberate and systematic exclusion of the State Department from the decision-making process, Nixon and Kissinger still relied on bureaucratic expertise, especially that of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, headed by Assistant Secretary Marshall Green in order to develop policy options in the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) papers from 1969 to 1971.23 Hence, senior State Department officials, regional experts, and intelligence officers contributed to the formulation of the new China initiative without knowing 18 In early 1971, Nixon told the White House Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, that he needed a record of his decision-making to protect himself in the eyes of history. Nixon wanted Oval Office and Cabinet Room meetings recorded on tape. Hence, the Technical Services Division of the US Secret Service installed a voice-activated system in the Oval Office and a switch-activated system in the Cabinet Room starting on February 16, 1971. The entire system, which was completed during the next four months, recorded conversations between President Nixon, his staff, and visitors at locations in the Oval Office; the President’s Executive Office Building hideaway office; the Cabinet Room; various White House telephones in the Oval Office and the Lincoln Sitting Room; and at various Camp David locations. History of the Nixon White House Tapes, Audiovisual Research Room, National Archives, Archive II, College Park, Maryland. 19 Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. 20 Morton H. Halperin, Correspondence with the author, May 11, 2004. 21 Ibid. 22 Haldeman was often present when Nixon and Kissinger held private discussions about US China policy. Thus, Haldeman’s handwritten notes and diaries provide very useful records about precisely when Nixon and Kissinger discussed China policy. Specific examples are examined in Part II (Chapters 3–6). 23 As for the reassessment of the operational process of US rapprochement with China by former US officials, see, for example, Alexander M. Haig Jr. (with Maccarry Charles), Inner Circles, How America Changed the World: A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992); H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994); Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Maryland: DacorBacon House, 1994); and John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of the Normalization of US-China Relations (Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1997).
Secrecy in US Foreign Policy
8
the real intentions of Nixon and Kissinger. On the other hand, while maintaining a low profile, NSC staff members, such as Winston Lord and Peter Rodman, played a crucial role as a mini-bureaucracy in the day-to-day operation of highly secretive US China policy. NSC staff regional experts, such as John Holdridge, Richard Smyser and Richard Solomon also provided expertise in policy option studies and situational analyses as well as NSC briefing papers for Nixon and Kissinger prior to the July and October 1971 trips and February 1972 trip. In particular, the evidence presented in the chapters that follow shed a new light on the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970 as the first major breakthrough during the US opening to China, which officially clarified the US intention to promote a new dialogue with the People’s Republic of China. Ironically, however, Nixon and Kissinger introduced a number of ideas without sufficiently attempting to “discover the kinds of policies toward China that had [previously] been advocated.”24 Hence, the bureaucratic preparation for the Warsaw talks also revealed the difference between the White House (especially the Kissinger-NSC staff) and the State Department (especially its Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs) regarding the timing and agenda for the new China initiative. In comparison, while the White House wanted to operate faster and was principally interested in improving relations with its adversaries, namely China and the Soviet Union, the State Department remained cautious and was concerned more about coordinating US relations with its allies, especially the Republic of China (commonly referred to as Taiwan) and Japan. On the one hand, Nixon and Kissinger tended to impose the simplified global framework of a US-Soviet-China strategic triangle on complex and subtle regional issues, such as the handling of Taiwan’s status, Japan’s role in East Asia, and the India-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia. On the other hand, because of their pursuit for strict secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger under-estimated the importance of the US’s regular diplomatic channels with its allies. Hence, Nixon and Kissinger did not sufficiently use the multiple intelligence sources from the State Department to more effectively implement China policy, especially after the US’s military operation in Cambodia in May 1970 and the subsequent ending of Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger failed to understand the subtle and symbolic signals that China was sending in the attempt to promote a new dialogue.25 Moreover, as the following chapters will show in detail, there was bureaucratic rivalry among US officials with different views on the priority of issues in the US relations with China. For example, there was difference between the NSC staff and State Department officials over the method, timing, and agenda of a new China initiative, and also between China experts and Soviet experts within the State Department over the pros and cons about the resumption of a diplomatic dialogue with China.26 Finally, as already suggested, the inadequate communication between the White House and the State Department increased the perception gap between them over a new China policy.
24 25 26
Rosemary Foot, interview with the author, July 13, 2004. Specific examples are examined in Chapter 6. Specific examples are examined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5
Introduction
9
In military-security terms, Nixon and Kissinger sought to restore the US centrality in the international system. On the global level, through secret diplomacy and private negotiations, Nixon and Kissinger estimated that because of the deepening SinoSoviet rift since the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the opening to Beijing would make Moscow become more cooperative with Washington in arms control talks and thus enhance détente – the easing of tensions between the two superpowers. Repeatedly stressing the importance of Realpolitik and the balance of power, it is Kissinger who criticizes China experts (both in the bureaucracy and in academia) and the liberals who failed to recognize sufficiently the opportunity for the US to exercise leverage within the Sino-Soviet rivalry.27 On the regional level, with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine to promote Vietnamization, which increased pressure on America’s Asian allies to further build up their defense capabilities, Nixon and Kissinger sought to explore the opportunity to use China’s influence on North Vietnam to promote a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War. Consequently, as Kissinger often stressed, the US rapprochement with China thus marked the beginning of a new relationship, the so-called “strategic triangle” between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. More particularly, as this book examines in greater detail, during the behindthe-scene talks in July and October 1971, and February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger gave a private assurance to the Chinese leaders of the US withdrawal from Taiwan in accordance with the easing of tensions in Indochina. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that the remaining US military presence in Asia would serve China’s security interests in order to counter-balance other states, not only the Soviet Union, but also Japan and India.28 This book thus perceives the rapprochement as the beginning of a long political and diplomatic process to pursue pragmatic co-existence between the United States and China, not as new friends or as old enemies, but as the two unsentimental calculators of selfinterests. The purpose of this book, then, is a detailed and systematic analysis of the evolution process of the rapprochement policy, with particular attention to the pursuit of secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger. In doing so, the focus is on the three major stages in the US rapprochement with China:
27 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165. Kissinger’s views on the balance of power in theory and practice are examined in Chapter 1, Sub-sections 2.2 and 2.3 (pp. 31–35) of this book. 28 Recent publications examine Chinese motivations for the rapprochement with the United States and a series of internal policy studies as well as discussions among the Chinese leaders. Shambaugh recognizes that Zhang Baijia, the son of Zhang Wenjin, former Foreign Minister [1971–1972], is a very important historian in the Chinese Communist Party’s Party Research Office in Beijing. David Shambaugh, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. See, for example, Zhang Baija and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontations: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” and Li Jie, “Changes in China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-US Relations,” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds), Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chapter 9.
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•
•
•
Conception: The similarities and differences between Nixon’s and Kissinger’s views on China, the presidential leadership and the revitalization of the NSC system as the principal foreign policy decision-making body. Implementation: The development of policy option studies and the public and private signal exchange from January 1969 to June 1971, and the pattern of bureaucratic rivalry between the Nixon-Kissinger White House (including the National Security Council staff) and the State Department (especially its Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs) regarding the timing and issues of US negotiations with China. Direct talks: The major security issues during the “behind-the-scene” talks in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971 and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.
2. A Note on Sources Underpinning this book is the substantial use of new archival materials in the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff and the State Department files in the National Archives and private papers of former US officials in the Library of Congress.29 Equally important, the study makes extensive use of the updated transcripts of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC) in the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)30 as well as the National Security Council Project in the Brookings Institution, which has conducted a series of oral history roundtables with former NSC staff members and State Department officials.31 Finally, the work 29 The year 1997 marked the 25th anniversary of Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. Therefore, historians anticipated that US official documents on the rapprochement with China would be declassified in the following years. This study, which started in October 1997, has thus examined both newly-declassified archival documents and recently-published documents. 30 The Foreign Affairs Oral History Program was established in 1985 and housed in the Special Collections Room at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University and at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, Virginia. Tucker explains that one of the main reasons why the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection was established was because a former State Department official, Marshall Green, was “bitter” about Kissinger’s underestimation of other officials’ contributions to the Nixon foreign policy. Green thus provided some of the funding for the ADST to develop a collection which would help to advance a more balanced understanding of important initiatives, including the opening to China. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Interview with the author, October 1, 2003. Significantly, the collection of interviews has been added to and updated every year. 31 The Nixon Administration National Security Council (published online December 8, 1998) , accessed October 15, 2003. The Roles of the National Security Adviser (published online October 25, 1999) , accessed October 15, 2003. China Policy and the National Security Council (published online November 4, 1999) , accessed October 15, 2003. The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHP), The Brookings Institution and Center for
Introduction
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is also based on the author’s interviews with former US officials, and with senior scholars on US-China relations, as well as declassified on-line documents, memoirs and diaries of former US officials, and newspaper articles. Mining these sources made it possible to shed new light on the complexity and dynamism of the evolution of the new China initiative and to demonstrate the existence of a range of policy options and different perspectives among US officials. 3. Organization The book is organized in three major parts. Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) examines the conception of US rapprochement with China. Chapter 1 reassesses how Nixon and Kissinger developed their respective perceptions of the China policy before they entered office. Chapter 2 analyzes the revitalization of the National Security Council system during the transition period from November 1968 to January 1969. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of the highly secretive and centralized foreign policy decision-making machinery. In particular, the chapter compares the respective roles in the new China initiative played by the NSC staff and State Department officials. Finally, it investigates the geopolitical perception gap between the White House and the State Department. Part II (Chapters 3–6) examines the implementation of the US rapprochement with China. The process of Washington’s resumption of diplomatic communication with Beijing is divided into four major stages. Chapter 3 analyzes the initial development of strategic perspectives and policy options for a new China initiative that emerged in the first half of 1969, including Nixon’s directive for the review of US China policy, and the NSC’s and State Department’s investigation of the outbreak of Sino-Soviet border clashes. Chapter 4 explores the continuing reassessments of the US China policy in the latter half of 1969, including Nixon’s installing of the Pakistani and Romanian backchannels to launch private communications with the Chinese leaders, the NSC’s and State Department’s policy option studies toward the escalation of Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the rifting of trade restrictions, and the Chinese representative issue in UN. Chapter 5 examines the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to January and February 1970, and their collapse as a result of the Cambodian military operation in May 1970. In particular, the chapter investigates the widening gap between the White House and the State Department regarding the method, timing and agenda for a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. Chapter 6 analyzes the development of back-channel communications with the Chinese via Pakistan and Romania from June to December 1970, and also the breakthrough from April to June 1971 in terms of the further pursuit of strict secrecy by the White House in order to completely cut off the State Department from direct decision-making process. Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) then turns to the direct talks between the US and the Chinese leaders. Chapter 7 begins by examining the development of policy option International and Security Studies at Maryland. The author would like to show his gratitude to Mr. Winston Lord who suggested the inclusion of these crucial sources into the research for the present book.
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studies for Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, including the NSC staff briefing papers for Kissinger and the Nixon-Kissinger private talks. The main body of the chapter analyses the five major security issues which arose during the KissingerZhou talks in July and October 1971: the Taiwan issue; the conflicts in Indochina; Japan’s future role; the India-Pakistan rivalry; and the growth of the Soviet military threat. Finally, it examines how Nixon and Kissinger assessed the implications of a new China initiative in briefing meetings with Cabinet officials, Congressional leaders, and foreign leaders from July to December 1971. Chapter 8 begins by examining the final preparations for the Nixon trip, such as Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972 and the NSC staff and State Department briefing papers for the President. The chapter mainly investigates how Nixon and the Chinese leaders discussed the five major security issues in February 1972. Finally, it analyses how Nixon and Kissinger assessed the implications of the China summit in briefing meetings with Cabinet officials and Congressional leaders. The Epilogue picks up on the trends exposed in the foregoing chapters, to show how US officials continued to discuss the remaining conflicting issues with the Chinese leaders through the mid-1970s – including the conflicts in Indochina, Japan’s future role, the Soviet military threat, and the treatment of Taiwan’s status. The Conclusion evaluates the major issues raised in this work and assesses what the US rapprochement with China in the early 1970s achieved, and what it left unresolved. The evidence unearthed in these chapters made for a fascinating period of research. It is hoped that the resulting account and analysis might prove equally fascinating reading – and perhaps challenge some view and assumptions in the process.
PART I The Foundations of Foreign Policy Decision-Making
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Chapter 1
The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership for a New China Initiative The first chapter of Part I begins by investigating both the similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger regarding their respective views on US policy toward China. The first half of this chapter examines the development of Nixon’s view on China from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. While maintaining a “cold warrior” public image against the threat of Communist China, Nixon privately spent many years to develop his more pragmatic view to open a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. The latter half of this chapter analyses the development of Kissinger’s view on the balance of power both in theory and in practice. It also examines how Kissinger developed his view on the China policy. Kissinger sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift and enhance US leverage within the US-Soviet-China strategic triangle. Finally, this chapter assesses the Nixon-Kissinger leadership for the opening to China. It was Nixon who set the overall directive for a new China initiative, while Kissinger provided a philosophical framework for the Nixon administration’s foreign policy. 1. Richard M. Nixon as the Architect of US Rapprochement with China 1.1 The development of Nixon’s early view on China This book perceives Richard Nixon as the architect of the US opening to China. Richard Solomon, a former NSC staff member, and China expert, emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between Nixon as a politician and Kissinger as an academic.1 Nixon had “a lot more exposure to Asia and foreign policy decision1 Richard Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. Since his death on April 22, 1994, there have been a number of reassessments on Nixon’s influence in re-shaping US foreign policy and American society. See, for instance, Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Perseus Books, 1994); Michael Barone, “Nixon’s America,” US News and World Report, September 20, 1999; William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang S Division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998); Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999); and Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). Kissinger reassesses Nixon’s presidency, foreign policy style, and personal character in his third memoirs, Years of Renewal (Boston: Little Brown, 1999). As for the controversial dark characteristic aspects of Nixon, see Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swan, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon (London: Victor Gollancz, 2000).
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making than Kissinger did.” Solomon argues that because of his life-long involvement in politics, Nixon was an “‘expert’ by virtue of his long-term exposure to China as a political issue.” It is thus important to take into consideration the self-confidence of successful politicians – the ability to understand the political dynamics of the international situation.2 The development of Nixon’s view on China needs to be re-examined within the broader context of change and continuity in the US relations with China. There are three major angles in America’s historical view on China from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century: • • •
From an idealistic point of view, to transform China into a friendly nation in Asia, From a realist point of view, to re-build China as a central political force to maintain stability in Asia, From a commercial point of view, to foresee China as a potentially huge market in Asia.3
The origins of Nixon’s interest in China policy can be traced back to his political career in the late 1940s and the early 1950s.4 During his early career as congressman, Nixon built up his political reputation as a strong anti-Communist cold warrior by criticizing the Truman administration’s “Loss of China” to the Communists.5 It was a result of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the 2 Ibid. 3 Allen Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. Shambaugh uses the term “paternalism” to describe the US approach to China prior to the Second World War. Paternalism means “co-optation, hegemonic power and patron-client relationship,” in which the US intended to transform China in its own image from a Christian ideological standpoint. David Shambaugh, interview with the author, October 8, 2003. 4 Regarding Nixon’s view on China in his pre-presidential era, see, for example, Irwin Gellman, Richard Nixon: The Congress Years, 1946–1952 (New York: Diane Pub Co, 1999); Philipe Pope, “Foundation of Nixonian Foreign Policy: The Pre-Presidential Years of Richard Nixon, 1946–1968,” PhD thesis University of Southern California, August 1988; and Glenn Speer, “Richard Nixon’s Position on Communist China, 1949–1960: The Evolution of a Pacific Strategy,” PhD thesis, City University of New York, 1992; and Evelyn Goh, Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 5. The author would like to show his gratitude to Dr. Goh for her advice regarding the pre-presidential Nixon materials. 5 In spring 1949, the Truman Administration published the so-called “White Paper,” which claimed the inevitable course of the fall of the mainland under the control of the Chinese Communists. Nixon accused Secretary of State, Dean Acheson of heading a “Cowardly College of Communist Containment.” See US Department of State, United States Relations with China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1949); and Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grssett & Danlap, 1978), p. 110. During his campaign for a Senate seat in 1950, Nixon declared: “All that we have to do is to take a look at a map and we can see that if Formosa falls the next frontier is the coast of California.” A Speech by Richard M. Nixon during the California Senate Campaign, September 18, 1950, in China and US Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1971), p. 19.
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formulation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and Chinese volunteer troops’ entry into the war in October 1950.6 Within the United States, while the pro-Nationalist China Lobby exerted heavy pressure on Congress and influenced public opinion, the State Department was under sharp criticism.7 The United States pursued an open-ended containment policy towards the monolithic threat from Communism without clarifying a distinction between vital and peripheral interests.8 The main elements of US policy toward Beijing during the two decades of mutual hostility were the following: •
•
•
Military containment of Chinese Communist expansionism embodied in the renewed support for the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, the stationing of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, and the maintenance of a web of military security treaties with non-Communist Asian states. Political isolation of the Beijing regime in the international community as reflected in the sustained US effort to keep the People’s Republic of China from membership in the United Nations and associated agencies. Economic embargo imposed by the United States on any trade with Communist China.9
During the 1950s, as the Vice President in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon publicly maintained his firm political attitude towards the threat of Communist China. In the late spring of 1953, Nixon took his first official trip to Asia, which became a highly “educational” influence on Nixon’s thinking, establishing the basis of his foreign policy experience.10 In particular, the trip gave him a crucial opportunity to “assess” Asian attitudes toward the “emerging colossus” of Communist China.11 Nixon concluded that Communist China was the “major new and unfathomable While running for Vice President in 1952, Nixon charged that: “China wouldn’t have gone Communist – if the Truman Administration had had backbone.” Ibid. 6 On the question of the “Lost Chance” of Sino-US diplomatic relations in the late 1940s, see Warren I. Cohen, ‘Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China: Introduction: Was there a “Lost Chance” in China?’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. I, Winter 1997; and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 7 See Robert S. Ross, After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); and Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 8 This subject is discussed by John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 9 These policies are comprehensively analysed in Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995). Armstrong interprets the US attempts to pressure China as the process of socializing it in “the norms” of the international community. David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993), p. 177. 10 Nixon, RN, p. 134. Nixon recalls that throughout his political career, as Vice President, as a private citizen, and as President, he often dealt with people whom he had already met during his early trips, including the 1953 trip. 11 Ibid., p. 119.
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factor” in Asia, and that its influence was already “spreading throughout the area.”12 During the NSC meeting on December 23, 1953, Nixon emphasized that there was “very little chance” for the US policy of “containment and economic blockade” of the Beijing regime on the basis of the hope of “overthrowing the government from within instead of from without.”13 Nixon suggested the alternative “to continue the policy of containment and isolation but to allow trade,” which could be a “good cover” without necessarily recognizing Beijing.14 Nixon concluded that although it was important to preserve Formosa [Taiwan] as a “symbol,” the United States should tell Chinese Nationalists that “they can’t go back to the mainland.”15 The US Government publicly maintained its policy of nuclear deterrence against any aggression from Communists.16 On March 17, 1955, Vice President Nixon argued in Chicago that: “tactical atomic weapons are now conventional and will be used against the targets of any aggressive force.”17 During the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1954–1955 and in 1958–1959, Nixon continued to suggest firm response to pressure and contain the expansionism of Chinese Communists. For example, on September 12, 1955, in the National Security Council meeting, Nixon insisted on paying close attention to any sign of miscalculation from Beijing. Nixon suggested that the only practical choice would be to “play poker” in order to “keep the Communists guessing” and to “take a chance on the possible consequences.”18 On the other hand, Vice President Nixon suggested the easing of trade and travel sanctions on Communist China as means of unwinding its political and ideological rigidity. During an NSC meeting on August 18, 1954, Nixon argued that Communist 12 Ibid., p.136. 13 Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 23, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952–54, Vol. XIV, China and Japan (1of2) (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 348. 14 Ibid., p. 349. On the other hand, in December 1953, Vice President Nixon already privately expressed his interest in Communist China: “Someday I’ll go to China … mainland China.” In 1960, Nixon sought to obtain the permission to visit the People’s Republic of China. This was refused by the State Department. Summers with Swan, The Arrogance of Power, p. 163. 15 Ibid. 16 On the more realistic aspects of the Eisenhower-Dulles policy toward China, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “A House Divided: The United States, the Department of State, and China,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds), Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University, 1990); and John L. Gaddis, “The American Wedge Strategy, 1949– 1958,” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (eds), Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989). 17 The New York Times, March 17, 1955. 18 Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XIV, pp. 622–623. On the US policy toward the two Taiwan Strait Crises, see Ronald W. Pruessen, “Over the Volcano: The United States and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954–1955,” and Robert Accinelli, ‘“A Thorn in the Side of Peace”: The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis,’ in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds), Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954– 1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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China was “the key problem” for the US policy in Asia. Nixon remained cautious, suggesting that any decision to change the policy of containment and isolation towards Communist China “should be postponed for the time being.”20 Nixon presented three specific points to consider: 1) how much the US was willing to trade with Communist China; 2) whether the US would recognize China; and 3) whether and when Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations.21 Nixon claimed that the US would have to face the final decision whether to adopt “a hard or a soft policy” toward Communist China.22 He went on to suggest that the US should explore “an area of action between war and appeasement” because in the long run, the Soviet Union and Communist China “can and must be split apart.”23 Thus, Nixon entered into the policy debate on the possibility of a rift between China and the Soviet Union. Foot argues that Nixon was “less influenced by the ideological tenor” of the Beijing government, and “more concerned about power issues – the balance of power issue – even in those days.”24 During the presidential debate in October 1960, while condemning the EisenhowerDulles team for their “brinksmanship” in the Taiwan Strait crises, Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy insisted that the small offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu were “not strategically defensible” or “essential to the defense of Formosa [Taiwan].”25 Nixon sought to defend the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the offshore island crisis of 1958 by emphasizing that if the United States drew a line at the island of Formosa itself, it would lead to a “chain reaction” of aggression by Chinese Communists.26 On October 13, Nixon emphasized Communist China’s expansionist threat: “Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They don’t want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don’t want just Formosa. They want the world.”27 Importantly, Nixon became “very fascinated with China”: his main concern was the Soviet threat, and his interest in the China issue grew out of the QuemoyMatsu discussion during the campaign debates.28 Solomon emphasizes the long-term importance of the Nixon-Kennedy debate in 1960 on the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958, which “set off some interesting trends that took over a decade to fully play themselves out.”29 19 Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 18, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954 Vol. XIV, p. 529. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., p. 535. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. p. 536. 24 Rosemary Foot, interview with the author, July 13, 2004. 25 Robert W. Barnett, Oral History Interview, March 2, 1990, p. 9, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University. See also Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 345. 26 Ibid. See also Nixon, RN, p. 220. 27 China and US Foreign Policy, Second edition. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), p. 1. 28 Richard H. Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p. 18, FAOHC. 29 Ibid.
