Robert Smithson Learning from New Jersey and Elsewhere
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Ann Reynolds
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Robert Smithson Learning from New Jersey and Elsewhere
This page intentionally left blank
Ann Reynolds
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
Robert Smithson Learning from New Jersey and Elsewhere
© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the Millard Meiss Publication Fund of the College Art Association. This book was set in FF Scala Sans by Achorn Graphic Services, Inc. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reynolds, Ann Morris. Robert Smithson : learning from New Jersey and elsewhere / Ann Reynolds. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-18227-0 (hc : alk. paper) 1. Smithson, Robert—Criticism and interpretation. 2. Smithson, Robert—Archives. I. Smithson, Robert. II. Title. N6537.S6184 R48 2003 700—dc21 2002022770 Illustration credits are found on pages 346–353.
to Jon
contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
VIII
PREFACE
X INTRODUCTION Culture as a Way of Seeing PERCEIVING ABSTRACTION
1
15
Abstraction’s Ambiguities
31
The Lessons of Optical Art
45
Perceptual Enantiomorphs
59 77
The Crystal Land
79
Perspective: The Metropolis
83
A Guide to the Monuments of Passaic
TRAVEL AS REPETITION
3
100 123
A Cartographic Premise
125
The Terminal View
134
Yucatan Is Elsewhere
163
DIRT AS DISORDER
4
13
The Alogons
NEW JERSEY
2
1
193
Buried Architecture
195
Trespassing
205
Image Crisis
215
NOTES
236
ROBERT SMITHSON’S LIBRARY
297
ILLUSTRATION CREDITS
346
INDEX
354
acknowledgments
This book’s existence depends on the intellectual and emotional generosity of individuals from all aspects of my life. First, I would like to thank Rosalind Krauss, my adviser for the earliest version of this study, and the other members of my doctoral committee: Eugene Santomasso, Linda Nochlin, Rose-Carol Washton Long, and Rosemarie Bletter. Nancy Holt offered her time, memories, and commentary during every phase of this project, and I hope this book does justice to her faith in it. Virginia Dwan also gave me invaluable access to her archives and shared her recollections of Smithson’s work and thought process. Charles Harrison, Nicholas Mirzoeff, Molly Nesbit, and the other, anonymous readers for MIT Press provided valuable critical readings of the manuscript. Ann Cvetkovich, Eve Andrée Laramée, and Mary Anne Staniszewski provided indispensable advice and encouragement; they are true and precious friends. Special thanks also to Priscilla Murr and Maria Rubinate for allowing me to listen. My students have been wonderful listeners and critics of this work, and I am particularly grateful to Lori Cavagnaro and Pam Franks, whose intellectual tenacity concerning their own work was inspirational to me during the final stages of writing. A number of other individuals assisted me with research or photographs: Robin Bowman; Michael Duncan; Lee Ewing; Rosalie Fisher; Amy Finkbeiner and Elyse Goldberg at the James Cohan Gallery; Linda Henderson; Wendy Hurlock, Nancy Malloy, and Judy Throm at the Archives of American Art; Anne Kovach at the Virginia Dwan Collection/Dwan Gallery Archives; Uta Kriefall; and Eugenie Tsai. A Gina and Walter Ducloux Fine Arts Faculty Fellowship at the University of Texas at Austin, the Texas Friends of Art History Fund, and the Millard Meiss Publication Fund Committee helped to support the writing and production of this book. I am also grateful to Roger Conover, Deborah Cantor-Adams, Rosemary Winfield, and Tímea Adrián at MIT Press for their support and care in transforming my manuscript into a physical object. The intellectual curiosity, emotional strength, and radiant spirit of my mother, Helen Morris Reynolds, have provided fundamental life models for me. Jonathan Smit made this book possible by committing himself to it in every conceivable way. I have had the rare privilege of living my life with someone who shares his time, intellect, and love without question, a gift impossible to honor in words alone. This book is dedicated to him . . . and to my beloved K.
preface
Although this book is about Robert Smithson, his work, and his working process, it is not a monographic study. I concentrate on a limited number of projects and concepts that I find crucial to understanding Smithson’s work as a whole, important to the cultural history of the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, and relevant to present and future visual practice. Many of my choices are not the obvious or traditional ones. I discuss at great length Smithson’s early sculpture of 1963 through 1967, which has been somewhat neglected by scholars, and consider only briefly the most well-known work Smithson produced, the Spiral Jetty. The Spiral Jetty and Smithson’s other later, large-scale earthworks, however, are implied inevitabilities of many of the projects I do consider. Some of my choices originated with a desire to take a fresh approach to my subject, but as my work progressed, I began to realize that the book had a second focus, history itself or, more specifically, the problem of how to address contemporary art in terms of history. History usually takes a back seat in monographs; it functions as a general framework or set of secondary circumstances that enhance the unfolding of the individual artist’s life, work, and achievements. In her essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?,” Linda Nochlin identifies the monograph as one of art history’s techniques for celebrating the manifestation of artistic “genius”—that “atemporal and mysterious power somehow embedded in the person of the ‘Great Artist’”—at the expense of historical specificity.1 In approaching my study of Robert Smithson, my primary concern was not to establish Smithson’s importance as an artist or to present a chronological unfolding of his major works. Frankly, I felt comfortable assuming that Smithson’s significance as a twentieth-century artist is well established and growing and that his work merits serious consideration. Although Smithson’s significance has increased, however, the relation of his work and the work of his close contemporaries to their initial historical context has yet to be articulated or clearly understood. This may be due, in some part, to the way that much of this work continues to feel contemporary even as our relationship to its historical moment grows increasingly distant. Several types of writing on Smithson’s work have emerged over the past forty years, each with its own particular historical dimension. There are the interviews or essays undertaken during Smithson’s lifetime or retrospectively by individuals who shared a common history with him.2 Then, during the late 1970s, Rosalind Krauss and Craig Owens began to refer to Smithson, among others, when developing a theory of postmodernism.3 This second type of writing provided the earliest descriptions of the theoretical significance of Smithson as a postmodern artist during a historical
moment in the critical reception of structuralist and poststructuralist theory in the United States. A third approach, which has been ongoing since the 1960s, situates Smithson’s work within established art historical lineages, narratives, or categories or identifies him as a cofounder of one: “earthworks.”4 The latter two types of writing rarely articulate the historically specific theoretical or ideological frameworks that inform them except in terms of their own internal genealogies. For example, Craig Owens is often credited with first identifying Smithson’s working strategies as postmodern, while the history of the reception of the critical theory necessary to this identification and Smithson’s situation within this history are not and have never been addressed. My work engages with each of these approaches by considering the historical dimensions—and limitations—to the arguments they construct. My aim is not to offer the definitive, historically correct Smithson but to propose a way to remain historically conscious when writing about contemporary artists and to reveal the benefits of doing so. I consider what it was possible to discuss in the 1960s and early 1970s, how these discussions and their objects and images looked, and what could be assumed and therefore remain unsaid. I have used Smithson as a test case for how to write such a history. The most important resource for this project has been Smithson’s papers and library, which his widow, Nancy Holt, donated to the Archives of American Art in 1987. This archive is the object of my study, and Smithson’s library has served as my principal bibliography.5 Its contents, rather than the contents of the Smithson estate, the existing literature on him, or interviews with individuals who knew him, set the primary physical and historical parameters of what I have chosen to consider. There are two reasons for this decision, one simply practical and the other more complicated and methodologically significant. First, Smithson’s archive provides an opportunity to conduct extensive historical research on a postwar U.S. artist in a manner that is not yet possible for most of Smithson’s contemporaries, since the majority of them are still living and without substantial public archives. The estates of those who are deceased have either imposed cumbersome restrictions on access to their papers or have not consolidated them. Although Smithson’s archive as it exists at the Archives of American Art is not complete either—such a situation would be impossible—it includes an enormous amount of material. Its large quantity of unpublished materials produced by Smithson renders all of the pre-1988 scholarly literature on the artist incomplete.6 Working with an archive as vast as Smithson’s forced me, almost immediately, to consider how to use it. If my approach had been monographic, even initially, I would have focused on the “work proper” and all of its obvious source materials,
xii
such as preparatory sketches, drafts, models, and cited texts, and disregarded the rest, more than half of the material in the archive. However, I was drawn to these less immediately qualifiable items—a large variety of magazines, tourist pamphlets, postcards, books, and records—and I chose to give equal consideration to them, almost from the start. It was this decision that ultimately set me on a different methodological course from others who have written about Smithson.7 When considering Smithson’s entire archive, its contents become less unique, less individually specific, since they include images, materials, and a record of activities that were a part of a large number of people’s lives and, consequently, part of a particular period in history that extends well beyond the personal history of the artist or his work.8 When considered as a part of this archive, Smithson’s work remains embedded within a broad sampling of its historical context, and it can be more readily recognized as part of this context. Early in my research, I began to notice morphological relationships among a number of things in the archive. My discovery of some of these relationships drove me to look more closely at items that were not initially identifiable as central to the “work.” I discovered morphological relationships between things that were purely formal, others that were purely structural, and some that were a combination of both. For example, a number of diagrams and textual descriptions in books and other printed materials in Smithson’s library share the same formal structure as a number of his own drawings and three-dimensional works (see, for example, figures 1.13, 2.5, and 2.9), even though they do not seem to possess any functional similarities. These and other morphological relationships that I discovered brought eclectic groups of authors, disciplines, concepts, and images together, seemed to confound many of the established narratives for Smithson’s work and for the period as a whole, and offered points of reentry into a number of significant historical debates. Comparative morphology and history are usually understood to be unrelated, if not diametrically opposed, analytical methods. The historian Carlo Ginzburg provided me with a healthy response to this problem: “Even if typological or formal connections were out of bounds for the historian (as Bloch has maintained), why not analyze them anyway, I asked myself?”9 In several books and in numerous essays, Ginzburg uses morphological classifications “to reconstruct a series of phenomena which [he] would like to analyze historically.”10 As a result, his morphological networks sweep against history’s hierarchical and chronological grain and restore apparently negligible phenomena to view. By formally linking such phenomena to other much more familiar or “relevant” historical material, he proposes a complex type of history
PREFACE
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based on cultural circulation between types of knowledge—formal and informal, popular and elite—that is neither hierarchical nor holistic. The questions Ginzburg asks and his morphological approach to archival materials helped me to recognize the conceptual underpinnings of my tendency to pursue morphological relationships among things in Smithson’s archive. As the number and variety of items on my lists of these relationships grew, I began to be able to focus on their precise formal, structural, and conceptual points of overlap and finally to identify their shared historical significance. These networks of overlapping morphological relationships provide the historical and conceptual framework for most of my arguments in this book. My decision to adopt a morphological approach was substantiated by my understanding of Robert Smithson’s working process, as also revealed by his archive. Although Smithson finished high school, he was essentially an autodidact, and his learning and working processes take a somewhat unorthodox shape. Every item in his archive communicates something, either implicitly or explicitly, about this working process, and after close and extended observation, general patterns of use emerge. These patterns reveal Smithson’s own morphological sensibility and, in turn, support my own decision to use morphology as an instrument to move beyond the usual art historical assumptions.11 For instance, Smithson was a prolific writer, and his writings are compelling and complex, filled with references to a wide range of fiction writers, poets, film makers, philosophers, critical theorists, and other artists, whereas most of his drawings and other two- and three-dimensional works, although often equally compelling, can appear to be rather simple and didactic. This apparent disparity in complexity has led to the assumption, often unstated, that the drawings, photographs, and three-dimensional works illustrate Smithson’s writings or, worse, are secondary supplements to them. The beauty and visual sophistication of Smithson’s mid-1960s drawings and three-dimensional work actually made a number of critics uncomfortable when they saw them in the artist’s first major museum retrospective in 1980 through 1982 because they had considered both to be “black and white” diagrams of his ideas.12 This reaction came about partly because little of this work had been seen for ten years; it had been known only through reproductions, which were usually black and white. But it also reflects a general tendency to overlook the significance of the drawings and early three-dimensional work due to an unacknowledged critical bias in favor of the seemingly rarified literary and theoretical apparatus of the writings.13 This emphasis on texts, regardless of the theoretical claims of individual authors, has undermined the profound intertextuality of the work.
xiv
The archive provides abundant proof that Smithson based his visual work on complex combinations of images, principles, and methods, compiled from the vast number of texts in his library, which he condensed into deceptively simple but conceptually complex designs. The archive also reveals that Smithson began some of his essays as straightforward narratives to which he then added increasing numbers of borrowed ideas or quotations until the narrative thread was buried under an elaborate collage of analogies. Conversely, he began with assemblies of borrowed ideas or quotations that he worked and reworked until they flowed together as his own words in the final, published versions.14 Once these respective patterns of layering materials from numerous, eclectic sources become clear, any attempt to prioritize one medium over another, even if it is unintentional, seems fundamentally misguided. But, even more important, the logic operating behind Smithson’s patterns of working emerges as well. This logic is based on morphological classifications. Smithson combines things and ideas to reveal fundamental formal and structural connections between reading and viewing and between categories of thought and images that remain invisible to established hierarchies of interpretation. Smithson intends for all aspects of his work—straightforward and oblique, popular and philosophical—to be appreciated and made sense of collectively in terms of their paradoxical formal and structural similarities. Smithson’s ability to construct his work around such deep morphological connections was one of his most impressive skills. His archive has given me the tools to understand and appreciate this crucial aspect of his work and to recognize relationships between a number of projects that otherwise would not be immediately intelligible. My pursuit of a morphological history reveals Smithson’s own morphological strategies within their historical moment for the first time, even if some of my conclusions complement the arguments of others who have considered Smithson’s working process. For example, Craig Owens’s 1978 essay “Photography en abyme” contains a brief but insightful discussion of Smithson’s photographic strategies.15 Owens’s general aim is to problematize photography’s assumed relation to the “real” by defining photography in terms of its own self-referential structure, what he calls en abyme, a literary construct that refers to a narrative’s internal folding, mirroring, duplication, and reduplication of its images. He illustrates this set of structural terms through some carefully chosen examples, and his argument depends heavily on them as proof. He doesn’t connect the photographers either to his interpretations of their images or to the theoretical texts he uses to make those interpretations until the very end of the essay, when he discusses the work of Smithson. And Smithson, unlike
PREFACE
xv
the other photographers whom Owens discusses, is allowed to speak because he does so in a language that is compatible with other individuals Owens cites: Roland Barthes, Roman Jakobson, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jacques Derrida. The implication is that Smithson’s working practice is informed by structuralist and poststructuralist thought. I could use Smithson’s archive to supplement Owens’s implicit claim by identifying which authors and which texts Smithson was reading, based on what books and magazines he owned and what was available in English at the time, and thus reconstructing the historical limits and personal idiosyncrasies of his theoretical knowledge.16 But whereas Owens’s real interest is in using specific aspects of Smithson’s work to construct a larger theoretical argument about photography, I am interested in reconstructing broader aspects of the historical and conceptual field in the United States during the late 1960s, of which structuralist theory was only a part, to reveal how Smithson, and by extension, a number of his contemporaries, worked within this field to produce counterculture. Structuralism and poststructuralism in various guises made up a part of this field, but they were not synonymous with it. Nor were they or their art historical companions, modernism and postmodernism, the key terms of Smithson’s practice. In fact, the way in which Smithson and his contemporaries understood and thought about structure—and modernism—was fundamentally different from the way Owens understood it or contemporary art historians in general understand it today. Looking at the archive as a whole, rather than just scanning it for source material that I could immediately tie to Smithson or to established art historical narratives or theoretical constructs, has enabled me to recognize these differences and theory’s historical dimension. In doing so, I am able to acknowledge the shared theoretical conditions that permit Smithson, Owens, and me to speak about structure, reduplication, and mirroring, but I can at the same time remain aware of the differences in our working methods, based on our historical relation to the theories, including structuralism and poststructuralism, that inform us.17 What follows is my reconstruction of four key trajectories of Smithson’s working process. Each of these trajectories embodies a historically specific set of conditions and debates, which I articulate through a set of morphological relationships discovered in Smithson’s archive. The year 1966 provides a shared point of temporal reference for three of the four by marking the beginning, middle, or end point for a set of overlapping discussions, which span a six-year period from 1963 to 1969. Although brief in terms of chronological time, these years were extremely productive for Smithson. He developed most of his basic working principles and formats during the first
xvi
three years of this period. All of these principles and formats consist of overlapping visual and conceptual elements, modified by a variety of adjectives and combined in a number of different relationships to each other but ultimately drawn from a relatively stable set. Thus none of the principles and formats based on this set of elements can be considered in isolation or in terms of a strictly progressive model. They are all willfully entangled. Smithson moves round and round them until they accrue extremely dense meanings. Thus, in each section of the book, I also move round and round these principles and formats to build an appropriate analysis. In late 1969 and early 1970, Dennis Wheeler conducted a series of lengthy interviews with Smithson.18 As the two men talked, they sifted through a significant amount of diverse materials that became part of Smithson’s archive, and Smithson produced the drawing A Surd View for an Afternoon (see figure 3.37). Their conversations and the drawing divulge much more than information about Smithson’s work and ideas; they provide detailed diagrams of his thought at a particular moment in time, which became the basis for my analysis of some of Smithson’s late works in the fourth chapter of the book. The four trajectories I choose to articulate—and Smithson’s work in general—also share a physical and conceptual reference point, the 1965 work Enantiomorphic Chambers (see figure 1.24). This work is emblematic of Smithson’s desire to reveal what I call “enantiomorphic situations.”19 “Enantiomorphic” describes a mirror-image relationship between things that are alike in all other respects, the most common example being the relationship between the right and left hands. The enantiomorphs in Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers consist of two mirrored chambers. When observers stand in front of these paired chambers, their gaze is not met by the expected reflections because the internal exchange of reflections and counterreflections generated by the enantiomorphically configured mirrors cancels out the central, illusionistic plane of focus by directing the focal point of each eye outward, in the opposite direction from the other eye. Such an experience creates a blind spot at the center of vision. Enantiomorphic construction literally, and by extension, metaphorically, allows Smithson to reveal the blind spots or enantiomorphic situations embedded within a number of historically contemporary models of perception. These models are usually binary in structure, but their oppositional terms are really just mirror images of one another—enantiomorphs—with a shared blind spot, a set of hidden assumptions. In each chapter of my book, I focus on the enantiomorphic situations Smithson seeks to expose and dismantle in descriptions of the perception of abstraction, the metropolis, space and time travel, nature, and psychological and
PREFACE
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sexual disorders. These situations are also the points at which his work most clearly participates in historically specific debates. I begin my introduction and each of the four chapters of the book with an extended analysis of an individual project or a limited group of works. This strategy might try the reader’s patience, but clearing my interpretative space of as many established art historical narratives as possible allows my arguments to emerge from looking at the work and reveals the way Smithson considered and then directed the experience of the work through sketches, photography, and exhibition design. Little of the published writing on Smithson interacts with the work in this way, and many of the works I focus on have been paid scant attention in the existing literature. From this analysis, I move to one or more contextual historical moments that I elicit from morphological relationships suggested both by the archive and by Smithson’s own morphological excursions. The final section of each chapter brings together the preceding visual and historical arguments to focus on another aspect of Smithson’s work and the enantiomorphic situation it embodies. Rather than seeking to be comprehensive either in terms of addressing Smithson’s work or the historical moment it was a part of, my intention is to propose through my working method a broader spectrum of possibilities for where and how to look when writing a history of contemporary art. My goal throughout has been to understand Smithson’s working method, its historical terms or limits, and its potential to be useful again, under different historical conditions and in different hands.
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introduction
CULTURE AS A WAY OF SEEING [He] is a recorder, not a maker. But to be a poet is to make. Such skill and tact as his argue a genuine vocation for poetry, but they are not enough. They do not promise enough by themselves. The poet also needs culture. He must leave New Jersey. clement greenberg Has Passaic replaced Rome as The Eternal City? robert smithson My generation, your generation, we have been marked by the sign of travel. jonas mekas
A Life cover from 28 July 1967 evokes that long, hot summer of racial conflict with an image of the twisted body of a black child. He lies in the street, his face hidden in shadow and his unseen wound staining the dark pavement. His left arm juts unnaturally above his shoulder blade, and his small hands rest beside his chest, their pale palms turned awkwardly toward the camera. The image is simple, stark, but somewhat ambiguous. If not for the small caption to the left of the image that indicates that the boy has a nonfatal gunshot wound, one might assume that he is dead, a victim of what the magazine’s headline calls “Newark: The Predictable Insurrection.” Robert Smithson scrawled the phrase “Primary Structures” across the cover of his copy of this Life magazine with a black felt-tipped pen. The caption Smithson imposes on the image of the boy could be interpreted as a direct response to the image’s political implications—that the depressed inner cities of the metropolitan United States, ethnic struggle, and violence are the results or emblems of primary contemporary social and economic structures.1 Smithson’s archive contains many such pieces of evidence that link him to specific historical events. But tacit conclusions as to what these links convey about him or his art can be deceiving. To discover what Smithson actually did with these documents and images, rather than what they appear to express as isolated things, one has to reconstruct Smithson’s patterns of use. For example, as a regular subscriber to a wide variety of magazines and journals, Smithson did what many subscribers do when their monthly or weekly issues pile up: he sorted through them and saved all or parts of particular issues that interested him, often noting why he was keeping them by quickly jotting down the title or subject of a specific article on their covers. The handwritten message on Smithson’s July 1967 issue of Life is the result of such a routine ordering practice: his caption refers to an article in the magazine on the 1966 Primary Structures exhibition that included his work. Inhibitions that might hold in check a temptation to write over an image that is unique rarely apply to disposable, mass-produced images. In addition, an ambiguous image, such as Life’s photograph of the boy, invites interpretation or even misreading and for the image’s absorption into any number of systems.2 An investigation of activities such as writing over and recirculating images according to personal or established art-world ordering systems can reveal significant blind spots in what otherwise appear to be routine practices of consumption. To write such an unrelated message on top of such a powerful and yet ambiguous image, Smithson had to see the image as merely a convenient surface to write on. The title and date of the publication are important to his personal archive, but he appears to be blind to the image
2
beneath his notation since it plays no role in his decision to keep the magazine cover. Neither does it play a part in his or the art-world’s ordering system. Smithson’s apparent indifference to the independent significance of the photograph of the boy on the cover of Life is not necessarily surprising. None of his visual work directly addresses historically significant social or political issues in ways that my first reading of the phrase “Primary Structures” suggests. Yet this does not mean that nothing can be learned from Smithson’s seeming disregard for the Life image, beyond the fact that he was accustomed to writing over images. The tension between his routine action and the historically specific, visually jolting photograph, and by extension between the history of the “primary structures” of the art world that Smithson documents here and the documentation of contemporary street violence on this cover of Life magazine, is undeniable regardless of whether or not Smithson recognized it in 1967 or later.3 Routine practices such as sorting and filing magazines are generally considered to be part of the monotonous backdrop to the significant or singular events of history. Yet these practices, usually associated with consumption, can conceal the purloined letter of history itself. Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, and other theorists of the everyday have argued that activities such as reading, eating, dressing, walking, or organizing files do not simply mirror production but can be self-consciously creative and even subversive re-productive practices since they are negotiated by individuals.4 De Certeau notes that the material residue of these activities “indicate[s] a social historicity in which systems of representations or processes of fabrication no longer appear only as normative frameworks but also as tools manipulated by users.”5 Even though Smithson’s Life magazine cover probably does not reflect self-conscious creativity, it does indicate, like so many other things in his archive, re-productive practices and a social historicity for his personal activities and for the art world at large.
As early as 1959, Smithson did appreciate the social and perhaps the political precariousness of his own position as an artist working in an area of New York prone to street violence and general social chaos. In a letter to Nancy Holt, he vividly lays out the formal and social contradictions of his life circumstances in terms one might associate in retrospect with the early stages of urban gentrification of lower Manhattan: I’m living in a new place. A newly renovated studio—doesn’t that sound Chic? Yes, it’s lovely, perfect for the party—tile floors—new white pure white walls & ceiling—on 6th
INTRODUCTION CULTURE AS A WAY OF SEEING
3
ave & 23rd St. It’s sort of in the hinterlands between the Garment district and the Village. My mad roommate is still with me—N.Y.C. in the summer is curious and deadly. This was my first season without a vacation. Nothing but hanging around fitting pieces together both Psychic and Otherwise. I pulled many paintings out of that caved-in atmosphere on the Lower East Side. “Murder-Mile”—says the tabloids. The deserted houses on our street looked like the plague swept through them; windows would break every minute; on the pavement was a big sign that said: DRAGONS “The Blacks and Spics are wiping out the Jews.” Some kid got his nose shot off. Furniture always burning in the streets. Phil’s typewriter was stolen. The water stopped running. Bee Bees would shoot through our windows—the sound of breaking glass was everywhere. So goes life in the lower depths. My paintings are Posters from Hell. . . . how glorious— if you know what I mean—well, let’s hope you know what I mean, because I don’t know what I mean—3 cheers for a Meaning—.6 Here Smithson acknowledges a number of elements from overlapping systems of social classification—race, class, lifestyle—rubbing up against each another to produce unavoidable, unambiguous tensions. And as a young, unknown artist with few financial resources, he was a part of the mix as he struggled to move out of such a tenuous, peripheral status and into the art world’s centers.7 By the late 1950s, the contemporary art world had an acknowledged geographical center—New York City—and designated sites of production and circulation—selected studios and lofts, art magazines, galleries, and museums—that were located mostly within this center. Areas that were outside of the “new white pure white walls & ceiling[s]” of artist’s studios, exhibition spaces, and the pages of the art magazines—outside, in other words, of Manhattan—were considered the true “elsewheres” of this world, literal blind spots in the cultural gaze. But, ironically, just as consensus on the status of these “white” centers was building, the implicit and accompanying assumption that culture was equivalent to a particular place—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles—or to particular spaces within these urban areas seemed increasingly untenable. This sense of the selected locality of culture became increasingly destabilized because of the major political and social events of the 1960s—the ongoing civil rights movement and the rise of the women’s movement and the black power movement, riots in cities like Detroit and Newark, the escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict and the ensuing antiwar protests, student uprisings on college campuses, and organized challenges to the policies of major art-world institutions by artists themselves, to cite just the major ones. Artists crossed more
4
and more boundaries. They questioned where their subjects were or should be located as well as what they looked like. In other words, culture was increasingly acknowledged to be a site as well as a sight.8 At first glance, the pop-art versus high-art debates seem to initiate this questioning of boundaries in the 1960s, but even during the early part of the decade, the questioning process was, in fact, much more complex and comprehensive than the issues raised by pop alone. A limited set of terms like “pop” or “anti-art” have now outlasted their original, more multifaceted, contextual roles in this larger questioning process and become signs of an almost gratuitous acknowledgment of this early and crucial period of critical differentiation. Before they became categories of art, such terms referred to categories of experience that were the subjects of intense cultural debates that comprised not simply differences of aesthetic or artistic practice but issues of class as well. Such categories were not understood to be strictly synonymous with specific classes, but they were understood in terms of class and thus inflected the ways critics spoke about artists, their backgrounds, and their work during the decade.9 Discussions of the location or site of culture occurred early on, and these discussions were generated from a broad spectrum of positions. Correspondingly, the structure of these debates wasn’t simply binary—high versus low, inside versus outside, good versus bad.10 Middle terms and shared historical conditions of production and circulation facilitated these debates. These terms and conditions, unlike the major historical events mentioned earlier, now may seem too mundane to be considered significant. One such shared condition was the print media. It facilitated the circulation of ideas and images to an audience not necessarily limited by geography or social circumstances. It provided commentary on activities occurring at the centers and elsewheres of the cultural landscape. And because, for many readers and writers, the printed word and image comprised their only experience of such activities, distinctions between commentary and “the thing itself ” became increasingly difficult to make. Magazines in general, and the art magazine in particular, also became one of the sites of culture—“magazine culture”—that artists began to investigate; this domain was not precisely coterminous with the art world proper. Travel, specifically the ubiquitous postwar road trip, was a second shared condition that made the questioning of culture’s location possible. Travel involves physical circulation, but, more important, travel depends on seemingly innocuous but essential interventions between viewers and environments. These interventions are always mediated by numerous conventions since the disparities between home and
INTRODUCTION CULTURE AS A WAY OF SEEING
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away, on-site experience and printed or photographed interpretation, are simply too great for any one representational convention to reconcile. These conventions and the concrete experiences of travel do not readily translate into one another, and different conventional systems require educated leaps of understanding and the ability to translate one set of representations into another. A yellow star on a road map, for example, indicates a capital city under the terms established by a map’s legend or key, while the city itself is neither star-shaped or yellow but the capital all the same.11 Among the objects collected, photographs taken, maps folded, and guidebooks creased in efforts at understanding a place, a time, or an experience, decisions have to be made about what to use. The traveler constructs an archive whose order and completeness depend on personal preoccupations, no matter how generic the contents. Robert Smithson was such a traveler all his life. As a child, he determined where and how his family spent their vacations by marking out routes on road maps that passed through national parks and historic sites. His father liked to drive, his mother liked to ride anywhere, and Smithson provided them with destinations.12 Afterward, he recounted his adventures to his classmates while they viewed the postcards he had collected through a hole in a little booth that he had made himself.13 As an adult, his road trips followed a similar pattern. His archives contain various types of maps, cheap tourist brochures, snapshots, and glossy postcards for almost every trip or project he undertook. In collective terms, these items are neither rare nor special, but if one reads the texts and analyzes the images individually, they show signs of careful consideration and use. Books, magazines, and pamphlets lack many of their original illustrations, lines of red or blue ink highlight selected passages, and diagrams and maps contain hand-numbered locations or are overlaid with geometric designs. Spread out on a table, these individual snippets make little or no sense as sources or even as categories of information. They must be gathered together again into an ordered system, captions with images and maps with keys, to retrieve meanings that will be useful to someone else. By pulling apart his books, magazines, pamphlets, and maps, Smithson reduces these bits of text, maps, and photographs to their original status as a collection of images and descriptions scattered on some graphic designer’s paste-up board. At some point they were fitted into a format that could be understood by an audience of tourists whose expectations seem to be satisfied by a conventional series of statements: “Here is a guide to ‘somewhere,’ use the map to locate your position, note these particular sites and why they are important, see how beautiful or interesting they look, and enjoy this experience now and later when you return home.”
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As each aspect of a traveler’s experience is shuffled into a cohesive order by the anonymous but personable voice of the travel guide, a new place begins to appear less chaotic. Such ordering does more than record or document a place; it constructs it as an experience. Travel guides and postcards cue the traveler to recognizable values and procedures, so that a new place can be understood and assimilated in familiar ways. A rhythm of absorption develops, dependent on visual and verbal cues located by the tour guide in the place itself. Finding these cues leads to understanding and appreciation. Thus the unfamiliar place is made to answer to the expectations of the traveler, whose expectations in turn have been shaped by the tour guide. When Smithson destroys the official order of the travel materials in his files and then rearranges them to make his own work, he challenges the apparently easy correlation between description and place and the appearance of each fragment as innocent information. He dismisses the ordered prescriptions of the tour guide and starts again. In doing so, he renders normative frameworks into “tools manipulated by a user”—that user being himself. Smithson and the tour guide can never simply record in a neutral and impartial fashion; they always create a cultural experience through the active consumption of the conventions of travel.14 Smithson’s trips weren’t solely an outgrowth of his childhood family vacations. Jack Kerouac’s On the Road defined the road trip for a generation during the late 1950s and into the 1960s. Smithson took several trips across the United States and Mexico in 1957 and 1958. He later identified his excursions as a significant part of his generation’s experience: “It was the period of the beat generation. When I got back On the Road was out, and all those people were around, you know Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg, both of whom I met.”15 Travel became a popular literary device because it provided opportunities for self-consciousness. It offered the ideal conditions for individual independence and, at the same time, submersion in the collective effect of the already familiar images of American mass culture clustering along the highway, singing over the radio, and flashing across the television screen. Artists and writers were not alone in recognizing the importance of “highway culture” and considering what it might mean: Ad-men, media critics, perceptual psychologists, political and social scientists, journalists, cultural critics, architects, advocates of urban renewal, and many others analyzed this paradox with unmitigated fascination.16 All acknowledged a new kind of viewer who carried around multiple personal visual skills and who was connected to a mass-media pipeline that fed a vast array of visual imagery to an international audience. But while the imagery may have been shared, the ways of reading it were not. The uniform, seemingly neutral voice of the tour guide necessarily gave way to visual multiplicities, difficulties, and unexpected responses.
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New York film culture, which included underground film (what Jonas Mekas and others called “home movies”), art film, and B-pictures, was a third condition that, although not as widely shared as print media or travel, frequently provided a lens through which to view both.17 Often a product of the road trip, sometimes culturally transgressive, these films, their makers, and their transient or art-house venues and audiences defined a subculture of overlapping interests that surfaced in magazine culture frequently enough to be acknowledged, written about, and increasingly circulated to broader, more mainstream audiences during the 1960s, usually as evidence of alternative lifestyles—the downtown art scene, the European left, biker culture, beat culture, gay culture.18 But this film culture and its communities represented much more than a set of bohemian social and political activities or wardrobe choices. Jack Smith’s Flaming Creatures, the films of Roger Corman, Jean-Luc Godard, and Andy Warhol fashion and refashion images of members of these communities for their respective constituents’ private consumption and as a form of masquerade or social critique for a mass audience. Although this culture rarely makes an appearance in histories of 1960s visual art, except as an aside, it was central to defining the terms of the New York art world and its various communities, both socially and culturally. Vision itself changed during the 1960s, not only in terms of how the world looked or what it was possible to see, but in terms of vision’s importance to understanding in general. Many artists of Smithson’s generation felt compelled to address this new culture of the visual and its attendant challenges to received perceptual models. This culture was not tied to a particular place or a particular set of officially sanctioned images or media but grew out of the visual and verbal tension between conventional modes of perception and methods of describing them, and new or unfamiliar modes of perception, environments, situations, or personal experiences that could not be contained by these conventions.19 Over and over again, Smithson and others exploited and explored these tensions by creating work that precipitated encounters between the viewer’s conventional expectations and unconventional visual conditions. In doing so, they participated on a deep structural level in significant debates concerning perception and the dynamics of this new culture.
The poet William Carlos Williams perceived the paradoxical qualities of everyday modern life earlier than most. And he understood that he did not have to travel far from home to experience it. In a dry and seemingly direct manner, he revealed how famil-
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iarity does not always satisfy expectation and how description can fail to produce a particular, expected effect. The opening paragraph of his short story “Life Along the Passaic River” demonstrates how this vision unfolds: About noon of a muggy July day, a spot of a canoe filled by the small boy who no doubt made it, lies west of the new 3rd St. Bridge between Passaic and Wallington, midstream opposite the Manhattan Rubber Co.’s red brick and concrete power plant. There’s a sound of work going on there, and a jet of water spouts from a pipe at the foundation level below the factory onto the river’s narrow mud bank which it has channeled making a way for itself into the brown water of the two hundred foot wide stream. The boy is drifting with the current but paddling a little also toward a couple of kids in bathing suits and a young man in his shirt sleeves, lying on what looks to be grass but is probably weeds across the river at the edge of an empty lot where they dumped ashes some years ago, watching him. These youngsters who make boats out of barrel hoops and a piece of old duck, wherever they find it, live by the river these hot summer days. It’s a godsend to them.20 Williams selects a familiar image of rural America—young boys lazily floating along a river in crafts of their own design—described by Mark Twain and exploited over and over by popular illustrators such as Norman Rockwell and by advertisers seeking to mine this image of American innocence. Then, through visual operations that are almost cinematic in effect, he contextualizes this pastoral image within a wider pan of the river and a telephoto scanning of its banks. Assumptions about what should be a rural setting give way to an urban, industrial environment, and grass becomes weeds bordering the edges of an incinerator dump. Significantly, Williams accomplishes this contextualization through a flat, uninflected description of what he sees in front of him; explicit commentary comes only at the last instant. Following his own dictum, “there are no ideas but in things,” he not only contradicts expectations of simple sentimentality but also locates tragedy worthy of high art through the way he contextualizes his image, the way he sees, and the visual politics it implies.21 By overlaying different visual frames of reference, Williams reveals that things are and yet are not equal to the conventions through which they are described and that traditional cultural icons or categories can traffic with the elements of any specific place to “find a local cultural assertion . . . art in the local condition.”22 In fact, a sense of tragedy is produced through a disappointment of the viewer’s expectations surrounding the conventional pastoral image. This crush of disillusionment heightens all the more the reader’s realization that things are not what they initially appear to be.
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William Carlos Williams impressed Robert Smithson from an early age. He was the artist’s pediatrician, and they met briefly again in 1959. Beyond incidents of personal biography, their shared New Jersey backgrounds, which Smithson became aware of through Williams’s poetry, brought them together as artists: “I guess the Paterson area is where I had a lot of my contact with quarries and I think that is somewhat embedded in my psyche. As a kid I used to go and prowl around all those quarries. And of course, they figured strongly in Paterson. When I read the poems I was interested in that, especially this one part of Paterson where it showed all the strata levels under Paterson. Sort of a proto-conceptual art, you might say. Later on I wrote an article for Artforum on Passaic which is a city on the Passaic River south of Paterson. In a way I think it reflects that whole area. Williams did have a sense of that kind of New Jersey landscape.”23 Smithson also called his Passaic article “a kind of appendix to William Carlos Williams’s poem ‘Paterson,’ ” since both “come out of that kind of New Jersey ambience where everything is chewed up,” a historical and cultural junk heap.24 Williams provided Smithson with a valuable road map through the cultural and social complexities of this New Jersey landscape and beyond. And sometime around 1966, it seems that Smithson began to use that map to consider a landscape that supposedly existed outside the boundaries of culture imposed by the New York–centered art world. Later Nancy Holt described this change in both Smithson and herself as an increasingly self-conscious “process of reconnecting with the essential aspects of ourselves and our pasts, our culture, and not accepting the secondary, imposed culture.”25 Unlike Clement Greenberg, Williams and eventually Smithson believed that culture was not a destination beyond the landscape of New Jersey but was waiting to be discovered by the traveler anywhere, elsewhere, or even at home.
Robert Smithson in Mexico, 1969.
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PERCEIVING ABSTRACTION Cincinnatus was opaque. Sometimes, in the midst of a sudden silence, the teacher, in chagrined perplexity, would gather up all the reserves of skin around his eyes, gaze at him for a long while, and finally say: “What is wrong with you, Cincinnatus?” Then Cincinnatus would take hold of himself, and, clutching his own self to his breast, would remove that self to a safe place. . . . [He] would turn this way and that, trying to catch the rays, trying in desperate haste to stand in such a way as to seem translucent. Those around him understood each other at the first word, since they had no words that would end in an unexpected way, perhaps in some archaic letter, an upsilamba, becoming a bird or a catapult with wondrous consequences. vladimir nabokov, INVITATION TO A BEHEADING Sightings fall like heavy objects from one’s eyes. Sight becomes devoid of sense, or the sight is there but the sense is unavailable. Many try to hide this perceptual falling out by calling it abstract. Abstraction is everybody’s zero but nobody’s nought. robert smithson, “some void thoughts on museums”
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FIGURE 1.1 Robert Smithson, sketchbook page, n.d.
The Alogons Sometime during the 1960s, Smithson started a small spiral notebook with a simple ink sketch of two stepped forms situated in front of a rectangular shape (figure 1.1).1 The two forms face each other on the page, and Smithson renders them both from the same, slightly oblique point of view. The two forms appear to be almost identical; because of their simplicity and their positions relative to a shared viewpoint, one can infer that the invisible aspects of one form correspond to the visible aspects of the other and that information gathered from any other viewpoint would be consistent with that offered by the one that Smithson chooses. The viewer’s confidence in such a reading is also supported by the fact that Smithson positions the stepped forms as mirror images of one another. In fact, the rectangular shape behind the two forms suggests that they could be two halves of the same three-dimensional rectangle. Thus, even though the two stepped forms in Smithson’s sketch are not literally transparent or even translucent, nothing about them—their relative shapes, sizes, or positions in space—is unclear or hidden from view. The unified structure of the sketch renders all of these qualities visually logical and conceptually transparent.2 In a subsequent series of related sketches, Smithson continues to use a rectangular shape as a frame behind which he carves deep, illusionistically threedimensional spaces based on one-point perspective or as a wall from which he projects three-dimensional forms loosely based on two-point perspective orthogonals (figure 1.2). Both types of images are articulated by stepped forms and are conceptually or literally transparent. Scattered between these sketches Smithson includes several images of floating, receding geometric planes, but a few pages later the rectangular shape reasserts itself, now clearly as a room, with similar geometric planes rushing outward from its centrally placed back wall (figure 1.3). In the final sketch in the series (figure 1.4), Smithson eliminates any distinctions between the geometric forms and the walls, floor, and ceiling of the room by fusing them into a densely gridded receding space. The forms now generate the spaces they occupy. A clear depiction of an illusionistically rendered three-dimensional space and the forms that occupy it transpires on a two-dimensional surface because of the literal or conceptual transparency of the individual forms and their conformation to the dictates of one-point perspective. One sees through or into the illusionistically rendered space of the sketch because the means of rendering this space and the forms that occupy it are transparent to their illusionistic ends. Everything is visually logical, a perfect fit. On their own, these notebook sketches and the issues they address might be attributed to a number of different artists working in the 1960s. Yet Smithson did
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FIGURE 1.2 Robert Smithson, sketchbook page, n.d.
FIGURE 1.3 Robert Smithson, sketchbook page, n.d.
FIGURE 1.4 Robert Smithson, sketchbook page, n.d.
