Archimedes Volume 14
Archimedes NEW STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 14
EDITOR...
26 downloads
1286 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Archimedes Volume 14
Archimedes NEW STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 14
EDITOR JED Z. BUCHWALD, Dreyfuss Professor of History, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA. ADVISORY BOARD HENK BOS, University of Utrecht MORDECHAI FEINGOLD, Virginia Polytechnic Institute ALLAN D. FRANKLIN, University of Colorado at Boulder KOSTAS GAVROGLU, National Technical University of Athens ANTHONY GRAFTON, Princeton University FREDERIC L. HOLMES, Yale University PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, University of Hannover EVELYN FOX KELLER, MIT TREVOR LEVERE, University of Toronto JESPER LÜTZEN, Copenhagen University WILLIAM NEWMAN, Harvard University JÜRGEN RENN, Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte ALEX ROLAND, Duke University ALAN SHAPIRO, University of Minnesota NANCY SIRAISI, Hunter College of the City University of New York NOEL SWERDLOW, University of Chicago Archimedes has three fundamental goals; to further the integration of the histories of science and technology with one another: to investigate the technical, social and practical histories of specific developments in science and technology; and finally, where possible and desirable, to bring the histories of science and technology into closer contact with the philosophy of science. To these ends, each volume will have its own theme and title and will be planned by one or more members of the Advisory Board in consultation with the editor. Although the volumes have specific themes, the series itself will not be limited to one or even to a few particular areas. Its subjects include any of the sciences, ranging from biology through physics, all aspects of technology, broadly construed, as well as historically-engaged philosophy of science or technology. Taken as a whole, Archimedes will be of interest to historians, philosophers, and scientists, as well as to those in business and industry who seek to understand how science and industry have come to be so strongly linked.
Revisiting Discovery and Justification Historical and philosophical perspectives on the context distinction
Edited by
JUTTA SCHICKORE Indiana University, Bloomingdales, IN, U.S.A. and
FRIEDRICH STEINLE Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13
1-4020-4250-7 (HB) 978-1-4020-4250-8 (HB) 1-4020-4251-5 (e-book) 978-1-4020-4251-5 (e-book)
Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
www.springer.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2006 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
CONTENTS
JUTTA SCHICKORE & FRIEDRICH STEINLE /
Introduction:
Revisiting the Context Distinction
vii
PART I: The contexts of the Distinction DON HOWARD /
Lost Wanderers in the Forest of Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Discovery-Justification Distinction
Inductive Justification and Discovery. On Hans Reichenbach’s Foundation of the Autonomy of the Philosophy of Science
3
GREGOR SCHIEMANN /
Freedom in a Scientific Society: Reading the Context of Reichenbach’s Contexts
23
ALAN RICHARDSON /
41
PART II: Forerunners? JUTTA SCHICKORE /
A Forerunner?—Perhaps, but not to the Context Distinction. William Whewell’s Germano-Cantabrigian History of the Fundamental Ideas
57
¨ LOTHAR SCH AFER /
Autonomy versus Development: Duhem on Progress in Science
Psychologism and the Distinction Between Discovery and Justification
79
VOLKER PECKHAUS /
99
PART III: Revisions and Applications PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE /
Context of Discovery versus Context of Justification and Thomas Kuhn
THOMAS STURM AND GERD GIGERENZER /
How Can We Use the Distinction Between Discovery and Justification? On the
v
119
vi
CONTENTS
Weaknesses of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science
133
THOMAS NICKLES / Heuristic Appraisal: Context of Discovery or
Justification? Concept Formation and the Limits of Justification. “Discovering” the two Electricities
159
FRIEDRICH STEINLE /
Contexts of Justifying and Discovering the Nature of Ecosystems: From Concepts to Objects and Vice Versa
183
THOMAS POTTHAST /
On the Inextricability of the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification
197
THEODORE ARABATZIS /
Contributors
215 231
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. In recent years, the distinction has vanished from philosophers’ official agenda. However, even though it is rarely explicitly addressed, it still informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new developments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical thinking about science. This volume helps clear the grounds for the productive and fruitful integration of these new developments into philosophy of science. We identify several focal points for the re-assessment of the distinction: the original contexts, especially the work of the Logical Empiricists, its alleged forerunners in the nineteenth century, and its evolution and dissemination throughout the twentieth century. The distinction is usually traced back to Hans Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938). In this work, Reichenbach claimed that the context of justification is the only part of scientific practice that is epistemologically relevant and open to philosophical—which, in the perspective of Logical Empiricism, means of course: logical—reconstructions. Thus understood, the distinction delineates the scope of philosophy of science—the justification of fully developed theories—and at the same time shapes its method, logical analysis. Since then, this distinction has served two important, related purposes. First, it has been used to demarcate philosophy of science proper from historical, political, sociological and other empirical approaches to science. Within the analytical framework of the context distinction, doing philosophy of science means uncovering the logical structure of scientific theories and the logical relations between theories and evidence. Secondly, the distinction is taken to imply that there is no logic of discovery and that the process of discovery is excluded from philosophical reconstruction. For several decades, the context distinction dictated what philosophy of science should be and how it should proceed. Only in the 1960s, when the influence of Logical Empiricism was beginning to wane, did the context distinction come under attack. Two main, related lines of critique can be distinguished; both of them questioning philosophy’s narrow boundaries. The first critique concerned the exclusion of discovery from the domain of philosophy of science, the second the exclusion of history and sociology. Following Norwood Russell Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery (Hanson vii J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification, vii–xix. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
viii
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
1958), several philosophers began to reconsider the possibility of developing a logic of scientific discovery. This task became a major topic of concern in the 1970s and early 1980s. Thomas Nickles’s two-volume collection on Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Nickles 1980a) gathers together important contributions by the “Friends of Discovery” (Ronald Giere’s term). Only some of the contributions, however, are concerned with the possibility of a logic of discovery (e.g., Schaffner 1980). Most of them recast the problem of the logic of discovery as a question about rationality. They focus on the question of whether, and to what extent, scientific discoveries are amenable to reconstructions and explanations in rational terms. Nickles’s introduction draws attention to two important outcomes of the critical assessments of the distinction. First, it points out that the context distinction as it appears in philosophical discussions is ambiguous. It is sometimes temporally, sometimes logically construed. According to the first, temporal version, the process of discovery is followed by the process of justification. According to the second, logical version, the process of discovery is separated from the logical reconstruction, explication, and assessment of scientific achievements.1 Secondly, the introduction notes that the distinction between discovery and justification as it is applied in the actual analysis of scientific practice is somewhat arbitrary because we lack criteria for drawing a clear boundary between those elements of scientific practice that belong to “discovery” and those that belong to “justification” (Nickles 1980a, p. 19). Here the collected efforts of the Friends of Discovery indicate some alternatives. These philosophers claim that instead of a dualist scheme, we need a framework that acknowledges a middle phase of “pursuit” or “prior assessment” as part of the process of knowledge generation that already embraces elements of justification (e.g., Kordig 1978; Schaffner 1980; Darden 1998). Concern with the “logic of scientific discovery” has migrated into cognitive science, where scientific reasoning processes have been studied with the help of computational methods. Kenneth Schaffner’s contribution in Nickles’s collection is representative of this approach (Schaffner 1980). In these works, discovery is thought of as the process of finding efficient heuristic methods for the generation of plausible explanations (Buchanan 1985). Scholars working in this field seek to provide supportive evidence for the “logic of scientific discovery” with computer programs that utilize such heuristics to “make discoveries”, i.e. to represent successful discovery procedures on a computer. Because we can reconstruct the discovery processes with a set of heuristic rules, the argument goes, we can consider them as rational.2 Several Friends of Discovery (and others informed by their work) are now active in the field of philosophy of biology. Many of them have bypassed the abstract debates as to whether a “logic of discovery” is possible through concrete detailed investigations and analyses of research on biological mechanisms.3 Based on the assumption that “much of the practice of science can be understood in terms of the discovery and description of mechanisms” they show how traditional philosophical notions of discovery and theory change can be fruitfully recast in terms of “looking for” and “describing” mechanisms (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 2). In accord with the contributions to Nickles’s collection, they offer more finely grained descriptions of how accounts of biological mechanisms are generated, evaluated, and revised, which replace the neat
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
ix
dualism between discovery and justification philosophers of biology (Darden 1990; Darden 1991). The second line of critique of the context distinction came from a different angle, and it is this critique that most concerns us in the present volume. In the 1970s, a number of critical assessments were published in connection with debates about the relevance of sociological and historical studies for philosophy of science that unfolded in the wake of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962).4 Provoked by Kuhn’s sweeping historical refutation of philosophers’ rational reconstructions of theory change, many philosophers argued about the nature and scope of the context distinction, aiming to explore the possibility of a historically informed philosophy of science. At an early stage of this debate, Wesley Salmon remarked that the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification was “a major focal point for any fundamental discussion between history of science and philosophy of science” (Salmon 1970, p. 70). In the following decade, much was written about philosophy’s engagement with history and the marriage and divorce of history and philosophy of science.5 But in the end, the discussion about possible relations between history and philosophy remained inconclusive. The possibility of a historically informed philosophy of science was a promise that was never quite fulfilled. By the late 1980s, the context distinction had largely disappeared from philosophers’ official agendas. Remarkably, today the distinction is most explicitly discussed in the sciences themselves. In methodological introductions of science textbooks, it shapes the regulations for scientific research.6 These textbooks employ a particular version of the distinction, namely the context distinction temporally understood in combination with the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model of scientific research. According to this version of the distinction, the (unsystematic) process of discovery is completed before the (regulated) process of justification and testing can begin. Ironically, scientists and science educators now attack the distinction and accuse philosophers of describing science in a too simplistic manner (e.g., Harwood 2004). They argue that this twostep scheme is frequently violated in actual scientific practice and that it is in fact an impediment for science education if it is taught as the norm of “proper scientific behavior”. This line of critique of the temporal version of the distinction is certainly persuasive—if not new—but it has not led to fruitful exchanges with philosophers of science. In recent years, philosophers of science have rarely directly addressed, let alone attacked the distinction. But this does not mean that the distinction has been rendered irrelevant or that it has been successfully refuted. On the contrary, the legacy of earlier advocates of the distinction is still effective, and the distinction continues to delineate the scope philosophy of science. Exchanges between philosophy of science, history of science and science studies have been rather sparse; in fact, the disciplines have drifted further and further apart. Most scholars interested in the history and sociology of science have simply abandoned philosophical analyses. Take for example the growing field of science studies. During the last fifteen years or so, STS has gained an increasingly strong academic foothold. But this has not led to a productive exchange between science studies and philosophy of science. On the contrary, historians and
x
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
sociologists have largely ignored epistemological concepts and debates in their historical studies and thick descriptions of specific scientific episodes. Often they explicitly deny that the sciences can be profitably analyzed in generalized epistemological terms (e.g., Knorr-Cetina 1981; Collins 1985; Morus 1998; Gieryn 1999). On the other hand, philosophers working in the analytic tradition continue to exclude historical as well as sociological and psychological studies of science from philosophical reflection. Some have utilized bite-size episodes of past science for the purpose of illustrating philosophical points but they rarely consider historical developments over a longer period.7 Many others simply presuppose that investigations of the material culture, the historical changes, and the cultural and social environments of science lack epistemological significance. A quick glance at current journals in philosophy of science shows that articles dealing with special philosophical conundrums that arise out of current work in the sciences such as the units of selection problem mostly draw on material from present science rather than on historical developments, even though histories of epistemological concepts, scientific experimentation, and instruments have flourished for quite some time.8 Papers in general philosophy of science that talk about realism, explanation, the status of laws and so on fall squarely into the traditional context of justification. Only very rarely does one encounter explicit attempts to bridge the gap between different metascientific enterprises.9 The persistent if unstated force of the distinction becomes manifest in professional philosophers’ reactions to certain recent developments in history and philosophy of science, such as the New Experimentalism and the history of philosophy of science. These developments have been marginalized just like the works of the Friends of Discovery 25 years ago, a fact that indicates to what extent our metascientific efforts and assessments are still governed by the very distinction that had seemingly faded away by the late 1980s. Take for example the New Experimentalism. There was a brief upsurge of philosophical interest in experimentation in the early 1980s. Just like the Friends of Discovery, philosophers concerned with experimentation study aspects of the generation of knowledge but their work is not a ramification of earlier studies of the logic of discovery. Rather, it has evolved from Ian Hacking’s new and original approach to the ongoing debates about realism and antirealism that he outlined in Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983) and from Allan Franklin’s The Neglect of Experiment (Franklin 1986), which, inspired by Hacking, attempts to rehabilitate experiment as a topic for philosophical concern against the “theory-dominated” philosophical literature of the 1960s and 1970s.10 Franklin as well as a few other philosophers informed by his and Hacking’s works focus on the epistemic strategies by which experimental results are justified.11 Nevertheless, experimentation is still rarely considered to be a legitimate topic for philosophical analysis.12 The fact that the New Experimentalism in philosophy is of comparatively little importance13 —except for the realism— antirealism debate—can be easily explained by the fact that the New Experimentalism is a violation of the philosophical agenda implied in the context distinction. However, if it is correct that justificatory elements are an integral part of experimental research, then we need to reconsider the context distinction and its implications in this light.
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
xi
The New Experimentalism has posed challenges to traditional philosophy that have been little heeded. In contrast, new efforts in the area of history of philosophy of science have attracted more attention in the community, particularly the studies on the institutional and socio-political contexts of Logical Empiricism and its successors on the other side of the Atlantic. A number of studies have corrected the received view of Logical Empiricism that we encounter in standard philosophy textbooks.14 But remarkably little attention has been paid to the fact that history of philosophy of science can shed new light on the very context distinction and its “prehistory”. Judged by the drastic changes that novel historical studies have produced in our image of Logical Empiricism, we may expect similarly surprising results if we explore in detail the original settings of the distinction. The same holds for the “prehistory” of that distinction. Inspired by the idea of the content and delineation of philosophy of science that the received context distinction offers, philosophers usually construct the prehistory of philosophy of science as a sequence of “forerunners” that already contain important elements of that distinction. Among others, John Losee and Larry Laudan have suggested that Reichenbach merely brought into a standard form certain ideas that various philosophers had already expressed throughout the nineteenth century.15 But it is very likely that the context distinction has molded the way in which philosophers write the history of philosophy of science before the advent of Logical Empiricism. If we want to acknowledge properly the important recent work in the history of philosophy of science, the New Experimentalism, as well as the historical studies of scientific experimentation, we need to re-open the debate about the nature, development, and significance of the context distinction and about its merits and flaws. The current philosophical enterprise presents us with several major challenges. First, we need to provide close readings and detailed analyses of the original textual sources for the context distinction. What purposes and goals did this distinction have for Reichenbach and his contemporaries? Are these goals still valid and legitimate today? Secondly, we need to revise those chapters in the history of philosophy of science that have been written through the lens of Logical Empiricism. Are the main endeavors in nineteenth-century philosophy of science really just preliminary versions of the distinction and the philosophical conception that comes with it? If not, is it possible to extract elements from these earlier endeavors that can help us deal with the philosophical challenges that the New Experimentalism and historically, socio-politically and economically oriented science studies have placed before us? Thirdly, we need to map, clarify, and analyze the derivations and mutations of the context distinctions as we encounter them in current history and philosophy of science. What are its different manifestations in present discussions? Drawing on these analyses, we need to consider, fourthly, what is left of the distinction. Is there a version of the distinction that prevails and can be fruitfully applied in a historically informed philosophy of science? The essays in the present collection respond to these challenges. The contributions to the first part place the original textual sources for the context distinction in their respective historical and argumentative contexts. The essays consider
xii
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
Reichenbach’s work from various angles. They present close readings of the original texts (Schiemann) as well as reconstructions of the political and philosophical debates in which Reichenbach was engaged while formulating his version(s) of the context distinction (Howard, Richardson). Indeed, Reichenbach’s writings provide an excellent touchstone of the fruitfulness of a historically informed philosophy of science. Reichenbach brought up the distinction in the context of specific controversies. In the 1930s, he disagreed with Otto Neurath about whether and how philosophy of science should engage in political debates. In the 1950s, however, Reichenbach wrote against the American pragmatists, in particular John Dewey. In each case, he drew the distinction differently. To assess the nature, significance, and implications of Reichenbach’s approach, a study of the contexts of the distinction is essential (Howard). The authors take into account that philosophical ideas and systems are situated. These ideas are formulated in specific scientific, institutional, and socio-political contexts. It is only through the analysis of the contexts of the distinction that we will be able to understand fully the original intentions behind it and to assess its merits and demerits. The second section is entitled Forerunners? The question mark signals our discomfort with those scholars who have stressed that Reichenbach just brought into a standard form the distinction between discovery and justification that had long been implicitly present. The contributions to this part extend backwards in time the recent efforts in history of philosophy of science. They focus on those nineteenth-century philosophers who are commonly regarded as advocates of the context distinction avant la lettre and consider whether this interpretation really holds water. They offer new vistas of a number of these so-called “forerunners”: William Whewell, the acclaimed early advocate of a hypothetical deductivist philosophy of science (Schickore), the anti-inductivist Pierre Duhem (Sch¨afer), and Gottlob Frege and his contemporaries, who allegedly prepared the grounds for radical antipsychologism in philosophy (Peckhaus). The fresh looks at the “forerunners” that these essays offer give rise to an extremely important insight. They highlight the extent to which the reception of nineteenthcentury philosophical writings was itself shaped by the early twentieth-century advocates of the context distinction. The appropriation of the works of these nineteenthcentury thinkers in terms of the context distinction led to severe distortions of their views. Actually, these works contain a great deal of material that many twentiethcentury advocates of the context distinction would deem unphilosophical. If we approach their writings in a conscious attempt at overcoming the disciplinary limits that the early twentieth-century context distinction has forced upon us, we find that these works can contribute a lot to the enterprise of a historically informed philosophy of science. While the second part of the volume puts the emphasis on historical revisions, the third group of essays traces the evolution and ramifications of the context distinction as we encounter them in current philosophy of science. Many of the difficulties surrounding the debates about the distinction have emerged from a conflation of the different versions that have evolved from the original sources. We can remove certain problems and see more clearly the value of the distinction if we carefully distinguish
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
xiii
between evaluative and descriptive attitudes to science. This “lean” distinction separates two perspectives on scientific knowledge or two ways of looking at science (Hoyningen-Huene). None of the contributors to this volume denies the value of this “lean” distinction. Of course, the act of justification presupposes something as its object—a “happy thought”, as Whewell would have called it—and this “something” must come from “somewhere”. Hence, it appears that we also need to preserve some basic kind of temporal distinction between “generating” a knowledge claim and “securing” it. In addition, for the description and explanation of the actual fixation of scientific claims to knowledge some version of the distinction may be required (Sturm and Gigerenzer). However, the essays in this section imply in one way or another that it is awkward to regard the category of justification as one side of a stable dichotomy between justification and discovery, justification and experiment, or justification and theory construction. Justification is not “the other” or “the opposite” of theory construction, experimentation or indeed discovery but an integral part of the extended process of knowledge generation, and our reconstructions need to take this into account. Discovery, in any meaningful understanding of the concept, is a prolonged activity that involves both the generation and the fixation of knowledge claims (Arabatzis, Potthast). We can go even further and contend that the two aspects of generation and fixation are necessarily inextricably intertwined: The fixation of knowledge claims hinges on and must be formulated in terms of the very concepts that are formed and stabilized in the experimental process whose results are being secured (Steinle). Moreover, the contributions to this part also show that our reconstructions should be sensitive to the fact that the fixation of knowledge claims begins at the bench and does not stop with the published result. Ludwik Fleck’s distinction between journal, vademecum, and textbook science [Zeitschriften-, Handbuch- und Lehrbuchwissenschaft] still provides a valuable and instructive framework for the analysis of the generation and fixation of scientific facts. While the journal article allows at least a glimpse of the experimental production of results (say, in the lab)—if only in the highly regulated and schematic sections on “methods” and “observations”—the handbook, and even more so, the textbook account is completely severed from the initial research processes and indeed from the justificatory procedures that were actually employed in experimentation (Steinle). We may even say that the justificatory procedure begins before the initial research takes place. To decide about what to do next, and to obtain funding, scientists (and grant agencies) need to evaluate research plans from the perspective of future fertility (Nickles). Here lies an important topic for future research on justification. We need to trace the ways in which knowledge is secured vis-`a-vis different audiences. New studies of experimentation in combination with recent work on science and the public16 can serve as starting points for more detailed analyses of justificatory procedures. Taken together, the essays included in this volume demonstrate that two very basic conceptual distinctions need to be preserved. The first is the “lean distinction” between two questions or attitudes to science, the descriptive and the evaluative. The second is the distinction between two processes, the generation of “something”—a claim to
xiv
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
knowledge—that is to be justified, and the fixation of that claim. But neither of these distinctions can provide a foundation for the dualistic picture of context of justification versus context of discovery. However, if we give it up, what does this mean for the distinction between philosophy of science and science studies that is so closely tied to that bifurcation? Who is now “in charge” of the generation and fixation of knowledge claims, and how should we deal with these issues? Is the study of the generation of knowledge claims merely a descriptive task? Does the fixation of knowledge claims remain an exclusively philosophical (evaluative) category, or shall we treat it strictly as an actors’ category? Or shall we resort to the approach of the “lean distinction” and say: this is simply a question of perspective? Both the generation and the fixation of knowledge claims are major themes that call for collaborative philosophical and empirical studies of (past) science. First, it requires the combined effort of philosophy, history, and science studies to clarify what that “something” is that we have tentatively termed “claim to knowledge”— whether it is an isolated event or a statement, whether it can be credited to a single individual or to a group, how the materiality of the setting shapes that claim, and so on (Arabatzis). Secondly, the contributions to this volume show that there is no particular, distinctive “context” of justification that merits philosophical efforts— justificatory aspects are ubiquitous in science. No doubt, our perspective on the fixation of knowledge claims can be strictly descriptive. But even in this perspective, the understanding of what justification is is not merely an empirical enterprise, and in this regard the endeavor to understand justification strongly resembles our efforts to understand the generation of knowledge claims. With regard to the evaluative task, an interdisciplinary approach is also required. Philosophers need to clarify different aspects of that process in constant engagement with historical material. To answer our evaluative questions of whether and how claims to knowledge are justified, we need to consider justificatory procedures in (past) science and their evolution. We need to analyze conceptually different types of the fixation of knowledge such as the heuristic appraisal of future fertility, the practical considerations that govern the lab work, the formalized reconstructions in the journal article, and the decontextualizations in textbooks and popular magazines. We need to conduct historical research because justificatory norms and strategies, for example those inherent in guidelines for scientific publications and heuristic appraisals, change over time. We need to bring these together with the concepts of justification that philosophy of science has developed and explicated. And we need to combine history with conceptual analysis to explore how justificatory arguments evolve with the formation of the new concepts that are generated in scientific research (Steinle). We can conceive of this critical assessment as a process of iteration. This emphasizes the fact that it is of no fundamental importance whether our initial engagement is with (past) scientists’ justificatory activities or with philosophers’ epistemological analyses of the concept of justification. Both beginnings are possible, legitimate, and plausible. One may wish to call the first approach an epistemologically informed history and the second approach a historically informed epistemology, but in the end, this difference does not matter. The crucial point is that after a few iterations, the approaches
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
xv
will merge. Regardless of whether we choose to start with actual justificatory procedures or with received epistemological categories of justification, epistemological analyses of the concept of justification need history of philosophy of science and empirical explorations of justificatory processes in (past) science as their corrective. This book is the outcome of a prolonged collective effort. Many of the contributions to this volume were first presented and discussed at the conference Revisiting Discovery and Justification at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin) in spring 2002. Preliminary versions of almost all the contributions of the present volume were discussed again in an authors’ workshop in spring 2004. The volume has benefited greatly from these exchanges. We wish to take this opportunity to thank all participants of these meetings, especially Alessandra Allegrini, Davis Baird, Dick Burian, Jessica Carter, Lindley Darden, Jan Frercks, Giora Hon, David Hyder, Hans Poser, and Friedrich Stadler, for their instructive contributions and comments.17 Warmest thanks go to Hans-J¨org Rheinberger, who offered helpful advice and critique at all stages of our project and provided generous funding.