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1.2 Changes and developments of the China issue during the 1960s The development of Nixon’s view on China took place within the context of the gradual development of academic and bureaucratic discussion on relaxation and subsequent reconciliation with Beijing. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, a fragmentation emerged in Sino-Soviet relations. One of the major causes of the split was the Soviet attempt to seek détente with the West, which was against China’s anti-capitalist united front strategy.30 Hence, the Chinese were “competing against” the Russians, “making a deliberate, direct challenge for the leadership of the world communist movement.”31 Since the first nuclear explosion in October 1964, which was a major symbol of her self-reliance, China pursued a revolutionary dual strategy towards the two superpowers.32 Throughout the 1960s, however, Chinese leaders had an increasing sense that they were surrounded by hostile enemies. In the north, the Soviet Union, with its satellite state, Mongolia, increased hostilities along the long disputed border areas with China. In the east, China faced the US network of allied relations with Japan and South Korea with their extensive bases. Moreover, the regular US navy patrolling in the Taiwan Straits indicated Washington’s continuing support for the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. In the southwest, after the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, there was a continuing increase of tension between Beijing and New Delhi leading India to move towards the Soviets. In the southeast, US military intervention in Indochina increased tension in China’s southern hemisphere. Thus, Beijing came to face with the danger of full “encirclement” – being surrounded by the hostile neighbors.33 In 1966, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, terminating all diplomatic relations with other states (except with Egypt) and bringing about China’s political isolation. During the 1960s, the Cold War still “hindered the whole image of China as a positive element in the international community.”34 Public opinion polls in the US showed that some 90 percent of Americans still had a negative image of China, and approximately 70 percent saw China as the greatest threat to the world peace. Within the US government, the China threat was “seen in a domino sense.”35 Thus, there was a “huge debate” about the question of “whether China would intervene in
30 See Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990). 31 John Holdridge (Interviewed by Marshall Green), Oral History Interview, in A China Reader, Vol. II, p. 22, January 1995, FAOHC. 32 On US policy toward China’s nuclear capabilities, see, for example, Foot, The Practice of Power, chapter 7; and Electric Briefing Book No. 1, The United States, China and the Bomb; and The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–1964, The National Security Archive, George Washington University. 33 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 240. 34 Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. 35 Ibid.
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36
the Vietnam War.” Equally important, there were “heated and bitter” arguments about the Sino-Soviet rift. On the one hand, a group of opinion insisted that the Chinese had very deep “anti-foreign feelings,” especially toward the West, and that they would move back toward the Soviet Union if it suited their national purposes.37 However, another school of thought insisted that China was “not aggressive” as previously estimated, and could be a “bulwark” against the Soviet Union, and thus the United States should “open up relations” with China.38 On a bureaucratic level, since the early 1960s, State Department officials had discussed the beginning of a “task force” approach on the “broad-scale rethinking exercise” of China policy.39 By the mid 1960s, although Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, “resisted very strongly” any moves toward China, a change in China policy was “debated in bureaucracy.”40 Rusk was also “extremely reluctant to acknowledge” the Sino-Soviet split because he emphasized the monolithic threat from the Sino-Soviet alliance to “rationalize the deeper engagement in Vietnam.”41 There still remained
36 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. Solomon argues further that what the US government did not fully understand at that time was that Mao needed the army within China to support the Cultural Revolution politically, rather than to send it off to fight in Vietnam. 37 James R. Lilley (CIA station, Hong Kong, 1969–1970), Oral History Interview, pp. 61–62, 1996, FAOHC. 38 Ibid. 39 Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, “Quick Thought on China,” March 1, 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, Vol. XXII, China; Korea; Japan (Washington DC; Government Printing Office, 1996). A China expert in the Policy Planning Staff, Edward Rice, prepared a detailed paper on possible initiatives toward China, including the lifting of the trade embargo and the promotion of the Warsaw Talks. “US Policy Toward China,” October 26, 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, Vol. XXII, pp.162–167. For bureaucratic reassessment of US China policy during the 1960s, see James C. Thomson, Jr. “On the Making of US China Policy, 1961–1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” China Quarterly, 50 (April–June 1972); Rosemary Foot, “Redefinition: The Domestic Context of America’s China Policy in the 1960s,” in Ross and Jiang (eds), Re-examining the Cold War; and Goh, Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974, chapters 2–4. 40 William H. Gleysteen, JR. (career Foreign Service officer, 1951–1981), “China Policy and the National Security Council,” p. 5, The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and the Brookings Institution, November 4, 1999. For Rusk’s rigidity on China policy, see also Foot, “Reflections,” p. 283. 41 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department of State, 1965–1981), Oral History Interview, p. 3, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. The creation of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs in 1965 – the separation of the ROC from the mainland led to turn the focus of policy attention much more on the People’s Republic. Ibid. Moscow supplied more advanced weaponry to Hanoi than Beijing, which could only advise the pursuit of guerrilla warfare and provide rifles and bullets. However, Hanoi had no intention of being Moscow’s puppet, and exploited SinoSoviet hostility, obtaining military aid from both, but taking sides with neither. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 3–5.
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rigidity at the top level of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, while middle rank officials in the State Department were reassessing US China policy. During the twenty years of mutual hostility, despite harsh rhetorical exchanges in public, Washington and Beijing attempted to develop and preserve a communication line at the Ambassadorial level, firstly in Geneva from 1955 to 1957, and then in Warsaw from 1958 to 1968.42 Although the talks did not reconcile profound political and ideological differences, the two sides continued to communicate in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the degree of threat in the case of crisis. As a former State Department official, Donald Anderson, recalls, US officials kept informing the Chinese in Warsaw that “we seek no wider war in Vietnam,” which was intended as an “assurance” that the United States did not intend to invade North Vietnam.43 Anderson argues further that State Department officials also attempted to “promote some sort of informal non-official contact,” such as to get journalists into China in order to “improve the atmosphere” and “lower the tension levels” between the two sides.44 Overall, the State Department officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations prepared a list of policy items to move towards a “civil dialogue with China,” in an attempt to “open up travel and trade.”45 In reality, however, the possible flexibility of the Johnson administration’s policy in East Asia was tied down by the combination of the escalation of the Vietnam War, the Chinese refusal to ease tension with three major adversaries, the United States, the Soviet Union and India, and the outbreak of Cultural Revolution.46 During the 1960s, it was academic experts who led the public argument about the need to move toward China.47 For example, during the height of the Cultural Revolution, William Bundy, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs of the Johnson administration, “set up sort of a Wise Men’s Group of some academic scholars,” such as A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein, John King 42 “A Resume of the Warsaw Talks, 1955–1970,” October 12, 1971, Secret-Sensitive, Box 2189, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG59), National Archives. See also Steven M. Goldstein “Dialogue of the Deaf: The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955–1970,” in Ross and Jiang (eds), Reexamining the Cold War; and Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 43 Donald Anderson (China Desk/Warsaw talks, Department of State, 1966–1970), Oral History Interview, p.12, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 44 Ibid. 45 Ralph Clough (Deputy Chief of Mission American Embassy Taipei, Taiwan, 1961–1965), Oral History Interview, p. 19, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 46 Foot, The Practice of Power, pp. 262–263; and Robert D. Schulzinger, “The Johnson Administration, China, and the Vietnam War,” in Ross and Jiang (eds), Re-examining the Cold War. President Johnson remarked that “lasting peace” could never come to Asia, “as long as 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.” The New York Times, March 14, 1966. 47 As for academic activities on the re-assessment of China policy during the 1960s, see Foot, “Redefinition,” pp. 278–279, and Idem, The Practice of Power, pp. 93–103.
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Fairbank, Lucian W. Pye, and Robert Scalapino, to discuss periodically “whither China”48 In reality, however, Whiting points out that the Vietnam War had “broken the sense of community” in America, and thus, there was no “academic community” as a whole.49 Thus, there had to be “some public form that could legitimise the consideration of China as a normal power.”50 From March 8 to 30, 1966, the Hearings for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled “US Policy with Respect to Mainland China” broadcasted a number of views of China experts as well as International Relations experts in academia.51 A. Doak Barnett urged the shift of America’s China policy from “containment plus isolation” to “containment without isolation.”52 John King Fairbank advocated an open policy to promote “international contact with China on many fronts,” in order to encourage its leaders to reshape their worldview and to bring China into the international order.53 Thus, the Hearings provided the most comprehensive discussion of China policy ever given to the American people. In essence, US China policy debate during the mid 1960s was a crucial turning point which promoted the American domestic political attitude of the necessity of new relations with China. The American public came to realize that the existence of Communist China was a fact of life. Foot suggests that a broad “consensus” of opinion emerged in America regarding the integration of China; and this consensus became a powerful “inheritance” for Nixon and Kissinger to take an initiative toward China.54 Nixon, as a private citizen, paid close attention to the US policy and public opinion toward China during the 1960s. In public, Nixon maintained his antiCommunist hardliner stance by describing the Vietnam War as a manifestation of Communist China’s expansionism, namely a “confrontation” between the US and China.55 In private, however, there were signs of development in Nixon’s view on China. During his private trip to Europe in June 1963, Nixon met French President
48 Anderson, Oral History Interview, p.15, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 49 Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. Whiting explains further that among academic experts on China, A. Doak Barnett was the “foremost progressive speaker” who was a “cautious, optimistic, forward-looking, but he was not advocating any radical move.” Robert Scalapino supported the Vietnam War, and “took a lot of abuse because of that.” Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 “US Policy with Respect to Mainland China,” Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 89 Congress, 2nd session, March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966. 52 A. Doak Barnett statement, ibid., p. 306. 53 John King Fairbank statement, ibid., p. 309. 54 Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 85, pp. 112–113. 55 Speech to the Commonwealth Club of California by Richard M. Nixon, The New York Times, April 2, 1965. For the Johnson administration, Communist China and North Vietnam were still inevitably “linked.” In response to Nixon’s recommendation to take a hard line in Vietnam, President Johnson stated that: “China’s the problem… We can bomb the hell out of Hanoi and the rest of that damned country, but they’ve got China right behind, and that’s a different story.” Nixon, RN, pp. 280–281.
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Charles De Gaulle and discussed “whether it might not be wise to develop lines of communications with the Soviets and the Chinese.”56 Nixon argued that there was “considerable sentiment” in the US State Department, not only in favor of a “Soviet-US détente” but also of a “lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the US against Chinese.” Nixon judged that while this might be a “good short-range policy,” it was more important in the longer run to recognize that China and the USSR were “two great powers,” and to develop “parallel relationships with them.”57 In March 1967, Nixon again took a trip to Europe, during which the China issue came up regularly. The West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer urged that in order to “counterbalance” the growth of the Soviet military threat, the United States should lean toward China.58 Nixon’s initial reply to Adenauer was that the West should not unilaterally exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, Nixon continued to argue that if the situation developed, the United States might benefit from the expansion of differences between the two communist states. During his talk with the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceauşescu, Nixon expressed his doubt whether any true détente with the Soviet Union could be achieved until “some kind of rapprochement” was reached with Communist China.59 Nixon felt that if China remained isolated, within twenty years, it could pose a grave threat to world peace. In the short run, Nixon remained cautious, expressing doubt about the possibility of establishing effective communications with China until the Vietnam War had ended. Nixon argued that, following the war, the United States could “take steps to normalize relations” with China.60 In April 1967, Nixon took a trip to Asia and consulted with Asian leaders and US diplomats regarding the development of recent changes in the region. Nixon recognized that there was a “growing concern” about China’s emergence among Asian leaders who came to agree that some “new and direct” relations between the United States and China were “essential” for the restoration of stability in the postVietnam era.61 In Indonesia, Nixon met the US Ambassador, Marshall Green, with
56 During his presidential visit to France in March 1969, Nixon reviewed the China issue of their 1963 talk with De Gaulle. Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p. 6, Presidential/HAK MemCons Box 1023, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). In his memoirs, however, Nixon fails to mention the specific contents of his private talk with De Gaulle in June 1963. See Nixon, RN, p. 248. 57 Ibid. 58 Nixon, RN, p. 281. 59 Ibid. See also James H. Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p. 17. 60 Ibid., p. 282. 61 Ibid., pp. 282–283. Nixon’s speechwriters, Raymond Price and William Safire, recall that Nixon had a great knowledge on foreign affairs. For example, while they were preparing for briefing books for Nixon’s trip to Asia in April 1967, Nixon made his own preparation, asking specific questions on leadership and political situation of Asian countries. See William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (DaCapo Press, 1975), pp. 367–368.
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whom he had a long private conversation on events in East Asia, especially China.62 Green emphasized the development of new nationalism in Asia and suggested that it would be wise to limit the US presence and promote each Asian country’s initiative in dealing with Asian problems. In particular, Green recalls Nixon’s much more “realistic” and “strategic” remarks on the development of the Sino-Soviet split: “We must not line up with China or with the Soviet Union against the other; we must always play it even-handed.”63 As Solomon explains, Nixon was assessing “policy alternatives based on domestic concerns” by consulting with many American people and other experts on Asia, Nixon’s approach to China policy was driven “primarily by the concerns about the Soviet Union, and secondly by the Vietnam War.”64 Overall, Nixon’s trips overseas during the mid-1960s provided crucial opportunities for him to assess geopolitical changes in Asia, especially the re-emergence of China. 1.3 “Asia after Viet Nam” in October 1967 Nixon’s article entitled “Asia after Viet Nam” appeared in Foreign Affairs of October 1967.65 As the two decades of containment of China became an increasingly heavy burden for the US, Nixon urged the need to comprehend the reality of China’s reemerging geopolitical dynamism in Asia and the world: Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations ... There is no place on this planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation ... The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent we can influence the events, shall be to induce change.66
Nixon suggested that: 1) in the short term, “a policy of firm restraints of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interest can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international activity” and 2) in the long term, “pulling China back into the world community – but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”67 Reflecting the re-emergence of 62 Marshall Green, Evolution of US-China Policy 1956–1973: Memoirs of An Insider, p. 25, FAOHC. Nixon “took down notes on key points” and also tape-recorded his talks with Green. Green recalls: “When I asked him what he did with all these notes and tapes, he replied that he had them transcribed, filed and cross-filed for later reference.” Green remembers Nixon as the “best informed on foreign affairs” of all the luminaries who visited Jakarta during his four years there. Ibid. However, in his memoirs, Nixon did not mention his conversation with Green. 63 Ibid. 64 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 65 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs (October, 1967). Nixon’s speechwriters, Raymond Price and William Safire, assisted the drafting of the article. See Safire, Before the Fall, pp. 367–368. On July 29, 1967, Nixon made an informal speech to the Bohemian Club, San Francisco, arguing: “We live in a new world,” with new ideas and new leaders, which his Foreign Affairs article developed further. It was off the record and received no publicity. Nixon, RN, p. 284. 66 Ibid., p. 121. 67 Ibid., p. 123.
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Japan and Western Europe as economic great powers, Nixon also urged that the United States should coordinate its relations with its major allies in order to reduce its burden for the open-ended containment of Communism. Finally, Nixon encouraged the US continuing presence in Asia, as an “Asian power,” and emphasized that US leadership should be exercised “with restraints,” and there was a need for American “subtle encouragement” of the Asian initiatives.68 When the Foreign Affairs article was first published, it was generally considered as Nixon’s political attempt to moderate his anti-Communist image and acquire the nomination for the Republican Presidential Candidacy in 1968.69 After the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969, the article captured public attention as the framework of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy. However, the importance of the Nixon article should not be over-stated. Nixon’s suggestions were not entirely new because his views reflected the debates which were taking place among Democrats and also among Republicans during the 1960s. In the short run, Nixon still preserved his hard-liner stance, criticizing that the “containment without isolation” covered “only half the problem.”70 In particular, Nixon was still against any short-term change to allow trade with China. He also advocated pressuring China by the build-up of Asian allies’ military capabilities. Finally, Nixon implied that it was not the US but China that had to change. On the other hand, Shambaugh assesses that the article was a “crucial piece of evidence” regarding Nixon’s interest in China. Shambaugh emphasizes the importance of Nixon’s “intentional” selection of terms in his writing, which avoided direct criticism of China’s ideology or expansionist tendency.71 Nixon clearly had a political intension to present his personal interest in opening a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. In particular, the phrase of Nixon’s article, especially China being “outside the family of nations” suggests that there was a broader and “multitiered conceptualisation” of engaging China “as a society and as an economy, not simply strategically playing it off against the Soviet Union.” Finally, Nixon’s proposal of integrating China into the world community was an origin of the policy of engagement with China.72 More particularly, Foot stresses the importance of the US long-term practice of its “structural power” to embrace China into an international pattern of behavior.73 In the historical perspective, the integration strategy reflects a 68 Ibid., p. 124. In this article, Nixon perceived the Soviet Union as a European power. 69 “Nixon Sees Asia Helping Itself,” The New York Times, September 17, 1967. 70 Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” p. 123. For example, in October 1967, Secretary Rusk warned of the danger of billions of Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. See Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, New Jersey: Cooper Square, 1980), pp. 283–289. 71 Shambaugh, interview with the author, October 8, 2003. 72 Ibid. See also David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 182. 73 Foot, The Practice of Power, pp. 9–21, pp. 262–265. Foot refers to Nye, who introduces distinctions between “hard” and “soft” power and between “the coercive and visible forms and the consensual and less visible aspects.” In particular, “soft” power refers to more indirect ways of getting others to do what one wants by “the attractiveness of one’s culture and ideology” or “the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices.” Hence, the issue of legitimacy, drawn from a recognized authority, becomes important to the exercise
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very long lasting tradition in the US approach to China, which could be traced back to the end of nineteenth century, namely the idea that the US could “tutor” China to “either protect it or modify it or change it.”74 Former NSC staff members, such as Lord, Rodman, and Solomon argue that, after his trip to Asia in April 1967, Nixon’s views on Asia and China were already quite well developed.75 Nixon had become aware of the need to shift the course of foreign policy with more restraints of power. By the late 1960s, it was widely recognized that Washington’s non-recognition policy to Beijing became largely stalemated because of the major changes in the international situation, such as the Sino-Soviet rift, the US over-involvement in the Vietnam War, and the prolonged Sino-US mutual hostility. Hence, realizing the major shifts in “American conceptions of what needed to be done in terms of China policy,” Nixon assessed the political advantage of promoting accommodation with China.76 In his meeting with Premier Zhou on February 24, 1972, President Nixon remarked: [M]y goal is normalization with the People’s Republic ... I started down this road in 1967 in an article in Foreign Affairs, with some rhetoric. And now we are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I alone at the outset initiated and it’s my intent to realize this goal.77
In essence, Nixon viewed the materialization of diplomatic normalization as the beginning of long and complex process to integrate China into the international system. 1.4 China issue during the 1968 presidential election campaign During the presidential campaign in 1968, Nixon’s public statements on the China issue reflected two contradictory aspects of his view. On the one hand, Nixon continued to maintain a firm attitude towards China’s aggression, and thus denied any immediate possibility of recognizing the Beijing regime. In October 1968, Nixon remarked that:
of power in normative terms. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Book, 1990), p. 267, n. 11, cited in ibid., pp. 3–5. 74 Foot, interview with the author, July 13, 2004. 75 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003; Winston Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003; and Peter Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2003. 76 Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 103. 77 Memcon, Nixon and Zhou, February 24, 1972, p. 10. Memoranda for the President, “Beginning February 20, 1972,” Box 87, President’s Office Files (POF), NPMS, NA. During the height of the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao had not only already read Nixon’s writings, including the October 1967 Foreign Affairs article, but also followed a number of America’s newspaper accounts of the policy reassessment progressing in the State Department. See Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through ‘Old Friends’ (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p. 48; and Chen, Mao’s China, pp. 238–239.
