Rethinking the BSE Crisis
Louise Cummings
Rethinking the BSE Crisis A Study of Scientific Reasoning under Uncertainty
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Prof. Louise Cummings School of Arts and Humanities Nottingham Trent University Clifton Campus Clifton Lane NG11 8NS Nottingham United Kingdom
[email protected]
ISBN 978-90-481-9503-9 e-ISBN 978-90-481-9504-6 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9504-6 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010932529 © Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2010 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Cover picture: Cow on a Bun © Corbis #12759508/Fotolia Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
In fond memory of my grandmother Ruby Stewart Who taught me to value learning
Preface
Uncertainty is a well trodden area of intellectual inquiry. Whether we are concerned with the philosophical dimensions of this concept or the psychological strategies that human agents use to cope with uncertainty, this is not a notion that investigators can readily ignore. This statement is even more apt in the case of scientific inquiry where sophisticated bodies of knowledge notwithstanding, uncertainty can appear as an insurmountable obstruction to further progress on a scientific issue or question. Uncertainty, and scientific responses to it, is the overriding theme of this book. Yet, the context is a more specific one than scientific inquiry in general. For the aim is to examine novel modes of reasoning that are only in evidence under conditions of extreme uncertainty and then only when combined with certain practical imperatives for action. To this end, I will examine the reasoning of scientists who are charged with understanding and containing a newly emerging infectious disease. The disease in question is bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Although I have selected BSE for this study, I could have chosen with equal legitimacy any one of a number of other infectious diseases that have challenged scientists in recent years. These diseases include HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian and swine influenzas. What all these diseases have in common is the pressing demand for effective containment in the absence of scientific knowledge of the pathogens involved and their routes of transmission. However, there is also a compelling reason to make BSE the focus of investigation. The UK’s BSE epidemic has been the subject of a public inquiry which was conducted over a three-year period between 1998 and 2000. The team in charge of this inquiry was headed by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. The Inquiry Report, which was published in October 2000 and examined all matters relating to BSE up to March 1996, represents the most extensive record of any human or animal health phenomenon in recent years. The report charts in minute detail every decision and action that was taken in relation to BSE. Importantly for this study, it provides an exhaustive account of the work of each of the scientific advisory committees that were established to provide advice to successive British governments on the handling of BSE. In short, this report is an invaluable resource for any investigator wanting to study the reasoning of scientists during what has been a significant episode in the public
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health of the UK. Certainly, no comparable document exists in relation to any of the aforementioned diseases. Although the issues that I will discuss relate to BSE, the lessons from this study move beyond this single infectious disease. At the heart of this investigation is the attempt to conceptualise certain traditional informal fallacies as reasoning strategies that can facilitate scientific inquiry under conditions of uncertainty. This book is thus a contribution to the theoretical study of the fallacies. Yet, this is a contribution with a distinctive twist. For while there is nothing new in the idea that fallacies can have non-fallacious variants in certain contexts of use, the novelty of the current approach rests in presenting the fallacies as forms of argument that are specially adapted to conditions of uncertainty. Quite apart from being fallacious, these arguments are a key component of a cognitive rationality that has evolved to deal with adverse epistemic conditions such as those that confront scientists in the early stages of scientific inquiry. In achieving a significant reconfiguration of the fallacies, I am also making a contribution to epidemiology, the branch of science that identifies and tracks newly emerging infectious diseases. One cannot go far in epidemiological literature, or at least in the more critical aspects of this literature, without realising that there are calls from within epidemiology for investigators to engage with new modes of reasoning in contexts of uncertainty. This book proposes to take these calls seriously but also to move beyond them in a significant way. For the model of reasoning that I will advance challenges the dominance of deductive and inductive frameworks in epidemic modelling. The emphasis in this book on new modes of reasoning that eschew deduction and induction as the only reasoning frameworks of relevance to epidemiology is the second enduring lesson of this study. Nottingham, UK
Louise Cummings
Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of the following people: Melania Ruiz of Springer for her receptive response to my proposal of this book; Judith Heaney for her careful preparation of the bibliography and diagrams; Louise Crane and Laura Pastorelli of the Wellcome Trust for their provision of photographs; Chris Mills, Art and Design, Nottingham Trent University for his work on images; Maurice Bardsley and Heather Hulse of the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Weybridge, England for their help in locating images and staff at the Boots and Clifton libraries of Nottingham Trent University for their assistance in obtaining literature. The contribution of each of these individuals to this book has been invaluable. Several images and photographs appear in the following pages. They have been provided by the following individuals and agencies: D. Carleton Gajdusek/Wellcome Images; Professor Sebastian Brandner, Institute of Neurology, London; Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Weybridge, England; Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.; Dr Jason C. Bartz, Creighton University, Nebraska; Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources; Dr Kurt VerCauteren, National Wildlife Research Center, Colorado; Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, Colorado State University; Kerry Mower, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and the US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). I owe a huge debt of gratitude to each of these individuals and agencies. Finally, I have been supported in this endeavour by family members and friends who are too numerous to mention individually. I am grateful to them for their kind words of encouragement during my many months of writing.
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Contents
1 BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 1.2.1 Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease . . . . . 1.2.2 Kuru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Gerstmann-Sträussler Syndrome . . 1.2.4 Scrapie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.5 Transmissible Mink Encepalopathy . 1.2.6 Chronic Wasting Disease . . . . . . 1.3 The BSE Knowledge Problem . . . . . . . 1.3.1 The Knowledge Problem Exposed . 1.3.2 The Knowledge Problem Bridged .
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2 The Scientific Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Current Paradigm in Epidemiology . . . . . 2.2.1 Theoretical Development in Epidemiology 2.2.2 Epidemiology and Other Disciplines . . . 2.2.3 Reasoning and Epidemiology . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Spatiotemporal Factors and Epidemiology 2.3 Early Epidemiological Investigations . . . . . . .
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3 Arguing Through Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Presumption and Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Feature 1: Presumptions Display an Orientation to Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Feature 2: Presumptions Exhibit Rational Justification 3.2.3 Feature 3: Presumptions are Inherently Defeasible . . 3.2.4 Feature 4: Presumptions Display Context Sensitivity . 3.2.5 Feature 5: Presumptions Have a Low-Grade Epistemic Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Presumption and Uncertainty Management . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Presumption, Reasoning and Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4 Good Arguments During the BSE Inquiry 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Early Years: 1986–1989 . . . . . 4.2.1 Argument from Analogy . . . 4.2.2 Argument from Ignorance . . . 4.2.3 Question-Begging Argument . 4.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contents
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5 The Unravelling of an Argumentative Strategy . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Middle Years: 1989–1994 . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Argument from Analogy . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Argument from Ignorance . . . . . . . 5.2.3 False Attribution of a Part to a Whole 5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6 An Unchallengeable Scientific Consensus . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The Final Years: 1994–1996 . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Argument from Analogy . . . . . 6.2.2 Argument from Ignorance . . . . . 6.2.3 Arguing to the Wrong Conclusion 6.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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7 Political and Commercial Interests in the BSE Inquiry . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Reasoning and Non-scientific Interests in the BSE Inquiry . 7.2.1 Argument from Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Argument Against the Person . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 Argument from Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8 Learning the Lessons of the BSE Crisis . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 A Model of Reasoning in Scientific Inquiry . . . . . 8.2.1 A Model of Reasoning in Early Inquiry . . . 8.2.2 A Model of Reasoning in Middle Inquiry . . . 8.2.3 A Model of Reasoning in Late Inquiry . . . . 8.3 The Model, Risk Analysis and Public Health Science 8.3.1 The Precautionary Principle . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.2 As Low As Reasonably Practicable . . . . . . 8.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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List of Figures
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Kuru victims at Kuru Research Centre, Papua New Guinea, late 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A boy from the Fore tribe, Papua New Guinea . . . . . . . . Victims of kuru, Papua New Guinea, c1950s . . . . . . . . . A young boy from the Fore tribe in Papua New Guinea . . . Deposition of abnormal prion protein . . . . . . . . . . . . A sheep with scrapie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stellate prion protein deposits in sheep . . . . . . . . . . . . Mink affected with encephalopathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . A haematoxylin and eosin section of the thalamus of mink at the stage of clinical disease with TME . . . . . . . . . . A CWD positive whitetail deer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A CWD positive elk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A section from the solitary tract of the brainstem . . . . . . Tonsillar biopsies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BSE positive cows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BSE positive-neuropil vacuolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scrapie-associated fibril . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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List of Diagrams
2.1 4.1 8.1
Reconstruction of the arguments linking BSE to scrapie . . . . . . . Circle in the reasoning of the Tyrrell Consultative Committee on research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A model of scientific reasoning under uncertainty . . . . . . . . . .
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Chapter 1
BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
1.1 Introduction In 1986, the UK’s scientific community was confronted with the emergence of a new and invariably fatal brain disease in cattle. Diagnosed as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), this disease joined a group of pre-existing pathologies called the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). TSEs were known to affect a wide range of mammalian vertebrates, including humans. Yet, their study prior to 1986 had occupied something of a twilight zone between veterinary science and medicine. The only apparent implications of TSEs for human health were cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and the occurrence in the 1950s of a TSE called kuru in the remote Fore tribe of New Guinea. The emergence of BSE in the UK’s national herd thus served to refocus scientific attention on this devastating group of diseases. Although no TSE had previously been identified in cattle, spongiform encephalopathies were nonetheless familiar to farmers and veterinarians through the long-standing presence of scrapie in sheep populations in the UK and elsewhere. Scrapie was also one of the most extensively investigated TSEs with experimental studies of the disease initiated in earnest some decades earlier. Here, it seemed, was a template for how BSE would behave in cattle. In this chapter, I will examine what was known about human and animal TSEs when BSE first emerged in British cattle. This knowledge base had a profound influence on the reasoning of scientists whose task it was to understand and contain this new disease. Certainly, it provided scientists with working hypotheses that were to shape scientific advice to government ministers as well as health pronouncements to the public at all stages of the BSE epidemic. In examining this knowledge base, I will be concerned to establish if its full epistemic potential was exploited by scientists or if certain aspects of this knowledge were allowed to unduly influence scientific thinking about BSE. Of course, in addressing questions about BSE, scientists were compelled to employ reasoning strategies that took them beyond the comfortable confines of what was certain and known about TSEs. Coping with uncertainty was thus a major part of the challenge that BSE presented to scientists. Much will be said in subsequent chapters about the ways in which BSE scientists
L. Cummings, Rethinking the BSE Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9504-6_1, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
addressed this uncertainty. For my purposes in this chapter, however, I will assess the extent to which the scientific knowledge base about TSEs contributed to that uncertainty.
1.2 Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies By 1986, several human and animal TSEs had been identified by scientific researchers. These diseases included the human TSEs Gerstmann-Sträussler syndrome, kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.1 The animal TSEs that had been identified included scrapie in sheep and goats, chronic wasting disease in wild deer in North America and transmissible mink encephalopathy. Despite extensive investigation of at least some of these TSEs by 1986, there was still considerable scientific uncertainty about the type of pathogen that was responsible for these diseases. This uncertainty was clearly conveyed in a 1982 article about the scrapie agent by Stanley Prusiner. Prusiner coined the term ‘prion’ (pronounced pree-on) to refer to a proteinaceous infectious particle that he believed was the pathogen responsible for scrapie. Prusiner’s work was to earn him the 1997 Nobel Prize in Medicine. Yet, the chemical structure of this extraordinarily resistant particle2 was still not established in 1982. Specifically, the results of Prusiner’s study indicated that the scrapie agent lacked nucleic acid found in other types of pathogen.3 But, at the same time, postulating the existence of a protein that was devoid of nucleic acid was ‘clearly heretical’.4 Moreover, the absence of a nucleic acid in the scrapie agent suggested that some novel mechanism was needed to explain the replication of prions.5 By the time BSE emerged in British cattle, Prusiner’s prion hypothesis was beginning to gain acceptance. However, as is clear from scientific articles that were published in 1986 and later, investigators still subscribed to the view that a ‘slow’ or ‘unconventional’ virus was responsible for diseases such as scrapie.6 We will return to the issue of what scientists knew about the pathogen responsible for TSEs in later sections. In the meantime, we will consider the state of knowledge of TSEs that existed in 1986.
1.2.1 Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease By 1986, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) had already been extensively discussed in the scientific literature. Epidemiological studies revealed that CJD had an estimated prevalence rate of approximately 1 per one million population (Tsuji and Kuroiwa 1983). Annual incidence for England and Wales for the periods 1964–1973 and 1970–1979 was 0.09 cases per million (Matthews 1975) and 0.3 cases per million (Will et al. 1986), respectively. Tsuji and Kuroiwa (1983) obtained an annual incidence in Japan of 0.19 per one million population. The disease was generally thought to affect males and females with approximately equal frequency (Brown et al. 1986; Baron et al. 1986; Cathala et al. 1980). However, one study did report an unexpected excess of female cases (Will et al. 1986). CJD typically affects
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individuals in the sixth and seventh decades of life. Brown et al. (1986) reported a mean age of 61.5 years in their study of 230 patients with the disease. The most frequent age at onset in 124 consecutive cases of CJD in France was 60–64 years (Brown et al. 1979a). The three subjects with CJD studied by Mitrová et al. (1978) had a mean age at onset of 52.3 years. Haltia et al. (1979) reported a lower mean age at onset (52 years) in a Finnish family with 9 cases of the disease in three generations. Masters et al. (1981a) found that the onset of disease in familial cases is significantly earlier than in sporadic cases. Cases of CJD have also been reported in adolescents (Brown et al. 1985; Monreal et al. 1981). There is some evidence that certain ethnic groups may be disproportionately affected by CJD. Baron et al. (1986) found that Mediterranean Jews accounted for one-third of cases of CJD in continental France between 1968 and 1982 with Tunisian Jews constituting two-thirds of this ethnic group (see also Cathala et al. 1985). Neugut et al. (1979) found statistically significant clustering of CJD within Libyan-born Israeli families. Space-time clustering of cases has been reported in some studies (Matthews 1975; Mayer et al. 1978) but is not substantiated by other studies (Will et al. 1986; Masters et al. 1979; Brown et al. 1979b). There are three types of CJD: sporadic, familial and iatrogenic CJD. (A new variant of CJD, that is related to exposure to BSE, was not identified until 1996.) Sporadic CJD is the most common form of the disease, with the familial form accounting for 4–8% (Brown et al. 1986), 11.5% (Baron et al. 1986), 15% (Masters et al. 1979) and 45% (Gálvez et al. 1983) of cases in epidemiological studies. In familial cases, the pattern of inheritance appears to be autosomal dominant (Baron et al. 1986; Gálvez et al. 1983; Masters et al. 1981b; Cathala et al. 1980; Haltia et al. 1979). The iatrogenic form of CJD describes cases of the disease that are caused by some form of medical intervention. This can occur through the use of contaminated electrodes during neurosurgery (Bernoulli et al. 1977), cadaveric dura mater grafts and cadaver pituitary-derived growth hormone (Powell-Jackson et al. 1985; Tintner et al. 1986; Rappaport 1987). Natural case-to-case transmission is advanced to explain the repeated finding of a positive correlation between frequency of CJD and population density (Brown et al. 1979b, 1983; Cathala et al. 1982). Experimental transmission of CJD to a range of species has been achieved, including goats, guinea pigs, mice, rats, marmosets and squirrel and patas monkeys (Dr˘ag˘anescu et al. 1984, 1985; Tateishi et al. 1980, 1981a, b; Cathala et al. 1981; Espana et al. 1975–1976; Peterson et al. 1978; Hadlow et al. 1980a). CJD has also been transmitted to hamsters and Mongolian gerbils through rats (Tateishi et al. 1980). Intracerebral inoculation is the most efficient route of transmission followed by other parenteral and oral routes (Tateishi et al. 1980, 1981a). The relationship of CJD to scrapie in sheep had been the subject of a number of epidemiological studies by 1986. Chatelain et al. (1981) found no evidence that regional lamb consumption was correlated with the frequency of CJD between 1968 and 1979 in France. Nor was the geographic distribution of scrapie-affected flocks related to the residential location of patients with CJD. Similarly, Brown et al. (1979b) found that potential exposure to scrapie was not associated with an increased risk of contracting CJD in 170 patients in France between 1968 and 1977
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
(see also Cathala et al. 1979). Studies that suggested a link between CJD and scrapie were Lo Russo et al. (1980) in Italy and Chatelain et al. (1981) in France who found that lamb consumption in nationwide categories of increasing population density correlated with an increasing frequency of CJD (but see studies above that indicate a correlation between population density and frequency of CJD). Also, Dickinson (1976: 213) sounded a cautionary note when he stated that ‘[w]e should not assume, at this stage of our knowledge, that scrapie agents are never transmissible to man from infected meat, particularly as we know that some types of cooking would not inactivate the infectivity’. The clinical symptoms of CJD are numerous. Brown et al. (1979a) established 14 broad categories based on the symptoms they observed during the clinical course of 124 consecutive cases of CJD. Some symptoms were observed infrequently and included cranial nerve anomalies (2%), vegetative symptoms (3%), sensory disturbances (7%) and seizures (9%). Mental deterioration, predominantly dementia, was observed in all subjects. A movement disorder, mostly myoclonus, was observed in 90% of subjects, while 77% of subjects had an evocative electroencephalogram (EEG). Brown et al. (1986) found that the great majority of neurological symptoms in their consecutive series of 230 patients with CJD were of cerebellar or visual origin. In over 95% of these patients, involuntary movement or periodic EEG activity were observed. Ataxia, tremulousness and dementia were observed in two cases of sporadic CJD described by Leiderman et al. (1986). Haltia et al. (1979) described the following consistent clinical features in six subjects with familial CJD: progressive dementia, upper motor neuron signs, muscular rigidity, twitching and irregular tremors. By 1986, atypical cases of CJD had also been described in the literature. Tintner et al. (1986), for example, described the case of a 32-year-old man with iatrogenic CJD who displayed atypical symptoms. This man had predominantly cerebellar signs, little mental deterioration and no abnormal movements or periodic EEG activity. The duration of illness in patients was typically less than a year and often only a few months. In their study of 124 consecutive CJD cases, Brown et al. (1979a) reported that the most frequent duration was 2–3 months. In a later study of a consecutive series of 230 patients, Brown et al. (1986) recorded a median duration of illness of 4 months and a mean of 7.6 months. Of these patients, 90% were dead within a year of onset of the disease. There is some evidence that duration is longer in familial than sporadic CJD (although Baron et al. (1986) concede that this may be due to ascertainment bias). For example, Haltia et al. (1979) reported an average duration of illness in six familial CJD cases of 21 months (range 11–36 months). Brown et al. (1979a) reported much longer durations of illness in the familial CJD cases in their study. In one patient the duration of illness was 40 months, while in another the illness lasted for 120 months. Long incubation periods for CJD in humans and animals have been reported. Baron et al. (1986) found minimal incubation periods of up to 43 years in their study of 329 patients with CJD. Dr˘ag˘anescu et al. (1985) recorded a very long incubation period (over 360–420 days) in guinea pigs which were intracerebrally inoculated with cerebrospinal fluid and/or brain tissue suspensions from patients with CJD.
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By 1986, CJD was most reliably diagnosed by means of post-mortem histological examination. Diagnosis could be performed ante mortem using brain biopsy. However, Levy et al. (1986) argued that brain biopsy is unnecessary in making a diagnosis. These investigators considered that ‘[t]he presence of periodic sharp wave complexes [in EEG] in association with the appropriate clinical, biochemical, cerebrospinal fluid and neuroradiological findings is diagnostic of CJD’ (1986: 1). The histopathological features of CJD were well characterized by 1986. All three CJD patients studied by Mitrová et al. (1978) exhibited neuronal loss, intracytoplasmic vacuolation, spongiosis and astrocytosis. Cortical regions, basal ganglia and cerebella were severely affected. Yamanouchi et al. (1986) described spongiform change, neuronal loss and severe proliferation of astrocytes at autopsy in a 73-yearold woman with CJD. These pathological changes were unusual in this subject in that they only affected the left side of the brain. Amyloid plaques were also known to occur in the brains of some CJD patients (Kitamoto et al. 1986). By 1986, investigators were beginning to examine the role of genetics in CJD. Studies were revealing that genetic factors played a significant role in susceptibility to CJD and controlled the incubation period of the disease. Kuroda et al. (1986) found a highly significant increase of a human leukocyte antigen in 16 cases of CJD in Japan compared to normal subjects. These investigators claimed that this finding provided evidence for the genetic control of susceptibility to CJD in humans. In a study of inbred strains of mice which had been intracerebrally inoculated with the CJD agent, Kingsbury et al. (1983) identified previously unrecognized genes that controlled the length of the CJD incubation period.
1.2.2 Kuru This human TSE was first described in 1957 by Gajdusek and Zigas.7 Kuru was confined to several adjacent valleys in the mountainous interior of New Guinea, where it affected 160 villages with a total population of just over 35,000 people (Gajdusek 1977: 949). Over 80% of kuru cases occurred in the Fore cultural and linguistic group in New Guinea and it is from this group that the disease takes its name (‘kuru’ is the Fore word for shivering or trembling). Between 1957 and 1960, the prevalence of kuru in the South Fore was 20.1 cases per annum per 1,000 population, while in the North Fore prevalence was 10.1 cases (Gajdusek et al. 1961). Kuru mortality in the South Fore was twice that in the North Fore, 16 and 8 cases per annum per 1,000 population, respectively (Gajdusek et al. 1961). These deaths were not evenly distributed between the sexes or, indeed, between different age groups. In the 3-year period between 1957 and 1959, 60% of kuru deaths occurred in adult females. Only 2% of deaths were in adult males, while female and male children accounted for 19 and 12% of kuru deaths, respectively. Zigas and Gajdusek (1959) reported that 23.5% of the first 200 kuru cases studied occurred in pre-adolescent or early adolescent children under 15 years of age. Whatever causative factor(s) gave rise to kuru,8 it was clear they were affecting children and adult females to a much greater extent than adult males. A cultural practice in which women and
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
children consumed the bodies of dead kinsmen has since been widely credited with explaining this distribution in kuru deaths. Conjunctival, nasal and skin contamination with highly infectious brain tissue was also thought to be a significant source of kuru infection during this ritual.9 Certainly, since cannibalism ceased in the late 1950s or early 1960s, there had been a steady decline in the number of kuru deaths.10 The first cases of kuru, it is believed, developed following cannibalism of a subject who died of CJD in about 1900 in the hamlet of Uwami (Scrimgeour et al. 1983) (Figs. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4). The clinical characteristics of kuru are numerous and vary with the course of the disease. Prusiner et al. (1982) described clinical features in 15 patients with kuru. Joint pains that preceded difficulty in walking occurred in all patients. Neurological dysfunction varied from mild truncal and limb ataxia to marked ataxia, rigidity, spasticity and dementia in terminal illness. All patients had an apprehensive, frightened facial expression and most had diminished or absent optokinetic nystagmus bilaterally. Apprehensive facies and an absent or diminished optokinetic nystagmus had not previously been described in kuru patients (but see below). Scrimgeour et al. (1983) described the features of kuru in a 42-year-old male from the Eastern Highlands Province of New Guinea. This subject first noticed the gradual onset of weakness in the legs with ataxia in October 1977. He attended a government hospital in April 1978 complaining of occipital headache, pain in the neck and legs and severe gait disturbance. On examination, various primitive reflexes were elicited. The subject presented with dysarthria and moderate ataxia of the upper limbs with intention tremor and dysdiadochokinesis. He was unable to stand without support due to mild truncal ataxia and severe ataxia of the legs. At rest and on movement, irregular, jerky, involuntary contractions of muscle groups in the neck, shoulders
Fig. 1.1 Kuru victims at Kuru Research Centre, Papua New Guinea, late 1950s. The pregnant patient on the left delivered a healthy infant 4 months before her death. Kuru is so advanced in these women that they require the use of one or two sticks for support. Photograph courtesy of D. Carleton Gajdusek/Wellcome Images
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Fig. 1.2 A boy from the Fore tribe, Papua New Guinea, with moderately advanced kuru. He has athetoid (involuntary, repetitive) movements of the arms and strabismus (squinting). Photograph courtesy of D. Carleton Gajdusek/ Wellcome Images
Fig. 1.3 Victims of kuru, Papua New Guinea, c1950s. One of the women has developed choreiform movements of the upper limbs. A number of the women are seen smiling. One of the characteristics of the disease is unmotivated laughter. Photograph courtesy of D. Carleton Gajdusek/Wellcome Images
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Fig. 1.4 A young boy from the Fore tribe in Papua New Guinea with advanced stages of kuru. He had muscular weakness preventing him sitting up without support. There was also strabismus present. Photograph courtesy of D. Carleton Gajdusek/Wellcome Images
and limbs were present. The clinical features of cerebellar dysfunction became progressively more severe. Dementia and dyspraxia were present. Sustained clonus of knee and ankle and hyperreflexia (both indicative of pyramidal tract dysfunction) developed latterly. Basal ganglia dysfunction appeared in the late stages of the disease. Like Prusiner’s subjects, this patient presented with an anguished expression. The patient died 7 months after admission. Scrimgeour et al. estimated that the incubation period in this patient was over 20 years, while the duration of the disease was approximately 12 months. After death, this patient’s brain was examined to establish its histopathological features. Sections were taken from the frontal cortex, cingulate, motor strip, temporal cortex, occipital cortex, hippocampus and caudate/putamen. Spongiform change was observed in all these areas and was particularly severe in the cingulate, motor
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9
strip and caudate/putamen. Moderate gliosis was present in all areas except temporal and occipital cortices. Mild amyloid plaques were observed in two regions, the motor strip and occipital cortex. Neuronal loss was mild in the frontal cortex, motor strip and hippocampus and moderate in the cingulate and caudate/putamen. Neuronal loss was not observed in the temporal and occipital cortices. Zigas and Gajdusek (1959) obtained complete post-mortem examinations on 25 of over 300 cases of kuru that were investigated during the first year of intense field study. The main pathological findings in the central nervous system were widespread neuronal degeneration, myelin degeneration, astroglia and microglia proliferation, presence of plaque-like bodies and occasional perivascular cuffings with mononuclear cells. Neuronal degeneration was most severe in the cerebellum and extra-pyramidal system, although there were also changes in the anterior horn cells, inferior olives, thalamus and pontine nuclei. Myelin degeneration most commonly involved pyramidal, spinocerebellar tracts, brachia conjunctiva and brachia pontis. Astroglial and microglial proliferation were usually very intense. The former was found in areas of neuronal degeneration, although astrocytic gliosis was also intense in areas of minimal neuronal loss. Microglia proliferation occurred in degenerative grey and white matter. Plaque-like bodies were found in the majority of kuru cases. They occured frequently in the cerebellum and were found occasionally in the basal ganglia and cerebral cortex. Perivascular cuffings were seen in some kuru cases and were usually found in the medulla, pons and basal ganglia. By 1986, it was known that kuru could be transmitted experimentally to a number of primates. They included rhesus monkeys (Gambarelli et al. 1981), spider monkeys (Beck et al. 1975, 1982; Gajdusek et al. 1968), pigtail macaques (Gambarelli and Vuillon-Cacciuttolo 1983), squirrel monkeys (Gibbs et al. 1980; Scrimgeour et al. 1983), gibbons (Masters et al. 1976a), capuchin monkeys (Scrimgeour et al. 1983), marmosets (Peterson et al. 1978), sooty mangabeys (Masters et al. 1976a) and chimpanzees (Lampert et al. 1975). Transmission was achieved through intracerebral inoculation (e.g. Gambarelli and Vuillon-Cacciuttolo 1983) and the oral route (Gibbs et al. 1980). Variable incubation periods were observed via these different routes of infection. The squirrel monkey which was orally exposed to kuru by Gibbs et al. (1980) had an incubation period of 36 months. The squirrel and capuchin monkeys intracerebrally inoculated by Scrimgeour et al. (1983) displayed incubation periods of 27.5, 37, 39 and 43 months. Histopathological features of experimental kuru include spongiosis of the neuropil, neuronal vacuolization, astrocytic hyperplasia and neuronal loss (Masters et al. 1976b; Gambarelli et al. 1981; Gambarelli and Vuillon-Cacciuttolo 1983). Beck et al. (1975) described the histopathological features of experimental kuru in spider monkeys which were incubating the disease but were free of neurological signs. Bi-nucleated neurones were found in the limbic cortex, striatum, hypothalamus and amongst Purkinje cells of the cerebellum at 4 weeks after inoculation. There was a loss of neurones and proliferation of fibrous astrocytes in the cerebral and cerebellar cortex in the later stages of incubation. Fibrous astrocytes also proliferated in the hypothalamus. Status spongiosis and generalized astrocytic proliferation and hypertrophy, both of which are characteristic of fully developed experimental kuru, were not
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observed. Ultrastructural abnormalities included membrane-bound intracytoplasmic vacuoles predominantly in dendrites and concentric laminar arrays derived from the endoplasmic reticulum.