NOTES 1. See Nickles 1980b, pp. 8–9; see also Hoyningen-Huene 1987 for a detailed analysis of the different aspects of the context distinction. 2. See, for example, Feigenbaum et al. 1971; Simon 1973; Simon et al. 1981; Langley et al. 1987; Simon and Kulkarni 1988; Gooding 1990; Graßhoff and May 1995; Grasshoff et al. 2000; for an overview of recent work see Darden 1997. See also Nersessian 1995 for recent discussions about discovery in cognitive science. 3. For recent investigations of research on biological mechanisms, see especially Darden 1991; Darden 1996; Glennan 1996; Grasshoff et al. 2000; Craver 2001. See also Bechtel and Richardson 1993 on discovering complexity. 4. An important document of these discussions is the volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). It includes, among other things, Lakatos’s important paper on the methodology of scientific research programmes, which offers a rational reconstruction of Kuhn’s dynamic image of scientific revolutions (Lakatos 1970). See also Laudan 1977 for another influential contribution to this discussion. 5. See, e.g. Salmon 1970, p. 70; Feigl 1970; Giere 1973; Burian 1977; Kr¨uger 1979; McLaughlin 1982. For a revision of these debates, see Nickles 1985. 6. See Steinle’s contribution (this volume). 7. A notable exception is Ian Hacking’s work on the historical development of epistemological concepts (see esp. Hacking 1990; Hacking 1995; Hacking 1999). Perhaps not surprisingly, philosophers have focused their attention on his contributions to debates about scientific realism (Hacking 1983). Hacking’s other works are almost exclusively debated by historians. 8. See, for instance, the collections Gooding et al. 1989 and Buchwald 1995 on experimentation as well as Hankins and Silverman 1995 and Joerges and Shinn 2001 on instruments. 9. There are some notable exceptions, e.g., the recent works by Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino, which seek to bring science studies to bear on philosophical thought (see, for example, Kitcher 2001; Longino 2002). See also the contributions to Steinle and Burian 2003 and (specifically on experimentation) Heidelberger and Steinle 1998 for recent interdisciplinary endeavors.
xvi
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
10. In more recent publications, the target of Franklin’s critique has shifted from theory-dominated philosophy of science to social constructivism, see e.g., Franklin 1999; Franklin 1994. 11. See, among others, Rasmussen 1993; Bechtel 1994; Culp 1995; Chalmers 2003. 12. For recent philosophical approaches to instruments and experimentation, see especially Rheinberger 1997; Ankeny 2000; Baird 2004; Weber 2005; Steinle 2005 as well as a small body of work on error statistics, see e.g., Mayo 2000; Rudge 2001; Elliot 2004. Most of the recent work on experimental practice, however, is done in case studies focusing on specific examples, often from contemporary science (see, among others, Dror 1999; Rader 1999; Benschop and Draaisma 2000; Gaudilli`ere 2001; Creager 2002; Bresadola 2003). 13. The recent collection on The Philosophy of Experimentation edited by Hans Radder is a noteworthy exception. However, in his introduction (tellingly titled ‘Toward a More Developed Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation’), Radder also notes that after the ‘rapid start’ with Representing and Intervening, the philosophy of experimentation swiftly lost its momentum (Radder 2003, p. 1). 14. Cf. among others Uebel 1991; Cartwright et al. 1996; Giere and Richardson 1996; Stadler 1997; Friedman 1999. 15. See, e.g., Losee 1979; Laudan 1980; Schaffer 1986; McMullin 1990. 16. See, e.g., Cooter 1984; Golinski 1992; Yeo 1993; Winter 1998. 17. We extend our thanks to Jason Baker, Steve Crowley, and Noretta Koertge, who offered insightful comments on this introduction and made valuable suggestions for improving it.
REFERENCES Ankeny, R. (2000), “Fashioning Descriptive Models in Biology: Of Worms and Wiring Diagrams,” Philosophy of Science 67 (supplement): S260–S272. Baird, Davis (2004), Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments (Berkeley: University of California Press). Bechtel, William (1994), “Deciding on the Data: Epistemological Problems Surrounding Instruments and Research Techniques in Cell Biology,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 167–178. Bechtel, William and Robert Richardson (1993), Discovering Complexity (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Benschop, Ruth and Douwe Draaisma (2000), “In Pursuit of Precision. The Calibration of Minds and Machines in Late Nineteenth-Century Psychology,” Annals of Science 57: 1–25. Bresadola, Marco (2003), “At Play With Nature: Luigi Galvani’s Experimental Approach to Muscular Physiology”, in F. L. Holmes et al. (eds.), Reworking the Bench: Research Notebooks in the History of Science (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer), pp. 67–92. Buchanan, B. G. (1985), “Steps Toward Mechanizing Discovery”, in K. Schaffner (ed.), Logic of Discovery and Diagnosis in Medicine (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 94–114. Buchwald, Jed Z. (ed.) (1995). Scientific Practice. Theories and Stories of Doing Physics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press). Burian, Richard M. (1977), “More Than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy of Science 44: 1–42. Cartwright, Nancy, Jordi Cat et al. (1996), Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Chalmers, Alan (2003), “The Theory-Dependence of the Use of Instruments in Science,” Philosophy of Science 70: 493–509. Collins, Harry (1985), Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage). Cooter, Roger (1984), The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization of Consent in Nineteenth Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Craver, Carl F. (2001), “Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy,” Philosophy of Science 68: 53–74.
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
xvii
Creager, Angela (2002), The Life of a Virus: Tobacco Mosaic Virus as an Experimental Model, 1930– 1965 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Culp, Sylvia (1995), “Objectivity in Experimental Inquiry: Breaking the Data-Technique Circles,” Philosophy of Science 62: 430–450. Darden, Lindley (1990), “Diagnosing and Fixing Faults in Theories”, in J. Shrager and P. Langley (eds.), Computational Models of Scientific Discovery and Theory Formation (San Mateo: Morgan Kaufman), pp. 319–346. Darden, Lindley (1991), Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics (New York: Oxford University Press). Darden, Lindley (1996), “Essay Review. Generalizations in Biology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 27: 409–419. Darden, Lindley (1997), “Recent Work in Computational Scientific Discovery”, in M. Shafto and P. W. Langley (eds.), Proceedings of the Nineteenth Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), pp. 161–166. Darden, Lindley (1998). Discovery, Evaluation, Revision: Cycles in Scientific Change (abstract). International Congress on Discovery and Creativity, Ghent. Dror, Otniel E. (1999), “The Scientific Image of Emotion: Experience and Technologies of Inscription,” Configurations 7: 355–401. Elliot, Kevin (2004), “Error as Means to Discovery,” Philosophy of Science 71: 1–24. Feigenbaum, E. A., B. G. Buchanan et al. (1971), “On Generality and Problem Solving: A Case Study Using the DENDRAL Program,” Machine Intelligence 6: 165–190. Feigl, Herbert (1970), “Beyond Peaceful Coexistence”, in R. H. Stuewer (ed.), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (New York et al.: Gordon and Breach), pp. 3–11. Franklin, Allan (1986), The Neglect of Experiment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Franklin, Allan (1994), “How to Avoid the Experimenters’ Regress,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25: 463–491. Franklin, Allan (1999), Can That Be Right? (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer). Friedman, Michael (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Gaudilli`ere, Jean-Paul (2001), “Mapping as Technology: Genes, Mutant Mice, and Biomedical Research, 1910–1965”, in B. Joerges and T. Shinn (eds.), Instrumentation. Between Science, State and Industry, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook XXII (Dordrecht: Kluwer), pp. 29–48. Giere, Ronald (1973), “History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 24: 282–297. Giere, Ronald N. and Alan W. Richardson (1996), Origins of Logical Empiricism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Gieryn, Thomas F. (1999), Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Glennan, Stuart (1996), “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation,” Erkenntnis 44: 49–71. Golinski, Jan (1992), Science as Public Culture. Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Gooding, David (1990), Experiment and the Making of Meaning (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Gooding, David, Trevor Pinch et al. (eds.) (1989), The Uses of Experiment. Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Grasshoff, Gerd, R. Casties et al. (2000), Zur Theorie des Experimentes. Untersuchungen am Beispiel der Entdeckung des Harnstoffzyklus (Bern: Bern Studies for the History and Philosophy of Science). Graßhoff, Gerd and Michael May (1995), “Methodische Analyse wissenschaftlichen Entdeckens,” Kognitionswissenschaft 5: 51–67. Hacking, Ian (1983), Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hacking, Ian (1990), The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hacking, Ian (1995), Rewriting the Soul. Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
xviii
JUTTA SCHICKORE AND FRIEDRICH STEINLE
Hacking, Ian (1999), “Historical Meta-Epistemology”, in W. Carl and L. Daston (eds.), Wahrheit und Geschichte (G¨ottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), pp. 53–77. Hankins, Thomas L. and Robert J. Silverman (1995), Instruments and the Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Hanson, Norwood Russell (1958), Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Harwood, William S. (2004), “A New Model for Inquiry. Is the Scientific Method Dead?,” Journal of College Science Teaching 33. Heidelberger, Michael and Friedrich Steinle (eds.) (1998), Experimental Essays—Versuche u¨ ber das Experiment (Baden-Baden: Nomos). Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1987), “Context of Discovery and Context of Justification,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18: 501–515. Joerges, Bernward and Terry Shinn (eds.) (2001), Instrumentation. Between Science, State and Industry (Dordrecht: Kluwer). Kitcher, Philip (2001), Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). Knorr-Cetina, Karin (1981), The Manufacture of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press). Kordig, Carl (1978), “Discovery and Justification,” Philosophy of Science 45: 110–117. Kr¨uger, Lorenz (1979), History and Philosophy of Science—A Marriage for the Sake of Reason. Abstracts 6: 6th International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Hannover: Dr. B¨onecke), pp. 108–112. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, in O. Neurath et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Lakatos, Imre (1970), “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press), pp. 91–195. Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Langley, P., Herbert A. Simon et al. (1987), Scientific Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative Processes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Laudan, Larry (1977), Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press). Laudan, Larry (1980), “Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery, vol. I (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 173–183. Longino, Helen E. (2002), The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Losee, John (1979), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden et al. (2000), “Thinking About Mechanisms,” Philosophy of Science 67: 1–25. Mayo, Deborah G. (2000), “Experimental Practice and an Error Statistical Account of Evidence,” Philosophy of Science. Supplement 67: S193–S207. McLaughlin, Robert (1982), “Invention and Induction. Laudan, Simon and the Logic of Discovery,” Philosophy of Science 49: 198–211. McMullin, Ernan (1990), “The Development of Philosophy of Science 1600–1900”, in R. C. Olby et al. (eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science (London and New York), pp. 816–837. Morus, Iwan Rhys (1998), Frankenstein’s Children: Electricity, Exhibition, and Experiment in EarlyNineteenth-Century London (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Nersessian, Nancy J. (1995), “Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science and History of Science,” Osiris: A Research Journal Devoted to the History of Science and its Cultural Influences 10: 194–211. Nickles, Thomas (1980a), “Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the Future of Philosophy of Science”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 1–59. Nickles, Thomas (ed.) (1980b), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Dordrecht: Reidel). Nickles, Thomas (1985), “Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate,” Philosophy of Science 52: 177–206.
INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
xix
Radder, Hans (2003), “Toward a More Developed Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation”, in H. Radder (ed.), Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 1–18. Rader, Karen (1999), “Of Mice, Medicine, and Genetics: CC Little’s Creation of the Inbred Laboratory Mouse, 1909–1918,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences 30: 319. Rasmussen, Nicolas (1993), “Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology with the Electron Microscope,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24: 227–265. Reichenbach, Hans (1938), Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Rheinberger, Hans-J¨org (1997), Toward a History of Epistemic Things (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Rudge, David Wyss (2001), “Kettlewell from an Error Statistician’s Point of View,” Perspectives on Science 9: 59–77. Salmon, Wesley C. (1970), “Bayes’s Theorem and the History of Science”, in R. H. Stuewer (ed.), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (New York et al.: Gordon and Breach), pp. 68–86. Schaffer, Simon (1986), “Scientific Discoveries and the End of Natural Philosophy,” Social Studies of Science 16: 387–420. Schaffner, Kenneth (1980), “Discovery in the Biomedical Sciences: Logic or Irrational Intuition?”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 60 (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 171–205. Simon, Herbert A and D. Kulkarni (1988), “The Process of Scientific Discovery: The Strategy of Experimentation,” Cognitive Science 12: 139–175. Simon, Herbert A. (1973), “Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?,” Philosophy of Science 40: 471– 480. Simon, Herbert A., Patrick W. Langley et al. (1981), “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving,” Synthese 47: 1–28. Stadler, Friedrich (1997), Studien zum Wiener Kreis (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp). Steinle, Friedrich (2005), Explorative Experimente. Amp`ere, Faraday und die Urspr¨unge der Elektrodynamik. Boethius 50. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag). Steinle, Friedrich and Richard M. Burian (2003), “Special Issue: History of Science and Philosophy of Science,” Perspectives on Science 10. Uebel, Thomas E. (ed.) (1991), Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle. Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Weber, Marcel (2005), Philosophy of Experimental Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Winter, Alison (1998), Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Yeo, Richard (1993), Defining Science. William Whewell, Natural Knowledge, and Public Debate in Early Victorian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
DON HOWARD
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DISCOVERY-JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION
1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD WE ASK
Neo-positivism is dead. Let that imperfect designation stand for the project that dominated and defined the philosophy of science, especially in its Anglophone form, during the fifty or so years following the end of the Second World War. While its critics were many,1 its death was slow, and some think still to find a pulse.2 But die it did in the cul-de-sac into which it was led by its own faulty compass. The project was this: To provide global, formal explications of central methodological notions—confirmation, explanation, laws—and global, formal answers to global questions about the structure and interpretation of scientific theories, including, most famously, the realism—antirealism debate.3 That the neo-positivist project would lead to a dead end should have been clear, and was clear to some, from very early on. W.V.O. Quine made the point already in 1951 in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Quine 1951) with his critique of the notion of analyticity, and I have always read Nelson Goodman as having tried to make a similar point in his 1953 lecture, “The New Riddle of Induction” (Goodman 1955), with the argument that no merely formal explication of the notion of confirmation can mark the distinction between a law-like generalization such as “All emeralds are green” and its nonsensical cousin, “All emeralds are grue.” Quine and Goodman also pointed out where the error lay, Quine with his explicit endorsement of epistemological naturalism (Quine 1969) and Goodman with his suggestion that the difference between a projectable predicate like green and an unprojectable predicate like grue was to be explained (not explicated) by means of a concept of entrenchment borrowed from anthropological linguistics. The error lay in the philosopher of science’s principled restriction of philosophical attention to the merely formal. Quine and Goodman believed that making sense of empirical science required the tools of empirical science, Quine celebrating such reflexivity (to use the fashionable modern term) as not vicious but virtuous circularity, if, that is, the goal is taken to be not justification, which Hume already taught us was impossible, but, more modestly, the description of how, to borrow a phrase from Quine, sensory input becomes theoretical output. The project whose ultimate demise was thus foretold by Quine and Goodman was born in the 1930s, chiefly through the work of Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Foremost among its central dogmas, foremost at least for the purpose of legitimating a conception of the philosophy of science as a purely formal enterprise, was the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification and the 3 J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification, 3–22. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
4
DON HOWARD
associated claim that the philosophy of science confines itself to formal questions within the context of justification, for the perspectives on science thus proscribed as inherently non-philosophical—history, sociology, psychology, biology and kindred studies of the contingent—treat of subjects falling within the realm of what Hume dubbed “matters of fact.” Logic alone survives as the one “science” in a science of science. Many questions cannot be asked and answered by a philosophy of science so constrained. Thus, neo-positivism was as if dumbstruck by questions about the role of science in human affairs, whether they be questions about nuclear weapons, environmental problems, or biotechnology.4 And the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science could be theorized in no way other than as an insult to the historian, with the suggestion that history’s only role was to provide rationally reconstructed case studies as vindication for the philosopher’s normative methodological claims. But neo-positivism is dead, and so we now ask questions that were once taboo. Are we, however, asking all of the right questions? The point of the present paper is to suggest that, perhaps, we are not. We might think ourselves like Theseus. Having slain the Minotaur, do we now follow our Ariadne’s thread back out of the cave? Perhaps. But might we not be more like Hansel and Gretel, having found that the crumbs with which we marked the trail into the woods have all been gobbled up? I worry that we are seriously lost. To return from the realm of metaphor, my concern is that unless we understand the proscriptive work really intended by the authors of such neo-positivist dogmas as the DJ distinction, we cannot know what questions we should now be asking. It is good that we now explore the way in which experimental practice, the social structures of science, and the psychology of the researcher play a role in the acceptance of scientific theories. As I have argued elsewhere, however, when, in 1938, Reichenbach beatified the DJ distinction in Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938), his target was not—or not just—epistemological naturalism. His target was, instead, Otto Neurath, Philipp Frank, and the left wing of the Vienna Circle, Neurath especially being then famous for his effort to theorize a positive role for social and political values in theory choice (Howard 2000). The history of that encounter between Reichenbach and Neurath is retold, briefly, in the next section of this paper. For now, I just state the lesson of that history, a lesson itself elaborated later on. The lesson is that, if what was forbidden was the assertion of a positive role for social and political values in theory choice, then the task today is to resume the conversation with Neurath about whether there is and should be such a role for values in the doing of science. 2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: REICHENBACH AND NEURATH ON VALUES AND THEORY CHOICE
In 1913, Neurath published a lovely little essay in which one finds adumbrated all of the main ingredients of his mature philosophy of science. As well known in its day as it is unknown today, it carries a curious title: “Die Verirrten des Cartesius
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
5
und das Auxiliarmotiv. Zur Psychologie des Entschlusses,” nicely translated as “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive (On the Psychology of Decision)” (Neurath 1913). The image of the lost wanderer is taken from a passage in the Discourse on Method, where Descartes contrasts theory and practice by pointing out that, unlike science, practical action requires our making firmly fixed, if perhaps ungrounded and uncertain decisions. In the realm of praxis we are like people lost in a wood. To find a way out, one must simply decide to keep moving in a given direction, though there be no reason for preferring that direction over others. Neurath believes that Descartes is wrong, that science, like practical action, requires ungrounded decisions. That by which we so decide he calls the “auxiliary motive” (note—not “auxiliary reasons”). He mocks the foundationalist illusion of fixed rules of method and fixed criteria of theory choice as “pseudo-rationalism.” Why are there no such foundations? The argument proceeds from an essentially Duhemian view of science (Duhem 1906), wherein theories are interconnected wholes, and theory choice is underdetermined by logic and experience: Whoever wants to create a world-view or a scientific system must operate with doubtful premises. Each attempt to create world-picture by starting from a tabula rasa and making a series of statements which are recognized as definitively true, is necessarily full of trickeries. The phenomena that we encounter are so much interconnected that they cannot be described by a one-dimensional chain of statements. The correctness of each statement is related to that of all the others. It is absolutely impossible to formulate a single statement about the world without making tacit use at the same time of countless others. Also we cannot express any statement without applying all of our preceding concept formation. On the one hand we must state the connection of each statement dealing with the world with all the other statements that deal with it, and on the other hand we must state the connection of each train of thought with all our earlier trains of thought. We can vary the world of concepts present in us, but we cannot discard it. Each attempt to renew it from the bottom up is by its very nature a child of the concepts at hand. (Neurath 1913, p. 3)
Basically this same view of theory choice is reiterated, with occasional refinement and clarification, in Neurath’s writings over the next twenty-five years. On one key point, however, Neurath was much more explicit in later years. It is that prominent among the auxiliary motives are social and political values.5 On Neurath’s view, it is a contingent fact, well supported by historical evidence, that we do choose among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of our estimation of the likelihood of their serving our favored social and political ends, this especially in sciences like economics and sociology. Denial of this fact being symptomatic of pseudo-rationalism, it were better that we be honest with ourselves and others about our so choosing. The cause of scientific objectivity and the cause of human freedom (for Neurath those two causes are one) are better served by open, public debate about the values whereby we choose, for the agents of regressive social and political interests hide their agendas behind the disguise of pseudo-rationalism. It is surely no accident that, unlike Carnap, Reichenbach, and Moritz Schlick, who cut their philosophical teeth on general relativity, Neurath was an economist and sociologist. Briefly imprisoned after the First World War for his role as President of the Central Economic Office in the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, Neurath
6
DON HOWARD
went on to become a prominent figure is the Austrian Social Democratic Party, for many years Director of the Social and Economic Museum in Vienna, an institution with deep roots in the worker education movement. An Austro-Marxist, Neurath’s far-left politics infused all of his philosophical work. His ambition for the Vienna Circle, the Verein Ernst Mach, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and the logical empiricism that was their philosophical doctrine was that they would promote an image of science and scientific philosophy as engines of progressive social change.6 Though not Marxists of any stripe, Reichenbach and Carnap were also socialists, Reichenbach having been a prominent leader of the student socialist movement in Berlin at the end of the First World War. But Reichenbach and Carnap disagreed profoundly with Neurath over the role of social and political values in theory choice. It is not widely enough known that their famous dispute over the role of conventions in science, a dispute that we recall, if at all, in the form it took in the protocol sentence debate of the early 1930s, was, in important measure, an argument over this very question (see Neurath 1932; Carnap 1933; Schlick 1934; see also Zhai 1990). Even as a dispute over the role of conventions, however, the issue is not always clearly enough understood. Here it is in outline. In an effort to craft an empiricism capable of defending the empirical integrity of general relativity against mainly its neo-Kantian critics, Schlick and Reichenbach had in the 1920s elaborated a view of conventions according to which only analytic coordinating definitions are conventional. They held that once the coordinating definitions are fixed by convention, each remaining synthetic proposition in a scientific theory is thereby endowed with a determinate empirical content of such a kind that the proposition’s truth or falsity is unambiguously determinable on the basis of the corresponding experience. Alternative conventions are possible, and simplicity considerations might lead us to prefer one set over another, but the resulting differences in theory are held to be inconsequential, being no different in kind than the difference between English units and metric units. The very fact that two alternative theories are empirically equivalent guarantees that they are just two different ways of saying the same thing, for empirical content is the only content of theory. This is verificationism, the view later attacked by Quine in “Two Dogmas.” The view worked against neo-Kantian critics of general relativity by securing the synthetic, empirical status of claims about the metrical structure of spacetime.7 But the verificationism of Schlick and Reichenbach does other work as well. For if it works, then it also blocks Neurath’s assertion of a role for social and political values in theory choice. If the difference between alternative conventions is no more than the difference between two languages, and if every synthetic proposition has its own, determinate, empirical content, then theory choice is, in principle, univocally determined by considerations of logic and evidence, leaving no room for the operation of values of any kind. Neurath’s theoretical and epistemological holism inclined him to a different view of conventions. Such holism being inhospitable to the analytic synthetic distinction upon which the Schlick—Reichenbach view is based, Neurath tended like Duhem before
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
7
him and Quine after him to view all of the propositions composing a theory as equally conventional or equally empirical in character. Such holism being incompatible with the verificationist semantics of Schlick and Reichenbach, Neurath tended to view the differences between alternative empirically equivalent theories as being often quite significant, especially from the point of view of the differential capacities of alternative social and economic theories to promote specified social ends. It was this argument with Neurath that Reichenbach resumed when, in 1938, in Experience and Prediction, he premiered the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.8 Reichenbach wrote Experience and Prediction in English during his exile from Nazism in Turkey. He did so for the explicit purpose of introducing himself and his philosophical movement to the North American audience he hoped soon to be addressing directly. Neurath is not named as the target of the DJ distinction, and that he was the target was not evident then, and is not evident now, to Anglophone readers ignorant of the German philosophical literature from which Reichenbach was emerging. But it would have been crystal clear to Reichenbach’s former Viennese and Berlin colleagues. The distinction is introduced in section one of Experience and Prediction, “The Three Tasks of Epistemology.” These three tasks are, respectively, the descriptive, the critical, and the advisory task. The descriptive task involves only the rational reconstruction of historical episodes for the purpose of bringing to the fore those crucial logical aspects of the episode that reside in the context of justification. The critical task involves the direct analysis of those logical features of the structure and interpretation of theories. It, too, resides wholly in the context of justification and forms the heart of scientific philosophy. The advisory task is most interesting. One might think that the philosopher of science should offer advice about the ends served by the different choices we make when doing science, as Neurath surely would, but Reichenbach recommends a more modest advisory role, in which the advisory task collapses into the critical task. The philosopher of science should advise not about ends, but only about means for the attainment of such ends: We may therefore reduce the advisory task of epistemology to its critical task by using the following systematic procedure: we renounce making a proposal but instead construe a list of all possible decisions, each one accompanied by its entailed decisions. So we leave the choice to our reader after showing him all factual connections to which he is bound. It is a kind of logical signpost which we erect; for each path we give its direction together with all connected directions and leave the decision as to his route to the wanderer in the forest of knowledge. And perhaps the wanderer will be more thankful for such a signpost than he would be for suggestive advice directing him into a certain path. Within the frame of the modern philosophy of science there is a movement bearing the name of conventionalism; it tries to show that most of the epistemological questions contain no questions of truth-character but are to be settled by arbitrary decisions. This tendency, and above all, in its founder Poincar´e, had historical merits, as it led philosophy to stress the volitional elements of the system of knowledge which had been previously neglected. In its further development, however, the tendency has largely trespassed beyond its proper boundaries by highly exaggerating the part occupied by decisions in knowledge. The relations between different decisions were overlooked, and the task of reducing arbitrariness to a minimum by showing the logical interconnections between the arbitrary decisions was forgotten. The concept of entailed decisions, therefore, may be regarded as a dam against extreme conventionalism; it allows us to separate the arbitrary part of the system of
8
DON HOWARD knowledge from its substantial content, to distinguish the subjective and the objective part of science. The relations between decisions do not depend on our choice but are prescribed by the rules of logic, or by the laws of nature (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 14–15)
As Reichenbach had earlier explained, the concept of entailed decisions was one of the more important discoveries already made under the heading of epistemology’s critical task. The suggestion seems to be that too much attention to the context of discovery leads us to exaggerate the significance of logically and empirically ungrounded choices that lead to a genuine parting of the ways, choices that Reichenbach here terms “volitional bifurcations.” Put on the blinders, focus on the context of justification, note the central role of entailed decisions—choices that are implied by prior choices— and the genuinely volitional aspect of science nearly disappears. Narrowing the focus to the context of justification, declaring unphilosophical all questions in the context of discovery, means, then, our declaring unphilosophical all of those questions about the role of social and political values in theory choice that Neurath addressed under the heading of the auxiliary motive, all of those questions about social and political values that, for Neurath, mattered most.9 Scientific philosophy as Reichenbach characterizes it is but another species of pseudo-rationalism. Neurath died late in 1945 and so did not survive the war to speak to a new Anglophone audience on behalf of a philosophy of science that claimed a positive role for social and political values in theory choice. Philipp Frank was the one friend of Neurath’s view to survive the emigration. Through the 1950s he promoted the Neurath line in many papers and books (see especially Frank 1953 and Frank 1957), but he was doing so from the comparatively ineffective position of a part-time teacher of physics undergraduates at Harvard. It was Reichenbach at UCLA and Carnap at, first, Chicago, and then as the late Reichenbach’s successor at UCLA who were training a new generation of Ph.D.s in the philosophy of science and setting the agenda for the discipline in its new North American home. Reichenbach continued to advocate a politically disengaged philosophy of science in works such as The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Reichenbach 1951). Carnap had come around partially to Neurath’s view in the protocol sentence debate, but he never wavered in his defense of analyticity, and while his personal political activities, his favorable reception of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions as co-editor of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and his characterization of external questions respecting the choice of a linguistic framework as “pragmatic” (Carnap 1950) might suggest some subtlety in his mature view, his public philosophical example, at least, never even hinted at a sympathy for Neurath’s view of the place of social and political values in theory choice.10 The fact is that when neo-positivism emerged in the 1950s as the “received view” in the newly institutionalized and rapidly expanding discipline of the philosophy of science, no one was left to speak for Neurath. Interlocutors might have been found among the followers of John Dewey’s theory of science, as witness the example of Charles Morris, co-instigator with Neurath and later co-editor with Carnap of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. But the old socialist Dewey was dead
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
9
by 1952 and the ranks of his followers were thinning rapidly, Dewey’s conception of a theory of science being deliberately driven out of the academy by thinkers as diverse in their sympathies as Sidney Hook and Ernest Nagel. Science might have won the war in defense of freedom and democracy, but not even those values were to be accorded a place in the postwar project of the philosophy of science. 3. RESUMING THE CONVERSATION I: LETTING NEURATH SPEAK
If the real target of Reichenbach’s introduction of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification was Neurath’s philosophy of science, with its assertion of a role for social and political values in theory choice, then questioning the distinction requires, first and foremost, our resuming the conversation with Neurath. In fact, several scholars have recently sought to do just that, most notably Nancy Cartwright.11 But while much has lately been written about Neurath’s politics, a specifically philosophical engagement with his claims about the place of value in science has, thus far, not been a central theme in the conversation. Cartwright, for example, is drawn more to Neurath’s celebration of theoretical pluralism. I want us to take up the conversation about values in science. The potential benefits to the discipline of our renewing the conversation about values are many. Most importantly it might open up the prospect of the discipline’s once again finding something helpful to say about the place of science in human affairs, this in a philosophical voice, and not just as citizen participants in the political process who merely happen to be philosophers of science. It might also open up the possibility of a rapprochement between the philosophy of science and those historians and sociologists of science who feel themselves estranged from a purely formal philosophy of science mainstream. It might make possible our welcoming our feminist colleagues into the mainstream. And it might make possible our reintegrating the philosophy of science with philosophy more generally, not now primarily on the epistemological ground where once we met when general methodology defined the philosophy of science mainstream, but in the domains of moral philosophy and, to the extent that contextual values are accessible only historically, the history of philosophy.12 Moreover, these benefits can accrue without threat of a loss of the philosophical rigor upon which we philosophers of science have always prided ourselves. If we are to resume the conversation with Neurath about values in science, let us start by giving him the chance to speak first. He did, after all, have a lot to say on this score, much of it quite insightful. I turn then, first, to some central points in the further elaboration of Neurath’s socially and politically engaged philosophy of science. A complete account of Neurath’s philosophy of science is not to be given here,13 but rather my own rather selective list of points important for the subsequent conversation. a. Values and Objectivity Begin with the all-important question about values and objectivity. Is scientific objectivity so obviously threatened by according values a central place? Two points are
10
DON HOWARD
to be made under this heading. First, Neurath’s general epistemological framework is that of Duhemian underdeterminationism. The place of values in science is secured by the fact that, on Neurath’s view, logic and experience underdetermine theory choice. But turn that argument around and it implies that values come into play only within what I like to call the domain of underdetermination. That is, logic and experience are first allowed to do all of the work they can do. Only then do we ask which of several empirically equivalent theories is most conducive to the achievement of our social and political ends. Though values have an essential, unavoidable role to play, science as thus portrayed is as rigorously empirical and logical, hence, in this sense, as objective as it can possibly be. Value considerations are not intended to trump considerations of logic and experience; they are intended to respect them. Second, given the fact that social and political values play a role in theory choice, the cause of objectivity is best served by openness and honesty about that role. This is a point often stressed in our day by feminist philosophers of science.14 But androcentrism is not the only interest served by the pretense of a science that lives above the fray. Neurath thought the interests of capital equally well served by that pretense. Openness about the role of values in science is not always easy to achieve, however, especially for those—typically those in power—whose agendas are thus served by the pose of value neutrality. Think only about the absurd pretense of scientific objectivity among the practitioners of neo-classical economics. Neurath believed that clarity and honesty about the role of values in science is more easily achieved, though of course not necessarily so, by the dispossessed and the downtrodden. Here is how he expresses his version of what we would call standpoint theory: Marxism makes it understandable why the bourgeoisie, conditioned by its class position, becomes ever more unscientific in the field of social theory. To many bourgeois it may seem degrading, and an infringement of the dignity which is conceded to science, if one looks at it from the point of view of the class struggle. The proletariat appreciates science properly only as a means of struggle and propaganda in the service of socialist humanity. Many who came from the bourgeoisie are worried whether the proletariat will have some feeling for science; but what does history teach us? It is precisely the proletariat that is the bearer of science without metaphysics (Neurath 1928, p. 297).