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Secrecy in US Foreign Policy I would not recognize red China now and I would not agree to admitting it to the UN and I would not go along with those well-intended people that said, ‘Trade with them, because that will change them.’ Because doing it now would only encourage them, the hardliners in Peking and the hardline policy that they’re following. And it would have an immense effect on discouraging great numbers of non-communists elements in Free Asia that are now just beginning to develop their strength and their own confidence.78
On the other hand, Nixon expressed the view that, in the long run, Washington should begin a new dialogue with Beijing. On August 9, 1968, after obtaining the nomination for the Republican Presidential candidacy, Nixon stated that: “We must not forget China. We must always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the USSR ... We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make changes.”79 Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the tension between Beijing and Moscow increased further along their shared border areas.80 On September 17, 1968, the United States proposed a resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. On November 8, New China News Agency (NCNA) article described US election as “cut-throat competition” between various cliques of “Monopoly Capitalism,” and all these groups are “jackals of the same lair” and equally incapable of saving US “from fate of utter defeat.”81 On November 15, 1968, the US government proposed postponing the next Warsaw meeting until next February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese on their intentions with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. On November 26, 1968, Beijing responded by proposing a Sino-US Ambassadorial talk at Warsaw to 78 China and US Foreign Policy, Second edition. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), p. 89. Quotation marks in original. 79 US News and World Report, September 16, 1968, p. 48. Reflecting the policy review within the Johnson administration for “containment without necessarily isolation,” Democrat presidential candidate, Herbert Humphrey also advocated such specific moves as 1) the lifting of the ban on exports of non-strategic goods, 2), the promotion of exchange of scholars, journalists, and technicians, and 3) the clarification of the US intention to welcome China’s participation in the international community. Herbert Humphrey, Interview with Asahi Shimbun, October 22, 1968, Translated and transmitted by American Embassy in Tokyo, October 31, 1968 to Bryce Harlow, Office of President Elect Nixon, The Pierre Hotel, New York, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, Henry A. Kissinger’s Office Files (HAKOF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. 80 As for China’s criticism of the Soviet Union after its invasion of Czechoslovakia as a “social-imperialist” state, see Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, pp. 242–243. Shambaugh explains that there are two types of rules in Chinese governance, benevolent rule “Wan” and coercive rule “Ba.” The Soviet Union was announced as “Ba” – hegemon. The difference between hegemony and imperialism is that while hegemony is a “type of behavior,” imperialism is a “stage of government’s governance system.” Thus, one can have a “socialist state that is hegemonic.” And one can also have a “capitalist state that is hegemonic.” However, one cannot have a “socialist state that is imperialist theoretically.” Nevertheless, the Chinese called the Soviets “social-imperialists” because when they charged, they realized that the real meaning was “social hegemonism.” Shambaugh, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 81 Telegram, American Consulate General Hong Kong, “Chinese People Told of Nixon Victory,” November 9, 1968, p. 1, POL Chicom-US, 1967–69, Box 1972, SNF, RG59, NA.
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take place on February 20, 1969. Beijing added a “very significant” statement in the eyes of US officials: “It has always been the policy of the People’s Republic of China to maintain friendly relations with all states, regardless of social systems, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.”82 Finally, the Chinese urged the United States to “withdraw all its armed forces from China’s Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits.”83 During the meeting with Kissinger on November 25, 1968, Nixon mentioned his concern about the “need to re-evaluate” US policy toward China, and urged Kissinger to read the October 1967 Foreign Affairs article.84 Former NSC staff member Winston Lord assesses that China was one of the “three real priorities” of Nixon, along with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.85 By 1968, Nixon had a personal interest in seeking an opening towards China, though he had not yet formulated the precise methods and timing of a new initiative. It is likely that Nixon tactically manipulated his political image and utilized ideological rhetoric with a practical aim. In reality, although many of its older generation passed away, the China Lobby still had influence, particularly in the Republican Party.86 Thus, Nixon was still concerned about the “backlash” from pro-Taiwan conservative supporters, such as Anna Chennault, the widow of Claire L. Chennault, who served as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek during the World War II, Walter Judd, former medical missionary in China and Congressman, and Ray Cline, former CIA officer and CIA station chief in Taipei.87 82 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, pp. 21–22, January 1995, FAOHC. Premier Zhou first brought up the five principles of peaceful coexistence at the Geneva Conference in 1954. 83 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 245; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 166. 84 Nixon, RN, p. 341. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger does not refer to Nixon’s suggestion to read his Foreign Affairs article. Lord recalls that: “I don’t know whether Kissinger talked about China with Nixon during the transition. I suspect they did. Before he took office, Kissinger independently saw the advantages of opening to China. Nixon certainly saw the value of it. And, in fact, they may have talked about it. I would think they would have.” Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 85 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. After the victory in the presidential election on November 5, 1968, Nixon held private talks and telephone conversations with President Johnson on the succession of the policy issues and options. On December 12, 1968, Johnson and Nixon met alone in the Oval Office – the only occasion during November and December when they met alone. Document 331, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume XIV, Soviet Union (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2001). Although no official record of the talk is found by the State Department’s historians, William Bundy introduces an episode (which presumably took place in their December 12 talk) from his personal files: “Johnson had told Nixon that he was prepared to go ahead with these measures [the resumption of Warsaw Ambassadorial talks and the lifting of travel and trade restrictions] on his own responsibility, but that if Nixon preferred, he would refrain from taking action and simply turn them over to the incoming administration to use as it saw fit. Nixon replied that he preferred the latter course.” Bundy, A Tangled Web, p. 103. Bundy served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from March 1964 to May 1969. 86 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 87 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003.
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Finally, there is one interesting point, which is related to Nixon’s long experience with foreign affairs. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nixon had already met almost all the major political leaders in the world, and he had visited most Asian countries. China remained the only major state which Nixon had not visited, and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were two of the few world leaders whom Nixon had not met yet. Thus, before entering the office, Nixon had developed a strong personal interest in obtaining the sole credit for the historic opening to China. 2. Henry A. Kissinger’s Role in US Rapprochement with China 2.1 Kissinger as a theorist for new administration’s foreign policy philosophy Henry A. Kissinger came to office with the experience of being an academic at Harvard over 15 years, as well as having been a consultant to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the 1960s. In essence, he provided the fundamental “intellectual framework” for the new administration’s foreign policy.88 In his early writings, Kissinger defines an international order as “legitimate” if all the major states agree about the “nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy”; he defines it as “revolutionary” if one or more of the major dissatisfied states refuses to cope with other states in accordance with the conventional rules of state relations.89 In a legitimate international order, status quo states are principally concerned with their security, and there is a tendency for the pursuit of equilibrium on the basis of the practice of balance of power. Hence, stability is a consequence of generally accepted legitimacy. A legitimate international order does not prevent conflicts, but it limits the scope of them. By the late 1960s, owing to the prolonged open-ended containment policy of the monolithic threat of Communism, the United States was in relative military and economic decline. In his article of 1968, a year before he entered the government, Kissinger presented his perspective on the newly emerging political multipolarity in world politics. He argued that military bipolarity caused rigidity: “A bipolar 88 See, for example, Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: Biography (New York: McGrawHill, 1992); Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Idem, ‘“Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 5 (November 2003). 89 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 1–2; and Idem, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 316–321. On Kissinger’s intellectual base as an academic, see, for example, Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), chapters 2 and 3; Robert L. Beisner, “History and Henry Kissinger,” Diplomatic History, 14 (Fall 1990); Richard Weitz, “Henry Kissinger’s Philosophy of International Relations,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, “Rescuing Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft of Henry Kissinger,” in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds), Diplomats 1939–1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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world loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival.”90 Political multipolarity would not necessarily guarantee stability, but it would reduce rigidity and provide greater opportunities for developing “an agreed concept of order” in the international system.91 The great powers had to exercise power with restraint, and also restrain the actions of less cooperative states in order to maintain the stabilizing equilibrium of the system. Kissinger believed that although the two superpowers would remain powerful with their overwhelming military strength, a more pluralistic world was in the long-term interest of the United States. In order to re-adjust US power resources to a new international situation, Kissinger urged a pragmatic conception of foreign policy, namely the re-assessment of the national interests in military, political, economic, and psychological terms. Accordingly, the Nixon administration advocated that America’s new initiative should be based on “a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests,” proclaiming: “Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.”92 The Nixon administration sought to promote “mutual self-restraint” among states to accommodate conflicting national interests “through negotiation rather than confrontation.”93 It was this particular issue of self-restraint that was the fundamental requirement for the balance of power among states. 2.2 Kissinger’s balance of power in theory Kissinger has often explained the US opening to China in terms of maintaining a balance of power: “It was not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a balancing position to use for constructive ends – to give each Communist power a stake in better relations with us. Such an equilibrium could assure stability among the major powers.”94 He argues that the traditional criteria of balance of power were territorial; military power was considered as the final recourse.95 However, he maintains that in a nuclear age, power cannot automatically be translated into influence, and it is difficult to use power diplomatically.96 Managing a military 90 Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 56–58. 91 Ibid., p. 57. 92 Richard M. Nixon, “United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Strategy for Peace,” A Report to Congress, Vol. 1, February 18, 1970 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 119. 93 Richard M. Nixon, “US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace,” A Report to the Congress, Vol. 3, February 9, 1972, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, 1972 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 345–346. 94 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 192; Idem, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p. 54. Idem, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 722–723; Idem, Years of Renewal (New York: Little Brown, 1999), p. 140. See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 279–282, and pp. 295–298. 95 Kissinger, “Central Issues,” pp. 9–60. 96 Ibid., pp. 61–62.
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balance of power required vigilance on two levels: “being strong enough not only strategically with nuclear power but also locally with conventional arms.”97 In theory, Kissinger’s concept of balance of power evolved from the intellectual base of the traditional/classical realist school.98 Realists perceive states as the main actors in international relations, and the international system as the most important level of analysis. On the international level, the most crucial factor is the permanent existence of the struggle for power among states. In the absence of any central authority maintaining order, states seek to maintain and enhance power, especially militarily, to secure their survival. States also practice balance of power in order to prevent the emergence of a predominant state in the international system. Hans Morgenthau suggests that the balance of power takes four forms: 1) a policy aimed at certain state affairs, 2) an actual state of affairs, 3) an approximately equal distribution of power, and 4) any distribution of power.99 Balance of power functions only when states recognize “the same rules of the game” and act “for the same limited stakes” in order to achieve “international stability and national independence.”100 Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the balance of power as a policy of a state to prevent the emergence of predominant power and the balance of power as a system within which the state interactions prevent the predominance of any one state.101 Reflecting the diffusion of power resources and the emergence of economic interdependence among states from the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the neo-realist school advanced the analysis of balance of power by emphasizing “structure.”102 97 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 62. 98 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, Sixth edition (Brief edition). (New York: Harper & Knopf, 1993); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Second edition. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), p. 575. Morgenthau suggests nine major elements which determine the national power of a state: geography, natural resources, industrial capability, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government. Ibid., pp. 124–165. 99 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 186. Haas presents eight meanings of balance of power. See Ernst B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?” World Politics, Book V (July 1953), pp. 442–477, in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Third edition. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1990), pp. 30–31. Wight clarifies the nine meanings of balance of power. See Martin Wight, “The balance of power” in H. Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 151. 100 Ibid., pp. 189–190. 101 Ibid. 102 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979); Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and Barry Buzan, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Waltz argues that the bipolar system is less likely to be the subject of rapid transformation than multipolar system.
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Structure is defined as the interrelationship of states composing the international system. The international political system is defined by anarchy and differentiated by the distribution of power capabilities in military, political, and economic terms among sovereign states. There is a strong tendency towards balance within the system, and the expectation is that balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or the other. A state thus reacts to the emergence of a more powerful state by counterbalancing – either to enhance its own power or to align itself with an opposing state or group of states. Structure imposes constraints on states’ behavior. In sum, the balance of power is a rule-based system, inseparable from diplomatic practice as a policy, which restrains the sources of instability, limits the scope of conflicts, and brings relative stability in which no single state or group of states would be in a permanent position to determine the fate of others. Kissinger’s concept of balance of power system evolved as a central characteristic of the loosening military bipolarity and the emerging political multipolarity from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Kissinger’s concept of balance of power regarding the US rapprochement with China can be defined as the application of realist logic to exploit the deepening Sino-Soviet hostility, which led to the development of triangular relations between the US, USSR, and China. Accordingly, Kissinger’s practice of balance of power policy toward US rapprochement with China needs to be clarified. 2.3 Kissinger’s balance of power in practice Kissinger has been quite critical of academic experts on China. For example, during the transitional period after the November 1968 presidential election, a group of academic experts from Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology sent a memorandum to President-Elect Nixon.103 These experts examined the implications of the US-Soviet-China relations: Implicit in the foregoing suggestions is the hope that the new Administration will attempt to view Sino-American relations as a separate problem from Soviet-American problem, though inevitably a related problem. The Sino-Soviet split provides us with an opportunity to treat each party separately and to scrutinize our national interests in each relationship with care. We urge that the new Administration, in its proper concern with the bilateral super-power balance, avoid judgments about China and its development that derive from Moscow’s views of Peking. A Soviet-American alliance against Peking may serve Russian’s interests; but it may not automatically serve US national interests.104
The academic experts therefore warned the new administration of the danger of a possible US-Soviet collusion against China. Kissinger criticizes that these academics missed the geopolitical perspective “with respect to the Soviet Union that the Chinese might have an incentive to move toward us without American concessions but their
103 “Memorandum for President-Elect Nixon on US relations with China,” November 6, 1968, Re-produced in “Communist China Policy,” Hon. John Rousselot, The House of Representatives, August 6, 1971, pp. 30765–30767. 104 Ibid., p. 30765.
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need for American counterweight to the Soviet Union.”105 In other words, Kissinger condemned their proposal for its failure to explore the linkage among the three states and the possible US leverage within the context of Sino-Soviet hostility. In October 1969, Kissinger’s NSC staff assessed that the diffusion of independent political activity among states had encouraged the loosening of Cold War military bipolarity. For example, Western Europe and Japan, sought much more independence from the superpowers in policies and national will. However, this diffusion had not yet taken the “form of the emergence of significant new centers of military power,” such as the destruction of alliances, major realignments or the consolidation of new groupings among states.106 The only notable exception, the Sino-Soviet alliance, had become a deep rivalry and created a “tripolar relationship” in which (a) the US, USSR, and the PRC respectively had an interest in preventing the other two states cooperating (b) the Soviets had parallel interests with the US in containing China (c) the US ability to achieve closer relations with China and to exploit Moscow’s fear of a US-Chinese rapprochement was limited. Within a broader framework of political multipolarity in the world, there was a possibility for the development of US-SovietChina triangular relationship. The most comprehensive explanation of the multipolar balance of power came from President Nixon during his interview with Time magazine in January 1972: We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It was when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.107
105 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165. Italic in original. Despite his personal antipathy toward academia, Kissinger was still “interested in what the scholars thought” on China. Levin, “China Policy and the National Security Council,” p. 9, NSCP-OHR. For example, in April 1969, Kissinger and the NSC staff organized a meeting with 48 scholars. As for the options for China policy, a NSC staff member Richard L. Sneider sought to obtain expertise view on: 1) what the long-range US objective on dealing with China should be; and 2) what concrete steps the US might take toward these objectives. Memo from Sneider to Kissinger, “Tentative Schedule for April 12 Meeting,” April 9, 1969, p. 1, Box H–299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69–5/30/69 [2 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 106 Kissinger to Nixon, “Analysis of changes in international politics since World War II and their implications for our basic assumption about US foreign policy,” October 20, 1969, Agency Files, NSC 1969–1971, National Security Council Files (NSCF), NPMS, NA. 107 President Richard M. Nixon, interview with Time, January 3, 1972, p. 3. As Secretary of State, Kissinger came to realize the emergence of the balance of power at different levels: “In the military sphere, there are two superpowers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged.” Henry A. Kissinger, Address to the Pacem in Terris III Conference, Washington, October 8, 1973, cited in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 282.
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On February 14, 1972, three days before Nixon’s departure to China, Kissinger provided his assessment of the future role of China within the triangular diplomacy: For the next 15 years we have to lean the Chinese against the Russians. We have to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now, we need the Chinese to correct the Russians, and to discipline the Russians … Our concern with China right now, in my view Mr. President, is to use it as a counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy. … The fact that it doesn’t have a global policy is an asset to us, the fact that it doesn’t have global strength yet – and to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russia dominates China, that would be a fact of such tremendous significance.108
In sum, Kissinger’s practice of the balance of power policy toward the US rapprochement with China can be defined as the diplomatic practice of using the weaker China as a counterweight against the stronger Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, while publicly seeking to create an appearance of taking an even-handed political approach toward the two communist giants. Accordingly, it should be examined how Kissinger developed his view on US policy toward China prior to 1969. 2.4 Kissinger’s early views on China Kissinger was originally not an Asia or China expert, and thus he approached China “from his experience as a specialist in European politics.”109 In his memoirs, although admitting: “China had not figured extensively in my own writings,” Kissinger still emphasizes the importance of his role in the composition of the draft of Nelson Rockefeller’s presidential campaign speech of May 1, 1968 which proposed “a dialogue with Communist China.”110 In particular, the speech suggested the possible development of a “subtle triangle” of relations between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow: “we improve the possibilities of accommodation with each as we increase our options toward both.”111 Former NSC staff memberRodman perceives Kissinger’s suggestion as “independent of Nixon’s.”112
108 Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, February 14, 1972, 4:09–6:19pm, Oval Office, OVAL 671–1, White House Tapes, NA. 109 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 110 Nelson Rockefeller, Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, May 1, 1968, The New York Times, May 1, 1968. 111 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165; and Idem, Diplomacy, p. 721. The intellectual origins of Kissinger’s policies toward Sino-Soviet relations, what was to be known as the triangular diplomacy on the basis of the balance of power concept, can be traced back to his early writings. In a study of the European balance of power after the Napoleonic upheavals, Kissinger praised Metternich for placing Austria in a position among its rivals where it served as “the pivotal state” so that “the differences of the major powers among each other were greater than their respective differences with Austria.” Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 247. Kissinger also analyzed Bismarck’s proposal to “manipulate the commitments of the other powers so that Prussia would always be closer to any of the contending parties than they were to each other.” Henry A. Kissinger, “White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” Daedelus, XCVII (Summer 1968), pp. 912–913. 112 Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2003.
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In reality, however, Kissinger’s early writings failed to show depth on the changing nature of the Sino-Soviet relations, and America’s China policy was never discussed independently. In the late 1950s, Kissinger considered China as a “revolutionary” power along with the Soviet Union.113 He referred to the US primary task of “dividing” the Sino-Soviet alliance: the Sino-Soviet relations might become “cooler,” if the US sought to pressure the two communist states to take risks where only one stood to benefit.114 In the early 1960s, Kissinger cautiously argued that the possibility of a “rift” between Communist China and the USSR “must not be overlooked.”115 He hinted only that “if it [a rift] occurs we should take advantage of it rather than force the erstwhile partners into a new alliance through intransigence. Our diplomacy cannot have as a goal what we can only treat as a fortunate event.”116 Therefore, Kissinger had failed to explore sufficiently the seriousness and complexity of SinoSoviet hostility. By the mid-1960s, Kissinger acknowledged the fact of a Sino-Soviet split; he suggested that it was “insoluble” owing to the two parties’ conflicts over doctrinal issues.117 It was De Gaulle who sought to play off the weaker Communist China as a “counterweight” to the stronger Soviet Union.118 However, Kissinger still tended to regard China as an “objective threat” to US “global responsibilities.” In his memoirs, Kissinger argues that there was a tendency in the new administration to view China as an aggressive power: Originally, we had not thought reconciliation possible. We were convinced that the Chinese were fanatic and hostile. But even though we could not initially see a way to achieve it, both Nixon and I believed in the importance of an opening to the People’s Republic of China.119
However, the above statement is misleading, because as previously suggested, it was Nixon who came to suggest the importance of opening a dialogue with China by 1967. In Solomon’s re-assessment, Nixon estimated that the Soviet Union was a much greater threat than China.120 Moreover, Nixon was coming to power at the time when the country was torn apart by Vietnam. And he did “not want to fall into the trap where Lyndon Johnson was trapped, and his presidency was destroyed by the Vietnam conflict.” Thus, when Nixon was talking about the secret plan for ending the Vietnam War, a critical element of that was including the relations with
113 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, chapter 10. 114 Ibid., pp. 148–149. 115 Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 202. 116 Ibid. 117 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 198, and pp. 201–202. 118 Ibid., pp. 59–60. On January 27, 1964, France became the first Western state which officially recognized the People’s Republic of China. See Stephen Erasmus, “General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking,” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April–June, 1964), pp. 195–200. 119 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163. 120 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003.
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China. On the contrary, Kissinger saw China as a real threat to the US and regarded the Vietnam War as a “trap drifting resources and political attentions away from the Soviet problem.” Thus, Solomon concludes that: “Nixon was several years ahead of Kissinger.”121 On February 21, 1972, Kissinger admitted to Mao and Zhou that: “We thought all socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn’t understand until the President came to the office the different nature of revolution in China and the way revolution developed in other socialist states.”122 Thus, in 1968 and 1969, Kissinger still viewed China as much more aggressive than the Soviet Union. Kissinger claims that, despite some differences in opinion, he and Nixon came to realize that the development of triangular relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China would provide “a great strategic opportunity for peace.”123 Lord argues that: “Each one came to office, considering the benefits of opening to China with respect to primarily the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and Asia in general.”124 In actuality, however, Kissinger was not initially interested in China, and remained skeptical about any quick move toward China during the early months of the new administration. Kissinger perceived the China issue in terms of its short and mid term relationship to Sino-Soviet rift. Thus, for Kissinger, China policy was initially a part of a much broader Soviet policy. On the other hand, Nixon believed that “ending the isolation of 800 million Chinese itself removed a great threat to peace.”125 Thus, Nixon was convinced that, even without the growing Soviet military threat, it was still “essential” to open towards China, while China was still physically weak rather than waiting until later when China would have less need of a relationship with the United States.126 Overall, it was Nixon’s determination that drove the initiative, and Kissinger brought the initiative to fruition and fit into a triangular global balance framework. 3. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership One of the main reasons why the opening to China was conducted “very secretly and very quietly” was because Nixon and Kissinger were afraid that if it became public, the “domestic public and political reaction could have killed off the initiative before it began.”127 Paradoxically, it was Nixon’s life long background as a “staunch antiCommunist” that provided a strong basis within the US domestic political context to open a new dialogue with Communist China.128 On the other hand, Kissinger 121 Ibid. 122 Memcon, Mao, Zhou, Nixon, and Kissinger, February 21, 1972, p. 8, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai, February 1972, Box 91, Country Files – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 123 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164. 124 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 125 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164. 126 Richard M. Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 130. 127 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 128 Ibid; and Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003.