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not create them to be viewed on their own or to be viewed publicly. In these respects, the sketches have nothing in common with his more “signature” finished drawings, which, even if related to specific projects, were often executed after the fact, were usually signed and dated, were exhibited during Smithson’s lifetime, and continue to be included in exhibitions since his death.3 The notebook sketches represent a significant but relatively invisible aspect of Smithson’s working process and therefore need to be considered as a part of this process in order to be understood. In 1966 and 1967, Smithson produced a series of multiple-unit, threedimensional works, which he called Alogons, that possibly began with these notebook sketches. At least, Smithson made the sketches with the Alogon series in mind. The designs for all of the Alogons are based on some variation of the same basic forms Smithson uses in the sketches. Alogon and Alogon #3 (figures 1.5 and 1.6), for example, consist of a series of three-dimensional step forms that are similar to the two forms in the first notebook sketch. When considered together, however, the illusionistic worlds of harmonious three-dimensional forms and spaces that Smithson creates in the sketches also provide an illuminating counterpoint to their three-dimensional counterparts—the sculpture and its spaces of exhibition. The specific terms of this counterpoint emerge through the numerous ways that Smithson directed the Alogons to be photographed in preparation for his first one-person exhibition at Dwan Gallery in 1966. These photographs reveal the terms of the stepped forms’ transformation from two-dimensional illusions of three-dimensional objects in rendered space into three-dimensional sculptures occupying actual space. This transformation process is not a smooth one, and viewing the sketches, photographs, and sculpture in relation to one another renders visible the gaps. Smithson was in the habit of photographing or having others photograph his sculpture in a variety of arrangements and from a number of different angles.4 Some of the resulting images were intended to be used for publicity purposes or as documentation, but, primarily, they reflect a significant aspect of Smithson’s working method, which can be appreciated only by considering the full range of contemporary images taken of any one work.5 Photography is a second, relatively invisible aspect of Smithson’s working process, at least in terms of his early, three-dimensional work. Alogon provides a good case study of this practice since the most complete selection of images of this work exists. Some photographic images of Alogon (see figure 1.5) establish a visual harmony between the diminishing size of the work’s seven stepped units and the receding space of the room in which the work is placed through Smithson’s choice of the camera’s location and lens angle. Although not every side of each
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FIGURE 1.5 Robert Smithson, Alogon, 1966.
FIGURE 1.6 Robert Smithson, Alogon #3, 1967.
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individual unit is visible in the photograph, nothing in the image contradicts the assumption that each unit is simply an identical albeit smaller version of the geometric form that precedes it. The three-dimensional totality of this work can be easily understood from the two-dimensional surface of the photograph, just as the totality of the illusionistically rendered images can be understood in the notebook sketches. Yet Smithson is not simply “trying with desperate haste,” like Cincinnatus, to “stand his sculpture in such a way as to make it seem transparent.” In reality, he is attempting something quite different. As line drawings, the notebook sketches related to these sculptures have no “other side” that is out of sight. Even if rendered as solid forms, their adherence to a unified spatial recession or projection determined by linear perspective makes their three-dimensionality both clear and spatially consistent. Smithson’s built versions of these sketches, however, are not tied to the illusionistic conventions for rendering three-dimensional images on a two-dimensional surface or to a particular space or spatial arrangement. The individual units in each multiple-unit work can be arranged either in decreasing or increasing order by size so that together they articulate the spatial projection or recession of the notebook sketches regardless of their specific spatial surroundings. By photographing Alogon so that its individual units diminish in size in relation to the recession of the space it occupies, Smithson chooses one of several possible options that are available to him when setting up and photographing the work. And in doing so, he reveals that visual logic and conceptual transparency are illusions that require careful construction. Most of the photographic images of Alogon convey much more ambiguous or even contradictory relationships between the sculpture and the space it occupies. For one photograph (figure 1.7), Smithson removed the work from the wall—its usual location when exhibited or photographed—and placed it on the floor. To stablize the individual units on the floor, Smithson rotated them ninety degrees. He also reversed the order of the units so that they were lined up in tight succession from smallest to largest. The work then was photographed without direct light and from a low enough angle so that the six steps of the individual units produce overlapping sets of jagged edges that appear to slightly increase in height and width as they recede in space toward a back wall of the gallery. The resulting image is somewhat ambiguous and opaque. For another photograph (figure 1.8), Smithson flipped Alogon so that its stepped units face left instead of right, but maintained the same dimensional progression from smallest to largest unit, even though, in the resulting photograph, the work now occupies a more ambiguous spatial context. Because the physical limits of
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FIGURE 1.7 Robert Smithson, Alogon, 1966.
the space—floor, ceiling, and walls—are out of focus, the work almost appears to float. And Smithson lights the work so that it casts no shadows that would aid the viewer in reading the work’s precise spacial orientation. The conventions for photographing modern sculpture for reproduction during this period proscribed distracting shadows, backgrounds, or any other indication of spatial context that would distract from the viewer’s perception of individual works as discrete objects.6 While one intended purpose of these conventions was the production of legible, accurate, and aesthetically pleasing photographic images, such practices were also conceived to affect the viewer’s comprehension of a three-dimensional object on a two-dimensional photographic plane; a potentially discomforting sense of an unseen side or view was suppressed. Although never a stated goal, the successful suppression of sculpture’s physical three-dimensionality was assumed to be necessary to the production of a successful photographic reproduction—hence the ubiquitous instruction in photography manuals to “select one good view.” Smithson’s flipping of Alogon seems to echo another photographic privilege, the option to flip a photographic negative to reverse the spatial orientation of the image it produces. When eliminating spatial context or flipping his work, Smithson
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may be thinking like a photographer, yet in doing so he reveals the limitations of such photographic practices because Alogon cannot be easily or consistently read as a noncontextual or “flipped image.” Because the space of the photograph (see figure 1.8) is ambiguous, it creates no sense of depth or forward projection on its own. Alogon dictates the spatial terms of the photograph by appearing alternately to project out from the plane of the photograph and then to recede behind it. This constant spatial shifting produces a visually irreconcilable image. Here Smithson has created a perspectival rebus that is similar to the experiments with flipped or reverse perspective produced by a number of painters during this period, particularly Frank Stella and the artists associated with the Park Place Group.7 The final and more conventional question this photographic image begs—how can the image appear to project forward or recede in space when the units become increasingly smaller as the distance decreases between the viewer, or in this case the lens of the camera, and the sculpture—can be answered only because the image is obviously a photograph of a three-dimensional object and not an illusionistically rendered two-dimensional image of a threedimensional object. Smithson disrupts visual expectations for illusionistic two-
FIGURE 1.8 Robert Smithson, Alogon, 1966.
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dimensional images only to define how visual expectations operate in three dimensions more clearly. Photography, in providing an indexical link between two types of dimensional rendering, acts as the perfect tool for revealing the differences between them. Alogon occupies actual space and therefore does not have to conform either to the terms of illusionistic or even anti-illusionistic space depicted in contemporary painting or to the conventions of an unobtrusive “no space” present in most contemporary reproductions of sculpture. When reproduced, particularly with text, these photographic images of Alogon (figure 1.9) disrupt the two-dimensional coherence of the page with perceptual conundrums that make the formal and spatial terms of the works depicted difficult to read. The anything but smooth transformation of a threedimensional object into a two-dimensional image is thereby revealed. This is another important point to Smithson’s photographic practice—he understood that his sculpture would be experienced by a majority of people through photographic reproductions in magazines, catalogues, and books. What is merely visually ambiguous or perceptually irreconcilable in the Alogon photographs becomes absurd when Alogon is experienced in actual, threedimensional spaces. The work doesn’t always cater to established pictorial conventions; why should it conform to the perceptual terms of the actual spaces it occupies? In a 1967 article on perspectival experimentation, Lucy Lippard describes visual ambiguity and absurdity as polar opposites. She credits the former with significance and aesthetic value and links the latter with meaninglessness and artistic failure: “Success depends on the degree and intelligence of the ambiguity, which must be relevant to vision as an autonomous phenomenon or to painting as a continually developing means of expression.”8 Although Lippard’s discussion focuses on paintFIGURE 1.9 Robert Smithson, advertisement
ing, she mentions a number of sculptors, including Smithson, whose work deals with
for his first one-person exhibition
perspectival ambiguities. Yet her failure to discuss their sculpture in any detail implies
at Dwan Gallery, New York, 1966.
that she assumes that the work of these artists merely extends investigations associated with painting into three dimensions. Such assumptions, typical of many critics writing during the postwar period, hobbled the efforts of artists working in three dimensions to be understood in anything but pictorial terms, even if pictorial terms
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were supposedly being pushed to their limits at the time. But it was the other assumption imbedded in Lippard’s statement—that vision could be an “autonomous phenomenon”—that Smithson aims to critique in his three-dimensional work by revealing that there is no such thing as “autonomous vision.” He performs this critique by revealing the experiential differences between two-dimensional images and three-dimensional objects in space. Seeing occurs in relation to space—the space depicted or occupied by the image or object and the space within which it is viewed. These relationships can be ambiguous and are potentially “absurd.” This absurdity, however, is not the sign of artistic failure, but a strategy intended to reveal that autonomous vision is nothing more than a myth perpetuated by critical discourse. Smithson meant to generate absurd visual experiences for precisely this reason. Alogon #2 (figure 1.10) consists of ten three-dimensional, stepped, painted steel units of uniformly decreasing or increasing proportions, depending on one’s vantage point. It is a floor piece; the stepped sides of each unit meet at right angles to provide a base filled by one, two, and then three descending stepped cubes. Although the idea of a simple repetition of the same geometric configuration on a graduated scale is easy to comprehend conceptually, experientially it is not.9 In fact, encountering the work in any space generates a series of short circuits between one’s conceptual sense of the work and one’s visual and physical experience of it as one moves around it. These disparities occur in relation to several interrelated aspects of the work’s design and installation. Smithson called Alogon #2 and his other three-dimensional work from this period examples of solid or “three-dimensional perspective,” meaning that these works fill in portions of the backward or forward convergence of conventional one- or two-point perspectival orthogonals to present them as solid, three-dimensional objects. But these conventions for describing a visually coherent illusion of a three-dimensional image in space on a two-dimensional surface do not translate satisfactorily into threedimensional objects situated in three-dimensional spaces. Logistical problems immediately arise with regard to the placement and viewing of this sculpture when Smithson actually begins to plan its arrangement within specific spaces. One of these problems can easily be seen by comparing Smithson’s spiral notebook sketches of the sculptural forms in space to his sketches of the New York Dwan Gallery floor plan and the possible arrangements of actual works within it.10 In one sketch, which is probably related to his second one-person exhibition at Dwan, Smithson indicates the floor plan of the main gallery space with a dark outline, and traces of several scribbled out areas reveal that he considered several
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FIGURE 1.10 Robert Smithson, Alogon #2, 1966.
positions for some of the pieces. But what is most striking is that although the floor plan is an aerial view, Smithson sketches almost all of the individual sculptures in elevation, as they would appear at eye level. Smithson has a difficult time turning the works around in his mind to render them intelligible when seen from above because, in the end, these works are actually not visually or conceptually transparent. From some angles they make no visual sense either individually or in relation to a coherent spatial context. Transparent sculpture not only must consistently answer its viewer’s gaze with a coherent demonstration of how it occupies space but demonstrate its formal consistency from any point of view. Each side of any one of Smithson’s sculptures presents a different, often contradictory image. When viewing works like Alogon #2 in a gallery, the spectator is free to move in any direction and can even look at the piece from a position in which the units increase in size as the distance between them and the viewer increases. Thus the work is solid and often visually opaque. It is pictorially logical from only a limited number of points of view and absurd from all others, even though, as a free-standing, threedimensional object, it encourages the viewer to physically move around it. In this viewing situation, the illusionistic conventions for rendering objects in three-dimensional
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space might appear to function as a kind of a gestalt image, which the spectator seeks to discover and then retain. But the experience is not really similar to the experiences generated by the gestalt-based work of Smithson’s contemporaries, particularly Robert Morris, or by so-called minimalist work in general, with which Smithson’s early sculpture has traditionally been grouped.11 Morris’s 1965 Untitled (Three L-Beams) (figure 1.11), for example, consists of several identical, three-dimensional, L-shaped forms, which the artist exhibits in several different positions—upright, inverted, or flat on the floor. Initially, one’s visual experience of these individual units of the work is inconsistent with one’s preconception of their basic form because of the variety of ways in which each unit occupies space. Although their placement yields changes in one’s understanding of their shared form, this is possible only because the form itself remains constant. Morris explains: “If the predominant, hieratic nature of the unitary form functions as a constant, all those particularizing relations of scale, proportion, etc., are not thereby canceled. Rather they are bound more cohesively and indivisibly together.”12 Smithson’s Alogons possess no constant form or gestalt that can be disengaged from their placement in space. Their gestalt, if it can even be called that, is a solid rendering of a fragmentary illusion of three-dimensional space. Different placements and arrangements of the work, as Smithson’s photographs demonstrate, result in the dissolution of this gestalt rather than in its coherence. Only one work in Smithson’s Alogon series, Plunge (figure 1.12), possesses a set of unitary forms that function as constants. Ironically, these constants are the three invisible, two-dimensional cubes produced by the overlapping of the four graduated, stacked, cube forms within each unit; they remain three, six, and nine inches square for each unit in the series. Therefore, the work’s gestalt is what one literally can never see.13 A spectator’s movement around the individual units of Morris’s Untitled (Three L-Beams) is encouraged but is not really necessary to a visual understanding of this work. Placement of the units and a resulting awareness of the space around and between them render the perceptual particularities and physical three-dimensionality of each of the constant forms visible, but all of these things can be observed from almost any one point of view.14 Movement only confirms one’s initial impression through a dynamic process of adding up individual impressions of the units in space in relation to a unitary gestalt. Morris may claim that it is “the viewer who changes the shape constantly by his change in position relative to the work,” but it is the exhibition space itself that accommodates both of these changes.15 Thus, even though the individual units in Morris’s Untitled (Three L-Beams) or in any of his early geometric sculpture are not physically transparent, nothing about them—their relative shapes, sizes,
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FIGURE 1.11 Robert Morris, Untitled (Three L-Beams), 1969 refabrication of a 1965 original.
or positions in space—is really hidden from any one point of view. The harmony between their forms and the visual logic of the spaces they occupy eventually render all these qualities conceptually transparent. As stated above, for a viewer of Smithson’s Alogons, space is not so accommodating. And the more he or she moves around the work, the more the viewer is subject to the contradictions between the work and the space it occupies. Any logical relationship between the space and the work that might have been granted from one position in the room dissolves into a series of disconnected views that don’t add up to anything but increasing perceptual disorder. The work is willfully static and resistant to a spectator’s movements and to the time he or she invests. As a result, the unfolding of time and of space seem to split apart. The passage of time becomes an experience that is separate from and offers no guarantee of a cumulative experience of space. To make this split and the willful stasis of the object more palpable, Smithson attenuated the space-time gap by rotating the ten units of Plunge ninety degrees four times during the work’s first public exhibition at Dwan Gallery in November 1966 through January 1967—the first time after eight days, the second after nine days, the third after ten days, and the final time after eleven days. This process, which is docu-
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FIGURE 1.12 Robert Smithson, Plunge, 1966.
mented in the pamphlet Smithson designed to accompany the exhibition, stretches out and slows down the intervals between his physical alteration of the work and the resulting changes in the work’s appearance in the gallery, even as his rearrangements maintain a logical perspectival view from the same number of limited vantage points.16 Ironically, these rearrangements don’t really alter the perceptual experience of the work even as time passes. One doesn’t learn any more about the expanded potential of a constant set of basic forms as in Morris’s Untitled (Stadium), a floor piece consisting of eight units that Morris rearranged into different geometric configurations throughout the course of the work’s exhibition, each rearrangement resulting in a different coherent geometric image. Smithson’s rearrangements seem gratuitous, almost a parody intended to reveal the limitations of Morris’s efforts to explore seriality’s marking of space and time. Collectively, all the experiences of form, space, and time generated by Smithson’s Alogons expose the amount of entropy inherent to his chosen system of representation in its culturally specific context, the enclosed white box of the art gallery. The placement of a three-dimensionalized version of a convention used to render illusions of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface into a three-
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dimensional space makes no sense. The work and the space don’t fit, and the resulting struggle to reconcile the two over time produces palpable “energy-drain.”17 The specific terms and limitations of the space that the Alogons occupy and of the viewer’s location in this same space become much more tangible than they do when viewing Morris’s Untitled (Three L-Beams), since when viewing the Morris the viewer is asked to become aware of space in general—not the lack of fit between the work’s particular three-dimensional representation of space and the specific space it occupies. The Morris doesn’t confound the visual logic of the room; it simply introduces it as a variable in viewing the work. Smithson’s Alogons are pretty much at odds with the visual logic of the spaces they occupy; for the most part, they appear to belong elsewhere than where they actually are. They are more sight-specific than site-specific, although the specificity of their site produces this sight-specificity.
Smithson didn’t confine his sketching to the pages of a proper artist’s sketchbook or even to the small spiral-bound notebooks he frequently used for both drawing and writing. He sketched wherever he discovered a convenient blank page—the backs of letters and photographs, end pages of books, and pamphlets. He also drew in the margins or on top of photographs or other types of images printed in books, pamphlets, and magazines. In so doing, he incorporated a wide variety of conceptual material into his working process because in most cases he was translating the concepts and images from the source material into his own conceptual and formal terms. Thus his works are often hybrids in which he has incorporated a number of different concepts and images. Sketches related to the Alogons turn up in a number of places— for example, on the blank end pages of Smithson’s copies of Helen Fouché Gaines’s Cryptanalysis and Harry Asher’s Experiments in Seeing. The Alogons therefore cannot be considered to be simple manifestations of simple mathematical calculations or threedimensional versions of the perspectival sketches in his spiral notebook. They are attempts to decipher codes, perceptual experiments in which the outcome is more significant than the sum of the sources of their formal terms. Smithson based several of his sculptural designs from this period on one particular set of found images, a simple type of drawing called an alternating perspective figure or an isometric figure. These figures are the perceptual puzzles frequently used in perceptual experiments. Although the figures take a number of forms, all use standard perspectival tricks to create the illusion of two conflicting three-
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FIGURE 1.13 Illustrations of alternating perspective figures, in M. D. Vernon, The Psychology of Perception (1962).
dimensional images (figure 1.13). A square appears to thrust forward and then to recede backward, or one side of a cube reads initially as the cube’s back and then as its top, or a staircase carries the viewer visually upward and then seems to flip over to represent a cornice or bit of architectural molding, all because of a few well placed lines. Two images can be viewed in such figures since both of these images are based on line drawings that carry none of the typical indications of weight or mass, such as texture or modeling in light or shadow, that would promote one three-dimensional reading over another. Some, like the cube, consist of transparent planes that are articulated by lines that indicate spatial perimeters but do not block them off or anchor them in space. All the lines in the figures are primary; there are no dotted lines to
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FIGURE 1.14 Illustration of an alternating perspective figure, in Ronald G. Carraher and Jacqueline B. Thurston, Optical Illusions and the Visual Arts (1966).
suggest invisible edges in a figure’s three-dimensional image. In other words, everything is visible in these figures; they don’t concede either of their three-dimensional aspects. Yet because viewers cannot seem to hold both of these aspects together completely in one view, the figures sustain a constant alternation between competing images. Both the appeal of and frustration caused by the alternating perspective figures lie in their inclusiveness. Temporarily undoing this perceptual rebus is easy since alternating perspective figures are necessarily two-dimensional. This is the only way that they can allude to two different three-dimensional images of space. Smithson simply selects one of the two three-dimensional images from a particular alternating perspective figure and uses it as the formal basis for his design of a three-dimensional sculpture. He was able to alternate between the two images contained in Schröder’s “reversible staircase”—the staircase and the cornice—by changing the orientation of Alogon, and he based his design of Alogon #2 on a “honey-comb” figure (figure 1.14). A view of any one unit of Alogon #2 from its stacked cube side reveals how Smithson transformed the two-dimensional alternating perspective figure into a concrete, three-dimensional object by removing the lines and shadings that make the figure illusionistically
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shuttle backward and forward when presented on the two-dimensional page.18 Experiencing Alogon #2 in a three-dimensional space, however, produces a new set of irreconcilable images that, like their two-dimensional source, ultimately call attention to their fundamental circumstances—in this case, the actual three-dimensional space that the work occupies and the viewer’s inability to visually reconcile this space with the work’s formal appearance. Smithson extends the alternating perspective figure’s ambiguity into three dimensions, and the resulting experience is no longer strictly pictorial. Through a simple transformation of a perceptual rebus, Smithson challenges visual habits and implicates ambient space in the perceptual process.
Abstraction’s Ambiguities That ambiguity cannot be seen is a central thesis of E. H. Gombrich’s Art and Illusion. . . . Fortunately, the task of challenging Gombrich does not devolve upon me, since Picasso spent his life challenging it. Gombrich’s conviction that alternatives cannot be seen in simultaneity is argued on the evidence of trivial diagrams. leo steinberg, “the algerian women and picasso at large” Numerous individuals who dealt with perception in the early 1960s included a seemingly trivial diagram, the alternating perspective figure, in their arguments. This figure’s widespread appearance was more than just a coincidence; its presence signaled points where assumptions, usually unacknowledged, about perception overlapped, even in apparently antithetical arguments. As morphological connections, these alternating perspective figures now reveal gaps or blind spots in critical discourse and thus provide a useful point of reentry into a set of significant debates concerning perception and abstract art at some of these telling points of overlap, and provide an important context for Smithson’s three-dimensional work. Smithson owned several texts that contain discussions and illustrations of alternating perspective figures. One of his principle sources was the contemporary literature on perceptual psychology. This was also true of many of Smithson’s contemporaries who used the alternating perspective figure, or at least the perceptual conditions it describes, in their arguments. One important source for Smithson was M. D. Vernon’s 1962 text The Psychology of Perception.19 Vernon introduces alternating perspective figures and a number of other perceptual experiments into her discussion of the relationship between attention and perception to determine where the role of
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biology ends and education or conditioning begins in the perceptual process, her primary aim being to emphasize the central importance of the latter. She admits that the visual fluctuation that alternating perspective figures provoke and the viewer’s attempt to overcome it by favoring one illusion over the other in the figures might be due to some as yet undiscovered events in the central nervous system, but she believes that neither can be solely retinal, the result of “any form of retinal fatigue.”20 She stresses the role of conscious attention, conditioned by instruction, interest, or expectation, in controlling what is seen over purely retinal sensations or gestalt theory’s claims for the universality of the “good image’s” victory.21 For her, conditioned expectation plays the major part in generating the alternating perspective figure’s perceptual instability and the viewer’s methods of resolving it. She demonstrates this point by discussing the perceptual effects of alternating perspective figures in relation to the three-dimensional fusion of retinal disparity in stereoscopic images. A stereoscope viewer’s binocular mask directs the user’s eyes to two images of the same object or scene photographed or rendered from two different points in space situated at a distance apart from each other that is roughly equal to the distance between the two eyes. These two images are mounted on a single card attached to a track that extends out in front of the mask. Viewers slide the two side-by-side images closer to or further from their gaze until, at the proper distance, the two images appear to fuse into one to produce the illusion of a single, threedimensional image. Vernon states that while this retinal fusion of the two images may appear to be “spontaneous and unlearnt,” it is not—since the process that produces it always favors culturally familiar images.22 She offers an example of pairs of photographs presented stereoscopically—“a Mexican scene to one eye and an American one to the other, to Mexican and American observers. The Mexican scenes tended to dominate for the Mexican observers, the American ones for the Americans.”23 Retinal fusion also occurs more quickly and completely when one views representational images, even if the images are contradictory. If one photograph of a face is placed in front of one eye looking through a stereoscope and the same photograph is placed upside down in front of the other, then the upright image dominates, and the inverted one is sometimes completely suppressed. Abstract stereoscopic images can also produce a coherent threedimensional illusion, “but it will be slower and less certain in appearance.”24 Vernon explains that we need the familiar clues of unified spatial orientation, context, and content on which visual conditioning has trained us to depend and that perception is facilitated if images satisfy these needs. Abstract images generally lack these clues, and
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this lack affects perceptual accuracy. For example, if a tilted abstract circle appears outside of a discernible context, eventually it will be perceived as an ellipse, but if the circle is placed within a specific, spatially coherent setting that allows a viewer to identify it as an object that is traditionally round such as a barrel stay, then the image will be read as a circle seen on end. The abstract circle needs consistent spatial cues to be properly read, yet these spatial clues are purely cultural and in no way essential to perception generally, since, without the cues, the circle is still perceived, just not perceived correctly. Vernon’s stereoscopic examples demonstrate this important distinction between perceiving what one expects to perceive or feels comfortable perceiving and perceiving what is actually there, and the central role that cultural conditioning plays in the process. The way one perceives, and particularly the way one perceives in space, in illusionistic or actual three-dimensions depends on the presence or absence of cultural conventions, and binocular retinal rivalry or fusion, in spite of their names, can in no way be attributed solely to the biological fact that one has two eyes.25 The paired images in alternating perspective figures are almost always geometric, and they are ostensibly abstract in Vernon’s sense of the term since the way they occupy space as three-dimensional illusions renders them readable as representations—boxes, staircases, towers—and at the same time renders them so unstable as to make their status as representations unstable as well. The spectator’s difficulty with resolving the visual ambiguities of these figures or the disparate images on a stereoscope card might be compared to his or her difficulties with reading abstract images generally, since many of the latter also lack clues sufficient to repress multiple or contradictory readings. Although Vernon does not make this particular analogy, a number of contemporary art historians and critics not only make the analogy but assume that the structure and perceptual experience of the figures and the structure and perceptual experience of some types of paintings are the same. In his 1960 text Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, for example, E. H. Gombrich directly links cubism’s suspension of illusionistic transformation to an alternating perspective drawing called Thiéry’s figure by illustrating the latter (figure 1.15) and stating that it presents “the quintessence of cubism.”26 Thiéry’s figure challenges viewers in a manner that is typical of alternating perspective figures; it appears to shuttle back and forth between an illusion of an apparently upright and then an inverted stack or tower. Gombrich’s description of the perceptual terms of this process in cubist painting is similar to Vernon’s discussion of the process of viewing alternating perspective figures: “If illusion is due to the
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FIGURE 1.15 Thiéry’s figure (upper left), in Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1960).
interaction of clues and the absence of contradictory evidence, the only way to fight its transforming influence is to make the clues contradict each other and to prevent a coherent image of reality from destroying the pattern in the plane. . . . Try as we may to see the guitar or the jug suggested to us as a three-dimensional object and thereby to transform it, we will always come across a contradiction somewhere which compels us to start afresh.”27 According to Gombrich, the result of these frequent reversals in Thiéry’s figure is to “force our attention to the plane.”28 Cubism’s ultimate goal is the same: “to stamp out ambiguity and to enforce one reading of the picture—that of a man-made construction, a colored canvas.”29 In both cases, any hint of illusionistic
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three-dimensionality ultimately collapses into a perceptual awareness of what is actually there in two dimensions. In comparing the experience of viewing cubist paintings with Thiéry’s figure, Gombrich not only equates the visual experiences of painting with the visual experience of a diagram; he also identifies the figure’s design and visual effects as one of several of the artistic conventions that cubists used to undermine illusionism. Gombrich demonstrates that such devices can be traced back to the ancient decorative art of mosaics and recognized in twentieth-century commercial art. The cubists, Gombrich claims, were just the first to exploit these conventions in the high art of painting. Gombrich’s entire argument in Art and Illusion depends on the identification of such conventions or what he calls “schema.” Most of these schema facilitate illusionism, but all of them mitigate the inherent ambiguity of two-dimensional images and of vision itself. Viewers use these schema to interpret images in art and elsewhere by a process of trial and error. Their interpretive process mirrors the artist’s own making or matching of images, based on established stylistic schema, that create a persuasive illusion of reality as distinct from the ambiguities of actual vision. In describing the artist and the viewer’s process in this way, Gombrich refutes John Ruskin’s theory of the “innocent eye” by proposing a mediating historically and socially variable “artistic vision.” He bases his analysis of the production and perception of art on the shared artistic schema of the period in which a work of art was produced; not in relation to an assumed, universal perceptual coherence to be found in the natural world and painstakingly transcribed onto canvas by the artist. Gombrich identifies the rise of cubism as the crux in the history of illusionism. Whereas illusionistic art distracts the viewer away from an awareness of ambiguity through the use of cultural schema, cubism, by engaging in a crucial “revolt” against illusionism, reveals ambiguity to the viewer in order to stamp it out. It succeeds in doing both of these things by implementing conventions, such as the alternating perspective figure, that embrace contradictory illusions and visual ambiguity to defeat both. Abstract or nonfigurative art’s ambiguity, according to Gombrich, is quite different. It is overt and unresolvable because “there is no possible test by which we can describe which reading to adopt.”30 Such art lacks intelligibility or what Gombrich calls the “beholder’s share” because it operates in relation to no familiar conventions or schema. The viewer’s only recourse would be a limited identification with the artist’s personal creative process, which is an interpretive possibility granted to only a select group of individuals close to the artist. Under such conditions, the
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quality of works of art cannot be objectively judged since the criteria used would have to be tailored to the work of each individual artist. In an earlier essay, Gombrich does concede, however, that this “art might even gradually build up a framework of conventions like the one which made Western music possible; that system of expectations within which the musician creates, even when he defies it.”31 And by clinging to his “making and matching” formula, Gombrich also concedes in Art and Illusion that nonfigurative art might eventually develop a social function through the development of such a framework of aesthetic conventions: “If this game [meaning the reading of nonfigurative art] has a function in our society, it may be that it helps us to ‘humanize’ the intricate and ugly shapes with which industrial civilization surrounds us. We even learn to see twisted wires or complex machinery as the product of human action. We are trained in a new visual classification.”32 Much has been made of Gombrich’s avowed dislike of abstract art’s ambiguity, and Art and Illusion has often been criticized because Gombrich appears to equate successful art with naturalistic illusionism.33 Yet Gombrich defines ambiguity in a specific manner. He does not use the term to refer to a lack of recognizable subject matter, since the alternating perspective figure, the cubist paintings he describes, and the shapes in abstract art all contain or will at some point contain relatively familiar images: towers, guitars, jugs, twisted wires, etc. Rather, he focuses on how artists render images within schema that can ultimately be recognized by the viewer as coherent and stable or not. Without such schema, a work is overtly ambiguous. According to Gombrich, this ambiguity causes discomfort in the viewer because it is not perceptually sustainable; ambiguity cannot be seen. Gombrich requires that something has to resolve visual ambiguity for perception to occur. Vision requires literal or at least conceptual transparency—one set of unified spacial clues—that, in the end, cubism provides but abstract art cannot produce. Rather than explicitly stating that this need is biological or inherent to the physical mechanics of seeing itself, Gombrich places this need for resolution in an anchor that holds the viewer in relation to the artist’s intention so deeply into his understanding of art making and viewing that it can be taken for an a priori condition. His use of the alternating perspective figure as a paradigm of this dilemma indicates an identification between the mechanics of seeing and the dilemmas inherent in viewing art. Therefore, Gombrich seems to suggest that retinal fusion is endemic to perception and is not a culturally conditioned result. Some equivocation occurs here, and one realizes that, for Gombrich, not only is the experience of looking at an alternating perspective figure the same as the experience of look-
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ing at a cubist painting, but both experiences reflect the fundamental conditions of perception in general. Clement Greenberg also discusses the perception of abstract art in terms of ambiguity in a number of essays in his 1961 anthology Art and Culture. According to Greenberg, the illusionistic depiction of space, figures, or narratives was one of the primary concerns of pre-modern artists, whereas modernist artists, following cubism’s lead, rejected illusionism for varying degrees of abstraction or “antiillusionism.” This anti-illusionism is a major source of audience estrangement, and Greenberg describes the sense of loss viewers may feel in front of modernist painting as an “abrogation of those spatial rights which images used to enjoy back when the painter was obligated to create an illusion of the same kind of space as that in which our bodies move.”34 We miss the intermediary terms of this unified illusionistic space— its “nouns and transitive verbs”—and not the images of representational art, he claims, and we stumble over unfamiliar spatial language that meets few of our habitual expectations.35 On all of these points, Greenberg and Gombrich appear to be in general agreement, even if they describe the relationship between abstract art and cubism a bit differently—a continuum rather than a distinct break—and the terms they use to describe the viewer’s visual difficulties—a lack of illusionistic space’s familiar “nouns and transitive verbs” in contrast to a lack of unified schema—are not precisely the same. Early in his career, Greenberg, like Gombrich, also addresses modern art’s rejection of illusion or mimesis and the difficulties this rejection creates for viewers in relation to a broader set of cultural conditions, which he links to the industrial revolution. Before the advent of industrialized civilization, all cultural producers and consumers occupied a specific social or class position, and serious art was destined for a particular audience and a controlled set of social spaces. The industrial revolution upset this order by providing the working classes, or what Greenberg calls the masses, with expanded leisure time and a need for activities to fill it. Although the working class now had greater access to high culture through their new location in or near urban centers, and increasingly public and much more comprehensive modes of cultural consumption, they lacked the visual skills required to comprehend high culture.36 The loss of a distinction between producers and consumers threatened high culture’s very existence and resulted in the creation of a debased form of this culture to fill the new needs and spaces of leisure. Greenberg calls this debased cultural form “kitsch,” and he attributes its popularity to the fact that the viewer “recognizes and sees things in [kitsch] the way in
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which he recognizes and sees things outside of pictures—there is no discontinuity between art and life, no need to accept a convention.”37 Greenberg implies that kitsch offers effortless “unreflective enjoyment” and that mass spectators seek such passive relaxation, the opposite of work, or more specifically in this case, “cultural work” at the end of a long work day or work week.38 He argues that the avant-garde artist’s renunciation of mimesis provides a partial solution to this debased cultural situation by demanding that spectators reflect on “the immediate impression left by the plastic values” of a particular work rather than merely recognize what is depicted.39 Such demands allow advanced art to remain apart from society’s main commercial arenas and unintelligible to those unable to do cultural work and at the same time to continue to be concerned at a distance with the primary intellectual underpinnings of society’s modern sensibility.40 Greenberg felt that abstraction was best suited to accomplish this balancing act. Flatness, because of its denial of illusionism, was an appropriate metaphor for modern society’s positivism, and simple geometric forms and their implicit economy of means could refer to the rationalized processes of contemporary industry.41 Yet the problem of how an audience would understand and appreciate abstract art’s balancing act still existed for the critic: “The difficulty remains our failure to relate this high conception of contemporary art to our own lives, our inability to be detached about either art or life, detached and whole as people are who are at home in a world of culture.”42 This difficulty arose, in part, because for Greenberg visual habits were learned and therefore, at this point, fairly class-specific. An appreciation of Picasso required training in skills beyond those used in everyday life, skills that could be acquired only by those with sufficient time, not restricted to legislated leisure away from work. Greenberg did remain alert to moments when particular works might successfully break through the limitations of class-specific visual expectations or of existing viewing conditions. He recognized that generating a new kind of audience awareness, particularly for abstraction, depended more on the artist’s successful reshaping of the conventional formats of picture-making and the spaces within which they were to be viewed than on accomplishing formal revolutions within the confines of the easel picture itself. He admired, for instance, Jean Dubuffet’s crossing of class lines to give an aesthetic role to the “anti-social” graffiti of the urban lower classes but acknowledged that high art cannot overcome consumer capitalism merely by trading up its traditional values for styles borrowed from the realm of popular culture as long as it depends on the forms of display dictated by the dominant institutions of art consumption.43
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In his later, mostly post-1950 essays, Greenberg increasingly replaces cultural explanations for the advantages and difficulties of abstract art with simple bridges that arch over abstraction’s complex social and political ramifications. Instead of addressing the issue of visual skills or expectations in terms of class or social location, he attempts to define the relationship between modernist art and its viewers in experiential terms alone. The viewer’s relationship to abstraction is no longer defined by the social position of the avant-garde or the purity of the art object but by the purity of visual experience itself. Greenberg codified this position regarding abstraction when he collected his writings for publication in 1961 in Art and Culture. The “Greenberg” of Art and Culture and after was the critic familiar to the 1960s art world and to Smithson.44 For the Greenberg of Art and Culture, modernist art closes the alienating distance between the unfamiliar look of abstraction and the viewer’s expectations by transforming the language of viewing in terms of spatial experience. The possibility of understanding this new language was available to anyone willing to commit to a new kind of looking. In his essay “The New Sculpture,” Greenberg bases his argument on a self-imposed rigor that is extremely exclusive. His field of analysis is equivalent to what he can see in front of him. The possibility of occupying such an all-knowing position is, for Greenberg, one of the major achievements of modernist art: “The human body is no longer postulated as the agent of space in either pictorial or sculptural art; now it is eyesight alone, and eyesight has more freedom of movement and invention within three dimensions than within two.”45 Nor did he want the objects of his gaze to describe a physical three-dimensional form; they should reinforce the visual terms of the spectator’s experience and not his or her physical circumstances. Thus they should have no corporeality or tactility; these qualities would set off associations that are located outside of purely visual experience. “Instead of the illusion of things,” he declares, “we are now offered the illusion of modalities: namely, that matter is incorporeal, weightless and exists only optically like a mirage.”46 Greenberg delivers several of his seminal descriptions of this optical mirage in his essays on cubism. In this way he can underscore his belief that modernist art—which, in his mind, was becoming increasingly synonymous with pure abstraction and, particularly, modernist sculpture—was a logical continuation and development of the visual and spatial insights of cubism. In “Collage,” he claims that Braque and Picasso were originally concerned “with obtaining sculptural results by strictly nonsculptural means, that is, with finding for every aspect of three-
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dimensional vision an explicitly two-dimensional equivalent, regardless of how much verisimilitude might suffer in the process.”47 Here he identifies abstraction’s objective as a compatible description of space, surrounding and encompassing the viewer on all sides and yet visually comprehensive from a single position. For Gombrich, cubism transcends its visual ambiguities by forcing the viewer to give up illusionism altogether and return to what is literally there—the two-dimensional surface of colored canvas. Greenberg proposes a more inclusive alternative. In “The New Sculpture” he states: “To render substance entirely optical, and form, whether pictorial, sculptural or architectural, as an integral part of ambient space—this brings antiillusionism full circle.”48 According to Greenberg, sculpture can function as the great facilitator of an optical solution to audience alienation because its visual language is inherently three-dimensional whether its forms are abstract or representational. It addresses viewers by sharing their space rather than, as with abstract painting, requiring viewers to adjust their expectations of what that space should be.49 In abstract art, threedimensional deception occurs only optically, never pictorially, and then only in painting; sculpture never deceives in this way since it is literally three-dimensional and therefore optical without deception. In “Modernist Sculpture, Its Pictorial Past,” Greenberg describes cubist painting’s transformation of sculpture “into an art that was neither pictorial—at least not in the accepted sense—nor sculptural, neither bas-relief nor monolith, but something for which the only precedent I know of is the open, painted wood carving of northern New Ireland in the South Seas. How this transformation came about, I try to explain in more detail elsewhere. . . . Suffice it to say here that the fates of sculpture and pictorial art seem more closely intertwined at this moment than ever before in historical art.”50 “Elsewhere” refers to Greenberg’s description of collage’s achievement of image representation, particularly the connotations “of the threedimensional space in which the objects represented originally existed,” without resorting to illusionism, and to “The New Sculpture”: “[sculpture] is now undergoing a transformation, at the hands of painting itself, that seems to promise it new and much larger possibilities of expression.”51 So here, even within his neither-nor argument, he is also suggesting a progression or dialectic from anti-pictorial experience to something resembling sculptural experience, and both point beyond to something else. Greenberg describes this “something else” at various points in Art and Culture. Although he constructs his routes somewhat differently in each case, he arrives at the
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same optimal aesthetic experience, which he alternately calls optical literalism, literal illusion, or optical mirage; all of these descriptions depend on visual exclusivity. As he does in linking cubist sculpture to the wood carvings of New Ireland, Greenberg draws on Byzantine art and other historical models for modernism’s rejection of pictorial illusionism to neutralize the unfamiliar look of abstraction by placing it within a respectable historical continuum. The fact that Greenberg feels free to call attention to shared visual experiences between the art produced at different historical moments or by different cultures proves that he is no longer concerned with the specific historical habits and circumstances of vision. He now seeks to achieve a normalization of the viewer’s relationship to abstraction by identifying a return of a former art historical visual effect, although now devoid of its previous content. This strategy, commonly used by U.S. promoters of modernism, ostensibly placates viewers by educating them about formal analogies.52 But Greenberg has a much more specific aim in mind when he establishes his analogies, and they are hardly formal. He justifies the abstract qualities of modernist art by naturalizing their look in terms of what he defines as the essential operations of vision and in terms of an ostensibly “honest” relationship between what actually exists in front of the viewer and the viewer’s visual experience. No level of meaning is acknowledged to exist before a primary, visual one, which in turn is naturalized and universalized. We have the “illusion of modalities” without the untidy experience of illusionism, the social business of reference ostensibly so important to Gombrich. Since the sculpture that Greenberg applauds presents a mirage that is simultaneously a physical reality, the work itself does not elude but just is. The Greenberg of Art and Culture praises modernist art for meeting vision’s purest and therefore most universal expectations by allowing anti-illusionism to come “full circle.” Greenberg’s arguments in Art and Culture concerning the perceptual experience of modernist art also belong to a larger history that, once recognized, renders the ordering parts and resulting criteria of his argument much less idiosyncratic and arbitrary. When revising his essay “Collage” for a 1972 reprinting of Art and Culture, Greenberg retrospectively acknowledged the analogies between his own position and Gombrich’s by footnoting almost the identical passages on cubism from Art and Illusion that I have cited above.53 He doesn’t follow Gombrich’s argument all the way to his comparison of cubism and Thiéry’s figure, but he must have recognized enough of his own description in Gombrich to cite him, without comment, at the moment in his text when he describes the way that collage’s consistently shifting surface points back to “its very surfaceness, only by this contrast.”54 Although many critics have
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recognized that Greenberg’s description of optical space derives from his analysis of cubism, they have not considered that his reading of cubism might depend, if only indirectly, on contemporary theories of perception.55 His descriptions of the optical mirage—the flickering awareness of the image as both two- and three-dimensional, an anti-illusion—resonate with echoes of the perceptual effects of the alternating perspective figure, yet in his version the visual ambiguities have been resolved by collapsing a three-dimensional reality into a two-dimensional illusion.56 Even so, Greenberg describes the experience of looking at modernist sculpture, albeit indirectly, in terms of the visual experience of a diagram.