1.2.3 Gerstmann-Sträussler Syndrome Gerstmann-Sträussler syndrome (GSS), also called Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome, was certainly the least known and investigated human TSE in 1986. Since 1928, when Gerstmann recorded an unusual cerebellar disease in a female who was 25 years of age at onset, several cases of GSS have been described in the literature. What these cases had in common was the appearance of the disease in a number of family members over two or more generations. In this way, Hudson et al. (1983) described an Italian family in which two sisters and the son of one of the sisters were known to have GSS. This spongiform encephalopathy was known to differ from CJD in a number of respects. Firstly, GSS progresses more slowly than CJD. The duration of illness in the three subjects examined by Hudson et al. was 3.5, 6 and 8 years, respectively. Secondly, the age at death in GSS is lower than in CJD. In 17 cases examined by Masters et al. (1981b), the mean age at death was 48 years (range 29–62 years). Thirdly, amyloid plaques, which are only observed in some CJD patients, are found in all GSS subjects (Kitamoto et al. 1986). Fourthly, spongiform change is less severe in GSS than in CJD (although Vinters et al. (1986) reported a much greater degree of cortical spongy change in the subject in their study than was observed in the relatives of this subject, a finding which indicated phenotypic heterogeneity in the disorder). Other histopathological features of GSS include severe astrocytic gliosis in the grey and white matter, pronounced neurone loss (Vinters et al. 1986) and white matter loss or degeneration (Masters et al. 1981b) (Fig. 1.5). The clinical features of GSS vary with progression of the disease. In one of the three cases examined by Hudson et al. (1983), difficulty in walking was the first clinical sign. Within the first year of illness, the patient experienced an impairment of writing, slurred speech and had slight difficulty swallowing. At 2.5 years after onset, a slight nystagmus on upward gaze, pseudobulbar dysarthria, slow movement of all limbs, slight awkwardness in arms, frank weakness and ataxia of lower limbs, brisk deep tendon reflexes and bilateral Babinski’s signs were observed. At 3.5 years after onset, the patient was confined to a wheelchair. He had severe dysarthria, nystagmus on lateral and vertical directions of gaze, weakness of convergence of eyes, incoordination of all extremities, moderate weakness of lower extremities, absent deep tendon reflexes in upper and lower limbs and bilateral Babinski’s signs. At 1 year prior to death, he was unable to feed himself because of extreme incoordination and weakness of arms. He was incontinent of urine, his speech was difficult to interpret and his swallowing was poor. At this time, he appeared intellectually normal, although his mental state subsequently deteriorated. At 1 month prior to his death, he was severely dysarthric but could say ‘yes’ and ‘no’. He appeared alert
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11
Fig. 1.5 Deposition of abnormal prion protein (PrP) in different types of prion diseases. (a) In many cases of sporadic CJD, there is a synaptic (diffuse granular) deposition of PrP. (b) Variant CJD often shows plaques, which are sometimes surrounded by small vacuoles. In addition, there are also synaptic deposits seen. (c) Kuru often shows deposition of prion protein in the form of dense core plaques, but many areas may also show deposition of synaptic PrP. (d) Deposition of plaques of variable size in inherited prion disease with P102L mutation (Gerstmann-SträusslerScheinker syndrome). In addition to the plaques, this form of prion diseases may also show synaptic deposition. Scale bar: (a), (c) 50 µm; (b), (d) 100 µm (Courtesy of Professor Sebastian Brandner, Chair of Neuropathology, Division of Neuropathology and Department of Neurodegenerative Disease, Institute of Neurology, London)
and cooperative, but could only respond to simple commands. He exhibited bilateral limitation of lateral and upward gaze, nystagmus to both right and left lateral gaze, spastic muscle tone, flexed posture in upper limbs, extension of lower limbs and neck stiffness. Motor power was slightly decreased in his upper limbs and there was weakness in the lower extremities. There was marked wasting of muscle in the lower extremities, particularly below the knees. The lower limbs were immobile and upper limb movements were slow, ataxic and at times athetoid like. Deep tendon reflexes were present in the arms but absent in the lower extremities. Plantar responses were bilaterally extensor. Sensory testing was not possible. By 1986, GSS had been experimentally transmitted via intracerebral inoculation to marmosets (Baker et al. 1985) and mice (Tateishi et al. 1984). The marmosets inoculated by Baker et al. using brain tissue from a patient with CJD and a second patient with GSS displayed similar histopathological changes. Specifically, this included spongiform change which was most pronounced in the basal ganglia and thalamus. In neither case was amyloid deposition detected. Similar histopathological patterns were observed by Tateishi et al. in mice that had been inoculated with GSS and CJD. These patterns involved spongiform change and astroglial proliferation in the cerebral cortex, especially in the parietal lobe and hippocampus, thalamus and basal ganglia. Changes in the cerebral white matter, brainstem and cerebellum were less prominent in mice inoculated with GSS than in those inoculated with CJD. No amyloid plaques were observed in the mice receiving GSS inoculum. Baker et al. reported that the average survival time for marmosets inoculated with brain tissue from a GSS patient (29.5 months) was longer than that for animals inoculated with tissue from a CJD patient (21.4 months). Tateishi et al. recorded the appearance of
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clinical symptoms at 255 and 244 days after inoculation in the first passage mice which were inoculated with GSS in their study. This incubation period dropped to 144 and 153 days in second passage mice. The incubation periods in the first passage GSS mice were considerably shorter than those seen in mice inoculated with CJD.
1.2.4 Scrapie By 1986, scrapie11 was by far the best known animal TSE. Although the first published article on scrapie appeared in 1913 in the Journal of Comparative Pathology (Stockman 1913), the disease had first been recorded in England nearly 200 years earlier in 1732. Extensive research of this spongiform encephalopathy had been underway in Great Britain since the 1940s. This research was undertaken at three institutions, the Moredun Research Institute in Edinburgh, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) Field Station at Compton in Berkshire and the ARC Animal Breeding Research Organisation in Edinburgh.12 An American veterinary neuropathologist, William Hadlow, worked at Compton in the 1950s. Hadlow’s work was to have a profound influence on our understanding of scrapie, a disease that had consistently confounded scientific researchers.13 In this way, Palmer (1957: 1318) remarked that ‘[t]here is a mystery about scrapie that makes it an unpopular subject for research; its study can be a chastening experience. The condition has defied solution so persistently that perhaps it should be classified as a disease extraordinary’. As importantly, however, Hadlow was also the first scientist to propose a link between scrapie in sheep and kuru in the Fore people of New Guinea.14 On the basis of his experience of the experimental induction of scrapie in sheep, Hadlow recommended that efforts be made to experimentally induce kuru in a laboratory primate.15 This recommendation prompted Carleton Gajdusek to reconsider his view of the aetiology of kuru,16 a view that had been gravitating towards a genetic basis for the disorder.17 Although Hadlow’s work didn’t receive the recognition at the time that many believed it warranted,18 his contribution to our understanding of TSEs was to be felt again nearly three decades later when BSE emerged in British cattle. By 1986, a number of epidemiological studies of scrapie had been undertaken. Dickinson (1976) reported that a 10% incidence of scrapie in certain breeds and flocks is not uncommon and it is occasionally much higher. In France, Chatelain et al. (1986) examined the incidence of scrapie in a flock of Ile de France sheep between 1978 and 1983. Incidence varied from year to year. The average incidence for the 5 year period of the study was 8.3%. The onset of scrapie occurred most frequently between the ages of 2 and 4 years with 25 of 45 (55% of) affected sheep developing the disease in this age group. In the later years of the study, the onset of the disease occurred in younger age groups suggesting the presence of genetic anticipation in this flock. In an earlier study of the frequency of scrapie in different breeds of sheep in France between 1968 and 1979, Chatelain et al. (1983) recorded 1.8 outbreaks of scrapie per 100,000 Ile de France sheep. Scrapie was most
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commonly found in Hampshire and Suffolk sheep in this study, with 60.0 and 40.0 outbreaks occurring per 100,000 sheep, respectively. Mortality rates due to scrapie have been found to vary considerably. Pálsson (1979) reported mortality rates due to rida (scrapie) in some Icelandic flocks of 3–5% annually among breeding ewes. In other Icelandic flocks, Pálsson noted a mortality rate among adults of more that 30% annually. The transmissible nature of scrapie had been apparent to scientists for many years prior to the emergence of BSE. The first sign that scrapie was transmissible was obtained inadvertently. In 1946, William Gordon reported that scrapie had been transmitted to sheep using a louping-ill vaccine. The vaccine had been prepared using a 10% saline suspension of brain, spinal cord and spleen tissues taken from sheep 5 days after infection with louping-ill virus. Some 18,000 doses from an infected batch of vaccine prepared in 1935 were administered to sheep. The incidence of scrapie in these sheep ranged from 1 to 35% with an average of about 5% (Gordon 1946). Natural transmission among sheep and between sheep and goats has since been demonstrated in a number of experiments.19 Hadlow et al. (1980b) found that three dairy goats became infected with scrapie while living with naturally infected Suffolk sheep. Brotherston et al. (1968) reported that 10 of 17 goats which were kept for long periods in the same pen as sheep infected with natural scrapie subsequently developed the disease. Transmission to goats did not occur when sheep with experimental scrapie were used. Blackface sheep which were kept in continuous contact with naturally infected sheep of various breeds from the time of birth for periods of 3 years 9 months to 4 years 4 months also developed scrapie. Dickinson et al. (1974) reported the occurrence of lateral transmission of scrapie under normal field conditions in 28% of purebred Scottish Blackface sheep which had been in lifetime contact with Suffolk × Blackface crosses (Suffolk sheep, unlike Scottish Blackface sheep, develop natural scrapie). This study also demonstrated a dominant role for maternal transmission of the scrapie agent. Animal-to-animal transmission has also been demonstrated in other species. Zlotnik (1968) found that uninoculated mice developed scrapie after a period of cohabitation of 15–16 months with mice which had been inoculated with the disease. The transmission studies examined above all relate to transmission under natural (i.e. non-experimental) conditions. However, as with other spongiform encephalopathies, scrapie has also been experimentally transmitted to a number of species. Hanson et al. (1971) reported the transmission of a spongiform encephalopathy to mink following intracerebral inoculation using a brain suspension from Suffolk sheep with naturally acquired scrapie. The resulting disease was indistinguishable in terms of both clinical signs and pathological lesions from transmissible mink encephalopathy. Hadlow and Race (1986) transmitted scrapie via intracerebral inoculation to four African pygmy goats. Pattison (1965) transmitted scrapie to goats and mice that had been inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie goat brain and scrapie mouse brain, respectively. Zlotnik and Rennie (1965) succeeded in experimentally transmitting mouse passaged scrapie to goats, sheep, rats and hamsters. Transmission was achieved through intracerebral inoculation (goats, rats, hamsters) and subcutaneous inoculation (sheep).
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Although scrapie can be experimentally transmitted via a number of routes, some have been shown to be more efficient than others. Kimberlin and Walker (1978) found that the intracerebral route was the most efficient, followed by intravenous, intraperitoneal and subcutaneous routes. Kimberlin et al. (1971) reported an increased incubation period in mice which were inoculated with scrapie via the intraperitoneal route. The incubation period was 3–4 weeks longer in the mice in this study than that which is routinely observed in BSVS (bacteria susceptible, virus susceptible) mice which are inoculated intracerebrally with the Chandler strain of scrapie agent. Kimberlin et al. attribute this increased incubation period to the delay that occurs after intraperitoneal inoculation before the agent reaches the brain.20 There was also evidence of qualitative differences in the distribution of lesions in these intraperitoneally inoculated mice compared to mice which had been inoculated intracerebrally. The mice in this study exhibited an absence of astrocyte reaction and of certain enzyme activity from the corpus callosum and there was a low incidence of vacuolation in the hippocampus. These differences in the distribution of lesions were attributed to different sites of entry of the scrapie agent into the central nervous system (CNS) in intraperitoneal and intracerebral inoculation.21 Pathogenesis studies of scrapie conducted by 1986 had consistently revealed early infectivity of tissues in the lymphoreticular system.22 Hadlow et al. (1982) found scrapie virus first in the lymphatic tissues and intestines of clinically normal lambs of 10–14 months of age. The first sign of scrapie virus in the CNS was in a clinically normal sheep of 25 months of age. These investigators stated that ‘[t]he early appearance of virus in tonsil, retropharyngeal and mesenteric-portal lymph nodes, and intestine suggests that primary infection occurs by way of the alimentary tract, either prenatally from virus in amniotic fluid or postnatally from virus in a contaminated environment’ (1982: 657). The important role of the spleen in the extraneural replication of the scrapie agent was demonstrated in a study by Fraser and Dickinson (1978). These investigators found that splenectomy in mice reduced the host’s capacity to replicate the ME7 scrapie agent. Splenectomy increased the incubation period of scrapie in mice following intraperitoneal infection by 10–30%. The replicative capacity that was lost following splenectomy remained for at least 60 days following the procedure. The replicative loss was less pronounced in newborn mice – the incubation period was prolonged in splenectomized newborn mice by over 9%. Experiments involving thymectomy failed to show any role for the thymus and its dependent lymphoid system in the pathogenesis and replication of scrapie in mice. Hadlow et al. (1980b) reported that scrapie virus was widespread in non-neural sites, particularly lymphatic tissues and intestines, in dairy goats that had become infected with scrapie while living with naturally infected Suffolk sheep. When scrapie agent progresses to the CNS, infectivity titres exceed those found in the lymphoreticular system and significant histological changes can also be observed.23 Hadlow et al. (1980b) found scrapie virus in much higher titres (5.1–5.8 log10 mouse intracerebral LD 50/30 mg of tissue) in nervous tissue in dairy goats than in non-neural sites (titres ranged from 3.0 to 3.5 log10 in these sites). The most severe histological changes were observed in the diencephalon, midbrain, medulla oblongata, and cerebellar cortex, all of which had the highest mean titres. Bruce
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(1981) used mice which had been intracerebrally inoculated with scrapie agent to examine the number of amyloid plaques and the severity of vacuolar lesions that developed during the incubation period. The first histological lesions, which appeared at 60 days after injection, were amyloid plaques (these plaques are now known to contain protease-resistant prion protein). The appearance of plaques long before vacuolation or other changes occurred suggested that they were not simply secondary to degenerative vacuolar lesions. The first plaques to appear were found close to the lateral ventricles and were probably related to the localization of inoculum soon after injection. In the later part of the incubation period, when vacuolation was also present, plaques were detected in areas distant from the ventricles. The histopathological pattern in the brain is influenced by the type of scrapie agent used in inoculation. Hadlow and Race (1986) found widespread spongiform degeneration of the cerebral cortex in four African pygmy goats that had been intracerebrally inoculated with scrapie agent from Suffolk sheep brain. This pattern is typical of that found in goats that are inoculated with transmissible mink encephalopathy. The scrapie agent that was used in this study had been passed three times in ranch mink. Fraser and Dickinson (1973) found that any of five different types of scrapie agent could be reliably distinguished from the others based on a lesion profile that involved damage in nine brain regions in two inbred mouse strains. The lesion profiles in the mice were not affected by the dose of scrapie agent used (Figs 1.6 and 1.7). By 1986, scientists knew that genes regulated the pathogenesis of scrapie in a host. Dickinson and Fraser (1969) investigated titres of scrapie agent in the spleen of mice with two different alleles of the sinc gene24 up to 29 days after inoculation. Some mice were homozygous for the s7 allele (short incubation period), while
Fig. 1.6 A sheep with scrapie. An intense itching sensation (pruritus) is one of the symptoms of the disease. This causes the animal to engage in rubbing, scraping or chewing behaviour with resulting deterioration of the fleece. © Crown copyright 2011. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office or the Veterinary Laboratories Agency or any other government department
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Fig. 1.7 Stellate prion protein deposits in sheep. Radiating, branching deposits often centred on glial nuclei of diverse morphologies and occasionally around neurones. Can be found throughout the grey matter of most brain areas, including the cerebral and cerebellar cortices. © Crown copyright 2011. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office or the Veterinary Laboratories Agency or any other government department
others were homozygous for the p7 allele (long incubation period). Mice with the long incubation period allele experienced a delay of 4 weeks in the initiation of an increase of scrapie agent in the spleen. Mice with the allele for a short incubation period experienced an almost immediate increase in the concentration of scrapie agent in the spleen. Dickinson et al. (1969) examined mice with the same alleles of the sinc gene for the period subsequent to 60 days after inoculation. At this later stage of disease progression, the titre of scrapie agent in the spleen of these mice did not differ. Where mice with these two alleles did differ was in the titre of scrapie agent in the brain. Mice with the p7 alleles exhibited a long initial delay in the increase of titre in the brain. However, mice with both types of alleles were similar in the subsequent rate of increase and in terminal scrapie titre. The two alleles (s7 and p7) of the sinc gene in mice show no dominance (Dickinson et al. 1968a). The same is not true, however, of genes that control the incubation period of scrapie in sheep. Dickinson et al. (1968b) found evidence of a gene in Cheviot sheep that controlled susceptibility to clinical scrapie. The dominant allele of this gene conferred susceptibility on the host – clinical signs appeared 197±7 days following intracerebral inoculation or 313±9 days when inoculation was performed subcutaneously. Sheep that appeared to be homozygous for the recessive resistant allele of the gene only developed scrapie after a very long interval of 917±90 days following intracerebral inoculation (see also Nussbaum et al. 1975). Breeding experiments were already underway by 1986 to develop flocks of sheep that displayed reduced susceptibility to experimental scrapie (Davies and Kimberlin 1985).
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1.2.5 Transmissible Mink Encepalopathy Although transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) had not been studied to the same extent as scrapie, much was still known about this spongiform encephalopathy in 1986. The disease was first described in 1965 by Hartsough and Burger in Wisconsin. Hadlow (1965) described the same disease in Idaho ranch mink. Hadlow and Karstad (1968) reported the occurrence of the disease in Ontario, Canada. All three outbreaks occurred during the summer of 1963 (Hadlow and Karstad 1968). Only adult breeder animals over 1 year of age are affected by the disease (Barlow 1972). Hadlow and Karstad (1968) explain the age of affected animals by the ‘unusually long’ incubation period of 6.5 months or more. Dukur et al. (1986) found that the incubation period in the experimentally induced mink in their study varied from 7 to 9 months with different routes of inoculation. Marsh and Hanson (1979) reported that intradermal inoculation was an efficient means of exposure to the TME agent in the mink in their study. Barlow (1972) found little or no evidence of horizontal (lateral) or vertical transmission in naturally occurring TME (but see Dukur et al. (1986) who reported lateral and maternal transmission and Marsh and Hanson (1979) who described how bite wounds inflicted by littermates could spread the infectious agent between mink). By 1986, TME had been experimentally transmitted to other species including Chinese hamsters (Kimberlin et al. 1986) and squirrel monkeys (Eckroade et al. 1970). However, TME appeared to be biologically inactive in mice with experimental studies failing to achieve transmission of the disease (Taylor et al. 1986).25 The TME agent was known to possess the same extraordinary resistance to chemical and other challenge that had been witnessed in scrapie. In this way, Burger and Gorham (1977) reported that the TME virus retained biological activity after prolonged storage in formalin of approximately 3.5 years and in paraffin tissue blocks that are used for histological preparations (the latter for approximately 6.5 years). Marsh and Hanson (1969) found that the TME agent was resistant to ultraviolet irradiation and relatively resistant to 10% formalin.26 The TME agent was not an infectious nucleic acid (Marsh et al. 1974). As with other TSEs, no inflammatory response was observed in TME27 (Figs 1.8 and 1.9). The clinical signs of TME include locomotor disturbances and excitability. Over a few weeks, this progresses to ataxia which is characterized by stiff, jerky movements. There are increasing periods of somnolence (Barlow 1972). Marsh and Kimberlin (1975) reported that ataxia was not prominent in TME-affected hamsters. Rather, these animals tended to become more and more lethargic as the disease progressed. Hadlow and Karstad (1968) described histopathological changes that occurred in the brains of mink which had developed TME in the Ontario outbreak. These changes included a loosened or porous appearance of grey matter which varied from scattered patches of holes to diffuse sponginess of neural tissue. Some neurones were shrunken and deeply basophilic, while others had disappeared. The cytoplasm of some neurones was vacuolated. The size and number of astrocyte nuclei had increased. The cerebral cortex was affected,
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Fig. 1.8 Mink affected with encephalopathy may appear somnolent and grasp an object for extended time periods. Photograph taken from Virus Infections of Carnivores, M.J. Appel (ed), Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1987. The permission of Elsevier to reproduce this photograph is gratefully acknowledged
Fig. 1.9 A haematoxylin and eosin section of the thalamus of mink at the stage of clinical disease with TME. The diseased mink was experimentally inoculated with TME by the oral route. Like spongiform encephalopathies in other species, there is extensive vacuolation. Courtesy of Dr Jason C. Bartz, Medical Microbiology and Immunology, School of Medicine, Creighton University, Nebraska, USA
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sometimes to a large extent. Gyri along the midline in the more rostral parts of the cerebrum were often most severely affected. Sometimes the hippocampal formation was involved. The diencephalon and corpus striatum were regularly affected. The same histopathological changes of astrocytic hypertrophy, microvacuolation of the neuropil and neuronal degeneration have also been observed in TME-affected hamsters (Marsh and Kimberlin 1975). Different strains of the TME agent have been found to produce characteristic profiles of vacuolation in hamsters (Kimberlin et al. 1986). Studies of tissue infectivity in hamsters have revealed that the TME agent multiplies rapidly in the brain prior to the onset of clinical signs and that titres in the spleen were 4–6 logs lower than titres in the brain during the asymptomatic or clinical course of the disease (Marsh and Kimberlin 1975). In hamsters dying of TME, the corneal epithelium has been found to be infectious (Marsh and Hanson 1975). Marsh et al. (1973) failed to find infectivity in lymphocytes of mink with TME.
1.2.6 Chronic Wasting Disease In 1986, chronic wasting disease (CWD) was the least investigated TSE in animals. This disease was known to affect Rocky Mountain elk (Williams and Young 1982), mule deer and black-tailed deer (Williams and Young 1980). All affected animals were held in captivity in several wildlife facilities in Colorado and Wyoming. In mule deer and elk, clinical signs occurred after captivity lasting 2.5–4 years, and 3–5 years, respectively. The disease affected males, females and castrates. The duration of illness was 1–6 months in elk and 2 weeks to 8 months in mule deer (Williams and Young 1980; Williams and Young 1982). Behavioural changes were observed in all animals and included nervousness or hyperexcitability, alterations in personality and changes of behaviour towards handlers. Progressive weight loss led to emaciation. No motor or sensory neurological signs were observed. The course of the disease was usually interrupted by complications (e.g. pneumonia) or euthanasia. Histopathological changes, which were limited to the CNS, included the now familiar triad of widespread spongiform transformation of the neuropil, single or multiple intracytoplasmic vacuoles in neuronal perikaryons (cell bodies) and intense astrocytic hypertrophy and hyperplasia (Williams and Young 1980). Bahmanyar et al. (1985) found amyloid plaques in CNS tissues in 13 of 21 (62%) adult captive mule deer with CWD. In 1986, little was known about how CWD was transmitted. The elk studied by Williams and Young (1982) had sporadic fence-line contact with clinically normal and affected deer. They were also occasionally kept in pens in which CWD-affected deer had been previously held. This led Williams and Young to consider the role of horizontal transmission in the movement of this disease between species28 (Figs 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, and 1.13).