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admits the relative weakness of his position in the early period: “I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own.”129 Moreover, as the briefing books for his October 1971 trip to Beijing indicated, Kissinger came to anticipate that domestic political reactions to a new China initiative would be “manageable.”130 With his past credentials and his following from the right and center, Nixon was “much less vulnerable to attack than would be more leftist figures” in American society. Thus, the President was probably the “only leader who could carry through this policy.”131 Kissinger explained to Zhou in October 1971 that Nixon asked him to “reaffirm in the strongest terms his personal commitment” to the improvements in relations between the US and China.132 Finally, during the Nixon-Mao meeting in February 1972, Kissinger admitted that: “It was the President who set the direction and worked out of the plan.”133 Regarding the actual policy operational process, Kissinger emphasizes that once the President set “a policy direction,” he left it to the National Security Adviser “to implement the strategy and manage the bureaucracy.”134 Ambrose evaluates Kissinger’s role “as agent, tool, and sometimes adviser, not as a generator of ideas”: “The basic thrust of Nixon’s innovations came from the President, not the National Security Adviser.”135 Haig assesses Nixon as a “strategic thinker of historic dimensions” and Kissinger as a “brilliantly gifted diplomatic tactician carrying Nixon’s ideas forward.”136 Edgar Snow, an American journalist, interviewed Premier Zhou. Interestingly, that interview revealed that the Chinese knew about Kissinger through their intelligence system and through reading of his writings. “Kissinger?” Zhou said, “There is a man who knows the language of both worlds – his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With him, it should be
129 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163. 130 Opening Meeting, HAK Talking Points, p. 6, Briefing book for HAK’s October 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) – China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 131 Ibid. 132 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, October 20, 1971, 4:40–7:10pm, p. 3, HAK visit to PRC October 1971 Memcons – originals, For the President’s Files – China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 133 Memcon, February 21, 1972, p. 3, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai February 1972, Box 91, Country Files – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 134 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163. See also Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 47, pp. 61–62. 135 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume II: The Triumph of a Politician 1962–1972 (London: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 655. Former Soviet Ambassador to America, Anatoly Dobrynin, assesses that Kissinger was a “good tactician” in both direct and behind-the-scenes negotiations in Soviet-American relations. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 1995), p. 195. 136 Alexander M. Haig Jr. (with Maccarry Charles), Inner Circles, How America Changed the World: A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992), p. 204.
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possible to talk.” Finally, during a meeting with Zhou in February 1972, President Nixon described Kissinger’s role: I think that one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in his services to my administration is his philosophic views. He takes the long view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my schedule is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic and foreign policy that I don’t have as much time to take the long term view as he does.138
In Winston Lord’s assessment, Nixon and Kissinger “divided labor very skillfully; Nixon was providing fundamental guidance. Kissinger was a skillful negotiator and an operator, as well as a strategist.”139 Isaacson gives credit to both Nixon and Kissinger in terms of the speed of transformation in the US-China relations.140 Based on his vision, Nixon held ultimate authority, making the final decision for a new initiative. Kissinger was a dynamic theorist and tactician, skillfully conducting a series of crucial negotiations. In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed the foreign policy decision-making system and bureaucratic expertise on the formulation and implementation of America’s China policy, as the following chapter examines.
137 Zhou Enlai, interview with Edgar Snow (conducted on November 5, 1970), Life, July 30, 1971 p. 3. After the July 1971 secret talks, Zhou privately commented on Kissinger, “very intelligent – indeed a Dr.” Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 266. 138 Memcon, February 26, 1972, p. 16, Box 87, POF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 139 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 140 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 353. Holdridge recalls that: “I’m sure Nixon respected Kissinger for his intellectual capabilities, but the respect did not necessarily mean a warm and intimate friendship.” John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, p. 108, July 20, 1995, FAOHC.
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Chapter 2
Foreign Policy Decision-Making Machinery for the US Rapprochement with China This chapter examines the revitalization of the National Security Council (NSC) as the principal decision-making body for the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger. It begins by investigating how Nixon and Kissinger reassessed the main structural and operational problems of previous NSCs and designed a White House centered decision-making machinery. Next, this chapter analyses the development of the systematic control of policy study papers by Kissinger and the NSC staff and the subsequent exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process. Finally, it compares and contrasts the roles of the NSC staff and State Department officials for the US policy towards China in greater detail. Despite the pursuit of strict secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger still privately benefited from the expertise of the State Department to develop a broader set of policy options. Additionally, there were private interactions between the NSC staff and State Department officials. The existing diversity on policy options among foreign policy decision makers will be analyzed not as the mere extension of conflicting bureaucratic interests but as a more dynamic interplay among different geo-strategic perceptions, reflecting a broader debate within the foreign policy decision-making circle. 1. Organization and Procedure for a New NSC System 1.1 Problems of the previous NSCs During the transition period from November 1968 to January 1969, Presidentelect Nixon and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs designate Kissinger sought to re-vitalize the function of the National Security Council to identify the US’s capabilities, interests, and objectives.1 In their meeting on November 25, 1968, President-elect Nixon talked with Kissinger about a “massive 1 The functions and responsibilities of the National Security Council were set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Its membership included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other high officials, such as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate. See, for example, History of the National Security Council (http://www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html); John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991),
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organizational problem.” Nixon did not trust the State Department bureaucracy because of his personal experiences: the Foreign Service had disdained him as Vice President during the 1950s and ignored him as a private citizen during the 1960s. Nixon also believed that the State Department would “leak secrets” and had some very conservative views in some areas that would “resist change.”3 In response, Kissinger recommended that if the President-elect intended to operate foreign policy on a “wide-ranging basis,” he would need to establish the best possible national security machinery within the White House that could plan, analyze, and review “policy options” systematically for him before making decisions.4 Nixon and Kissinger wanted to establish a system which would enable them to be presented with all sides of any issues in the presence of all concerned.5 The President needed to understand not only the substantive background of the issues but also their bureaucratic histories and political implications because he would inevitably be surrounded “by advocates with strong, often institutional, and nearly always conflicting views.”6 The new administration thus needed a mechanism that would establish “clear, consistent, and feasible goals” in the national security field, which would translate these goals into “specific programs” and monitor the progress of these programs.7 Before entering office, Nixon and Kissinger had already shown their respective views towards a highly bureaucratized foreign policy decision-making process. During the 1968 campaign, Republican Presidential candidate Nixon promised to “restore the National Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning.”8 Kissinger criticized the combination of abstractness and rigidity resulting from traditional American idealism, insisting that foreign policy had to be based not on sentiment but on an assessment of strength. When policy became identified with the consensus of a committee, it was fragmented into a series of ad hoc decisions
pp. 29–32; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Progress, Sixth edition. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), pp. 328–348. 2 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 11. On December 2, 1968, Nixon officially announced the appointment of Kissinger as the Special Assistant for the President for National Security Affairs. 3 Richard Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 4 Richard M. Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 341. 5 As for the development of the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system, see NSC History: The Nixon Administration 1969–1974 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html#nixonn); and Prados, Keepers of the Keys, pp. 265–267, pp. 277–283. 6 “The National Security Process, National Security Staffing in the White House,” International Social Studies Division, November 6, 1968, p. 3, HAK Administrative and Staff Files (HAK-ASF), Box 1, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, Henry A. Kissinger’s Office Files (HAKOF), The National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). 7 Lean Sloes to Kissinger, “Organizing the National Security Machinery,” December 21, 1968, p.1, HAK-ASF, Box 3, General Transition Books, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 8 Richard M. Nixon, Radio Speech, October 24, 1968, cited in Kissinger, White House Years, p. 38.
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which made it difficult to achieve a sense of overall direction. Thus, the National Security Council was “less concerned with developing measures” in terms of “a wellunderstood national purpose than with adjusting the varying approaches of semiautonomous departments.”10 In particular, Kissinger emphasized the importance of secrecy in the decision-making body: One reason for keeping the decisions to small groups is when an unpopular decision may be fought by brutal means, such as ‘leaks’ to the press or to congressional committees. The only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out. In consequence, the relevance of the bureaucracy might continue to send out cables with great intensity, thereby distorting the effort with the best intensions in the world. You cannot stop them from doing this because you do not tell them what is going on.11
Hence, the Nixon transition staff reassessed the main problems of the National Security Council during previous administrations.12 President Truman was suspicious of congressional intent in establishing the NSC system, which might have restricted his flexibility of action. Thus, he initially restricted its policy role and began to pay substantive attention to its function only after the outbreak of the Korean War.13 President Eisenhower institutionalized the NSC into a large and highly structured body, with formal procedures, staff systems, and interdepartmental relationships.14 It appeared, however, that the Eisenhower administration’s NSC mechanism became very formalized, especially during its second term, because the machinery spent a long time to reach an interdepartmental consensus, which resulted in delays in getting staff papers to the Council, and many staff papers without clearly defining policy alternatives. As Vice President, Nixon was frustrated by Eisenhower’s practice of encouraging a consensus amon the NSC principals before an issue reached the President for the final decision. Nixon wanted a system that was “formal and orderly” but not as rigid as the Eisenhower system and which moved authority from the departments to the White House.15
9 Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 29–34. 10 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice; Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960), pp. 343–344. 11 Henry A. Kissinger, “Bureaucracy and Policymaking: The Effects of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process,” in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p. 89, quotation marks in original. 12 Letter from Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson, March 3, 1970, p. 1, Box H – 300, NSC System, NSC Organization [1 of 3], National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA. 13 Colonel J.M. Chambers to Bryce N. Harlow (Assistant to the President-Elect), “Suggested Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 1968, p. 3, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 14 Ibid. See Prados, Keepers of the Keys, pp. 57–95. 15 Morton H. Halperin, correspondence with the author, June 10, 2004.
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The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations maintained the NSC system in “name only,” downgrading its role as a continuing, objective entity and relying only on a few personal advisors.16 The Kennedy NSC was relatively informal, more flexible, and, in many respects, action rather than policy-oriented. The Johnson NSC was based on informal and issue-oriented committees, and the so-called “Tuesday Lunches” at the White House, where current concerns were discussed in an unstructured and highly personalized manner. The Kennedy-Johnson national security policies thus relied too much on ad hoc planning which did not sufficiently engage the resources of the bureaucratic experts on the Council. In consequence, the Kennedy-Johnson national security decision-making suffered from the “absence of systematic policy planning,” the “weakness of procedures for inter-agency coordination,” and the “lack of continuous assessment of short and long range objectives.”17 1.2 Goodpaster’s memoranda As for actual planning of a new NSC system, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger consulted General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s NSC Staff Secretary, and asked him to produce option papers.18 Goodpaster recommended strengthening the NSC as the President’s “highest deliberative, advisory and policy-formulating body.”19 The system should formulate “broad and far-reaching conceptions of a longrange character” and provide the “main structure of the nation’s approach to its international and security problems.”20 Its policy process should provide “coherence and reasoned dynamism, together with a sense of direction, to the whole complex of policy and action.”21 Goodpaster recommended that in order to decrease bureaucratic friction, the control of agenda creation should be managed by the White House, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should run the key committees.22 It was crucial to impose some degree of order on the flow of 16 Chambers to Harlow, “Suggested Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 1968, p. 5, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 17 Sloes to Kissinger, “Organizing the National Security Machinery,” December 21, 1968, p. 2, HAK-ASF, Box 3 General Transition Books, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 18 Halperin, correspondence with the author, June 10, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 41–44; and Idem, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 72–76. As Staff Secretary of the NSC during the Eisenhower administration, Goodpaster was responsible for the flow of matters on security and international activities between the President and the departments and agencies. The roles of Staff Secretary and National Security Adviser were combined during the Kennedy-Johnson NSCs. Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under President Eisenhower,” December 12, 1968, pp. 1–2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 19 Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Organization and Procedures for the Conduct of National Security Affairs,” December 13, 1968, p. 1, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 The idea of White House control of the NSC agenda was reinforced when Goodpaster and Kissinger consulted with former President Eisenhower at Walter Reed Army
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information and action papers to and from the President and to have that supervised by the National Security Adviser who should be fully familiar with the President’s views, priorities, and interests. The new NSC structure appeared similar to the one Eisenhower used in terms of its structure for systematic analysis of policy options. Goodpaster recalls Eisenhower’s statement: “Plans are nothing, but planning is everything” which emphasized the importance of preparatory work, giving all departments and agencies concerned a chance to present respective positions and bringing together all of the relevant facts.23 Regarding Nixon’s view, Goodpaster assesses that: “he put a real value on the way that had been done during the Eisenhower time.” While Eisenhower “intended to maintain control through laying down the policies, main guiding policies, and then allowing that to evolve as the years went on,” Nixon “personally intended to take an active part in major initiatives that could reshape the relationships – major relationships in the world – particularly the relationships among the great powers.”24 Goodpaster thus emphasizes that it was not just Presidential control of foreign policy, but that Nixon was going to “direct” it and “engage” himself in it.25 1.3 Halperin’s memorandum Kissinger also asked Morton Halperin, a former junior professor at Harvard and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to produce a memorandum on how the analysis of bureaucratic politics could be applied to national security and foreign policy decision-making.26 In theory, bureaucratic politics analysts focus on the politics of a government, where foreign policy decisionmaking is characterized as a resultant of a bargaining process among a multitude of bureaucracies with competing viewpoints and possessing different amounts of
Hospital in December 1968. Eisenhower insisted that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) structure (which was established in 1967 and chaired by the Under Secretary of State) should be abolished because the Defense Department would never like taking orders from the State Department. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 43; and Idem, Years of Renewal, p. 75. 23 Andrew J. Goodpaster, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 3, The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and the Brookings Institution, December 8, 1998. 24 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 25 Ibid., p. 4. As for the study of the presidential leadership in foreign policy decisionmaking, see, for example, Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); and Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Regan, Fifth edition. (New York: Free Press, 1990); and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 485–514. 26 Halperin, correspondence with the author, June 10, 2004. Kissinger consulted with Goodpaster and cleared Halperin’s memo with him without saying that Halperin wrote it. Then Lawrence Eagleburger dealt with Goodpaster. Halperin was originally a junior professor and also Kissinger’s former teaching assistant at Harvard. See also Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 154–155.
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power within the national governmental hierarchy.27 Thus, policy-making is a matter of widening the base of support within the executive branch through the constant modification of the proposed policy. Concessions are made toward potential allies to satisfy their interests and overcome their objections to establishing a majority intradepartmental coalition. A major characteristic of policy-making is its timeconsuming nature. In practice, there were two fundamental issues to the new NSC system: who would control the agenda and the flow of policy papers; and who would chair the key NSC sub-committees. Halperin proposed two major changes. The first proposal, also reflecting General Goodpaster’s view, was to eliminate the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), which was chaired by the Undersecretary of State and was in charge of reviewing all options and proposals before they reached a formal NSC meeting. It would be replaced by a Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, which would give Kissinger the power to approve any papers submitted to the President by departments and agencies; and the control of the agenda for NSC meeting. Halperin’s other proposal was to give the National Security Adviser the power to direct National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs, which were pronounced NIZ-ums) to departments and agencies. These directives would become a key tool for Kissinger to decide which policies should be reconsidered, when they would be placed on the agenda, and how they would be discussed. It would also allow him to use the bureaucracy without revealing his real purposes as well as to conduct negotiations secretly. In short, the new NSC system emphasized two principal objectives of the President: the retention of control over foreign policy decision-making at the top of the system; and the systematic development of clear policy analysis and alternative choices. 1.4 Objections from the Defense Department and the State Department Kissinger sent his memorandum on the new NSC system to Nixon, which he privately approved. On December 28, 1968, Nixon summoned Secretary of Statedesignate William Rogers and Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird to Key Biscayne, Florida, to discuss the Kissinger organizational plan. After the discussion, Nixon gave the final approval of the plan. On December 28, 1968, The New York Times reported that President-elect Nixon intended to “enlarge the role of National 27 For bureaucratic politics of foreign policy decision-making, see, for example, Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, “A Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework,” in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 1–42; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp with Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second edition. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007); John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, Fifth edition. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc., 1989), pp. 61–71; Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 457–480; and Graham Allison and Philipe Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second edition. (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 4–7.
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28
Security Council.” In his memorandum to departments and agencies on January 16, 1969, Kissinger made clear the flow of policy papers under the control of NSC: All communication directed to the President originating in executive departments and agencies, including those from department and agency heads, should be delivered to the office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs. The NSC office under the direction of the Assistant to the President will establish secretariat control of all incoming papers prior to forwarding them to the office of the President. National security papers which the president asked upon or otherwise disposed of will be preceded out of the President Secretariat to the NSC office. Any subsequent actions required, such as the relay of Presidential decisions, return of signed correspondence or follow-up on Presidential comments will be accompanied under the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.29
In reality, however, the State Department and the Defense Department were not entirely convinced of the newly increased role of the National Security Adviser. Secretary of Defense-designate Laird objected to a “closed loop” in which “all intelligence inputs would be channeled through a single source” – the Assistant and his NSC staff.30 Such an arrangement would isolate not only the President from direct access to intelligence community outputs, but also the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other key members of the President’s team. Laird also objected that the proposal would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they would be performed as well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC meetings. Laird thus suggested that there should be some “consultation” with the NSC principals to establish the priorities of these studies. The principals should be able to place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President. Secretary of State-designate Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key Biscayne. However, “in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates,” Rogers wanted to reserve judgment, which Kissinger commented: “It would not be helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement.”31 In their memorandum to the President-elect, State Department officials insisted that it should be the principal responsibility of the State Department to define and formulate the issues, and to bring them to the attention of the President. In foreign policy decision-making, the Secretary of State must have authority not only over the State Department, but also over other departments. In particular, State Department officials insisted that policy papers prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups for the NSC
28 The New York Times, December 28, 1968. 29 Memorandum for Executive Departments and Agencies, Attached to Memo from Kissinger to Haldeman, “Arrangements for Secretariat Control of National Security Papers,” January 16, 1969, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 30 Laird to Kissinger, “Your Memorandum dated on January 3, 1969 concerning a New NSC System,” pp. 1–2, January 9, 1969, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 31 Kissinger to Nixon, “NSC Procedures,” January 7, 1969, p. 1, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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should be transmitted through the Secretary of State to the NSC Review Group.32 The Secretary of State, through the Under Secretaries Committee, must review papers on their way to the NSC to ensure all options were adequately examined, and the NSC should be seen primarily as an appeal board for when departments disagreed. In essence, the basic studies for NSSMs should be conducted at the assistant-secretary level of the State Department on an interagency basis, and then sent directly to the NSC Review Group. Kissinger criticized the State Department for being unable to take the lead in managing interagency affairs because the Foreign Service, in training and background, was “inadequate” to the task of long-range planning and management, and that their forte was in “compromising differences,” and “avoiding a confrontation of conflicting point of view.”33 In particular, Kissinger argued that the State proposal would restrict the Interdepartmental Groups in preparing policy papers to the scope and context of State Department functions, rather than fully and directly giving them the broader perspective of Presidential security concerns.34 The only way the President could ensure that all options were examined, and all the arguments fairly presented, was to “have his own people” who were “responsive to him, and with a Presidential rather than departmental perspective” to oversee the preparation of the papers.35 Overall, the fundamental question was whether Nixon was going to have a State Department oriented system or an NSC oriented system. If the President wanted to control policy, he had to control the policy-making body. Kissinger thus recommended to Nixon that the State proposal should be “rejected.”36 Accordingly, Goodpaster had a meeting with Under Secretary of State-designate Elliot Richardson and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs-designate U. Alex Johnson. The fundamental confrontation with the State Department was “over control of the agenda and the exercise of chairmanship of the principal committees that would be established.”37 Finally, the conflict was resolved by enforcing Nixon’s decision, “overruling” the position of the State Department.38 Nixon urged that anyone who opposed his decision for the new NSC system “should submit his resignation.”39
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. As for State Department’s organizational and operational problems, see, for example, Kissinger, “Bureaucracy and Policymaking,” in Halperin and Kanter (eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy, p. 89, pp. 95–96; Spanier and Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, pp. 51–65; and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 360–370. 34 Kissinger and Goodpaster to Nixon (n.d.), p. 1, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Goodpaster, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 3, NSCPOHR. 38 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 39 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 46.