Objective science is, for Neurath, therefore, precisely—if ironically—a value-laden science that is just honest with itself about its value-ladenness. b. Values All the Way Down A politically engaged philosophy of science secures the objectivity of science by restricting the operation of value considerations to the domain of underdetermination. But how large is that domain? A famous and crucial claim of Neurath’s in the protocol sentence debate was that the holism and the consequent underdetermination go all the way down to the protocol sentences, the observation sentences wherein theory meets experience. This was a principal premise in Neurath’s argument for a physicalist protocol language. Since phenomenalist protocols lack the veridicality required for them to perform their intended foundationalist work, that lack of veridicality a consequence
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
11
of the unavoidably propositional character of our protocol sentences, better to adopt a physicalist protocol language, the putative referents of which—medium-sized physical objects—have an advantage over the subjective contents of momentary, private experience, the advantage of being public objects. But we pay a price for the public character of physicalist protocols, for like all discourse about physical objects, physicalist protocols are entangled in the web of belief: Science is ambiguous—and is so on each level. When we have removed the contradictory groups of statements, there still remain several groups of statements with differing protocol statements that are equally applicable; that are without contradictions in themselves but exclude each other. Poincar´e, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have agreed on the protocol statements, there is an unlimited number of equally applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We have extended this tenet of the uncertainty of systems of hypotheses to all statements, including protocol statements that are alterable in principle. (Neurath 1934, p. 105 [translation corrected]; see also Neurath 1932, pp. 94–95).
Neurath had the courage of his convictions in thus acknowledging what some might see as a fatal implication of his view. What happens to scientific objectivity if the domain of underdetermination, the domain in which value considerations play a proper role, extends to the whole of science? More is to be said later about the values all the way down problem. For now, just a mitigating observation. In principle all physicalist protocols in all scientific fields are underdetermined. In practice, however, this phenomenon will be far more pronounced in the social and economic sciences that were Neurath’s chief concern. But this is also the realm in which most of us never doubted the theory-ladenness of observation. More so than in physics, social data need an interpretation before they become evidence.15 From this perspective, what first appeared to be a threatening implication of Neurath’s view turns out to be little more than a platitude. c. Praxis and Theory Choice A recurring theme in Neurath’s philosophical works, especially when he was writing, as he did regularly, for an audience of his fellow socialists, is that, at least in the social and economic sphere, theory choice is driven by the need for practical action, a need often so compelling and often felt in similar enough ways by many members of relevant communities as to obscure the fact that a genuine array of empirically equivalent theoretical alternatives is always available. “Action” here means both direct political action and the more mundane activities of everyday life, and typically, for Neurath, “action” means not the private actions of atomic individuals but collective social action. I quote a longish passage to illustrate the feel of Neurath’s thinking on this point: This is how matters stand in every “layer” of scientific work, not only in the narrower sphere of systems of hypotheses, as Poincar´e and Duhem have pointed out with such intensity. But these initiatives in multiplicity are constricted by life. A whole human lifetime is hardly long enough to immerse oneself in even a single view and to give full thought to its consequences. And how soon one senses the weakening effect of isolation. Thus one deserts the lonely, though perhaps auspicious, notions of an outsider to join in the work in a way of thought that enjoys more support and has therefore better
12
DON HOWARD chances of greater scientific achievement. In such ways it happens that not even too many possibilities are treated by several groups at the same time: through adaptation and selection a kind of assimilation of whole generations takes place—not to speak of the cases in which certain trains of thought are anathema, persecuted and suppressed. This insight that a logically tenable multiplicity is reduced by life has little hope of response because it contradicts the usual view of a connection between achievement and “success.” The representatives of a victorious doctrine are too much inclined to believe that their victory could be justified as it were by closer logical investigation. Many see the course of the history of science like that. (Neurath 1935, p. 117)
Neurath adds: “If, in spite of these comments on multiplicity and uncertainty, one sets unswervingly to the work that is seen as a common one, one can do so only because one knows how much the historical situation reduces the manifoldness via facti” (Neurath 1935, p. 119). When the action in question is direct political action, there might be more conscious awareness of choices being made: The Marxist, as strict scientist, must admit that the course of history allows of various interpretations. But successful collaboration is possible only when those who act fix on one possibility, whether by agreement or propaganda. This choice is itself a matter of action and resolution, but that does not mean that such action has no scientific basis. (Neurath 1928, p. 293)
It is not as though Neurath was the first or last philosopher of science to think about the relation between theory and practice, but what is more commonly intended under that heading are questions addressed via a distinction between pure and applied science, where it is assumed that we first choose our theories on more narrowly epistemic grounds and then act by applying those theories. That is not what Neurath intends. On Neurath’s view, practical considerations intrude at the start as well as the finish. Far more can and should be said about Neurath’s philosophy of science. Would that time permitted, for example, our thinking about his promotion—this with almost missionary zeal—of a unity of science not via theoretical unification but via the adoption of a universal physicalist protocol language. Neurath intended this, too, to do political work, for the physicalist protocol language was recommended in part for its being inhospitable to the obscurantist rhetoric favored by apologists for capital and other socially regressive interests. But it was Neurath’s employment of the Duhemian view of empirically underdetermined theory choice for the purpose of securing a place for social and political values in science that Reichenbach aimed to block with the DJ distinction. Let us keep the focus there for now, and let us now venture a response to Neurath. 4. A DIGRESSION: THE EPISTEMIC—NON-EPISTEMIC DISTINCTION
Before we can begin our response to Neurath, however, we must do some philosophical housecleaning. One cobweb, in particular, must be removed, namely, the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, a distinction introduced in reaction to Kuhn. Replying to various early critical responses to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn sought to defend his claims about incommensurability while
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
13
denying the relativist implications that some readers found in his story about paradigm conflict. According to Kuhn, all parties to a paradigm dispute typically share a common ground in their commitment to all manner of values, including simplicity, explanatory power, fertility, and empirical accuracy. Where they disagree is in their weighing of these shared values in assessing the merits of competing paradigms (Kuhn 1969, pp. 184–186; Kuhn 1973). To this perhaps not wholly convincing argument Ernan McMullin responded, not unsympathetically, by recommending a distinction between what he termed epistemic and non-epistemic values. The former, the truthinducing values, were to be accorded a respectable place in science, the latter not, for a science that chooses according to the former is less open to the charge of relativism (McMullin 1982). A theory’s being conducive to one’s favored social and political ends would be regarded as a non-epistemic value, and choosing among theories on such grounds invites the charge of relativism. That empirical adequacy is an epistemic virtue few would doubt. Things get a bit murkier when we turn to explanatory power, fertility, and simplicity. Consider the case of Einstein on simplicity. One would be hard pressed to find a stronger advocate of simplicity as a criterion of theory choice, especially in frontier physics far removed from the realm of direct empirical testability. But near the end of his life, after decades of reflecting on the question, Einstein gave up the attempt to define this elusive virtue, concluding that while scientists tended to agree in their judgments of simplicity, the comparison of theories with respect to simplicity amounted to “a reciprocal weighing of incommensurable qualities” (Einstein 1946, pp. 21, 23; see also Howard 1998). Fertility is no more likely to be captured in a formula, and for all that our intuitions might incline us to expect otherwise, even explanatory power proves hard to characterize in a sufficiently general manner.16 Does the frustration we feel in seeking global definitions of simplicity, fecundity, and explanatory power tell us something about those virtues, or does it tell us something about the underlying distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic virtues? I suspect the latter. Who would doubt the prima facie reasonableness of choosing among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of putatively epistemic virtues? But why do we think that in so choosing we choose the theories more likely to be true? It depends partly on how we think about truth. If we think that there is only one truth about nature and that in choosing among empirically equivalent theories we take a step, fallible though it might be, toward the establishment of that one truth, then the appeal and the cogency of the epistemic—non-epistemic distinction is evident. But at this point I find Quine helpful. This most thoroughgoing Duhemian was famous for arguing that, if theory choice is underdetermined by considerations of logic and evidence, then there can be no global, extra-theoretical talk of truth or the approach to the ultimate truth, for one can put through a Tarski truth definition only theory by theory: “Truth is immanent, and there is no higher. We must speak from within a theory, albeit any of various” (Quine 1981, pp. 21–22; see also Quine 1960, chapter 1; Quine 1969). If Quine is right, then the ground falls out from under the epistemic—non-epistemic distinction, for the distinction requires access to an extratheoretical semantic perspective whose existence Quine denies. The reasonableness of preferring simple to
14
DON HOWARD
complex theories remains, but so too does the reasonableness of choosing theories that will make the world a better place. 5. RESUMING THE CONVERSATION II: DOING NEURATH THE COURTESY OF A REPLY
Now we are ready to begin replying to Neurath about the place of social and political values in science. Where to begin? I want to begin with what I think is the most serious challenge posed to us by Neurath, namely, the argument that underdetermination and hence a role for value considerations, goes all the way down to the level of the protocol sentences. Note that while Quine has not expressed interest in promoting a role for social and political values in theory choice, he agrees with Neurath that even our observation sentences are entangled in the web of belief (see Quine 1951, p. 43; Quine 1960, pp. 42–45). Why do we find the claim that it is values all the way down so worrisome? It is surely worrisome if one’s ambitions for epistemology are of the foundationalist, justificatory sort that Neurath and Quine disavow. If we can choose from among our protocols only those flattering to our political agendas, then protocols cannot exert upon theory choice the kind of univocal empirical control for which foundationalist empiricists like Schlick hoped. But if the aim is simply to describe how science is done, why be distressed by the claim that there are values all the way down? If that’s the way the world is, then that’s the way the world is. Wishing it were otherwise will not make it so. The real worry occasioned by the claim that it is values all the way down is that radical, anything-goes relativism then threatens. Such worries are, however, misplaced, being partly consequent upon a frequent misunderstanding about the underdetermination thesis. Consider the latter in its most extreme, Quinean form: Theory choice in all domains is empirically underdetermined, this underdetermination persisting even if one were in possession of the infinity of all possible evidence. It follows, says Quine, that any favored hypothesis or, if Neurath is right, any cherished protocol can be saved as long as one is prepared to make sufficiently radical alterations elsewhere in the web of belief. But from the assertion that any one proposition can be, thus, insulated from refutation, it does not follow that anything goes, and this precisely because of the theoretical and epistemological holism that is the flip side of underdetermination. The web of belief is a deeply interconnected whole. To save a cherished hypothesis or protocol, one must make changes elsewhere in the web. The freedom of choice is not a freedom simply to deny the manifest evidence of the senses. One has to interpret, one has to tell a coherent story, and one has to tell a story that works. Yet another reason why many see the threat of radical relativism in the claim that it’s values all the way down is that we tend, wrongly, to model scientific decision making as if it took place in a social and historical vacuum. In fact, such choices are made by communities of inquirers whose members typically share, in large measure, a biology, a history, a language, an education, a paradigm, perhaps, and much else besides, the effect of which is to incline them to similar choices. Do we wonder,
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
15
with Einstein, how it can be that the experts agree in assessments of simplicity even though simplicity proves hard to define? No deep mystery here. A virtual necessary condition on the experts’ being recognized as experts is their being similarly socialized into the communities’ shared ways of regarding nature. The surprise would be if they disagreed in their assessments of simplicity. And the same holds, though perhaps to a lesser degree, when the values are not aesthetic but social and political. There are no a priori principles guaranteeing the possibility of consensus, just contingent, empirical facts about communities of inquirers making more or less likely the possibility of consensus. Be the ground for its possibility a necessary or a contingent one, consensus is still consensus.17 Mention of socialization brings us to another important point well understood by Neurath, which is that theory choice, including the choices that constitute the empirical basis of science, is a collective enterprise. Theory choice does not take place in a vacuum and it is not the work of disembodied, isolated, individual knowers; it is the work of social groups. But if we regard even the experience upon which science rests as a social achievement,18 yet another perspective avails itself from which to regard the question of radical relativism and the claim of values all the way down. For it shows us that, even as philosophers, we can and should be asking questions about the social structures through which such experience is achieved. An older literature frequently dramatized the threat of radical, anything-goes relativism by the example of the Lysenko affair. In this rightly notorious case, Soviet work in evolution and genetics was set back by over a generation thanks to obvious perversions of scientific practice in the name of a political agenda (Joravsky 1970). But the problem here was not that Soviet geneticists had a faulty philosophy of science, and the threat was not to be met by the fantasy of a value-neutral science, though that was the standard prescription. The problem was that the social institutions of science were not working as they should. The passing whims of Joe Stalin were no good substitute for peer review. There once was a time when Robert Merton’s work on the social norms of science was deemed a subject matter fit for the philosophy of science journals.19 But that was a long time ago. Today we might fault Merton’s naive philosophical understanding of science, his overly simple assumptions about truth and objectivity, and his reluctance to adopt a sociological perspective on the content of science, as opposed to its institutional structures, but that should not blind us to the value of his example. For the recollection of the older philosophical literature on Merton’s norms should remind us that philosophers qua philosophers can and should concern themselves with questions about the social structure of science. Our doing so would pay dividends. I would be delighted, for example, if one could turn to the philosophy of science journals for tough-minded discussions of proprietary research. If philosophers of science were once so exercised over the Lysenko affair, why are they not even more exercised by this new and distressing trend, where research is done under contract to private corporations with the stipulation that the corporation, not the scientist, owns the results of the research and can block their publication in the standard scientific venues. Why should we trust Merck Pharmaceuticals any more than we trust Joe Stalin?20
16
DON HOWARD
If philosophers qua philosophers can take the naturalistic turn by way of asking questions about the social structures of science, then yet another perspective opens up on the question of objectivity, a perspective famously associated with Helen Longino (Longino 1990; Longino 2002). Many worry that viewing science as a social enterprise entails, inevitably, some compromise with objectivity, for it opens the door to interests other than an interest in the truth. Longino argues, with deliberate irony, that, far from subverting the cause of objectivity, the socializing of our view of science promotes objectivity (or at least intersubjectivity) by making public debate about those interests an integral part of science. Neurath’s comments on pseudo-rationalism are directed toward a similar end. Bad science is done when we lie to ourselves about the place of social interest in science. Good science, objective science, is science that is honest about social interest, about the auxiliary motive, for that is the way to reveal those interests for public scrutiny and debate. In addition to the claim that it is values all the way down, Neurath, as we heard, insisted that the need to act played a major role in resolving underdetermination. If act we must, then we cannot pause like Buridan’s ass before empirically equivalent piles of straw. If act we must, then often our choices will have been made for no other reason, if a “reason” it be, than that some choice must be made. And for Neurath that’s a good thing. More commonly, however, we choose with a practical aim in view. As mentioned above, this is not the way mainstream philosophers of science have usually theorized the relation between theory and practice. What is usual is to distinguish pure science from applied science and then argue that the epistemic merits of the former are unaffected by the latter. Neurath’s way of conceiving the relation makes practice an essential part of the epistemological story. What are the consequences of such a reorientation? One consequence is that this reorientation of the question about theory and practice gives us a more hospitable framework in which to pose questions such as those that interest contemporary philosophers of experiment. Many students react at first with puzzlement to the claim that there is significant cognitive content in experimental practice. How can that be? Experiments are things that I do with my hands. But any good pianist understands what it means to say that there is knowledge in one’s fingertips, and anyone who learned to ride a bicycle at age five should understand what it means to say that one has knowledge in the seat of one’s pants. The problem with the pure—applied distinction is that it makes doing discontinuous with knowing, or rather “knowing how” discontinuous with “knowing that.” On Neurath’s view, all knowing is just a form of doing. Making a choice between empirically equivalent theories in the course of acting is how knowledge is made, and this at every level, right down to the making of protocol statements.21 Let me forestall misunderstanding by noting that such making is not what is intended when the phrase “social construction” is spoken with a Scottish accent. What is made on Neurath’s view is knowledge as genuine as knowledge can be, the making being constrained by all manner of factors other than just social interest, factors such as evidence. As that other Neurathian, Quine, would remind us, we can put through a Tarski truth definition, albeit not a single one for all theories.
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
17
Another consequence of our reorienting our thinking about theory and practice along Neurath’s lines is a moral one. The pure—applied distinction makes possible a most annoying moral dodge: As a scientist I am responsible only to the truth and not responsible for the consequences of applying the theories I discover and prove. But if the application is a part of the proof, then responsibility to the truth entails responsibility for the applications. I think that we used to talk about this under the name “pragmatism.” A final consequence that I would mention here of our thus reorienting our thinking about theory and practice is its suggesting that we are overlooking a lot if we think that the only epistemological questions worth asking are questions about the acceptance of theories. If theory choice is so thoroughly practical in character, then a finer vocabulary of epistemic attitudes is needed to do justice to scientific practice. Merely acting on a theory need entail nothing about one’s having accepted the theory as true or as possessing a high degree of verisimilitude. As noted above, sometimes I choose just because I have to. Sometimes I choose because my choice is permitted given the relevant constraints. Sometimes I choose because my choice flatters my prejudices. Sometimes I choose because my choice represents the way I wish things were even if I have no clue that they are so. And sometimes I choose because my choice seems the most prudent basis for action after weighing such evidence as might be at hand and the risks of acting on the basis of other choices. We are not helped by being told that attitudes other than grounded acceptance all fall below the divided line, in the realm of illusion and mere opinion.22
6. CONCLUSION
It is no accident that, as we have neared the end of this paper, the density of references to Dewey and to feminist philosophy of science has steadily grown. Deweyan pragmatism and feminist philosophy of science are just about the only two philosophical projects of the twentieth century capable of carrying on a respectful conversation with Neurath. It is also no accident that neither occupies a place in the philosophical mainstream. Continuing the conversation with Neurath would require our bringing in those voices far more than was possible here. Important questions would be raised. Thus, an interesting difference between Neurath and Dewey concerned the question of whether science has a role to play in the choice of ends, Dewey saying yes, Neurath no. Save that question for another occasion.
NOTES 1. A list of important early critics from within the philosophy of science mainstream would have to include Stephen Toulmin (Toulmin 1953, 1961, 1972), Norwood Russell Hanson (Hanson 1958), Paul Feyerabend (Feyerabend 1975, 1978), and Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962). It can be argued that the effect of later critiques by, for example, social constructivists and feminist philosophers of science, has been felt more strongly outside of the philosophy of science mainstream than within, for better or worse. For more on why that has been the case, see Howard 2003.