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Fig. 1.10 A CWD positive whitetail deer. There is extensive wasting of the neck, flank and hindquarters (Courtesy of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources)
Fig. 1.11 A CWD positive elk. This elk displayed an extraordinary rate of decline. Within just 6 days, it went from having normal appearance, to displaying obvious signs and then lying down, at which point it was euthanized. (Courtesy of Dr Kurt VerCauteren, Research Wildlife Biologist, CWD Project Leader, National Wildlife Research Center, USDA/APHIS/Wildlife Services, 4101 Laporte Ave, Fort Collins, Colorado 80521)
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Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
21
Fig. 1.12 A section from the solitary tract of the brainstem at the level of the obex from a CWD positive elk that originated from Canada. It displays the vacuoles that are characteristic of CWD as well as cell nuclei (dark dots). It has been produced using haematoxylin and eosin (H&E) staining (Courtesy of Histopathology, Department of Pathology, Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Weybridge, England)
Fig. 1.13 Tonsillar biopsies can be used to diagnose CWD in animals suspected of having the disease. The stained circular areas in this image of tonsillar tissue are positive lymphoid follicles (Prepared by the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory of Colorado State University and supplied by Kerry Mower of the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish)
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
1.3 The BSE Knowledge Problem The review in Section 1.2 of what was known about TSEs in 1986 is certainly not intended to be exhaustive. Yet, it nonetheless conveys something of the extent of the scientific knowledge base that existed at the time. That knowledge base, and the reasoning skills that scientists employed when assessing its contents, were the basis of the scientific response to the emergence of a new brain disease in cattle. In this section, we examine the different types of knowledge that scientists were able to bring to bear upon questions relating to the nature and behaviour of BSE. The BSE problem presented a uniquely difficult challenge to scientists. Never before had scientists had to assess the risk posed to human health by a spongiform encephalopthy that would have to jump species to infect man and that would most likely pass to man through the oral route, although parenteral transmission was also a possibility.29 Certainly, the cases of kuru and CJD showed that oral and parenteral transmission of a spongiform encephalopathy to man was possible. But the infectious agents in kuru and CJD were already adapted to a human host and did not have to cross a species barrier. Similarly, spongiform encephalopathies had been shown to transmit between species. But such transmission was achieved through experimental means (e.g. intracerebral inoculation) and the host was typically primates and lower mammals which would not necessarily have the same response as man to the infectious agent in TSEs. Whatever way investigators turned, pre-existing knowledge of TSEs in 1986 only permitted scientists to address questions about BSE indirectly. The challenge for scientists was to assess this background knowledge and decide which aspects of it would provide a rational basis for addressing issues relating to BSE. The species barrier that BSE would have to cross in order to infect man and the oral route through which this disease would most likely be transmitted to humans conferred a special seductiveness on another animal TSE. The disease in question was scrapie in sheep. Here was a spongiform encephalopathy that appeared to address two significant gaps in our scientific knowledge about BSE. Firstly, scrapie would have to overcome the same species barrier to transmission that was a source of considerable uncertainty in BSE. Secondly, if scrapie were to cross the species barrier to humans, the oral route was likely to be its most important route of transmission. In terms of both species barrier and route of transmission, scrapie seemed to assume special significance above all other animal and human TSEs for scientists considering the problem of BSE. Even more importantly, extensive veterinary experience with scrapie had failed to link any case of human disease to this animal TSE. The TSE that appeared closest to BSE in terms of its potential to cause disease in humans thus provided scientists with some degree of reassurance that BSE might have few, if any, implications for human health. As well as considering the knowledge gaps that confronted scientists in their deliberations about BSE, this section will examine those aspects of our knowledge of TSEs in 1986 that had epistemic salience for scientists who were attempting to close those gaps. The issue of whether that salience was warranted will be examined in subsequent chapters. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it will suffice to
1.3
The BSE Knowledge Problem
23
identify the gaps in knowledge of TSEs that were of relevance to scientists who were charged with responding to BSE in 1986 and to establish how scientists envisaged those gaps might be most effectively addressed.
1.3.1 The Knowledge Problem Exposed Scientists who were charged with responding to the emergence of BSE were in no doubt that theirs was a particularly daunting epistemic challenge. In private communications to each other and in evidence submitted to Lord Phillips and his team, scientists were candid about the lack of knowledge and uncertainty that confronted every aspect of their deliberations. In a letter dated 9 August 1988 to Dr E. Poole of the Radcliffe Infirmary in Oxford, Sir Richard Southwood30 stated that ‘[m]y colleagues and I have made various recommendations based, I have to admit, largely on guesswork and drawing parallels from the existing knowledge of scrapie and CJD’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 55). In oral evidence to Lord Phillips and his team, Sir Richard remarked: . . .the science was so uncertain here we often had to leave – what was distasteful for us as scientists – a really secure base and make a judgement. They are difficult judgements that people have to make from time to time. Good and wise men and women may reach different sorts of conclusions. We were actually all unanimous, but it would have been quite possible for us to have a minority report on some aspects of it because there were so many uncertainties (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 4: 67).
Indeed, the science was uncertain. By 1986, Stanley Prusiner’s proposal that the causative agent in TSEs was an infectious protein was only beginning to gain ground, and was still contested in many scientific quarters. So even if it could be demonstrated that BSE was a TSE, this fact in itself did little to shed light on the type of pathogen that scientists were confronting or on how containment of this pathogen could be achieved. Mr Cruickshank of the Animal Health Group in the UK’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) succinctly captured the uncertainty and lack of knowledge that characterized the early days of this new disease when he remarked that ‘[w]e do not know where this disease came from, we do not know how it is spread and we do not know whether it can be passed to humans’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 44). When BSE first came to the attention of scientists, the knowledge problem for investigators was thus all pervasive. Although an extensive knowledge base existed for other TSEs, scientists lacked the knowledge that was required to link this new brain disease in cattle to that base. Specifically, the histopathological examinations and transmission experiments31 that would eventually lead to the identification of this new disease as a bovine TSE had yet to be undertaken and would not result in a definitive classification of the disease as a TSE until September 1988.32 The first knowledge gap to confront scientists therefore concerned the classification of the disease as a type of TSE.
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
Knowledge Gap 1: The classification or nature of this new bovine brain disease The integration of this new bovine disease within the TSE knowledge base was actively pursued by investigators, as it secured a number of early gains for scientists. Firstly, this body of knowledge provided a highly structured framework in which scientists could proceed to generate predictions about this bovine TSE. Every aspect of these diseases from routes of transmission to pathogenesis, length of incubation period and clinical course had been previously examined in the context of other TSEs. Such examination might reasonably be expected to offer a rational basis upon which predictions about BSE could be generated and subsequently tested in a rigorous programme of research. Secondly, a practical demand for disease containment measures to be implemented could be satisfied by integrating BSE within the TSE knowledge base (although previous attempts to contain TSE diseases (e.g. outbreaks of scrapie in Iceland) had largely demonstrated the ineffectiveness of most containment efforts). Thirdly, an assessment of the risk posed by BSE to public health was also made possible through the integration of this new bovine disease with other TSEs. This assessment would inevitably draw upon pre-existing veterinary knowledge of the sheep TSE scrapie, the only TSE to afflict a farmed animal that was a significant part of the human food chain.33 And while there were obvious implications for BSE from scientists’ experience with scrapie, there was also the danger that any analogy between scrapie and a new TSE in cattle would be pushed too far. In subsequent chapters, we will consider if this danger was realized in the case of BSE. In the meantime, we consider further gaps that existed in the knowledge of scientists in the early days of the BSE crisis. When BSE first emerged in British cattle, considerable epidemiological effort was expended in establishing the source of this new disease. In May 1987, this task was assigned to Mr John Wilesmith of the Central Veterinary Laboratory’s Epidemiology Department. He concluded that the disease was caused by contaminated meat and bone meal which had been incorporated into cattle feed. The meat and bone meal contained offal from scrapie-infected sheep and had become infectious, he contended, due to changes in rendering practices.34 These early epidemiological conclusions were significant in at least two respects. Firstly, they led to the widely held view that BSE was bovine scrapie and, as such, this disease could be expected to behave like scrapie. This ‘bovine scrapie’ thesis was to have a profound influence on scientific assessments of the risk to humans posed by this new disease and on health pronouncements made by successive British Government ministers. Secondly, these conclusions were the basis for the first measure that was introduced to contain the spread of BSE, a ban on the inclusion of ruminant protein in ruminant feed that came into effect on 18 July 1988. Although this ban was intended to prevent scrapie-infected sheep tissues from entering animal feed (the tissues which scientists believed were responsible for BSE), it had the effect of also removing those tissues that were actually transmitting infection (i.e. BSE-infected cattle tissues). We will see in later chapters that these epidemiological conclusions were erroneous. Nevertheless, they formed the mainstay of the early scientific response to BSE and were to have a profound influence on the nature of subsequent
1.3
The BSE Knowledge Problem
25
inquiry into this disease. The investigations of epidemiologists were thus intended to address the following gap in scientific knowledge of this new brain disease in cattle. Knowledge Gap 2: The origin or source of this new bovine brain disease Early epidemiological investigation did more than suggest an ovine origin for this new disease in cattle. For it provided, in effect, an account of the mechanism by means of which the disease was being transmitted among cattle. Mr Wilesmith did not believe that an effective mechanism of cattle-to-cattle transmission existed. He argued that by far the most significant route of infection was a contaminated feed source in the form of meat and bone meal. Each affected animal, Mr Wilesmith contended, was an index case that had developed disease as a result of consumption of scrapie-infected feed.35 We now know that cattle were being infected through the consumption of feed that contained BSE-infected tissue and not scrapie-infected tissue. Moreover, we also know that no rendering process was probably ever capable of inactivating the scrapie agent. Indeed, given what was known about the extraordinary resistance of the scrapie agent prior to 1986 (see note 2), it could be argued that the scientists who were responsible for these early epidemiological conclusions about the transmission of BSE should also have known that no current or former rendering process could have inactivated this agent. Notwithstanding the erroneous nature of these conclusions, their generation was intended to bridge another important gap in scientists’ knowledge of BSE. Knowledge Gap 3: The transmission properties of this new bovine brain disease If the issue of how BSE was being transmitted among cattle was a knowledge gap for scientists, an even more grave uncertainty surrounded the question of whether this new bovine disease would transmit to humans. Here was a question that troubled scientists more than any other. If this question could not be addressed, or was addressed incorrectly, the consequences for human health could potentially be very serious indeed.36 The issue of BSE transmission within cattle at least provided scientists with certain ‘facts of transmission’ to work on – epidemiological investigation had revealed, for example, the age of cattle that were succumbing to disease, the geographical distribution of those cattle, amongst other things. Transmission among cattle had already occurred and was proceeding at an alarming pace.37 In considering the question of BSE transmissibility to humans, scientists lacked even these basic facts. On this question, the certainty of a prior transmission event (some disease agent had already transmitted to cattle to cause BSE) was replaced by the uncertainty of a future transmission event (the transmissibility of BSE to humans). If transmission to humans was occurring, epidemiologists in human disease had no evidence that such was the case. Yet, scientists knew enough about the long incubation period of TSEs, which would be lengthened still further by the species barrier that an infective agent would have to cross, to know that an absence of evidence of transmission to humans was not a guarantee that BSE posed no risk to human health. Government ministers sought early advice on the extent of this risk from
26
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
expert scientific committees. Their deliberations and assessments of risk will be considered in detail in later chapters. In the meantime, it is clear that a particularly significant gap in early scientific knowledge of BSE was the following. Knowledge Gap 4: The transmissibility to humans of this new bovine brain disease These four knowledge gaps relating to the nature, origin, transmission and transmissibility to humans of this new brain disease in cattle capture the major sources of uncertainty that confronted scientists in the early days of the BSE epidemic. In subsequent chapters, these uncertainty sources will be examined in more detail with focus upon their philosophical and other features. For the moment, it suffices to emphasize that these knowledge gaps overlap each other to greater or lesser extents. For example, in order to address the question of BSE transmissibility to humans, one must first know something about the origin of this disease. We will see that the erroneous belief that BSE had an ovine origin was the basis of the mistaken scientific assessment that it was highly unlikely that BSE would transmit to humans. Also, each of these knowledge gaps also subsumes a number of more specific questions and areas in which scientists lacked knowledge. For example, knowledge of the nature of BSE subsumes questions about the histopathology, pathogenesis, prognosis and clinical course of this disease. The progressive, degenerative nature of the disease (clinical course), its invariably fatal outcome (prognosis), the widespread vacuolation in the brains of affected animals (histopathology) and the presence of peripheral infectivity before infectivity of the CNS (pathogenesis) are the very hallmarks of a TSE and were all vital elements in the identification of this new bovine brain disease. The pervasive nature of these knowledge gaps meant that scientists struggled to gain an early epistemic foothold on this emerging disease. It is little wonder, therefore, that urgent efforts were made to establish a robust framework of reasoning that could sustain scientists in their decision-making at a time of extreme uncertainty. It is to a preliminary examination of this framework that I now turn.
1.3.2 The Knowledge Problem Bridged It may seem self-evident that reasoning should be the central component of any scientific response to uncertainty. After all, our cognitive resources, and reasoning in particular, must be our first and last resort when an issue demands resolution, especially one as serious as the containment of a newly emerging infectious disease. The application of reason to the problems that confront us is not just our only, but is also our most powerful, response to a whole range of scientific and other challenges. The self-evidence of these statements notwithstanding, epidemiologists and public health scientists have displayed a somewhat uneasy relationship with the concept of reasoning. Seldom, if ever, is reasoning the focus of epidemiological discussion.38 More often than not, such discussion is preoccupied with technical
1.3
The BSE Knowledge Problem
27
questions that leave little room for the type of conceptual and theoretical inquiry that holds the best prospect of generating new modes of reasoning adapted to conditions of uncertainty.39 Moreover, reasoning in public health science and epidemiology is usually unduly constrained through its identification with deduction and induction. Philosophy has also been guilty of such identification. For most of the long history of logic, deduction and, to a lesser extent induction, has effectively dominated the logical terrain.40 It is only in more recent years that presumptive frameworks have begun to receive serious philosophical attention. These frameworks will be integral to the analysis of scientific reasoning that will be undertaken in the following pages. In this section, we begin that analysis by outlining the type of reasoning strategies that scientists used to bridge the knowledge gaps that confronted them when BSE first emerged in cattle. The analysis of scientific reasoning pursued in this book has at its heart two philosophical claims. The first claim is that deduction and induction have a rather negligible role to play in the reasoning of scientists who are engaged in a scientific inquiry that is in its formative stage. This is the stage of inquiry when knowledge gaps are at their most pronounced and scientists must conduct their deliberations in conditions of extreme uncertainty. Traditional philosophical accounts of scientific reasoning,41 in which investigators move from certain and known theses by means of deduction to other certain and known theses, bear little or no resemblance to the view of scientific reasoning that is being proposed here. In fact, it is questionable if such accounts have ever borne any resemblance to the actual process of scientific reasoning or if they have merely existed as some type of ideal abstraction from that process in the minds of philosophers. In any event, the relevance of these accounts to scientific reasoning is directly challenged in this study. The second claim of this book is that a group of so-called informal fallacies, which have been maligned throughout most of the long history of logic, are a scientist’s best friend in the early stages of an inquiry. Quite apart from being fallacious, these arguments, I will contend, are entirely acceptable strategies or modes of reasoning when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. We will see in subsequent chapters that the gains that these arguments bestow on inquiry are really quite substantial – an economic ordering of the questions to be addressed in inquiry, the generation of specific lines of inquiry, and the progression of inquiry on an exploratory basis are just a few of them. Certainly, the view of these ‘fallacies’ that emerges is one in which these forms of reasoning are an integral part of cognitive rationality, the part that subserves our cognitive deliberations in the most straitened of epistemic circumstances. To appreciate the main thrust of this approach, consider the predicament in which scientists found themselves when BSE was first recognized in British cattle in 1986. As we saw in Section 1.3.1, all aspects of this new disease were essentially unknown to scientists – key questions about the nature, origin, transmission and transmissibility to humans of this bovine disease lacked readily available answers. Moreover, the evidence that could address these questions was still some way off – in the case of the transmissibility of BSE to humans, it could take many years for such evidence to emerge. In such circumstances, scientists’ epistemic choices were threefold: (1)
28
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
to suspend all judgement until such time as appropriate evidence becomes available, (2) to continue in inquiry employing the same standards of rational acceptability that are employed when appropriate evidence is available or (3) to continue in inquiry employing a different standard of what is to qualify as rationally acceptable in full recognition of the fact that the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. Clearly, the suspension of judgement in (1) is not a viable cognitive policy for scientists to pursue. Scientists are not in the position of a cognitive sceptic who declines any and all commitment to theses. They are ultimately rooted in the practical sphere from where they must achieve a rational basis for action. In the case of an emerging infectious disease like BSE, decisions must be made in advance of the availability of evidence in order that effective disease containment measures may be instituted. Nor can scientists afford to proceed in inquiry in contexts of uncertainty with the same standards of rational acceptability that are operative when evidence is available. For by these standards, scientists’ decisions and judgements would invariably be found rationally wanting. This particular cognitive policy does not capture the fact that even when compelled to form judgements under the most difficult epistemic circumstances, scientists would affirm that those judgements are rationally motivated to the very best extent possible. The only cognitive policy that satisfies the demands of the practical sphere on the one hand and a commitment to attainable rationality on the other hand is option (3). Different standards of rational acceptability must be assumed to operate in the formative stage of an inquiry. These standards do not fall short of some ideal of cognitive rationality. Indeed, to view them as doing so is to experience perpetual dissatisfaction with our own cognitive resources.42 Rather, these standards are part of a highly evolved cognitive rationality that is adapted to cope with diverse epistemic conditions. These conditions must include the absence of knowledge as well as the presence of knowledge. Cognitive rationality that can only guide decisionmaking and judgement formation in favourable epistemic circumstances and that abandons us in adverse conditions is not only an ill-adapted resource but a positively dangerous one. No such rationality, I contend, is at issue in the scientific case (or in more mundane forms of thinking and reasoning, although I will not directly argue in support of this point). The cognitive rationality that sustains scientists in the early stage of an inquiry is an uncertainty-gravitating resource that seeks to bridge knowledge gaps through specially adapted heuristics of reasoning. These heuristics, I contend, are the argument forms that have traditionally been identified as informal fallacies. Whether we are arguing from an absence of knowledge or from a premise that is as uncertain as the conclusion we are attempting to prove, there is a fallacy that embodies the particular logical pattern in question (in this case, the argument from ignorance and question-begging argument, respectively). The aim of this book will be to demonstrate how these argument forms served to bridge the significant knowledge gaps that confronted scientists in the early stages of inquiry into BSE.
Notes
29
Notes 1. A further human TSE, fatal familial insomnia, had not been classified as a TSE in 1986, as there was no evidence at that time that the disease was transmissible (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 28–29). Medori et al. first characterized fatal familial insomnia as a prion disease in 1992. These investigators discovered a mutation in codon 178 of the prion protein gene in two members of a family who presented clinically with progressive insomnia, dysautonomia (disorder of autonomic nervous system function) and motor signs. 2. In his 1982 article, Prusiner remarked upon the ‘extraordinary resistance’ of the scrapie agent to formalin. This resistance was nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in a study by Pattison (1965) who found that scrapie occurred in 8 of 9 goats that had been intracerebrally inoculated with scrapie goat brain that had been stored at room temperature in 10 or 12% formalin for periods ranging from 6 to 28 months. Pattison (1965: 163) stated that ‘[i]n the light of these and other unusual findings regarding the properties of the scrapie agent, that has not yet been identified, the opinion is expressed that if the agent is a living virus it is likely to be a virus of a kind as yet unrecognised’. Other studies appeared to confirm the uniquely resistant properties of the scrapie agent to inactivation. For example, Gibbs et al. (1978) reported the survival of the kuru, CJD and scrapie viruses to unusually high doses of ionizing radiation. However, Rohwer (1984) reported the findings of kinetic studies which demonstrated that the resistance of the scrapie agent is limited to small populations of the total infectivity and that the majority population is highly sensitive to inactivation. 3. ‘The foregoing summary of experimental data indicates that the molecular properties of the scrapie agent differ from those of viruses, viroids, and plasmids. Its resistance to procedures that attack nucleic acids, its resistance to inactivation by heat, and its apparent small size all suggest that the scrapie agent is a novel infectious entity’ (Prusiner 1982: 141). 4. ‘Our data and that of other investigators suggest two possible models for the scrapie agent: (i) a small nucleic acid surrounded by a tightly packed protein coat or (ii) a protein devoid of nucleic acid, that is, an infectious protein. While the first model might seem the most plausible, there is no evidence for a nucleic acid within the agent. The second model is consistent with the experimental data but is clearly heretical’ (Prusiner 1982: 141–142). 5. ‘If prions do not contain a nucleic acid genome which codes for its protein (or proteins), alternative mechanisms of replication and information transfer must then be entertained’ (Prusiner 1982: 143). 6. For example, Strain et al. (1986) described scrapie as a ‘CNS slow virus infection’, Kascsak et al. (1986) and Kimberlin and Walker (1986) as an ‘unconventional slow virus’ and Davanipour et al. (1986) as a ‘slow viral encephalopathy’. Even to the present day, scientists subscribe to the view that a slow virus is responsible for TSEs, BSE specifically included. In this way, Manuelidis (2007: 897) remarks that ‘[t]he transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) such as endemic sheep scrapie, sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), and epidemic bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) may all be caused by a unique class of “slow” viruses. This concept remains the most parsimonious explanation of the evidence to date, and correctly predicted the spread of the BSE agent to vastly divergent species. With the popularization of the prion (infectious protein) hypothesis, substantial data pointing to a TSE virus have been largely ignored. Yet no form of prion protein (PrP) fulfills Koch’s postulates for infection’. 7. Vincent Zigas was an Estonian-born physician who was the district medical officer. He first learned of kuru in 1956 from an Australian district police officer. Carleton Gajdusek was an American paediatrician and virologist who heard about kuru while visiting Australia (Poser 2002a). Along with Baruch S. Blumberg, Gajdusek was the co-recipient of the 1976 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on kuru. 8. While recognising that the agent that caused kuru was novel in certain respects, Gajdusek (1977) nevertheless subscribed to the view that this agent was a virus: ‘Kuru has led us. . .to
30
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
a more exciting frontier in microbiology than only the demonstration of a new mechanism of pathogenesis of infectious disease, namely the recognition of a new group of viruses possessing unconventional physical and chemical properties and biological behavior far different from those of any other group of microorganisms. However, these viruses still demonstrate sufficiently classical behavior of other infectious microbial agents for us to retain, perhaps with misgivings, the title of “viruses”’ (Gajdusek 1977: 943). In his early published work on kuru, Gajdusek subscribed to the view that the disease had a genetic, rather than an infectious, basis (see note 17). The oral route was not the only, or even the most significant, route of transmission of the kuru agent, a point that is frequently overlooked in accounts of cannibalism in the Fore people. Gajdusek himself was aware of the significance of parenteral routes of transmission in kuru when he stated that ‘[i]nfection with the kuru virus was most probably through the cuts and abrasions of the skin, or from nose picking, eye rubbing, or mucosal injury’ (1977: 956). Alpers and Gajdusek (1965) examined the change in mortality of kuru between 2- and 3-year periods, 1957–1959 and 1961–1963. There was a 23% reduction in the total number of kuru deaths between the first and second of these periods. From 7.64 deaths per thousand population per annum between 1957 and 1959, kuru mortality rates had decreased to 5.58 deaths per thousand population per annum, a reduction that was statistically significant. Figures reported by Hornabrook and Moir (1970) show that kuru deaths continued to decrease after 1964, although not as rapidly as in the early 1960s. The term ‘scrapie’ derives from the scraping action that is habitually performed by affected sheep. Palmer (1957: 1318) states that ‘[a]lthough not necessarily the earliest sign of scrapie one of the most important is the apparent irritation that induces the animal to rub itself relentlessly, nibble the skin and tear out wool: the areas denuded of fleece are usually bilaterally symmetrical’. In 1981, the Agricultural Research Council and the Medical Research Council established a joint institution, the Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU), which combined the scrapie research programmes and facilities of all three of these institutions (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 22). Although Hadlow’s work on scrapie is frequently remarked upon, it should not be overlooked that he also investigated transmissible mink encephalopathy. See Section 1.2.5 for discussion of some of Hadlow’s work on this spongiform encephalopathy. As Poser (2002a) recounts, a fortuitous set of circumstances was to lead Hadlow to suggest an analogy between scrapie and kuru. On 28 June 1959, Hadlow was visited at Compton by a colleague, William Jellison, who worked as a parasitologist at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory in Hamilton, Montana. Jellison happened to mention to Hadlow an exhibit on kuru that he had seen at the Wellcome Medical Museum in London. Five days later, Hadlow visited the exhibit. He was struck by the photomicrographs of the neurohistological changes that occurred in kuru and the similarity of these changes to those that he had witnessed in scrapie. On 18 July 1959, Hadlow wrote to the editor of The Lancet to express his thoughts about the similarities between these diseases. This letter appeared on 5 September 1959 entitled ‘Scrapie and Kuru’. ‘. . .it might be profitable, in view of veterinary experience with scrapie, to examine the possibility of the experimental induction of kuru in a laboratory primate, for one might surmise that the pathogenetic mechanisms involved in scrapie – however unusual they may be – are unlikely to be unique in the province of animal pathology’ (Hadlow 1959: 290). Fearing a printer’s strike, Hadlow sent a copy of his letter, soon to be published in The Lancet, to Gajdusek. In his book Deadly Feasts, Richard Rhodes commented that Gajdusek told him that Hadlow’s letter ‘had forced [him] to reconsider the problem’ (1997: 64). This view of the genetic basis of kuru was expressed in Gajdusek’s first published article on the disease and in subsequent articles. In this way, Gajdusek and Zigas (1957: 974) stated that ‘[t]hese clinical observations, along with further epidemiologic study, suggest a possible
Notes
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
31
genetic etiology or, at least, hereditary predisposition for this unusual condition’. In a later paper, Alpers and Gajdusek (1965: 852) stated that ‘in view of the absolute ethnic limitation of the disease overriding all boundaries of custom and environment, some genetic mechanism must form the basis for it’. As investigators began to link kuru to the practice of cannibalism, the view that kuru had a genetic basis was increasingly challenged. In this way, Hornabrook and Moir (1970: 1178) stated that ‘the epidemiological data suggest that a special genetic constitution may not be a prerequisite for contracting kuru. Instead, the presence of the kuru agent in a limited geographical area, combined with a mode of transmission dependent on a primitive custom, is sufficient to explain the restriction of the disease to the Fore people and their neighbours’. Poser (2002a: 9) states that ‘[i]t is to William Hadlow’s enormous credit that he was the first to make the crucial connection between animal and human disease, paving the way for one of the most significant scientific developments of the twentieth century and making it possible for both Gajdusek and Prusiner to win the Nobel Prize, but not sharing in that recognition’. Although Hadlow’s realization that scrapie and kuru exhibited histological similarities was a key development on the road to Prusiner proposing his protein-only prion theory, other contributions also helped shape this theory. For discussion of these contributions, the reader is referred to Poser (2002b). In all these experiments, infected and disease-free animals were in direct contact with each other. Scrapie has also been shown to infect sheep under field conditions when infected and disease-free animals have used the same land separated by a period of years. Pálsson (1979) describes how Icelandic lambs developed rida (scrapie) when they were introduced to land that had been free from scrapie infected sheep for a period of 3 years. Pálsson (1979: 362) states that ‘[t]his experience indicates an indirect spread of the disease and at the same time a long term persistence of the agent causing rida’. This is also borne out by a later study in which Kimberlin and Walker (1979) examined intracerebral, intraperitoneal, intravenous and subcutaneous routes of scrapie infection in Compton white mice. In peripheral routes of infection, replication of the scrapie agent occurred early in the spleen and reached a plateau concentration of agent before replication occurred in the spinal cord, the latter after 25–42% of the incubation period (a roughly comparable percentage of the incubation period – 24–34% – had elapsed before replication occurred in the spinal cord in intracerebral inoculation). In peripheral routes, 41–55% of the incubation period had elapsed before replication of the agent occurred in the brain. This is much later than in intracerebral inoculation where replication of the agent in the brain was detected after just 13–19% of the incubation period had elapsed. Kimberlin and Walker claim that this pattern of replication suggests the spread of the scrapie agent from the spleen to the spinal cord and then to the brain in peripheral routes of infection. That route of inoculation has an effect on degree of vacuolation was confirmed in a study by Outram et al. (1973). These investigators inoculated two inbred strains of mice with the ME7 scrapie agent. Inoculation was performed intracerebrally and intraperitoneally. The route of injection had the largest effect on the degree of vacuolation, assessed in terms of the intensity of grey matter vacuolation in nine areas of the brain. Although the genotype of the donor and recipient also had a highly significant effect on the shape of the lesion profile, this effect was of a smaller magnitude than that due to route. The lymphoreticular system (LRS) contains bone marrow, tonsils, spleen, thymus and lymph nodes. Additionally, in ruminants, there is an additional primary lymphoid tissue in the gut called the ileal Peyer’s patch. In addition to histological changes, a number of gross changes of the brain can also be observed. Kimberlin and Millson (1967) reported a slow, progressive decrease in brain weight in scrapie affected mice that started at around 40–50 days after inoculation. This process greatly accelerated just before the first clinical signs of scrapie appeared. Dickinson et al. (1968a) proposed the term ‘sinc’ for this gene to denote scrapie incubation period.