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2. The Structure and Procedure of the New NSC System The new National Security Council became the “principal forum” for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination.40 The issues ranged from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.41 At the Presidential direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as the chief supervisory officer, was responsible for “determining” the agenda and “ensuring” that the necessary papers were prepared.42 There was a continual flow of memoranda to and from the President, and Presidential requests to Kissinger fell into two main categories: 1) directives and 2) requests for more information. The NixonKissinger NSC system was structurally three-tiered with the Council at the top, the NSC Review and Operational Groups in the middle, and the Interdepartmental Groups at the base.43 Once the President, with recommendation from his National Security Adviser, determined that an issue involving interdepartmental considerations required analysis and Presidential decision, the NSC staff prepared a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) to “direct” a study of the issue to one of the Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State.44 The IGs drafted the basic paper for consideration by the NSC, defining the issue requiring Presidential decision, setting forth US objectives, and outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative courses of action.45 As a former NSC staff member, Winston Lord, recalls, at the beginning of the administration, there was a number of NSSMs being sent out asking for studies for two main reasons: one was a “genuine search for an intellectual path, analysis and preparation of options for policy by the various agencies,” and the other reason was to “put so much work on the bureaucracy and 40 National Security Decision Memorandum 2 (NSDM2), “Reorganization of the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p. 1, National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs), Box 363, Subject Files (SF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. 41 The Council met regularly, and discussions were limited to agenda subjects except in unusual circumstances. At the first NSC meeting, President Nixon stated that the NSC would meet two times a week during January. After January, meetings would be once a week. Within approximately four months, meetings should be conducted on a bi-monthly basis. NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 42 NSDM2, “Reorganization of the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p. 1, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 43 History of the NSC (n.d.), p. 1, NSC History Files (NSC-HF), Box H-314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 44 National Security Decision Memorandum 1 (NSDM1), “Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series,” January 20, 1969, p. 1, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. There were six Interdepartmental Regional Groups, such as Africa, Latin America, East Asian and Pacific, Near and Middle East, Europe, Politico-Limitary – each chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. History of the NSC (n.d.), p. 4, NSCHF, Box H-314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 45 NSDM2, “Reorganization of the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p. 4, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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keep them so busy” that enabled Nixon and Kissinger to establish their control over US foreign policy.46 After an IG meeting, the NSC staff prepared a Review Group meeting book which included the following items: • •
• • • • •
Cover Memo, which briefly stated the subject of the meeting and pointed out any special problems of particular points; HAK Review Group Talking Points, in outline form, including all the issues Kissinger should raise at the meeting. (The views of the NSC staff on the answer and the likely responses of other Review Group members was also indicated); Review Group paper, which was the paper as it was distributed to the other members of the Review Group. A summary was prepared and placed on top; Background Papers; NSSM; Memo Requesting NSC Briefings, which was a draft of a memorandum to relevant agencies requesting briefing for the NSC discussion of this subject; Issues for Decision.47
After the papers were examined in Pre-Review Group meeting, the Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, met as a “planning board” to examine policy study papers prior to their submission to the NSC.48 The role of the Review Group was to “assure” that the issue under consideration was worthy of NSC attention; “all realistic alternatives” were presented; and the “facts” and “all department and agency views” were fairly and adequately presented.49 In September 1970, the Review Group was re-named the Senior Review Group and raised from the Assistant to the UnderSecretary level.50 The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), chaired by the 46 Winston Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 7, NSCP-OHR. 47 Halperin to Kissinger, “NSC Procedures,” June 23, 1969, p. 2, NSC, Vol. III, 6/1/69–12/31/69 [2of2], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 48 Kissinger to Nixon, “Additional Provisions Concerning the Conduct of National Security Affairs,” January 10, 1969, p. 1, HAK-ASF, Box 2, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 49 NSDM2, “Reorganization of the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p. 2, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The membership of the Review Group included: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman); a representative of the Secretary of State; a representative of the Secretary of Defense; a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence; and a representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 50 National Security Decision Memorandum 85, “The National Security Council Senior Review Group,” September 14, 1970, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The Senior Review Group comprised: the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman). As for other interagency review groups in this category, the Verification Panel was formed to gather the essential facts relating to a
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Assistant to the President, drafted contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action on a daily basis.51 Solomon emphasizes the importance of the “preparatory activity” that preceded a formal NSC meeting “where the issues of who really trusts whom, and who’s really relying on whose judgment, and the pre-planning of positions gets worked out.”52 Prior to the NSC meeting, the NSC staff prepared a briefing book for the President including: • • •
• • • • •
HAK Memo to the President – A brief memo summarizing what the issue was and calling any special problems to the attention of the President; Issues for Decision – An analytical paper summarizing the issues for decision from the Review Group paper, with recommendations on the issues; RN Talking Points – A brief memo including an introductory sentence, a list of the briefings, and an indication that Kissinger should be called on to discuss what the issues were; Review Group Paper, with a summary on the cover; Background Papers; HAK Talking Points – in outline form summarizing the main issues and pros and cons (included only in HAK’s copy of book); NSSM (in HAK book only); Memo Requesting Briefings (in HAK book only).53
At the NSC meeting, with the President in the chair, the National Security Adviser outlined the issues and the alternative courses of action, and the President requested comments and recommendations from each NSC member. In addition to arguing for his own favored course of action, each NSC member had the opportunity to disprove the arguments of the other members with whom he did not agree.54 Nixon encouraged a “free give and take discussion” at NSC meeting, because he wished to hear “all” points of view rather than a “consensus recommendation.”55 A former NSC staff member, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, explains that the roles of the NSC meetings were mainly to “keep the President’s options open” without allowing any officials to formulate a majority position, so that the President would not have
number of important issues of strategic arms limitation, such as Soviet strategic capabilities. The Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) examined the factors which would determine the course of Vietnamization. 51 The WSAG consisted of the Review Group (later the Senior Review Group), enlarged by additional military and intelligence specialists. 52 Richard Solomon, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 34, NSCP-OHR. 53 Halperin to Kissinger, “NSC Procedures,” June 23, 1969, pp. 3–4, NSC, Vol. III, 6/1/69–12/31/69 [2of2], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 54 History of the NSC (n.d.), p. 5, NSC-HF, Box H – 314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 55 NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
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to overrule other officials. Nixon and Kissinger were also “very careful not to show their cards” in the meeting.57 Thus, the President would “never decide at the meeting.”58 Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger were sensitive to the dangers of leakage. For example, during the first NSC meeting on January 21, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining “the strictest security” with respect to the deliberation of the NSC and directed its members to inform their subordinates that “press leaks must be avoided.”59 After each NSC meeting, the NSC staff reviewed the records of it and presented their views and suggestions for a “follow-up” consideration by Nixon and Kissinger.60 Kissinger summarized the main issues of the staff recommendations as well as his views in a memorandum to the President. After his private talks with Kissinger, the President made his final decision. At this stage, the NSC staff prepared a National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) to “report” the contents of the Presidential decision to the departments and agencies.61 In response to NSDMs, the Under Secretaries Committee (USC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, with representation at the Deputy or Under Secretary level, developed operational plans and recommendations to implement policy decisions.62 In essence, three levels of meetings in the new NSC system emerged: 1) Statechaired interdepartmental working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level; 2) Kissinger-chaired meetings (where the basic decisions were essentially either made or prepared for the President); and 3) the NSC meetings. As Lord points out, the “crucial” factor in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system was that many of the subcommittees were chaired by Kissinger or his staff, which Kissinger himself was “very conscious about.”63 Besides, reflecting Nixon’s personal reluctance to settle disagreements directly with Cabinet members and heads of departments and agencies, the new NSC system came to rely heavily on “memoranda rather than face-to-face meetings.”64 In this new NSC system, the President became almost inaccessible or even isolated from the head of each department and agency. It was only Kissinger who had full access to the President, and thereby the influence of both Secretary of State Rogers and the State Department were decreased with regard to foreign policy decision-making.
56 Helmut Sonnenfeldt (senior NSC staff member on Soviet affairs, 1969–1974), “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 33, NSCP-OHR. 57 Michael Guhin (NSC staff member, 1969–1974), “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 33, NSCP-OHR. 58 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 33, NSCP-OHR. 59 NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 60 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 33, NSCP-OHR. 61 NSDM1, “Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series,” January 20, 1969, p. 1, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 62 History of the NSC (n.d.), p. 3, NSC-HF, Box H-314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 63 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 7, p. 32, NSCP-OHR. 64 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 68.
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3. Other Key Players in the New China Policy 3.1 NSC staff 3.1.1 NSC staff procedures Kissinger, as the executive secretary of the National Security Council staff, outlined the problems and options and managed the day-to-day policy process. In December 1968, General Goodpaster produced the outline of new NSC staff procedures, stressing the importance of its supporting role for the President’s consideration of “broad, far-reaching conceptions of the central importance in guiding policy and operations.”65 The President would need a strong NSC staff that could present him with clear-cut alternatives, explain to him the implications of choosing between alternatives, and help him to articulate his chosen policies. Goodpaster suggested that the NSC staff should also prepare for, conduct, and take further action on the meetings, and to manage the NSC supporting structure.66 Hence, during the transition period, Kissinger sought to recruit the best available young experts from the State Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and academia.67 The newly emerged National Security Council Staff was divided into three main groups, plus the military assistant: 68 •
•
Assistant for Program – three or four Assistants, such as Morton Halperin (1969), and Anthony Lake (1969–1970), integrating planning and operations by bringing a long-range (five-year) perspective to current operations. Operations Staff – approximately five senior staff members, each senior staff member responsible for certain geographic regions and functional activities (such as East Asia, Europe, Near East, South Asia, Latin America, Africa). Its main roles were to follow day-to-day matters, attend inter-agency meetings, and bring to the attention of the National Security Adviser matters requiring Presidential attention. Its senior members on East Asia included: John Holdridge (1969–1973), Richard Smyser (Vietnam expert, 1970–1971 and 1973–1975), Richard Sneider (Japan expert, 1969), Richard Solomon (China expert, 1971–1976). Holdridge explains that the “geographical line” of the NSC staff was organized more or less “corresponding to the same bureau that would be in the Department of State.”69 In particular, Kissinger highly
65 Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Organization and Procedures for the Conduct of National Security Affairs,” December 13, 1968, p. 4, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 66 Ibid., p. 1. 67 Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 50, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 23–24. 68 A New NSC System, pp. 4–5, NSC, Vol. II, 4/1/69–5/30/69 [2 of 2], Box H-299, Memo from William Watts to Kissinger (via Lake/Haig), “Revised NSC Staff Arrangements,” September 12, 1969, NSC System, Staff and Committees [2 of 3], Box H-301, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 69 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 81, FAOHC.
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•
•
valued Solomon’s expert insight regarding the implications on Chinese public statements and private messages, and on China’s domestic political situation.70 Solomon assesses that Kissinger worked by “departmentalizing different people in separate organizational ‘boxes’.”71 Planning Staff – approximately three senior staff members, such as Richard V. Allen (1969) and Winston Lord (1969–1973; also special assistant to Kissinger for China policy, 1970–1973), and five junior staff members, such as Peter Rodman (1969–1977). Its roles included: preparing NSC agenda papers on planning matters, producing necessary follow-up papers, supporting Assistants for Programs, participating in inter-agency planning studies, and providing alternative thinking to the National Security Adviser. Lord explains that: “Our job was also to help manage the paper flow, working with the relevant regional honcho or functional honcho on the staff.”72 The Military Assistant – helped the National Security Adviser in developing staff papers on military matters, including judgments on military questions, and in monitoring and assembling intelligence material. Colonel Alexander M. Haig Jr. (1969–1970; promoted to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970–1973), and Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1969) were in the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Rodman recalls that Kissinger “wanted to have all this sort of diversity of opinion,” and contrary to the usual image of him, Kissinger “liked to have debates” and “respected people who stood up to him.”73 Overall, the NSC staff had “coherence and competence.”74 It was “bureaucratically very complex and very personalized.”75 Kissinger “kept everything very tightly controlled inside the White House” and the NSC staff practically operated as a “separate State Department.”76 3.1.2 Drafting of policy papers Kissinger valued and benefited from the individual contributions of the NSC staff members. Sonnenfeldt comments that: “the quality of a paper drafted by one individual with a couple of assistants is bound to be better than a State Department internally negotiated document, or a Defense Department internally negotiated document.”77 As for actual drafting of policy studies, Holdridge recalls that Kissinger “would have three different groups working on a problem in the National Security Council, which might even include China. Not one of the members of those groups knew 70 Peter Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2003. 71 Richard Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 72 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 73 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 51, FAOHC. Rodman states further that Kissinger’s NSC staff was “surprisingly liberal, moderate, and intellectual,” especially for a Nixon administration. Ibid. 74 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 75 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 76 Ibid. 77 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” pp. 25–26, NSCP-OHR.
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78
that the others were working on the same problem.” Kissinger’s style of operation in a sensitive negotiation was to have both the “substantive experts” from the NSC staff and one of his “special assistants” to be his private secretaries.79 For example, Winston Lord was Kissinger’s principal special assistant, and thus was very much involved in the formulation and implementation of the China initiative. Lord also kept notes of Kissinger’s talks with Chinese officials. Peter Rodman was a junior special assistant, and there was a division of labor between Lord and Rodman.80 In his own operational role in particular, Lord explains that “I was working as part of a team for a variety of issues. I was always paired with a Vietnam expert on Vietnam, a China expert on China, and a Russia expert on Russia. I was the only one who was involved in all these in addition to Kissinger himself.”81 Overall, the NSC staff’s role included “setting up meetings where various agencies submitted their views. And NSC papers usually summarized those views, trying to present them fairly but also often presenting Kissinger’s views on top. These were usually drafted either by the regional experts concerned or by people like myself or some combination.”82 Kissinger took speeches “very seriously, demanding many drafts” from his NSC staff.83 In particular, during the transition period, Kissinger proposed to Nixon an idea to produce a document that would serve as a “conceptual outline of the President’s foreign policy, as a status report, and as an agenda for action.”84 Kissinger expected that the report would also “guide our bureaucracy and inform foreign governments about our thinking.”85 Nixon approved the proposal on January 30, 1969. Richard Allen recalls the drafting of Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress (February 1970, February 1971, February 1972 and May 1973) as one of the “great exercises” for the NSC staff, which was in a sense a “challenge to long-range planning.”86 Rodman agrees that the drafting of the report “educated” the NSC staff, because Kissinger “spent a lot of time on it with his staff in shaping … what should be our approach, what is the philosophy of our policy in this area, what are our real goals and interests.”87 Holdridge emphasizes the drafting of the first report of February 1970 as the “turning point” because it was drafted “entirely inside” the KissingerNSC staff without any “clearances” or “input” from the State Department. 88 After the NSC staff issued the first report in late 1969, President Nixon called all of the 78 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, p. 31, January 1995, FAOHC. 79 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 9, FAOHC. 80 Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2003. 81 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 158. 85 Ibid. However, Kissinger complains that although changes in US attitude toward China were “foreshadowed” in the reports, the media covered only the section on Vietnam. Ibid., p. 159. 86 Richard V. Allen, “The Roles of the National Security Adviser,” p. 25, and p. 35, NSCP-OHR, October 25, 1999. 87 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 47, FAOHC. 88 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 79, FAOHC.
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NSC staff members in the Cabinet Room, and expressed his personal distrust of Career Foreign Service officials that: “If the State Department has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me.”89 Nixon thus made it very clear that his administration’s foreign policy would be “run” by the NSC: “we were to keep our distance from State and not in fact do anything more than to ask for input, but certainly not for advice.”90 3.1.3 The Kissinger-NSC staff relations Within the White House, Kissinger himself was “an object of considerable suspicion throughout those early months,” because he was originally a “Rockefeller man.”91 In addition, most of the newly recruited members of NSC staff Kissinger had appointed turned out to be Democrats, which greatly increased the suspicion of the White House political staff.92 Thus, as Holdridge recalls, members of the NSC staff were ‘always treated and sneered at as “the intellectuals” by the rest of the White House staff.’93 On the other hand, Kissinger was “quite deliberately downgrading the staff in order to upgrade himself.”94 Moreover, in trying to avoid antagonizing other departments and also to prevent leaks, Kissinger ordered the NSC staff not to have contacts with outsiders, especially the press. In reality, however, Solomon reveals that he “developed a dialogue with some press people,” particularly on the Asia issues, because what Kissinger was telling the NSC staff was usually very different from what he saw going on and he had to know the difference between Kissinger’s “inside” game and his “outside” game in order to fulfill his roles.95 Moreover, there were private communications that occurred outside of the official lines between the NSC and the CIA. Solomon emphasizes that Kissinger’s excessive secrecy caused “compartmentalization of the policy process.”96 Kissinger could not even turn to the CIA for support in learning about senior Chinese leaders for his first trip to Beijing in July 1971. Thus, Solomon personally developed a covert “off-line” arrangement with CIA analysts to “draw on the intelligence community’s expertise and grasp of history.”97
89 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, p. 29, January 1995, FAOHC. 90 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 79, FAOHC. 91 Richard Moose (Staff Secretary of the NSC, January–August 1969), “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 12, NSCP-OHR. Kissinger was originally the chief foreign policy adviser to Nelson Rockefeller who competed with Nixon for the Republican presidential candidacy in 1968. 92 Lewis, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 11, NSCP-OHR. 93 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 94, FAOHC. 94 Lewis, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 12, NSCP-OHR. 95 Solomon, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 47, NSCP-OHR. 96 Ibid. The US government had previously dealt with the Chinese Communist leaders during the 1940s in Chungking and Yenan, and therefore there were a number of documents on these contacts in the CIA files. However, as Solomon recalls, “no one was tasked to go look at this material, we never drew on our past experience.” Ibid. 97 Ibid.
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The NSC staff rarely saw the President because Kissinger gathered the information from his staff and did all the briefing of the President himself, even on subjects on which he was not necessarily an expert. Lord argues that Kissinger “did keep the staff from having access,” and that NSC staff would attend meetings with foreign officials at times, however, no NSC staff members were allowed to be present “when he [Kissinger] was consulting with the President.”98 Lord also recalls that “When Nixon and Kissinger talked alone, he [Kissinger] would generally keep us informed.”99 Both foreign and US ambassadors tended to deal directly with the NSC, and Kissinger developed his own channels of communication with the ambassadors.100 However, Kissinger “continued to mistreat and ignore most [US] ambassadors,” although there were exceptions during the opening to China, especially Ambassador Walter Stoessel to Warsaw, Poland, and Ambassador Joseph Farland to Rawalpindi, Pakistan.101 During the early months of the Nixon administration, diplomatic observers already began to speculate that Kissinger inevitably would be over-burdened in his new staff function. Kissinger himself was reported to have stated that “it may not be possible to handle both planning and coordination of operations in this job.” 102 At the beginning of the day, Kissinger did not necessarily give briefings to the President by himself, as Harry R. Haldeman (The White House Chief of Staff) or John Ehrlichman (Nixon’s top domestic affairs adviser) was usually in the Oval Office. Kissinger had a “hard time” with their presence, because he was “not comfortable with it.”103 Very importantly, however, Rodman assesses that Haldeman did not “interfere in foreign policy,” because he believed that Nixon was the “master” in foreign policy; Haldeman had “no claim” to know the foreign policy, and thus the most important substantive discussions were conducted between Nixon and Kissinger “just alone.”104 Haldeman also “backed up” Kissinger when there was a bureaucratic fight between the NSC and the State Department; Haldeman would sometimes ring up Secretary of State Rogers and say, “The President wants this.”105 Haldeman would 98 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 13, NSCP-OHR. 99 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 100 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 59, NSCP-OHR. 101 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 56, NSCP-OHR. 102 The Boston Globe, January 30, 1969, in Box 95, Folder: Kissinger, Henry A., Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 103 Moore and Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.14, NSCP-OHR. Philip Odeen (member of the NSC staff, 1971–1973) recalls that: ‘when we’d be in a meeting and Haldeman would walk in, Henry would get “visibly nervous.” … It was different with Ehrlichman – Ehrlichman was less threatening. But Haldeman – everybody got nervous when Haldeman was around. He was, at least from my perspective, kind of a fierce guy. I would see Henry seemingly act differently when Haldeman was around.’ Ibid., p. 13. Quotation marks in original. As for Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s involvement in the Watergate scandal, see, for example, Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart Strober, Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994). 104 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 16, FAOHC. 105 Ibid., p. 17. Kissinger recalls that: “Because Nixon’s method of governing guaranteed incessant bureaucratic competition and disagreements, he was obliged to institute
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play an intermediate role between Kissinger and Rogers on the China initiative after Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. Overall, Haldeman was a “totally loyal person who did things because of what the boss wanted.” Haldeman was a “gate-keeper” of any access to the Oval Office because Nixon preferred interacting with a minimum number of people.106 There was “competition within Kissinger’s sphere over who would be his deputy.”107 The White House staff, especially Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not want too many liberal academics on the NSC. The argument was that in order to “balance experience and perspective,” a military person should be Kissinger’s deputy.108 Alexander M. Haig Jr. was thus appointed as the deputy, however in reality this was also to “keep an eye on Kissinger.” 109 As the deputy to the National Security Adviser, Haig would advise Kissinger on questions involving military considerations and help to produce policy memoranda and other papers on foreign affairs to be placed before Nixon for his decision.110 Haig was “very disciplined” in making the machinery work and dealing with the NSC staff, as Kissinger had less and less contact with them owing to his tight schedule. Haig was thus the “manager of the staff” and “master of the bureaucratic process” in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system.111 Importantly, Haig knew “how to smooth the rough edges” between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.112 Laird was a “more wily bureaucratic operator,” in Kissinger’s words, a “better guerrilla fighter” than senior officials in the State Department.113 When it came to specific defense issues, Kissinger did not have the “competence to press hard” because he did not have the “depth of background or experience.”114 In particular, as for the pace of Vietnamization, which Laird himself defines as a program to “turn over the war in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese and give them the responsibility,” there was a bureaucratic struggle between the NSC
ad hoc procedures for adjusting controversies. Sometimes he would ask Haldeman ... to settle the disputes he both fomented and resented.” Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 69. 106 Ibid., pp. 17–18. As for the importance of a strong Chief of Staff, see Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 328–329. 107 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 108 Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p. 35, FAOHC. Goodpaster recalls that Kissinger asked him to call Alexander Haig, who was then serving at West Point, to serve as his military assistant in the new NSC staff. “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 3, NSCP-OHR. 109 Ibid., p. 36. 110 Alexander M. Haig Jr. (with Maccarry Charles), Inner Circles, How America Changed the World: A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp. 190–191. 111 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 23, FAOHC. 112 Ibid., p. 24. 113 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 8, NSCP-OHR. See also Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 198–202. As for operational roles of the Defense Department, see Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 370–379. 114 Odeen, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 21, NSCP-OHR.