18
DON HOWARD
2. Those with the best stethoscopes work in the domain of inductive logic and probability theory. Perhaps the most interesting case, however, is that of Philip Kitcher. His recent work seeks an opening for questions about the way science lives in a social and political context, but his anxiety about the threat of relativism draws him to assumptions about truth and objectivity so strong as to make problematic any systematic integration of value considerations in the doing of science (see, for example, Kitcher 1993; Kitcher 1998a; Kitcher 1998b; Kitcher 2002; Kitcher and Cartwright 1996). 3. Here I rely heavily on Arthur Fine’s way of characterizing the problem (Fine 1984a; Fine 1984b). 4. Philip Kitcher is, of course, the notable exception among mainstream philosophers of science (see Kitcher 1985; Kitcher 1996). Still more exceptional is Kristin Shrader-Frechette, whose work as a philosopher of science takes her deep into the heart of policy debates (see Shrader-Frechette 1985; Shrader-Frechette 1991; Shrader-Frechette 1993). 5. The idiom of “values” was not that in which Neurath, himself, expressed the point, explicit talk of “value” carrying the wrong connotations in an early twentieth century Germanophone environment where the Werturteilsstreit was a recent memory (Albert and Topitsch 1971; Ciaffa 1998). But it was the idiom employed in the Anglophone literature, especially in North America, whether in Reichenbach’s public disagreements with Dewey over values in science or in Frank’s later promotion of Neurath’s position. For more on the North American setting, see Howard 2003. 6. There is now an abundance of good secondary literature on Neurath. See, for example, Cartwright et al. 1996; Nemeth 1981; Nemeth and Stadler 1996; Reisch 1995; Stadler 1997; Uebel 1991; Uebel 1992. 7. Classic statements of this view of the role of convention in science are Reichenbach 1928 and Schlick 1935. For a discussion of the development of this view and the background of debates over the empirical integrity of general relativity, see Howard 1994. 8. The idea behind the DJ distinction was certainly not original with Reichenbach, it having long been central to debates about psychologism. Thus Popper deploys much the same idea in his critique of induction in his Logik der Forschung (Popper 1934). For more on the history of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century debates about psychologism see Coffa 1991; Kusch 1995; and Peckhaus, this volume. What is original with Reichenbach and influential in the further development of logical empiricism is the specific formulation of the distinction and the use to which it is put. 9. Promoting a politically disengaged philosophy of science was more than prudent in those parts of Europe under fascist control in the 1930s. It might have been prudent and was surely expedient in North America in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (see Howard 2003 and Reisch 2005). 10. See, however, the not entirely unsympathetic discussion of his disagreement with Neurath on this point in his “Intellectual Autobiography” (Carnap 1963, pp. 22–23). For more on Carnap’s reaction to Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when it was submitted for publication as part of the Encyclopedia, see Reisch 1991. 11. See, especially, Cartwright 1999; see also the authors cited above in note 6. 12. Major chapters of the history of philosophy are, after all, really about the history of science and the history of the philosophy of science. This is especially true, as Gerd Buchdahl (Buchdahl 1969) argued, in the modern period. Sch¨afer (this volume) discusses Duhem’s arguments for integrating history and philosophy of science. 13. Those wishing a more complete rehearsal of Neuarth’s views should consult first Uebel 1992 and Cartwright et al. 1996. 14. See, for example, Longino 1990; Longino 2002. 15. But even in the physical sciences there can be a significant interpretive moment in the selection of one’s protocol sentences. See, for example, Sch¨afer’s discussion (this volume) of Duhem’s views on the “moral” element in theory choice associated with the assessment of the reliability of the sources of one’s evidence, his example being Kepler on the 8 of arc accuracy in Tycho’s data. 16. And recall from the discussion of Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” that even the notion of empirical adequacy might prove hard to pin down. For more on recent skepticism about global, unitary characterizations of methodological norms, see Stump and Galison 1996.
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
19
17. Sch¨afer (this volume) discusses Duhem’s view of the manner in which tradition constrains theory choice and, thereby, makes more likely a measure of continuity in the historical development of science. 18. Dewey, a famous critic of the spectator theory of knowledge, stressed the social nature of experience (Dewey 1929), as do a growing number of contemporary philosophers of science (see, for example, Longino 1990; 2002; Solomon 2001; and Kusch 2002). 19. The classic sources are Merton 1938; Merton 1942. Note that the former was published in Philosophy of Science. For more on the place of Mertonian sociology of science in pre-1950s North American philosophy of science, see Howard 2003. See also Wang 1999; Douglas 2004. 20. Kuhn was interested in social structures, but he tended not to be interested in using sociological tools in what one might term a knowledge-critical manner. He taught us to think of a paradigm as the shared commitments of the members of a scientific community, but he did not bother to ask questions about what kinds of community structures were conducive to good science, once, that is, one gets beyond claims about socialization and normal science as a precondition for the doing of science. 21. Here is another place where there are interesting and provocative parallels in the work of Dewey; see again Dewey 1929. See also Nickles, this volume. 22. The need for a more varied vocabulary of epistemic attitudes is a theme in Bas on van Fraassen’s The Empirical Stance (van Fraassen 2003).
REFERENCES Albert, Hans and Topitsch, Ernst (eds.) (1971), Werturteilsstreit. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Buchdahl, Gerd (1969), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science; The Classical Origins: Descartes to Kant. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Carnap, Rudolf (1933), “Ueber Protokolls¨atze.” Erkenntnis 3: 215–228. Carnap, Rudolf (1950), “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue internationale de philosophie 4(11): 20–40. Carnap, Rudolf (1963), “Intellectual Autobiography.” In The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 11. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 3–84. Cartwright, Nancy (1999), The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cartwright, Nancy et al. (1996), Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics. Ideas in Context, no. 38. Quentin Skinner et al. (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ciaffa, Jay A. (1998), Max Weber and the Problems of Value-free Social Science: A Critical Examination of the Werturteilsstreit. Lewisburg, NJ: Bucknell University Press. Coffa, J. Alberto (1991), The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Linda Wessels (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Douglas, Heather (2004), “Robert Merton and the Ethos of Science.” Paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of HOPOS, the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, San Francisco, pp. 24–27 June 2004. Duhem, Pierre (1906), La Th´eorie physique. Son objet et sa structure. Paris: Chevalier & Rivi`ere. Einstein, Albert (1946), “Autobiographical Notes.” In Schilpp 1949, pp. 1–94. Quotations are taken from the corrected English translation in: Autobiographical Notes: A Centennial Edition. Paul Arthur Schilpp, trans. and ed. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1979. Feyerabend, Paul (1975), Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: NLB. Feyerabend, Paul (1978), Science in a Free Society. London: NLB. Fine, Arthur (1984a), “The Natural Ontological Attitude.” In Jarret Leplin (ed.) Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 83–107. Reprinted in Fine 1986, pp. 112–135.
20
DON HOWARD
Fine, Arthur (1984b), “And Not Anti-Realism Either.” Noˆus 18:51–65. Reprinted in Fine 1986, pp. 136–150. Fine, Arthur (1986), The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frank, Philipp (1953), “The Variety of Reasons for the Acceptance of Scientific Theories.” In Frank (ed.) 1956, pp. 13–26. Frank, Philipp (1957), Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Goodman, Nelson (1955), “The New Riddle of Induction.” In Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 59–83. First delivered as a lecture at the University of London, May 26, 1953. Hanson, Norwood Russell (1958), Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howard, Don (1994), “Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of Logical Empiricism.” In Language, Logic, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: The Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial. Wesley Salmon and Gereon Wolters (eds.) Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Konstanz: Universit¨atsverlag, pp. 45–105. Howard, Don (1998), “Astride the Divided Line: Platonism, Empiricism, and Einstein’s Epistemological Opportunism.” In Idealization in Contemporary Physics. Niall Shanks (ed.) Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 63. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, pp. 143– 163. Howard, Don (2000), “Vertrieben und Verirrt: Politics and the Philosophy of Science in Exile.” Paper delivered at the Third International Conference on the History of the Philosophy of Science, Vienna, Austria, 6–9 July 2000. Howard, Don (2003), “Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of North American Philosophy of Science at Mid-century.” In Logical Empiricism in North America. Alan Richardson and Gary Hardcastle (eds.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 25–93. Joravsky, David (1970), The Lysenko Affair. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kitcher, Philip (1985), Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kitcher, Philip (1993), The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. New York: Oxford University Press. Kitcher, Philip (1996), The Lives to Come: Tthe Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kitcher, Philip (1998a), “Reviving the Sociology of Science.” PSA 98. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II, Symposia Papers. Don Howard (ed.) Philosophy of Science S67: pp. S33–S44. Kitcher, Philip (1998b), “A Plea for Science Studies.” In Koertge 1998, pp. 32–56. Kitcher, Philip (2002), Science, Truth, and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. Kitcher, Philip and Cartwright, Nancy (1996), “Science and Ethics: Reclaiming Some Neglected Questions.” Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social 4: 145–153. Koertge, Noretta (ed.) (1998), A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science. New York: Oxford University Press. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1969), “Postscript–1969.” In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 174–210. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1973), “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.” Matchette Lecture delivered at Furman University, 30 November 1973. First published in: The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 320–339. Kusch, Martin (1995), Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge. Kusch, Martin (2002), Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
LOST WANDERERS IN THE FOREST OF KNOWLEDGE
21
Longino, Helen (1990), Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Longino, Helen (2002), The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McMullin, Ernan (1982), “Values in Science.” In PSA 1982, Vol. 2. P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles (eds.) East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 3–28. Merton, Robert K. (1938), “Science and the Social Order.” Philosophy of Science 5: 321–337. Merton, Robert K. (1942), “Science and Technology in a Democratic Social Order.” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1: 115–126. Nemeth, Elizabeth (1981), Otto Neurath und der Wiener Kreis. Revolution¨are Wissenschaftlichkeit als Anspruch. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Nemeth, Elizabeth and Stadler, Friedrich (eds.) (1996), Encylopedia and Utopia: the Life and Work of Otto Neurath (1882–1945), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, no. 4. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer. Neurath, Otto (1913), “Die Verirrten des Cartesius und das Auxiliarmotiv. Zur Psychologie des Entschlusses.” Jahrbuch der Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universit¨at Wien. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Page numbers and quotations from the English translation: “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive (On the Psychology of Decision),” In Otto Neurath. Philosophical Papers, 1913–1946. Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath (ed.) and trans. Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 16. Henk L. Mulder, Robert S. Cohen, and Brian McGuinness (eds.) Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 1–12. Neurath, Otto (1928), Lebensgestaltung und Klassenkampf. Berlin. E. Laub. Page numbers and translations from the excerpt translated as “Personal Life and Class Struggle” in Neurath 1973, pp. 249–298. Neurath, Otto (1932), “Protokolls¨atze.” Erkenntnis 3:204–214. Page numbers and translations from the excerpt translated as “Protocol Sentences” in Neurath 1983, pp. 91–99. Neurath, Otto (1934), “Radikaler Physikalismus und ,wirkliche Welt’.” Erkenntnis 4: 346–362. Page numbers and translations from the excerpt translated as “Radical Physicalism and the ‘Real World”’ in Neurath 1983, pp. 100–114. Neurath, Otto (1935), “Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe.” Erkenntnis 5:16–22. Page numbers and translations from the excerpt translated as “The Unity of Science as a Task” in Neurath 1983, pp. 115–120. Neurath, Otto (1973), Empiricism and Sociology. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen (eds.) Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 1. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel. Neurath, Otto (1983), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946. Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath (eds.) and trans. Vienna Circle Collection, Vol. 16. Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: D. Reidel. Popper, Karl Raimund. (1934), Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick (eds.) Vienna: Julius Spring. Quine, W. V. O. (1951), “Two Dogmas of Empiricism’.” Philosophical Review 60:20–43. Reprinted in: From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 20–46. Quine, W. V. O. (1960), Word & Object. Cambridge: MIT Press. Quine, W. V. O. (1969), “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, pp. 69–90. Quine, W. V. O. (1981), “Things and Their Place in Theories.” In Theories and Things. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–23. Reichenbach, Hans (1928), Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. Berlin: Julius Springer. Reichenbach, Hans (1938), Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reichenbach, Hans (1951), The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Reisch, George (1991), “Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?” Philosophy of Science 58: 264–277. Reisch, George (1995), “A History of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Chicago.
22
DON HOWARD
Reisch, George (2005), How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schlick, Moritz (1934), “Ueber das Fundament der Erkenntnis.” Erkenntnis 4: 79–99. Schlick, Moritz (1935), “Sind die Naturgesetze Konventionen?” In Actes du Congr`es International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935. Vol. 4, Induction et Probabilit´e. Actualit´es Scientifique et Industrielles, no. 391. Paris: Hermann, 1936, pp. 8–17. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin (1985), Risk Analysis and Scientific Method: Methodological and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin (1991), Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin (1993), Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. Berkeley: University of California Press. Solomon, Miriam (2001), Social Empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stadler, Friedrich (1997), Studien zum Wiener Kreis. Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus im Kontext. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. English translation: The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001. Stump, David and Galison, Peter (eds.) (1996), The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Toulmin, Stephen (1953), The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction. London: Hutchinson & Co. Toulmin, Stephen (1961), Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the Aims of Science. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Toulmin, Stephen (1972) Human Understanding, Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Uebel, Thomas E. (1992), Overcoming Logical Positivism from Within: The Emergence of Neurath’s Naturalism in the Vienna Circle’s Protocol Sentence Debate. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi. Uebel, Thomas E. (ed.) (1991), Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle: Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 133. Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: Kluwer. van Fraassen, Bas (2002), The Empirical Stance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wang, Jessica (1999), “Merton’s Shadow: Perspectives on Science and Democracy since 1940.” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 30: 279–306. Zhai, Zhenming (1990), “The Problem of Protocol Statements and Schlick’s Concept of ‘Konstatierungen.”’ PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 15–23.
ALAN RICHARDSON
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY: READING THE CONTEXT OF REICHENBACH’S CONTEXTS
The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, this distinction dear to the projects of logical empiricism, was, as is well known, introduced in precisely those terms by Hans Reichenbach in his Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938). Thus, while the idea behind the distinction has a long history before Reichenbach, this text from 1938 plays a salient role in how the distinction became canonical in the work of philosophers of science in the mid twentieth century. The new contextualist history of philosophy that has arisen in recent years invites us into an investigation of the nuances of philosophical distinctions and their roles in shaping the development of disciplines. Logical empiricism played a key role in the historical development of philosophy of science and this contextualist history has revealed a much richer set of projects in logical empiricism than the potted histories had allowed. Many stories have been told about the contexts of justification and discovery; few of those stories have paid more than passing attention to the larger projects in epistemology and meta-epistemology that Reichenbach was pursuing when he drew the distinction. This brief essay will seek partially to rectify that lack in, I hope, a somewhat surprising way. I shall stress the connection between this canonical distinction and some other epistemological and social terms that loom large in Reichenbach’s text, arguing that the social relevance of scientific philosophy for Reichenbach cannot be set aside in understanding his use of the DJ distinction. My point is, therefore, historical and reflexive. If we attend to the larger significance of the project in scientific philosophy that Reichenbach was advancing, we can see more clearly why the DJ distinction was introduced and rethink the significance of questioning the distinction. I do not mean to defend the distinction here, but I do hope that my discussion of Reichenbach’s project reveals its attractiveness to him and, potentially, to us. First, some familiar stage-setting: Reichenbach’s distinction was meant, as is clear from the first few pages of Experience and Prediction, to solve the key meta-epistemological question of his time, clearly to demarcate epistemology from psychology.1 In this project, Reichenbach found aid and comfort in Rudolf Carnap’s claim in the Aufbau that epistemology provided rational reconstructions of the process of cognition, writing: “For this logical substitute the term rational reconstruction has been introduced; it seems an appropriate phrase to indicate the task of epistemology in its specific difference from the task of psychology” (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 5–6). This
41 J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification, 41–54. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
42
ALAN RICHARDSON
demarcation between psychology and epistemology frames the terms within which Reichenbach then proceeds to introduce the distinction between the contexts of justification and discovery—discovery is a psychological process internal to an individual scientist and at least potentially touched by genius; justification is a communal and communicative process. The famous words with which Reichenbach introduces the distinction explicitly analogize the context of justification to the public presentation of scientific knowledge (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 6–7): If a more convenient determination of this concept of rational reconstruction is wanted, we might say that it corresponds to the form in which thinking processes are communicated to other persons instead of the form in which they are subjectively performed. The way, for instance, in which a mathematician publishes a new demonstration, or a physicist his logical reasoning in the foundation of a new theory, would almost correspond to our concept of rational reconstruction; and the well-known difference between the thinker’s way of finding his theorem and his way of presenting it before a public may illustrate the difference in question. I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of justification to mark this distinction. Then we have to say that epistemology is only concerned with constructing the context of justification.
There are many places that one might with profit pause over in this passage, but one aspect of the passage that has received little attention is the last phrase of the last sentence: why does Reichenbach say not that epistemology is concerned only with the context of justification but, rather, that epistemology is “only concerned with constructing the context of justification”? The simplest answer, the one most clearly expressed in passages following this one in Reichenbach’s text, is simply that even scientific language is inexact and imprecise and only philosophers hold the tools needed to eliminate such imprecision. Thus, in the actual practice of science, scientific publication is the closest analogue to a fully rationalized discourse of science, but even that requires a bit of rational reconstruction. This simple story is, for the overall significance of the context distinction, only the less interesting half of the story, however. The introduction of logically precise terms is, in the envisioned process of fully rationalizing science, itself a social process that first creates the conditions of rationality even within science itself. There must be a “public,” a community of agents all speaking the same language, before the context of justification is even possible. By drawing attention to both the need for clear meanings and the role of social decision in making scientific knowledge possible, Reichenbach’s account of epistemology gives scientific philosophy a social function and, ultimately, a political significance. Scientific philosophy is meant to help create the conditions for a rationalized society within which justification finally makes clear and explicit sense.2 Reichenbach’s book was, I shall argue, an intervention in the social order in virtue of being an intervention in the epistemic order, given his account of the proper tasks of epistemology. I will argue for this through attention to some of the ways in which Reichenbach uses motivating terms in the book. Ultimately, Reichenbach is engaged in an effort common among the scientific philosophers we associate with logical empiricism—the effort to construct on scientific grounds the epistemic space in which beliefs can be freely adopted but rationally controlled. This is a delicate balancing act. On the one side are irrationalists and even unbridled conventionalists who threaten
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
43
to make all knowledge-making into free flights of imagination; on the other side are inductivists and epistemic determinists of various stripes who threaten to make our epistemic life a matter of machine-like rule-following or the iron laws of history. The problem of knowledge for the logical empiricists is the problem of how to allow for the freedom of thought and yet enforce proper concern for epistemic responsibility. This problem becomes almost identical with the problem of liberal democratic tolerance, of course—as well it might since the need for a rationalized international socialist democratic society was, the logical empiricists agreed, the only real option to fascism in Europe in the 1930s.3 TEXTUAL EVIDENCE IN EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION
Some aspects of my thesis are fairly obvious in the text. Reichenbach’s book is very much dedicated to stressing the uncertainty of all claims to knowledge while holding out the possibility of knowledge. Indeed, he suggests in the Preface that the term “logical empiricism” should give way to “probabilistic empiricism” (Reichenbach 1938, viii). The key to Reichenbach’s probabilistic empiricism is the idea that knowledge is for the prediction of the future course of experience and for the possible control of the future course of experience. It is for this reason that the problems of the interpretation of probability and the justification of induction are central to the work. Moreover, the “pragmatic justification of induction” is quite explicitly to be contrasted with any “inductivism” that finds an algorithmic inductive logic as the key to the establishment of certain scientific truth. Indeed, the pragmatic justification of induction leaves open the possibility that inductive inference does not succeed in predicting the future course of experience—the world might turn out that way. The fragility of knowledge and the need for a creative freedom of the scientist that is consistent with epistemic responsibility in an uncertain world are main themes of the work. While all of this may be clear, the claim that Reichenbach is trying to make a point at the interface of epistemology and social philosophy might still be seen as dubious. I admit that the textual evidence in the book is more suggestive than probative. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of Reichenbach’s view that suggest lessons that he elsewhere takes to be social and political lessons. The key to the connection is the various ways Reichenbach invokes the freedom of the scientist while demanding rational control as a necessary condition of knowledge. The first place in the text where this theme is rehearsed is right at the front, when Reichenbach stresses the ineliminable role of decision in science even as he limits the scope of it beyond what he finds in “extreme conventionalism” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 15). The first important distinction Reichenbach makes within epistemology is between free decisions within the knowledge system and true-or-false claims made once the appropriate decisions have been made. This is, of course, where Reichenbach imports his work regarding conventions in space-time theories and broadens it into an account of conventions throughout the structure of knowledge. But Reichenbach is at pains even in these early sections to both deepen and limit the significance of free decisions in knowledge. He performs both of these tasks by distinguishing between
44
ALAN RICHARDSON
conventions and “volitional bifurcations” in science. The latter are introduced with these words (Reichenbach 1938, p. 10): There are decisions of another character which do not lead to equivalent conceptions but to divergent systems; they may be called volitional bifurcations. Whereas a convention may be compared to a choice between different ways leading to the same place, the volitional bifurcation resembles a bifurcation of ways which will never meet again.
A volitional bifurcation marks a place where the decisions of scientists or the societies in which they live have permanent consequences for what can be known. Significantly, Reichenbach’s first example of such a volitional decision in science is one regarding the very aim of science itself. Moreover, he defends a non-standard decision as to a goal of science with a claim about practical rights (Reichenbach 1938, p. 10): What is the purpose of scientific inquiry? This is, logically speaking, a question not of truth-character but of volitional decision, and the decision determined by the answer to this question belongs to the bifurcation type. If anyone tells us that he studies science for his pleasure and to fill his hours of leisure, we cannot raise the objection that this is “a false statement”—it is no statement at all but a decision, and everyone has the right to do what he wants.
The very goal of the pursuit of knowledge can only be grounded in epistemic freedom, guaranteed by personal rights. Volitional bifurcations, on the other hand, according to Reichenbach, limit the freedom within science through the notion of “entailed decisions” (Reichenbach 1939, p. 13): The system of knowledge is interconnected in such a way that some decisions are bound together; one decision, then, involves another, and, though we are free in choosing the first one, we are no longer free with respect to those following. We shall call the group of decisions involved by one decision its entailed decisions.
It is this notion of entailed decisions—the way decisions ramify and interact within the system of scientific knowledge—that leads Reichenbach away from the dangers of unbridled conventionalism (Reichenbach 1938, p. 15): The concept of entailed decisions, therefore, may be regarded as a dam erected against extreme conventionalism; it allows us to separate the arbitrary part of the system of knowledge from its substantial part, to distinguish the subjective and the objective part of science.
It is important to note that the notions of the “arbitrary” and the “subjective” here do not signal that these elements are harmful to or eliminable from science. Reichenbach introduces “entailed decisions” in an effort to locate and to minimize the arbitrary and subjective, but the role of subjective volition, as we have already seen, cannot be reduced to zero within science. Science is based on decisions. Unbridled conventionalism, according to Reichenbach, misunderstands the way decisions ramify, but there is a necessary element of the volitional within science. This understanding of the interconnection of the volitional is the first step not in eliminating, but in disciplining the arbitrary and subjective. Science, as a given social enterprise4 , could not proceed on the basis of each individual making his or
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
45
her own choices, unconstrained by the need for co-ordination and control. It is of interest that this sort of intersubjective control is, in fact, the language within which Reichenbach demarcates his scientific philosophy from the concerns of traditional metaphysics. For example, in section 26 and following, Reichenbach discusses the scientifically acceptable (by his lights) understanding of the problem of other minds. He argues that there is no introspective access to the operations of “psychical” phenomena. He notes that this claim is disputed in metaphysics, which claims each of us has privileged access to his or her own psychical phenomena (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 227–228): It is a current opinion among philosophers that what we have said is valid only for our observations of other persons, as we cannot share their psychical life, but that for our own person there is another means of observation, a direct view into our internal life. This distinction is one of the profound misunderstandings on which the traditional metaphysics is based. To clarify this question, let us enter into an analysis of the difference between our own personality and other personalities. There is, of course, a specific difference; but it is not of the type assumed by traditional philosophy.
What is notable for our purposes in this discussion is how he goes on to speak of behavioristic psychology as involving the “control” of behaviors. Thus, he considers the warrant for the claim that someone else sees (properly, i.e., as three-dimensional) a stereoscopic image. The pertinent question, according to Reichenbach is (1938, pp. 229–230): Now let us see how we control the statement that another person has the stereoscopic image. That the person is looking through the stereoscope is not a sufficient reason to believe that he has the impression. We control it by his reactions . . . . When the stereoscopic effect occurs, almost every person, especially if untrained, shows a sudden expression of joy and surprise, by an exclamation or a smile. This reaction, in combination with the other ones, is a very good indicator.
Throughout his entire discussion of the virtues of behavioristic psychology, Reichenbach returns again and again to the notion of control. Behaviorism, in sticking to a physicalist language of stimulus and reaction, succeeds where the vague, metaphysical, introspective psychology fails (1938, p. 241): It is the advantage of behaviorism that an objective language is obtained which can be controlled by everybody; reports of the person are not needed, and the method is applicable to animals as well as men.
Where he objects to behaviorism, it is in the confusion of this point about language with a point about method: the objective, physicalist language of behaviorism does not obviate the usefulness of self-observation as a method in psychology; here, too, the language is the language of control (1938, p. 243): “The method of self-observation is, I think, a necessary element of psychology; it is to be controlled but not to be dropped.” The point in stressing the use of the notion of “control” here is to stress the other side of the problem of dependence of knowledge upon the will: the will must be disciplined. “Control,” for Reichenbach, involves the intersubjective co-ordination of the scientific will and the checking of claims against the world and with one another. The point of
46
ALAN RICHARDSON
the context of justification and the intersubjectivity of scientific knowledge is that they allow such checking. “Control” seems to have been chosen because of its relations to the word “kontrollieren” of Reichenbach’s native German; this word suggests less domination by a superior power (putting someone under one’s control) and more the checking of equipment or of procedure (as in “control group”). Indeed, Reichenbach uses “control” in this way quite explicitly in discussing unanticipated experimental results in physics—one checks one’s accounts of abstractions and inferred concrete objects (his illata) by checking them against independently achievable alterations in observable and manipulable concrete objects, such as wires and batteries (1938, pp. 274–275): Imagine an engineer who discovers a new effect in a vacuum tube, say, a sudden rise of anodic current when a certain pressure of a specific gas is poured into the tube. At first he will not believe in this physical interpretation of his experience. He will look over his wires, batteries, and screws to ascertain whether the concreta basis of his inferences is unchanged. He will then control his instruments and his set by replacing his tube by another tube of known effects; he thus determines whether his concreta basis leads to usual concrete effects if it is used in a normal way. He connects in this way the observed fact with a wider concreta basis. Whoever takes part in practical work with abstracta and illata—and almost every branch of higher engineering is occupied with such things—will know that this return to the concreta basis is used as the only decisive method of control.