In his Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy, Michael Baxandall makes a simple distinction between the fifteenth century, when “painting was still too important to be left to the painters,” and “our own late romantic condition, in which painters paint what they think best and then look round for a buyer.”57 Contemporary spectators may not participate as directly in the creation of works of art as they did in the fifteenth century, but along with the picture trade’s necessary assimilation to a more diversified, market-driven economy, the reception process has become a complex negotiation of various different sets of critical expectations. We may now “buy our works of art ready-made,” but we still do not buy a ready-made way of looking at them; we learn how in ways that were and continue to be fought over. All of the authors I have been discussing—Vernon, Gombrich, Greenberg, and to some degree even Leo Steinberg—describe the relationship between viewer and abstract images in terms of perceptual ambiguity. The perception of abstraction is something of a puzzle, akin to the perception of an alternating perspective figure. Therefore, the fact that three of these individuals use alternating perspective figures or descriptions of visual effects that are similar to those produced by these figures to describe and, in some cases, to try to resolve the perceptual ambiguities of abstraction is not just a morphological coincidence. It reveals a shared pedagogical approach to a problem. For each, perception is shaped by education and by the establishment and elaboration of expectations, yet the assumed limits of perception itself set the parameters of these expectations and determine everything that follows. And the conventions used to define these limits are, at times, seen as coterminous with perception itself.
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Sight, in itself, had no obligation to sense or non-sense for Robert Smithson. Nor did he feel the need to define abstraction’s purpose in relation to a particular type of perceptual experience. He was more concerned with revealing the conditions or terms of vision as they were established both by the formal conventions tied to a particular medium and the context within which it was then viewed. As his Alogons demonstrate, these two factors could undermine one another, but again, the frustration the viewer experienced as a result should not be blamed on abstraction. Smithson connected the experience of a sight “devoid of sense” with a specific contemporary viewing condition, that of the art museum. And since the art museum and what Smithson liked to call “its miniature counterpart, the art gallery,” were the primary, intended destinations for his work at this moment, the encounter between his work and these spaces was necessarily ambiguous and even “tragic.” In a drawing entitled The Gallery Interior as a Tragic Site (figure 1.16), Smithson makes an analogy between “tragic” spaces such as tombs and New York art galleries by arranging hand-rendered floor plans of four midtown galleries—Feigen, Castelli, Dwan, and Stable—in two symmetrical rows to call attention to the similarities between their individual layouts as a group and between their layouts and those of Egyptian burial chambers specifically.58 He labels the office and other private areas in each plan “chambers” or “ante-chambers,” and he identifies the narrow corridors that connect the two main exhibition spaces in each as “blind alleys.” The latter term is both a literal description since these corridors have no windows and a punning and ironic reference to the drawing’s title, The Gallery Interior as a Tragic Site. When sensible sight is the expectation, frustration of this expectation or apparent blindness is truly a “tragic sight.” In The Museum of the Void (figure 1.17), a drawing from the period 1966 to 1968, Smithson uses stacked, stepped forms, which are similar to those in the spiral notebook sketches, to refer to an architecture of death. Miniature examples of mausoleums, cenotaphs, and pyramids are clustered on top of the museum’s entrance. The museum itself consists of stacked forms that rush back in space along thickly drawn, orthogonal lines to a heavily penciled black void that signifies not only a visual emptiness or dead end but general visual impenetrability, since the dark area is defined not as a finite black wall but as a thickly penciled opaque surface. Smithson includes a lightly sketched rectangular frame to the right of this museum, which heightens the contrast between void as opacity and void as emptiness. The drawing’s void and thus the museum’s void are, for Smithson, equivalent to an infinite visual opacity, a tragic site without sense.
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FIGURE 1.16 (right) Robert Smithson, The Gallery Interior as a Tragic Site, n.d. FIGURE 1.17 (above) Robert Smithson, The Museum of the Void, 1966–1968.
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Smithson’s 1967 essay, “Some Void Thoughts on Museums,” echoes his contemporary drawing’s title and also its sentiments about the kinds of vision the museum promotes.59 In describing a spectator’s tour through the halls of the art museum, Smithson equates looking at the museum’s historical anachronisms—“ ‘pictures’ and ‘statues’ ”—with perceptual difficulty. And, as in the drawing, this blankness or void is physical, solid, and opaque: “Bright colors conceal the abyss that holds the museum together. Everything solid is a bit of clogged air or space. Things flatten and fade. The museum spreads its surfaces everywhere, and becomes an untitled collection of generalizations that immobilize the eye. [A lack of focus is the only certainty.]”60 Smithson’s Alogons, once positioned in space, produce visual experiences that are similar to those he describes in his essay on the museum: “Sightings fall like heavy objects from one’s eyes. Sight becomes devoid of sense, or the sight is there, but the sense is unavailable.”61 But it is not the abstract form of the works that creates the discomforting gap between viewer and work of art because for Smithson all works exhibited in the deadly spaces of the art museum and gallery slide into opacity. His works exaggerate this condition to render it visible. Thus expectations and certain descriptions of viewing abstraction that are upheld by the institution and, by extension, by contemporary critical discourse set up the spectator for a perceptual fall. Smithson is pointing out this visual situation in his Alogons and his other multiple-unit work from 1966 and 1967 by returning to the scene of the crime and to the illusionistic conditions of linear perspective, which were supposedly defeated by cubism, to upset the viewer all over again. Rather than seeking to make an art that reconciles the viewer to an experience of abstraction, Smithson uses abstraction to reveal to viewers the gap or void in the recidivistic assumptions they bring to the experience of viewing art. And, in doing so, he appears to turn Greenberg’s arguments, in particular, inside out.
The Lessons of Optical Art What’s involved here is pure publicity. And it’s not the influence of art on the culture, it’s art transformed by culture. . . . And my feeling, if it was a negative one—and to a degree it was—was a loss of interest in the idea because it was all messed up. william seitz, “the changing role of the modern museum” “Perceptual art” made its major institutional debut at New York’s Museum of Modern Art with William Seitz’s 1965 exhibition The Responsive Eye. Smithson hoped to make
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his own museum debut in this show, but his work was summarily dismissed from consideration. Nevertheless, the exhibition and the critical response to it provide a significant context and a historical starting point for Smithson’s thinking about abstraction, perception, and institutionalized spectatorship. It is therefore an important event around which to focus an analysis of the perceptual debates that I introduced in the previous section. William Seitz had ambitious aims when in the fall of 1962 he announced the working title of his exhibition, but what originated as a plan for a sweeping historical presentation of optical art from impressionism to the present ended up as an international survey of contemporary art concerned with perceptual effects. In the catalogue’s acknowledgments, Seitz conceded that “so rapid was the subsequent proliferation of painting and construction employing perceptual effects however that demands of the present left no time nor gallery space for a retrospective view.”62 One critic of the exhibition cynically observed that, in fact, “three-quarters of the works shown in the exhibition were made after the announcement.”63 Such suggestions of crass opportunism on the part of both Seitz and the artists who submitted work to him, Seitz’s seemingly indiscriminate and sweeping bundling together of eclectic terminology and artists from exhibitions organized by others, and his willful disregard for distinctions between the perceptual experiments of artists and scientists created widespread interest and considerable controversy both inside and outside the art world. Seitz began planning his exhibition during a period in which several other individuals had already attempted to define a widely acknowledged stylistic shift in avant-garde painting. Because The Responsive Eye had so much advance press, some even hoped that it would provide the definitive set of criteria.64 Seitz devised five organizing categories for his exhibition: The Color Image, “Invisible” Painting, “Optical” Painting, Black and White, and Moiré Pattern. He based these categories on the terminology and artists introduced in Clement Greenberg’s 1964 Post Painterly Abstraction, Ben Heller’s 1963 Towards a New Abstraction, and a collection of statements paraphrased from several other contemporary exhibitions and articles.65 For example, Seitz makes Post Painterly Abstraction and Towards a New Abstraction practically synonymous with his first exhibition category, The Color Image, in the opening paragraph of his discussion of this category: “these canvases do belong to one family which has been designated as ‘new’ or ‘post-painterly’ abstraction.”66 He includes Walter Darby Bannard, Gene Davis, Thomas Downing, Paul Feeley, Morris Louis, Kenneth Noland, Ludwig Sander, and Frank Stella, ten of the seventeen artists included in Greenberg’s exhibition and three of the nine artists included in Heller’s exhibition.67-
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He also uses part of Greenberg’s stated selection criteria to define the category: “These large heraldic canvases share a dependence on original and striking color juxtaposition, a reduction of shape-vocabulary to the simplest units and combinations, and what Clement Greenberg calls a ‘clarity and openness’ that minimizes the importance of the frame.”68 Although Seitz uses only aspects of Greenberg’s argument, his assessment of them misrepresents Greenberg’s intent. Seitz attaches Greenberg’s comments on “openness and clarity” of design or composition to his own conclusions concerning the role of the frame, whereas Greenberg links “clarity” with the “optical” in noting that post painterly abstract artists shun thick paint and tactile effects. And although Seitz is correct in stating that the frame plays no significant role in Greenberg’s argument in Post Painterly Abstraction, it is of crucial importance to him in a number of other, contemporary essays, including “Modernist Painting.”69 Similarly, even though Seitz claims Heller’s Towards a New Abstraction as an alternate title for The Color Image, he ignores Heller’s stated criteria altogether. He has to because Heller believes that the central attitude shared by artists in his exhibition is a conceptual approach to painting: “the work deals with ideas as conceived, not with things as seen.”70 As a result of Seitz’s apparently superficial mixture of preexisting critical criteria and artists throughout his catalogue essay, it is difficult to determine whether he didn’t understand or just didn’t want to bother with the specifics of the arguments he borrowed from his contemporaries. But the lack of agreement between him and these other individuals on how to interpret the same or similar paintings by the same artist reveals that there is more at stake in his misreadings than just an effort to develop an all-inclusive stylistic argument out of the art world’s previous efforts at categorization. By bringing together the major critical positions of the moment and the painters chosen to represent them, and then joining both to his own descriptive analogies drawn from scientific images or diagrams, Seitz suggests that what links all of these arguments and artists, beyond their implicit goal of formal categorization, might be their concern with the role of perception in aesthetic experience. Seitz’s analysis of Ellsworth Kelly’s 1964 painting Green Blue Red (figure 1.18), a work and artist included in several other “category” arguments from the period, can serve as a case in point for Seitz’s unique concerns. It is the first and one of the few specific paintings that Seitz discusses in his catalogue essay. Thus the way he discusses it and the particular visual analogy he draws are meant to carry considerable weight in his overall argument. Kelly’s large, rectangular canvas contains two identical, vertical, lozenge shapes, one blue and the other green, that are situated on
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FIGURE 1.18 (see PLATE 1) Ellsworth Kelly, Green Blue Red, 1964.
either side of the central area of a large, red canvas. According to Seitz: “The division of the picture surface into two equally important foci stimulates a perceptual urge to fuse the two images into one, as with a stereoscopic viewer. Exaggerated emphasis on centrality and an attempt, which is all but futile, to avoid its tyranny are poles between which perceptual composition oscillates. Dualistic symmetry (as well as the use of homogeneous patterns and dynamic ‘target’ arrangements) suggests that the establishment of situations that activate or frustrate the mind’s tendency to unify and tranquilize is a necessary condition of perceptual art.”71 Here Seitz describes the visual experience of the Kelly and of what he calls perceptual art generally in terms of retinal rivalry, a perceptual condition that both the stereoscope and now supposedly the painting exploit, although to opposite ends. Remarkably, Seitz does not mention the role that color plays in enhancing the perceptual effects created by the painting since blue, green, and red increase the visual urge to fuse the two poles even though the structure of the painting frustrates it. In choosing these three colors and not the colors used in color mixing that would have consisted of the primaries red, blue, and yellow, Kelly deliberately aims this additive effect at light-inflected vision.72 Seitz’s lack of interest in the specific role that color plays in this and the other works that he discusses provides a striking departure from
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the analyses of most of his contemporaries. So it comes as no surprise that a majority of the critics of The Responsive Eye condemn Seitz for disregarding color’s central importance to the best or most advanced contemporary art. One of these critics, Rosalind Krauss, notes that color is actually irrelevant to many of the multi-hued paintings in Seitz’s exhibition since it is used only incidentally to evoke value contrasts. She singles out Seitz’s inclusion of the work of Larry Poons and then, in a footnote, Ellsworth Kelly as therefore, particularly wrong-headed: “In that Kelly’s works exhibit an awareness of the issues at stake in modernist painting, his appearance in this exhibition only serves to confuse a proper reading of his art.”73 Seitz’s apparent disregard for color is most obvious in his discussion of his fourth exhibition category, Black and White. Here, again, he links the representative work in this category with an analogy drawn from perceptual science, Schröder’s “reversible staircase.” Seitz juxtaposes the staircase with one of Joseph Albers’s black and white engravings on plastic so that one cannot miss the formal similarities between the two images (figure 1.19). The juxtaposition points to Albers’s probable dependence on alternating perspective figures as sources, but the way the two images are laid out on the page also hints at their almost equal status.74 Albers’s work is an alternating perspective figure as well as an example of perceptual art, and the same is true of Schröder’s reversible staircase. Seitz anticipates criticism of the black and white work in his exhibition because of its formal similarity to “psychologists’ diagrams” and “projects from classes in graphic design.”75 Thus he tries to historicize the connection between art and science to legitimize the formal relationship he wants to establish between them. Like Gombrich, Seitz links the diagrams to a long artistic tradition of perceptual abstraction found in Roman mosaics, in Bauhaus design principles, and most recently in the black and white reverse-perspective paintings of Frank Stella.76 But because Seitz’s main goal is to describe the ambiguous perceptual effects of the images he has brought together in his exhibition and not to provide a history of the formal structure that produces these effects, neither color nor the ultimate functional destination of the images he brings together in his argument are particularly significant to him by themselves. He does not discuss color’s role in Kelly’s Green Blue Red because he is not as interested in the subtle, formal qualities of the perceptual effects that particular colors enhance as he is in the general perceptual frustration they cause. Seitz claims that beyond the obvious formal similarities, there is a perceptual connection between the images of science and art. The alternating perspective figure and devices such as the stereoscope that exploit retinal rivalry stand for “science”
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FIGURE 1.19 Schröder’s Staircase and Joseph Albers’s JHC II, in William Seitz, The Responsive Eye (1965).
in his text and also act as image bridges between the broadly defined discipline of science and the visual mechanics of Seitz’s definition of the new perceptual abstraction. In the catalogue’s conclusion, Seitz drives these scientific connections, along with his synthesis of contemporary critical categories, to a sweeping conclusion: “it can be said without falsification that, seen together, these works inaugurate a new phase in the grammar of art that has already spread among freebrush abstract as well as figurative painters and has had its effect on sculpture too. Every new development merges at its periphery with other tendencies; purity is not necessarily a virtue in art. It is clear also how close to the border of science and technology some of the ‘hardcore’ optical works are, and they remind us at the same time how close to art are some
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of the images of science.”77 Thus, according to Seitz, Greenberg’s post painterly abstraction and the alternating perspective figure share this new visual grammar. Seitz gets into trouble with critics precisely because he makes this type of grammatical connection between science and art and not, despite claims at the time, because he builds a thesis that practically ignores color and includes simple black and white diagrams.78 Underneath the formalist arguments against Seitz’s disregard for the central importance of color to “serious” contemporary painting, the critical disgust in fact derives from Seitz’s scrambling of the aims and perceptual experience of serious or modernist painting and the gimmicks and trivial diagrams of a popularized science of perception. Barbara Rose confesses: “In contrast with this high art [again Kelly, Poons, and so on] in which retinal response, although sometimes elicited, does not constitute the entire content of the work, purely ‘optical’ art, based on textbooks and laboratory experiments, theory, equation, and proofs, is empty and spiritless, though it may jangle the nerves and assault the eyeballs. . . . Another idea a show of this nature puts across is the equally false one that science and art have something to do with one-another.”79 Seitz’s general aim in The Responsive Eye was simple—“to dramatize the power of static forms and colors to stimulate dynamic psychological responses.”80 And as I stated earlier, this power depends neither on color nor on the ultimate functional destination of the image. As early as 1964, Seitz had noted that the works he was considering for The Responsive Eye “exist less as objects than as generators of perceptual responses.”81 And in the catalogue, he becomes even more precise in defining both the type of work he is concerned with and the type of perceptual effects it creates. He wants to limit all past associations with actual objects or spaces; thus every work he includes is “entirely abstract.” Geometric forms, pure colors flatly applied, and hard edges predominate. He also makes clear that the new abstract work he is discussing differs from earlier geometric abstraction, namely De Stijl, in its almost complete abandonment of asymmetrical, nonrelational compositions: “too much diversity of form impedes perceptual effect.”82 This is one of the reasons Seitz claims that “certain of these works therefore have a stronger family resemblance to mechanical patterns, scientific diagrams, and even to screens and textured surfaces than to relational abstract art.”83 Seitz also claims that contemporary perceptual abstraction—both artistic and scientific—has moved its focus “from the outside world, passed through the work as object, and entered the incompletely explored region between the cornea and the brain.”84 To interpret this type of abstraction properly, Seitz must focus on what
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Gombrich had five years earlier called “the beholder’s share” and what he now identifies as the gap between seeing and thinking. This focus raises problems of interpretation since Seitz admits that even when describing the perceptual effects of the alternating perspective figure, “it is difficult to determine whether the appearance of recession brought about by isometric figures is innate in vision or is conditioned by long habits of seeing.”85 How can one estimate the ratio between biology and conditioned expectation? All the critics that Seitz depends on in his catalogue essay relate aesthetic experience to the quality of the spectator’s perception. And, as I have already noted, Gombrich and Greenberg admit that the aesthetic experience of abstraction is difficult precisely because it is perceptually ambiguous. Seitz appears to have operated from similar premises in selecting works for The Responsive Eye. His principle criteria were that the work should be abstract and that it should generate immediate perceptual ambiguities for the spectator. But Seitz’s more explicit connection between abstraction and perceptual difficulty makes the merging of biology and perception in his argument much more obvious, even though he, like his contemporaries, acknowledges education’s role in perception. When Seitz eliminates distinctions between the categories of diagrams and devices, such as the alternating perspective figure and the stereoscope and abstract paintings, the distinctions between the perceptual conventions embodied by the former two—perspective and retinal rivalry—and the perception of abstraction are elided as well. It literally becomes difficult to see the learned conventions now buried under these definitions of perception, to apprehend the perceptual difficulties considered to be inherent to them, or to recognize the possibility that abstraction does not necessarily have anything to do with either. Seitz most clearly exposes—and champions—a visual model based on implied universal conditions of seeing that underlie, to varying degrees, all the positions he incorporates into his argument. At a significant point, however, Seitz departs from the relationships his contemporaries draw between perception and abstraction. In the conclusion to his catalogue essay, he states that the new, “perceptual” art may finally have a means of satisfactorily replacing the content usually lost in abstraction through its “psychic effectiveness.” He even asks: “Can an advanced understanding and application of functional images open a new path from retinal excitation to emotions and ideas?”86 All of this happens because the viewer is visually thrown off balance by perceptual abstraction: Seitz embraces the visual ambiguity that his contemporaries have been either decrying or providing ways to overcome. By becoming a means to an end, ambi-
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guity gives abstraction meaning beyond its formal “self ” through the very fact that it makes no visual sense. Thus, Seitz can suggest that the new visual grammar has begun to “spread among free-brush abstract as well as figurative painters and has had its effect on sculpture too.”87 Seitz’s argument is problematic for the same reasons that his earlier MoMA exhibition, The Art of Assemblage, was problematic.88 In both, Seitz extends a technical or formal development in artistic practice directly into an assumed set of shared intentions. His two key, viewer-based terms in The Responsive Eye—perceptual abstraction and perceptual movement—also override his formal categories of abstraction to constitute a generalized, experiential definition for contemporary abstraction, without independent reference to content, style, or formal qualities in individual works of art. The breadth of this definition of visual experience allows Seitz to draw morphological connections between science and art and to speak of the effects of images from both realms in the same terms. Pop art may have borrowed its imagery from mass culture, but viewing it was still understood to be an experience different from looking at a comic book, billboard, or packing crate. Even its detractors understood that.89 But perceptual art, as Seitz presented it, seemed to have erased the boundary between the worlds inside and outside the gallery. Seitz’s argument and many of the works in his exhibition open up perceptual experience for the viewer in a way that even a New Yorker cartoonist could comment on (figure 1.20). In the cartoon, a man emerges from a building advertising numerous op art exhibits, and his eyes bulge wide open in astonishment at an urban environment filled with the abstract patterns and presumably the visual effects that he had just seen on the walls inside. Even the sun’s rays appear as a series of thin, closely spaced black lines that abruptly confront even more closely spaced rows of vertical black lines, a moiré pattern in the making.90 In other words, optical art can be experienced anywhere. Although Seitz hints at these viewer-friendly possibilities, even he was in no way prepared for the New Yorker cartoon’s “man in the street.” Despite the almost unanimously negative reviews in the art press, The Responsive Eye received overwhelmingly positive reviews and a great deal of coverage in the popular press—in Life, Look, Newsweek, Time, women’s fashion magazines, and the Young Catholic Messenger. Seitz claimed that the show’s popular success was due to a reduction and popularization of his thesis: “What’s involved here is pure publicity. And it’s not the influence of art on the culture, it’s art transformed by culture. . . . And my feeling, if it was a negative one—and to a degree it was—was a loss of interest in the idea because it was
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FIGURE 1.20 James Stevenson, cartoon, The New Yorker (3 April 1965).
all messed up.”91 His disappointment is ironic, considering his own stated intention of blurring boundaries and specifically his claim that “purity is not necessarily a virtue in art.” Like the individuals whose arguments he plunders in his catalogue essay, Seitz wants to keep the abstract art he champions perceptually pure, even though the responses he hopes it will generate are not. In his reaction, he also acknowledges his awareness of his responsibilities as a curator at an influential institution and reveals where he too is willing to draw the line between inclusiveness and “messing up.”92 He is directing the spectator’s troubled perception toward transcendence; this experience was not to be confused with banal tricks and “trivial diagrams.” The critic Lawrence Alloway had the opposite reaction to the popularization of Seitz’s intentions: “What I liked about ‘The Responsive Eye’ was that it was an exhibition put on at a major museum which became an instant success in fashion magazines, humor magazines, teenage magazines, Time magazine, and so on. . . . Why are you [Seitz] so disturbed by the connections to other areas of human experience?”93 Seitz was disturbed, in part, because others inside the art world were disturbed. By so blatantly linking the “new” abstraction to the diagrams and viewing devices of popular science, he not only unwittingly opened the door to other, less aes-
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thetically controllable areas of human experience but designated a dividend for perceptual ambiguity beyond aesthetic experience that angered his contemporaries. The conventional edges to their arguments became noticeable as well. In all of these descriptions, a great deal was at stake—most important, the nature and power of spectatorial interpretation and who and what defined it. In retrospect, what emerges is a sense of the urgency of the question of perception and the broad affiliations between various attempts to define the nature and value of early 1960s abstraction, along with a sense of the often subtle contradictions between those attempts and the boundaries or limits that many inside the art world agreed should be maintained. Such revelations and the generally public nature of these debates also exposed the perimeters of institutional power over how and what the contemporary spectator should look at and consider “abstract art.”
In 1964, Robert Smithson submitted several works for William Seitz to consider for inclusion in The Responsive Eye. Smithson worked on these paintings and several related drawings over roughly a six-month period, and all of them shared similar compositions and types of color combinations. High Sierra (figure 1.21) is typical of the group. Its composition consists of a series of light-blue lightning-bolt shapes that drop down from the top of the canvas and occupy approximately half of its surface. These jagged shapes provide a strong contrast to the deep-blue background color of the rest of the canvas.94 Smithson’s flat and dry paint application leaves little trace of his brush work so that the resulting surface consists simply of alternations in color and interlocking shapes that create a slight perceptual “shudder.” Another painting from this period, Homage to Carmen Miranda, has a somewhat similar format, although in this work two of the three geometric forms resemble the explosive “bursts” found in comic books.95 Smithson has also added a thin outline to all three of the shapes in a third color. Little in these works saves them from a purely formalist reading, other than their recognizable and somewhat cartoonlike images. The commentary that Smithson adds to these two paintings, and presumably to the others, is in the titles. Both give the dry, formal surfaces a popular twist with their references to Hollywood cinema—a particular film and a well-known female film personality.96 The circumstances surrounding both the viewing conditions of works of art and the demands of the spectator had been crucial to Smithson’s early, negative reactions to the contemporary art scene in New York. He wrote to Nancy Holt from Italy
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FIGURE 1.21 Robert Smithson, High Sierra, 1964.
where his second one-person gallery exhibition was currently taking place: “The way I feel now, I would rather have people look at my painting with a flashlight with a room faintly lit by violet lights and the air filled with the odor of heliotrope and jasmine. In the background the tender throbbing of tambourines could add a tone for a select few. But alas! People want to stare with aggressive eagerness or they feel they must stare in order to grant approval. There is something indecent about such staring.”97 Smithson’s discomfort with the visual demands of the contemporary spectator in this letter and his favorable description of the mysterious settings of Roman churches that follow it betray his Catholic upbringing and a young artist’s general misgivings about public exposure. There is also a particular edge to his description of vision that appears later in secular form.98 For example, he already prefers viewing conditions that would defuse a clear and purely visual experience. But the last two sentences in his letter to Holt are the most striking: “People want to stare with aggressive eagerness or they feel they must stare in order to grant approval. There is something indecent about staring.” People want to stare or must stare; both are indecent, but Smithson links the latter imperative to granting approval, or rather, he identifies the act of staring as an essential part of contemporary critical practice. Star-
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ing is a prerequisite for making critical judgments concerning art. Smithson does not define what people are looking for with this “indecent stare,” but he suggests some of the things that this staring does not include—peripheral and extravisual sensations and what he calls later in the letter “the invisible worlds of dreams within dreams.”99 Smithson’s “critical viewer” had a considerably narrower set of visual expectations in mind when approaching a work of art. The artist longed for more: “From the dooms of ‘modernism,’ something cries out for the missing Dust, then fades into the printed word and photograph. The Dust is leaving us with ‘pop’ art and Clement Greenberg’s visual puritanism. Soon there will be nothing to stand on except the webs of manufactured time warped among throbbing galaxies of space, space, and more space. The Great Universal Vision is caving in, and the Age of Astonishment is beginning.”100 In response to Smithson’s submissions to The Responsive Eye, Seitz acknowledged that “although interesting and relevant to the scope of the exhibition,” the work did not “have an individuality that other artists on our list have expressed.”101 The descriptive term “individuality” seems odd in retrospect, considering the type of work Seitz ended up choosing and the considerable amount of criticism he received for the exhibition’s formulaic appearance. Yet if Seitz was looking for static forms that stimulate dynamic psychological responses through perceptual movement, perhaps the perceptual shudder that Smithson’s lightning-bolt paintings produced was not up to the mark. Their individuality, as I have already pointed out, was not primarily perceptual, at least not in the manner in which Seitz understood it. The paintings “messed up” his distinctions between “the influence of art on culture” and “art transformed by culture.” According to Holt, Smithson was not very impressed with The Responsive Eye exhibition as it materialized in 1965, nor had he been particularly interested in op art generally. He thought it was “kind of dry and scientific”—thus his own formally dry paintings with their contrary, pop titles.102 But in 1964, a relatively unknown artist like Smithson could hardly avoid the temptation to submit work to what was promoted to be a major exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art. No one could ignore the potential exposure such an exhibition would provide for a young artist, no matter what the exhibition’s specific aims, the latter being still quite vague when Smithson and others submitted work for consideration.103 In fact, the artist Bruce Glaser noted that at the time rumors suggested that “many people actually created work for the exhibition on the basis of what they heard about it.” And Seitz even conceded that “there is no doubt they did.”104 Smithson’s lightning-bolt paintings may be consistent
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FIGURE 1.22 Robert Smithson, The Eliminator, 1964.
with what was going on stylistically in New York painting at this time, but they also betray some other, extra-formalist issues that Smithson was dealing with as well.105 Within months of submitting photographs and transparencies of his paintings to Seitz, Smithson designed a three-dimensional work that incorporated his lightning-bolt image (figure 1.22), but now the same zigzag shapes literally shudder off and on because they are made of electrically activated neon-gas-filled tubing. Adjacent and at a forty-five-degree angle to the vertical tubes on both sides, two mirrors momentarily reflect the flashing lightning bolts as multiple images, and yet, like the central neon original, these reflections oscillate between bold red light and the translucent form of the bent-glass tubing.106 These two contradictory visual experiences not only violently undercut one another and make any kind of visual resolution impossible; they open up a perceptual gap that is separate from the experience of either one of the two images. Smithson called this piece The Eliminator for reasons that he clearly spells out in an essay with the same title: “The viewer doesn’t know what he is looking at, because he has no surface space to fixate on; thus he becomes aware of the emptiness of his own sight or sees through his sight. Light, mirror reflections, and shadow fabricate the perceptual intake of the eyes. Unreality becomes actual and
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solid.”107 As I indicated above, Seitz had claimed that his intent in The Responsive Eye was “to dramatize the power of static forms and colors to stimulate dynamic psychological responses.”108 Smithson’s “optical” forms are no longer static in The Eliminator, nor is he interested in their potential to create psychological responses from the inside out. Blindness, not transcendent vision, is his objective. Concentrated “staring” through the space between cornea and the brain provides the spectator with nothing. We need to catch ourselves actually seeing or not seeing to comprehend the difference. Soon after Smithson received his rejection letter from Seitz, he destroyed most of his optical paintings, and his work changed radically. In retrospect he realized it: “I would say that I began to function as a conscious artist around 1964. I think I started doing works then that were mature. I would say that prior to the 1964–65 period I was in a kind of groping, investigating period.”109 In his new work, he continued to depend on some of the same optical tricks used in his 1964 paintings, but now with different ends in mind. Instead of a stylistic parody of perceptual painting, the new work brings perception itself, the illusionistic conventions that supposedly mimic it, and the dominant critical assumptions about both under direct attack.
Perceptual Enantiomorphs Is it possible that somehow—perhaps in terms of a space and time wildly unlike the space and time we know on the macroscopic level—every particle is a true mirror image of its antiparticle? Is it possible that antimatter is nothing more than ordinary matter with its entire space-time structure, down to the last detail, reversed as by a looking glass? martin gardner, the ambidextrous universe When asked to contribute an artist’s statement to the catalogue for the 1966 exhibition Art in Process, Smithson submitted a “Paragraph from a fictive artist’s journal,” and in this guise, he recommends a guidebook to sight that he found, he claims, in a private art-book library. Smithson’s imaginary artist states that this text, The Exhaustion of Sight or How to Go Blind and Yet See, “is a true paradigm of unending importance” and that he “look[s] forward to the day when it will be published in ‘paperback’ so that millions of artists everywhere will be able to share its many treasures.”110 The artist also claims that the book contains intricate diagrams “on seeing sight,” probably the type of diagrams Smithson was fond of drawing over or tracing out of the many books in his own private library. One such diagram became the basis for one of
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FIGURE 1.23 Robert Smithson, drawing in James P. C. Southall, Introduction to Physiological Optics (1961).
Smithson’s drawings (figure 1.23) for his 1965 Enantiomorphic Chambers, the work he exhibited in Art in Process. Smithson describes the drawing in an early draft of his notes on Enantiomorphic Chambers: “Superimposed over a plan of ‘a simple box stereoscope,’ in James P. C. Southall’s book Introduction to Physiological Optics is a bird’s eye view of The Enantiomorphic Chambers. This superimposition indicates the removal of the illusionistic plane of focus, sometimes called the ‘picture plane.’ It is a known fact that we do not see with our eyes but rather with our brain. Thinking about one’s sight enables one to build or invent a structure that sees nothing.”111 The stereoscopic viewer, together with its stereoscopic cards, is designed to mirror the physical conditions necessary to the process of retinal fusion—binocu-
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lar vision.112 Viewers cannot help but be generally aware of this fundamental aspect of the stereoscope’s design since they have an opportunity to look at the two views on a stereoscope card both with and without the stereoscope’s viewer. The threedimensional images that viewers see through the stereoscope’s viewer are also highly unstable. Thus the blindered eyepiece is necessary to eliminate all extra-visual stimuli in the viewer’s immediate surroundings, including the viewer’s own body. The ability to see stereoscopic illusions seems to depend on the viewer’s ability to repress the physical conditions of perception and to suspend knowledge that she or he is actually looking at two distinct images, rather than one, even as she or he depends on these anthropomorphic conditions to see the stereoscopic illusions. Therefore, the entire system depends on a contradiction to work.113 Smithson uses bright pink marker to indicate on Southall’s stereoscope plan how he intends to replace the two pictures on the stereoscope card with paired sets of mirrors.114 The two sets of mirrors are enantiomorphs, meaning that they are exactly alike in every respect except that the arrangement of the mirrors in one is the “mirror image” of the arrangement of mirrors in the other. The internal exchange of reflections and counter-reflections generated by these enantiomorphic mirrors cancels out the illusionistic plane of focus by directing the focal point of each eye outward in the opposite direction from the other eye. When viewers stand before the threedimensional counterpart of Smithson’s diagram of an altered stereoscope, Enantiomorphic Chambers (figure 1.24), they see nothing in the mirrors: “The double prison of the eyes becomes a fact.”115 This momentary blindness arises from the disappointment of a visual expectation when looking at mirrors. Viewers expect to see a reflection of themselves. Yet they also gain a new “sight.” What they see is not just what they see in the mirrors, which is nothing, but also what they normally don’t see. They catch themselves in an act of seeing that contradicts their conditioned thoughts about seeing, particularly their understanding of retinal fusion. Retinal fusion is the result of cultural conditioning, and the mechanics of binocular seeing are not synonymous with either retinal fusion or cultural conditioning. Seeing and what viewers think they are seeing or expect to see can be at odds, and as Smithson points out, one has to think about sight to create a situation in which one sees nothing. In a collage from the same year as Enantiomorphic Chambers (figure 1.25), Smithson places a photograph of himself as a “headless torso,” standing erect, back to the camera, head hooded and bent forward, and hands helplessly in his pockets, between two photographs of the same, singular enantiomorphic chamber cut from a
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contact sheet; one image is identified as “right side up,” and the other as “upside down.”116 Here again Smithson takes advantage of the photographic privilege of flipping to create a mirror image or enantiomorphic pair out of a single object just as he does when he flips the arrangement of the individual units of Alogon. Mirrors and cameras can transform anything, even a stereoscopic situation into an enantiomorphic one. Ruled blue pen lines cut across the torso at about heart level to connect the opposing diagonal vectors in the enantiomorphic situation created by the two images of the chamber. The headless body of the artist occupies the vanishing point of the picture plane; sight is canceled out both literally and through Smithson’s punning title, Afterthought Enantiomorphic Chambers. The body is a necessary “afterthought” in the stereoscope’s design, and sight in Smithson’s work comes “after thought,” after the loss of the head. This pun, in turn, also loops back to Smithson’s remark: “thinking about one’s sight enables one to build or invent a structure that sees nothing.” The
FIGURE 1.24 (opposite page) Robert Smithson, Enantiomorphic Chambers, 1965.
FIGURE 1.25 Robert Smithson, Afterthought Enantiomorphic Chambers, c. 1965.
artist includes a written commentary under the torso in fuschia-colored pencil— “stopping of sight not by brutal opposition but by lowering the ‘head.’ ” Smithson’s pun on “head” viscerally and erotically extends his simultaneous exposure and “decapitation” of the body’s role in vision, and Smithson leaves the dummy body, his body, hands in pockets, to a game of “pocket-polo,” playing by itself.117 It is important to consider Smithson’s choice of the stereoscope as the particular diagram of seeing to be undermined by his Enantiomorphic Chambers not only because contemporary discussions of early 1960s abstraction include references to the stereoscope but also because of the way the stereoscope’s structure and perceptual effects were often used as analogies for the structure and perceptual effects of painting and for the process of perception itself.118 For example, to privilege the perceptual effects of Kelly’s Green Blue Red in his analysis, William Seitz deliberately links the viewer’s perceptual urge to fuse the painting’s blue and green lozenges to the same perceptual urge exploited by the stereoscope. Yet his analogy fails to address the important differences between looking at the Kelly and looking through the mask of a stereoscope viewer and how or why this urge to resolve visual ambiguities occurs in both. In constructing such a circular argument, Seitz retains the stereoscope’s inherent contradictions, transposes them onto the experience of viewing abstract painting, and thus mystifies the perceptual process by default. Smithson’s use of the stereoscope parallels that of the perceptual psychologist, M. D. Vernon, in that he uses a simple experiment with an actual stereoscope, or at least a diagram of one, to determine where in the perceptual process the role of biology ends and thought begins.119 His investigation reveals the component parts of the perceptual process through a critique of one diagram of that process, rather than assuming that this diagram and its intended effect are equivalent to the perceptual process.