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BSE – A Leap Into The Unknown
25. In 2005, Windl et al. succeeded in transmitting TME to transgenic mice which expressed the mink prion protein gene. 26. Marsh and Hanson also found that the agent was sensitive to ether and susceptible to proteolytic digestion with pronase. The combination of these features led these investigators to state that ‘[i]t appears that the TME agent cannot be easily differentiated from the scrapie agent on the basis of their biochemical properties’ (1969: 179). 27. Marsh et al. (1970) failed to demonstrate specific serum antibody or immune complexes in the brains of mink with TME. 28. It was some years later before oral transmission of CWD was demonstrated. Sigurdson et al. (1999) orally inoculated mule deer fawns with a brain homogenate that was derived from mule deer with naturally occurring CWD. PrPres, an abnormal prion protein isoform, was detected in alimentary-tract-associated lymphoid tissues as early as 42 days following inoculation and in all fawns at 53–80 days after inoculation. Sigurdson et al. (1999: 2757) state that ‘[t]he rapid infection of deer fawns following exposure by the most plausible natural route is consistent with the efficient horizontal transmission of CWD in nature’. 29. It will be seen in subsequent chapters that bovine tissues were used in the manufacture of human medicinal and surgical products including surgical catgut and vaccinations. These products thus presented a risk of parenteral transmission of BSE to humans. 30. Sir Richard Southwood was the Chairman of the Southwood Working Party, which was established on the recommendation of Sir Donald Acheson (Chief Medical Officer, 1983–1991) ‘to advise on the implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and matters relating thereto’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 4: 2). The Working Party consisted of a professor of zoology (Sir Richard Southwood), a professor of virology (Anthony Epstein), a clinical neurologist (Sir John Walton) and a veterinarian (Dr William B. Martin). 31. Of course, it could be argued that in performing transmission experiments to establish that this new disease was a bovine TSE, scientists were already assuming that such was the case (for if this were not the case, why would scientists perform transmission experiments as opposed to a myriad of other possible experiments?). Implicit in this contention is the claim that scientists were engaging in a cyclical process of argumentation whereby they had assumed that the new bovine disease was a TSE in order to be able to demonstrate that it was a TSE. I will argue in Chapter 4 that such cyclical patterns of argumentation are inherent in scientific inquiry and that these patterns are non-fallacious in nature. 32. The identification of BSE as a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy proceeded initially on the basis of histopathological examination of the brains of affected animals at the Central Veterinary Laboratory in Weybridge, Surrey. Hope et al. (1988) identified BSE fibrils which were similar to scrapie-associated fibrils (SAFs) in electron microscopic studies of brain homogenates. These fibrils contained the bovine homologue of a protease-resistant form of PrP which was a molecular marker of SAFs. Attempts at the CVL to transmit BSE to hamsters in February 1987 and then again in January 1988 were unsuccessful. The transmissible nature of BSE was finally confirmed in September 1988 when inoculations of mice, which had been undertaken in November 1987, were found to induce disease (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 68). 33. Some indication of just how significant sheep were in terms of human meat consumption can be gleaned from MAFF figures for meat production between 1986 and 1995. During this period, sheepmeat production in the UK experienced steady growth before flattening out. Production increased by 30% from 301,000 tonnes in 1986 to 400,000 tonnes in 1995, with a peak of 418,000 tonnes in 1991 (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 10: 26). 34. In rendering, the raw material from slaughterhouses was crushed and heated. Moisture in the material was evaporated which enabled the fat (called ‘tallow’) to be separated from the highprotein solids (known as ‘greaves’). In order to remove further tallow, the greaves underwent more processing by pressing, centrifuging and solvent extraction. The protein-rich material that resulted from these further processes was then ground into meat and bone meal (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 25–26).
Notes
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35. ‘The form of the epidemic was typical of an extended common source in which all affected animals were index cases. . .The findings were consistent with exposure of cattle to a scrapielike agent, via cattle feedstuffs containing ruminant-derived protein’ (Wilesmith et al. 1988: 638). 36. Although the Southwood Working Party concluded that it was most unlikely that BSE would have any implications for human health, the general conclusions section of their report ended with this warning: ‘Nevertheless, if our assessment of these likelihoods is incorrect, the implications would be extremely serious’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 55). 37. At the time of the Southwood Report (submitted to government on 9 February 1989), suspected BSE cases were being reported at the rate of about 400 a month (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 17). 38. It is regrettable that the very scientific disciplines that need to examine how scientists engage in reasoning often devote little or no effort to this important reflective exercise. Journals in epidemiology routinely do not publish the type of critical and philosophical discussions that this reflection requires. Indeed, the dearth of such discussions has prompted the development of a new, online journal. In this way, Phillips et al. (2004) state that ‘the desire for new information means that the health science literature is overwhelmingly devoted to reporting new findings, leaving little opportunity to improve the quality of the science. Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations was created to provide a forum for efforts to improve the quality of health science research and its applications’. Humanities and social scientific disciplines, including philosophy, sociology and politics, are very often the only fields in which scientific reasoning and decision-making come under any scrutiny. 39. Christakos et al. (2005) adopt a critical stance towards the current state of epidemiology. They believe that the discipline’s preoccupation with technical practice has led to an impoverishment of the type of theoretical developments that will lead to the generation of new models of reasoning adapted to conditions of uncertainty. We will have cause to return to the views of these investigators in subsequent chapters. 40. And they are maybe still doing so. Walton (2002: 112) remarks that ‘logic textbooks are still dominated by deductive and inductive reasoning, many of them implying by their treatment of the subject matter that these two types of inference are all that are important to know about in logic’. 41. The deductive model of scientific reasoning in these accounts has its historical precedents in Aristotle and, latterly, logical positivism, as Bechtel (1988: 22) remarks in his discussion of the positivists’ deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation: ‘Following a tradition that does back at least to Aristotle, the Positivists maintained that explaining an event consisted of deriving a statement describing that event from statements of scientific laws and statements describing antecedently known empirical facts (initial conditions). Thus, deduction plays a central role in their account of explanation. . .’. 42. The dissatisfaction described here has its roots in a very old epistemological problem concerning the relationship of mind to the world. Philosophers have variously assumed that it is possible to step outside of our minds and assume a metaphysical standpoint (a God’s eye point of view) from which we can describe the world as it actually is or that it is not possible to make this leap, in which case we are confined to our mental procedures and resources which are unable to reflect how things actually are (hence, the dissatisfaction mentioned in the main text). Also, there are other philosophers (Hilary Putnam is a case in point) who challenge the very idea of an interface between mind and world that must be transcended and the notion that a metaphysical standpoint even makes any sense. For the reader who is interested in pursuing this debate, Putnam (1990, 1992, 1994) provides a good starting point. The same metaphysical standpoint, I have argued, has been lurking in discussions of argument and fallacy (see Cummings 2002a, 2003, 2004a).
Chapter 2
The Scientific Challenge
2.1 Introduction In the last chapter, I described how a number of argument forms that had traditionally been characterized by philosophers as weak or fallacious modes of reasoning could be shown to facilitate scientific inquiry into BSE when little was known about this new brain disease in cattle. The point was made that these argument forms have relevance to the epidemiologists and public health scientists whose task it was to identify and respond to this emerging infectious disease. However, this point requires some explanatory work if it is to have more than a very general application to the work of these public health professionals. For these professionals might ask with some justification why they should treat seriously argument forms that have been deemed to be logically inadequate by generations of philosophers. They might also wonder if philosophical discussion of reasoning has anything but the most abstract lessons for scientists who are charged with containing infectious diseases. In this chapter, I undertake this explanatory work by arguing that philosophical contributions on reasoning and argument are not only relevant to epidemiology, but that they also represent the very best prospect for investigators of addressing some of the criticisms of epidemiology that have been raised in recent years. These criticisms have been expressed most clearly by Christakos et al. (2005), although other theorists have also added their voices to the exchange. I believe, and will subsequently argue, that it is only when epidemiology and philosophy come together on questions relating to reasoning that true progress will be made on devising models of reasoning that are adapted to conditions of uncertainty. Certainly, this belief is the principal motivation for the model of reasoning that will be defended throughout this book. If the model of scientific reasoning that I am proposing is to have epidemiological value, it must be able to demonstrate its worth to the early investigations of epidemiologists in the BSE crisis. Accordingly, this chapter will also be used to extend the examination of those investigations which was commenced in Chapter 1. The aim will be to show how this model is very directly motivated by the deliberations that were undertaken as part of those investigations. Specifically, the conclusions of those early epidemiological studies set in motion an argumentative strategy that was
L. Cummings, Rethinking the BSE Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9504-6_2, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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to shape all subsequent inquiry into BSE. That strategy was a form of analogical reasoning, the central premise of which sought to relate BSE in cattle to scrapie in sheep. The warrant that attended that premise is of critical significance in assessing the rational merits of this argument form and of the many decisions and risk assessments that were based upon analogical reasoning throughout the BSE crisis. In order to assess the strength of that warrant, we must first know something about the epidemiological context in which it was developed. A thoroughgoing examination of that context will be the second main task of this chapter.
2.2 The Current Paradigm in Epidemiology In a recent book, Christakos et al. (2005) undertake a much needed critical examination of the modern science of epidemiology. These authors present a strong case for their claim that the current paradigm in epidemiology is fundamentally flawed. Although I do not wish to rehearse the full details of their argument, its essence can be captured by the following points: (1) the focus of epidemiology is on technical practices rather than on theoretical developments1 ; (2) there has been little recognition in epidemiology of the essentially interdisciplinary nature of much public health research2 ; (3) the current paradigm has neglected to give any emphasis to epistemic cognition notions such as reasoning3 ; (4) there has been little or no attention given to the spatiotemporal characteristics of epidemics under conditions of uncertainty.4 To respond to these weaknesses of the current paradigm, Christakos et al. (2005: 5) propose the development of a synthetic epidemic paradigm (SEP) that will be able to account for the points listed above ‘in a mathematically tractable and epidemiologically thoughtful fashion’. The extent to which SEP succeeds in addressing the shortcomings of the current paradigm is the topic of another discussion. In the present context, I want to consider how the model of scientific reasoning that will be presented throughout this book can respond to these features and how a much greater role for philosophy within epidemiology is envisioned as a result.
2.2.1 Theoretical Development in Epidemiology A chief concern of Christakos et al. is the lack of theoretical development within epidemiology. This theoretical void has been filled by a proliferation of studies whose main concern is the use of techniques.5 Kaplan (2004: 127) states that: [T]here has been considerable lament regarding the ascendancy of technique over theory in epidemiology and its separation from basic foci of public health. Indeed, development of epidemiologic theory per se, separate from techniques for analyzing causal effects and partitioning sources of noise in data may be required.
In the absence of theoretical development, epidemiology has become preoccupied with conducting studies of associations. Many of these associations are weak and never replicated. Their combined effect has been to bring about an erosion of
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The Current Paradigm in Epidemiology
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public trust in the state of the science (Taubes 1995). Certainly, the findings of these various studies get us nowhere in the absence of an underlying theory that is able to offer some explanation of these associations. In relation to his own field of social epidemiology,6 Kaplan (2004: 128) remarks that: [T]he spatial scope over which determinants of specific outcomes such as all-cause mortality, infant mortality, or cardiovascular disease, or other outcomes, operate is less clear. Without some theory to suggest the ways in which the determinants of these outcomes are spatially embedded, one is left with a plethora of analyses of “area” effects that seem more often driven by the level of spatial data available, or other arbitrary factors, than by reasoned etiologic considerations.
The paucity of theoretical labour in epidemiology has adverse implications for the knowledge base of the discipline. When that knowledge base is impoverished, our ability to engage in scientific explanations and predictions is considerably diminished. Yet, these are the very activities that scientists must undertake in order to mount an effective response to a newly emerging infectious disease. To predict the behaviour of an epidemic across space-time, for example, scientists must draw upon theoretical frameworks in a range of disciplines, including mathematics, systems engineering, molecular biology, toxicology, climate change and demography (Christakos et al. 2005). Where these frameworks are lacking or are otherwise poorly developed, the epidemiologist must approach the task of prediction with the burden of uncertainty. It is this burden that the epidemiologist aims to minimize through the development of ever more powerful models of reasoning.7 The model of scientific reasoning that I will be proposing in this book is simultaneously realistic and optimistic about the place of uncertainty in inquiry. On the one hand, it recognizes that uncertainty is an unavoidable feature of scientific inquiry.8 On the other hand, it believes that uncertainty can be brought within manageable limits. Each of the argument forms that will be demonstrated throughout this book serves to contain uncertainty by bridging specific gaps in our knowledge. These gaps may ultimately come to be ‘filled in’ as results from experimental studies begin to emerge. Until such time as these results are forthcoming, however, reasoning strategies that include circular arguments, arguments based on analogy and arguments from ignorance perform a useful facilitative function, that of advancing inquiry on a tentative basis. To appreciate how this is possible in the case of one of these arguments, the argument from ignorance, one need only consider one of the many ways in which this argument was used during scientific inquiry into BSE. The lack of evidence that scrapie had transmitted to humans in the 250 years it had been present in British sheep populations was taken to support the proposition that scrapie was not transmissible to humans. This proposition was something very much worth knowing, as it was used in subsequent assessments by scientists of the risk that BSE posed to human health. A renewed emphasis on theoretical developments within epidemiology is essential if the knowledge base of this scientific discipline is to be expanded. But an equally important part of this emphasis must be the development of innovative ways of reasoning from the incomplete knowledge bases of epidemiology and related disciplines.
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2.2.2 Epidemiology and Other Disciplines As the above example of epidemic prediction demonstrates, the theoretical frameworks that inform the scientific activities of explanation and prediction come from a range of disciplines. Interdisciplinarity is at the heart of the SEP that Christakos et al. wish to see replace the current paradigm in epidemiology.9 According to these authors, ‘important sources of knowledge available in the physical and life disciplines are ignored at the cost of profoundly inadequate epidemic and human exposure studies’ (2005: 4). One discipline above all others that influences how Christakos et al. approach epidemiology is philosophy. These authors reflect very deeply on questions that are essentially epistemological in nature. They argue, for example, that ‘regardless of how technical or formal [public health scientists’] research may be, they will always need to gain intellectual access to issues such as the nature and reliability of knowledge, the conception of reality, the reasoning mode, and the underlying methodological assumptions’ (2005: 66). To this extent, public health scientists may find themselves operating as ‘applied philosophers’. Nor are Christakos et al. alone in envisioning a role for philosophy in epidemiology. While epidemiological studies have little difficulty demonstrating associations between risk factors and disease, only some of these associations are genuinely causal relationships. The strong tendency of epidemiologists to interpret even weak associations as causal relationships suggests that something may be wrong with the way these scientists conceive of the notion of causality.10 Rothman (2002: 15–16) states that how this notion is applied within science in general, and epidemiology in particular, is a question of interest to philosophers of science: [H]ow do we go about determining whether a given relation is causal? Some scientists refer to checklists for causal inference, and others focus on complicated statistical approaches, but the answer to this question is not to be found either in checklists or in statistical methods. The question itself is tantamount to asking how we apply the scientific method to epidemiologic research. This question leads directly to the philosophy of science.
Philosophy has a further intellectual contribution to make to discussion within epidemiology. As the critical discipline par excellence, philosophy has a key role to play in addressing scientists’ concerns that epidemiology has for many years experienced a grievous lack of critical analysis. For example, Phillips (2008: 62) remarks that ‘epidemiology is characterized by the cranking out of thousands of new research reports per month, with little attempt at critical analysis’.11 In an earlier article, Phillips et al. (2004: 2) state that: It is troubling that we plow ahead with billions of dollars worth of research every year while making minimal effort to answer fundamental questions about what the research is really telling us. Epidemiology is far too important to our society to be treated as an exercise in uncritically following existing formulae.
Clearly, epidemiologists must engage in a critical way with the very standards and methods that are integral to their own discipline. If critical analysis can reverse the largely uncritical bent of epidemiology to date, then philosophy is the obvious
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The Current Paradigm in Epidemiology
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place to seek out such analysis. Trainee epidemiologists would do well, for example, to engage with the critical thinking courses of philosophy students. For it is in such courses that significant questions concerning types of arguments and standards of evidence are routinely examined and debated.12 Christakos et al. (2005: 64) appear to concur with this emphasis on critical thinking when they state that ‘critical thinking systems based on the close interaction between concepts and experimental fact may be more valuable in public health research and development than belief-based systems’. It emerges that philosophy has much to offer the study of epidemiology. From epistemology to philosophy of science and critical thinking, philosophy undoubtedly has a strong contribution to make to this scientific discipline. Christakos and others are to be congratulated for recognizing the significance of that contribution. In the chapters to follow, however, I want to go much further than these investigators by extending philosophy’s contribution to epidemiology to that sub-discipline of logic that is concerned with the study of informal fallacies. In navigating the logical terrain between rationally acceptable and fallacious forms of argument, informal logicians are uniquely placed to address issues of uncertainty in reasoning. Some consideration of the task of argument evaluation reveals why this is the case (we will return to argument evaluation in later chapters). A central tenet of the presumptive and pragmatic frameworks that are at the heart of the model of reasoning presented in this book is that the boundary between rational acceptability and fallaciousness in the study of argument is not pre-ordained and absolute but is subject to variation on the basis of features of context. Uncertainty is a significant feature of epistemic context and, as such, must enter into the task of argument evaluation for the informal logician. To the extent that epidemiologists must also address issues of uncertainty, most notably during scientific inquiry, there is much that these scientists can glean, I will argue, from the critical insights of informal logic. Certainly, this particular parallel between the disciplines of informal logic on the one hand and epidemiology on the other hand will be very much in evidence in the arguments presented in this book.
2.2.3 Reasoning and Epidemiology Beyond challenging the dearth of theoretical research and lack of genuine interdisciplinarity in epidemiology, Christakos et al. mount another revealing attack on the current paradigm. This paradigm, they argue, effectively neglects the contribution of epistemic cognition notions to the study of epidemiology: The solution of mathematical models of epidemics has been viewed as a purely ontologic affair that focuses on abstract and dry formulas, whereas crucial factors – such as modes of perception and reasoning, and their integration – are neglected. Thus, what the current perspective is missing is that these models are imperfect constructs of the human mind, often they do not account for essential site-specific knowledge, and they constitute an uncertain representation of reality (2005: 4; italics in original).
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The Scientific Challenge
The emphasis given to our cognitive procedures in Christakos et al.’s epistemic cognition framework13 is at once refreshing and instructive. It is refreshing because for too long epidemiology has viewed our cognitive procedures with more than a little distrust. This is evident in the proliferation of formal and statistical techniques which, it is argued, deliver nature to us objectively – something that the current paradigm in epidemiology appears to have assumed our own cognitive resources are powerless to do.14 It is interesting to note that the epidemiologist is acting on the same impulse as the knowledge sceptic, who positively urges us not to accept what our cognitive procedures (e.g. perception) tell us about the world. That impulse leads both the epidemiologist and the knowledge sceptic to view our cognitive procedures as being irretrievably flawed for no other reason than they are prone to error. And a cognitive procedure that commits errors (so the argument goes) is a cognitive procedure that cannot be trusted to deliver knowledge to us. However, to dispense with our cognitive procedures on the ground that they are prone to error is to overlook the facts that these procedures can and do serve us well and that they are the basis of our many epistemic successes.15 The emphasis on cognitive procedures within Christakos et al.’s epistemic cognition framework is also instructive. For whatever epidemic models and solutions we set about developing, they are ultimately judged to be acceptable and plausible by standards that are implicit in our cognitive procedures: [T]he solution of [an epidemic] system should follow certain rules of reasoning. But these rules are, in the final analysis, propositions about one’s epistemic cognition process. The reasoning rules leading to a solution in uncertain space-time domains do not constitute an independent ontologic entity, but they are rather implicit in the epistemic cognition process that enforces them (Christakos et al. 2005: 22).
As well as urging the epidemiologist to relocate the focus of study on the cognitive procedures that generate mathematical solutions to epidemics, Christakos et al. believe those solutions should be judged by cognitively attainable standards. A similar cognitive reorientation is envisaged in the model of reasoning based on informal fallacies that will be advanced in this book. The philosophical study of fallacies has displayed the same neglect of the cognitive domain that Christakos et al. believe characterizes the current paradigm in epidemiology.16 This neglect has had rather unfortunate consequences. Despite fallacies being committed by arguers and detected (or not, as the case may be) by other arguers, the presence of a thinking agent has been largely subordinated to other issues in discussion of the fallacies. Moreover, fallacies have been evaluated according to standards that are set apart from our cognitive procedures.17 In aiming to locate fallacies firmly within a wider cognitive framework, I propose to take seriously a claim by John Woods (2004: xxvi) that ‘an account of fallacies needs to be set in a more general theory of cognitive agency’. When recast in cognitive terms, many informal fallacies lose the appearance of fallaciousness that has engendered so many centuries of philosophical rejection.18 Quite apart from being ‘improprieties of rational performance’ or ‘failures of one or another of our basic rational survival skills’ (Woods 2004: 10–11), the fallacies can be shown to have positive survival value for the cognitive
2.2
The Current Paradigm in Epidemiology
41
agents who possess them. Of course, these arguments can still misfire and cause agents to pursue unproductive and (occasionally) catastrophic courses of action. Nevertheless, they confer sufficient epistemic advantage on any agent that possesses them to warrant their continued inclusion in what Woods calls our ‘rational survival kit’.
2.2.4 Spatiotemporal Factors and Epidemiology Spatial and temporal factors play a significant role in the spread of any infectious disease. The widespread geographical distribution (space) of early BSE cases and the distribution of cases by month and year of onset (time) led epidemiologists to conclude that the epidemic had an extended common source (i.e. contaminated meat and bone meal). Spatial factors were of vital importance in the SARS outbreak of 2003. We now know that the outbreak in many locations began with ill travellers coming from SARS-affected areas and that healthcare settings played an important role in amplifying outbreaks (Lingappa et al. 2004). With the ongoing threat to human health from avian and swine influenzas,19 spatial and temporal considerations are integral to the epidemiological models that scientists are using to predict the behaviour of pandemic human influenza. These models predict, for example, that for effective control of this disease to be achieved, antiviral prophylaxis would have to be started within approximately 3 weeks of the first human-to-human transmissions and within two days of the onset of a new case once an outbreak is underway. This control strategy, Smith (2006) argues, would be extremely difficult to achieve in rural Southeast Asia. Beyond models of infectious diseases, spatial and temporal factors are equally important to disease modelling in other branches of epidemiology. Christakos et al. (2005: 7) state that ‘in the case of environmental epidemiology, the adequate description of the geographical and temporal distribution of the exposures (toxic chemicals, radioactive materials, etc.) to which the population has been subjected is a crucial component of any modelling study’. Krieger (2001: 694) places similar emphasis on spatiotemporal factors in social epidemiology when she states that ‘[a]dequate epidemiological explanations . . . must account for both persisting and changing distributions of disease, including social inequalities in health, across time and space’. Notwithstanding the centrality of spatiotemporal factors to the study of disease processes, it is clear that epidemiological investigations have not always acknowledged these factors. Christakos et al. (2005: 4) believe that the neglect of spatial and temporal factors represents one of the ‘significant limitations of the current epidemic paradigm’: Mathematically rigorous and epidemically meaningful stochastic tools (e.g., spatiotemporal random field theory) have been ignored in favor of deterministic methods and classical statistics techniques that neglect vital cross-correlations and laws of change on space-time manifolds.
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The Scientific Challenge
Kaplan (2004: 126) is equally critical of diagrammatic models in social epidemiology in which ‘[i]nformation is seldom available at the multitude of levels portrayed in such models and, where available, is often measured cross-sectionally, making the temporal influences that we consider so important in the assessment of causality opaque’ (italics added). Similarly, Holmes (1997: 111) bemoans the neglect of spatial considerations in epidemiological theory when she states that: [M]ost classical epidemiological theory glosses over the spatial dimension of disease transmission and instead assumes that every individual is equally likely to contact every other. A key question is to what extent do we lose insight or are quantitatively misled by modelling the intrinsically spatial process of disease spread with nonspatial theory.
Krieger (2003: 384) attempts to explain the loss of ‘place’ in epidemiology and proposes a possible remedy in the form of geographic information system technology: [D]espite epidemiology’s longstanding concern with “time, place, and person” (or, perhaps more accurately, “time, place, and population”), “place” had receded into the background by the mid-20th century, conceptually unmoored from increasingly influential etiologic frameworks based on characteristics of the individual. Fortunately, geographic information system technology has contributed in recent years to a reviving awareness that any epidemiologic explanation worth its salt must encompass geographic – and temporal – variations in population health.
The model of reasoning that will be presented in this book attempts to address this neglect of spatiotemporal factors by directly integrating these factors within the rational evaluation of the argument forms that were used by scientists during the BSE inquiry. The temporal dimension is particularly significant to such evaluation. It is to be expected, for example, that the epistemic context in which scientists conducted inquiry changed over time as more became known about BSE and as the results of experimental studies began to emerge. This context was thus dynamic and evolving rather than static and immutable as the epidemic raged on in the years during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Accordingly, the reasoning strategies that served scientists well at one time point in inquiry might be expected to become redundant at a later time point. To address this essential temporal dimension of the BSE problem, a chronological approach will be adopted when examining the reasoning of scientists. It is of interest to this study, for example, that a particular argumentative strategy was used intensively by scientists in the early weeks and months of the BSE epidemic when little was known about this new brain disease in cattle. But it is equally interesting to establish if this strategy persisted across the time course of the epidemic and, if not, how it was revised or discharged. The temporal dimension is integral to epidemic modelling in epidemiology and public health science. It will become evident to the reader that temporal considerations had an equally significant role to play in the reasoning of scientists during the BSE epidemic.
2.3
Early Epidemiological Investigations
43
2.3 Early Epidemiological Investigations It was described above how reasoning based on an analogy between BSE in cattle and scrapie in sheep was an integral part of the argumentative strategy that shaped scientific inquiry into BSE. This analogy had its origin in the early epidemiological investigations that were conducted into BSE and specifically a study that was undertaken by Wilesmith et al. (1988). This study sought to relate this new brain disease in cattle to scrapie in sheep and it is to it that we must turn in order to establish the strength or otherwise of this emergent analogy. Our task will be the reconstruction of the different arguments that these investigators used to support the claim that BSE and scrapie were essentially related diseases. These arguments are interlinked in revealing and complex ways (see Diagram 2.1). One of these arguments has the status of a main or primary argument. The conclusion of this argument is the analogical thesis that motivated much subsequent reasoning during the BSE crisis. Other arguments are subarguments in that their conclusions serve as premises within the main or primary argument. These subarguments developed a number of independent lines of evidence that converged on the same primary argument. Having reconstructed these arguments, our next task will be their rational evaluation.20 We cannot proceed to assess the rational merits of the different analogical arguments that were in evidence during the BSE inquiry if we don’t first establish the rational standing of the analogical thesis that is the main premise of these arguments. This latter, evaluative task will reveal the tentative, presumptive nature of the early reasoning of BSE scientists.