So, I am not suggesting a coercive political agenda in Reichenbach’s work; something like “science inevitably seeks political control.” Rather, I am suggesting an interesting connection that is quite necessary given Reichenbach’s claims about scientific freedom: science will achieve objectivity, despite the necessary expression of scientific freedom, through a demand for epistemic control; science seeks claims that can be checked against the world and which epistemic agents can agree upon (so we can check one another). This politically tinged language is the natural language of expression in Reichenbach’s scientific epistemology. Reichenbach’s logical empiricism stressed both a human right to epistemic freedom and the need for exercise of the will in the pursuit of knowledge; this had to be counter-balanced with a source of epistemic responsibility in the control of claims to know. The construction of the context of justification, then, is the source of epistemic responsibility of science and the social responsibility of the scientific philosopher.
METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE IN NEURATH AND REICHENBACH
“Control” in the sense at issue is obviously close kin to “verifiability” and, even more so, to “testability.” This is not a sense of “control” unique among logical empiricists to Reichenbach, moreover. Otto Neurath also used the word in this way (Neurath [1931] 1983, p. 48): What do I mean by a positive statement, and how can I test it? A statement that cannot be controlled is a thesis devoid of sense. Those who thus succeed in formulating a system of laws which they apply in predicting events were best regarded as ‘representatives of a scientific conception of the world’.
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
47
Indeed, Neurath was as likely to use the notion of “rationally uncontrolled assertion” as “unverifiable sentence” is discussing the nature of metaphysics.5 This allows Neurath to avoid the pseudo-rationalism (another of his favored terms) of a belief any general method of verification in favor of a fallible procedure of check and control. More than this, however, the term “uncontrolled” as used by Neurath and Reichenbach suggests a danger in metaphysics. Metaphysical claims lack all connection to empirical claims. Belief in such claims, thus, does not help and may actually hinder ability to act in the world of physical things. Metaphysicians, therefore, consciously or unconsciously, offer stories that might decrease agents’ abilities constructively to act in the world. Thus, for example, one of the main lessons of Neurath’s Anti-Spengler is exactly that belief in the Spenglerian story of the decline of western civilization decreases one’s ability to act in the world: dedicated to “youth and the future they shape,” the work ends with a plea to “young people who take life seriously” to “advance to strong constructive activity” (Neurath [1921] 1973, pp. 158, 213). Similarly, pseudo-rationalist metaphysics, which offers reasons why certain procedures must lead to knowledge, decreases the number of options one seriously considers through a misleading story of rational inevitability. It is unusual to place Neurath and Reichenbach side-by-side when discussing logical empiricism; Neurath is the leader of the “left Vienna Circle” whereas Reichenbach, while not a Circle member at all, is often firmly associated with views of the “right” Circle.6 I suggest that there is more to the connection between Neurath and Reichenbach than has sometimes been allowed. In 1938, Reichenbach is firmly within the physicalist wing of logical empiricism and his views on “control” illuminate the twin resources of epistemic control available within the physicalist phase of logical empiricism: On the one hand, on Reichenbach’s view individual concrete material objects simply presented themselves to us in our experience; he calls this the “peremptory character of immediate things” (1938, p. 275). These things are beyond our willful control and present the material conditions of knowledge; they are the things in experience whose brute existence nothing worthy of being called “knowledge” could ignore. On the other hand, communal volitional decisions as to the meanings of words provide the semantic control over the languages we speak. Our joint decision to speak the same language and to hold one another to its requirements provided the grounds upon which to object to deviant, deceptive, or meaningless speech. As it did for Neurath, Reichenbach’s interest in “control” finds expression also in the tight connection that he makes—if only by decision—between knowledge and prediction. Prediction is all about control of experience aided by being able reliably to foretell the consequences of natural and social acts. Indeed, Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction—perhaps the most famous portion of the book—makes explicit the way in which Reichenbach sees reliable action as the point of knowledgeseeking (1938, p. 346): Inductive inference cannot be dispensed with because we need it for the purpose of action. To deem the inductive assumption unworthy of the assent of a philosopher, to keep a distinguished reserve, and to meet with a condescending smile the attempts of other people to bridge the gap between experience and prediction is cheap self-deceit; at the very moment when the apostles of such a higher philosophy
48
ALAN RICHARDSON leave the field of theoretical discussion and pass to the simplest actions of daily life, they follow the inductive principle just as surely as does every earth-bound mind.
Indeed, the inductive principle is a principle of action: inferring in accordance with the assumption that there is a limit of frequency is acting and, if Reichenbach’s justification of induction works, is a way of acting epistemically that leads to reliable action generally, if there is reliable action at all.
EPISTEMIC CONTROL AND THE REJECTION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE IN REICHENBACH
It is worth recalling the form of the pragmatic justification of induction in Reichenbach’s text: The argument says that assuming that there is a determinate limit of frequency and inferring from observed frequencies to the limit frequency, adjusting as needed, will lead (eventually) to the correct limit of frequency if there is a limit at all. Thus, one is warranted in so inferring, regardless of whether there are frequency limits (laws of nature, one might say), since the point of knowing is reliable prediction and this process leads to reliable prediction if prediction can be reliable at all. Now back in his dissertation in 1915, Reichenbach had provided what he thought of as a transcendental deduction of the need for probability judgments if the world was to be objectively represented at all. The pragmatic justification of induction seems, on the face of it, to be a similarly transcendental argument, with a somewhat weaker conclusion. Reichenbach’s pragmatic argument has a tint of Kantianism about it; it sounds almost as if he is saying that the inductive principle is a necessary precondition of knowledge. Reichenbach himself noted this tone and sought to argue against reading too much Kantianism into his position in 1938. For our purposes here, what is most interesting to note are the terms in which Reichenbach distances himself from a Kantian reading of the argument (1938, p. 360): There might be raised, instinctively, an objection against our theory of induction: that there appears some thing like “a necessary condition of knowledge”—a concept which is accompanied since Kant’s theory of knowledge with an unpleasant flavor. In our theory, however, this quality of the inductive principle does not spring from any a priori qualities of human reason but has its origin in other sources. He who wants something must say what he wants; he who wants to predict must say what he understands by predicting.
This is quite informal talk but it is suggestive of the key transformation between the Kantian and the probabilistic empiricist position, as Reichenbach saw it. On the one hand, we have the familiar move to meaning: what is at stake is the meaning of “prediction.” More importantly, however, in my view is the phrase “he who wants something must say what he wants.” The key metaepistemological move in Reichenbach’s rejection of Kantianism is the movement from reason to will. The traditional a priori is the constraints on knowledge offered by the very nature of reason; the necessary conditions for knowledge for Reichenbach, on the other hand, are the changing desires and interests that form the decisions needed for science.
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
49
The key lies in the metaepistemological point of Reichenbach’s epistemic voluntarism. We no longer have an a priori guarantee in transcendental philosophy that knowledge is possible at all. We do need to determine what we want of knowledge and, given our choices regarding the goal of knowledge, we can determine whether knowledge in that sense is possible at all and under what conditions. We have here a sort of voluntary a priori—a willful, existential Kantianism. Of course, Reichenbach holds no truck with romantic individualism, so this existential Kantianism must, if it is to help construct the context of justification, become a matter of communal, not individual, choice.7 These are the terms in which Reichenbach expresses the import of the “formalistic conception of logic” (1938, p. 334f). The formalistic conception contrasts with a traditional “a prioristic interpretation” of logic, that sought to subject us to the commands of the mind (1938, p. 334): For the first interpretation, which we may call the aprioristic interpretation, logic is a science with its own authority, whether it is founded in the a priori nature of reason, or in the psychological nature of thought, or in intellectual intuition or evidence—philosophers have provided us with many such phrases, the task of which is to express that we simply have to submit to logic as to a kind of superior command.
The formalistic interpretation of logic frees us from this superior command by recognizing the necessities of logic as the entailed necessities of our choices of linguistic forms: we subject ourselves to the consequences of our own choices, nothing more and nothing else. As Reichenbach says (1938, p. 336) “logical necessity . . . is nothing but a relation between symbols due to the rules of language.” These rules are, moreover, our rules; within a rationalized context of justification, we will have chosen these rules quite explicitly. This epistemic voluntarism is Reichenbach’s general weapon against a priorism in all its forms. In late work, such as his (1951) Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Reichenbach deploys this voluntarism in his discussion of the nature of ethics, insisting that if we properly see the logical type of the ethical imperative, we shall see that such imperatives simply express volitions. On this basis, he sets up a second-order volition that he dubs “the democratic principle”: “Everybody is entitled to set up his own moral imperatives and to demand that everyone follow these imperatives” (1951, p. 295). What is the nature of this principle? It is not a dictate of reason; it is a freely adopted principle of rationalized social life (1951, p. 296): I do not derive my principle from pure reason. I do not present it as the result of a philosophy. I merely formulate a principle which is at the basis of all political life in democratic countries, knowing that in adhering to it I reveal myself as a product of my time. But I have found that the principle offers me opportunity to propagate and, in large measure, to follow my volitions: therefore I make it my moral imperative.
The language to this point in Reichenbach’s discussion has been robustly individualistic but Reichenbach does not wish to be seen as a radical individualist—indeed, his democratic principle is opposed to an “anarchist principle” that says simply “everyone has a right to do what he wants” (1951, p. 294). Part of the argument against this
50
ALAN RICHARDSON
anarchic individualism is an obscure argument about the difference between rights to act and rights to demand (1951, p. 295f). A more promising line of argument, given Reichenbach’s metaethical stance is provided by a sort of pragmatic argument based on a psychological principle of harmonizing effects of living within groups whose individuals have opposing volitions (1951, p. 297): Whoever wants to study ethics, therefore, should not go to the philosopher; he should go where moral issues are fought out. He should live in the community of a group where life is made vivid by competing volitions . . . . There he will experience what it means to set his volition against that of other persons and what it means to adjust oneself to group will . . . . The exponent of individualism is shortsighted when he overlooks the volitional satisfaction which accrues to belonging to a group.
Lest there be any doubt in the minds of the reader of his text that this argument is meant to recall the pragmatic justification of induction, Reichenbach ends the argument is this way (1951, p. 301): We try to pursue our own volitional ends, not with the fanaticism of the prophet of an absolute truth, but with the firmness of the man who trusts his own will. We do not know that we shall reach our aim. Like the problem of a prediction of the future, the problem of moral action cannot be solved by the construction of rules that guarantee success. There are no such rules.
Lest it seem that I am making too much of this metaepistemological reorientation from reason’s immutable structure to the framing role of changeable volitions, it is interesting to see that in 1928, in a popular work, Reichenbach drew this inference explicitly ([1928] 1978b, p. 244): Rational knowledge in our sense is not tantamount to categorization within the pre-established cubbyholes of a reason that governs a priori, but simply amounts to unconditional faith in the power of the human capacity for knowledge—within the framework of a critique of its own goals. Thus the rational element is itself subject to change; and it emerges with increasing clarity that the basic stance of science is a faith more akin to an instinct than to rational insight, to will than to knowledge. Thus the will, the tenacious, malleable, indefatigable, and yet, eternally modifiable will is probably the basic element that truly represents the world view standing behind the scientific investigation of nature.
SUMMARY AND CODA
I have argued that the need within a scientific culture to balance the freedom necessary for scientific thought against the need for epistemic responsibility is the larger agenda behind Reichenbach’s famous distinction between the contexts of justification and of discovery. In constructing the context of justification, scientific epistemology serves a social function; it exposes and institutes the conditions of epistemic responsibility. I have argued for this through an effort to excavate the terms within which Reichenbach expresses his epistemological project, especially the notions of volition and control. This project has much to recommend it beyond the narrow confines of interpreting Experience and Prediction, however. It helps illuminate two issues in the Reichenbach literature precisely by bringing them together. The first issue is a standing issue within the interpretation of Reichenbach’s philosophy of the significance of his acceptance
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
51
of Schlick’s term “convention” over his own earlier use of a neo-Kantian “a priori.” Some, like Michael Friedman (Friedman 2001), have downplayed this move as primarily terminological: the key to understanding convention as used by Reichenbach from the mid-1920s is to see it as playing the same role as the variable or relativized a priori of his earl work on the theory of relativity (Reichenbach [1920] 1965). Others, like Don Howard (1994), have argued that we miss a significant moment of anti-Kantianism if we downplay this shift in Reichenbach’s vocabulary. I have stressed the metaepistemological level at which Reichenbach rejects the a priori—in essence, he rejects an account of the a priori that makes the a priori the realm of the inviolable demands of reason. He so ties the a priori to this account of it, that in rejecting the account, he rejects the very notion of the a priori. Thus, I split the difference between Friedman and Howard. I agree with Friedman that if we, as philosophical interpreters, have a sensible notion of the variable a priori in hand, then we can see Reichenbach as accepting such a notion, even when he uses the term “convention” to denote it. I agree with Howard that we miss something if we do not take seriously Reichenbach’s commitment to rejecting the term “a priori” because of association between that notion and the notion of reason’s demands. The conventional is the realm of the freedom of the will, not the necessary demands of reason. Reichenbach’s metaepistemology leads him to reject the associations of the a priori with “ways we must think.” This does not solve all remaining issues but it does raise issues at the proper interpretative level, I believe: the issue is not “is there an a priori element in Reichenbach’s epistemology circa 1938?”—a question that depends on our ability to make sense of a variable a priori—but, rather, “why did Reichenbach come to associate apriorism with the necessary and inviolable demands of unchanging reason between 1921 and 1938?” (or, to put the issue in a different way, we can ask “what would Reichenbach have objected to in my phrase ‘existential Kantianism’?)8 This leads to the second issue, which is rarely if ever considered in the arguments over the first issue, but, in fact, on my view, holds the key to it. This issue is the relation of Reichenbach’s scientific epistemology to his political point of view and activities. As I have argued, the metaepistemology of Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction can be read as suggesting a social responsibility for scientific philosophy: exposing and creating the conditions of transparent rationality of discourse. This required an acknowledgment of an ineliminable role for volition in the construction of knowledge and the concomitant need for co-ordination and control. This connects quite explicitly with the terms Reichenbach used as a student radical in the 1910s in his writings on university reform. The Free Student Movement, according to Reichenbach (Reichenbach [1913] 1978a, p. 110), “reject[ed] every authoritarian morality that wants to replace the autonomy of the individual with principles of action set forth by some external authority.” This individualism did not stand opposed to community; indeed, it formed, according to Reichenbach a proper sort of socialism (1978a, p. 110): It is incorrect to speak of a contradiction between individualism and socialism . . . . When we demand the autonomy of the individual and require at the same time that the individual grant to everyone else the same right to self-determination, we are really presenting one and the same thought from two different aspects.
52
ALAN RICHARDSON
The reason why it is the same thought is because the enemy of both is solely and wholly an external and binding constraint on the will of anyone. Reichenbach argued there were no such constraints and came increasingly to see a commitment to the a priori as expressing the view he so forcefully rejected. Just as the metaepistemology of Experience and Prediction reflects his social and ethical agenda, so too does his rejection of the a priori reflect his metaethical view that moral imperatives are volitions, not offerings of reason. Reichenbach introduces the discussion of the nature of ethics in chapter 17 of Rise of Scientific Philosophy precisely by tying his views to the rejection of an a priori element in knowledge (Reichenbach 1951, p. 276): The exposition of the second part of this book has so far been concerned with questions of knowledge; it was shown, in particular, how the synthetic a priori was eliminated in the cognitive field. The present chapter will be concerned with a similar analysis of the field of ethics. The idea of a synthetic a priori has been applied not only to knowledge but also to ethics . . . . It is the problem of the present chapter to replace the cognitive and aprioristic conception of ethics by a conception compatible with the results of scientific philosophy.
Reichenbach’s rejection of the a priori is a systematic commitment, based on the view that the a priori is irredeemably tainted with the mark of the necessary demands of reason. The rejection of this view is the primary lesson of his account of the role of volition in knowledge and in ethics. Reichenbach’s metaperspective uses the language of the faculties of the mind to argue for the primacy of will over reason. In using decision and choice as the weapon against the a priori, Reichenbach explicitly re-introduced a notion of the will back into theories of knowledge—a theory of the subjective element in knowledge becomes a theory of free and constrained choice of structures within which to represent the world.9 We best read Reichenbach not as attempting to give a theory of knowledge as simply a theory of accurate representation, but as also a theory of the conditions of choice that induce a genuine human and social responsibility for knowledge claims. Reflection on the social and epistemic situation surrounding the theorists of knowledge on the 1910s through the 1950s will help reveal why such responsibility was a key, if now forgotten, theme of epistemology at the time.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Portions of this essay were presented at the conference celebrating Michael Friedman’s work at the University of South Carolina in October 2004 and as the 2005 Hans Reichenbach Lecture at UCLA. I thank my audiences at each event, especially Mary Domski, Michael Dickson, Michael Friedman, David Kaplan, and Maria Reichenbach, for comments and encouragement. I wish to thank the other contributors to this volume, and especially its editors, for useful comments on an earlier draft. My thinking about these issues has been stimulated over the years by conversations with many people, especially Michael Friedman, Gary Hardcastle, Don Howard, George Reisch, and Thomas Uebel. John Beatty served as the material precondition
FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
53
of the possibility of this essay. As I was writing the essay my good friend and valued colleague, Stephen Straker, passed away; I dedicate the essay to his memory.
NOTES 1. I am interested in the distinction as it appears in Reichenbach’s text and I do not wish to say much more about it than he does. If called upon to place Reichenbach into Hoyningen-Huene’s (this volume) typology, I’d say that Reichenbach was committed to versions one, three, and four, but that the key issue was how to demarcate the proper task and tools of philosophy of science, which I think is the import mainly of version four. This is why the distinction is not, in the first instance, between discovery and justification, but between the contexts of discovery and justification. 2. Thomas Uebel (Uebel 2005) has recently stressed the social aspects of Neurath’s philosophy of science, contrasting it with a less completely social picture in Reichenbach’s philosophy of science. Uebel is certainly right that the social aspect of Neurath’s philosophy is much more explicit and self-conscious; it is nonetheless there also in Reichenbach. 3. The politics of logical empiricism are now no longer news. See, for example, Stadler, 2001; Uebel 2000; Howard, 2003; Reisch, 2005, and the essays in Heidelberger and Stadler, 2003. 4. “Every theory of knowledge must start from knowledge as a given sociological fact” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 3)—this is the first sentence of Experience and Prediction. 5. Thus, according to Uebel 2004, p. 255, Neurath wrote a letter to Rudolf Carnap in which he says “I like to use the word ‘metaphysics’ when I am confronted with a view that is supported by the tendency to formulate uncontrollable assertions” (Neurath to Carnap, 29 February 1935; ASP/RC 029-09-80). Cartwright et al. 1996 offers a view (or more than one view perhaps) of what Neurath meant by “rationally uncontrolled assertions” in metaphysics. 6. On the terminology of “left” and “right” here, see Uebel 2004. For Reichenbach as “right wing,” see Howard 2003. 7. A recent commentator who has made much of Reichenbach’s voluntarism and has also sought to use resources from existentialism to rehabilitate empiricism is Bas van Fraassen (van Fraassen 2002). 8. I have attempted to say more about Reichenbach’s rejection of the a priori recently in Richardson 2005. 9. Interestingly, one contemporary of Reichenbach, C.I. Lewis (Lewis 1929) also argued for the primacy of will over reason and then, rather than reject the a priori, provided on this basis a “pragmatic conception of the a priori.”
REFERENCES Cartwright, Nancy, Cat, Jordi, Fleck, Lola, and Uebel, Thomas E. (1996), Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Friedman, Michael (2001), Dynamics of Reason (Stanford: CSLI Publications). Heidelberger. Michael and Stadler, Friedrich (2003), Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Politik (Vienna and New York: Springer). Howard, Don (1994), “Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of Logical Empiricism,” in W. Salmon and G. Wolters (eds.), Language, Logic, and the Structure of Scientific Theories (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Konstanz: Universit¨at Konstanz), pp. 145–205. Howard, Don (2003), “Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of North American Philosophy of Science at Midcentury,” in G. L. Hardcastle and A. W. Richardson (eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 25–93. Lewis, C. I. (1929), Mind and the World Order (New York: Scribner). Neurath, Otto (1973), “Anti-Spengler,” in M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Otto Neurath: Empiricism and Sociology (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 158–213.
54
ALAN RICHARDSON
Neurath, Otto (1983), “Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Viennese Circle,” in R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath (eds.), Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers, 1913–1946 (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 48–51. Reichenbach, Hans (1938), Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Reichenbach, Hans (1951), The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press). Reichenbach, Hans (1965), Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press). Reichenbach, Hans (1978a), “The Free Student Idea: Its Unified Contents,” in M. Reichenbach and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings, 1909–1953 (Dordrecht: Reidel), vol. 1, pp. 108–123. Reichenbach, Hans (1978b), “The World View of the Exact Sciences,” in M. Reichenbach and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings, 1909–1953 (Dordrecht: Reidel), vol. 1, pp. 241–244. Reisch, George (2005), How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Richardson, Alan (2005), “‘The Tenacious, Malleable, Indefatigable, and Yet, Eternally Modifiable Will’: Hans Reichenbach’s Knowing Subject,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 78, pp. 73–87. Stadler, Friedrich (2001), The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism (Vienna and New York: Springer). Uebel, Thomas E. (2000), Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft: Otto Neurath und der erste Wiener Kreis (Vienna and New York: Springer). Uebel, Thomas E. (2004), “Carnap, the Left Vienna Circle, and Neopositivist Antimetaphysics,” in S. Awodey and C. Klein (eds.), Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: The Open Court), pp. 247–277. Uebel, Thomas E. (2005), “Epistemic Agency Naturalized: The Protocol of Testimony Acceptance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 78, pp. 89–105. Van Fraassen, Bas C. (2002), The Empirical Stance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
GREGOR SCHIEMANN
INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND DISCOVERY. ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification continues to be relevant all the way up to the present. This can be seen clearly in the tense relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. In the current debates about the relationships between these two disciplines one encounters arguments that Reichenbach used to defend this distinction, as well as arguments brought forth by his critics.1 Sometimes the discussions even refer directly to the influence of Reichenbach’s distinction (Giere 1999, pp. 11–18 and 217–230). Historically, this influence can be understood to have gone hand in hand with the significance of logical empiricism in the twentieth century for the development of philosophy of science and science studies, i.e., history, sociology and psychology of science. Reichenbach used the distinction in 1938 in his “Experience and Prediction”, which played a key role in the new beginning of logical empiricism in the US. Among the many motives that might have led Reichenbach to formulate this distinction, his intention to contribute to the foundation of the autonomy of a “scientific philosophy” presumably had central importance.2 In this context, its function was to clarify Reichenbach’s stance towards other philosophical trends, to prove the homogeneity of the methodology and content of philosophy of science, and to distance philosophy of science from rival disciplines. Reichenbach’s remarks suggest—and I shall return to this point—that “context of discovery” means above all a part of the research conducted in the natural sciences. One of the messages that Reichenbach wanted to communicate with his distinction was: the “scientific philosophy” of logical empiricism can provide a justification for the theories brought forth in the natural sciences, whereas the natural sciences themselves are not in a position to do so. Since the “historical turn” accompanying Thomas S. Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, the distinction of contexts has been increasingly influential in distinguishing among the philosophy of science and the disciplines of science studies— in particular to the relationship between the philosophy and the history of science. To put it simply, from the perspective of analytical philosophy of science—into which the tradition of logical empiricism passed over—the historical presentation of the natural sciences now stands alongside the natural sciences, which are themselves the province of the context of discovery. I do not want to go into the details of the debates about the justification of disciplinary boundaries and relationships between the history and the philosophy of science. Rather, I would like to assume that Reichenbach’s distinction lives on, and 23 J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification, 23–39. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
24
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
to seek arguments in his texts that would justify their relevance in this field. The persuasive force of these arguments transcends the contingent circumstances apart from which their genesis and local transmission cannot be made understandable. These arguments have not yet been sufficiently acknowledged in the expansive secondary literature dealing with the context distinction—which might not be a small matter, considering their current influence. My thesis is that, for Reichenbach, the context distinction unfolds its relevance for the formation of disciplines in relation to the theory of induction. This connection has until now only seldom been mentioned.3 This is all the more astounding considering that most of the few passages where Reichenbach employed the distinction subsequent to1935 make direct reference to induction (Reichenbach 1935a, pp. 172–173; Reichenbach 1938, pp. 6–7 and 381– 382; Reichenbach 1944, p. 80; Reichenbach 1947, p. 2; Reichenbach 1949a, pp. 433– 434; Reichenbach 1949b, pp. 291–293; Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). Since induction plays a key role for Reichenbach in the natural sciences as well in epistemology, he is confronted with the question of the autonomy of epistemology. How does the application of and the thinking about induction differ between epistemology and the natural sciences? Are the differences gradual or categorical in nature? Reichenbach’s conclusive answer goes back to the pragmatic justification of induction that he developed in 1933. This justification emphasizes the normative character of epistemology in contrast to the disciplines that study science in a more descriptive manner. I am not interested in attempting a new defence of this justification—which is still controversial today—but in highlighting its role in establishing a discipline’s specific claim to rationality.4 The plausible elements of this function come to light if one looks beyond Reichenbach’s exaggerated fixation on logical analysis. They provide positive points of reference that can be used today in understanding the relationship between the philosophy and the history of science. My presentation of the connection between the context distinction and induction takes into account only the version of the distinction—among the many in Reichenbach’s work (Schiemann 2003; Hoyningen-Huene, this volume)—that relates to its function of contributing to the distinction between the tasks and practices of epistemology and those of other disciplines—which is probably its historically relevant function.5 I can only mention here that this version—as well as the others—goes back to a traditional distinction between genesis and validity that reaches back to Kant (Schiemann 2003; Stadler 2002). I shall begin by characterizing the context distinction as employed by Reichenbach in “Experience and Prediction” to differentiate between epistemology and science (1). Following Thomas Nickles and Kevin T. Kelly, one can distinguish two meanings of the context distinction in Reichenbach’s work. One meaning, which is primarily to be found in the earlier writings, conceives of scientific discoveries as potential objects of epistemological justification. The other meaning, typical for the later writings, removes scientific discoveries from the possible domain of epistemology. The genesis of both meanings, which demonstrates the complexity of the relationships obtaining between epistemology and science, can be made understandable by appealing to the historical context (2). Both meanings present Reichenbach with the task
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
25
of establishing the autonomy of epistemology through the justification of induction. Finally, I shall expound this justification and address some of its elements of rationality characterizing philosophy of science (3). 1.