If, in his drawings and writings at the end of the 1960s, Smithson accuses the art museum of being the chief mystifier of the perceptual experience of art, he begins his investigation of the roots of this mystification process with one individual, Clement Greenberg. Holt recalls that during the period 1964 through 1967, Greenberg was Smithson’s primary critical adversary or foil: “Greenberg was the one that got him going because his ideas were so restrictive. He constantly talked about Greenberg: it was an obsession.”120 During this period, Smithson’s written references to Greenberg, scattered across numerous essays, published and unpublished, reflect a particular
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sense of what he considered debatable in Greenberg’s arguments and what he did not.121 Surprisingly, he accepts many of the critic’s formal observations without challenge, such as his description of how Barnett Newman structures his paintings by repeating the framing support or canvas edge inside the picture.122 But Greenberg’s categorization of these formal observations troubles Smithson. In his earliest written criticism of Greenberg, Smithson denounces the experiential poverty of what he calls Greenberg’s “visual puritanism,” and even here, the artist singles out for condemnation not what the critic sees but what he refuses to see. Later, around 1966, he writes his first detailed analysis of Greenberg’s visual conclusions and still calls them “rigid” but certainly no longer “pure.” He begins this essay, entitled “Abstract Mannerism,” by claiming that “Some artists never question the ‘creative process,’ they consider it to be quite natural. Yet, no matter how naturally creative the artist is, no matter how much he relies on ‘smart instincts,’ little bits of self-consciousness creep into his art. What is called ‘cool’ today is in a way the rebirth of the Mannerist sensibility.”123 Smithson identifies Kenneth Noland’s “little hints or references to the ‘drip’ or the ‘splash,’ ” which the painter leaves along the framing edges of his otherwise hard-edge paintings, as an example of mannerism masquerading as spontaneity. He concludes: “It’s hard to tell whether Noland’s ‘mistakes’ are more or less interesting than Andy Warhol’s fake ‘corrections.’ ”124 Greenberg frequently singled out Noland’s work from the mid-1960s for praise, in large part because it conformed so closely to the criteria the critic had set forth in “Modernist Painting” and other essays on painting, which he published in the 1960s. Noland was also one of the artists that many critics felt William Seitz contaminated by including him in The Responsive Eye. In comparing Noland’s work to Warhol’s, Smithson has gone one step further than Seitz in blurring distinctions between the rigidly defined categories then recognized by a majority of the art world, but he was prepared to go even further and pin the title of “that great Mannerism” on the “ultra-consciousness of the ‘framing edge’ ” itself, which he credits Greenberg with bringing to public attention. To prove his point, Smithson places a description of the role of the frame from a book on mannerism side by side with Greenberg’s well-known description of the picture edge: “let us look back into awful art history: Jacques Bousquet in his book Mannerism says, ‘By a typically Mannerist paradox, the frame became the picture! In France, the feigned frame enjoyed great vogue.’ Meanwhile, back at the Avant-Garde, which is beyond history, Greenberg tells us in his essay ‘American-Type Painting,’ ‘What is destroyed is the Cubist, and immemorial, notion and feeling of the picture edge as a confine; with (Barnett) Newman, the picture edge is repeated inside, and
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makes the picture, instead of merely being echoed.’ ”125 Through this juxtaposition, Smithson reveals that the act of transforming the framing edge into the picture is itself a convention, even if it is employed to different ends at different historical moments. He concludes: “History repeats itself, but in the Abstract. Criticism has entered a maze of mirrors. . . . [Decadent forms of analysis seem to permeate much of what is called pure criticism].”126 Not only does the avant-garde mirror kitsch in Smithson’s analysis of Greenberg’s description of the framing edge—Greenberg aligns mannerism numerous times with the attributes of kitsch and would not have been happy with Smithson’s association of both with his definition of avant-garde painting—but the creative process itself is no longer a mystery, hidden behind what Smithson calls “the pretentious wall” that modernism had set up to protect itself.127 Smithson begins to explore the “maze of mirrors,” which he claims contemporary critics like Greenberg inhabit, with several of his early mirror pieces; all of them exploit prevalent forms, colors, and perceptual expectations in the art world to scramble “pure”—and not so pure—conventions of all kinds to produce an “abstract mannerism” of their own.128 In a 1964 drawing (figure 1.26), Smithson illustrates and describes his three basic types of mirror sculpture—enantiomorphic wall pieces, mirror vortices, and mirrored block floor pieces.129 The wall pieces “absorb the entire room that the piece is in” by juxtaposing two enantiomorphic mirror configurations. In one work (figure 1.27), a purple steel rhomboid structure frames two pairs of extremely acute mirrorized-plastic triangles that extend outward slightly from the wall and toward the viewer and connect to each other along their short bases. These right- and left-handed convergence lines double and reverse the vanishing point so that the viewer sees a three-dimensional space but not an illusionistically unified one. One pair of mirrors tilts slightly downward; the other tilts upward so that the viewer’s gaze is not returned but bounces off the ceiling and floor of the space in which the work hangs so that these two opposing surfaces are viewed as reflected images, now side by side on the wall. Another untitled wall piece from about a year later (figure 1.28) absorbs the room more completely by reflecting the surrounding four walls as well as the ceiling and floor in three pairs of enantiomorphic mirrors. Because of the inward-facing positions of the two central mirrored triangles, the floor is reflected over the ceiling, bringing aspects of the viewer’s environment to him or her in jumbled pieces. Smithson also blurs the distinction between framework and mirrored surface in this work by using rose-colored mirrorized plastic in addition to the light-blue steel frame.130 He often chooses a lighter, brighter color for the metal frame of these mirrored works so
FIGURE 1.26 Robert Smithson, Three Works in Metal and Plastic, 1964.
that their frames dominate and clearly project forward toward viewers as the darker, mirrored surfaces appear to flatten or even recede away from them. Mirrors are not supposed to call attention to themselves as surfaces or as colored fields. When they do, a multi-part visual experience opens up: the viewer’s concentration oscillates among the clean geometric lattice of the frames, the seemingly flat colored fields behind the frames, and the contradictory web of mirror reflections that the colored mirrors contain. Smithson is playing with the formal attributes of the geometric flat color fields and shaped canvases of contemporary “hard-edge,” “post painterly” or “perceptual” abstraction in his mirror paintings to prevent viewers from focusing on either formal or purely optical concerns.131 They are forced to consider both. Through the scrambling of all of the formal attributes of these various categories, Smithson demonstrates how the conventions that render abstraction
FIGURE 1.27 (opposite page) Robert Smithson, Untitled, 1963–1964.
ambiguous depend more on what viewers expect to see than on any one isolated,
FIGURE 1.28
abstract element a work might possess. The colored mirrors function as the ultimate
Robert Smithson, Untitled, 1964–1965.
visual pun by presenting perception’s mental and physiological activities as enantiomorphs, doubled or binary and possessing no visible center or field of undivided focus: “Abstract art is not a self-projection, it is indifferent to the self.”132
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Smithson based his conception of perceptual enantiomorphs on Martin Gardner’s The Ambidextrous Universe. In this text, Gardner progresses from an introductory discussion of simple mirror tricks that illustrate enantiomorphic phenomena to a revelation of the presence of enantiomorphic forms or structures in the most simple to most complex life forms. Similarly, Smithson begins his investigation of enantiomorphs with his own mirror tricks—the early enantiomorphic wall pieces, The Eliminator, and Enantiomorphic Chambers. He then proceeds to reveal the presence of the enantiomorph in contemporary theory and artistic practice. In an early draft of his statement for Art in Process, Smithson compares the enantiomorph’s splitting and mirroring of perception to a number of other things: the structure of crystals and by extension, as elaborated in his contemporary essay, “The Crystal Land,” the New Jersey landscape, and the poetry of the artist, Dan Graham.133 The draft provides a list of the key enantiomorphic analogies that Smithson will continue to refer to and develop throughout his career. In all of these analogies, geology replaces biology, inanimate replaces animate, abstraction replaces representation, antimatter replaces antiillusionism. Later Smithson describes the importance of this moment in his work: “That [Enantiomorphic Chambers] in a sense establishes a certain kind of point of departure not so much toward the idealistic notion of perception, but all the different breakdowns within perception, so that’s what I’m interested in. I’m interested in zeroing in on those aspects of mental experience that somehow coincide with the physical world.”134 Although like Seitz, Gombrich, and indirectly Greenberg, Smithson is still relying on a scientific model, this model is no longer anthropomorphic. For Smithson, the enantiomorph is a more appropriate model for abstraction and a more relevant tool for interpreting contemporary culture than the stereoscope or the alternating perspective figure because of the enantiomorph’s relationship to recent developments in science. When the stereoscope is used as the descriptive paradigm for the 1960s, perception itself appears to have no historical specificity. Smithson had trouble with the stereoscopic analogy of perception and with Greenberg’s visual puritanism, and in his mind the two were connected. A comparison between the principles of Greenberg’s “optical” tour of the work of art and the travel done with the stereoscope reveals that the advantages of both—“passive” travel and disembodied vision—rely on shared conventions and hidden contradictions. The stereoscope provides sight that travels; in other words, distant places and things hover before the viewer like three-dimensional mirages. Physical movement is reduced to the subtle wrist action of sliding the two stereoscopic images into focus. Simultaneously, cultural space is controlled by the visual whims of the viewer
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through a type of looking that is ensconced within the traditions of passive leisure. Smithson contradicts this stereoscopic vision in his early three-dimensional work— the Alogons and the mirror pieces—by providing what he called “an illusion without an illusion.”135 Smithson’s phrase is not equivalent to Greenberg’s “anti-illusionism,” since the latter purports to present pure visual truth, once all the extra-optical elements of aesthetic experience are stripped away. The Enantiomorphic Chambers, for example, demonstrates how one’s idea of visual truth is based on illusionary expectations. It turns the tool of the optical tourist inside out, dispelling the myths of voyeuristic objectivity and autonomous vision and bringing the viewer back to voyeuristic subjectivity—cultural expectations—and the biological conditions that support them. Supposed mirages or “elsewheres” become actual places that no longer meet expectations, and the viewer is forced to recognize that where she or he is standing is limited to a specific space and time. As I have already stated, Greenberg postulates that works of modernist sculpture proffer exclusively visual modalities and that the viewer’s experience of this sculpture, in turn, is primarily visual: “The human body is no longer postulated as the agent of space in either pictorial or sculptural art; now it is eyesight alone, and eyesight has more freedom of movement and invention within three dimensions than within two.”136 Yet this disembodied vision is actually body-affirming by default because, in reality, the body must be present to produce Greenberg’s “optical” experience or what the eye alone knows. Specifically, his optical mirage—two- and threedimensional at once—depends on retinal fusion, which is also the perceptual process behind the design of the stereoscope. Like the designers of the stereoscope, Greenberg internalizes retinal rivalry and its reconciliation, retinal fusion within his description of aesthetic vision, but unlike the former he avoids any such bodily aspects in his description and attributes the spectator’s difficulty in seeing or holding onto the mirage to problems attributable to abstraction, not to his or her body or mind. Thus Greenberg could conveniently side step the viewer’s perceptual limitations without fully acknowledging them. The designer of the stereoscope, on the other hand, implicitly concedes that the spectator’s perceptual difficulties originate with the body and mind; otherwise the blindered mask and the focusing track would not be essential parts of the stereoscope’s design. Early on, in his 1966 essay “Quasi-Infinities and the Waning of Space,” Smithson accuses Greenberg of anthropomorphizing space, the very trait that stereoscopic images and Greenberg’s optical mirage share when internalizing retinal rivalry. He cites Greenberg’s description of the new space of abstract art as belonging to “the
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same order of space as our bodies” in “Abstract, Representational and so forth” and comments: “Here Greenberg equates ‘space’ with ‘our bodies’ and interprets this reduction as abstract. This anthropomorphizing of space is aesthetically a ‘pathetic fallacy’ and is in no way abstract.”137 Smithson dismisses Greenberg’s “experiential” definition of abstraction just as he crosses the mimetic “eyes” of the stereoscope in his Enantiomorphic Chambers. And in what is probably an early draft of “QuasiInfinities,” he turns the critic’s definition of art—“Art is a matter strictly of experience, not of principles, and what counts first and last in art is quality; all other things are secondary”138—around altogether by claiming that “abstraction is not governed by ‘expression’ or what Greenberg calls ‘experience,’ but by a mental attitude toward esthetics that is in no way dependent on formal reduction. An Egyptian idol is more abstract than a Noland painting, because it excludes emotional needs. Abstract art does not appeal to the emotions but to the mind. All expressive art is representational.”139 This argument justifies Smithson’s claim in “Quasi-Infinities” that “there is nothing abstract about de Kooning or Pollock” (both so-called abstract expressionists) and leads to Smithson’s central bête noire, the all too pervasive use of biological metaphors in art criticism, science, and technology. Such biological metaphors, when used by artists or critics, undermine any claim that a work is abstract. The two realms are, for Smithson, mutually exclusive, just as they are for Wilhem Worringer in his Abstraction and Empathy. Smithson bases his criteria for abstraction on a number of Worringer’s distinctions—a dread of space, tactility, crystalline form, and the traditions of Egyptian, primitive, and Eastern art. Worringer’s other term, “empathic art,” lines up with many of the things Smithson rejects—an embrace of space, a privileging of optical perception, organic form, and the art historical traditions of the antique and the Renaissance.140 Finally, Smithson has found a theory of abstraction that he can embrace, although he has to look far outside the immediate historical boundaries and sources of the discourse of his contemporaries.
Many elements of the arguments I have been discussing thus far come together in 1967 with the advent of the second major museum survey of the decade’s sculpture, American Sculpture of the Sixties.141 Smithson was represented in this exhibition by Alogon #2, and Greenberg contributed “Recentness of Sculpture,” his first substantial analysis of the three-dimensional work by Smithson and his contemporaries.142 Greenberg begins his essay with a discussion of aesthetic boundaries. He describes how
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arbitrary resemblances between abstract forms in art and in modern life—what he calls the look of “art” as opposed to “non-art”—have increasingly blurred the boundaries between these two categories and have generated a corresponding anxiety in the viewer. He states that modern art has been consistently addressing this problem of boundaries to various degrees but that “by now we have all become aware that the farout is what has paid off best in avant-garde art in the long run—and what could be further out than the arbitrary?”143 According to Greenberg, visually ambiguous relationships between art and non-art were no longer possible in painting since painting had already reached its limit in the unpainted canvas, which in all its spareness could clearly now be identified as art. So the borderline needed to be sought elsewhere, in the domain of the three-dimensional, where sculpture and everything else material that was not art also resided. Greenberg’s argument echoes his earlier belief in modern sculpture’s greater modernist potential, but here he credits minimalism specifically with recognizing and exploiting the opportunities available at this moment, since this sculpture wastes no time with anything but the borderline between art and non-art.144 The trouble with minimal sculpture, for Greenberg, also grows out of its too single-minded pursuit of this boundary; it remains too much a feat of ideation: Its idea remains an idea, something deduced instead of felt and discovered. The geometrical and modular simplicity may announce and signify the artistically furthest-out, but the fact that the signals are understood for what they want to mean betrays them artistically. There is hardly any aesthetic surprise in Minimal art, only a phenomenal one of the same order as in Novelty art which is a one-time surprise. . . . The artistic substance and reality, as distinct from the program, turns out to be in good safe taste. I find myself back in the realm of Good Design, where Pop, Op, Assemblage, and the rest of Novelty art live. By being employed as tokens, the “primary structures” are converted into mannerisms. The third dimension itself is converted into a mannerism.145 I quote Greenberg at length here to do justice to the way his argument resonates with issues that I have been articulating. The opposite of the “ideated” sculpture Greenberg criticizes is obviously his modernist or “non-ideated” sculpture, which is “self-sufficient” and “optical” and does not refer to anything outside itself. His description of the experience of modernist sculpture here complies with his description in “Abstract, Representational and so forth” of an aesthetic experience whose outcome is impossible to anticipate and whose quality depends solely on that experience alone.146
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In “Recentness of Sculpture,” Greenberg advises Smithson and his “minimalist” contemporaries to learn from artists like Anthony Caro, Ellsworth Kelly, and Kenneth Noland; in particular they needed to learn “how to rise above Good Design.”147 But how can Smithson learn from these artists when he intends to undermine the perceptual models on which Greenberg and others assume their work is based? Smithson does intend a formal resemblance between his mirrored wall pieces and the contemporary paintings that Greenberg championed, but his works promote a completely different way of seeing. And soon even the formal resemblance between Smithson’s work and the work of these artists, already quite fragile, will cease to exist.148 The final irony inheres in Greenberg’s claim that minimalism is not spontaneous but is based on conventions, while the art he champions is not. Smithson had already gone to some length to prove this incorrect in his earlier essay, “Abstract Mannerism.” Smithson claimed that his title Alogon comes from the Greek word that refers to the unnameable and irrational number.149 Thus, when used as a title for sculpture, “alogon” refers to something that suspends primary order and rationality, that breaks with a gestalt.150 Here that broken gestalt is more than just the “good” or even the coherent image; it is what Smithson once called the entire “art establishment” and its relationship to perceiving abstraction. As if to answer Smithson’s complaint that “abstraction is everybody’s zero but nobody’s nought,” Lawrence Alloway provided his own description of the artist’s multiple-unit work: “Nothing is simple. For one thing, our continuing contact as spectators with such work replaces blankness and the sense of zero with recognition of purpose.”151 In most of his early geometric sculpture, Robert Smithson seeks to confound visual expectations and to create discomfort for viewers. All this work is abstract, but abstraction is not what causes the confusion. Rather, this confusion is generated by Smithson’s manipulation of certain artistic conventions or descriptive analogies such as linear perspective, the alternating perspective figure, or the stereoscope that normally reward particular expectations. Smithson suspected that confusion in front of abstract works of art was due to the fact that viewers depended on the presence of such conventions or analogies to give works of art their structure and make them intelligible. Not only are these paradigms or conventions more appropriate to representational images, but Smithson also felt that abstraction had no inherent obligation to them or to meet the expectations they satisfy.152 So he made the expectations clear by deliberately disappointing them in the design of his work, hoping then that the viewer’s frustration would lead to an awareness of her or his visual preconceptions and not just to the conclusion that abstraction was inherently ambiguous.
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As I have already shown, Smithson was not alone in attempting to describe the relationship between spectatorial discomfort and abstraction in the early to mid1960s. His work and writings develop out of a larger historical debate in which more was at stake than just the stylistic arguments concerning degrees or types of abstraction that many assessments of this period tend to emphasize. This debate involved establishing a general definition of the nature of aesthetic experience that would accommodate abstraction as either a positive or a negative development within it. Despite the theoretical complexity and diversity of the various positions within this debate, however, many of the actual descriptions of the process of viewing abstract art given by its participants, both inside and outside the art world, during the early 1960s are formally similar, even though they are found in texts now considered to be antithetical to one another. These morphological similarities provided a point of entry for Smithson because he understood that what drew them together was the connection all sides inevitably made between ambiguity and abstraction. But in all of these descriptions, the actual cause of this ambiguity was perceptual; it was always due to the confounding of a coherent presentation of objects in space and often specifically due to the confounding of linear perspective or visual transparency. Although the authors of these descriptions held different opinions concerning whether abstraction’s visual ambiguity could be overcome by the viewer, all agreed that the ambiguity or visual opacity of abstract images was the central issue and that sight or its frustration was the seat of a spectator’s success or failure to “read” these images. Smithson attacked these descriptions of the perception of abstraction in a number of ways and finally was able to illustrate the limits of perception generally, both physiologically and culturally, as separate from the perception of abstraction specifically. Smithson articulates the space of vision as a historically specific space in his early sculpture by attributing perceptual ambiguities to cultural expectations, based on learned conventions that were tied to a particular site—the museum—and not to be “found in nature.”153 Once identified, these cultural expectations and sites could be challenged by the introduction of other types of experiences and sites—what one might call “cultural elsewheres.”
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NEW JERSEY The city, like man, no longer had limits. . . . It tends . . . to alter the very eyes of society. Those left behind in the central city—the aged, the racial and national minorities, the poor generally—drop out of the mind and sight of those riding the superhighways from suburbia to office and back. michael harrington, THE ACCIDENTAL CENTURY Why should any artist be concerned with the monuments of Passaic? Should one feel sad or glad about such a visit? What value, besides suburban scenery is behind that “unstressed” landscape? Is there some kind of secret motive for going to such a place? Is the artist who goes there a debased romantic, or an astoundingly brilliant artist pretending to be a debased romantic? Would the installation of a few of “the best works of art” in the streets improve the spirits of the citizens? Who am I to propose such questions? robert smithson, text related to “the monuments of passaic” Everything was coming apart. Everything was falling. A spinning wind was picking up and whirling: dust, rags, chips of painted wood, bits of gilded plaster, pasteboard bricks, posters; an arid gloom fleeted; and amidst the dust, and the falling things, and the flapping scenery, Cincinnatus made his way in that direction where, to judge by the voices, stood beings akin to him. vladimir nabokov, INVITATION TO A BEHEADING
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FIGURE 2.1 Robert Smithson, Untitled, 1964–1965.
The Crystal Land Smithson’s investigation of cultural “elsewheres” begins with New Jersey. He was born and raised there. His parents lived the rest of their lives there, and he visited them regularly after he moved to New York in 1957. At a certain point, he also began to make regular excursions to the state, alone or with friends, for the purposes of his art. On these trips, he sought out particular kinds of sites—quarries, airfields, swamps, postindustrial towns—that were forgotten, abandoned, or marginalized in some way. Early on, he viewed these landscapes beyond Manhattan somewhat dispassionately even as he brought them back into circulation in a variety of ways. They provided him with a foil for the New York art world, of which he was increasingly a part. Nancy Holt recalls one particular New Jersey trip in which they never let New York City out of their sight. In this and many other instances, New Jersey became a set of opportunities for viewing New York.1 By the mid-1960s, Smithson also conceived of the New Jersey landscape as a mirror that reflected images from science fiction, crystallography, and the work of his contemporaries. In “The Crystal Land,” his earliest published description of this landscape, he establishes relationships between these images by compiling a chain of formal analogies. The essay begins: “The first time I saw Don Judd’s ‘pink-plexiglass,’ it suggested a giant crystal from another planet.”2 By comparing a work by Judd to a crystal from another planet, Smithson enters the Judd into the lexicon of nonbiological metaphors that he was proposing for his own work and the work of many of his contemporaries at the time, but his network of analogies expands further to include the actual crystals he and Judd collected at the Upper Montclair quarry.3 The view from the quarry cliffs then leads to a discovery of the predominantly crystalline shapes that weave the New Jersey landscape together: “The highways crisscross through the towns and become man-made geological networks of concrete. In fact, the entire landscape has a mineral presence. From the shiny chrome diners to glass windows of shopping centers, a sense of the crystalline prevails.”4 Later on in the essay, Smithson returns to his reference to “another planet” by suggesting that the Jersey Meadows would be a good location for a movie about life on Mars: “It even has a network of canals that are choked by acres of tall reeds.”5 Finally, he brings his chain of analogies full circle to include one of his own works by reproducing a black and white photograph of Untitled in the published article (figure 2.1). This photographic reproduction extends the chain of reflected images to Smithson himself because it includes a reflected image of the artist in one of the sculpture’s mirrored surfaces. And, just like this crystalline, mirrored sculpture, the essay functions to “feed back an infinite number of reflected ‘ready-mades,’ ” this time from the New Jersey landscape.6
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During the mid-1960s, Smithson uses the term “ready-made” to refer to Marcel Duchamp’s work and to Robert Morris’s facsimiles of specific works by Duchamp. He also uses the term to describe a general type of contemporary artistic activity he associates with Duchamp. Both as an object and as an activity, the readymade functions as a pun on the Bergsonian concept of “creative evolution” with its idea of “ready made categories.” Says Bergson, “The history of philosophy is there, however, and shows us the eternal conflict of systems, the impossibility of satisfactorily getting the real into the ready-made garments of our ready-made concepts, the necessity of making to measure.” But it is such an “impossibility” that appeals to Duchamp and Morris. With this in mind, Morris’s monstrous “ideal” structures are inconsequential or uncertain ready-mades, which are definitely outside Bergson’s concept of creative evolution. If anything, they are uncreative in the manner of the 16th century alchemist-philosopher-artist.7 In embracing the ready-made as a strategy, the artist can avoid creating anew or “making to measure.” He or she assumes, like the alchemist, the power to transmit one thing into another because of a belief in the inherent sameness of these things. “Alchemy,” according to Smithson, “is a concrete way of dealing with sameness.”8 In “The Crystal Land,” this alchemical approach to “sameness” constellates on the level of perception rather than manufacture.9 Repetition at the level of making objects entails doing something over and over again; repetition at the level of perception entails seeing something over and over again. Each image in the essay reflects its predecessor, and Smithson draws all of these perceptions from images already constituted elsewhere. Thus they are sights that are not created anew, not made to measure. Smithson’s model for his perceptual alchemy is the satellite. In the margins of a drawing entitled Three Works in Metal and Plastic (see figure 1.26), Smithson notes that “it has been reported that the Mariner camera showed Mars to have surfaces like mirrors,” and later, when again referring to the Mariner photographs in a letter, he concludes: “Sometimes I think the whole universe is a Hall of Mirrors. Reflections reflecting reflections.”10 The New Jersey of “The Crystal Land” appears to be part of this hall of mirrors, but the way Smithson represents it has more in common with science fiction than science proper. More specifically, his description resembles the satellite’s transforming eye of light in J. G. Ballard’s contemporary novel, The Crystal
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World.11 Tracing the logic of Ballard’s vision reveals the significance of this type of reflective vision for both authors. The hero of Ballard’s novel, Dr. Edward Sanders, travels to an area deep within the continent of Africa at the invitation of some former colleagues. Once there, he discovers an odd quality to the light. Soon he realizes that what he had assumed to be its source—an enormous star—was in fact an old satellite whose “luminosity has increased by at least tenfold, transforming the thin pinpoint of light that had burrowed across the night sky for so many faithful years into a brilliant luminary outshone only by the moon.”12 Like Smithson’s vision of the landscape of New Jersey, Ballard’s satellite reveals a surface that it has transformed from a purportedly undifferentiated ground into a brilliant field of reflective crystals. And this new landscape or “crystal world” continues to reflect and expand the effects of the satellite’s gaze even after the satellite falls behind the horizon. A young army doctor provides the first explanation of the crystallization process in the novel: “It is closer to a cancer than anything else— and about as curable—an actual proliferation of the sub-atomic identity of all matter. It’s as if a sequence of displaced but identical images of the same object were being produced by refraction through a prism, but with the element of time replacing the role of light.”13 Time, now playing light’s role in the mirroring process, renders moments from the past visible. As the past bounces forward into the present, the two time-bound experiences from these two historically distinct points cancel each other out and collapse into an infinity of timeless, almost archetypal images of paradise. For example, on his first trip into the crystallized forest, Sanders experiences a flood of images from his childhood that recall “the paradisal world when everything seemed illuminated by that prismatic light described so exactly by Wordsworth in his recollections of childhood.”14 And later he experiences “a curious premonition of hope and longing, as if he were some fugitive Adam chancing upon a forgotten gateway to the forbidden paradise” as he approaches a large colonial house.15 These experiences ultimately prove to be fatal for Sanders because, in abandoning the present, temporal world outside the forest, he also accepts the dangers of the crystalline world rapidly closing in to absorb him: “its hazards were a small price to pay for its illumination of my life.” He is seduced by the possibility of complete physical and spiritual transfiguration, an afterlife through death that he would experience in the paradisal realm of the distant past. Although Ballard’s crystal world is far more menacing and seductive than Smithson’s crystal land, the structural terms of their respective descriptions of their crystalline landscapes are similar. Both present a closed circuit of reflections reflecting
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reflections in which the individuated qualities of time and space succumb to timelessness and a ubiquitous crystalline space. Postcolonial Africa disappears and metropolitan New Jersey flattens out into a uniform crystalline grid in which space-age futures collapse into geological pasts.16 The present exists only in fleeting glimpses of generic images of colonialism, suburbia, or industrial ruin. It has no unique or stable image status. As I stated in the previous chapter, the principle terms of Smithson’s system of perceptual analysis—crystals and enantiomorphs—mirror each other physically and linguistically as both objects or nouns and as concepts or metaphors. These two terms also provide the basis for the chain of analogies Smithson establishes in the “Crystal Land” essay. Both Smithson and Ballard reconfigure signification or representation as a fixed set of constantly circling deferrals or referrals rather than as a simple progression from signifiers to signifieds that depends on a specific referent. This is what Smithson means by the phrase “reflected ‘ready-mades.’ ” Such a strategy appears to dissolve the boundaries between inside and outside the system of reflections through a linguistic sleight of hand since, in Smithson’s crystal land, crystals reflect and are the structure they reflect. Their relationships are not arbitrary since they all share the same structure, yet neither are they specific since any crystal will do. This reflective relationship between objects and structures also provides a way of connecting two disparate realities without necessitating a disjunctive gaze into the center of reference where lie the inequalities between images and reflections—and specificities of both time and place. The specificity of reference is lost because these perceptual conditions are enantiomorphic. Through his experiments with enantiomorphic perception in his early sculpture, Smithson seeks to reveal and defeat the expectations concomitant with anthropomorphic descriptions of vision: “ ‘I saw all the mirrors in the planet and none reflected me . . . ’ (Borges).”17 Yet enantiomorphic vision possesses its own set of conditions and expectations. In 1966, the artist acknowledged this fact: “Perception as a deprivation of action and reaction brings to mind the desolate, but exquisite, surfacestructures of the empty ‘box’ or ‘lattice.’ ”18 Thus, in “The Crystal Land,” New Jersey becomes an enantiomorphic crystalline lattice that is always ready to accommodate analogical images projected onto it because it is perceived as empty, without a center. Smithson describes it this way: “The ‘landscape’ as a nonbiological metaphor is disclosed in The Crystal Land by Robert Smithson. This ‘landscape’ has no depth or meaning other than its presence. The center of this landscape is absent, therefore it is enantiomorphic.”19 As Smithson gazes across the physical and cultural landscape of
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New Jersey, this landscape becomes simply the object of his crystalline vision, a distinctly ordered set of “reflected ‘ready-mades’ ” and a place whose boundaries are clearly marked: “As we drove through the Lincoln Tunnel, we talked about going on another trip, to Franklin Furnace; there one might find minerals that glow under ultraviolet light or ‘black light.’ The countless cream colored square tiles on the walls of the tunnel sped by until a sign announcing N.Y. broke the tiles’ [inorganic] order.”20
Perspective: The Metropolis To approach a city, or even a city neighborhood, as if it were a larger architectural problem, capable of being given order by converting it into a disciplined work of art, is to make the mistake of attempting to substitute art for life. jane jacobs, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
In his first essay on New Jersey, if only in the intervals between reflections, Smithson also records the undifferentiated flow of information from geological handbooks, newspapers, juke boxes, and commercial radio stations. These notations act as freefloating textual and aural “static” that disrupt the artist’s crystalline vision. Smithson edited most of this material out of the published text of “The Crystal Land,” but the bits that he allows to remain acknowledge a world at odds with his ordered visual lattice, where experience is diverse and highly chaotic.21 He admits much more of this chaotic material into “The Monument: An Outline for a Film,” which he wrote sometime in the spring of 1967. In fact, one might say that this material provides the underlying structure and cultural contexts for the script’s narrative—a story of the conception, on-site research, fabrication, and exhibition of a “landscape project for N.Y. gallery.”22 It manifests in the outline’s shifting locations—the apartment of the dealer Virginia Dwan, a station wagon traveling down the New Jersey Turnpike, a turnpike restaurant, the Pine Barrens Plains, a flying saucer convention, a motel, and finally a gallery opening and party; its overlapping images, including shots of the industrial landscape; and its soundtrack, comprised of sitespecific, but overlapping dialogue, conversations about art, art critics, and shows, descriptions of the local “Pineys,” interviews with “saucer-buffs,” and rock and roll music by Vanilla Fudge. From this short outline of a film that Smithson never made, one gains a sense that this chaos is culture as it is experienced when one moves from place to place, particularly from New York to New Jersey and back again.
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Order and chaos, and the value judgments that were attached to these two terms, delimited the debates over the present and future of what was called “the exploding metropolis” in the United States by 1957.23 The New York metropolitan area, including most of New Jersey, was a popular case study for this phenomenon. The issue was pervasively discussed in numerous public and private forums among individuals and within organizations representing a wide variety of personal and professional interests.24 Smithson participated in these debates, most directly as a speaker at the 1966 Yale Art Association symposium “Shaping the Environment: The Artist and the City.”25 The strategies for describing and evaluating that emerged from this symposium and numerous other events and publications provide a historically relevant context for Smithson’s own efforts at representing this phenomenon in his work and reveal shared discursive patterns. Visibility, legibility, and what the urban design theorist Kevin Lynch called “imageability” were the primary criteria used to evaluate the changing landscape of postwar United States. Without these qualities, most critics agreed, the inhabitants of this metropolitan landscape would be lost; they would not be able to negotiate geographically, socially, or culturally. Lynch articulated the seriousness of this concern for himself and his contemporaries: “The very word ‘lost’ in our language means much more than simple geographical uncertainty; it carries overtones of utter disaster.”26 For some, this sense of being lost had ideological overtones, particularly in terms of maintaining a coherent identity: “People who live and work in an urban area have a deep emotional need to have ‘their city’ stand for something worthwhile in the world and to present to themselves and to mankind a strong physical image of this spiritual ambition in the structure of the city, in its vistas and in its major monuments. Through these, men venerate the past, remember the achievements of those who have gone before, reach for the future and affirm their self-respect and idealism.”27 Although “visibility,” “legibility,” and “imageability” are not synonymous terms, they all signified a visual order that facilitated negotiation of the metropolitan landscape and the consolidation of a coherent identity within it, despite the presence of random or superficial chaotic elements. Bringing the metropolitan environment into focus as a visible and legible image also usually meant describing it in terms of a number of preexisting and often well-worn images or metaphors. These metaphors were meant to temper the newness and strangeness of the landscape by revealing its ordering logic in familiar terms or conventions. Some individuals used biological metaphors to describe the metropolis as a living organism that grows according to cell- or plant-like logic. Others borrowed
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organizational structures from the physical sciences, particularly grids or regularized crystalline structures.28 A second strategy was to define the metropolitan landscape in terms of what it was not—the pastoral or rural landscape. In this model, the new city consisted of a variety of futuristic images based on science fiction or technology, and the old city was based on images rooted in the past, ranging from the pastoral landscape of the classical world to the preindustrial village.29 Finally, others drew terminology and categories from modern art when describing the visual effects of moving through the metropolis. These terms usually appeared in oppositional pairs as well. Again, the ways in which individual authors of these descriptions combined metaphors often appear to be somewhat arbitrary. But the poles around which they organized their chosen terms—order versus chaos—were not. For the proponents of imageability in the 1960s, the shared binary structure of these arguments, their dependence on trite visual metaphors, and their explicit or implicit ideological values were the significant shared components of the dominant models of perceiving the metropolitan landscape and, by extension, its inhabitants. In his 1964 text God’s Own Junkyard, Peter Blake exemplifies the conservative response to the new American metropolitan landscape; he expresses despair over its lack of “image,” its formlessness and eclecticism. Symbolic forms developed for particular structures now appear in random combination with other, previously unrelated symbolic forms, and, most absurdly, Blake notes, many contemporary buildings possess oversized signs announcing what they are because they no longer clearly represent their function on their own.30 Because this built environment complies with no apparent ordering principle or predetermined system of symbols, Blake feels that people can no longer perceive, let alone judge their visual environment. He blames their visual alienation on the metropolitan landscape’s creators, “people without ties to the landscape or townscape in which they live, people whose eyes have lost the art of seeing.”31 This intellectual elite, he claims, has discarded the rational guiding principles of implicitly classical forms to embrace an undisciplined novelty of form and design. The book jacket design for God’s Own Junkyard illustrates the visual chaos Blake deplores in a black and white photo-silkscreen montage of photographs included in the text. The intended effect is a visual junkyard of cacophonous images.32 Other pairings of photographic images inside the book imply that a such a collage sensibility is at the root of the problem, while the clean geometric forms and transparency of high, Miesian modernism uphold the ordered standards of the past. One pair of images in particular juxtaposes a cluttered Army/Navy surplus storefront in San Francisco with a spare and elegant gift shop in New York City. By drawing a
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distinction between two major modernist formal devices—collage and abstract geometry—and their architectural counterparts, Blake ties the two devices to negative and positive values concerning visual ambiguity or clarity and, in turn, to categories of novelty (mass-culture-based) and classical (high) art.33 His conclusion is striking: “For the truth is that the mess that is man-made America is merely a caricature of the mess that is art in America—and a very mild caricature at that. The inscription on Sir Christopher Wren’s tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral contains the famous words: ‘If thou seek his monument, look about thee.’ God forbid that this should ever become our epitaph.”34 The architects Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown view this same American landscape, and contemporary American art, much more positively. Rather than complaining about chaos and blindness, they assume the presence of a syntactical order that has a different, nonclassical kind of coherence, and they discover a new and vital visual experience along what they call “Roadtown, USA.”35 In their 1968 article “A Significance for A & P Parking Lots, or Learning from Las Vegas,” the two architects claim that learning from the present, instead of destroying it to establish a new, utopian order in line with the classical past, is an alternative “way of being revolutionary.”36 They challenge the puritanical position of orthodox modern architects as not only impractical but boring and call for a return to the content-rich, romantic eclecticism of historical reference informed by the example of “roadside eclecticism.” The only significant differences that Venturi and Scott Brown see between the two types of eclecticism reflect the way architecture is now experienced: “The philosophical associations of the old eclecticism evoked subtle and complex meanings to be savored in the docile spaces of a traditional landscape. The commercial persuasion of roadside eclecticism provokes bold impact in the vast and complex setting of a new landscape of big spaces, high speeds, and complex programs.”37 Venturi and Scott Brown give the two sites mentioned in the title of their article the kind of analytic attention usually reserved for the grand-scale architectural projects of the past. Two elements—the sign and the strip—provide them with their greatest insights into the ordering system behind the apparent chaos of the new, highspeed eclecticism embodied in these sites. Signs are crucial in a complex and rapidly moving society; Venturi and Scott Brown claim that Blake’s desire for an architecture that formally presents both its function and its meaning is impossible in such a society. In many cases, the sign plays a more important role than the building in informing the passer-by, since it must compete for recognition within the highly charged visual complexity of the strip.
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Although the commercial strip appears chaotic, it is based, according to the authors, on a system that is both ordered and inclusive: “It is not an order dominated by the expert and made easy for the eye. The moving eye in the moving body must work to pick out and interpret a variety of changing, juxtaposed orders, like the shifting configurations of a Victor Vasarely painting.”38 Like Blake, Venturi and Scott Brown use the term “juxtaposition” to describe the formal configuration of the strip and the visual experience of it, but they see it as a positive development. They even link this visual experience to the paintings of one of the artists most prominently featured by Seitz in The Responsive Eye and thus to that “mess that is art in America.” Seitz believed that perceptual art’s visual chaos or ambiguity provided opportunities for transcendence; his critics thought that it was merely an exercise in visual trickery. In many respects, the value judgments of Venturi, Scott Brown, and Blake are based on the same perceptual dichotomies, and both define the metropolitan landscape in terms of art. Tony Smith’s 1966 story of his nighttime car ride on the unfinished New Jersey turnpike is often cited as one of the earliest descriptions of the dematerialization of the art object. It was also one of the earliest accounts of a metropolitan landscape in transition to appear in an art magazine.39 Smith describes moving through this new landscape along a paved road with no traditional markers of space or visible boundaries; only the “stacks, towers, fumes, and colored lights” of distant industrial complexes and towns “punctuate” the distant hills. He concludes that this mostly artificial unbounded space produced an experience unlike any provoked by art. The effect was liberating for him: “The experience on the road was something mapped out but not socially recognized. I thought to myself, it ought to be clear that’s the end of art. Most painting looks pretty pictorial after that. There is no way you can frame it, you just have to experience it.”40 Smith identifies other “artificial landscapes without cultural precedent” that produce this same, unbounded experience of space, as if he were considering these sites and the particular, outside-time and -tradition experiences that they produce as possibly a new category of experience. In suggesting that such a new category exists, Smith echoes the conclusions of Venturi and Scott Brown. However, he doesn’t tie this new category to any established metaphors or art historical precedents. According to him, it has none. He isn’t able to describe it in terms of the relative dichotomies of order versus chaos since he claims that the turnpike is both
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“mapped out” and socially unrecognizable. Its value is independent of either one of these terms. The site’s transitional status, in part, dictates this contradiction. Its boundaries are fragile, and it occupies a space between designated functions—so its ability to be deciphered in terms of preexisting categories, as one thing or another, is temporarily suspended. One is forced to observe it on its own terms, if at all. The unfinished turnpike is the type of New Jersey site Smithson sought out—a temporally marginalized, functionless, and traditionless space that is illegible in terms of habituated social and cultural vision. Smithson was evidently quite taken with Tony Smith’s night-ride story since he comments on it extensively in his 1967 essay “Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site” and a year later in “A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects.”41 In both instances, he is attracted by Smith’s choice of an “unfinished” site, but he appreciates even more the way Smith uses language to convey his experience of it. The syntax of Smith’s writing and the individual words he uses provide direct linguistic equivalents for the new and raw sense data of the things he describes without resorting to outmoded precedents, art historical or otherwise: Tony Smith writes about “a dark pavement” that is “punctuated by stacks, towers, fumes and colored lights.” (Artforum, December 1966.) The key word is “punctuated.” In a sense, the “dark pavement” could be considered a “vast sentence,” and the things perceived along it, “punctuation marks.” . . . Of course, I form these equations on the basis of sense-data and not rational-data. Punctuation refers to interruptions in “printed matter.” It is used to emphasize and clarify the meaning of specific segments of usage. Sentences like “skylines” are made of separate “things” that constitute a whole syntax. Tony Smith also refers to his art as “interruptions” in a “space-grid.”42 Smithson felt that such descriptive sensitivity exposed the reader to the “rules of structure based on a change in the semantics of building.”43 Such changes, endemic to the metropolitan landscape, remained imperceptible under the old framework of the rational language of tradition and function used both by Blake and by Venturi and Scott Brown. Smithson hoped that these changes would be communicated directly in their own formal terms rather than perceived as fulfillments of established patterns of visual and cultural expectations. Smithson links Smith’s reference to his art as “ ‘interruptions’ in a ‘spacegrid’ ” to Smith’s description of his nighttime car ride. He may have also considered
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the reference to be similar to his own analogue for New Jersey, a crystalline lattice disrupted by visual and aural static. Yet the spatial experience that Smith describes in his story isn’t consistently articulated in terms of such an inorganic—and static—grid. Smith may not revert to the obvious historical precedents of his contemporaries, Blake, Venturi, Scott Brown, and others. But what is fundamentally striking about all of their descriptions, including Smith’s, is that they share an unarticulated common ground. They all choose images ordered by orthogonals rushing to some distant vanishing point, often seen through the windshield of a car or from the middle of the street, to illustrate or describe their visual experience of these new landscapes. In doing so, they present these landscapes, and viewers then perceive them, through an unacknowledged visual convention for moving through space—linear perspective— and the car becomes a favored vantage point.44 Blake’s first comparison (figure 2.2) consists of a symmetrical view down the length of the old campus at the University of Virginia and a similarly plunging view down Canal Street in New Orleans. Aesthetic distinctions between juxtaposition and geometric abstraction hardly matter when the overall spatial experience is laid out this way. The only significant difference between the two images is in the amount of visual information their respective orthogonals bear. Venturi and Scott Brown also conceive of the strip as a receding set of orthogonals, loaded with information.45 Their first and only two-page photographic view of Las Vegas, taken by Scott Brown (figure 2.3), is similar to Blake’s New Orleans image; both are what the authors would call “Main Streets,” and both visually construct a deep, receding space regardless of whether this space is empty or full. Tony Smith claims that “there is no way you can frame it” when describing his night ride, but he does indeed contain it in terms roughly equivalent to those of linear perspective. The space of the unfinished highway rushes away along “the dark pavement” toward an indistinct but presumably existent vanishing point somewhere in the distance. Thus, this is hardly an experience without “cultural precedent.”46 In his 1967 essay “Art and Objecthood,” Michael Fried points out the presence of perspective in Smith’s description—both as a formal device for describing the experience of three-dimensional space and as a way of plotting the position of the spectator in relation to the experience of this space. In Fried’s words: being able to go on and on indefinitely is of the essence. What replaces the object—what does the same job of distancing or isolating the beholder, of making him a subject, that the object did in the closed room—is above all the endlessness, or objectlessness, of the
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FIGURE 2.2 George Cserna and Wallace Litwin, photographs, in Peter Blake, God’s Own Junkyard (1964).
approach or on-rush of perspective. It is the explicitness, that is to say, the sheer persistence, with which the experience presents itself as directed at him [Smith] from outside (on the turnpike from outside the car) that simultaneously makes him a subject—and establishes the experience itself as something like that of an object, or rather, of objecthood.47 Since it is a convention for describing deep three-dimensional space, linear perspective often implies a destination that is hypothetical. One never actually arrives at the vanishing point but presumably continuously and indefinitely “passes through” space toward it. This is particularly true if the convention is used to describe or photograph spatial experience from a moving car, as Smith does—and often as Blake, and as Venturi and Scott Brown do. Second, Fried rightly claims that what Smith describes as an immediate experience was, in fact, an encounter with a hidden anthropomorphic projection of himself. Fried states: “On the one hand, the turnpike, airstrips, and drill ground belong to no one; on the other, the situation established by Smith’s presence is in each case felt by him to be his.”48
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FIGURE 2.3 Denise Scott Brown, photograph, in Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, “A Significance for A & P Parking Lots, or Learning from Las Vegas,” Architectural Forum (March 1968).
In a letter to Artforum, Smithson responds to Fried’s article: “Every refutation is a mirror of the thing it refutes—ad infinitum. Every war is a battle with reflections. What Michael Fried attacks is what he is.”49 After all, Fried is, according to Smithson, “the keeper of the gospel of Clement Greenberg,” the author of the most influential descriptions of anthropomorphized space.50 Fried’s argument in “Art and Objecthood” depends on Greenberg’s description of the optical mirage produced by modernist sculpture. For example, Fried claims that a three-dimensional work by Jules Olitski establishes “surface—the surface, so to speak, of painting—as a medium of sculpture.”51 He compares this optical surface that is “more like that of a painting than like that of . . . ordinary objects and other sculpture” to what he derides as the latent anthropomorphism of “literalist” art or “objecthood.”52 Thus he adopts a description of perception that Smithson reveals in his contemporary writings and work to be essentially anthropomorphic and uses it to expose the “hidden anthropomorphism” in the work of Tony Smith and his contemporaries. Smithson’s assertion that Fried “attacks what he is” is, therefore, accurate. Linear perspective is the hidden anthropomorphic paradigm informing both Fried’s critique and Smith, Blake, and Venturi and Scott Brown’s definition of the proper or new aesthetic experience.