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115
and the Defense Department. Lord assesses that where Kissinger wanted on “the whole to go slower,” Laird wanted to “speed it up.”116 To put it another way, while Laird, being a Congressman in the past, was familiar with the “congressional and domestic mood,” Kissinger was more concerned with US capability to “maintain military balance” and “leverage” with the North Vietnamese.117 Secretary of Defense Laird thus established direct “communications channels” between Kissinger’s office and his own office regarding all official Department of Defense (DOD) elements which would be involved in NSC matters.118 As a result, the Kissinger-Laird rivalry became a significant example where the new NSC system did not necessarily defeat bureaucratic politics. Defense Department officials highly valued the intermediate role of Alexander Haig, Jr. between the DOD and the NSC. The “authoritative source” in the absence of Kissinger owing to his busy schedule was Colonel Haig who had “direct and continuing access” to Kissinger and the entire NSC staff. Haig was often able to “reflect the views of the President himself.”119 Most importantly, Haig “had increasingly direct contact” with Nixon when Kissinger was away on trips, which made Kissinger “very sensitive.”120 Thus, there emerged a triangular dynamic between them: Kissinger sought to gain Haig’s support and to co-opt him; Haig operated between Kissinger and Nixon, maintaining his good working relations with the President, and also working closely with Kissinger.121 Overall, Haig presented himself as the President’s man, an “enforcer,” to make certain that the President’s orders were followed.122
115 Melvin Laird, interview in CNN Cold War, Episode 16: Détente, Transcripts in National Security Archive (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-16/ laird1.html). 116 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 22, NSCP-OHR. 117 Ibid. Laird had his own information sources, such as the National Security Agency, learning that Kissinger often used the military’s cable network. For example, to coordinate messages involving the secret opening to China, which was arranged with Pakistan as an intermediary, a secure channel was set up through the US Navy’s attaché in Karachi. Secretary Laird and Navy Chief Admiral Elmo Zumwalt knew what was happening each step of the way, even if the CIA and the State Department did not. See Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 201; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 32–33. 118 Laird to Kissinger, “National Security Council, January 22, 1969, p. 1, and Kissinger to Laird, “National Security Council,” January 25, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [1 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 119 Lemnitzer to Admiral Johnson, September 29, 1969, p. 1, Box H – 300 NSC System, NSC Organization [1 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 120 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 23, NSCP-OHR. 121 Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p. 36, FAOHC. 122 Ibid.
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3.2 The State Department 3.2.1 Secrecy in bureaucratic politics As previously explained, one of the main reasons for the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger during the opening to China was their personal distrust of bureaucracy, especially the State Department.123 For Secretary of State, Nixon appointed his long-term friend and colleague, former Attorney General of the Eisenhower administration, William P. Rogers.124 By taking advantage of Rogers’ unfamiliarity with foreign affairs, Nixon intended to assure his control of foreign policy decision-making from the White House.125 Kissinger, on the other hand, had uneasy relations with Rogers. Sonnenfeldt argues: “Henry wasn’t exactly sure where he was going to fit in this close friendship and long-time association. I think it became a total surprise to Henry that Nixon didn’t want Rogers to play a major role, except publicly.”126 However, Secretary Rogers himself did not fight hard in the rivalry over the control of foreign policy, which resulted in the “demoralization of the State Department and its expertise.”127 Lord confirms that Kissinger “mistreated Rogers, although a lot of this was President Nixon’s fault, not his. But he would admit he didn’t resist the Nixon approach.”128 Whiting assesses that the State Department was “ready to serve,” however, they had no access and were consequently “under-used.”129 Whiting emphasizes that it was “not a mobilization of expertise and knowledge” which one expects in a government.130 In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed help from the State Department. Levin points out that: “their work was the mortar and the bricks of what happened when the grand policy designs actually took form. They heavily influenced policymaking by the information and analysis they provided, through they had little opportunity for formal policy advocacy.”131 On China policy, Nixon and Kissinger “benefited from all the thinking in the administration.”132 In particular, Nixon and Kissinger “used the interagency process” to obtain what they thought was the “best
123 During his visit to China, Nixon stated to Zhou that: “our State Department leaks like a sieve. Also within our bureaucracy there is great opposition to some of the positions I have taken.” Memcon, February 22, 1972, p. 3, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao and Chou En-lai February 1972, Country Files-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 124 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 197; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 26–32. 125 Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1969–1973), Oral history interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp. 10–11, FAOHC. 126 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 25, NSCP-OHR. 127 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 12, FAOHC. As for the general rivalry between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, see Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 333–334. 128 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 44, NSCP-OHR. 129 Allen S. Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. 130 Ibid. 131 Herbert Levin (NSC staff member for East Asian affairs, 1970–1971), “China Policy and the National Security Council,” p. 4, NSCP-OHR, November 4, 1999. 132 Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2003.
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of the technical knowledge” of the bureaucracy, especially the State Department.133 Thus, there was “a whole menu of steps” that was developed, namely a series of unilateral public signals, which the United States could send toward China, such as opening up trade and lifting travel restrictions.134 Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger would form the strategy themselves, deciding “how to play it” on their own initiative and schedule.135 Nixon and Kissinger “did everything to minimize the risk of leak by dealing only with a very few officials,” and therefore, most of the early cable communication abut engaging China went through CIA or Navy channels rather than the State Department’s regular channels.136 3.2.2 Senior State Department officials As Lord reassesses, despite their pursuit of secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger still could have brought in a few key State Department officials on the China policy and “sworn them to secrecy and used their expertise and had more bureaucratic support.”137 During the early months of the new administration, Kissinger still sought to smooth the relations between the NSC and the State Department and held regular meetings with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson (January 1969– June 1970), who chaired the Undersecretaries’ Committee. Kissinger did not have intellectual uncertainties about “being overrun by the Foreign Service,” as Rodman recalls, “[H]e knew that he could provide intellectual leadership; he found that they provided a lot of expertise.”138 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alex Johnson (February 1969– February 1973) developed a close working relationship with Under Secretary of State Richardson and also with Secretary of State Rogers.139 Johnson also acted as an intermediary between the White House and the State Department. In particular, Johnson, a former US Ambassador to Japan, kept emphasizing the importance of coordination between the US and its major allies in Asia, especially Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) regarding the linkage between their respective sensitivities to possible US withdrawal from Asia in the post-Vietnam era and US moves toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green (May 1969–May 1973) was a “very astute” career Foreign Service Officer who got along very well with both Secretary of State Rogers and Congress.140 Green chaired
133 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 13, FAOHC. Kissinger admits in his third memoirs that: “The interdepartmental process produced option papers from among which Nixon and I were able to select the course of action most compatible with our overall strategy without necessarily informing the authors of the decision until we had achieved a diplomatic breakthrough.” Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 83. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 137 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 44, NSCP-OHR. 138 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 14, FAOHC. 139 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hands of Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 516–517. 140 Arthur W. Hummel Jr., Oral History Interview, 1994, pp. 134–135, FAOHC.
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an Interdepartmental Group: East Asian and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), including the “China Working Group,” which performed the following functions: •
• •
discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which could be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of implementation of NSC decisions; preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC.141
In reality, however, Green did not get along well with Kissinger, and remained very “bitter” about Kissinger’s handling of East Asian issues and deliberate undermining of the roles of the State Department in the opening to China.142 Green criticizes that: “Kissinger had lots of gaps in his knowledge of the world,” and that “his failure to draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was a great mistake on his part.”143 Green, who was the State Department’s main counterpart toward Kissinger on East Asia, especially suffered from the secrecy surrounding the China initiative. Green recalls that: When you are ‘cut out’ of things, you begin to lose confidence in yourself. … Kissinger knew that you didn’t have the complete picture, and therefore he tended to discredit your views accordingly. It ended up by nobody really knowing what the other person knew or didn’t know. … We had a wonderful opportunity but, of course, a lot of that was not properly used. We could have done much better.144
Despite his unpleasant experiences with Kissinger, Green continued to remain loyal to President Nixon, whom he greatly admired for his knowledge and understanding of foreign affairs. During the early months of the new administration in 1969, Green held some significant conversations with Nixon regarding possible options and steps of opening a new dialogue with China.145 Overall, despite the exclusion from the direct decision making-process, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific played a crucial role in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) process. 3.2.3 Intelligence sources The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is the State Department’s representative in the US intelligence community.146 The INR is the unit through which the State Department makes its input into various interagency committees that 141 Interdepartmental Group: East Asian and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), Chartered by NSDM 2 (January 20, 1969), NSC Organization [2 of 3], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 142 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, interview with the author, October 1, 2003. 143 Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, p. 56, FAOHC. 144 Ibid. Quotation marks in original. 145 The main issues in their talks are examined in Chapters 3 and 4. 146 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State (http://www. state.gov/s/inr//); United States Intelligence Community, Department of State: Bureau of
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seek to guide intelligence operations. The INR draws on multiple intelligence source input from other agencies and also from overseas posts and provides value-added independent analysis of events to the Department’s senior officials. In particular, its staff drafts very insightful intelligence analyses, such as the “Intelligence Note” and the “Research Study,” which are among the most highly valued within the government. In addition to US embassies abroad, the State Department had an intelligence base in the Consulate General in Hong Kong, which was a very vital place for China watchers.147 A former State Department official and China watcher, Herbert Horowitz, recalls that: “people who came out of China as refugees or escapees would come to Hong Kong, and people who were going into China for business or trade would enter via Hong Kong and come out via Hong Kong.”148 Thus, Hong Kong was essentially a “gateway in and out of China” where China watchers obtained information from many different parts of Mainland China.149 As for China’s American policy, a former Deputy Chief of Station in the US Consulate General in Hong Kong, James Lilley, explains that: “we were dealing with the Chinese who were passing us messages from the Chinese Communists. They were telling us that they were reasonable and were coming out of this very bad experience during the Cultural Revolution. They said that they wanted to open up to the United States. … We reported this in some detail to Washington.”150 3.2.4 The State Department-NSC staff relations There was a question of rivalry between the NSC staff and the State Department. As early as January 1969, there was already media coverage on Nixon’s centralization of foreign policy decision-making within the White House. On January 29, President Nixon called upon the State Department to re-affirm his confidence in the nation’s foreign policy establishment. Nixon denied the media’s speculation that Kissinger and his NSC staff began to seize authority from Secretary Rogers.151 Although Nixon’s exact plans for the new NSC had not yet been made public (until the publication of Nixon’s first Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970), and Kissinger’s
Intelligence and Research (http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_state.shtml); and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p. 384. 147 Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p. 4, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 148 Herbert Horowitz (China watching, American Consulate General Hong Kong, 1965–1969), Oral History Interview, p. 1, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 149 Ibid. 150 James R. Lilley, Oral History Interview, 1996, pp. 54–55, FAOHC. The following chapters examine cables and intelligence studies from the US Consulate General in Hong Kong. 151 Crocker Snow Jr., “Nixon Denies Kissinger To Dictate Foreign Policy,” The Boston Globe, January 30, 1969, in Box 95, Folder: Kissinger, Henry A., Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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staff kept silent about its rules and procedures, it was widely speculated that the NSC had been “re-vitalized.”152 Kissinger initially requested that the State Department conduct a number of policy studies, and thus State Department officials could express their views. However, after a while, the State Department officials became cynical because they felt that they were just doing a “make-work,” and their views were not being taken seriously.153 Without having a strong influence of its own, the State Department’s bureaucracy “often would look for the NSC to take the lead on an issue in order to bring the other agencies into a workable sort of arena.”154 In reality, as Solomon points out, most regional experts in the NSC staff were originally recruited from the State Department, and thus still kept “covert dealings” with their former colleagues “without telling Kissinger.”155 Holdridge emphasizes that: “Those of us who were on detail from the State Department had to be very cautious. We tried to be as open as we possibly could, to keep in good, personal contact with Marshall Green, [U.] Alexis Johnson.”156 Levin also confirms that Johnson and Green “never pressured me to do anything or tell them anything when I was on the NSC staff, but we did meet privately.”157 3.2.5 The question of geopolitical perspective There was a significant difference of geopolitical perspective between the White House and the State Department. In the first place, the State Department had a “weak organizational base,” and that it was “very hard to get the State geopolitical view into a NSSM.”158 The State Department was also “much more anxious to try to keep some control of the regional issues,” and it never fought nearly as hard on the “functional” issues.159 Hence, there was a diversity of views on China within the State Department. First, as Lord emphasizes, some officials in the State Department initially insisted that the United States would “alienate the Russians” if it “opened up with the Chinese.”160 The so-called “Slavophile” opinion group, especially Ambassadors Charles Bohlen and Lyewellyn Thompson, both specialists on the Soviet Union, claimed that Moscow was very suspicious of a Washington-Beijing “collusion,” and therefore any effort to improve US relations with China would cause serious trouble
152 Ibid. 153 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 154 Samuel Lewis (career Foreign Service Officer, NSC staff aide for Latin America, 1968–1969), “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 37, NSCP-OHR. 155 Solomon, interview with the author, September 24, 2003. 156 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, pp. 29–30, January 1995, FAOHC. 157 Herbert Levin (member of the NSC staff for East Asian affairs, 1970–1971), “China Policy and the National Security Council,” p. 9, NSCP-OHR. 158 Lewis, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 20, NSCP-OHR. 159 Ibid., p. 32. 160 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 45, NSCP-OHR.
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161
for the promotion of Soviet-American relations. Sonnenfeldt recalls that: “until the Nixon administration, the State Department insisted on briefing the Soviets on every conversation that Alex Johnson and others had with the Chinese in Prague and Warsaw. … Thompson religiously called Dobrynin [Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States] in and gave him a full briefing. The suggestion that we might have a relationship with the Chinese without reassuring or telling the Soviets would not have occurred to anybody in the State Department.”162 Regarding a positive course for the new China policy, the so-called “Sinophile group” had long favored a “broad policy review.”163 Thomson stresses the importance of “a decade-old ‘laundry list’ of possible US initiatives towards China and a great deal of internal paper to support them.”164 For the public, the US government continued to express its support for the Republic of China on Taiwan. Rodman argues that China experts in the government insisted that: “Taiwan was such an overwhelming problem, and we could never have contact with China without sacrificing Taiwan.”165 Simultaneously, within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, there were a number of policy study papers that had been written on the recognition of Beijing. As a former Taiwan Desk officer, Thomas P. Shoesmith points out, there was increasing pressure to bring the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations, and thus the State officials’ main concern was to try to find a way to “retain the Republic of China in the General Assembly.”166 Thus, having assessed that the so-called “China Lobby” in Congress by the late 1960s was “no longer a significant factor,” and that Taipei would be “increasingly isolated, diplomatically and internationally,” State Department officials examined possibilities of pursuing “a two-China policy.” In military-security terms, as Shoesmith stresses, the Republic of China was “very cooperative in allowing us to use their bases in support of our activities in Vietnam.”167 Nevertheless, even the US Embassy in Taipei came to share 161 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 720. After a meeting with Thompson and Bohlen in the summer of 1969, Nixon mocked “the incorrigible softheadedness” of the Foreign Service. The Soviet desk was not entirely unitary within the State Department. Finally, it was presidential authority that excluded the Sovietologists. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 182. 162 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 17, NSCP-OHR. Dobrynin recalls that Llewellyn Thompson told him confidentially in mid-June 1971 that there were two camps of views within the American leadership: one side leaned toward giving priority to agreements with the Soviet Union; and other view gave precedence to an opening to China, believing that China could help end the Vietnam war soon, partly by “bringing pressures to bear upon the Soviet Union.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 1995), p. 224. 163 A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 381; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165, p. 182; and Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 335. 164 James C. Thomson Jr. “On the Making of US China Policy, 1961–1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” China Quarterly (April/June) 1972, p. 243. 165 Rodman, interview with the author, October 21, 2004. 166 Thomas P. Shoesmith (Taiwan Desk, Department of State, 1966–1971), Oral History Interview, p. 1, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 167 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
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a prevailing view within the State Department that “sooner or later relations [with China] should be normalized.”168 From Kissinger’s perspective, however, those within the State Department who supported the opening towards China appeared to be concentrated on “trade and cultural exchanges” with the Chinese, which was “secondary” compared to the “geopolitics and the Russian and Vietnamese dimensions.”169 As for the Soviet dimension, namely the US policy towards the Sino-Soviet rift, Paul Kreisberg, the former director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA), recalls that one of the key differences between the State Department and the NSC was that while the State Department saw the normalization with China as being “beneficial to us in an Asian context,” the NSC, especially Kissinger saw it in “Soviet terms” and regarded the Asian context as “minor.”170 Overall, Kreisberg reassesses: “We saw the Soviet Union as one factor, but not the driving one. He [Kissinger], obviously, saw it as the driving one.”171 In other words, while the State Department considered the restoration of Asian regional stability to be a priority in US policy toward China, Kissinger believed that the principal purpose of the US opening to China was to explore US leverage in Sino-Soviet rivalry. As for the Vietnam dimension, the Kissinger NSC expected that the opening to China would influence North Vietnam to end the war. Lord explains that: “If we were dealing with both of Hanoi’s patrons, Beijing and Moscow, it would help to isolate them and put pressure on them to be more reasonable at the negotiating table.”172 Kissinger interprets that Nixon regarded the opening toward China as “a somewhat great opportunity” in order to “squeeze” the Soviet Union “into short-term help on Vietnam.”173 Although the subject never came up in any official instructions, Nixon may also have thought that: “if we were able to improve relations with China, we would indirectly diminish the Chinese interest in supporting the Vietnamese.”174 On the other hand, the State Department was principally concerned about reassuring the Chinese in the Warsaw ambassadorial talks that the US military operation in Indochina was “not designed to threaten China.”175 Thus, the State Department underestimated the degree of China’s support for North Vietnam. Kreisberg explains that: “most of us were surprised as we found out to what degree the Chinese had engaged themselves. … we all saw the Vietnam-China issue as one
168 James Klemstine (Economic Officer, American Embassy, Taipei, Taiwan, 1970– 1973), Oral History Interview, p. 2, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 169 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 45, NSCP-OHR. 170 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department of State), 1965–81, Oral History Interview, p. 8, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 171 Ibid. 172 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 173 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164. 174 Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p. 11, in A China Reader, Vol. III, January 1995, FAOHC. 175 Ibid., p. 13.
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that was, essentially, peripheral.” The State Department perceived the BeijingHanoi relations in regional security term. Kreisberg recalls that: “most of us at the EA Bureau level saw the Chinese, at most, as wanting to use the Vietnam War as a lever to weaken the United States, but not to expand the war and not to risk war with us. And when we talked about it in Warsaw, they never wanted to say very much about it other than to support the Vietnamese.”177 In summary, the re-vitalization of the NSC system was much more systematic and complex than was previously estimated in the existing literature. The NSSMs and NSDMs were planned to provide a broad range of policy alternatives and perspectives. The fundamental source of Kissinger’s power was his control of the flow of policy study papers by chairing the key subcommittees, such as the Review Group and the Washington Special Action Group. On the other hand, the State Department lost its chairmanship of key committees for policy planning. However, it still remained the principal provider of ideas and recommendations in the NSSM process. The State Department obtained information from a number of sources, such as US embassies, foreign officials, and journalists and conducted a day-to-day analysis of change and development in Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, despite Kissinger’s pursuit of strict secrecy, State Department officials and the NSC staff members maintained informal communication to exchange views and develop policy studies. The NSC meeting became a formal occasion for departments and agencies to present their respective views and issues rather than acting as a decision-making body. Nixon’s preference to avoid face-to-face meeting enhanced the development of communication by memoranda between the Oval Office and other senior officials in his administration. The President, accompanied by Kissinger, maintained the authority for making the final decision in a highly confidential way. Together, Nixon and Kissinger would pursue strict secrecy during the US opening to China. It was on the basis of this presidential initiative and highly centralized foreign policy decision-making machinery that the US rapprochement with China would evolve as demonstrated in the following chapters.
176 Ibid. The Chinese continued to provide aircraft gunners and logistics personnel in North Vietnam. See Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 286; and Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–1969,” China Quarterly, 142 (June 1995), pp. 357–387. 177 Ibid.
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PART II The Evolution of the Rapprochement Policy
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Chapter 3
The Development of Policy Options from January to July 1969 The first chapter of Part II explores the evolution of a new China policy during the first half of 1969. First, it examines President Nixon’s initiatives from January to March, 1969. Nixon was quick to explore US policy toward China both as an NSC directive and as a central diplomatic issue in his talks with French President De Gaulle, while Kissinger remained skeptical of a possible new China initiative. Next, this chapter assesses the implications of the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969. Despite his frequent emphasis on the importance of the event, at this earlier political stage, Kissinger still remained unconvinced of the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet differences. Finally, it conducts a detailed analysis of the policy option studies, including the State Department’s recommendations and the inter-departmental studies, namely the National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs). This book interprets the initial development of US policy toward China as a much more complex and dynamic political process than previously considered in the existing literature, on the basis of a number of policy option studies within the administration.1 1. First Development 1.1 Inaugural address In his Inaugural address on January 20, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the entry of world politics into an “era of negotiation” after a long period of confrontation: “Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world – open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods
1 “US-China Policy 1969–1972,” Far East, Box 86, Countries Files (CF), HAK Office Files (HAKOF), National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). The date and issue of internal studies, policy statements, and public steps in the following analysis are based on a detailed chronological survey of this document. Media sources, such as The New York Times and The Washington Post are also used where appropriate. Finally, there remains the so-called “black-box,” namely private exchanges between Nixon and Kissinger. Allen Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. This study thus examines the exchange of memoranda between Nixon and Kissinger as well as the records of their conversations.