Since the connection between the context distinction and induction is already made clear in his presentation in section 1 of “Experience and Prediction”, and since Reichenbach provides here a relevant basis for subsequent reflections, I will go into some detail about this passage. Reichenbach speaks in section 1 of three tasks that are typical for epistemology in contrast to other disciplines: the “descriptive”, the “critical” and the “advisory” task. The Descriptive Task The descriptive task consists in the “rational reconstruction” of scientific “thought processes”. (By “science” Reichenbach means here and indeed for the most part natural science.) The concept of “rational reconstruction” is borrowed from Rudolf Carnap (Carnap 1928). It characterizes the normative task of epistemology: “to construct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur if they are to be ranged in a consistent system” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 5). Any logical connections missing between the “starting point and issue” of a real thought process are produced in such a way that the postulate of greatest possible correspondence is fulfilled (Reichenbach 1938, p. 5). This postulate has to presuppose that real scientific processes have something at least approximating a logical content. In order to characterize the relative difference between the reconstruction and its object, Reichenbach introduces his context distinction. He does justice to the relativity of this difference by defining rational reconstruction by analogy to scientific practice: “If a more convenient determination of this concept of rational reconstruction is wanted, we might say that it corresponds to the form in which thinking processes are communicated to other persons instead of the form in which they are subjectively performed. [. . . The] well-known difference between the thinker’s way of finding [. . . a] theorem and his way of presenting it before a public may illustrate the difference in question. I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of justification to mark this distinction. Then we have to say that epistemology is only occupied in constructing the context of justification. But even the way of presenting scientific theories is only an approximation to what we mean by the context of justification” (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 6–5—emphasis in original).
Thus, the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification is intended initially to mark a distinction within scientific practice. Scientific knowledge, according to Reichenbach, is often presented in a form different from that in which it was found. (Following Reichenbach, one could speak of an “inner-scientific” distinction of contexts.) The demarcation of the descriptive task of epistemology from science is a further step beyond this initial distinction. Epistemology differs from science in that its domain is limited to the context of justification, which exists to some extent also within science.
26
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
Reichenbach does not offer any reason why scientists could not in principle reconstruct their theories themselves. He notes only two factors that prevent scientific presentations from meeting the demands of logic. First, there are “the traces of subjective motivation from which [. . . the scientific expositions] started” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 7). Secondly, “scientific language, being destined like the language of daily life for practical purposes, contains so many abbreviations and silently tolerated inexactitudes” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 7). But these explanations raise more questions than they answer. Why should “subjective motives” and “practical goals” lead to non-logical elements in the presentation of theories? Can these factors also influence logic and epistemology? What stands in the way of eliminating non-logical elements in the sciences—given that they are present—to a degree that satisfies logicians?6 Critical Task Until the initially vague demarcation is sharpened, there can be no foundation of the autonomy of epistemology. This is achieved in part by reference to the following two tasks. In its critical task, epistemology is no longer bound to the postulate of greatest possible correspondence. Reichenbach assumes now that the logical content of scientific thinking is so defective that a rational reconstruction cannot achieve a logically consistent structure. The “analysis of science” must therefore replace reconstruction. We “replace actual thinking by such operations as are justifiable, that is, as can be demonstrated as valid” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 7).
But the analysis of science remains bound to the “starting point and issue” of real thought processes. Within this general condition the inductivist conception of science emerges, which Reichenbach was to develop further in the course of the book. This conception regards relations among data as the starting point and scientific theories—which reproduce and inductively generalize these relations by applying mathematical functions to them—as the issue of scientific thought processes. The goal of epistemology—as set out in chapter 5 of “Experience and Prediction”—is a formal demonstration of the validity of the inductive relations between data and theories. In pursuing this goal, the analysis of science can rely on structures that already exist—however incompletely formulated—in scientific presentations. Indeed, Reichenbach propounds the “thesis that all inferences occurring [in science] are of the inductive type” (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 370–371). The analysis of science endeavors to explicate the logical form of this inductive structure by resolving it into a structure of deductive relations, leaving the rule of induction as the only non-deductive relation (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 471). He understands the rule of induction—to choose one of his many formulations—as “the assumption that an event which occurred n times will occur at all following times” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 341). I should like merely to note at this stage that the justification of this rule would exceed the scope of an
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
27
epistemology characterized by the two tasks I have addresses thus far. As David Hume showed, the rule cannot be logically proven. Its justification—if at all possible – demands that one abandon the field of logical analysis, which is the third task of epistemology licenses. Advisory Task In performing its advisory task, epistemology meets science as an independent discipline with positive suggestions. This is necessary, as Reichenbach sees it, because the analysis of science may be an indispensable tool for making correct decisions between different modes of presentation and different directions in which science might be developed. With respect to different modes of presentation, Reichenbach only speaks of the choice between “equivalent conceptions” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 9), i.e., theories that he considers logically equivalent because they agree in all observable facts (Reichenbach 1938, p. 374; Reichenbach 1951, p. 180). One could mention at this point also the case of the non-equivalent theories Reichenbach discusses in chapter 5, which differ in their prognoses and therefore present a problem of making a choice too (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 375–376). Unfortunately, Reichenbach offers no precise characterization of these two types of relationship between theories. It remains unclear just how broadly he construes the concept of logical equivalence. Strictly speaking, logical equivalence is only derived from empirical equivalence when all theoretical concepts are defined by observational concepts (Friedman 1983, p. 280; Klein 2000, p. 85). In any case, it is clear that for Reichenbach only logical analysis can determine whether theories are equivalent or non-equivalent. In the case of equivalent theories, science can be relied upon to choose between them on the basis of mere expediency. As for non-equivalent theories, on the other hand, Reichenbach believes that his theory of induction provides the framework in which a decision can be made (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 375–379). Hence, epistemology could exercise an important influence in the presentation of scientific theories. Apparently Reichenbach does not take into account (at least not in the context of “Experience and Prediction”) the empirical underdetermination of scientific theories, as formulated by Pierre Duhem. Underdetermined theories may have the property of being logically incompatible and thus elude the competency of an analysis of science. If Reichenbach had taken this property into consideration, he could only have maintained the role of epistemology in examining and choosing between theories by abandoning his limitation to logical analysis and—like Neurath, for example—admitting values as a philosophical topic.7 That this would not have been wholly out of the question is demonstrated by his ideas about “volitional bifurcations” which concern the direction in which science might be developed. Choices about the aims of research count as such bifurcations (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 10–11). Although Reichenbach does not mention it at this stage, justification of the rule of induction would also have to be included here, since it depends on the specific aim of predicting the future. Moreover, fundamental concepts
28
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
of a philosophy of science—i.e., causality and probability—can be traced back to volitional bifurcations (Reichenbach 1938, p. 11). Reichenbach does make the claim that the advisory task could be reduced to the critical task if epistemology is restricted to “constru[ing] a list of all possible decisions, each one accompanied by its entailed decisions [. . . and] leav[ing] the choice to our reader” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 14). But in the course of the book he does not justify his assertion that epistemology itself is free from volitional bifurcations. In subsequent chapters he makes decisions about the fundamental concepts of philosophy of science and logical presentation without displaying the alternatives neutrally to the reader.8 If one traces the relationship between epistemology and science step-by-step through the delineation of the three tasks, one arrives at a paradoxical conclusion. On the one hand, the distance between the two disciplines increases successively from the initial postulate of maximal correspondence to the merely formal relationship of inductive structure, and finally to the stage at which epistemology fulfils its advisory task as an independent discipline. But there is also a sense in which the distinction between the two disciplines becomes increasingly problematic. When Reichenbach asserts that the formal structure of scientific reasoning is essentially inductive and knowledge thereof is decisive in examining and choosing theories, the question presents itself to the reader: why should science have to yield the task of analyzing this structure to another discipline at all? Epistemology, in Reichenbach’s view, differs from science in that it is limited to the context of justification and focuses on its logical presentation. But the inductive structure of logical presentation refers to the question of discovery. Reichenbach conceives of “the aim of induction” as finding “the laws of nature in their most general form, including both statistical and so-called causal laws” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 350). If real processes of discovery until now have not followed the inductive method, could epistemology develop an alternative logic of discovery? Reichenbach seems however to suspect that there are also rational elements already in real processes of discovery. In his critique of Karl Poppers’s “Logik der Forschung” in 1935, he states that “the process of constructing scientific hypotheses ought to be rationalized” (Reichenbach 1935b, p. 281). Can the thought processes involved in discovery be at least partially grasped through inductive logic? These questions show that the theory of induction plays a decisive role in the characterization of the context distinction as a criterion for distinguishing the two disciplines. 2.
Reichenbach gives no clear answer to these questions. In fact, his views on the context distinction were subject to vacillations over the years that cannot neatly be assigned to specific time periods. One can however tentatively distinguish two phases in which he emphasizes different aspects of its meaning (Nickles 1990, p. 158; Kelly 1991, pp. 137–139). In an early phase he places weight on the rationalization of processes of discovery as a matter for epistemology, whereas in a later phase he is inclined to
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
29
doubt that this rationalization is possible and eliminates it from the epistemological context of justification. The Early Phase: Rationalizing Discovery The last two paragraphs of “Experience and Prediction” belong to the early phase. Here the distinction of contexts does not prevent scientific discoveries from following the inductive method too. “If we were to analyze the discoveries of [. . . scientists], we would find that their way of proceeding corresponds in a surprisingly high degree to the rules of the principle of induction [. . . ]. The mysticism of scientific discovery is nothing but a superstructure of images and wishes; the supporting structure below is determined by the inductive principle. [ . . . It] seems to be a psychological law that discoveries need a kind of mythology [, . . . ] that sometimes those men will be best in making inductions who believe they posses other guides” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 403) (Reichenbach uses the term “principle of induction” here and elsewhere synonymously with “rule of induction”.)
The context distinction assumes the shape of a distinction formulated in Marxist terminology between super- and supporting structure.9 The inductive supporting structure is susceptible of justification, whereas the mythology of the superstructure—i.e., “instinctive presentiments” and “belief in a mystic harmony between nature and reason” (Reichenbach 1938, pp. 403–404), but also “belief in induction, belief in a uniformity of the world” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 403)—is not. These notions, which for whatever inexplicable reasons are necessary for the application of induction in the sciences, could only be left to psychology to investigate. Within the framework provided by this conception, the history of science—which Reichenbach does not address—would deal with the superstructure as well as the supporting structure (cf. Salmon 1970). As much as these and other formulations in the last two paragraphs of “Experience and Prediction” seem to place Reichenbach in proximity to a “logic of discovery” (Nickles 1980; Curd 1980; Laudan 1980), a close reading reveals that he does not go beyond general statements like those in the passage quoted above. In none of the examples he mentions does he claim that natural scientists “find” theories by applying an inductive method.10 It always remains an open question how the scientists arrive at their theories. It may be that they are guided by inductive considerations, but as for this question, Reichenbach says merely: “we do not maintain anything” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 382). He does not question the distinction between supporting structure and superstructure. At the same time, it stands firm in “Experience and Prediction” that theory generation in the sciences may in principle proceed inductively, and that the context of discovery belongs among the possible objects of an analysis of science.11 Against this background, Reichenbach must have been uncertain whether it might have been better to advise scientists to employ the inductive method in their pursuit of discovery instead of abandoning themselves to mythology. His ambivalent stance is reflected in the rhetoric with which he invests the distinction of contexts in the penultimate paragraph. On the one hand, he disparages scientists by suggesting that they
30
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
misunderstand the nature of their own method and are trapped in the false consciousness of the superstructure.12 On the other hand, he himself yields to mythology by invoking the unfathomable genius who is not guided by logic but “follows other ways” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 382). Directly after establishing that the principle of induction “is the only rule the physicist has at hand” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 380), Reichenbach broaches the subject of the context distinction. The distinction posits a gap precisely at the point where epistemology and science are at their closest to each other. If induction is the decisive methodological principle not only in justification but also in discovery, then the innerscientific validity of the context distinction—and along with it its function as a criterion for distinguishing between science and epistemology—is relativized significantly. Within this framework the context distinction takes on an arbitrary—and indeed dogmatic—character.13 That this dogmatic character does not exhaustively mark the distinction is clear in view of the fact that Reichenbach still has two options for justifying the distinction. First, the nature of the non-rational factors in the sciences remains unexplained (i.e., the influence of the “subjective motivations”, “practical purposes” and the mythological superstructure). If these factors unavoidably exist and hinder scientists from taking over the logical analysis of their own discoveries and justifications, the independence of epistemological analysis of science would be justified. But if this cannot be established—and Reichenbach does not establish it—then epistemology would nevertheless retain one last task, which is in fact central in Reichenbach’s book although he does not mention it as such: namely, the justification of the inductive procedure in the sciences. This task is not only beyond the scope of a logical analysis but also inaccessible to empirical science (see part 3 below). The Later Phase: Discoveries Do Not Belong to the Context of Justification By 1949—when the English edition of the “Theory of Probability” appeared—the later phase had already begun. Here—after emphasizing the significance of induction for the empirical sciences again—Reichenbach sets epistemology in sharp opposition to the context of discovery. He states clearly: “I simply refuse the challenge of developing rules for a logic of discovery. Such rules do not exist. The logic of induction has to do with the critical process of checking over solutions that already exist” (Reichenbach 1994, pp. 439–448).14
Hence, the logical distinction gives way to a temporal one, according to which the epistemological reconstruction of a new theory cannot begin until scientists have formulated the theory.15 This qualification need not have any effect upon the conception of the inner-scientific relationship between discovery and justification. True, Reichenbach now stresses that discoveries can “only be analyzed with psychological, not with logical means” (Reichenbach 1951, p. 231; Reichenbach 1994, p. 439). But he still believes for example that the “logical schema of the theory of relativity corresponds surprisingly with the program which controlled its discovery” (Reichenbach
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
31
1949b, p. 293). Though the relationship between discovery and justification in the sciences may be complex, the tasks of epistemology remain henceforth limited to the context of justification. Epistemology has no pretensions about reconstructing the context of discovery.
The Historical Context of the Discussion of Induction Although I do not want to over-emphasize the vacillations in Reichenbach’s conception of the context distinction, I would like to have a closer look at its historical context— including its establishment through the justification of induction. The vacillations can be attributed to uncertainties that are understandable in light of the considerable difficulties faced by the logical empiricists as they re-settled to the US in the 1930s. According to Ronald N. Giere, philosophy in German in the opening decades of the twentieth century was shaped by a “Kantian framework”, whereas the “philosophical climate” of the US was dominated by the traditions of Empiricism and Pragmatism (Giere 1999, p. 225). Giere invokes this difference to explain the fact that probability and induction, which had “not played a significant role” for the logical empiricists before their relocation, became “major topics in the philosophy of science.” Indeed, although Reichenbach had occupied himself as early as 1916—in his dissertation— with the theory of probability, it was not until he left Berlin that he began actively publishing work on the induction problem.16 From that point on, induction was to remain in the foreground—not only in “Experience and Prediction” but also in the English edition of the “Theory of Probability.” In the US, induction was an ideal area for Reichenbach to establish himself with a contribution.17 With his justification of the rule of induction, he succeeded. He himself believed that he had no less than “finally arrived at a solution to the induction problem”, which had stood “as the unsolved riddle before all empiricist philosophy since the time of Hume” (Letter of June 3, 1935 to Ernst von Aster, quoted in Kamlah 1994, p. 533). In “Experience and Prediction” and in the English edition of the “Theory of Probability”, the justification of the rule of induction assumes central importance. Reichenbach intended to show with the context distinction that the logical analysis of induction and the justification of induction he had proposed are among the tasks that belong exclusively within the province of epistemology. At the same time, only after justifying the rule of induction could Reichenbach demonstrate that logical analysis avails itself exclusively of justified laws and thereby establish the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification. Justification of the laws of deduction is unproblematic, since they “always lead to true sentences if the premises are true. [. . . But for] the rule of induction such a proof is not possible” (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 471). In the absence of a justification of the rule of induction, there can be no response to the Humean argument that one assumes the validity of induction out of habit. Induction would belong alongside the non-rational elements of discovery among the objects that can only be analyzed by psychology. Thus neither the earlier
32
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
interpretation of the context distinction nor the later one can be maintained without a justification of the rule of induction. 3.
In order to distinguish Reichenbach’s justification of the rule of induction from a “validation”, Herbert Feigl characterized it as a “vindication”. Rules are validated when they are derived from a fundamental principle. When this is impossible—as in the case of the rule of induction—their use can be vindicated by defending its appropriateness for a given purpose (Feigl 1950). I would like to add that a rule which has been justified in this manner can be regarded as rational in an instrumental sense, since the appropriateness of its application is established only as a means to a given goal. A more broadly construed concept of rationality could surely encompass the well-founded choice of goals. But this would not accurately represent Reichenbach’s procedure, since he gives no reasons for his choice of the aim of the scientific method, namely “of predicting the future” (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 474, or Reichenbach 1938, pp. 349–350). Moreover, he does not address alternatives to this resolution—like Goethe’s decision to limit his scientific research to the description of nature, or the atomistic program of explaining nature, to mention just two of the historically most significant examples—although such a discussion would be possible within the framework of the advisory task of epistemology (see part 2 above). The decision in favor of prognosis determines Reichenbach’s formulation of the rule of induction, i.e., “that an event which occurred n times will occur at all following times” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 341; see above). He believes that a defense of induction can only succeed within the framework of his theory of probability. The core of his argumentation can however be understood independently of the specific probabilistic interpretation with which he invests it. It corresponds to the structure of Blaise Pascal’s famous wager, according to which one must decide in favor of belief in the existence of God, since this is the only way one might—if God indeed exists—attain truth and salvation.18 Like Pascal, Reichenbach assumes two possible states of the world and two possible courses of action. For Reichenbach, the world can be either uniform or non-uniform. Insofar as he does not think it possible to know the actual state of the world, he shares Hume’s scepticism. The possible courses of action—given independently of the state of the world—can be divided disjunctively into the inductive and the non-inductive. This scheme yields four possible states: 1. The application of the inductive method leads in the long run to certain success in the uniform world. 2. In the non-uniform world its successes are merely coincidental, thus its success is on the whole uncertain. 3. Uncertainty of prognostic success is also characteristic of the state of the nonuniform world when the inductive method is not employed, i.e., when either no methodology or non-inductive methods such as clairvoyance are used.
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
33
4. But it in fact makes a difference in the uniform world which of these non-inductive variants one chooses. Only the absence of any methodology at all would in general be unsuccessful. The possible success of a non-inductive method, however, could only be assessed in comparison to the results of the inductive method. There can be no guarantee of prognostic success in the uniform world when induction is not employed.19 Given Reichenbach’s suppositions, induction is the surest procedure for attaining successful prognoses—when success is possible. The first state is the only rational one. The vindication has a pragmatic character, since—and herein lies another resemblance to Pascal’s wager—it does not defend belief in the success of actions but the rationality of a procedure for choosing actions.20 “Actions directed by the rule of induction are legitimate attempts at success; no form of belief is required for the proof ” (Reichenbach 1949a, p. 481). Hence, belief in the success of induction is just as mythical in nature as belief in the success of non-inductive procedures in the sciences. The validity of Reichenbach’s vindication remains controversial.21 As I have already stated, I do not want to enter into a discussion of the criticism. Rather, I would like simply to concede the argument—with one qualification—in order to show how a claim to rationality can be utilized in establishing the autonomy of a discipline. The qualification concerns Reichenbach’s exclusive identification of the goal of science with prognosis. Although one may concede the plausibility of his argument that the choice of induction in pursuance of this goal is rational, one ought not forget that other goals might be incompatible with induction and other means necessary to achieve them. To stick with the aforementioned examples, Goethe’s research of nature led him to a critique of induction, and the atomistic program of explaining nature led to the assumption of non-inductive hypotheses. I would like to emphasize three of the things that can be learned from Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction and its relation to the context distinction. First, Reichenbach is right to emphasize the tremendous significance of induction in the natural sciences. Since the Aristotelian beginnings of science and of theoretical reflection about the methods of science, induction has played a key role in both areas. The inductive procedure is among the methods of contemporary science the application of which transcend epochal and disciplinary boundaries. The focus on such non-local structural patterns in the development of science is more characteristic of the philosophy of science than of the history of science (Radder 1996). Induction being among these structural patterns (others would be mathematization and technization), the context of justification being the name of an appropriate domain for theoretical reflection about these patterns, and the context of discovery being the name of an appropriate domain for the presentation of their historical reality, one may say that the context distinction reflects a plausible relation between philosophy and history of science. Secondly, the discussion of induction is not only thematically, but also methodologically, exemplary of specific characteristics of philosophy of science. This is made
34
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
clear by the argumentative character of the vindication of induction, upon which Reichenbach bases epistemology’s claim to justification. According to Reichenbach “the justification of a theory in terms of observational data is the subject of the theory of induction,” which—apart from the rule of induction—avails itself exclusively of deductive laws (Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). This claim of justification holds for every application of the theory of induction, whether it be with approximately logical content as in the sciences, or with exclusively logical form as in Reichenbach’s epistemology. But the vindication—in contrast to its object, namely induction—is categorically distinct from the scientific justification, since it proceeds not empirically but argumentatively. Thus the vindication of induction establishes the autonomy of epistemology even if an epistemological analysis of science cannot be distinguished sharply from the inductive procedure of the sciences, as in the earlier of the aforementioned phases of the context distinction. Argumentative justifications are typical of philosophy and still constitute a criterion for distinguishing philosophy from science studies. Thirdly, in addition to distinguishing philosophy form other disciplines, the vindication yields an inner-philosophical distinction as well. Its object differs for example from all non-inductive procedures, such as Popper’s deductive falsificationism. Its pragmatic character distinguishes it from Carnap’s attempt to meet Hume’s challenge with a new concept of theoretical rationality (Schramm 1993, pp. 548–553). 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I set out to look for arguments to account for the relevance of Reichenbach’s distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification upon the establishment of the autonomy of philosophy of science (which he calls epistemology). The autonomy of this discipline is problematic for Reichenbach because of its close relationship to the practice and theory of science. Justification is conceived of in his writings as essentially inductive and as a topic for the sciences and epistemology. The epistemological justification differs from the scientific one only in that it is limited to logical form. It remains unclear why the sciences should not also be competent to carry out a purely logical analysis of their inductive methods of inference. According to Reichenbach, it is more typical for the sciences than for epistemology to aim for discoveries. In his writings it remains an open question to what extent the processes of scientific discovery are inductive and hence a potential object of inquiry within the context of (scientific or epistemological) justification. In part, he seems not to want to exclude the possibility of future processes of discovery employing a strictly inductive logic, which would then dissolve the context distinction. But as for discoveries made up to the present, he assumes for the most part that they arise from circumstances as yet not uniformly characterized. Induction, on the other hand, is for Reichenbach a method generally characteristic of the sciences and of the justification of theories. In Reichenbach’s view, epistemology stands in danger of being dissolved into the sciences. But his context distinction is no merely verbal, last-ditch attempt at distinguishing epistemology. Reichenbach characterizes epistemology by appealing to
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
35
the fact that it thematizes general characteristics of science. Although philosophy of science has long since stopped limiting itself to the logical analysis of scientific methods, this is still an aspect—alongside its focus on contemporary problems— which distinguishes it from most research in the history of science. Reichenbach’s justification of induction demonstrates paradigmatically how philosophy employs its own method—essentially argumentative in nature—outside the domain in which it seeks to justify the knowledge produced in other disciplines. This vindication belongs alongside Pascal’s wager in the tradition of pragmatic arguments. Analyzing it reveals that Reichenbach’s one-sided focus on the prognostic goals of science and on the inductive method does not entail the exclusion of discoveries from the context of justification. Rather, it impugns the claim to validity of non-inductive procedures taken to be pre-requisites to the formulation of theories. If one drops the claim to exclusivity with which Reichenbach invests his vindication, one can learn from his procedure that the foundation of the autonomy of a discipline can emerge from a justification that ascribes rationality to the methods of that discipline. Reichenbach was right in viewing methodological rationality as dependant upon the goals attributed to a given domain of research, yet he overlooked the plurality of such goals. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to the participants of the Workshops “Revisiting Discovery and Justification” at the Max-Planck-Institut f¨ur Wissenschaftsgeschichte for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Professor Kamlah for his stimulating suggestions, and to John Michael for his translation. NOTES 1. The literature concerning the debate between philosophy and history of science is extensive. For an overview see Laudan 1990; Hull et al. (eds.), 1992; Nickles 1995. For more recent publications, see for example Radder 1997; Pinnick and Gale 2000; Burian and Steinle 2002. 2. Reichenbach’s motivations in formulating the context distinction are discussed in Zittlau 1981, 44; Nickles 2002; Stadler 2002; Howard 2004; Howard, this volume. 3. Concerning the reception of the context distinction generally, i.e. insofar as it cannot be attributed exclusively to Reichenbach, see Hoyningen-Huene 1987; for the reception of Reichenbach’s version of it Schiemann 2003, p. 237. In connection with the treatment of Reichenbach’s theory of induction, there is some discussion of the context distinction in Salmon 1991; Kelly 1991. As for Reichenbach’s theory of induction, see also Clendinnen 1979; Schramm 1993. 4. Concerning the debate about Reichenbach’s justification of the theory of induction, see Clendinnen 1979; Schramm 1993; Kamlah 1994, 545–549; Gerner 1997, 165 et seq. More recently Piller 1987; Schurz 1988. 5. This version corresponds most nearly to the fourth version characterized by Hoyningen-Huene (this volume), although Reichenbach counts the natural sciences among those empirical disciplines from which epistemology is distinct. 6. In another passage, Reichenbach explains “the division of labour between the physicist and the philosopher” by referring to the “limitation of human capacities”: “It appears to be practically impossible that the man who is looking for new physical laws should also concentrate on the
36
7. 8. 9. 10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15. 16.