MOLECULAR ARGUMENT P1: BSE fibrils contain a bovine homologue of PrP, a molecular marker of SAFs (Hope et al. 1988)
C: There are molecular similarities between BSE and scrapie, in that both diseases contain aberrant forms of the PrP protein
HISTOPATHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
PRIMARY ARGUMENT Molecular premise: BSE fibrils contain an aberrant protein that is similar to PrP in scrapie-associated fibrils
Histopathological premise: BSE produces similar histopathological changes in brain tissues as other TSEs, including scrapie
Epidemiological premise: Incidence and distribution of BSE cases is consistent with food-borne transmission of scrapie to cattle
P1: Vacuolation is present in neurones of grey matter in BSE cases (Wells et al. 1987)
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT P1: All BSE cases were fed commercial concentrates (Wilesmith et al. 1988) P2: BSE incidence is greatest in dairy herds (Wilesmith et al. 1988) P3: Exposure of cattle to BSE is coincident with increased exposure to scrapie agent (Wilesmith et al. 1988) P4: Distribution of BSE cases is consistent with distribution of MBM (Wilesmith et al. 1988) P5: Food-borne transmission of scrapie has been suggested as a probable cause of TME (Marsh and Hanson 1979; Hartsough and Burger 1965) P6: Scrapie-like diseases found in nyala and gemsbok (Anon 1986; Jeffrey and Wells 1988). Investigation revealed that both animals had been fed concentrate ration containing MBM (Wilesmith et al. 1988)
P2: Fibrils that are morphologically similar to SAFs are found in BSE cases (Wells et al. 1987)
C: BSE produces similar histopathological changes in brain tissue as other TSEs, including scrapie
Aetiological conclusion: BSE is similar to (is aetiologically related to) scrapie in sheep (Wilesmith et al. 1988)
Diagram 2.1 Reconstruction of the arguments linking BSE to scrapie
C: Epidemiological evidence is consistent with food-borne transmission of scrapie to cattle
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The Scientific Challenge
The epidemiological study conducted by Wilesmith et al. (1988) was initiated in June 1987. This study undertook to obtain descriptive epidemiological, including genetic information, about early BSE cases; to monitor the incidence of BSE within herds and nationally; to collect data on the duration of the disease and the frequency of clinical signs, and to develop hypotheses about the aetiology of the disease. It is this last aspect of the study that is of particular significance to us as we seek to reconstruct the reasoning that led John Wilesmith and his colleagues to conclude that there were ‘aetiological similarities’ between BSE and scrapie in sheep. It is important to be clear from the outset about what this claim of aetiological similarity meant to these investigators. Wilesmith et al. were not merely stating that BSE was similar to scrapie in the sense that both diseases belonged to the group of TSEs (although this statement is clearly a corollary of their claim of aetiological similarity). Rather, these investigators were making the more specific claim that the infectious agent that causes scrapie in sheep had transmitted via a feed source to cattle and was now causing BSE. This specific claim of aetiological similarity, I will argue subsequently, was ‘strengthened’ during the BSE crisis to become a claim of aetiological identity (BSE is scrapie in cattle). This ‘bovine scrapie’ thesis and its weaker ‘similarity’ counterpart (BSE is similar to scrapie in sheep) assumed the status of explicit and implicit premises21 in the reasoning of BSE scientists. Certainly, these theses formed the cornerstone of much analogical reasoning during the BSE inquiry. In 1988, when Wilesmith et al. were advancing their claim of aetiological similarity, it could not be directly validated. Specifically, strain-typing studies, which were to reveal that the BSE ‘signature’ was distinct not only from scrapie but also from other naturally occurring TSEs, had yet to be completed.22 Consequently, Wilesmith et al. were forced to fall back on a number of less direct sources of evidence. One such source was histopathological evidence presented in a paper by Wells et al. (1987).23 This evidence consisted of two findings based on the investigation of
Fig. 2.1 BSE positive cows. The vacant stare, low head carriage and a wide-based hind limb stance are typical of the disease. Behavioural changes in temperament (e.g. nervousness or aggression), abnormal posture, incoordination and difficulty in rising, decreased milk production, and/or loss of weight despite continued appetite are followed by death in cattle affected by BSE (Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), respectively)
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pathological material obtained from four herds with BSE cases: (1) the presence in the grey matter of neuronal degeneration that most often involved intracytoplasmic vacuoles and (2) the electron microscopic identification of fibrils that morphologically closely resembled scrapie-associated fibrils (SAFs).24 (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3). It is clear that Wells et al. took these histopathological features to suggest a ‘similarity’ or ‘resemblances’ between BSE and encephalopathies caused by unconventional infectious agents in other species: There are strong resemblances between this disorder of cattle and the unconventional viral agent encephalopathies recorded in several species (1987: 420; italics added). [T]he authors regard this sporadic, slowly progressive, neurological disorder of adult cattle, characterised by grey matter vacuolation and scrapie associated fibrils, as compelling provisional evidence of similarity with diseases caused by unconventional infectious agents (1987: 420; italics added).
Yet, there are at least two significant ways in which these ‘similarity’ claims differ from those that were later advanced by Wilesmith et al. (1988). Firstly, Wells et al. did not attempt to draw any aetiological connection with scrapie in particular – the similarity in question was with TSEs in general. Secondly, although these resemblances were described as ‘strong’ and evidence of similarity was ‘compelling’, Wells et al. were also keen to stress the largely tentative nature of these early conclusions about the aetiology of BSE. Their caution is signalled through the emphasis of the ‘provisional’ nature of the evidence. Also, they remarked that ‘[a]dditional evidence is required. . .to establish the true nature of this entity’ (Wells et al. 1987: 420). Finally, these investigators stated that ‘[i]t should be emphasised that at present the aetiological basis of bovine spongiform encephalopathy remains
Fig. 2.2 BSE positive-neuropil vacuolation in the nucleus of the solitary tract (bovine brainstem at the level of the obex). © Crown copyright 2011. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office or the Veterinary Laboratories Agency or any other government department
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Fig. 2.3 Scrapie-associated fibril, magnification X 39,000. © Crown copyright 2011. Published with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office or the Veterinary Laboratories Agency or any other government department
unknown and no connection with encephalopathies in other species has been established’ (1987: 420). The tentativeness and generality of Wells et al.’s ‘similarity’ claims are indicative of their rather low epistemic standing. Certainly, these claims had an altogether lower epistemic standing than the ‘similarity’ claims that were subsequently endorsed by Wilesmith and his colleagues. Histopathological evidence provided Wilesmith et al. with a rational basis upon which to begin developing an analogy between this new brain disease in cattle and scrapie in sheep. Yet, this evidence was still some way off establishing the more specific aetiological link with scrapie that emerged from Wilesmith et al.’s early epidemiological investigation. Additional evidence was needed in order to move from Wells et al.’s claim of similarity of BSE with TSEs in general to Wilesmith et al.’s claim of similarity with scrapie in particular. Such evidence was to emerge from a number of other sources. One of these was a molecular study conducted by Hope et al. (1988). These investigators demonstrated that the fibrils, which had appeared morphologically similar to SAFs in Wells et al.’s study, did indeed contain a protein that is the bovine homologue of PrP, a molecular marker of SAFs.25 This finding helped to strengthen the developing aetiological connection of BSE to scrapie: ‘Our protein data. . .confirm the homology of this novel cattle disorder and scrapie’ (Hope et al. 1988: 392). Further confirmatory evidence was obtained from Wilesmith et al.’s own epidemiological study. In order to establish the claim of aetiological similarity between BSE and scrapie, Wilesmith et al. needed to make a case for the claim that scrapie had transmitted to cattle. If scrapie had transmitted to cattle to cause BSE, then there were only two main routes by means of which transmission could have occurred. They included (1) direct or
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indirect contact between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle and (2) the consumption of scrapie-affected sheep tissues by cattle. Research into TSEs prior to 1986 had demonstrated that these diseases could be spread through direct and indirect contact between diseased and healthy animals both within and across species. In this way, scrapie could be transmitted between sheep through contaminated pastures and enclosures (see Section 1.2.4). Also, elk had been found to develop chronic wasting disease following sporadic fence-line contact with clinically affected deer and the use of pens in which such deer were kept (see Section 1.2.6). Yet, to the extent that 20% of farms with BSE did not have sheep (Wilesmith et al. 1988), route (1) appeared an unlikely means of transmission and was rejected by these investigators. A food-borne route of transmission did, however, receive support from several findings. Firstly, all BSE cases for which accurate records existed were at some time fed commercial concentrates, either as protein supplements used in home mixed rations or as finished rations such as pelleted calf feed and dairy cow cake. Secondly, Wilesmith et al. found a greater incidence of BSE cases in dairy herds (311 of 44,767) compared to beef suckler herds (11 of 54,166). The animals in the former herds received more commercial concentrates than the animals in the latter herds. Thirdly, a computer-based simulation model indicated that the exposure of cattle began in the winter of 1981/1982. This date is coincident with a number of developments which increased the exposure of cattle to the scrapie agent via feedstuffs.26 Fourthly, the widespread geographical distribution of BSE cases is consistent with the distribution of meat and bone meal in commercial feedstuffs. The geographical variation in BSE incidence was not, however, consistent with the distribution and use of tallow in these feedstuffs. Scrapie-like agents were known to be associated with cell membranes and were expected during the rendering process to partition with the cellular residues of the meat and bone meal fraction rather than the lipids of tallow. Each of these findings served to increase the plausibility of the food-borne hypothesis of the transmission of scrapie to cattle. Additional supportive warrant for this hypothesis was provided by the appearance many years earlier of a spongiform encephalopathy in ranch reared mink. Hartsough and Burger (1965) described several outbreaks of the disease between 1947 and 1963. They remarked that ‘[w]e feel that in the 1961 and 1963 episodes there is reasonable evidence of a food-borne exposure. . .we may even assume that tissues of bovine or perhaps ovine origin are possible sources for the as yet hypothetical contagion’ (Hartsough and Burger 1965: 392). Later, Marsh and Hanson (1979: 460) confirmed that TME had resulted from the oral transmission of scrapie to mink: ‘[T]here appear to be no major obstacles remaining to the probable fact that TME originates from feeding mink scrapie-infected tissues’. The development of a spongiform encephalopathy in mink provided Wilesmith et al. with an important precedent for the food-borne transmission of the scrapie agent. Certainly, this finding constituted a further, plausibility-raising thesis in support of the claim that scrapie had transmitted to cattle via a food source. The same could be said of the discovery in a wildlife park in England of a scrapie-like disease in a nyala and a gemsbok (MAFF/ADAS 1986; Jeffrey and Wells 1988), both of which had been fed
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a concentrate ration containing meat and bone meal (Wilesmith et al. 1988). Like the finding before it, Wilesmith et al. could contend that if scrapie had transmitted via a food source to infect these species,27 it could do so again to cause BSE in cattle. These additional findings complete the task of the reconstruction of the argumentation that was used by Wilesmith and his colleagues to support their claim of aetiological similarity between BSE in cattle and scrapie in sheep. As can be seen from Diagram 2.1, this claim relied on multiple sources of evidence from studies that separately examined the histopathology, molecular biology and epidemiology of this new disease. Individually, these sources carried little probative weight. Collectively, I will argue that they conferred sufficient rational warrant on Wilesmith et al.’s aetiological claim to give that claim legitimacy as a presumptive truth in subsequent scientific inquiry into BSE. This latter of our two tasks is an evaluative one. Its outcome will determine the rational credentials of the analogical thesis that was integral to much scientific reasoning about BSE. Not every source of evidence brought forward by Wilesmith et al. to support their claim of aetiological similarity conferred the same degree of warrant on this claim. We have already seen how Wells et al.’s histopathological findings only went as far as supporting a claim of similarity to TSEs in general, rather than scrapie in particular. By themselves, these findings could not support the more specific aetiological connection of BSE to scrapie that Wilesmith et al. were attempting to draw in their early epidemiological study. Accordingly, these investigators had to bring forward other forms of evidence that would raise the plausibility of their aetiological claim by suggesting a specific aetiological link between BSE and scrapie in sheep. This other evidence included the results of a molecular study by Hope et al. as well as Wilesmith et al.’s own epidemiological findings. These latter findings included the following four claims: (1) All BSE cases were fed commercial concentrates. (2) BSE incidence is greatest in dairy herds. (3) Exposure of cattle to BSE is coincident with increased exposure to the scrapie agent. (4) Distribution of BSE cases is consistent with distribution of meat and bone meal. Of these claims, only the first two could be established with any certainty. Claim (3) was based upon a number of factors which Wilesmith et al. (1988: 643) described as being ‘undoubtedly significant in the occurrence of this epidemiological phenomenon’. Yet, upon close examination, the significance of at least two of these factors may have been somewhat overstated. The two factors in question were (i) the introduction of continuous rendering processes during the 1970s and 1980s (the effect of which was to reduce the temperature and length of time at which animal material was rendered) and (ii) the decline in the practice of using hydrocarbon solvents and terminal heat treatment for fat extraction since the mid 1970s. Both factors relate to the rendering of animal material for commercial products, including cattle feedstuffs. However, it is clear from what was known about rendering
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practices on the one hand and the extraordinary resistance of the scrapie agent on the other hand that no rendering process was probably ever capable of inactivating TSE agents. During the BSE Inquiry, Lord Phillips and his team established that up until the 1970s, temperatures during rendering were not recorded or monitored systematically, that they could be very variable and that the absence of proper managerial control meant it was possible to discharge material before it was completely cooked (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 13: 90). These various lapses in practice almost certainly resulted in a failure to deactivate the scrapie agent. Also, considerable evidence existed by 1988 to show that the scrapie agent failed to be deactivated by temperatures of 100◦ C or greater (Brown et al. 1982; Kimberlin et al. 1983; Rohwer 1984). Both considerations served to weaken Wilesmith et al.’s claim that changes in rendering practice played a significant role in increasing the exposure of cattle to the scrapie agent.28 Claim (3), it emerges, was not as strongly warranted as it first appeared. Claim (4) was also largely tentative in nature. When Wilesmith et al. were advancing their aetiological hypothesis, little was known about the exposure of cattle to meat and bone meal, the ingredient in commercial concentrates that was believed to be the source of infection. In April 1988, in response to a request from Mr Meldrum (Director of the Veterinary Field Service) to produce a report on BSE, Mr Wilesmith responded: ‘In brief we have no conclusions to explain why BSE should have occurred from the findings of the various investigations on the feedstuffs industry thus far’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 3: 70). Even at the point of publication of their epidemiological findings in December 1988, Wilesmith et al. (1988: 643) indicated that their investigations of the feed industry, and the production and use of MBM in commercial feedstuffs in particular, were still some way off completion. These investigators stated that ‘[s]tudies are in progress to determine more precisely the exposure of affected and unaffected animals to meat and bone meal in commercial concentrates’. It is a presupposition of this statement that the exposure of animals to meat and bone meal had not been precisely determined by the stage at which these investigators were advancing their claim of aetiological similarity between BSE and scrapie. Lord Phillips and his inquiry team identified some reluctance on the part of investigators to make an early approach to the feed industry to enquire about its practices in general and MBM in particular. Such an approach, it was argued, could lead to a concealment of information.29 For this reason, confidential enquiries were made on an informal basis to individuals with industry experience, not all of it recent.30 These ‘off the record’ meetings meant that Wilesmith and his colleagues were unable to confirm their food-borne hypothesis for some months after this hypothesis began to be seriously entertained by investigators.31 Claim (4), it can be seen, was still subject to empirical validation even as it was being advanced by Wilesmith et al. in support of their aetiological link between BSE and scrapie. As well as epidemiological findings, Wilesmith et al. used the results of Hope et al.’s molecular study of bovine fibrils to support their claim of aetiological similarity between BSE and scrapie. Certainly, this study reveals similarities between the major protein of BSE fibrils and the PrP protein that is a molecular marker of
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scrapie-associated fibrils. In this way, BSE fibril proteins were similar in protease sensitivity and size to PrP in SAFs that were purified from the brain of a Cheviot sheep with natural scrapie. Also, the N-terminal 12 amino acids in bovine PrP were identical to those found in sheep SAF protein and differed by one amino acid from mouse, hamster and human PrP. The aetiological significance of these molecular similarities is somewhat doubtful, however. By 1988, studies demonstrating molecular similarities between the proteins in different transmissible spongiform encephalopathies were commonplace. In this way, Bendheim et al. (1985) found that CJD proteins had molecular weights similar to those observed for scrapie prion proteins. These investigators also remarked that ‘[p]urification of the two infectious pathogens by virtually identical procedures provided further evidence for similarities in their molecular structures’ (1985: 997). Kitamoto et al. (1986) found that antisera raised against hamster scrapie PrP stained amyloid plaques in the brains of humans and rodents with CJD and a human subject with Gerstmann-Sträussler syndrome. Bockman et al. (1985) reported a similar reaction to antibodies raised against the scrapie prion protein in proteins from the brains of two patients with CJD. These investigators stated ‘[o]ur findings suggest that the amyloid plaques found in the brains of patients with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease may be composed of paracrystalline arrays of prions similar to those in prion diseases in laboratory animals’ (1985: 73).32 Molecular similarities between scrapie prions and prions in CJD and GSS certainly provide sufficient warrant for the claim that these diseases all belong to the group of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies caused by unconventional agents: ‘We conclude that the molecular and biologic properties of the CJD agent are sufficiently similar to those of the scrapie prion protein that CJD should be classified as a prion disease’ (Bendheim et al. 1985: 997). But this nosological relationship between these prion diseases is something quite different from the aetiological relationship between BSE and scrapie that Wilesmith et al. are seeking to support through Hope et al.’s molecular findings. The latter relationship does not merely seek to relate one prion disease (BSE) to another prion disease (scrapie). Rather, it goes one step further in asserting that the agent that causes scrapie in sheep is also causing BSE in cattle. It is this more specific aetiological relationship that is not supported by findings of molecular similarities between the prion proteins that cause BSE and scrapie. To see this, one need only consider studies such as that of Bendheim et al. which established molecular similarities between prion proteins in CJD and scrapie prions. These molecular similarities did not lead these various investigators to suggest that the scrapie agent had transmitted to humans to cause CJD. Indeed, by 1988 there was a developing scientific consensus that scrapie had not transmitted to humans to cause CJD despite extensive opportunity for it to do so.33 In this case, molecular similarities between CJD prion proteins and scrapie prions led to the (warranted) conclusion that these diseases were nosologically related in the absence of any wider claim to the effect that scrapie had transmitted to humans to cause CJD. A similar situation, I am arguing, pertains in the case of Hope et al.’s findings of molecular similarities between prion protein in BSE fibrils and prions in SAFs. These molecular similarities certainly support a nosological relationship between BSE and scrapie. However, they are much less able to support the type of
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aetiological relationship between these diseases that Wilesmith et al. are attempting to advance. We have now evaluated the histopathological, molecular and epidemiological evidence that was used by Wilesmith et al. to support their claim of an aetiological relationship between BSE and scrapie. Each of these strands of evidence, we have seen, is problematic in one or more respects. In some cases, essential knowledge was lacking (e.g. knowledge of the exposure of cattle to meat and bone meal). In other cases, greater significance was attributed to certain facts than a thoroughgoing assessment of these facts would have permitted (e.g. the overstated significance of changes in rendering practices). These various problems serve to weaken the supportive warrant that particular strands can confer on Wilesmith et al.’s aetiological conclusion. Yet, these individual strands and their attendant problems are less important to determining the supportive warrant of this aetiological conclusion than is the plausibility-raising capacity of these strands considered collectively.34 With each additional source of evidence, Wilesmith et al.’s claim of aetiological similarity between BSE and scrapie grew in epistemic stature. The epistemic evolution of this aetiological claim was at all possible because this claim had the status of a presumption, an epistemic category which, although tentative in nature, can improve its standing during inquiry. We will examine presumption in detail in the next chapter, where it will be seen that this notion is particularly well equipped to deal with the adverse epistemic conditions that characterize scientific inquiry in its early, emergent stage. The focus of this chapter, however, has been on an account of the evidential processes that were used by Wilesmith and his colleagues to forge an aetiological connection between BSE and scrapie, a connection that was to have a profound influence on all subsequent reasoning during the BSE crisis.
Notes 1. ‘In many cases of public health research, the emphasis is solely on data gathering (experimental, observational, surveillance, etc.) and the black-box operation of the techniques/instruments employed for this purpose, without any appreciation of the kind of substantive theoretical modelling that underlies these techniques/instruments and gives voice to the data’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 5; italics in original). 2. ‘Little attention has been given to the interdisciplinary nature of epidemic research and development. In this manner, important sources of knowledge available in the physical and life disciplines are ignored at the cost of profoundly inadequate epidemic and human exposure studies’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 4; italics in original). Clearly, Christakos et al. subscribe to the view that epidemic modelling requires the integration of knowledge bases from several disciplines. Savitz et al. (1999: 1159) make a similar point in relation to public health work in general when they remark that ‘[t]he phrase “the basic science of public health work” implies that the entire knowledge base underlying public health comes from epidemiology. . .it should be acknowledged that many other sciences serve public health as well. Among the basic public health sciences are clinical medicine, sociology, toxicology, molecular biology, anthropology, nutrition, sanitary engineering, policy analysis, risk assessment, industrial hygiene, economics, and political science’. 3. ‘The solution of mathematical models of epidemics has been viewed as a purely ontologic affair that focuses on abstract and dry formulas, whereas crucial factors – such as modes of perception and reasoning, and their integration – are neglected. . .’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 4; italics in original).
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4. ‘The fundamental spatiotemporal character of an epidemic under conditions of uncertainty has been mostly neglected. Intrinsically spatiotemporal phenomena, like disease propagation, are often modelled with “aspatial” and “aspatiotemporal” theories. . .This neglect has resulted in unsatisfactory analyses of major issues such as space-time prediction of disease distribution, epidemic explanation, and causation’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 4; italics in original). 5. In a 2003 interview with the eminent epidemiologist Mervyn Susser for the journal Epidemiology, Susser is asked for his opinion of the current state of health of epidemiology. His response conveys his concern that the field has become preoccupied with a focus on methods: ‘I have been writing a fair amount about this over the past dozen years, starting with “Epidemiology Today: ‘A Thought-Tormented World.’” I felt that we were at cross-purposes in formulating what epidemiology was. The academic center of the field was diverging from its concern with substance into the minutiae of methods. Not to say that methods are not essential, but to make methods a principal activity, to the neglect of the object of the activity, seems to me a travesty’ (Paneth 2003: 750). 6. The field of social epidemiology involves the ‘examination of the role of a broad array of social factors in the development and progression of many important health problems, and in the natural history of the risk factors for those diseases and conditions’ (Kaplan 2004: 124). 7. For Christakos et al. (2005: 68), stochastic modelling is the method of choice for dealing with multiple sources of uncertainty: ‘. . .in our view stochastic modelling is the primary conceptual and operational apparatus for studying fundamental uncertainties of the type happening in public health research, in general, and epidemics, in particular’. 8. That uncertainty is unavoidable in scientific inquiry is recognized by both scientists and philosophers. Christakos et al. (2005: 43) remark that ‘[u]ncertainty, in its various forms, is at the center of many scientific investigations and debates. Indeed, in the last few decades scientists have moved from seeing nature as inherently stable and deterministic to viewing it as uncertain, subject to unexpected shifts and changes. . .’. In this extract, Christakos et al. attribute uncertainty to nature. In Rescher’s philosophical account, uncertainty, in the form of incompleteness of knowledge, stems from the process of inquiry itself: ‘Certain fundamental features inherent in the very structure of man’s inquiry into the ways of the world thus conspire to indicate the incompleteness of the knowledge we can attain in this sphere’ (1980: 237). In Chapter 3, we will consider different sources of uncertainty during inquiry. 9. ‘If the development of SEP is going to produce rigorous rules for the integrated modelling of knowledge from different disciplines and levels of organization, it must rely on an adequate understanding of scientific intradisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in an epidemic assessment context’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 14). 10. Of a paper by Adams et al. (2003) and responses to it by economists, epidemiologists and others in the same publication, Kaplan (2004: 126–127) remarks that ‘one is left with the impression that a number of the authors believe that the analysis of causal relations in observational data is so flawed as to potentially threaten even the conclusion that smoking causes lung cancer’. 11. Phillips et al. (2004) include the ‘critical analysis’ of epidemiology as one of the areas in which the new online journal Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations welcomes submissions. 12. Weed (1995: 916) sees the development of critical thinking skills among epidemiologists as one of the key benefits to emerge from a greater alignment of epidemiology with the humanities: ‘The ability to think critically is important to scientists. It is a broader ability than the concept of criticism alone, encompassing explanation, logic, creativity, and inquisitiveness. Critical thinking is useful for identifying bias, for finding hidden assumptions in causal criteria, and for developing new theories of disease causation that explain joint exposure effects. . .Critical thinking can be developed directly by studying the works of philosophers promoting it’. It is clear that an educational effort of the sort described in the main text is already underway in some public health circles. In a Technical Report prepared by the American Public Health Association (APHA), it is stated that ‘APHA should continue efforts
Notes
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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to strengthen training in schools of public health in the analysis of scientific evidence on public health problems’ (APHA 1990: 749). ‘In the epistemic cognition framework, the contribution of cognition is to identify basic knowledge-assimilation, belief-forming and problem-solving processes, which are then examined by means of the evaluative standards of epistemology’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 5). ‘[A]nother potentially significant departure of SEP from the traditional epidemic paradigm is the thesis that an epistemic cognition solution (which assumes that the relevant models describe incomplete knowledge about the epidemic and focuses on cognitive mechanisms) can lead to more adequate results than the conventional ontologic solution (which assumes that the models describe nature as is and focuses on form manipulations)’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 19–20; italics added). In developing a logic of error, Gabbay and Woods (to appear) subscribe to a form of fallibilism. They state that ‘[f]allibilism would be a harsh and pessimistic doctrine, and a stupid one, if it didn’t embed a further pair of assumptions. . .The one assumption says that the frequency with which we commit errors has not shut us down as would-be knowers; far from it. The other says that, notwithstanding the errors in which they land us, it is to the procedures in question that we owe our epistemic successes. They are not only the best that we can do, but they serve us rather well’. This neglect is a consequence of the concern not to conflate psychology with philosophy in the study of fallacies. In this way, Kahane (1980: 38) remarks that: ‘Well, then, do we overstep the bounds of logic and philosophy when we theorize about fallacious reasoning. Not, it seems to me, when we attempt to specify what fallacious reasoning consists in, nor when we specify the logical factors which make fallacious reasoning fallacious. These are questions of methodology, and thus of logic and philosophy. But we do overstep when we attempt to specify psychological mechanisms that lead to fallacious reasoning, and when we devise psychological categories useful in avoiding fallacious reasoning’. A theorist who explicitly acknowledges a role for cognition in the study of fallacies is Dale Hample (1982, 1985, 1988). Hample (1982: 59) states that ‘a message can only stimulate a fallacy; the actual fallacy is a cognitive event’ (italics in original). For further discussion of Hample’s views, see Cummings (2004b). Fallacy theorists have often advanced standards which actively eschew any role for the thinking agent (here, the user of argument) in argument evaluation. This can be seen in the following views of Biro and Johnson (the latter summarized by Walton): Both these approaches [Perelman’s rhetorical approach and Hamblin’s dialectical approach], in spite of their great interest, share the flaw we have seen to be fatal in Sanford’s treatment: relying, instead of on the necessary argument-relativity of the notion of knowability, on the essentially user-relative notions of assent and acceptance (Biro 1977: 270). Johnson’s claim is that mere “acceptance” or “effectiveness” in causing a listener to accept something she did not accept before is too weak a standard to do the job of providing a normative model of argument to help with analyzing fallacies (Walton 1993: 308).