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Smithson was certainly aware of all the texts and images I have been discussing. He made extensive remarks concerning at least two. However, he takes a different approach to perspective when dealing with the metropolitan landscape.53 As I have already stated, his approach is based, in part, on his earlier work, specifically his mirrored sculpture. He uses the enantiomorphic paradigm of vision developed in these works to structure his early descriptions of New Jersey in “The Crystal Land.” In so doing, he is able to avoid viewing New Jersey through a naturalized perspectival frame. His organizing principles are deliberately crystalline and abstract. In a related text, Smithson even proposes that the view from inside a car could be enantiomorphic if it included the “dislocated” reflections from the rear-view mirror.54 Sometime in 1967, Smithson began a short essay entitled “Pointless Vanishing Points” with the claim that modern artists are unaware of the artificial conditions of vision hidden within the theories of space that they embrace. In such theories, mental conceptions masquerade as the physiological conditions of vision by misrepresenting the terms of these conditions. Smithson calls the resulting space of such vision “ ‘kinesthetic space’ or what is sometimes called ‘surveyor’s space’ ”: “The eyes do not see this kind of space, but rather they perceive through a mental artifice of directions without determined distances, which in turn gives the illusion of infinite spaces. Natural visual space is not infinite. The surveyor imposes his artificial spaces on the landscape he is surveying, and in effect produces perspective projections along the elevations he is mapping. In a very non-illusionistic sense he is constructing an illusion around himself because he is dealing directly with sense perceptions and turning them into mental conceptions.”55 Here Smithson not only describes the process of surveying by using the conventional terminology of linear perspective, but, more important, he implies that the conceptual underpinnings of both surveying and linear perspective and the illusions they provide are utopian. Surveyor’s space appears unified and infinite only because the vanishing point is a mental conception of a hypothetical destination and not based on the perception of a particular place. Smithson notes that he first became aware of the repressed physiological aspects of vision when he built the Enantiomorphic Chambers, since this work divides a central vanishing point into two diverging points and thus calls attention to the structure of a unitary three-dimensional visual field as an illusion: “we tend to forget the actual stereoscopic structure of our two eyes or what I will call ‘enantiomorphic vision’—that is seeing double.”56 This enantiomorphic vision produces an enantiomorphic perspective that “differs from central perspective in so far as it is mainly three dimensional and dual-
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istic in conception, whereas the latter is two dimensional and unitary.”57 He suggests building a three-dimensional structure from behind a two-dimensional image rendered in two-dimensional dualistic perspective. He believed that, if accomplished, this structure would “resemble a reversed stereoscopic viewer. One would be physiologically transported behind the ‘fused image’ of the picture plane, to where the vision diverges.”58 The mental projections of surveyor’s space would have nowhere to hide under such conditions.
The term “surveyor’s space” implies more than a theory of vision; it is the practice that brought the metropolis, from its sight lines to its property lines, into view through the production of maps. Smithson rarely used maps in traditional ways. He often purchased road maps of the regions he traveled through; for example, a Hagstrom map of Passaic remains whole and unmarked in the project file for “The Monuments of Passaic.” But often when he consulted maps, particularly geological survey quadrangles, “the mapping followed the traveling.”59 For him, these maps were objects in their own right, independent of the places they represented. They were also pieces of paper that provided two-dimensional templates for his designs. Thus the quadrangle maps became working drawings in a number of different ways. Smithson’s alterations and additions to a Weehawken, New Jersey, quadrangle transform it into a geometric image that he used frequently in his three-dimensional work during the mid- to late 1960s (figure 2.4). Formal relationships exist between Smithson’s map of Passaic and his drawings and sculpture before and after 1967, and by considering some of them together, one can begin to discern the information Smithson wanted the map to convey about the work he was doing in Passaic. Smithson designed his map of Passaic as an illustration for his second published account of a trip to New Jersey, “The Monuments of Passaic,” by superimposing a black grid onto a black and white negative photostat of a Weehawken quadrangle.60 He then cut the map into a stepped shape which conforms to the squared lines of the grid.61 Although Smithson’s published caption states that the map shows the “Region of the Monuments along the Passaic River,” Passaic and the Passaic River are the only points of reference mentioned in the text of the article that are visible on the map. The map’s black, abstract form visually takes precedence over the geographical information it contains.62
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FIGURE 2.4 Robert Smithson, Negative Map Showing Region of the Monuments along the Passaic River, 1967.
The Passaic map’s predominantly black silhouette most precisely echoes the individual units of Smithson’s Alogons. For Smithson, the term “alogon” refers to something that suspends primary order and rationality and breaks with a gestalt. As I argue in the previous chapter, Smithson deliberately shatters the perceptual paradigms underlying contemporary descriptions of viewing abstraction through the design of his Alogons by rendering in concrete, three-dimensional form the alternating perspective figures commonly used as models for these descriptions. In a 1967 drawing related to a contemporary three-dimensional work, Pointless Vanishing Point (figure 2.5), Smithson refers both to his earlier Alogons, through the shape of the sculpture’s stepped end, and to the Schröder staircase; his use of hard, clean ruled lines rendered in dark pencil in the drawing seems to be a deliberate attempt to echo the precise, diagrammatic quality of alternating perspective figures.63 However, Smithson does not slavishly copy the Schröder staircase. As in all of his three-dimensional works based on such figures, he chooses one of its three-dimensional images—in this case, the staircase—and removes the two lines from the original figure that had allowed two images—the staircase and the floating cornice—to coexist in the visually ambiguous alternating perspective figure. These two lines, which alternately create a back wall for
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FIGURE 2.5 Robert Smithson, Drawing for Pointless Vanishing Point, 1967.
the staircase and then establish the forward edge of the cornice, are crucial to the double reading of the Schröder staircase; their elimination allows Smithson’s title for the drawing, Pointless Vanishing Point, to make sense. Without the two lines, Smithson’s image, in which the perspectival recession of the staircase is exaggerated, appears both as a set of narrow stairs and as a set of orthogonals that have lost their vanishing point. Alternating perspective figures create the illusion of two different threedimensional images through standard one- and two-point perspectival tricks. In Smithson’s drawing, the Schröder staircase has lost its perceptual “point” as well. Smithson extends this chain of formal and conceptual analogies in his three-dimensional Pointless Vanishing Point and in several of the photographic images he takes or directs to be taken of it. One photograph provides a view of the sculpture from its long side so that it appears like a partially opened three-dimensional fan (figure 2.6) (this is the image most often reproduced); the second is an “aerial” view, possibly of a prototype for the final version. Two other photographs (figures 2.7 and 2.8) clearly reveal the two-dimensional shape of the sculpture’s stepped end. In one of these images (see figure 2.7), Pointless Vanishing Point is positioned to replicate the 1967 Pointless Vanishing Point drawing; the large, stepped end is close to the picture
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FIGURE 2.6 Robert Smithson, Pointless Vanishing Point, 1968.
plane and yet set back on the right-hand side at a bit of an angle so that the stepped orthogonals extend back and sharply up toward the upper right-hand corner of the photograph. In the second of these photographs (see figure 2.8), the stepped end is flush with the picture plane; its two straight edges match those of the photographic image exactly. Together, the two images roughly conform to the terms of a stereoscope card—two views of the same object from slightly different points in space. In fact, they resemble one of the first drawings for the stereoscope by one of its inventors, Sir Charles Wheatstone, as reproduced in a book in Smithson’s library (figure 2.9).64 But Smithson flips them and, in doing so, perhaps indicates that they are similar images viewed from behind. These two photographs reveal a second flipping as well. In both, the photographer has lit Pointless Vanishing Point from above so that the photograph reproduces the long section of the work as a crisp white shape while the stepped end is cast in shadow. The position of the sculpture in the second photograph heightens the contrast between the bright white orthogonals that appear to rush almost directly backward and the black silhouette of the stepped edge. The dark appearance and apparent flatness of the front edge of the sculpture now correspond to the dark, two-
FIGURE 2.7 (top left) Robert Smithson, Pointless Vanishing Point, 1968. FIGURE 2.8 (top right) Robert Smithson, Pointless Vanishing Point, 1968.
FIGURE 2.9 Stereoscopic pictures from Sir Charles Wheatstone, Scientific Papers, in Harry Asher, Experiments in Seeing (1961).
dimensional shape of Smithson’s Passaic map, but with one significant difference. The two shapes are mirror images of one another. The Passaic map is a “flipped” Pointless Vanishing Point.65 Physically, this situation would extend the “pointless” vanishing point of the sculpture out into the spectator’s space and, in fact, place her or him at or at least within the vicinity of its phantom point. Under these conditions of reversed perspective, the map would then become the two-dimensional image projected from this solidified and monocular gaze. Through the sequence of images made up of the Passaic map, the ink Drawing for Pointless Vanishing Point, and finally the photographs of the completed three-dimensional work, Smithson has produced the conditions of the reversed stereoscope viewer he describes in his contemporary “Pointless Vanishing Points” essay. However, Smithson reduces the binocular premise of the hypothetical viewer to a monocular or single vantage point in the completed work. He made a similar choice in his Alogons to defeat the illusionistic visual flicker of alternating perspective figures. In connecting a map of a specific site with the projected, two-dimensional face of one of these now monocular vanishing points, he implies the collapse of perceptual illusions into a set of two-dimensional images. Such an operation exposes the naturalized conditions of surveyor’s space. By locating the viewer near a “pointless” vanishing point and suggesting the projection of two-dimensional images from this same location, Smithson describes a set of perceptual conditions for viewing Passaic that is based on “reflected ‘ready-mades,’ ” both his own and analogies drawn from elsewhere. And together these ready-mades create an enantiomorphic situation, which, once again, reveals an empty center. In another work executed in 1967, entitled New Jersey, New York with 2 Photos (figure 2.10), Smithson provides a diagram of the terms of this perceptual collapse. He attaches a diamond-shaped fragment of a color map of the New Jersey and New York City area to a sheet of grid paper. This map lacks its central section and thus creates a crenelated frame around the exposed grid paper underneath. Smithson emphasizes the map’s framing function by adding several heavy, black ink outlines around its inner edge. The resulting shape of the exposed grid paper consists of four stepped “alogon” forms, one facing each corner of the page. This image resembles several of the Alogon drawings Smithson made in the small spiral notebook (see figure 1.2). None of these notebook images, however, refers to any specific type of space or location. In New Jersey, New York with 2 Photos, as in Negative Map Showing Region of the Monuments along the Passaic River, Smithson uses the “alogon” image to frame the
FIGURE 2.10 (see PLATE 2) Robert Smithson, New Jersey, New York with 2 Photos, 1967.
expanded enantiomorphic poles of his two points of artistic reference, New Jersey and New York. Near the top and bottom points of this internal, “alogon” shape, Smithson has placed two black and white Instamatic photographs. The top image provides a view toward Manhattan through the raised orthogonals of two parallel lanes of a New Jersey highway.66 Presumably, Smithson shot the lower photograph somewhere in New York; it too is a view down a divided highway whose four lanes appear to converge somewhere in the distance. Smithson leaves the mathematical center of the collage empty, except for a double-edged square frame that he has penciled in lightly. All of the markers of a concise description of three-dimensional space are here in the image, except that they converge toward nothing specific or unitary. These images and the conclusions Smithson hopes to draw from them conform to the general sense of “alogon” as a breakdown of gestalt objects and as a signifier of the “surd” or movement “toward the fringe” and the “ungraspable aspect of perspective.”67 In his Passaic map, Smithson turned a single, monocular vanishing point around and projected it out from Passaic. Instead of being a hypothetical location somewhere off on the horizon, the vanishing point originates with the viewer. And at the other end of vision, only abstract, two-dimensional projections—“alogons” in the form of maps—remain. Meanwhile, Passaic, the referent, vanishes. Smithson develops a critique of perspective based on the visually disturbing, three-dimensional models of perspective found in his contemporary multiple-unit sculpture to understand why New Jersey vanishes when he passes through it. Its legibility as an image, a strip, or any other ready-made artistic convention is only apparent. As a lived reality, the street, the city, the metropolis is something different.68 What then does it mean to occupy this vanishing point?
A Guide to the Monuments of Passaic Many subjects had difficulty in making a mental connection between the fast highway and the remainder of the city structure, just as in the Boston case. They would, in imagination, even walk across the Hollywood Freeway as if it did not exist. A high-speed artery may not necessarily be the best way of visually delimiting a central district. kevin lynch, THE
IMAGE OF THE CITY
Highway culture is invisible because it’s taken for granted, except by those who don’t like it. lawrence alloway, “hi-way culture”
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On Saturday, 30 September 1967, Robert Smithson boarded the #30 Inter-City Transportation Co. bus at New York’s Port Authority Building for Passaic, New Jersey, with a one-way ticket. He went alone this time, choosing a route taken by commuters but making the journey in reverse, on a weekend, and without intending to return, at least not the way he came. He carried a copy of The New York Times, a science fiction novel by Brian Aldiss, a spiral notebook, and his Instamatic camera, accessories that together also made him somewhat exceptional and difficult to characterize: businessman, urban anthropologist, or tourist? As the bus made its way toward Passaic, Smithson skimmed through both the newspaper and the paperback and jotted down a list of roadside landmarks in the notebook. After he got off the bus on the outskirts of town, he continued to record the information printed on the signs, buildings, and machines he must have passed, the street addresses of several of the places he stopped, where he ate lunch, and a fragment of overheard conversation. He also shot several rolls of black and white film. Since he went alone, this is all that can be stated definitively about Smithson’s trip without relying on his own published account of what happened. On their own, these conditions, actions, and notations are inconclusive, and the photographs are fairly ambiguous. Yet these physical traces, conditions, tools, and actions were not fortuitous and did not lack a larger context. They all can be discussed in terms of established systems, either Smithson’s own systems or those of the society of which he was a part. One cannot fully reconstruct Smithson’s experience of his trip to Passaic apart from his own account, and the two things—experience and written account—are not equivalent. But one needs to recognize that Smithson’s essay is a reconstruction of what was a carefully constructed experience. Smithson’s spiral notebook provides some evidence of how this worked. The notebook was not empty when Smithson got on the bus at the Port Authority. It already contained an unfinished draft of an essay entitled “A Guide to the Monuments of Passaic New Jersey.” The existence of this draft suggests that Smithson initially believed that he could write such an essay, or at least a substantial part of it, without making a special trip to Passaic, since he had already made many such trips. At some point, he changed his mind. His list of what he saw on his solo trip to Passaic appears several pages after the draft in the notebook. The chronological sequence is clear because Smithson uses the categories of sights he proposes in the unfinished draft to select and in some cases briefly describe the items on the list he made on-site.69 A second, much longer essay follows the on-site list, and in this essay Smithson places the information from this list into the framework of categories and abstract terms introduced in the first essay. The second essay becomes the basis for his published article
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“The Monuments of Passaic.”70 Through his choices and actions, Smithson transforms an abstract set of terms into a chaotic set of personal experiences and then into a kind of ordered chaos that allows the tension between the two to remain intact. The first notebook essay begins with a catalogue of the five types of monuments in Passaic: Type A, “memorials to exhausted meanings” or “what the-man-inthe-street considers to be a monument”; Type B, certain pre–Wall Street crash buildings, which Smithson characterizes as “Old Suburbia”; Type C, certain buildings of the post–World War II period, which Smithson calls “New Suburbia”; Type D, “Dead spots,” or empty sites such as dry swimming pools, parking lots, and degraded land masses, which Smithson claims “seem to exist for a limited duration of time”; and Type E, the “ ‘Ruin in Reverse’—any new construction that will eventually be completed.”71 According to Smithson, the five types “may also be found in different combinations,” but most of them lack function, and all are detached “from any suggestion of nature” and given an abstract, “cinematized existence” because of their shared “suburban mise en scene.”72 Smithson uses this suburban context and its urban counterpart, New York City, to frame and address a number of experiential conditions. His terms are based, in part, on those he used a year earlier in “The Crystal Land,” but he is speaking now of New Jersey and New York as elements of a larger, metropolitan landscape that is connected by highways and by social and economic interdependence and that is traveled within and through. The edges or boundaries, the places—and moments— where something breaks the established order like the sign announcing New York in the Lincoln Tunnel, become the keys to his investigation of the whole. He writes: “A departure from urban to suburban consciousness changes one’s [temporal sense]. Travel from urban to urban area keeps one at the center of temporal order, but travel from urban to suburban takes one to the edge of the temporal. The duality between urban and suburban seems especially acute in New York City, so much so that one’s consciousness of time becomes dual.”73 Smithson describes this dual consciousness in terms of paired opposites—center versus periphery, solid versus void—and, as in “The Crystal Land,” Passaic is still something of an “absence.” Its center seems “full of ‘holes’ compared to the center of New York City, which seems tightly packed and solid.”74 But Smithson now adds a temporal dimension to these holes by defining them in terms of his five monument types: “these holes in a sense are monumental vacancies that define a memory-trace without any durational space or movement— there is the apprehension of the memory of memory.”75 Smithson adds that “this memory tends to glide forward rather than backward or the future appears to precede
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the past. A trip to Passaic can turn one into a ‘time-traveler’ and take one into a memory of the future.”76 As a result of this temporally framed description, Smithson’s use of the adjective “cinematized” to describe the Passaic monuments and their suburban context becomes more precise. Together they conform to the actual, not perceived, conditions of cinema: strips of individual, still images—holes in the emulsion—that can be projected backward or forward to produce the illusion of movement but that in reality are records of a past passed off as new every time they are projected.77 As film strips, Passaic’s “monumental vacancies” also conform to the chains of analogies Smithson compiles in “The Crystal Land” or to Smith’s “ ‘interruptions’ in a ‘spacegrid,’ ” yet here their alchemical “sameness” occurs more strictly on the level of structure than on the level of images. New Jersey no longer merely looks like a movie— “a good location for a movie about life on Mars”; it is structured like one as a series of vacancies or “stills.” And it produces an experience of time equivalent to going to a movie, as described by Smithson a year earlier in “Entropy and the New Monuments”: “Time is compressed or stopped inside the movie house, and this in turn provides the viewer with an entropic condition. To spend time in a movie house is to make a ‘hole’ in one’s life.”78 Presumably, emerging from the movie house would produce an awareness of temporal duality that is similar to traveling from urban to suburban areas or back again since the latter, when labeled “commuting,” is frequently described in terms of making a hole in one’s life as well. In the first notebook essay, Smithson contrasts the temporal consciousness that such time travel evokes to the experience of traveling through space that trips from one urban center to another produce: “Time consciousness seems not to depend on sensory space, nevertheless space appears to feed on time in an almost organic way, that’s why to the space-centered person, space and time appear to be one. ‘Space eats time,’ said John Exhaustus.”79 Distinctions between time and space collapse into one experience in any correctly rendered perspective drawing since the distance “traveled” in both space and time is identical and an illusion. And here, once again, Smithson is speaking about the relationship between space and time in pictorial terms: “The notion of ‘space-travel’ is representational and concerned with an external unconsciousness that is defined by the language of facts [realism], while the notion of ‘time travel’ is abstract and concerned with an internal consciousness that is defined by the language of ideas [idealism].”80 In the essay’s final paragraph, Smithson intimates that he prefers “timetravel” over “space-travel” for the artist since the latter renders perceptions “sub-
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jective and unconscious.” As with surveyor’s space, something stands between perception and its object: “Indiscrete sensations are felt in place of any simultaneity between perception and the thing perceived, ‘space’ therefore should be avoided when establishing the limits of time-travel.”81 The text is incomplete and trails off soon after this sentence with the final phrase: “Picture yourself in the 8th Avenue Port Authority Bus Terminal getting ready to visit Passaic, . . . . ”82 This is where Smithson’s actual trip to Passaic and his reconstruction of it in the second essay in the notebook will begin.83 The elements of the first notebook essay that I have elucidated here— Smithson’s catalogue of monument types, his discussion of the dual consciousness of time in the metropolis, and his chosen mode of address to the reader in the text’s final sentence fragment—will all be important to Smithson’s second notebook essay and to his final, published account of his trip to Passaic but no longer as concepts and categories provided for readers to use in “picturing for themselves.” When he turns from writing “A Guide to the Monuments of Passaic New Jersey,” to a first-person narrative of his own trip, “The Monuments of Passaic,” the artist adapts these tools to his own use. The chaos of encounter comes to the fore, and the reader reads a reconstruction of Smithson’s experience of a particular site on the temporal edge. One can understand how and why this takes place by following the transformation of Smithson’s abstract guidelines for others in his first draft into tools that he himself puts to use. Smithson appoints himself an “official” guide to Passaic and its monuments in an advertisement he designed to accompany the publication of his Passaic article. Its proposed text reads as follows: SEE THE MONUMENTS OF PASSAIC NEW JERSEY What can you find in Passaic that you can not find in Paris, London or Rome? Find out for yourself. Discover (if you dare) the breathtaking Passaic River and the eternal monuments on its enchanted banks. Ride in Rent-a-Car comfort to the land that time forgot. Only minutes from N.Y.C. Robert Smithson will guide you through this fabled series of sites . . . and don’t forget your camera. Special maps come with each tour. For more information visit Dwan Gallery, 29 West 57th Street.84 This advertisement was never published, Dwan doesn’t remember such tours being arranged or even considered by the gallery,85 and I doubt that Smithson ever intended actually to go ahead with this masquerade because it was too patently ironic and too great a departure from the actual experiences he had in Passaic alone and, later, with
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several groups of friends.86 The advertisement copy is also unusual in its complete reliance on a single set of representational conventions—stock phrases borrowed from promotional travel brochures. Smithson usually balances one set of conventions with at least one other, contradictory one. In the advertisement, he intended to establish the contradictions by exaggerating the tour guide references made in his first notebook essay and then juxtaposing the resulting text as an advertisement for an experience that is disappointed in the accompanying article, “The Monuments of Passaic.” Smithson had deliberately not ridden in “Rent-a-Car comfort,” just as he had never seriously been interested in asking readers to “picture” themselves anywhere. In fact, this last phrase in the first notebook essay—“Picture yourself”—was one of the first to be deleted before he scrapped this essay altogether. Smithson’s approach to describing his trip to Passaic in his published text differs dramatically from the seductive simplicity of that of his alter ego, the tour guide, and from the easy analogies he establishes between images and landscape in his earlier New Jersey essay, “The Crystal Land.” These differences are apparent early in the text in the way Smithson arbitrarily quotes passages from the art section of the Times, glances out the window of the bus, and applies similar descriptive phrases to the things he sees: “Outside the bus window a Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodge flew by—a symphony in orange and blue.”87 The collision of the passing image and Smithson’s caption is humorous and jarring, similar to some of the asides Smithson includes in “The Crystal Land,” but here Smithson makes the source of the description much more precise, and how he views the Howard Johnson’s—“flying by,” suggesting a blending of color harmonies—becomes part of the analogy as well.88 When he picks up the Brian Aldiss novel, Earthworks, he compares the author’s description of the sky as a “great black and brown shield on which moisture gleamed” to the “clear cobalt blue” sky over Rutherford, “a perfect Indian summer day.” The landscape of science fiction may still resemble the sculpture of Smithson’s contemporaries as it did in “The Crystal Land,” but it no longer resembles New Jersey. His pairs of images, both visual and verbal, lack “fit,” and the irony in the combinations is much more obvious now because of the greater specificity of his descriptions of what and how he sees. Not only does Smithson approach Passaic by bus, but he deliberately makes the last mile or so of his journey across the Passaic River and to the town’s center on foot. By walking, Smithson slows down his experience of the landscape, and, in doing so, he sees it from the particularly intimate vantage point of the pedestrian. This area was not formally accessible to pedestrians since River Drive, the sole means of access running through the landscape along the Passaic River, was a four-lane road.
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Smithson chooses to walk through a landscape that was meant to be seen from a moving car, if noticed at all. In deliberately slowing down his experience, Smithson may have been sympathetic to Tony Smith’s desire to counteract what he felt was contemporary art’s fascination with sensation overload: “I find the bombardment of the senses very disturbing. I am very disturbed if I see something move too fast or something that is too fragmented. . . . the telescoping of images at a pace that is too fast for the senses to grasp.”89 But Smithson’s manner of slowing things down is different, and it has a different set of consequences. Most significantly, he chose to get off of the bus, whereas Smith—and Venturi and Scott Brown and Blake—stayed in their cars or at least let cars dictate the visual terms of their experience. For some educators, particularly those dedicated to promoting an appreciation of nature in ever-expanding metropolitan areas, speeding by the landscape between cities and suburbs posed pedagogical problems. Some proposed that nature trails be located near superhighways so that the automobile could be transformed into an asset by bringing more people closer to nature. In a special issue of Natural History dedicated to education, Frank Lutz praises the opportunities for learning provided by the “highway nature trail” as much more dynamic and personal than a museum: “a museum is a place to which specimens are brought and in which they are stored. The nature-trail idea is to leave things where they are but to label them with interesting facts.”90 He also states that the labels should give the feeling that “a friend is taking a walk with you and pointing out interesting things.”91 Such pedagogical patterns of learning through handling specimens and walking along nature trails were familiar to Smithson; so were the natural history and science museums that promoted them.92 In 1969, when Smithson designates a trail for the viewer between the site of his Cayuga Salt Mine Project and the Andrew Dickson White Museum of Art at Cornell University, he sees it as a stabilizing force that eases the viewer’s transition from one point to another: The route to the site is very indeterminate. It’s important because it’s an abyss between the abstraction and the site; a kind of oblivion. You could go there on a highway, but a highway to the site is really an abstraction because you don’t really have contact with the earth. A trail is more of a physical thing. These are all variables, indeterminate elements which will attempt to determine the route from the museum to the mine. I’ll stabilize the chaos between the two points. . . . Oblivion to me is a state when you’re not conscious of the time or space you are in. You’re oblivious to its limitations. Places without meaning, a kind of absent or pointless vanishing point.93
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In Passaic, Smithson counters one metropolitan blind spot—the highway—with an experience presented as its cure or at least its corrective: a slow, pedestrian stroll through it with a “learned friend.” In doing so, he stabilizes the chaos between two destinations, New York and Passaic, by physically immersing himself in the perceptual “oblivion” between them.94 Smithson argues in his first notebook essay that the difference between traveling from one urban area to another and from urban to suburban areas lies in the traveler’s experience of time. By traversing the former set of origins and destinations, the traveler remains at the center of the temporal order; thus his or her experience of time is unconscious and external because it is subsumed into the concrete representations of the space as “traveled through.” Changing one’s destination from urban to suburban takes one to the edge of the temporal, where one’s unconscious acceptance of temporal and perceptual experience as external and spatial is shattered. Smithson concludes: “Any reference to ‘space’ involves an appeal to realism, time as a cinematized abstraction, on the other hand dematerializes the limits of travel, and detaches one from sensations of movement or the need for destinations.”95 So in walking across the Passaic Bridge and along the banks of the Passaic River, Smithson literally enters a temporal and perceptual “elsewhere” on the other side of the “moving ‘picture window’ ” that the automobile or bus provides.96 Instead of viewing the blur of passing “pictures” of the landscape that he or anyone normally sees when sweeping past in a car or bus to some set destination, he immediately finds himself inside and among these “pictures,” but, because his visual experience does not match his expectations, all he can grasp are the pictorial conditions that remain from his expectations, and even these are simultaneously mirrored and turned inside out: “Noon-day sunshine cinema-ized the site, turning the bridge and the river into an over-exposed picture. Photographing it with my Instamatic 400 was like photographing a photograph. The sun became a monstrous light-bulb that projected a detached series of ‘stills’ through my Instamatic into my eye. When I walked on the bridge, it was as though I was walking on an enormous photograph that was made of wood and steel, and underneath the river existed as an enormous movie film that showed nothing but a continuous blank.”97 Smithson’s terminology here is clearly cinematic and photographic; he rephotographs a reality that already exists as a loop of cinematic film or as a giant photographic image that he can stand on. He also indicates that his eye is aligned with his camera’s lens and that both lenses then superimpose images projected by the sun onto his retina. Some of them, like the river below him, reflect a dead blank, like the mirrors of his Enantiomorphic Chambers.98
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As I stated in the previous chapter, the stereoscope allows the viewer to create an illusion of three-dimensional space by fusing two, two-dimensional photographs into a single three-dimensional image. The resulting image floats before the viewer, bringing a faraway place into close proximity as a highly illusionistic mirage without requiring any of the inconveniences of physical travel. When he walks across that bridge in Passaic, Smithson forces himself out of the studio and the viewer out or his or her armchair or, by extension, the car seat.99 By breaking free of these highly controlled spaces, he consciously experiences firsthand the boundaries constructed by spatial descriptions of perception.100 Once again, Smithson defies the stereoscope’s seemingly “natural” equivalence to perception, but this time he does it by reducing the stereoscope’s convergence of two eyes, two lenses, and two images to one eye, one camera lens, and a series of separate, two-dimensional “stills.” Smithson simultaneously enters the stereoscope’s three-dimensional mirage and walks across its separate photographic images to confirm that the stereoscopic “mirage” consists of layers of two-dimensional images. Traveling with the eyes and physically traveling through stereoscopic space are not the same thing. In a perceptual no-man’s land, with no learned conventions masquerading as the pure conditions of vision, Smithson can see nothing but two-dimensional images and never the three-dimensional reality before him. Daniel J. Boorstin, a contemporary cultural historian, stated the problem succinctly: “[As we grow] more and more accustomed to testing reality by the image, we will find it hard to retrain ourselves so we may once again test the image by reality.”101 Smithson’s own photographs of the Passaic landscape appear to grant the spectator a set of indexical links to New Jersey.102 Yet on their own, as still images constructed by rather stale conventions of picture-making, they offer little information specific to the site. For example, although Smithson states that “the glassy air of New Jersey defined the structural parts of the monument as I took snapshot after snapshot,” he deliberately shoots the bridge from angles that position these structural parts and their shadows as vectors converging toward single, spatial vanishing points. In one image (figure 2.11), the inside edge of the bridge’s wooden walkway, the outer handrail, and its cast shadow appear to rush backward into bright hazy sunlight and thus seemingly into infinity. To create such an image, Smithson had to stand at the Passaic end of the bridge and train his camera lens back down the wooden walkway to the right of the main structure of the bridge toward the other bank, from which he had come. Although Smithson has gone to some trouble to construct this and other perspectival images in his photographs, he is left with two-dimensional images of a
FIGURE 2.11 Robert Smithson, The Bridge Monument Showing Wooden Sidewalks, 1967.
convention for describing pictorial space that describe little or nothing about Passaic, other than the fact that it can be represented as such a space and passed through. This is precisely his point. Smithson took a significant number of snapshots in Passaic.103 Most of them are either conventional or nondescript; they resemble other images more than anything else. To establish an art historical pedigree for these photographs, some have compared them to the industrial images of Charles Sheeler and of Bernd and Hilla Becher.104 But these artists present industrial edifices in carefully composed and printed photographs that reward close examination. Smithson’s grimy, commercially printed, little Instamatic snapshots are often out of focus, many are underexposed, and one even includes the most pathetic indication of amateurism, the photographer’s finger. They seem to indicate rather than illuminate their subjects, like illustrations for industrial or instructional pamphlets or magazines or newspapers. And like such images, they seem to possess little independent significance, beyond what is provided by their captions and publication context. Smithson was not alone in producing amateurish or what were considered at the time to be just plain “bad” photographs. Edward Ruscha’s 1963 book, Twentysix Gasoline Stations, received this telling review from Philip Leider: “the photographs are not professional—most of them are not even good . . . but the book is so curious, and so doomed to oblivion that there is an obligation, of sorts, to document its existence, record its having been here, in the same way, almost, as other pages record and document the ephemeral existence of exhibitions which are mounted, shown, and then broken up forever.”105 Ruscha’s book, the first of many book projects created by the artist between 1963 and 1972, consists of fairly uniform and “straight” black and white photographs of twenty-six highway gasoline stations. The captions are also straightforward; they consist of the name of the station and its geographical location, city and state. Ruscha’s only consistent variation when shooting the twenty-six stations was to alter the angle of his lens from head on to raked. The latter practice produces images caught in perspective (figure 2.12), but again, like Smithson’s photograph of the Passaic Bridge, these images embody a contradiction. They illustrate the fact that the stations are part of roadside America and that they can be represented as part of a larger three-dimensional space and passed by, and yet, in the context of Twentysix Gasoline Stations, each individual image is actually two-dimensional and still.106 Twentysix Gasoline Stations and all of Ruscha’s other early book projects stimulated critical confusion because they failed to signify either as works of art or as documents of social or personal narratives. There didn’t seem to be enough to them.
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FIGURE 2.12 Ed Ruscha, “Whiting Bros., near Ludlow California,” Twentysix Gasoline Stations, 1963.
In a general review of Ruscha’s photobooks, one critic wrote: “No one has any idea of what the author is doing or trying to do. Those who have had the opportunity to question him receive answers that only add to the uneasiness.”107 This critic never considers that perhaps some of the ambiguity resided in the previously nondescript subjects of Ruscha’s books or that it might be due to the fact that viewers cannot reconcile their previous visual experiences of these subjects—gas stations, apartment buildings, things thrown from cars—as seen in passing from a car or bus window with Ruscha’s presentation of them as a series of individual still images of one category of things. So they project their difficulty back onto Ruscha’s images. The critic’s reaction is not unlike Gombrich or Greenberg’s projection of visual difficulty onto abstraction. One can demand order and significance from images; reality is much more elusive. Vladimir Nabokov’s hero of Invitation to a Beheading struggles with such disparities between reality and its representation after reading the distant past through a series of photographic images published in an old magazine: “ ‘But then perhaps,’ thought Cincinnatus, ‘I am misinterpreting these pictures. Attributing to the epoch the characteristics of its photograph. The wealth of shadows, the torrents of light, the gloss of a tanned shoulder, the rare reflection, the fluid transitions from one element to another—perhaps all of this pertains only to the snapshot, to a particular kind of heliotypy, to special forms of that art, and the world really never was so sinuous, so humid and rapid—just as today our unsophisticated cameras record in their
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own way our hastily assembled and painted world.’ ”108 Smithson uses the last phrase in this quotation to open his essay “The Monuments of Passaic.” And it perfectly describes his own written and photographic efforts to record and interpret his subject. In describing these efforts, Smithson makes it abundantly clear that his difficulties result from his having been accustomed to passing over the landscape and framing it as a series of pictorial or spatial images. These spatial projections were not the only way to experience the site. He had already described how this works in his first notebook essay: “Space has a way of obscuring the M-types of time, so that perceptions become subjective and unconscious. Indiscrete sensations are felt in place of any simultaneity between perception and the thing perceived, ‘space’ therefore should be avoided when establishing the limits of time-travel.”109 In his published essay he interrupts his wanderings “in a moving picture that I couldn’t quite picture” with an ironic, yet culturally prescient discovery—“just as I became perplexed, I saw a green sign that explained everything”: YOUR HIGHWAY TAXES 21 AT WORK Federal Highway
U.S. Dept. of Commerce
Trust Funds
Bureau of Public Roads
2,867,000
State Highway Funds 2,867,000
New Jersey State Highway Dept. His record of all of this information creates a physical break in his text—just as it does in mine. It creates static, a disruption, but to Smithson’s mind, the most reassuring explanation of what he has yet seen. The sign not only suggests the future, functional form of the site but, headed by the statement “Your Highway Taxes 21 at Work,” gives the impression that “you” are behind it all. Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown might call it an example of the way that captions have become necessary to the new, metropolitan condition. Smithson provides descriptive analogies or captions for the ambiguous images he sees in this futuristic landscape, just as he did for the images he saw from the bus window. Motionless construction machinery becomes “prehistoric creatures trapped in the mud, or better, extinct machines—mechanical dinosaurs stripped of their skin.” Rows of drainage pipes suggest horizontal smokestacks, and their spewed liquid resembles homosexual sex acts.110 But even before offering these specific analo-
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gies, Smithson calls all of these images—what he sees at the site and what he records with his camera—“monuments,” and the term functions as a caption for both. Smithson uses his photographs to illustrate the monuments he locates within the Passaic landscape because the photographs are simultaneously as “still” and as fragile as the monuments themselves. One’s ability to enter this landscape, and by extension, photographs of it, is not determined by perspective or by formal analogies but by temporal consciousness. This is why Smithson chooses “monuments” as his image category; the term implies moments in the historical and cultural past and the physical points of reference for these moments. As markers, monuments plot out and charge a space with meaning, but in themselves they are simultaneously physically still and yet filled with opportunities for temporal awareness through remembrance. Peter Blake believed that monuments embodied the highest achievements and, in some cases, the only evidence of an individual’s or a society’s existence. For him, therefore, any deterioration of established standards, based on visual skills, for distinguishing between what could and could not be called a monument seriously jeopardized one’s ability to evaluate a culture.111 Smithson also chose “monument” as a visual category because of the implied value judgment it places on a particular object. But in declaring that almost anything can be a monument, he acknowledged that the category is “cool” rather than “hot,” to use Marshall McLuhan’s contemporary categories for media—meaning that monuments are “high in participation or completion by the audience.”112 “Hot” media, on the other hand, “do not leave so much to be filled in” by the consumer.113 This latter definition would accommodate Blake’s belief that monuments possessed aesthetic and historical values, which could be recognized and appreciated but not created by the spectator. For Smithson, spectators not only determine the monument’s value but have the power to characterize anything as one. Ruins serve a similar function, and they are often monuments. Time’s physical alterations to a monument’s original appearance permit even looser interpretations of its value or the significance of the past moment it represents, which, in turn, leads to active imagining and even self-serving nostalgia.114 In her Pleasure of Ruins, Rose Macaulay describes such imagining as double-edged, both pleasurable and vindictive.115 Spectators derive pleasure from their feelings of superiority over the past and simultaneous delight in decay as evidence of the ultimate fate of all things, even the present.
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Macaulay illustrates this last point by noting the popularity in the eighteenth century of fantasy paintings of contemporary buildings in ruin, a trend with parallels that Smithson would surely recognize in the “anti-monuments” of the late 1960s such as Claes Oldenburg’s Placid Civic Monument and Barnett Newman’s Broken Obelisk.116 Both works were included in a 1967 New York exhibition entitled Sculpture in Environment that opened the very week Smithson was writing “The Monuments of Passaic.” The exhibition’s ostensible goal was to expand the boundaries of aesthetic encounter by placing large-scale, three-dimensional works of art in the public domain. August Heckscher, Administrator of Recreation and Cultural Affairs and Commissioner of Parks, stated in the catalogue’s foreword: “to let these great pieces loose in the city, to set them under the light of day where they intrude upon our daily walks and errands—that causes a different reaction! In the end, however, if this is indeed to be a great age for the arts, we shall all have to accustom ourselves to seeing art and life in a new relationship.”117 Heckscher was concerned with altering the context for viewing art, but this change does not necessarily alter the perception of art or the city. Newman’s Broken Obelisk is a “romantic ruin” of a public monument type in every sense that Macaulay defines one. Oldenburg’s performance Placid Civic Monument (figure 2.13), on the other hand, occupied public space but provided little opportunity to be seen. The performance consisted of the digging and filling in of a hole in Central Park by professional grave-diggers. A few photographs of the work remain to provide a nonspatial experience of time, what Smithson might call a “memory-trace without any durational space or movement.”118 The government sign along the unfinished New Jersey highway provides Smithson with the answer to his perceptual confusion precisely because it describes the landscape in front of him in terms of time rather than space and because this description leads him to accurately characterize how his monuments function. They, like Oldenburg’s Placid Civic Monument, are “ruins in reverse”: “That zero panorama seemed to contain ruins in reverse, that is—all the new construction that would eventually be built. This is the opposite of the ‘romantic ruin’ because the buildings don’t fall into ruin after they are built but rather rise into ruin before they are built. This antiromantic mise-en-scene suggests the discredited idea of time and many other ‘out of date’ things.”119 Smithson demonstrates and then twists “the pleasure of ruins” to locate an experience of time rare in a landscape normally “without a rational past . . . just what passes for a future.”120 This “utopia minus a bottom, a place where the machines are idle, and the sun has turned to glass” produces an experience that is specific to the site and bound to memory. Smithson’s Passaic landscape may have
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FIGURE 2.13 Claes Oldenburg, Placid Civic Monument, 1967.
been in the process of vanishing, but it was no longer “pointless.” It encouraged selfconscious viewing. In his 1963 film X: The Man with the X-Ray Eyes, Roger Corman presents a cinematic corollary to Smithson’s “ruins in reverse.” Smithson saw Corman’s film either during the time he was writing “The Monuments of Passaic” or immediately afterward.121 The film’s protagonist, Dr. James Xavier, develops x-ray vision as the result of experiments he conducts on himself to expand the range of human sight. Initially, he embraces his expanded perception, but he soon discovers that it is a curse, and he is forced to become a man on the run. As he flees the city, he gazes out the car window at the buildings that he passes as they dissolve in the eerie light of
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Spectarama effects. His companion asks, “What do you see?” He replies: “The city as if it were unborn, rising into the sky with fingers of metal, limbs without flesh, girders without stone, signs hanging without support, wires dipping and swaying without poles. The city unborn, its flesh dissolved in an acid of light. The city of the dead.” To achieve this “x-effect,” Corman filmed a construction site over time and then edited the footage backward. The viewer sees the unraveling of “ruins in reverse” into the past, which in the film is presented as an image of a future, utopian vision that unravels as well into blindness when Xavier finally, in desperation, puts out his own eyes. As soon as Smithson steps out of his construction site of authentic “ruins in reverse,” he claims that he is leaving “the real future behind in order to advance into a false future,” a landscape that caters to more conventional, blatantly false experiences of the future, such as 1968 WIDE TRACK PONTIACS, available for purchase in 1967.122 Near the end of the “Monuments of Passaic” essay, he describes walking down a parking lot that covered the old railroad tracks that used to run through the middle of Passaic: “That monumental parking lot divided the city in half, turning it into a mirror and a reflection—but the mirror kept changing places with the reflection. One never knew what side of the mirror one was on. There was nothing interesting or even strange about that flat monument, yet it echoed a kind of cliché idea of infinity; perhaps the ‘secrets of the universe’ are just as pedestrian—not to say dreary.”123 His return to a perception of Passaic as one big enantiomorphic structure is “dreary,” especially when the town is also understood as a secondary “reflection” of New York City. Smithson chooses a “vanishing point” on the New Jersey landscape, a site under construction—a ruin in reverse. Yet unlike Tony Smith, he opens up his site to slow scrutiny on all levels of understanding. He does not pass over or through the image and its contradictions via any one ordering process.