17.
18.
19. 20.
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL analysis of his method”. Moreover, there is a difference in the mentalities of the two groups of people: “The discovery of general relations [. . . ] requires a mentality different from that of the philosopher, whose methods are analytic and critical rather than predictive” (Reichenbach 1949b, p. 292). Cf. Howard’s and Richardson’s discussions in this volume. The definition of probability based on frequency is, for example, by no means the only alternative; and the reduction of causality to inductive relations of probability is also controversial. Maria Reichenbach and Hermann Vetter translate “super- and supporting structure” with “Unter¨ und Uberbau” (Reichenbach 1983, p. 253). Referring to Galileo he constrains himself to the formulation “he found that the quantities measured fit into the formula s = gt2 /2, and inferred, by means of the inductive principle, that the same law holds for similar cases” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 371). Of Darwin he only writes: when “Darwin formulated [his] theory, it was based on facts” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 390). And as for Einstein, he remarks merely that he “saw—as his predecessors had not seen—that the known facts indicate such a theory; i.e., that an inductive expansion of known facts leads to the new theory” (Reichenbach 1938, p. 382). Reichenbach does not consistently assert the rationalizability of discoveries throughout his early writings: “the procedure of discovery is however hardly rationalizable” (Reichenbach 1935a, p. 172). On other occasions Reichenbach states more explicitly that he does not even believe scientists who claim to have arrived at their theories by non-inductive means: (Reichenbach 1935b, pp. 281–282). Some interpreters claim that Reichenbach does not justify the distinction in “Experience and Prediction” (Giere 1999, p. 228; Kelly 1991, pp. 137–140). Since later discussions of the distinction do not repeat the justification, Kelly speaks of a “dogma” (Kelly 1991, p. 139). This characterization is inaccurate, though, considering that Reichenbach attempted to justify the distinction not only directly upon introducing it but also in the context of his work. In Reichenbach 1949b, the “challenge of developing rules for a logic of discovery” is not sharply distinguished from logical analysis: the “philosopher of science is not much interested in the thought processes which lead to scientific discoveries” (Reichenbach 1949b, p. 292). This meaning matches up with Hoyningen-Huene’s Version 1 (this volume). He made the first announcement of his “illumination of the induction problem” in a letter to Moritz Schlick dated February 22, 1933 (Kamlah 1994, p. 546). There is an anecdote that Reichenbach proclaimed as the Nazis closed the Berlin University: “Now I understand the induction problem” (Giere 1999, p. 226). Giere 1996 assumes that Reichenbach applies the context distinction in order to establish induction as a topic for Logical Empiricism. However, Howard 2004b, p. 23, points out that the context distinction received critically among American Pragmatists. Pascal 1984, Fragm. 233. On the structure of Pascal’s wager, cf. Hacking 1975, pp. 63–72; Jordan 1994. On the similarity between Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification and Pascal’s wager see Creed 1939; Salmon 1991; Gerner 1997; Schramm 1999; Kamlah 1977, p. 479 draws attention to a difference. Reichenbach 1933; Hertz 1936; Reichenbach 1936; Reichenbach 1949a, pp. 469–482; Reichenbach 1938, pp. 348–357; Salmon 1991, p. 100; see also literature of Footnote 4. In 1939, Reichenbach referred explicitly to the close systematic relationship between the pragmatic character of his justification of induction and the work of American pragmatists Dewey and Peirce on the induction problem (Reichenbach 1939, pp. 187–190). It cannot be ruled out that he may have been chosen to work on the issue of induction, and also proposed a pragmatic justification of the rule of induction, with a mind to improving his chances for a professorship in the US. In doing so, Reichenbach distanced himself from the typically Kantian transcendental justification, which he himself developed in his dissertation on the related problem of probability. The pragmatic and the transcendental justifications share only the general demand for “a necessary
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
37
condition” of knowledge in common (Reichenbach 1936. cf. Kamlah 1977, pp. 476–480; Kamlah 1989, pp. 443–447; Richardson, this volume). 21. Cf. Footnote 4.
REFERENCES Carnap, R. (1928), Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Weltkreis). Clendinnen, J. F. (1979), “Inference, Practice and Theory”, in Salmon (ed.), pp. 85–128. Creed, I. P. (1940), “The Justification of the Habit of Induction” The Journal of Philosophy 37: 85–97. Curd, M. (1980), “The Logic of Discovery: An Analysis of Three Approaches”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific discovery, Logic and Rationality (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 201–219. Feigl, H. (1950), “De Principiis Non Disputandum . . . ?”, in M. Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis (Ithaca), pp. 119–56. Friedman, M. (1983), Foundation of Space-Time Theories (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Gerner, K. (1997), Hans Reichenbach—sein Leben und Wirken, eine wissenschaftliche Biographie (Osnabr¨uck: Phoebe-Autorenpress). Giere, R. N. (1999), Science without Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Hacking, I. (1968), “One Problem about Induction”, in L. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductic Logic (Amsterdam : North-Holland Publishing Company), pp. 44–59. Hacking, I. (1975), The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Haller, R. und F. Stadler (eds.), (1993), Wien–Berlin–Prag: Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Zentenarien Rudolf Carnap—Hans Reichenbach—Edgar Zilsel (Wien: H¨older-PichlerTempsky). Hertz, P. (1936), “Kritische Bemerkungen zu Reichenbachs Behandlung des Humeschen Problems”, Erkenntnis 6: 25–31 Howard, D. (2004), “Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of North American Philosophy of Science at Mid-Century”, manuscript. Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1987), “Context of Discovery and Context of Justification”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18: 501–515. Hull, D. et al. (eds.), (1992), “Symposium: What has the History of Science to say to the Philosophy of Science?”, in D. Hull et al. (eds.), (1992): Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 467–496. Jordan, J. (ed.) (1994), Gambling on God. Essays on Pascal’s Wager (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). Kamlah, A. (1977), “Erl¨auterungen, Bemerkungen und Verweise zum Vortrag ‘Rationalismus und Empirismus’ und zum Buch ‘Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie”’, in Reichenbach 1971– 1999 Vol. 1, pp. 466–480. Kamlah, A. (1985), “The Neokantian Origin of Hans Reichenbach’s Principle of Induction”, in N. Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism (Lanham: University Press of America). Kamlah, A. (1989), “Erl¨auterungen, Bemerkungen und Verweise zu den Schriften dieses Bandes”, in Reichenbach 1971–1999 Vol. 5, pp. 371–454. Kamlah, A. (1994), “Erl¨auterungen zu: H. Reichenbach, Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre”, in Reichenbach 1971–1999 Vol. 7, pp. 519–549. Kamlah, A. (1998), “Hans Reichenbach”, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London/New York: Routledge). Kelly, K. T. (1991), “Reichenbach, Induction, and Discovery”, Erkenntnis 35: 123–149. Klein, C. (2000), Konventionalismus und Realismus. Zur Erkenntnistheoretischen Relevanz der empirischen Unterbestimmtheit von Theorien (Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag). Laudan, L. (1980), “Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?”, in Nickles (ed.), pp. 173–183. Laudan, L. (1990), “The History of Science and the Philosophy of Science”, in R. Olby (ed.), Companion to the History of Science (London/New York: Routledge), pp. 47–59.
38
GREGOR SCHIEMANN AND WUPPERTAL
Nickles, T. (1980), “Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the Future of Philosophy of Science”, in Nickles (ed.), pp. 1–59. Nickles, T. (1990), “Discovery”, in R. Olby (ed.), Companion to the History of Science (London New York: Routledge), pp. 148–165. Nickles, T. (1995), “Philosophy of Science and History of Science”, in Osiris: A Research Journal Devoted to the History of Science and its Cultural Influences Vol. 10, pp. 139–163. Nickles, T. (2002), “The Discovery-Justification-Distinction and Professional Philosopy of Science”, in Schickore and Steinle (eds.), pp. 67–78. ¨ hg. und eingel. von E. Wasmuth (Stuttgart: Reclam). Pascal, B. (1984), Gedanken. Ub., Piller, C. (1987), “Das Vindizierungsargument—seine Wichtigkeit, seine Wirksamkeit seine Widerlegung”, Grazer Philosophische Schriften 29: 35–58. Pinnick, C., and G. Gale (2000), “Philosophy of Science and History of Sciene: A troubling Interaction”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31: 109–125. Radder, H. (1996), In and About the World. Philosophical Studies of Science and Technology (New York: State University of New York Press). Radder, H. (1997), “Philosophy and History of Science: Beyond the Kuhnian Paradigm”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28: 633–655. Reichenbach, H. (1929), “Ziele und Wege der physikalischen Erkenntnis”, in H. Geiger und K. Scheel (eds.), Handbuch der Physik. Vol. 4. (Berlin: Springer). Reichenbach, H. (1933), “Die logischen Grundlagen des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffes”, Erkenntnis 3: 401–425. Reichenbach, H. (1935a), “Zur Induktionsmaschine”, Erkenntnis 5: 172–173. ¨ Reichenbach, H. (1935b), “Uber Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Bemerkungen zu Karl Poppers ‘Logik der Forschung”’, Erkenntnis 5: 267–284. Reichenbach, H. (1935c), Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij). Reichenbach, H. (1936), “Warum ist die Anwendung der Induktionsregel f¨ur uns notwendige Bedingung von Voraussagen?”, Erkenntnis 6: 32–40. Reichenbach, H. (1938), Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundation and Structure of Knowledge (Chicago/Illinois: University of Chicago Press). Reichenbach, H. (1939), “Dewey’s Theory of Science”, in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey (Evanston: North Western University). Reichenbach, H. (1944), “Philosophische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik”, in Reichenbach 1971– 1999 Vol. 5. Reichenbach, H. (1947), “Grundz¨uge der symbolischen Logik”, in Reichenbach 1971–1999 Vol. 6. Reichenbach, H. (1949a), The Theory of Probability. An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundation of the Calculus of Probability (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press). Reichenbach, H. (1949b), “The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher—Scientist (Evanston: The Library of Living Philosophers, pp. 287–311). Reichenbach, H. (1951), The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley etc.: University of California Press). Reichenbach, H. (1968), Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie (Braunschweig: Vieweg). Reichenbach, H. (1971–1999), Gesammelte Werke in 9 B¨anden (Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg). Reichenbach, H. (1983), Erfahrung und Prognose. Eine Analyse der Grundlagen und der Struktur der Erkenntnis, in Reichenbach 1971–1999 Vol. 4. Reichenbach, H. (1994), “Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre”. 2. Auflage auf Grundlage der erweiterten amerikanischen Ausgabe bearbeitet und herausgegeben von G. Link. Mit Erl¨auterungen von A. Kamlah, in Reichenbach 1971–1999 Vol. 7. Salmon, W. C. (1968), “The Justification of Inductive Rules of Inference”, in L. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductic Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company), pp. 24–43. Salmon, W. C. (1970), “Baye’s Theorem and the History of Science”, in H. Stuewer (ed.) Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press). pp. 68–86. Salmon, W. C. (1991), “Hans Reichenbach’s Vindication of Induction”, Erkenntnis 35: 99–122.
DISCOVERY ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION
39
Salmon, W. C. (ed.), (1979), Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist (Dordrecht etc.: Reidel). Schickore, J. and F. Steinle (eds.), (2002), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Preprint 211. MaxPlanck-Institut f¨ur Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Berlin). Schiemann, G. (2003), “Criticizing a difference of contexts. On Reichenbach’s Distinction between “Context of Discovery” and “Context of Justification””, in F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives (Dordrecht), pp. 237–252. Schramm, A. (1993), “Zwei Theorien der Induktion—Reichenbach und Carnap”, in Haller und Stadler (eds.), pp. 538–554. Schurz, G. (1988), “Das Vindizierungsargument funktioniert doch: Eine Erwiderung auf Christian Piller”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 32: 187–195. Stadler, F. (2002), “Challenging the Dogma of the Ahistorical Philosophy of Science: The Case of Relativism”, in Schickore and Steinle (eds.), pp. 27–40. Steinle, F., and R. M. Burian (2002), “Introduction: History of Science and Philosophy of Science”, Perspectives and Science 10: 391–397. Zittlau, D. (1981), Die Philosophie von Hans Reichenbach (M¨unchen: Minerva-Publikation).
JUTTA SCHICKORE
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION. WILLIAM WHEWELL’S GERMANO-CANTABRIGIAN HISTORY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS
INTRODUCTION
William Whewell’s philosophical work has often been considered as a “forerunner” to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and sometimes Whewell is presented as an “early advocate” of that distinction (Losee 1979; Laudan 1980; Hoyningen-Huene 1987; Schaffer 1994; Yeo 1993). In contrast to other nineteenth-century “forerunners”, notably Duhem and the anti-psychologists (see Sch¨afer and Peckhaus, this volume), Whewell does not owe this dubious honor to the advocates of early twentieth-century Logical Empiricism. Rather, he was made a forerunner by those philosophers who have been concerned with hypothetico-deductivist approaches to science. Larry Laudan, for example, has claimed Whewell for his study of the emergence of epistemological fallibilism. According to Laudan, the link between the logic of discovery and the justification of theories was abandoned in the early nineteenth century, and it was then, that criteria for justification were found to be independent of the generation of theories. Whewell appears as one of the central figures in this development, because he held that “(1) theories can be appraised (“verified”) independently of the circumstances of their generation, and (2) such modes of appraisal, even if fallible, are more germane to the process of justification than any fallible rules of discovery would be” (Laudan 1980, p. 181). In the following, I examine to what extent Whewell can be claimed as a forerunner for the context distinction. I proceed in two steps. In the first section of my essay, I revisit the recent debates about Whewell’s alleged hypothetico-deductivism. I argue that Whewell’s position is in agreement only with a very specific aspect of the context distinction—the separation of the initial moment of generation and the process of validation—but certainly not with the additional division between scholarly disciplines that is commonly derived from that distinction. In the second section of the paper, I show that the reconstruction of Whewell’s philosophical program from the perspective of hypothetico-deductivist philosophy produces a distorted image of his project. Actually, Whewell advocated a hermeneutic and critical approach to knowledge, which centered on the history of the “fundamental ideas” of science. If we approach Whewell from this new angle, we can extract from his writings a number of inspiring contributions to a historically informed philosophy.
57 J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification, 57–77. C 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
58
JUTTA SCHICKORE
The Orthodox Context Distinction Those contributions to this volume that are concerned with Reichenbach’s version of the context distinction show that Reichenbach’s approach is, in fact, quite different— and considerably more sophisticated—than the formulations of the distinction that one encounters in philosophy textbooks (see Richardson and Schiemann, this volume). Much closer to the textbook versions comes Herbert Feigl’s rendering of the distinction, which is included in a paper tellingly titled The Orthodox View of Theories. This paper, published in 1970, defends the main claims of Logical Empiricism. Feigl acknowledges the numerous different renderings of the distinction. However, he maintains that if not the wording, then at least the intent of the distinction is “quite clear: It is one thing to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, the social-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories; and it is quite another thing to provide a logical reconstruction of the conceptual structures and of the testing of scientific theories” (Feigl 1970, p. 4). The point of Feigl’s distinction is to separate the scientists’ actual reasoning from logical reconstruction and the theory’s origin, its development and acceptance from its conceptual structure and testing. Feigl’s distinction thus comes closest to version 3 in Hoyningen-Huene’s classification (Hoyningen-Huene, this volume) As it is common among advocates of Logical Empiricism, the distinction is then combined with a distinction between scholarly disciplines (version 4 in Hoyningen-Huene’s classification). Through the separation of the two contexts, the scope of the logical reconstruction is delineated. It is only the end product, the established theory, and its relation to the facts that are considered in the reconstruction. It will be convenient to call Feigl’s version of the distinction the “orthodox” one. It is a good starting point for a discussion about potential “forerunners” because it was this type of distinction rather than the much richer and more ambiguous version proposed by Reichenbach that has been in the center of the debates in philosophy of science. This distinction, and the image of philosophy that is implied by it, has shaped our understanding of the tasks of philosophical analysis of science ever since. The principal task of philosophy of science is the reconstruction and evaluation of given theories, evidence, and the relations between the two. From the perspective of historically inclined philosophers, one of the particularly dire consequences of the orthodox distinction is that it has been instrumental in separating history and philosophy of science. The distinction implies, first, that no aspect relevant to the development of a specific theory bears on the assessment of its final state. The testing of the product alone determines its merits. Secondly, the distinction implies that the rules that govern the logical reconstruction and testing cannot be derived from (past) science. Ronald Giere made this point explicit: “If one grants that epistemology is normative, it follows that one cannot get an epistemology out of the history of science—unless one provides a philosophical account which explains how norms are based on facts” (Giere 1973, p. 290). In other words, the distinction would only be undermined if the philosopher could show just how the study of the actual acceptance of theories contributes to the normative criteria for reconstruction. An impossible task (says Giere). There can be no epistemologically significant role for history, and hence, no
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
59
intimate relationship between history and philosophy of science. The best the two can get is a marriage of convenience, a more or less peaceful coexistence within the walls of a few HPS departments. One may wish to object that even fervent anti-historians like Norwood R. Hanson allowed for a more intimate relationship. Even though Hanson was convinced that “the logical relevance of history of science to philosophy of science is nil” (Hanson 1962, p. 585), he conceded that history does have a bearing on philosophy: “[T]he risk of inferring that there is thus no connection at all between the two is the risk that philosophers of science may not know what they are talking about, a verdict none of us can accept silently” (Hanson 1962, p. 586). In other words, Hanson suggested that history of science delimit the scope of philosophy of science. Only very few philosophers would want to dispute Hanson’s contention, especially if history is construed broadly, so as to include present science. Still, the suggested connection is not an “intimate relationship”. History provides only the theme, but it does not contribute to philosophy in any significant way. Hence, Giere’s challenge is not met. Hanson’s connection between history and philosophy is a somewhat lopsided companionship rather than a truly intimate relation: Philosophy’s precedence over history is left virtually untouched. To forge a truly intimate relationship, we are required to show just how history contributes to our understanding of the honorific aspects of the concept of knowledge. Or so it seems. Because if we take into account that the idea of philosophy on which we are currently operating is itself a product of the context distinction as it was introduced in the early twentieth century, we may perhaps want to consider another option. We may want to be more radical and question the limits that early twentiethcentury philosophy of science posed to philosophical analysis. It is in this spirit that Don Howard has taken up the dialogue with Neurath (see Howard, this volume). It is in this spirit also that I would like to take up the conversation with Whewell. After all, Whewell himself maintained a close relation between history and philosophy of science. His major books, the History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time and the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History, were published in quick succession, 1837 and 1840. Whewell stressed that these projects mutually informed each other, reporting in a letter to a friend: “when I find myself, in the course of my historical researches, becoming metaphysical and transcendental, I open Book two, in which all these things fall into their places and will in the end make the most beautiful system that can be imagined” (Todhunter 1876a, p. 193). In what follows, I examine Whewell’s work with special attention to the possibility of a historically informed philosophy of science.
Happy Guesses William Whewell, born in 1794, spent his whole academic life of altogether fifty-four years at Trinity College, Cambridge, twenty-six of them as Master of Trinity. He read mathematics but pursued various additional topics on the side, occupying himself with the study of the classics, mineralogy, poetry, as well as German language and
60
JUTTA SCHICKORE
literature. After graduating second wrangler in 1816 he became first a fellow of his college. Subsequently, he was appointed professorships in mineralogy and, later, moral philosophy. Many commentators have been astounded by the bewilderingly wide range of Whewell’s writings. His first publication was a textbook on mechanics, followed by articles related to his research on the tides and crystallography. He published, among other things, tracts on liberal education, several sermons, lectures on moral philosophy, the Bridgewater Treatise on astronomy, and translations of contemporary German poetry. He contributed a number of reviews to review journals, and his History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences comprise several volumes. The interpretation of Whewell’s philosophy as a “forerunner” to the orthodox context distinction draws on a number of statements from the Philosophy that seem to suggest a crucial role for scientists’ bold ventures beyond the bounds of the known and familiar. Whewell wrote, for example, that “we must acknowledge [. . . ] that, speaking with strictness, an Art of discovery is not possible;—that we can give no Rules for the pursuit of truth which shall be universally and peremptorily applicable;—and that the helps which we can offer to the inquirer in such cases are limited and precarious” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 483). He also claimed that “[s]cientific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought, of which we cannot trace the origin, some fortunate cast of intellect, rising above all rules. No maxims can be given which inevitably lead to discovery” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 186). Elsewhere, he stressed that “advances in knowledge are not commonly made without the previous exercise of some boldness and license in guessing. The discovery of new truths requires, undoubtedly, minds careful and scrupulous in examining what is suggested; but it requires, no less, such as are quick and fertile in suggesting” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 221). But these statements must be read in the context of Whewell’s entire methodology. Whewell outlined the main methodological aspects of his philosophy of discovery in the second part of the Philosophy.1 This book provides an analysis of the nature of scientific discoveries. Roughly speaking, a scientific discovery binds together, or colligates, a set of facts by bringing them under a general conception. The colligation produces something new. It even shows the previously known facts in a new light, as it is “never the mere sum of the facts” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 250). A successful colligation requires “clear and exact” facts and “distinct” ideas. These elements are not simply “given”, they are not there to be brought together. Rather, they are themselves products of scientific activity. According to Whewell, a successful colligation requires the specification of facts—for example through systematic observation, measurements and experimental manipulations of matter—and the clarification of ideas, i.e., the exposition of the definitions and axioms which are tacitly implied in a concept. Therefore, scientific activity consists of three main elements, namely, “the Decomposition and Observation of Complex Facts; the Explication of our Ideal Conceptions; and the Colligation of Elementary Facts by means of those Conceptions” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 483). These steps are by no means successive. Rather, the scientists go back and forth between binding together the facts, clarifying the idea, rendering the facts more exact, and so forth.