At the root of such criticisms lies the concern that by assigning any significance to the user or recipient of an argument in judgements of argument acceptability, we are losing all sense of the objective from argumentative discourse. 18. Hansen and Pinto (1995) bring together the work of some of the key thinkers down the centuries who have engaged with the fallacies. Starting with Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), they include the authors of the Port-Royal Logic, Antoine Arnauld (1611–1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625–1695), John Locke (1632–1704), Isaac Watts (1674–1748), Richard Whately (1787– 1863) and John Stuart Mill (1803–1874). A further historical overview of the fallacies can be found in Charles Hamblin’s 1970 book Fallacies.
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19. See Lipsitch et al. (2009) for discussion of the uncertainty confronting scientists during the recent emergence of the influenza A (H1N1) virus that is responsible for swine flu. 20. As presented here, it seems that the tasks of argument reconstruction and evaluation are conceptually and temporally distinct activities with evaluation only occurring after the process of reconstruction has taken place. In reality, however, reconstruction and evaluation are interrelated stages in argument analysis. The task of argument reconstruction is already dependent on evaluative analysis, for example, when decisions concerning missing premises are made. We only accept as missing premises in an argument those claims which contribute to the deductive validity, plausibility or rational acceptability of an argument. And such notions are inherently normative and thus evaluative in nature. 21. An ‘implicit’ premise is also known by the terms ‘missing’ premise, ‘tacit’ premise, ‘unstated’ premise and ‘hidden’ premise. The standard role of these premises, according to Govier (1987: 82), is to ‘fill inference gaps’. 22. Bruce et al. (1997: 499) state that ‘[t]he BSE “signature”, based on both incubation periods and pathology, has only ever been seen in transmissions from animals suspected or known to have been infected with BSE. It has never been seen throughout an extensive series of transmissions, set up in Edinburgh between 1963 and 1994, of other naturally occurring TSEs (35 sheep and two goats with scrapie, two mink with transmissible mink encephalopathy, and a mule deer with chronic wasting disease)’. 23. Wells et al. (1987: 420) were the first investigators to call this new brain disease in cattle ‘bovine spongiform encephalopathy’: ‘Pathological and epidemiological studies, analyses of genetic data and experimental transmission studies have been initiated but until further characterisation is achieved the authors suggest for this disorder the provisional appellation: bovine spongiform encephalopathy’. 24. Patricia Merz was the first scientist to identify SAFs (Merz et al. 1981). Using electron microscopy, Merz demonstrated the presence of SAF ‘in all combinations of strain of scrapie agent and strain or species of host examined, regardless of their histopathology’ (1981: 63). 25. ‘In this report, we show the major protein of BSE fibrils is the bovine homologue of PrP as judged by its size, protease resistance, immunoreactivity, lectin binding and partial N-terminal protein sequence’ (Hope et al. 1988: 390). 26. ‘A number of factors have been identified which when combined are undoubtedly significant in the occurrence of this epidemiological phenomenon. These include: a dramatic increase in the sheep population in Great Britain which commenced in 1980 and has continued; a probable increase in the prevalence of scrapie infected flocks; the greater inclusion of sheep heads in material for rendering; the greater inclusion of casualty and condemned sheep in material for rendering as a result of the reduction in the number of knackers’ yards; the introduction of continuous rendering processes during the 1970s and 1980s which may have resulted in the rendering of animal material at a lower temperature and, or, a shorter time than previously and the decline in the practice of using hydrocarbon solvents and terminal heat treatment for fat extraction since the mid 1970s’ (Wilesmith et al. 1988: 643). 27. It should be emphasized that food-borne transmission of scrapie to these species is not suggested in the paper by Jeffrey and Wells (1988) or by the Report of the Chief Veterinary Officer (MAFF/ADAS 1986). In fact, Jeffrey and Wells (1988: 399) only appear to consider early feeding practice and direct and indirect (via paddocks) contact between this nyala and sheep (as well as mink and deer) as possible routes for the transmission of scrapie: ‘This nyala had no direct contact with sheep or goats, and its paddock had not previously been used by those species. It was bottle-reared on domestic cow’s milk by an attendant with responsibility for a small number of sheep grazed at a different location, but scrapie has not been reported in these sheep. Neither mink nor North American species of deer are kept at the wildlife park’. 28. This same point was made by Lord Phillips and his team when they remarked that ‘[t]he theory that BSE resulted from changes in rendering methods has no validity. Rendering methods have never been capable of completely inactivating TSEs’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: xix).
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29. The Head of the Pathology Department and BSE research coordinator at the CVL, Mr Bradley, felt that an early approach to the feed industry would result in concealment of information. When asked on 27 November 1987 if an approach should be made, he responded ‘[n]ot yet. We must first identify the right questions to ask and we have more data to collect yet. We also need time to think. If we approach too early concealment of information is likely’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 3: 61). 30. In a written statement to Lord Phillips and his team, Mr Rees (Chief Veterinary Officer, 1980–1988) remarked that ‘in these early stages we did manage to have some very informal discussions with a few advisers who we knew on a more personal basis, to determine the extent of the use of MBM in commercial feedingstuffs, and the distribution of MBM. These were really very informal chats as no one wanted to meet formally with MAFF at this stage’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 3: 63). Mr Rees also told the inquiry team ‘of a single conversation that he had, on a personal and confidential basis, with an adviser to a feed manufacturer. While willing to assist, the adviser was not able to give very sound information as to the content of animal feed 4 or 5 years in the past’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 3: 63). 31. From evidence given to Lord Phillips and his team, it is clear that Mr Wilesmith was more interested in contaminated vaccine than feed as a possible source of infection in June 1987 (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 3: 60). However, by December 1987 Mr Wilesmith was ‘sufficiently confident’ that a feed-borne source was responsible for BSE (Volume 3: 62). Yet, it was 3 months later before feed industry representatives even became aware of a suspected link between feed and BSE. In this way, the UK Agricultural Supply Trade Association told the inquiry team that they did not learn of such a link until March 1988 (Volume 3: 61). Similarly, Mr Paul Foxcroft of Prosper De Mulder (the leading renderer in England and Wales) told Lord Phillips and his team ‘that he was absolutely certain that he was not aware of any suggestion of a link between BSE and animal feed until March 1988’ (Volume 3: 63). The time lag between Mr Wilesmith’s suspicion of a link and an opportunity to validate this suspicion through intensive investigation of the feed industry is responsible, I am arguing, for the lack of empirical validation of Wilesmith et al.’s food-borne hypothesis even by December 1988, when these investigators’ epidemiological findings were published. 32. Other studies in the same vein include Baron et al. (1988) who demonstrated immunoreactivity to rabbit antiserum raised against SAF protein in scrapie-infected mice and two familial cases of transmissible dementia. Manuelidis et al. (1985) tested protein blots of human, guinea pig and hamster CJD fractions with an antibody raised against a 29-kDa band from mouse scrapie. In all CJD and scrapie fractions, 29-kDa proteins were labeled. Bode et al. (1985) used antisera raised in rabbits and mice against SAF protein from hamster brain to test SAF proteins from hamster and mouse and from CJD. The antisera detected five bands in a Western blot analysis with molecular weights of 26, 24, 20, 18 and 16 K. By gel electrophoresis, these antigens seem to be identical in hamster, mouse and man. 33. A study by Brown et al. (1987), which concluded a 15-year investigation of CJD in France and reviewed the world literature, found no evidence whatsoever of a link between scrapie in sheep and CJD in humans. These investigators stated that although numerous cases of CJD had been observed in rural sheep-raising areas in Italy, Czechoslovakia and Chile, scrapie had not been recognized in sheep for at least a century in the latter two countries while there was no evidence that the Italian cases had been exposed to infected animals. In France, no increased risk of CJD was observed in people who were most exposed to sheep or sheep products, nor was there any relationship between CJD frequency and the distribution routes of sheep products from scrapie-endemic areas. CJD cases had occurred in France in people who had never eaten lamb or other sheep tissues and a life-long vegetarian in England also developed the disease. Furthermore, scrapie had been assiduously barred from Australia, where CJD occurs with the usual frequency, and Japan also experienced CJD cases even though scrapie had not been known until 1981. 34. This account differs from Rescher’s (1976) analysis of plausible reasoning in two significant respects. Firstly, Rescher (1976: 60–61) adopts a deductive approach to plausibility: ‘The
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presently envisaged approach to plausible inference thus proposes to assess the plausibility of a “merely plausible” piece of reasoning in terms of the plausibility of the added enthymematic premisses needed to transform it into a valid deductive argument’. As will become clear in Chapter 3, the model of reasoning that I am advancing in this book is essentially nondeductive in nature. Secondly, Rescher (1976: 61) states that the plausibility of an argument’s conclusion consists in the maximum plausibility among the various minimum plausibilities of the supplemental premises that are needed to turn the argument into a valid deduction: ‘the plausibility of the argument is to be the maximum value among the minima of the plausibilities of the enthymematic supplementations that enable a deductive derivation of the conclusion from the premisses’. My own model of reasoning adopts a cumulative approach to plausibility wherein no single premise determines the plausibility of the conclusion of an argument. Rather, all premises contribute to the raising of the plausibility of a conclusion, with high plausibility premises making a greater contribution to the plausibility-raising of the conclusion than low plausibility premises.
Chapter 3
Arguing Through Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction In the last chapter, the evidential basis of Wilesmith et al.’s aetiological claim was examined in detail. That claim sought to relate BSE and scrapie in the sense that BSE was caused by the transmission of scrapie to cattle. The evidence in support of this claim, I argued, was not without its weaknesses. The result was a rather tentative claim that was certainly grounds enough for proceeding in inquiry, but still fell some way short of the type of outright commitment that is associated with an established scientific thesis. I called this tentative claim a presumption and the evidential standard that attends it plausibility. Presumption has been something of a poor cousin in epistemological discussion. While concepts such as knowledge and belief have dominated epistemology, presumption has been the subject of much less philosophical inquiry. Yet, this notion has very direct relevance to a range of scientific deliberations, particularly where those deliberations are conducted against a backdrop of uncertainty. In this chapter, I demonstrate the epistemic resourcefulness of presumption within scientific inquiry that proceeds in a context of uncertainty. I will examine how the very features that have made philosophers overlook, if not altogether shun, this epistemic concept are the features that have made presumption a key ally of scientists in an emerging inquiry. These features include, most notably, presumption’s defeasibility and its association with error. A sound grasp of presumption on its own terms is vital if we are to proceed in delineating the type of argumentative strategies that were used by scientists during the first weeks and months of the BSE crisis. For presumption is the concept at the very heart of these strategies. Along with its bedfellow plausibility, presumption allows scientists to make gradual, but significant, epistemic gains at a time when conditions are adverse and the consequences of inaction, at least in the case of human health, are potentially catastrophic. The argumentative strategies which are integral to the reasoning of BSE scientists are very directly related to an old philosophical area. That area is the study of fallacies. The history of the fallacies has been an interesting one to say the least. Since Aristotle first examined the fallacies in Sophistical Refutations, and with the exception of contributions from medieval logicians and theorists such as Sidgwick,
L. Cummings, Rethinking the BSE Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9504-6_3, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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Whately and Mill, the fallacies have languished in a state of almost total neglect. In recent years, they have undergone something of a transformation, a transformation that was initiated by the publication in 1970 of Charles Hamblin’s landmark book Fallacies. Hamblin achieved a significant reinvigoration of the study of fallacies that is still being felt to the present day.1 One consequence of this reinvigoration is that logicians began to subject fallacies to the same systematic treatment that had long been evident in other domains of logic. It wasn’t long before this treatment began to bring forward results in the form of new frameworks for the analysis and evaluation of fallacies.2 Within these frameworks, investigators found increasingly elaborate ways of proscribing argument forms that had traditionally been characterized as fallacies. But an equally fortunate consequence of the development of these frameworks is that many so-called fallacies no longer appeared quite so fallacious when examined against new concepts (e.g. presumption) and standards of evidence (e.g. plausibility) in argument. In this way, non-fallacious variants of a number of traditional fallacies began to be described, including petitio principii (begging the question), argumentum ad ignorantiam (the argument from ignorance), and argumentum ad baculum (the argument from the stick or appeal to force) (Walton 1985, 1992; Woods 1995, 2004). The resurgence of interest in fallacies had effectively served as an impetus for investigators to characterize non-fallacious variants of these traditionally erroneous forms of argument. At the same time as fallacies were coming under renewed scrutiny, other developments were taking place that would change how theorists conceived of argument and reasoning. The first development was that theorists were increasingly beginning to challenge the relevance of formal (deductive) logic to the study of reasoning and argument.3 While it was recognized that reasoners and arguers were capable of drawing deductively valid conclusions, it was becoming increasingly evident that when making plans for the future, or arriving at a decision or assessing possible courses of action, arguers are much more likely to employ non-deductive modes of reasoning than accounts of reasoning had previously assumed.4 This decline in the traditional dominance of formal logic effectively cleared the way for investigators to begin describing forms of reasoning that had received little direct attention (at best) or that had been purposefully ignored (at worst) for no other reason than they did not attain deductive standards of validity and soundness. These forms included circular arguments, lack-of-knowledge reasoning and arguments based on analogies, amongst others. The second development was that philosophical accounts of science began to move away from the idea that scientific inquiry proceeded by means of deduction from certain and known theses to theses that are uncertain and unknown.5 Rather, scientific inquiry was as likely to contain a number of non-linear, non-hierarchical forms of reasoning in which the ordering of theses need not conform to strict epistemic priority requirements.6 Certainly, non-linear progression through scientific inquiry was no longer conceived as a subversion of the epistemic ground rules of inquiry and began to be viewed as a legitimate means of conducting inquiry, particularly in its earliest stages. Developments in epistemology have also served to create an intellectual context within which the view of scientific knowledge and reasoning expressed in this book
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may fit. Stanley (2005: 2) has recently challenged an epistemological orthodoxy – that the factors which make a true belief into knowledge are all truth conducive – by arguing for a role for practical interests in knowledge: ‘I will argue that the factors that make true belief into knowledge include elements from practical rationality. One consequence of my arguments is that the distinction between practical and theoretical rationality is less clear than one might wish’. To the extent that our practical interests have epistemic significance, we must countenance considerations such as the costs of being wrong within claims to knowledge. Where there is much at stake for an individual in a particular belief being true or false, this consideration is at least as relevant as any epistemic factor in whether that individual may be said to have knowledge: ‘There are cases in which two people are similarly situated, but one has knowledge, whereas the other does not, because one has greater practical investment in the truth or falsity of her beliefs. What makes true belief into knowledge is not entirely an epistemic matter’ (Stanley 2005: 2). The BSE affair saw practical interests intrude in a very direct manner onto what scientists did and did not know. There were considerable costs, particularly in terms of human health, of scientists being wrong. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, there were numerous occasions in which BSE scientists confronted what Stanley characterises as a ‘high stakes’ scenario, a situation in which the cost of error precluded a claim to knowledge. It will also be evident from the discussion in these chapters that this practical consideration should have dissuaded scientists from making knowledge claims on many more occasions than was actually the case. Stanley’s epistemology captures a powerful intuition about why knowledge claims were not warranted under these conditions. A resurgence of interest in the fallacies, a reduction in the significance of deductive logic to reasoning and argument, a revision of the structure of scientific inquiry and the development of alternative epistemologies are the major developments that have made the analysis of scientific reasoning that will be presented in this book possible. Specifically, the argument forms that, I will argue, serve to advance inquiry under conditions of uncertainty are the very same argument forms that generations of philosophers have characterized as fallacies. Yet, these arguments are only fallacious when judged against standards which are based on deductive logic (and deductive logic, I am claiming, is no longer the only, or even the dominant, standard of argument evaluation). Moreover, these arguments can only subvert inquiry if the latter is construed along strictly linear lines in which certain and known theses have epistemic priority over uncertain and unknown theses (and such a linear model, I am claiming, is no longer the only, or even the dominant, conception of scientific inquiry). Indeed, I contend that the rational merits of these argument forms in scientific inquiry have been largely overlooked to date because of the distorting effects of the dominance of deductive logic on the one hand, and of models of scientific inquiry that assume epistemic priority, on the other hand. With these distorting effects removed from consideration, I intend to show that these argument forms directly facilitate scientific inquiry by conferring specific epistemic gains on this inquiry. But before we can describe these gains, we must first explore the epistemic concept that is the basis of these argument forms. That concept is called presumption.
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3.2 Presumption and Science Presumption is quite a remarkable concept. Few concepts that are as evident as presumption in our everyday discourse have received so little examination in epistemological discussion.7 Presumption has had a prominent and venerable presence in law but has been neglected, and even despised, in scientific contexts.8 A concept that can simultaneously inspire and infuriate is certainly worthy of further consideration. In this section, we will analyze presumption in detail as this concept is fundamental to the various argumentative strategies that were used by scientists during the BSE crisis. Central to this discussion will be an examination of five features of presumption that make this concept particularly suited to the work of science. These features variously draw upon aspects of the legal, dialectical and epistemic conceptions of presumption that have been discussed in the literature (see Rescher (2006) for discussion of these conceptions). In this section, we address those conceptions to the extent that they illuminate the particular features of presumption that are of relevance to scientific inquiry. Having discussed these features, we turn in the next section to consider how presumption is particularly well adapted to conditions of uncertainty in the emergent stage of a scientific inquiry. In Section 3.4, we will examine how presumptive frameworks are increasingly being used in the analysis of the various arguments that are integral to the model of reasoning which I am developing in this book. These frameworks provide a starting point for the exploration of the logical and epistemic attributes of the arguments that are the basis of this model. Also in this section, we identify examples of reasoning by BSE scientists that exemplify the argument forms in question in preparation for the evaluative analyses of Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. Notwithstanding the rather limited treatment of presumption in epistemological literature, definitions of presumption are commonplace. These definitions assume somewhat different emphases according to the legal, dialectical and epistemic conceptions within which they are advanced. A general characterization of this notion – and a good starting point for further discussion – is a definition advanced by Walton (1992: 42): [A] presumption is a kind of provisional concession or acceptance of a hypothesis that is reasonable to act on for the present, but that may have to be given up at some future point.
This definition reflects all five of the features of presumption that are operative in a scientific context. Chief amongst these features is presumption’s orientation to action (Feature 1). Presumption is a practical concept that permits agents to pursue a particular course of action. The action in question may be cognitive in nature (e.g. making a decision) or something which involves physical action (e.g. implementing disease control measures). The actions that are licensed by presumption are only warranted to the extent that there is some rational justification for the presumption in question (Feature 2). That it must be ‘reasonable to act’ on a presumption is essential to presumption’s claim to rational legitimacy both in scientific contexts and elsewhere. Notwithstanding this claim to rational legitimacy, a presumption may be shown by subsequent developments to be lacking or inadequate in some respect. In
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such an event, a presumption must be relinquished rather than stubbornly adhered to in the face of contrary evidence. The abandonment of a presumption is at all possible because of the inherent defeasibility of this notion (Feature 3). The conditions under which a presumption is first warranted are not always the conditions that may pertain at a later point in time. Presumption must display sensitivity to the wider contexts within which it operates and must be capable of responding to any changes in these contexts (Feature 4). Finally, a presumption is not a well established thesis but one which has a ‘provisional’ standing. Consequently, presumption has a rather lowgrade epistemic status (Feature 5). All five of these features will be examined in more detail below.
3.2.1 Feature 1: Presumptions Display an Orientation to Action Presumption’s orientation to action is very aptly demonstrated within a legal setting. Presumption rules in law, Ullman-Margalit (1983: 154–155) contends, function as a ‘means of extrication’ from some deliberation that cannot be resolved on the basis of the available evidence. They facilitate agents in coming to a decision and in taking a course of action in advance of completion of deliberation: A presumption rule. . .comes to the aid of a deliberating agent when he or she is called upon to act, when the choice of the course of action to be taken hinges in a material way on whether a certain state of affairs obtains, and when the agent is in a state of ignorance or doubt concerning the answer to the question. The significant factor in the description of the situation is that the person concerned is constrained to take action, some action, before his or her deliberation can be terminated: the time to act precedes the rational resolution of the deliberation process.
Ullman-Margalit (1983: 156) uses the legal presumption of innocence to demonstrate how ‘presumption rules function as, and are thus justified qua, means of extrication from unresolved deliberation processes’. In a criminal trial, where evidence clearly points to the guilt or innocence of a defendant, the deliberation process can be progressed to the point where a verdict is reached. However, in cases where evidence is inconclusive and some doubt exists about a defendant’s guilt or innocence, some method needs to be found of resolving the deliberation process. The presumption of innocence brings ‘triers of fact’ to the point where a verdict can be obtained. It thus avoids a situation in which deliberation must be aborted on grounds of failure to advance it. The action-oriented nature of presumption thus licences actions in practical and cognitive domains9 when the deliberative process encounters factors that risk throwing it into a state of indefinite suspension. Deliberation may be unable to proceed when there is a lack of evidence relating to the question-at-issue or when evidence is available but fails to conclusively establish one thesis over other, competing theses. Some means must be found of licensing action in the absence of a conclusion to the deliberative process. That means is presumption. In scientific inquiry, particularly when there is a pressing demand for action, the inquiry process may in itself represent an unacceptable delay on the initiation of such action. Presumption may then
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licence the implementation of a range of practical measures in advance of inquiry issuing forth in the type of theoretical knowledge that might be the basis of action under different circumstances. Walton (1992: 42) describes this circumvention of inquiry by presumption as follows: Presumption is basically a practical idea. Its use is to enable action to go ahead in a practical manner, instead of being stifled by lengthy investigations and inquiries that would delay any action past the point where action could be useful.
The action-oriented character of presumption comes into its own in the context of an inquiry into an emerging infectious disease. Diseases such as BSE and, more recently, SARS have posed a potentially serious, but at the time of their emergence largely unquantifiable, risk to humans. Scientists charged with responding to this risk have had the dual tasks of developing theoretical knowledge of the disease agents involved and of undertaking practical measures to contain the spread of an outbreak. The implementation of disease containment measures cannot await the outcome of inquiry, but must be initiated in advance of the attainment of complete or even partial knowledge of the disease processes that are responsible for an epidemic. Presumption warrants these actions in the practical sphere, actions that must proceed out of necessity and before the process of inquiry has terminated (and, in some cases, even started).
3.2.2 Feature 2: Presumptions Exhibit Rational Justification Although we only ever have a tentative commitment to presumption, that commitment must be rationally warranted. There must be some grounds in place to support a presumption. Godden and Walton (2007: 337) state that ‘presumptions can be based on practical, epistemic, moral, social, and prudential grounds, and each of these grounds befits a certain level of presumption’. In this way, moral and ethical considerations relating to the protection of human health warrant a presumption against the safety of new drugs and other medical interventions. Prudential considerations lead those who handle guns to adopt the presumption that they are loaded. The social norms and expectations that are implicit in our interactions with others warrant a range of communicative presumptions – that an interlocutor is being sincere, is contributing truthful, relevant utterances to the interaction, etc. A presumption in favour of our perceptual and cognitive resources is warranted on epistemic grounds – these resources are able to deliver true claims to us and are the basis of our various knowledge claims.10 Underlying each of these domain-specific justifications of presumption is a justification that is formulated in pragmatic terms. For presumptions are ultimately justified by virtue of the fact that they enable us to fulfil certain purposes and goals in a domain, should this be the safe handling of firearms, the successful containment of an infectious disease or the understanding of a speaker’s intended meaning in producing an utterance. Rescher (2006: 51) captures the pragmatic justification of presumption as follows:
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Our policies of presumption are justified through their purposive efficacy in facilitating realization of the inherent purposes and objectives of the domain in which they are instituted. Be it in matters of justice or inquiry or communication, these principles of presumption find their justification, insofar as they indeed are justified, through the common consideration that their operation is pragmatically effective.
According to Rescher, those presumptions that prove their purposive efficacy in a particular domain undergo retrovalidation whereby they can improve their epistemic standing in inquiry (see Feature 5 below). Some of the resentment towards presumption in science is a direct consequence of the mistaken belief that presumptions are little more than claims established on a whim, or at least not on any rational basis (certainly, this belief appears to motivate the comments about the place of presumption in science in note 8). Yet, the rational justification that attends presumption is similar to that which attends hypotheses in the context of a scientific inquiry. The rational justification of presumption inheres in evidential considerations, as Rescher (2006: 53) points out in the case of cognitive presumption: ‘The validation of a principle of cognitive presumption can – and ideally should – eventually come to rest on an experiential and evidential foundation’.11 The evidence in question is that of a ‘track record’ that the presumptions, which we have adopted, have served us well in fulfilling the goals of a domain. This track record, while ultimately a practical consideration, actually differs little from the evidential considerations at work in the acceptance of scientific hypotheses. For in accepting scientific hypotheses, we are favourably inclined towards those hypotheses that help us achieve certain cognitive and epistemic goals (e.g. we accept those hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the data). Although these goals are in the theoretical domain, their attainment is nonetheless a pragmatic consideration. So quite apart from being hostile terrain for presumptions, scientific inquiry has pragmatic considerations at the heart of its own processes of rational justification of hypotheses.
3.2.3 Feature 3: Presumptions are Inherently Defeasible Notwithstanding their very real claim to rational warrant, presumptions can be overturned as soon as evidence that is contrary to them emerges. Their capacity to be overturned by contrary evidence is the feature of defeasibility. While all presumptions are defeasible,12 the evidence that overturns them can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, the evidence that leads me to doubt that a communicator is adhering to a presumption of sincerity in conversation is quite different from the evidence that will overturn a presumption against the safety of a new drug. While a lack of eye contact by my interlocutor may lead me to relinquish the former presumption, only extensive clinical trials that demonstrate no adverse effects of the drug will lead me to overturn the latter presumption. Clearly, a presumption’s defeasibility is a function of the significance of the particular issue under consideration13 – where the issue is one of safety and wellbeing, the evidence that defeats a presumption will be of a different order to that which defeats a presumption upon which little of significance rests. The defeasibility of presumption is thus
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intimately linked to the probative rules that operate in a particular domain. These rules specify the burden of proof14 that must be discharged by the opponent of a presumption in order for that presumption to be overturned. Presumption is closely tied to burden of proof in a dialectical conception of this notion.15 As Rescher (2006: 15) remarks: Presumption – and the idea of burden of proof that is indissolubly connected to it – also serves as a fundamentally dialectical conception and has figured as such from classical antiquity to Hegel and beyond.