In 1966, Smithson returns to New Jersey as the New Yorker cartoon’s “man in the street.” He notices that one finds the same forms and images that the art world claims for itself—repetitive minimalist geometry and eclectic pop imagery—all mixed together in the parking lots and suburban tract houses of New Jersey.124 But when his game of “making and matching” in New Jersey ultimately fails “to ‘humanize’ the intricate and ugly shapes with which industrial civilization surrounds us” in the way that Gombrich and others had intended, one realizes that Smithson is not training the viewer in “a new form of visual classification.”125 He is pointing out the inherent
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fragility of images; they are thin illusions, doomed to fail our expectations, doomed eventually to crumble. Smithson’s final line in “The Monuments of Passaic”—“The false immortality of the film gives the viewer an illusion of control over eternity—but ‘the superstars’ are fading”—describes his sense of the cultural conditions in Passaic, but it also reflects his attitudes toward perception, art, and society in general. The line follows Smithson’s discussion of a final monument, a children’s sand box (figure 2.14). Like all of the others, this monument’s discovery sets off a chain of analogies—a “model desert,” “a map of infinite disintegration and forgetfulness,” and “an open grave that children cheerfully play in”—that complete the circle of opposites embodied in monuments and in ruins.126 But most important, the box provides the perfect landscape for Smithson’s last camera shot of an entropic eternity, and he finally uses a story-teller’s opening to begin his description: Picture in your mind’s eye the sand box divided in half with black sand on one side and white sand on the other. We take a child and have him run hundreds of times clockwise in the box until the sand gets mixed and begins to turn grey; after that we have him run anti-clockwise, but the result will not be a restoration of the original division but a greater degree of greyness and an increase of entropy. Of course, if we filmed such an experiment we could prove the reversibility of eternity by showing the film backwards, but then sooner or later the film itself would crumble or get lost and enter the state of irreversibility. Somehow this suggests that the cinema offers an illusive or temporary escape from physical dissolution. The false immortality of the film gives the viewer an illusion of control over eternity—but “the superstars” are fading.127 Smithson is telling a story after all; he is hastily recording a world that is as fragile as the film he hypothetically uses to reverse the future because it depends on memory, the most fragile material of all. Smithson’s story is similar in many ways to the one William Carlos Williams tells in “Life Along the Passaic River” or the one Roger Corman depicts in X: The Man with the X-Ray Eyes. All three storytellers are attempting to disentangle their descriptions from nostalgia. Smithson recognizes the corrupted memories of his own generation in a 1970 interview with Dennis Wheeler: Smithson: I would say like the nostalgia for the pre—we have almost like a kind of rinky dink idea of nature, mickey mouse, like the people of my generation have
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grown up in the industrial blight, and it’s not like the rustic woodside that we remember. . . . Wheeler: Like lament for something you never had? Smithson: Yeah. . . . 128 Smithson’s child in the sandbox, Corman’s sci-fi Oedipus, and Williams’s equally cinematic description of the boy in the hand-made canoe dissolve false yet satisfying “superstar” images—such as Huck Finn or the utopian destination that is always just over the horizon—into “ruins in reverse” or what Williams calls “modern replicas” of the myths of the past, by collapsing the experience of the future, present, and past together.129 As a result, the three story-tellers also suggest that nostalgic images never reflect reality in the first place but reiterate only an inherited set of cultural expectations. What are we learning about New Jersey in Smithson’s essay “The Monuments of Passaic”? The answer cannot be visual skills that favor either Venturi and Scott Brown’s revamped romantic eclecticism or Blake’s rational order. Smithson questions his own motives in a short text he wrote in his notebook before his trip: “Is there some kind of secret motive for going to such a place? Is the artist who goes there a debased romantic, or an astoundingly brilliant artist pretending to be a debased romantic?”130 In the end, he recognizes both attitudes and vocabularies—romantic and classic—to be the same: “it’s not that I consider myself any one of those things, but it’s the tension between the two— . . . the extremity of the two oppositions, the two polarities, uh, setting up this tension of possibilities, so that there’s no opting for romanticism or classicism, since both of them are like old chestnuts anyway.”131 In “The Monuments of Passaic,” Smithson juxtaposes the travel narrative with its concomitant typologies of monuments and ruins and the formal homologies of the New York art world with what he actually finds in his birthplace, Passaic, New Jersey. The juxtapositions prevent the assimilation of this industrial landscape into either model or any other binary categories such as high and low art by holding up a distorting mirror to both. The metropolitan landscape is unpleasant, visually and otherwise, not merely because, as Venturi and Scott Brown or even Gombrich would have it, we don’t know how to appreciate its unfamiliar visual qualities. Smithson’s juxtapositions are so startling and unstable that the reasons one desires to pass over the landscape become unavoidably clear. Some things and the relationships between them are not meant to be seen or to be seen in any sustained manner by certain members of society—those who “commute.” Smithson is not really making a reverse
FIGURE 2.14 Robert Smithson, The Sand-Box Monument (also called The Desert), 1967.
commute from city to suburbia when he gets on that bus at Port Authority. He is returning home to make art. Dan Graham, a fellow New Jerseyite, later described their roots and interests in terms of class: “There was a vital lower and lower-middle-class culture in New Jersey that both Bob and I were aware of—highway culture. Bob’s area of New Jersey (around Paterson) had been an industrial center of America and was decaying into a new mass popular culture which gave birth to rock music, science-fiction, and latenight radio. My area (Union County) was one where people coming from less privileged backgrounds were becoming more affluent and merging into a new middle-class suburb.”132 Graham’s description of “Bob’s area” parallels the culture Smithson depicts in his film outline for “The Monument.” In his 1966 project, “Homes for America,” Graham documents the socioeconomic transformation of his area and its immediate surroundings, its cultural complexity, and his personal stake in it through images and texts that describe the empty standardization of rows of boxy, postwar houses consisting of limited sets of floor plans and color schemes. He originally intended to illustrate this text with images of Bayonne, New Jersey, row houses that resemble the serial images of Donald Judd and that refer to the systems of mass fabrication that produced both.133 At the time he was working on the project, he recalls that “Esquire magazine was publishing sociological exposés like David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd. They used photographers in the school of Walker Evans, photographers who were showing vernacular workers’ housing, suburban housing, but usually from a humanistic negative viewpoint. I wanted to keep all of those meanings but empty out the pejorative expressionistic meanings. On the other hand, I didn’t want to go as far as minimal. I wanted to show that minimal was related to a real social situation that could be documented.”134 In “The Monuments of Passaic,” Smithson recognizes that the forms that represent the “up to date” in the New York art world and the forms that appear in the “futuristic utopias” of New Jersey parking lots, main streets, and suburban areas offer equally false futures. And the latter spaces would be good places for art galleries; in a manner of speaking, they already are.135 The present and its adjacent future are located not in a set of images or places, since in the case of art and suburban architecture they reflect the same thin utopias, but in a chaotic set of experiences produced by the contradictions inherent to the metropolitan condition. These experiences do not seek to represent what Michael Harrington has called the “accidental revolution”—“the sweeping technological transformation of the Western environment which has been, and is being, carried out in a casual way”—but to make it conscious as an ongoing
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condition through lived experiences.136 The political implications for this type of consciousness-raising are elusive; Dennis Wheeler called Smithson’s art “political by inference in its effect,” a description that Smithson did not deny.137 The closest contemporary description of the way Smithson’s New Jersey work resonates politically is Theodor Adorno’s defense of autonomous art: “when the social contract with reality is abandoned, and literary works no longer speak as though they were reporting fact, hairs start to bristle. Not the least of the weaknesses of the debate on commitment is that it ignores the effect produced by work whose own formal laws pay no heed to coherent effects. So long as it fails to understand what the shock of the unintelligible can communicate, the whole dispute resembles shadow-boxing.”138 Smithson seeks to shock with visual unintelligibility. In his reading of the metropolitan landscape, the tension between chaos and order is never quite resolved. He propels his readers and spectators out of their accustomed categories of visual experience, while refusing to provide an alternative to fill the gap. His work in New Jersey produces autonomous aesthetic experiences, to be sure, but his activities in Passaic also, in Adorno’s words, “point to a practice from which they abstain: the creation of a just life.”139
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TRAVEL AS REPETITION If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable. What might have been is an abstraction Remaining a perpetual possibility Only in a world of speculation. What might have been and what has been Point to one end, which is always present. t. s. eliot, BURNT NORTON On the edge of memory, art finds a temporary foothold. robert smithson, draft of “incidents of mirror-travel in the yucatan”
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A Cartographic Premise Smithson held his second one-person exhibition at Dwan Gallery in New York in March 1968. It included six works that were conceived and produced over a relatively brief period of time, about one year. In the gallery’s main space (figure 3.1), the visitor encountered five of the works—Leaning Strata, Shift, Sinistral Spiral, Gyrostatis, and Pointless Vanishing Point—all of them abstract, three-dimensional floor pieces. Each one consists of one or more folded or stacked geometric shapes made of painted steel, fiberglass, or plastic, and all of them are white.1 Their forms lean, curve, or converge toward an absent point or center, which makes them appear somewhat precarious, but their measured stacking and folding holds them securely upright and in place.2 Despite these basic similarities, the majority of these works don’t offer an easy way in, either as a group or individually. Strictly speaking, because of the folding and stacking they are not serial sculptures, in the manner in which many of Smithson’s earlier, multiple-unit works such as Plunge and Alogon are. And they don’t readily allow for Lawrence Alloway’s “recognition of purpose,” which the critic identified as the end result of studying contemporary serial work and recognized in Alogon #2’s graduated stepped units.3 The ordering systems or structures underpinning the singleunit works are not legible in the same way. The creases and overlaps hidden by the works’s fabrication suggest invisible aspects yet to be discovered if only the works
FIGURE 3.1 (opposite page)
could be smoothed out as diagrams on two-dimensional sheets of metal or plastic.
Installation view of the first room
Because of their missing centers or absent points of convergence, the
of Smithson’s one-person exhibition, Dwan Gallery, New York, including
works also appear somewhat incomplete, like fragments of familiar but unrelated
Pointless Vanishing Point, Leaning
wholes. Their titles suggest a variety of physical principles or geological processes—
Strata, and Shift, 2–27 March 1968.
gyrostasis, sinistral spiraling, stratification, shift—that can be illustrated by twodimensional diagrams or three-dimensional models, but such models usually are supplemented by explanatory texts and other types of documents. Smithson’s works stood alone in the gallery, except for the exhibition’s poster (figure 3.2), hung between the two elevator doors. Visitors to the exhibition would have walked right past this poster on their way into the gallery. But once inside and standing in the center of the galley space, they could have looked back and seen its image of the white silhouette of Leaning Strata framed by the receding orthogonals of a linear perspective grid. The exhibition poster’s image and the presence of one, less ambiguous work, Pointless Vanishing Point, offer evidence that Smithson based the radiating designs of all the works in the exhibition on some portion of a perspectival grid, and thus the absent centers and points of convergence are literally “vanished” points. Yet there are still
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FIGURE 3.2 Poster for Smithson’s one-person exhibition, Dwan Gallery, New York, 1968.
several important aspects of the works’s shared designs that cannot be accounted for. What, for example, determines the different orientations of the rotations of the perspectival grids in each work, especially the verticality of Leaning Strata (figure 3.3), which seems to contradict the horizontal implication of the term “strata” in the work’s title? And finally, how does Smithson transform the two-dimensional grid into threedimensional sculptures—since the profiles of the tops and sides of the individual works seem as uniformly calculated as the fronts and backs? The second room of the exhibition contained the key: a black and white photostat of a map, cut in the shape of a hexagon onto which Smithson has drawn dark lines that radiate from the map’s center to its six corners (figure 3.4). The second room also contained another floorpiece, A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) (figure 3.5), whose design is clearly based on the format of the two-dimensional map mounted on the wall behind it. The floorpiece consists of six sets of five blue aluminum bins arranged to form a hexagon around a central, hexagonally shaped bin. The individual bins in each set decrease incrementally in size in all three dimensions in relation to their proximity to the central hexagon, and each one is filled with sand. The entire work is set on a low, white wooden platform. The platform establishes a primarily aerial
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FIGURE 3.3 Robert Smithson, Leaning Strata, 1968.
position for viewing the work, unlike the more ambiguous visual orientations suggested by the works in the previous room. Drawings for several of the five pieces in the first room of the exhibition and other related works executed around the same time (figures 3.6 and 3.7) reveal the principles behind Smithson’s thinking and the presence of maps as physical surfaces he is working with in 1967 and 1968. Smithson folds or cuts and stacks up flat maps into three-dimensional sculptures, and in doing so hides some aspects of what they were originally meant to communicate. Drawings for Leaning Strata (figure 3.8) and Shift illustrate how Smithson created their three-dimensional designs by superimposing parts of a polar coordinate mapnet of longitudinal and latitudinal lines onto a linear perspective grid.4 In each drawing, the mapnet’s radiating latitudinal and longitudinal lines cut across the orthogonal grids to create the three-dimensional edges—the tops or sides of each of the sculpture’s designs. Thus these sculptures are three-dimensional projections of the intersection of fragments of the two-dimensional grids of global mapnets and linear perspective. Drawings for the other works reveal similar, and perhaps subtler combinations of the two grid systems. Smithson also
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FIGURE 3.4 Robert Smithson, A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork), 1968.
FIGURE 3.5 Installation view of the second room of Smithson’s one-person exhibition, Dwan Gallery, New York, including A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork), 2–27 March 1968.
FIGURE 3.6 (top left) Robert Smithson, Untitled (folded map of Beaufort Inlet), c. 1967. FIGURE 3.7 (top right) Robert Smithson, Untitled (Antarctica), n.d.
FIGURE 3.8 Robert Smithson, Drawing for Leaning Strata, 1968.
identified the central importance of mapnets to the designs of the works in a statement included in the exhibition’s press release: If the earth is considered to be a planispherical grid map, all rectangular coordinates converge at the fixed points of the poles. At the poles all visual sense of place or site is abolished. Around such fixed points radiate latitude lines; such lines may be extended into infinite magnitudes, and these magnitudes may be compressed or contracted into three-dimensional artifices (the way the planet earth may be contracted into a global map). I call these three dimensional finite compressions infra perspectives, since they don’t relate to natural visual conditions or room interiors, environments, places, sites, etc. The terrains are artificial and abstract.5 All of this information—drawings, contemporary works, and statements— helps to explain Smithson’s general intentions, yet little of it was apparent when standing in the gallery. Perhaps this was deliberate. It is important to pay attention to the specific experience Smithson set up for the viewer in Dwan’s two-room gallery space, especially since it was here that Smithson chose to introduce his concept of the site/nonsite for the first time.6 The infra perspectives represent a shift in interpretive tensions since the shared source of their “difficulty” is less immediately identifiable than it was in the slightly earlier multiple-unit work, the mirrored wall pieces, or even in Enantiomorphic Chambers. Looking at Enantiomorphic Chambers or any of these other works results in momentary blindness and mental confusion, until the mind can catch up and make sense of what is happening. When looking at the infra perspectives, the ensuing difficulty doesn’t originate with obvious visual or physical confusion; the works don’t provide disorienting reflections of the exhibition space nor do they, with one exception, mock the three-dimensional terms of the room. Works like Leaning Strata do reveal the limits of visual and intellectual comprehension. The apparent contradiction between its geological title and appearance, for example, suggests an uneasy alliance between what the mind knows and the eye recognizes. The exhibition poster and Pointless Vanishing Point suggest more abstract levels of reading by referring to methods of rendering space such as linear perspective that are present in the designs of the works. Collectively, these clues indicate some of the overlapping systems at work but also their lack of a precise “fit.”7 Smithson developed the designs for his earlier three-dimensional work by splitting apart the superimposed two-dimensional images or the conditions that produce alternating perspective figures or stereoscopic views. This splitting caused dis-
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comfort since the resulting works did not meet or fit expectations: viewers did not see what they thought they would see. The works in the first room of Smithson’s 1968 Dwan exhibition cause discomfort because they are too inclusive, too layered. The mind has much more to deal with and to reconcile than just differences between perception and expectation, objects and space. The process involves a greater degree of abstract thought, and the physical conditions of the room become almost irrelevant to the experience, since, as Smithson states, the terrains of the infra perspectives “are artificial and abstract.” He might have added, “like maps.” Maps are abstractions that appeal primarily to the mind. The origin of the mapnet grid is the globe, which also is an abstraction and not a likeness of the earth. The precise mapping of a location on the earth is futile for some of the same reasons that the precise rendering of a three-dimensional landscape or object on the twodimensional surface of a canvas or sheet of paper is impossible, yet the flat map never masquerades as the site it represents. Illusionism never enters into the mapping process because maps begin and end with their integrating frameworks, the longitudinal and latitudinal lines that comprise the mapnet and that are capable of endlessly contracting or expanding into flat projection maps or spherical globes. Even when cartographers used photographs taken by Surveyor Spacecraft I to map the curve of a lunar terrain that has yet to be explored, they employed such frameworks—in this case, selenographic coordinates (figure 3.9).8 By compressing portions of mapnet projections into three-dimensional artifices, Smithson might appear to be reversing the two-dimensional map’s transformation of things or places into abstractions. But since his creations are based on the mapnets, they also remain abstractions, albeit three-dimensional ones, of a previous abstraction. They are not returns to some original referent; like the planar projection’s transformation into a spherical projection or globe, they defer such a return by displacing one abstract representation on to another much like metaphors linguistically displace the sense of one word on to another. In fact, both cartographers and Smithson frequently refer to maps and diagrams as two-dimensional analogies or metaphors for the things they stand for. Smithson often described his nonsites this way: “The Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) is a three dimensional logical picture that is abstract, yet it represents an actual site in N.J. (The Pine Barrens Plains). It is by this three dimensional metaphor that one site can represent another site which does not resemble it—thus The Non-Site.”9 By deferring the exhibition visitor’s encounter with an actual map until she or he reaches the second room of the exhibition, Smithson deferred any precise read-
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ings of the works in the first room, allowing such difficult experiences to precede the encounter with the final work in the exhibition. In his 1966 text Mapping, the cartographer David Greenhood notes that a map’s framework is not like the frame of a picture but “like the skeleton of a body; it’s structural. It forms from reference points within itself as well as to points without.”10 Without such reference points, the five works in the first room present the structural aspects of mapping, its skeleton—thus the prefix “infra” meaning on the underside, below, underneath—as exoskeleton, disengaged from any particular place or site either inside or outside the gallery. When A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) reattaches this framework or structure to a site FIGURE 3.9 Spherical mosaic of narrow-angle photographs of lunar scene
located on a map, two places are brought together, overlapped through a set of comparable structural relationships. The gallery appears as a different set of limits,
at low sun illumination, Surveyor
and its structural logic as a site or nonsite rather than its unique perceptual presence
Spacecraft I, 1966.
as a set of sights, is revealed as well. In the second room of the gallery, Smithson sets the idea of a designated “site” outside the gallery in relation to the abstract, cartographic, two- and three-dimensional forms it takes in the gallery. Added to the mix are the conditions under which these two things are experienced in the space of
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the gallery, since the gallery too becomes temporarily part of the designation “nonsite” by containing the nonsite. For the viewer, the attempt to incorporate this complexity into a comprehensive idea of the work creates a tension that is more mental than visual. In bringing these limiting terms—inside/outside, site/nonsite, twodimensional/three-dimensional—into close proximity, Smithson introduces complexity into what might be understood as simple, binary relationships. These paired terms seem more fragile, more temporary, and almost completely dependent on location. Viewers can be in only one location at a time, but they are forced to think about at least one other location and the limitations involved in doing so. In other words, the lack of precise fit becomes the problem in that these places overlap but are endlessly incommensurable, just like maps and the sites they refer to.11 A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) reproduces more than the mapnet framework; it is also a container. In taking this step from framework to container, Smithson appears to take the cartographer’s next logical step: he fills his map’s empty framework with “content.”12 In a typed statement included with the nonsite’s map, Smithson notes that the nonsite contains sand that was collected from a location indicated by a red dot on the nonsite map. Thus, unlike the rest of the information Smithson provides about the site, the sand is not an abstraction. It is material. It also provides evidence that the artist did travel to the designated site. Or does it? Once again the viewer is thrown back to the structural aspects of the site/nonsite situation since they legitimize the sand’s metonymic authenticity.13 Otherwise, the sand is just sand, which on its own cannot demonstrate that it comes from any particular place. In this sense, the sand is no different than the dotted pattern used to indicate the presence of sandy terrain on a map, a presence that can be indicated the same way at any number of places. The only certainty offered by A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) is the sand’s displacement from an earlier position to its current position both inside the nonsite’s aluminum frame and inside the space of the gallery. And this is crucial to Smithson’s central objective in this exhibition: to dramatically shift the reference points of artistic experience through a sequence of repeated cartographic actions— folding, stacking, displacing.14
Smithson’s shift in reference points can be traced back to a number of events. One of the most important was his engagement as an “artist-consultant” by the architectural firm Tibbetts, Abbott, McCarthy, and Stratton (TAMS) from July 1966 through June
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1967.15 Members of this firm were developing a proposal for the Dallas–Fort Worth Airport and wanted Smithson to contribute to their discussions of what an air terminal means as well as to the overall design of their specific proposal. Through this relationship, Smithson was exposed to a variety of unfamiliar architectural concepts and design and construction procedures, many of them involving maps.16 Also during this period, Smithson was working his way through a number of recently translated texts by key French intellectuals associated with structuralism as well as contemporary essays about structuralism and French literary works and films associated with it. These two activities—Smithson’s work with TAMS and his engagement with structuralism—were intertwined. Smithson wrote a series of essays and initiated a number of other projects in 1966 and 1967 related to his experiences working with TAMS. Each is a manifestation of one or more aspects of his process of thinking about the conceptual and practical problems that the air terminal posed through a kind of “structuralist activity.”17 His process of thinking about and mapping out the air terminal through structuralist strategies was crucial for most of his later projects, including his nonsites, mirror displacements, and earthworks.
The Terminal View Nothing sorts out memories from ordinary moments. Later on they do claim remembrance when they show their scar. chris marker, LA
JETÉE
Chris Marker’s 1964 film La Jetée opens with a sequence of images of an air terminal and the following voice-over narration: This is the story of a man, marked by an image from his childhood. The violent scene that upset him, and whose meaning he was to grasp only years later, happened on the main jetty at Orly, the Paris airport, sometime before the outbreak of World War III. Orly, Sunday. Parents used to take their children there to watch the departing planes. On this particular Sunday, the child whose story we are telling was bound to remember the frozen sun, the setting at the end of the jetty, and a woman’s face. Nothing sorts out memories from ordinary moments. Later on they do claim remembrance when they show their scars. That face he had seen was to be the only peacetime image to survive the war. Had
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he really seen it? Or had he invented that tender moment to prop up the madness to come? The sudden roar, the woman’s gesture, the crumpling body, and the cries of the crowd on the jetty blurred by fear. Later, he knew he had seen a man die.18 In these opening scenes, two senses of a terminal view converge as visual memories—a view of an air terminal and a view of a death, a “termination” or “terminal view.” The dilemma for the narrator, who is also the protagonist of the film, consists of not being able to understand the significance of these memory images or why they survived. In the film’s final frames, he returns to the original time and place of these visual memories, but now as a grown man. His memories of the past converge with his experiences of the same sequence of events in the present, and he finally receives an answer to his questions. La Jetée was an important film for Smithson; he borrows aspects of its structure and subject matter in a number of his own works. Yet beyond identifying these quotations and affinities, a more fundamental set of questions might be asked: what does Smithson’s “terminal view” look like, and is it, like Chris Marker’s, both a view of a terminal and a terminal view? At first, Smithson’s view of a terminal appears to possess only two dimensions. In 1966, Tibbetts, Abbott, McCarthy, and Stratton (TAMS) published a prospectus for the Dallas–Fort Worth airport that includes reproductions of the slides they used in their presentation of their project design to the top management of the airlines that serve the Dallas–Fort Worth region. This document, entitled Terminal Area Concepts, contains limited descriptive texts since, in the words of the architects, “these charts and diagrams are largely self-explanatory.”19 Smithson added his own visual concepts to his copy of this document’s master plan (figure 3.10). They include four types of earthworks—a square of red rocks, a rectangle of yellow rocks, a spiral of blue rocks, and five circular mounds of white sand—each precisely rendered in pencil with ruler and compass so that the forms are integrated into the overall printed plan. As built forms, Smithson also intended for these earthworks to conform to the terminal’s functional specifications by indicating on the plan that they could be no more than five feet in height, which is well below the sight lines needed by the pilots and air controllers to guide the terminal’s air traffic in and out of the airport. Smithson devised a method for bringing the four earthworks inside the terminal via television cameras that were positioned adjacent to each and that would transmit their images to monitors located in a central museum inside the terminal, which he labeled “the terminal museum,” an intentional double play on the
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word “terminal” in terms of the museum’s physical location and its status as the “final” museum. Smithson’s contributions to a second set of printed airport plans entitled Texas Airport (figure 3.11) are so modest that they are practically invisible. Here again he uses pencil to make crisp, clean, spiraling lines around, within, or beside each plan and to place dots at the ends of runways or at regularly spaced intervals along the edges of the plans’ long, straight elements. Once the drawing is reproduced in photographs or photocopied, all the subtle distinctions between the printed and
FIGURE 3.10 (opposite page) (see PLATE 3) Robert Smithson, drawing in Terminal Area Concepts,
hand-drawn lines and dots disappear; Smithson’s added embellishments merge with
Tibbetts, Abbott, McCarthy,
the formal elements of the original plans. In contrast, Smithson’s formal additions
and Stratton, c. 1966.
to the Terminal Area Concepts prospectus communicate in a language drawn from FIGURE 3.11
abstract painting, which, when added to the two-dimensional airport plan, suggest
Robert Smithson,
reading the latter as a two-dimensional modernist grid.20 The individual abstract
Texas Airport AP 10, 1966.
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forms, when viewed in the terminal museum, or the overall abstract grid, when viewed from an ascending or descending airplane, would integrate the visual language of one domain, the art gallery or museum, into the viewing conditions of another, the air terminal. This scheme is prophetic; Smithson appears to be already working with forms—the spiral—and concepts—inside/outside—that will be fundamental to his earthworks and nonsites. But the visual connections here are awkward. Such a reading would be largely irrelevant to the site and its function and would not be evident to a majority of its intended audience in this context. In Texas Airport, on the other hand, Smithson’s additions disappear into the overall original plans of the individual terminals, with little or no effect. In spite of these problems, the two drawings establish the outermost perimeters of what will become two of the key terms of his working method at the air terminal site—accommodation and transformation. Through his drawing style in both drawings and his accommodation of the necessary sight lines of an air terminal in the Terminal Area Concepts master plan, Smithson acknowledges through reiteration that he is working within systems of architectural rendering and air traffic control whose visual terms and conditions have already been established. In setting up a situation in which two sites, one inside and the other outside the terminal, come together, he acknowledges a third condition of the air terminal—visual convergence. As one travels in and out of an airport, one views the air terminal from a sequence of different points of view—from the air above the terminal, from the ground out on the airfield, and from inside the main air terminal building. Each of these points of view provides a different image. From the air, the terminal appears as a cluster of two-dimensional shapes and lines, and from the tarmac or from inside the main terminal building, most of the terminal’s structures appear as three-dimensional forms. At some point during the plane’s descent or ascent, these two sets of images momentarily converge and then transform into either two-dimensional or three-dimensional images depending on the upward or downward direction of one’s movement. In Terminal: Plans for Dallas–Fort Worth Regional Airport (figure 3.12), Smithson provides a diagram of such convergences and transformations. His diagram contains a sequence of terminals, arranged horizontally along a central vertical axis. Each terminal consists of a long rectangle labeled “terminal,” with several adjoining squares on one side and a set of connected parallel lines that gradually shift to the left or right on the other. Together, the parallel lines and the rectangular terminal shape create an image that appears to fold out or back in space like an accordion. Smithson presents an analogous conception of stacking in a contemporary three-dimensional
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work (figure 3.13). This work consists of rectangular mirrored glass plates, cut to the same dimensions and stacked on top of each other to create a solid rectangular tower. The terminal buildings don’t actually unfold or stack up as one descends into an airport; Smithson’s stacked mirrors and his drawing Terminal: Plans for Dallas–Fort Worth Regional Airport are diagrams of the visual convergence and transformation of two-dimensional planes into three-dimensional forms. Both diagrams evoke a relatively invisible visual condition of the air terminal. They also evoke a relatively invisible process of transforming the air terminal site into a photographic image. When Smithson began working with TAMS, he
FIGURE 3.12 (top left)
wanted to make work that would accommodate and reveal the visual conditions of the
Robert Smithson, Terminal:
air terminal as a working facility, and he also wanted to make art that would speak
Plans for Dallas–Fort Worth
about the invisible materials and processes that helped to bring the terminal into exis-
Regional Airport, 1966.
tence as visual form. Aerial photography provided the first comprehensive images—
FIGURE 3.13 (top right)
and aerial views—of the terminal site. Aerial photographs are composite images, the
Robert Smithson, Untitled, c. 1966.
products of overlapping photographic images, all of them taken from a plane flying according to a designated flight plan over a particular site (figure 3.14). An airplane flies over a predetermined line while individuals positioned at strategically spaced
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points on the ground below monitor the pilot’s ability to remain on axis. Two or four cameras, mounted on the plane’s underside and situated at different angles to produce a wide arc of vision, automatically and simultaneously shoot sets of images at intervals regulated by a timer on each camera. The resulting sequence of photographic FIGURE 3.14 (top left) Diagram showing how photographic
negatives are then overlapped to create a mosaic photomap of a particular site. Cartographers then use these same negatives to produce geological survey
shots are overlapped in aerial mapping,
maps of the area. First, they identify the objects in aerial photographs so that they can
in David Greenhood, Mapping (1964).
correctly orient their readings according to cartographic principles, but their primary
FIGURE 3.15 (top right)
task is to recognize the overall three-dimensional aspects of the photographed terrain.
Diagram showing the stereographic
According to Greenhood, a skilled photo-interpreter can “train his eyes to see the pic-
production of contour maps, in David
tures stereoscopically even though he also uses various stereoscopic devices. These
Greenhood, Mapping (1964).
‘grow up’ into the complicated instruments of stereophotogrammetry, which plots out
FIGURE 3.16 (opposite page)
from the photograph the points and lines for showing on the map the relief with pre-
Robert Smithson, Glass Stratum, 1967.
cision.”21 These instruments reverse the process used to create the aerial photographs (figure 3.15). Copies of paired sets of individual aerial photographs are inserted into projectors whose positions and arcs of vision correspond to the positions and arcs of vision of the cameras mounted on the airplanes. The photographs are then projected
onto a tracing table, and the position and elevation of every point of the subject of the photograph are plotted through the intersection and transformation of the two images into a three-dimensional image. Although Smithson’s library provides ample evidence that he was aware of how aerial photographs and geological survey maps are made, his Glass Stratum and Mirror Stratum provide another, more intriguing kind of evidence. Early on, Smithson made a few of these works by stacking pieces of mirrored glass of equivalent sizes and shapes, but he produced most of them by stacking or overlapping glass plates of incrementally smaller dimensions (figure 3.16). The result visually evokes a crosssection of the strata of a contoured landscape at the same time that it suggests the stacking of glass negatives. Smithson also suggests his awareness of the process by which geological survey maps are generated from the stacking and overlapping of aerial photographic negatives when he reverses this process in another work, Untitled (Map on Mirror-Passaic, New Jersey) (figure 3.17). This work consists of seven square pieces of stacked glass of incrementally decreasing sizes. Smithson has mounted a black and white photocopy of a square section of the Weekhawken, New Jersey quadrangle, also in equivalently decreasing size, on the flat surface of each
FIGURE 3.17 Robert Smithson, Untitled (Map on Mirror-Passaic, New Jersey), 1967.
stacked glass piece.22 The completed work reveals that a map is a collapsed threedimensional image by reversing the process—by building the map’s two-dimensional surface back up into a three-dimensional contour or, to tie this operation back to Smithson’s terminal forms in Terminal: Plans for Dallas–Fort Worth Regional Airport (see figure 3.12) by spreading the map out like a deck of cards. To enhance this “fleshing out” process, Smithson also cuts away the section of map that represents the Passaic River to expose the silvery reflections of the mirrorized glass underneath. The aerial photographic process mirrors Smithson’s method of representing visual convergence and transformation. His air terminal develops into an image through symmetrical layering; in using glass, he refers not only to the overlapping or stacking of forms but also to negatives, which are often made of glass and laid on top of one another to produce a “thick” image. Smithson produced the works I have been discussing during or in the months directly after his period of employment by TAMS. Throughout his experiments with the air terminal’s visual conditions and the available processes for visualizing the air terminal and its terrain, Smithson deals with convergences—outside to inside, above to below, and two-dimensional image into three-dimensional object and vice
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versa. And he derives all of the terms for articulating these convergences from the visual conditions of the air terminal itself or from the materials used by architects and engineers to render it visible—in other words, its visual rhetoric.
In 1966, Smithson began to describe landscapes located on the periphery of Manhattan in terms of formal and structural analogies drawn from his work and that of his contemporaries. Smithson’s 1966 essay “The Crystal Land” was the result of one such reading. Throughout his work on the air terminal, Smithson also sought to establish formal and structural analogies, and yet because he was being asked to consider unfamiliar terrain, design materials, and procedures and actually to build something on this terrain—neither condition is the case in his contemporary work in New Jersey— the analogies did not come easily. The air terminal project presented its own set of problems that Smithson needed to work on from the inside out by rethinking how he should view and mark such unknown terrains. One solution was to accommodate and reiterate the visual conditions of the air terminal. A second solution entailed reading the terminal as if it were a text and reiterating its linguistic rules of functioning. Analogies to his work and the work of his contemporaries arose from this reading process, but these analogies were more conceptual than formal, and they emerged out of linguistic models of replication rather than as strictly mirror images or facets of a crystalline lattice. In other words, Smithson’s air terminal analogies were more properly structuralist. The term “structure” was already a familiar and even an overused term in the New York art world by 1966.23 It had appeared in the titles of a number of important exhibitions, including Art in Process: The Visual Development of a Structure and Primary Structures: Younger British and American Sculptors, and in the writings of a wide variety of critics and artists, including Smithson’s early essays. Some used the noun “structure,” instead of sculpture, to indicate a general category of art or to describe “the change in painting from a flat surface to a constructed form”;24 others used “structure” as an adjective to describe an individual work’s formal appearance, to suggest its relationship to mathematical or scientific models or to imply its nonanthropomorphic occupation of space;25 and still others used “structure” as both a noun and an adjective, as in Morris’s statement: “The word structure applies to either anything or to how a thing is put together.”26 None of these uses necessarily reflects a conscious application of structuralist theory, yet some of them, particularly Morris’s
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definition, suggest a formal predisposition to such thinking that will be more clearly articulated later on. For example, in his 1967 essay “Notes on Sculpture: Part 3,” Morris writes: “The most obvious unit, if not the paradigm, of forming up to this point is the cube or rectangular block. This, together with the right-angle grid as method of distribution and placement, offers a kind of ‘morpheme’ and ‘syntax’ that are central to the cultural premise of forming.”27 Morris provides a formal description of cubes or blocks here, but his linguistic analogy manifests what Roland Barthes has called “the rules of functioning (the ‘functions’) of this object,” a goal of structuralist activity. Similar shifts occur in Smithson’s thinking and in his work as well, and his efforts to read the air terminal provided the necessary context. Throughout, he rarely discards a physical sense of structure for a purely linguistic one. His readings of structural theory emerge in concrete visual analogies, now inflected with the capacity to signify.28 Smithson developed several interrelated approaches to reading the air terminal. They all appear in their earliest form in an unpublished 1966 or 1967 essay entitled “The Artist as Site-Seer or Coded Environments,” and all are based on models of replication developed by a variety of individuals toward different theoretical ends. Smithson disregards the disparate aims of these individuals to focus on the parallels he recognizes in their chosen means—replication—since he believes that these parallels belie what they all truly share, “the same degree of esthetic awareness” of how things can be read.29 Smithson calls his first approach the “coded environment.” He introduces it through a quotation from J. G. Ballard’s novel Terminal Beach: “The system of megaliths now provided a complete substitute for those functions of his mind which gave to it its sense of the sustained rational order of time and space, his awareness kindled from levels above those of his present nervous system (if the automonic system is dominated by the past, the cerebro-spinal reaches toward the future). Without the blocks his sense of reality shrank to little more than the few square inches of sand beneath his feet.”30 In this text, Ballard describes a built environment—the system of megaliths—that hovers between concept and reality, yet because his protagonist cannot establish a reasonable distance from this environment without severely compromising his sense of reality, he is in no position to choose between the two. For Smithson, coded environments, such as Ballard’s fictional megaliths and their material counterparts at Stonehenge, provide alternatives to more utilitarian approaches to reading the environment since the order of their experience “springs from a transcendent enigma that is prior to all empirical theory.”31 These environments are synthetic
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but never secondary to something one might call an original or a referent. They reconstitute the real as information in which the real is fundamentally implicated. One cannot stand outside one to judge its veracity in relation to the other because there is no such space or rational rule of measure. For example, Smithson states that “far from being a primitive Druid Temple,” Stonehenge was a veritable “Neolithic computer” capable of predicting eclipses and following solstices and equinoxes.32 Thus as a communication channel, such a coded environment has no clearly delineated inside or outside that distinguishes it from the environment it codes, just the limits or boundaries of its own framing edge through which the environment is coded. Smithson acknowledges that his conception of the coded environment is analogous to Roland Barthes’s “simulacrum of the object,” a structuralist reconstruction that manifests an object’s invisible “rules of functioning.”33 According to Barthes, it is “intellect added to object,” a replication with something new that is intelligible at the time of reconstitution but not meant to last. Structuralism itself “is a certain form of the world, which will change with the world; and just as [man] experiences his validity (but not his truth) in his power to speak the old languages of the world in a new way, so he knows that it will suffice that a new language rise out of history, a new language which speaks him in his turn, for his task to be done.”34 Such time-bound reordering permits Smithson to read structures such as Stonehenge in terms of a contemporary functional analogy, the computer, and not presume that this reading has anything to do with a neolithic experience of this object or with experiences of it in the distant future.35 The prime object is a second category of objects possessing enigmatic origins that Smithson discusses in “The Artist as Site-Seer or Coded Environments.” He derives this conception from George Kubler’s text The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things.36 Kubler’s primes consist of the rare, great monuments in the history of art: the Parthenon, the portal statues at Rheims, the frescoes of Raphael, and many others that have been lost or destroyed over time. These primes, like their mathematical namesakes, prime numbers, are enigmatic because no rule can predict either their appearance or their sequence (the order in which they will appear). Few remain in completely manifest form, and most of them are known only through replications or what Kubler calls the replica-mass—“the entire system of replicas, reproductions, copies, reductions, transfers, and derivations, floating in the wake of an important work of art.”37 Some replicas in this replica-mass reproduce the prime completely; others alter it slightly so that in time what Kubler refers to as the replica’s “drift” from the
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prime is recognized by an artist who imposes on the mass of replicas a new scheme manifested as a prime object not categorically different from the preceding prime object, yet historically different in that it corresponds to a different age in the formal sequence to which both prime objects belong.38 Smithson rehearses all these qualities of the prime object by piecing together individual sentences and phrases from Kubler’s text and by acknowledging the source of some but not all of them.39 In the process, he alters Kubler’s argument by downplaying his distinctions between prime and replica: “What Kubler suggests in his theory is an ‘equality’ between the ‘prime’ and the ‘replication’ that maintains itself throughout the monotony of ‘Historical Drift.’ ”40 Kubler concedes that identifying primes among accumulated replicas can be extremely difficult and sometimes impossible, but he never describes them as equal. Smithson doesn’t elaborate on why or how he sees them as equal, but he does proceed to pair particular primes with work by his contemporaries: Stonehenge with Robert Morris’s circular earthworks, Alexander Graham Bell’s lattice structures with Sol LeWitt’s modular sculpture. Smithson brings Kubler’s prime object into his discussion of coded environments to justify Robert Morris’s interest in building the edge-ring of Stonehenge.41 He states that since “very few primes survive, . . . it seems only logical for Morris to want to build the edge-ring of one of the world’s most completely manifest prime objects—Stonehenge.”42 But he never defines the status of Morris’s edge-ring in relation to Stonehenge in terms of Kubler’s categories. Is Morris interrupting the drift to introduce another prime in the formal sequence to which Stonehenge also belongs, or is he just producing another replica in the mass? These distinctions don’t seem important to Smithson, except in terms of their temporal sequence as members of the same formclass, another way that Kubler describes family relationships between primes and between primes and their replicas. This lack of independent specificity is what Smithson likes about Kubler’s model in general; all of its terms are relative even if some are more significant than others. When introducing his discussion of the Great Pyramid, Smithson states: “The Great Pyramid would qualify as a prime object, but would not as a Juddian ‘specific object.’ ”43 Donald Judd’s “specific objects” present the viewer with a unitary “wholeness” of forms, materials, and images that is manifest in individual works; “the thing as a whole, its quality as a whole,” is what Judd finds interesting.44 Kubler bases his categories of prime and replica on comparative distinctions between them in terms of quality, historical circumstances, and degree of intention. They are manifest as specific things or aspects of things but cannot be experienced solely as such. In
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other words, they are never whole; in fact, they can be confined to minute fragments or prime traits of an object.45 Smithson takes Kubler’s formula one step further by eliminating the hierarchical implications of Kubler’s two categories, at least in terms of the work of the contemporary artists that he links with his designated primes. Instead of replications or new primes, the works by his contemporaries function more like repetitions or even reconstructions of primes in Barthes’s sense of a simulacrum of the object. Morris wants to build Stonehenge’s edge-ring, the prime’s mound-like fringes, and not its megalith rings. In doing so, he works on a traditionally less noticed aspect of the prime—perhaps the prime trait—and renders this aspect visible, thus clarifying the prime’s overall “rules of functioning.” In the paragraph following his discussion of Kubler’s prime objects, Smithson asks if the ciphers, glyphs, and symbols carved onto another set of Ballard’s fictional megaliths could be the millions of utterances that Kubler speaks of in reference to the replica-mass. In linking replicas with the integers of written communication through Kubler’s own metaphor, Smithson suggests Kubler’s dependence on linguistic models, particularly “linguistic drift,” in conceiving his history of things and their analogous “historical drift,” and an interchangeability between material objects and language, communication and function.46 Smithson ties this sense of interchangeability to his third model of replication, which he derives from the activities of Alexander Graham Bell. He claims that Bell is the “first ‘structuralist’ to deal with language in a concrete way.”47 In an endnote to this statement, he adds: “Define Bell by Roland Barthes’ ‘structuralist activity’—‘ . . . by the controlled manifestation of certain units and certain associations of these units,’ ” and then he continues in the main text with a description of how Bell traced sounds onto the surfaces of smoked glass with a device called a phonautograph and then measured the phonautograph’s marks with another device called a spectrograph, which stacks “successive instants of speech” and makes it “possible to ‘read’ the stacked spectra, and identify the syllables, words, or sentences visually.”48 Bell’s three-dimensional tetrahedronal lattice structures duplicate this “phonetic logic” because they also consist of repeated, stacked modules. Smithson calls Bell’s kites made out of these lattice systems “flight texts” (figure 3.18). Smithson emphasizes the linguistic aspects of Bell’s work to provide more examples of Barthes’s structural activity, but he specifically wants to demonstrate how, through such activity, the way language functions as accumulated material units also becomes visible. For a structuralist, all operations on an object lead back to this linguistic analogy of function, and Smithson needs to make this clear to conclude at the end of his essay: “To talk constantly ‘about seeing’ is a linguistic problem not a visual
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FIGURE 3.18 Photograph of Alexander Graham Bell with his tetragonal lattice kites, in Robert Smithson, “Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site,” Artforum (Summer 1967).