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
61
The “happy thought” or “happy guess” is one aspect of the colligation, namely, the act of conceiving the appropriate idea that binds together a set of facts. It is a central claim of Whewell’s “antithetical philosophy”2 that facts cannot be observed as such, but that observation always involves the supply of conceptions. Facts can never be combined to form new truths “except by means of some new conceptions, clear and appropriate”, and it is these new conceptions, which become manifest as happy thoughts. This “previous condition of the intellect, and not the single fact, is really the main and peculiar cause of the success. The fact is merely the occasion by which the engine of discovery is brought into play sooner or later. It is, as I have elsewhere said, only the spark which discharges a gun already loaded and pointed; and these is little propriety in speaking of such an accident as the cause why the bullet hits its mark” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 189). Such an idea is a “happy thought” because there is no way of forcing anybody’s mind to produce it. There is no way of prescribing a method for making “happy” guesses. In this sense, happy guesses are accidental; in other words, the advancement of science depends on serendipity. Moreover, only very fortunate creatures can conceive happy thoughts. “Such accidents never happen to common men” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 190). It is only geniuses, men like Kepler or Fresnel, who conceive of the fundamental ideas of the sciences.3 However, making a happy guess is not yet a discovery. The happy guess is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for discoveries. The main point about the (natural) philosopher’s activity is “not that he never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures are clearly conceived, and brought into rigid contact with the facts. He sees and compares distinctly the Ideas and the Things;—the relations of his notions to each other and to phenomena” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 220). In an important sense, scientific discoveries are not accidental. Whewell stressed: “No scientific discovery can, with any justice, be considered due to accident. In whatever manner facts may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become the materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already provided with precise and suitable conceptions by which they may be analyzed and connected” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 189). This is, in a way, already suggested by the image of the loaded gun: the happy thought is not a “wild guess” but only he whose mind is prepared to see something very specific will actually notice it.4 Moreover, the colligation based on the happy thought must be shown likely to be true on the data at hand. The criteria of testing are predictive power, simplicity, and, in addition, “consilience”, that is, a higher range of generality (broader applicability) of the theory that the actual colligation produced.5 Whewell’s philosophical methodology of discovery contains two non-anticipatable elements. First, the “happy guess”, the spell of originality that engenders a hypothesis, and secondly, the ingenuity that enables the individual to be original. The underlying idea is that the individual’s creative act of generating a novel thought is not amenable to rational reconstruction. While this specific variant of the distinction between the generation and validation of ideas—which, by the way, does not feature in Hoyningen-Huene’s classification—is perhaps not as undisputed as the “lean” distinction6 between factual and normative perspectives,7 it is certainly widely
62
JUTTA SCHICKORE
acknowledged amongst philosophers. Still, it has become clear that Whewell’s philosophy of science cannot be rendered in terms of the orthodox distinction, which opposes the logical reconstruction and the testing of theories—the realm of philosophy—with the “historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, and the sociopolitical-economic conditions for acceptance and rejection”. Whewell’s approach draws the line differently. On one side of the divide, we have “happy thoughts”, which are necessary but not sufficient for the generation of new knowledge. They manifest the rather narrowly construed moment at which new ideas first emerge in somebody’s mind. On the other side of the divide, we have collective debates by which the ideas and facts are clarified, bound together and tested. Because the colligation must be shown likely to be true on the data at hand, aspects of the theory’s “historical origin” are admitted into the domain of philosophical assessment. History is also admitted on another level. The application of the criteria of consilience requires assessment of consecutive theories in view of their increasing generality. One might want to describe this as a part of the “testing” of the happy guess. But again, this testing is very different from the models of testing that are implied in the orthodox context distinction. The context distinction opposes the justification with the “historical origins, psychological genesis and development, and the social-political-economic conditions”, while the Whewellian notion of testing relies on the historical origins and development of a theory as part of its test. Whewell’s methodology of discovery prescribes how the happy thoughts are to be integrated into the given system of facts and ideas. The testing of a theory is not merely consequential and not detached from the theory’s origins, on the contrary, it involves integrating the happy guess into a framework of known facts and evolving fundamental ideas. A colligation, if properly done, has as such justificatory force. All things considered, Whewell’s “happy thoughts” are a somewhat unhappy option for the advocates of the orthodox context distinction. Fundamental Ideas In fact, Whewell’s Philosophy challenged the disciplinary divide that emerges from the orthodox context distinction in an even more fundamental sense. The history of the sciences is an integral part of Whewell’s philosophical approach to science. The complete title of the Philosophy is Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History. This is usually taken to be an indication for the close relation between the Philosophy and Whewell’s other principal text, the History of the Inductive Sciences, which was written at roughly the same time. According to the standard interpretation, Whewell regarded the history of science as the quarry, as it were, that the philosopher was to exploit. He “saw history as a source of lessons for the best means of making further discoveries” (Yeo 1993, p. 163); he “proposed to examine the actual process of discovery in the various sciences in order to see if any patterns are displayed therein” (Losee 1979, p. 120).8 According to this interpretation, the methodology that Whewell laid out in Part II of the Philosophy is simply the generalized result of the examination of the actual progress in the sciences that the History displayed. If Whewell had really held this view, it would be very hard indeed to say in what way his project was more than a sophisticated history of science. Moreover, this
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
63
interpretation is at odds with the fact that Whewell himself regarded the first part of the Philosophy—comprising more than 700 pages devoted to the history of the fundamental ideas of science—as the essence of his philosophy. In a letter to a friend, he wrote: “the Philosophy of Science, in my interpretation of the phrase, is the discussion of the Fundamental Ideas which [science] involves” (Todhunter 1876a, p. 284), and in the introduction to the Philosophy, Whewell claimed that “an exposition and discussion of the fundamental ideas of each Science may, with great propriety, be termed the PHILOSOPHY of such science” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 76). I therefore suggest that the second part of the Philosophy’s title refers not so much to the History of the Inductive Sciences but rather to the history of the fundamental ideas. The project of a history of the fundamental ideas is the pivot of Whewell’s entire work. If we bring the fundamental ideas to the center of Whewell’s writings, all these things fall into their places and his seemingly scattered works become integral parts of a larger whole. To appreciate fully the nature of the fundamental ideas, we need to contextualize Whewell’s Philosophy and read it against the background of the intellectual and institutional environment in which it was conceived. This approach as such is not new. Geoffrey Cantor for instance interpreted Whewell’s History in the context of the Liberal Anglican historiography that dominated the interests of the Trinity dons in Whewell’s immediate vicinity (Cantor 1991).9 Cantor’s reading of the History can be fruitfully extended to the Philosophy. Redirecting attention from Liberal Anglican historical scholarship to hermeneutics, I argue that the Philosophy offers a hermeneutic and critical theory of the nature of knowledge that resonates with principal themes in the works of the Trinity Fellows. Against this background, it becomes clear that Whewell’s philosophy is by no means a mere “generalization” of actual patterns of past scientific activity but a critical analysis of the advancement of science, which aims to understand the past better than the historical actors themselves. To expose the hermeneutic character and critical thrust of Whewell’s Philosophy, I first examine Whewell’s analysis of the fundamental idea of the so-called “secondary mechanical sciences”. These are acoustics, optics, and “thermotics”, the sciences that deal with sound, light, and heat. I then show how the account of the secondary mechanical sciences fits into the entirety of Whewell’s endeavors and indicate the extent to which his writings had absorbed his intellectual environment. Fundamental ideas are what the mind contributes to knowledge. I have already noted that Whewell regarded the fundamental ideas as basic organizing concepts that govern the way in which the facts relevant to specific scientific fields can be ordered and structured. There is at least one fundamental idea that is particular to each science. The fundamental ideas include Space, Time (including Number), Cause (including Force and Matter), Media, Polarity, Chemical Composition and Affinity, Substance, Likeness, Means and Ends, Symmetry, and Vital Power.10 The secondary mechanical sciences are governed by the idea of the medium. Like every other science, the secondary mechanical sciences are considered twice, once in the History, once in the Philosophy. The History narrates the gradual establishment of the laws of these sciences, such as reflection, refraction, and polarization.
64
JUTTA SCHICKORE
The relevant chapter of Part I of the Philosophy exposes and discusses the fundamental idea. It begins with an explication of this idea, stating that the sciences of sound, light, and heat depended on the “Fundamental Idea of Media by means of which we perceive those qualities. Like the idea of cause, this idea of a medium is unavoidably employed, more or less distinctly, in the common, unscientific operations of the understanding; and is recognized as an express principle in the earliest speculative essays of man” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 266). Starting from this explication, the chapter goes on to expose this idea, or, as Whewell put it, “to illustrate the principles on which we necessarily reason respecting the secondary qualities of bodies” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 274). This sounds like a Kantian operation, and to a certain extent, it was. Whewell aimed to bring to light how the idea of the medium serves as the condition of the possibility of diverse theories and practices. However, he departed from Kant when he strongly emphasized that fundamental ideas unfold over time. They begin as vague, latent notions, which have to be made clear and distinct. The clarification is a collective enterprise, which is maintained by the scientists’ debates and practices. The chapter outlines the nature of the fundamental idea by presenting a wide range of concepts and practices that are united by the fundamental ideas and at the same time illustrate its unfolding. It traces the steps of this development, proceeding from Greek beginnings to Locke’s, Reid’s, and other philosophers’ discussions of primary and secondary qualities. The philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities is shown to hinge on the presupposition that colors, sounds, and tastes are effects that objects produce on us by means of the medium. According to Whewell, the next step in the unfolding of the idea was the introduction of measuring instruments and conventional scales, through which the relevant facts could be made more exact. Secondary qualities require specific kinds of devices. While we can measure length directly, by addition of extension, there is no direct measure of changes in quality, in intensity of sensation, such as the intensity of shades of red. Whewell praised Johann Heinrich Lambert for having introduced measurements of that kind. His photometry, pyrometry, and hygrometry are early examples of the reduction of secondary qualities to quantities (see Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 309). Fraunhofer’s black lines of the solar spectrum served Whewell as another, more recent example. Here it is the sensation of color that is rendered precise: Through Fraunhofer’s discovery, “the prismatic spectrum of sunlight became, for certain purposes, an exact Chromatometer” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 315). In this way, the history of the fundamental ideas establishes a two-way relation between instruments and measurements and the ideas. The introduction of instruments like photometers, chromatometers and thermometers is informed by the idea of the medium and at the same time a major contribution to its unfolding. Several commentators have noted that Whewell deployed his History and Philosophy for the purpose of advancing particular scientific views.11 This is certainly correct. In fact, Whewell’s philosophical theory of knowledge openly encourages philosophers to do so. Along with the application of novel instruments, the scientific controversy is the principal mode of advancing fundamental ideas. “[S]truggles and
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
65
conflicts”, Whewell maintained, “are always requisite before the conceptions acquire that clearness which makes them fit to appear in the enunciation of scientific truth” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 176). It is for this reason that the chapter on the secondary mechanical sciences traces the debates about the secondary qualities. It is for this reason also that Whewell reported the struggle over emission and wave theories. This battle was of course still ongoing when he wrote. In the 1830s, supporters of the wave theory were pushing forward their views against the corpuscular theory, which had been foremost since the days of Newton.12 Whewell regarded this controversy as vital for bringing the fundamental idea of the medium to maturity, and both in the History and in the Philosophy, he sought to advance it. He took a stance in favor of the wave theory. Taking sides with Airy, Herschel, and other proponents of the wave theory against the advocates of the emission theory (most prominently, Brewster, one of the most fervent opponents of Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatise of 1834), Whewell showed that the wave theory was the most adequate clarification of the fundamental idea of the secondary mechanical sciences.13 In Part II of the Philosophy, the message is emphasized with graphic means through the “inductive table of optics”. The table is displayed on a folding chart, which illustrates very effectively the consilience that the wave theory affords.14 In many ways, Whewell’s book delineates and exemplifies how the philosopher qua exponent of the fundamental ideas played an active part in their development. This brief outline of the fundamental idea of the secondary mechanical sciences indicates that Whewell’s Philosophy goes well beyond the recovery of actual patterns of past science in at least three respects. First, it aims to understand the past better than the historical actors themselves understood it. Secondly, it is a history of the present in the sense that the hermeneutic exposition is to show how the fundamental ideas have become entrenched in the everyday worldview. The claim is that only through the reworking of these debates, we can fully grasp our very own epistemic notions, in this case, our ideas about perceiving light, heat, and sound. Thirdly, Whewell’s Philosophy is critical in the sense that the philosopher partakes in the process of clarifying those ideas which are still imprecise. All three aspects, the hermeneutic, the presentist, and the critical, resonate strongly with the work that was pursued by the members of the so-called “Cambridge Network”.15 This circle was a loosely connected group of historians, theologians, mathematicians, and other scholars, most of them connected to Trinity College. The group members were united by a common aim, the modernization of university education and the promotion of mathematics and the sciences.16 Another outstanding feature of the group’s intellectual life is that many of its members were inspired by contemporaneous German thought. The Trinity Fellows offered, as Walter Cannon put it, “a heady combination of historical scholarship, German Idealism, and modern poetry, along with the best of modern science, and all this in a Christian context” (Cannon 1964, p. 78). This Germano-Cantabrigian scholarship17 was, to a large extent, hermeneutic and historical learning, modeled on novel German conceptions of historical study and hermeneutic analysis. Important inspiration for the circle came from the historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr and the philosopher-theologian Friedrich
66
JUTTA SCHICKORE
Schleiermacher. Two of Whewell’s fellow dons, Connop Thirlwall and Julius Hare, promulgated Niebuhr’s and Schleiermacher’s views at Cambridge. Many Trinity dons took part in the debates about what Hare later characterized as the “German notion of history”,18 viz., the endeavor “to estimate all prior systems according to their historical position in the progressive development of human thought, to show what truths it was the especial province of each to bring out, and how each fulfilled its appointed work” (Hare and Hare 1871, p. 470). The historian Niebuhr and his famous multi-volume R¨omische Geschichte played a prominent role in these debates. Niebuhr’s book, first published in 1811–1812, offered a new method of source criticism to support the author’s rather startling claim that an indigenous poetic oral tradition existed, which reflected Rome’s earliest history.19 Niebuhr aimed to devise interpretative techniques through which myths could be distinguished from those elements of folklore that related to historical reality. He placed great emphasis on the faculty of “guessing and divining” as the mental faculty that helped sort source material into evidence and useless remains. It was the close connection between poetry and history as well as the element of “divining” that many contemporaneous scholars found extremely appealing in Niebuhr’s work. Friedrich Schleiermacher faced similar methodological problems in his own field of scholarship, Evangelical theology. Starting out from New Testament exegesis, Schleiermacher aimed to develop a “general hermeneutics”, so as to provide the theoretical grounding of the technique of understanding. The counterpart of hermeneutics, which aimed at recovering a text’s meaning, is “criticism”, the art of judging the authenticity of a text. Schleiermacher stressed that both arts presupposed each other.20 Like Niebuhr, Schleiermacher introduced an element of “divination” into his system. One of the key parts of Schleiermacher’s concept of understanding was “divinatory” understanding, the “surmising” of a meaning.21 He explained that the act of understanding involves the understanding of a subject as something universal and finds the individual aspect by comparison with other subjects included under that universal. But to posit something under a universal in the first place, divination is required (cf. Schleiermacher 1998, p. 93). Schleiermacher regarded this act of divinatory understanding also as “guessing”, adding that this type of immediate understanding required “divinatory boldness” (Schn¨adelbach 1984, pp. 117–118). “We arrive nearly everywhere via a leap” (Schleiermacher 1998, p. 240). Niebuhr’s and Schleiermacher’s writings became well known in England through the multifarious activities of Julius Hare. Fluent in German and deeply immersed in German literature, philosophy, and philology from an early age,22 Hare very effectively propagated the study of things German among the Trinity students and fellows. Together with another Trinity don, Connop Thirlwall, Hare undertook the translation of Niebuhr’s work into English. His own book, which he initially wrote together with his brother,23 also did a lot to gain hermeneutic-historical thought a wider English audience. First published in 1827, the two-volume work was immensely successful. It went through many printings and editions and stayed in print until the early twentieth century. Leafing through the text, the reader finds something like a commonplace
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
67
book, cluttered with aphorisms and useful observations on the conduct of a good Christian, the nature of art, the relationship between man and woman, and so forth. On closer scrutiny, she finds numerous essays on historical, literary, and philosophical topics, which reverberate most all the themes that made feelings run high at the Trinity dinner table. Turning to the cover, she catches sight of the book’s title: Guesses at Truth. A longish essay is devoted to the relation between poetry and history. Hare celebrated “that union of the poet with the philosopher, which is essential to form a perfect historian: he has the imaginative and plastic power of the first, the reflexion and discretion of the latter; and all his other faculties are, as they ought to be, under the dominion of the most penetrative practical understanding” (Hare and Hare 1827b, p. 223). The notion that in an important sense, the retrospective interpretation of the past supersedes past actors’ judgments of their own affairs, is the theme of several pieces. Following Schleiermacher’s diction that the hermeneutic task was to understand an utterance “first just as well and then better than its author” (Schleiermacher 1998, p. 23), Hare emphasized that we can understand past actors better than they could understand themselves, and that we can understand our own epistemic position only through a recovery of our history. He presented this position in graphic terms: “The last and fullest theory on any subject enables us better to fix both the positive and the relative value of all previous treatises concerning it. Only after the sun has mounted above the horizon, do we perceive the cause and nature of twilight. [. . . ]There is nothing more amusing, it is true, and little more instructive, than to follow the march of the human mind through any particular region of knowledge: but in such investigations it is well to have the map of the country according to the latest and correctest survey lying open before us, to understand the difficulties which were to be, which have been, and which still remain to be overcome, and then to examine the manner of accomplishing what has already been done. This is far better than creeping at the heels of successive discoverers, borrowing their eye-glasses, and throwing aside the improved telescopes of the present day, through fear of seeing further than they did: for in this way we shall rarely see so far; since few men have ever emptied our all the contents of their minds, at least if there was much in them, on paper, or communicated all their knowledge, still less their power and art of applying it. The civilized man may be better off than the savage, but not as a savage” (Hare and Hare 1827a, pp. 240–242).
This is worth quoting in full, because the passage contradicts very effectively the common view that the Germano-Cantabrigians proposed some kind of historical relativism, according to which the historical actors were to be understood in their own terms. Theirs was a presentist perspective, inspired and permeated by the idea of progress. Thirlwall made the connection explicit: “The progress of society is something in which the student of history has a deep personal concern. He is himself a part of that which he sees. He is carried along by the movement which he scans, and contributes in some measure to modify it by his presence. His actual position and prospects have been determined by the past, and it is only by the light of the past that he can discern their real nature and bearings” (quoted after Forbes 1952, p. 168). Hare and Thirlwall’s views match perfectly the presentist position of
68
JUTTA SCHICKORE
Whewell’s Philosophy, which traced the unfolding of the fundamental ideas from the perspective of the actual inductive sciences. It was Hare who introduced Whewell to German thought. Hare coached Whewell in the German language when both were undergraduates at Cambridge. The two were intimate friends24 and stayed in close contact even after Hare had left Cambridge to take the living of Herstmonceux in Sussex. As early as 1819, after Whewell had published his textbook of mechanics, Hare asked Whewell if he intended “to keep your history of the science for the next volume, or to publish it separately, or to keep it back to form a part of the history of mathematics from the creation of the world down to the year of the Lord 1836?” (Todhunter 1876a, p. 101) This rather prophetic remark not only shows that Whewell entertained the idea of writing a history of the sciences as early as 1819 but also that Hare was one of the people with whom he discussed his projects. Much later, Hare noted that in England it had been “Dr. Whewell”, who had applied the German notion of history to the history of science (Hare and Hare 1871, p. 470). Whewell was well acquainted with the “German metaphysicians”, as he frequently called contemporaneous German scholars, and he appreciated his friend Hare’s attempts to promulgate Schleiermacher’s ideas in England. In a letter to Hare, written in 1834, he noted that “Schleiermacher and the best of the Germans” required a specific intellectual discipline, and that the truth to be found in the writings of these men “must be taken up in the mind of some genuine Englishman and given out in a suitable form, before they will take a national hold upon us. Do this, if you can and will, and you will be an immense benefactor to England” (Todhunter 1876b, p. 196). Whewell was certainly sympathetic to Hare’s Guesses. He dedicated his four sermons on the foundations of morals to Hare with the note: “Yet to you I may say, without any doubt of receiving your assent, that this employment of Guessing at Truth, is both in itself praiseworthy and if carried on with a humble trust in the Divine Giver of all Truths, is full of deep and wide sources of practical blessing” (Whewell 1837a, iv). So one can surmise that Niebuhr and Schleiermacher’s conception of “guessing”, reinforced through Hare’s book, was a major source for Whewell’s notion of the “happy guess”, all the more so because Whewell himself drew a close connection between Germano-Cantabrigian scholarship and his conception of inductive hunches, those “instantaneous hypotheses which metaphysical writers tell us are so useful in discovery” (Todhunter 1876b, p. 268). At least the author of Whewell’s obituary in Macmillan’s Magazine found the connection between Hare and Whewell rather obvious. He observed that none of the readers of Whewell’s Philosophy “could fail to find in it much that was suggestive if not convincing, and many brilliant guesses at truth, if not clear discoveries of it” (Clark 1866, p. 547). Whewell certainly fully embraced the hermeneutic-historical approach in his Philosophy and made use of the conceptions of exposing, enunciating, and divining in several ways. After all, he explicitly noted that we have “to divine the general form of the relation by which phenomena are connected” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 542,
A FORERUNNER?—PERHAPS, BUT NOT TO THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION
69
emphasis added). He stressed that there was more to the fundamental idea than meets the eye; “the Idea is disclosed but not fully revealed, imparted but not transfused, by the use we make of it in science” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 70). It was the task of the history of the fundamental ideas to tease out the deep structures conditioning the stock of scientific concepts and practices, to “detect and enunciate in words the principles which are thus, perhaps silently and unconsciously, taken for granted by those who have a share in the establishment of scientific truth”, which, as Whewell noted, was “a task of some difficulty” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, pp. 182–183). And in a sense, the structure of the whole chapter on the secondary mechanical sciences can be understood as a manifestation of the hermeneutic circle. The chapter presents a wide range of concepts and practices as united by the very idea whose unfolding they illustrated in their succession. It is an integral part of hermeneutic philosophy that the business of understanding is “an infinite task” (Schleiermacher 1998, p. 23). Schleiermacher portrayed this business as a collective process, in the course of which “we more and more give each other reciprocal support, in that each provides the others with points of comparison and analogies” (quoted after Schn¨adelbach 1984, p. 118). The collective enterprise of clarification, conceived as controversy, takes center stage in Whewell’s philosophical program. Whewell repeatedly stressed that ideas were clarified by controversies. Therefore, the history of the fundamental ideas of science traced not only these ideas “as they have successively come into notice in the progress of science; the gradual developement [sic] by which they have arrived at their due purity and clearness” but also, “as a necessary part of such a history,” it provided “a view of some of the principal controversies which have taken place with regard to each portion of knowledge” (Whewell [1840] 1996a, p. 76). An essential part of such controversies is the clarification that is achieved through communication, that is, through “the desire of men to impress their opinions on others [. . . ] In trying to make others understand them, they learnt to understand themselves. Their speculations were begun in twilight, and ended in the full brilliance of day” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 173). Whewell believed that the gradual clarification of an idea was at the same time a gradual entrenchment in our everyday worldview. The clearer the idea, the more common it became. According to Whewell, the idea first appears in the genius’s bold guess, which the lesser scientists take up and help unfold and develop. It then becomes the property of well-educated men before it finally gets entrenched in our everyday worldview. As such, the fundamental idea becomes a natural element of the education of children. For Whewell, all this had grave implications for the selection of appropriate topics for intellectual education. The chapter in the Philosophy that deals with intellectual education demands that only the clear ideas and the sciences that are informed by them—arithmetic, elementary geometry and mechanics—ought to be taught to the student. Those sciences that grounded in ideas that were still imprecise, such as chemistry, ought not to be part of the school or university curriculum (see Whewell [1840] 1996b, pp. 513–520). Whewell’s tract on university education, which was
70
JUTTA SCHICKORE
published in 1837 while Whewell was working on the Philosophy, outlines the same educational principles. This similarity shows that the writings on philosophy, history, and education were in fact parts of the same overall project.25 The educational tract integrates moral philosophy into the canon, which indicates that Whewell’s sermons and lectures on moral philosophy were also part and parcel of his endeavor.26 Whewell envisaged “a future period of mental culture” where not only the ideas of chemistry and geology, but even “the ideas which are the basis of sound criticism, morals, and politics,” would become “equally distinct and equally diffused” as those of arithmetic and mechanics. This, then, was “the grand and boundless vista of possible and probable intellectual refinement and civilization which the future offers” (Whewell 1837b, p. 29).27 Whewell alluded to this grand vista in the Philosophy. Concluding Part I, he stated that the analysis of the sciences leads us “to a point of view from which we have a prospect of other provinces of knowledge, in which other faculties of man are concerned besides his intellectual, other interests involved besides those of speculation. On these it does not belong to our present plan to dwell: but even such a brief glance as we have taken of the connexion of material with moral speculations may not be useless, since it may serve to show that the principles of truth which we are now laboriously collecting among the results of the physical sciences, may possibly find some application in those parts of knowledge towards which men most naturally look with deeper interest and more serious reverence” (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 165). The “fair and lofty temple of Truth” that Whewell had set out to erect (Whewell [1840] 1996b, p. 165) was still unfinished. Many fundamental ideas, those of politics, language, and moral science, were still insufficiently unfolded. Nevertheless, they were part of the edifice of science.28 Time and again, Whewell linked the history of the fundamental ideas to moral philosophy in his sermons and lectures on the foundation of morals and on moral philosophy.29 The preface to the sermons emphasizes that the “fundamental idea of a moral law” and the “system of Ethics” that could be constructed on it, needed to be developed (Whewell 1837a, viii, ix). The second sermon repeats the main features of the history of the fundamental ideas—the successive appearance of ideas and their clarification and general establishment through controversies—before it discusses the Greeks, who “with so acute and subtle a spirit seized all the elementary truths of the science of space, entirely erred and mistook when they would have proceeded to other portions of knowledge, which now appear to us no less clear and plain” (Whewell 1837a, p. 41). The introductory lectures on moral philosophy, which flank the year of publication of the Philosophy, convey a similar message. A the end of the first lecture of 1839, Whewell insisted that the principles of the inductive sciences had to inform moral science, too: “Inquiries into the nature of truth, the means and methods of its discovery, and the philosophy of science, even