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and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.”2 The use of the phrase “angry isolation” was adopted from his message in the October 1967 Foreign Affairs article. In his memoirs, Nixon emphasized that he had intended to send a diplomatic signal toward Beijing.3 Nixon took the drafting of presidential addresses very seriously, reviewing the drafts prepared by the NSC staff and adding phrases reflecting his own thoughts. For his inaugural address, Nixon approved of the inclusion of some statements to the effect that the new administration believed in “open lines of communication,” which Kissinger intended “toward Moscow.”4 Kissinger recommended to Nixon that the overall implication in the inaugural address should be to present a new message of “sober, precise, methodical, and un-dramatic progress.”5 On January 21, 1969, however, the New China News Agency strongly denounced Nixon as the “puppet” of the “monopoly bourgeois clique” attempting to implement the “vicious ambition of US imperialism to continue to carry out aggression and expansion in the world.”6 Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) and Hongqi (The Red Flag) also jointly published an editorial essay characterizing Nixon’s address as nothing but “a confession in an impasse,” which demonstrated that “the US imperialists ... are beset with profound crises both at home and abroad.”7
2 For Immediate Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, The White House, “Inaugural Address of President Richard M. Nixon” The Capitol, January 20, 1969, p. 5, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon reviewed his predecessors’ inaugural addresses, especially that of Kennedy’s. 3 Richard M. Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 545. 4 Kissinger to Nixon, January 8, 1969, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, HAK Administrative and Staff Files (HAK-ASF), Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger thus reminded Nixon that he would pass this implication to his “Soviet contact” on January 17. Ibid. 5 Kissinger to Nixon, “Proposed Foreign Policy Section of Your Inaugural Address, January 14, 1969, p. 2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 6 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 238; Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and Thawing of US-China Relations,” p. 333, in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds), Re-examining the Cold War: USChina Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001). Major newspapers all over China also reprinted Nixon’s address, which was unprecedented in the history of the People’s Republic. It was Mao Zedong who personally ordered the publication of Nixon’s address. Ibid. In his memoirs, however, Nixon stated only that the Chinese “ignored the low-level signals” which the United States sent during 1969 and that it was not until 1970 that the US “began a serious approach” to open dialogue with China. Nixon, RN, p. 545. The Nixon memoirs thus failed to explore the administration’s early efforts, including the NSC meetings on China policy as well as the State Department’s attempt to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, which this book examines in the present and following chapters. 7 Ibid.
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1.2 Nixon’s memorandum to Kissinger and the directive of NSSM 14 During early months, Nixon’s public statements still included two contradictory elements. On January 27, 1969, in his first press conference at the White House, President Nixon stated that it was up to the Chinese representatives at the forthcoming Warsaw meeting on February 20 to clarify “whether any changes of attitude on their part on major substantive issued may have occurred.”8 In addition, Nixon also reiterated that the United States would “continue to oppose Communist China’s admission to the United Nations.”9 On February 1, 1969, Nixon sent a confidential memorandum to Kissinger, directing that: ‘I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this administration is “exploring possibilities of raprochement [sic] with the Chinese.” This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction.’10 In his memoirs, Kissinger explains that Nixon’s memorandum did not ask him to do anything toward the Chinese; it only urged him to create the “impression” that the United States was “exploring a move toward China.”11 In reality, however, Nixon’s memorandum was much more important as the beginning of substantial policy studies on China during 1969. On February 5, Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSC14) directing an inter-departmental study to examine: • • • •
The current status of US relations with Communist China and the Republic of China; The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia; The interaction between US policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China; Alternative US approaches on China and their costs and risks.12
It was a general directive to review the US policy toward China. The directive requested that the paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10. 8 The New York Times, January 27, 1969. 9 Ibid. 10 Nixon to Kissinger, February 1, 1969, Quotation marks in original, White House Confidential Files (WHCF), White House Special Files (WHSF) Co (Countries), [Ex] Co 32 Chad, Republic of [1969–70] to [Gen] Co 34 China [1969–70], Box 17, NPMS, NA. 11 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 169. Italic in original. On January 29, 1969, the National Security Study Memorandum 9 (NSSM9) entitled “Review of International Situation” already directed to examine the deepening strains in Sino-Soviet relations: “it is possible that each will become more active in seeking to prevent the other from aligning too closely with the US, and to use its own relations with the US as a means of checkmating the other’s policies.” National Security Memorandum 9 (NSSM 9) “Review of International Situation,” January 23, 1969, and Department of Defense, Response to NSSM 9, Box 365, Subject Files (SF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. 12 National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSM14): United States China Policy, Box 365, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Because of the outbreak of Sino-Soviet border clashes in March, it would be submitted on April 30, 1969, and throughout 1969 there were crucial review meetings to discuss and improve the main issues and contents of NSSM 14, as the following sections and chapters examine. Winston Lord, a former NSC staff member and Kissinger’s special assistant, emphasizes that Nixon was privately “very quick” to move to a new China initiative.13 At this early stage, however, Kissinger still remained skeptical of both the necessity and possibility of opening toward China.14 On February 17, the first official meeting between President Nixon and the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, was held. The pursuit of secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was already emerging, and thus Secretary Rogers was not invited to attend. Nixon told Dobrynin that Kissinger would be his counterpart in a confidential communication channel. Calling for serious negotiations at various levels, Dobrynin delivered a letter from Moscow, which agreed to move forward on issues of the two superpowers’ concern, such as Arms Control and Vietnam. Nixon in turn hinted that if US-Soviet relations did not develop well, he could explore opening to “others,” which Dobrynin interpreted as China.15 1.3 The cancellation of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in February 1969 The immediate major issue between the United States and China was the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks scheduled to take place on February 20, 1969. Although Kissinger’s memoirs do not explain any particular issues, the preparation for the Warsaw talk provided an important opportunity for the new administration to re-examine the agenda for its China policy. As for possible Chinese motivations, both an airgram from the US Consulate General in Hong Kong and Kissinger’s memorandum to President Nixon examined the following possibilities:
13 Winston Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. 14 Alexander Haig recalls that Kissinger was very bewildered by Nixon’s directive to reassess US China policy: ‘“Our Leader has taken leave of reality … He thinks this is the moment to establish normal relations with Communist China. He has just ordered me to make this flight of fancy come true.” He grasped his head in his hands, “China!”’ Alexander Haig Jr. (with Charles McCarry), Inner Circle: How America Changed the World, A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992), p. 257; Alexander M. Haig Jr., interview Transcript, Nixon’s China Game, PBS American Experience (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/filmmore/ reference/interview/haig01.html). 15 Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, Dobrynin, and Toon, February 17, 1969, Subject Files (SF), Box 340, USSR, Memcons Dobrynin/President, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 39–40; and Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 1995), pp. 198–199. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred to this point in their respective memoirs. See Nixon, RN, pp. 369–370; and Kissinger, White House Hears, p. 143. On USUSSR SALT negotiations, see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 316–332; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 146–226.
The Development of Policy Options from January to July 1969
• • •
• •
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Internal difficulties, caused by the Cultural Revolution, which might increase the desire for an easing of external relations; The continuing US-North Vietnamese Paris peace talks in accordance with the declining military outlook of the North Vietnam; A reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions, caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia – the Chinese might believe in a US-USSR collusion and perceive the resumption of the Warsaw talks as a means to counter-pressure Moscow; An effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon; An effort to detect US positions, particularly in its relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan.16
Kissinger was still unfamiliar with China policy, and thus relied heavily on the recommendations of the NSC staff.17 In his memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger argued that the Warsaw talks could offer an opportunity to shift the focus of US policy and to promote a dialogue with the Chinese which would provide “greater stability” for East Asia (a) “without abandoning our commitments to Taiwan or undermining its position” or (b) “damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan.”18 Kissinger’s memorandum suggested three major approaches toward China. Option 1 was to indicate that the United States was “prepared to negotiate a normalization of relations” with Beijing. However, the memo suggested that this option would involve “considerable risk” because it could make the Chinese interpret “softness” on the part of the US, cause a “crisis of confidence” in Taiwan and “seriously upset” Japan.19 Option 2 was to indicate that the US was “prepared to enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies” except the US commitment to Taiwan.20 However, this approach was likely to leave Japan and other Asian
16 Airgram, Consulate General Hong Kong, “Communist China: US Policy Assessment,” January 24, 1969, pp. 2–3, POL Chicom-US. 1967–1969, Box 1973, SubjectNumeric Files (SNF), General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG59), NA; and Kissinger to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks,” February 11, 1969, pp. 1–2, Country File (CF)Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA. 17 Prior to Nixon’s inauguration, NSC staff member-designate Richard Sneider wrote to Kissinger that the Warsaw ambassadorial talks scheduled for February 20 would provide the “first clear opportunity” for the new Administration to “signal its own policy.” Sneider argued that: “At this stage I would be inclined to move very cautiously with the Chinese” and wait until they respond with “any specific proposals for peaceful co-existence but leaving the door open for reconsideration of our policies with the exception of our commitment to Taiwan.” Finally, Sneider recommended that the China policy required a comprehensive NSC consideration in mid-term (four to five months) rather than short-term (within the next two months). Sneider to Kissinger, January 7, 1969, “Major Issues Anticipated During the Next Six Weeks in East Asia,” pp. 1–2, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 18 Kissinger to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks,” February 11, 1969, p. 2, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA. 19 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 20 Ibid., p. 4.
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countries nervous if there was no immediate positive response from Beijing, and there would be a “quick and negative response” from Taipei. Option 3 suggested that the United States would pick up the Chinese reference to “peaceful coexistence” and “ask whether they have any specific proposals to make,” without taking any initiatives.21 Kissinger recommended the seemingly risk-free position of option 3. In a memorandum to President Nixon, State Department officials recommended that the United States adopt a “firm posture” on its commitments to the Republic of China coupled with a “general expression of willingness to negotiate all other issues,” as well as work toward peaceful coexistence with Beijing.22 In particular, the “mutual hostility and suspicion” between Beijing and Moscow had led each side to regard any possibility of the other’s rapprochement with the United States with the “greatest concern” and to do what they could to “prevent it.”23 State Department officials declared: “Here is an opportunity for us to determine how far Peking may be prepared to move from its current positions.”24 The ultimate premise for any US move was that “it symbolizes the emphasis and direction in which the new Administration wishes to proceed.”25 The initial proposal represented a combination of the US proposal for (a) “renunciation of the use of force,” and (b) “our desire not to prejudice our defense commitments on Taiwan.” The key new element was an “explicit expression of willingness to negotiate normalization” with Beijing while “not changing” the US’s “normal relations” with the Republic of China.26 The State Department proposal was thus mainly concerned with the impact of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks on US relations with the Republic of China. Very importantly, moreover, State Department officials recommended that for the “first time,” the United States offer to “send a special US representative” to Beijing.27 On February 18, however, the Chinese cancelled the planned 134th Warsaw meeting, because a Chinese diplomat in the Netherlands had defected and was given political asylum at the US Embassy in The Hague in late January 1969. On February 18, following President Nixon’s instruction, Secretary of State Rogers expressed US regret at the Chinese cancellation of the Warsaw talks and declared that the United 21 Ibid. 22 Rogers to Nixon, “US Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting,” February 12, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-US, 1967–1969, Box 1973, SNF, RG59, NA. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., p. 2. 26 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 27 Brown to Rogers (via Richardson), “US Policy Toward Peking and Instruction for the February 20 Warsaw Talks – Action Memorandum,” February 5, 1969, p. 1, POL ChicomUS. 1967–69, Box 1973, SNF, RG59, NA. The notion of sending a special representative to Beijing was originally raised within the instructions for the Warsaw talks in November 1968. Memo from Paul H. Kreisberg to Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, “Warsaw Talks Instructions,” November 8, 1968, POL Chicom-US, 1967–1969, Box 1972, SNF, RG59, NA. The timing of sending a special representative re-emerged as one of the main issues of bureaucratic disagreement between the NSC and the State Department during the resumption of the Warsaw talks in January and February 1970, as Chapter 5 of this book examines.
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States wanted to engage in a broad program of cultural and scientific exchange with China.28 On March 4, however, Nixon himself stated at a news conference that: “Looking further down the road, we could only think in terms of a better understanding with Red China. But being very realistic, in view of Red China’s breaking off the rather limited talks that were planned, I do not think that we should hold out any great optimism for any breakthroughs in that direction at this time.”29 1.4 The Nixon-De Gaulle talks It was during his first official European trip from February 23 to March 2, 1969 that Nixon held talks with French President Charles De Gaulle in Paris and discussed the need for a new China initiative.30 Both the NSC staff’s briefing paper and Nixon’s Talking Points reveal that US officials paid particular attention to the appointment of a new French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne M. Manach – their top Southeast Asian expert.31 It was anticipated that De Gaulle would be likely to ask about US policy toward China, and the NSC staff suggested that the President inform the French leaders that the United States would “seek maximum contact” with mainland China.32 During their talk on February 28, 1969, it was Nixon who initially asked for De Gaulle’s evaluation on China.33 De Gaulle suggested that Nixon put himself in the position of the Soviet leaders to see China: This is an enormous country which has a common frontier thousands of miles long with Russia. The Chinese have always detested the Russians and will probably detest them tomorrow more than at any other time in the past. Chinese ambitions are directed mainly against Russia. … The Russians know this and China is their main preoccupation. … They are thinking in term of a possible clash with China tomorrow. They cannot face 28 “US China Policy 1969–1972,” Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 29 President Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, March 4, 1969, Box 88, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 30 See Nixon, RN, pp. 371–374; and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (Hill and Wang, A Division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 1998), pp. 100–103. 31 Talking Paper for European Trip, China, p.1, General Background Papers, President Nixon’s Trip to Europe – February-March 1969, Box 442, President’s Trip Files (PTF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. 32 Talking Paper on European Trip, France – General Talking Points, p. 9, General Background Papers, Box 442, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 33 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, General De Gaulle’s Office in the Elysee Palace, Paris, February 28, 1969, p. 1, Presidential/HAK MemCons (P/HAK Memcons), Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Regarding secrecy, Nixon emphasized to De Gaulle that: “what would be said would not be put on the normal diplomatic circuit,” and even Kissinger was not present. Ibid. A former NSC staff member, John Holdridge, recalls that Nixon “preferred one-onone in his meetings with chiefs of state and heads of government.” John Holdridge, Oral history interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, p. 10, January 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.
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It was the growing Sino-Soviet mutual hostility within which the two Presidents came to share the idea of the Russian “primary fear” of China.35 In their second talk on March 1, it was De Gaulle who raised the China issue by indicating that: “Some said that one should try and play the Chinese off against the Soviets and try to divide them. Others felt that it was worth trying to improve relations with both.”36 De Gaulle suggested: We should have exchanges at all levels and we might eventually see the beginnings of a détente. How this would affect the Soviets was difficult to know. … The West should try to get to know China, to have contacts and to penetrate it. We should try to get them to sit at the table with us and offer them openings. … If the US began to have relations with China this would mean that China would probably get into the UN.37
After the prolonged mutual hostility and the policy of isolation, the US should take an initial diplomatic step to recognize the increasing importance of China’s presence in world politics. In his response, Nixon suggested a long-range policy toward China: [I]n looking down the road towards talks with the Soviet Union we might keep an anchor to windward with respect to China. This did not mean that we would do anything so crude as to suggest we play China off against the Soviet Union. The Soviets would resent this bitterly. In 10 years when China had made significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than we had today.38
De Gaulle agreed with Nixon by urging that: “it would be better for the US to recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China.”39 In his memoirs, Kissinger assesses that Nixon did not ask for any specific assistance on March 1; it was De Gaulle who “initiated” the China issue by stressing its importance as a “huge entity with great resources,” and Nixon appeared to be “skeptical” of it.40 Kissinger thus argues that the new administration had “no clearcut plan.”41 In reality, however, as a result of two decades of assessment, there was a solid basis for Nixon to realize that it would be better to resume a dialogue with China before it became too strong to deal with. Finally, it was during the Nixon-De Gaulle talk on March 2 in which Nixon proposed to establish a confidential direct
34 Ibid., pp. 1–2. 35 Ibid., p. 4. 36 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, Grand Trianon, Versailles, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p. 7, P/HAK Memcons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 37 Ibid., p. 8. See also Nixon, RN, pp. 373–374. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 9. 40 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 170. 41 Ibid.
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channel with De Gaulle: “if either of them wished to communicate directly with the other they could do so by private letters and such relations need not necessarily pass through the usual diplomatic channels.”42 2. The Outbreak of the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes 2.1 The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet border dispute worsened when Chinese and Soviet patrolling troops exchanged fire at Chenpao (in Chinese)/Damansky (in Russian), an island on the Ussuri River.43 The New York Times reported that: “Soviets and Chinese Clash on Border; Each Lists Deaths in Siberian Encounter.”44 The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts estimated that the clash was the result of “persistent efforts by both sides to establish control” over the islands in the Ussuri and was not likely to lead to “wider fighting in the near future,” however, that similar incidents could be expected from time to time.45 INR officials also monitored that Beijing had launched its “most extensive anti-Soviet denunciation campaign since January–February 1967.”46 On March 4, 1969, during a briefing to the Congressional leaders on his trip to Europe, Nixon expressed that to side with the Soviets against the Chinese might be good short-range policy. However, it would be a suicidal long-range policy, for the Russians were “extremely sensitive” about this possibility. It was his experience that “fights between members of the same ideologies were more severe usually than fights between members of differing ideologies or religions.”47 On March 15 and 17, the second and third Sino-Soviet border clash erupted at Chenpao/Damansky on a much larger scale. The State Department’s INR analysts reported that Beijing responded to the March 15 and 17 border clashes with a “less
42 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, General De Gaulle’s Office – Elysee Palace, Paris, March 2, 1969, p. 1, P/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 43 See, for example, Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2000; William Burr, “Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps towards Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 2001; and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative Story (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 47–49. 44 The New York Times, March 3, 1969. 45 Intelligence Note, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State, “USSR/China: Soviet and Chinese Forces Clash on the Ussuri River,” March 4, 1969, p. 1, POL 32–1 Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 46 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Millions Denounce Moscow,” March 7, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 47 Patrick Buchanan to Nixon (Buchanan’s notes of the second bipartisan leadership meeting), March 4, 1969, pp. 18–19, Box 77, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records of Meetings, President’s Office Files (POF), White House Central Files (WHCF), NPMS, NA.
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threatening tone and far less internal propaganda exploitation.”48 It appeared that Beijing sensed a “greater danger of military escalation” than it did immediately after the March 2 clash and was assessing the problem in a “much more sober fashion.”49 Moreover, CIA intelligence officers concluded that it was the Chinese side that “triggered the initial clash” and thus the battle was the Chinese attempt to “contest” the Soviet presence.50 Kissinger recalls that after the Ussuri River clashes, “ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further hesitation toward a momentous change in global diplomacy.”51 Kissinger’s memoirs thus create a misleading impression that the March border clashes were the decisive events for the Nixon administration, especially Kissinger himself, to comprehend the depth of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. In reality, however, since January 1969, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA had already engaged in a series of situational studies on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.52 In contrast, at this stage, Kissinger was still skeptical of a new China initiative.
48 Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border: “Has Peking Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew?” March 18, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. Initially, the Chinese leadership, Mao and Zhou were “very poorly informed.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry ceased its function during that period. There was only an element of the intelligence apparatus, which later became the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). At that time, CICIR was a part of the investigation department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and was the only institute that functioned. After the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969, several members of that institution were brought back to Beijing to “brief Mao and the leadership specifically on world affairs, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.” David Shambaugh, interview with the author, October 15, 2003. In late February, following Mao’s instructions, Zhou told the four Marshals to meet “once in a week” to discuss “important international issues” and provide the Party Central Committee with their options. On March 18, they finished their first report, “An Analysis of War Situation in the World”; eleven days later they had completed their second report, “The Zhenbao Island as a Tree in the Forest of the Whole World.” Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 246. 49 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 50 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Weekly Review,” 21 March 1969, p.12, CIA Freedom of Information release to National Security Archive. On March 15, 1969, Mao gave instruction for the preparation for the outbreak of war: “The northeast, the north, and the northwest should be prepared... We will try to gain mastery by striking the enemy only after he has struck.” “Mao Zedong’s Talk at a Meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group,” March 15, 1969, in Chen Jian and David L. Wilson (eds), “‘All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos’–Beijing, the Sino–Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1969,” p. 162, Bulletin 11, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 51 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 170–171. 52 For example, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research initiated an intelligence study series entitled “Sino-Soviet Affairs.” Sino-Soviet Affairs, INR, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, SNF, RG59, NA.