problem. All abstract concepts are blind, because they do not refer back to anything that has already been seen. The ‘visual’ has its origin in the enigmas of blind order— which is in a word, memory.”49 He concludes: “When art and memory combine, we become aware of the syntax of communication.”50 Seeing the environment, therefore, is akin to reading it, an activity that occurs in time as well as in space. It is no accident that Smithson discusses works by three of this contemporaries—Carl Andre, Sol LeWitt, and Robert Morris—in “The Artist as Site-Seer or Coded Environments.” This text was a preliminary version of his major published essay on the air terminal project, “Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site,” and all these artists were then currently involved in developing “aerial art” projects for the Dallas–Fort Worth Air Terminal. As early as April 1967 and perhaps earlier, Smithson, Andre, and Morris traveled to the Pine Barrens in New Jersey to look for a site for an outdoor exhibition to be based on their aerial art projects.51 The exhibition, ultimately entitled Aerial Art, was planned to open indoors at Dwan Gallery, New York, in September 1967. Although it never took place, enough related drawings and essays remain to piece together what the built equivalents to Smithson’s “simulacrum of the air terminal” might have looked like. Robert Morris’s proposal, Project in Earth and
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Sod, was to be his realization of Stonehenge’s edge-ring—a circular earth mound, trapezoidal in cross-section and covered with sod.52 Carl Andre intended to hire a contractor to place and fuse an explosion powerful enough to create a crater twelve inches deep and 144 inches in diameter. Sol LeWitt planned to bury a six-inch wooden cube, containing something and encased in cement, three feet underground at an undesignated spot.53 Smithson’s initial proposal consisted of seven square “aerial pavements” of graduated sizes from three to fifteen feet square, each to be made of sixteen-inchthick asphalt paving. The pavements were to be aligned along one eighty-one-foot line and spaced three feet apart.54 Although Smithson could link only Morris’s proposal to a specific prime from the past in “The Artist as Site-Seer,” he could identify the other projects as replicas of aspects of a new prime, the air terminal itself. Each artist isolates discrete aspects or stages of the surveying or building process—grading and shaping the land’s contours, sodding it, creating subterranean spaces through explosions, boring for soil samples and then filling in the holes, and pouring out asphalt runways—so that these aspects or stages of the terminal’s design and construction could, in Smithson’s own words, “be viewed as an array of art works that vanish as they develop,” just as the process of constructing the terminal did.55 Only now the proposals render these aspects or stages of construction visible as a set of forms to be replicated or worked on and as a set of rules of functioning. And because Smithson intended that all of the proposed projects be built on the unusable fringes of the site before major construction of the terminal building began, they would reiterate the physical limits of the site as well as its syntax. They would transform it into a coded environment. Initially, Smithson intended to cover the entire floor of Dwan Gallery’s exhibition space with an enlarged map of the air terminal site and to position scale models of each of the participating artist’s proposals on it.56 This arrangement would have established an aerial viewpoint for both the site and the models that would echo the visual conditions of the air traveler hovering in an airplane above the terminal site. But it also would have placed spectators inside the site or at least inside a “logical twodimensional picture”of the site. These conditions are somewhat analogous to those Smithson sets up in the Terminal Area Concepts drawing; in the Dwan exhibition, the viewer stands in a gallery in New York and looks at a “picture” of an air terminal site somewhere on the periphery of Dallas–Fort Worth, whereas in the drawing Smithson indicates that the viewer was to stand inside the terminal museum and view pictures of earthworks situated on the terminal site’s periphery. The gallery viewer is able to see more “sites” at once in the installation—the overall terminal site, including the four
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earthworks, and the gallery itself—but the more significant difference here is in the way these conditions of viewing overlap. Instead of using television cameras to convert, transfer, and display the earthworks as two-dimensional images on television monitors in the gallery, Smithson fits his sites into the space by adjusting their relative scales in terms of a shared cartographic grid. No other term of conversion is necessary. Each site—the gallery, the air terminal, and the earthworks—is realized as an expansion or compression in two or three dimensions of the same gridded framework, one nestled inside the other. Smithson had already conceived of three-dimensional exhibition spaces in terms of receding perspectival grids in his spiral notebook sketches (see figures 1.3 and 1.4), and he, Ad Reinhardt, and Robert Morris based the installation design of their 1966 exhibition 10 on the hypothetical, three-dimensional grid produced by the gallery’s walls, ceiling, and floor.57 10 took place in the same space—Dwan’s New York gallery—that Smithson was intending to use for the Aerial Art exhibition. So his “mapping” of the gallery floor with a plan of the air terminal site might seem like an obvious next step, yet the ramifications are now quite different. In the earlier exhibitions, Smithson and others arranged individual works according to the specific architectural terms of the exhibition spaces or, in the case of his multiple-unit sculpture, to contradict these terms. In his design for the Aerial Art exhibition, both the air terminal and the gallery lose their specificity as independent spaces; they are specific only in relation to one another. Again, the gridded framework makes this comparison possible by providing a shared structure. To make such comparisons, this shared structure needed to be based on an abstract and much more all-encompassing system than the anthropomorphic terms of linear perspective or the terms of a particular architectural space. One needed what Smithson called a “vast lattice” that would be able to lock all air and land together.58 Smithson often spoke about how newer technologies such as the Secor surveying satellite use such a lattice to instantaneously link geographical areas that are more than 2,000 miles apart by bringing space to a standstill and replacing it with what he calls a “crystalline structure of time.”59 The satellite generates these links the same way the cartographer unifies selected sites into a network of gridded longitudinal and latitudinal lines. It just does so on a much larger scale and at much greater speed. In laying the air terminal map on the floor of Dwan Gallery, Smithson acknowledges that the gallery and the air terminal site are relative portions of this network of plotted or projected lines and thus can be made to mirror each other, “reflections reflecting reflections,” as in “The Crystal Land.” Under these shared conditions, their
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formal qualities as spaces become more generic and thus easily convertible. The same is true of their quantitative limits, where they begin and end as portions of the lattice. And their contents—the models and other details of the site—are commensurable to a certain degree as well. Yet despite all of the coincidences of form, limits, and contents that the lattice makes possible, the status of the two sites is not the same. One is absent and represented by a two-dimensional map. The other is present as a threedimensional space. These distinctions require the shared structure of the two sites to do much more than link them together as commensurable parts of a vast lattice. They require the conditions of signification. According to the cartographer David Greenhood, “a map has as much right to be figurative as spoken or written language has; it too is language.”60 As I have already indicated, Smithson discusses many things, including maps and glass plates, in terms of syntax to justify his claims that all material objects have the potential to function linguistically and, adversely, that language is a physical material like any other that artists can choose to work with.61 And both can traffic back and forth between literal and metaphorical signification.62 In “Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site,” for example, he claims that Bell’s telephone and other investigations transformed language into “linguistic objects,” a “visual language of modules” whose “points, lines, areas, or volumes establish the syntax of sites.”63 Smithson learned about Bell’s activities from Konrad Wachsmann’s 1961 book The Turning Point of Building: Structures and Design, which may have been an important sourcebook for him when he first began work for TAMS. Wachsmann’s text contains a lengthy section on modules—the fundamental unit of measure for modern architecture—that alternates short texts with diagrams. One of these diagrams (figure 3.19) illustrates the element module, a category that defines dimensional relationships among all objects with surface-defining characteristics. Wachsmann explains: “Making the theoretical assumption that there is such a thing as a universal surface, that is, an element with so many physical properties that, abstractly expressed, it can serve any purpose, we can establish the following functional categories: opaque elements, transparent elements, surface-defining frame elements.”64 The diagrammatic equivalents of these categories unfold through slight modifications—added lines to signify transparency, doubled outlines to indicate frames—to the same rectangular unit’s appearance. The dimensions of each unit and thus their interchangeability remain the same. They are practically self-explanatory; they speak of their function within a larger architectural system, another “vast lattice,” which holds them together. They are both images and diagrams, things and language.
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For Smithson, language, the new semantics of buildings, and sites all possess an identifiable and relatively constant structure with relevant features—paragraphs, sentences, and words for language; windows, floors, and walls for buildings; and points, lines, areas, or volumes for sites—that artists use to communicate.65 Critics and some artists often deny the new, shared syntactical structures of things to make them conform to preexisting criteria—thus Smithson’s embrace of Tony Smith’s appreciation of “the rules of structure” of the unfinished turnpike—by isolating one outmoded feature or linguistic detail to stand for the whole (structure). Quickly, according to Smithson, these details become diseased, and their syntactical function fails or becomes much too specialized. Smithson’s favorite example of such a diseased detail is painting. “ ‘Painting,’ ” according to Smithson, “is not an end, but a means, therefore it is linguistically an out-of-date category.”66 In a number of essays written around 1966 and 1967, Smithson describes
FIGURE 3.19 Diagrammatic representation of elements describing surfaces, in
how painting has transformed a linguistic feature of building—the window—into a
Konrad Wachsmann, The Turning
homeless architectural detail by clotting up its gridded surfaces with paint. In one text,
Point of Building: Structures and
he uses the linguistic analogy of too much expression “filling the syntax” to describe
Design (1961).
painting’s current situation.67 Both activities—filling the gridded surfaces of a window with paint or filling syntax with too much expression—and their resulting objects— paintings and texts—promote private over public values by hiding or denying the
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shared signifying structure on which they both depend, just as the art museum, with its thick opacity, does (see figure 1.17): “Bright colors conceal the abyss that holds the museum together. Everything solid is a bit of clogged air or space.”68 In another essay, Smithson elaborates: Today, esthetic dogma endorses the concept of “a painting” as a unity or private object, and detaches it from pictorial language, when in fact a painting is nothing but the absence of a picture, therefore this seems to mean that the meaning of a painting contains a hidden duality that has yet to be discovered. The term “painting” has become a function of both language and technique, yet the artist when he blanks out a surface in order to gain wholeness, may very well imagine this wholeness to be a unity without any dividing factor or double meaning. But technique replaces the value of the picturable, when language is considered parasitic or “literary.” When the problem of picturable syntax is negated, this leaves a non-picture as is the case in the art of Baer and Reinhardt.69 These “non-pictures” offer the viewer silence, but this silence can be understood only in terms of a refusal to communicate. Syntax therefore is acknowledged through negation.70 Smithson explains that Reinhardt and Baer do this by maintaining “the convention of the rectangular format or false window or mirror” as blank surfaces that reflect nothing. They are willfully opaque. He also notes that both “have in their art an infra-game structure that suggests maps without natural designations.”71 So he calls them “infra-maps,” because, like his infra perspectives, they retain only the structural terms of the conditions to which they refer. And in using the grammar of windows, mirrors, and maps negatively, they present false reflected light and space that is artificial or “non-space.” In 1966, Smithson designed a number of works that consist of modular frameworks filled with a variety of black, white, or colored materials—tar, blue coal, pulverized silica, and gravel (figures 3.20 and 3.21). These works all relate in format to his four earthworks in his Terminal Area Concepts drawing; all address Smithson’s interest in negative picture-making, as opposed to painting and, as such, lack specific referents or natural designations, although as filled frameworks or foundations they do refer to the air terminal’s general “rules of functioning” by mirroring its architectural conditions: grids and modules.72 In 1967, Smithson also made several drawings for projects he called “earth windows” (figure 3.22)—rectangular pits lined with powerful fog or outdoor stadium lights and covered with either a window grid and clear broken glass or square panes of glass arranged into a gridded pattern. He conceived
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FIGURE 3.20 Robert Smithson, Tar Pool and Gravel Pit (model), 1966.
FIGURE 3.21 Robert Smithson, Three Side Views of Concrete or Wooden Foundations to be Plotted on Level Ground, 1966.
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of some of these windows in graduated sequences of three and others as single constructions. All of them were intended for the air terminal. Formally, they can be linked to his earlier “frame works”—gridded formats “filled” with materials—but now they are transparent. Electric light passes through the windows and upward toward the incoming airplanes, so that as images they appear as gridded light. Since their surfaces consist of glass, they would have also reflected the sky and anything else that happened to pass over them during the day. In other words, they were no longer opaque surfaces—Reinhardt and Baer’s dark or light mirrors that reflect nothing real or imaginary. They are windows and mirrors that are materially present but simultaneously transparent to the overall spatial and temporal syntax of surfaces and lines at the site. Unlike the illusionistic transparency of linear perspective, this was an abstract form of transparency that Smithson could advocate because it allows the Earth Windows to move beyond the status of private objects or even independent categories of objects—windows, walls, paintings—to communicate what Smithson called the “primary data” of the site.73 They functioned locally, like the transparent element module, within a syntax and were part of a larger, universal surface: “The most common type
FIGURE 3.22 Robert Smithson, Three Earth Windows (under broken glass) AP 2, 1967.
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of window in the modern city is composed of a simple grid system that holds panes of clear glass. The ‘glass wall’ is a part of many standard stores and office buildings. By emphasizing the transparent glass we arrive at a total crystalline consciousness of structure, and avoid the clotted patchy naturalistic details of ‘painting.’ The organic shapes that painters put on the ‘canvas-pane’ are eliminated and replaced by a consciousness that develops a new set of linguistic meanings and visual results.”74 Smithson discusses the theoretical conditions of this transparency in an essay concerning the Earth Windows entitled “Untitled (Air Terminal-Windows)” and in “Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site.”75 In both essays, he links his use of the term “transparency” to Barthes’s discussion of a similar transparency in successful theater costume design: “In short, the good costume must be material enough to signify and transparent enough not to turn its signs into parasites.”76 This was Smithson’s goal for all of the aerial art at the air terminal as well. He summarizes the material forms and signifying functions of these works in his final essay on the terminal project this way: “On the boundaries of the taxiways, runways or approach ‘clear zones’ we might construct ‘earthworks’ or grid type frameworks close to the ground levels. These aerial sites would not only be visible from arriving and departing aircraft, but they would also define the terminal’s manmade perimeters in terms of landscaping.”77 All of these added elements would “expose” the terminal as a coded environment, a “picturable situation” that could be read in a number of different ways and from a number of points of view.
By the time Smithson, Andre, Morris, Dwan, and Holt traveled to the Pine Barrens to look for a site for their outdoor exhibition of “aerial art,” Smithson was already considering another type of air terminal project. Four years later he described the confluence of events and images underlying this project, his first nonsite: The first non-site that I did was at the Pine Barrens in southern New Jersey. This place was in a state of equilibrium, it had a kind of tranquility and it was discontinuous from the surrounding area because of its stunted pine trees. There was a hexagon airfield there which lent itself very well to the application of certain crystalline structures which had preoccupied me in my earlier work. A crystal can be mapped out, and in fact I think it was crystallography which led me to map-making. Initially I went to the Pine Barrens to set up a system of outdoor pavements but in the process I became interested in
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the abstract aspects of mapping. At the same time I was working with maps and aerial photography for an architectural company. I had great access to them. So I decided to use the Pine Barrens site as a piece of paper and draw a crystalline structure over the landmass rather than on a 20 x 30 sheet of paper. In this way I was applying my conceptual thinking directly to the disruption of the site over an area of several miles. So you might say that my non-site was a three dimensional map of the site.78 In choosing to “map” a site in New Jersey in his first nonsite, Smithson follows another one of the most basic conditions of map making: “start with your own home terrain.”79 According to Dwan, Smithson discovered the airfield on a Woodmansie quadrangle map after their first trip to the Pine Barrens: “the mapping always followed the traveling.”80 Because the landscape lacked significant landmarks and the abandoned airfield was located at some distance from the region’s only major road and therefore not visible from this road, Smithson couldn’t have discovered it otherwise. The small airfield has three runways that bisect each other to produce six spokes of roughly equivalent lengths. It appears near the quadrangle map’s center as a white, star-shaped image with a hexagonal center; its shape and lack of color make it stand out against the uniform green color of most of the rest of the map. Smithson selected this site because it is already an airfield, a cartographic image, and a crystalline structure. He just framed what is already there. First, he made a black and white photostat of a Woodmansie quadrangle map, which eliminated the map’s color. Then he rotated the map approximately forty-five degrees and used a ruler and black pen to connect the ends of the six spokes of the airfield together into a hexagonal shape, to extend each spoke approximately five inches, and, using these extended lines, to draw five more incrementally wider hexagonal shapes out to their edges. Finally, he cut the rest of the photostat image away to produce a hexagonally shaped map with the hexagonally shaped airfield at its center (see figure 3.4). The A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) map is one of a group of two- and potentially three-dimensional works that Smithson made by cutting up various types of maps. Untitled (Antarctica) (see figure 3.7) is based on a polar coordinate map of the south pole. A polar coordinate map takes a pole as its center and its mapnet of parallels and meridians extend out from this center as a series of circular rings or curved lines. Smithson cut along the concentric circles created by this mapnet’s parallels and then pulled four rings of equal width apart from the central arctic circle of the pole. His action reveals the fundamental relationship between a flat map and the curved surface it represents and makes the transition between the two clear.81
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Smithson had already associated a hexagonal shape with the air terminal in a 1966 work entitled Terminal (figure 3.23).82 This work consists of ten pairs of incrementally larger, hexagonal shapes that are vertically stacked on either side of a large central hexagonal shape. The work’s design is enantiomorphic, and the work was included in Smithson’s first one-person exhibition at Dwan, along with Alogon and Plunge. In his second one-person exhibition, he rotated a similar hexagonal shape ninety degrees and used it as a platform for A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) (figure 3.24). According to Smithson, the nonsite “was a three dimensional map of the site.”83 In this sense, he is referring to the sculptural aspects of the nonsite, which mirror the hexagonal design of the nonsite map as a reverse projection of it in three dimensions. Smithson folds out, thickens, or stacks up the map’s framework into a three-dimensional form, just as he indicates the folding out of the terminal as a threedimensional form in his drawing Terminal: Plans for Dallas–Fort Worth Regional Airport (see figure 3.12) or stacks up a contoured form out of glass plates in Glass Stratum (see figure 3.16). Because it is mounted on a low platform, the primary orientation when viewing this map is aerial, as if the spectator were in an airplane hovering over
FIGURE 3.23 Robert Smithson, Terminal, 1966.
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the Pine Barrens, in preparation for landing. A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) refers back to all of the visual conditions of the airport—the relationship between inside and outside, views from the air and on the ground, and two- and threedimensionality—as well as to the material processes used to construct the airport. It is also both a “grid type framework” and an “earthwork”—container and contained. The nonsites, then, are the point of convergence for all of Smithson’s thinking about the air terminal. Later, in 1972 Smithson describes the range of this convergence:
Range of Convergence The range of convergence between Site and Nonsite consists of a course of hazards, a double path made up of signs, photographs, and maps that belong to both sides of the dialectic at once. Both sides are present and absent at the same time. The land or ground from the Site is placed in the art (Nonsite) rather than the art placed on the ground. The Nonsite is a container within another container—the room. The plot or yard outside is yet another container. Two-dimensional and three-dimensional things trade places with
FIGURE 3.24 Robert Smithson, A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork), 1968.
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each other in the range of convergence. Large scale becomes small. Small scale becomes large. A point on a map expands to the size of the land mass. A land mass contracts into a point. Is the Site a reflection of the Nonsite (mirror), or is it the other way around? The rules of this network of signs are discovered as you go along uncertain trails both mental and physical.84 One could say many of the same things about the air terminal. It too provides a range of convergence and a suspension between states. Smithson exploited both as early as 1966 in his four proposed earthworks. He intended for them to be built on a scale that would have been equivalent to the other major structures in the TAMS master plan. So from the air, they would have appeared as two-dimensional images, analogous to the equally two-dimensional geometric shapes of the terminal buildings. But because they were to be constructed low to the ground, they would temporarily disappear from view once one was on the ground, only to reappear again as a second set of twodimensional images on the television monitors inside the terminal. Smithson illustrates similar gaps or suspensions in visual convergence in A Web of White Gravel (figure 3.25). In this work, he adds a web of lines to a photostat of a blueprint of the airport master plan. This web functions as a visual pun on the idea of the airport as a spider’s web that ensnares large flies, meaning planes, but Smithson also indicates on the drawing that this web consists of six-foot-wide white gravel paths “to be seen from airplanes and walked on.” So again, the web earthwork has a double function: it is a two-dimensional image to be viewed from the air and a three-dimensional thing to stand or walk on to view the airport when on the ground. This “image/platform” shuttles back and forth between these two functions, depending on one’s position in relation to it.85 And like the four earthworks, it too would be invisible from certain vantage points. Smithson set up the viewing situation of all of these earthworks in the way that he did because he felt that such a situation reflected the terms of visual experience at an airport, constant visual and spatial convergences and shifts, often with blind spots in between. All of these visual convergences depend on memory to fill in these perceptual gaps or blind spots, a holding in the mind of the image of an object as it appeared from a previous position, either in the air or on the ground, while experiencing the same object from a new or different position. One remembers what the earthworks or the terminal looked like from the air when these two-dimensional images can no longer be seen once the plane has landed, and then one sees them again on the television monitors inside the terminal. These memories also allow
FIGURE 3.25 Robert Smithson, A Web of White Gravel, 1967.
the viewer to constantly compare past experience and present experience, twodimensional images and their three-dimensional counterparts, so that there is a mental but never a visual convergence of these things. The visual convergence is conditional—an either-or proposition that is completed by the mind. Here Smithson is still splitting vision to point out that “it is a known fact that we do not see with our eyes but rather with our brain.”86 All of the projects Smithson developed in relation to the air terminal—various forms of landscaping, earthworks, and nonsites—were loosely interchangeable; all dealt with convergence in one form or another. “Monuments” is another term that sometimes appears on Smithson’s lists of landscape-related projects and is relevant here as well.87 The suspension between images that occurs at the airport and, by extension, at the nonsites could also be understood as “small deaths.” Being in an airport can feel like death or at least a temporary suspension of the terms of ordinary life. The past is there, the future in the form of a destination looms ahead, but the present is the dead, almost non-space of waiting to connect with this destination or future; one is all too often just passing time, standing still. As the narrator states at the beginning of Chris Marker’s La Jetée, “Nothing sorts out memories from ordinary moments. Later on they do claim remembrance when they show their scar.”88 The earthworks and the nonsites, like monuments, act like scars or signs of a death. When looking at them, viewers can be at only one point in time and space. Thus all aspects of either the site and the nonsite or the earthwork as an image and the earthwork as a platform can never be fully present at once, although each aspect reminds viewers of its corollary and, as memories, can be perceived as “ruins in reverse.” Viewing entails absence or loss; one has to die a little. At the end of La Jetée, the hero is allowed to return to the past—to the moment of his childhood memory and to the woman he loves as an adult: “Once again on the main jetty at Orly, in the middle of this warm, prewar Sunday afternoon where he could now stay, he thought in a confused way that the child he had been was due to be there too, watching the planes. But first of all he looked for the woman’s face, at the end of the jetty. He ran toward her. And when he recognized the man who had trailed him since the underground camp, he understood there was no way to escape Time, and that this moment he had been granted to watch as a child, which had never ceased to obsess him, was the moment of his own death.”89 The significance of La Jetée’s hero’s memory comes at a cost, his own death. He is allowed to experience the convergence of his past, present, and future because he is going to die.90 Smithson proposes an experience in his A Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) and in
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most of the work he developed in relation to the air terminal, which is similar. All of them provide a view of a terminal but also a terminal view. Something always has to be sacrificed in the viewing process—the two-dimensional or the three-dimensional, the past or the future, the here or the there, and hopefully the museum itself.
Yucatan Is Elsewhere It never looked quite like this—but very like a postcard to me. Being beaten to death by post-card landscapes. “Wish you were here.” messages on postcards sent to bob and nancy smithson Smithson and many of his contemporaries sent each other lots of postcards. Some were the ubiquitous exhibition announcements, which artists often designed for their solo or group shows. They also sent personal postcards when on vacation, when traveling in search of possible sites for constructing new work or, increasingly, when traveling by invitation to execute work for international exhibitions. Even though these postcards now appear to fall into two discrete categories—public and private—all were attempts to maintain a sense of community even as their senders’ sphere of artistic exchange was beginning to expand well beyond the boundaries of lower Manhattan. The images and messages on these postcards often establish a syntax for artistic exchange across space and time as well. Smithson and his contemporaries relied on the serial and temporal activity of sending and receiving cards to build visual and verbal sentences. Sometimes the sentence-building process was quite literal. For example, several individuals sent Smithson a sequence of postcards spaced out over the course of months. Each card contained an isolated phrase, word, or image that made little sense on its own. But when the cards are arranged according to the order in which they were received, the sequence produces a complete sentence or coherent message. Other artists developed a type of visual shorthand that relied on an accumulation of similar forms to signify. Eva Hesse sent Smithson a postcard of the Bell System Space Dome in Andover, Maine, in the summer of 1967. The dome, like the postcard, is a tool of communication; an antenna, housed inside the dome, communicates with satellites by amplifying their messages 500,000 times. But Hesse does not choose the image for this reason alone. The dome has a dramatic, concentric shape that Hesse associates with the concentric circular forms she frequently uses in
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her own work. On the back of the postcard she makes a drawing of her circular design, and the likeness between the two images, front and back, “snap” together. The image she makes is so central to her artistic practice that she knows she doesn’t need to sign her name on the postcard. She trusts that the Smithsons will immediately identify it with the sender. Place, image, artist, and ultimately artistic community come together, and, by extension, looking and travel become opportunities for sights and actions that acknowledge these repeated sights. My investigation of these postcard practices is necessarily one-sided since Smithson’s archive contains the postcards that he and Holt received and few examples of what he sent to others. But as I have already indicated, there is plenty of evidence of a syntactical practice in Smithson’s work, particularly in the chains of analogies he establishes in his travels through “The Crystal Land,” which is similar to the syntactical chains developed by his contemporaries through the sending of postcards. When traveling, Smithson constantly recorded sightings of forms and formal arrangements that were similar to those he used in his three-dimensional work. During his trip to Mexico, he rendered the stepped stonework capping pattern on the Temple of the Inscriptions on the inside back cover of his Palenque guidebook so that it resembled his asphalt pavements design for the air terminal and several other of his drawings of the Alogons.91 Other examples of the analogies he habitually drew while traveling include his comparison of Carl Andre’s 1966 and 1967 exhibitions of his Equivalents I–VIII and Cuts, which were, respectively, positive or negative installation patterns of bricks or capstones on the floor of the Tibor de Nagy Gallery in New York and the Dwan Gallery in Los Angeles, with a similarly paired set of positive and negative Olmec jaguar masks made of colored bricks, in his essay “Incidents of MirrorTravel in the Yucatan.”92 In a 1970 interview with Paul Toner, Smithson describes the relationship between the two in terms that are similar to Kubler’s concept of the formclass: “New art changes how we look at old art. You are not in a vacuum. You are not just a personality spewing out things from your gut. Art changes the view of the past. There is a lot of archaic art, there are giant earthworks in Peru, that haven’t been thought about. Indian mounds and all that kind of building leads to another kind of perception. That’s why I put the jaguar mask in the Yucatan article, to show that Carl Andre’s art can go all the way back.”93 Most of Smithson’s own practice after 1967 also was based on the repetition of a fixed set of actions—collecting rocks and other materials, plotting on maps, laying mirror trails or displacements, overturning rocks, upending trees, constructing hypothetical continents, making drawings, taking photographs or slides, and writ-
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ing—that the artist adapted to the conditions of specific locations and that had a syntactical dimension.94 For example, in 1969, Smithson executed a number of “earthmaps” that were made out of different materials and based on the shapes of hypothetical continents that he found in various books. He made two earthmaps of Cathaysia out of rocks and quicksand in Alfred, New York, one of Lemuria out of shells on the beach at Sanibel Island, one of Gondwanaland out of limestone rocks he gathered near the Mayan ruins at Uxmal in the Yucatan, and one of Atlantis out of broken glass on Loveladies Island, New Jersey. As photographed images—and that is the only way most individuals will ever perceive them since they were usually abandoned or destroyed after completion—these earthmaps all look practically interchangeable as forms and certainly not much different from any other pile of shells, rocks, or glass found on any beach, near any ancient ruin or quarry, or in any junkyard. By designating his piles as three-dimensional maps of hypothetical continents, Smithson makes possible a similar designation for any pile of stuff, thus creating a syntactical chain or form-class through repetition.95 In a collage entitled Earthmap of Gondwanaland Ice Cap (figure 3.26), Smithson spells out how this works cartographically. The collage contains two pairs of images. The pair in the lower register of the work consists of a section of a road map of the Yucatan and a section of a guidebook map of the Uxmal ruins district. The pair in the work’s upper register consists of a hypothetical map of the Gondwana Great Ice Cap taken from a textbook on stratigraphy and life history and a drawing by Smithson of his built earthmap of Gondwanaland.96 A straight line connects the equivalent sites on the maps in the pair in the lower register. In the upper register, Smithson has copied the map outline of the Gondwana ice cap in his sketch of the earthmap and has indicated that the “edge of ice” on the textbook map translates into an “edge of limestone” in his sketch. In drawing formal and geographical analogies between four types of maps, Smithson implies that one place or form can be equivalent to another, just as one map can be read in terms of another. Smithson also includes information on the relative scale of the four maps in his drawing, but he considers this scale in terms of time as well as space. After all, he is transposing an image of a continent from “305 to 270 million years ago” onto a terrain that was once part of an ancient civilization and thus creating what he calls “a collision in time that left one with a sense of the timeless” at the site.97 This sense of timelessness occurs, in part, because Smithson makes no mention of the present. It appears to be superseded by his stacking of two images with different past tenses. Only the two maps cut from the road map and the guidebook contain information that might be based on present conditions of the site, but there is no way of verifying this
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on the basis of these two fragments.98 They become generic spatial frameworks for the experience of timelessness. Returning to the postcards for a moment, when a sender seeks to establish a shared syntax between images, he or she often deliberately misrepresents both the actual site and time represented by a chosen postcard’s image. Mel Bochner attaches his own caption to a postcard image of a trail of footprints across a Cape Cod sand dune: “This looks like the ‘after’ shot from your ad on the Arts Yearbook. Anyway it will do until we get to the moon” (figure 3.27).99 In doing so, Bochner makes a plausible comparison between his chosen postcard image and Smithson’s advertisement, which the latter designed for the 1967 exhibition Dwan Gallery New York at Dwan Gallery Los Angeles and published in Arts Yearbook in 1967 (figure 3.28). Like Hesse, Bochner finds an image and brings it into circulation with other images already within his artistic community by pointing out resemblances. But he also addresses the issue of travel’s narrative sequence, the “before” and “after,” . . . and even “after that,” with his reference to the moon walk, still almost exactly two years in the future. After all, the passage of time is as much a part of the experience of travel as movement in space. Bochner’s attempt to picture the “after” while still occupying the “before” parallels the time travel of individuals writing for the mainstream press. For Life’s 28 February 1969 issue, Anne Morrow Lindbergh contributed a cover story entitled “The Moon Voyagers and the Earthly Beauty that Beckons them Back” (figure 3.29). Her essay, a call for environmental responsibility at home, includes photographs taken of the natural habitats surrounding Cape Canaveral, Florida. All these images are paired with images or descriptions of things associated with the upcoming Apollo 11 mission. One pair juxtaposes a set of animal tracks with a satellite photograph of the moon’s
FIGURE 3.26 (opposite page)
surface. The accompanying caption reads: “Lunar-looking scene above is the track of
Robert Smithson, Earthmap
a racoon in the sand near the Apollo 9 launching site.” Lindbergh’s aims are a bit dif-
of Gondwanaland Ice Cap, 1969.
ferent from Bochner’s since she seems more convinced that her substitute “futures” are sufficiently beautiful and should not be forgotten in the thrill of the potentially beautiful—yet to be perceived and recorded by NASA’s technology. Bochner is not interested in relative beauty or truth but in sequence and in how an image’s caption directs a reading in terms of sequence, regardless of inherent truth or verifiability. The 8 August 1969 cover of Life and the cover of Artforum for September of the same year (figures 3.30 and 3.31) present another set of sequential images. The Life cover contains one of the first color photographs of the 1969 moon landing ever published. It and the other images in the magazine’s featured photo-essay were taken by
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the astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin. The image on the cover of Artforum magazine was taken by Robert Smithson. It is a photograph of his First Mirror Displacement, one of nine illustrated in his essay “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan,” which also appears in this issue of Artforum. The similarities between the two covers are striking, regardless of whether they were intentional on the part of Smithson or the editor of Artforum.100 The two images depict a powdery grey ground, devoid of human figures and yet marked by traces of their former presence—footprints and a flag or mirrors. These things cast strong shadows on the ground. Both photographs were taken at angles that tip the space up toward the viewer and eliminate the horizon line. A consideration of their formal similarities calls into question FIGURE 3.27 (top left)
the rhetoric of these images and of the paired images previously discussed. If one dis-
Postcard sent by Mel Bochner to
cards their captions and the titles of their respective places of publication, do these
Robert Smithson, 13 July 1967.
images maintain their veracity as records of specific places and their proper places in
FIGURE 3.28 (top right)
the “before” and “after” sequence? To address this question, one needs to determine
Robert Smithson, advertisement for
how these images manifest a tense that has yet to be represented in these compar-
Dwan Gallery, Arts Yearbook (1967).
isons—the present. Postcards themselves challenge the usual sequence of traveling and returning to tell by blurring the distinctions between the two. One tells while traveling; the postcard often arrives after one has returned home or one sends an image that
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has nothing to do with where one is. Yet postcards do possess one indisputable index of the moment of sending, both in terms of time and place—the postmark. This mark or stamp connects the sender to a precise place and time and to an indisputable present tense that then is immediately and necessarily detached from all three. This fragile mark was to become increasingly important to Smithson. He was preoccupied with time travel; his trip to Passaic was, in large part, an experiment in self-conscious time travel. He also believed that such travel was particularly important for artists since “for too long the artist has been estranged from his own ‘time’ ” because critics tended to focus on the art object rather than the artist’s process. Toward the end of 1968, Smithson wrote: The mental process of the artist which takes place in time is disowned, so that a commodity value can be maintained by a system independent of the artist. Art, in this sense, is considered “timeless” or a product of “no time at all”; this becomes a convenient way
FIGURE 3.29 Illustrations for “The Moon Voyagers and the Earthly Beauty that Beckons them Back,” Life (28 February 1969). FIGURE 3.30 (following pages, left) (see PLATE 4) Cover of Life (8 August 1969). FIGURE 3.31 (following pages, right) (see PLATE 5) Cover of Artforum (September 1969).
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to exploit the artist out of his rightful claim to his temporal processes. . . . Artists with a weak view of time are easily deceived by this victimizing kind of criticism, and are seduced into some trivial history. . . . The deeper an artist sinks into the time stream the more it becomes oblivion; because of this, he must remain close to the temporal surfaces. . . . Floating in this temporal river are the remnants of art history, yet the “present” cannot support the cultures of Europe, or even the archaic or primitive civilizations; it must instead explore the pre- and post-historic mind; it must go into the places where remote futures meet remote pasts.101 Smithson made his first mirror displacements in the spring of 1969 while he was traveling in Mexico. By repeating some of the activities of a nineteenth-century predecessor to Mexico, the explorer and travel writer John Lloyd Stephens; by repeating many of his own previous artistic practices; and by consciously anticipating some of the actions soon to be performed by the first explorers of the moon, Smithson attempted to provide his own artistic postcards of an indisputable present tense in between the “before” and “after” of Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula.
Smithson’s trip to Mexico began with postcards. Other artists he knew had already been there, and evidence of their travels remains in Smithson’s correspondence files. Virginia Dwan traveled to Mexico in February 1968, “blazing a trail to Yucatan” partly, she states in a postcard, to gather “some ideas for our trip.”102 On 15 April 1969, Smithson, Nancy Holt, and Dwan left New York for Florida. After a few days at Sanibel Island and then Captiva Island spent with Robert Rauschenberg, they flew out of Tampa to Merida, Mexico, where they picked up a rental car for their drive through the Yucatan peninsula. Over a period of two weeks, they drove down highway 261 through the state of Yucatan, past the Mayan ruins at Uxmal, then into Campeche, along the Gulf coast through the towns of Campeche and Champotón, and back into the peninsula’s interior toward Palenque in the state of Chiapas. They left their car in Palenque for a trip by airplane and boat to the Mayan ruins at Bonampak and Yaxchilán in the Lacandón rain forest. After returning to Palenque, they drove northwest to the city of Villahermosa and then to the coast of Tabasco and Campeche, crossing the Laguna de Términos on a series of ferries that connected the Isla del Carmen with the mainland on either side. They returned to Merida via the coast of Campeche on highway 180 and arrived back in New York on 2 May. The trip lasted about two and a half weeks.