A dialectical conception of presumption presupposes a context of argument. Within this context, two related conceptions of burden of proof can be seen to operate. On the first conception – what Rescher calls the probative burden of an original assertion – the arguer who initiates the assertion of a thesis has the burden of supporting it in argument. This burden remains upon this arguer throughout the course of argumentation. On the second conception of burden of proof – what Rescher calls the dialectical burden of further reply in the face of contrary considerations – the onus for advancing grounds in support of a thesis shifts between two arguers. In this way, when an arguer advances sufficient grounds in support of a thesis, that arguer has discharged his or her burden of proof. The thesis in question assumes the status of a presumption. The opponent of this thesis then has the right to advance grounds against it or in support of an opposing thesis. As well as advancing a dialectical conception of presumption, Rescher has emphasized the dialectical character of science itself. Scientists, he claims, are pursuing a form of rational dialectic in which scientific theses are subject to the critical examination of other scientists. This examination takes the form of a debate in which scientists assume the roles of proponents and opponents of various theses: [C]reative science appears in the light of an adversary procedure, with proponents and opponents carrying on a debate to secure the approbation of knowledgeable but “disinterested” (i.e., unaligned) parties – often as not the rising generation of specialists in the field (Rescher 1977: 111; italics in original).
The adversarial nature of scientific inquiry is well attested. Even established scientific theses may be subject to revision and rejection if sufficient grounds are adduced against such claims. And scientific theses grow in epistemic stature as they are seen to withstand the challenges of one’s scientific peers. These dialectical exchanges between scientists are only possible because of the existence of presumption and burden of proof. Their combined operation permits the progression of scientific inquiry – when sufficient evidence is adduced to overturn a presumption, the obligations of opposing scientists change and the inquiry enters a new phase of dialectic. The interlocking concepts of presumption and burden of proof therefore prevent a situation in which a single party to a scientific dispute can stall inquiry – their function is to regulate the actual conduct of inquiry.16 Also, as successive phases of dialectic are entered, the rational grounds of a thesis are progressively laid bare. As well as procedurally guiding inquiry, presumption and burden of proof thus make it possible to explore the rational basis of scientific theses.
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A dialectical conception of presumption has other important applications to scientific inquiry. Science is by its nature a fallible activity. As such, it must be able to respond to the emergence of error in a proportionate manner. The discovery of error should not normally entail the wholesale rejection of scientific theories – a complete unravelling of theories is both cognitively wasteful and likely to be unnecessary in particular cases. Dialectical presumptions can cope with the emergence of error on account of their defeasibility. Presumptions are highly sensitive to the onset of difficulties and can leave the dialectical scene as quickly as they entered it. The slightest unfavourable shift in the evidential warrant of a presumed thesis can trigger the rejection of that thesis. So the capacity of dialectical presumptions to be defeated and to fall by the wayside in scientific inquiry is an important feature of presumption’s response to scientific error. Where presumptions are beyond the reach of contrary evidence, they assume the status of immutable theses. Such theses are much closer to the presumption rules found in law than they are to the inherently defeasible presumptions that are required by science. However, even in science presumptions can be shielded from contrary evidence. Where emerging evidence cannot stand against a presumed thesis, this thesis becomes fossilized in inquiry. A fossilized presumption persists in inquiry regardless of the evidence that is adduced against it. It is thus a distortion of presumption, an aberrant presumption that outlives its warrant. In Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, we will consider examples of fossilized presumptions in the inquiry into BSE, as well as discuss instances in which presumptions were appropriately overturned by contrary evidence.
3.2.4 Feature 4: Presumptions Display Context Sensitivity Thus far, we have seen a number of ways in which presumption is linked to aspects of context. Presumptions, we argued above, were justified in the final analysis in pragmatic terms through their fulfilment or otherwise of the purposes and goals in a particular domain. The presumption of sincerity in conversation is ultimately justified by whether or not it permits communicators to successfully understand each other’s utterances. The goal of successful comprehension between communicators confers rational legitimacy upon communicative presumptions but would hold little sway in justifying the presumptions of other domains such as the law (e.g. the presumption of innocence). The rational justification of presumption is a context-sensitive business with justification residing within the unique features that pertain in a particular domain or setting.17 Similarly, the evidence that can overturn a presumption cannot be determined apart from the particular context in which that presumption has been used. The defeasibility of presumptions rests on a multitude of factors in a given situation (e.g. the seriousness of the contention at issue) and is thus a context-sensitive affair. Walton (1996: 41) remarks upon the context sensitivity of presumption in reasoning as follows: [T]he job of evaluating presumptive reasoning is inherently pragmatic, in that it depends on the particular circumstances of a given case, as far as these are known, to a given point.
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3 Arguing Through Uncertainty This context-sensitivity and openness to revision is also characteristic of practical reasoning generally – a kind of reasoning that takes as its object an inherently variable situation unfolding in time.
Context sensitivity poses considerable difficulties for investigators who wish to develop a theory of presumption. It precludes the attempt to state in general terms the conditions under which presumptions are rationally justified, defeated and much else besides. Even in a single domain such as science, presumptions stand and fall on the basis of context-specific considerations that vary across and within different inquiries. We will see that during the BSE affair, the emergence of experimental and other findings over time profoundly changed the evidential context in which the inquiry into BSE was conducted. To the extent that scientific presumptions are context sensitive, this evolving evidential context might be expected to have implications for the rational standing of theses in this inquiry. On some occasions, this context sensitivity was reflected either in an increase in the epistemic stature of theses as confirmatory evidence emerged from experimental studies or in the revision and rejection of theses as disconfirming evidence was forthcoming from studies. However, on a significant number of occasions presumptions became detached from the evidential contexts in which they operated. In failing to reflect the available evidence relating to some aspect of the BSE problem, these presumptions were essentially context insensitive. We will see in Chapter 5 that this detachment of presumption from context served to distort the operation of presumption and burden of proof in BSE inquiry and with it the dialectical progress of this inquiry.
3.2.5 Feature 5: Presumptions Have a Low-Grade Epistemic Status Another feature of presumptions is their low-grade epistemic status.18 A presumed thesis is not a known thesis.19 However, for those presumptions that prove their worth to inquiry, some improvement in their epistemic standing is possible. At the outset of inquiry, presumption occupies a rather lowly epistemic status. While this status is inadequate as a basis for theory construction in science,20 it presents a distinct advantage for scientists in the initial stage of inquiry. For the scientist who is setting out on a new scientific inquiry, presumption represents an important route into that inquiry. Our minimal commitment to presumption means that scientists can embark on inquiry when a requirement for more established theses would make the initiation of inquiry impossible. Our attitude to presumption is one of forging ahead on an almost exploratory basis with no expectation of where that exploration will take us. Of course, our chosen presumptions may lead us into error (see Feature 3). Alternatively, they may be validated by evidence that emerges during the conduct of inquiry. Validated presumptions grow in epistemic stature and improve their standing in inquiry. According to Rescher (1977: 56), this improvement comes about through a process of retrospective revalidation: We begin by provisionally accepting certain theses whose initial status is not that of certified truths at all, but merely that of plausible postulations, whose role in inquiry is (at
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this stage) one of regulative facilitation. Eventually these are retrovalidated (retrospectively revalidated) by the results of that inquiry. At that stage their epistemic status – though not their content – changes. In the first instance these presumptions have a merely provisional and regulative standing, though in the final instance they attain a suitable degree of factual-constitutive substantiation. (italics in original)
The picture to emerge is one of certain presumptions undergoing an epistemic evolution from their earliest, tentative beginnings to their subsequent upgrading in inquiry. This evolution is consistent with the long-standing philosophical idea that scientific inquiry proceeds in phases or stages, each of which contains a distinct type of intellectual activity.21 The first of these stages involves the generation of hypotheses. Hypothesis generation is essentially a creative process that can draw upon information from a range of sources.22 Its unconstrained character has led some philosophers to question whether any progress can be made in understanding the global processes at work in this stage of scientific inquiry.23 Once generated, a hypothesis must be tested for its ability to explain the data that is available in a case. A hypothesis that explains these data is confirmed and is assimilated into a body of scientific knowledge. This stage of scientific theory construction involves certain and known theses that have been rigorously validated by preceding phases of inquiry. Theory construction is not receptive to untested presumptions which, although plausible, may have little value to inquiry in the long run. Presumptions are thus most prominent in the initial, hypothesis generation stage of inquiry and least evident in the final inquiry stage of theory construction. Walton (2005: 73) captures these different phases of scientific inquiry, and the role of plausible (presumptive) argumentation and reasoning within them, as follows: Plausible argumentation in science is typical of the initial discovery stage of an investigation where a hypothesis is formed, even though it has not yet been verified by collecting enough data. At a later stage, once more information is in, testing and further verification of the initial hypothesis may lead to a point where it can be evaluated as probably true or probably false by inductive reasoning. Or still later, no reservations may need to be expressed, once a precise theory has been constructed and deductive arguments can be used to prove it. Plausible reasoning can be useful as a way to move forward provisionally and narrow down the number of hypotheses that need to be experimentally tested.
To appreciate the epistemic evolution of presumptive theses during the scientific inquiry into BSE, it is important to avoid conducting an examination of this inquiry at one or more discrete points in time. As with all inquiries, the inquiry into BSE possesses a temporal context and it is to that context that we must turn in order to track the trajectory of scientific presumptions. We will see that some presumptions were relatively short-lived during the BSE affair while others persisted throughout most of the course of inquiry (e.g. the presumption that beef was safe to eat). Some presumptions that persisted in inquiry achieved an epistemic standing that was not always warranted by the available evidence (e.g. the presumption that BSE was bovine scrapie). An examination of these and other presumptions will reveal some critical uses and abuses of presumption by scientists and government ministers alike.
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3.3 Presumption and Uncertainty Management Clearly, presumption is a complex concept with many attributes that warrant a much greater integration of this notion with the concerns of science itself. Yet, if the argument that I am advancing is correct, the ultimate value of presumption to science resides in this concept’s unique capacity to navigate a safe route through the treacherous waters of uncertainty. While philosophical and scientific analyses of uncertainty24 abound, few if any of these contributions have thus far produced a viable framework for the management of uncertainty in a public health context. In this way, Christakos et al. (2005: 9) remark that ‘no systematic methodological framework exists for integrated epidemic modelling in a realistic space-time domain under conditions of multi-sourced uncertainty’. In this section, we examine what uncertainty consists in within a public health setting. This discussion reflects a much wider range of considerations than have traditionally been encountered in work on uncertainty. Specifically, it will be argued that although uncertainty is typically manifested in a lack of knowledge in a particular domain, that lack of knowledge can have its source in a range of conceptual, empirical, cognitive and technical issues. The successful management of uncertainty, I contend, will require investigators to embrace an equally eclectic mix of considerations in whatever frameworks are instituted. Central to my argument will be the claim that a model of reasoning that has presumption at its centre is particularly well equipped to deal with the multidimensional concept of uncertainty that pertains in public health science. Certainly, some such model, it will be argued, can go a considerable way towards addressing the substantial dissatisfaction that is experienced by public health researchers with attempts to manage uncertainty.25 A few preliminary remarks are in order. The phrase ‘the management of uncertainty’ has a significance which will have an important bearing on what will subsequently be said about uncertainty. That significance concerns the existence of uncertainty. In this discussion, it will be assumed that uncertainty is omnipresent in public health science. Scientists can never eliminate uncertainty;26 rather, they can at best more or less successfully manage it. The elimination of uncertainty is not an attainable scientific aim, if for no other reason than nature is itself not a certain entity: Uncertainty, in its various forms, is at the center of many scientific investigations and debates. Indeed, in the last few decades scientists have moved from seeing nature as inherently stable and deterministic to viewing it as uncertain, subject to unexpected shifts and changes, which can suddenly create huge opportunities for the prepared and sometimes fatal threats for the slow movers (Christakos et al. 2005: 43).
Scientists are increasingly acknowledging the inevitability of uncertainty in their work. This acknowledgement takes many forms. In a report of a World Health Organization meeting held in Copenhagen in December 2005, the lack of certainty in science was highlighted. A recommendation to emerge from this meeting was that scientists should make efforts to educate the public and decision makers on the essentially uncertain nature of much of their work and challenge the
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pronouncements of politicians where these misrepresent the uncertain nature of science: Underlying the concept of uncertainty is a belief that “certainty” exists, which. . .is more of a myth than a fact when it comes to evidence on environment and health. Science has contributed to creating this myth in the past focusing on what we know and not so much on what we do not know. . .This has led policy makers to choose the courses of action that appear to be based on the most certain information, which might not be the best overall option. It was recommended that scientists be clearer to the public and decision-makers about the underlying lack of certainty of their work. It was proposed that scientists “deny” politicians clear-cut recommendations in order to make them accept fundamental uncertainty. . . (World Health Organization 2006: 9–10).
An important proviso attends the inevitability of uncertainty in science. In admitting that uncertainty is inevitable in science, we are not leaping into a sceptical abyss whereby the very possibility of acquiring knowledge in science is immediately foreclosed. Certainly, the knowledge sceptic uses a ‘no certainty’ claim of sorts to justify such foreclosure.27 However, his abandonment of the entire enterprise of knowledge is motivated by a transcendental conception of certainty which is foreign to the concerns of science.28 The scientist is concerned to tackle uncertainty from within the project of knowledge. In this way, he is prepared to concede that there are truths which could be known, even if we do not currently know them. For the sceptic who is subscribing to a transcendental notion of certainty, there are not even truths which could be known. In science, the omnipresence of uncertainty is a feature of our epistemic dispensations that could in principle yield to the best inquirers (even if this doesn’t always happen in practice). The omnipresence of uncertainty for the knowledge sceptic is the consequence of the hyperbolic requirement that we must be able to step outside of our minds and assume a metaphysical standpoint in making claims to knowledge. To the extent that we cannot remove ourselves from our cognitive standpoints, the sceptic argues that we can never satisfy knowledge’s requirement for absolute certainty with the result that we cannot claim to know anything at all. The sceptic places himself outside the knowledge enterprise through his imposition of an unattainable form of certainty on the concept of knowledge. For the scientist, such certainty is no part of the knowledge concept that is integral to scientific inquiry and its imposition constitutes a distortion of knowledge itself. So the picture to emerge is one in which uncertainty is omnipresent in public health science without this claim raising the spectre of knowledge scepticism. The uncertainty that confronts the public health scientist is a manageable attribute of scientific inquiry, notwithstanding its resistance to resolution in particular cases. Yet, resolution is possible and not only in exceptional circumstances. The central plank of the scientific response to uncertainty must be the cognitive concepts that the knowledge sceptic assumes we can somehow transcend. Chief amongst these concepts is reasoning, although perception (a cognitive process particularly distrusted by the sceptic), memory, visual imagery and linguistic features could equally be added.29 Modes of reasoning, which are much broader than those traditionally characterized as deduction and induction, have a key role to play if for no other
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reason than deduction demands the type of certain theses that are somewhat thin on the ground in a context of scientific uncertainty. Similarly, the probable theses of induction are a considerable luxury in the uncertain terrain of an emerging scientific inquiry. Reasoning based on presumption, I contend, is ideally placed to counter uncertainty. However, in order for this last claim to stand, presumption must be shown to be able to accommodate the types of uncertainty that are inherent in scientific inquiry. Such demonstration will be the focus of the remaining discussion in this section. Public health scientists have variously construed the concept of uncertainty that confronts them in their work. For some of these scientists, uncertainty is a psychologically laden notion that captures a certain imprecision or lack of clarity in our own thought processes.30 For other scientists, uncertainty is best construed in ontological terms where it captures certain objective features of reality itself.31 For still other scientists, uncertainty is a technical notion that results from various limitations in our measurement and other techniques.32 Each of these forms of uncertainty is in evidence in scientific inquiry with the inquiry into BSE no exception in this regard. But there is a significant sense in which uncertainty during scientific inquiry has sources that are not fully captured by these psychological, ontological and technical conceptions of the notion. These additional sources must also be addressed by public health scientists.33 In an interdisciplinary inquiry, such as occurred during the BSE crisis, uncertainty can arise when investigators from a range of different fields are contributing their respective expertise on a particular problem or issue. The differences between these fields are more than merely terminological in nature. Everything from types of evidence and burdens of proof through to modes of reasoning and processes of knowledge generation set these fields apart. Yet, their integration is needed in order for scientists to be able to address an interdisciplinary problem such as the risk that an animal disease like BSE poses to human health. Where this integration does not occur, or occurs only inadequately, uncertainty with all its pernicious consequences is the result. The question now is whether presumption has the requisite conceptual resources to achieve this integration. This question can be answered, I believe, in the affirmative. But before doing so, we want to establish if there are other features of scientific uncertainty which must be captured by presumption. More often than not during inquiry, forms of uncertainty are interrelated with the result that it is not always clear which of several uncertainty sources is the main or primary obstruction to the resolution of an issue. Where a primary form of uncertainty cannot be addressed for whatever reason, there is little prospect of scientists successfully managing other forms that are related to, or dependent upon, it. For example, during the BSE inquiry, the results of a study designed to investigate maternal transmission of BSE could not be clearly interpreted (uncertainty 1) because it was not possible to exclude the possibility that calves had been exposed to infected feed (uncertainty 2) and there was a lack of knowledge of the genotype of the calves in the study (uncertainty 3). To the extent that ingestion of contaminated feed could not be eliminated as a cause of the increased incidence of BSE in the offspring of infected dams and given that the genetic studies required to establish
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the genotype of subject and control calves were not available in 1989, the results of this maternal transmission study remained essentially uncertain: When the results were obtained, there was a difficulty in analysing them. Although the experiment had been designed to be large enough to give an answer despite the possible exposure of the animals to infected feed, it was not possible to establish with certainty whether the increased incidence in offspring of affected dams was the result of maternal transmission of BSE, or maternal transmission of genetic susceptibility to BSE. . .a complex genetic association study using multiple polymorphic genetic markers would have been needed to determine if there were significant differences in genotype between subjects and controls. Such a study would not have been possible in 1989. However, the consequence is that uncertainty remains about the interpretation of the results of the study (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 209; italics in original).
Clearly, a lack of scientific knowledge of the genotype of the calves in this maternal transmission study is responsible for the uncertainty in the experimental results of this study. This case reveals how concept-related uncertainty and fact-related uncertainty are intimately linked in scientific inquiry.34 However, it demonstrates something altogether more fundamental that a concept of presumption which is equipped to deal with uncertainty will have to address. That is the question of the order in which uncertainties should be addressed in scientific inquiry. In most cases, that order is epistemically determined. In the example above, the forms of uncertainty represented as ‘uncertainty 2’ and ‘uncertainty 3’ are epistemically prior to the form of uncertainty represented as ‘uncertainty 1’ – investigators cannot know if maternal transmission is responsible for BSE in the calves in this study without first knowing if the calves had been exposed to infected feed, etc. To make progress on ‘uncertainty 1’, scientists must first tackle these prior forms of uncertainty. But this epistemic ordering of uncertainties is no more set in stone than is the requirement that we proceed in inquiry from well known theses to less well known theses (see Section 3.1). This maternal transmission study also demonstrates that where one or more of these prior forms cannot be resolved in either the short or longer term, investigators are confronted with intractable uncertainty. Such uncertainty may have to be held in abeyance while other uncertainties, which can be addressed, are given priority. In such a case, pragmatic considerations relating to the forms of uncertainty that investigators can address in a particular context assume precedence over epistemic considerations. We will see subsequently that there were episodes during the BSE inquiry where just such a prioritising of uncertainties occurred on pragmatic grounds. As well as coping with the uncertainty that attends the convergence of different disciplines on a scientific inquiry, and managing the prioritization of uncertainties in inquiry, presumption must also address the temporality of uncertainty. Some uncertainties during scientific inquiry are particularly enduring. We will see, for example, that uncertainty surrounded the question of whether BSE could be transmitted to humans right up until 1996, when the disease was first definitively diagnosed in ten young people. Other uncertainties have a transitory quality and are relatively shortlived in inquiry. For example, the uncertainties surrounding the host range of BSE were beginning to be resolved by the summer of 1990, when cats were first observed
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to have a TSE (this was clear demonstration that BSE did not have the same host range as scrapie). These varying temporalities are intimately connected with the developing evidence base of an inquiry with uncertainties persisting or resolving as and when evidence becomes available. The temporality of uncertainty serves to emphasize once more the importance of the temporal context in which a scientific inquiry is conducted (see Section 2.2.4). This temporal context was often a foe to investigators during the BSE inquiry. Much of the uncertainty that BSE scientists had to confront was a direct consequence of the need to take decisions about the management of the disease in advance of obtaining results from experimental studies. Some of these studies took several years to complete such as a BSE pathogenesis study, which was initiated in December 1991 at the CVL and produced significant results in June 1994. These results showed that BSE pathogenesis differed from that of scrapie. However, in November 1989 a more limited ban of specified bovine offals (SBO) was implemented than was necessary to protect human health. So it emerges that presumption must be able to integrate the disciplines that converge on a scientific inquiry, accommodate the prioritization of uncertainties in inquiry and capture the temporality of uncertainty. It can be readily demonstrated that presumption can address each of these scientific applications. A range of scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines converged on the investigation of BSE. They included human and animal neuropathology, genetics, molecular biology, histopathology, biochemistry, epidemiology, zoology and virology, to name just a few. To these, one must add knowledge of animal husbandry, industrial processes relating to meat production and human food production processes. With so many specialisms contributing to questions about BSE, some means needed to be found of successfully integrating the knowledge bases of each. Presumption, I contend, is that means. In Chapter 2, we saw how studies investigating the histopathology, molecular biology and epidemiology of BSE collectively served to raise a presumption regarding the aetiological basis of this bovine brain disease. The plausibility of this presumption was a function of its entire evidential base: its supportive warrant lay in the presence of several interlocking strands of evidence. Presumption thus derives its tentative strength by drawing upon multiple sources of evidence often across different disciplines. By itself, each individual source has a rather limited presumption-raising capacity – we saw in Chapter 2 that the studies which investigated the histopathology, molecular biology and epidemiology of BSE individually fell short of supporting the aetiological claim that John Wilesmith and his colleagues went on to advance. Through the integration of these evidence sources, presumption was able to attain a level of warrant that would not otherwise have been possible. Presumption thus serves to integrate disciplines through its own requirement to interrelate evidence sources and, in so doing, establish the strongest possible supportive warrant for presumed theses. The different disciplines that converged on the study of BSE are unified by virtue of the fact that they are the sorts of rational activities that are capable of raising presumptions. Indeed, it is from these disciplines that presumptions receive their rational validation – these disciplines provide evidential support for the presumptions that they individually and collectively generate. If we consider the type of
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disciplines involved, we can see why this is the case. There has been a longstanding recognition that science has a uniquely successful track record in delivering truths to us about the natural world. This special status of science is acknowledged through the extensive range of scientific principles, techniques and methods to which we are prepared to grant either the status of presumptive truths or a presumption-raising capacity. In this way, a presumption of truth operates in favour of inductive parameters in science such as simplicity and uniformity (Rescher 1977: 37). Continuing the scientific methodology theme, we also accept as presumptively true the pronouncements of scientific experts,35 the information made available to us through the use of scientific instruments (e.g. microscopes, telescopes) and the results of scientific experiments. Further still, the history of our various cognitive practices clearly shows that we are prepared to reject any presumptive status for those sources that set themselves apart from the rational methodology of science.36 Put quite simply, the scientific disciplines that investigated BSE are integrated by virtue of their adherence to the entire probative framework that is given effect by means of the operation of presumption and plausibility. It is this framework that ultimately unifies these disciplines and makes substantive conceptual interchange between them even possible. We have seen how scientists must be able to prioritize the uncertainties that they encounter in inquiry. Such prioritization occurs by and large along epistemic lines with the uncertainties that are epistemically prior to other uncertainties among the first to be addressed by scientists. We saw above, for example, that scientists first needed to have some knowledge of the genotype of the calves in the maternal transmission study before they could conclusively say if maternal transmission of BSE, rather than inheritance of a genetic susceptibility to BSE, was responsible for the increased incidence of this disease in the offspring of infected dams. But this epistemic prioritization of uncertainties, it was emphasized, is not immutable and readily yields to other factors that are operative in the context of inquiry. Some uncertainties present greater urgency to investigators because their lack of resolution poses a significant risk to human health or has some other equally grave consequences. But even these more urgent uncertainties may be subordinated in a particular context to uncertainties that are addressed for no other reason than that they can be tackled. This continuous adjustment in the prioritization of uncertainties during scientific inquiry can only be accommodated by a concept that is sensitive to changing contextual factors. Presumption is such a concept. Through its context sensitivity, presumption is ideally placed to respond to the competing priorities of addressing those uncertainties which it is most urgent to manage, or addressing those uncertainties which have epistemic priority over other uncertainties, or addressing those uncertainties which can be tackled practically in a particular context. The relative significance of these various factors within an inquiry is most readily accommodated by a concept of presumption that is responsive to features of context. Where the prioritization of uncertainties is subject to the competing influences of several contextual factors, the temporality of uncertainty relates only to the temporal dimension of context. This aspect of uncertainty management reflects the
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importance of temporal context in scientific reasoning in general, particularly where that reasoning is concerned to address the rapidly evolving dynamics of an emerging infectious disease. During some episodes in the BSE inquiry, expert scientific deliberation proceeded at a pace that was largely blind to temporal context. For example, it took from February 1991 to September 1994 for a Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens to complete and issue guidance to those handling risk tissues in laboratories, hospitals and mortuaries (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: xxvii). Of course, uncertainty about the risks that these workers might be exposed to contributed in no small part to this inordinate delay. But this case amply demonstrates that uncertainty management cannot proceed in a manner that is divorced from temporal context. With its emphasis on context sensitivity, presumption is ideally placed to handle the temporal dimensions of uncertainty in such a case. But another feature of presumption, its defeasibility, also comes to the fore when we are discussing the temporality of uncertainty. BSE scientists arrived at the decision to exclude certain tissues from the human SBO ban on the basis of an uncertainty, namely, that the pathogenesis of BSE was similar to that of scrapie. At the point in time at which it became apparent to investigators that the pathogenesis of BSE differed in significant respects from that of scrapie, the presumptions that were the basis of the decision to exclude certain tissues from the human SBO ban were swiftly rejected. Such rejection was at all possible on account of the defeasibility of presumption. It emerges that along with the integration of disciplines in inquiry and the prioritization of uncertainties, presumption is also equipped to deal with temporal aspects of uncertainty management.