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On March 31, the day after Eisenhower’s funeral in Washington DC, President Nixon held talks with French President De Gaulle.53 Nixon asked De Gaulle to play the role of a go-between and inform the Chinese of the US decision for a withdrawal from the Vietnam War and of Washington’s desire to improve its relations with Beijing.54 Accordingly, on April 23, De Gaulle instructed the French Ambassador in Beijing, Etienne M. Manach, to deliver Nixon’s private message to the Chinese leaders at the highest official level.55 Hereafter, Nixon and Kissinger would spend the next six months (until September 1969) to assess the nature of Sino-Soviet relations and their possible impact on US policy toward Asia. Therefore, the March border clashes should be regarded as the beginning of substantial White House assessment of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. 2.2. The first official initiatives by the State Department The first official diplomatic signal of the Nixon administration’s policy toward China since Nixon’s inaugural address and the cancellation of the Warsaw talks came from the State Department. On April 21, during an address in New York, Secretary Rogers made clear the US intention to promote a new dialogue with China: One cannot speak of a future of Pacific community without reference to China. The United State Government understands perfectly well that the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan and Communist China on the mainland are both facts of life. … Not even a nation as large as mainland China can live forever in isolation from a world of inter-dependent states. Meanwhile, we shall take initiatives to re-establish more normal relations with Communist China and we shall remain responsive to any indication of less hostile attitudes from their side.56
53 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, Yellow Oval Room, The White House, March 31, 1969, p. 2, P/HAK MemCons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 54 Ibid. Regarding Vietnam, De Gaulle stated that “the sooner it was clear the US was leaving, the greater would be the willingness of the Thieu regime and the NLF to get together and work out some sort of a solution.” In other words, “the longer they believed the US would remain, the less likely they were to arrive at some solution.” Ibid. On March 17, 1969, the United State secretly began to bomb the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trial through Laos and Cambodia – the North Vietnamese’ supply road. The bombings, which became public knowledge on May 9, 1969, continued until May 1970. As for the Nixon administration’s military operation of the Vietnam War, see Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998); and Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 2001). 55 With De Gaulle’s support, Nixon might have considered the “French backchannel” as a possible main means of communication with the Chinese. In reality, however, De Gaulle resigned the presidency on April 28, 1969 and died on November 9, 1970. 56 Address by Secretary of State William Rogers, before the Associated Press Annual Luncheon Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, April 21, 1969, pp. 5–6, Extra Copies of Memo to President on Asia Trip [27 June–23 July 1969] [Part I], Box 465, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon and Kissinger did not refer to Rogers’ speech in their respective memoirs. From April 1 to 24, 1969, the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, and Lin Biao was named Chairman Mao’s heir-designate. Lin’s speech reiterated that China would
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In a broad sense, the State Department shared with the White House the general objective of improving relations with China. During the rest of 1969, senior officials in the State Department would give public statements on the China policy. However, the State Department was not entirely informed of the real intentions of Nixon and Kissinger. Therefore, the State Department operated independently in assessing a new China policy until the re-activation of the Warsaw channel in December 1969. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs principally conducted interdepartmental studies on US policy toward China. Particularly important, during his trip to Asia in March and April 1969, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs-designate, Marshall Green, informed many of the Asian leaders that the United States “would make moves from time to time designed to prove that it is Peking, not Washington, that is isolating China.”57 Upon his return, Green produced a long report to the President. Green assessed that there was “less of a consensus” among Asian leaders on “whether Peking’s growing nuclear capability would lead to adventurism.”58 In particular, Green emphasized that: “No one seemed to share the Soviets’ concern that the US was contemplating normalization of relations with Peking.” Green concluded that: “Moscow may not have any clear idea as to how to proceed in Asia. Moscow must have been left in a deep dilemma by the widening Sino-Soviet rift, the upheaval in Indochina, and the costs and risks of supporting Hanoi and Pyongyang in the years ahead.”59 Overall, the Green report thus demonstrated the widening anxiety among Asian leaders about Chinese nuclear threat, as well as Moscow’s deepening concerns regarding the growth of Beijing’s military capability and possible diplomatic prospects for Washington in the Sino-Soviet differences. “This is Great,” Nixon commented on the top page of Green’s report, and Kissinger sent the copies of the report to Secretaries of State and Defense, the administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the director of the US Information Agency.60 In reality, however, Kissinger was not pleased with Green’s direct contact not attack unless it was attacked and criticized US imperialism and Soviet revisionism as equal threats to China. “Mao Zedong’s Addition to Lin Biao’s Political Report at the Party’s Ninth Congress,” April 1969, p. 162, in Chen and Wilson (eds), “All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos,” CWIHP. The State Department’s intelligence officials analysed that while the party Congress promised “little change in the substance” of Beijing’s foreign policy, it left “room for a normalization in the conduct of Chinese diplomacy.” Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Lin Piao’s Report to Party Congress Published,” April 28, 1969, p. 1; and Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Lin Piao Charts China’s Foreign Policy Course,” April 30, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-US. 1967–1969, Box 1962, SNF, RG59, NA. 57 Marshall Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp. 52–53, and Idem, Evolution of US-China Policy 1956–1973: Memoirs of An Insider, p. 27, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, January 1995, FAOHCF. After his return from the Asia trip, Green became the Assistant Secretary by replacing William Bundy. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger refers to the Green memorandum in their respective memoirs. 58 Green to Nixon, “A View of East Asia,” April 21, 1969, enclosed in Memo from Kissinger to Rogers, May 28, 1969, POL Asia, SNF, RG59, NA. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.
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with Nixon, which had bypassed the National Security Adviser and his NSC staff. After this earlier contact, the relationship between Kissinger and Green began to deteriorate. On April 16–17, April 25, and May 2, more clashes broke out along the SinoSoviet border areas, about two thousand five hundred miles to the west of the frontier between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan. On April 26, Moscow publicly proposed to Beijing the resumption of the Sino-Soviet meetings of the Joint Commissions for Navigation on Boundary Rivers, which had been suspended since 1967. On May 11, Beijing accepted the Soviet proposal. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research experts interpreted Beijing’s response in a May 24 government statement on the Soviet proposal as the affirmation of the Chinese desire to take the dispute off the battlefield to the conference table.61 However, more fighting erupted along the Amur River on May 12, 15, 25, and 28; and further clashes occurred on May 20 and June 10 in the Sinkiang border area. The INR analysts concluded that these Sino-Soviet border incidents suggested that the Chinese were the provocateurs.62 In the short term, Beijing was trying to “agitate” the Soviets and “test” the reaction to these counter-pressures to determine “how far the Soviets may be prepared to go.”63 Beijing’s tactics had been developed “out of fear to offset a position of weakness.”64 In his memoirs, Kissinger recalls that the Sinkiang clash convinced him that the Soviet Union was “the aggressor.”65 However, this statement is misleading, because Kissinger remained somewhat uncertain about the nature of the Sino-Soviet rivalry until late 1969, as this book demonstrates in the following sections and chapters. 2.3 NSC review group meeting on NSSM 14 in May 1969 On April 30, 1969, the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group completed the first comprehensive study entitled “United States China Policy” in response to NSSM 14 of February 5, 1969.66 The paper explored the nature of the Chinese threat to US interests and the range of US objectives and options vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper also examined wide-ranging specific issues, such as the impact of US policy toward China on Communist states and Non-Communist states, US relations with the Republic of China (ROC) as a US military base, Sino-US normalization, the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations, and trade. 61 Intelligence Note, INR, “Peking Agrees to Soviet Border Talks,” May 28, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 62 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Peking Inflates Soviet War Threat,” June 3, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 63 Intelligence Note, INR, “Peking’s Tactics and Intentions Along the Sino-Soviet Border,” June 13, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 64 Ibid., p. 3. 65 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 177. 66 Winthrop G. Brown (Acting Chairman, East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group) to Kissinger, “United States China Policy (Response to NSSM 14), April 30, 1969, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China NPG [Part 2], 5/15/69, National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA.
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The paper assessed that the PRC wanted to extend its influence in Asia and to be treated as a major world power as well as the primary source of revolutionary ideological leadership.67 In particular, the PRC would seek the removal of the US military presence from both the Taiwan Strait area and Taiwan, and simultaneously a US acceptance of its long-term claim that Taiwan was an internal matter.68 As for China’s security environment, the US-USSR bipolar situation that characterized Asia in the previous two decades was shifting toward a “four-sided relationship among the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China.”69 It was therefore likely, the paper judged, that China’s leaders genuinely felt threatened by a US-USSRJapan-India “encirclement.” Their charges of US-Soviet “collusion” and Japan’s alleged intention to re-establish the “greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere” were, in Chinese eyes, more than just propaganda.70 The possible impact of the Sino-Soviet tensions on US policy toward the Soviet Union and China would be discussed in NSSM 63 in late 1969. At the time, US strategy consisted of two elements: deterrence of any possible direct Chinese threat; and limited efforts to suggest to the Chinese the desirability of changing their policies. The paper suggested two alternative strategies: movement toward intensified deterrence and isolation; and movement toward reduction of points of conflict and international isolation.71 To encourage the reduction of tension, while continuing necessary measures to deter any possible overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia, the United States (a) could gradually de-emphasize the military aspect of its containment of the PRC; (b) could unilaterally reduce or eliminate economic and political measures designed to isolate Beijing; or (c) could acquiesce to the PRC’s fuller participation in the international community.72 In their summary paper of NSSM 14, State Department officials recommended that decisions were required on three specific issues: the future use of Taiwan as a military base; US policy toward the Offshore Islands; and trade with Communist China.73 In particular, the US military presence on Taiwan had increased in support of operations in Vietnam, and therefore a decision on the “over-all question of Taiwan as a military base” was required before these specific policy issues could be decided upon.74 Thus, the principal interest of the State Department remained the Taiwan issue, namely the treatment of Taipei’s status in the Washington-Beijing relations. The NSC staff commented on NSSM 14 that there had not been a sufficient treatment of the “broader Asian context” and of possible effects upon relationships
67 NSSM14: United States China Policy, p. 2, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 68 Ibid., p. 2. 69 Ibid., p. 5. 70 Ibid., Annex A-10. 71 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 72 Ibid., p. 5. 73 NSSM14: United States China Policy, Summary Paper on Major Issues for Decision Regarding US China Policy (Summary by State at May 2 RG Meeting), p. 1, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 74 Ibid., p. 2.
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with Japan and the Soviet Union. The NSC staff recommended that that alternative strategy option of the “Gradual Reduction in Tension” represented the “most prudent course towards China at the moment.”76 In particular, immediate decisions could be made on both relaxing trade controls and lifting travel restrictions. Finally, the NSC staff recommended further studies on (a) steps and program for the gradual relaxation of trade controls, and (b) alternative UN scenarios. In essence, the NSC staff sought to reassess the China policy within a broader geopolitical context. These recommendations would be the basis of NSSMs 106 and 107 in late 1970. On May 15, 1969, a Review Group meeting on China policy was held. Kissinger, who chaired the meeting, presented his fundamental questions: “[W]hat do we want from China over the longer term and what can we reasonably expect to do to influence that outcome?”77 Kissinger believed that a “nation of 700 million people, surrounded by weaker states, could be a security threat no matter what type of policy it pursued.”78 The question was whether US policy toward China should be framed by security considerations, such as a balance of power approach, or by desire for a more conciliatory attitude. There was general agreement that US policy could have little impact on Chinese behavior over the short term. Kissinger asked: “whether we care if China maintains her policy of isolation so long as this is coupled with a relatively low level of aggression.”79 In response to Kissinger’s questions, a NSC staff member, Morton Halperin, suggested that the basic choice was between maintaining the status quo and easing some of the tensions in US-China relations. CIA officer, Jack Smith, also argued that the essential issue was how to bring China into the world community in the long term, which might make her “more manageable.”80 Suggesting Sino-Soviet difficulties as a “key issue,” Kissinger asked: “What is our view of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, how much can we influence them, should we favor one or the other? [sic]” Kissinger noted that “the Soviets and Chinese each think we are playing with the other.”81 The so-called “Kremlinologists” in the bureaucracy believed that “any attempt to better our relations with China will ruin those with the Soviet Union.” However, Kissinger counter-argued that history suggested to him that “it is better to align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners,” because it would function as a restraint on the stronger.82 Kissinger thus criticized the NSSM 14 paper for not making clear what the desirable role of China in the world should be, nor fully exploring “the
75 Review Group Meeting, May 7, 1969, NSSM14: United States China Policy, HAK Talking Points, p. 2, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, Box H-037, Senior Review Group Meetings, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 76 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 77 Lord to Kissinger (via Morton H. Halperin), “Review Group Meeting, 2:10–3:55pm, White House Situation Room, May 15, 1969,” May 19, 1969, pp. 1–2, SRG Minutes Originals, Box H-111, Senior Review Group, Minutes of Meetings (1969–1974), NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., p. 6 80 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 81 Ibid., p. 8. 82 Ibid., p. 9.
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US-China-Soviet triangular relationship,” to which a NSC staff member Richard L. Sneider added Japan.83 Kissinger appeared to remain skeptical of a new China initiative. Kissinger reiterated an alternative formulation that “it is not our interest – or at least our task – to bring China in. We need not strive to isolate her, but may not be worth great investment in US policy to move positively.”84 A State Department official Winthrop Brown disagreed, suggesting that the question remained how “we might be able to bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge from present isolation.”85 Sneider also argued that “China policy is difficult because the short term threat is much less than the longer term threat; we have more flexibility in the short term because of the nature of the threat but we have less flexibility because of the Chinese attitude.”86 In other words, a more self-confident China armed with nuclear weapons would be much more difficult to accommodate in the long-term. Overall, under the option of “reducing tensions,” there was consensus on the three sets of issues: a) those that could be taken immediately if it were decided to change the China policy – trade and travel; b) those dependent on other decisions – use of Taiwan as a base; c) longer range problems – overall policy toward Taiwan, Offshore Islands, United Nations and possibly diplomatic recognition.87 2.4 The Sino-Soviet border clashes in June and July 1969 On June 8, 1969, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev delivered an address to the International Conference of Communist parties in Moscow: “We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.” On June 19, Beijing criticized that the USSR and the US were unifying their efforts to encircle China militarily and incite India against China’s southwestern frontier, thereby “gravely threatening the security of China.”88 The State Department’s intelligence analysis recognized the deepening mutual suspicions as a result of Sino-Soviet border tensions, namely Moscow’s apprehension of Sino-US maneuverings as well as Beijing’s fear of US-USSR collusion. On June 22, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs estimated that the present Sino-Soviet border tension was “serious,” and 83 Ibid., p. 10. However, it is likely that Kissinger read only the NSC staff’s summary rather than the entire NSSM 14 papers, which explored the question of US-USSR-PRCJapan relationship. China experts, such as Tucker and Whiting also argue that Kissinger did not carefully read policy study papers. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, interview with the author, October 1, 2003; and Allen Whiting, interview with the author, October 19, 2003. 84 Ibid., p. 11. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p. 12. 87 Ibid., p. 13. Owing to a number of recommendations for further studies at the interdepartmental level, the consideration of the China paper at the NSC meeting was postponed (materialized on August 14, 1969). See Chapter 4, Section 2.1 (pp. 101–103) of this study. 88 INR, “Concern Over China Pushes USSR Toward Collective Security Concept for Asia,” p. 1, Sino-Soviet Affairs, No. 7, 1969, POL Chicom, 1967–69, Box 1963, SNF, RG59, NA.
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there remained a possibility that the Soviets might launch a “surgical strike against the Chinese nuclear installations.”89 On June 26, Kissinger requested NSC staff to prepare a NSSM on “US Posture with respect to the Sino-Soviet Split and Our Role in the Triangle.”90 On July 9, 1969, a Sino-Soviet border incident on an island in the Amur River had evoked the most direct Soviet threat to date towards China. A Soviet Foreign Ministry note of July 8 informed China that the USSR was “compelled to take additional measures against the actions of the Chinese authorities.” The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that the wording of this threat was deliberately ambiguous.91 However, Moscow might then be persuaded that the credibility of its warning would be at stake if Beijing was allowed to continue to provoke border incidents.92 On July 15, 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai portrayed to foreign officials the Soviet threat as a replacement of US efforts rather than “collusion” with the US.93 On July 14, in the National Security Study Memorandum 69 (NSSM 69) circulated to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and CIA Director Richard Helm, Kissinger stated: “the President had decided on the preparation of a study” to examine “US strategic nuclear capability against China” and “a range of possible situations in which a US strategic nuclear capability against
89 US State Department, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, “Implications of Sino-Soviet Developments: Meeting of June 21,” Pol 32–1, Chicom-USSR, SNF, RG59, NA. Nixon showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in the frozen US relationship with the PRC. On a return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at Midway Island in early June 1969, Nixon invited Green to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly two hours they discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was “interested in the history of our efforts to achieve some thaw in US-China relations.” Green, Evolution of US-China Policy 1956–1973, p. 27, Oral history interview in A China Reader, Vol. II, January 1995, FAOHC. 90 Haig to Halperin, “NSSMs to be Prepared,” June 26, 1969, Box H-299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69–5/30/69 [2 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 91 Intelligence Note, INR, “USSR-China: Renewed Border Fighting Evokes Soviet Threat,” July 9, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967–1969, Box 1975, SNF, RG59, NA. 92 Ibid., p. 2. 93 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Chou En-lai Hits Moscow’s Asian Collective Security,” July 15, 1969, p. 1, POL Chicom-US, 1967–1969, Box 1973, SNF, RG59, NA. In their July 1969 report, the four Chinese marshals warned of the danger of collusion and contention between the superpowers: “US imperialists and the Soviet revisionists collaborate with each other while at the same time fighting each other. The contradictions between superpowers, however, are not reduced because of collaboration between them; rather, their hostilities toward each other are more fierce than ever before.” Report by Four Chinese Marshals – Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen – to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation,” July 11, 1969, in Chen and Wilson (eds), “All Under the Heaven,” pp. 166–167; and Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 247.
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China would be useful.” In other words, Kissinger asked Rogers, Laird, and Helm to consider how to prevent China from becoming a fully-developed nuclear power by targeting its nuclear facilities. 2.5 NSSM 35: Easing trade and travel restrictions During June and July 1969, following the review of trade restrictions ordered by NSSM 35 on March 28, the US government publicly began to modify its two decade-old trade embargo against China.95 On June 26, Kissinger signed a directive to the agencies: “The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify certain of our trade controls against China.”96 Accordingly, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by Elliot Richardson, was asked to prepare detailed recommendations to implement the Presidential decision. In their respective memoranda to Nixon, Richardson and Kissinger pointed out the implications for the presidential decision at this particular time: • •
•
The decision would “demonstrate the flexibility” that the President now had in administering trade controls. A delay might lead the United States into a period where “unforeseen circumstances,” such as changes in Indochina and worsening of the SinoSoviet border situation, could prevent the announcement and thus cause the President to lose the diplomatic benefits. Such a delay would also increase the likelihood of [a] press leak. If the President waited to announce this decision until his return from Bucharest [a friend of China], it would probably be tied in with speculation regarding a presumed anti-Soviet purpose in the Bucharest stopover. This would give his decision an “overly overt anti-Soviet significance.” 97
On July 21, 1969, two days before Nixon’s departure for his official trip to Asia and Romania, the State Department announced a partial lifting of trade and travel
94 National Security Study Memorandum 69: US Nuclear Policy in Asia, July 14, 1969, SF, Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Tyler argues that there was an option for the United States to agree or cooperate with the Soviet Union to wipe out China’s nuclear capability in return for Soviet help in Vietnam. Tyler, A Great Wall, p. 63. However neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred to this study in their respective memoirs. 95 National Security Study Memorandum 35: US Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries, March 28, 1969, Box 365, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 173. 96 National Security Decision Memorandum 17: China Trade, June 26, 1969, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 97 Richardson to Nixon, “NSDM 17: China Trade,” July 10, 1969, pp. 1–2, Quotation marks in original; and Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China,” July 11, 1969, p. 1, China, Box 839, Name Files (NF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. It was initially assumed that actual implementation had to await passage by Congress of the revised Export Control Act anticipated in September. Quotation marks in original.
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sanctions on China. The New York Times reported the announcement as “the first sliver of a break in the total embargo” against China since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.99 In his memoirs, regarding economic issues as secondary, Kissinger argues that the actual change itself was not important, however, the “symbolism” was vast.100 Lord recalls: “These [The relaxation of trade and travel restrictions] were modest unilateral steps which did not require any response from the Chinese.”101 Overall, therefore, officials in the Nixon administration regarded unilateral actions as a diplomatic tool to send a low-key signal that the United States was willing to improve its relations with China. In summary, it was Nixon’s presidential leadership that launched the new China initiative during the first half of 1969. Fearing bureaucratic leak and US domestic conservative backlash, Nixon took the lead very secretly, directing Kissinger to conduct a series of NSSMs on the China policy. Nixon believed that a nucleararmed China outside of the international community would be a great threat in the long run and thus that it would be important to initiate a new dialogue with Beijing before Washington would be forced to do so. In contrast, Kissinger did not have any particular interest in China at this earlier period and thus remained skeptical about a new China initiative. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 marked the beginning of the long process for US officials to assess the nature of Sino-Soviet relations throughout the remainder of 1969. It was the State Department, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that conducted a number of studies. In particular, the first comprehensive inter-departmental policy study, NSSM 14, provided a broad range of policy alternatives for a new China initiative. During the latter half of 1969, while the interdepartmental studies on US policy toward China continued to develop at the bureaucratic level, Nixon and Kissinger sent a series of public and private signals to Chinese leaders, as the following chapter examines.
98 Department of State, July 21, 1969, A Matter of Record – No. 8, Public Statements on China by US officials, Box 86, US China Policy 1969–1972 [2of 2], Country Files (CF) – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The decision permitted tourists and residents abroad to purchase 100 dollars of Chinese goods and authorizing automatic validations of US passports for travel to China for certain categories of persons, such as members of Congress, journalists, scholars, scientists, medical doctors, and representatives of the American Red Cross. There was a brief delay for the announcement. On July 16, two American yacht men were captured by the Chinese when their lifeboat drifted into Chinese waters off Hong Kong. Chinese remained silent without playing the incident into any anti-American campaign. On July 24, the Chinese released the yachtsmen. 99 The New York Times, July 21, 1969. 100 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 179. 101 Lord, interview with the author, October 15, 2003.
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Chapter 4
The Reassessment of the China Policy from July to November 1969 This chapter explores the bureaucratic reassessment of US policy toward China within the Nixon administration during the latter half of 1969. First, it examines President Nixon’s initiative to send both public and private signals to Beijing for a new dialogue, such as the US redefinition of its policy toward Asia, symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, and the initial opening of the backchannels to the Chinese leaders via Pakistan and Romania. Through his presidential diplomacy, Nixon sought to create a more constructive political atmosphere to resume a dialogue with China. Second, this chapter analyzes the escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes from August to September, 1969 and the first full NSC meeting on the China policy. It was during this crucial period when Kissinger came to convince himself of the seriousness of Sino-Soviet mutual hostilities and more substantially considered the possibility of playing a pivotal role for the US within the US-Soviet-China strategic triangle. Finally, this study examines the further development of policy option studies by the NSC staff and the State Department in late 1969. These policy studies would materialize to further reduce trade restriction in US-China relations, as well as to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in early 1970. 1. Nixon’s Trip to Asia and Romania in July and August 1969 1.1 The Nixon Doctrine By the late 1960s, realizing the limitation of power resources, the United States was reassessing its open-ended containment policy toward the monolithic threat from Communism.1 A major opportunity arrived when President Nixon took an aroundthe-world trip from July 23 to August 3, 1969. On July 25, on his first stop in Guam, President Nixon announced major changes in US policy toward Asia, in what came to be known as the “Nixon Doctrine”: • •
The United States will keep its treaty commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
1 On this subject, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), chapters 9 and 10.
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In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required and as appropriate, but we shall look to the