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On at least nine different occasions during their travels they stopped the car or boat at towns or at the sites of Mayan ruins that Smithson marked on a road map. At each stop, they got out of the car or boat or off the dirt path, and Smithson placed the same mirrors in the soil or vegetation and took color slides of them. At some sites they stayed longer, and Smithson executed other projects. He overturned rocks, constructed the Gondwanaland earthmap, and planted a tree upside down, and he photographed these projects as well. These activities were repetitions of practices Smithson had developed earlier. For example, he used mirrors in a similar manner in his trail of eight mirrors placed at evenly spaced points that he designated on a U.S. Geological Survey map of the area around Ithaca, New York. This mirror trail was one of several projects involving mirrors that he executed there in February 1969 for the Earth Art exhibition at Cornell University. He first arranged and photographed the mirrors he brought with him to Mexico on the beach at Sanibel Island for a work he called Mirror Shore. After his visit to the Yucatan, Smithson arranged mirrors in England, New Jersey, and a few other places, calling them all “mirror displacements.” As already stated, the earthmap of Gondwanaland, made of limestone rocks Smithson gathered near the ruins at Uxmal, is also one of several earthmaps the artist made of hypothetical or mythical continents during 1969. So why leave home at all? In the Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, Smithson doesn’t make anything that will last or that he hasn’t done before or won’t continue to do elsewhere later on. The things that he creates almost immediately take the form of memories since they are either abandoned or quickly destroyed. Nothing remains of these works but two dozen or so images “entombed”—Smithson’s term—in his Instamatic camera. Shuffled among snapshots of other places, they would retain few visual attributes that readily signify “Mexico” to an outsider. Similarly, when Smithson uses the names of cities and the sites of Mayan ruins in his illustrated narrative of this trip, “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan,” it is never to describe their specific qualities but only to indicate his present location on a map. This makes it easy to retrace Smithson’s itinerary but does little to illustrate the particular relevance to Smithson of the places where he got out of the car. The reader must gather associations from other contemporary sources, unraveling relevant coincidences of Mayan myth and the geological and cultural history of Mexico.103 Smithson read history in many directions and on many levels in preparation for his trip to Mexico; he seems to have discriminated between texts on the basis of subject matter and not on the basis of “scientific” validity. Otherwise, he could not have placed two volumes on the history of Latin America—James Churchward’s The
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Lost Continent of Mu and Peter Nehemkis’s Latin America: Myth and Reality—on the same shelf in his library. Smithson’s paperback copy of Churchward’s book is heavily creased and marked; the spine on the Nehemkis volume is not even broken. Perhaps he preferred myth as history to history revealed as myth. His text and images for his essay “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan” eschew local culture and history when both were always readily at hand. In fact, the proximity of contradictory cultural artifacts to the very sites where Smithson laid down his mirrors emphasizes the artist’s deliberate avoidance of these artifacts in his work. Smithson’s camera mostly stares downward at bits of colorful landscapes or hesitantly gazes across them when no one else or any significant landmark is around.104 Other materials in the archive and slides and photographs remaining in Holt’s photo albums of their trip reveal Smithson’s personal interest in contemporary Mexico, including its industry, architecture, and public art, and thus disclose his deliberate excision of these interests from his published account of the trip. When discussing his Fourth Mirror Displacement, which he installed on a beach near Seybaplaya, Smithson relates to the reader what Chalchihiuticue, the Surd of the Sea, said to him at the site: “The true fiction eradicates the false reality.”105 A clue to what Smithson is after lies in the way he places the mirrors and what they reflect. Smithson’s narrative is constantly being interrupted by the voices of various Mayan and Aztec gods. These voices are his primary guides throughout the “Incidents” essay, and, according to Dwan, Smithson even gave her, Holt, and himself a particular god to personify on the trip so that they would experience everything in terms of these gods.106 This way, they could live a “true fiction” amid a “false reality.” Smithson had several models to choose from when developing this fictional mode of experiencing Mexico. In one model, which was represented by a number of texts in his library, the authors read history in terms of myth; in other words, they assumed that certain myths, particularly those dealing with lost continents, were “true fictions,” remnants of the history of a lost primary civilization.107 James Churchward’s The Lost Continent of Mu, a book with a considerable cult following in the 1960s, dispenses with all scholarly apparatus or local evidence to portray every ancient civilization, including the Maya of the Yucatan, as colonies of a master civilization that perished with the explosion of its motherland, the Pacific continent of Mu.108 This task requires immense leaps of logic, but the author is up to them. With footnoted references to “various records,” photographs derived exclusively from the popular press, and all other documentary images rendered by the author himself, Churchward makes assertions that are simultaneously as outrageous
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as they are irrefutable because of the general level on which they are made. Basically he invents a historical past with a few scraps of myth and then shows the reader what this past looked like. When The Lost Continent of Mu is paired with Ignatius Donnelly’s classic 1882 work Atlantis: The Antediluvian World, patterns in the thought processes behind the myth-as-history model emerge.109 Both Donnelly and Churchward search for repetitions of or resemblances between motifs and narratives from diverse civilizations that inevitably depend on broad plot generalizations provided by the authors or on simplifications of the appearances of compared artifacts. These ersatz resemblances then appear to match the authors’ a priori expectations that they derive from shared, original meanings or underlying historical events. The continuous reappearance of these motifs and narratives at numerous times and geographical places proves that the ur-object or originating event that they represent actually existed or happened at one place long ago. These shared repetitions also reveal a collective historical memory of the original object or event, but one that has degenerated over time since each appearance is an ever fainter copy of its source. Such a biological model of history as a process of birth, growth, and decay renders the present as nothing more than a seriously compromised version of what Donnelly and Churchward believed was a great past.110 Neither Churchward nor Donnelly is discerning when establishing the terms of their resemblances between things. They often pair up objects that share only the most superficial formal similarities, such as triangular shapes or names that begin with the same letter (figure 3.32). Form has little independent signifying force in their remakes of history. It is a vessel, the contents of which—a shared historical origin— shapes the form into the likeness of other vessels that contain the same stuff. The result is a history of the replica-mass of one prime. Context gets little respect from these authors, either. The local almost always indicates the global, just as the present exists only as a faint echo of the past. And if their “evidence” is not credible enough, phrases such as “so identical” or “striking resemblance” persuade readers to attribute their resistance to the authors’ comparisons to the poor quality of the reproductions in their texts. Smithson later claimed that his work in Mexico was a “reflection” of these earlier investigations, an “anti-expedition.”111 When traveling in Mexico, Smithson repeated a set of formal practices and ignored the specific circumstances of the culture that surrounded him. But he did allow the voices of the local ancient Mayan gods to direct him in his practice. He wanted to live in that past and hear its unique voice
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FIGURE 3.32 Comparative architectural forms, in Ignatius Donnelly, Atlantis: The Antediluvian World (1882).
and mind. As he had stated a year earlier: “[The present] must instead explore the preand post-historic mind; it must go into the places where remote futures meet remote pasts.”112 In this effort, Smithson echoes John Lloyd Stephens’s aims in traveling to the Yucatan in the mid-nineteenth century.113 Stephens’s goal differed from Donnelly’s or Churchward’s because he believed that the Mayan ruins then buried in the jungles of the Yucatan peninsula were evidence of a unique culture. When Stephens reproduced the same image of a Mayan arch included in Donnelly’s text (see figure 3.32), he used it to argue that the arch was not derived from the Greco-Roman tradition but was a completely different architectural form in terms of its engineering and symbolic function. Smithson based the title of his “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan” essay on the title of Stephens’s 1843, two-volume account of his own travels, Incidents of Travel in Yucatan, and loosely followed Stephens’s travel routes through the Yucatan peninsula. The main influence that Stephens’s text had on Smithson, however, was Stephens’s use of the term “incidents.” Stephens wrote a series of travel books, and he was a well-known travel writer during his lifetime. Although he traveled to and wrote about many parts of the world—Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Central America—the titles of all of his books begin with the same phrase: “Incidents of Travel in. . . . ” In his volumes on the Yucatan, Stephens uses the term “incidents” to
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refer to encounters with the locals, usually difficult ones that momentarily disrupt the flow of his narrative. These incidents are momentary experiences of the present amid lengthy speculations about the past or about culture in general. So the term “incidents” does double duty for Stephens: it links all his travel narratives together as part of a set, regardless of their specific subjects, and it signals disruptions within these travel narratives.114 Smithson devises a similar double function for his nine mirror displacements in “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan.” They are members of a larger set, the mirror displacement work, and each example contains elements that belie a simple characterization of them as more of the same. Smithson makes the tension between these two aspects of the work palpable through the way he arranges the mirrors, takes slides of them, and reproduces the resulting images in Artforum. These three actions are related but distinct aspects of the work that need to be analyzed separately. Also, Smithson’s stated actions and his images of the results of these actions are not equivalent. For example, some of the color slides of the Yucatan displacements contradict his claim that he used the same twelve mirrors at each of the nine sites since, in several of them, more or fewer than this number are visible. In the previous chapter, I focused on Smithson’s activities in Passaic in relation to his written account of these activities. Here, as a sort of corrective, I focus on his published images and how he came to terms with the context of the magazine by viewing it as a sort of nonsite. In creating each of the Yucatan mirror displacements, Smithson arranged nine to thirteen square mirrors in patterns that are consistent with a gridded framework. The edges of the mirrors were roughly parallel to one another, even when wedged into the uneven ashes, sand, or dirt surfaces on the ground or when woven into branches, vines, or undergrowth. The uniform square shape and size of the mirrors also helped to limit the variety of his arrangements. For the published article, Smithson laid out his images of the nine mirror displacements on a single page in rows of three each (figure 3.33). This arrangement also creates a grid to which the uniform square shape of the original slides easily conforms, and in turn, this square grid conforms to the square shape of Artforum. The entire project from the selection of the square mirrors to the choice to publish the article in a square magazine comes together as a process of stacking one set of squares arranged into a grid on top of another, the square being the basic unit or module. When describing the Yucatan mirror displacements, Smithson stated: “There is an attempt to regulate the irrational aspects. So my work is always uncertain,
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but at the same time the uncertainty is arrested where the system breaks down, or where the incapacity comes in. To locate that is even more interesting than a willful, logical position; anybody can do that.”115 Through his consistent use of the square gridded framework, he is able to locate several points where the rational ordering of this framework breaks down. On the magazine page, the uniform white lines created by the intervals between the individual images render the analogous intervals between the mirrors in the images more visible but also more irregular in contrast. The tilt and recession of the individual mirrors reveal the specific conditions of the ground and the chosen angle of the camera at each site, and thus the grid they form is not a flat and crisp one. As Smithson later described the work: “I’m more interested in the terrain dictating the condition of the art. . . . The actual contour of the ground determined the placement of the twelve mirrors.”116 The terrain of the magazine dictated the placement of Smithson’s images on the page so that two terrains are mapped to be superimposed on top of one another by a shared grid, whether designated as a set of contour lines in one place or by the gridded register of a paste-up board in another. Yet like the relationship Smithson establishes between his Alogons or his infra perspectives and their exhibition spaces, the two terrains—image and magazine context— don’t quite fit together because they are maps of very different types and scales and, even more obviously, as Smithson points out in an essay on the uneasy relationship between photographs and text on the pages of art magazines: “Maps within maps are seen where no maps are supposed to be.”117 The same could be said of the mirrors, in a sense, because they were not where they were supposed to be and they disrupted the visual field—“created holes in the ground”—both at the site and on the printed page. The viewing situation was similar to the one created by Smithson’s earlier, enantiomorphic mirror pieces (see figure 1.27). At each site, Smithson situated the mirrors so that they would reflect the sky or the actual light source for the site.118 Because of this arrangement, two different
FIGURE 3.33 (opposite page) (see PLATE 6) Robert Smithson, Nine
planes of the space of the site became visible simultaneously. It is as if Smithson has
Mirror Displacements,
created a fold, crease, or weave in the space to displace the sky onto the ground: “Oh,
in Artforum (September 1969).
for the happy days of pure walls and pure floors. Flatness was nowhere to be found.”
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Later, Smithson also claimed that by situating mirrors in this way, he was “dealing with actual light as opposed to paint. Paint to me is matter, and a covering, rather than light itself.”120 His statement situates the mirror displacements in line with the Earth Windows as nonmalignant surfaces and lines, transparent to the specific conditions of the site, which are unstable and chaotic. Although they are abstract, the mirrored squares “absorb[ing], reflect[ing] the site in a very physical way.”121 This
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abstract transparency demands not only to be seen or seen through but to be read in Barthes’s sense of the term, as a sign “communica[ting] ideas, information or sentiments” about the site, also in a very physical way.122 When discussing what Smithson did with the mirror displacements in Mexico, one depends, as with “The Monuments of Passaic,” on what the artist says took place. The color slides, especially as published in Artforum, provide a different level of experience of the work, once they are no longer seen as documents reflecting what actually took place in Mexico. A viewer looking at any one of the images of the mirror displacements does not see, and does not expect to see, actual reflections. The mirrors in the slides reflect or capture images of the sky or fragments of the landscape that were behind or slightly to the left or right of the photographer as well as images of the ground supporting the mirrors (figure 3.34). In this way, the images in the mirrors and the images that contain these “mirror images” present the terms of a threedimensional space, or at least the back and front or up and down of one, which, although analogous to the space the viewer is occupying, is significantly different because in the slides, these terms are transposed, one on top of another, so that sky and ground or tree and facing bushes exist on the same plane. Smithson has created his own version of the alternating perspective figure here by combining two contradictory images. Instead of overlapping two different images of three-dimensional forms, however, he fits together two different views of three-dimensional space, the ground and sky, and two types of physical and cultural space, Mexico and Artforum. The fact that the images lack figures is beside the point since the three-dimensional terms of the spaces Smithson constructs are collapsed and therefore physically uninhabitable.123 Their collapse cannot be reconciled visually, either, since it does not produce coherent stereoscopic views or even optical mirages. Anthropomorphic spacial concerns are denied, and the cultural specificity of the site is acknowledged, if only as an absence. After describing his perceptions of the contrast between the relatively stable shadows cast by the mirrors and the momentary reflections of butterflies flying over the mirrored surfaces of his third mirror displacement, Smithson concludes: “A scale in terms of ‘time’ rather than ‘space’ took place.”124 This scale depends on a ratio of contrasting continuous durations. The camera collapses the terms of this contrast by arresting all duration, whether slow or rapid, into a single instant. This act renders the process discontinuous—“at least,” Smithson says, “in terms of the record of the process.”125 It becomes specific, not just in terms of being a record but in terms of the way it presents time. The flickering forms on the surfaces of the mirrors are brought to a standstill in a way that they could never be experienced at the site; they indicate
FIGURE 3.34 (see PLATE 7) Robert Smithson, Seventh Mirror Displacement, 1969.
blind spots or “holes in the emulsion,” conditions of photography that have no analogy in human perception. As marks on the mirrors, they now refer to the site the way a postmark on a postcard refers to its point of origin—undeniable but often in contradiction to the postcard’s message or its image. As I stated above, this mark or stamp also connects the sender to a precise place and time and to an indisputable present tense, which then is immediately and necessarily detached from all three, displaced.126 Similarly, the image of the flickering forms disrupts the flow of the sequential or durational travel narrative by insisting on a present that was never experienced as such by anyone but the camera. By the time someone, either Smithson or the reader of Artforum magazine, sees these marks, they already exist in a past that is passed off as present. They are markers of an absent present and an absent place. In the words of Smithson’s contemporary, the novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet: “For of course an elsewhere is no more possible than a formerly.”127 In a 1970 interview, Smithson stated: “For the mirror pieces, there is no audience, yet if the work is strong enough, and photographed properly, it is fed back into a mass distribution situation.”128 The same could be said of the 1969 lunar landing. There was no audience at the site, and yet the event was fed back to billions of people all over the world via live satellite images and later through photographs published in magazines. As already noted, these two events—Smithson’s trip to Mexico and the lunar landing—occurred practically on top of one another, and the time frame for the distribution of their respective photographic images was even tighter, only a matter of weeks. Smithson could not have avoided making comparisons, at least in his mind, and if he didn’t, others were there to make them for him. For example, in a letter dated 17 April 1969, Philip Leider, then editor of Artforum, called Smithson’s attention to the first installment of a two-part article in The New Yorker on preparations for the moon landing.129 Leider notes how the phrases used by the article’s author and NASA’s terminology are “of the kind that characteristically appears quoted at the head of various parts of your essays,” but the article’s descriptions of the types of activities planned are equally striking. The astronauts were to collect rocks from the moon’s surface in what were called “sample-return containers,” plot the collection locations on maps, and document them with photographs. To prepare for executing these relatively simple tasks in conditions of reduced gravity, they repeated them over and over inside NASA’s artificially recreated moon environments. The New Yorker author states that such controlled repetition was necessary because “advancing science must take a second place to testing the performance of the astronauts. . . . Finding out that we are
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able to fill the contingency-sample scoop is just as important as bringing back the contingency sample itself. Once we know that, we can go on to more complex jobs.”130 The fact that the astronauts’ activities resembled Smithson’s activities at his chosen sites led the artist to call the results of the entire Apollo mission “a very expensive nonsite.”131 But the “proper” methods of feeding these activities back into a mass distribution situation differed a great deal. The Apollo 11 mission was tightly choreographed to eliminate or at least contain the unexpected. The layouts of the earliest images of the landing and first moon walk frequently reflect this rationalized choreography by providing a clear narrative sequence of the major events—the descent of the lunar module, its landing on the surface of the moon, the descent of Neil Armstrong from the module, and his first step on the moon. Each significant moment in this narrative is represented by a single image, and these images are arranged in sequential order, from right to left or top to bottom. In some instances, such as in the 8 August issue of Life (figure 3.35), the designer has edited Buzz Aldrin’s 16 millimeter film footage so that only four crucial stages of the descent remain, but the stills retain their status as individual frames of film footage because a continuous heavy black border has been inserted at the top and bottom of the images and thin white strips have been placed in between them to suggest a strip of film. Although many minutes of action have been edited out, the effect
FIGURE 3.35 Illustrations from “Men on the Moon,” Life (8 August 1969).
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is one of continuous action. Smithson, on the other hand, uses a gridded framework to bring his narrative to a standstill. A similar comparison can be made between the indexical qualities of the two sets of images. In many of the lunar photographs, Aldrin and Armstrong use shadows to verify their positions in space and to enhance the narrative. The images in the top register of the page from Life record the descent of the lunar module to the lunar surface. The edge of the module’s window and a shadow it casts on the moon establish continuity for each shot so that the image of the increasingly closer surface is framed by them until in the final image “a landing probe reached down to touch its own shadow on the moon.”132 Even the dust kicked up by the module as it landed signifies this immediacy analogically as a grainy blur on the surface of the image. Instead of suggesting motion or indicating location, Smithson’s analogs of reflection—the flickering marks on the images of the surfaces of his mirrors—suggest dislocation, asymmetry, absence, and a present that has already past. Because of these disparities and the chronological order in which the pictures were taken, Smithson’s image on the cover of Artforum can be viewed as a past tense of the cover of Life. Basically, NASA invented a future and then showed viewers what it looked like, just as Smithson invented a past and then showed the readers of Artforum what it looked like. One comes off as reality emerging out of science fiction, and the other as fiction emerging out of reality. In his 1968 essay “A Museum of Language in the Vicinity of Art,” Smithson wrote: “What the artist seeks is coherence and order—not ‘truth,’ correct statements, or proofs. He seeks the fiction that reality will sooner or later imitate.”133 My comparison of the two covers seems to prove him to be correct. Smithson based this conception of the artist’s practice on what others have described as the “definable specificity of science fiction”—“a literature which explores the range of the possible, as science permits us to envision it.”134 Smithson liked this model because it blurs the distinction between fiction and reality by allowing fantasy to be projected into a potential future that could be realized or that already has been realized in as yet unappreciated ways. He and Mel Bochner delighted in how the images in the 1951 Hayden Planetarium show End of the World illustrate a future in which “the problem of the ‘human figure’ vanishes,” “anthropomorphic concerns are extinct,” and “ ‘nature’ is simulated and turned into ‘handpainted’ photographs of the extreme past or future. . . . History no longer exists.”135 “The Monuments of Passaic” also contains a number of examples of this type of plausible time travel. Mayan hieroglyph writing, as understood by Eric Thompson, provided an analogous model for
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Smithson’s time travels in Mexico. Thompson characterized the Mayan relationship to the passage of time as one of poetic absorption in its rhythmic forward and backward flow: “Like a miser counting his hoard, the Maya priest summed the days that had gone and the days that were to come, stacking them in piles, juggling combinations to learn when the re-entering cycles of time would again pass abreast the turnstiles of the present.”136 Thompson believed that the individual glyphs of Mayan hieroglyphic writing manifested this flow in their arrangement and individual form. Each one was an integer in a cycle and a marker of an actual historical event, and their physical appearance and fairly uniform shapes—which were often carved on individual rectangular stones and used to build architectural elements such as staircases or organized into gridded horizontal registers on these elements—only enhanced Thompson’s image and its formal relationship to Smithson’s mirror arrangements. Thompson’s description of Mayan glyphs also mirrors Smithson’s understanding of monuments as markers that plot out and charge a spatial field with memory but that are at once physically still and yet filled with opportunity for the internal awareness of time.137 To extend the analogy, both monuments and glyphs are “cool” in a McLuhanian sense of the term. This analogy can be extended further to include the types of societies that produced these two cool systems for representing the experience of time by switching discursive tracks from art history, archaeology, and media studies to structural anthropology and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s distinctions between “cold” and “hot” societies—“the former seeking, by the institutions they give themselves, to annul the possible effects of historical factors on their equilibrium and continuity in a quasi-automatic fashion; the latter resolutely internalizing the historical process and making it the moving power of their development.”138 Lévi-Strauss proposes these distinctions as replacements for what he considers to be the usual, clumsy distinction between “ ‘peoples without history’ and others,” in part because the latter expresses a false distinction and a singular understanding of historical process in terms of change. According to Lévi-Strauss, cold societies do not deny the historical process; they admit it as a form without content: “There is indeed a before and an after, but their sole significance lies in reflecting each other.”139 “Our ancestors taught it to us,” and therefore we repeat it. Such a history, states Lévi-Strauss, “presents the paradox of being both disjoined from and conjoined with the present.”140 Ritual expresses these “disjoined” and “conjoined” conditions through an elaborate synchro-diachronic system of procedures that weave the past and present together as a sequence of repetitions and reversals.
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Lévi-Strauss cites the example of the three-tiered rites of the Australian tribes of the Cape York Peninsula. The first category, the rites of control, regulate species or totemic phenomena at the centers established by the ancestors at various points in the tribal territory. According to Lévi-Strauss: The commemorative or historical rites recreate the sacred and beneficial atmosphere of mythical times—the “dream age,” as the Australians call it—mirroring its protagonists and their great deeds. The mourning rites correspond to an inverse procedure: instead of charging living men with the personification of remote ancestors, these rites assure the conversion of men who are no longer living men into ancestors. It can thus be seen that the function of the system of ritual is to overcome and integrate three oppositions: that of diachrony and synchrony; that of the periodic or non-periodic features which either may exhibit; and, finally, within diachrony, that of reversible and irreversible time. For although present and past are theoretically distinct, the historical rites bring the past into the present and the rites of mourning the present into the past, and the two processes are not equivalent: mythical heroes can truly be said to return, for their only reality lies in their personification; but human beings die for good.141 Sometimes ritual objects complete this system by providing physical confirmation of, as Lévi-Strauss states, “the diachronic essence of diachrony at the very heart of synchrony,” and Lévi-Strauss provides the churinga, ritual objects from central Australia, as a particularly potent example. The churinga are objects of stone or wood (figure 3.36) that represent the physical body of a specific ancestor and are passed on, generation after generation, to the living individuals thought to be the reincarnation of this specific ancestor. They are, therefore, “the past materially present and they provide the means of reconciling empirical individuation and mythical confusion.”142 Smithson acknowledges Lévi-Strauss’s description of the synchrodiachronic history practiced by cold societies by opening his “Incidents of MirrorTravel in the Yucatan” with this quotation from The Savage Mind: “The characteristic feature of the savage mind is its timelessness; its object is to grasp the world as both a synchronic and a diachronic totality and the knowledge which draws from it like that afforded of a room by mirrors fixed on opposite walls, which reflect each other (as well as objects in the intervening space) although without being strictly parallel.”143 Smithson’s mirror displacements are reinactments of the savage mind’s room of mirrors. As photographic images, they fold synchronic and diachronic registers of experience together into an absent present tense that is similar to a cold society’s acknowledg-
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FIGURE 3.36 Illustration of Churinga of an Aranda man of the Frog totem, in Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1966).
ment of history as a form without content. As objects, the mirror displacement images are also analogous to the churinga; they are literally “the past materially present.” These analogies, defined in terms of time collapse, are a long way from Smithson’s initial adaptations of the stereoscope’s collapse of space. But he had to defeat the latter and the dominant perceptual paradigm it represented to arrive at the former and a paradigm articulated in terms of structural analysis.
Near the end of Jean-Luc Godard’s 1963 film Les Carabiniers, two soldiers return home from a fictitious postcolonial war—based in part on World War II, the Algerian War, and the war in Vietnam—with a suitcase full of the “deeds” to their booty. These deeds take the form of postcards of monuments and technological achievements of civilizations from all over the world; several of them depict Kublerian primes. The soldiers take countless stacks of these cards from their suitcases and identify them to map out their travels and reconstitute their conquests for the women they returned to, but in the end the soldiers have mistaken the replica-mass for primes. When the sol-
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diers go to claim their booty, they discover that their side has lost, and they are shot by the very men who had enlisted them. They have been sold a bill of goods. They die mistaking apparent conditions for actual ones. Their value was contingent on their current position within a larger political system. As individuals—like the postcards— they are interchangeable and disposable. In The Shape of Time, Kubler makes a correlation between the historian and the astronomer: “both are concerned with appearances noted in the present but occurring in the past.”144 Accordingly, Kubler claims, works of art are like stars: “However fragmentary its condition, any work of art is actually a portion of arrested happening, or an emanation of past time. It is a graph of an activity now stilled, but a graph made visible like an astronomical body, by a light that originated with the activity.”145 Time alters these “signals,” and correspondingly, “the present interpretation of any past event is of course only another stage in the perpetuation of the original impulse.”146 In a roughly contemporary essay, Barthes claims that criticism is “neither a ‘tribute’ to the truth of the past nor to the truth of the ‘other’; it is the ordering of that which is intelligible in our own times.”147 Barthes ties this temporal relativity to structuralist criticism in particular and to the relative transparence of literary texts— their potential to be endlessly available to any critical language at any time.148 Racine’s plays were such texts for Barthes: “It is ultimately his very transparence that makes Racine a veritable commonplace of our literature, the critical object at zero degree, a site empty but eternally open to signification.”149 Godard’s film and Kubler’s text depart from the assumption that individuals and objects are complete and self-sufficient entities. One of them depicts such assumptions as absurd, if not fatal; the other proffers an alternative approach in which historians employ objects to “transpose, reduce, compose, and color a facsimile which describes the shape of time.”150 The art object becomes part of a larger system and is read in terms of it. As already noted, Smithson blamed critical focus on the art object for the artist’s estrangement from his own “time.” Such a focus also obscured the work of art’s “time” since “every object, if it is art, is charged with the rush of time even though it is static, but all of this depends on the viewer.”151 Barthes’s characterization of Racine’s work as “the critical object at zero degree, a site empty but eternally open to signification,” suggested a possible alternative approach. In a short text, written around 1968, Smithson uses Barthes’s criteria to delineate the types of sites in which he has attempted “to locate ‘structural’ meanings.”152 Each of his readings is, according to Smithson, “apparent rather than actual, or you might say ‘reconstructed appearances.’ ”153 His chosen sites—the urban apart-
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ment, the suburban house, the artist’s studio or loft, the urban office building, the art gallery, the modern art museum, and industrial sites, including the air terminal— manifest their transparency by sustaining a number of functions and mythological readings. This is particularly true of “the artist’s studio or loft,” since it not only signifies “a mutation of the urban apartment” or “implies some sort of handicraft,” but also suggests that “the artist is tending to a more public or corporate outlook.”154 The two generating points of all mapnets are the poles. They are cartography’s sites at zero degree. In his 1970 drawing A Surd View for an Afternoon (figure 3.37), Smithson labels the central horizontal axis of a sheet of polar coordinate paper “perception at the zero degree” and, by situating the air terminal at its center, provides a diagram that places cartography, the air terminal, and, by extension, structuralism at the center of his artistic practice. In a 1969 interview, he uses the phrase “site at zero degree” to describe his site selection process: “The sites show the effect of time, sort of a sinking into timelessness. When I get to a site that strikes the kind of timeless chord, I use it. The site selection is by chance. There is no willful choice. A site at zero degree, where the material strikes the mind, where absences become apparent, appeals to me, where the disintegrating of space and time seems very apparent. Sort of an end of selfhood . . . the ego vanishes for awhile.”155 Such claims for personal neutrality, even absence in the presence of such “zero degree” sites, echo Barthes’s delineations of a “zero degree writing”: “writing at the zero degree is basically in the indicative mood, or if you like, amodal; it would be accurate to say that it is a journalist’s writing; if it were not precisely the case that journalism develops, in general, optative or imperative (that is emotive) forms. The new neutral writing takes its place in the midst of all those ejaculations and judgments, without becoming involved in any of them; it consists precisely in their absence.”156 Godard’s soldiers occupy such a timeless landscape—neither urban nor suburban, just on the fringe of something, and devoid of landmarks of any kind—before they are called away to war. The landscape they travel through while at war is still the French countryside and the people they encounter invariably speak French, regardless of the supposedly international scope of the soldiers’ campaigns.157 The postcards and archival film clips of tanks and bombers provide the soldiers and the film audience with the necessary exoticism and historical “authenticity,” but only the soldiers confuse these simulacra for something real. They are too involved and therefore blind to the circumstances of their situation, whereas Godard incites the audience to disassociate from the soldiers’ responses to see the politics and structure of the situation more clearly. Virginia Dwan identified Godard’s
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Les Carabiniers as a “pivotal film” for Smithson that he hoped to emulate in his working process.158 However, Smithson manipulates Godard’s critique, as he did Kubler’s, to suit his own artistic purposes. His “postcards”—the still and empty souvenirs of the monuments of Passaic or the “incidents of mirror-travel”—are anti-postcards. They and their status as independent art objects are radically diminished and easily disposable. Yet as residue of activities now stilled, they continue to provide the viewer with a facsimile of time. Smithson uses rows of mirrors and other gridded frameworks—mapnets, satellite photography, architectural modules, and the layout of the art magazine—as a structuralist. The sites he selects, such as the air terminal or the Yucatan peninsula, may appear to vanish into these abstract frameworks of “perpetual sameness,” yet the frameworks also allow these sites to signify in new ways.159 They are endlessly transparent to new readings. “Yucatan is elsewhere,” Smithson’s last line admits, but in a 1970 interview Smithson and Wheeler have a final exchange concerning the significance of this phrase and Smithson’s goals in all of his travel work: Smithson: [new discoveries in physics about anti-matter] . . . raises the question of whether after all our corner of the universe is representative of the entire potentialities that may exist elsewhere. Elsewhere. That’s how the Yucatan runs. The Yucatan
FIGURE 3.37 (opposite page)
is elsewhere, so it’s like a kind of anti-Yucatan.
Robert Smithson, A Surd View for
Wheeler: That was a very good ending on that, cause it doesn’t end anything. Like
an Afternoon, 1970.
all of a sudden you step, if you want to, off into whatever goes elsewhere. And that doesn’t even have to be the Yucatan at that point.160 Smithson offers an absence, but one that is open-ended. Every site stands empty but “eternally open to signification.” One needs only to reconstitute it within the terms of a present situation.
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DIRT AS DISORDER The Freudian dualism prevents us from positing any break with nature, and consequently precludes the notion of a return to nature; and since the failure to posit a break with nature entails the necessity of projecting man’s sickness back into nature, a return to nature, even if it were possible, would not be a return to health. norman o. brown, LIFE AGAINST DEATH If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place. This is a very suggestive approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. mary douglas, PURITY AND DANGER Modern day ecologists with a metaphysical turn of mind still see the operations of industry as Satan’s work. The image of the lost paradise garden leaves one without a solid dialectic, and causes one to suffer an ecological despair. Nature, like a person, is not one-sided. robert smithson, “frederick law olmsted and the dialectical landscape”
4
FIGURE 4.1 Robert Smithson, Partially Buried Woodshed, 1970.
Buried Architecture Sometime near the end of 1969, Smithson received an invitation to participate in Kent State University’s Annual Creative Arts Festival. The students requested that he and four other guests give a public lecture or demonstration, appear on a panel, and visit classes. The stated aim of these events was “to set up a new kind of communication between students, teachers (on the insides of the great citadels) and you artists (on the outside depending on how you look at it).”1 Initially, Smithson proposed building a mudflow, a project that he had proposed for several previous venues but that in each case had proved either impractical or too environmentally invasive.2 At Kent State, low temperatures prevented him once again from executing the mudflow, so he turned to another project he had been considering for some time—burying a building. He located a site on the periphery of the campus—an abandoned farm with a derelict woodshed that was used to store dirt, gravel, and firewood.3 On 22 January 1970, a building contractor hired by Smithson backhoed dirt from a campus construction site onto the shed until its central beam cracked. It took twenty truckloads. Smithson then signed a statement donating the work and a forty-five-foot area surrounding it to the University. As part of the gift, the University’s Art Department had to accept the work as permanent and agree not to alter it or remove anything from it or from the fortyfive-foot surrounding area, although Smithson considered natural alterations and weathering to be part of the work.4 He called the work Partially Buried Woodshed. Although he documented the process of making Partially Buried Woodshed, Smithson claimed, as he did about his contemporary flows and pours of asphalt, concrete, or glue, that he was interested in this aspect of the work only insofar as it was absorbed into the experience of the work afterward. When asked about the significance of Asphalt Rundown, he stated: “You see, it’s ultimately what’s done after the truck pulls away.”5 What all of these works do “after the truck pulls away” is collapse. Partially Buried Woodshed incorporates two interdependent experiences of collapse. The first, embodied in the cracked central beam, was a direct result of the process of loading dirt onto the woodshed and the point at which this process was suspended. The crack marked the moment when the shed’s wooden framework began to give way under the accumulated weight of the dirt—when the tension between the two materials was at its height but before these two materials totally collapsed into one another. It rendered this limit or boundary visible, tangible, and physical. In a series of drawings (figure 4.1), Smithson highlighted the two components of this suspended condition—woodshed and dirt. In one of the drawings he indicates the
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location and look of the cracked beam through a caption, arrows, and two images of the beam—one inside the shed and the other a diagram outside the shed. In a caption to another drawing in the series, he states “Pile on roof till it shows signs of breaking.” The cracked beam is one of these signs. The cracked beam suspends other pairs of terms in close proximity as well—the inside and outside of the shed and an awareness of gravity’s effects versus gravity’s physical manifestation, which is arrested at a precarious point. A contemporary viewer of the work might have anticipated what would happen next but couldn’t know when or if a sudden total collapse would occur or even if it was safe to speculate or investigate. As already discussed, Smithson was fond of creating “enantiomorphic situations” to reveal the blind spots embedded within a number of descriptive models of perception. His Alogons, infra perspectives, and most notably his Enantiomorphic Chambers disrupt facile relationships between thought and perception, and his aerial works, nonsites, and mirror displacements open up gaps in or reveal limitations to mental and perceptual experiences of time and space. In all of these cases the tension produced once these limits were revealed was primarily conceptual; the mind raced to fill the gaps by repressing one term or by collapsing the two terms together. The physical and psychological tensions were minimal and safely contained by the institutional frame, whether gallery, museum, or magazine. Partially Buried Woodshed created a situation of real physical danger and, as a consequence, some physical and psychological discomfort. The boundaries or limits it revealed and pressed were potentially catastrophic or directly referred to catastrophic situations. The second experience of collapse generated by Partially Buried Woodshed, although implicit in the first, was less immediately perceptible—the slow inevitable slide of the work into physical dissolution. While at Kent State, Smithson referred to this situation as the “built-in breakability” of the work.6 The beam crack functioned as a marker or point of no return in this de-structive process as well; once it appeared, the act of destruction and its consequences could not be undone or reversed. Eventually this crack would succumb to the forces that created it, and the two terms it suspended would collapse into each other, just as the black and white sand turned to grey when a child ran them together in Smithson’s hypothetical sand box in “The Monuments of Passaic.” In summing up his sand box analogy, Smithson speculates that “if we filmed such an experiment we could prove the reversibility of eternity by showing the film backwards,” but then concedes that eventually the film itself would suffer the same entropic fate of irreversible physical dissolution.7 He
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offered no such escape, however temporary, for the Partially Buried Woodshed, and nothing about its situation was hypothetical. Entropy will—and does—prevail.8 The crack in the woodshed’s central beam produces a physical cut or slice in time that clearly articulates the boundary between before and after at the very point of no return. In this sense, it materializes time as a marker of a fixed present tense just as it signifies a temporal—and physical—unraveling. The situation is analogous to the contrasting durations in Smithson’s Yucatan mirror displacement photographs, except in the Partially Buried Woodshed both temporalities—absent present (here a form of a past tense) and present—were visible at the site, not just in images, at least for as long as the woodshed remained standing. The physical presence of both temporalities heightens an awareness of the continuous physical presence of entropy; it is not just a hypothetical concept or a fixed image. And once its destructive presence is indicated and marked, one realizes that it is always already present in every situation—collapsing or pulling things apart as soon as “the truck pulls away.” In a 1971 interview, Smithson was asked about his attitude toward such changes in his work over time. He responded at length on the relationships between physicality, entropy, and the disintegration of structures: The main objective is to make something massive and physical enough so that it can interact with those things [climate and its changes] and go through all kinds of modifications. If the work has sufficient physicality, any kind of natural change would tend to enhance the work. Geology has its own kind of entropy, that has to do with sediment mixtures. Sediment plays a part in my work. Unlike Buckminster Fuller, I’m interested in collaborating with entropy. Some day I could like to compile all the different entropies. All the classifications would lose their grids. Lévi-Strauss had a good insight, he suggested we change the study of anthropology into “entropology.” It would be a study that devotes itself to the process of disintegration in highly developed structures. After all, wreckage is often more interesting than structure. At least, not as depressing as Dymaxion domes. Utopian saviors we can do without.9 Collapse also can be figured in terms of relative scale; one can compress— or expand—things or experiences indefinitely as long as they share a common reference point. For example, relative scale can be transposed onto the inside/outside duality since, as Smithson notes, “The Earth is an island. Everything is confined, whether it is indoors or outdoors. It is the degree of awareness of the ratio between the two.”10 Smithson’s site/nonsite configuration works in an analogous way because
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each of its terms share the earth as a common point of reference. The site is a largescale, physical fraction of it, and the nonsite is a compressed, cartographic abstraction or model of this physical fraction. Both are minuscule in relation to the scale of the earth, but their relative scale helps the mind to grasp their vast, shared referent.11 In constructing Partially Buried Woodshed, Smithson brought the two terms of the site/nonsite configuration and their relative scales into much closer proximity, to the point where they almost collapse into one another. The work’s “abstract model”—in this case, the grid of architectural construction—is a found physical structure—the post and lintel construction of the woodshed. This structure is synonymous with the site and not an abstract projection of it. In addition, Smithson reverses the relative terms of containment so that the material gathered—the dirt, which the abstract model usually contains in the gallery—now contains the model or framework and dictates its limits at the site: “where there is dirt there is system.” Smithson’s Partially Buried Woodshed was a demonstration of sorts but not of a preconceived idea or set of actions. According to the artist, such a procedure would imply an ideal situation—the resulting work being some sort of representation or imperfect version of this preconceived situation. There would be no danger, no surprises, and the work itself would be a mere afterthought, analogous to the activities of astronauts on the moon or of most conceptual artists.12 What he stated concerning his Enantiomorphic Chambers—that it “in a sense establishes a certain kind of point of departure not so much toward the idealistic notion of perception, but all the different breakdowns within perception, so that’s what I’m interested in”—holds for his Partially Buried Woodshed as well. It too “zero[es] in on those aspects of mental experience that somehow coincide with the physical world.”13 It accomplishes this by functioning as a model of a number of material conditions in the world; as a model, it renders these conditions perceptible as mental, physical, and emotional experiences. In The Savage Mind, Claude Lévi-Strauss suggests that the small-scale model or miniature might be the universal type for the work of art since almost all works of art are reductions in terms of scale, dimensionality, or number of the senses they address.14 Their reduction makes the object or experience to be reproduced seem, as a whole, less formidable, and, according to Lévi-Strauss, “this quantitative transposition extends and diversifies our power over a homologue of the thing, and by means of it the latter can be grasped, assessed and apprehended at a glance.”15 This homologue is necessarily man-made and therefore not a passive projection or purely a conceptual abstraction; it constitutes a real experiment with the thing on a
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metaphorical level. “In other words,” Lévi-Strauss states, “the intrinsic value of the small-scale model is that it compensates for the renunciation of sensible dimensions by the acquisition of intelligible dimensions.”16 Lévi-Strauss’s definition of a work of art is similar to Barthes’s simulacrum of the object or Smithson’s own version of the latter, his coded environment, in its effect; all three are tangible reiterations of an object with “intellect added.”17 In an interview conducted one month before he buried the woodshed, Smithson indirectly refers to Lévi-Strauss’s notion of art as a miniature: “Every art is really a miniature and when the earth itself becomes a miniature, and you can reverse it. You can look at a grain of sand as a gigantic boulder; it’s just how you want to view it in terms of your scale sense. And that is why scale is one of the key issues, in terms of art.”18 Finally, Lévi-Strauss sees the artistic process as “a nicely balanced synthesis of one or more artificial and natural structures and one or more natural and social events. The aesthetic emotion is the result of this union between the structural order and the order of events, which is brought about within a thing created by man and so also in effect by the observer who discovers the possibility of such a union through the work of art.”19 The crack in the beam signifies such a union between a structural order and the order of events on a scale that is both large enough and small enough to be materially and visually intelligible. The object that Smithson represents in miniature in his Partially Buried Woodshed is the mine. Mines, after all, are buried buildings or three-dimensional structural grids. Smithson merely reverses the terms of construction, just as he did on a smaller scale in his Cayuga Salt Mine Project a year earlier for Earth Art at Cornell University.20 In the earlier project, Smithson transformed a mine, his “first underground site,” into an exhibition site by setting up a series of mirror displacements within its tunnels. He then installed the mirrors, salt gathered from the mine, and photographs of the displacements in the university’s museum. The salt shored up the mirrors at both sites (figure 4.2), just as the dirt pressed and contained the wooden structure of Partially Buried Woodshed. Neither functioned solely as containers or frameworks; they articulated tenuous physical limits. One of Smithson’s archival photographs of a nineteenth-century print entitled Mining on the Comstock illustrates the formal terms of this reversal (figure 4.3). The print depicts a mine in cross-section so that its gridded wooden infrastructure, nestled in the empty spaces carved out by the miners and supporting the surrounding rock surfaces left to be excavated, is visible. This infrastructure resembles some of the gridded geometric frameworks of Smithson’s nonsites and the cartographic frameworks on which many of their designs are based. In
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FIGURE 4.2 Robert Smithson, Eight-Part Piece (Cayuga Salt Mine Project), 1969.
an interview with Dennis Wheeler, Smithson seems to be describing this mining image or one very much like it: Smithson: It was just a matter of going to where the ore was, there was no preconceived idea of where the ore was, yet somehow they found a way to get to it. But it’s rather a crazy kind of grid situation instead of going . . . look at this, these center shafts coming down getting to this and . . . Wheeler: Getting to the center of what they were after. Smithson: And then the branching off aspect, again, everything can be read in terms of that. This calculus, this visual experience and physical evidence.21 Smithson describes the process of discovery and then of reaching limits, as represented by the mine, as “imaginative” rather than logical: “You are going toward that particular material that you have decided that you need, the resource, yet how you get there is not based on any preconceived tautological logic, otherwise like what you’d have is like the perfect mountain. . . . And this is the difference, this is the way that I think. Where this is [what] I would call the conceptual fallacy, where physical reality
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isn’t like that.”22 Smithson uses the term “imaginative” in an unorthodox manner; he means it to fold together the mental processes of imagining and imaging with experiences of the real. He inverts the structure of logic so that the search becomes real, physical, “more dangerous and tenuous,” and “genuinely new.”23 The miner’s search and the mine’s conditions balance the real and the hypothetical or the real and the abstract, just as the crumbling walls, even though they are shored up by the wooden infrastructure, continue to break down, from the force of the miner’s pickax, from the much slower process of geological erosion, or from the mine’s sudden, catastrophic collapse due to the relentless pull of gravity. The grid maintains a fragile boundary that suspends the collapse of the mine and marks a temporary edge of discovery. Smithson concludes: “It’s admitting to, like, most of our abstractions are hypothetical. Our mapping is hypothetical, because we have to make an outline. We have to outline the continents, the land masses, and yet when you get into the actual land masses, then you find where is the edge of this. . . . and there’s always the temptation to want to simplify this.”24 But this edge, whether a shoreline or a mountain contour line, is always subtly shifting and eroding the abstraction. Both the miner and the viewer of Partially Buried Woodshed experience the edges or framework and what they contain as
FIGURE 4.3 T. L. Dawes, Mining on the Comstock, 1876.
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real, even though the boundary between them is always somewhat precarious and in the process of eroding. Lewis Mumford calls mining “un-building” or “Abbau” in his 1961 text The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects. He claims that the mine, along with the factory and the railroad, was one of the generating agents of the new city or what he calls “Coketown.”25 Mining’s “slavish routine, whose labor was an intentional punishment for criminals, became the normal environment of the new industrial worker,” and the railroad extended its un-building process into almost every industrialized community by the third quarter of the nineteenth century.26 Mumford elaborates: Few of us correctly evaluate the destructive imagery that the mine carried into every department of activity, sanctioning the anti-vital and the anti-organic. Before the nineteenth century the mine had, quantitatively speaking, only a subordinate part in man’s industrial life. By the middle of the century it had come to underlie every part of it. And the spread of mining was accompanied by a general loss of form throughout society: a degradation of the landscape and a no less brutal disordering of the communal environment. Agriculture creates a balance between wild nature and man’s social needs. . . . The process of mining, on the other hand, is destructive: the immediate product of the mine is disorganized and inorganic; and what is once taken out of the quarry or the pithead cannot be replaced.27 Eventually, Mumford argues, this un-building began to spread to the urban environment in the form of the “underground city ideal” of bundling all services together and burying them underground in a network of tunnels: “As one should expect of a regime whose key inventions came out of the mine, the tunnel and the subway were its unique contributions to urban form; and not uncharacteristically, both these utilities were direct derivatives of war, first in the ancient city, and later in the elaborate sapping and mining necessary to reduce the baroque fortification. Though the surface forms of Coketown’s transportation and shelter have been widely replaced, its underground network has prospered and proliferated.”28 This network provided a new kind of urban environment and life, based on an extension and normalization of the conditions initially forced on the miner. Once accepted, the conditions of this underground environment—mechanically produced and controlled light and ventilation—emerged from the underground and increasingly dictated the design of build-
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ings erected above ground as well, and so, according to Mumford, defeated art at every point.29 As we have seen, Smithson was able to make a lot of art out of a similar conceptual model of the metropolis—the interpenetration and mirroring of a crystalline structure shared by suburban New Jerse