3.4 Presumption, Reasoning and Fallacies Thus far, it has been argued that presumption has a central and valuable role to play in scientific methodology and that presumption is quite substantially equipped to deal with the challenges inherent in uncertainty management. To the extent that these contentions are well grounded, there is a strong case for saying that presumption is a most important concept for investigators whose task it is to deal with uncertainty in the context of a scientific inquiry. But although presumption is a key concept in this context, it can only be pressed into operation through its inclusion within a model of reasoning. This essentially epistemic concept must assume a cognitive character for this to be possible. In this section, we examine reasoning frameworks that are based on presumption. Although these frameworks have been discussed in fields as diverse as computer science (particularly artificial intelligence),37 linguistics38 and jurisprudence, it is in the sub-discipline of logic called informal logic that we find models of presumptive reasoning that are best equipped to handle the informal fallacies. Historically, presumptive analyses of the fallacies have been slow to emerge. Although they are still far from commonplace, there are now a number of theorists who are casting the fallacies in explicitly presumptive terms (see Cummings 2009). We examine these analyses as they relate to
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the fallacies that will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. We will then be in a position to undertake the evaluative treatment of the fallacies in those chapters. While deductive and even inductive reasoning has had a long and distinguished history in logic, presumptive reasoning has been largely overlooked by logicians. Walton (1996: 17) remarks that ‘[a]lthough presumptive reasoning is very important in philosophy, it has tended to be neglected by logicians’. One reason for this neglect is that presumption itself is a relatively unexplored concept.39 However, an equally significant reason for this lack of logical interest in presumptive reasoning is that such reasoning is viewed as being inherently inferior to deduction and is, accordingly, not worthy of investigation. On this view, the true premises and valid inferences in deductive arguments (and even the probable premises and inferences in inductive arguments) represent a more rigorous standard of reasoning than is achievable in presumptive reasoning. The latter is, by its nature, a tentative form of reasoning that is subject to defeat should specific counter-indications emerge.40 Such attributes are clearly demonstrated by the following example which is based upon events that took place during the BSE inquiry: In November 1989, the human Specified Bovine Offal (SBO) ban came into force. This ban was intended to protect human health by removing infective bovine tissues from the food chain. The decision to include some tissues within the ban and exclude other tissues was based on what was known about the pathogenesis of scrapie. However, it became apparent to scientists in June 1994 that tissues which had not been infective in lambs (e.g. distal ileum) displayed infectivity in calves. As a result, the decision was taken in the same month to extend the human SBO ban to include these additional, infective tissues.
The tentative nature of the reasoning in this example derives from the uncertainty of the following major premise which is implicit in the above extract: the pathogenesis of BSE is similar to the pathogenesis of scrapie. This premise is a defeasible presumption that was not without evidential support, albeit of an indirect kind (this premise derives tentative support from the aetiological claim that was examined in Chapter 2). To this extent, there is some degree of presumptive warrant for the conclusion that certain bovine tissues, such as the distal ileum, will not contain infectivity. The structure of this presumptive argument is as follows: MAJOR PREMISE: MINOR PREMISE: CONCLUSION :
The pathogenesis of BSE is similar to the pathogenesis of scrapie. The distal ileum is not infective in lambs. The distal ileum will not be infective in calves.
The presumptive warrant for the conclusion of this argument derives from the strength of the major premise. As soon as that premise could no longer be supported – experimental results revealed that the pathogenesis of BSE was dissimilar to scrapie – investigators were compelled to reject it, along with the conclusion which was the basis for the exemption of the ileum from the human SBO ban. This presumptive argument has the form of an argument from analogy. In analogical arguments, it is argued that a proposition is true in one case because it is true in a case that is similar in some respects. Problems arise when the similarity between these cases can be shown, as in this example, not to hold or when the two cases can
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be shown to be dissimilar in some other, relevant aspects. The inherently presumptive nature of analogical arguments means that there is an ongoing requirement for investigators to keep this type of argument under review. At the first onset of difficulties, investigators must be prepared to reject any conclusion that is arrived at through these arguments. Although such rejection occurred swiftly in the example above, we will encounter in subsequent chapters many more instances during the BSE inquiry in which analogical conclusions persisted in the face of significant counter-indications. With presumptive reasoning demonstrated in outline, it is now possible to say something about the theoretical frameworks that have been advanced to capture this process. One of the most prominent theorists to discuss this type of reasoning is Douglas Walton. Although Walton has for some years examined the full gamut of approaches to presumptive reasoning, it is clear that his approach of choice is to view presumption as a speech act within argumentative dialogue.41 He explains his rationale for doing so as follows: A theory showing how presumption functions as a type of speech act put forward in argumentative dialogue is set out. The goal of the analysis is not to aid research in artificial intelligence specifically, but more generally, to provide a concept of presumption that is useful for the evaluation of argumentation in everyday conversations, and especially for the analysis and evaluation of informal fallacies (Walton, 1996: 18).
To the extent that Walton’s approach promises to address a concern of interest in the present context – the informal fallacies – it is worthy of further consideration. For Walton (1996: 18), presumption is a ‘distinctive kind of speech act halfway between assertion and mere assumption (supposition)’. Unlike assertion, it can be brought forward in dialogue without a requirement that the proponent who advances it must prove it. Rather, the proponent must merely show that the presumption has some practical value in the sequence of argumentation. Once it is in place as a working presumption, the burden is on the respondent to refute it. If refutation is not possible, the presumption becomes established as a commitment in dialogue. In keeping with its defeasible nature, presumption is not a non-retractable commitment for either of the parties in a dialogue, although it will typically stay in place for a particular round of argumentation. The points in a dialogue at which a presumption can be advanced and retracted as well as the obligations on the proponent and respondent are stipulated within a set of speech act conditions. These conditions provide ‘a general normative framework for the use of presumptive reasoning in dialogue which can help in the determination of certain kinds of argumentation as fallacious or nonfallacious’ (Walton, 1996: 30). In demonstration of this framework, we will examine another argument form that will be discussed at length in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The argument in question is the argument from ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam). Although this argument has several forms,42 it consists in arguing from a lack of knowledge that a proposition is true (false) to the conclusion that this proposition is false (true). This argument can be more or less warranted in particular contexts. In a setting where a knowledge base is closed and we can be reasonably confident that if a particular
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proposition were true, then we would know about it, the lack of knowledge of the truth of a proposition can be used as grounds to conclude that a proposition is false. Such epistemic closure43 can be seen in the case of expert knowledge systems44 but is also evident in more mundane contexts.45 Fallacious variants of the argument arise when such closure does not exist in a particular case, but a reasoner nevertheless concludes to the truth or falsity of a proposition as if it did exist. During a critical discussion, a lack of closure is evident when the respondent, whose task it is to hold the proponent of a thesis to his requirement to defend that thesis (let’s say T), is suddenly asked by the proponent to prove the opposite of that thesis (i.e. not-T). To the extent that the respondent is not obliged by the rules of a critical discussion to defend not-T, it is likely that he will be unable to do so. His failure to prove not-T cannot be taken, however, as proof of T. During inquiry dialogue, a lack of closure is evident at the start of an inquiry when none or very few of the facts of a case are present. At this stage, as in critical discussion, the argument from ignorance is used fallaciously. However, at a later stage of inquiry, when exhaustive investigation of a question has been completed, it is perfectly reasonable for investigators to conclude to the falsity of a proposition from a lack of knowledge of the truth of that proposition. So it emerges that presumption can be implemented within a model of reasoning which has unique characteristics that set it apart from traditionally dominant deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. Presumption can also be readily integrated within normative dialogical frameworks which can be used to capture fallacious and nonfallacious forms of argument. But there is a significant sense in which these presumptive analyses do not go far enough for the type of work that will be undertaken in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. Implicit in these analyses is the assumption that while certain of the fallacies can be shown in context to confer a practical or other advantage on reasoners, that this advantage is not somehow a consequence of the workings of cognitive rationality. This is evident in the following comments by John Woods (2004: 13) in relation to one inductive fallacy called hasty generalization: [H]asty generalization is sometimes a prudent strategy, especially when the risks are high, even though the haste of the generalization might attract a charge of fallaciousness. If fallacies are violations or failures of rationality, then we could expect to have it that survival skills are sometimes exercised successfully but not rationally. (italics in original)
Woods appears to be saying that success in making decisions and taking actions in the practical sphere, especially when that success is predicated upon the use of a so-called fallacy, is not ordained by cognitive rationality. There can be little doubt that the fallacies have managed in the last 40 years to shrug off to a considerable extent the largely negative characterizations that philosophers and logicians have been wont to make of them. But it is equally clear that they still have some way to go on their journey towards full integration within cognitive rationality as long as views of this type remain. Such integration would represent an important opportunity for the fallacies on the one hand and for models of scientific reasoning on the other hand. In relation to the fallacies, integration could only really be achieved if there was a significant cognitive reorientation in the study of the fallacies.46
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One cannot go far in the literature on the fallacies without realizing that there is a widespread tendency on the part of investigators to overlook the cognitive character of the fallacies.47 An emphasis on cognitive agency would certainly serve as a useful corrective to some of the more untenable analyses that have been undertaken in relation to the fallacies.48 With recent developments in logic,49 such a cognitive reorientation in the study of the fallacies appears more likely now than at any point in the past. Models of scientific reasoning are also likely to gain from the integration of the fallacies within cognitive rationality. These argument forms represent a rational cognitive resource that has been largely unexploited to date in accounts of scientific reasoning in contexts of uncertainty. But if public health scientists are to make significant gains in managing uncertainty, then they must take seriously the call by Christakos and others for investigators to engage with new and different modes of reasoning and to place ‘the science of the mind’ at the centre of attempts to deal with public health problems.50 The account of the fallacies that I will pursue in subsequent chapters thus has the ascendance of the fallacies within rationality at its heart. In casting the fallacies as rational strategies that bestow epistemic gains on scientific inquiry in contexts of uncertainty, the approach taken in this book is consistent with the work of certain rationality scholars. These scholars subscribe to the view that some mental short cuts and heuristics are beneficial to agents in that they are economical with respect to cognitive effort and effective in achieving cognitive goals: ‘at least some heuristics earn their keep by being not only fast and frugal, but also sufficiently accurate to be effective or adaptive’ (Smithson 2008: 210). For example, Todd and Gigerenzer (2000: 727) demonstrate how certain heuristics, by exploiting the way in which information is structured in particular environments, can enable ‘living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information’. Moreover, the performance of these simple heuristics is comparable to that of more complex algorithms.51 Theorists who subscribe to this adaptive heuristics view of some of our cognitive processes additionally contend that these processes have a strong evolutionary basis. Cosmides and Tooby (1992), for example, make this claim of the specialized inferential processes that are involved in social cognition.52 I will not directly argue in support of these claims in relation to my own account of the informal fallacies. However, the reader should be aware that implicit in my analysis of these fallacies is a view in which these argument forms are operating as adaptive heuristics in all but name.53
Notes 1. Hamblin (1970: 12) was concerned to challenge the so-called standard treatment of the fallacies that was found in logic textbooks: ‘And what we find in most cases, I think it should be admitted, is as debased, worn-out and dogmatic a treatment as could be imagined – incredibly tradition-bound, yet lacking in logic and historical sense alike, and almost without connection to anything else in modern logic at all. This is the part of his book in which a writer throws away logic and keeps his reader’s attention, if at all, only by retailing traditional puns, anecdotes, and witless examples of his forbears’. Where Hamblin led, other fallacy theorists
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followed. Massey (1981: 489) stated that ‘[t]extbooks are parasitic upon journals and scholarly tomes, and properly so. Cut off from their natural source of nourishment, textbooks are likely to suffer from conceptual malnutrition. Some of its symptoms: aimless or directionless thinking, exaggerated fascination with taxonomies, and shoddy reasoning. Alas but not unexpectedly, textbook treatments of fallacy exhibit all three symptoms’. Finocchiaro (1981: 18) remarked that ‘textbook accounts of fallacies are basically misconceived, partly because their concept of fallacy is internally incoherent, partly because the various alleged fallacious practices have not been shown to be fallacies, partly because their classification of fallacies is unsatisfactory, and partly because their examples are artificial’. Walton (1992: 383) directly attributes the presumptive framework that is the basis of his analysis of nonfallacious arguments from ignorance to Hamblin’s formal dialectic: ‘This analysis of presumption clearly itself presumes the existence of a dialectical framework for the evaluation of arguments where two parties “reason together”. But such a framework is given in the outline of formal dialectic presented by Hamblin (1970). . .’. Logicians had typically viewed deductive logic as the most significant form of logic or even the only form of logic. Against deductive logic, all other forms of logic and reasoning were viewed as being inadequate. This is evident in comments made by Rescher in his account of plausible reasoning. Rescher (1976: 99, 101) states that inductive inference is ‘an aspiring but failed deductive inference’ and that ‘[d]eductive logic is seen as the only genuine logic’. The theorists who challenged deductive logic’s dominance had several motivations for doing so. They included those who were charged with teaching introductory logic courses to students (see note 4), and authors such as Chaïm Perelman who were dealing with more abstract concerns (in Perelman’s case, developing a theory of justice). Perelman (1963: 142) states that ‘[m]odern formal logic was set up as the study of the means of demonstration used in the mathematical sciences. But as a result its domain is limited, for whatever is ignored by the mathematicians is foreign to formal logic. The logicians should complete their theory of demonstration by a theory of argumentation. They face the task of analysing the means of proof which the human sciences, law and philosophy make use of. They must analyse the argumentation presented by publicists in their journals, by politicians in their speeches, by lawyers in their briefs, by philosophers in their treatises’. The lack of relevance of deductive logic to the study of everyday reasoning was starkly brought home to Howard Kahane during an introductory logic course. Kahane (1971: v) recalls that ‘[i]n class a few years back, while I was going over the (to me) fascinating intricacies of the predicate logic quantifier rules, a student asked in disgust how anything he’d learned all semester long had any bearing whatever on President Johnson’s decision to escalate again in Vietnam. I mumbled something about bad logic on Johnson’s part, and then stated that Introduction to Logic was not that kind of course. His reply was to ask what courses did take up such matters, and I had to admit that so far as I knew none did. He wanted what most students today want, a course relevant to everyday reasoning, a course relevant to the arguments they hear and read about race, pollution, poverty, sex, atomic warfare, the population explosion, and all the other problems faced by the human race in the second half of the twentieth century’. The lack of relevance of deductive logic to these different forms of mundane reasoning extended to areas such as the recovery of implicatures during utterance interpretation. In this way, Leech (1983: 30–31) states that implicatures are ‘probabilistic’, and that the process by which they are recovered ‘is not a formalized deductive logic, but an informal rational problem-solving strategy’. These accounts have their origins in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, where the idea of scientific knowledge obtained by means of demonstration is described: ‘What I now assert is that all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause. Unless these conditions
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6.
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9.
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3 Arguing Through Uncertainty are satisfied, the basic truths will not be “appropriate” to the conclusion. Syllogism there may indeed be without these conditions, but such syllogism, not being productive of scientific knowledge, will not be demonstration’ (Posterior Analytics, Book I, Part 2). A particularly significant proponent of this alternative view of scientific inquiry is Nicholas Rescher. For some years, Rescher (2005a: 38) has advanced a dialectic of inquiry, scientific inquiry specifically included: ‘In deduction we move uni-directionally from accepted premises to a conclusion. Inquiry dialectic, by contrast, is a far more complex process. In dialectic we move cyclically, testing the acceptability of premises in terms of the acceptability of the conclusions to which they lead’. Writing in 1983, Ullman-Margalit (1983: 143) remarks of presumption that ‘the notion itself has not so far been the focus of proper philosophical attention. I shall in this paper give it the attention I think it deserves’. Ullman-Margalit cites only three papers that use ‘presumption’ in their titles: Llewelyn (1962), Lamb (1972) and Katzner (1973). There is little evidence that this situation has changed in the 25 years since Ullman-Margalit wrote ‘On Presumption’. Recently, Rescher (2006: xii) has remarked of presumption that ‘their foothold in epistemology is still rather insecure’. Also, in the 5 year period between January 2003 and December 2007, not a single article on presumption has been published in The Journal of Philosophy (the source of two of the three articles cited by Ullman-Margalit). Douglas Walton (1992: 43) captures science’s uneasy relationship with presumption as follows: ‘Presumptions are also used in scientific investigations and inquiries. . .but scientific methodology tends to be unfriendly to presumptions if they can be avoided or dispensed with by gathering evidence to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis, one way or the other. Presumptions are often necessary in scientific investigations, but science is a quest for evidence, and therefore scientists tend to be uncomfortable with presumptions and try if possible to turn them into hypotheses where some hard evidence can be found either to confirm or disconfirm them. Presumptions exist in science but the goal of scientific inquiry is to eliminate them (as presumptions) if possible’. Fuller and Collier (2004: 301) state that ‘scientists are professionally mandated to treat presumptions not as positive accomplishments in their own right, but as way stations to be superseded on the road to inquiry’. The importance of the cognitive domain in the context of presumption is acknowledged by Rescher (2006: 11) who states that ‘[s]ome writers see presumption as merely an actionguiding device. But this does not do full justice to the matter. For while a practice is indeed at issue with presumption, this can also include the practice of information management – of epistemic or cognitive procedure’. Rescher (2006: 93) states that ‘[o]ur standard cognitive practices incorporate a host of fundamental presumptions of initial credibility, in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary’. Rescher extends the scope of cognitive presumptions by including scientific instruments such as telescopes. In this way, he states that there is a presumption ‘[t]o accept the reliability of the standardly employed cognitive aids and instruments (telescopes, calculating machines, reference works, logarithmic tables, etc.)’ (Rescher 2006: 94). Rescher (2006: 49) states that cognitive presumptions are ‘validated on the basis of their utility in fostering the aims of the cognitive enterprise – obtaining appropriate answers to our questions and securing useful information’. Some so-called legal presumptions are indefeasible. However, as Rescher (2006: 5) points out, these indefeasible presumptions are presumptions ‘in name only’; they actually have the status of legal postulates: ‘To be sure, certain legal principles are sometimes characterized as “conclusive presumptions” (for example, that a child of less than 7 years cannot commit a crime or that a crime exists only with establishment of circumstances “beyond reasonable doubt”). But these indefeasible “presumptions” are presumptions in name only – in actual fact they are incontestable legal postulates’. Rescher (2006: 17) states that ‘what will be evidentially sufficient in shifting a burden of proof hinges on the inherent seriousness of the contention at issue’.
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14. The concept of burden of proof is integral to the precautionary principle: ‘The precautionary principle asserts that the burden of proof for potentially harmful actions by industry or government rests on the assurance of safety and that when there are threats of serious damage, scientific uncertainty must be resolved in favor of prevention’ (Goldstein 2001: 1358). This principle characterised the public health response to the BSE problem, at least according to the various actors who participated in this response (see note 38, Chapter 7). The precautionary principle is discussed further in Section 8.3.1. 15. Godden and Walton (2007) attribute the first detailed account of presumption in a dialectical framework to Rescher (1977). 16. Rescher (2006: 19; italics in original) makes this point as follows: ‘The workings of the conception of burden of proof represent a procedural or regulative principle of rationality in the conduct of argumentation: a ground rule, as it were, of the process of rational controversy – a fundamental condition of the whole enterprise’. 17. Walton (1992: 43) makes this point in relation to dialogue as follows: ‘To understand any presumption as reasonable or not, you have to look at the context of dialogue in which the presumption has supposedly been made, and you have to understand the purpose of making the presumption in that context’. 18. Rescher (2006: xii) describes presumptions as low-grade data. 19. ‘[P]resumption is certainly not knowledge: we do not know what we merely presume to be so. As an informative resource its standing is quite different from that of knowledge’ (Rescher 2006: 6; italics in original). 20. Scientific disdain for presumptions in theory construction is related to the increased likelihood of error for the theses in this epistemic category. Erroneous presumptions, it is argued, necessitate costly revisions of scientific theories. Walton (1992: 42) captures this point as follows: ‘In a scientific investigation where the researchers want to establish the facts conclusively as a basis for building up a solid body of evidence, it may be thought desirable to avoid presumptions if at all possible. For presumptions may have to be withdrawn as further evidence builds up in the inquiry, thereby necessitating revisions that could complicate a well-established theory that has been carefully constructed and developed’. However, with few, if any, of their most central theoretical commitments resting on presumptions, scientists can afford to dispense with presumed theses as soon as they become problematic without scientific inquiry incurring widespread adverse epistemic consequences. Scientific error can thus be absorbed by low-grade presumptions, leaving the better established theses and theories of science relatively unscathed. 21. The logical positivists held the view that scientific practice could be divided into two distinct types of activity – a context of discovery, in which scientific hypotheses were developed and a context of justification, in which they were rationally assessed. They believed that the factors which were operative in the development of hypotheses were essentially non-logical in nature, while the correctness of an idea required a logical relation between a hypothesis and its supporting evidence. 22. Bechtel (1988: 18) describes a famous example of how the initial, discovery phase of scientific inquiry may be influenced by an indefinable range of non-logical factors: ‘Kekule is supposed to have developed his proposal for the structure of the benzene radical while gazing upon the pattern of a flame from a burning log. He interpreted the flames as atoms dancing in snakelike arrays, and when one of the snakes seemed to grasp its tail, forming a ring structure, that suggested to him the ring structure for benzene’. 23. One such philosopher is Jerry Fodor. Fodor (1983: 129) believes that we are very far from having an adequate account of the psychology of hypothesis formation and confirmation because both processes require the involvement of global processes: ‘[T]he reason that there is no serious psychology of central processes is the same as the reason there is no serious philosophy of scientific confirmation. Both exemplify the significance of global factors in the fixation of belief, and nobody begins to understand how such factors have their effects’.
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24. Uncertainty is only one of five dimensions of non-knowledge that Dressel and Wynne (1998) use in their analysis of the BSE crisis. This analysis draws upon Beck’s (1992) theory of the risk society. Beck identifies five dimensions of non-knowledge in the risk society: selective perception; uncertainties; possibilities of mistakes; inability to know; and unwillingness to know. See Bammer et al. (2008: 292) for discussion of ‘two attempts to put structure on uncertainty’. 25. Several authors have remarked upon this dissatisfaction. Graham (1995: 30) states that ‘[i]n light of the growing importance of risk assessment, it is disconcerting that America’s current risk assessment processes do not command a high degree of respect within the scientific community, interest groups and the public at large’. One reason given for this lack of respect is that ‘[t]he degree of uncertainty in risk estimates is poorly characterized’ (1995: 42). 26. Indeed, according to Michaels and Monforton (2005: S40), uncertainty is often purposefully generated in a public health context. The generation of uncertainty is pursued with a view to obstructing regulatory action against certain products and processes: ‘manufacturing uncertainty and creating doubt about scientific evidence is ubiquitous in the organized opposition to the government’s attempts to regulate health hazards’. 27. Rescher (2005b: 75) captures the sceptics ‘no certainty’ argument as follows: ‘All knowledgeclaims are committed to a demand for absolute certainty. Objective factual claims are always evidence-transcending: they are never in a position to meet absolutistic demands. Our objective factual claims can never amount to actual Knowledge’ (italics in original). 28. The sceptic’s transcendental conception of certainty requires that we step outside of our cognitive skins and eliminate all possibility of error in making a knowledge claim, not just any realistic possibility of error. In this way, before we can claim to know anything, we must first be able to eliminate the possibility that some evil scientist or demon is manipulating our perception and thoughts. However, Rescher (2005b: 82–83) contends that ‘we need not in the usual course of things exert ourselves in an endeavor to rule out the imaginative sceptic’s recourse to the whole demonology of uncannily real dreams, deceitful demons, powerful evil scientists, etc. . .To claim knowledge in specific cases, all we need do is eliminate those case-specific considerations which would countervail against the claim at issue’. 29. Christakos et al. (2005: 17) envisage an equally broad set of cognitive considerations within their synthetic epidemic paradigm: ‘It could be a constructive approach. . .that the SEP views interdisciplinarity as a reasoning process that entails rigorously formulated logical and cognitive mechanisms (scientific argumentation modes, conceptual metaphors, epistemic principles, mathematical techniques, etc.) in a composite space-time manifold (in which space and time are intimately connected)’. 30. ‘Some public health policy studies assume a purely subjective interpretation of uncertainty and associate it with preferences, subjective decisions, beliefs and linguistic imprecision’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 44; italics in original). 31. ‘[U]ncertainty characterizing a public health system can be seen both as an epistemic concept describing one’s state of incomplete knowledge regarding the system and an ontologic concept that reflects certain objective aspects of reality’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 65; italics added). 32. ‘[I]n the eyes of many practicing public health scientists the uncertainty encountered in realworld situations should be described as a technical notion linked with measurement errors, heterogeneous data bases, erratic fluctuations of the underlying processes’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 44–45; italics in original). 33. Christakos et al. (2005: 45) express a similar view: ‘In our view. . .a sound public health model should go beyond these common uses of the uncertainty concept. Uncertainty is of far greater importance in scientific thought than merely a technical notion reflecting error measurements and observation biases or a subjective kind of a variable associated with decisions and preferences’. 34. ‘Uncertainty in concept formation will be reflected into a corresponding uncertainty in experimental results. An adequate representation of the uncertainty related to proposed concepts
Notes
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39. 40.
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can improve the accuracy of the facts gathered through experimentation; similarly, a meaningful calculation of the uncertainty of the experimental facts can offer valuable information in our representation of the uncertainty of the corresponding concepts. This twofold argument is summarized as follows: concept-related uncertainty and fact-related uncertainty are closely linked and can enlighten each other’ (Christakos et al. 2005: 64). The role of presumption in appeal to authority arguments will be discussed in Chapter 7. Although ‘argumentum ad verecundiam’ is often used to describe arguments that appeal to authority, Walton (1995: 278) remarks that this expression should be used only to refer to fallacious appeals to authority. Rescher (1977: 57) states that ‘one can, without problems, invalidate an entire source that has provided a basis of presumptions, as, for example, abandonment of the longstanding practice of giving probative weight to dreams, omens, signs, portents, etc.’. The defeasibility of presumption is the basis of a feature of presumptive reasoning called nonmonotonicity. Deductive reasoning is monotonic in that a valid argument cannot be rendered invalid by the introduction of new premises. Such reasoning is unresponsive to changes or fluctuations in the context in which reasoning occurs. A quite different situation pertains in presumptive reasoning where the emergence of new evidence, facts or findings has the potential to bring about the revision or rejection of presumptive conclusions (as we will see in the main text). Non-monotonicity is of interest to workers in artificial intelligence, where a range of defeasible inferences have been studied. These inferences are often based on defaults which capture what is typically or normally the case. In this way, reasoners know that it is normally or typically the case that birds can fly, so they are likely to conclude that Tweety, a particular bird, can also fly. However, this conclusion, based on a default, will be overridden if it is discovered that Tweety is a penguin or an ostrich, i.e. a bird that does not fly (Reiter 1987: 149). In linguistic pragmatics, presumption is integral to Stephen Levinson’s theory of generalized conversational implicature. For Levinson, presumed meanings are the basis of utterancetype meaning which is the middle level of three levels of meaning: sentence meaning, utterance-type meaning, utterance-token meaning. The presumptive meanings that constitute this middle level of meaning are neither semantic nor pragmatic. Rather, they are ‘presumed, default interpretations, arrived at by virtue of the repeated scenarios from the past,